Research Handbook on Authoritarianism 1802204814, 9781802204810

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RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON AUTHORITARIANISM

Research Handbook on Authoritarianism Edited by

Natasha Lindstaedt Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex, UK

Jeroen J.J. Van den Bosch Independent scholar (PhD), Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland

Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Natasha Lindstaedt and Jeroen J.J. Van den Bosch 2024

Cover image: Photograph by Tengyart on Unsplash. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher. Published by Edward Elgar Publishing Limited The Lypiatts 15 Lansdown Road Cheltenham Glos GL50 2JA UK Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. William Pratt House 9 Dewey Court Northampton Massachusetts 01060 USA A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Control Number: 2023952041

This book is available electronically in the Political Science and Public Policy subject collection http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/9781802204827

ISBN 978 1 80220 481 0 (cased) ISBN 978 1 80220 482 7 (eBook)

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Contents

List of contributorsviii Introduction to the Research Handbook on Authoritarianism1 Natasha Lindstaedt PART I

UNDERSTANDING AUTHORITARIANISM

1

Typologies of autocratic regimes Steffen Kailitz

11

2

Electoral authoritarianism: persistence and innovation in sub-Saharan Africa Andrea Cassani and Giovanni Carbone

25

3

Authoritarian populism Ezgi Elçi

42

4

Autocratization and democratic backsliding Alejandra López Villegas and Erica Frantz

59

PART II

ACTORS, INSTITUTIONS AND STRATEGIES

5

The personalization of power in dictatorships Abel Escribà-Folch and Joan C. Timoneda

6

Why size matters: the origins and effects of variation in party size in revolutionary and non-revolutionary communist regimes Martin K. Dimitrov

7

The authoritarian security apparatus: officer careers and the trade-offs in command Christian Gläßel, Belén González and Adam Scharpf

76

96

111

PART III COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION AND SUPPORT 8

Authoritarianism and digital communication Eda Keremoğlu and Nils B. Weidmann

128

9

Citizen support for autocratic regimes Marlene Mauk

139

10

Commitment and information problems in authoritarian regimes Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen, Hans H. Tung and Wen-Chin Wu

153

v

vi  Research handbook on authoritarianism PART IV PERFORMANCE AND POLICY 11

Authoritarian regimes, health and disease management Natasha Lindstaedt

167

12

Authoritarian regimes and the reversal of economic reforms Bumba Mukherjee and Nguyen Huynh

182

13

Authoritarian regimes and women’s rights Daniela Donno

198

14

Authoritarian regimes and the environment Natalie Koch

213

PART V

SURVIVAL, TRANSITIONS AND STABILITY?

15

Authoritarian survival Erica Frantz

229

16

Leadership succession Thomas Ambrosio

244

17

The assassination of autocratic leaders Abel Escribà-Folch

261

18

Patterns of de-personalization and leader succession within personalist regimes276 Jeroen J.J. Van den Bosch

19

Pressure proofing: how authoritarian regimes respond to sanctions Christian von Soest

300

PART VI CASE STUDIES 20

China: change and continuity Julia Bader

317

21

Uganda: authoritarianism in the age of regular elections – a review of the 2021 electoral violence Jude Kagoro

22

Turkmenistan: authoritarianism, nation building and cult of personality Sebastien Peyrouse

356

23

Egypt and Syria: the authoritarian republics of the Middle East Raymond Hinnebusch

370

24

North Korea: what can it teach us about authoritarianism? Alexander Dukalskis

386

331

Contents  vii Epilogue to the Research Handbook on Authoritarianism399 Natasha Lindstaedt Index

401

Contributors

Thomas Ambrosio is Professor of Political Science at North Dakota State University, USA. He published on authoritarianism, authoritarian diffusion, critical geopolitical, the domestic and international politics of the former Soviet Union, and ludic studies. Julia Bader is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. She holds an MA in Politics and Management from Konstanz University and a PhD in Political Science from Heidelberg University. Her research on development cooperation, China’s foreign relations, regime transition and autocratic stability elsewhere, and on the Chinese Communist Party’s outreach to parties and elites around the globe have been published, amongst others, in International Studies Quarterly, European Journal of Political Research, Democratization and the Journal of Peace Research. Her 2014 monograph China’s Foreign Relations and the Survival of Autocracies has been published by Routledge. Giovanni Carbone received his PhD at the London School of Economics. He is Professor of Political Science at the Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy and Head of the Africa Programme at ISPI, the Italian Institute for International Political Studies. His research focus is the comparative study of politics, geopolitics and economic development in sub-Saharan Africa. Andrea Cassani is Assistant Professor at Università degli Studi di Milano, Italy. He studies democratization, autocratization, authoritarianism and the developmental consequences of regime change. Martin K. Dimitrov is Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at Tulane University, USA. His research focuses on China and on other communist and post-communist regimes. Daniela Donno is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma, USA. She researches international norms and the politics of gender in authoritarian regimes. Alexander Dukalskis is Associate Professor in the School of Politics & International Relations at University College Dublin, Ireland, and the Director of the UCD Centre for Asia-Pacific Research. His research interests include authoritarian politics and human rights and his most recent book, Making the World Safe for Dictatorship, was published by Oxford University Press in 2021. Ezgi Elçi is Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations at Özyeğin University, Turkey. His research interests include populism, democratization, autocratization, anti-immigration and collective nostalgia. Abel Escribà-Folch is Associate Professor of Political Science at Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Senior Research Associate at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals, Catalonia. His research is on comparative authoritarian regimes, contentious politics and democratization. viii

Contributors  ix Erica Frantz is Associate Professor in Political Science at Michigan State University, USA. She specializes in authoritarian politics and the dynamics of political change. Christian Gläßel is a Postdoctoral Researcher in the Centre for International Security at the Hertie School, Berlin, Germany. His work centres on authoritarian politics, media and repression. Belén González is the Head of Research for International Security, Peace, and Conflict in the Department of Political Science at the University of Zurich, Switzerland. Her research focuses on the strategic choices of domestic and international actors in political conflict. Raymond Hinnebusch is Professor of International Relations and Middle East Politics, University of St Andrews, Scotland, UK. He is the author of numerous works on Egypt and Syria, including Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State (Cambridge University Press, 1985) and Syria: Revolution from Above (Routledge, 2001). Nguyen Huynh is Assistant Professor in the Department of International Relations and Politics at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan. He conducts research on populist leaders and international agreements and statistical methodology with a focus on split-population models. Jude Kagoro is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Institute of Intercultural and International Studies at the University of Bremen, Germany. He has published widely on themes of peace, militarization, security and policing. Steffen Kailitz is a Senior Researcher at the Hannah Arendt Institute for Totalitarianism Studies and Associate Professor at the Technische Universität Dresden, Germany. His research focuses on comparative democracy and autocracy studies as well as research on political extremism, especially right-wing extremism. Eda Keremoğlu is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Political Science at the University of Konstanz, Germany. Her research focuses on comparative authoritarian politics, digital politics, repression and societal co-optation. Natalie Koch is Professor of Geography at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, USA. She is a political geographer who works on geopolitics, authoritarianism, identity politics and state power, especially in the Arabian Peninsula. Natasha Lindstaedt is Professor of Government at the University of Essex, UK. Her research focuses on authoritarian regimes, failed states, violent non-state actors and development. Alejandra López Villegas is a PhD candidate in Political Science at Michigan State University, USA, where she studies democratic backsliding, gender politics and the intersection between both dynamics. Marlene Mauk is a Senior Researcher at GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences in Cologne, Germany. Her research focuses on citizens’ attitudes towards the political system in democracies and autocracies; among other topics, she studies political trust and its sources, political value orientations and various aspects of democratic quality.

x  Research handbook on authoritarianism Bumba Mukherjee is Professor of Politial Science at Penn State University, USA. His fields of research include comparative and international political economy, violence and civil conflict, and statistical methodology. He is currently completing a book manuscript on the varieties of populism in developing countries and papers on dispute initiation by populist leaders. Sebastien Peyrouse, PhD, is the Director of the Central Asia Program and a Research Professor in the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, USA. His main areas of expertise are political systems in Central Asia, economic and social issues, Islam and religious minorities, and Central Asia’s geopolitical positioning towards China, India and South Asia. He has authored and co-authored several books and many articles on Central Asia. Adam Scharpf is Assistant Professor of Comparative Politics in the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His research focuses on political regimes and their production of loyalty and allegiance, both on the national and international level. Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taiwan. Using game theory and quantitative methods, his research mainly focuses on media politics in democracies and autocracies, especially the information problems faced by dictators and voters. Joan C. Timoneda is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Purdue University, USA. His research focuses on authoritarian regimes, democratic backsliding and methodology. Hans H. Tung is Professor in the Department of Political Science at National Taiwan University. His research specializations include comparative authoritarianism, political economy and Chinese politics. He is primarily interested in formal and empirical analyses of the political-economic dynamics under authoritarian rule at both macro and micro levels. Jeroen J.J. Van den Bosch is an independent researcher, editor and project coordinator at Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland. He specializes in Slavonic studies, European Union foreign policy, comparative politics and dictatorships covering sub-Saharan Africa, Eurasia and (recently) the Indo-Pacific. Christian von Soest is a Lead Research Fellow and Head of the Peace and Security Research Programme at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg, Germany. He is also an honorary professor at the University of Göttingen and a member of the GIGA Office Berlin. Nils B. Weidmann is Professor of Political Science at the University of Konstanz, Germany. His research focuses on political violence and mobilization, the role of information and communication technology, and political methodology with a particular focus on autocracies. Wen-Chin Wu is Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taiwan. His research interests include comparative and international political economy, comparative authoritarianism and Chinese politics, with a particular focus on economic statecraft and media politics in dictatorships.

Introduction to the Research Handbook on Authoritarianism Natasha Lindstaedt

The study of authoritarian regimes has changed significantly over the past several decades. No longer are authoritarian regimes lumped into one residual category of what democracy is not, and no longer are they shrouded in mystery (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011). Research on authoritarian regimes has become its own intensely studied field of comparative politics, attracting attention from many areas of political science and various other disciplines (Carlitz and McLellan, 2021; Geloso et al., 2020; Svolik, 2012). Many recent interesting findings have shed light on how authoritarian regimes function and perform, how they consolidate power, and how they survive and withstand threats. Answering these questions is particularly important because the world is in the midst of a democratic slump. As of 2022, a whopping 72 per cent of the global population lives in authoritarian regimes, compared to 48 per cent of the population in 2010 (Papada et al., 2023). Thus, we are seeing an increase in attacks on personal freedoms; greater repression of political rights and civil liberties; an erosion of the rule of law and institutions of accountability; a growth in authoritarian values such as prioritizing security, order and conformity over individual rights and the need to be loyally obedient towards a strong leader; and a rise of personalism. Yet we can also observe that authoritarian regimes are experiencing greater levels of hybridization (use of “democratic” institutions) and populism, and are concerned about appearing legitimate and effective, and able to generate positive spin. Due to the state of the world, we start the volume by looking at various puzzles in authoritarian research in Part I. Given that the landscape of authoritarian regimes appears to be more complex than ever, is there anything we can do to better understand and reduce this complexity? How do we categorize authoritarianism, and what are the challenges? In the chapter by Steffen Kailitz, these debates about how to measure and categorize authoritarian regimes, in light of rising levels of personalism and hybridization, are thoroughly explored. Speaking to these trends, one of the other puzzles is the increase in authoritarian regimes that at first glance look like they are democratizing. These are sometimes referred to by the more benign label of hybrid regimes (or anocracies, semi-democratic and/or semi-autocratic regimes), but this simply masks their authoritarian components (Levitsky and Way, 2010). More often than not, these new forms of authoritarian regimes are not regimes attempting to democratize but are often cleverly using democratic institutions to prolong the longevity of their regimes (Bernhard et al., 2020; Lindstaedt and Frantz, 2019). One of the most commonly used “democratic” institutions in authoritarian regimes are elections, which is ironic given the presence or absence of free and fair elections is often considered the key distinguishing feature between democracies and autocracies. In fact, electoral autocracy has become the most common form of authoritarian rule. In the chapter by Andrea Cassani and Giovanni Carbone, the authors shed more light on how electoral autocracies function and why they have become so common in spite of how potentially destabilizing elections 1

2  Research handbook on authoritarianism can be to autocracies. In particular, the authors explore how autocracies in sub-Saharan Africa have used elections to solidify their rule, while also broadening their strategies for regime survival. Building from what was explored in Kailitz’s chapter, the authors also clarify how the category of electoral autocracy is itself highly complex, and how electoral regimes may differ based on whether they are party-based or personalist. The flip side of exploring autocracies that “appear” to be democratizing is to look at democracies that are autocratizing. The next two chapters address not just the rise in authoritarian regimes, but the rise in authoritarianism more generally. The most common pathway of autocratization of democracies in the last decade has been through populism. Just as autocracies usurp democratic institutions such as elections to strengthen their rule, democratically elected leaders are seizing upon authoritarian proclivities in the “will of the people” to justify engaging in authoritarian power grabs. In the chapter by Ezgi Elçi, authoritarian populism is defined as the antithesis to pluralism, liberalism, elitism and internationalism. Populist leaders also attack the rule of law, individual rights and the rights of minorities, but populists also need some aspects of democracy to remain intact. Elections yet again are important for populist leaders because they offer them a source of legitimacy. As Elçi explains, populist leaders don’t abolish institutions, but restructure them to suit their needs. Given the large number of autocratizing regimes, it’s important to better understand the debates regarding democratic backsliding. Why are new democracies relapsing to authoritarianism, and why are established democracies eroding? Though most cases of autocratization are taking place in authoritarian regimes and hybrid regimes, this process is also affecting long-standing democracies as well (Lindstaedt, 2021). There needs to be a current overview of these processes and greater conceptualization of what is taking place. In the chapter by Alejandra López Villegas and Erica Frantz, the authors clearly define what we mean by backsliding, and explain the institutional and societal factors that make a country at risk of backsliding. The authors also bring to light the critical issues that must be resolved to better understand if and how the world is becoming more authoritarian. Part II looks at the key actors and institutions in dictatorships, and the choices they make to ensure their survival. In other words, what are the dilemmas that different types of dictatorships face, and what strategies do they use to overcome these dilemmas? We start this part by looking at personalist rule, which, as previously noted, has been on the rise. In some ways the rise in personalism harkens back to an era where dictators were synonymous with the state. Our understanding of this style of leadership was informed by past authoritarian research which produced interesting case studies on dictators such as Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin and Mao (Arendt, 1951; Friedrich and Brzezinski, 1969; King-Hall, 1964; Wilson, 1977). Given that personalist power has become such a scourge in global politics today, there is renewed interest in better understanding personalist power accumulation. Additionally, the availability of improved datasets on personalist rule has enabled scholars to empirically explore the most common trajectories of personalist dictators. Using data from 1946 to 2010, Abel Escribà-Folch and Joan Timoneda examine the personalization of power in their chapter. The authors investigate how personalist dictators solidify their rule, by zooming in the specific details of how they accumulate power, such as when they purge and install loyalists and how they gain control over the military. The chapters in this section also explore the survival strategies of military and single-party regimes, and how they navigate maintaining control and effectiveness. Understanding the practices of the military regimes is particularly important, because the military is so critical

Introduction  3 to the survival of authoritarian regimes (Geddes, 1999, 2003; Geddes et al., 2014). As the biggest threats to autocrats come from the military, a large body of literature has looked at how authoritarian regimes coup-proof their militaries (Albrecht, 2015; Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015; Powell, 2019; Quinlivan, 1999). The assumption was that the leader’s political survival trumps everything else, and the option was either to deliberately weaken their own military (as is often seen in personalist regimes – spelled out in Escribà-Folch and Timoneda’s chapter) or absorb this risk and focus on military effectiveness, which is important to ensuring state sovereignty. In the chapter by Christian Gläßel, Belén González and Adam Scharpf, however, the authors look at how military regimes balance the need for military effectiveness with coup-proofing. In doing so, the authors demonstrate empirically how coup-proofing strategies that deal with recruitment and deployments are much more complex and nuanced. As the authors show, while field commanders are recruited based on merit, officers with uncertain loyalties are reserved to home deployments. Another dilemma for authoritarian regimes is how they gain information about their citizens, and what institutions are best suited to accomplish this. Single-party regimes have been studied for their longevity and ability to generate better outcomes in conflict and economic stability, but less is known about how they gain intelligence from their citizens. In the chapter by Martin Dimitrov, the question of how single-party regimes collect information from the public is fully explored. As he sees it, there is a trade-off between gaining information through citizen complaints (voluntary provision) and surveillance (involuntary provision). Dimitrov demonstrates that larger parties are more successful with the former, while smaller parties must rely upon spying on their own citizens. Dimitrov examines the relationship between party organization and size on societal legibility while also laying out how single-party regimes function more generally. In Part III, we look at issues that are associated with newer research on authoritarianism, such as the importance of communication, legitimacy and making credible commitments. An area of growing interest is how the role of social media and other forms of technology are being used to maintain authoritarian rule. In contrast to predictions that social media and the internet would help destroy authoritarian grips on power, autocracies have become incredibly adept at using technology to control information and create authoritarian counter-narratives that not only have a domestic impact, but an international reach as well (Rød and Weidmann, 2015; Walker, 2016). In the chapter by Eda Keremoğlu and Nils Weidmann, the authors review the literature on how autocrats use digital communication to manipulate, and underscore the technological innovations that are taken advantage of. In addition to specifying the key tools of digital autocrats, they address the theoretical and empirical challenges in studying this topic. As the use of digital tools to manipulate citizens has attracted more attention, it’s also important to investigate the relationship between autocracies and their publics more generally. Though it may sound counter-intuitive, authoritarian regimes earn far greater legitimacy from their citizens than previously thought (Gerschewski, 2018; Nathan, 2020). What explains why authoritarian regimes are legitimate, and what are their sources of support? How many authoritarian regimes want to be viewed as legitimate in the eyes of their publics, and what might the lasting impacts of these efforts be? Though repression and co-optation are still important, in the chapter by Marlene Mauk, she demonstrates how autocracies secure some genuine support from their citizens by manipulating the information environment, skewing perception of economic and political performance, something that has become easier to do with technology (as seen in the previous chapter).

4  Research handbook on authoritarianism Authoritarian regimes certainly desire more legitimacy than previously thought. A key factor in attaining legitimacy for autocracies is understanding how the public feels, effectively responding to citizens’ needs, and being capable of committing to agreements. Thus, autocracies want to gain accurate information from their citizens (as also highlighted in the chapter by Martin Dimitrov), while also appearing credible. How do modern dictators accomplish this? In the chapter by Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen, Hans Tung and Wen-Chin Wu, the authors explain how dictators establish binding institutions both to share power with other elites and to collect intelligence on their performance. The authors also highlight the role that the media plays in collecting information and responding to social demands, and the role of international organizations, while providing important questions for future research on the credibility of dictatorships. Given that the credibility of dictatorships has become increasingly important, we also need to take a new look at how authoritarian regimes actually perform, which is addressed in Part IV. True, much of the authoritarian regimes’ literature has already focused on how different types of authoritarian regimes perform (Chang and Golden, 2010; Geddes, 1999; Geddes et al., 2014; Peceny and Butler, 2004; Przeworski and Limongi, 1993; Weeks, 2012; Wright, 2008). These findings have been helpful to better understand the variation and nuances in authoritarian rule and how they may be better distinguished with democracies. But collating all of the research on the impact of authoritarian rule is a time-consuming process, and there is a need to synthesize the literature and take stock of the new findings on authoritarian performance. In particular with the Covid-19 pandemic still raging, there have been narratives promoted by authoritarian regimes that they are better suited to handling infectious disease outbreaks (Yang and Chen, 2021). But does the empirical evidence support this? New and constantly evolving threats to human security necessitate a fresh look at how authoritarian regimes perform. In the chapter by Natasha Lindstaedt, the question of the authoritarian advantage when it comes to disease management is explored. As the chapter demonstrates, autocracies do not perform better than democracies when it comes to a host of different health outcomes, in spite of best efforts to tell us otherwise. When it comes to advancing women’s rights, the empirical record of autocracies is a bit more complex. On the one hand, the chapter by Daniela Donno explains how authoritarian regimes, on average, lag behind democracies when it comes to de jure women’s rights. This result is in line with recent scholarship that has shown that autocrats fear feminist movements and there is evidence of a patriarchal backlash against women’s rights (Chenoweth and Marks, 2022). Donno cautions, however, that some authoritarian regimes have been able to make vast improvements in women’s rights and gender equality, and the poor performance of the Middle East has driven the results. As the chapter explains, this is largely due to the role of Western aid and the ideological commitments and power base of the specific regime. In spite of these achievements, implementation is still undermined by social norms in some contexts and there are continual concerns of autocratic gender washing (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2022). The environment is another area of global concern which has generated interesting questions about the abilities and commitments of dictatorships. Just as the international community has focused on advancing women’s rights, there has been some international pressure on addressing the environment and climate change. Are there also issues with autocratic green washing or a real commitment to tackle environmental problems? In the chapter by Natalie Koch, she offers that concern for the environment in authoritarian regimes is again closely tied with regime survival. On average, democracies perform better than autocracies when it comes

Introduction  5 to fighting climate change (Bättig and Bernauer, 2009). However, rather than comparing autocracies with democracies in this instance, what can be learned by looking at why autocracies decide to be proactive in protecting the environment? In Koch’s chapter, she lays out how environmental issues provide opportunities for regimes to seek legitimacy and gain credentials in topics that are not destabilizing for the regime. This part also looks at how authoritarian regimes perform when it comes to responding to globalization. Some autocracies initially embraced globalization and adopted trade and financial liberalization policies in the 1980s and 1990s. Since the early 2000s, however, many authoritarian regimes have reversed their economic liberalization strategies and reverted to state intervention in the economy. Again, the issue of political survival is so salient in the study of authoritarian regimes. As the authors Bumba Mukherjee and Nguyen Huynh explain, economic liberalization proved too risky to autocrats’ survival. The authors also explore how economic globalization empowers anti-reform actors. While Parts I–IV address different authoritarian tools and practices of survival more implicitly, Part V tackles this topic directly. How do authoritarian regimes and leaders survive in the 21st century? Much of the literature has argued that the political survival of dictatorships is based on repression and co-optation. But, referring back to the chapter by Keremoğlu and Weidmann, how do digital tools affect their ability to co-opt and repress? In the chapter by Erica Frantz, she demonstrates how autocrats have not only improved their digital capabilities, but they have also used digital technology to co-opt and engage in greater levels of digital repression. Drawing from empirical work, Frantz also shows that different forms of digital repression enhance the chances of authoritarian survival. Another reason why authoritarian regimes have become more durable is due to the efficient management of succession. Past research has shown that authoritarian regimes are astute in elite management to ensure that their power is not fleeting (Blaydes, 2008; Lust, 2009; Lust-Okar, 2006). Are there new findings about these relationships to shed light on how power is distributed and succession is managed? In the chapter by Thomas Ambrosio, all of the dilemmas of succession are thoroughly explored. Ambrosio highlights the challenges of managing hereditary succession, single-party succession and succession in electoral autocracies. As succession is the most critical point for any authoritarian regime (Svolik, 2012), Ambrosio claims that dictatorships are able to overcome the potentially destabilizing nature of succession by ensuring elite unity and properly managing elite expectations. The chapter by Jeroen Van den Bosch also looks at succession (both unexpected and groomed), but explores how these transitions can sometimes lead to de-personalization, particularly when facing other external shocks, old age and/or bad health. Most of the book argues that the trend in global politics is increased personalization, but what are the instances where this trend is being bucked? Using the Geddes-Wright and Frantz dataset, the chapter explores what types of transitions cause de-personalization and the different scenarios in which they do not. As the chapter explains, groomed successions, which are properly managed, can lead to de-personalization. Past research has shown that when succession is not properly managed, this can open the door for irregular transitions to take place, more specifically a violent exit for dictators (Frantz and Stein, 2017). Violent exits include revolutions, coups or even assassinations. While there has been an extensive literature on revolutions and coups, very little is known about assassinations. In the chapter by Abel Escribà-Folch, the frequency, drivers and consequences of assassinations in non-democracies are fully explored. Though assassinations are not common,

6  Research handbook on authoritarianism they occur more frequently than previously thought. Escribà-Folch shows where assassinations are most likely to occur and how personalism impacts the propensity for assassination. Escribà-Folch also demonstrates how destabilizing assassinations are – leading to an increased likelihood of coups, coup attempts and conflict. Though rare, assassinations constitute a constant threat to paranoid authoritarian leaders. A potentially more ubiquitous threat to authoritarian regimes is the threat and implementation of sanctions. But do sanctions really threaten authoritarian rule? How do authoritarian regimes respond to instruments by the international community to destabilize them? In the chapter by Christian von Soest, he highlights the various strategies used by authoritarian regimes to counteract the effectiveness of sanctions. According to von Soest, sanctions lead to a greater dependency of the public on the state, and often lead to greater levels of nationalism and repression. But the type of authoritarian regime matters in terms of the effectiveness of sanctions. Here again it is weak personalist regimes that are the most vulnerable (Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2010). Von Soest concludes that future research needs to examine the role of sanctions in conjunction with other foreign policy tools to destabilizing authoritarian regimes and the dynamic patterns of current sanctions application. After exploring the wide range of issues regarding authoritarian survival, in-depth case studies of authoritarian regimes can help shed light on the discussion. In Part VI, we look at some of the more durable closed authoritarian regimes. The spine that connects these chapters together is personalist rule – to varying degrees, and an unrelenting quest for survival. How do authoritarian regimes repress in the digital age? What is the role of institutions in solidifying their rule? How do authoritarian regimes gain legitimacy, while responding to evolving threats to their rule? We first look at China – the biggest authoritarian regime in the world in terms of population. In Julia Bader’s chapter, she spells out how China has adapted to changes in the global landscape. More specifically, Bader looks at how China has used repression and co-optation to ensure social stability, which appears more important to the regime than even external threats. The chapter also explores the sources of China’s legitimacy that have been critical to the regime’s survival, and how this has evolved over time. One of the notable changes in Chinese politics is the growing levels of personalism under Xi Jinping (2013–). The chapter demonstrates that Xi’s attempts to personalize power have short- and long-term impacts – that could be potentially destabilizing for China. In the short run, it has caused decision-making bottlenecks, while in the long-term, the question of succession (as addressed in the chapter by Thomas Ambrosio) is now unresolved. We then look at Uganda, a personalist regime under the leadership of Yoweri Museveni (1986–). Uganda, which has had a history of political violence during times of uncertainty, is seeing history repeat itself (Otunnu, 2016). Though political violence is destabilizing, in the case of Uganda, the chapter by Jude Kagoro contends that violence is used because it benefits an increasingly unpopular incumbent regime. Pre-election violence alters the elections results by reducing electoral competition and encouraging the opposition to withdraw and boycott the elections and heightening ethnic divisions. As Kagoro explains, elections have done little to lessen violence in Uganda; instead, elections and the ensuing electoral violence have helped to prolong the Museveni regime, becoming a fixture in Ugandan politics. In contrast to Uganda, elections in Turkmenistan are a far more muted affair. Turkmenistan is notably one of the most authoritarian regimes in the world, but small cosmetic changes were made to the electoral system in 2017 to allow multiple parties to nominate presidential

Introduction  7 candidates. Despite the façade of moving towards democratic principles, all of the rivals of the incumbent heaped praise on the leader’s remarkable economic and political success (Polese et al., 2017). How have leaders Saparmurat Niyazov (1985–2006), Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov (2007–22) and his son Serdar Berdymukhamedov maintained power over the country? Like Uganda, issues of ethnic identity and personalized politics are salient in the politics of Turkmenistan, but unlike Uganda, Turkmenistan has seen very little political violence. In the chapter by Sebastien Peyrouse, he explains the role of nationalism and an ongoing personality cult in managing potential threats to the regime and in building a subservient population. As Peyrouse argues, while this has created stability for the regime, it has disastrous consequences for Turkmenistan’s economic outlook and future. We then look at the republics of Syria and Egypt, which offer examples of populist and post-populist authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa, having experienced both significant change and continuity. Both countries also experimented with modest levels of political and economic liberalization, only to return to robust forms of authoritarianism. As Raymond Hinnebusch explains in his chapter, both countries also became increasingly personalist but lacked the unending personality cult that has been a throughline in Turkmenistan’s politics or significant economic achievements to rely on in the case of China. Hinnebusch’s chapter details how these regimes have evolved over time and how their apparent resilience actually masks a perpetual instability and lack of hegemony, more similar to Uganda. Instead, as Hinnebusch argues, Syria and Egypt have had to constantly work at regime maintenance through a host of different strategies that include coercion, co-optation and divide and conquer. While the Arab Spring presented a juncture for radical change, the result has been greater repression and authoritarian restoration. We close by looking at one of the most authoritarian regimes in the world – North Korea, the last truly totalitarian regime. The survival of the Kim dynasty in North Korea is remarkable given the potential threats to its power from an ever-changing world, its lack of achievement to rest on and the human catastrophe that it generated in the 1990s. North Korea has overcome these challenges by building one of the most pervasive personality cults ever seen, with most of the population completely brainwashed or too petrified to demonstrate otherwise. As the chapter by Alexander Dukalskis illustrates, North Korea is an interesting case of authoritarian resilience. It is perpetually engaging in regime legitimation and surveillance and monitoring of society. It has also successfully managed two successions in leadership, and shows no signs of breaking down. Though the number of authoritarian regimes around the world may ebb and flow, it is clear that there is a need for a more comprehensive and thorough understanding of this style of rule in the 21st century. Research on authoritarian regimes has made great strides, with a better grasp of how authoritarian regimes differ from one another, how they differ from democracies, how they emerge, fall and most importantly how they survive. At the heart of authoritarian politics is a story of political survival. Authoritarian regimes are driven by a need to persist amidst a host of different threats from external actors, the opposition, their own citizens, technological advances and global economic shocks. The volume speaks to the strategies that they pursue to maintain themselves in power, their sources of support, their performance, credibility and legitimacy, and other new patterns and trends that have yet to be explored in depth.

8  Research handbook on authoritarianism

REFERENCES Albrecht, H., 2015. Does coup-proofing work? Political–military relations in authoritarian regimes amid the Arab uprisings. Mediterranean Politics, 20(1), pp. 36–54. Arendt, H., 1951. The origins of totalitarianism. Harvest Press. Bättig, M.B. and Bernauer, T., 2009. National institutions and global public goods: Are democracies more cooperative in climate change policy? International organization, 63(2), pp. 281–308. Bernhard, M., Edgell, B.A. and Lindberg, S.I., 2020. Institutionalising electoral uncertainty and authoritarian regime survival. European Journal of Political Research, 59(2), pp. 465–87. Bjarnegård, E. and Zetterberg, P., 2022. How autocrats weaponize women’s rights. Journal of Democracy, 33(2), pp. 60–75. Blaydes, L., 2008. Authoritarian elections and elite management: Theory and evidence from Egypt. Paper prepared for the Princeton University Conference on Dictatorships, April. https://​www​.princeton​.edu/​ ~piirs/​Dictatorships042508/​Blaydes​.pdf. Böhmelt, T. and Pilster, U., 2015. The impact of institutional coup-proofing on coup attempts and coup outcomes. International Interactions, 41(1), pp. 158–82. Carlitz, R.D. and McLellan, R., 2021. Open data from authoritarian regimes: New opportunities, new challenges. Perspectives on Politics, 19(1), pp. 160–70. Chang, E. and Golden, M.A., 2010. Sources of corruption in authoritarian regimes. Social Science Quarterly, 91(1), pp. 1–20. Chenoweth, E. and Marks, Z., 2022. Revenge of the patriarchs: Why autocrats fear women. Foreign Affairs, 101, p. 103. Escribà-Folch, A. and Wright, J., 2010. Dealing with tyranny: International sanctions and the survival of authoritarian rulers. International Studies Quarterly, 54(2), pp. 335–59. Frantz, E. and Ezrow, N.M., 2011. The politics of dictatorship: Institutions and outcomes in authoritarian regimes. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Frantz, E. and Stein, E.A., 2017. Countering coups: Leadership succession rules in dictatorships. Comparative Political Studies, 50(7), pp. 935–62. Friedrich, C.J. and Brzezinski, Z., 1969. The general characteristics of totalitarian dictatorship. In Blondel, J. (ed.), Comparative government: A reader. Palgrave, pp. 187–99. Geddes, B., 1999, September. Authoritarian breakdown: Empirical test of a game theoretic argument. In Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta (Vol. 2). Geddes, B., 2003. Paradigms and sand castles: Theory building and research design in comparative politics. University of Michigan Press. Geddes, B., 1999. What do we know about democratization after twenty years? Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1), pp. 115–44. Geddes, B., Wright, J. and Frantz, E., 2014. Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set. Perspectives on Politics, pp. 313–31. Geloso, V., Berdine, G. and Powell, B., 2020. Making sense of dictatorships and health outcomes. BMJ Global Health, 5(5), pp. 1–4. Gerschewski, J., 2018. Legitimacy in autocracies: Oxymoron or essential feature? Perspectives on Politics, 16(3), pp. 652–65. King-Hall, S., 1964. Three dictators: Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin. Faber & Faber. Levitsky, S. and Way, L.A., 2010. Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press. Lindstaedt, N., 2021. Democratic decay and authoritarian resurgence. Bristol University Press. Lindstaedt, N. and Frantz, E., 2019. Democracies and authoritarian regimes. Oxford University Press. Lust, E., 2009. Democratization by elections? Competitive clientelism in the Middle East. Journal of Democracy, 20(3), pp. 122–35. Lust-Okar, E., 2006. Elections under authoritarianism: Preliminary lessons from Jordan. Democratization, 13(3), pp. 456–71. Nathan, A.J., 2020. The puzzle of authoritarian legitimacy. Journal of Democracy, 31(1), pp. 158–68. Otunnu, O., 2016. Crisis of legitimacy and political violence in Uganda, 1890 to 1979. Palgrave Macmillan.

Introduction  9 Papada, E., Altman, D., Angiolillo, F., Gastaldi, L., Köhler, T., Lundstedt, M., Natsika, N., Nord, M., Sato, Y., Wiebrecht, F. and Lindberg, S.I., 2023. Democracy report 2023: Defiance in the face of autocratization. V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg. https://​www​.v​-dem​.net/​documents/​ 29/​V​-dem​_democracyreport2023​_lowres​.pdf. Peceny, M. and Butler, C.K., 2004. The conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes. International Politics, 41(4), pp. 565–81. Polese, A., Ó Beacháin, D. and Horák, S., 2017. Strategies of legitimation in Central Asia: Regime durability in Turkmenistan. Contemporary Politics, 23(4), pp. 427–45. Powell, J., 2019. Leader survival strategies and the onset of civil conflict: A coup-proofing paradox. Armed Forces & Society, 45(1), pp. 27–44. Przeworski, A. and Limongi, F., 1993. Political regimes and economic growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(3), pp. 51–69. Quinlivan, J.T., 1999. Coup-proofing: Its practice and consequences in the Middle East. International Security, 24(2), pp. 131–65. Rød, E.G. and Weidmann, N.B., 2015. Empowering activists or autocrats? The internet in authoritarian regimes. Journal of Peace Research, 52(3), pp. 338–51. Svolik, M.W., 2012. The politics of authoritarian rule. Cambridge University Press. Walker, C., 2016. The authoritarian threat: The hijacking of “soft power”. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), pp. 49–63. Weeks, J.L., 2012. Strongmen and straw men: Authoritarian regimes and the initiation of international conflict. American Political Science Review, 106(2), pp. 326–47. Wilson, D. ed., 1977. Mao Tse-Tung in the scales of history: A preliminary assessment organized by the China Quarterly. Cambridge University Press. Wright, J., 2008. Do authoritarian institutions constrain? How legislatures affect economic growth and investment. American Journal of Political Science, 52(2), pp. 322–43. Yang, Y. and Chen, X., 2021. Globalism or nationalism? The paradox of Chinese official discourse in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak. Journal of Chinese Political Science, 26(1), pp. 89–113.

PART I UNDERSTANDING AUTHORITARIANISM

1. Typologies of autocratic regimes Steffen Kailitz

1.1 INTRODUCTION Giovanni Sartori once asserted that “whatever their limits”, classifications remain a “condition for any scientific discourse” (Sartori 1970, p. 1040). A superordinate typology of political regimes is necessary in the field of research and the comparison of political regimes in order to be able to integrate the differentiations of research into an overall picture. A typology of political regimes as all typologies reduces the complexity of the world. It is supposed to say something essential about the defined types. Regarding political regimes the almost infinite variety of forms of political rule are reduced to a few main types. In the field of comparative politics much effort has been spent testing hypotheses “about the conditions under which political regimes emerge and survive, and their consequences for a broad set of outcomes, notably their impact in promoting economic development and international peace” (Cheibub et al. 2010, p. 67). All type formations can be carried out on a continuum between the purely constructed/ideal type (see e.g. McKinney 1966), which does not occur in reality, and an empirical type resulting from an empirical classification, which is created without concept formation. An example of an ideal type already cited by Max Weber is a purely economistic-rational thinking person as the starting point of theory formation. A purely empirical type, on the other hand, results exclusively from observations without prior conceptualization. Purely empirical types are formed by researchers on the basis of cluster or factor analyses (see e.g. Sodeur 1974). Most typologies in comparative politics have elements of both theoretical conceptualization and an observation of variable configurations in the real world. Typologies have to meet “the norms for standard categorical scales, the cells should be mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive” (Collier et al. 2008, p. 157, see also e.g. Bailey 1992, p. 2188). That means in our case that the political regimes of all countries should be covered by one category and only one category of the typology. If a given political regime could be classified at the same time as different types of a political regime it seems arbitrary in which category it falls in the end. In order to enable a clear and meaningful assignment to the types, two points must be fulfilled. The phenomena assigned to one type must be as similar as possible (internal homogeneity) and the ones assigned to different types must be as different as possible (external heterogeneity) (e.g. Sartori 1991; Bailey 1994, p. 1; Kluge 1999, p. 27). Both criteria are concerned with the question of whether the typology forms distinct categories. Another criterion for judging a typology is whether the characteristics that are given as criteria for the classification are also consistently used for assignment to the types. When creating a typology, it is also important to ask whether contradictions can arise when several criteria are used. In addition to that it is important to distinguish between monothetic and polythetic typologies (Bailey 1973a, 1973b). In a monothetic typology the “possession of a unique set of features is both necessary and sufficient for identifying a specimen as belonging to a particular cell of the 11

12  Research handbook on authoritarianism typology” (Bailey 1973b, p. 21). Polythetic typologies need not meet the above outlined criteria of uniqueness, exclusivity, and completeness to the same extent as monothetic ones. The far more limited requirement for polythetic typologies is that the phenomena of one category be more similar, in terms of typologizing features, than the phenomena of different categories. With this approach, it is possible, but not mandatory, to specify criteria that are necessary for assignment to a type. Thus, such a typology can also be formed entirely without necessary features (Sokal and Sneath 1963, p. 14). While a monothetic typology essentially provides only the means to ascertain the possibility to determine whether a phenomenon can be assigned to a type, a polythetic typology permits the gradational assessment of its association with a type. Some authors such as Alberto Marradi (1990, p. 29) argue that when only one fundamentum division is considered, a classification scheme is produced; and only if several fundamental are jointly considered, a typology is produced (see also e.g. Lauth et al. 2015, p. 44). Others like David Collier, Jody Laporte, and Jason Seawright outline that a classification on the basis of one characteristic can be regarded as “one-dimensional typologies” (Collier et al. 2008, p. 153). From this point of view the number of classification features for a typology appears to be of secondary importance and a typology can be formed on the basis of one characteristic as well as on the basis of 20. A one-dimensional typology is always monothetic. If one categorizes political regimes on the basis of only one characteristic, then a certain expression of that characteristic is necessary for assignment to a type. One-dimensional typologies can fulfill the same functions as multidimensional typologies. However, due to the complexity of the world, one criterion is often not enough to create a meaningful typology. Therefore, most social science typologies are multidimensional. If we want to categorize, for instance, political regimes, all cases can be located in a property space. Out of an extremely large possible number of variates a given typology usually only considers a few. Hence, a typology “is the reduction of a property space, in other words the selection of a certain number of combinations or groups of variables” (Capecchi 1968, p. 9). The term “property space” originates from mathematics. A property space is used to identify patterns among objects. First, various relevant dimensions are defined in which the objects differ. The dimensions of the property space are determined by the criteria measured, with the possibility of combining several related criteria into a single dimension. Subsequently, the features are measured for each object and the object can be located in the property space accordingly. The higher the number of characteristics used for a typology, the more differentiated it is, but on the other hand, fewer and fewer objects, in our case political regimes, fall into a category (Sartori 1991, p. 246). As a result, generalizing statements about a type are not far-reaching, since they concern only a few cases. In a typology, the smaller the number of characteristics used for categorization, the less differentiated it is. The types formed are then quite broad. However, this offers the advantage of encompassing a substantial number of cases, facilitating comparisons such as the assessment of varying performance among distinct political regime types.

1.2

A BRIEF HISTORY OF CLASSIFICATIONS OF POLITICAL REGIMES FROM ARISTOTLE TO LINZ

When it comes to a classification of political regimes the overarching concept is: political regime. This clarifies what a classification of political regimes is and is not. It becomes immediately apparent that measurements of the degree of freedom1 or democracy are just that,

Typologies of autocratic regimes  13 Table 1.1

Determinants of autocracies

 

One

Few

Many

Positive

Monarchy

Aristocracy

Polity

Negative

Tyranny

Oligarchy

Democracy

but not classifications of political regimes. Giovanni Sartori made the argument that political regimes are “bounded wholes” and, hence, degreeism per se is “stultifying in his view” (Sartori 1987, p. 184, 1991, p. 248). In contrast to Sartori this chapter argues that measuring the degree of democracy or freedom can be very useful for certain research questions (Collier and Adcock 1999, p. 561). Nevertheless, the starting point in evaluating the validity of political regime classifications needs to be the theoretical definition of the concept of political regime. Compared to the literature that outlines the concept democracy there is astonishingly little literature on the concept of a political regime (Munck 1996, p. 19; Skaaning 2006). What can be distilled from the current definitions of a political regime is the following essence: A political regime is a set of rules that identifies: who has access to power; who is allowed to select the government; and under what conditions and limitations authority is exercised. Hence, two questions appear to be of fundamental importance for the classification of political regimes: (1) who rules? and (2) how is the rule exercised? And a third question is: why do rulers rule? An additional important question is: how much do rulers rule (Snyder 2006)?2 Efforts to distinguish political regimes go as far back as Aristotle (335 BC) (Aristotle 1992). Aristotle’s traditional regime classification was based on a combination of the above-mentioned two crucial questions. Since then, for good reasons, almost all regime typologies emphasize at least one of the first two questions in one form or another. Aristotle’s typology of political regimes combined an empirical and a normative aspect. He distinguished political regimes, namely, based on the number of people involved in ruling and the normative quality of the rule. Regarding typologies we face here a classical example of a matrix typology. Such a typology is formed by the intersection of categorical variables. While in principle more than two categorical variables can be used for a matrix typology most authors use just two dimensions (Gerring and Christenson 2017, p. 43). If we think a moment about it, even if it is sometimes not explicitly said in modern typologies of political regimes the distinction between democracy and autocracy is one between a “good” political regime type and a “bad” one (Lidén 2014). Until today autocracy has often just been handled as the dark opposite of democracy. Sartori, for instance, argued that autocracy “stands as an undisputed and hardly disputable good opposite of democracy” (Sartori 1987, p. 205). More often than not even in specific research on autocratic regimes they are only negatively defined as all political regimes that do not meet the criteria of a democratic regime (Reich 2002, p. 7; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, p. 9; Wahman et al. 2013, p. 19). From this standpoint Gandhi defines dictatorships as “regimes in which rulers acquire power by means other than competitive elections”. Dictators “may come to power by a coup d’état, a palace putsch, or a revolution” (Gandhi 2008, p. 8). But what about rulers who come to power by semi-competitive elections? To complete a typology of regimes it seems necessary to include the determinants of autocracies in its design (Kailitz 2009). This requires a positive definition of autocracy. We find astonishingly little efforts in political science to define what the features of an autocracy are.

14  Research handbook on authoritarianism Karl Loewenstein provides perhaps the best starting point for a positive definition. According to him, an autocracy is a political regime of “concentrated exercise of political power” (Loewenstein 1965, p. 30). From this point of view the opposite is not democracy but constitutionalism as a political regime with “shared exercise of political power” (Loewenstein 1965, p. 31). Thus, “one of the central pillars of modern constitutional democracies” are “the institutional limitations on the executive’s power to shape political decision-making processes” (Schmidt 2016, p. 115). However, Loewenstein immediately conceded that “elements of the autocratic and constitutional political system are often combined and blended in the course of historical dynamics” and that many political regimes are hybrids or intermediary regimes (Loewenstein 1965, p. 31). Apart from executive constraints political freedom can be used as a measure of autocracy. However, if a positive or negative definition of autocracy or dictatorship is used, there is always a strong normative aspect that has to be kept in mind. While the overwhelming majority of political regimes in history were non-democratic in the modern sense, the idea that the terms dictatorship and autocracy were negative opposites to democracy came only to broad use after the First World War (Nolte 1975, pp. 919–24). The terms were used in this time to address communist Russia and soon also the fascist dictatorships in Italy and Germany. It soon came to mind that these are a specific kind of regime type that differs from traditional dictatorships. It became more and more common that the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were referred to as totalitarian dictatorships (see e.g. Kailitz 1997). The distinction of political regimes into three basic forms – democracy, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism – became dominant from the 1930s (Ziegler 1932). The most influential version of this political regime typology comes from Juan Linz (1975). Before Linz (1964) elaborated on the characteristics of an authoritarian regime, using Spain as an example, research generally focused on totalitarian regimes (Arendt 1951; Friedrich and Brzezinski 1956), and authoritarian regimes were a very large but largely ignored group of political regimes. Linz distinguished political regimes based on the degree of pluralism, the limitation of rule, and most prominently based on ideologization and mobilization. Totalitarian regimes are viewed as having a very high degree of ideologization and mobilization, whereas authoritarian regimes are associated with a low degree of these factors. Often overlooked, however, was the fact that in addition to the three modern regime forms, Linz also delineated three traditional regime forms of political regimes: monarchy, sultanism (which is a personalist regime), and “caudillismo”. Hence, his regime typology encompassed six rather than three types. Linz emphasized especially that sultanism should be seen as a regime type clearly distinct from authoritarian regimes in their various manifestations (Linz 2000, p. 2; see on this regime type Chehabi and Linz 1998). The type of totalitarianism became more and more controversial, and the type of authoritarianism had the problem of being extremely broad and increasingly encompassed almost all non-democratic regimes. Linz formed seven subtypes of authoritarian regimes: (1) bureaucratic-military regimes, (2) organic states, (3) mobilizing modern authoritarian regimes in post-democratic societies, (4) postcolonial mobilizing authoritarian regimes, (5) racial or ethnic “democracies,” (6) “imperfectly” totalitarian and “pre-totalitarian” regimes, and (7) “post-totalitarian” regimes (Linz 2000). The range of these subtypes already is one problem. The second problem is that their assignment to the two basic types of authoritarianism and totalitarianism is not convincing. It is difficult to understand why Linz classified pre-, proto-,

Typologies of autocratic regimes  15 and post-totalitarian autocracies as subtypes of authoritarian regimes and not as diminished subtypes of totalitarian regimes. In 1996 Linz together with Alfred Stepan came to the already widely spread verdict that the “existing tripartite regime classification has not only become less useful to democratic theorists and practioners than it once was, it has also become an obstacle” (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 39). Linz and Stepan modified the original regime typology. They distinguished between the following regime types in the modern world: democracy, authoritarianism, totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism, and sultanism. Since autocratic electoral regimes are by far the most widespread form of autocracy after the fourth wave of democratization (Doorenspleet 2005), it is a fundamental problem that this form of autocracy is not defined as a separate type in this typology. Even a broader type of party autocracies is not existent in this typology. In the 1990s the need for a regime typology to be not only theoretically outlined but also systematically applied to classify regimes of the world became more and more apparent. As strange as it seems given the long history of the tripartion of political regimes into democratic, authoritarian, or totalitarian there were no empirical applications of it on a global scale until the 1990s. In 1996 Linz and Stepan presented a proposal for operationalization of their typology. The problem was that the theoretical foundation of the typology did not correspond well with the operationalization. Linz and Stepan focused in their empirical application only on the degree of realization of civil liberties based on the measurements by Freedom House. They regarded as totalitarian countries those that consistently achieved the worst score (seven) on the scale of political and civil liberties in Freedom House’s regime measurement during the period 1978–87 (Linz and Stepan 1996, p. 40). However, the “totalitarian” country selection measured with this sole criterion did not correspond to the countries they would describe as totalitarian on the basis of the ideologization and mobilization criteria. Somalia and Sudan, for instance, were fragile states, and clearly not totalitarian regimes as defined by Linz and Stepan’s theoretical classification criteria. All problems aside, Linz’s typology has its merits. While it has lost influence in the debate on political regimes, it is still present. One of the proponents is Alan Siaroff (2013, pp. 230ff.) who uses a slightly modified version of the original typology by Linz. When speaking of typologies of autocratic regimes, it is necessary that the typology distinguishes between various types of autocratic regimes. From this point of view distinctions between various types of autocracy are as significant as differences between democracies and non-democracies (Geddes 1999). This means that apart from the aforementioned continuous measures, such as the degree of democracy or freedom, dichotomous classifications of democracies and non-democracies (e.g., Bollen and Jackman 1989; Boix et al. 2013) cannot be subsumed under a discussion of typologies of autocratic regimes. The first group includes, for instance, the measure of Freedom House, which is a measure of freedom rights. One might argue that Freedom House itself offers a translation of the scores into regime categories: consolidated democracies (5.01–7.00), semi-consolidated democracies (4.01–5.00), hybrid regimes (3.01–4.00), semi-consolidated authoritarian regimes (2.01–3.00), consolidated authoritarian regimes (1.00–2.00). Nevertheless, one has to keep in mind that this is a classification of countries according to the degree of freedom and not a classification of political regimes. The greatest problem with Freedom House is that it remains arbitrary how the ordinal indices are translated into categorical shifts of regime type (e.g. Reich 2002, p. 3). However, as argued above, coming from a positive definition of autocracy, a lack of freedom can be used to measure the degree of autocracy (not democracy). For instance, Monaco is

16  Research handbook on authoritarianism clearly a non-democracy but it receives a perfect score by Freedom House because it is not an autocracy at all and the citizens enjoy all freedoms. As can easily be seen, the classification of Monaco as a “consolidated democracy” is wrong. Nevertheless, that does not mean that liberty rights and data by Freedom House are not helpful in classifying political regimes. A specific problem with the data from Freedom House is that it has published “long lists of items that it claims to take into account,” but “there has never been a clear description of the procedure by which such information is used to generate its ratings” (Coppedge et al. 2008, p. 637). Another measure that was widely used to classify political regimes is the Polity dataset. Different from Freedom House there is a theoretical framework by Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr behind the dataset (Eckstein 1969; Gurr 1974; Eckstein and Gurr 1975). The biggest problem is that it is largely ignored that Gurr explicitly suggested that the Polity data should not be used to label polities (regime periods) as a democracy or an autocracy (Gurr 1974, p. 1487). In empirical studies countries have usually been classified on two 11-point “democracy” and “autocracy” variables. Both variables are indices composed of five institutional measures. Typically, the autocracy score is then subtracted from the democracy score to get a regime score. While it seems intuitive to use measures as Freedom House or Polity to classify political regimes there is a huge problem with such approaches. Frequently if one looks at the history of a specific country it remains unclear why a regime change is observed by studies using Polity or Freedom House data. Despite this argument there is no doubt that such measures can still be helpful to classifying political regimes.

1.3

REGIME TYPOLOGIES WITH A DEMOCRACY BIAS

If we turn especially to older typologies of political regimes, they classify them “between the classical polar opposites of authoritarian and democratic” (Pye 1990, p. 13) or totalitarian and democratic with authoritarian regimes in between them. However, there is also a specific strand of regime typologies with a democracy bias. This stems from the fact that the overarching concept they define is not political regime but democracy. From Robert Dahl onwards researchers have made use of dimensions to measure democracy, most prominently inclusiveness/participation and contestation/competition to classify political regimes. Dahl (1971, p. 7) distinguished the regimes listed in Table 1.2 on these two dimensions. In this line of research there are important contributions by Tatu Vanhanen (1984, 1997). When Lucian Pye called in 1990 for finer graded typologies, researchers began looking for hybrid regimes between democracy and autocracy (Diamond 2002; Wigell 2008; Bogaards 2009; Levitsky and Way 2010; Gilbert and Mohseni 2011). On this foundation the inclination to develop regime typologies based on the presence or absence of democratic features of political regimes spread. An example is the typology by Andreas Schedler. Countries are classified in this typology from least to most democratic. Countries without elections are classified as closed autocracies; those with elections that are not free and fair are electoral autocracies; Table 1.2

Autocracies, inclusion and participation

 

No or low inclusiveness

High inclusiveness

High participation

Competitive oligarchies

Democracies/polyarchies

Low or no participation

Closed hegemonies

Inclusive hegemonies

Typologies of autocratic regimes  17 those with free and fair elections are electoral democracies; and liberal democracies constitute those that also have the rule of law, government accountability, and civil liberties (Schedler 2002, p. 37). Similar variants of a regime typology were proposed by Larry Diamond (2002, pp. 25ff.) as well as Philip Roessler and Marc Morjé Howard (2009). In addition, among electoral non-democracies Levitsky and Way (2002) proposed a distinction between competitive and hegemonic regimes. Competitive authoritarianism is characterized by meaningful competition and even while the playing field is not fair, the outcome of elections is uncertain. In hegemonic authoritarian regimes democratic institutions only exist on paper. A complete typology combined with the classical trio (democratic, authoritarian, totalitarian) would then be: totalitarian regimes, closed authoritarian regimes, hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes, competitive electoral authoritarian regimes, electoral democracies and liberal democracies. Anna Lührmann, Marcus Tannenberg, and Staffan I. Lindberg (2018) provided a dataset from 1900 to the present based on the four-fold classification of Schedler. A main critique regarding this approach is that looking on the autocratic side, there are huge differences with communist party single-party regimes, military regimes, and personalist regimes all lumped together in the category of closed autocracies (Snyder 2006).

1.4

TYPOLOGIES WITH POLITICAL REGIMES SUI GENERIS

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a new wave of autocracy studies emerged as the spread of democracy faltered. New classifications of political regimes were put forward, which had antecedents in older research. They usually either used political institutions and/or the identity of the ruling elite to classify political regimes. What distinguishes these typologies from the ones in the previous section is that the overarching concept is indeed the political regime and not democracy. Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi, and Adam Przeworski (ACLP) presented in 1996 a widely used classification of political regimes. Usually, the ACLP approach is remembered for distinguishing between democracies and dictatorships. However, they also provided a classification on the non-democratic side between bureaucracies (non-democracies with legislatures) and autocracies (non-democracies without legislatures) (Alvarez et al. 1996). If we look at this typology, there is a democracy bias as we outlined above. The above-mentioned autocratic forms are thus explicitly not regarded as regime forms sui generis. While the line between democracies and non-democracies is still drawn in the same way the classification of autocratic regimes changed substantially from ACLP to the updated version by José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Vreeland (CGV) in 2010. CGV distinguished non-democracies into military, civilian and royal (Cheibub et al. 2010).3 While the aforementioned forms of autocracy actually appear as sui generis regime types, they continue to be listed in the typology as subtypes of autocracy. Between ACLP and CGV the seminal article by Barbara Geddes (1999) on the topic appeared. Different from ACLP and CGV, Geddes emphasized that different types of authoritarian regimes differ as much from each other as from democracy. Autocracy is thus used as an umbrella term, but the forms of autocracy subsumed under it are not interpreted as subtypes, but as regime types sui generis. In Geddes’s theoretical view, political decisions, including the selection of leaders, result from different forms of “competition among rival factions” (Geddes

18  Research handbook on authoritarianism 1999, p. 121) in autocratic regimes. Based on this perspective, she differentiated between party-based military and personalist autocratic regimes (Geddes 1999). She outlined the features of her three main types as follows. In military regimes, a group of officers decides who will rule and exercises some influence on policy. In single-party regimes, one party dominates access to political office and control over policy, though other parties may exist and compete as minor players in elections. Personalist regimes differ from both military and single-party in that access to office and the fruits of office depend much more on the discretion of an individual leader. According to Geddes, the person at the top of a personalist regime can be a military person, a party member or a civilian outside the party. So, her distinction is not simply about “who rules” but how rule is exercised, namely, if the party or the military actually constrains the power of the ruler (e.g. Geddes 2007, p. 60). In the later version with Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz (GWF) the category of monarchies was added (Geddes et al. 2014). However, the theory was not extended to cover monarchies. Geddes also added “intermediate categories” to her classification scheme after discovering how many of the cases simply resisted being crammed into one or another of the original categories” (Geddes 2007, p. 51). The GWF typology is one of only two typologies that focus completely on autocratic regimes. The GWF dataset even excluded democracies from the dataset. However, since the regime narratives identify democratic periods, it is easy for users who need the democratic category to add to it. In addition to that, the dataset excludes countries that are not independent. The last version of the dataset includes data on regime start/failure dates, failure event variables, and regime type for over 200 autocratic regimes in 122 countries from 1946 to 2010. Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell introduced a modified version, which added to Geddes’s classification, a distinction between one-party autocracies and multiparty autocracies, and abolished the category of personalist regimes (Hadenius and Teorell 2006, 2007). They also added the category of no-party regimes. Based on the different modes of accessing and maintaining political power they distinguish between (1) hereditary succession or lineage (monarchy), (2) the actual or threatened use of military force (military regime), and (3) popular elections (party regime). However, this simple distinction does not work very well. It is not true that the usual mode of power maintenance in party autocracies is popular election. Elections are either not free and fair in multiparty elections or there is not even a choice for the voters in one-party regimes. Moreover, in all kinds of autocracies one pillar of power maintenance is the actual or threatened use of military force. In cooperation with Michael Wahmann, Hadenius and Teorell (HTW) presented 2013 an updated version of their dataset (Wahman et al. 2013). Steffen Kailitz views in his typology political regimes as “bounded wholes” and classifies them based on their patterns of legitimation (Kailitz 2013). He distinguished on the autocratic side between electoral, one-party, military, and personalist autocracies as well as (ruling) monarchies and ideocracies. What is specific about the classification is that it addresses ideocracies. This is a regime type addressed by Linz either as totalitarian, pre-totalitarian, or post-totalitarian. It is in some ways congruent with the regime type that Steven Levitsky, Lucan Way, and their collaborators later label as revolutionary autocracies. However, it is narrower since regimes like Mexico under the rule of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional are not classified as ideocracies (Levitsky and Way 2013, 2022; Lachapelle et al. 2020). Ideocratic regimes are legitimized by a totalitarian ideology, the claim to fulfill the laws of nature, history, or God and pave the way to a utopian future (Backes and Kailitz 2016). Hence, their source of legitimation lies in the future, beyond the procedures of the political regime itself. The distinction between ideocracies and non-ideocratic one-party autocracies bridges

Typologies of autocratic regimes  19 the gap between the old classification by Linz and the new one by Geddes et al. and Hadenius and Teorell. In 2024, a new, greatly expanded and revised version of the dataset is presented under the title “Varieties of Political Regimes”, covering the period from 1900 to the present. This broad dataset also includes colonial regimes. Apart from the three above-mentioned regime typologies there are a few more, which are more or less similar to the above-mentioned. The typology by Beatriz Magaloni, Jonathan Chu, and Eric Min distinguishes “autocratic regimes according to two basic criteria: the dictators’ ‘launching organization’ and the number of political parties” (Magaloni 2008, p. 731) in monarchies, military, single-party, and multiparty (Magaloni et al. 2013). The resulting categories of the typology are mostly similar to the ones by Hadenius, Teorell, and Wahmann. The typology used by Carsten Anckar and Cecilia Fredriksson explicitly closely follows HTW and distinguishes political regimes based on the institutions and not the ruling group as GWF (Anckar and Fredriksson 2019, p. 86). What differs from other typologies is mostly that constitutional monarchies are not subsumed under autocratic regimes, but are viewed as hybrid regimes between democracy and autocracy.

1.5

PROBLEMS REGARDING REGIME TYPOLOGIES

What is immediately striking in all of the above discussed typologies is that the differences between political regime types cannot be clearly traced back to one easily observable characteristic. All of these typologies, even if the claim to rely on one criterion as the identity of the ruling group or the legitimation of the regime, are in fact multidimensional. If we compare the different approaches and how regimes are classified it becomes visible that the approach to classify political regimes seems to have huge consequences when a regime change is identified. In GWF a regime change is registered if, for instance, a military coup brings a new ruling group to power even if this coup occurred in a military regime. According to HTW, the institutions have not changed and, hence, they do not address this as a regime change. The decision by HTW that a regime change in their dataset always presupposes a change from one regime category into another seems counterintuitive. If an opposing faction in the military overthrew a military regime there is no regime change, according to this dataset. This is a problematic decision, especially if members of the ruling group of the previous regime are executed or jailed. While the GWF dataset introduced multiparty elections – if they are not free and fair – this is not considered as a discrete point of regime change. In contrast, the other regime typologies (usually) distinguish the appearance of multiparty elections as a regime change. The view of the majority of these typologies is in line with the regime typologies with a democracy bias. In these typologies, the introduction of multiparty elections is the key distinction from closed autocracy to electoral autocracy. What has to be emphasized at this point, if we compare the regime typologies, is that there is a lack of clarity of what constitutes a regime change. Overarchingly, Gerardo Munck (1996, p. 3) addressed this lack of clarity of key concepts in the field of political regime studies in 1996. Since then, not much has changed. To be clear, the problem is even greater with typologies with a democracy bias discussed above. Changes in the democratic quality of a regime do not necessarily constitute a regime change. A problem that arises from the lack of clarity of the concept of regime change is that different datasets on political regimes often tell different stories about regime changes in the same

20  Research handbook on authoritarianism country. Additionally, regime narratives of countries in the qualitative literature sometimes do not match the classifications in regime typologies. Matthew Wilson (2013) addressed this problem using regime narratives of Nicaragua, Colombia, and Brazil. In fact, if empirically observable regime types and not merely abstract regime constructs are to be distinguished from one another, it appears necessary to use the regime histories of countries as the basis for classification. Otherwise, a problem that might arise is that a regime typology “has the effect of fragmenting one regime into several” (Brownlee 2007, p. 532) as it is identified in the comparative politics literature. One of the most disputed issues in the discussion on regime types is if personalist autocracies constitute a distinct regime type or if personalism is a varying feature of political regimes. The category personalist regime is part of GWF and Kailitz, but not of all other typologies. The personalist regime type is also much more broadly defined in GWF’s typology than in Kailitz’s and therefore includes a much larger proportion of political regimes. While it makes sense to separate a category for personalist regimes, the one created by Geddes seems very broad and its boundaries remain unclear. Very different regimes are included in this category. Uzbekistan and Syria under Assad are, for instance, classified as party regimes despite the high degree of personalism of these regimes. However, Iraq under Saddam Hussein is labeled as a personalist autocracy. The main problem is a lack of transparency on when exactly a country is coded in which category. One of the neglected points in the classification of autocratic regimes and political regimes in general is the treatment of dependent territories, such as colonies. At present, it is noticeable that while occupation phases are coded in most regime datasets, colonial periods/regimes remain excluded. This is difficult to understand, as colonial rule is obviously a form of rule. At least in a typology of all political regimes, a systematic inclusion of colonial regimes seems necessary. Another often underestimated problem regarding regime typologies is determining the cut-off date at which a regime is coded in datasets. This problem follows from the fact that almost all datasets are disseminated in country-year format. The most common cut-off dates are January 1 and December 31. If in a country a regime change occurs in between these dates, datasets based on the same classification would note different regime types. When comparing different datasets the cut-off dates always must be kept in mind. Overall, the country-year format of almost all regime datasets leads to restrictions. In one country, several regime changes can be recorded in one year. Because of the cut-off date rule in most regime datasets, regimes that lasted one day or only a few days appear in a dataset, but other regimes that span almost a year in between are not included. If we look at the quality of the current datasets, all have some problems. However, GWF set a new standard for regime datasets in this field. The codebook for the dataset (Geddes et al. 2013) is by far the most comprehensive. It includes descriptions of the initial and final events for each autocratic regime (including the used sources). In addition, it includes documentation of cases where GWF and CGV codings do not match (i.e. first, observations that CGV code as non-democratic that are not coded as autocratic in GWF; second, cases that CGV code as democratic and GWF as autocratic), with a brief explanation of the coding decisions for the dissenting cases. Such a documentation is exemplary and it is highly recommended that it be adopted by all typologies for autocratic regimes but also for political regimes more generally.

Typologies of autocratic regimes  21

CONCLUSION Typologies of political regimes are significantly different in terms of both their theoretical grounding and operationalization. Therefore, they cannot be treated as interchangeable (Roller 2013, p. 37). Researchers have to choose carefully based on their research question which typology they use. Overall, regarding typologies of political regimes an intensification of the methodological debate appears necessary. This is especially true in cases of overlapping categories in different typologies. It has to be made more transparent why a specific regime is coded differently than in another dataset. Basic terms like “political regime” and “political regime change” should be discussed in more detail. While there is a lot of literature on the measurement of democracy and how to draw a line between democracy and electoral autocracy more discussion is needed on standards for a “good” regime typology and how to draw, for instance, a clear line between a (constitutional) monarchy and a democracy with a monarch without executive powers. As the landscape of authoritarian and democratic regimes is much more complex, better measurements are needed to capture this complexity.

NOTES 1. https://​freedomhouse​.org/​. 2. While Snyder focused the last question on stateness it is also important for the distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. 3. The newest version of this dataset stems from Bjørnskov and Rode (2020) and covers the period from 1950 to 2022.

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24  Research handbook on authoritarianism Sartori, Giovanni (1991). Comparing and miscomparing, Journal of Theoretical Politics 3, 243–57. Schedler, Andreas (2002). Elections without democracy: The menu of manipulation, Journal of Democracy 13, 36–50. Schmidt, Manfred G. (2016). Regime types: Measuring democracy and autocracy, in: Hans Keman and Jaap J. Woldendorp (eds.), Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Political Science. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 111–26. Siaroff, Alan (2013). Comparing Political Regimes. A Thematic Introduction to Comparative Politics, 3rd edn. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Skaaning, Svend-Erik (2006). Political Regimes and their Changes: A Conceptual Framework. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Snyder, Richard (2006). Beyond Electoral authoritarianism: The spectrum of non-democratic-regimes, in: Andreas Schedler (ed.), Electoral Authoritarianism. The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 219–31. Sodeur, Wolfgang (1974). Empirische Verfahren zur Klassifikation. Stuttgart: Teubner. Sokal, Robert R. and Sneath, Peter H. (1963). Principles of Numerical Taxonomy. San Francisco, CA: W.H. Freeman and Company. Vanhanen, Tatu (1984). The Emergence of Democracy. A Comparative Study of 119 States, 1850–1979. Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica. Vanhanen, Tatu (1997). Prospects of Democracy. A Study of 172 Countries. London: Routledge. Wahman, Michael, Teorell, Jan, and Hadenius, Axel (2013). Authoritarian Regime types revisited: Updated data in comparative perspective, Contemporary Politics 19, 19–34. Wigell, Mikael (2008). Mapping “hybrid regimes”: Regime types and concepts in comparative politics, Democratization 15, 230–50. Wilson, Matthew C. (2013). A discreet critique of discrete regime type data, Comparative Political Studies 47, 689–714. Ziegler, Heinz O. (1932). Autoritärer oder totaler Staat. Tübingen: Mohr.

2. Electoral authoritarianism: persistence and innovation in sub-Saharan Africa Andrea Cassani and Giovanni Carbone

2.1 INTRODUCTION Between the mid-1970s and the 1990s, the so-called “third wave of democratization” (Huntington, 1991) dramatically changed the political landscape across most world regions, as universal suffrage multiparty elections became the modal procedure to assign government power. Optimism for the “democratic moment” (Plattner, 1991) and the future of democracy and political freedom, however, was short-lived and soon gave way to dilemmas about the challenges of consolidation (Haggard and Kaufman, 1994; Linz and Stepan, 1996) and the dangers that newly established democracies were facing (Schmitter, 1994). By the beginning of the 21st century, the “fallacy of electoralism”, to which Schmitter and Karl (1991) warned about years before, became most manifest (Carothers, 2002). Rather than eradicating despotism, the widespread introduction of elections and multipartism during the third wave now partly appeared under a different light, as many authoritarian rulers learned how to coexist with them. Authoritarianism thus proved more resilient than initially expected and able to transform its institutional structures to adapt and survive in an “age of democratization” (Brownlee, 2007). Accordingly, several countries that were previously considered in protracted transition towards democracy were reclassified as instances of a new form of non-democratic rule, namely, “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler, 2002), in which seemingly democratic voting and institutions coexist with autocratic practices. Since the 1990s, electoral authoritarianism has expanded exponentially and its diffusion was further accelerated by a recent, reverse wave of democratic backsliding and autocratization (Bermeo, 2016; Cassani and Tomini, 2019; Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). As a consequence, the authoritarian use of elections currently represents the most common type of political regime in the world (Boese et al., 2022), and a lively scholarly debate has emerged on the nature, origins, functioning, and performance of these political systems. We review this literature in the next section of this chapter. The recent diffusion of electoral authoritarianism, however, is not only challenging for the present and future of political freedom, but also for research. The larger the number of electoral autocracies in the world, the weaker the utility of electoral authoritarianism as an analytical tool to study contemporary non-democratic politics. Increasingly, a systematization of the existing heterogeneity within the electoral authoritarian universe is needed, for instance, regarding the processes of regime change leading to electoral authoritarianism, the resilience of these regimes, the different ways in which it could be either achieved or challenged, and the factors that could either strengthen or destabilize an electoral autocracy. To examine this variance, in Section 2.3 we focus on sub-Saharan Africa. The region is particularly relevant for the study of electoral authoritarianism, as it is home to slightly less than half of the world’s electoral autocracies, which in turn represent the modal regime type in 25

26  Research handbook on authoritarianism this region (Boese et al., 2022). We map existing varieties of electoral authoritarianism south of the Sahara since the wave of multiparty politics reforms of the early 1990s, examine the relatively divergent trajectories these regimes followed over the past three decades, and discuss the strategies and techniques they employ to survive as well as their evolution.

2.2

ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIAN RULE: NATURE, ORIGINS, AND STABILITY

Electoral authoritarianism is the prevailing form of non-democratic rule in the contemporary world, and the object of a vigorous debate. Research has thus far covered three broad questions concerning these regimes, namely: What are they? What are the reasons of their diffusion? And are these regimes stable? As we will show, scholars have offered multiple and sometimes diverging answers, which we re-examine to identify the defining features and main varieties of electoral authoritarianism, trace the origins and diffusion of this political phenomenon, and reflect upon the stability and relatedly the future of this form of regime. 2.2.1

Nature and Varieties of Electoral Authoritarianism

In his influential work, Andreas Schedler characterizes electoral authoritarian rule as regimes that “play the game of multiparty election”, where elections “are broadly inclusive …, minimally pluralistic …, minimally competitive …, and minimally open …”. And yet such elections are not democratic as “governments subject them to manifold forms of authoritarian manipulation that violate the liberal-democratic principles of freedom, fairness, and integrity” (Schedler, 2013, p. 2). This definition highlights the “structural ambivalence” (Schedler, 2002, p. 37) of electoral authoritarianism, deriving from the coexistence of some of the institutions typical of procedural democracy – notably, universal suffrage and regularly repeated multiparty elections for both the legislative and the executive – with abuses of state power that are typical of autocracy. These abuses range from the manipulation of elections’ rules, conduct and results to the infringement of civil liberties (e.g. voter intimidation and opposition harassment), from the misappropriation of state resources for partisan ends to the limitation of media freedom. As much as the use of democratic procedures is not sporadic, but represents the principal means for acquiring power, the violation of their spirit is widespread, profound, and systematic. While the above definition clearly indicates that electoral authoritarianism refers to a “hybrid” political regime (Diamond, 2002), some clarifications are in order. The notion of hybrid regime describes all those political regimes that populate the so-called “grey zone” (Carothers, 2002) between democracy and autocracy, as they combine democratic and autocratic features. So defined, hybrid regimes represent a broader category that includes both electoral autocracies and “defective democracies” (Boogards, 2009). The latter hold elections that fulfil minimal democratic conditions, even though they are characterized by systematic deficiencies regarding civil rights, horizontal controls, political participation, and the effective power to govern (Merkel, 2004). Hence, while electoral authoritarianism is a form of hybrid regime, not all hybrid regimes are electoral authoritarian: electoral autocracies represent specific kinds of hybrid regimes.

Electoral authoritarianism  27 Because of its hybrid nature, we observe considerable disagreement over electoral authoritarianism as a category for classifying non-democratic regimes, which can easily translate in measurement problems, influence research findings, and hamper the accumulation of knowledge (Cassani, 2014; Handlin, 2017). Three main approaches can be identified. Currently, the most common approach is to consider electoral authoritarianism as a diminished type of autocracy (Linz, 2000), typically in the context of a four-fold typology of political regimes ordered along a continuum that includes closed autocracy, electoral autocracy, electoral (or defective) democracy, and liberal democracy (Diamond, 2002; Lührmann et al., 2018, among several others). According to an alternative approach, electoral authoritarianism represents a subtype of autocracy, different from other authoritarian subtypes, but not necessarily less authoritarian (or more democratic) than the latter (Kailitz, 2013; Wahman et al., 2013). While different, the two previous approaches similarly build on the idea that there is something fundamentally distinct about electoral authoritarianism vis-à-vis other forms of non-democratic rule. However, other scholars consider authoritarian “electoralism” as a modus operandi that various non-democratic regimes may adopt, but not as a feature that redefines their identity and that identifies a separate regime category (Cheibub et al., 2010; Geddes et al., 2014). A further issue refers to the heterogeneity existing within the electoral authoritarianism universe. The prevailing approach is to distinguish based on the degree of political competition that is allowed in these regimes. While all electoral authoritarian regimes display a “playing field [that] is heavily skewed in favour of incumbents” (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p. 5), these regimes vary depending on the actual ability of opposition parties to operate above ground and challenge the ruling elite. Accordingly, competitive authoritarianism denotes an electoral autocracy in which “opposition parties … contest seriously for power and, on occasion, successfully” (Levitsky and Way, 2010, p. 5). Typically, the competitiveness of these regimes derives more from the weakness of the ruling elite than from a deliberate decision. In other electoral autocracies, on the contrary, incumbents enjoy an almost unchallenged hegemony (Magaloni, 2006; see also Sartori, 1976). Even the distinction between competitive and hegemonic electoral autocracies presents measurement challenges. Frequently, scholars rely on either the vote share of the winning party or candidate (Howard and Roessler, 2006) or the percentage of legislative seats held by the ruling party (Brownlee, 2009; Diamond, 2002). Thresholds typically range from 70 to 75 per cent. Others utilize a longevity requirement – e.g. at least 20 years of uninterrupted rule (Magaloni, 2006). Carbone and Pellegata (2020), in turn, suggest that hegemony may derive from the presence either of a single strong leader that holds on to power, or of a strong ruling party that nonetheless allows for intra-party rotation at the executive. Besides the level of electoral hegemony, Morse (2017) distinguishes electoral autocracies based on the level of repression against opponents. Further distinctions refer to the historical and institutional context an electoral authoritarian regime emerges from (Morse, 2017), and the level of competition at the subnational level (Saikkonen, 2016). 2.2.2

Origins and Diffusion of Electoral Authoritarianism

At the beginning of the 21st century, electoral authoritarianism already represented the modal type of regime in the developing world (Schedler, 2002). In 2021, electoral autocracies out-

28  Research handbook on authoritarianism numbered any other form of democratic and non-democratic regime globally (Boese et al., 2022). Regarding the origins of electoral authoritarianism and the reasons of its recent diffusion, we should first clarify that it does not represent an entirely new phenomenon, as several “past regimes have paid lip service to democracy while frequently violating its basic tenets” (Ottaway, 2003, p. 4; see also Hermet et al., 1978; Miller, 2015a). Hence, not the emergence, but the proliferation of these regimes represents “very much a product of the contemporary world” (Diamond, 2002, p. 24). We can identify two main explanations of the global spread of electoral authoritarianism, roughly corresponding to two broad trends of regime change and historical phases. First, many contemporary electoral autocracies are a byproduct of the third wave of democratization and, more specifically, the result of a process of transformation and adaptation of regimes that were already non-democratic, especially during the late 1980s and the 1990s. This path to electoral authoritarianism stems from a combination of pro-democratic conditions at the international level and the absence of such conditions at the domestic level. The end of the Cold War caused the loss of external support for many super-power sponsored dictatorships and the diffusion of Western political models (Levitsky and Way, 2010). However, in several countries, certain domestic “unfavourable conditions” – including ineffective state institutions, an underdeveloped economy, a weak civil society, and neopatrimonialism – “created formidable obstacles to the establishment … of democracy” (Ottaway, 2003, pp. 3–4). In similar contexts, the political elites (both the old ones who managed to hold on to power and the new ones who replaced former dictators) made institutional concessions to their domestic opponents and to Western development aid donors, but “consciously [chose] to limit the amount of transformation” (Ottaway, 2003, p. 159). In such cases of authoritarian transformation, changes did take place but the country remained in the realm of non-democratic forms of rule. A second path to electoral authoritarianism was experienced by several countries during the past two decades through a process of autocratization. The increasingly frequent signals of a global wave of autocratization (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019) are an object of thorough academic scrutiny. Contrary to the waves of autocratization that characterized the 20th century, in particular, it has been noticed that contemporary processes of autocratization tend to unfold slowly and incrementally through a combination of executive aggrandizement and electoral manipulation (Bermeo, 2016). In other words, the current authoritarian tide has only rarely resulted in the cancellation of elections and the institutionalization of closed forms of dictatorship. More frequently, leaders elected through reasonably free and fair contests have subsequently tried to expand and consolidate their power, leading their countries to electoral authoritarianism (Cassani and Tomini, 2019). 2.2.3

Stability and Future of Electoral Authoritarianism

At this point, it should be clear that electoral authoritarianism is not ephemeral, but something that will likely characterize the global political landscape for a long time. The diffusion and persistence of electoral authoritarianism as a phenomenon, however, does not necessarily imply the stabilization of these regimes. Some scholars consider the coexistence of democratic rules and autocratic methods an inherent source of instability (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Others see formally democratic institutions either as an instrument of authoritarian stability

Electoral authoritarianism  29 (Boix and Svolik, 2013; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007), or to have no significant effect on regime breakdown (Brownlee, 2009). Much of the existing disagreement regarding the stability of electoral autocracies has to do with the role of elections in these regimes. While everyone agrees that elections under authoritarian rule are not just window dressing, these institutions can have both a stabilizing and a destabilizing effect. Elections can help autocrats to mobilize popular support, maintain elite cohesion, and weaken opposition (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni, 2006). First, they facilitate the management of intra-elite relationships, as they establish a regularized method to share power among ruling party politicians and for career advancement. Second, they can be used to neutralize the opposition. On the one hand, by scoring overwhelming victories, rulers signal regime strength to their opponents. On the other hand, by allowing multiparty competition, rulers trap opposition parties in coordination dilemmas that spur fragmentation. Third, elections ease control over the population, as they help mobilize the masses and provide information about citizens’ preferences and satisfaction, which in turn can be used to reward friends, punish enemies, and adjust policy-making (Miller, 2015b). However, elections could also bring about defections and unexpected results. Mismanagement and bad economic performance, for instance, may stir the ambitions of disaffected members of the ruling elite willing to defect and capitalize upon popular discontent (Kailitz and Stockemer, 2017; Reuter and Gandhi, 2011). Nor are autocrats always able to manipulate the polls successfully, especially when state capacity is low (Seeberg, 2014). In fact, rather than mere tools of authoritarian governance, authoritarian multiparty elections represent arenas of struggles that offer opportunities for opposition groups to erode authoritarian stability (Schedler, 2013). It has been noticed also that a repeated practice with elections could help opposition parties to learn how to challenge the ruling party (Lindberg, 2006). In particular, incumbent vulnerability peaks when opposition parties form pre-electoral coalitions and endorse a single presidential candidate (Gandhi and Reuter, 2013; Howard and Roessler, 2006). Bunce and Wolchik also highlight the importance of deploying “innovative, well-planned, detailed and sometimes dangerous strategies” and of running “ambitious political campaigns” (2010, p. 73). Does this mean that electoral autocracies are likely to democratize? Several scholars find that electoral authoritarianism is “the typical stepping-stone to democratisation” (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007, p. 152), especially the more competitive variant (Brownlee, 2009), or at least that these regimes are more likely to democratize than to backslide towards closed authoritarianism (Dresden and Howard, 2016) when they break down. Others caution against assuming that in electoral autocracies opposition parties, as well as other non-state actors (Balderacchi, 2022), are more committed to democracy than incumbents. Even in the case of government turnover, therefore, electoral authoritarianism could survive. Moreover, besides the preferences of domestic actors, electoral autocracies’ prospects for democratization heavily depend on the international context, and particularly the density and tightness of a country’s linkages to the West (Levitsky and Way, 2010).

2.3

TRAJECTORIES OF ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM SOUTH OF THE SAHARA

The review of the literature presented in the previous section highlights several sources of variance within the electoral authoritarian universe regarding the origins, stability, and future of

30  Research handbook on authoritarianism these regimes. Yet what are the main trajectories that electoral autocracies followed during the past three decades? We address this question by focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, which offers an optimal regional context for an in-depth study of this relatively new form of non-democratic regime. The third wave of democratization reached the shores of sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s. The vast majority of countries on the continent embarked on processes of transition to multiparty politics that were initially celebrated as the beginning of a continent-wide movement of democratic progress. Hopes ran high that political power would be depersonalized through the introduction of regularized and competitive voting for leadership selection and replacement. Africa’s political reforms confirmed that elections do not equal democracy though. In several cases, change only affected the surface of politics. Electoral authoritarianism soon became the prevailing form of government south of the Sahara, which in turn is the region with the highest absolute number of electoral autocracies today (Boese et al., 2022). To trace the trajectories of African electoral authoritarian regimes, we proceed as follows. Regarding the origins of electoral authoritarianism, two main paths can be identified, one of authoritarian transformation from closed autocracy to electoral autocracy, and one of autocratization from democracy to electoral autocracy. Moreover, electoral autocracies vary in terms of continuity, which to some extent reflects the ruling elite’s ability to hegemonize the political arena. In hegemonic electoral autocracies, the same political elite proves able to hold on to power for substantial periods of time. However, this kind of hegemony can be achieved in two distinct ways, through either a personalist leadership or party dominance. Even non-hegemonic electoral autocracies differ from each other. In some cases, more or less peaceful ruling elite changes occur without causing outright regime transitions. Elsewhere, leadership changes represent either a driver of democratization or a source of instability, especially when they are irregular. Our analysis rests on a sample of 34 African electoral autocracies that have existed during the 1990–2021 period, though not necessarily lasting for the entire period. To identify these cases, we first considered all 49 sub-Saharan states and we discarded four non-electoral regimes, that is, countries that never held multiparty elections during the period (Eritrea, eSwatini, Somalia, and South Sudan). The remaining 45 countries are electoral regimes, which we classify as either democratic or electoral authoritarian. For clarity, we consider an electoral regime to be in place if a country holds a series of at least three valid universal suffrage multiparty elections for the executive, with no interruption in between due to military coups, civil war, or other suspensions of the constitutional order. As an example, we consider Comoros to be an electoral regime only since 2002, as both the 1990 and 1996 elections were followed by military coups that overthrew elected governments. Among electoral regimes, we identify 11 relatively stable democracies. Our assessment relies on the V-Dem’s Regimes of the World indicator (Lührmann et al., 2018) and Freedom House’s Electoral Democracy indicator, as well as case-specific knowledge (especially when the two indicators disagree). African democracies include Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, Namibia, Sao Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and South Africa. Many of these countries democratized in the early 1990s, and have remained democratic ever since. Botswana, Mauritius, and Senegal democratized before 1990. In other countries, democratic rule stabilized with some delay due to civil war and/or coups, such as in Lesotho, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

Electoral authoritarianism  31 Table 2.1

Electoral autocracies in sub-Saharan Africa since 1990

Angola 2008–21

Guinea-Bissau 2014–21

Benin 2016–21

Kenya 1992–2021

Burkina Faso 1991–2015

Madagascar 2001–19

Burundi 2005–21

Malawi 1994–2021

Cameroon 1992–2021

Mali 2013–20

Central African Republic 2016–21

Mauritania 1992–2021

Chad 1996–2021

Mozambique 1994–2021

Comoros 2002–21

Niger 2011–21

Congo-DRC 2006–21

Nigeria 1999–2021

Congo-RoC 2002–21

Rwanda 2003–21

Côte d’Ivoire 2010–21

Seychelles 1993–2015

Djibouti 1993–2021

Sudan 1996–2019

Equatorial Guinea 1996–2021

Tanzania 1995–2021

Ethiopia 1995–2021

Togo 1993–2021

Gabon 1993–2021

Uganda 2006–21

Gambia 1996–2021

Zambia 2011–21

Guinea 1993–2021

Zimbabwe 1980–2021

The remaining 34 countries represent – for at least some time during the period we cover – as many cases of electoral authoritarianism, that is, non-democratic regimes holding both legislative and executive universal suffrage multiparty elections that are neither free nor fair. Table 2.1 reports the period during which in each of these countries an electoral authoritarian regime was in place. Even a cursory look at these cases reveals important differences regarding the regime trajectories they have followed during the past three decades. In some of these countries, electoral authoritarianism represented a constant since their transition to formally multiparty and inclusive politics (Cameroon and Mozambique are cases in point), whereas in other countries it has represented either a phase that is now over (e.g. Seychelles) or only a recent “achievement” (e.g. Benin). As anticipated, however, the duration of these regimes likely reflects more substantive variations in terms of origins, continuity, and, relatedly, stability and instability, which we now examine. Concerning the origins of electoral authoritarian rule, we classify our sample of African cases based on the type of regime that was in place prior to the transition to electoral authoritarianism. We use data from several sources (Boese et al., 2022; Geddes et al., 2014; Wahman et al., 2013), as well as case knowledge. If electoral authoritarianism results from a process of authoritarian transformation, the “starting point” was a closed (or non-electoral) autocracy of either the military, one-party, or personalist type (eSwatini, that is, the only hereditary monarchy in the region, did not undergo any changes of status). In turn, if electoral authoritarianism results from a process of autocratization, the starting point is democracy. Alternatively, in a number of cases electoral authoritarianism emerged from protracted periods of internal conflict, such as civil wars and violent takeovers. Figure 2.1 shows that authoritarian transformation is by far the main path to electoral authoritarianism in sub-Saharan Africa. More specifically, transitions from personalist rule are the most frequent; followed by transitions from single-party regimes. The majority of transitions from closed to electoral authoritarianism occurred during the wave of reforms that swept the continent during the 1990s. Slightly less than one-quarter of African electoral autocracies emerged from conflict situations (e.g. Congo-DRC, Rwanda, but also Guinea-Bissau, which

32  Research handbook on authoritarianism

Figure 2.1

Origins of electoral authoritarian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa

experienced four violent leadership changes between 1999 and 2012). A “mere” 18 per cent of cases resulted from a process of autocratization. Most of the latter representing relatively recent transitions occurred during the 2010s, when the pace of the global wave of autocratization accelerated (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). Similarly to other world regions, most of these processes of autocratization occurred in defective democracies, whereas the most advanced African democracies have thus far proved resilient (Cassani and Tomini, 2019). We account for the continuity of electoral autocracies by distinguishing hegemonic regimes from non-hegemonic ones. To measure hegemony, we depart from the common practice of focusing on the ruling candidate’s electoral performance or the ruling party’s share of legislative seats. Instead, based on data from the Africa Leadership Change (ALC) dataset (Carbone and Pellegata, 2020), we focus on the longevity of the ruling elite (Magaloni, 2006) and particularly on its ability to hold on to power for at least three consecutive electoral mandates. Non-hegemonic electoral autocracies, on the contrary, are characterized by the occurrence of both regular and irregular changes of the ruling elites that are in office. About 58 per cent of sub-Saharan electoral autocracies are hegemonic, according to our classification. In addition, we distinguish two types of hegemony, one built on a personalist leadership and one based on party dominance (Carbone and Pellegata, 2020). In party-based electoral autocracies, the same ruling party remains in power but rotations at the chief executive position occur. Leader-based electoral autocracies, in turn, are characterized by the permanence of the same leader as chief executive. Among non-hegemonic regimes, we identify a competitive subtype based on the occurrence of one or more relatively peaceful executive alternations via elections that do not alter the electoral authoritarian nature of the regime. We separate these cases from a rather heterogeneous group of intermittent electoral autocracies that are comparatively unstable (or not yet stable), often as a consequence of one or more irregular leadership changes (e.g. Central African Republic and Guinea). In Table 2.2, we explore connections between origins and stability of electoral authoritarianism in sub-Saharan Africa. We identity two main patterns. The first is one of continuity with the period preceding the introduction of multiparty electoral politics. On the one hand, former single-party regimes have been replaced virtually always by party-based hegemonic regimes, such as Mozambique and Tanzania, in which the ruling party oversees periodic leadership

Electoral authoritarianism  33 Table 2.2

Trajectories of electoral authoritarianism in sub-Saharan Africa

 

CONTINUITY Hegemonic

Non-hegemonic

(continuity)

(discontinuity)

Leader-based

Party-based

Competitive

Intermittent

Authoritarian

Military

Sudan

Ethiopia

Nigeria

–

transformation

Single-party

–

Angola,

Kenya

–

Malawi

Guinea,

Mozambique, Tanzania, Seychelles, Zimbabwe Personalist

Burkina Faso,

–

Mauritania

ORIGIN

Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Togo, Uganda Autocratization

–

–

Gambia,

Niger, Mali

Madagascar, Zambia, Benin Conflict

Congo-RoC, Côte d’Ivoire, Rwanda

Burundi

Comoros,

Central African

Congo-DRC,

Republic

Guinea-Bissau

changes. On the other hand, a majority of former personalist regimes have become leader-based hegemonic regimes, including Burkina-Faso, Cameroon, and Uganda. We include in this category also Djibouti, Gabon, and Togo, in which “big men” were replaced by members of their families following a de facto dynastic succession. In both cases, therefore, authoritarian transformations saw the ruling elites – and quite often incumbent leaders themselves – managing the transition from closed to electoral authoritarianism without losing their grip on power. A second trend refers to the electoral authoritarian regimes that emerged from a process of autocratization, whose rulers have failed (thus far) to hegemonize the political arena. Many of them represent cases of competitive authoritarianism, such as Gambia and Zambia. The remaining two “intermittent” cases – Mali and Niger – represent unstable countries that transitioned to electoral authoritarianism following military takeovers that broke down their fragile democracies, in 2010 and 2012, respectively (in the case of Mali further military interruptions occurred in 2020 and 2021). A further interesting point (if not an outright trend) is that electoral autocracies that emerged from conflict situations tend either to be hegemonized by the leader that won the conflict (e.g. Kagame, Sassou-Nguesso) or to evolve in somewhat competitive regimes (Guinea-Bissau).

2.4

EXPLAINING ELECTORAL AUTHORITARIANISM SOUTH OF THE SAHARA: BEYOND THE ELECTORAL ARENA

Whether politically stable or not, African electoral autocracies are far from static in the specific ways they operate. The strategies and techniques they employ to ensure survival and

34  Research handbook on authoritarianism implement repression evolve hand in hand with variations in the surrounding environment, including changes in the availability of repressive tools, the presence of international backing, and the whims of public opinion. 2.4.1

Change and Innovation in Authoritarian Practices

Electoral authoritarian regimes, as mentioned, have often controlled and manipulated popular voting, turning it from a constraint on the exercise of power into a tool strengthening an autocrat’s hand (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni, 2006; Miller, 2015b; Svolik, 2012). Besides and beyond the well-established instrumental use of formally democratic institutions, however, African electoral autocracies have been in line with comparable regimes in other world regions in that they too have increasingly privileged a long-term, fine-tuned management of the political space so to make old-fashioned vote stuffing and other election-day blatant, fraudulent practices somewhat less urgent, if still typically part of the picture. The curtailment of media freedom has been one of the most glaring features among recent trends. Africa’s political openings, back in the 1990s, had nurtured the flourishing of free, independent, and pluralist media, if with noticeable differences across the region. This seemed to put an end to the previous era of state-controlled information only, when autocrats could count on unfailingly positive news coverage. FM radio broadcasting, an early but still a key source of information across the continent, was a prominent case in point. Uganda, for example, progressed from having a single official broadcaster in 1992–93 to over 300 private FM stations in the early 2020s. In recent years, however, African journalists and the media have increasingly become the target of censorship, legal restrictions and bans, bribery, misinformation and disinformation campaigns, arrests, murders, attacks and harassment. Restrictive laws targeting the sector, for example, were introduced in countries such as Tanzania and Ethiopia; journalists were arrested from Cameroon and Nigeria (in the latter country, six were killed too between 2016 and 2020) to Rwanda and Uganda; in Liberia, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, and other places, police raids were conducted against independent radio stations. While, in 2006, six African countries were considered to have a “free” media environment, none was deemed so in 2019; meanwhile, popular support for media freedom declined from 56 per cent to 46 per cent, according to Afrobarometer surveys (Conroy-Krutz, 2020, p. 97). Poverty and weak state capacity did not prevent sub-Saharan electoral autocracies from adopting cutting-edge authoritarian techniques via learning and adaptation. Just like China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, or Cuba were considered at the frontline in devising new methods of repressing freedoms, a number of African countries too pioneered the use of comparatively novel tools, notably Rwanda, Uganda, Congo-DRC, Equatorial Guinea, and Togo (Morgenbesser, 2020). Kampala, for example, employed spyware and other sophisticated surveillance technology against political opponents to the ruling group. Observers’ attitude towards digital technologies and social media, over the past decade, has shifted from naïvely acclaiming the unlimited potential of “liberation technology”, apparently demonstrated by the initial events of the Arab Spring, into a more sceptical awareness of the risks and frequent misuses of technological progress, including the spread of disinformation and populism via social media such as Twitter, Facebook, or WhatsApp, which in Africa have occasionally fuelled ethnic and political turmoil (Cheeseman et al., 2020).

Electoral authoritarianism  35 Yet innovation went beyond technology. Congo-RoC’s Denis Sassou-Nguesso, Gabon’s Ali Bongo, and Equatorial Guinea’s Theodore Obiang variously hired lobbying, law, and public relations firms with the aim of improving the image of their regimes abroad. A number of African autocrats can personally dispose of financial resources large enough to buy support from specific constituencies in the West, including businesses with vested interests in their countries or media, think tanks, and others available for favourable coverage (this was reportedly at the origin of Bongo’s controversial nomination by the Atlantic Council for its Global Citizen Award) (Carter, 2018). Ultimately, striving for survival, African regimes did not simply cling to the past, but they turned to expanding and adapting the range of tools and practices employed by authoritarian leaders. 2.4.2

External Actors and Political Models

Contrary to commonly held views, the widespread introduction of multiparty elections in post-Cold War Africa was largely due to domestic rather than external reformist drives. But it was undoubtedly favoured by an international scenario in which the cost of retaining outright dictatorship had suddenly become unbearable, particularly for countries with significant ties to, or dependence on, the West (Levitsky and Way, 2020). Accordingly, bending democratic rules and adapting electoral practices often earned African regimes criticisms and penalties from rich donors keen on promoting or protecting democracy (though the latter did not always put their money where their mouth was). Since around the turn of the century, however, a massive surge in external interest towards the sub-Saharan region has become apparent, with European and American influence increasingly challenged by a proliferation of alternative international partners knocking at the doors of Africa’s presidential palaces. As Western countries entered a time of “democratic fatigue” during which they diminished their interest and efforts aimed at the promotion (or the defence) of democratic principles and rights (Rakner, 2019; van de Walle, 2016), an opposite pull emerged coming from a number of non-Western external players. Most prominently, China’s economic expansion in the region was accompanied by Beijing proudly showing off the success of its authoritarian developmental model. Russia’s return, on the other hand, took an unambiguously anti-Western undertone, most apparent in Moscow’s political meddling and de facto support for military takeovers across the Sahel and beyond. Both countries’ narratives and actions convey an illiberal view of modernity explicitly challenging the spread of emancipative values (Welzel, 2021). The new multipolar scenario thus meant that Western-derived norms and institutions could now more openly be questioned and manipulated. The “external cost of authoritarianism”, Levitsky and Way (2020, p. 55) point out, has gone down compared to the 1990s, as “autocratic behaviour no longer triggers a costly punitive response”. While the full-fledged abandonment of multiparty voting has hardly been on the African table yet – even the recent wave of military coups came with pledges that elections would soon be restored – authoritarian regimes’ twisting of electoral practices was made somewhat easier by the external environment. China’s governance model legitimizes political monopoly, unelected and unchallenged leaders, social repression and cyber-surveillance, minority subjugation, and media control and censorship. In Africa, such a model has been increasingly promoted in three main ways (Scott, 2021). First, by cultivating ties with African elites so to shape their views and behaviours. This

36  Research handbook on authoritarianism was done both via party-to-party exchanges (including with major ruling parties such as the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) as well as through training on the key features of “the Chinese way” – including norms and techniques for managing public affairs – offered to the likes of journalists, the military, and members of civil society. Every year, some 10,000 African officials are reportedly tutored (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2022, p. 23). Second, by exporting cybersecurity and surveillance technology and infrastructure – part of the broader Digital Silk Road strategy that Beijing launched in 2015 to expand the role of its tech companies worldwide and thus earn China a global technology leadership – including internet firewalls, social media monitoring tools, cell data collection instruments, facial or number-plate recognition software. Nigeria and Zambia are two of the countries that “benefited” from this cooperation. Finally, direct and indirect interventions in African media are carried out with the aim of shaping and disseminating pro-China narratives. This is done by acquiring media infrastructures and stakes in media outlets, by distributing news and sharing content from Beijing-controlled sources, by nurturing ties with local journalists, or by hindering access to Western media sources. Through Xinhua, China Daily, China Global TV Network, and China Radio International, for example, Kenya’s capital Nairobi has been made the centre of Beijing’s expanding role in East Africa’s media scenario (Scott, 2021). If on a lesser scale, Russia’s presence and influence in Africa has been on the rise too, nurtured not only through practical means (arms trade, military agreements, mercenary activities, mining deals, agricultural exports), but also, more subtly, by turning into sources of soft power the legacy of Soviet-era links, the rise of anti-Western resentment in parts of the continent, the training of thousands of Africans in Russia, and inroads into Africa’s media landscape and narratives. Pragmatic and opportunistic, Moscow’s return to Africa has been immensely less systematic and resourced than China’s, and frequently unofficial, but it has frequently featured meddling into the domestic politics of sub-Saharan nations with the goal of achieving economic gains and political allies. Western responses to the challenges raised against the liberal democratic model, in the broader context of great power competition, have mostly been low key, at least until the Ukrainian crisis. The single most visible effort was possibly the 2021 (virtual) “summit for democracy” organized by the Biden administration – with 17 African states among 112 countries convened – in a team-building and collective action exercise that largely failed to leave a mark. 2.4.3

Region-wide Context and Dynamics

Outsiders meddling into Africa’s political dynamics, however, are certainly not the only reason for the widening scope electoral authoritarian practices have gained. Regional contextual factors are crucially part of the picture. Domestic dynamics often reverberate next door across Africa’s state boundaries. Back in the 1990s, this was vividly demonstrated by a veritable domino effect as nation after nation embarked on democratic openings. Currently, an opposite neighbourhood effect appears to be at play. In West Africa and across the Sahel, emulation arguably contributed to the string of military coups that shook five countries over a brief period of time (Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, and Sudan), while other soldiers’ attempts to seize power failed elsewhere in the region (Niger, Guinea-Bissau).

Electoral authoritarianism  37 In a more subtle and largely indirect manner, electoral authoritarian regimes appear to shore each other up. In Eastern Africa, for example, the regimes of countries such as Tanzania, Mozambique, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi “each benefits from the presence of neighbours that champion authoritarian development” (Paget, 2017, p. 154). Proven “best practices” easily travel across frontiers to be replicated in nearby states. In 2019, Africa was not spared as pro-democracy protests reached an all-time high in a veritable global wave (Maerz et al., 2020). Demonstrations took place in several countries, from Burkina Faso to Nigeria, with Sudan’s bread riots and the related ousting of long-term ruler Omar al-Bashir the best known case. That season was largely sedated by the Covid-19 pandemic. Emergency responses to the pandemic were used to justify violations of democratic standards – hampering the goals and the practices of mass demonstrations – with major episodes taking place under electoral authoritarian governments in Mauritania, Guinea, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and others (Edgell et al., 2020). Elsewhere – in Ethiopia, Cameroon, and Mozambique – it was armed conflicts that gave governments an opportunity to crack down on the opposition and on civilians in crisis-ridden areas and beyond. Mounting electoral challenges also explain the harsh reaction of some electoral authoritarian states. Following its lowest-ever electoral showing in 2015, for example, Tanzania’s ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi party went on to adopt a long series of punitive measures that successfully stifled the country’s opposition, civil society, and media environment (Paget, 2017, 2021). Many Africans have courageously tried to resist the expansion of electoral authoritarian practices. But this was not the only attitude the continent’s publics have displayed. Too many in the region feel somewhat betrayed by what democracy has been able to deliver in terms of living condition improvements by addressing basic needs such as access to electricity and safe water, quality roads, health and education services, and the like. Empirical evidence does show that democracy tends to favour economic and welfare advances, and that this has been the case particularly for sub-Saharan Africa (Carbone et al., 2016; Colagrossi et al., 2020; Harding, 2019; Kriekhaus, 2006). Yet the widespread persistence of poverty, unemployment, inequalities, corruption, and violent conflicts, alongside the enviable developmental performances of some authoritarian states, both foreign (China) as well as within the region (Ethiopia, Rwanda), arguably contributed to the perception of democracy’s failure to produce development and socioeconomic progress. For many African countries, the situation was compounded by growing demographic tensions, environmental challenges, and the deterioration of economic conditions following the end of the commodities super-cycle and the emergence of the Covid-19 pandemic. The Ukrainian crisis most recently added fuel to the fire through its negative impact on food security and, more broadly, on the global economic outlook. To an extent, public opinion surveys show that Africans ostensibly retain their commitment to democracy: some 68 per cent of those interviewed in 2016–18 by the Afrobarometer claim they prefer democracy over any other form of government, and between 72 per cent and 78 per cent reject strong-man, one-party, or military rule (Dryding, 2020). These opinions would make any leader in the region think twice before formally dumping multiparty voting. Yet it is the relative shallowness or inconsistency of such commitment (a mere 42 per cent agree with all four of the above) that expands the room for the kind of harassment and restrictions that have been gaining ground across the continent (Mattes, 2019). Democratic restrictions and backsliding, in particular, “may meet little popular resistance” (Mattes, 2019) due

38  Research handbook on authoritarianism to a limited presence of so-called “dissatisfied democrats” (i.e. individuals demanding more complete democratic freedoms and practices than they think they are supplied with), that is, those Africans that are most likely to engage in growing and deepening democracy rather than allowing it to be eroded. The latest round of the Afrobarometer surveys points to a continental average of no more that 15 per cent of a country’s population, with low points in places such as South Africa, Kenya, or Tanzania. A continent facing growing violence, economic hurdles, and social problems risks seeing many gradually withdraw their support for democratic institutions in favour of more down-to-earth daily needs such as security, housing, and employment. Across the region, the perception of a trade-off plays into the hands of authoritarian rulers.

2.5 CONCLUSION What do we learn about electoral authoritarianism from Africa? The analysis of electoral authoritarianism south of the Sahara revealed both elements of continuity and of innovation vis-à-vis “old-style” authoritarianism. First, besides a prevalence of African electoral autocracies that originated from a process of authoritarian transformations – that is, changes from one form of non-democratic rule to another – many of the most recent cases resulted from processes of (re-)autocratization of previously democratized regimes. Overall, therefore, the current proliferation of electoral authoritarianism can be described as the consequence of a broader trend of hybridization, or convergence, that has characterized both non-democratic and democratic countries alike. Second, while the introduction of authoritarian multipartyism in what were already non-democratic regimes mostly translated into hegemonic autocracies where the same ruler or ruling party remained in office uninterruptedly, autocratization often led to electoral regimes that have thus far maintained a modicum of change, either in the form of a degree of competitiveness or in the form of an intermittency of political setups. But deviant cases exist. For instance, we observe both examples of relatively unstable electoral autocracies whose ruling elites are apparently building new hegemonies (e.g. Niger), and cases of relatively stable hegemony that either broke down following military interventions (e.g. Sudan) or democratized subsequent to opposition victories (e.g. Seychelles). Third, Africa’s elected autocrats have refined their strategies for regime survival, broadening them to include a series of activities that reach well beyond the sheer (and potentially counterproductive) manipulation of voting and counting at election time. Limiting media freedoms has become a growing trend aimed at constraining dissenting and opposition voices. Restrictive measures have similarly affected social media and the internet at large. New technologies, including spyware, have also been used to closely monitor the opposition, as happened in autocracies belonging to other world regions. Fourth, a significantly more permissive international environment allowed increased autocratic repression across several African countries to go relatively unsanctioned, encouraging elected autocrats to adopt punitive initiatives more easily than would have been the case two or three decades ago. Such measures were more or less directly supported by some of the world’s major or emerging non-democratic states, crucially, whereas the West only showed limited resolve in defending what democratic progresses had been achieved in the region. Fifth, at the continental level, both a neighbourhood effect and a public opinion effect appeared to be at play. The spread of electoral authoritarian rule across the region implied that

Electoral authoritarianism  39 open and competitive political systems – as well as the domestic actors pushing for democracy within each of them – became not only increasingly small in number, but also comparatively isolated in a surrounding context primarily made of autocracies. It was elected autocrats rather than democrats who could more easily join forces, set examples, create networks, exercise pressures. Meanwhile, growing numbers of Africans appeared disenchanted with regard to what democracy can deliver in terms of socioeconomic betterment, a particularly crucial concern in poor societies. Indirectly, the weakening of Africans’ commitment to democracy arguably proved supportive of autocratization moves across sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, this chapter by no means exhausted the questions surrounding electoral authoritarianism, in sub-Sahara Africa and elsewhere. For instance, more research is needed regarding whether and how the role of elections differs systematically across leader-based and party-based hegemonic regimes. A quick look at our data (Table 2.2) offers conflicting hints as, on the one hand, both these regime sub-types include “partly free” and “not free” countries (Freedom House) but, on the other hand, they display quite different uses and treatments of election-related institutions such as term limits (Cassani, 2021; Ezrow, 2019). Moreover, many of the electoral autocracies that emerged from a process of autocratization are recent and thus must undergo deeper examination, and so does the changing influence of international actors and of internal public opinions on the (in)stability of these regimes.

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Electoral authoritarianism  41 Maerz, S.F. et al. (2020) “State of the world 2019: Autocratization surges, resistance grows”, Democratization, 27(6), pp. 909–27. Magaloni, B. (2006) Voting for autocracy. Cambridge University Press. Mattes, R. (2019) Democracy in Africa: Demand, supply, and the “dissatisfied democrat”, Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 54. Merkel, W. (2004) “Embedded and defective democracies”, Democratisation, 11(5), pp. 33–58. Miller, M. (2015a) “Democratic pieces: Autocratic elections and democratic development since 1815”, British Journal of Political Science, 45(3), pp. 501–30. Miller, M. (2015b) “Elections, information, and policy responsiveness in autocratic regimes”, Comparative Political Studies, 48(6), pp. 691–727. Morgenbesser, L. (2020) “The menu of autocratic innovation”, Democratization, 27(6), pp. 1053–72. Morse, Y. (2017) How autocrats compete: Parties, patrons, and unfair elections in Africa. Cambridge University Press. Ottaway, M. (2003) Democracy challenged: The rise of semi-authoritarianism. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Paget, D. (2017) “Tanzania: Shrinking space and opposition protest”, Journal of Democracy, 28(3), pp. 153–66. Paget, D. (2021) “Tanzania: The authoritarian landslide”, Journal of Democracy, 32(2), pp. 61–76. Plattner, M. (1991) “The democratic moment”, Journal of Democracy, 2(4), pp. 34–46. Rakner, L. (2019) “Democratic rollback in Africa”, in Cheeseman, N. (ed.), The Oxford encyclopaedia of African politics. Oxford University Press. https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​acrefore/​9780190228637​.013​.887. Reuter, O. and Gandhi, J. (2011) “Economic performance and elite defection from hegemonic parties”, British Journal of Political Science, 41(1), pp. 83–110. Saikkonen, I. (2016) “Variation in subnational electoral authoritarianism: Evidence from the Russian Federation”, Democratization, 23(3), pp. 437–58. Sartori, G. (1976) Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis. Cambridge University Press. Schedler, A. (2002) “The menu of manipulation”, Journal of Democracy, 13(2), pp. 36–50. Schedler, A. (2013) The politics of uncertainty: Sustaining and subverting electoral authoritarianism. Oxford University Press. Schmitter, P. (1994) “Dangers and dilemmas of democracy”, Journal of Democracy, 5(2), pp. 57–74. Schmitter, P. and Karl, T.L. (1991) “What democracy is…and is not”, Journal of Democracy, 2(3), pp. 75–88. Scott, C.D. (2021) “Does China involvement in African elections and politics hurt democracy?”, http://​ www​.democracyinafrica​.org. Seeberg, M.B. (2014) “State capacity and the paradox of authoritarian elections”, Democratization, 21(7), pp. 1265–85. Svolik, M. (2012) The politics of authoritarian rule. Cambridge University Press. van de Walle, N. (2016) “Conclusion: Democracy fatigue and the ghost of modernization theory”, in Hagmann, T. and Reyntjens, F. (eds), Aid and authoritarianism in Africa: Development without democracy. Zed Books, pp. 161–78. Wahman, M. et al. (2013) “Authoritarian regime types revisited: Updated data in comparative perspective”, Contemporary Politics, 19(1), pp. 19–34. Welzel, C. (2021) “Why the future is democratic”, Journal of Democracy, 32(2), pp. 132–44.

3. Authoritarian populism Ezgi Elçi

3.1 INTRODUCTION Meaning, that Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of individuals, but a community that needs to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in this sense, the new state that we are building is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not deny foundational values of liberalism, as freedom, etc … But it does not make this ideology a central element of state organization, but applies a specific, national, particular approach in its stead. (Viktor Orban, 2014)

Populism’s precarious relationship with liberal democracy is aptly explained by the quote from Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban. During his 12 years of tenure (as of 2022), Hungary’s autocratization trend has spiked and paved the way for classifying a European Union member state from democratic to not democratic (Alizada et al., 2021). Discussions on the detrimental effect of populism on democracy had become popular particularly during the Populist Zeitgeist with the election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States and the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom (Mudde, 2021). However, the debate on whether populism is corrective or harmful to democracy precedes the contemporary populist tide. This chapter discusses authoritarian populism. Specifically, the chapter argues that populism is incompatible with the institutions of liberal democracy, such as the rule of law, checks and balances, and minority rights. Especially when populists come to power with majorities, they capture or weaken these institutions in the name of people’s sovereignty. Hence, we see the effects of populist conquest of the state with the surveys that measure the level of democracy as a decreasing trend. The recent autocratization trend in several countries initiated the discussions of changed paths toward democratic breakdowns. While the primary cause of democratic declines was coups d’état in the second wave of autocratization, now authoritarian leaders come to power mainly through elections. Hence, the path toward autocracy is now more gradual rather than sudden, which makes it difficult to detect, take measures, and fight against (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). According to Bermeo (2016, p. 10), executive aggrandizement, which corresponds to that “elected executives weaken checks on executive power one by one, undertaking a series of institutional changes that hamper the power of opposition forces to challenge executive preferences,” became the most common practice of current autocratization. In other words, now, the elected autocrats manipulate the institutions – rather than abolishing them – in favor of their interests to secure a clear electoral victory, which, in turn, provides legitimacy to their rule. The usual suspects of contemporary autocrats are authoritarian populists who come to power with free and fair elections yet usurp the institutions and make them “their” institutions. In this chapter, I will first unpack the definitions and characteristics of populism, illiberal democracy, and authoritarianism. Next, I will elaborate on the concept of authoritarian pop42

Authoritarian populism  43 ulism and briefly present four case studies: Brazil, the Philippines, Turkey, and the United States. Finally, I will discuss and conclude the chapter.1

3.2 POPULISM Populism is a contested concept that has been defined by several scholars (see Laclau, 2005; Moffitt, 2020; Ostiguy, 2017; Weyland, 2001). In this study, I follow the ideational approach to populism that defines it as a “thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonte generale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2007, p. 23). The logic of populism sits on two characteristics (Mudde, 2021). First, populism is based on the moralistic struggle between the authentic people and the infamous elite. For Müller (2017a), populism is a moralistic imagination of politics. Hence, morality is the differential characteristic of populism from other ideologies. Second, populism is monist. Again for Müller (2017b), populism functions as if there is only one single will, one common good, and one single opinion of all people. Given that populism is against pluralism, populists profoundly criticize the institutions protecting minority rights. Since populism is at odds with liberal democratic institutions, populists have severe problems with the mechanisms and values of constitutionalism, such as checks and balances, the rule of law, and constraints against majoritarianism (Müller, 2017b). Some scholars even define populism as democratic illiberalism (Pappas, 2019). At stake here is the inherent tension between democracy in its purest form and liberalism – or constitutional liberalism (Zakaria, 1997). Many scholars agree that populism is democratic, but the monist characteristic of populism makes it illiberal. For Pappas (2019, p. 35), “populism is always democratic but never liberal.” Mudde (2021, p. 581) states that “populism is an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism.” For Canovan (1981, p. 174), “populist democracy consists of attempts to realize that promise and to make ‘government by the people’ a reality.” Populists overall seek an unmediated relationship with the people. As they are critical of the institutions of liberal democracy, their goal is to convert, if not conquer them, according to their agenda. As opposed to liberal democracy, populist democracy rejects multiple cleavages in society. Instead, they act as if there is only one single cleavage: the pure people versus the corrupt elites. Populists are also against deliberation, negotiation, and compromise. For populists, they have nothing to debate with the corrupt elites because compromise will eventually be harmful to the people’s will (Pappas, 2019). Populists support unanimity rather than consensus. However, they try to reach the former by disregarding the demands, or even existence, of some part of the society who does not deserve to be part of “the people.” Therefore, particularly when populists are in power, we see significant declines in the democratic levels of countries (Ruth-Lovell et al., 2019). Previous studies that point to this outcome have argued that populism has a detrimental impact on democracy. While this argument is correct in the first instance, populists do not have a problem with democracy if one defines it in the minimalist sense. Moreover, one cannot talk about populism if there are no basic democratic institutions (i.e., elections) in a given country (Müller, 2017b). Populists justify their claims and gain legitimacy through the people’s sovereignty. Especially if they are the winners in the elections, populists claim that the people have spoken and are entitled to rule without any constraints whatsoever. Hence, they have an anything-goes approach to politics (Castanho

44  Research handbook on authoritarianism Silva et al., 2018). However, populists do not abolish liberal democratic institutions when they are in power. Instead, they aim to make them “the people’s” institutions. For example, they do not abolish the constitution. Instead, they rewrite it, as in the case of Hungary (Bánkuti et al., 2012) and Venezuela (McCoy, 2000). Populists do not destroy the constitutional courts, but they change their members by either removing them from their seats or appointing additional members to make decisions certain in favor of them (Müller, 2017b). The anti-pluralist or monist dimension of populism also paves the way for an intergroup cleavage in society. The us versus them distinction of populism generates a pure in-group of an imagined community (Anderson, 2006) while drawing exclusionary borders against several groups, including migrants, refugees, and minorities (Mudde, 2007). Meanwhile, populists blame elites and politicians as traitors because the latter groups turn a deaf ear to the concerns and anxieties of the people. Such a Schmittian (2007) friend versus foe distinction functions as a breeding ground for populism. An external crisis, discontent, or threat toward the in-group, in turn, increases in-group solidarity and exacerbates out-group hostility (Aslanidis, 2020; Stephan et al., 2005; also see Stephan et al., 2008 for a detailed discussion). Previous studies posit that populist leadership thrives on a sense of crisis (Rooduijn, 2014) or discontent (Spruyt et al., 2016). Populists exaggerate situations with low salience in politics, but once populists politicize an issue, they exaggerate its importance and exploit it to their ends (Moffitt, 2015; Rydgren and Van der Meiden, 2019; Taggart, 2004). In particular, populism develops under conditions where there is a sense of collective threat. According to Béland (2020, p. 164), populism emerges with the politics of insecurity in which specific actors “frame and reframe perceived threats while offering potential responses to these threats.” Populist leaders construct collective insecurity, which corresponds to “a shared state of anxiety or fear stemming from perceived internal or external threats.” In many cases, populists try to convince the people that the underlying cause of their suffering is liberal institutions and, as such, promise to give power back to the people. When the people’s needs are not fulfilled and values are threatened, society may look for authoritarian alternatives to satisfy their needs and protect their values (Bar-Tal and Magal, 2021). This is where populism becomes a threat to democracy: a non-democratic alternative gains support from the electorate (Pappas, 2019).

3.3

ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY

In order to understand illiberal democracy, it is best to start with a definition of liberal democracy. According to Zakaria (1997, p. 22), liberal democracy is “a political system marked not only by free and fair elections, but also by the rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property” (italics added). In fact, the italicized parts indicate the liberal dimension of the liberal democracy concept, which corresponds to constitutional liberalism. Illiberal democracy, in short, corresponds to an “unlimited governmental power: there is no subject matter outside its purview” (Wagrandl, 2021, p. 111). According to Abts and Rummens (2007), liberal and democratic dimensions have an opposing relationship. For the liberal tradition, state authority should be bounded by the rule of law, which protects “the individual rights of all citizens against the arbitrary exercise of power by the state or by other citizens” (p. 410). Institutions of horizontal accountability and checks and balances system ensure that different interests mutually check one another. The democratic

Authoritarian populism  45 dimension, based on “the combination of popular sovereignty and majority rule” (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012, p. 10), treats citizens as a political community with a common will (volonte generale), which is the utmost base of political legitimacy, hence, majoritarianism in its purest form (Rummens, 2017). Pappas (2019) argues that the private individual plays a vital role under the impersonal institutions and the rule of law in liberal democracies. In contrast, in populism or democratic illiberalism, the authentic people occupy the very core of the system. Liberal democracy allows the citizens to support a myriad of crosscutting cleavages which overlap at some point and produce a common good. The values of liberal democracy are “pluralism, toleration, autonomy, and consent,” in which a limited constitutional government holds office based on periodic elections (p. 54). Liberal democracy and its institutions protect minorities against the tyranny of the majority. The election results are not moral and open to errors, yet impartial institutions help the system continue functioning. In other words, liberal democracy, for Wagrandl (2021), is a limited democracy. In Federalist Papers, Madison (2014, p. 254) argues, “If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.” For populists, the people’s will are the angels, a sacred entity that cannot be limited. Populist democracy, or democratic illiberalism, produces a majoritarian outcome based on the general will of the people. Any obstacle that hinders the people’s will is not democratic. As a homogeneous, organic entity, the people make the morally best decisions because they are always right and pure. Their moral superiority overrules the rights of minorities and the interests of corrupt elites. Liberal democratic institutions cannot constrain the people’s sovereignty. The elections also lead to moral outcomes (Pappas, 2019) because vox populi vox dei (“The voice of the people is the voice of God”) (Hawkins, 2010). Rummens (2017) explains the antagonism within liberal democracy based on Claude Lefort’s democracy theory. According to Lefort (1988) (and Rummens, 2017), the locus of power in a democracy is empty. Such an emptiness means that no single entity, be they politician or party, is able to represent the will of the people as a whole. The people’s will is diverse and subtle, derived from a democratic society based on the plurality of free and equal citizens with different political views and opinions. In contrast, in populism, the people occupy the empty place of power. The populist people are a single, unique entity whose decisions should be accepted by all of society, even at the expense of other citizens. Also, the populist party, which is the only true representative of the underdogs, reserves the locus of power because, as Müller (2017b, p. 591) argues, “they and only they properly represent the authentic people” (italics in original). In addition, populists do not see their rivals as legitimate opponents but rather as enemies to be destroyed. Other parties are labeled as illegitimate and corrupt. When populists do not accept their opponents as legitimate, they damage the plural structure of liberal democracy: populists are exclusive (Rummens, 2017). In fact, populists do not have any aim to protect pluralism (Müller, 2017a). Instead, pluralism is one of the two opposing concepts of populism, along with elitism (Akkerman et al., 2014). Elsewhere, Przeworski (1991) sees the democratic system as an institutional framework where multiple political groups compete. Such institutions are universalistic or are not in favor of any particular competitor. Outcomes in democracies cannot be known ex ante by any actor because the consequences of their actions are related to one another which are not predictable. Specifically, thanks to the institutional framework, actors know the possible outcomes but do

46  Research handbook on authoritarianism not know the specific outcome. Institutions define the roles of winner and loser, and actors know the probability of their victory or defeat. However, they cannot be certain if they will lose or win. In short, democracy means institutionalized uncertainty: institutions allow predictability but not certainty about the outcomes of actions. On the contrary, according to Müller (2017b), populists offer and want certainty; hence, they change institutions to their ends. They make them “the people’s institutions,” which produces morally correct outcomes. Populists desire a system that allows an unconstrained popular will as well as a direct and unmediated relationship between the leader and the people. The populist leader, the party, and the people are united, which represents the authentic general will. Hence, populists must stay in power for good because they are the only true, legitimate representative of the people. Furthermore, they design institutions for this goal: to manage uncertainty. In the end, populists damage the system of liberal democracy.

