Reprobation: from Augustine to the Synod of Dort: The Historical Development of the Reformed Doctrine of Reprobation [1 ed.] 9783666564833, 9783525564837

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Peter Sammons

Reprobation: from Augustine to the Synod of Dort The Historical Development of the Reformed Doctrine of Reprobation

Reformed Historical Theology Edited by Herman J. Selderhuis in Co-operation with Emidio Campi, Irene Dingel, Benyamin F. Intan, Elsie Anne McKee, Richard A. Muller, and Risto Saarinen

Volume 63

Peter Sammons

Reprobation: from Augustine to the Synod of Dort The Historical Development of the Reformed Doctrine of Reprobation

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek: The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data available online: https://dnb.de. © 2020, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht GmbH & Co. KG, Theaterstraße 13, D-37073 Göttingen All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher. Typesetting: 3w+p, Rimpar Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Verlage | www.vandenhoeck-ruprecht-verlage.com ISSN 2197-1137 ISBN 978-3-666-56483-3

To my lovely wife Gabrielle, my son Owen, and my daughter Geneva. To my students present and future. To my Covenant head, prophet, priest, king, my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ.

Contents

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Author’s Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Assumptions and Presuppositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Purpose, Layout, and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter One: The Early Church and Reprobation The Early Church Fathers (33–325 AD) . . . . . The Greek Fathers and Latin Fathers . . . . . . Post-Nicene Fathers (326–475 AD) . . . . . . . . Augustine (354–430 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . Prosper of Aquitaine (390–455 AD) . . . . . . Lucidus (473 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter Two: The Middle Ages and Reprobation . . . . . Early Middle Ages (476–799 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fulgentius of Ruspe (467–533 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Second Council of Orange (529 AD) . . . . . . . . . Isidore of Seville (560–636 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . High Middle Ages (800–1299 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gottschalk of Orbais (803–869 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109 AD) . . . . . . . . . Peter Lombard (1095–1160 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alexander of Hales (1185–1245 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . Albert the Great (1200–1280 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bonaventure (1217–1274 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . Late Middle Ages and Early Renaissance (1300–1520 AD) Duns Scotus (1266–1308 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . William of Ockham (1285–1347 AD) . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter Three: The Reformation Period and Reprobation Reformation and Counter-Reformation (1521–1610 AD) Martin Luther (1483–1546 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ulrich Zwingli (1484–1531 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Council of Trent (1545–1563 AD) . . . . . . . . . . John Calvin (1509–1564 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bellarmine (1542–1621 AD) and Suarez (1548–1617 AD) Heinrich Bullinger (1504–1575 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . Peter Martyr Vermigil (1500–1562 AD) . . . . . . . . . Theodore Beza (1519–1605 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . John Knox (1513–1572 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jerome Zanchi (1515–1590 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reformed Confessions Prior to the Synod of Dort . . .

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Chapter Four: The English Reformation and Reprobation The English Reformation (16th and 17th Century) . . . . William Perkins (1558–1602 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . William Whitaker (1548–1595 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . Cambridge Predestination Controversy (1595 AD) . . . Johann Piscator (1546–1625 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . Amandus Polanus (1561–1610 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Chapter Five: The Synod of Dort and Reprobation . . . Dutch Reformers Nadere Reformatie (1600–1750 AD) Franciscus Junius (1545–1602 AD) . . . . . . . . . . Lucas Trelcatius (1542–1602 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . Franciscus Gomarus (1563–1641 AD) . . . . . . . . Jacob Arminius (1559–1609 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . The 1610 Remonstrance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Hague Conference (1611 AD) . . . . . . . . . . William Ames (1576–1633 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . Festus Hommius (1576–1642 AD) . . . . . . . . . . Johannes Maccovius (1588–1644 AD) . . . . . . . . The Second Remonstrance (1617 AD) . . . . . . . .

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Thomas Bradwardine (1290–1349 AD) Nicholas of Lyra (1270–1349 AD) . . . Gregory of Rimini (1300–1358 AD) . . Gabriel Biel (1410–1495 AD) . . . . . John Eck (1486–1543 AD) . . . . . . .

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Contents

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The Synod of Dort (1618–1619 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Summary Remarks Concerning the Historical Development of Reprobation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Acknowledgments

This book is essentially the fruit of the historical research I did for the first section of my PhD dissertation. The process of making this work into a standalone book was done with the help of many. I could not have achieved this task without the sacrifice of so many others who aided me in the process. If you have any benefit from this book, you owe it to the editorial skills of Jack Smith, who labored to read through the manuscript multiple times, spell checking, formatting, and providing critical feedback to make this project possible. Also, for helping me typeset my manuscript, I must thank Anastasia Prinzing; and for indexing and believing in my work, many thanks are due to Alan Quinones. Any errors within are mine alone. I am indebted to the academic process and the exquisite knowledge and assistance of my local librarian, John Stone, who provided me with a plethora of resources. One of these resources was the dissertation by Donald Sinnema, whose work helped guide my own historical research. I am also thankful for all the libraries that granted me access to rare texts that aided me in my studies. I must also thank my dear friend Mike Riccardi for his support and critical feedback during my doctoral work, which in turn made this work what it is today. I am grateful to the many scholars who read my manuscript and pushed me toward publication: JV Fesko, Mark Dever, Steve Lawson, and John MacArthur were all very helpful in this regard. I am thankful for my employment at Grace to You, which provided me the time and flexibility to work on this project. And most importantly I am indebted to Phil Johnson, who has been like a spiritual father to me in many ways. Finally, I am thankful to my wife, who sacrificed more than is reasonable to allow me to pursue my doctoral work, for following me to the ends of the earth, for being my helpmate, best friend, and comforting companion throughout life’s earthly trials. Without her, this work would never have seen the light of day. Soli Deo Gloria

Author’s Preface

The historical development of doctrine is vital to understanding each particular doctrine’s impact on Christendom. However, when the historical development of any given doctrine is neglected, the result is an underdeveloped theology. Heresies that have already been condemned in church history reemerge when theology is done without an eye to the past. Novelty, which is nothing more than reimagined heresy, takes the place of truth. When studying church history, it is important to remember that not every doctrine is given the same amount of attention within each generation. In fact, doctrinal error is often necessary to force the church to wrestle with issues and mature its previous conclusions (in the form of a counter-response). In this respect, error always lends a hand in developing truth through fire. The doctrine of reprobation is no exception. The approaches to studying reprobation are many. Biblical commentators and theologians rarely object to God’s ordination of good things (cf. Rom 8:28 or 11:36), but when Scripture alludes to the divine ordination of men unto damnation, a wide variety of objections and alternative explanations are offered.1 The spectrum of interpretations ranges from Open Theism to hyper-Calvinism, with a host of divergent viewpoints in between. A survey of the various arguments brought against modern day Calvinistic predestination reveals that the primary objection raised by non-Calvinistic critics pertains to the doctrine of reprobation. Thus, it is necessary to investigate this doctrine carefully. While there are many approaches to better understand the 1 One such serious objection is raised by Roger Olsen: “Taken to their logical conclusion, that even hell and all who suffer there eternally are foreordained by God, God is thereby rendered morally ambiguous at best and a moral monster at worst. I have gone so far as to say that this kind of Calvinism, which attributes everything to God’s will and control, makes it difficult (at least for me) to see the difference between God and the devil. Some of my Calvinist friends have expressed offense at that, but I continue to believe it is a valid question worth perusing. What I mean is that if I were a Calvinist and believed what these people teach, I would have difficulty telling the difference between God and Satan.” Roger Olson, Against Calvinism (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 23.

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various positions (exegetical, theological, polemical, etc.), there is one approach that helps to put the whole panoply of positions into perspective; this is the historical theological approach. Often people misunderstand the historical theological approach in thinking that it is merely biographical in nature. Or they misuse historical theology by sifting through various historical documents to find people to support their modern position. However, these approaches are not helpful in our practice of historical theology. Historical theology should be aimed at retrieval, not reinterpretation. Through the retrieval process theologians can make accurate assessments as to what has been historically seen as precise ways to understand the doctrine of reprobation. It is helpful to see where discussions began and how they progressed through reformed thought. This is beneficial to setting helpful boundaries and establishing precise definitions. This in turn allows the modern church to be in communion with its rich history, but it also prevents the church from deviating into heterodoxy or even heresy unintentionally. Yet historical retrieval cannot be done in a merely topical basis without keeping a close eye on other influencing doctrines. For example, I generally have a host of questions I like to ask new students. These questions will generally pertain to either the atonement or predestination. The reason why I often ask a student what their position is on either of these two doctrines is because these doctrines are what I like to call “plumb-line,” or “capstone doctrines.” The reason this is the case is because whatever view the student presents represents a whole host of conclusions they have made in other related areas of theology. For example, if someone holds to a general atonement as opposed to a particular atonement, they have made assessments regarding many other related issues such as: the extent of the atonement, the purpose of the atonement, the nature of the atonement, God’s sovereignty, predestination, human depravity, the character of God (such as His love and grace), and a host of other doctrines. Doctrinal convictions are always interconnected to other doctrinal convictions. And this is true of every theologian in Church History! The interconnectedness of theology is important when doing retrieval work in church history. One cannot simply skim through historical works and look for every occurrence of a particular doctrine, that is if they want to get an accurate account of that individual’s theology. Furthermore, other doctrines likely influence their conclusions regarding reprobation. It is important to understand what other doctrines are influencing their conclusions. And that is why throughout this book I try to highlight key thoughts that likely influence the conclusions of various characters and traditions. The most important of which is how theologians differentiate (or don’t differentiate) between the decree of reprobation and its execution. For a proper distinction between decree and execution will either lead someone to accept a grotesque version of reprobation or

Author’s Preface

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reject the true doctrine of reprobation. So special attention is given to how men define reprobation proper (its parts) and its execution. Yet, doing retrieval theology is difficult if someone does not recognize their personal presuppositions and influences. In fact, what is difficult for most students of God’s Word is that they generally have difficulty removing the sentimentality attached to their presuppositions. They often approach the word of God unaware that they even have presuppositions that need evaluating by the exegetical data yielded from Scripture. The Reformers did this with the catholic teachings on indulgences, Mary worship, synergistic salvation, and a host of other issues. So, you see our guard rails are not the final authority, they are helpful, yes. They are even necessary! But they need to constantly be tested against Scripture. So that the Scripture, as the London Baptist Confession states (and every confession worth its salt), confesses that our final authority is Scripture and Scripture alone. Calvinism and reformed theology have been synonymous with the doctrine of predestination since their inception, and they have been ostracized by their opponents primarily because of the necessary corollary of predestination: reprobation.2 The perceived distastefulness of the doctrine of reprobation often stems from a failure to distinguish between primary and secondary causality; a distinction necessary to address the objection that reprobation makes God out to be a capricious author of sin. In order to properly explain the doctrine of reprobation’s relationship to secondary causality, it is important to identify how the church’s understanding of reprobation has developed throughout church history. The progression of nuanced thought from Augustine to seventeenth century reformed orthodoxy is critical for a proper understanding of compatibilism, secondary causality, and God’s decree for the non-elect. This book is intended to be a handbook of the development of the doctrine of reprobation through church history, eventually finding itself a mature fixture of reformed orthodox thought by the seventeenth century. A survey such as this establishes the positive affirmation of reprobation by every generation from Augustine to the Synod of Dort. This will demonstrate the acceptance of the doctrine as a chief point of conviction throughout church history, that it has been neither novel nor marginal. Along the way, major contributors to the develop2 For those who claim predestination was not central to Calvin or later Calvinism, see Francois Wendel, Calvin: the Origins and Development of His Religious Thought (Grand Rapids: Collins, 1976), 263–64; as well as Basil Hall, “Calvin Against the Calvinists,” in John Calvin: A Collection of Distinguished Essays, ed. G. E. Duffield (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966), 19–37. Most scholarship proves otherwise. See B.B. Warfield, Calvin and Calvinism (1927; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker, 1981); Richard Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1988); and Paul Helm, Calvin and the Calvinists (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1982).

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ment of the doctrine (both opponents and supporters) will be highlighted. In large part, this will disclose how reprobation has been articulated and defined throughout its development. The goal in this book is to be as objective as possible. While neutrality is unattainable for any historian or theologian, equity is the intention. Individuals will be allowed to speak for themselves before conclusions are drawn from their words. After an individual’s views are summarized and original contributions are presented, charitable scholarship allows for a critique of the perspective in order to draw helpful conclusions.3 So here I would briefly outline my approach and presuppositions for the reader.

Assumptions and Presuppositions While attempting to be objective, this study assumes several key theological presuppositions. First, it presupposes that God’s Word is not silent concerning this topic, and that the church has historically believed God’s Word contains the answers concerning this seemingly thorny issue. As William Perkins noted, “If there be an eternal decree of God, whereby he chooseth some men, then there must needs be another whereby he doth pass by others and refuse them.”4 Such a statement is not merely a logical deduction. Rather, it is predicated on passages of Scripture where God is said to “create” or “prepare” “vessels of wrath prepared for destruction” (Rom 9:22), “appoint men to destruction,” (1 Pet 2:8) and mark them “out for condemnation” (Jude 4). Second, God’s Word—not history, emotions, logic, or philosophy—is affirmed as the ultimate authority on this subject. And while retrieval theology is helpful, it is not the final authority on the matter. It is acknowledged that God’s Word is neither contrary to the history of God’s church, nor detached from human emotion, nor independent of the rules of logic and philosophy. Nevertheless, these are not the chief contributors to the author’s conclusions. Scripture alone is the final authority for the establishment of any doctrine. The author affirms and embraces the verbal, plenary, inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture. Yet, retrieval theology helps to set the guardrails in the discussion and is richly informative as to how the church has handled the Bible concerning these issues. Third, God is recognized as impeccably holy. God is the only inherently holy being. He is so holy that holiness is equated with His name (Isa 6:3; Rev 4:8). Not 3 Carl R. Trueman, Histories and Fallacies: Problems Faced in the Writing of History (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2010), 27–28, 62–68. 4 William Perkins, “Creed of the Apostles,” in The Workes of that Famous and Worthy Minister of Christ in the Universitie of Cambridge, Mr. William Perkins, ed. John Legatt (London: John Legatt, 1626), 1:287. Hereafter, just Works.

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only is He holy, but He cannot be the direct agent or cause of any form of sin or temptation (Jas 1:13, 17; 1 John 1:5). Fourth, God is held to be meticulously sovereign.5 God rules over everything, including calamity (Lam 3:38), disaster (Amos 3:6), the casting of lots (Prov 16:33), the hearts of kings (Prov 21:1), and even the crucifixion (Acts 2:23). Fifth, man is responsible for every act he commits. Man, in his heart, loves sin (John 3:20) and, hates God (Rom 8:7). Thus, he commits iniquity in accordance with his nature (Luke 6:45; John 8:44). The degree of man’s culpability is in accordance with his knowledge (Rom 1:19). These final two presuppositions lend themselves to a compatibilist understanding of the human will.6 All these presuppositions are highlighted in the Westminster Confession when it states: God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.7 While these convictions may not be held by all who read this work, the author is concerned with presenting the information objectively and faithfully. Acknowledging these theological presuppositions at the forefront allows the book to focus on the primary issue at hand: how the historical development of the articulation of the doctrine of reprobation throughout church history has helpfully expressed precise definitions with great caution and care. 5 A.W. Pink summarizes the Puritan/Reformed definition of God’s sovereignty well: “The Sovereignty of the God of Scripture is absolute, irresistible, infinite. When we say that God is Sovereign we affirm His right to govern the universe which He has made for His own glory, just as He pleases. We affirm that His right is the right of the Potter over the clay, i. e., that He may mold that clay into whatsoever form He chooses, fashioning out of the same lump one vessel unto honor and another unto dishonor.” A.W. Pink, The Sovereignty of God (1930; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1984), 21. There is an edition of The Sovereignty of God published by Banner of Truth (2009), however, it has omitted important sections related to reprobation (particularly chapter 5) and therefore I could not recommend it over the Baker edition. 6 As opposed to a libertarian understanding of the human will, supported by those of the Arminian persuasion. For those who hold to a compatibilist view of the will see Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. J.I. Packer and O.R. Johnston (Grand Rapids: Fleming H. Revell, 1990); John Calvin, The Bondage and Liberation of the Will: A Defense of the Orthodox Doctrine of Human Choice against Pighius, ed. A.N.S. Lane, trans. G.I. Davies (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1996); Jonathan Edwards, The Freedom of the Will 1, The Works of Jonathan Edwards, ed. Paul Ramsey (1834; repr., Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1995). For those of the opposing view, libertarian free will, see Roger E. Olson, Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006); William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God: The Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 1999); Norman L. Geisler, Chosen But Free: A Balanced View of God’s Sovereignty and Free Will (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2010). 7 Philip Schaff, Creeds of Christendom, Volume III: The Creeds of the Evangelical Protestant Churches (1887; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1977), 3:609.

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And a final presupposition of the author is that compatibilism and concurrence are synonymous in reformed thinking. There has been a lengthy discussion between Richard Muller and Paul Helm about the place of Edwards (and compatibilism) within the reformed tradition.8 This disagreement only highlights the fact that there are legitimate scholars who disagree about harmony in the reformed/puritan eras due to the diversity found in the Westminster Assembly and even at Dort. Even so, many people have argued (Richard Muller) that ”R”eformed is based on what is in the confessions. And because compatibility versus concurrence—or even particularism versus hypothetical universalism—is not articulated as clearly, scholars sometimes think there is more acceptable diversity than perhaps myself (or Paul Helm do). I do not discredit those who take Muller’s view on the issue (I know they are very accomplished and capable theologians), but I cannot help but find disappointment with their conclusion. Just because there was disagreement on an issue between two theologians rightly called “Puritans/Reformed,” does not mean that there is therefore no “Puritan/Reformed” position on this issue. It could be that one Puritan defected from the “Puritan” view on that subject. For example, Baxter’s neonomianism does not mean that there was no “Reformed” or “Puritan” view on Justification/ atonement just because Baxter could be rightly called Reformed/Puritan. Those doing recovery work on the reformed diversity are doing important work, but it should be remembered that the dominant views that shaped the tradition for generations was not found in the diversity, but in the unanimity. And thus it is my attempt to show where the unanimity of thought exists between successive generations, as they build upon generations of the past, when unanimity is actually present.

Purpose, Layout, and Methodology The book aims to retrieve from history a proper definition of reprobation as the church historically has interacted with the biblical texts. Through the book it can be observed that each successive generation builds upon generations before them in their endeavor to harmonize, synthesize and precisely define what the Bible 8 See: Richard A. Muller, “Jonathan Edwards and the Absence of Free Choice: A Parting of Ways in the Reformed Tradition,” Jonathan Edwards Studies 1, no. 1 (2011): 3–22. The Replay by Paul Helm, “Jonathan Edwards and the Parting of the Ways?,” Jonathan Edwards Studies 4, no. 1 (2014): 42–60. Muller’s reply to Helm, “Jonathan Edwards and Francis Turretin on Necessity, Contingency, and Freedom of Will,” Jonathan Edwards Studies 4, no. 3 (2014): 266–85. And Helm’s final response “Turretin and Edwards Once More,” Jonathan Edwards Studies 4, no. 3 (2014): 286–296.

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teaches concerning predestination. However, at key junctures in history, it is important to highlight new articulations and clarifications to the doctrine of reprobation that come because of other tangential doctrines. This then helps to show how definitions are augmented to take new information into account throughout the centuries. This in turn helps us to properly retrieve the correct doctrine of reprobation from reformed historical thought. The retrieval of each successive generation will include a summary explanation and survey of pertinent statements by key Christian theologians. Key categories related to or influencing an individual’s understanding of reprobation will be examined in greater detail to glean pertinent information regarding that particular influence. In the process, a variety of sources (both primary and secondary) will be consulted, including those from a non-reformed perspective. While a wide variety of opinions concerning the doctrine of reprobation can be found among commentaries and systematic theologies, it is a doctrine which is often either assumed or outright rejected. Accordingly, the doctrine has received little attention in scholarly literature, despite the fact that it has divided the church since the fourth century. In fact, the dearth of literature on this subject is primarily due to the topic’s perceived divisiveness, which has left many to conclude that it is best left to the mysteries of God (Deut 29:29).9 The reformed position has been that God’s eternal decree of reprobation does not require Him to implant sin into men to guarantee His desired outcome. Rather, God preserves both the volition of the creature and His own holiness by means of secondary causes. It is the intention of this book to help faithful Christians understand reprobation properly and to help them recognize and articulate a proper understanding of reprobation, because this process helps elucidate a vast number of Scripture passages that are often neglected, avoided, or distorted by many in the church. The categorization of secondary causes preserves God’s holy sovereignty and man’s accountability with respect to the issue of reprobation. The purpose of this book is two-fold. First, it seeks to gather key thoughts from prominent theologians through each century that influenced the articulation of the reformed doctrine of reprobation. This functions as a sort of mini-encyclopedia of thoughts and the development of thoughts by influential theologians in church history. Second, from this material, it seeks to properly define the doctrine of reprobation. Since the Synod of Dort in 1618, many in Christendom have

9 To see a popular level treatment of the history of this debate, see R.C. Sproul, Willing to Believe: The Controversy over Free Will (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1997); Erwin Lutzer, The Doctrines that Divide: A Fresh Look at the Historic Doctrines that Separate Christians (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1998).

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Author’s Preface

been speaking past one another when it comes to this doctrine, simply because adequate care has not been given to defining it historically. This book then seeks to define, clarify, and explain a reformed view of reprobation against misunderstandings of it by retrieving a proper definition from history by means of tracing the development of reprobation and related doctrines through history. It is not within the scope of this book to address every issue related to predestination (i. e., providence, election, or the order of the divine decrees).10 By focusing specifically on the doctrine of reprobation, this book both traces historical progression and helps to establish historical definitions with precision. Furthermore, this book does not seek to exhaustively deal with every opposing view raised against the doctrine of reprobation. Many arguments have been made in modern history, but for the sake of the book objections of conviction by modern opposing views will not be examined, but only those which historically occurred from the time of the Early Church up to the Synod of Dort.

10 With respect to the order of the divine decrees, four major positions stand out. Arminianism, Amyraldism, Infralapsarianism, and Supralapsarianism. The Infra- and Supra- positions are strongly associated with the doctrine of reprobation, which is rejected by the two former positions. For more discussion on Supralapsarianism and Infralapsarianism see Joel. R. Beeke, “Did Beza’s Suprelapsarianism Spoil Calvin’s Theology?,” RTJ 13 (Nov. 1997): 58–60; Joel. R. Beeke, “Theodore Beza’s Supralapsarian Predestination,” RRJ 12, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 69–84; William Hastie, The Theology of the Reformed Church (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1904). Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, trans. G.T. Thomson (London: Allen & Unwin, 1978), 147–48. Both Infra- and Supra- camps have argued using various lines in the Institutes that Calvin held to their position. However, the debate was in its infant state when he was alive. See William Cunningham, The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1862), 364; Richard A. Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1986), 292. John Fesko claims that the Westminster Confession confirmed Infralapsarianism as the official Reformed position. See John Fesko, “The Westminster Confession and Lapsarianism: Calvin and the Divines,” in The Westminster Confession into the 21st Century. Volume 2: Essays in Remembrance of the 350th Anniversary of the Westminster Assembly, ed. J. Ligon Duncan (2004; repr., Fern, Scotland: Mentor, 2005), 2:497–501. However, this is not conclusive. The Westminster divines were split on the subject; for example William Twisse, the proctor of the Westminster Assembly, and William Perkins were both adamant Supralapsarians, therefore, the Westminster Standards were left ambiguous on the issue. John Murray states, “The confession is non-committal on the debate between the Supralapsarians and the Infralapsarians and intentionally so, as both the terms of the section and the debate in the Assembly clearly show.” Ian H. Murray, ed., Collected Writings of John Murray (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1977), 4:209.

Chapter One: The Early Church and Reprobation

The Early Church Fathers (33–325 AD) The early church is unique with respect to the doctrine of reprobation. Before Augustine, there is no refined discussion on predestination. In fact, most early church fathers simply cite biblical texts without expounding on them in much detail. Sinnema summarizes this period: The Apostolic Fathers did little more than repeat the biblical givens. Simple reflection on the matter began in the context of the early church’s struggle to counter Stoic fatalism as well as Manichean and Gnostic dualism. Against the thought of two fixed classes of people, one by nature good and elected to salvation and the other by nature evil and bound for damnation, the early Fathers asserted that good and evil is a matter of the will.1

The early church taught the depravity of man and his need for grace; however, because of their struggle to combat philosophical Stoicism, fatalism, and dualism, they often attributed too much to man’s autonomy.

The Greek Fathers and Latin Fathers The early Greek and Latin Fathers are often cited by advocates of libertarian free will in order to counter the strong history of predestinarian thought that follows Augustine. Pighius, when he wrote his treatise against Calvin, claimed the early church did not support him. Modern scholarship claims this as well: “This in part explains why Calvin cannot cite ante-Nicene fathers against his libertarian opponents (e. g. Pighius). Hence, when Calvin debates Pighius on the freedom of the 1 Donald W. Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort (1618–19) in Light of the History of this Doctrine,” (PhD dissertation, University of St. Michael’s College: Toronto School of Theology, 1985), 8.

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will, he cites Augustine abundantly, but no early church fathers are cited.”2 Even Calvin recognized this, but explained its irrelevance, stating, “Further, even though the Greeks above the rest––and Chrysostom especially among them–– extol the ability of the human will, yet all the ancients, save Augustine, so differ, waver, or speak confusedly on this subject, that almost nothing certain can be derived from their writings.”3 While Calvin’s assessment that the early church claimed both total depravity and free will as true, what should be pointed out is that there is an absence of any meaningful articulation of the doctrine of predestination. This was particularly because the early church was concentrating on other errors.4 Contending against rampant errors like Arianism and Gnosticism, it comes as no surprise that the early church gave little attention to predestination. It should also be noted that the early church’s response to doctrinal error was often done in a pragmatic way, even if for the right reasons. In the case of theodicy, the church often appealed to the notion of free will rather than Scripture. One such example of this is Pseudo-Clement of Rome, who states, For some things, as we have said, He has so willed to be, that they cannot be otherwise than as they are ordained by Him; and to these He has assigned neither rewards nor punishments; but those which He has willed to be so that they have it in their power to do what they will, He has assigned to them according to their actions and their wills, to earn either rewards or punishments.5

Pseudo-Clement, like others after him, rendered God’s foreknowledge of human demerits as the basis for the choice of God to punish the wicked. Ignatius of Antioch likewise stated, “If anyone is truly religious, he is a man of God; but if he is irreligious, he is a man of the devil, made such, not by nature, but by his own choice.”6 Justin Martyr, one of the most cited advocates of libertarian free will, stated it this way: “God’s foreknowledge is intuitive, not active, and is caused by man’s choices.”7 Quite simply, the emphasis on human freedom in the early 2 Gregory Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 360. 3 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1:259. 4 For example, the various Gnostic errors, Dualism, Docetism, Marcionite error, Unitarian Dynamic Monarchianism, Modalism, Sabellianism, just to name a few. 5 Pseudo-Clement of Rome, “Recognitions of Clement,” in Fathers of the Third and Fourth Centuries: The Twelve Patriarchs, Excerpts and Epistles, the Clementia, Aprocrypha, Decretals, Memoirs of Edessa and Syriac Documents, Remains of the First Ages, ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, trans. M.B. Riddle, ANF 8 (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Company, 1886), 121. 6 Ignatius of Antioch, “The Epistle of Ignatius to the Magnesians,” in The Apostolic Fathers: Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, ed. Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, trans. M.B. Riddle, ANF 1 (New York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1903), 61. 7 Justin Martyr, “First Apology,” ANF 1, 177.

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church was not a product of discussions regarding compatibilism or predestination, but was merely asserted, as described here by Justin Martyr: “Unless the human race has the power of avoiding evil and choosing good by free choice, they are not responsible for their actions.”8 Similar statements can be found in the Latin fathers, in which predestination is said to be based on foreseen merits. According to one, “It is not the part of good and solid faith to refer all things to the will of God[…]as to make us fail to understand that there is something within our power.”9 Once again, these statements are in response to Dualism and Gnosticism which sought to remove the culpability of men for sin. This is consistently admitted by church historians. For example Schaff writes: The Greek, and particularly the Alexandrian fathers, in opposition to the dualism and fatalism of the Gnostic systems, which made evil a necessity of nature, laid great stress upon human freedom, and upon the indispensable cooperation of this freedom with divine grace; while the Latin fathers, especially Tertullian and Cyprian, Hilary and Ambrose, guided rather by their practical experience than by speculative principles, emphasized the hereditary sin and hereditary guilt of man, and the sovereignty of God’s grace, without, however, denying freedom and individual accountability. The Greek church adhered to her undeveloped synergism, which coordinates the human will and divine grace as factors in the work of conversion; the Latin church, under the influence of Augustine, advanced to the system of a divine monergism, which gives God all the glory, and makes freedom itself a result of grace; while Pelagianism, on the contrary, represented the principle of a human monergism, which ascribes the chief merit of conversion to man, and reduces grace to a mere external auxiliary. After Augustine’s death, however the intermediate system of Semi-Pelagianism, akin to the Greek synergism, became prevalent in the West.10

The context of heresies that persisted in the early church shaped their discussion of doctrinal issues, as it does in every generation. However, it should be noted that their perspectives on free will were in contrast to Gnosticism/Dualism––not in relation to predestination. Within this theological context, the early church expressed that God’s punishment of sinners was always on account of their volitional acts of sin.

8 Justin Martyr, “First Apology,” ANF 1, 177. 9 Tertullian, “On Exhortation to Chastity,” ANF 4, 50–51. 10 Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1867) 3:786.

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Post-Nicene Fathers (326–475 AD) The doctrine of predestination makes a formal debut into church dogmatics between the fourth and fifth centuries. This period, designated as the “PostNicene Fathers,” signifies the point in time immediately following the historic Council of Nicea (325 AD), a council in which the church set grounds for orthodoxy concerning Christ and the Trinity. Perhaps more significantly, this council also helped in establishing how rules of authority would be determined for orthodox discussions on doctrine. Various scholars have noticed this in the early Post-Nicene eras. When it comes to the doctrine of predestination, there are few periods of history that have had more lasting impact than the Post-Nicene era. Aside from the Protestant Reformation (built in large part on the shoulders of Augustine, which is demonstrated by their citation of him above all other theologians), this period has much to say concerning predestination. Philip Schaff summarizes the emergence of predestination on the theological landscape of the church when he writes: But up to the time of Augustine the doctrine had never been an object of any very profound inquiry, and had therefore never been accurately defined, but only very superficially and casually touched. The Greek fathers, and Tertullian, Ambrose, Jerome, and Pelagius, had only taught a conditional predestination, which they made dependent on the foreknowledge of the free acts of men. In this, as in his views of sin and grace, Augustine went far beyond the earlier divines, taught an unconditional election of grace, and restricted the purpose of redemption to a definite circle of the elect, who constitute the minority of the race.11

With that in mind, there are three prominent figures which can be seen in the Post-Nicene era: Augustine, Prosper of Aquitaine, and Lucidus.

Augustine (354–430 AD) Augustine of Hippo’s writings have had widespread influence on the development of Western Christianity and Western philosophy. In fact, his impact was so great that the Protestant Reformation points back to him as the means through which they rediscovered central Protestant doctrines.12 Augustine’s insight into

11 Schaff, History of the Christian Church, 3:735. 12 B.B. Warfield points out, “[I]t is Augustine who gave us the Reformation. For the Reformation, inwardly considered, was just the ultimate triumph of Augustine’s doctrine of grace over Augustine’s doctrine of the Church.” B.B. Warfield, Calvin and Augustine (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1954), 322.

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the doctrines of original sin and predestination are among his greatest theological contributions. The doctrinal contributions of Augustine were in large part a result of his interactions with Pelagius. Pelagius believed that man was born good; he denied the concept of original sin, predestination, and asserted that the human will and nature was not influenced by Adam’s sin. As a result of these arguments Augustine developed his doctrine of predestination and the inability of the human will to respond to God in matters of salvation.13 Regarding the doctrine of reprobation, Augustine was the first to explain it in detail. Scholars have noted that Augustine’s position underwent a change between his early writings and his later debates with Pelagius.14 However, Augustine’s position did not change dramatically; rather, his position matured through these debates as his understanding of Romans 9 increased. This later understanding led him to the assertion that foreknowledge was not an acceptable way to discuss predestination.15 Augustine’s position on predestination and reprobation begins with his understanding of original sin: as a consequence of Adam’s

13 Pelagius was cleared by a Jerusalem synod, and he was again acquitted by a synod of bishops at Diospolis in 415 AD (both in the East). Pope Innocent I excommunicated Pelagius in 417 AD, but Pope Zosimus lifted the ban. He reinstated it in 418 AD. Popes Boniface and Sixtus III rejected appeals from Pelagian supporters to have him reinstated. In addition to his excommunication, two councils in Africa condemned him in 416 AD on the basis of his book on free will. He was also barred from Palestine by a synod in Antioch in 424 AD. See Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, eds., “Excursus on Pelagianism,” The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church, NPNF2 14 (1900; repr., Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 230; Earle E. Cairns and J.D. Douglas, The New International Dictionary of the Christian Church (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1978), 761. For summaries of Pelagius’s doctrine, see R.C. Sproul, Willing to Believe: The Controversy over Free Will (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1997), 33–48; Lutzer, The Doctrines that Divide, 153–62. William G.T. Shedd summarizes Pelagius’ theology: “At birth, each man’s physical nature is liable to disease and death, as was Adam’s at creation; and, at birth, each man’s voluntary faculty, like Adam’s at creation, is undetermined either to sin or holiness. Being thus characterless, with a will undecided either for good or evil, and not in the least affected by Adam’s apostasy, each individual man, after birth, commences his own voluntariness, originates his own character, and decides his own destiny, by the choice of either right or wrong.” William G.T. Shedd, A History of Christian Doctrine (New York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1863), 2:94. 14 See Peter Robert Lamont Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 400–10; Eugene TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Pub., 2002), 176–82. Augustine notices his own shift in the articulation of his position in The Retractions, trans. Sister Mary Inez Bogan, vol. 60, The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1968), 96–100 (§1.22.2–4). 15 Augustine, “Miscellany of Questions in Response to Simplician,” in Responses to Miscellaneous Questions, trans. Boniface Ramsey, vol. 1, no. 12, The Works of Saint Augustine (Brooklyn, NY: New City Press, 2008), 189 (§2.5).

