Rescher on Rationality, Values, and Social Responsibility: A Philosophical Portrait 9783110329070, 9783110328677

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Nicholas J. Moutafakis Rescher on Rationality, Values, and Social Responsibility

READING RESCHER Volume 1

Nicholas J. Moutafakis

Rescher on Rationality, Values, and Social Responsibility A Philosophical Portrait Foreword by Nicholas Rescher

ontos verlag Frankfurt I Paris I Ebikon I Lancaster I New Brunswick

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Printed on acid-free paper This hardcover binding meets the International Library standard Printed in Germany by buch bücher dd ag

For Nicholas Rescher

“…Only an honest book can live; only absolute sincerity can stand the test of time....”

“Literary Values” by John Burroughs

Rescher on Rationality, Values, and Social Responsibility Foreword (by Nicholas Rescher) Preface

1

Introduction

5

Chapter 1: ON RATIONALITY AND ITS PREDICAMENTS

21

Chapter 2: THE EVOLVING NATURE OF PERSONHOOD

63

Chapter 3: RESCHER’S GENERAL CONCEPT OF “E-VALUE-ATION”

85

Chapter 4: RESCHER ON DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND UTILITARIANISM

105

Chapter 5: QUALIFYING PREFERENCE AND PRACTICAL ACTION

121

Chapter 6: PERSONHOOD AND THE ABSOLUTE NATURE OF MORALITY

139

Chapter 7: ON COMMONALITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF SCEPTICISM AND RELATIVISM

161

Chapter 8: THE MORALITY OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

181

Bibliography

201

Name Index

251

Foreword

I

n my long philosophical career, now extending well over fifty years, I have worked out a systematic body of philosophical thought. But the extensive and diffuse nature of my publications—attested by the bibliography at the end of this volume—make it difficult to see the forest for the trees. The ideas very much need to be coordinated and rendered synoptically perspicuous. In producing this overview of my work on rationality, values, and social responsibility, Nicholas Moutafakis has rendered a substantial contribution to my cause, making it easier to see how various scattered pieces fit together to form a combined body of thought. I am much indebted and deeply grateful for the excellent job he has done in producing this accessible and comprehensive account. Nicholas Rescher

PREFACE

I

embarked on this book in 1997, in the wake of my failing to find a substantive synoptic study of Nicholas Rescher’s significant contributions to philosophy. The literature then as now is wanting, in that though many critical articles and notes have been published on specific facets of Rescher’s work, no one has attempted a careful synthesis of his position across the many decades in which it has evolved. Ernest Sosa’s fine anthology of critical essays, The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher, while providing critical assessments of some of Rescher's ideas and includes Rescher's reaction to these studies, provides no synthesis of where Rescher stands in terms of the history of philosophy and the significance of his brand of pragmatic idealism. Moreover, in far too many of these essays the scholarship is on some single point or thesis in one of Rescher’s works, without any extended consideration of other discussions regarding the broader implications of what he is saying. What has been lacking for far too long is a study that would offer the academic community an independent and responsible overview of at least a major component of Rescher’s philosophy, and how it relates to other philosophical traditions. The task is surely daunting for anyone to undertake. This is the case not simply from the viewpoint of the volume of published material, but also from the standpoint of the variety of the areas of inquiry requiring special expertise; the latter ranges from traditional epistemology and metaphysics to contemporary discussions on axiology, decision theory, and the philosophy of science. In listening to conversations about Rescher’s impact on contemporary philosophy, the common refrain seems always to turn on the point that there is “yet another book” to appear, and that it is thus impossible to capture a full statement of his work as long as things are being produced. It seemed to me, however, that this was hardly a reason to defer action, but a stimulus to pursue avenues whereby a picture could be produced of an already amazing and still on-going legacy. A dynamic resonance continues in his work, which from the outset has crossed over to many different fields of philosophical discussion. The challenge was in coming up with

Nicholas Moutafakis

some motif that would bring together as many themes as possible into a coherent account, while preserving the natural energy and integrity of Rescher’s work overall. A strictly serial approach would have collapsed from the shear volume and variety of his publications, leaving the reader no better off than before. Trying to do everything would just be too much! What seemed to be needed was a strategy that begins with a central focal point, a starburst of sorts that could be explored and followed along as it illuminates a cluster of interesting themes emerging throughout the corpus of his work. This I found when I carefully considered his early rendition of the notion of “Rationality.” The latter, as a concept that involves both the deliberative and the evaluative dimensions of consciousness, forms the nexus for other discussions in many of his later works. It is involved in his explanations of how human intelligence emerges, what constitutes the basis for the justification of moral decision making, how we define the notions of person and value, and what comprises the rationale for social responsibility. It is also at the basis of his critique of various philosophical positions, such as Scepticism, Utilitarianism, Positivism, Moral Relativism, and Existentialism. Having come upon a strategy for bringing certain strands of his thought together systematically, the next step was to make certain that the end result did not distort the integrity of the original. This is to say that the overarching design, as proposed, had to be appropriate and fair to the content of Rescher’s own thinking, while allowing this author the liberty of inserting his assessment of the material at certain points. Moreover, if this was to be a work about Nicholas Rescher’s philosophy, then it had to present him as his is, a philosopher reacting to the philosophical ideas and traditions surrounding him in a manner that reveals his personal creative take over a long and historically significant period. A pervasive theme in his work speaks to support the ancient belief that philosophy is not to be closeted away in an ivory tower, but belongs in the life of a community as a vibrant and liberating force. Hence it is appropriate to regard this present effort as a philosophical portrait, since portraits are of living subjects. They are intended to capture for posterity some nuance of the essence and character of an individual, involved in the enterprise of life. Analogously, Rescher’s philosophical portrait presents the philosophical overviews of a thinker who has sought to see lived experience in terms of the grandeur of ideas

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Preface

and the nobility of the human spirit. This, therefore, had to be more than a book that deals exclusively with technical philosophical details. It has to present Rescher in the arena of what had come to be contemporary western philosophy in the last half of the twentieth century. The book needed to provide a portrait of someone who has never shunned defending the centrality of philosophy in public affairs. Thus though not a personal portrait, the book is intended to be about Rescher’s professional life as a philosopher. This meant working with Professor Rescher in the course of planning this material, and determining whether the course I had chosen was indeed suitable for what was desired. In this regard I wish to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Nicholas Rescher for reviewing the draft of my final manuscript and providing useful comments toward its expansion and improvement. Throughout this process I enjoyed the benefits of his patience, understanding, and encouragement, which have sustained me in completing this task. I would also like to thank the Director of the Cleveland State University Library, Dr. Glenda Thornton and the staff of the interlibrary Loan Service, especially Ms. Debra L. Durica, for their wonderful work in facilitating my research efforts.

Nicholas J. Moutafakis Cleveland State University September 2006

3

Introduction

N

icholas Rescher’s contribution to philosophical inquiry is as profound in its intellectual depth as it is broadly encompassing in the breadth of its scope, embracing a vast panorama of human experience. His professional activity, ranging over half a century, has resulted in an enduring legacy of unique philosophical discussion, one that speaks to the pressing need of contemporary civilization to comprehend moral decision making in terms of the universal and uniquely human requirements of rationality, one that involves both reason and compassion. The twentieth century has seen within the halls of America s academia the periodic domination and quiet passing of several philosophical schools. In the early part of that century it was Idealism, Phenomenology, Pragmatism, and Logical Positivism. Somewhat later on came Existentialism, and the great number of things that are included beneath the banner of “Ordinary Language Philosophy.” More recently, Post Modernism has endeavored to assume the rights to empire. Towards all of this Rescher’s work manifests a refreshing aloofness, refusing a narrow commitment to any one of these philosophical movements and classifications. There is in what he says a studious and creative eclecticism which centers consistently on the idea that at its best philosophy must never loose sight of the fact that it is meant to address life’s real challenges, in their varied turns, vivid hues, and vexing complexities. His focus is steadily trained on the broader picture of lived experience, while creating a selfcorrective philosophical system that provides a rational framework for clarifying the far-reaching ramifications of any philosophical issue, in its uniquely human experiential context. Thus it cannot be said that his interest is in a detached academic exercise that is bent upon examining merely the meaning of words or in identifying a possible range of interpretations in some over-worked text. Though such pursuits surely have their place in the details of the enterprise of philosophical inquiry, Rescher’s efforts go further to illustrate how the doing of philosophy must relate to our lives as intelligent and thriving human beings, interacting within a civilized social context. Numerous passages can be cited illustrating Rescher’s commitment to the basic human dimension

Nicholas Moutafakis

of the philosophical enterprise. One is perhaps most telling in capturing succinctly the communal essence of his approach. It is found in one of his earliest works, Introduction to Value Theory, where he notes that in pursuing an understanding of the overt role of values in the rationalization of action, one finds that: “… the language of value must be part of the language of common life.”1 Rescher’s commitment to the pivotal role that lived experience has in articulating philosophical ideas is perhaps no more clearly illustrated than in the manner with which he argues for his unique interpretation of Idealism. He takes care to avoid the traditional vagaries of this position by dealing creatively with concepts developed by philosophers in the past. By recasting these concepts in new forms and blending them with contemporary innovations, he produces a more powerful explanatory framework for understanding the world as it manifests itself in our times. For example, in Conceptual Idealism he presents his theory of transactional cognition that masterfully combines elements of Kant, Phenomenology, Pragmatism, evolutionary theory, and Leibniz.2 What is striking here is how he critiques each of these ingredients individually while taking something useful from them to create a new synthesis. Thus he rejects Kant’s idea of the “Ding an sich,” as well as Bradley’s “Absolute.” Both, he argues, are examples of advocating an “empty idealization”, since these concepts lead to lines of reasoning that are unworkable.3 They require our speaking of mind-independent particulars, which though patently unknowable, are taken by their advocates as somehow corresponding to objects that should be familiar and intelligible to us. This mode of discourse, however, in the final analysis, does not convey meaningfully any relation of “correspondence” at all. In such contexts, the realm of the mind-independent is and always must be cognitively vacuous to us, and none of the categories that are applicable to particulars of mind-manifest objects can be employed to describe a “mind-independent reality” so-called, without confounding different conceptual schemes.4 However, this does not mean that Rescher totally rejects Kant’s theory of the understanding. He grants that Kant had it partly right in recognizing the formative power of reason upon experience, and that without the latter knowledge would be impossible. His own view of nature, Rescher observes, is mind conditioned, not in a spiritualistic or transcendentalist sense, but in the sense of being conceptually mindinvolving, or “noomorphic” (mind structured).5 Reality-as-we-think-aboutit, Rescher notes, is “a mental construct in whose construction mentalesque elements play a substantial role.”6 Here, however, he again backs away

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INTRODUCTION

from going too far with Kant in that he denies that this structuring is transcendentally necessary. Rather he sees it as generated within the constitution of our ordinary conceptual scheme. Moreover, this scheme is not in itself uniquely subjective, as concepts such as the Bradlean Cosmic Mind or Absolute Spirit require, rather it is rooted in “the generic, public, interpersonal capacities of mind”.7 The latter develop the “conceptual scaffolding” which helps make sense of the world in terms of patterns of order, taxonomic organization of experience, explanatory frameworks, social categories and roles, intentionality and purpose, evaluative categories, etc.8 This is the innovative “transactional” character of his theory of cognition, which renders his brand of idealism so profoundly creative. He surely has no use for Husserl’s indefensible “suspension” of the natural viewpoint, i.e. the έποχή, just as he has no use for Kant’s “an sich”. These ideas introduce a fiction into the discussion, namely that of mind as spectator, fully detached from some “intrinsically unknowable” independent reality, and yet as somehow making the process of understanding possible. Rescher’s transactionism requires that mind be seen primarily as a contributing agent along with extra-experiential reality, so that the resulting phenomenon is an irreducible synthesis of both. As the outcome of the transaction, that is the end result, cannot be said to be a solely mindindependent reality which becomes mind-involving, since that would disown the mind’s own unique contribution when summoned by experience. Neither can it be said, without again violating the transforming role of transactionism, that there is a fully formed self, with an innately prefigured conceptual scheme, that operates on automatic pilot, so to speak, inwardly surveying experience as raw data and mechanically generating understanding. For the self’s varied capacities to synthesize knowledge are themselves dependent on the outcome of the transaction itself. Our knowledge of the world is thus one that has a Leibnizian verdicality, in that it is consistent with our “warranted theorizing”.9 In this he aims at clinching the personally transcending objectivity of our knowledge of particulars, since it is ultimately a knowledge that is causally dependent upon both the novelty and surprise of extra-experiential experience, as well as on the mind’s interpretive role. In this respect, a correspondence theory of truth is in principle seen to be unsupportable, where this is interpreted as a strictly referential relation between knowledge claim and “Ding an sich”. Rescher prefers, as the more reasonable theory, a coherence theory of truth, when endeavoring to explain the truth-value of propositions about the world. In the latter case, truth is seen as a judgment emerging at the end of an

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Nicholas Moutafakis

evaluative process, where a proposition is judged true or false with respect to how it coheres within an established and rationally ordered system of knowledge claims. Rescher also reaches further into Philosophy’s rich past to assimilate from Hegel the useful concept of a communitarian self. In the latter he sees a valuable component for his pivotal concept of personhood, an absolutely indispensable ingredient for his theory of values. In this respect he borrows the Hegelian view that persons are defined partly by the position they share in relation to others, within a just social order. To this he adds an element of personal independence and individuality by incorporating elements of Nietzsche’s notion of a personal self. In the latter he finds much that is of value in the assertion of one’s independence, and in the insistence upon the privacy of our inward state. The delicate balancing of these two factors create Rescher’s uniquely holistic conception of what it is to be a person, i.e. a rationally independent agent who by participating with others in the shared life of a just community evolves into a morally responsible human being. Again, as is characteristic of his eclectic approach, he spurns Hegel’s belief in the inexorable logic of historical change as the key and determinative factor in defining a person. For this tends to eradicate all vestiges of individuality. He replaces Hegel’s restrictive logic with the spontaneous and pervasive influence of nature’s evolutionary process in shaping the conceptual schemes we have discovered and employed successfully. Rescher spurns the extremes of Nietzsche’s view of self as well, noting that: ”…someone who exists only unto himself, without relationships of community and interrelationships with others, is enmeshed in a delusional detachment from the world’s course of things that makes him a freak rather than a person”.10 Neither does he find anything useful in Nietzsche’s focal concept that life itself is nothing more than the unforgiving “will to power.” This attitude of thought only serves to dehumanize others by depriving them of their sense of self-worth and therefore of their personhood. It is in this respect that he finds Pragmatism to be a key influence in his philosophical overview, in that the latter harbors an understanding of the world that is founded upon beliefs that are both nurtured and challenged by experience as actually lived. In going in this direction he discovers that he can be consistent in preserving the important idea of the formative function of mind, which though itself subject to an evolving process, nonetheless serves to synthesize our knowledge of things in a systematic manner. The astute eclecticism underlying his approach also requires noting how

8

INTRODUCTION

he steers clear of Husserl and phenomenological reductionists generally. For their methods posit an indefensible conceptual divide between mind per se and phenomenal world as “bracketed,” in their parlance. However he still finds much that is useful in the works of Franz Brentano and Alex Meinong. Surely within the general tenor of his arguments against the rationally unsupportable exclusivity that a Cartesian subject/object split engenders one discerns a derivation from its original source in Brentano, as is seen as well in Rescher’s emphasis upon beginning his inquiries by considering phenomena from a “presentational mode".11 The latter is especially important to Rescher since his entire philosophical approach is predicated upon the “irreducible” presentational immediacy of experience. Also, in Alexis Meinong he finds much that is useful in the idea that cognition itself is an evaluative activity. For in saying that something is true or false about any thing, one is in essence doing nothing less than “judging the value” of a single proposition.12 Moreover, it should be noted as well how Rescher’s belief that philosophy, in its truest sense, must be sensitive to the circumstances human beings actually find themselves in, is not open ended. He knows where to draw the line in recognizing the legitimacy of the philosophical enterprise. This is exemplified in his American Philosophy Today, where he cites the present day perversion of pragmatism by some contemporary American writers who have “turned their backs on” the traditional pragmatic standard for testing objective adequacy, i.e. they have disregarded the “... individual-transcending reality principle ...[that] offsets the vagaries of personal reactions,....”13 Labeling them “pseudo-pragmatists,” Rescher notes that they have substituted pragmatism’s communal concern for “what works for us” with their egocentric concern of “what works for me.” This trend has shamefully laid by the wayside “the classical pragmatic approach that saw the rational validity of intellectual artifacts to reside in the success of our conduct of our extra-theoretical affairs....”14 These latter day pragmatist, so-called, and their “murky subjectivism,” are neither pragmatists nor philosophers. For in denigrating the communal dimension of truth they have forsaken the basis of rationality itself. Interestingly, there is in what Rescher says about the centrality of life and its dynamic effect on the pursuit of philosophical understanding a hint of what John Herman Randall had attempted to explain much earlier, regarding the very nature of the philosophical enterprise. In a superbly incisive definition Randall states “...Philosophy is the criticism of the fundamental beliefs in any of man’s great cultural enterprises, science, art, relig-

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Nicholas Moutafakis

ion, the moral life, social and practical activity, when some new idea or altered experience has impinged upon them and generates intellectual tensions and maladjustments….15 Randall observes, for example, that for all of its innovative brilliance, Cartesianism was still very much like any other emergent philosophical movement, in that it reflected the ever-recurring traditional concerns inherent in humanity’s relentless attempt at comprehending the universe it is a part of. This eternal quest, according to Randall, is generally as old as the Ancient Greeks.16 There are always, he observes, certain persistent distinctions in the history of philosophy, certain logical antitheses, which receive attention in every age, though with different words and different emphases. These distinctions are at the heart of all philosophical disputes: the one and the many, permanence and change, the real and the ideal, reason and experience, form and matter, structure and process. Though some have looked upon these conceptual structures as problems to be solved once and for all, for Randall they have become conceptual tools with which philosophers endeavor to make sense of our continuous experience of the intelligible world. They are, Randall adds, weapons to be used in fighting. The fight itself, the quest, the enemy forever evolves as ever new in every generation and epoch, but the fighting and the weapons used, these, Randall says, are as ancient as the Greeks.17 The most radical thinkers, Randall continues, are soaked in tradition, and in the case noted, Descartes was surely no exception. For he also sought to champion the belief in an underlying mathematical structure to the world, not unlike Plato’s in its essential perfection. He rejected the vacuous and seemingly endless distinctions of the Scholastics, and advocated the pre-eminence of mathematical truth over common sense experience in understanding and explaining the real world. In all of this he was armed with the arsenal of the past (Pythagoreanism and Platonism)— though expanded to include the descriptive power of his invention: analytical geometry, and his battleground was the decayed thinking of his temporal present, i.e., Scholasticism.18 Analogously, Rescher employs the tools of his times, i.e., the history of philosophy, evolutionary theory, propositional logic, decision theory, probability theory, etc., to define in formal and conceptual terms the character of possible actions in the uninhibited expression of our rationality. He illustrates how one can define and quantify the value of action within a contemporary context of real life situations. His overarching goal is to preserve and justify the inherent moral core of rationality in decision-making. A goal generally consistent with certain moral theories of the past yet set

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INTRODUCTION

within a contemporary dialogue relating to humanity’s evolutionary nature. Moreover, his aim is to address the pressing needs of our contemporary world, needs that are evidenced by a pervasive corrosion of standards of honesty, decency, and integrity at the highest levels of our civil, religious, commercial, and political institutions. The present day indifference toward the rights of others, toward respecting and furthering the well being of our fellows, toward cherishing the role reason plays in guiding our choices, etc. is an ominous factor that threatens an unsettling future for the survival of our freedoms. Significantly, in Randall’s view, the history of ideas is both cumulative and original. Ideas that satisfy the particular needs of people at a specific time in their history have a structure of their own. Old ideas are abandoned for new ones when elements of a culture develop the possibilities of new experiences. Invariably, the tendency always is to abandon an idea before it is well understood and to replace it with a new and more serviceable one. Ideas triumph for only a short time. They speak to the immediate need of the philosopher to satisfy his desire to explain what is before him. The history of philosophy manifests not an orderly development of thought through the ages, but a series of “lootings”, wherein no great philosophy has ever been thoroughly and rationally refuted. There are a lot of discards in the wake of the history of philosophy. It is littered with ideas that have been abandoned because they are no longer useful in explaining new experience. Logical disproof is not what displaces one philosophical movement for another, the culprit, rather, is irrelevance. For Randall, the history of philosophy may thus be seen as a series of episodes in which philosophers attempt to explain the world in terms of concepts first defined by the Greeks. Each episode reflects both its own misunderstanding of these fundamental conceptual tools, and its creative embellishment of them. Rescher echoes some of Randall’s basic sentiment on this score in The Strife of Systems, where he reflects upon how the philosophical enterprise never lends itself to the total rational refutation of a philosophical interpretation. However, he is cautious in backing away from Randall’s central claim that philosophical developments are basically spontaneous and lack completely any orderly progression. Philosophers, Rescher notes in partially agreeing with Randall, clearly do have their own feel for what is right, and their sense of what is right is not ever subject to evidential proof or disputation. “...The central role of cognitive values in philosophizing means that learning philosophy is not only a matter of mastering facts but it is also one of acquiring a “point of view”, of forming cognitive attitudes,

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Nicholas Moutafakis

of acquiring affinities and allegiances in matters of exploiting data.”19 No amount of reasoning ever manages to dislodge the acquired point of view. It persists and uses reasoning to interpret the facts of the world as it sees it. This is why value diversity is inevitable. Philosophical conversions, Rescher notes, are not matters of altered courses of reasoning, but of quantum jumps to a different value outlook. Having said this, however, Rescher also sees a pressing need to bring forward something very important that Randall evidently misses in his discussion of how progress occurs in philosophical inquiry. For there is a distinction to be drawn between the philosopher’s “gut” reaction to the world on the one hand, and the evolution of philosophical inquiry on the other. Whereas the former is something both Randall and Rescher agree plays a key motivational role in generating a philosophically unique point of view, the latter, as a process of discourse leading to a fully developed philosophical system, is clearly recognized only by Rescher. Surely without the presence of critical dialogue the "strife of systems" could not be what it is, namely philosophical dialogue. This, Rescher says, constitutes the essential nature of the evolution of philosophical systems. It is only through the discussion and criticism of other philosophical theories that philosophers transform their “gut reaction” to the world into new systems of philosophical explanation. Their work is not nurtured in a vacuum, as Randall appears to suggest in several passages. Various philosophies, Rescher is keen to observe, emerge as rival solutions to shared problems.20 One should also note here how for Rescher the human element, as one’s “gut” response to the world of values mentioned above, is something that remains at the heart of the enterprise, it both guides and challenges the activity of philosophizing. This insight aligns itself quite nicely with the popular and philosophically profound message Lewis Carroll conveys through his story of Achilles and the tortoise.21 Despite the efforts of Achilles to convince Tortoise that given any argument of the form having premises: “if p then q”, and “p”, one must always rationally conclude: “q”, Tortoise stubbornly insists upon having just one further justification for taking the “actual” step to the conclusion: “q”. While Achilles patiently and pointlessly supplies the added rule to secure the concluding inference, sly Tortoise continues to insist upon yet another “additional” justification. A rule justifying “making him” arrive at the conclusion, and so on ad infinitum. Lewis’ point is clear and very important, it dramatizes the conceptual divide between our pure formal reasoning and one’s inner motivation for action, an insight we will

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INTRODUCTION

see Rescher holding as central to his philosophical outlook. For it is the “gut” reason of everyday life that motivates us to see the world in a certain way, philosophically, and to act on what seems to us to be right. The cathedrals in the pristine formalisms of logic are lacking in conveying such motivational power. Some of the flavor of Rescher’s general approach concerning what the doing of philosophy involves can also be found to have parallelisms with Richard Rorty’s views involving the role of rationality in the pursuit of philosophical truth. The latter’s critique of the belief in a universal rationality has him saying that he would much prefer replacing the notion expressed by “the force of the better argument” with something like “the force of the better vocabulary”. By this Rorty means to emphasize the importance of securing “the argument that works best for a given audience,” as opposed to seeking to find a single argument that somehow is “universally valid” for everyone at any time.22 The reason for this is that universal validity is prefaced upon the fictional idea of a universal or ideal audience. In Rorty’s view it is more realistic to think of doing philosophy in terms of a given group of listeners, instead of prejudging your audience as being intrinsically better than another. He claims that one must separate rationality from absolute truth, so that rationality is seen as dealing with notions like curiosity, persuasion, and tolerance. When a culture comes to adopt this more expansive view of the rational it can see itself in more secure terms; as one that is involved in the adventure of changing its moral identity, “...it can find its identity precisely in its willingness to enlarge its imagination and merge with other groups, other human possibilities, so as to form the barely imaginable, cosmopolitan society of the future....”23 Somewhat in line with Rescher, Rorty is pointing to the human dimension of philosophical activity, where one’s view of the world must fit comfortably with their evolving philosophical awareness of that world. It will be seen in the discussions that are to unfold that Rescher also believes that the “universality of rationality” is not to be construed in some transcendent platonic sense, nor is it to be regarded relativistically as simply consensus. Rather it is to be taken in the beneficial and objective sense of that which ought to be adhered to by every intelligent human being that interacts with the world at large. However, one should also be quick to note the profound differences in their overall view of philosophy, as expounded by Rorty and Rescher. Though both welcome the need to see human experience within the context of a presently evolving process, each differs profoundly as to what this

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Nicholas Moutafakis

means for the discipline itself. The former advocates a skeptical stance, i.e. the total abandonment of doing philosophy in any of its traditional ways. As a contemporary hermeneuticist he advises renouncing the centrally philosophic quest for alternative cognitive methods, preferring to concede to the natural sciences the general notion of "cognition." The idea is to dissolve rather than to resolve philosophical issues. The goal of philosophy, Rorty insists, should not be an inquiry into matters of fact, but a conversation into matters of interest. Philosophy’s usefulness, were one to pursue its study seriously, is to demonstrate its futility as a productive discipline, and to illustrate the broad cultural base of the history of ideas. Rescher’s reaction is clearly quite the opposite of Rorty’s. His own critique of Rorty is to note how the latter is perhaps too willing to sacrifice comprehension for a supposed liberation from philosophical discussion and inquiry. One of philosophy’s major concerns, Rescher observes, is to resolve issues dealing with the coherence of our beliefs concerning life and the world we live in. To abandon philosophy in the manner Rorty suggests is to decide to be content with ignorance and incoherence. It takes away the possibility of making things better, which, in Rescher’s view, is a loss of great consequence. Moreover, knowing the history of philosophy is liberating in itself in the sense that it enables us to understand how and why ideas emerged and how to avoid their unnecessary if not tyrannical control upon our present day thinking. Thus the many twentieth century “isms” are not unsatisfying because they have been rationally refuted, rather their relevance has been brought into question because of changes in our needs in understanding things. They were articulated on the basis of philosophers needing to interpret the world of their time, to provide a comprehensive view of life as once lived, and surely Positivism and Phenomenology have their earlier counterparts, such as Idealism and Realism, etc. Asking whether we are “better off” for having entertained these philosophies is asking whether intellectual creativity itself has any value. The answer of course is “yes”. They and their predecessors, represent one more fight in lived experience, one more quest, one more attempt to make sense of life; and Philosophy was there, as Randall would say, to prepare the combatants, to shout the battle cry, and to point to the possibility of something more serene beyond the tumult.24 In this context it is of interest to note Rescher’s selectivity in what he perceives to be the enduring and useful legacy of Philosophy’s past. With great care he employs ideas that others have propounded as primary colors

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INTRODUCTION

for his pallet. The final result is a creative blend of past and present. The overall effect of his work is that of a new philosophical understanding of life as a vibrant, precious, and delicately fragile experience. It offers interesting insights into how certain philosophical lessons speak over the centuries in genuinely enduring and optimistic terms of the nobility of the human spirit and of our personhood. To understand him, therefore, requires that we know something of the essence of Plato and Aristotle, something more of Kant and Hegel, Peirce and Dewey, and a generous amount of the phenomenology that is found in Brentano and Meinong,—through without the transcendentalist tendencies of some of their followers. In this respect the emphasis of his work reminds us of Socrates’ admonishment of Phaedo that we must never permit ourselves to grow weary of or angry at the difficulty of philosophical inquiry because it has not enabled us to achieve a definitive resolution of an issue. For the quest is in itself as important as any solution—if not more so, in that it serves to remind us of the power of our intellect in its search for truth, and of the essential goodness of our nature.25 Even in works where Rescher brings to bear his considerable analytical skills, where the complexity of the mathematical analysis may challenge the general reader’s attention, one finds his underlying theme to be steadily targeted at some prominent social concern requiring common sense attention and scrutiny. At virtually every turn in his writings one encounters his gentle reminding of the reader of what philosophical work should be, and how it has a unique and indispensable role to play in our understanding of the function of values and moral decision making in contemporary life. We see in the long history of his works that he argues, often prophetically, that when dealing with values philosophy’s role cannot be usurped by Cultural Anthropology, Economics, or defined by "one size fits all" utilitarian theories of ethics. Such studies fail terribly in giving an account of the complex human component that arises when vicarious affects befall an individual who interacts within a social structure. This sentiment is expressed eloquently in Moral Absolutes, where Rescher defines the study of morality as being “... in its very nature a functional enterprise cultivated by rational agents for the achievement of certain beneficial results: the protection and advancement of the real interests of people.... At the heart of morality lies benevolence—a due care for the interests of people-in-general....”26 Thus in turning our attention to his substantial contribution in the area of values, we encounter Rescher’s insistence on the need to respect the centrality of philosophy’s place in contemporary life. This is an especially

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significant aspect of Rescher’s work, one that stands up to those who claim that the entire relevance of Western Philosophy, and of all of Western Culture for that matter, is problematic in today’s global environment. Some have argued that it may very well be that Philosophy, as we have known it, has simply outlived its importance and usefulness, if it indeed ever had any. For Rescher, and others, nothing can be further from the truth. The lessons of philosophy that have withstood the test of time and tyrants are those speaking of the uniqueness of human rationality as the essential vehicle with which the great achievements of man have come about. The latter are to be found not only in the natural sciences and the arts, but also in the most humane area of philosophical investigation, the study of morality itself. In this domain, which Rescher is quick to distance from the debilitating influences of relativism, one has the discovery of the universally recognized truth that rational validation is the only true basis of moral action. Moral action,—when seen as totally independent of custom or mores,—is that which cares for, preserves, and enhances the dignity and real interests of persons universally. This insight, first realized by the Greeks and refined by Western thinkers for over two millennia, stands as one of Western Philosophy’s greatest and most enduring contributions to world civilization. Thus in terms of its broadest implications, Rescher’s work strikes a positive and highly optimistic note on the unique importance of Western thought. His philosophy offers to a world presently demoralized by moral relativism and threatened by fanatical terror, the hope and confidence of an enduring morality. A morality that is rooted in the only thing morality can be based upon the essential and uniquely human attribute of rationality, conceived as a composite of reason and compassion. II. Why a book on Nicholas Rescher? This question can be approached from a variety of perspectives. From one standpoint, Rescher’s relevance as an important voice in twentieth century American Philosophy is beyond dispute. This is not simply a matter dictated by the volume and quality of his scholarly achievement. It is substantiated as well by the professional recognition he has received nationally and internationally as one who has labored tirelessly to further the cause of philosophical study here and abroad for over half a century. Through the creation and sponsorship of top tier philosophical journals, the development of indispensable computerized venues for pursuing philosophical re-

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INTRODUCTION

search, the mentoring of philosophical associations, internationally renowned scholarly institutes and professional conferences, etc. he has emerged as a prominent leader in supporting the free exchange of ideas worldwide. Moreover, in reading the many critiques of Rescher’s work one finds disturbingly a pervasive failure by commentators to consider the broader ramifications of his contributions. Some think that they can discuss his position by simply looking at one of his books, perhaps a single article or even a book chapter, and that is all the research one needs to do to critique Rescher. The attitude of many commentators is, just take a shot at a fragment of his view and you’ll be done with him! What results is shoddy scholarship. It reflects work that fails to do justice to the systemically integrated character of Rescher’s position.27 What is needed is a study that alerts us to the fact that such critiques do more harm than good, and that in terms of content one needs to have a more panoramic understanding of Rescher’s work so as to appreciate its significance, relevance, and applicability. Apart from the above is the fact that in reviewing and evaluating Rescher’s work, one finds that the contemporary issues he discusses become resuscitated and reinvigorated by the very perspective he chooses to adopt. Cutting edge debates on culture wars, the effects of technology on contemporary culture, the influence of the social sciences in determining values and the nature of moral discourse, etc. acquire a more challenging, lively, urgent, and resonant tone when seen through his prism. In addition, Rescher’s work offers an opportunity to once again approach philosophical inquiry from a standpoint that has been lost sight of for far too long. This is that of developing an integrated philosophical system of explanation, one that goes beyond the narrow focus of Analytical Philosophy that dominated the twentieth century in the West, and beyond having to subscribe to the nihilistic pointlessness of life proffered by Existentialism. Several intimidating assumptions have been allowed to become all too prevalent within philosophy in the last one hundred years. These are that the world has become too complex, the information it holds too vast, the sophistication required for its mastery far too demanding, the unspeakable cruelty of human beings toward each other too universal, too unforgiving, and beyond reasonable redemption for human experience to be subjected to philosophical systematization. Gone forever, some say, are the halcyon days of Aristotle, Descartes, or Kant, where life seemed more manageable and philosophy more capable in providing a consistent and systematic pic-

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ture of man and the universe he shares with other creatures. Rescher’s work, reflecting something of the spirit of Alfred North Whitehead’s in this regard, provides enticing suggestions that these assumptions need not be so, that there are ways one can pursue to integrate different fields of knowledge into a consistent body of understanding, one that results in philosophy’s greater serviceability. Essentially, one finds that Rescher has absolutely no fear of complexity and its daunting challenges. In this respect his work provides hints of how the ancient dream of a rational picture of things can be revived and pursued in a productive manner. This and much more makes studying Rescher’s lead fun, a sentiment that appears to have been lacking in the discipline’s stifling austerity of recent times. The aim of this volume, therefore, is to present, in basic outline, an exegesis of some of Rescher’s vast contribution in the area of value theory. In a way, this effort attempts to synthesize his position across some of the enormous amount of material he has written on this topic up to the present time. Interestingly, in reading his work one finds a remarkable degree of consistency in his writings over five decades, a consistency which speaks to how early on in his philosophical development he arrived at clearly thought out positions which had the potential of being fruitfully expanded and carefully enriched. Our design will be to sketch his views first on the general concept of rationality, and then to examine how this central notion is woven into other facets of his philosophical thinking, e.g., personhood, valuation, decision-making, consistency, inference, morality, and social responsibility. In addition, it is important to be reminded again of the fact that Rescher’s work incorporates many lessons from philosophy’s past. After carefully scrutinizing his work it seems fair to say that a lot of what he says is significant only when one views his place historically in the traditions of Western Thought. Thus in drawing his philosophical portrait we have taken pains to render the background of the rich and varied influences and traditions he uses as guides to his own thinking in lines and hues which do them justice. To neglect pursuing this aspect of his work is to leave unexpressed the dazzling creative scholarship that forms the basis of his unique contribution. So while attention occasionally shifts in the exegesis to develop a concept that appears originally perhaps in Aristotle, or St. Augustine, or Kant, or Peirce, etc. effort has been made to keep the focus centrally on Rescher as much as possible, with the occasional excursion to other relevant material. It is hoped that the outcome will be a substantive

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INTRODUCTION

and responsible critical statement concerning the work of one of America’s most prominent, interesting, and loved philosophers. NOTES

1 Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory (1969), p. 3. 2 Rescher, Conceptual Idealism (1983), pp. 153-57. 3 Ibid., pp. 154-55. 4 Ibid., pp. 156-157. 5 Ibid., p. 156. 6 Ibid., p. 156. 7 Ibid., p. 156, Footnote 2. 8 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 9 Ibid., pp. 166-67. 10 Rescher, Human Interests (1990), pp. 10-11. 11 Franz, Brentano, “The Distinction Between Mental and Physical Phenomena,” in Realism and the Background of Philosophy, edited by Roderick M. Chisholm, (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1960), p. 62-63 12 Alexius Meinong, The Theory of Objects, in Realism and the Background of Philosophy, edited by Roderick M. Chisholm (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1960), pp. 79-80. 13 Rescher, American Philosophy Today (1994), p. 19. 14 Ibid. 15 John Randall, How Philosophy Uses Its Past, (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 19. 16 John Randall, The Career of Philosophy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 4-6. 17 Ibid., pp. 4-6.

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NOTES

18 Ibid. pp. 373-4. 19 Rescher, The Strife of Systems (1985), p. 117 20 Ibid., p. 121. [See also N. Rescher’s critique of Randall’s approach, The Strife of Systems, p. 33.] 21 Lewis Carrol, “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles,” Mind, n.s. 4, (1895), pp. 27880. 22 J. Niznik and J. T. Sanders, Debating the State of Philosophy, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996), p.85. 23 Ibid. 24 J. H. Randall, How Philosophy Uses Its Past, pp. 16-7. 25 Plato, The Phaedo, 89d-90c. 26 Rescher, Moral Absolutes (1989), p. 6. [For an interesting critique of Richard Rorty’s position see Rescher’s The Strife if Systems, pp. 245-51.] 27 Examples of this are too numerous to itemize completely [See Bibliography at the end of this volume.]. One who is representative of this tendecy is Leslie Armour. Armour proposes to discuss the origins, significance, import, and impact of Rescher’s conceptual idealism in less than three pages. The result is a venting of a rather wildly exaggerated critique. For example, he is found to claim: 1. Rescher’s rendition of idealism commits him to “the view that nature is permeated by mind.” 2. Rescher holds that the properties of things in the world are associated with mind, while he [Rescher] disassociates the properties of mind from having “any” analogous relation with material things. And 3., Rescher can avoid the conventionalist argument “only if” he can show that no legitimate alternative inferences can be drawn from the data of experience. Armour never explains what sort of alternative inferencing this would be, nor does he explain why the flexibility of the system of scientific inquiry itself should be deemed suspect or inadequate. [See “F. H. Bradley and Later Idealism: From Disarray to Reconstruction,” in Philosophy After F. H. Bradley: A collection of essays edited by Leslie Armour ... [et al.]. Preface by James Bradley (Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press, 1996), pp. 20-23.]

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Chapter 1 On Rationality and Its Predicaments Reasoned actions are a reflection of our cognitive reaction to an evolving world. Rational response within a societal context enables us to discover the limitless potential of our personhood. 1. THE MYSTERY OF NATURE’S INTELLIGIBILITY EXPOSED

I

n his discussion of the general concept of rationality as it evolves in Rationality, and toward the end of both A Useful Inheritance and The Riddle of Existence, Rescher asks and discusses the answer to a very important and highly intriguing question: “Why is nature intelligible to man?”1 His attempt to answer this question, albeit in a highly speculative and conditional manner, provides an informative background for comprehending his entire analysis of the concept of rationality itself, since it introduces Rescher’s seminal discussion of evolution’s central role in making possible the emergence of human intelligence. As we will see, for Rescher evolution is the most primal system known, without which life would be impossible. And it is by way of evolution, as a dynamic and orderly natural system, that Rescher sees manifested a fascinating possibility that explains the nature of rationality, i.e., the advantage humans relate to and come to count upon most. For him the nature of rationality as a general concept is intimately linked to our understanding of evolutionary change as a systematic process, and how we are an integral part of its working.2 Indeed, subsequent analyses in the areas of values and social responsibility will invariably come to reflect what he has to say about the basic nature of human intelligence, as it has come to evolve in the world we inhabit. Rescher begins this section of Rationality by observing that Albert Einstein, Erwin Schroedinger, and Eugene Wigner had expressed amazement at the simple fact that mathematical physicists have had such remarkable success in accurately describing the physical universe. All three felt compelled to use a form of the word “miracle” to characterize how, on the one hand, we are able to discover precise mathematical laws to describe physical events, indicating thereby that nature herself in some way has order,

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since she lends herself to intelligibility. On the other hand, however, we have absolutely no means of explaining why this is so.3 Rescher suggests that this question, in the form in which it is presented by these eminent scholars, needs to be reformulated to reflect the fact that one’s basic concern here is actually not with the application of the a priori truths of mathematics to the actual world, but with issues dealing with “the empirical applicability of mathematics.” One will find that by changing the focus of the discussion to “the a posteriori contingent truth of lawful fact” one can go a long way toward demystifying the question as first posed by the eminent theoreticians mentioned above.4 As the mystery was expressed by them, there is implied a separation between pure mathematics and the world that is to be described by science. This is not a realistic rendition of the situation, according to Rescher. In A Useful Inheritance he observes the following: “...what is at issue [here] is the empirical applicability of mathematics, its pivotal role in framing the a posteriori, contingent truths of lawful fact that renders nature’s ways amenable to reason.”5 The fact that the world is “mathematics-congenial” does not necessarily imply that the natural world must conform to precise mathematical formulations. In a word, we should not think that the world conforms to our mathematics because it is intelligible to us. Rather, there must be something in common to both sides of the issue, i.e. our side, as mathematizing intellects, and the world’s side, as mathematically congenial evolutionary process. On our side we can say that mathematics is ultimately based upon our experience of the natural world, and in having this “experience” we are in essence reacting to the nature that surrounds us, i.e. to a world of solid objects having sufficient stability to allow for their measurement. While mathematics is surely not a natural science, it is nonetheless a science that deals with what Rescher calls “imaginable structures.” And this imagining is accomplished by a nature-evolved and nature-embraced mind, i.e. homo quaerens. Moreover, this mind does its possibility-imagining by considering which possibility projections are nature congenial and which are not. This is to say, we first apply our cogitation to the surrounding world we know, and then project the resulting mathematical patterns of uniformity to a broader theoretical framework. It is not surprising then that the mathematics we have discovered and find so useful is indeed applicable to our conceptualization of nature.6 One can cite here John Stuart Mill’s observation regarding the origins of the study geometry as an example. According to Mill the recurring need for accessing a practical means of measuring land areas ((γεωµετρία), after seasonal river flooding in Ancient Mesopo-

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tamia and Egypt, led ultimately to the formal study of the abstract structures systematized in plane geometry.7 Evidently, this intellectual achievement, for all of its striking complexity, is still an aspect of the evolutionary process we have experienced and which we are a part of, and therefore the mathematics we have created is not something generically separate and onto itself, to which nature must conform. For nature already has very probably played a significant part in causing and nurturing its emergence. In a strikingly interesting passage he says: “...Our mathematics is destined to be congenial to nature because it is itself the product of a natural process; it fits nature because it reflects the way we ourselves are placed within nature as integral constituents thereof, as products of evolutionary process proceeding within nature’s realm.”8 Rescher goes on to observe that it is no more surprising that the mind can grasp nature’s ways and adjust to them, than it is for the eye to accommodate light, or for the stomach to digest food.9 Now for the other side of the mind-nature relation: nature’s cooperative or congenial side. Nature as evolutionary process, Rescher says, must have contributed something to the emergence of life and intelligence. Its primal role in this regard was most likely that of providing an environment of consistent and yet simple patterns of stimuli to organisms of the most rudimentary anatomy, so that they acquired a means, i.e. learned a way, to respond appropriately to them. What is essential here is what is conveyed by terms such as “stable,” “patterned,” “structured,” and “appropriate response.” The simplest of organisms can survive only if it has learned to execute those responses, albeit mechanically, that will allow for its survival, and this would be impossible if the environment itself had no stability, no pattern of stimulation, no consistent structure. Without the fixity of these elements in the process, learning as appropriate response would be inconceivable. Any creature, lacking a stable or even a marginally predictable environment, would soon become extinct, if indeed it ever managed to survive in the first place. Thus the simplest set of regularities, imbedded within nature, became the basic and directly “learnable” patterns of occurrence, which probably constituted the simplest “laws of nature”. Rescher now proceeds to his main conclusion: “...The existence of such learnable ‘structures’ of natural occurrence means that there must be some useful role for mathematics, ‘which, after all, is the abstract theory of ‘structure’ in general’“.10 Rescher’s further hypothesizes that if the natural world was completely indifferent to the evolutionary emergence of intelligence, then it could

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never have evolved into our present world, i.e., a world in which intelligent creatures have not only emerged, but have survived and flourished in complex forms because of their very intelligence. Furthermore, if intelligence did not provide an edge to creatures that possessed it, either human or nonhuman, intelligence itself would never have survived and developed further.11 Thus as an essential instrument of survival, intelligence has operated within a naturally supportive environment. Nature’s systematic stimulation of intelligence has in a sense forced it to evolve to higher levels. Moreover, the very fact that intelligence has evolved over time, bringing forth progressively more astonishing creative achievements, such as mathematical interpretation itself, is strongly indicative of the fact that the world is congenial to the survival of intelligence. The mathematizing mind’s success in understanding “nature’s ways” should therefore not be seen as an astonishing mystery, as it seemed to Einstein and the others. When the practical factors are properly fleshed out on both sides of the mind-nature relation, then one sees that there cannot be a hard and fast exclusionary duality operating here at all. For the mind that Rescher speaks of is an evolving mind that is connected integrally to nature via the evolutionary process. Nor can it be said, of course, that there exists a platonic intelligence, which is to say mind that is inherently complete in its knowledge and ontologically distinct from physical world, in its essential nature.12 In A Useful Inheritance he admits that the thesis he is proposing has a ring of circularity, in that it is an explanation of our understanding of nature in terms of what is known about how natural things behave. In a sense the explanation relies upon information which natural science provides in a retrospective fashion to explain how it itself develops as a field of study. The circularity, Rescher claims, is not vitiating, however, in that it reflects the healthy self-sufficiency of scientific knowledge, and its claims to adequacy.13 Rescher’s position concerning the uniquely transactional nature of intelligence will become a central focus of many critiques of his work, critiques which target a perceived tension between his “qualified idealism” and his “qualified realism”. Briefly, Rescher recognizes that certain readings of his writing in this area convey a sense of conflict between his holding: (1) our knowledge of the world is reflective of the interaction between ourselves and the real world as “it exists in itself”, apart from our theories about it; and (2) all that can be said about this “real world” is what our theorizing allows us to say about it. The problem is reduced to simply saying that while our world is the world that is known through theorizing, we

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still feel compelled to a “realistic acceptance” of a world an sich. Why are we so compelled to believe in this pre-theoretic world that is delivering information to our minds, if all we can know of it is what our theorizing tells us?14 Rescher’s response here is of a kind which we will find him employing repeatedly, in various other contexts and discussions. Essentially, it is that of pointing out that his critics have failed to consider the “retrospective” aspect of the issue at hand. This is to say that the question above never arises while we are actually researching and/or theorizing about the world. However, once we have gone on to develop science and we have achieved some semblance of a theoretical description of the world, then we can reflect “retrospectively” about the real nature of the pre-theoretical world. It is only under such circumstances that we begin to wonder about the “real” world, whose picture science provides as its best effort at this present point in time. Past experience of theory construction illustrates and cautions, however, that this picture can and does evolve in certain of its details and emphases. Since this is found to be so by experience, we have come to expect that no matter how precise, our ultimate descriptions of the world shall always remain “defeasible and never fully adequate.” According to Rescher, it is this recognition of a world always “out there,” so to speak, after the theorizing has been done, which preserves the integrity of the distinction between “appearance” and “reality.” Thus “idealism”, as a concept, is chastened by the “reality of the world that lies beyond.” Here Rescher concludes with Kant’s insight that the “reality” of our conception is less an object of knowledge than an index which illustrates that there is nothing in our knowledge of reality that is ever absolute and complete.15 Rescher’s remarks concerning evolution’s substantive influence upon the emergence of intelligence also bring to mind Monroe C. Beardsley’s parallel discussion in Aesthetics, where the latter endeavors to explain our understanding of the meaning adhering to certain elementary forms of musical expression. He suggests that such understanding could be accounted for by considering the relation between music and specific physical properties that attend our thought processes. Beardsley observes: “...music and mental life both have features that belong to process as such: tempo, variations of intensity, impulsiveness, relaxation and tension, crescendo and diminuendo.”16 He views music as process which we find meaningful because we relate it to certain similar manifestations of kinetic patterns associated with our mental life. Music naturally does not communicate through the expression of propositions, in the manner of spoken or written dis-

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course, i.e. in terms of verbs and nouns, subjects and objects. Rather in an important sense music signifies by iconofying with sound the kinetic pattern of our thought processes. What is striking in this suggestion is that Beardsley sees music as reflective of the rhythmic pattern of our mental life, as this is embodied in its physical characteristics. This in turn appears to lend greater cogency to Rescher’s hypothesis that our intellectual achievements,—in Beardsley’s case musical expression, which is essentially mathematical reasoning applied to the organization of sound structure—are as they are because they are reflective of and reactive to the simple pulsating patterns occurring within the broader evolutionary process that affects and nurtures us as thinking and evolving physical beings. In this context, it is pertinent to recall Leonard Bernstein’s famous lectures on the rhythmic structure of music, where he would show students a film of a beating human heart to illustrate the point of the intimate correspondence between rhythmic musical form and the pulse of human life. Whether Beardsley’s suggestion can be extended to support the even more fascinating thesis concerning the therapeutic aspects of music is clearly beyond our present focus. However, his basic point is clearly in line with the direction of Rescher’s fundamental position that our achievements in mathematical studies are the result of a symbiosis [Interactionism] between our sentient capacities and certain simple yet structured influences emanating from within our physical surroundings. Again in A Useful Inheritance Rescher reinforces the point most eloquently were he says: “...It is these interconnections between thought and world that condition our sense of order and beauty of regularity, symmetry, economy, and elegance. The modes of order that attract the attention of mathematical theorists interested in structures,—the concepts that shape their ideas of beautiful theories—are thus, unsurprisingly, also at work in the nature within which these conceptualizations arise....”17 2. THE BASIC RATIONALITY OF REALITY In all of what he has said, Rescher is still mindful of the fact that the mind’s understanding of reality is limited, since our interactions with the world are confined to specific times and by particular parameters. Our understanding of “reality” is by consequence hardly ever complete since the real is exhibiting a constant cache of novelty and surprise. Yet we still want to believe and say that the real is completely rational, though we are never absolutely sure that reality actually is or even that it must be so. Ex-

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perience tells us that at best whatever we have to say about the real better be rational, that is, we best have a well-reasoned account for saying what we are saying about it, if we are going to be believed. We are thus forced back to a consideration of questions concerning the cognitive process. What is it that we truly know about the real? What can we say about the real that is justifiable, without presuming that we can say anything about its totality? In the end, all we can be responsible for is the rationality of our own account of the subject. This alone can be discussed and understood apart from any postulated metaphysical commitment to an order within nature herself. At this juncture it is appropriate to consider George Gale’s criticism of Rescher’s hypothesis relating to the intelligibility of nature. Gale contends that it is by no means a given that nature has laws and that they are necessarily mathematizable. The “lacunae” in Rescher’s position is that Rescher has not proven that nature has laws, or that they are necessarily mathematical in character.18 Gale’s argument, however, does not reflect a careful reading of what Rescher is saying. As Rescher notes in his reply, the hypothesis that nature has laws is suggested on the basis of the observation that without some “systemic pattern of cause/stimuli and effect/responses” the evolution of intelligent creatures would hardly have been possible. Rescher is not proposing “as a given” that nature has laws, as if this were an absolute requirement. Rather, Rescher claims that saying that nature has laws seems to be a conditional requirement concerning his account of the evolutionary process itself. These regularities may be “tangential rather than necessitarian, probabilistic rather than deterministic”.19 Whatever their status ultimately turns out to be, it does not preclude them, as patterned structures presently known, from being characterized in mathematical terms. Gale goes on to argue that Rescher has overlooked the Pythagorean possibility, namely that it may be that (pure) mathematics is already imbedded within nature. This thesis, resuscitated in 1939 by Paul Dirac, reintroduces the ancient premise that the physical universe is determined by an imbedded arithmetical principle. Gale quotes Dirac’s statement to this effect: “there is some mathematical quality in nature.” According to this thesis there is only one mathematics that is at all possible, just as there is only one physical universe. According to Gale, had Rescher confronted this theory at the outset of his discussion, he may not have gone on to present his tenuous distinction between pure mathematics and physical mathematics, or his hypothesis concerning evolutionary interactionism.20

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Gale argues that the ancient thesis implies that there is a one universal mathematics, i.e. pure mathematics. Contrary to Rescher’s claim and irregardless of environment factors, or the specific nature of say an alien life form, it [the alien life form], like its human counterpart, would ultimately come to articulate the same mathematics, having derived it from a common universe within which mathematics resides. One cannot form an opinion concerning the seriousness of Gale argument at this point, or whether it is meant as a genuine challenge to Rescher. In his reply, Rescher again refers to the variability that governs the direction of our cognitive understanding of the world. He notes that the problems we have chosen to deal with and the answers we have discovered, albeit incomplete and probable at best, are surely unique to the way in which we as human beings, upon this tiny planet in this specific spot in the vastness of the entire universe, have had to interact with what is around us. The mathematics we have derived could be identical to or very different from that arrived at by alien life in other worlds. We just have no way of knowing one way or another. None of this appears to affect the ultimate issue, however, which is that of the mathematization of natural laws. Neither do Gales’s comments appear to invalidate Rescher’s distinction between applied and pure mathematics because of his [Rescher] not taking the Pythagorean thesis seriously. The fact remains, and it has been recognized as so by astute thinkers since Plato, that the natural order of discovery in mathematics is historical in the sense that we come first to encounter processes, then to the regularities and repetitions within process, third to the recognition of “patterns of regularity”, and lastly we come to counting.21 Whether the perfection of human understanding will show that this process itself is a fluke, that its manifestations of repetition is a random coincidence which has no claim to essentiality in the nature of things; all these future outcomes have no bearing on the present fact that we can regard these regularities as law-like, and that they can be given a useful mathematical formulation. 3. RECOGNIZING THE UNIVERSALITY OF ACTION BY FOCUSING UPON ITS OBJECTIVITY. Having admitted to the evident tenuousness of our understanding of the world, Rescher proceeds to put in proper perspective the nature of the universal appeal of reasoned accounts. He observes that rationality’s universality is evidenced by the simple fact that “...if something is indeed ‘the ra-

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tional thing to do” then it must be possible in principle for anyone to recognize [my italics] the rational sense of it once enough information is secured.”22 It should be possible, therefore, to say that the “sense” of an act’s, belief’s, or value’s rationality, if “truly” rational, is perceivable as such by any though not necessarily by all intelligent beings, regardless of whether or not they are doing the action, holding the belief, or expressing the value. Though particular actions and beliefs may be and are often influenced and determined by the variety of circumstances the agent finds himself in, Rescher claims that these factors do not hinder the universal recognition of the rationality of an act or belief. What is required is that the agent provide a cogent account of the objectively determinable circumstances which underlie his or her action in some particular case. The rationality of an act is therefore that characteristic of an act’s justification that can hold generally for everyone and anyone in like circumstances.23 One should be clear on the fact that Rescher’s discussion of rationality throughout this work is focused on its cognitive aspect. This is to say that he sees the rationality of an act in terms of what can be said about what is understood and/or known by the agent who acts or believes, or who adopts a value. Rationality, therefore, pertains to what can be said about the truth of what the agent knows. This becomes the basis of the justification for what he does or believes. Rationality is thus context dependent, what is known and what is assessed is unavoidably culture driven. Yet apart from this, all of us, Rescher would argue, seek to understand the grounds upon which someone has chosen the means to secure his ends, and this in fact becomes the only way to judge the agent’s rationality. In essence it is the possible recognition by all intelligent observers of the appropriateness of the “fit” of means to ends which constitutes the universality of rational action. Moreover, when Rescher alludes to recognizing rationality, he is not referring to intuiting some specific type of mental state within consciousness per se, but to evaluating the shared account of the reasons for someone choosing the end and selecting the means for its optimal acquisition. It is in this respect that Rescher is concerned with the cognitive aspect of rationality, and not with characterizing the ontology of some private state of conscious state. Rationality is, Rescher goes on to say, a kind of enterprise. Historically it is manifested in our ceaseless aspiration to determine as completely and as thoroughly as possible the formal principles of all areas of study: “be it science or carpentry,” much like the λóγον διδóναι of the ancient Greeks.24 This ultimate goal, i.e., the establishment of absolute principles