3.4 AUTHORITARIANISM Authoritarianism can be defined in two ways: a form of government and attitudes. The former is defined by Linz (1973, p. 185) as a political system “with limited, not responsible, political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive nor intensive political mobilization, except at some points in their development, and in which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.” Thus, similar to populism, the arch enemy of authoritarianism is also pluralism. However, while populism is based on the mobilization of the masses, authoritarianism is fundamentally against it. Finally, the pivotal difference between democracies and autocracies is predictability: the outcomes in democracies are not predetermined. When populists aim to make them predictable, they hamper democratic institutions. Although Linz’s definition is useful for furthering the discussion on democracy, populism, and authoritarianism, the literature, in fact, explains democratic setbacks in countries by the attitudinal explanations of authoritarianism. One of the notable, yet controversial, concepts developed to explain public support for authoritarian regimes was the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950).2 According to Adorno et al. (1950), the authoritarian personality is receptive to anti-democratic propaganda and has prejudice toward minorities. Later work by Bob Altemeyer (1981) built off of this concept, arguing that right-wing authoritarianism, in particular, is a state of mind that may lead to support for abolishing democratic institutions. Authoritarians not only strongly accept and obey traditional societal norms but are aggressive and suspicious toward outsiders or those who challenge social conventions (Miller et al., 1993). Still, some scholars define authoritarianism as the mirror image of liberalism. On the one extreme, authoritarianism supports that “personal needs and values should be subordinated to the cohesion of the group and its requirements.” On the other end, liberalism defends that “the requirements of group cohesion should be subordinated to the autonomy and self-regulation of the individual member” (Oesterreich, 2005, p. 281; also see Duckitt, 1989). Authoritarianism is also a dimension of populist radical right parties, along with populism and nativism (Mudde, 2007). Previous studies posit that a perceived threat to an in-group is the primary trigger of authoritarian attitudes in order to seek security (Duckitt, 2001; MacWilliams, 2016; Oesterreich,

Authoritarian populism  47 2005). For example, MacWilliams (2016) explains Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency with a sense of threat and unequal treatment toward us or the people. The threat comes from two fronts: first, the elites who are corrupt and immoral, and second, minorities and immigrants. According to Oesterreich (2005), authoritarian personalities avoid situations that may lead to uncertainty and security. If they fail to cope with such situations, it turns to anxiety. Their behavior is right and difficult to change. Authoritarians seek familiarity to minimize the risks of novelty. Their submission to authority and conformity is actually a result of protecting themselves from complex problems they think that they cannot deal with. Finally, their sense of inefficacy and insecurity makes them hostile to others. Similar to populism, intergroup cleavages can also be a catalyzer of authoritarian attitudes. Ethnocentrism, particularly, plays a vital role in explaining negative attitudes toward others. The most extreme forms of intergroup relations lead to prejudice, discrimination, and even aggression toward out-groups which are correlated with authoritarian predispositions (Hogg, 2013). For example, early research illustrated that prejudice is related to sociocultural determinants rather than personality factors, which are significant indicators of racial hostility in South Africa and the United States (Pettigrew, 1958). Diversity is the trigger of authoritarianism. According to Stenner (2005), authoritarianism evolves into a normative worldview that prioritizes obedience and conformity over freedom and difference, as well as group authority over individual autonomy. Authoritarianism promotes coercion and bias against out-groups while supporting restrictions on their rights and actions, such as “legal discrimination against minorities and restrictions on immigration; limits on free speech, assembly, and association” (p. 17).

3.5

AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM

The previous discussion on populism, illiberal democracy, and authoritarianism finally brings us to authoritarian populism, which is a major concern of the contemporary period when it comes to explaining autocratization. Authoritarian populism is first defined by Hall (1979, p. 15) as “an exceptional form of the capitalist state – which, unlike classical fascism, has retained most (though not all) of the formal representative institution in place, and which at the same time has been able to construct around itself an active popular consent.” He also adds that authoritarian populism entails “weakening of democratic forms and initiatives, but not their suspension.” Two issues are at stake here. First, authoritarian populism is different from classical fascism. The latter, according to Mudde (2019, p. 192), is a totalitarian ideology which supports “economic corporatism, an ethical state, a national rebirth, an all-powerful leader, and the cleansing qualities and nature state of violence and war.” Contemporary authoritarian populists, on the other hand, are ethnopluralist and support varying economic policies. Second, contrary to pure authoritarian systems, authoritarian populism is based on popular consent, which is determined under weakened democratic institutions. More recently, Norris and Inglehart (2019) conceptualized authoritarian populism as a cultural backlash to the rising multiculturalism and pro-immigration policies. Under threat against our culture, the people and populists aim to defend us against them – the aliens – and increase support for restrictions on the movements of others into the homeland and demand policies against their cultural or religious practices. Authoritarian populists are intolerant of the groups that pose a threat to their authenticity. They carry strong xenophobic, racist, homophobic, and

48  Research handbook on authoritarianism misogynistic attitudes. Authoritarian populists are protectionist in foreign affairs and support national sovereignty. They are against multinational alliances and the European Union. They prioritize order and security over liberal democratic institutions, including independence of the judiciary, media freedom, individual liberties, and checks and balances. Similarly, according to Zürn (2022), authoritarian populism has four dimensions. First, it is anti-pluralist, which aims to construct the homogeneous people or the “silent majority.” Second, it is anti-liberal because authoritarian populism is at odds with individual and minority rights. Third, it is anti-internationalist because national sovereignty is indispensable, and the aim is to protect the nation-state’s authority. Finally, it is anti-elitist since the corrupt elite betrays the authentic people. Since liberal democracy is based on constitutionalism, individual rights, the rule of law, and minority rights, it is the enemy of the people and the populists. So far, I have discussed how populism and authoritarianism overlap and defined the concept of authoritarian populism. Now, I elaborate on the previous theoretical discussion to understand the rise of authoritarian populism. Previous studies suggest four explanations for the rise of populism: economic anxiety, cultural backlash, the tension between responsiveness and responsibility, and negative partisanship and polarization (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). While such explanations have strong explanatory power, we also know that they are catalyzers of populism based on underlying structural problems (Mudde, 2021; also see Galston, 2018). Previous studies provided both supply- and demand-side explanations. I argue that none is exclusive; instead, they interact with one another. Specific underlying mechanisms serve as a breeding ground for other explanations. Nevertheless, they affect each other. Threat and uncertainty under threat are the lowest common denominators of the rise of both authoritarianism and populism. Of course, such a threat does not need to be real. What matters is the way that the people perceive and interpret the threat (Bar-Tal and Magal, 2021). In short, authoritarian populism is an outcome of mitigating uncertainty under threatening circumstances. According to Mudde (2021), the rise of undemocratic liberalism challenged popular sovereignty in many countries. Politics have moved backstage, and the citizens have lost their voice in decision-making. Also, mainstream parties support identical policies, making it difficult for the voters to differentiate them. Several crucial actions were taken as if “there is no alternative,” which depoliticized political issues. That said, the relationship between the rulers and the ruled was also challenged due to the preference for responsible politics over responsive politics. While the latter means acting in line with the voters’ demands, the former corresponds to expert decisions that have to be done due to global norms and rules. Such expertise also brought a new group of professionalized politicians and bureaucrats who are out of touch with their constituencies. Finally, changing media structure also affected politics. While previously the conventional media played a gatekeeping role for political agendas, social media has unleashed a myriad of information and enabled the spread of authoritarian populist messages. The increasing number of terrorist attacks, the influx of immigrants from war-torn countries, the 2008 financial crisis, and the rise of “fake news” catalyzed the threat perception of citizens where they feel incompetent or inefficient to interfere in politics (Bar-Tal and Magal, 2021). According to the Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan et al., 2008, p. 58), there are four types of threats. First, realistic threats are threats to the in-group’s political and economic power and physical well-being. Second, symbolic threats cover threats toward the in-group’s values, beliefs, and worldview. Third, intergroup anxiety appears as people expect negative outcomes

Authoritarian populism  49 due to intergroup interaction in which individuals are mostly concerned about experiencing exploitation, physical harm, and disapproval from out-group or in-group members. Finally, negative stereotypes are conducive to the expectations that out-group members will harm the in-group; hence, negative stereotypes are perceived as threats toward the in-group members. Stenner (2005) also illustrates that normative threats, which are threats to oneness and sameness, are conducive to the rise of authoritarian predispositions. When plurality increases, people tend to seek conformity and familiarity with their in-group values, norms, and beliefs. However, “minimizing difference requires others’ obedience and conformity, which necessitates someone to obey, something to conform to, and some idea of who must do all this obeying and conforming – that is, some system of collective authority and constraint, and some conception of who ‘we’ are to which the system applies” (italics in original, p. 18). Authoritarian populists offer the concerned people defending the collective normative order in which they prioritize the in-group (the people) exclusion and stigmatization of out-groups (the elite, minorities, immigrants, etc.), conformity to authorities, rules, and norms while punishing the ones who refuse to obey. Authoritarian predispositions are triggered during threats to the normative order that emerges from dissent, diversity, social disorder, moral decay, and decline. Authoritarian populism is built on the existing problems of liberal democracy (or undemocratic liberalism), where politicians have lost touch with their constituency and the establishment failed to answer the voters’ demands. Other developments, such as terrorist attacks, multicultural diversity, or economic crises, become a threat and often serve as a tipping point for the rise of authoritarian populism. For example, according to authoritarian populists, immigrants are not only a threat to the culture, customs, and religion of the in-group but also a threat to the economic well-being of the authentic people. These latecomers exploit the state’s financial resources and take jobs away from the native population. For authoritarian populists, the liberal democratic system, which is unresponsive to the people’s demands and protects non-natives or latecomers, is the primary source of the problem. In sum, populists feel that the liberal part of democracy should be eliminated; it is not needed for the people’s sovereignty.

3.6

CASE STUDIES

The symptoms of contemporary authoritarian populism can be seen in several countries. This section briefly presents evidence on the impact of authoritarian populist incumbents on the level of democracy, how democratic preferences or appeals to a strong leader changed over time, which can be a proxy to measure authoritarian populism (Galston, 2018), and the change of authoritarian child-rearing values in the United States between 1992 and 2020. First, due to the data availability, I will focus on four major examples of authoritarian populism: Brazil, the Philippines, Turkey, and the United States. These four cases also illustrate that the rising tide of authoritarian populism is not unique to a particular country or area. Instead, they demonstrate that while appeals to a strong leader increased over time, authoritarian populist incumbents paved the way for autocratization. After the transition from military rule during the 1980s, Brazilian democracy flourished, and successful alternation of power was not interrupted. During the early 2000s, the Workers’ Party in Brazil gained two consecutive victories and captured the presidency, first by Lula da Silva and then by Dilma Rousseff. However, corruption scandals and economic problems during the two presidents weakened democratic politics and created a window of opportunity

50  Research handbook on authoritarianism for the rise of authoritarian populism. Former military officer Jair Bolsonaro, who is racist, sexist, and homophobic, won the 2018 presidential elections and is an admirer of human rights violations during military rule. Nevertheless, he lost his second run in the presidential elections in 2022 to former president Lula (Feres Júnior and Gagliardi, 2021). His supporters protested the outcome with Nazi salutes, and attacked the Congress and presidential offices (Times of Israel, 2022). In the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte became president in 2016, also known for his vocal support for the extrajudicial killings of drug dealers and petty criminals, in addition to anti-corruption appeals. His “penal populism,” on the other hand, also overlaps with the authoritarian personality, given that both support the punitive punishment of deviant social behaviors (Kenny and Holmes, 2020). Interestingly enough, his approval ratings remained high during his presidency (Peralta-Malonzo, 2022). He could not run for the 2022 presidential elections due to term limits. However, he is still an influential figure in Philippine politics. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)) came to power in 2002 and have been in power ever since. While the AKP came to power with a pledge to eliminate civil-military bureaucracy’s undemocratic interventions in civilian politics, they gradually diminished liberal democratic institutions over time. For example, while the 2010 referendum damaged judicial independence, the transition from a parliamentary to a presidential system in 2017 further impaired the separation of powers and checks and balances (Aytaç and Elçi, 2019). However, despite the economic crisis and narrowing of the democratic field, more recently, Erdoğan won the 2023 presidential elections in the runoff by gaining 52 percent of the valid votes. Also, AKP became the first party in the parliamentary elections despite a significant decrease from 43 percent in 2018 to 36 percent. Finally, a total outsider of politics in the United States, Donald Trump, captured the White House in the 2016 elections with a majority in the electoral college. In addition to Trump’s anti-establishment rhetoric, his racist and misogynic discourse raised concerns in one of the oldest democracies in the world (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Although he won the 2020 presidential nomination from the Republican Party, he lost the election against Joe Biden. However, Trump’s rejection of the outcome led to outrage among his supporters. On January 6, 2021, after Trump’s “Save America” rally, a group of participants attacked the Capitol Building and raided Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s office to halt vote counting in the electoral college and overturn Biden’s victory. Nevertheless, although Trump lost the election, his legacy remains in the state institutions. For example, according to Pew Research, 28 percent of currently active federal judges were appointed by Trump (Gramlich, 2021). Such examples raise the following question: Is authoritarian populism detrimental to democracy? Figure 3.1 illustrates that four countries experienced significant autocratization during the tenure of these four authoritarian populist leaders. In the United States, the primary breakdown happened in 2016 after Trump’s electoral victory and continued to decrease until 2019. Although the level of democracy decreased in Brazil before Bolsonaro, his victory further weakened the democratic structure in 2018. Duterte’s presidency in the Philippines also harmed the level of democracy, which gradually decreased over time. Last but not least, although the level of democracy in Turkey increased during the AKP’s first tenure, it gradually decreased between 2007 and 2013 until the brutal suppression of the Gezi uprising. However, the level of democracy reached its nadir in 2017, during the aftermath of the 2016 failed military coup, which paved the way for the state of emergency rule, mass purges, and violation of democratic rights.

Figure 3.1

Liberal democracy index

Note: Ribbons indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Source: Data from Coppedge et al. (2022).

Authoritarian populism  51

52  Research handbook on authoritarianism The descriptive results shown in Figure 3.1 also overlap with the previous literature that authoritarian populism is a threat to democracy (Ruth-Lovell et al., 2019). Particularly after gaining majorities in the parliament or presidential victories, authoritarian populists damage the democratic structure in various cases. If contemporary autocrats do not capture office by illegal means, how do they gain legitimacy to launch a war against liberal democracy? Different than previous cases, contemporary autocratization is an outcome of mass demand for authoritarian leaders in different countries (Bermeo, 2016). Put differently, today’s autocrats come to power through popular elections rather than a top-down revolution or a military coup. Also, instead of totally eliminating democratic institutions or abolishing elections, authoritarian populists weaken liberal democracy and its institutions. The underlying cause of this trend could be explained with the approval of a strong leader. To illustrate this assumption, I used the World Values Survey dataset and compared the means of strong leader support in the fourth and seventh waves (Haerpfer et al., 2021). Figure 3.2 shows a statistically significant increase in all countries in support of a strong leader since the late 1990s. Furthermore, Figure 3.2 also shows that the four countries also differ in strong leader support, and their rankings do not change over time: while participants from the United States have the least support, the Philippines have the highest support for a strong leader. Finally, while the Brazilian and Philippine population is above the midpoint (2.5) in both waves, Turkish participants spiked above the midpoint over time. In sum, however, having a strong leader bothers participants in four countries less today compared with the 1990s. Finally, I also checked the variation of authoritarian child-rearing values over time using American National Election Studies (ANES) (2022) time-series dataset in the United States. To this end, I coded answers that respect for elders, obedience, good manners, and being well behaved as 1 and otherwise zero (except for the missing values). Next, I summed these four variables and generated a scale ranging from 0 to 4 (N = 65,074, mean = 0.757, standard deviation = 1.293, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.853). According to Figure 3.3, on the one hand, there is no statistically significant difference between Democrats and Republicans between 1992 and 2008. On the other hand, authoritarian values increased until 2012, before Trump’s presidential victory. In 2012, Republicans appeared significantly more authoritarian than Democrats, and this trend has continued. In 2020, Republicans ranked as the most authoritarian group compared to independents and Democrats; while the former stayed above the midpoint (2), the latter group is below it. The margin between the two parties has gradually increased since 2012. Although it is impossible to make big claims based on Figure 3.3, one can claim that while one part of the American society moves toward a less authoritarian path, the other continues to support authoritarian behavior. Such a gap can also explain the rising polarization between the two parties’ supporters. One can also assert that while Trump lost the 2020 elections, authoritarianism still exists among the GOP (“Grand Old Party”) supporters, which may lead to another victory of an authoritarian leader in the future.

3.7 CONCLUSION The contemporary rise of autocratization, largely driven by authoritarian populism and authoritarian attitudes of the masses who endorse strong authoritarian leaders, has increased concerns about the future of liberal democracy. In this chapter, I argue that, in line with the

Authoritarian populism  53

Note: Vertical lines indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. Question wording: I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Answers range between 1 (fairly bad) and 4 (very good). Higher scores indicate more approval. N = 14,178, mean = 2.451, standard deviation = 0.998. Source: World Values Survey.

Figure 3.2

Mass attitudes toward a strong leader

previous literature, democracy and liberalism have a Janus-faced relationship (Laruelle, 2022). Constitutional liberalism aims to limit the arbitrary power of the executive with institutions while protecting minority rights, whereas authoritarian populists want an unconstrained people’s sovereignty. Such antagonism arises when people feel threatened and incapable of dealing with out-group threats. To fight against threats, authoritarian populists offer conformity and familiarity to their constituencies. However, the way that authoritarian populists appease the concerns or fears of the people mostly damages the liberal side of democracy.

Figure 3.3

Authoritarian child-rearing values in the United States

Note: Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Source: ANES.

54  Research handbook on authoritarianism

Authoritarian populism  55 Authoritarian populists are not against democracy in the minimalistic sense. Instead, they need the fundamental institutions of democracy, that is, elections, because they need legitimacy. Elections are the ultimate source of people’s sovereignty. However, authoritarian populism can threaten liberal democracy if they come to power with majorities or capture the presidency. Authoritarian populists conquer the state institutions by revising their structure rather than abolishing them: they restructure institutions as the people’s institutions. Since elections provide legitimacy to authoritarian populists, they do not abolish them as the military interventions did during the second wave of autocratization. A gradual and covert democratic reversal is a far less costly method (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). Several examples illustrate that authoritarian populists openly endorse illiberal democracy, have racist and exclusionary rhetoric, gradually weaken liberal democratic institutions, and support brutal suppression of others. However, unfortunately, mass appeals to a strong leader give legitimacy to authoritarian populists. How to deal with authoritarian populism is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, attending to the underlying mechanisms that serve as a breeding ground for authoritarian populism is essential. More work needs to be done to understand how to mitigate people’s fears and decrease perceived threats that lead to intergroup cleavages.

NOTES 1.

Other studies also elaborate populism as a corrective for democracy (see Canovan, 1981; Filc, 2015; Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 2018; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). However, in this chapter, I will focus on the detrimental effects of populism on liberal democracy. Elsewhere, I have also discussed that populism can be both corrective and harmful to democracy depending on the dimensions of populism (Çarkoğlu and Elçi, 2023). 2. Although Fromm and Horkheimer published on the authoritarian character of the people before Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford, the latter scholars’ 1950 book The Authoritarian Personality opened a new page in authoritarianism studies (Baars and Scheepers, 1993).

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58  Research handbook on authoritarianism Spruyt, B., Keppens, G., and Van Droogenbroeck, F. (2016) ‘Who supports populism and what attracts people to it?’, Political Research Quarterly, 69(2), pp. 335–46. Stenner, K. (2005) The authoritarian dynamic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stephan, W.G., Renfro, C.L., Esses, V.M., Stephan, C.W., and Martin, T. (2005) ‘The effects of feeling threatened on attitudes toward immigrants’, International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 29(1), pp. 1–19. Stephan, W.G., Renfro, C., and Davis, M.D. (2008) ‘The role of threat in intergroup relations’, in Wagner, U., Tropp, L.R., Finchilescu, G., and Tredoux, C. (eds.), Improving intergroup relations: Building on the legacy of Thomas F. Pettigrew. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell Publishing, pp. 55–72. Taggart, P. (2004) ‘Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 9(3), pp. 269–88. Times of Israel (2022) ‘Bolsonaro backers in Brazil allegedly give Nazi salute, triggering uproar’, Times of Israel, November 4. Available at: https://​www​.timesofisrael​.com/​bolsonaro​-backers​-in​-brazil​ -allegedly​-give​-nazi​-salute​-sparking​-uproar/​ (accessed November 8, 2022). Wagrandl, U. (2021) ‘A theory of illiberal democracy’, in Sajó, A., Uitz, R., and Holmes, S. (eds.), Routledge handbook of illiberalism. New York: Routledge, pp. 94–117. Weyland, K. (2001) ‘Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American politics’, Comparative Politics, 34(1), pp. 1–22. Zakaria, F. (1997) ‘The rise of illiberal democracy’, Foreign Affairs, 76, p. 22. Zürn, M., (2022) ‘How non-majoritarian institutions make silent majorities vocal: A political explanation of authoritarian populism’, Perspectives on Politics, 20(3), pp. 788–807.

4. Autocratization and democratic backsliding Alejandra López Villegas and Erica Frantz

4.1 INTRODUCTION Nayib Bukele was elected President of El Salvador in 2019, the first leader to win power without the backing of the country’s two main ruling parties since democratization in 1994. The timing was ripe for political change in El Salvador, as corruption scandals and prolonged violence had discredited the traditional political establishment, paving the way for Bukele’s victory. Soon after winning the presidency, however, there were signs that democracy in El Salvador may be at risk under Bukele’s leadership (Meléndez-Sánchez, 2021). In 2020, for example, Bukele ordered the security forces to storm the legislature, in a bid to get legislators to support his security bill. The political stunt drew condemnation from observers, who began to question Bukele’s commitment to democratic norms of behavior. The situation deteriorated even more in 2021 when, after his party secured a majority in the legislature following midterm elections, Bukele immediately fired the attorney general and the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber and staffed these positions with loyalists. These moves set the stage for the top court’s ruling later that year allowing presidents to serve two consecutive terms, thereby opening the door for Bukele to run for re-election in 2024. In light of these developments, observers have expressed concerns that El Salvador is experiencing autocratization (Meléndez-Sánchez, 2021), a process generally understood as a decline in the democratic qualities of a political system (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019; Tomini et al., 2023). As one human rights advocate put it in 2021, “Democracy in El Salvador is on the edge of the abyss” (BBC News, 2021). El Salvador is but one of many democracies around the world to have elicited such concerns in recent years. Other examples include countries as wide-ranging as Serbia, Turkey, Benin, Senegal, Nicaragua, and the United States. In some instances, declines have left democracy weakened but intact (as in Poland), but in other instances they have led to a transition to authoritarian rule (as in Hungary). Only rarely do regressing democracies recover and rebound (as they did in Ecuador and South Korea) (Laebens and Lührmann, 2021). While observers have primarily focused on autocratization experiences in democracies, they have also transpired in autocratic contexts, where authoritarian regimes featuring some democratic traits saw them decline, as in Russia since Vladimir Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and Myanmar following its 2021 military coup.1 In response to these trends, there has been a marked increase in scholarly attention to autocratization, in particular its narrower manifestation – democratic backsliding. Whereas autocratization can occur in any political system, some scholars argue that democratic backsliding is restricted to democratic environments (where democracy either regresses to some degree or fully collapses to authoritarianism) (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019). As Waldner and Lust (2018) note, publications referencing the term “democratic backsliding” rose dramatically from 1990 to 2010, according to academic articles indexed by JSTOR. This trend has 59

60  Research handbook on authoritarianism only amplified since, with academic research devoted to democratic backsliding expanding considerably (Jee et al., 2022). The increased attention to democratic backsliding (as opposed to the full range of potential autocratization experiences) can perhaps be attributed to recent high-profile reversals away from democracy, a number of which we referenced. As Bermeo (2016) points out, such reversals have increasingly happened at the hands of democratically elected leaders, a phenomenon we expand on more later in this chapter. Despite the sizeable growth of the broader autocratization field, however, much of the literature within it is somewhat scattered and siloed. It is therefore an opportune moment to take stock of the key themes in the literature, assess the critical debates, and identify important considerations for future research. This chapter seeks to fulfill this task, focusing in particular on democratic backsliding. It begins with an overview of how scholars conceptualize democratic backsliding – and how it fits under the larger umbrella of autocratization – and synthesizes the central features of the various definitions proposed. It looks at the ways in which democratic backsliding is measured in the literature and discusses the range of considerations that underlie common measurement approaches. It then reviews major themes in the literature on the causes of democratic backsliding, grouping theories according to their focus on institutional or societal factors, before covering the (more limited) literature on the factors that can halt democratic backsliding. The latter half of this chapter switches gears to consider the primary roadblocks that stand in the way of a deeper and more cohesive understanding of democratic backsliding. To frame the discussion, we briefly review debates on global trends of reversals away from democracy. We put forth that despite substantial scholarly interest in democratic backsliding, there is little consensus in terms of the specifics of what democratic backsliding refers to and how to appropriately capture it. While scholars tend to agree that backsliding is a process in which the quality of democracy declines, assessments of what this means in practice are often divergent and/or unclear and the consequences of various measurement approaches not fully explored. Moreover, in many instances the components identified as part of democratic backsliding overlap with the factors proposed to cause it, thereby muddying understanding of causal pathways. In this way, this chapter provides a foundation for understanding where the literature on democratic backsliding – and autocratization more broadly – stands and opportunities for where it can move forward.

4.2

CONCEPTUALIZATING AUTOCRATIZATION AND DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

Autocratization is generally conceived to be a deterioration in a political system’s democratic quality (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019; Tomini et al., 2023). As Lührmann and Lindberg put it, autocratization is “democratization in reverse” (2019: 1100).2 Scholars diverge, however, with respect to whether they view autocratization as a distinct concept from democratic backsliding. For some in the field, the terms “autocratization” and “democratic backsliding” are interchangeable. As Daxecker (2023: 4) writes, for example: “The terminology is still somewhat in flux – democratic backsliding, autocratization, or democratic recession seem to be the most

Autocratization and democratic backsliding  61 prominent terms.” Lindberg (2023: 10) echoes this, observing that the process is “alternatively discussed as autocratization, democratic backsliding, or democratic decline.” For others, however, democratic backsliding is a particular type of autocratization (Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019; Tomini et al., 2023). From this perspective, autocratization can transpire within any type of political system – whether democracy or autocracy – and therefore encompasses three phenomena: (1) when democracy declines but falls short of collapse; (2) when democracy declines and ushers in a transition to authoritarian rule; and (3) when the democratic features of an authoritarian regime decline and bring about a deepening of authoritarianism. Democratic backsliding is a narrower manifestation of this process, encompassing only the first two scenarios above (both of which entail a democratic system as the starting point). For clarity, in this chapter we adopt the latter view and differentiate the terms “autocratization” and “democratic backsliding,” but are careful to point out variations in the literature in this regard where relevant. Because existing research thus far has placed greater attention on democratic backsliding – as opposed to the broader idea of autocratization – the bulk of this chapter is dedicated to this concept. 4.2.1

What is Democratic Backsliding?

Any understanding of democratic backsliding must begin with an understanding of the term at its core: democracy (Jee et al., 2022). While most research agrees that democratic backsliding refers to some sort of process in which the quality of democracy declines (Waldner and Lust, 2018), scholars diverge in terms of the specific ways in which they define democracy and the factors they assess determine its quality (Kendall-Taylor et al., 2019). Many definitions of democracy proposed have their roots in the foundational work of Dahl (1971), who put forth that democracy is a system in which the government is responsive to the citizens’ preferences. In order for the government to be responsive, it must allow citizens to formulate their preferences, signify them, and have them weighed equally. In this sense, the government must allow for contestation (to ensure that the opposition can compete) and inclusion (so that citizens can vote and express their preferences). Emphasis on these two dimensions gives way to a conceptualization of democracy that stresses the importance of procedures, namely, elections that are free and fair (e.g., Przeworski et al., 2000; Schumpeter, 1947). And, indeed, most definitions of democracy – at a minimum – feature this requirement, that free and fair elections are the means through which the executive achieves power. Scholars diverge, however, in terms of whether they see this requirement as enough for a country to be considered democratic. Some in the literature put forth, for example, that democracies require additional qualities too, such as the ability of citizens to express themselves, the existence of mechanisms of accountability, or the presence of the rule of law (see Kendall-Taylor et al., 2019 for a review). Under these “thicker” conceptualizations of democracy, other features must be present in addition to free and fair elections for a country to be classified as a democracy. We therefore see a range of conceptualizations in the literature in terms of what constitutes democracy and how high the bar is to qualify as one. These varying viewpoints trickle over into how scholars conceive of democratic backsliding.3 In what follows, we focus on a handful of these perspectives and how they compare.

62  Research handbook on authoritarianism For Waldner and Lust (2018), for example, democratic backsliding occurs when elections are made less competitive, participation more restrictive, and/or constraints of accountability are loosened. They stipulate that a democracy can be considered backsliding when we see declines in at least two of these areas: competition, participation, and accountability. Haggard and Kaufman, by contrast, put forth that democratic backsliding is “the incremental erosion of institutions, rules, and norms that results from the actions of duly elected governments” (2021: 27). In practice, they see three developments as common to backsliding cases: loosening of horizontal constraints, limitations of political and civil liberties, and undermining of the electoral system. While these conceptualizations certainly share some overlap, they are at the same time not synonymous. We might, for example, see competition and participation (items Waldner and Lust emphasize) as relevant to political and civil liberties and the nature of the electoral system (items Haggard and Kaufman emphasize), but this is not guaranteed (depending, among other things, on how each of these items themselves are defined). This sort of conceptual similarity in the grand scheme of things – but potential for difference in the details – is common in the literature. For Tomini (2021) (who uses the term autocratization), for example, backsliding entails a change in the political system where the exercise of political power becomes more arbitrary and repressive and the space for contestation and participation more restricted. For Jee et al. (2022) backsliding instead involves formal or informal reductions in freedom of choice, freedom from tyranny, and equality in freedom. These definitions are clearly not too different from one another, and yet they are also clearly not one and the same. It is possible that the political space growing more arbitrary and repressive (as Tomini emphasizes) captures the same process as freedom from tyranny declining (as Jee et al. emphasize). This is by no means assured, however absent additional information on how the underlying components stressed are conceptualized. Scholars also differ in their understanding of where democratic backsliding can occur. Some see democratic backsliding as a process that can transpire only within democracies (Bermeo, 2016; Coppedge, 2017), but others suggest that it can take place within autocracies too (Waldner and Lust, 2018). From the latter perspective, backsliding can happen in any system that loses some of its democratic qualities (a broader process that some refer to as autocratization rather than democratic backsliding, as mentioned earlier, e.g., Lührmann and Lindberg, 2019).4 As this discussion makes clear, while there is broad agreement in the literature on what democratic backsliding is in general, there is divergence when it comes to the details of what it refers to in practice. The same is true with respect to how scholars operationalize democratic backsliding, a subject to which we now turn. 4.2.2

Measuring Democratic Backsliding

Scholars have proposed a variety of ways to measure democratic backsliding, for both small-N and large-N research. Regardless of the nature of the research, all measures of democratic backsliding require that scholars make choices about a number of factors. The first has to do with what the starting point will be: What set of countries will be in the sample of potential “backsliders”? For some scholars, all countries are contenders, regardless of their political system type. Waldner and Lust (2018) argue, for example, that backsliding can occur in any political system, even in autocracies – where it would manifest as a deterioration

Autocratization and democratic backsliding  63 in democratic qualities of governance. While they choose to focus on backsliding in democracies in their study, they contend that it is not a process limited to democratic environments. Even among scholars interested solely in backsliding in democracies, choices must be made about how to determine which democracies will be included in the sample. Bermeo (2016), for example, includes any country she considers to be democratic, whereas Haggard and Kaufman (2021) are more restrictive, only examining those countries that have been democratic for at least eight years. Relatedly, scholars must also make choices about what measure of democracy (or political system type more broadly) to rely on (Jee et al., 2022). Some of the more commonly used measures come from political system type data provided by Freedom House, the Varieties of Democracy project, and the Polity IV project. Yet even among these sources, the variables offered can be used to measure democracy in distinct ways. The Varieties of Democracy project, for example, offers an index of electoral democracy and an index of liberal democracy, which differ in terms of the underlying variables they aggregate. Both have been used frequently in the backsliding literature. Importantly, scholars must also decide what sorts of developments will denote democratic backsliding (Jee et al., 2022). To do so, they must determine the types of changes they will observe, their size, and the period over which they transpire. Occasionally, scholars assert that backsliding occurs if there are a certain number of declines across a set of indicators emphasized (as with Waldner and Lust, 2018). More frequently, however, the type of change scholars rely on is a decline in the particular measure of democracy used. There is substantial divergence among scholars, however, regarding what size the decline must be and over how long it must occur for a country to be considered to be backsliding. For instance, Coppedge (2017) uses the Varieties of Democracy Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) to identify backsliding episodes. He suggests that backsliding can be identified where there was a decline of 0.09 or more in the LDI for five subsequent years. Alternatively, Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) identify what they refer to as autocratization episodes using the Varieties of Democracy Electoral Democracy Index (EDI). They first identify potential episodes as those where there was a decline in any given year of 0.01 on the EDI. They then identify actual episodes as those where the decline in the EDI adds up to a decline of at least 0.1. Though these authors both see democratic decline as a matter of degree, given that it does not always entail democratic breakdown, how they measure it in practice differs. Conversely, Skaaning (2020) has criticized approaches that use certain thresholds in the decline of democracy scores and in time to measure autocratization – his focal point.5 In his view, it is not obvious why a decline needs to be substantial to signify autocratization, or why it should last for a specific number of years. He suggests that false positives can be avoided by using uncertainty estimates associated with democracy indicators (such as those offered by the Varieties of Democracy). As such, he argues that autocratization occurs when there is any decline in a democracy score. Tomini (2021) notes, however, that making inferences based on false positives can be worse than making inferences based on false negatives, adding an additional dimension to this debate. And, further complicating matters, some scholars have begun to question whether data generated from expert coder surveys (such as the Varieties of Democracy’s) are reliable ways to measure democracy in the first place, in light of the potential for coder bias (Little and Meng, 2023).6

64  Research handbook on authoritarianism To summarize, there are a multitude of ways in which scholars have operationalized democratic backsliding (and autocratization), only a handful of which are referenced here. As this discussion makes clear, the literature lacks consensus on a number of key fronts, ranging from what types of countries can experience backsliding to how to identify when backsliding has occurred. This variance likely explains the variance (and ambiguity) present in our understanding of the factors that cause democratic backsliding and can help deter it. We discuss this literature in the section that follows.

4.3

WHAT MAKES A DEMOCRACY AT RISK OF BACKSLIDING?

Research on the factors underlying democratic backsliding has expanded considerably in recent years, though we still lack a coherent picture of backsliding’s origins and causes. As Waldner and Lust (2018: 95) wrote, “Efforts to explain backsliding remain inchoate.” In this section, we synthesize some of the central themes that have emerged. To be clear, the focal point of much of this research is on democratic stability and/or consolidation, not necessarily on the phenomenon of democratic backsliding. This is important to highlight, given that the same factors that explain democratization may not also explain democratic backsliding. We emphasize, as well, that (unless otherwise noted) this literature examines political processes transpiring in democracies (and therefore cannot speak to autocratization in authoritarian settings).7 That said, in what follows we provide a brief overview of the major theories relevant to our understanding of backsliding, which we group into two loose categories: (1) institutional factors and (2) societal factors. We then turn to the more limited set of studies devoted to conditions that increase the chance backsliding will be halted. 4.3.1

Institutional Factors

A number of scholars have looked at how institutional factors influence democracy’s prospects. Linz (1990), for example, suggests that presidentialism is detrimental to democracy. In providing dual legitimacy to the executive and legislative powers, presidentialism leads to deadlock and conflict across bodies that are threatening to democratic stability. Other research also links presidentialism to democratic instability, albeit through different pathways. Svolik’s (2015: 735) work, for example, suggests that presidentialism poses a risk to democracy because it increases the risk of the incumbent accumulating too much power. Consistent with this, Pérez-Liñán et al. (2019) show that in Latin America, when presidents have had greater executive hegemony, the chance of democratic backsliding has been higher. The type of parties and party systems are also proposed to influence democratic stability. On the one hand, the ideological distribution of the existing parties may negatively affect democracy if there is substantial party system polarization (Sartori, 1976). This may enable the presence of anti-system parties and irresponsible opposition parties that make impossible promises to voters (Sartori, 1976). On the other hand, parties that focus on clientelist commitments provide a direct exchange of goods/services between voters and politicians. The prevalence of clientelist parties may threaten democracy by making the objective of elections offering material incentives to voters as opposed to promoting policy platforms (Kitschelt,

Autocratization and democratic backsliding  65 2000). Additionally, party system institutionalization may affect democracy’s prospects. In functioning democracies, parties should accept one another as legitimate actors, respect the electoral process, and operate autonomously from the state. Low levels of party institutionalization may threaten these sorts of norms and democracy more broadly (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Randall and Svåsand, 2002). Institutional legacies are also put forth to be influential for democratic trajectories. Research shows, for example, that democracies that experienced authoritarianism and democratic breakdown in the past have a higher risk of backsliding (Svolik, 2015). A history of military dictatorship appears especially detrimental for democratic resilience (compared to a history of civilian or monarchic autocratic rule) (Cheibub, 2007; Svolik, 2015). This is consistent with other research illustrating that anti-democratic practices tend to persist following democratic transitions because new democracies often fail to reform the authoritarian institutions of their past (González, 2021). As a result, organizations such as the police, often used to repress the public under authoritarian rule, can function as authoritarian enclaves even after a regime has transitioned to democracy. 4.3.2

Societal Factors

Societal factors – such as the rise of populist leaders, declining public support for democracy, and polarization – have also been proposed to be influential for democracy. The literature on populism, for example, suggests that the election of populist leaders can increase democratic vulnerability (Mounk, 2018; Mudde et al., 2012). Populist leaders tend to frame themselves as political outsiders who want to challenge the elite in power and political establishment (for more on this, see Chapter 3). To gain popular support, they often tap into citizens’ dissatisfaction with democracy, their economic status, or cultural changes. Once in office, they may use anti-democratic tactics to push forward their agendas. Researchers have highlighted two main circumstances under which populist leaders are more likely to rise (Norris and Inglehart, 2019). The first is where countries are experiencing rapid demographic changes and shifting cultural values. In such contexts, populist leaders may gain popularity by promising to restore the country to the way it used to be. Such leaders may promote nativist policies and xenophobia and/or more traditional gender values. The second environment argued to be favorable to the rise of populists is where there are high levels of economic inequality. In particular, in countries where some groups have been negatively affected by economic globalization, we may see populist leaders emerge promising to bring about better economic circumstances. This is consistent with research suggesting that unequal democracies often struggle to consolidate (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Houle, 2009). Other research looking at how societal factors influence democracy emphasizes the role of public support for democracy. From this perspective, democracy is only likely to survive where sufficient sectors of the citizenry support it (Claassen, 2020). According to this research, public support for democratic values is critical to preventing democratic reversals to authoritarianism. That said, other research challenges these findings, suggesting that once a different measurement strategy is used, there is little relationship between public support for democracy and democratic survival (Tai et al., 2022). Mixed findings in the literature aside, it is worth highlighting the factors scholars have proposed influence public support for democracy. Research shows, for example, that citizens who feel dissatisfied with their economic situation and have experienced downward social

66  Research handbook on authoritarianism mobility in recent years tend to be more likely to be dissatisfied with democracy (Houle and Miller, 2019). Perceptions of corruption also appear influential, such that when citizens feel that corruption is high, they are more likely to support anti-democratic actions, such as military coups (Lupu et al., 2021). High levels of societal violence may be influential, as well, in that citizens may be more willing to accept authoritarian practices if it means higher levels of security (González, 2021). Polarization is an additional societal factor scholars have linked with democratic backsliding. Haggard and Kaufman (2021), for example, argue that as polarization increases, people begin to mistrust democratic institutions, making it more likely that parties will go to the extremes of the ideological distribution. This in turn increases the risk of backsliding because once an incumbent rises to power and manages to get the acquiescence of the legislature, it is easier for them to concentrate power in their hands. The public is more likely to tolerate anti-democratic actions by the incumbent as polarization increases because it incentivizes them to prioritize other principles before democracy, such as partisanship, policy extremism, or a candidate’s platform. These incentives to exchange democratic principles for other interests increase with the intensity of partisanship (Graham and Svolik, 2020; Svolik, 2020). Much of the research on polarization and democratic backsliding relies on the use of surveys and survey experiments, where scholars gain insight into this relationship by asking respondents questions about the conditions under which they would tolerate specific democratic transgressions (e.g., Graham and Svolik, 2020; Svolik, 2020). Ahmed (2022) points out, however, that while this research is careful to conceptualize and measure polarization, it does not do the same with respect to democracy. This lack of conceptual and measurement clarity creates several problems for scholars in terms of their ability to extrapolate what the survey results imply for public unwillingness to preserve democracy and confounds understanding of the relationship between polarization and democratic backsliding. 4.3.3

Halting Backsliding

The literature on the factors that can stall or reverse democratic backsliding once it has begun is worth reviewing as well. Though this area of research is more limited, scholars have highlighted a handful of factors that appear influential in this regard. In terms of institutional arguments, accountability mechanisms appear particularly valuable for stunting democratic backsliding once it has gained steam: formal and informal processes that can hold leaders accountable improve the odds that democratic backsliding will be impeded (Graham et al., 2017; Lührmann, 2021). Scholars have highlighted a number of accountability mechanisms that are important. According to Boese et al. (2021), for example, judicial oversight of the executive plays a key role in averting democratic backsliding at the hands of incumbent leaders. In a different vein, Bernhard et al. (2020) find that institutionalized parties and an active civil society are critical for holding leaders accountable and limiting democratic backsliding. Other research, by contrast, has found that backsliding in democracies has been halted in its most successful forms when a confluence of formal and informal factors coincides. For example, when citizens become dissatisfied with the incumbent because of corruption scandals, economic problems, or unpopular policies, and when there are institutional means to kick incumbents out of power (such as term limits and meaningful elections), democratic backsliding has been successfully reversed (Laebens and Lührmann, 2021).

Autocratization and democratic backsliding  67 Lastly, some studies have also focused on opposition strategies to push back against democratic backsliding. This strand of research suggests that opposition members are better able to halt backsliding when they cooperate with one another and use institutional channels to restrain the incumbent (Gamboa, 2017; Lührmann, 2021). When opposition members try to oust incumbents via radicalization and extra-institutional means, by contrast, they risk being expelled from democratic institutions, losing their appeal, or facing repression. That said, the ability of the opposition to effectively coordinate and maintain a moderate stance is influenced by a variety of factors – such as electoral rules, voters’ loyalty, strategic voting, and negotiating capacities – making opposition moderation more difficult to achieve in practice (Jiménez, 2021; Wahman, 2016). These insights in mind, it is important to note that research also shows that the window of opportunity for seeing a reversal of political trajectories is small: democratic breakdown is more likely the longer the backsliding episode lasts (Boese et al., 2021). Future research is needed to better understand these and other dynamics. This chapter thus far has offered some background on the status of the growing literature on democratic backsliding. We now switch gears and identify some of the important considerations for future research.

4.4

WHAT DO WE REALLY MEAN BY DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING?

We begin with a reminder of what is at stake in terms of ensuring we get democratic backsliding “right.” In 2023, the global democracy watchdog Freedom House documented in its annual report 17 consecutive years of declines in freedom worldwide (Freedom House, 2023: 2). The same year the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) independent research institute stated in its annual report that levels of global democracy in 2022 were down to 1986 levels, such that “advances in global levels of democracy made over the last 35 years have been wiped out” (Varieties of Democracy, 2023: 6). These developments are striking. They suggest that despite initial optimism regarding the future of democracy following the end of the Cold War and the “third wave” of democratization that accompanied it (Huntington, 1991), the spread of democracy has not only stalled but potentially reversed course. Yet are these assertions fair? Or, put differently, are the doomsday inferences commonly made about global trends in democracy accurate? While this appears to be the central take-away in much of the mainstream media and in many academic circles, even on this point the literature lacks consensus. Nearly all scholars concur that democratic backsliding has occurred in some surprising places in recent years, yet some have suggested that perhaps the negative messaging is overstated (Little and Meng, 2023; Treisman, 2023). For one, there is evidence that democracies still outnumber autocracies (by a very slim or moderate margin depending on the data source),8 and that the proportion of the world governed by democracies is at or close to an all-time high (Treisman, 2023). High-profile instances of democratic backsliding, such as in Hungary and the United States, may be overshadowing lower-profile instances of democratic improvements, such as in Ecuador and Madagascar.

68  Research handbook on authoritarianism Additionally, there are questions about the reliability of studies that base their assessments of a democratic reversal using data generated by surveys of expert coders, given the potential for coder bias (Little and Meng, 2023). Some scholars have likewise taken issue with assertions that global declines in democracy comprise a “wave” of democratic reversal, as Huntington (1991) conceived it. Skaaning (2020), for example, puts forth that a reverse wave (per Huntington) means that the number of autocracies relative to the number of democracies increased. With this definition of a wave, there is no evidence of a global reversal (Skaaning, 2020; Treisman, 2023). At the same time, because backsliding is often a gradual and incremental process, it is possible that Huntington’s original definition is inappropriate for studying current trends (Lührmannn and Lindberg, 2019). The central message is that scholars lack a shared understanding of whether democratic backsliding is on the rise worldwide and, if so, to what degree. This means that even on the most basic questions about democratic backsliding, there are varying viewpoints. Despite the expansion of the field, “there is little consensus about when, where, and why backsliding occurs” (Jee et al., 2022: 754). We put forth that a number of roadblocks exist in the literature on democratic backsliding, which are thwarting a deeper and more cohesive understanding of this phenomenon. We argue that central to many of these roadblocks is a lack of clarity in terms of what we mean by democratic backsliding. As Bermeo observes, “backsliding’s different meanings can complicate causal stories (2022: 156). Jee et al. (2022) likewise emphasize that many of the inconsistencies in the literature come from differences in how democratic backsliding is measured and in the conceptualization of democracy that underlies these measures. We concur with these insights, but contend that the conceptual problems are even farther reaching. In particular, beyond the ambiguity and/or variance that exists in terms of how to conceptualize and operationalize democratic backsliding, we note that many of the factors identified as part of the backsliding process in the literature overlap with the factors proposed to cause it. We discuss the key roadblocks in what follows, which we organize with a set of questions for researchers to consider. For most of them, we do not take a position on what the “correct” perspective is, given that it likely varies depending on the question that scholars seek to answer. That said, we encourage scholars to take these considerations seriously as they move forward in their research. 4.4.1

Where Can Democratic Backsliding Occur?

The literature lacks consensus in terms of what sorts of countries can experience democratic backsliding. Some scholars see it as process that can transpire in all political systems (i.e., autocratization, as we defined it earlier), others only in countries that are democratic, and yet others only in countries that have been democratic for some time. On the one hand, looking at all countries enables scholars to consider political trajectories in a larger set of contexts, such as in those political systems that share both democratic and autocratic features. Yet on the other hand, the process in which autocracies lose some of their democratic qualities is likely different than the process by which democracies do (Sinkkonen, 2021). Lumping all countries together therefore risks lumping together potentially distinct dynamics. Moreover, it may also cloud our assessment of the extent to which democracy is threatened, if many of the declines in democracy documented are occurring in autocratic contexts.

Autocratization and democratic backsliding  69 We see such differences in understanding of where backsliding can occur across the field as at least partially responsible for the varied interpretations of global trends. We suggest that scholars take great care in their research to stipulate the scope of political systems that their conceptualization of democratic backsliding (or autocratization) applies to and be faithful to it in the evidence they use to evaluate their assertions and in the inferences they make with respect to their findings. 4.4.2

What is the Duration of the Backsliding Process?

Scholars differ in their perspectives of the duration of the backsliding process. This differing view manifests itself in two domains. The first is conceptual. For some in the literature, backsliding is an incremental phenomenon that occurs slowly over time (Haggard and Kaufman, 2021). For others, however, it can take place both slowly or abruptly, depending on context. Bermeo (2016), for example, sees situations in which elected governments are ousted amid promises of a quick return to democracy as instances of backsliding. What matters is not necessarily the pace through which the undermining of democracy occurs, but rather that it is a process emerging from within democratic institutions.9 These differences in perspective matter because they influence the types of events that we might classify as backsliding. The second area in which disputes over duration appear is in terms of operationalization, specifically how long declines in the quality of democracy must transpire to be considered democratic backsliding (Jee et al., 2022). For some, any drop in democracy (even if minimal) is representative of democratic backsliding; for others, however, deterioration must occur for a longer spell. For these reasons, we encourage scholars to think carefully about how they conceptualize and operationalize the duration of the backsliding process in their research. If possible, they should consider how broader versus more restrictive interpretations of backsliding duration influence their findings. As a final point, we also suggest that those in the field consider at what point backsliding democracies no longer warrant the “backsliding” adjective. For example, while the quality of democracy in Poland deteriorated starting in 2015 with the election of the Law and Justice party (PiS), in the past few years its level of democracy (while lower than pre-2015) has for the most part remained steady. And, yet, Poland is still regularly referred to as a backsliding democracy. At what point are democracies that were once higher in quality but have since declined simply accepted as such? These and other issues related to the duration of the backsliding process warrant further contemplation. 4.4.3

What is the Outcome of Democratic Backsliding?

Assertions that democracy is under threat around the globe in recent years are common, as mentioned earlier. Yet, scholars differ in terms of the extent to which they consider the outcome of the backsliding process, specifically whether backsliding results in weakened democracy or new autocracy (or, for those studies that include autocracies in the sample, a “less democratic” form of authoritarianism). For some in the field, outcomes are not considered at all, but for others they are a key focal point on which to base inferences. We see taking into account outcomes as particularly important for research interested in identifying causal pathways. It is possible, for example, that some factors that trigger back-

70  Research handbook on authoritarianism sliding put democracies at risk of transition to autocracy, while others only raise the risk of weakened democracy. We suggest that scholars carefully consider whether disaggregating the outcome of the backsliding process in their research would influence their findings and inferences. 4.4.4

What are the Key Components of Democratic Backsliding?

As this chapter has emphasized, there are a variety of ways in which scholars conceptualize democratic backsliding. In turn, as Jee et al. (2022) point out, there are a variety of components of democracy that they include in their measures of it. We see these various aggregation strategies likely contributing to the mixed findings in the literature about causal pathways. For this reason, we suggest that scholars consider looking at distinct subcomponents of democracy in their research to better disentangle democratic backsliding processes. Such an approach could shed light on a number of important questions in the literature. For example, does a decline in one subcomponent typically trigger a decline in the others? Is there a typical sequence of events in terms of how these processes play out? Are there particular subcomponents that are especially consequential for triggering democratic collapse or valuable for ensuring democratic preservation? Relatedly, in many instances the components scholars identify as part of the backsliding process overlap with the sorts of things that are proposed to cause it. This leads to obvious issues in terms of assessing causality. In their excellent assessment of existing challenges in the democratic backsliding literature, for example, Jee et al. (2022: 760) propose a new conceptualization of democracy that takes into account factors such as a shared understanding of facts among citizens and representatives. A conceptualization of democracy that takes into account broader factors such as this is as such, but prohibits scholarly inquiry into the extent to which democratic backsliding might cause declines in these areas. Likewise, if polarization is stipulated to be part of the backsliding process (as it occasionally is), then we can no longer assess whether backsliding causes or is caused by polarization. Put differently, too often the factors that are proposed to be warning signs that democracy is at risk are actually part of our measures of democratic decline (Frantz et al., forthcoming). For this reason, we see additional advantage in disaggregating the various components of democratic backsliding that scholars rely on in their research (or, alternatively, streamlining their conceptualization of democracy to begin with), as doing so would broaden our ability to evaluate potential causes and effects. We see this as a particularly important direction for future research.

4.5 CONCLUSION While a large and rich literature has been devoted to democratization, understanding of its reverse counterpart – autocratization – has until recently been far more limited. Research in this area has expanded rapidly in the past few years, however, as scholars have sought to shed light on global developments. This is particularly true with respect to work on democratic backsliding – a narrower manifestation of autocratization – which has grown remarkably in a short time. Given the considerably greater attention devoted to democratic backsliding, it is the focal point of this chapter.

Autocratization and democratic backsliding  71 This chapter has synthesized the major themes in this literature. In it, we first discussed how scholars conceptualize democratic backsliding (under the larger umbrella of autocratization) and summarized existing approaches to measuring it. Next, we reviewed major themes in the literature on the of causes of democratic backsliding, grouping theories according to whether they focus on institutional or societal factors, before covering the (more limited) literature on the factors that can halt backsliding. With this backdrop in mind, we then turned to challenges that exist in the literature. We emphasize, in particular, the lack of scholarly consensus on what democratic backsliding is as a roadblock for moving the literature forward. This absence of clarity has problematized our understanding of the most basic questions about democratic backsliding. For example, despite messaging from organizations such as Freedom House and the Varieties of Democracy Institute that global democracy is on the decline, we lack a clear sense of what this actually means in practice. While most scholars concur that democratic backsliding represents a decline in the quality of democracy, greater clarity and consensus on other details are needed, including with respect to the specific components that comprise democratic backsliding, the environments in which backsliding may occur, and the pace with which it transpires. Absent a clearer understanding of how to think about and measure democratic backsliding – and autocratization more broadly – it will be difficult to gain a more solid sense of the extent to which these processes are happening, the various factors that underlie them, and the types of things that can potentially stall or reverse them. This chapter provides a first step for thinking through these critical issues in the larger literature on autocratization and moving this important line of research forward.

NOTES 1. 2.

This chapter uses the terms autocratic and authoritarian interchangeably. There are, of course, some exceptions to this portrait of autocratization. Gerschewski (2018: 5), for example, sees it in a narrower light, as “a regime change from a democratic to an autocratic one.” Tomini (2021) likewise takes issue with this view, asserting that autocratization should be defined in a positive way (as a process that moves a system towards autocracy) rather than in a negative way (as one that moves a system farther from democracy). 3. We note that for the most part, the term “backsliding” and synonyms such as “decay,” “deterioration,” and “erosion” are used interchangeably in the field, though see Gerschewski (2021a, 2021b) for exceptions. 4. Note that Waldner and Lust (2018) do not reference the term “autocratization” in their study. 5. Skaaning (2020) makes little reference to the term “democratic backsliding” in his study. 6. For a critique of this assessment, see Knutsen et al. (2023). 7. The literature on autocratization in authoritarian settings – where authoritarian regimes experience declines in the quality of democracy that result in deepened authoritarianism – is in its infancy (Sinkkonen, 2021). Notable exceptions, however, include recent research by Sinkkonen (2021) and Corrales (2023). 8. At the end of 2022, data from Varieties of Democracy (2023: 11) indicate that there were 90 democracies in power, compared to 89 autocracies. Data from Geddes et al. (2014) (updated by Frantz) suggest a somewhat larger gap (83 democracies versus 67 autocracies). 9. This discussion also raises the question of how we should classify military coups that topple democracies. Such events are clearly instances in which the quality of democracy declines, but it is unclear whether many in the field would see them as representative of democratic backsliding.

72  Research handbook on authoritarianism

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Autocratization and democratic backsliding  73 Jee, H., Lueders, H., and Myrick, R. (2022). “Towards a unified approach to research on democratic backsliding”, Democratization, 29(4), pp. 754–67. Jiménez, M. (2021) “Contesting autocracy: Repression and opposition coordination in Venezuela”, Political Studies, 71(1), pp. 47–68. Kendall-Taylor, A., Lindstaedt, N., and Frantz, E. (2019) Democracies and authoritarian regimes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kitschelt, H. (2000) “Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic policies”, Comparative Political Studies, 33(6), pp. 845–79. Knutsen, C.H., Marquardt, K.L., Seim, B., Coppedge, M., Edgell, A., Medzihorsky, J., Pemstein, D., Teorell, J., Gerring, J., and Lindberg, S.I. (2023) “Conceptual and measurement issues in assessing democratic backsliding”, The Varieties of Democracy Institute Working Paper Series, May. Laebens, M.G., and Lührmann, A. (2021) “What halts democratic erosion? The changing role of accountability”, Democratization, 28(5), pp. 908–28. Lindberg, S.I. (2023) “The state of democracy: Global challenges and challengers”, in Bartels, L.M., Daxecker, U.E., Hyde, S.D., Lindberg, S.I., and Nooruddin, I. (eds.), “The forum: Global challenges to democracy? Perspectives on democratic backsliding”, International Studies Review, 25(2), pp. 1–55. Linz, J.J. (1990) “The perils of presidentialism”, Journal of Democracy, 1(1), pp. 51–69. Little, A., and Meng, A. (2023) “Subjective and objective measurement of democratic backsliding.” Available at: SSRN 4327307. Lührmann, A. (2021) “Disrupting the autocratization sequence: Towards democratic resilience”, Democratization, 28(5), pp. 1017–39. Lührmann, A., and Lindberg, S.I. (2019) “A third wave of autocratization is here: What is new about it?” Democratization, 26(7), pp. 1095–113. Lupu, N., Rodríguez, M., and Zechmeister, E. (2021) Pulse of democracy. Nashville, TN: LAPOP. Mainwaring, S., and Scully, T. (1995) Building democratic institutions: Party systems in Latin America. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Meléndez-Sánchez, M. (2021) “Latin America erupts: Millennial authoritarianism in El Salvador”, Journal of Democracy, 32(3), pp. 19–32. Mounk, Y. (2018) The people vs. democracy: Why our freedom is in danger and how to save it. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Mudde, C., and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2012) Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or corrective for democracy? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Norris, P., and Inglehart, R. (2019) Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit and authoritarian populism. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pérez-Liñán, A., Schmidt, N., and Vairo, D. (2019) “Presidential hegemony and democratic backsliding in Latin America, 1925–2016”, Democratization, 26(4), pp. 606–25. Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M.E., Cheibub, J.A., and Limongi, F. (2000) Democracy and development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Randall, V., and Svåsand, L. (2002) “Party institutionalization in new democracies”, Party Politics, 8(1), pp. 5–29. Sartori, G. (1976) Parties and party systems: A framework for analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schumpeter, J.A. (1947) Capitalism, socialism and democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers. Sinkkonen, E. (2021). “Dynamic dictators: Improving the research agenda on autocratization and authoritarian resilience”, Democratization, 28(6), pp. 1172–90. Skaaning, S. (2020). “Waves of autocratization and democratization: A critical note on conceptualization and measurement”, Democratization, 27(8), pp. 1533–42. Svolik, M.W. (2015) “Which democracies will last? Coups, incumbent takeovers, and the dynamic of democratic consolidation”, British Journal of Political Science, 45(4), pp. 715–38. Svolik, M.W. (2020). “When polarization trumps civic virtue: Partisan conflict and the subversion of democracy by incumbents”, Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 15(1), pp. 3–31. Tai, Y., Hu, Y., and Solt, F. (2022) “Democracy, public support, and measurement uncertainty”, American Political Science Review, pp. 1–7. doi:10.1017/S0003055422000429. Tomini, L. (2021) “Don’t think of a wave! A research note about the current autocratization debate”, Democratization, 28(6), pp. 1191–201.

74  Research handbook on authoritarianism Tomini, L., Gibril, S., and Bochev, V. (2023) “Standing up against autocratization across political regimes: A comparative analysis of resistance actors and strategies”, Democratization, 30(1), pp. 119–38. Treisman, D. (2023) “Is democracy in danger? Assessing the risk with historical data”, Comparative Political Studies, 56(12), pp. 1924–52. Varieties of Democracy (2023) “Democracy report 2023: Defiance in the face of autocratization”, Gothenburg: Varieties of Democracy Institute. Wahman, M. (2016) “Opposition coordination in Africa”, American Political Science Association, Comparative Democratization Newsletter, 14(1), pp. 1–7. Waldner, D., and Lust, E. (2018) “Unwelcome change: Coming to terms with democratic backsliding”, Annual Review of Political Science, 21, pp. 93–113.

PART II ACTORS, INSTITUTIONS AND STRATEGIES

5. The personalization of power in dictatorships Abel Escribà-Folch and Joan C. Timoneda

5.1 INTRODUCTION How did dictators such as Moammar Gaddafi, Idi Amin, Jean-Bédel Bokassa, Vladimir Putin, or Rafael Trujillo manage to accumulate so much personal power? What specific steps did they take to become strongmen and rule with little or no constraints? One of the most consequential processes in dictatorship is the personalization of power, that is, the accumulation of power in the hands of the leader at the expense of the support group. If successful, the process culminates in the ruler controlling all levers of political power. The military and the ruling party no longer operate independently of the leader, and they are marginalized to the point they cannot credibly constrain the leader’s choices (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2018). As Wright (2021: 2) claims, “[f]or formal institutions to structure political interaction that further accountability or constraint, humans, often organized into groups such as parties or militaries, must act collectively to enforce them.” When institutions fail to play that role and the ability of individuals to act collectively is undermined, personalist dictators come to dominate the state apparatus and can exercise power with little restraint. The trajectory opposite to personalism in autocracies is institutionalized power-sharing (Svolik, 2012). Power-sharing mechanisms between the ruler and his support coalition give regime elites access to decision-making and rents in credible and predictable ways. They often regulate succession rules and help co-opt opposition groups. In such cases, allies and insiders retain the ability to credibly oust the dictator should he deviate from their bargain. As Meng (2020: 4) succinctly puts it, “[i]nstitutions that empower and identify specific challengers help to solve elite coordination problems, therefore better allowing them to hold incumbents accountable,” and, therefore, she continues, “[i]nstitutionalization limits executive power by creating conditions that actually threaten the leader.” It is worth noting, though, that the presence of formal institutions does not automatically involve effective power-sharing unless they are binding (and not simply rubberstamp) and impose limits on executive power (Timoneda, 2020). The importance of understanding the process of personalization lies in two related factors. First are the observed consequences of personalist rule. As scholars have repeatedly emphasized, personalist regimes have been linked to numerous disastrous political and economic outcomes. These include, most notably, higher levels of violent repression, a higher risk of internal and international conflict, nuclear proliferation, a higher likelihood of giving way to state failure upon collapse, and poor economic performance (Frantz et al., 2020; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014; Way and Weeks, 2014; Weeks, 2012; Wright, 2008). The second factor is the growing importance of such regimes and the global rise in average personalism levels. Personalism is indeed on the rise and unconstrained autocrats can be found in almost every region of the world (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright, 2017). Figure 5.1 shows the global average latent level of personalism in dictatorships from 1946 to 2010, using data from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018).1 76

The personalization of power in dictatorships  77

Figure 5.1

Evolution of personalism in dictatorships over time

However, our knowledge on the specific steps that dictators take to personalize power and the timing of such maneuvers is rather limited. As Sinkkonen (2021: 1179) emphasizes, “when authoritarian leaders reach their power position, they must take active measures to stay there. Understanding this dynamism will help us reach a more comprehensive account of global trends in governance. Currently, dynamic changes within regimes such as fluctuations in the level of autocratization remain poorly conceptualized and measured.” To shed some light on the dynamic process of power accumulation, this chapter first discusses the view of personalism as a latent characteristic present in all non-democratic regimes to varying degrees, as opposed to personalism being a fixed, time-invariant regime category. We then review the main works examining the emergence of personalist rule. The next section uses eight items indicating the leader’s control over the security sector and the party to explore the most common pathways through which rulers manage to accumulate power.

5.2

PERSONALISM AND ITS MEASUREMENT: DIMENSION VS. CATEGORY

The conceptualization of personalism above entails that it can vary across regimes, dictators, and over time. We define personalism as the extent to which “the dictator has personal discretion and control over the key levers of power in his political system,” and, hence, the extent to which dictators are unconstrained “by the institutions that can act as veto players in other dictatorships, especially the military high command and the ruling party executive committee” (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2018: 70–71). Personalism is thus interpreted as a characteristic that is present with different intensities in all types of authoritarian regimes and that can

78  Research handbook on authoritarianism change throughout a dictator’s tenure. That is, personalism is a time-varying characteristic of dictatorships. However, some initial classifications viewed personalist regimes as a separate time-invariant regime category (Geddes, 1999), which sparked some debate on the nature of the concept and its empirical implications (e.g., Svolik, 2012; Van den Bosch, 2015). Comparative research on non-democratic regimes has traditionally relied on distinct categorical typologies to examine the consequences and behavior of different forms of autocratic rule and their propensity to break down and democratize. In order to capture heterogeneity among non-democracies, scholars have created several typologies (and datasets), which normally differ from each other in the specific dimension or feature that they consider the most relevant for distinguishing regimes from one another. Some focus on the identity or background of the effective leader (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, 2010), others on the composition of elites and the institutions that control power (Geddes, 1999; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014; Magaloni, 2008), others on how power is acquired and maintained (Hadenius and Teorell, 2007; Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius, 2013), and others on the presence of multiparty or semi-competitive elections, or other formal (nominally democratic) institutions (Diamond, 2002; Gandhi, 2008; Levitsky and Way, 2010). Still others have created four-fold typologies based on two dimensions: whether the leader is constrained or not, and whether the leader and their support group are military or civilian (Lai and Slater, 2006; Weeks, 2014). One of the typologies most frequently used in comparative politics is the one developed by Geddes (1999) – and later extended in Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). The measure focuses on who or what group holds power ultimately. Her classification was the first to incorporate personalist regimes as a distinct ideal regime type alongside military, party-based regimes, and (in later work) monarchies. In the dataset, each non-democratic regime spell is coded as belonging to one of these four typologies for its entire duration. The main problem with regime categories and typologies (both by Geddes as well as others) is, according to Svolik (2012: 30), that they “are neither mutually exclusive nor collectively exhaustive.” Criticisms of such classifications have been especially strong for the case of the personalist category since the “classification judgments must weigh conceptually incommensurable aspects of authoritarian politics” Svolik (2012: 31). The steadiness of the personalist category within a given spell, Svolik continues, makes it “particularly difficult to objectively ascertain the occurrence and timing of a transition from a military or single-party dictatorship to a personalist one – primarily because each of the three types measures a different aspect of authoritarian politics.” Personalism, according to several scholars, should thus be interpreted as a feature of dictatorships to be operationalized separately as its own time-varying measure. The task, while now widely shared among scholars, still presents conceptual and measurement challenges. Scholars have made new efforts at measuring personalism as a distinct dimension or trait that can vary across regimes and time (Gandhi and Sumner, 2020; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2018; Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius, 2013; Weeks, 2014; Wright, 2021). Initial efforts to capture this trait were very problematic since they relied on constraints on the executive (as measured in the Polity IV dataset) or on the duration of tenure to capture personalism (Magaloni, Chu, and Min, 2013; Wahman, Teorell, and Hadenius, 2013). These are both problematic: The former only captures institutional constraints and regular limitations and exhibits little variation, while the latter is endogenous to the process of consolidation. Weeks (2014) uses Geddes’s original (yes/no) questions used to create her typology to construct an index of personalism representing the proportion of yes answers. Her measure shows considerably little variation within leader spells. More comprehensive indicators have been recently created

The personalization of power in dictatorships  79 by Wright (2021) and Gandhi and Sumner (2020). They both look at specific actions taken by dictators aimed at reducing the constraints that the military and the support party pose to their rule. These actions are in turn used to produce an underlying level of personal power using item response theory models. Importantly for the goal of this chapter, namely, to examine the specific pathways of power accumulation, a series of case comparisons show that Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s (2018) and Wright’s (2021) data do a better job at documenting the steady rise of personalist power for numerous dictators (Chin et al., 2022).

5.3

EXTANT WORK: THE DETERMINANTS OF PERSONALISM

Dictators want to reduce their dependence on those groups that helped them seize power, and thus undermine their ability to replace them. Yet, elites have a strong interest in retaining (or even increasing) their influence to avoid being sidelined. Some dictators manage to usurp control of decision-making and political appointments at the expense of their top allies and launching organizations. In such contexts with opposing interests, elites can only prevent the ruler from doing so if they can retain the capacity to act collectively against the leader and, hence, credibly threaten to remove him should he behave opportunistically (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2018; Svolik, 2012). The risk of elite coups is thus argued to be the main deterrent against power accumulation. Any increase in the dictator’s personal power risks aggrieving elite members who see the risk of marginalization increase and their influence dwindle. Specifically, “[w]hen the members of the ruling coalition suspect that the dictator is making steps toward strengthening his position at their expense, they may stage a coup d’état in order to stop him” (Svolik, 2009: 479). Personalism can then emerge when the credibility of that threat is undermined. Our understanding of the conditions under which some dictators manage to escape elite control and concentrate power is still relatively limited. Existing works point to several factors that can influence the balance of power between the ruler and the support coalition in favor of the former and can thus pave the way for the monopolization of power in the dictator’s hands. These factors can be classified into domestic and international ones, and into structural and contextual ones. Structural accounts have paid attention to time-invariant or slow-moving factors that may give dictators a bargaining advantage over elites. Recent accounts stress the importance of initial conditions and, hence, the initial power balance at the beginning of a regime. Meng (2020) argues that strong leaders, namely, post-colonial founding presidents and those coming to power via a coup, are unlikely to institutionalize their regimes due to their higher popularity and control over security forces, respectively.2 Alternatively, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018) focus on the initial internal cohesion (or factionalism) of seizure groups. Specifically, they claim that factionalized elites cannot obstruct “the dictator’s drive to concentrate power” due to their inability to coordinate, while, at the same time, “the dictator can bargain separately with each member of a factionalized seizure group,” inducing competition and driving down the price of support (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2018: 78–9). As for structural and (to a large extent) foreign factors, Fails (2020) shows that increases in oil rents lead to higher personalism levels. Ample unearned resources allow rulers to finance patronage networks and reduce the need to share power (Meng, 2020). Another crucial foreign factor concerns international support. The existence of credible support from foreign countries

80  Research handbook on authoritarianism for the incumbent undermines the credibility of a coup threat by elites, so increasing the ruler’s advantage vis-à-vis them. Although not focusing directly on the multifaceted process of personalization, some authors posit that the influence of foreign countries can facilitate power consolidation. For example, Casey (2020) finds that Soviet sponsorship facilitated the adoption of coup prevention strategies in client regimes, while Boutton (2019) shows that defense alliances make elite purges more likely as dictators anticipate military support. Research on contextual factors that can at least temporarily alter the internal power balance is much scarcer. One such factor that has been shown to have profound impacts on internal power dynamics is failed coups. Failed coups reshape the information environment and create both incentives and opportunities for the dictator to undermine elite control (Bokobza et al., 2022; Timoneda, Escribà-Folch, and Chin, 2023). A failed attempt signals the existence of inside threats, which urges rulers to take action to prevent further challenges. Furthermore, after a failed coup the credibility and deterrent effect of elite threats is temporarily weakened. However, several questions remain unanswered. On the one hand, a set of works has concentrated on the use of purges, giving possibly the impression that this is a first, swift, and essential (if not the only) step towards power consolidation. On the other, despite allowing for general theories about the rise and consequences of personalism, works using latent measures, by aggregating information from several indicators, cannot inform us about the specific steps dictators may take, what they do first, and how that may facilitate the next step. Consequently, we still know little about the specific steps that dictators follow to concentrate power and which factors influence those strategic decisions. In particular, we have a limited understanding of which actions or power grabs are chosen first under different circumstances, what sequences of actions are more common and more likely to be successful, and if any patterns in the pathways of personalism can be detected.

5.4

PATHWAYS TO POWER ACCUMULATION

Becoming a strongman is a challenging process. The dictator and the ruling coalition typically hold opposing interests in intra-regime bargains that shape the organizational configuration of the regime. As noted above, any move by the dictator intended to increase his personal power risks aggrieving elite members and trigger a backlash. What steps do dictators most often take? In this section, we exploit the several indicators used to construct Geddes, Wright, and Frantz’s (GWF 2018) latent personalism index. There are eight constituent measures based on observable actions by dictators aimed at increasing their personal power relative to the support party (if one exists) and the military. In other words, these eight components describe the distribution of power within the regime. In particular, they indicate for every country-year identified as autocratic by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) whether the leader makes access to office dependent on personal loyalty (office personalism), the leader created a new support party after seizing power (new party), the ruler controls appointments to the party executive committee (party exec committee), the party executive committee is absent or is simply a rubberstamp for the leader’s decisions (party rubberstamp); and, concerning the security forces, whether the leader personally controls the security apparatus (control sec apparatus), the leader promotes officers loyal to himself or from his support group or forces officers from other groups to retire (military promotion), the leader creates paramilitary units, a president’s

The personalization of power in dictatorships  81 guard, or a new security force loyal to himself (paramilitary), and, finally, whether the leader imprisons or kills officers from other groups without a fair trial (military purges). 5.4.1

Empirical Analysis

Our empirical analyses provide descriptive evidence of the different and most common pathways of power personalization in dictatorships between 1950 and 2010. We use a few key variables of interest from the aforementioned GWF data. First is the main measure of latent personalism for every dictator-year in the sample. Using an Item Response Theory (IRT) model, Wright (2021) creates a continuous measure of personalism based on the eight manually coded categorical variables described above. While one of our innovations is to trace the evolution of personalism using the constituent measures, the overall measure of personalism is useful to understand the extent to which a dictator has concentrated power. We provide descriptive statistics using overall personalism throughout the analysis. As stated, the personalism variable has eight constituent measures, which we divide into two groups of four. First is civil or party personalism, which captures how a dictator concentrated power within civilian government institutions and their support party. The four measures in this group are creating a new party, office personalism, party rubberstamp and party executive committee. The second category is military personalism, which includes variables that capture the dictator’s personal grasp on the armed forces. Included in this category are military purges, military promotions based on loyalty, the creation of a paramilitary and attaining direct personal control over the security apparatus. We analyze the paths of personalism along these two dimensions for various reasons. One is conceptual clarity. It is intuitive to think that the dictator needs to deal with both party and military institutions, no matter its general makeup, and that the strategies for each might be different. It is also easy to allow military personalism to dominate the discussion, and we show that civilian personalization is also relevant. Lastly, a more practical reason is that the combinations of all possible paths increase exponentially with a larger set of options, making the presentation of the results more cumbersome. By presenting the results by civilian and military personalism, we simplify the presentation and make it more intuitive. At the end, we discuss the common paths between civil and military personalism. Lastly, we use other variables from the GWF data to describe the different leader spells and their chosen personalization pathways. These measures are (1) ideal regime types, (2) how the regime came to power – coup, election, rebellion, etc. – and (3) the seizure groups whose support brought the leader to power. We provide this information, along with tenure duration and level of personalism, for each of the personalization paths we identify below. Note also that our main unit of observation is the dictator-year, since personalism is conceptually related to leaders and their ability to concentrate power, not the regime. We use the GWF dataset to define dictators’ time in office. We begin with a general overview of the evolution of personalism over time. Figure 5.1 showed that personalism increased more or less steadily over time between 1950 and 2010. Figure 5.2 (left plot) captures the evolution of average personalism within leader spells. As expected, personalism increases rapidly on average during a leader’s first years in office and slows down after 20 or so years in power. Note, however, that in the full sample, leaders remain in office for 8.81 years on average, and the median age of leader replacement is 5 years. It is therefore expected that leaders who have established themselves for longer exhibit higher

82  Research handbook on authoritarianism

Figure 5.2

Evolution of personalism within leader spells (left) and by category (right)

levels of personal control. Figure 5.2 (right plot) shows the evolution of the military and civil/ party personalism within leader spells. A trend emerges, namely, that new dictators focus on personalizing the military apparatus more than civil institutions and/or their party. The longest lasting regimes also reach the highest levels of military personalism but only personalize the civil side of their government to an extent. That said, during the first 20 years of rule, on average, both civil and military personalization increase in parallel. Indeed, for most autocrats, military and civil personalization of power go hand in hand for a majority of their rule. Figure 5.3 plots the evolution of each of the eight sub-measures divided into civil (left) and military (right) personalism. In terms of civil personalism, autocrats focus most of their attention on loyalty appointments in positions of power within the government. Dictators also resort, though more moderately, to obtain personal control of the party apparatus. This can be seen in the party rubberstamp and executive committee measures, which go hand in hand throughout a leader’s tenure (left plot). Dictators therefore see the incentive early on to remove party figures as veto players. Fewer dictators create a support party, but there is a catch, as some dictators inherit a party and prefer to transform it to their image rather than create a new one.

Figure 5.3

Evolution of civil (left) and military personalism (right) by subcategory

The personalization of power in dictatorships  83 The move to make appointments based on loyalty on the civil side closely mirrors the evolution of loyalty appointments in the military (right plot, top line). Very early on, leaders focus on placing loyal elements within the military apparatus. Second, dictators also prioritize obtaining personal control of the security apparatus. Interestingly, both purges and the creation of a paramilitary unit happen less frequently at the beginning of a dictator’s rule, but increase progressively over age throughout their tenure. The evidence provided so far only begins to paint a picture of autocrats’ decisions when it comes to tightening their personal grip on power. To shed more light on the specific sequences of power grabs, Figures 5.4 and 5.5 offer a visual pattern for the most common personalization paths. Figure 5.4 shows the most common paths for civil (or party) personalization. As suggested by Figure 5.2, the most common first move by dictators is to make appointments based on loyalty within the party and government. As Table 5.1 shows, 166 dictators did this, a large majority, and 83.13 percent of these did it during the first year of their tenure; 17 rulers create a party as their first civil personalization move, while 13 move to control appointments to the party executive, and yet another 13 ensure that the party always follows their directives. Interestingly, dictators whose first move is to personalize through loyalty appointments in mostly civil positions last an average of 12.61 years. Leaders who first ensure that the party solely rubberstamps their decisions do so, on average, within 1.92 years of taking over, and 69.23 percent of leaders do it their first year. These leaders also enjoy a relatively lengthy tenure of about 11 years, on average. Getting to control appointments to the party’s executive committee takes longer for dictators – on average 5.38 years after taking over, and only 46.15 percent manage to do it in their first year in power. Despite making this move later, these leaders do last significantly longer, 14 years on average, probably because there are fewer powerful elements within the party’s top echelons to push for a takeover or coup. It is also likely combined with military personalization moves that aid consolidation. Table 5.2 provides more information about dictator spells as a function of their first personalization choices. Leaders who first focus on loyalty appointments to civil positions exhibit higher levels of personalism already during the first three years of tenure – an average of 0.38. This is exactly at the mean of the overall personalism measure. The reason for this higher level of initial personalism is that these dictators appear to combine this civil move with one or two other military personalization acts (we will talk about this more later). These leaders then go on to have an average of 0.51 in latent personalism for the duration of their spells in power. As expected, a majority of these dictators are considered personalist (43.98 percent) in Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). Most came to power via a coup (36.14 percent) and the leader’s main support group is the military. Of the other three possible first civil personalism moves, only rubberstamp is associated with higher levels of personalism throughout the duration of the leader spell (0.45). These are mostly party-based regimes where the leader tries to gain personal control over party decisions. Also note that leaders who create a party as their first move are generally low in overall personalism both initially and throughout their time in office. These are mostly military dictators (58.82 percent) who create a civil support party when they come into office. Examples are Park Chung-hee’s Democratic Republican Party (DRP) in the Republic of Korea, founded shortly after his military takeover in 1961, or Than Shwe’s Union Solidarity and Development Association, founded by the Burmese dictator in 1993 shortly after seizing power. Based on the alluvial plot in Figure 5.4, we see that the most common second personalization move by dictators is to create a support party after making loyalty appointments. If the

84  Research handbook on authoritarianism

Figure 5.4

Personalization decisions after first move, civil measures

Table 5.1

Breakdown of leader spells by first move (civil)

First Move

Office Pers.

Create Party

Rubberstamp

Exec. Commit.

Number of Dictators

166

17

13

13

Mean Time to First Move

2.25

3.12

1.92

5.38

Max. Time to First Move

28

9

7

31

Frequency at t = 1 (%)

83.13

23.53

69.23

46.15

Avg. Lifespan

12.61

8.18

11.08

14

dictator inherited a party, it is equally likely that they will move to dominate party decisions (rubberstamp) or control appointments to the party executive (partypers), or will move to make at least two of these moves (see ‘all’ category). There are other minority paths, such as creating a party first and then making loyalty appointments, or controlling party decisions first and then making loyalty appointments. We provide specific data on each of these possible paths in Table 5.3.

The personalization of power in dictatorships  85 Table 5.2

Regime and leader characteristics by first move (civil)

First Move

Office Pers.

Create Party

Rubberstamp

Exec. Commit.

Personalism First 3 Years

0.38

0.15

0.24

0.2

Personalism Avg. Spell

0.51

0.31

0.45

0.26

Most Common Reg. Type

Personal

Military

Party

Party

Most Common Reg. Type (%)

43.98

58.82

92.31

84.62

2nd Most Common Reg. Type

Party

Personal

Military

Military

2nd Most Common Reg. Type (%)

21.08

29.41

7.69

7.69

Most Common Seizure Method

Coup

Coup

Coup

Rebellion

Most Common Seizure Method (%)

36.14

76.47

53.85

46.15

2nd Most Common Seizure Method

Foreign

Foreign

Foreign

Coup

2nd Most Common Seizure Method (%)

16.87

17.65

30.77

23.08

Most Common Leader Support Group

Military

Military

Dom-party

Dom-party

Most Common Leader Support Group (%)

33.73

64.71

38.46

38.46

2nd Most Common Leader Support Group

Hereditary

Foreign

Military

Insurgency

2nd Most Common Leader Support Group (%)

16.27

17.65

38.46

23.08

Note: Dom-party = Dominant party.

Notably, 28 dictators created a support party after making loyalty appointments. They did so on average 6 years after the first move. These dictators lasted an average of 16 years and their overall personalism was 0.61 over the leader’s tenure. Both of these figures are significantly above average when compared with the full sample of leader spells. A well-known example of this path to personalism was Cuba under Fidel Castro, who moved to make loyalty appointments to civil positions in year 1 (1959) and created the Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas in 1961, which brought the different revolutionary factions under the same umbrella and Castro’s unquestioned leadership. Of the other paths, we want to note that leaders who inherited a party and quickly moved to make loyalty appointments lasted the longest when combined with a second move of fully controlling the party’s decisions (rubberstamp) – a lifespan of almost 22 years on average for the 7 leaders that took this path. An example is Paraguay under Alfredo Stroessner, who made appointments based on loyalty in year 3 and moved to fully control his political party in year 13. Lastly, 153 dictators did not make a second civil personalization move after making the first one. The life expectancy of these dictatorial spells is lower compared to others, but it could also be due to the fact that leaders cannot personalize as much if their tenure is shorter. Interestingly, dictators who create a support party but do not move to personalize control of it only last a little over 6 years in power, on average. Let us now examine how dictators personalize the security apparatus. Figure 5.5 shows the alluvial plot for the most common personalization paths for military sub-measures. The first – and potentially most relevant – finding is that military purges are one of the least common first personalization moves by dictators. In fact, only 7 (probably desperate) dictators used purges as their sole first move. As shown in Table 5.4, all of these 7 autocrats did so in their first year in power, but only lasted an average of 3.71 years in office, much below both the mean (8.8) and the median (5) of the distribution. Conversely, a majority of leaders moved first to appoint loyalists within the military in order to build a loyal ruling coalition. This was the sole first move for 139 dictators, 84.17 percent of whom did so in their first year. As noted above, this pattern mirrors what we saw earlier with civil personalism, where the first move for most dictators was to control appointments to

– –

Avg. Lifespan

Avg. Personalism for Spell

23

–

21.86 0.52

Avg. Lifespan

Avg. Personalism for Spell

23.25 0.51

Avg. Lifespan

Avg. Personalism for Spell

8 5.39

 

 

33 0.48

–

–

–

–

Overall stats for “Party Rubberstamp” as Second Move

–

–

Mean Time to Second Move

Number of Dictators

 

9.24

Mean Time to Second Move

Number of Dictators –

0.39

Avg. Personalism for Spell

PARTY RUBBERSTAMP

27.67

Avg. Lifespan

3 18

Mean Time to Second Move

Second Move

1 10

Overall stats for “Office Personalism” as Second Move

0.4

Number of Dictators

7

–

Mean Time to Second Move

 

–

Number of Dictators

1

0.61

Avg. Personalism for Spell

11

16.07

Avg. Lifespan OFFICE PERSONALISM

28

Second Move

NA

NA

NA

0

Rubberstamp

Overall stats for “Create Party” as Second Move

–

–

6.00

0.61

Avg. Personalism for Spell

CREATE PARTY

Mean Time to Second Move

16.07

Avg. Lifespan

–

–

Create Party

Number of Dictators

28 6.00

Mean Time to Second Move

Office Pers.

Breakdown of leader spells by first and second moves (civil)

Number of Dictators

Second Move

From (First Move)

Table 5.3

0.33

18

5.39

2

0.26

27

18

1

NA

NA

NA

0

Party Ex. Com.

86  Research handbook on authoritarianism

0.51

Avg. Personalism for Spell

14

0.51

Avg. Personalism for Spell

10.13 0.42

Avg. Lifespan

Avg. Personalism for Spell

NA

NA

12

0.37

11.25

NA

NA 9.99 0.39

Mean Time to Second Move

Avg. Lifespan

Avg. Personalism for Spell

153

Overall stats for “None” as Second Move

Number of Dictators

 

6.36

NA

Mean Time to Second Move 0.22

NA

117

Number of Dictators

NONE

23.2

Avg. Lifespan

5 15.28

Second Move

0 NA

Overall stats for “Party Executive Committee” as Second Move

–

–

Mean Time to Second Move

Number of Dictators

 

23.2

Avg. Lifespan

–

–

15.28

Mean Time to Second Move

5

Rubberstamp

Number of Dictators

Create Party PARTY EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Office Pers.

Second Move

From (First Move)

0.24

11.9

NA

10

–

–

–

–

Party Ex. Com.

The personalization of power in dictatorships  87

88  Research handbook on authoritarianism

Figure 5.5

Personalization decisions after first move, military measures

powerful government and party positions. The most common second move for this group of dictators are purges (see Table 5.6). The second most common strategy for dictators is to first establish personal control over the security apparatus. This was, for instance, the path chosen by Houari Boumédiène in Algeria on the same day when he took power (Timoneda, Escribà-Folch, and Chin, 2021) – 81 percent of leaders who first move to personally control the security apparatus do so in their first year in office and last 11.52 years in power, on average. Fewer dictators (10) proceed first to create a paramilitary organization. As opposed to the case of party control, dictators often make two simultaneous first moves when it comes to personalizing the security forces. The most common of these combinations are (1) loyalty appointments and control of the security apparatus and (2) loyalty appointments and purges.3 Notice that loyalty appointments, when considering these combinations, make up an ever larger majority of the total set of dictator first moves. Also, some leaders do decide to purge right away but only do so when managing to simultaneously appoint loyalists within the military; 43 dictators pursued this strategy, and 95 percent made both moves in year 1 of their

The personalization of power in dictatorships  89 Table 5.4

Breakdown of leader spells by first move (military)

First Move

Purges

Appts

Paramil.

Loyalty

Security

Appts

Appts

App.

Loyalty +

Loyalty +

Security App. Purges Number of Regimes

7

139

10

42

46

43

Mean Time to First Move

1

1.65

4.1

1.98

1.54

1.26

Max. Time to First Move

1

12

21

25

10

8

Frequency at t = 1 (%)

100

84.17

70

80.95

91.3

95.35

Avg. Lifespan

3.71

9.33

12.50

11.52

12.50

8.93

tenure. However, these two moves are not necessarily harbingers of prolonged rule, as the life expectancy of this group of dictators is on average 8.93 years. In fact, personally controlling the security apparatus produces better longevity, at 11.52 years when it is the only first move and 12.5 years when combined with appointments on loyalty. Table 5.5 provides more detail about the dictators who choose each of these first six moves. Most of the regimes who purge right away have overall low levels of personalism (0.17 and 0.19), much below the overall mean (0.37). That is, they purge right away but do not have the time or opportunity to further accumulate power; 3 dictators who only purged first were from military regimes and 3 others were from party-based regimes. A majority came to power via a coup (57 percent) and most of these dictators have the military as their main support group. When purges are combined with loyalty appointments, personalism does increase substantially over time, going up to 0.5 on average. An interesting finding is that leaders who sought to take over the security apparatus first most commonly came to power via an election, which probably means that their grasp over the military was more tenuous and such a move was necessary Table 5.5

Regime and leader characteristics by first move (military)

First Move

Purges

Appts

Paramil.

Loyalty

Security

Appts

Appts

App.

Loyalty +

Loyalty +

Security App. Purges Personalism First 3 Years

0.17

0.14

0.24

0.31

0.35

0.34

Personalism Avg. Spell

0.19

0.34

0.5

0.4

0.43

0.5

Most Common Reg. Type

Military

Party

Military

Party

Party

Party

Most Common Reg. Type (%)

42.86

45.32

30

47.62

41.3

58.14

2nd Most Common Reg. Type

Party

Military

Party

Personal

Personal

Military

2nd Most Common Reg. Type (%)

42.86

35.97

30

35.71

23.91

20.93

Most Common Seizure Method

Coup

Coup

Coup

Election

Coup

Coup

Most Common Seizure Method (%)

57.14

48.92

30

40.48

28.26

51.16

2nd Most Common Seizure Method

Uprising

Foreign

Rebellion

Coup

Foreign

Foreign

2nd Most Common Seizure Method (%) 28.57

17.99

30

19.05

19.57

20.93

Most Common Leader Support Group

Military

Military

Military

Dom-party

Military

Military

Most Common Leader Support Group

71.43

48.2

30

33.33

26.09

51.16

Insurgency

Dom-party

Foreign

Prior dem.

Dom-party

Dom-party

14.29

25.18

20

26.19

21.74

18.6

(%) 2nd Most Common Leader Support Group 2nd Most Common Leader Support Group (%)

Note: Prior dem. = prior democracy; dom-party = dominant party.

90  Research handbook on authoritarianism to minimize the risk of a coup. In line with Meng and Paine (2022), we observe that rebel regimes are not likely to make power grabs as they tend to mitigate the guardianship dilemma via credible power-sharing. Table 5.6 breaks down the data for each dictator based on their first and second moves to personalize the security forces. We saw that leaders who purge first have a short lifespan, but those who purge second, after making appointments on loyalty, do enjoy longer spells. In fact, when purges are the second non-simultaneous move, the average expected lifespan of a dictator in office jumps to 16 years irrespective of the first move they made. A total of 29 dictators purged second and did so 5.9 years after the first move. An example of this strategy was Deng Xiaoping in China, who maintained an overall level of personalism throughout his tenure. He moved to make appointments on merit from year 1 (1978), but only purged in year 11 (1989) around the Tiananmen Square protests, weeding out reformist elements within the Chinese Communist Party. Kim Il Sung’s spell in North Korea is another example of this personalization path. He first made appointments based on loyalty shortly after taking over in 1948, and followed this up two years later with a large-scale purge of party members deemed not to have fought US and South Korean occupation strongly enough. Most notably, when purges are the second non-simultaneous move after both loyalty appointments and personal control of the security apparatus, dictators are expected to last a whopping 22.6 years in office, on average. This is relevant since the existing literature focusing on purges (Sudduth, 2017) may have given the impression that such move was the first (even only) and most urgent and crucial to consolidate power. However, we find that purges have actually been more effective as the second non-sequential move for dictators after a few years in office. Another path worth noting is the one consisting of first making appointments based on loyalty and, second, moving to personally control the security apparatus. A total of 11 dictators followed this path, 9 of which led party regimes and 2 personalist regimes according to Geddes’s typology. The fact that most of these regimes were party-based explains the relatively long lifespan of 17.5 years as well as the average levels of personalism (0.37). A notable example of this personalization path is Mao Zedong in China, who made appointments on loyalty rapidly after taking over power in 1949 and moved to personally control the military in 1964, when he switched China’s defensive military strategy to one of guerrilla warfare (Fravel, 2019). Another example was Sierra Leone under Joseph Saidu Momoh, who placed loyalists within the military when he took over in 1985 and personalized control over the security apparatus in 1987 after uncovering a coup plot against him. Contrast this with leaders who do not make a second non-simultaneous personalizing move (i.e., second move is “none”). Average lifespans are all close to or below the mean, and some of them below or at the median. Generally, dictators who do not make a second move only last 6.73 years in office and exhibit low overall levels of personalism. The most common pathway when no second move is forthcoming is to make appointments on loyalty, but these regimes only last 5.73 years on average with a personalism level of 0.16. Two simultaneous first moves of loyalty appointments and personal control of the security apparatus yield the longest longevity at almost 10 years. Purges, again, have some of the lowest levels of life expectancy at 3.5 when they are the only move and 6.06 when they are combined with appointing loyalists to top military positions. A couple of final notes on the data. First, note that the figures and tables only include leaders that have made at least one personalizing move during their tenure. Indeed, out of the 466 total number of dictators in the sample, 231 made no attempts at party personalism, and 113 dictators made zero moves to personalize the military. Combined, a total of 93 dictators did not

0.47

Avg. Personalism for Spell

27

–

0.50

Avg. Personalism for Spell

2 12.93

Avg. Lifespan

14

Mean Time to Second Move

 

8

0.47

18.62

3.5

4

0.46

17.25

3.75

Overall stats for “Paramilitary” as Second Move

–

Number of Dictators

 

0.52

15

0.21

3

Avg. Personalism for Spell

Avg. Lifespan

7.75

1 2

Number of Dictators

Mean Time to Second Move

–

0.49

Avg. Personalism for Spell

–

17.67

Avg. Lifespan

PARAMILITARY

12 3.50

Second Move

3 0.24

Appts Loyalty +

0.49

22.62

8.62

8

0.53

10.75

5.25

4

–

–

–

–

Security App.

Overall stats for “Appointments on Loyalty” as Second Move

0.62

Mean Time to Second Move

4

2 9.5

Number of Dictators

 

–

4.5 0.16

Avg. Lifespan

Avg. Personalism for Spell

–

–

2 3

Number of Dictators

Mean Time to Second Move

1 2

APPOINTMENTS ON LOYALTY

16.03

Avg. Lifespan

Second Move

29 5.93

Mean Time to Second Move

–

PURGES

Security App.

Overall stats for “Purges” as Second Move

NA

NA

NA

0

Paramilitary

Number of Dictators

 

14.05

– –

Avg. Lifespan

Avg. Personalism for Spell

0.46

5.05

–

Mean Time to Second Move

20

Appts Loyalty

–

Purges

Breakdown of leader spells by first and second moves (military)

Number of Dictators

Second Move

From (First Move)

Table 5.6

–

–

–

–

0.58

6

2

1

–

–

–

–

Appts Loyalty + Purges

The personalization of power in dictatorships  91

7

25

0.3

7.76

NA

NA 6.73 0.26

Mean Time to Second Move

Avg. Lifespan

Avg. Personalism for Spell

196

Overall stats for “None” as Second Move

0.27

Number of Dictators

 

5.73

3.5 0.2

Avg. Lifespan

Avg. Personalism for Spell

0.16

NA

4 NA

Number of Dictators

Mean Time to Second Move

6

0.48

Avg. Personalism for Spell

NA

17.16

Avg. Lifespan NONE

19 4.79

Second Move

– –

Appts Loyalty +

0.39

9.88

NA

33

–

–

–

–

Security App.

Overall stats for “Security Apparatus” as Second Move

Mean Time to Second Move

96

15 0.52

Number of Dictators

 

17.5 0.369

NA NA

Avg. Lifespan

Avg. Personalism for Spell

–

–

1 2

6

NA

Mean Time to Second Move

Security App.

SECURITY APPARATUS 11

Paramilitary

0

Appts Loyalty

Number of Dictators

Purges

Second Move

From (First Move)

0.31

6.06

NA

32

0.64

17

3.29

7

Appts Loyalty + Purges

92  Research handbook on authoritarianism

The personalization of power in dictatorships  93 make any personalization moves throughout their entire tenure. Of these, the longest lasting was Leonid Brezhnev at 18 years, followed by Burkina Faso’s Sangoulé Lamizana at 14. The rest of the 91 dictators lasted on average only 2.7 years in office. The absence of power grabs is thus generally associated with much shorter tenures.4 Second, some dictators made no party personalization moves and instead focused on personalizing the military. Notorious among these is the case of Lee Kuan Yew, who ruled Singapore for 25 years since independence in 1965 until his retirement in 1990. He only made appointments based on loyalty within the military, and maintained the lowest overall level of personalism in the sample (0) throughout his tenure. The next longest lasting case was Mozambique under Chissano at 19 years, and he also only made loyalty appointments within the military. The rest of the dictators who made only one personalizing move during their tenure (73) lasted on average only 4.27 years. An interesting set of cases are dictators who fully personalized the military (made all possible moves) without making any civil personalism moves. There are 3 of these leaders in the sample. Particularly astonishing is the case of Moussa Dadis Camara in Guinea, who ruled for only one year, 2009.5 In this short period of time he purged officers, made military appointments based on loyalty, created a paramilitary group and took personal control of the security forces. The speed of the moves might have generated backlash and contributed to his swift downfall. The other cases are Raul Castro in Cuba, who inherited a stable regime from his brother in 2006 and went on to stay in power until his retirement in 2018; and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who ruled for 14 years and only carried out purges in his eleventh year in office. These cases point to the importance of the regime the leader inherits. In cases of family succession, dictators will most likely be able to personalize power sooner, making strong moves without incurring coordinated and dangerous backlash from other powerful members within the regime. In cases where leaders come into power in a weak regime, or they take over and create a new regime from scratch, personalization will generally be slower and focus on moves that do not provoke swift backlash, such as loyalty appointments, and avoid those that do, such as purges.

5.5 CONCLUSION This chapter offers a detailed examination of the process of personalization of power in dictatorships. Although scholars have started to analyze personalism using new composite measures, we still know little about the sequence of decisions and actions dictators adopt to personalize their rule. Our descriptive analysis points to a few interesting patterns in the data. First, it is extremely rare for dictators to solely conduct purges as their first personalization move once they take office. Rather, both in terms of civil as well as military personalization, dictators first make moves aimed at gaining personal control of appointments to high office. The goal is to quickly be able to influence the composition of the ruling coalition and install loyalists in positions of power, both in government and in the military, and only then conduct purges. In fact, first taking personal control of military appointments within about 1.5 years in office and then purging after another 5 years is one the most common personalization pathways found in the data. Second, it is also rather rare for leaders not to attempt any sort of personalization move during their tenure. Only 18.6 percent of dictators did this, and this is likely due to the fact that

94  Research handbook on authoritarianism they simply did not have much time to personalize. After accounting for Leonid Brezhnev’s and Sangoulé Lamizana’s abnormally long tenures without a single personalizing move, this group of dictators lasted only 2.7 years in office, on average. That said, a large majority of first moves came within 2 years of tenure for the full sample, which makes us think that the dictators who did not personalize at all were perhaps too weak to attempt to do so. More research is needed to answer this question. Third, a relatively large set of leaders, including some of the longest lasting ones, took personal control of the security apparatus first. These tended to be dictators who came in via an election and ruled through a strong party apparatus, which probably conferred them the strength to take a stronger approach vis-à-vis the military. There are many other patterns worth mentioning. Among them is the fact that many autocrats only make one power grab, be it civil, military, or one of each. However, these dictators tended to last fewer years in power than those who made more personalizing moves over time. The circumstances for why this is so and whether personalism actually promotes dictator longevity should be explored in further research.

NOTES 1. See also Wright (2021). The time-varying personalism index is constructed using a two-parameter item response theory model. See below for further details of its eight components. The latent measure ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher personalism levels. 2. Similarly, Sudduth (2017) claims that leaders who seize power via a coup are more likely to take steps to consolidate power (i.e., purges) since they have a new loyal coalition that forcefully replaces the existing one, so the elites’ ability to coordinate diminishes temporarily. 3. There are other combinations but they represent a very small fraction of the total. 4. Whether making no moves leads to shorter tenures, however, requires further research. 5. He took over mid-December 2008 and was overthrown mid-January 2010.

REFERENCES Bokobza, L., Krishnarajan, S., Nyrup, J., Sakstrup C. and Aaskoven, L. (2022) “The Morning after: Cabinet Instability and the Purging of Ministers after Failed Coup Attempts in Autocracies”, Journal of Politics, 84(3), pp. 1437–52. Boutton, A. (2019) “Coup-Proofing in the Shadow of Intervention: Alliances, Moral Hazard, and Violence in Authoritarian Regimes”, International Studies Quarterly, 63(1), pp. 43–57. Casey, A.E. (2020) “The Durability of Client Regimes: Foreign Sponsorship and Military Loyalty, 1946–2010”, World Politics, 72(3), pp. 411–47. Cheibub, J.A., Gandhi, J. and Vreeland, J.R. (2010) “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited”, Public Choice, 143(1–2), pp. 67–101. Chin, J., Escribà-Folch, A., Song, W. and Wright, J. (2022) “Reshaping the Threat Environment: Personalism, Coups, and Assassinations”, Comparative Political Studies, 55(4), pp. 657–87. Diamond, L. (2002) “Elections without Democracy: Thinking about Hybrid Regimes”, Journal of Democracy, 13(2), pp. 21–35. Fails, M.D. (2020) “Oil Income and the Personalization of Autocratic Politics”, Political Science Research and Methods, 8(4), pp. 772–9. Frantz, E., Kendall-Taylor, A., Wright, J. and Xu, X. (2020) “Personalization of Power and Repression in Dictatorships”, Journal of Politics, 82(1), pp. 372–7. Fravel, M.T. (2019) Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gandhi, J. (2008) Political Institutions under Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press.

The personalization of power in dictatorships  95 Gandhi, J. and Sumner, J.L. (2020) “Measuring the Consolidation of Power in Nondemocracies”, Journal of Politics, 82(4), pp. 1545–58. Geddes, B. (1999) “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?”, Annual Review of Political Science, 2, pp. 115–44. Geddes, B., Wright, J. and Frantz, E. (2014) “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set”, Perspectives on Politics, 12(2), pp. 313–31. Geddes, B., Wright, J. and Frantz, E. (2018) How Dictatorships Work: Power, Personalization, and Collapse. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hadenius, A. and Teorell, J. (2007) “Pathways from Authoritarianism”, Journal of Democracy, 18(1), pp. 143–57. Kendall-Taylor, A., Frantz, E. and Wright, J. (2017) “The Global Rise of Personalized Politics: It’s Not Just Dictators Anymore”, The Washington Quarterly, 40(1), pp. 7–19. Lai, B. and Slater, D. (2006) “Institutions of the Offensive: Domestic Sources of Dispute Initiation in Authoritarian Regimes, 1950–1992”, American Journal of Political Science, 50(1), pp. 113–26. Levitsky, S. and Way, L.A. (2010) Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Magaloni, B. (2008) “Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule”, Comparative Political Studies, 41(4–5), pp. 715–41. Magaloni, B., Chu, J. and Min, E. (2013) “Autocracies of the World, 1950–2012 (Version 1.0)”, Dataset, Stanford University. Meng, A. (2020) Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes. New York: Cambridge University Press. Meng, A. and Paine, J. (2022) “Power Sharing and Authoritarian Stability: How Rebel Regimes Solve the Guardianship Dilemma”, American Political Science Review, 116(4), pp. 1208–25. Sinkkonen, E. (2021) “Dynamic Dictators: Improving the Research Agenda on Autocratization and Authoritarian Resilience”, Democratization, 28(6), pp. 1172–90. Sudduth, J.K. (2017) “Strategic Logic of Elite Purges in Dictatorships”, Comparative Political Studies, 50(13), pp. 1768–801. Svolik, M. (2009) “Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes”, American Journal of Political Science, 53(2), pp. 477–94. Svolik, M. (2012) The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. New York: Cambridge University Press. Timoneda, J.C. (2020) “Institutions as Signals: How Dictators Consolidate Power in Times of Crisis”, Comparative Politics, 53(1), pp. 49–68. Timoneda, J.C., Escribà-Folch, A. and Chin, J. (2023) “The Rush to Personalize: Power Concentration after Failed Coups in Dictatorships”, British Journal of Political Science, 53(3), pp. 878–901. doi:https://​doi​.org/​10​.1017/​S0007123422000655. Van den Bosch, J. (2015) “Personalism: A Type or Characteristic of Authoritarian Regimes?”, Czech Political Science Revue, 21(1), pp. 11–30. Wahman, M., Teorell, J. and Hadenius, A. (2013) “Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective”, Contemporary Politics, 19(1), pp. 19–34. Way, C. and Weeks, J.L.P. (2014) “Making It Personal: Regime Type and Nuclear Proliferation”, American Journal of Political Science, 58(3), pp. 705–19. Weeks, J.L.P. (2012) “Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict”, American Political Science Review, 106(2), pp. 326–47. Weeks, J.L.P. (2014) Dictators at War and Peace. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Wright, J. (2008) “Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment”, American Journal of Political Science, 52(2), pp. 322–43. Wright, J. (2021) “The Latent Characteristics That Structure Autocratic Rule”, Political Science Research and Methods, 9(1), pp. 1–19.

6. Why size matters: the origins and effects of variation in party size in revolutionary and non-revolutionary communist regimes Martin K. Dimitrov

6.1 INTRODUCTION Like all autocrats, the leaders of communist regimes aim to achieve societal legibility, which refers to gaining in-depth state knowledge of its citizens and their activities. While various tools can be used to realize this goal, a hierarchically organized Leninist party is the optimal solution, as it enables both sectoral breadth and territorial depth of penetration, which are essential for ensuring legibility. However, there exists substantial variation among Leninist parties across the communist universe. As this chapter argues, revolutionary communist regimes seize power when the party is numerically small. By contrast, non-revolutionary regimes are established when the communist party is significantly larger. These differences in size persist throughout the lifespan of communist autocracies and impact the trajectories of regime development. This chapter analyzes the sources of this divergence and focuses on its effects, with particular emphasis on how party size impacts societal legibility in communist autocracies. Specifically, it argues that there exists a tradeoff between voluntary provision of information (through citizen complaints) and involuntary collection (through surveillance) and that a larger party promotes a higher volume of voluntary provision, while a smaller party needs to place a greater emphasis on involuntary collection. In turn, these differences in voluntary provision vs. involuntary extraction impact the type of governance practiced in communist regimes. Although party building understandably assumes a prominent position at the forefront of the attention of communist regime insiders (Dimitrov 2024), it has not received sustained scholarly attention.1 We lack basic empirical knowledge of the temporal variation in party size across all 15 regimes that constitute the communist universe. This chapter is based on a new dataset on party size, which allows us to systematically document that variation. We also lack a theory of which functions of communist parties are especially sensitive to variation in party size (and which are not); what explains variation in size; and what are the effects of this variation. These lacunae can be addressed by studying internal documents generated by communist regimes. When appropriately contextualized, these materials yield rich empirical and theoretical insights about the operation of parties in the communist universe. This chapter relies on a large corpus of such materials from China and from other communist regimes. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the extensive literature on the functions of authoritarian parties and argues that communist parties have additional important functions that are executed more easily when size increases. Section 6.3 presents the empirical findings from the dataset regarding the general patterns of divergence in communist party size between revolutionary and non-revolutionary regimes; discusses the variation over time in 96

Why size matters  97 individual countries; and provides an overview of the numerical strength of non-communist parties in communist autocracies. Section 6.4 focuses on the origins of the variation in party size, emphasizing the role of both pre-communist legacies and the challenges presented by the initial years when communist rule is being established. Section 6.5 analyzes the effects of the variation in party size by presenting a paired comparison of revolutionary and non-revolutionary regimes that illustrates the tradeoffs between voluntary information provision (through complaints) and involuntary extraction (through informants). Section 6.6 concludes, discussing how variation in party size impacts societal legibility in communist regimes. But before we proceed with Section 6.2, we need to discuss the methodology adopted by the chapter and we have to define the communist universe. 6.1.1

Sources and Methods

How can we study communist parties? In general, we have two options: relying on publicly available data or seeking internal materials not meant for publication. When it comes to the empirical question of variation in party size, publicly available indicators exist that shed light on some communist regimes at certain points in time. We do need to stress, however, that even this information, which may appear anodyne, is sensitive in some contexts, and thus not publicly disseminated. For example, the most detailed statistical compendium on party building in China is designated for internal use (neibu 内部) and is available at a single specialized repository in the West (Zhonggong Zhongyang 2011). When it comes to the questions of the origins of the variation, and especially the theory about its effects, public sources are less useful. For this reason, this chapter is based on a combination of internal materials at various levels of classification, which are supplemented with appropriate publicly circulating materials. Because they were not meant for public distribution, such internal materials hold the potential to reveal to scholars how regime insiders themselves understood the advantages bestowed by a larger party; those insights are especially relevant for developing a theory of non-elite cooptation and information collection in communist regimes (Dimitrov 2023a). Specifically, this chapter is informed by three original datasets. First, a dataset on the size of communist parties, which was constructed from scholarly research and open sources like the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs, as well as from internal sources like Organization Department materials from China and archival materials from the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union. Second, a complaints dataset, constructed primarily from archival sources and internal publications from China, Bulgaria, the GDR, and the Soviet Union. And third, an informant dataset, constructed from State Security materials from the GDR, the Soviet Union, and Bulgaria, supplemented as appropriate by scholarly research. The informant dataset also contains data on China, where a corpus of classified police almanacs, gazetteers, histories, and yearbooks (representing all 31 provinces, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, and 11 cities, counties, and prefectures) was supplemented with national and provincial police journals, as well as annual reports of the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of State Security, and the People’s Armed Police. Throughout the chapter, empirical findings from these three datasets are referenced as “author’s dataset.”

98  Research handbook on authoritarianism 6.1.2

The Communist Universe

Communist autocracies shared common institutional features, which made them into a recognizable genus: they were all single-party regimes that based their claim to rule on the promise to carry out a utopian social project­—a proletarian revolution abroad and, more importantly, the building of a new society at home. Within the individual countries, identical tools of governance were used to implement this transformative social project: a communist party built on the principles of democratic centralism; a dominant ideology; mass mobilization; a commitment to central planning; and an implicit social contract (Cook 1993) that promised redistribution in exchange for political quiescence. An overriding concern of most communist regimes was to ensure high levels of economic growth, which were necessary for effective governance, in particular so as to fulfill the redistributive commitments made under the social contract. Exceptionally, these regimes can survive periods of negative economic growth, provided that they have access to the tool of repression (to punish opponents) and to a credible external threat to stability (to mobilize support among loyal citizens), as, for example, in North Korea, in the Soviet Union during portions of the Stalinist period, or in Poland during martial law. Using these criteria, there existed 15 communist regimes (Dimitrov 2013): six non-revolutionary (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Romania) and nine revolutionary (Albania, China, Cuba, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Yugoslavia).2 Others see the communist universe differently (Saxonberg 2013). At one point or another between 1982 and 1990, 11 regimes were classified as communist in the CIA World Factbook and the Yearbook on International Communist Affairs. These regimes included Angola, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Grenada, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Afghanistan, and South Yemen.3 A notable feature of this group is that the Soviet Union did not recognize any of its members as communist. Regimes designated communist by the Reagan administration were classified by Moscow either as “countries with a socialist orientation” or as “countries following a non-capitalist road of development” (Khasbulatov 1987). Both of these designations were understood to be entirely different from “socialist countries” (sotsialisticheskie strany), the term used to refer only to the 15 core communist states. In line with Soviet understandings, the scholarly consensus is that these 11 non-core regimes were not communist during the Cold War (Brown 2009, 104–5; Johnson 1988; McAdams 2017). Rather, they belonged to the communist penumbra (Dimitrov 2013, 17–19). A close look at these autocracies provides us with another opportunity to highlight what is distinctively communist about the 15 core cases. The most salient difference between the communist penumbra and the 15 core regimes is the extent of institutionalization. Although they were single-party regimes with a self-declared Marxist-Leninist orientation, the regimes in the penumbra did not resemble the core 15 countries in terms of the size of the ruling party or its penetration of society.4 In the economic sphere, no regime in the penumbra managed to carry out wholesale nationalization or agricultural collectivization, let alone successfully implement a five-year plan. In the ideological realm, Marxism-Leninism was not used as a tool for indoctrination and mass mobilization, in part because of the very low levels of literacy (Babakhodzhaev 1990). Implementing a social contract featuring commitments to universal healthcare and compulsory education was an entirely fantastical proposition for countries in the penumbra, one of which had a mere 50 physicians when it declared its Marxist-Leninist orientation.5 By the standards of the 15 core regimes, the penumbra consisted of barely functioning postcolonial states, which, with the

Why size matters  99 exception of Benin and Zimbabwe, had experienced civil war, inter-state conflict, or prolonged international invasion for most of their existence as newly independent states. These regimes are best described as personalist single-party hybrids, where the party was devoid of any ideological function and existed simply to distribute patronage to the supporters of a first-generation military or civilian leader (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 77–8). For the present argument, it is notable that, incapable of the intensive process of party building and constant institutional adaptation that characterizes the 15 core communist regimes, these regimes had short lifespans, lasting on average only 14 years (duration calculated by the author).

6.2

COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THEIR FUNCTIONS

Existing research has convincingly demonstrated that the presence of parties in non-democracies is associated with longer regime tenure (Brownlee 2007; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Magaloni 2006). Variation exists in the world of autocracies, with single-party dictatorships outlasting multi-party regimes (Smith 2005; Svolik 2012, 186); within the group of single-party dictatorships, communist regimes have the longest average longevity (Dimitrov 2013, 2023a, 8); and within the group of communist autocracies, regimes that came to power through revolution survive longer than non-revolutionary regimes (Levitsky and Way 2012, 2022). Those general patterns have considerable consequence for specific countries, such as China, where, as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) celebrated its centenary in 2021, a series of studies emerged stressing the protean capacity of the party for endurance and transformation (Cheek, Mühlhahn, and van de Ven 2021; Dickson 2021; Saich 2021; Shambaugh 2021). This resonates with an earlier line of research on the adaptative resilience of the CCP (Dimitrov 2013; Heilmann and Perry 2011; Nathan 2003). Parties matter in autocracies. The specific mechanisms linking the presence of authoritarian parties with durability that have been identified in the literature are diverse, as fits the range of autocracies. One line of research attributes durability to electoral competition (Magaloni 2006; Miller 2020; Simpser 2013), which provides valuable information to the incumbent about his level of support. Another focuses on elite cooptation through sinecures in party-dominated legislatures, cabinets, and other institutions of power (Gandhi 2008). At a more general level, the literature has emphasized the capacity of party-based regimes to foster elite cohesion and to attract party members through the hierarchical assignment of service and benefits (Brownlee 2007; Svolik 2012). The literature adopts a dichotomous view, where the party is either present or absent, with beneficial effects accruing for autocrats when parties are present. This chapter takes a different approach. It focuses on the longest-lasting autocratic subtype—communist regimes, all of which are party-based. It does, however, find that there exists substantial variation in the size of the communist party, both over time and across regimes. To get a sense of the effects of this variation, we need a theory of the specific impact of size on party functions in communist autocracies. 6.2.1

What Functions Depend on Party Size?

Parties have many functions. Existing theory provides no exhaustive guide as to what those functions might be and, more important, which can be executed by a numerically small party

100  Research handbook on authoritarianism and which cannot. Based on the analysis of a large corpus of internal materials from China, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, the GDR, and Cuba (Dimitrov 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2023a), as well as an examination of the archivally informed scholarly literature (Bahr 2016; Bergien 2017), we can make several general statements. To start off, the function of elite cooptation (Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2006; Simpser 2013) does not depend on party size. The reason is that the elite is numerically small and coopting it can be effectively carried out through party and non-party sinecures even when the party is not especially numerous. In the communist world, parties have two sets of functions. Some are executed at the higher levels and are therefore not impacted by party size. A non-exhaustive list would include ideological supervision, international liaison, discipline inspection, and general guidance of agriculture, industrial development, and monitoring the political-legal system. Elite cooptation is also carried out at the higher levels and can be successful even when the party is numerically small. However, other functions require deep penetration of society and are thus best executed when party size is greater. Examples include non-elite (mass) cooptation and systematic collection of information about society. Information collection, in particular, has implications for achieving better societal legibility. 6.2.2

Organizational Advantages of Communist Parties in Terms of Achieving Societal Legibility

Communist parties are hierarchically organized and aim to achieve both vertical depth and horizontal breadth in their reach. Depth is ensured through party cells that operate at every level of the administrative system, all the way down to the grassroots. Breadth requires a wide sectoral penetration, which can be accomplished by establishing a party presence in all government offices; in all types of firms; in all educational institutions; and in all types of social organizations (Koss 2021). One consequence of this organizational design is that Leninist parties grow over time and can exceed 10 percent of the population. This growth is a key metric of the successful incorporation of wide segments of society into the party. The alternative, which involves individuals leaving the party and creating opposition political movements, is a sign of regime decay and an indicator of a higher probability of collapse. We lack theories about the effects that this variation can have on governance. This chapter highlights one potential benefit—namely, larger size can allow the party to achieve full territorial and sectoral penetration of the country, thus enabling enhanced societal legibility (on legibility in different contexts, see Blaydes 2018; Foucault 1979; Scott 1998; Wallace 2023). Territorial penetration is no easy task, as illustrated by statistics on party membership in Tibet, which remained a terra incognita for the Chinese regime (Dimitrov 2023a, especially chapter 4). Saturating all bureaucracies with party members is also challenging, as revealed by the inability of the CCP to find any more than 671 cadres to staff the Beijing police upon the takeover of the city in January 1949 (Beijing 2003, 59). Even today, achieving complete sectoral penetration remains a priority for the CCP, as illustrated by the recent emphasis by Xi Jinping of the importance of party building in Internet companies (Xue 2018). Complete territorial and sectoral penetration allows the party to generate a higher volume of information for regime insiders. In contrast to the patchy information collection that takes place when the membership base is small, increased party size makes possible the systematic nationwide collation of comprehensive information, which is transmitted voluntarily (through complaints) or is extracted involuntarily (through party monitoring). Although parties always

Why size matters  101 delegate some involuntary collection tasks to State Security and to other information collectors, a larger party delegates less than a smaller party has to do. Delegation to State Security comes at a cost: namely, overt dissent is detected and promptly dealt with through harsh repression (ex post governance). Less delegation to State Security allows the party to adopt a softer type of selectively repressive and strategically redistributive rule, which focuses on detecting and defusing discontent at its latent state (ex ante governance). In sum, a larger party improves societal legibility and allows for a less repressive governance approach to be implemented. This is linked to legitimacy, as public satisfaction increases when repression declines and redistribution grows; some autocrats do have popular support (Dimitrov 2009).

6.3

VARIATION IN THE SIZE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES

Although all communist parties start out small, there is substantial variation in their size at the moment of regime inception. For example, communist party members accounted for 0.8 percent of the Chinese population at the end of 1949 vs. 3.7 percent of the Bulgarian population in March 1945, as the country was gradually moving from a competitive multi-party system towards single-party rule, which was established by 1949 (Tsvetanski 1988, 29; Zhonggong Zhongyang 2011, 7). A new dataset, which informs the discussion in this section, allows us to document how parties evolve throughout the lifespan of the 15 regimes that constitute the communist universe. As Table 6.1 demonstrates, the effects of regime type persist over time: although party membership in revolutionary regimes gradually increases, party size remains consistently smaller than in the non-revolutionary regimes. The analysis reveals a few additional points that should be emphasized. In 1988, the mean size of non-revolutionary parties was 8.92 percent of the population, with a range of 5.79–16.1 percent. In the same year, the mean size of revolutionary parties was 5.49 percent of the population, with a range of 1.04 percent (Laos) to 11.37 percent (North Korea); 1988 was also the year when the Communist Party of the Soviet Union reached its maximum size of 6.82 percent of the population. We might wonder about the long-term effects of surviving the watershed of 1989. Although party size has continued to grow, the surviving communist regimes are no match for the non-revolutionary regimes that existed in Eastern Europe. In 2021, the mean for Cuba (6.18 percent), China (6.87 percent), Laos (4.72 percent), and Vietnam (5.38 percent) was 5.78 percent of the population. North Korea consistently claimed 2.5–3 million members of the Workers’ Party of Korea (10–12 percent of the population) from the 1980s; while this makes Table 6.1

Determinants of party size (as percentage of the population) in communist regimes

Independent variable

OLS coefficients

Revolutionary regime

−4.253055**

Tenure (years since regime establishment)

0.1198031*

Constant

5.001752

R-squared

0.3751

N

15

Note: Party size and regime tenure measured in 1988. Significance levels: * = 0.1; ** = 0.05. Source: Author’s dataset.