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fall, all men are sinners born into the same lump of fallen humanity, therefore deserving of condemnation.16 He explains: Owing to one man all pass into condemnation who are born in Adam unless they are born again in Christ, even as He has appointed them to be regenerated, before they die in the body, whom He predestined to everlasting life, as the most merciful bestower of grace; whilst to those whom He has predestined to eternal death, He is also the most righteous awarder of punishment, not only on account of the sins which they add in the indulgence of their own will, but also because of their original sin, even if, as in the case of infants, they add nothing thereto.17

For Augustine, the purpose of discussing the decrees of God is to properly establish the fact that he is the first cause (and better yet, the ultimate cause) of all things, even with respect to sin. “As the supreme good, He made good use of evil deeds, for the damnation of those whom He had justly predestined to punishment and for the salvation of those whom He had mercifully predestined to grace.”18 He believed that God’s predestination has been done in eternity past, without deference to anything foreseen in man, for both the elect and the non-elect. In this respect he was the first to articulate not only unconditional election, but also unconditional reprobation. Augustine had a form of double predestination that was oftentimes stronger or even more symmetrical than that of the later Re-

16 Augustine even goes so far as to say that infants who die unbaptized are still condemned because of original sin. See Augustine and Landes, Augustine on Romans: Propositions from the Epistle to the Romans, Unfinished Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, ECL 6 (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982). It has long been an accusation that those who subscribe to the doctrine of reprobation believe all infants go to hell. This accusation stems from the Reformers’ dependence on Augustine here. However, neither Augustine nor the Reformers taught that all infants go to hell. Rather, they taught that all infants deserve hell and are not blameless, on account of original sin. The Synod of Dort addressed this accusation, clarifying the claim that reprobation teaches all infants go to hell. The Canons state in Article 17, “Since we are to judge of the will of God from His Word which testifies that children believers are holy, not by nature, but by virtue of the covenant of grace, in which they, together with their parents, are comprehended, godly parents have no reason to doubt of the election and salvation of their children whom it pleaseth God to call out of this life in their infancy.” Beeke and Ferguson, “Canons of Dort (1619),” in Reformed Confessions Harmonized, 33. At the same time, the same also rejected “that God, by a mere arbitrary act of His will, without the least respect or view to any sin, has predestined the greatest part of the world to eternal damnation; and has created them for this very purpose; that in the same manner in which the election is the fountain and cause of faith and good works, reprobation is the cause of unbelief and impiety[…]and many other things of the same kind which the Reformed Churches not only do not acknowledge, but even detest with their whole soul.” Ibid., 63. 17 Augustine, “On the Soul and Its Origin,” NPNF1 5, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis (1887; repr., Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999), 361. 18 Augustine, “Enchiridion,” NPNF1 3, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis (1887; repr., Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999), 100.

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formers. His placement of the attributes of God’s mercy and justice as parallel acts was the leading cause for this conclusion: The human race is so apportioned that in some is displayed the efficacy of merciful grace, in the rest the efficacy of just retribution. For both could not be displayed in all; for if all had remained under the punishment of just condemnation, there would have been seen in no one the mercy of redeeming grace. And, on the other hand, if all had been transferred from darkness to light, the severity of retribution would have been manifested in none.19

However, Augustine shows that the two acts are distinct, in that they do not occur in the same way. Predestination to eternal life is an act entirely of grace and predestination to eternal death is an act of justice according to human sin. Augustine shows that God’s sovereign choice in choosing the non-elect for damnation parallels God’s choosing the elect for salvation. However, he also distinguishes between the attributes displayed through each, hinting at a degree of unequal ultimacy. In some the will is prepared by the Lord, in others it is not prepared, we must assuredly be able to distinguish what comes from God’s mercy, and what from His judgment[…] Therefore mercy and judgment are manifested in the very wills themselves […] Therefore the mercy by which He freely delivers, and the truth by which He righteously judges, are equally unsearchable.20

Although Augustine did not have the opportunity to clarify his statements, given that further objections were developed by later generations, his statements indicate that he attributes predestination entirely to God. For the elect and nonelect, however, two distinct means or attributes are expressly manifest: mercy and justice. That is to say, God’s basis for election is not a matter of justice and God’s basis for damnation is not a matter of mercy. Augustine also attributes the origin of God’s decree to God’s sovereign and uninfluenced will. He explains how the withholding of God’s regenerating work producing faith is an expression that it is His will for the non-elect to be reserved unto judgment. He explains, Faith, then, as well in its beginnings as in its completion, is God’s gift; and let no one have any doubt whatever, unless he desires to resist the plainest sacred writings, that this gift is given to some, while to some it is not given. But why is it not given to all ought not to disturb the believer, who believes that from one all have gone into condemnation,

19 Augustine, “City of God,” NPNF1 2, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Marcus Dods (1887; repr., Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999), 463. 20 Augustine, “On the Predestination of the Saints,” NPNF1 5, ed. Philip Schaff, trans. Peter Holmes, Robert Ernest Wallis, revised by Benjamin B. Warfield (1887; repr., Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999), 503–4.

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which undoubtedly is most righteous; so that even if none were delivered therefrom, there would be no just cause for finding fault with God.21

What can be seen in Augustine is the beginnings of almost every major development of the doctrine of reprobation. In virtually every case, Augustine makes his conclusions regarding the plan of God for the non-elect based on his understanding of original sin and the sovereignty of God in predestination from Romans 9. First, Augustine taught unconditional election and reprobation. Second, he taught that the execution of reprobation was to display God’s justice and always took man’s sin into account. Third, he taught that God uses means to bring about his decree of reprobation (i. e., withholding faith). And finally, he taught that God is not the chargeable cause of sin. This has led many scholars to conclude, with David Steele and Curtis Thomas, that, “The basic doctrines of the Calvinistic position had been vigorously defended by Augustine against Pelagius during the fifth century.”22 Thus C. Gregg Singer was right to conclude, “The main features of Calvin’s theology are found in the writings of St. Augustine to such an extent that many theologians regard Calvinism as a more fully developed form of Augustinianism.”23 Augustine came to his conclusions not merely in defending an abstract doctrine such as original sin or predestination against Pelagius, but through the convictions that come through Studying God’s Word. However, that conflict was a means to sharpen him and refine his thinking, as Augustine was committed to the authority of Scripture above all else. Spurgeon comments on this, stating, “Augustine obtained his views, without doubt, through the Spirit of God, from the diligent study of the writings of Paul, and Paul received them of the Holy Ghost, from Jesus Christ.”24

21 Augustine, “On the Predestination of the Saints,” 506. 22 David N. Steele and Curtis C. Thomas, The Five Points of Calvinism (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 1963), 19. While Calvin and Calvinism are used by many people as synonymous for predestination, Calvinist and Arminian scholars agree, “John Calvin did not originate the doctrines that bear his name.” Laurence M. Vance, The Other Side of Calvinism, rev. ed. (Pensacola, FL: Vance Publications, 1999), 37. Furthermore, B.B. Warfield stated, “The system of doctrine taught by Calvin is just the Augustinianism common to the whole body of the Reformers.” Benjamin B. Warfield, Calvin and Augustine, ed. Samuel G. Craig (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 1956), 22. Spurgeon stated, “[P]erhaps Calvin himself derived it mainly from the writings of Augustine.” Charles Haddon Spurgeon, ed., “Exposition of the Doctrines of Grace” in Metropolitan Tabernacle Pulpit (1861; repr., Pasadena, TX: Pilgrim Publications,1995), 7:298. And Alvin L. Baker stated, “There is hardly a doctrine of Calvin that does not bear the marks of Augustine’s influence.” Alvin L. Baker, Berkouwer’s Doctrine of Election: Balance or Imbalance? (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 1981), 25. 23 C. Gregg Singer, John Calvin: His Roots and Fruits (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1989), vii. 24 Spurgeon, “Exposition of the Doctrines of Grace,” 7:298.

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Prosper of Aquitaine (390–455 AD) Prosper of Aquitaine was trained by Augustine and was ultimately left to defend Augustinian doctrine against Pelagianism’s doctrinal derivative: Semi-Pelagianism. Semi-Pelagianism arose after Pelagianism was condemned at the Council of Carthage in 318 AD and again at the Council of Ephesus in 431 AD. Prosper, like his mentor Augustine, believed salvation was either entirely of God or entirely of man, but not in between. Thus, for Prosper, Semi-Pelagianism was not a sufficient solution to the problems of Pelagianism nor its denial of original sin and predestination. He critiqued the Semi-Pelagian position stating, “The alliance between the two which your new system advocates does not reconcile them in any way; it unduly presents the Catholic position as wrong and the Pelagian one as correct.”25 The Semi-Pelagian argument was that predestination unto condemnation ultimately was predestination to sin. In response, Prosper defended the Augustinian doctrine of reprobation, but he did so by diffusing Augustine’s unconditional nature of God’s decree, introducing the concept of foreknowledge of sin into the discussion of reprobation. Prosper, building upon Augustine, asserted that such foreknowledge was not based on what man would do, as the Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian held, but a foreknowledge of God’s own actions in the matter ( just as it was in election).26 The actions of God were based on either mercy or justice; human works (for good or bad) were never the cause of predestination but its effect, according to Prosper. Like many who would come after him, and like Augustine who preceeded him, Prosper answered the Semi-Pelagian argument with the compatibilist view of the will. According to this view, the will of the reprobate is still active in rejecting God, which is in their nature to do, and it is God’s restoration of the will by grace that leads to the salvation of the elect.27 Prosper affirms the double decree of God in election and reprobation, as Augustine did, but he does so in a slightly moderated way. Prosper agrees with

25 Prosper of Aquitaine, “On Grace and Free Will, Against Cassian the Lecturer,” in Defense of St. Augustine, trans. P. de Letter S. J. (New York: Newman Press, 1963), 81. 26 “The divine election is based on grace, not on merits.” Prosper of Aquitaine, “Answers to the Extracts of the Genoese,” in Defense of St. Augustine, trans. P. de Letter S.J. (New York: Newman Press., 1963), 54. 27 “For, although it lies in man’s power to reject what is good, yet unless it is given him, he is unable by himself to choose this good. The power to do the former was contracted by our nature with original sin; but nature has to receive the ability to do the latter from grace.” St. Prosper of Aquitaine, The Call of All Nations, ed. Johannes Quasten and Joseph C. Plumpe (London: The Newman Press, 1952), 87. Aquitaine, “Answers to the Extracts of the Genoese,” 55.

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Augustine that it is “grace that differentiates a believer from an unbeliever.”28 He agrees that the unconditional election of God involves choosing persons out of the mass of condemnation, while also leaving others under it. He affirms God’s involvement as the one who “opens the hearts of the first and closes the hearts of the second,” further stressing the meticulous sovereignty of God, in that, “all things are ordained by God’s decree”—including election and reprobation.29 Like Augustine, he affirms God’s unequal involvement in bringing both election and reprobation to pass, stating, “Both God’s mercy and His justice are operative in the very wills of men.”30 Yet, there are several modifications or concessions Prosper was willing to make which distinguished him from Augustine. First, Prosper does not state that salvation and reprobation are equal. Although predestination to life (election) is always unconditional, as it was for Augustine, predestination unto death (reprobation) is conditioned upon foreseen sin.31 A second difference is that Prosper does not grant assurance to believers based on election. Like Augustine, he rests the decision of election and reprobation in the hidden will of God.32 But unlike Augustine, Prosper determined that this meant believers were to examine their lives for fruit as evidence of their election. To believers, Prosper insists, “Trust that you are not excluded from the number of the predestined who are His people, because it is He Himself who gives you the grace to make this prayer. God forbid that you should despair of your salvation, for you are commanded to place your hope in Him, not in yourselves.”33 Ultimately, like Augustine, Prosper attributed his understanding of predestination to a proper hermeneutic. He explained, “Our opponents say this on the strength of some texts of Holy Scripture, but they do not explain these texts in the proper way.”34 He then at length proceeds to demonstrate his exegetical method 28 Aquitaine, “Answers to the Extracts of the Genoese,” 55. 29 Prosper of Aquitaine, “Letter to Rufinus,” in Defense of St. Augustine, trans. P. de Letter S. J. (New York: Newman Press., 1963), 36. 30 Aquitaine, “Answers to the Extracts of the Genoese,” 54. 31 When understanding this slight clarification in Prosper it is important to remember that “foreseen” in the mind of Prosper and Augustine is not foresight of man’s actions, but God’s actions. From this Prosper could easily be said to be infralapsarian. Like Augustine, he also draws his conclusion from his robust understanding of original sin. “But all have sinned in one: in punishment of Adam’s sin the whole race was condemned. Therefore, all have lost what Adam lost. He lost faith in the first place; and if faith is the first gift we all lost, it is also the first gift we have to receive it again.” Aquitaine, “Answers to the Extracts of the Genoese,” 53. Therefore the federal headship of Adam necessitates the imputed guilt of Adamic sin, which includes unbelief. 32 “There is no end to discussions in either camp so long as they make no distinction between what can be known and what remains hidden.” Aquitaine, The Call of All Nations, 26. 33 Aquitaine, “Answers to the Extracts of the Genoese,” 67. 34 Aquitaine, “Letter to Rufinus,” 25.

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in comparing Scripture with Scripture. He also shows how there can be no contradictions when an exegetical conclusion is reached if a non-contradictory conclusion satisfies the exegetical information.35

Lucidus (473 AD) The position of Lucidus is difficult to surmise because his works have been lost. What is known about his significance comes from the Council of Arles in 473 AD, located south of Roman Gaul (modern France). His view of predestination was brought before this council based on the accusations of Faustus of Reiz. Although little is known about the doctrinal stance of Lucidius from his own words, much may be determined from those who presided over the council. Faustus had many complaints against Lucidus, but those most pertinent were leveled against Lucidius in the form of anathemas, chiefly, the third and fourth anathemas. The third anathema was charged against Lucidius’ stance that God predestines some men to sin and eternal death. The fourth anathema was charged for his stance that God does not grant all men the means of salvation. Furthermore, Faustus condemned Lucidus’ interpretation of Romans 9. By all accounts, Faustus and the Catholics of southern Gaul were not merely critical of Lucidus, but also Augustine, on the matter of predestination.36 Some have un-

35 Matthew J. Pereira agrees that Prosper believed the exegetical method was the grounds for his conclusions on predestination: “Prosper of Aquitaine’s letter addressed to Rufinus reveals his confidence in biblical exegesis, and it underscores the importance of interpretation in the predestination debates. Prosper explained to his trusted confidant that the controversy was the consequence of defective biblical exegesis. He declared that his adversaries had transgressed one of his hermeneutical rules, which stated that biblical passages deemed vulnerable to varied theological conclusions could not be justifiably employed to prove the theological truths of another scriptural reference. In other words, he contended that a proposition was only valid when the biblical passage under investigation could not be reinterpreted in any other possible direction that con¯icted with the original hypothesis.” Pereira, “Augustine, Pelagius and the Southern Gallic Tradition: Faustus of Riez’s De Gratia Dei,” in Grace for Grace: The Debates After Augustine and Pelagius, ed. Alexander Y. Hwang, Brian Matz, and Augustine Casiday (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2014), 181. 36 Therefore, it is important to suspend judgment as to Lucidus’ own position. “We should take into account that all the available documents concerning Lucidus’ affair only describe the priest’s teaching from the point of view of his adversaries[…]We should also consider that these documents only present Lucidus’ views on grace and predestination under the form of short sentences extracted from the full context of the priest’s teaching. In fact these sentences offer a version of predestinationism which is exactly the same than that attributed to Augustine by some south-Gallic ecclesiastical and monastic circles since before Augustine’s death and shortly afterwards.” Rau´l Villegas Mari´n, “Lucidus on Predestination: The Damnation of Augustine’s Predestinationism in the Synods of Arles (473) and Lyons (474),” in Papers presented at the Fifteenth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in

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derstood the council’s judgment to mean that Lucidus was more extreme than Augustine (which, if true, may set Lucidus as the first proponent of what would later be called “hyper-Calvinism”).37 However, it appears that the Council of Arles, and Faustus in particular, were rejecting something specifically taught by Augustine. One of Faustus’ verdicts stated, “Anathema to those who say it is by means of God’s foreknowledge that man is thrust down into death.”38 Because of this statement, many have concluded that Lucidus was Augustinian and that the Council of Arles reflects the spread of Semi-Pelagianism in southern Gaul. After all, monks in southern Gaul were already at odds when Augustine and Prosper’s doctrines were recognized as the standard of orthodoxy. This led to a distinct Semi-Pelagian doctrine of grace, which was far different from that of Augustine. Tomas Smith concludes: De gratia, therefore, represents Faustus’s theological exposition of two episcopal synods’ deliberations. Despite any idiosyncrasies that the work may possess, it is essentially the portrait of what one must regard the mainstream, centrist doctrine of grace in southern Gaul in the latter fifth century.39

One of the strongest accusations leveled against Lucidus was based on his interpretation of Romans 9:20–23, which served as his defense for teaching election and reprobation. Lucidus stated, “Anathema to him who said that it is not possible to raise a vessel unto indignity, while [there be] a vessel unto honor.”40 It can be recognized, based on this pronouncement, that the unconditional nature of the choice of God was the concept rejected by most Semi-Pelagians, just as it was at the time of Augustine.41 Thus, the Council of Arles leaves the student of

37

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39 40 41

Oxford 2007, ed. J. Baun, A. Cameron, M. Edwards, and M. Vinzent, Studia Patristica 44 (Walpole, MA: Peeters, 2010), 164–65. Some have interpreted the records of Faustus at the Council of Arles to mean that Lucidus was more extreme than Augustine. Rebecca Harden Weaver concludes, “[T]he Council of Arles in 473 was thus rejecting the manifestation of Augustinianism that was in some respects a significant departure from the teachings of both Augustine and Prosper.” Rebecca Harden Weaver, Divine Grace and Human Agency: A Study of the Semi-Pelagian Controversy (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1996), 163. Translations will all be my own unless otherwise noted. “Anathema illi, qui per Dei praescientiam hominem deprimi in mortem dixerit.” Faustus of Riez, “Epistula 1,” in Fausti Reiensis Praeter Sermons Pseudo-Eusebianos, ed. Augustus Engelbrecht, CSEL 21 (De Gruyter: Berlin, 1891), 162. Tomas A. Smith, De Gratia: Faustus of Riez’s Treatise on Grace and Its Place in the History of Teology, ed. Charles Kannengiesser, CJA 4 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 59. “Anathema illi, qui dixerit, quod uas in contumeliam non possit adsurgere, ut sit uas in honorem.” Faustus of Riez, “Epistula 1,” 162. Mari´n notes, “We must remember that Augustine’s critics rejected his exegesis of this Pauline passage because they considered it depriving some men of hope of salvation.” Marín, “Lucidus on Predestination,” 165.

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history with only one of two possible conclusions: either Lucidus was teaching a form of equal ultimacy due to a poor articulation of his views, or Semi-Pelagianism was on the rise to such an degree that this council was the first to officially deny Augustinian orthodoxy. As Matthew Pereira notes, Augustine diligently collated the Scriptures into an anthology of theological proof-texts largely derived from the Pauline epistles.[…]In Faustus’s reassessment of biblical passages pertaining to divine sovereignty, he effectively transformed the theological import so that these Scriptures were aligned with the Gallic doctrines of creation, anthropology, sin, and salvation. In a virtuoso display of interpretation, Faustus recasts the theological meaning of Augustine’s favored predestinarian biblical texts, which had traditionally challenged the ascetical theology of the doctores Gallicani.42

Many have observed the biased nature of the Gallic monks toward Semi-Pelagianism and their refusal to embrace Augustinian orthodoxy. Therefore, based on the evidence, it appears that Lucidus taught Augustinian predestination while the Council of Arles rejected it.43

42 Pereira, “Augustine, Pelagius and the Southern Gallic Tradition: Faustus of Riez’s De Gratia Dei,” 186. 43 “The depiction of Lucidus as a spokesman of an extreme form of predestinationism, a pupil who would have distorted the teachings of his master, should be reconsidered. If Lucidus really held the ideas that Faustus attributed to him in his writings, then the priest would have learnt his theories not from Augustine’s writings, but from certain opuscula written with the aim of discrediting Augustinian theology on grace and predestination. It seems to us that what Lucidus probably defended in his discussions with Faustus was, in fact, pure Augustinian thought.” Mari´n, “Lucidus on Predestination,”167.

Chapter Two: The Middle Ages and Reprobation

Early Middle Ages (476–799 AD) When evaluating the early Middle Ages, one must give careful consideration to the Church’s view of both Scripture and ecclesiastical authority. By this time, the entire canon had been affirmed; the Council of Hippo (393 AD) recognized the twenty-seven books of the New Testament, and the Council of Carthage (397 AD) maintained that only those canonical books were to be taught.1 However, there was still much confusion regarding the authority of the councils and Church Fathers. “In the fifth and sixth centuries, the con¯ict over the doctrine of predestination was simultaneously a debate over con¯icting evaluations of the Church Fathers and competing approaches to biblical exegesis.”2 The debate, then, on predestination followed the cultural importance for teachers to align themselves with the teachings and wisdom of the early church.

Fulgentius of Ruspe (467–533 AD) Fulgentius of Ruspe was the bishop of Ruspe, located in North Africa, in the fifth and sixth centuries. During the time of Fulgentius, Semi-Pelagianism had become commonplace; it was not only regarded as orthodox by many Catholics, but it had become a position of great popularity. The same misrepresentations of Augustine’s position (which haunted Prosper) were still in vogue––the SemiPelagian argument that reprobation made God the chargeable cause for human sin.3 Following the footsteps of those who came before him, Fulgentius presented

1 Revelation was added in 419 at the subsequent synod of Carthage. See F.F. Bruce, The Canon of Scripture (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1988) 230. 2 Pereira, “Augustine, Pelagius and the Southern Gallic Tradition,” 181. 3 Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 16.

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and defended the Augustinian position on predestination from Romans 9. For example: Esau himself was also circumcised in the flesh, nonetheless he was not removed from the lump of perdition by the gift of divine love and election[…]Therefore, before the world even existed, God hated the earthly man’s iniquity that remained in Esau, and he justly relegated Esau to punishment. Moreover, in Esau’s brother God did not foreknow any good works that might issue from the man and lead God to choose and love him.4

Like Augustine, Fulgentius presented unconditional election while simultaneously presenting unconditional reprobation.5 He believed that unconditional reprobation does not represent predestination to sin, nor an unjust punishment by God, because justice is delivered based on merit. He writes: Next, there is no doubt that in these two brothers a figure of two groups of people has been established, one group to be saved, the other to be condemned. Yet salvation is not thus bestowed on the former group because of works, just as condemnation is not rendered to the latter because of works. But one group received the gift of saving grace, which it did not deserve, and the other received the destruction of just condemnation according to its merit.6

Reprobation is simply the choice of God to leave, out of the mass of humanity, certain individuals to be the recipients of his justice. Their assignment to justice was not on the basis of God foreseeing their works, although the execution of his justice is in accordance with their works. Furthermore: Therefore, no one is distinguished from that condemned lump on the basis of the foreknowledge of future works, but one is separated out on the basis of the compassionate potter’s help and work. For this reason, vessels of mercy (which, although they are from the same lump, are freely made into vessels for honor) are set apart from the vessels of wrath (which were created for dishonor).7

4 Fulgentius of Ruspe, “The Truth about Predestination and Grace,” in Fulgentius of Ruspe and The Scythian Monks: Correspondence on Christology and Grace, trans. Rob Roy McGregor and Donald Fairbairn, FC 126 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2013), 129. 5 Demonstrating God’s unconditional choice in the matter of election and reprobation, Fulgentius writes, “Therefore, apart from remembering works, God offers no other reason why he loved one of the twin brothers and hated the other, except so that we might recognize through their common bond of conception and birth, constituting them as brothers, that each one is by equal merit bound into the lump of condemnation, and so that merciful goodness might freely distinguish one of them from that lump, and so that God’s just severity might not be unjust in leaving the other one in that lump.” Fulgentius of Ruspe, “The Truth about Predestination and Grace,” 128. 6 Fulgentius of Ruspe, “The Truth about Predestination and Grace,” 130–31. 7 Fulgentius of Ruspe, “The Truth about Predestination and Grace,” 126.

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The Second Council of Orange (529 AD) Semi-Pelagianism from southern Gaul at the time of Lucidus had risen in popularity to such an extent that the church gathered to determine whether or not it was to be allowed to continue in the realm of Christian orthodoxy. Pelagianism, condemned at the Council of Carthage in 418 AD and again at the Council of Ephesus in 431 AD, had long since been addressed.8 The Council of Orange then became the first major church council to convene regarding the matter of the will and salvation of man. Therefore, it stands as a critical council in that respect. The Reformers often cited the Council of Orange as proof that the Roman Church had abandoned and contradicted itself regarding the authority of the church. The Semi-Pelagian argument against predestination was chiefly dependent on a libertarian view of free will, which likewise was used to deny the choice of God in reprobation. The Council established a monergistic understanding of compatibilism when it came to the will of men who are saved. Canons 5 and 6 read as follows: Can. 5. If anyone says, that just as the increase [of faith] so also the beginning of faith and the very desire of credulity, by which we believe in Him who justifies the impious, and [by which] we arrive at the regeneration of holy baptism [is] not through the gift of grace, that is, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit reforming our will from infidelity to faith, from impiety to piety, but is natural to us, he is proved [to be] antagonistic to the doctrine of the Apostles, since blessed Paul says: We trust, that he who begins a good work in us, will perfect it unto the day of Christ Jesus [Phil 1:6]; and the following: It was given to you for Christ not only that you may believe in Him, but also, that you may suffer for Him [Phil 1:29]; and: By grace you are made safe through faith, and this not of yourselves; for it is the gift of God [Eph 2:8]. For those who say that faith, by which we believe in God, is natural, declare that all those who are alien to the Church of Christ are in a measure faithful. [cf. St. Augustine]. Can. 6. If anyone asserts that without the grace of God mercy is divinely given to us when we believe, will, desire, try, labor, pray, watch, study, seek, ask, urge, but does not confess that through the infusion and the inspiration of the Holy Spirit in us, it is brought about that we believe, wish, or are able to do all things as we ought, and does not join either to human humility or obedience the help of grace, nor agree that it is the gift of His grace that we are obedient and humble, opposes the Apostle who says: What have you, that you have not received? [1 Cor 4:7]; and: By the grace of God I am that, which I am [1 Cor 15:10; cf. St. Augustine and St. Prosper of Aquitaine].9 8 William L. Reese, Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion: Eastern and Western Thought (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1980), 421. 9 Henry Denzinger, The Sources of Catholic Dogma, trans. Roy J. Deferrari (1954; repr., Fitzwilliam, NH: Loreto Publications, 2002), 76. Furthermore in the conclusion, “[W]e ought to proclaim and to believe that through the sin of the first man free will was so changed and so weakened that afterwards no one could either love God as he ought, or believe in God, or

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Some have understood the council’s silence on the matter of predestination as a “softening” of Augustine’s doctrine.10 Others have believed it to affirm what would later be the Arminian doctrine of prevenient grace, since the council did not appear to affirm irresistible grace.11 However, both of these conclusions are highly unlikely, considering the council was not gathered to discuss predestination in particular, but rather the monergistic work of God in regeneration (as opposed to a synergistic understanding of salvation). The Council of Orange was consciously affirmative of the tradition from Augustine to Prosper, Lucidus, and Fulgentius.12 Also, the council likewise affirmed that God’s decree of reprobation does not mean God predestines men to evil or sin. This misrepresentation of Augustine’s teaching on reprobation was a major point of contention raised against all four men, which the Council of Orange likewise rejected, stating, “We not only do not believe that some have been truly predestined to evil by divine power, but also with every execration we pronounce anathema upon those, if there are [any such], who wish to believe so great an evil.”13 The significance of the Second Council of Orange is that it establishes the monergistic compatibilist understanding of the human will. It denies an equal ultimacy understanding of predestination. It affirms the free election of God whose grace, not foresight, is the primary cause of salvation. This understanding of compatibilism is what will later become a linchpin in a proper explanation of reprobation.

Isidore of Seville (560–636 AD) An observation of history up to this point in time reveals a spectrum of perspectives representing double predestination, ranging from Augustine (who held a more active form) to Fulgentius (who held a more passive form). However, it

10 11

12 13

perform what is good on account of God, unless the grace of divine mercy reached him first.” Ibid., 80. Schaff, History of the Christian Church, 3:746. Francis Oakley, The Medieval Experience: Foundations of Western Cultural Singularity (University of Toronto Press, 1988), 64. Roger E. Olson, Arminian Theology: Myths and Realities (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 81; Keith D. Stanglin and Thomas H. McCall, Jacob Arminius: Theologian of Grace (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 153. Not only do both of these sources assume an Arminian victory from utter silence, they do not take into account that Luther, Calvin, and all the Reformers used it as a proof for their position as opposed to Rome and all forms of synergism. Schaff, History of the Christian Church, 3:746. This is a denial of equal ultimacy double predestination. See Denzinger, The Sources of Catholic Dogma, 81. The positions at the Second Council of Orange were affirmed as the official Catholic position by Boniface II (see pp. 81–83).

High Middle Ages (800–1299 AD)

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appears that in the course of time, the first use of the actual phrase “double predestination” was by Isidore of Seville. Seville was the capital of Spain and one of its largest cities for over thirty years. His Sententiarum libri tres (“Three Books of Sentences”) was the first major manual of doctrine in the church.14 In it, he claimed not only a double predestination, but also that the reprobate were predestined to punishment and judgment (although not to sin in particular). For example he stated, “There is a double predestination, of the elect to life, or the reprobate to death. Both are treated with divine justice.”15 This second phrase shows that he, like others before him, believed reprobation to be a predestination unto justice and not unto sin. Furthermore, it demonstrates that “reprobation” (reproborum) and “election” (electorum) were in use as technical terms for the elect and reprobate by this time in history.

High Middle Ages (800–1299 AD) The High Middle Ages is a period in church history in which much was written concerning predestination. Like the early Middle Ages, there was still a commitment to Scripture, as well as the struggle to prove a consensus among the Church Fathers. The church was often concerned with harmonization not only of the Biblical text, but also of the Church Fathers. However, one unique element that begins in the High Middle Ages is that there are more appeals to philosophy and logic to help explain more difficult elements of a given doctrine derived from Scripture. While it was not done at the expense of Scripture or to undermine the Church Fathers, there seems to be a noticeable trend towards explanations in greater detail and with more precise terminology than previous generations had utilized. In this period, the prominent writers on predestination are the following: Gottschalk of Orbais, Anselm of Canterbury, Peter Lombard, Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas.

14 For more on the life of Seville, see John Henderson, The Medieval World of Isidore of Seville: Truth from Words (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 15 The entire context can be found here: “Gemina est praedestinatio, sive electorum ad requiem, sive reproborum ad mortem. Utraque divino agitur judicio, ut semper electos superna et interiora sequi faciat, semperque reprobos ut infimis et exterioribus delectentur deserendo permittat.” Sancti Isidori Hispalensis, Sententiarum libri tres, ed. and comp. Jacques Paul Migne, PL 83 (Parisiis: Excudebat Migne, 1862), 606.

