Religious Diversity in Singapore 9789812307552

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Religious Diversity in Singapore

The Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) was established in 1988 as a think-tank dedicated to fostering good governance in Singapore through strategic policy research and discussion. It is an autonomous research centre in the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. IPS focuses on Singapore’s domestic developments and her external relations. It takes on a multi-disciplinary approach in its analysis with an emphasis on long-term strategic thinking.

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued almost 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

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Religious Diversity in Singapore

EDITED BY

LAI AH ENG

Lee Kuan Yew ~ • School Public Policy I ~-,~ of

.F5 I

National University of Singapore

INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

Institute of Policy Studies

First published in Singapore in 2008 by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: jointly with Institute of Policy Studies Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy National University of Singapore 29 Heng Mui Keng Terrace #06-06 Singapore 119620 E-mail: [email protected] Website: All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2008 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publishers or their supporters.

ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Religious diversity in Singapore / edited by Lai Ah Eng. 1. Singapore—Religion—Congresses. 2. Religious pluralism—Singapore—Congresses. 3. Religious tolerance—Singapore—Congresses. I. Lai Ah Eng. BL2085 R381 2008 ISBN 978-981-230-753-8 (soft cover) ISBN 978-981-230-754-4 (hard cover) ISBN 978-981-230-755-2 (PDF) Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Utopia Press Pte Ltd

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CONTENTS

List of Figures and Tables

ix

List of Appendices

xii

Foreword President S. R. Nathan

xv

Preface Tommy Koh

xvii

Acknowledgements

xix

The Contributors

xxi

Abbreviations

xxxiii

Glossary

xxxvii

Introduction Lai Ah Eng I

xliii

THE LANDSCAPE OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

1

Religious Influences and Impulses Impacting Singapore Tham Seong Chee

2

Religious Trends and Issues in Singapore Tong Chee Kiong

3

Keeping God in Place: The Management of Religion in Singapore Eugene K. B. Tan

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55

vi

4

Contents

Discourses on Islam in Southeast Asia and Their Impact on the Singapore Muslim Public Azhar Ibrahim

83

5

Global Christian Culture and the Antioch of Asia Jean DeBernardi

6

“Religiously-inspired”, “India-derived” Movements in Singapore 142 Vineeta Sinha

7

Baha’is in Singapore: Patterns of Conversion Foo Check Woo and Lynette Thomas

8

Diversities and Unities: Towards a Reformist Buddhism in Singapore Kuah-Pearce Khun Eng

195

The Sathya Sai Baba Movement in Singapore: Its Service Mission and Philosophy of Communal Identity Construction Nagah Devi Ramasamy

215

9

116

167

10

The Muslim Religious Elite of Singapore Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman

248

11

The Evolution of the Sikh Identity in Singapore Arunajeet Kaur

275

12

Religious Processions: Urban Politics and Poetics Lily Kong

298

II 13

14

RELIGION IN SCHOOLS AND AMONG THE YOUNG

From Moral Values to Citizenship Education: The Teaching of Religion in Singapore Schools Charlene Tan

321

Religious Education as Locus of Curriculum: A Brief Inquiry into Madrasah Curriculum in Singapore Sa’eda Buang

342

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Contents

15

16

vii

Mission Schools in Singapore: Religious Harmony, Social Identities, and the Negotiation of Evangelical Cultures Robbie B. H. Goh

362

Religious Switching and Knowledge among Adolescents in Singapore Phyllis Ghim-Lian Chew

381

III RELIGION IN THE MEDIA 17

18

Religious Reasons in a Secular Public Sphere: Debates in the Media about Homosexuality Kenneth Paul Tan

413

The Internet and Religious Harmony in Singapore Randolph Kluver, Benjamin H. Detenber, Lee Wai Peng, Shahiraa Sahul Hameed, Chen Yanli, and Pauline Hope Cheong IV

434

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN SOCIAL SERVICES

19

Muslim Organizations and Mosques as Social Service Providers Enon Mansor and Nur Amali Ibrahim

459

20

Hindu Temples in Charities and Social Services Sinniah Vivakanandan and Nagah Devi Ramasamy

489

21

Delivering Welfare Services in Singapore: A Strategic Partnership between Buddhism and the State Kuah-Pearce Khun Eng

505

Saving the City through Good Works: Christian Involvement in Social Services Mathew Mathews

524

22

V 23

INTERFAITH ISSUES AND INTERACTION

Religious Diversity, Toleration and Interaction Ten Chin Liew

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24

Contents

Negotiating Christianity with Other Religions: The Views of Christian Clergymen in Singapore Mathew Mathews

571

25

The Inter-Religious Organization of Singapore Lai Ah Eng

26

Interactions among Youth Leaders of Different Faiths: Realities from the Ground and Lessons Learnt Charles Phua Chao Rong, Anita Hui and Yap Ching Wi

642

Building Bridges between Christians and Muslims: A Personal Journey See Guat Kwee

668

Conclusion: Some Remarks on Religious Diversity in Singapore Lai Ah Eng

689

27

28

605

Index

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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

FIGURES 18.1

18.2 18.3

Responses to the Statement “The Availability of Religious Material on the Internet Is Disruptive to Religious Harmony” On-line Activities Related to One’s Own Religion by Religion On-line Activities Related to Others’ Religion by Religion

443 446 446

TABLES 2.1 2.2 2.3

2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8

Religions and Population Distribution by Religion in Singapore, 1849–1931 Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion for the Years 1980, 1990 and 2000 Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Ethnic Group and Religion for the Years 1980, 1990 and 2000 Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by Religion and Ethnic Group for the Year 1990 Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by Religion, Ethnic Group and Sex for the Year 1990 Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion and Age Group for the Years 1990 and 2000 Malay Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by Religion and Age Group for the Year 1990 Indian Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by Religion and Age Group for the Year 1990

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32 37

39 39 42 43 44 44

x

Table 2.9 2.10 2.11

2.12 2.13 2.14 2.15

List of Figures and Tables

Chinese Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by Religion and Age Group for the Year 1990 Proportion Reporting “No Religion” by Age and Ethnic Group for the Year 2000 Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion and Highest Qualification Attained for the Years 1990 and 2000 Educational Stream by Christianity Religious Affiliation by Stream of Education Resident Working Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion and Occupation for the Year 1990 Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion and Type of Dwelling for the Year 2000

3.1

Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Above by Religion

6.1

“Religiously-inspired”, “India-derived Movements” in Singapore

16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.8 16.9 16.10 18.1 18.2

Number and Percentage of Respondents and Switchers by Age Group and Type of School Percentage of Respondents by Age Group and Religion Percentage Comparison of Data Sample with Singapore Census 1980, 1990 and 2000 Percentage of Grandparents, Parents and Respondents by Religion Percentage of Switchers by Religion Percentage of Switchers in Terms of Language Used Percentage of Respondents by Level of Knowledge on Religions in Singapore Ways of Finding out about Other Religions Percentage of Interviewees in Relation to Their Introducers Percentage of Interviewees in Relation to Switching Time Comparison of the Religion of Internet Users and the General Population in Singapore Comparison of Engagement in Different On-line Religious Activities by Religion