102  Research handbook on authoritarianism it unusual for a revolutionary regime, it is not unique by comparison with a non-revolutionary regime like that in the GDR, which reached a similar party size. The most recent South Korean estimate of 6.5 million party members is equivalent to a quarter of the DPRK’s population.6 Like all other assessments of party size in North Korea, it has not been independently verified. The data presented in Table 6.2 point to several conclusions about the trajectory of party development in revolutionary and non-revolutionary regimes. Two thresholds of size are relevant here: the first is reaching 3 percent of the population and the second is the 6 percent mark. Those are not arbitrary metrics. A political organization that can make a claim to have overcome the basic challenge of projecting its power throughout the country needs to be larger than 3 percent of the population. Expanding party membership to 6 percent allows for additional depth and breadth to be reached. Beyond that threshold, it is less clear what the optimal size of a communist party would be. Although societal legibility increases as the party continues to grow, there is a tradeoff in terms of non-elite cooptation. To be desirable, communist party membership has to remain exclusive. From a practical point of view, it is difficult to maintain exclusivity when more than 10–12 percent of the population are party members. There exist remarkable differences in the speed of initial party building between the two types of communist dictatorships. As Table 6.2 shows, in non-revolutionary regimes, the 3 percent threshold was either reached before the establishment of the regime (as occurred in the GDR and in Czechoslovakia) or shortly thereafter, in the first or second year after regime inception. Contrast this with the revolutionary regimes, which accomplished this task at a much slower pace. In Albania and Yugoslavia, the party reached this threshold in years 4 and 6, respectively. But in the Soviet Union, the 3 percent mark was surpassed only in 1951, which was 34 years after the October Revolution. Laos took even longer to develop its party to that level. Even China, which devoted substantial attention to party building, did not achieve 3 percent until 1971, which was 22 years after the establishment of the regime. Similar patterns characterize achieving the 6 percent threshold. Remarkably, all non-revolutionary regimes completed this stage in party building very fast, between year 1 (the GDR) and year 4 of their existence (Bulgaria and Romania). By contrast, some revoluTable 6.2

Thresholds in communist party development

Regime

Revolutionary

Tenure

Party > 3% population

Party > 6% population

Soviet Union

Yes

1917–91

1951 (year 34)

1975 (year 58)

Mongolia

Yes

1924–90

1932 (year 8)

Never achieved

Yugoslavia

Yes

1943–91

1949 (year 6)

1976 (year 33)

Albania

Yes

1944–91

1948 (year 4)

Never achieved

North Korea

Yes

1948–

N/A

1948 (at creation)

China

Yes

1949–

1971 (year 22)

2011 (year 62)

Vietnam

Yes

1954–

1978 (year 24)

Not achieved by 2022

Cuba

Yes

1959–

1978 (year 19)

1989 (year 30)

Laos

Yes

1975–

2011 (year 36)

Not achieved by 2022

Bulgaria

No

1944–90

1945 (year 1)

1948 (year 4)

Hungary

No

1944–89

1945 (year 1)

1946 (year 2)

Romania

No

1944–90

1946 (year 2)

1948 (year 4)

Poland

No

1945–89

1947 (year 2)

1948 (year 3)

Czechoslovakia

No

1946–90

N/A

1949 (year 3)

GDR

No

1949–90

N/A

1950 (year 1)

Source: Author’s dataset.

Why size matters  103 tionary regimes never achieved this level of development: this characterizes both regimes that eventually collapsed (Albania and Mongolia) and some of those that are still extant, with Laos and Vietnam having parties below this threshold as of 2022. For the revolutionary regimes that reached the 6 percent mark, this occurred slowly. In Cuba and Yugoslavia, it required 30 and 33 years, respectively. The process was even more protracted elsewhere. In the Soviet Union, it took 58 years after the October Revolution to surpass 6 percent; in China, this occurred in 2011, which was 62 years after the establishment of the PRC. Party building is substantially slower in revolutionary regimes. We should discuss two revolutionary outliers. The first is Mongolia, where only eight years after the establishment of the regime, the party had 42,000 members (5.8 percent of the population) (Szalontai 2003, 123, citing Rupen 1977, 58–9). This was followed by extraordinarily broad purges, that reduced party size to 1.1 percent of the population by 1934. Afterwards, party development proceeded along the lines associated with revolutionary regimes, reaching 4.4 percent in 1965 and remaining at a similar magnitude through 1988, when it was equivalent to 4.3 percent of the population. The second outlier is North Korea, which claimed 725,762 party members at regime inception, which was equivalent to 10.3 percent of the population. Since then, party size has been reported infrequently, typically in round numbers (1 million; 1.8 million; 3 million; and most recently, 6.5 million) that were always greater than 10 percent of the population and, on occasion, reached 20–25 percent. If they are true, those statistics will make North Korea the most successful example of party building in the communist universe. They have not, however, received scholarly validation. 6.3.1

Parallel Tracks: Variation in the Size of Non-communist Parties in Communist Regimes

Some communist autocracies have more than a single party. However, a previously unappreciated difference exists between revolutionary and non-revolutionary regimes in the size of these parties. Take China as an example, where another eight parties exist beyond the CCP under the umbrella of the United Front: the Jiusan Society; the China Democratic League; the China Zhigong Party; the Revolutionary KMT; the China National Democratic Construction Association; the China Association for Promoting Democracy; the Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party; and the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League (Van Slyke 1967). Though numerous, these parties are equivalent to about 1 percent of the size of the communist party. In 2020, for instance, these eight minor parties had a combined membership of 1.3 million, which was a tripling since 1996 (Groot 2004, 185)—and yet, these 2020 figures were equivalent to only 1.4 percent of the CCP membership. No statistics on the membership in non-communist parties in other revolutionary regimes like Cuba and North Korea have been released. There is no reason to think that they might be higher than in China. Contrast this with the situation in the non-revolutionary regimes, where non-communist parties were sizable and allowed to operate under the umbrella of a National (or Fatherland) Front. The Bulgarian Agricultural National Union, for instance, had a membership equivalent to one-sixth of that of the communist party in 1974 (Baichinski 1974, 468; Tsvetanski 1988, 29); Poland also possessed sizable agrarian parties; in the GDR, the four non-communist parties (the Christian-Democratic Union; the Democratic Farmers’ Party; the Liberal-Democratic Party; and the National Democratic Party) similarly had a membership base equivalent to at

104  Research handbook on authoritarianism least 15–20 percent of that of the Socialist Unity Party (Akademie 1985, 126–31; Suckut 2018, 163). In both types of regimes, these parties are directly managed by the communist party. Further similarities involve their rival incorporation (Hou 2019; Suckut 2018; Zhang 2021) and information collection functions (Li 2023; Suckut 2018). Unquestionably, the capacity of these non-communist parties to assist the communist party by carrying out meaningful rival incorporation and information collection roles at the subnational level is enhanced when their size increases. An issue that awaits future research concerns the specific mechanisms through which a larger communist party may foster larger non-communist parties. Another puzzle that cannot be discussed here is why some communist regimes ban non-communist parties whereas others allow them to persist. What matters for the present analysis is that just like the communist parties, non-communist parties are also bigger in the non-revolutionary regimes.

6.4

ORIGINS OF THE VARIATION AT THE MOMENT OF REGIME INCEPTION

A central question concerns the sources of this heretofore unfamiliar variation in the size of communist parties. We should point out three relevant factors. The first is that the communist parties had a much longer existence prior to the takeover of power in the six non-revolutionary regimes than they did in the nine revolutionary cases. In places like Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, the precursor parties emerged in the final decades of the nineteenth century. The revolutionary regimes had much younger communist parties: contrast the cases of Bulgaria (where the precursor party emerged in 1891, which was 53 years before the 1944 pro-communist coup) and China, whose communist party was established in 1921, a mere 28 years before the takeover of power (Saich 2021). Organizational development is more successful when parties have persisted for a longer period of time. Second, the six non-revolutionary regimes had experience with parliamentary democracy that preceded the establishment of communist rule. During that time, communist parties learned how to recruit members under conditions of routine democratic party competition. In Bulgaria, for instance, although it was banned in the 1920s and had to change its name to a workers’ party, the communist party could count on the support of up to 30 percent of the electorate during moments of political or economic crisis (double its support during non-crisis periods) (Migev 1993, 245). The party was able to emerge as the third-largest parliamentary faction in 1931 (Daskalov 2005, 230) and to secure twice as many votes as the ruling party in the 1932 municipal elections in the capital (Gruncharov 1993, 632). Similar dynamics can be observed in other non-revolutionary regimes. Such party-building know-how could subsequently be applied to the new realities of communist rule. By contrast, pre-communist experience with parliamentary democracy was either completely absent or exceedingly brief in the revolutionary regimes. Third, in the non-revolutionary regimes these parties persisted during disruptions to normal political life stemming from the spread of fascism in the 1920s, the rise of Nazism in the 1930s, and the effects of World War II. During such periods, communist parties were typically banned and operated underground (Daskalov 2005; Vezenkov 2014). This meant that they developed an unusual capacity to adapt, similar to the revolutionary parties that resorted to guerilla tactics and functioned subrosa prior to the takeover of power (Koss 2018). In sum,

Why size matters  105 communist parties in non-revolutionary regimes were more experienced and better tested political actors at the moment of regime inception, thus accounting for their larger size by comparison with the revolutionary parties. We should further note that in non-revolutionary regimes, the initial years of regime inception can also provide opportunities for augmenting the size of the party, due to the electoral competition that exists during this period. Take East Germany as an example. Between 1945 and 1949, what eventually became the German Democratic Republic was administered as the Soviet Occupied Zone (SBZ). The Nazi Party, which was the most formidable opponent of communist ideology, had been dissolved in 1945 and its activists were executed or sent to prisons and labor camps by the Soviet military administration (Kowalczuk and Wolle, 2010, 80–82). Although this made it easier for the communists to rally support, the results of the 1946 elections, which were free, convincingly demonstrated that the Socialist Unity Party (SED) at best had the votes of less than one-half of the population: it received 47.5 percent at the polls (Adamski 2012, 56), which allowed it to reach a bare majority in the Landtage (state parliaments)—but only when the reserved trade union and women’s league seats were added in (Suckut 2018, 52). This was consistent with the size of the party, which stood at 128,415 members in 1946, in contrast to the combined 295,727 Christian-Democratic and Liberal-Democratic party members (Schroeder 2019, 27). Bulgaria also attests that the gradual displacement of the biggest opposition party requires a numerically large party—there the biggest opposition party (Agrarian Union “Nikola Petkov”) had 280,000 members in 1945 (Paraskevov 2005, 16), as contrasted with 254,140 for the Bulgarian Communist Party (Tsvetanski 1988, 29). In sum, the remnants of electoral competition in the early years of communist rule provided an additional impetus for party building in the non-revolutionary regimes. One might point out that a numerically small party has advantages when seizing power, as it is less likely to be infiltrated by spies than a large party. However, the advantages that small size can confer prior to the takeover of power quickly become a disadvantage once the revolutionary party is transformed into a ruling party. At that point, larger size is beneficial, as discussed in the next section.

6.5

EFFECTS OF THE VARIATION IN PARTY SIZE ON INFORMATION COLLECTION

A larger party has many desirable effects from the point of view of communist regime power holders. One, which will not be treated in this chapter due to space limitations, is rival incorporation. We will focus instead on information collection. We need to keep in mind that there exists a difference between information that citizens voluntarily transmit to the communist party (primarily in the form of complaints) and information that is involuntarily extracted (mainly through surveillance). High levels of voluntary transmission of information through complaints enable the adoption of anticipatory (ex ante) governance that detects and responds to discontent while it is still in its latent phase. Governance that focuses primarily on surveillance tends to detect discontent once it is already overt, thus necessitating ex post responses that are typically repressive (Dimitrov 2023a). A larger party incentivizes voluntary information provision, because it fosters a sense among citizens about greater responsiveness to their demands centering on problems with the

106  Research handbook on authoritarianism fulfillment of the socialist social contract (Dimitrov 2014a). A comparison of China with two non-revolutionary Eastern European regimes (Bulgaria and the GDR) helps bring specific empirical details to these claims. The letters-and-visits (xinfang 信访) system was never used extensively in China: in 1979, the peak year for petitioning during the entire 1949–89 period, the central complaints offices received 769 letters and visits per million people, which was 5.8 times less than the central-level petitions in East Germany (4,464 per million people) and in Bulgaria (4,494 per million people) (Diao 1996, 260; Mühlberg 2004, 177; TsDA f. 1B op. 55 a. e. 940 [1983], 28). Nationwide, complaints in China reached 13,862 per million people in 1979 and again rose to 10,870 at their post-1989 peak in 2003 (the introduction of online petitioning has been accompanied by a further decrease in the frequency of complaining, Dimitrov 2023a, 342). In Bulgaria, the composite number of complaints in 1978–89 ranged between a low of 27,777 per million people (in 1989) and a high of 75,120 per million people (in 1984) (Dimitrov 2023a, 423). The logic behind these empirical patterns is clear: a larger party has a deeper grassroots presence and is more immediately visible and accessible to aggrieved citizens. In turn, more complaints have beneficial effects for voluntary information provision and enable the emergence of ex ante anticipatory governance. A second effect of party size on information collection has to do with surveillance. The general pattern is that a larger party correlates with fewer State Security informants. A paired comparison of China and the GDR helps illustrate that. Contrary to stylized facts that the GDR had the highest penetration with informants, existing research has demonstrated that China was more densely saturated with informants than the GDR (Dimitrov 2023a, especially 22, 71, 247, 303, 329). Table 6.3 brings additional data that allow us to highlight the size of the party in explaining these trends. The GDR had a larger party than did China, but relied on fewer informants; this pattern is best illustrated by analyzing the ratio of communist party members to informants in the two countries (Table 6.3). How can we interpret these findings? The communist party was both a producer and a consumer of information. In addition to analyzing grievances that were voluntarily transmitted to it, the party also engaged in the involuntary collection of information through numerous mechanisms that have been detailed in the literature (Dimitrov 2023a); instructions on raising party vigilance mandated that party members “apprise the party leadership of any information they have acquired or of hostile elements they have encountered that are planning, preparing, or have commenced carrying out acts against the people” (TsDA f. 1B op. 6 a. e. 525 [October 7, 1948], 11). One advantage that size gave to the party was of both wider and deeper penetration, which made it easier to “see” the society it was governing. Smaller size meant that more of these tasks of involuntary collection had to be delegated to State Security. The problem was Table 6.3

Ratio of communist party members to informants

 

GDR ratio

China ratio

1950

302.499038

0.92597224

1960

16.3213194

1.35959984

1971

14.9792863

2.60452122

1981

12.28569

2.06221664

1987

13.4819398

2.96593376

1988

13.4317169

3.054864

2017

N/A

2.68906272

Source: Author’s dataset.

Why size matters  107 that once it detected dissent, State Security acted in a more heavy-handed manner to extinguish it than the party could. The fundamental tradeoff between party and State Security involuntary information collection is that a greater role for State Security meant a longer persistence of ex post reactive governance rather than a prompt transition to ex ante anticipatory rule.7

6.6 CONCLUSION Generations of scholars from Michel Foucault to James Scott to Lisa Blaydes have been concerned with the relationship between the legibility of social groups and governance. This chapter has argued that communist parties can help improve the legibility of society by supplying regime insiders with information that has both breadth and depth. In turn, providing enlightened autocrats with access to such information can enable a faster transition to a more sophisticated type of rule, where governance is anticipatory rather than reactive. To re-appropriate James Scott’s metaphor, seeing like a communist state requires a large party. While better visibility is important for ensuring regime durability, the relationship is not automatic: leaders have to be able and willing to act on the information they receive, which only occurs under specific conditions that I have outlined elsewhere (Dimitrov 2023a). In closing, we should provide a few caveats. First, the differences in size between revolutionary and non-revolutionary parties are of degree, not of kind. The CCP certainly looked impressive in 2022 with its 96.7 million members (6.8 percent of the population) organized in nearly 5 million party branches.8 Party building is essential in both types of regimes, with non-revolutionary regimes accomplishing this task faster. Second, the tradeoff between voluntary information provision and surveillance through informants is also of degree, rather than of kind: all communist regimes use both, with the emphasis varying depending on party size. Finally, and perhaps most important, even if a larger party allows for greater societal legibility that in turn translates into the quicker adoption of softer anticipatory rule, we should not make the mistake of equating that with the permanence of the regime. As we know, even well-governed communist autocracies eventually collapse. A few words about scope conditions are necessary. This chapter presents an argument about communist autocracies. Extending it to non-communist regimes reveals that both the information-gathering priorities and the information-gathering institutions are different outside the communist universe, though not in the way we might expect: counterintuitively, communist regimes develop the most sophisticated information-gathering institutions, reflecting the high priority they assign to achieving societal legibility (Dimitrov 2023a). Future research may want to engage with the question of whether the argument can be extended to non-communist revolutionary regimes—though, as a first step, we need to acknowledge that all regimes that fully develop the three pillars that Levitsky and Way associate with durable authoritarianism (a cohesive ruling elite; a highly developed and loyal coercive apparatus; and the elimination of rival organizations and alternative centers of power) are communist revolutionary regimes (Dimitrov 2023b). This only highlights that the mechanisms through which communist regimes ensure their unusual resilience are worthy of deeper study.

108  Research handbook on authoritarianism

NOTES 1. For exceptions, see Koss (2018) (on China) and Hough and Fainsod (1979) (on the Soviet Union). 2. I use “communist” as a shortcut. Party names varied across countries and over time, with communist, socialist, people’s revolutionary, and workers’ being the usual modifiers (e.g., Chinese Communist Party; Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party; Socialist Unity Party of Germany; Polish Workers’ Party). 3. Some also classify Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and Sao Tome and Principe as regimes that have professed to be Marxist-Leninist/Marxist in outlook and have been recognized as “socialist-oriented” by Moscow (Albright 1997). 4. In Grenada, for example, at its peak in 1982 the New Jewel Movement had 356 members, or 0.4 percent of the population (Pryor 1986, 228). 5. Mozambique had 50 doctors in 1975. See “UCSD Medicine in Mozambique,” At UCSD 8:1 (January 2011). 6. Hye-yoon Na, News 1 Korea (2021), https://​www​.news1​.kr/​articles/​?4172242 (accessed October 23, 2023). 7. For an explanation of the factors underpinning the adoption of the two models of rule, as well as a nomenclature of the types of informants in China, the GDR, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Taiwan, see Dimitrov (2023a). 8. http://​www​.gov​.cn/​xinwen/​2022​-06/​29/​content​_5698405​.htm (accessed October 23, 2023).

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Why size matters  109 Diao Jiecheng. 1996. Renmin xinfang shilüe, 1949–1995. Beijing: Beijing Jingji Xueyuan Chubanshe. Dickson, Bruce. 2021. The Party and the People: Chinese Politics in the 21st Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Dimitrov, Martin K. 2009. “The Popular Autocrats,” Journal of Democracy 20 (1): 78–81. Dimitrov, Martin K., ed. 2013. Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Asia and Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press. Dimitrov, Martin K. 2014a. “Tracking Public Opinion under Authoritarianism: The Case of the Soviet Union under Brezhnev.” Russian History 41 (3): 329–53. Dimitrov, Martin K. 2014b. “What the Party Wanted to Know: Citizen Complaints as a ‘Barometer of Public Opinion’ in Communist Bulgaria.” East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 28 (2): 271–95. Dimitrov, Martin K. 2015. “Internal Government Assessments of the Quality of Governance in China.” Studies in Comparative International Development 50 (1): 50–72. Dimitrov, Martin K. 2017. “The Political Logic of Media Control in China.” Problems of Post-Communism 64 (3–4): 121–7. Dimitrov, Martin K. 2019. “The Functions of Letters to the Editor in Reform-Era Cuba.” Latin American Research Review 54 (1): 1–15. Dimitrov, Martin K. 2023a. Dictatorship and Information: Authoritarian Regime Resilience in Communist Europe and China. New York: Oxford University Press. Dimitrov, Martin K. 2023b. “Review of ‘Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism’ by Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way.” Perspectives on Politics 21 (3): 1024–5. Dimitrov, Martin K. 2024. The Adaptability of the Chinese Communist Party. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. Foucault, Michel. 1979. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books. Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. Political Institutions under Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press. Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2018. How Dictatorships Work. New York: Cambridge University Press. Groot, Gerry. 2004. Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United Front Work, Corporatism, and Hegemony. New York: Routledge. Gruncharov, Stoicho. 1993. “1919–1944 godina.” In Ivan Bozhilov, Vera Mutafchieva, Konstantin Kosev, Andrei Pantev, and Stoicho Gruncharov, Istoriia na Bulgaria, 552–730. Sofia: Hristo Botev. Heilmann, Sebastian and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds. 2011. Mao’s Invisible Hand: The Political Foundations of Adaptive Governance in China. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hou, Yue. 2019. The Private Sector in Public Office: Selective Property Rights in China. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hough, Jerry F. and Merle Fainsod. 1979. How the Soviet Union Is Governed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Johnson, Robert T. 1988. “Misguided Morality: Ethics and the Reagan Doctrine.” Political Science Quarterly 103 (3): 509–29. Khasbulatov, R.I. 1987. Osvobodivshiesia strany v perekhodnyi period: politiko-ekonomicheskii analiz. Moscow: Ekonomika. Koss, Daniel. 2018. Where the Party Rules: The Rank and File of China’s Communist State. New York: Cambridge University Press. Koss, Daniel. 2021. “Party Building as Institutional Bricolage: Asserting Authority at the Business Frontier.” The China Quarterly, no. 248: 222–43. Kowalczuk, Ilko-Sascha and Stefan Wolle. 2010. Roter Stern über Deutschland: Sowjetische Truppen in der DDR. 2nd rev. edn. Berlin: Ch. Links. Levitsky, Steven R. and Lucan A. Way. 2012. “Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability.” Perspectives on Politics 10 (4): 869–89. Levitsky, Steven R. and Lucan A. Way. 2022. Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Li, Lumin. 2023. “Non-Communist Parties under Communist Rule: An Analysis Based on China.” PhD Dissertation (in progress), Department of Political Science, Tulane University.

110  Research handbook on authoritarianism Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press. McAdams, A. James. 2017. Vanguard of the Revolution: The Global Idea of the Communist Party. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Migev, Vladimir. 1993. “Liavata opozitsiia v Bulgariia (1923–1939 g.).” In Dimitar Sazdov, Radoslav Mishev, Trendafil Mitev, Milcho Lalkov, and Vladimir Migev, Istoriia na Tretata bulgarska durzhava, 244–55. Sofia: Ami. Miller, Michael K. 2020. “The Strategic Origins of Electoral Authoritarianism.” British Journal of Political Science 50 (1): 17–44. Mühlberg, Felix. 2004. Bürger, Bitten und Behörden: Geschichte der Eingabe in der DDR. Berlin: Karl Dietz Verlag. Nathan, Andrew J. 2003. “Authoritarian Resilience.” Journal of Democracy 14 (1): 6–17. Paraskevov, Vasil. 2005. “BZNS ‘Nikola Petkov’ (1945–1947 g.).” PhD Dissertation, VAK, Sofia. Pryor, Frederic L. 1986. Revolutionary Grenada: A Study in Political Economy. New York: Praeger. Saich, Tony. 2021. From Rebel to Ruler: One Hundred Years of the Chinese Communist Party. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Saxonberg, Steven. 2013. Transitions and Non-Transitions from Communism: Regime Survival in China, Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schroeder, Klaus. 2019. Die DDR: Geschichte und Strukturen. 2nd rev. edn. Stuttgart: Reclam. Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Shambaugh, David. 2021. China’s Leaders: From Mao to Now. New York: Polity Press. Simpser, Alberto. 2013. Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications. New York: Cambridge University Press. Smith, Benjamin. 2005. “Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule.” World Politics 57 (3): 421–51. Suckut, Siegfried. 2018. Blockparteien und Blockpolitik in der SBZ/DDR 1945–1990. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag. Svolik, Milan W. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. New York: Cambridge University Press. Szalontai, Balasz. 2003. “The Dynamic of Repression: The Global Impact of the Stalinist Model, 1944–1953.” Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, no. 8: 120–55. Tsvetanski, Stoian. 1988. Organizatsionno razvitie na BKP, 1944–1986 (Istoriko-statisticheski analiz). Sofia: Institut po Istoriia na BKP pri TsK na BKP. Van Slyke, Lyman P. 1967. Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Vezenkov, Aleksandur. 2014. 9 septemvri 1944 g. Sofia: Ciela. Wallace, Jeremy L. 2023. Seeking Truth and Hiding Facts: Information, Ideology, and Authoritarianism in China. New York: Oxford University Press. Xue Xiaorong. 2018. Hulianwang qiye dangjian: Jishu, ziben yu zhengzhi luoji zhangli xia de dangzheng zhili. Beijing: Shishi Chubanshe. Zhang, Zhu. 2021. “Wealth Without Power: The Rise of China’s Super-Rich and Their Relationship to the Communist Party.” PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Tulane University. Zhonggong Zhongyang Zuzhi Bu. 2011. Zhongguo gongchandang dangnei tongji ziliao huibian, 1921–2010. Beijing: Dangjian Duwu Chubanshe.

7. The authoritarian security apparatus: officer careers and the trade-offs in command1 Christian Gläßel, Belén González and Adam Scharpf

7.1 INTRODUCTION Autocracies are notorious for high levels of repression and an exceptional coup threat (e.g., Svolik, 2012; Valentino, 2004; Wintrobe, 2000). This puts the security apparatus and those who work within it at the center of authoritarian power politics. Equipped with the resources to quell uprisings and revolutions, the military serves as the last line of defense against threats from outside of the regime leadership (e.g., Barany, 2016; Koehler and Albrecht, 2021; Pion-Berlin, Esparza and Grisham, 2014). At the same time, however, officers can and often do use their power to overthrow the very regime they are supposed to protect (e.g., De Bruin, 2020; Powell, 2012; Singh, 2014). Faced with the dual threat of revolutions and coups, autocratic leaders must forge a security apparatus that is both capable and loyal. This chapter sheds light on the dynamics within the authoritarian security apparatus to explain how autocrats balance competence and loyalty among officers. Recent research suggests that the staffing of authoritarian security organizations involves a fundamental trade-off (Greitens, 2016; Talmadge, 2015). While competent officers can efficiently quash revolutions, they are also more likely to stage successful coups (Egorov and Sonin, 2011). Moreover, skilled lieutenants are less likely to fight unconditionally for the autocrat’s survival, as their competence makes them indispensable to successor regimes (Zakharov, 2016). Autocrats are thus said to rely on less competent officers to carry out the regime’s violence. A recent study demonstrates that secret police forces—the shadowy organizations primarily responsible for protecting the regime’s inner circle—are indeed dominated by underachievers who loyally execute repression in the hopes of improving their bleak career prospects (Scharpf and Gläßel, 2020).2 While it is plausible that autocrats exploit underachievers for the execution of dirty work, it also raises an important yet unaddressed question in the study of authoritarian regimes: Who do autocratic regimes entrust with the management of their defense? This chapter focuses on the officers that autocrats put in charge of overseeing the regime’s security.3 We dissect the security apparatus to study those who work within it. Managing a regime’s internal and external defense requires individuals with solid skills and competence. However, these managerial positions provide officers with excellent conditions for successfully ousting the regime in power. To explain how autocrats resolve the dilemma of competence and loyalty in the higher echelons of the security apparatus, the chapter uncovers the strategic logic behind the allocation of command positions—an important ingredient to successful officer careers. We argue that autocratic regimes strategically place officers on command posts in order to maximize both competence and loyalty. First, to most efficiently protect the regime from revolutionary threats, the regime requires skilled personnel that is able to lead, coordinate, 111

112  Research handbook on authoritarianism and organize. Autocrats are therefore likely to select capable officers as field commanders. Second, the regime must minimize the risk that these competent officers will (ab)use their new position in the field to stage a coup. Autocrats thus seek to please and co-opt the possibly most disgruntled commanders by stationing them close to their home regions. Next, we review research on the security apparatus of authoritarian regimes. We then develop our argument on the competence–loyalty maximizing logic behind the selection and placement of officers on managerial positions. Using data on an entire officer corps, we show this logic at work in Argentina’s last military dictatorship—the National Reorganization Process (el Proceso). The chapter concludes by highlighting potential avenues for future research.

7.2

THE SECURITY APPARATUS AND THE DUAL THREAT TO AUTHORITARIAN RULE

Without free and fair elections, most autocrats lose power through popular revolutions (peaceful or violent) or coups d’état (e.g., Svolik, 2012). Given the grave consequences for overthrown dictators, authoritarian politics are fundamentally shaped by the dual threat from the masses and the elites (e.g., Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2018; Greitens, 2016; Wintrobe, 2000). To protect their rule from revolutions and coups, autocrats employ a wide range of measures designed to generate regime stability. For example, some exploit seemingly democratic institutions such as parties, parliaments, or elections as tools to generate legitimacy, co-opt opposition, reward loyalty, and uncover collusions (e.g., Ezrow and Frantz, 2011; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014; Gandhi, 2008; Gerschewski, 2013; Magaloni, 2006). Others rely on all-encompassing regime ideologies or widespread information controls (e.g., Roberts, 2018; Tannenberg et al., 2021; Voigtländer and Voth, 2015). However, these strategies often fail to entirely eliminate the leadership’s actual or perceived threats (e.g., Blaydes, 2018; Gläßel and Paula, 2020; Hobbs and Roberts, 2018). Most autocrats therefore ultimately depend on extensive surveillance and repression. This makes the security apparatus the key institution in defense of authoritarian regimes. At the same time, the centrality of security organizations provides the military and secret police with the resources and power to end the very regimes they are supposed to protect (e.g., Dragu and Przeworski, 2019; Greitens, 2016; Svolik, 2012). 7.2.1

The Guardianship Dilemma and the Drawbacks of Structural Fixes

With the security apparatus being both the single most important source of regime protection and the biggest threat to the autocrat’s survival, leaders face the so-called “guardianship dilemma” (McMahon and Slantchev, 2015): the more an autocrat depends on his security forces, the more resources and autonomy he has to give to officers to ensure their loyalty (Svolik, 2012). Better equipped and more autonomous security forces are more effective at putting down uprisings, and financially spoiled soldiers have lower coup motivation (e.g., Bellin, 2004; Powell, 2012). At the same time, however, these resources pave officers’ way to the regime’s center of power and raise their capacity to overthrow it (e.g., Powell, 2012; Svolik, 2012). That is, the more dictators rely on the repressive services of the security apparatus, the higher the coup risk.

The authoritarian security apparatus  113 Many studies examine how the guardianship dilemma shapes the architecture of the authoritarian security apparatus (e.g., Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2018; Greitens, 2016; Talmadge, 2015). According to Greitens (2016: 12), leaders tailor the apparatus to the type of threat they perceive to be most acute: “Autocrats chiefly concerned with the risk of a coup create fragmented and exclusive organizations, while autocrats most threatened by popular unrest create unitary and inclusive ones.” In order to reduce the risk of coups, leaders have an incentive to break the apparatus into competing entities that constantly spy on each other, or set up paramilitary organizations to counterbalance the power of the military (Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015; De Bruin, 2020; Quinlivan, 1999). Regimes also tweak the composition of security organs to prevent disobedience (e.g., Brooks, 1998; Harkness, 2016; Quinlivan, 1999). Virtually no authoritarian security apparatus is fully representative of the society at large (Allen and Brooks, 2023).4 Nepotistic leaders typically fill top positions with family members, friends, and associates who have a vested interest in the regime, as their privileges depend entirely on the fate of the dictator (Sassoon, 2016; Slater, 2003; Taylor, 2011). In countries with politically salient societal cleavages, units or even the entire apparatus may be dominated by members of supposedly loyal social, ethnic, or religious groups (e.g., Bellin, 2004; Harkness, 2016; Johnson and Thurber, 2020; McLauchlin, 2010). However, although various dictators fundamentally reshape their security apparatus and tweak recruitment criteria in an attempt to bolster loyalty, both structural fixes entail important drawbacks. First, competition within a fragmented security apparatus can trigger fierce rivalries and even plunge states into civil war (De Bruin, 2020; Roessler, 2016). Second, both fragmentation and stacking reduce military effectiveness, which leaves the regime vulnerable to internal or external aggression (Lyall, 2020; Talmadge, 2015). Third, exclusionary recruitment practices and reliance on a single societal group make regimes dependent, which ultimately weakens organizational control as executives cannot credibly threaten purges or punishments (Harkness, 2018; Stacher, 2012; Svolik, 2012). In view of this trade-off, autocrats may be wary of heavy fragmentation and identity-based recruitment. For many autocrats, exclusive recruitment strategies are not even feasible, as ethno-religious or socio-economic cleavages are too weak to be politically exploited (Scharpf and Gläßel, 2020). Even if deep divisions exist, broad categories such as religion, ethnicity, or economic class describe large groups of different individuals. As Allen and Brooks (2023: 214) note, “[i]dentity, including among military personnel, is not unidimensional but comprised of multiple, interdependent commitments.” Divisions are often crosscutting and complex, rendering group-based identities poor predictors of individual behavior. Autocrats therefore often face a much more heterogeneous pool of officers with varying allegiances, interests, and skills than commonly assumed (Allen and Brooks, 2023; Sassoon, 2016). This begs the question of how autocratic regimes effectively fend off revolutions and coups with the personnel they have. 7.2.2

The Competence–Loyalty Trade-off

A growing literature investigates how autocrats deal with security personnel to maintain an effective and obedient force (Hassan, 2017; Scharpf and Gläßel, 2020). Theoretical studies suggest that authoritarian regimes face a fundamental trade-off between competence and loyalty.5 Egorov and Sonin (2011) argue that competent officers are better able to successfully stage a coup than low-skilled lieutenants are. Zakharov (2016), in turn, holds that skilled

114  Research handbook on authoritarianism officers are likely to defect when autocrats need them most, that is, in so-called end-game scenarios where the survival of the regime hinges on the ruthless suppression of revolutionary masses. Since qualified officers consider themselves indispensable under any successor regime, the argument goes, they have little reason to stick with the current leader (Paine, 2022). Together, this suggests that autocrats have a strategic incentive to select less competent officers for the sake of greater loyalty. However, the proposed arguments on the competence–loyalty trade-off have also been questioned. In light of the manifold security threats of autocratic regimes, it seems difficult to believe that dictators would promote guardians who are incapable of protecting them. Problems with ineptitude seem to be particularly pressing at higher ranks, which are responsible for managing the regime’s overall defense. For this reason, McMahon and Slantchev (2015) argue that autocrats generally have an incentive to establish meritocratic promotion criteria and select skilled rather than incompetent officers.6 Yet, autocrats often fail to identify and weed out “lemons” in the security apparatus. The prevalence of incompetent viziers may therefore reflect the autocrat’s lack of cogent information rather than a well-calibrated strategy. In an attempt to reconcile these contradictory accounts, Scharpf and Gläßel (2020) focus on different organizations within the security apparatus to show how autocrats seek to combine competence and loyalty. They show that less-skilled agents join the secret police, while smart officers remain in the regular military. In meritocratic organizations such as the army, incompetent officers have grim career prospects and are threatened by discharge. These officers have a strong incentive to carry out the regime’s dirty work in the hopes of demonstrating their value to the leadership and salvaging their careers. This suggests that by placing high- and low-achieving individuals on fitting posts across the security apparatus, autocrats can forge a loyal secret police, while maintaining an effective military. Together, these studies offer first insights into authoritarian human resources management. Yet, little is known about the tools autocratic regimes might use to deal with personnel heterogeneity within the same organization. For example, how do dictators use the interests of higher-ranking officers—those in charge of overseeing the state’s defense—to their advantage?

7.3

COMPETENCE AND LOYALTY IN FIELD COMMANDS

In order to maintain a satisfied apparatus that lends its skills to the regime, autocrats and dictators must deal with classic issues of human resource management including salaries, bonuses, promotions, posts, and work-life balance (Brooks, 1998; De Juan, Krautwald and Pierskalla, 2017; Droz-Vincent, 2007; Hassan, 2017). Next, we shed new light on two strategies used by regimes to leverage officers’ personal and professional interests to balance competence and loyalty. We focus on the regime’s strategic selection and geographic placement of officers on command posts. To this end, we first take a closer look at the career paths of officers and the importance of deployments. We then turn to the regime to explain why autocrats seek competent officers to manage security matters in the field, and how regimes try to maximize compliance among these officers by strategically choosing their command locations.

The authoritarian security apparatus  115 7.3.1

Career Paths and Officer Interests

Across regimes, security organizations such as the army are hierarchically organized, pyramid-shaped, competitive systems. According to Nordlinger (1977: 43), the “vast majority of military establishments approximate” the ideal typical bureaucracy, which includes “the use of achievement criteria in the determination of promotions … and a strictly hierarchical ordering of offices and their individual occupants.” Within these organizations, most officers seek promotions since each step on the career ladder comprises increased pay, power, and prestige.7 However, like in other organizations, it is common that the number of applicants exceeds the number of positions available at the next higher level. To climb up, officers therefore have to fulfill the promotion criteria put in place. In general, successful officer careers share three main features. These include the “relative standing in one’s graduating class from the military academy, attendance at advanced training centers, [and] proven ability” (Nordlinger, 1977: 43). At an early career stage, the most important criterion for an officer’s rapid advancement is performance. Final grades at the military academy demonstrate the officer’s competence and aptitude. Such performance also shapes advancement at more senior ranks. Those with the best grades are most likely to gain access to higher education institutions. At command and staff schools or war colleges, mid-level officers develop the management and leadership skills necessary for assuming commanding positions to then open doors at the very top. As officers climb the career ladder, however, formal training commonly loses its importance. In contrast to early career stages, where an “elaborate system of grading and ranking … supplied plenty of opportunity for those who wished to demonstrate their energies and drive” (Janowitz, 1988: 136), at mid-levels most officers have excellent credentials. To climb up, officers thus have to find other ways to attract attention from the leadership and demonstrate their value (Moore and Trout, 1978: 452–3). It is for this reason that higher-ranking officers strive to obtain the right post at the right time. According to Janowitz (1988: xxxi), candidates’ “ability to rise farther depends on the particular assignment which will permit [them] to display [their] talents and make a conspicuous contribution.” Gaining field experience and taking on a command post is crucial for officers who want to make it to the top for two reasons. First, field assignments help officers demonstrate their competence and prove themselves beyond mere theory. As Moore and Trout (1978: 464) explain, “the performance of a commanding officer in combat appears to be much more clearly measurable than during peacetime … If an officer does well in command of a combatant ship or battalion, for example, one can hardly doubt his ability to command at higher levels.” Command posts thus reveal much-sought information on the officers’ practical competence, offering superiors a general impression of the commanders’ skill set. Second, field deployments generate visibility at the leadership level. To stand out from their competitors and build a reputation, officers must come to the attention of important superiors (Janowitz, 1988: 145). Thus, especially for mid-ranking officers, “a pattern of visible job assignments … and of course service in command [become] crucial factors in separating the potential leaders from the pack” (Moore and Trout, 1978: 458). With regimes only maintaining a fixed number of garrisons and military bases across their territory, attaining one of the few prestigious field positions enables selected officers to particularly stand out. Command posts thus allow officers to attract the attention of superiors and make important contacts. A close relationship with an influential mentor who offers support and vouches for the officer can open

116  Research handbook on authoritarianism much-sought routes to the top (Lyle and Smith, 2014). Most officers should thus have a strong interest in acquiring prestigious field deployments sooner rather than later in their careers. Notwithstanding their professional ambitions, officers also have private goals and interests that they want to have fulfilled (De Juan, Krautwald and Pierskalla, 2017). Balancing work with family life is difficult for many officers, especially when taking on positions in the field. Janowitz (1988: 181) reports that the disruptions to family lives caused by frequent moves are one of the main reasons why officers resign from service. The continuously changing workplace and the distance to family and friends often puts the private life of officers to a serious test. In view of the problems of settling down for longer and having a stable social network, many officers marry early and select their partners “from among their home-town friends, rather than [someone] from among service-connected [acquaintances]” (Janowitz, 1988: 190). Overall, officers are likely to have a strong preference for being deployed to the field, but should also seek posts that are geographically close to their family and the center of their personal life in order to reconcile their professional and personal commitments. 7.3.2

Regime Interests and Fears

For autocratic regimes, in turn, field deployments and command placements are key instruments to project power and protect their rule (e.g., De Juan, Krautwald and Pierskalla, 2017; Hassan, 2017). Autocrats probably know that modern defense and security operations— independent of whether targeted against subversive insurgents or foreign armies—are complex undertakings (Biddle, 2004; Talmadge, 2015). The “specialized troops, units, functions, and pieces of equipment” of modern military organizations demand skilled coordination and control (Van Creveld, 1985: 2). Therefore, the regime’s protection from actual or perceived enemies fundamentally depends on the decisions made by the commanders in the field. The complexity of managing the regime’s security is highly demanding. It requires great cognitive and managerial skills. Commanders in the field are expected to permanently gather, process, filter, and forward information on the state of their “own forces, the enemy, as well as external factors such as weather and terrain” (Van Creveld, 1985: 7). From this wealth of information, field commanders have to constantly prepare up-to-date assessments of the situation, define goals, design plans, make decisions, draft and transmit orders, verify the orders’ reception, and monitor their implementation. To be up to the task, officers must be smart, have a quick wit, and good judgment. As Van Creveld (1985: 268) puts it: “[t]he best system of command … is always to have a genius in charge, first in general and then at the decisive point.” For autocrats, however, the deployment of competent officers to powerful commands is risky. These posts provide officers with great resources and authority, which they can use to harm the regime (Albrecht and Eibl, 2018; Singh, 2014). Autocrats must fear that commanders refuse to order heavy-handed operations which they perceive as too expensive, counterproductive, or simply unjust. Being in the field might also allow commanders to build influential networks and a personal power base—the sine qua non condition for any successful military coup (Luttwak, 2016). Commanders may use their influential position to recruit trusted subordinates or coordinate activities with like-minded peers. Historically, the most successful armies have been those that granted their commanders large autonomy (Van Creveld, 1985), but smart officers can exploit this leeway and use their resources (i.e., tanks, armored vehicles, airplanes) and authority (i.e., subordinate officers and troops) to overthrow the regime. Thus,

The authoritarian security apparatus  117 while autocrats have an incentive to put competent officers in the field to build a strong regime defense, the leadership has to equally ensure that these officers remain loyal. How do regimes reconcile this dilemma? 7.3.3

The Two-step Logic of Officer Selection and Placement

We argue that autocrats strategically deploy officers to maximize both military effectiveness and loyalty. Regimes are likely to first decide which officers to select as field commanders, and then determine where to place the selected officers. Which officers are chosen for a command? To strengthen the regime’s defense lines, autocrats have high incentives to select the most competent officers for command posts in the field. Competent officers establish efficient procedures and clearly defined responsibilities in their units. The improved quality of intelligence and security operations should increase the regime’s chances of swiftly defeating enemy forces. Commanding officers, in turn, can expect to gain visibility and reputation, increasing their chances of promotion and career advancement. How do autocrats ensure the loyalty of officers entrusted with command positions? We expect that autocrats use geographic placements as an instrument of co-optation. As explained above, officers have a vested interest in being stationed close to their families. However, since the number of military bases and garrisons is limited, the regime must decide which of the selected commanders will and will not be granted the privilege of serving close to home. In the hope of reducing coup risk among their field commanders, autocrats thus have an incentive to grant home deployment to the most disgruntled officers. The officers who feel the most discriminated against by the regime are probably those who have had to wait the longest for their first prestigious post and, despite their competence, have repeatedly been ignored. The regime may therefore place commanders closer to home the longer they had been waiting for their first prestigious deployment in the field.

7.4

INSIGHTS FROM AUTOCRATIC ARGENTINA

Using the case of Argentina’s military dictatorship (1976–83), we illustrate how autocratic regimes use field operations to inspire loyalty among competent officers. Since the early 1970s, Argentina had faced uprisings by two insurgent groups: the Trotskyist People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP) around Tucumán province and the left-Peronist Montoneros, carrying out terrorist attacks against state and business representatives (Lewis, 2002; Moyano, 1995). Supported by the country’s economic elite, the military forcibly took power in a coup in March 1976 in order to end the turmoil in a nationwide counterinsurgency campaign (Gläßel, González and Scharpf, 2020). The generals were convinced to “not confront an opponent who [fought] to defend a flag, a nation or its borders” but a subversive enemy that sought “to destroy the foundations of the Western civilization” (Andersen, 1993: 195). Under the leadership of General Jorge R. Videla, the junta therefore wanted to “eradicate the vices affecting [their] country” with “absolute firmness” (Lewis, 2002: 131, emphasis in original). However, the military government consisted of different factions, which resulted in mutual distrust and feuds (Fontana, 1987). These ideological rifts and struggles for positions ran through the entire military down to the lower officer ranks (Scharpf, 2018). Given Argentina’s

118  Research handbook on authoritarianism coup-ridden history, disobedience or open defiance by military officers posed real threats to the junta. Since 1950, Argentina has experienced 7 successful and 13 failed coup attempts. The regime’s war on subversion turned commanding officers into the managers of internal security. The organizational backbone of the dictatorship’s security operations was a cellular, grid-based system that put army officers in charge of fixed geographical entities.8 The system included five zones, divided into a total of 19 subzones, with each consisting of several smaller areas.9 Each zone and subzone was headed by one commanding officer. On the subzone level, authority was with commanders of brigade-sized units.10 Figure 7.1 shows the locations of all subzone headquarters across the Argentine territory. Rotating in and out of the field, commanding officers were in charge of a subzone for about 18 months.

Figure 7.1

Command headquarters

Following the Argentine doctrine, subzone officers functioned as the central managers of internal security and had far-reaching powers. Each subzone officer was “a warlord in the zone under his control” (Timerman, 2002: 26), responsible for overseeing intelligence collection and planning anti-subversive operations. Every subzone hosted at least one intelligence detachment to identify enemies among the population. Operational orders were sent down the chain of command to the areas where subordinate officers would implement them. For the actual policing, including kidnappings and disappearances, commanders relied on short-lived “task forces” (CONADEP, 1986).11 The central position in the regime’s chain of command, coupled with the authority to design and oversee policing operations, made subzone commanders the linchpins of the regime’s internal defense. To shed light on the two-step logic behind the selection and placement of subzone officers, we draw on unique historical and archival sources. First, we utilize historical information on the military grid system to identify all 64 army officers in charge of subzones (D’Andrea

The authoritarian security apparatus  119 Mohr, 1999; Mittelbach and Mittelbach, 2000). Second, we link this list with original biographical and career information of all officers serving in the army during the dictatorship (Figueroa, 2008). Overall, the analysis dataset contains information on 1,024 officers. The unit of observation is the individual officer.12 7.4.1

Competence-based Officer Selection

Who gets a command position? Our expectation is that leaders choose competent commanders to manage regime defense. To empirically analyze officer selection, we construct a binary dependent variable indicating whether an officer was appointed subzone commander. For operationalizing individual officer competence, we draw on their military educational achievements: (a) Class rank gives an officer’s performance at the military academy compared to the rest of his cohort. The variable ranges between 0 and 100; the higher score, the better the officer’s grades. (b) Advanced training indicates whether the officer continued his studies at military college and successfully graduated from the Army’s Higher War School. Figure 7.2 visualizes the substantive effects of Class rank and Advanced training on officers’ probability of receiving a subzone command. The results are based on a multivariate logistic regression model, which includes control variables for officers’ biographical and professional backgrounds.13 Both graphs indicate that officer competence played a crucial role in appointments as subzone commanders.14 Compared to officers who graduated at the bottom of their cohorts, top performers at military academy were almost three times more likely to receive a subzone command. Officers who additionally completed the army’s war college experienced a comparable increase in their chance of obtaining a command post. This shows how the military regime strategically placed competent officers on defense management positions.

Figure 7.2

Selection of subzone commanders

120  Research handbook on authoritarianism 7.4.2

Loyalty-based Officer Placement

Who may serve where? We suspect autocrats use placements as a co-optation tool, and test whether officers with uncertain loyalties were deployed closer to their home cities. To this end, we calculate the geographic proximity and travel time between each commander’s birthplace and the location of their subzone headquarters.15 The key independent variable is Waiting time, measuring the time between an officer’s graduation from the military academy and his selection for a command position. Officers who wait longer for career-enhancing assignments presumably harbor grudges against the leadership, which is why the regime has an incentive to give them preferential treatment to keep them loyal. We thus expect Waiting time to increase geographic proximity and decrease travel time. Figure 7.3 visualizes the substantive effects from linear regressions.16 Panels (a) and (b) show the geographic distance and travel time from an officer’s hometown to his location of deployment as a function of the time he had to wait for his first assignment as subzone commander. Both graphs support our expectation that the geographic placement of commanders followed a logic of co-optation. The military regime placed competent officers with uncertain loyalty, who had been waiting longer for their stint, on commands near the officers’ hometowns, allowing them to travel home in less time to visit their families. On average, each additional year of waiting reduced the distance between home and work by 40 km or 2 hours of travel time. In sum, our empirical analyses based on unique individual-level data show how the Argentine military junta strategically selected competent officers and placed them on commands close to their home regions to buy their loyalty.

Figure 7.3

Placement of officers

The authoritarian security apparatus  121

7.5

LOOKING BEYOND ARGENTINA’S MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

Is autocratic Argentina the exception or can we expect other regimes to also employ the hypothesized deployment strategies? With the Argentine junta being a military dictatorship influential in Operation Condor and typical in many respects, the empirical case has substantial external validity.17 The approach of the Argentine security apparatus is certainly most representative of other military regimes, such as those in Chile and Brazil. Anecdotal evidence indicates that across regime types, time, and space, autocrats influence individual officer deployments, taking into account the skills of subordinates and the amenities of posts. For example, Iraq’s long-term dictator Saddam Hussein, whose personalist regime has been frequently characterized by his nepotism and sectarian staffing, replaced incompetent with competent generals during the invasion of Iran (McMahon and Slantchev, 2015). And in Namibia, the German colonial administration deployed competent police commanders with demonstrated combat skills to security-sensitive areas, while potentially disgruntled officers were placed on administrative positions in locations with a higher quality of life (De Juan, Krautwald and Pierskalla, 2017).18 The presented argument and findings may thus inform autocratic personnel management beyond the Argentine military dictatorship. Nonetheless, autocrats’ selection and placement of personnel might depend on regime type and the specific coup-proofing measures in place (Talmadge, 2015). For example, party-based regimes might draw more heavily on ideological indoctrination and political commissars to ensure loyalty among competent lieutenants, while personalist regimes tend to divide the military and counterbalance it with paramilitary units (Casey, 2020; Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2018; Quinlivan, 1999). While these measures might weaken the competence–loyalty trade-off among military officers, the dilemma is likely to recur for the group of political commissioners and paramilitary officers. The question thus becomes how regimes try to combine competence and loyalty among these individuals. Our two-step logic of strategic staffing allows researchers to formulate first expectations of how autocrats resolve this second-order dilemma.

7.6 CONCLUSION This chapter provides an overview of the dual threat to authoritarian rule, the central role of the security apparatus, and regime strategies designed to maintain both loyal and capable security forces. As Adam Przeworski notes, we too are “obsessed by the question of why people with guns obey people without them” (2016, 10). While most research focuses on exclusive recruitment policies, this chapter highlights how dictators manage the human resources they have. We show how autocrats leverage field deployments to balance the need for competence and loyalty at key posts within the apparatus. The staffing of command posts presents an integral, yet often overlooked component of human resource management in non-democracies. Autocrats appear to employ a two-tiered logic in dispatching officers to key positions. First, they select competent officers to further military effectiveness. Second, to prevent competent officers from using their skills and the power of their position against the regime, autocrats co-opt potentially disgruntled commanders by granting them preferential treatment in terms of work-life balance. Evidence from Argentina’s last military dictatorship shows this dual logic

122  Research handbook on authoritarianism at work. The junta selected field commanders based on merit while reserving home deployments to officers with uncertain loyalty. The chapter has three key implications for future research on autocratic regimes. First, dictators might not entirely be at the mercy of the compromise between competence and loyalty. By paying special attention to the private interests of potentially disgruntled, competent officers, autocrats could be able to take advantage of their skills without exposing themselves to greater danger. This qualifies the often invoked dilemma of autocrats between military effectiveness and coup-proofing (Talmadge, 2015), which might spur more work on the human resource management of authoritarian regimes, including recruitment, rotations, shuffling, and placements within armed and civilian bureaucracies (Nakanishi, 2013). Second, the chapter shows that autocrats draw on a variety of hitherto overlooked tools to shield themselves from coups and incentivize obedience (Scharpf and Gläßel, 2022). Future research may want to pay more attention to management techniques that authoritarian leaders use to integrate or ditch dangerous personnel. For example, how do autocratic regimes select officers for training programs at prestigious military schools abroad such as West Point or Sandhurst? And does the competence–loyalty trade-off also affect dictators’ personnel decisions when filling diplomatic and attaché posts? Finally, the chapter speaks to autocrats’ deployment strategies during international wars or peacekeeping missions. Such deployment decisions are likely to follow a coup-proofing logic as well (Albrecht, 2020), but we still know very little about the characteristics of selected commanders and soldiers. As this chapter shows, regimes might assign competent officers to international operations as well. An unanswered question is what the consequences are for the regime’s military clout abroad and its ability to repress at home.

NOTES 1. We thank Adam Casey, Erica De Bruin, Erica Frantz, and Jacob Hariri, workshop participants at the Universities of Münster and Konstanz, as well as attendees of the 2022 ISA and 2022 LASA Annual Conventions for their helpful comments. This research was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation), Project number 505141610. 2. For an explanation of how different types of career setbacks can turn ordinary individuals into loyal regime agents, see Scharpf and Gläßel (2022). 3. Following Nordlinger (1977: 47), officers are “professional managers of force and violence [who] direct the application of force and violence to enhance national security in the face of potential or actual threats ranging from subversion to all-out conventional warfare.” 4. To varying degrees and at different layers within the apparatus, most autocrats engage in “identity-based recruitment, promotion, or marginalization” (Allen and Brooks, 2023: 2010). 5. A burgeoning literature studies the competence–loyalty trade-off in the autocrat’s party organization or regular state administration (e.g., Aaskoven and Nyrup, 2021; Bai and Zhou, 2019; Jia, Kudamats and Seim, 2015; Landry and Lü, 2018; Lee and Schuler, 2020; Reuter and Robertson, 2012). 6. According to McMahon and Slantchev (2015), regimes can address the guardianship dilemma by limiting the resources for competent officers and thus their coup ability. 7. Another important incentive for officers to move up the career ladder are up-or-out promotion systems, whereby officers must leave the organization if they have been overlooked for promotion too many times. 8. The grid system had been secretly put in place in the late 1950s. It was based on plans for Argentina’s territorial defense, drafted in the early 1940s, and later modified for insurrections. 9. Army officers controlled all zones and were in charge of 18 of the 19 subzones.

The authoritarian security apparatus  123 10. Commanding officers held the rank of Colonel or Brigadier Generals. 11. Members not only included military, police, and intelligence personnel, but also criminals (Lewis, 2002: 150). 12. Officers who held more than one subzone command appear in the dataset more than once. 13. Due to space limitations, information on control variables, summary statistics, regression tables, and robustness checks are available in the Online Appendix at Harvard Dataverse: https://​doi​.org/​ 10​.7910/​DVN/​TFLGJT. 14. Calculations are based on Model 6, shown in Table A.4.1 in the Online Appendix at Harvard Dataverse. Control variables are held at observed values. Shading and vertical lines give 95 percent confidence intervals. 15. Information on birthplaces comes from personnel files that were available for 76.5 percent of the commanders in Argentina’s General Army Archive. 16. Calculations are based on Models 3 and 6, shown in Table A.4.2 in the Online Appendix at Harvard Dataverse. Control variables are held at observed values. Shaded areas indicate 95 percent confidence intervals. 17. Further qualitative and quantitative information on the representativeness of the Argentine military regime can be found in the Online Appendix at Harvard Dataverse. 18. Our proposed logic of selection and placement might be even at work in democracies. Under J. Edgar Hoover, the FBI chose the most competent candidates to become field agents, while only those with long service time could hope for posts close to their hometowns (Cunningham, 2004).

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PART III COMMUNICATION, INFORMATION AND SUPPORT

8. Authoritarianism and digital communication Eda Keremoğlu and Nils B. Weidmann

8.1 INTRODUCTION Control of the information environment has always been central to autocrats’ attempts to stay in power, even more so in recent years (Guriev and Treisman, 2019). This has not changed with the advent of digital communication technologies; rather, these innovations have expanded the space to be controlled. While early analysts praised the Internet as a “liberation technology,” its misuse for political repression became commonplace in the authoritarian world. Non-democratic rulers spy on citizens, disrupt the free flow of information and actively disseminate news in their favor. Recent examples include Internet shutdowns in Iran in 2022 that cut off reporting on state violence against protesters (Strzyżyńska, 2022), or China flooding the web with non-political content to distract from protest against the government’s zero-Covid policies (Milmo and Davidson, 2022). This chapter provides a systematic overview of how autocrats use and control the digital information environment to repress the opposition, activists and the broader population. Researchers oftentimes refer to autocrats’ misuse of the Internet as “digital repression.” We follow Feldstein’s definition of digital repression as “the use of information and communications technology (ICT) to surveil, coerce, or manipulate individuals or groups in order to deter specific activities or beliefs that challenge the state” (Feldstein, 2021: 25). Crucially, digital repression targets challenges that can take place both online and offline (Earl, Maher and Pan, 2022). Censorship, for instance, deletes critical messages online, but can also be used to prevent mobilization of “offline” protest. Similarly, surveillance not only means monitoring online communication but ultimately yields intelligence on opposition on the ground. This is in line with the definition given by Earl, Maher and Pan (2022: 1) on digital repression that also includes “the use of digital or social media to raise the costs for social movement activity, wherever that contestation takes place.” Overall, the aim is to control the information available on the digital sphere and, ultimately, to fend off information and communication challenging incumbents’ rule. What is new about the information environment in digital times? While some researchers argue that the online world is a mere expansion of the offline information environment, the very nature of the Internet offers new modes of how communication happens. Traditional media relies on broadcast networks where information is transmitted to all receivers from one node such as a TV or radio station and newspapers (Weidmann and Geelmuyden Rød, 2019: 17). In autocracies, these broadcasting networks are usually under tight governmental control and supervision. On the Internet, however, broadcast-type media can in principle also be run by any individual, thereby diversifying the available sources of information. The Internet also offers peer-to-peer communication via e-mail or chat applications, thus blending different types of networks in one space. In sum, the Internet “blurs the distinction between information providers and information consumers, enabling ordinary citizens to reach potentially large 128

Authoritarianism and digital communication  129 audiences” (Weidmann and Geelmuyden Rød, 2019: 18). This can pose a critical threat to rulers if left uncontrolled. While this presents autocrats with new challenges in overseeing an expanded and diversified space, new technologies also offer unprecedented opportunities to control the information environment. Information control can happen much faster, often in real-time, to a wider extent, in a much cheaper way and at very different levels, both overt and covert. Provided that governments possess the technological sophistication, control and repression can be automated. Much of the interference we observe in autocracies can be done by implementing automated control tools (Feldstein, 2021), which complement manual control done by humans (King, Pan and Roberts, 2013). This chapter discusses authoritarian information control and the very different ways in which autocrats use the Internet to manipulate what citizens can access and disseminate online. While our focus lies on domestic interference, we also review the literature that researches control beyond national borders. We structure control techniques on each level according to three strategies. We first start with interference aimed at (a) monitoring digital content, content creators and digital communication. While this is a rather passive governmental action in merely observing the flow and type of information, it oftentimes has severe offline repercussions for individuals and groups. We then proceed to discuss strategies that actively shape the information environment. Most research has focused on (b) how suppressing information happens in non-democratic countries. This strategy aims to remove information by making it disappear through censorship, for instance. More recently, research has shifted its focus to studying (c) how autocrats actively supply information by feeding content into the environment through disinformation campaigns and flooding. We conclude this chapter with a discussion of theoretical shortcomings and empirical challenges in the study of authoritarian information control.

8.2

THE DOMESTIC INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Most research on digital communication has focused on governmental interference with the domestic information environment. In the following, we discuss how autocrats monitor digital communication, but also how they actively engage with it by withholding or supplying information. 8.2.1 Monitoring Surveillance has always been a central component of authoritarian politics. The advent of the Internet has tremendously facilitated governmental monitoring of the opposition and broader population. As most of online communication is public on websites and social media, for instance, state officials can easily keep track of critical voices and opposition activity. Crucially, however, the Internet has made surveillance also much more pervasive and subtle. Built-in surveillance tools such as deep packet inspection enable automated real-time monitoring of digital communication, also of content intended to be private. Most of autocrats’ surveillance practices presumably are a covert activity, which makes it difficult for ordinary users to notice and for researchers to study. Some governments, however, engage in overt surveillance practices, thereby publicly signaling to citizens that they are being watched. One

130  Research handbook on authoritarianism prominent case is China where open surveillance ranges from Internet monitors censoring social media posts and virtual police officers patrolling the web (King, Pan and Roberts, 2013) to its social credit system based on all-encompassing monitoring enhanced by digital technologies (Xu, Kostka and Cao, 2022). Overall, digital surveillance increases autocrats’ capacity to track down and, ultimately, repress dissenters (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz and Wright, 2020; Pan and Siegel, 2020). 8.2.2

Suppressing Information

Authoritarian governments worldwide have been leveraging digital tools to manipulate their domestic information environment. The most common strategy is censoring content they deem critical. According to Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net report for 2022 (Shahbaz, Funk and Vesteinsson, 2022), “online censorship reached an all-time high” with authoritarian governments spearheading the list of countries. In this way, autocrats tightly control what information citizens can access in the first place, but also what they can communicate to others. Censorship can be achieved by a variety of methods, ranging from invisible, automated filtering of critical keywords to brute-force measures such as denial-of-service attacks to shut down whole websites. We discuss different approaches governments take to restrict the free flow of information in more detail below. One of the widely known strategies of digital repression are Internet shutdowns. This brute-force measure regularly makes the news as it is a visible and drastic intervention by governments to cut off access to individual services, throttle speed or shut down the Internet as whole. This can happen for particular regions or the whole country during politically contentious times such as violent conflict, popular protests or elections (AccessNow, 2023; Dainotti et al., 2014; Gohdes, 2020). Governmental shutdowns usually serve three purposes. First, by cutting off access to information, governments disrupt the flow of information, also on ongoing protest. Further, shutdowns aim to disrupt the coordination of activists and the opposition. Lastly, shutdowns also limit reporting on state violence during civil wars or mass mobilization. Infamous examples include shutdowns during uprisings in Iran in 2019 and 2022 where blackouts were accompanied by violence and killings of protesters (Strzyżyńska, 2022). While, on average, shutdowns usually last for a few days, some notable exceptions include Sudan shutting down for 30 days, and Myanmar with one nationwide shutdown lasting for 73 days (AccessNow, 2023). An alternative way to cut off access to information are so-called denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Those attacks bring down individual websites by overloading hosting servers with a wave of requests. As a consequence, the server cannot respond and the website cannot be reached anymore. This is a relatively cheap and efficient way to censor information especially when websites are hosted outside the government’s jurisdiction, for example, on servers abroad. Research has shown that this tactic is more prevalent in non-democratic states (Asal et al., 2016) and particularly attractive during election periods (Lutscher et al., 2020). As opposed to shutdowns, DoS attacks are not easy to identify as such by ordinary users, but are oftentimes perceived to be caused by technical issues. Autocrats also have more fine-tuned techniques at their disposal with which they can set up a “technical filtering regime” (Zittrain and Palfrey, 2008). The Internet’s network layer provides the means to tailor censorship and implement automated long-term control. As opposed to the examples discussed above, these tactics leave the network intact while at the same

Authoritarianism and digital communication  131 time subtracting content selectively. Examples include filtering by proxy servers or based on critical keywords and blocking data packets depending on particular senders or receivers (Hellmeier, 2016; Murdoch and Anderson, 2008). In this way, citizens remain connected, but the government tightly controls what content they can see and post and which applications they can use. China’s “Great Firewall” is an infamous example of a highly regulated “national intranet” (Kalathil and Boas, 2003) that not only blocks particular foreign websites and services, but also offers alternatives such as WeChat and Sina Weibo that are subject to strict governmental control. Several of the censorship mechanisms discussed above are easier to implement when governments have direct control over the Internet infrastructure. This is best achieved when they act as Internet service providers. Recent research has found that authoritarian governments are significantly more influential at the transit level than their democratic counterparts (Keremoğlu et al., 2024). Transit providers as the backbone of the Internet connect access networks to the global network. This gives them direct capabilities to tamper with Internet traffic while going mostly unnoticed. Crucially, state involvement is presumably underestimated since – especially in autocracies – individual shareholders oftentimes have strong links to incumbents, requiring a detailed look at ownership structures (Freyburg, Garbe and Wavre, 2023). Where direct technical control is not an option, autocrats have other means to censor information and communication. With the advent of the Internet, especially non-democratic governments were keen to accompany the expansion of digital networks with regulatory means to control digital communication (Boas, 2006; Feldstein, 2021). These include policies and laws to regulate how key infrastructure is set up and how users are supposed to behave in cyberspace. This is especially effective if governments do not own service providers. In these cases, regulations force private companies to meet governmental demands, thereby expanding autocrats’ repressive reach (Deibert, 2015). 8.2.3

Supplying Information

Authoritarian governments actively supply information on the digital realm for political purposes. This can happen for a number of reasons: to spread propaganda and misinformation, but also to distract citizens from current contentious issues discussed online. In the following, we discuss the different motivations behind the supply of online content by autocratic governments. The use of propaganda has been a frequent feature of autocratic governments. Historically, the spread of propaganda relied on conventional communication channels such as newspapers, TV or radio, which can be effective in fending off political threats such as open dissent (Carter and Carter, 2021a). In recent times, however, most propaganda is spread via digital channels. Rather than openly praising the government or promoting its policies – what is typically called “hard” propaganda (Huang, 2018) – this type of digital propaganda often uses more subtle forms of influence, appealing to feelings or emotions (Mattingly and Yao, 2022). The use of propaganda is closely related to disinformation, which is at the heart of a current debate about the malicious use of ICTs in democracies. Disinformation is commonly understood to be the intentional spread of misinformation, the latter being defined as statements that are factually wrong (see Wu et al., 2019 for a more detailed categorization). Although not inherently limited to digital information, almost all disinformation today is disseminated via digital channels, and therefore falls within the scope of this chapter. Whether applied in

132  Research handbook on authoritarianism autocracies or democracies, the spread of misinformation by political actors is led by malign intent, to deceive the public, or to discredit political organizations or opponents. While some work exists on the domestic use of disinformation in autocracies (Barrie and Siegel, 2021; Jones, 2022), we will come back to this topic below when discussing the international use of ICTs by autocratic governments. The content supplied by governmental actors need not necessarily be political. In fact, research has shown that digital content can be supplied for the purpose of distracting citizens from politically sensitive issues. The “flooding” of social media makes it more costly for users to encounter non-censored information online, since it is effectively crowded out by other, less politically contentious posts (Roberts, 2018). King, Pan and Roberts (2017) show that this strategy guides much of the Chinese government’s online efforts. For Venezuela, Munger et al. (2019) show that during protests, elites tweet about topics unrelated to opposition criticism, in a similar effort to divert public attention away from particular issues. However, flooding is not always directed at the citizens, but can also be used to distract coverage by media outlets in ways convenient for the regime (Roberts, 2018). In practice, all content-supplying strategies are closely related to other uses of ICTs by dictators. Privileging certain messages over others can be supported by the removal of the latter, which qualifies as censorship (Tucker et al., 2018: 30). Also, technology plays a key role for creating and disseminating content at scale. For example, bots are routinely deployed in autocracies for this purpose, as Stukal et al. (2022) show for the case in Russia. Artificial intelligence tools support these efforts, since they help autocrats improve disinformation campaigns by gaming content curation algorithms on social media platforms, but also by helping creating forged content, such as images or videos (Feldstein, 2019).

8.3

THE INTERNATIONAL INFORMATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The global reach of the Internet gives autocratic governments unprecedented opportunities to expand their influence internationally. However, in comparison to the interference in the domestic information environment (see previous section), the different types of influence are more restricted. For example, one way in which digital communication can be restricted domestically is through regulation, which is more difficult internationally. Nevertheless, other means of influence can be used transnationally, which we discuss below. 8.3.1 Monitoring As discussed above, the monitoring of digital communication flows is often a covert operation and therefore difficult to study empirically. However, there are some indications that autocratic regimes retain these monitoring capabilities also beyond their borders. As shown in Keremoğlu et al. (2024), there are many Internet providers owned by autocratic governments that provide network services in other countries, which gives them direct access to data flows and the associated metadata, from which it is possible to detect access to particular websites abroad, but also block them. Also, Keremoğlu et al. (2024) find that the international operation of autocratically owned providers happens primarily in other autocratic countries, which could be the result of shared standards for (reduced) anonymity and the protection of civil rights on the Internet.

Authoritarianism and digital communication  133 8.3.2

Suppressing Information

While the means of suppressing information internationally are restricted, autocrats still have ways to expand their repressive means beyond national borders. Recent research on the setup of the Internet infrastructure has shown that many Internet providers owned by authoritarian governments operate in other countries. This gives them direct influence over data flows going from and to their respective customers, including cutting off access, throttling bandwidth and implementing more fine-tuned censorship tools as discussed above. When governments do not have direct means of control because they do not act as Internet service providers, they can make use of more brute-force measures such as DoS attacks. This is an especially attractive tool when actors want to target websites hosted on servers abroad over which they neither have legal jurisdiction nor control over the infrastructure (Lutscher et al., 2020). 8.3.3

Supplying Information

Much of the contribution and dissemination of digital content by autocratic regimes that we discussed for the domestic arena can also be done internationally. In particular, this has been discussed extensively since the 2016 US presidential election, where foreign actors, in particular Russia, were assumed to be responsible for the large amount of misinformation that was circulated digitally. Among several other autocratic countries, Russia has been engaging in foreign influence campaigns for some time. It relies both on covert actions, but also outlets that were clearly aligned with, and supported by, the Russian government, such as, for example, the Russian-sponsored TV/online channel RT, formerly Russia Today (Yablokov, 2015). These efforts are partly successful. For example, RT has been shown to affect Americans’ views about foreign policy (Carter and Carter, 2021b). There is extensive research that has studied the amount, the effects and the impact of foreign disinformation in the US since 2016. Overall, these efforts seemed to be intended to support Trump’s campaign, and more generally, to criticize and erode liberal democracy. To this end, a variety of tactics were used, such as, for example, the commission of online trolls (Golovchenko et al., 2020; Linvill et al., 2019). Despite the extensive public debate about this influence, however, recent research shows that the production of this online material can be attributed to a very small number of accounts, and was consumed overwhelmingly by conservative users (Eady et al., 2023). Overall, there seems to be little evidence that Russian influence had any effect on citizens. Overall, there is very little comparative research that goes beyond particular prominent cases of foreign misinformation and misinformation campaigns by autocratic governments. However, existing work has shown that relatively few countries engage in disinformation abroad (Bradshaw and Howard, 2018), with Russia clearly standing out in these efforts (Martin, Shapiro and Nedashkovskaya, 2019).

8.4

SHORTCOMINGS AND CHALLENGES IN THE STUDY OF AUTHORITARIAN INFORMATION CONTROL

The last decade has seen a surge of studies that have advanced our knowledge on how autocrats worldwide misuse the Internet for political means. Despite this progress, we identify both

134  Research handbook on authoritarianism conceptual shortcomings as well as empirical challenges we believe the literature needs to address if we want to gain a more comprehensive understanding of authoritarian information control. A key shortcoming in the current literature is a lack of a comprehensive conceptualization of information control, its drivers as well as outcomes. As a result, current scholarship mostly lacks comparative studies that investigate information control beyond a particular country or tool. While this is presumably for valid research-pragmatic reasons, it challenges our ability to give more comprehensive answers that go beyond the particular cases examined. Do regime type and political institutions matter for information control? Some of the variation in information control we observe might be linked to institutional differences between authoritarian regimes. Comparative autocracy research, for example, suggests that power-sharing institutions constrain autocrats’ policy discretion (Magaloni, 2008; Svolik, 2012). Do differences in regime institutions also explain the extent to which governments exert control over digital information flows (Weidmann and Geelmuyden Rød, 2019, Chapter 9)? In the same vein, we lack an understanding of the conditions of different manipulation strategies. Why do some autocrats engage in censorship more than others? What type of content is more likely to be manipulated (King, Pan and Roberts, 2013)? What explains overt control, and why do some autocrats use a multitude of both overt and covert strategies? Why is some interference overt if it can backfire (Hobbs and Roberts, 2018)? While a country’s technical sophistication might be an important factor here, current work has not yet provided a theoretical mapping of information control and its conditions. A fundamental empirical challenge is the measurement of authoritarian information control. Some instances of interference are easier to observe and computational methods have been very fruitful in uncovering meddling with the network. Several studies, for instance, have detected how authoritarian governments use technical and manual means to censor information. Other types of control pose a greater challenge with disinformation campaigns being one of the most prevalent topics. Current efforts to capture disinformation usually rely on media reports (Bradshaw and Howard, 2018; Martin, Shapiro and Ilhardt, 2022). The advantages of this approach include comparability of disinformation efforts across countries. Oftentimes, the news media are also more likely to report on responsible actors, making it easier to attribute campaigns to governments. However, when researchers rely on media reports, they run the risk of underestimating disinformation campaigns. As the aim of these efforts is usually exerting influence while going unnoticed, “successful” campaigns will be less likely to be observed and hence not be reported. Some research relies on computational methods to identify disinformation campaigns run with the help of social media bots (Stukal et al., 2022). While this measures this type of disinformation more comprehensively, the downside to this approach is that its use is usually restricted to a single country or a particular platform. A second empirical challenge researchers face is to correctly identify those actors engaging in the manipulation of the information environment. Some manipulation happens blatantly, but oftentimes, it is difficult to solve the attribution problem as much interference is a covert action and can be carried out by virtually anyone. While some instances suggest governmental interference, such as censorship of opposition websites or shutdowns during anti-government protest, we cannot always be certain. This problem is exacerbated when manipulation is done by state-affiliated or hired actors, which makes blame shifting easy for incumbents (Deibert et al., 2012). It is easier to assume responsibility for particular types of manipulation when ownership structures are known, which is what recent work has focused on (Freyburg, Garbe

Authoritarianism and digital communication  135 and Wavre, 2023; Keremoğlu et al., 2024). However, as discussed above, ownership is not always straightforward when government affiliates function as individual shareholders, or where sham companies or other “opaque ownership structures” hide governmental links. One example is Iran’s Revolutionary Guard being present in Syria through its links to a Malaysian mobile operator (Sabbagh et al., 2022). A third challenge is to assess the effect of information control. Scholarship agrees that the purpose of authoritarian interference is political. The tight control over digital information and communication is seen as part of autocrats’ survival strategies to fend off challenges. Only a few studies, however, systematically assess the impact of Internet control. Rød and Weidmann (2015) find that Internet penetration is not conducive to democratization but rather bolsters authoritarian rule. The study finds that Internet adoption is linked to control of traditional media, suggesting that “going digital” is accompanied by tight governmental control of the digital sphere. Few other studies have investigated the effect of particular control tools, but have come to diverging conclusions. While shutdowns in Syria, for instance, sparked government violence against rebels (Gohdes, 2020), blocking Instagram in China backfired in politicizing users (Hobbs and Roberts, 2018). Existing work thus looks at individual cases and individual tools, which makes it difficult to draw conclusions about the impact of information control.

8.5 CONCLUSION In this chapter, we have discussed the different ways in which autocratic governments can influence the information environment domestically and abroad. As digital communication is expanding to ever more areas of citizens’ everyday lives, so are autocrats’ opportunities for interference. In our discussion, we have distinguished between three different purposes for which this interference can be used: first, for the surveillance of citizens and their communication online; second, for the suppression of information and information access and to remove politically unwanted information; and third, for the active provision of digital content for the purpose of propaganda and misinformation. Some of these measures can be implemented at the level of the (physical) Internet infrastructure, for example, through the involvement of government-controlled Internet providers. Most of them, however, operate at the application level, where content is removed or added on news portals or social media platforms (Keremoğlu and Weidmann, 2020). As governments scale up the level of sophistication of digital interference, so can citizens employ measures to counter this. There are some examples in the academic literature that study this process of digital “adaptation.” One of these studies analyzes the case of China’s sudden blocking of Instagram, which led many users to turn to Virtual Private Networks (Hobbs and Roberts, 2018). Strauch and Weidmann (2022) show in a comparative study that the local occurrence of large protest events in autocracies increases the use of The Onion Router (Tor), a distributed anonymization technology that protects data flows on the Internet. Other ways in which citizens can avoid or bypass digital censorship are discussed in the comprehensive review by Roberts (2020). Nevertheless, autocrats worldwide similarly adapt to these developments, often learning from best practices and technical innovations from other non-democracies such as China (Shahbaz, 2018) or even relying on tools offered by

136  Research handbook on authoritarianism democratic countries such as Israel’s Pegasus spyware (Marczak et al., 2018). Overall, these examples underline the dynamic struggle over the digital information environment. While our review centered exclusively around digital interference by autocratic governments, these are clearly not the only actors influencing the political information environment. While the measures they can employ are much more limited as compared to governments, many non-governmental organizations use digital communication channels for their own political goals. For example, research has examined how rebel groups use social media to appeal to international audiences (Loyle and Bestvater, 2019). Similarly, misinformation is not limited to governmental actors in autocracies. For example, Feldstein (2021: 192) describes how activists in Ethiopia set up a Facebook page to spread misleading and false information. These examples, together with our discussion above, show that the digital information environment will remain a major political battleground in the years to come, in autocracies and democracies alike. While this gives comparative political scientists new opportunities for scientific analysis, it also requires the field to quickly adapt its methodological toolkit to analyze these rapid developments.

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138  Research handbook on authoritarianism Murdoch, S.J. & Anderson, R. (2008), Tools and technology of Internet filtering, in R. Deibert, J. Palfrey, R. Rohozinski & J. Zittrain, eds., Access denied: The practice and policy of global Internet filtering, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 57–72. Pan, J. & Siegel, A.A. (2020), “How Saudi crackdowns fail to silence online dissent”, American Political Science Review 114(1), 109–25. Roberts, M.E. (2018), Censored: Distraction and diversion inside China’s Great Firewall, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Roberts, M.E. (2020), “Resilience to online censorship”, Annual Review of Political Science 23, 401–19. Rød, E.G. & Weidmann, N.B. (2015), “Empowering activists or autocrats? The Internet in authoritarian regimes”, Journal of Peace Research 52(3), 338–51. Sabbagh, R., Dihmis, L., Shahrour, S., Shaar, K., Dziadosz, A. & Greenwald, J. (2022), “Syria’s www​ .occrp​ newest mobile operator has a hidden link to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard”. https://​ .org/​en/​investigations/​syrias​-newest​-mobile​-operator​-has​-a​-hidden​-link​-to​-irans​-revolutionary​-guard (accessed: October 31, 2023). Shahbaz, A. (2018), The rise of digital authoritarianism, Technical report, Freedom House. https://​ freedomhouse​.org/​report/​freedom​-net/​2018/​rise​-digital​-authoritarianism (accessed: October 31, 2023). Shahbaz, A., Funk, A. & Vesteinsson, K. (2022), Countering an authoritarian overhaul of the Internet, Technical report, Freedom House. https://​freedomhouse​.org/​report/​freedom​-net/​2022/​countering​ -authoritarian​-overhaul​-internet (Last accessed: 31 October 2023). Strauch, R. & Weidmann, N.B. (2022), “Protest and digital adaptation”, Research & Politics 9(2), 205316802211004. Strzyżyńska, W. (2022), “Iran blocks capital’s internet access as Amini protests grow”, The Guardian. https://​www​.theguardian​.com/​world/​2022/​sep/​22/​iran​-blocks​-capitals​-internet​-access​-as​-amini​-pro tests​-grow (accessed: October 31, 2023). Stukal, D., Sanovich, S., Bonneau, R. & Tucker, J.A. (2022), “Why botter: How pro-government bots fight opposition in Russia”, American Political Science Review 116(3), 843–57. Svolik, M.W. (2012), The politics of authoritarian rule, Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Tucker, J.A., Guess, A., Barberá, P., Vaccari, C., Siegel, A., Sanovich, S., Stukal, D. & Nyhan, B. (2018), “Social media, political polarization, and political disinformation: A review of the scientific literature”. https://​papers​.ssrn​.com/​sol3/​papers​.cfm​?abstractid​=​3144139 (accessed: October 21, 2023). Weidmann, N.B. & Geelmuyden Rød, E. (2019), The Internet and political protest in autocracies, Oxford studies in digital politics, Oxford University Press, New York. Wu, L., Morstatter, F., Carley, K.M. & Liu, H. (2019), “Misinformation in social media: Definition, manipulation, and detection”, ACM SIGKDD Explorations Newsletter 21(2), 80–90. Xu, X., Kostka, G. & Cao, X. (2022), “Information control and public support for social credit systems in China”, The Journal of Politics 84(4), 2230–45. Yablokov, I. (2015), “Conspiracy theories as a Russian public diplomacy tool: The case of Russia Today (RT)”, Politics 35(3–4), 301–15. Zittrain, J. & Palfrey, J. (2008), Internet filtering: The politics and mechanisms of control, in R. Deibert, J. Palfrey, R. Rohozinski & J. Zittrain, eds., Access denied: The practice and policy of global Internet filtering, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 29–56.

9. Citizen support for autocratic regimes Marlene Mauk

9.1 INTRODUCTION Traditionally, accounts of autocratic rule emphasize repression and cooptation as key means of securing the autocrat’s power (Davenport, 2007; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Magaloni, 2008). More recently, however, legitimation has gained increased attention as a source of autocratic stability (Dimitrov, 2013; Gerschewski, 2013). The idea itself is not exactly new: David Easton (1965, 1975) already argued that either kind of political regime needs at least some support from its citizens to survive in the long run. Studies on democracies have shown that citizens’ views of their political system have strong behavioral implications. People who hold more positive attitudes towards the political regime are more willing to pay taxes, more likely to comply with the law, and less likely to demand regime change (Abdelzadeh, Özdemir and van Zalk, 2015; Dalton, 2004; Letki, 2006; Marien and Hooghe, 2011; Scholz and Lubell, 1998). While autocracies can certainly exert a higher degree of coercion than democracies, a reservoir of regime support will facilitate the smooth functioning of autocratic and democratic politics alike and reduces the need for – and costs of – control and supervision in autocracies. Yet how much support do ordinary citizens around the world actually extend to their autocratic regimes? And on what grounds are citizens willing to support a political regime that, by definition, lacks democratic legitimation and denies them basic political rights? Conceptualizing regime support as citizens’ attitudes towards the institutional structure of the political regime in which they live (Easton, 1965; Fuchs, 2009), this contribution takes stock of the existing literature on regime support in autocracies. It reviews the most common explanatory approaches, summarizes the empirical findings, and adds its own account of how much and for what reasons citizens in autocracies do – or do not – support their political regime. Before turning to those tasks, the following section first discusses the challenges associated with studying citizen support for autocracies.

9.2

CHALLENGES OF STUDYING CITIZEN SUPPORT FOR AUTOCRACIES

Studying citizens’ political attitudes is certainly never easy (Groves et al., 2009; Wolf et al., 2016) but doing so in autocracies is especially challenging. The main issue that plagues survey-based research in autocracies is political fear: where citizens are used to the political regime not respecting their civil liberties, they are potentially less willing to respond truthfully to survey questions about this political regime for fear of repercussions (Kuran, 1997). Instead, they may opt to not respond at all (resulting in item or unit nonresponse) or to respond with a lie (preference falsification) – typically, pretending to have more positive attitudes towards the ruling regime than they actually have (Zimbalist, 2018). While nonresponse limits the 139

140  Research handbook on authoritarianism representativeness of the results, preference falsification compromises their validity. Perhaps surprisingly, these matters have received only limited attention in previous research. Among the few studies that discuss preference falsification in autocratic regimes, Kalinin (2016) as well as Robinson and Tannenberg (2019) find at least some evidence for preference falsification when it comes to direct questions about the Russian president or the Chinese central government. On the other hand, Frye et al. (2017) conclude that Russians’ responses in public opinion surveys paint a fairly accurate picture of their attitudes towards Vladimir Putin, and studies looking into political fear more generally find it to be neither widespread nor systematically correlated with political support (Guriev and Treisman, 2016; Shi, 2001; Wu and Wilkes, 2018).1 Examining the extent of item nonresponse in autocracies, Mauk (2020a) observes no systematic patterns of such nonresponse that would point to citizens in autocracies being generally unwilling or cautious in responding to survey questions about their political regime. Benstead (2018) as well as Kruse, Ravlik and Welzel (2019) reach similar conclusions. Even though (the lack of) patterns of item nonresponse can only give an indication rather than definitive evidence regarding the prevalence of political fear, and we still know virtually nothing about those refusing to be interviewed altogether, previous research does point to political fear at least not being a pervasive problem for survey research in autocracies. In addition, the substantial efforts high-quality survey projects make to assure respondents of the anonymity and confidentiality of their replies should contribute to making respondents feel reasonably safe in the interview situation. This does not, however, mean that we should blindly trust survey data from autocracies (as well as, at least to a certain degree, from democracies; Blasius and Thiessen, 2021; Kuriakose and Robbins, 2016). Especially in very repressive regimes, citizens may still opt to refuse participation or to report false preferences in fear of punishment should they elicit criticism of the regime. Nonetheless, the – arguably scarce – research there is on political-fear effects in autocracies does point to citizens being fairly willing to respond to survey questions about the political regime in a truthful manner, indicating that these data are reasonably trustworthy and that we can in fact draw valid conclusions about regime support from their analysis if we are careful in how we interpret them. Another potential problem that plagues the study of citizen support in autocracies is insufficient data: despite the recent proliferation of public opinion research across the globe, autocratic political regimes are still underrepresented in global survey data. This is true in particular for very repressive autocracies like North Korea or Turkmenistan, for least developed countries, and for micronations (the latter two issues similarly affect public opinion research in democracies). We must therefore never assume that results obtained from our limited selection of countries are representative of all autocracies.

9.3

HOW MUCH SUPPORT CAN AUTOCRACIES COUNT ON?

Despite the challenges associated with studying regime support in autocracies, political science has at least begun trying to gauge how much citizens support the autocratic regime in which they live. Nonetheless, prior research is still scarce and more often than not examines political support only in a single or a handful of countries rather than reports more generalizable results. China is by far the most frequently studied country in this respect. Starting with

Citizen support for autocratic regimes  141 the early account by Chen, Zhong and Hillard (1997), a number of studies have concluded that the Chinese communist regime enjoys an at least moderately high level of popular support from different strata of the Chinese population, and few Chinese express a desire for fundamental regime change (Chen and Dickson, 2008; Chu, Welsh and Chang, 2013; Inoguchi and Blondel, 2008; Shin, 2013; Wang, Dalton and Shin, 2006; Wang and Tan, 2013; Zhong and Chen, 2013). The same appears to be the case for other autocracies in Eastern Asia, even though considerable cross-national variation becomes apparent once a comparison is made (Chu, Welsh and Chang, 2013; Mauk, 2020a; Norris, 2011; Shin, 2013; Wang, Dalton and Shin, 2006; Wang and Tan, 2013). The picture tends to look rather different when it comes to autocratic regimes in Eastern Europe and Latin America: Here, popular support for the political system is mediocre at best (Booth and Seligson, 2009; Haerpfer, 2008; Haerpfer and Kizilova, 2014; Mauk, 2020a; Mishler and Rose, 2005; Norris, 2011; Rose, Mishler and Munro, 2011). Intraregional variation is particularly high in Africa, where some autocracies like Burundi or Mozambique receive plenty of support, while support figures for countries like Zimbabwe or Nigeria look rather dismal (Bratton, Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi, 2005; Gudeta, 2019; Hutchison and Johnson, 2017; Mauk, 2020a). Expanding and updating these previous accounts, the following empirical analysis aims to provide an up-to-date assessment of how much citizens in autocracies around the world support the autocratic regime in which they live. To provide as diverse and as recent a picture as possible, the empirical analysis combines data from five comparative public opinion surveys, fielded between 2016 and 2020 (Afrobarometer, 2019; Arab Barometer, 2020; Asian Barometer, 2022; Corporacion Latinobarómetro, 2020; Inglehart et al., 2020). The data cover 43 autocracies2 in Southern and Central America, Eastern Europe, Western, Central, Southern, South-Eastern, and Eastern Asia, as well as Northern, Eastern, Western, Central, and Southern Africa.3 Figure 9.1 gives an overview of the countries included in the analysis. Following the bulk of prior research, it measures regime support as trust in core political institutions, in this case government, parliament, courts, police, and army. By capturing all three branches of government as well as representative and implementing institutions, the composite measure should thus provide a reasonably general account of citizens’ attitudes towards their political regime. For the composite measure, a value of “0” represents no regime support at all and a value of “1” represents full support for the regime. Turning to the average level of regime support in the 43 autocracies, the descriptive analysis yields a mean value of 0.55, which is close to the scale midpoint of 0.5 and thus indicating a medium amount of public support (Table 9.1). As in previous research, the amount of support varies considerably across regimes as well as across world regions (Table 9.1). While autocratic regimes in most of Asia appear to receive fairly ample support, Latin American autocracies in particular can barely rely on their people to support them. In the Middle East and across Africa, we find both autocratic regimes that can rest on plenty of support, like Tanzania, Iran, or Jordan, and regimes that are viewed mostly negatively by their citizens, like Palestine, Libya, or Gabon. To summarize, contemporary autocratic regimes appear – on average – not to suffer too badly from their lack of democratic legitimation. Yet this should not occlude what can be significant differences between individual countries and world regions, with some autocratic regimes like Gabon and Venezuela clearly failing in the eyes of their citizens.

Figure 9.1

Data coverage of selected survey projects

Source: Map created with mapchart.net.

142  Research handbook on authoritarianism

Citizen support for autocratic regimes  143 Table 9.1 Country

Levels of regime support UN region

Mean support

Asia

Country

UN region

Mean support 0.73 [0.72; 0.74]

Sub-Saharan Africa

Tajikistan

Central Asia

0.75 [0.73; 0.76]

Tanzania

Eastern Africa

China

Eastern Asia

0.74 [0.74; 0.75]

Mozambique

Southern Africa

0.67 [0.65; 0.68]

Vietnam

South-Eastern Asia 0.73 [0.72; 0.74]

Zambia

Southern Africa

0.61 [0.59; 0.62]

Philippines

South-Eastern Asia 0.67 [0.66; 0.68]

Uganda

Eastern Africa

0.59 [0.58; 0.61]

Bangladesh

Southern Asia

0.64 [0.63; 0.65]

Eswatini

Southern Africa

0.59 [0.57; 0.61]

Kazakhstan

Central Asia

0.62 [0.61; 0.63]

Ethiopia

Eastern Africa

0.58 [0.57; 0.60]

Hong Kong

Eastern Asia

0.59 [0.58; 0.60]

Zimbabwe

Southern Africa

0.55 [0.53; 0.56]

Thailand

South-Eastern Asia 0.59 [0.58; 0.60]

Cameroon

Central Africa

0.52 [0.50; 0.55]

Pakistan

Southern Asia

0.58 [0.57; 0.59]

Kenya

Eastern Africa

0.52 [0.50; 0.53]

Malaysia

South-Eastern Asia 0.57 [0.56; 0.58]

Guinea

Western Africa

0.44 [0.42; 0.46]

Myanmar

South-Eastern Asia 0.52 [0.51; 0.54]

Togo

Western Africa

0.40 [0.38; 0.42]

Kyrgyzstan

Central Asia

0.48 [0.46; 0.49]

Madagascar

Southern Africa

0.39 [0.37; 0.40]

 

 

 

Gabon

Central Africa

0.35 [0.33; 0.37]

 

 

 

Middle East and Northern Africa Iran

Western Asia

0.70 [0.68; 0.71]

Europe

Jordan

Western Asia

0.68 [0.68; 0.69]

Russia

Eastern Europe

0.51 [0.50; 0.53]

Turkey

Western Asia

0.68 [0.67; 0.69]

Serbia

Eastern Europe

0.41 [0.39; 0.42]

Kuwait

Western Asia

0.65 [0.64; 0.67]

 

 

 

Yemen

Western Asia

0.60 [0.58; 0.61]

Latin America

Egypt

Northern Africa

0.55 [0.54; 0.56]

Honduras

Central America

0.34 [0.32; 0.36]

Morocco

Northern Africa

0.53 [0.53; 0.54]

Nicaragua

Central America

0.28 [0.27; 0.29]

Sudan

Northern Africa

0.51 [0.50; 0.52]

Venezuela

Southern America

0.22 [0.20; 0.23]

Algeria

Northern Africa

0.47 [0.46; 0.48]

 

 

 

Iraq

Western Asia

0.46 [0.45; 0.47]

 

 

 

Lebanon

Western Asia

0.45 [0.45; 0.46]

Autocracies global average

0.55 [0.55; 0.55]

Palestine (WB)

Western Asia

0.43 [0.42; 0.44]

 

 

 

Libya

Northern Africa

0.39 [0.37; 0.40]

 

 

 

Sources: Afrobarometer (2016–18); Arab Barometer (2018–19); Asian Barometer (2018–19); Latinobarómetro (2018); World Values Survey (2017–20).

9.4

WHY DO PEOPLE SUPPORT AUTOCRATIC REGIMES?

Having established that autocracies do not generally lack citizen support, but that some autocratic regimes are a great deal more popular than others, we can now turn to the question of why citizens support – or do not support – the autocratic regime in which they live. Research on sources of regime support pertaining exclusively to autocracies is still nascent, with the bulk of studies examining regime support (also) in autocracies assuming – for the most part implicitly – that the sources of such support are the same as in democracies. Empirically, several determinants are indeed found to be important and to have similar effects in both democracies and autocracies. Positive perceptions of the national economic condition relate to more support (Chen, 2017; Chu, Welsh and Chang, 2013; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Wang, 2005), as do citizens’ perceptions that their country is doing a good job in rooting out corruption (Chang, 2013; Chen and Dickson, 2008; Wang, 2016), providing political rights and freedoms (Chang, Chu and Welsh, 2013; Mauk, 2017; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Park, 2013), and other public goods such as safety and public services (Chang, Chu and Welsh,

144  Research handbook on authoritarianism 2013; Chu, Welsh and Chang, 2013). Popular incumbents can also boost support for the political regime, regardless of whether they have been elected democratically or not (Citrin and Green, 1986; Conroy-Krutz and Kerr, 2015; Grönlund and Setälä, 2012). Explicitly aiming to compare democracies and autocracies, Mauk (2020a) argues that, at least on the individual level, the driving forces behind regime support are universal across all types of political systems: political value orientations, societal value orientations, incumbent support, democratic performance evaluations, and systemic performance evaluations should all work together similarly regardless of whether the regime in question is democratic or autocratic. In particular, she shows adherence to traditional values, satisfaction with the incumbent government, and favorable evaluations of both the level of democracy as well as of public safety to be associated with higher levels of regime support in democracies and autocracies alike. The effect of pro-democratic value orientations is conditional on how democratic citizens think their political regime is – again, this applies in both democracies and autocracies (see also Mauk, 2020b). On the system level, however, Mauk (2020a) argues that autocracies differ systematically from democracies in how objective realities like macroeconomic performance or democratic quality get translated into citizens’ perceptions and attitudes. Unlike in democracies, where citizens have ample opportunities to gather accurate information about how high the unemployment rate is or whether there was fraud in the most recent election, the information environment is significantly less free in autocracies. As a consequence, citizens’ perceptions of economic as well as political performance are often skewed, sometimes up to the extent where they become entirely decoupled from reality.4 As a result, actual macroeconomic or political performance plays little to no role in determining regime support in autocracies (Mauk, 2017, 2020a). Arguments geared specifically at autocracies are limited and can be subsumed under three headings: (Asian) values, indoctrination, and propaganda.5 The region-specific “Asian values” thesis argues that traditional cultural as well as political values derived from the Confucian ethic are particularly conducive to nondemocratic forms of rule and therefore positively related to political support for autocratic regimes (Shi, 2001).6 The empirical evidence for East Asian autocracies lends strong support to this claim (Chu, Welsh and Chang, 2013; Shi, 2001; Wang and Tan, 2013; Yang and Tang, 2010). The indoctrination hypothesis suggests that formal education should have a positive effect on citizens’ support as autocracies can use the education system to politically indoctrinate their people and instill them with regime-conducive ideas (Coleman, 1965; Lewis-Beck, Tang and Martini, 2014). Empirically, however, this proposition does not appear to hold (Lewis-Beck, Tang and Martini, 2014; Yang and Tang, 2010; Zhong and Chen, 2013). Following a similar vein, another explanation brings in propaganda as a possible source of support for autocratic regimes: as citizens are exposed to information that is primarily controlled and regulated by the regime, they become more likely to adopt the media’s favorable depiction of the political system (Chen and Shi, 2001; Geddes and Zaller, 1989; Guriev and Treisman, 2020; Wang, Dalton and Shin, 2006). Media consumption and political interest should thus both increase political support in autocracies (on the supposedly more ambiguous influence of the internet, see Tang and Huhe, 2014; Xiang and Hmielowski, 2017). Empirically, studies on China find individuals with higher political interest express higher levels of regime support (Chen, Zhong and Hillard, 1997; Lü, 2014; Yang and Tang, 2010), whereas the effects of media consumption appear less clear-cut (Chen and Shi, 2001; Kennedy, 2009; Xiang and Hmielowski, 2017). Perhaps the most dedicated contribution to the literature so far is a recent article by Guriev and Treisman (2020), which presents four potential sources of support for

Citizen support for autocratic regimes  145 autocratic leaders:7 repression, performance, information manipulation, and political business cycles. In their macro-level analysis of 51 autocracies, they argue and find repression to generally decrease citizen support, yet to also trigger political fear and thus preference falsification in more overtly repressive regimes. With regard to performance, both economic performance as well as public safety bolster support. When it comes to information manipulation, greater censorship is associated with higher support, whereas broader access to the internet as well as citizens recognizing censorship for what it is relates to lower support. Finally, in terms of political business cycles, they find support to be higher shortly after an election, especially when this election resulted in a change of leadership (Guriev and Treisman, 2020). Building on this literature, we can expect the following determinants to influence citizens’ support for autocratic political regimes: economic performance, political performance, incumbent popularity, value orientations, and propaganda. For economic and political performance, we can further distinguish between actual performance and citizens’ performance evaluations. In line with the arguments in Mauk (2020a), I hypothesize citizens’ evaluations of both economic and political performance to have a positive effect on regime support, whereas actual performance in both the economic and political realm should be unrelated to how citizens view their autocratic political regime. Citizens who approve of the incumbent ruler should ceteris paribus express higher support for the political regime itself than those who dislike the current president or government. When it comes to value orientations, both anti-democratic political values and traditional cultural values should relate to increased regime support in autocracies. Finally, greater exposure to regime-driven propaganda should result in more support for the autocratic regime. To test these propositions, the following empirical analysis uses individual-level public opinion data from the Afrobarometer (round 7, 2016–18), Arab Barometer (round 5, 2018–19), and Asian Barometer (round 5, 2018–19). These surveys all contain suitable items to capture not only citizens’ support for their political regime, but also the potential individual-level sources outlined above for 27 autocracies.8 Economic performance evaluations are operationalized by a question about the current state of the national economy, while the perceived level of democracy and the perceived extent of corruption gauge political performance evaluations. An item querying citizens’ satisfaction with the incumbent government or president measures incumbent popularity. For value orientations, an item asking whether respondents think democracy is (not) the best political system represents traditional political values; agreement with the statement that men make better leaders than women is interpreted as an expression of traditional cultural values. Finally, political interest and internet use are used to approximate exposure to regime-driven propaganda. In the case of the internet, more frequent usage should allow participants access to alternative sources of information, corresponding to lower (or less exclusive) exposure to state propaganda. To assess the effects of macroeconomic performance, the analysis employs World Bank (2022) data on GDP growth in the year the respective survey was fielded. For political performance, it makes use of the Liberal Democracy Index from the Varieties-of-Democracy Project (v11.1, Coppedge et al., 2021). Control variables include household financial situation, place of residence, education, gender, age, and logged GDP per capita. Table 9.2 summarizes the results of the analysis. The strongest determinants of regime support in autocracies are citizens’ evaluations of economic and political performance, as well as satisfaction with the incumbent. Those who think that the present government is doing a good job, that the national economy is in a good state, that the country is providing a rea-

146  Research handbook on authoritarianism Table 9.2

Sources of regime support in autocracies

 

Model 1

 

Unstd.

Std.

Individual-level effects Economic performance evaluations

0.11

(0.02)

Perceived level of democracy

0.15

(0.01)

0.22***

Perceived extent of corruption

−0.12

(0.02)

−0.17***

Satisfaction with incumbent

0.29

(0.03)

0.44***

Traditional political value orientations

0.00

(0.01)

0.00

Traditional cultural value orientations

0.01

(0.01)

0.03

Political interest

0.00

(0.01)

Internet use (ref: never)

 

 

0.16***

0.00  

 

monthly or less

−0.03

(0.01)

−0.02***

 

up to a few times a week

−0.03

(0.01)

−0.04***

 

daily

−0.02

(0.01)

−0.04*

System-level effects GDP growth

0.01

(0.01)

0.30

Liberal Democracy Index

−0.16

(0.15)

−0.14

Individual-level controls

YES

System-level controls

YES

Individuals

42,721

Countries

27

r² (within)

0.34

r2 (between)

0.34

AIC

152,733

Notes: Multi-level structural equation modeling. Maximum likelihood estimation. Unstandardized and standardized estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Individual-level control variables: household financial situation, place of residence, education, gender, age. System-level control variables: logged GDP/capita. Sources: Afrobarometer (2016–18); Arab Barometer (2018–19); Asian Barometer (2018–19); World Bank (2022); V-Dem v11.1.

sonably high level of democratic quality, and that corruption is rare express the most support for their political regime. Traditional political or cultural value orientations, on the other hand, yield no effect on regime support, as does political interest. The more frequently citizens use the internet, the lower their support for the autocratic regime, indicating that the internet might indeed provide at least some opportunity for accessing more balanced sources of information. Interestingly – and in line with previous findings – despite the strong effects of subjective evaluations of both the economic and the political performance, actual GDP growth and level of democracy are irrelevant for how citizens view their political regime.9 Overall, these results are mostly consistent with the existing literature on sources of regime support in autocracies. They corroborate earlier studies that find substantive positive effects of economic performance evaluations, perceptions of corruption control, perceived democratic quality, and incumbent popularity. As in previous research, internet use is again found to decrease regime support, pointing to the propaganda-countering potential of this hard-to-regulate medium. The present results do not, however, lend much support to the idea embodied in the Asian values thesis that citizens’ value orientations play a decisive role in shaping support for the political regime. This may at least in part be due to the single-item

Citizen support for autocratic regimes  147 measures employed here, which might be rather too crude to adequately capture more complex concepts such as political and cultural value orientations.

9.5 CONCLUSION Despite its importance, the study of regime support in autocracies is still young and often a mere by-product of studying citizen support in democracies. As outlined above, so far only little theoretical work has been done that takes into account the specific configurations of autocratic regimes. This might not pose too much of a problem with regard to the individual-level mechanisms that shape citizens’ attitudes towards their political regime, as these mechanisms appear to be universal across regime types, allowing us to borrow the theoretical approaches originally developed for democracies and apply them to autocracies without modification. Yet when it comes to the way in which system-level context factors translate into attitudes, a lot more work still remains to be done. As some newer works have pointed out, the biased information environment in autocracies – an environment in which media freedom and public expression of opinion are severely restricted, and in which some states engage in serious propaganda and indoctrination efforts – can result in citizens’ perceptions of the world they live in to be heavily distorted (Guriev and Treisman, 2020; Kruse, Ravlik and Welzel, 2019; Mauk, 2020a). More research is needed that studies how distorted information actually is in autocracies, how much of this distorted information citizens encounter, how much of it they believe, and what this does to their perceptions of their regime’s performance. One avenue in this direction would be to examine the role of media freedom in conditioning the relationship between, for example, actual democratic quality and citizens’ perceptions of democratic quality. Furthermore, researchers could place greater emphasis on analyzing how citizens’ consumption of different media channels (e.g., state-controlled television channels vs. less regulated social media channels) interacts with media freedom in shaping regime support. Bringing in the literature on autocratic legitimation strategies (e.g., Brusis, Ahrens and Schulze Wessel, 2016; Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2017; Mazepus et al., 2016) to trace the effects of different indoctrination and propaganda strategies might provide further insights into how public opinion is formed and manipulated in autocracies. For example, modernizing regimes might focus their pro-regime propaganda more on the economic realm, while single-party regimes might choose to emphasize ideological indoctrination instead; there is good reason to believe that such differences in strategy will have divergent effects on citizens’ perceptions and attitudes as well. In addition to distinguishing between different legitimation strategies, future research might find it useful to disentangle and compare regime support and its determinants across different groups of autocratic regimes. The distinctions between distinct institutional makeups (see Chapters 1 and 2 in this volume) or forms of authoritarian leaderships (see Chapters 6, 7, and 17 in this volume) might prove particularly instructive. Finally, we also need to expand our geographical scope, filling the blanks in our map of survey data. Less developed countries located in Central Africa in particular, as well as the Pacific micronations, remain gravely underrepresented in public opinion surveys even today; the same is true for some of the most repressive among the autocracies. As these gaps in data coverage are far from random, closing them would allow us to both draw more generalizable

148  Research handbook on authoritarianism conclusions and to investigate more thoroughly into potential systematic differences between different groups of autocracies.

NOTES 1.

2.

3. 4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9.

In a recent update to their 2015 study, Frye et al. (2022) caution against the naïve use of list experiments to measure the popularity of authoritarian leaders; regardless, they still interpret their results from Russia as an indication that citizens even in repressive regimes do not engage excessively in preference falsification. Algeria, Bangladesh, Cameroon, China, Egypt, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, Guinea, Honduras, Hong Kong, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Palestine, Philippines, Russia, Serbia, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. Countries are classified as an autocracy based on V-Dem’s Regimes-of-the-World Measure (Lührmann, Tannenberg and Lindberg, 2018). Citizen perceptions of democratic quality appear especially detached in autocracies (Kruse, Ravlik and Welzel, 2019; Mauk, 2017; Park, 2013). Some authors additionally point to political fear as a potential source of regime support in autocracies. However, political fear is rather a potential source of measurement error due to preference falsification (cf. Section 9.2). In political theory, the view that “Asian values” are conducive to nondemocratic rule because they are incompatible with liberal democracy is contested. While some scholars like Samuel Huntington (1991), Lucian Pye (1985), or Chenyang Li (1997) advance the “incompatibility thesis,” others such as Francis Fukuyama (1995), Amartya Sen (1997), or Daniel Bell (2006) argue that Confucianism and liberal democracy can be reconciled. Despite focusing on incumbent support, their arguments can similarly be applied to regime support. Algeria, Cameroon, Egypt, Eswatini, Gabon, Guinea, Hong Kong, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique, Philippines, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. This remains the case even if we remove the individual-level performance evaluations from the model, eliminating the possibility of a mediated effect.

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10. Commitment and information problems in authoritarian regimes Greg Chih-Hsin Sheen, Hans H. Tung and Wen-Chin Wu

10.1 INTRODUCTION A dictatorship is a political regime in which there are no binding institutions, free and fair elections in particular, to determine or remove its political leaders (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010; Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014). Policymaking in dictatorships also diverges from democratic principles, notably the absence of features like representation or majority rule. By this definition, top political leaders under dictatorships, or dictators in general, are individuals who have absolute power without institutional constraints. Accordingly, dictators face a problem of making credible commitments when dealing with other political elites, their citizens, and foreign governments. Specifically, because of their possession of power, authoritarian leaders are less able to convince others that they will honor all, if not any, policy commitments than their counterparts in democracies. There are two institutional sources of this commitment problem facing dictators. First, a dictator is not constrained by other actors or institutional rules, so he can do whatever he likes. Although the lack of constraints makes it easy for a dictator to commit to certain policies at the present time, it is also easy for him to break the commitment in the future. In short, a dictator is unable to convince others that they will honor their commitment to policies that will contradict their interests. This commitment problem, stemming from potential “time-inconsistent” preferences, is more serious when a dictator becomes more powerful. Second, institutions under dictatorships are less transparent than those under democracies (Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2018), so outsiders of the authoritarian decision-making process are unable to check and verify the information released by dictators and their regimes (Broz, 2002). The inadequacy of cross-validation about the regime information makes dictators less able to make their policy commitments credible to outsiders unless they include those outsiders in the decision-making process, which in turn weakens dictators’ power and gives birth to power-sharing in authoritarian regimes (Boix and Svolik, 2013). Even if dictators would like to commit to policy transparency, such a commitment is not credible because they can always break it when transparency hurts their interests. For example, in normal times in China, people are passively allowed to use VPN to access blocked websites outside of China, but when the government considers it is essential to tighten Internet censorship, it can disallow VPN access at any time. As a consequence, dictators’ disability to make credible commitment leads to a “credibility deficit,” a situation in which dictatorships are regarded as less credible and less likely to convince others than their democratic counterparts. Despite controlling mighty power, dictators cannot rule alone. They need compliance from citizens, and they also need cooperation with elites and foreign governments. Otherwise, it would be too costly for them to sustain their authoritarian rule with coercive force. For instance, dictators need to build a ruling coalition within which they share power with other 153

154  Research handbook on authoritarianism elites. In addition, they must maintain a certain level of responsiveness to citizens’ need for good governance to prevent them from overthrowing the regime. To be responsive and stabilize their regime, dictators need to collect accurate information to evaluate their policy performance (Kuran, 1991). Similarly, some dictators would like to engage with the global market to either generate economic growth or reduce inequality to consolidate their regimes (Milner and Kubota, 2005; Wu, 2015). They need to sign international agreements with foreign countries to achieve these goals (Chang and Wu, 2016; Arias, Hollyer and Rosendorff, 2018). However, dictators’ grasp of absolute power leads to the commitment problem that prevents them from getting cooperation with other elites or foreign governments (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002). The commitment problem also makes it difficult for dictators to acquire correct information. Specifically, citizens or bureaucrats may not “tell the truth” to the dictator due to the fear of being punished for revealing true information about regime performance that facilitates dissatisfaction with the regime (Tannenberg, 2022). Dictators are less able to induce foreign countries to sign international agreements with them because their power may not be bound by electoral competition that offers better information for citizens and foreign countries to evaluate whether the governments comply with the agreements (Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff, 2002). Therefore, the closed and opaque information environment in autocracies makes it difficult for autocrats to resolve the commitment problem and induce cooperation from citizens and foreign countries. Facing these challenges of making a credible commitment to others, dictators have to find ways to resolve this “credibility deficit.” It is also puzzling for researchers to see that some dictatorships can overcome these challenges. In this chapter, we review recent studies on this issue. In particular, we investigate why and how some dictators can reduce the credibility deficit while others cannot. We discuss the two approaches documented in the literature that the dictators could take to foster commitment: to create (binding) institutions and to convince the public. We argue that the former, from a state-centric perspective, suggests that the dictators can make their power-sharing commitment credible by “tying their hands” through institution-building. In particular, they establish political institutions, such as elections and legislatures, to constrain their discretion of abusing power to exploit resources or attack opponents. Accordingly, these binding institutions can facilitate cooperation and compromise among dictators and their allies. Although these institutions cannot be used to determine or remove the dictator, they enable dictators not only to share power with other elites but to collect accurate information about society and make responsive policies. While the latter, through a state–society relations perspective, contends that by creating an (to some extent) active civil society that would revolt against the dictators when they abuse their power, the power-sharing relationship among elites can be maintained. In addition, an authoritarian government can make its information or policies credible if they are endorsed by independent actors, such as citizen journalists or international organizations. In other words, regime transparency to civil society and the ruled would stabilize the ruling coalition and increase the credibility of authoritarian regimes. In the next section, we review important studies on the information problem and credibility deficit under dictatorship and introduce some studies that integrate two lines of research. The final section offers directions for future research and concludes.

Commitment and information problems in authoritarian regimes  155

10.2

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE DICTATOR’S COMMITMENT PROBLEM

10.2.1 State-centric Approach It is a consensus among social scientists that all rulers, including dictators, do not rule their countries alone. To survive in office, dictators need to share their power with elites to create ruling coalitions (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Frantz and Ezrow, 2011; Svolik, 2012). Different types of ruling coalitions not only lead to the varieties of dictatorships but also different levels of power-sharing among the dictator and other elites (Geddes, 1999; Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2018). However, this kind of alliance must build upon mutual trust that dictators would not abuse their allies, and the elites would not continuously contemplate replacing the incumbents. To maintain mutual trust, commitment to power-sharing from the dictators is fundamentally essential. Unfortunately, commitment from authoritarian leadership is often not credible, as dictators can always renege on their commitments to power-sharing. But perhaps a bit ironically, it is in the dictators’ interest to maximize their credibility when they commit to power-sharing; otherwise, “they will be in permanent danger of being overthrown, both by members of the ruling elite and by outside rivals” (Magaloni, 2008, p. 715). In this section, we discuss how dictators might be able to alleviate the fundamental commitment problem through the institution-building approach. That is, in autocracies, the elites might agree to establish institutionalized power-sharing arrangements to stabilize the ruling coalition. Using a more formal language, we can say that sometimes, establishing institutions to tie the dictators’ hands is sometimes an incentive compatible for them. Two anecdotal examples illustrate how authoritarian leaders use political institutions to commit to power-sharing (for more on this, see Chapter 18). First, Deng Xiaoping abolished China’s system of life tenure in leading party and government posts in the 1980s. Although Mao Zedong established a personalist regime in his later years, Deng’s policy reform transformed China from a personalist regime into one characterized by collective leadership. This shift not only facilitated China’s peaceful political succession among elites but also contributed to the “resilience” of China’s authoritarian rule (Nathan, 2003; Shirk, 2018). Second, shortly before his emergent surgery in July 2006, the former Cuban leader, Fidel Castro, provisionally delegated his power (as well as all of the key positions) to his brother, Raul Castro, who was later formally elected as Cuba’s head of state in 2008. Lacking Fidel’s charisma, Raul bade farewell to his brother’s personalist rule that suppressed factionalism within the regime and moved it towards a collective leadership by sharing more power with other elites (Hoffmann, 2009, pp. 239–40; Linzer and Staton, 2015, p. 240). In the literature of comparative authoritarianism, the most prominent and widely discussed choices for institutionalized power-sharing arrangements are legislature and elections (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2006, 2007). While these institutions may seem to be quite democratic, by installing these institutions, dictators can use them to maintain their rule instead of pursuing democratization. As Lust-Okar (2006, p. 468) has stated: “such elections are more likely to help sustain the authoritarian regime than they are to promote democracy.” In the early discussion of authoritarian legislatures and elections, institutions are regarded as tools of policy concession for resolving the distributional issue of rents among the dictator and elites (Svolik, 2009; Boix and Svolik, 2013); they are honored and maintained by default. Magaloni (2008), on the other hand, discusses credible power-sharing among the dictator’s

156  Research handbook on authoritarianism ruling coalition utilizing autocratic parties, elections, and legislatures. As Boix and Svolik (2013) contend, while institutions, such as parties, legislatures, and advisory councils, could alleviate commitment and monitoring problems between the dictator and the other elites in the ruling, an authoritarian power-sharing arrangement can only be maintained when it is backed by a credible threat of a rebellion by the dictator’s allies. In other words, elites’ threat of overthrowing dictators can force the latter to honor the commitment to power-sharing within political institutions. Without a positive probability for other elites to stage a coup against the dictators, these institutions will be ineffective in tying the dictators’ hands or breaking down. Essentially, this idea can be traced back to the discussion of North and Weingast (1989) on the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in England. Importantly, Magaloni (2008, p. 723) argues that the institutions such as legislatures and elections are not self-enforcing, and maintains that the dictator’s promise to a long-term power-sharing arrangement is only credible “when he gives up absolute power to select members of the ruling coalition into positions of power by delegating this authority to the ruling party.” In essence, one function of regular multiparty elections in autocracies, despite the fact that only the dictator’s party can be competitive in these elections, is to tie the hands of the dictator. More specifically, these institutions are established to make the power-sharing deal obliging the ruler to promote the rank-and-file to power positions with certain regularity (Magaloni, 2008, p. 724). By providing the rank-and-file and mid-level party officials an effective avenue to progress in the political arena, elections allow autocratic political parties to incentivize the weaker party members to be loyal to the ruling coalition and to the party. It is not only the lower rank officials that would be attracted by these institutions. To the higher rank political figures, autocratic political parties could also attract their loyalty to the regime through the institutionalized leadership succession process. That is, officials who enjoy embedded interests would be happy to maintain the status quo. Ideally, even the officials of very high rank who can reasonably expect to become the ruler’s successor would wait patiently and support the existing institutions. Regular autocratic multiparty elections provide bargaining power to potential ruling party rivals to threaten electoral splits that can credibly challenge the dictator. However, if the dictator can leverage the opacity feature of the regime and rig the elections or manipulate the information, the dictator’s commitment problem would persist even with the prospect of a coup. From a normative perspective, institutions might seem to be able to constrain the dictators by default. In effect, not all legislatures constrain dictators; in reality, not all autocracies are equipped with binding ones. Wright (2008) shows that different types of dictatorships tend to create binding or non-binding legislatures. Specifically, dictatorships differ by the identity of elite groups that monopolize the power and decision-making within the regime. They can be further categorized into military, monarchy, personalist, single-party authoritarian regimes (Geddes, 1999). This variation then leads to different levels of economic growth. According to Wright (2008, p. 322), dictators could create a binding legislature “as a credible constraint on the regime’s confiscatory behavior.” With this credible and binding constraint, the dictator and other elites in an autocracy would behave well and this results in higher economic growth. He further contends that in regimes that rely more on natural resource revenue, a non-binding legislature would be created. It would then serve as a mechanism for the dictator to “bribe and split the opposition” when he encounters credible challenges from other political elites. In other words, a binding legislature serves as a mechanism to avoid elite misconduct; a non-binding legislature creates a platform for the elites to share the perks and allows the

Commitment and information problems in authoritarian regimes  157 dictator to maintain cooptation. Both types of legislatures could stabilize power-sharing arrangements. Military and single-party regimes are more dependent on domestic investment and less dependent on natural resource revenue, so they have an incentive to create binding legislatures. Personalist regimes and monarchies typically rely more on natural resource revenues, so non-binding legislatures are more likely to exist. The lack of binding institutions also makes personalist dictators more corrupt than others (Chang and Golden, 2010). It should be noted that when autocratic institutions are binding, they tend to prolong regime survival (Geddes, 1999; Geddes, Wright and Frantz, 2014). One explanation is that binding institutions make autocrats’ commitment to sharing power and resources credible to other elites, so the ruling coalition becomes stable (Greene, 2010). Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014) discuss how dictators utilize political parties and legislatures to facilitate the cooptation of potential enemies. They argue that by allowing the existence of political parties in the political arena and creating a legislature, dictators “draw his potential opposition out of the general public and into state institutions, making it easier to identify who these opponents are, to monitor their activities, and to gauge the extent of their popular support” (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014, p. 332). In this way, dictators can better identify who would likely engage in rebellions. Hence, they would be able to effectively use “physical integrity rights violations,” such as torture and political imprisonment against their enemies, instead of employing the more costly “empowerment rights restrictions,” like censorship against all members in the society. Interestingly, Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014) empirically demonstrate that because cooptation would also empower the dictator’s rivals, that is, they will have political positions and powers to plot a coup against the dictator, the dictator may thus have more incentive to repress these potential elites. Therefore, they warn that the existence of seemingly democratic institutions does not necessarily mean fewer human rights violations. Relatedly, Vreeland (2008) explains the ironic fact that authoritarian countries that exercise more torture are more likely to join the UN Convention Against Torture by arguing that though more torture takes place in dictatorships that allow multiple political parties, because political parties exert some power over the ruling party, the regime would adhere to international institutions as a gesture of making some political concessions. Recently, Xu (2021) shows that, along with the advance of digital surveillance technologies, dictators now rely more on targeted preventive repression and less on universal cooptation. Dictators not only utilize authoritarian institutions to coopt potential oppositions. These institutions can be used to consolidate the existing power-sharing arrangements. Svolik (2009) suggests that a fundamental problem in authoritarian politics is the moral hazard in power-sharing. To enforce the power-sharing arrangement, a credible threat from a coup is essential. But that is not to say that institutions are meaningless. Svolik argues that political institutions in authoritarian regimes may be instrumental for alleviating the moral hazard problem associated with power-sharing. The mechanism at work is that these institutions make the behaviors of the elite involved in the power-sharing arrangement visible. More specifically, Svolik (2009, p. 493) suggests that political institutions in dictatorships, such as governing councils, legislatures, or parties, would allow the elite to observe what others are doing, and as such, “reassure each other that none of them is trying to acquire more power at others’ expense.” In other words, power-sharing institutions are essentially created to make the information environment more transparent to ruling elites to reduce the moral hazard problem.