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Gottschalk of Orbais (803–869 AD) Gottschalk of Orbais was a Saxon theologian and one of the largest figures in the Middle Ages to write extensively on predestination, in particular, double predestination. His writings started a major controversy which led the Roman Catholics to incarcerate, flog, and officially silence him. Gottschalk wrote two catechisms on the doctrine of predestination which earned him widespread popularity, especially among those who supported and espoused Augustine’s views on the matter.16 Although the sum of Gottschalk’s writings have been lost, the majority of his views were preserved in his various letters and catechisms, most notably, his Longer Catechism. However, a few important elements of the teachings of Gottschalk can be observed. Gottschalk’s understanding of predestination was a derivative of his theology proper. Unlike Augustine, whose argument for reprobation was consequent to his doctrine of federal headship and original sin, Gottschalk argued specifically from the immutable sovereignty of God. For example, a twofold decree of God for reprobation and election was fixed on the character of God before time began, according to Gottschalk: I believe and confess that the omnipotent and immutable God has gratuitously foreknown and predestined the holy angels and elect human beings to eternal life, and that he equally predestined the devil himself, the head of all demons, with all of his apostate angels and also with all reprobate human beings, namely, his members, to rightly eternal death, on account of their own future, most certainly foreknown evil merits, through his most righteous judgment.17

16 Gottschalk of Orbais, Gottschalk and a Medieval Predestination Controversy: Texts Translated from the Latin, ed. and trans. Victor Genke and Francis X. Gumerlock (Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2010). “At that time, it seems, the charismatic preacher from Saxony reached the climax of popularity; his teaching spread not only in Italy, but also in the realm of Louis the German.” Ibid., 29. The first opposition to Gottschalk came from Rabanus Marus, where Gottschalk was called to give an account for his teaching on predestination. “The confidence with which Gottschalk went to Mainz shows that he was altogether convinced that his ideas were orthodox, and he attacked rather than defended himself.” Ibid., 30. However, when Gottschalk would later be required to give account for his teachings on predestination, he, at length, quoted from Augustine, Ambrose, Gregory the Great, Fulgentius, and Isidore, to name a few. 17 Gottschalk of Orbais, Gottschalk and a Medieval Predestination Controversy, 71. Like Augustine, Gottschalk’s use of foreknowledge is synonymous, he in many places stresses the simultaneousness of the knowledge of God and his decrees: “Therefore, as I have already said, both are true, that is, that the reprobate have been condemned by foreknowledge and by predestination, whom it is absolutely clear were justly predestined to destruction.” Ibid., 82.

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Yet, Gottschalk’s belief in “equal” predestination is not to be misunderstood as teaching “equal ultimacy.”18 Rather, what is meant by Gottschalk is that God had one predestination, of which both election and reprobation were equal parts. That is to say, they were two elements of God’s one plan for all human destiny. He states, “Predestination is said to be twofold so that there are not by any means said to be two predestinations, but one.”19 It is important to note that Gottschalk did not believe in an arbitrary damnation for the reprobate; it was always based on the justice of God and the evil works or merit of the wicked. He rightly clarifies a common misunderstanding: that God’s predestination of the judgment of the wicked is not arbitrary, but is a matter of strict justice on account of their evil merits: The immortal, eternal, and immutable God did not create the angels, whom he nonetheless foreknew were going to be apostates and deserters, or also human beings, whom he likewise foreknew would be perpetually reprobate, in order that they would sin against God and abandon him. But those whom he foreknew were going to fall and persevere in evil through their own wrong doing and outrage, offense and vice, he of course rightly predestined through just judgment.20

Gottschalk uses foreknowledge and predestination interchangeably––he is not teaching prescient foreknowledge. Nevertheless, he maintains the holiness of God by stating that reprobation takes into consideration the fallen state of mankind on account of “their own wrong doing.” This shows that Gottschalk’s reprobation hinged on a thorough understanding of man’s depravity and culpability. He further maintains human culpability and God’s holiness when he states, “[…]hardening, abandoning, and consequently condemning whomever he wills with no injustice, but certainly with highest fairness, as befits a just judge, bestowing grace on the elect and rendering justice, judgment, and punishment to the reprobate.”21 Thus, Gottschalk maintains the holiness of God by asserting condemnation of the wicked on account of their sin and justice for the wicked on account of his decree of reprobation. Like others before him, Gottschalk could have benefited from explaining reprobation by means of secondary causality, a doctrine which remained undeveloped until years later. This would have allowed him to refute those who believed he was teaching the idea that God predestines men to hell without respect to sin or any other consideration. 18 “Although he was suspected of teaching predestination to evil, Gottschalk did not hold such an extreme position. He agreed with his opponents that God foreknew both good and evil, but only predestined only the good.” Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 19. 19 Gottschalk of Orbais, Gottschalk and a Medieval Predestination Controversy, 55. 20 Gottschalk of Orbais, Gottschalk and a Medieval Predestination Controversy, 56. 21 Gottschalk of Orbais, Gottschalk and a Medieval Predestination Controversy, 57.

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When Gottschalk was on trial in 848 AD at Mainz and in 849 AD at Quierzy, he brought with him a plethora of scriptural proofs and citations of patristic fathers as proof that his views were orthodox.22 By quoting from the most respected Church fathers, Gottschalk aligned himself with men that others would not be able to openly deny. For example, no one argues that he misunderstood Augustine or those who followed him. Because of this, those who eventually flogged, isolated, and silenced Gottschalk disagreed with him, but not with any of the proofs he provided. Based on several accounts, he was forced to burn his works and receive public punishment. It is left a mystery whether it was his doctrine, his life, or his conduct that was so offensive.23

Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109 AD) Anselm was a Benedictine monk, abbot, philosopher and theologian, serving as the archbishop of Canterbury, England between 1093 AD and 1109 AD. Disliking the term “foreknowledge,” Anselm introduces some intriguing thoughts to the Church’s understanding of predestination. In his mind, the eternality and timelessness of God preclude the idea of something said to be “before” with respect to the plans of God. He stated: Since God is believed to foreknow or know all things, we are now left to consider whether His knowledge derives from things or whether things derive their existence from His

22 Gottschalk of Orbais, Gottschalk and a Medieval Predestination Controversy, 39. 23 “Another question has not been investigated, namely, why a simple monk like Gottschalk, backed by only a few followers who were common people, would present himself before kings and archbishops and let them know that their ideas about God and the Church were nonsense, and that they were in fact heretics unless they agree with him at once.” Gottschalk, Gottschalk and a Medieval Predestination Controversy, 41. Many people have tried to reconstruct the behavior of Gottschalk. His opponents claimed he walked around naked, was possessed by a demon, he wouldn’t eat or bath himself, have all been explained by historians in many ways. For example some claim it was senile dementia or prison psychosis. Victor Grenke concludes that from his evidence it is difficult to tell if his madness was “factual or feigned.” Ibid., 43. Grenke said, “attempts to explain all this as senile dementia or prison psychosis do not seem convincing. Gottschalk wrote almost all the time that he spent at Hautvillers, and his treaties do not resemble in the least the thoughts of a feeble-minded person.” Ibid. While there may be truth to his cleanliness, it appears he did not bathe as a form or holiness code or protest to his wrongful imprisonment. The fact that most of these claims were made about him by his opponents should shed light on the falsehood of their claims––not to mention that they were said before he attended Mainz, Quierzy, or Hautvillers, and before his current existing writings were penned––prove these claims to be false. For what kind of madman could present himself before kings and magistrates with such detail or write with such excellence concerning such a difficult topic? The simple answer is, “None.”

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knowledge. For if God derives His knowledge from things, it follows that they exist prior to His knowledge and, hence, do not derive their existence from Him.24

So, like Augustine before him, he understood foreknowledge and predestination as synonymous. Anselm’s chief contribution on the matter is in respect to the philosophical questions he raises about the volition of man and the sovereignty of God. His chief work, De Concordia, uses rules of logic and deduction to establish what would be later known as compatibilism. Furthermore, he extends his logic to conclude that since all things occur by the creative power of God, even evil exists only because God wills that it exist. However, he clarifies what evil is by defining it as injustice: “For injustice is neither a quality nor an action nor a being but is only the absence of required justice and is present only in the will, where justice ought to be.”25 What characterizes the Middle Age theologians is their starting point. Like Gottschalk, who started with the immutability of God, Anselm starts with the foreknowledge of God (predestination): “God’s knowledge or foreknowledge imposes necessity on everything He knows or foreknows, then He does not freely will or cause anything (either in accordance with eternity or in accordance with a temporal mode); rather, He wills and causes everything by necessity.”26 However, God’s knowledge, which demands necessity of everything, is applied to both the elect and reprobate: Predestination can be said [to apply] not only to good men but also to evil men—even as God is said to cause (because He permits) evils which He does not cause. For He is said to harden a man when He does not soften him, and to lead him into temptation when He does not deliver him. Hence, it is not inappropriate if in this manner we say that God predestines evil men and their evil works when He does not correct them and their evil works.27

According to Anselm, although this sovereign plan of God necessitates that evil actions happen, it does not remove the volition of the creature. In fact, he goes on to explain that God’s determination of actions, including evil actions in which he chooses not to intervene, are done so concordantly with the creature’s volition. In doing this, Anselm shows that God’s plan includes the means of that plan to be carried out by the volitional agency of those creatures. “For God, who foresees that some action is going to occur voluntarily, foreknows the very fact that the will

24 Anselm of Canterbury, The Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury, trans. Jasper Hopkins and Herbert Richardson (Minneapolis, MN: The Arthur J. Banning Press, 2000), 543. 25 Anselm, The Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury, 544. 26 Anselm, The Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury, 537. 27 Anselm, The Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury, 547.

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is neither compelled nor prevented by anything. Hence, what is done voluntarily is done freely.”28 Thus, Anselm’s contribution to the development of reprobation is to introduce compatibilism as a primary means of explaining God’s plan for the wicked while preserving God’s holiness and man’s volition. While clarifications on this are more thoroughly established by Aquinas and others, Anselm makes a pivotal contribution to the matter of reprobation. Anselm was also the first to introduce a more passive role for God with respect to the predetermination of evil. He insisted that God’s choice to not correct something that is wrong, or evil, is not an evil action in and of itself.

Peter Lombard (1095–1160 AD) Peter Lombard was a scholastic theologian, Bishop of Paris, and author of the Four Books of Sentences, a textbook which became the theological standard for decades following his death. Lombard was the first to make a strict distinction between predestination and reprobation, starting a trend that many Middle Age theologians would follow. In like manner to Anselm, Lombard specifically categorizes God’s predestination of evil as a more passive action. He also shows that God is involved in preparing the judgment of the wicked, but not in the wickedness of the wicked. The reference to reprobation merely as “non-election” has been famously attributed to Lombard.29 He stated that reprobation is the “foreknowledge of the iniquity of certain people and the preparation of their damnation.”30 By defining foreknowledge and reprobation this way, Lombard drifts considerably from the Augustinian definition of these terms. For Augustine, foreknowledge was not foresight in any respect, while Lombard asserted that an element of foresight at least accounted for the wickedness of the reprobate prior to being assigned to judgment. Furthermore, he simply defines reprobation as the choosing of God not to choose certain individuals for election unto salvation––a considerable nuance to the doctrine at this time.31 Taking into account Anselm’s contribution to the discussion of God’s foreknowledge and necessity, Lombard explains how reprobation itself does not 28 Anselm, The Complete Philosophical and Theological Treatises of Anselm of Canterbury, 533. 29 Chad Van Dixhoorn, “Election” in T&T Clark Companion to Reformation Theology, ed. David M. Witford (New York: T&T Clark, 2012), 92. 30 “Praescientia iniquitatis quorundam et praeparatio damnationis eorundem.” Peter Lombard, Libri IV Sententiarum, Latin by Collegium S. Bonaventurae (Rome: Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1916), 251. 31 Lombard, Libri IV Sententiarum, 252. He also defined reprobation as God’s unwillingness to have mercy on the wicked (see pp. 253–54).

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cause evil. In so doing, he concedes that tension still exists within his own presentation of the doctrine. However, while reprobation unto damnation seems to be the foreknowledge of God in Lombard’s understanding, he goes so far as to say neither Jacob nor Esau were elect nor reprobate based on foreseen merits. This would suggest that Lombard operates on the assumption that God foresees all men in a fallen state due to Adam, which was similar to the position of Augustine. Within this framework, God’s choice to not grant them grace is his decree of reprobation, and his assigning them to judgment is based on their wickedness. In that respect, he sees a double predestination.32 When it comes to the means of reprobation, Lombard acknowledged hardening as a means that God uses. The assignment of reprobation does not take into account man’s actions (although it does take into account their sin), but hardening is a judicial means God uses towards sinners on account of their sin. Lombard’s distinction between predestination unto election and reprobation would become one of the hallmark characteristics of medieval theology. In like manner, his deeming certain elements of reprobation based on foresight had a major impact on later theologians.33 Much of his acceptance likely came from his extensive quoting of Augustine and other church fathers, although it has been noted that he selectively quoted them, leaving out areas where they present a stronger view of God’s sovereignty in reprobation.34

Alexander of Hales (1185–1245 AD) Alexander of Hales (England) was an important theologian and philosopher in the development of Scholasticism and of the Franciscan School of Theology. He was the first Franciscan friar to hold a chair in a University. Drawing from the distinctions made by Lombard, Alexander of Hales further delineated the doctrine of reprobation in his Summa Universae Theologica. He was heavily influenced by Peter Lombard, and thus used his writings as the standard book in his classes.35

32 “Praedestinatorum nullus videtur posse damnari, nec reprobborum aliquis posse salvari.” Lombard, Libri IV Sententiarum, 249. 33 “Such stress on foreknowledge allowed medieval theology to underscore human responsibility and preserve divine justice. But it ran the risk of diluting God’s sovereignty in the act of reprobation.” Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 23. 34 Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 22. 35 See Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993), 78; Christopher M. Cullen, “Alexander of Hales,” in Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 104–9. It has also been noted that Alexander misunderstood Lombard’s teachings on reprobation; see William Ockham, Pre-

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First, he distinguished where within God the power to reprobate originated. He claimed it was not in the will of God, but in his intellect or knowledge. It would appear that by making this clarification, he de-emphasized the role of causative foreknowledge in exchange for foresight, which was the trend of philosophers in this period in order to underscore human volition. Hales would also introduce a threefold system (in the form of past, present, and future) for understanding reprobation; from its conception in the intellect of God to its consummation in eternal punishment. He saw the foreknowledge of God as the basis of the former (past) and the present wickedness of man as the meritorious cause of the latter (future).36

Albert the Great (1200–1280 AD) Albert the Great (Magnus) was a German Dominican friar and Catholic bishop. Scholars have referred to him as the greatest German philosopher and theologian of the Middle Ages.37 Borrowing from Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great continued the Lombardian view of reprobation in that he understood reprobation to be the opposite of predestination (election); the threefold influence of Alexander of Hales proved to be an influence on Albert.38 He simplified Alexander’s view of the relationship between foreknowledge and reprobation by classifying it purely as God’s foresight of wickedness. Although foresight did not produce wickedness, future wickedness did become the basis upon which God prepared the damnation of the reprobate. He says: Predestination is the opposite of reprobation[…]I say [predestination and reprobation] are not subordinate to one another. But damnation is justice for the wicked[…]In respect to the condemnation of the wicked, it was necessary that He was preparing for them, in general, according to His intellect and His knowledge of their works, by destination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, trans. Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 35n2. 36 Kent Emery Jr., “Fate, Providence and Predestination in the Sapiential Project of Denys the Carthusian,” in Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern Thought, ed. Gerd Van Riel and Pieter d’Hoine (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 2014), 621–22. Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 23. 37 A. Weisheipl, “Albertus Magnus,” Dictionary of the Middle Ages, ed. Joseph Strayer (New York: Scribner, 1982), 1:129. 38 He cites Lombard to start his entire discussion on the matter of reprobation. See Albert the Great, Summa Theologiae, Part 1, vol 31, Opera Omnia, ed. Auguste Borgnet (Paris: Louis Vives, 1895), 666. However, as Sinnema rightly points out, he incorrectly attributes it to Augustine, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 24. “Adhue, Reprobatio, sicut dicit Augustinus, est nolle misereri: nolle autem miserere sine causa non protest convenire ei cujus proprium est miserere et parcere: causa autem non potest esse nisi peccatum: ergo reprobatio non est nisi ex peccato.” Albert the Great, Summa Theologiae, 667.

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arranging, and preparing. But in respect of their wickedness, God is not the reason for it.39

He also viewed reprobation in a twofold sense, stating, “Therefore, reprobation is said to be in two ways, namely, rejecting them for eternal life, by which the wicked are cast out, and the withholding grace in time.”40 First, it is an eternal rejection by God that he rejects the reprobate and determines not to give them grace. Secondly, he appears to conflate the means of reprobation with reprobation itself, claiming that reprobation is God’s removal of grace over time. In this sense, he asserts a gradual or progressive means of reprobation, although he does not identify it as such. He attributes this second form of reprobation (the gradual removal of grace) to the merits of men, while the first form is left to the will of God.41 The unique element of Albert’s theology, besides his simplification of foreknowledge to foresight, is his distinction between efficient causality versus meritorious causality. God is said to be the efficient cause of damnation in that he decrees to reject men.42 But that is not to say that God causes evil because His decree, as the efficient cause, does not cause man’s actions. Instead, God permits man’s own self-hardening and evil deeds, which become the meritorious cause of their damnation.43

Bonaventure (1217–1274 AD) Bonaventure was a Franciscan friar, Master of Theology at the University of Paris, Minister General of the Franciscan Order, and cardinal of the Catholic Church. During his lifetime, he rose to become one of the most prominent men in Latin Christianity. In his teaching on predestination, he returns to the earlier notion of the divine will being the reason for reprobation. Unlike many in the Middle Ages who based man’s damnation on divine foreknowledge, Bonaventure 39 “Ex opposite enim habet se reprobatio ad praedestinationem[…]Dico autem generibus non subalternatim positis. Damnatio enim iniqui justa est[…]unde respect damnationis iniquorum, oportuit quod reprobatio esset in genere praeparationis, et in genere scientiae practicae quae est scientia ordinans, disponens, et praeparans. Respectu autem iniquitatis, cujus Deus causa esse non protest.” Albert the Great, Summa Theologiae, 668. 40 “Unde reprobation dupliciter dicitur, scilicet abjecto aeterna, qua mali reprobati sunt: et subtraction gratiae in tempore.” Albert the Great, Summa Theologiae, 669. 41 Albert the Great, Summa Theologiae, 669. 42 Albert states, “It should be said that God is in no way the cause of sin, but he is the efficient cause of their damnation, not the meritorious cause [of it].” Translation mine. “Dicendum, quod Deus nullo modo est casa iniquitatis, sed est causa damnationis effeciens, non meritoria.” Albert the Great, Commentarii on Sententiarum, 347. 43 Albert the Great, Commentarii on Sententiarum, 336.

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makes no mention of it.44 However, he picks up where Albert the Great left off, once again discussing the meritorious cause of reprobation. His conclusion, like those before him, was to divide the nature of reprobation into three parts: God’s will, temporal hardening, and damnation.45 Within his theological construct, the will of God is uninfluenced by the actions of man (a position which harkens back to the earlier fathers). However, the second two aspects––gradual temporal hardening and the consequence of eternal damnation––both take man’s demerit into consideration. Since Bonaventure’s utmost concern is the holiness of God in the matter, he affirms that God’s reasoning (the efficient cause) is not the meritorious cause; it is not the grounds for damnation.46 He, like Augustine, attributes the hidden will of God as the reasoning for God’s choice in election or reprobation. He also affirmed an active and passive dichotomy within the doctrine of predestination, election as the active side and reprobation as the passive side. In regard to the passive side, however, it is not that God did not make a choice, but that his choice was to permit the non-elect to turn away.47 Finally, it is noteworthy that he believes more men are reprobate than elect, “to show that salvation is a special grace, while condemnation is ordinary justice.”48

44 Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 25. In fact, Bonaventure criticizes Lombard for locating the origin of God’s decree of reprobation in the intellect and not the will of God. See Guido Stucco, God’s Eternal Gift: A History of the Catholic Doctrine of Predestination from Augustine to the Renaissance (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris Corporation, 2009), 469. 45 “Since every merit is the cause of what is merited, and what is merited is temporal (unlike predestination and reprobation, which are eternal realities) it follows that the temporal cannot be a cause of the eternal. The eternal purpose (propositum aeternum) of God to predestine some and to reprobate or abandon sinners to their devices had no other cause than God himself, though the glory and the punishment respectively connoted by predestination and reprobation can be merited.” Ibid., 473. It is noteworthy that Stucco believes Bonaventure held to a synergistic view of salvation. He claims that Bonaventure does not affirm compatibilism as Augustine does but a libertarian view of the will. This does not seem to be the case and he appears to be in the minority who interpret Bonaventure this way: “Bonaventure thus holds what would later be called a monergistic theory of salvation in which God preelects or predestines certain human beings for salvation without consideration of their merits.” Christopher M. Cullen, Bonaventure (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 181. 46 Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 25. 47 Cullen, Bonaventure, 181. 48 Cullen, Bonaventure, 181.

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Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274 AD) Thomas Aquinas was an Italian Dominican friar and Roman Catholic priest, remembered as an immeasurably influential philosopher, theologian, and scholar in the tradition of Scholasticism. By many accounts, he was the most influential philosopher to live in the Middle Ages, popularizing natural theology and the school of thought known as Thomism (which follows his philosophical thinking). His views would set a precedent for the manner in which theological truths were discussed. When it came to predestination, Aquinas followed many of the trends of other medieval theologians by using their categories of thought, which he likely found helpful; but he further defined and elaborated on those categories in ways no one before him ever had. For example, Aquinas believed in the concept of distinguishing between election and reprobation by referring to God’s predestination to election, similar to Lombard and Albert. Like Bonaventure, he also viewed the decree of reprobation as closely related to the will of God. He stated, “Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.”49 According to Aquinas, the will of God is involved in both election and reprobation. Unlike others before him who attempted to attribute reprobation to God’s intellect (i. e., foreknowledge or foresight), Aquinas related it directly to the will of God. He believed that reprobation was the decision of God to reject certain individuals, to leave them out of his election unto mercy. He stated, “For as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory, so reprobation includes the will to permit someone to fall into fault and to inflict the punishment of damnation in consequence.”50 Like Augustine, he also perceives God’s decrees of election and reprobation as means God employs for the purpose of displaying the glory of his mercy and justice. He claims, “God wills to manifest His goodness in men, in respect to those whom He predestines, by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom He reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others.”51 49 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Part 1 (1912; repr., New York: Cosimo, 2007), 127 (I. q. 23, art. 3). Aquinas goes on to respond to the objection that God loves everyone and states, “God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good—namely, eternal life—He is said to hate or reprobate them.” Ibid. 50 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, vol. 5, God’s Will and Providence, ed. Thomas Gilby (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 117 (Ia. 23, 3). 51 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Part 1, 130 (I. q. 23, art. 5).

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In addition to his discussion of means, a second lasting contribution by Aquinas regarding the doctrine of reprobation comes in his discussion of compatibilism.52 It is of importance to note that Aquinas uniquely answers many of the questions raised by the doctrine of reprobation through his discussion of God’s means in bringing about a particular decree. While many before him simply state that reprobation does not cause God to be the author of sin, Aquinas is the first to elaborate why. He states: Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination [election]. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future life by the predestined—namely, glory— and of what is received in this life—namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not the cause of what is in the present—namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned in the future—namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from the free will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace.53

For Thomas Aquinas, God’s use of secondary causation explains how God not only governs the world, but humanity in particular. He developed the idea of God being the ultimate cause, bringing to pass his decrees of predestination through secondary causes. For example, with respect to prayer and predestination he states: Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered —namely, the divine preordination; and its effect. As regards to the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards to the latter, predestination, is said to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence.54

Late Middle Ages and Early Renaissance (1300–1520 AD) This period marks two highly important features. First, it marks a return to prior convictions held by men such as Augustine and those in the Post-Nicene period. Secondly, it marks the pairing of those convictions with the philosophical distinctions and categories raised in the Early Middle Ages. However, unlike the Early Middle Ages, the Late Middle Ages is an era characterized by a return to the authority of Scripture in developing these claims. While the Early Middle Ages 52 The discussion on compatibilism will be saved for the third chapter. 53 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, Part 1, 127 (I. q. 23, art. 3). 54 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Volume 1, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Notre Dame, IN: Christian Classics, 1948), 133 (I. q. 24, art. 8).

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was steeped in philosophical conjecture (some of which was helpful), it was a period that neglected to give much, if any, attention to Scripture. In contrast, all of the major figures in the Late Middle Ages return to Scripture for either the proof or the basis of their conclusions.

Duns Scotus (1266–1308 AD) Duns Scotus (also known as John Duns) was a Scotsman who reached prominence as a philosopher-theologian near the end of the High Middle Ages and Late Middle Ages. He was one of the first influencial philosophers to impact Christian thought after the full impact of Aquinas had permeated Christian theology. He affirms that reprobation, as well as election, are acts of God’s will. However, Scotus was the first to propose that the will of God for the reprobate included damnation. This would later be known as “affirmative reprobation,” a distinctive that is maintained in the Reformed tradition. Theologians would later classify these two elements of reprobation as negative and affirmative (they would go on to be further refined by the terms “preterition” and “predamnation”). For example, as Heinrich Heppe explains: Negative reprobation means the eternal act of the divine power and judgment, by which according to the counsel of His will He did not resolve to pity the rest whom He did not elect to the extent of presenting them with the peculiar grace of election not due to them. The affirmative kind is the act by which He resolved to impose upon the same men, justly left in the lump of perdition or of their own free will variously abusing the light of nature and the gospel, the punishment they had earned. But neither must we take this as though the two acts were really different.55

While Scotus introduces a concept many find to be an adequate explanation of these elements of reprobation, he himself made few of these distinctions. This has led some to see little-to-no distinction between his views of reprobation and election (which has been linked to hyper-Calvinism). However, the real con-

55 Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources, rev. and ed. Ernst Bizer, trans. G. T. Thomson (1950; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1978), 181. Another name for this other than negative and affirmative is: passive and active. It has been observed that the first person to actually use this language (“negative reprobation” and “affirmative reprobation”) was Etienne Brulefer, cited and translated in Sinnema; he writes, “Reprobation is twofold, namely negative and affirmative[…]of negative reprobation there is no cause or reason on the part of the object, just as there is not an objective cause or predestination[…]Although of predestination there is no reason on the part of the object, nevertheless, of positive reprobation there is such a reason.” Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 35–36.

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tribution of Scotus comes with respect to causality.56 Scotus establishes a school of thought that is more complex in respect to causality than that of Aquinas.57 Based on his formulated principles of causes, Scotus held a theory of four aspects that defined God’s decision process regarding reprobation. He used the example of Peter and Judas to explain these principles.58 First, God has in his mind both Peter and Judas as individuals. By nothing other than his will, he chooses Peter for glory and does not choose Judas (again, this is the negative act of reprobation). Second, God actively wills his mercy to be the means of Peter’s glory (in which case he does not choose Judas as a recipient of this). Third, God assigns both Peter and Judas to be represented in the fall of Adam, an active act by God on behalf of both men. Then, at this moment, with sin in mind, God reprobates Judas on the basis of this sin and actively and willfully chooses to hold him accountable to justice.59

William of Ockham (1285–1347 AD) William of Ockham was an English Franciscan friar and scholastic philosopher and theologian most notably recognized for his contribution to philosophy that came to be known as Ockham’s Razor. William of Ockham does not see anything that God does in eternity past as being distinct from his being; neither predestination nor reprobation can be distinguished from God himself.60 At the outset, 56 Efrem Bettoni, Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of His Philosophy, ed. Bernardine Bonansea (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1961). This is probably one of the most helpful examinations of John Dun Scotus’s metaphysics, epistemology, theology, and ethics. 57 The Philosophy of Duns First Principle Causality can be explained as eminence versus dependence. Whatever is perfect and nobler in its essence is the first cause, according to Duns Scotus. This follows that everything else is of a dependent nature and is therefore posterior. Therefore God is independent (aseity) and everything else in some respect is dependent. So God being the cause produces the posterior orders of necessity. After this first and essential division of being, that is existence, the posterior orders may then be subdivided. Scotus is very different from Aristotelian Philosophy at this point. For more on this, see Alexander W. Hall, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus: Natural Theology in the High Middle Ages (London: Continuum, 2007); John Duns Scotus, On the Will and Morality, selected and trans. Allan B. Wolter (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1997). 58 Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 28. 59 It is important to note that at this point, with a distinction between the action of election and the action of reprobation, it appears Scotus would have been favorable toward infralapsarianism. 60 There are some modern scholars who try to reinterpret William Ockham as teaching a predestination dependent on human free-will. Some proponents of this view are: Heiko A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (1963; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 185–215; Harry J. McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong?

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he denies the principles of causality established by Scotus, because to some degree, for Scotus and others, reprobation takes into account foreknowledge or foresight of sin. He states: Neither active predestination nor active reprobation is a real thing distinct in some way or other from God or the divine Persons. Nor is passive predestination something absolute or relative distinct in some way from the person who is predestinate. But the noun ‘predestination’ (or the concept), whether taken in the active or in the passive sense, signifies not only God Himself who will give eternal life to someone but also the person to whom it is given[…]Similarly, ‘reprobation’ signifies God who will give eternal punishment to someone, [eternal punishment, and the person to whom it is given].61

From this it can be observed that Scotus uses a form of reasoning similar to many who would be of the supralapsarian persuasion. For example, for Ockham, the temporal can never cause the eternal, therefore the creature cannot cause anything in the Creator. In this respect, reprobation has no cause in anyone other than God himself. It is a decision he makes without the influence of another agent. However, there is a second sense in which reprobation is based on sin. This distinction would be more properly called the “efficient cause” versus the “meritorious cause” (as was observed by others previously). While this precise classification is not employed by Ockham, it is present in this thought: I maintain that there is a cause of predestination in the predestinate and of reprobation in the reprobate as long as ‘cause’ is taken in the second rather than in the first way mentioned in Assumption 9. For this inference is correct: ‘He commits the sin of final

An Ecumenical-Theological Study of Luther’s Major Work, The Bondage of the Will, By a Roman Catholic Scholar (Minneapolis, MN: Newman Press, 1969), 199–215; Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987) 2:1327–47. A big proponent of this is James L. Harverson, Peter Aureol on Predestination: A Challenge to Late Medieval Thought, ed. Heiko A. Oberman (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 113–16. However, those who hold this view seem to neglect the context of many of Ockham’s statements. Likewise, they seem to ignore many of his philosophical distinctions and they disagree with the majority of Medieval scholars. See Reinhold Seeberg, Lehrbuch der Domegeschichte (Leipzig: Deichert, 1893), 3:769; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Die Prädestinationslehre des Duns Scotus in Zussammenhang der scholastichen Lehrentwichlung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1954), 142–43; Paul Vignaux, Justification et prédestination au XIVe siècle: Duns Scot, Pierre d’Auriole, Guillaume d’Occam, Grégoire de Rimini (Paris: E. Leroux, 1934), 135–45. 61 William Ockham, Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, trans. Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), 45.

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impenitence; therefore, he will be reprobate’[…]God is not a punisher before a man is a sinner.62

According to Ockham, the first cause is God, who is the efficient cause, or ultimate cause, of reprobation. The second cause is the sin of man, which grants consequence to that which preceded it. Therefore, God is not the material, formal, or final cause of sin, although it is his unpersuaded decree that grants man the permission, ability, and ultimately the culpability for sin.

Thomas Bradwardine (1290–1349 AD) Thomas Bradwardine was an English Scholastic philosopher and, for a brief time, the Archbishop of Canterbury. He was one of the first to follow in the footsteps of Gottschalk of Orbais in a strong Augustinian double predestination or, as some have called it (in order to distinguish it from hyper-Calvinism), “absolute predestination.” He cites Augustine, Isidore, and Anselm, reflecting the thought that predestination can be used in a broad sense for both the elect and reprobate. Bradwardine’s strong double predestination language came as a result of what he claimed was the Pelagianism of the churches in his day. He stated, “In the schools of the philosophers I rarely heard a word concerning grace[…]but I continually heard that we are the masters of our own free actions.”63 He further added, “The Pelagians now oppose our whole presentation of predestination and reprobation, attempting either to eliminate them completely or, at least, to show that they are dependent on personal merits.”64 This would seem to indicate that theologians were beginning to recognize that the Semi-Pelagian tendency to undermine predestination or redefine it on the basis of foresight (popularized in the church since Faustus of Reiz and the southern Gallic monks since the time of Augustine) was purely Pelagian. Bradwardine reiterated what many before him had already articulated: a twofold character of reprobation. First, he saw the choice of God not to give grace to certain individuals as having a temporal effect of hardening. The second aspect of reprobation he mentions is unto damnation. Bradwardine does not place 62 Ockham, Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, 77. For more on Ockham and predestination, see Matthew Levering, Predestination: Biblical and Theological Paths (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 84–89. 63 Cited by Harry Buis, Historic Protestantism and Predestination (1958; repr., Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2007), 22. 64 Heiko Augustinus Oberman has compiled translations of Thomas Bradwardine’s De causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum here: Forerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late Medieval Thought, trans. Paul L. Nyhus (1967; repr., Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 2002), 151.

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foreknowledge as the basis for this damnation; reprobation was an act of God’s will independent of anything foreseen in the creature: The argument that if Adam had not sinned, no one would have been reprobated but all would have been predestined does not prove at all that predestination and reprobation depend on merit[…]God does not predestine a certain end for man or man for a certain end; that is to say, God does not grant man eternal life on account of his future good works, but, on the contrary, he grants the good works that may bring him to eternal life.65

From this he shows that the position of his opponents confuses the ends (predestination/election or reprobation) with the means (good or evil merits). To further clarify God’s decree of redemption and alleviate confusion between ends and means, he contributes to the discussion by distinguishing the merit for eternal punishment from the cause of reprobation in God’s will: “God eternally punished no one apart from his own temporally preceding and eternally lasting fault; however, God did not eternally reprobate anyone on account of fault, as a cause antecedently moving the divine will, but on account of certain final causes.”66 The final contribution Bradwardine makes is an argument that the final act of sin cannot be blameworthy on account of the efficient cause, for that would mean the very crucifixion, the most gracious act in human history, would have not been grace but sin.67

Nicholas of Lyra (1270–1349 AD) Nicholas of Lyra was a Franciscan teacher and was one of the most influential teachers of biblical exegesis in the Middle Ages. At the same time that William of Ockham was developing a form of “negative” and “affirmative” reprobation, Nicholas of Lyra was developing this thought. By attempting to harmonize several of the positive elements of previous contributions regarding reprobation while answering legitimate concerns raised by lack of comments on this doctrine,

65 Bradwardine, Forerunners of the Reformation, 160. 66 This citation of Bradwardine is found in Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 32. 67 “Why do they not accuse God because[…]he gave up his own most innocent Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, to a most painful, cruel, and tormenting punishment. But since God is omnipotent, completely free Lord of his whole creation, whose will alone is the most righteous law for all creation—if he should eternally punish the innocent, particularly since he does it for the perfection of the universe, for the profit of others, and for the honor of God himself, who would presume to dispute with him, to contradict him, or ask, ‘Why did you do this?’ I firmly believe, no one!” Oberman, Forerunners of the Reformation, 162. He concludes his comments by citing Romans 9:21.