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45 45

47 48 48 49 49 57

147

386 387 387 388 389 390 391 398 402 402

442 445

List of Figures and Tables

Table 24.1 24.2 24.3

24.4

24.5

24.6

24.7

24.8 24.9

24.10 24.11

24.12 24.13

26.1

xi

Agreement to Statement “Inter-religious Dialogue between Religious Leaders Can Be Fruitful” Agreement to Statement “I Would Have Dialogue with Leaders of Other Faiths if I Had the Opportunity” Agreement to Statement “It Would Be Best for Inter-religious Dialogue to be Conducted by Denominational Leaders and not the Average Church Pastor” Agreement to Statement “I Have Fears that Inter-religious Dialogue Can Lead to Compromising Religious Convictions” Agreement to Statement “I Find It Difficult to Receive Donations (without Any Strings Attached) from a Non-Christian Religious Group for Any Activity of My Church” Agreement to Statement “It Will Be Difficult for Me to Cooperate with Another Non-Christian Religious Leader for a Charity Drive in My Community” Agreement to Statement “I Would Find It Ethically Difficult to Lead in Prayer in a Gathering of Religious Leaders where Each Leader Will Lead in Prayer Following His Religious Tradition” Acceptance of Practice — Following a Procession around a Coffin Led by a Chinese Medium/Buddhist Monk Acceptance of Practice — Bowing to a Coffin of a Deceased Family Member during a Chinese/Buddhist/ Hindu Funeral Acceptance of Practice — Eating Food Which Has Been Offered by Family Members to an Idol Acceptance of Practice — Holding Joss-Sticks/ Other Religious Objects in a Non-Christian Funeral Rite with a Clear Conscience That One Is Not Engaged in Any Worship but Merely Following along with Others Acceptance of Practice — Placing Flowers at a Non-Christian Altar Table in Honour of One’s Ancestors Agreement to the Statements — None of the Above Are Acceptable Options General Household Survey 2005 — Resident Population by Age Group, Ethnic Group and Sex

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574 576

577

578

580

581

583 591

591 592

592 592 593

661

LIST OF APPENDICES

7.1

Survey Questionnaire for Research Project with the Institute of Policy Studies

186

Background Information and Activities of the Sathya Sai Baba Centres in Singapore

238

11.1 11.2

Survey on Sikh Identity in Singapore Interview Guidelines

293 294

16.1 16.2

The Questionnaire Guidelines to Interviewers

408 409

18.1

Internet’s Influence on Religious Harmony in Singapore

453

19.1

Timeline of the Development of Muslim Social Service Organizations in Singapore

483

20.1

Survey on Services Provided by Hindu Temples

499

22.1

Survey of Christian-related Services

545

24.1

Survey Background and Questions

598

25.1 25.2

Major International Events and Participation by the IRO Major Local Activities, Events and Issues Undertaken by the IRO

632

9.1

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633

List of Appendices

25.3

26.1 26.2

xiii

The 2004 IRO Conference: Enriching Interfaith and Multiracial Harmony

636

Research Questionnaire 662 Two Examples of Interfaith Youth Events and Lessons Learnt 665

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FOREWORD

The world is experiencing growing religious pluralism amidst rapid globalization. Religious pluralism has two faces: it can promise peace and harmony through mutual tolerance and understanding, but it can also pose challenges to social cohesion. Recent global and regional events and developments have shown how religion can be misused and misinterpreted to cause conflict among countries and peoples, be it through military intervention or incendiary words and actions of zealots. Yet, all religions teach love of humankind, peace and harmony, and share the same golden rules to treat others as one would like to be treated himself and forgive those who have wronged us. Such common religious teachings are now being actively harnessed to nurture harmonious personal and group behaviour for the larger common good of society. Singapore has long been an example of religious pluralism. Our largely religious population adheres to the tenets of various faiths and an extensive range of religious traditions, customs, expressions and organizations. This overlaps with an equally impressive range of ethnic and cultural diversity. Adding yet another layer to this diversity is the Singapore state which is strongly secular in its administration and yet fully supportive of freedoms to adhere to one’s faith. The state also engages with the different religious groups for the purpose of nation-building. I believe that Singapore’s experience of religious pluralism, its record of peaceful inter-religious relations and its management of mutual religious recognition could be a useful reference as we deal with the challenges that are apt to influence our society from the growing impact of religious practices and preachings from around the world. This book is the result of extensive research and a rare collaboration that cuts across religions, disciplines and interests. Its collection of reflective essays provides a range of information, illustrations and insights of Singapore’s religious landscape, discusses candidly specific religious issues and

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developments, and offers suggestions for managing them. It will help to address, to a certain extent, the concern about the need for understanding both the intra-religious and inter-religious tensions that surround us. I would like to congratulate IPS, especially Dr Lai Ah Eng, the editor of this book, for taking the initiative to address a difficult subject and delivering a seminal volume. S.R. Nathan President Republic of Singapore

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PREFACE

This book is the outcome of a three-year research project led by my colleague, Dr Lai Ah Eng. The project’s objectives were threefold: to identify key trends and issues pertaining to religious harmony in Singapore; to offer insights and suggestions to policy-makers; and to contribute to inter-religious understanding and harmony. These objectives are also consistent with IPS’ mission of undertaking strategic policy research and of building bridges among our diverse communities and stakeholders. It is never easy to undertake research on religion because of the potential sensitivities. It becomes all the more difficult when we study religion at a time when it has been politicized and hijacked by violent groups to further their political agendas. But, for that very reason, this book is both timely and significant. The attention to religious revivalism, ethno-religious issues, inter-religious interaction and intra-religious divisions further adds to the book’s importance. Given the challenging nature of the project, it was necessarily a long and arduous journey and it required the collective effort of many good people. Among them were academics, religious practitioners and graduate students from a range of disciplines and backgrounds. Without their diligence, commitment, objectivity and courage, this book would not have been possible. On behalf of IPS, I would like to thank each and every one of the contributors to this book. IPS is also indebted to President S.R. Nathan who so kindly agreed to write the Foreword to this book. I should also record our deep appreciation of Singapore Pools (Private) Limited for sponsoring the entire project. Finally, I would like to congratulate Ah Eng for adding one more seminal volume to Singapore’s growing literature on religion and ethnicity. Professor Tommy Koh Chairman IPS Management Board

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is the outcome of a research project titled Religious Diversity in Singapore that was conducted between January 2004 and December 2006 by the Institute of Policy Studies. Many people and processes were involved in this huge research and book project. A conceptual brainstorming session with invited religious and civil society representatives, academics and interested individual citizens was first conducted in February 2004, followed by a workshop on 1–2 September 2005 during which thirty research papers were discussed. This book comprises revised versions of most of the workshop papers. The chapter writers themselves comprise both individuals who responded to the call for participation and those invited to undertake specific topics within their areas of research and expertise. Throughout the project, the availability of participants and coordination of their work to match the project’s requirements was a constant problem. At times the coordination became a weary nightmare, but this was made up for by many participants who were dream teams to work with. Overall, the many opportunities to discuss with individuals who were highly committed to the project and appreciative of understanding religious diversity in Singapore always served as a reminder that the project was worthwhile. There are many people as well as organizations to thank for many reasons in this project. I would first like to thank the Singapore Pools (Private) Limited for sponsoring the entire project. The participants of the conceptual brainstorming session are to be thanked for speaking freely and frankly and for their many suggestions and moral support. Equally heartfelt thanks are due to those who gave permission to researchers to access their organizations for surveys, interviews and observations, and to those who responded. The participants at the project’s workshop must also be thanked for their comments and suggestions on the papers presented. The project benefited much by way