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of rationality in a given field, becomes mediated by developing norms for determining what is rational, by selecting rules of procedure for the rational resolution of choices, and finally by deciding whether certain concrete things or cases can be subsumed under these rules. According to Rescher, as one “descends” from the top most level of defining principles to norm development, procedural rules, and lastly to the examination of particular cases, one encounters increasing levels of detail and variation. This shift to considerations of greater specificity introduces an element of conditionality and/or of the hypothetical in our norm determination and rule generation, which is absent at the highest level, where rational principles are defined. The latter is the level of greatest possible generality and abstraction. Any “truly” rational account of action, belief, etc., must involve a common thread that runs from the legitimacy of the concrete ends that we are seeking to achieve to the principle of rationality which we want our actions to illustrate.25 In a word the rational legitimization of what we do, believe, and value, must be validated at every stage of the process outlined above, from the concrete and specific case up to the abstract principle we hold to be universally valid. Rescher is careful to point out that in his view the uniform absolutism of the principle of rationality does not disown or otherwise discredit the “… pluralism and relativism at the ground level of [the] concrete resolutions of … concrete cases.”26 The latter are part of what rationally involves, insofar as it comes into play at the lower level of norm determination and case evaluation. The “uniformatarian absolutism” of the highest principles of rationality is said to be perfectly consonant with the pluralism and relativism at the lower level. Herein one sees Rescher’s brilliant attempt to combine idealism with pragmatism within one consistent philosophical system. For the practicality of taking the particular objective circumstance into account is essential to projecting the ultimate principle which would ideally explain all such cases, events, or circumstances. The particular fact is thus not determined by the principle, but is delimited by it.27 A further point needs to be made as to the relation between public consensus and rationality. Rescher states that it is common to find rejection even with respect to the most plausible and strongly substantiated account supporting the performance of an action. This, however, does not invalidate its objective truth. Achieving consensus of opinion generally is an ideal aspiration that surrounds an explanation, but there is no guarantee that it will be fulfilled, nor is there any presumption that it can be fulfilled universally. More importantly, however, Rescher seizes upon this turn in

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the argument to attack the relativist view that a common lack of consensus is illustrative of the strength of their position, namely that there is no objective truth at all, which consequently makes meaningful deliberation about absolute truths impossible. This position, historically central to scepticism, is indicative of flawed reasoning, according to Rescher. Differences of culture and upbringing may and often do engender experiential variations in our interpretation of things. However, to insist that a statement of fact is genuine only when it is universally recognized as such, or where there is complete consensus, is to adopt a false premise in one’s argumentation. This is precisely what the sceptic does when he points to the failure of some philosophers to achieve universal consensus on any statement of fact as grounds that support the relativizing or the total de-objectifying of facts. In essence there is a logical disconnect in his argument, which attempts to force a relation between the lack of universal consensus on the one hand, and the complete denial of “objective factuality” on the other. Surely, lack of consensus or disagreement can be explained in terms other than those pertaining to the content of the factual claim. Indeed, the progress of modern science is replete with examples where theories had to be revisited or even abandoned by investigators, and replaced with statements of greater accuracy. In these evolutionary changes in scientific knowledge, hardly any one would say that because of vociferous and ongoing debates reflecting the differences of opinion expressed by investigators, that science does not deal with the objectively factual.28 Further on Rescher remarks that universal consensus is an ideal which we should not expect to achieve in this world. Indeed, it is not even a goal that we should aim to achieve in the first place. In this respect he rejects Juergen Habermas’ belief that the ultimate goal of all inquiry is a universal consensus, achieved eventually by a community of rational inquirers. Nor can he support C. S. Peirce’s belief that eventually “a community of scholars” will arrive at the “real” truth of the matter. In both cases one has a misunderstanding of the aim of rational inquiry. Good reasons, Rescher says, are not good because they lead to consensus. Rather, good reasons are good because “they ought (ideally) to lead to consensus because they are good.”29 Consensus then, as an aspiration at the end of our investigation, is not the cause or even the aim of the investigation itself. In a delightfully crisp turn of expression Rescher observes that consensus reflects what people do think, objectivity reflects what people ought to think. The ideal meeting of these two is when people do as they ought, i.e. they recognize the rationality of whatever claim. Yet in the final analysis, it

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is objectivity that is the more important of the two. For it is only when objectivity has taken hold of an issue that rational deliberation can take place. For us mortals, rationality can be achieved only in a limited way, given the variable means at our disposal, and the “varied circumstances of a difficult world.” This pervasive relativism, however, does not work to unravel rationality.30 For in endeavoring to determine a rational basis for doing the best we can in the conduct of our affairs in this admittedly imperfect world, we commit ourselves to having others see how they too ought to adopt the same standard as well.31 In a practical sense, rationality is seen by Rescher in terms of how reason manifests itself in those three distinct contexts first identified by Immanuel Kant, namely the epistemic (beliefs), the practical (actions), and the evaluative (values). In these different domains, rationality is taken as “the appropriate use of reason to resolve choices in the best possible way.”32 It involves a deliberate endeavor to maximize “benefits relative to the expenditure of available resources.”33 Moreover, our ability to do this as a species serves to differentiate us from all other creatures and constitutes the determining factor which makes our survival possible in the evolutionary process. The rationality of a belief, action, and/or evaluation naturally lends itself to justification in terms of the presentation of an account of the underlying reasons involved, much in the sense of Plato’s insistence upon a reasoned account in the Republic and the Theatetus, and Aristotle’s reasoned justification for ethical conduct in the Nicomichean Ethics. Such accounts ultimately stand to be recognized by everyone as explanations of the sensible thing to do under the circumstances, they basically explain “... optimal conduciveness to appropriate ends.”34 In addition, the syntactic form of the account must exhibit the essential attributes which are the hallmarks of a reasonable account, namely: logical consistency, uniformity of subject, [contextual] coherence, simplicity, and economy.35 It is also important to distinguish between the mere having of a reason for one’s actions which is based on desires and wants, and the having of a good reason, which is adopting the most cost effective means towards the acquisition of “an appropriate end.” Rationality, Rescher says, is not mere rationalization, rather it requires the exercise of intelligence. He characterizes it further as a Janus-faced concept. On one side it involves concern for the efficiency of process (the means), and on the reverse it requires a valued-geared concern for the “appropriateness of ends.” Hence the rational person must exercise cognition in determining what the best available

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means are which will optimally produce the desired end—given the circumstances that surround him—and he must also evaluate the end to which these means are directed, as a reasonably appropriate end worthy of attention. Rescher links his view on rationality to our being realistic about what we can do in the world around us. Thus the rational person is the realistic individual, in that he or she has found the best reasons for securing their real interest. It is only the most rational means that can optimally secure the appropriate end, and therefore rationality is the only choice in intelligent decision-making. Here Rescher again refers to Plato, this time to the Timaeus,36 where Plato speaks of the pervasive rational force (νοûς = World Soul) within nature, which orders everything for the best. The point here is to call the reader’s attention to the long established philosophical tradition that advocates a connection between one’s doing the most rationally responsible thing, and a belief that the real world in which our actions take place is itself rationally ordered. In the same vein, Rescher’s proposal is that of a close linkage between rational action and the apparent order already within the world we inhabit. This theme, which he will come to expand upon further on, is central to his overarching conception of rationality as a notion that reflects the realization that what we have found to be the right course of action is the result of our understanding the context of the possibilities and restraints imposed upon us by the familiar world of bitter experience. Rescher is of course not advocating a world that is necessarily pre-ordered in a Platonic sense, but one, as described at the outset of this chapter, having order by virtue of our relation to it and the requirements we can legitimately expect when interacting with its basic nature. Thus our rational actions can only be properly understood within the context of what is possible in the environment that surrounds and sustains our life. One would never want to achieve an end half heartedly or incompletely, for that would be failure. Seeing the connection between the rational and the optimal achievement of the end that is judged to be appropriate is crucially important in understanding how rationality involves being realistic in ones’ beliefs, actions, and values. For to understand those conditions which surround the agent and which are most conducive to the achievement of the right end is to exercise one’s cognition, and thus it is to see the context in its most realistic terms. To act on such understanding is to optimize the probability of achieving the end. For these reasons, Rescher concludes that rationality is necessarily at the core of optimization.

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4. RATIONALITY’S BROAD FIELD OF VISION Having said the above Rescher also observes that we must not limit the range of the content of rationality to that of our material interests alone. The scope in which reason operates is broader than that. It includes everything that lies within the vast realm of human interest and which is rationally judged to be of importance in the determination of our “higher” values, be they aesthetic, social, or spiritual. This will be brought out more forcefully and in greater detail in the forthcoming chapters, where Rescher’s views on values will be discussed in greater detail. Reason demands our attention, Rescher says. It commands us to respond to its requirement, on pain of doing or believing the “wrong thing.” The imperatival nature of reason was evidenced above in the way in which the test for rationality was found to require an account of our beliefs, actions, or values. It is also present in the idea that this “reasoned” account, if it is truly so, must be recognized as such by everyone who sees it. Rescher comes to say that though it is often the case, from a practical point of view, that we will never be in the exact same situation another person is in when choosing to do A rather than B, still the point to bear in mind is that were we “in his shoes,” then the rational thing would be to choose A given the same context. Recognizing the “universal” rationality of a particular belief, action, or valuation is thus, in theory at least, something anyone can do. Having said this much Rescher also raises the thorny issue of how much of our own idiosyncratic self enters with us when we attempt to fit into the other person’s shoes. If we step into his shoes as “him,” then “we” have not stepped into his shoes at all. If we step into his shoes as “our self”, then the situation has changed radically. Sure1y our idiosyncratic needs and wants will create a new scenario. Here Rescher cautions that somehow we must intelligently assess the situation in terms of what it would be realistic for anyone to do in situations “sufficiently like” his. We must attempt to answer the question of what it would be right for him to do given the information he has and the situation he is in. We must use our intelligence and ‘common sense’ to determine how well the agent has played the game by the rules he has followed or by the rules he ought to have followed, in light of his valid needs and interests. When this occurs and we find the holding of the belief, the doing of the action, or the evaluation rational, then we have what constitutes universal recognition of rationality.37 In a sense it is instructive to observe how Rescher is cautioning us not to take some descriptive devices too literally, e.g. “putting one-

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self in another’s shoes.” This expression should be understood rather in the sense of making an effort to see objectively what the subject herself was up against when she acted as she did, what facts influenced what she had to do, how much did she know, etc. The expression, however, should not be taken as a call for us to act in place of or instead of the agent. Furthermore, we naturally respond preferentially to the rational because we are rational beings. We endeavor to use our reason within the limited framework of available resources to achieve our ends. This is never a perfect rationality of course, because our state of knowledge is always incomplete, and our resources are always limited. Hence rationality, as Rescher speaks of it, is not an idealized and perfect capacity, but it is a capacity for reason nonetheless. Rationality involves five faculties: imagination, information processing, evaluation, selection, and agency. All of these collectively go into constituting what a rational human being is. The last two also illustrate that rationality is not keyed into intelligence alone, since it involves the will and the capacity for choice. Moreover, it is “sensible” to assume that rationality involves the exercise of “free-will”, which Rescher defines as the exercise of intelligent choice among many possible alternatives. This enables Rescher to make an incisive distinction between mere intelligence and rational agency. Thus robots solve the problems that are presented to them, whereas persons solve the problems they choose to solve. Thus one should not confuse the automaton’s mere mechanical movement with rational action, which human free will alone is capable of. Rational behavior also requires the exercise of a form of intelligence that may not always require prolonged conscious deliberation. A person drowning in a river grasps at a tree branch to save his life. This, Rescher observes, is not a matter of agency resulting from the luxury of careful deliberation, though it is intelligent conduct nonetheless. Aristotle’s view of rational conduct, according to Rescher, would not allow us to include such actions under rationality because there is no discernable deliberative component, either as fixed by habit or as actually in operation. Rescher, however, uses this illustration to show why the notion of rational conduct must necessarily have a broader base. It must be able to cover the above case, where we instinctively choose to do the right thing, though we are not thinking coolly or consciously deliberating at the time. Rescher’s reservations concerning the limitations inherent in Aristotle’s conception of rationality will become an object of further discussion when the issue of moral responsibility is raised in full view further on in the exe-

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gesis of his position. Efforts at that point will be directed at showing that perhaps his interpretation of Aristotle on this issue suffers from an overreliance upon widely popular, though not necessarily accurate, interpretations. In the final analysis it will be argued that a basis can be found for holding that the conceptual divide supposed separating these two may not be as formidable as is usually supposed. The earlier reference to responses that are instinctual is meant to include under the rubric of rationality all of what Rescher terms the “preestablished recognition that there is a good reason for what one does.”38 This recognition is manifested in all sorts of instinctive activities we engage in every day of our lives, e.g. reaching for an umbrella on a rainy day, buckling one’s seat belt prior to driving, turning on the light switch when entering a dark room, etc. These automatic activities, when carefully scrutinized, have all the “good reasons” logic attaches to them, i.e. rationality, as do those activities which involve “explicit deliberation in the face of recognized alternatives.”39 The difference being that the former have become habitual, whereas the latter are carefully planned and premeditated. The important question Rescher entertains in the course of the discussion at this point is whether a person is a better person if he or she is more rational. Rescher says the answer here is yes. The more rational a person’s actions are, the more fully he/she realizes the ideals and the values involved in being a person, the better person he or she is. For the attribute of rationality, unlike that of having a backbone, is inherently normative. One would not say that a mammal is a better mammal because it has a bigger backbone than another. However, our personhood is ever so much more enriched or diminished by the degree in which we exercise the faculties which determines our personhood, i.e., our rationality. Moreover, the very exercise of that faculty not only produces results that are fully accountable on a rational basis, but we as persons grow in the skill of being reasonable with every act of deliberation we perform. As such we become persons with histories others can judge as indicative of individuals who are: “reliable,” “fair,” “responsible,” “judicious,” etc. Consequently, our personhood acquires greater value, so to speak, when our track record is that of long and consistent rational agency. Moreover, our “...commitment to the intelligent pursuit of intelligently adopted objectives...” is a given, it never varies, even though the pursuit itself manifests itself in various ways as our knowledge increases and circumstances change. This account of beliefs, rational agency, and valuation itself requires the illustration of evidence that the agent has considered the wider context of

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the circumstances. As such, Rescher notes, the account must provide an explanation of how the belief, action, or value relates systematically to the global system in which these are taken. Thus judging the appropriateness of the ends or goals, as well as the rationality justifying the means for their acquisition, requires taking a holistic perspective—an approach which so typifies all of Rescher’s work. Things cannot be realistically assessed in isolation and apart from the broader picture in which they are naturally found. 5. THE ETERNALLY SPLENDID MISERY OF RATIONALITY. Rescher’s presentation of the concept of rationality is not completely unproblematic. Rationality, he says, engenders a state of “misery” for mortals, and any failure to see this would mean that our understanding of it is inadequate, and fails to account for the way in which things really are. The proverbial fly in rationality’s ointment is the fact that as we learn more about the context in which we are to act, the more difficult it becomes for us to act with absolute certainty, and in the most advantageous manner. Our additional knowledge does not merely enlarge the evidence from which we choose to act, rather it should also be seen as revising or transforming our understanding of the entire context in which we are acting as well. This is a crucially important point for Rescher to make. It reflects the fact alluded to above, namely that what is believed, chosen, or valued must fit into a system that forms the global context for these activities. More information or evidence is not merely additive to what is already known, rather its effect transforms our comprehension of the entire context and influences our reasoning, whether our inferences are deductive, inductive, abductive, evaluative, or practical.40 We are naturally enjoined by rationality’s calling to select the course of action which will most optimally assure the realization of the appropriate end we have chosen for ourselves. Yet be it for the selection of the means or for the determination of that appropriate end, the call is always for fuller information, and for a keener revising of the proper course of action. Rescher observes: “Optimality,..., is ‘context sensitive’ with respect to the informational context.”41 All of this serves not only to complicate the matter, but there is the added fact that rationality beckons that we act within a reasonable and realistic time frame. Hence there must always be a necessary limitation as to how well the context can ever be “fully” known, if one is to act “in time”. It is for this reason precisely that we can never be sure what the conse-

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quences of our actions will be, since we are forever stopped from knowing the “complete” context in which our actions will play out. In this life, Rescher adds, we are constrained to act for love, in business, or in war. We thus face a strange and miserable predicament, namely that of rationality ultimately compelling us to do what she always cautions and advises us not to do, which is to take a risk. This is to say, to act on the basis of information that is forever incomplete. Though this may appear paradoxical, it actually only reflects the sense of the realistic which is embedded within his general concept of rationality. For it is a concept that cannot be discussed apart from the “sub-ideal” conditions of life, and presented simply as a calculation that is indifferent to human limitations. Rescher elaborates upon the above where he discusses his rule of Deconditionalization with respect to the nature of the inference-rules we employ to optimally secure an appropriate end. In essence his position is that any inference-rule that completely characterizes the conditions for relevant action cannot ever exclude some obtaining circumstances that work against the selection of that action. In assuming that the characterization of the surrounding conditions is complete and that there are no additional circumstances that run counter to the optimization of the appropriate end, two important things are being asserted:”...(1) there are none [i.e. additional circumstances] that are known to us, and (2) there are none [i.e. additional circumstances] that are unknown to us”.42 The first assertion is of course unproblematic. The second, however, is the nub of the problem. Assertion (2) is what we desire to suppose but which we can never actually prove because of cognitive limitations. The predicament of rationality is eased to a degree when we abandon the idea that we must act as perfectly rational agents. Here Rescher draws a distinction between ideal rationality and practicable rationality. The former resides within a utopian world, the latter operates in our world of realistic and achievable ends. It is prudent therefore to revise the general concept of rationality to reflect the reality described at the outset of this chapter. Rescher suggests that rationality, as it relates to everyday life, does not involve absolute optimization but rather circumstantial optimization, which is the doing of the best that can be done under the circumstances known to us.43 Rationality may on these terms turn out to be a resource of limited utility. It compels us to aim for the best solution, but advises us to settle for what is available in a realistic sense. There is never any assurance that the rational course of action, given the best possible information available, will necessarily lead to a rationally op-

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timal resolution. In knowing this inescapable fact, one faces perhaps the most profound lesson of life, as eloquently rendered by Shakespeare in Hamlet where the protagonists reflects upon how even the best laid plans are subject to reversals: “... Thus conscious does make cowards of us all; And thus the native hue of resolution is sicklied over with a pale cast of thought, And enterprises of great pitch and moment with this regard their currents turn awry, and lose the name of action....”44

The absence of a guarantee for the success of our chosen course of action is not the sole factor which contributes to the “misery of rationality”. Rescher states that in the very consideration of the very question of why one should act rationally, there are produced additional issues that point to the complex nature of the notion itself. Why should I do the rational thing? For Rescher this is not a true question, at least it is not a question where “why” functions in its usually grammatical way to elicit new information. Following Kurt Baier’s analysis, Rescher notes that it is like asking: “Tell me whether doing what is supported by the best reasons, is doing something that is supported by the best reasons?” Surely, if the “why” in the above “why question” functions properly to elicit the best reasons for doing whatever, then what more can be added by way of an answer which is not already assumed in the phrasing of the question? Is this not somewhat like the way “why” works when asking: “Why is a circle a circle?” The “why” here fails to function, it is idling, since nothing seems to qualify as suitable additional information that would satisfy answering a meaningful interrogative. There is an impetus to do the intelligent thing, Rescher states, and once we have found the best “available” reasons for doing something then there is no longer any further basis to persist in questioning why we should not do what intelligence deems we must do. Rescher notes, however, that there is still a problem in endeavoring to act in the manner that intelligence dictates, and it is that the very justification for doing the apparently rational action when we know that our information is forever incomplete. Why act rationally when what seems to be the best course of action now may very well turn out to be the worse thing to in the long run? He deals with this issue by focusing upon the future projection that is implicit in our acting upon what seems to be presently the best available reasons. What one really wants to do by acting intelligently is to improve the probability of optimal success, as opposed to doing absolutely nothing

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and thus possibly reducing the probability of achieving one’s goal to zero. Not acting at all may turn out to be the worse possible thing to do. According to Rescher, one accepts the council of a physician or the policy recommendations of an economist not because they are guaranteed to be right, but because they afford the subjective probability that doing what is suggested will advance our real interests. Thus it is the very knowing that we have at least taken the most reasonable course of action at the time that ultimately constitutes the justification for acting intelligently. Rescher calls it improving the “subjective probability” of optimizing the realization of one’s real interests. This element of “hope” is thus at the center of our motivation which leads us to action. There is surely no ironclad assurance in the real world of reasoned decision making that things must work out in the way we anticipate. However, all that actually seems to suffice is the recognition that we have done all that is reasonable to enhance our chances for success, knowing full well that things may turn out differently. Once we have made up our mind in this regard, then there is no longer any basis for further questioning whether we are to act for the best reasons that are available to us. Again Rescher focuses upon the vexing nature of rationality, in that it forces us to act on probabilities that cannot be actual realizations, but subjective in their very nature. For what are these other than educated estimates of what may happen? In essence they are our interpretations of the best-case scenario favorable to our real interests, relative to some future course of events. He also observes, in a haunting vein, that if we choose to abandon rationality in favor of something else, say acting for the sake of being congenial, we invariably lose “... sight of the actual ends of the cognitive, practical, and evaluative enterprises, to the detriment of my real (as opposed to my apparent) interests....”45 Thus I may decide to support Professor Leadbottom’s promotion, say, just to be congenial with colleagues and make friends, and “fit in” in a hostile setting. My doing so, however, forces me to not only act selfishly, that is, I am looking out for my own personal comfort first, but I also sacrifice doing the rational thing: giving my honest professional opinion with respect to the rewarding of quality performance. This will ultimately cause me the discomfort of knowing that I am committing even more deeply to a depressive environment that nurtures mediocrity, cronyism, and hypocrisy; an outcome that is surely far from my real interest as a person who should cherish integrity and responsibility. Thus, as Rescher concludes, “...if we abandon reason [then] there is no place better that we can (rationally) go.”46

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The need to do the rational thing is not to be defended strictly on pragmatic grounds. Here Rescher also notes his departure from John Kekes’ view that we act rationally in solving our problems because this has “actually” been shown to be the most productive means of dealing with them. Kekes’ position pivots the justification for acting rationally on our actual or proven success in problem solving, whereas Rescher’s justification of rationality is closely tied to our very “judging” that a certain course of action is best for optimizing our success. The latter view argues for rationality’s justification on the strength of the self-reliance of reason itself as intuitively judged, not on the record of the actual past successes of our judgments.47 This sort of justification is nonetheless a defense of the practical use of reason, since it recognizes the impossibility of getting beyond the limitations inherent in our understanding of any given context. Furthermore, it is a defense that encompasses aspects of pragmatic thinking, in that in knowing the context in which our actions will play themselves out, we must consider the effects of these actions on others in our community. We cannot act to optimize the realization of our real interests by neglecting how others are impacted by what we do. Here rationality highlights the need for communication, co-operation, collaboration, and co-ordination with others in one community. It also brings to light the fact that our own life or death success hinges on the fact that others must be able to “read” our actions as rationally predictable, just as we read theirs as so. In the final analysis, rationality engenders the imperative of civil socialization, the willingness to put ourselves in the positions others are in, and to the best of our abilities determine whether their actions are rational with respect to their real interests. The sceptic’s objection that such a justification of rationality is subject to vicious circularity is discounted by Rescher. Rationality’s self-reliance is based upon coordinating and illustrating the mutual support among its interlinked components. It does not entail a vicious circle involving question begging. Rather, to say: “You should be rational in resolving your choices because it is rational to believe that the best available prospects of optimality-attainment are effectively realized in this way.” is to express what Rescher whimsically terms a “virtuous circularity.”48 It is a statement about the “well-coordinated and mutually supportive interrelationship” of the constituents that compose the self-reliance of rationality. The appearance of circularity here is unavoidable in Rescher’s view since the nature of the justification of rationality is itself reflexive and self-

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referential, and therefore cyclic. Rationality is not a linear process that requires something outside itself to define it. In fact Rescher is not proposing a definition but a justification of rationality. And all that he is claiming is that it is of the nature of this kind of a justification that it speaks to the selfsufficient character of rationality. There is simply no alternative to reason in supplying a justification of a rational act. This apparent circularity is not a defect in the justification itself, but a manifestation of rationality’s intrinsic autonomy, for it naturally stands alone and separate from all other contexts. The sceptic’s objection is thus seen to betray a misunderstanding of the self-reflexive nature of rationality; for he harbors the faulty presupposition that somehow something external to the act of rational justification itself can be brought in to justify rational justification. In a sense the sceptic wants to appeal to the irrational (non-rational) to justify or to explain the rational. In all of this the sceptic can still insist that the lack of complete certainty in our knowledge concerning the future warrants our withholding action, even when the action we are contemplating is founded upon the strongest reasons. It is at this point that Rescher’s conception of rationality receives its strongest test. His rebuttal is that the sceptic’s view requires that we do what is most humanly demeaning, namely to have no hope in improving our circumstances, to have no trust in the rational actions and the goodwill of others, and to have no faith in the knowledge we have carefully acquired, however limited that may be. As stated above, rationality enjoins us to take the risk the sceptic is incapable of even considering.49 This resembles the point St. Augustine recognizes in his Contra Academicos II, where an example is given of two travelers standing at a fork in the road. The sceptic traveler doubts a passing farmer’s credibility, though the latter offers directions as to which road leads to the next village. He is immobilized by doubt. The second traveler takes the “risk”` and follows the farmer’s advice, knowing that if it is accurate he will arrive at the village. At the very least, he, unlike his sceptic companion, has done something rational “hoping” thereby to improve his present situation; he is thus putting himself in a more advantageous position in that he will either reach safe haven for the night or he will know which path was the wrong way. Augustine’s ultimate aim, unlike Rescher’s, is of course to refute the wisdom of the philosophers, specifically that of the Pyrronic sceptics, and to champion truth as revealed by Christian faith. Nonetheless, his attack upon scepticism has the same effect as Rescher’s, in that it shows how scepticism demeans the human condition by robbing it of its essential opti-

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mism.50 Rationality naturally prods us to seek additional knowledge. In doing so it expresses a natural affirmation of human life, since it forces us to face the challenges our surroundings pose. One is reminded here also of Aristotle’s magnificent insight at the beginning of the Metaphysics: “All men by nature desire to know.”51 In essence Rescher is bringing forward this same idea, namely that the pursuit of knowledge or rational understanding is as much an important and vital part of what we are as the breath we draw to sustain us. Rationality’s essential nature is therefore an aspect of our humanity. It emerges in the mode of the interaction between the surrounding world and our self. This point again simply reaffirms the discussion at the very outset of this chapter relating to evolutionary character of rationality. The sceptic’s position, by contrast, has an alluring simplicity, which further inquiry discovers to be erroneous. Scepticism questions the very possibility of new knowledge, if it is to be based upon previous knowledge that is unavoidably incomplete. Thus sceptics argue that an infinite regress ensues where we try to justify new beliefs on the basis of our incomplete knowledge for our pre-justified beliefs. The sceptic rebels at the idea that knowledge is at all possible, saying that discursive justification operates on the faulty premise that pre-justified beliefs can serve as evidence for the justification of new beliefs. Rescher states, however, that the sceptic cannot deal with what he calls presumptive justification, which precedes discursive justification. The former is where a belief is presumed justified since in the context of the totality of our understanding there is no rationally pre-justified belief that stands in the way of its acceptance. It is precisely this mode of rationality that initiates the entire process of cognition. We often adopt beliefs on the basis that there are absolutely no countervailing points of evidence against them, and we know we will abandon them once sufficient grounds emerge for their rejection. What is important, however, is that presumptive beliefs “get things started,” they do not stifle our initiative in our desire to advance understanding. The sceptic’s refusal to presume that certain beliefs are justifiably true, given that there is no evidence against them, shuts off the possibility of cognition, as well as any means of reasoning with him. He rejects the possibility that we can make any inferences whatsoever, even on a provisional basis. This is like refusing to accept the credit worthiness of a responsible borrower. No lending institutional would be able to keep its doors open if it

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were to operate without trust. Under normal situations one first extends limited credit to an individual, and then increases the amount as the borrower shows continued responsibility in repaying his obligation, and success in its utilization. To deny the evidential verdicality of experience even when there is no occasion to suspect it is mindless, if not “irrational.” In the area of cognition, we naturally increase our trust in our beliefs as we encounter more success in our actions. The latter is guided by those beliefs we have been willing to accept on a presumptive basis. In Rescher’s view one finds presumptive justification operating where we are exercising our “natural inclination”, or where we desire to achieve “epistemic unity” by presuming that certain things already known could be brought to bear to explain some unique phenomenon that requires explanation (i.e. as in the case of abductive inference), or where we are inclined to give “analogical explanations,” and finally where we are looking for a “fit” with other established theses. In these cases we see something of what Aristotle terms the “aporiatic method.”52 This is where we attempt to expand our understanding by adopting a method of inquiry that proceeds on path of least resistance, endeavoring to project hypotheses or explain new phenomena on the basis of established beliefs, endoxa, in areas where there is no evident countervailing reason for not doing so. We therefore take the risk for the furtherance of knowledge, knowing that we have much to gain and little to lose. There is cost effectiveness in pursuing a presumptive approach to cognition. It resides in the fact that presumptive justification works to initiate a program of inquiry to which we are already committed. It is the primal stage that makes possible the enormous gains of systematic study, and of those of rational cognition itself. Here Rescher follows H. H. Price in saying that the prudent risk taker comes out better than the risk avoider (the sceptic), since the former stands to get more answers to many different kinds of questions than the latter.53 Though all of the answers may not be completely true, still there will be more correct answers and fewer mistakes for the risk calculator than can possibly be the case for the sceptic. Furthermore, the inquirer has the precious advantage of possibly acquiring information, and of having answers to questions, whereas the sceptic retains only the stifling safety of simply not knowing. In fairness one should recognize that in its classical formulation, as it has survived in the works of Pyrrho and Sextus Empiricus, scepticism’s primary aim was the pursuit of inquiry leading ultimately to the attainment of personal tranquility [άταραξία]. With this as its main aim, it held that

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one should avoid not only the dogmatism of either Aristotle or Plato, but one should also suspend [έποχή] judgment as to the truth of any claim to knowledge, where an opposing claim is found to be equally compelling. Hence historically, in its original form, scepticism tended to avoid taking any side where many sides were discovered to be competing equally for one’s acceptance.54 Consequently, scepticism should not be construed as an ostrich-like philosophical position that simply refused to enter into active rational inquiry. Actually quite the opposite was the case. It encouraged robust rational investigations into the discovery of opposing views on specific empirical judgments. Once these were determined and stated, however, scepticism insisted upon suspending any attachment to such judgments, and avoided sanctioning any action on them so as to escape the “trauma” of doubt and failure. In a sense sceptics rejected the fruits of their very labors as having no further value beyond that of ultimately inducing us to back away from any action for fear of experiencing emotional disquietude. Though Rescher’s critique of scepticism cites its reluctance to employ presumptive justification for beliefs, and how this hinders its success in acquiring new knowledge and taking action upon it, a sceptic would likely be unmoved by such observations. For sceptics could note that they do arrive at new knowledge through their inquiries, and that their suspension of action upon judgments provides them with the tranquility they so dearly cherish and uphold as the central goal of human happiness. Whether or not this is enough to offset the advantages garnered by the evolving edifice of productive knowledge man has built through the ages via risk taking [Rescher’s presumptive justification] is surely a matter of debate. The correctness of Rescher’s critique of scepticism is not diminished by recognizing that originally scepticism had pursued very active and very detailed inquiries into the discovery of competitive alternative beliefs. For Rescher it is the sceptic’s inability to act intentionally on any belief, to risk doing something, that seriously impairs the usefulness of his position. This is a matter that is quite distinct from the sceptics desire to discover opposing beliefs. Moreover, whether the sceptic’s targeted aim of ensuring tranquility is not itself just another philosophical dogma is again something that is subject to further debate. Nonetheless, it would be disingenuous to suggest, as is often the done in contemporary discussions, that scepticism simply offered nothing toward the advancement of human understanding, and that all it did was denigrate the pursuit of any inquiry. Surprisingly, what these ancients did provide for future generations was their enduring standards of logical analysis and criticism, as David Hume discovered and

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used to great advantage. Ironically, these indispensable instruments of inquiry were valued by them only in the rather narrow sense of their being helpful tools that lead ultimately to the avoidance of the emotionally disquieting consequences that risky action could bring, when performed within a context of conflicting beliefs. The conceptual limitations of the sceptic’s position, and the advantages Rescher’s views on rationality affords, can be sharply highlighted and perhaps more readily appreciated by turning to another source, one that is empathetic to the thrust of Rescher’s overall approach.55 In this respect Roderick M. Chisholm’s Ethics and Intrinsic Values, provides a context that can be gainfully employed to set off in higher relief the significance and serviceability of Rescher’s thesis. Chisholm’s analysis is targeted primarily at showing how the sceptic’s rejection of beliefs in the existence of an external world can be argued against. However, in the course of his discussion he brings to light an important clarification, first recognized by St. Augustine in his commentary on Cicero’s defense of Pyrrho’s views on knowledge that is based on “probability.”56 According to Chisholm, Augustine states that the ancients understood “probability” as pertaining either to (1) what is to be approved, or (2) what is to be proved.57 It is this distinction specifically that is found to be seminal in further clarifying Rescher’s position concerning the nature of rational justification. On the one hand, one would be inclined to interpret “probable or probably true” in sense (2), as that which can be proven true by appealing to a number of confirming instances. Thus “All metals expand when heated.” is deemed more probably true than “Cleopatra wore a red dress when she first met Mark Anthony.” The (probable) truth of the former is said to be greater, given the sheer volume of evidence that can be summoned to support it. We also say of such “propositions” that referentially they assert something about the world “out there,” and we believe their truth is established by a sampling of “objective” evidence that can be brought to their support, given the relevant evidentiary instances are reliable. This sense of “probable” is generally operative in procedures involving scientific investigations, such as controlled experimentation, observation, and the framing of scientific hypotheses. It entails a method of truth-determination that is premised on the idea that proving veracity requires going “outside” the propositional realm, so to speak, to a “corresponding” and factually evidentiary reality. This state of affairs is presumed to be “out there” in some

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extra-mental sense, and is accessible through precise and appropriate investigatory means. On the other hand, sense (1) of “probable,” the sense recognized by Augustine as involving “approval,” conveys the idea of the inwardly approbative, and this has been discussed widely in the history of Western philosophy. It is an idea that conveys a sense of confirmation that is also found to underlie Rescher’s interpretation of rational justification. As an epistemic concept having a “doxiastic” character, the probable in this sense reflects what we find to be approbative or reasonable in a belief, for example.58 Chisholm further observes that believing, knowing, judging, remembering, hoping, etc., or any “doxiastic” attitude, are properties that only individual thinking substances can have. Thus in knowing or in believing it is we and we alone who, as cognizing agents, are aware of having these intentional properties. We alone undertake the particular intentional activity of believing, knowing, etc., as thinking beings reacting in the first person.59 Moreover, all of us gradually come to acquire and internalize a system of mutually supportive beliefs. Consequently, any recent claim involving apparent perceptions, or any recollection of beliefs already contained within our internalized system, is subject to evaluation by us in the context of this background of understanding, to determine that proposition’s truth, certainty, and therefore candidacy for approvability. Additionally, Chisholm notes that the Latin “probo,” from which “probabilis” [probability] is derived, originally was taken in the first sense noted above, that is, “to approve.” Hence to have said of some claim that it is probable meant that it was “worthy of (ones) approval”, or conversely, if it was said to be improbable, it was “worthy of (ones) disapproval”. This “evaluative” sense of the probable was distinguished from the “statistical” sense of “probability” mentioned earlier, which is articulated around the requirements of objective verification and factual enumeration essential to inductive inference.60 According to Chisholm, Augustine sees the approbative sense of “probable” as expressing a crucially important idea, namely the basic, positive, and vitally important thesis that knowledge is indeed possible. For in finding a claim worthy of approval, i.e., to regard a claim worthy of acceptance as belief, in itself is an act that constitutes achieving the fundamental step in erecting an edifice not only of knowledge and understanding, but of also releasing the initiative for rational action. From this Chisholm observes that historically reference to the probable was also intended to convey something about the worthiness of acting and

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of intending to act, either approvingly or disapprovingly. In the final analysis, when sceptics, for example, argued for their position they maintained that some beliefs were such that there is as much to be said, doxiastically, in support of them as against them. When beliefs were found to be counterbalanced in this manner, Pyrrhonean sceptics deemed such beliefs: “improbable,” i.e., unworthy of approval, meaning by implication that we should not “intend” to act upon them in any way. Judgments regarding acting in situations where such beliefs were involved were to be totally suspended and abandoned for fear of losing ones personal tranquility. “Probability” in this sense, Chisholm concludes, pertains both to our believing, as the act of believing, as well as to the content of our beliefs: what it is that is being believed. We come to assure ourselves of the rational certainty of the content of our beliefs by bringing our understanding to bear on them, i.e. all those previously accepted beliefs about our past experiences of remembrances and perceptions. In other words, we appeal to that internalized structure of knowledge, specifically, to the complex system of integrated beliefs already evolved within our consciousness by means of experience and reflection, to determine the worthiness of the new belief. This worthiness is a function of whether the new claim can be integrated within the existing conceptual structure of our understanding, which, if free of doubt, will ultimately support our intention to act upon the “true” belief. The certainty of one’s belief is thus based upon our evaluating what it claims as true in light of the information already contained within the intentional state of understanding we have actually acquired. Such certainty cannot be secured or justified by going outside that frame of reference to some non-intentional properties, i.e., experiences we have not had. Thus the sort of “intentional” certainty Chisholm is explaining can only be justified by considering the “belief-candidate,” so to speak, as evaluated in relation to the coherent structure of knowledge as internalized, i.e. to what Chisholm describes as “… a set of beliefs that mutually support each other…,” and about which we have no doubt.61 Chisholm labels this kind of certainty a postoriori certainty, since it results from justifying the belief in the context of our previously acquired understanding. It is a certainty that is “exemplified by our conscious states.” This he distinguishes from the a priori certainty that the statements of geometry, logic, and mathematics share by virtue of their being logically necessary, axiomatic, and subject to conceptualization.62 Unlike the latter, the former certainty is of a kind that is uniquely self-reflective and autonomous.

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For Chisholm we always begin the process of belief-justification with some such fundamental system of understanding, from which the edifice of our knowledge gradually rises. If this were not the case when we attempt to determine the truth of any claim so as to expand our understanding of things, we would be like the sailor who attempts to rebuild his boat at sea after undoing all of its planks.63 Chisholm’s ideas on belief-justification provide a deeper perspective from which to elucidate and appreciate key aspects of Rescher’s position on rationality, and the sense of certainty it engenders. First, Rescher’s discussion of how every piece of newly acquired information is not simply additive to what we know, but in fact alters and affects the entire system of our understanding, reflects the insight developed in the course of Chisholm’s analysis. For the latter notes that certainty is determined by judging the content of a claim in light of our set of internalized beliefs that are mutually supportive of each other. Thus we are not simply serially adding to our understanding a list of facts from the new beliefs we are acquiring. Rather we are integrating into our system of beliefs these new beliefcandidates, so to speak, and thus expanding the interpretive power of that entire system. The certainty of a belief is dependent upon the way in which it relates to the prevailing coherence of that systematized understanding, to what Chisholm refers to as “the system of mutually supportive beliefs.” This historically central idea is at the basis of Rescher’s explanation of rationality, namely justifying beliefs within the context of an internalized coherent system, one that always remains expandable and logically consistent, if it is going to remain serviceable. Second, Rescher alludes to the self-sufficiency or self-reliance of belief justification, that is, to what he fancifully described as that non-vitiating and “virtuous circularity” which rational justification engenders. This again is suggestive of the ancient and philosophically central “doxiastic” sense of the “probable” St. Augustine alludes to as residing at basis of all understanding, and with which Chisholm begins his own analysis. Belief justification, Chisholm noted, was held to exhibit a natural autonomy and intuitive independence, once the background of doxiastic cognition is brought into the picture. It results in a type of certainty [apostoriori certainty] that leads either to our approval or disapproval of the beliefcandidate, and thus also to sanctioning acting upon its content. Such certainty, as opposed to a priori certainty, is said by Chisholm to be “exemplified by our conscious states….”64 In other words, for Chisholm as well as for Rescher, there is a unique look to approbative justification that draws

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into play the self-sufficiency of “inward evaluation,” as opposed to the uncertainty which the openendedness of inductive inference entails.65 Thirdly, Chisholm’s explanation of the uniquely self–reflective character of intentional properties or “doxiastic attitudes” gives depth to Rescher’s observation earlier that determining the rationality of belief is not a linear but a circular process. At best a belief’s rationality can be internally justified, but not categorically defined. In this connection, the problems Rescher notes many have in answering K. Bair’s question: “Tell me whether what is supported by the best reasons is doing something supported by the best reasons?” is now seen to involve a great deal more than possibly the idling of grammaticality. The question is unique in forcing us to recognize that there is a rock bottom beyond which the suggestion of further rational inquiry commits intellectual suicide. Furthermore, it brings us to the realization that to idly question the guidance rationality provides is to disregard our natural interest in acquiring knowledge, which in turn denigrates the essential optimism of the human spirit. Significantly, it is a question that enables us to understand that ultimately there is a tight conceptual link between cognition and praxis. Finally, Chisholm’s characterization of the certainty of our beliefs as an “a postoriori certainty,” one that emerges upon evaluating the merit of what they claim, provides an additional level of clarification for understanding Rescher’s idiosyncratic style of inquiry, embracing what he terms the “retrospective approach” to philosophical theorizing. For as Rescher maintained earlier, it is only after we have acquired some confidence in the understanding of things, i.e., only after we have internalize a structure of understanding, that we are able to have the advantage of a basis from which to speculate about what may or may not lie beyond or behind appearances. Chisholm likens this type of approach to the aircraft pilot who has a great deal more leeway at his disposal to do things once he gets the plane off the ground, than prior to his taking off. 6. CRITIQUES AND REBUTTALS: SCEPTICS VS. COGNITIVISTS. One of the most interesting commentaries on Rescher’s allusion to the use of presumptive judgments as a way of arguing against scepticism is presented by Marcus Willascheck in his essay “Skeptical Challenge and the Burden of Proof on Rescher’s Critique of Skepticism.’66 Though Willascheck’s remarks are directed to what Rescher has to say in A System of Pragmatic Idealism and in Scepticism, what he claims also pertains pre-

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cisely to the views expressed by Rescher on this same theme in his later work, Rationality, which is the main focus of the present discussion. Willascheck astutely observes that Rescher’s approach in dismissing scepticism is to argue that scepticism makes impossible a central element of human flourishing, namely the acquisition of theoretical knowledge and cognitive understanding. Hence Rescher’s rejection of scepticism is based upon his pragmatic defense of cognitivism, and thus his is not a theoretical refutation.67 As such, Rescher’s critique is not a direct challenge to scepticism, since it does not address the key question of whether knowledge itself is possible, which is the central issue for the sceptic. Willascheck states that Rescher clearly does a very good job in showing that scepticism is not a productive philosophical position, and that in fact its adoption is antithetic to the very nature of human beings as creatures that naturally “desire to know”. However, nothing in what he says on this point directly affects scepticism fundamental claim, which is that no knowledge is possible. He claims that no allusion to presumptive judgements, or to anticipating replacement by other such judgements in the future—based upon stronger evidence—can ever change the fact of our being constantly plagued by the “nagging doubt” that perhaps all of what we take to know is in fact mistaken. This is a doubt which is easily enhanced by an appeal to so-called “skeptical possibilities” such as Descartes’.68 Willascheck states that we are always aware of the fact that any judgment we make about the world is subject to revision or falsification. It is precisely this which drives the engine of the skeptical challenge against cognitivism, and which remains unscathed by Rescher’s critique. To properly refute the skeptic, therefore, one must directly refute his basic claim that knowledge is impossible, and this Willascheck says Rescher has not done. Moreover even if the sceptic were to reject the principle of absolute certainty for a knowledge claim to gain legitimacy, he could still say that Rescher has not provided any proof for saying that we are obliged to know things, and therefore we are justified in adopting a procedure whereby we should accept presumptive judgments. For Willascheck no immediate conceptual link has been demonstrated as holding between the cognitivists approach, i.e., the obligatory search for knowledge, and their hidden assumption that knowledge is indeed possible. In the absence of any proof concerning the possibility of knowledge, given that only a kind of provisional or presumptive knowing is all that we can have, how can cognitivists argue that we are obliged to pursue knowledge?69 How can anyone be obliged to

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acquire that which has evidently not been shown to be acquirable? In light of the above one sees how Willascheck endeavors to turn the argument back upon the cognitivists, citing how their own position already presupposes—subtly of course—the thesis of the possibility of knowledge, while attempting to establish how the systematic acquisition of knowledge can lead to successful action. For this reason Willascheck observes that it is misleading for Rescher to suggest in his own critique of scepticism that there are two definite choices, namely scepticism and cognitivism, and that the latter is more credible. Actually there are no such choices, since the thesis of the possibility of knowledge, assumed true by cognitivism and false by scepticism, has not been decided either way.70 Therefore, since this issue remains unresolved, neither scepticism nor cognitivism emerge as viable options. However, by consequence, given that the key issue remains in limbo, it may be, at least at this point in time, that scepticism is right, and that cognitivism is in fact in a state of self-delusion. Rescher’s reply to Willascheck begins with an attack upon the cogency of the latter’s mode of reasoning. Briefly, Rescher notes that Willascheck’s argument goes as follows: 1. Scepticism is possibly a correct position. 2. Insofar as scepticism remains a possibly correct position, nothing can be established conclusively. 3. If nothing can be established conclusively, then knowledge (strictu sensu) is impossible.”71 In light of the above, Rescher proceeds to map out the two “win-win” scepticism-friendly alternatives of Willascheck’s thesis. Accordingly, either reasoning is a useless delusion and thus the sceptic is right, or reasoning is to be relied upon, in which case the above argument again vindicates the sceptic’s position, since scepticism may be right. For Rescher, however, the problem here is with Willascheck’s statement 3., which says that only claims that can be established conclusively qualify as knowledge. Rescher states that throughout his writings on this issue he has advocated a standard interpretation of the concept of knowledge, one which does not define knowledge in Willascheck’s way, namely as that which can be established conclusively. Thus Willascheck’s critique is not addressing Rescher’s concerns. More significantly, perhaps, is the evident quivocation on

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the word “possibly,” which plagues statements 1. and 2. Rescher notes that “the possible” can be taken to mean: I. mere logical possibility, or II. “a real or effective possibility.” In Willascheck’s statement 1. it seems that “possibly” can only be meant in sense I. in order for it to be tenable, whereas in his statement 2., “possibly” can only be taken in sense II., in order for it to be tenable. Thus there is a noticeable shift in the meaning of “possibly” from I. to II., which results in an equivocation.72 Rescher then proceeds to the key issue of the problem of scepticism, which concerns its insistence upon a distinction between the discursive properties of human understanding, i.e. the “ground rules of human thought and action,” and what he calls “objective realities—of how things really stand.”73 In proceeding as he does he cunningly endeavors to turn the argument back to the sceptics, since they tacitly assume that what is ordinarily taken to be knowledge is not what it seems. The sceptic argues that there is a permanent disconnect between “internal validation” and “objective factuality.” Rescher is willing to go as far as to concede the irrefutability of this point, noting how knowledge having perfect certainty is impossible for sceptics. What is important, however, is our reaction to this outcome. We may respond to it nihilistically and claim, somewhat indiscriminately, that all knowledge claims are bogus. Alternatively, we can react to this same outcome optimistically, as Rescher chooses to do, claiming that he is not, nor has he ever been, concerned with knowledge in such a pristine pure sense, since it is unattainable in a practical sense. Therefore the sceptics have actually misunderstood the real problem.74 Rescher’s critics on this point are still seen to be relentless, objecting to what they see as a basic flaw in his theory of knowledge. Laurence Bonjour, for example, takes issue with the cogency of Rescher’s methodological pragmatism, since it appears to be advocating an appeal to practical successes as an adequate criterion for accessing theoretical truth about the world.75 In essence Bonjour is saying that Rescher cannot justify going from a criterion of truth that emanates from within a context involving the “practical\affective” aspect of cognitive inquiry to a criterion of truth operative in the context of the “cognitive\theoretical.” In his view, this is what Rescher is in fact doing where he introduces the kind of presumptive justification mentioned above.76 He goes on to charge that Rescher cannot escape from adopting (empirical) foundationalism, if he wants to claim that his coherence theory of truth is reflective of the real world. Rescher, he holds, also cannot escape the charge of “vicious circularity” where he says that rational justification is “comprehensively systematic” since “...its sev-

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eral elements...[are placed]...into a coordinated framework which unites them within one overall nexus of mutual substantiation....” 77 What prevents this cohesiveness from ever coming about in Bonjour’s view is the fact that it must arise from “a diverse set of partial criteria which apply to different areas of inquiry....”78 In essence, he holds that Rescher has simply not provided sufficient proof to show how cohesiveness is at all possible among such a wide spectrum of domains. Bonjour’s critique of Rescher is focused not specifically on the concept of rationality, but on the claimed cohesiveness of Rescher’s theory of empirical knowledge, and on whether such a theory can ever end up having any relation to the external world. However Bonjour also maintains, as the basic point of his critique, that Rescher cannot bridge an apparent conceptual gap between his theory of knowledge, constituted as it is of rational judgments about the world, and our actual experiences and observations of the external world. This apparent divide between judgments and empirical data seriously threatens not only what Rescher has to say about coherence, but raises questions concerning the relevance of any system of knowledge purportedly being about the world, though not closely tied to observational sentences. Hence, since Bonjour raises the issue of whether any system of judgments about the world can ever actually tell us anything about the world itself, his critical remarks are relevant to our present discussion. In Rescher’s reply to Bonjour he insists that the former’s objection misses the mark, since in Rescher’s “view ‘coherent’ means that which is coherent with the plausible data.” 79 Thus the coherence Rescher is claiming for his theory of knowledge is not rationally recognized by him as such without any attention whatever being given to the dictates of fact. It is absurd to deny that the hard and often cruel facts of the physical world have absolutely no tangible influence upon our beliefs about the world; as if, for example, we can will ourselves well when we are deathly ill. The basic point, according to Rescher, is that the bond between actual and judged success, as well as that between actual and judged failure, is so strong “that no very serious objection can be supported by pressing hard upon a distinction that makes so little difference.” 80 In the context of this rebuttal, one sees how important it is to keep in view the basis of Rescher’s critique of scepticism, namely that if there are no countervailing instances against a belief about the external world, then it is irrational for us to suppose that the said belief does not express a truth about that world. Erroneously for the sceptic, all options are of equal merit, namely they have no merit, since there is no absolutely reliable bond be-

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tween belief and the external world. Hence the prospect of determining an optimal realization of a real end is impossible. Indeed, for the sceptics the idea of determining what counts as one’s real interest is in itself cognitively irrational. Rescher again observes in a somewhat whimsical vein that scepticism is the hydrogen bomb that levels the credibility of all contentions. What the sceptic fails to see, however, is that the real issue is not with the grounds for accepting particular contentions, but rather with the earlier and more basic stage of deciding upon those grounds upon which we are to accept policies or criteria for acceptability-determination.81 By emphasizing the need to determine criteria of acceptance—and specifically those mentioned earlier relating to presumptive acceptance based upon a “cautiously managed evidentialism”82—the advantage of Rescher’s approach is that it not only leads to the accumulation of new knowledge, but it also seriously undercuts the sceptics central claim that his approach, unlike any other, eliminates the possibility of mistakes. As noted above, the sceptic makes a very fundamental mistake. He fails to see that the problem at hand is a methodological one, not one pertaining to the veracity of particular claims. In essence the sceptic cannot justify not presuming the truth of a statement, if there is absolutely no evidence against what it claims. In doing so the sceptic may think he is avoiding mistakes of one sort, namely those unavoidable ones that the real world inflicts upon any claim we make about things. However, in acting in this manner he invites another more serious kind of mistake, namely the policy mistake of accepting nothing. NOTES

1 Rescher, Rationality (1988), p. 176; A Useful Inheritance (1990), pp. 55-56; The Riddle of Existence (1984), pp. 83-99. 2 Rescher revisits this theme in his later work, A System of Pragmatic Idealism, vol. 1, Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective (1992). In the latter version, p. 100, he refers to Charles S. Peirce as having suggested a similar argument relating to the evolution of human knowledge. 3 Ibid., p. 178. 4 Ibid., p. 179. 5 Rescher, A Useful Inheritance, p. 59.