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he clarifies this dichotomy more clearly than anyone before him. He does so through his exegetical observations of Romans 9:17: Reprobation, in a broad sense, is a simple negation to glory. In this sense [reprobation] has no basis in man, nor God’s foreknowledge. His predestination is to not choose [them for glory]. In another way, properly speaking, it is an ordination of someone to punishment. [Reprobation in this sense] is not unjust, nor has it been willed by God except on account of sin; and therefore, following reason, this rejection, properly called reprobation, is preceded by God’s foreknowledge of sin.68

Essentially this shows a definite distinction between God’s initial decree (uninfluenced by foreknowledge of sin) that certain people would be excluded from election unto glory. However, the decision of God to assign men unto punishment does take into account their sin, which is the second half of reprobation.

Gregory of Rimini (1300–1358 AD) Gregory of Rimini was an influential theologian of the Augustinian order.69 This order is characterized by the following commitments: (1) a recovery and dependence on Augustine’s works, especially in his anti-Pelagian years, (2) a use of these writings to address perceived Pelagianism in the church, (3) a strong Augustinian view of original sin, (4) Scripture as the final authority on any issue, (5) the belief in salvation by grace alone, and (6) the doctrine of double predestination, among others.70 With these commitments in view, one can readily understand how influential Augustine was in establishing and developing Gregory’s doctrine of predestination. Like many Augustinian theologians of his time, he was deeply committed to the independence of God in issuing his decrees. Gregory regarded reprobation as 68 “[…]reprobatio aliquando accipitur large, & sic dicit simplicem negationem ad gloriam; & sic non habet causam in re, nec in Dei praescientia, sicut nec electio seu praedestinatio ei opposite. Alio modo proprie, & sic est ordination alicuius ad poenam, quae non est iniusta nec a Deo volita nisi propter culpam; et ideo reprobationem sic dictam, qua Deus aliquos reprobate, praecedit in Deo sucundum rationem tantum praescientia peccatorum.” Nicholas of Lyra, Bibliorum sacrorum cum glossa ordinaria, copied by Strabus, Fulgensis (Venetiis, 1603), 6:124 (68). 69 Frank A. James defines it “as an ‘academic Augustinianism’ committed to the pursuit of and obedience to the genuine theology of Augustine, especially his mature soteriological views.” Frank A. James III., Peter Martyr Vermigli and Predestination: The Augustinian Inheritance of an Italian Reformer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 129. In this section he is discussing the influence of Gregory’s view of predestination on those around him. He also sees Thomas Bardwardine in this tradition. 70 A version of this list can be found in Alister E. McGrath, The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1987), 104.

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different from eternal punishment; one was the cause, the other the result. However, God’s punishment of men was always based on their sin, while his decree to reprobate them was uninfluenced by human sin.71 For example, he stated: Two things are to be considered distinctly: One is that God resolved not to have mercy on some. In this the definition of reprobation properly consists; and why he so resolved is not to give a cause beyond his own good pleasure[…]The other is that, for such people on whom he resolved not to have mercy, he also prepared due punishment for sins. And therefore, although it is not on account of their sin that God is unwilling to have mercy [reprobation], i. e., to give eternal life, nevertheless, he wills to give punishment to them on account of their sins, original or actual or both.72

It is also noteworthy that Gregory does not use the term “reprobation” in relation to the consequences of sin, but only to the choice of God to withhold mercy from the non-elect.

Gabriel Biel (1410–1495 AD) Gabriel Biel was a German scholastic philosopher. He studied in both Thomist and Ockham traditions of logic, having completed his studies in Heidelberg, Erfurt, and Cologne. As a result, he borrows from two different traditions of thought when it comes to reprobation. First, like Ockham, he sees the decrees of God as inseparable from God himself. This is to establish the independence of God—the claim that he cannot be influenced.73 He then follows Ockham by discussing the twofold sense of “cause” in reprobation. Secondly, he borrows from Peter Lombard and sees reprobation based on God’s foreknowledge of sin. In this respect, he sees reprobation as the result of foreseen sin. Gabriel is an example of someone who attempted to wed together two schools of thought on the issues of foreknowledge and reprobation.

71 Gordon Leff misunderstands Gregory and states that he believed God didn’t take human sin into consideration for punishment. This is incorrect. See Gordon Leff, Gregory of Rimini: Tradition and Innovation in Fourteenth Century Thought (Oxford: Manchester University Press, 1961), 197, 204. 72 Gregory of Rimini, Super Primim et Secundum Sententiarum (1522; repr., New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1955), 161. This translation is given by Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 34. 73 Gabriel Biel’s views are examined in Oberman, Harvest, 185–216.

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John Eck (1486–1543 AD) John Eck was a German scholastic theologian and advocate for Roman Catholicism during the Protestant Reformation. While Eck has become known in history for his crusade against Martin Luther, his work on the doctrine of predestination preceded that situation. His initial findings provided a helpful overview of Catholic dogma on the issue at the time of the Reformation, especially as the Catholic church had yet to settle on a particular position. The three orthodox positions were the following: (1) election and reprobation have no reason in man, only in God;74 (2) both election and reprobation have cause in man because of the foreknowledge of God;75 and (3) election has no basis in man, but reprobation does.76 Eck believed the first and third views could be harmonized based on Nicholas of Lyra’s twofold distinction between negative and affirmative reprobation. The first group simply stressed the negative element: the unwillingness of God to elect some men. The third group stressed the affirmative element, that God will hold men accountable for their sins, resulting in their damnation.77 Eck personally held to the second view, especially at the height of his conflict with Martin Luther. Like many Roman Catholics, he viewed God’s decrees based on God’s foresight of human merit or demerit.78

74 From those examined thus far Eck lists: Augustine, Lombard, Aquinas, Albert the Great, and Gregory of Rimini. Gottschalk, among others, could fit into this group. Johannes Eck, Chrysopassus (Augsburg, 1514), I, xci. 75 In the second group, he lists: Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Ockham, and Gabriel Biel. Some of the individuals in his listing are based on his interpretation and may not fall into this category. Eck, Chrysopassus (Augsburg, 1514), I, xci. 76 In the third group he cites Duns Scotus and Anselm, from what has previously been examined. He lists others as well. Eck, Chrysopassus (Augsburg, 1514), I, xci. 77 Eck, Chrysopassus, I, xci; II, xlix. 78 Eck, Chrysopassus, II, iviii; IV, xiii. Sinnema points out that it appears Eck changed his view in 1542, to adopt the affirmative negative distinction of reprobation. He states that negative reprobation (God’s decision not to give mercy) is based only on God’s will, not human sin, while affirmative reprobation is caused by human sin. He shows this in John Eck, Primum Librum Senentiarum Annotatiunculae (Leiden, 1976), I, d. 40, 111; d. 41, 117. See Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 38; fns. 134–45, on p. 50.

Chapter Three: The Reformation Period and Reprobation

Reformation and Counter-Reformation (1521–1610 AD) The Protestant Reformation and subsequent Counter-Reformation set notable trajectories for the discussion on the issue of predestination and reprobation. Twentieth-century theologian Loraine Boettner stated, “Calvin and Augustine easily rank as the two outstanding systematic expounders of the Christian system since Saint Paul.”1 In considering the development of reformed orthodoxy on the issue of reprobation, it is important to note that many of the Reformers did not use the positive-negative distinction developed in the previous century. In fact, they return to a form of predestination and reprobation that had more in common with the Patristics, especially Augustine. While there are several variations on the matter between Luther and other Reformers, the majority of their views remain in agreement.2 One of the main areas of agreement among the Reformers was a 1 Loraine Boettner, The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing, 1932), 405. 2 Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 52. Sinemma argues that there was no single Calvinist position. However, this is to assume that clarifications or minor differences warrant a different position. The fact that they cite one another with agreement and that Calvin claimed Pigious was trying to strike at Luther through himself shows that they and their advisories believed they had the same position. For example Calvin states, “that half a book— which was written chiefly against Luther and Phillip Melanchthon but secondarily against all of us together.” Calvin, The Bondage and Liberation of the Will: A Defense of the Orthodox Doctrine of Human Choice against Pighius, ed. A.N.S. Lane, trans. G.I. Davies (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1996), 6. And furthermore, regarding Pighius’s work Free Choice, “He does indeed frankly declare that he is doing this with the specific intention of (as it were) driving his spear through my side into Luther and the rest of our party.” Ibid., 7. It is impossible to read Calvin’s work against Pighius and not see that he believed he was on the same side as Luther on the matter. Also, he defends Luther repeatedly and calls his teachings scriptural. See ibid., 49. Others have said that Calvin tried to avoid Luther’s teachings on necessity (ibid., xxviii), however, this does not appear to be the case, rather, it appears that Calvin further develops and clarifies the position that he believes they share in common. See also Brian A. Gerrish, “The Pathfinder: Calvin’s Image of Martin Luther,” in The Old Protestantism and the New (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), 27–48.

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commitment to further develop the doctrine of causality in reference to the decrees of God and human volition.

Martin Luther (1483–1546 AD) Martin Luther was a German professor of theology of the Augustinian order. He would become the seminal figure in the Protestant Reformation, as he rejected several teachings and practices of the Late Medieval Roman Catholic Church. Luther’s perspective on election and reprobation was driven by two major beliefs: the sovereignty of God (necessity) and the inability of man.3 These two beliefs guided Luther to present his doctrine of election and reprobation in its clearest form, culminating in the thesis of his work, The Bondage of the Will. In this work, Luther asserted that free will is not the ultimate cause of man’s salvation or damnation. Luther, being an Augustinian monk, remains true to Augustine’s understanding of reprobation and predestination.4 Luther’s understanding of God’s absolute sovereignty shapes much of his discussion regarding the necessity of human destiny being dependent on the free will of God rather than man. For example, he states, “God’s love toward men is eternal and immutable, and his hatred is eternal, being prior to the creation of the world, and not only to the merit and work of free choice; and everything takes place by necessity in us, according as he either loves or does not love us from all eternity.”5 Luther presents double predestination clearly, basing it on his understanding of God. In order to better understand Luther’s view of reprobation, attention must be

3 Much has been written about Luther’s doctrine of necessity; see Harry McSorley, Luther Right or Wrong? (New York: Newman Press, 1969), 310–53. For more on Luther’s view of God’s attributes in respect to predestination, see Frederik Brosche, “Luther on Predestination: The Antinomy and Unity Between Love and Wrath in Luther’s Concept of God,” (PhD diss., Uppsala University, 1978). 4 Alister McGrath is an example of a scholar who would disagree. While he agrees that Luther taught double predestination, he also believes Luther strayed from Augustine. He states, “[Luther’s] assertions that Wycliffe was correct to maintain that all things happen by absolute necessity, and that God is the author of all man’s evil deeds, have proved serious obstacles to those who wish to suggest that Luther was merely restating an Augustinian or scriptural position[…]Luther explicitly teaches a doctrine of double predestination, whereas Augustine was reluctant to acknowledge such a doctrine, no matter how logically appropriate it might appear.” Alister McGrath, Iustitia Dei: A History of The Christian Doctrine of Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 15–16. McGrath’s conclusion seems contrary to the evidence; the strong double predestination views of Augustine which have already been demonstrated above. 5 Martin Luther, Word and Sacrament IV, vol. 33, Luther’s Works, ed. Helmut T. Lehmann and Martin E. Lehman (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1971), 199.

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given to two areas: first, his view of the role of the will of God in reprobation, and second, his view of the volition of man (in terms of compatibilism). First, Luther has a strong view of the sovereignty of God in the matter of predestination. His famous distinction between the hidden and revealed will of God plays a crucial role in properly understanding his view of necessity. For Luther, everything happens by necessity according to the sovereign will of God. Like those who came before him, Luther attributed all of God’s decrees to his uninfluenced will. Luther does not hesitate to prove this fact, using the specific examples of Pharaoh, Judas, and Esau to establish his case that God sovereignly determined to harden and reprobate certain men according to the counsel of his own hidden will. For example, he states: Here, God Incarnate says: ‘I would, and thou wouldst not.’ God Incarnate, I repeat, was sent for this purpose, to will, say, do, suffer, and offer to all men, all that is necessary for salvation; albeit He offends many who, being abandoned or hardened by God’s secret will of Majesty, do not receive Him thus willing, speaking, doing and offering[…]It belongs to the same God Incarnate to weep, lament, and groan over the perdition of the ungodly, though that will of Majesty purposely leaves and reprobates some to perish. Nor is it for us to ask why He does so, but to stand in awe of God, Who can do, and wills to do such things.6

In this example, he shows that God’s revealed will demonstrates that the source of salvation is only in Christ. However, he also expresses that it is God’s secret will that Christ would be of no effect for the reprobate. Furthermore, Luther would state that since it does not please God when the wicked perish, based on God’s revealed will, it is only the reason that the wicked perish that remains within God’s hidden will. The will of God is the driving factor in eternal matters. It is by God’s will alone that everything happens, and because of that, everything happens by necessity. In his arguments with Erasmus on the matter he shows that nothing happens by chance, whether election and reprobation or mercy and hardening. Instead, it can only be ascribed to God: On your view [Erasmus], God will elect nobody, and no place for election will be left; all that is left is freedom of will to heed or defy the long-suffering and wrath of God. But if God is thus robbed of His power and wisdom in election, what will He be but just that idol, Chance, under whose sway all things happen at random? Eventually, we shall come to this: that men may be saved and damned without God’s knowledge! For He will not have marked out by sure election those that should be saved and those that should be damned; He will merely have set before all men His general long-suffering, which forbears and hardens, together with His chastening and punishing mercy, and left it to them to choose

6 Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. J.I. Packer and O.R. Johnston (1517; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker, 1957), 189.

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whether they would be saved or damned, while He Himself, perchance, goes off, as Homer says, to an Ethiopian banquet.7

The entirety of Luther’s Bondage of the Will could be cited to support the fact that Luther understood Erasmus’ conclusions about human free will to be robbing God of his sovereignty. In other words, Luther would succinctly state that everything happens exactly and only as God has ordained it to happen. While there are some in the Lutheran tradition who adhere to single predestination, it is apparent that Luther himself did not.8 His comments on Judas show this rather convincingly: If God foreknew that Judas would be a traitor, Judas became a traitor of necessity, and it was not in the power of Judas or of any creature to act differently, or to change his will, from that which God had foreseen. It is true that Judas acted willingly, and not under compulsion, but his willing was the work of God, brought into being by His omnipotence, like everything else[…]If you do not allow that the thing which God foreknows is necessarily brought to pass, you take away faith and the fear of God, you undermine all the Divine promises and threatenings, and so you deny Deity itself.9

These comments readily avail themselves to the second element of Luther’s doctrine of reprobation: man’s volition and God’s necessity. Based on his perspective of Judas, it is apparent that he affirms compatibilism.10 Luther has been noted as having stated, “free choice after sin is a reality only in name,” “free choice is

7 Luther, Bondage of the Will, 200. 8 For an example of a Lutheran who holds this position, see Robert G. Hoerber, Introduction to Concordia Self-Study Bible (St. Louis: Concordia, 1984). He states, “According to Ephesians 1, our salvation is the result of our election by God from eternity, which is a gospel message. To deduce by logical reasoning that therefore some people must be predestined to damnation is law—a clear instance of mingling law and gospel. On the other hand, the “unreasonable” doctrine of election to salvation (but not to damnation) is a particularly comforting part of the gospel message.” Ibid., xviii. More will be discussed on single predestination in subsequent chapters, however at this point it needs to be mentioned that for Luther such a conclusion is impossible, because everything happens by necessity according to God’s eternal plan. Those who hold to single predestination believe that God marks out the elect, but does nothing with the remainder of humanity. For Luther, that would mean that the destiny of the reprobate would not be determined by God, which would leave it to chance. For Luther, unless God marks out and knows both the elect and reprobate, his sovereignty as well as omniscience would suffer. Alister E. McGrath recognizes this in Luther (although I believe he misunderstands Augustine on the same issue). See Alister E. McGrath, “Luther explicitly teaches a doctrine of double predestination,” in Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 203. 9 Luther, Bondage of the Will, 213. 10 For more on this, see chapter 2. In brief, the issue is this: are the wills of God and man compatible with each other? Non-compatibilists (especially libertarian free-will theologians) such as Erasmus, and Arminius after him, believe that men have “free will” in spite of God’s sovereignty, whereas compatibilists, such as Luther, and Calvinists after him, believe that human freedom works under God’s freedom, but humans cannot operate outside the freedom of God.

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something imaginary, a name without substance,” and, “all things happen by absolute necessity.”11 However, by this Luther does not mean that men are puppets, or have no volition, but that their volition was determined on account of sin and God’s eternal plan to either release them or keep them under the dominion of sin. Furthermore demonstrating his understanding of compatibility, he writes: You may be worried that it is hard to defend the mercy and equity of God in damning the undeserving, that is, ungodly persons, who, being born in ungodliness, can by no means avoid being ungodly, and staying so, and being damned, but are compelled by natural necessity to sin and perish; as Paul says: ‘We were all the children of wrath, even as others’ (Eph. 2:3), created such by God Himself from a seed that had been corrupted by the sin of the one man, Adam. But here God must be reverenced and held in awe, as being most merciful to those whom He justifies and saves in their own utter unworthiness; and we must show some measure of deference to His Divine wisdom by believing Him just when to us He seems unjust.12

By answering the issue raised regarding free will in this manner, Luther is appealing to a compatibilist version of the will. That is to say, wicked men act according to their desire (ultimately, a desire for wickedness) without the aid or power of God. Thus, the reason God saves some out of this condition is owed to his grace, whereas the reason others are left in this condition is still on the basis of justice, even if it does not appear to be. Luther’s conclusion is contrary to those who follow the Lombardian model of foreknowledge in reprobation. Since the Lombardian model allows for God to reprobate on the basis of foreseen sin, God’s decision in the decree of reprobation becomes informed by something outside of himself. Foreknowledge in the Lombardian scheme makes God’s decree dependent on human merit or demerit, in some respect. By the time of Erasmus’ period of influence, this had fully blossomed into the notion that both of God’s decrees were determined by foreknowledge (or better yet, foresight) of sin. However, Luther disagrees, stating, “God foreknows nothing contingently, but[…]He foresees, purposes, and does all things according to His own immutable, eternal and infallible will.”13 For Luther, and subsequent Reformed theologians, compatibilism becomes the means by which God’s will in reprobation is preserved alongside man’s volition to sin.

11 Martin Luther, Career of the Reformer II, vol. 32, Luther’s Works, ed. Helmut T. Lehman (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1958), 92–94. 12 Luther, Bondage of the Will, 314. 13 Luther, Bondage of the Will, 80.

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Ulrich Zwingli (1484–1531 AD) Ulrich Zwingli was a leader of the Reformation in Switzerland. He acted as chaplain for the Zurich army on many occasions, while simultaneously serving as a pastor and professor. The writings of Zwingli on reprobation are less abundant than those of Luther.14 Rather than discussing predestination from the standpoint of original sin or human inability (as Augustine and Luther did), Zwingli does so from his understanding of providence. He says concerning providence, “[It] must exist because the supreme good necessarily cares for and regulates all things.”15 Providence, in Zwingli’s estimation, is an extension of the sovereignty of God; he has to be meticulously in control of all things or else he would not be omnipotent.16 This deductive reasoning formed the basis of Zwingli’s understanding of predestination and sovereignty. He believed that man could not be free outside the ordination of God, because then, “there would be a might independent of [his] powers and therefore different from it.”17 Zwingli believed that mankind could not limit the power of God in any respect. Historian G. R. Potter has described Zwingli’s conception of humanity as a tool in the hands of God’s providence, which he uses at his own pleasure.18 Zwingli’s perspective naturally raised questions about God’s responsibility for evil. He makes a unique argument in response, essentially saying that without evil in the world there would be no appreciation of God’s grace or good. He argues: And since the Deity could not possibly show us unrighteousness in His own person, inasmuch as He is by nature perfectly true, holy, and good, He produced an example of unrighteousness by means of a created being, not as if the created being produced it of itself, since it has neither being, life, nor activity without the Deity, but that the Deity is Himself the author of that which to us is unrighteousness, though not in the least so to Him.19

From this, Zwingli extrapolates how God cannot be responsible for sins committed by men; even though men cannot act otherwise, they still act according to their sinful nature. He affirms that God is the ultimate cause of everything, and that men are his instruments. He continues reasoning that God has the right to do with sinners whatever he pleases because he is higher than the laws imposed upon

14 Gottfried Wilhelm Locher, Zwingli’s Thought: New Perspectives (Leiden: Brill, 1981); and, William Peter Stephens, The Theology of Huldrych Zwingli (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986). 15 Huldrych Zwingli, On Providence and Other Essays, ed. William John Hinke (1922; repr., Durham, NC: Labryinth, 1983), 131. 16 Zwingli, On Providence and Other Essays, 130. 17 Zwingli, On Providence and Other Essays, 137. 18 G.R. Potter, Huldrych Zwingli (New York: St. Martin’s, 1977), 81. 19 Zwingli, On Providence and Other Essays, 175–76.

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humanity, and he himself cannot be blamed for sin.20 From this, one might conclude that God is the author of sin, but for Zwingli, instrumentality included “secondary causes.”21 He generally talks about sovereignty from a panoramic view on the matter. As a result, he stands in stark contrast to Aquinas by asserting that men do not contribute to their eternal destiny––an assertion which applies not only to the elect, but also the non-elect.22 God’s sovereignty by means of his providence cannot be avoided. Zwingli states, “[…]‘election’ does not apply to those who are said to be miserable, though the divine will does decree concerning them also, to avoid, cast down and reject them, so they will be examples of his justice.”23 As expected from a Reformer, he then turns to Scripture to prove his case.24 Operating from Romans 9:18, Zwingli comments: And those words often repeated, are not hyperbolic threatening, as some think, but really, warning and declaring to man beforehand the secret of his resolve by which he has decreed to reveal to the world, which resolved Pharaoh’s stubbornness and treachery, his rejection and damnation, which he had decreed with himself before he created the world[…]This clearly given so the world would understand how the Lord displays his power and justice by the example of audacity and stubbornness. Since when he hardens them so that they resist him, it is indisputable that he does this for no other cause than to display before the world an example of his justice.25

He sees Paul teaching that both good and evil, the elect and the reprobate, are all the result of God’s sovereignty and nothing else. Furthermore, he states, “What else could he mean by these words other than that election and rejection are the work of God’s free will?”26 Although Zwingli and Luther had their documented differences, 20 G.W. Bromiley, Zwingli and Bullinger (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953), 33; Zwingli, On Providence, 138. 21 Zwingli sees little separation between the ultimate cause (God) and the chargeable cause (men); rather, he uses the terminology of “causality” from the perspective of humanity. See Zwingli, On Providence, 138. 22 Jill Raitt, “St. Thomas on Free Will and Predestination,” DDSR 43 (1978): 190. 23 “[…]quamvis et de illis constituat divina voluntas, sed ad repellendum, abiiciendum et repudiandum, quo iustitiae exempla fiant.” Ulrich Zwingli, “De Providentia Dei,” in Worke (Zurich: F. Schulthess, 1841), 4:115. 24 “Nune ad scripture testimonia imus, quibus non iam, quae as electionis definitionem pertinent, firmantur, sed totum quoque providentiae negotium sub oculos pointer.” Ibid. 25 “Atque ea verba saepenumero repetivit, non hyperbolie comminando, ut quidam autumant, sed vere monendo ae praedicendo homini areanum suae constitutionis, qua decreverat Pharaonis repudiationem ae damnationem contumacia et perfidia eius mundo patefacere, quam ille apud se constituerat antequam mundum crearet[…]Quibus manifeste datur intelligi, quod dominus huiuscemodi exemplis audaciae et pervicaciae mundo et potentiam et iustitiam suam ostendit. Quum enim indurate ut reluctentur: indubitatum est, quin non on aliam causam hoc faeiat, quam ut eos exampla iustiae mundo proponat.” Ibid. 26 “Quibus ille verbis quid aliud quam liberae voluntatis opus esse electionem et repudiationem ostendit?” Ibid., 116.

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a form of solidarity existed between these men on matters pertaining to the pillars of the Reformation, including the essentials of predestination. In fact, their unity on the matter was so strong that at the Council of Trent their positions were perceived to be in complete concord. It should also be noted that Zwingli responded to Erasmus’ diatribe on free will before Luther did, and his sermon De Providentia Dei is a product of this discourse.27 This demonstrates the unity of the magisterial Reformers on the matter of predestination and reprobation. They believed that both election and reprobation are acts of God’s sovereign will to display His power and justice over the vessels of destruction and unrighteousness.

The Council of Trent (1545–1563 AD) Interestingly, the Council of Trent, often called the “Counter Reformation,” makes only one comment on reprobation. Session VI in Cannon 17 reads, “If anyone says that the grace of justification extends only to those who are predestined to life, but that all others who are called are called indeed but do not receive grace, inasmuch as they are by divine power predestined to evil, let him be anathema.”28 What is interesting about this conclusion is that it not only vaguely mentions the issues at hand in the debate of reprobation, but it also mischaracterizes what has been taught and denied for centuries leading up to the Counter Reformation. In surveying the history of the years examined by the Council, there apparently was much debate on the matter before it reached its final conclusion. It reads: Cateneus replied, that then the distinction of the elect and the reprobate would proceed from ourselves, a contradiction to the sense of the Church, which teaches that it is grace alone which separated the vessels of mercy, from the vessels of wrath; and that it would give occasion to men to believe that predestination is not the pure effect of the divine will, but the sole prescience of our merits. This last consequence, drawn by Cataneus, led them to debate upon, and to examine the Protestant’s doctrine of predestination, because of the connection between the arguments; 1) in predestination and reprobation there is nothing on man’s part, but all comes from God, and the divine will; and 2) the predestinate can never be damned, nor the reprobate saved. On the first article their opinions were divided; some looked upon it to be Catholic, others said it was heretical. The former went upon the doctrine of St. Thomas, and the generality of the doctors who held that God chose, before the creation of the world, out of the whole mass of mankind, some creatures that should be saved out of pure mercy, which is called predestination. That the number of the predestinate is fixed and determined, so 27 William Peter Stephens, “The Place of Predestination in Zwingli and Bucer,” in Zwingliana 19, no. 1 (1992): 395. 28 B.W. Mathias, Compendious History of the Council of Trent (Dublin: William Curry, Jun. & Company, 1832), 94.

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that not one can be added to it; that the rest cannot complain, because God prepared succors for them sufficient for their salvation, though none but the elect were to be saved. They cited St. Paul for their authority, who, speaking of Jacob’s election, and Esau’s reprobation, says, that the decree was pronounced before they were born, not in view of their merits, but for the sole good pleasure of God. The others called this opinion severe, cruel, inhuman, and impious, making God partial, if, without any knowledge of the cause, he should choose some, and reject others; and unjust, if he determined men to damnation by his proper motion, and not for their own faults; and if he should create so many millions of souls, only to damn them. They said, moreover, that this opinion destroyed free will. Catharinus proposed an opinion, which was as it were in the middle between them both. God, he said, out of his goodness, chose a small number of men whom he would save absolutely, and accordingly prepared for them effectual and infallible means; and for the rest he willed also should be saved, and prepared for them a sufficient supply, which they were free to accept and be saved, or refuse and be condemned. Of these some are saved, though they are not of the number of the elect, because they will accept of this assistance; and others be damned, because they refuse to co-operate with God, who would willingly save them. The cause of the predestination of the first, is the sole will of God; the salvation of the second comes from their acceptance and good use of his grace; and the reprobation of the last from a foresight of their refusal of grace.29

It is important that those in attendance at the Council did not reach a final consensus regarding reprobation, which is why their final statement does not mention it. However, they desired to maintain a view of salvation where the majority of mankind can decide to make use of the grace of God or not. They maintained this based on one of the arguments raised against reprobation, which was man’s free will. The compromise to maintain man’s liberty and to allow for a system where works are appropriated or neglected by much of humanity (apart from the few elect) was synergism. This would become one of the chief tenets of the Council of Trent.

John Calvin (1509–1564 AD) John Calvin was an influential French theologian and pastor who started a school in Geneva that became the flagship institution for Reformed Protestantism. He was recruited by William Farel to help reform the church in Geneva, a place in which he would go on to regularly teach Scripture. The Reformers saw that their position on predestination was unanimous. While there were minor differences in explanation, 29 Mathias, Compendious History of the Council of Trent, 79–81. It is noteworthy that when you examine the whole section, not one Scripture is used by those who support the second opinion, while the first (which was eventually rejected) cited Romans 9 at length.

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they saw themselves in overall agreement on the matter of predestination. In fact, it ought to be recognized that the Counter Reformation also viewed the Protestant position as being in such agreement that they lump the Reformers together when they assemble their refutation of the Protestant doctrine of predestination. This can be reflected in Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion at various levels. In Calvin’s first few editions of the Institutes there was less attention given to Predestination, however, as the Catholics continued to assault the Protestant position on predestination, Calvin added clarity on the matter in each subsequent edition.30 The Reformers did not see themselves as novel thinkers in the area of predestination; rather, they saw their position as the historic and orthodox position of the Church dating back to the time of Augustine. Proof that Calvin understood his teachings as an extension of Augustine can be found in his declaration that, “Augustine is so wholly with me, that if I wished to write a confession of my faith, I could do so with all fullness and satisfaction to myself out of his writings.”31 Furthermore, Calvin states, “With Augustine I say: the Lord has created those whom he unquestionably foreknew would go to destruction. This has happened because he has willed it.”32 For the Protestant Reformation, the doctrine of predestination was no trivial or fringe matter; rather, it stood as a pillar of Christian orthodoxy. To stress its importance, Calvin stated, “No one who wishes to be thought religious dares simply deny predestination, by which God adopts some to hope of life, and sentences others to eternal death.”33 Like Zwingli, Calvin believed that what separated men is not anything within themselves, but rather is found in the sovereign will of God. He saw election and reprobation as both falling under God’s predestination of the eternal destinies of men, the elect and the reprobate. He stated, “Election itself could not stand except as set over against reprobation.”34 Continuing, Calvin added: God’s eternal decree, by which He compacted with Himself what He willed to become of each man. For all are not created in equal condition; rather, eternal life is foreordained for

30 Richard Muller tried to show that Calvinism was not to be identified strictly with Predestination exclusively. While Calvin offers much more to Reformed Scholasticism than writings on reprobation, nevertheless his contribution on this matter cannot be ignored. See Richard A. Muller, “Predestination and Christology in Sixteenth-Century Reformed Theology” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1976). 31 John Calvin, “A Treatise on the Eternal Predestination of God,” in John Calvin, Calvin’s Calvinism, trans. Henry Cole (Grandville, MI: Reformed Free Publishing Association, 1987), 38. 32 John Calvin, Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1960), 2:952 (§3.23.5). 33 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2:926 (§3.21.5). 34 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2:947 (§3.23.1).

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some, eternal damnation for others. Therefore, as any man has been created to one or the other of these ends, we speak of him as predestined to life or to death.35

Although Calvin does not give a precise definition of reprobation, he approaches a better definition when he states, Therefore, those whom God passes over, he condemns; and this he does for no other reason than that he wills to exclude them from the inheritance which he predestines for his own children[…]we have been taught that hardening is in God’s hand and will, just as much as mercy is [Rom. 9:14].36

Here it is possible to see that, for Calvin, reprobation rests in the uninfluenced will of God. His will is uninfluenced by foresight of any kind.37 According to Calvin, “God is said to have ordained from eternity those whom he wills to embrace in love, and those upon whom he wills to vent his wrath.”38 Furthermore, rejecting the Lombardian proposal, Calvin taught that reprobation is not based upon sin, but upon the will of God: “God elects as sons those whom He pleases, according to the good pleasure of His will, without any regard for merit, while He casts out and condemns others.”39 Calvin understood that the temporal damnation of the wicked along with their eternal punishment is not without basis in the temporal realm. It is not an arbitrary act of God; rather, it is always on account of human sin.40 Although Calvin does not articulate preterition and condemnation––the distinctions later developed under the heading of reprobation––he nevertheless taught these. Therefore, reprobation is based not merely on sin foreseen, but sin decreed by God: 35 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2:926 (§3.21.5). 36 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2:947–48 (§3.23.1). 37 There are many discussions as to which view of the Infralapsarianism and Supralapsarianism debate Calvin falls into. This will be a continual point of debate within the Reformed discussion on predestination. However, it has never been a point of serious division within the Reformed camp. See J. V. Fesko, Diversity within the Reformed Tradition: Supra- and Infralapsarianism in Calvin, Dort, and Westminster (Greenville, SC: Reformed Academic Press, 2001). Herman Bavinck is incorrect to conclude, “The churches, however, consistently opposed this supralapsarian scenario. As a result, there is not a single Reformed confession that contains it.” Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 2:366. Of the Calvinists at the Synod of Dort, a majority was comprised of supralapsarian delegates (perhaps a decisive majority). The confessions do not speak either in favor or in disagreement with either position (infra- or supra-). 38 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2:985 (§3.24.17). 39 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2:958 (§3.23.10). 40 For example, he states, “[L]et us, in lieu of reply, ask them, in turn, what they think God owes to man if He would judge him according to His own nature. As all of us are vitiated by sin, we can only be odious to God, and that not from tyrannical cruelty but by the fairest reckoning of justice. But if all whom the Lord predestines to death are by condition of nature subject to the judgment of death, of what injustice toward themselves may they complain?” Ibid., 2:950 (§3.23.3); see also §3.23.8; §3.22.7; §3.24.12.