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of the papers’ analyses and recommendations being subject to their public and professional scrutiny. My colleagues at IPS are gratefully acknowledged: the Institute’s chairman Professor Tommy Koh and deputy director Mr Arun Mahizhnan for their support and encouragement; Dr Gillian Koh, IPS’ publications coordinator, for working with the publisher, ISEAS, on contractual details; Ms Irene Lim and Ms Claris Wang for their tremendously helpful and efficient administration of the project; and Ms Kartini Saparudin without whose technical and filing assistance I simply could not have managed. Many others helped to make this book’s publication possible. I thank the many readers of the individual chapters for their useful comments. Ms Rahilah Yusuf of ISEAS Publishing is gratefully thanked for her copyediting role and handling production of this book. I would also like to thank the Asia Research Institute, my current place of employment, for allowing me the time to work on the last stages of the manuscript. Last but not least, I would like to thank the book’s contributors as well as their research assistants. One of my main concerns in this project was finding enough researchers for various topics. While it was true that I could not find a suitable participant each time I started on a search, it also always did turn out that I would eventually meet someone who would help with a suggested name or two, which I would follow up on, with the end result unfailingly being a secured contributor. Such good luck, good support and, as one participant saw it, “the good God’s grace and guidance” not only led the project to receive a bumper crop of contributions at the end of the long haul, but also to each one being undertaken with much care, concern and commitment. Once again, I thank all for their goodness, grace and guidance in making this book possible.

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THE CONTRIBUTORS

ARUNAJEET Kaur graduated from the National University of Singapore in 1996 with a BA in History and English Language, and in 2003 with an MA from the South Asian Studies programme. Her MA thesis was on the role of Sikhs in the colonial policing of British Malaya and the Straits Settlements. Her research interest has been on the Sikhs, leading her to write and direct a theatrical performance about the personality Gurchan Singha or “Singa” in 1997 at the Substation. In 1999, she curated and organized a national exhibition about the role of Sikhs in the British Imperial Army, commissioned by the Sikh community. She is currently a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and is working on a book project regarding the Sikhs in Singapore. AZHAR Ibrahim is a Lecturer with the Asian Languages and Cultures Academic Group, National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He is also currently a PhD candidate at the Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore, and his topic of investigation is the “Characterization in Modern Malay Literature: A Study of Human Types and Its Social Meanings”. He completed his MA on “The Understanding of Islam as Reflected in Classical Malay Texts: A Study of the Interplay between Religion and Values” at the same department in 2001. He co-edited Islam, Religion and Progress (2006) and Moral Vision and Social Critique: Selected Essays of Syed Hussein Alatas (2007). His research interests include sociology of religion, sociology of literature, classical and modern Malay literature and Malay language and intellectual development. CHEN Yanli graduated in 2007 with a first class honours in Communications Studies from Nanyang Technological University (NTU) where she majored in communications research. At NTU, Yanli was awarded the President’s

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Research Scholarship to pursue academic research in the areas of Internet and religion as well as gaming interactions. She was also the recipient of the University’s Nanyang Scholarship. Her research studies have been published in peer-reviewed conferences and journals such as the Heidelberg Journal of Religions on the Internet and the Crossroads Conference 2004 in Istanbul, Turkey. She is currently a Research Associate with Millward Brown International. Pauline Hope CHEONG (PhD, Annenberg School of Communication, University of Southern California) is Associate Professor at Hugh Downs School of Human Communication, Arizona State University. She researches the social implications of information and communication technologies, particularly the socio-technical gaps in access and media use among traditionally marginalized populations, including ethnic minorities, religious communities, females and youths. Prior to her current appointment, she was Assistant Professor at the University at Buffalo, State University of New York. Pauline enjoys multi-method and comparative research for the development of contextually sensitive frameworks and understanding of social change. She has presented more than thirty papers at international conferences, and has published in multiple international refereed journals, including New Media and Society, Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, Critical Social Policy, Prometheus, and Information, Communication and Society. Phyllis Ghim-Lian CHEW is Associate Professor/English Language and Literature at the National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She lectures and supervises post-graduate students on language methodology and sociolinguistics. She has been keynote and/or plenary for many conferences in linguistics, women’s studies and comparative religion. She is past president of AWARE (Association of Women for Action and Research), founder-president of UWAS (University Women’s Association of Singapore), a past director of the UNAS (United Nations Association of Singapore) and ELLTAS (English Language and Literature Teachers’ Association of Singapore). She received a PSC scholarship to do her Masters in 1982 and an NIE scholarship to do her PhD in Macquarie University in 1989. Other awards include Teacher of the Year award and Teaching Excellence awards from Nanyang Technological University, as well as the Ministry of Community Development Long Service Award for many years of voluntary social work.

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Jean DeBERNARDI is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Alberta (Edmonton), Canada. She received her training as a cultural anthropologist at Stanford University, Oxford University and the University of Chicago, and has been teaching in Canada since 1991. Her current research explores the modernization of Taoism, focusing on religious and cultural pilgrimage to the Taoist temple complex at Wudang Mountain, South-central China. She has conducted extensive ethnographic research on Chinese popular religion in Malaysia and Singapore and recent publications include Rites of Belonging: Memory, Modernity and Identity in a Malaysian Chinese Community (2004) and The Way that Lives in the Heart: Chinese Popular Religion and Spirit Mediums in Penang, Malaysia (2006). She is currently completing a monograph entitled If the Lord be not Come …: Evangelical Christianity and the Brethren Movement in Singapore and Malaysia. Benjamin DETENBER (PhD, Stanford) teaches communication theory and research classes at the School of Communication and Information, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore since 1998. Earlier, he taught at the University of Delaware and Stanford University. He has many years of experience in video production and non-commercial radio, and has consulted with high-tech companies, taught communication skills to school teachers, and given numerous presentations to educators and media professionals. He has conducted studies on the psychological and emotional impact of media presentations, processes and outcomes associated with social cognition, and theoretical aspects of public opinion. His recent research is on the social and psychological impact of the Internet and computer-mediated communication (CMC). His recent journal publications (co-edited) include: Singaporeans’ attitudes toward lesbians and gay men and their tolerance of media portrayals of homosexuality (2007), Mining the Internet plateau: An exploration of the adoption intention of non-users in Singapore (2006), and The impact of synchronicity and civility in online political discussions on perceptions and intentions to participate (2005). ENON Mansor is a social worker by profession. She graduated from the National University of Singapore with honours in sociology in 1998 and a Master of Social Science (Social Work) degree in 2003. Enon has worked in the Singapore Anti-Narcotics Association (SANA) and the National Council of Social Services. In 2000, she and two colleagues formed Insyirah Consultancy which specializes in providing consultancy and support for the social service