158  Research handbook on authoritarianism Transparency in authoritarian regimes not only helps consolidate the power-sharing arrangement among elites; it also incentivizes bureaucrats to work harder (Egorov, Guriev and Sonin, 2009). Dictators may not have complete information about how local bureaucrats behave, but their political survival is affected by bureaucrats’ governance. Therefore, while autocrats, by default, would not want to allow a fully free flow of information that may cause regime instability from the public, allowing partial freedom of speech, such as limited investigative reporting that monitors the behavior of (lower-level) elites and bureaucrats, can improve governance (Lorentzen, 2014). Fjelde and De Soysa (2009) find that, compared to coercive power, building state capacity with trustworthy institutions is more effective for regimes to maintain regime stability and longevity, and it leads to the pacifying effect that correlates to robust economic development and reasonable public spending. They argue that the pacifying effect is mainly due to imposing constraints on the executive, so that the dictator and other elites cannot abuse the power they possess. Apart from the moral hazard among the elites and bureaucrats, another fundamental problem faced by dictators is about understanding whether the public sincerely supports the authoritarian leadership or merely falsifies their preference. This is the classic problem that Wintrobe (1998) called “dictator’s dilemma.” Regular elections in democracies are an effective way for politicians to understand the public’s view of their performance. Elections in autocracies, however, may not be as effective in terms of preference aggregation. Malesky and Schuler (2011) contend that dictators face a trade-off between allowing more competitive elections in order to gather reliable information and making the elections non-competitive as to guarantee electoral victory. Indeed, as the “authoritarian resilience” argument has argued, the understanding of social problems is the first-order task for an authoritarian government to respond correctly to public demands (Nathan, 2003, p. 14). Elections in autocracies are not purely rubber stamps in all circumstances; they sometimes provide useful information to the leadership, and rulers may respond to public demand with policy concessions. Miller (2015) shows an empirical pattern that falling votes for the ruling party predict increases in spending on education and social welfare and decreases in military spending, but this pattern does not appear in resource-rich countries. With the advance of the Internet and social media, some less formal institutions, such as the online participation portal of China’s National People’s Congress, are found to be able to serve consultative purposes and improve citizens’ perception of government responsiveness (Truex, 2014). However, Qin, Strömberg and Wu (2017) also found that the Chinese government has been monitoring public discussion on social media platforms to crack down on collective activities preemptively. Concerning the dictator’s incentive to allow the free flow of information, Sheen, Tung, Wu and Wu (2023a) formalize the censorship procedure in dictatorships and argue that while the dictator may require and encourage truthful reporting from the media ex ante, the media may not “tell the truth.” This is because the dictator, as he controls the government apparatus, can always punish the media for their truth-telling ex post. As a result, this commitment problem of the dictator induces self-censorship from the media. Furthermore, they show that when the society is rather stable or when the dictator is more capable of manipulating information, the dictator would thus suffer from more severe information insufficiencies in these situations. In other words, the inherent commitment problem becomes more severe when dictators are more powerful.

Commitment and information problems in authoritarian regimes  159 It is not only politicians that are concerned about whether dictators and their governments will honor their promises, but investors also worry that the governments may not protect property rights and might even confiscate their investments one day. Gehlbach and Keefer (2011, 2012) find that ruling-party institutionalization, as measured by the regularity of ruler entry into office, and the competitiveness of legislative elections, can alleviate the investor’s concern. However, they also point out that only domestic investors, but not their foreign counterparts, would respond to these measures. Jensen, Malesky and Weymouth (2014, p. 655), on the other hand, show that “authoritarian legislatures are better at generating corporate governance legislation that protects investors from corporate insiders than they are at preventing expropriation by governments.” Therefore, the institutionalized party system and legislatures can only partially address investors’ concerns about dictators’ potential malfeasance. Institutionalized party systems, legislatures, and elections are not the only strategies available for dictators to coopt potential opposition or to maintain the existing power-sharing arrangement. These institutions, in particular, are not self-enforcing in many cases. The manipulation of media, or more generally, the information environment, is a less formal but effective way to maintain regime stability and circumvent the issue of self-enforcement. We discuss this in greater detail in the following section. 10.2.2 State–Society Relations Approach The institutional turn in the comparative authoritarianism literature has brought to the fore the importance of authoritarian institutions in maintaining political stability among elites in dictatorships (Pepinsky, 2014). The key mechanism for such a stabilizing effect arises from their ability to make transparent the information about power-sharing between the dictators and their allies (Boix and Svolik, 2013). More critically, it is also such transparency that makes authoritarian institutions self-enforcing. On the one hand, the information about the intra-elite balance of power enables the dictator’s allies to more easily overcome their collective action problem once the dictator tries to renege on their previous power-sharing promise. On the other hand, since the information makes the allies’ deterrence credible, in game-theoretic terms, it also makes the dictator’s opportunistic attempts an off-the-path behavior and therefore sustains the institutional equilibrium. As for what these institutions are, on top of the traditional ones such as legislatures and political parties, Sheen, Tung and Wu (2022) more recently show that media freedom can also be an alternative. While the state-centric approach discussed above highlights the role of political institutions in honoring the dictator’s commitment to power-sharing, it is unclear why their commitment is credible. At the same time, the dictator also needs to make sure that other elites will not coalesce and overthrow the ruling coalitions. To answer these questions, Sheen, Tung and Wu (2022) posit that dictators, as well as other elites within the ruling coalition, need transparency through media freedom to induce trust and cooperation among their allies within the regime. In other words, when dictators need more cooperation from elites, they need more information transparency of the regime to sustain their power-sharing arrangement. The empirical investigation of Sheen, Tung and Wu (2022) confirms the hypothesis by analyzing data from 98 dictatorships from 1960 to 2010. Their conclusion departs from the conventional wisdom that media freedom is mainly determined by dictators’ need for local information, as suggested by Egorov, Guriev and Sonin (2009) or to reduce bureaucratic moral hazard

160  Research handbook on authoritarianism (Lorentzen, 2014), and shows that the power dynamics within their ruling coalitions also matters. Sheen, Tung and Wu’s study (2022) is in line with the emerging research agenda on authoritarian transparency and political (in)stability. Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland (2015) find that the disclosure of economic data by the authoritarian government facilitates social unrest, such as strikes, riots, and demonstrations. They further show that the key rationale for autocrats to release information that may destabilize the regime is to “threaten rival members” within the ruling coalition (Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland, 2019, p. 1488). In other words, the ruling coalition would become more cohesive when facing external threats from civil society, and dictators can strategically commit to information transparency or media freedom to induce the equilibrium of their authoritarian survival. Although regime transparency would facilitate social unrest, the discontent from civil society also plays a role of “fire alarm” for the dictators (Lorentzen, 2013). The information environment under dictatorships is usually closed, and authoritarian leaders face a commitment problem when asking others to tell the truth. They need to rely on other post hoc tools to address this information deficiency and evaluate the stability of their ruling. Accordingly, dictatorships allow the media to report and the ruled to protest against the misconduct of local bureaucrats. The state can punish the corrupted officials or adjust its policies once the true information is revealed (Huang, Boranbay-Akan and Huang, 2019). Chen and Xu (2017) also show that allowing citizens to publicly express their dissatisfaction with the authoritarian government can be a tool of “divide and rule” to increase regime stability when there is preference heterogeneity among citizens. Nevertheless, it should be noted that even a strong dictatorship like China is very cautious about the potential threats of collective actions facilitated by such information transparency. Accordingly, an authoritarian government would also engage in censorship, information manipulation, and propaganda even if it commits to media freedom or information transparency (King, Pan and Roberts, 2013, 2017; Huang, 2015). The use of these information-control tools reduces the credibility of the information released by authoritarian governments. Dictators have to weigh the cost of credibility loss and the gain of political stability. While the mainstream literature emphasizes the aforementioned institutional solutions to dictators’ commitment problem, the recent literature nonetheless shows other possibilities arising from certain state–society relationships. While dictators and their regimes might lack the ability to commit to future promises, it doesn’t necessarily follow that there are no other sources of credibility in their societies. Moreover, recent studies have shown that dictators are also able to mitigate their credibility deficits by borrowing credibility from certain social actors. For example, during the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic when non-pharmaceutical measures such as social distancing were essential to preventing the virus from spreading, authoritarian governments had to conduct risk communication to induce their citizens’ cooperation. Sheen, Tung and Wu (2021) leveraged such a crisis to administer a survey experiment in Hong Kong to show that the Chinese government’s COVID-related press release was made more credible with the endorsement by an independent citizen journalist. Their study suggests that dictatorships may allow (partially) independent media outlets to make their official information more credible. In addition to citizen journalism, Sheen, Tung, Wu and Wu (2023b) place the question of endorsement in another context and show that international organizations can also be a valuable source from which dictators can borrow some credibility. Specifically, based on a survey

Commitment and information problems in authoritarian regimes  161 experiment conducted in Taiwan in 2021, their study finds that World Health Organization (WHO) endorsement can induce acceptance of Chinese vaccines among Taiwanese people. In other words, despite Taiwanese people’s suspicion of the efficacy of the Chinese vaccines and the Chinese government’s authoritarianism, the endorsement from the WHO as a professional international organization was still able to enhance the credibility of its vaccines. The discussion above gives rise to another important implication for solving the commitment problem in dictatorships. Compared to democracies where most adults enjoy the freedom to choose their leaders and representatives, the absence of such a right along with other liberties for most citizens creates an essential tension in dictatorships between the rulers and the ruled. While such a monopoly over political power might give dictators a sense of security, the price they have to pay is the weakening of their civil societies. Does it matter? Based on the findings summarized above, if a society in a dictatorship is so completely deprived of its activism, it also means that the dictator will have no source in the society from which they can “borrow” credibility. In other words, when the dictator loses almost all their credibility, the authoritarian ruler will have to rely solely on coercion, which is certainly costlier than other non-violent means of governance. Furthermore, when authoritarian governments lose local sources of credibility, the study of Sheen, Tung, Wu and Wu (2023b) discussed above shows that credibility could also be derived from abroad. However, this might not necessarily be good news for dictators since appealing to an external authority is tantamount to admitting their own deficiencies, which can also be detrimental to regime legitimacy.

10.3

CONCLUSION, DISCUSSIONS, AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

In this review, we discuss the commitment and information problems facing dictators. We regard autocrats’ inability to commit to policies as the commitment problem and their need to collect true information as the information problem. Both problems are interrelated, and autocrats need to resolve them to sustain their political survival. We discuss two approaches in the literature for dictators to overcome both problems. One is the state-centric approach through which the dictators establish binding institutions within which autocrats share power with other elites and collect information about the weakness of their governance. The other approach focuses on state–society relations in which dictators rely on the media and other sources to collect information and respond to social demands. We focus on a novel approach whereby dictators can also seek international organizations’ endorsement to boost their credibility. Although several studies have investigated both problems of authoritarian politics, there is an unbalanced emphasis between the two approaches with which dictators resolve these problems. Current studies are too state-centric, focusing on how institutional characteristics mitigate the commitment problem. Yet, these studies ignore the society embedded in political institutions. More specifically, Przeworski (2022, p. 2) recently points out that many formal models of authoritarian regimes “ignore the efforts of rulers to provide what people value.” As these efforts are context-dependent, we need to bring society back into the theoretical discussions on autocrats’ solutions to the commitment problem. For example, do people’s deference to authority make them more likely to trust the government? Can the government take advantage of citizens’ nationalist sentiments when it aims to convince them of the legitimacy of certain policies?

162  Research handbook on authoritarianism Another challenge to future work is to explain the origins and changes of power-sharing structures under dictatorships. Although existing studies have shown that authoritarian political institutions reflect the equilibrium of power-sharing and policy outcomes, they usually fail to explain why certain institutional arrangements are chosen in the first place and replaced thereafter. In particular, why would a dictatorship arise as a military regime but become a single-party regime later? Why would a consolidated personalist regime “de-personalize” and transform into another type of regime? Why would the level of power-sharing within an authoritarian regime change over time? Are these changes induced by endogenous factors or exogenous shocks? Moreover, how do political actors think of the information problem when they try to address the commitment problem under different institutional choices? These are important theoretical issues awaiting further investigation. In addition, there are issues with empirical studies being too society-focused. Many studies have pointed out that society, such as the media and social movements, would constrain political elites under dictatorships. However, these studies are based on macro-level data, and few of them actually test the mechanisms underlying these findings. Future studies may endeavor to find micro-level evidence for whether ordinary citizens do take into account the dictator’s commitment problem when they make decisions. This is especially relevant in an age of polarization. Padró-i-Miquel (2007) reminded us quite a long time ago that underperforming dictators can tap into people’s fear of being governed by opposing social groups (e.g., different ethnicities), in order to stay in power. A highly polarized society provides a fertile ground for autocrats. It is critical for political scientists to investigate individuals’ attitudes towards dictators’ commitment ability in a context of political polarization. Current literature is also limited in exploring mechanisms through which transparency of authoritarian regimes can prolong authoritarian survival. On the one hand, transparency consolidates authoritarian ruling coalitions. On the other hand, transparency also induces social unrest. Therefore, it is still unclear why transparency would help to consolidate authoritarian regimes. Lastly, it is worthwhile to investigate the dynamic of the commitment problem in the age of democratic backsliding and autocratization. For example, does a declining level of democracy make a country less credible? When a country is experiencing autocratization, how would it overcome the commitment problem and maintain its credibility? Will the costs of becoming less credible prevent a country from autocratizing? These are potential topics awaiting future research.

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PART IV PERFORMANCE AND POLICY

11. Authoritarian regimes, health and disease management Natasha Lindstaedt

11.1 INTRODUCTION Relatively early into the COVID-19 pandemic, authoritarian regimes such as China, Vietnam and Singapore boasted about their authoritarian advantage in managing disease spread and death rates. Fast forward to 2023 and it’s not so clear that authoritarian regimes have been stronger in their response. All types of regimes have struggled – as the pandemic has posed far-reaching challenges. And though the COVID-19 pandemic has certainly been enduring, a pandemic disease event is one of many health issues that states have to deal with. When it comes to public health, there are numerous challenges that states face to maintain a healthy population. Thus, this chapter begins by taking a deeper look at how authoritarian regimes perform when it comes to health in general. We demonstrate that authoritarian regimes do not have an advantage when it comes to managing general health outcomes or endemic diseases, and we explain the theoretical reasons for why this is the case. But it is also true that there is a lot of variation within dictatorships when it comes to managing health outcomes, with personalist dictatorships performing the worst. We highlight why personalist dictators perform so poorly compared to their authoritarian counterparts. We also explain what factors motivate authoritarian regimes to provide health public goods, and how healthcare may be tied to legitimacy. Additionally, while there is no clear advantage when it comes to managing the COVID-19 pandemic, there is a clear danger with authoritarian regimes in preventing disease sparks as they lack the will and/or the capacity to monitor and publicize new and re-emerging disease outbreaks. We explain why authoritarian regimes pose such huge risks to the global community when it comes to reporting the spark of a new or re-emerging infectious disease.

11.2

AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND HEALTH

As mentioned in the introduction, the management of the pandemic has been challenging to all countries, and there does not appear to be a specific authoritarian advantage in managing the pandemic. However, when it comes to managing general health outcomes, authoritarian regimes, on average, do not perform well if we look at some of the most important markers of a healthy population – life expectancy rates, infant and child mortality rates and maternal death rates (Baum and Lake, 2003; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006; Bollyky et al., 2019; Cutler et al., 2006; Ghobarah et al., 2004; Hall and Jones, 2007; Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2000; Lake and Baum, 2001; Lin et al., 2012; Muntaner et al., 2011; Safaei, 2006; Vollmer and Ziegler, 2009). In particular, several studies have argued that authoritarian regimes perform comparatively worse when it comes to life expectancy (Baum and Lake, 2003; Mackenbach, 167

168  Research handbook on authoritarianism 2013; Mackenbach et al., 2013). Using World Bank data from 2020, if we just look at the 25 most autocratic countries in the world, the average life expectancy rate is 71.7 years of age. This compares with the global average of 73.2 years of age, while the 25 democratic countries in the world have a life expectancy of 78.88 years of age. Many studies have especially examined the relationship between infant and child mortality rates and regime type. Infant and child mortality rates are a key measure of health outcomes, because they serve as a window to the health and nutritional status of young children and pregnant women. It is a figure that also takes years of sustained effort to make improvements on. Child mortality rates show a similar picture to life expectancy rates (Figure 11.1). Using child mortality rates data (on the y-axis) from the World Bank for 2020, and from Varieties of Democracy Liberal Democracy scores (on the x-axis), we can see that it is the countries that score the highest on the Liberal Democracy Index that have the lowest child mortality rates, while countries that score the lowest on the Liberal Democracy Index have the highest child mortality rates. Though there are many authoritarian regimes that have low child mortality rates, such as China, Singapore, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, the vast majority of countries that have child mortality rates of over 40 per 1,000 live births are authoritarian on the Liberal Democracy Index, as measured by a score that is 0.5 and below.

Note: Democracies are 0.5 or above on the x-axis, according to V-Dem data. The child mortality rate on the y-axis is out of a 1,000 live births.

Figure 11.1

Child mortality rate and autocracy

Nevertheless, there have been a handful of studies that question the validity of the argument that democracy is better for health. A 2006 study by Michael Ross argues that when looking at infant mortality rates, democratizing does not lead to better outcomes, possibly because there are no guarantees that a newly democratic country will invest in the poor. Thus, even though democracies are more likely to provide public goods, new democracies are not necessarily more likely to target those who are most impoverished, which would be the best way

Authoritarian regimes, health and disease management  169 of improving infant mortality rates. Ross also claims that infant and child mortality rates have vastly improved across all regimes regardless of whether they were democratic or not. Using more recent data, another study showed that democratization led to lower child mortality rates in 21 countries, but greater mortality rates in 8 countries and caused no change in 32 cases (Ramos et al., 2020). In particular, Latin America was highlighted as a region where transitions to democracy led to increases in child mortality rates, such as Chile experiencing a 50 per cent increase. The study concludes that it is access to clean water and sanitation, maternal healthcare, female education, nutrition, immunization rates and incomes that matters more than regime type. Another study looked at rates of diarrhoea and malnutrition by regime type and demonstrated that GDP per capita and improved sanitation at the country level mattered more than democracy or dictatorship (Burroway, 2016). Still, other studies are more sanguine about democracy and democratization in leading to a reduction in infant and child mortality rates. A study by Navia and Zweifel (2003) demonstrated that even controlling for income, on average, a country’s infant mortality rates are lower in a democracy – with an additional five out of every thousand newborns dying if they are born in an authoritarian regime. A 2016 study showed that the impact of democratization just takes time. Democratization reduces child mortality rate in countries after ten years, and has a particularly notable effect in countries whose child mortality rates were above the global average (Pieters et al., 2016). Even partial democratization might be able to make an impact. A study of post-communist Georgia found that even some electoral competition has reaped some benefits for the citizens of Georgia who saw the government respond to demands to improve healthcare (Cassani and Natalizia, 2021). Scholars have theorized that poor performance in autocracies may be driven by dictators not wanting to invest in their citizens, for fear that a healthy population may pose a bigger threat to their rule. Additionally, studies that have investigated the role of international organizations in promoting policy change in investing in human capital (such as healthcare) have had a mixed record, at best. One study showed that World Bank efforts to induce Latin American military dictatorships to improve health performance during the 1970s and 1980s were completely ineffective (Hunter and Brown, 2000). Many authoritarian regimes had preferred at the time to use other means to gain domestic and international legitimacy. But there are other theoretical factors that may assist democracies in performing better in health outcomes. According to this literature, there is a representation effect; a participation effect; an accountability effect; and a selection effect (Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006). We explain in further detail how this works. First, while democracies have to represent the public, authoritarian regimes only need to co-opt a select group of individuals that prop up their regimes (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011). The public in a democracy may push for issues like better healthcare and regulations necessary to safeguard health and safety, while autocracies don’t allow for much input from the public at large. There is reduced political competition, which means that there is little feedback from a constituency. Because authoritarian leaders only need to win over a much narrower support group, this may result in worse outcomes when it comes to health as there is little pressure to advocate on behalf of the health needs of the entire population. During an economic slowdown, autocracies may be more willing to cut social spending (Brown and Hunter, 1999). As such, studies reveal that authoritarian regimes are less likely to spend and invest in healthcare (Liang and Mirelman, 2014), and are, on average, less likely to have universal healthcare (Templin et al., 2021).

170  Research handbook on authoritarianism Second, and related to the previous point, authoritarian regimes do not allow the public to participate in the decision-making process. In many autocracies the decision-making process is often opaque with little transparency of how decisions are being made and little societal input. In contrast, in democracies there is greater input from citizens and knowledgeable networks that can drive sound policy (Wigley and Akkoyunlu-Wigley, 2011). Citizens in a democracy can also advocate themselves for change if it affects their health (Sen, 1999). Third, there is less accountability in authoritarian regimes, and it is much harder to hold autocrats to account. Authoritarian regimes may not allow for the free flow of information and may block valuable information coming from activists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) if they feel threatened by these actors. Authoritarian regimes may have an incentive to cover up the impact of a policy that is not working, and without whistle blowers to uncover what is taking place, it is difficult to ensure public safety. It is also less likely that leaders who are negligent when it comes to health and safety will face consequences. In contrast, failure by democracies to pay attention to health issues and make tangible improvements may affect re-election chances (Nelson, 2007). Finally, authoritarian regimes may be more likely to select incompetent and inexperienced leaders (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2011). Most dictatorships in history have emerged as the result of a military coup, where a high-ranking member of the military with no political experience seizes power and rules with an iron fist with little concern about health outcomes. In other instances, authoritarian leaders emerge because of hereditary conditions, which is highly variable in terms of the quality of leadership. Further to these mechanisms, some authors also argue that authoritarian regimes tend to have higher levels of corruption which ensures that the implementation of policy takes place (Kolstad and Wiig, 2016; Rock, 2009). For example, in China in 2008, at least six infants died and almost 52,000 infants and young children were hospitalized with renal problems after ingesting infant formula processed with melamine, an industrial chemical (Tang et al., 2015). Complaints made in 2005 about the milk being tainted with unauthorized substances went ignored (Lim, 2008). Though the products were eventually recalled by the government and the manufacturers were punished, tainted milk powder was still illegally resold years later. Authoritarian regimes are also associated with lower levels of access to clean water, which is critical to preventing infectious diseases and can negatively impact life expectancy (Lake and Baum, 2001). For example, in Russia there are serious problems with contaminated drinking water and according to one study, possibly as much as 60 per cent of drinking water reserves do not meet safety standards (Ritter, 2018). In total, this means that safe drinking water is inaccessible for 11 million Russians (Ritter, 2018). Some of this is due to Soviet-era dumping of toxic waste which impacts Russia’s water reserves, but is also due to the fact that there is little regulation, health codes are often ignored, and little money was invested in water pollution control equipment (Peterson, 2019). Democracies, in contrast, offer more citizens access to clean water because investing in these services is critical to support from the public (Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006). In spite of these conclusions, several studies have countered that there is an authoritarian advantage when it comes to health outcomes (Shandra et al., 2004). The argument in favour of authoritarian regimes theorizes that autocracies do not have to deal with bureaucratic resistance, political gridlock or public resistance to an unpopular policy that may benefit public health. Authoritarian regimes may be better at mobilizing their population since they can resort to using force or threats of force, if necessary, which may enable them to successfully execute

Authoritarian regimes, health and disease management  171 a simple public intervention (Golinowska and Sowa, 2007). This might ensure that authoritarian regimes deliver on immunization rates which can lower infant and child mortality rates (Gauri and Khaleghian, 2002; Nelson, 2007). True, some authoritarian regimes have managed to ensure low under-five mortality rates such as China at 7 deaths per 1,000 live births, Cuba with 5 deaths and Singapore with 2 deaths. But these are more the exception than the rule. Countries like Chad and the Central African Republic have 113.8 and 110.1 deaths, respectively. Of all of the countries that perform the worst on this indicator (looking at the bottom 25 per cent), there is not one country that is a full democracy and the same can be said for infant mortality rates (see Figure 11.1), demonstrating that there is at least a correlation. The few studies that have examined the impact of authoritarian rule on the management of endemic diseases (almost exclusively looking at HIV/AIDS) have revealed a similar outcome. Authoritarian regimes do not manage endemic diseases well, as they are less likely to provide access to treatment to all members of society (Baum and Lake, 2003; Besley and Kudamatsu, 2006). Democracies, on the other hand, respond to HIV treatment as a public good, with democratic countries like Botswana and Costa Rica providing free treatment. Botswana has gone so far as to offer free treatment to non-citizens as well (Habib, 2019). Other studies concede that while there is no authoritarian advantage, it’s faulty logic to assume that authoritarian regimes do not care about investing in human capital. More recent studies have argued that autocracies have tried to prevent rebellion and win some support by providing public goods (Gallagher and Hanson, 2009; Mares and Carnes, 2009; von Soest and Grauvogel, 2018). There are also a few historical examples that support this view, such as Otto von Bismarck of Prussia using welfare policies to pre-empt political opposition to his regime (Briggs, 1961). Contemporary authoritarian regimes are interested in performance legitimacy, and though much of the focus is on economic performance (Dickson et al., 2017; Holbig and Gilley, 2010; Lustig and Sorensen 2013), healthcare is increasingly recognized as an important public good (Duckett and Munro, 2022). Notwithstanding these arguments, overall, authoritarian regimes perform worse when it comes to public health indicators, but as some of the aforementioned examples reveal, there is variation among dictatorships in terms of performance. For example, studies also show that just holding elections matters – as electoral autocracies or authoritarian regimes that hold multi-party election perform better when it comes to disease outcomes (Miller, 2015). Other studies have demonstrated that the type of authoritarian regime matters – and that regimes that are led by a single party may have an advantage when it comes to lower infant mortality rates compared to military regimes and monarchies (McGuire, 2013). Life expectancy in Hong Kong is the highest in the world at 85.29 years of age edging out democratic Japan at 85.03. Life expectancy in Singapore (84.07) is higher than Iceland (83.52). China has also greatly improved life expectancy levels to 77.47 years up from 44 years in 1960. China has been a standout in eliminating malaria, with the World Health Organization (WHO) certifying that it went from 30 million cases to zero by June 2021 (Cao et al., 2021). Cuba has also improved its life expectancy levels from 57.63 years in 1950, 63.55 in 1960 to 78.98 today. Haiti suffered through decades of personalist rule and still registers a life expectancy today (64.4 years) that is only slight better than Cuba’s was in 1960. Much of the success could be attributed to the role of single-party regimes that are focused on achieving objectives that require a robust and healthy public. In order to ensure that labour remained productive, communist countries worked to provide basic sanitation and universal health coverage for their citizens. In line with this argument, one study argued that autocracies

172  Research handbook on authoritarianism have done well in countering infectious diseases that threaten people when they are at their most productive age, while more likely to ignore health threats that affect older populations (Rosenberg and Shvetsova, 2016). They may be also more likely to tackle disease that affect urban populations. Thus, in contrast to the argument that autocrats have no interest in promoting human development, concern for productivity may have caused single-party regimes to invest in improving better health outcomes (McGuire, 2013). Single-party regimes may also care more about attaining legitimacy, particularly in the absence of multi-party elections. In particular, single-party regimes in Eastern Europe tried to provide health services, to generate more legitimacy (Åslund, 2002). In the case of China, improving healthcare has been a more recent phenomenon, and is connected to Beijing’s quest for greater legitimacy, especially as its growth rates have started to falter. Public opinion surveys in China have found that health provision is a high priority for the population (Whyte and Sun, 2010). The government responded by improving public hospitals and access to primary care and making healthcare more affordable in 2009 (Kornreich et al., 2012). In a survey of 49 cities, there is greater regime support due to local spending on public goods such as health (Dickson et al., 2016). Another study using data from a nationally representative survey supported this view that healthcare provision has improved regime legitimacy (Duckett and Munro, 2022). Personalist regimes may be the worst when it comes to disease management as they have the shortest time horizons due to an absence of institutionalized mechanisms for turnover in power. A dictator that constantly fears that they will be ousted by both the public and other elites is less likely to invest in healthcare spending or to address long-term health problems or invest in human capital (Dionne, 2011; Yan and Lin, 2020). Personalist dictators may surround themselves and fill government offices with people that have no experience or expertise to handle public health challenges (Ezrow and Frantz, 2011). Personalist regimes are free to make decisions at their whim, since there is no one surrounding the dictator that can challenge what the dictator wants to do. Without any challengers, the personalist leader is also free to syphon off funds that could go towards healthcare and disease prevention into their own pockets. The personalist dictator also creates an environment that fosters false reporting and politically managing facts. If the truth is inconvenient, the regime will look the other way (Egorov and Sonin, 2011; Frantz and Ezrow, 2009). Personalist rule is also highly unpredictable (see Frantz and Ezrow, 2009), repressive and vindictive, which has been cited as a push factor that has led to an exodus of trained health personnel (Chojnicki and Oden-Defoort, 2010). In the case of Equatorial Guinea, by the time personalist dictator Francisco Macías Nguema was deposed (1968–79) there was not a single university graduate remaining in the country (Decalo, 2019). As a result of all of these factors, personalist regimes are erratic and tend to perform poorly on almost all health indicators (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011). Though there are some resource-rich personalist dictatorships that may invest somewhat in human capital, the results do not match their assets (Kendall-Taylor et al., 2019). For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo was run for many years by personalist dictators Joseph Mobutu (1965–97), followed by Laurent-Désiré Kabila (1997–2001), followed by Kabila’s son Joseph (2001–19). In spite of being a resource-rich country, after several decades of personalist rule, health financing became non-existent with the country dependent on both out of pocket payments and humanitarian aid (McFerson, 2009; WHO, 2015). This led to fragmentation, waste and duplication of the health sector, and a complete lack of manage-

Authoritarian regimes, health and disease management  173 ment and regulation. Due to poor funding and planning, capacity remains incredibly uneven. In one district, for example, the capacity was developed to test HIV/AIDS, but not to deliver treatment. Another issue is that health funding is used for personal gain. Medical equipment and supplies were purchased by the central government, with the deliveries coinciding with the first round of presidential elections in 2008 to boost popularity of the incumbent regime. The supplies were then given to parliamentarians, who were tasked with delivering them to their constituencies, but there was no oversight of this process. Some supplies never arrived while some equipment was delivered without qualified staff to operate it (WHO, 2015). In Venezuela, which had once been a middle-income country, years of personalist rule (first by Hugo Chávez starting with his turn to dictatorship in 2005 and followed by Nicolas Maduro who cemented his power after Chávez’s death in 2013) plunged the country into chaos and poverty. Though initially some progress in health outcomes took place under Chávez, corruption and the drop in oil prices led to the collapse of the health system and the resurgence of preventable diseases (Paniz-Mondolfi et al., 2019). After Maduro took over things deteriorated further and diseases like malaria were surging again. By 2019, Venezuela saw a 1200 per cent increase in malaria cases since 2000 with nearly half a million cases per year, and accounted for 3 per cent of the malaria deaths in South America (Gabaldón-Figueira et al., 2021). The last official report from the Ministry of Health was in 2016, and after releasing it Health Minister Antonieta Corporale was immediately fired. Though turnover was high for this position with Venezuela having 17 different health ministers in 20 years, Corporale was sacked because the report revealed that there had been a 65 per cent and 30 per cent increase in maternal and infant mortality rates, respectively (The Lancet, 2018). The country refuses to release any other health or epidemiological data. Venezuela has also experienced a massive exodus of biomedical scientists and qualified healthcare professionals (Garcia Zea, 2020). Of course, politically managing the numbers and hiding disease outbreaks can happen in single-party regimes as well (as the case study of China will illustrate), but these regimes usually have more potential whistle blowers that are willing to come forward. As previously mentioned, single-party regimes are also more capable of handling health challenges because they tend to invest in health in order to achieve their programmatic outcomes of economic growth and economic expansion. Personalist regimes usually have very little incentive to adequately address any infectious diseases, but there are exceptions. Paul Kagame (a personalist leader) of Rwanda has invested in the overall healthcare of Rwandans and has won accolades from the international community for his commitment to infectious disease control and substantial amounts of foreign aid (Iyer et al., 2018). Yoweri Museveni (another personalist leader) of Uganda has also worked hard to target the AIDS crisis with some initial success (Allen and Heald, 2004). But for every Museveni and Kagame there are many others (like ex-presidents Idriss Déby of Chad, Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso and current President Paul Biya of Cameroon) who have allowed infectious diseases to run rampant with little investment or preventative measures in place to address them. In addition to personalist rule driving poor health outcomes, resource-rich countries may also underperform – in spite of having the revenues available to tackle health challenges. One of the few studies looking at the relationship between regime type and malaria demonstrated that dictatorships that are rich in resources perform the worst in controlling and treating malaria, compared to resource-rich democracies (Chang, 2020). Resource-rich countries tend to establish patronage politics where resource rents are delivered to supporters but no public

174  Research handbook on authoritarianism goods are offered (Robinson et al., 2006). Studies have also shown that resource-rich countries have higher infant and child mortality rates (Makhlouf et al., 2017) and lower life expectancy (Pendergast et al., 2011). Resource-rich countries also spend less on healthcare (Cockx and Francken, 2014). The Central African Republic (which also suffered through many years of personalist rule) is rich in diamonds, gold, uranium and other minerals, but it spends very little on healthcare – only $97 per capita compared to $1,089 in Botswana. And although malaria is one of the leading causes of death, in rural areas a study showed that only 26 per cent of people have access to treatment for it (Green, 2012). Furthermore, though resource-rich Gulf monarchies perform adequately when it comes to health indicators, life expectancy rates could be higher. Not one oil-rich Gulf state has a life expectancy as high as democratic Costa Rica (and Saudi life expectancy is lower than Nicaragua – one of the poorest countries in the world), and they all spend less per capita on healthcare than the countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Chang, 2020). We can also see a general correlation between authoritarian regimes and disease management. Data available shows that countries with the highest Disease Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) (or the number of years that have been lost due to poor health, disability or early death) are authoritarian regimes in sub-Saharan Africa. The only democracies that perform poorly on this measure are South Africa with 21,500 DALY rates out of 100,000, Botswana with 17,400 and India with 13,200. This compares with the Central African Republic which records 53,800 (Our World in Data, 2017). And though every country has improved, autocracies have improved the least. For the most part, the authoritarian advantage literature lacks robust quantitative evidence. And regardless of the variation within dictatorships, other recent works have emphasized that democracies lead to more positive health outcomes than autocracies in general, though there are questions surrounding the impact of democratization. A study using data from the Varieties of Democracy that looked at 170 countries from 1900 to 2012 found that democratic rule, measured by looking at the quality of competitive elections, has consistently had positive outcomes on a population’s health, even when taking good governance into account (Wang et al., 2019). Though there are exceptions, most authoritarian regimes are unable and/or unwilling to invest, innovate, consult with their publics to create robust public healthcare systems that build human capital and ensure the strongest possible health outcomes.

11.3

AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES AND THE PANDEMIC

Very few studies have investigated the relationship between pandemic disease outbreak and authoritarian regimes. COVID-19 will change this, as there will likely be an abundance of new studies that will tackle pandemic management from every discipline. Initial studies have shown no clear correlation between authoritarian regimes and huge outbreaks, but more time will be needed to take stock of our response to the disease (Cepaluni et al., 2020; Kleinfeld, 2020). One study has claimed that though democracies reacted slowly in the short term, their outcomes will overall be better because they place a higher value on human life and health (Karabulut et al., 2021). Time will tell if that prediction is valid. In spite of their low levels of transparency, authoritarian regimes have boasted that their regimes are better equipped to deal with crises and outbreaks. But authoritarian regimes are

Authoritarian regimes, health and disease management  175 also more likely to engage in medical censorship that can have devastating consequences for reporting the spark of a new virus. Case in point: the Syrian government forced doctors who sounded the alarm that polio had returned to disappear (Eichner and Brockmann, 2013); the doctor who had alerted the world about MERS was forced into exile by the Saudi regime (Sparrow, 2021); the Chinese government punished the surgeon who dared to speak out about SARS (Dowell, 2006). This medical censorship is particularly dangerous because the medical community is so critical to identifying emerging threats. In fact, the Chinese government’s attempt to cover up SARS led to the revision of the International Health Regulations (IHR), which stipulated that all countries must report any novel virus that could be of international concern. After the SARS crisis, the Chinese government spent about $100 million in setting up the largest direct reporting network system in the world. The system was supposed to allow any doctor at any level to directly report signs of a disease outbreak to the central government in real time, but this was never implemented in practice (Farrell, 2020). Despite the self-adulation, the early handling of the crisis by the regime made the crisis considerably worse. With COVID-19, Chinese authorities also concealed that there was a problem, and actively repressed the timely flow of crucial public health information (Kuo, 2020). This was in spite of the fact that by 27 December 2019, officials knew just how serious the threat was. Nevertheless, hospital leaders refused to authorize wearing personal protective equipment such as masks because it would cause unnecessary panic – even as patients were infecting healthcare workers in droves. Hospital leaders continued to insist that no staff members were infected and diagnoses were changed to demonstrate this. Doctors continued to warn one another and those who tried to tell the truth were silenced. Despite the reforms to the IHR, China failed to notify the WHO on the pandemic threat. Instead, the WHO learned about COVID-19 not through Beijing but through an open-source platform for doctors to quickly disseminate information that could be frowned upon by their governments. China was asked to verify the outbreak but instead of responding within 24 hours, the government spent time going after those spreading rumours and taking measures against law breakers, as an intimidation tactic. By 20 January, Beijing finally admitted that there was human to human transmission taking place, but continued to manage the data to only report a fraction of the real numbers (Sparrow, 2021). Because the transmission rate appeared to be low based on the data China released, the WHO decided to not immediately declare a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) and informed the public that the virus was spread through large droplets that landed on surfaces rather than through airborne micro droplets. As such, regular hand washing was advocated instead of masks. Many crucial pieces of information were not communicated by the Chinese government that could have been helpful to the WHO and governments to accurately provide a response and public health advice about the dangers of the disease. The case of China illustrates the cracks in the “authoritarian advantage” arguments. Though authoritarian regimes have more repressive tools at their disposal, they are more likely to deal with a health crisis with a cover-up and disinformation campaign even if it undermines their ability to respond effectively (Shih, 2020). Authoritarian regimes have incentives to cover up the severity of a crisis and to politically manage the data to make themselves appear more in control. In contrast, democracies benefit from a free flow of information and transparency, and can make use of all sorts of reports to respond more appropriately to danger from everyday citizens and journalists (Sen, 1994).

176  Research handbook on authoritarianism In authoritarian regimes like China, government employees screen and censor online content and guide online discussions, prohibiting any comments that may spur mobilization and collective action (King et al., 2013). The Chinese government has a long history of secrecy from its disastrous responses to the Great Leap Forward (where an estimated 20–50 million people died of famine). Secrecy and maintaining order have been prioritized over telling the truth. In the case of SARS in China, as late as 3 April 2003, the minister of health insisted that there was nothing to be worried about (Tai and Sun, 2011). Fearing retribution, the mass media in China did not even publish the WHO global alert about SARS (Zhang, 2003). Beijing also tried to restrict the WHO’s inspection team from accessing to SARS cases (Baekkeskov and Rubin, 2017). There have also been a handful of leaders in authoritarian regimes that initially downplayed the COVID-19 crisis. Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko called the coronavirus a “psychosis” that can be fixed with vodka and saunas. Lukashenko appeared on national television playing ice hockey and hugging other players (Williams and Tétrault-Farber, 2021). President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov of Turkmenistan announced that it had no cases of coronavirus, in spite of its proximity to hard-hit Iran. Berdymukhamedov suppressed news about the virus and banned it from being publicly discussed (Kakissis, 2020). Kim Jong Un also initially declared that there were no cases in North Korea, though the government received funds from the WHO to combat the virus and diagnostic tests from the Russian government, and was one of the first countries to shut its borders (Eberstadt, 2020). Authoritarian regimes are also usually more concerned with appearing competent than actually being competent. This image of competence, in most cases, is only an illusion. Most modern authoritarian regimes are low on skill and competence, choosing to mostly blame others when they fail to deliver on any promises. Authoritarian regimes also threaten to punish journalists, bureaucrats, healthcare workers and other whistle blowers that might expose information that is negative for the regime. By arresting whistle blowers, this delays a public health response (Burkle, 2020). Another issue of authoritarian regimes is many have very low levels of trust as well as interpersonal trust. Governments of China and Singapore are more of the exception than the rule. Many authoritarian regimes also have high levels of corruption which fosters low levels of legitimacy in the government (Fjelde and Hegre, 2014; Hollyer and Wantchekon, 2015; Kalenborn and Lessman, 2013). While these low levels of trust don’t necessarily translate into regime overthrow – there are serious implications for how these regimes perform when a disease outbreak takes place. States that have performed the best in dealing with outbreaks have high levels of trust in the government and are willing to comply with orders without the government having to resort to using force. They trust that the information that the government is providing is accurate and that obeying these orders makes sense. These societies also have high level of interpersonal trust which makes them more likely to engage in community-minded behaviour that benefits the greater good, like Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In Guinea, in the case of Ebola, years of dictatorship, economic mismanagement and corruption have fostered high levels of distrust in the government. In 2009 protests ended with a massacre of more than 150 people, which further contributed to growing tensions (Field, 2019). As a result of these low levels of trust, when the Ebola virus broke out in Guinea several years later, the community hid the sick, conducted funerals in secret and worked to elude any contact tracing.

Authoritarian regimes, health and disease management  177 Thus, the danger with authoritarian regimes and diseases with pandemic possibility is that they are likely to engage in a cover-up when there has been a spark of a new or re-emerging infectious disease. Autocracies may claim to manage disease outbreaks better, but they have a poor track record in being transparent and acting in a timely fashion with the international community when there has been a disease spark. Given the speed with which some infectious diseases can spread, even slight delays in reporting can lead to additional millions of deaths.

11.4 CONCLUSION Since 2020 there has been greater attention on health security, with particular scrutiny on what types of regimes are better able to manage health outcomes. Additionally, research on how authoritarian regimes seek legitimacy by providing better healthcare is a relatively recent research area, as is whether or not this strategy is effective. This chapter has provided an overview of some of the key indicators of public health, including life expectancy rates, child mortality rates, infant mortality rates and DALYs. The chapter also explored studies that have looked at how regime type has affected the response to several infectious diseases including HIV/AIDS and malaria. It was noted that there is no authoritarian advantage when it comes to diseases and more likely a democratic advantage when it comes to health performance on a number of indicators. The impact of democratization was much more mixed, and some scholars noted that there are other factors that are more important in impacting health outcomes than regime type, but the worst performers in health are always autocracies. A handful of studies have noted that there is quite a bit of variation in dictatorships with personalist regimes performing far worse than single-party regimes, military juntas and monarchies. And while single-party regimes, like China, are generally better at managing diseases once they are endemic or have become an epidemic, authoritarian regimes are not transparent and often engage in medical censorship. COVID-19 has illustrated the added damage that can be caused when an infectious disease sparks in a country that silences its medical community.

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180  Research handbook on authoritarianism Lim, L. 25 September 2008. Chinese milk worker: Complaints ignored for years. National Public Radio. https://​www​.npr​.org/​templates/​story/​story​.php​?storyId​=​95026204​&​t​=​1638535628145. Accessed 30 November 2021. Lin, R.T., Chen, Y.M., Chien, L.C. and Chan, C.C., 2012. Political and social determinants of life expectancy in less developed countries: A longitudinal study. BMC Public Health, 12(1), p. 85. Lustig, J. and Sorensen, A., 2013. The governance gap. Current History, 112(750), p. 3. Mackenbach, J.P., 2013. Political conditions and life expectancy in Europe, 1900–2008. Social Science & Medicine, 82, pp. 134–46. Mackenbach, J.P., Hu, Y. and Looman, C.W., 2013. Democratization and life expectancy in Europe, 1960–2008. Social Science & Medicine, 93, pp. 166–75. Makhlouf, Y., Kellard, N.M. and Vinogradov, D., 2017. Child mortality, commodity price volatility and the resource curse. Social Science & Medicine, 178, pp. 144–56. Mares, I. and Carnes, M.E., 2009. Social policy in developing countries. Annual Review of Political Science, 12, pp. 93–113. McFerson, H.M., 2009. Governance and hyper-corruption in resource-rich African countries. Third World Quarterly, 30(8), pp. 1529–47. McGuire, J.W., 2013. Political regime and social performance. Contemporary Politics, 19(1), pp. 55–75. Miller, M.K., 2015. Electoral authoritarianism and human development. Comparative Political Studies, 48(12), pp. 1526–62. Muntaner, C., Borrell, C., Ng, E., Chung, H., Espelt, A., Rodriguez-Sanz, M., Benach, J. and O’Campo, P., 2011. Politics, welfare regimes, and population health: Controversies and evidence. Sociology of Health & Illness, 33(6), pp. 946–64. Navia, P. and Zweifel, T.D., 2003. Democracy, dictatorship, and infant mortality revisited. Journal of Democracy, 14(3), pp. 90–103. Nelson, J.M., 2007. Elections, democracy, and social services. Studies in Comparative International Development, 41(4), pp. 79–97. Our World in Data, 2017. Disease burden. https://​ourworldindata​.org/​burden​-of​-disease. Accessed 20 May 2022. Paniz-Mondolfi, A.E., Tami, A., Grillet, M.E., Márquez, M., Hernández-Villena, J., Escalona-Rodríguez, M.A., Blohm, G.M., Mejías, I., Urbina-Medina, H., Rísquez, A. and Castro, J., 2019. Resurgence of vaccine-preventable diseases in Venezuela as a regional public health threat in the Americas. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 25(4), p. 625. Pendergast, S.M., Clarke, J.A. and Van Kooten, G.C., 2011. Corruption, development and the curse of natural resources. Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, 44(2), pp. 411–37. Pieters, H., Curzi, D., Olper, A. and Swinnen, J., 2016. Effect of democratic reforms on child mortality: A synthetic control analysis. The Lancet Global Health, 4(9), pp. e627–e632. Ramos, A.P., Flores, M.J. and Ross, M.L., 2020. Where has democracy helped the poor? Democratic transitions and early-life mortality at the country level. Social Science & Medicine, 265, p. 113442. Ritter, K. 12 April 2018. Pollutants and heavy metals taint Moscow’s water supply. Circle of Blue. https://​www​.circleofblue​.org/​2018/​europe/​pollutants​-and​-heavy​-metals​-taint​-moscows​-water​ -supply/​. Accessed 4 December 2021. Robinson, J.A., Torvik, R. and Verdier, T., 2006. Political foundations of the resource curse. Journal of Development Economics, 79(2), pp. 447–68. Rock, M.T., 2009. Corruption and democracy. The Journal of Development Studies, 45(1), pp. 55–75. Rosenberg, D. and Shvetsova, O., 2016. Autocratic health versus democratic health: Different outcome variables for health as a factor versus health as a right. In The political economy of social choices (pp. 1–20). Springer. Ross, M., 2006. Is democracy good for the poor? American Journal of Political Science, 50(4), pp. 860–74. Safaei, J., 2006. Is democracy good for health? International Journal of Health Services, 36(4), pp. 767–86. Sen, A., 1994. Liberty and poverty: Political rights and economics. New Republic, 210(10), pp. 31–7. Sen, A.K., 1999. Democracy as a universal value. Journal of Democracy, 10(3), pp. 3–17.

Authoritarian regimes, health and disease management  181 Shandra, J.M., Nobles, J., London, B. and Williamson, J.B., 2004. Dependency, democracy, and infant mortality: A quantitative, cross-national analysis of less developed countries. Social Science & Medicine, 59(2), pp. 321–33. Shih, V.C., 2020. Economic shocks and authoritarian stability: Duration, financial control, and institutions. University of Michigan Press. Sparrow, A. 18 March 2021. The Chinese government’s cover-up killed health care workers worldwide. Foreign Policy. https://​foreignpolicy​.com/​2021/​03/​18/​china​-covid​-19​-killed​-health​-care​-workers​ -worldwide/​. Accessed 4 December 2021. Tai, Z. and Sun, T., 2011. The rumouring of SARS during the 2003 epidemic in China. Sociology of Health & Illness, 33(5), pp. 677–93. Tang, L., Binns, C.W. and Lee, A.H., 2015. Infant formula crisis in China: A cohort study in Sichuan province. Journal of Health, Population, and Nutrition, 33(1), p. 117. Templin, T., Dieleman, J.L., Wigley, S., Mumford, J.E., Miller-Petrie, M., Kiernan, S. and Bollyky, T.J., 2021. Democracies linked to greater universal health coverage compared with autocracies, even in an economic recession: Study examines the associations that democracy has with universal health coverage and government health spending in 170 countries from 1990 to 2019. Health Affairs, 40(8), pp. 1234–42. Von Soest, C. and Grauvogel, J., 2018. Identity, procedures and performance: How authoritarian regimes legitimize their rule. In Justifying Dictatorship (pp. 37–55). Routledge. Vollmer, S. and Ziegler, M., 2009. Political institutions and human development. The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, 4818. Wang, Y.T., Mechkova, V. and Andersson, F., 2019. Does democracy enhance health? New empirical evidence 1900–2012. Political Research Quarterly, 72(3), pp. 554–69. Whyte, M.K. and Sun, Z., 2010. The impact of China’s market reforms on the health of Chinese citizens: Examining two puzzles. China: An International Journal, 8(1), pp. 1–32. Wigley, S. and Akkoyunlu-Wigley, A., 2011. The impact of regime type on health: Does redistribution explain everything. World Politics, 63, p. 647. Williams, M. and Tétrault-Farber, G. 11 January 2021. Reuters. https://​www​.reuters​.com/​article/​us ​-belarus​-election​-icehockey/​angering​-critics​-belarus​-lukashenko​-hugs​-world​-ice​-hockey​-boss​-id USKBN29G28Y. Accessed 20 January 2021. WHO (World Health Organization), 2015. Improving health system efficiency: Democratic Republic of the Congo: improving aid coordination in the health sector. No. WHO/HIS/HGF/CaseStudy/15.4. World Health Organization. Yan, H.T. and Lin, Y.C., 2020. How time horizons of autocrats impact health expenditure: A mixed methods research. BMC Public Health, 20(1), pp. 1–9. Zhang, E., 2003. SARS: Unmasking censorship in China. China Rights Forum, 3, pp. 44–9.

12. Authoritarian regimes and the reversal of economic reforms Bumba Mukherjee and Nguyen Huynh

12.1 INTRODUCTION On September 15, 2020, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) issued the Opinion on Strengthening the United Front Work of the Private Economy in the New Era in which it directly declared to private firms that they should “unswervingly follow the Party and devote themselves to development” (Luong, 2021). This démarche was preceded by the CCP cracking down on China’s technology giants such as Alibaba and Tencent “for growing too powerful” (Luong, 2021). These actions “shocked” various media outlets, including the Financial Times and the Wall Street Journal (see Financial Times, 2020; Ostroff and Vigna, 2020). But these declarations simply followed the 2016 statement by the President of China, Xi Jinping, in which he called for establishing a “modern state-owned enterprise system” (Livingston, 2020: 1) in China where private and foreign firms will play a secondary role (Gabrielle, 2020; Pei, 2021). Yet the CCP Central Committee’s declaration mentioned above led to both a sharp decline and volatility in major stock market indices around the globe in mid-September 2020 owing to concerns that China’s authoritarian state may “shut the door” to international business (Allen et al., 2017; Bloomberg, 2020; Gabrielle, 2020; see also Livingston, 2020). The example above is hardly unique to China’s authoritarian regime. Rather, since 2008, autocratic states as diverse as Russia, Venezuela, and even Saudi Arabia have rolled back economic reforms, suppressed domestic private firms, raised trade barriers, restricted international capital flows, and expanded the state’s role in the domestic economy (Von Soest et al., 2017). The possibility that autocracies, on average, have pushed back against economic globalization—this includes the reversal of trade and financial liberalization—can be visualized more generally from a time-series cross-sectional dataset (TSCS) of trade and capital account openness from 118 developing countries (autocracies are primarily developing economies) during the 1980–2018 period. Consider, for instance, the scatterplot in Figure 12.1 drawn from a TSCS regression model in which we assess the influence of a continuous measure of Authoritarianism on the level of Trade Openness1 in our sample. Authoritarianism is operationalized as an inverted and re-scaled version of the Polity project’s measures of executive constraints and competitive executive recruitment, thereby implying that larger and more positive values denote higher levels of authoritarianism. Figure 12.1 reveals a clear negative association between authoritarian countries and trade openness. Likewise, consider the scatterplot in Figure 12.2 extracted from a TSCS regression model in which we evaluate the effect of Authoritarianism on Chinn and Ito’s (2008) measure of Capital Account Openness. This latter figure shows a strong negative association between authoritarian regimes and the extent of capital account (i.e., financial) liberalization between 1980 and 2018. These aggregate-level figures suggest unambiguously that the degree of trade 182

Authoritarian regimes and the reversal of economic reforms  183

Note: Scatterplot of Trade Openness against Authoritarianism from our pooled sample (1980–2018). Scatterplot is overlaid with the pooled OLS best-fit line for the correlation between these two measures.

Figure 12.1

Autocracies and trade openness

Note: Scatterplot of Capital Account Openness against Authoritarianism from our pooled sample (1980–2018). Scatterplot is overlaid with the pooled OLS best-fit line for the correlation between these measures.

Figure 12.2

Autocracies and capital account openness

184  Research handbook on authoritarianism and capital account openness has declined across autocratic states. Concurrent with this shift away from economic globalization, policies that promote state-owned enterprises (SOEs) at the expense of private and foreign firms have also been frequently implemented in autocracies (Allen et al., 2017; Lardy, 2019; Pei, 2021). It is perhaps not surprising then that some scholars and pundits acknowledge the growing reversal of economic reform in autocracies even though comprehensive theoretical accounts of this phenomenon have not (to our knowledge) been fully developed (Lardy, 2019; Pei, 2021). The reversal of trade and financial liberalization, as well as growing restrictions against private and foreign firms, raises the following two questions addressed in our chapter: ● Why do autocratic states increasingly reverse economic reforms, including trade and financial liberalization? ● What are the domestic sources of opposition to economic globalization within authoritarian regimes? It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide full-fledged theoretical answers and test these claims. Rather, we address these questions in three sections below by systematically (i) reviewing the nascent literature on the pushback against economic globalization in autocracies and briefly (ii) developing our theoretical claims about economic reform reversal in autocracies. The first section starts with a formal definition of authoritarian regimes provided by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). We then illustrate some descriptive results from our aforementioned TSCS sample, which reveals that autocracies have, on average, increased trade barriers and restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows since the early 2000s. The second section reviews an emerging literature that explores why autocracies are reversing economic reforms by reverting to trade protectionism or increasing financial market restrictions. To this end, we discuss three main theoretical perspectives that account for the rollback of economic liberalization in autocracies: political ramifications of macroeconomic crises stemming from economic globalization for autocrats, susceptibility to international sanctions for autocratic regimes that result from exposure to trade and financial flows, and the authoritarian ruling elite’s rational fear of losing control over the domestic economy because of economic liberalization. In the third section, we delineate our alternative theoretical story that also accounts for the rollback of economic reform across autocracies. Unlike extant perspectives, the theory we summarize focuses on how anti-reform pressure exerted by SOEs and apparatchiks within the state induces autocrats to reverse economic reforms. Before we present the preceding analysis in detail in the following sections of this chapter, it is worth emphasizing here that addressing the two central questions posited earlier is substantively important for three reasons. First, autocratic states play a crucial role in the economy of the developing world in which all autocracies reside. In fact, our sample described earlier reveals a staggering 66 percent of total economic output in the developing world has been generated by autocracies since the late 1990s. Although this figure declines to approximately 40 percent when China is excluded from the sample, the said output value is certainly significant. Understanding why autocracies are reversing economic liberalization is, therefore, important as the “rollback” of reforms by these states—that effectively play a crucial role in the global economic system—has adverse consequences for the developing world. Second, scholars have long recognized that unlike democratic incumbents, autocratic leaders face less formal institutional constraints, limited societal pressure, and few (if any) veto players that can restrict them from designing or implementing policies (Bueno De Mesquita

Authoritarian regimes and the reversal of economic reforms  185 et al., 2003; Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Wintrobe, 1998). Early studies on the politics of economic reforms, in fact, employed these insights to emphasize that lower constraints and pressure faced by dictators induced them to liberalize their economic policies or made it easier for them to implement economic reforms (Haggard and Kaufmann, 1995; Weyland, 1998). Recent research has built on these earlier studies to suggest that autocrats pursue the reduction of trade and financial market barriers to sustain economic growth, which is deemed necessary to avert anti-regime discontent (e.g., Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003; Gehlbach et al., 2016; Robinson and Acemoglu, 2006). These studies undoubtedly provide compelling insights. Yet, they pay less attention to the growing phenomenon of economic reform reversal across authoritarian states. A broader goal of this chapter is to thus sensitize researchers to explore and understand why autocracies are turning their back to economic globalization. Third, a growing body of research has developed and evaluated theories about why or when authoritarian regimes liberalize trade and capital account policies (e.g., Hankla and Kuthy, 2013; Malesky, 2009; Pond, 2018). This research posits that incentives to survive in office by maximizing their citizens’ material welfare and long-term economic security are key factors driving autocrats to adopt economic reforms, including reduction of trade barriers and capital account restrictions. These studies provide important theoretical contributions. But the aforementioned insight that they offer also raises the following puzzle—if autocrats seek to prolong their political survival by reforming trade and financial policies, then why have they, as described earlier, increasingly reversed such reforms? We suggest that further development of extant theories—that are reviewed below and then extended by our theoretical claims—will allow researchers to answer this crucial puzzle. As such, answering this intriguing question will help scholars fully understand the strategic calculations and politics associated with economic liberalization in autocratic states. The next section starts with a formal definition of authoritarian regimes and presents descriptive results about trade barriers and FDI flows across these states. This is followed by a discussion of three theoretical perspectives on economic reform reversal in autocracies and our theoretical account of this phenomenon. The chapter ends with a conclusion that provides suggestions for future research on economic reforms in autocracies.

12.2

AUTOCRACIES AND ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION: PRELIMINARY DATA INSIGHTS

Notwithstanding Fukuyama’s (2006) exhortation in his classic work, The End of History and the Last Man, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not lead to authoritarian regimes’ demise. Rather, as emphasized by Haber (2006), 40 percent of the world’s governments remain authoritarian, and over half of the planet’s population lives under non-democratic rule. The persistence of autocracies (combined with the decline of “liberal democracies”) has driven scholars to systematically conceptualize authoritarian regimes and analyze the intricacies and nuances of politics within these regimes (e.g., Boix et al., 2013; Cheibub et al., 2010; Geddes et al., 2014; Gedded et al., 2018; Hadenius et al., 2012). Although inspired by early work on autocracies by O’Donnell (1973) and Linz and Stepan (1978), among others, recent studies on political regimes have focused on developing definitions of autocratic states that can be empirically operationalized for statistical tests.

186  Research handbook on authoritarianism For this chapter, we focus on the definition by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014; hereafter GWF), who characterize authoritarian regimes as those where leaders and policies are chosen with, Any means besides direct, reasonably fair, competitive elections in which at least ten percent of the total population was eligible to vote; or an indirect election by a body, at least 60 percent of which was elected in direct reasonably fair, competitive elections; or constitutional succession to a democratically elected executive. (p. 6)

GWF’s definition is not unique since scholars such as Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010; hereafter CGV), Hadenius et al. (2012), and Boix et al. (2013) have also provided detailed definitions of authoritarian regimes. While all these definitions are widely used, CGV’s (2010) definition is the most parsimonious. CGV (2010), in fact, define autocratic regimes as those in which the executive is not chosen by a popular election, the legislature is not popularly elected, contested elections with more than one party are not held at regular intervals, and there is no alternation in power under formal electoral rules. Autocracies are, however, not a homogeneous group of states. Rather, they are often classified into military, personalist, single-party, and civilian dictatorships (Cheibub et al., 2010; Geddes et al., 2014; Geddes et al., 2018; Gehlbach et al., 2016). Scholars also account for differences in the structure of national legislatures and other institutional constraints across autocracies (Geddes et al., 2014; Geddes et al., 2018; Gehlbach et al., 2016; Hadenius et al., 2012; Svolik, 2012). We do not delve into the institutional differences across autocracies here because of space constraints. Instead, we conduct two simple empirical exercises to briefly assess the correlation between authoritarian regimes and the following well-known indicators of economic liberalization: custom (i.e., import) duties and foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. For the first empirical exercise, we plot in Figure 12.3 the moving average of Customs Duties (% GDP) across all autocracies—as per the GWF definition of these regimes—from 1988 to 2016.2 The figure reveals that Customs Duties declined substantially during the immediate post-Cold War decade until 2000–2001, but then increased sharply from around 2002 to around 2016 (barring the 2010–13 period). This indicates that autocrats reverted to trade protection by directly increasing trade barriers since the early 2000s. For the second exercise, we extract a scatterplot from estimating the effect of Authoritarianism on FDI inflows (% GDP) in our pooled sample described earlier (Figure 12.4). Figure 12.4 shows a significant negative association between Authoritarianism and FDI inflows, thereby implying that autocrats have restricted FDI inflows in recent decades. Examples further corroborate the rollback of economic liberalization in autocracies. For instance, on December 19, 2020, China’s National Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Commerce jointly issued the Measures for Security Review of Foreign Investment.3 These measures officially declare that all foreign direct and indirect investment in China that are a threat to the country’s national security will be scrutinized and possibly debarred.4 Russia also implemented and recently extended Decree No. 730 that bans the import of agricultural products from particularly the US and the European Union to retaliate against Western sanctions and protect the domestic agricultural sector from import competition (Von Soest et al., 2017).5 Other autocracies as diverse as Iran, Cuba, and Saudi Arabia have raised trade and capital account barriers after the 2008 financial crisis (Richter, 2013). While these cases represent few examples, they suggest—combined with the illustrations in Figures 12.1

Authoritarian regimes and the reversal of economic reforms  187

Note: Moving Average of Customs Duties (% GDP) across Autocracies, 1988–2016.

Figure 12.3

Customs duties across autocracies, 1988–2016

Note: Scatterplot of FDI inflows against Authoritarianism from our pooled sample (1980–2018). Scatterplot is overlaid with the pooled OLS best-fit line for the correlation between these measures.

Figure 12.4

Autocracies and FDI inflows

188  Research handbook on authoritarianism to 12.4—that autocracies have shifted away from trade and financial liberalization. Why is this so? We turn to review the existing literature that seeks to answer this question.

12.3

AUTOCRACIES AND THE RETURN TO ECONOMIC AUTARKY?

Unlike the extensive research on why or when authoritarian regimes pursue trade and financial sector reforms,6 there is less systematic theoretical and empirical research that accounts for reversal of economic reforms across autocracies. Yet, a handful but growing set of recent studies have offered theories to account for the rollback of economic reforms in authoritarian states (e.g., Albertus et al., 2018; Egorov and Sonin, 2020; Lardy, 2019; Pei, 2021). Although disparate, these theories can be classified into the following three main perspectives. 12.3.1 Market Reforms, Weak Control of the Economy, and Declining Rent Autocratic governments often seek to control various domestic economic sectors (e.g., Albertus and Menaldo, 2018; Haber, 2006; McGuire and Olson, 1996; Robinson and Acemoglu, 2006). Such control is obtained by maintaining the state’s intervention in the economy via the development of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), taxation of trade and financial transactions, and government regulation of industries (e.g., Haber, 2006; Lardy, 2019; Pei, 2021; Wintrobe, 1998). Sustaining a tight grip over domestic economic activity is deemed necessary by most autocratic regimes for at least two reasons. First, controlling the levers of production and intervening in the economy via taxes and tariffs allow autocrats to extract rent from produced goods and trade transactions (Albertus et al., 2018; McGuire and Olson, 1996; Wintrobe, 1998). These rents help autocrats finance patronage to “the heads of the armed forces, national and local government bureaucrats, individuals who control the apparatuses of the ruling party, and often segments within the business community” (Desai et al., 2007: 2; see also Albertus and Menaldo, 2018; Haber, 2006). Patronage fosters the loyalty of these actors toward the “regime” whose political support is crucial for autocrats to survive in office (Desai et al., 2007; Robinson and Acemoglu, 2006; Wintrobe, 1998). Second, operating SOEs and intervening in the economy allows autocrats to fund welfare programs for workers and provide “subsidies, transfers, and cheap credits to support specific economic sectors or firms” (Desai et al., 2007: 2; Haber, 2006; Robinson and Acemoglu, 2006). It also helps autocrats enlarge the public provision of economic benefits as compensation to citizens in exchange for the latter’s acquiescence to constraints on their political liberties (Albertus and Menaldo, 2018; Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003; Robinson and Acemoglu, 2006). Providing patronage to regime supporters and compensating denizens with subsidies or public goods is vital for dictators as it helps them garner domestic political support to prolong their rule (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003; Wintrobe, 1998). Note, however, that the implementation of economic reforms such as trade and financial liberalization compels authoritarian states to relinquish control of the economy (Kaire, 2019; Lardy, 2019; Richter, 2013). Liberalizing trade policies via reduction of trade barriers entails the loss of protectionist rent that can be extracted from tariffs (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003; Robinson and Acemoglu, 2006). Capital account reforms permit private owners of capital

Authoritarian regimes and the reversal of economic reforms  189 (domestic and foreign) to allocate investment to efficient firms rather than serve the autocratic state’s political interests (Lardy, 2019; Milner and Mukherjee, 2009). This reduces the access to financial capital for autocrats and diminishes their capacity to allocate capital to reward supporters (Albertus and Menaldo, 2018; Haber, 2006; Lardy, 2019). The fact that economic liberalization substantially erodes the authoritarian state’s control over the economy can endanger the ruling elite’s political survival and induce them to reverse economic reforms. To see why, first note that the shift in economic power from the state to the market that results from liberalization prevents autocrats from appropriating rent through taxation, tariffs, or other forms of predatory behavior (McGuire and Olson, 1996; Robinson and Acemoglu, 2006; Wintrobe, 1998). This, in turn, makes it difficult for dictators to distribute rent and patronage to regime loyalists or those in the “minimal winning coalition” that support the regime (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003; Kaire, 2019). Next, the more the authoritarian state detaches itself from controlling the economy because of economic liberalization, the lower its ability to raise revenue from domestic production. This raises the regimes’ cost of delivering economic benefits such as subsidies and transfers to the general populace. The autocrat’s increasing inability to provide rent to regime loyalists owing to the reasons delineated above can be destabilizing given that “the most serious threat dictators face emanates from within their support coalition” (Albertus and Menaldo, 2012: 974). Furthermore, lower capacity to deliver fiscal benefits to citizens that results from ceding economic control to the market may engender anti-regime discontent and induce civilians to “demand” political reforms, including democratization (Albertus et al., 2018; Boix and Stokes, 2003; Robinson and Acemoglu, 2006). These demands can be reinforced by domestic private sector firms who might use their newly acquired wealth from economic liberalization to compel the regime to democratize. It is important to note here that ensuring regime survival requires autocrats to sustain the loyalty of supporters, including those in the minimum winning coalition (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003; Haber, 2006). It also requires autocrats to consistently provide a steady stream of material benefits to civilians to sustain the implicit bargain between the ruling elite and domestic citizens whereby the latter relinquish political freedom in exchange for transfers and public goods from the regime (Desai et al., 2007; Gehlbach et al., 2016). Because economic reforms prevent dictators from raising the necessary (i) rent required to maintain the supporters’ loyalty and (ii) resources to sustain the implicit bargain, they will thus have strong incentives to reverse such reforms to survive in office. 12.3.2 Susceptibility to Sanctions Higher levels of trade and financial (e.g., capital account) openness have given access to export markets and foreign capital for autocracies that liberalized their economic policies (Desai et al., 2007; Malesky, 2009; Richter, 2013). On the one hand, economic liberalization generated benefits such as greater foreign investment inflows and higher economic growth (on average) for autocratic states (Desai, et al., 2007; Pond, 2018; Richter, 2013). On the other hand, however, it has also imposed economic costs—for example, exposure to terms-of-trade shocks, higher exchange rate volatility, and growing inequality—for these regimes. Access to foreign export markets and foreign capital from global financial markets has also made autocracies more vulnerable to international economic sanctions imposed by particularly advanced industrial democracies (Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2015; Hufbauer et al., 2007; Kaire, 2019).

190  Research handbook on authoritarianism Authoritarian regimes are targeted by such sanctions particularly when they rig elections, crack down on dissidents, restrict civil liberties, or violate human rights (Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2015; Kaire, 2019). Indeed, Western powers frequently condemn human rights violations committed by authoritarian states and “punish” such violations via sanctions that entail “withdrawal of customary trade or financial relations” (Hufbauer et al., 2007: 3; see also Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2015; Marinov, 2005). Economic sanctions of this sort include travel bans, stopping capital and investment flows to repressive autocracies, and severely curtailing oil or other natural resource exports from these regimes (Hufbauer et al., 2007; Kaire, 2019). These sanctions are overt attempts to put pressure on autocracies and incentivize policy change, including greater respect for human rights by these regimes. Examples of economic sanctions levied against autocracies are not rare. For instance, the European Union imposed sanctions on Venezuela in 2017 for human rights violations committed by Maduro’s regime. The US and UN’s Security Council have around 50 active sanctions in place that largely target autocracies. Sanctions usually involve banning oil exports from Venezuela and “freezing” foreign capital inflows to the country’s domestic economy (Hufbauer et al., 2007; Von Soest et al., 2017). Access to foreign capital, investment, and export markets for Mugabe’s regime in Zimbabwe was cut by advanced democracies in 2011. Cuba and Iran have also been targeted by the various types of sanctions listed above (Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2015; Hufbauer et al., 2007). Whether economic sanctions imposed on autocracies are effective is a matter of scholarly debate. For instance, some researchers suggest that sanctions levied against autocrats may compel them to “adjust” their behavior under certain conditions (Hufbauer et al., 2007; Von Soest et al., 2017). Others, however, contend that sanctions against autocracies are ineffective owing to the lack of electoral accountability within these states and their capacity to employ repression (Licht, 2017; Marinov, 2005). Notwithstanding this debate, it is plausible that fear of sanctions has deleterious consequences for the domestic economy that can induce autocrats to reverse economic reforms. This is because of two main reasons. First, the material costs of sanctions incurred by autocracies that are targets of such punishment are likely to be prohibitively high when these countries are highly integrated with the global economy. This is not surprising as autocratic states that have strong links with the global trading and financial system depend on foreign markets, particularly advanced industrial democracies, for export revenue and foreign capital (Escribà-Folch and Wright, 2015; Licht, 2017). Losing access to export markets and foreign capital because of sanctions, therefore, has severe adverse macroeconomic effects for “dependent” autocracies that are highly exposed to global trade and financial flows (Hufbauer et al., 2007; Kaire, 2019; Marinov, 2005). Moreover, ordinary citizens within such sanction-targeted autocracies face the brunt of the aforementioned deleterious consequences that can include job losses, sharp decline in consumption, and economic insecurity. This breeds discontent against the authoritarian ruling elite among denizens and induces them—often with the support of opposition groups—to mobilize against the regime (Albertus et al., 2018; Desai et al., 2007; Kaire, 2019). Hence, to prevent credible challenges to their rule from citizens and opposition groups, autocracies relying on foreign exports or capital (or both) have political incentives to backtrack from economic liberalization. Doing so reduces their economy’s overall exposure to export markets and foreign capital, which reduces their dependence on “outside” powers. This helps the autocratic elite prolong their rule, further encouraging them to step back from economic reforms. Second, advanced industrial democracies that provide substantial aid, investment, or access to markets to autocratic states have greater capacity to exercise their economic leverage

Authoritarian regimes and the reversal of economic reforms  191 against such “dependent” autocracies. Leverage can be and has been exercised by advanced democracies via (for example) “technology deprivation”—that is, banning high-technology goods to economically dependent autocracies that can be diverted by the latter for nuclear weapons development or augmenting intelligence capabilities (Kaire, 2019; Marinov, 2005). The second channel through which advanced democracies exercise their leverage is to credibly threaten arms embargoes against autocracies that rely on international trade and capital flows. Note that when Western powers exercise their leverage via these two channels against autocracies that are highly integrated with the global economy, it can severely jeopardize their security. Rational autocrats in such economically integrated states will likely recognize ex ante that their country’s security will be compromised ex post because of arms embargoes and technological sanctions. This expectation will induce them to backpedal on economic liberalization and reduce their dependence on foreign markets to avert sanctions exercised against them by external powers. 12.3.3 Economic Liberalization, Trade and Financial Shocks, and Political Survival Trade liberalization has promoted greater productivity, economic growth, and higher living standards in developing economies, which include autocracies (Milner and Mukherjee, 2009; Pei, 2021). Financial (e.g., capital account) reforms in autocracies have also generated benefits including augmentation of domestic savings, reduction in capital costs in these states, and greater allocative efficiency of capital that increases economic growth (Allen et al., 2017; Gabrielle, 2020). Yet autocracies have also incurred costs stemming from international trade and capital flows that follow economic liberalization. For instance, exposure to international capital flows has increased exchange rate volatility in autocracies and made these states (and developing economies) more susceptible to currency crashes or “sudden stop” crises (Allen et al., 2017; Lardy, 2019). This has led to recurring balance-of-payments crises, current account imbalances, and sharp contractions in economic output. Further, as Mansfield and Reinhardt (2008: 621) suggest, “exposure to global market increases the vulnerability of a country’s economic output”—this includes autocracies—to terms of trade shocks or other idiosyncratic supply shocks. Additionally, higher levels of trade in final goods and offshoring (trade in intermediate inputs) resulting from more trade openness increases long-term economic instability in developing economies (including autocracies) through their impact on labor-demand elasticities (Milner and Mukherjee, 2009; Robinson and Acemoglu, 2006). More competition due to trade liberalization tends to drive firms in autocratic (and other developing) states to import cheaper and a higher variety of input that are substitutes for domestic workers (Gabrielle, 2020; Lardy, 2019). The easier it is for firms to substitute across inputs in the production process, the greater the elasticity of demand, implying that demand for labor responds significantly to a change in wages. Higher labor demand elasticities increase unemployment and economic insecurity. This depresses real wages, and correspondingly domestic civilians’ consumption levels, ensuring the deterioration of citizens’ welfare in authoritarian economies. To exacerbate matters, autocratic states often lack adequate social safety nets, welfare programs, and institutionalized emergency mechanisms, all of which allow these regimes to effectively address the domestic fallout of severe terms-of-trade shocks and financial crisis (Albertus et al., 2018; Haber, 2006; Lardy, 2019). This hinders the autocrats’ ability to address macroeconomic crises that may result from higher levels of trade and financial openness, while triggering resentment

192  Research handbook on authoritarianism among citizens and thus incentivizing them to oppose the regime (Gehlbach et al., 2016; Wintrobe, 1998). The possibility that citizens can credibly challenge the regime in the context of globalization-induced economic crisis has two immediate effects that induce authoritarian regimes to reverse economic reforms. The first is that the authoritarian ruling elite will likely recognize that anti-regime discontent among citizens creates opportunities for political opponents to mobilize mass-based anti-regime protests (Desai et al., 2007; Gehlbach et al., 2016; Robinson and Acemoglu, 2006). The second effect is that the authoritarian elite may anticipate that they may need to either employ heavy-handed repression or extend political rights to denizens in response to anti-regime mobilization (Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2003; Gehlbach et al., 2016). Because both these “second-order” effects resulting from trade and financial openness can undermine the autocratic elite’s tenuous grip on power, they thus have political incentives to reverse economic reforms. While the theoretical claims from this and the other perspectives discussed above provide rich insights, they do not provide a comprehensive theory of the domestic political processes that trigger economic reform reversal in autocracies. We explain this drawback in the following section and then briefly present our theoretical ideas that explain why authoritarian states have pushed back against economic liberalization.

12.4

SOES, APPARATCHIKS, AND ECONOMIC REFORM REVERSAL

The theoretical perspectives summarized in the previous section raise some key questions, which suggest the need for further theoretical refinement to comprehensively address the issue of economic reform reversal across autocracies. First, despite the compelling arguments provided by existing studies presented above, they do not adequately address the timing of the reversal of economic reforms in autocracies. Indeed, less effort has been exerted toward explaining why authoritarian states have generally retreated from economic liberalization only since the early 2000s, but not earlier. Answering this question is important in helping researchers fully grasp the underlying political processes that have driven autocrats over time to step back from trade and financial liberalization. Second, extant theories have paid relatively less attention to the role domestic economic actors have played in autocracies with respect to pushing back against economic reforms (Albertus et al., 2018; Lardy, 2019; Pei, 2021). This is surprising as policymakers in authoritarian states—similar to their democratic counterparts—are susceptible to anti-reform pressure from domestic actors including economic elites or other actors whose material interests are adversely affected by trade or financial liberalization (Gehlbach et al., 2016; Haber, 2006; Lardy, 2019). Indeed, following from the preceding claim, we briefly suggest that one key powerful economic group within autocratic states actively seeking to roll back economic liberalization are SOEs. To this end, note that trade and financial liberalization can have far-reaching consequences on the economy, affecting not only foreign, but also domestic state-owned firms in developing states, including autocracies (Lardy, 2019; Milner and Mukherjee, 2009; Pei, 2021). Market reforms require SOEs to sacrifice their “soft-budget constraint” (Kornai, 1980) and disregard their strong networks with the state. However, SOEs are often structurally rigid and thus cannot adjust to a dynamic business environment engendered by pro-market reforms. SOEs, therefore, struggle to cope financially as they progressively

Authoritarian regimes and the reversal of economic reforms  193 lose market share to private and foreign firms in the wake of economic liberalization. The loss of market share induces SOEs to put pressure on the authoritarian state to “step away” from economic reforms. Another key domestic group in autocracies whose material interests are adversely affected by economic reforms are the “privileged apparatchiks” (Pei, 2021: 8) within authoritarian states. Although apparatchiks are frequently associated with the interests of the ruling elite in communist dictatorships, this group’s economic interests are often tied to SOEs or other state-owned businesses that cannot compete against import competition and newly emerged domestic private firms following economic liberalization (Haggard and Kaufmann, 1995; Weyland, 1998). The weakening of SOEs is particularly damaging for this domestic group as they often rely on state-owned businesses to obtain rent, establish their political or business influence, and extend their privileges (Kornai, 1980; Pei, 2021). As such, the potential losses apparatchiks incur from economic liberalization will influence them to use their entrenched leverage within the authoritarian regime to push back against economic reforms. As suggested by Pei (2021: 8) in the context of autocracies such as China as well as other autocracies, A transition away from communism … is also likely to get stuck because entrenched interests, above all the privileged apparatchiks of the Leninist party-state, will use the legacy institutions of totalitarianism to block economic reforms … and prevent democratization lest it cost them their power and privileges.

We build on our preceding theoretical claims to posit that the SOEs’ and the apparatchiks’ opposition to economic reforms as well as their common material interests will encourage them to form anti-reform coalitions. This coalition will exert pressure on the authoritarian regime, including the ruling elite, to “roll back” economic liberalization policies. Pressure of this sort can cause ideational and coalitional shifts within the autocratic state itself (or within domestic authoritarian institutions) and empower other pro-statist actors who either ideologically oppose economic reforms or view such reforms as a threat to their political and financial interests. This, in turn, can plausibly result in stalling and reversal of economic reforms. It can also result in the emergence of a new state-led “political” equilibrium in which market-oriented reforms are replaced with SOEs remaining atop the “commanding heights” of the economy. We, therefore, briefly suggest in the conclusion how researchers can evaluate our theoretical arguments and the competing theoretical claims summarized earlier.

12.5 CONCLUSION This chapter began with a simple empirical observation—namely, that authoritarian regimes have, on average, backtracked from economic reforms by increasing restrictions on trade, capital account restrictions, and FDI inflows. Researchers have to date focused on how concerns held by autocratic states about the loss of control over the domestic economy, vulnerability to sanctions, and exposure to volatile international trade and financial flows explain their retreat from economic liberalization (e.g., Kaire, 2019; Lardy, 2019; Pei, 2021). We, however, suggest that the emergence of powerful anti-reform coalitions within autocracies—between SOEs and privileged apparatchiks—has played a crucial role in driving reversal of economic reforms in these states.

194  Research handbook on authoritarianism Our theoretical story and the other theoretical perspectives presented earlier need more development, detailed conceptualization, and clear micro-foundations. Future research should thus focus on building a more coherent and comprehensive—yet parsimonious—theoretical framework that provides testable predictions and causal claims to account for the reversal of economic reforms across autocracies. The more daunting challenge for researchers, however, will be testing the competing theoretical perspectives discussed in this chapter, including our proposed theoretical arguments and predictions. We lack the space to discuss the details of the research design required for empirically testing our theoretical predictions. Yet, as an example, we briefly suggest here that researchers should employ a quasi-experimental research design that involves three methodological tools for evaluating our theory (and other competing perspectives): panel data from authoritarian regimes for statistical tests of aggregate-level hypotheses, subnational observational and survey-response or survey-experiment data for identifying causal effects, and qualitative analysis of primary sources for “process-tracing” key causal mechanisms. For instance, our prediction that economically powerful SOEs exert pressure on the authoritarian ruling class to reverse economic reforms can be evaluated by estimating the association between the output share of SOEs (as % GDP) and economic policies or outcomes (e.g., customs duties, capital account openness, FDI inflows) in a panel dataset of autocracies. It might also be worth testing whether public investment in SOEs has increased over time in order to gauge whether state-led firms are being increasingly employed for generating jobs compared to private and foreign-owned firms in autocratic states. Second, collecting subnational observational firm-level data from one or a few autocracies will be necessary to identify the industries or sectors where SOEs have been disproportionately affected by import shocks or financial crises or both and estimate the extent of this adverse effect. Researchers should then gather survey-experiment or survey-response data from employees (e.g., managers) in SOEs in a few autocracies to assess their attitudes and the actions they may have taken in response to economic liberalization. Finally, qualitative analysis of primary sources will permit scholars to carefully evaluate whether SOEs and state apparatchiks have indeed formed anti-reform coalitions to push back against trade or financial liberalization in authoritarian regimes. “Process-tracing” of these sources may enable researchers to unpack the preferences of these domestic actors mentioned above and their tactics to resist trade and financial liberalization. This chapter has thus far emphasized the need to explain and evaluate why autocracies— as a (presumed) homogeneous group—have turned their backs to economic reforms. Yet future work in this issue area will benefit substantially if researchers explore whether or how institutional differences across authoritarian regimes may affect the prospects for economic liberalization of (or lack thereof) in these states. This research can be pursued by addressing the following questions: ● Does the “type” of authoritarian regime—military, personalist, or single-party dictatorship—influence economic reforms in these states? If so, how? ● To what extent (if at all) do legislative institutions across autocracies affect the pushback against trade and financial liberalization in these regimes? ● How does the interaction between autocracies and international institutions like the International Monetary Fund and World Bank influence the degree of trade and capital account openness in these states?

Authoritarian regimes and the reversal of economic reforms  195 Answering these questions is important because it appears that the “End of History” is unlikely in the first half of the twenty-first century. Rather, authoritarian regimes persist and are making a comeback across Africa and Asia in particular. Thus, understanding why and when autocracies opt for economic autarky is vital since it has implications for global economic welfare and possibly the bleak future for democracy in the developing world.

NOTES 1. Operationalized as (Exports + Imports)/GDP (%). 2. The temporal range of the import duties variable is determined by the availability of data for this measure. 3. See https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2021/01/china-enacts-new-foreigninvestment-security. Accessed June 9, 2021. 4. The official translation of this measure is available at https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-/media/​ files/insight/publications/2021/01/foreign_investment_security_review_measures.pdf?la=en. Accessed June 23, 2021. 5. See “Presidential Decree of the Russian Federation”, November 21, 2020, available at https://cis​ -legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=128721. Accessed May 15, 2021. 6. This includes earlier and recent work on economic reforms in autocracies by, for example, Haggard and Kaufmann (1995), Weyland (1998), Malesky (2009), and Pond (2018).

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Authoritarian regimes and the reversal of economic reforms  197 Weyland, K. 1998. “Swallowing the bitter pill: Sources of popular support for neoliberal reform in Latin America”. Comparative Political Studies, 31(5): 539–68. Wintrobe, R. 1998. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

13. Authoritarian regimes and women’s rights Daniela Donno

13.1 INTRODUCTION Recent decades have seen a rise in reforms advancing women’s rights and equality in autocracies. Rwanda is often touted as a key example. In concert with increased female representation in the legislature, local government and civil service, Rwanda has adopted laws reforming women’s access to property and inheritance; strengthening penalties for domestic violence; and enhancing girls’ access to education. Similar, if perhaps less pronounced, trends have occurred in other East African countries, including Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia. In North Africa, an alignment between moderate regimes and women’s movements have ushered in reforms to family codes in Morocco and Algeria, in an effort to sideline more religiously conservative opposition parties. These reforms, while admittedly facing implementation problems, are important steps for women in societies with a long tradition of Shari’a law, whose application has sharply limited access to divorce, inheritance, citizenship rights and child custody. In Asia, autocratic regimes like Malaysia, Cambodia and Vietnam have enacted legislation expanding penalties for domestic violence and sexual harassment, and enhancing women’s equality in family and property law. This progress contrasts with the idea that women’s rights are dangerous for autocrats (Chenoweth and Marks 2022), or that it is necessarily the suppression, rather than the advancement, of women’s rights that enables autocratic survival (Fish 2002). This progress does resonate, however, with other bodies of research that have recognized the compatibility between women’s rights and autocracy, either for ideological reasons or because advancing gender equality is politically beneficial to the regime (Charrad 2001; Gal and Kligman 2000; Htun 2003; Tripp 2019; Valdini 2019). This chapter synthesizes insights from theoretical and empirical research to elucidate the conditions under which (and the reasons why) autocracies advance women’s rights. I draw a distinction between those who argue that women’s rights threaten autocracy and those researching state feminism and modernizing dictatorships who note the long tradition of autocrats making political use of women’s rights. Using cross-national data, I show that, on average, autocracies lag somewhat behind democracies on de jure respect for women’s rights, but this gap is greatly influenced by the poor performance of regimes in the Middle East. In other regions, differences between democracies and autocracies are less pronounced, and many autocracies exceed democracies in their enactment of reforms related to women’s rights. Interestingly, these patterns are not driven solely by political institutions or geographic location. Rather, a combination of more contingent political factors – including the ideological commitments and power base of the regime – as well as the country’s international position – namely, the degree to which it relies on Western aid and approval – help explain why some autocracies have embraced gender equality as a policy priority. I conclude by considering contemporary challenges to women’s rights embodied by the transnational anti-gender movement. In a cohort of right-wing populist and conservative regimes, previously hard-fought gains for women’s equality are eroding. Although this trend 198

Authoritarian regimes and women’s rights  199 is not specific to authoritarian regimes, it has taken hold in a number of large and prominent autocracies, including Russia and Turkey.

13.2

TWO PERSPECTIVES

It is often assumed that women’s rights and democracy go hand in hand. Intuitively, as a system of government that fosters political equality, democracy should create greater space for women to claim rights not only in the political sphere, but in the social, economic and private spheres as well (Beer 2009). Democracy enhances women’s ability to lobby for policy changes that may not otherwise be in the interest of the political elite. Research on 20th-century democratic transitions, particularly in Latin America, notes that women’s movements played an important role in mobilizing for political change (Bermeo 1999; Waylen 1994). This is still true today, as women have been at the vanguard of mobilization during the Arab Spring (Moghadam 2018) and more recently in Iran (2022–23). Historically, the extension of suffrage to women is a hallmark of democratic deepening. And improvements in women’s rights have been found to be a precursor of democratic change globally (Wang et al. 2017). Conversely, the suppression of women’s rights has been shown to be an important factor contributing to the enduring longevity of authoritarianism in the Middle East (Fish 2002). Authoritarianism is typically associated with patriarchal social systems; and even at the micro-level, research has demonstrated a link between misogynistic (patriarchal) world views and authoritarian attitudes (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Inglehart, Norris and Welzel 2003). It’s no wonder that analysts continue to view feminist movements as a threat to autocrats (Chenoweth and Marks 2022). Yet, the empirical track record is far more complex – and scholarly consensus far more elusive – than the simple idea that authoritarianism is antithetical to women’s empowerment. Many autocracies have advanced women’s rights and equality in the political, economic and social spheres (Donno and Kreft 2019). And while this trend has increased in recent decades – due to post-Cold War international dynamics to be further elaborated below – there are historical roots as well. Roughly speaking, two autocratic profiles have embraced progressive policies on gender. First, communist and socialist regimes advanced gender equality in the economic sphere, as women’s participation in the workforce was central to the ideological model (Gal and Kligman 2000; Zheng 2005). A host of social services and reproductive health care accompanied this focus on women’s economic participation, though de facto inequalities and hierarchies remained, including in the political sphere which continued to be male-dominated (Waylen 1994). Second, women’s rights have been advanced by a diverse set of authoritarian states that can be loosely categorized as “modernizing.” These regimes have embraced policies that seek to reform society and the economy, jump start economic development, and bring their countries closer to the West. There is no single institutional profile that matches this description. It includes a range of military dictatorships, monarchies, and even some personalist autocracies. In Latin America, modernizing military regimes in the 1960s and 1970s enacted reforms to women’s civil status and property rights (Htun 2003). In the Muslim world, the mantle of modernization has been assumed by various regimes in different eras: Kemal Ataturk’s reforms in post-Ottoman Turkey; secular-nationalist regimes in the 1960s, including Egypt, Tunisia and Iraq; and modernizing monarchies in the 1990s and 2000s, including Morocco, Qatar and

200  Research handbook on authoritarianism Jordan. The common thread among these cases is that women’s empowerment has come to be associated with modernity and its attendant benefits, including international prestige (Towns 2010) and economic development (Coleman 2004). 13.2.1 Political Institutions and State Feminist Policies A diverse literature on “state feminism” encapsulates several of these examples. Stetson and Mazur (1995) define state feminism as the creation and activities of government structures that are formally charged with advancing women’s equality and empowerment. This includes the adoption of legislative gender quotas – a by now nearly ubiquitous policy among authoritarian regimes – but also the creation of ministries and agencies dedicated to female empowerment. Consider, for example, Vietnam’s Law on Gender Equality (2006) which sets a number of national gender equality goals and mandates the creation of a state agency for implementation and monitoring of these goals. An important thread running through research on state feminism is that, in autocracies, the impetus for these policies may be as much political as they are normative. The creation of state feminist machinery does not necessarily translate to effective policy implementation (Adams 2007). As Lorch and Bunk (2016, 7) explain, “the main motivation behind such measures may not be the advancement of women’s rights per se, but the desire of non-democratic regimes to realise other political objectives, such as remaining in power.” Discussing Rwanda, Berry and Lake (2021) note that the regime’s highly touted gender-progressive policies have boosted international and domestic legitimacy while “masking the regime’s otherwise authoritarian consolidation of the power of a small Anglophone Tutsi elite” (p. 469). Research on legislative gender quotas in authoritarian contexts highlights various ways that regimes can orient these policies toward their own political advantage (Muriaas and Wang 2012). In Tanzania, Bjarnegård and Zetterberg (2016) show how the ruling party benefits politically from quotas, because it has a reserve of strong and loyal female candidates tied to the party women’s wing; in contrast, opposition parties are too weak to use quota seats as a way to advance competitive candidates with a women-focused agenda. More generally, quota seats in authoritarian legislatures tend to be populated by loyal supporters of the regime, commonly with family or economic ties to the ruling elite (Bush and Gao 2017; David and Nanes 2011; Sater 2007). In short, women’s rights can be employed by autocrats to enhance their legitimacy, popular support and political hegemony. Donno and Kreft (2019) further probe this idea by examining how variation in the institutionalization of authoritarian regimes shapes the extent to which governments benefit politically from advancing women’s rights. In particular, autocracies governed by institutionalized ruling parties – more so than personalist regimes – have the ability to use feminist reforms to coopt women’s support, thereby shoring up and expanding their coalition; and they find accordingly that party-based authoritarian regimes are more active in advancing women’s political, economic and social rights than other types of dictatorships. Another ancillary reason why well-institutionalized parties may be associated with a women-focused agenda is that strong parties often seek to transcend ethnic divisions. Research in Africa shows that women’s representation in positions of political power is systematically lower in countries whose politics are dominated by ethnicity (Arriola and Johnson 2014). Ethnic-based systems tend to have weak party structures, and politics is organized around (co-ethnic) patronage; women rarely occupy prominent positions in these

Authoritarian regimes and women’s rights  201 ethnic clientelist networks (Benstead 2016). It is perhaps not surprising, then, that many of the autocratic ruling parties active in prioritizing women’s rights and representation are those which espouse ideologies that transcend ethnicity and seek to build a national (non-ethnic) identity. Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) is a national movement with socialist origins; Rwanda’s ruling party (Rwanda Patriotic Front, RPF) seeks to erase ethnicity altogether. Tripp’s (2001) research on Uganda reveals that women leaders view the ruling party’s ‘anti-sectarianism’ as a key positive factor which warrants their support. 13.2.2 Women’s Movements in Autocracies Politically, the process of top-down state-driven reform often involves some accommodation of the women’s movement. This is an important point, because it belies the notion that women’s movements are necessarily a threat to autocrats. To be sure, there is an element of cooptation in these relationships, and feminist movement leaders are well aware of the compromises they must make in order to achieve policy goals in autocracies. In a study of contemporary state feminism in Cameroon, Adams (2007, 185–6) describes the mechanics of patronage and cooptation in detail: At state-sponsored celebrations … MINCOF [Ministry of Women’s Affairs] distributes goods such as farm tools, fertilizer and small machinery to women’s groups. Only registered groups are eligible for this assistance … [W]omen’s associations that seek to eliminate discriminatory legislation, to develop new laws that protect women’s rights and to advocate for other gender equity policies must work through the ministry.

In Uganda, Tripp (2001) identifies a more balanced relationship, whereby the women’s movement has retained an important degree of autonomy that has allowed it to choose when to cooperate with the regime on particular issues. The women’s movement in Uganda is composed of a varied network of issue-based organizations, most of which are not dependent on the state for resources. This has allowed them to “challenge patterns of clientelist politics” and “pursue an agenda that goes far beyond what was permitted by mass women’s organizations tied to the ruling party or state” (Tripp 2001, 108). At the same time, women leaders must sometimes choose between loyalty to the ruling party – which ensures their political survival – and loyalty to the movement, and different individuals navigate these compromises in different ways. Notwithstanding these challenges, the experience of Uganda and elsewhere demonstrates that women activists can have a real policy impact in authoritarian regimes (Bauer and Burnet 2013; Moghadam 2017). Landmark reforms to family, civil and criminal law in Morocco and Algeria were the product of sustained interaction, compromise and cooperation between the regime and women’s movements (Tripp 2019, chapters 4–5). On the other hand, there are counterexamples like Saudi Arabia where advances in women’s rights have been accompanied by harsh repression of the women’s movement. Since taking power in 2017, Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) has ushered in a range of changes to Saudi Arabia’s guardianship system, limited the power of the religious police (the main body enforcing restrictions on women), and perhaps most famously has allowed women to drive. Yet, for MBS it is essential that these changes be perceived as “top-down” and flowing from above. Reforms are an instrument to enhance the personalist nature of the regime. Scores of female activists have been imprisoned. A similar dynamic was evident in Tunisia under Ben Ali

202  Research handbook on authoritarianism (1987–2011) during which autonomous organizations had little influence and Islamist women activists in particular faced harsh repression (Tripp 2019, chapter 6). The question of why autocratic leaders sometimes forge cooperative versus combative relationships with feminist activists is an area ripe for future research. It is likely that the nature of women’s demands matter, namely, whether they would upset social hierarchies, particularly those upon which the regime also depends (Ritter, Barnes and Lynn 2022). Institutions matter as well. In autocracies where legislatures play some role in crafting policy, members of the women’s movement may gain representation and use this to insert themselves in the policymaking process.1 In Uganda, for example, an increase in female members of parliament has brought an increase in legislative attention to women’s issues (Clayton, Josefsson and Wang 2016). Though women representatives in autocratic legislatures tend to be relegated to less influential committee positions, their influence may increase over time (Shalaby and Elimam 2019), and in certain issue domains such as family and education, they are more likely to hold positions of leadership (Shalaby and Elimam 2020).

13.3

EMPIRICAL PATTERNS

As the previous discussion outlined, advances in women’s rights in authoritarian contexts are common. To give shape to this insight, this section examines cross-national patterns using data on the de jure status of women over time. I categorize countries as authoritarian or democratic using the classification scheme of Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014). They define authoritarian regimes, minimally, as those which lack the key feature of democracy, namely, competitive elections that are reasonably free and fair. The first data source on women’s status comes from the World Bank’s Women, Business and the Law (WBL) project (World Bank Group 2022). This project measures women’s de jure rights along eight indicators: mobility, workplace, pay, marriage, parenthood, entrepreneurship, assets and pensions. As a summary measure of women’s de jure status across these issue areas, I employ the variable WBL Index, which averages across these eight indicators. Higher values equate to better legal status for women. It is important to note that this index is based only on de jure status; whether legal protections and rights are effectively enforced is a different question, which I discuss further below. It is therefore possible for countries to score well on the WBL Index, but for women to nevertheless experience persistent de facto economic and social subordination. Figure 13.1 shows average values of the WBL Index since 1971, by regime type. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries are excluded from the analysis in order to provide a more focused comparison among developing countries. Clearly, women’s de jure status has been improving over time, but there is a persistent gap between democracies and authoritarian regimes in the developing world. Yet, if we look just below the surface, we see that there is wide variation among authoritarian regimes. Breaking up the autocracies by region (Figure 13.2) reveals that the average is greatly influenced by the low performance of countries in the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region. Dictatorships in Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and the Americas cluster more closely to the democratic average, and communist/post-communist dictatorships of Eurasia (including those in East and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union) perform even better than democracies for much of the time period under consideration.

Authoritarian regimes and women’s rights  203

Figure 13.1

Women, Business and the Law Index: average values for democracies and dictatorships

Figure 13.2

Women, Business and the Law Index: average values for dictatorships by region

204  Research handbook on authoritarianism The persistently low legal status of women in the Middle East is the product of a complex mix of social, cultural and political factors. It is, in other words, an over-determined outcome. The enmeshment of religious with political authority, including in constitutions (Htun and Weldon 2018), and the ceding of social and family matters to Shari’a courts are features of many MENA countries. Yet, among a number of countries in the region, change is brewing. A second measure of interest, then, has to do with the intensity of legal change. In a recent article with co-authors Sara Fox and Joshua Kaasik, we collected data on the number of legal reforms advancing women’s rights in a range of social, economic and political issue areas (Donno, Fox and Kaasik 2021). Whereas the WBL data provides a comparative measure of women’s status, these data measure the intensity of reforms, and are therefore capturing the extent of the regime’s commitment to making de jure advances on women’s rights. Figure 13.3 presents the average number of legal reforms for women’s rights over time (the data begin in 1996), comparing democracies and authoritarian regimes. As before, the analysis is limited to developing (non-OECD) countries. The key variable is a count of the number of legal reforms per country-year (averaged across regime type). Strikingly, there is little difference between democracies and non-democracies on this measure, and the gap seems to have closed somewhat over time. In other words, authoritarian regimes are, on average, enacting gender reforms at a rate quite similar to democracies. In seeking to explain these patterns, Donno, Fox and Kaasik (2021) show that this is not driven simply by the fact that many dictatorships begin at a lower starting point of women’s empowerment (and therefore have more room for reform). In fact, it tends to be the regimes with middle to higher performance on women’s empowerment that continue to enact further reforms, in a kind of virtuous cycle.

Figure 13.3

Average number of women’s rights (WR) reforms per year, by regime type

Authoritarian regimes and women’s rights  205 Table 13.1

Autocracies with highest rate of women’s rights (WR) legal reforms, 1996–2015

Country

Avg. No. of WR Reforms Per Year

1. UAE

0.33

2. Mozambique

0.32

3. Zimbabwe

0.31

4. Ethiopia

0.27

5. Morocco

0.23

6. Uganda

0.23

7. Jordan

0.23

8. Bangladesh

0.23

9.

0.21

Saudi Arabia

10. Egypt

0.19

11. Algeria

0.17

12. Democratic Republic of Congo

0.16

13. Namibia

0.15

14. Mauritania

0.15

15. Venezuela

0.14

Which countries are most active in advancing gender reforms? There is not a simple answer to this question. Table 13.1 lists the 15 highest performing authoritarian countries, in terms of the average number of legal reforms enacted per year, considered over a 20-year period from 1996 to 2015. (For countries that transitioned to or away from authoritarianism during this time period, only authoritarian regime-years are included in the calculation of this average.) The list includes countries from MENA, Africa, Latin America and Asia, characterized by a range of institutional configurations: monarchies, republics, revolutionary party-based regimes (Zimbabwe), military regimes (Egypt) and personalist regimes (DRC, Venezuela). In short, patterns of variation among autocracies in terms of legislative activity for women’s rights defies simple explanation in terms of region, religion or constitutional system. Several studies have highlighted the role of international (Western) pressure and linkage in encouraging reforms – a point discussed further below. 13.3.1 Implementation Challenges in Autocracies The question of how meaningful these legal reforms are is an important one. Particularly in authoritarian contexts, where rule of law is often weak, laws may be enacted just for show. Whereas in democracies citizens and social movements can mobilize around issues of compliance and enforcement – and can use the legal system to press for implementation of laws – in authoritarian contexts these bottom-up compliance strategies are more difficult. On the issue of implementation of women’s rights reforms, Bjarnegård and Donno (2023) distinguish between issue areas where implementation is centralized versus decentralized. Gender quotas – particularly the reserved seat variety common in autocracies – are implemented in a one-shot, centralized manner that simply involves the creation of new legislative seats and the addition of these contests to the electoral ballot. In contrast, laws related to violence against women, family law or women’s economic rights are implemented in a far more decentralized manner, involving the interaction of state prosecutors, the police, firms and citizens on a case-by-case basis.

206  Research handbook on authoritarianism Effective implementation is therefore complex and can be inhibited by patriarchal social norms that make it difficult for women to come forward to claim their rights in courts of law. These problems are likely to be especially pronounced in autocratic contexts that lack judicial independence and robust civil society organizations to assist women in bringing cases forward. In Jordan, for example, despite reforms that raised the legal age of marriage to 18, Shari’a courts in charge of family law regularly grant exceptions to this rule (Prettitore 2015). The persistent authority of customary and religious courts governing issues of family and personal status remains a major impediment to the effective realization of women’s legal rights in many countries (Nyamu-Musembi 2006). Moreover, this institutional authority is entwined with ideas about social norms: when patriarchal, conservative norms are believed to be pervasive in a society, this can inhibit state actors from applying or enforcing laws that would empower women (Barnett 2022).

13.4

INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES

To understand why women’s rights reforms in autocracies have increased particularly in recent decades, we must consider the importance of international norms and incentives. Since the end of the Cold War, advancing women’s rights has proved to be a way for dictatorships to align with (Western) democratic norms without necessarily having to engage in more politically costly liberalization of the political-electoral spheres. In other words, as pressure for democracy increased, autocrats sought ways to signal adherence with Western values without introducing fully competitive elections. In support of this idea, Donno, Fox and Kaasik (2021) show that autocracies that are highly dependent on international (Western) aid and that are subject to high levels of human rights shaming are enacting more women’s rights reforms. This is true for a range of reforms related to violence against women, access to education, equal work laws and family law: dictatorships under international pressure are more active in the sphere of gender reform. Interestingly, this is not true of reforms related to electoral competition, which are more immediately threatening to the autocrat’s grip on power. There is also evidence, on the other side of this relationship, that international policymakers reward women’s rights. In an experimental study on a unique sample of international development professionals, Bush, Donno and Zetterberg (2023) find that they value when autocrats make women’s rights reforms, that they are willing to reward them with greater foreign aid, and perhaps most interestingly that they interpret these reforms as a sign of democratic progress. In a complementary vein, a substantial body of research on legislative gender quotas documents the role of international norms, assistance and pressure in promoting this particular policy. Quotas are now nearly ubiquitous in autocratic legislatures – a remarkable outcome which would be difficult to envision in the absence of international incentives. The push and pull factors range from concerns about international status (Towns 2010), to the specific demands of international organizations and foreign aid donors (Bush 2011; Edgell 2017; Okundaye and Breuning 2021), to pressure from transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Hughes, Krook and Paxton 2015; Hughes et al. 2019). Enhanced female representation in autocracies has surely shaped societal conceptions about women’s role in politics for the better, and has given women a formal place in the political process. As discussed above, in the more open authoritarian contexts – and particularly when combined with

Authoritarian regimes and women’s rights  207 an active women’s movement – this has afforded women representatives a real role in crafting legislation. This being said, it is worth noting again some of the limits of gender quotas in autocratic contexts, such as where legislatures play a limited policymaking role and where loyalty to the regime is often the key criterion for career advancement. To sum up, international influences have certainly helped advance women’s de jure rights in authoritarian regimes. Yet, a cautionary point is that these incentives for reform stem rather specifically from Western actors and international organizations associated with the liberal international order. In recent years, autocratic great powers – most importantly Russia and China – have assumed more assertive global roles, and women’s rights do not feature as one of their foreign policy priorities. We should be mindful, then, of the growing limitations of Western influence. Countries that receive substantial aid and support from China and Russia are now less likely to feel obliged to enact policy changes in line with the Western democracy and rights-based agenda (Hyde 2020). There is also a strategic dynamic underpinning the interactions between autocrats and their international partners (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2022). Women’s rights are preferred by so many autocrats precisely because they are less politically costly than other democratic reforms. And the challenges of effectively implementing gender reforms – especially those related to women’s social and economic rights – are real. Reforms may therefore be introduced for show, as a kind of “lip service” to international norms. This is the cynical interpretation that focuses on the instrumentalization of women’s rights. A more balanced interpretation would acknowledge the substantive limits of legal reforms in autocratic contexts, but would point out that changes in laws are often the starting point for longer-term processes of deeper societal mobilization and change (Bauer and Burnet 2013; Htun and Jensenius 2022). Additionally, in the absence of international engagement, the outcome in many authoritarian states might have been no change at all.

13.5

ANTI-GENDER BACKLASH

Advances in women’s rights in authoritarian regimes face a growing threat in the form of the transnational “anti-gender” movement. It is hard to pinpoint exactly when this movement crystallized, but its momentum has picked up in the past decade as a response to the legal and normative gains of the LGBT and transgender movements. In response, a global network of political parties, governments, religious leaders, and influencers – mostly of the right-wing conservative populist variety – have placed the idea of the traditional family at the center of their political agendas, using it as a rallying cry to mobilize socially conservative voters. While primarily motivated by the LGBT and transgender movements, this sweeping anti-gender backlash has also brought serious policy setbacks for the women’s movement in many countries. Legal access to abortion is under sustained threat; domestic violence laws are eroding; women’s educational gains are at risk; conservative religious authority over family law is increasing. These trends are certainly not limited to authoritarian regimes: right-wing populist parties in Brazil, Poland, the US and other democracies are at the forefront of this movement. But it has also taken hold in a number of large and prominent autocracies, in a manner all the more alarming because gains for women previously implemented under secular modernizing regimes are at risk.

208  Research handbook on authoritarianism Turkey is a prime example. From Turkey’s democratization in the 1980s until roughly 2010, a series of progressive gender reforms were introduced, encouraged by a vibrant women’s movement and by the promise of progress toward membership in the European Union. Yet, in the past decade, as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Turkey and the AKP (Justice and Development party) have consolidated their authoritarian grip, women’s rights are facing threats unprecedented in the modern era. The government has leveraged its control over the courts to reinterpret family law in a way that allows for greater religious authority – and fewer civil protections for women (Arat 2022). Autonomous women’s movements have been sidelined and suppressed in favor of state-affiliated institutions whose purpose is to support the regime rather than advocate for feminist goals. Similarly, in recent years the Russian state has forged a close alliance with the Orthodox church and increasingly turned its rhetoric toward the idea that the traditional family is under attack (Dogangun 2020). Putin portrays Russia globally as the last bastion and defender of conservative values. This has been accompanied by an erosion of domestic violence protections for women. In Hungary, anti-LGBT positions have long been a staple of the ruling party (Fidesz) repertoire. This has edged over most recently in a tightening of abortion laws, and a suggestion that a source of Hungary’s demographic and social problems is the existence of too many educated women. All three of these autocracies – working in concert with others, including democracies like Bulgaria and Poland – were at the forefront of opposition to the Council of Europe’s (CoE) Istanbul Convention on violence against women. This landmark document, forged after years of negotiations among CoE member states, would commit states to strengthen legal penalties for all forms of violence against women, including domestic violence, forced marriage and workplace sexual harassment. Despite being the first country to ratify the treaty, in 2021 Turkey did an about face and withdrew, citing concerns that it “normalizes homosexuality” and undermines Turkey’s “family values.” Hungary and Bulgaria have not ratified the treaty, for similar reasons, while Poland is threatening to withdraw, in a coordinated effort to undermine the Convention. Russia and Azerbaijan never signed in the first place. Nevertheless, the treaty has entered into force, and nothing prevents willing states from fulfilling their commitment to strengthen laws and enforcement capacity with the goal of combating violence against women. Yet the symbolic implications of opposition to the Convention are substantial, a sign of the growing size and coordination of this global “anti-gender” coalition with links to the broader surge in right-wing populism.

13.6 CONCLUSION Autocracies do not always suppress women’s rights. In fact, the landscape of women’s empowerment across countries and regimes is far more varied – and positive – than is often assumed. As outlined in this chapter, advancing women’s political, economic and social rights can be in autocrats’ political interest. There is in fact little difference across developing democracies and autocracies in terms of the scope and pace of legal gender reform. Pro-women policies can grow the autocrat’s base of societal support, can undermine socially conservative opposition and can buy precious goodwill from the international community. Women’s empowerment can also be in autocrats’ economic interest, part of a wider effort to modernize and grow the economy.

Authoritarian regimes and women’s rights  209 We should also bear in mind that the track record of democracies in the developing world is far from rosy, particularly when weak states, corruption and patriarchal social norms hamper efforts to empower women (Brulé 2020). Another problem in many developing democracies is the politicization of ethnicity, which creates high hurdles to bringing women into the ranks of political leaders, because ethnic horse-trading tends to center around traditional male-dominated power structures. Consider how countries like Nigeria and Kenya – where party competition and governance revolves around ethnicity – compare with more authoritarian countries like Uganda and Rwanda. Although politics is quite open in the former, women’s empowerment rarely breaks through as a policy priority. Consequently, Kenya and Nigeria lag behind many of their neighbors in women’s political representation and in the scope and intensity of efforts to enact gender-equality reforms. In Rwanda and Uganda, in contrast, the regime’s prioritization of women’s rights coincides with a focus on de-politicizing ethnic divisions and instead building a national identity. This is no accident, and it is an important aspect of authoritarian state-building in the developing world. To be sure, authoritarian regimes often use women’s rights instrumentally, raising important questions about the intention behind reforms, how meaningful they are, and whether they are effectively implemented. Writing about the phenomenon of autocratic “gender washing,” Bjarnegård and Zetterberg (2022, 62) note that women’s rights reforms are often enacted by autocrats “with ulterior motives. The idea behind it is to help a regime appear progressive, liberal and democratic, while diverting attention from its persistent authoritarian practices.” This suggests the troubling possibility that progress on women’s rights may enable the persistence of rights violations in other areas. Yet, before drawing too cynical a conclusion, it is important to consider the value of gender reforms in autocracies. Even if new policies are enacted for instrumental reasons, they have, at minimum, symbolic value and may eventually enable real progress for women. They may represent a shift in the leader’s calculation such that women are viewed as an element of the regime’s coalition of supporters, and therefore merit policy concessions. In closing, this attempt to synthesize research on gender and authoritarianism suggests a few particularly fruitful avenues for future research. One is to develop a more general comparative theory of legislative gender quotas. Quotas are by far the most studied policy for women’s empowerment, but most research focuses on democracies. We lack a systematic understanding of how they function differently in autocracies. How meaningful are quotas (and enhanced female representation more generally) for policymaking and coalition-building across different types of authoritarian regimes? Factors such as ruling party hegemony, personalism, the strength of legislatures, and the role of ethnicity in politics should be explored in a more unified way. Second, as discussed, we need a better understanding of the barriers to the implementation of gender reforms in authoritarian regimes. Under what conditions are laws likely to have teeth, and how does this vary across different categories of women’s economic, social and political rights? A third area for further research relates to how autocrats engage with today’s changing international environment, as newly assertive autocratic powers and the transnational “anti-gender” movement provide alternative models that either de-emphasize or actively challenge the feminist agenda.

210  Research handbook on authoritarianism

NOTE 1.

On the role of the legislature in Jordan, for example, see Shalaby and Elimam (2020, 241–2).

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14. Authoritarian regimes and the environment Natalie Koch

14.1 INTRODUCTION The environment poses a number of policy questions for any regime, including issues of pollution and climate change, the scope and spatial extent of environmental protection, how natural resources can and should be extracted, investment in sustainability initiatives and the “green economy,” how to manage environment-related protest movements, and more. But as Stephen Brain and Viktor Pál (2019: 2) note, “the tendency among Western scholars to associate praiseworthy environmental policy with liberalism and individualism” means that much of the existing literature on environmental policies in authoritarian systems focuses narrowly on its negative aspects, “while casting positive developments in the darkest possible light or omitting them entirely, frequently positing the lack of democratic input into the decision-making process as a key factor.” Many authoritarian regimes do have poor environmental records, but Brain and Pál’s concern, and one advanced in this chapter, is that a broader perspective is needed to account for the wide range of ways that the environment and resources are politicized in authoritarian contexts. The chapter accordingly examines three case studies from the United Arab Emirates, Kazakhstan, and China to unravel the multi-faceted relationship between authoritarian regimes and the environment. Stretching across different income levels (middle to high), population size (10 million to 1.4 billion), regime type (monarchy, personalist, and single-party authoritarian regimes), and range of environmental issues faced, these cases illustrate that nature– society relations in authoritarian regimes are just as variable as the regimes themselves. But when this diversity is approached through the lens of political geography, we can discern broader patterns that show how authoritarian regimes can develop particular concerns for environmental issues where they intersect with concerns for domestic and international legitimacy.

14.2

POLITICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT

In the West, “the environment” is understood in relation to the concept of “nature” – both ideas loosely referring to the nonhuman and physical world, forming part of “a family of keywords whose meanings bleed into, and borrow from, one another” (Castree, 2017: 3). Together, the concepts assume a particular understanding of reality that naturalizes the split between the human and nonhuman. Geographers and other critical scholars have long challenged this divide – arguing that it is a social construction rather than an empirical fact. In fact, the rhetorical and material acts that socially construct “nature” and “the environment” as spheres, separate from humans, are political acts (Castree and Braun, 2001). Setting out the boundaries between the human/nonhuman and the natural/unnatural have a long history in Western thinking, but gained special significance in the era of colonialism, when Europeans encoun213

214  Research handbook on authoritarianism tered new natures and environments, and with them, new contexts of defining nature–society relations (Merchant, 2003). As with the broader history of colonialism, Western ontologies were spread along with the colonial agents and settlers that brought new places under European control. Rather than embracing the social and cultural integration of humans with the physical world, as diverse Indigenous societies did in the precolonial Americas, Africa, and Asia, these ways of relating to nature were defined as “other” and served as an index of backwardness (Castree and Braun, 2001; Drayton, 2000; Merchant, 2003). The resulting understanding of reality that sets humans apart from nature, rather than as part of nature, is also what forms the basis for hegemonic understandings of contemporary environmentalism (Grove, 1995; Ybarra, 2018). So while this chapter will refer to “the environment” without further caveats, it is important to bear in mind that it is a social construction. The environment is politicized in myriad ways today, building from but extending well beyond the colonial patterns of ascribing a political significance to nature–society relations (Dalby, 2014; Harcourt and Nelson, 2015; Perreault et al., 2015). There are relatively few explicit studies about the relationship between the environment and authoritarianism, but as Brain and Pál (2019) note, scholars that have written on the topic often approach it with a normative frame of stigmatizing authoritarian regimes. Of course, many authoritarian regimes have tragic records of caring for the natural world and pursuing policies that expose their populations to toxic landscapes and all range of environmental injustices (Arefin, 2019; Brown, 2013; McNeill and Unger, 2010; Plokhy, 2018; Shapiro, 2001). But it is important to develop a critical perspective that does not quickly collapse analytical questions to simple moralizing storylines of good and evil, in a way that “others” authoritarianism and elevates liberal speakers as noble experts (Hoffman, 2018; Koch, 2017, 2019, 2022b). Rather, there are many questions about how authoritarian regimes relate to the environment, how citizens and subjects of authoritarian systems understand their relationship to the natural world, and how authoritarian relations beyond traditional state institutions are interwoven with environmental issues (Böhmelt, 2014; Brain, 2011; Pál and Perez, 2021; Sonnenfeld and Taylor, 2018). To address these questions with nuance, a critical geographic approach to the environment and authoritarianism begins from the idea that “there is a geopolitics of how environmental problems are represented” (Castree, 2003: 427, emphasis in original). Geopolitics is a form of power/knowledge rather than an empirical set of “facts” (Ó Tuathail, 1996). The act of defining an environmental “problem” is therefore fundamentally a discursive act of power. So while environmental problems are “real,” “there is no objective perspective on their nature, causes, and solutions. Instead, we have an array of actors – such as states, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), quasi-governmental bodies, and environmental scientists – all claiming to know the ‘truth’ about these problems (to the extent that what is defined by some actors as an environmental ‘problem’ is not seen as one by others)” (Castree, 2003: 427). A discursive approach raises questions about how authoritarian regimes define environmental issues, as well as how they narrate solutions to environmental challenges and identify opportunities. Environmental issues are politically charged in non-authoritarian systems as well, but they can assume a unique political valence when they become entangled with questions of regime survival. Indeed, authoritarian leaders’ concern with the environment and natural resources often results from a more proximate concern with ensuring the regime’s legitimacy rather than environmental protection as a good in itself.

Authoritarian regimes and the environment  215 Regime survival concerns can be manifested and narrated in many different ways, but this includes threats and opportunities from outside and inside, that is, foreign and domestic actors, institutions, and circumstances. Authoritarian regimes are notoriously concerned with their legitimacy among foreign and domestic audiences. Environmental issues can provide opportunities for regimes seeking international legitimacy, especially if they have the resources to demonstrate their environmental credentials to foreign governments or agencies, for example, by promoting positive climate change policies or hosting large environmental summits. Likewise, legitimacy can be threatened if the international community questions or decries their environmental policy failures. This same pattern of threats and opportunities applies for domestic audiences, but with the added threat that citizens might protest or otherwise mobilize against a regime if the environment is allowed to become a flashpoint for anti-regime sentiment (Doyle and Simpson, 2006; Kirchhof and McNeill, 2019; Middeldorp and Le Billon, 2019). But regime anxiety about protests does not necessarily mean a clamp-down on the people. In some cases, the potentially destabilizing effect about environmental activist movements might cause authoritarian governments to be even more engaged or proactive in managing environmental problems – or in some cases, limiting public access to information about them. The environment as a political terrain also encompasses natural resources. Natural resources are elements from the natural world to which humans ascribe a use value, typically because they support economic activities (Bakker and Bridge, 2006; Bridge, 2009; Harvey, 1974). These can include energy sources like oil, coal, or natural gas, as well as land, soil, food, and water, or minerals and precious metals like gold, copper, iron ore, lithium, and so forth. Resources are politicized because their spatial distribution is inherently uneven, both at the global level and at regional, state, sub-state, and local levels (Koch and Perreault, 2019). Authoritarian regimes have varying degrees of dependence on natural resource extraction, and likewise, the distribution of harms and benefits vary widely across different authoritarian regimes. Given the indeterminacy of both political and physical geographic circumstances, critical geographic research interrogates who controls access to certain resources, how they are extracted, who benefits and who is harmed from extraction processes, and how those profits and harms are distributed among various political actors. So even where the resource in question may be the same, harms and benefits of extraction are more questions of political geography. For example, citizens receive huge benefits from their authoritarian governments’ oil exports in the Arab Gulf states, but almost no benefits in the Central Asian states where oil revenues are largely misappropriated by political elites (Koch, 2015a). This variability means that it difficult to make any large generalizations about authoritarian regimes and the environment, except to say that the nexus must be approached through a deep, contextual analysis of how nature–society relations intersect with political, social, and cultural factors. That is to say, a critical geographic perspective is needed.