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If God only foresaw human events, and did not also dispose and determine them by his decision, then there would be some point in raising this question: whether his foreseeing had anything to do with their necessity. But since he foresees future events only by reason of the fact that he decreed that they take place, they vainly raise a quarrel over foreknowledge, when it is clear that all things take place rather by his determination and bidding.41

In order for Calvin to conclude that God decreed the eternal judgment of the reprobate by eternally rejecting them from the inheritance of the elect, he appealed to compatibilism. In so doing, Calvin, like Luther, understood this as preserving God’s justice and mankind’s culpability. For example, he writes: For we do not say that the wicked sin of necessity in such a way as to imply that they sin without willful and deliberate evil intent. The necessity comes from the fact that God accomplishes his work, which is sure and steadfast, through them. At the same time, however, the will and purpose to do evil which dwells within them makes them liable to censure.42

Subsequent to Calvin and Luther, the Reformed tradition takes on a very definitive direction. Not only do the Reformers consistently apply the free will of God to the matter of reprobation, but the means of this reprobation are always according to a compatibilist understanding of the human will. Furthermore, it is always in such a way that God remains holy and the creature chargeable for all the sin men commit.

Bellarmine (1542–1621 AD) and Suarez (1548–1617 AD) Robert Bellarmine, an Italian Cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, and Francisco Suarez, who was a Spanish Jesuit priest, proved to be two Roman Catholics who did not follow the final conclusion of the Council of Trent, capitalizing, to some extent, on the liberty provided by Canon 17 to hold to double predestination. Bellarmine and Suarez were contemporaries of Calvin and other Reformers; however, they did not see eye to eye on this matter.43 Bellarmine writes: 41 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2:954–55 (§3.23.6). 42 He continues, “But, it is said, they are driven and forced to this by God. Indeed, but in such a way that in a single deed the action of God is one thing and their own action is another. For they gratify their evil and wicked desires, but God turns this wickedness so as to bring his judgments to execution.” Calvin, Bondage and Liberation of the Will, 37. See also, John Calvin, Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God, trans. J.K.S. Reid (London: James Clarke, 1961), 168–85. 43 There was a point when Bellarmine criticizes Calvin, and falsely accuses him of rejecting Augustine’s writings on the matter, however, Calvin did not reject Augustine but rather Peter Lombard’s interpretation of Augustine. See Jean-Louis Quantin, The Church of England and Christian Antiquity: The Construction of a Confessional Identity in the 17th Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 188.

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We say, reprobation is made up of two acts, one negative, the other positive[…]The first is God’s will not to save them; Then he has the will to condemn them; By the way, in the case of the first act, there is no cause on the part of men, just as it is with predestination. But in the latter the cause is the foresight of sin.44

Bellarmine was one of the first to change the traditional medieval terminology of “affirmative-negative” to “positive-negative” (although the terms have the same meaning). Of interest is the fact that within Catholicism there was, even post-Trent, a string of individuals who held to the earlier forms of reprobation and double predestination. Within the Catholic system, they were given liberty on the matter because the Roman Church was undecided. While Bellarmine was in the minority, he was not alone. His contemporary Suarez also taught the negative-positive elements of reprobation and even remarked that those distinctions were common.45

Heinrich Bullinger (1504–1575 AD) Heinrich Bullinger was a Swiss Reformer who became the head of the Zurich church as the successor of Ulrich Zwingli. His views have been the subject of much debate. He has been championed as the father of Covenantalism by many;46 nevertheless, there are some who believe that he taught a competing view of predes-

44 The full text is, “Dicimus deinde, reprobationem dous actus comprehendere, alterum negativum, alterum positivum; siquidem reprobi opponuntur electis contradictorie et contrarie. Primum enim non habet Deus voluntatem illos salvandi; deinde habet voluntatem eos damnandi; et quidem, quod attinet ad priorem actum, nulla datur ejus causa ex parte hominum, sicut neque praedestinationis. Posterioris autem datur causa praevisio peccati.” Roberti Bellarmini, Opera Omnia (Paris: Vives, 1873), 576. He also believed that the Pelagian error needed to be refuted by a proper understanding of predestination and he asserted the Calvinists errored on reprobation, because he understood them to be teaching that reprobation was predestination to sin (see ibid., 575). His mischaracterization of Calvinism will be shown in the sections to follow, since they repudiated a predestination to sin. 45 Garrigou-Lagrange, Predestination, 158. 46 Vos believes that the sermons of Bullinger, enclosed in five books called The Decades, follow the structure of the covenant idea. See Geerhardus Vos, Redemptive History and Biblical Thought, ed. Richard B. Gaffin (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1980), 236. Heinrich Bullinger’s A Brief Exposition of the One and Eternal Testament or Covenant of God (1534) was the first book devoted to Covenant theology. An English translation may be found here: Charles S. McCoy and J. Wayne Baker, Fountainhead of Federalism: Heinrich Bullinger and the Covenant Tradition (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1991), 101–38. Perhaps it could be said that Bullinger was the first to recognize, via the discipline of biblical theology, the role of the covenant framework. He stated, “The entire sum of piety consists in these very brief main parts of the covenant.” Ibid., 112. It is interesting to note that Bullinger never taught a Covenant of Works or a Covenant of Redemption (creation). His contribution to covenant theology was to insist that “covenant” was the central theme of Scripture.

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tination that would have been at odds with the Reformed tradition.47 In particular, one view asserts that Bullinger believed in single predestination and viewed Calvin’s double predestination position as being too harsh.48 His views on predestination are primarily preserved in a series of letters between himself and Calvin, the first of which was concerning a man named Hieronymus Bolsec, who publically denied Zwingli and Calvin’s view. As a result, Bolsec became the center of attention in the Zurich controversy on predestination in 1560 AD. While imprisoned in Geneva, he claimed to teach single predestination and cited Melanchthon and Bullinger as supporters.49 Geneva asked Bullinger to comment on the claims of Bolsec and to present his view of predestination. He stated, “Therefore, however many men are preserved, they are preserved by the mere grace of God the savior; those who perish do not perish by virtue of being compelled by a fatal necessity, but because they willingly reject the grace of God.”50 From this, it can be observed that Bullinger believed in the Reformed mantra of Sola Gratia. Nevertheless, the mischaracterization of “fatal necessity” was a subtle critique of Calvin and Zwingli’s position on the matter. Furthermore, he wrote, “Now believe me, many are offended by your statements on predestination in your Institutes, and from that Hieronymus has drawn the same conclusion as he did from Zwingli’s book on providence[…]the reprobate perish on account of their own guilt, and not by the malice of God.”51 Finally, he questioned Calvin’s view: “That God not only foresaw but also predestined and dispensed the fall of Adam, this seems to be a manner of speaking about the origin of evil and the cause of sin which can be turned around so that God himself is the author of sin.”52 As a result he calls Calvin’s view harsh. Shortly after these letters, Bullinger’s disagreement with Calvin became common knowledge. English theologian Bartholomdus Taheronus (who was in 47 From this some have concluded that Bullinger taught a contrary view of predestination by emphasizing covenants versus decree, e. g., J. Wayne Baker, Heinrich Bullinger and the Covenant: The Other Reformed Tradition (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1980). Baker writes, “Bullinger’s was the other Reformed tradition. The core of this tradition was the covenant, and the issues on which Bullinger most clearly disagreed with the Calvinist Reformed tradition-predestination and the Christian community.” Ibid., 165. For those who see some discontinuity in Bullinger’s view of predestination yet maintain he is within traditional Reformed theology, see Cornelis P. Venema, Heinrich Bullinger and the Doctrine of Predestination: Author of “the Other Reformed Tradition”? (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002). 48 Bullinger took issue with “absolute double predestination” as taught by Calvin, according to Baker, Heinrich Bullinger and the Covenant, 169. 49 Cornelis P. Venema, “Heinrich Bullinger’s Correspondence on Calvin’s Doctrine of Predestination, 1551–1553,” SCJ 17, no. 4 (1986): 438. 50 Translation and citation from Venema, “Heinrich Bullinger’s Correspondence,” 439–40. Subsequent translations from Bullinger will be taken from Venema as well. 51 Venema, “Heinrich Bullinger’s Correspondence,” 441. 52 Venema, “Heinrich Bullinger’s Correspondence,” 442.

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agreement with Calvin) wrote to Bullinger to see whether he had adopted Melanchthon’s synergistic views on providence, predestination, and free will.53 Venema explains Bullinger’s response when he writes, “The letter amounted to a substantial treatise in which Bullinger dealt with providence, the three-fold status of the human will, and predestination. In the letter, he sought to distance himself from Melanchthon’s synergism without embracing the strong statements of Calvin on predestination.”54 His solution to this tension was to speak about predestination without referring to it as an eternal decree, but primarily temporal providence. Introducing the concept of divine “permission,” he sought to solve the problems he perceived to be inherent in Calvin’s double predestination and Melanchthon’s synergism. For Bullinger, permission was not a deistic detachment from creation, but rather, God’s granting permission to sin, which he did not will or compel anyone to do. With respect to the will, he affirmed Augustine, Luther, and Calvin’s understanding of concurrence. Based on this, it becomes apparent that Bullinger’s definitions are starkly different from Calvin’s. Yet, when he defines predestination he reads similar to Calvin, to the extent that without such a subtle distinction, it would appear that they were in complete agreement. He writes, Furthermore, predestination, preordination, or predetermination—that is the ordination of all things to a certain end by God from eternity. However, the Lord has primarily destined every man, and this is his holy and just counsel, his just decree. Now the elect of God from eternity he justly elects some to life, others to destruction. The cause of election and predestination is nothing other than the good and just will of God, undeserved in the salvation of the elect, yet deserved in the damnation and rejection of the reprobate.55

Statements like this are what have led to the confusion surrounding Bullinger. Whether he was a friend of Reformed theology, or foe of Reformed theology, or a pioneer of something new altogether, the language he employs merely heightens the uncertainty of his position. Not only did he introduce the concept of permission with respect to God’s control over sin and sinners (an apparent denial of meticulous sovereignty), but he also attributed the ultimate cause of damnation to the rejection of the Gospel by the non-elect rather than within God’s will. Based on this theological framework, God rejects, or reprobates, men on the basis that they rejected the Gospel. Ultimately, Bullinger presents two unique contributions to the discussion of reprobation. First, he introduces a perspective affirming single predestination, yet remaining distinct from both Melanchthon and the synergism of Roman Ca53 There are no complete records of these letters. 54 Venema, “Heinrich Bullinger’s Correspondence,” 443–44. 55 Venema, “Heinrich Bullinger’s Correspondence,” 445.

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tholicism. Secondly, he introduces the idea of “permission” into the divine rejection of the wicked. This appears to (hypothetically) place election in God’s independent will (to counter synergism) and to place reprobation on the basis of God’s foresight of human rejection allowed by divine permission.56

Peter Martyr Vermigil (1500–1562 AD) Peter Martyr Vermigli was an Italian-born Reformed theologian. He fled Italy for England when he converted to Protestantism and, as a result, he influenced the Edwardian Reformation, including the Eucharistic service of the 1552 Book of Common Prayer. He wrote during the Zurich controversy of 1560 AD. He taught a medieval view of predestination, being that of the elect only, leaving reprobation to be contingent on foreknowledge (similar to Peter Lombard).57 He defined reprobation as, “God’s most wise design by which before all eternity he firmly decreed, without any injustice, not to have mercy on those whom he has not loved but passed by, in order that by their just condemnation he might declare his wrath toward sins and also his glory.”58 Vermigli exclusively referred to reprobation in terms of God’s rejection, or passing over, of the non-elect. This follows the more negative definitions found in the Middle Ages. The contribution of Vermigli comes through a twofold cause of reprobation. He distinguishes between eternal reprobation and its temporal punishment in damnation, which was not an uncommon distinction, but he attributes different originating causes to these two elements of reprobation. He writes, Forasmuch as predestination is the purpose or will of God, and the same will is the first cause of all things, which is one and the selfsame with the substance of God; it is not possible, that there should be any cause thereof. Howbeit, we do not therefore deny, but that sometimes may be shewed some reason of the will of God: which although they may be called reasons, yet ought they not be called causes, especially efficient causes. But that in

56 Sinnema notes that the Arminians appealed to Bullinger’s position to justify their own. See Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 119. 57 For more on Vermigil’s view of predestination, see J.C. McCelland, “The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination according to Peter Martyr,” SJT 8 (1955): 255–71. It has been considerably demonstrated that Vermigil was influenced by Bucer; see J.P. Donnelly, Calvinism and Scholasticism in Vermigli’s Doctrine of Man and Grace (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 124–40. See also James, Peter Martyr Vermigli and Predestination, 223–44. 58 Translation by Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 65. Of, Peter Martyr, Loci Communes (London, 1583), 451.

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the scriptures are sometimes assigned reasons of the will of God, may be many placed to be gathered[…]But that there are final causes of the predestination of God, we deny not.59

According to Vermigli, the first cause of reprobation (God’s passing over) cannot be known because it is in the hidden will of God, not in foresight of sin by any means. However, the second cause (damnation) was sin.60

Theodore Beza (1519–1605 AD) Theodore Beza was the successor of Calvin in Geneva.61 Beza has been inseparably linked with supralapsarianism; however, this position does not commandeer one’s view on the cause or execution of the doctrine of reprobation, merely the timing of its origin. Beza is often mischaracterized as an “ivory tower academic” based on his position at the school in Geneva. Yet, his arguments on the cause and execution of reprobation are not steeped in philosophical metaphysics; rather, his defense is drawn from Romans 9 and other texts.62 Beza spends a great amount of time articulating various elements of reprobation. He distinguishes between the cause and execution of reprobation and their respective sources, stating, We have to distinguish, in the plan [reprobation], that of rejection and condemnation. Rejection is hidden from us in the mystery of God, and the other [condemnation], gives us the reason for destruction. This reason being, given to us in the Word of God, expressed by “corruption,” “unbelief,” and “the iniquity of the vessels of dishonor” to his Maker.63

59 Peter Martyr Vermigli, “Predestination and the Thirty-nine Articles,” trans. and commentary by David Neelands, in A Companion to Peter Martyr Vermigli, ed. Torrance Kirby, Emidio Campi, and Frank A. James III (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 363. 60 Ibid., 365. Needlands believes that Peter Martyr held to a form of double predestination but election was only unto life and God’s role in reprobation was strictly passive, contra Donnelly, Calvinism and Scholasticism, 132. 61 John S. Bray believes that Beza distorted Calvin’s teaching through philosophical rationalism. He states, “Romans 9 has been exploited by Beza as an opportunity to expound his theory of predestination. Thus one discovers that Beza has read into the text of Romans 9 controversies in which he himself was involved.” John S. Bray, Theodore Beza’s Doctrine of Predestination (Nieuwkoop: DeGraaf, 1975), 73. However this is far from the case. Bray’s theory has been thoroughly refuted, see Raymond A. Blacketer, “The Man in the Black Hat: Theodore Beza and the Reorientation of Early Reformed Historiography,” in Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of Richard A. Muller on a Maturation of a Theological Tradition, ed., Jordan J. Ballor, David S. Sytsma, and Jason Zuidema (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 227–41. 62 Blacketer, “The Man in the Black Hat,” 237. 63 “Debemus enim inter reprobandi propositum & reprobationem ipsam distinguere. Nam illius mysterium nobis occultum esse voluit Deus: istius autem, & exitii quoque quod ab ea

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At this point, Beza is drawing from an established tradition that highlights the negative-positive elements of reprobation. Furthermore, he affirms the ultimate cause of reprobation to be God’s sovereign will and the meritorious cause to be the culpability of man’s sin: Nevertheless, to carry out the plan for his eternal glory, which was dependent upon his infinite wisdom, [he determined] both the elect and reprobate. As for salvation, he made his elect as the sign of his mercy, and the wicked condemned to show his justice, it is necessary that both cases include stubbornness and sin, however as all believers, which is the elect, have mercy. And the vice in the reprobate is proof of their just condemnation, to whom it has not been granted to believe in the mysteries of God.64

Beza, in a letter to Calvin regarding debates on the issue, spends time explaining the proper role of secondary causes: So if someone asks concerning the cause by which God should have decided from all eternity to elect some and to condemn others, I think that we must reply by saying that this is in order that God’s immense power may be made known better. But if they then ask about the “material cause” (as they call it) of this decree, then I have nothing to point to other than the will of God, who has just as much freedom [over the creation] as the potter, by which he can produce one vessel for honor, and the other for disgrace[…]In responding to these questions, I would not appeal to “secondary causes,” among which number are included Christ and Adam, but rather to what follows on from this. The question does not concern the degree of election or reprobation, but their execution. There are ordained secondary causes for the execution of the divine counsel.65

From this it becomes evident that secondary causes do not have a role in the ultimate plan of God; the ultimate cause of all things is the will of God. He has not disclosed his purposes beyond the fact that the vessels of wrath, of whom he dependet, causa habemus in verbo Dei expressas, nimiru corruptionem, infidelitatem, & iniquitatem vasoru ad contumelia factoru.” Théodore de Bèze, Tractationes Theologicae (Crispinus, 1570), 1:176. This has led Lynne Courter Boughton to surmise, “Beza, applying this study of causation to the manner of predestination, ultimately developed a supralapsarian doctrine which, in its harshest but most precise form, proposed that God’s decrees to create man and to permit the sin of Adam were means to the accomplishment of a prior decree to reveal divine glory through the predestination of men to either election or reprobation.” Courter Boughton, “Supralapsarianism and the Role of Metaphysics in SixteenthCentury Reformed Theology,” WTJ 48, no. 1 (1986): 65. 64 “Dominvs vt aeternum illud consilium ad gloriam saum exequeretur, viam quondam sibi muniit pro sau infinita sapientia, vtrisque tum eligendis, tum reprobandis communem. Quum enim in electorum salute constituisset insigne misericordiae suae specimen edere: itemque in reprobis condemnandis iustum suum iudicium ostendere, necesse suit vy vtrosque sub contumacia & peccato includeret, vt omnium credentium, id est, electorum misereatur. & econ trario vt iustae damnationis argumentum in iis inueniat, quibus neque credere, neque mysteria Dei noffe datum est.” Ibid., 177. 65 Alister E. McGrath, ed., The Christian Theology Reader, 3rd ed. (Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 451.

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disapproves of all of their sin, are to display the glory of his justice. However, secondary causes are important for discussion when it comes to the meritorious cause of damnation (or the execution of the decree), as it is based on the sin of the wicked. This distinction between the decree and its execution becomes a fixture in the development of reprobation in Reformed orthodoxy.

John Knox (1513–1572 AD) John Knox is regarded as the founder of the Presbyterian Church in Scotland and is known primarily for his evangelistic endeavors to win Scotland to Protestantism. He also helped translate the Geneva Bible, which included marginal notes on the doctrine of predestination (both election and reprobation).66 The letters of Knox demonstrate that he affirmed the doctrine of double predestination even before meeting Calvin and studying under Beza in Geneva.67 Knox believed that nothing happened outside of God’s will; nothing was to be attributed to circumstance or chance. The foreknowledge of God was not based on passive foresight, but determinative decree. The fact that Knox affirmed a form of double predestination has been unanimously confirmed. He stated, “The Elect can not finally perish, neither yet that the Reprobate can never be saved, we constantly affirm[…]our doctrine is this, that because the Reprobate have not the Spirit of regeneration, therefore they can not do those works that be acceptable before God.”68 Knox included both election and reprobation under the heading of predestination and believed that all humanity was subject to God’s decree of predestination before the world began.69 It is important to note that Knox, like all others before him, placed more emphasis on election than reprobation.70 Knox also had a firm belief that the reason for all of God’s decrees, election and reprobation included, was to display the glory of God: “Seeing that God’s glory must needs shine in all his creatures, yea, even in the perpetual damnation of Satan, and torment of the Reprobate, why shall now he will, and take pleasure, that so it 66 Dan G. Danner, “The Theology of the Geneva Bible: A Study in English Protestantism” (PhD diss., University of Iowa, 1967), 164–67. 67 Richard Kyle, “The Concept of Predestination in the Thought of John Knox,” WTJ 46, no. 1 (1984): 59. Kyle shows Knox’s view on reprobation throughout his works very well in this article. 68 John Knox, “On Predestination, in Answer to the Cavillations by an Anabaptist, 1560,” in The Works of John Knox, ed. David L. Laing (1878; repr., Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth, 2014), 5:394. I have modernized all the spelling of words, hereafter cited as Works. 69 Knox, Works, 5:36, 73. 70 Knox, Works, 5.61.

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come to pass.”71 God’s glory is therefore demonstrated through his justice upon the wicked. He saw the decree of reprobation as equally immutable and divinely determined in the same manner as election.72 Furthermore, he considered the source of the decree to be God’s hidden will and not the foreseen acts of the creature: “That albeit the cause of God’s will be incomprehensible, secret, and hid from us, when of the same mass he ordained some vessels to honor and some to destruction, yet it is most just, most holy, and most to be reverenced.”73 Knox demonstrates a unique comprehension on the matter that many of his contemporaries lacked. While Knox was not systematic in his presentation of the doctrine, he demonstrates an acute accuracy in articulating the elements of reprobation. He expresses both the negative-positive elements and the primary-secondary causes of reprobation. The negative element of reprobation, preterition (or passing over), is the primary manner of which Knox spoke. He maintains that God, “leaves to themselves to languish in their corruption[…]till that they come to perdition.”74 He continues on, stating, “that God in his eternal counsel[…]hath of one mass chosen vessels of honor[…]and of the same mass he hath left others in that corruption in which they were to fall, and so were they prepared to destruction.”75 The positive element, condemnation, is also present in Knox: “And from that same eternity he hath reprobate others, whom[…]he shall adjudge to torments and fire unextinguishable.”76 With regard to the causes of reprobation, Knox affirmed two elements: the primary and secondary causes. He was not hesitant to place God as the primary cause. Like Zwingli, Knox believed the hidden will of God was the primary cause of all things.77 He stated, “But because that in his Word there is no cause assigned (God’s good will only excepted) why he hath chosen some and rejected others.”78 For Knox, the secondary cause, the chargeable cause of sin, is always man. In this way, God is never the cause of sin. He states, “Man therefore falls (God’s providence is ordaining), but yet he falls by his own fault.”79 Furthermore, like Augustine and Calvin before him, he places the fault for man’s falling on the sinful nature of man. He claimed that regardless of the gospel offer, or God’s kindness to all men, the reprobate flee God and cannot love him.80 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80

Knox, Works, 5:405. Knox, Works, 5:405–6. Knox, Works, 5:38. Knox, Works, 5:125–26. Knox, Works, 5:112–13. Knox, Works, 5:61. Knox, Works, 5:39. Knox, Works, 5:391. Knox, Works, 5:71. Knox, Works, 3:13–75.

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Jerome Zanchi (1515–1590 AD) Jerome Zanchi was an Italian Protestant Reformer and theologian. He was one of the first Reformed theologians to debate the post-Melanchthon Lutheran scholars on the matter of predestination. In Strasbourg in the early 1560s, he developed his argument against John Marbach. Zanchi affirmed predestination on the basis of the character of God. While other scholars had highlighted the will of God or the sovereignty of God, Zanchi emphasized the eternal nature of God in order to develop his doctrine of reprobation. He defined it as follows: Now, God does, and will do, nothing, but in consequence of his own decree[…]therefore, the condemnation of the unrighteous was decreed of God; and, if decreed by him, decreed from everlasting: for all his decrees are eternal. Besides, if God purposed to leave those persons under the guilt and power of sin, their condemnation must of itself necessarily follow[…]Therefore, if God determined within himself thus to leave some in their sins he must also have determined within himself to punish them for those sins but God did determine both to leave and to punish the non-elect: therefore there was a reprobation from eternity.81

The decree of God is not dependent on foreknowledge of the future, but is instead of his own free will from eternity past; therefore, the decree itself is an eternal decree. This issue would be raised again at the Synod of Dort since, as Zanchi asserted, Scripture always speaks of predestination as an eternal act of God before the foundation of the world. He taught that reprobation had multiple parts, stating, for example: We distinguish between preterition, or bare non-election, which is purely a negative thing; a condemnation, or appointment to punishment: the will of God was the cause of the former, the sins of the non-elect are the reasons for the latter. Though God determined to leave, and actually does leave, whom he pleases[…]yet he does not positively condemn any of these merely because he hath not chosen them, but because they have sinned against him.82

For Zanchi, there are three aspects of reprobation. The first is the efficient cause: God’s will. This is God’s rejection of the non-elect from grace. The second is assigning the non-elect to dishonorable use. Zanchi states, “Some men were from all eternity not only negatively accepted from a participation of Christ and his 81 Jerome Zanchius, The Doctrine of Absolute Predestination Stated and Asserted, trans. Augustus Toplady (1811; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1971), 145. Interestingly, Sinnema believes the Toplady translation to be unreliable. However, when compared with his own translations it seems Toplady catches the sense just as well. Though Sinnema does not substantiate why he does not like the translation work of Toplady, it is likely because Toplady does not regularly cite which area of the work he is translating from. See note 131 in “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort (1618–19),” 123. 82 Zanchius, Absolute Predestination, 146.

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salvation; but positively ordained to continue in their natural blindness, hardness of heart, and that by the just judgment of God.”83 Finally, the third aspect is condemnation to eternal death on account of sin. While God destines the reprobate to eternal damnation, it is not unjust because it is always on account of their actual sin. God has the right to withhold grace, since it is owed to none, and God has the right to hold men accountable to sin, since he is a just judge. While these are both elements of reprobation from before the world began, they cannot be said to be the cause of sin. The hardness of the reprobate heart is the cause of sin, not the reprobation itself. He explains further, stating, “[Reprobation] by no means follows from these premises, that God is therefore the cause of sin; for sin is nothing but illegality, want of conformity to the divine law, 1 John 3:4, a mere privation of rectitude; consequently, being itself a thing purely negative, it can have no positive or efficient causes, but only a negative and deficient one.”84 Since God withholds grace, men naturally and freely sin, and from eternity past God chose to hold them accountable.85

Reformed Confessions Prior to the Synod of Dort During the sixteenth century, a number of primary confessions were used among the Reformed churches prior to the Synod of Dort, including the Belgic Confession (1561 AD), Heidelberg Catechism (1563 AD), and the Second Helvetic Confession (1566 AD). These confessions reflect, in a unique way, the development and articulation of the doctrine of reprobation from the time of Luther until the convening of the Synod of Dort. They represent perspectives that would have been objected to by those involved in the Remonstrance. The first is the Belgic Confession. It contains, in article 16, a statement on election: We believe that all the posterity of Adam, being this fallen into perdition and ruin by the sin of our first parents, God then did manifest Himself such as He is; that is to say, merciful and just: merciful, since He delivers and preserves from this perdition all whom He, in His eternal and unchangeable counsel, of mere goodness hath elected in Christ Jesus our Lord, without any respect to works; just, in leaving others in the fall and perdition wherein they have involved themselves.86

83 Zanchius, Absolute Predestination, 143. 84 Zanchius, Absolute Predestination, 95. 85 For the development of the relationship between first and final causes in the theology of Girolamo Zanchi, see Otto Gründier, “Thomism and Calvinism in the Theology of Girolamo Zanchi (1516–1590)” (PhD diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1963). 86 Beeke and Ferguson, “The Belgic Confession (1561),” 28.

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Within this confession there is little given regarding reprobation; the term “perdition” is used in its place. Yet, this substitution of terminology is not intended to deny or soften reprobation because, as former periods of history have indicated, this was a common way of referring to the negative aspect of reprobation. In like manner, this confession highlights the negative element of reprobation.87 The second confession of this period is the Heidelberg Catechism, which has no direct statement on the matter of reprobation. Although it mentions “everlasting condemnation”88 and “gathers[…]out of the whole human race,”89 the language of predestination is scarce. Since it was intended to be used to teach young children, it is brief on the matters it addresses. Understanding the background of the Reformed tradition at this time in history is the only real indicator that it was assumed by certain phrases. A more lengthy statement found in the third major confession, the Second Helvetic Confession (1566 AD), has a number of statements in section 10. Article 4 warns against knowing the hidden will of God and those numbered among the reprobate.90 It encourages evangelism even though there are men who are reprobate, because who they are is unknown.91 It tells believers to take heart in assurance of salvation on the basis of predestination.92 More importantly, it condemns those, both elect and reprobate, who think that they can live a lifestyle of sin because of the doctrine of predestination. Article 6 of section 10 states the following: Wherefore we do not allow of the wicked speeches of some who say, few are chosen, and seeing I know not whether I am in the number of these few, I will not defraud my nature of her desires. Others there are who say, if I be predestined and chosen by God, nothing can hinder me from salvation, which is already certainly appointed to me, whatsoever I do at any time; but if I be in the number of the reprobate, no faith or repentance will help me, seeing the decree of God can not be changed.93

While the doctrine of reprobation is not taught in its own article, it is assumed throughout the confession, as can be seen in the statement above. A number of other confessions were in use in the church prior to the Synod of Dort. Some of these, especially the earliest, contain no reference to reprobation. Others allude to reprobation but make no direct statement about it.94 Among these 87 This Confession also appears to be overtly assuming the infralapsarian position even though this was not a matter of debate at the time of its drafting. 88 Beeke and Ferguson, “Heidelberg Catechism (1563),” in Reformed Confessions Harmonized, 196 (Q. 52). 89 Beeke and Ferguson, “Heidelberg Catechism (1563),” 28 (Q. 54). 90 Beeke and Ferguson, “Second Helvetic Confession (1566),” in Reformed Confessions Harmonized, 28 (X. 4). 91 Beeke and Ferguson, “Second Helvetic Confession (1566),” 29–30 (X. 5, 8). 92 Beeke and Ferguson, “Second Helvetic Confession (1566),” 30–31 (X. 9). 93 Beeke and Ferguson, “Second Helvetic Confession (1566),” 30 (X.6). 94 B.B. Warfield, “Predestination in the Reformed Confessions,” PRR 12 (1901): 118–19.

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confessions are the first Basel Confession (1534 AD), the Hungarian Confession (1557–1558 AD), the English Forty Two articles (1553 AD), and Thirty Nine articles (1563–1571 AD). Princeton theologian Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield gave two reasons why reprobation might have been omitted. First, it was already assumed and implied, hence it did not need a separate section. Second, since these were intended as brief statements for children, the doctrine of reprobation was believed to be too complex for simple Christians.95 Either of these could serve as valid explanations.

95 Warfield, “Predestination in the Reformed Confessions,” 122–24. G.C. Berkouwer critiques both of these conclusions. First, he says it is not fully formed (“the confessional manner of speaking is not yet clarified”) and then second, that it is not necessary because “there is an intuitive and reflexive understanding of the Scriptural message of election.” G.C. Berkouwer, Divine Election (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1960), 195. Sinnema agrees with Berkouwer on the critique of the first reason, but not the second. See Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 125n157. However, the fact that the Dutch churches which held these confessions were the ones which gathered, drafted, and ratified the lengthy statements on reprobation at the Council of Dort proves they were commonly held by their members.

Chapter Four: The English Reformation and Reprobation

The English Reformation (16th and 17th Century) The next period in Church history where men separated from Roman Catholicism is known as the English Reformation. Although the English Reformation was hurried along for political reasons (the desire of King Henry VIII to leave his wife), nevertheless, it was progress on a theological level. This eventually provoked a series of violent disputes that led to the English Civil War. Due to their convictions, Protestant theologians found themselves at odds, on many occasions, with leaders in the government. One such example was the establishment of the Anglican Church as the official Church of England along with prescribed beliefs, worship practices, and church structures. One of the standards was The Book of Common Prayer, which was not well received by many in England. The major theological movement that rejected the authority of Anglicanism was led by the Puritans. The Puritans sought to “purify” the Church of England by continuing to apply the principals of the Reformation throughout the church. Predestination saw great development and strong affirmations through the period of the English Reformation. William Perkins (1558–1602 AD) William Perkins was an influential English pastor and Cambridge theologian. Though he died at a relatively young age, his influence was extensive. Perkins brought the strong Reformed views of Calvin and Beza into popularity in England and is known for his strong views on predestination (supralapsarianism in particular). He defines reprobation as, “That part of predestination, whereby God, according to the most free and just purpose of his will, hath determined to reject certain men unto eternal destruction, and misery, and that to the praise of his justice.”1 The reason for God’s determination is the manifestation of his own 1 Perkins, Works, 1:106.