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sector. Currently she is also a speaker on family life education for the Health Promotion Board. Enon has also volunteered her services in various organizations, including the former PPIS-MENDAKI Family Service Centre, Family Resource and Training Centre and the Muslim Converts’ Association of Singapore. Among her co-authored publications are Tranquil Hearts: A Guide to Marriage (1998) and Jalur Hidayah (2000), a marriage guidance handbook. The results of a research project on ageing that she managed have been published in the book Growing Old in the Malay Community (1992). FOO Check Woo graduated with a BSc (Chemistry) from Nanyang University, Singapore (1980) and MSc (Chemistry) from the National University of Singapore (1987). He is currently pursuing a part-time MSc in Information Studies at Nanyang Technological University. Check Woo is the group manager responsible for food science and quality assurance in a regional research and development company. He has been a writer, having co-authored two books on classical Chinese poetry in English (1991 and 1996), served as a co-editor for the proceedings of the 7th World Congress of Food Science and Technology (1987) and worked as a foreign language expert in Wuhan, China (1998– 2000). Check Woo has been a Baha’i since 1973 and has served on both local and national Baha’i governing councils, as well as various departments and offices of the national Baha’i council, including the Office of Environment and the Office for Inter-Faith Activities. He is currently the Chairman of the national Baha’i governing council and a member of the IRO Council. Robbie Boon Hua GOH is head of the department of English Language and Literature, National University of Singapore. He teaches and writes on nineteenth century British literature, Christianity in Asia, the construction of Asian social identities, and popular culture. Recent publications include Sparks of Grace: The Story of Methodism in Asia; Contours of Culture: Space and Social Difference in Singapore; Christian Ministry and the Asian Nation: The Metropolican YMCA in Singapore; Asian Diasporas: Cultures, Identities, Representations (co-edited with Shawn Wong); Theorizing the Southeast Asian City as Text (co-edited with Brenda Yeoh), and articles in Urban Studies, Journal of Religion and Society, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, and various collections of essays. His edited volume, Ethnic Nationalisms: Narration, Race and Cultural Politics in Asian Societies from Independence to Globalization is forthcoming. Anita HUI aspires to become a research academic specializing in the moral education of children. She recently graduated with a MA in Psychology of

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Religion from Heythrop College, the Specialist Philosophy and Theology College of the University of London. She also holds an MSc degree in Child Development from the Institute of Education, University of London. Anita is an active member in many volunteer organizations. Her internship at Kong Meng San Phor Kark See Monastery, her leadership as the Vice-President (Student Social Club) at the Methodist International Centre and as the Course Coordinator (Little Bodhi Garden, Children Sunday School) have helped her gain a better understanding of different religious practices and the potentials of interfaith engagement. Randolph KLUVER (PhD, USC) is Director of the Institute for Pacific Asia and a Research Professor in the Department of Communication at Texas A&M University. Previously, he was Executive Director of the Singapore Internet Research Centre, and Associate Professor in the School of Communication and Information, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. He has published over thirty peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters, and is the author, editor, or co-editor of four books. His current research interests include the role of the Internet in Asian societies, Asian political communication, globalization, and the political and social impact of information technologies. His recent publications include The Internet and National Elections: A Comparative Study of Web Campaigning (edited with Kirsten Foot, Nicholas Jankowski, and Steve Schneider, 2007), and Asia.Com: Asia Encounters the Internet (edited with K. C. Ho and Kenneth C. C. Yang, 2003). Lily KONG is Director of the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore. She is a social and cultural geographer and is Professor in the Department of Geography, National University of Singapore. Her research has spanned a wide range of social and cultural issues, from religion, to music, cultural policy, cultural economy, landscapes and nation, nature and the environment. Her recent publications include Landscapes: Ways of Imagining the World (with Hilary Winchester and Kevin Dunn) and Politics of Landscape: Constructions of “Nation” in Singapore (with Brenda Yeoh). KUAH-PEARCE Khun Eng is Associate Professor and Head of Department of Sociology and Honorary Academic Director of the Centre for Anthropological Research, University of Hong Kong. Her research areas include the relationship between mainland Chinese and Chinese in the diaspora, Chinese women and their network capitals, and religion (Buddhism) and politics. She is the author of State, Society and Religious Engineering:

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Towards a Reformist Buddhism (2003) and Rebuilding the Ancestral Village: Singaporeans in China (2000). She is editor or co-editor of Chinese Women and Their Social and Network Capitals (2003), Where China Meets Southeast Asia (2000), Overseas Chinese and the Qiaoxiang Society (Qiaoxiang yimin yu difang shehui) (2003), Chinese Voluntary Organisations in the Diaspora (2006), and At Home in the Chinese Diaspora: Memories, Identities and Belongings (forthcoming). LAI Ah Eng is senior research fellow, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore and was, until recently, senior research fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies. She graduated from Universiti Sains Malaysia, University of Sussex and Cambridge University with BSoc Sc (Economics), MPhil (Development Studies) and D Phil (social anthropology) degrees respectively. She has worked in various research capacities at the Consumers’ Association of Penang, Housing Development Board (Singapore), the National Archives of Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore) and Institute of Policy Studies, and lectured at the Departments of Sociology and Social Work, National University of Singapore. Her research areas include multiculturalism, migration, family and heritage. Her major publications include Meanings of Multiethnicity: A Case Study of Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Singapore (1995), Beyond Rituals and Riots: Ethnic Pluralism and Social Cohesion in Singapore (2004), and Secularism and Spirituality: Striving for Integrated Knowledge and Success in Madrasah Education in Singapore (coedited) (2005). She has also written articles on ethnic, gender and family issues. LEE Wai Peng (PhD, Wisconsin-Madison) was an Associate Professor and Sub-Dean at the School of Communication and Information (SCI), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. At NTU, her research areas included persuasion and public opinion in the contexts of health and political communication. She was part of the Singapore Internet Project research team and an associate of the Singapore Internet Research Centre (SIRC). Her research projects included risk perception of HIV/AIDS, e-health, e-government, and Internet and religion. She taught research methods, public opinion and persuasion, and introductory communication and media courses. She also supervised a twenty-station computer-assisted telephone interviewing facility and a focus-group research lab. As Sub-Dean, she handled student and alumni affairs. She lives in Cork, Ireland. Mathew MATHEWS completed his PhD at the National University of Singapore with the thesis “Clergy and Counsellors: Mental Health Care in