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NOTES

6 Rescher, Rationality, pp. 178-9. 7 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, in John Stuart Mill’s Philosophy of Method, 1843, Chapters V and VI. [Though Mill’s insights concerning the practical beginnings of geometry are indubitably correct, he erred in concluding that therefore the truths of geometry and mathematics were based upon high empirical verification.] 8 Rescher, Rationality, p. 182. [Again it should be noted that Rescher is addressing the issue of the primal origins of mathematics, not that of the a priori content of mathematical statements. Neither does he intend to imply that evolution itself impels creatures to develop mathematics in that it advantages them in the struggle for survival. The fact that man appeared millennia before the emergence of mathematics is sufficient to dispel this suggestion. See A Useful Inheritance, p. 67.] 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., p. 183.[Rescher makes this point a little more forcibly in The Riddle of Existence where he says: “…Our intellectual mechanisms—mathematics included—fit nature because they are themselves a product of nature’s operations as mediated through the cognitive processes of an intelligent creature that uses its intelligence to guide its interactions with a nature of which it is itself part and parcel. Our mathematics is destined to be congenial to nature because it itself is a natural product: it fits because it reflects the way we ourselves are emplaced within nature as integral constituents thereof.” p. 89.] 11 Ibid., p. 184. 12 Ibid., pp. 184-5. 13 Rescher, A Useful Inheritance, pp. 70-1. 14 Rescher, Conceptual Idealism, pp. 156-7. {To read Bruce W. Hauptli’s critique of Rescher’s theory of evolutionary epistemology one would think that Rescher never ever considers matters pertaining to the tenuousness of the inference one can draw from the apparent stability and coherence of stimuli emanating from the natural environment. Given that this is clearly not the case, one wonders how Hauptli could manage to charge Rescher with failing to temper the claim that his (Rescher’s) transcendental argument relating to the fundamental nature of reality is but one possible explanation, not “the” explanation. [See “Rescher’s Unsuccessful Evolutionary Argument,” in the British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, vol. 45, (1994), p. 297.}}

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NOTES

15 Rescher, “Reply to Butts,” in The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher, edited by Ernest Sosa, (London: D. Reidel Publishing, 1979), pp. 204-5. [I have limited my remarks only to Rescher’s response to Robert E. Butts’ critique of Rescher’s work on the nature of scientific explanation, since it adds clarity to this phase of the former’s concept of rationality. The inclusion of Butts’ arguments at this juncture would have diverted the discussion toward a different direction.] 16 Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics, Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), p. 334. 17 Rescher, A Useful Inheritance, p. 62. 18 George Gale, “Rescher on Evolution and the Intelligibility of Nature,” Pragmatic Idealism, Critical Essays on Nicholas Rescher’s System of Pragmatic Idealism, (Atlanta, GA: Amsterdam, 1998), p. 56. 19 Ibid., p. 233. 20 Ibid. p. 57. 21 Ibid., pp. 233-4. 22 Rescher, Rationality, p. 158. 23 Ibid. p. 160. 24 Ibid., p, 163. 25 Ibid., pp. 164-66. 26 Ibid., p. 168. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid., pp. 160-171. 29 Ibid., p. 173. 30 Ibid., pp.174-5. 31 Rescher’s views concerning the relation between objectivity and consensus will be found to have a profound influence upon what he has to say about the relations be-

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NOTES

tween value and preference in discussions in other chapters. It is important to keep in mind at this point that Rescher basis his concept of value on his concept of objectivity. 32 Rescher, Rationality, p. 1. 33 Ibid., p. 2. 34 Ibid., p. 3. 35 Ibid., p. 16. 36 Plato, Timaeus, 37 Rescher, Rationality, pp. 17-18. 38 Ibid., p. 14. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., p. 22. 41 Ibid., p. 25. 42 Ibid., p. 27. 43 Ibid., p. 28-9. 44 William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act. III. Scene 1, ll. 83-88. 45 Rescher, Rationality, p. 39. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid., p. 40. 48 Ibid., pp. 42-3. 49 Ibid., pp. 46-47. 50 St. Augustine, A Critique of Scepticim, in John F. Wipple and Alan B. Wolter (eds), Medieval Philosophy, (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 38-39.

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NOTES

51 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, Book 1., l. 1. 52 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 995a21-995b15. 53 Rescher, Rationality, pp. 59-60. 54 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrronism, in Louis P. Pojman (ed.), Classics of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 370-373. 55 William, P. Alston, “Chisholm on the Epistemology of Perception,” in The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, The Library of Living Philosophers, Volume XXV, Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed., (Chicago and la Salle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1997), p. 109. [Alston notes that R. M. Chisholm talks about experiences in terms of ways of being conscious, that is, as presentational “appearances.” This eliminates the need to couch the discussion of perception in comparative terms that suggest the existence of external objects, i.e., as ontologically different kinds of things, as opposed to or distinct from that which appears to us presently in some manner as an appearance. This attitude of thought also underlies Rescher’s account of the basic character of human cognition, and can be used to advantage in explaining the deeper implications of the latter’s position on the nature of rational certainty.] 56 Roderick M. Chisholm, “Knowledge and the Challenge to the Skeptic,” Ethics and Intrinsic Values, Internationalen Akademie für Philosophie, Vol. XII, Heidelberg, 2001, p. 5. 57 Ibid., p. 6. 58 Ibid., p. 7. 59 Ibid., p. 7 and pp. 20- 21. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid., p. 18. 62 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 63 Ibid., p. 16. 64 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 65 Add info.

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NOTES

66 Marcus Willascheck, “Skeptical Challenge and the Burden of Proof on Rescher’s Critique of Skepticism,” in Ernest Sosa (ed.), The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher, (London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 203-223. 67 Ibid., p. 205. 68 Ibid., p. 212. 69 Ibid., pp. 213-4. 70 Ibid., pp. 215-6. I have not included Willascheck’s adaptation of G. E. Moore’s internal refutation argument in this discussion since it moves beyond his critique of Rescher’s attack upon scepticism. 71 Ibid., p. 254. 72 Ibid., p. 255. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Bonjour’s critique refers to views expressed by Rescher in earlier works, such as The Coherence Theory of Truth, and The Primacy of Practice. I introduce it here, however, to deal with Rescher’s position on rationality, which relates to what Rescher says in earlier works. 76 L. Bonjour, “Rescher’s Epistemological System,” in Ernest Sosa (ed.), The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher, (London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), p. 160, and p. 163. 77 Ibid., p. 164. 78 Ibid., p. 166. 79 Rescher, “Reply to Bonjour,” in Ernest Sosa (ed.), Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher,(London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), p. 173. 80 Ibid., p. 174. 81 Rescher, Rationality, pp. 62-63.

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82 Ibid., p. 63.

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Chapter 2 The Evolving Nature of Personhood An analysis of Rescher’s account of rational deliberation, intended as an improvement over Aristotle’s interpretation of the processes involved in moral reasoning. 1. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE IN AN EVOLUTIONARY CONTEXT

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s is often the case in Rescher’s writings, a critical point of discussion is subjected to further elaboration by returning to a consideration of man’s place in the evolutionary process. Thus Rescher describes humans as homo quaerens, a species that naturally desires to acquire as complete knowledge concerning its surroundings as is possible. Anything less produces the psychological discomfort of the “unknowing” mentioned by William James, or the “irritation or doubt” alluded to by Peirce, which is soothed only through the establishment of pragmatically useful, though not necessarily true, beliefs. In a curious turn of the argument, pragmatists such as Peirce and James make much of the cessation of doubt, which true beliefs make possible through the exercise of productive action. Yet it is also the avoidance of doubt, which the ancient sceptics referred to as leading to the desirable state of “tranquility” (άταραξία), that is said by them to be sustainable only by our suspension of belief, and thus by not taking any action whatsoever. Thus a major difference here is that for pragmatists doubt is a motivator for further inquiry and subsequent action, whereas for sceptics, doubt brought about by the discovery of conflicting beliefs, is a motivator in the opposing direction, the cessation of further inquiry and action. It is also of interest to note how Rescher’s treatment of man’s place in this context introduces a teleologically oriented perspective upon the evolutionary process. “Man,” Rescher says, “has evolved within nature to fill [my italics] the ecological niche of an intelligent being.... The need for information, for cognitive orientation in our environment, is as pressing a human need as that for food itself....” 1 His claim that man’s natural evolving has been for the sake of filling a niche presents us with a somewhat unusual interpretation of the process. Was the niche already there, planned

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in some way perhaps to be filled by homo quaerens? Or, is the niche a result of what homo quaerens is capable of doing unaided? What is the status of this “ecological niche?” If all that Rescher means here is achieving a foothold in the struggle for life, then is this niche not a product of a symbiosis of organism with its surroundings, and therefore not attributable solely to man’s efforts, that is, to his intelligence? Rescher does not dwell upon these issues in this section of Rationality, but presses the point that our species-specific quest for answers is a manifestation of our essential nature since the dawn of human existence. The discussion here is laconic and could use his more profound analysis, offered at the outset of the last chapter, where Rescher says that environmental influences align intelligence with nature. Axel Wüstehube, in his interpretation of Rescher’s views on the range of reason sees him as claiming that the natural evolution of human intelligence has empowered man to secure his ecological niche and thus to survive and triumph. He summarizes Rescher’s view by saying “...our intelligence is itself a well-keyed response to the exigencies of our environmental situation...”2 For Wüstehube this niche is something only human intelligence has been able to achieve. However, Wüstehube seems unconcerned with the effect upon what he has just said where he also cites Rescher in A System of Pragmatic Idealism as saying: “... Basically, then, we are so smart because that is our developmentally assigned place in evolution’s scheme of things.... [My italics]”3 For Wüstehube, Rescher’s statement conveys the suggestion that evolution is an agent that places us in its scheme of things. Here evolution is not being construed in the manner in which it is normally understood, i.e., apart from the survival of the fittest, being a preference-neutral process whose purpose or design, if indeed it ever makes sense to say that there is one, is assumed to be either implausible or unknowable, and perhaps even unfathomable. Nonetheless, an interesting clarification of this particular rendition of evolutionary theory can be gained by considering Jude P. Dougherty’s discussion of the concept of “potentiality” in Rescher’s work.4 Dougherty observes that the traditional concept of Aristotelian potentiality is often revisited within contemporary discussions of “possibility.” In fact he notes that potentiality and possibility are ideas that are closely allied even in Aristotle’s own writings.5 What is important for our purposes, however, is what he has to say about the ontology of possibilities in Rescher’s thought. Dougherty notes that Rescher recognizes three different levels of possibility: “... (1) dispositional possibilities of actual things, (2) counterfactual,

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and (3) the purely hypothetical or unrealized possible states of actual things,”6 All of these are intellectual constructions in the world of Rescher’s idealism. Thus as a theory, evolution is basically a hypothetical account of the potentiality (or possibility) of living organisms transforming the nature of their responses so as to acclimate to the changing environment which surrounds them. The ontology of the theory of evolution, as theory, is therefore like that of any other mentally constructed possible world-view. Possibilities, Dougherty observes Rescher saying, do not exist in isolation, but are of a nature that is linked (cognitively) to “the resources and processes of the actual world.”7 They are mental projections which may involve descriptive conceptualizations of specific things, or suppositions (or hypotheses) about the actualization of things. Hence their ontology as mental construct is related to the real world, which is itself one of many alternative possibilities; the difference being that the real world about which a hypothesis speaks is “actually” realized. Dougherty points to Rescher’s fundamental belief that the initial starting point of any intellectual construct is “an informed view of the real world as provided by the sciences.”8 The constraint of the given information is implicit in intellectual construction, and therefore we should not assume that we are dealing simply with the mere imposition of an independent mental structure upon the actual world, a la Kant. Evolution, as a case in point, as a theory about the dynamic possibilities of actually living things, whether formerly or presently alive, must account for the evident agency manifested in the dynamic interchange between organism and environment, while avoiding the suggestive language of purposive agency, e.g. “evolution’s scheme” or “man’s preordained ecological niche,” etc., which would go beyond what the basic content our information allows. As a realist Dougherty cautions against the adoption of (anthropocentric) terminology for our explanations of the possibilities of the physical world, terminology that has no known relation to the reality which it describes [i.e. man’s filling his ecological niche]. In his response to Dougherty, Rescher endeavors to allay these fears. He begins by focusing upon the approach which conceptual idealism takes in describing the real world. The latter is concerned only with “the status of the concepts of laws, dispositions, theoretical entities, etc....” and not with their reality.9 Rescher underscores the point that his is a conceptual idealism, as opposed to an ontological idealism. His position is concerned solely with the character of the concepts involved, viewing them solely as mentalistic artifacts created for the purpose of serving as “mentalistic para-

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digms”. They are constructed to provide explanatory and descriptive information about the real world, but having said this does not commit one to saying that these constructs relate as real spatial temporal things to the real world of actual entities. Surely it cannot be said that these laws, theories, etc., as mentalistic artifacts, affect the realistic aspects of the extra-mental world they are designed to explain. Basically concepts are seen as tools used for descriptive purposes, where apart from their being mental constructs no other ontological assumption can be made about them. Conceptual idealism is therefore immune to any criticism voiced by positivists and orthodox behaviorists, to the effect that one must avoid entitling unobservables, such as laws and theories. Rescher argues that such admonishments would be irrelevant to what he is pointing out, namely the cognitive nature of scientific theories, hypotheses, and laws.10 In light of this, one could say of Rescher’s use of phrases such as “evolution’s scheme” or of man having “…evolved within nature to fill the ecological niche of an intelligent being...” that, as instances of mentalistic paradigms used to describe natural processes, these expressions should not be construed as implying an ontological commitment to a “real scheme” within the actual evolutionary process, or to a pre-existing “real ecological niche” waiting to be filled by human intelligence. Such a reading would reflect the reductionist myopia of positivism, which misses the distinction Rescher is trying to draw between his brand of idealism and that of an ontological idealism. Moreover, we should keep firmly in place the perspective that when Rescher refers to “ecological niche” or to “real scheme,” he is speaking in a retrospective context. This is to say that “evolutionary theory”, as theory, suggests that given the evidentiary facts concerning the evolution of our species presently at our disposal, it appears that man has secured a place in the dynamic of natural change. This is far from claiming that a “niche” or a “scheme” has been pre-ordained or pre-destined by some overseeing agent. In the final analysis one’s fasçon de paler must not be allowed to become literally the reality of what one desires to describe. Interestingly, Rescher’s critique of scepticism, entwined as it is with his views on human rationality, states that essentially the sceptic severs any connection between action and rationality. Consequently, the sceptic’s view of man results in the manifestation of a creature who could never have survived evolutionary processes. For it is the conceptualization of an “unnatural” man, one who cannot act because he cannot trust any claim to knowledge. A creature who believes it ought not to be attempting to acquire any knowledge, whatsoever. Ironically, it is also the concept of a

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creature that is oblivious to any threat to its being. Thus any need for companionship, or for the safety of a community, or for the many advantages resulting from belonging to a society is irrelevant to it. Ultimately, scepticism comes to view man as necessarily and naively asocial and amoral. Since no rational account can ever serve as an adequate justification for the sceptic’s actions, we may say that he is left with only his instinctual self. His automatic nervous system is his sole cause of his action, if even that. Thus the sceptic drinks when thirsty, eats when hungry, and sleeps when exhausted. There is really no rational accountability here, since what he does or desires result from an unconscious and uncontrolled knee-jerk reaction to stimuli. Here Rescher even rejects Hume’s observation that the sceptic’s total denial of belief leads to a state of complete immobility. Instinct and habit would still allow the sceptic some power to act automatically, without the possibility of rational justification.11 Whether such action would cover the case alluded to earlier regarding the drowning person reaching for one of two branches poses an interesting problem. The desperate swimmer is making a last-ditch effort to save himself, which Rescher sees as a manifestation of rationality, though without prolonged or perhaps even conscious decision making being involved. This, however, is not a mere knee-jerk reaction. It presupposes consciousness of some real impending danger, as well as the recognition that something must and can be done to affect a life saving result. There is thus a definite amount of information the imperiled swimmer is taking in, trusting, and reacting to. As such his activity is rational in Rescher’s expanded conception of rationality, and more than a reflex response to stimuli. The sceptic, on this account, will drown because of his distrust of the truth of any information whatsoever. Frantic desperation is not even a rational option for him. In the final analysis Rescher’s rejection of scepticism is based on his attack upon the very grounds sceptics themselves believe constitute the singular strength of their view, i.e. perfect understanding. Fundamentally, the issue of the rejection of scepticism is not one which concerns actions directly, but of whether one wants to “secure information about the world.” The latter is possible only if we are willing to believe certain assumptions.12 In essence it is an issue that deals with examining the very possibility of the cognitive enterprise. For the sceptic to insist upon a standard of knowledge that is unattainable is to undercut the rationality of the very standard he himself has chosen to adopt as his ideal. On the other hand, our recognition that the best we can do is all that can be possibly expected of

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us is being sensible. The radical sceptic’s insistence upon all or nothing, that a principle, rule or belief is absolutely true or we should have nothing to do with it, is debilitating to the point of making even ordinary communication impossible. Discourse itself dissolves in his caustic aphorism that vilifies the “good enough,” since no standard of basic linguistic use can survive his quest for absolute perfection. Scepticism’s only redeeming value is that it sensitizes us to the limits of our understanding, and to how our cognitive interpretation of the world is forever incomplete. Its flaw, however, is that it proceeds beyond its enlightening critical function to the extreme of declaring all aspects of the cognitive enterprise to be absolutely impossible and therefore worthless, including the latter’s philosophically central role of serving as a basis for action.13 2. RESCHER CRITIQUES “THE GREEKS” Whereas scepticism advocates the futility of action, in the long history of Western Philosophy it has been assumed that “rationality” somehow provides its own impetus for action. However, as this concept has been understood and refined in the past, “rationality” in itself [like the U.S. Supreme Court] is found to be powerless in implementing the actions it advises us to take. For however it has been rendered and understood in the past, rationality itself cannot enforce its decisions nor can it in any way ensure that its conclusions will lead to eventual implementation.14 This is the insight Rescher reaches in Rationality where he attacks the entire tradition of thought initiated by Socrates and “the Greeks” in general, on the grounds that they were unable to explicate what it was precisely about the counsel of rational deliberation that necessitates acting upon its dictates. He maintains that it was irrational and unrealistic for them to have thought and to have propagated the idea that there is something compulsory about a conclusion rationally derived, which induces men to act according to its dictates. “Philosophers still follow the Greeks who generally adopted Socrates’ view that a person is moved to act only by all that he currently deems to be good—that no one ever knowingly does what he takes to be the wrong thing to do.…”15 This idea, as well as Aristotle’s dictum that action (praxis) is the ‘conclusion’ of practical reasoning, Rescher claims are erroneous when considering the way in which people actually do act in everyday life. He goes further to suggest the presence of a conceptual confusion in the rationale of Aristotle’s view regarding the genesis of action. He states that the conclusion of a practical inference cannot be an action,

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but rather another proposition that speaks to the fact that a certain course of action is the appropriate and/or reasonable thing to do given the preceding premises. Actions may be said to “implement” what the concluding proposition of an argument requires, but as actions they are not, ontologically, the same kind of thing as propositions. Thus Rescher says of actions that they are not “constituted” by propositions. In a way this is reminiscent of what was said earlier that logical conclusions in themselves do not and cannot induce rational praxis, as Achilles came to discover in his frustrating encounter with Tortoise. In Rescher’s view this is the forbidding “ontic gap,” philosophically speaking, between theory and action which is present throughout Aristotle’s writings, and which he [Aristotle] has trouble bridging it16 Since the Greeks, philosophy is replete with discussions involving the reasons why the will may be thwarted in doing what cognition finds preferable. Passion, willfulness, hedonism, etc., all are said to enter in as powerful forces to prevent that which our rationality deems ought to be from actually happening. Rescher neatly sums up the situation by saying: “...It is de facto preference that is linked to (attempted) action, not de jure preference....”17 Any irrationality involved in this matter lies in the agent knowing what reason dictates should be done, and yet he or she chooses to do differently. This is different from saying that the agent is incapable or incompetent, which would be the case where he or she is enfeebled and thus inhibited from understanding what rationality requires them to do.18 In retrospect, however, it may be easier to sustain Rescher’s arguments concerning the “ontic” divide between thought and action, as well as those regarding the perverse motives for acting people find themselves stooping to, against Socrates and Plato, and less so against Aristotle. In the former case, one is clearly dealing with a conceptual framework where reason is presumed to be a manifestation of an “otherworldly” agent. The soul (ψυχή), for Plato, which somehow by virtue of its divine nature and function as the source of perfect understanding, induces men to act according to the dictates of logic and dialectic. It leads one to reflect upon a sublime order of paradigms, which when properly understood, “somehow” compels conformity to its reality. Thus the question: “Why should one act by the dictates of reason?” squarely challenges the conceptually divide presupposed between an eternal and transcendent reality of unchanging truth, and that of a reality of physical change and instability. Plato sees these two realms as different in virtually every way, ontologically, epistemologically, hierarchically, etc. In a word, the separation of the eternally real and true

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from the changing and only seemingly true is fundamental to Platonism. Here the question of how one justifies going from what thought comprehends and expresses as perfectly true in propositional form to what we actually do in a different mode, is pertinent and challenging. It directs itself specifically toward questioning whether the separation between these two realms is at all justified, and, if so, whether it can be bridged in light of what history tells us about the flawed character of human action. For the latter is illustrative of a record containing an over-abundance of examples proving that we knowingly act against our supposed “angelic nature”, and for the worst of reasons. However, Rescher’s attack upon “all” the philosophers of Greece is not the best of strategies. Aristotle surely presents us with a unique philosophical concept when it comes to explaining the justification of moral action, one that possibly avoids the impasse encountered when Rescher’s objection is raised with respect to Plato. Moreover, it will be seen that of all the philosophers of antiquity, it is to Aristotle that Rescher turns later on for inspiration and guidance when it comes to developing his seminal views on the nature of political justice and social responsibility. Thus it is centrally important to discuss his critique of Aristotle’s view on the nature of ethical action. This allows one the opportunity to secure a firmer understanding of the studious eclecticism guiding Rescher’s philosophical thinking regarding the nature of moral conduct and how this evolves in his later works, especially with respect to Aristotle. Significantly, there are two crucial points Rescher claims Greek Philosophy, and Aristotle in particular, is unable to resolve. The first, the conceptual/ontological split, deals with the issue of how one proceeds from propositions to actions. As noted above, this involves bridging the “gap” between the two previously mentioned realms, i.e. thought and action. The second is essentially an issue of practicality. It is that the Greeks failed to see that actually we often act for other than rational reasons. Surely we do things out of spite, passion, insensitivity, etc., even though at the time we are fully aware of the fact that acting in such a way is not doing the rational and “responsible” thing. The Greeks (Plato especially) did not take into sufficient account this quirk in our conduct, which often over-rules rational reflection. In Rescher’s view, therefore, no philosophical system put forward by them has ever been able to address these two points of serious difficulty. The importance of raising both these issues is great for Rescher, given the broader scope of his position. Rescher wants to argue here and else-

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where that “rationality,” as this term or its equivalent has been bandied about in philosophy since antiquity, is associated solely with the deductive side of reasoning, i.e. the purely reckoning function of consciousness exemplified in mathematical and/or logical inquiry. This he will argue is an erroneous and unrealistic conception. There is more to deliberation than pure reckoning, especially when it comes to involve moral decision making. For him the rational includes both the deliberative and the evaluative faculty. Rescher seeks to champion this more inclusive understanding of rationality so as to illustrate its superior serviceability, and how what he is advocating departs sharply from conceptions of rationality in the past. The moral person is not simply the most logical mind, but the individual who combines in measured proportion the logic of the situation, an awareness of the legitimate needs of others, and one’s respect for his or her own selfinterests and self-esteem. What results is the dynamic of an evolving person, one who acts in ways where he or she shares in the esteem for others while respecting his own self. In so doing the personal growth of the individual emerges, in terms of sensitivity and intelligence. At the time of his writing this is a bold and innovative step because the sway of Logical Positivism in American Philosophy was emphasizing the need to stay close to the scientific model when handling philosophical issues. Thus “the rational” for Positivists is properly thought to pertain to what is calculable within a context of scientific objectivity alone. Ultimately this view leads to the rejection of the possibility that moral claims can be subject to any rational analysis, since they are not subject to verification. It is therefore very important for Rescher to come up with a credible conception of moral deliberation. A conception that successfully critiques the one dimensional definition of rationality proffered in the past and adopted by later day Positivists, and yet one that also preserves the possibility of meaningful moral discourse. To this end his more inclusive sense of the rational is seen to be a step of defiance against a very popular trend. On the face of it, the first issue requires an examination of what is involved in going from conclusion, derived through rational reflection and expressed propositionally, to overt action. The apparent difficulty here stems from taking the “ontic” differences existing between the results of rational deliberation and action to be so mutually exclusive, that, so to speak, never the twain shall meet. Conclusions are linguistic entities, conveying what the premises of valid arguments allow us infer. Actions, by contrast, as implementations of conclusions, are different in that they are

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what we do to “objectify” or “perform” what is concluded, but they are not sentential expressions. The problem then is in how the transition is to be explained, going from a proposition (as derived conclusion) to an action. In essence Rescher is asking us to keep firmly in mind that with the traditional view of rationality, we cannot be said to infer actions but conclusions, expressed propositionally, that in some yet “unexplained” way lead to actions. The impression one gets from Rescher’s critique is that because of the fundamental difference in their respective nature, propositions and actions are not causally inter-relatable or connectable in any manner. Thus it can never be claimed that the latter are “constitutive” of the former, and conversely. “…Aristotle, who saw action (praxis) as constituting the ‘conclusion’ of practical reasoning, was quite wrong. The conclusion of a practical inference, like the conclusion of any other inference, is a proposition…. An action as such may implement a course of practical reasoning, but does not constitute it….”19

Thus to “constitute” is one thing, but to “implement” is quite another. It is reasonable to say then, with respect to Aristotle, that a sequence of propositionally expressed practical reasonings can “somehow” bring about or precipitate an action, but not that an action itself can make up or come to constitute, or in any intelligible sense be held to be “part of,” that sequence of reasoning. Hence, on the basis of this analysis, how can any logically derived conclusion lead to or bring forth something so different from its own nature, such as an action? Action here is somehow being construed as marking the end of the deliberation, where the latter somehow takes over at the end of process of reasoning. It is fair to inquire into whether Aristotle’s ethical theory fails because of its inattention to this kind of difficulty, in the manner suggested by Rescher in Rationality. Rescher’s way of raising this issue straightforwardly assumes that in Aristotle we are dealing with two very different kinds of things, i.e. logically derived propositions and the actions that are taken as implementing the conclusions. However, a closer look allows us to see that what we should be dealing with here are not just “actions” as acts per se, but “moral acts.” In other words, the heart of the issue appears to be that of explaining how one proceeds from the rational justification of a moral course of action to the moral act itself. Here Rescher would also agree that we are not involved simply with “act” in a generic sense, as a mechanical

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motion performed by humans. There is something special about a moral action, if the expression itself is going to make any sense. As a “moral act” it seems that something more is required for its complete description, something that transcends an account that involves its basic physiology, as merely a behavioral phenomenon. Yet granting the truth of Rescher’s belief in the deeper sense of moral deliberation, the question is still whether his critique would be relevant to Aristotle. Did the latter see the drawing of a moral inference and the doing of a moral act as categorically two different kinds of things? This is to say, the criticism would be valid if Aristotle did regard action in this case as coming in at the very end of rational thought; i.e. as something different occurring after all reflection has ended. This would assume that action, as a different sort of activity, occurs only after reflection itself has run its full course and reaches its ultimate terminus. However, it may be that Aristotle did not approach the matter of how judgment is related to moral action in just this way. Consequently, if the forthcoming analysis is correct, there is room to argue that Rescher’s critique of Aristotle on this point may be founded upon interpretations of Aristotle that are not be addressing what it is that he is actually saying, at least with respect to the sphere of moral discourse. Kenneth A. Telford, in his commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, explains how Aristotle has been misinterpreted on the issue of how the relation between rational deliberation and moral action is to be understood. Telford observes that one of the “world’s great insights”, discovered by Aristotle, is that morality and politics “are about things done in the interest of nothing beyond completing the action itself.” This comes to saying, as the common refrain reminds us, “Virtue is its own reward”. Nowhere in the Nicomachean Ethics does Aristotle say that moral action is aimed at an end, separate from the action itself, τελευτή. What he does say is that action is aimed at its completion, τέλος. Telford stresses that care should be taken in seeing how the word: τέλος is used, in those contexts where Aristotle speaks of ‘that for the sake of which’ […τò οû ενεκα] there is process, either with respect to natural processes or with respect to rational deliberation that leads to moral action. Scholars have translated τέλος as if it were synonymous to the Greek: τελεύτή, meaning “an end”. They use words like “end” or “terminus” to render Aristotle’s expressions conveying the sense of what it is that, or for the sake of what, thought (rational reflection) is directed toward. They have treated the goal of moral action as something separate from the entire activity itself; as an end prod-

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uct that is achieved as a result of action, such as a cobbler’s shoe results from shoemaking, etc. However, the proper rendering for τέλος in the context of Aristotle’s discussion of moral action, is best achieved with terms such as “completion,” “fulfillment”, or “realization,” not by “end”.20 The point is fundamental for understanding how in Aristotle nature and reason, as processes, are never terminated by anything, as though there is some sort of an abrupt stopping when something comes to fruition, or as Aristotle would say: “achieves actuality.” The only way to speak of “the end” of the process in these two cases is to refer to its abrupt interruption by some destructive agent, bringing about “the end” or “the ending” of the activity. In this case the process in question is no longer in operation. This happens when someone or something silences us while we are engaged in a discussion, or when a tree is felled by a woodsman. For Telford a phrase such as “the end,” as a reference to something that stands distinct from the process itself, does not work when it comes to conveying what is involved when Aristotle speaks of what it is that a process is directed toward within a moral context. Rather, what both nature and reasoning, as continuous processes, are properly said to achieve is their “fulfillment” or “realization,” not their “end”. If the latter were the case then by our doing, i.e. acting, the process would actually be ending. In contrast, the morality of an act is not said to be “in” the end it is be said to achieve, but “in” the completion of the act itself, as ongoing process. In other words, we judge the morality of the act by evaluating the process that goes into it, and we determine whether it is rational and just, and whether it has informed our character to make us better moral agents in the future. It is for this reason that we say: “Virtue is its own reward.” It is its own reward because it informs and transforms the individual to a life of ongoing enjoyment and happiness. Telford drives this point home strikingly with his saying: “…The word ‘end’ never appears in any practical treatise, because it explains nothing about any action or motion. An end of an action or motion is incapable of defining it, but only fixes it ostensibly or statistically, as the ends of a line fix two parts of it without saying anything of what is between the ends, for a line ‘is’ what it does between the ends, its completion or wholeness.”21

If Professor Telford is correct, then in reading Aristotle we cannot separate the completion or fulfillment of the process of moral deliberation from moral deliberation itself. For in the case of such deliberation, the action as “completion” or “fruition” exists as an aspect of the idea in the mind of one

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who reflects upon the totality of the moral act. This is generally consistent with Aristotle’s statement elsewhere that in the order of thought, actuality is both temporally and logically prior to potentiality.22 Therefore on Telford’s reading, a basis can be formed for arguing that the troublesome “ontic” divide Rescher presumes exists in Aristotle between rational deliberation and action is not applicable to the framework of moral conduct. In Aristotle’s terminology, moral action does not simply refer to physical movement totally divorced from the involvement of reflection, rather it refers to and closely incorporates a more expanded concept of the fulfillment of rational deliberation. An interesting outcome of this discussion is that it illustrates how Aristotle’s position on the nature of the justification of moral action is actually closely allied to Rescher’s. According to the interpretation Telford proposes, Aristotle is seen to be emphasizing how in justifying moral action one must come to an appreciation of the total reality of the fulfillment of the act as part of one’s deliberation. Thus in acting morally one takes into account how the act will affect both agent and surrounding environment, including those individuals his or her actions may affect. The act itself is thus an agent of change not only in the world, but in its influencing the agent as well, contributing to his or her informed opinion and happiness. As such moral action is not an activity involving the consideration of only whether the act conforms to or is an instance of following some “a priori ideal or generalization”, as we find in Plato or Kant. Rather, for Aristotle moral action has a uniquely derivative nature, that is, one must consider what “particular facts in a particular incident are … essential and requisite in determining the formulation by virtue of the whole.”23 The determination of what is right or good by virtue of a whole is an issue of legislation, it brings in considerations of equity. Thus for Aristotle moral actions are derivative in the sense that when they are performed in particular circumstances, they are affirmed to be good within the context of their immediate execution. The most important implication of the derivative nature of moral terms, therefore, is that they are not to be applied literally but analogically. “It is its derivative nature that makes an action seeming proper on the whole, improper in the particular.”24 This broader sense of moral action, involving far more than a mere mechanical means-ends dynamic, will be seen to have strong resonance in Rescher’s view on how the justification of moral conduct must allow for considerations involving both self-realization and benevolence. Aristotle’s emphasis upon viewing moral action as what is pursued for its own sake,

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as what harbors absolutely no ulterior or utilitarian purpose and which allows one to realize the rational nature of his humanity, are themes Rescher finds pertinent to his central concept of the evolution of personhood.25 In a relevant passage in Human Interests Rescher observes that moral conduct must reflect a balance of both happiness and benevolence. The former involves the well being of the agent as a person. The one who acts in a manner that is appropriate for his sense of self. Yet this acting out of respect for oneself is necessarily conjoined to acting in a manner that is reflective of acting out of consideration for others. Thus the moral person for Rescher does not operate in a vacuum. He or she evolves in their personhood in the broader context of insuring their self-respect and concern for others. In a pertinent passage of Human Interests he says: “…Both benevolence ethics and self–realization ethics form intimate parts of morality’s overall mandate. And indeed, every single-track benevolence moralist cannot really avoid coming to grips with the matter of personal development at issue in self-realization, since their care for the benefit of people is bound to project into this area of what actually is best for people. The question of “the good of a person” is a crucial matter for a morality of any sort.”26 The second point Rescher raises with respect to Aristotle is the one regarding the matter of whether or not rational deliberation must necessarily always lead to action. He notes that in fact Aristotle has missed the point of how we often do act for other than rational reasons and that as stated previously passion, ignorance and/or perversity play a role in distinguishing what we actually do end up preferring from what is morally preferable. On this basis Rescher reminds his readers that in the real world there is a great difference between preference and preferability. This point is well taken and backed by solid scholarship in critiques of Aristotle by many writers. 27 Rescher launches his attack by questioning Aristotle’s presumption that one always wants what actually appears to be good. Specifically, he refers to Metaphysics, xii, 1072a28-30: “…For the apparent good is the object of desire (έπιθυµία: appetite) and the real good is the object of rational choice (βούλησις)…”28 He observes how in this passage Aristotle is giving humans too much credit. In point of fact he says we usually choose things simply because we want them, not because we have carefully deliberated about them and find them to be absolutely “really” good, or even because they only “appear” to be the best. Rescher adds how our choices need not be the result of a weakness of will to do what reason reveals to be best. He notes that we sometimes act out of “perversity,” i.e. we know very well what the best choice is on rational

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grounds, but we choose to go against the dictates of reason, out of spite, mean spiritedness, depravity, etc. The critique of the Greek philosophy leads to further discussions regarding the difficulty Aristotle has in explaining exactly what there is about the nature of rational justification, taken generically, that necessarily entails or compels action toward that which is rationally determined to be morally best. This new issue differs from the problems discussed earlier regarding the ontology of action and justification, and the proclivity of persons to knowingly choose a course of action for reasons that are widely recognized to be unwholesome. Instead, what we have further along in the discussion is Rescher focusing specifically upon the psychological mechanics of rational inference in Aristotle, and just how one is to explain its presumed persuasive power. Rescher develops this aspect of his analysis as an extrapolation from arguments put forth by John M. Cooper in Reason and Human Conduct in Aristotle.29 Hence our attention to Cooper’s work in this context is dictated by Rescher’s stated reliance upon Cooper’s observations. Briefly, Cooper’s critique rests on observing that there are places in Aristotle where he realizes that we do not always act on purely logical grounds, when it comes to acting morally. However, Aristotle himself seems uneasy with his account of the relation between thought and action, and decides to provide additional clarification on this point. To this end he states that we sometimes act on the basis of imagination or recollection, as opposed to logical calculation. Aristotle concedes to the fact that sometimes we reason in such a way that the minor premise of the syllogistic argument, being transparently obvious, simply does not register in our attention. In its place an agent may imagine the immediacy of an object of interest or recall its location. On the basis of this, cognition can induce the agent to act with swift immediacy. Under such conditions actions may be taken without any formal thinking ever having occurred.30 Cooper goes further to insist that Aristotle has failed hopelessly, since a fundamental inconsistency lies within his theory of moral action. This is where, with respect to practical reasoning, Aristotle states that it is only intellectual judgment that allows us to determine which ultimate end is worthy of pursuit. However, how we come to an understanding of any ultimate good in the first place, is never explained further than that of its being somehow taken to be so through intuition. The latter is assumed to be a knowing that has not resulted from “… deliberation or by having deduced it from the first principles of any theoretical science….”31 We somehow

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“know” what is good and what accordingly we should be striving for, but what is thus known is not seen as having any further rational justification, beyond what intuition reveals. Within the framework of how he conceives of the nature of practical reasoning, therefore, Aristotle has to admit that first principles simply are accepted as intuitively true. Moreover, Cooper observes that elsewhere, where Aristotle discusses the power of the method of argumentation known as dialectic, and its usefulness in defending the acceptance of first principles, there is no improvement. Dialectic analysis comes into play where the disputant considers the consequences of denying the truth of a presumed i.e. “intuited” principle. The negative consequences that are shown to follow are then given as reasons for holding the contested principle. This mode of argumentation still does not serve to prove that the principle in question is true beyond its being said to be so intuitively. Cooper thus highlights the futility of Aristotle’s holding that first principles are intuitively known while we are engaged in the exercise of practical reasoning, and in saying that our understanding of these principles can also be established through dialectical analysis. In the latter instance it is evident that dialectical analysis has no perceivable role in establishing the truth of first principles beyond that of showing that some bad consequences will follow if they are abandoned. Cooper concludes that Aristotle apparently felt that it was sufficient to have the ordinary person intuit the truth of what good living is, and to have the critical intellect, i.e. the philosophic mind, provide a dialectical examination of what this moral intuition delivers.32 Whichever approach Aristotle chooses, whether that of practical inference or that of dialectics, a precise connection between rational deliberation and the motivation for action is never established. For the basic principle that enables us to decide what will be the moral course of action, i.e. the principle of the good itself, is found to be dependent ultimately upon intuition. It is here that the inconsistency of Aristotle’s theory of the rationality of moral conduct becomes glaringly apparent, since it is in this context that one sees how the ultimate ground for action is not consistently rational, but relies upon the vagaries of intuition. It is this that Rescher finds most limiting in Aristotle’s theory of moral conduct as well. For Aristotle’s theory is flawed in permitting a conceptual chasm to develop between theory as a rational construction, and one’s motivation for overt moral action. Our detailed attention to Cooper’s work serves to identify an important source for the framework of Rescher’s own reservations concerning Aristotle’s views on the justification of moral action. It is an emphasis deserving of its place, since it is necessitated by the fact that Rescher’s own philosophical position invests heavily in his unique conception of rationality, as a synthesis of rea-

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son and compassion. For he sees in his broad rendition of this idea something refreshingly different in traditional philosophical discourse, something of singular importance that can allay difficulties resulting from the recurring inability of philosophers to bridge the gap between thought and act, theory and practice.

3. PERSONHOOD, WHAT SCEPTICS LACK! Though Aristotle’s analysis leaves much unexplained as to how moral principle is related to moral action, he never waivers from the central insight that individuals are autonomous agents, whose goals proceed from their own thought processes and who, consequently, are responsible for their actions.33 It is in this sort of insistence upon the inherent responsibility all persons bear for their actions that Rescher finds the framework he needs to present his own account of why we must always, contrary to the sceptic’s irrational and stubborn abstinence, opt for taking of action. According to Rescher there is in fact an imperative for doing so, once proper reflection has taken place. For all of the aforementioned is intimately connected to his powerful concept of personhood. On this point Rescher provides an inspiring statement as to what it means to be a human being, outlining a vision of man that goes further than anything that can be fathomed in Aristotle’s laconic: “man is a rational animal”. For he sees the relation between rational deliberation and proper moral conduct as residing within the self-determining process known as “rationality”. This is the process, broadly conceived as more than just the exercise of logic that ultimately comes to define one’s personshood. The ontology of persons, Rescher holds, is certainly not that of things but of processes.34 The voice of reason recommends rather than commands. It suggests what the advisable thing to do is, but it itself cannot demand that one do what it says. And yet we want to say along with Aristotle that the advice of reason acquires a deontic force. How then is this at all possible, if rationality can only suggest? Here Rescher resorts to his discussion of the nature of human beings, and of their unique presence in the evolutionary process. In a stunning passage Rescher states: “... The binding obligation to be rational is the ‘metaphysical’ consideration that we owe it to reality at large to realize ourselves as the sort of being we are to take our proper place in the world’s scheme of things. The factors of self-interest and selfrealization contrive to thrust the rationality project upon us as one in which we both self-interestedly should be and properly ought to be involved.”35 Thus if we are correct in our interpretation of what he is saying, it is our own natural proclivity to self-interest and self-realization, factors which

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earlier had been explained as resulting from the intersection of organism and environment within the evolutionary process, which compel us to listen to the voice of reason; for in doing so we remain “aligned” with the world in which we have been nurtured. Ultimately, previous experience tells us that this means we will survive, since we have done so in this way in the past. Our comporting ourselves according to the dictates of reason is, according to Rescher, reflective of the way in which “rationality is an essential part of our self-definition as human persons.” 36 The intriguing element in his analysis is the allusion to the “metaphysical consideration” that we are obligated to fulfill ourselves as rational beings, because we “owe it” to reality at large. According to Rescher this is an ontological imperative resulting from the modality of our existence in nature. We have a natural proclivity to make good on the opportunities set before us for self-improvement. To fail to do so would be unintelligent and therefore contrary to our nature. A being such as man, having the unique ability for value realization, ought to be able to realize it. It is for this that councils of reason never cross over to become commands.37 The latter allow for no argument, reflective deliberation, or dialogue. They demand obedience, and as such they disown the assertion of self. In following the ontological imperative of reason we fulfill our selfinterest, which is the fundamental duty of self-realization. It is a duty that we owe not only to ourselves but to the scheme of things that makes up our community, which brought us forth to develop our highest potential. “Human rationality is a product of a prolonged process of evolution.”38 Intelligence provides us with the “evolutionary edge,” as Rescher calls it. It is not brute force that has enabled us to survive, but the ability to rationally figure out how nature works, and to exploit that knowledge in a way which allows us to adapt through foresight to her challenges. We are not hard-wire programmed to be intelligent, or to do the intelligent thing. However, we do discover that being intelligent is a most advantageous mode of existence and that there is no other mode of being that can compete with it. Our self-worth as persons is found to be tied to our perception of ourselves as successful in coordinating our doings with the ways of the world; in a word, in our being survivors, in our self-fulfillment. We enter into special groups or societies, seeking acceptance and to accept others who have perceptions of their own self as intelligent beings similar to our own. Who we are as persons depends in part on what we say about ourselves when seeking an identity within a group. That identity claim,

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however, is in a sense legitimatized by whether the group we desire to impress accepts our description of ourselves. Our identity is thus not something we can determine alone and apart from the judgment of the community we seek to belong to; which usually requires an evaluation of whether the history of our actions supports our declaration as to who we are. The broader context of a society conditions who we say we are, and therein lies the basis of our self-esteem and self-worth.39 It is in terms of this dynamic that it is said that the council of reason becomes the imperative of rationality. For it is an essential need of humans to belong to a supportive community which in turn mandates them to act in ways congenial to that group’s inherent rationality. NOTES

1 Ibid. p. 64. 2 Axel Wüstehube “Is Systematic Philosophy Still Possible,” in Axel Wüsterhube and Michael Quante, (eds.), Pragmatic Idealism, Critical Essays on Nicholas Rescher’s System of Pragmatic Idealism, (Amsterdam: Rodopi, , 1998), p. 16. 3 Rescher, A System of Pragmatic Idealism, (992-94), vol. 1, p. 37. 4 Jude P. Dougherty, “Potential from Aristotle to Rescher, and Back,” in E. Sosa, (ed.), The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), pp.114-5. 5 J. P. Dougherty, ibid., p. 111. 6 Ibid., p. 114. 7 Ibid., p. 115. 8 Ibid., p. 117. 9 Rescher, “Reply to Dougherty,” The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher, p. 124. 10 Ibid. 11 Rescher, Rationality, pp. 66-67. 12 Ibid., p. 69. 13 Ibid., p. 69.

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NOTES

14 Ibid., pp, 71-72. 15 Ibid., p. 202. [It is useful to add that Rescher’s reference to Socrates, with respect to our acting upon what is deemed to be good, incorporates the thesis that we always act on the basis of what is deemed to be rational. Though Rescher’s attack upon Aristotle is directed toward what he perceives to be a specific limitation in the latter’s general theory of action, in later works such as Sensible Decisions, where he expounds upon the nature of social responsibility, he states in unequivocal terms that Aristotle is his philosophical mentor.] 16 Ibid., pp. 202-3.[Rescher does not explicitly state that this difference is one of “ontology”. However, there appears to be no other way of characterizing what he means by this distinction between conclusion and action except in the manner suggested.] 17 Rescher, Rationality, p. 203. 18 Ibid., p. 204. 19 Rescher, Rationality, pp. 202-3. 20 Kenneth A. Telford, Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics,’” (New York Institute of Global Cultural Studies: State University of Binghampton,, 1999), p. 5. 21 Ibid., p. 5. 22 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1049 b 5. 23 Kenneth A. Telford, Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics,’” p. 115 24 Ibid. 25 See Chapter 7, Section 2, below. 26 Rescher, Human Interests p. 106.

27 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, (Garden City, NJ: Image Books: 1962), Vol. I, Part III, pp. 80-81. [Rescher’s upcoming objection founders on the example he elects to examine as illustrative of the error Aristotle often commits. Aristotle presents this passage to explain how the objects of desire and the intelligible move things without themselves being altered. The passage stands as an elaboration of his discussion of the nature of action with respect to heavenly bodies, in-

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NOTES

cluding the Unmoved Mover. The agents Aristotle refers to here are not mortals but celestial beings whose rational abilities are superior. This corrigendum does not refute Rescher’s main point, however, that Aristotle has not taken under sufficient consideration our proclivity toward “acting for perverse reasons,” and does not invalidate what is correctly observed as a shortcoming in Aristotle’ theory overall.] 28 Rescher, Rationality, p. 202. 29 John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Conduct in Aristotle, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 53-58. 30 Ibid., pp. 53-54. 31 Ibid., p. 64. 32 Ibid., pp. 68-71. 33 Rescher, Human Interests, Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology, Stanford Series in Philosophy, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 6. 34 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 35 Rescher, Rationality, p. 205. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., p. 206. 38 Ibid., p. 207. 39 Ibid., pp. 207-8.

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Chapter 3 Rescher’s General Concept of “E-value-ation” Reasoning about values involves more than the exercise of logic upon factual data. The rationality of value-determination invokes the subject’s personal reaction to his environment. Economists have failed to provide theories of value-assessment that protect the rights of persons. 1. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF VALUATION

I

n his Introduction to Value Theory, and in numerous other works, Nicholas Rescher analyzes value judgments within the broader context of the processes of human rationality. He concludes here and in various ways elsewhere that “e-value-ation is essentially a comparative assessment or measurement of something.” Such remarks, often expressed with moving metaphorical expressions such as “rationality carries morality in its wake,”1 reflect Rescher’s basic starting point in the development of his theory of value. This is illustrated by his receptivity for language that has a phenomenological perspective, one whose origins is to be found in the writings of Franz Brentano and Alexis Meinong. For Rescher, one’s understanding of value requires first giving proper consideration to the role of rationalization, to the extent to which this plays a part in reckoning and assessing projected states, conditions, events, which both involve and effect the human condition. It is no great point of insight to discover in Rescher’s earlier investigations into a theory of value the influence of Brentano’s basic views concerning the nature of the object of reflection and the reflective processes that help define it. Specifically, Rescher is open to the kind of view expressed in the former’s Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunkt where Brentano notes that “...Aristotle is quite correct, therefore, in saying that the “this is so” by which we indicate our agreement with a judgment means nothing but that the judgment is true, and that truth has no being outside of the person judging, in other words, it exists only in that loose and improper sense, but not strictly and in reality....”2 It is important to note at this point that Brentano was unique in concentrating upon the relational nature of

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judgment, and in seeing that its ontology was not to be properly understood in the sense of its being a static and isolated entity, e.g. the judgment as a separate and discrete object, to be rendered in the manner of an atomic description. Rather, judgments must be seen and understood as events within the continuous processes of consciousness. They are for Brentano processes within the more general or more pervasive process of rational reflection. The importance of this lays in the fact that Rescher makes fruitful use of Brentano’s insight into the ontological status of judging or evaluating. He finds it fundamentally necessary to begin his own presentation of the concept of value as one that is to be understood in terms of mental processes involving judgment, reflection, and rationalization. For Rescher, without an initial accounting of these processes the concept of evaluation or of what Aristotle terms the judgment that “this is so” in the above quote would be incomplete, if not impossible to comprehend. In line with this Rescher observes early in the Introduction to Value Theory that values are fundamentally things of the mind, that is, they are the way individuals desire to direct their choices so that some important status will accrue to them in terms of what they do or say.3 In indicating the above, however, it is also important to understand that he also makes use of Brentano’s further insight that the object of reflection is not, by virtue of the fact that it is a phenomenological object, so uniquely private that it is also and necessarily an object devoid of certain pragmatic attributes. For it, the object as a known expression of fact, belief, opinion, etc., is held or maintained by someone to be so (or true). Thus the phenomenological object, in Brentano’s account of the totality of its presentation, must involve in a fundamental way one’s noting or observing that some agent [i.e. the speaker] stands in some relation to some sentential description of some state of affairs, so that the agent judges that the linguistic expression (i.e. sentence) about so and so is, in virtue of some preestablished and publicly agreed upon standard(s), taken to be (i.e. judged) by the sentence speaker an accurate accounting of some aspect of one’s environment (however broadly conceived). Further into the Introduction Rescher makes special reference to Brentano in connection with how the latter discussed the activity of valuation in terms of the human emotions of love and hate. He notes that Brentano does not see these emotions as formal or conceptual opposites, but as degrees of emotional difference with respect to some judgment relating to an objective state of affairs. This was Brentano’s way of understanding the ever-

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ongoing processes of human consciousness in a way that departed from the self-imposed limitations of a fixed Kantian structuralism. For Brentano an object of thought is never free of some coloring by our emotional predispositions. Consequently, in Rescher’s own analysis of the activity of valuation, the advance which Brentano’s work offered was that it saw the dynamic of the phenomenon of valuation in abstraction, that is as a process separate from the “varied spectrum of contexts.”4 A unified theory of value must thus take into account certain generic attitudes that are at its basis. In subsequent refinements of Brentano’s initiative Rescher observes that Meinong offered his own theory of value, one which sought to clearly identify its four basic ingredients as: 1. The value-subject. 2. The value-feeling (positive or negative). 3. The value-object, i.e. the real or “intentional” object. and 4. The excitant judgment that causes the value-feeling. These four components of the evaluative act are intended by Meinong to clarify what is implicit in Brentano‘s position concerning the central role of the emotions in the process of valuation. Rescher’s concept of value is strongly influenced by the phenomenological perspective outlined above. He retains from the Brentano-Meinong approach the idea that “value is not an independent self-sustained characteristic of things, but a derivative characteristic arising out of their [that is, of things] relationship to people who interact with them experimentally.” Value is not seen as having an objective basis separate from thought, emotion and experience; and value experiences can be either appropriate (correct) or inappropriate (incorrect). For Rescher, “...value has an objective foundation in the characteristics of its objects.”5 Here one should again emphasize that the “characteristics” referred to are just those attributes of things that are judged to have relevance to human experience. Further into Introduction to Value Theory Rescher elaborates upon his concept of valuation. He states that the criterion of evaluation employed in the reflective act of evaluating “mediates” a transition between “fact” and an object’s having “value,” i.e. “it underwrites a move from the object’s de facto possession of certain descriptive characteristics to its having certain value features. The presence or absence in an object of these characteristics whose possession endows it, according to the evaluation criterion, with a certain value, is a purely factual matter.”6 Rescher also observes how there is an interesting structural similarity between valuation and classification, for the latter lends itself to the same considerations involving the insights that: 1. The existence of that which can be classified is more highly prized than the existence of that which defies classification. 2. A preferred status

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is given to that thing which can be identified as belonging to a system of thought as opposed to that which is not identifiable in any context, and finally 3. The greater the numbers of a thing that is subject to classification the stronger the justification for that classification. Rescher concludes on the basis of the above that valuation can be viewed as a “mode” of classification, meaning that evaluation, as an act of reflection, implicitly presumes the classificatory process. For without the latter evaluation would not be possible. One notes in passing how the above three aspects of classification clearly reflect three inter-connected [though individually distinguishable] stages of a consistent phenomenological analysis, since they involve prizing the existence of the object that will be classified, which in turn presupposes the mind’s recognizing that what is classified is of greater value than that which is not, which then assumes our justifying a classification by virtue of the fact that a great number of other cases can be brought forth to exemplify it. The uniqueness of Rescher’s approach, moreover, lies in the fact that while on the one hand it requires the introduction of a line of analysis which reflects Brentano’s presentational requirements within the context of the latter’s descriptive psychology, as a preliminary to providing any serious explanation of the nature of value judgments, on the other hand it endeavors to avoid the notorious epistemological difficulties which abound when attempting to deal with the privacy of mental states, especially within the framework of experimental psychology. This is achieved by turning the emphasis of the inquiry upon the pragmatic component within evaluative analysis, in that the proper approach to value analysis requires an accounting of the relation between the agent as a rational being, the object of value, and the requirements of the environment in which there is interaction. Thus it can be said by way of summary that once we take the first step with Rescher, which is the step of adopting the phenomenological standpoint, then the discussion turns naturally to the identification of those essential components of the process of valuation that can be readily recognized through the rational analysis of the concept of value. This reliance upon a “rational analysis” of valuation is designed to introduce an intrasubjective standard into the discussion, which avoids the problem of defining the notion at hand in the prohibitively subjective terms of “private language”.