14.3

THREE CASE STUDIES

To illustrate the critical geographic approach that scholars of authoritarian regimes might use to investigate their relationship with the environment, the remainder of the chapter considers three case studies from the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kazakhstan, and China. As noted above, the countries have different income levels (middle to high), population size (10 million

216  Research handbook on authoritarianism to 1.4 billion), regime type (monarchy, personalist, and single-party authoritarian regimes), and range of environmental issues faced. Interpreting the unique manner in which the environment and natural resources are politicized in each place requires careful attention to the variation among political elites, government institutions, and actors in different roles in everyday society. Further, the environmental policies of each of these countries have various implications for communities outside the borders of the territorial state, meaning that international actors and sites are also an important part of the story. I cannot do justice to the full scope of these interactions across scale, space, and time, so I consider a handful of examples for each country that both includes and moves beyond the binaries of top-down, regime-dominated policies and bottom-up, popular attitudes and activities of the ordinary residents of the state, as well as the domestic and foreign aspects of environmental politics as they have been approached by the authoritarian regimes of the UAE, Kazakhstan, and China. 14.3.1 United Arab Emirates The United Arab Emirates is a federation of emirates, each being an absolute monarchy but united through various federal power structures. According to convention, the President is the ruler of Abu Dhabi (currently Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan), but each individual emirate is ruled by its own royal family. The UAE has significant oil and gas reserves and, since gaining independence in 1971, the government has institutionalized ways to distribute profits from hydrocarbon extraction to citizens. This includes free or subsidized fuel, electricity, and water, free education and healthcare, free or subsidized land upon marriage, privileged access to high-paying state-sector jobs, and more. Various commentators refer to this distribution of fossil fuel profits as the “ruling bargain” in Gulf countries, whereby citizens exchange political rights for extensive welfare goods (see Herb and Lynch, 2019). But the generous welfare benefits given to citizens, who represent a mere 11 percent of the population, are notable for the fact that they exclude the majority of the UAE’s residents – the remaining 89 percent who have virtually no possibility of ever gaining citizenship. The system of privileging citizens not only garners crucial support for the authoritarian regime that presides over it, but also engenders strong feelings of “resource nationalism” (Koch and Perreault, 2019) around the country’s fossil fuel resources. Many Emirati citizens are proud of their country’s place in the oil industry and are equally proud to hold jobs in the sector. Yet the long-standing role of oil in Emirati nationalism is beginning to be called into question due to the growing strength of global narratives about climate change and with it, the vilification of companies and countries promoting the hegemonic fossil energy systems. This presents challenges for the UAE’s authoritarian leaders on many levels – it both calls into question the economic underpinnings that the regime has long been able to take for granted and it calls into question the legitimizing scripts of Emirati nationalism that link oil, progress, and modernity (Koch, 2022a, 2023). Now, business and political elites are increasingly wary of the fact that being a global leader in the oil and gas industry “has sullied their international reputation and that their near-exclusive economic dependence on resource rents makes them suspect in the eyes of global financial elites” (Koch, 2018a: 532). Like their counterparts in the other hydrocarbon-exporting countries of the Arabian Peninsula, Emirati leaders have been trying to reframe their international reputation as being the center of the “backward” dirty energy system of oil, and instead being vanguards of the “modern” clean energy system of renewables. This has led to new nationalist scripts

Authoritarian regimes and the environment  217 in the UAE, which Nicole Grove (2021: 1035) describes as “anticipatory authoritarian nation-building,” which are “organized around an imagined community premised on a nostalgic longing for a mythic future rather than a mythic past.” Besides the “Mars 2117” project that she describes, the UAE’s new nation-building efforts guided by environmental anxieties include spectacular solar parks, eco-cities, green university facilities, and broadcasting sustainability as a key theme in major international events like EXPO 2020 Dubai and the United Nations COP28 meeting in 2023. Employing spectacle as a political tactic (Koch, 2018b), these initiatives are all designed to rebrand the UAE through the now globally celebrated discourse of “being green” (Koch, 2018a, 2023). These branding efforts are targeted at domestic and foreign audiences alike, but at present, they largely operate as PR to deflect attention from the fact that they are built on an inherently unsustainable use of resources or what Mari Luomi (2012) describes as the “natural unsustainability” built into contemporary Gulf societies. A key environmental issue for all these countries, including the UAE, is that no development could happen without substantial water resources (Jones, 2010; Joseph and Howarth, 2015). The Arabian Peninsula is extremely arid and the UAE has little aquifer water to tap into, so its demand is almost exclusively met by desalinating seawater. Desalination is an energy-intensive process and, even though Emirati planners have long claimed to move toward renewable energy sources, nearly all of the country’s water is produced by burning natural gas (McDonnell, 2014). Nonetheless, water is used lavishly in the UAE, for everything from private and industrial uses, to the broader agenda of promoting spectacular urban development across the country (Cummings and von Richthofen, 2017; Günel, 2016, 2019; Koch, 2018a, 2018b; Molotch and Ponzini, 2019; Ouis, 2002, 2011a, 2011b; Ponzini, 2011; Rizzo and Mandal, 2021). The “natural unsustainability” of these policies, which are key to the UAE government’s legitimacy, is not a safe topic for public discussion. The UAE’s authoritarian regime does not allow free speech, so open discussion of the environmental harms of the country’s pro-development political economy is systematically excluded from the media. Meanwhile, environmental activism is not exactly banned but any critical expressions of environmentalism are simply precluded via the widespread practices of self-censorship, through which UAE residents know that open critique is off limits (Koch, 2018a). Instead, the censored media landscape only airs celebratory stories about the country’s positive environmental credentials or about the conservationist ethic of the country’s “founding father,” Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan. In fact, this nationalist conservation story extends beyond the UAE’s borders, including how it is woven into how the country is internationally branded in the sustainability sector, such as through the EXPO and COP28 events noted above (Koch, 2022a, 2023). It also includes international wildlife programs like the Sheikh Zayed Falcon Release Program in Kazakhstan and the UAE-owned Otterlo Business Corporation’s game program in Tanzania’s Ngorongoro Conservation Area, a UNESCO World Heritage Site that borders the Serengeti National Park. In both these cases, though, the “conservation” narrative is used to justify the exploitation of foreign wildlife for the hunting pleasure of Emirati royal family members and other elites (Al Jazeera, 2022; Gbadamosi, 2019; Koch, 2015a). Here again, we see that nationalist narratives and “the environment” intersect in how the authoritarian regime and its allies pursue their own individual interests. While its diverse sustainability and conservation projects may seem to take the edge off of its environmentally harmful policies, this regime is ultimately dependent on a global energy system dominated by oil. How much longer this world order will persist is unclear, but as with all authoritarian regimes, the government of Sheikh Mohammed bin

218  Research handbook on authoritarianism Zayed keenly perceives the environment and natural resources to be crucial political issues for the regime’s survival in the not-too-distant future. 14.3.2 Kazakhstan Kazakhstan, one of the 15 successor states of the Soviet Union, has had an authoritarian regime since it gained independence in 1991. This personalist regime was led by President Nursultan Nazarbayev for almost 30 years, until he stepped down in March 2019. His successor, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, has not developed a comparable cult of personality as did Nazarbayev, but he has shown no interest in democratizing the country or loosening the tight controls on political or press freedoms. Rather, in response to a series of protests rippling through the country for several years, the most dramatic of which involved significant violence in January 2022 and shoot-to-kill orders for protesters issued by the government, Tokayev has only hardened what was a more “soft authoritarian” regime under Nazarbayev (Koch, 2013a; Kudaibergenova and Laruelle, 2022; Schatz, 2009). Nazarbayev’s government was the first to take control of Kazakhstan after gaining independence. The regime accordingly had the dual task of establishing legitimacy of the state as such and the regime as the rightful authority to control the levers of power in the state. Kazakhstan has significant natural resources (oil, uranium, copper, wheat, etc.), so the regime immediately saw the possibilities to develop the country by promoting their exports. They also found many opportunities to enrich themselves by exploiting the state-owned enterprises involved in the extraction processes, as well as a range of other strategies that allowed them to dip into the state coffers (Koch, 2015a, 2018b; Lillis, 2018; Yessenova, 2015). But the story alone – of resource-fueled modernization – was a powerful tool in legitimating the Nazarbayev regime’s focus on exploiting its natural resources. It was also an argument that the government frequently made with reference to the ambition of achieving what the Gulf countries had achieved through their own oil-funded development agendas (Koch, 2013b). Like the Gulf Arab monarchies, though, Nazarbayev’s government slowly began to pick up on the changing geopolitical winds about the future of energy needing to move beyond oil. Promoting a positive, “modern” image for Kazakhstan internationally was an especially important aspect of the Nazarbayev regime’s nation-building project (Bekus, 2022; Koch, 2010, 2012, 2018b; Laszczkowski, 2016), so they began adopting and adapting the language of sustainability to index their commitment to working toward a post-oil modernity. To that end, the government adopted the “Concept on Transition towards Green Economy until 2050” in 2013, hosted the second-tier World’s Fair EXPO 2017 in Astana around the theme of “Future Energy,” and otherwise started promoting a range of small but attention-grabbing renewable energy projects (Diyar et al., 2014; Koch, 2015b, 2021; Koch and Tynkkynen, 2021). Nazarbayev opened EXPO 2017 with a bold promise of moving Kazakhstan from under 1 percent renewable energy sourcing in 2013, to 3 percent by 2020, 30 percent by 2030, and 50 percent by 2050. Like other flashy numerical promises for a post-oil, clean energy future that governments and companies around the world are increasingly promoting, these promises are designed to flag the country’s modernity. Outside observers largely remain suspicious of the genuine commitment of oil-dependent countries like Kazakhstan to promoting renewable energy, but such projects nonetheless reflect the regime’s interest in enticing the foreign investment that is equally important to international and domestic legitimacy (Koch and Tynkkynen, 2021: 525). As their Gulf counterparts have already understood, “sustainability”

Authoritarian regimes and the environment  219 is an important frame for authoritarian regimes today to tap into for both the symbolic and financial capital that it offers. Also like their Gulf counterparts, planners in Kazakhstan have clearly perceived the power of environmental spectacle in lending the government a degree of splendor and prestige – especially through harnessing the emotionally evocative image of water in the desert. Shortly after the country gained independence, Nazarbayev decided to move the country’s capital from Almaty to Astana (renamed Nur-Sultan in 2019 after Nazarbayev stepped down from office). Astana was Nazarbayev’s pet project pegged to his own legitimacy as a benevolent and forward-looking leader, and curating the image of the city was an important part of this project. According to the city’s master planner, Amanzhol Chikanayev, whom I interviewed in 2011, The old idea of a city is that it should be comfortable, nice, green. There was an idea that one had to preserve (sokhronit’) the environment. But in the 21st century, there is a new philosophy, and it is recognized that this simply isn’t enough. We need to build nature at the same time as we build a city – together. (Quoted in Koch, 2015b: 676)

The act of “building nature” was a common theme of Soviet nation-building, and the awe that it is supposed to inspire toward a government so powerful that it can control a force as powerful as nature, and so powerful that it can mobilize the vast human and material resources needed to do so (Bolotova, 2004; Breyfogle, 2018; Josephson, 2013, 2014; McCannon, 1995; Peterson, 2019; Richter, 1997). For Kazakhstan’s President Nazarbayev and his planning chief Chikanayev, this show of state power through building nature in the new capital entailed diverting a river to run through the city, embarking on a huge urban and peri-urban afforestation campaign, and otherwise populating the city with all range of fountains and green spaces (Koch, 2015b, 2018b). Since independence, the authoritarian government of Kazakhstan has approached environmental issues, like other policy domains, in a top-down manner. This is despite – or perhaps because of – the country’s history of powerful grassroots environmental organizing toward the end of the USSR, primarily around the Soviet nuclear testing program in Semipalatinsk (with 456 nuclear tests conduct on the Kazakh SSR from 1949 until 1989). The Nazarbayev regime was happy to promote its anti-nuclear credentials in the early years of independence, but any serious environmental organizing in the new country was stifled, either directly or indirectly through self-censorship. The government has since neglected to undertake any serious remediation of the site and the gross injustice of the environmental pollution’s past and present continues to take its toll on residents in the region (Brunn, 2011; Stawkowski, 2014, 2016; Weinthal, 2002). A similar situation prevails for other ecological challenges in Kazakhstan, which result in serious health problems for communities whose water and air are contaminated from oil extraction and mining, such as the Baikonur Cosmodrome, the desiccated Aral Sea, and even ordinary urban populations living with severe air pollution (Koch, 2018b, 2021; Kopack, 2019; Watters, 2009; Wheeler, 2021; White, 2019). Overall, government neglect for environmental protection in Kazakhstan goes hand in hand with celebratory environmental spectacle attached to the government’s dazzling greening projects in the capital and its iconic “future energy” and sustainable economy development agenda. By highlighting the regime’s favorite projects and downplaying the more complicated challenges, elites work to “cultivate a parallel image of state power and magnanimity, while effacing the structural violence that they simultaneously depend on and deepen” (Koch,

220  Research handbook on authoritarianism 2015b: 677). The resulting forms of “slow violence” (Nixon, 2011) from environmental abuse, wrought on people and land alike, are not unique to authoritarian regimes. Yet they are politicized by authoritarian regimes in a way that reflects their concerns for legitimacy, internationally and domestically. Unfortunately for the citizens of Kazakhstan, these political practices are rarely seen to be priorities for international audiences, while their ability to demand change and environmental justice continue to be restricted by a regime wary of popular expression by ordinary citizens. 14.3.3 China China, or the People’s Republic of China, has been governed by a series of authoritarian leaders presiding over the one-party system of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) since 1949. The party-controlled state was established by the first CCP Chairman Mao Zedong, who ruled until 1976. A series of successors since then have oscillated between softening and hardening the regime, but the current CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping has returned to a far more personalist style of rule as prevailed under Mao (Shirk, 2018). Since Xi took office in 2012, his regime has systematically developed around a tighter and more punitive form of authoritarian power. Despite this variability, the environment has been an important political issue over the entire 75 years of Communist Party rule (Marks, 2017; Shapiro, 2016). Like the Soviet vision of powerful humans “mastering” nature, Chairman Mao’s vision of environmental conquest was aggressive. Judith Shapiro (2001: 3) elaborates: “The Maoist adversarial stance toward the natural world is an extreme case of the modernist conception of humans as fundamentally distinct and separate from nature.” Mass mobilization campaigns enlisted ordinary citizens of China to implement a range of modernist environmental projects, with official rhetoric defining the population as being part of a “war against nature” (Shapiro, 2001: 3–4). The brute force of this martial discourse under Mao, combined with the state’s dominance of public discourse about the environment, meant that the kind of spiritual and emotional forms of environmentalism that arose in the West in the 1960s and 1970s did not find their way into popular conceptions of nature in China. Where environmentalism arose in the country, it tended to be defined around more pragmatic concerns of health and economy – and often, it too was state-led. The increasing efforts of the government to address environmental problems in the country over the past few decades has led scholars to hold China up as an exemplar of “authoritarian environmentalism,” whereby the government uses its authoritarian toolkit to quick and forceful action on solving an environmental problem (Beeson, 2010; Gilley, 2012; Li and Shapiro, 2020; Moore, 2014). Some authors writing on this issue in contemporary China have picked up the threads of older Western environmental discourse promoting “eco-authoritarianism,” but critical scholars reject the dangerous impulse to engage in the essentialist question of whether democracies or autocracies are “better” at environmental protection (Shahar, 2015). Rather, as serious scholars of authoritarianism know, regimes and citizens cannot be reduced to singular variables. Complex contextual factors interact to explain how the environment is politicized by specific regimes and individuals at a particular moment in time – and there are a staggering number of factors at play in China. While space does not allow a full review here, nuanced, ethnographic research on authoritarianism and environmental relations in China works to capture this diversity and, in so doing, challenges the overly simplistic understanding of top-down state power. Scholars doing this research evocatively show elite narratives are powerful, but that citizens

Authoritarian regimes and the environment  221 also internalize certain environmental scripts and police one another and their communities in a horizontal fashion (e.g., Clarke-Sather, 2017, 2019; Geall, 2018; Mao and Zhang, 2018; Owen, 2020; Yeh, 2009, 2013). In many ways, environmentalism is a state-controlled discursive field in China today. But the ruling regime has limits and it cannot singlehandedly impose its environmental vision on citizens. As Mao and Qiu (2020: 594) show, activist “netizens” have been able to use new digital technologies to do their own reporting about environmental crises in China and, in some cases, even effect a change in state policy. Ultimately, Emily Yeh (2009: 893) explains that a critical perspective on authoritarian power and the environment in China needs to examine what forms of knowledge and representation allow “the environment” to come into being as an object of regulation and intervention, and what the implications of these authorized interventions are, not only for ecological outcomes and the livelihoods of specific groups of affected people, but also for the relationship between the state and different groups of citizens and for the production of new interests and subjectivities.

That is, authoritarian state power is neither unitary nor unidirectional, meaning that the environment is bound to be politicized in highly variable ways – both by and within a given regime, and by and among different actors in the population. Among the diverse ways that the Chinese government has worked to enlist ordinary people in its various environmental projects in recent years has been by inciting and then tapping into neoliberal desires for individual wealth and prosperity (Hoffman, 2006; Lim, 2014; Zhang and Ong, 2008). Like the cases of the UAE and Kazakhstan, the Chinese government’s developmental agenda that underpins its domestic legitimacy has been overwhelmingly defined by a focus on urban growth in the last few decades. And as with those countries, the resource-intensive processes of urban development have been branded as “green,” with sustainability credentials now commonly interwoven with contemporary modernity discourses. Urban sustainability has quickly become a favorite topic of the government in recent years, in no small part because the “green building” discourse is easily applied to an already-established pattern of massive urban development schemes that have been a key feature recent economic configurations in the country (Caprotti et al., 2015; Chang, 2017; Hoffman, 2009, 2011; Pow and Harvey, 2013, 2015; Ren, 2012; Williams, 2017; Zhou, 2015). Extending beyond just the economic opportunities of continuing unsustainable city building schemes, Xi Jinping’s regime has sought to cultivate the symbolic power of environmental discourse by inscribing its vision of “Ecological Civilization” into the Chinese Constitution in 2018. Ecological Civilization is framed as a set of values and development priorities to define a vision of a “green” future for China (Hanson, 2019). Xi is decidedly less concerned with Western opinion than his counterparts in Kazakhstan and the UAE, but this nationalist articulation of sustainability discourse – of “sustainable development with Chinese characteristics” – serves as an important way to unify diverse actors across China while also recognizing that the regime’s developmentalist vision is inextricably linked to global political economy. In her study of Chinese investment in Namibia’s uranium sector, Meredith DeBoom (2020) shows how Xi has explicitly defined Ecological Civilization as a “global endeavor,” extending this nationalist vision of the environment well beyond China’s borders. Indeed, both the import and export of natural resources are essential to the government’s legitimacy-building efforts, as they are essential to reaching ambitious domestic growth targets and to entrench the natural resource dependencies that underpin its foreign policy relations around the world

222  Research handbook on authoritarianism (Andrews-Speed et al., 2016; DeBoom, 2017, 2020, 2021; Klinger, 2017, 2020; Murton, 2020; Rogelja, 2020).

14.4 CONCLUSION Environmental issues, like borders, are politicized in divergent ways across different authoritarian regimes and among their subjects. While it may be a convenient shorthand to define a particular authoritarian regime as having power over the environment and environmental policy within the bounds of its territorial borders, the globalized structure of contemporary political economy combined with the spatially diffuse effects of environmental forces like climate change defy all such borders. It is nonetheless important to ask how territorial borders are relevant for differently positioned actors and ideas, which continue to both arise from and clash against them. Regimes across the entire political spectrum today all operate within the dominant state system, meaning that they face similar intuitional constraints in the sphere of geopolitics and the environmental treaties that they may be party to. Yet because authoritarian regimes still seek – and need – to engage with the broader world community, they also pursue the legitimacy that might be derived from contemporary sustainability discourse and take seriously other key environmental issues of our time. Likewise, even though authoritarian regimes are differently constrained by their domestic political structures, which are not fundamentally guided by the idea of popular representation and civil society engagement, they also need certain forms of financial and symbolic capital that might be attached to environmental and natural resource issues in their country. Thus, when considering the relationship between authoritarian regimes and the environment, a critical geographic approach shows how nature–society relations in authoritarian regimes are just as variable as the regimes themselves. These relations are not predetermined, but rather consist of a wide range of flows across and within state borders, among the regime and its subjects, and, ultimately, across the generations who feel the effects of environmental decisions made by their forebears. A critical analysis of the relationship between authoritarian regimes and the environment requires that scholars take political geography seriously. This perspective refuses any grand generalizations about an essential “authoritarian” approach to the environment. Critical scholars instead ask more salient questions of how regimes politicize the environment and natural resources, how they define environmental policies and problems, how they advertise or obscure facts about the natural world, how they narrate solutions to environmental challenges, how they define and relate to natural resources under their control, how they encourage or discourage certain forms of environmental citizenship among their subjects, how they relate to international environmental discourses, institutions, economies, and so on. By investigating such questions and attending to the multiply-scaled contextual factors that shape any political system, future scholars of authoritarianism can open up key questions about how nature–society relations are interwoven with challenges to the legitimacy of many kinds of regimes – a topic that is increasingly important and increasingly volatile in today’s context of climate crisis.

Authoritarian regimes and the environment  223

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Authoritarian regimes and the environment  227 Rogelja, Igor (2020), “Concrete and Coal: China’s Infrastructural Assemblages in the Balkans”, Political Geography, 81, 102220. Schatz, Edward (2009), “The Soft Authoritarian Tool Kit: Agenda-Setting Power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan”, Comparative Politics, 41 (2), 203–22. Shahar, Dan (2015), “Rejecting Eco-authoritarianism, Again”, Environmental Values, 24 (3), 345–66. Shapiro, Judith (2001), Mao’s War against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Shapiro, Judith (2016), “Environmental Degradation in China under Mao and Today: A Comparative Reflection”, Global Environment, 9 (2), 440–57. Shirk, Susan (2018), “China in Xi’s ‘New Era’: The Return to Personalistic Rule”, Journal of Democracy, 29 (2), 22–36. Sonnenfeld, David and Peter Leigh Taylor (2018), “Liberalism, Illiberalism, and the Environment”, Society & Natural Resources, 31 (5), 515–24. Stawkowski, Magdalena (2016), “‘I Am a Radioactive Mutant’: Emergent Biological Subjectivities at Kazakhstan’s Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Site”, American Ethnologist, 43 (1), 144–57. Stawkowski, Magdalena (2017), “Life on an Atomic Collective: The Post-Soviet Retreat of the State in Rural Kazakhstan”, Études Rurales, 200, 196–219. Watters, Kate (2009), “The Fight for Community Justice against Big Oil in the Caspian Region: The Case of Berezovka, Kazakhstan”, in Julian Agyeman and Yelena Ogneva-Himmelberger (eds.), Environmental Justice and Sustainability in the Former Soviet Union, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 153–88. Weinthal, Erika (2002), State Making and Environmental Cooperation: Linking Domestic and International Politics in Central Asia, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Wheeler, William (2021), Environment and Post-Soviet Transformation in Kazakhstan’s Aral Sea Region, London: UCL Press. White, Kristopher (2019), “Environmental Issues in Kazakhstan”, in Ali Farazmand (ed.), Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, Cham: Springer, pp. 1–7. Williams, Austin (2017), China’s Urban Revolution: Understanding Chinese Eco-Cities, New York: Bloomsbury. Ybarra, Megan (2018), Green Wars: Conservation and Decolonization in the Maya Forest, Oakland, CA: University of California Press. Yeh, Emily (2009), “Greening Western China: A Critical View”, Geoforum, 40 (5), 884–94. Yeh, Emily (2013), “The Politics of Conservation in Contemporary Rural China”, The Journal of Peasant Studies, 40 (6), 1165–88. Yessenova, Saulesh (2015), “The Political Economy of Oil Privatization in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan”, in Hannah Appel, Arthur Mason and Michael Watts (eds.), Subterranean Estates: Life Worlds of Oil and Gas, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 281–98. Zhang, Li and Aihwa Ong (2008), Privatizing China: Socialism from Afar, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Zhou, Yu (2015), “State Power and Environmental Initiatives in China: Analyzing China’s Green Building Program through an Ecological Modernization Perspective”, Geoforum, 61, 1–12.

PART V SURVIVAL, TRANSITIONS AND STABILITY?

15. Authoritarian survival Erica Frantz

15.1 INTRODUCTION Political survival is the key goal of any authoritarian leader.1 In the uncertain world of authoritarian politics, however, it is never assured. The risk of overthrow – whether at the hands of elite rivals, opposition groups, or external actors – is an omnipresent threat to authoritarian leaders. Maintaining control requires strategic assessments of risk, but in an information environment that is fundamentally unreliable. No one can ever truly be trusted; the risk of defection and betrayal exists at every moment. Absent a third party that can credibly enforce any deals or agreements (Svolik, 2012), alliances and loyalties are never guaranteed. To survive in power, authoritarians must navigate the waters carefully. They rely on two broad strategies to do so: repression and cooptation (Wintrobe, 1998).2 As such, they use both carrots and sticks. Repression is a form of sociopolitical control that authorities deploy against those under their rule to discourage activities and beliefs deemed threatening to political order (Goldstein, 1978). It is a classic feature of authoritarian governance. Whereas democratic leaders are susceptible to electoral accountability should they engage in repression, authoritarian leaders are not and can often carry out repressive acts with impunity. For this reason, all dictators use some form of repression to maintain control (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014), and they are far more likely to do so than their democratic counterparts (Poe and Tate, 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith, 1999; Hathaway, 2002; Davenport and Armstrong, 2004; Vreeland, 2008). Cooptation tackles survival from a different vantage point, offering rewards rather than punishment as an incentive for backing the dictator. Cooptation is the intentional distribution of benefits to potential challengers in exchange for their loyalty (Corntassel, 2007). Patronage is perhaps the most common way that dictators use cooptation, but they often use institutions to do so too, by – for example – enabling those whose support their need to hold local office or legalizing legislatures. Authoritarian leaders must balance their use of repression and cooptation in ways that adjust to ever-changing threats to their rule. Both strategies have costs and benefits, and their risks are not always predictable or easy to anticipate. For this reason, authoritarians may look to experiences of both their contemporaries and predecessors to gain insight into the particular ways in which they can most effectively apply repression and cooptation to prolong their rule (Olar, 2019). Such authoritarian “learning” is perhaps most clearly reflected in the evolution of authoritarian survival strategies witnessed since the end of the Cold War (Frantz, 2018). In response to the changing geopolitical and societal landscape, authoritarians fine-tuned their use of repression and cooptation in ways that mimicked democracies. Modes of repression grew subtler and methods of cooptation more democratic in name, among other changes. This has resulted in a more robust model of authoritarianism than that of their Cold War predecessors. 229

230  Research handbook on authoritarianism More recently, the advent of the digital era has also transformed the authoritarian survival toolkit (Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, and Wright, 2020). Authoritarian regimes have harnessed new technologies in ways that are boosting their abilities to both repress and coopt. This “digital” style of authoritarianism is on the rise globally and likely to further expand as new technologies grow available to a wider swathe of authoritarians. It is associated with more durable authoritarian rule. This chapter covers the basic features of authoritarian survival tools, their evolution, and the implications of these dynamics for authoritarian politics. To set the stage, it first offers a glimpse into the authoritarian landscape, illustrating changes over time in the distribution of authoritarian regimes and their survival rates. Next, it delves into the authoritarian survival toolkit, explaining what repression and cooptation refer to, how they are traditionally applied, and the ways in which reliance on each has evolved in the post-Cold War era. It then turns to the rise of the digital age, shedding light on how new technologies have supercharged authoritarian survival tools and their implications for authoritarian survival. Lastly, it closes by highlighting important areas for future research.

15.2

THE AUTHORITARIAN LANDSCAPE

To better understand contemporary authoritarian political dynamics, this chapter begins with a portrait of the authoritarian landscape. Here, authoritarian regimes are defined as those systems where free and fair elections are not used to select the leadership.3 Two trends are worth noting. The first is changes over time in the distribution of authoritarian regimes; the second is changes over time in their typical duration. Figure 15.1 offers a plot of the first trend, illustrating the number of authoritarian regimes in power from 1946 to 2020. It shows that authoritarianism rose dramatically following the end of World War II, as the Cold War heated up and geopolitical factors contributed to a surge in authoritarian rule. With the thawing of Cold War tensions starting in 1989 and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union, however, the number of authoritarian regimes in power began to notably decline. The declining trend has continued, for the most part, in the years since. Today, democracy is the most common form of government. As of 2020, democracies governed 90 of the world’s countries, with authoritarian regimes only governing 55. This trend may appear to run in contrast to reports that authoritarianism has been on the rise in the last decade or so – with organizations such as Freedom House documenting multiple consecutive years of declines in global freedom (Repucci and Slipowitz, 2022). It is important to bear in mind, however, that these declines do not necessarily reflect the demise of democracy and emergence of dictatorship. Many of the documented declines in freedom, for example, occurred in democracies that backslid but remained intact (e.g., Poland and Slovenia), meaning that free and fair elections continue to be the method used to select the country’s leadership. Some of these declines also occurred in countries already authoritarian (e.g., Russia and Nicaragua). In fact, since the turn of the century, transitions to democracy have outnumbered transitions to new dictatorship. From 2000 to 2019, there were 21 cases of democratization, compared to 16 cases of democratic breakdown. That said, the rapid pace of democratization brought on by the end of the Cold War has clearly decelerated, suggesting that the tide could be changing (Frantz, 2021).

Authoritarian survival  231

Figure 15.1

Number of authoritarian regimes in power: 1946 to 2020

Figure 15.2 also lends important insight, showing trends over time in the duration of the typical authoritarian regime in power from 1946 to 2020. It reveals that authoritarian regimes have grown remarkably robust during this period. While they are not as numerous as they were during their peak in the Cold War, those authoritarian regimes that are in power have governed for some time. For the bulk of the Cold War (from the 1950s to the 1970s or so), the typical authoritarian regime in power had governed for somewhere between 5 and 15 years. From then on, however, authoritarian regimes grew substantially more durable, such that by the tail end of the Cold War, their median duration had increased to more than 20 years. The dismantling of a number of long-lasting authoritarian regimes that transpired after the Soviet Union fell apart brought the median value down, but it has proceeded to rise ever since. Today, the typical dictatorship in power has governed for 30 years, the highest value recorded during the period. This enhanced durability has occurred in tandem with important changes in the authoritarian survival toolkit (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2014). While we cannot infer that these survival adaptations are the cause of enhanced authoritarian durability – given that it may be that only the most robust regimes have the capacity to implement the strategies most effective for prolonging their rule (see, e.g., Pepinsky, 2014) – it is clear that the two go hand in hand. The two trends discussed here provide a backdrop for understanding the contemporary authoritarian landscape. Though there are fewer dictatorships in power today than in years past, today’s authoritarian regimes have been in power for a substantial about of time. The next section discusses the key features of the authoritarian survival toolkit and how it has evolved.

232  Research handbook on authoritarianism

Figure 15.2

15.3

Duration of the typical authoritarian regime: 1946 to 2020

THE AUTHORITARIAN TOOLKIT

Traditional depictions of authoritarian leaders portray them as brutally ruthless political actors, who use repression with a heavy hand. While this is certainly true of some authoritarian regimes – such as Idi Amin’s Uganda, Pol Pot’s Cambodia, or North Korea today under the Kim family – most authoritarians do not rely solely on repression to maintain control, opting to incorporate cooptation into their toolkit as well. Some authoritarians rely so little on repression, in fact, that their regimes look more like a modern democracy on any given day than a typical dictatorship, as with Singapore under the People’s Action Party. The extent to which authoritarian leaders rely on repression and cooptation varies substantially from one case to the next, depending on the environments they operate in, their resources, and the nature of the threats to their rule. That said, the survival toolkit of the vast majority of authoritarians involves some mixture of repression and cooptation. 15.3.1 Repression Repression is a classic feature of authoritarian governance and an obvious strategy for securing political control in such contexts. Referred to as the “Law of Coercive Responsiveness” (Davenport, 2007a), the basic logic behind repression is that it can prevent, counter, and eliminate threats to authoritarian rule. This is consistent with a large body of research, which has illustrated that repression levels rise in concert with threats from dissidents (see, e.g., Hibbs, 1973; Francisco, 1995; Moore, 1998; Davenport, 2007a). Repression is an effective strategy for survival for authoritarian leaders because it makes opposing their rule more costly, both in terms of individual acts of disloyalty and broader

Authoritarian survival  233 efforts at anti-regime collective action. Ordinary citizens are far less likely to hit the streets and protest if they assess that others are unlikely to do the same (Tucker, 2007). In this way, by making individuals grow more fearful of making their true preferences about the regime public, repression hinders the ability of the opposition to mobilize and pressure the regime. For these reasons, we tend to see fewer acts of civil disobedience where repression is high than in other more tolerant environments (Kricheli, Livne, and Magaloni, 2012). Repression is not a risk-free strategy, however, and its use comes with costs (Gartner and Regan, 1996). Repressive acts can trigger a backlash against authoritarian governments, particularly where they are indiscriminate, severe, and easily observable (Francisco, 1995; Kalyvas, 2006). They can fuel the flame of popular discontent, lessening the dictator’s legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary citizens, and increasing the chance that small and dispersed acts of defiance will spiral into broader destabilizing movements for the regime (Lichback, 1987; Moore, 1998). Repression can also be costly for authoritarian leaders because it can limit their access to information about levels of dissent. As repression grows more intense, citizens will be less likely to express discontent with the regime, and regime supporters will grow more fearful of relaying information about levels of societal anger. The shrinking of information channels available to the dictator make responding to and preempting threats to their rule far more difficult (Wintrobe, 1998). Lastly, repression also brings with it direct risks to the dictator: providing resources to the security sector to apply repression creates the very real possibility these same resources will be used to target the dictator (Wintrobe, 1998; Nepstad, 2013). As the security sector grows more competent and efficient in its ability to implement repression, its ability to turn against (rather than protect) the dictator increases as well. For these reasons, while repression is an obvious survival tool for authoritarians, they must be strategic in how they use it. There are many types of repression, each with their own purpose (Fein, 1995; Hathaway, 2002; Davenport, 2007b). Scholars generally group them into two categories: high-intensity repression and low-intensity repression. These types of repression vary in terms of who the target is and the extent to which violence is used (Frantz, 2018). High-intensity repression captures overt and brutal acts of violence, usually targeting groups or individuals who are well recognized. In this way, it is easy to observe and difficult for governments to deny. Examples include widespread detentions or killings of protestors or members of opposition groups. The government’s massacre of hundreds of students in Tiananmen Square in China in 1989 is a classic manifestation of high-intensity repression. Despite the visibility of this form of repression, it can be difficult to measure in practice, given that perpetrators often go to great lengths to cover up and lie about their actions. That said, one of the more common ways that researchers measure high-intensity repression is by looking at physical integrity violations, which capture tactics such as disappearances, torture, and political imprisonment. Low-intensity repression, in contrast, is subtler and usually targets a broader sector of the populace (such as, the opposition in general). Examples include actions such as surveillance of opponents, lawsuits that target government critics, and censorship. The Singaporean government’s use of defamation lawsuits to weaken its opponents falls under the category of low-intensity repression. Governments have many options at their disposal for carrying out low-intensity repression and, for this reason, there are a number of ways to measure it. One of the more common ways

234  Research handbook on authoritarianism is to look at repression of empowerment rights (or civil liberties). This entails the use of strategies such as censorship, restrictions on assembly, and limitations on free speech. Repression’s appeal to authoritarian leaders is reflected in its widespread application. Since World War II, all authoritarians have repressed empowerment rights during their rule, and all but three of them repressed physical integrity rights (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014).4 The evidence suggests that it is in their interest to do so: repression decreases an authoritarian leader’s risk of overthrow (Escriba-Folch, 2013). Authoritarian regimes vary in terms of their reliance on repression. Dominant-party dictatorships – where a single political party is in charge – are the least repressive type of dictatorship, regardless of how repression is captured (Davenport, 2007b). The logic is that because dominant-party dictatorships incorporate a greater portion of the populace in their political processes, there are more opportunities for public discussion about the regime, giving these regimes tools beyond coercion for influencing and monitoring citizens. In contrast, military dictatorships – where a military junta maintains control – are the most likely form of authoritarianism to repress physical integrity rights; while personalist dictatorships – where power is concentrated in the hands of a single individual – are the most likely to repress empowerment rights. Research looking at repression of human rights (broadly speaking) confirms this, revealing that as power grows more concentrated in the hands of the leader, repression is likely to rise (Frantz et al., 2020). This helps explain the uptick in repression witnessed under the tenure of Xi Jinping in China, who most observers assert has personalized power in that regime. Patterns of repression have changed over time (Frantz, 2018). Contemporary authoritarians are more likely to use subtle – as opposed to overt – repressive tactics to maintain power. Their repressive approaches have grown less overt and more ambiguous, such that they are less likely to attract attention and easier to plausibly deny. This enables authoritarians to pretend that they are complying with democratic norms of behavior, a desirable model in the post-Cold War geopolitical and societal landscape. As an indicator of this, today’s authoritarians are more likely to turn to other nominally independent actors to carry out repression, such as paramilitary groups. The Iranian regime’s use of the Basij (a voluntary armed group) to carry out repression against protestors in 2009 exemplifies this. This tactic enables authoritarians to blame outside groups for repressive actions and deny that there is blood on the regime’s hands. Authoritarians are increasingly using lawsuits and other legal avenues to target their opponents, as well. And they have grown less heavy-handed in their use of censorship. Contemporary authoritarians usually allow some space for their opponents to operate, instead monitoring and surveilling them to gain valuable information about their intentions. This evolution in the way in which authoritarians apply repression helps to explain the decline over time in traditional indicators of repression that observers have identified (Fariss, 2014). Today’s dictatorships have not given up on repression; rather they are using it more strategically than in the past. 15.3.2 Cooptation Repression alone is a risky strategy for an authoritarian leader to depend on, and for this reason most authoritarians also incorporate cooptation in their survival toolkit. At the most basic level, cooptation entails giving out perks to select individuals in exchange for loyalty.

Authoritarian survival  235 It involves “encapsulating” members of the population into the regime via the distribution of benefits (O’Donnell, 1979, 51). The individuals targeted are often framed as “potential challengers” in most academic work, yet who these individuals are varies quite a bit, not only from one authoritarian context to the next, but also in terms of the specific form of cooptation under analysis. Cooptation is a desirable strategy for authoritarian leaders for a number of reasons. For one, it gives those individuals benefitting from the regime good incentive to continue to support it (Wintrobe, 1998). Faced with the potential that a successor could be less generous, recipients are likely to see the leader’s survival at the helm as in their interest. The benefits individuals receive – whether they involve cash transfers, jobs, policy concessions, or other perks – make tolerating the leader’s rule easier to endure. Moreover, the decision of whether to take part in cooptation can split the opposition, with some members feeling strongly that doing so is a deal with the devil and taking issue with the decisions of others to accept the deal. This can boost authoritarian survival by making it more difficult for the opposition to unite and mount an effective challenge (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010). Cooptation can also keep elites from defecting. Rivals may come to view the leader as legitimately popular (having bought the support of sectors of the population) and assess that ousting them will be met with domestic criticism (Geddes, 2006). As with repression, there are many forms of cooptation, the majority of which have largely been unexplored in the literature, due at least in part to the difficulties that lie in observing and measuring them. For example, while most researchers agree that dictators commonly feature patronage heavily in their cooptation strategy, identifying and capturing patronage networks in practice is challenging. Moreover, many forms of patronage may not be observable, such as when transactions occur behind closed doors or involve very small distributions. Citizens supportive of the regime may receive benefits such as quicker access to government services yet measuring the efficiency of service distribution so as to demonstrate this is no easy task. It is perhaps for this reason that most academic work dedicated to cooptation in dictatorships is either theoretical (e.g., Wintrobe, 1998) or devoted to its institutional manifestations (e.g., research on authoritarian political parties and legislatures). The latter area of inquiry comprises the bulk of research devoted to cooptation in authoritarian settings. Elections, for example, are seen as a tool for cooptation in dictatorships (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009), and most dictatorships hold them (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz, 2014). Elections in authoritarian regimes vary in terms of how frequently they are held, whether the electoral cycle is fixed, how competitive they are, and the types of positions that are up for grabs. Elections serve a cooptative role because they give both regime supporters and opponents an opportunity to participate in the political process, even if in a limited capacity. Elections create obvious risks for dictators, of course, given the very real possibility things could go wrong and they lose them, but authoritarians have a variety of resources at their disposal to ensure that they come out on top. These include flooding the media environment with pro-regime campaigns, harassing opponents, and of course fraud. Research suggests that despite the short-term risks that elections could topple authoritarians, in the long term they prolong their survival (Knutsen, Nygard, and Wig, 2017). Political parties are another institutional form of cooptation in dictatorships. They help authoritarian leaders mobilize popular support and give members a vested interest in the regime’s survival (Magaloni, 2006). This reduces the chance that party members will align with opposition coalitions or otherwise seek the regime’s ouster. Political parties may also

236  Research handbook on authoritarianism enable authoritarians to more credibly commit to power sharing with regime actors (Magaloni, 2008). Legislatures are an additional mode of institutional cooptation in authoritarian regimes. Researchers have identified a variety of ways in which the incorporation of legislatures confer positive benefits for authoritarians. For one, they create a venue in which potential members of the opposition can be incorporated in the system, thereby decreasing the chance they will devote time and effort toward toppling the regime (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Boix and Svolik, 2013). They also are a forum that authoritarian governments can use to collect information about citizen demands (Manion, 2015; Truex, 2016) and solidify power-sharing deals via information sharing and monitoring (Svolik, 2012; Boix and Svolik, 2013). Though scholars may disagree on causal pathways, the evidence suggests that all of the institutional forms of cooptation referenced here go hand in hand with enhanced authoritarian survival (Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). That said, as with repression, cooptation creates positive levels of risk for dictatorships. Institutions of cooptation, for example, can open space for political discussions that are destabilizing to authoritarians or give rivals a context in which to expand their bases of support (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2014). Research also shows that institutional cooptation – specifically, the use of nominally democratic institutions – decreases the chance of coups, but at the expense of increasing the chance of anti-government protests (Woo and Conrad, 2019). Dictatorships that use cooptation, therefore, cannot afford to do so carelessly. Even with these risks, the evidence indicates that the survival benefits cooptation offers generally makes it a strategy worth pursuing. For these reasons, institutional cooptation is very common in dictatorships (and increasingly so, for reasons to be discussed shortly). As Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014) point out, only 50 (11 percent) of the 460 dictators in power from 1946 to 2004 chose not to create a party or legislature at some point while in office. And, though there is little high-quality, cross-national research on non-institutional forms of cooptation, there is good reason to believe that most authoritarians rely on this too. Anecdotally, instances of authoritarian regimes not using patronage in some capacity, for example, are difficult to bring to mind. As with repression, patterns of cooptation among authoritarians have changed over time (Frantz, 2018). Authoritarian governments still rely on traditional forms of cooptation, but now complement them with a broad array of innovative methods. Many of these techniques borrow from the norms and institutions typical of democracies, adjusted to suit authoritarian survival needs. Geopolitical and societal changes incentivize such an approach. Beyond the nominally democratic institutions discussed earlier, authoritarians are using other institutions for cooptative purposes, as well, such as consultative forums. In Russia in 2005, for example, Vladimir Putin created the Public Chamber as a means of cooptation, an institution that provided civil society activists with an official arena for expressing their needs and interests albeit with the regime fully in control of the takeaway narrative (Greene, 2014, 103). Authoritarians elsewhere, such as in Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Cuba, have even created fake civil society organizations that they staff with supporters of the regime (Cooley, 2015). Today’s authoritarians continue to develop a steady crop of new ideas for coopting key actors, many of which draw from democratic environments. These tactics help maintain the facade that the leadership is welcoming to outside actors and voices, while improving its ability to identify and stifle its critics and challengers.

Authoritarian survival  237 15.3.3 How Repression and Cooptation Interrelate While there is little debate among scholars that repression and cooptation are the foundation of the authoritarian leader’s survival toolkit, research examining the relationship between the two is sparse (Davenport, 2007a). Wintrobe (1998) offers an economic model of authoritarianism rooted in the supply and demand of loyalty and repression and derives four types of dictatorships (totalitarians, tinpots, tyranny, and timocracy). This model can inform our understanding of how different types of authoritarians are likely to behave. That said, it is based on the individual preferences of the authoritarian leader, such that it does not speak to the extent to which repression and cooptation interact with each other, or how the use of one affects the use of the other. More recent research advances the literature in this regard. Vreeland (2008) and Conrad (2014), for example, look at how institutions of cooptation in authoritarian regimes – specifically political parties – influence the use of torture. Both studies find that authoritarian regimes that feature multiple political parties see higher rates of torture. This occurs because the existence of multiple parties generates opportunities for members of the opposition to vocalize their viewpoints. Some will go too far, however, and will be the targets of repressive acts. Likewise, Gandhi (2008) examines how cooptation might influence repression. She finds that where authoritarians allow legislatures and political parties, there tends to be greater freedom of speech. In authoritarian regimes that feature partisan legislatures – or those legislatures in which members of opposition parties are allowed to hold seats – the leader and the opposition are more likely to have to reach policy compromises. The opposition receives concessions from the dictator (in this case an easing up on repression of free speech) and in return the dictator receives its buy-in to keep efforts for political change within the confines of the regime. Research from Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014) reveals that cooptation can also influence the ways in which authoritarians balance their use of different types of repression. They find that institutions of cooptation – specifically legislatures and political parties – incentivize authoritarian leaders to lessen their reliance on repression of empowerment rights and ratchet up their reliance on repression of physical integrity rights. Partisan legislatures bring opponents to the regime out into the public domain, easing the ability of authoritarian leaders to identify and monitor them. This reduces their need to use broad forms of repression – which are generally unpopular among ordinary citizens – and allows them to be more targeted in their repressive approach. This is consistent with work by Rivera (2017), which shows that dictatorships with opposition parties see greater repression of physical integrity rights. While a handful of studies have examined how repression and cooptation interrelate, future research is needed to better understand how reliance on one may influence reliance on the other, and how these dynamics affect broader authoritarian survival patterns.

15.4

HOW THE DIGITAL ERA IS SUPERCHARGING LONG-STANDING SURVIVAL TACTICS

The advent of new technologies has transformed the authoritarian environment. On the one hand, the digital age has improved the ability of ordinary citizens to hit the streets and challenge authoritarian governments by making coordination easier. On the other hand, digital-era

238  Research handbook on authoritarianism mobilization efforts are often unsuccessful, not only because they often lack a “foundation for sustained engagement” and can fizzle quickly, but also because authoritarian governments have learned how to use digital tools to undermine them (Chenoweth et al., 2019). Despite initial optimism that new technologies would empower ordinary citizens and destabilize authoritarians, the overall message to emerge is that they have instead made authoritarians stronger. Digital technologies have expanded the tools available to authoritarians to enhance their rule and supercharged long-standing tactics (Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, and Wright, 2020; Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright, 2020). This has primarily occurred in the domain of repression, but it has influenced techniques of cooptation too. It has led to the emergence of a new “digital” model of authoritarianism. Better understanding how digital tactics work with one another in the broader authoritarian survival toolkit is therefore an important area for future research (Keremoglu and Weidmann, 2020). While research in this area is in its infancy, the basic insights that have emerged thus far are discussed in what follows.5 15.4.1 Digital Repression The dawn of the digital era has dramatically changed the ability of authoritarian leaders to repress (Feldstein, 2021).6 Whereas in the past, effectively implementing repression required substantial resources and manpower, with today’s digital tools this is no longer the case. Digital technologies enable authoritarians to pursue their repressive strategies using far fewer humans to do the job and often in a manner that is more efficient and less noticeable than traditional methods. Figure 15.3 illustrates important trends in this regard. Drawing from the measurement approach of Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, and Wright (2020), it shows patterns of digital repression and digital capacity from 2000 to 2019 using data from the Digital Society Project (Mechkova et al., 2020). Digital repression is measured using indicators of the government’s reliance on tools such as monitoring, censoring, or shutting down social media or the Internet. Digital capacity is measured using indicators of the government’s capacity to carry out these techniques, regardless of whether they actually do. For comparison purposes, the graph displays these trends for both democracies and authoritarian regimes. There are a number of key messages that emerge. The first is that levels of digital repression and digital capacity have increased over time, in both democracies and authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian regimes use digital repression quite a bit more than their democratic counterparts; they also have greater digital capacity. Democracies have the capacity to use digital repression, but do not necessarily choose to do so. Authoritarians, by contrast, use digital repression to a great degree, even when they lack the capacity for sophisticated techniques. In such instances, they rely on simpler tactics, such as shutting down the Internet. This suggests that as authoritarians improve their capacity to implement digital repression, they are likely to increase their reliance on it even more. Authoritarians are using digital technologies to enhance their application of repression in a variety of ways, a handful of which are highlighted here. The first is in monitoring citizens and identifying dissidents. Artificial intelligence-powered surveillance technology, in particular, has led to a significant evolution in the ability of authoritarians to keep tabs on and pinpoint their opponents, both within their borders and outside of them. As Xu (2021) shows, for example, digital surveillance in China has given the regime informational advantages that

Authoritarian survival  239

Figure 15.3

Digital repression and capacity over time: 2000 to 2019

enhance its ability to use targeted repression. Spying malware, high-resolution cameras, and facial recognition systems are just a few resources digital authoritarians can use that improve their ability to surveil. These same technologies can also be used to improve authoritarian leaders’ ability to monitor the performance of regime elite and weed out underperforming officials. New technologies have improved authoritarians’ ability to censor too, due to significant advances in high-powered computing, machine learning techniques, and automated text analysis. All of these tools make it easier for digital authoritarians to identify content that is unfavorable to their rule and promptly remove it. Importantly, where censorship fails to quell dissent and threats to the regime escalate, digital authoritarians can simply shut down the Internet. Cutting off all (or most) access to the Internet is a rapid method for dramatically stifling opposition efforts to coordinate. The digital era has made it easier for authoritarians to control the information space as well, opening up new avenues for social manipulation and disinformation. Authoritarian governments can use trolls or automated bots to harass critics to their rule, post deliberately undesirable content about their opponents, and inflate perceptions of their popularity. In Russia, for example, the regime is known to flood the Internet with information that is favorable to it while distracting Internet users from evidence to the contrary. In this way, today’s authoritarians are using digital technologies to enhance their control over information. 15.4.2 Digital Cooptation Digital tools have also enhanced authoritarians’ ability to use cooptation, though perhaps to a lesser degree than with repression. In particular, new technologies have made it easier for authoritarians to determine who to target in their cooptative efforts. In China, for example, the regime has used its social credit system to more accurately determine which citizens should gain access to government services: those who are loyal to the regime receive perks, while those who are not are denied them (Hoffman, 2019). In this way, new technologies enhance

240  Research handbook on authoritarianism authoritarians’ “use of reward and refusal, blurring the line between co-option and coercive control” (Kendall-Taylor, Frantz, and Wright, 2020, 111). 15.4.3 Consequences of Digital Authoritarianism for Survival Research investigating the impact of digital authoritarianism on political survival is in its infancy, but all indicators suggest that new technologies have been a boon for autocrats, according to research by Frantz, Kendall-Taylor, and Wright (2020) examining the consequences of digital repression specifically. For one, the evidence shows that the use of digital repression in authoritarian regimes is associated with increases in high-intensity repression. This suggests that authoritarian regimes are not using digital repression in exchange for traditional modes of repression, but instead to improve their ability to apply it. By giving authoritarians greater information about their opponents, digital repression is enhancing the precision and efficiency with which authoritarians can apply repression. Digital repression is also shown to lower the incidence and success of protests in authoritarian systems. This is consequential for political survival, given that protests are a key threat to today’s authoritarians. Where digital repression ratchets up, the chance of protest declines. Lastly, though it is difficult to assess whether this is a causal relationship, those dictatorships that use digital repression last longer in power than those that do not. To summarize, early evidence reveals that the advent of the digital era has improved the survival prospects of today’s authoritarians.

15.5

CONCLUSION: WHAT LIES AHEAD

Peering into the mind of an authoritarian is often a fool’s errand. As observers of authoritarian politics, we rarely have insight into the true motivations of authoritarian governments; secrecy shrouds the uncertain environments they operate in. That said, the assumption that political survival is their primary goal is a useful starting point. In this way, better understanding the specific tactics that authoritarians pursue to enhance their political survival can inform our expectations of the policy choices we are likely to see in authoritarian systems. This chapter reviewed the broad contours of the authoritarian survival toolkit. To set the stage, it first offered background on changes over time in the distribution of authoritarian regimes and their survival rates. It then turned to the two key tools authoritarians rely on to maintain control: repression and cooptation. It explained what these tools refer to, how they are traditionally applied, the benefits they confer for authoritarians, and the ways in which they have evolved over time. One of the key messages to emerge is that today’s authoritarians are savvy in their choices, adapting to changing geopolitical and societal circumstances in ways that enhance their rule. Beyond tailoring their survival strategies so that they are more palatable to post-Cold War audiences, they are also leveraging new technologies to supercharge long-standing survival tactics. Importantly, as it grows easier for authoritarian governments to import these technologies, we are likely to see the digital model of authoritarianism spread across the globe. Opportunities for future research in this area are many. For one, better understanding the dynamics underlying digital authoritarianism is an important line of inquiry. In what ways does digital authoritarianism create new vulnerabilities for today’s authoritarian leaders? How

Authoritarian survival  241 does it alter their reliance on traditional strategies for control? What are the factors that underlie their preference for one specific digital tactic over others? These questions are difficult to answer, at least in part because academia has often struggled to keep pace with the technological advances that have occurred. Yet, far more basic questions about authoritarian survival remain unanswered as well. Among them, how do authoritarian survival tools interrelate? What are the factors that underlie decisions to rely on one versus the other? In what ways can researchers better capture the nuanced ways in which authoritarians apply repression and cooptation? Research on the authoritarian survival toolkit – though rich and flourishing – has abundant areas opportune for a deeper understanding.

NOTES 1. In some instances, authoritarian leaders are synonymous with the regimes they govern (e.g., Libya under Muammar Qaddafi), but in many other instances they are not, with authoritarian regimes representing more than a single individual (e.g., Brazil under military rule) (Frantz and Ezrow, 2011). This chapter focuses mainly on the survival calculations and strategies of authoritarian leaders, rather than authoritarian regimes more broadly. That said, there is a lot of overlap; many of the messages about authoritarian leadership survival are relevant to understanding authoritarian regime survival (and vice versa). 2. Some scholars put forth that legitimation is a third broad strategy that authoritarians use. For research on legitimation, see Gerschewski (2013), Kailitz (2013), von Soest and Grauvogel (2017), Dukalsis and Gerschewski (2017), and Maerz (2020), to name a few. 3. See Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) for a more extensive discussion of this definition. Data used here and throughout to capture the start and end dates of authoritarian regimes, their duration, and their transition type come from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). These data cover the years 1946 to 2010; they were updated by Frantz to extend through 2020. 4. These leaders are Karoly Grosz and Matyas Szuros, both of Hungary, and Jambyn Batmonkh, of Mongolia. 5. This discussion draws from Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2021). 6. Democracies rely on digital repression too, but too a far lesser degree than dictatorships (Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, 2021).

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16. Leadership succession Thomas Ambrosio

16.1 INTRODUCTION There is one eternal truth in politics: no one can rule forever. Every government inevitably transitions from one leader to another due to death, resignation, removal from office, or term limits. In democracies, this is fairly common and frequently straightforward, guided by a country’s voters and laws, and undergirded by an adherence to the rational-legal authority that stems from constitutional systems (Helms 2020). Autocracies, by contrast, rely far more upon the perception that they will endure, that the status quo is immutable, and that alternatives are not possible (Hale 2015: 14). Expected or actual leadership successions represent a break in this continuity and can therefore undermine the very foundations of the power structure, despite the best efforts of governments to “create illusions of normalcy” in these circumstances (Schedler and Hoffman 2016: 102). Consequently, leadership successions in autocracies are widely seen as “a real problem” (Tullock 1987: 151) which have the potential to create “daunting challenges” (Brownlee 2007a: 598), “a moment of crisis” (Nathan 2003: 7), existential regime “vulnerability” (Ezrow and Frantz 2011a: 6), and even political “chaos” (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2016: 160). Moreover, because they represent “one of the only opportunities for policy and structural changes” in these political systems (Govea and Holm 1998: 132), they also provide a possible opening for those outside the inner circle, and the masses more generally, to intervene in the political process. Prior research has demonstrated the dangers that leadership transitions cause for authoritarian regimes. Ezrow and Frantz (2011a: 6) found that they collapsed in 47 percent of such cases. Meng’s (2020: 10–11) focus on the survival rates of autocratic ruling parties was similarly pessimistic, with only 42 percent surviving transitions, even when their founding leader left office non-violently. Additionally, elites and the masses are often exposed to danger during these periods as 44 percent of authoritarian leadership transitions between 1946 and 2008 occurred violently (Meng 2020: 2). Despite all this, however, the data also show that many autocratic regimes are able to successfully manage this process and remain in power. And, given the global prevalence of authoritarian learning (Ambrosio and Tolstrup 2019), the collapse-survival balance will likely increasingly favor the latter as dictatorships identify which succession strategies work. This chapter explores the conditions under which autocracies are more likely to successfully navigate leadership successions. As Bunce (1981: 16) noted, this is not just “the mere replacement of governing officials, but rather … a complex process which alters the policy environment in certain ways and, perhaps, policy priorities as well.” While some top elites may not remain in positions of power post-transition, success requires, at a minimum, for the regime to continue with most of its current power structure and ruling coalition intact and to avoid political disintegration, democratization, or its overthrow from those outside of the current ruling coalition, even if the ultimate outcome is another dictatorship. The current literature highlights how success is often dependent upon the maintenance of regime unity and the 244

Leadership succession  245 ability of the ruling coalition to manage the dictator-elite and intra-elite conflicts which might be precipitated or intensified by this process. These conflicts are, at their core, a reflection of how uncertainty shapes the interests and incentive structures of the major actors in this process and therefore impacts the relative stability of the regime both before and after a transition. The literature has also identified several critical dynamics which appear to encourage or mitigate these effects. This chapter examines four of these: the designation of an heir apparent, single-party regimes, competitive authoritarianism, and the absence of any substantive succession plan. Before turning to these, however, we must first consider how uncertainty permeates this entire process.

16.2 UNCERTAINTY Mesquita (2016: 372) was writing specifically about Kazakhstan, but his observation applies more broadly: all authoritarian leadership successions “will ultimately create winners and losers.” The problem is that no one knows how they will fare in the future as existing patronage and power structures may be fundamentally disrupted by such transitions. Complicating this is the fact that the main actors in the regime also know that others are in a similar situation. An interactive environment of uncertainty and fear develops within the ruling coalition because the range of outcomes is wide and the potential stakes not only include the loss of one’s power and privileges, but also one’s life. Fears about the future can become self-fulfilling prophecies and cause the system to succumb to internal and external pressures. These conditions will often intensify as the transition timeline shortens because of a leader’s age or ill health, or some legal restriction on their tenure in office (Hummel 2020: 984). While everyone in the political system must confront this uncertainty, the literature has primarily focused on two main actors in this process: the incumbent dictator and the elites, paying far less attention to the masses. This is unsurprising as scholarship on dictatorships more generally has identified how politics in authoritarian systems “centers on an interplay between [these] two key actors” (Frantz and Ezrow 2011: 1). This appears to be especially true when it comes to authoritarian leadership succession: even when a transition goes badly and a regime collapses, it is less likely to lead to democracy than to the formation of a new dictatorship, possibly with substantial changes in the makeup of its top elites (Gandhi 2008: 166). The case of post-Franco Spain’s transition to democracy – in which Franco’s successors were unable to sustain the authoritarian system he created (Share 1986) – is a notable exception, but an exception nonetheless. Instead, the popular opposition often serves primarily as an instrument and extension of intra-elite conflicts within the ruling coalition, as seen below.1 How the incumbent dictator and the elites anticipate or respond to political transitions drives this process. 16.2.1 Incumbent Dictator No matter how much control a leader appears to have, they must govern through and rely on elites, who have their own interests and powerbases. Because of this, the elites who are part of the ruling coalition usually represent the greatest threat to the incumbent dictator (Frantz and Ezrow 2011: 2–3; Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2014: 38). This dictator-elite dynamic extends to the fact that everyone in the regime knows political transitions are ultimately unavoidable

246  Research handbook on authoritarianism and that they must plan accordingly. Consequently, a key threat for the incumbent dictator is that elites, motivated by their own fears about the future, will seek to actively manage the succession process while the dictator is still in office by preemptively seizing power for themselves (Frantz and Stein 2017) or by backing another who is perceived to be in a more credible position to distribute rents in the future (Hale 2015: 239). Unless they pass away suddenly, this is the reason why few dictators actually die in office and are more often than not forcibly removed via a coup. In Zimbabwe, for example, the aging Robert Mugabe was removed by his subordinates, who feared that his expected death would destabilize the regime (Hummel 2020: 985). Even if they avoid forcible removal by willingly departing before their death – either through retirement or honoring term limits – the dictator must be concerned about facing punishment for themselves and their family under the new regime (Levitsky and Way 2010: 28–9; Escribà-Folch 2013; Egorov and Sonin 2015). In these cases, leaders may seek legal or informal promises of good treatment. However, this is not a guarantee. Promises may be honored, as in the case of Russia: after Boris Yeltsin handed the presidency to Vladimir Putin, the new president immediately signed a decree granting legal immunity to his predecessor and financial protections to his family. Sometimes these arrangements may only be temporary, as Nursultan Nazarbayev found in Kazakhstan: despite positioning himself to maintain some power behind the scenes as part of a negotiated transition when he retired in 2019, this agreement was revoked less than three years later by his hand-picked successor because of mass protests. Although no leader can know if they will rule tomorrow, there is no question that they will have less control over the outcome after they leave office. Leaders will therefore often seek to delay a succession plan for as long as possible out of fear that, once the possibility is openly broached, it may begin a process that they will not be able to control. Incumbent dictators must therefore not only manage the enduring power dynamics between themselves and their ruling coalition, but also broader expectations about future leadership transitions both within and outside of the regime. This means balancing the twin impulses of taking active steps to mitigate the uncertainty surrounding their inevitable departure from office and remaining in power for as long as possible. 16.2.2 Elites Being a member of the ruling coalition undoubtedly has its privileges, but also comes with risks as elites must confront vertical and horizontal threats, even under normal circumstances (Frantz and Ezrow 2011: 1). The former come from their reliance upon the patronage and support of the leader to maintain their status, but also from the threatening possibility that the masses will rise up and overthrow the regime, and them along with it. Horizontally, elites regularly compete with their co-elites, who represent their natural rivals for power and influence. Dictators routinely play elites off against each other in order to remain in office and, consequently, create an environment of distrust and division which pervades the entire political system (Hale 2015: 84). Leadership succession compounds both vertical and horizontal threats. Elites must now face the dangers of a power vacuum at the top and associated political disruptions resulting from the absence of the dictator, a population which might sense an opportunity for political change, and the ambitions of their fellow elites. Moreover, one cannot be sure who will ultimately emerge as the next leader, whether they will be able to consolidate power, and how the remain-

Leadership succession  247 ing elites will be treated under the new regime. These challenges occur within an environment of imperfect information as “the distribution of power [is] even less transparent [during successions] than in ordinary circumstances” and “it may be difficult to know who actually controls the loyalty of military regiments and economic resources that were formerly under the direct personal control of the leader” (Kokkonen and Sundell 2020: 436). Worse still, too much intra-elite conflict over a transition could lead to regime destabilization (Ezrow and Frantz 2011a: 7–8), increased chances of a violent transition (Meng 2020: 3), and even civil war (Kokkonen and Sundell 2020) – any of which could fundamentally undermine the very foundations upon which their status rests. For example, the period leading up to and following the death of Lansana Conté in Guinea was marred by instability and violence, as elites fought amongst themselves and eventually brought about the end of the regime (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2016: 169; Meng 2020: 2). How elites respond to uncertainty will be a key driver in the succession process. Elites may seek to ensure they will be on the winning side of a transition by preemptively seizing power for themselves – in essence, getting ahead of the succession process by attempting to remove the incumbent dictator. The rewards are great in one-person dictatorships since “the presidency is an indivisible good” and “only one of them can attain this large prize and the losers risk being cut off entirely by the winners” (Hale 2015: 84). Obviously, no one can do this alone and therefore they must conspire with others to do so. However, “other members of the inner circle might seize the opportunity to reposition themselves favorably within the regime by exposing the plot to the leader in hopes of garnering [the dictator’s] favor” (Frantz and Stein 2017: 942). This creates a significant coordination dilemma for elites. If a coup plotter is able to overcome this and actually move toward initiating a coup, they can still never be sure if they will succeed. Failure will most certainly mean facing the leader’s wrath. Nonetheless, if they wait until after a transition has already begun – following the leader’s death, for example – the likelihood of failure increases because they have not only lost the initiative, but they must contend with their co-elites, whose own aspirations and incentives to seize power have now been triggered. The divergent fates of Lavrentiy Beria and Nikita Khrushchev following Joseph Stalin’s death illustrate well the risks and rewards of a power grab. Seeking safety in numbers, such as through an elite pact to seize power together, is also no guarantee of long-term, individual safety since members of a collective leadership coalition may soon find themselves sidelined or purged by an individual who seeks power just for themselves. This occurred in Libya and Chile when Muammar Gaddafi and Augusto Pinochet, respectively, consolidated power by removing potential rivals within their military regime. Even if one does not seek power themselves, but instead supports another’s bid, there remain many sources of elite uncertainty. One’s preferred candidate may not be able to consolidate power and reward them. Backing a loser can lead the eventual winner to punish their rival’s allies. Similarly, elites may back a potentially weak successor that they believe they can control in order to increase the chances that they will maintain or improve their status (Kennedy 2008). However, this may actually undermine the stability of the regime if the new leader proves to be ineffective, thus risking bringing down the entire system along with them. Even if they back someone who is able to govern effectively, one cannot know if the agreements made during a transition will be honored. Sometimes, this arrangement works. For example, a deal was reportedly struck between potentially rival claimants to Uzbekistan’s presidency in 2007 so that one could successfully exit the elite a wealthy man, while the other took power (Anceschi 2021: 668). In other cases, it does not, as in North Korea when certain senior members of the

248  Research handbook on authoritarianism regime who supported the hereditary succession of Kim Jong-un thought they could exert influence over the young ruler, only to find themselves removed (sometimes terminally) and replaced by the new leader’s loyal cadres (Ishiyama and Kim 2020). In short, without the stability that an authoritarian leader represents or possessing the power of the leader themselves, leadership succession places elites in a highly uncertain and almost impossible situation. They do not know whether they will survive a transition with their lives and status intact, whether they will maintain or advance their position, or whether the regime itself will endure. Some elites may see this as an opportunity to fulfill their ambitions and emerge as the new leader, whereas others will prefer a continuation of the status quo and become risk adverse actors. The calculations for each member of the ruling coalition will be different depending on perceptions of their position relative to others, the likelihood of success or failure associated with taking certain actions, and the stability of the regime now and in the future.

16.3

HEIR APPARENT

One amongst the elites may be selected to follow the incumbent dictator in office: the heir apparent. This can be a legal status set forth in the country’s constitution or laws,2 or something less formal such as the “clear and unambiguous designation of a successor” (Herz 1952: 37). Having an heir apparent qualitatively changes the uncertainty surrounding the succession process by at least theoretically reducing the number of legitimate successors. Possessing this knowledge profoundly impacts the interests and incentives of the ruling coalition and adds a new, prominent actor to this process. Meng (2020: 22) showed that even “the designation of an informal successor” led to peaceful transitions of power in about 60 percent of cases – and this is even greater if this designation is enshrined in the political system’s formal rules. Nevertheless, designating an heir carries its own sources of risks and rewards for these actors and for the regime as a whole, but often in contradictory ways. 16.3.1 Contradictory Effects on Elite Incentives Designating a successor can be seen both as an act of preparing for the future and a means for the incumbent dictator to strengthen their grip on power (Frantz and Stein 2017). If we accept Frantz and Ezrow’s (2011) premise that authoritarian politics is fundamentally driven by the constant jockeying for power between the dictator and the regime’s elites, then appointing an heir apparent can reduce threats emanating from within the ruling coalition by creating a natural ally amongst the elites. Since the heir apparent now has a strong incentive to maintain the status quo until they can take over, they will actively defend the current leader against threats emanating from the non-designated elites, serving as a “barrier” between them (Konrad and Mui 2017: 2158; Meng 2020: 3). The presence of an heir apparent also affects the risk-reward calculations of the non-designated elites in ways that make it less likely that they will attempt to preempt the succession process through a coup, even if they would be better off becoming the leader themselves. This occurs in two ways. First, although nothing is certain, elite concerns about a disorderly succession causing a power vacuum at the top can be partly assuaged by providing some clarity as to who is likely to emerge as the new leader (Markowitz 2016: 518; Zeng 2020: 772). Thus, as elites feel more secure about their future, they are less

Leadership succession  249 likely to act out of fear in the ways outlined above. Second, the designation of an heir apparent makes plain to any ambitious elites, and any potential co-conspirators, that moving against the incumbent leader means facing not only the resources and allies that they can muster, but the heir apparent’s as well. By reducing the expected success of a coup, the leader has made it less likely that any member of the elite would even try in the first place, thus further securing the incumbent’s position. On the other hand, there are also compelling reasons why the designation of a successor might increase conflicts within the ruling coalition and, accordingly, undermine regime coherence and stability. Since all succession processes create winners and losers, the heir apparent’s appointment “may alienate important constituencies,” as it necessarily excludes those who might be interested in power themselves from being designated as such (Hoffmann 2009: 235). It is one thing for aspiring dictators to believe that their options are open and that they might succeed the leader, but it is quite another to preclude it in advance. According to Brown (2005: 100), “Those disappointed with the current policies could consider this appointment as a permanent defeat, and react accordingly.” For example, certain elites may believe that they will suffer unacceptable losses to their status, privileges, or even their lives under a new regime led by the designee. This may increase the chances that non-designated elites will preemptively move against the regime either by launching a coup or defecting to the opposition. Elites may also object to the incumbent dictator’s choice if the heir apparent themselves or the process by which they were selected are seen as violating important regime or societal norms. This designation can “trigger an elite backlash against the selection” and thus fracture the ruling coalition (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2016: 162). Furthermore, the heir apparent may be perceived by elites as too weak to effectively preserve the regime once taking office and thereby a threat to their future status. In each of these cases, elites may now be incentivized to rally around another individual deemed more acceptable or even to actively move against the incumbent dictator themselves. 16.3.2 Crown Prince Dilemma Compounding these problems for the incumbent dictator is what is widely known as the “crown prince” dilemma: by elevating a member of the elite to the position of heir apparent, the dictator may inadvertently create the biggest threat to their continued rule (Herz 1952: 30). As Hale (2015: 61, emphasis in original) observed, “power … becomes a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy whereby those who are expected to become powerful (for whatever reason) can become powerful by virtue of these expectations.” Being the heir apparent is an enviable position to be in since it signals to the ruling coalition that they will be able to reward allies and punish foes in the future. If we assume that non-designated elites wish to maintain or improve their status following the incumbent dictator’s departure from office, then they will wish to be seen as backing the heir apparent in order to curry favor with them in advance of taking power – in essence, banking goodwill now for a later payoff. This relationship can easily coalesce into a clear and present danger to the incumbent dictator as they become “increasingly seen as irrelevant to the political future” (Hale 2006: 308–9). Members of the ruling coalition may consequently withdraw their support from the now-lame duck and actively throw it behind the expected future ruler. If the heir apparent is willing to bide their time and simply wait their turn, this would not be a problem. However, the heir apparent, empowered by their prominent position and newfound elite support, now has a strong incentive to safeguard their future

250  Research handbook on authoritarianism position in the present by leading their own preemptive coup against the incumbent dictator. This may reflect a fear that their mentor will change their mind and choose another, or that opposition to their candidacy will reach a critical level which would force their replacement. It is for these reasons – its effect on the ruling coalition and the possibility of empowering a direct threat – that dictators are often loath to identify a clear successor, despite the barrier effect that the heir apparent may play to bolster their position vis-à-vis the ruling coalition. 16.3.3 Hereditary Succession An important factor which appears to affect these dynamics is if the heir apparent is a blood relative of the incumbent dictator – that is, if a hereditary succession is planned. This method of succession forms the very foundation of monarchies, but also is not unheard of in states that are formally republics. Examples of both are found or were attempted in the Arab world (Billingsley 2010; Stacher 2011), but hereditary republics, while compromising a clear minority of authoritarian regimes, have been seen worldwide. North Korea is a prominent case because it is the only three-generation hereditary republic, with power transitioning from Kim Il-Sung to his son Kim Jong-Il, and then to his grandson, Kim Jong-un. Amongst former Soviet republics, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have already conducted hereditary successions and, according to all outward indicators, another appears to be planned in Tajikistan (Tolstrup and Ambrosio 2022). Research on formal monarchies has shown that the establishment of hereditary succession in European states – especially if limited to direct parent-child successions, and even more so to only first-born sons – was positively correlated with regime- and state-survival rates and negatively correlated with preemptive coup attempts by elites and the heir apparent (Kurrild-Klitgaarn 2000; Kokkonen and Sundell 2014; Kokkonen, Krishnarajan, Møller, and Sundell 2021). This is a key reason why many European countries adopted this method of succession. Moreover, these findings are not limited to Europe and the logic behind hereditary succession made the practice pervasive worldwide. Certainly, it is not a foolproof method of avoiding succession crises, such as in situations where there is no clear hereditary heir (e.g., the War of the Roses) or too many possible claimants (e.g., the fratricidal struggles within the Ottoman Empire). Nonetheless, hereditary succession can foster regime stability and smoother transitions because of the ways in which it affects elite calculations and incentives, as well as the crown prince dilemma. By genetically limiting those who could become the new ruler, hereditary succession creates a “conspicuous” choice of successor (Tullock 1987: 165). As this method of succession becomes more firmly rooted in the norms and laws of a political system, the succession process becomes endowed with Weberian traditional and rational-legal authorities which elites are less likely to contest before or after the fact. Hereditary succession also sends strong signals to elites not in the royal bloodline that they, and any co-conspirators, will face a stark legitimacy crisis should the process be circumvented. There is also strong evidence that the barrier effect that the heir apparent plays in defending the regime extends to the wider royal family, as familial affinity and a shared sense of self-interest causes them to rally together against non-family threats, even if they themselves will not be the next monarch (Kokkonen, Krishnarajan, Møller, and Sundell 2021). With a reduced chance of success, elite ambitions are therefore more likely to remain in check.

Leadership succession  251 Set rules for hereditary succession also provide elites with greater certainty that they will avoid suffering a post-transition loss in status. This comes from two sources. First, even if the rules will automatically exclude them from the possibility of ruling, elites are willing to accept this bargain because the rules, if followed, mean that they are less likely to face the prospect of a succession struggle in which they will have to choose a side and risk making the wrong choice. As Kokkonen and Sundell (2020: 439) put it, “regime members need only to accept the designated successor’s ascension to power to assure regime continuity and avoid civil war.” Second, elites can also reasonably assume that the new ruler, being of the same family, will not radically change things upon assuming power. In many cases, leading noble families may be related to the royal family. In other words, the royal family and the patronage networks upon which it rests becomes a known quantity which is more likely to continue into the future for those who already benefit from it. Thus, even if they would be better off sitting on the throne themselves, the non-heir apparent elites – who themselves may be of royal or noble blood – have a strong interest in keeping the entire system of hereditary privilege from being undermined. Hereditary succession is also thought to help mitigate the leader’s crown prince dilemma, especially if the process is based upon primogeniture. It is not unheard of for an impatient heir apparent to attempt to speed up their ascension to the throne, as occurred in Qatar when Prince Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani ousted his father in a bloodless palace coup in 1995 (MacLeod 1996). However, the incentive to do this is lessened by several factors. First, the heir apparent knows that their position is more secure because the hereditary rules in place often make it difficult for the monarch to simply replace them by choosing another from the available elites or for elites to rally behind an alternative (Tullock 1987: 163–4). In most cases, all they need to do is wait their turn. This assumes, of course, that there is not another with an equally legitimate claim to the throne. In such cases, the heir apparent’s position becomes less certain, as occurred in Jordan when, two weeks before his death, King Hussein surprised many by replacing one son with another as his successor (Jehl 1999). Second, if power is intended to be passed from parent to child, the heir apparent, being necessarily younger, has a longer time horizon and, again, is more likely to await their turn. Finally, one should not discount the fact that familial affinities – and especially the inherent and natural hierarchy between parent and child – create an emotional bond which tempers the willingness to move against one’s parent (Kokkonen, Krishnarajan, Møller, and Sundell 2021).3 Beyond easing the immediate threat to the dictator, securing a hereditary succession makes it more likely that the dictator themselves and their broader family will be protected after they leave office, since the new ruler will be their blood relation. Brownlee (2007a) has shown that many of these same dynamics also hold in political systems which lack a legal basis for hereditary succession, but when power is nonetheless passed through family members – the hereditary republics. For example, even if they would be better off taking power themselves, elites are sometimes willing to accept a hereditary succession in a non-monarchy if such a step is perceived as more likely than other options to preserve the political status quo and avoid fierce intra-elite conflicts which could threaten the regime and their position. In addition, by having their kin succeed them, dictators in republics can better ensure that they and their family will be protected long term. It is for this reason that hereditary republics should not be treated merely as a “cultural fluke” or a “curiosity” (Brownlee 2007a: 602), but rather as an important (albeit, understudied) aspect of modern autocratic politics.

252  Research handbook on authoritarianism However, even if a dictator in a modern autocracy wishes to establish a political dynasty, it can be quite difficult to implement in practice. Because this mode of power transfer lacks the legitimacy found in monarchial systems, hereditary succession violates the very premises of republicanism and is a powerplay of the highest order against the other, non-related elites. As such, even the appearance of empowering one’s kin and positioning them to eventually rule can invite strong opposition from the ruling coalition and the population at large. It is likely only possible when the dictator is at their apex in terms of power and, as Brownlee (2007a) showed, under conditions of highly personalist authoritarian systems, rather than ones with strong parties or other institutions which could block this maneuver. Such a backlash occurred in Egypt, where the obvious desire of Hosni Mubarak to pass power to his son, Gamal, was deemed unacceptable by those inside and outside of the regime and made it more likely that the military and ruling party would turn on him following mass protests in 2011 (Kelly 2016: chapter 6).

16.4

SINGLE-PARTY REGIMES

The foregoing discussion was largely premised upon the core dynamics of authoritarian political systems which lack substantive institutionalization and are primarily defined by the relationships between an individual dictator, on the one hand, and their ruling coalition, on the other. Geddes (1999) referred to these as personalist regimes. Since there is little holding the system together other than the dictator and these relationships, it is unsurprising that, all else being equal, uncertainty intensifies dramatically when the incumbent’s continued rule is called into question (Ezrow and Frantz 2011b: 220). Even in systems with formal hereditary succession rules – traditional monarchies – power resides less in the institutions of state, than in the person of the monarch and the royal family (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2016: 167). Authoritarian leadership succession operates quite differently within authoritarian single-party regimes, which Geddes (1999) defined as more highly institutionalized political systems in which the structures and procedures of the dominant party form the primary foundation of power. Personalist regimes will almost certainly have a party-of-power, too, but these are little more than an extension of the dictator’s will and do not have any independent decision-making role. Thus, Geddes (1999: 124) made a distinction between “nominal” single-party systems found in otherwise personalist systems and “real” single-party systems discussed in this section. The literature shows that single-party regimes have been historically better at managing leadership transitions and ensuring regime survival by reducing elite uncertainty and containing intra-elite conflict (Ezrow and Frantz 2011b: 200–203, 210–11).4 Unless something goes very wrong, the primary actors in single-party regimes have greater assurance that the decision regarding who will emerge as the next leader will be filtered through the party’s institutions and preestablished procedures, with input from key stakeholders. Even if the outcome is not predetermined or the rules are not followed in their entirety, the process itself will be more predictable, managed, and inclusive (Ezrow and Frantz 2011a: 7–8). As such, these systems have a greater chance of avoiding a power vacuum at the top, procedural chaos, or extra-institutional interventions. Few, therefore, would have an incentive to circumvent this process – or allow it to be circumvented – since following it is the best guarantee of a stable transfer of power (Brownlee 2007b: 12–13).

Leadership succession  253 Single-party regimes are also characterized by greater institutional constraints on the leader and a greater diffusion of power between them and the top party elites. While this means the leader yields less discretionary authority, it actually makes their position more secure because their continued tenure in office is not dependent on personal politicking and fluctuations in the balance of power between leader and elites, but rather upon predictable and stable party rules. While intra-party coups do occur – such as the one which ousted Khrushchev (Svolik 2012: 94–100) – party rules will at least shape this process. More importantly, the consequences of losing a leadership contest are reduced as, to reuse Hale’s formulation cited above, leadership in these systems is less of an “indivisible good” than in personalist regimes. This is especially true if there are set term limits or an understanding that power will rotate between factions, thus ensuring that “no single faction suffers permanent defeat by another” (Brownlee 2007b: 12–13). This is not to say that leadership contests are without stakes or that the competition for the top spots may not be fierce – there are benefits to being the leader or at the top levels of the party, after all. Instead, with elites possessing a greater capacity to avoid being punished or sidelined post-transition, leadership succession is not the kind of zero-sum game found in personalist systems (Smith 2005: 449). This allows for the development of a more “collegial” political culture which places a premium on ensuring balance between factions and preventing them from feeling the need to undermine the political status quo (Nathan 2003: 11). Thus, with uncertainty about potential future losses reduced, the chief actors in the system are incentivized to secure their long-term interests by working to preserve the party’s monopoly on power, rather than by positioning themselves to be victorious in some future winner-take-all contest for power which ultimately undermines regime cohesion (Geddes 1999: 129). Several cases of single-party regimes achieving stable, multiple transitions have been highlighted in the literature, including Mexico (Sanderson 1983), Tanzania (Meng 2020), and Vietnam (Giang 2020). However, the most prominent recent case has been China because its intentional succession design has been widely seen as an important factor for providing a stable foundation upon which the party could affect China’s dramatic economic and geopolitical rise (Dittmer 2003; Zeng 2014). Before communist rule and immediately after Mao Zedong’s death, leadership transitions in China were often characterized by brutal intra-elite conflict, purges, coups, and violence. Deng Xiaoping, who emerged as the dominant figure out of the post-Mao succession struggles, made a conscious effort to avoid this in the future and to instead stabilize and strengthen the party by instituting a set of procedures and norms regulating the replacement of top party officials. These included term limits and retirement ages, clearly delineated paths for promotion, and predetermined selectorates for elite positions. Furthermore, the relationship between the outgoing and incoming leaders, as well as their post-leadership roles, were better defined. This arrangement allowed the incoming leader to build up sufficient power to effectively govern post-transition without threatening the tenure of the incumbent (Zhang 2011; Wang and Vangeli 2016). While sometimes the implementation of these rules was inconsistent, Chinese Communist Party elites generally accepted them as fair, more meritocratic, and a way to prevent the consolidation of power by any one individual or faction (Nathan 2003: 6–7). Xi Jinping’s current dominance has called all of this into question, however. Even though Xi rose through the ranks by these rules, he has undermined their foundations by abolishing term limits for himself and retirement ages for his allies, as well as by circumventing promotion procedures when it suited him in order to put loyalists in important positions. With the Chinese political system seemingly departing

254  Research handbook on authoritarianism from a single-party regime and reverting back to personalism, the literature would suggest that the succession struggles of the past, along with their accompanying political instability, will return when Xi eventually departs the political scene, unless some institutionalized succession procedures are reestablished (Düben 2020). 16.4.1 Competitive Authoritarianism Although nearly all full dictatorships hold regular elections, many of these are almost entirely for show and may not even include a choice not controlled by the government. Between these regimes and full democracies are the so-called competitive or electoral authoritarian systems, which hold regular, neither truly free nor fair multiparty elections which the opposition is allowed to contest, even if this contestation is circumscribed by law and policy. These systems have spawned a wide-ranging literature, as Morse (2012) discussed over a decade ago. While “surprise defeats” may occur (Brownlee 2007b: 10), these elections are almost always faits accomplis when the incumbent runs for reelection as they possess overwhelming advantages which prevent the opposition from having any real impact. These include a sense of inevitability; the full coercive, political, and legal apparatus of the state at their disposal; and the ability to keep elites onside through an expectation that the incumbent will win and continue to provide rents to allies and punish defectors. These advantages may not hold when the incumbent chooses not to run for reelection or if term limits5 are honored, thus ensuring a leadership transition. Maltz (2007: 134), Ezrow (2019: 283), and Baturo (2022: 81) each used quantitative data to illustrate that there is a stark difference in outcomes for competitive authoritarian systems when the incumbent runs for reelection versus when they do not, with the regime significantly more likely to fall in the latter scenario. Hale (2015: chapters 7–8) pointed to a series of cases in the former Soviet Union as examples of how this dynamic played out: when incumbents ran for reelection, there was regime stability; when incumbents did not run, the regime was fundamentally undermined. The primary causes seen for this dichotomy are elite defections and the relatively weaker position of the possible successor. When the incumbent fails to run for reelection, disgruntled elites have both an opportunity and incentive to defect from the regime to the opposition. This is because they are not expected to be the chosen successor and they believe that their position will be substantively worse in the future because of the expected post-election power arrangements under the new leader. Alternatively, they may perceive that the regime itself is weak or widely illegitimate and they may wish to get ahead of a possible regime collapse by exploiting the opening that an election provides. In closed, fully authoritarian systems, this may not be a real option as most meaningful politics occurs within the ruling coalition and defections are likely to be meaningless gestures which come with the risk of serious punishment from a unified elite eager to preserve their status. Even in competitive authoritarian systems in which the dictator is running for reelection, the expectation is that, unless they are highly unpopular, they will win the election and be around to, again, punish defectors. However, when the dictator is not running for reelection, the risk-reward calculations change: defectors face neither the likely costs associated with confronting a sitting dictator nor the relative certainty of the election outcome under normal circumstances. Instead, they now face a lame-duck dictator and a yet-untested, and comparatively weaker, possible successor. Under these conditions, elites are provided with an alternate, less risky path to power outside of the ruling coalition. As Hale

Leadership succession  255 (2015: 12) described it, former regime insiders “suddenly become ‘democrats’, mobilizing as many people as they can muster in the streets to fight for their cause.” What might appear at first to be a popular revolt is actually an extension of preexisting intra-elite power struggles as regime defectors opportunistically use the opposition and an impending leadership change for their own self-interest (Hale 2005: 140–41, 2006: 309–10; Brownlee 2007b: 14, 41–3). Thus, by not running for reelection, incumbent dictators open the door for regime division. Regimes appear to be better able to successfully manage such a transition, even in the face of elite defections to the opposition, if there is a clearly designated successor who is empowered enough to maintain the backing of the remaining elite. As Zeng (2020) observed, much of this operates in a manner similar to the dynamics discussed above regarding the designation of an heir apparent: while this designation might push some elites to respond negatively, the regime can hopefully forestall a larger intra-elite conflict over who will succeed the incumbent. However, the dynamics of competitive authoritarian systems are quite different than those found in fully authoritarian ones since the designated successor still has to run and win an election. Baturo (2022: 77) described how successor candidates are at a relative disadvantage compared to incumbent dictators since they “may not appear invincible yet” and cannot point to a series of achievements to rally the masses. Moreover, even if regime insiders, and the incumbent themselves, may be better off if the successor candidate wins, the successor candidate may not enjoy the full loyalty and weight of the state apparatus to tip the electoral scales in their direction since elites are less certain that they will be successfully elected (Cheeseman 2010: 143). Just as important is the effect on regime outsiders: the “novelty effect” associated with even the possibility of a change in leadership may “embolden the opposition and break the apathy of the population,” leading to better opposition candidates and greater unity and coordination amongst anti-regime forces (Baturo 2022: 77). This is why successor candidates, even if they win, tend to fare notably worse in elections than their more established predecessors. These disadvantages are accentuated if a successor is not clearly designated or is designated too late for this to be effective (Hess 2010). In these circumstances, the ruling coalition’s fractures become apparent, intra-elite conflict intensifies as multiple factions vie for power, and the regime is slow or incapable of mobilizing in its defense, squandering its institutional dominance. And as the election outcome thus becomes less predictable, the regime will further weaken, since more elites will either defect to the opposition or stay neutral in hopes of preserving their status post-election. While the competitive authoritarian model can provide a variety of benefits for regimes that either cannot nor choose not to implement full authoritarianism, such as a modicum of domestic and international legitimacy, this has the potential to evaporate if a leadership transition is certain to occur. 16.4.2 Incumbent Dictator Death As discussed throughout this chapter, uncertainty surrounding leadership succession is potentially harmful to regime stability because it can intensify, and can even precipitate, dictator-elite and intra-elite conflicts. Conditions which lower this uncertainty are more likely to result in a less disruptive transition from one dictator to another. Thus, it would logically follow that these negative dynamics should be at their zenith when a leader dies without substantive preparations to empower an heir apparent or to build institutionalized party structures, since the political system has no choice but to immediately confront the question of who will

256  Research handbook on authoritarianism become the new leader. This has the potential to create a political vacuum filled by a political free-for-all of ambitious elites and their allies seeking political dominance. Herz’s (1952: 40) prophetic comment about the power struggles which followed Stalin’s death came true, making it, according to Anceschi (2021: 666), “the archetypal case of chaotic post-personalistic succession,” since nothing was done to prepare the system for this political shock. Nevertheless, the USSR – absent certain high-ranking officials, of course – survived for nearly another 40 years and disintegrated for reasons completely unrelated to succession. Kendall-Taylor and Frantz’s (2016: 160, 165) quantitative analysis6 showed that post-Stalin Soviet Union was far more representative of political outcomes when the incumbent dictator dies in office than the previous literature would suggest: Death in office is the least likely type to precipitate regime change, even when compared to regime-sanctioned forms of leadership transition, such as term limits or informal decisions made among elites behind closed doors. Our findings indicate that a leader’s death in office almost never leads to significant near-term liberalization. Likewise, only rarely does it spell the end of the regime or precipitate instability in the form of coups or protests. On the contrary, authoritarian regimes have proven to be remarkably resilient when a leader dies.

These findings may seem counterintuitive, but they hold for all regime types – though, unsurprisingly, less so for personalist regimes. They also hold for not just the short-term transition from one dictator to another, with an 87 percent regime survival rate, but in the medium term, too, with 76 percent of regimes remaining in power five years after a leader dies in office. Those regimes that experienced breakdowns under these conditions were mostly ones which already had an established history of political instability. Regimes have been able to survive leader deaths in office for two key reasons. First, not all leadership transitions in authoritarian systems are the same: some are more politically disruptive and leave a weaker foundation for the subsequent regime. Military coups, for example, are often violent and can fundamentally transform the ruling coalition, replacing bedrock elites with officers whose continued rule is based primarily upon their ability to use force, rather than elite cooptation and traditional patronage structures. Once this sort of behavior gets established, it is easy to replicate. This is one reason why countries that experience a military coup are more likely to experience another in the future (McGowan 2003). This does not apply when a leader dies in office, as Kendall-Taylor and Frantz (2016: 160) explained, since these transitions are not “politically motivated” or “the result of decision or actions taken by political actors” dissatisfied with the status quo within or outside of the ruling coalition. Instead, they are simply a reflection of the natural mortality of all human beings. While undoubtedly disruptive to some degree, they are at the lower end of the disruption spectrum because they represent passive, rather than active political change. In fact, the death of a dictator in office, especially if they were advanced in age or ailing, could actually be taken as evidence that the regime rested upon a stable foundation since neither elites nor the masses were motivated or powerful enough to preempt the process. Second, rather than a dictator’s death triggering maximum elite conflict, the opposite is often true. Even if they would benefit more from being the new leader themselves, elites are likely to consider it better to have a regime insider take over than risk having an outsider do so, especially if they can have a say in this process through a negotiated elite pact. After the dictator’s death, the remaining elites are therefore strongly incentivized to come to a consensus

Leadership succession  257 amongst themselves about who will become the new leader in order to avoid compromising the stability of the regime and their political status (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2016: 161). Some of this may actually occur behind the scenes prior to the leader’s death if the top elites have informally determined who will become the new leader when the time comes or the process by which they will later choose the new leader (Hummel 2020: 984). In these cases, the elites are not actively moving against the dictator, but rather laying the groundwork for the future. Granted, elites may be pushed aside later by the new leader, but the uncertainty over this possible future outcome is countered by the shorter-term certainty associated with facilitating a smooth transition. Horák (2018) and Anceschi (2021) both described how these dynamics played out in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Both countries should have faced difficult transitions since they were both highly personalist, non-institutionalized political systems without established norms or even examples of succession, as the newly departed dictators were their respective country’s founding leader. This was especially true for Turkmenistan since Saparmurat Niyazov died rather unexpectedly and had concentrated power to a profound degree. Nevertheless, both regimes were able to successfully accomplish leadership transitions with minimal political disruption. In Uzbekistan, there was a negotiated agreement between the top contenders over who would assume the presidency and how the other would be treated. Turkmenistan’s case became complicated when the constitutionally designated successor was quickly arrested on questionable grounds by more powerful actors in the ruling coalition and a minor member of the elite was chosen by them as a compromise candidate whom they believed they could control.7 Despite these differences, however, the result was the same: elite pacts quickly and decisively foreclosed any possibility of a political opening and the regime remained intact despite little preparation for this eventuality.

16.5 CONCLUSION Ever since Herz (1952) published his groundbreaking work on authoritarian leadership succession, scholars have sought to better understand the challenges that dictatorships face when confronting even the prospect of transitioning from one leader to another. This chapter explored how the uncertainty surrounding these ultimately inevitable events disrupts expectations of future status and structures the incentives of dictators and elites alike. In order to attempt to exercise some control over the future, these actors may pursue their interests in ways that precipitate and intensify dictator-elite and intra-elite conflicts detrimental not only to regime stability, but to their long-term interests too. It also highlighted how this process can operate in contradictory and counterintuitive ways. The most obvious example is how the designation of an heir apparent has the capacity to both heighten and reduce these conflicts, as well as to both bolster and undermine the incumbent dictator. Moreover, the fact that many highly personalist regimes are still able to survive when the question of who will become the new leader is purposefully left open until after the incumbent dictator dies indicates that even high levels of uncertainty are not fatal to dictatorships. If there is any single conclusion that can be definitively reached, it is that the unity of the ruling coalition is perhaps the most crucial element in this process because it is necessary for preventing the uncertainties surrounding the succession outcome from tearing the regime apart and becoming a political opening for those outside of it. And this unity is best assured

258  Research handbook on authoritarianism by a political environment which limits elite expectations of a significant drop in future status caused by either the anticipation or the reality of a leadership transition. This does not require full elite consensus, but rather an agreement amongst enough relevant members of the ruling coalition that they would be better off with a stable transition than by risking a more precarious process, even if they themselves do not emerge as the new leader. Active measures such as reducing the number of likely or legitimate successor candidates, institutionalizing the procedures by which a successor is chosen, reducing the consequences of not emerging as the new leader, or entering into self-interested elite pacts can achieve this end. Competitive authoritarian systems have more difficulty doing this, which should give some hope to opposition forces in these cases. However, those hoping to use political transitions as an opportunity for political change in fully authoritarian systems are likely to be disappointed. While authoritarian leadership succession is always a serious matter and does lead to regime collapse in some cases, the evidence is clear that they can be successfully managed and are not nearly as destabilizing as once thought.

NOTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Mass-led revolts have been on the rise, however, and constitute a growing means by which dictators leave office (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2016). This assumes, of course, that the position has substance and is not just a pro forma designation without any political meaning. It is for these two latter reasons that hereditary successions within the same generation – such as between brothers – can be problematic, as they are older, less likely to be patient, and more likely to see the monarch as an equal (Brownlee 2007a: 599). Though, as Meng (2020) showed, this is not a guarantee. As mentioned above, China has term limits, but these are fundamentally different than what is being discussed here, as China is a single-party regime which allows for no space for any political opposition. All meaningful politics occurs within the party. As well as Hummel’s (2020) expansion on this study. Incorrectly, it turned out. Rather than serving as a puppet, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow was able to consolidate power and push out those who selected him.

REFERENCES Ambrosio, T. and Tolstrup, J. (2019) “How do we tell authoritarian diffusion from illusion?”, Quality & Quantity, 53, pp. 2741–63. Anceschi, L. (2021) “After personalism: Rethinking power transfers in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 51(4), pp. 660–80. Baturo, A. (2022) “When incumbents do not run: Presidential succession and democratization”, Democratization, 29(1), pp. 74–92. Billingsley, A. (2010) Political succession in the Arab world: Constitutions, family loyalties, and Islam. New York: Routledge. Brown, N. (2005) “Monarchies constitutionnelles et républiques non constitutionnelles”, Égypte/Monde arabe, 2, pp. 89–104. Available at https://​journals​.openedition​.org/​ema/​1061 (accessed December 9, 2022). Brownlee, J. (2007a) “Hereditary succession in modern autocracies”, World Politics, 59(4), pp. 595–628. Brownlee, J. (2007b) Authoritarianism in an age of democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leadership succession  259 Bunce, V. (1981) Do new leaders make a difference? Executive succession and public policy under capitalism and socialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cheeseman, N. (2010) “African elections as vehicles for change”, Journal of Democracy, 21(4), pp. 139–53. Dittmer, L. (2003) “Leadership change and Chinese political development”, China Quarterly, 176, pp. 903–25. Düben, B. (2020) “Xi Jinping and the end of Chinese exceptionalism”, Problems of Post-Communism, 67(2), pp. 111–28. Egorov, G. and Sonin, K. (2015) “The killing game: A theory of non-democratic succession”, Research in Economics, 69(3), pp. 398–411. Escribà-Folch, A. (2013) “Accountable for what? Regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946–2004”, Democratization, 20(1), pp. 160–85. Ezrow, N. (2019) “Term limits and succession in dictatorships”, in Alexander Baturo and Robert Elgie, eds. The politics of presidential term limits. Oxford Oxford University Press, pp. 269–84. Ezrow, N. and Frantz, E. (2011a) “State institutions and the survival of dictatorships”, Journal of International Affairs, 65(1), pp. 1–13. Ezrow, N. and Frantz, E. (2011b) Dictators and dictatorships: Understanding authoritarian regimes and their leaders. New York: Continuum. Frantz, E. and Ezrow, N. (2011) The politics of dictatorship: Institutions and outcomes in authoritarian regimes. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Frantz, E. and Stein, E. (2017) “Countering coups: Leadership succession rules in dictatorships”, Comparative Political Studies, 50(7), pp. 879–1020. Gandhi, J. (2008) Political institutions under dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Geddes, B. (1999) “What do we know about democratization after twenty years?”, Annual Review of Political Science, 2, pp. 115–44. Giang, N. (2020) “Succession politics and authoritarian resilience in Vietnam”, Southeast Asian Affairs, pp. 411–46. Govea, R. and Holm, J. (1998) “Crisis, violence and political succession in Africa”, Third World Quarterly, 19(1), pp. 129–48. Hale, H. (2005) “Democracy, autocracy, and revolution in post-Soviet Eurasia”, World Politics, 58(1), pp. 133–65. Hale, H. (2006) “Democracy or autocracy on the march? The colored revolutions as normal dynamics of patronal presidentialism”, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 39(1), pp. 305–29. Hale, H. (2015) Patronal politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. Helms, L. (2020) “Leadership succession in politics: The democracy/autocracy divide revisited”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 22(2), pp. 328–46. Herz, J. (1952) “The problem of successorship in dictatorial regimes: A study of comparative law and institutions”, Journal of Politics, 14(1), pp. 19–40. Hess, S. (2010) “Protests, parties, and presidential succession: Competing theories of color revolutions in Armenia and Kyrgystan”, Problems of Post-Communism, 57(1), pp. 28–39. Hoffmann, B. (2009) “Charismatic authority and leadership change: Lessons from Cuba’s post-Fidel succession”, International Political Science Review, 30(3), pp. 229–48. Horák, S. (2018) “Leadership succession in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan: Between stability and instability”, Central Asian Affairs, 5, pp. 1–15. Hummel, S. (2020) “Leader age, death, and political liberalization in dictatorships”, Journal of Politics, 82(3), pp. 981–95. Ishiyama, J. and Kim, T. (2020) “Authoritarian survival strategies and elite churn: The case of North Korea”, International Area Studies Review, 23(2), pp. 160–76. Jehl, D. (1999) “King Hussein stuns Jordan with plan to switch heirs,” New York Times, 24 January, p. 4. Kelly, I. (2016) “Regime elites and transitions from authoritarian rule: A comparative analysis of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings”, PhD thesis, Dublin City University, Dublin. Kendall-Taylor, A. and Frantz, E. (2014) “How autocracies fall”, Washington Quarterly, 37(1), pp. 35–47. Kendall-Taylor, A. and Frantz, E. (2016) “When dictators die”, Journal of Democracy, 27(4), pp. 159–71.

260  Research handbook on authoritarianism Kennedy, R. (2008) “Institutionalization and strength of leaders in authoritarian regimes”, Paper presented at the APSA Annual Conference in Boston, MA (August). Kokkonen, A. and Sundell, A. (2014) “Delivering stability: primogeniture and autocratic survival in European monarchies, 1000–1800”, American Political Science Review, 108(2), pp. 438–53. Kokkonen, A. and Sundell, A. (2020) “Leader succession and civil war”, Comparative Political Studies, 53(3–4), pp. 434–68. Kokkonen, A., Krishnarajan, S., Møller, J. and Sundell, A. (2021) “Blood is thicker than water: Family size and leader deposition in medieval and early modern Europe”, Journal of Politics, 83(4), pp. 1246–59. Konrad, K. and Mui, V. (2017) “The prince – or better no prince? The strategic value of appointing a successor”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(10), pp. 2158–82. Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (2000) “The constitutional economics of autocratic succession”, Public Choice, 103(1/2), pp. 63–84. Letvisky, S. and Way, L. (2010) Competitive authoritarianism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. MacLeod, S. (1996) “Battle Royal on the Gulf”, Time, 148(21). Available at https://​content​.time​.com/​ time/​subscriber/​article/​0​,33009​,985412​-1​,00​.html (accessed December 19, 2022). Maltz, G. (2007) “The case for presidential term limits”, Journal of Democracy, 18(1), pp. 128–42. Markowitz, L. (2016) “Rural economies and leadership change in Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey, 35(4), pp. 514–30. McGowan, P. (2003) “African military coups d’état, 1956–2001: Frequency, trends and distribution”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 41(3), pp. 339–70. Meng, A. (2020) Constraining dictatorship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mesquita, M. (2016) “Kazakhstan’s presidential transition and the evolution of elite networks”, Demokratizatsiya, 24(3), pp. 371–97. Morse, Y. (2012) “The era of electoral authoritarianism”, World Politics, 64(1), pp. 161–98. Nathan, A. (2003) “Authoritarian resilience”, Journal of Democracy, 14(1), pp. 6–17. Sanderson, S. (1983) “Presidential succession and political rationality in Mexico”, World Politics, 35(3), pp. 315–34. Schedler, A. and Hoffmann, B. (2016) “Communicating authoritarian elite cohesion”, Democratization, 23(1), pp. 93–117. Share, D. (1986) “The Franquist regime and the dilemma of succession”, Review of Politics, 48(4), pp. 549–75. Smith, B. (2005) “Life of the party: The origins of regime breakdown and persistence under single-party rule”, World Politics, 57(3), pp. 421–51. Stacher, J. (2011) “Reinterpreting authoritarian power: Syria’s hereditary succession”, Middle East Journal, 65(2), pp. 197–212. Svolik, M. (2012) The politics of authoritarian rule. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tolstrup, J. and Ambrosio, T. (2022) “When children join the coalition: Apparent hereditary grooming as an authoritarian power-preservation tool”, Paper presented at the CBEES Annual Conference at Södertörn University, Stockholm (December). Tullock, G. (1987) Autocracy. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. Wang, Z. and Vangeli, A. (2016) “Rules and norms of leadership succession in China: From Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping and beyond”, China Journal, 76, pp. 24–40. Zeng, J. (2014) “Institutionalization of the authoritarian leadership in China: A power succession system with Chinese characteristics?”, Contemporary Politics, 20(3), pp. 294–314. Zeng, Q. (2020) “Leadership succession and the resilience of electoral authoritarian regimes”, Political Studies, 68(3), pp. 768–96. Zhang, Y. (2011) “The successor’s dilemma in China’s single-party political system”, European Journal of Political Economy, 27(4), pp. 674–80.

17. The assassination of autocratic leaders Abel Escribà-Folch

17.1 INTRODUCTION The assassination of autocrats has attracted the imagination of novelists. Dictators are often depicted as paranoid individuals, constantly worried about the risk of being assassinated. This view is also shared by political thinkers such as Plato and Cicero, among others, who characterized tyrants as living in constant fear and saw their actions being constantly driven by the presence of that threat. How real is that threat? From 1946 to 2010, there have been a total of 4,591 authoritarian country-years in independent countries with more than one million inhabitants in 2009 (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014). During that period there have been 117 assassination attempts against dictators.1 This means that the unconditional probability of a dictator being victim of an assassination attempt in any country in any given year is just 0.025. When examining irregular leader transitions in autocratic regimes, most attention has been paid to coups and, more recently, to popular uprisings. Yet, historically, disgruntled elites, aggrieved opponents, and lone-wolves have also relied on a more drastic technology for trying to remove non-democratic leaders, namely, assassinations. Cases such as Hipparchus (Athens), Julius Caesar (Rome), Naser al-Din Shah (Iran) may come rapidly to mind; and, more recently, Faisal I (Saudi Arabia), Park-Chung-Hee (South Korea), Laurent Kabila (Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)), and, as recently as 2021, Jovenel Moïse (Haiti). Much more abundant have been attempts in which perpetrators failed to kill the leader though. Dictators are difficult to reach and are strongly protected. For example, in August 2018, Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro survived an attempt on his life using drones carrying explosives. In 1986, the Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front failed to kill Pinochet after attacking his motorcade with rockets and gunfire. Argentina’s military junta leader, Jorge Rafael Videla, survived two bomb explosions in 1976 and 1977. And Libya’s former strongman, Muammar Gaddafi, survived five assassination attempts during his tenure and even the retaliatory bombing of Libya by US forces in 1986. He was eventually killed by rebel forces in 2011. This chapter examines the assassination of autocratic leaders. To do so, the next section presents a definition of assassination attempts, compares them to coups, and presents some temporal and geographical patterns using newly collected data. I then briefly survey the justifications of tyrannicide developed throughout history by different political thinkers. I then discuss the main determinants of assassination attempts and report some empirical evidence. Finally, the chapter examines the consequences of successful assassinations. The last section concludes.

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17.2

DEFINITION, DATA, AND PATTERNS

An assassination attempt occurs whenever perpetrators (be it insiders or outsiders) take concrete illegal actions to kill an incumbent autocratic leader. When that happens, two outcomes may transpire: a successful assassination attempt, which results in the leader’s death; or a failed attempt, after which, the regime leader survives. However, other forms of irregular ouster attempts, especially coups and insurgencies, do sometimes result in the killing of the dictator. The distinction between these events lies ultimately on the goals of perpetrators or plotters. Assassins simply try to kill the regime leader, without any specific plan to seize power.2 In contrast, a coup attempt involves concrete, observable, and illegal actions by civilian regime insiders and/or current, active members of the security forces to hold and seize power for themselves or their affiliates (Chin, Carter, and Wright, 2021). According to most recent data, there have been total of 151 assassination attempts against autocratic leaders during the 1946–2010 period. Out of these, 39 were successful, involving a success rate of 25.8 percent;3 34 of these attempts, however, occurred during or as a result of a coup attempt, which leaves us with 117 standalone cases, of which only 17 succeeded in killing the incumbent dictator, entailing a 14.5 percent success rate.4 All in all, these figures suggest that assassinations are a disruptive event that, albeit rare, are more common than previously thought and, hence, in need of more scholarly attention. At the same time, they suggest that attempting to kill the ruler is a more precarious, desperate, and less effective strategy of political change that rivals and opponents might resort to when lacking the ability to launch a more organized attack. For the same 1946–2010 period, Chin, Carter, and Wright (2021) identify and code 395 coup attempts in dictatorships, 49.4 percent (195 cases) of which were successful. Figure 17.1 shows the geographical distribution of standalone assassination attempts in dictatorships (both failed and successful) that occurred during the 1946–2010 period.5 While attempts have occurred in all of the world’s regions where dictatorships have existed, it is in North Africa and the Middle East where we find the highest numbers of such events. The countries which have had autocratic regimes within the period considered with the highest number of attempts are Togo (6), North Yemen (6), Cambodia (6), Libya (5), and South Korea (5). Figure 17.2 shows the temporal evolution in the number of both failed and successful attempts by five-year periods from 1946 to 2010. Unsurprisingly, the figures are low, with less than ten events typically happening per period. This shows that assassination attempts are indeed relatively rare events. In only four of the periods shown in Figure 17.2 the number of attempts was higher than ten. The number of attempts reached a peak during the 1960s ‒ though only one of those 17 attempts was successful ‒ and in the late 1970s ‒ when four of the 16 attempts ended with the ruler killed. Since then, and similarly to the case of coups d’état, the incidence of killing attempts has decreased notably over time, and in the late 2000s only three attempts against autocrats took place (concretely, in Eritrea, Guinea, and Algeria).

17.3

THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS OF TYRANNICIDE

The killing of tyrants by their own subjects may have been largely overlooked by the contemporaneous comparative literature, yet it has historically occupied a very important space in

Figure 17.1

Geographical distribution of assassination attempts against dictators, 1946–2010

The assassination of autocratic leaders  263

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Figure 17.2

Number of assassination attempts in dictatorships, 1946–2010

both early and modern political theory (Jászi and Lewis, 1957; Ford, 1985). In particular, even before the appropriateness or justification for mass elections or popular revolts were discussed, tyrannicide and its legitimacy was a central topic of philosophical debate among early thinkers from the Classical period to the Middle Ages, and later among Enlightenment philosophers. And before they came to be equated to terrorism, tyrannicides were often not only justified, but also celebrated and praised. The first philosophical justifications of tyrannicide can be traced back to Classical thinkers, when it was mostly conceived as a form of pre-emptive protection. The disturbing emergence of tyrants led to the explicit and decisive support for tyrannicide by the ancient Greeks (and later the Romans), giving individuals a mandate which even resulted in the promulgation of laws (or decrees) strongly incentivizing it (Teegarden, 2014; Dillinger, 2015). The main tenet was that tyranny represented an unjust form of rule acting against the will, welfare, and virtue of the people, so that tyrannicide was necessary to preserve or restore democracy, the rule of law, and equality (Brincat, 2008). Tyrants were seen as simply guided by passion, desire for power, and self-interest. But also, tyranny entailed the breakdown of the contract between polis and ruler, which would justify citizens’ (unlawful) actions in search of protecting the common good. “Tyrannicide was merely a logical extension of the postulate that if a man’s life was primarily public then the ruler’s life was dependent upon his usefulness for the polis” (Brincat, 2008: 218–19). The strongest defense of tyrannicide during the Classical period was developed by Cicero, who, in reaction to the rise of Julius Caesar in Rome, argued that killing a tyrant (or a would-be one) was morally just and necessary since tyranny represented a transgression of the laws of nature.

The assassination of autocratic leaders  265 As Brincat (2008) notes, and despite the explosion in philosophical attention to kingship and the conduct of rulers, the unambiguous support for the killing of tyrants became less clear and with opposing views during the medieval period due to the influence of Biblical principles, the Christian Church’s prohibition of murder, and the scholastic examination under the prism of natural law. Augustine mostly opposed it claiming that individuals ought to submit to and obey the (secular and temporal) authorities of the city of man. The deep influence of Augustinian thinking reduced attention to and support for tyrannicide until several centuries later, when justifications were again revived by John of Salisbury and Thomas Aquinas in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, respectively (Dillinger, 2015). The former defended the doctrine of tyrannicide and, hence, that unjust government, being a crime against justice, should be ultimately punished. Relying on the organic metaphor, he claimed that “all members of the body politic are ultimately charged with guarding and protecting the common good” (Nederman, 1988: 373–4). On the other hand, Aquinas offered a highly conditional view, arguing that the killing of the tyrant is justified only if it is the last resort against usurpers representing a threat to law and the well-being of the community, if it is conducted by someone with public authority or by private individuals if such authorities are unwilling or unable to act, and, importantly, if the killing does not result in a worse situation for the citizens than the status quo (e.g., Wyllie, 2018). Diverging views characterized also the Reformation period (Dillinger, 2015). More explicit support for assassinating tyrants came from Jesuit thinkers, mainly Suárez and Mariana. Interestingly, both viewed the power of the ruler as emanating from the people (Brincat, 2008). It was, according to them, the breaking of that consent or delegation that would make regicide permissible. Drawing on several past principles and also new theoretical underpinnings, late modern philosophers of the Enlightenment (such as Locke, Rousseau, and others) developed strong arguments in favor of tyrannicide and for resistance more generally. Such positions relived the central notions put forward by the Classics, and thus moved away from theological arguments. Central to these thinkers’ line of reasoning was the notion of the social contract and constitutional rights and limits. The justification for removing a ruler, with less direct reference to murder, stems from tyranny involving the breaking of the social contract based on the consent of the people and the violation of specific constitutional provisions aimed precisely at preventing the abuse of power and protecting inalienable, individual rights. In contemporary times, tyrannicide has seemingly lost its relevance.6 The emergence of modern dictatorships (adopting different organizational forms and structures) in the twentieth century made it difficult to find clear equivalents to the traditional idea or concept of tyranny. More importantly, treacherous or perfidious assassinations came to be prohibited by international law (i.e., The Hague and Geneva Conventions). Finally, there is growing attention on the legitimacy and effectiveness of non-violent forms of resistance, while murderous attacks are normally qualified as acts of terrorism. Only a general appeal to people’s resistance against tyranny remains, but of particular importance, since it can be found in the Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948): “it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law … .” Its implications are unclear. This has not, of course, prevented assassinations (even foreign-sponsored ones) from happening, and in important numbers.

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17.4

EXPLAINING ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS

Given that violence is an ever present constant of autocratic politics, one may logically be inclined to think that assassination attempts are simply random acts of violence carried out by deranged individuals, without a clear logic behind them and, hence, highly unpredictable. This would make it difficult if not impossible to find variables explaining them or to find some regular patterns in the data. This is a plausible null hypothesis indeed. The existing literature on leaders’ assassinations is fragmented and extremely limited and, hence, so are the arguments providing insights into the political conditions leading to assassinations. This is in large part caused by inconsistencies in the concepts, data, or samples employed by prior works (Iqbal and Zorn, 2006; Jones and Olken, 2009; Torgler and Frey, 2013; Perliger, 2017; Serban et al., 2018). These studies use samples that include both dictatorships and democracies, without carefully considering how power struggles and political dynamics differ between both regimes. In addition, most studies concentrate on analyzing successful assassinations (so ignoring failed attempts and the inherent randomness of outcomes) and/or include assassinations of non-leaders that likely have distinct determinants. What are the main determinants of assassination attempts against dictators? One first general view focusing on contextual factors suggests that assassinations of leaders are more likely in contexts already characterized by environmental constraints (e.g., poverty and scarcity) as well as by ongoing political instability and social conflict (Perliger, 2017; Serban et al., 2018). Other arguments, more closely centered on the structure of incentives and opportunities of relevant actors, suggest which types of dictators or autocratic regimes are more likely to be targeted by assassinations attempts. Drawing on extensive prior research on comparative authoritarianism, one possibility is to consider the potential role of formal (nominally democratic) institutions. Scholars have found these institutions, such as parties and legislatures, to be related with a lower incidence of irregular and violent challenges in dictatorships, mainly coups and insurgencies (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, 2010; Bove and Rivera, 2015; Woo and Conrad, 2019; Kim and Sudduth, 2021). Institutions, they aver, can channel societal demands, alleviate commitment problems, co-opt elites and opposition groups, and regularize access to power, which decreases actors’ incentives for acting against the ruler (e.g., Gandhi, 2008; Ezrow and Frantz, 2011; Svolik, 2012). Extending this logic, one could expect institutions to also reduce the incentives for trying to kill the dictator.7 These views, while logical, tend to overlook the strategic choices actors make and the potential trade-offs between irregular challenges that formal institutions do not capture. To understand the potential underlying political factors explaining the occurrence of assassination attempts against autocrats, it is crucial to keep in mind the characteristics of this technology for removing dictators from power in comparison to others. In short, assassination attempts reveal the (arguably self-recognized) inability of perpetrators to capture the state via organized challenges. Their very low success rate (14.5 percent) attests to the precariousness, ineffectiveness, and difficulty of such challenges. When compared to other irregular forms of unseating autocrats, such as coups, insurgencies, or protests, assassinations require fewer organizational resources and participants, but, at the same time, require getting close access to the targeted leader to carry out the deed. There are two main arguments relating autocratic power structure and the risk of assassination. One first view suggests that more powerful leaders can better mitigate the risk of assassination. For example, Perliger (2015: 58) suggests that “the more centralized the political

The assassination of autocratic leaders  267 power, the more leverage a leader has in developing mechanisms that diminish the risk of his or her assassination. This is especially true in authoritarian systems, whether these mechanisms are a cult of personality, indoctrination or robust security forces capable of deterring an assassination.” Similarly, Iqbal and Zorn (2006: 492) posit that unconstrained, powerful “leaders’ ability to create atmospheres of fear, ‘cults of personality,’ and so forth can lead to domestic political cultures in which the assassination of a leader is not even contemplated, let alone planned or executed.” According to this view, therefore, assassinations would be more unlikely to be attempted against strongmen. An alternative view claims the opposite, to a large extent, by placing assassinations in the context of other irregular forms of non-democratic leader change (mainly coups) and by paying attention to the strategic choices of rivals and to the mobilization requirements of different rebellion technologies. Personalist rule would be the type of contemporary form of non-democratic government more directly equivalent to the idea of tyranny and of powerful, despotic leaders, that is, a system where power, lying in the hands of one individual, is mostly unlimited and used unfairly and even cruelly (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2018; Meng, 2020). According to this second approach, the risk of assassination attempt should increase with power personalization, because at high levels of power concentration rivals lack the ability to get rid of rulers via organized collective challenges (mainly coups and uprisings) while, at the same time, have stronger incentives to eliminate them. This logic of substitution between rebellion technologies has already been found to impact civil war occurrence. In his analysis of sub-Saharan autocracies, Roessler (2011, 2016) shows that protection against inside coups from rival ethnic groups, and their subsequent exclusion from the ruling coalition increases the risk of outside challenges such as insurgencies. In the case of assassinations, as Chin, Escribà-Folch, Song, and Wright (2022: 667) put it, “[u]nder such circumstances, excluded elites might substitute assassination attempts for coups; prior defectors, repeatedly discriminated groups, and clandestine opposition organizations may not have substantial mobilization capacity to coordinate a well-planned seizure of power, but they may still try to kill the dictator.” Thus, rivals and opponents develop strong incentives to try to eliminate the ruler. For one, they may want to seek retribution and kill the man responsible for the abuses and pain suffered. And secondly, perpetrators may be moved by the hope that killing the ruler will make the whole regime fall and pave the way for political development (Torgler and Frey, 2013; Chin, Escribà-Folch, Song, and Wright, 2022). As Chaliand and Blin (2007: 80) put it, [w]hatever the case, when a popular uprising is not possible ‒ the norm in most societies ‒ political assassination is the only way left to confront power. The concept of political assassination is associated first and foremost with that of despotism. Most political assassinations are justified by their perpetrators as a blow against despotism.

The relationship between personalism and assassinations may not be simply linearly positive. As some works suggest, at low levels of personalism there is also the possibility of infighting between former allies turned rivals and factions within the ruling coalition (Wimmer, Cederman, and Min, 2009; Roessler, 2011). Competition over the distribution of power and its perks can intensify existing inter-factional mistrust and personal rivalries within the ruling group. Figure 17.3 reports the results of two models where the dependent variable is coded 1 for those country-years where a standalone assassination attempt took place, and zero otherwise. The coefficients are estimated using a linear probability model with unit and year fixed-effects

268  Research handbook on authoritarianism

Note: Coefficients and 90 percent and 95 percent confidence intervals.

Figure 17.3

Explaining assassination attempts against autocrats

and errors clustered on leader and year (Timoneda, 2021).8 To test the first set of arguments, model 1 examines the effect of formal institutions (i.e., parties, legislatures, and elections) alongside other potential structural and contextual determinants stressed by previous research such as international and civil conflict, oil rents, the leader’s age, and income per capita.9 The second model, which explores arguments on power structures, uses regime type categories instead of formal institutions and includes dummies for personalist and military regimes as coded by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) alongside the other item variables above.10 The results show that the presence of formal institutions does not exert a significant effect on the risk of killing attempts. Whether the regime has a support party or a legislature with or without opposition parties in it does not protect leaders against attacks, nor do they encourage them.11 The holding of an election where the office of the regime leader is contested does not have any influence either. The results of the second model suggest that, as compared to party-based regimes and monarchies, the risk of assassinations is significantly higher in personalist and military regimes, both characterized by higher levels of repression and exclusion. The results, though, go only partially against the claim that more powerful dictators can mitigate the risk of attacks against their life. While the stronger effect is found for personalistic regimes, collegial military regimes are not statistically different. The other correlates only seem to have some effect: involvement in an international conflict significantly increases the likelihood of attempts, and so does civil conflict, but, interestingly, less strongly.12 These results indicate that there is an interesting international dimension to

The assassination of autocratic leaders  269 assassinations. International conflicts or disputes may provide incentives for foreign countries to try to get rid of rival rulers either directly or by assisting domestic actors. For example, in June 1978, North Yemen’s President al-Ghashmi was killed by a special envoy from the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen carrying explosives in a briefcase. These initial results present several challenges. On the one hand, formal institutions do not necessarily entail the presence of credible power-sharing agreements or effective constraints on the executive (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2018; Meng, 2020).13 On the other, regime categories do not vary over a given regime spell, so they cannot inform us about how the process of power personalization shapes the incentives and capacities of would-be perpetrators. The more elaborated argument discussed above suggests a non-linear dynamic relationship between personalism levels and assassination risk. To further explore the role of regime power dynamics on assassinations, Figure 17.4 reports the relationship between personalism levels in autocracies and the conditional risk of an assassination attempt.14 The predicted probabilities are obtained using a fixed-effects semiparametric estimator, which allows us to capture non-linear relationships between the continuous measure of personalism and the outcome variable without imposing a specific functional form on the relationship.15 The personalism measure consists of a latent index that varies across distinct autocratic regimes and also within them over time.16 The patterns in Figure 17.4 give us a more nuanced understanding of how power dynamics within autocracies shape incentives and opportunities of actors which are generally in line with the theoretical arguments above. The risk of an attempt is high at very low levels of personalism. It then drops sharply, to increase again (and remain high) at mid-high levels of power personalization. These patterns seem to provide some clarity to the previous finding that assassinations were more likely in both personalist and military regimes. High assassination risk at low personalism levels may be more likely to happen in fledgling collegial military regimes,17 where rivalries and disputes may lead to escalation and violence between armed factions.18 On the other hand, the high risk of assassination in personalist regimes would respond to different dynamics and be captured in the right-hand side of Figure 17.4 showing the high levels of personalism and assassination risk.