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Singapore”. Besides his undergraduate and graduate training in sociology, Mathew received his training in religion at Liberty University and Grand Rapids Theological Seminary. While Mathew’s main research interests are related to issues on mental health and family, he is always keen to examine how religion intersects these and other aspects of human society. NAGAH DEVI Ramasamy graduated from the National University of Singapore in 2004 with a Bachelor of Social Sciences (Honours) in sociology. She is presently completing her Master’s in Sociology by research at NUS. Her current research is ethnographic in orientation and is concerned with a detailed examination of the Sathya Sai Baba spiritual movement in Singapore. Her research interests include the sociology of religion, new religious movements, voluntarism, racial and ethnic studies, gender issues, and urban anthropology. As a graduate student, she also undertook some part-time undergraduate teaching and worked as research assistant on some projects of the faculty. NOOR AISHA Abdul Rahman (PhD) is currently Assistant Professor at the Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore. Her research areas include Malay legal history and institutions, Muslim law and its administration in Singapore and Malaysia, and sociology of religion (Islam and Malay religious orientations). She authored Colonial Image of Malay Adat Laws (2005) and co-edited Secularism and Spirituality: Striving for Integrated Knowledge and Success in Madrasah Education in Singapore (2005). She has also written several articles, including “Traditionalism and its Impact on the Administration of Justice: the Case of the Syariah Court of Singapore”, in InterAsia Cultural Studies 5, no. 3 (Dec 2004). She recently completed a research project on marriages among minors in the Muslim Community of Singapore. She is currently a member of the Board of Trustees of ISEAS, the NUS Institutional Review Board, and the National Heritage Board. NUR AMALI Ibrahim is currently pursuing his PhD in the Department of Anthropology, New York University, with funding from the Henry M MacCracken Fellowship. He attained his Bachelor of Arts (First Class Honours) in 2001 from the National University of Singapore, where he majored in Southeast Asian Studies. He plans to continue developing research interests in Southeast Asia on the social lives of youths, the anthropology of Islam, religious formations in the secular age, and incidents of conflict and violence.

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PHUA Chao Rong, Charles read his MSc (Research) and BSc (Hons) in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Sciences under a Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) scholarship. At university, he was involved in student/youth activities and was one of the first Singapore citizens to receive the Goldman Sachs Global Leaders Award (2004), an honour awarded annually to the top 100 second-year undergraduates from seventy-seven world-renowned universities, for their academic and leadership excellence. He also received the HSBC-NYAA Youth Excellence Award and the University of London Union’s Honorary Life Membership. Charles writes for the SAF’s POINTER Journal and serves in the exco of the National Youth Achievement Award Gold Award Holders’ Alumni. His interest in interfaith work sprang from his contact with Catholic, Methodist and Buddhist establishments throughout his schooling life. He believes world peace is attainable through everyone’s right understanding of religions and their teachings. SA’EDA Buang is a lecturer with the Asian Languages and Cultures Academic Group, National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University. Her research interests are in the areas of Islamic and Muslim education, literature, curriculum reformation and alternative assessments. She has written chapters, presented papers relating to madrasah and Islamic education at international seminars and was guest editor of the Asia Pacific Journal of Education’s special issue on “Muslim Education: Challenges, Opportunities and Beyond”, Vol. 27, no. 1 (March 2007). She was involved in the madrasah teachers’ training needs survey conducted by the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore in 2004. SEE Guat Kwee completed an MA degree in Islamic Studies and ChristianMuslim Relations at Hartford Seminary CT USA in 2007. Her MA thesis is entitled “History of Christian-Muslim Relations in Singapore since the country’s independence in 1965. She has lived with Muslim women from Turkey, Morocco, Germany, Syria and Saudi Arabia over the last three years. Guat has spoken at interfaith seminars in Singapore to encourage ChristianMuslim and interfaith relations, and also at the International Conference on “Islam, The West, and the Rest. Towards a Multicultural World: Conflict or Reconciliation” organized by Institut Agama Islam Negeri, Alauddin Makassar in 2005. Her article “Muslim-Christian Dialogue: Signs of Hope” appeared in European Judaism in 2005. In 2007, she received the Celie J. Terry Award for academic achievement and interfaith action in the community. Guat graduated from the National University of Singapore in 1981 and worked at

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the Singapore Economic Development Board for over eighteen years during which she undertook different portfolios. SHAHIRAA Sahul Hameed is Research Associate at the School of Communication and Information, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She obtained a Master of Soc Sc from the National University of Singapore and a BSc (Hons) form Curtin University and a BA from Murdoch University. Shahiraa works closely with researchers at the Singapore Internet Research Centre, based in NTU. She is interested in the social and psychological impacts of new media on society and the individual and the interaction between the individual and new communication technologies. She also helps with supervising the School’s research facilities. Charlene TAN (PhD) is Assistant Professor in Policy and Leadership Studies, National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. Her recent publications include a co-edited book Critical Perspectives on Values Education in Asia (2007); “Creating ‘good citizens’ and maintaining religious harmony in Singapore” (British Journal of Religious Education, forthcoming); and “The teaching of religious knowledge in a plural society: the case for Singapore” (International Review of Education, forthcoming). She is on the editorial board of international journal Reflective Practice and her research interests include comparative education in Asia, reflective practice, values education, and philosophical issues in education. Eugene K. B. TAN is assistant professor of law at Singapore Management University’s School of Law. A lawyer by training, Eugene is a graduate of the National University of Singapore, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Stanford University where he was a Fulbright Fellow. His inter-disciplinary research interests include the mutual interaction of law and public policy, the regulation of ethnic conflict, and governance and public ethics. He has published in these areas in various edited volumes and internationally-refereed journals such as The Australian Journal of Asian Law, Citizenship Studies, The China Quarterly, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Ethnopolitics, Hong Kong Law Journal, Journal of Asian Business, and Terrorism and Political Violence. He currently teaches a university core curriculum course in Ethics and Social Responsibility at the SMU. Kenneth Paul TAN is Assistant Dean (Academic Affairs) and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore (NUS). An award-winning teacher, he has

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taught at the NUS’ Political Science Department and University Scholars Programme. His research interests have spanned political theory, comparative politics, and cinema studies, specializing in Singapore studies and focusing on topics such as democracy, civil society, media, multiculturalism, and meritocracy. He authored Renaissance Singapore? Economy, Culture, and Politics (edited volume; 2007) and Cinema and Television in Singapore: Resistance in One Dimension (forthcoming) and has also published in journals. The 1995 Lee Kuan Yew Postgraduate Scholar, he received his PhD in social and political sciences in 2000 at the University of Cambridge. In 1994, he obtained a first class honours degree in the School of Economics and Politics at the University of Bristol on a Public Service Commission overseas merit scholarship. He is the founding chair of the Asian Film Archive’s board of directors, and sits on the board of directors of theatre company The Necessary Stage. TEN Chin Liew is Professor of Philosophy at the National University of Singapore. He was previously Professor of Philosophy at Monash University, Australia, Visiting Professor at the City University of New York, and Adjunct Professor at Charles Sturt University, Canberra. Elected a Fellow of the Australian Academy of Humanities in 1989, and the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia in 2000, he has also been an Invitation Fellow, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, and an Honorary Consultant, Law Reform Commission of Victoria. He is on the editorial boards of several international journals in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, and is an Associate Editor of the Australian Journal of Philosophy. His publications have appeared in journals of philosophy, law, politics, and the history of ideas. His books include Mill on Liberty (1980); Crime, Guilt, and Punishment (1987); four volumes of collected essays, Was Mill a Liberal?, A Conception of Toleration, The Soundest Theory of Law, and Multiculturalism and the Value of Diversity (2004); and Theories of Rights (2006). THAM Seong Chee is the current president of the United Nations Association of Singapore (UNAS). He was formerly Professor and Head of the Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore. He has a wide interest in sociological and anthropological subjects. His publications include books and papers on modernization, education, linguistics, literature, religion, and culture. In recent years, he has written papers on various UN and UN-related issues relating to development and the environment. He is a member of the Board of International Trustees of Biopolitics International, Athens and also Vice-President of the Singapore Association for the Advancement of Science.