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2. EVOLUTIONARY INFLUENCES AND VALUE JUDGMENTS Rescher’s method of introducing value as a product of human rationality serves his over-arching design, which grafts the notion of evaluation onto an account of the historical struggle of human survival. As we have seen in Rationality, he describes human rationality in broad terms as “the survival instrument of Homo sapiens.”7 Evaluation, we have seen from the previous chapter, results from the exercise of rationality, it is the analysis of the means whereby we deliberately attempt to expend available resources so as to optimize benefits. This ability is what enables us to compete in our environment, and to adjust the latter to our needs. It is in this context that one sees most vividly not only Rescher‘s conception of the centrality of the study of value, but his basic philosophical position, namely that of pragmatic idealism. From such a standpoint, value judgments are part of what makes the fabric of human social activity possible. They require a careful scrutiny of the ratiocination inherent within reflection upon those empirical realities necessary for survival, the latter being the dynamic in the ever-shifting relation between human organism and environment, where environment is conceived as either physical nature, local community, society, national state, etc. For Rescher, the determination of value is not a purely mechanical determination. The interactivity between individual and environment, however defined, is no longer just a matter of explaining an evolutionary mechanism, one whose dynamic is indifferent to the controlling influence of human conduct, feeling, and of their rational prerequisites. This attitude of thought is supported by the fact that in its history human understanding has achieved the means for profoundly altering the basic character of the natural environment. What we judge to be our proper needs and wants, as a manifestation of our reflective ability, presently has the awesome potential of profoundly altering many fundamental aspects of the traditional evolutionary equation, as for example by way of genetic engineering, environmental conservation and revitalization, cloning, hydroponics, etc. The focus of this creative potential is now involved in what is rationally thought to be conducive to the preservation of our species. The latter, which is to say, the conceived goods and attendant means necessary for human survival, as conceptions requiring the activity of reflective attention, have now come to involve considerations that go beyond the mere given of the mechanical effects of evolutionary change. They introduce the

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need for an examination of the formal requirements of rational justification and consistency as primary focal points in any analysis of value. Thus though the metaphor of evolutionary interaction dominates Rescher’s thinking here and in many places in this area, the imagery itself is never pushed to the point of a brutal outcome of the style found in nineteenth century aphorisms such are found in Nietzsche regarding the “survival of the fittest.” There is present in his analyses the pervasive recognition of the need for a compassionate rationality, one that seeks to preserve a civil humanity as a background for value. It is this element which makes Rescher’s position so different from C. S. Peirce’s thorough going pragmatic evolutionism, for example. For Rescher insists that rationality, in a broadly defined sense, is fundamental, and that its most important function is to be self-corrective. One can gain a clearer insight into Rescher’s view of valuation by briefly considering his critique of Peirce in his Peirce’s Philosophy of Science.8 In reviewing Peirce’s work on the nature of the methodology of scientific progress Rescher observes that the former was wrong in believing that scientific knowledge advances by a strictly additive progression and detailed elaboration of what has already been discovered. While Peirce was partly correct in seeing that science was self-corrective, he failed to see that progress in science is just as often subtractive, and that more often than not it is brought about through conceptual re-definitions, which lead to revolutionary changes in scientific understanding. In Rescher’s view, the progress of science cannot be properly accounted for, if one fails to take into account the central role played by creative insight. Though Peirce was the first to see that human achievement itself is basically unpredictable, in that scientific discovery often involves choosing “instinctually” the correct hypothesis through the exercise of an abductive mode of reasoning, his overall belief that a community of scholars will ultimately arrive at the one scientific explanation of truth that all will come to agree upon was incomplete.9 For he failed to take account of the fact that scientific progress is often motivated by the need to fashion imaginative solutions to pressing human problems. The latter is what constitutes the context in which scientific knowledge grows and expands. New evidence, new information, i.e. a wider context, serves to make us revisit our old answers. As such, scientific knowledge is not simply reflective of the results of a steady investigatory evolution from previous insights to a single absolutely perfect and rational form. In actuality one needs to take into account those “external-toscience” and yet highly influential factors which speak to how we are to

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overcome unexpected hindrances to our lives and well being, when attempting to give a complete account of the nature of scientific progress. In an analogous manner, it is also the controlling influence by environmental factors that determines what constitutes a proper expression of values. Progress in moral conduct, Rescher would maintain, is based mainly on our ability to continuously re-conceptualize the symbiosis we desire to maintain between the individual—however broadly conceived, and the environment—however far extended. As in the case of scientific inquiry so also in the case of investigations into the determination of value judgments, the discovery of what constitutes a proper mode of action results not from simply carrying forth the requirements of an abstract formula, nor does it result from the mere enumeration of empirical data, but progress emerges from our ability to re-think the “look” of things, i.e. to re-conceptualize what is already before us in light of new information concerning our human needs and the means available for their realization. Clearly for Rescher there is more to “rationality” than merely the exercise of logic. This is expressed at the outset of Rationality where he says: “Sometimes ‘rationality” is contrasted with ‘feeling’, and ‘reason’ with ‘human sympathy’. But this overly cerebral conception represents a far too narrow and one-sided view of reason’s domain. Rationality is broad and comprehensive. Feelings are generally not a matter of reasoning, but they are certainly not outside the province of reason. As Pascal saw, ‘the heart too has its reasons, which are unknown to mind’. Feelings too can canalize the operations of intelligence. The human spirit extends beyond the human body that determines our material interests and the human mind that determines our cognitive interests.... Reason herself recognizes the utility and appropriateness of our ‘higher’ (aesthetic and effectively social and even ‘spiritual’) values. The realm of rationality is as large and comprehensive as the domain of valid human concerns and interests.”10 This crucial passage summarizes not only the scope of Rescher’s concept of rationality, but it focuses upon the validity of those ‘higher’ motives that enter into the process of evaluation. One again sees here how Rescher implicitly adopts Brentano’s insight that emotions are not to be excluded from the province of reason as less important than or as alien to the latter, but that they are to be considered seriously in the general enterprise of human survival.11 They enter into the determination of value and their presence cannot be sauntered off into the corner of the empirically unverifiable and therefore an example of meaningless propositions, as Logical Positivism had encouraged its followers to do earlier in the last century.

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Turning more centrally to the concept of evaluation itself, Rescher is found to employ the paradigm of the land surveyor to elucidate further his conception of this idea’s basic ontology. In Introduction to Value Theory12 he states that the surveyor’s land assessment is relational in the sense that it is not a property in the land itself, such as soil acidity. Rather it is a property that emerges from the relation of the land to the people it affects. Thus the “being” or ontology of the assessment, so to speak, is to be understood in terms of the human context for which it was made. This is to say that the objectivity of valuation is to be found in the way it interpersonally relates to persons, and in how it requires the application of publicly recognized standards of assessment.13 In light of this value is both relational and objective. It must reflect rational justification, in the broad sense Rescher brings out above, while also dealing with what is practically useful. For just as one cannot disassociate rational activity from the act of evaluation, one cannot divorce the practical aspect of evaluation from what it is about, i.e. content. When carefully undertaken, determining the rationality of an act of evaluation makes manifest an understanding of the agent’s character, i.e. his or her record of past actions, which in turn provides a basis for inferring what he or she is likely to do in future cases of a similar kind. Without this sort of information any insistence one may make upon the need for consistency in moral activity, and any value judgment one may want to make on the basis of the consistency of an action, would be meaningless. Similarly, to speak of a community’s values, or more broadly of “social values” in general, is ultimately to refer to how that society is likely to act, consistent with its actions in the historical past. Rescher would again caution that consistency here should not be interpreted as belonging to a kind of formal rigidity associated with deductive inference. Rather the requirement of consistency in this case is more in line with justifying the probability involved in inductive inference, wherein based upon passed circumstances and actions taken in response to them, the probability is that such and such mode of action would be consistent and therefore expected of a specified agent. It is our reliance upon inductive inference therefore which allows for the possibility of our projecting or estimating the probable course of choice in the future activity of some particular agent or social grouping. The matter of the consistency or the “self-supportedness” of evaluation introduces one of the most interesting aspects of Rescher’s theory of value. For apart from its rendition in quantitative terms, which will be discussed

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in detail below, Rescher’s treatment of the need for consistency in valuation introduces the issue of how the individual’s perspective relates to that of a larger structure, such as community, social order, etc., and conversely. As early as 1969 Rescher raises the question, with a sense of foreboding, of whether by the year 2000 future studies of value would illustrate a transition in emphasis away from individualistically orientated value systems nurtured in home environments to impersonal organizational value systems.14 The danger in losing the standpoint of the individual in determining evaluation, or on the other equally repulsive extreme, the sacrifice of the “social propriety” of a measure by an adherence to a “blinded selfinterest,” is one of many prophetic themes, which constantly reappear throughout Rescher’s work. Rescher clearly sees the need for preserving a balance between what the individual brings to the determination of value and what the reality of the broader context of social coherence will allow. To sacrifice the former for the dominance of the latter leads to the loss of the sense of one’s own individual identification within the broader picture, which in turn corrodes one’s feeling of self-worth. On the other hand, to sacrifice the group’s coherence for the dominance of each individual’s caprice leads to anarchy and the disintegration of a viable social structure. Rescher’s point here is to say that the challenge in determining value is to secure a rational means whereby that which is valued by both the individual and the social grouping is an expression of a synergy between the interests of both parties, wherein it is understood by all that the process of interaction itself helps enhance the growth of responsibility in the participants. Moreover, and of equal importance, Rescher maintains that the belief in the inviolability of both the individual’s self-expression and in the group’s social coherence is founded upon philosophical grounds which recognize the need for beginning on some clearly rational foundation when dealing with the dynamics of civilized life. Rescher again deals with this issue in a later work entitled Risk,15 where he discusses the close relationship between individual and collective interests. In acting upon our self-interest, he says, we invariably discover that we must take the interests of others into account. The extent to which we “value” another’s interest depends directly upon that individual’s proximity to us and to our actions. Thus in the ordinary example of driving a car, one must consider not only the risk one puts oneself in, but also the danger others may face by that individual’s driving. In this case, as well as in many others, our consideration of the individual’s interest must involve

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taking a strong interest in the wellbeing of others, if one is to live and function successfully.16 Rescher observes as well that there are cases where the concern over one’s individual interest can become an impersonal matter. For example, a responsible legislator may look at the interests of his constituency in terms of the long run, and thus the legislation he is involved in crafting to meet those interests will take into consideration its long-range effect on generations yet to come. To him the importance of the immediate present is no greater than that of the distant future. Similarly, one’s trusteeship in an organization must take into account the real interests of the entity over which one has governance, and not only its immediate wants and apparent interests.17 Thus the general thrust of what Rescher is saying is that in the real world one cannot “rationally” separate considerations of self-interest from those of collective interest without falling into the absurdity of arguing for a socially dysfunctional model. It must not be supposed, however, that Rescher endeavors to state in explicit terms what the above balance should be between self-interest and collective interest in all cases and in all circumstances. Rather all that he attempts to do is to point to the difficulties that are often involved in stating just what should be the factor that determines the proper balance. For example, philosophers refer to the “social value of life” as the yard stick for determining how decision making should be guided when describing this balance, as if this were a thing which can be quantified. What is often not realized is that the value of life, so called, is on many occasions determined by how we view what terminates or threatens life. For example the death of a dozen individuals from the common cold would not be viewed as negatively as the death of the same number of people by a nuclear mishap. In other cases, the mere concentration of the number of individuals who are killed affects how one assesses the value of life. Thus the loss of 500 hundred individuals in car accidents across the country in a year would not seem as catastrophic as the loss of 500 individuals from the same small town in an air disaster.18 Rescher concludes that the difficulty here is twofold. First one erroneously assumes that the value of life is a thing that can be quantified. Second is the seemingly endless variety of the contextrelevance of the notion under investigation. Having considered the seemingly endless factors which go into identifying what may count as “the value of life”, Rescher observes that it is often the case that when decisions are made mainly on the basis of economic feasibility, then issues relating to the value of life rarely come into play.19

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3. THE INABILITY OF ECONOMICS TO EXPLAIN HUMAN VALUATION In an earlier article, “Economics vs. Moral Philosophy,” Rescher pursues this same theme in greater detail, arguing against the strict application of the Pareto Principle in economics since it violates consideration of “certain realities of living within a social setting.”20 The principle, he notes, is often presented as a set of definitions: “1. One distribution of ‘utility’ to members of a society is “a Pareto improvement” if some individuals fare better than others, and none are worse off. 2. A distribution is Pareto Optimal within a range of alternatives if it represents a Pareto improvement over every other member of this set.”21 Rescher proceeds to consider underlying the thesis suggested by this principle, namely: “3. When a distribution of utilities is Pareto optimal among a set of rivals, then the “socially rational” thing to do is to prefer this alternative to the rest.”22 Rescher asks the important question of whether it is perfectly clear that the “socially preferable” resolution in this competitive context, meaning thereby that resolution which is clearly “rational,” is the one which is expected to emerge by following the Pareto Principle for preferabilityassessment. The answer is no, once we consider the character of two paradigm cases, one where a subject is asked to choose between x or y on the basis of “blinded self-interest”, where he does not know how either choice will affect how others fare, and the case where the subject is given a choice between a distribution across the entire population if he gets x, and the alternative where there is a variant distribution, where he gets y. Clearly it is only in the scenario of the latter case where we can speak meaningfully of the “socially preferable or rational” support of an action. The former case, where the action taken is purely on the basis of self-interest, is useless for determining the “social” preferability of an action. In Rescher’s view it is this position, which the first definition in the principle expresses, which

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prevents one from moving on to the second definition in the principle, that speaks about distribution within a range of alternatives. This virtual lack of concern by economists to the social implication of a measure is strikingly illustrated in C. E. Ferguson’s and S. Charles Maurice’s text Economic Analysis, Theory and Application, where they discuss the Pareto Principle. In discussing the implications of this principle they describe a case where a new highway is planned for an area where some homes will have to be demolished. While the homeowners will be compensated at fair market value for their property, there will still be some who will refuse to sell for the price, and who will then be forced to leave by right of eminent domain. These individuals will be harmed by the proposed construction, though millions of travelers will benefit. The authors proceed to make the following statement which reflects the precise point of criticism Rescher is attempting to establish: “...Economists as economists cannot say that the new highway increases or decreases social welfare [Italics added]. For this reason economists are primarily interested in Pareto optimality because it expresses efficiency and not because the concept is a social goal. The technical efficiency aspect of welfare economics is a major aspect of the subject to economists.”23 What counts then is the cost effectiveness of the result. If the new highway cuts the time and therefore the cost of travel between A and B, then it is cost efficient and therefore the right thing to do. The matter of the dislocation for homeowners by the enforcement of eminent domain, or the hardship to the establishments along the old route, is irrelevant and therefore inessential to the economist. Our actions, however, must reflect what Rescher terms “social rationality,” which requires consideration of policies governing distribution within the group.24 Rescher uses this position against those economists who desire to masquerade their notion of normative or “prudential” self-interest as that which is “rational.”25 Though our attention in preserving the coherence of the group‘s interests is essential, it must not be allowed to overwhelm or distort our perceptions of the individual’s preference. As will be seen, Rescher makes extensive use of examples from economics when discussing the notion of value. In doing so, he indicates that when the language of economics becomes infected with a crude mechanical model from evolutionary biology, e.g. only the fittest survive, then it fails to address the complex reality of the human condition. Economists have a tendency to monopolize the concept of rationality so as to suggest that if anyone does not support their line of reasoning, he or she is irrational. However, were

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one to scrutinize their description of what is rational, one would discover the clandestine version of old normative prudential self-interest. Again, using an example from economics, Rescher says in Introduction to Value Theory that one should not accept analyses that assimilate values with preferences.26 Though one can learn a great deal concerning a person’s values from the sort of things he or she prefers, still the former are relational in the sense discussed above, i.e. instrumentalities for reasoning, whereas preferences are more expressions of personal taste, usually requiring no rational deliberation or justification. Unfortunately, economists are all too quick to equate values with preferences, thereby failing to see that their efforts at arriving at a viable conception of social welfare out of the consideration of the mere polling of the expression of individual preference is based upon a dubious economico-political ideology. One sees here how Rescher is quick to point out how methodology in economics is often too willing to operate with the mere surface or appearance of human behavior, not with its deeper interactive context. In the same vein, Rescher tackles the issue of arriving at a viable conception of “social preference” from a distillation of individual preference expressions. He observes in this connection that Kenneth Arrow’s approach in Social Choice and Individual Action is to say that the problem of defining a social preference function is insoluble given certain “plausible requirements.” These requirements are: I.

Collective Rationality: From any set of individual preference ranking a social preference ranking can be determined.

II. Citizen’s Sovereignty: Given a pair of alternatives x and y, there is some set of individual preferences which lead to the result that the society prefers x to y. III. Pareto Principle: If all the individuals of a set prefer x to y, then the social ranking will be that x is preferred to y. IV. Positive Association: Given that in a particular instance of social preference ranking x is preferred to y, this preferability will continue even when the individual’s preference rankings are in some cases altered to y’s advantage by way of other alternatives.

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V. Nondictatorship: There is no individual with the property such that where he prefers x to y the society does as well, regardless of the preference of other individuals. VI. Irrelevance of Extraneous Alternatives: In determining a society’s preference between x and y, we consider only the individual preference rankings and can neglect all extraneous alternatives.”27 Rescher observes that Arrow argues for how there can be no social welfare function that satisfies all of these plausible requirements at the same time. Hence the passage from individual preference rankings to a social preference ranking seems permanently blocked as far as analyses by economists are concerned. This is known as Arrow’s Barrier. Rescher reasons, however, that if one of the above so-called “plausible” requirements can be shown to be spurious, then Arrow’s position would be undone. In his view the last requirement seems to be the weakest, since it appears to be begging the question as to what is or is not “extraneous,” and what is or is not “irrelevant.” Rescher’s refutation of Arrow’s last requirement is incisive. He presents the following situation. Consider two individuals both of whom rank order alternatives x, y, and z as follows: x y z Individual I. (1, 2, 3) [xPy, yPz, xPz] Individual II. (2, 3, 1) [xPy, zPy, zPx] From the above it can seen that both individuals prefer x to y [xPy], and this can also be said to be the “overall” social choice given the domain of the two subjects. However, it can also be seen that I. prefers y to z, while II. prefers z to y. Thus it can be argued that the society of these two individual’s would end up being “indifferent” to the comparison of y and z. Consequently, the following ordered ranking would satisfy this second situation: x y z Individual I. (1, 2, 3) [xPy, yPz, xPz]

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Individual II. (3, 2, 1) [zPy, zPx, yPx] In the second case, however, since individual I. prefers x to z, and individual II. prefers z to x, then the society’s “overall” reaction would be that of indifference to the comparison of x and z as well. Furthermore, with respect to the y-z comparison, the situation can be expressed by the following pair ranking: x y z Individual I. (1, 2, 3) [xPy, yPz, xPz] Individual II. (1, 3, 2) [zPx, zPy, xPy] From this last case it follows that the society should be indifferent between y and z. It turns out from the last two scenarios above that the society will be indifferent to any comparison between x and z, as well as to any comparison between y and z. However, the transitivity of indifference would also lead one to conclude that if the society is indifferent to x and z, and to z and y, then it must be indifferent to any comparison between x and y, which would be in violation of the initial preference finding. Thus Arrow’s Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is questionable.28 One thing that is immediately evident is that one cannot deal with the expression of preference in a realistic human context and expect to come out with a reasonably consistent picture of what is happening though a straightforward application of formal logic. More basically, however, his rebuttal of Arrow’s position is targeted upon arguing not that a function for “social welfare” is attainable through simply a consideration of the individual preference rankings within that society, but upon showing that the assumptions Arrow makes as to how one is to approach the formulation of such a function are flawed because they are based upon misconceptions in the very methodology of economics itself. Economists, Rescher argues, accept utilities as expressed at face value.29 They, unlike the philosopher, do not assess or evaluate utilities in terms of their being morally correct. The economically expedient thing or what is politically advantageous has no intrinsic value for the philosopher, whereas it is the basic starting point for the economists. This is why Arrow’s sixth requirement concerning the “ir-

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relevance of extraneous alternatives” is important to target. For in a sense it epitomizes the tendency common in the purely descriptivist analyses of the social sciences to remove the relevance of the human background for the value phenomena, to label it in loose terms as “extraneous,” so as to formalize the phenomena in the most expeditious way possible. In doing this, however, the rationale for what is happening is discarded or at the very least seriously distorted, making it virtually impossible to say anything rationally cogent concerning the expressed value either in analytical or normative terms.30 Rescher finds it very troubling to presume that economists can decide on their own terms what is or is not “extraneous,” and therefor what is or is not rational.31 When dealing with values Rescher argues that consistency of thought requires that attention be paid to the preservation of the integrity of the interdependence between the agent’s autonomy and that of the society he finds himself in. Rescher summarizes his view quite eloquently in his 1987 article where he writes: “...The boat we build through our actions is one we must sail in together. Because of the systematic connections of the world’s arrangements, it would be a gross mistake to think that action contrary to the welfare of others is without consequence for one’s own.” 32 It is in this respect that Rescher sees his approach as coming close to Aristotle’s, while also maintaining a distance from it. For as in Aristotle the rational justification of a moral act must take into account both agent and context, as well as what can be rationally sustained as proper moral conduct within a particular social situation.33 Both resist the view that the process of evaluation can be formalized unilaterally across a population of agents. However, though both would also insist that rational justification contributes centrally toward deciding whether an act is morally defensible, it is doubtful whether given the scope of Rescher’s concept of rationality that the “golden mean” formula would be all that was required for such justification. It is conceivable, given Rescher’s rendering of the complexity of the evolving and practical circumstances in which evaluation occurs, as well as with his rendering of the notion of rationality itself, that a requirement calling for the “logical” midpoint between opposite modes of action as always being the rational and therefore the morally responsible course to take is not a defensible position. Rescher, as has been shown, does not see the rational justification of moral conduct as necessarily having to operate within an arena of conceptual opposites, such as cowardice vs. foolhardiness, or ostentatiousness vs. frugality, etc. Rather, values should be seen as determined within a dy-

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namically changing world of real and actual physical phenomena in socio/political context. There is in Rescher’s position a greater respect for the endless variety of possible modes of moral conduct than would have been possible in an Aristotelian world, structured as the latter was in accordance with the symmetry of classical criteria. Aristotle supposed that reason enables us to determine the order that is inherent within the nature of the cosmos, just as it enables us to determine the nature of moral conduct, once it is understood and properly utilized by the agent. This presumption of an imbedded formal order which influences both the realm of things and the outcomes in moral conduct, however, is far from the present day warranty of fact, and closer to an idealized conception of the natural synergy among things favored by Aristotle. Alternatively, Rescher also expresses strong reserve with respect to any utilitarian rendering of valuation. In the latter case one still has the methodology which accepts the given as that which contributes to the good or happiness, so-called, of the “greatest number.” This is again very close to the kind of approach to value one finds in economics and decision theory. The philosopher of morals, Rescher notes, has no difficulty in subjecting those proposed utilities of various sorts to critical scrutiny, seeing that often as not they have no intrinsic merit in and of themselves.34 NOTES 1

Rescher, “Rationality and Moral Obligation,” Syntheses vol. 72 (1984), p. 31.

2

Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom Empirischen Standpunct, in Roderick M. Chisholm (ed.), Realism and the Background of Phenomenology (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1960), p. 72.

3

Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory (1969), pp.4-5.

4

Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory, pp. 50-51.

5

Ibid., p. 52.

6

Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory, p.72.

7

Rescher, Rationality, p. 2.

8

Rescher, Peirce’s Philosophy of Science (1978), pp.29-30.

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NOTES 9

Charles S. Peirce, Pragmatic Philosophy, (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), pp. 96-98.

10

Rescher, Rationality, p. 9.

11

Franz Brentano, The Distinction Between Mental and Physical Phenomena, in Roderick Chisholm (ed.), Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1960), p. 41.

12

Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory (1969), pp. 55-56.

13

Ibid. p. 56.

14

Ibid., pp. 125-127.

15

Rescher, Risk (1983), Chapter XIII.

16

Ibid., pp 158-159.

17

Ibid., pp. 160-161.

18

Ibid., pp. 176-177.

19

Ibid., pp. 179-180.

20

Rescher, “Economics vs. Moral Philosophy,” Theory and Decision, vol. 10, (1979), pp. 172-173.

21

Ibid, pp. 169-170.

22

Ibid., p. 170.

23

C. E. Ferguson and S. Charles Maurice, Economic Analysis, Theory and Application, Third Edition (Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1978), p. 490.

24

Ibid, p. 171.

25

Ibid, p. 178.

26

Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory, p. 109.

27

Ibid., p. 102.

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NOTES 28

Ibid., p. 103.

29

Rescher, “Economics vs. Moral Philosophy,” Theory and Decision, Vol. 10, (1979) pp. 176-177.

30

Ibid., p. 128.

31

Ibid., p. 178.

32

Rescher, “Rationality and Moral Obligation,” Synthese, vol. 72 (1987) p. 31.

33

Rescher, “Practical Reasoning and Values,” Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 16 (1966), p. 121.

34

Rescher, “Economics vs. Moral Philosophy,” Theory and Decision, vol. 10, (1979) pp. 176-17

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Chapter 4 Rescher On Distributive Justice and Utilitarianism Utilitarians, in reducing the uniqueness of the individual to membership in a group, distort the realities of actually lived experience and thus sacrifice fairness for a perverted sense of justice. 1. ESTABLISHING THE PRELIMINARIES FOR A THEORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE. OPPOSING THE “DE-ETHICIZATIION” OF VALUES IN ECONOMICS

A

consideration of Rescher’s views about evaluation provides a helpful background for understanding his position on the broader issue of establishing a viable principle for the distribution of goods and services within a context of practical social activity. One finds in his present treatment of the rationality of reward distribution the same concern for the dynamic of the individual and the constantly evolving environment he finds himself in as was found earlier, in his discussion of “e-value-ation” and rationality. This position, which evolves into his view on the nature of distributive justice, emerges from Rescher’s creative harmonizing of the concept of individualism, implicit in utilitarianism, with commutarian holism, a thesis implicit within Hegelianism. What he extracts from utilitarianism is the idea that the individual is centrally important. However, for Rescher it is an importance that goes far beyond simply saying that everyone counts the same and should be treated identically in every situation. Rather, it is a position that requires saying that every person is important because of their unique merit, which in turn is based upon their particular achievement and circumstances; factors which must be considered when dispensing rewards. This emphasis on personal achievement in defining who the individual is and what his merits should be Rescher derives from Hegel. Interestingly, Rescher backs away from a commitment to Mill’s unpalatable egalitarianism just as quickly as she backs off of Hegel’s equally unpalatable idea of humanity’s inexorable historical march toward “consensus.” The danger which the latter poses for a future world where there is absolutely no vari-

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ety of opinion and healthy democratic debate Rescher finds too chilling to ponder, if not terribly unrealistic as to how the world has worked thus far.1 In one of his earliest works, Distributive Justice, he begins by introducing Aristotle’s distinction between “distributive justice,” which is “exercised in the distribution of [public assets such as] honor, wealth, and other dividable assets of the community,” and “collective justice,” which is simply that which “supplies a corrective (or “rectifying”) principle in private transactions.”2 Rescher observes that in his own rendition of this distinction, the concept of an agent will involve not only the state, as is assumed by Aristotle, but individuals and institutions as well. Hence, his view on either collective or on distributive justice involves more than the kind of agent Aristotle mentions when he speaks of collective justice in these matters. There is no difficulty in deciding upon a means for equitable distribution, Rescher says, where the situation warrants merely giving back what one already owns. If things are simply a matter of an accounting, then the problematic of ethics is not involved. The issue can be simply one of “collective” justice. However, one should not confuse justice in this sense with fairness, since where the mere giving and getting of one’s due share is the only thing that matters, then the ethical issues of charity and selfabnegation have no role to play. Rescher shrewdly observes that a “juster” world is not necessarily a “better” world.3 However, in the real world of human life, the role taken by the philosopher is that of developing a principle of distribution that is both defensible on ethical and moral grounds and also being capable of dealing with situations involving the distribution of certain goods that are not even existent. For Rescher it is the ethical dimension of the enterprise of devising such a principle which is of paramount importance, and which is complicated by the fact that it must have application in those less than ideal situations found in the real world. The attempt to devise a theory of distributive justice must involve establishing, on the basis of ethical and moral grounds, a principle for assessing “alternative possible distributions.” His emphasizing the ethical and moral justifications of such a principle is intended to again draw attention to the limitations found in attempts by economists to address issues relating to distributive justice. Here Rescher reiterates his stated dissatisfaction with the Pareto Principle, essentially on the grounds that (1) the principle assumes the impractical scenario that no person is ever hurt in the process of even the slightest improvement to the general welfare of a community, and

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(2) that the principle provides no criterion for deciding between competitive improvements, should any exist.4 He proceeds to attack economists like Nicholas Kaldor, who advocate a separation between questions of production and those of distribution. Kaldor would have economists be in sole charge of the former, while politicians will be in control of distribution. 5 According to Rescher, Kaldor would claim that any increase in goods and services is a good as opposed to the situation provided by the old order, since those who are the beneficiaries of the increases would simply turn around and compensate from the new bounty those who are the losers, rewarding the latter because of their willingness to go along with the new order. This, Rescher says, is mythology, both in theory and practice. The conceptual flaw Rescher sees in the above view is that it erroneously distinguishes between production and distribution. In this view, production is seen merely as the result of exercising the mechanical means of efficiently controlling the supply of a commodity, and the kinds of material considerations that come into play in achieving the increase. In such a case production is quite distinct from distribution, where the latter is seen as the mere allocation of these increased goods and services to certain sectors of the population deemed worthy by the political establishment. Moreover, Kaldor assumes that increased goods can be distributed at will, an abstraction that does not reflect how an economy is actually “...a complex network of institutions, practices and arrangements which limit the possibilities of distribution in various and sometimes in very drastic respects.”6 2. THE CASE AGAINST UTILITARIANISM The philosophic import of Rescher’s remarks thus far is that they prepare the groundwork for his interesting assault upon utilitarianism. This attack is armed with the views of W. D. Ross’ intuitionism, in particular it is a thrust based upon a persons’ unique ability to intuit the “moral sense” of a case. When critiquing utilitarianism Rescher states that it is best to deal with it retrospectively rather than prospectively. This is to say that one can get lead astray with irrelevant empirical issues relating to the casual consequences of distribution when the matter is approached solely in terms of the possible consequences of actions, missing thereby any discussion concerning the real value of the results of the actions themselves, “after everything is said and done.”7 This is avoided when the utilitarian position is

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considered retrospectively, that is in terms of the value of the ultimate utilitarian outcomes themselves. This emphasis on the outcome makes no assumptions concerning the moral attributes of the individuals affecting the distribution. It avoids in turn issues relating to individual self-interest, interest or disinterest. Avoided as well are issues relating to the ways and means of distribution, of just distributions unjustly arrived at, and who has the right (morally) to choose as to the manner of distribution. Thus the focus of Rescher’s critique of utilitarianism will be mainly on the comparative justness of alternative distributions. In a sense the position he is asking us to take is that of off-stage observers who have no effect on what has actually happened. We are simply making retrospective preferential judgments about “...wholly defined alternatives involving human action.” We are not assuming the position of the moral agent who has actually taken part in the scenario. Fundamentally, Rescher notes that utilitarianism is unable to provide criteria for deciding between alternative distributions of a good. In this there is rigidity in the view itself, since it cannot consider any possible varieties of how a distribution is to be effected. Some utilitarians have shifted their requirement to that of the “greater good,” forsaking the older and more familiar requirement of the “greater number.” In doing this they have concentrated too heavily on the total good, as opposed to the pattern of its distribution. Their former consideration of the more traditional criterion of the “greater number” in matters pertaining to distribution was their way of lowering the standards for what could be taken as the “total good.” Rescher finds it unconscionable that a moral theory, such as utilitarianism, can allow individual interests to be sacrificed for the greater good. A “utility floor” must surely be introduced to protect against the excesses of the group as a whole. His views are clearly consistent with his adoption of Ross’ intuitionism, in that Rescher lays stress upon the intuitive clarity of the danger where larger numbers can easily overwhelm individual interests. Utilitarian theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries often attempted to defend the unfairness implicit in view by claiming that there simply was never enough subsistence for everyone in the society. This morally indefensible position Rescher claims itself underscores the need to add to the floor noted earlier a principle of equity to handle utility allocations, something along the lines of “...a rule of least deviation from the average...”8 Here he refers to John Hospers recognition of the inherent defect in utilitarianism, namely its inability to balance the total amount of good at issue with the fairness of the distribution itself. Rescher does not insist that

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his suggestion of an “effective average” will be the panacea for securing fairness in distribution, but it is certain from his perspective that utilitarianism by itself is inept in handling the issue of fairness. Utilitarianism, Rescher goes on to state, is basically flawed because it does not take into account the individual’s claims, merits and/or deserts. Without these no theory of distributive justice can lay claim to viability. The problem here basically is that utilitarians fail to deal with the reality of diversity among individuals, in terms of the latter’s abilities, social status, interests, and those distinguishing conditions that determine uniqueness. Bentham showed his disregard for just distribution where he says that justice is itself an obscure notion that gets “in the way of” happiness. Mill then proceeded to defend the morality of utilitarianism as Bentham had presented it by arguing that an “in itself” just distribution can never lead to happiness since it will ultimately undermine the structure of any society. Hence justice for Mill must be a derivative of utility, and not the other way around, as Cicero claimed. Rescher is opposed to both views since both erroneously assume that justice and utility must come to terms of agreement with each other in some sense. What is being assumed here fails to consider the difference between immanent goodness within a hypothetical universe, and transeunt goodness, which is the amount of goodness of a hypothetical universe. Utilitarians like Sidgwick handle this difference carelessly, thinking that the former is inconsequential if not meaningless, and that all that counts is transuent goodness, which is the goodness of the entirety. To pursue matters in this way is to avoid the issues that limit utilitarianism from ever becoming a viable theory that explains distributive justice. Utilitarianism in an unrestricted sense claims that the sheer maximization of goodness is a good in itself, paying absolutely no attention to considerations of justice, and totally ignoring factors relating to whether or not an individual is “deserving”. In the absence of the possibility of considering a person’s relevant or legitimate deserts, the principle of utility must fail as a principle of distribution. Rescher goes on to observe that the matter is more complex than simply “giving” someone what he or she already “owns.” A principle of “proportionality” is needed to replace that of utility, so that the shares of distribution may be proportionate to the legitimate claims of the deserts.9 There is thus a need to take into account the functional deservingness of the individual in terms of how his claim figures in the context of the setting in which he operates.

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3. TWO SEPARABLE CONCEPTS: FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE Additionally, one should look at justice in terms of its two contraries, namely injustice and more than justice, i.e. compassion, generosity and mercifulness. Utilitarians cleave to the “more than just” category since they consider only the numbers to be rewarded, not whether the individuals are deserving of reward. To reward good for good, and evil for evil, is to offer a theory which conflicts with rule-utilitarianism. The latter surely misses the fact there simply is no monolithic factor that justifies the merit of a claim. Functional and role-related considerations must come into play. Rescher observes that “...A man does not simply “deserve x,” [rather] he “deserves x of y in virtue of z.””10 A doctrine of distribution which shows no sensitivity for judicial accommodation of claims is no doctrine of distributive justice at all. By way of illustration Rescher cites the case of the child and the senior citizen, both of which achieve the blessedness of Heaven. The Lord places the older arrival at a higher level of repose than the child. The child protests, claiming that it should be rewarded in the same manner as his senior companion. The Lord explains that the older person, in his long life, had done more good deeds than the child, and that had He allowed the child to live longer it would have never made it to Heaven. A loud clamor is then heard by the inhabitants of Hell, all of whose voices issue forth with the one complaint that they too should have been allowed to live for as long as the child.11 The matter of distributive justice, as Rescher sees it, becomes even more complex where distribution contends with the context of unearned claims, as in the case of an heir’s claim to an inheritance. Inheritance is defended by “positive law,” and ironically utilitarians usually are found supporting this instance of an unearned claim on the basis of what contributes to the “common good.” Most common cannons of distributive justice are found to be wanting because they fail to take into account the legitimacy of people’s claims. Rescher reviews various cannons of distributions, e.g. equality, need, ability, effort, productivity, social utility, etc., and all fail to avoid exclusivity. Distribution based on universal equality, for example, leads to public outrage since it fails to respect the legitimacy of the individual’s claims. The naturally gifted individual is cheated by a system of distribution that disregards the striking effect of his or her talent or skill. Exceptional work goes unrecognized, and society suffers through a lack of emphasis upon excel-

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lence. Similarly a cannon of distribution based on need is not only inherently ambiguous, but it totally neglects the right of inheritance. Parallel problems emerge if the standard is based upon natural ability, since the latter is not something that has been earned, thus it cannot be something that can serve as a primary basis for a claim. Rewards offered on the basis of effort alone, without peripheral considerations, leads to favoring incompetence. It produces a situation that provides no incentive for the development of a skill. Productivity also leads to unfairness as a standard since it rewards the physically stronger at the expense of the physically weaker, though the latter may have had no say in their condition. Finally, supply and demand, the capitalist approach, is similarly flawed since it is insensitive to unearned claims, and to factors pertaining to individual effort and need.12 Rescher concludes that in the final analysis distributive justice must be based upon the legitimacy of the individual’s claims, not upon standards of exclusivity as exemplified above. Each of the above criteria commits the sin of omission in failing to include the unavoidable broader picture. A proper criterion for distribution is needed, one that is more pluralistic and heterogeneous. One of the most important matters to be determined prior to setting forth the conditions for the fairness of a distribution, however, is that of “what can be produced” in a given situation. It is this foundation which has a lot to say in the fairness of what is determined to be “the greatest good” or “from each according to ability.” In an economy of scarcity it can propel questions of fairness to the forefront of importance, while under conditions of affluence it can render issues relating to distributive fairness to virtual insignificance. Rescher again asks the reader to distinguish between fairness and justice in the sense of the general good. Fairness and justice do not conflict according to Rescher, since the former deals with what is “simply” fair, whereas the latter involves considerations of the common good and the principles of production. Justice in this broader sense, which he also refers to as “true justice,” requires considering more than fairness and equity, since it extends to an examination of “social advantage, claims, rights, and deserts.”13 This separation of fairness from justice can be illustrated by the case where one must give preference to the claims of only one of two ambassadors, where the claims of both are perfectly equal. The indivisibility of the good is obviously apparent here, as well as the fact that principles of equity

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are inapplicable. Here one does not have a situation where the proportionality of shares comes into play. To solve the problem by introducing “equality of opportunity” would only underscore the fact that the simple allocation of shares to claims is not feasible. Hence the issue is not simply one of fairness. Rather the matter must be addressed along the lines of a broader conception of justice, where social advantage, claims, rights, etc., come into play. The inapplicability of the notion of fairness can also be seen in the scenario of an economy of scarcity. For if the “good” to be distributed is so small that it cannot possibly be distributed to everyone without having everyone live on a sub-minimal level, employing the principle of fairness for all would then be disastrous. What is needed here is a consideration of the “total good,” where a “utility floor” allows as many people as possible to compete for the limited resources that are available.14 Rewarding the deserving person in the context of having established a utility floor eliminates the possibility of “utility deprivation” that would be brought about through the strict application of the principle of fairness. On the other hand, under conditions of economic prosperity, the paradox that emerges is that by raising the standard for what counts as the minimal standard of the good life, one also raises the feeling of “economic insufficiency.” This boils down to one having to come to grips with what the society can provide in securing the highly elusive state of the “satisfactory life.” The worry over survival pervading the prior scenario in the economy of scarcity has now given way to the concern with whether one is living “well enough” under conditions of economic affluence. Rescher goes on to introduce a vitally important observation in the context of the preceding discussion. He states that greater rewards for the exceptionally gifted person are sanctioned not by the claims of those individuals themselves, but by the society who sees them as providing the incentives for furthering the general welfare of everyone. Here again one notes how Rescher is insisting that it is not a principle of fairness that is at the basis of this sort of allocation but the broader principle that speaks to the long term well being of the society as a whole. Thus he concludes that inequality is economically justified if it counts as a necessary incentive.15 Rescher notes that it is at this point that one clearly sees how economists have parted company with ethicists, who are concerned only with the principles of distribution. The former have sought to concentrate upon identifying and controlling those measurable factors that increase production and thereby insure abundance. They thus sanction welfare economics through

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the “de-ethicization” of economics. The ethicists are concerned with the justice of the distribution in the broader sense Rescher outlines above. At this juncture Rescher is carefully re-tracing the steps of his critique of welfare economics in the first chapter of Distributive Justice. While he retains his basic position that economists have failed miserably in defining in quantitative terms utility values, as these pertain to individuals and intersubjectively to the public as a whole, their analysis of the basic elements responsible for increasing production has served to insure a fundamental level of material well being for most in industrialized societies. Thus while his discussion on how economics de-ethicized values retains its caustic character, specifically with respect to the lack of any realistic concern for values and the human element in the study of economics, he ends by saying that through their efforts at identifying the concrete and quantifiable elements of production, economists have contributed significantly to the basic material welfare of most. Curiously, the implication of what he is arguing is that economists, though unable to deal with issues of value as these pertain to individuals and societies, have nonetheless managed to bring about a positive effect by way of enhancing the general material well being of most. It is not that their failure in the former pursuit is a cause of their success in the latter, but rather that in doing what they do best, that is, by their concentration on understanding, predicting, and controlling the measurable factors involved in production, they have made possible the material betterment of life generally. The question naturally arises whether this material improvement is itself a “moral improvement.” One would expect Rescher to argue that there is more to moral value than simply the presence of material abundance. For if this was not the case then value becomes simply a material condition. This is not what he wants to conclude. Rescher would insist, it seems, that for these effects to have a moral character, they would have to have been generated under conditions which where keenly sensitive to human values, with which the de-ethicized study of economics is unable to cope. Hence the good that economists bring about is at best a positive transformation of the preexistent state of an economic condition, either in the direction of scarcity or of abundance, relative to what the state of an economy calls for. As such, it is value neutral in any moral sense since questions of distribution have not yet entered into the picture. It is only when our attention turns to how individuals within the community benefit from what economist have managed to bring about that question of value and justice come into play.

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4. MORAL VALUES AND SOCIAL SYNERGY. HARE CONTRA RESCHER: DEFENDING THE NON-INTUITIVE NATURE OF UTILITARIANISM It now becomes clearer at this point why Rescher insists at the outset of Distributive Justice that his position with respect to his critique of utilitarianism is retrospective and externalized, and not prescriptive. His views on how conditions pertaining to personal deserts, advantage, rights, claims, etc. can be considered only after the reward is available for distribution, not before. Moral value is a function of the synergy between the individual and the environment, where both are understood in terms of their unique complexity, and the needs of each of these major components are met for the continuance of life. It is the reflection upon the variety of ways in which rewards can be distributed so as to maintain the dynamic movement of life that attracts Rescher’s interest, and utilitarianism simply cannot deal with such complexity. Rescher goes on to conclude that the bitter pill utilitarians must swallow is that the conditions of fairness and justice are not derived from within utilitarianism itself, but are external to it. In fact utilitarianism must become subservient to the principle of justice mentioned above, and its only useful application is in the area of legislation, where the stability and equality of conditions is a given. 16 More recently, R. M. Hare has attempted to defend utilitarianism from Rescher’s onslaught. In the essay “Utilitarianism and the Vicarious Affects” he endeavors to refute Rescher’s central claim in Unselfishness that utilitarianism is simply unable to deal with the complexity of the actual world in which we have all come to be involved.17 Specifically, Hare focuses upon Rescher’s reference to the fact there are certain vicarious affects which we must take into account and which have, or at least should have, a pivotal influence in how we decide to act in a moral context. These are situations where for example we are concerned for the safety of others, as in the case of our concern for the well being of our own child when it is ill or the safety of a loved one when they are traveling in an unfamiliar area, though we ourselves are not personally confronted with any danger. Vicarious affects may be either positive or negative. In the latter case we may find ourselves pleased at our enemie’s distress, or envious of their successes. Hare notes that in Rescher’s view reflection upon positive vicarious affects have the important function of extricating us from the propensity to act solely from the point of view of our own self interests. They

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induce us to consider the impicational details of the broader picture, so that our moral actions will come to share in greater social cooperation and beneficence, which in turn insures the achievement of optimality for all concerned.18 Hare observes how Rescher argues that since utilitarianism is locked into a benevolence of impartiality, following Bentham’s dictum: “Everybody to count for one, and nobody for more than one.” it cannot deal with the popular partiality which positive vicarious affects direct our attention to in normal circumstances. For example, utilitarianism cannot handle the situation where we feel that we are morally obligated to take care of our own children, but unwilling to accept the responsibility of raising a total stranger’s offspring. To this extent then it can be said that utilitarianism is self-defeating since it cannot achieve optimality. In other words, it cannot deal with the exception that the ordinary situation often demands, since in its desire to treat everyone the same utilitarianism finds itself needing to suppress the very vicarious affects which any normal and everyday situation engenders.19 Hare rejects Rescher’s critique of utilitarianism on such grounds since it fails to take into account the “substantial component” of the doctrine of utilitarianism, which is grounded in the facts as they are, and not as they appear in some fantastical view of the world. Critics, including Rescher, have assumed that all there is to the doctrine is its “formal or theoretical component,” which holds for any logically possible world. Consequently they proceed to charge utilitarianism with the defect of not being able to operate in the complex context of practical moral questions. This approach is surely unfair to the utilitarian position, and Hare endeavors to illustrate that it shortchanges how utilitarianism can be of great service in resolving practical moral issues. For example, Hare argues that in the case of the care of the feeding and rearing of our own children, utilitarianism can provide a more cogent reason than Rescher does as to why we should prefer doing the former, rather than attempt to care for all the children in the world. Quite simply, fostering a feeling of moral obligation for the caring of all children will produce a scenario where more children will come to be less well fed, and more will face starvation. Moreover, a universally felt obligation to feed all children is less likely to inspire us to meaningful humanitarian action, than one which requires that we attend to the more immediately felt needs of children we have brought into the world. The utilitarian solution aims at improving “the good, in sum, of those affected.” In doing so its rationale is coherent and consistent, and not subject to the relativism of

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positions which rely upon “intuitions about rights and justice which vary with the politics of their exponents,...” 20 Hare then proceeds to his other key argument. He states that one can handily give a utilitarian account of intuitionism, which shows that at a higher critical level of analysis utilitarianism actually includes intuitive moral reasoning, and is thus more fundamental than the latter. Thus though some philosophers have come to view their moral intuitions as sacrosanct and beyond critical evaluation, they have failed to understand that these intuitions are the direct results of their early experiences, and/or of the influence of those who have been closest to them. There is surely no other way to explain how we can speak of right and wrong intuitions unless they were somehow given birth in our actual experience. If we are lucky to have the right influences early in our lives, these will produce the “right” dispositions that will serve us in good stead as moral intuitions in our practical decision-making.21 All of the above is made evident when at the level of critical analysis we ask: What are the intuitions we ought to have? Answering this question by appealing to intuition itself would be fruitless, since doing so would only generate further circularity. Thus we are forced to consider something in our experience itself that will serve as the explanation for having a proper intuition. The advantage which act-utilitarianism has over any strictly intuitionistic approach to moral decision making, according to Hare, is that it has a productive way of resolving situations where duties conflict. The utilitarian always considers whether doing one thing or its contrary will result in an effect that is conducive to whether “its general acceptance in society will be optimific.”22 The inculcation in one’s thinking of dispositions which are grounded from such deliberation insures for the act-utilitarian that he will live as well as he possibly could. In Hare’s view it now becomes difficult to argue in Rescher’s manner that a utilitarian cannot address the requirements engendered by vicarious affects. If anything, act-utilitarianism insists that the consideration of vicarious affects is absolutely essential to the achievement of optimality. What Rescher does, and which is seen as unfair by Hare, is to create artificial situations set up on the bases of game-theory matrices, and then to portray the utilitarian as an all-knowing figure, applying a rule of thumb version of utilitarianism to generate consequences that are antithetic to what we would expect to see happen in everyday situations. The flaw with Rescher’s critique is that it renders utilitarians as super humans, “archangels,” having full cognizance of all the effects of all their actions. This is a

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caricature of the doctrine that is far too simplistic to do justice to what actutilitarianism stands for. Moreover, it is a mistake to claim that the rational act-utilitarian automatically suppresses positive vicarious affects. In Hare’s view it is more correct to say that whether the act-utilitarian suppresses or does not suppress considering a vicarious affect depends upon whether that affect is perceived to be beneficial. When we reach the point of seeing how the act-utilitarian has allowed himself to be inculcated by dispositions resulting from his mode of decision making, then we will come to the realization that he is operating in the exact same manner as that of a rational intuitionist. Hare concludes that at this point no difference can be seen between the two, except that the utilitarian understands the need for asking the question of whether he has the right intuitions, whereas the intuitionist does not.23 Rescher’s reply to Hare’s critique begins with two basic questions: (1) What is this utility which utilitarianism is said to maximize? and (2) “... what sort of utility is to be maximized in our utilitarian calculations?”24 Answers to these questions require that we resolve an issue that is more profound and more fundamental than the mere adoption of the position of act-utilitarianism. For we cannot use the principle of utility to justify our pursuit of a form of moral decision making that counts positive vicarious affects and discounts negative ones. Something needs to be decided first, and in Rescher’s view what is involved here is the very issue of what sort of standard utilitarianism is. Basically Rescher’s quarrel with the utilitarians is seen to be a logical quarrel. Its resolution requires that we investigate and determine first “how things work in the realm of human affairs...,” and not by simply starting with the reckoning of utilitarian calculations. The facts of life, Rescher says, are so much more compellingly basic and important to the non-utilitarian than Bentham’s principle of utility. For the intuitionist the displacement of the boundary between these facts and the realm of principle is an unacceptable consequence of the utilitarian position.25 Though Rescher finds utilitarianism to be closer to his own view in the area of public and political ethics, it is in the area of personal morality and individual decision-making that utilitarianism appears to flounder. In this respect Rescher claims that utilitarianism commits the error of transposing a reasonable standard for social decision-making into one for personal ethics. This is simply unacceptable. In addition, Rescher observes that though Hare is correct in holding that our intuitions should be subject to scrutiny and careful evaluation, this does not imply that the only proper standard of

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evaluation is the theory of utility. Here Rescher concludes that in his view intuitions should be studied and made part of a democratic project of evaluation, refinement, and cohesive systematization. They are data of varying “weight and significance” which the theoretician must weave into a systematic pattern without destroying, in the process, their essential nature; somewhat analogously to the way that natural science has systematizes data of various levels into a body of knowledge about the world.26 Rescher’s profound disagreement with utilitarianism is voiced as well at the close of a later work, Moral Absolutes, where he observes that the utilitarian’s impetus to moral conduct is bonded only to considerations that involve the reckoning of general advantage.27 Thus utilitarians cannot provide a cogent reason as to why we “ought to be” moral, in the sense of one having an actual moral obligation. The utilitarian is used to seeing morality as a matter of personal interest, to the extent where moral obligation does not appear on his radar screen. His biggest difficulty, therefore, lies in going from selfish motivation to deontic obligation. There is for the utilitarian, according to Rescher, no machinery provided him by his very position for his doing this. Morality that is validated either upon a basis of social solidarity or upon personal advantage is no morality at all, since it is not a morality that is adequately linked to the value system of morality itself, i.e. to respect for persons, honesty, fairness, advancing the legitimate interests of others, etc.28 The questions of why one should be moral in the first place and why one should do moral acts, questions that demand resolution prior to the reckoning that utilitarians treat as essential, are never frontally addressed by them. NOTES 1

Rescher, Sensible Decisions (2003), pp. 99-100.

2

Rescher, Distributive Justice (1966), p.5. [See also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, Chapter 2.]

3

Ibid., pp.6-7.

4

Rescher, Distributive Justice, pp. 13-14.

5

Ibid., pp. 14-15.

6

Ibid., p. 16.

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NOTES 7

Ibid., p. 20.

8

Ibid., p. 32.

9

Ibid., pp. 57-58.

10

Ibid., pp. 61-62.

11

This illustration is taken from the works of the Arabian philosopher Ghazali. See Rescher’s Cosmos and Cognition (2005), p. 97.

12

Ibid., pp. 75-81.

13

Ibid., p. 92.

14

Ibid., p. 96.

15

Ibid., pp. 102-103.

16

Ibid., pp. 116-117.

17

R. M. Hare, “Utilitarianism and the Vicarious Affects,” in E. Sosa (ed.), The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher (London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979).

18

Ibid., p. 141.

19

Ibid., p. 142.

20

Ibid., pp. 145-6.

21

Ibid. p. 148

22

Ibid.

23

Ibid., pp. 149-51.

24

Rescher, “Reply to Hare,” in E. Sosa (ed.), The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher, (London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), p. 153.

25

Ibid., p. 154.

26

Ibid., pp. 154-5.

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NOTES 27

Rescher, Moral Absolutes (1989), p. 88-89.

28

Ibid., p. 89 and pp. 92-93.

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Chapter 5 Quantifying Preference and Practical Action Rescher’s metrization of individual preference illustrates a precise characterization of choice, going beyond that provided by economists and utilitarians. From this formalization he arrives at the concept of a group’s aggregate sum value as conceptually distinct from the concepts of “social choice” and “social practice”. Choice is then seen in the isomorphic contexts of cost and information acquisition, when applied to practical action. 1. THE DISCONNECT BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE AND SOCIAL VALUATION

R

escher takes care to apply the analytical tools of logic and mathematics to illustrate the complexity of the personal preference relation, and its possible connection to social valuation, and he thereby succeeds in showing in very clear terms is the derivative nature of that sense of preference that emerges from a matrix of choice options. This aspect of his work may prove somewhat taxing for a reader who is unfamiliar with formal logic but is important for illustrating the diverse styles of philosophizing his work manifests, particularly in earlier writings. The discussion of distributive justice in the prior chapter comes to involve the idea of preference as the operative notion for determining how rewards are to be allocated. One also recalls that in Introduction to Value Theory Rescher asks the reader to consider the conditions under which it is said that someone has or subscribes to certain values. The response requires that we observe how a person defends a certain position or particular cause, for in doing so that person is illustrating his or her commitment to a value or a set of values. Moreover, one would eventually come to expect from that agent, based upon our knowledge of his or her past behavior, a certain mode of activity in terms of alternative choices offered within specific contexts as a further indication of his or her commitment to those values. Rescher states that ultimately values, though things sui generis to the mind, are “made known” to us by the way in which an individual desires to direct his/her choices. Hence the evidence that certain things are of impor-

Nicholas Moutafakis

tance for someone will emerge in the actions performed and in the things said.1 All of this is seen as something distinct from the rationality of values as standards held by the agent. This is to say that the reason why we hold the values we do involves something that lies beyond the scope of logic. In a sense our values lay at the rock bottom of our intuitive disposition toward the world, they come to manifest our “gut reaction” to that world. Rescher had written extensively about preferences and their logic early in his career.2 For him the philosopher only observes this behavior and infers and/or assesses the individual’s commitment to values on the basis of what the subject says and does. It is in this way that one realizes how value is basic to the concept of preference, the latter being the externalized manifestation of one’s personal choice of values.3 As so often happens in his work, it is a topic he investigates because of his dissatisfaction with the manner by which economists or other social theorists have dealt with these issues in the past. In Rescher’s view the latter simply take preferences as given, without further elaboration. What he proposed as early as 1966 is quantifying the preference relation, in a way that moves it away from the simplistic and one dimensional domain of what is held to be “intrinsically preferred”, to one where preference reflects real life, in terms of alternatives, consequences, choices, and risks. Thus in “Notes on Preference, Utility, and Cost,” for example, Rescher identifies his goal as that of investigating the metric aspect of three concepts which are closely related to each other in economics, namely preference, utility, and cost. He begins by noting his objection to the traditional objections by economists to a measurement of cardinal utility. The complex interpersonal character of the situation of preferences with regard to X preferring apples, and Y preferring oranges, has driven theoretical economists to abandon the idea of metric utility in favor of a measurement of comparative utility. However, he believed that the problems here were not as limiting as economists have made them out to be. His approach is twofold. First he proceeds to illustrate the “metrization” of individual preferences. Second, he will proceed to illustrate the “interpersonalization of metrized individual preferences.”4 The latter is the closest we can get to a concept of an aggregate preference, as opposed to a social value, which is totally unrelated to the former. Rescher notes that quite simply the rule of transitivity, when applied to choices a, b, c, e.g. a < b < c, does not say anything concerning an individual’s personal reaction to each choice as say, perfectly awful, rather bad, neutral, pretty good, or perfectly wonderful. Thus a straightforward formal

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preference-ordering does not say anything about the details of X’s absolute grading or X’s comparative assessment of the preference for one item as opposed to another. Both these factors are seen as the basic components of the machinery that is required for the metrization of individual preferences. Here an important point emerges, namely that his intent is not to elicit the measure for X, but rather to construct it for X on the basis of information elicited from X concerning her/his choice. Thus there is no imposition of value or preference-commitments on X, rather the idea is to numerically characterize the “reflection” of preferences as the agent’s response affords us the necessary information. All that is assumed, along with a respondent’s behavior, is the fundamental requirement of logical (rational) consistency.5 As with his critique of utilitarianism above,6 Rescher’s approach here is retrospective, not prescriptive. This is to say that preference is considered in terms of quantifying a pattern of observed responses within the context of an individual’s range of alternative choices, rather than in terms of attempting a rationalization of the so-called intrinsic nature of preference, in terms of its so called intrinsic nature, or what the agent “ought” to have preferred. Next he combines the individual preferences determined along the lines outlined above into an expression concerning an interpersonal measure of preference. The problem here is to find a function of combination, F, so as to define an interpersonal, social measure, relative to a group of persons and an array of alternatives. Consider the sequence of alternatives, a1, a2, a3, ... taken as having the resulting metric values: m(a1), m(a2), m(a3), ... The problem then is that of devising a means so as to make the transition from personal to social valuation, i.e. to the value of F. Rescher suggests the following matrix, where the individuals involved are expressed as: X1, X2, X3, ...