17.5

THE CONSEQUENCES OF ASSASSINATIONS

As stressed above, assassinations differ from other forms of irregular rebellion in that the perpetrators do not overtly attempt to take over power for themselves (or other allied actors), but simply to physically eliminate the incumbent ruler. This may be done (or attempted) with the aim of simply taking revenge against and getting rid of a particularly brutal or corrupt dictator by aggrieved individuals. Or it may also be done with the hope that cutting the head of the serpent will make the rest of the regime subsequently collapse. Indeed, successful assassinations result in the violent and immediate removal of the leader and are thus a major shock to existing political structures. A key empirical question is thus whether such disruptive events give way to further and lasting political changes, and, hence, whether regime change follows assassinations. And, if so, what type of transition is more likely to transpire: an autocratic or a democratic one. The existing comparative evidence is very limited and partially contradictory. Using a global sample including democracies and dictatorships covering the 1952–97 period, Iqbal and Zorn (2008) find that assassinations are usually followed by more instability (unrest and civil war), especially in polities where leadership succession is informal and unreg-

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Figure 17.4

Personalism levels and the risk of assassination attempts

ulated. Using global data for the 1875–2004 period, and exploiting the inherent randomness in the success (or failure) of assassination attempts, Jones and Olken (2009) report a positive impact of successful assassinations on next year’s likelihood of democratization. Finally, Miller (2021) concludes that leader assassinations (in the previous five years) only had a small positive effect on the prospects of democratization between 1800 and 2014. Using the new data on assassinations described above (Chin, Escribà-Folch, Song, and Wright, 2022), Table 17.1 shows all successful cases of assassination in the data (along with the country and year when they occurred) and whether a major political event took place in the same year (t) or within five years after the murder of the dictator (t + n). Major political events or outcomes include democratic and autocratic transitions, coup attempts, and civil conflict onsets.19 One first possibility is that the assassination of the dictator does not result in any substantial political change, so that the shock is absorbed by the existing regime without notable consequences other than the replacement of the regime’s head after his unnatural death. Indeed, regime continuity is the most likely outcome; 11 out of 17 cases, as shown in Table 17.1. A rapid handling of the succession signals continuity and stability, while it minimizes the possibility of a power vacuum that triggers an open contest for power between inside factions. In the aftermath of the ruler’s killing, a new member of the ruling coalition can be (rapidly) installed as the new leader. The existence of institutional mechanisms and succession mechanisms in organizational regimes and monarchies might facilitate this task and reduce the risk of disputes. For example, after being assassinated by his nephew, Faisal I was succeeded within a few days by Khalid, Faisal’s half-brother following a meeting of senior family members. King Abdullah I of Jordan was replaced by his oldest son Talal. In Algeria, three days after

The assassination of autocratic leaders  271 Table 17.1

Successful (standalone) assassinations and subsequent political change and instability in non-democracies, 1946–2010

Leader

Country/year

Democratic

Autocratic

transition

transition

Coup d’état

Civil conflict onset

Carlos Castillo Armas

Guatemala 1957

 

t+1

t (S)

 

Anastasio Somoza Garcia

Nicaragua 1956

 

 

 

 

José Antonio Remón

Panama 1955

t

 

 

 

Carlos Delgado Chalbaud

Venezuela 1950

 

 

t + 2 (F)

 

Gualberto Villarroel

Bolivia 1946

 

t

t + 3 (F)

 

Laurent Kabila

D. R. Congo 2001

 

 

t + 3 (F)

t+5

Samora Machel

Mozambique 1986

 

 

 

 

Hendrik Verwoerd

South Africa 1966

 

 

 

 

Mohamed Boudiaf

Algeria 1992

 

 

 

 

Abdullah I

Jordan 1951

 

 

 

 

Faisal bin Abdulaziz

Saudi Arabia 1975

 

 

 

t+4

Ibrahim al-Hamdi

North Yemen 1977

 

t+1

t + 1 (F)

t+3

Ahmad al-Ghashmi

North Yemen 1978

 

t

t (F)

t+2

Hafizullah Amin

Afghanistan 1979

 

 

 

 

Park Chung-Hee

South Korea 1979

 

 

t (S)

 

Liaquat Ali Khan

Pakistan 1951

 

 

 

 

Ranasinghe Premadasa

Sri Lanka 1993

t+1

 

 

 

Note: Years in the “country/year” column indicate the year the leader was assassinated. In the “coup” column, letters in parentheses indicate whether the coup was successful (S) or failed (F). All civil conflict onsets in the last column are of low intensity (i.e., at least 25 but less than 1,000 battle-related deaths in one calendar year).

a bodyguard killed Chairman Boudiaf in 1992, Ali Kafi was selected as Chairman by the collective executive body, High Council of State. Upon Prime Minister Verwoerd’s assassination in 1966 in South Africa, Eben Dönges, as senior member of the Cabinet, immediately occupied his position, but was replaced a few days later by John Vorster, who was elected by the National Party in congress. In more personalistic regimes, often keen on installing civilian dynasties, relatives of the dead ruler also make for readily available successors. For example, within ten days of the assassination of DRC’s President Laurent Kabila on January 16, 2001, his son Joseph, by then Chief of Staff of the Land Forces, took his place. And in Nicaragua, Luis Somoza replaced his father Anastasio as president on the very same day as the latter’s assassination in September 1956. There are, however, some arguments that suggest that in some contexts the killing of a dictator could potentially spur more profound political changes and further instability. Assassinations signal a temporary weakening of the regime and can lead to a power vacuum, which can open a window of opportunity for the emergence of new actors with an interest in political change, including democratization. However, the patterns described in Table 17.1 indicate that democracy is a rather unlikely outcome after the assassination of dictators, with only two cases out of 17 experiencing a democratic transition after the violent death of the ruler. In the case of Panama, the assassination of military leader José A. Remón (the circumstances and perpetrators of which remain unclear) led to a split within regime elites of the Coalición Patriótica Nacional. The faction more in line with Remón’s policies was marginalized by the more traditional elites. Remón was succeeded first by the first Vice President Guizado, and after he was accused of being an accomplice in the assassination plot, by the second Vice President, Ricardo Arias, who oversaw the competitive election of 1956 that culminated in the

272  Research handbook on authoritarianism political change. In the case of Sri Lanka, the assassination of President Premadasa in 1993 by a Tamil Tiger suicide bomber was followed by democratic elections (both presidential and parliamentary) in 1994 after his successor, Prime Minister Dingiri Banda Wijetunga, chose not to run as the candidate of the ruling party. Autocratic transitions have been slightly more common than democratization processes, with three such events occurring after successful assassinations: Guatemala, Bolivia, and North Yemen.20 In this type of transition, the autocracy is replaced by a new one controlled by a different ruling group (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014). In Guatemala, a few months after the murder of President Castillo, a non-democratic election in 1958 in which left-wing parties could not compete was held and won by a right-wing candidate lacking the support of the military. In Bolivia, the uprising and the killing of Villarroel in 1946 gave place to a transitional government and then to not fully free elections (as only a small fraction of the population, the literates, was allowed to vote) and hence to a new ruling coalition and a liberalized (but not democratic), oligarchic regime. In North Yemen two presidents were assassinated within eight months. The second one, al-Ghashmi, was replaced by a collective body (Presidential Council) which chose Lieutenant-Colonel Salih as the new president and head of the armed forces. The new president reshaped the support coalition reducing the influence of military officers while increasing that of sheikhs and his own family and tribe members.21 Rather than paving the way for democratization (or even autocratic transitions), in several of the cases listed in Table 17.1 the assassination of an autocrat and the resulting power vacuum and temporary weakness of the regime may have sparked overt competition for power among rival factions and groups. The absence of regime collapse does not entail the absence of conflict and turmoil. Such conflicts manifested in the form of turmoil, coups, and conflict. Coups occurred in seven countries soon after the leader had been killed. Only two of those initial coups were successful though, the others failed to unseat the new ruler, but still reflected the presence of power competition. And four countries experienced civil conflict in the following years. For example, after the assassination of Park Chung-Hee in South Korea in 1979, Major General Chun Doo-Hwan led a coup against General Chung Seung-Hwa, head of the army, and nominal, acting President Choi (Chin, Wright, and Carter, 2022). In Yemen, shortly after taking power in 1978 replacing the assassinated al-Ghashmi, President Ali Abdullah Salih faced several violent challenges, including a failed coup in 1978 and an armed rebellion in 1980 by the leftist National Democratic Front (which was defeated). The coup was executed by a rival faction within the regime comprised of supporters of former President al-Hamdi seeking revenge for the killing of al-Hamdi and to stop the narrowing of the support coalition under Salih (Chin, Wright, and Carter, 2022).

17.6 CONCLUSION Dictators must be wary of different threats to their rule. That includes uprisings, insurgencies, coups, but also assassinations, which, by representing a type of threat to their lives that is more difficult to detect, might open the way to fear and paranoia. Assassination attempts against dictators have been more common than initially thought, although still rare as compared to coups and other irregular methods for overthrowing leaders such as uprisings. The arguments and evidence presented in this chapter suggest that some dictators are more likely to be the targets of assassination attempts and that they are random acts of violence.

The assassination of autocratic leaders  273 While formal institutions seem to have no effect on those events, the evidence presented shows that high levels of personalism increase the risk of leaders being targeted by would-be assassins. Interestingly, though, low personalism levels also show high probabilities of assassination attempts. I also show that successful assassinations rarely lead to regime change, much less democratization.

NOTES 1. 2.

As clarified in the next section, this figure only includes standalone attempts. Executions of recently deposed leaders are not considered to be assassinations since such killings no longer target the incumbent, as they only take place after the ruler has been ousted. 3. For more details on the data, coding decisions, cases, and narratives, see Chin, Escribà-Folch, Song, and Wright (2022). 4. The identification of authoritarian regimes and leaders follows Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014, 2018). Note that this 17 figure includes 30 cases deemed relatively ambiguous because contemporary observers or the historical sources have conflicting interpretations over whether perpetrators took concrete actions to kill the regime leader. 5. Countries that remained democratic during the whole period are also indicated in white. 6. See Brincat (2009), however, for an attempt at a contemporary model of tyrannicide based on the principle of self-defense and on human rights. 7. Elections in non-democracies can help co-opt opposition groups and channel some demands, yet they also represent focal points of power competition. Perliger (2017) finds that elections increase assassinations of politicians, namely, legislators and opposition leaders, but not heads of state. 8. Regime-level fixed-effects allow us to account for both country-specific historical factors as well as regime-specific factors such as how the regime came to power. 9. The models also include a control for the time the leader has been in office (log transformed), and for cubic polynomial transformations of the time since the last assassination attempt. The latter are not reported. 10. Party-based regimes and monarchies are the reference categories. 11. Data are from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018) and NELDA (Hyde and Marinov, 2012), respectively. 12. Both variables are from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and indicate the presence of conflicts generating at least 25 battle-related deaths per year. 13. As Wright (2021: 2–3) correctly notes, “Formal political institutions (conceived of as ‘rules of the game’) and the (relative) power of organized groups are therefore conceptually distinct areas of study, need not be collinear in measurement, and may be fruitfully explored separately or in combination with each other to examine how they produce outcomes of interest.” 14. I report models using two dependent variables. One includes all standalone assassination attempts, that is, excluding only those that occurred during coups; the second one excludes coup cases and also ambiguous cases. A case is considered ambiguous if contemporary observers or historical sources have conflicting interpretations over whether perpetrators took concrete actions to kill the regime leader. See Chin, Escribà-Folch, Song, and Wright (2022). 15. The specification adjusts for a non-linear time trend and time since last event (cubic polynomials). See Chin, Escribà-Folch, Song, and Wright (2022) for further details. 16. The variable is taken from Wright (2021) and Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018). The index relies on eight observable acts by dictators aimed at increasing their power relative to the support party (if one exists) and security apparatus: one of the components concerns appointment power for high office, four indicate the leader’s ability to control security forces, military promotions, purges, or create loyal paramilitary forces, and the other three concern the ability to create a new party or to control the ruling party executive via appointments or making it serve as a rubber stamp. 17. Such regimes would present low personalism levels because power ultimately resides within a junta composed of a group of officers representing different groups or branches of the armed forces.

274  Research handbook on authoritarianism 18. Similarly, Kim and Kroeger (2018) show that irregular exits, especially reshuffle coups, are more likely in collegial military regimes. 19. Data on regime transitions are from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014); data on coups are from Chin, Carter, and Wright (2021), and data on civil conflicts are from the UCDP. For an event to be considered and indicated in t, the start or occurrence date must be posterior to the exact date of the assassination. The table only records the first event since the assassination, not subsequent ones of the same type. 20. In the case of North Yemen, there was an autocratic transition following two successful assassinations in 1977 and 1978. 21. It is worth noting that out of these three transitions, two gave place to highly personalistic regimes.

REFERENCES Bove, V. and Rivera, M. (2015) “Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies”, International Interactions, 41(3), pp. 453–79. Brincat, S.K. (2008) “‘Death to Tyrants’: The Political Philosophy of Tyrannicide – Part I”, Journal of International Political Theory, 4(2), pp. 212–40. Brincat, S.K. (2009) “‘Death to Tyrants’: Self-Defence, Human Rights and Tyrannicide – Part II”, Journal of International Political Theory, 5(1), pp. 75–93. Chaliand, G. and Blin, A. (2007) “Manifestations of Terror through the Ages”, in Chaliand G. and Blin A. (eds.), The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to Al-Qaeda. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, pp. 79–92. Cheibub, J.A., Gandhi, J. and Vreeland, J.R. (2010) “Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited”, Public Choice, 143(1/2), pp. 67–101. Chin, J.J., Carter, D.B. and Wright, J. (2021) “The Varieties of Coups D’état: Introducing the Colpus Dataset”, International Studies Quarterly, 65(4), pp. 1040–51. Chin, J.J., Wright J. and Carter, D.B. (2022) Historical Dictionary of Modern Coups D’état. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Chin, J.J., Escribà-Folch, A., Song, W. and Wright, J. (2022) “Reshaping the Threat Environment: Personalism, Coups, and Assassinations”, Comparative Political Studies, 55(4), pp. 657–87. Dillinger J. (2015) “Tyrannicide from Ancient Greece and Rome to the Crisis of the Seventeenth Century”, in Law R.D. (ed.), The Routledge History of Terrorism. New York: Routledge, pp. 15–27. Ezrow, N.M. and Frantz, E. (2011) “State Institutions and the Survival of Dictatorships”, Journal of International Affairs, 65(1), pp. 1–13. Ford, F.L. (1985) Political Murder: From Tyrannicide to Terrorism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gandhi, J. (2008) Political Institutions under Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press. Geddes, B., Wright J. and Frantz, E. (2014) “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transition: A New Data Set”, Perspectives on Politics, 12(2), pp. 313–31. Geddes, B., Wright J. and Frantz, E. (2018) How Dictatorships Work. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hyde, S.D. and Marinov, N. (2012) “Which Elections Can Be Lost?”, Political Analysis, 20(2), pp. 191–201. Iqbal, Z. and Zorn, C. 2006. “Sic Semper Tyrannis? Power, Repression, and Assassination since the Second World War.” Journal of Politics, 68(3): 489–501. Iqbal, Z. and Zorn, C. (2008) “The Political Consequences of Assassination”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52(3), pp. 385–400. Jászi, O. and Lewis, J.D. (1957) Against the Tyrant: The Tradition and Theory of Tyrannicide. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. Jones, B.F. and Olken, B.A. 2009. “Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War”, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 1(2), pp. 55–87. Kim, N.K. and Kroeger, A.M. (2018) “Regime and Leader Instability under Two Forms of Military Rule”, Comparative Political Studies, 51(1), pp. 3–37.

The assassination of autocratic leaders  275 Kim, N.K. and Sudduth, J.K. (2021) “Political Institutions and Coups in Dictatorships”, Comparative Political Studies, 54(9), pp. 1597–628. Meng, A. (2020) Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes. New York: Cambridge University Press. Miller, M.K. (2021) Shock to the System: Coups, Elections, and War on the Road to Democratization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Nederman, C.J. (1988) “A Duty to Kill: John of Salisbury’s Theory of Tyrannicide”, The Review of Politics, 50(3), pp. 365–89. Perliger, A. (2015) “The Rationale of Political Assassinations”, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. Perliger, A. (2017) “The Role of Civil Wars and Elections in Inducing Political Assassinations”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40(8), pp. 684–700. Roessler, P. (2011) “The Enemy within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa”, World Politics, 63(2), pp. 300–346. Roessler, P. (2016) Ethnic Politics and State Power in Africa: The Logic of the Coup-Civil War Trap. New York: Cambridge University Press. Serban, A., Yammarino F.J., Sotak, K.L., Banoeng-Yakubo, J., Mushore, A.B.R., Hao, C., McHugh, K.A., and Mumford, M.D. (2018) “Assassination of Political Leaders: The Role of Social Conflict”, The Leadership Quarterly, 29(4), pp. 457–75. Svolik, M.W. (2012). The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. New York: Cambridge University Press. Teegarden, D.A. (2014) Death to Tyrants! Ancient Greek Democracy and the Struggle against Tyranny. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Timoneda, J.C. (2021) “Estimating Group Fixed Effects in Panel Data with a Binary Dependent Variable: How the LPM Outperforms Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data”, Social Science Research, 93, pp. 1–12. Torgler, B. and Frey B.S. (2013) “Politicians: Be Killed or Survive”, Public Choice, 156(1/2), pp. 357–86. Wimmer, A., Cederman L.-E. and Min B. (2009) “Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict: A Configurational Analysis of a New Global Data Set”, American Sociological Review, 74(2), pp. 316–37. Woo, A.S. and Conrad, C.R. (2019) “The Differential Effects of ‘Democratic’ Institutions on Dissent in Dictatorships”, Journal of Politics, 81(2), pp. 456–70. Wright, J. (2021) “The Latent Characteristics That Structure Autocratic Rule”, Political Science Research and Methods, 9(1), pp. 1–19. Wyllie, R. (2018) “Reconsidering Tyranny and Tyrannicide in Aquinas’s De Regno”, Perspectives on Political Science, 47(3), pp. 154–60.

18. Patterns of de-personalization and leader succession within personalist regimes Jeroen J.J. Van den Bosch

18.1 INTRODUCTION Most autocracies possess a tendency to turn increasingly personalist over time, meaning that dictators try to amass power at the cost of their inner circle and closest supporters. From their position as primes inter pares in collegial regimes, some succeed to purge, shuffle, exile or remove their peers in the inner circle, replacing them by less able but loyal followers, which they play out against each other in order to exert and maintain absolute, unchallenged power. This process (as illustrated in Chapter 5) is often gradual, depending on how rulers come to power, and can take weeks, months and at times even years. Milan Svolik (2012) names this process the ‘problem of authoritarian power sharing’ whereby rulers actually are unable to trust the elites that surround them and engage in actions to reduce their power, making other elites even more likely to act against them. And while it is true that personalism is on the rise across the globe, this assumes that the direction of travel is always toward personalization and not away from it. As the chapter explains, there are many instances of de-personalization in personalist regimes, particularly during succession. In this chapter, personalism will be treated in two ways: first, as a characteristic present in all regime types with high or low levels of centralized power by the main powerholder (like on a scale); second, once the cut-off point of personalist rule has been reached (where other elites can no longer credibly threaten a ruler with a coup), a regime will be labeled as personalist, in line with convention. I adhere to the criteria used in the dataset by Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014, 2018), hereafter called the GWF dataset. The GWF dataset (2018, codebook: 2) provides eight specific measurements for regimes that have reached this threshold, cumulatively gauging their intensity. One (high office) relates to a leader’s full discretion to pick his inner circle. Three relate to a leader’s control over the party: did he create it (create new party); is its party executive committee absent or simply a rubber stamp for the regime leader’s decisions (rubber stamp party); and does the regime leader control appointments to the politburo (party exec committee)? The four remaining measures are associated with control over the military and coup-proofing: Does the ruler have the power to remove commanding officers (military purge) and can he stack security institutions with loyalists from his community of trust (military promotion)? Does the leader create a parallel security force (paramilitary) and does he personally control the security apparatus (security apparatus)? These eight criteria can all be answered with a yes (1) or no (0), thus enabling a scalic measure from 0 to 8, also listed in percentages from 0 percent to 100 percent available per country-year in the GWF database (2018). This is called the latent personalism measure (LPM) of a regime. In the Appendix, I list the changes in the LPM in a given year. 276

Patterns of de-personalization and leader succession  277 Having defined personalism as a characteristic, personalist rule as a regime and how to measure it,1 let me introduce the focus and scope of this chapter. First of all, I only observe personalist regimes (as defined by the GWF dataset), but I do update the sample with recent cases (after 2010). Note that all such rulers have been males.2 This means that the findings do not automatically apply to non-personalist or ‘collegial’ regimes, which can be sorted into monarchies, single-party or military regimes (or their hybrids) and democracy. This chapter will reappraise and untangle the phenomenon of de-personalization in personalist regimes. Though not the norm, it is an interesting issue. M. Svolik found that ‘there is no return from established to contested autocracy. Once a dictator is established, he may, of course, still lose power, but such instances should be rare and occur primarily by a process that is politically divorced from the interaction between the dictator and his ruling coalition’ (Svolik, 2012: 65). Only when regimes fall (e.g. invasion) or are ousted (e.g. coup, revolution) are they taken over by a new regime that may have a lower LPM or not be personalist at all. This observation is correct: once established, personalist rulers rarely lose their power during their lifetime. However, the GWF dataset (2018) does provide evidence of two types of de-personalization within regimes: Some instances of de-personalization within a ruler’s lifetime occur as a result of external shocks, and during leadership transfers, which are increasingly common in personalist regimes. This chapter takes a closer look at both these (distinct) phenomena, and aims to systematize and order them by analyzing individual cases. In this book, this chapter nests3 comfortably between the one on assassinations by Abel Escribà-Folch and the one on leadership succession by Thomas Ambrosio. However, both these chapters take a broader look at the sample of regimes regarding their explanandum. This chapter, on the contrary, does not venture beyond personalist rule and thus does not cover collegial regimes, which have distinct intra-regime dynamics.

18.2

EXPLAINING DE-PERSONALIZATION DURING A RULER’S LIFETIME

The GWF data provide us with an interesting sample of these rare episodes of de-personalization that took place within a ruler’s lifetime for established personalist regimes between 1946 and 2010. Some of these instances were structural and lasted until the end of the regime, others were temporary. Only a closer look at the cases themselves allows for sorting them between ‘lame ducks,’ ‘stunned ducks’ and those applying ‘autocratic troubleshooting.’ Table 18A.1 in the Appendix shows the full list of cases and their classification. A decrease in the level of personalism within the lifetime of a personalist dictator seems to be the effect of external forces like deep economic crises or deteriorating security. They differ from drops resulting from intra-regime leadership changes (see Section 18.3) in that the former are never so significant as those from the latter and mostly play out at the party level. When faced with external shocks – either economic crises or (external) military threats, or both – personalist dictators sometimes relinquish full control over top-level positions in the politburo and/or army to face such challenges. This results in temporary windows of opportunity for personal advancement (and repositioning) by other elites, thus theoretically increasing the risk of coup d’états. Methodologically speaking, there are not much control data available here. Because of the country-year observations in the GWF (2018) dataset, it is impossible to assess if successful

278  Research handbook on authoritarianism coups are preceded with a drop in LPM – if both the LPM decrease and coup happened in the same year, and if they are even causally linked. (If a coup takes place in the same year, it will be coded as a regime ouster, and the LPM of the new regime will be gauged instead of the drop in LPM of the predecessor.) However, there are several cases where it took personalist regimes some years to fall and the preceding LPM drops (lasting several years) were registered in the dataset. As mentioned in the literature on coups (e.g. Albrecht, 2015), age or ill health of the ruler can be a factor, but it would be unfair to ascribe all instances of LPM dips to lame duck syndrome, since in many cases it is temporal. Typically, in democracies a ‘lame duck’ is an elected official whose power is reduced because a replacement has been elected (Cambridge dictionary). This definition has been adapted to autocracies with a very specific meaning: It often happens that elites come to expect a patronal president’s imminent departure from power, and this can undermine the president’s capacity to shape elite expectations as to how other elites in the system will behave even before the president actually leaves office. Elites anticipating the change begin thinking about a future without the old president, a future when the old president may not be capable of deciding who is punished and who is rewarded. The value of presidential promises and the gravity of her threats start to dissipate. The president can become a ‘lame-duck.’ (Hale, 2015: 84)

For this reason, it might be better to distinguish between ‘lame ducks’ and ‘stunned ducks.’ The former being on borrowed time by structural factors and the latter just temporally stunted by external shocks. The dataset finds evidence for both types. 18.2.1 Lame Ducks and Losing Grip In Paraguay, General Alfredo Stroessner was forced to release his iron grip on the Colorado Party from 1982, several years before a (bloody) palace coup ousted him in 1989. The long-established Colorado Party was an effective organization for doling out patronage and surveilling the political arena.4 Combined with the ruthlessly efficient paramilitary police force it smoked out social dissent among peasants and students. In 1983 the politburo regained influence and Stroessner no longer controlled all top-level appointments. By then he was 70 years old and the longest-ruling dictator of Latin America. In February 1983 the general bluntly rigged his sixth reelection at a time of economic malaise (despite the recent finalization of the Itaipu hydroelectric dam) without much of a fuss. But soon after, the first splits in the Colorado Party started to emerge. The militantes (opportunists and unconditional Stroessner loyalists, adhering to the current neo-fascist model even after Stroessner’s eventual demise) quickly became despised by the tradicionalistas (the old guard of Colorado leaders who rose to power along with the general and who gave him the necessary political base to legitimize his regime). Soon, another faction, the éticos, started openly challenging Stroessner’s next reelection, demanding a civilian Colorado candidate (Nickson, 1988: 240, 248–9; Schumacher, 1983). Relinquishing party control thus opened the gate to open intra-regime dissent. In 1989 he was ousted by his closest confidant, General Andrés Rodríguez Pedotti, siding with the tradicionalistas. Another example is the Aliyev regime in Azerbaijan in 2000–2001. Heydar Aliyev was almost 76 years old in early 1999 when he underwent heart surgery in the US. Thus, signaling a successor was a prime concern during and after his two-month recovery (Freedom House, 2001). To this purpose, he pushed his party, the New Azerbaijan Party (Yeni Azərbaycan

Patterns of de-personalization and leader succession  279 Partiyası, YAP) through the parliamentary elections in 2000, gathering 75 of the 125 seats (Bader, 2011; Cornell, 2001). This institutionalization has been considered a first step at grooming his son, Ilham, and securing his succession by dominating the legislature and debilitating the opposition landscape with a full-out electoral humiliation. (Needless to say, the elections were nor free or fair.) In the following years YAP continued to expand its influence and control, and ultimately enabled the takeover of his son in 2003 (see below). Note that YAL was established by Heydar Aliyev, but before he propelled himself to power in the 1993 coup. Thus, it was never created as a ‘new party’ even though the Aliyev clan had full control over it. Brownlee (2007a) and Magaloni and Kricheli (2010) find that hegemonic parties, first of all, weaken opposition by successfully co-opting competing rivals – by extending regime patronage in exchange for loyalty. Second, if hegemonic parties dominate at the polls, they signal to the people as a whole that the incumbent is invincible. Bader (2011: 190) finds: ‘The benefits for the regime of minimal competition are evident: there is less insecurity in elections, legislatures are fully controlled, and there is bigger confidence in the long-term survival of the regime.’ Such institutionalization can thus secure (hereditary) succession. Older examples are harder to verify due to the sparsity of data, but by reconstructing the narrative, I uncovered that in Gabon, Leon M’ba’s presidential power was pried from his fingers while he was lying in a hospital bed in France. The ailing president had already been rescued from a successful coup d’état by De Gaulle in 1964, and while cancer was eating his body away, his former colonial French protectors insisted on appointing his successor, Albert-Bernard (later El Hadj Omar) Bongo – a political outsider to the M’ba ruling clan dominated by the ethnic Fang – who became president in 1967 (Nugent, 2004: 394–5; Reed, 1987: 284). 18.2.2 Stunned Ducks and External Shocks Even Joseph Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC), the posterchild of personalist rule and sultanism, registered a short dip in his LPM between 1977 and 1978. After copper prices plummeted (after the end of the Vietnam war) and his kleptocratic nationalization campaign had backfired, the nationwide economic crisis was topped off by two bouts of invading rebels, necessitating the battered ruler to internationalize the conflict – ringing the Cold War bell – to muster foreign support. (Mobutu could not rely on his own Zairian army to cope with the rebels.) After having survived both ‘Shaba Wars,’ Zaire received a lot of unwanted, unflattering attention (in the Western press), which complicated relations with donors. Also confronted with the people’s resentment (they welcomed the rebels as liberators) Mobutu took a strategic step backwards (for five years) regarding top-party appointments, faking reforms and doing cabinet shuffles to appease the populations. A couple years later, he was cracking down on any sign of dissent just like before (Darnton, 1978; Ogunbadejo, 1978; Young and Turner, 1985). The same can be witnessed in Eritrea in 2000–2001. The country had just signed a ceasefire agreement regarding its border war with Ethiopia. The UNSC established a monitoring mission to keep both parties committed and accountable. Isaias Afwerki, the undisputed leader of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and ruler of the de facto state thus had the world’s eyes upon him. With the hostilities suspended, hopes were high, and establishing political control was essential: previously postponed electoral milestones, like the elections for the national assembly (that were supposed to be held in 1998) were put back on the agenda, and as

280  Research handbook on authoritarianism a consequence, draft plans to enable a multiparty system were circulated in mid-2001. In May 2001, a faction in his own party, the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), called the ‘Group of 15’ criticized the slow progress (the electoral arena remained closed while these draft plans were ‘pending’ adoption) and demanded real reforms, multiparty elections and full application of the constitution. By late September 2001, Afwerki had arrested 11 of the Group of 15 and viciously cracked down on student protests, reestablishing full control and even closing the free press (Human Rights Watch, 2002: 50–51). Shocks can stun rulers: in Togo (1991–96), Gnassingbé Eyadéma had the wind knocked out of him with the sudden boom of sovereign conferences – a particular characteristic of the democratization wave in Africa right after the Cold War. Other cases are Rwanda (1993–94), Guinea-Bissau (1990–91), Georgia (1995–97) and Burkina Faso (2006–07), which were stunned by domestic insecurity (rebels) combined with coups and assassination attempts. As a result, they either lost control over a (rebellious) ruling party or they granted it more autonomy in order to gain more legitimacy in the face of widespread economic malaise and instability. Congo-Brazzaville (2001–02) and Egypt (1967–69) faced the aftermath of international conflict. In Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré did not deal with rebellion, but was affected by the civil war from the neighboring Ivory Coast, the influx of Burkinabe refugees, combined with violent contestation and mutinies at home. Fidel Castro in Cuba experienced two bouts of de-personalization during his long rule. One (1970–71) was a stunning setback (a failed sugar harvest), the other was a calculated move. 18.2.3 Autocratic Troubleshooting It is important not to interpret every LPM setback as a structural weakness. For instance, the GWF dataset registers a drop in LPM for Madagascar between 1985 and 1986 on the dimension of its personalist control over the security forces. Didier Ratsiraka had co-opted Kung Fu clubs as thugs for strike-breaking and intimidation, but these had become fully criminalized and unruly by 1984. In 1986 the dictator’s army cracked down on them, killing over 200 members and its leadership (Van den Bosch, 2021a: 93–4). This was a targeted way to isolate and deal with a specific problem for the regime. Therefore, I would call this technique ‘troubleshooting.’ In Cuba, Fidel Castro’s LPM dropped in 1961 in the aftermath of the Bay-of-Pigs invasion, where he was forced to share control over the security apparatus with other regime insiders to mitigate an acute and deteriorating security situation. In 1961, Castro declared himself to be Marxist-Leninist, and by extension the Cuban revolution as well. Many observers correctly saw this as an attempt to gain security guarantees from Moscow, essential due to the systemic US aggression toward the Cuban administration and the many assassination attempts on its leadership (Bain, 2019: 70). However, to safeguard his regime from Soviet infiltration at this moment of weakness, Castro decided to overhaul Cuba’s institutional frame, co-opting other powers. A year later, after a widespread purge, all parties would be channeled into a single institution, the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), created by himself, putting his regime’s LPM at 100 percent by 1967 (Franklin, 2016). Another elegant example of troubleshooting is Karimov’s Uzbekistan. In 1996 Islam Karimov is seemingly losing control over the ruling party, the People’s Democratic Party of Uzbekistan. This is curious, because the party was the legal successor of the titular Communist Party, renamed in 1991, while Karimov was already at the helm. Alisher Ilkhamov (2004)

Patterns of de-personalization and leader succession  281 explains how his resignation as party chairman was actually a calculated move: when Karimov rehashed the old communist party into this new entity, he transferred its resources and old party members. However, he centralized his control over regional party appointments (the governors – hakims/hokims – at ‘oblast’ (province) level), which – after reshuffling elites in regions with doubtful loyalty – resulted in a backlash from regional elites, which in turn started nominating fellow (aggrieved) candidates to the parliament, in addition to the seats they already occupied through the rebranded ruling party. Thus, a large anti-Karimov (majority) coalition was in the making. In response, Karimov started creating new pro-government (puppet) parties in 1995 to counter this threatening coalition, and to check the ruling party’s power. Therefore, he resigned as its chairman, and actively promoted a contender party (Ilkhamov, 2004: 162–71). 18.2.4 Lame, Stunned or Cunning? Episodes of de-personalization are thus clearly symptomatic for a diverse range of issues. As I show lower, very few leaders actually exhibit drops in LPM as lame ducks for several years before being replaced – at least few did before 2010, the upper limit of the dataset. Svolik is correct to observe that established (personalist) rulers when facing difficulties from outside the inner circle can lose their grip on power along the way. But de-personalization itself does not seem to be caused by the ruling coalition (neither for lame nor for stunned ducks). There is a logic to this. Why would a ruling coalition merely settle for bringing down the LPM of a ruler by a notch or two? A ruler would still be able to retaliate and punish the challengers. So, it’s all or nothing. Whenever disgruntled elites are prepared, they oust the dictator the first chance they get, either in a palace coup (when regime insiders are the culprits) or through a regular coup (non-regime actors). A ruler’s health and age are thus crucial factors when elites calculate their changes at a successful takeover. Section 18.3 thus will take a closer look at these dynamics.

18.3

DIVERGING OUTCOMES DURING LEADER SUCCESSIONS IN PERSONALIST REGIMES

Successions are among the most uncertain periods in regime lifespans. This was true for the absolute monarchies of the past and is even more true for contemporary autocracies that cannot rely on traditional or popular legitimacy (see also Chapter 16). Historically, there are many risks involved, ranging from selecting an incompetent heir apparent, to accidently triggering fraternal infighting, to selecting a too young candidate unable to produce their own offspring or too malleable by political advisors, regents or in-laws. For (established) personalist regimes that have not yet undergone a succession, there are two pitfalls that keep aging rulers up at night. The first pitfall is the ‘crown-prince dilemma’ (Brownlee, 2007b: 604; Herz, 1952) – a balancing act between selecting a suitable candidate, but not publicly appointing one too early for fear that the latter, once appointed, will speed up the succession process by deposing the incumbent. Kokkonen and Sundell (2014) and others note that the generational age gap of primogeniture allows the grooming of a designated heir, patient enough to inherit power peacefully (Brownlee, 2007b). Succession by a brother is a second-best option; they are often competent (because of their role in the regime), but they might feel like taking over prema-

282  Research handbook on authoritarianism turely. Grooming non-kin takes away any real guarantees regarding this matter, but when there is no (male) offspring, or these are totally incompetent or uninterested, rulers often pick and groom a confidant. Having picked a (loyal and patient) successor, the second dilemma relates to convincing the rest of the ruling coalition to honor this choice afterwards. While children (unlike siblings) still lack the network (or expertise) to oust their father, they have a harder time to convince their father’s peers that they are competent enough to rule in his stead. Especially if there are alternative succession rules in place. Brownlee (2007b: 598) finds that: ‘elites are more prone to abet hereditary succession when they lack an orderly precedent for leadership selection and are weary of a leadership vacuum. Consequently, contemporary autocrats who overshadow the parties through which they rule are likely initiators for future hereditary successions.’ In contrast, a different issue that keeps the other members of the inner circle up a night is transition chaos, when the ruler is suddenly incapacitated or dies, and no plan for succession has been agreed upon by surviving elites. This often proves fatal for personalist regimes. In this chapter, I have structured personalist regime succession scenarios according to their nature and most common outcome. The first criterion is the starting position of the incumbent at the moment of departure. The ruler’s perceived position of strength links up differently with two pathways: (A) Are we dealing with a sudden power vacuum of an able-bodied, fit ruler? Or (B) was the ruler showing increasing (of full-fledged) symptoms of lame-duckism (Table 18.1)? In other words, did the incumbent’s age, health, incompetence, erratic behavior, or sometimes even increased radicalism alienate other regime insiders, resulting in the (re)emergence of dissatisfied factions in the inner circle. The different time-horizons of these pathways reflect the general level of preparation of other elites. A second criterion relates to who is present in the succession race? Is it a free for all? Is there one publicly announced heir? Or are there several promising candidates on the intra-regime shortlist? Or is the regime’s number two just impatient? 18.3.1 Sudden Power Vacuums The sudden death of the ruler can signify a swift end to a personalist regime when there is no succession plan in place. Personalist rulers (in relatively good health) have no incentive to appoint a successor when they are still fit to rule. Doing so early either targets them as prospective lame ducks as other elites swarm around the successor, or can provoke the impatience of the nominee (cf. crown-prince dilemma). Therefore, they often send out mixed signals to keep eager offspring and other domestic elites on their toes, and to hamper the emergence of factions (coalescing around the most likely candidate) by keeping everyone guessing. If such leaders suddenly drop dead, have a fatal accident or are assassinated (see Chapter 17), the regime usually has a real problem. 18.3.1.1 Open duck season Dictators are seldom popular and this has generated several cases with assassinations: the murder of Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala in 1957 led to disarray and contested elections, bringing his regime down. Similarly, in the Dominican Republic, when Rafael Trujillo was ambushed and shot dead in 1961 by disgruntled army officers, there were too many contenders in play and no rules: while the coup failed (and plotters were hunted down), his son, Ramfis, took over as generalissimo for a while, but did not have the support of his own uncles, and was

duck)

(Incumbent is a (nascent) lame

EXPECTED TRANSITIONS

(B)

Ducks in a row

(Waiting their turn)

(Appointed/available candidate/

elites prepared)

Groomed ducklings

Designation

(Regulated/elites prepared)

Procedural

Structural de-personalization

No change

Turkmenistan 21–22 (?)

Syria 00–01

North Korea 94–95

Nicaragua 56–57

Haiti 71–72

Cuba 06–-07

Azerbaijan 03–04

(Hereditary)

Liberia 71–72

(Non-hereditary)

North Korea 11–12*

Cuba 18–21* (!)

(Hereditary)

Panama 81–82

Nigeria 98–99

Guinea 08–10

Guatemala 57–58

Bangladesh 81–82

(Non-hereditary)

Dominican Rep. 61–62

(Hereditary)

Egypt 81–82

Egypt 70–71

(Non-hereditary)

Nicaragua 67–68 (!) (?)

(Hereditary)

Cases + Transfer Years

Iraq 66–67

regime collapse

Instant de-personalization &

Initial de-personalization

Outcome

incapacitation or death)

(Unregulated/elites unprepared)

SUDDEN POWER VACUUM

Open duck season

Label Ducks in a row

(Accident/assassination/sudden

Chaotic

(Regulated/elites unprepared)

Procedural

Succession

Succession scenarios in personalist regimes

(A)

Exit

Table 18.1

Patterns of de-personalization and leader succession  283

duck) (continued)

(Incumbent is a (nascent) lame

EXPECTED TRANSITIONS

(B)

Exit

(Unregulated/elites prepared)

Palace coup

re-personalization

(Improvised as ruler dies

personalization

(Preemptive, but elites wait to strike until the last moment)

Palace coup and increase in

Cuckoos

unexpectedly)

Elite struggle or negotiation and

(Appointed/available candidate/

Lucky ducks

break free and re-personalize

(Elite pact)

Designation

elites prepared) (continued)

Outcome Initially de-personalized, then

Label Supervised

Succession

Cases + Transfer Years

Romania 65–66

Niger 87–88

Honduras 54–55

Gabon 67–68

Armenia 08–09

(Non-hereditary)

Gabon 09–10

Djibouti 99–00*

(Hereditary)

Uzbekistan 16–17*

Turkmenistan 06–07

(Non-hereditary)

Togo 05–06

DRC 01–02 (?)

(Hereditary)

Kyrgyzstan 17–18*

Kazakhstan 19–21*

Honduras 48–49

DRC 18–19*

Bolivia 78–79

(Non-hereditary)

284  Research handbook on authoritarianism

Egypt 54–55

still establishing his reign or is ‘wobbly’)

(continued)

Malawi 93–94 Paraguay 89–93

denoted successor)

Note: Timeframe goes from 1945 to 2023 using these abbreviations: 46–99 = 1946–99 and 0–23 = 2000–23; * not included in the GWF dataset; (!) exception – slightly different outcome; (?) might be classified elsewhere too. Source: Author’s own work, based on Geddes et al. (2018).

Spain 68–75

Portugal 68–74

Indonesia 98–99

expiration date with no

(Non-hereditary)

(Regimes are past their

Venezuela –50–51

(Unregulated/elites disorganized)

Syria 70–71

duck) (continued) Lame duck flatlining

Sudan 99–00 (!)

(Incumbent is a (nascent) lame

Unguided

Russia 99–00

Panama 83–84

Haiti 01–02

Afghanistan 79–80

EXPECTED TRANSITIONS

Short-term regime collapse

Afghanistan 86–87

personalization

(Speed up process while ruler is

(Unregulated/elites prepared)

Cases + Transfer Years

Snakes

Palace coup

(Non-hereditary)

Outcome Palace coup and increase in

Label

Succession

(B)

Exit

Patterns of de-personalization and leader succession  285

286  Research handbook on authoritarianism figuratively backstabbed by the ‘puppet-president’ Joaquín Balaguer, who in the end – with support of the US – succeeded in taking over and ousting his contenders. It was the same scenario for the charismatic Ziaur Rahman in Bangladesh, who was shot in 1981, after which his regime disintegrated swiftly. Accidents can have the same effect: like the unexpected plane crash that claimed the life of Iraqi ruler Abdul Salam Arif in 1966 (succeeded by his more malleable brother, Abdul Rahman) or Omar Torrijos’s fatal crash in 1981, bringing the regime of Manuel Noriega to power in Panama. In Nigeria, Sani Abacha’s heart attack (some rumors still say poisoning) in 1998 forced his military regime back to the barracks paving the way for elections. A recent example of an aged, ailing dictator is Ali Bongo Ondimba in Gabon. After taking over from his father Omar Bongo in 2009 in a challenged succession, he was turning 59 in 2018 and still going strong. In January that same year his ruling party succeeded in (unanimously) passing a revised constitution abolishing his term limits and securing freedom from prosecution. In October 2018 he suddenly vanished from public life after suffering a stroke in Riyad, later recuperating in his private residence in Rabat. His half-brother Frédéric, head of security, ran the country during his absence and his aunt, Marie Mborantsuo (on the constitutional council), refused to declare a vacancy in the office of the president. The rumor mill sped up. Two short video broadcasts alongside the Moroccan king and one with Gabonese top officials, respectively, only showed Bongo from his left profile angle (and without sound). These obscure (seemingly manipulated) ‘proof-of-life videos’ just added fuel for speculation. The issue was that no succession had been prepared. None of his children were in a sufficiently influential position to claim the presidency, and the opposition was gaining momentum after the last election was rigged. In 2019 several (ill-prepared) junior officers attempted a coup, declaring the restoration of democracy, questioning Ali Bongo’s capacity to rule, and appealing to young people to rise up. But Ali Bongo recovered, purged and shuffled cabinets with a vengeance, and proactively put his eldest son Noureddin Bongo Valentin up for the succession race (Akum, 2019; Allafrica.com, 2018; Asia News Monitor, 2018; BBC, 2019; Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 2018; Powell and Thyne, 2011; Yates, 2009). 18.3.1.2 Ducks in a row (and the unexpected) When there is precedent and there are succession procedures, regimes seem to bounce back from unexpected transitions. There are not many examples like this for personalist regimes, since this form of succession is typical for collegial single-party regimes. The few cases we have for this category (considering the full set of cases with expected transitions described below) seem to experience structural de-personalization as the main outcome. For unexpected transitions it can be posited that it is caused by the shock of sudden death of the leader, but alternatively this drop in LPM might be attributed to loss of charisma of the regime’s founding father and the routinization of power, referring to Weberian frames (cf. Isaacs, 2015). In Egypt the successions of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak might have taken place in chaotic circumstances, but they were not without preestablished procedure. Gamal Nasser himself was prime minister to Mohamed Naguib, whom he forced out in 1954 (cf. ‘Snakes’ – Egypt 54–55). When Nasser, many years later, suddenly died of a heart attack, Sadat was the prime minister, and thus designated successor (at the time) (Johnson, 1972). The same situation repeated itself when Sadat was gunned down in 1981 and Mubarak took over. Of course, keep in mind that the regime established by Naguib and Nasser had revolutionary origins and did have widespread support at its inception. In the GWF database, it is classified

Patterns of de-personalization and leader succession  287 as a party-personalist hybrid, meaning that the party was not a rubber stamp institution, but a pillar of stability and legitimacy for the regime. Some successors did re-personalize during their tenure (Sadat soon after, though Mubarak did not). The other (possible) example is Nicaragua (1963–64) during the second Somoza succession (from Luis Somoza Debayle to his younger brother, Anastasio Somoza Debayle) after the former had a heart attack, aged 44. Their father (Anastasio Somoza García) had been assassinated at the age of 70 in 1956, so both siblings had experienced such a crisis before. Maybe the case falls under ‘lucky ducks’ (see below) since Anastasio Somoza Debayle was head of the security service for his father and brother and swiftly consolidated his power (Ferrero Blanco, 2010). 18.3.2 Expected Transitions The dynamics of leader transfers might still be obscure for regime outsiders, but for the inner circle they do not come as a surprise. Mostly their expectations relate to the age of the rulers (usually entering their 70s) and – closely related – their health (a state secret in most personalist regimes). In other cases, nascent lame ducks are those unable to get rid of their term limits, or have failed to consolidate their rule after a couple of years and are considered to be incompetent by their inner circle. The interacting factors in play here are procedures or established informal rules, the presence of an heir apparent, or the continued, stubborn palace politics of an incumbent unable or unwilling to signal a clear successor. 18.3.2.1 Ducks in a row (and the expected) As mentioned previously, personalist regimes can fall back on earlier transitions that set the precedent. These rules can be informal, and as simple as: the incumbent has the right to appoint; from now on the prime minister takes over; the head of the party is to be the next regime candidate for the elections; etc. In this category we have three cases where a third leader takes over according to the same rules. In Liberia, William Tolbert (vice-president) took over from the ailing William Tubman in 1971 with endorsement by the True Whig Party, just as the former had party support when he ran against the ailing Edwin Barclay in 1944. In North Korea, Kim Jong-Il appointed his son, Kim Jong-Un, in true dynastic fashion just like his father did before him. In Cuba, aging Raúl Castro, first serving alongside his brother Fidel and then as the anointed successor, passed on the torch to the new generation, Miguel Díaz-Canel, becoming the president (in 2019) and first secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba (in 2021) – a real power transfer. Two of these three successors (Cuba, North Korea) were obviously groomed, but I posit that the inner circle expectations (expecting to follow precedent) matter more. Neither of these successions were openly contested (by fellow elites), and outgoing incumbents had less fears that their wishes would not be followed than their predecessors (despite their lower LPMs). Of course, all new personalist leaders purge some of the old guard and let in some of their kith and kin into the inner circle, without upsetting the regime composition. There is no noticeable evidence for re-personalization in this case – unlike those mentioned above – for transitions that have their ducks in a row.

288  Research handbook on authoritarianism 18.3.2.2 Groomed ducklings These transitions of course refer to hereditary power transfers, especially to selected offspring or extended family that have convinced the incumbent that they do not mind waiting their turn. Because of this nepotism and how they were groomed in the shadow of the incumbent, they do have to find a modus vivendi with the incumbent’s peers, usually a generation older than themselves. This is an ongoing balancing exercise and an insecure starting point for these new leaders. The result is a noticeable drop in personalization. The newcomers are either handed the keys to the party or to the armory, but usually not both. Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan actually lost both sets of keys in 2003, doing an LPM freefall from 78 percent to 16 percent, losing control over the party and politburo while unable to remove military officers or promote loyalists at will. In North Korea, Kim Jong Il retained control over the party, but couldn’t promote army staff at will in 1994 since these were his father’s peers (from 78 percent to 68 percent) (Lim, 2012). In Syria, a single-party-military -personalist hybrid regime, Bashir al-Assad, had to contend with an autonomous party, but did have some influence over the promotions in the army (from 61 percent to 33 percent). The transition from ‘Papa Doc’ to ‘Baby Doc’ in Haiti in 1971 left Jean-Claude Duvalier with less control over the party, but with comfortable command over the security forces (from 87 percent to 58 percent). Raúl Castro in Cuba, of course, was a sibling of Fidel, and already in charge of the military. He did not inherit control over the party in 2006 (from 66 percent to 42 percent). Turkmenistan’s situation is hard to assess, since the incumbent Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov is actually still alive after appointing his son Serdar in 2021, which recently overturned the institutional outlook of the country to accommodate his father’s superior position. In other words, the grooming process is ongoing and the transition is far from complete. 18.3.2.3 Supervised Without suitable offspring to take over the reign, rulers have the alternative option of designating a non-hereditary successor. They usually act upon this before they turn full lame duck, and at times their choice is limited. For this reason, I categorize such successions as elite pacts. Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan is the best recent example of a successful transfer, but still resulting in an elite-pact breakdown. The cases in Honduras (1948–49), Bolivia (1978–79) and Kyrgyzstan (2017–18) were much clearer examples where the incumbent was a lame duck (tied to constitutional term limits), denoting a loyal party member that then shoved the incumbent aside. The DRC is a weird case, because the elite pact was stricken with the opposition, not a regime insider. In all four cases, these elite pacts broke down and once-loyal protégés broke free and re-personalized, squeezing out their predecessors once they were in power (for a while). This makes such transitions so different from hereditary power transfers, thus connecting well with the crown-prince dilemma literature. By 2019, Nazarbayev was not showing any signs of weakness in Kazakhstan. He was in good health and in absolute control, despite his age. Even though Central Asia watchers had compiled a shortlist, they were left guessing who would be the ultimate pick for a successor. Nazarbayev has no sons, only two daughters and one son-in-law that fell out of grace a long time ago. His choice for Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, alternatively acting as the former prime minister, foreign affairs minister and chairman of the senate, was a safe bet. A new position of ‘first president’ was designed for Nazarbayev, reserving the first seat on the Security Council

Patterns of de-personalization and leader succession  289 of Kazakhstan for him, the main organ supervising the armed forces. Nazarbayev stepped aside, but not away. Tokayev did everything right after taking over, meandering his way between signaling due praise and respect for his mentor while at the same times building up his own image as a somewhat independent leader. All this ended with the January 2022 riots. In a few days, the peaceful protests of January 1, 2022 against rising energy prices turned political by demanding change. Experts find that other Nazarbayev loyalists instrumentalized criminal elements to turn these anti-regime protests violent in Almaty. The protests were being used to mask a coup attempt. Tokayev reacted prudently by not relying on his own armed forces, but instead requested military assistance from foreign allies (notably Russia) that came to his aid immediately to execute a counter-coup. The plotters, a group made up from the old Nazarbayev guard, spearheaded by Karim Massinov (secret service), was purged, together with Nazarbayev, who was stripped of his power, offices and influence, rendering Tokayev the sole powerholder, albeit beholden to the Kremlin (Anceschi, 2022; Dubnov, 2022). The DRC is often a frontrunner in dictatorial innovation, and the supervised power transfer of 2018 is a case in point. Joseph Kabila was in power from 2001, and his constitutional second term ended in December 2016. Extensive legal wrangling – nicknamed ‘le glissement’ (the slithering) – enabled him to postpone the inevitable elections by another two years (Berwouts and Reyntjens, 2019). To make a long story short, the 2018 elections were stolen and Joseph Kabila was dominating the parliament but not running himself. Kabila struck a deal with Félix Tshisekedi, an opposition candidate and presidential candidate (and son of a famous opposition figure under Mobutu). Note that Tshisekedi had not done well in the election, and was thus complicit in stealing the vote by entering a pact with Kabila. They formed a new government, stacked with Kabila stalwarts. The latter still controlled the main state institutions, including the constitutional court and the security forces. Despite his lack of experience and his precarious position, Tshisekedi worked the international community, and within two years found the momentum to remove key figures in his administration on corruption charges, refusing nominations of Kabila loyalists and, finally, ousting or retiring Kabila’s cronies from the constitutional court and the army’s command, later blowing up his coalition with Kabila’s party. There are of course other political heavyweights in the game (e.g. Moïse Katumbi and Jean-Pierre Bemba) with whom Tshisekedi needs to maintain a working relationship. The 2023 elections will tell if Tshisekedi is able to consolidate his takeover (Hoebeke, 2021). 18.3.2.4 Lucky ducks There is ‘being in the right place at the right time’ and ‘making your own luck.’ Both apply in these few cases. In this scenario, the eventual successors have moved themselves up high in the political machines of the incumbent, but they are not the only candidate, nor have they received the blessing of the incumbent, who is entering the limelight of his tenure. (Or is suddenly assassinated like the battered Laurent-Désiré Kabila in the DRC during the second Congo War.) The lame duck aura emanates from health setbacks, old age or severe domestic crises. There is no succession plan as making a move is still too dangerous, but elites are scheming in the shadows, though not coordinated since any leaked talks about succession are taboo and punishable. In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, long-time rulers also suddenly dropped dead in 2006 and 2016, leaving inner circle heavyweights to fight it out amongst themselves before the population and the international community got wind that these dictators were not coming back. Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov had been chosen by the rest of the ruling clan as a safe

290  Research handbook on authoritarianism option and figurehead, but deftly and swiftly purged those who sought to control him. Shavkat Mirziyoyev similarly elbowed other heavyweights out to first become interim president, and then secured the post for good (Anceschi, 2021; Van den Bosch, 2021b). ‘Sometimes you choose your rabbi, sometimes your rabbi chooses you’ – as the saying goes. In Togo, Faure Gnassingbé Eyadéma was one of the many sons of the incumbent, (Étienne) Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who died during the airlift to a hospital (in Paris) after collapsing from a heart attack on February 5, 2005. The swiftness through which the Togolese army command declared their support for his son Faure masks the whispered threats they issued to keep the civilian politicians in line to follow their ‘chosen’ successor. Since the transfer was unconstitutional, an election had to be organized and subsequently rigged to undo international criticism. Faure was not only chosen because of his relatively extensive education but also because his mother came from the south. Thus, he was well suited to bridge the ethnic antagonism between the north and the south of the country. Still, the bulk of the ruling clan is controlled by the Kabye ethnic group, and most army officers belong to this group, just as the late president (Osei, 2018). The regime certainly de-personalized in 2005–06 (from 100 percent to 49 percent) with Faure Gnassingbé losing all direct control over the party and top brass, but inching back up by 2010 (58 percent) as he was able to oust some top officers. This scenario is different from ‘open duck season’ because incumbents are increasingly considered ‘lame ducks,’ meaning other ruling elites are established and confronted with a time-horizon for succession in the near future due to signs of aging, deteriorating health or political crisis. During ‘open duck seasons,’ elites are still in a stage where they are preoccupied with integrating themselves into the regime and fit incumbents do not send out any ambivalent signs. Unlike the scenarios where a clear candidate is appointed (cf. ‘groomed ducklings’ or ‘supervised’ transitions), any hint or speculation about transfers can be punishable when it reaches the incumbent ears, since no such plans are to be discussed. Due to the sudden nature of the power vacuum, contextual factors matter greatly: Who is where at what time? Who is unavailable (on a mission abroad)? Who was first in line to hear the news of the incumbent’s demise? Which candidate is most ‘trustworthy’? All these factors usually benefit the closest of regime insiders, and even then, the shortlist of potential contenders becomes even shorter as other elites have to be persuaded to cast their lot (and life) in the camp of the most likely candidate. There are no ‘pinkie swears’ or promises that hold and backstabbing is expected, and these are thus very dangerous times for ruling elites. Even the smallest advantage (speed, position, location) can make a difference. The agility of the major players is crucial in making these small advantages work in their favor. It is no surprise then that these regimes tend to re-personalize. Some do so, even immediately after, like Berdymukhamedov in Turkmenistan in 2007. 18.3.2.5 Cuckoos This category of successors is almost identical to ‘lucky ducks,’ beside the fact that the latter are not confronted with a sudden demise of the ruler. Rulers in this case are obvious lame ducks, living on borrowed time, and the self-appointed successors play a double game: convincing the ailing ruler that they are no threat, while mustering their coalition to push through. Out of fear of reprisals by the ruler, they do wait for the perfect moment to strike and make their move launching them into power. The example already referred to is Leon M’ba’s winning power in Gabon (in the context of de-personalization during a ruler’s lifetime). Here his successor, Omar Bongo, colluded

Patterns of de-personalization and leader succession  291 with the French to get them to pressure the dying M’ba to anoint him. Ironically, Omar Bongo would undergo the same fate. In May 2009 Omar Bongo suspended his official duties, allegedly to mourn the death of his wife, but was actually being treated for cancer in a Barcelona hospital (Reuters, 2009). This is when his son Ali Bongo made his move. He was not the chosen one: ‘Omar had serious doubts about his eldest son Ali. “In effect, Omar Bongo had often regretted that his eldest daughter Pascaline had not been a boy”’ (Yates, 2019: 499). Nicolae Ceaușescu in Romania (1965–66), Ali Saibou in Niger (1987–88) and Ismail Omar Guelleh (cousin to the incumbent) in Djibouti in 1999–2000 were all neither groomed nor designated candidates (Vanguardafrica, 2021; Whiteman, 2006). They all bided their time before making their move, and all increased their LPM in the aftermath of their takeover. 18.3.2.6 Snakes While cuckoos take over after hatching and when they are full-grown, snakes just raid the nest at the earliest opportunity. There are quite a few examples of these palace coups by regime insiders. Most interesting is not the how and the who – it is always the regime’s number two – but that this tends to happen quite early in a regime’s lifespan. This means that snakes strike more commonly when the regime is still ‘wobbly,’ not established nor consolidated. Almost always the usurpers are the ones later pressing their mark on the regime (Nasser in Egypt, Noriega in Panama, Hafez al-Assad in Syria, Putin in Russia, Omar al-Bashir in Sudan), and all these regimes personalize swiftly. (Only Sudan had a slight dip when al-Bashir took over from Hassan al-Turabi.) Interesting is that ‘lame-duckism’ in these cases is not so much characterized by age or health, it can relate to personal characteristics of the incumbent too, like addiction (Yeltsin in Russia) or radicalism (al-Turabi in Sudan, Jadid in Syria). 18.3.2.7 Lame duck flatlining When established incumbents have clearly become lame ducks by age, illness or nationwide crisis, this gives other seasoned elites too much time to speculate about in what direction to continue without fearing lethal reprisals from a ruler they have worked with for decades. These elites don’t push for a swift palace coup, they have too much to lose and want to play it safe, preferably even take over with the blessing of the ruler. Their speculative factions then try to get the ear of the ruler, endorsing their vision of the future, or feel the time is ripe to (politely) voice their criticisms on the current course. In any case, any fractions between hardliners and reformers become more pronounced as personalist rulers become lame ducks. In combination with the usual life-cycle, regimes that have been in power for decades commonly experience real crises; usually economic crises that spill over into violent regime contestation (Van den Bosch, 2021a). Such contexts then, in turn, polarize ruling elite factions even more, since they are very much concerned about the near future without the incumbent. Weakened rulers, on the other hand, often relish such discord, since this allows them to cling on to their slipping power (by playing factions off against each other). In the example of Stroessner’s Paraguay that I mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, one can witness a structural weakness in the regime starting in 1982 that opened the flood gates to ruling party infighting. When Stroessner tried to reestablish control after 1985, his purges ultimately triggered a palace coup. With the regime on the defense, the LPM score of his usurper, General Andrés Rodríguez Pedotti, was at 33 percent after the coup (down from 87 percent in 1989 under Stroessner). The new leader effectively lost control over the ruling

292  Research handbook on authoritarianism party, the latter constitutionally tying him to term limits soon after his takeover, ending the regime. Regime insiders in fascist Spain and Portugal respectively found their old caudillos slipping into debilitating states from which they did not recover.5 Franco hung onto power despite his stroke. Factions coalesced around the ill old man, pushing for a reactionary course or liberalization. The last years of his rule were marred with palace intrigues. Franco transferred the power of state on his deathbed to Prince Carlos, three agonizing weeks before he died (Payne and Palacios, 2014). Similarly, succession arrangements had not been made in the case of Prime Minister Salazar, and the Portuguese president started intra-regime consultation rounds to identify a suitable successor after the latter had slipped into a coma (De Meneses, 2013: 604–6). Suharto’s Indonesia suffered a full blowout crisis as the Asian Financial crisis in 1997 spread to South East Asia. Both elites and the population turned against Suharto’s long-lasting dictatorship. He was forced to resign, leaving the unprepared vice-president B.J. Habibie to fend for himself. The regime de-personalized overnight, and ended in 512 days, transitioning to democracy (Gittings, 2019). In Malawi, Hasting’s Banda also had religiously avoided appointing any successor before the nonagenarian was flown off to a South African hospital to treat his brain tumor, resulting is his regime imploding, with his regular army turning on his paramilitary.

18.4 CONCLUSION This overview of succession scenarios for personalist regimes (and their hybrids) offers a new perspective on how these regimes are affected by leadership transition. Much attention has gone into the dynastic tendencies of personalist regimes from the point of view of their survival, but few comparative studies have X-rayed how intra-regime dynamics are affected, depending on the mode of exit and the nature of the transition. Regarding representativeness, let’s keep in mind that, so far, this phenomenon affects only a small subset of the total sample of personalist rule. To enable groomed or supervised successions, for instance, regimes reach a LPM of 64 percent on average by the time of such power transfers. In the larger sample, many personalist regimes do not even obtain such a high LPM during their entire reign, and most of these eventually break down, have their rulers forcibly removed or even lose elections.6 Although with the scope and level of personalism on the rise, globally, this topic is expected to become more salient. Another observation regarding the sample is that many of these regimes with successful power transfers are personalist hybrids: Afghanistan 72–92, Bolivia 71–79, Cuba 59–NA, Egypt 53–11, Gabon 60–NA, Honduras 33–56, Indonesia 66–99, North Korea 48–NA, Panama 68–82, 82–89, Paraguay 54–89, Syria 63–NA, Romania 45–89, Turkmenistan 92– NA, Uzbekistan 92–NA. Their additional reliance on a hegemonic party and/or a cohesive military command not only contribute to regime longevity (Van den Bosch, 2021a: 285) but also seem to be conducive to multiple successful leadership transitions without regime breakdown. Maybe scholars should reevaluate this hybridity when it comes to succession instead of solely linking successful dynastism to personalist features (in non-monarchies). This close-up likewise breaks open in part the black box of leadership transfers: not all father-son successions are the same or bring about the same result. Quite a few should be con-

Patterns of de-personalization and leader succession  293 sidered palace coups, and this thus brings to the fore that the current literature could use a more detailed theoretical understanding of the different impacts of regular coups and palace coups on regime transitions. The impact of leader exits also matters a lot, as well as their timing. A reappraisal of the literature on political assassination (tyrannicide) might also want to take into account at what stage of their rule a (personalist) leader is taken out. Groomed successions actually de-personalize regimes, while opportunistic palace coups lead to an immediate increase in personalization. This is a counterintuitive conclusion, since hereditary succession and dynastism as a whole is widely considered to be the pinnacle of personalist rule. Similarly, supervised transitions don’t seem to work out well (for the old regime powerholders), and often regime breakdown follows soon after (Bolivia, Honduras, Kyrgyzstan). In contrast, regulated succession practices, even if informal, allow regimes to withstand sudden power vacuums and severe shocks. An important observation regarding the routinization of power transfers in arbitrary rule! This puts future successions in a different spotlight, like the next transition in Azerbaijan, North Korea, Gabon or Cuba. Interesting would be to dig deeper into the contributing factors of re-personalization. For Syria, the civil war in the aftermath of the Arab Spring (2011) seems to have been conducive. Is the same true for Azerbaijan? Are there other examples? Also, resource curses, especially oil curses correlate greatly with personalist longevity and leader transfers. Van den Bosch (2021a) indicates that it is not the oil curse as such, but the international leverage that comes with it that contributes to regime stability. In the same fashion, personalist regimes with an important geostrategic position can attract external support for their rule. Maybe de-personalization and re-personalization are both driven by factors outside the ruling coalition dynamics? My concluding thought wanders off to Cuba. The GWF dataset classifies Cuba as single-party-personalist until 2010, marking the regime ongoing, and other research often extends these labels beyond the measured timeframe, thus still treating Cuba this way. In 2006, Fidel handed over power to his younger brother, Raúl while recovering from surgery, but he never returned to politics. (He died in 2016 at the age of 90.) From 2007, Cuba’s LPM dropped to 42 percent – in line with ‘groomed successions,’ but Raúl made the regime even more collegial after 2011 introducing term limits and age limits for the party’s politburo to allow for the gradual renovation of cadres. In February 2013, Raúl Castro confirmed that this second term would be his last one, thus abiding by his own rules, and paving the path for Miguel Díaz-Canel to take over (Centeno, 2017: 108–11). Even in 2023, under Miguel Díaz-Canel, there are, arguably, still several personalist aspects (control over the military), but how much blunting is needed before a knife turns into a spatula? If this trend continues, Cuba would be the first personalist regime de-personalizing completely without regime collapse.

NOTES 1. Note that the LPM measure is a comprehensive tool to measure personalism as defined by Geddes and her colleagues. It is designed to fit all regimes and does not include an economic measure of the ruler’s clan over the national economy, nor does it quantify the ruler’s legal restraints on his mandate (term limits vs. president-for-life). 2. All known personalist leader transfers have resulted in a male takeover. To my knowledge there are no cases of women taking power in the capacity of personalist rulers (in modern times). For this reason, I logically refer to some of these successors as ‘sons’ or ‘brothers.’ For other autocratic regime types, women can occupy the position of the supreme powerholder, albeit rarely.

294  Research handbook on authoritarianism 3. Speaking of nesting – in this chapter I did stretch the analogy of ‘lame ducks’ quite far regarding leadership transfers. For scholars that are not comfortable applying the same labels, feel free to refer to the nature of the succession: procedural, chaotic, designated (groomed/supervised), palace coups (improvised, preemptive, sped-up), as well as unguided succession. 4. The Stroessner regime is considered a single-party-military-personalist hybrid regime in the typology by Geddes et al. (2014) and its party preceded the ascent of the personalist ruler. 5. Technically, Salazar, after a month in a coma, did recover, but by then had been replaced while his funeral logistics were being discussed. His inner circle never had the nerve to tell him the truth. They kept up this charade for another 23 months. It is unclear if Salazar ever figured it out (De Meneses, 2013: 604–8). 6. Consult Van den Bosch (2021a) for an overview of transitions from personalist rule as well as the determining factors for post-transition outcomes, encompassing a global sample up to 2020.

REFERENCES Akum, F., 2019. Does regime security come ahead of real reform in Gabon? Institute for Security Studies (issafrica.org), February 11. Al Arabiya, 2010. Nasser did not die of poisoned coffee: Doctor claims that Sadat killed Nasser are unfounded, September 26. Albrecht, H., 2015. The myth of coup-proofing: Risk and instances of military coups d’état in the Middle East and North Africa, 1950–2013. Armed Forces & Society, 41(4), pp. 659–87. AllAfrica.com, 2018. Video of Gabon’s ailing president raises more questions than it answers, December 5. Anceschi, L., 2021. After personalism: Rethinking power transfers in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 51(4), pp. 660–80. Anceschi, L., 2022. Kazakhstan: Secrets, lies, and foreign troops. Carnegie Europe, January 11. Asia News Monitor, 2018. Gabon: Power vacuum in Gabon: end of the Bongo dynasty? November 20. Bader, M., 2011. Hegemonic political parties in post-Soviet Eurasia: Towards party-based authoritarianism? Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 44(3), pp. 189–97. Bain, M.J., 2019. Moscow and Havana 1917 to the present: An enduring friendship in an ever-changing global context. Rowman & Littlefield. BBC, 2019. Gabon coup attempt: Government says situation under control, January 7. Berwouts, K. and Reyntjens, F., 2019. The Democratic Republic of Congo: The great electoral robbery (and how and why Kabila got away with it). Africa Policy Brief, April 19. Brownlee, J., 2007a. Authoritarianism in an age of democratization. Cambridge University Press. Brownlee, J., 2007b. Hereditary succession in modern autocracies. World Politics, 59(4), pp. 595–628. Centeno, R.I., 2017. The Cuban regime after a decade of Rául Castro in power. Mexican Law Review, 9(2), pp. 99–126. Cornell, S.E., 2001. Democratization falters in Azerbaijan. Journal of Democracy, 12, pp. 118–31. Darnton, J., 1978. Despite unrest, Mobutu is keeping tight lid on Zaire. New York Times, April 24. De Meneses, F.R., 2013. Salazar: A political biography. Enigma Books. Dubnov, A., 2022. Kazakhstan: A coup, a counter-coup and a Russian victory. Aljazeera, January 16. Ferrero Blanco, M.D., 2010. La Nicaragua de los Somoza, 1936–1979. Huelva. Franklin, J., 2016. Cuba and the US empire: A chronological history. NYU Press. Freedom House, 2001. Freedom in the world 2001 – Azerbaijan, available at: https://​www​.refworld​.org/​ docid/​5278c99914​.html (accessed June 20, 2023). Geddes, B., Wright, J. and Frantz, E., 2014. Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set. Perspectives on Politics, 12(2), pp. 313–31. Geddes, B., Wright, J.G., Wright, J. and Frantz, E., 2018. How dictatorships work: Power, personalization, and collapse. Cambridge University Press. Gittings, J., 2019. BJ Habibie obituary. Guardian, September 17. Hale, H.E., 2015. Patronal politics: Eurasian regime dynamics in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press.

Patterns of de-personalization and leader succession  295 Herz, J.H., 1952. The problem of successorship in dictatorial regimes; A study in comparative law and institutions. The Journal of Politics, 14(1), pp. 19–40. Hoebeke, H., 2021. Rumble in the DR Congo: President Tshisekedi is taking control. Egmont Paper, 112, pp. 1–25. Human Rights Watch, 2002. Eritrea: Human rights developments. Human Rights Watch World Report 2002. Ilkhamov, A., 2004. The limits of centralization: Regional challenges in Uzbekistan. In The transformation of Central Asia: States and societies from Soviet rule to independence, Jones Luong, P., ed. Cornell University Press, pp. 159–81. Isaacs, R., 2015. Charismatic routinization and problems of post-charisma succession in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Studies of Transition States and Societies, 7(1), pp. 58–76. Johnson, P. 1972. Egypt under Nasser. MERIP Reports, 10, pp. 3–14. Kokkonen, A. and Sundell, A., 2014. Delivering stability – primogeniture and autocratic survival in European Monarchies 1000–1800. American Political Science Review, 108(2), pp. 438–53. Lim, J.C., 2012. North Korea’s hereditary succession: Comparing two key transitions in the DPRK. Asian Survey, 52(3), pp. 550–70. Magaloni, B. and Kricheli, R., 2010. Political order and one-party rule. Annual Review of Political Science, 13, pp.123–43. Nickson, R.A., 1988. Tyranny and longevity: Stroessner’s Paraguay. Third World Quarterly, 10(1), pp. 237–59. Nugent, P., 2004. Africa since independence. Palgrave Macmillan. Ogunbadejo, O., 1978. Conflict in Africa: A case study of the Shaba crisis, 1977. World Affairs, 141. Osei, A., 2018. Like father, like son? Power and influence across two Gnassingbé presidencies in Togo. Democratization, 25(8), pp. 1460–80. Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 2018. Gabon: President will consolidate his power, January 23. Payne, S.G. and Palacios, J., 2014. Franco: A personal and political biography. University of Wisconsin Press. Powell, J.M. and Thyne, C.L., 2011. Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2010: A new dataset. Journal of Peace Research, 48(2), pp. 249–59. Reed, M.C., 1987. Gabon: A neo-colonial enclave of enduring French interest. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 25(2), pp. 283–320. Reuters, 2009. Gabon’s Bongo suspends activities to mourn wife, May 7. Schumacher, E., 1983. Paraguay strongman dusts off his voting routine. New York Times, February 5. Svolik, M., 2012. The politics of authoritarian rule. Cambridge University Press. Van den Bosch, J.J.J., 2021a. Personalist rule in Africa and other world regions. Routledge. Van den Bosch, J.J.J., 2021b. Political regimes in Central Asia: Tracing personalist rule from the Khanates to the present. In European handbook of Central Asian Studies: History, politics, and societies, Van den Bosch J.J.J., Fauve, A. and De Cordier, B., eds. ibidem Verlag, pp. 387–446. Vanguardafrica, 2021. In Djibouti, A dictator clings to power and extends suffering, April 19. Whiteman, K., 2006. Hassan Gouled Aptidon: Founding president of independent Djibouti. Guardian, December 5. Yates, D., 2019. The dynastic republic of Gabon. Cahiers d’études africaines, pp. 483–513. Young, C. and Turner, T.E., 1985. The rise and decline of the Zairian state. University of Wisconsin Press.

296  Research handbook on authoritarianism

APPENDIX The latent personalism measure (LPM) is measured with eight criteria. These eight criteria can all be answered with a yes (1) or no (0), thus enabling a scalic measure from 0 to 8, per country-year in the GWF database (2018). Tables 18A.1 and 18A.2 denote changes, marking the shifts between years: +1 (for increased control regarding this criterion), −1 (for the loss of influence for this criterion), 0 (for no change) and “-” to indicate that a criterion was not present before and has not emerged. These are the eight measures with their shorthand abbreviation between brackets (cf. GWF, 2018 codebook: 2): ● Does the regime leader control appointments to the party executive committee? (party exec committee) In other words, is the ruler in charge of the politburo, or can this group exert influence over the latter and veto decisions? ● Is the party executive committee absent or simply a rubber stamp for the regime leader’s decisions (rubber stamp party) Are legislation and executive decisions actually evaluated, discussed to be approved or vetoed? Does this institution initiate laws? ● Does access to high office depend on personal loyalty to the regime leader? (high office) Does the ruler have the discretion to pick his inner circle or is he forced to work with established elites? ● Did the regime leader create a new support political party after seizing power? (create new party) Is the ruling party mostly used to dole out patronage to and gain information from its members, or is the party a real organization, established before the ruler came to power, and thus – in some cases – has its own procedures to regulate succession? ● Does the regime leader imprison/kill officers from groups other than his own without a reasonably fair trial? (military purge) Does the ruler use arbitrary repression, unchallenged by regime insiders? ● Does the regime leader promote officers loyal to himself or from his ethnic, tribal, regional, or partisan group, or are there widespread forced retirement of officers from other groups? (military promotion) Does the ruler resort to ‘ethnic stacking’ (from his community of trust) and purges to staff the security forces with loyal commanders? ● Does the regime leader create paramilitary forces, a president’s guard, or new security force loyal to himself? (paramilitary) Is the ruler protected by a parallel security force that acts as a bodyguard and serves to prevents coup d’états by other military forces? ● Does the regime leader personally control the security apparatus? (security apparatus) Is the chain of command broken to ensure the ruler has both full civilian and military control?

–

−1

0

–

–

0

–

1

–

0

−1

−1

0

–

−1

–

0

−1

−1

−1

−1

–

−1

0

–

–

+1

–

–

0

–

*

–

−1

−1

−1

0

−1

−1

–

−1

0

−1

−1

−1

–

−1

0

–

stamp party

−1

Rubber

committee

+1

0

0

0

−1

0

0

−1

0

−1

−1

−1

0

0

0

−1

0

–

0

0

0

0

0

−1

+1

High office

–

–

−1

–

−1

–

–

–

–

−1

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

−1

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

party

Create new

−1

0

−1

0

−1

−1

−1

−1

−1

0

−1

–

0

0

–

−1

–

−1

–

–

–

–

–

−1

–

Military purge

–

0

0

–

−1

–

0

–

–

0

−1

0

−1

0

0

−1

–

−1

0

0

–

0

+1

0

0

promotion

Military

–

+1

0

0

–

−1

−1

−1

–

0

–

0

–

0

−1

0

–

0

+1

–

–

0

–

–

–

Paramilitary

Latent personalism measure and succession (1945–2010)

Party executive

Table 18A.1 Security

–

–

0

0

−1

0

−1

−1

−1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

–

0

–

–

−1

–

apparatus

1979

2006

2005

2001

1998

1993

1989

1975

1968

2006

2003

2000

1994

1971

1956

1981

1971

1970

1967

2009

2008

1987

1967

1965

1954

transfer

power

Year of

Lucky duck

Lucky duck

flatlining

Lame duck

flatlining

Lame duck

flatlining

Lame duck

flatlining

Lame duck

flatlining

Lame duck

Groomed duckling

Groomed duckling

Groomed duckling

Groomed duckling

Groomed duckling

Groomed duckling

Ducks in a row

Ducks in a row

Ducks in a row

Ducks in a row

Cuckoo

Cuckoo

Cuckoo

Cuckoo

Cuckoo

Mauritania 78–05

(no data)

Turkmenistan 91–NA Lucky duck

Togo 63–NA

Congo/Zaire 97–NA

Indonesia 66–99

Malawi 64–94

Paraguay 54–93

Spain 39–76

Portugal 26–74

Cuba 59–NA

Azerbaijan 93–NA

Syria 63–NA

Korea North 48–NA

Haiti 57–86

Nicaragua 36–79

Egypt 52–NA

Liberia 44–80

Egypt 52–NA

Nicaragua 36–79

Gabon 60–NA

Armenia 98–NA

Niger 74–91

Gabon 60–NA

Romania 45–89

Cuckoo

scenario

GWF Honduras 33–56

Succession

Regime as listed in

Patterns of de-personalization and leader succession  297

–

−1

–

–

–

–

–

–

0

–

–

–

–

–

+1

–

−1

–

−1

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

+1

–

–

–

−1

–

–

−1

–

−1

−1

0

0

0

–

+1

–

0

–

+1

–

−1

−1

−1

−1

−1

−1

0

High office

–

–

–

+1

–

–

–

–

–

0

–

–

–

−1

−1

–

−1

−1

–

party

Create new

−1

–

–

–

0

0

–

0

–

0

+1

0

−1

–

0

0

−1

–

–

Military purge

Note: Author’s own work based on Geddes et al. (2018).

–

–

stamp party

committee

–

Rubber

Party executive

Military

−1

+1

–

–

0

0

+1

0

0

0

+1

−1

−1

−1

0

0

−1

−1

–

promotion

–

−1

+1

–

–

–

+1

–

+1

+1

–

−1

−1

–

−1

0

−1

−1

–

Paramilitary

Security

–

−1

0

–

–

0

+1

+1

+1

+1

+1

−1

−1

–

−1

–

0

–

–

apparatus

1978

1948

2001

1999

1999

1986

1983

1979

1970

1954

1950

2009

1998

1981

1981

1966

1961

1957

1984

transfer

power

Year of

Open duck season

Bolivia 71–79

Honduras 33–56

Haiti 99–04

Russia 93–NA

Sudan 89–NA

Afghanistan 78–92

Panama 82–89

Afghanistan 78–92

Syria 63–NA

Egypt 52–NA

Venezuela 48–58

Guinea 08–10

Nigeria 93–99

Panama 68–82

Bangladesh 75–82

Iraq 63–68

Supervised

Supervised

Snake

Snake

Snake

Snake

Snake

Snake

Snake

Snake

Snake

Open duck season

Open duck season

Open duck season

Open duck season

Open duck season

Dominican Rep 30–62 Open duck season

Guatemala 54–58

(no data)

scenario

GWF Mauritania 78–05

Succession

Regime as listed in

298  Research handbook on authoritarianism

–

−1

0

−1

−1

−1

–

−1

–

0

0

0

–

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

–

0

0

0

–

–

–

–

0

0

0

–

0

–

0

–

0

0

–

+1

−1

party

0

0

0

–

–

–

0

0

0

–

0

0

0

0

0

–

0

0

purge

Note: Author’s own work based on Geddes et al. (2018).

–

–

−1

−1

−1

−1

−1

−1

0

−1

0

0

0

−1

0

−1

−1

0

–

−1

–

–

–

–

stamp party

committee

High office Create new Military

–

−1

0

0

–

–

0

0

–

–

0

0

–

0

0

–

0

–

promotion

Military

0

0

–

0

0

0

–

0

–

–

0

0

−1

0

0

–

–

–

Paramilitary

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

−1

0

0

0

0

0

−1

−1

–

apparatus

Security

2006–07

2001–02

2001–02

2000–01

1996–97

1995–96

1993–94

1991–96

1990–91

1985–86

1982–85

1977–82

1972–73

1970–71

1967–69

1964–65

1961–62

1954–55

Timeframe

Burkino Faso 87–14

Congo/Brazzaville 97–NA

Azerbaijan 93–NA

Eritrea 93–NA

Uzbekistan 91–NA

Georgia 92–03

Rwanda 73–94

Togo 63–NA

Guinea Bissau 80–99

Madagascar 75–93

Paraguay 54–93

Congo/Zaire 60–97

Dominican Rep 66–78

Cuba 59–NA

Egypt 52–NA

Gabon 60–NA

Cuba 59–NA

Thailand 47–57

Regime as listed in GWF

Latent personalism measure and de-personalization during a ruler’s tenure (1945–2010)

Party executive Rubber

Table 18A.2 Type of

Stunned duck

Stunned duck

Lame duck

Stunned duck

troubleshooting

Autocratic

Stunned duck

Stunned duck

Stunned duck

Stunned duck

troubleshooting

Autocratic

Lame duck

Stunned duck

troubleshooting?)

(no data – autocratic

Stunned duck

Stunned duck

Lame duck

troubleshooting

Autocratic

(no data)

de-personalization

Patterns of de-personalization and leader succession  299

19. Pressure proofing: how authoritarian regimes respond to sanctions1 Christian von Soest

19.1 INTRODUCTION Traditionally, Comparative Politics scholars have focussed on the inner workings of authoritarian2 rule and regimes. However, authoritarian regimes are also prime targets of international pressure, for instance from Western countries or the United Nations (UN). Research on authoritarian regimes has, in turn, increasingly acknowledged the importance of international factors for the maintenance and (de)stabilization of authoritarian rule (Levitsky and Way 2010; Tansey 2016a; Whitehead 1996) and has incorporated insights from research on foreign policy instruments – for instance, sanctions (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2015; von Soest and Wahman 2015). Analysing pressure imposed on non-democratic regimes is indispensable to learning more about the international as well as internal politics of authoritarianism. Two fundamentally opposing developments have characterized the last 15 to 20 years. On the one hand, growing autocratization processes (Tomini 2021) and the “return of authoritarian great powers” (Gat 2007) have created an increasingly permissive environment for authoritarian practices worldwide. On the other, authoritarian rule is under considerable domestic and international pressure. For example, sanctions are mostly enacted on non-democratic regimes. Around 75 per cent of all countries under UN, United States (US) and European Union (EU) sanctions are authoritarian. In addition, “democracy sanctions” that aim at improving democratic and human rights constitute the biggest sanction category (Portela and von Soest 2012; von Soest and Wahman 2015). As military intervention has become largely discredited and with the public in the West having become increasingly war-weary, sanctions are arguably the most common foreign policy tool used to deal in the twenty-first century with hostile behaviour by authoritarian regimes – such as Russia’s aggression towards Ukraine. In this chapter, I present findings from current research on the nature and political consequences of exerting pressure on authoritarian regimes. I review how economic and diplomatic restrictions work and examine authoritarian targets’ pressure-proofing strategies. Authoritarian governments represent particularly problematic targets as they can shield themselves from external pressure more easily than their democratic counterparts can. With their limited or – in extreme cases – even non-existent level of political competition, participation, rule of law and considerable control of the public discourse (Brooker 2009; Dahl 1971; Wintrobe 1998), they are harder to influence from the outside than liberal democracies are. In particular, as will be shown, in an attempt to proof themselves against external pressure, authoritarians can more easily fall back on economic, discursive and repressive resources. Before analysing the pressure imposed on authoritarian regimes, it is important to make two clarifications. First, there is a fundamental difference between the general international and/or regional environment for authoritarian rule – be it permissive or hostile – and foreign policies, which are directed and intentional: in this case, external pressure applied to authori300

Pressure proofing  301 tarian regimes. Here, I focus on the latter: specific pressure applied to destabilize authoritarian regimes or change their policies. Second, it is a well-established research finding that Western countries and international organizations are not consistent in imposing such pressure. On the contrary, their related decisions are highly selective or even strategic. To be sure, the US and its allies have regularly supported authoritarian rule, for instance in Egypt (Brownlee 2012) or in sub-Saharan Africa (Hagmann and Reyntjens 2016). Given the wealth and breadth of existing research on the topic, the overview offered in this chapter must be selective. I proceed in four steps as follows. First, I present trends in the application of pressure, in particular sanctions, against authoritarian regimes. Second, I review factors that influence the success of sanctions and, third, I examine authoritarian targets’ attempts at pressure proofing to counter the effects thereof. Fourth and finally, I suggest avenues for further research concerning the questions to be tackled, research design and data.

19.2

EXISTING LITERATURE

Two strands of Political Science have examined how external pressure affects authoritarian regimes. Unfortunately, they have often worked in isolation. The first is Comparative Politics research on authoritarianism. Boix (2011, 809) found that the “structure of the international system affects the resources and strategies of pro-authoritarian and pro-democratic factions in client states”. Directly after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, the international context became overwhelmingly supportive of democracy. Yet, the global dominance of liberal democracy proved short-lived. The ascendance of authoritarian great powers (Gat 2007), most notably China and Russia, and of authoritarian states, like Saudi Arabia, has turned the tide once again. The success of populist leaders across the globe (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018) has also created a more permissive environment for authoritarian regimes. China and other authoritarian powers provide massive material, military and ideological support while the so-called China Model sets an internationally appealing example (Bader 2015). Scholars have analysed the different international dimensions of authoritarianism. Levitsky and Way (2010) examined how international linkage and leverage affect “competitive authoritarian” regimes in different world regions. In the following, scholars have also investigated processes of authoritarian diffusion (Bank 2017; Weyland 2017), the collaboration of authoritarian regimes (Tansey 2016b; von Soest 2015), aid provided to authoritarians (Hagmann and Reyntjens 2016) and the international image-building of non-democratic regimes (Dukalskis 2021). This has resulted in a better conceptualization and more fine-grained understanding of how international factors contribute to the strengthening or weakening of authoritarian rule across the globe. Second, International Relations research has provided fundamental new insights into the effect of specific foreign policies. The literature on international sanctions has massively expanded in the last 10 to 15 years. The first major data-collecting endeavour on sanctions came from Hufbauer et al. (2007; first published in 1990). Following in their footsteps, the number of captured sanctions episodes has grown significantly. This has allowed researchers to better differentiate targets, measures and sanctions goals. Consequently, it has become possible to examine the effect of sanction threats (Morgan, Bapat and Kobayashi 2014); to disentangle different policy demands – most notably separate “democracy sanctions” aiming at

302  Research handbook on authoritarianism strengthening democracy and human rights from measures pursuing other demands (von Soest and Wahman 2015); and to assess UN targeted sanctions (Biersteker, Eckert and Tourinho 2016) and EU sanctions (Weber and Schneider 2022), regionally imposed measures as well as the ending of sanctions (Attia and Grauvogel 2022; Attia, Grauvogel and von Soest 2020). Furthermore, new approaches have served to cover the broad range of economic restrictions sanctioning powers utilize (Felbermayr et al. 2020). In principle, this sanctions data permits scholars to comparatively test factors that affect democracies and authoritarian regimes, as well as various types of the latter, in greater detail. However, only a fraction of newer works has closely investigated the sanctions–authoritarianism nexus (most notably, Escribà-Folch and Wright 2015; Lektzian and Souva 2007). Most studies, if at all, work with an autocracy dummy, to differentiate between democratic and non-democratic regimes, typically using Polity IV as their data source (Marshall and Jaggers 2010). In addition to the compilation of datasets and statistical analysis, scholars have qualitatively assessed the effect of external pressure in authoritarian settings (e.g. Jones 2015; Raynor 2022). However, efforts to explicitly link qualitative and quantitative approaches and combine their respective benefits have remained rare (e.g. Biersteker, Eckert and Tourinho 2016).

19.3

DIFFERENT FORMS OF PRESSURE

External pressure may be applied for various reasons: to fight armed conflicts; to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; to counter support for terrorism; to punish human rights violations; to address democratic deficiencies; to tackle drug trafficking; or to combat money laundering and corruption. Following Baldwin’s (1999) “logic of choice”, states, international organizations and regional organizations can react in different ways to undesirable behaviour by authoritarian regimes: they can stay silent or provide incentives – for instance, material ones – to bring about change (Blanchard and Ripsman 2013). Beyond that, they have a large foreign policy toolbox at their disposal to impose pressure on authoritarian regimes.3 Table 19.1 presents these measures. Seen as a being between “words and wars” (Wallensteen and Staibano 2005), sanctions have arguably been the most prominent foreign policy tool used to exert pressure on authoritarian regimes since the end of the Cold War. They can be understood as “penalties linked to real (or alleged) misconduct”, or, more elaborately, as “penalties threatened or imposed as a declared consequence of the target’s failure to observe international standards or obligations” (Doxey 1996, 9). It is important to note that economic and/or diplomatic restrictions are not only coerTable 19.1

Means of coercion

Form of pressure

Main mode

Military intervention

Military

Economic sanctions

Economic

Foreign aid withdrawals (and conditionality) Human rights prosecutions

Legal

Naming and shaming campaigns

Political/Discursive

Diplomatic efforts

Note: Measures are presented in descending order of severity.

Pressure proofing  303 Table 19.2

Nature of sanctions

Type

Economic costs

Comprehensive trade embargo

High (ascending, particular sectoral sanctions such

Sectoral sanctions:

as arms embargos might impose low economic

a) import and export restrictions

costs)

b) Investment restrictions c) Stopping arms supplies and military cooperation Financial controls and limiting of access to international financial markets Suspension of development aid Individual sanctions against persons and entities (“blacklists”), mainly by

Low

banning them from entering the country and freezing their assets Diplomatic sanctions (expulsion of diplomats or severance of diplomatic relations)

cive tools but are also applied to constrain a target’s actions and to send a strong signal about international norms (Giumelli 2011). Regularly, they are used in conjunction with other policy means, such as diplomatic negotiations or military interventions. The term “sanctions” encompasses a wide variety of measures, ones that are specifically packaged in each instance (Table 19.2). Triggered by the devastating humanitarian consequences of the UN embargo on Iraq in the 1990s, the last 20 years have seen a major transformation of the sanctions tool. In contrast to traditional trade embargoes that indiscriminately affect the whole economy and/or population, Western powers and the UN now almost exclusively impose targeted sanctions. These focus on particular economic sectors and social groups (sectoral sanctions) or on specific persons and entities (individual sanctions) to minimize the adverse humanitarian impacts (Biersteker, Tourinho and Eckert 2016; Drezner 2011). The most notable trend has been the “individualization” of sanctions since the early years of the new century. In line with this tendency to individualize accountability (Sikkink 2009), such sanctions seek to coerce responsible individuals and entities to change their behaviour, constrain their actions and send a strong signal about a particular international norm (Giumelli 2011). Yet, as the most recent sanctions packages against Iran, Syria and Russia demonstrate, sanctions have become more comprehensive again. 19.3.1 The Main Sanctioning Entities The imposition of pressure on authoritarian regimes has become widespread since the end of the Cold War. This is due to two main developments. First, the effective blockage on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as the highest and most legitimate international body, imposing such pressure ended in 1990. While the UNSC had only imposed two sanctions regimes up to 1990, namely, against Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa, it has since enacted over 23 such regimes against 18 countries (Biersteker, Tourinho and Eckert 2016, 23). All of these targets can clearly be rated “authoritarian”. Accordingly, scholars dubbed the 1990s the “sanctions decade” (Cortright and Lopez 2000). However, following this “unipolar moment”, the UNSC is now blocked again – the main international decision-making body can hardly agree on new multilateral sanctions. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is the most obvious example here – UN sanctions against this permanent member of the UNSC are completely unrealistic.

304  Research handbook on authoritarianism Second, the US and later the EU, as the most active sanction senders globally, massively stepped up their use of autonomous sanctions – that is, ones not mandated by the UNSC. As the world’s most powerful democracy, the US regularly acts unilaterally on issues of international democracy and human rights promotion (Ignatieff 2009; Moravcsik 2005). Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the US has entered into a “new era of financial warfare” (Zarate 2013) and uses the country’s dominant position in the global financial system to block the funding of state and non-state actors it perceives as a threat to its security interests. Since the passing of the 2012 Global Magnitsky Act, the US has a special law in place that requires the government to ban purported human rights offenders from entering the country and to freeze their assets (Tama 2018). In line with its self-understanding as a union of liberal values, the EU has repeatedly used “restrictive measures” to strengthen human rights and democracy abroad (Hazelzet 2001; for a critique, see Brummer 2009). Only recently has the EU implemented its own “horizontal” human rights sanctions regime, providing the legal basis for individual designations. With the adaption of this new regime in December 2020, alongside similar initiatives addressing cyberattacks and the proliferation of chemical weapons, EU member states have created the legal basis for sanctions addressing particular issues rather than behaviours linked to specific countries’ governments (Portela 2021; von Soest 2019). Australia, Canada, Japan and the United Kingdom have their own sanctions policies in place and regularly align with US and EU sanctions. Finally, it is important to note that not only Western countries apply autonomous, non-UN-mandated sanctions. Russia and increasingly China use this foreign policy tool themselves too (Harrell, Rosenberg and Saravalle 2018; Timofeev 2021).

19.4

THE SUCCESS OF SANCTIONS

For years, academics, practitioners and policymakers have discussed whether sanctions “work”, meaning whether they help sanctioning powers achieve their political goals. According to Hufbauer et al.’s groundbreaking study (2007), sanctions attain their objectives in one-third of all cases. Pape (1997), however, established a considerably lower success rate of just 5 per cent. He set a very high, potentially unrealistic, threshold for success; for him, only complete target acquiescence to the sender’s demands counts. Also, concurrent military intervention would render the effect of sanctions meaningless. As a second fundamental consequence, external restrictions might – in ways intended or not – contribute to the destabilization or even collapse of authoritarian regimes or rulers’ removal from office (Marinov 2005). In principle, the effect of sanctions depends on three groups of factors: the target’s institutional characteristics; pressure-inherent factors; and the policy objectives attached to a given sanctions package. In the following, I will address each of these in more detail. 19.4.1 Institutional Characteristics One of the most established findings in the scholarship is that sanctions are more successful in attaining concessions from democracies than authoritarian regimes (Allen 2008a; Brooks 2002; Lektzian and Souva 2007; Peksen 2009). Authoritarians are less reliant on the consent of their citizens. Going by these studies, authoritarian rulers and their coteries are generally better able to isolate themselves from outside pressure or even use it to their advantage. Democratic

Pressure proofing  305 governments, on the other hand, are less able to repress growing domestic dissent and tarnish their electoral chances through economic crises and international isolation caused by outside pressure. They can simply be voted out of power. Within the category of “authoritarian regimes”, there are notable differences when it comes to susceptibility to outside pressure. It is important to note that it is less the sheer size of the winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003) but more its composition that fundamentally influences authoritarian-elite behaviour in the face of external pressure. Generally, less institutionalized regimes are more susceptible to sanctions (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2015; Jeong and Peksen 2019). Personalist regimes are more prone to both making concessions and collapsing in the face of such measures. These regimes are highly centralized around the leader at the top while formal institutions such as an impartial bureaucracy or judiciary are weak (Frantz et al. 2020; Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014; Grundholm 2020). Regularly, personalist regimes lack the capacity to extract taxes on a large scale and are based on patron–client relations (von Soest 2009). In consequence, they tend to be reliant on foreign aid flows and/or natural-resource rents that can be cut off more easily by economic sanctions. It is important to take the sender’s perspective into account, too. The growing literature on “the determinants of public support for democracy-promotion instruments” (Escribà-Folch, Muradova and Rodon 2021, 2) implies that public opinion in sender countries like the US regularly drives target selection. For instance, US citizens supported in one study the use of coercive measures against personalistic, oil-rich countries with no ties to their own – characteristics that all make sanctions’ success extremely unlikely (Escribà-Folch, Muradova and Rodon 2021). These findings help to explain why governments impose sanctions in cases where coercive measures and other instruments hardly work. Sanctions reduce the funds available to co-opt members of the elite, the ruling coalition as well as the domestic population at large (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Morrison 2009). Furthermore, the resources available for the repressive apparatus and the military dwindle. Established and institutionalized party regimes such as China, military regimes as well as monarchies are therefore better able to withstand external pressure. 19.4.2 Pressure-inherent Factors The nature of pressure – for instance, how economically costly sanctions are and whether targets can redirect trade to alternative partners (“sanctions busting”) – determines whether sanctions successfully affect (authoritarian) targets (Early 2011, 2021). All else being equal, higher economic costs increase the chances that a target will capitulate. However, as shown above, this relationship is not linear, but contingent on factors such as the target’s regime type. Furthermore, studies show that multilateral sanctions, for instance, by the UN, tend to be more effective than restrictions imposed by one or a small number of countries (Bapat and Morgan 2009; Miers and Morgan 2002). Multilateral sanctions provide fewer loopholes and opportunities for sanctions busting (Early 2011) and enjoy higher legitimacy, particularly mandatory UN sanctions. In these cases, targeted regimes have a harder time denouncing sanctions as “imperialist”. These findings counter earlier concerns that to forge multilateral sanctions, sanction senders would settle on the lowest common denominator, meaning weak sanctions (Drezner 2000). Finally, sanctions issued by trade partners and politically aligned senders tend to be far more successful than measures imposed by other countries (McLean and Whang 2010).

306  Research handbook on authoritarianism 19.4.3 Policy Objectives The nature of the “disputed policy” (Dorussen and Mo 2001) or the “issue salience” (Ang and Peksen 2007) – as seen from the target’s perspective – fundamentally affects the prospects for sanctions success. The policy objectives tied to sanctions can be divided into attempts to destabilize the authoritarian regime in question and improve democratic and/or human rights, on the one hand, or to force changes in particular policies, on the other. Naturally, demanding democratization or even outright regime change goes to the core of authoritarian rule and directly puts the security of rulers’ and authoritarian elites’ tenure in office at risk (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2015; von Soest and Wahman 2015). Demanding free and fair elections or respect for political freedoms threatens the targeted regime’s grip on power. These sanctions goals send strong signals of disapproval and potentially directly undermine the targeted regime’s survival and national security. Unsurprisingly, the demand for democratization or regime change regularly meets stern resistance. In addition, salient goals such as Russia’s unlawful territorial conquest of Ukraine can hardly be achieved through sanctions alone. On the other hand, authoritarian targets are more likely to succumb to limited and clearly defined policy demands.

19.5

PRESSURE-PROOFING STRATEGIES: HOW AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES COUNTER SANCTIONS

Scholars have devoted their attention and energy mostly to answering the question of how successful sanctions are, meaning the extent to which they succeed in coercing the target and stopping a particular behaviour. Less discussed is the issue of how economic pressure actually translates into policy shifts. Using a micro-foundations approach (Kirshner 1997), we can differentiate three main ways in which sanctions affect the cost–benefit calculations of authoritarian rulers: they can change tack (“it’s not worth it”), the coterie around the ruler or other powerful members of society can force a rethinking of policy (or even regime change), or citizens may take to the streets. Naturally, these processes are not mutually exclusive and thus feed each other. Innovative research applying an interest-group model (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2000) has shown that measures harming powerful segments of society who initially support government policy tend to be the most successful. Similarly, affecting the interests of “innocent bystanders” (Major and McGann 2005) – that is, internationally linked businesspeople with political influence – is a particularly effective strategy. These groups might, in turn, lobby for policy changes to get sanctions lifted. The crucial insight emanating from this public-choice perspective is that the political pressure coming from influential groups is regularly more decisive than the will of the general population (on authoritarian regimes in general, see Svolik 2012). Research findings on sanctions’ effects on protest remain inconclusive. Sanctions communicate regime disapproval (Schwebach 2000) and may thereby trigger domestic political protest to bring about the desired behavioural changes. Visible sanction threats can work as a signal of support for would-be protestors and stimulate collective action against targeted governments (Grauvogel, Licht and von Soest 2017). Furthermore, anti-government protest is more likely to occur in times of economic hardship (Kricheli and Livne 2011; Ulfelder 2005). Thus, sanctions’ economic costs increase the probability of anti-regime activity. However, there is no consistent empirical support for this deprivation mechanism. The perceived prob-

Pressure proofing  307 ability of success is at least as influential a mechanism for triggering protest as deprivation is (Allen 2008b). Sanctions put authoritarian rulers at risk – be it through increased elite and/or popular pressure and deprivation and/or signalling mechanisms. Consequently, one of the most solid findings from extant quantitative research is that sanctions increase the probability of regime collapse and a change of ruler (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2015; Licht 2017; Marinov 2005; von Soest and Wahman 2015). Authoritarian leaders are well aware of these destabilizing risks. In an attempt to shield themselves, they draw on their power resources and even try to turn such external pressure to their advantage. At the international level, autocratic regimes try to evade sanctions and find alternative political and trade partners (Early 2011; Lektzian and Biglaiser 2013). In 2019, for instance, the Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif proudly declared that his country had “a Ph.D. in sanctions busting” (De Luce 2019). The extent of this “black knight” support depends on how isolated the target is regionally and internationally. Internally, authoritarian regimes use economic, discursive and repressive strategies to limit the domestic repercussions of outside pressure. As a result, sanctions – be they comprehensive or targeted – often fail to achieve their political objectives and can even have negative consequences – they may strengthen the targeted government’s role in distributing scarce resources, contribute to a “rally-round-the-flag effect” and/or induce increased state repression and corruption. Evidence from survey experiments in targeted societies, such as Venezuela, suggests that the framing of external pressure is decisive for public attitudes towards sanctions (Sejersen 2021). Citizens in target countries find external pressure more legitimate when they perceive sanctions to be directed at the incumbent elites and imposed to improve the local human rights situation. 19.5.1 Economy: Strengthening the Role of Government Comprehensive sanctions inhibit the flow of imports and exports as well as financial exchanges. They thereby contribute to the shortage of specific goods and investments or even to economic crisis, as in Iran or in Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s rule. However, unintentionally, these restrictions also increase the role of the targeted government in distributing scarcer resources and providing support in countering sanctions’ repercussions for citizens and the domestic economy (Escribà-Folch 2012). Thus, the population often becomes more dependent on government subsidies. They can be revoked. In Syria, for instance, the government cut subsidies for oil products, thereby fundamentally increasing the cost of living for citizens (Daher 2021). Regularly, targeted governments focus their resource distribution on politically well-connected businesspeople and those population groups that support the ruler in power. In principle, targeted sanctions are expected to minimize economic and social harm to the general population (Cortright and Lopez 2002). However, targeted sanctions are no silver bullet. Recent studies have criticized them for having adverse humanitarian impacts similar to comprehensive measures (e.g. Gordon 2019; Moret 2021). In addition, even though scholars and policymakers alike deem sanctions targeting top decision-makers to be most effective in changing the policies in question and sending strong signals about international norms (Wallensteen and Grusell 2012), only recently have powerholders become increasingly blacklisted. Currently, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Belarus’s Alexander Lukashenko, North Korea’s Kim Jong-Un, Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad have asset freezes and travel bans imposed on them, while other powerful decision-makers who have committed

308  Research handbook on authoritarianism similarly egregious human rights violations are not targeted by the US or the EU (von Soest 2019). 19.5.2 Discursive Strategies: Using Sanctions to Authoritarians’ Advantage Using censorship and propaganda, authoritarian governments have a tight grip on the public discourse and the struggle over the meaning of sanctions. Targeted authoritarian regimes regularly even try to use sanctions to their advantage, integrate them into their legitimation strategies and blame senders for their economic woes – thus diverting attention away from their own mismanagement. Governmental legitimacy and ideology fundamentally influence the vulnerability of rulers to external pressure. Regimes with strong anti-imperialist ideologies can even turn it to their advantage to create a rally-round-the-flag effect (Galtung 1967) and quell internal dissent. Such an effect occurs when the sanctioned government can portray that external pressure as an attack on the entire country and thus successfully appeals to the solidarity of its population (Grauvogel and von Soest 2014; Tannenberg et al. 2021). This is particularly relevant for regimes that have a strong ideological foundation, for instance, as a result of past revolutions or wars of liberation (Goldstone 2001; Levitsky and Way 2022). China, Cuba, Iran, Venezuela and Zimbabwe are prominent examples. On the other hand, regimes that have a thin ideological base and pursue a performance-based legitimation strategy are, all things being equal, more vulnerable to outside coercion (Grauvogel and von Soest 2014). On the whole, however, current experimental evidence suggests that a rallying effect is rarely caused by external pressure alone. After the 2014 annexation of Crimea, for example, Russian national euphoria and President Putin’s approval ratings skyrocketed because of the deed itself, rather than the subsequent confrontation with the West (Alexseev and Hale 2020; Frye 2019). 19.5.3 Repression: Tighter Grip There is solid empirical evidence that sanctions on the whole – albeit unintentionally – contribute to increased human rights violations and state repression in targeted regimes (Liou, Murdie and Peksen 2021; Wood 2008). This negative effect also holds when targeted sanctions are imposed. Sanctions also contribute to reduced human rights protection (Gutmann, Neuenkirch and Neumeier 2020). Further empirical research shows that political violence tends to increase most in regimes situated between liberal democracies and full autocracies in the face of international sanctions (Allen 2008b) (see Table 19.3 for a summary). The long-term effects might be more positive. First, as outlined, sanctions are particularly corrosive for personalist regimes. Peksen (2019, 638) states that “[w]eak state capacity and institutions also reduce their ability to use repression and other coercive tools to suppress Table 19.3

Summary: targeted authoritarian regimes’ internal means of pressure proofing

Strategies

Examples

Economic

Redistribution to political constituencies, elites, supportive regions and actors

Discursive

Recurrence to glorious past, outsiders’ imperialism and to nationalism; rally effects

Repressive

“Hard” and “soft repression”: increased censorship and propaganda, declaring a state of emergency, quelling protests, extrajudicial killings, greater use of police, military and intelligence apparatus

Pressure proofing  309 growing domestic dissent and opposition following the sanctions imposition”. Second, sanctions that aim at improving democratic and human rights on average seem to have a slightly positive effect and contribute to increased democracy levels in targeted states in the long run (von Soest and Wahman 2015).

19.6

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

Authoritarian regimes are the prime targets of external pressure designed to alter their policies or even contribute to their destabilization and regime change. Yet, compared to their democratic counterparts, authoritarians are harder to influence from the outside. Their institutional characteristics – a lower degree of political competition and participation, as well as a more modest rule of law – mean that authoritarian regimes can shield themselves from external pressure more effectively. (As outlined, in addition to these regime-specific characteristics, prior relations between senders and targets and the size of the economy determine the vulnerability to outside pressure.) Variation within the broad category of “authoritarian regimes” is substantial, however. Overall, such pressure is most harmful to less-institutionalized personalist dictatorships, while sanctions can hardly affect highly isolated and repressive targets like North Korea. 19.6.1 Pressure Proofing Potentially influencing state–society relations in targeted countries, external pressure directly affects the “politics of autocratic survival” (Escribà-Folch and Wright 2015). Authoritarian regimes tend to maintain power with a mixture of repression, co-optation and legitimation strategies (Gerschewski 2013; von Soest and Wahman 2015; Wintrobe 1998). They regularly draw on these strategies to shield themselves against externally imposed sanctions: they redistribute scarce goods to supporters, portray even targeted measures as an imperialist attack on the whole country and step up repression to intimidate would-be protesters. In addition to these domestic resources, authoritarian regimes are active in the international arena: they try to circumvent sanctions (Early 2011), forge ties between themselves to impede democratic forces (von Soest 2015), attempt to influence public opinion in Western countries (Dukalskis 2021) and impose retaliatory sanctions (Fuchs and Klann 2013; Timofeev 2021). In sum, the effects of such pressure depend on sanctions-specific factors (most notably the political demands made and economic costs imposed) and on the domestic resources that the targeted regime can draw on (economic, discursive and repressive). 19.6.2 Outlook: Avenues for Further Research Concurrent with the increasing use of international sanctions – former US President Donald Trump’s “maximum pressure campaign” comes to mind – to influence authoritarian regimes, analysis of and knowledge about this key foreign policy tool has fundamentally expanded in the last 15 to 20 years. Conversely, Comparative Politics research increasingly acknowledges how external factors and outright pressure affect authoritarian rule (Levitsky and Way 2010). As authoritarian regimes will remain the main targets of Western powers’ pressure in the years

310  Research handbook on authoritarianism to come, further scholarly progress in examining its consequences for incumbents, as well as their pressure-proofing strategies to counter it, is of utmost importance. First, despite the considerable advancements made, scholars still largely investigate sanctions in isolation – that is, without linking them to other means of exerting pressure. Yet, sanctions are always used in conjunction with other foreign policy tools – for instance, diplomacy, foreign aid, mediation efforts and material incentives. In the spirit of Escribà-Folch and Wright (2015), and of Biersteker, Brubaker and Lanz (2022), future studies should systematically theorize and empirically explore the effect of sanctions on authoritarian regimes vis-à-vis other coercive measures. In doing so, qualitative and quantitative perspectives could be more systematically connected, as could Comparative Authoritarianism and International Relations research on sanctions. Second, existing research often fails to capture the highly dynamic and non-linear listing patterns that dominate current sanctions practice. Even targeted measures are normally conceived of as single events with a sole start and end date (Peksen 2019). Individual sanctions are almost exclusively aggregated at the annual and country levels as if they were comprehensive sanctions. A promising analytical strategy to overcome this simplification has been Eriksson’s (2011, 47–51; see also, Biersteker, Tourinho and Eckert 2016, 17) disaggregation of country-level sanctions regimes into separate episodes that could form a fruitful starting point for further investigation. Third and finally, newer developments – such as so-called horizontal sanction regimes in the EU and other jurisdictions – that directly target specific persons and entities have led to a sharp increase in individual listings. These require new data-collection efforts. Doing so will help us analyse their repercussions for targeted individuals and entities in authoritarian settings in a more fine-grained manner. Autocratization processes across the globe, the increasing antagonism between democratic and authoritarian regimes, and the “weaponization of interdependence” (Farrell and Newman 2019) all mean that external pressure and related pressure-proofing strategies will become even more important issues going forward. Continued scholarly efforts will therefore be instrumental to gaining further key knowledge about how authoritarian rule can be influenced from the outside (or not).

NOTES 1. I thank Abel Escribà-Folch and Natasha Lindstaedt for their extremely helpful comments and suggestions. 2. In this chapter, I use the terms “authoritarian”, “autocratic” and “non-democratic” interchangeably. 3. In their excellent review, Krasner and Weinstein (2014) consider several external policies and group them into three categories: contracting, coercion and imposition.

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312  Research handbook on authoritarianism Doxey, Margaret P. 1996. International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective. 2nd revised edn. Houndmills: Macmillan. Drezner, Daniel W. 2000. “Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?” International Organization 54 (1): 73–102. Drezner, Daniel W. 2011. “Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice.” International Studies Review 13 (1): 96–108. Dukalskis, Alexander. 2021. Making the World Safe for Dictatorship. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Early, Bryan R. 2011. “Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic Sanctions.” Foreign Policy Analysis 7 (4): 381–402. Early, Bryan R. 2021. “Making Sanctions Work: Promoting Compliance, Punishing Violations, and Discouraging Sanctions Busting.” Research Handbook on Economic Sanctions. https://​www​ .elgaronline​.com/​view/​edcoll/​9781839102714/​9781839102714​.00015​.xml, last accessed: 29 March 2022. Eriksson, Mikael. 2011. Targeting Peace: Understanding UN and EU Targeted Sanctions. Farnham: Ashgate. Escribà-Folch, Abel. 2012. “Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions.” Comparative Political Studies 45 (6): 683–713. Escribà-Folch, Abel, and Joseph Wright. 2015. Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocratic Survival. New York: Oxford University Press. Escribà-Folch, Abel, Lala H, Muradova, and Toni Rodon. 2021. “The Effects of Autocratic Characteristics on Public Opinion toward Democracy Promotion Policies: A Conjoint Analysis.” Foreign Policy Analysis 17 (1). https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​fpa/​oraa016. Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. 2019. “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.” International Security 44 (1): 42–79. Felbermayr, Gabriel, Aleksandra Kirilakha, Constantinos Syropoulos, Erdal Yalcin, and Yoto V. Yotov. 2020. “The Global Sanctions Data Base.” European Economic Review 129 (October): 103561. Frantz, Erica, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Joseph Wright, and Xu Xu. 2020. “Personalization of Power and Repression in Dictatorships.” The Journal of Politics 82 (1): 372–7. Frye, Timothy. 2019. “Economic Sanctions and Public Opinion: Survey Experiments from Russia.” Comparative Political Studies 52 (7): 967–94. Fuchs, Andreas, and Nils-Hendrik Klann. 2013. “Paying a Visit: The Dalai Lama Effect on International Trade.” Journal of International Economics 91 (1): 164–77. Galtung, Johan. 1967. “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia.” World Politics 19 (3): 378–416. Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2006. “Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships.” Economics and Politics 18 (1): 1–26. Gat, Azar. 2007. “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers.” Foreign Affairs, July/August. Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set.” Perspectives on Politics 12 (2): 313–31. Gerschewski, Johannes. 2013. “The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes.” Democratization 20 (1): 13–38. Giumelli, Francesco. 2011. Coercing, Constraining and Signaling: Explaining and Understanding International Sanctions after the End of the Cold War. Colchester: European Consortium for Political Research. Goldstone, Jack. 2001. “Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory.” Annual Review of Political Science 4: 139–87. Gordon, Joy. 2019. “The Hidden Power of the New Economic Sanctions.” Current History 118 (804): 3–10. Grauvogel, Julia, and Christian von Soest. 2014. “Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes.” European Journal of Political Research 53 (4): 635–53. Grauvogel, Julia, Amanda A. Licht, and Christian von Soest. 2017. “Sanctions and Signals: How International Sanction Threats Trigger Domestic Protest in Targeted Regimes.” International Studies Quarterly 61 (1): 86–97.

Pressure proofing  313 Grundholm, Alexander Taaning. 2020. “Taking It Personal? Investigating Regime Personalization as an Autocratic Survival Strategy.” Democratization 27 (5): 797–815. Gutmann, Jerg, Matthias Neuenkirch, and Florian Neumeier. 2020. “Precision-Guided or Blunt? The Effects of US Economic Sanctions on Human Rights.” Public Choice 185 (1–2). Hagmann, Tobias, and Filip Reyntjens. 2016. Aid and Authoritarianism in Africa: Development without Democracy. London: Zed Books. Harrell, Peter, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and Edoardo Saravalle. 2018. “China’s Use of Coercive Economic Measures.” Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security (CNAS). https://​www​.cnas​.org/​ publications/​reports/​chinas​-use​-of​-coercive​-economic​-measures, last accessed: 20 May 2023. Hazelzet, Hadewych. 2001. “Carrots or Sticks: EU and US Reactions to Human Rights Violations (1989–2000).” Doctoral dissertation, Florence: European University Institute (EUI). http://​cadmus​.eui​ .eu/​handle/​1814/​7157, last accessed: 1 March 2019. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Jeffrey J. Schott, Kimberley Ann Elliott, and Barbara Oegg. 2007. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute of International Economics. Ignatieff, Michael, ed. 2009. American Exceptionalism and Human Rights. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jeong, Jin Mun, and Dursun Peksen. 2019. “Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63 (1): 194–217. Jones, Lee. 2015. Societies under Siege: Exploring How International Economic Sanctions (Do Not) Work. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kaempfer, William H., and Anton D. Lowenberg. 2000. “A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions.” In Sanctions as Economic Statecraft Theory and Practice, edited by Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury, 158–86. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Kirshner, Jonathan. 1997. “The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions.” Security Studies 6 (3): 32–60. Krasner, Stephen D., and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2014. “Improving Governance from the Outside in.” Annual Review of Political Science 17 (1): 123–45. Kricheli, Ruth, and Yair Livne. 2011. “Mass Revolutions vs. Elite Coups.” In APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper. Toronto. http://​papers​.ssrn​.com/​sol3/​papers​.cfm​?abstract​_id​=​1449852, last accessed: 14 November 2012. Lektzian, David, and Glen Biglaiser. 2013. “Investment, Opportunity, and Risk: Do US Sanctions Deter or Encourage Global Investment?” International Studies Quarterly 57 (1): 65–78. Lektzian, David, and Mark Souva. 2007. “An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (6): 848–71. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2022. Revolution and Dictatorship: The Violent Origins of Durable Authoritarianism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Licht, Amanda A. 2017. “Hazards or Hassles: The Effect of Sanctions on Leader Survival.” Political Science Research and Methods 5 (1): 143–61. Liou, Ryan Yu-Lin, Amanda Murdie, and Dursun Peksen. 2021. “Revisiting the Causal Links between Economic Sanctions and Human Rights Violations.” Political Research Quarterly 74 (4): 808–21. Major, Solomon, and Anthony J. McGann. 2005. “Caught in the Crossfire ‘Innocent Bystanders’ as Optimal Targets of Economic Sanctions.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (3): 337–59. Marinov, Nicolay. 2005. “Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?” American Journal of Political Science 49 (3): 564–76. Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 2010. “Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2009.” Fairfax, VA: Center for Global Policy School of Public Policy at George Mason University and Center for Systemic Peace. http://​www​.systemicpeace​.org/​polity/​polity4​.htm, last accessed: 29 November 2021. McLean, Elena V., and Taehee Whang. 2010. “Friends or Foes? Major Trading Partners and the Success of Economic Sanctions.” International Studies Quarterly 54 (2): 427–47. Miers, Anne, and T. Morgan. 2002. “Multilateral Sanctions and Foreign Policy Success: Can Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth?” International Interactions 28 (2): 117–36.

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Pressure proofing  315 von Soest, Christian. 2019. “Individual Sanctions: Toward a New Research Agenda.” CESifo Forum 20 (4): 28–31. von Soest, Christian, and Michael Wahman. 2015. “Are Democratic Sanctions Really Counterproductive?” Democratization 22 (6): 957–80. Wallensteen, Peter, and Helena Grusell. 2012. “Targeting the Right Targets? The UN Use of Individual Sanctions.” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 18 (2): 207–30. Wallensteen, Peter, and Carina Staibano. 2005. International Sanctions: Between Words and Wars in the Global System. Abingdon: Routledge. Weber, Patrick M., and Gerald Schneider. 2022. “Post-Cold War Sanctioning by the EU, the UN, and the US: Introducing the EUSANCT Dataset.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 39 (1): 97–114. Weyland, Kurt. 2017. “Autocratic Diffusion and Cooperation: The Impact of Interests vs. Ideology.” Democratization 24 (7): 1235–52. Whitehead, Laurence. 1996. “Three International Dimensions of Democratization.” In The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas, 3–25. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wintrobe, Ronald. 1998. The Political Economy of Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press. Wood, Reed M. 2008. “‘A Hand upon the Throat of the Nation’: Economic Sanctions and State Repression, 1976–2001.” International Studies Quarterly 52: 489–513. Zarate, Juan C. 2013. Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare. New York: PublicAffairs.