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While still in academia he also served on the National Library Board, the Board of Trustees of ISEAS, adviser to the Ford Foundation Southeast Asia Programme and was vice-chairman of the UNESCO Advisory Committee for the Study of Southeast Asian Cultures. Lynette THOMAS has a BA (Hons) in French from the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne (1975) and a MEd from the National University of Singapore (1992) for which she presented a dissertation on the Parent’s Role in the Pre-school Child’s Language Development. She also holds a Royal Society of Arts Certificate in TEFL and taught at the British Council in Singapore. She has been a homemaker, freelance writer and editor, and volunteer for numerous agencies, notably the Singapore Breastfeeding Mothers’ Group for which she earned a Long Service Award from the Ministry of Community Development in 1999 for ten years of voluntary service. Since 1995 she and her business partner have run Bookaburra, a children’s bookshop. Lynette has been a Baha’i since 1987 and has served on both local and national Baha’i governing councils, as well as various offices of the national Baha’i Council, including the Office of Environment, the Office for the Advancement of Women and the Office of Information. Currently she is the Secretary General of the national Baha’i governing council. TONG Chee Kiong teaches at the Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore. Chee Kiong completed his undergraduate training at the University of Singapore and obtained his MA and PhD from Cornell University, USA. His research interests focus on ethnicity, religion and the nation state in Southeast Asia. His publications include Rationalizing Religion: Religious Conversion, Revivalism and Competition in Singapore (2007), Chinese Death Rituals in Singapore (2004), Chinese Migrants Abroad (2002), and Alternate Identities: The Chinese of Contemporary Thailand (2001). Chee Kiong has also published papers in the British Journal of Sociology, Diaspora, International Migration Review and International Sociology. VINEETA Sinha is Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore. She obtained her PhD in Anthropology from the Johns Hopkins University. Her research interests include the critique of concepts and categories in the social sciences, the history of the social sciences, teaching of sociological theory, sociology and anthropology of religion, forms of Hindu religiosity in the Indian diaspora and the anthropology of health and medicine. The courses she teaches include “Social Thought and Social Theory”, “Sociology of Everyday Life”, “Sociology of Food” and

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“Sociology of Religion”. She recently published her first book A New God in the Diaspora? Muneeswaran Worship in Contemporary Singapore (2005). Some recently published articles include “Theorising talk about ‘religious pluralism’ and ‘religious harmony’ in Singapore”, in Journal of Contemporary Religion (2005); “Decentring Social Sciences in practice through individual actions and choices”, in Current Sociology (2003); and “Merging different sacred spaces: enabling religious encounters through pragmatic utilization of space?”, in Contributions to Indian Sociology (2003). VIVAKANANDAN Sinniah is Chief Executive Officer of Ang Mo Kio – Thye Hua Kwan Hospital. He has wide-ranging experience spanning over seventeen years in the public sector and social services. He was previously Chief Executive Officer of Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA), head of corporate services in a statutory board, and Director of Services, Planning and Policy Division of the National Council of Social Services. During his tenure at SINDA, the organization was awarded the Best Volunteer Management System Award (2002) and the e-Society Excellence Award (2005). He introduced more than fifty new programmes, raised its active volunteer pool from 100 to more than 4,000 and was also commended for his outreach work with low-income families. He has also been an active volunteer with Tamil Murasu, Sree Ramar Temple, Tembusu Programme, National Longevity Insurance, IT Services Co-operative Limited, National Library Board, and Bukit Batok Home for the Aged. He has an MSc degree from the University of Sydney and a BA (Honours) from the National University of Singapore. YAP Ching Wi manages the Youth Ministry of the Buddhist organization, Kong Meng San Phor Kark See Monastery. Trained in social work at the National University of Singapore and social policy and planning at the London School of Economics, she has worked with communities from the arts, the non-profit sector, inter-religious engagement, gender issues and animal welfare. Grateful for and inspired by these communities’ compassion and commitment, her professional focus is in developing inter-disciplinary and inter-sectoral collaborations towards building trust and moral values. The KMSPKS Youth Ministry supports the personal and spiritual developments of young adults and facilitates the Buddhist youths’ contribution towards Singapore’s community development, including enhancing inter-racial and inter-religious understanding. It recently supported the Singapore Inter-faith Forum (SIFY), an initiative arising from the National Youth Forum.

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ABBREVIATIONS

4PM ABIM AEF AMLA AMD AMP ARI BAPA Bawaean Putra CATI CDAC CDC CME CNN CSGB Darul Arqam DRH FCBC FEBA FGCBF FSC HBI HDB HEB IAIN ICCI IDSS IIIT

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Malay Youth Literary Association Angkatan Belia Islam Asia Evangelistic Fellowship Administration of Muslim Law Act Advance Medical Directive Association of Muslim Professionals Asia Research Institute Religious and Educational League of Radin Mas Speak Takraw Club Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing Chinese Development Assistance Council Community Development Council Civics and Moral Education Cable News Network Central Sikh Gurdwara Board Muslim Converts Association Declaration of Religious Harmony Faith Community Baptist Church Far East Broadcasting Associates Full Gospel Christian Businessman Fellowship Family Service Centre Himpunan Belia Islam Housing Development Board Hindu Endowments Board Institut Agama Islam Negeri Interreligious Coordinating Council in Israel Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies International Institute of Islamic Thought

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Abbreviations

IIUM IPS IRCC IRO ISA ISEAS ISKON ISTAC

International Islamic University Malaysia Institute of Policy Studies Inter-Racial Confidence Circles Inter-Religious Organization Internal Security Act Institute of Southeast Asian Studies International Society for Krishna Consciousness International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization Institute of Technical Education Jemaah Islamiyah Prophet Muhammad’s Birthday Memorial Scholarship Fund Board London Missionary Society Central Council of Malay Cultural Organizations Singapore Medical Counselling Service Muslim Counselling Service of the Singapore AntiNarcotics Association Ministry of Community, Youth and Sports Council for the Development of Muslim Community Ministry of Defence Malay-Muslim organization Ministry of National Development Ministry of Education Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act Muslim Trust Fund Association Islamic Religious Council of Singapore Metta Welfare Association National Council of Churches in Singapore National Council of Social Services not-for-profit organization National Education non-government organization National Kidney Foundation New Religious Movements Nahdlatul Ulama National University of Singapore National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre National Youth Council

ITE JI LBKM LMS Majlis Pusat MCS MCS-SANA MCYS Mendaki MINDEF MMO MND MOE MRHA MTFA MUIS MWA NCCS NCSS NFP NE NGO NKF NRM NU NUS NVPC NYC

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OMF PA PCMR PERDAUS PERGAS

Overseas Missionary Fellowship People’s Association Presidential Council of Minority Rights Adult Religious Students’ Association Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association Literary Association People Like Us Young Women Muslim Association Religious Education Centre for Research on Islamic and Malay Affairs Religious Knowledge Religious Moral Education Registries of Societies Singapore Armed Forces Youth Wing of PERDAUS Singapore Buddhists Federation Singapore Centre for Evangelism and Mission Singapore Ceylon Tamils’ Association Social Development Unit Spiritual Education Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak Committee Singapore Indian Development Association Singapore Internet Project Singapore Kadayanallur Muslim League SMT Uthavum Karangal (Helping Hands) Singapore National Heart Foundation (formerly SHF, Singapore Heart Foundation) Malay cultural dance group Singapore Soka Association Sathya Sai Central Organization of Singapore Singapore Tenkasi Muslim Welfare Society Singapore Malay Youth Association voluntary welfare organization Young Sikh Association