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a2 a3 ..., aj m1(a1), m1(a2), m1(a3), ..., m1(aj), .... m2(a1), m2(a2), m2(a3), ..., m2(aj), .... m3(a1), m3(a2), m3(a3), ..., m3(aj), ....

a1 X1 X2 X3 . . . Xi . . . .7

mi(a1), mi(a2), mi(a3), ..., mi(aj), ....

The issue now is to define the social measure of m*(aj) as the combinatory function F, on the basis of the valuation of aj: m*(aj) ‘ F[m1(aj),m2(aj),m3(aj), ...] Generally, one can say that Rescher sees the symmetry of F, in the sense of it being a principle of “equity” or of “indifference.” This is to say that in Rescher’s view F treats the preference-ratings of Xj in the same way without regard to specifics. Thus, (1) F(..., x..., y,..,) ≡ F(..., y..., x...). Closely allied to the principle of indifference Rescher’s sees another characteristic of F, namely, what he terms the person-to-person indifference of an increment. This thesis simply states that the measurements mi for each Xi have identical scales. This is the construction of social preference valuation “the views of persons are to “count for one.”“ It provides for what Rescher terms an identity of scaling.8 Hence, (2) F(..., x.., y+ξ, ...)≡ F(..., x+ξ, ..., y,...), identically in Z. It is important to point out that (1) speaks to the sequence (or order) in which F treats all the preference-ratings in the very same way, whereas (2) specifies consistency of numerical measure.

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One outcome of the analysis thus far is that Rescher sees F as a function simply of the sum of its parameters. Thus it is a linear function, and thus also it satisfies the linearity condition, expressed as: (3) F(x, y,..., z) ‘ a(x + y +...+ z) + b. One additional and non-problematic restriction on F is proposed next, namely what he terms the uniformity-condition. (4) F(x, x,..., x) ‘ x He explains (4) by saying that if everyone agrees upon valuing something to a given degree, then the society as a whole also values it “in this same degree.” Where x’0, then F(x, x,...,x) ‘ a(nx) ‘ x, so that a’1/n. One should be careful in interpreting Rescher’s insight at this point. He is not saying that individual preference determines social values. For he states quite clearly in An Introduction to Value Theory that there is a conceptual separation between individual preferences and “social practice,” and that the two notions are not necessarily inter-relatable.9 Rather, all that (4) is conveying is the idea that where all members of a group value something in a uniformly specific way, then the aggregate sum of all those individual instances of valuing expresses that “everyone” values the object in an identical way. One ought not call this the group’s “social value” or “the social practice,” since the latter, as a concept, must somehow provide for the autonomy of the individual’s freedom within a democracy, and therefore the possibility of dissent. Much later, in Sensible Decisions Rescher makes this same point with riveting clarity “Y a healthy democratic social order cannot only tolerate, but ever-within limits B welcome discussions (disagreements, discords), provided that the conflicts are kept within “reasonable bounds Y.”10 An aggregate of individual preferences naturally does not convey this idea individual autonomy. Social value therefore carries with it a strong sense that it is not nor need it be an expression of “unanimity” of the aggregate population. This is consistent with Rescher’s overarching theme that moral choice, which Kenneth Arrow would look upon as an extrane-

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ous factor, is individual specific and not attributable or transferable to a community or society as a whole. In Moral Absolutes, for example, Rescher states that morality is by nature a functional enterprise, cultivated by rational agents for the realization of certain benefits.11 Moral value is thus naturally something judged of an agent’s conduct, it is not properly attributable to a state or social entity. Though we may often allow ourselves to speak rhetorically of “the nation’s sense of justice” or of “the fairness of a country’s foreign policy,” what is actually meant by these expressions is that there is a sense of justice or fairness which the legislator(s) or public official(s) is known to share, and that this is held by them as “properly” representing the disposition of the majority of their constituents. By contrast, the combinatory function F is simply the average or arithmetical mean of its parameters. (3) F(x, y, …, z)’ a(x + y+ … + z)+ b Rescher now proceeds to consider the linearity assumption in (3) from a number of different perspectives. First, considered from the point of view of the marginal indifference of an increment, (3) can be rewritten as: (3’) F(..., x + ξ, ...) – F (…, x, …) ≡ F(..., u + ξ, ...) - F(..., u ...), identically in ξ. ‘Marginal value’ is thus a constant within the context of this group-relativized counterpart, just as in the previous case regarding individualized mi-valuations, they were interpreted as measures of utility having c constant marginal worth.12 Second, another way of interpreting (3) is to see how it stipulates scaling invariance. For where (3’) is re-interpreted as: (3’’) F(..., x + ξ, ...) -F(..., u + ξ, ...) ≡ F(...,x,...) –F(...,u,...), identically in ξ. In (3’’) one has expressed the fact that “… any systematic re-setting of the origin of an individual’s preference-valuation, [e.g. mi#(aj) ‘ mi(aj) + c; c constant], will leave the differences in the social metrization of the alternatives unaffected.” This is the stipulation of scaling invariance Rescher referred to earlier with regard to (3).

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The concluding point is that social valuation ms can be defined in terms of averaging individual valuation mi, so that: ms(aj) ‘ 1/n[m1(aj) + m2(aj) +...+ mn(aj)]. Rescher points out that this analysis works only in cases where one is dealing with objects of public possession or social states involving everyone, but not with items of exclusive possession. The latter incurs the need to consider a way of rectifying the unevenness in the patterns of the distribution of benefits. Thus rather than working with the average represented by: ms, one must now deal with the effective average: ms* ‘ ms -2σs. In this case σs is the standard deviation from the mean ms for the several valuations mi(aj). Rescher retains the symmetry and uniformity conditions expressed by (1) and (4) above, but (2) and (3) need qualification in terms of considerations relating to effective averages for evaluations, as it has just been shown.13 The final stage of the analysis deals with the “logic” of the concept of cost. Here Rescher introduces the propositional measure, C(p)P, which is “the cost of bringing it about (or assuring) that P.” This is another way of talking about the “price” of P. C(p) is a propositional measure in the same way as the following are propositional measures: “(1) Pr(p) measuring probability/credibility/ confirmation; (2) U(p) measuring utility/ preferability/ desirability; (3) I(p) measuring content/ informativeness.”14 Rescher proceeds to make several observations concerning C(p). First for any p, 0 ≤ C(p) ≤ ∞. Secondly, where p is necessary [in either a logical or physical sense], then C(p)’ 0. (The same would hold if p is a true proposition about the past.) C(p) should be construed universally as referring to “the price of acting from now on [i.e., henceforth] to assume p.” Where p is impossible, either logically or physically, then C(p) ‘ ∞. [The same holds if p is a false proposition about the past.]

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Where p is a future-contingent proposition, then 0 ≠ C(p) ≠ ∞. These relationships, presented in terms of rules-of-calculation, are found to behave in a formal way so that: (i) C(p) is the inverse of the probability measure, and therefore (ii), it [C(p)] is propositionally identifiable as an information measure. Here Rescher expresses the concept of cost and utility in terms of the role played by an informational component. This is to say that he introduces factors of value, namely cost and utility, as these come to be evaluated within the collective efforts of members of a group endeavoring to bring about some common benefit. In essence what he is suggesting is that a human factor in always centrally involved, determining and defining what cost and usefulness ultimately mean. In concluding “Notes on Preference, Utility and Cost,” Rescher states that the “logic of cost” presents us with no novelty, “but is isomorphically identical with the logic of information.”15 However, can C and I be defined in terms of Pr? Rescher responds to his own question by observing: “there just is no fixed relationship between the C-cost and the Pr-probability value of a proposition.”16 2. AN EXTENSIONAL CALCULUS OF PRACTICAL ACTION The theoretical groundwork he prepares in these discussions works as a foundation for another essay, also written in 1966.17 What he has to say about the quantifiable properties of preference, cost, and utility in the former essay, comes to provide a backdrop for his account of what constitutes practical reasoning about values in the second article. In “Practical Reasoning and Values” we find Rescher exploring the formal properties of discourse concerning practical action. What is significant is that this work reflects an innovative emphasis upon treating these properties as they come to be framed within considerations of value assessment. Thus again the agent is not simply seen as acting in the manner in which an economist would regard him. This is to say as a subject merely reacting to certain conditions of stimulus. Rather the agent is presented as involved in a context that expresses his own evaluative processes, someone who takes into account what the good or well-advised thing to do is. For example, at the outset the discussion shifts smoothly from an analysis of preference to one about practical action. Rescher observes that the resurgence of interest in the analysis of practical reasoning is misguided,

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due to a lack of attention given to the role of values in articulating an adequate theory of practical reasoning. He sees his central aim as that of clarifying the role of value in such inquiry, and of showing how practical reasoning must have at its center a “mechanism for the application of a suitable machinery of valuation.” Fundamentally, Rescher sees practical reasoning in Aristotelian terms, i.e. as rational deliberation leading toward and providing the grounds for action. His initial strategy is to distinguish first certain conceptual facets of action, and to supply terms for them. Thus he sets forth: 1. “generic action type” (e.g. opening a [any] window) 2. “specific action type” (e.g. opening this window) 3. “particular operant” (e.g. this window) 4. “concrete act” or “specific action” (e.g. Jones’s opening of that window at 3 p.m. yesterday.) He notes that the specification of three items in fixing the concrete context, namely, the agent, the specific action type, and the particular occasion of action.18 For the purpose of his analysis, “acts” can be either concretely actual or possible. He next introduces variables to refer to the basic ingredients of his analysis up to now. Thus, assuming the future introduction of subscripts: (1) X, Y, Z, refer to agents (2) x, y, z, refer to specific action types (3) t, t0, t1, t2,.... refer to particular time periods or occasions. An “action performance statement”: [X/x/t] is taken as meaning the formal triadic, “The agent X carries out (performs) the specific action, x, on the particular occasion, t.” However, he endeavors to provide greater depth to his analysis by introducing p, which denotes an action performance sentence. Thus ‘T(X:p)’ is understood as the “task thesis” T : “One thing for X to do (under the existing circumstances) is to make it true that p.” This aspect of his work, as

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well as much of the remaining part of his analysis, comes somewhat close to Richard M. Martin’s independently derived extensionalized pragmatics of discourse, as based upon the latter’s logic of events.19 Moving beyond the Aristotelian focal point, however, Rescher recognizes there are several things that need further elaboration, as far as explaining the kind of performance or action he has in mind. Thus he sees the need to specify two key aspects of performance as: (1) that the thing to be done is the “good or the well advised” thing to do, and not just what the possible or feasible thing to do is, and (2) that with regard to the “task thesis,” the “making” of p to be true is to be taken as an expression of deliberative action on the part of the agent which will (in all probability) make p true. The task thesis is in this sense said to be a first analysis consideration, rather than a final analysis consideration.20 Moreover, Rescher views practical reasoning as the instance where the premises are such that they are about matters adduced in support of a conclusion that is itself a “task thesis.” In the context of his later work, as this has come to be discussed earlier in Chapter 4., Rescher is seen to be asking his readers to view practical inference retrospectively. This is to say that he formalizes the task thesis on the assumption of ones already knowing what its actualization actually involves. For the agent is described as already knowing what it will take to make p true. He proceeds to clarify additional aspects of the task thesis on the basis of this same retrospective approach. He claims that interpreting the task thesis requires making explicit the person (first, second, third) at issue. Hence the general breakdown is to have: a. T(I: [I/x/t]) meaning “One thing for me to do is to do x at t.” A statement of this form is said to be a deliberation-derived judgment.21 b. T(You: [You/x/t]) meaning “One thing for you to do is to do x at t.” Statements of this form are advice-presenting judgments. Rescher sees these kinds of statements as responses to questions of the type: “What—in your judgment—would be a good thing for me to do at t?” c. T(He: [He/x/t]) Again one notices here, and at further points that follow, how this entire analysis is predicted on the informational content derived from an inter-

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rogative context, which is again reflective of the retrospective stance already noted. T(X :[X/x/t]), where X is not I, and X is not you, meaning X would do well to do x at t. The form of such statements are taken as representative of act-advisability judgments, within the context of a dialogue event. They are responses to questions of the nature “What is a (good) thing for him (X) to do at x?” The next distinction to be drawn is that between task theses which are subject-uniform and those which are subject-diverse, e.g. ‘T(X :[Y/x/t])’, where X is not Y. Thus in the case of the latter one has the example of “One (good) thing for the guard to do is to make it true that the prisoner does x at t.” The three restrictions Rescher imposes on any task thesis is that there be no “agency impotence,” “performance impotence,” and “time inaccessibility.”22 Rescher cautions that he will hitherto consider the task thesis in abstraction from moral, legal, prudential, volitional, and synoptic or ceteris paribuis constructions. This, of course, is not to deny the fact that certain interpretations within the aforementioned contexts will have implications for the logical points at issue. Here he observes that the synoptic interpretation, for example, may be most likely at odds with any of the other interpretations, given any subject-uniform task thesis.23 Further restrictions are placed by Rescher on the scope of his inquiry by concentrating only upon categorical (unconditional) task theses of the type ‘T(X :p)’, meaning “One thing for X to do (under the existing circumstances) is to make it true that p”. Thus the hypothetical (conditional) task will not be considered at this juncture. Rescher next offers a practical principle such as: (PI): Whenever anyone wants to achieve an objective and cannot achieve this objective unless he performs a certain action, then one thing for him to do is to perform this action. Principles such as this serve as enthymatic premises to trivialize (to “render deductively valid”) cogent practical arguments, or examples of practical reasoning. The evaluation of such practical principles is the “main task” of a substantive theory of action. The latter is distinguished from a merely logical theory of practical reasoning. An interesting issue arises as a result of Re-

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scher’s last observation, relative to how practical principles work to render “deductively valid” examples of practical reasoning. He will become deeply involved in explaining just how practical reasoning can be a purely formal phenomenon, were facts must play a role. Finally, Rescher states that going from a practical principle to a task thesis, i.e. the conclusion of a practical argument, requires the mediation of a practical premise of the type: “X wants to achieve the objective....”, etc.24 3. ADAPTING PROPOSITIONAL PRACTICAL ACTION

LOGIC

TO

A

LOGIC

OF

Rescher makes numerous references to George Heinrik Von Wright’s “Practical Inferences” (1963), not to illustrate examples of practical inference, but to explicate how they can be subject to greater refinement. Thus he converts von Wright’s argument: (1) X wants to do x. Unless X does y, he cannot do x. _________________________ Therefore, X must do y. into: (2) X must do x. Unless X does y, he cannot do x. [practical principle PR 1.] ________________________________________________ Therefore, X must do y. For Rescher the cogency of (1) is strengthened by replacing von Wright’s “wants to” to ‘must,’ because of PR 1. Departing from the pattern exemplified in (2) one can have: (3) X would do well to do x. Unless X does y, he cannot do x. _____________________________ Therefore, X would do well to do y. In symbolic form this argument can be rendered as:

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(4) T(X : X does x) -[X does y] → -[X does x] _____________________ T (X : X does y) Rescher sees (4) as a “patently cogent, plausible and “valid” practical inference. The validity of (3) is established if one takes task theses as being subject to the usual logical principles, e.g.: Modus Ponens T(X : p) P→q __________ T(X :q)

Modus Tollens T(X : -p) q→p _____________ T(X : -q)25

In presenting his view on the validity of practical reasoning, Rescher notes the importance of keeping the interpretation of X uniform. The same must be said about the interpretation of T, i.e. it will make no difference to the validity of the argument’s forms whether this operator is construed morally, legally, prudentially, etc. In a manner of speaking, the “justification” for the various task theses discussed above arises from the “sanctions” imposed by the moral context, the legal context, etc. Apart from this kind of sanction, there are derivative sanctions, which are the derivation of certain task theses from others. Though there are bound to be certain task theses that are non-derivative, it is the logical derivation of one thesis from another that constitutes, for Rescher, the formal theory of practical reasoning. Furthermore, “the theory governing inferences to ...task theses [are] the key issue in the logical theory of practical reasoning.” Rescher goes on to recognize the crucial difficulty of how one is to apply validity to arguments that derive a task-thesis as a conclusion. For it is obvious that one cannot apply a truth-value to the premises of an argument that is couched in imperatival terms, such as “X is to make it true that p”, etc. This now becomes problematic: How is the concept of validity to be applied to such arguments?26 Rescher’s way of avoiding this issue is to say that p and q are to be interpreted as action performance statements. Hence, the expression p → q is taken as saying “to make it true that p requires making it true that q”, thus by expressing the fact that q one is asserting a practically necessary condi-

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tion for p. What he endeavors to accomplish here is to provide a rigorous logic for action, involving practical inferences, by by-passing the problem of actually including commands in the chain of inference. For by making no assertion commands cannot be true or false. Hence they defy inclusion within a two-valued propositional logic. Thus the expression he uses: “to make it true that q” is his way of rendering the fulfillment of the command “Do q!” into the more manageable assertive form “one doing of q results in …”. The next problem is to consider the issue of competing task-theses, so that the performance of one action on the way of securing a task thesis will necessitate taking a course of action that is undesirable in terms of its broader range of effects. For example, the satisfaction of paying off one creditor from one’s meager funds will prevent the borrower from paying off another. This issue directs Rescher to a consideration of the possibility of whether or not there is a variant conception of the T-operator so as to allow plausible seeming inferences of familiar forms to obtain. The above introduces the idea of “choice” between two task theses, say that of p and q. This is reflected in the form representing inconsistency: T(X :p) T(X :q) ______ p → -q Here Rescher feels it is very important to make the distinction between the “ordinary meritorious-task thesis” and the “(circumstantially) optimal-task thesis”. This is rendered as the difference between “‘One thing for X to do is to make it true that r.’ “so that one has T(X :r), and “‘The very best thing for X to do (under the existing circumstances) is to make it true that r,’” so that one has T#(X : r)27 The above distinction is one which emerges upon carefully considering the different stages involved in deliberation itself, these are: (i) Deliberation ‘A good thing for me to do is A.’ etc.(assuming the stage of feasibility assessment)

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(ii) Decision-Making ‘All considered, the very best I can do under the existing circumstances is to do C.’ (iii) Resolution ‘I shall do C.’ (iv) Implementing Action ‘I do C.’ Rescher notes that the above process can go wrong at any of the above stages. It is to be observed, however, that (i) through (iv) are clearly reflective of his overarching phenomenological thesis. For each stage helps constitute a progression, which determines what defines cognition in the mode of what may be identified as the taxonomy of overt action. His argument now turns to the prospect that where one has circumstantially optimal-task thesis, inconsistent practical inferences are impossible. Under this interpretation it is impossible to have the following as an inconsistent triad: T#(X :p) T# (X :p) _______ p → -q Rescher notes however that even with the introduction of the idea of circumstantially optimal-tasks, there may be cases of the possible failure of the inference pattern: T#(X : p) p→q _______ T#(X : q)

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Here he observes that it may be the case that the very best thing to do is to open the windows in a house, but this may necessarily entail the opening of one window which is not a welcomed outcome. Consequently, Rescher introduces the idea of optimum-derivative task thesis. Expressed as: T*(X :p), and which says that there is an action q such that “the very best thing that X can do is q, and the doing of q implies the doing of p.” Thus it is seen that the doing of p is part of the doing of q, which is an optimal task for X.28 Rescher sees the advantage of T* as avoiding practical inconsistencies such as: T*(X : p) T*(X : q) ________ p → -q Also, as opposed to T#, T* has the advantage of “entailment-transmissibility,” so that one can have inferences of the form: T*(X : p) p→q _______ T*(X :q) Rescher goes on to conclude that his discussion is fast coming around to consideration of which action is the more valuable or meritorious. These question must be seen both in light of the individual merit of an act, and in the way it plays with a whole context of activity. Thus priorities must also come into play, and what the value of an action is. Value must come into focus because of the need to make a decision among incompatible alternatives. Here Rescher is showing the possibility of interrelating the different theses he has worked on for a very long time. Also evident is his concern for the coherence of the picture of decision-making.29 He goes on to note that decision-making is not a matter of championing the ends over the means, or conversely. Rather it is a matter of assessing means and ends on a individual or first level analysis, as well as on the level of contextual relevance, i.e. the final analysis.30 Practical reasoning therefore does not involve only the goals to be achieved, but the cost of those goals within the ranking of our competing wants.31

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NOTES 1

Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory (1966), pp. 3-4.

2

Rescher, “Notes on Preference, Utility, and Cost,” Synthese, vol. 64 (1966). See also The Logic of Decision and Action (1968).

3

I limited the scope of my discussion of Rescher’s formal logic of preference in The Logics of Preference, (1987), pp. 89-118 to the purely form properties of his calculus. What I shall attempt in this chapter is a much broader treatment of his concept of preference, one that involves the contexts of choice, risk, and consequence.

4

Ibid. p. 332.

5

Ibid. p. 335.

6

See Chapter 3. above.

7

Ibid., p. 336.

8

Ibid., p. 337.

9

Rescher, An Introduction to Value Theory (1969) Chapter VIII.

10

Rescher, Sensible Decisions, p. 100.

11

Rescher, Moral Absolutes, (1989), p.6.

12

Rescher, “Notes on Preference, Utility and Cost,” p. 338.

13

Ibid., p. 341.

14

Ibid.

15

Ibid., p. 342. [In conversations with Professor Rescher he cautioned that his remarks on this score should be treated as applying to a limited or qualified frame of reference.]

16

Ibid., p. 343.

17

Rescher, “Practical Reasoning and Action,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 64 (1966), pp.

18

Ibid., p. 121.

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NOTES 19

Richard M. Martin, Events, Reference and Logical Form (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1978).

20

Rescher, “Practical Reasoning and Values,” p. 122.

21

Ibid., p. 123.

22

Ibid., pp. 124-5.

23

Ibid., pp. 125-6.

24

Ibid., p. 126.

25

Ibid., p. 127

26

Ibid., pp. 128-9.

27

Ibid., pp. 130-1.

28

Ibid., p. 132.

29

Ibid., p. 133.

30

Ibid., p. 134.

31

Ibid., p. 135.

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Chapter 6 Personhood and the Absolute Nature of Morality The object of morality resides in protecting and/or enhancing the “valid” interests of persons, which in turn is predicated upon recognizing the universal rationality of those interests. Diversity in social customs does not support a belief in alternate moral standards and actions. 1. LOGICAL POSITIVISM’S BLATANT BEDEVILING OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MORAL CLAIMS

R

escher’s defense of moral absolutism is striking when seen in the context of his rejection of other ethical theories, especially those of his contemporaries. Among these he targets in particular the Logical Positivists, whose influence in academic circles within Great Britain and the United States was substantive and lasted as a dominant philosophical movement from the early 30’s to circa the early or mid 60’s of the past century. Contrary to what the empirical reductionism of Logical Positivism maintained, Rescher insists that moral claims cannot and must not be treated as extending no further than displaying the dynamics or the affects of the emotive use of language. Logical Positivism’s position, vigorously championed by figures such as A. J. Ayer, C. L. Stevenson, M. Schlick, and others, aimed at reassessing the significance of ethical theories, and of metaphysical claims generally, by showing that these do not convey any descriptive information about publicly verifiable facts concerning the actual world.1 Using insights derived from his analysis of the concept of rationality, Rescher counters by holding that there is much more to moral conduct and the logic of its discourse than the mere venting of feelings through the emotive use of language. Positivists, Rescher recounts, following a general trend of thought initiated in the late nineteenth century and carrying along philosophers such as Frederick Nietzsche and Karl Marks—who originally reacted against Kant’s objectivism in ethics—regarded moral claims as nothing more than

Nicholas Moutafakis

expressions of personal attitude.2 They held that moral discourse was intended either for the purpose of conveying the speaker’s personal sentiment of approval or disapproval regarding a specific mode of behavior, or for the purpose of inducing someone to adopt a moral standard through exercising the evocative force of discourse. Ultimately this could come to involve cajoling or actually intimidating the listener to follow the speaker’s directives. Positivists such as Rudolph Carnap elaborated upon this view, while pursuing their over-riding attempt at reforming philosophy through the adaptation of those highly successful techniques and standards of investigation found in the natural sciences, especially those derived from Physics in the early 1920’s. Carnap and others, at the outset, sought to apply the operational concepts developed in the highly rigorous language of that science to Philosophy, seeking thereby to model philosophical discourse along the lines of the language of Physics. They regarded the latter as a language that had been thoroughly cleansed of any emotive bias and of any contamination by metaphysical ambiguities through the creation of a crystal clear referential terminology, augmented with the incorporation of precise mathematical descriptions of physical phenomena. Thus also Moritz Schlick and Otto Neurath, for example, sought to banish from the realm of “productive” philosophical inquiry all of what they regarded as the arcane and “cognitively meaningless” fields of ethics and metaphysics. At best, they argued, these areas are to be seen as correctly belonging within the sphere of poetry and fictional literature in general, rather than to a “real” discipline, where new and productive knowledge could be achieved and empirically established.3 Alternatively, at their worst, the areas of ethics and metaphysics were seen as the moribund remains of an ancient repository of meaningless gibberish, whose sole claim to comprehensibility was due to the fact that they were foolishly proffered by their authors as significant knowledge. However, after seeing through its superficial semblance of grammaticality one found that this knowledge, socalled, contained no objectively determinable and/or verifiable content. It should be underscored that the entire thrust of Logical Positivism was to clarify philosophical discourse by excising from philosophical inquiry all of what had long since become useless to the advancement of knowledge. Thus there was revisionist panache to what it did. Positivists desired to make philosophy productive “again” by adapting it to the methodologies of the natural sciences, which had experienced such phenomenal successes during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, one of the new and “practical” services Positivism claimed to have discovered for

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philosophy was that of demonstrating, through its “newly” realized capacity for logical analysis, the ambiguity laden in certain forms of discourse in general. They suggested that the entire field of philosophical study could now be reoriented and put on a more practical footing, as a field that provided a methodology that allowed one to discern the cognitively meaningful from the cognitively meaningless. For Rescher, however, the grave error promulgated by these reformers was that they assumed morality had absolutely nothing to do with fact, and everything to do with personal sentiments. Positivism prided itself upon having proven, with its Principle of Verification, that moral claims, by virtue of their presumed exclusively personal content, could not be subjected to any public confirmation. The principle stated in essence that a statement is cognitively meaningful only if it can be empirically verified. As a result, moral claims were said to be without any “cognitive meaning,” i.e. they were meaningless with respect to the expression of factual information. By contrast they argued that statements of fact or scientific statements are clearly verifiable and therefore meaningful. The meaning of moral statements were dubbed “emotive,” and their status was seen as strictly “second class,” in contrast to the meaning of scientific statements, which express statements that were subject to verification and were therefore deemed to have greater respectability with respect to their basic cogency. The short sightedness of the Positivist’s view, however, was in its failure to see that “factual claims” can and do report on more than just descriptive matters. By excluding evaluative considerations from the domain of factuality, Positivism insisted upon an unbridgeable (and for Rescher an unjustified) separation between factual promises and evaluative conclusions.4 Rescher also argues that this approach missed what is essential to the study of morality. “... Moral claims are...inherently fact-purporting. The morally determinative circumstance that certain modes of action are conducive and others are deleterious to the best interests of people poses an altogether factual issue. Such matters can be investigated, evidentiated, and sensibly evaluated by the standards generally prevalent in rational discussion and controversy. Moral issues are not merely matters of feeling or taste, but represent something objective about which one can deliberate and argue in a sensible way, on the basis of reasons whose cogency is, or should be, accessible to anyone. The modes of behavior of people that render life in their communities “nasty, brutish, and short” (or indeed even merely more difficult and less pleasant than need be) admit of straightforward and generally easy discernment.... [Italics added]”5

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Fundamentally, Rescher’s approach to the study of morality is predicated on a premise first set forward by Franz Brentano, that the morally good is that which is deserving and worthy of our love and desire as rational agents, because it can be shown—in a perfectly objective way—to promote our true interests. Judgments of what is morally good are therefore judgments of fact, since they are subject to characterization as either correct or incorrect, given certain conditions prevailing at the time and certain universal ethical norms which have relevant application. Citing W. D. Ross, Rescher notes that it is not our personal admiration of an action per se that makes an action a good action, but rather it is the goodness of the action itself that causes us to admire it.6 The latter translates into considering good reasons: i.e. the rationale, the forethought, the judgment, etc., which have entered into the action, and which we recognize to be correct or fitting in an objective sense, whether or not we are disposed to desire the action itself. Moral actions affect people’s lives in objective ways. They can preserve their civil rights, protect them from unwarranted harm, or ensure their well-being. These are matters of objective fact rather than of “unaccessible” private states of taste, desire, or personal feeling.7 Rescher insists that the rationality of moral action must take into account more than the mere logical appropriateness of action in relation to the relevant circumstances. In the concluding section of Rationality he observes “… Reason, after all, is not our sole directrix. Emotion, sentiment, and the affective side of our nature have a perfectly proper and highly important place in the human scheme of things—no less important than the active striving for ends and goals. In so far as other valid human enterprises exist, there is good reason why reason can (and should) recognize and acknowledge them. To insist on reasoning as the sole and allcomprising agency in human affairs is not rationalism but a hyperrationalism that offends against rationality as such.”8 2. MORALITY’S UNIQUE PHILOSOPHICAL DOMAIN. IT’S NOT CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY! Rescher’s stern critique of Positivism’s blatant heavy handed “scientific” reductionism is matched by his equally resolute attack upon those social scientists who, while granting the cogency of moral claims, proceed to view morality in terms of their own familiar context-sensitive styles of analyses. In the end they claim to have illustrated that there is no single or absolute morality per se, but only context dependent relative morality. As

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was the case with his rejection of Positivism, we note again Rescher’s opposition to the operational idea that one can take the procedures, concepts, and specific styles of analysis which are of service in one discipline, and apply them unilaterally to another. In this case it is the situation where anthropologists and sociologists endeavor to resolve “philosophical” discussions on morality. Thus in the introduction to Moral Absolutes Rescher states that social scientists have propagated the myth that morals are merely an aspect of a given culture’s customs and norms, and that therefore the study of morals is a proper area for anthropologists and sociologists to focus their professional inquiries. Along the same lines, economists argue that since they study what is to our rational self-interest in the production and distribution of goods, it follows that the study of morality is properly within the domain of economics as well. Attending these views is the attempt to view morals as being entirely culture relative in nature, since they emerge essentially from within a multi-cultural or contextual variability. Taking the diametrically opposite view, Rescher stands against the usurpation of the study of morals by the social sciences and seeks instead to defend the absolute nature of morals generally along Kantian lines.9 He argues for what he terms “the legitimation of the moral project” by illustrating the plausibility of moral absolutism as opposed to the serious error of moral relativism. This legitimization of morals, within a strictly philosophical context, will be based upon an appeal to morality-external values, such as personhood and responsibility for self-realization, values which Rescher sees as “consonant with moral concerns.”10 By contrast, values such as social conformity and personal advantage, which are regularly appealed to as sources of justification in the social sciences, are not consonant with moral concerns. His thesis is therefore supportive of a “Kantian (deontological) validation of morality in terms of absolute values, rather than a Hobbesian (contractarian) or a socio-political (utilitarian) validation in terms of cultural solidarity and social benefits.... [Or an] egotistic validation in terms of personal advantage.”11 Rescher’s adoption of Kant’s approach to ethical justification in terms of duty and what is rationally right and wrong is set within his own interpretation of what all of this involves. This is to say that at this point one sees in Rescher not simply a reference to Kant, but an expanded and more profound rendering of the basics of Kant’s view, a rendering that is built upon the foundation of Rescher’s views concerning the nature of human experience. Essentially, there is more here than simply a re-introduction of

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Kant’s supposedly intuitively valid Principle of Universalization as a rational justification of moral conduct. Rescher’s earlier explanation of the evolution of human understanding: i.e. as experience that arises from the mind’s interactivity with an extra-mental world of orderly stimulation, is at the basis of the universality (or absolutism) that is recognized as lying at the very heart of any “genuine” moral rule of conduct.12 Breaking a genuine moral rule, or for example, entertaining action upon its negation as an equally valid moral alternative, is disruptive to the rational structure of the entire conceptual framework of beliefs the mind has fashioned through its interactive experience in a social domain. Thus there is more here than merely Kant’s intuition of what is right or wrong, or what “ought” to be. One must look upon Rescher defense of moral absolutism in the context of his unique rendition of conceptual idealism, as well as in terms of his adaptation of pragmatism. To justify doing a moral act requires explaining its conceptual grounds, as something that “any” rational human being would recognize as natural to all human experience. The point above regarding the circumspect manner with which Rescher adopts Kant’s position on the categorical validation of morals is discussed again in his more recent work, Sensible Decisions. Rescher notes that an important distinction should be drawn between rule breaking behavior which pertains to some arbitrary conventional systems like the game of chess, arithmetic, poker, etc., and rule breaking behavior that is not rooted in any conventional system, but in the requirements of actually lived experience. The former he describes as practice definitive, in the sense that the rules are the system. If I move a chess piece in a direction other than that prescribed by the rules of the game, i.e. always move the bishop diagonally, I am no longer “playing the game.” The rule in this case holds no exception. However, the rules of life cannot afford to be without exception, “… the world’s complexities being what they are, any inherently natural and thereby inescapable rules of action will admit of exceptions–will have to be rules of thumb.”13 Rescher’s position is targeted at showing how Kant’s insistence upon categorical rules of morality, rules which are made to focus upon the unobservable motivational contexts of acts: “Do not harm others just for your own pleasure.” or “Do not inflict pointless pain on others.” don’t address the observable things that people actually and overtly do. The question that should be asked is whether there are exception-precluding rules in this latter context. The answer is of course not. Life is clearly not unbending and rigid. Its complexities preclude the possibility that there are no exceptions as to how one is to achieve their legiti-

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mate aims and interact with others. Having said this, however, Rescher is quick to point out that this is not a back sliding surrender to moral relativism. Rather, the exceptions to rules that do arise in the moral sphere must still be rooted in “cogent and sufficient reasons.”14 There is no exception to this last requirement. Prior to embarking upon an even deeper discussion of this thesis, it is both important and interesting to observe how Rescher’s passion for what he believes to be the essentially philosophical foundation of morality pervades the entire tone of his writing in Moral Absolutes. Rarely does one find in the numerous, bland, and otherwise insufferably monotonous contemporary texts purporting to be reductionist analyses of moral concepts, anything that comes close to Rescher’s stern chastising of the social sciences in this area. There is a noticeable sense of urgency in his manner of expression. His references to the appalling and deeply damaging view that morality is simply “conformity” to mores, and to how some economists hold it to be essentially benefit-maximization of a personal or social type, are reflective of his deep rooted concern about where contemporary civilization is headed. Moreover, it is also a concern that cautions against the danger of articulating morality on the basis of values that have “no characteristically moral bearing.”15 Whether Rescher is a voice that remains tragically unheeded in a modern wilderness remains for history to judge. What is unmistakable, however, regardless of whether one believes him to be right or wrong, is that he brings the philosophical discussion of morals squarely back to the stoa, so to speak. In his hands this discussion is not abstract logical analysis detached from everyday life, or mere etymological discussion, or even the disconnected and seemingly endless anecdotal accounts commonly proffered by medical ethicists. Rather it is an attempt at a systematic reflection that has relevance to our nature and destiny as intelligent and caring human beings, interacting within an open and democratic society. Benevolence, the due care for the well-being of others, Rescher says emphatically, is at the heart of morality, it is its “controlling value.”16 This concern for others may be pursued either by way of sympathy for the interests of others, motivated by feelings of solidarity and fellowship, or it may be motivated along Kantian lines, which is that of “a cognitive appreciation of the inherent appropriateness of care for others.”17 The former involves the emotions in the “affective valuing of other people,” the latter brings the intellect into play to recognize that the care of another is something inherently valuable and rationally deserving. In the latter case morality must

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provide the rationale that proceeds from the “inherent worth and dignity of our fellows and their legitimate rights and claims to a consideration of their interests in our deliberations.”18 In having said this much one sees how moral inquiry, as Rescher’s describes it, clearly cannot be handled by cultural anthropology and/or sociology. Studies which spend a great amount of time struggling to find a “common ground” with which to interpret their findings, while failing to see how the universality of human nature is immune to the superficial influences of culture and material self interest. This latter insight pertaining to human nature, whether accurate or not, can be discussed only within philosophy, not within Anthropology, Economics, or Sociology. In any genuinely civilized society rules of morality, such as caring for the interests of others, must be absolute. Citizens in such societies are duty bound to follow moral laws, since through rational reflection these laws are discovered to be binding on all rational beings. In Rescher’s view this cuts across all cultural boundaries and ethnic diversities to focus upon the very nature of man as a rationally reflective being. Moreover, it is the very universality found inherent in all moral norms that insures the absolute nature of morality, since without it there can be no morality. Rescher astutely observes that it is this and this alone that prevents moral values, as opposed to political values, from being totally relativized by social contract. In practice our individual actions are assessed by considering whether or not they fall under higher-level moral principles. For example, paying one’s debt is discovered to be obligatory by reflecting upon the truth of the higher principle: “Everyone ought to honor a freely undertaken commitment.” etc.19 Morality, Rescher states, by necessity requires choice in action. Choice, in turn, assumes that the agent sees himself or herself as a person having the freedom to select, and as possessing the reasoning abilities that enable them to make informed and intelligent decisions regarding circumstances that impact their lives. There is a great deal of justification in saying therefore that historically, prior to the manifestation of the concept of personhood, there was perhaps no personal identification of the individual as an autonomous self, apart from the role they shared in a group. Thus also there may have been no conception of morality as we understand it today. Humanity’s faltering steps toward refining the concept of personhood embodies the story of a painfully slow journey toward a fuller clarification and realization of this specific concept.20 It is a struggle enshrined at various times in documents such as: The Ten Commandments, Plato’s Republic, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, The Magna Carta, The Bill of Rights,

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The Emancipation Proclamation, The U.N. Charter, etc. Surely Rescher’s insight has been glimpsed in the past by many others, however imperfectly. Aristotle, for example, states at the outset of the Nicomachean Ethics that the art of politics is the noblest of disciplines since it alone affords one the opportunity to create a community in which every citizen can actualize their full potentiality. For it is only through politics that one can provide for an entire citizenry those nurturing conditions which attend most intimately to their nature as rational creatures, and which allow for the free exercise of reason in decision making, leading to genuine happiness.21 Other disciplines may provide personal satisfaction, e.g. philosophy, or satisfaction that may impact a limited number of individuals, as for example architecture or music. Politics alone, however, begins with a commitment to man’s essential nature as a rational and social being, and on that basis serves to facilitate everyone’s potential happiness. For these reasons it is the study having the grandest nobility. “…For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain it for a nation or for a citystate….”22

Though Aristotle’s views on who qualifies for citizenship are of course far of the mark, in light of present day standards. However, there is in what he says about the pursuit of politics as a vocation the implicit recognition of the need for political leadership to secure everyone’s independence, so that the free exercise of rational choice can occur. It is this that lies at the heart of the Rescher’s more developed notion of personhood as well. Moreover, the universality of moral rules is not actually challenged seriously by those who cite the exceptional circumstance. Situations where it is said that it is “right to lie” in the case where false information is given to a crazed killer seeking the whereabouts of his victim, or where it is deemed “right to steal” when one’s children are starving and there is no available public assistance, do not defeat the claim concerning the absolute nature of moral norms. The former represent cases where moral norms are not being presented in their proper form. Rescher notes that only where the moral injunction is properly “conditionalized”, can its absolute authority emerge and stand beyond dispute, as for example: “Wanton lying is wrong,” “Pointless lying is wrong,” “Malicious lying is wrong,” etc. Even in the case of murder, one would say that where it is understood that murder is

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“unjustified killing”, then “Murder is wrong” is an absolute moral imperative.23 Rescher readily admits his indebtedness to Kant at this juncture, and goes on to observe how Kant’s critics have seriously overestimated the effect of their basic objection that special situations tend to mitigate or disprove the thesis that moral norms are absolute. The universality of the norm: “Murder is wrong” is not dissolved by the situation where a police officer must kill an assailant who is threatening the innocent. Neither is the universality of “Wanton lying is wrong” undone when a mother soothes her child’s anguish in losing its first tooth by relating to it the pending visit of the tooth fairy. Failure to take motives into account is the root cause of the mistake of those who seek to relativize moral rules, and who go on to deny that obligatory-universality is a factor in moral decision-making. Such critics do not realize that the obligatory nature of morality is such that if it is wrong for you to commit murder or to lie, it is so because it is wrong for me and for everyone to do such things. “Morality binds everyone.” Rescher proclaims.24 Its benefits are universal for everyone, since it invites us to act for everyone’s interest and not only for our own. Returning specifically to the unique focus of morality as a philosophical study, Rescher underscores the point that it is now abundantly clear that morality cannot be reduced to “parochial tribalism,” where we are concerned merely with the actions of those around us.25 Rather, morality must look upon every person as a moral agent, and therefore differences in gender, skin pigmentation, culture, social class, etc., play absolutely no role in this consideration. Its focus therefore is that of the genuine interests of “people-in-general,” including the interests of the agent himself. There is a necessary generosity in extending the range of who counts as a person or free agent to everyone, when maintaining the position of the absolute character of moral norms. Exceptions or uniqueness can play no exclusionary role here. Even in cases where the subject is a potential person, as it is with the unborn human, Rescher states it too must be seen as a person or potential rational agent, since no moral reason can be found which will exclude it. Animals, however, clearly do not qualify as rational agents, and are thus not to be treated as persons. This is not seen as providing license to treat them cruelly, to destroy their natural habitat, or to hunt them to extinction. Rather it is merely a means of defining the range of the concept of free rational agent, and the parameters beyond which it cannot be applied.

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3. THE CASE AGAINST MORAL RELATIVISM. THE CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGISTS’ FALLACY: “ANYTHING GOES!” Rescher’s attention also turns to the contemporarily popular and presumed self-evident thesis that there are no standards of absolute propriety or correctness when it comes to morals. The view is surely not new in that it is found to be an attitude of thought which can be traced to the sceptics of antiquity, though maintained by them for other than present day reasons. Citing Emile Durkheim as one of its more recent proponent, Rescher alights upon the former’s basic assumption that morality is tied to social change: “...There is not just one morality but several, and as many as there are social types. And as our societies change, so will our morality....”26 Moral relativism argues that morality is like language itself, that is, it is a social artifact. A common practice in one culture may be taboo in another. Shaving one’s beard, for example, was deemed necessary for Roman aristocrats but is forbidden for Orthodox Jews. In the same way, morality is therefore merely the result of custom and/or social habituation. There is really nothing more involved here. Consequently, moral relativists argue that there is actually no legitimacy to claims by moral absolutists, who support the notion of a rational appropriateness attendant to all clearly recognized moral principles, regardless of cultural influence.27 Staunchly defending this sentiment is Ruth Benedict, who in “Anthropology and the Abnormal” writes: “… It is a point that has been made more often in relation to ethics than in relation to psychiatry. We do not any longer make the mistake of deriving the morality of our locality and decide directly from the inevitable constitution of human nature. We recognize that morality differs in every society, and is a convenient term for socially approved habits. Mankind has always preferred to say, “it is morally good,” rather than “It is habitual,” and the fact of this preference is matter enough for a critical science of ethics. But historically the two phrases are synonymous.”28

At this point it is appropriate to present Rescher’s pivotal objection against the sort of relativist thesis proffered by Benedict in the above passage. Unequivocally, he rejects all efforts at declaring the demise of moral validity because of the variety that cultural pluralism offers. While morality has surely no monopoly on the meaning of “right” and “wrong,” it nonetheless concerns itself exclusively with a particular sort of right and wrong, namely that which deals with “the care of people-in-general.”29 The safe-

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guarding of the interests of others [without geographic or cultural boundaries] is morality’s special domain. Because of this it must examine the rationale of actions toward this end. Morality therefore has no interest in conduct that is driven solely by habit, custom, or taboo. In cases of this type rational deliberation is not being exercised, one is simply following a common practice. A moral action, however, must allow for an account of its motivating rationale, in order for it to be deemed “moral.” This must introduce considerations of motive: Did he know what he was doing? Did he want to do what he did or was it an accident? and, Was he compelled to act in the why he did? These questions comprise the motivational rationale of an act that is to be judged moral, they speak to the character of the act itself, where act, reason, and motive stand in perfect alignment.30 Hence no appeal to the variety inherent within cultural pluralism serves to dismiss the absolutist thesis. The right and wrong addressed by the philosopher is as it is and is of a universal nature insofar as it is a creation of rationality: “rationality carries morality in its wake,....”31 Basically, what is morally right or wrong depends upon the reasons for the act itself. Those reasons must stand up to the rational scrutiny of open discussion. Rescher suggests that it is useful to consider morality from the standpoint of what he calls a “functional” perspective. Accordingly, one should take into account the purpose of the moral act, as a goal-orientated enterprise that leads to the well being of a community. Ostensibly, like a language or a custom, morality enables us to live together in a supportive way. However, unlike the latter, there is something more profound to morality, in that it engenders the insight that if we were to violate a true moral rule we would be actually violating the interests of a fellow person and causing them real harm. This is different than merely violating “the customs of the tribe.” The latter are understood to be limited to the specific culture which subscribes to them. Moral rules are for Rescher, who follows the Kantian thesis of universalization, self-evidently universal once their rationale has been clearly explicated.32 Their truth pertains to all persons regardless of culture or custom. Both the act’s character and its rationale (its determinable context) must be taken into account before it can be said to be moral. For example, consider on the one hand the act of stealing, seen as the taking of something that belongs to another person for one’s own benefit or personal gratification, as a case in point. Here the act itself: stealing, and its rationale: pure self-interest, are sufficient to render it immoral. On the other hand, when the stealing is done because it is the only means available to sustain life for

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an impoverished person, it may be deemed moral. Thus an act’s morality is determined in large measure by whether “it is needed to protect or advance the best interest of people....”33 If such is the basic motivation animating the agent’s action, then it guides us in determining whether in fact the act is moral. Evaluating moral situations requires paying attention to more than the content of the action, since the intent behind the action is of paramount importance. A culture whose mores allow for the wanton hurting of the feelings of others for one’s own benefit is a culture without morality. Here the intent which the custom sanctions is one that violates the universal standard of absolute morality, namely that of safeguarding the interests of other persons. One notes here how this act totally disregards the victim’s personhood, and places the agent’s self-interest above everything else. At this point the anthropologist may raise the issue of whether it makes any sense to say of any society, such as the one pictured by Rescher, that its customs violate the standard of absolute morality even if it has no consciousness of this standard, and therefore of “morality” in Rescher’s sense. Persons in such a culture may not know or even be dimly conscious of any so-called “absolute standard,” in which case it surely cannot be said that they are actually “intending” to violate the standard. Hence, if the intent is formed in ignorance of any violation, how can the intent or the act which the custom sanctions after the intent is fashioned be said to be immoral? This question is perhaps one that an anthropologist would cherish most, since it apparently forces the issue back into the arena of cultural relativism. Rescher’s reply here can be predicted, in the sense that he would point to the fact that the question only serves to underscore his thesis that the issues morality concerns itself with cannot be treated on a culturally relative basis. To say that a custom violates an absolute standard of morality means that those who act according to that custom are acting in a manner that is contrary and threatening to the real interests of persons, which is a rationally accepted standard of morality. The intent behind their action is immoral, as is its perceived effect. One’s personal ignorance of this absolute standard does not change the character of the act, as it is judged to be immoral by the moral absolutist. The native of our hypothetical society is never presumed to know anything about standards of absolute morality. This does not change the rationale for our saying that what he or she is doing is immoral, since we have determined that the requirements of the cus-

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tom are such that they are antithetic to what the moral absolutist would say: “... is needed to protect or advance the best interest of people....” 34 What the anthropologist is missing when he raises this kind of objection is that Rescher is approaching this issue in the same way in which he is seen to critique Utilitarianism in Chapter 4, that is, “retrospectively”. Insofar as philosophers can determine post facto that the agent knew at that time that the effect of the custom would be to hurt the person’s feelings for the sake of advancing the agent’s own self-interest, his intent was immoral. It is reasonable to say therefore that evaluative judgments of this kind should be made by the philosopher alone, not by the cultural anthropologist. If it were otherwise, that is, if the action is to be judged immoral “prospectively,” we would find ourselves in the awkward position of having to say that somehow the native of our hypothetical society should be able to arrive at something resembling Kantian insights on his own prior to acting. Thus because he fails to do so, his actions are immoral. For had he somehow fathomed Kant’s principle of universalization, he would have never done what he did—customs or no customs, mores or no mores! This is patently absurd. The intent is judged to be immoral not because of anything the agent realized or failed to realize. Rather, the intent is immoral because as it is understood and expressed by the agent in his acting, we find upon our analysis, retrospectively, that it contradicts some universally recognized principle of moral conduct. Anthropologists, by contrast, have no cause to do what the philosopher does since their concern is basically descriptive. They simply report the phenomenon as a cultural practice of some sort. Many examples can be brought forth, from a variety of areas, to elucidate further the point Rescher is making in regard to the limitations facing the social sciences, when dealing with moral norms in the sense in which they are discussed by philosophers. Floyd Lounsbury’s analysis, in his seminal paper “Language and Culture”, provides perhaps one of the most succinct and interesting encapsulations of the fundamental issues at hand.35 In his discussion Lounsbury recounts the late nineteenth century controversy between ethnographers and cultural anthropologists relating to how best to devise the proper means, i.e. via language, to report useful information pertaining to the unique phenomena encountered when investigating the cultures of people living in remote areas of the world. On the one hand, according to Lounsbury, ethnographers operate in the manner of cryptologists, trying to discover certain common conceptual links between the meaning of the practices of the people they are investigating and the lan-

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guage they are using to report their findings to their discipline. Cultural anthropologists like E. Sapir and Whorf, on the other hand, object to such methodology since they subscribe to what they term the “incommensurability of language.” This is to say, many anthropologists argue that any given language, because of the uniqueness of the conceptual forms upon which it is based, though serving to express something about the sense of one’s experience of other cultures, necessarily and unavoidably also “defines” how we understand these other worlds. Thus as a social artifact, the language we use has certain basic conceptual presuppositions or cultural “biases” which materially influence what we are trying to understand and describe to others. In the final analysis Sapir argues that there are no crosslingual categories which all languages share in common. Hence the approach taken by ethnographers in the past is destined to failure since it cannot avoid distorting the very thing it is attempting to explain.36 Without straying far from the subject of Rescher’s own critique of the anthropologists, it is enlightening to reflect upon the implications of Sapir’s notion of linguistic incommensurability, as they impact upon the thesis of the universality of morals. The approach taken in Cultural Anthropology, because of its fundamental commitment to the uniqueness of any given language, finds itself unable to even raise the possibility of the universality of morals, in a Kantian sense. The anthropologist is seen as having to preserve the integrity of the particular phenomenon’s cultural uniqueness in his or her reporting about it. They must thus commit to the thesis that cultural practices cannot be properly evaluated in terms of a totally unbiased “universal” standard, which the Kantian universalization principle purports to be. Such a standard would in fact be deemed illusionary if not misleading, since it can be argued that Kant’s standard is just another culture’s (eighteenth century Austrian in this case) view of what is morally right or wrong, imposed upon the subject at hand by aficionados of Immanuel Kant and/or Eurocentrists generally. For example, it can be argued that what a “person” is or what this important term means depends upon how this word is defined by a particular culture, and by that culture alone. Its significance, therefore, is not something that can be shared “universally” by anyone on the “outside,” since it cannot be rendered in totally unambiguous terms into another’s language and frame of reference. The anthropologist would insist that the moral validity or propriety of an act within a particular culture, as reported within his discipline, can be evaluated as moral, if at all, only by using that culture’s own standards or morality, and within the context of the subject culture. Again, Ruth Benedict

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drives this sort of point home with great resolve in Anthropology and the Abnormal, where she speaks to the issue of our misunderstanding regarding the presumed universal validity of our social values: “… Most of the simpler cultures did not gain the wide currency of the one which, out of our experience, we identify with human nature, but this was for various historical reasons, and certainly not for any that gives us as its carriers a monopoly of social good or of social sanity. Modern civilization, from this point of view, becomes not a necessary pinnacle of human achievement but one entry in a long series of possible adjustments.”37

To carry Benedict’s thesis further and presume, for example, that the ritual practices of head hunters in New Guinea, or those of cannibals in Fiji, are self-evidently and universally immoral, is to introduce an inappropriate, perhaps even “eurocentrically” slanted, standard of evaluation into the description. In this respect the inference drawn from Benedict’s position is that such presumptions distort not only the cultural significance of the very behavior we are attempting to understand, but they fail to pay appropriate attention to the accident of isolation that befalls one culture and not another. Had we in the West been restrained by geographical, political, and historical impediments, and those in the South Pacific were impelled to global trade and colonialization by their technical expertise, then there could have been a reversal of roles. Our customs and conception of person could have been those coming under scrutiny and repression by the people of New Guinea, and assessed according to “their” very different standard of “morality”. In Benedict’s view, the prevalence and predominance of a morality is simply a matter of historical accident, and not of any intrinsic value that relates to humanity generally. Apart from Professor Benedict’s argument, however, one must still explain why, for example, recently civil rights groups from around the world expressed their horror at the way in which Moslem women were being treated in Afghanistan during Taliban rule. They were similarly outraged at how the civil rights of women are being marginalized in Iran under its current extremist regime. Can cultural anthropologists look upon such expressions of outrage as mere manifestations of culture bias? This could be held to be so by them if, in certain societies worldwide, women were customarily seen to be inferior to men, and thus could be reasonably denied the basic necessities of personal safety, medical care, and education. Such expressions of outrage would never be taken as reflecting part of one’s “objective” description of these practices within their indigenous cultural

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setting. The outcry against such “blatant” inhumanity would itself have no real place or propriety, since in the very relating of these practices the ideal anthropological narrative must restrict itself to explaining how these attitudes toward women were deemed justified and therefore proper within the confines of a specific cultural construct. To go beyond this and include a declaration of one’s moral outrage and the need for reform as an aspect of the description brings into the account something that is clearly extraneous to the relevant facts of the anthropological report. Perhaps what should be concluded here is that because it sees itself as a social “science”, Cultural Anthropology cannot allow its commitment to an over-riding “scientificlike” objectivity to be “tainted” by any philosophical presupposition concerning speculative metaphysics regarding the universality of moral norms. As a result, the cultural phenomena it purports to describe must be reported, however imperfectly, in a value-neutral and nonjudgmental manner, much in the way that a narrative episode is presented as “simply happening” in a novel by Gustave Flaubert. However to argue in this manner is again to grant too much to the cultural anthropologists, namely it is to argue that morality and moral justification has nothing to do with objective fact. If this is indeed how things must stand for anthropologists, then on what basis can they assume that they can even talk about “morality” in a meaningful sense, and proceed further by proposing a basis for it that is fundamentally relativistic? Are they not assuming authority beyond the purview of their discipline when advocating relativism, an authority that erroneously presumes an identity between mores and morality? More tellingly, however, is how their view leads to saying that the very expression of moral outrage over the above case involving the disenfranchisement of millions of people because of their gender is somehow inappropriate with respect to certain specific cultural contexts. Their position now is tantamount to asking one to stifle one’s sense of humanity. By contrast, it is to Philosophy’s credit that it supports and indeed demands that such expression be voiced as a manifestation of one’s moral responsibility. To fail to do so, or to argue that the expression of our sense of injustice is inappropriate or out of place, portends that something is radically wrong with the rationality of one’s personal reaction to the real world. There is something radically wrong here with one’s sense of selfhood, as there is with the view that sees silence on the part of the observer in this context as a manifestation of intellectual responsibility.