PART VI CASE STUDIES

20. China: change and continuity Julia Bader

20.1 INTRODUCTION The Chinese regime is commonly classified as a communist, party-based, or single-party regime in comparative quantitative regime classifications (e.g. Kailitz, 2013; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 2014; Anckar and Fredriksson, 2019) with remarkably stable scores since the early 1980s. Such stability however, masks important dynamics below the surface over time. In a nutshell, under Mao Zedong (1949–76, usually referred to as the first leadership generation) the regime was ideologically driven, highly personalized, and totalitarian in its mass campaigns. Mao Zedong’s successor Deng Xiaoping (1978–1992, the second leadership generation),1 introduced not only economic reforms, but also pursued ‘political structural reforms,’ a strategy of regime institutionalization and de-personalization, and redefined the relationship between the state, the party, and the society. These adjustments remained in place and were pushed further under Jiang Zemin (1989–2002, the third generation) and Hu Jintao (2002–12, the fourth generation) (Nathan, 2003; Fewsmith and Nathan, 2019). With overly growth-oriented economic policies antagonistic to the party’s official communist ideology, the party continuously also undertook attempts to redefine its ideational claim to legitimacy by nurturing and instrumentalizing nationalism. However, since Xi Jinping (fifth generation, since 2012) assumed the position of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the regime has seen a shift towards neo-Stalinism (Pei, 2021): Xi has challenged some of the institutionalization measures of party organization, started a drastic anti-corruption campaign, intensified ideological indoctrination, re-centralized power in the party and his own person, and promoted a cult around his own person. Since then, the political climate has become increasingly repressive and new digital mass surveillance technologies offer unmatched repressive capacities. This chapter aims to give an overview of the past 70 years of communist rule in China, which is an interesting case to study with regard to many of the concepts of interest to scholars of authoritarianism such as legitimacy, repression, and cooptation, but also institutionalization and personalization.

20.2

CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE CCP

The overall political system of the People’s Republic of China was modeled on a Leninist one-party system with a dual structure of the party and state. In this system, party structures exist in parallel to a separate state structure and this double structure of party and state organs is replicated at different administrative levels, from the central level down to rural townships or urban districts. 317

318  Research handbook on authoritarianism The party penetrates and controls state and societal institutions directly through overlapping positions or indirectly through the selection of leading personnel (nomenklatura). In practice, the CCP takes all important decisions on the overall direction of politics, society, and the economy and delegates their implementation to state ministries. The state judiciary is a separate body which is, however, not independent. And there exists a separate system to investigate party members and government employees, the Commission for Discipline Inspection, which, in turn, instructs state courts how to handle these cases (Liao and Tsai, 2020). Importantly, the People’s Liberation Army is a party-army that reports to the CCP rather than to a state office (Brown, 2015: 85) and the Central Military Commission is usually chaired by the paramount leader. The CCP often argues that China has a system of multiparty cooperation or even that it is a democracy, citing, for example, the existence of village elections and other minority parties.2 Indeed, after 1980, direct village elections were introduced throughout the country, and next to the CCP, China has eight officially recognized so-called democratic political parties with a combined membership of around 700,000 (Wang, 2018). However, elections have not been expanded beyond villages to higher, more meaningful levels, nor been systematically accessible for critical or non-party candidates. As Brown argues, ‘in the contemporary PRC, no official with any meaningful control over resources or finance is directly elected’ (Brown, 2015: 89). As for the eight minority parties, these are represented in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), a consultative body filled with hand-picked individuals which is designed to coopt societal elites outside of the Communist Party. The CPPCC can submit proposals, but cannot enact them, and so the CPPCC’s actual role and those of the minority parties are very limited too. Hence, despite claims otherwise, the CCP remains the one and only relevant political actor in China. Discussing China’s authoritarian regime therefore necessitates a focus on the CCP. In the summer of 2021, the CCP celebrated its 100th anniversary. Having come to power in 1949 after years of civil war, the CCP is one of the longest-ruling communist parties in power to date. In 2021, the CPP had around 100 million members (Blanchette and Medeiros, 2021: 29), corresponding to roughly 6.5 percent of the Chinese population. The CCP itself remains very much organized according to the principles of a Leninist party with highly centralized and highly hierarchical structures. One of the CCP’s core principles is democratic centralism. Democratic centralism stipulates the subordination of the individual to the party organization, the minority to the majority, lower levels to higher levels, and all members to the Central Committee (Thornton, 2021: 54). The party organization resembles a pyramid, with the National Party Congress at the bottom (roughly 2,200 members) with its Central Committee (350 members), which is presided by the 24-member Politburo and its seven-member Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), and at the helm the General Secretary. Theoretically, the members of higher-level party congresses and committees are elected by lower-level congresses and committees. In practice, however, lower-level party cadres are appointed by higher-level party committees and higher levels oversee and instruct lower levels. Initially, democratic centralism also implied participation through open internal discussion which was decided by majority vote. Once a discussion was reached, all members were expected to support the outcome. However, interpretation and practice of this principle have been quite malleable over time and centralism was soon prioritized over democracy (Thornton, 2021).

China  319

20.3

MODERNIZATION AND SURVIVAL UNDER DENG XIAOPING AND SUCCESSORS

When Mao Zedong died in 1976 he left an impoverished population and a wrecked party organization which enjoyed little legitimacy in the population. Party elders saw that re-establishing inner-party norms and reinstating party discipline after the upheavals of the Cultural Revolution was central to achieve political stability and economic development (Fewsmith, 2013: 2). Under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, China embarked not only on economic reforms – the reform and opening up for which Deng Xiaoping has become famous – but also the modernization of the party organization which aimed at ensuring ‘the continuing vitality of the Party and the state’ (Deng Xiaoping as cited in Blanchette and Medeiros, 2021: 24). 20.3.1 Institutional Reforms and Organizational Capacity From 1982 to 2012, the Chinese system experienced a normalization of party-society relations, an institutionalization of party politics, and a routinization of political life (Fewsmith, 2013). For example, from 1982 onwards party congresses were held in regular five-year intervals; age-based retirement rules introduced in 1982 led to the gradual replacement of party veterans with younger and better educated cadres, often engineers; collective leadership and decision-making rather than one-man rule became the norm. The 1989 Tiananmen crisis put a tempory halt to these modernization attempts, however, after a brief period, the path was continued and Deng Xiaoping’s successors took up earlier ambitions to limit the party’s reach into state and society. Administrative reforms in the 1990s aimed at separating the state from the party bureaucracies (Brødsgaard, 2018). Against the background of rapid societal changes, such as the increase of income inequality, the weakening or abolishment of Mao-era mechanisms of social and migration control or the provision of welfare through work units, institution building so as to improve the party’s governing capacity and legitimacy, and hence its resilience, continued to be a key element to ensure the party’s survival by Deng’s successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao (Shambaugh, 2008; Brødsgaard, 2018). Many of the policies introduced or experimented with until the mid-2000s should be understood in this light. For example, the introduction of village self-governance and local-level elections for village leaders or village party secretaries aimed at improving the deteriorated relationship between party cadres and farmers that threatened the party’s ruling ability (Li and O’Brien, 1999). Bureaucratic reforms introduced elements of accountability and competition into the bureaucracy and changed the incentive system of civil servants (Ang, 2018). To fill the void of a retreating state in welfare provision, private, non-governmental actors, and a developing civil society were welcomed in the health, education, and other sectors (Economy, 2018: 7). Several channels of consultation and citizen appeal were introduced, for example, public hearings and surveys, and consultations with the CPPCC or the People’s Congresses, appeals through administrative lawsuits, through offices for complaints in party and state bureaucracy, the possibility to file (online) appeals and the opportunity to submit freedom of information requests (Nathan, 2003; He and Thøgersen, 2010; Fu and Distelhorst, 2018). These mechanisms were introduced to increase the responsiveness of the party and state bureaucracy to citizens’ requests and also to serve as important channels of information gathering. In 2002, Jiang Zemin pragmatically opened up the party to private entrepreneurs in order to broaden the CCP’s constituency, coopt these newly important

320  Research handbook on authoritarianism because affluent segments of society, and realign the party with the reality that many cadres had become private entrepreneurs. The CCP’s need and desire to increase its capacity and legitimacy also explains China’s participation in Western-funded good governance and democracy promotion programs during the 1990s. In retrospect, it appears that such participation was systematically limited to areas in which the regime saw use in adopting governance techniques that would improve its capacity without losing control (Cho, 2021). At the 14th Party Congress in 1992, Jiang Zemin argued that ‘socialist democracy’ was needed ‘to ensure that “institutions and laws will not change with changes in the leadership or changes in the views or attention of any leader”’ (Jiang Zemin as cited in Fewsmith, 2013: 69). For CCP leaders, reference to democracy meant a form of intra-party democracy in which elements commonly associated with democracy such as transparency, rule of law, accountability, participation, consultation or elections are practiced to a limited degree and only under one-party rule and are designed to strengthen the regime rather than to empower citizens (Shambaugh, 2008; He and Thøgersen, 2010). The 2005 White Paper clarified that Socialist Democracy with Chinese Characteristics would entail a one-party system that is effective and legitimate (Heberer and Schubert, 2006). As late as 2009, the improvement of intra-party democracy was considered ‘a matter of life and death for the CCP’ (Li, 2009: 11) when the Fourth Plenary Session of the 17th Central Committee called for reforms that would lead to more competitive inner-party elections to choose CCP officials; a more consensus based decision-making processes (by vote) which also included consultation with academic institutions and other political parties, as well as social and public hearings; more restrictive rules to regulate the tenure, transfer, and regional allocation of high-ranking leaders; a multi-dimensional supervision system to restrain corruption and other forms of power abuses; and a new emphasis on the transparency of party affairs (Li, 2009: 7). Against this background, China scholars described the regime of the 2000s as ‘resilient’ (Nathan, 2003) and ‘consultative’ (He and Thøgersen, 2010; Teets, 2013), or ‘deliberative’ (He and Warren, 2011), but also as ‘fragmented’ authoritarianism (Mertha, 2009).3 20.3.2 Cumulative Ideology and Shifting Legitimacy Claims A discussion of the CCP’s attempts to modernize in the post-Mao era would be incomplete without a discussion of the party’s pragmatic and flexible approach to ideology and legitimacy claims. The CCP had come to power in civil war in 1949 as a revolutionary party with a communist agenda. But after Mao’s many antagonizing campaigns, the disasters of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, the CCP faced a serious lack of legitimacy. Since then, reclaiming legitimacy has been at the center of Chinese politics (Holbig and Gilley, 2010: 398). China’s ‘opening up’ under Deng Xiaoping aimed at regaining legitimacy through performance-oriented development and welfare gains. The political reform described above was successful in bringing about some accountability for state organs and the cadre bureaucracy through the rule of law and increased local-level participation. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, the regime had managed to regain legitimacy (Holbig and Gilley, 2010) with the aid of this new ‘social contract’ according to which citizens accept the rule of the CCP in exchange for economic wellbeing.

China  321 In addition to economic growth, the CCP banked on nationalism as a source of legitimacy. Nationalist sentiments were consciously boosted through school education in response to the legitimacy crisis provoked by the Tiananmen Square crackdown. During the nationwide Patriotic Education Campaign of the 1990s, the old class-struggle narrative in Chinese textbooks that had justified the CCP’s cause was replaced with a narrative about how the CCP’s revolutionary struggle liberated the country from foreign humiliation (Wang, 2008). This narrative both victimized China and glorified the party at the same time, all with the aim to justify the party’s rule (Wang, 2008). Importantly, however, the CCP has never abandoned its communist ideology – despite China’s rapid economic development that is difficult to square with communist values. Instead, ideology itself is seen as being ‘in constant renovation’ or reconstruction (Holbig and Gilley, 2010). In the modernization of ideology, party ideology is cumulative and new elements are added to the canon. Early on, Mao Zedong adapted Marxism-Leninism to the specific conditions of China, for example, when he declared the peasantry rather than workers as the party’s base given the very small industrial base in China and the party’s reliance on peasants during the civil war. His successors, in their attempt to react to changing realities, made their own theoretical contributions to party ideology so as to justify policy changes. Deng Xiaoping’s Socialism with Chinese Characteristics replaced class struggle as a key objective with economic development (Brown, 2012). Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents redefined the party’s social base to include private entrepreneurs which had become the biggest growth sector and could no longer be ignored by the mid-2000s – even though this was de-emphasized in later reinterpretations (Holbig and Gilley, 2010). Hu Jintao’s concepts of Scientific Development and Harmonious Society, in turn, promoted a more sustainable development and acknowledged the need to address the social tensions produced by the existing one-dimensional economic growth strategy. 20.3.3 Changing Means of Repression and Control In Maoist China, in which individuals were assigned to a given work unit and where residence registration prevented people from moving around in the country, neighborhood committees exerted significant social control over individuals. Also, personal dossiers (dang’an) with information on family background, job history, achievements, shortcomings, political activities, and superior evaluations were kept of all (urban) individuals. Having a flawless dossier was crucial for any party member’s career (Jiang, 2020). In the reform period, these dossiers became less effective as a tool of control, because of corruption and economic incentives trumping political ones (Dreyer, 2008: 181). What can be observed is, hence, a shift in how the regime has sought to exert control over society. The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests played a key role in this shift. Though Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms were hugely successful, in 1989, over 10,000 students protested on Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and elsewhere in the country against corruption, rising inflation, and the lack of political freedom. In the context of faltering communist regimes across the Soviet Union, the 1989 Tiananmen protests themselves were perceived by many party elders, including Deng Xiaoping, as an existential threat to the CCP’s rule. After internal fights about how to react, the crisis was solved with brute force by calling in the People’s Liberation Army to clear the square.

322  Research handbook on authoritarianism The 1989 Tiananmen Square protests had a profound securitizing impact on Chinese politics. On the one hand, the regime started to invest heavily in internal security and the People’s Armed Police, a domestic riot police – as opposed to the military (Wang and Minzner, 2015). The resources spent on internal security in the two decades after the Tiananmen crackdown appear massive and exceeded the PRC’s spending on external security. However, when looked at in relative terms, and given the simultaneous rise in both crime and politically motivated protests which all needed to be dealt with, the budgets are less impressive (Greitens, 2017). On the other hand, the maintenance of social stability was elevated into the party cadre evaluation system, that is, the career advancement of authorities became directly connected to preventing public unrest. Nevertheless, public protests and discontent increased massively in the 1990s and 2000s. Protests in China are usually small and weakly formalized, and collective action often results spontaneously as a result of denied, ignored or repressed attempts of citizens to make use of their right to appeal or file petitions (Johnston and Zhang, 2020). A tradition of imperial China, petitioning was continued under Mao Zedong as a tool to gather information about the efficiency of policies and as a tool to monitor lower-level cadres. After the Tiananmen massacre, petitions and in particular collective petitions (submitted by more than five people) or petitions filed at higher levels came to be seen as indicators of social instability that was to be prevented by local officials. This certainly increased the responsiveness of the regime to public grievances. One study found that 43 percent of citizens’ appeals to the so-called Mayor’s Mailbox, an institution to reach out to local officials, received helpful responses (Distelhorst and Hou, 2017). Experimental research shows that China’s authorities in the Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao era were particularly sensitive, and hence responsive, to the threat of collective action by citizens. That is, those posts on social media and online platforms and those complaints and citizen requests that may mobilize collective action received particular attention from local authorities, or got censored (King, Pan and Roberts, 2013, 2014; Chen, Pan and Xu, 2016). Threatening with collective petitions became a strategy to exert concessions from local officials (Wang and Minzner, 2015); which was, however, also sometimes met by intimidation and informal and extralegal repression through hired thugs or the pressuring of a petitioner’s relatives (Fu and Distelhorst, 2018). By aligning their claims with central-level official discourse, citizen and civil society activists were able to align the interests of local level or other authorities in the fragmented bureaucratic system with their own aims, and so find allies in the system (Mertha, 2009; also see Qiaoan and Teets, 2020). Even when protestors got to the streets, there was great variance in how authorities reacted. While protests in the countryside, protests by ethnic minorities, and larger protests were more likely to be met with violence or arrests (Göbel, 2021; Li and Elfstrom, 2021), the ‘government had been relatively tolerant towards demonstrations’ as long as they did not spiral out of control (Qiaoan and Teets, 2020). Analysis based on social media data suggests that repression largely depends on how costly it is for local state authorities to concede to protestors’ demands. That is, protests against investment scams, housing issues or labor protests which are essentially directed against private firms face a rather low likelihood of repression. However, protests against medical mistreatment in public hospitals or against land evictions which demand compensation from local authorities are much more likely to be repressed (Göbel, 2021). In the second half of Hu Jintao’s leadership the number of indictments for ‘endangering state security’ dramatically increased from an average of 600 each year between 1998 and

China  323 2007 to 1,049 between 2008 and 2012, a trend that would continue after leadership transition (Li and Elfstrom, 2021).

20.4

PERSONALIZATION, CENTRALIZATION, AND NEO-TOTALITARIANSIM UNDER XI

After the removal of Mao Zedong from power, under the rule of Deng Xiaoping and his successors the party organization has seen a push towards institutionalization and collective leadership while reforms aimed at a separation of state and party structures. However, these measures could not prevent the erosion of the party’s ‘organizational hold and internal discipline’ (Brødsgaard, 2018: 15) and paralysis during the second half of the 2000s. China’s economic reforms produced not only economic growth and wealth, but also mounting societal problems such as economic inequality, environmental degradation, and crony capitalism with endemic corruption. On top of these domestic problems, the international context and its examples of mass upheavals of the Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring, as well as the 2008 Global Financial Crisis increased the threat perception among China’s party elites. Under the existing system, the leadership was unable to address these mounting challenges, because the collective leadership which had been introduced as an insurance against the erratic one-man rule of the Mao era tended to be slow and inefficient in its decision-making. The consensus-based decision-making process favored low-risk outcomes and was often unable, or unwilling, to produce policy responses on controversial topics altogether. The shared concern about the CCP’s (dis)abilities to effectively address these issues among party elites formed Xi Jinping’s mandate to remake the party (Blanchette and Medeiros, 2021: 26). This background and the consent, if not active support of senior party officials enabled Xi Jinping to reverse many of the earlier reforms and to quickly centralize power in his person since 2012 (Baranovitch, 2021). 20.4.1 Xi’s Rise to and Consolidation in Power Xi Jinping’s rise to power followed an orderly and predictable succession process. During the past 20 years, a number of formal and informal succession rules had been evolved that reduce, but cannot entirely limit the risk of conflict over succession. For example, retirement age rules and term limits determine when positions get vacant. In combination with age limitations when promoted to office, and expectations about the offices that a candidate should have held before being promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee, such rules also critically limit the pool of potential candidates for top leadership positions (Smith, 2021). Xi Jinping met those criteria together with Li Keqiang in the mid-2000s. Eventually, Xi was selected by the consensus of senior leaders (Fewsmith and Nathan, 2019: 177; Blanchette and Medeiros, 2021), and involving a straw poll among top party officials (Wang and Vangeli, 2016). Xi emerged as a compromise candidate between the rivaling factions affiliated with his predecessors, Hu Jintao (the Youth League faction) and Jiang Zemin (the Shanghai Gang), respectively (Wang and Vangeli, 2016; Pei, 2020). Though formally too old, Bo Xilai, the party chief of Chongqing and a Politburo member, attempted to challenge this decision, and was eventually removed from power under corruption charges (and only after his police chief Wang Lijun had fled to the US embassy and

324  Research handbook on authoritarianism revealed damaging information about Bo, including the involvement of Bo Xilai’s wife in a murder case). The very fact that Bo tried to promote himself for the position certainly illustrates that the succession process remains a vulnerability and the stage for power struggles. Indeed, in the past, attempts to institutionalize party politics at the elite level have regulated, but never entirely eliminated elite infighting. The transition of formal leadership positions in the past has often not come with full transition of actual power, and several times, rules such as age retirement rules have been flexibly adapted to get rid of particular opponents (Fewsmith and Nathan, 2019). Regarding his own succession, Xi Jinping himself has also defied expectations by not designating a successor at the 2017 19th Party Congress for succession in 2022. In addition, he made the National People’s Congress abolish the formal constitutional two-term limit for the presidential office in 2018, which allowed him to remain in power beyond 2022. Once promoted to the position of General Secretary, Xi Jinping quickly and decisively consolidated his position. A few cornerstones of this process of personalization, on the one hand, and recentralization, on the other, can be observed. Firstly, early on, Xi purged his political opponents. His rigorous anti-corruption campaign targeted his rivals, imposed discipline on other party cadres, and gained him the support of ordinary citizens. From 2016 onwards, through reform and integration of existing bodies, Xi established a new ‘great system of supervision and investigation’ (Liao and Tsai, 2020: 30). As is increasingly becoming clear from these organizations’ self-description, this system has been designed not only to fight corruption, but has also been mandated to ‘safeguard’ Xi’s ‘status as the core of the CCP Central Committee and the whole Party’ (Gao, 2019). The targeted anti-corruption campaign has clearly helped to establish Xi Jinping’s uncontested position (Béja, 2019). Secondly, like Deng Xiaoping, Xi attempts to improve the CCP’s governance capacity through institutional reform. However, while Deng’s reforms were designed to loosen control and decentralize power, under Xi power got recentralized in the party, when many state and party institutions were merged in 2018 (Béja, 2019; Shambaugh, 2021). However, Xi not only shifted power from state institutions back to the party, he also centralized power in his own hands. The establishment of new committees, many of which got institutionalized during the 19th Party Congress, allowed Xi Jinping to bypass existing hierarchies and centralize decision-making in his own hands as the committee chair (Béja, 2019: 220). Thirdly, Xi has reinvigorated the penetration of all aspects of society through regulations that demand all government organization, administrative organs at all levels, economic, cultural, and mass organizations to incorporate a party group (Brødsgaard, 2018: 8). Fourthly, towards the public, Xi started to promote a personality cult in state media and public life through the publication of photos, praising songs and other gadgets with his portrait (Béja, 2019: 218). Social credit points can be gained for consuming Xi’s ideas on a Xi Jinping app (Shambaugh, 2021: 285). This is an obvious deviation from the consensus among Chinese leaders post-Mao that collective leadership is preferable over leadership exercised through personality cult. In ideological terms, fifthly, Xi has managed to get his Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era (see below) added to the party canon early on. And finally, the abolishment of term limits to the presidential office paved the way for Xi to remain in office indefinitely after his second term. Xi’s quick consolidation in power has triggered a debate among China experts about whether processes, practices, or norms around leadership succession and collective decision-making at

China  325 the top have been correctly interpreted as processes of institutionalization and to what degree Xi Jinping is or is not breaking such norms. This debate is inconclusive with some who accept the emergence and existence of (new) rules (e.g. Nathan, 2003; Wang and Vangeli, 2016); and others questioning whether institutionalization has ever occurred (e.g. Fewsmith in Fewsmith and Nathan, 2019). Some argue that norms and rules are and remain important, but they are born by the necessity to overrule opponents, balance competing factions, or eliminate the continuing influence of retired party leaders rather than by the normative desirability of norm-based procedures (Nathan in Fewsmith and Nathan, 2019). Again, others argue that there is a need to distinguish more between practices, formal, and informal rules and how these interact with each other to constrain unconstrained rulers (Smith, 2021). 20.4.2 Xi Jinping’s Ideological Moves and Legitimacy Claims Like previous leaders, Xi has made a theoretical contribution to the socialist canon Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics of a New Era. Unlike others, he managed to get his name and ideas enshrined in the party and the state constitution already after his first term in office. As Babones (2017) aptly summarizes, ‘Jinping Thought is an unabashed program of national revival backed up by increasing military power.’ Xi’s Chinese Dream promises China’s ‘national rejuvenation,’ that is, the return to ancient greatness, of a CCP-led China that has a moderately prosperous society and a capable military. Most importantly, this all is to be achieved under the leadership of a strong and centralized CCP that rejects any previous liberalization and Western values, individual freedoms and rights. Xi Jinping is drawing heavily on China’s cultural and philosophical heritage, such as Confucianism, as a means to bolster the legitimacy of the CCP. This is no real paradigmatic shift in ideology, but rather a new discursive strategy (Lams, 2018). In contrast to the CCP’s earlier rejection of China’s traditions, particularly under Mao Zedong, Xi Jinping sees China’s traditions as a political asset and has started to exploit China’s traditional philosophy and culture ‘to assert its unique status and reaffirm its right to rule’ (Kubat, 2018: 50). This goes beyond emphasizing that China’s civilizational history offers a rich body of indigenous religions, philosophies, and traditions that predate and differ from Western ideas about governance. The party has also started to select particular traditional moral norms and virtues, and from there derives moral instructions for society and party cadres. According to Kubat (2018: 77–8), a narrative that brings in China’s traditions may have several legitimizing effects: by discussing desirable governance (intra-party) mechanisms in contemporary China through traditional philosophical terms with strong ethical undertones, one-party rule is presented as ‘being guided by moral reflection and care for society.’ The narrative also establishes the CCP as the ‘natural, default inheritor of Chinese civilisational heritage while at the same time claiming the role of being its only legitimate carrier into the future.’ The CCP becomes a moral, rather than an ideological vanguard, which aims at the ‘safeguarding of China’s distinctive values and model of sociopolitical organisation.’ 20.4.3 Shrinking Space for Activism and Data-based Surveillance State Under Xi Jinping, repression has increased and changed in quality. On the one hand, China’s surveillance capacity has been rapidly evolving during the past decade in which China’s tech companies became frontrunners in e-commerce and artificial intelligence (AI). Digital

326  Research handbook on authoritarianism platforms that offer everything from communication to payment on one device are convenient and popular – and leave troves of data of individual consumers, which are all accessible to the regime. Moreover, in 2014, the social credit system was expanded from its initial purpose to evaluate citizens’ financial creditworthiness. The ambition was to construct a centralized infrastructure for the collection and analysis of data on various aspects of individual, organizational, and company behavior mostly related to compliance with existing law (Drinhausen and Brussee, 2022). Once data, that is (digital) records, of organizations and individuals has been collected with the help of various government agencies, local and national-level administrations, and commercial IT companies, individuals, enterprises, and organizations are to receive creditworthiness scores, or be listed on black or red lists (Liang et al., 2018). Yet, the implementation of the project seems to be far from complete, and may see major adjustments along the way (Drinhausen and Brussee, 2022). More importantly, the regime has set up a data-based surveillance regime with much more serious implications. As early as 2005, the regime started to invest in surveillance cameras in public spaces, officially for the sake of fighting crime. The 2015 ‘Sharp Eye’ project was a massive upgrade of such earlier initiatives: it aimed at installing an ‘omnipresent, fully networked, always working and fully controllable’ system of AI-enhanced surveillance cameras and ‘100 percent’ coverage in specified areas by 2020 (Qiang, 2019: 57). In addition, face-recognition technologies are complimented with the development of voice-recognition software and data bases, and the regime has started with the systematic collection of biometric data, including DNA (Qiang, 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic has added even more instruments and another pretext to the data-driven pre-emptive surveillance toolkit. For example, the system of COVID-19-related QR codes has not only been used for health-related contact tracing, but has reportedly also been misused by authorities to restrict the mobility of citizens in order to prevent them from voicing grievances (Wong, 2022). The systematic and swift crackdown on anti-zero-COVID policy protestors in late 2022 displayed the efficiency of this surveillance state (Cadell and Shepherd, 2023). Though having been the targets of surveillance and repression before, ethnic minorities in Tibet, Xinjiang, and increasingly Inner Mongolia have been most severely affected by the intrusive data collection and repression of this new type of surveillance state. Under Xi Jinping repression of ethnic minorities, including mass incarcerations, forced abortions, and the destruction of religious and cultural identities has reached unprecedented heights. In addition to this upgrade in surveillance capacity and AI-enhanced pre-emptive repression, Xi Jinping has shifted the discourse from one about social stability to one about national security while, at the same time, criminalizing social society activism (Fu and Distelhorst, 2018). During Xi’s first term, new laws were passed on national security, non-governmental organizations, charity, counterterrorism, and cybersecurity, aiming at limiting the space for activism, increasing state control, and restricting the ties of organizations in China to foreign ones (Qiang, 2019; Shambaugh, 2021: 294). Hong Kong’s 2020 National Security Law extended this trend. With this new framing activists can be targeted as internal enemies who also threaten national security (Fu and Distelhorst, 2018). Under Xi, the previous sporadic harassment of civil society activists has turned into the proactive dismantling of organizations, systematic arrests and indictments with endangering state security crimes, often accompanied with public confessions (Fu and Distelhorst, 2018). Collaboration with state authorities in the fragmented bureaucratic system in which civil society activists and organizations ‘were able to exploit

China  327 both vertical and horizontal divisions within the state’ for their cause has become much less likely under Xi Jinping. Under Xi’s stringent top-down governance style, state agents have become less inclined to ally with civil society actors (Fu and Distelhorst, 2018: 121).

20.5

CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK

As discussed in this chapter, Xi Jinping has done away with many of the reforms in post-Mao China. What might be the implications of this for the future development of the CCP’s regime? Expert assessment of Xi’s rule thus far is divided: some argue that Xi’s power grab was necessary to put an end to excessive corruption inside the party and to promote economic reform against the pushback from the provinces (Economy, 2018: 24). However, Xi’s power grab may also pose a number of short- and long-term problems. In the long term, succession may be the most destabilizing aspect of Xi’s rule. As expected, Xi stayed on for a third term at the 20th Party Congress in 2022 without designating a successor. Competition about succession could spark rivalries even among Xi’s loyalists, as they lack personal trust among each other (Pei, 2022). In the short term, the concentration of power in Xi’s person is already creating decision-making bottlenecks (Economy, 2018: 25). There is only so much time and attention one particular individual can invest on a given topic. Moreover, Xi’s demand of absolute fidelity, a tendency to micro-manage, and his extended anti-corruption campaign with changing rules and regulations is increasing uncertainty and policy paralysis among local officials, who are afraid of becoming a target if they do anything wrong. This incentivizes lower-level cadres to hold back unpleasant, but important information for fear of personal consequences (Fewsmith and Nathan, 2019; Blanchette and Medeiros, 2021) and has the unintended side-effect that many local officials have become reluctant to launch new projects or even continue running ones. In the short term, this has slowed China’s economy (Economy, 2018: 35); but ultimately, it may risk suffocating policy innovations given that flexibility and experimentation at the local level has been a hallmark of governance in China and often led to policy innovations that were later on extended to other parts of the country. Most concretely, Xi’s (mis)handling of the COVID-19 pandemic illustrates the risks of his ideologically rigid and centralized leadership that ignores dissenting voices and faces difficulties correcting policy mistakes. Holding back information when the virus was initially discovered, Xi constrained the response of local authorities in Wuhan. Later, the draconian zero-COVID policy became his signature policy against the judgment of health experts and other officials (Xia, 2022). Having boasted as the county’s savior with this approach, Xi was unwilling to change course despite the policy’s mounting economic, societal, and human costs (Ong, 2023). This led to declining public trust and the most extensive public protests since the Tiananmen crisis. While authorities have been quick in identifying and intimidating protestors, China’s future will hinge on whether Xi Jinping succeeds in regaining this trust among citizens.

328  Research handbook on authoritarianism

NOTES 1. Other figures such as Hua Guofeng, Hu Yaobang, and Zhao Ziyang who held powerful positions prior to Deng Xiaoping are usually not discussed as paramount leaders in the literature (see e.g. Shambaugh, 2021). 2. See, for example, the White Paper, China: Democracy That Works (State Council, 2021). 3. The concept of fragmented authoritarianism refers to the complexity of China’s governance system, with its interplay between party and state organs, between different levels of governance, and the distribution of sometimes overlapping authority among various vertical agencies within a given policy field (Lieberthal, 1992). Such fragmented authoritarianism allows for implementation gaps and policy discretion in the implementation of centrally designed policies when faced with resistance or demands at the local level (Mertha, 2009). As such, it opens up space for collective action, policy entrepreneurship, and bargaining by civil society actors.

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21. Uganda: authoritarianism in the age of regular elections – a review of the 2021 electoral violence Jude Kagoro

21.1 INTRODUCTION On 14 January 2021, Uganda held a fiercely contested and controversial presidential election, which gave the incumbent president, Yoweri Museveni, a sixth term in office. Museveni won 5.85 million votes (58.6 per cent), while the main opposition contender Robert Kyagulanyi, better known as Bobi Wine, won 3.475 million votes (34.8 per cent). The 76-year-old Museveni, who will have been in power for four decades by the end of his term in 2026, became president of Uganda in 1986 following a five-year guerrilla war. At present, Museveni is one of the longest serving presidents in the world. The 2021 elections were characterised by widespread violence ranging from the ruthless manhandling and detention of opposition presidential candidates, killings of opposition supporters by security forces, illegal arrests and abductions, a crackdown on the media, and disruption of opposition rallies to the deployment of heavily armed and hard-boiled looking security forces especially in the Kampala metropolitan area. Moreover, there was a total shutdown of the Internet, which made access to information and reporting on the elections a nightmare (see Clarke, 2021). Uganda’s key development partners called for an investigation into electoral violence and irregularities (McSweeney & Busari, 2021; United Nations, 2021). The EU Council of Ministers indicated that there was massive harassment of the opposition by the security forces. In February 2021, the EU Parliament passed a resolution describing the election as undemocratic and condemned the excesses of the security forces (Biryabarema, 2021a). The US State Department said that it was deeply troubled by reports of election violence orchestrated by the security forces and voting irregularities and termed the electoral process as fundamentally flawed (Milliken, 2021, see also Taylor, 2021a). British officials called for an investigation into concerns over the validity of the election and Africa Elections Watch said they observed irregularities (Milliken, 2021). Despite the backlash, Museveni was sworn in on 12 May 2021 and remains in power. Though ten candidates ran against the incumbent, violence was predominantly meted out against the supporters of popular musician-cum-politician Robert Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, commonly known as Bobi Wine. At 38 years and half the age of the incumbent, Bobi Wine stood out as the candidate who seriously threatened the status quo. First, he emerged as the leader of the People Power Movement before assuming leadership of a newly reformatted party, the National Unity Platform (NUP), which had before Bobi Wine existed as the National Unity, Reconciliation and Development Party (NURP).

331

332  Research handbook on authoritarianism On 18 November, in Luuka district, Eastern Uganda, the police arrested Bobi Wine on the campaign trail for allegedly breaching COVID-19 regulations by mobilising a large crowd, which, in the perspective of the security forces, could have led to the spread of COVID-19. In response, violent protests broke out in different parts of Uganda, especially in the Kampala metropolitan area. Though official statistics claim that 54 people died after security forces responded with lethal force, other sources indicate that at least 100 people, including innocent bystanders, died and over 500 were injured (Cheeseman, 2021). The riots stand out as the deadliest in the history of Uganda. The 2021 electoral period witnessed hundreds of NUP members being abducted, the majority of whom were held incommunicado, for allegedly participating in riots, possession of military stores, and holding meetings to plan post-election violence (see Biryabarema, 2021b). Several of those arrested were charged at a military court martial for apparently being in possession of ammunition belonging to the Ugandan army. This research has established that armed men picked up people off the streets or from their homes and took them away in unmarked vans without licence plates, commonly referred to as “drones”. The wave of abductions was perpetrated in part by a commando unit that was previously deployed in Somalia (Taylor, 2021b). As confirmed by President Museveni in the case of Kampala, we also brought a commando unit, which had distinguished itself in fighting in Somalia. And which had destroyed ADF [Allied Democratic Forces]. It was deployed in the Kampala area. And this group quickly defeated the terrorists who had started operating here. They killed a few, who had tried to attack them and arrested scores of those law breakers. (see Athumani, 2021)

This research took a qualitative approach conducting 32 in-depth interviews with security officers, politicians drawn from both the opposition and the ruling party, victims of torture, members of the civil society, and journalists. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in August and September 2021, while those online (via Zoom) were conducted in October 2021. The research reviewed both international and local media reports on the elections, non-governmental organisation (NGO) reports and academic publications on political dynamics in Uganda. Fieldwork was conducted in the Kampala metropolitan area, where most of the violence happened. Due to the sensitivity of this research most interviewees are anonymised. Due to time constraints the research did not extensively cover all opposition groups, thus concentrating on the NUP whose supporters were the most affected by the electoral violence and human rights abuses in the 2021 elections.

21.2

CONCEPTUAL REFLECTIONS ON ELECTORAL VIOLENCE

There is a view that electoral violence is often an outcome of governments that want to stay in power at any cost. In order to stay in power while electoral support for it disappears, the argument goes, out-of-favour governments resort to violence against citizens, opposition candidates, and political parties, among other targets (Hafner-Burton et al., 2013; see also Tamale-Muyomba, 2015). This research draws on Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski’s (2013) framework of electoral violence. Leaders who are unwilling to leave power, according to their thesis, have a greater incentive to crack down if (a) they think or know that an election might remove them, (2) they

Uganda  333 have few or no constraints on the use of violence, and (3) they are convinced that there will be no consequences for their violence (Hafner-Burton et al., 2013). In that sense, the causal factors for electoral violence are both psychological to the extent that they are driven by the thinking and attitudes of leaders, and structural because of the facilities that encourage leaders to use violence: collusion between a president and the power centres that would check his or her excesses including incumbent political party, Parliament, the military, and the courts. On the flipside, a government or leader who may also be out of favour with the electorate may not resort to violence if accountability for violent malfeasance is certain. In this sense, the psychological urge for violence is tempered by structural impediments. Hafner-Burton and Hyde (2014) and Hafner-Burton et al. (2013) place their faith in the independence of the judiciary and other checks on executive power such as the legislative check, ruling party constraint, and the military check, contending that when a structural counterbalance to the incumbent’s worst impulses exists, election violence becomes less likely even when a leader or party’s position in power is seriously threatened. The above thinking is predicated on the view that election violence is a symptom of a weakening incumbent government (Hafner-Burton and Hyde, 2014). This chapter contends that violence is resorted to because of its benefit to an unpopular incumbent, that is, its tendency to keep them in power – and may be used both before and after elections for the same ends. Pre-election violence can alter the election results in the incumbent’s favour by reducing the electoral competition when it induces the opposition to boycott an election or influences voter turnout in the incumbent’s favour; hence, increasing the incumbent’s odds of staying in power (Hafner-Burton et al., 2013). Post-election, if the election was not free or fair to the extent that it galvanises protests against the incumbent, violence becomes a necessary tool for a regime to keep itself in power. This is because post-election rebellion raises the prospect of new elections or forcing the incumbent to step down (see also Bunce and Wolchik, 2006), none of which would be reasonable for or acceptable to the leader; hence, the resort to violence to keep power. What the thesis does not mention is that in some environments, the incumbent government may not act violently owing to weakness or diminished electoral support. Sometimes, a government may act violently due to the treasonous behaviour, violent posture, and ill-intention of the opposition (especially supporters of opposition candidates), which may not necessarily possess an electoral edge over the incumbent. The incumbent may activate violence because of the fear of losing power, but not necessarily through elections but extra-election means. Electoral violence has also been theorised to occur during high-stakes elections. According to scholars such as Asunka et al. (2019), Collier and Vicente (2014), Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski (2013), Straus and Taylor (2012) among others, the more competitive an election is, the more the likelihood of election violence. However, this construal is contested and as Birch (2020) has observed, the evidence is mixed, in that election violence may occur whether the election is hotly contested or not. Accordingly, high-stakes or hotly contested elections may be, but are not the only explanation for election violence. In that sense, Evéquoz (2019), among others, found that voters in opposition strongholds experience higher levels of violence, thus confirming that high-stakes elections are associated with election violence. Rauschenbach and Paula (2019) and others also found that voters in opposition strongholds, where there is no cut-throat competition between incumbents and the opposition, experience higher violence.

334  Research handbook on authoritarianism The type of electoral institution design determines whether or not violence will occur in electoral climates with high stakes (Alesina et al., 2018; Claes, 2016). In specific terms, Fjelde and Höglund (2016) have argued that majoritarian elections tend to produce high-stakes electoral contests that are associated with greater levels of electoral violence. Other scholars, including Nellis, Weaver, and Rosenzweig (2016) and Nellis and Siddiqui (2018), have also found a connection between ethnic polarisation, the exclusion of ethnic groups from power, and parties representing particular ethnic or religious identities to be combustible ingredients for electoral violence. It is also argued that international factors do matter. For instance, Daxecker (2014) has shown that the presence of observers can forestall the use of violence as a strategy for attaining political ends.

21.3

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTIONS IN UGANDA

When John Locke argued that men being by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be subjected to the political power of another without his own consent (Locke, 1946), he envisioned a society in which the governed possess the sovereignty to choose who governs them. Locke’s vision spoke to a democratic system of governance in which elections affirm the sovereignty of the people by which they express their will and consent as to who governs them. With the exception of a handful of states, including Brunei, China, Eritrea, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and South Sudan, people across the globe are regularly provided the opportunity to elect their leaders in national elections (Birch et al., 2020). In theory, elections ought to be a mechanism that allows citizens greater say over how they are governed. Yet in practice, elections, especially in competitive authoritarian states such as Uganda, are fraught with significant levels of violence during the campaign period, on polling day or in the aftermath of voting (Birch et al., 2020; Höglund, 2009; Kagoro, 2016; Nordic Africa Institute, 2018). Despite their aim of allowing for peaceful transfers of power, most elections held outside of consolidated democracies are often accompanied by substantial violence and human rights abuses (Birch et al., 2020; IRI, 2021). In particular, violence seems to have become a predominant feature of competitive elections in many parts of Africa, including Uganda. A study drawing on statistical data from more than 50 African elections from 2011 to 2017 indicated that nearly all these elections were violent at some stage of the poll (Kewir and Gabriel, 2018). Uganda subscribes to the democratic ideal. According to the National Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy under the Constitution, Uganda is supposed to be governed under democratic principles, which empower and encourage the active participation of all citizens at all levels in their own governance. Under Article 1(2) of the Constitution, all authority in the state emanates from the people of Uganda and the people shall be governed through their will and consent. Article 1(4) of the 1995 Constitution (as amended) states that The people shall express their will and consent on who shall govern them and how they should be governed, through regular, free and fair elections of their representatives or through referenda.

Uganda’s electoral system is premised on both international and national legal instruments. At international level, they include the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN-UDHR); African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG); African

Uganda  335 Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR); and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), among others. At national level, legal instruments relating to the electoral system in Uganda include the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 (as amended); Electoral Commission Act, 1997 (as amended); Presidential Elections Act, 2005 (as amended); Parliamentary Elections Act, 2001 (as amended); and the Local Government Act, 1997 (as amended), among others. Uganda ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1995. Furthermore, Uganda signed the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) in 2008. Article 3(4) of the charter emphasises the need to hold regular, transparent, free and fair elections. The Electoral Commission of Uganda is constitutionally mandated to conduct regular, free and fair general elections, by-elections, referenda, and demarcate constituencies among other functions. According to Article 62 (as amended), “the commission shall be independent and shall, in the performance of its functions, not be subject to the direction or control of any person or authority”. The Presidential Elections Act, 2005 (as amended) regulates the manner by which presidential elections should be conducted by the Electoral Commission of Uganda; and how the presidential candidates should conduct themselves throughout the process of aspiring to be elected among other provisions. In particular, Part Four of the Act prohibits presidential candidates or their agents from voter bribery; procuring prohibited persons to vote; publication of false statements against the opponents; and obstruction of voters.

21.4

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN UGANDA

Elections in Uganda’s politics have always been disputed and a habitual source of political controversy since the colonial period (Cheeseman et al., 2020). This chapter underlines that elections in Uganda have become a source, not a cure, of violent accession to and maintenance of power. Often, the violence is unleashed by incumbents; other times, it is instigated by opponents of incumbent leaders while in some cases, it erupts among supporters of candidates or parties. Uganda has never witnessed a peaceful transfer of power since independence from British colonial rule in 1962. Uganda’s elections date back to pre-independence times when the British colonial government made a statute in 1957 that allowed Africans (Ugandans) to participate, starting with the Legislative Council (LEGCO) of 1958. In 1961, the colonial government organised the very first direct elections in accordance with Article 7 and the Second Schedule of the 1955 Buganda Agreement; Section 9 of the Electoral Law; and recommendations by the Constitutional Committee of 1959. These elections were marred by violence, intimidation, and boycott mostly perpetrated by Buganda loyalists whose interests of a privileged Buganda within Uganda were being threatened (Ssempebwa, 2015). Because the 1961 elections were deemed unrepresentative, mainly because of Buganda’s boycott, another election was organised in 1962. Though this election led to the formation of the first post-colonial government headed by Prime Minister Milton Obote, a significant level of violence was meted out on the supporters of Benedicto Kiwanuka’s Democratic Party (DP) within Buganda (Ssempebwa, 2015).

336  Research handbook on authoritarianism Although the 1962 Constitution had provided for holding elections after every five years, Uganda was the only country in Africa that never organised any form of general elections between 1962 and 1980 (Lindberg, 2004). Moreover, after overthrowing Milton Obote through a coup in 1971 Idi Amin outlawed the Parliament, banned political parties, weakened the judiciary and dismantled local governments. In the space of one and a half years – between April 1979, when Idi Amin fell, and in December 1980, when elections were held – Uganda experienced three regime changes through violent coups and military manipulation. The political anarchy after Amin’s fall was compounded by messy general elections in 1980 from which Obote emerged in charge for the second time in the country’s history (Kagoro, 2015). In the course of the 1980 elections, presidential candidates, including Yoweri Museveni, were harassed and several of their supporters arrested, beaten and some killed by pro-Obote security forces (Karugire, 2003; Ssempebwa, 2015; Willis et al., 2017). In many constituencies, opposition agents were prevented from guarding the votes while the tallying and declaration of results was interfered with by the partisan military council led by Paulo Muwanga. One of the losers in the 1980 elections, Yoweri Museveni, and his allies immediately launched a five-year guerrilla war (1981–86), which they had promised in case the elections were rigged (Kagoro, 2015). In January 1986, Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM) managed to take over power, marking Africa’s first successful overthrow of a regime by a locally based guerrilla movement (Hills, 2000, p. 91; Kagoro, 2016, pp. 155–6, 2018; Karugire, 1996, p. 90; Kasozi, 1994, p. 175).

21.5

THE NRM GRAND PROMISE FOR DEMOCRACY AND THE RELAPSE TO ELECTORAL VIOLENCE

The NRM took over power promising enthusiastic Ugandans a “fundamental change” premised on its ten-point programme that entailed democracy and protection of human rights. The NRM government established the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) under the provisions of Article 51(1) of the 1995 Constitution. The functions and powers of the Commission were operationalised under the Uganda Human Rights Act of 1997. Through the establishment of UHRC, the NRM showed signs of committing to promote and protect human rights and freedoms of citizens in recognition of Uganda’s violent and turbulent history characterised by arbitrary arrests, detention without trial, torture and brutal repression with impunity on the part of security organs. The NRM introduced the no-party democracy or the Movement system, which was “broad-based”, “all-inclusive”, and premised on the principle of individual merit (Lindemann, 2011, p. 395; Mugaju and Oloka-Onyango, 2000, p. 1; Tripp, 2004, p. 7). Elections were held strictly between individual candidates as opposed to political parties (Carbone, 2008, pp. 22–3). The no-party democracy system improved the quality of politics as well as levels of political participation and civil liberties (Carbone, 2008, p. 23; Rubongoya, 2007, p. 24; Wapakhabulo, 2000, pp. 79–94), though it inhibited aggregated political competition (Carbone, 2003, p. 487; Girke and Kamp, 2011, p. 53; Hickey, 2005, p. 998). Kasfir (2000, pp. 75–6) argues that this system was instrumental in providing the NRM with an important resource to legitimise its rule for a substantial period of time, which also led to considerable social and economic benefits for the country. For 19 years (1986–2005), multi-

Uganda  337 party politics remained banned based on NRM’s discourse that multiparty politics polarise the population and perpetuate violence based on religious and ethnic sectarianism (Hickey, 2005, p. 998; Kasfir, 1998, p. 60; Museveni, 2000, p. 245; Rubongoya, 2007, p. 25). At the same time, Western powers hailed Uganda as the cherished child of Africa and viewed President Museveni as one of a “new breed” of African leaders (Mamdani, 2001, p. 276; Oloka-Onyango, 2004, pp. 29–52; Schlichte, 2008, p. 371; Tripp, 2004, p. 3). Uganda’s closer relations with the West in the post-Cold War era developed during the same period in which the rest of sub-Saharan Africa was under immense pressure to democratise according to the paradigm of liberal democracy (Kagoro, 2018, 2020). As a measure to democratise the state, but also as a strategy to establish legitimacy and penetrate the countryside, the NRM organised local elections in 1989 that were largely free and fair. These were the first elections for the local leaders in the history of Uganda. In the previous governments, local governance had been the role of administrators appointed by the central government. The process saw a hierarchy of popularly elected councils called Resistance Councils (RCs) – later renamed Local Councils (LCs) – from RC 1 to RC 5; RC 1 being a village council and RC 5 being a district council. The exercise led to the expansion of the National Resistance Council (NRC) from 38 to 270 members with the apex authority being the National Executive Council (NEC), which at the time performed the role of Parliament (Golooba-Mutebi, 2008) until 1994. Since 1996, Uganda has consistently held regular elections, including two referenda in the years 2000 and 2005 to decide on the political system. However, citizens have experienced violence, brutality, and intimidation since then. In addition, voter bribery and general commercialisation of politics and the electoral processes have been observed as the new normal in Uganda’s politics. In 1996, the first general elections under Museveni saw the rallies of the presidential candidate Paul Kawanga Ssemogere, who at the time caused limited threat due to Museveni’s popularity, blocked by the police, and his supporters were beaten (Mwenda, 2020). In 2001, the NRM, for the first time, experienced internal political fracture when Colonel Kizza Besigye, who had until then entrenched the NRM ideology in the country (a senior member of the NRM that ran government since 1986), ran for the presidency against Museveni. The decision by Besigye to run for the presidency evoked arguably the most violent pre-election reaction by state security forces in Uganda’s electoral history since the 1980 election. As many as 156 supporters of Besigye were killed in election-related violence (Kagoro, 2015, 2016; Mwenda, 2020; Rubongoya, 2007). Nonetheless, the violence was not lopsided; while Besigye and his Reform Agenda were on much of the receiving end of the violence by state security agents and allied formations on the side of Museveni, to a lesser extent, intimidation and assault had been directed at Museveni’s supporters or perceived supporters by Besigye enthusiasts (Tamale-Muyomba, 2015). In the 2006 elections, the main challenger, Kizza Besigye, was in addition to the deadly violence against his supporters,1 personally harassed with arrests, detention, and charged with trumped-up criminal charges (Kagoro, 2012, 2015).2 The military court martial charged Besigye with possession of illegal arms and for having connections with the shadow People’s Redemption Army (PRA) rebel group, spending most of the campaign period between court and Luzira Prison (Vegel, 2007, p. 387; Kagoro, 2015). In its ruling in a presidential election petition brought by Kizza Besigye, the Supreme Court, in a unanimous determination,

338  Research handbook on authoritarianism declared that the principle of free and fair elections was compromised by bribery, intimidation, and violence in some areas of the country (Tamale-Muyomba, 2015). In 2011, the elections were relatively peaceful, but in the immediate aftermath there was deadly violence after the opposition contested the re-election of Museveni and engaged in civil disobedience activities they dubbed “walk to work”, resulting in at least nine deaths and several injuries and arrests, stone throwing, and destruction.3 In 2016, there were arrests of presidential candidates and supporters, beatings of supporters of opposition candidates, and certainly deaths. As many as 20 individuals were killed during the 2016 elections.4 Uganda, therefore, presents an excellent case of a competitive-authoritarian state that is officially democratic but in reality, maintains power through a range of repressive strategies (Cheeseman, 2021; Kagoro, 2016; Tripp, 2010). Ultimately, this chapter argues that the 2021 general elections only confirmed that violence is a common thread running through the electoral fabric of the Ugandan polity under the NRM. These elections, however, witnessed unmatched levels of explicit violence and human rights abuses as this research shows. 21.5.1 Premises for Amplified Violence during the 2021 Elections The 2021 general elections were radically different from the previous five general elections under Museveni (1996, 2001, 2006, 2011, 2016), not least because they presented a political outsider and a much younger individual in Robert Kyagulanyi, 38 years old in 2021, as the most serious political foil to a much more politically experienced 76-year-old incumbent, who by the 2021 polls had ruled Uganda for 35 years. Prior to mounting an electoral challenge to Museveni, Kyagulanyi was a recording artiste who grew up on the socioeconomic margins of society and whose only political experience was being a Member of Parliament between 2017 and 2021, having won the parliamentary seat in a by-election, with 78 per cent of the vote on an independent ticket (The Conversation, 2021). From an insular constituency he represented in Parliament, Kyagulanyi managed to galvanise support from across the country, organise and lead a fairly robust political movement (People Power) that attracted a mammoth following, and to form the biggest opposition political party (National Unity Platform) at the expense of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC), in four short years. Within his first two years in Parliament, Kyagulanyi had built a reputation as an ardent opponent of Museveni, having fiercely opposed the removal of the presidential age limit article in the Constitution and led protests against the government’s proposed tax on social media in July 2018 (The Conversation, 2021). Earlier, Kyagulanyi had campaigned for opposition candidates for parliamentary seats in by-elections and helped them to win seats: in Jinja East Constituency for Paul Mwiru of the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC),5 in Bugiri Municipality Constituency for Asuman Basalirwa of the Justice Forum,6 in Rukungiri for Betty Muzanira of the FDC,7 and in Arua for Kassiano Wadri on an independent ticket.8 All the above candidates won against NRM candidates that President Museveni had personally campaigned for. The streak of electoral wins in the by-elections by Kyagulanyi against NRM candidates was an eye-opener, as it were, to the NRM regarding the rising political momentum of a politician first underestimated as a political novice. The NRM government, which is known for treating its foremost political challengers as enemies and securitising their

Uganda  339 political and electioneering efforts, turned its eyes on Kyagulanyi. To the NRM and the security forces, Kyagulanyi was no longer just a politician but a security threat. Kyagulanyi’s rising popularity was driven by his support among the country’s disenfranchised youth, amid increasing perceptions that the government is out of touch with the needs of the youth population.9 He also represented the downtrodden of society given his background as a hustler who had surprisingly emerged from the ghetto to run for the highest office (Akumu, 2020).10 Kyagulanyi also represented the younger generation, which had seen no other president in their lifetime. Approximately 78 per cent of Uganda’s population was under the age of 30 in 2020, when Museveni had been at the helm for 35 years. This was projected as a demographical advantage for Kyagulanyi and his NUP party – and a headache for the incumbent, and mainly so because Uganda had one of the highest youth unemployment rates in Africa (Among and Munavu, 2019).11 Kyagulanyi also had a secret tool to his advantage that could have been a threat to the incumbent. He is a celebrated pop star. Even before he jumped into the political fray, Kyagulanyi used his musical talent to sing about the plight of the common person while castigating government corruption and indifference. When he joined politics, he would completely take off his gloves and hit Museveni directly in his lyrics, singing about dictatorship and the need for redemption in more direct ways (Anonymous, 2019).12 Museveni attempted to belittle Bobi Wine as only a musician who knew nothing about governance (Anonymous, 2019). Yet by portraying Bobi Wine in derogatory terms, Museveni saw his musicality as a serious political threat. In October 2017, the police banned Kyagulanyi’s performances (Daily Monitor, 2017)13 at Museveni’s instigation. In a BBC interview, Museveni defended the banning of Kyagulanyi’s concerts, charging that Bobi Wine could not be allowed to benefit from Uganda’s prosperity because he had attempted to sabotage it by asking investors to boycot Uganda (Musungu, 2019).14 According to Golooba-Mutebi (2018), Kyagulanyi’s concerts threatened Museveni because they created a political space for Kyagulanyi to do early campaigns and raise funds ahead of the elections, which Museveni and the NRM had in the past exclusively enjoyed at the expense of opposition candidates and parties.15 Therefore, Museveni had every incentive to block Bobi Wine’s concerts because by doing so, he cut off Kyagulanyi’s most vibrant means of political expression (Musungu, 2019).16 Bobi Wine had started his ambition to stand for presidency by mobilising the youth through songs rallying them to get a national identity card to be able to participate in the elections. Most ghetto youths did not have IDs and of course were not registered voters. When the government realised Bobi Wine’s power it tried to counter by buying off other ghetto musicians such as Butcher Man and Full Figure who were appointed presidential advisers (Kagoro, 2023). 21.5.2 The November Riots and Military Takeover of the Police’s Roles On 18 November, in Luuka, Eastern Uganda, the police arrested Bobi Wine on his way to a planned campaign rally. The arrest was allegedly executed due to Bobi Wine’s breach of COVID-19 regulations by mobilising a large crowd. In response to the arrest, violent protests broke out in different parts of Uganda, especially in the Kampala metropolitan area. The security forces responded with lethal force, resulting in the deaths of at least 100 people, many of them bystanders, and injuring over 500 others (see Cheeseman, 2021). Interviewed members

340  Research handbook on authoritarianism of NUP vehemently rejected the official death toll of 54 that was provided by the government. Lewis Rubongoya, the secretary general of NUP, argued that many of their supporters died in far-off places like Butambala, Kayunga, and Masaka and the official statistics concentrated on the bodies taken to Mulago Hospital or those who died from there. During the riots, purported NUP supporters were captured on camera targeting individuals wearing yellow NRM T-shirts and some destroying President Museveni’s campaign posters. The malignant acts by Kyagulanyi’s supporters, security officers argue, courted violent reaction from the security agencies endowed with constitutional authority and burdened by the duty to uphold the law and to ensure public safety, order, and security. President Museveni defended the acts of the security forces, calling them heroes and referring to protesters as terrorists and the protests as an insurrection, and made veiled, derogatory references to Kyagulanyi (who he called the Opposition), including that he was a traitor and an agent of foreign interests.17 Museveni also called out those who criticised the security forces for their disproportionate reaction to the protests, saying, “It is dishonest for anybody to talk about the mistakes, if any, of the security forces without talking about the origin of the problem: treason, using terrorism by the Opposition.”18 Despite the spirited defence by the president and his security minister of the acts of the security forces, an investigation by the BBC, in which 30 eye-witness accounts and 400 video footages were analysed, concluded that security forces targeted several innocent civilians and bystanders who were not engaged in the protests (BBC, 2020a).19 In the course of the November riots the regime feared that youth would galvanise and severely stretch the regime or possibly cause an insurrection. An arrangement was quickly made to rapidly deploy the military to counter the protests. The police force was then relegated to following orders from the military. In general, the response was haphazard, disorganised and panicky, thus leading to a reckless shooting and several deaths. In December 2020, a few weeks after the riots, President Museveni appointed Major General Paul Lokech,20 who had earned the nickname “Lion of Mogadishu” for his exploits fighting against al-Shabaab in Somalia, as the new deputy Inspector General of Police, replacing another army officer, Major General Sabiiti Muzeeyi. The president also appointed Major General Kayanja Muhanga to coordinate joint security operations involving the police, military, and intelligence agencies. Major General Muhanga has previously worked in counter-terrorism operations and also commanded Ugandan troops in the African Union Mission to Somalia. Ironically, this research found out that some of the violence was secretly coordinated by the opposition supporters whose allegiance was fluid and shifting from one camp to the other. The role of such individuals was to instead create intra-NUP divisions, spy for vital information, and sometimes provoke violence from opposition supporters. Their activities, to a large extent sanctioned by state operatives, were intended to justify the brutal actions of security agencies and to possibly turn public sentiment against NUP. Security operatives interviewed during this research severally mentioned secret collaborators. To them, their ability to penetrate NUP was their biggest success. Many of the secret collaborators are masters at deception, a senior police officer offered. The majority are drawn from an urban criminal milieu and financial rewards were at play, but others were typical members of the NUP, including high-profile politicians. It is also believed that some had become disenchanted within the NUP especially due to two factors: some found

Uganda  341 the NUP supporters to be radical while others felt segregated on sectarian grounds, thus deciding to secretly switch sides. The fear of state security agencies appears to have been one of the main pulling factors. When some of the NUP supporters started hearing and seeing their colleagues being kidnapped and tortured they reverted to becoming informants to preserve themselves. Actually, they felt that they were already targets of the state and others believed that the state would kill them. Nalepa and Grigore (2021) have posited that authoritarian regimes are able to infiltrate the political opposition depending on the balance between the coercive capacity of the regime and the resistance capacity of the target. In the case of the 2021 elections, this research shows that the extensive infiltration scheme profited from the organisational vulnerability of the opposition. The NUP generally lacked the capacity to prevent infiltration as anyone could profess to be in their struggle, especially the people downtown or in ghettos. One only had to speak ill of the state and due to the impersonal character of urban life, with its many secondary and superficial relations, an opportunity was provided for the secret collaborators to easily blend into the NUP structures. The recruits were instructed to frustrate every effort of the NUP to consolidate its sociopolitical forces or to recruit new or useful adherents.

21.6

THE POST-MUSEVENI AND THE “MUHOOZI PROJECT” DIMENSION

On 14 September 2021, while reacting to President Museveni’s claims that those responsible for the killing of protesters during the November 2020 riots would be prosecuted, Bobi Wine retorted that the move was hypocritical, maintaining that the president’s son, Lieutenant General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, was the main culprit behind the repression (France 24, 2021). Some interviewees that this research interacted with argued that there are indeed some elements within the security forces and the NRM structures in general that are promoting Lieutenant General Muhoozi as the next president of Uganda. This group viewed Bobi Wine not as a competitor of Museveni, but part of his son’s future plans. In this group’s perspective, the destruction of Bobi Wine’s support base was paramount. Maximum violence was therefore applied, leading to heightened abuses of human rights. Since April 2013, when the former Coordinator of Intelligence Services, General David Sejusa, revealed that he had gathered evidence that President Museveni was grooming his son to take over power at a future date, the general’s disclosure continues to generate considerable debate. Sejusa insisted that the deliberate ploy to impose Muhoozi on Uganda included the assembling of trusted security personnel to protect what he called the “Muhoozi project” (see Kisakye, 2020). Though President Museveni has repeatedly denied claims that he is grooming his son, including in a recent interview with France 24,21 a number of indications seem to show otherwise. For several years there has been a sustained online campaign of selling the Muhoozi project. Muhoozi himself has on several occasions declared that he will be Uganda’s next president after his father and has equally appointed numerous influential people to publicly promote his presidential ambitions.

342  Research handbook on authoritarianism 21.6.1 Ethnic Undertones The majority of the youths that died in the riots were Baganda, almost 90 percent of those picked by the drones and tortured were Baganda … it was sad to see several Baganda mothers and grandmothers appearing on TV searching for the missing sons and some mourning those killed. We did not see other tribes affected.22

The 2021 election took place when the mood in Buganda was explicitly hostile to Museveni. Since independence in 1962, Museveni has largely been considered the first non-Muganda president of Uganda that was accepted by Baganda, the largest ethnic group in Uganda. On the one hand, there seem to be growing tensions between the central government and the Buganda Kingdom at a macro level while, on the other, disadvantaged Baganda youths appear to attribute their limited opportunities to the pervasive sectarianism that has arguably favoured Western Uganda youth over those from Buganda. During the November riots, for instance, some youths mounted illegal roadblocks and engaged in extortionist behaviour, blocked roads to disrupt traffic flow, burnt car tyres to damage the tarmac, attacked police officers, and targeted people of a particular ethnicity. To put these ethnic attacks into context, Kyagulanyi is a Muganda and most of his support was in Buganda. Kyagulanyi’s main rival, the incumbent Museveni, is a Munyankore. During the riots, Kyagulanyi’s supporters, who were mainly Baganda, targeted Banyankore who they presumed to be natural supporters of the incumbent. The tribal dimension of the violence is concerning because it revealed underlying umbrage by one tribe against another. A member of the Uganda Human Rights Commission agrees: On the November riots, some of the acts are regrettable [by the security forces] but we also noted that some young men and women attacked people; there were incidents of sectarianism and nepotism coming out, they destroyed people’s property just because they were perceived to be of a particular tribe … The violence was not only about the election; there were underlying causes that need to be addressed. The elections gave the underlying causes a platform. (Ruth Ssekindi)23

The anti-Banyankore sentiment among some Baganda is reinforced by the fact that the security agencies are dominated by Banyankore or people from Western Uganda, and whenever there is a confrontation that has an ethnic dimension, between security agencies and civilians, it is taken as a struggle of the Baganda against the Banyankore. As one NGO leader in an interview observed about the 2021 election violence: Ninety per cent of the commanders that brutalised people were Banyankore or westerners. It shows that in the police or army, you rely on your tribe. But also, that creates an angle of enmity within the population. People begin to think that the Banyankore are the ones brutalising them. For the first time since the NRM took power, Museveni lost in Buganda his hitherto stronghold. Kyagulanyi who hails from the Gomba District in central Uganda garnered 62% of votes cast in Buganda, compared to Museveni’s 35.91%. Museveni took this bitterly and in his first address to the nation after being declared the winner on January 16, 2021, complained “in some of the voting, the pattern which we saw, for instance, in Buganda, very interesting; you can see some sectarianism … I have been following what has been going on. There is nothing I don’t know. I know who has been meeting who; who was giving money to who (sic); I know all that … They were talking of a new Uganda. But actually they wanted to bring back the old Uganda that failed. That is what they wanted to bring back: the old way of sectarianism.” Museveni then likened the NUP wave in Buganda to the 1960s Baganda-dominated political party – Kabaka Yekka – a Ganda-centric political organisation that rallied around Buganda causes.

Uganda  343 Ironically, Museveni did not highlight the parallel that voters in western Uganda, where he comes from, voted overwhelmingly for him, with 80.60% compared to the 14.03% that Kyagulanyi scored.

21.6.2 The Plan B Rhetoric The 2021 electoral violence was further precipitated by the general belief by the opposition that power alteration in Uganda cannot be achieved through electoral processes. Relatedly, surveys conducted have shown that the majority of Ugandan voters do not believe that it is possible to change the government via the ballot box (Cheeseman, 2021). The opposition continuously advanced the idea that the Electoral Commission and the courts that are run by the regime and answerable to the president cannot work.24 The narrative that the opposition stood a better chance through popular resistance was emboldened. It seems that this idea had sunk deep in the psyche of opposition groups, as well as the security forces. This created fertile ground for extreme violence. It appears that Bobi Wine and the NUP also adopted a militant strategy suggesting that Uganda was ready for a revolution as was the case in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and to some limited extent Zimbabwe, where the youth had collapsed long-serving presidents.25 The political patterns elsewhere in Africa seemed to have, on the one hand, emboldened the youth, while, on the other, scared the status quo. All security officers interviewed explained that there was a plan to cause massive disruption in Kampala in order to precipitate regime collapse. On asking what kind of plan it was and who was instigating it, operatives insisted that it was many elements in the opposition, including Kizza Besigye, who was working behind the cover of the NUP. At least many sources in the security circles thought that the plan was not authored by Bobi Wine. The real brain behind the plan was Besigye and radical elements in the People Power Movement. The plans to burn Kampala, according to state agents, would work well because Besigye and Bobi Wine share a political base. Besigye has the experience and political acumen that Bobi Wine lacks, a senior police officer reasoned. There was money distributed to young people to prepare for the mayhem. Security claims that in the ranks of the planners were some retired junior military officers from the Buganda region and other young people who have some combat experience because they previously worked as security guards in Iraq and other places. They had established a system that covered the whole of Kampala. Pseudo commanders had been put in place in all Kampala ghettos. They had a detailed plan of barricading Kampala to slow down security responses. They had planned to overstretch security and wear it down. There was cross-fertilisation between Besigye’s secret plans and some radicals within the NUP. The state viewed People Power and NUP as a bastard child of Besigye’s defiance campaigns. The sentiments were the same. 18–20 November 2020 was a signal and on the FDC’s official Twitter account they announced a roll-out of a Plan B.26 For effective penetration and as a strategy to destroy the NUP, the regime drew a detailed profile of critical NUP supporters that it perceived to have possessed the potential to organise violence against the state. By the first week of January 2021, the NUP had been deeply penetrated and all their activities and secrets provided to the state on a daily basis. The arrests, meanwhile, were mainly coordinated by the secret collaborators who provided details of their colleagues, including places of work, abode, and family networks.

344  Research handbook on authoritarianism On the day of his nomination in November 2020, Museveni revealed that his government would not tolerate the activities of enemies, that he did not name, who were allegedly plotting chaos (Muhumuza, 2020). “There’s nobody who is going to disturb here. Whoever tries will regret. Because for us, we don’t play … The NRM fought to bring peace in this country. Nobody has more guns than us. But we don’t scare people.”27 This was a clear indication that Museveni and his security agencies feared an insurrection. In fact, several pro-NRM individuals revealed that their biggest fear was not losing the election, but the potential insurrection that the electoral period could trigger. Victims of drones, arrest in safe houses and torture all revealed to this research that the prevailing question they were asked was for them to disclose details of Plan B. The more one denied knowledge, the more that person was tortured, many victims explained. One of the reasons behind shutting down the Internet was the fear that social media platforms would be used to coordinate violence aiming at regime collapse. “We asked telecom companies to switch off several numbers of NUP die-hards to disable their organisational capacity. Between January 12 and 16 2021 we must have switched off more than 5,000 numbers, especially in Kampala and Wakiso”, a military officer revealed. To forestall insurrection, the state also emphasised military deployment. Towards the voting day, the military warned of firm action against any dissent (Kamoga, 2021). The military displayed heavy artillery as posture and strategy to cow the relentless youths who had already witnessed ugly scenes of violence including the November riots. President Museveni defended the military deployments, claiming that the force was aimed at guarding against violence orchestrated by his political opponents. The president further argued that he had deployed army units that have experience in urban warfare in Somalia because of weakness and corruption within the regular police force (Kamoga, 2021). This message was to also show the population that despite the ongoing campaigns he was still in charge and could deploy the forces at his discretion, which of course boosts his warrior image, demoralising his opponents and their supporters. The tension was further heightened by NUP supporters who were full of revolutionary rhetoric. Some professed to have been ready to take on the state though for the majority it was the fantasy of violence, which provided some temporary relief for their oppressed and powerless position in Uganda’s politics, one of the NUP politicians reasoned. According to him, such fantasies were not fully analysed or rather were used to justify the violent actions of the security forces. Security institutions were, meanwhile, in direct competition, all trying to show that they are working more than their counterparts.

21.7

CURTAILING ELECTION OBSERVERS

The 2021 elections were the least observed elections since the NRM took power. Several organisations and individuals that had expressed interest in observing the elections were severely impeded. The regime seemed to have systematically planned to hold elections that were as opaque as possible.28 In the end, a handful of what some commenters called friendly short-term observer missions such as the East African Community (EAC) and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) were in Uganda. The IGAD preliminary election observation report highlighted that there was an absence of domestic observers and limited representation of other international observers in the 2021 elections (IGAD, 2021).

Uganda  345 The European Union refused to deploy an observer mission because previous recommendations from their 2016 mission had been ignored. According to an EU 2018 report, none of the 30 recommendations made by the observer mission sent to monitor the last election in 2016 was implemented.29 Two days before the elections, the United States cancelled its plans to observe the election saying that most of its accreditation requests were denied.30 In November 2020, meanwhile, Isaack Otieno Okero, a Kenyan national, who had been in Uganda as the acting head of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), a US-based NGO that engages in advancement of democracy, was arrested at gunpoint in his room at the Sheraton Hotel. Security operatives ransacked his room, taking away his passport, phones, laptop, and money. He was later bundled into a waiting car and driven to immigration jail in Kampala. To avoid further attention from the media, Okero was driven for over four hours to the Uganda-Kenya border at Busia, where there was a standoff since the authorities could not justify the deportation, and they had also denied him a chance to use his return ticket (see Menya, 2020).

21.8

ELECTORAL IRREGULARITIES AND THE FACADE OF COVID-19 STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOPS)

The official electoral results from several districts seem problematic, or at least raise a number of questions.31 In these districts, Museveni scored between 95 and 100 per cent and in several cases voter turnout was 100 per cent, all voting for candidate Museveni.32 Though the Electoral Commission’s official voter turnout was 59.35 per cent (10,744,319 of the 18,103,603 registered voters), 409 polling stations were announced to have had 100 per cent voter turnout.33 Such voting patterns, some observers have argued, are reflective of direct manipulation and falsification of the vote count by the Electoral Commission or coercion of voters at the polling stations.34 Two days after declaring Museveni the winner it emerged that the Electoral Commission had not included results from more than 1,257 polling stations (see Daily Monitor Team, 2021). The Electoral Commission explained that it had a 48-hour period to report a result and could not obtain such information in time from these polling stations. The majority of the uncounted votes were in Kampala and Wakiso where Bobi Wine won in both districts by about 73 per cent and 75 per cent, respectively, while Museveni polled 24 per cent in both districts.35 It remains unclear how many other polling stations in NUP’s strongholds were not counted by the Electoral Commission. Ironically, immediately after being declared winner, Museveni stated: “I think this might turn out to be the most cheating-free elections since 1962, when the country achieved independence.”36 The 2021 election was unique because it happened during the time of the COVID-19 pandemic, which brought about a number of restrictions on the movements of the candidates. The opposition candidates had limited interactions with their supporters because they were blocked under the guise of the COVID-19 Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) (see BBC, 2020b; Human Rights Watch 2020). The 2021 election, as Cheeseman (2021) inferred, represents a clear case in which COVID-19 restrictions were manipulated for political ends. Though Uganda had comparatively low cases of COVID-19, during the election period it introduced stringent SOPs that were unevenly enforced. The Electoral Comission made it clear that rallies were effectively banned, as the maximum number of people allowed to attend an

346  Research handbook on authoritarianism event was set at 70 (Isilow, 2020), although this was subsequently increased to 200 (CIPESA, 2021). The Electoral Commission also required all actors to respect social distancing measures of two metres, use facemasks, and ensure regular hand-washing (Cheeseman, 2021). The Electoral Commission maintained that campaigns would be conducted on radio and television, in newspapers, and on the Internet.37 Reaching out to voters via media platforms as suggested by the Electoral Commission seemed unfeasible since a 2014 census showed that one million homesteads had television sets and 3.4 million had radio sets, yet Uganda had 18 million voters in the 2021 elections.38 Civil society and opposition leaders disapproved of the restrictions, suggesting that the number of COVID-19 cases was too low to justify such restrictions. They further insisted that the measures had been introduced to enhance the incumbent but restrict the activities of rival parties. Security forces frequently cited COVID-19 SOPs as their reason for breaking up political campaigns and arresting opposition leaders and supporters. The opposition and neutral observers, including human rights activists, argued that the forces were using these regulations as a pretext to violate human rights, political freedoms and to incapacitate the opposition for the benefit of the status quo.39 On 8 January 2021, the UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR) spokesperson, Ravina Shamdasani issued a statement expressing concern that they had increasingly observed that the COVID-19 restrictions were being enforced more strictly to curtail opposition electoral campaign activities in a discriminatory fashion. Generally, both the NRM and NUP held events at which more than 200 people attended, but the Electoral Commission and the security forces responded by selectively enforcing COVID-19 protocols, shutting down NUP’s events and detaining and harassing Bobi Wine, while allowing ruling party meetings to continue without any interference (Schwikowski, 2020). As a result, the Citizens’ Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU) concluded that the Electoral Commission had failed to strike a balance between public safety, mitigation of health risks from COVID-19, and electoral freedoms and rights (CCEDU, 2021). On 26 December 2020, about 18 days before the polling day, the Electoral Commission came up with an order banning campaigns in over 15 districts and cities which had been categorised by the health experts as high, sustained, and diffuse transmission districts/areas.40 Though the Electoral Commission statement indicated that the ban was a strategy to prevent gatherings in the wake of surging cases of COVID-19, the majority of the interviewees insisted it was to stop Bobi Wine from accessing his stronghold areas, especially in central Uganda. The Electoral Commission added some areas outside Buganda as a cover-up and ironically Museveni had already campaigned in those locations that the ban affected.41

21.9

CRACKDOWN ON THE MEDIA AND ATTACKS ON JOURNALISTS

The 2021 elections were further overshadowed by unprecedented efforts to block public access to information. Since the last presidential election in 2016, Uganda fell 23 places in the Reporters Without Borders’ (RSF) World Press Freedom Index and at the time of filing this report, it was ranked 125th out of 180 countries (Reporters Without Borders, 2021).

Uganda  347 Human Rights Network for Journalists (HNRJ) Uganda reported over 100 cases of human rights violations against journalists when covering political candidates, including getting teargassed and beaten (Amnesty International, 2020). Between 2 October and 25 November 2021 RSF tallied 17 press freedom violations, including seven attacks, four arbitrary arrests of journalists, and many cases of obstruction. In a move that was seen as a scheme to restrict media access and coverage during the election period, the Ugandan Communication Commission (UCC) insisted that all online data communication and broadcasting services must obtain prior authorisation from the UCC before providing such services to the public (Reporters Without Borders, 2021). And a few hours before the polls opened, the UCC instructed Internet providers to cut its subscribers off the Internet. The Internet shutdown was preceded with a ban of Facebook and other social media platforms due to what the regime termed the “arrogant behaviour” of those companies. On election day, therefore, news could only be published via radio or TV. The Internet lockdown seriously impacted the ability of media organisations and journalists to competently cover the election and some commentators reasoned that democracy was in darkness (see Maukonen, 2021). After voting, moreover, the Electoral Commission deflected questions about how countrywide voting results were transmitted during the Internet blackout by saying, “we designed our own system”, but did not explain how it worked.42 According to the International Press Institute (IPI), media organisations and journalists feared security forces’ violence and thus many kept a distance from covering the electoral campaigns and voting proceedings. In particular, reporters covering opposition candidates were harassed, arrested, beaten and even shot at by the security forces (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2021; Maukonen, 2021). Furthermore, in November 2020, security operatives deported a news crew from the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBS), comprising Lily Martin, Jean-Francois Bisson, and Margaret Evans. The deportation disregarded the fact that the crew had been granted accreditations by the Media Council (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2021; International Press Institute, 2021). Prior to the deportation, President Museveni and his loyalists had severally accused foreign media houses and journalists of favouring the opposition candidate. Colonel Paddy Ankunda, a military intelligence officer, suggesting that international journalists were CIA agents (Reporters Without Borders, 2021). The Media Council issued new guidelines to foreign journalists in December 2020 requiring them to reapply for their accreditations within one week. Though the state authorities disguised the new guidelines as a strategy to safeguard journalists and rid the field of quack reporters, the true intention was to muzzle credible reporting on the elections (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2021; International Press Institute, 2021). 21.9.1 President Museveni’s Military Posture In a televised address a day before the election, Museveni put on his military jacket to speak to Ugandans. He claimed that he had held a meeting with the security forces and they were ready to defend the population. “Therefore, don’t fear anything, come out and vote. Nobody will intimidate you, nobody will attack you. If anybody does that we shall get him.” This was premeditated to systematically show the people that he was a military general. His attire was not random; he chose it carefully and the words he spoke were to clearly assure the population that he is not only a general, but he also has the military under his tight grip. The

348  Research handbook on authoritarianism population was of course reminded that the opposition in general, and Bobi Wine in particular, had no chance. The military attire gives Museveni the much-needed symbolic capital which he frequently uses to dominate his opponents. Museveni reappeared in a military jacket while casting his vote on 14 January 2021 well aware that the cameras would be on him. He again had on the military jacket while reading out his victory speech on 16 January 2021. Research shows that the general public in Uganda attaches high symbolic value to the military and its associated ethos. Specifically, military attire communicates power and status (Kagoro, 2015). Having come to power after winning a guerrilla war, Museveni’s supremacy is more valid when a military threatening enemy exists – real, imagined, or created. It is not surprising, therefore, that Museveni’s strongest political rivals have been mostly presented as a security rather than a political challenge. President Museveni continually connected Kizza Besigye to rebel groups, including the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the People’s Reduction Army (PRA) (see Kagoro, 2015) and in the 2021 elections his main challenger, Bobi Wine, was alleged to be promoting terrorism. To Museveni and the NRM regime in general, Bobi Wine and the NUP were seen from the prism of a security threat. This meant that the supporters were perceived or framed as dangerous criminals that had to be decisively dealt with. This approach, therefore, exacerbated human rights abuses, before, during, and after the 2021 elections. Presenting political rivals as a security challenge enables Museveni to construct different shades of insecurity and to further stage himself as the defender of the people. He has been able to project himself as a security bridge that people can use to cross from insecurity to security. This he has done in two ways. First, by highlighting “looming” security threats and second, by promising to crush all those intending to cause insecurity. This also gives the security forces justification to engage in massive human rights abuses.

21.10 CONCLUSION Electoral violence in Uganda seems to have become an entrenched practice. Since the tail end of the colonial period, elections in Uganda have been both controversial and violent. This research has shown that the 2021 elections were exceedingly violent and there were unprecedent levels of human rights abuses by the security forces. The abuses ranged from torture, abductions, illegal arrests of opposition leaders and supporters, tear-gassing and dispersing the majority of opposition rallies, clamping down on the media and civil society organisations to killing of opposition supporters. The elections seemed to suggest that the incumbent regime, the NRM and President Museveni wanted to maintain the status quo at all cost. This argument is in line with the conceptual model which suggests that electoral violence is a negative consequence of a government that wants to stay in power regardless of the consequences. Drawing on scholars such as Hafner-Burton et al. (2013), this research has demonstrated that because President Museveni and the NRM party are unwilling to relinquish power, there is a greater incentive to crack down on the opposition. Based on the conceptual lenses of Hafner-Burton et al. (2013), therefore, the violence and human rights abuses in the 2021 elections can be understood from three dimensions. First, the NRM feared that the elections could have changed the status quo. Second, they unleashed

Uganda  349 violence because there are few, if any, constraints on the use of the security forces in their favour. Third, the NRM and President Museveni were convinced that there are virtually no consequences for applying violence. In that sense, the 2021 electoral violence was premised on the attitude of NRM that seems to see violence as one of the means to achieve its ends because the prevailing sociopolitical circumstances facilitate the use of violence with limited, if any, consequences for the perpetrators of human rights abuses. The research has shown that there were specific factors that heightened the violence in the 2021 general elections. First, there were internal cracks within the NRM after the party lost its pillars that had previously been key in organising party structures or in curtailing the opposition. Second, and related to the first factor, is that the elections took place at a time when there were heightened inter-security agency rivalries. Third, to a large extent the 2021 elections bifurcated Ugandan society along generational lines. Fourth, the election assumes an ethnic dimension, flaring up violent emotions. Fifth, the NRM was facing an opposition group that was new on the scene and whose political base was unpredictable. Sixth, the elections were held in a toxic atmosphere when the opposition repeatedly expressed its mistrust of the Electoral Commission and the voting processes in general. Many opposition leaders professed a Plan B, an unconstitutional strategy of removing the incumbent through an insurrection. Seventh, this research has also shown that the competition between Museveni and Bobi Wine was interpreted as a competition between the latter and the former’s son, Muhoozi Kainerugaba. The pro-Muhoozi elements within the security forces are said to have unleashed violence to dismember the People Power Movement and Bobi Wine to forestall any eventuality that this group might cause to their future prospects. This research contributes to the general understanding of electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa and specifically to the comprehension of the human rights abuses in the 2021 elections in Uganda.

NOTES 1. See, for instance, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2006/2/16/ugandan-opposition-rally-turns​bloody. 2. https://​www​.bbc​.com/​news/​world​-africa​-11524243. 3. https://​www​.hrw​.org/​news/​2016/​04/​22/​uganda​-5​-years​-no​-justice​-walk​-work​-killings. 4. https://​www​.voanews​.com/​africa/​study​-many​-uganda​-voters​-fear​-violence​-next​-elections. 5. See “‘Reclaim your country’ – Besigye, Bobi Wine rally Jinja East to vote Mwiru”, SoftPower News. 6. See https://​www​.softpower​.ug/​photos​-basalirwa​-bobi​-wine​-engage​-in​-door​-to​-door​-campaign​-in​ -bugiri/​. 7. See “Bobi Wine excites Rukungiri voters ahead of tomorrow’s woman MP election”, Sqoop – Get Uganda entertainment news, celebrity gossip, videos and photos. 8. See https://​www​.youtube​.com/​watch​?v​=​mcEoK0EzB​_I. 9. See http://​country​.eiu​.com/​article​.aspx​?articleid​=​1407158524​&​Country​=​Uganda​&​topic​=​Politics​&​ subtopic​=​Forecast​&​subsubtopic​=​Political+​stability. 10. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/dec/13/ugandas-young-voters-are-hungry-for-change​ -bobi​-wine​-museveni. 11. https://​blogs​.worldbank​.org/​nasikiliza/​we​-want​-to​-be​-heard​-the​-voices​-of​-ugandas​-young​-people​ -on​-youth​-unemployment.

350  Research handbook on authoritarianism 12. https://​africasacountry​.com/​2019/​05/​singing​-truth​-to​-power. 13. https://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/Bobi-Wine-music-shows-Police-Mukono-/688334​ -4144840​-14drbe5z/​index​.html. 14. https://​nairobinews​.nation​.co​.ke/​museveni​-why​-i​-banned​-bobi​-wines​-concerts/​. 15. https://​www​.theeastafrican​.co​.ke/​oped/​comment/​Now​-Bobi​-Wine​-finds​-he​-cannot​-sell​-old​-politics​ -in​-new​-bottles/​434750​-4907838​-rwx46g/​index​.html. 16. https://​nairobinews​.nation​.co​.ke/​museveni​-why​-i​-banned​-bobi​-wines​-concerts/​. 17. See https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/museveni-guards-holding-50-missing-per sons​-3315436. 18. See note 17. 19. See https://​www​.bbc​.com/​news/​av/​world​-africa​-57286419. 20. In September 2021 Major General Paul Lokech died of a blood clot. 21. See details at https://​www​.france24​.com/​en/​tv​-shows/​the​-interview/​20210908​-exclusive​-uganda​-s​ -museveni​-says​-guinea​-coup​-leaders​-should​-get​-out, accessed 26 October 2021. 22. Interview with a Ugandan political scientist, held on 6 September 2021 in Kampala. 23. Interview with a senior official at at Uganda Human Rights Commission, Ruth Ssekindi, held on 8 September 2021 in Kampala. 24. Interview with a head of an international non-governmental organization, held on 7 September 2021 in Kampala. 25. https://​www​.france24​.com/​en/​video/​20190613​-bobi​-wine​-says​-uganda​-inspired​-sudanese​-protests. 26. Interview with a Senior security officer X2 held on 25 August 2021 in Kampala. 27. https://apnews.com/article/yoweri-museveni-elections-bobi-wine-arrests-uganda-cbbbe0c26dfc​ a3485f0a99b5f35296b6. 28. Interview. 29. See https://​www​.reuters​.com/​article/​us​-uganda​-politics​-idUSKBN27W1H1, accessed 11 October 2021. 30. https://​www​.reuters​.com/​article/​uk​-uganda​-election​-idUSKBN29I1AV, accessed 10 October 2021. 31. These districts include Amudat, Isingiro, Kamwenge, Karenga, Kazo, Kiruhura, Kyankwanzi, Mbarara, Nabilatuk, Nakapiripirit, Nakaseke, Napak, and Ntungamo. 32. For details, see the Electoral Commission tally sheet at https://www.ec.or.ug/2021-presidentialresults-tally-sheets-district, accessed 19 October 2021. 33. Ibid. 34. See https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/16/ugandas-museveni-declared-winner-of-presiden tial​-election, accessed 19 October 2021. 35. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/special-reports/ec-excludes-results-from-over-1-200-polling​ -stations​-3260542, accessed on 19 October 2021. 36. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/16/ugandas-museveni-declared-winner-of-presidential​ -election, accessed 19 October 2021. 37. https://​theconversation​.com/​why​-ugandas​-ban​-on​-open​-air​-campaigns​-could​-tilt​-the​-2021​-poll​-in​ -musevenis​-favour​-144814, accessed 21 October 2021. 38. Ibid. 39. https://​www​.bbc​.com/​news/​world​-africa​-55573581. 40. See Electoral Commission statement at https://​www​.ec​.or​.ug/​news/​ec​-suspends​-campaign​-meetings​ -specified​-districts, accessed 19 October 2021. 41. Interview with a senior official of the National Unity Platform (NUP), held on 8 September 2021 in Kampala. 42. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/16/ugandas-museveni-declared-winner-of-presidential​ -election, accessed 19 October 2021.

Uganda  351

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22. Turkmenistan: authoritarianism, nation building and cult of personality Sebastien Peyrouse

22.1 INTRODUCTION The Turkmen nation, like all others, can be regarded as a modern creation. The region has always been a vast zone of ethnic mixing, with the Iranian roots of the population having been largely transformed by the arrival of several massive waves of Turkic peoples. Although the term Turkmen has existed since the tenth century, it was not at that time an ethnic designation. The different Turkmen clans did not constitute a unified political entity and never fought as one against foreign domination. The Turkmen nation was constituted very recently, in the twentieth century, under the influence of radical social, political, and cultural processes instituted by the Soviet regime. The founding of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic in 1924 saw the creation, for the first time, of a Turkmen political entity with defined borders. The construction of a national narrative occurred as a result of massive literacy programs, the spreading of shared knowledge through the school system and the media, the setting up of mechanisms of social promotion linked to ethnic identification, and the partial effacing of old tribal and regional identities to give way to modern national sentiment (Edgar, 2004). The role of this Soviet past in the creation of the nation has, however, not only been ignored but denied by the post-independence Turkmen regime, which instead makes much of the people’s age-old uniqueness and their journey through the centuries free of foreign cultural borrowings. From the very beginning of independence, Turkmenistan nation building has been focused on three main objectives: the unity of tribes, political and socio-cultural de-Russification, and higher economic and life standards thanks to the country’s rich gas reserves. This has had a profound impact on the organization of the economic and social life of the Turkmen people in the 30 years since independence. First, the intangible concept of a proclaimed homogeneous Turkmen identity, which would have existed for thousands of years on its current territory, has materialized in the authoritarian centralization of the clans, in an ethnicization of the regime, namely, an open promotion of the so-called ethnic Turkmens along with the discrimination against all other national minorities. Second, this approach has resulted in an extreme authoritarianism of political power, embodied by the presidential figure and a worship of his omnipresent personality. The Turkmen regime has asserted a right to interfere and intervene in all social realms, and has required, through a combination of both incentives and coercion, support and unconditional submission of the Turkmen people. Finally, the Turkmen regime has built its legitimacy on the principle of a so-called “Turkmen path”, which is meant to be unique, and whose success, both economic and social, is to be gradual and long term. This unique Turkmen way has led to a foreign policy based on the principle of permanent neutrality, and which since the 1990s has resulted in the voluntary isolation of the country on the international scene. 356

Turkmenistan  357 In this chapter, I argue that the nation state, which is built on an intrusive authoritarianism made of an exaggerated cult of personality, ethnicization of the society, strict control of religion, culture and education, and foreign policy isolationism in the name of the Turkmen path, weakens rather than nourishes its stability. This political system, which has become so implausible, contributes in the long run to jeopardizing the country’s development and its economic and social future. Despite the absence of official sociological studies due to the extreme authoritarianism of the country, many sources inside the country show that the average Turkmen has seen his or her own social and cultural role in nation building evolve from that of participant and even “co-producer” to that of an increasingly reticent, and coerced consumer.

22.2

AUTHORITARIANISM AND MONOPOLIZATION OF POWER

Since the country’s independence in 1991, its three successive presidents—Saparmurat Niyazov (1991–2006), Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov (2006–2022), and Serdar Berdymukhamedov (2022–)—have worked to secure their monopoly on power (Polese, Ó Beacháin and Horák, 2017: 427–45). All elections held in Turkmenistan have taken place in a “strictly controlled political environment,” according to the OSCE election observation missions (OSCE/ODIHR, 2017: 1). The president of the republic is the head of the executive and the Cabinet of ministers, and he wields immense power to appoint officials at all levels of society: members of the administration, governors (hokims), directors of the state-run industries, deans of universities and the Academy of Sciences, etc. The Soviet-inherited system for the selection and confirmation of cadres was maintained, according to which the requisite state body was in charge of drawing up lists of the candidates, generally party members, who qualified for the posts. Over the years since independence, the decision-making powers of the government and ministers were reduced, and decisions referred almost exclusively to the president and his close political advisors. Like the legislature, the judiciary was entirely beholden to the executive. The presidents appoint all judges—including those on the Supreme Court, the attorney general, and regional judges. Officially, they could be dismissed only by court decisions and on the legal grounds specified by the constitution. In practice, however, the chief executive reserved the right to remove them at any time. The Turkmen system of justice remains one of the opaquest in the world. For over 30 years, Turkmen presidents have ensured that no person could emerge as a threat to their hold on power. They have sought to prevent the emergence of any opposition internal to state structures through systematic and constant purges. Arrests came with such regularity that in the last years of Niyazov’s rule, many refused positions of responsibility, aware of the risk involved. Such monolithic authority required extremely tight societal control, which was provided by several organs of surveillance and repression, including the Committee for National Security (KNB), a renamed version of the former Soviet KGB. Following an old Soviet tradition, opponents who could not flee the country were often jailed without a trial, and dozens of them disappeared (Prove They’re Alive, 2021). The extraction of confessions by torture was, and continues to be considered, common practice in Turkmenistan. The right to strike or demonstration is nonexistent. Civil society has been unable to organize; individuals— even those not involved in politics—were threatened by arbitrary arrests by police and judicial decisions; the opposition, which was organized but unrepresentative, has grown only in exile.

358  Research handbook on authoritarianism All media remain strictly controlled by the executive authorities. Any criticism or mention of economic and social problems, however slight, is prohibited. Since 1991, the post-Soviet generations of Turkmen citizens have grown up entirely within a context marked by a lack of state institutions other than that of the president, an absence of independent media, restricted access to the outside world, and a cultural sphere dominated to a large degree by the works of the presidents. For a large majority of the population, independence signified continuity with the Soviet era in terms of ideological control over society. In comparison, the Brezhnev period and the short years of perestroika can be considered periods of relative freedom. In 2022, Turkmenistan was again ranked by Freedom House as one of the most authoritarian states in the world, with only 2 points out of 100, behind Eritrea and North Korea, but ahead of Syria and Sudan. In Turkmenistan the probability of a “color revolution” along the lines of the Georgian, Ukrainian, or Kyrgyz model seems unlikely. The necessary conditions—parliamentary elections contested by a cohesive opposition enjoying at least in part foreign financial support— have in no way been present. Instead, presidential successions have taken place in a context of rivalries within the circles of political elites and, as argued by the scholar Luca Anceschi, contrary to conventional wisdom, have gone relatively smoothly (Anceschi, 2021: 661). 22.2.1 Managing Succession Upon the announcement of the death of Niyazov in 2006, the first signs of competition appeared between members of the nomenklatura. According to the constitution, the interim presidency should have been given to the president of parliament, lawyer Ovezgeldy Ataev; however, power was transferred to the vice president of the ministerial Cabinet, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov. Born in the same region as Niyazov, he was part of his entourage from the 1990s until his death. As Niyazov’s personal dentist, he quickly climbed up the ladder and in 2001 was named deputy prime minister and health minister. Berdymukhamedov led the committee for the president’s funeral, which in Soviet tradition confirmed his status as the official successor. A few days after the death of Niyazov, the attorney general requested that the parliament vote on Ataev’s resignation in order to allow for the opening of a criminal investigation against him for arcane reasons related to the abuse of power and immoral conduct. After the vote, Ataev was dismissed, arrested, and sentenced to five years in prison. Circumvention of the constitution and the political elimination of the legal successor of the president thus confirmed the importance of succession struggles in the corridors of power. The succession between Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov and his son Serdar Berdymukhamedov was prepared by the former as a dynastic transfer. Serdar was gradually placed in positions of increased responsibility. He was appointed Minister of Industry and Construction in 2020, was promoted at the beginning of 2021 to the positions of Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the Supreme Control Chamber, and also became a member of the State Security Council. Serdar’s cumulation of strategic positions that control the levers of power combined with his increasingly frequent media appearances and the official narrative presenting him as the “son of the nation” and a symbol of generation continuance, demonstrating Berdymukhamedov’s strategy of ensuring his family succession. In May 2022, Serdar was appointed president of the country following elections that the OSCE refused to observe, arguing that all recommendations of its previous observations to Turkmenistan had remained unaddressed, including those related to the separation of powers and pluralistic environment,

Turkmenistan  359 the exercise of fundamental human rights, freedom of the media, election administration, voter and candidate registration, campaigning, and election day procedures (OSCE/ODIHR, 2022). 22.2.2 Authoritarianism and Cult of Personality Authoritarianism and personality cults have been an essential and basic element of nation building in Turkmenistan. However, unlike other states in the region, for example Uzbekistan where the cult of personality of the first president Islam Karimov was built by proxy in reference to the historical figure of Tamerlane, nation building in Turkmenistan has centered almost exclusively and directly on the presidential personality, who has been proclaimed to be the essential generator of Turkmen national identity, and who connects, on a mystical, primordial, or organic way, the people to the Turkmen land (Denison, 2009: 1176). The whole Turkmen population is therefore supposed to recognize itself through the president’s cult of personality. This has shaped not only the country’s political institutions, but also its social and cultural life. In the 1990s, Niyazov put in place mechanisms to establish his own cult of personality and portrayed himself as a benevolent father and leader, ready to sacrifice himself for the good of his people (“Saparmurat Turkmenbashi—president XXI veka,” 1999: 1–2). From 2001, the cult accelerated with the publication of the Ruhnama, or “book of the soul,” officially written by the president himself. The book was supposed to amalgamate the best of what Turkmen culture had produced over thousands of years and provide new values to the Turkmen people to lead it into the “golden age of Turkmenistan.” The Ruhnama did not present an ideology or a political doctrine per se, but was a disparate patchwork of borrowed elements from the Koran, Communist literature, and traditional Turkmen epics. Niyazov decreed that the Ruhnama would be regarded as “the second holy book after the Koran.” From 1990 to 2007, the image of Niyazov remained omnipresent in the streets, institutions, schools, factories, and transportation of Turkmenistan. All public areas were decorated with the portraits and slogans of Turkmenbashi (the leader of Turkmens), his official title. After Niyazov’s death in 2006, G. Berdymukhamedov quietly shelved the cult of his predecessor. However, this soon gave way to a new cult of the second president and his family. The portraits and writings of Berdymukhamedov gradually replaced those of Niyazov. The media described Berdymukhamedov with designations similar to those of his predecessor, including “dear son of the Turkmen people,” the “backbone of the nation” (“Happy new cult!,” 2009), or Arkadag (protector), introduced in 2010, which has become his main title in official propaganda. As under Niyazov, the declamation of slogans about the president was almost ritualized: there is almost no news coverage, including such minor events as the launching of a project or the inauguration of a new building, which is not associated with the cult of Berdymukhamedov (Meurs, 2011). Since 2006, the ubiquitous media performances by the Turkmen president, who was presented as omnipotent, able to sing in public with a guitar, perform surgical operations, ride a horse, win car races, or master military equipment, was not only part of a well-established pattern of myth-making, but also an attempt at diversion from the fall in hydrocarbon prices that is sinking the country into crisis and feeding a serious social malaise (BTI, 2022). However, Berdymukhamedov substantially revised his cult of personality in order to differentiate himself from his predecessor. The theme of Renaissance, which praises the new achievements that the country has attained and the justness of presidential decisions,

360  Research handbook on authoritarianism has replaced that of the golden age. With this new slogan, Berdymukhamedov has portrayed the Niyazov era as a simple transition from the Soviet order to democracy and to the Renaissance era, which he is, de facto, the authentic and unique architect. Praise for the main post-independence achievements, both in domestic and foreign policy, go to him, while the name of Niyazov is rarely mentioned in connection with these achievements. This revision of the cult of personality, the pillar of the Turkmen nation building, had already under Niyazov been elaborated on by the creation of a new narrative around the presidential personality, focused on his present life and his recent personal past. Berdymukhamedov simply replaced the cult of his predecessor’s parents with that of his own ancestors, aligning himself with a Turkmen tradition according to which parents and ancestors have an essential influence on their descendants. Consequently, the cult of his family spread, a museum dedicated to his grandfather opened in 2009, and Turkmen historians have been required to study their lives (“Grandfather’s Museum,” 2009). Being an authentic Turkmen supposedly meant to be aware of a revised version of history that establishes Berydymukhamedov’s parents and ancestors as heroes of the nation; to revere the president’s ancestors is to revere the president. The cult of personality under the second president, however, was further altered by the appearance of new themes, which are intended to underpin the nation state as designed by Berdymukhamedov. A former dentist, he made health an essential component of national identity. Through propaganda requiring a healthy nation, Berdymukhamedov uses a paternalistic approach in posing as the healer of the nation (Polese and Horák, 2015: 470). The propaganda touting the capital’s hospitals as equipped with state-of-the-art equipment—in reality often unused due to a lack of competent personnel—is supposed to demonstrate the progress and modernity of the country reaching international standards. In Ashgabat, many shops for the treatment of diabetes have opened, a condition suffered by the president. Through his professional background and health profile, Berdymukhamedov creates an overlap between his person, the state and his people (Polese and Horák, 2015: 470). This way of highlighting the medical sector, which at the same time has remained opaque and extremely diminished for many years (Sapargel’diev, 2017; “Turkmenistan’s Opaque Health System,” 2010), has considerably widened the gap between its real capacities and the needs of the population (Peyrouse, 2019). Another important innovation is the introduction of sport in the narrative of the nation; it has been established as one of the main themes of the second president, and forms part of his health-oriented focus for the Turkmen nation (Horák, 2016: 48–63; Horák and Polese, 2016). Berdymukhamedov has led the significant development of sports education which he imposes in the daily life of Turkmen, from children in schools to his political entourage, demanding that his ministers join sports classes or practice gymnastics. He appeared regularly on television or on propaganda posters in sports clothes, usually green, the color of the Turkmen flag. These appearances are intended to record the perfect state of health of the president—despite his diabetes—and, by extension, of the country and its people. The Turkmen president also presents himself as the trainer of the population for a healthy life, which he makes a point of national pride and value. Any information on the slightest health problem likely to damage this image is banned. This led the president to consistently deny the presence of Covid-19 in Turkmenistan throughout the pandemic, despite numerous testimonies and reports of the deaths of many people from the disease. On the other hand, through the development of numerous and expensive sports infrastructures (stadiums and gigantic facilities, including a sport complex for winter games in a desert

Turkmenistan  361 country where summer temperatures consistently exceed 40 degrees), Berdymukhamedov places sport in the cult of architecture that was initiated by his predecessor, and through which the image of the leader of the nation is translated into architectural landscapes (Koch and Valiyev, 2015: 575–98). With the growing presence of sports infrastructure in the urban landscape, sport has become an omnipresent element in the daily life of the Turkmen citizen, whether they are sporty or not. The cult of sport is also intended as a showcase for the international community. In 2017, hosting the Asian Indoor and Martial Arts Games was presented as the consecration of this policy: the cult of sport and its corollary, a healthy nation and president, were supposed to be recognized and admired worldwide and consequently nourish, by means of media propaganda, the pride of the Turkmen people. Finally, all presidents have made architecture an important element of enhancing their image as leader of the nation, which led them to reshape urbanism, the architecture and landscape of Turkmenistan with Pharaonic projects, whose cost cut deep into the state budget and mortgaged the country’s development. The entire capital has been rebuilt as an open monument dedicated to the presidents. Both have commissioned the construction of a number of luxurious palaces and cultural centers, the large size of which contrasts with the lack of public services. This grandiosity, which is said to be known and admired by the whole world, supposedly feeds national pride (Koch and Valiyev, 2015: 577). The third president, Serdar Berdymukhamedov has maintained his predecessors’ cult of personality. During the reporting period, authorities in Turkmenistan forced private taxi drivers to have a portrait of the new president on the windshield of their vehicles; it is allegedly as mandatory as having a driver’s license and car registration documents (“Turkmen Authorities Make Moves,” 2022). From May 1 2022, the display of his portrait was mandatory in all schools, that is, in principals’ offices, in halls, and in every classroom. Although the image of Serdar Berdymukhamedov is becoming pervasive, this has not ended his father’s cult of personality. The enhancement of the personality of the son has instead been added to the cult of personality of his father. This ongoing cult of the former president has included the presentation of books that he allegedly authored. Several ceremonies widely highlighted in the media were held around his new (57th) book, Ömrümiň manysy (The Purpose of My Life), presented as “the outstanding philosophical and literary work and … a kind of quintessence of wisdom and primordially national spiritual and moral values transmitted by the Turkmen people from generation to generation for millennia” (“Kniga, vdohnovlyayushchaya na novye dostizheniya,” 2022: 3). 22.2.3 Managing the Political Power of Tribes Authoritarianism and the monopolization of power by the president has also consisted in building a narrative of the demographic growth of a people, divided among clans but now supposedly gathered around its leader. Nevertheless, the policy of the two presidents with regard to the clans has been significantly different. Under Niyazov, Turkmen authorities largely manipulated population growth statistics, gaining a certain pride from the would-be demographic expansion. According to official sources, the population numbered 5.56 million in 2002 and was approaching 7 million people at the death of Niyazov in 2006, although such statistics were considered as unrealistic by international observers (World Population Prospects, 2009).

362  Research handbook on authoritarianism Importantly, constructing the nation state according to an authoritarian and centralizing principle consisted of managing the thorny issue of clans and networks, perceived as an element of division, and a potential threat to the political and economic prerogatives of the incumbent president, his family, and his main circles of support. Turkmenistan is composed of a dozen clans, including the main one, the Teke, which the two presidents are from. Turkmen society grants a particular importance to the question of line of descent: kinship plays a role in matrimonial alliances (endogamous or exogamous strategies), and is used in the domain of rituals, during marriages, burials, or commemorations. Nevertheless, the Turkmen clans cannot be seen as political actors in their own right. They do not have charismatic leaders by which to challenge other clans on the national stage and are involved primarily in regional affairs. Moreover, the influence of clans as a network was largely hampered by Niyazov. In the early years of independence, he sought to balance the distribution of power between tribal networks. Under his rule, the energy sector was technically in the hands of the Yomut clan, from the Balkan region, even if the revenues drawn from the gas riches were controlled by Ashgabat. Berdymukhamedov has much more distinctly emphasized this patronage tradition by giving priority to his own clan (Peyrouse, 2011: 111–12). He initiated some leadership purges in this sector, enabling the Ahal Teke to take control of it again. However, and as before, tribal affiliation is by no means a unique condition sufficient for career prospects. Individual carriers are based much more on their unswerving fidelity to the state leader rather than to an influential group (Kadyrov, 2003: 169–72). 22.2.4 The Ethnicization of Turkmen Society Authoritarianism and nationalism have gone hand in hand in Turkmenistan. Both Niyazov and Berdymukhamedov have pursued a policy singling out ethnic Turkmen for support, while at the same time discriminating against national minorities. This policy has materialized through the affirmation of national identity along a linguistic line, that is, Turkmen. It targeted first and foremost national minorities, but it also affected the Turkmen majority in that the Turkmen identity of an individual is not claimed only through blood ties, but also and necessarily by knowledge of Turkmen language (Clement, 2014). This has resulted in the ethnicization of the state in all its sectors, political, economic, and social. Turkmen citizens belonging to a national minority are not permitted to enter into public service, especially the police, security services, and legal, financial, and military sectors. In 2002, the People’s Council Halk Maslahaty required that all state employees prove their “ethnic origins” by tracing them back as far as three generations. In addition, universities were encouraged to reject candidates whose names did not “sound” Turkmen, with national minorities treated essentially as second-class citizens (Bohr, 2016: 32–5). The two largest national minorities in the country, the Russians and the Uzbeks, have experienced particularly difficult legal, social, and cultural circumstances. Right after independence, Niyazov pursued a policy of de-Russification in the public sector by dismissing Russian employees. The Russian language lost its status, and the country announced the discontinuation of the use of Cyrillic, making many Turkmens de facto partly illiterate. The Turkmenization of education was also pursued: Russian language education disappeared gradually from curricula, and the teaching of Russian was reduced to one hour per week. As of 2001, all institutions of higher learning use Turkmen as their exclusive language of instruction.

Turkmenistan  363 In June 2003, Niyazov reneged on a treaty on dual citizenship signed with Russia in 1993, and gave all holders of dual citizenship (approximately 100,000 people) three months to choose one or the other. Accompanying this order were discriminatory measures against those who chose Russian citizenship. A prohibition was placed on their ownership of property and they were forced to leave the country within three months (“Rossiian mogut evakuirovat’ iz Turkmenii,” 2003). This discrimination led to widespread emigration. In the last Soviet census of 1989, there were 334,000 ethnic Russians living in Turkmenistan, making up 9.5 percent of the total population of the republic. In 2020, their number was estimated at under 100,000, most of whom live in Ashgabat (Najibullah, 2020; “The results of census in Turkmenistan,” 2015). The Russians are not the only group to suffer discrimination. The position of ethnic Uzbeks is also far from enviable. Estimated at about 500,000 people, and representing 10 percent of the population in the census of 1995, they constitute the largest minority in the country. In the 2000s, many of them requested to change nationality in a bid to become “Turkmen” to avoid ethnic discrimination (“IWPR: Uzhas deportatsii zakonchilsia?,” 2008). The rights of national minorities have remained widely flouted under Berdymukhamedov’s presidency. In the immense majority of cases, it continues to be impossible for national minorities to obtain positions in the administration, and they remain heavily discriminated against when it comes to finding employment. They are given virtually no room to engage in cultural activities, whereas this right is largely seen as depoliticized in the neighboring states, even in authoritarian ones like Uzbekistan. The Uzbek language schools have all closed. There are practically no media outlets for the national minorities. Only one Russian language newspaper, Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan is published. The broadcasting of Russian television channels was banned in 1994; the sole exception was ORT, Russia’s premier channel, which continued to broadcast in the country until 1998. None of the other national minority languages are represented in the media.

22.3

CULTURE AND EDUCATION SUBSERVIENT TO AUTHORITARIANISM

The rewriting of history has constituted a mainstay of independent Turkmenistan. It allows, in a primordialist mode, the linking of ethnic Turkmen to Turkmenistan, in particular through the most famous mythical rulers in the history of the country, and consequently the creation of a specific geo-cultural space (Denison, 2009: 1173; Du Boulay and Isaacs, 2019: 17–41). According to the few official historical works, the Turkmen nation, founded by Oghuz Khan, himself a descendant of the Biblical Prophet Noah, has existed for at least 3,000 years. It follows that Turkmen people have been present since the time of Noah, undivided by clans and uninfluenced by inputs from neighboring cultures (Niyazov, 2002: 2). All Turkic dynasties and tribes are retroactively considered to be of Turkmen origin. After a first golden age under Oghuz Khan, the Seljuk period (1040–1194) is depicted as the apotheosis of Turkmen civilization (Horák, 2005: 105–33). After the Seljuks, Turkmenistan supposedly fell into a period of decline until the emergence of new figures in the eighteenth century, like the poet Magtymguly and his father, Azady. The second president has validated this rewriting of history, however, and taken it even further, for example by pushing back the beginning of Turkmen history by 3,000 years through making Ashgabat an 8,000-year-old city (Meurs, 2011).

364  Research handbook on authoritarianism Russian colonization in the late nineteenth century is regarded as a long period of enslavement that prevented Turkmenistan’s entry into a new golden age. At school the country’s decades as a part of imperial Russia and the Soviet Union go unmentioned. The leading Turkmen figures from the early Soviet period, who perished in Stalin’s purges, have not been rehabilitated. The fight against Russian colonialism remains the only celebrated historical element of the last two centuries, especially the Gok Tepe battle in 1881, which saw the victory of Turkmens over the Tsarist troops (Horák, 2015: 149–61). In the period between this battle and independence in 1991, the single historical event studied by pupils is the patriotic acts performed by the Turkmen people during the Second World War. Excluding events from historiography and denouncing Russian colonization, especially the more recent Soviet regime, allows the Turkmen regime to impute to them the economic and social difficulties that Turkmenistan is currently facing. Besides, since independence, Turkmen culture has been (re)formulated by the invention of so-called traditions. This involved reviving customary practices, then adapting, ritualizing, and institutionalizing them in order to fit them into the precise schema of nation building, particularly a Turkmenized culture as defined by Berdymukhamedov. This has led to the reduction of Turkmen culture to its simplest form, and to limiting any artistic expression which does not conform to the so-called Turkmenity of the state. The authorities eliminated any independent intellectual or artistic expression, and sought to highlight only completely depoliticized mediums like traditional folk crafts, music, dance, and carpets. In 2001, Niyazov went so far as to prohibit theater, ballet, opera, classical and contemporary music, which he labeled “against the spirit of the Turkmen people” (Demidov, 2002: 104–7). The ban on circus and theater was reversed in 2008. Theaters have been built in all major cities and efforts have been made to construct a Turkmen tradition (for instance in opera). Literature in particular has been targeted by the regime. All national writers have been excluded from literature textbooks in favor of one or two figures selected by Niyazov and Berdymukhamedov, most often themselves or the poet Magtymguly. Limited to presidential works and a few other books that the authorities strictly control, the publishing field remains paltry. It is still practically impossible to import books published in Russia. Apart from school textbooks, the majority of publications are devoted to the president. For it is precisely toward the presidential figure, as a self-proclaimed living incarnation of Turkmenity, that Turkmen traditions are supposed to converge, and it is then from the presidential figure, as a central and omnipotent personality, that these same traditions emanate, and from whom people are supposed to take inspiration. This reinvention of traditions also resulted in the creation of what the scholar Laura Adams called in the Uzbek case “the spectacular state” (Adams, 2010). This manifested in the form of the engagement of many Turkmen citizens, sometimes on a voluntary basis but more often by coercion, in recitation of poems, songs, participation in parades and choreographies, in mass performances held throughout the year on the occasion of national holidays, the launch of new projects, the inauguration of new constructions, and the celebration of the president’s birthday. The participation of the average Turkmens aims to reduce the citizen’s sense of isolation and compulsion that authoritarianism nourishes, while preventing any input from them. The mobilization of people every year on the occasion of numerous celebrations and their repeated broadcast on television channels enchant, persuade, and give a sense of participation, although this process does not imply any real political democratic participation.

Turkmenistan  365 Authoritarianism and the cult of personality have largely contributed to the collapse of the education system. In the 2000s, the Ruhnama served as the basic manual from which pupils learned to read and write, and remained the topic of a mandatory exam in secondary schools and universities until 2012. After 2007, the reduction in the number of teaching hours of the Ruhnama did not lead to a freer atmosphere. New textbooks published since 2007 contain multiple references to the new president, and some disciplines aimed at spreading his personality cult have been included in the curriculum. Pupils must study “the policy of the Renaissance era,” in which they are taught about the new summits the country has attained and the justness of presidential decisions.

22.4

RELIGION MANAGED BY THE STATE

As in the other Central Asian countries, Turkmenistan’s constitution defines it as a secular republic and specifies the separation of the state and religion. After 70 years of Soviet atheism, the authorities also wanted to restore Islam as a national tradition (Clement, 2020). At his inauguration, Niyazov took the oath on the Qur’an, and in 1992, became the first Central Asian president to make the pilgrimage to Mecca. Muslim holidays—like Gurban-Bairam, which celebrates the end of the hajj, and Oraz-Bairam, marking the end of Ramadan—were made public holidays. Several large mosques were built in the country, and hundreds more reopened. However, although the legislation adopted after independence formally established the right to the freedom of belief and worship, Niyazov quickly became suspicious of religion, especially “foreign” religions or movements, whether Muslim or Christian. This has led to increased repression of religious movements and believers, whether Muslim, Christian, or otherwise. Berdymukhamedov has somewhat reworked the religious part of the nation building. Thirty years after independence, he no longer considers it necessary to prove to his people the outdated nature of the atheist and repressive policy of the Soviet regime, a task which was incumbent upon the first president. Religious “freedom” is proclaimed with slogans throughout the country. However, religion as a historical and cultural component of Turkmen identity is largely ignored in propaganda speeches and works. The second president has only once sworn an oath on the Qur’an, on the occasion of his first investiture. After his second election in 2012, he took his oath only on the constitution. Moreover, unlike Niyazov, who demanded engraving slogans to his glory and Ruhnama in religious places of worship, Berdymukhamedov rarely associates the cult of his personality with Islam and mosques. Besides, after the attacks of Islamist movements in the region and beyond, and with the risks associated with the Taliban presence in Afghanistan, and the Arab Spring, religion in general, and Islam in particular, are seen as potential threats to political power. Consequently, far more than his predecessor, Berdymukhamedov has emphasized the internal dangers that religious extremism would pose for the nation. The second president has extended all regulations imposed by the Soviet regime, which were then maintained or enhanced by Niyazov, in particular the obligation of every religious movement to register with the Ministry of Justice or face criminal penalties. The number of authorized movements remains extremely small. Control over Islam is extreme. Imams have been obliged to give praise to the president during their Friday sermons. Anyone with dissident tendencies can be imprisoned for “Wahhabism.” Although Islam remains an official part of the Turkmen nation state (praying before official events or ceremonies is for example widely accepted), the mosques remain largely empty, with

366  Research handbook on authoritarianism believers preferring to avoid the intrusion of police controls that attendance entails (Corley and Kinahan, 2017).

22.5

THE PRINCIPLE OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY

The last pillar of the state authoritarianism, economic and foreign policy has been developed according to a so-called “national way of development.” In the economy, this specific way has opposed liberalization as it was done in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. It resulted in the stagnation and the maintenance of strengthened state control over all aspects of the economy. The private sector remains very restricted and is kept under tight state control. The government’s economic approach continued to see the disconnect between the president’s upbeat discourse extolling his economic successes, grandiose objectives and reforms, including continuing the process of privatization of state property to attract investments and the population’s daily economic and social hardships. Hydrocarbon accounts for nine-tenths of Turkmenistan’s export earnings (BTI Transformation Index, 2022), and the 2014 fall in world hydrocarbon prices considerably reduced the state budget. This resulted in weakening the social welfare system, as well as the already frail education and health systems, and caused serious food insecurity leading to rationing in the state stores of which a majority of the impoverished population depends. This dire economic situation has also resulted in massive unemployment, now estimated at 60 percent (BTI Transformation Index, 2022), especially among young people and in rural areas. The lack of opportunities has led nearly half of the population to emigrate, a number almost unprecedented in a country during peacetime, leaving only some 2.8 million people out of a previously estimated population of 6 million (Peyrouse, 2022). Foreign policy constitutes an integral component of the “institutionalized” identity promoted by the Turkmen government (Anceschi, 2008). The first president never hid his desire to cut all links with the post-Soviet world, whether Russia or his Central Asian neighbors, and turned resolutely toward Turkey and Iran. As inspiration, he claimed to draw on the states of Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore), for their promotion of rapid economic development while maintaining authoritarian regimes. Moreover, after independence, the international and domestic geopolitical situation was equally complex, with two of its border neighbors, Afghanistan of the Taliban and Iran, both international pariah states. In this difficult geopolitical environment President Niyazov decided, in March 1995, to decree Turkmenistan’s status of “permanent neutrality” (also called “positive neutrality”). The United Nations formally recognized this status on December 12, 1995. Permanent neutrality has permitted the country to avoid the international tensions surrounding Iran and Afghanistan, but also led to autarky and further economic isolation. In the name of neutrality, the country limited its participation in post-Soviet and international institutions. This was also an essential instrument for the glorification of the politics and personality of the first president, who was the initiator of this status recognized by the United Nations and the entire international community. Berdymukhamedov has maintained this principle of neutrality, which has become an identity element of Turkmenistan’s foreign policy and a source of legitimacy for the government. He somewhat moderated the isolationist policy of his predecessor, traveling more abroad. With his so-called policy of openness to the international community, he insists less on the concept of neutrality, but nevertheless continues to support it as a glorifying element of the

Turkmenistan  367 regime and an essential pillar of the Turkmen nation. The concept of neutrality is therefore presented as a central component of the life of the ordinary Turkmen population. It is inscribed in the nationalist narrative, which meets an essential objective, that of maintaining the stability of an extremely authoritarian state. Both presidents ostentatiously touted the impact of Turkmen neutrality on internal stability and peace, and on the preservation of the best conditions for domestic development. The neutrality policy is therefore an essential tool for strengthening the internal loyalty toward the regime. Through this policy, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov and his son stands as central figures in the so-called Era of the Renaissance, not only inside the country, but also abroad. By becoming more involved with international leaders and international organizations such as the United Nations, Berdymukhamedov seeks to attract foreign investors to boost the country’s economy, which is facing serious issues, and to highlight the recognition of the neutrality status and consequently of Turkmen foreign policy, both to his population and to the international community. However, despite the so-called openness policy, the status of permanent neutrality has made it possible to remain on the margins of the international community, to avoid external pressures leading to liberalization, both economic and political.

22.6 CONCLUSION Present-day Turkmenistan has to confront the consequences of the first 30 years of its history as an independent state and its recent political past. While many elements of the political system introduced by Saparmurat Niyazov and Berdymukhamedov can be challenged, some components of independence are absolute, such as the existence of a Turkmen nation with its own language, culture, and state—one that is building its own history on the international scene. The fact that Niyazov was its first president has made him a major long-term figure: it will be difficult to deconstruct the “father of the nation,” even in the case that the regime is liberalized. One of the challenges facing the country is therefore to take stock of the first 30 years of independence, and to reappraise the Niyazov and Berdymukhamedov regimes without calling into question the experience of independence. The main long-term problem of Turkmenistan remains the lack of human capital, which has been destroyed in the last two decades and will need more time to be restored. In the name of building an independent state, both presidents have deliberately tried to break with the Soviet legacy, including with elements that proved valuable to other independent successor states, such as very high literacy and a guaranteed minimum of health care for all. No “Turkmen exceptionality” can justify a planned policy of literacy reduction and an organized destruction of the health system, not to mention massive cultural regression. Over the course of 30 years, they sacrificed an entire generation and mortgaged the future of the country. The notions that the Turkmen nation has its own “specific path of development” and unique “gradualism” have only served as culturalist arguments for a dictatorial power seeking its own ideological justification and regime security.