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glory. For Perkins, as well as Beza, God’s desired end (to display his glory) was determined before the means were determined. In the minds of these two men, predestination is not primarily about what it does for man, but how it manifests the glory of God. Perkins understood that the chief accusation against reprobation is that it makes God the author of sin. He is keen to address this accusation, and it is given careful attention in how he defines predestination in general. Perkins, like all Reformed theologians, rejects the idea that God is the author of sin. He admits that God has decreed all things, including the Fall, but does not conclude that this makes God the chargeable cause. As Perkins states, “We must not think that man’s fall was by chance, or by God’s failure to know it, or by barely winking at it, or by permitting it, or by allowing it against his will. Rather, miraculously, it happened, ‘not without the will of God, yet without all approbation of it.’”2 God did not make Adam sin. He did not infuse darkness into the heart of Adam. He simply held back the grace necessary for Adam to stand. This makes the devil and Adam joint heirs in the blame for sin. In this respect, Perkins demonstrates how God is not the meritorious nor chargeable cause of sin. He states, “The Devil attempting our overthrow, and Adam’s will, which when it began to be proved by temptations, did not desire God’s assistance, but voluntarily bent itself to fall away.”3 God held Adam to the standard of righteousness, and his decree to remove grace did not limit Adam’s freedom in any way. On account of this, Perkins spends a significant amount of time developing the doctrine of causality and compatibilism. By establishing these doctrines, he removes the accusation that God forces the human will.4 Perkins explains that God’s decree did not cause damnation; Adam’s voluntary sin did. Since God chose not to assist Adam by intervening (nor did Adam ask for assistance) the consequence was sin. Therefore, it can be said that the outcome of reprobation is sin, but sin is never the direct effect of reprobation.5 With these elements in mind, Perkins’ definition of predestination is careful to preserve God’s sovereignty and man’s volition: [God] doth all together order every event, partially by inclining and gently bending the will in all things that are good, and partly by forsaking it in things that are evil: yet the will of the creature, left unto itself, is carried headlong of [its] own accord, not of

2 William Perkins, The Work of William Perkins, vol. 3, The Courtenay Library of Reformation Classics, ed. Ian Breward (Abingdon, England: Sutton Courtenay Press, 1970), 197–98. 3 Perkins, Works, 2:607. 4 Perkins, Works, 2:619. 5 Perkins, Works, 1:294.

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necessity in itself, but contingently that way which the decree of God determined from eternity.6

Based on this, it is asserted that reprobation has two facets. The first is the plan of God not to intervene. The second is the right of God to judge the actions of man. This second facet––holding men accountable––is dependent upon man’s sin. In this way, it would be erroneous to conclude that men are absolutely predestined to hell, since God always incorporates the means of man’s sin.

William Whitaker (1548–1595 AD) William Whitaker was one of the leading figures among the Cambridge Calvinist theologians. Whitaker is historically recognized for drafting the Lambeth Articles (1591), which are also referred to as the Nine Articles.7 Queen Elizabeth I, known as anti-Puritan and hostile to Calvinism, was not pleased with the Articles since they were drafted without her consent. These Articles were intended to define Calvinist doctrine regarding predestination. They are as follows: 1. The eternal election of some to life, and the reprobation of others to death. 2. The moving cause of predestination to life is not the foreknowledge of faith and good works, but only the good pleasure of God. 3. The number of the elect is unalterably fixed. 4. Those who are not predestinated to life shall necessarily be damned for their sins. 5. The true faith of the elect never fails finally nor totally. 6. A true believer, or one furnished with justifying faith, has a full assurance and certainty of remission and everlasting salvation in Christ. 7. Saving grace is not communicated to all men. 8. No man can come to the Son unless the Father shall draw him, but all men are not drawn by the Father. 9. It is not in everyone’s will and power to be saved.8 6 Perkins, Works, 2:621. 7 For more on this, see Buis, Historic Protestantism and Predestination, 88–89; H.C. Porter, Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 344–90; W.D. Sargeaunt, “The Lambeth Articles,” JTS 12, no. 46 (1911): 251–60, and JTS 12, no. 47 (1911): 427–36. There are some who believe these were not overtly Calvinistic but were adapted by John Whitgift to moderate Calvinism. See Peter White, Predestination, Policy and Polemic: Conflict and Consensus in the English Church from the Reformation to the Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 101, 107–10. However, the final product was brought by the English representatives at the Synod of Dort to condemn the Arminian controversy. 8 Philip Schaff, Creeds of Christendom: with a History and Critical Notes (1877; repr., New York: Harper & Brothers, 1977), 1:660.

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Whitaker, believing that these articles fell within bounds of the Thirty-Nine articles already in existence, held that reprobation was the necessary corollary to the doctrine of election as taught in the Thirty-Nine articles. The Lambeth articles were revised and modified to receive wider acceptance by John Whitgift, the archbishop of Canterbury. The modified version (aforementioned) does not reflect unconditional reprobation in terms of the cause being God’s decree, however, it does express that sin is the cause of damnation. Whitaker taught a traditional view of negative reprobation that was prevalent at that time, limiting reprobation strictly to the decree (the decree not to elect) rather than extending it to include its execution (damnation).9

Cambridge Predestination Controversy (1595 AD) The Cambridge Predestination controversy was the result of multiple debates, books, and sermons written amongst competing schools of thought. William Barrett preached an anti-Calvinist sermon at Church of St. Mary the Great in Cambridge that vilified Calvin, Beza, Zanchi, and many other Calvinists.10 Barrett was summoned on multiple occasions to repent of the “irreverent” manner with which he attacked fellow Cambridge fellows and Calvinists. The administration would eventually call for a review of his various teachings. However, before this happened, he fled the country and converted to Roman Catholicism.11 The drafting of the Lambeth articles arose from this dispute, but it was not universally welcomed. This statement was an attempt by Calvinists to get a clearer articulation of predestination and reprobation added to the Thirty-Nine Articles; it failed, however, to gain acceptance.12 One major advisor to William Perkins and

9 For more on his doctrine, see Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 89. W.J. Torrance Kirby is incorrect to assume that Perkins or Whitaker believed in symmetrical causes in reprobation and salvation. This is a complete disregard of what Perkins was careful to show in explaining causality and the differences between election and reprobation, as shown above. See W.J. Torrance Kirby, Richard Hooker and the English Reformation (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer Science+Business Media, 2003), 59. 10 W.B. Patterson, William Perkins and the Making of a Protestant England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 37. 11 Augustus Robert Buckland, “Barret, William (1595),” Dictionary of National Biography, ed. Leslie Stephen (London: Smith, Elder & Co, 1885), 3:280–81. 12 Thomas Fuller, The Church History of Britain: From the Birth of Jesus Christ until the Year 1648 (London: T. Tegg, 1837), 3:149. However, they were later adopted into the Irish Articles (1615). Philip Schaff further notes, “They are still more important as the connecting link between the Thirty-nine Articles and the Westminster Confession, and as the chief source of the latter.” Schaff, Creeds of Christendom, 3:526.

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the Lambeth articles was Peter Baro.13 Peter Baro, in his work Suma Trium de Praedestinatione Sententiarum, has summarized three main positions prevalent at the time,14 the first position being that the cause of the decree of reprobation was unconditional. He attributes this to Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and Beza.15 The second position, held by Bellarmine and Zanchi, places the cause of reprobation on foreknown sin and holds to unconditional election.16 The third position, Baro’s view (which he claimed was held by the early Church, the early Augustine, and Melanchthon), taught conditional election and conditional reprobation.17 This third position that Baro presents became a turning point in the reprobation debate because it contained what would be taken and developed by Jacobus Arminius. He states the following: Wherefore God has predestined such as he from all eternity foreknew would believe on Christ[…]that he was prepared to bestow upon every one of them all the aids both of nature and grace, that were necessary for obtaining that blessedness, and to remove out of the way those hindrances which might prevent them from obtaining it; and that he has not willed concerning any man, to exclude him from the society of the blessed, or to be consigned to eternal torments, without having previously taken his sin into consideration[…]the Theology which it inculcates constantly holds to the two following axioms as the greatest verities and depending on the plain and manifest word of God: (1) ‘It is the will of God, that all men be saved and that none perish; and (2) Christ has died for all.’18

Prior to Arminius, this paradigm was labeled by many as “New Pelagianism.” Perkins, in particular, described adherents to this belief as, “the old and new Pelagians; who place the cause of God’s predestination in man.”19 His assertion

13 Mark E. Dever, Richard Sibbes: Puritanism and Calvinism in Late Elizabethan and Early Stuart England (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2000), 23. H.C. Porter, Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958), 376–90. For an article concerning the connections between Baro and Arminius, see Keith D. Stanglin, “‘Arminius Avant La Lettre’: Peter Baro, Jacob Arminius, and the Bond Of Predestinarian Polemic,” WTJ 67, no. 1 (2005): 51–74. 14 The English translation is found here: Jacob Arminius, “Summary of Three Opinions Concerning Predestination,” in The Works of James Arminius, ed. and trans. James Nichols and William Nichols (London: Grand Rapids: Baker, 1986), 1:92–100. 15 Arminius, “Summary of Three Opinions Concerning Predestination,” 1:92–93. 16 He inaccurately attributes this view to a later Augustine, however, it may be debatable if it is present in the early Augustine before he matured in his position during the Anti-Pelagian writings. See ibid., 1:93–95. 17 Arminius, “Summary of Three Opinions Concerning Predestination,” 1:95–98. 18 Arminius, “Summary of Three Opinions Concerning Predestination,” 1:96–98. 19 He sees the Roman Catholic position as distinct from this one. He calls them Semi-Pelagian because they place credit partly on God’s predestination and partly on God’s foresight of man’s works. Cited in J.V. Fesko, “William Perkins on Union with Christ and Justification,”

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was based on the position proposed by Baro (and others similar to him) because they held that God’s decrees were caused by something God foresaw in man.

Johann Piscator (1546–1625 AD) Johann Piscator was a very controversial character during the Remonstrance.20 Piscator developed his doctrine of reprobation largely from the work of Beza. However, Piscator was much more detailed regarding his treatment of the doctrine. He distinguished between God’s decree in eternity past and God’s act of choice in time. He would describe the order of events as follows: (1) God decrees the ends of election and reprobation, (2) God permits the Fall, (3) the temporal acts of election and reprobation are carried out. This distinction was intended to appease those involved in the infralapsarian-supralapsarian debate. Sinnema summarizes how Piscator attempted to do this with his definition: In the supra-infralapsarian debate Piscator took a distinctive position with the formula that the object of the decree of predestination is man considered not only as not yet created (by the decree to create by diverse ends), but also as created and not yet fallen (by the decree to permit sin) and as already created and fallen (by the decree to elect and reprobate). In this way he tried to overcome the opposition by giving a place to both supra- and infra- standpoints.21

Piscator also considered the temporal act of reprobation to be synonymous with preterition, “All the rest, however, he failed to draw, passed by, and finally reprobated them, and leaving them to themselves in the damnation which they had on account of the fall, where he left them. In this, his works of justice are displayed, there is no mercy to be found.”22 Based on this, Piscator identified two MAJT 21 (2010): 28. See also Mark R. Shaw, “William Perkins and the New Pelagians: Another Look at the Cambridge Predestination Controversy of the 1590s,” WTJ 58 (1996): 267–301. 20 A good overview of Piscator is given by R. Scott Clark, “Do This and Live,” in Covenant, Justification, and Pastoral Ministry: Essays by the Faculty of Westminster Seminary California, ed. R. Scott Clark (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2007), 232. Piscator is known for having denied the active obedience of Christ. See Wesley White, “The Denial of the Imputation of Christ’s Active Obedience: Piscator on Justification,” CPJ 3 (2007): 147–54; Peter C. Sammons, “No Hope Without It!: The Doctrine of Active Obedience Defined and Vindicated” (ThM thesis, The Master’s Seminary, 2013), 141–45. It should also be noted that Piscator eventually abandoned his views. He went from being a supralapsarian Calvinist to an Arminian. See Albert Henry Newman, Manual of Church History (Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society, 1900), 2:338–39. 21 Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 93. 22 “Reliquos vero neglexit, praeteriit, denique reprobavit, & in damnatione quam sibi per lapsum attraxerant, reliquit. In hoc quoque opera, si universim spectetur, nec Justitia nec Misericordia cernitur: sed potestas.” Johannes Piscator, Disputatio Theologica de Praedestinatione (Herbon: Ex officina Christophori Corvini, 1598), 134.

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distinct aspects for the same term (reprobation): the decree to reprobate and the act of God to leave the reprobate alone. One important element in Piscator’s double predestination was his belief that reprobation causes sin. This would mark the first time that an individual associated with High Calvinism would be willing to draw such a conclusion. All those before Piscator intentionally avoided defining reprobation in such a way as to say that it causes sin. However, Piscator, being a novel thinker, viewed election unto faith and reprobation unto unbelief as synonymous. He says, “Is not election the chief cause of faith itself ? Likewise, the chief cause of unbelief is reprobation, according to Christ’s saying in John 10:36, ‘You do not believe because you are not my sheep.’”23 On account of statements like these, Arminius and others would take their primary exception to Calvinism, and rightly so based on this line of reasoning. Sinnema shows that, when pressed by opponents who claim that his statements make God the author of sin, he responded with assertions that only appeared to further validate their accusations. He stated, Reprobation is the chief cause of unbelief[…]The necessity of sinning is imposed on the reprobate by God’s decree[…]The reprobate were destined and created for damnation and for the causes of damnation, so that they might live wickedly[…]God by his sheer good pleasure, absolutely and without consideration of any sin, reprobated the majority of the human race, and destined and created them to the causes of damnation.24

However, the preceding statements should not be indiscriminately attributed to Calvinism, because generations of Calvinists before and after Piscator spent an exorbitant amount of time correcting these kinds of misconceptions. While Piscator was not the most extreme in his views of predestination, his contributions made an impact. Using his own reasoning, he tried to preserve the justice of God by saying that God only condemns men to hell on account of sin. He stated, “For God could have chosen not to show mercy, but on account of the fall, the unfortunate outcome was not to just condemn the wicked, but the sufficient merit to condemn [on account of] sin.”25 Piscator understood God’s decree of reprobation to be the cause of unbelief and sin, whether or not sin itself becomes the grounds whereby God can condemn the reprobate. In the minds of Arminian theologians, this established justification for denouncing Calvinistic predestination. 23 “Principem fidei causem esse ipsam electionem? Iteq; principem incredulitatis causam esse reprobationem: juxta illud Christi Joh.10.v.26. Sed vos non creditis: non enim estis ex ovbius meis.” Ibid., 77. 24 Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 94–95. 25 “Nam nec misereri potuisset Deus electorum, nisi per lapsum miseri evasissent: nec juste damnare reprobos, nisi peccando damnationem meriti suiffent.” Piscator, Disputatio Theologica de Praedestinatione, 27.

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Amandus Polanus (1561–1610 AD) Amandus Polanus was a German theologian who would become a leading figure in the development of Reformed orthodoxy. The clarity that Polanus brought to the discussion comes chiefly in his writings against the Jesuit Robert Bellarmine. While he would agree with Bellarmine on a number of issues, he took issue with Bellarmine’s inversion of the order of negative-positive reprobation as well as his bifurcation of it into two works rather than two acts of the same work. Polanus had a high view of the need to properly understand reprobation in the decrees of God.26 He expressed the importance of this understanding when he stated, Even in this doctrine we are zealous for a measure of Christ’s gift to embrace this whole doctrine plainly and practically, yet if we might unravel the most difficult questions concerning election then we must also, in this address, do the same for reprobation.27

He emphasizes reprobation as being foundational to a proper understanding of predestination as a whole, in that we cannot understand predestination properly if we do not understand reprobation; if we do not handle it with the same care and concern as election, it will ultimately lead to a deficient, if not heretical, view of predestination. Polanus believed that one’s view of reprobation was a matter of orthodoxy. He used the Church Fathers extensively, indicating that he believed that their perspective and his perspective was one and the same.28 He states, By no means do we brashly employ the name predestination for reprobation to destruction; nor do we introduce a novel doctrine into the Church (the doctrine of the eternal predestination of the reprobate) as our opponents accuse us, unless they want to accuse Augustine, Fulgentius, and other fathers of the same crime.29 26 Muller is incorrect in believing that reprobation was merely an appendix to the doctrine of election for Polanus. See Muller, Christ and the Decree, 160. 27 “Etsi autem in ipsa Διδασκαλια studuimus pro mensura doni Christi totam doctrinam perspicue et utiliter complecti: tamen non abs re fuerit, si quasdam difficillimas tum de Electione, tum de Reprobatione quaestiones etiam in hac προσφωνησεις explicuerimus.” Amandus Polanus a Polansdorf, De Aeterna Dei Praedestinatione Didascalia, Epistola Nuncupatoria (Basilea: Conradum Waldkirch, 1600), f2r. 28 E.P. Meijering, “The Fathers and Calvinist Orthodoxy: Systematic Theology: A. Polanus, J. Wolleb and F. Turrettini,” in The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists, ed. Irena Dorota Backus (New York: E. J. Brill, 1997): 1:867–89; and F. Stuart Clarke, “Christocentric Developments in the Reformed Doctrine of Predestination,” Churchman 98, no. 3 (January, 1984): 229–45. Robert W.A. Letham, “Amandus Polanus: A Neglected Theologian?” SCJ 21, no. 3 (September, 1990): 463–76. 29 “Nequaquam igitur flagitiosissime praedestinationis vocem pro reprobatione ad interitum usurpamus: nec nos peculiare dogma de aeterna praedestinatione reproborum ad damnationem, in Ecclesiam introducimus ut nosaccusant adversarii, nisi eiusdem flagitii accusare velint Augustinum, Fulgentium et alios patres.” Polanus, De Aeterna Dei Praedestinatione Didascalia, 134.

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Not only did Polanus point to the history of the Church for his validation, he primarily developed his arguments from Scripture. He had eleven arguments from Scripture that he appealed to in order to defend the importance and orthodoxy of reprobation.30 He was very precise in defining the decree of reprobation so as to distinguish its two parts (negative-positive) as two acts (one defining the ends and other defining the means). He defined reprobation as follows: “The decree of reprobation, is the decree whereby God purposes within himself, to not have mercy on those whom he would leave in eternal destruction, who on account of sin were to be punished, to the declaration of his justice.”31 While this is a very standard definition for Polanus, the ends-means distinction becomes important in explaining why men are accountable for their own sin. For Polanus, the ends of reprobation was determined by God’s will, while the means (or better, the execution of that determination of God’s will) was always the sin of man. He clarifies, “Reprobation, is the predestination of God, for his own justice, whereby he abandons those whom he does not have mercy in the destruction which they had freely cast themselves.”32 This ends-means dichotomy can be seen in his explanation: There are two parts of the act: the first, is the allocation of the reprobate to eternal death; the latter, is the allocation of the means to carry out the decree of reprobation, to which belongs their condemnation by a just judgement on account of their sin. For God in the decree of predestination first ordains creatures to their end, that is to say either to eternal life or eternal death, and then afterwards ordains the means for executing his purpose.33

The material (impelling) cause of reprobation is precisely the same as that of election, the purpose or decree of God. Sin cannot be the cause of the decree because that would not only distort the purpose of God, but it would also fail to

30 Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 95–96. 31 “Decretum reprobationis, est decretum quo Deus sibi proposuit, eos quorum non vellet misereri, in aeterno exitio, cui propter peccatum futuri erat obnoxii, relinquere, ad suam justitiam declarandam.” Amandus Polanus, Partitiones Theologicae Iuxta Naturalis Methodi Leges Conformatae Duobus Libris (Basilea: Conradum Waldkirch, 1598), 16–17. 32 “Reprobatio, est praedestinatio qua Deus pro sua justitia, eos quorum non est misertus, in exitio in quod se sponte praecipitarunt, relinquit.” Ibid., 42. 33 “Partes seu actus eius sunt duo: Prior, est destinatio reprobatorum ad mortem aeternam; posterior, est destination mediorum exsequendi decretum reprobationis, ad quae pertinet condemnatio eorum propter peccatum justissimo judicio. Deus enim in Decreto Praedestinationis primum ordinavit creaturas ad finem illarum, nempo vel ad vitam vel ad mortem aeterna: deinde demum subordinavit media ad exsequendum consilium suum.” Amandus Polanus a Polansdorf, Syntagma Theologiae Christianae (Hanovia: Claudium Marnium & Johannus Aubrius, 1610), 1612.

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give the proper place to both agents (God and man). Sin (man’s work) is the cause of damnation but reprobation (God’s decree) is not the cause of sin. To imply that man’s works influenced God’s decree would make God a mere responder to man, rather than sovereign over man. Nevertheless, God is not the one who causes evil in men, nor does he punish them for no reason. Polanus explains, “The punishment of damnation is one thing, the eternal decree to inflict the punishment of sin is another. Indeed God decreed to inflict punishment on the devils on account of sin; but sin is not the cause of the decree. Sin is the cause of punishment, but it is not the cause of the decree to punish.”34 Furthermore, one of the more convincing arguments Polanus makes is that the good works of the redeemed are not any more responsible for the decree of election than the works of the wicked are responsible for the decree of reprobation. He says, “If sin is the cause of reprobation then the merit of good works will be the cause of the decree of election.”35 Polanus then establishes an axiom of ends-means to explain the relationship between the decree of God and the means by which it is executed. This axiom becomes the standard in Reformed orthodoxy for explaining the difference between two chief elements of the doctrine of reprobation.

34 “Quia alia res est poena damnationis; alia decretum aeternum de instigenda poena damnationis, Decrevit quidem Deus poenam diabolis infligere propter peccatum: sed non idcirco decreti causa est peccatum. Poenae causa est peccatum, non autem decreti poenae.” Polanus, De Aeterna Dei Praedestinatione Didaskalia, 132. 35 “Si peccatum est causa decreti reprobationis, tum meritum bonorum operum erit causa decreti electionis.” Ibid., 168.

Chapter Five: The Synod of Dort and Reprobation

Dutch Reformers Nadere Reformatie (1600–1750 AD) While there are a number of individuals who were influential in the development of the doctrine of reprobation between Amandus Polanus and Franciscus Junius, the influence of the Calvinists in the Netherlands becomes a major point of discussion prior to the Synod of Dort.1 Despite the fact that there were major Calvinist strongholds, the Calvinist position was not unanimous throughout the country. In order to understand how the conflict over predestination grew to a national level, one must first recognize the rise in popularity of Arminius’ theology among his contemporaries. This leads to a proper context in which to understand the teaching of Arminius and why it was tolerated within the Dutch churches at that time. One major influence leading up to this period was one of the most popular books on predestination: Bullinger’s Decades. This work was a far cry from Calvinist orthodoxy (as previously demonstrated).2 The sheer quantity of anti-Calvinist thinkers in the country provided an environment for the unmitigated growth of the views of Arminius and his followers. This led to the climactic event at the Synod of Dort.

1 Sinnema does an excellent job outlining each of these key figures in “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort”: William Bucanus (pp. 99–100); Bartholomew Keckermann (pp. 100–1); and Daniel Tossanus (pp. 101–2). Both Matthias Martinius (pp. 103–8) and Johann Heinrich Alsted (pp. 108–11) would be present at the Synod of Dort. Alsted’s systematic work would become a staple in most seminaries at the time of the synod and would have been discussed, since it was released just a half year prior to the synod’s first meeting. 2 Another example would be Anastasius Veluanus’ work where he criticized Calvin and Beza. A number of other theologians who were always in disputes because of their anti-Calvinist teachings were: Hubert Duifhuis, Caspar Coolhaes, Herman Herberts, Cornelis Wiggerts, Taco Sybrants, and Adolphus Venator.

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Franciscus Junius (1545–1602 AD) Franciscus Junius was a French Reformed scholar and theologian who was a prominent teacher during the life of Jacob Arminius. As contemporaries, much of Arminius’ thinking regarding Calvinist predestination is displayed in a series of personal letters the two shared, as well as through a number of formal disputations at Leiden.3 Because it appeared that Arminius did not understand reprobation, its history nor common usage in theology, Junius took the time at the beginning of their discussion to clarify what was intended by the use of the term. He stated, The word is used in three ways; one general, two particular. The general use is when nonelection, or preterition and damnation, is comprehended in the word, in which way Calvin and Beza frequently understood it, yet so as to make some distinction. A particular mode of signification is when it is opposed to election, and designates nonelection or preterition, in which sense the fathers used it according to the common use of the Latins. There is also a particular use of the word, when reprobation is taken for damnation, as I perceive that it is used by you in this whole letter. The first mode is synecdochical, the second common, the third metonymical; I add that the third might properly be called catachrestic if we attend to the just distinction of these members. I wholly approve the second meaning and shall adhere to it in this whole discussion.4

The fact that Junius suspected Arminius to have misunderstood the whole discussion only adds to the intrigue of this historical account. Junius takes time to articulate the various uses of the term reprobation so as to clarify their meaning. First, he shows that, according to Calvin and Beza, reprobation can refer to the whole act of God in damning the wicked; using one part to describe the whole. Secondly, the term can be used as a specific description of God’s passive or negative choice to leave men alone (which he approves of as being a more proper use of the term). Third, and finally, he believes reprobation is synonymous with damnation, which is a misuse of the term, which he believes is the chief way Arminius understands it. From this, it is evident that Junius understood the various ways the term was employed by those who came before him, and he prefers defining God’s decree according to the negative element of reprobation. The fact that Arminius did not understand these various distinctions can be further seen in later correspondence with Junius, who states:

3 The most reliable English translation is found in James Arminius, “A discussion on the Subject of Predestination,” in The Works of James Arminius, ed. W. R. Bagnall (1853; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker, 1977), Volume 3. It will be hereafter referred to as Works. For more details of the correspondence between Junius and Arminius, see Carl Bangs, Arminius: A Study in the Dutch Reformation (Grand Rapids: Francis Asbury Press, 1971), 199–203. 4 Arminius, Works, 3:20.

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Before I treat the subject itself, it is necessary to refer to the ambiguity which was alluded to, in your answer to the second proposition. In the whole of your letter, to reprobate is to damn, and reprobation is damnation. But in my usage, reprobation, and preterition or non-election are the same. Hence, that the subject may be made more plain, you will not complain if I substitute the word damnation for the word reprobation. You say that, ‘predestination, preterition and damnation, have no reference to action in the predestinate etc.,’ that is, that the predestinate or elect, the passed by, and the damned, are elected, passed by, and damned by God without any consideration of quality which exists in the individual. I think, indeed, that the relation of these things is different according to the Scriptures. Election and non-election have reference to nothing in the elect and the passed-by: but damnation supposes sin, in view of which the sinner is damned, otherwise the entire work of predestination, is limited to eternity.5

Based on this correspondence, it appears that Arminius did not allow any of Junius’ distinctions to stand as they were intended. In Junius’ clarification, he affirms what Polanus taught as the ends-means distinction. Previously, this was known as the twofold cause of reprobation, that there was no cause in the choice of God to pass by the non-elect, outside of his own will and that the cause of damnation was sin (also known as negative-positive or passive-active). The execution is distinct from the decree itself. Much of what Junius presented was based on the assumption that Arminius understood the long history of the discussion, which Arminius evidently did not. Furthermore, he explains the relationship between God’s decree and sin in the traditional manner, stating, “We by no means deny that sin is the consequent of that decree, though not as caused by it, or as its necessary effect.”6 This is similar to what was taught by Albert the Great, William of Ockham, Jerome Zanchi, and John Knox, among others. Like Calvin, Junius was careful to distinguish preterition from temporal damnation. He states, For although they are the same in subject, and all the passed-by are damned, and all the damned are passed-by, yet their relation as passed-by or reprobate is one thing, and their relation as damned is another. Preterition or reprobation is not without justice, but it is not of justice, as its cause; damnation is with justice and of justice.7

From this, it becomes easy to classify the two elements under the heading of God’s decree for the non-elect: preterition and condemnation. Preterition does not find its cause in man in any respect, while condemnation does. God’s decree does not cause sin, but sin is a consequence of it. Junius explains, “that antecedent to sin is particular reliction by God in the beginning and progress of sin, but that the foundation of that particular reliction is non-election, or preterition 5 Arminius, Works, 200–1. 6 Arminius, Works, 243. 7 Arminius, Works, 56.

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and reprobation, which we acknowledge to be, not the cause, but the antecedent of sin.”8 Junius believes it is important to separate cause from antecedent in order to properly understand reprobation. The reasoning of Junius would be as follows: Suppose you are in a room with no windows and only one light. If I turn out the light, you will not be able to see. My turning out the light did not cause you not to see. Darkness is what caused you not to see. Likewise, my turning out the light did not cause your sightlessness, but was simply the antecedent to your blindness.

Lucas Trelcatius (1542–1602 AD) Lucas Trelcatius was a part of the famed Leiden theology faculty with Junius and Gormaus, all three of whom were strong Calvinists. Arminius first received his opportunity to teach at Leiden when both Trelcatius and Junius died from the plague.9 Trelcatius taught nothing novel with regard to predestination; his views seem to mirror those of Zanchi. However, Trecatius shows that at this time in the Netherlands, the constituency of professors was comprised of strong Calvinists. His arguments in defense of reprobation are threefold: 1) the testimony of the church, 2) the testimony of Scripture (Rom 9:18; 1 Pet 2:8; Jude 4; Prov 16:4), and 3) the testimony of logic. His logical conclusion was simply, “He who elects rejects what he does not elect.”10 In order to explain the relationship between decree and execution, Trelcatius sees three steps in reprobation followed by three means of its execution. The three steps in the decree are the following: 1) God’s decree to assign them to dishonor, 2) God’s rejection of them from saving grace, and 3) their damnation on account of sins. This follows what is commonly understood as Supralapsarianism. The three means of its execution are summarized by Sinnema, who states, “Three things follow the decree of reprobation: 1) the privation or withdrawal of grace follows the last stage of the decree; 2) then follow the sins which arise from man’s infirmity and corruption; 3) finally, punishments follow sins. The first and third of these are from God as a just judge; the second is from man.”11

8 Arminius, Works, 153. 9 Mark A. Ellis, Simon Episcopius’ Doctrine of Original Sin (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2006), 31. 10 Cited in Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 140. 11 Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 140–41.

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Franciscus Gomarus (1563–1641 AD) The history between Gormaus and Arminius is most interesting. Gormarus was a Dutch theologian who presided as the chair over Arminius’ doctoral examination and granted Arminius the first doctorate from Leiden University.12 However, in later years Gomarus was so uncomfortable with Arminius’ theology that he tried to stop him from becoming a professor at the university. When a position opened up at Leiden, Gomarus, who was the head of the theological department, tried to intervene by telling a story about his former colleague Junius: on his deathbed, Junius warned against appointing Arminius as his successor because of the errors in Arminius’ theology. However, this claim was not well received; the academic curators told Junius that he had no authority to speak on the matter.13 After Arminius was appointed to the theology department, there was an agreement between Arminius, Trelcatius, and Gomarus to conduct a number of debates on the doctrine of predestination. Arminius began the dialogue and caused little commotion. He defined predestination as single predestination based on foreseen faith. Gomarus responded with his disputation, presenting thirty-two theses. Because Gomarus conducted his disputation outside the originally agreed-upon schedule (perhaps to stem the growing popularity of Arminius), it caused some commotion among academics. Nevertheless, it was already agreed upon that he would get his opportunity to speak on the matter. Ultimately, the thirty-two theses became the chief point of conflict between Calvinism and Arminius. Gormarus defined predestination as follows: The purpose of God by which He has foreordained out of rational [creatures] foreknown [by Him] in a general and indefinite way, some of them according to his right and good pleasure, to their supernatural ends, their creation in the innocent state of original righteousness, and to other appropriate means, in order to glorify His saving grace, wisdom, and perfect sovereignty.14

The mention of God’s indefinite foreknowledge is Gomarus’ first attempt to explain the objects of God’s decree. The theological contrast between indefinite foreknowledge and definite knowledge is that indefinite foreknowledge belongs to God’s archetypal knowledge, that God knows within himself all the possibilities of what a “man” can be. On the other hand, his definite knowledge is how 12 Ellis, Simon Episcopius’ Doctrine of Original Sin, 31. 13 Keith D. Stanglin, Arminius on the Assurance of Salvation: The Context, Roots, and Shape of the Leiden Debate, 160–1609, BSCH 27 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 24. 14 This disputation was originally translated into Dutch as Twee disputaten vande goddelyck predestinatie (Leiden, 1610). The translation of key portions of the 32 theses is provided by Willem J. van Asselt and Paul H.A.M. Abels, “The Seventeenth Century,” in Handbook of Dutch Church History, ed. Herman Selderhuis (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014), 300.