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The dramatic difference between morals and mores receives sharper focus in further discussion in Moral Absolutes. Rescher points to how no one in a proper frame of mind would condemn an act of indiscriminate charity as immoral. In fact no situation can be constructed which can ever show that an act of free and unrestricted charity is morally wrong. Yet the justification for such acts cannot be reduced to a matter of merely following a custom, such as eating mashed potatoes with a fork. The fact that no rational person can find a credible case where indiscriminate charity is wrong shows that the morality of the act is neither determined by nor restricted to time or place. It is universally recognized to be moral, as is: “give all you have to the poor and follow me.” “Morality,” Rescher says, “is inherently normative—geared to the implementation of those particular values which reflect a care for the interests of others—honesty, common decency, civility, courtesy, helpfulness, generosity, and the like....”38 Recently, the “universal” expression of disgust at alleged acts of torture perpetrated by elements of the American military upon Iraqi prisoners is generally indicative of the point Rescher is making. The world could not believe that the foremost power for international justice and peace would harbor such inhumane treatment of defenseless persons in its custody. Across all national boundaries, as well as within its own borders, the United States found itself facing expressions of universal disapprobation on what had happened. Surely ethical relativism could hardly provide even the semblance of a justification in this context. By contrast, the “Anthropologist’s Fallacy” consists in saying that when individuals in a society judge the rightness or the wrongness of an action, they are merely using “the locally prevailing criteria” of right and wrong. Therefore, what is conceived generally to be “right” and what is conceived generally to be “wrong” means whatever is determined to be so by merely following “the locally prevailing standards of evaluation.”39 The error which triggers this fallacy turns upon making the illicit move from considering the doing of a specific practice as sanctioned by local custom, the modus operandi, to claiming something essential about the meaning of “right” and “wrong” generally. Rescher elaborates by noting that the mistake here is parallel to that of saying that the meaning of the concept of “Arithmetical multiplication” is that of calculating by using the multiplication table one was given in grade school.40 Elsewhere Rescher makes the same point with the astute observation that when it comes to morality one cannot use a causal explanation as a basis for rational validation.41 A mode of action that has achieved the status of ingrained social habituation

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cannot serve as a rational justification for that action. In determining an act’s morality reasons must come into play, with considerations pertaining to appropriate means and justifiable ends clearly brought forth. Interestingly, some anti-relativists are baited into making a similar kind of mistake when claiming that because certain moral rules appear to be cross-cultural they are therefore also universal, even though members of a particular society may not see or understand them to be explicitly so. More specifically, these opponents of relativism argue that since breaking certain ubiquitous rules of conduct can obviously engender the destruction of an entire society, and since this outcome is everywhere seen as something to be avoided, it follows that all cultures have in some way already individually come to recognize these rules as absolute. Thus they proceed to hold up locally sanctioned injunctions against lying and murder as representative of universal rules of morality. The problem, according to Rescher, is that there is the same mistake occurring here as before with the moral relativists. For the immorality of an act must be linked to the way in which the stated reasons for the act, i.e. the underlying intent, are found to be contrary to one’s protecting and advancing the real interests of people. The overall survival of a society or culture cannot in itself become the relevant rationale that justifies judging an act as universally moral or immoral.42 For example, a culture may engage in the practice of exposing its enfeebled elderly to the harshness of the elements so as to precipitate their demise. This practice, as custom and habituation, does not by itself constitute a rational justification of the morality of such a crude form of euthanasia. It is only when we go on to ask why this is done, and justificatory considerations are provided, e.g., “they had their chance and this is our way of saving them from the prolonged ravages of old age as well as assuring the young’s survival given our meager resources,” that we begin to come into the domain of moral discourse. At last one is now able to explore the specific rationale that constitutes the justification of the act. This involves going on to see whether alternative means are available to the social practice that will be more protective of the real interests of the elderly population, while achieving a more effective and humane result for the group’s younger constituency. Merely claiming that the survival of the entire group depends upon this customary practice does not in itself constitute a rational reason for validating the morality of the act. More is needed by way of an account that goes beyond the dictates of self-interest and custom, something is needed which shows that all peoples’ legitimate interests are being respected and that they are being treated as persons.43

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As Rescher sees it, morality in not a matter of “cultural imperialism” but of “conceptual fixity.” Here it is important to distinguish between two questions: “What is moral?” and “What is morality?” The answer to the former requires reference to a variety of concrete actions. The answer to the latter requires alluding to a single concept and to the ground rules of its use that are fixed by the “questioner’s prerogative.”44 The concept of “morality” is therefore ours, Rescher states, and the application that is made of it is a result of our deliberations. It is here that he sees absolutism in morals becoming triumphant. A society that through custom allows for the abuse of women, or which knowingly exploits children, or one that condones cannibalism by custom, etc., is not illustrative of one that is merely adopting an alternative form of morality. Rather, such a society has no morality at all. NOTES 1

Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover reprint, 1952), p. 108.

2

Rescher, Moral Absolutes (1989), p. 67. It should be noted that in his review of this book Professor Sterling Harwood argues that on this point Rescher fails to appreciate how both he and Nietzsche ground their respective theories of morality on nature, and that Rescher’s supposed error on this point opens him to contradiction. Harwood seems oblivious to how differently the over all concept of nature is treated by these men, and how Rescher’s theory of morality must be viewed in the context of what he has to say about Conceptual Idealism. See Harwood, S., “Sterling Harwood, Review of Rescher’s Moral Absolutes,” Auslegung, vol. 19 (1993), p. 180.

3

The positivists’ emphasis in placing traditional philosophy on a par with fictional literature was intended to underscore its failure as a discipline, whose original goal had been to attain new and useful knowledge. This new attitude of thought stood in sharp contrast to George Santayana’s naturalism, for example, which viewed philosophy as a distinct and focal discipline. For the latter the importance of philosophy resided in the fact that through its prism it enables us to rightfully comprehend poetry and religion as they truly are: “poetry ... [is seen to loose] ... its frivolity and ceases to demoralize, while religion surrenders its illusions and ceases to deceive….” The importance of alluding to Santayanna at this juncture is to illustrate how he saw how philosophy could preserve its critical role without needing to succumb to positivist reductionism. See: Interpretations of Poetry and Religion, pp.?

4

Rescher, Moral Absolutes, p. 74.

5

Ibid. p. 67.

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NOTES 6

Ibid. p. 68.

7

Ibid. p. 69.

8

Rescher, Rationality (1988), p. 221.

9

Ibid. p. 2.

10

Ibid.

11

Ibid.

12

See Chapter 1. above p.

13

Rescher, Sensible Decisions (2003), pp. 96-97.

14

Ibid. p. 98.

15

Rescher, Moral Absolutes, p. 3.

16

Ibid. p. 6.

17

Ibid.

18

Ibid. p.7.

19

Ibid. p. 9.

20

Ibid. p. 10.

21

Aristotle, Nicomachaen Ethics, 1094b 9-11. In: Introduction to Aristotle, Richard McKeon, Modern Library College Editions, New York: Random House, 1947).

22

Ibid. 1094b 9-10.

23

Rescher, Moral Absolutes, pp. 11-12.

24

Ibid. p. 12.

25

Ibid. p. 13.

26

Ibid. p. 20.

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NOTES 27

Ibid. p. 21.

28

Ruth Benedict, “Anthropology and the Abnormal,” The Journal of General Psychology, vol. 10 (1934), pp. 81-82.

29

Rescher, Moral Absolutes, p. 22.

30

Ibid. p. 24.

31

Rescher, “Rationality and Moral Obligation,” Synthese, vol. 72 (1984), p. 31.

32

Rescher, Moral Absolutes, pp. 24-25.

33

Ibid. pp. 26-27.

34

Ibid.

35

Floyd Lounsbury, “Language and Culture,” in Sydney Hook (ed.), Language and Philosophy—A Symposium, (New York: University of New York Press, 1969), pp. 9-10.

36

Ibid.

37

Ruth Benedict, Anthropology and the Abnormal,

38

Rescher, Moral Absolutes, p. 30.

39

Ibid.

40

Ibid. p. 31.

41

Ibid.

42

Ibid.

43

Ibid. p. 32.

44

Ibid. p. 39.

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Chapter 7 On the Commonalities and Limitations of Scepticism and Relativism Scepticism and Relativism offer no rational justification for their attitude of indecision and/or indifference toward the role of universal values. Moral Absolutism and Pluralism are linked by the process of rational decision-making. 1. THE CASE FOR MORAL ABSOLUTISM

R

escher holds that there can be no rational or inferential connection between moral pluralism, as understood and advocated by cultural anthropologists, and moral indifference. It is the latter which moral relativists have come to support as the more “enlightened take” on morality for today’s world.1 Rescher observes that the society which engages in the practice of sacrificing its’ first born female infants, for example, is one whose grasp of morality is either inadequate or nonexistent. In light of this, it cannot be argued that because of the enormous quantitative and qualitative diversity of cultural practices, it actually makes no moral difference what you do, since one moral code is just as good as another. Merely pointing to the wide diversity of mores is not the same as providing rational grounds that support of diversity in morality. To claim that it is affords a classic case of mixing apples and oranges. Since mores are not morals, one cannot use the variety manifested in the former to justify indifference toward the latter.2 It makes a moral difference, Rescher insists, whether you treat a stranger with respect, or whether you eat him. It also makes a moral difference whether you treat a handicapped person with kindness, or whether you drown him. This difference is one that requires reflection upon the role of reason in our actions. Moreover, it is a difference that engenders understanding the principle that if something is morally wrong for us to do, it is also morally wrong for everyone to do. It is only through reflective and judicial evaluation that the moral propriety of an action is determined. Reason cuts through the particularities and idiosyncrasies of a situation and establishes what is absolutely essen-

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tial with regard to the application of a single family of fundamental moral principles. To focus only upon the ephemeral differences manifested by customs, or on the superficiality of specific habits of action, is to terribly restrict the flexibility of what morality can do in different circumstances and within various environments. Here we again encounter the tight rigor of Rescher’s overall philosophical position. For what he is about to tell us concerning the fundamental nature of morality is a reflection of what he has already said earlier with regard to the range of rationality, as the latter proceeds from considerations of minute specificity to validations of the greatest generality. This will be found to be illustrative of what we have already noted concerning Rescher’s conception of the basic nature of morality, namely that “rationality carries morality in its wake”. First, however, Rescher reminds us that though there are many different kinds of circumstances in which we can be moral, this is not to deny that there are certain overarching and fundamental values and principles that lend cohesion to the enterprise of being moral. In spite of the appearance of an ephemeral moral variability, “...an absolute uniformity does, and must, prevail at the level of fundamentals.”3 The variability itself is the result of nothing more than the application of these basic values and principles, already referred to above, in a variety of contexts. Morality, “as we understand it”, requires that there are certain really terrible consequences if its basic principles are trashed. For these principles preserve a clear and absolute distinction between action that is morally right and one that is morally wrong. They safeguard people’s well being and legitimate self-interests, and they instruct us in the understanding that if we trample moral rules we cause real injury to the life and welfare of others. To become oblivious to these principles would mean that we have ceased being involved with the subject at hand; one would have, in fact, actually changed the subject. It is important to observe that Rescher prefaces his case for the thesis of absolute morality with the italicized: “as we understand it.” The point here is that, as a subject, morality must not be regarded as a hand maiden to Anthropology, as though she is spawned from one’s reflection upon crosscultural commonalities. In actuality, however, morality is not subject to characterization as a family resemblance concept, one that results upon having studied Anthropology and having observed certain similar looking traits common among many different mores in many different cultures. Rather, morality is a distinct sub-discipline of Philosophy. It presupposes fully developed concepts of person, value, real self-interest, rational valida-

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tion and justification, etc. Five levels of stratification are involved in the implementation of moral norms. These, according to Rescher, reflect an order descending toward increased concrete specification. This begins at the level that defines the overarching aims and objectives of morality, and ends with particular rulings concerning concrete actions. The topmost level, the “aims of the enterprise,” are fixed in the nature of the subject of morality. These define the absolute and universal moral virtues that constitute the second level of the hierarchy, namely “honesty,” “trustworthiness,” “civility,” etc. At the third level one has the moral imperatives that guide our deliberations and decisions, e.g. “Do not lie!” “Do not steal!” etc. These general guidelines, like the Ten Commandments, provide the perimeters for a community’s moral practice. Prior to the application of these guidelines to concrete cases there is a fourth level, wherein certain “operating directives” come into play. Here one has to incorporate situationrelative standards and criteria to particular cases so that the more general overarching objectives of morality can gain control of the concrete action. It is at this point that variability comes into play, such as in “Killing is always morally wrong, except (my italics) in situations of self defense.” Finally one has the level where particular moral rulings are made with respect to specific situations.4 Though there is always a certain degree of “slack” at the lowest level, since one is dealing with concrete cases were the influence of chance and cultural habits are most profound, the need for justification by appealing to superordinated standards will always assure higher level uniformity in the implementation process. Rescher notes that frequently discussions on moral relativism by philosophers and/or social scientists go astray because moral norms are dealt with in an oversimplified way, that is, as always being context-dependent and variable. Little effort is made to distinguish between lower level rules and standards, and higher level values and principles. It is in the latter domain that one encounters the universality and fixity of morality. Once this distinction is understood, however, there are grounds for showing that absolutism and pluralism in morality are not mutually incompatible, rather they are connected hierarchically, given the conceptual stratifications outlined above.5 However, where one forgets or chooses to neglect the overarching uniformities that are part of the enterprise of assessing the morality of certain practices, then “the moral landscape assumes a kaleidoscopic variety.”6 This inattentiveness hides the fact that the uniformity and contexttranscendence of morality is many sided at the level of fundamentals.

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Rescher also observes that we must never confuse pluralism in morality with relativism. The former reflects the fact that there can be “different, yet in their own appropriate context, moral codes.”7 This fact does not sanction the attitude of moral indifference called for by the kind of relativism cultural anthropologists are often found to be suggesting. Pluralism in morality does not preclude the possibility of applying standards to evaluate socially accepted modes of conduct. There is no specific moral practice or code that can present itself as detached from criticism and reevaluation. The fact that pluralism enables us to survey many “different ... moral codes” does not mean that these are mutually exclusive of each other, or that they are logically incompatible to each other. On the contrary, what it does mean is that there can be any number of rationally justified moral modes of conduct, each reflecting the novelty and peculiar character of the specific context in which moral norms are brought to bear. In this case variety of moral codes does not imply “alternative moralities.” Rescher concludes this phase of his defense of moral absolutism by stating that whether one is pursuing medicine, dietetics, science, etc., the outlines of the same kind of hierarchical series can be discerned descending from overarching defining objectives of the given discipline to specific resolution of concrete cases. This basic conceptual structure, seen underlying the implementation of moral norms, is operative across different disciplines, being basically that of the subordination of specific situations under higher-level norms. 8 2. SCEPTICS AND MORAL RELATIVISTS: TWO PEAS IN A POD OF INACTION Within the scope of Rescher’s general analysis of the concept of rationality, an intriguing contrast emerges involving the formal implications of his arguments against moral relativism, and those resulting from his arguments against cognitive scepticism (as the latter were considered earlier9). For there are several striking parallelisms between both of these themes in terms of their ultimate nihilistic outcomes, which, from a conceptual standpoint, provide an informative and surprisingly unnoticed sphere of commonality. Generally, Rescher’s argument against absolute scepticism focuses on the fact that it sanctions inaction with respect to any sort of decisionmaking. By bringing forward the impossibility of our achieving complete certainty in our understanding of the world, sceptics infer that it is absurd

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to believe that one course of actions can truly be rationally justified, as compared to any other. For them it is axiomatic that our knowledge of the world, and the understanding that ensues there from, can never justify acting decisively in any context. Rescher, we have seen, finds the sceptic’s tolerance of this state of affairs deplorable, since it leads to a fatal pessimism, that is, to an inertia that is antithetic to the natural hopefulness he perceives underlies all normal human activity. Scepticism is thus a position that totally dismisses the possibility of making any progress in human understanding through what he terms “presumptive justification”. The latter was seen to be that important “leap of faith” all rational human beings make in believing that their practical knowledge of the world, though imperfect, can make a seemingly difficult course of action fruitful. This confidence naturally manifests itself in any situation, especially where there is either little or no evidential basis to suspect that the subject matter at hand is significantly different from what it outwardly appears to be. Indeed, Rescher sees this sort of normal hopefulness residing in the background of all of our human endeavors. In itself it serves as the basic impetus behind all progress. In a curious yet unsurprising way, however, a case may yet be made in behalf of the “sincere” sceptic. Apart from Rescher’s critique of him as being unsupportive of the best in human potential, it may still be argued that he is actually, and perhaps even understandably, eligible to be excused from action. For the understanding usually needed to justify one’s conduct, like all understanding founded upon reasons for acting in the everyday/real world, could not be deemed sufficient to someone who subscribes to the idea that indubitable knowledge of the world is in fact the only standard for decisive action. In the absence of the possibility of anyone ever acquiring the latter, how can one justify saying that the sceptic is somehow “wrong” in holding the views he does, even if the consequences of his position may lead to situations which many would judge to be “irresponsible” and/or “immoral”? Why, in other words, can it not be sustained that because of his very insistence upon acting only upon the basis of perfect knowledge, the sceptic ought to be absolved of or excused from any and all considerations regarding his personal responsibility for what may transpire by his self-styled non-involvement? If it difficult to see plausibility in such a proposal, then perhaps it would be helpful to be reminded of the fact that it is unreasonable to conclude that the sceptic can ever act in a patently careless or immoral way? Surely, one would have to grant that he would be incapable of acting in an intention-

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ally irresponsible manner, where this is seen as a conscious effort to purposely violate a standard of public safety, for example, or some widely recognized ethical norm. For by parity of reason, he would have no irrefutable epistemic basis from which to act in such a way. Hence it appears that neither moral conduct nor immoral conduct, nor responsible nor irresponsible action of any sort, are available to him as “live options” to choose from, to use the terminology of William James’ conceptual analysis. Thus by putting forth his high standard for epistemological truth, the sceptic may be said to have bypassed the range of culpability, taking the “high road” with regard to discussions pertaining to accountability for conduct of whatever kind. This seems to follow regardless of whether “proper” conduct requires acknowledging, as its minimal justification, an absolute standard of conduct that enjoins respect for persons, fairness, and maximizing another’s real self-interests. By extension, and more squarely within the domain of moral discourse, moreover, another question arises from such considerations. Namely whether is it now fairer to say of the sceptic, that with respect to moral conduct, his position is more properly described as “amoral”, rather than moral or immoral? By “amoral” one does not mean someone who is intentionally indifferent to moral behavior in a general sense, nor one who looks with disdain upon persons who are said to act morally. Rather, in our sense one is said to be amoral if, because of the unavoidable consequences of the operating assumption governing his view of epistemological justification, he is rendered incapable of taking a moral stand. Can the sceptic, in other words, be exempt from all responsibility whatsoever, i.e. be deemed amoral, because of his choice of a basic assumption, which is reflective of the widely recognized practical impossibility of finding a absolutely perfect cognitive basis, of any kind, upon which to justify action? Surely it would be unproblematic to say of a person afflicted with Alzheimer’s Disease, for example, that they are “amoral” in so far as, tragically, they can comprehend neither the causal rationale nor the possible consequences of their actions. One would also say of someone that they are amoral if they grew up in an environment where there was no opportunity to become cognizant of whatever it is that constitutes a moral mode of conduct. The sceptic for his part, though in full possession of his faculties and in responsible control of his surroundings, is unable to partake in any sort of action because he or she finds no flawless epistemic basis for doing so. Again, is it reasonable to see the latter as providing sufficient grounds for saying of the sceptic that he/she too is amoral? In the Alzheimer’s case

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the label “amoral” is attached because of a physiological and/or environmental deficiency producing an unintended, unwanted, and thereby excusable condition of unawareness or insensitivity. Obviously these are not the reasons why we would say of the sceptic that he or she is amoral. On the contrary, the sceptic’s inability to act is due to his clear understanding of the implications of his philosophical stance. Nonetheless, we may see his steadfast refusal to believe that one course of action is always justifiably right, and another always justifiably wrong, as arguably counting for something. As a belief it emerges from a legitimate basis, namely it reflects the individual’s personal sincerity regarding the integrity of one’s motivation. His steadfastness in refusing action upon any cognitive content that suggests only probable and not absolute epistemic certainty may be deemed a genuine basis for excusing him from moral conduct. In this instance, his/her amorality, one could say, stems from a sincere commitment to an idea. Why would this sort of attitude of thought, this “gut reaction to the world”, to use one of Rescher’s own expressions, not serve as genuine rationale, on a par equal to that which induces us to excuse the person afflicted with Alzheimer’s? Why could this stance toward the requirement for acting not be as legitimate a mitigating circumstance, warranting our saying of the sceptic that he too is excused from responsibility, i.e. he too in this sense is amoral? In proposing the above one is surely not intending to suggest that because the sceptic may be said to be amoral, those who do take a moral stand on the basis of only probable or incomplete information, are less diligent in what they are doing and therefore irresponsible. Concluding that those who do take a risk, who operate on the basis of “presumptive justification”, again to use Rescher’s parlance, are actually not acting appropriately, is not what is intended in this charitable defense of absolute scepticism. For one is not saying that the sceptics are moral in saying that they are amoral, and that others are immoral. On the contrary, one is saying that if the sceptics are amoral, then in a manner of speaking one is setting them aside in a special category. The normal rules of accountability simply do not apply to them. The counter argument, however, can still be pressed along Rescherean lines, with devastating consequences. Ironically, it can be claimed that the sceptic, in taking the position he has chosen, is in essence robbing himself of his own personhood. For he chooses to distance himself from everyday human activity, for the sake of his philosophical commitment, so called. In doing so he is by implication advocating a “subhuman” standard of human

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conduct for his own self. How different is the final outcome of what he does from the state that befalls the individual afflicted with Alzheimer’s, where the loss of one’s sense of self is the tragic outcome? The latter does not intentionally bring this unpleasant state upon himself. The sceptic, however, amazingly submits to something comparable to the loss of the sense of his own self willingly! On the one hand, we tend to excuse the mentally challenged because the misfortune that has befallen them, in loosing awareness and control of self, is not of their own choosing. We tend to regard care for the victims of the disease as a supremely humane responsibility, on a par with the care of infants and children. Their inability to comprehend the significance of their actions makes them vulnerable to harm and exploitation, necessitating protective measures. The sceptic, on the other hand, in choosing as he does, intentionally diminishes himself as a person, and in so doing disenfranchises the world around him because he deprives it of his contribution. His free choice leads to a dehumanization of himself, to a curious inversion of the goal of the intellectual life, where inaction is seen as the ideal that leads to personal enlightenment. What the sceptic has decided upon is to forego involvement in life itself, on the basis of what he understands to be his intellectual integrity. His defense, however, falters on the grounds that it leads to the abdication of self, to the suicide of the will, and finally to a betrayal of the very intellect whose integrity he claims to value above everything else. By aborting action he thwarts the potential he can help realize in a positive manner. Even in Michel de Montaigne’s classic defense of Pyrrhonist scepticism, which he sees as providing the philosophical framework that saves us from falling into the unpleasantness of revolution and anarchy, there is a disconcerting and hollow ring. When one compares the limitless possibilities risk taking provides historically, in struggles aimed at improving the political well being of humanity, his comments against taking decisive action against tyranny in his Essays seem appallingly unsatisfying: “…It is very easy to accuse a government of imperfection, for all mortal things are full of it. It is very easy to engender in a people contempt for their ancient observances; never did a man undertake that without succeeding. But as for establishing a better state in place of the one they have ruined, many of those who had attempted it achieved nothing for their pains.”10

Such an attitude of thought, Rescher would argue, merits neither excuse nor absolution from condemnation. We apply the label “amoral” in a humane way to a person who is mentally challenged, thereby excusing that

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individual of any responsibility for the harmful effects of their actions. However, the term has no reasonable or parallel application with respect to the sceptic. Montaigne’s desire to live a life of total isolation and solitude, surrounded by his vast library, sheltered from the difficulties and challenges of the real world by his palatial estate, is not indicative of a life that is fitting a responsible human being. It is perhaps in this context that we best appreciate the importance of Rescher’s measured adaptation of Nietzsche’s view concerning the importance of seeing the person as a free, independent, and creative agent. The label “amoral” is also inapplicable to the sceptic for another significant reason. This is because of the fact that the sceptic’s thesis is already supportive of selfishness. Scepticism, it is important to keep in mind, is not simply based upon an intellectually detached entertainment of the fact that our knowledge of the physical world is forever incomplete, and therefore rationally we are forever stopped from taking any decisive action. It goes beyond this to the matter of accepting the impropriety of actually taking action upon such knowledge. Historically, the sceptic refusal to act is because he feels it would be distressing for him to do so. What lies at the basis of this sentiment is a prioritizing of his or her emotional comfort as a state of personal well-being, which for him merits considerations above everything else. No matter how carefully he investigates an issue, if he discovers in the slightest a competing course of action that reasonably conflicts with some other proposed way of acting, he adamantly refuses to act. He will not allow himself to be subjected to the emotional unpleasantness of possibly being wrong. Being wrong, for him, engenders a state of stress, ταραξία. Hence his position is one that consciously treasures the tranquility of one’s state of mind, at the expense of everyone and everything else. This “me first” philosophy militates against the thesis that the sceptic escapes the pawl of personal responsibility on account of the epistemological underpinnings of the position he has chosen. For it can be easily seen that this position compels him to prioritize what is most important to him, i.e. his own peace of mind, which, as a value judgment, is imbedded within his basic philosophical thesis. The sceptic’s sanctioning of inaction in decision making because of what are perceived to be unavoidable limitations in justification, and the moral relativist’s support of inaction because of his perceiving the improbability of an absolute morality, can now be compared as parallel positions. Both respectively deny the logical exclusivity of the corresponding opposing view. Sceptics deny there is any absolute knowledge, while relativists

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deny there is a universal or absolute standard of morality. Both offer nothing in the place of the position they are attacking, except doing nothing. The sceptic says there is no certainty with which to justify action, and leaves it at that. For him doing nothing makes more sense than doing something, however provisional that something may be in its scope. Moral relativism says that at best morals are based totally on specific social factors, so one society’s mores are just as good or as bad as another’s, and one should leave it at that. The moral relativist would never advocate that one culture’s moral outlook is superior to another’s since supposedly no one can provide an independent standard to support such a distinction. The possibility of an absolute or universally overarching moral standard is for the relativist simply unsupportable empirically. Like the sceptic, he too would find a type of “existential inaction” an appropriate implication of his outlook. In the final analysis both views, in their extreme formulation, would support a type of nihilism or paralysis of praxis as the more intelligent and rationally appropriate outcome. The difference between them is only that whereas scepticism demurs on the possibility of there ever being any action one should take; moral relativism denies that this always needs to be so. The latter would allow that though there is no universally justified moral action one must take, an individual may still justify following the mores of a tribe or culture as a matter of his or her own taste or personal preference. As has been seen, Rescher would note that in his view moral relativism does not constitute a moral position, nor can it lead to moral action. The action a relativist thinks is moral is not moral at all; rather, because it lacks justification in rational reflection, it is little else than the adaptation of a habit or custom of that particular culture. Hence, whatever the relativist is doing, he is not doing “morality” because he cannot rise above the particular tribal practices that attract his fancy, and toward which he may express a personal liking. In this way also it could never be said of him that in acting he finds himself in the position of entertaining general principles, norms, and patterns of rational justification. In retrospect, a key point of Rescher’s critique is that scepticism ultimately denigrates the role human rationality provides in productive problem solving. Similarly, the upshot of his critique of moral relativism, taken under the imprimatur of the approach pursued by Cultural Anthropology, is that it demeans or otherwise discounts the importance of respect for others and personal responsibility as universal values that reside at the core of all rational decision making. Here it is well to keep in mind what Rescher had

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to say earlier about how all encompassing the concept of human rationality is. For it involves more than logic and formal inference, since it must reflect human interests and respect for persons. The realm of rationality, he said above, “…is as large and as comprehensive as the domain of valid human concerns and interests.”11 Therefore, whether one is considering scepticism or moral relativism, in both something valuable and truly essential is being taken away from human personhood, and in doing this both views diminish the value of what it is to be a human being. In the former case what is being denied is the hope and promise our rationality makes possible, in its demonstrable capacity to improve the quality and enjoyment of life. In the latter case it is one’s respect for others regardless of their class status or group membership, as well as the universal equality with which we desire to treat others and have others treat us, that suffers from the ravages of the relativist’s indifference. Thus the ultimate effect of both is a disinterest in and disparagement of any expression of the importance of our uniqueness, of our intelligence, of progress and of compassion. An interesting outcome emerges at this juncture, one that helps align even more closely our discussion on scepticism with that of moral relativism. For it is significant that we are brought to a consideration of the sceptic’s, as well as the relativist’s, concern over emotional predisposition. The sceptic, we have seen, chooses his strategy for action on the grounds of his desire to avoid emotional distress, ταραξία. The moral relativist justifies his adopting a form of moral conduct on what he or she finds is to their “liking”. For both, it is fundamentally a matter of what their personal preference dictates or approves doing or not doing. For each it is ultimately a matter of one’s emotional predisposition, which then motivates agency. Reason directed toward a concern for oneself and for the well being of others is not a factor, nor is the development of ones self as a person a consideration. 3. REVISITING HUME’S MORAL THEORY The discernment of an apparently irreducible factor involving emotional disposition, residing at the heart of both moral relativism and scepticism — as the factor that decides ultimately what our “moral” or “cognitive” response to the world should be—brings us to a retrospective of David Hume’s views concerning the justification of morals. It is in Hume that one finds the consummate blend of sceptic and ethicist. One who resolves to

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explain moral judgments entirely in terms of our emotional reaction to external experience, rather than upon the deliberate exercise of evaluative judgment. Significantly, Rescher takes special care to address Hume’s position in many of his works, voicing strong objection to the latter’s narrow conceptualization of what justification entails in moral judgments and in cognitive understanding. A consideration of Hume’s work in this domain is thus in order. It is seminal for understanding the philosophical significance of Rescher’s challenge that rationality plays a defining role in moral decision-making. With this he takes on not only Hume, but also several influential philosophical traditions of the modern era that were profoundly impacted by Hume. For example, it is recognized that Hume was an inspiration to Bentham in the latter’s formulation of Utilitarianism, and a formative figure for several prominent contemporary moral subjectivists, such as C. L. Stevenson. Essentially, Hume denied that moral conduct had any rational justification, in the manner in which such justification is illustrated in geometry and mathematics when proving propositions, or in the way in which reasons function in describing the causes of factual states in the physical world.12 Granting that moral claims are basically expression of private sentiment and not of fact, he proceeded to declare his famous dictum that one can never derive “ought from is”. Along these lines he saw the determination of an agent’s motivating character, specifically with respect to what he termed the “natural virtues”, i.e., benevolence, meekness, charity, etc., as resulting exclusively from the dictates of an inner “universal moral sense”. This is to say that our immediate emotional sympathy with regard to a specific situation provides the insight needed to identify the character of the agent of the act. Thus our determining that an act performed by someone is benevolent or miserly, meek or bold, charitable or selfish, in essence requires our reacting to whether the experience itself, the act as beheld by the observer, affords us either pleasure or pain.13 Hume, in this context, is clearly not a moral relativist in the sense discussed above. He does not believe that certain practices are moral by virtue of their being reflective of social beliefs, customs or mores determined by societal and/or cultural influences. The closet he comes to this, if at all, is in Part 2. of the Treatise, where he refers to the “artificial virtues”, e.g. justice, promise keeping, allegiance, chastity, etc. The artificiality of the latter lies in this being derived from education and social convention. According to Hume the motivation for acting justly, for example, results from our self-love, wherein we desire the advancement of society for the sake of our own self-

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preservation. Thus we adhere to practices that respect the possessions of others so as to keep society in tact, and our personal safety secure. This process gradually entails the development of a sense of common interest, of respecting rules, and of expecting others to behave in a predictable manner. However, with respect to the natural virtues, he believed that ultimately most of humanity, through the independent activity of the inner moral sense found in all persons, will eventually come to agree upon what is morally right and wrong. This moral awareness, which turns out to be a feeling for what is right or wrong, is universally recognizable and dramatically illustrated as such when we reflect upon those occasions where we actually even come to admire virtue, courage or bravery in our most terrifying adversaries.14 Thus there is something universal and ubiquitous about the moral sentiment, despite its localized presence in the individual, and its manifestation in the most unanticipated circumstances. Alternatively, Hume cannot be characterized as a moral absolutist either. For the universality of humanity’s moral agreement, as alluded to above, is not determined by adhering to an absolute moral standard, promulgated either by religious dogma or rational necessity. Rather he sees such conformity as an intriguing phenomenon, manifested when our individual moral sense reacts to certain situations, say to an act of murder; finding ourselves always repulsed and disapproving of it, regardless of who we are and where we happen to be. Significantly, Hume holds that the sentiment of morality does not discover these moral attributes in the object of experience itself, as though these are among its enumerable objective attributes. On the contrary, the morality of an act, so to speak, resides in us as a feeling sensed toward the circumstances confronting us. Moreover, there is no limit as to the sorts of objects that may affect the moral sense. They can be things we have actually come to witness in everyday life, or have read about, or imagined. The morality of the act itself is the emotional response the experience elicits in the individual observer, and as an emotional response per se it has no objectivity beyond the sphere of one’s very own consciousness. Hume thought this a unique discovery, in character revolutionary, and of a caliber of importance equal to that of the discovery of the solar system by Copernicus. His intention in all of this is quite clear, i.e. keep reason separate from emotion, and base moral judgments exclusively upon the latter. Our emotional approbation or disapprobation is thus an end state resulting from our personal reaction to the world. If we feel emotional pleasure on the occa-

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sion of our encounter with the experience, what that occasion is about is morally good. If we feel pain, then it is morally bad. There simply are no objectively identifiable reasons that can be shown to lead to these endstates, which would explain why we feel as we do. As an end the emotion of approbation makes no statement that can be shown to be either true or false. Thus reason has no role to play as far as evaluating the justification of that emotion. Though our moral sense can be refined, enhanced, and sensitized by good example and proper education, for Hume our moral awareness shall always remain an expression of ones personal predisposition.15 Herein also one sees the reasons for Bentham’s keen interest in Hume. For by noticing the way in which Hume links moral approbation to a commonly experienced feeling of pleasure elicited by some state of affairs, the idea that the greatest moral good is what the greater number desire and find pleasurable became disarmingly powerful. An additional amplification is needed to highlight at least some of the conceptual confusions that detract from the cogency of Hume’s position. As D. G. C. MacNabb observes, when speaking about one’s feeling of pain or repulsion Hume engages in a subtle transition, holding that the feeling of pain, for example, is also an expression of disapprobation. However, Hume then goes further to refer to such disapprobation as “a sentiment of blame”.16 However, to blame someone, MacNabb notes, involves holding someone at fault for failing to do something responsibly. It is imputing something negative about that person’s character. This, MacNabb concludes, is no longer simply a matter of expressing feeling. Where in Hume’s moral theory do we, or where can we, draw the line between personal feelings of pleasure or pain and expressing praise or blame?17 A miscategorization is taking place here. In saying, for example, that blaming is a feeling of pain, one is confusing an activity that requires some complex cognitive judgment—blaming, with an immediate emotional response— feeling pain. Macnabb’s criticism of Hume is illustrative of a fact about Hume’s position that Rescher will pursue with great resolve. For it underscores how Hume actually cannot prevent references to evaluative reasoning from seeping into his own account of the nature of moral discourse. It also important to note how Hume’s position on the essential subjective basis of the natural virtues has some significant elements that resist its total absorption into a positivist framework. For apart from its allusion to the emotions as the basis of certain moral virtue that Positivism finds much to its liking, there is in Hume’s view an abiding respect for the moral sentiment that all persons exhibit to a greater or lesser degree. In this there is

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no suggestion that moral claims are arbitrary or meaningless, as positivists will come to claim, or that their meaning is of a “lesser kind” because they are expressed through propositions that cannot be verified in a scientifically precise manner. Rather, there is implied in Hume the notion that the moral sense is a reality that leads us all, individually, to a consensus as to what is right and wrong. Rescher, however, totally rejects Hume’s view that reason can simply “beg off” from considering the validity of moral ends.18 Reacting to a passage in Hume’s A Treatise on Human Nature: “…It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger. It is not contrary to reason for me to choose my total ruin. It is as little contrary to reason to refer even my own acknowledged lesser good to my greater, and to have a more ardent affection for the former than the latter….”19

Rescher cautions against blindly following our motivating passion along the path Hume is advancing above. To place sacrificing the whole world on an equal footing with a scratch on your finger is absolutely absurd, if not morally perverse. Neither can the wanton willing of ones own ruin be justified by reason. Rescher finds it nothing short of “strange” that Hume believed that reason never evaluates the passions on whether they are pushing us toward something that is either good or bad for us. Furthermore, he sees no grounds upon which to argue that reason cannot evaluate what is preferred, especially if it is against our interests. Preferences, like beliefs, can be absurd, and it takes an “evaluative rationality” to inform us of this. To insist that reason only concerns itself with the efficiency of means to ends, that it cannot set ends or advise us about priorities, is to propose a very narrow if not unrealistic view of reason indeed.20 Only by doing violence to the evaluative side of reason can Hume maintain his position. Moreover, Rescher also notes that Hume was actually incapable of holding his own view in a consistent manner, since in various texts he is seen to be vaguely hinting that something more than the emotions are involved in moral discourse. For example, both in The History of England and in An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals Hume refers to the passions associated with the objectives of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 as “worthy”, whereas those passions connected to enthusiasm in general are not. Yet how is one to make this distinction, except through the application of evaluative reasoning? Moreover, Hume’s allusion to a “rational sympathy” as a way of ameliorating the problem simply doesn’t

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make it as a “justificatory resource”. For if by this he means to refer to the activity of our instincts, then the fact is that there is variance among people as to what instinct compels them to do.21 Finally, though Rescher agrees that reason in itself can neither prevent nor produce action, he holds firmly to the idea that it can serve at least to motivate action by illustrating how doing something is appropriate for our interests or against them. 22 “… People are no doubt the definitive authorities regarding what pleases them, but certainly not regarding what benefits them….”23 It is therefore a mistake to sever reasoning from action, since doing so distorts the important role evaluative reasoning plays in our lives. A discussion of Rescher’s critique of Hume’s theory of morals would be incomplete were one not to consider the reasons for his rejection of C. L. Stevenson’s “attitudinal/recommendation” theory of morals as well. As noted above, Hume’s theory clearly had resonance with Stevenson, insofar as he interpreted moral claims as expressions of moral approbation or disapprobation, coupled to a statement of fact.24 Thus the statement: “You acted wrongly in stealing the money” can be bisected into its “factual” component: “you stole the money”, and its “moral” component: “I disapprove of your action and admonish you to adopt my attitude on this matter, and never steal again”. For Stevenson, moral claims are not primarily intended (i.e. used) to report facts, but to influence the listener’s feelings.25 His brand of moral subjectivism, though not denying totally the meaningfulness of moral claims in the style of the earliest positivists, nonetheless sees the significance of such claims as basically functioning to emote. “Don’t steal”! really says: “I disapprove of your stealing, and I am telling you to stop it, or else”! Thus moral disagreements, if indeed there can be called “disagreement’, are ultimately never about facts and their causes, but about differences in attitude. There is thus nothing substantive, i.e. objective, to disagree about. Consequently, a definitive resolution of a moral issue is impossible, since ultimately all that one can hope for is to persuade the listener to adopt the speaker’s feelings or attitude on the matter. This is not an issue that involves the examination of objectively determinable facts and/or logic. Thus Stevenson would hold that moral claims are not really ever wrong in themselves, people just think they are. However, to equate “Doing X is wrong” with “I disapprove of X” reveals, for Rescher, a gross misunderstanding. The two statements do not have the same semantic force. The first says that the doing of X is wicked, bad or reprehensible, which are evaluative terms that cannot be expunged from the sense of this or any other moral claim. The second statement,

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however, simply reports that I disapprove of doing X. Therefore Stevenson’s emotive theory runs two very different kinds of things together when it endeavors to “identify moral evaluation with personal reaction.”26 For to evaluate is not necessarily to recommend, nor is it to require that someone adopt your personal views. MacNabb also recognizes the issue here and observes that Stevenson, and other moral subjectivists, find themselves saying that a moral statement is essentially an expression of a dispositional attitude, hoping thereby to make clearer the emotional basis of their position. However, he adds that this maneuver simply does not work. Attitudes and dispositions are things we consciously decide to adopt for a reason. They require a rationale. In themselves they lack the sense of immediacy of an emotional reaction to experience, as Hume’s original position on the role of the emotional sentiment in morals supposed.27 Furthermore, for Rescher this issue involves far more than just semantics. Rational evaluation, the rationality of ends, is important to life itself. All of rationality is not merely a matter of cognitive and instrumental rationality, a focusing only upon acquiring information. Rather an indispensable portion of its functioning involves acting for the best of reasons. The embezzler, Rescher notes, may exercise the greatest cunning in achieving his end, but the moral inappropriateness of his objective, i.e. cheating unsuspecting investors and persons who trusted him with their life savings, renders what he does objectionable. How is this determination to be made, however, without a thorough accounting of the conditions of his actions and the affects of his behavior on others? It seems evident then that actions that are purported to be moral or immoral require that their reasons must be provided to explain their motivation. The supposed disconnect Hume, and later Stevenson, propose between reason and moral action thus appears to be untenable in terms of real life situations.28 While Rescher’s views on social responsibility will be addressed in the next chapter, it is helpful to mention already at this point how Rescher’s position on this heading will conflict sharply with all of what Hume has to say about the virtues of “self-love”, alluded to above. This is dramatically evident with the latter’s rendition of the concept of justice, seen as a virtue that is inculcated within us by a sense of self-love, i.e. self-preservation, forcing us to conform to rules respecting other peoples’ property. Being just, for Hume, has no further significance beyond the pragmatic advantage of keeping society stable so that we can benefit from its protective sheltering. The idea of justice having to do with looking after the legitimate well being of our fellow citizens, of championing the cause of the rational justi-

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fication of morality, unlike the case with Rescher, has no transaction for Hume. NOTES 1

Moral Absolutes (1989), p. 43.

2

Ibid. p. 48.

3

Ibid.

4

Ibid. pp. 50-52.

5

Ibid. p. 57.

6

Ibid. p. 57.

7

Ibid. p. 53 and p. 61.

8

See Chapter 1, Section 6, above.

9

Michel de Montaigne, Selected Essays, translated by Donald M. Frame, Classics Club, (New York: Walter J. Black Inc., 1943), p. 160.

10

Michel de Montaigne, Selected Essays, translated by Donald M. Frame, Classics Club, (New York: Walter J. Black Inc., 1943), p. 160.

11

Rescher, Rationality (1988), p. 9.

12

David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, Sec. I. in Charles W. Hendel, Jr. (ed.), Hume Selections, (New York: Charles Scribners and Sons, 1955), pp. 197-198.

13

Ibid. p. 198.

14

Ibid. [Sec. IV. Why Utility Pleases], pp. 212-213.

15

Ibid. p. 194.

16

Ibid. p. 199.

17

D. G. C. MacNabb, “David Hume” in: The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vols. 3 and 4, edited by Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan and the Free Press, 1972), p. 187.

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NOTES 18

Rescher, Rationality, p. 94.

19

David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, bk. II, pt. iii, sect. 3.

20

Rescher, Rationality, p. 94.

21

Ibid. pp. 95-96.

22

Ibid. p. 96.

23

Rescher, Moral Absolutes, p. 67.

24

As Alasdair MacIntyre observes, the influences upon C. L. Stevenson were numerous, and included A. J. Ayer and G. E. Moore. The latter two themselves had recourse to Hume as the source for holding that: 1. Rejecting the idea that moral claims conveyed any factual information (Ayer), and 2. Emphasizing the commendatory function of terms such as “good” (Moore). Both of these viewpoints serve as underpinnings for Stevenson’s interpretation of the nature of moral discourse. See Alasdair MacIntyre A Short History of Ethics, (New York: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 255-258.

25

Rescher, Moral Absolutes, pp. 64-65.

26

Ibid. p. 65.

27

D. G. C. MacNabb, op. cit., p. 187.

28

Ibid. pp. 64-65.

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Chapter 8 The Morality of Social Responsibility The imperative of social responsibility is nurtured in democratic societies that allow for the assertion of the self in rational public dialogue. 1. DEFINING A JUST SOCIAL ORDER BY PRESERVING AVENUES OF RESTRAINED DECENSUS

T

o explore the rationale of social responsibility we do well to begin with the bedrock of a democratic structure—the heart and soul of a healthy society. This foundation, Rescher states, must be carefully surveyed from every vantage point. No contamination by the maxim: “consensus for the sake of consensus” should be allowed to infiltrate this ultimate basis. For the latter is a dangerous dictum indeed, one that historically has led to the de-emphasis of pluralistic diversity, and consequently to the suppression of what Rescher describes as that essential and necessary restricted dissonance all civil societies should protect and nurture.1 The entire tradition of German social thought that followed Hegel succumbed to the idea that “a communally benign social order” was possible through commitment to consensus. What resulted from this operating assumption devolved into a social, political, and humanitarian catastrophe, witness Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.2 Truth, Rescher stresses, is never determined by consensus, rather it is evidentiated by it. One normally expects and hopes that reasonable people within a free society would be naturally concerned about what is true and appropriate. These basic interests are expressed freely only through those uninhibited venues provided within a democratic state.3 Understandably, we come to admire greatly those individuals who valiantly express their descent in circumstances where they are confronted with intimidation by the prevailing consensus. Rescher refers to three such examples, Bartolomeo de las Casas who defended the human rights of the Amerindians against the conquistadors and Spanish settlers in the Americas, the eighteenth-century American abolitionists’ heroic defiance of slavery, and J. S. Mill’s battle against the subjection of women.4

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Generally, the requirement of preserving restricted dissonance is based upon a fundamental respect for the beliefs and values of others. Rescher argues that within a democratic social order there must be a welcoming of disagreement and discord as long as these are kept within “reasonable bounds.” His vision is that of a society that can be “unabashedly pluralistic and based not on the pursuit of agreement but on arrangements that provide for an acquiescence in disagreement.” The goal of such a society is not one of “judgmental homogeneity,” but of dissonance and diversity that are channeled in a civil manner so that they do not break out into injurious conflict and social chaos.5 As has been seen throughout, in various discussions of numerous other themes, so also presently with his discussion of the concept of dissonance and social order, Rescher endeavors to develop this concept as a manifestation of that dynamic change living things undergo as autonomous agents within a continuously evolving process. The momentary equilibrium nature achieves in supporting the symbiosis between an organism and its environment is never precipitous of something that is forever fixed, i.e. as if it were something wallowing in an eternally stagnate state of stasis. Rather, from what is known, nature always retains the potential dynamic for change, as an energizing agent embedded within that transitory equilibrium which supports life itself. Thus every living thing is continuously and conspicuously in a state of possible thesis or transition. In a sense, because of her spontaneous proclivity toward novelty and surprise, nature can be said to thrive upon species acclimating to a sustained dissonance in her cultivation of diversity. Analogously, a social order that does not allow for the propensity toward innovation is deficient in being able to create an environment where real live human beings can be happy and thrive as intelligent and uniquely creative beings. Moreover, it should be noted that change in successful human societies, analogously to the change that occurs in all forms of biological life, takes place within the confines of a selfregulating process. The latter cannot operate in a manner that stifles the prospect for the occurrence of modification. In this respect public institutions and forums must respect and protect the framework of just governance. Within a democratically defined context this becomes possible only when dissonance is allowed to exist as a motivator that is always at hand whenever the occasion beckons change to occur. Perhaps nowhere else in his voluminous contribution to philosophy than here is there a finer example, so beautifully crystallized, of Rescher’s uncanny vision of the conceptual synergy holding between three basic fac-

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tors: (1) What we know of nature’s manner of self-governance. (2) The evolutionary character of personhood. (3) The dynamic processes underlying the reality of social organization. Conceptually his view of the nature of social responsibility is linked seamlessly to what he has said earlier with regard to the nature of rationality, values, and what it is to be a person. As we have seen, the latter were themes he explores within the framework of an evolutionary process. Here also he proceeds to emphasize the pragmatic value of political theory, as it pertains to making possible the processes that are conducive to manifesting the civil life and the free expression of citizens within a democratic state. 2. RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF ARISTOTLE’S CONCEPTION OF MAN AS “POLITICAL ANIMAL” In taking this general stance Rescher sees in Aristotle the better teacher for explaining how social institutions actually arise and how we relate to them, than with Plato, whose impractical idealizations lead to the creation of a utopia that is unworkable as a realistic political system. The former, Rescher says, valued “organic balance and an equilibration of diversity and division,” while the latter favored “the rational uniformity of a universal consensus.”6 Rescher characterizes the philosophical difference between these two as “the great continental divide” that dominated the landscape of European political thought for millennia. Since the Enlightenment, however, political thinking became fixated on the notion that a people’s “general consent” is truly determinative of the broader community’s general agreement. Historically discerning the significance of such agreement was held by a few unscrupulous persons to be non-apparent to the “uninformed” masses themselves, requiring special “interpretation” by a few select and “insightful” people. The tragedies resulting from the exploitation of this concept are dramatized in the excesses of the French Revolution. The latter stand as mournful examples of what may very well result when one willfully neglects the unforgiving lessons the diversified complexity of history offers as fact.7 Thus Rescher’s preference for the Aristotelian approach, with its sensitivity toward respecting the diversity in human experience, is indicative of his profound concern for what is practical and rational in social activity. For example, when one looks carefully at Aristotle’s Politics it is fascinating to discover in general outline a progression of thought that, remarkably, is reflected in Rescher’s own overall strategy, when articulating his

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political philosophy. Significantly, the former attempts to explain the subject matter of the science of politics by considering first the natural order of things. Here he finds that we must begin with those basic and absolutely necessary “political” unions most human beings commonly enter into, in virtue of what our nature requires of us as a species of animal. These include marriage between a man and a woman for the sake of procreation, the establishment of a family unit and the role of parenting: the rearing and educating of children, the division of labor between provider and homemaker for the support of the household, etc. From these natural political relationships Aristotle proceeds to suggest the emergence ultimately of the organization and administration of larger political entities, such as the village and the city-state. In Book One of Politics he concludes almost immediately: “… it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal…”8 For Aristotle it is nature that “creates” the state by virtue of the way in which human beings are constituted. We, as rational beings involved within nature’s continuum, structure the institutions that regulate our practical affairs in ways that are conducive to our rational wellbeing and happiness as free living things. There is of course no deterministic casuistry between nature and man. For Aristotle our free will and reason work to insure that the political process does not restrict or enslave our choice of action. However, in order for this to occur and for the actualization of our potentialities to achieve their highest fruition, the organization of the just state must reflect a democratic entity. For this is the best avenue for free expression. Unlike Rescher, however, Aristotle had neither the advantage that the conceptual framework of evolutionary biology provides, and of course none of its powerful vocabulary. Yet despite his erroneous commitment to the classical presumption regarding the eternal fixity of the universe and of all life forms contained therein, Aristotle, as has been stated, did reserve an place of honor for the science of politics in his discussions on government. A status that reflected that discipline’s unique nobility and unparalleled importance as the science that studies practical action in human affairs, and that should be undertaken solely for the purpose of insuring for every citizen the attainment of happiness (eudaimonia). For him it was the field that, in terms of practicality, far outdistanced metaphysics in importance, i.e., the delightful study of “being qua being”, since it dealt with and helped provide for what is most centrally relevant and enjoyable to every person. To lead politically was, for Aristotle, to guide others with reason and intelligence. It meant that all (male) citizens in a state could come together un-

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der a democratic structure, and exercise their judgment and well-seasoned experience to assist in creating the proper environment that would provide the necessary means whereby their fellow citizens could flourish as creative beings. Yet just as the effort at self-governance is not realizable through a quest for consensus for Rescher, so also it is not for Aristotle. He makes this abundantly clear in the Nicomachean Ethics where he says: “… The principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few best is one that is maintained, and, though not free from difficulty, yet seems to contain an element of truth. For the many, of whom each individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but collectively, just as a feast to which the many contribute is better than a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each individual among the many has a share of virtue and prudence, and when they meet together, they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and senses; that is a figure of their mind and disposition. Hence the many are better judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some understand one part, and some another; and among them they understand the whole….”9

Thus in coming to fruition, political leadership actualizes not only a man’s highest “natural” potential as “political animal,” but provides for all citizenry the opportunity to achieve that potential as well. As the above passage indicates each person has something special to contribute in the political process of decision-making. As a result the administration of the state is best when the voices of diversity are heard; where decisions are made on the basis of the rationality of those voices. Governance is poorest, however, when one seeks to advance only his or her limited self-interest, or the interests of the group to which one owes allegiance. Securing the former means that one has achieved an environment that is conducive to human happiness generally, the fruition of all rational action. This is the raison d’être that makes civilization possible.10 Rescher’s keen interest in Aristotle can now be explained on the basis of three fundamental points. 1. The profound importance Aristotle saw in the role nature played with regard to the necessity that human beings create political institutions. 2. How interest in social responsibility in terms of political leadership is reflective of something that is essential to our basic nature as “political animals,” or to what Rescher would call our evolving “personhood.” 3. Just decision making in politics is essentially a collective matter, requiring the seasoned and proper exercise of reason within a de-

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mocratic social order, and has nothing to do with custom, religion, or mores. Moreover, throughout this entire discussion on political action, Aristotle sees man exhibiting a seamless link to the physical world as “animal.” For Aristotle, man’s essential nature as a natural creature is neither determined nor transformed by political activity. One’s relation to the natural world is a given for him, as it is for Rescher, except that for the latter there are, as we would say today, far sounder scientific reasons for believing this. Having highlighted these “correspondences” between both, nonetheless one must be careful not to run afoul of Professor Kenneth L. Telford’s important admonition. This is to say that one ought not assume that some specific facet of Aristotle’s thought is what influenced any particular thinker, or that an element of Aristotle’s thought is to be “found in” another’s work, etc. Doing so implies that one can cherry pick out of Aristotle some specific segment and take it to be independent of everything else he has said, and then proceed to assert that it exists or is somehow manifested in another, very different, context. Invariably this approach leads to misinterpretation. Telford notes that Aristotle’s philosophy constitutes a complete organic whole, one whose internal cohesiveness rests upon a very deliberate and a rational foundation. It just cannot be segmented without doing violence to it. One also runs the risk of misinterpretation when glossing over the fine point of whether a particular author claiming to have been influenced by Aristotle has actually provided evidence that he or she has adequately authenticated their understanding of what Aristotle is saying.11 Thus it is prudent to treat with extreme caution the fact that in one aspect of his philosophical overview Rescher takes serious exception to Aristotle’s approach toward the rational justification of moral decision-making. This is found specifically in the way in which the latter is said to put too great of an emphasis exclusively upon the role of reason, as strictly logical reckoning, in decision-making. For Aristotle, according to Rescher’s interpretation, rationality with regard to practical deliberation is equated exclusively with reasoning in a pattern of deductive inference that endeavors to illustrate the logical justification of means to ends. Rescher, we have seen, sees rationality in a broader sense.12 Though Aristotle is said to have recognized an important aspect of cognitive deliberation, namely that of acquiring information for securing the rationally proper means toward an end, for Rescher there is yet another, equally important, aspect to such deliberation. The latter deals with whether the ends we want to attain are ap-