368  Research handbook on authoritarianism

REFERENCES Adams, L. 2010. The Spectacular State: Culture and National Identity in Uzbekistan. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Anceshi, L. 2008. Turkmenistan’s Foreign Policy: Positive Neutrality and the Consolidation of the Turkmen Regime. London: Routledge. Anceschi, L. 2021. “After Personalism: Rethinking Power Transfers in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 51 (4): 660–80. Bohr, A. 2016. “Turkmenistan: Power, Politics and Petro-Authoritarianism,” Research Paper, Chatham House, March: 32–5. BTI Transformation Index. 2022. Turkmenistan Country Report: BTI 2022 (bti-project.org). Clement, V. 2014. “Articulating National Identity in Turkmenistan: Inventing Tradition through Myth, Cult and Language,” Nations and Nationalism, 20 (3): 546–62. Clement, V. 2020. Religion and the Secular State in Turkmenistan. Washington, DC, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program. Corley, F. and Kinahan, J. 2017. “Turkmenistan: Religious Freedom Survey,” Forum 18, January 6, https://​www​.forum18​.org/​archive​.php​?article​_id​=​2244. Demidov, S.M. 2002. Postsovetskii Turkmenistan. Moscow: Natalis. Denison, D. 2009. “The Art of the Impossible: Political Symbolism, and the Creation of National Identity and Collective Memory in Post-Soviet Turkmenistan,” Europe-Asia Studies, 61 (7): 1167–87. Du Boulay, S. and Isaacs, R. 2019. “Legitimacy and Legitimation in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan,” in Isaacs, R. and Frigerio, A. (eds.), Theorizing Central Asian Politics: The State, Ideology and Power. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan: 17–41. Edgar, A. 2004. Tribal Nation: The Making of Soviet Turkmenistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. “Grandfather’s Museum.” 2009. The Chronicles of Turkmenistan, November 27, http://​www​.chrono​-tm​ .org/​en/​?id​=​1226 (accessed March 21, 2022). “Happy new cult!” 2009. The Chronicles of Turkmenistan, September 9, http://​www​.chrono​-tm​.org/​en/​ ?id​=​1151 (accessed April 2, 2022). Horák, S. 2005. “Mify Velikogo Turkmenbashi” [Myths of the Great Turkmenbashi]. Vestnik Evrazii– Acta Eurasica, 28 (2): 105–33. Horák, S. 2015. “The Battle of Gökdepe in the Turkmen post-Soviet historical discourse,” Central Asian Survey, 34 (2): 149–61. Horák, S. 2016. “Nation-Building and Sporting Spectacles in Authoritarian Regimes: Turkmenistan’s Aziada-2017,” in Koch, N. (ed.), Critical Geographies of Sport: Space, Power and Sport in Global Perspective (Routledge Critical Studies in Sport). Abingdon, UK and New York: Routledge: 48–63. Horák, S. and Polese, A. 2016. “Personality Cults and Nation Building in Turkmenistan,” in Isaacs, R. and Polese, A. (eds.), Nation-Building and Identity in the Post-Soviet Space: New Tools and Approaches. Abingdon, UK and New York: Routledge: 159–75. “IWPR: Uzhas deportatsii zakonchilsia? Mrachnoe sushchestvovanie uzbekskikh nelegalov v Turkmenii.” 2008. Centrasia, February 18, https://​centrasia​.org/​newsA​.php​?st​=​1203338040 (accessed November 7, 2023). Kadyrov, S. 2003. “Natsiia Plemen”. Etnicheskie istoki, transformatsiia, perspektivy gosudarstvennosti v Turkmenistane. Moscow: RAN. “Kniga, vdohnovlyayushchaya na novye dostizheniya.” 2022. Neytral’nyi Turkmenistan, April 30: 3. Koch, N. and Valiyev, A. 2015. “Urban Boosterism in Closed Contexts: Spectacular Urbanization and Second-Tier Mega-Events in Three Caspian Capitals,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, 56 (5): 575–98. Meurs, H. 2011. “Nation-Creation in Turkmenistan,” ISPA-ECPR Joint Conference, Sao Paulo, Brazil, February 16–19. Najibullah, F. 2020. “‘Distancing’ Grounds Russian Learning in Turkmen Schools, Despite Parental Pushback,” RFE/RL, October 21, https://​www​.rferl​.org/​a/​distancing​-grounds​-russian​-learning​-in​ -turkmen​-schools​-despite​-parental​-pushback/​30905262​.html (accessed November 9, 2023). Niyazov, S. 2002. Ruhnama. Turk. gos. izdatel’skaia sluzhba.

Turkmenistan  369 OSCE/ODIHR. 2017. Turkmenistan Presidential Election, February 12, OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report. OSCE/ODIHR. 2022. “Turkmenistan Early Presidential Election,” March 12, https://​www​.osce​.org/​ files/​f/​documents/​3/​2/​513565​.pdf (accessed June 24, 2023). Peyrouse, S. 2022. “Could a New President in Turkmenistan Provide an Opportunity for the US to Promote Reform?,” Diplomat, February 19, https://​thediplomat​.com/​2022/​02/​could​-a​-new​-president​ -in​-turkmenistan​-provide​-an​-opportunity​-for​-the​-us​-to​-promote​-reform/​ (accessed January 17, 2024). Peyrouse, S. 2011. Turkmenistan: Strategies of Power, Dilemmas of Development. London and New York: Routledge. Peyrouse, S. 2019. “The Health of the Nation—the Wealth of the Homeland! Turkmenistan’s Potemkin Healthcare System,” Ponars Memo, no. 574, February, http://​www​.ponarseurasia​.org/​memo/​health​ -nation​-wealth​-homeland​-turkmenistans​-potemkin​-healthcare​-system (accessed November 10, 2023). Polese, A. and Horák, S. 2015. “A Tale of Two Presidents: Personality Cult and Symbolic Nation-Building in Turkmenistan,” Nationalities Papers, 43 (3): 457–78. Polese, A., Ó Beacháin, D. and Horák, S. 2017. “Strategies of Legitimation in Central Asia: Regime Durability in Turkmenistan,” Contemporary Politics, 23 (4): 427–45. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision, http://​esa​.un​.org/​unpp/​p2k0data​.asp (accessed March 24, 2020). Prove They’re Alive. 2021. “List of the Disappeared in Turkmenistan’s Prisons,” https://​provetheyarealive​ .org/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2021/​12/​Disappeared​-in​-Turkmenistans​-prisons​_report​_Prove​_November​ -2021​_final​.pdf (accessed November 8, 2023). “Rossiian mogut evakuirovat’ iz Turkmenii.” 2003. RIA Novosti, June 23. Sapargel’diev O. (2017). “TurkmenneZdrav. Gde ono kachestvennoe lechenie?,” Centrasia, February 10, http://​www​.centrasia​.ru/​newsA​.php​?st​=​1486716960 (accessed September 15, 2019). “Saparmurat Turkmenbashi—president XXI veka.” 1999. Neitral’nyi Turkmenistan, April, 14: 1–2. “The Results of Census in Turkmenistan.” 2015. Chronicles of Turkmenistan, February 2, http://​en​ .chrono​-tm​.org/​2015/​02/​the​-results​-of​-census​-in​-turkmenistan/​ (accessed September 15, 2019). “Turkmen Authorities Make Moves to Ensure Berdymukhammedov Cult Continues.” 2022. RFE/ RL, March 31, https://​www​.rferl​.org/​a/​turkmenistan​-berdymukhammedov​-personality​-cult/​31779714​ .html (accessed November 9, 2023). “Turkmenistan’s Opaque Health System.” 2010. Special Report, Doctors Without Borders. Amsterdam, April. “World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision.” 2009. Report of the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, New York, http://​www​ .un​.org/​esa/​population/​publications/​wpp2008/​wpp2008​_highlights​.pdf, p.  35 (accessed November 12, 2019).

23. Egypt and Syria: the authoritarian republics of the Middle East Raymond Hinnebusch

23.1

INTRODUCTION: VARIATIONS IN AUTHORITARIANISM

Authoritarianism has been the modal form of governance in the Middle East; but the very different forms it has taken allows us to explore the variation in kinds of authoritarian regimes. This chapter takes the cases of Egypt and Syria to explore the causes and outcomes of variation in the Middle East and North Africa’s (MENA) authoritarian republics over time and across country contexts.1 The analysis takes a historical sociology neo-Weberian approach, borrowing notably from Michael Mann’s dissection of the dimensions of regime building and also viewing state trajectories as the outcomes of interactions between the agency of regime builders and structural factors such as inherited regional culture and global political economy. The chapter examines variations in MENA authoritarianism along two dimensions, namely, how much power a regime possesses and what (whose) purposes are served by this power. The amount of regime power is assessed along two dimensions, “autonomy” (of societal pressures) in policy making and “capacity” in policy implementation via Mann’s (1984) “infrastructural power.” As to the purposes of power, the main distinction is between “authoritarianism of the right” which includes privileged social forces in order to defend an inegalitarian social structure vs populist “authoritarianism of the left” which mobilizes plebian social forces in order to exclude the “old oligarchy” in the name of egalitarian “revolution from above.” The purposes of power shape the configuration of institutions. Regimes defending the status quo distribution of wealth against the “have-nots” may, in MENA, take the form of monarchy or republic while conceding semi-constitutional institutions incorporating the bourgeoisie, while populist regimes are presidential republics that deployed Leninist practices to mobilize their plebian constituencies. However, many regimes sought to balance between social forces rather than take sides, and over time converged in their deployment of similar hybrid political technologies mixing, for example, personalism and clientelism with military and single or dominant party rule. The Egyptian and Syrian cases illuminate major similarities and differences in MENA authoritarianism: both started as populist authoritarian regimes, stabilized as hybrid combinations of personalistic, military and single party governance and evolved toward post-populism. But their stabilization and post-populist evolution took place at different rates and with somewhat different combination of practices that may be explained by the differential impact of shared structural forces, notably wars with Israel and changes in the global political economy, or the contrast between Egypt’s long history of statehood and secure national identity compared to the fragmented identity and recent “artificial” statehood of Syria.

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23.2

POPULIST AUTHORITARIANISM IN MENA

23.2.1 Origins and Conditions of Populist Authoritarianism The emergence of populist authoritarianism (PA) in early independence MENA was a function of a breakdown of traditional authority creating a vacuum in which contending social forces battled for power. Radical military officers, a reforming force recruited from the emerging new middle class, forged alliances with the peasantry to contest and overthrow the old Western-aligned landed oligarchies and monarchies. The new regimes rose out of nationalist movements in the emerging post-colonial era that were inflamed by the Palestinian conflict with Israel and determined to roll back the remnants of imperialism in the region. In Marxist thinking, this scenario, wherein the landed oligarchy was in decline and new classes were rising to challenge it, and no industrial bourgeoisie had emerged, favored the assumption of leadership by the petit bourgeoisie and its establishment of “Bonapartist regimes” “above” classes: and pursing modernizing “revolution from above” (Hussein 1973; Trimberger 1978). Moreover, global conditions—Cold War bi-polarity, in which the Soviet Union offered protection and aid to Third World nationalist regimes—and the widespread belief in the developmental state, were congruent with the trajectory of these regimes. 23.2.2 Consolidation of Populist Authoritarianism: Power Techniques While societal and global structures created conditions in which PA could consolidate power, it took agency as well—that is, the strategies and actions of regime builders. Following Weber (1968), new regimes were often founded and power concentrated by charismatic leadership in the name of a revolutionary ideology but this had, if the regime was to persist, to be “routinized” in political institutions that would enable the infrastructural power needed to carry out policy and organize supportive constituencies. However, in the Third World the outcome was frequently what Weber’s later followers conceptualized as neo-patrimonialism, which combined traditional personalism and clientelism with modern bureaucratic institutions (Bank and Richter 2010). Indeed, after decades of instability in MENA, in which purely military regimes, personalistic dictatorships and traditional monarchies failed to consolidate power, regime builders finally hit on a winning formula. The consolidation of authoritarian rule in the revolutionary republics, apparent in the 1970s and 1980s, rested on a complex mix of tradition and modernity. First, PA regimes learned to concentrate what Mann (1984) called “despotic” power via combinations of “traditional” practices and coercion. Cohesive ruling elites were built and endemic intra-elite factionalism overcome through the dominance of a personalist leader over the rest of the elite. This was achieved through his exploitation of indigenous “Khaldunian” (as described by the 14th-century Arab sociologist, Ibn Khaldon) political cement, namely, the emplacement at the levers of the machinery of power of “trusted men” linked to the leader by assibiyeh (solidarity based on kin, tribe, sect, friendship or regional ties, but also shared ideology). Second, power concentration depended on PA regimes’ ability to prevent coups, hitherto the main vehicle of instability in the region, in order to forge reliable instruments of repression to marginalize rival power contenders. The penetration of the army by the ruling party; the purge of higher-class elements from the military; the multiple wings of the mukhabarat (intelligence or security services) that maintained pervasive surveillance of the officer corps;

372  Research handbook on authoritarianism the recruitment of the security forces from trusted in-groups were among the factors that made the repressive apparatus a reliable tool of power concentration. Third, patronage was used to co-opt and ensure the loyalty of key groups and to service clientelist networks. This was increasingly enabled by the flow of “rent” —oil revenues and foreign aid—into state coffers which particularly ballooned after the 1970s oil price boom (of course most of the republics had to make do with less than their monarchic counterparts but some enjoyed transfers from richer regional states) (Hinnebusch 1982, 1990a; Saouli 2020). However , concentrating power had, according to Huntington (1968; Huntington and Moore 1970), to be followed by its expansion if regimes were to be consolidated and the revolutionary single party was the institutional form best situated to satisfy enough participation demands and organize enough of a constituency for the ruling regime to enable this; as Perlmutter (1981) put it, the single party was the modern form of authoritarianism. These institutions were able to incorporate a middle class/peasant alliance because of the “revolution from above” launched by PA regimes—typically land reform and nationalizations of big business which enabled a “social contract” with regime constituents guaranteeing socio-economic rights in return for political acquiescence, which gave workers and peasants a certain stake in the persistence of populism. At the same time, the economic dominance of the old oligarchy was demolished while bureaucracies and public sector enterprises greatly expanded, thereby co-opting much of the educated middle class and organized workers into public employment. Ruling parties also incorporated constituencies via professional organizations and, in particular, by co-opting worker and peasant unions that were given privileged access to decision makers in a populist version of corporatism. In short, PA regimes combined personalist leadership resting on clientelism with a ruling single party, a politicized army and nationalist legitimacy. The result was a highly durable combination of mass incorporating populism with rent-lubricated patrimonialism (Hinnebusch 2001a, 2019). 23.2.3 Variations in Regime Consolidation Trajectories: Egypt vs Syria Post-1952 Egypt and post-1963 Ba’athist Syria appeared to converge in the 1960s as relatively similar kinds of regime. Both originated in coups by radical officers of ex-peasant or middle-class origin, established military-bureaucratic and single party structures, and legitimized themselves through social reform and nationalist rhetoric. Yet, owing to their different social structures, regime consolidation took somewhat different forms in Egypt and Syria. 23.2.3.1 Authoritarian consolidation in Egypt Gamel Abdel Nasser’s major contribution to the formation of the Egyptian state was to forge its dominant structures and to endow it with a nationalist-populist legitimacy which gave it roots in society. His regime began as a military coup, but the latter was the product of a secret organization of revolutionary Free Officers reflective of popular anti-imperialism and Nasser, in a series of successful foreign policy “victories” over “imperialist” powers that made Egypt the acknowledged center of the Arab world, soon emerged as a charismatic mass leader, embraced by Egyptians as a national hero with unmatched personal legitimacy. It was this which consolidated and legitimized the regime, allowing it to transcend its purely military origins, and raised Nasser above the rest of his colleagues among the Free Officer movement (Hinnebusch 1985, 1990b).

Egypt and Syria  373 Its legitimacy consolidated, the Nasser regime launched modernization and populist reform from above. Nasser sought first to accommodate, then to replace the private sector as the motor of the economy in favor of state planning, entrepreneurship and investment. Gradually, the heights of the economy were nationalized producing a huge expansion in the public sector. As part of import-substitute industrialization (ISI) a big investment push by the state in infrastructure and manufacturing raised industry’s share of GNP from 15 to 23 percent, diversifying from light to heavy industry and doubling the size of the industrial working class. Land reform and cooperatization of agriculture and the Aswan High Dam which completed Egypt’s hydraulic agriculture—spreading irrigation, flood control, and making vast new power resources available for industrialization—restored agricultural productivity. The steady fall in GNP/capita Egypt had experienced since 1900 was arrested (Abdul-Malek 1968: 97–175; Hinnebusch 2019; Mabro 1974: 56–106, 140–343). Nasser cut the previously dominant landlord classes down to size and raised up and won the support of the middle and lower classes through “populist” policies that established certain economic “rights”—from reasonably priced food to education and employment—as part of the “social contract” between the regime and public. The middle class was widened via opportunities for upward mobility through free university education and state employment for graduates. The urban lower classes were lifted up through rent and price controls, worker profit sharing in industry and subsidization of basic foodstuffs. Land reform reduced landless peasants from 60 percent to 40 percent of the total, which, in addition to tenancy laws, doubled the share of peasants in agricultural income (Hinnebusch 2019). In harnessing charisma, ideology and radical reform to its challenge to the old order and the formation of a new one, the Nasser regime had powerful elements of Weber’s charismatic leadership. R. Hrair Dekmejian’s Egypt under Nasir (1975) explored the charismatic leader’s attempt to routinize his charisma in ideology and political institutions. However, perhaps because of the relative ease with which his enormous popular support and the compliant bureaucracy at his command enabled Nasser to consolidate power and smash opposition forces, he never felt the need to establish a strong party system; while the regime did create ruling parties (National Union, Arab Socialist Union – ASU), these were widely regarded as “weak” and chiefly designed to co-opt the local notability and control the trade unions. Without a strong revolutionary party there was no instrument for replenishing the ruling elite with plebian elements having a stake in the leader’s populist ideology and elite recruitment remained dominated by the upper echelons of the army and bureaucracy. This also made the regime vulnerable to decline into neo-patrimonialism; indeed, some scholars claimed the military in later decades had become a class of “New Mamluks,” agents of traditional practices such as clientelism, not modernizing authority (Sonbol 2000). Finally, without a revolutionary party there was no vehicle to institutionalize mass activism in defense of the leader’s ideology once he was replaced by a new president—Anwar Sadat—ready to jettison “Nasserism.” 23.2.3.2 Authoritarian consolidation in Syria By contrast to Nasser, the Syrian Ba’ath Party confronted a much less pliable political environment, a sharply fragmented praetorian society. In the 1950s the party had developed a significant middle-class peasant base but never mobilized enough support to take power through mass votes or revolution; hence, it seized power by military coup. In its initial years (1963–65), the regime concentrated power by excluding rival elites from the army and government, but this generated an intense and enduring urban-centered opposition which it lacked

374  Research handbook on authoritarianism the mobilizational capacity to submerge. Nor did it have the institutional legitimacy to subordinate the military to its authority, with military praetorianism barely contained in the first years in power and the Ba’athist elite susceptible to constant factionalism organized around rival Ba’athist officers. No leader with Nasser’s unquestioned popular legitimacy emerged: the puzzle, therefore, is how a durable, fairly robust regime in fact emerged from a highly fragmented society and notoriously unstable polity (Hinnebusch 1982). In a first phase (1965–70), the new elite transformed itself from a simple military regime to a military/single party “symbiosis” by forging the Ba’ath into a Leninist-like single party, recruited from militants of the lower and lower-middle strata and particularly rooted in the villages where the Ba’ath originally flourished. By the 1970s an elaborate party apparatus incorporated roughly 150,000 activists and organized almost a third of the population behind its mass organizations—for peasants, workers, youth, professionals, women, etc. The party apparatus replenished the elite with “plebian” elements drawn from below while the army became a second major channel of power drawing disproportionately on the Alawi minority, a long-deprived minority sect which had been profoundly alienated from the hitherto dominant oligarchy against which the Ba’ath revolution had been made and which had a deep stake in revolutionary policies and in the survival of the regime. The party came to represent an apparatus of control helping the regime carry out policy and deflect opposition access to the masses. Its branches penetrated the bureaucracy and incorporated the Ba’athist officers who ensured the loyalty of the army and through its local branches and mass organizations it reached into factories, schools and villages, linking the elite to mass society and cutting across Syria’s many societal cleavages. The party gave the regime an organized base and a modicum of legitimacy which a merely military regime could not achieve and without which the regime’s survival is inconceivable (Hinnebusch 1990a, 1991). This was accompanied, beginning in the 1960s, by a “revolution from above” that, in reducing the economic power of opponents and mobilizing subaltern support, shaped a political economy landscape friendly to regime consolidation. In agriculture, reform dismantled the large landed oligarchy and constituted a medium to small peasant agriculture, organized in cooperatives and enjoying generous agricultural support prices. This translated into a continuous increase in agricultural output and a significant rise in the rural standard of living. The nationalization of banks and big businesses provided the basis for a public industrial sector that became the main engine of investment, produced three-quarters of industrial production and employed a third of the labor force. Overall, economic growth rates were a respectable 3.7 percent per capita per year from 1965 to 1986, better than the 2.6 percent average for middle-income Least Developed Countries and providing the basis for significant upward mobility for elements of the regime’s peasant and salaried middle-class constituency (Hinnebusch 2001a). In 1970, a second phase of political consolidation began, when Hafiz al-Asad came to power in an intra-regime coup, spelling a substantial dilution of the experiment in Leninist-like party rule. Asad reshaped the Ba’ath state into a neo-patrimonial regime which subordinated the Ba’ath party apparatus to a personalized “presidential monarchy,” a term conveying the enormous powers of the office and the incumbent’s effective rule for life. Assuming full powers to appoint and dismiss governments and military commands, Asad made the presidency the undisputed command post of the Ba’ath state raised above the other power institutions of the state—army, party and bureaucracy. High policy came to be made by an inner circle of key military, government and party leaders who, while not quite mere staff whom Asad could

Egypt and Syria  375 dismiss or ignore at will, lacked independent bases of power which could challenge the presidency; yet party seniority and credentials remained essential for climbing the ladder of power. Big initiatives were now chiefly the prerogative of the president but he was constrained by the views of influential groups in the army and party and left many lesser issues to be decided within collective leadership bodies—cabinet, party commands—or even wider arenas such as party congresses, aggregating and reconciling the interests of the regime’s varied constituency (Hinnebusch 2001a). Because Asad never enjoyed the personal charismatic legitimacy that Nasser did, the party remained indispensable to his rule over society; in parallel his intra-regime power concentration relied heavily on emplacement of trusted fellow Alawi kinsmen in the command posts of the army and security services. The subordination of the collegial party leadership to an Alawi presidency buttressed by an Alawi coercive apparatus represented a significant increase in the power of Alawi senior officers under Asad. In addition, elite embourgeoisement proceeded apace: Asad sought a détente with Damascene Sunni bourgeoisie families who became favored in co-optation through corporatist institutions such as the Chambers of Commerce and Industry or the Council of Ministers while the Alawi military elite was enriched by corruption. Asad balanced between the two groups, and commercial and even marriage alliances generated a “military-mercantile complex” at the heart of power, thus altering the formerly rural plebeian domination of the state. Still, the fact that Asad and many of his lieutenants were of a minority sect and face continued opposition from parts of the traditional establishment and from radical Islamic militants made the party all the more crucial to the regime’s capacity to incorporate a base among the Sunni majority (Hinnebusch 1990a, 2001a). Asad appeared by the mid-1970s to have effectively forged a more cohesive and stable regime. A patrimonial strategy of personalizing and concentrating power in a presidential monarchy resulted in a much more cohesive elite center. The co-optation of the Damascene bourgeoisie widened the elite coalition while not sacrificing the party institutions through which a mass constituency was incorporated. But Asad’s strategy had its costs. Patrimonialization and embourgeoisement narrowed responsiveness to the regime’s traditional rural populist coalition and alienated much of its ideologically motivated activist support. The patrimonial thrust also predictably reignited opposition among those outside the favored in-group: a powerful counter-ideology—fundamentalist Islam—became the vehicle of a widening anti-regime coalition. Society was bifurcated between regime and opposition. To be sure, the regime showed it had the coercive capacity to turn back the powerful Islamist rebellion of the late 1970s to early 1980; but from that time on, the security forces became ever more powerful and intrusive—congealing into a harder authoritarianism than that in Nasser’s Egypt (Hinnebusch 1990a, 2001a).

23.3

FROM POPULIST TO POST-POPULIST REGIMES: THE CHANGING PURPOSES OF MENA AUTHORITARIANISM

23.3.1 The Origin and Conditions of Post-Populist Authoritarianism (PPA) A multitude of factors came together to foster the move to post-populism among MENA authoritarian republics. Variations in these from country to country explain the differences in the timing and depth of the transformation. Egypt was the pioneer in this while Syria was the

376  Research handbook on authoritarianism most reluctant and a couple of decades “behind,” but the forces driving post-populism were similar. The vulnerabilities of etatist/populist economic development were the root cause of post-populist development. First, import substitute industrialization’s dependence on import of machines when combined with the absence of industrial export capacity and reliance on raw material exports led to chronic foreign exchange scarcity and deficits. Another problem was the failure of capital accumulation through the public sector owing to inefficient management, excess labor, low fixed prices for products, corruption and regimes taxing of the public sector for military spending. Exhaustion of the public sector as the engine of development empowered those who argued for a revival of the private and foreign capital sectors, which required an investor-friendly environment (i.e. Western alignment, internal liberalization). But the extent of the economic crisis, hence pressure for change, was considerably stronger in Egypt than in Syria (Hinnebusch 2001b, 2019). 23.3.1.1 Global political economy The above internal factors in themselves created a problem but how it would be resolved depended on international and regional factors. First, the neo-liberal revolution of the 1980s transformed the norms of global political economy from Keynesianism and socialism that legitimatized the developmental state congruent with MENA republics’ populist etatism. Neo-liberalism de-legitimized state intervention in the economy and empowered investors and global finance capital. This was paralleled by economic decline in the Soviet Union, the globalization of US finance capital and the global promotion of neo-liberalism in the Third world by international financial institutions (Hinnebusch 2001b, 2019). 23.3.1.2 Regional geopolitics The geopolitical situation of a MENA state could accelerate or retard post-populist evolution. The end of the populist era in MENA, and specifically Egypt and Syria, was ushered in by a common disaster, the defeat of 1967 by Israel, which fatally undermined their legitimizing Arab nationalist ideologies and led to economic crises. Both states needed to recover the territory occupied by Israel in 1967 which led them to go to war together in 1973. But thereafter, their paths palpably diverged: since Egypt failed to liberate the Sinai with Soviet arms, it staked its future on US diplomacy to get Israeli withdrawal. Moreover, Egypt’s need for economic aid on a scale that the USSR could not provide made it turn to the US and the West for capital and the price of US assistance was de-alignment from the Soviet Union and abandonment of Egypt’s Arab-nationalist foreign policy. Syria’s Ba’athist regime faced somewhat lesser economic pressures and could not afford to abandon its legitimizing Arab nationalist ideology: instead, it sought to diversify its dependencies—on the Soviets for arms, the Saudis for money—while never closing the door to American mediation with Israel. Its internal economic liberalization was correspondingly more restrained and political liberalization even more so (Hinnebusch 2001b, 2019). The post-1974 OPEC-engineered oil boom had variable impacts on the move to post-populism. The main MENA oil producing monarchies transferred a portion of their new wealth to the non-oil republics as part of a strategy to “moderate” their radical nationalist foreign policies. This was successful in Egypt, but less so with Syria where the oil states were brought to support Syria’s front-line status with Israel. A more subtle impact of the regional flow of petrodollars was to transform regional political culture from—as Haykel

Egypt and Syria  377 put it—one centered on thawra (revolution) to tharwa (resources), wherein elites (including the ex-populist revolutionaries) began a scramble to claim a share of the new wealth, partly through corrupt practices, and partly by promoting a reintegration of their states into the world capitalist system (Hinnebusch 2001b, 2019). Global neo-liberalism legitimized their drives for self-enrichment just as socialism had formerly de-legitimized it. 23.3.1.3 Social structure: the changing balance of class power But post-populist solutions were only adopted because of changes in the balance of class power away from the populist coalitions and toward new post-populist ones. One dimension of this was the transformation of the formerly petit bourgeois political elites into “state bourgeoisies” as they used their power over the statist economy to acquire wealth, and which, as statism faltered and state revenues were exhausted, saw new opportunities in economic liberalization and privatization of state enterprises to acquire public assets and foreign investment partners. The outcome was a contraction of the state’s formerly popular social bases and a shift to reliance on a new coalition of state-private foreign capital. This was mirrored by a change in the composition and perceptions of the ruling elite, namely, its “embourgeoisement” as plebian elites married into old wealthy families and accumulated wealth or were replaced by Westernized technocrats from upper/upper-middle class families (Hinnebusch 2001b, 2019). The change in the balance of class power was much more advanced in Egypt than in Syria where the party gave popular forces a more enduring voice in policy making compared to Egypt where no strong populist party existed; the sectarian cleavage in Syria also retarded the formation of a new ruling class compared to Egypt’s lack of such cleavages. 23.3.2 Post-populist Governance 23.3.2.1 Post-populist political economy strategies The outcomes at the policy level were similar across the region. Trade liberalization led to massive imports which damaged national industry; the freeing of the market from state regulation (price controls) and cutting of subsidies on basic consumption goods raised the cost of living for the poor. While the oil price boom of the 1970s had alleviated fiscal and foreign exchange crises in the short term, with the price bust (around 1986), regimes opted to sustain spending via foreign debt, making them more vulnerable to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and creditor pressures for “structural adjustment”—austerity for the masses in order to pay off debt. As the public sector was run down, regimes also opted to rely on foreign and private capital which required a capital-friendly investment climate and export competitiveness, hence driving down wages and labor rights. International financial institutions also worked to force open protected markets to unequal competition from Western exporters, leading to de-industrialization, and encouraged privatization of state industries—thereby turning them from public monopolies into the private monopolies of an emergent class of crony capitalists. A reversal of land reform—notably in Egypt—even allowed the partial restoration of the rural oligarchy at the expense of the peasants initially favored by populist regimes. These policies were associated with the restoration of the economic inequalities initially compressed under populist development (Hinnebusch 2001b, 2019).

378  Research handbook on authoritarianism 23.3.2.2 Post-populist politics This new development strategy required inclusion of emerging crony capitalists and the exclusion of the old populist constituency in a post-populist version of authoritarianism (PPA), in which authoritarian power started to serve very different ends than in the populist period. In this version of authoritarianism, a lopsided form of limited political liberalization opened new access for the bourgeoisie to the ruling elite through parliaments, business interest groups and ruling parties while the unions and popular organizations that had mobilized the masses to support populist development were now used to control and de-mobilize them, with a resulting shift in the balance of access/influence in intra-elite conflicts toward the “haves.” As regimes abandoned efforts to politically incorporate their populations, they faced rising Islamist and leftist opposition. As such, authoritarian power had to be preserved, even hardened, to defend the new exclusionary order (Kienle 2001; King 2009). However, these changes did not take place in any mechanical way and rather than MENA regimes becoming mere “transmission belts” of global neo-liberalism, post-populism emerged via political struggles in which regime survival calculations, inter-elite rivalries, and elite perceptions of threats and opportunities (regarding the extent of economic crisis, the class balance, global political economy and regional geopolitical constraints) all determined variations in outcomes, for example, between more and less rapid or thorough economic liberalizers. This was so of the differing pace and forms of post-populist development in Egypt and Syria (Hinnebusch 2001b). 23.3.3 Variations in Post-populist Trajectories 23.3.3.1 Egypt: limited liberalization in a pluralizing political arena The most immediately obvious explanation for differing policy courses, especially in authoritarian regimes like Egypt and Syria, was leadership. At Nasser’s death, Vice President Anwar Sadat inherited, almost by accident, the presidency and the enormous legal powers with which Nasser had endowed it—a critical asset in consolidating his rule. Nevertheless, lacking the popular legitimacy of Nasser with the masses, he needed a solid social base. He found this support in the “state bourgeoisie” which, with a foot in both high state office and assets in private society, was the most strategic social force and ready to accept his leadership in return for economic and political liberalization. In parallel, economic opening (infitah) to private/foreign capital benefited a new capitalist class while disengagement from the populist social contract increased insecurity for the masses, provoking resistance which could only be managed by the continuance of authoritarian power (Kienle 2001, especially 187; see also Hinnebusch 1985; Waterbury 1983). Sadat’s gradual abandonment of Nasser’s populism and Arab nationalism (as he aligned with America and moved toward peace with Israel) precipitated rising opposition. The most immediate threat to Sadat, the Nasserist Free Officers such as Ali Sabri at the helm of the ruling Arab Socialist Union (ASU), lacked command of a strong party apparatus that could have mobilized resistance to Sadat and he readily purged them. Since even after that the main threat continued from the Nasserite left, Sadat allowed the mainstream Islamic movement, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the liberal New Wafd party—each representative of different segments of the bourgeoisie alienated from the state under Nasser—to re-enter the political arena to contain the nationalist left. As Egypt’s political arena was thus pluralized, Sadat attempted to absorb and contain it by a controlled political liberalization. Under this formula,

Egypt and Syria  379 while the ultimate powers of the authoritarian presidency could not be overtly challenged, the role of the state in society contracted, the private sector was revitalized, and the economy opened. The military, newly de-politicized, assumed a professionalized stance subordinate to presidential legal authority. Parliament, press, judiciary and interest group activity were given more autonomy allowing the bourgeoisie growing scope to advance its interests through them. Nasser’s single party, the ASU, a focus of few loyalties and interests, was swept away without a whimper and opposition parties were allowed to form and compete in parliamentary elections (Hinnebusch 1985; Kassem 2004). The result was a dominant party system with a large government party straddling the center and an array of smaller opposition parties to its right and left. The new government party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), combined at its heart the top ministerial elite and the pro-government caucus in parliament, incorporating major segments of the most strategic social forces—military, bureaucracy, private bourgeoisie, rural notability—into the ruling coalition; while this gave them no way to hold the presidency accountable, it provided enough privileged access to co-opt them. The government party represented a ladder of political recruitment and access for the re-emergent private sector bourgeoisie and its parliamentary caucus was the source of initiatives and responses to government proposals defending or promoting the interest of its largely bourgeois constituency. The NDP lacked a strong extra-governmental organization, but by way of the clientelist networks of the pro-government notability and its appointment of the leaders of the trade unions, it brought a portion of the village and urban masses into the regime camp, protecting the government’s societal base and obstructing opposition access to the masses. The opposition parties functioned as “parties of pressure” within the dominant party system. They could not hope to take power but advocated particular interests or promoted the fortunes of aspirant politicians hoping for co-optation. The Liberal (Ahrar) and New Wafd parties advocated more economic and political liberalization while the leftist National Progressives defended the Nasserite heritage, for example, food subsidies; the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists won Islamization concessions from the secular regime. Party pluralization actually enhanced the regime’s ability to divide—and rule—the political arenas. The opposition parties channeled much political activism which might otherwise have taken a covert, even violent, anti-regime direction into more tame, manageable forms. Opposition party elites, in playing the regime’s game, incorporated their own followings into the system (Hinnebusch 1985, 1990a, 1993b, 1997; Kassem 2004). 23.3.3.2 Syria: calculated decompression as a substitute for political liberalization With Hafiz al-Asad’s 1970 seizure of power from the Ba’ath party’s radical leadership, the first priorities became regime consolidation, war preparation and defense; from the priority put by Asad on the liberation of the occupied territories without abandoning the Palestine cause flowed a foreign policy seeking detente with conservative Arab oil states, and a limited economic liberalization meant to appease the bourgeoisie, maximize production and attract Arab aid and investment. The struggle with Israel dictated a large proportion of Syria’s financial and human resources be channeled into a constantly expanding military establishment. The continued state of war discouraged private investment and made Syria ineligible for foreign private investment on a serious scale. However, Syria’s economic crisis was not as severe as Egypt’s and the rent Syria began receiving from the Arab oil states for its front-line role in the conflict with Israel relieved pressures to abandon the populist social contract and Arab nationalism which remained the regime’s main claims to legitimacy (Hinnebusch 1993a, 1998, 2001a).

380  Research handbook on authoritarianism Nor had the balance of social forces tipped as far toward the bourgeoisie as in Egypt. To begin with, Asad, unlike Sadat, had not been converted to capitalist restoration, affirmed his commitment to the “national-socialist line,” and continued to expand the party’s organized mass base and role in the regime on which his own power was contingent. To be sure, the dormant private sector was encouraged, for example, via trade liberalization, but without prejudice to the dominant role of the state sector, which until the 1990s continued to receive the major proportion of national investment. However, the state turned over implementation of a lot of its development program to local contractors, fueling growing webs of shared (often corrupt) interests between state officials, senior military officers and private capital. The enrichment of the Alawi political elite turned an element—previously one of the strongest forces for radical change in the regime—into a group with privileges to defend which was becoming a partner with families of old and new business wealth, bridging some of the sharp antagonism between the two and helping win the acquiescence of sections of the bourgeoisie in Ba’ath rule. On the other hand, the balance of forces did not favor a thorough economic liberalization. Ba’ath ideology was routinized in the party, public sector, cooperatives and mass organizations the regime had created and these resisted any wholesale abandonment of statist and populist policies. The military was much more politicized than in Egypt, and the Alawis who dominated it still felt threatened by any accommodation returning power to the Sunni merchant establishment. From the side of the main conservative opposition groups, too, there was less willingness to strike an accommodation with the regime than in Egypt; and a powerful element of it, linked to the traditional petit bourgeoisie of the urban quarters and imbued with Islamic sentiment, continued to reject Ba’athist rule. The regime’s partial economic liberalization tended, at the same time, to erode its own “populist” base. Even as officials and merchants were enriched, inflation generated by the opening of the economy eroded the relatively fixed incomes of the salaried employees, workers and small peasantry: thus, new inequalities were rapidly replacing those demolished in the 1960s. To preserve its constituency in the face of continuing hostility from big parts of society, the regime had to continue key elements of statist populism—public sector employment, food subsidies, high farm prices, etc.—which the geopolitical and oil rent it received enabled it to do (Hinnebusch 1991, 1995, 1997). Political liberalization was much more modest than in Egypt and largely took the form of co-opting small leftist and nationalist factions—Nasserites, Communists—into government posts. No party of the bourgeoisie was authorized and although the Chamber of Commerce came to function as a pressure group for mercantile interests, it was balanced by the still powerful worker and peasant unions. And the Islamist uprising of the early 1980s forced the regime to fall back on its traditional rural mass constituency while also demonstrating that any political liberalization risked that Islam would become a potent vehicle of counter-regime mobilization, thus checking trends toward amalgamation between the Ba’athist political elite and the urban bourgeoisie. After Hafiz’s death and under his son, Bashar al-Asad, economic liberalization was revived and furthered (notably as rent declined), incrementally shifting the balance of class power further away from the regime’s popular constituency. But this was not reflected in a major advance in political liberalization. After a first experiment with such an opening—the “Damascus Spring of 2001–02—provoked such harsh criticism of the regime, it was promptly rolled back. However, Bashar systematically enervated the Ba’ath party which he saw as an obstacle to needed economic liberalization, thereby strengthening his own personal power inside the regime while unwittingly enervating the latter’s grip on society and preparing the way for the Syrian uprising.

Egypt and Syria  381

23.4

FROM AUTHORITARIAN RESILIENCE TO MASS UPRISINGS AND AUTHORITARIAN RESTORATION

23.4.1 Authoritarian Resilience in the 2000s As the “Third Wave” of post-Cold War democratization in the 1990s bypassed the Middle East, debates about Middle East exceptionalism attributed authoritarian resilience to deep structural conditions. For some observers, it was the inherited political culture: the patriarchal family was congruent with neo-patrimonial rule at the state level and primordial segmentation of societies (via tribes, sects, etc.) obstructed broad-based mobilization against authoritarian rule. Some versions of Islam, citing the “sovereignty of God,” were opposed to democratization and authoritarian rulers exploited the sharp cleavage between Islamists and secularists to “divide and rule.” In parallel, the exceptional concentration of hydrocarbons in the region translated into oil renterism which, by concentrating resources in the state, made social forces, including the bourgeoisie and the middle class—that would normally push for democratization—vulnerable to co-optation since the key to wealth was access to state patronage. This prolonged the “shelf-life” of neo-patrimonial practices such as clientelism (Schlumberger 2020: 55–9). Moreover, the use by ruling elites of global neo-liberalism to foster crony capitalism and their own self-enrichment gave regimes an increased stake in the authoritarian power needed to promote this. Nor could ruling elites risk democratization at a time when they were reneging on the populist social contract, fostering growing inequality and sacrificing the nationalist legitimacy on which they were originally founded, all of which allowed Islamist opposition to assume the banner of populism and nationalism (Kienle 2001). Nevertheless elites’ interest in avoiding democratization does not explain how they avoided it. As Heydemann (2007) demonstrated, elites had to continually work at it to stay on top of opposition and contain pressures from below, devising new techniques that he labeled “authoritarian upgrading.” King (2009) focused particularly on the cultivation of new constituencies by PPA regimes to substitute for those being abandoned: the privatization of public sectors provided patronage to co-opt rent-seeking supportive crony bourgeoisies. 23.4.2 The Arab Uprisings and Authoritarian Restoration In spite of this, the authoritarian republics proved highly vulnerable to the mass uprisings beginning in 2010. The uprisings were a reaction to the post-populist turn. Neo-liberal policies had generated massive grievances among large parts of the population—from the stalling of middle-class upward mobility to reversals of land reforms, labor protections and food subsidies. Growing inequality could not be mitigated (as in oil monarchies) since limited rent and large populations prevented much economic co-optation beyond crony capitalist circles. Limited political liberalization, for example, controlled elections, had exhausted its capacity to co-opt opposition. Presidents’ attempts to act like monarchs and pass power to their sons was incongruent with the norms of urban mobilized societies. While legitimacy had been based on nationalist foreign policies and a populist social contract, the republics widely reneged on both. Yet the outcome of the rebellions was authoritarian restoration rather than democratization, albeit with differing features that in Syria and Egypt are mostly attributable to variations in social structure.

382  Research handbook on authoritarianism 23.4.2.1 Syria: failed democratic transition, failed state Although the mass opposition unleashed in 2011 demanded democratization, conditions were not favorable in Syria: identity fragmentation weakened society while a robust combination of both patrimonial authority and bureaucratic institutions gave the regime exceptional resilience. Owing to the cross-cutting of class inequalities by urban-rural, sectarian and ethnic (Arab-Kurd) cleavages, and the willingness of the loyal military, partly due to identity cleavages between them (Alawi dominant) and protestors (Sunni dominant), to use violence against the uprising, opposition mobilization was insufficient to overthrow the regime. However, defections from the military were sufficient, together with high levels of external intervention, to militarize the conflict, resulting in protracted civil war and a partly failed state. The Uprising greatly sharpened identity cleavages along both sectarian and secular-Islamist lines: the breakdown of order stimulated a “security dilemma” in which rival identity groups saw the other as the enemy and a war economy was fueled by rival trans-state funders that gave warlords on both sides a stake in the continuance of the conflict. To fight civil war, the regime reconstituted itself as a more violent and exclusionary form of neo-patrimonialism but with enough bureaucratic capabilities to keep control over a majority of the population; in parallel, charismatic jihadists led rival attempts at state reformation in opposition-controlled areas. In both cases, the population was included and excluded largely on identity grounds. However, with Russian and Iranian help, the regime defeated the militarized opposition and restored a more repressive form of patrimonial rule over the rump of the Syrian state, excluding those parts under quasi-foreign (Turkish, US) occupation (Hinnebusch 2018). 23.4.2.2 Egypt: authoritarian restoration In Egypt, no identity fragmentation prevented an anti-regime cross-class coalition mobilizing against the ruler. The relative autonomy of the military, which prioritized its own interests, allowed it to engineer presidential departure. However, no democratic consolidation took place, allowing a restoration of authoritarianism. In spite of a relatively peaceful transition from Mubarak’s rule, the post-Uprising power struggle between secular revolutionaries, the military and Islamists was unconstrained by agreement on rules of the game. The lack of a strong, organized pro-democracy movement and autonomous trade unions, compared to the over-sized politicized military, and the split between secularists and Islamists allowed a substantial “restoration” of the old regime. Military-led authoritarian restoration depended on sophisticated versions of divide and rule, as exemplified by the military’s co-optation of the Muslim Brotherhood to demobilize anti-Mubarak street protests followed by its co-optation of secular activists to help destroy the Brotherhood’s President Morsi. Only an authoritarian regime could exclude one of the most important socio-political forces in Egypt. Also, Egypt’s dependence on foreign aid allowed Saudi and Emirati money to play a crucial role in encouraging and supporting the “counter-revolution” by funding the al-Sisi regime. Al-Sisi’s hybrid regime combined an intolerance of dissent more repressive than under Mubarak with exclusionary or manipulated elections, with some groups included in order to exclude others (Hinnebusch 2018).

Egypt and Syria  383

23.5 CONCLUSION Authoritarian rule was initially consolidated in MENA republics by quite similar mixes of military rule, single party systems incorporating populist alliances of the middle and lower classes combined with doses of “traditional” practices such as personal rule, elite assabiyyah and clientelism. These complex political structures incorporated social bases, penetrated society and guarded some level of state autonomy. But this general formula could take somewhat different forms. In Egypt charismatic leadership presiding over a powerful bureaucracy in a society with a secure identity became the model form of populist authoritarianism widely admired across the region. An alternative variant in identity-fragmented societies such as Syria and Iraq substituted a more robust form of single party rule for charismatic leadership. The purposes served by authoritarian power did not remain static: on the contrary the neo-liberalization and uni-polarization of the global political economy led to change from populist to post-populist authoritarianism, reversing the purposes of authoritarian power from the breaking down of old (oligarchic) inequalities to reconstructing new ones (crony capitalism). The Nasserite state was too dependent on the charismatic leader to maintain course once he was no longer at the helm, evolving thereafter into a presidential monarchy with limited political liberalization facilitating some power sharing with the bourgeoisie. In the Syrian case, Leninist party structures and persisting sectarian and ideological cleavages between state and bourgeoisie delayed movement along the same political trajectory. These post-populist changes showed the capacity of authoritarian regimes to adapt to conditions different from those obtaining at their founding. Indeed, the remarkable resilience of MENA authoritarianism, surviving the Third Wave of global democratization and then its local avatar, the Arab uprisings, showed that it was a viable, not obsolete, form of rule. But that does not mean authoritarianism is stable; rather, lacking hegemony, “fierce” authoritarian states have constantly to work at regime maintenance, deploying substantial coercion, co-optation, divide and rule, etc. These techniques, on the other hand, work because they are relatively congruent with the societal context, notably the way rentierism revived traditional clientelism in the region.

NOTE 1. The analysis focuses on “modern authoritarianism” in Perlmutter’s (1981) words, for while ruling monarchies are a distinctive form of authoritarian governance, almost exclusively confined to MENA, they are too different from the republics to be treated in a single chapter with space constraints. Moreover, analysis of the republics allows greater scope to examine the agency of MENA regime builders than the monarchies that were much more the products of international forces, notably British imperialism.

REFERENCES Abdul-Malek, Anouar (1968) Egypt: Military Society, New York: Vantage Books. Bank, André and Thomas Richter (2010), “Neo-patrimonialism in the Middle East: Overview, Critique and Alternative Conceptualization,” Paper given at German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, August 23. Dekmejian, Richard H. (1975) Egypt under Nasir, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

384  Research handbook on authoritarianism Heydemann, Steven (2007) Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World: Analysis Paper No. 13, Washington DC: The Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Hinnebusch, Raymond (1982) “Syria under the Ba’th: State Formation in a Fragmented Society,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 4 (3), pp. 177–99. Hinnebusch, Raymond (1985) Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-Populist Development of an Authoritarian-Modernizing State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hinnebusch, Raymond (1990a) Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba’thist Syria: Army, Party and Peasant, Boulder CO: Westview Press. Hinnebusch, Raymond (1990b) “The Formation of the Contemporary Egyptian State from Nasser and Sadat to Mubarak,” in Ibrahim Oweiss (ed.), The Political Economy of Contemporary Egypt, Washington, DC: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, pp. 188–209. Hinnebusch, Raymond (1991) “Class and State in Ba’thist Syria,” in R. Antoun and D. Quataert (eds), Syria: Society, Culture, and Polity, Albany, NY: SUNY Press, pp. 29–47. Hinnebusch, Raymond (1993a) “State and Civil Society in Syria,” Middle East Journal, 47 (2), Spring, pp. 243–257. Hinnebusch, Raymond (1993b) “The Politics of Economic Reform in Egypt,” Third World Quarterly, 14 (1), 159–71. Hinnebusch, Raymond (1995) “The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization in Syria,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 27 (3), 305–20. Hinnebusch, Raymond (1997) “The Politics of Economic Liberalization in Syria,” Third World Quarterly, 18 (2), 249–66. Hinnebusch, Raymond (1998) “Syria: Calculated Decompression as a Substitute for Democratization,” in Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble (eds), Democratization and Political Liberalization in the Arab World, vol. 2, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 223–40. Hinnebusch, Raymond (2001a) Syria: Revolution from Above, London: Routledge. Hinnebusch, Raymond (2001b) “The Politics of Economic Liberalization: Comparing Egypt and Syria,” in Hassan Hakimian and Ziba Moshaver (eds), The State and Global Change: The Political Economy of Transition in the Middle East & North Africa, London: Curzon Press, pp. 111–34. Hinnebusch, Raymond (2018) “Understanding Regime Divergence in the Post-Uprising Arab States,” Journal of Historical Sociology, 31 (1), 39–52. Hinnebusch, Raymond (2019) “The Rise and Decline of the Populist Social Contract in the Arab World,” World Development, 129, 105–15. Huntington, S (1968) Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. and Clement H. Moore (eds) (1970) Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, New York: Basic Books. Hussein, Mahmoud (1973), Class Conflict in Egypt, New York: Monthly Review Press. Kassem, Maye (2004) Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. Kienle, Eberhard (2001) Egypt: A Grand Delusion, London: I.B. Tauris. King, Stephen (2009) The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. Mabro, Robert (1974) The Egyptian Economy, 1952–72, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mann, Michael (1984) “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” European Journal of Sociology, 25 (2), 185–213. Perlmutter, Amos (1981) Modern Authoritarianism: A Comparative Institutional Analysis, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Saouli, Adham (2020) “States and State-Building in the Middle East,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Jasmine Gani (eds), Routledge Handbook of the Middle East States and States System, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, pp. 40–50. Schlumberger, Oliver (2020) “Political regimes of the Middle East and North Africa,” in Raymond Hinnebusch and Jasmine Gani (eds), Routledge Handbook of the Middle East States and States System, Abingdon, UK: Routledge, pp 51–66. Sonbol, Amira El-Azhary (2000) The New Mamluks: Egyptian Society and Modern Feudalism, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Egypt and Syria  385 Trimberger, Ellen Kay (1978) Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Waterbury, John (1983) The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Weber, Max (1968) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Free Press.

24. North Korea: what can it teach us about authoritarianism? Alexander Dukalskis

24.1 INTRODUCTION North Korea (or DPRK, standing for Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) is one of the longest-lasting authoritarian regimes in the contemporary world. Having already outlived the Soviet Union and having been founded one year before the People’s Republic of China, it is a remarkable case of authoritarian resilience. Despite developments in the 1990s, including the collapse of most of its erstwhile communist allies, the death of its founding leader, and a disastrous famine, the DPRK managed to survive with essentially the same political system intact. This chapter adopts a comparative perspective, drawing on comparative politics scholarship and indices to explore what North Korea is a case of. After clarifying that the DPRK is a single-party regime organized along Leninist lines with a personalist hereditary leadership, the chapter examines three dimensions that bear on autocratic survival: personalism, adaptability, and succession. The penultimate section discusses the three areas in which North Korea can uniquely contribute to scholarship on authoritarian politics: ideology and propaganda, everyday authoritarianism, and migration and transnational authoritarianism.

24.2

WHAT IS NORTH KOREA A CASE OF?

If we consider a comparative perspective, by most indices that measure levels of democracy North Korea is ranked among the least democratic regimes in the world. In the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), which is produced by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project and assesses the quality of electoral democracy, civil rights protections, and checks and balances, North Korea ranked as second-to-last in the world, just ahead of Eritrea (Boese et al., 2022: 10–12). This was essentially unchanged from the same measurement ten years prior. The Polity 5 project, which tries to capture democracy and authoritarianism on a spectrum with 10 being the most democratic and −10 being the most autocratic ranks North Korea as −7 from 1948 to 1955, −8 from 1956 to 1965, −9 from 1966 to 1993, and after the hereditary succession from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il, −10 from 1994 to 2018, when the data ends (Marshall, 2020). The same goes for human rights and state repression. The Political Terror Scale rates states on a spectrum of 1 to 5 with 1 being the least repressive and 5 indicating that “terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals” (Gibney et al., 2021). North Korea has received a 5 every year since 2008, and 4 or 5 each year prior to that for which data is available. The Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI) has an index of physical integrity rights protections that measures respect for rights to be free from torture, 386

North Korea  387 extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance (Cingranelli et al., 2021). It ranges from 0 (no respect for these rights) to 8 (full respect for these rights) and begins in 1981. The average for North Korea of all the years for which data was available in the most recent dataset is 0.68, indicating a consistent lack of respect for these rights (Cingranelli et al., 2021). North Korean state repression does not stop at its borders as indicated by its frequent efforts to target those who have left North Korea, are in exile, or who defected (Fahy, 2019). According to publicly available data, there are at least 156 instances in which North Korea threatened, attacked, kidnapped, extradited, or assassinated North Koreans abroad (Dukalskis, 2021). Given the secretive nature of transnational repression, especially when it involves actions in neighbouring China, the true number is likely much higher. No serious observers dispute that the North Korean political system is highly authoritarian and deeply repressive. There are more interesting debates about what type of autocracy it is. Several approaches can be identified, although often they are more about points of emphasis rather than inherent disagreements. One approach highlights North Korea’s essentially Leninist organizational structure and legacy, therefore putting it in the tradition of the study of comparative communism (Dimitrov, 2013; McAdams, 2017; Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2020; Breslauer, 2021; Lee, 2022). This perspective highlights the DPRK’s emergence during the early days of the Cold War, its interactions with other communist states, and its quest to survive as a Leninist state (i.e. with a sole political party superseding the state and its institutions in importance and power) in a world bereft of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The most immediate points of comparison for understanding North Korea’s contemporary political and economic development therefore become the world’s remaining Leninist states, namely, China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba, and especially the three of those states located in Asia (Greitens and Silberstein, 2022). Another view emphasizes the personalist and hereditary nature of North Korean politics (e.g. Kwon and Chung, 2012; Haggard et al., 2014; Song and Wright, 2018). Here the focus is on the power consolidation of Kim Il Sung in the early days and the subsequent ability of Kim to bequeath power to Kim Jong Il and for the latter to, in turn, leave power to Kim Jong Un. Elites in other communist states draw on family connections and legacy to rise to the top. Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, for example, is the son of a former high-level party leader, but North Korea is unusual in its hereditary system and the ideological propaganda focused on the leader’s family. Personalist rule itself is relatively common in Leninist regimes due to the lack of checks and balances and transparency within the system, but it often disappears after the first generation of leadership passes on (see McAdams, 2017). As the examples of Stalin, Ceaușescu in Romania, Hoxha in Albania, Tito in Yugoslavia, Castro in Cuba, Mao Zedong (and indeed Xi Jinping) in China all testify, a leader who can muscle his (always a “he” thus far) way to the top of a Leninist system has few formal checks on his power as well as an organized party apparatus which he can use to implement his plans. Although many communist regimes felt pressure to de-personalize after Stalin’s death in 1953 and the subsequent 1956 “Secret Speech” by Soviet Leader Nikita Khrushchev calling for a repudiation of the personality cult and power centralization of the late Stalin era, North Korea redoubled its personalism with Kim Il Sung at the pinnacle. Although North Korea has the Worker’s Party of Korea as its Leninist organizational apparatus, Song and Wright (2018: 164) rate North Korea as far more personalist than other Asian communist states ever since the ebbing of the Cultural Revolution and its attendant Mao cult in China.

388  Research handbook on authoritarianism A final view emphasizes the role of the military and security services in maintaining authoritarian rule in the DPRK (Haggard et al., 2014; Smith, 2015). Wintrobe (2013) even goes so far as to label North Korea a military dictatorship, arguing that the entire society has been militarized. Other research maintains that while the military plays a key role in maintaining regime security and has high status in North Korea’s structure and propaganda, it is not politically autonomous and is rather more of a tool at the disposal of the regime rather than the driving force behind its power (Woo, 2014, 2016, 2018). Although comparative research suggests that empowering the military with a decisive role in repressing threats the way that Kim Jong Il arguably did amid the breakdown of many party-state institutions in the mid-1990s presents the risk of a coup (Svolik, 2013), North Korea has robust coup-proofing mechanisms that have thus far prevented such an outcome (Byman and Lind, 2010). As repression is a core element of authoritarian stability (Gerschewski, 2013), the military and internal security services are clearly important elements of North Korea’s regime resilience, but the personalist rule and party structures remain too important to define it as a military regime. In comparative terms, although Svolik (2012: 31) points to the unsatisfactory nature of regime types, the Geddes et al. (2014) label of party-personalist does seem apt in the North Korean case. To specify further, the personalist dimension is hereditary while the party system is a Leninist sub-type, with the party leading the state and competitor parties banned. The latter indicates that it has structural commonalities with the surviving communist states of China, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba.

24.3

THREE PERSPECTIVES ON DPRK RESILIENCE

On top of the distinctions outlined in the previous section, the DPRK is also a resilient form of party-personalist, hereditary, Leninist rule, remaining in power from 1948 until at least this writing in 2023. Three dimensions of this resilience deserve a closer look in line with many of the other contributions of this volume: personalization, adaptability, and succession. Each will be considered in turn to illustrate North Korea’s path to autocratic survival. Despite the single-party structure and legacy of North Korea’s political system, there is no doubt that it is highly personalized. Biographically focused works on North Korean leaders illustrate the overwhelming power that the Kim family has wielded in North Korea for seven decades (Suh, 1988; Fifield, 2019; Lee, 2019; Ra, 2019; Pak, 2021). A seminal argument in this regard is that by Kwon and Chung (2012), who maintain that a central theme of North Korean politics is how the system attempts to transform the revolutionary credentials and charisma of Kim Il Sung, disseminated by propaganda and a cult of personality, to his offspring. This manufactured but “historically durable, transcendental charismatic authority” (Kwon and Chung, 2012: 5) permeates the DPRK system from the pinnacle of staged leadership events like the funeral of Kim Jong Il (Lee, 2019: 113–17) to the curriculum of elementary school pupils (Dukalskis, 2017: 80–81). After Kim Jong Un’s assumption of power, his and his family’s personality cult was amplified by the North Korean propaganda system even more from an already high baseline, likely to build his revolutionary credentials and charismatic authority via his lineage (Boussalis et al., 2023). The extraordinary power of the Kims was not achieved with propaganda alone. After eliminating rivals in the initial period of power consolidation from the late 1940s (Smith, 2015: 84–6) purges in the late 1950s of real or suspected rivals to Kim Il Sung consolidated his

North Korea  389 power (Lankov, 2002). Kim Jong Il began to emerge as a potential successor to Kim Il Sung in the 1970s, and purges from then and again in the 1990s helped marginalize those who were critical of dynastic succession (Kim, 2021), which was, after all, a first for the communist world (Breslauer, 2021: 291). To consolidate his own power, Kim Jong Un purged military officers and other elites, including his uncle Jang Song Thaek in 2013 (Haggard et al., 2014; Lee, 2019: 127–31; Ra, 2019). As a result, there appear to be no serious internal challenges to the continued hereditary rule of the Kim family over North Korea’s single-party Leninist regime. Of course, North Korea is an opaque information environment and so there may be developments that are unobservable to outsiders, but given the information available, the personalization of power over the system is extensive. Amid this personalization, the system has proven able to withstand challenges with which it is confronted. To be sure, the adaptations that the regime has made over time often seem to be reactive rather than proactive. While crises in autocratic regimes often appear to observers to occur suddenly, they usually result from changes that build slowly over time (Gerschewski, 2018). This is certainly the case with the DPRK’s most existential challenge since the Korean War, namely, the famine of the 1990s. The “Arduous March”, as it is known in North Korean propaganda, resulted from a combination of slow adaptation to changing global circumstances (particularly in the Soviet Union), the deterioration of the Public Distribution System, which was meant to feed much of the population, lack of free flow of information that might have sounded alarm bells earlier, and proximate factors like bad weather and poor harvests (see Haggard and Noland, 2007; Fahy, 2015: 10–14; Smith, 2015: 187–91, 196–202; Gray and Lee, 2021: 127–32). The result was a humanitarian catastrophe, with widespread starvation and suffering. From the regime’s perspective, this presented a challenge to its ability to survive. It could not deliver for its people despite decades of rhetoric promising material abundance, and people were reduced to scavenging or bartering for food instead of working at their state jobs or attending school. The military was elevated in stature and power as a stabilizing force, and propaganda initiatives emphasized collective resilience (Gray and Lee, 2021: 132–5). Ultimately, the regime survived the famine, but not without important changes. In the absence of other options, people turned to black markets to survive (Smith, 2015: 211–20). While markets were widely tolerated with state officials actively participating at virtually all levels, they were mostly still technically illegal (Smith, 2015: 222). Bribery and bargains sustained the system (Joo, 2010). In 2002, the government ratified and formalized an increased role for the market via a series of reform measures (Gray and Lee, 2021: 144–9). However, in November 2009 the authorities launched a currency revaluation as part of a broader effort to reign in the private wealth and independence generated by the market, but this resulted in apparently widespread discontent, with the government ultimately forced to backtrack and permit the status quo ante (Lankov, 2013: 126–32). Market entrenchment changed society’s relationship with the state, although the nature of those changes is debated and still unfolding (Yeo, 2021). Ideologically, the market provides the networks within which subversive information and criticism can circulate, as indicated by interview evidence and periodic crackdowns by the authorities on “anti-socialist” material (Joo, 2014; Dukalskis and Joo, 2021: 373–7). Economically, the market provides some autonomy from the state and facilitates a type of modernization that sits at odds with much of the DPRK’s official philosophy and governing practices (Cha, 2016: 266–9). However, it is also clear that there are control mechanisms in place to limit political threats emanating from the

390  Research handbook on authoritarianism market, nor do North Koreans appear to think of the market as a “political” space in the sense of being oppositional to the state (Dukalskis, 2016). Furthermore, the fact that the state has been involved in driving some market changes indicates that it thinks it can control the political fallout from circumscribed marketization processes (Gray and Lee, 2021: 137–66), and may even be pursuing a strategy akin to China and Vietnam to marry Leninist political control with a more dynamic role for the market in the economy (Greitens and Silberstein, 2022). As discussed above, North Korea has already gone through two hereditary successions, justifying the arrangement with propaganda, and protecting it with purges. As of this writing Kim Jong Un is around 40 years old and so succession is still some ways off if things go according to his presumed plans. His wife Ri Sol Ju is a public figure, and North Korea has a long history of building propaganda around mothers of the leadership to bolster the legitimacy of the leadership’s lineage (Kwon and Chung, 2012: 113–22). The couple has a daughter named Kim Ju Ae who is about 11 years old, with some sources indicating that they have two more children (Pak, 2021: 201). Starting in November 2022, Kim Ju Ae began to appear in propaganda photos with her father, and in February 2023 she was photographed sitting between her parents and in front of members of North Korea’s top military brass at a celebration of the 75th anniversary of the Korean People’s Army (Kim, 2023). This suggests that the ground is being prepared for a fourth generation of Kim family rule. Based on the information we have, other family members do not appear to be credibly jockeying to succeed Kim Jong Un. Kim’s brother, Kim Jong Chol, apparently shows little interest in politics (Fifield, 2019: 220–22) and his half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, was assassinated in Kuala Lumpur airport in 2017. Kim Jong Un’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, is a high-ranking official in the party and state, although North Korea’s leadership system is highly patriarchal (Jung and Dalton, 2006), so a Kim Yo Jong succession (much like an eventual Kim Ju Ae succession) might not be easily accepted by other DPRK elites. However, we simply do not know for sure. Kim Yo Jong is rumoured to have children, but nothing is confirmed. Overall, while it is reasonable to assume that the plan is for a third dynastic succession at some point, details are too murky to make a definitive prognosis.

24.4

WHAT NORTH KOREA CAN TEACH US ABOUT AUTHORITARIANISM

Moving beyond the personalization, adaptability, and succession dimensions of North Korean politics, the regime’s extremity in many respects grants leverage to scholars. Specifically, the long-standing centrality of ideology and propaganda in North Korea gives a unique window into the role of information and information control in sustaining authoritarianism. Furthermore, and relatedly, the dense control mechanisms on ordinary people and the regime’s reach into the most mundane aspects of life in the DPRK alongside recent changes brought by marketization allow for the possibility to study authoritarianism at the everyday level. Finally, the extremely closed nature of the DPRK’s political system, including tightly controlled borders, allows for a distinctive view on studying migration from authoritarian states, diaspora activism, and the state’s response.

North Korea  391 24.4.1 Ideology and Propaganda Spurred in large measure by Gerschewski’s seminal 2013 article on the three pillars of authoritarian stability (Gerschewski, 2013), students of authoritarian politics have renewed their attention to legitimation, or the justifications that leaders give for their right to rule. Common options to legitimate authoritarian rule include performance, the personalism of the leader, and/or a ruling ideology that explains political reality (see Dukalskis and Gerschewski, 2017; Tannenberg et al., 2021). Having a compelling legitimation formula can help secure belief among at least some within the population, thereby reducing the need for repression and co-optation to maintain political control. Within most authoritarian systems, and especially North Korea’s, censorship pushes out competing ideas that might challenge the government’s preferred formulations. North Korea’s efforts to disseminate its official ideas and prevent competitors stands out as extreme amongst contemporary authoritarian states. During an age in which many dictatorships learned to live with a degree of informational openness, North Korea seems old-fashioned with its totalitarian ideology and strict information controls (Guriev and Treisman, 2022). And yet, the formula has thus far worked to help sustain the DPRK in power. In the first instance, North Korea attempts to secure a legitimacy belief in elites and the population. The substance of this belief has varied over time, but has always had at its core the idea that the Kims and the Worker’s Party of Korea should rule North Korea. As discussed above, the personality cult around Kim Il Sung and the subsequent Kims permeates all levels of official society from birth to death. Woven in with personalist legitimation is North Korea’s official ideology of Juche. Juche emerged first in 1955 and was elevated and prioritized in earnest from the mid-1960s (Myers, 2006; Lankov, 2013: 67–8). Usually taken to mean “self-reliance” with an emphasis on Korean nationalism and sovereignty, Juche also has it that humans (in this case Koreans) are the motors of revolution, and that a supreme wise leader (in this case Kim Il Sung) is necessary to control that motor (Kwon and Chung, 2012: 82). It is a vague ideology, which means that its interpretation can change to fit prevailing necessities, but it always justifies the rule of the current leadership (see Van den Bosch, 2017). If belief in the ruling ideology cannot be secured, the next best outcome for authoritarian leaders is passive acceptance that resistance is futile. Overweening and repetitive propaganda messages help demonstrate the state’s power, which in turn helps convince people with doubts about the government to stay silent for fear of being repressed (Huang, 2015). When combined with censorship that helps marginalize alternative ideas, existing political arrangements acquire a taken-for-granted quality that makes it difficult for people to conceive of alternatives (Dukalskis, 2017). In the North Korean case, the longevity of the regime compounds the ability of the state to narrow citizens’ political horizons as multiple generations have been socialized into the system, its logic, and its values (Dukalskis and Lee, 2020). Recent research shows how North Korea’s propaganda is targeted for different audiences (Ba et al., 2023). However, the ruling ideology is not immune from challenges. Outside information about South Korean or Chinese prosperity strains the credulity of North Korea’s claim to be providing a materially prosperous life for its citizens. Each subsequent generational succession of the leadership brings it further from North Korea’s mythologized heyday of revolution and successful socialist modernization. The entrenchment of markets, while not constituting an opposition realm, does create vested interests which has pitted citizens against the state, such as during the 2009 currency revaluation. However, the propaganda and ideological messages

392  Research handbook on authoritarianism can adapt. For example, South Korea’s prosperity is no longer something the DPRK can shield from its citizens, so the message has adapted to portray South Korea as materially well-off but spiritually bankrupt, highly unequal, and manipulated by the United States (Lankov, 2013: 105–6). Ultimately, while it is possible that there exists widespread discontent with the leadership and disbelief of the ideology only waiting to manifest when the spectre of repression is lifted, this can only be known after the fact. For now, North Korea’s ideological, propaganda, and censorship systems remain intact and stand as comparative reference points in the wider study of authoritarianism. 24.4.2 Everyday Authoritarianism Authoritarian politics is usually analyzed at the elite level. For many research questions this makes sense because elites are generally much more influential than the broader population in determining authoritarian survival (Svolik, 2012). And yet authoritarian rule has consequences for citizens that go beyond regime survival, impacting quality of life, potential for collective action, economic options, gender relations, and a host of other outcomes. A strand of scholarship on North Korea has sought to understand the contours of everyday politics in the DPRK from its founding (e.g. Kim, 2013) through the famine of the 1990s (e.g. Fahy, 2015) to the recent era of marketization and third-generation rule (e.g. Choi, 2013; Dukalskis and Joo, 2021). In the DPRK, the extent of political control and its impact on everyday life is remarkable (see e.g. Hassig and Oh, 2009). Of course, the government does not achieve perfect control over people’s lives, but its infrastructure of control is able to strictly constrain citizens’ political horizons from cradle to grave. From elementary school, fealty to the regime is prioritized, while as citizens age they are tracked into mass organizations that limit their free time, with males serving long stints in the military, and workplaces subject to ideological study sessions. The surveillance and monitoring of society, from the Ministry of Public Security to the local-level neighbourhood organizations known as inminban, prevents meaningful collective action critical of the government from emerging in the first place, rendering repression of mass movements unnecessary. And yet, there have been changes to this regime of control in the last 25 years, catalyzed mostly by the emergence of markets since the 1990s. As noted above, the marketplace has created a realm of interaction that is partially removed from the totalizing ambitions of the North Korean state (Joo, 2014). As marketization has deepened, debates have ensued about the longer-term political consequences for North Koreans and the DPRK system (e.g. Joo, 2014; Dukalskis, 2016; Yeo, 2021). As it is too late to put the cat of marketization back in the bag, much depends on the regime’s strategy towards ongoing marketization (Yeo, 2021). If it can incorporate it into its broader political survival strategy, as it appears to be trying to do (Greitens and Silberstein, 2022), then authoritarian control and a deeper role for markets can coexist. The corruption that has accompanied marketization may even be harnessed to provide revenue for the state and as a safety valve for North Koreans who might otherwise push for political change (Carothers, 2022). However, the increased outside information and less regulated information exchange that comes with marketization presents a challenge for the regime and increases pressure on it to facilitate material prosperity to prevent opposition. As of now, the political controls in North Korea combined with state agents’ involvement and vested interest in the markets have prevented them from becoming a space of political opposition to

North Korea  393 the regime, while still limiting the government’s options when it comes to cracking down on market activity (Dukalskis and Joo, 2021). A notable shift that can be traced directly to marketization processes has been the increased resources of women in North Korean society. Despite rhetoric to the contrary (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2022), authoritarian states generally perform less well in terms of gender equality than their more democratic counterparts (e.g. Englehart and Miller, 2014; Sundström et al., 2017). Data limitations usually prevent North Korea from being included in global indices of gender equality, but North Korea’s socio-political system remains highly patriarchal with little representation for women in decision-making roles and widespread discrimination against women in the official economy (Jung and Dalton, 2006; Lankov and Kim, 2014; Kim and Easley, 2021). This remains the case, but the rise of the market has provided women with an opportunity to accumulate wealth in ways that previously did not exist (Lankov and Kim, 2008, 2014; Kim and Easley, 2021). In part because men must often still report to their official jobs, women are more able to earn money in the market. This access to resources helps explain why women constitute more than 70 per cent of the North Koreans who have made it to South Korea since the 1990s (see below), because they are able to pay the bribes necessary to do so. However, the fact that the state is still male-dominated means that there is a limit to how much the market can empower women in North Korea (Haggard and Noland, 2013), particularly as the state co-opts aspects of the market. 24.4.3 Migration and Transnational Authoritarianism While scholarship on authoritarian politics usually focuses on what happens within the state (and usually only at relatively elite levels), students of authoritarianism are paying renewed attention to the transnational dimensions of authoritarian rule (e.g. Tansey, 2016; Cooley and Heathershaw, 2017; Glasius, 2018). Migration sees authoritarian states respond by taking measures to control their populations abroad and mitigate threats that may emanate from exiles (Tsourapas, 2021). While North Korea is extremely isolated in many respects, it also participates in the global economy (Gray and Lee, 2021), albeit sometimes in unorthodox ways given the sanctions it must navigate (Hastings, 2016), and sees its citizens leave the state in both permitted and forbidden ways. This means that North Korea can inform the study of migration from autocracies and the transnational dimensions of authoritarianism. North Korea’s state media paints the outside world as a curious combination of dangerous enemies out to get Korea, on the one hand, and as full of supporters and admirers of the DPRK’s revolutionary accomplishments, on the other (see Boussalis et al., 2022). Yet for years now the information blockade about the outside world has been sufficiently permeated to allow for North Koreans, within strictures and at some cost, to access non-official foreign information, communicate with family members who have left North Korea, and receive remittances through networks of brokers operating between South Korea and China (see Tudor and Pearson, 2015; Baek, 2016). Information about China’s relative prosperity comes through seeing the Chinese goods that make it to North Korea, from Chinese media, and from talking with Koreans who have been to China, while information about South Korea comes directly from talking with family members who have left and through South Korean media that filters back into the North (Dukalskis and Joo, 2021: 374–5). Despite strict controls on outward migration, some North Koreans go abroad temporarily for work or study. For example, North Korean entities partner with external entities to run

394  Research handbook on authoritarianism a chain of DPRK-themed restaurants mostly in China, but also elsewhere such as Indonesia, Cambodia, or the Netherlands (Hastings, 2016: 124–34). The financial arrangements are opaque, but one thing is clear: the waitresses who staff the restaurants are subject to extensive control mechanisms while outside North Korea (Hastings, 2016: 129–30). They often live in dormitories monitored by minders, must participate in ideological indoctrination sessions, and are punished for transgressions. Arrangements like this see the DPRK extend its coercive control over its citizens abroad, but even so opportunities to earn money in this fashion are often seen as attractive propositions for many North Korean workers (Lankov, 2017). Another form of outward migration is unofficial, and indeed illegal. According to South Korea’s Ministry of Unification, about 34,000 North Koreans have left the DPRK and resettled in South Korea since the 1990s.1 From 2006 to 2011, the number was more than 2,000 in each year. More recently the flow has nearly stopped due to increased border restrictions associated in part with Covid-19. From 2012 to 2019, the number was between 1,000 and just over 1,500 per year, while in 2020, it was only 229, in 2021 dropping to 63, and to 67 in 2022. The provisional count for 2023 as of this writing is 139. There are also some North Koreans who leave the DPRK and stay in China, and a handful that go to third countries like Japan or the United Kingdom. This migration means that there is now a small but meaningful North Korean diaspora (Greitens, 2020). Those who end up in South Korea must adjust to a new environment not only in practical terms, but also by grappling with the dissonance between their political socialization in the North and the prevailing democratic political values of the South (Hur, 2020). Many maintain some contact with their families remaining in the North and/or send money to help with life in the DPRK or perhaps to follow them to the South. For scholars of authoritarian politics and life in North Korea, this population has been a rich source of insights, although interview and survey data of this sort has well-known limitations and potential pitfalls (Song and Denney, 2019). Some North Koreans who settle in the South become activists who push for human rights change in the DPRK (see Yeo and Chubb, 2018; Fahy, 2019). Groups like North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity or Fighters for a Free North Korea send anti-DPRK information into the North. Many defectors testified in public hearings and private interviews for the 2013–14 United Nations Human Rights Council Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which documented in a nearly 400-page report a range of severe human rights abusees in North Korea.2 North Korean authorities view transnational activism as a threat and take measures to discredit defectors or punish their families who remain in the DPRK (Fahy, 2019). As mentioned above, there are more than 150 documented instances in which North Korean authorities have attempted to repress those who have left the state, ostensibly because their defection and the information they have about life in the DPRK constitute a political threat to the government. Beyond repression, North Korea tries to control the side effects of diaspora activism by supporting loyal organizations aboard. During the 1970s the DPRK supported a range of ideologically aligned groups and foreign actors abroad (Young, 2021). Today there is a scattered network of pro-DPRK groups like the Korean Friendship Association or Juche Idea Study Groups that try to boost the image of North Korea, but these appear to be exclusively populated by non-Koreans and are quite marginal. More significant, especially historically, is Chongryon, the pro-DPRK group of Koreans in Japan supported by Pyongyang that runs a network of schools, clubs, financial institutions, and a Tokyo-based university (see Ryang,

North Korea  395 1997, 2016; Bell, 2021). The organization is well past its heyday of the 1950s and today struggles to cope with international sanctions relevant to the DPRK as well as domestic restrictions in Japan, but still has an infrastructure through which North Korea can reach outward to the Korean diaspora.

24.5 CONCLUSION North Korea is often thought of as an outlier in the study of authoritarianism, and in many respects, it is, but putting analysis of the DPRK into conversation with comparative perspectives on authoritarianism can enrich both. As a personalist, single-party regime with a Leninist structure and hereditary succession, North Korea is a typological blend with different dimensions that can be leveraged to study the politics of authoritarianism. This chapter reviewed its personalism, adaptability, and succession in this light. The DPRK’s longevity and extremity provide unique perspectives on ideology and propaganda, everyday authoritarianism, as well as migration and transnational repression. The ideology and propaganda are virtually all-encompassing, but have faced challenges in the post-famine era stemming from marketization and poor service delivery. The entrenched regime reaches deeply into society, thus illuminating the study of everyday authoritarianism along with coping and resistance strategies. Finally, even one of the most closed political societies in the world generates migration, and shows how a state like this responds to diaspora activism and engages in transnational repression.

NOTES 1.

https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/relations/statistics/defectors/ (accessed 6 November 2023). 2. Full report here: https://​documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org/​doc/​UNDOC/​GEN/​G14/​108/​71/​PDF/​G1410871​ .pdf​?OpenElement (accessed 17 August 2022).

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Epilogue to the Research Handbook on Authoritarianism Natasha Lindstaedt

Though most work in comparative politics has focused on democracy and democratization, the past 25 years have seen a huge upsurge in academic work on authoritarian regimes. In the past, the study of authoritarian regimes led to broad generalizations about these regimes, and the idea that they constituted the mirror image of democracy or what democracy was not. As it turns out, authoritarian regimes are incredibly complex, inspiring interesting debates about how best to measure and categorize non-democratic regimes. The 21st century is also bringing new forms of authoritarianism which are lasting longer than their predecessors. Today, the typical dictatorship has been in power for decades. Iran’s theocratic regime, for example, has ruled since the fall of the Shah in 1979. China and Cuba’s Communist regimes have been holding power since 1949 and 1959, respectively. Paul Biya has led Cameroon since 1982. The longevity and tactics of authoritarian rule has been one of the major areas of research of the past few decades. Part of the reason why authoritarian regimes have become more adaptable is that they are using “democratic” institutions to sustain their rule (Levitsky and Way, 2010; Slater and Fenner, 2011). Elections are no longer an institution in which democracies hold a monopoly. But when elections are held by authoritarian regimes it is not a sign that genuine democratization is taking place. Rather, elections are a tool to prolong their rule. In spite of this, studying elections in authoritarian regimes is a useful exercise. Authoritarian regimes are not only more resilient than ever before but they have become more adept at concealing their authoritarian nature. This edited volume on authoritarian research examines the newest trends in authoritarianism, namely, what authoritarian regimes do to survive, and why they remain so durable, looking at cases that are both past and present. Along the way, the chapters look at the various ways of attaining legitimacy, credibility and obedience. The chapters look at what motivates their performance and policy output, and how this measures up to other regimes. The volume also explores how authoritarian regimes have harnessed technological advances to maintain greater control over their citizens. Indeed, technology has ironically played a big role in authoritarian durability. Instead of liberating people from autocratic styles of rule, autocracies have become more creative at using the media to spin positive narratives about their regimes. In spite of the pressures coming from collapse of the Soviet Union, globalization, the Arab Spring, the Colour Revolutions, the Global Economic Recession, and COVID-19, today almost 6 billion people live in some form of autocratic rule. For people residing in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Asia-Pacific and sub-Saharan Africa, living under authoritarian forms of rule is the norm. In fact, 98 per cent of the population living in the MENA region live in autocracies, 89 per cent of those in the Asia-Pacific and 79 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa. This means that for much of the world, 399

400  Research handbook on authoritarianism speaking freely, forming associations and gaining accurate information is difficult, while access to employment opportunities, justice and the rule of law is arbitrary. It also means that most people live in countries where there is little way to hold their leaders to account and it’s more unpredictable whether or not the government will be able to produce optimal outcomes. As autocracies have spread around the world, they have also become more assertive on the world stage, and they now constitute 46 per cent of the global GDP. Authoritarian regimes have gained enormous power and will remain a fixture in international politics. Given the current global balance of power, it has never been more important to uncover more about authoritarian regimes, and where future research should lead us.

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Index

Abacha, S. 286 abductions 332 Abdullah I of Jordan 270 Abts, K. 44 accountability 169, 170 mechanisms 66 ACLP classification 17 activism 154, 159–61 diaspora activism 394–5 reduced space for in China 325–7 see also protests Adams, L. 364 Adams, M. 201 adaptability 388, 389–90 Adorno, T. 46 advanced training 119 Afghanistan 366 Africa 141, 142 East Africa 198 North Africa 198 see also Middle East and North Africa (MENA); sub-Saharan Africa; and under individual countries African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) 334, 335 Afwerki, I. 279–80 AKP (Justice and Development Party) 50, 208 Aliyev, H. 278–9 Aliyev, I. 279, 288 Allen, N. 113 Altemeyer, B. 46 Alvarez, M. 17 Amin, I. 336 Anckar, C. 19 Ankunda, P. 347 anti-corruption campaign 324 anti-gender movement 198–9, 207–8 anti-reform coalitions 193, 194 apparatchiks 193, 194 Aquinas, T. 265 Arab uprisings 381–2 architecture 361 Argentina 117–21, 121–2 Arif, A.S. 286 Aristotle 13 arms embargoes 191 al-Asad, B. 380 al-Asad, H. 374–5, 379–80 Asia 141, 143, 198

East Asia 141, 144 see also Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and under individual countries Asia-Pacific 399 ‘Asian values’ 144, 146 assassination 5–6, 261–75 consequences of 269–72 definition, data and patterns 262, 263, 264 explaining assassination attempts 266–9, 270 theoretical justifications of tyrannicide 262–5 Astana 219 Ataev, O. 358 Augustine, St 265 authoritarian landscape 230–32 authoritarian personality 46, 47 authoritarian populism 2, 42–58 case studies 49–52, 53, 54 conceptualization 47–9 illiberal democracy 44–6 MENA 371–5, 383 authoritarian practices 34–5, 38 authoritarian republics 370–85 authoritarian resilience 158, 381, 388–90 authoritarian restoration 381, 382 authoritarian toolkit 232–7 see also cooptation; repression authoritarian transformation 30, 31–3, 38 autocratic transitions 272 autocratization 42, 52 and democratic backsliding 2, 59–74, 162 electoral authoritarianism 28, 30, 31–2, 33, 38 Azerbaijan 278–9, 288 Ba’ath Party 372, 373–5, 376, 380 backsliding see democratic backsliding Bader, M. 279 Balaguer, J. 286 Banda, H. 292 Bashir al-Assad 288 Baturo, A. 255 Béland, D. 44 Belarus 176 Berdymukhamedov, G. 7, 176, 357, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366–7 cult of personality 359–61 succession 288, 289–90, 358 Berdymukhamedov, S. 7, 357, 358, 361, 367

401

402  Research handbook on authoritarianism Beria, L. 247 Bermeo, N. 42, 60, 63, 68, 69 Berry, M.E. 200 Besigye, K. 337, 343, 348 Biden, J. 50 binding legislatures 156–7 Bismarck, O. von 171 Bjarnegård, E. 206, 209 Blin, A. 267 Bo Xilai 323–4 Bobi Wine (Robert Kyagulanyi) 339, 340, 341, 343, 345, 346, 348, 349 arrest for breaching COVID regulations 332 ethnic support 342 rising threat to Museveni 331, 338–9 Boix, C. 156, 301 Bolivia 272 Bolsonaro, J. 50 Bongo, A. (Bongo Ondimba, A.) 35, 286, 291 Bongo, O. 279, 290–91 Bongo Valentin, N. 286 books 364 Boudiaf, M. 271 Boumédiène, H. 88 Brain, S. 213, 214 Brazil 49–50, 51, 52, 53 Brezhnev, L. 93, 94 Brincat, S.K. 264, 265 Brooks, R. 113 Brownlee, J. 251, 282 Bukele, N. 59 Bulgaria 104, 105, 106 Bunce, V. 244 Bunk, B. 200 Burkina Faso 280 Bush, S.S. 206 calculated decompression 379–80 Camara, M.D. 93 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) 347 Canovan, M. 43 Capecchi, V. 12 capital account openness 182–4, 185, 186, 187 career paths, officers’ 115–16 Carter, D.B. 262 Cassani, A. 169 Castillo Armas, C. 271, 272 Castree, N. 214 Castro, F. 85, 155, 280, 293 Castro, R. 93, 155, 287, 288, 293 caudillismo 14 Ceaușescu, N. 291 censorship 128, 130–31, 132, 133, 134, 135, 158, 239 medical 175–7

UAE 217 Central African Republic 174 centralization 323–7 CGV classification 17, 20 Chaliand, G. 267 Chávez, H. 173 Cheibub, J.A. 17, 186 Chikanayev, A. 219 child mortality rates 168–9, 171 child-rearing values 52, 54 Chin, J.J. 262, 267 China 6, 106, 155, 158, 160, 161, 207, 301, 317–30 changing means of repression and control 321–3 COVID-19 pandemic 160, 175–6, 326, 327 cumulative ideology and shifting legitimacy claims 320–21 digital communication 128, 130, 131, 132, 135, 153 digital era and survival 238–9 economic reform reversal 182, 186 the environment 213, 215–16, 220–22 health 170, 171, 172 institutional reforms and organizational capacity 319–20 modernization and survival 319–23 non-communist parties 103 North Korea, migration and 393 personalization, centralization and neo-totalitarianism under Xi 323–7 political system 317–18 regime support 140–41, 144 shrinking space for activism and data-based surveillance state 325–7 and sub-Saharan Africa 35–6 succession 253–4, 323–4, 327 Tiananmen Square protest 233, 321–2 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 317, 318, 319–21, 323, 324, 325 organizational structure 317–18 Chissano, J. 93 Chu, J. 19 Chung, B.H. 388 Cicero 261, 264 citizen complaints 96, 100, 105–7 citizen support see regime support civil conflict 272 civil (party) personalism 81, 82–5, 86, 90–94 civil society 154, 159–61 see also activism; protests class power 377 class rank 119 clean water, access to 170 climate change 4–5, 216

Index  403 Cold War 230, 231 collective insecurity 44 colonialism 20, 213–14 Colorado Party 278 commitment problems 4, 153–65 state-centric approach 154, 155–9, 161 state–society relations approach 154, 159–61 communist penumbra 98–9 communist regimes 3, 96–110, 199 functions dependent on party size 99–100 organizational advantages of communist parties and societal legibility 100–101 variation in party size 101–7 effects on information collection 3, 96, 100–101, 105–7 non-communist parties 103–4 origins of variation at regime inception 104–5 communist universe 98–9 Comoros 30 Compaoré, B. 280 comparative politics research 301, 309–10 competence of officers competence–loyalty trade-off 111, 113–14 and loyalty 111–12, 113–22 Argentina 117–21 in field commands 114–17 competitive authoritarianism 17, 27, 32, 33 succession 254–5, 258 conflict 31–2, 33 civil 272 international conflicts 268–9 Conrad, C. 237 conservation narrative 217 consolidation of populist authoritarianism 371–5 consultative forums 236 Conté, L. 247 control China 321–3 over the economy 188–9 North Korea 390, 392–3 of security apparatus 80, 81, 82, 88–93, 94, 276, 296–9 cooptation 5, 229, 234–6, 240 digital 239–40 interrelation with repression 237 of potential opposition 157 Coppedge, M. 63 Corporale, A. 173 corruption 170 Council of Europe Istanbul Convention 208 coups 113, 247–8, 248–9, 262 Argentina 118 failed 80 following assassinations 272

military 36, 112, 170, 256 COVID-19 pandemic 37, 160, 167, 174–7, 360 China 160, 175–6, 326, 327 Uganda 332, 339–40 facade of Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) 345–6 credibility deficit 153–65 crown prince dilemma 249–50, 251, 281–2 Cuba 155, 171, 280, 287, 288, 293 cuckoos 284, 290–91, 297 cult of personality 359–61 culture 363–5 customs duties 186, 187 cut-off dates 20 Dahl, R.A. 16, 61 Daxecker, U.E. 60–61 DeBoom, M. 221 defective democracies 26 Dekmejian, R.H. 373 democracy 13, 14, 15, 61, 230 authoritarianism and 53–5 illiberal 44–6 liberal 42, 44–5, 49, 53–5 non-party democracy in Uganda 336–7 populism and 43–4 regime typologies with a democracy bias 16–17 sanctions and democracies 304–5 socialist democracy in China 320 and women’s rights 199 democracy sanctions 300, 301–2 democratic backsliding 2, 59–74, 162 conceptualization 60–64 duration of the process 69 halting 66–7 institutional factors 64–5 key components 70 measuring 62–4 outcome 69–70 societal factors 65–6 where it can occur 68–9 democratic centralism 318 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) see North Korea Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 172–3, 288, 289 democratic slump 1 democratization 230 failed in Syria 382 following assassination 271–2 and health 168–9 third wave of 25, 28, 30 Deng Xiaoping 90, 155, 253, 317, 323 modernization under 319–22

404  Research handbook on authoritarianism denial-of-service (DoS) attacks 130, 133 de-personalization 5, 276–99 during leadership successions 5, 281–93, 297–8 during a ruler’s lifetime 277–81, 299 deployment of officers 117, 121, 122 loyalty-based in Argentina 120, 121–2 despotic power 371–2 diaspora activism 394–5 Díaz-Canel, M. 287, 293 dictator’s dilemma 158 dictatorships assassinations 5–6, 261–75 commitment and information problems 4, 153–65 dominant-party dictatorships 234 evolution of personalism over time 76–7 personalization of power 2, 76–95 digital adaptation 135–6 digital capacity 238, 239 digital communication 3, 128–38 domestic information environment 129–32 international information environment 132–3 monitoring 128, 129–30, 132, 135 shortcomings and challenges in the study of authoritarian information control 133–5 supplying information 131–2, 133, 134, 135, 136 suppressing information 128, 130–31, 133, 135 digital cooptation 239–40 digital repression 128, 238–9, 240 digital surveillance 128, 129–30, 132, 325–7 digital technologies 34 and survival 230, 237–40, 240–41 discursive pressure-proofing strategies 308 Disease Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) 174 disease management 4, 167–81 authoritarian regimes and health 167–74 COVID-19 pandemic see COVID-19 pandemic disinformation 131–2, 133, 134 dissatisfied democrats 38 domestic information environment 129–32 dominant-party dictatorships 234 Dominican Republic 282–3 Dönges, E. 271 Donno, D. 200, 204, 205, 206 ducks in a row 283, 297 and the expected 287 and the unexpected 286–7 duration of authoritarian regimes 231, 232, 399 Duterte, R. 50 Duvalier, J.-C. 288

Earl, J. 128 East Africa 198 East Asia 141, 144 Eastern Europe 141, 143 Easton, D. 139 Ebola 176 Eckstein, H. 16 Ecological Civilization 221 economic autarky 188–92 economic globalization see globalization economic growth 98 economic performance 144, 145–6 economic policy post-populist authoritarianism 371 Turkmenistan 366 see also economic reform reversals economic pressure-proofing strategies 307–8 economic reform reversals 5, 182–97 autocracies and economic globalization 185–8 autocracies and the return to economic autarky 188–92 SOEs, apparatchiks and 192–3 education 362, 363–5 Egorov, G. 113 Egypt 7, 252, 286–7, 370–85 authoritarian consolidation 372–3 authoritarian restoration 382 post-populist authoritarianism 375, 376, 377, 378–9 El Salvador 59 election observers 344–5 elections 1, 18, 19, 29, 171, 399 authoritarian populism 55 commitment and information problems 155–6, 158, 159 free and fair 61 high-stakes 333–4 legal framework for in Uganda 334–5 tool for cooptation 235 electoral authoritarianism 1–2, 25–41 nature and varieties of 26–7 origins and diffusion of 27–8 stability and future of 28–9 sub-Saharan Africa 2, 25–6, 29–39 succession 254–5, 258 Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) 63 electoral violence conceptualization 332–4 Uganda see Uganda elite pacts (supervised transition) 284, 288–9, 298 elites 79 cooptation of 100 leadership succession 257, 258 death of incumbent leader 256–7

Index  405 effects of designating an heir apparent 248–9 hereditary succession 250–51 single-party regimes 253–4, 254–5 uncertainty 245–6, 246–8 MENA 371 empowerment rights, repression of 234 environment 4–5, 213–27 China 213, 215–16, 220–22 Kazakhstan 213, 215–16, 218–20 politics and the environment 213–15 UAE 213, 215–18 Equatorial Guinea 172 Erdoğan, R.T. 50, 208 Eritrea 279–80 Escribà-Folch, A. 267 Ethiopia 135 ethnicity 209 electoral violence in Uganda 342–3 ethnic minorities in China 326 ethnicization in Turkmenistan 362–3 European Union (EU) 304, 345 everyday authoritarianism 390, 392–3 executive aggrandizement 42 expected transitions 283–5, 287–92 external actors 35–6 external pressure 6, 300–315 forms of pressure 302–4 pressure-proofing strategies 306–9 success of sanctions 304–6 see also international influence external shocks 279–80 Eyadéma, F.G. 290 Eyadéma, G. 280 Ezrow, N. 244, 248 failed coups 80 Fails, M.D. 79 Faisal bin Abdulaziz (King Faisal) 93, 270, 271 family life 116 famine 389 fascism 47 Feldstein, S. 128, 136 field commands 114–22 financial liberalization 182–4, 185, 188–9, 377 financial shocks 191–2 Fjelde, H. 334 foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows 186, 187 foreign policy tools 302–3, 310 see also sanctions Turkmenistan 366–7 Fox, S.L. 204, 206 fragmented authoritarianism 320, 328

Franco, F. 292 Frantz, E. 18, 77, 78, 79, 80, 157, 186, 202, 237, 240, 244, 248, 256 Freedom House 15–16, 67, 71, 230 Fredriksson, C. 19 Frye, T. 140 Gabon 279, 286, 290–91 Gaddafi, M. 247, 261 Gandhi, J. 13, 17, 79, 186, 237 Geddes, B. 17–18, 20, 77, 78, 79, 80, 186, 202, 252 Gehlbach, S. 159 gender quotas 200, 206–7, 209 geopolitics 214 MENA 376–7 Georgia 169 German Democratic Republic (GDR) 103–4, 105, 106 Gerschewski, J. 391 al-Ghashmi, A. 269, 272 Gläßel, C. 114 global political economy 376 globalization 5, 182–4 autocracies and 185–8 Gnassingbé Eyadéma, F. 290 government role, strengthening 307–8 government-owned Internet service providers 131, 132, 133 Greitens, S.C. 113 groomed ducklings 283, 288, 297 Grove, N. 217 guardianship dilemma 112–13 Guatemala 272 Guelleh, I.O. 291 Guinea 176, 247 Guriev, S.M. 144–5 Gurr, T.R. 16 GWF latent personalism measure see latent personalism measure (LPM) GWF typology 18, 19, 20, 78 Haber, S. 185 Habibie, B.J. 292 Hadenius, A. 18 Hafner-Burton, E.M. 332–3, 348 Haggard, S. 62, 63, 66, 69 Haiti 171, 288 Hale, H.E. 246, 247, 249, 254–5, 278 Hall, S. 47 Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, Prince 251 al-Hamdi, I. 271, 272 health 4, 167–81, 360 COVID-19 pandemic see COVID-19 pandemic

406  Research handbook on authoritarianism hegemonic electoral autocracies 17, 27, 30, 32–3, 38, 39 heir apparent 248–52, 257 crown prince dilemma 249–50, 251, 281–2 hereditary succession 250–52, 283, 288 North Korea 387, 388–9, 390 Heydemann, S. 381 high-intensity repression 233, 240 high office (office personalism) 80, 81, 82, 83–5, 86–7, 276, 296–9 high-stakes elections 333–4 Höglund, K. 334 Hollyer, J.R. 160 Horák, S. 360 HTW typology 18, 19 Hu Jintao 317, 319, 321, 322, 323 Hufbauer, G.C. 301, 304 human rights 190 North Korea 386–7, 394 Uganda 336 abuses 336, 343–7, 348 Hungary 208 Huntington, S. 67, 68 Hussein, King 251 hybrid regimes 26 see also electoral authoritarianism hybridization 1 Hyde, S.D. 332–3 ideal types 11 ideocracies 18–19 ideology China 320–21, 324, 325 North Korea 390, 391–2 illiberal democracy 44–6 implicit bargain 189 inclusion 16 incumbent dictators de-personalization during their lifetime 277–81, 299 popularity 145–6 succession death in office 255–7 uncertainty 245–6 individualization of sanctions 303, 310 indoctrination 144, 147 Indonesia 292 infant and child mortality rates 168–9, 171 Inglehart, R. 47 information biased information environment 147 collection and variation in party size in communist regimes 3, 96, 100–101, 105–7 information control 3, 128–38, 145

domestic environment 129–32 international environment 132–3 monitoring 128, 129–30, 132, 135 North Korea 390, 391–2 shortcomings and challenges in the study of 133–5 supplying information 131–2, 133, 134, 135, 136 suppressing information 128, 130–31, 133, 135 information problems 4, 153–65 state-centric approach 154, 155–9, 161 state–society relations approach 154, 159–61 institutions 45–6, 55 and assassination attempts 266, 268, 269 building 154, 155–9, 162 cooptation 235–6, 237 institutional factors in democratic backsliding 64–5 institutionalized power-sharing 76 political institutions and state feminism 200–201 reforms in China 319–20 sanctions and characteristics of 304–5 Integrated Threat Theory 48–9 interest groups 306–7 intergroup cleavages 47 intermittent electoral autocracies 32, 33 international agreements 154 international conflicts 268–9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 335 International Health Regulations (IHR) 175 international influence personalism 79–80 on women’s rights 206–7 see also external pressure international information environment 132–3 international organizations 160–61, 169 international relations research 301–2, 310 Internet digital communication 3, 128–38 shutdowns 130, 239, 331, 344, 347 use 145–6 investors 159 Iqbal, Z. 267 Iran 128, 130, 234, 307, 366 Islam 365–6, 380, 381 Israel 379 Istanbul Convention on violence against women 208 item nonresponse 139–40 Jablonski, R.S. 332–3 Janowitz, M. 115, 116

Index  407 Japan 394–5 Jee, H. 62, 68, 69, 70 Jensen, N.M. 159 Jiang Zemin 317, 319–20, 321, 322, 323 John of Salisbury 265 Jordan 206 journalists, attacks on 346–8 Juche ideology 391 Justice and Development Party (AKP) 50, 208 Kaasik, J.I. 204, 206 Kabila, J. 172, 271, 289 Kabila, L. 172, 271 Kafi, A. 271 Kagame, P. 173 Kailitz, S. 18 Kalinin, K. 140 Kampala 343 Karimov, I. 280–81, 359 Kaufman, R. 62, 63, 66, 69 Kazakhstan 246, 288–9 the environment 213, 215–16, 218–20 Keefer, P. 159 Kendall-Talyor, A. 157, 237, 240, 256 Kenya 209 Keremoğlu, E. 132 Khan, O. 363 Khrushchev, N. 247, 253, 387 Kim Il Sung 90, 250, 387, 388–9, 391 Kim Jong Chol 390 Kim Jong Il 250, 287, 288, 387, 388, 389 Kim Jong Nam 390 Kim Jong Un 176, 248, 250, 287, 387, 388, 389, 390 Kim Ju Ae 390 Kim Yo Jong 390 King, S. 381 Koch, N. 361 Kreft, A.-K. 200 Kubat, A. 325 Kwon, H. 388 Kyagulanyi Ssentamu, R. see Bobi Wine Lake, M. 200 lame duck flatlining 285, 291–2, 297 lame ducks 278–9, 281, 297, 299 Lamizana, S. 93, 94 latent personalism measure (LPM) 276, 296–9 and de-personalization 277–8, 299 personalization of power in dictatorships 80–93 and succession 292, 297–8 Latin America 141, 143, 169 leader-based electoral autocracies 32–3, 39 leadership succession see succession

Lee Kuan Yew 93 Lefort, C. 45 legal reforms for women’s rights 204–5 implementation challenges in autocracies 205–6 legislatures 155–7, 159, 236 legitimacy 215 China 320–21, 325 legitimation 139 North Korea 391–2 strategies 147 Leninist states 387 Levitsky, S. 17, 27 liberal democracy 42, 44–5, 49, 53–5 Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) 63, 168, 386 liberalism 46 undemocratic 48, 49 Liberia 287 life expectancy 167–8, 171, 174 Limongi, F. 17 Lindberg, S. 60, 61, 63 Linz, J.J. 14–15, 18, 46, 64 Locke, J. 334 Loewenstein, K. 14 Lokech, P. 340 Lorch, J. 200 loss of grip 278–9 low-intensity repression 233–4 loyalty and competence among officers 111–12, 113–22 Argentina 117–21 in field commands 114–17 competence–loyalty trade-off 111, 113–14 loyalty appointments 80, 81, 82, 85–93, 276, 296–9 lucky ducks 284, 289–90, 297 Lührmann, A. 60, 63 Lukashenko, A. 176 Lust, E. 59, 62–3, 64 macroeconomic performance 144, 145–6 MacWilliams, M. 47 Madagascar 280 Madison, J. 45 Maduro, N. 173, 261 Magaloni, B. 19, 155–6 Maher, T.V. 128 Malawi 292 Malesky, E. 158, 159 Mann, M. 370, 371 Mao Zedong 90, 155, 220, 253, 317, 319, 321, 322 Mariana, J. de 265 market reforms 188–9, 192–3

408  Research handbook on authoritarianism North Korea 389–90, 391, 392–3 mass uprisings 381–2 matrix typology 13 Mauk, M. 140, 144 Mazur, A. 200 M’ba, L. 279, 290–91 McMahon, R.B. 114 media 36 crackdown in Uganda 346–8 freedom 159–60 curtailed in sub-Saharan Africa 34 medical censorship 175–7 Meng, A. 76, 79, 244, 248 Mesquita, M. 245 Middle East 198, 199, 202, 204 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 370–85, 399 authoritarian resilience 381 mass uprisings and authoritarian restoration 381–2 populist authoritarianism 371–5, 383 post-populist authoritarianism 375–80, 383 regime support 141, 143 women’s rights 202–4 migration 390, 393–5 military 7, 111–26 Argentina 117–21, 121–2 competence and loyalty in field commands 114–17 competence–loyalty trade-off 111, 113–14 control of security apparatus 80, 81, 82, 88–93, 94, 276, 296–9 and the dual threat to authoritarian rule 112–14 North Korea 388 officer career paths 115–16 officer placement 117, 120, 121–2 officer selection 117, 119, 121, 122 Uganda infiltration of the NUP 340–41 symbolic value in Uganda 347–8 takeover of the police’s roles 339–41 military coups 36, 112, 170, 256 military personalism 81, 82–3, 85–94 military promotion 80, 81, 82, 85–93, 276, 296–9 military purges 81, 82, 85–93, 276, 296–9 military regimes 2–3, 18, 234, 268 Miller, M.K. 158 Min, E. 19 Mirziyoyev, S. 290 misinformation 131–2, 133, 134, 135 Mobutu, J. 172, 279 modernizing regimes 199–200 modernization in China 319–22 Mohammad bin Salman (MBS) 201

Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Sheikh 216, 217–18 Momoh, J.S. 90 Monaco 15–16 monarchies 14, 18, 19, 250 presidential 374–5 Mongolia 102, 103 monitoring digital communication 128, 129–30, 132, 135 monopolization of power 357–63 monothetic typologies 11–12 Moore, D.W. 115 moral hazard problem 157 Morsi, M. 382 Mubarak, H. 252, 286, 287, 382 Mudde, C. 43, 47, 48 Mugabe, R. 246 Muhanga, K. 340 Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Lt. General 341, 349 Müller, J.W. 43, 46 multilateral sanctions 305 Munck, G. 19 Munger, K. 132 Museveni, Y. 6, 173, 332, 337, 338, 340, 347, 348–9 2021 election 331, 342–3, 344, 345 ban on Bobi Wine’s concerts 339 guerrilla war 336 military posture 347–8 succession 341 Muslim Brotherhood 379, 382 Naguib, M. 286 Namibia 121 Nasser, G.A. 286, 372–3, 378 Natalizia, G. 169 nation building 356–69 National Democratic Party (NDP) 379 National Resistance Movement (NRM) 336–41, 344, 346, 348–9 National Unity Platform (NUP) 331, 332, 338, 339, 340–41, 343, 344, 346 nationalism 321 natural resources 215, 218 see also oil nature–society relations 213–14, 222 Navia, P. 169 Nazarbayev, N. 218, 219, 246, 288–9 neighbourhood effect 36–7, 38 neo-patrimonialism 371, 374–5 neo-totalitarianism 323–7 neutrality 356, 366–7 new party creation 80, 81, 82, 83–5, 86–7, 276, 296–9 Nguema, F.M. 172

Index  409 Nicaragua 287 Nigeria 209 Niyazov, S. 7, 357, 361, 364, 365, 366, 367 cult of personality 359, 360 ethnicization 362–3 Ruhnama 359, 365 succession 257, 358 non-binding legislatures 156–7 non-communist parties in communist regimes 103–4 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 135 non-hegemonic electoral autocracies 32–3 non-revolutionary communist regimes 96, 98, 99, 101–7 Nordlinger, E.A. 115 normative threats 49 Norris, P. 47 North Africa 198 see also Middle East and North Africa (MENA) North Korea 7, 176, 386–98 everyday authoritarianism 390, 392–3 ideology and propaganda 390, 391–2 migration and transnational authoritarianism 390, 393–5 nature of the regime 386–8 party development 102, 103 perspectives on resilience of 388–90 succession 247–8, 250, 287, 288, 387, 388–9, 390 nuclear test sites 219 number of authoritarian regimes in power 230, 231 Obiang, T. 35 Obote, M. 335, 336 Oesterreich, D. 47 office personalism 80, 81, 82, 83–5, 86–7, 276, 296–9 oil 216–17, 219 Okero, I.O. 345 open duck season 282–6, 290, 298 opposition strategies against democratic backsliding 67 Orban, V. 42 organizational capacity 319–20 Ottaway, M. 28 Padró-i-Miquel, G. 162 Pál, V. 213, 214 Pan, J. 128 Panama 271–2 pandemics 174–7 COVID-19 see COVID-19 pandemic Pape, R.A. 304

Pappas, T.S. 43, 45 Paraguay 278, 291–2 paramilitary 80–81, 82, 88–93, 276, 296–9 Park Chung-Hee 271, 272 participation 16, 169, 170 party executive committee 80, 81, 82, 83–5, 86–7, 276, 296–9 party personalism (civil personalism) 81, 82–5, 86, 90–94 party pluralization 378–9 party rubber stamp 80, 81, 82, 83–5, 86–7, 276, 296–9 party size 3, 96–110 functions dependent on 99–100 variation in size in communist regimes 101–7 non-communist parties 103–4 party systems 156, 159 institutional factors in democratic backsliding 64–5 party-based electoral autocracies 32–3, 39 patronage 235, 372 Pedotti, A.R. 278, 291–2 Pei, M. 193 Pérez-Liñán, A. 64 performance 144, 145–6 Perliger, A. 266–7 permanent neutrality principle 356, 366–7 personal dossiers 321 personalism 1 assassination and 267, 268, 269, 270, 273 determinants of 79–80 evolution in dictatorships over time 76–7 and its measurement 77–9 North Korea 387, 388 personalist regimes 18, 20, 234, 252, 276–99, 305 de-personalization during ruler’s lifetime 277–81 health 172–3 leader successions 5, 281–93, 297–8 expected transitions 287–92 sudden power vacuums 282–7 personality, cult of 359–61 personalization 2, 76–95 China 323–7 North Korea 388–9 pathways to power accumulation 80–93 Philippines, the 49, 50, 51, 52 physical integrity rights 234 Pieters, H. 169 Pinochet, A. 247, 261 placement of officers 117, 120, 121–2 Poland 69 polarization 66, 69, 162 Polese, A. 360

410  Research handbook on authoritarianism political attitudes see regime support political business cycles 145 political change following assassination 269–72 political fear 139–40 political geography 213–15 political interest 145–6 political models 35–6 political parties 157 latent personalism index (LPM) new party creation 80, 81, 82, 83–5, 86–7, 276, 296–9 party executive committee 80, 81, 82, 83–5, 86–7, 276, 279 party rubber stamp 80, 81, 82, 83–5, 86–7, 276, 279 non-communist parties in communist regimes 103–4 pluralization in Egypt 378–9 tool for cooptation 235–6, 237 variation in party size in communist regimes 3, 96–110 political performance 144, 145–6 political regimes see typologies of political regimes political survival see survival Polity 5 project 386 Polity dataset 16 polythetic typologies 11–12 popular revolutions 112, 113 populism 2, 43–4 authoritarian see authoritarian populism democratic backsliding 65 Portugal 292 post-populist authoritarianism (PPA) 375–80, 383 post-totalitarianism 15 power MENA authoritarianism 370 changing balance of class power 377 power techniques 371–2 monopolization of in Turkmenistan 357–63 personalization of 2, 76–95 pathways to power accumulation 80–93 structure and risk of assassination 266–7 power-sharing 76, 154, 155–62 institution building 154, 155–9, 162 state–society relations perspective 154, 159–61 preference falsification 139–40 Premadasa, R. 271, 272 presidential monarchy 374–5 presidentialism 64 pressure-proofing strategies 306–9 pro-democracy protests 37 propaganda 131 North Korea 390, 391–2

and regime support 144, 145–6, 147 property space 12 protests 37, 192, 306–7 China 233, 321–3, 327 Przeworski, A. 17, 45, 121, 161 public opinion electoral authoritarianism in sub-Saharan Africa 37–8 regime support see regime support strong leader support 52, 53 support for democratic backsliding 65–6 purely empirical types 11 Putin, V. 208, 236, 246 Qatar 251 Qiang, X. 326 Rahman, Z. 286 rally-round-the-flag effect 308 Ramos, A.P. 169 Ratsiraka, D. 280 regime consolidation 371–5 regime inception 104–5 regime support 3, 139–52 challenges of studying 139–40 measuring 140–43 reasons for 143–7 religion 365–6 Remón, J.A. 271 renewable energy 216–17, 218–19 rent 188–9, 372 re-personalization 293 representation 169 repression 5, 145, 229, 232–4, 240 China 321–3, 325–7 digital 128, 238–9, 240 digital communication 128, 129 interrelation with cooptation 237 MENA 371–2 North Korea 386–7 pressure-proofing strategies 308–9 republics, hereditary 250, 251 resilience, authoritarian 158, 381, 388–90 resource-rich countries 173–4 reversal of economic reforms see economic reform reversal revolutionary communist regimes 96, 98, 99, 101–7 revolutions 112, 113 Ri Sol Ju 390 Rivera, M. 237 Robinson, D. 140 Rød, E.G. 135 Rosendorff, B.P. 160 Ross, M. 168–9

Index  411 RT TV/online channel 133 rubber stamp party 80, 81, 82, 83–5, 86–7, 276, 296–9 Rubongoya, L. 340 Ruhnama (‘book of the soul’) 359, 365 Rummens, S. 44, 45 Russia 133, 140, 186, 236, 239, 246, 303, 308 colonization of Turkmenistan 364 drinking water 170 and sub-Saharan Africa 35, 36 women’s rights 207, 208 Russians in Turkmenistan 362–3 Rwanda 173 women’s rights 198, 200, 201, 209 Sabri, A. 378 Sadat, A. 286, 287, 373, 378–9 Saddam Hussein 121 Saibou, A. 291 Salazar, A. de O. 292 sanctions 6, 300–315 forms of pressure 302–4 main sanctioning entities 303–4 policy objectives 306 pressure-proofing strategies 306–9 success of 304–6 susceptibility to 189–91 SARS 175, 176 Sartori, G. 11, 13, 64 Sassou-Nguesso, D. 35 Saudi Arabia 201 Scharpf, A. 114 Schedler, A. 16–17, 26 Schuler, P. 158 Scott, J. 107 sectoral penetration 100 security apparatus Argentina 117–21, 121–2 competence and loyalty in field commands 114–17 competence–loyalty trade-off 111, 113–14 control of 80, 81, 82, 88–93, 94, 276, 296–9 and the dual threat to authoritarian rule 112–14 North Korea 388 see also military Sejusa, D. 341 selection effect, and health 169, 170 selection of officers 117, 119, 121, 122 Shamdasani, R. 346 Shapiro, J. 220 Sheen, G.C.-H. 158, 159–60, 160–61 Siaroff, A. 15 Singapore 233 single-party regimes 18, 372

and health 171–2, 173 leadership succession 252–7 Syria 373–5 variation in party size 3, 96–110 Sinkkonen, E. 77 al-Sisi, A.F. 382 Skaaning, S. 63, 68 Slantchev, B.L. 114 snakes 285, 291, 298 social credit system 326 social media 34 flooding of 132 social norms 206 socialist democracy 320 socialist regimes 199 Socialist Unity Party (SED) 105 societal factors in democratic backsliding 65–6 societal legibility 96, 107 organizational advantages of communist parties in achieving 100–101 Somoza Debayle, A. 271, 287 Somoza Debayle, L. 271, 287 Somoza Garcia, A. 271 Song, W. 267 Sonin, K. 113 South Korea 272, 392, 393, 394 Spain 245, 292 spectacle 217, 219, 364 sport 360–61 Sri Lanka 272 Ssekindi, R. 342 Ssemogere, P.W. 337 stability 28–9, 270–71 Stalin, J. 247, 256 state bourgeoisies 377, 378 state feminism 200–201 state-centric perspective 154, 155–9, 161 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 184, 188, 192–3, 194 state–society relations 154, 159–61 status, women’s 202–4 Stenner, K. 47, 49 Stepan, A. 15 Stephan, W.G. 48–9 Stetson, D.M. 200 strengthening the role of government 307–8 Stroessner, A. 85, 278, 291 strong leader support 52, 53 stunned ducks 278, 279–80, 281, 299 Suarez, F. 265 sub-Saharan Africa 143, 399 electoral authoritarianism 2, 25–6, 29–39 change and innovation in authoritarian practices 34–5

412  Research handbook on authoritarianism external actors and political models 35–6 region-wide context and dynamics 36–8 trajectories 29–33 succession 5, 156, 244–60 China 253–4, 323–4, 327 and de-personalization in personalist regimes 5, 281–93, 297–8 expected transitions 283–5, 287–92 sudden power vacuums 282–7 following assassinations 270–71 heir apparent 248–52, 257, 281–2 hereditary see hereditary succession Museveni and the Muhoozi project in Uganda 341 North Korea 247–8, 250, 287, 288, 387, 388–9, 390 single-party regimes 252–7 Turkmenistan 257, 288, 289–90, 358–9 uncertainty 245–8, 257 Sudan 37 sudden power vacuums 282–7 Suharto, President 292 sultanism 14, 15 ‘summit for democracy’ 36 Sumner, J.L. 79 supervised transition (elite pacts) 284, 288–9, 298 supply of information 131–2, 133, 134, 135, 136 suppression of information 128, 130–31, 133, 135 surveillance 96, 105–7 digital 128, 129–30, 132, 325–7 digital repression 238–9 survey-based research 139–40 survival 5, 191–2, 229–43 authoritarian landscape 230–32 authoritarian toolkit 232–7 cooptation see cooptation impact of the digital era 237–40 repression see repression sustainability 217, 218–19, 221 Svolik, M. 64, 78, 79, 156, 157, 276 Syria 7, 135, 288, 293, 307, 370–85 authoritarian consolidation 372, 373–5 failed democratic transition 382 post-populist authoritarianism 375–6, 377, 379–80 Tannenberg, M. 140 Tanzania 37, 200, 201 targeted sanctions 307–8, 310 technical filtering regime 130–31 technological sanctions 191 Teorell, J. 18 territorial penetration 100 The Onion Router (Tor) 135

third wave of democratization 25, 28, 30 threat 46–7, 48–9 Tiananmen Square protest 233, 321–2 Togo 280, 290 Tokayev, K.-J. 218, 288–9 Tolbert, W. 287 Tomini, L. 62, 63 Torrijos, O. 286 torture 157 totalitarianism 14, 15 trade liberalization 182–4, 185, 188–9, 377 trade protection 186–8 trade shocks 191–2 transitions expected 283–5, 287–92 unexpected 282–7 transnational authoritarianism 390, 393–5 transparency 158, 159–60, 162 Treisman, D. 144–5 tribes 361–2, 363 Tripp, A.M. 201 troubleshooting 280–81 Trout, B.T. 115 Trujillo, Rafael 282 Trujillo, Ramfis 282–6 Trump, D. 42, 47, 50, 52 trust 176 Tshisekedi, F. 289 Tubman, W. 287 Tung, H.H. 158, 159–60, 160–61 Tunisia 201–2 Turkey 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 208 Turkmenistan 6–7, 176, 356–69 authoritarianism and monopolization of power 357–63 cult of personality 359–61 ethnicization of Turkmen society 362–3 managing political power of tribes 361–2 culture and education subservient to authoritarianism 363–5 permanent neutrality principle 356, 366–7 religion managed by the state 365–6 succession 257, 288, 289–90, 358–9 typologies of political regimes 1, 11–24, 78 history of classifications 12–16 problems regarding 19–20 with a democracy bias 16–17 with political regimes sui generis 17–19 tyrannicide, theoretical justifications of 262–5 Uganda 6, 173, 331–55 Constitution 334 crackdown on the media and attacks on journalists 346–8

Index  413 curtailing election observers 344–5 electoral irregularities and COVID-19 Standard Operating Procedures 345–6 ethnic undertones in the 2021 electoral violence 342–3 historical context of electoral violence 335–6 legal framework for elections 334–5 ‘Muhoozi project’ 341 November riots and military takeover of police’s roles 339–41 NRM promise for democracy and the relapse to electoral violence 336–41 Plan B rhetoric 343–4 premises for amplified violence during the 2021 elections 338–9 Presidential Elections Act 2005 335 women’s rights 201, 202, 209 Ukrainian crisis 37 uncertainty 245–8, 257 undemocratic liberalism 48, 49 unexpected transitions 282–7 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 213, 215–18 United Nations 305 United Nations Human Rights Council of Inquiry on Human Rights in the DPRK 394 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 303 United States (US) 345 authoritarian populism 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 foreign disinformation 133 sanctions 304, 305 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 265 urban development 221 Uzbekistan 247, 257, 280–81, 289–90, 359 Uzbeks in Turkmenistan 363

Wahman, M. 18 waiting time 120 Waldner, D. 59, 62–3, 64 water 170, 217 Way, L. 17, 27 Weber, M. 11, 371 Weeks, J.L.P. 78 Weidmann, N.B. 135 Weymouth, S. 159 Wintrobe, R. 237 women’s movements 201–2 women’s resources 393 women’s rights 4, 198–212 anti-gender backlash 198–9, 207–8 cross-national patterns 202–6 implementation challenges in autocracies 205–6 international influences 206–7 political institutions and state feminist policies 200–201 World Bank Women, Business and the Law (WBL) Index 202, 203 World Health Organization (WHO) 161, 175, 176 Wright, J. 18, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 156, 186, 202, 240, 262, 267 Wu, C.-H. 158, 160–61 Wu, W.-C. 158, 159–60, 160–61

Valiyev, A. 361 value orientations 145–6 Van Creveld, M. 116 Varieties of Democracy 63, 67, 71 Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) 63 Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) 63, 168, 386 Venezuela 132, 173, 190 Verwoerd, H. 271 Videla, J.R. 117, 261 Villaroel, G. 271, 272 Vorster, J. 271 Vreeland, J.R. 17, 157, 160, 186, 237

Yeh, E. 221 Yeltsin, B. 246 Yemen 271, 272

Xi Jinping 6, 182, 234, 253–4, 317, 323–7, 387 the environment 220, 221 ideological moves and legitimacy claims 325 repression and surveillance 325–7 rise to and consolidation in power 323–5 Xu, X. 157

Zaire 279 Zakaria, F. 44 Zakharov, A.V. 113–14 Zarif, M.J. 307 Zetterberg, P. 206, 209 Zorn, C. 267 Zürn, M. 48 Zweifel, T.D. 169