PERKAMUS PLU PPIS RE RIMA RK RME ROS SAF SAFF-PERDAUS SBF SCEM SCTA SDU SE SGPC SINDA SIP SKML SMTUK SNHA Sriwana SSA SSCOS STMWS Taman Bacaan VWO YSA

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GLOSSARY

adi aghawat ahli sunna wa’al jama’a ajaran sesat/songsang akal al-Fatihah amal maaruf nahi mungkar amrit aqidah arathi arccanai ardas asatizah ashram asuras at-tasawwuf Baha’ullah Bai shen Baisakhi baitulmal Bani bhajan bhakti ceramah chura dakwah

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original chieftains people of the approved way (with reference to the early theologians) deviation reason a prayer taken from the opening chapter of the Qur’an forbidding evil and enjoining good baptism ceremony belief, faith, creed camphor flame offering prayer, supplication to God religious teachers hermitage demons science of sufism glory of God praying to the gods Birth of Khalsa common fund Scripture devotional hymns devotional public talk a low caste similar to Mazhabi endeavours to make Muslims better Muslims

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dana dar al-Harb dar al-Islam dar al-Sulh/dar al-‘Ahd darurat dharma dhimmi dianah Diwali dukkha Dussehra fa-ming fardhu ain fatwa fiqh fitrah giani gotong royong gurdwara Gurmukhi guru guru bhakti hadith hafiz haj halal haram hijab Holi

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or to spread the message of Islam to nonMuslims transfer of property according to sastric or classical text rites so as to reach a fit recipient abode of war abode of peace abode of treaty state of temporary suspension/postponement for the implementation of syariah Buddhist teaching (Way of Higher Truth) protected status of non-Muslims residents in an Islamic state religion Festival of Lights, celebrating the victory of good over evil suffering festival that celebrates the victory of Durga over Mahisa Asura religious name compulsory rituals and theology that must be learned and practised religious opinion/legal opinion Islamic jurisprudence nature priest mutual help Sikh place of worship script the Sikh scriptures are written in spiritual teacher or head of a religious sect devotion to a spiritual master traditions relating to the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad one who memorizes the Qur’an pilgrimage permissible according to Islamic law prohibited according to Islamic law veil or headcover worn by Muslim women a one-day spring festival with the practice of throwing coloured water

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homam

act of making an oblation or burnt offering to the gods by throwing ghee into a sacrificial fire penal code of the Islamic law worship the use of one’s independent reasoning and legal judgement on a point of law not explicitly covered by the Qur’an or the sunna knowledge on the attributes of God caste title for those who were land owning farmers with a strong military tradition community of believers shorts, one of the five emblems of the Sikh comb, one of the five emblems of the Sikh action, ritual act or religious observance suffix to Sikh female names, meaning princess burdens; it is also a portable altar decorated with peacock feathers and attached to the devotee through 108 vels pierced into the skin on the chest and back mysticism steel bangle, one of the five emblems of the Sikh unshaven hair, one of the five emblems of the Sikh pure, the baptized Sikh dagger, one of the five emblems of the Sikh hymns sung in Gurmukhi Jawi scriptures yellow scriptures (indicating its well-used state) scriptures on the roots or fundamentals of religion which form the basis of theology ritual slaughter of animals according to Muslim rites for Hari Raya Haji festival celebrating the birth of Krishna warriors Arabic grammar religious school head of a Sikh religious centre or institution

hudud ibadah ijtihad

ilmu sifat jat jemaah kach kanga karma Kaur kavadi

kebatinan kerah kesh khalsa kirpan kirtan kitab jawi kitab kuning kitab usul al-din korban Krishna Jayanti Kshatriyas lughah madrasah mahants

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mahfudzat Mazhabi mujaddid mujahidin mujtahid muthalah al-hadith nahu Pali pater familias pesantren pondok Ponggal Puranic qira’ah Radha Soami Satsang

rathams Rehat Meryada rukhsah sabha sahijdhari

salaf salaffiyah salwar kameez samadhi samelans San-gui-yi Sanatan Dharma Sangha Sant sarf/saraf sati

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a codex of Muslim scholars’ traditions those of lower Hindu castes who convert to Sikhism receivers warriors of Islam the person with the authority to pass an ijtihad science of methodology of the Hadith Arabic grammar a Prakit language that is a scriptural and liturgical language of Theravada Buddhism father of the family Muslim boarding schools in Indonesia Muslim boarding school a harvest festival from Tamilnadu that of the tradition of the eighteen collections of Hindu mythological scriptures the reading of the Qur’an a religious sect that incorporates teachings of the Sikh scriptures with that of its religious leaders, both past and present chariots codes of conduct exemption assembly those who abide by the teachings of the ten gurus but do not necessarily maintain the Khalsa appearance first generation of Muslims early reformist ethnic Punjabi costume state of higher cognition; completion, contemplation or absorption gatherings Triple Gem (Buddha, Dharma and Sangha) pluralistic mode of Sikh tradition popular in the 19th century Buddhist order of monks and nuns holy teacher branch of Arabic grammar concerning gender and number virtuous woman

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satsang

literally, true company; company of a higher truth, guru or assembly of people who listen to or talk about truth service providers of service Temple of Submission to Heaven Seeker Lion biography of Prophet Muhammad annual festival dedicated to Siva Islamic government and politics benevolence hall peasants words and deeds attributed to the Prophet Muhammad code of law derived from the Qur’an and from the teachings and example of Muhammad consensus Qur’anic exegesis or commentary teaching of discipline or moral education, sometimes called as ta’dib or ta’adib method of reciting the Qur’an in proper intonations and notes Islamic insurance path or Sufi order Islamic worldview belief in the unity of God or monotheism, pertaining to basic Islamic faith to affirm the Oneness of Allah fire-walking festival in honour of the mother goddess, Mariamman veil or headcover worn by Muslim women Islamic scholars entire Muslim community minor pilgrimage reading and discussion circles teacher roots or fundamentals of religion which form the basis of theology principles of jurisprudence

seva sevadars Shuntian Gong Sikh Singh sirah Sivarathi siyasa shan-tang Sudras sunna syariah

syura tafsir tahzib tajwid takaful tarikat tasawur tauhid

Timiti tudung ulama ummah umrah usrah ustaz usul al-din usul fiqh

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Vaisayas vedas

farmers and traders any of the oldest and most authoritative Hindu sacred texts, composed in Sanskrit and gathered into four collections obligatory endowments potential beneficiaries/guardian chants and verses for supplications believers spiritual cultivation Vedic sacrifice traditional herbal shop