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propriate for us and merit our adoption. This involves considerations of value that do not lend themselves exclusively to a pattern of strict deductive inference. “… Both matters—the efficacy of means and the validity of goals—are essential aspects of practical rationality.”13 However, it can now be maintained that perhaps Rescher’s critique of Aristotle on this matter is open to reconsideration in light of Telfford’s observation, noted earlier. For as we have seen Telford argue quite forcefully that Aristotle does not actually talk about “ends” towards which actions are directed, but about the “completion” or “fruition” rationally justified actions bring about. The latter appears to be strongly suggestive of the possibility that Aristotle’s allusion to the fulfillment of an action could be taken as involving the whole of a wide spectrum of lived experience. This in turn appears to indicate that an act’s fruition goes beyond being just a reckoning of the particular propriety of means for acquiring a very focused and specific end. If this is so, then it can be said that perhaps Rescher’s own position on what the rational justification of moral action should cover, in its essential inclusiveness, is not all that distant from the richness of Aristotle’s own conception of what constitutes the scope of the fulfillment of action. These issues are raised especially in light of the fact that Rescher goes out of his way to recognize Aristotle as his prime philosophical mentor in this context. Thus in noting the similarities between them, one must be careful not to imply a relation of identity between the two. Rather it is more accurate to suggest that a striking parallelism is at play here. This is seen not only in the manner of Rescher’s philosophizing, but also in what he wants to accomplish philosophically, as well as with respect to his persistent concern over the internal cohesiveness of his systematic approach.14 For Rescher, what is very significant is that Aristotle saw human beings practically, as how they ought to be, and not in what they may be said to be ideally, as they are pre-conceived to be by Plato. In addition, his understanding of Aristotle suggests a firm grasp of how the former’s overall conception of politics relates to other aspects of his philosophical system, an insight that Rescher attempts to apply to his own approach to the subject. Thus one could say that what Rescher finds attractive in Aristotle, among many other things, is basically the systematic coherence of the former’s theory of ethics and politics, a factor which appeals to Rescher’s sense of conceptual inter-relatedness and utility. Collectively these points appear to allay Professor Telford’s legitimate concerns, at least to the point

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where we can comfortably appreciate the fascinating array of Aristotelian ideas surrounding Rescher’s innovative advance. The above helps one to appreciate as well the profound significance of Aristotle’s idea concerning how political activity is a manifestation of our physical nature, as mentioned earlier. Basically, one should not conceive of nature in this context as a separate and external agent or cause that somehow induces us to create political unions, such as marriage, housekeeping, providing material sustenance, etc. There is no cause and effect type of relationship between nature and individual at work here. Rather, it is the nature within us that “fulfills” or “completes” itself through the establishment of these fundamental political unions, which ultimately lead to the development of larger structures, such as legislative bodies and judicial systems. The link between man and nature is “seamless” in this sense, and we have seen a strong suggestion of something like this in Rescher as well, where he discusses the evolution of human intelligence and rationality. The latter, it is recalled, sees intelligence as evolving from the continuous interactivity of mind with its natural environment, so that the result is never separate from the evolutionary processes that brought it about. Where Aristotle speaks of nature’s fulfillment or completion, Rescher speaks of the continuous and systemic evolutionary processes that are operative both in the environment and in the organism. In both thinkers a new capacity is the result, i.e. a dynamic state that is not an ending of activity or a stasis per se, but rather the manifestation of a dynamic new possibility for action politically and intellectually. Moreover it should be noted that for both Aristotle and Rescher the link to the natural world does not limit the agent’s selfautonomy. This is to say, for both the exercise of rationality is liberating in the sense that one is called upon to react to the diversity and novelty of one’s social environment responsibly. This is not acting mechanically and/or in a predetermined manner. Our actions, when deemed morally responsible, are so because they are found to be appropriately creative, as well as rationally cogent and autonomous, not because they are predetermined by some supervening agent. Again Telford is helpful in bringing the above point to high relief. He observes in his commentary of how at the end of Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle makes a transition from his discussion of the requirements for moral conduct to one concerning those for political conduct, that he [Aristotle] further elaborates upon this in Politics:

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“There are, we find, two dimensions of the natural man on which the political problem must rely to make the associations of men the feasible means to the generation of the moral agent. First, there must be in the human … an impelling force toward action upon which the political effort may naturally rely as the natural impetus which the polity will simply seek to redirect. There is no moving cause of action in the polity that does not find its source in the natural individual human. Secondly, there must be in the completion naturally sought by individual action … what is both derivative and potential of the natural purposes of the political community. The individual’s completeness or purpose must not only be consonant with that of the community, but be implicit within the larger purpose, or the association will have goals irrelevant to the individuals it seeks to guide….”15

Several things are worthy of our attention with regard to the passage above. First is Telford’s reference to that naturally “impelling force” within political man, upon which all his effort must naturally rely. Second we note his reference to the way in which Aristotle holds the political environment to be naturally conducive to the generation or emergence of the moral agent. Third is the completion that is brought forth when the individual’s actions are seen to be “consonant with that of the community.” Here Telford is referring to how in Aristotle, all things being equal, responsible leadership requires being tuned into the community’s needs and appropriate requirements. In drawing the parallelism between Aristotle and Rescher, one must again be cautious of the fact that Aristotle’s world is still one where things are eternally fixed and classically ordered. Though he recognizes the reality of natural diversity, his conception of that diversity pales in relation to what diversity involves in evolutionary biology, as we know it. Nonetheless, the overarching and most essential idea that emerges in Aristotle at this juncture, which is also developed by Rescher in his own manner, is that in human affairs political responsibilities work synergistically with the actualization of one’s moral conduct. Professor Telford, in commenting about Aristotle, expresses this same point with admirable clarity where he states: “…Ethics deals with half the practical problem. If practical science aims not at knowing but at doing, and the fact that man is a political animal means that his nature is not fulfilled except in an association with others of his kind, such association being the condition under which the fulfillment of that nature is possible, there must be a determination, outside the purview of either

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science, that shows the condition under which the political problem can have as its subject the same human being understood as moral agent….”16

In the final analysis then, it is man, as “political animal,” who in his daily association with others creates the conditions wherein his fulfillment as a moral agent achieves complete fruition. This central theme in essence dismisses the presupposition that human nature is basically unruly or even evil, and morality results only when dictums and regulations are imposed upon us from without. For Aristotle, Telford observes, the moral problem is manifested within the very everyday de facto “variability of the performance of any function.”17 3. THE BASIC ANATOMY OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY A strikingly similar idea is expressed by Rescher concerning the nature of the association affecting the individual and the political context that surrounds him, though his thoughts are couched in terms of the dynamics of an evolutionary process. For example in Human Interests Rescher notes how, according to Aristotle, the aim of ethics is principally and properly that of enabling us to become good people.18 This, in Rescher’s framework of thought, occurs in a state of transformative becoming, involving a dual dimensionality. Given that there is goodness with respect to others, or benevolence, and goodness with respect to our self, or self-realization, the moral agent should endeavor to discover the synergy between these two. Clearly one cannot separate the character and value of one’s involvement with one’s socio/political context from one’s value as a person. The two have a concurrency that is mutually transformative. The more one interacts with one’s community for the betterment of others, the more developed becomes his or her sense of self-worth and personhood. The greater our sense of self-worth becomes, the higher the degree of receptivity toward our pursuit of benevolence for others. One cannot help seeing here the parallelism between Rescher’s overarching notion of rationality, with its bifurcated orientation between nature and intellect, and his present conception of moral conduct, as a mutual reciprocity between community and person. The synergy between these two distinct conceptual frameworks, that of rationality ensconced within that of moral decision-making, gives to Rescher’s work an astonishing depth of character and cohesiveness. It transforms what he is saying from a mere academically detached inquiry into the nature of moral conduct, into a description of the actually “lived experience” of what it means to be a moral

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agent. It is here that one realizes the profound implication of his saying, earlier on in the long history of his philosophical writings, that rationality carries morality in its wake. The Greeks, Rescher goes on to observe, had gotten it mostly right in seeing the need for a balance between self-realization and benevolence. In their moral theorizing they saw the importance of describing the virtuous person as he or she who balances what is due to others with what is right and fitting for his or her self. The former they described as virtue (aretè), the latter they saw as a kind of reflective happiness (eudaimonia). Generally, however, they tended to emphasize the attainment of rational selfsatisfaction, which when realized led to benevolence towards others as a kind of subsidiary component of aretè.19 This approach to moral theorizing was to remain fixed in Western thought through the modern period, with figures such as Spinoza and Kant taking in acceptance the differentiation between benevolence and selfrealization. Remarkably, Kant’s recognition of the importance of preserving a sense of a moral self did not limit his efforts at articulating the generality of his Categorical Imperative. Eventually, however, what evolved in philosophical discussions was an excessive emphasis upon attending to the level of generality at the expense of self-realization. Thus Jeremy Bentham swept the populist imagination with a morality that championed “the greatest good for the greatest possible number,” de-emphasizing the moral importance of a personal self. In recent times the spirit of utilitarianism in Anglo-America’s academia has virtually banished the aristocratic sounding self-realization ethics from serious discussion, replacing it with a “democratic dedication to public spiritedness” mantra that was aimed at promoting the general good. The domination of the rhetoric by socially orientated “do-gooders” has become so vociferous that it is difficult to hear the rationale of those who have refused to adopt the “narrowed moral vision of the post-utilitarian Anglo-Saxon moral theorists.”20 This prevailing attitude of thought has had the effect of discouraging any appreciation of opposing avenues of thought, such as those expressed by several contemporary Spanish philosophers like Miguel de Unamuno and Jose Ortega y Gasset. Rescher observes how Unamuno, for example, argues that the scientific approach cannot capture the sense of human life as “lived from within.” The values of science, i.e. regularity, lawfulness, order, and consistency, dehumanize the human condition when they are applied as standards of explanation for lived experience, as we confront it in everyday life. Contrasting sharply with prevailing philosophical tradi-

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tions in the West, Unamuno rejects the entrenched Aristotelian thesis that man is fundamentally a rational animal. Rather, he sees man as an imperfect creature, deeply flawed, and fraught with contradictions. That which resides within human nature is not reason and intellect, but emotion and sensibility. Only the latter can speak to what makes life worthwhile, i.e., spontaneity, immediacy, and contingency. His thesis, however, is not intended to be anti-rationalist but realist. It calls into question the assumption that reason alone is sufficient to secure the human good.21 There is a pervasive existential pessimism surrounding the condition of mankind in Unamuno’s world, since in fruitlessly striving to transcend our natural state, hoping thereby to achieve some illusory dream of perfection, we doom ourselves to failure. Herein lies the tragedy of human existence, i.e. a persistent and universal need to transcend the inescapable limitations of our actual existence. The mistake of modern man, in Unamuno’s view, is to denigrate the dignity of our idiosyncratic personality for the sake of some greater cause. Thus communism and fascism are both practically useless in helping us understand ourselves as human beings. It is the emphasis upon our personal striving as individuals, that is, upon our personal development, that should be emphasized, letting the general condition of mankind take care of itself.22 Rescher alludes to Unamuno’s work not to offer it as a remedy to the excesses of utilitarianism, but as an example of how a countervailing position can go too far in the opposite direction. The fact is that we cannot concentrate only upon ourselves, letting “the general condition of mankind” take a holiday. Our personal involvement in the world, in our welfare and in the welfare of others, is an inescapable given. Our nurturing of a sense of self-respect and self-worth is absolutely essential to our motivation as human agents. A proper balance between benevolence toward others and self-satisfaction therefore must be preserved, if our moral theorizing is to be reasonable and our attitude toward life optimistic. “…The basic idea is that personhood is sacred, and that we are duty-bound—to ourselves, to our fellows, and to the forces that have brought us into being in this world—to care for and foster the interests of personhood wherever we encounter it, be it in others or in ourselves.”23 We note here Rescher’s speaking of the importance of a commitment severally to ourselves, to others, to the forces that “brought us into being,” and to personhood generally—wherever we may find it. This holistic approach to moral theorizing requires a return to the Greeks. They were the first to understand it. Though failing to discover the means whereby a bal-

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ance could be attained between service to self and to others, nonetheless they were wise enough to recognize that this was the appropriate and central issue to raise, if the morally defined life was to make any sense. Contemporary theorists, Rescher laments, especially those who have sought to establish their reputations in the compartmentalized world of America’s academia, all but relegate to unimportance the role of self-development in their inquiries into morality.24 4. THE ONTOLOGICAL IMPERATIVE OF SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY As stated, Rescher’s explanation of what it is to be a ‘person’ in a fundamental manner involves the concept of rationality. This is because the latter provides the means by which we are able to account for our understanding of what ought to be to our self-interest, and/or what ought to be to the interests of others. As we have seen Rescher argue tirelessly, rationality is to be properly understood not as a fully developed faculty that as a given is confined to the subjective aspect of cognition, i.e. to that which has no dependence upon or contiguity with the “outside” world. For on the one hand, the nature of rationality, and of the “personhood” that ensues from its exercise, transcend the insular and virtually diaphanos conception of the self inherent within Cartesianism, fashioned as this is upon an artificiality, namely that of a subject/object split. On the other hand, the concept of rationality also steers clear of those difficulties attendant upon the atomistic disintegration of the self. The latter, inherent within the Humean notion of the understanding, treats sense impressions as a sequence of discrete elements curiously constituting, in some unexplained manner, a mosaic that is said to be “consciousness.” As a clearly identifiable human faculty, constantly evolving from our involvement with others in the world around us, rationality, as a life sustaining ability, is absolutely essential for our practical survival as a species. “…A world in which we cannot communicate and collaborate with others is not a very safe world for us and our kind. And so, evolutionary processes dictate our impetus to increasingly complex communication and collaboration….”25 Rescher refers repeatedly to this “impetus of reason” or to “the fundamental impetus to make good use of our opportunities for selfdevelopment” as that which “grounds obligation in considerations of nature (that is, as a modality of existence).”26 It is this grounding that constitutes the ontological imperative of rationality. It is here that the “counsels

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of reasons are transmuted into commands.”27 For in claiming to be free rational agents we are by necessity also asserting our personal position in the scheme of things. Pursuing the dictates of rationality now becomes a matter of duty and obligation. For the fulfillment of our self-realization, a requirement that is basic to our nature as Homo sapiens, demands that we obey these self-reflexive commands to ourselves to behave rationally. These are commands directed to our self by our very rationality, for the betterment of our person. This acting for the sake of our own self- development in itself needs no ulterior justification. It is animated by the impetus to become the person we think we ought to be. It is the way in which we discover the means to approve of who we have made ourselves become through our own actions. In this way also we get on good terms with ourselves, which in itself is “… the most fundamental and basic real and true interest that we have.”28 As stated, the duty we have is to ourselves, and to the general scheme of things that brought us about, requires that we develop our rational potential to the utmost. However, what is this nurturing scheme, this context of action? Rescher sees it as: “…the systematic interconnection among the interests of people coexisting in a shared world….”29 It is because of this that our concern for our own self-interest is found to become our concern for the interests of others as well. To disown any interest in the dictates of rationality, to deny that we should care about the interests of others, and of our own for that matter, is to bring about out own unhappiness. We become unable to live with what we have made ourselves become, unreasonable people; aberrations within a natural process. The individual who cares about no one is an individual who sacrifices his character and self-esteem. We, however, are obligated to be moral, not because doing so pays off materially, but because it is our ontological obligation, as persons within a community, to enhance our self-realization. It is this ontological imperative that supports the normative force of our moral actions.30 Much can be added to further illuminate Rescher’s thesis concerning the genesis of social responsibility. In this regard it is productive to return to the origins of his theorizing, that is to Charles Darwin’s own account of the causal conditions for our “moral being.” In doing so we discover how Rescher advances far beyond the latter in capturing the unique essence of what it is to be morally responsible. Here also we again see Rescher’s uncanny ability in taking a principle, such as that of evolutionary change, and rendering it in a more meaningful life-reflecting context. He thus enhances the theory’s explanatory power when dealing with the concept of rational-

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ity, while being careful not to allow himself to become entangled in Darwin’s flawed explanation of the moral sense. In the final chapter of The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex Charles Darwin states the following: “The development of the moral qualities is a more interesting problem. The foundation lies in the social instincts, including under this term the family ties. These instincts are highly complex, and in the case of the lower animals give special tendencies towards certain definite actions; but the more important elements are love, and the distinct emotion of sympathy. Animals endowed with the social instincts take pleasure in one another’s company, warn one another of danger, defend and aid one another in many ways. These instincts do not extend to all the individuals of the species, but only to those of the same community. As they are highly beneficial to the species, they have in all probability been acquired through natural selection. A moral being is one who is capable of reflecting on his past actions and their motives—of approving of some and disapproving of others; and the fact that man is the one being who deserves this designation, is the greatest distinction between him and the lower animals. … I have endeavored to show that the moral sense follows, firstly from the enduring and ever-present nature of the social instincts; secondly from man’s appreciation and disapprobation of his fellows; and thirdly, from the high activity of his mental faculties, with past impressions very vivid; and in these latter respects he differs from the lower animals…. Hence after some temporary desire or passion has mastered his social instincts, he reflects and compares the now weakened impression of such past impulses with the ever-present social instincts; and he feels that sense of dissatisfaction which all unsatisfied instincts leave behind, he therefore resolves to act differently for the future,—and this is conscience. Any instinct, permanently stronger or more enduring than another, gives rise to a feeling which we express by saying that it ought to be obeyed….”31

Darwin concludes that in lower animals only some members of a community inherit social instincts, and that these have been retained and passed on through natural selection. The moral sense in man, what ultimately leads to what one decides “ought” to be done, is said by him to arise out of our reflection upon the conflict that arises between these inherited and “enduring instincts,” and transitory impulses of momentary passion. In this account there is no allusion to a moral responsibility regardless of the approbation of our peers, or to the subject’s sense of personal self-worth. Moreover, as genetic characteristics the social instincts are not subject to

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rational evaluation. They are treated as part of the hard wiring of our psyche, so to speak. Interestingly, he regards the social instincts that enables lower forms of life to survive as manifested in humans as well, thus establishing for Darwin a common and automatic behavioral link among diverse forms of life. It is apparent that Darwin the biologist is speaking to us here. Man, like all other species, is determined in his moral conduct by forces and impulses that are beyond his rational determination or ability to control. The moral sense results from reflecting upon the “feeling” elicited by the social instinct, requiring that such and such action “ought to be.” Even where Darwin alludes to the “high activity of his [man’s] mental faculties” as contributing to the awareness of our higher moral sense, he is referring to a process that basically compares the sensation of emotional impulse to the ever-present social instinct. The level of sophisticated activity operative here appears as scarcely more than that of recollection and reaction. There is no venue for entering into a productive dialogue about morals, of assigning personal responsibility for moral choice, or of even considering the consequences to ourselves or to others in acting one way as opposed to another. The social instinct, which forms the base line for the moral sense, is a simple given, an impersonal automatic pilot of sorts that tells us what the morally correct thing is when the passions subside in our attention span. It serves as a motivator that operates apart from what we reckon, will, prefer, or choose. The overarching idea is that we aid in supporting the general good because it is a manifestation of the dictates of the social instinct. By doing so we receive the approbation of the group, which in turn feeds our instinctual need to be loved and accepted. This then fulfills our innate desire for happiness. In unmistakable utilitarian-sounding terminology Darwin says: “…the greatest-happiness principle indirectly serves as a nearly safe standard of right and wrong.”32 It is intriguing to see in this the classic stereotypes of nineteenth century science. Animals are said to inherit social instincts such as love, sympathy, heroism, and friendship.33 Darwin makes no effort to discuss and explain how these examples from human behavior, which for us have meaning only in the complex context of human social behavior, apply to the behaviors of lower forms of life. It is doubtful whether such concepts lend themselves to transference to explain the externally manifested activities of other species. More interesting is his vision of “primitive men” of long ago, as well as those “savages” living in his day in remote parts of the world. He sees them as little more than uncouth knuckle-dragging primitives, bereft of logical reasoning,

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proper manners, and lacking the beneficial influences of culture and monotheistic religion. One wonders how he would have reacted to Nigel Spivey’s revealing discussions, relating to the art of the cave painters of Altamira and of Cueva de la Pileta, and to the rock drawings of the indigenous inhabitants of Australia. These artifacts, and many architectural remains, in some cases dating to 25,000 BC and before, can hardly be said to be unskilled depictions of everyday life, or examples of ill-planned housing. On the contrary, the former is now recognized to be superbly skilled expressions of altered states of consciousness, reflecting sophisticated narrative histories of the mystical origins of ancient peoples. In the case of Stonehenge and the PrePottery Neolithic Göbekli Tepe stone circle, researchers have determined these to be architecturally precise and highly specialized structures, revealing advanced astronomical knowledge and great organizational planning.34 Spivey’s insights bring into focus an important fact about human rationality that in a way underwrites Rescher’s thesis in very vivid terms. This is that the ability humans have to solve difficult problems in their association with others in a community is not a monopoly of any one culture or historical period. The fact that the remote past offers such astonishing examples of human achievement is indicative of the truth that rationality is the manifestation of our unique problem solving abilities as a species. To create a visual record of the mythical history of ones people that endures for generations, or a structure that guides one in determining the Summer Solstice, is to exercise rationality of the highest order. It manifests the enduring affirmation of our person, and speaks in optimistic terms about how we manage our own survival. Rescher’s departure from Darwin’s rendition of the moral sense is remarkable, in that while he adapts aspects of the conceptual framework of Darwin’s theory of evolution to explain rationality, he does not succumb to its thesis of moral determinism. Rescher’s emphasis upon the selfmotivating role of the sense of person, as the awareness by the individual of herself as a free and rational agent, takes the subject of discussion out of the context of natural selection and physical determinism. The ontological imperative for social responsibility is not due to the dictates of some primordial and innate impulse for herd survival, inherited through natural selection. This removes from the individual any responsibility for his actions. Neither can it be said that it is first initiated by society’s demand for conformity. This again throws the whole issue back upon the unacceptable premise of morals and mores being indistinguishable, and opens the door

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to the stifling of descent. For Rescher the rationale for social responsibility is seen to be subtler than this. In responding to the challenge of the environment the socially responsible individual uses reason creatively to achieve a resolution of the issue. Given that the surroundings one finds herself in have a tendency toward novelty and surprise, reflecting the requirements of life, the agent must react to new challenges in ways that respect her sense of self worth while offering a rational justification for action in a new context. The procedures and methods, i.e. the mind’s software, we have derived to respond successfully to these challenges are not determined by natural selection, but by rational selection. Here we are not dealing with the biological origin of faculties and capacities, i.e. the brain’s hardware, but with the success of strategies.35 In the exercise of rationality, as Rescher defines it, we encounter elements of Hegel’s communitarian self. The individual discovers the possibility of fruitful and unfettered action occurring only in a free and just society. Moreover in reacting to the challenge she is facing, the creative response offered manifests elements of Rescher’s measured adaptation of Nietzsche’s assertion of the will. For the expression of one’s self through action, while respecting the rights of others, is an affirmation of the inviolability of the person. The creativity of the act is therefore a crucial factor coordinate with its rationality. Both come together in synthesis to mold the motive for action. In thus identifying the roles of creativity and rationality in the impulse toward doing the socially responsible thing there is the further realization that social responsibility, when allowed free expression, transcends cultural and sectarian biases, and speaks optimistically of a humane and humanitarian potential for survival. NOTES 1

Rescher, Sensible Decisions (2003), p. 100.

2

Ibid. p. 99.

3

Ibid. p. 100.

4

Ibid. p. 102.

5

Ibid. p. 100.

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NOTES 6

Ibid. p. 107.

7

Ibid.

8

Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, Chapter 2, ll. 1252a: 25-35, and ll. 1253a: 1-2. [Also see Introduction to Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon, The Modern Library, (New York: Random House, 1947), p. 554 and p. 556.]

9

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, Chapter 11, ll. 1280b:40-1281a:8. [Also see Introduction to Aristotle, Richard McKeon, ed., p. 597.]

10

Ibid., Book I, Chapter 2, ll. 1094a: 1-10. [Also see Introduction to Aristotle, Richard McKeon, ed., p. 309.]

11

Kenneth A. Telford, Commentary on Aristotle’s “Nicomachean Ethics,” (Binghampton, NY: Institute of Global Cultural Studies, State University of New York at Binghampton, 1999), p. 3.

12

See Chapter 1. Section 4. Above.

13

Rescher, Rationality (1988), pp. 92-93.

14

Rescher, The Strife of Systems (1985), p. 20.

15

Kenneth A. Telford, p. 290.

16

Ibid. p. 289.

17

Ibid. p. 78.

18

Rescher, Human Interests (1990), p. 106.

19

Ibid. p. 111.

20

Ibid. pp. 109-11.

21

Ibid. pp. 112-3.

22

Ibid. p. 114.

23

Ibid. p. 115.

24

Ibid.

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NOTES 25

Rescher, Reason and Rationality (2005), p. 63.

26

Rescher, Rationality, p. 206.

27

Ibid.

28

Ibid.

29

Rescher, Studies in Philosophical Anthropology (2006), p. 81.

30

Ibid. pp. 87-88.

31

Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex New York: Prometheus Books, Amherst, 1998). See especially Chapter XXI, pp. 633-634.

32

Ibid. p. 634.

33

Ibid. pp. 100-107.

34

Nigel Spivey, How Art Made the World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), pp. 35-40 and 45-47.

35

Rescher, A Useful Inheritance (1990), pp. 39-40.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY ____________________________________________________________ CONTENTS A. Works by Nicholas Rescher I.

Books and Monographys

1

II.

Tranalations of Rescher’s Books

8

III.

Articles

10

B. Discussions About Rescher’s Philosophy IV.

Books

34

V.

Other Publications

35

VI.

Dissertations About Rescher’s Philosophy

35

C. Articles Dealing with Rescher’s Work

36

___________________________________________________________ A. Works by Nicholas Rescher I. Monographs: Metaphysics: The Key Issues from a Realistic Perspective (Amherst, N.Y. Prometheus Books, 2006). Studies in Epistemology, Nicholas Rescher Collected Papers, Volume XIV (Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, 2006). Studies in Leibniz’s Cosmology, Nicholas Rescher Collected Papers, Volume XIII (Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, 2006). Studies in Metaphysical Optimalism, Nicholas Rescher Collected Papers, Volume XII (Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, 2006). Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Nicholas Rescher Collected Papers, Volume XI (Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, 2006). Studies in the History of Logic, Nicholas Rescher Collected Papers, Volume X (Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, 2006).

Nicholas Moutafakis Studies in Metaphilosophy, Nicholas Rescher Collected Papers, Volume IX (Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, 2006). Studies in Value Theory, Nicholas Rescher Collected Papers, Volume VIII (Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, 2006). Studies in Philosophical Anthropology, Nicholas Rescher Collected Papers, Volume VII (Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, 2006). Studies in Social Philosophy, Nicholas Rescher Collected Papers, Volume VI (Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, 2006). Studies in Cognitive Finitude, Nicholas Rescher Collected Papers, Volume V (Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, 2005). Studies in Philosophical Inquiry, Nicholas Rescher Collected Papers, Volume IV (Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, 2005). Studies in Idealism, Nicholas Rescher Collected Papers, Volume III (Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, 2005). Studies in Pragmatism, Nicholas Rescher Collected Papers, Volume II (Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, 2005). Studies in 20th-Century Philosophy, Nicholas Rescher Collected Papers, Volume I (Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt, 2005). Cognitive Harmony: The Role of Systemic Harmony in the Constitution of Knowledge (Pittsburgh, PA. University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005) Realism and Pragmatic Epistemology (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005) Epistemic Logic: A Survey of the Logic of Knowledge (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005). What if?: Thought Experimentation in Philosophy (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2005) Cosmos and Logos: Studies in Greek Philosophy (Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 2005). Commonsense: A New Look at an Old Philosophical Tradition (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2005). Reason and Reality: Realism and Idealism in Pragmatic Perspective (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005). Scholastic Meditations (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America, Press, 2005).

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BIBLIOGRAPHY After Whitehead: Rescher on Process Metaphysics (Michel Weber (ed.), Frankfurt: Ontos, 2004). Value Matters: Studies in Axiology (Frankfurt: Ontos; Piscataway, NJ: Dist. in North and South America by Transaction Books], 2004). Process and Analysis: Whitehead, Hartshorne, and the Analytic Tradition, edited by George W. Shields (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003). Rationality in Pragmatic Perspective (Lewiston, N.Y.: E. Mellen Press 2003). Sensible Decisions: Issues of Rational Decision in Personal Choice and Public Policy (Lanham, Md. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003). On Leibniz (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003). Cognitive Idealization: On the Nature and Utility of Ideals in the Cognitive Domain (Uxbridge: Cambridge Scholars, 2003). Epistemology: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003). Imagining Irreality: A Study of Unreal Possibilities (Chicago, Ill.: Open Court, 2003). Enlightening Journey: The Autobiography of an American Scholar (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2002). Fairness: Theory and Practice of Distributive Justice (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002). Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range, and Resolution (Chicago: Open Court, 2001). Cognitive Pragmatism: The Theory of Knowledge in Pragmatic Perspective (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001). Minding Matter: And Other Essays in Philosophical Inquiry (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001). Philosophical Reasoning: A Study in the Methodology of Philosophizing (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2001). Kant and the Reach of Reason: Studies in Kant’s Theory of Rational Systematization (Cambridge, U.K., New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Realistic Pragmatism: An Introduction to Pragmatic Philosophy (Albany, N.Y., State University of New York Press, 2000). Inquiry Dynamics (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2000).

203

Nicholas Moutafakis Process Philosophy: A Survey of Basic Issues (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000). Nature and Understanding: The Metaphysics and Method of Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). The Limits of Science (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999). Predicting the Future: An Introduction to the Theory of Forecasting (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998). Complexity: A Philosophical Overview (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers, 1998). Communicative Pragmatism and Other Philosophical Essays on Language (Lanham, Md.: Bowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998). Instructive Journey: An Essay in Autobiography (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1997). Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997). Profitable Speculations: Essays on Current Philosophical Themes (Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield, 1997). Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996). Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). Public Concerns: Philosophical Studies of Social Issues (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995). Satisfying Reason: Studies in the Theory of Knowledge (Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995). Luck: The Brilliant Randomness of Everyday Life (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1995). Metaphilosophical Inquiries (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), Vol. III of A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Philosophical Standardism: An Empiricist Approach to Philosophical Methodology (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994). The Validity of Values: a Normative Theory of Evaluative Rationality (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1993), Vol. II of A System of Pragmatic Idealim.

204

BIBLIOGRAPHY Human Knowledge in Idealistic Perspective (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), vol. I of A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Frank Plumpton Ramsey, On Truth: Original Manuscript Materials (1927-1929) From the Ramsey Collection at the University of Pittsburgh, edited by Nicholas Rescher and Ulrich Majer (Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991). Baffling Phenomena: and Other Studies in the Philosophy of Knowledge and Valuation (Savage, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991). Monadologie. English & French, G.W. Leibniz’s Monadology (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991). In the Line of Duty: The Complexity of Military Obligation (Colorado Springs: U.S. Air Force Academy, 1990). Aesthetic Factors in Natural Science (Lanham: University Press of America, 1990). A Useful Inheritance: Evolutionary Aspects of the Theory of Knowledge (Savage, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1990). Human Interests: Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1990). Evolution, Cognition, and Realism: Studies in Evolutionary Epistemology (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1990). Leibnizian Inquiries: A Group of Essays (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989). Cognitive Economy: The Economic Dimension of the Theory of Knowledge (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1989). Moral Absolutes: An Essay on the Nature and Rationale of Morality (New York: P. Lang, 1989). Rationality: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the Rationale of Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Scientific Realism: A Critical Reappraisal (Dordrecht; Boston: D. Reidel, 1987). Forbidden Knowledge: And Other Essays on the Philosophy of Cognition (Dordrecht; Boston: D. Reidel, 1987). Ethical Idealism: An Inquiry into the Nature and Function of Ideals (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). Leibniz: An Introduction to His Philosophy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986, 1979).

205

Nicholas Moutafakis Ongoing Journey (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986). The Strife of Systems: An Essay on the Grounds and Implications of Philosophical Diversity (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985). Pascal’s Wager: A Study of Practical Reasoning in Philosophical Theology (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985). The Limits of Science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). The Riddle of Existence: An Essay in Idealistic Metaphysics (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984). Mid-Journey: An Unfinished Autobiography (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983). Risk: A Philosophical Introduction to the Theory of Risk Evaluation and Management (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983). Introduction to Value Theory (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982). Empirical Inquiry (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1982). Induction: An Essay on the Justification of Inductive Reasoning (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980). The Logic of Inconsistency: A Study in Non-Standard Possible World Semantics and Ontology, Nicholas Rescher and Robert Brandom, (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1979). Scepticism, A Critical Reappraisal (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1980). Unpopular Essays on Technological Progress (Nicholas Rescher, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980). Induction: An Essay on the Justification of Inductive Reasoning (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980). Cognitive Systematization: A Systems-Theoretic Approach to a Coherentist Theory of Knowledge (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1979). Leibniz: An Introduction to His Philosophy (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1979). Scientific Progress: A Philosophical Essay on the Economics of Research in Natural Science (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978). Peirce’s Philosophy of Science: Critical Studies in His Theory of Induction and Scientific Method (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978). Scientific Progress: A Philosophical Essay on the Economics of Research in Natural Science (Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1978).

206

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Methodological Pragmatism: A Systems-Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Knowledge (New York: New York University Press, 1977; Oxford: Blackwell, 1977). Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976). A Theory of Possibility: A Constructivistic Conceptualistic Account of Possible Individuals and Possible Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975; Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975). Unselfishness: The Role of the Vicarious Affects in Moral Philosophy and Social Theory (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, [1975]). The Coherence Theory of Truth (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973). Conceptual Idealism (Oxford, Blackwell, 1973). The Primacy of Practice: Essays Towards a Pragmatically Kantian Theory of Empirical Knowledge (Oxford, Blackwell, 1973). Welfare: The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press [1972]). Temporal Logic (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1971). With Alasdair Urquhart. Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press, 1970). Introduction to Value Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969). Many-Valued Logic (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969). Reprinted 1993 (Aldershot: Gregg Revivals). Essays in Philosophical Analysis (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969). Temporal Modalities in Arabic Logic (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1967). The Philosophy of Leibniz (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967). Distributive Justice: A Constructive Critique of the Utilitarian Theory of Distribution (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966). Temporal Modalities in Arabic Logic (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1967). Studies in Arabic Philosophy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967). The Logic of Commands (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966). Galen and the Syllogism (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966).

207

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Al-Kindi: An Annotated Bibliography (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964). The Refutation by Alexander of Aphrodisias of Galen’s Treatise on the Theory of Motion. Translated from the medieval Arabic version, with an introduction, notes, and an edition of the Arabic text, by Nicholas Rescher and Michael E. Marmura (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1965). Studies in the History of Arabic Logic (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964). Introduction to Logic (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964). The Development of Arabic Logic (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964). Al-Kindi: An Annotated Bibliography, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964). Hypothetical Reasoning (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1964). Short Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Prior Analytics’. Translated from the original Arabic, with an introduction, and notes (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963). Al-Farabi: An Annotated Bibliography (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962). On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1960). With Olaf Helmer.

II. Translations of Rescher’s Books THE PRIMACY OF PRACTICE: La primacia de la práctica (Spanish tr. by Ana Sanchez Torres). Madrid (Editorial Tecnos), 1980. DIALECTICS: Taiwa No Roni (Japanese tr. by Taneomi Uchida). Tokyo (Kinokuniya Press), 1981. STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF ARABIC LOGIC (Arabic Translation). Cairo (Der al Ma’arif), 1982. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARABIC LOGIC (Arabic tr. by Dr. M. Maharan). Cairo (Dar al Ma’arif), 1986). COGNITIVE SYSTEMATIZATION: Sistematización cognoscitiva (Spanish tr. by Carlos Rafael Luis). Mexico City (Siglo Vientiuno Editores), 1981. SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS: (1) Wissenschaftlicher Fortschritt (German tr. by Gerhard Schaeffner). Berlin (de Gruyter Verlag), 1982. (2) Le progrès scientifique (French tr. by Michel Rosier). Paris (Presses Universitaires de France) 1993.

208

BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE LIMITS OF SCIENCE: (1) Grenzen der Wissenschaft (German tr. by Kai Puntel). Dietzingen (Reclam Verlag), 1985. [Contains an introduction to NR’s thought, “Einführung in Nicholas Rescher’s pragmatische System philosophie,” pp. 7-47.] (2) I limiti della scienza (Italian tr. by Rosalba Camedda). Rome (Armando Editore), 1990. (3) Los límites de la Ciencia (Spanish tr. by Leonardo Rodríguez Duplá (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos) 1994. INDUCTION: Induktion: Zur Rechtfertigung des Induktiven Schliessens (German tr. by Gerhard Schaeffner). Munich (Philosophia Verlag), 1987; “Introductiones” Series. RATIONALITY: (1) Rationalität (German tr. by Axel Wüstehube). Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1993. (2) Razionalità (Italian tr. by Francesca Febbraro). Rome Armando Editorial, 1999). (3) La racionalidad. (Spanish tr. by S. Nuccetelli). Madrid. Editorial Tecnos, 1993. (4) Chinese translation by Cau Guan Fa in progress. THE STRIFE OF SYSTEMS: (1) La lucha de los sistemas (Spanish tr. by Adolfo GarcEia de la Sienre. Mexico City (UNAM = Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México), 1995. (2) La lotti dei sistemi (Italian tr. arranged by Andrea Bottani.) Genoa (Marietti) 1993. (3) Der Streit der Systeme (German tr. by Birger Brinkmeier). Würzburg (Königshausen & Neumann), 1997. A USEFUL INHERITANCE. Warum sind Wir nicht klüger? German tr. by Astrid and Helmut Pape. Stuttgart (Hirzel Verlag, Edition Universitas), 1994. COGNITIVE ECONOMY. (Chinese translation). Beijing (Jiang Xi Education Publishers), 1999. LUCK: (1) Glück: Die Chancen des Zufalls. German tr. by Jens Hagesledt. Berlin (Berlin Verlag), 1995. (2) La suerte: Aventuras y desaventuras de la vida cotidiana. Spanish tr. by Carlos Gardini. Barcelona (Editorial Andrés Bello), 1997. (3) Japanese translation Tokyo (PHP Publishing House), 1999. (4) Korean translation Seoul (Good Guy Publishing Co.), 2000. PLURALISM: Bulgarian translation by T. Petkov and K. Gebrahova, Sophia (Critique and Humanism Publishing House), 2001.

209

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COMPLEXITY: (Chinese Translation) Shanghai (Scientific & Technological Eduction Publishing House), 2004. PROCESS METAPHYSCIS: Fondements de l’ontologie du procès. French translation by Michel Weber. Frankfurt (Ontos Verlag), 2005.

III.

Articles

A. Theory of Knowledge Problem No. 7, Analysis, vol. 16 (1955), pp. 4-5. “On Prediction and Explanation,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 8 (1957), pp. 281-290. “A Theory of Evidence,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 25 (1958), pp. 83-94. “Evidence in History and in the Law,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol 56 (1959), pp. 561578. With Carey B. Joynt. “The Legitimacy of Doubt,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 31 (1959), pp. 226-234. “Presuppositions of Knowledge,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie vol. 13 (1959), pp. 418-429. “Randomness as a Means to Fairness,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 56 (1959), pp. 967968. “A Factual Analysis of Counterfactual Conditionals,” Philosophical Studies, vol. 11, (l960), pp. 49-54. “The Problem of a Logical Theory of Belief Statements,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 27 (1960), pp. 88-95. Spanish tr. as “El Problema de una Teoria Logica de los Enunciados de Creencia” in T.M. Simpson (ed.), Semantica Filosofica: Problemas y Discussiones (Buenos Aires, 1973), pp. 401-416. “Belief-Contravening Suppositions,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 70 (1961), pp. 176-196. Reprinted in H. Feigl, W. Sellars, and K. Lehrer (ed.’s), New Readings in Philosophical Analysis (New York, 1972), pp. 530-545, and in E. Sosa (ed.), Causation and Conditionals (Oxford, 1975), pp. 156-164. “A New Look at the Problem of Innate Ideas,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 17 (1966), pp. 205-218. “The Future as an Object of Research,” RAND Corporation Research Paper P-3593 (April, 1967).

210

BIBLIOGRAPHY “A Methodological Problem in the Evaluation of Explanations,” Nous, vol. 2 (1968), pp. 121129. With Brian Skyrms. “Foundationalism, Coherentism, and the Idea of Cognitive Systematization,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 71 (1974), pp. 695-708. “The Systematization of Knowledge,” Philosophy in Context, vol. 6 (1977), pp. 20-42. “The Systematization of Knowledge,” International Classification, vol. 4 (1977), pp. 73-75. (Note: This is a different paper from the preceding.) “Die Kriterien der Wahrheit” in G. Skirbekk (ed.), Wahrheitstheorien (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977), pp. 337-390. “L’analisi coerentista dei contrafattuali,” in Claudio Pizza (ed.), Leggi di natura, modalita, ipotesi: La Logica dei ragionamento contrafattuale (Milano, 1978), pp. 114-129. “Appearance and Reality” in E. Sosa (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm (Amsterdam: Grazer Philosophische Studien, vol. 7/8, 1980), pp. 123-144. “Conceptual Schemes” in Studies in Epistemology edited by P. A. French et. al. (Minneapolis, 1980: University of Minnesota Press; Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 5), pp. 323345. “Extraterrestrial Science,” Philosophia Naturalis, vol. 21 (1984), pp. 400-424; reprinted in E. Regis (ed.), Extraterrestrials (Cambridge, University of Cambridge Press, 1985), pp. 83116. “Truth as Ideal Coherence,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 38 (1985), pp. 795-806. German tr. “Wahrheit als ideale Kohaerenz” in L.B. Puntel (ed.), Der Wahrheitsbegriff (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1987), pp. 284-297. Spanish Translation in J. A. Nicolás and M. J. Frapóli (eds.), Teorías de la verdad en el siglo XX (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1997). “How Serious a Fallacy is Inconsistency?” Argumentation, vol. 1 (1987), pp. 303-316. “Die Kohaerenztheorie der Wahrheit,” in H. Pauer-Studer et al. (eds.), Philosophie zum Lesen (Wien: Herder, 1987), pp. 46-48. “The Limits of Cognitive Relativism,” translated into Slovak as “Hranice kognitivneko relativiznise,” Filozofia (Boratislava), vol. 48 (1993), pp. 194-209. “Razon y realidad” Numbres: Revista de Filosofîa, vol. 3 (1993), pp. 61-69. “Reason and Reality,” Proto-Soziologie, vol 6 (1994), pp. 14-27. “Aspects of the Coherence Theory of Truth” in M. F. Goodman and R. A. Snyder (eds.), Contemporary Readings in Epistemology (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1993). [Reprinted from The Coherence Theory of Truth.]

211

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“Problems of Philosophical Relativism” [in Russian], Voprosi filosofi, no. 4 (1995), pp. 3554. “Some Questions About the Nature of Fiction,” in Fiction Updated: Theories of Fictionality and Contemporary Critical Theory, ed. by C.A. Mihailescu and W. Hamarneh (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), pp. 30-38. “I problemi di una teoria della varitá basate sul consenso” in Giulio Severino (ed.), IdentitáCoerenze-Contictizione (Genova:Il Melangolo, 1996), pp. 141-156. “The Law of Logarithmic Returns and Its Implications,” in D. Ginev and R. S. Cohen (eds.), Issues and Images in the Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), pp. 275-287. “Coping with Cognitive Limitations: Problems of Rationality in a Complex World,” Philosophical Exchange, No. 28 for 1997-1998, pp. 33-38. “The Role of Rhetoric in Rational Argumentation,” Argumentation, vol. 12 (1998), pp. 31523. “The Deficits of Scepticism” Revista Patagómica de Filosofía, vol. 1 (1999), pp. 5-30. “On Learned Ignorance,” Southern Journal of Philosophy vol. 37 (1999), pp. 479-93. “Trapped Within History?” Process Studies vol. 28 (1999), pp. xyz. “The Limits of Cognitive Relativism” in M. Krausz and R. Shusterman (eds.), Interpretation, Relativism, and the Metaphysics of Culture (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1999). “Über Zirkulantät und Regress beim rationalen Geltingsbeweis” in G. L. Lueken (ed.), Formen der Argumentation (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2000). “Epistemic Logic” in A Companion to Philosophical Logic (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). “Sosa and Epistemic Justification” in John Greko (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), pp. 145-64. “On the Ways and Vagaries of Fiction” in C. Perez and D. Greimann (eds.) Wahrheit-SeinStruktur (Hildesheim: G. Olms Verlag, 2000), pp. 174-97. “Methoden des Interpretieren” in Alex Buhler (ed.), Hermeneutik (Heidelberg: Synchron, 2003), p. 177-90. “The Fallacy of Respect Neglect,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 18 (2004). “Specificity Prioritization and the Primacy of the Particular,” in G. Wolters and M. Carrier (eds.), Homo Sapiens und Homo Faber: Festschrift Mittelstrass. (Berlin: Der Gruyter, 2004), pp. 201-12.

212

BIBLIOGRAPHY

“Textuality, Reality, and the Limits of Knowledge,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 59 (2005), pp. 355-77. “The Sceptic’s ‘No Certainty’ Argument,” in Michael Rahnfeld (ed.), . . . B. Metaphysics “The Identity of Indiscernibles: A Reinterpretation,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 52 (1955), pp. 152-155. “A Reinterpretation of ‘Degrees of Truth’,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 19 (1958), pp. 241-145. “Logical Analysis in Historical Application,” Methodos, vol. 11 (1959), pp. 187-194. “The Paradox of Buridan’s Ass: A Fundamental Problem in the Theory of Reasoned Choice,” Bucknell Review, vol. 9 (1960), pp. 106-122. “The Revolt Against Process,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 59 (1962), pp. 410-417. “Evaluative Metaphysics” in Metaphysics and Explanation, ed. by W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill (Pittsburgh (University of Pittsburgh Press), 1966), pp. 62-72. “Truth and Necessity in Temporal Perspective” in R. Gale (ed.), The Philosophy of Time: A Collection of Essays (London: MacMillan, 1968), pp. 183-220. “On the Characterization of Actions” in Myles Brand (ed.), The Nature of Human Action, Scott Foresman (1970) pp. 215-220. Reprinted in German translation in Georg Meggi (ed.), Analytische Handlungstheorie, vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main, 1977), pp. 1-7. “The Ontology of the Possible,” in M. Munitz (ed.), Essays in Ontology (New York, 1973), pp. 162-83. Reprinted in M. J. Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual (Ithaca, 1979), pp. 166-181. Reprinted in Romanian translation by. C. Moise in Krisis: Revista de filosofie, vol. 7 (1998), pp. 128-39. “The Equivocality of Existence,” in N. Rescher (ed.), Studies in Ontology Oxford, 1978; American Philosophical Quarterly Monography No. 12), pp. 57-66. “Mondi Possibili Non-Standard,” in Diego Marconi (ed.) La Formalizzatione della dialetilica (Torino, 1979), pp. 354-416). “Blanshard and the Coherence Theory of Truth” in P. A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Brand Blanshard (LaSalle, 1980), pp. 574-588. (See also Blanshard’s reply, pp. 589600.) “McTaggart’s Logical Determinism,” Idealistic Studies, vol. 12 (1982), pp. 231-241.

213

Nicholas Moutafakis “The Roots of Objectivity” in D. O. Dahlstrom (ed.), Realism (Washington, D.C.:ACPA Publications, 1984); vol. 59 of the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, pp. 19-34. “Reality and Realism” in W. Leinfellner and W. Wuketits (eds.). The Tasks of Philosophy (Wien: Hoelder-Pichler Tempsky Verlag, 1986; Proceedings of the 10th International Wittgenstein Symposium), pp. 75-85. “Chisholm’s Ontology of Things,” The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, ed. by Lewis E. Hahn (Chicago and LaSalle: Open Court, 1997), pp. 187-199. “How Many Possible Worlds Are There?,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 59 (1999), pp. 403-420 “Optimalism and Axiological Metaphysics,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 53 (2000), pp. 807-835. “What if Things Were Different?” Metaphysica, vol. 1 (2000), pp. 5-21. “Optimalism and Axiological Explanation in Metaphysics,” in Uwe Meixner (ed.), Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age (Wien: OBV & HPT, 2001), pp. 254-61. “Die vielen Facetten der Realität,” Information Philosophie, no. 3 (2000), pp. 7-17. “Reason and Reality” in Gerhard Preyer and George Peter (eds.), The Contextualization of Rationality (Paderborn: Mentis, 2000), pp. 231-47. “Immediate Experience and Ontology,” Journal of Philosophical Research. Vol. 29 (2004), pp. 113-24. “Nonexistents Then and Now,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 57 (2003), pp. 359-81. “Personal Experience and Realistic Ontology in Pragmatic Perspective,” in J. C. Marek and M. E. Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis (Wien: Obv. & Hpt., 2005), pp. 311-19. “What Sort of Idealism is Viable Today?,” Filosofski Alternative (Bulgaria), vol. ___ (2005), pp. ??? “Science and Reality,” Protosociology. “Optimalism and the Rationality of the Real,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 59 (2006), pp. 503-16. “Textuality, Reality, and the Limits of Knowledge,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 59 (2005), pp. 365-77. “What if Things Were Different,” Analysis and Metaphysics, vol. 4 (2005), pp. 43-58. Revised in Romanian translation, Linguistics and Philosophical Investigations, vol. 5 (2006).

214

BIBLIOGRAPHY C. Philosophical Anthropology: Philosophizing on the Human Condition “Technological Progress and Human Happines,” Philosophic Exchange (Annual published by SUNY, Brockport), vol. 2 (Summer 1979) pp. 64-79. “Luck,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, vol. (1990), pp. 5-19. Reprinted in Daniel Statman (ed.), Moral Luck (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp. 141-166. “Luck and the Enigmas of Fate,” Philosophic Exchange: 1993-94. No’s 24-25 (1995), pp. 95-105. “Predictive Incapacity and Rational Decision,” European Review, vol. 3 (1995), pp. 325-330. “The Ways of Luck,” U.S. Air Magazine, February, 1996 issue. “The Significance of Silence,” The European Review, vol. 6 (1998), pp. 91-95. “Ueber einen zentralen Unterschied zwischen Theorie und Praxis,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, vol. 47 (1999), pp. 171-182. “Die Begründung von Rationalität: Warum die Vernunft folgen? in Stefan Gosepath (ed.), Motive, Gründe, Werte: Theorien praktischer Rationalität (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Verlag, 1999), pp. 246-63. “Los enigmas del azar,” A Parte Rei, No. 5 (September, 1999). “Homo Optans: On the Human Condition and the Burden of Choice” Idealistic Studies, vol. 29 (2000), pp. 149-53. “Amphibious Man,” European Review, vol. 10 (2002), pp. 339-44. German translation “Der amphibische Mensch,” in IABLIS: Jahrbuch für europaeische Prozesse, vol. 1 (2002), pp. 195-200 and also Bonner Philosophische Vorträge (Bonn, Bouvier Verlag, 2003). D. Philosophy of Science and Technology “Mr. Madden on Gestalt Theory,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 20 (1953), pp. 327-328. “Science and Public Relations,” Science, vol. 118 (1953), pp. 420-421. with Herbert Curl. “Some Remarks on an Analysis of the Causal Relation,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 51 (1953), pp. 239-241. “Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. 6 (1955), pp. 89-106. With Paul Oppenheim. “On Explanation in History,” Mind, vol. 68 (1959), pp. 383-388. With Carey B. Joynt.

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Nicholas Moutafakis “On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences,” Management Sciences, vol. 6 (1959), pp. 2552. With Olaf Helmer. Reprinted in Executive Readings in Management Science, ed. by M. K. Starr; New York (Macmillan), 1965. Also reprinted in The Nature and Scope of Social Science, ed. by I. Krimerman; New York (Appleton-Century-Crofts), 1969; and in Olaf Helmer, Looking Forward: A Guide to Futures Research (Beverly Hills; 1983), pp. 25-48. “A Problem in the Theory of Numerical Estimation,” Synthese, vol. 12 (1960), pp. 34-39. An abstract of this paper appears in the Proceedings of the International Congress for Logic, Methodology and the Philosophy of Science (Stanford, 1960), pp. 86-87. “On the Probability of Nonrecurring Events,” in Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science, ed. by H. Feigl and G. Maxwell. New York (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston), 1961, pp. 228244. “The Concept of Randomness,” Theoria, vol 27 (1961), pp. 1-11. “The Problem of Uniqueness in History,” History and Theory, vol. 1 (1961), pp. 150-162. With Carey B. Joynt. Reprinted in Studies in the Philosophy of History, ed. by G. H. Nagel, New York (Harper’s) 1965. Reprinted in M. Mandelbaum, et. al. (eds.), Philosophical Problems, New York (Macmillan), 1967. “On Historical Facts,” Methods, vol. 14 (1962), pp. 11-15. With Carey B. Joynt. “The Stochastic Revolution and the Nature of Scientific Explanation,” Synthese, vol. 14 (1962), pp. 200-215. A some-what expanded version of this paper constitutes a chapter entitled “Fundamental Problems in the Theory of Scientific Explanation” in Philosophy of Science: The Delaware Seminar, II, ed. by B. Baumrin, New York (Interscience), 1963, pp. 41-60. “Discrete State Systems, Markov Chains and Problems in the Theory of Scientific Explanation and Prediction,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 30 (1963), pp. 325-345. “Fundamental Problems in the Theory of Scientific Explanation,” in William L. Reese (ed.), Philosophy of Science: The Delemse Seminar, vol. 2, 1962-1963, (New York: Interscience Publishers, 1963), pp. 49-60. “Generalization in Historical Explanation and Prediction in History,” S. Radhakrishnan Souvenir Volume, ed. by J.P. Atreya. Moradabad, India, 1964, pp. 385-388. “Cause and Counterfactual,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 34 (1966), pp. 323-340. With Herbert A. Simon. “Remarks on the Verification of Scientific Theories,” Demonstration, Verification, Justification, ed. by P. Devaus (Paris and Louvain, 1968), pp. 160-165. “Who’s Afraid of Big Science?,” The Sciences, vol. 18 (1978), pp. 7-9.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY “Some Issues Regarding the Completeness of Science and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge,” in G. Radnitzky and G. Anderson (ed.) The Structure and Development of Science (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), pp. 19-40. “Methodological Issue in Science and Technology Forecasting,”Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 20 (1981), pp. 101-112. Reprinted in German translation as “Einige Fragen zur Abgeschlossenheit der Wissenschaft und Grenzen wissenchaftlicher Erkenntnis,” in G. Radnitzky and G. Anderson, Voraussetzungen und Grenzen der Wissenschaft (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1981), pp. 21-46. “The Unpredictability of Future Science,” in R.S. Cohen et al. (eds.), Physics, Philosophy, and Psychoanalysis (Dordrecht, 1983), pp. 153 -168. “The Limits of Science” in Paul Weingartner and Hans Czermak (eds.), Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 7th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Vienna, 1984), pp. 223-231. “Extraterrestrial Science” Philosophia Naturalis, vol. 21 (1984), pp. 400-424. Also in J. Pitt (ed.), Change and Progress in Modern Science (Dordrecht, 1985), pp. 361-392. “Wie ist Naturwissenschaft moeglich? Grundzuege eines naturalistischen Idealismus,” Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology: Proceedings of the 9th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Wien, 1985), pp. 206-214. Also in P. Hoyningen-Huene and G. Hirsch (ed’s), Wozu Wissenschaftslphilosophie? (Berlin, 1988), pp. 265-280. “Natural Science as a Human Artifact,” Yearbook of the Academy of Sciences in Berlin (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1990), pp. 164-188. “Baffling Phenomena” in Daniel Dahlstrom (ed.), Nature and Scientific Method (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1991). Axel Wüstehube, “Wissenschaftsphilosophie: Ein Gesprächt mit Nicholas Rescher,” Information Philosophie, Mai 1993, pp. 30-36. “Nuestra ciencia en tanto que nuestra,” Daimon: Revista de filosofia, vol. 6 (1993), pp. 1-9. “Los limites de la sciencia,” Nombres: Revista de Filosofia (publication of the Faculty of Philosophy, Universidad de Córdoba, Argentina), vol. III, no. 3 (Sept. 1993). “Technological Escalation and the Explanation Model of Natural Science.” (Sorites (Spain), No. 5 (1996). (Electronically published philosophy journal.) “The Law of Logarithmic Returns and Its Implications,” in D. Ginev and R. S. Cohen (eds.), Issues and Images in the Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), pp. 275-87. “Las modalidades de la complejidad: in Contrastes, Supplemento 3 (1998), pp. 223-43.