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men will actually be of necessity based on his creating them and predetermining them.15 Thus, following a supralapsarian understanding of predestination, Gomarus defines mankind not merely as they will be (definite knowledge), but as they could be (indefinite knowledge): “rational creatures, not in so far as they in actuality will be saved or lost, be created, fall or stand firm, be renewed, but in so far as in remote and indefinite potency they are savable, damnable, creatable, fallible, and renewable.”16 With this proper understanding of God’s knowledge and the objects of reprobation, he moves on to define reprobation itself. He defines reprobation (Thesis 23, against Arminius) as follows: The predestination of God by which out of rational creatures foreknown [by Him] in an indefinite way He has foreordained some, who, according to His right and good pleasure regarding eternal life, have been rejected from eternal life to eternal death and shame, as well as His foreordained the path leading thereunto.17

This definition includes both the ends and the means of reprobation. The assertion that God makes this determination based on his indefinite knowledge is 15 Understanding the Reformed view of God’s knowledge is important. First, what is God’s knowledge? Brakel explains, “First, let us consider the mode of God’s knowledge. Man acquires knowledge by means of deliberation and rational deduction, deducing and drawing conclusions by viewing one fact in reference to another […]The knowledge of God, on the contrary, neither has its origin in the creature nor does it flow from the creature to God; rather it flows from God Himself to the creature. God does not become acquainted with things after the fact by virtue of their existence and function; rather, He knows matters in advance so that they will exist and function according to His decree.” Wilhelmus A. Brakel, The Christian’s Reasonable Service, Volume 1: God, Man, and Christ, ed. Joel R. Beeke, trans. Bartel Elshout (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritige Books, 1995), 1:102. The second is simple knowledge (or as is seen in earlier thinkers like Gomarus, “indefinite knowledge”) which can be defined as, “Such things as are possible to be wrought by the power of God, though they shall never in the least peep up into being, but lie forever wrapt up in darkness and nothing.” Stephen Charnock, The Existence and Attributes of God, vol. 1, The Complete Works of Stephen Charnock (1864; repr., Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth, 2010), 461–62. Furthermore, “God knows all other things, whether they be possible, past, present, or future; whether they be things that He can do, but will never do, or whether they be things that He hath done, but are not now; things that are now being, or things that are not now existing, that lie in the womb od their proper and immediate causes. If His understanding be infinite, He then knows all things whatsoever that can be known, else His understanding would have bounds, and what hath limits is not infinite, but finite.” Ibid. This is not to be confused with middle knowledge. The third is absolute knowledge or definite knowledge. Absolute knowledge is God’s knowledge of all events that are based in reality. In other words, it includes all things that have come to pass and must come to pass. God’s absolute knowledge is not hypothetical but in fact is in and of itself determinative. “This knowledge concerns things that actually are in terms of God’s decree and in terms of His self-knowledge.” Joel R. Beeke and Mark A Jones, A Puritan Theology: Doctrine for Life (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2012), 69. This is why God has perfect knowledge of future events; because he has infallibly decreed them. 16 Translation provided by Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 142. 17 Asselt and Abels, “The Seventeenth Century,” in Handbook of Dutch Church History, 300.

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how Gomarus tries to retain both human liberty and to remove any necessity to sin based on God’s decree. More so than those before him, Gomarus made distinctions between various acts and elements of God’s decree of reprobation. For example, he used the negative-positive distinction to explain how God firstly (negative) rejects certain individuals (cf. Rev 17:8), then secondly (positive) designates to damnation (cf. Matt 25:41; Jude 4). Furthermore, Gomarus affirmed the efficient versus the chargeable cause (which he called the sufficient cause) of reprobation. The first was in the good pleasure and sovereign will of God, while the second was in the sin of man. However, for Gomarus this distinction was not to be used strictly for God’s determining the ends, but also the means as well (similar to Lucas Trelcatius before him). In discussing God’s ordination of the means, Gomarus believed this to mean that God is the author of sin in an absolute sense (nevertheless, not the chargeable sense). He distinguished between the subordinate and proximate ends of reprobation; however, that led him to be less guarded in expressing God’s involvement in sin. He would state, for example, “God moves the tongues of men to blaspheme[…]nobody maintains that God absolutely decreed to reprobate men without sin; but as he decreed the end, so he likewise did the means; that is, as God predestined men to death, so he predestined him to sin as the only means of death.”18 The concept of absolute predestination was nothing new, nevertheless Gomarus did not make the necessary distinctions regarding man’s responsibility for sin and God’s non-direct involvement. For Arminius, this lapse in distinction only contributed further to the confusion over the matter.

Jacob Arminius (1559–1609 AD) Jacob Arminius is the Latinized name of the Dutch theologian Jakob Hermanszoon, a professor at Leiden and the founder of what is commonly referred to as Arminian theology. Arminius’ colleagues, Lucas Trelcatius Jr., Franciscus Gomarus, and Kuchlinus all held to Supralapsarianism, which Arminius believed was an extreme form of Calvinism.19 While Arminius’ reactions likely originated from his disagreement with the form of Supralapsarianism found in Beza, they

18 Newman, Manual of Church History, 2:339. 19 Stanglin and McCall, Jacob Arminius: Theologian of Grace, 16. Nevertheless he equally taught against all three forms of unconditional predestination found in Calvinism (infra-, supra-, and sub-). Ellis, Simon Episcopius’ Doctrine of Original Sin, 31.

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were clarified and cemented in the context of teaching at Leiden.20 Regardless of their origins, Arminius was obsessed with discussion of predestination.21 Arminius believed his opponents fell into three categories: 1) those who followed Calvin and Beza (individuals he considered supralapsarian), 2) those who followed Thomas Aquinas, and 3) those who followed Augustine (individuals he considered infralapsarian). Nevertheless, he considered them all to have this in agreement: “God, by an eternal and immutable decree, determined to bestow upon certain men, the rest being passed by, supernatural and eternal life, and those means which are the necessary and efficacious preparation for the attainment of that life.”22 Based on that perceived unanimity, Arminius disagreed with all three views. One of Arminius’ arguments against the Calvinist position stems from his belief in what it is allowable for God to do by his own justice. He explains, God can do whatever He wills with His own, but He cannot will to do with His own that which He cannot do of right. For His will is restricted by the limits of justice[…]The potter cannot, from the unformed lump, make a man to dishonor and condemnation, unless the man has previously made himself worthy of punishment and dishonor by his own transgression.23

In this argument, Arminius primarily takes aim at the supralapsarian position that God, from before time began and without regard to anything in man, chose some for mercy and others for justice. Nevertheless, he also includes the infralapsarian position in his refutation, stating, “God could not, in his justice illustrating his glory by mercy and punitive justice, have reference to man as not yet made, nor indeed to man as made, and considered in his natural condition.”24 Essentially, his objection rests on the premise that God cannot make plans for men he has not yet made. A second critique Arminius raises is against the decree-execution distinction that Calvinist scholars had made. He briefly describes how he understands the decree-execution distinction and rejects it, stating, “I deny that distinction; indeed I say that God, can neither will nor decree, by internal act, that which He

20 Peter White states, “Arminianism was conceived as a direct response to Beza’s doctrine.” White, Predestination, Policy and Polemic, 13. See also Nathan Bangs, The Life of James Arminius, D. D. Compiled from His Life and Writings, as Published by James Nichols (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1843), 38. To see how it was formulated and matured through Leiden, see Stanglin, Arminius on the Assurance of Salvation, 32–34. 21 F. Stuart Clarke, “Arminius’s Understanding of Calvin,” EvQ 54 (January–March, 1982): 30. 22 Arminius, Works, 3:13. He further elaborates each group on pages 19–20 23 Arminius, Works, 3:43. 24 Arminius, Works, 3:43.

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cannot do, by external act, and thus the object of the internal and external action is the same.”25 He explains in greater detail: They use it [decree-execution] thus; though God may have decreed from eternity to devote certain persons to death, and, that this may be possible, may have ordained that they should fall into sin, yet He does not execute that decree, by their actual condemnation, until after the persons themselves have become sinful by their own act, and, therefore, He is free from responsibility. I answer that the fact that the execution of the decree is subsequent to the act of sin, does not free from responsibility him, who, by his own decree, has ordained that sin should occur, that he might afterwards punish it; indeed he, who has ordained and decreed that sin should be committed, cannot justly punish sin after its commission.26

By this, Arminius is claiming that the decree-execution distinction does not remove God from any fault in the matter of sin since he has decreed it would happen. However, one important element Arminius misses in his discussion with Junius here is the “means” (the compatibilist view of the will). While it is unlikely that such a critical distinction would have convinced him, historical accounts of Arminius reveal a pattern of either misunderstanding his opponents or disregarding their definitions in the course of the discussion.27 For example, despite the many theologians who tried to explain that reprobation does not make God the author of sin, Arminius refused to allow any explanation of that claim to stand. He states, “Calvin himself, and Beza also, openly deny that God is the author of sin.”28 Yet, he does not allow for their own explanation, stating, “But according to the theory of Calvin and Beza God is necessarily made the author of sin;—Therefore it is to be repudiated.”29 For Arminius, God’s will determines sin, therefore God is the author of sin––with no allowable exceptions. As for Arminius’ own view, he understood predestination to be used for both the elect and reprobate, however he believed predestination was based strictly on foreknowledge of both. For the elect, it was because God foreknew they would be repentant; for the non-elect, reprobation was because he foreknew they would be unrepentant. Arminius explained, That which was prepared for all men on condition of obedience, which they could render the gift of divine grace, bestowed or to be bestowed on them, could not be denied to some men by the sure and definite decree of God, except on account of their foreseen disobedience. Eternal life was prepared for all men, on condition of that obedience which they could render. Therefore, eternal life could not be denied to some men, by the 25 26 27 28 29

Arminius, Works, 3:71. Arminius, Works, 3:86. Some of this was previously shown in the section above concerning Junius. Arminius, Works, 3:79. Arminius, Works, 3:77.

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sure and definite decree of God, that is, by preterition, except on account of their foreseen disobedience.30

Arminius’ order of the redemptive plan of God is unique at this point in history. He explains that the decree to create and permit the fall were both prior to the decrees to elect and reprobate because the decree-execution happens simultaneously.31 He also believes that election and reprobation are opposites, meaning the God who elects also reprobates.32 While Arminius rejected the teaching of the Reformed doctrine of reprobation, he nevertheless still used the term. He defined it as follows: But, as this decree of predestination is according to election, which necessarily includes reprobation, we must likewise advert to it. As opposed to election, therefore, we define reprobation to be the decree of God’s anger or of his severe will, by which, from all eternity, he determined to eternal death all unbelievers and impenitent persons, for the declaration of his power and anger; yet so, that unbelievers are visited with this punishment, not only on account of unbelief, but likewise on account of other sins from which they might have been delivered through faith in Christ.33

Within this definition, Arminius affirms a form of reprobation that is strictly affirmative, that God decides to affirmatively visit the judgment on the wicked that they have earned. He rejects any form of negative reprobation (preterition or predamnation).34 Arminius believed that the sin of man is what causes God’s decree of reprobation, and it is also what causes both affirmative reprobation and God’s decision to punish it. He explained, “The circumstance of sin and of the fall is of very great importance in this whole subject, not indeed as a cause but as a quality, requisite in the object, without a consideration of which I do not think that election or reprobation was or could have been made by the Deity.”35 So God could not make a decision to elect or reprobate without sin as a cause; however it is within God’s will to either punish or pardon it. In the end, Arminius adds many new elements to the discussion on reprobation: his scheme of decrees, his defining of both election and reprobation as being based on something foreknown in man, his views that the cause of rep30 31 32 33 34

Arminius, Works, 3:199. Arminius, Works, 3:32. Arminius, Works, 3:22, 32. Arminius, Works, 2:101. Whenever he did use the term, it was only according to his definition. Once again, this is based on God’s foreknowledge of their unwillingness to repent: “Preterition is an act of the divine pleasure, by which God from eternity determined not to communicate to some men supernatural happiness, but to bestow on them only natural or animal happiness.” Arminius, Works, 3:147. 35 Arminius, Works, 3:41.

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robation was man’s sin, and his view that sin is both the cause of the decree and the merit for its execution.

The 1610 Remonstrance The death of Arminius was received with mixed emotions. His friends attributed it to the exhaustion he felt from fighting for his doctrine against his enemies.36 However, his enemies believed it was the vengeance of God as a result of his errors.37 Nevertheless, the popularity of Arminius was so great that his followers, just three months after his death, drew up the Remonstrance, a protest whereby adherents to his teachings (calling themselves “Remonstrants”) called for a review of the two primary national Dutch confessions, the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism. This call for review was attached with Five Articles, a document which formulated the Remonstrance position. Afterward, there was a request calling for a national examination of the points under dispute. The letter first listed the Five Articles that the Remonstrance rejected, followed by the Five Articles they affirmed. The first two rejections pertained to reprobation: 1. That God has, before the fall, and even before the creation of man, by an unchangeable decree, foreordained some to eternal life and others to eternal damnation, without any regard to righteousness or sin, to obedience or disobedience, and simply because it so pleased him, in order to show the glory of his righteousness to the one class and his mercy to the other. 2. That God, in view of the fall, and in just condemnation of our first parents and their posterity, ordained to exempt a part of mankind from the consequences of the fall, and to save them by his free grace, but to leave the rest, without regard to age or moral condition, to their condemnation, for the glory of his righteousness.38

These refutations were given not to the doctrine of reprobation itself, but the Calvinist definition of it. In their Five Articles of affirmation, the first one presents the Arminian definition for it as follows: 1. That God, by an eternal, unchangeable purpose in Jesus Christ his Son, before the foundation of the world, has determined, out of the fallen, sinful race of men, to save in Christ, for Christ’s sake, and through Christ, those who, through the grace of the Holy Spirit, shall believe on his Son Jesus, and shall persevere in this faith and obedience of 36 Ellis, Simon Episcopius’ Doctrine of Original Sin, 32. 37 Ellis, Simon Episcopius’ Doctrine of Original Sin, 32. 38 Schaff, Creeds of Christendom, 1:517. Schaff mistakenly identifies the second view as the “sublapsarian” view, however it is most commonly recognized as the infralapsarian view by most scholars. See: Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 157.

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faith, through this grace, even to the end; and on the other hand, to leave the incorrigible and unbelieving in sin and under wrath, and to condemn them as alien to Christ, according to the word of the Gospel (John 3:36): “He who believes on the Son has everlasting life, and he who does not believe the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abides in him,” and according to other passages of Scripture also.39

When these three articles are compared with the works of Arminius, it becomes clear how the Remonstrants adopted his understandings and definitions of the Calvinist perspective of reprobation. Likewise, clarity is given by their affirmations that they utilize Arminius’ definition of reprobation.

The Hague Conference (1611 AD) As a result of the Remonstrance, great tension erupted at the national level regarding these doctrinal matters. Based on the aforementioned Remonstrance critique of the Reformed position on reprobation, and the subsequent conferences and synods, the doctrine of reprobation was at the heart of a national debate of paramount proportions. The Hague Conference is sometimes called “The Contra Remonstrance,” an event which hosted twelve delegates—six Remonstrance representatives and six Contra-Remonstrance representatives.40 Describing the event Dennison explains, The gathering of the followers of James Arminius (1560–1609) at Gouda in 1610 brought to the press a document agreed upon by forty-three ministers who declared themselves “Remonstrants.” Johannes Uytenbogaert (1557–1644), court preacher at The Hague, was the leader and champion of the Remonstrant cause. By December 1610, the States General of Holland urged the Remonstrants and the proto-Counter-Remonstrants (Gomarists) to meet so as to resolve the emerging doctrinal tensions. On March 10, 1611, at The Hague, the famous Collatio Hagensis (Conference of The Hague) convened with six members of the Remonstrant party and six members of the opposition. Festus Hommius (1576–1642), pastor at Leiden, delivered his answer to the 1610 affirmation in “counter remonstrance:” Over the next ten days (until March 20), each party labored to 39 Gerald Lewis Bray, Documents of the English Reformation 1526–1701 (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 1994), 453–54. Schaff calls this “conditional predestination” in Creeds of Chistendom, 517. 40 “The parties were admitted to a public conference at Hague, in the year 1611—usually spoken of as the Collatio Hagiensis—where the Remonstrants were represented by John Utenbogardus, Adrian Barrius, John Arnoldi Corvin, Nicolas Grevinchovius, Edward Poppius, and Simon Episcopius, the Counter-Remonstrants being represented by Peter Plaucinus, Libertus Frascinus, Ruardus Acronius, John Beccius, John Bogardus, and Festus Hommius. No good resulted from the conference and no determination in favour of either party was come to. Each party now openly sought the patronage of men of power and influence.” Walter Arthur Copinger, A Treatise on Predestination, Election and Grace, Historical, Doctrinal, and Practical (London: James Nesbit, 1889), 69.

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defend its position in two documents: one affirming their own interpretation of Scripture regarding the five points in dispute (Remonstrance versus Counter Remonstrance) and the other refuting the objections of the opposite party to their foundational declaration. In 440 pages (the record of the conference as printed), the parties concluded that there was an irreconcilable division between them: Arminianism and Calvinism were immiscible. It would take a National Synod to resolve this matter, or at least determine the authority of the Reformed faith for the Netherlands. But Arminianism would garner the respite of toleration; by mid–century, Reformed theology no longer united Holland de facto. Arminius had achieved his goal of a “third variety of Reformation” and attenuated the Calvinism of the Lowlands. In the wings were Benedict Spinoza and the precursors of the Enlightenment. It must be acknowledged that Arminianism paved the way for this epistemological revolution.41

The days of debate and dialogue did not directly address the two articles of the Remonstrance that spoke of reprobation. They followed where these themes were present in the Belgic Confession, which, as antecedent history indicated, was drawn by inference from the doctrine of election. This correlation between election and reprobation was not debated, but was assumed by members of both parties. Over the course of the meetings each day, there were questions and answers provided by both sides.42 The doctrine of reprobation was said to be so commonly discussed that, given that God’s damnation was on account of sin, none should be offended. When the Remonstrants asked for a definition of reprobation from their Calvinist counterparts, it was defined in this fashion: When we posit an eternal decree of election of certain particular persons, from this it can be clearly understood that we also posit an eternal decree of reprobation or abandonment of certain particular persons, since there can be no election unless there is also reprobation or abandonment. When out of a certain number some are elected, in this act the rest are also reprobated, for he who takes all does not elect. For example, when out of ten thousand Gideon chose three hundred[…]he also rejected all others […]As for all the questions and explanations which might be discussed in this matter, we consider it unnecessary to enter into high and difficult questions concerning this

41 James T. Dennison, ed., “The Counter Remonstrance (1611),” in 1600–1693, vol. 4., Reformed Confessions of the 16th and 17th Centuries in English Translation (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2014), 46–47. As was already noted, there was great theological latitude given in the country at this time. This form of tolerance allowed for both parties to grow in popularity to such a degree that a serious debate broke out and required national attention. The fact that this opened the door for more radical ideas is no surprise. 42 To read a summary of the day-by-day events, see Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 158–67. To see an English translation of records of the events, see Peter Y. De Jong, ed., Crisis in the Reformed Churches: Essays in Commemoration of the Great Synod of Dort, 1618–1619 (1968; repr., Grand Rapids: Reformed Fellowship, 2008), 248–50.

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doctrine, unless you want to fill the churches with unnecessary disputes and wrangling, to its greater unrest, detriment, and confusion.43

Although this would seem to be reasonable, especially since both parties were in agreement on the existence of reprobation and the execution of damnation on the basis of sin, nevertheless this answer would not suffice to bring unanimity to the church. Since the conference was not convened to discuss reprobation specifically (but rather an entire Arminian soteriology), it is no surprise that reprobation was not as thoroughly discussed. One would assume that such a minimalist definition would satisfy both parties. However, this definition addressed merely the bare necessities of reprobation; simply articulating its existence missed the entire point of the dispute. Because reprobation was so insufficiently addressed here at the Hague Conference, the matter would require further attention, which would be given seven years later at the Synod of Dort.

William Ames (1576–1633 AD) William Ames was an English Protestant divine and philosopher who attended Cambridge, rather than Oxford, because it was the center for Puritan education. He studied under William Perkins and worked alongside him at the Synod of Dort. Ames, like many non-Conformist Puritans, spoke out against the various Roman Catholic elements present in Anglicanism and was ultimately exiled for it. As a result of this, he fled to the Netherlands in 1610 AD. Ames wrote many works against the Remonstrance leading up to the Synod of Dort. One individual he corresponded publically with was Nicolaas Grevinchoven, who was one of the six members of the Remonstrance Party at the Hague Conference.44 Much of Ames’ writings concerning reprobation can be found in a summarized form in his magnum opus, The Marrow of Theology, which became a prominent systematic theology textbook used by later Puritans (specifically, the Pilgrims of the American Revolution and beyond). First, he placed reprobation

43 Translation provided by Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 162. 44 Most of Ames’ writings against Nicolaas Grevinchoven centered around many soterological issues other than reprobation, the main one being the extent of the atonement (limited or universal). Interestingly enough, John Owen, when he wrote against Arminianism, cited Nicolaas many times to represent the Arminian position on matters. This just demonstrates his lasting influence as a prominent Arminian thinker. See Pieter Geyl, History of the DutchSpeaking Peoples 1555–1648 (New Haven, CT: Phoenix Press, 2001), 337.

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and election under the heading of predestination, stating, “There are two kinds of predestination: election and rejection or reprobation.”45 It is worth noting that Ames describes negative reprobation by appealing to the hatred of God. He writes, “God hates them (the non-elect; Rom 9:13). This hatred is negative or privative, because it denies election. But it has a passive content, for God has willed that some should not have eternal life.”46 Ames should not be misunderstood to be teaching punitive hatred before sin is taken into account. Rather, Ames makes a distinction here between punitive (active) hatred (being on account of sin) and passive hatred (refusing to allow them to enter into his joy and blessing which is bestowed on the elect alone). In his section on the doctrine of predestination, he writes forty-one theses regarding it. The following are those most pertinent to understanding his view of the doctrine of reprobation. He writes, 33. This is the first difference (in reason) between election and reprobation; in election, not only the glorious grace of God is an end, but also the salvation of men themselves; whereas in reprobation, damnation in itself has no relation to an end or a good. 37. Because of this setting apart whereby God does not bestow blessedness upon some persons, he is said to hate them, Rom 9:13. This hatred is negative or privative, because it denies election. But it has a positive content, for God has willed that some should not have eternal life. 38. The second difference (in reason) between election and reprobation, namely, that the love in election bestows good on the creatures directly, but the hatred in reprobation only denies good—it does not bring or inflict evil because the creature himself deserves it. 39. The third act of reprobation is the intention to use means by which justice may be manifested in the reprobate. These means, most accurately speaking, are permission to sin and abandonment to sin, Rom 9:18; 2 Thess 2:11, 12. 40. Here is a third difference (in reason) between election and reprobation: Election is the cause not only of salvation, but of everything causally connected with salvation; reprobation is not properly a cause of either damnation or sin (which deserves damnation), but an antecedent only. 41. There is a fourth disparity, namely, that the means leading to reprobation are not in themselves either cause or effect. For the permission to sin is not the cause of the forsaking, the hardening, and the punishment: The cause of these is the sin itself.47

45 William Ames, The Marrow of Theology, trans. John Dykstra Eusden (1629; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1997), 154. 46 Ames, The Marrow of Theology, 156. 47 Ames, The Marrow of Theology, 155–56.

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These statements indicate that he believed that election and reprobation are asymmetrical. He affirms both active and passive reprobation; however, he goes to great lengths to stress and clarify the means of reprobation. For Ames, reprobation is not the cause of damnation or sin; means of permission to sin does not make God the author of sin. His explanation of God’s use of means is critical to a proper understanding of reprobation from the Reformed perspective.

Festus Hommius (1576–1642 AD) Festus Hommius was a Dutch theologian who held to the supralapsarian perspective of Calvinist theology. As a Bible translator, he played a role in the King James Bible translation. As the secretary of the Synod of Dort (1618–1619 AD), he was closely involved in the conflict between Jacobus Arminius and Franciscus Gomarus.48 Finally, as one of the six Counter-Remonstrance representatives at the Hague Conference, he was highly skeptical of the Arminian agenda. Aza Goudriaan summarizes Hommius’ skepticism: According to the Remonstrants no central Christian articles of faith were involved in the debate. Hommius, however, saw a far more comprehensive antagonism that concerned many other articles of faith in addition to those mentioned in the well-known Remonstrance of 1610. Actually, Hommius contended that the so-called major issue of predestination served as a smokescreen meant to conceal the promotion of some version of Socinian theology.49

His suspicion was not completely unwarranted. The Remonstrants, attempting to establish credibility amongst the churches outside the Netherlands, wrote to the English court in an attempt to gain allies outside the country. The response was that four of the five articles seemed tolerable, but were misleading and untrustworthy.50 However, they reported a favorable response to the general public. A summary of the letter written by Hommius to Ames is provided by Anthony Milton: Hommius reports that the Remonstrants claim that Caron, the Dutch ambassador in England, has written to van der Myle that the English bishops have examined the Remonstrant articles and approved the first four articles, although their judgment on the fifth is not yet certain. Hommius is confident however that this report is simply a Remonstrant lie.51 48 P.J. Wijminga, Festus Hommius (Leiden: Brill, 1899), 115–16. 49 Aza Goudriaan, “The Synod of Dort on Arminian Anthropology,” in Revisiting the Synod of Dort (1618–1619), ed. Aza Goudriaan and Fred van Lieburg (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 81. 50 Anthony Milton, The British Delegation and the Synod of Dort (1618–1619), (Woodbridge, Great Britain: Boydell Press, 2005), 21. 51 Milton, The British Delegation and the Synod of Dort (1618–1619), 61.

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His view of predestination was similar to those of his time. He understood it to contain two elements: election and reprobation. However, he describes reprobation as consisting of two elements as well, stating, Reprobation is God’s decree by which he decided to pass by the other people, to leave them in their deserved condemnation, and to condemn them by his just judgment on account of sin. There are two acts in this decree. The one is negative, which is his design not to have mercy, not to call them efficaciously, and not to save them. The other is positive, which is his design to condemn them justly.52

While his definition is relatively standard, he does have one unique element. He prefers referring to negative-positive reprobation as “reprobation-predamnation.” Since reprobation is the opposite of election, then negative reprobation (God’s passing by individuals) is the proper use of the term reprobation. He went on to state that the positive side of the decree for the non-elect is better referred to as predamnation because it is the opposite of justification. He used the term predamnation in order to distinguish it from damnation since God does not assign anyone to damnation without sin; predamnation is the fact that God will hold the non-elect accountable to their demerits.

Johannes Maccovius (1588–1644 AD) Johannes Maccovius was a Polish Reformed theologian who was a committed supralapsarian. It has been said that predestination was his favorite topic.53 In 1616 AD, he wrote a number of theses concerning this doctrine after one of his students joined with one of his colleagues, Sibrandus Lubbertus, in arguing against it. Lubbertus, operating according to his own understanding of predestination and reprobation, accused Maccovius of heresy. Their debate was never settled until the Synod of Dort in 1619 AD. The synod, while neither approving nor condemning his supralapsarianism, acquitted Maccovius of the charges of heresy brought against him. The reason why Maccovius was charged by his associate was because Maccovius was not willing to speak of sin as a necessary effect of reprobation. Maccovius believed that if reprobation has any relationship with sin at all, then that might make God appear as the author of sin. As a result of this, he denied the

52 Translation provided by Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 172. 53 Keith L. Sprunger, The Learned Doctor William Ames. Dutch Backgrounds of English and American Puritanism (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1972), 76.

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role of sin in positive reprobation. In turn, he only spoke of reprobation as the antecedent of sin.54 In order to accomplish this, Maccovius relied upon ‘the late medieval solution’ that defined reprobation as twofold—negative and positive—which identified God’s will as the cause of its negative side and human sin as the cause of its positive side (but only as a proximate cause). First, he gives the source of God’s decree, and then its relationship to means. The ultimate cause was God’s will. For example, he writes in thesis two of the section De Praedestinatione in his work Distinctiones, “Reprobation is the destination to punishment, which is good and moral, because it is according to the law of the justice of God.”55 In whatever way God reprobated the wicked, he starts with clarifying that God’s reprobation is in strict compliance with God’s justice. Next, in thesis three, he explains that the ultimate cause, and means thereby to attaining it, were determined by God: Predestination is non-contingent on anything external to God, for that itself would be causal. If this was the cause it would be that which moves God either this way or that way. And God would be dependent upon it. However, this is not independent of any means. For example, God has decreed to save those who believe, but by means and on account of Christ. So he decided to reprobate on account of the means of sin.56

Ultimately, nothing could influence the decision of God because it would then, by inference, have authority over God. His decision is completely his own uninfluenced choice; however, it is not void of his consideration of means. Second, he makes a distinction between negative-positive reprobation in theses eight and nine, providing an explanation of how reprobation relates to the wrath of God. He writes the following in regard to this distinction: Reprobation is negative and positive. Negative in that, there is no-election; that is their names are not written in the book of life; and those should not be given to Christ. Positive is the purpose of the penalty, on account of which the punishment is inflicted.57

54 M.D. Bell, “Propter Potestatem, Scientiam, ac Beneplacitum Dei: The Doctrine of the Object of Predestination in the Theology of Johannes Maccovius” (ThD diss. Westminster Theological Seminary, 1986), 127–28. 55 Johannis Maccovii, “Reprobatio est destination ad poenam, quae bona est moraliter, quia sit secundum leges justitiae Die,” in Distinctiones et regulae theologicae ac philosophicae (Amsterdam: Elzevir, Louis, 1653), 71. 56 “Praedestinatio est absoluta a causa impulsive quae extra Deum est. Si enim esset causa impulsive, quae moveret Deum ad hoc vel illud agendum, Deus esset causa dependens. Non autem absoluta est a mediis, verbi gratia, decrevit salvare fideles, sed per & propter Christum, sic decrevit reprobos damnare propter peccata.” Ibid., 72. 57 “Reprobatio est vel negative vel positive. Negativam discimus, non esse electrum; quod scriptura istis verbis essert, non esse seriptum in libro vit; non esse datum Christo. Positiva est ordination ad poenas, ad es, propter quae poena infligitur.” Ibid., 74.

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He further explains the positive element: Reprobation in a positive sense is either absolute or contributive. The absolute ordination is to destruction, to use the phrase of Scripture, “to eternal damnation; vessels fitted to destruction,” Romans 9. As Contributive in the decree, however, it is not punishment only, but a greater punishment, for example, those who deserve to undergo a greater punishment, who reject (the gospel), will pay the greater penalty.58

With respect to God’s hatred, Maccovius contributes to the discussion on reprobation and an understanding of Romans 9 by explaining the difference between the hatred of God toward the non-elect before and after sin. He explains this in thesis twelve: Hatred also has two aspects, a negative (or private). The negative is when God does not love someone, and this hatred is said to be of Esau before he ever committed any evil. The positive element of hatred, is that which peruses the wicked (Ps 5:6), on account of their sin, and not before.59

With this statement, he makes a distinction between the outworking of God’s hatred both before sin is committed and then after. Before sin is committed, God’s hatred is expressed by not extending the love of election. However, it is not expressed in execution until after they sin, at which point God holds them accountable for their sin. Both are righteous expressions of God’s hatred. The second expression (the positive element) would be agreed upon by most, however, the first is Maccovius’ attempt to explain how God hated Esau before Esau ever committed sin.

The Second Remonstrance (1617 AD) Leading up to the Second Remonstrance, a number of public disputes occurred regarding the issues surrounding predestination. The Classis Walcheren letter (1616 AD) stands among them. This letter attempted to summarize, for foreign theologians, the major issues between the Remonstrance and Counter-Re-

58 “Reprobatio positive, est vel absoluta vel comparata. Absoluta est ordination ad interitum, esserri solet his pharsibus prascriptum esse as sternam damnationem; vasa compacta esse ad interitum. Rom. 9. Comparata autem est ordinatio non ad poenam tantum, sed ad majorem poenam, verbi gratia, illi qui graviores poenas subituri sunt, reprobate sunt comparate ad majors poenas.” Ibid., 74. 59 “Odium duplex est, negativum vel privativum. Negativum dicitur, quando Deus non amat aliquos, & hoc odio dicitur odisse Esauum antequam quicquam, mali fecisset. Odium positivum est, quo persequitur peccatores (Psalm 5:6) posterius odium est propter peccatum, non prius.” Ibid., 75.

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monstrance parties.60 However, this letter was received critically by Remonstrance supporters who viewed it as yet another attack on their position. Caspar Barlaeus, a Remonstrance supporter, wrote a response to what he saw in the Classis Walcheren letter. In this letter, he lays out the fourfold decree held by Arminius.61 He espoused the position that God’s will was the primary cause of predestination (both election and reprobation); that it was God’s will to foresee in men what their choice would be. God could have willed another condition than this, but it was God’s will that established the prerequisites in the matter, that is, faith or unbelief on the part of man. These international disputes, spreading both in the Netherlands and abroad, led to numerous provocations. The first was the Contra-Remonstrance argument that the Remonstrance position was a novelty, and a subtle return to errors refuted by the Reformers. They claimed that the Remonstrance had abandoned the common Reformed confessions which united the church. This convention was an “endeavor to remove from themselves the crime of innovation, and to fasten the same on those pastors, who most constantly remained in the received doctrine of these churches.”62 The attempt of Remonstrance pastors to distance themselves from this accusation gained international attention, to an extent that many foreign leaders urged the Dutch government to settle the matter amongst themselves.63 The means to settle the matter on a national scale was through a synod. The Remonstrants wanted this synod to be a regional synod in Holland (where it 60 Donald Sinnema, “The Attempt to Establish a Chair in Practical Theology at Leiden University,” in Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism: Studies in Honor of Richard A. Muller on a Maturation of a Theological Tradition, ed. Jordan J. Ballor, David S. Sytsma, and Jason Zuidema (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 419–20. 61 The first, God decreed to save believers. The second, God decreed to damn unbelievers. The third, God’s decree to save those in whom he foresaw faith. Fourth, God’s decree to damn those whom he foresaw would not believe. 62 Thomas Scott, ed., The Articles of the Synod of Dort, and Its Rejection of Errors: With the History of Events which Made Way for that Synod, as Published by the Authority of the Statesgeneral; and the Documents Confirming Its Decisions (Utica, NY: W. Williams, 1831), 63. 63 “These long continued controversies had already brought not into the churches only, but the republic likewise, so great a mass of difficulties, perturbations, and confusions, that all who loved the safety of the federated provinces, or of the reformed churched which are in them, or who favored the same, understood, that the remedy of these evils could no longer be deferred without the manifest danger of the state and of the churches[…]James I. the most powerful and Serene king of Great Britain, out of his singular and sincere affection towards these regions and churches, thought[…]the States General should be admonished by letters, no longer to suffer the gangrene to feed upon the body of the republic: but that they should, as soon as possible, proceed to meet these unhappy contentions, divisions, schisms, and factions, which threatened manifest danger to the state. And at the same time he obtested them, that they would restore to its original purity, all the errors having been extirpated, the true and ancient reformed doctrine.” Ibid.