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Nicholas Moutafakis “Meaningless Numbers” in D. Anapolitanos (ed.), Philosophy and the Many Faces of Science (Lanham M.D.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 158-171. Also in Proto Sociology, vol. 12 (1998), pp. 92-112. “The Price of an Ultimate Theory,” Philosophia Naturalis, vol. 37 (2000), pp. 1-20. “Can Computers Overcome Our Limitations?” in M. Carrier et. al. (eds.) Science at the Century’s End (Pittsburgh and Konstanz: University of Pittsburgh Press and University of Konstanz Press, 2000), pp. 110-34. “Credit for Making a Discovery,” Episteme, vol. 1 (2005), pp. 189-200. “Science and Reality,” Proto Sociology, vol. 22 (2006), pp ??? E. Ethics, Value Theory “Reasonableness in Ethics,” Philosophical Studies, vol. 5 (1954), pp. 58-62. “An Axiom System for Deontic Logic,” Philosophical Studies, vol 9 (1958), pp. 24-30. “Reasoned Justification of Moral Judgments,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 55 (1958), pp. 248-255. “Conditional Permission in Deontic Logic,” Philosophical Studies, vol. 13 (1962), pp. 1-6. “The Ethical Dimension of Scientific Research” in Beyond the Edge of Certainty (ed. by R. Colodny, Pittsburgh, 1965), pp. 261-276. Re-printed in E.D. Klemke et al. (eds.) Introductory Readings in the Philosophy of Science (Buffalo, 1980) pp. 238-253. Also in Frederick E. Morsedale (ed.), Philosophy and Science (Englewood Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall, 1979), pp. 315-326. “Practical Reasoning and Values,” The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 16 (1966), pp. 121-136. “La Dynamique des Changements de Valeur,” Analyse et Prévision (Paris), vol. 2 (1966), pp. 649-664. “The Study of Value Change,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 1 (1967), pp. 12-23. Reprinted in E. Laszlo and J.B. Wilbur (eds.), Value Theory in Philosophy and Social Sciences (New York, 1970). “Values and the Explanation of Behaviour,” The Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 17 (1967), pp. 130-136. “Semantic Foundations for Conditional Permission,” Philosophical Studies vol. 18 (1967), pp. 56-61. “Semantic Foundations for the Logic of Preference,” in N. Rescher (ed.), The Logic of Decision and Action (Pittsburgh, 1967), pp. 37-62.

218

BIBLIOGRAPHY “What is Value Change?” in N. Rescher and K. Baier (eds.), Values and the Future (New York, 1969), pp. 68-109. “The Allocation of Exotic Medical Lifesaving Therapy,” Ethics, vol. 79 (1969), pp. 173-186. Reprinted in: (1) Question (January, 1970), pp. 13-31. Reprinted in: (2) T.L. Beauchamp (ed.), Ethics and Public Policy (Englewood Cliffs, 1975), pp. 424-441; (3) J.M. Humber and R.F. Almeder (eds.), Biomedical Ethics and the Law, (New York, 1976), pp. 447-463; (4) S.J. Reiser et al. (eds.), Ethics in Medicine (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977); (5) Robert Hunt and John Arras, Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine (Palo Alto, 1977); (6) T.L. Beauchamp and L. Walters (eds.), Contemporary Issues in Bioethics (Encino, 1978), pp. 378-388; (7) R. Munson (ed.), Intervention and Reflection: Basic Issues in Biomedical Ethics (Belmont, 1979), pp. 409-418; (8) Steven E. Rhoads (ed.), Valuing Life: Public Policy Dilemmas (Boulder, 1980); (9) Natalie Abrams and Michael D.Buckner, Medical Ethics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); (10) Hisatake Kato and Nobuyulki Ieda (eds.), The Bases of Bioethics. (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1988), pp. 291-329; (11) XYZ Pence (ed.), Classic Works on Medical Ethics (New York?: McGraw-Hill, 1997). “La Technica Delfos y los Valores,” Revista española de la opinión publica, vol. 21-22 (1970), pp. 227-241. “Response to Professors Fisher and Sosa” in The Philosophical Forum, vol. 3 (1972), pp. 363-368. With Kurt Baier. “Social Values and Technological Change” in Edward A. Maziarz (ed.), Value and Values in Evolution (New York: Gordon, Gordon, and Breach, 1979), pp. 163-78. “The Role of Values in Social Science Research” in Charles Frankel (ed.), Controversies and Decisions: The Social Sciences and Public Policy (New York, 1976), pp. 31-54. “Values in Science,” Proceedings of the Fifth InternationalConference on the Unity of the Sciences: Washington, 1976 (New York, 1977), vol. 2, pp. 1023-1030. “Moral Issues Relating to the Economics of New Knowledge in the Biomedical Sciences” in W.B. Bondeson et. al. (eds.), New Knowledge in the Biomedical Sciences (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: D. Reidel, 1982), pp. 35-45. “Rationality and Moral Obligation,” Synthese, vol. 72 (1987), pp 29-43. “II dilemma del prigioniero,” Fondamenti, vol. 9 (1987), pp. 57-61. “Leibniz, Keynes, and the Rabbis on a Problem of Distributive Justice,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 86 (1989), pp. 337-352. “How Wide is the Gap Between Facts and Values?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 50 (1990), Supplementary Volume (Fall 1990), pp. 297-319. “Moral Luck” in Daniel Statman (ed.), Moral Luck (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993), pp. 141-66.

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Nicholas Moutafakis “Moral Objectivity: Against Moral Relativism” in Julian Nida-Rümelin (ed.), Rationalität, Realismus, Revision, Vol. 23 of Perspecktiven der Analytischen Philosophie (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1999), pp. 90-102. “Is Reasoning About Values Viciously Circular?,” The Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 35 (2001), pp. 5-12. “In Line of Duty: The Complexity of Military Obligation,” in J. C. Ficarotta (ed.), The Leader Imparative: Ethics, Integrity, and Responsibility (West Lafayett, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 2001), pp. 243-52. “Nomic Hierachies and Problems of Relativism” in Mathias Gutmann et. al. (eds.) KulturHandlung-Wissenschaft (Weiterwist: Velbrück Wissenschaft, 2002), pp. 285-301. “By the Standards of their Day.” The Monist, vol. 86 (2003), pp. 469-80. 30. “On the Import and Rationale of Value Attribution,” Mind and Society, vol. 4 (2005), pp. 115-27. “Ethical Objectivity,” Philosophy and Public Policy, vol. ??? (2007). F. Social and Political Philosophy “Notes on Preference, Utility, and Cost,” Synthese, vol. 16 (1966), pp. 332-343. “Problems of Distributive Justice” in W. Sellars and J. Hospers (eds.), Readings in Ethical Theory, 2nd ed. (New York, 1970), pp. 596-614. “Welfare: Some Philosophical Issues,” Values and Valuation, ed. by J. W. Davis (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1972), pp. 221-232. “Some Observations on Social Consensus Methodology,” Theory and Decision, vol. 3 (1972), pp. 175-179. “The Environmental Crisis and the Quality of Life” in Philosophy and Environmental Crisis, ed. by W. T. Blackstone (Athens, Ga, 1973), pp. 90-104. “Value-Consideration in Public Policy Issues of the Year 2000” in J. R. Bright and M.E.F. Schoeman (eds.), A Guide to Practical Technological Forecasting (Englewood Cliffs, 1973), pp. 540-549. “Morality in Government and Politics,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. 48 (1974), pp. 259-265. “Ethical Issues Regarding the Delivery of Health Care Services,” Connecticut Medicine, vol. 41 (1977), pp. 501-506. “Technological Progress and Human Happiness,” Philosophic Exchange, vol. 2 (1978; summer issue), pp. 65-79.

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“Economics vs. Moral Philosophy,” Theory and Decision, vol 10 (1979), pp. 169-179. “Social Values and Technological Change: A Case Study -- Social Welfare and Personal Happiness,” in E.A. Maziarz (ed.) Value and Values in Evolution (New York and London, 1979), pp. 163-178. “The Social Value of a Life,” in M. Bradie and K. Sayre (eds.) Reason and Decision (Bowling Green, 1982: Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy, vol. III), pp. 111-122. “On the Rationale of Governmental Regulation” in T.R. Machan and M.B. Johnson (eds.), Rights and Regulation (Cambridge MA: Ballinger, 1983), pp. 249-258. “The Canons of Distributive Justice” in J.P. Sterba (ed.), Morality in Practice (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1983), pp. 33-40. “Whose Life Should We Save When Technology is Scarce?” Los Angeles Times, Monday, March 10, 1986, Pt. II, p. 5 (“Op-ed” page). “Playing God: Whose Lives to Save with Modern Technology?” The Evening Sun (Baltimore), Thursday, June 26, l986, page A21 (“Op-ed” page). “Moral Obligation and the Refugee” in John Earman et. al. (eds.), Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External Worlds (Pittsburgh and Konstanz: University of Pittsburgh Press and Universitätsverlag Konstanz, 1994), pp. 615-23. “Is Consensus Required for a Rational Social Order?” in Axel Wüstehube (ed.), Pragmatische Rationalitätstheorien (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1995), pp. 113-124. (German translation of) “Why Preserve Endangered Species?” [from Unpopular Essays] in Dieter Birnbacher (ed.), Ökophilosophie (Ditzingen: Reclam, 1995), pp. 178-201. “The Bell Curve Revisited,” Public Affairs Quarterly, vol. 9 (1995), pp. 321-30. “Progress and the Future,” in Arnold Burgen et al. (eds.), the Idea of Progress (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1997), pp. 103-19. “Technology, Complexity, and Social Decision,” in Sirkku Hellsten et. al. (eds.), Taking the Liberal Challenge Seriously (Aldershot UK: Ashgate, 1997), pp. 205-18. “Collective Responsibility,” Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 29 (1998), pp. 46-58. “Risking Democracy,” Public Affairs Quarterly, vol. 12 (1999), pp. 297-308. G. Process Philosophy “The Revolt Against Process,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 59 (1962), pp. 410-417.

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Nicholas Moutafakis “The Promise of Process Philosophy” in R. W. Burch and H. J. Saatkamp, Jr. (eds.), Frontiers in American Philosophy (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1992. Reprinted in Process Studies, vol. 25 (1996), pp. 55-71; also in George W. Shields (ed.), Process and Analysis (Albany: SUNY Press, 2003), pp. 49-66; also in C. Boundas (ed.), The Edinburgh Companion of Twentieth Century Philsoophy. “Chrisholm’s Ontology of Things,” The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chrisholm, ed. by Lewis E. Hahn (Chicago and LaSalle: Open Court, 1997), pp. 187-199. “On Situating Process Philosophy,” Process Studies, vol. 28 (1999), pp. 37-42. “Trapped Within History?: A Process Philosophical Refutation of Historicist Relativsim,” Process Studies, vol. 29 (2000), pp. 66-76. “Process Philosophy,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/). “Process Philosophy and Monadological Metaphysics” in Sigmund Bonk (ed.), Monadisches Denken (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2003), pp. 9-17. “Causal Necessitation and Free Will,“ Process Studies, vol. 35 (2006), pp. ??? H. Pragmatism “Pragmatic Justification: A Cautionary Tale,” Philosophy, vol. 39 (1964), pp. 346-348. “Scientific Truth and the Arbitrament of Praxis,” Nous, vol. 15 (1980), pp. 59-74. “The Epistemology of Pragmatic Beliefs: Some Observations on the Rationale of Pascal’s Wager,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. 58 (1984), pp. 173-187. “Counterfactuals in Pragmatic Perspective,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 50 (1996), pp. 35-61. “Perspectives on Pragmatism” in Kenneth R. Westphal (ed.), Pragmatism, Reason, and Norms: A Realistic Assessment (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), pp. 1-13. “Pragmatism in Crisis” in P. Weingartner et. al. (eds.), The Role of Pragmatics in Contemporary Philosophy (Vienna: Hölder-Publer-Tempsby, 1998). “Functionalistic Pragmatism,” The Philosophical Forum, vol. 32 (2001). Pp. 191-205. “Knowledge of the Truth in Pragmatic Perspective,” in J. Conant and Ursula Zegler (eds.), Hilary Putnam: Pragmatism and Realism (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 66-79. “Pragmatism and Practical Rationality,” Contemporary Pregmatism, vol. 1 (2004), pp. 43-60.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY 10. “Personal Experience and Realistic Ontology in Pragmatic Perspective” in M. E. Reicher and J. C. Merek (eds.) Experience and Analysis: Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgensteain Symposium (Vienna: Oebrepht, 2005), pp. 21-29. “Pragmatic Idealism and Metaphysical Realism” in J. R. Shook and Joseph Margolis (eds.), A Companion to Pragmatism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 387-97. “Pragmatism at the Crossroads,” Transaction of the C. S. Peirce Society, vol. 41 (2005), pp. 355-66. “Reply to Participants in the Symposium on Nicholas Rescher’s Pregmatism,” Contemporary Pragmatics, vol. 2 (2005), pp. 49-61. I. Idealism “Lawfulness as Mind-Dependent,” in Nicholas Rescher (ed.) Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel (Dordrecht, 1969), pp. 178-197. “Conceptual Idealism,” Idealistic Studies, vol. 2 (1972), pp. 191-207. “MacTaggart’s Logical Determinism,” Idealistic Studies, vol. 12 (1982), pp. 231-241. “Conceptual Idealism Revisited,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 44 (1991), pp. 495-523. “What Sort of Idealism is Viable Today?” Idealistic Studies, vol. 27 (1998), pp. 239-50. Reprinted in Bulgarian translation in Philosophical Alternatives (Sofia), vol. 14 (2005), No. 2, pp. 5-17. “Metaphysical Realism” in Richard Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 242-62. “Pragmatic Idealism and Metaphysical Realism” in J. R. Shook (ed.), A Companion to Pragmatism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 385-97. “Anglo-American Neo-Idealism,” The Edinburgh Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. by C. Boundas. “The Revolt Against Absolutes in Twentieth Century American Philosophy” Idealistic Studies, vol. 74 (2004), pp. 215-223. “The Absolute: a concise History,” Idealistic Studies, vol. 35 (2005), pp. 101-118. J. Metaphilosophy “Translation as a Tool of Philosophical Analysis,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 53 (1955), pp. 219-224. “Discourse on a Method,” Methodos, vol. 11 (1959), pp. 8l-89.

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Nicholas Moutafakis “Aporetic Method in Philosophy,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 41 (1987), pp. 283-297. “On First Principles and Their Legitimation,” Allegemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie, vol. 2 (1976), pp. 1-16. “Philosophical Disagreement,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 32 (1978), pp. 217-251. “Is Philosophy a Guide to Life?: On the Problematic Nature of ‘Applied Philosophy’,” in M. Bradie et al. (eds.), The Applied Turn in Contemporary Philosophy (Bowling Green, 1983; vol. V of Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy), pp. 1-15. “Are Synoptic Questions Illegitimate?” Erkenntnis, vol. 22 (1985), pp. 359-364 (Hempel Festschrift). “Metaphilosophical Coherentism,” Idealistic Studies, vol. 27 (1997), pp. 131-41. “The Interpretation of Philosophical Texts,” Proceeding of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. 72 (1999), pp. 117-29. Editorials (4 per annum) in the American Philosophical Quarterly, 1983-1993. “Philosophical Methodology” in Bo Mou (ed.) Two Roads to Wisdom: Chinese and Analytical Philosophical Traditions (Chicago: Carus Publishing Company, 2002), pp. 3-25. “The Mission of Philosophy” in Dale Jacquette (ed.), Philosophical Entrees: Classic and Contemporary Readings (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2001). “Principia Philosophiae,” Deutsche Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie, vol. 50 (2002), pp. 191-202. “Referential Analysis in Philosophy,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 40 (2003), pp. 169-74. “Philosophical Principles,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 58 (2004), pp. ??? “Ueber philosophische Systematisering: Plausibiltaet und Hegel’s Vision,” Deutsche Zeitschrift Fuer Philosophy, vol. 53 (2005), pp. 179-202. “Philosophical Systematication: Plausibiliity and the Hegeian Vision,“ The Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 43 (2005), pp. 415-42. Also published in a German version: “Philosophische Systematisierung,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, vol. 53 (2005), pp. 179202. “The Fallacy of Respect Neglect,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 71 (2005), pp. 392-98. “Philosophical Systematization: Plausibility and the Hegelian Vision,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 43 (2005), pp. 415-42.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY K. Philosophy of Religion (See also K3 and M6 and Pascal’s Wager). “The Ontological Proof Revisited,” Australiasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 37 (1959), pp. 138-148. “On Faith and Belief” in the author’s Human Interests (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). “In Matters of Religion” in Kelly Clark (ed.), Philosophers Who Believe (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993) pp. 127-136. Reprinted in J. S. Swindal and H. J. Gensler (ed’s), Anthology of Catholic Philosophy (Lanham,. MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), pp. 44147. Reprinted in the Sheld and Ward Catholic Philosophy Anthology. “Process Theology” in the author's Process Metaphysics (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1996). “Thomism and the Future of Catholic Philosophy,” New Blackfriars, vol. 80 (1999), pp. 194202. “God’s Place in Philosophy,” Philosophy and Theology, vol. 12 (2000), pp. 95-105. “The Catholic Philosopher Today” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophy Association. L. The Philosophy of Leibniz “Contingence in the Philosophy of Leibniz,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 61 (1952), pp. 26-39. Reprinted in R.S. Woolhouse (ed.), G.W. Leibniz: Critical Assessments, Vol. I (London & New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 174-86. “Leibniz’s Interpretation of His Logical Calculi,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 18 (1954), pp. 1-13. German translation in XYZ (ed.), Leibniz’ Logik und Metaphysik (Darmstadt: Wissenschafftiche Buchgesellschaft, 199?), pp. 175-192. “Monads and Matter: A Note on Leibniz’s Metaphysics,” The Modern Schoolman, vol 33 (1955), pp. 172-175. Reprinted in R.S. Woolhouse (ed.), G.W. Leibniz: Critical Assessments, Vol. IV (London & New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 168-72. “Leibniz and the Quakers” Bulletin of Friends Historical Association, vol. 44 (1955), pp. 100-107. “Leibniz’ Conception of Quantity, Number, and Infinity,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 64 (1955), pp. 108-114. “Logische Schwierigkeiten der Leibnizschen Metaphysik,” Akten des Internationalen Leibniz Kongresses, Hannover, 1966, vol. 1, Metaphysik Monadenlehre (Weisbaden, 1968), pp. 253-265. Reprinted as “Logical Difficulties in Leibniz’s Metaphysics” in The Philosophy of Leibniz and the Modern World, ed. by I. Leclerc (Nashville, 1973), pp. 176-188. Also in R.S. Woolhouse (ed.), G.W. Leibniz: Critical Assessments, Vol. II (London & New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 176-86.

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“Leibniz and the Evaluation of Possible Worlds,” in N. Rescher, Studies in Modality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974; American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph No. 8), pp. 57-69. “Leibniz und die Volkommenheit der Welten,” in: Müller, K., Schepers, H, Totok, W (eds.). Akten des II. Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses. Hannover, 19-22 Juli 1972. Vol. III (Wiesbaden 1975), pp. 1-14. (Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa Vol. XIV). “The Contributions of Leibniz’s Paris Period to the Development of His Philosophy,” Leibniz a Paris (1672-1676), vol. II, La Philosophie de Leibniz (Wiesbaden, 1978), pp. 43-53. (Studia Leibnitiana: Supplementa, Vol. XVIII.) “Leibniz and the Plurality of Space-Time Frameworks,” Rice University Studies, vol. 63 (1977), pp. 97-106. “The Epistemology of Inductive Reasoning in Leibniz,” Theoria Cum Praxi: Akten des III, Internationalen Leibniz-Kongresses, vol. III (Wiesbaden, 1980), pp. 94-100. Studia Leibnitiana: Supplementa, vol. XXI. “Leibniz on Intermonadic Relations,” Truth, Knowledge and Reality ed. by G.H.R. Parkinson (Wiesbaden, 1981: Studia Leibnitiana, Sonderheft 9), pp. 1-19. “Leibniz and the Concept of a System,” Studia Leibnitiana, vol. 13 (1981), pp. 114-122. “Leibniz, Keynes, and the Rabbis on a Problem of Distributive Justice,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 86 (1989), pp. 337-52. “Leibniz Finds a Niche,” Studia Leibnitiana vol. 24 (1992), pp. 25-48. “Leibniz und die Rationalität von Zwecken: Theoria cum Praxi,” Leibniz und Europa, (Sechster Internationaler Leibniz Kongress: Vorträge II/2 [Hannover: G. W. Leibniz Gesellschaft, 1995], pp. 242-247. “Leibniz and Possible Worlds,” Studia Leibnitiana, vol. 28 (1996), pp. 129-162. “Leibniz Visits Vienna: 1712-14,” Studia Leibnitiana, vol. 31 (1999), pp. 133-59. “Contingentia Mundi: Leibniz on the World’s Contingency,” Studia Leibnitiana, vol. 33 (2001), pp. 145-62. “Leibniz on God’s Free Will and the World’s Contingency,” Studia Leibnitiana, vol. 34 (2002), 208-20. “Leibniz’s Quantitative Epistemology,” Studia Leibnatiana, vol. 36 (2004), pp. 210-31

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BIBLIOGRAPHY M. The Philosophy of Kant “Noumenal Causality in the Philosophy of Kant,” Proceedings of the Third International Kant Congress (Dordrecht, 1972), pp. 462-470. Reprinted in L.W. Beck (ed.), Kant’s Theory of Knowledge (Dordrecht, 1974), pp. 175-183. “On the Status of ‘Things in Themselves’ in Kant,” Gerhard Funke (ed.), Akten des 5. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses: Mainz, 1981 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1981), pp. 437-447. Reprinted in Revue Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 35 (1981), pp. 346-357; also in Synthese, vol. 47 (1981), pp. 289-299. “Kant on the Epistemology of Scientific Questions” in J. Kopper and W. Marx (eds.), 200 Jahre Kritik der reinen Vernuft (Hildesheim, 1981), pp. 313-334. “Kant und das Cartesische Cogito,” Proceedings of the Sixth International Kant Congress, Vol I - Invited Papers (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1991). “On the Unity of Kant’s Categorical Imperative,” Acts of the Seventh International Kant Congress, Mainz 1990 (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991), pp. 375-395. “Kant’s Cognitive Anthropocentrism” in Essays in the History of Philosophy (Aldershot UK: Avebury, 1995), pp. 263-275. “Kant on the Limits and Prosepcts of Philosophy: Kant, Pragmatism, and the Metaphysics of Virtual Reality,” Kantstudien, vol. 91 (2000), pp 283-328. “On the Rationale of Kant’s Categorical Imperative,” Philosophical Analysis and History of Philosophy, vol. 3 (2000), pp. 185-208. N. The Philosophy of Peirce “Peirce and the Economy of Research,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 43 (1976), pp. 71-98. “Peirce on Scientific Progress,” Proceedings of the 1976 International Peirce Conference (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), pp. xyz. “Peirce on the Validation of Science” in Kenneth Ketner (ed.) Peirce and Contemporary Thought (New York: Fordham University Press, 1995), pp. 103-112. “Peirce, Popper, and the Methodological Turn” in D. G. Lakhuti, V. N. Sadowski, and V. K., Funer (eds.) Evolutionary Epistemology and the Social Sciences (Moscow: Editiorial URSS, 2000), pp. 210-221. O. History of Philosophy—Greek Philosophy “Cosmic Evolution in Anaximander,” Studium Generale, vol. 12 (1958), pp. 718-731. “Aristotle’s Theory of Modal Syllogisms and its Interpretation” in The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy, ed. by M. Bunge (London,.and New York, 1964), pp. 152-177.

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“A Version of the ‘Master Argument’ of Diodorus,” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 63 (1966), pp. 438-445. “A New Approach to Aristotle’s Apodeictic Syllogisms,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 24 (1971), pp. 678-689. With Zane Parks. “Thought Experiments in Pre-Socratic Philosophy,” in Tamara Horowitz and Gerald J. Massey (eds.), Thought Experiments Science and Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1991), pp. 31-41. “La deuda del escepticismo griego con los Sofistas,” Revista latinamericano de filosofía, vol. 19 (1993), pp. 33-57. P. History of Philosophy—Arabic Philosophy “Three Commentaries of Averroes’,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 12 (1958), pp. 440448. “A Ninth-Century Arabic Logician on: Is Existence a Predicate?” The Journal of the History of Ideas, col. 21 (1960), pp. 428-430. “The Logic-Chapter of Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Khwarizmi’s Encyclopedia ‘Keys to the Sciences’ (ca. 980 A.D.),” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 44 (1962), pp. 6274. “Some Technical Terms of Arabic Logic,” Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 82 (1962), pp. 203-204. “Al-Farabi on Logical Tradition,” The Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 24 (1963), pp. 127-132. “Al-Kindi’s Sketch of Aristotle’s Organon,” The New Scholasticism, vol. 37 (1963), pp. 4458. “Avicenna on the Logic of ‘Conditional’ Propositions,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 4 (1963), pp. 48-58. “On the Provenance of the Logica Alpharabii,” The New Scholasticism, vol. 37 (1963), pp. 498-500. “A Tenth-Century Arab-Christian Apologia for Logic,” Islamic Studies (Journal of the Central Institute of Islamic Research, Darachi, Pakistan), vol. 2 (1963), pp. 1-16. “Averroes’ Quaesitum on the Absolute (Assertoric) Proposition,”Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 1 (1963), pp. 80-93. “New Light from Arabic Sources on Galen and the Fourth Figure of the Syllogism,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, vol. 3 (1963), pp. 27-41.

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“Yahya ibn Adi’s Treatise ‘On the Four Scientific Questions Regarding the Art of Logic’,” Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 25 (1964), pp. 572-578. With Fadlou Shehadi. “Al-Kindi’s Epistle on the Concentric Structure of the Universe,” Isis, vol. 56 (1965), pp. 190-195. With Haig Khatchadourian. “Nicholas of Cusa on the Koran,” The Muslim World, vol. 55 (1965), pp. 195-202. “Al-Kindi’s Treatise on the Distinctiveness of the Celestial Sphere,”Islamic Studies (Journal of the Central Institute of Islamic Research, Karachi, Pakistan), vol. 4 (1965), pp. 45-54. With Haig Khatchadourian. “Al-Kindi’s Epistle on the Finitude of the Universe,” Isis, vol. 57, (1966), pp. 426-433. With Haig Khatchadourian. “The Impact of Arabic Philosophy on the West,” The Islamic Quarterly, vol. 10 (1966), pp. 311. “Avicenna on the Logic of Questions,” Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. 49 (1967), pp. 1-6. “The Arabic Theory of Temporal Modal Syllogistic” in Essays in Islamic Philosophy and Science, ed. by George F. Hourani (Albany, 1975), pp. 189-221. Q. History of Philosophy—Other “Charles Darwin and his Origin of Species: A Centenary Appraisal,” Introduction to the Darwin Centennial Exhibition Catalog issue by Lehigh University, November 1959. “Choice Without Preference: A Study of the Logic and of the History of the Problem of ‘Buridan’s Ass’,” Kanstudien, vol. 51 (1960), pp. 142-175. “The Philosophy of Nature of Andreas G.M. van Melsen” in G. Debrock et al. (eds.), Geloven in de Wereld (Nijmegen, 1985), pp. 120-141. “The Philosophers of Gambling” in An Intimate Relation, ed. by J. R. Brown and J. Mittelstrass (Dordrecht etc., 1989), pp. 203-220. “American Philosophy Today,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 46 (1993), pp. 717-45. Russian transl., Put, vol. ?? (1994), pp. xyz-uvw. “Reichenbach Falls (Or Only Stumbles?): Reichenbach, Probability, and the Problem of Surplus Meaning,” in Lutz Danneberg et al. (eds.), Hans Reichenbach und die Berliner Gruppe, (Braunschweig/Wiesbaden: Vieweg, 1994). “Philosophie am Ende des Jahrhunderts,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, vol. 43 (1995), pp. 775-).

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Nicholas Moutafakis “Who Has Won the Big Battles of Twentieth Century Philosophy?,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 36 (1999), pp. 159-63. “The Rise and Fall of Analytic Philosophy,” in Chen Bo (ed.), Analytic Philosophy: Review and Reflection (Beijing: ???? Publishing House, 2001), pp. 114-124. “Perspectives on Nature in American Thought,” in Jean De Groot (ed.), Nature in American Philosophy (Washington DC: Catholic University of American Press, 2004), pp. 157-80. “The Berlin School of Logical Empiricism and its Legacy,” Erkenntnis, vol. ??? (1905), pp. xxx. R. Autobiographical and Autodoxographical “H2O: Hempel-Helmer-Oppenheim,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 64 (1997), pp. 779-805. [A German version appeared under the same title in the Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, vol. 44 (1996), pp. 779-805.] “Futuristics at RAND: Project Delphi,” RAND Alumni Bulletin, Issue 29 (Summer 2002), pp. 6-14. “In Retrospect” in George Yancy (ed.), The Philosophical I (Landham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), pp. 207-218. “Nicholas Rescher: Curriculum Operis” in A. Mercier and M. Svilan (eds.) Philosophers on the Own Work, vol. 9 (Bern: Peter Lang, 1983), pp. 199-236. “In Matters of Religion” in Kelley Clark (ed.), Philosophers Who Believe (Downers Grove, Inter Varsity Press, 1993, pp 127-36. Reprinted in the Sheld and Ward Catholic Philosophy Anthology. “Plurality Quantification Revisited,” Philosophical Inquiry, vol. 26, no. 1-2 (2004), pp. 1-6 . “The Berlin School of Logical Empiricism and its Legacy,” Erkenntnis, vol. ??? (2006), pp. 1-25. S. Philosophical Logic “A Note on a Species of Definition,” Theoria, vol. 20 (1954), pp. 173-175. “Definitions of ‘Existence’,” Philosophical Studies, vol. 8 (1957), pp. 65-69. “On the Logic of Existence and Denotation,” The Philosophical Review, vol. 68 (1959) pp. 157-180. Reprinted in H. Feigl, W. Sellars, and K. Lehrer (eds.) New Readings in Philosophical Analysis (N.Y., 1972). “The Distinction Between Predicate Intension and Extension,” Revue philosophique de Louvain, vol. 57 (1959), pp. 623-636.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY “The Concept of Randomness,” Theoria, vol. 27 (1961, pp. 1-11. “On the Formalization of Two Modal Theses,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 2 (1961), pp. 154-157. “Non-Deductive Rules of Inference and the Problems in the Analysis of Inductive Reasoning,” Synthese, vol. 13 (1961), pp. 242-251. “On the Logic of Presupposition,” Philosophy and Phenomenological, vol. 21 (1961), pp. 521-527. “A Note on ‘About’,” Mind, vol. 72 (1963), pp. 268-270. “Can One Infer Commands from Commands?”, Analysis, vol. 24 (1964), pp. 176-179. With John Robison. “On the Logic of Chronological Propositions,” Mind, vol. 75 (1966), pp.75-96. “Temporally Conditioned Descriptions,” Ratio, vol. 8 (1966), pp. 46-54. With John Robison. Reprinted as “Zeitlich bedingte Kennzeichnungen” in Ratio (German edition), vol. 1 (1966), pp. 40-47. “A Note on Chronological Logic,” Theoria, vol. 33 (1967), pp. 39-44. With James Garson. Reprinted in Claudio Pizzi (ed.), La Logica del Tempo (Boringhieri, 1974). “Truth and Necessity in Temporal Perspective” in R.M. Gale (ed.), The Philosophy of Time (New York, 1967), pp. 182-220. “Recent Developments in Philosophical Logic,” Contemporary Philosophy, ed. by R. Klibansky (Florence, 1968), pp. 31-40. “Chronological Logic,” Contemporary Philosophy, ed. by R. Klibansky (Florence, 1968), pp. 123-134. “Recent Work in Many-valued Logic,” Contemporary Philosophy, ed. by R. Klibansky (Florence, 1968). Spanish translation: “Desarollos y Orientaciones Recientas en Logica,” Teorema, vol. 2 (1971), pp. 51-64. “Temporal Modalities in Branching Time Structures,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 35 (1970); p. 185. With Alstair Urquhart. “Counterfactual Hypotheses, Laws, and Dispositions,” Nous, vol. 5 (1971), pp. 157-178. “Possible Individuals, Trans-World Identity, and Quantified Modal Logic,” Nous, vol. 7 (1973), pp. 330-350. With Zane Parks. “On Alternatives in Epistemic Logic,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 2 (1973), pp. 119135. With Arnold vander Nat.

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Nicholas Moutafakis “The Equivocality of Existence” in N. Rescher (ed.), Studies in Ontology (Oxford, 1978; American Philosophical Quarterly Monograph No. 12). “How Serious a Fallacy is Inconsistency?”, Argumentation, vol. 1 (1987), pp. 303-316. “Response to Critics,” Informal Logic, vol. 14 (1992), No. 1, pp. 53-58. “Zeit und Zeitlogik” in Bertram Kienzle (ed.), Zustand und Ereignis (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1994), pp. 27-97. With Alasdair Urquhart. (An extract from our 1971 book.) “Truth Conditions vs. Use Conditions,” Logique et Analyse, vol. 38 (1995), pp. 347-59. Reification Fallacies and Inappropriate Totalites,” Informal Logic, vol 20 (2000), pp. 43-60. “Epistemic Logic” in Dale Jacquette (ed.), Companion to Philosophical Logic (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). “Default Logic” in Dale Jacquette (ed.), T. Symbolic Logic “Axioms for the Part Relation,” Philosophical Studies, vol. 6 (1955), pp. 8-11. “Some Comments on Two-Valued Logic,” Philosophical Studies, vol. 6 (1955), pp. 54-58. “Attributes vs. Classes in Principia,” Mind, vol. 67 (1958), pp. 254-257. “Can There Be Random Individuals?”, Analysis, vol. 18 (1958), pp. 114-117. “A Contribution to Modal Logic,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 12 (1958), pp. 186-199. “Many-sorted Quantification,” Proceedings of the 12th International Congress for Philosophy (Venice, 1958); vol. 4, Logic, Theory of Knowledge, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Language (Firenze, 1960), pp. 447-453. “Identity, Substitution, and Modality,” The Review of Metaphysics, vol. 14 (1960), pp. 159167. “Must Identities be Necessary?”, Revue Philosophique de Louvain, vol. 58 (1960), pp. 579588. “Plausible Implication, Analysis, vol. 21 (1961), pp. 128-135. “Semantic Paradoxes and the Propositional Analysis of Indirect Discourse,” Philosophy of Science, vol. 28 (1961), pp. 437-440. “Quasi-Truth-Functional Systems of Propositional Logic,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 27 (1962), pp. 1-10.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY “Modality Conceived as a Status,” Logique et Analyse, vol. 5 (1962), pp. 81-89. “Plurality-Quantification and Quasi-Categorical Propositions,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 27 (1962), pp. 373-374. “A Probabilistic Approach to Modal Logic,” Acta Philosophica Fennica fasc., vol. 16 (1963), pp. 215-225. (Proceedings of the “Colloquium on Non-Classical Logics” held August 1962 in Helsinki, Finland.) “A Note on Self-Referential Statements,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 5 (1964), pp. 218-220. Reprinted in S. J. Bartlett (ed.), Reflexivity: A Source Book in SelfReference (Amsterdam: North Holland Publ. Co., 1992). “A Quantificational Treatment of Modality,” Logique et Analyse, vol. 7 (1964), pp. 34-42. “Predicate Logic Without Predicates,” Logique et Analyse, vol. 7 (1964), pp. 101-103. “Quantifiers in Many-valued Logic,” Logique et Analyse, vol. 7 (1964), pp. 181-184. “Venn Diagrams for Plurative Syllogisms,” Philosophical Studies, vol. 16 (1965), pp. 49-55. With Neil A. Gallagher. “An Intuitive Interpretation of Four-valued Logic,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 6 (1965), pp. 146-154. “On Modal Renderings of Intuitionistic Propositional Calculus,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 7 (1966), pp. 277-280. “Recent Developments and Trends in Logic,” Logique et Analyse, vol 9 (1966), pp. 269-279. “Topological Logic,” The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 33 (1968), pp. 537-548. With James Garson. Italian translation in Claudio Pizzi (ed.), Logica del Tempo (Torino, 1974), pp. 211-29. “Autodescriptive Systems of Many-valued Logic,” Proceedings of the XIV International Congress of Philosophy (Vienna, 1968), Vol. 2 (1969). “On Inference from Inconsistent Premisses,” Theory and Decision, vol. 1 (1970), pp. 179217. With Ruth Manor. “Restricted Inference,” Logique et Analyse, vol. 14 (1971), pp. 675-683. With Zane Parks. “Modal Elaborations of Propositional Logics,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 13 (1972), pp. 323-330. With Ruth Manor. “Reductio ad Absurdum,” (http://www.utm.edu/research/iep).

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Nicholas Moutafakis U. History of Logic (See also sections L, O, and P above) “Desarraollos y orientaciones recientes en la lógica,” Teorema, vol. 2 (1971), pp. 51-64. “Russell and Modal Logic” in G. W. Roberts (ed.), Bertrand Russell Memorial Volume (London, 1979), pp. 139-149. “Plurality Quantification Revisited,” Philosophical Inquiries, vol. 26 (2004), pp. xyz-uvw.

B. Discussions About Rescher’s Philosophy IV. Books Ernest Sosa (ed.), The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979). [A collection of critical essays with brief replies by N.R. [The contributors include: Annette Baier, Stephen Barker, Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., Laurence BonJour, Robert E. Butts, Roderick M. Chisholm, L. Jonathan Cohen, Jude J. Dougherty, Brian Ellis, R.M. Hare, Hide Ishiguro, George Von Wright, and John W. Yolton.] Heinrich Coomann, Die Kohaerenztheorie der Wahrheit: Eine kritische Darstellung der Theorie Reschers von Ihrem historischen Hintergrund (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Peter Lang, 1983). Robert Almeder (ed.), Praxis and Reason: Studies in the Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982.) [A collection of critical and expanding essa ys with brief replies by NR. The contributors include: Timo Airaksinen, Robert Almeder, Antonio Cua, John E. Hare, Risto Hilpinen, John Kekes, Gerald J. Massey, Jack W. Meiland, Mark Pastin, Friedrick Rapp, James Sterba, and Dennis Temple.] Andrea Bottani, Verità e Coerenza: Suggio su’ll epistemologia coerentista di Nicholas Rescher, (Milano: Franco Angeli Liberi, 1989). [A systematic study of NR’s coherence theory of truth.] Michele Marsonet, The Primacy of Practical Reason: An Essay on Nicholas Rescher’s Philosophy (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1995). Axel Wüstehube and Michael Quante (eds.), Pragmatic Idealism: Critical Essays on Nicholas Rescher’s System of Pragmatic Idealism (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1998). [Critical essays on NR’s “Pragmatic Idealism” trilogy by eighteen contemporary philosophers in Europe and the USA.] Martin Carrier et. al (eds.), Science at the Century’s End: Philosophical Questions on the Progress and Limits of Science (Pittsburgh and Konstanz: University of Pittsburgh Press and University of Konstanz Press, 2000). [Pp. 40-134 contains a symposium devoted to NR’s work on the Limits of Science with contributions by Robert Almeder, Laura Ruetsche, Juergen Mittelstrass, and Martin Carrier.]

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Lotfallah Nabavi, Avicennan Logic Based on Nicholas Rescher’s Point of View (Tehran: Scientific and Cultural Publication Co., 2003). Michael Weber (ed.), After Whitehead: Rescher and Process Philosophy (Frankfurt: ONTOS Verlag, 2004). Paul D. Murray, Reason, Truth and Theology in Pragmatist Perspective (Leuven: Peeters, 2004). [A theological study largely devoted to NR’s ideas.]

V. Other Publications Lorenz Puntel, Einführung in Nicholas Rescher’s pragmatische Systemphilosophie, in Nicholas Rescher Die Grenzen der Wissenschaft (Ditzingen: Redam, 1985), German translation of The Limits of Science. “On Nicholas Rescher’s Work on Argumentation.” A special issue of Informal Logic, vol. 14 (1992) No. 1, pp. 1-58. [Critical discussions of NR’s work by Bryson Brown, David Goodman, Harvey Siegel, and Douglas Walton, with responses by NR.] “Book Symposium” on Nicholas Rescher’s trilogy, A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. 54 (1994), June issue. [Critical discussions of NR’s “Pragmatic Idealism” triology by Cornelius Delaney, Jack Meiland, Timothy Sprigge, John Kekes, Terrance McConnell, Joseph Margolis, and Johanna Seibt.] “Symposium on Nicholas Rescher’s Pluralism,” Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, vol. 42 (1994), pp. 291-334. [Critical discussion of NR’s Pluralism by Hans-Peter Krüger, Lothar Schäfer, Logi Gunnasson, and Axel Wüstehube.] Timo Airaksinen, “Methodological Pragmatism: The Pragmatic Epistemology of Nicholas Rescher” in Pragmatik: Handbuch Pragmatischen Denkens ed. by Herbert Stachowiak, Vol. V (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1995), pp. 179-95. Wenceslao J. González, “Racionalidad científica y actividad humana Ciencia y valores en la Filosofía de N. Rescher,” a long introductory discussion essay to NR’s Razón y valores en la Era científico-technológica (Bacelona: Editorial Paidós, 1999), pp. 11-44. Symposium: “Nicholas Rescher on Pragmatic Philosophy,” Contemporary Pragmatism, December 2005 issue.

VI.

Dissertations About Rescher’s Philosophy

Dennis M. Temple, A Study of Nicholas Rescher’s Theory of Natural Law. St. Louis, MO (Ph.D. Dissertation at Washington University), 1979.

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Nicholas Moutafakis Heinrich Coomann Die Kohaerenztheorie der Wahrheit (Düsseldorf,1979). (A doctoral dissertation at the University of Düsseldorf centering on NR’s The Coherence Theory of Truth.) Andrea Bottani, Aspetti fondamentali della teoria coerentista della verita in Nicholas Rescher. Genova, 1982. (A doctoral dissertation at the University of Genoa, centering on NR’s theory of truth.) Axel Wüstehube, Vollstänidige oder unvollständige Rationalität? Unlersuchungen zu einem Begriff pragmatischer Rationalität (Münster, 1996). (A habilitation dissertation at the University of Münster centering on NR’s theory of pragmatic rationality.)

C. Articles Dealing with Rescher’s Work Hobbs, Charles A. “Interview with Nicholas Rescher.” Kinesis: Graduate Journal in Philosophy, 31(2): pp. 18-42, 2004. Batens, Diderik. “A Strengthening of the Rescher-Manor Consequence Relations,” Logique et Analyse, 46(183-184): pp. 289-313, 2003. Murray, Paul D. Fallibilism, “Faith and Theology: Putting Nicholas Rescher to Theological Work,” Modern Theology, 20(3): pp. 339-362, 2004. Mittelstrass, Jurgen. “Nicholas Rescher on the Limits of Science” in: Science at Century’s End: Philosophical Questions on the Progress and Limits of Science, Carrier, Martin (ed.), pp. 76-83. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. Weber, Michael (ed.). “After Whitehead: Rescher on Process Metaphysics,” in: The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher, Discussions and Replies, edited by Ernest Sosa, with the advice and assistance of the Editorial Committee, L. Jonathan Cohen. Pragmatic Idealism: Critical Essays on Nicholas Rescher’s System of Pragmatic Idealism,” (edited by Axel Wüstehube and Michael Quante. Amsterdam; Atlanta, Ga.: Rodopi, 1998). Coomann, Heiner. Die Kohärenztheorie der Wahrheit: eine kritische Darstellung der Theorie Reschers vor ihrem historischen Hintergrund, Frankfurt am Main; New York: Lang, 1983. Verhoeven, Liza. “Changing One’s Position in a Discussion--Some Adaptive Approaches,” Logic and Logical Philosophy, 11-12: pp. 277-297, 2003. Batens, Diderik. “Towards the Unification of Inconsistency Handling Mechanisms,” Logic and Logical Philosophy. 8: pp. 5-31, 2001. Latus, Andrew. “Constitutive Luck,” Metaphilosophy, 34(4): pp. 460-475, 2003. Khatchadourian, Haig. “Existence,” Critica:Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofia, 16(47): pp. 33-58, 1984.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Ruetsche, Laura. “Toward the Pale: Cosmological Darwinism and the Limits of Science” in: Science at Century’s End: Philosophical Questions on the Progress and Limits of Science, Carrier, Martin (ed), pp. 1-75. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. Almeder, Robert F. “The Limits of Natural Science: Rescher’s View” in: Science at Century’s End: Philosophical Questions on the Progress and Limits of Science, Carrier, Martin (ed.), pp. 40-60. University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. Saka, Paul. “Pascal’s Wager and the Many Gods Objection,” Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 37(3): pp. 321-341, 2001. Pezzimenti, Rocco. “Dynamic Order: The Problem of Method in Evolving Nature (With Letters from N. Rescher, L. Pauling, J. Accles and K.R. Popper)”. [Book Review] Revue Philosophique de Louvain. My 00; 98(2): pp. 412-419. Siitonen, Arto. “The Ontology of Facts and Values,” in: Pragmatic Idealism: Critical Essays on Nicholas Rescher’s System of Pragmatic Idealism, Wustehube, Axel (ed.), pp. 191202. Rodopi, Amsterdam. Quante, Michael. “Understanding Conceptual Schemes: Rescher’s Quarrel with Davidson,” in: Pragmatic Idealism: Critical Essays on Nicholas Rescher’s System of Pragmatic Idealism, Wustehube, Axel (ed.), 174-190. [Contribution] Rodopi, Amsterdam. Puntel, Lorenz B. “Is Truth ‘Ideal Coherence’?” in: Pragmatic Idealism: Critical Essays on Nicholas Rescher’s System of Pragmatic Idealism, Wustehube, Axel (ed.), pp. 146-173. Rodopi, Amsterdam. Pitt, Joseph C. “Doing Philosophy: Rescher’s Normative Methodology,” in: Pragmatic Idealism: Critical Essays on Nicholas Rescher’s System of Pragmatic Idealism, Wustehube, Axel (ed.), pp. 135-145. Rodopi, Amsterdam. Martin, Raymond. “Was Spinoza a Person?” in: Pragmatic Idealism: Critical Essays on Nicholas Rescher’s System of Pragmatic Idealism, Wustehube, Axel (ed.), pp. 111-118, Rodopi, Amsterdam. Marsonet, Michele. “Scientific Realism and Pragmatic Idealism,” in: Pragmatic Idealism: Critical Essays on Nicholas Rescher’s System of Pragmatic Idealism, Wustehube, Axel (ed.), pp. 98-110, Rodopi, Amsterdam. Marconi, Diego. “Opus Incertum” in: Pragmatic Idealism: Critical Essays on Nicholas Rescher’s System of Pragmatic Idealism, Wustehube, Axel (ed.), 85-97 Rodopi, Amsterdam. Gale, George. “Rescher on Evolution and the Intelligibility of Nature,” in: Pragmatic Idealism: Critical Essays on Nicholas Rescher’s System of Pragmatic Idealism, Wustehube, Axel (ed.), pp. 45-58, Rodopi, Amsterdam. Palau, Gladys. “Ontologia de mundos posibles y contrafacticos,” Analisis Filosofico, 3(1): pp. 29-40, 1983.

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Nicholas Moutafakis Lanham, MD: University Press of America; Pittsburgh: Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1985. Brandom, Robert. “Varieties of Understanding” in: Reason and Rationality in Natural Science: a group of essays, edited by Nicholas Rescher, pp. 27-51. Lanham, MD: University Press of America; Pittsburgh: Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1985. Rosenberg, Jay F. “Science and the Epistemic Authority of Logical Analysis,” in: Reason and Rationality in Natural Science: a group of essays, edited by Nicholas Rescher, pp. 1-26. Lanham, MD: University Press of America; Pittsburgh: Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1985. Schlesinger, George. “On the Limits of Science,” Analysis, 46: pp. 24-26, 1986. Bergstrom, Lars. “Interpersonal Utility Comparisons,” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 16/17: pp. 283-312, 1982. Felt, James W. “Impossible Worlds,” [Journal Article], 23: pp. 251-266, 1983. Moutafakis, Nicholas J. Imperatives and Their Logics, [Monograph] Sterling Press, New Delhi, 1975. Salmon, Wesley C. “Partial Entailment as a Basis for Inductive Logic,” Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel. A tribute on the occasion of his sixty-fifth birthday. Essays by Donald Davidson, Frederic B. Fitch, Adolf Gr{232}unbaum [and others], Edited by Nicholas Rescher on behalf of the editorial committee, pp. 47-82, Dordrecht, D. Reidel [1970]. Ruja, Harry. “The Definition of God and the Ontological Argument,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 41: pp. 262-263, 1963. Goddard, L. “Mr. Rescher on Random Individuals,” Analysis, 19: pp. 18-20, 1958. Patton, T E. “A Reply to Rescher on Goodman’s ‘About’,” Mind, 74: pp. 592-593, 1965. Munitz, Milton [ed.]. Identity and Individuation, [Monograph] New York University Press, New York. Capitan, W H [ed.]. Merrill, D D [ed.]. Metaphysics and Explanation, [Monograph] Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh. Wilson, N L. Reply to Professor Rescher’s “Identity, Substitution, and Modality,” Review of Metaphysics, 14: pp. 714-720, 1961. Feldman, Seymour. “Rescher on Arabic Logic,” [Journal Article], 61: pp. 724-733, 1964. Martin, R M. “On Connotation and Attribute,” Journal of Philosophy, 61: pp. 711-723, 196

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Name Index Alston, William P., 59n55 Altamira, 197 Aristotle, 32, 35, 43-45, 59n51-52, 63-64, 68-70, 72-79, 82n15, 82n22, 8283n27, 85-86, 100-101, 106, 118n2, 146-47, 159n21, 183-90, 199n89 Arrow, Kenneth, 97-99, 125 Ayer, Alfred Jules, 139, 158n1, 179n24 Baier, Kurt, 39, 50 Beardsley, Monroe C., 25, 26, 57n16 Benedict, Ruth, 149, 153-54, 160n28, 160n37 Bentham, Jeremy, 109, 115, 172, 174, 191 Bernstein, Leonard, 26 Bonjour, Laurence, 53-54, 60n75-76 Brentano, Franz, 85-88, 91, 101n2, 102n11, 142 Butts, Robert E., 57n15 Carnap, Rudolph, 140 Chisholm, Roderick M., 46-50, 59n55-56 Cicero, 46, 109 Cooper, John M., 77-78, 83n29 Copernicus, 173 Copleston, Frederick, 82n27 Darwin, Charles, 194-97, 200n31 de las Casas, Bartolomeo, 181 Descartes, 51 Dirac, Paul, 27 Dougherty, Jude P., 64-65, 81n4-5 Durkheim, Emile, 149 Einstein, Albert, 21, 24 Ferguson, C. E., 96, 102n23 Flaubert, Gustrave, 155

Nicholas Moutafakis

Gale, George, 27, 28, 57n18 Gasset, Jose Ortega y, 191 Ghazali, 119n11 Habermas, Juergen, 31 Hare, R. M., 114, 115, 116-117, 119n17 Harwood, Sterling, 158n2 Hauptli, Bruce W., 56n14 Hegel, 105, 181, 198 Hospers, John, 108 Hume, David, 45, 171-78, 178n12, 178n19 James, William, 63 Kaldor, Nicholas, 107 Kant, 139, 143-44, 191 Kant, Immanuel, 25, 32, 65, 75, 152-53 Kekes, John, 41 Lounsbury, Floyd, 152, 160n35 MacIntyre, Alasdair, 179n24 MacNabb, D. G. C., 174, 177, 178n17, 179n27 Marks, Karl, 139 Martin, Richard M., 130, 138n19 Maurice, S. Charles, 96, 102n23 McKeon, Richard, 159n21 Meinong, Alexis, 85, 87 Mill, John Stuart, 22, 56n7, 105, 109, 181 Montaigne, Michel de, 168-69 Moore, G. E., 60n70, 179n24 Neurath, Otto, 140 Nietsche, Frederick, 90, 139 Pascal, 92 Peirce, Charles Sanders, 31, 55n2, 63, 90, 102n9 Pileta, Cueva de la, 197

250

NAME INDEX

Plato, 28, 32, 33, 45, 69-70, 75, 58n36, 146, 183 Price, H. H. 44 Pyrrho, 44, 46 Ross, W. D., 107, 142 Santayana, George, 158n3 Sapir, E., 153 Schlick, Mortiz, 139-40 Schroedinger, Erwin, 21 Sedgwick, 109 Sextus Empiricus, 44, 59n54 Shakespeare, William, 39, 58n44 Socrates, 69, 82n15 Spinoza, 191 Spivey, Nigel, 197, 200n34 St. Augustine, 42, 46-47, 49, 58n50 Stevenson, C. L., 139, 172, 176-77, 179n24 Telford, Kenneth A., 73-75, 82n20, 82n23, 186-90, 199n11, 199n15 Unamuno, Miguel de, 191-92 von Wright, Geroge Heinrik, 132 Whorf, 153 Wigner, Eugene, 21 Willascheck, Marcus, 50-53, 60n66, 60n70 Wüstehube, Axel, 64, 81n2

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