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appears they believed they had a majority rule), but the Contra-Remonstrance wanted a national synod.64 When the Remonstrants saw that there were not only kings, nobles, and statesmen from Holland (and other Dutch provinces) who wanted a formal national synod, but also international figures with the same preference, they attempted to persuade leaders in various provinces to send delegates who favored their position (which would not have settled the issue nationally). They argued that the nation should not rule over the provinces in these matters and, even if they had to go to war, it was worth defending.65 Letters of this nature only caused the international synod to convene with more urgency.

The Synod of Dort (1618–1619 AD) The Synod of Dort was held by the Dutch Reformed Church in order to settle an international controversy initiated by the rise of Arminianism. A total of one hundred fifty-four meetings were held between the first meeting on November 13, 1618 and the last meeting on May 9, 1619. The synod was comprised of eightyfour members and eighteen secular commissioners, of whom fifty-eight were Dutch delegates from the particular province, and the rest were foreigners.66 Various Reformed groups from across continental Europe were represented in the synod, including delegates from the Church of England and the Church of Scotland.67 The foreign delegates who were invited to convene on the matter have been described as follows: Some of their Theologians who were outstanding in learning, godliness, and wisdom, who with their counsel and judgment might diligently labor to still the differences which had arisen in these Netherlands Churches, along with the Delegates of the Netherlands Churches, and might again bring peace to those Churches.68

64 Scott, ed., The Articles of the Synod of Dort, and Its Rejection of Errors, 64–66. 65 “The dissentions of the Remonstrants would have brought these flourishing provinces into the danger of civil war.” Scott, ed., The Articles of the Synod of Dort, and Its Rejection of Errors, 66. 66 One hudred and two total voting representatives were present. See Martin Mulsow and Jan Rohls, Socinianism and Arminianism: Antitrinitarians, Calvinists, and Cultural Exchange in Seventeenth-Century Europe (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 38. 67 Milton, The British Delegation and the Synod of Dort (1618–19); Michael Horton, The Christian Faith: A Systematic Theology for Pilgrims on the Way (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 562. 68 Homer C Hoeksema, “Historical Foreword to the Acts of the Synod of Dordrecht,” in The Voice of Our Fathers: An Exposition of the Canons of Dordrecht (Grand Rapids: Free Reformed Publishing Association, 1980), 101.

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Naturally, one may wonder why an international presence was necessary. At a fundamental level, the foreign delegates were invited to lend credibility and objectivity to the Synod’s decisions. Historical scholar Hoeksema explains: And since the Remonstrants did not appear to think much of the judgment of the Netherlands Churches, and had always attempted to convince the people that they had no other views than did the Reformed Churches, therefore the States-General also saw fit to invite from all Reformed Churches from neighboring Lands, Principalities, and Republics certain theologians outstanding in godliness, learning, and wisdom, in order that they should support the delegates of the Netherlands Churches by their judgments and counsel, and that thus these differences, having been investigated and judged as by a common judgment of all Reformed Churches, might be laid to rest more certainly, expeditiously, firmly, and with greater joy.69

The major point to be discussed was the Arminian controversy. To that end, the political commissioners were instructed to invite the most well-known, educated, and articulate members of the Arminian perspective to come to Dort. After the Arminian delegates received their invitations, they met in Rotterdam to choose officers to represent themselves as a counter to the Synod of Dort. By all appearances, the primary tactic of the Remonstrants was to first attack the doctrine of reprobation, then label the Contra-Remonstrants as radicals, and finally divide the Contra-Remonstrants over the doctrine of Supralapsarianism and the candid teachings of Gomarus.70 One example of this occurred at the opening of the synod, in which Simon Episcopius (1583–1643 AD), who was the spokesman for the Remonstrants, was asked to speak: Episcopius[…]insisted on being permitted to begin with a refutation of the Calvinistic doctrines, especially that of reprobation, hoping that, by placing his objections to this doctrine in front of all the rest, he might excite such prejudice against the other articles of the system, as to secure the popular voice in his favor. The Synod, however, very properly, reminded him[…]that, as the Remonstrants were accused of departing from the Reformed faith, they were bound first to justify themselves, by giving Scriptural proof in support of their opinions. The Arminians would not submit to this plan of

69 Hoeksema, “Historical Foreword to the Acts of the Synod of Dordrecht,” 93. 70 There was a difference of opinion between the infralapsarian and the supralapsarian members of the synod. This has already been seen. All members of the Calvinist position at the synod rejected the Arminian view that God predestines on the basis of foresight (either of faith or unbelief). Many of the foreign theologians were infralapsarians; that is, they regarded fallen man as the object of God’s election or reprobation. The majority of key Dutch delegates were supralapsarians; they believed that God’s decree of election came in logical order before his decree to create man, so that man apart from his association with sin was the object of God’s predestination.

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procedure because it destroyed their whole scheme of argument[…]and were thus compelled to withdraw. Upon their departure, the Synod proceeded without them.71

The Arminian representatives were very disruptive and refused to follow the outline provided by the synod. They would be given an opportunity to raise their objections to reprobation, but not before they gave a scriptural defense of their own positions. The original intention of the synod was to discuss the Remonstrance complaint in 1610 AD against the national confessions. On the second day of the synod, Episcopius was scheduled to present the views of the Remonstrants, however, he did not provide his positions in any written form for the Synod to evaluate. Rather, Episcopius made a long speech that many thought was impertinent, in which he hurled accusations against the synod itself, questioning its authority as well as that of the States-General and the Prince.72 After Episcopius’ lengthy discourse, he was asked to supply a copy of his views so that the Scriptures and complaints he raised might be evaluated by the members of the synod. After refusing to comply, he was asked to provide his notes so that the synod might make copies themselves. Again he refused, claiming his copy was illegible. This was but one example of the Remonstrants’ constant attempt to deny the authority of the synod. Eventually, Episcopius complied by presenting his complaints, but he omitted all the passages referring to political authorities.73 One witness to the situation was John Hales, chaplain to the English ambassador.74 Through his letters, Hales records that Episcopius, the leader of the Arminians at the Synod, maintained that reprobation was the main issue and therefore needed to be addressed first. Hales also outlined the way in which the Arminian members’ manners continued to be a growing distraction and disruption to the synod. One such tactic employed by the Remonstrants was silence. Johannes Bogerman, who was elected president of the synod, asked the members of the 71 72 73 74

Scott, The Articles of the Synod of Dort, 5. Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 222. Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 225–28. The objectivity of the English delegates has been questioned. Gerard Brandt states, “King James sent such Divines to the synod of Dort whom he knew to be zealous enough to condemn the Remonstrants, but he was not so much inclined to act in this manner by the light of his excellent understanding, as for reasons of state, for his excellency Prince Maurice (with whom that king was engaged in a strict alliance, and for whose person and power he very much interested himself) having put himself at the head of the Contra Remonstrant party he thought fit to contribute all he could towards the oppression of the weaker side and for corroborating the authority of a prince whose interest he had espoused; insomuch that this monarch was rather an enemy to the persons than to the principles of the Remonstrants.” Gerard Brandt, History of the Reformation in the Low Countries (New York: AMS Press, 1979), 3:6.

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Remonstrance whether they acknowledged the Remonstrance of 1610 as truth. They all sat in silence, refusing to acknowledge his question (or, in their opinion, his authority). When they would not speak, they were asked to put their objections to the confessions into writing; still, they would not. Bogerman was aware of their complaints against reprobation and saw this as a tactic to make Calvinism look unnecessarily loathsome. When he asked them if this was their intention, they refused to respond. Ultimately, they were asked to present their view before critiquing the opposing view.75 Yet, it seems as though the Arminians resorted to obstructing the procedures as much as they could, all the while painting their opponents in a bad light. Afterward, a month was spent on procedural matters concerning the Remonstrants. They were finally ejected from the Synod at Session 57 on January 14, 1619.76 On January 14, 1619, Bogerman asked Episcopius and his followers for their answer. They replied that they would not submit to the Synod. Bogerman furiously replied, The foreign delegates are now of the opinion that you are unworthy to appear before Synod. You have refused to acknowledge it as your lawful judge and regarded it as an opposing party: you have tried in everything to have your own way; you have despised the decision of Synod and of the political commissioners; you refused to answer questions; you declared the credentials to be invalid. Synod has treated you with gentleness, but you have been lying from beginning to end, as one of the foreign theologians remarked. With this eulogy we will let you go. God will keep his word and he will bless the Synod. In order that we will not be delayed any longer, you will be sent out. Depart: Go! 77

Episcopius would have the final word. When the Arminians rose to leave the synod hall, he said, “We will with Christ be silent about this. God will judge between us and this Synod.”78 The Remonstrants wanted clarification and a sufficient articulation of the doctrine of reprobation, which they would get by the end of the synod in the form

75 Sinnema records their response, “since we were admonished by the President in the last session to refrain from negative statements and to treat the topic of election rather than the odious topic of reprobation.” Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 228. Even here, in presenting their view positively it appears they used it as an opportunity to paint the doctrine of reprobation in a negative light. 76 Anthony Milton, The British Delegation and the Synod of Dort (1618–19), 147–48. For a detailed account of all the events of Synod of Dort, see Sinnema, “The Issue of Reprobation at the Synod of Dort,” 214–63 (“Chapter 4: Reprobation and the Procedural Debates with the Remonstrants”). 77 J. Faber, The Bride’s Treasure: Introduction to the Canons of Dort (Launceston, Tasmania: Publication Organization of The Free Reformed Churches of Australia, 1979), 35. 78 Faber, The Bride’s Treasure: Introduction to the Canons of Dort, 35.

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of the official Articles of the Synod of Dort.79 Although the supporters of the Remonstrance were not present, the synod would refer to their writings, both the official articles of complaint from the Remonstrance of 1610 and many of their writings from the years leading up to the synod. The reason for the synod not allowing the Arminians to control the agenda by beginning with the doctrine of reprobation was likely twofold. First, they knew that if one point falls, the entire system is suspect of legitimacy. Second, they knew that if one point is misrepresented, the entire system would be misrepresented. Fredrick Calder observes: And while such excitements must have been felt by the Dutch [Calvinist] divines, they likewise knew that it was possible for the Remonstrants to present their doctrines and especially that of reprobation, in such a point of light as to shake the confidence of the people in other parts of the system.80

It is true that if one element can be impugned, suspicions can be formed about the legitimacy of the entire system of Calvinism. In many respects, they all stand or fall together. However, when a doctrine is misrepresented, it is easy to make it appear worse than it is. It is important to recognize that the opponents of Arminius believed he misunderstood the entire issue, which likely was a major influence on his followers. Gomarus, the chief antagonist of Episcopius, stated, He [Episcopius] had falsified the doctrine of reprobation, in representing it as merely designed to exhibit the severity and power of God. For no one maintains that God absolutely decreed to reprobate men without respect to sin: as he decreed the end reprobation, so he decreed likewise the means as the foundation of it; that is, as God predestined man to death, so he predestined him to sin as the only means of death.81

The Synod of Dort has been labeled the “persecuting synod,” and in some respects, this would be the case.82 However, the Dutch churches were bound by two confessional statements, the Belgic Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism. The Arminians pledged to abide by these statements, all the while undermining them. Van Oldenbarnevelt, a non-theologian and political ally of the Arminians, was declared guilty of treason and beheaded on May 14, 1619. The reply of Diodati, the delegate from Geneva, was one of inappropriate irony, saying that

79 Dewar claims “they were predestined to defeat.” M.W. Dewar, “The British Delegation at the Synod of Dort––1618–1619,” EvQ 46 (April–June, 1974): 108. 80 Calder, Memoirs of Simon Episcopius, 352. 81 Calder, Memoirs of Simon Episcopius, 335. 82 It is called this because 200 Arminian ministers would be removed from their offices and the political leaders were arrested. See Dewar, “The British Delegation at the Synod of Dort–– 1618–1619,” 115.

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“the Canons of Dort had shot off the Advocate’s head.”83 DeWitt is adamant in his judgment of Arminius and his successors, stating, “Arminius and his successors were oath breakers; and to avoid the consequences of this offence, they in effect withdrew themselves from the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts, while claiming to continue as faithful members of the Church, and placed themselves under the protection of the secular power.”84 The Canons treated election and reprobation together under the same head of doctrine and by doing this, they recognize that it is impossible to articulate a doctrine of election without exploring its implications for reprobation. The following excerpts contain all the references to reprobation found in the Canons of Dort: Chapter 1 Of the Doctrine of Divine Predestination Art. 1. As all men have sinned in Adam, and have become exposed to the curse and eternal death, God would have done no injustice to anyone, if he had determined to leave the whole human race under sin and the curse, and to condemn them on account of sin; according to those words of the apostle, “All the world is become guilty before God,” Rom 3:19. “All have sinned, and come short of the glory of God,” v. 23. And “the wages of sin is death” Rom 6:23. Art. 5. The cause or fault of this unbelief, as also of all other sins, is by no means in God, but in man[…] Art. 6. That some, in time, have faith given them by God, and others have it not given, proceeds from his eternal decree[…]According to which decree, he graciously softens the hearts of the elect, however hard, and he bends them to believe: but the non-elect he leaves, in just judgment, to their own perversity and hardness. And here, especially, a deep discrimination of men equally lost, opens itself to us; or that decree of election and reprobation which is revealed in the word of God. Which, as perverse, impure, and unstable persons do wrest to their own destruction, so it affords ineffable consolation to holy and pious souls. 83 Dewar, “The British Delegation at the Synod of Dort––1618–1619,” 115. Robert Picirilli comments, “Punishment for the Remonstrants, now officially condemned as heretics and therefore under judgement of both church and state, was severe. All Arminian pastors—some 200 of them—were deprived of office; any who would not agree to be silent were banished from the country. Spies were paid to hunt down those suspected of returning to their homeland. Some were imprisoned, among them Grotius; but he escaped and fled the country. Five days after the synod was over, Oldenbarnevelt was beheaded.” Robert Picirilli, Grace, Faith, Free Will: Contrasting Views of Salvation: Calvinism and Arminianism (Nashville: Randall House, 2002), 11. Picirilli makes no comment concerning the oath breaking of the Arminians against the national confessions they swore to uphold, nor does he comment on the fact that many Arminian theologians tried to draw political ties with enemies of the state. 84 Johns R. de Witt, “The Arminian Conflict and the Synod of Dort,” in Puritan Papers, Vol. 5: 1968–1969, ed. J.I. Packer (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2005), 10.

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Art. 15. Moreover, Holy Scripture doth illustrate and commend to us, this eternal and free grace of our election, in this more especially, that, it doth also testify all men not to be elected, but that some are non-elect, or passed by in the eternal election of God, whom truly God, from most free, just irreprehensible, and immutable good pleasure, decreed to leave in the common misery, into which they had, by their own fault, cast themselves, and not to bestow on them living faith, and the grace of conversion; but, having been left in their own ways, and under just judgment, at length not only on account of their unbelief, but also of all their other sins, to condemn and eternally punish them to the manifestation of his own justice. And this is the decree of reprobation, which determines that God is in no wise the author of sin, (which to be thought of is blasphemy,) but a tremendous, irreprehensible, just judge and avenger. Art. 18. Against those who murmur at this grace of gratuitous election, and the severity of just reprobation, we oppose this word of the apostle: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God?” Rom 9:10. And that of our Savior: “Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?” Matt 20:15. We indeed, piously adoring these mysteries, exclaim with the apostle “O the depths of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counselor! Or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed to him again! For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory forever. Amen.”85

The lasting influence of the Synod of Dort on Reformed orthodoxy cannot be overstated. One such example of its impact is seen in the Helvetic Consensus which was drawn up in 1675 AD. This consensus was, in part, intended to guard against doctrines taught at the French Academy of Saumur, which, taught Amyraldism, denied the verbal inspiration of the Hebrew Old Testament and rejected the imputation of Adam’s sin.86 Furthermore, it reiterates the many distinctions made by theologians in the past, while giving a standard for theologians who would come in the future. Several Arminian charges against unconditional reprobation are refuted and addressed in the brief articles contained in the Canons of Dort, including the idea that reprobation makes God the author 85 Scott, The Articles of the Synod of Dort, 87–93. At first glance it might appear that the Canons of Dort are strongly Infralapsarian, however this would be a slight oversight. Many of the main delegates were supralapsarian; and within a supralapsarian scheme there is still the necessity of sin, which is explicit in the Canons. This is likely because the Canons do not differentiate between the decree and its execution, which many scholars of the time did. 86 In France, Protestants lived surrounded by Roman Catholics, and faced many enemies arising within Arminianism. All the major errors stemmed from the Saumur School. Moise Amyraut taught that the atonement was hypothetically universal rather than definite. Louis Cappel denied the verbal inspiration of the Hebrew Old Testament. Josué de la Place rejected the immediate imputation of Adam’s sin as arbitrary and unjust. For more on this issue, see Philip Schaff, Creeds of Christendom, 1:477–89; Martin I. Klauber, “The Helvetic Formula Consensus (1675): An Introduction and Translation,” TJ 11, no. 1 (1990): 102. Richard A. Muller, Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988).

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of sin, discourages evangelism, and is unjust. These brief articles would become the basis for sections in the Westminster Standards and would become a tenant of the majority of Puritanism to follow.

Summary Remarks Concerning the Historical Development of Reprobation

The doctrine of reprobation was not formed in a vacuum, nor was it solidified into Reformed dogma overnight. Rather, the development of the doctrine took generations to come to fruition. Each successive generation built upon the teachings of the previous, and the maturity of the doctrine has always been at the center of many theological debates. The Patristic period was dominated by the influence of Augustine; no other writer would approach the topic to the extent that he did. His material became the source of discussion throughout the entire Middle Ages, to such an extent that nearly everyone cited him in support of their nuanced positions. His influence was so great that the Reformers spent more time citing him than any other theologian. He was the first to speak of double predestination (to life and death), which would become characteristic of the Reformed faith. When one examines the Middle Ages and the three separate councils intended to silence Gottschalk of Orbais, it is noticeable that many medieval theologians become hesitant to speak of double predestination. In this period, the attention given to reprobation shifted to the source of reprobation itself, deliberating whether it was based on God’s will or intellect (in some cases, pointing to an underdeveloped foresight). Through this period, there are two schools of thought: those who followed Lombard (trying to base the cause of reprobation on God’s intellect and foreknowledge of sin) and those who followed Duns Scotus (seeing it as a free act of God’s will). The division between the Lombardian school and the Scotus school would shape the Late Middle Ages and cause theologians in this period to attempt to resolve the tension between both sides. Fundamentally, both sides had commendable concerns. On the one hand, the Lombardian view was interested in preserving God’s justice; that he would not punish the reprobate without taking into account sin. On the other hand, the Scotus camp was burdened with preserving God’s liberty and sovereignty. As a result, the Late Middle Ages indicate a tendency to attempt to account for both parties’ concerns, leading to the negative-positive distinction and God’s use of causality. This allowed for the justice

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and sovereignty of God to be upheld concurrently, providing a theological framework that becomes the foundation for the Reformers. Martin Luther advocated a strong double predestination, which his followers would later reject in favor of single predestination. Luther believed in the unconditional nature of reprobation and stressed the element of God’s sovereignty in the matter. Calvin, following on the heels of Luther and Zwingli, advocated double predestination, but placed more emphasis on clarifying man’s role in the matter than Luther did. This helped remove the negative connotations associated with reprobation’s necessity for sin, which was left either unclear or unaddressed by Luther. It would go on to become the majority view of the Reformed tradition. Furthermore, Calvin stressed the ultimate versus meritorious causes in reprobation. This would be more thoroughly expressed through other Reformed thinkers who would differentiate between the eternal decree and the temporal execution of that decree. Such a distinction would allow room for Reformed thinkers to maintain both an unconditional reprobation as the cause of God’s decree, as well as God’s consideration of sin as the grounds for the execution of the decree in damnation. In turn, their views become the catalyst for the Council of Trent and the majority position of the Roman Catholic position which, in response to the Protestant position, established itself as synergistic (thereby making reprobation based entirely upon man’s actions). In contemplating the unconditional, absolute decree of reprobation, all Reformed thinkers agreed that the cause was to display the glory of God. Some would use this as a parallel with election, showing the benefit it provides to keep the elect humble and grateful for the grace of God. Yet, there would be those like Piscator and Gomarus who would stress reprobation to such an extreme that it provided merit to the Arminian objections. They appeared to advocate that man was not in any real way responsible for sin, but God was. In their minds, God was the author of unbelief (via reprobation) in a symmetrical way as he was the author of faith in the hearts of the elect. Ultimately, this provided traction for the Arminians, who seem to ignore the majority view (which permeated church history). In the end, these maverick thinkers took the Roman Catholic view, that both election and reprobation were based on God’s foreknowledge of man’s faith or unbelief. This would be why they were said to “return to Rome” at the beginning of the Synod of Dort.1 The Synod of Dort would be the first major doctrinal statement formulated in the church to govern what is essential to believe and reject concerning the doctrine of reprobation. It summarized and clarified what had been taught for generations within the Reformed church, while simultaneously rejecting what it 1 Augustus Toplady famously claimed that Arminianism was the “Road to Rome.”

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understood to be faulty views of reprobation. This synod would show a desire to ground its findings in Scripture, in addition to stressing a proper explanation of God’s use of means in order to combat any charge that reprobation makes God the author of sin.

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Index

absolute knowledge, 98n15 active reprobation, 51n55, 53, 108 “affirmative reprobation,” 51, 58, 102 affirmative-negative reprobation, 71 Albert the Great, 46–47, 58n74 Alexander of Hales, 45–46, 58n75 Ambrose, 23–24 Ames, William, 106–108 Amyraldism, 20n10, 119 Amyraut, Moise, 119n86 Anselm of Canterbury, 42–44, 58n76 ante-Nicene fathers, 21 apostate angels, 40 Apostolic Fathers, 21 archetypal knowledge, 97 Arminianism, 20n10, 99–106 Arminius, Jacob, 87–89, 93–105 aseity, 52n57 assurance, 30, 81 Augustine, 21–33, 40, 44–45, 58n74, 68, Augustinianism, 28, 29, 33, 56 author of sin, 15, 17, 50, 65, 72, 84, 89, 99, 101, 108, 119 Barlaeus, Caspar, 112 Baro, Peter, 88–87 Barrett, William, 86 Belgic Confession, 80–81, 103, 105 Bellarmine, Robert, 70–71, 90 Berkouwer, G.C., 82n95 Beza, Theodore, 75–77 Biel, Gabriel, 57, 58n75 Bogerman, Johannes, 115–116 Bolsec, Hieronymus, 72

Bonaventure, 47–48, 58n75 Bondage of the Will (Luther), 62 Book of Common Prayer, 74, 83 Bradwardine, Thomas, 54–55, 56n69 Bullinger, Heinrich, 71–74, 93 Calvinism, 15, 28, 68n30, 86, 89, 97, 105 Calvin, John, 21–22, 59n2, 67–70, 122 – on Augustine, 68 – on Luther, 59n2 Cambridge Predestination controversy, 86 Canons of Dort, 118–119 causality, 50, 52–53, 60, 76n63, 84, 86n9, 121 – efficient vs. meritorious, 47 – eminence vs. dependence, 52n57 – primary vs. secondary distinction, 15 cause of reprobation, 55, 87, 92, 99, 121 chargeable cause of sin, 28, 35, 65n21, 78, 84 Classis Walcheren letter, 111–112 compatibilism, 17–18, 29, 37–38, 43–44, 61– 63, 70, 84, 101 concurrence, 18 conditional election, 87 conditional predestination, 24, 104n39 conditional reprobation, 87 Contra-Remonstrance, 104–105, 112–113 Council of – Arles (473), 31–33 – Carthage (318), 29, 35, 37 – Ephesus (431), 29, 37 – Hippo (393), 35 – Nicea (325), 24 – Orange, Second (529), 37–38 – Trent, 66–67, 122

152 Counter Reformation, 66–68 covenant theology, 71n46 damnation, 26–27, 41, 44–49, 51, 54–55, 58, 62n8, 73–75, 77, 80, 84, 86, 88–89, 92, 94– 96, 99, 106–109, 122 – eternal reprobation vs temporal punishment in, 74 Decades (Bullinger), 93 decree of reprobation, 14, 19, 28, 38, 45, 48n44, 49, 57, 78, 89, 91–92, 95–96, 99, 102, 119, 122 decree-execution distinction, 14, 95–96 100–103, 119n85, 122 definite knowledge, 97–98 double predestination, 26, 38–39, 45, 54, 77, 89, 121–122 Dutch Reformers, 93–120 early church, 21–23 Early Middle Ages, 35–39, 50–51 Eck, John, 58 efficient cause, 47–48, 53–55, 79–80, 99 ends of reprobation, 98–99 ends-means distinction, 91 English Reformation, 83–92 Episcopius, Simon, 114–117 “equal” predestination, 41 equal ultimacy, 33, 38, 41 Erasmus, 61–63 Esau, 36, 45, 61, 67, 111 eternal punishment, 57 execution of reprobation, 28, 75–77, 86, 91– 92, 95–96 fatalism, 21, 23, 72 Faustus of Reiz, 31–33 federal headship, 30n31 first cause, 26, 52n57, 54, 74–75 First Principle Causality (Duns), 52n57 Five Articles (Remonstrance), 103–104 foreknowledge, 24–25, 29, 32, 36, 40n17, 41, 43–47, 53, 55–58, 63, 77, 79, 85, 101, 121–22 – causative, 46

Index

– indefinite foreknowledge vs definite knowledge, 97–98 foreseen sin, 30, 57, 69, 71, 75, Franciscan School of Theology, 45 free will, 50–51, 60, 67 libertarian view of, 22–23, 37 – of God, 60, 70 Fulgentius of Ruspe, 35–38 Gnosticism, 21–23 God – decrees of, 26–27, 40n17, 47, 49–50, 56– 58, 61, 63, 68, 76n63, 77, 79, 84, 88–90, 94, 97, 102 – eternality of, 42 – free will of, 60, 65, 70, 79 – hatred of, 60, 107, 111 – hidden will of, 30, 61, 75, 78, 81 – holiness of, 16, 19, 41, 44, 48 – independence of, 56–57 – intellect of, 46, 48n44, 49, 121 – justice of, 27–28, 30, 36, 39, 41, 49, 65, 70, 76–78, 89, 91, 100, 107, 110, 119, 121 – knowledge of, 42–43, 46, 61, 97–98 – love of, 60 – mercy of, 27, 30, 49, 57, 63, 76, 103 – sovereignty of, 17n5, 19, 28, 30, 40, 43, 60–62, 64–65, 73, 84, 121–22 – will of, 23, 26n16, 46–49, 55, 61, 67–69, 73–76, 79, 91, 99–100, 110, 112, 121 – wrath of, 69, 110 Gomarus, Franciscus, 97–99, 117, 122 Gottschalk of Orbais, 40–42, 58n74 Greek fathers, 21–24 Gregory of Rimini, 56–57, 58n74 Grevinchoven, Nicolaas, 106 Hague Conference (Collatio Hagensis), 104–106 Hales, John, 115 hardening, 41, 43, 45, 61, 107 – self-hardening, 47 – temporal, 48, 54 Heidelberg Catechism (1563), 80–81, 103 Helvetic Consensus (1675), 119 hereditary guilt, 23

153

Index

hidden will of God, 30, 48, 61, 75, 79, 81 High Middle Ages, 39–50 Hilary, 23 holy angels, 40 Hommius, Festus, 104, 108–109 human freedom, 22–23, 62n10 human monergism, 23 human will, 17, 21–23, 25, 27, 29, 37–38, 62– 63, 70, 84–85 human works, 29, 36, 41, 55 hyper-Calvinism, 13, 32, 51 indefinite foreknowledge, 97 indefinite knowledge, 98 infralapsarianism 20n10, 30n31, 52n59, 69n37, 81n87, 100, 114n70, 119n85 infralapsarian-supralapsarian debate, 88 Institutes of the Christian Religion (Calvin), 68 Isidore of Seville, 38–39 Jacob, 45, 67 Jerome, 24 Judas, 52, 61–62 Junius, Franciscus, 94–97 Knox, John, 77–78 Lambeth Articles (Nine Articles), 85–87 Late Middle Ages, 50–58 Latin Fathers, 21, 23 Lombard, Peter, 44–45, 48n44, 58n74 Lombardian view of reprobation, 46, 63, 69, 121 Lubbertus, Sibrandus, 109 Lucidus, 31–33 lump – of condemnation, 36n5 – of fallen humanity, 26 – of perdition, 36, 51 – unformed, 100 Luther, Martin, 60–63, 122 – vs. Erasmus, 61–62 Maccovius, Johannes, 109–111 Marbach, John, 79

Marrow of Theology (Ames), 106 Marus, Rabanus, 40n16 material cause of reprobation, 76, 91 means of reprobation, 28, 45, 47, 50, 55, 70, 85, 91–92, 96, 98–99, 101, 107–108, 110, 117, 123 Melanchthon, Phillip, 72–73 meritorious cause, 46, 47–48, 53, 76–77, 84, 122 monergism, 23, 37–38, 48n45 Nadere Reformatie, 93–120 Negative reprobation, 51–52, 58, 86, 102, 107, 109 negative-positive elements of reprobation, 76, 78, 91, 95, 99, 110, 121 “New Pelagianism”, 87 Nicholas of Lyra, 55–56 Open Theism, 13 original sin, 25–26, 28, 30n31, 37n9 passive hatred, 107 passive reprobation, 51n55, 53, 94, 108 passive-active reprobation, 95 Pelagianism, 23, 29, 54 Pelagius, 24–25 Perkins, William, 20n10, 83–85, 86n9, 87 “permission,” divine, 73–74 Pharaoh, 61, 65 Pighius, 21, 59n2 Piscator, Johann, 88–89, 122 Polanus, Amandus, 90–92 positive reprobation, 51n55, 55–56, 78–79, 99, 109–111 positive-negative reprobation, 59, 71 Post-Nicene Fathers, 24–33 predamnation, 51, 109 predestination – to damnation, 62n8, 67, 109 – to evil, 41n18, 66 – to hell, 41, 85 – to justice, 39 – to sin, 29, 36, 38 preterition, 51, 69, 78–79, 88, 94–95, 102

154 primary-secondary causes of reprobation, 79 Prosper of Aquitaine, 29–31 Protestant Reformation, 59, 66, 68 providence, 50, 64–65, 73 punishment, 26, 56 punitive hatred, 107 Reformed orthodoxy, 59, 77, 90, 92, 119 Remonstrance (1610), 103–106, 108, 115– 117 – Second (1617), 111–113 reprobation unto damnation, 45, 54, 80 reprobation unto unbelief, 89 “reprobation-predamnation,” 109 retrieval, 14–16, 18–20 revealed will of God, 61 Roman Catholicism, 58, 70–71, 122 Scholasticism, 45, 49 Scotus, Duns, 51–53, 58n76, 121 Scotus school, 52, 121 Second Helvetic Confession (1566), 80–81 secondary causality, 15, 41, 50 secondary causes, 17, 19, 50, 54, 65, 75– 78, 99 Semi-Pelagianism, 23, 29, 32–33, 35, 37, 54, 87n19 simple knowledge, 98n15 single predestination, 62, 72–73, 97, 122 Stoicism, 21 Suarez, Francisco, 70–71 sufficient cause of reprobation, 99 Spinoza, Benedict, 105

Index

supralapsarianism, 20n10, 53, 69n37, 75, 83, 96, 98–100, 109, 114, 119n85 synergism, 23, 67, 73–74, 122 Synod of Dort, 26n16, 93, 113–120, 122 temporal damnation, 69, 95 Tertullian, 23–24 Thirty-Nine articles (1563–1571), 82, 86 Thomas Aquinas, 49, 65–66 total depravity, 22 Toplady, Augustus, 122n1 Trelcatius, Lucas, 96 twofold cause of reprobation, 57, 74, 95, 110 ultimate cause, 26, 50, 54, 64, 65n21, 73, 76, 110, 122 unequal involvement, 30 unequal ultimacy, 27 Uytenbogaert, Johannes, 104 Van Oldenbarnevelt, Johan, 117 Veluanus, Anastasius, 93n2 Vermigli, Peter Martyr, 74–75 volition, 19, 43–44, 46, 61–63, 84 Warfield, Benjamin Breckinridge, 82 Westminster Confession, 17 Whitaker, William, 85–86 Whitgift, John, 85n7, 86 William of Ockham, 52–54, 57 Zanchi, Jerome, 79–80, 87 Zurich controversy, 72, 74 Zwingli, Ulrich, 64–66, 72