wajib wakaf waris wirid xin-tu xiu xin yaagam yao-cai-dian

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INTRODUCTION Lai Ah Eng

BACKGROUND Religious and ethno-religious issues are inherent in multiethnic and multireligious societies, and require ongoing attention. Singapore is no exception. It has long been a multiethnic, multicultural and multi-religious society, being historically and contemporarily at the crossroads of some of the world’s major and minor civilizations, cultures, religions and traditions. Today, every major religious tradition in Singapore probably has within it a full religious spectrum, from orthodox, traditional orientations to reform movements and independent spiritual clusters, while other minor religions and movements have created or renewed spaces, membership and expressions in the rapidly evolving city. Most have regional and global links and influences. Religious affiliation is high and religious identification is strong among the population. These have also occurred against a background of growing religiosity and religious change since the 1970s. Recent global, regional and local events and developments have further put the spotlight on religion, and raised issues concerning religious identity, inter-religious relations and their impact on social cohesion. Despite the diverse and dynamic religious landscape however, there is a lack of in-depth knowledge, nuanced understanding and regular dialogue about various religions and the meanings of living in Singapore’s multireligious world. Indeed, claims of ignorance, lack of inter-religious understanding, dialogue and interaction, negative stereotyping and other inter-religious encounters among individuals and groups present potential points of misunderstanding and tension. Some overlaps between ethnicity and religion further lend a heightened dimension and significance to ethnoreligious identities and issues. While much is happening on the ground,

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studies and published literature are few or limited in scope and research has generally fallen behind realities and developments. Literature on various religions, while abundant, tends to be focused on their respective religious concerns and congregations. There is a lack of systematic studies or surveys and little on religion in national census coverage. Recognizing that religious diversity and issues in Singapore need to be better appreciated, understood and managed, The Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) undertook the Research Project on Religious Diversity and Harmony in Singapore (2004–2007). The project’s objectives were threefold: (1) to identify key trends and issues, (2) to offer insights and suggestions for policy, practice and social management, and (3) to contribute to interreligious understanding and harmony, in the interests of social cohesion and the common good in Singapore. Given the challenging nature of the project, it was necessarily a collective effort. A conceptual brainstorming session with invited religious and civil society representatives, academics and interested individual citizens was first conducted in February 2004, followed by a workshop on 1–2 September 2005 during which thirty research papers were discussed. This book is the final outcome of the IPS research project and comprises revised versions of most of its workshop papers. Its themes follow closely that of the research project, while its chapters’ varying emphases on research, educational value and management implications reflect the project’s objectives. While focused on Singapore, the book bears in mind the wider and unavoidable global and regional impulses and impacts on Singapore’s religious diversity, and these are discussed wherever relevant, in many chapters. The chapters themselves are the outcomes of individuals’ own responses to the call for participation and of invitations to some to undertake specific topics within their areas of research and expertise. The schedules of potential participants, as much as the project’s own timing, largely determined the final list of chapter writers, who consist of academics, religious practitioners and graduate students. All chapters are based on their writers’ own recent research works or on research specifically conducted for the project. Coming from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, the researchers’ approaches and methodologies are wideranging. They include questionnaires, surveys, interviews, focused group discussions, participant and naturalistic observations, case studies and philosophical and personal reflections, besides referring to a variety of published sources. As such, all chapters contain much primary and secondary data of both a quantitative and qualitative nature.

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THE BOOK’S THEMES AND SUMMARIES OF CHAPTERS This book’s twenty-eight chapters are arranged along five themes: first, Singapore’s religious landscape, followed by religion in the specific arenas of schools and the young, media, social services, and interfaith issues and interaction. Theme I on Singapore’s religious landscape is the most extensively covered, with twelve chapters exploring both macro forces and specific religions and issues that reflect Singapore’s diversity and give meaning to its specific contexts, expressions and nuances. Chapter 1 by Tham Seong Chee aptly opens up the landscape’s diversity and complexity, first with a tracing of the long journey travelled by religion in general from about the fifteenth century to the present, followed by a discussion of the religious impulses and influences that impact on Singapore in particular. Shedding insights on the relationship between state and religion on the one hand and between religion and society on the other, Tham points out that the religion-based meaning system or “sacred canopy” of the past has, along religion’s journey, undergone change and differentiation consequent on several inter-related processes of secularization, globalization, modern capitalism, democratic liberalism and pluralism. The religious impulse remains, but now has to take into account the dominance of the state where the “laws of man” supersede the “laws of God” in the management of contemporary problems and needs. The religious response itself to pluralism and secularism is manifested in different forms, from accommodation to rejection and opposition. How these developments have an impact on secular and multi-religious Singapore are then examined briefly through the following: the state’s secular policy in relation to the society’s religious diversity; several contentious issues such as abortion, stem cell research, human organ transplants, the building of integrated resorts which include casinos (which in turn raise issues of gambling addiction and prostitution), and gay rights; and the rise of new religions. Major religious trends, various religions and religious issues in Singapore are given focused and detailed attention in Chapters 2 to 12. In Chapter 2, Tong Chee Kiong offers, through census data, an analysis of the religious landscape in Singapore, from the early days of its founding to the present. The picture that emerges is one in which the society is marked by a high degree of multi-religiosity, as well as significant changes in the religious landscape. In different periods, religions have waxed and waned. Some, such as Christianity, have been highly successful in recruiting members while

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others, such as Taoism, have seen their memberships decline. The data also shows that there is a correlation between religious affiliation and several socio-demographic variables, including age, education, occupation, and socioeconomic status. For example, Christians in Singapore tend to be younger, more educated and have a higher socio-economic status, whereas Taoists tend to be older, less educated and come from lower socio-economic groups. Another key variable is ethnicity. Religious affiliation is culturally or ethnically structured to some extent, with most Malays being Muslim, most Indians being Hindu, and Chinese, to a lesser degree, adopt Chinese religions. The state’s management of religion as part of Singapore’s religious landscape is given focused attention in Chapter 3 by Eugene Tan. He points out the paradox in which Singapore is a secular state and multi-racial country yet religion is envisaged to have a role in nation-building, and asks whether, given religion’s tremendous pull on Singaporeans of various faiths, a strong religious identity can co-exist with a strong Singaporean identity. He examines the state’s institutional and legal framework for secularism and the management of religion in Singapore within the governing ethos of multiculturalism (which includes multi-religiosity), highlighting the plethora of institutions overseeing various faiths which nestles with a coercive, pre-emptive legislative regime in forestalling any religious extremism and interfaith conflicts. He argues that the fear of vulnerability in the post-9/11 “war against terror” ensures that scrutiny, surveillance and sensitivity would be hallmarks of the state’s tightrope walk between secularism on the one hand, and wielding control and influence over religion and its expression for the purposes of state- and nation-building, on the other. He also examines the policy impulses behind the state’s co-option of religion to reinforce the teaching of moral values, to sustain economic vitality, and to urge the practice of one’s religion in keeping with the secular and multi-racial mores of Singaporean society. Subsequent Chapters 4 to 12 following the macro contexts discussed in earlier chapters to examine specific religions which make up and add to the dynamic local religious landscape, each through its own particular features, expressions and developments. These include both “old” and “new” religions, such as Islam, the “minority” religion in Singapore and “majority” religion in Southeast Asia and currently undergoing a global gaze; Christianity, the religion that came alongside colonialism and now returning via global evangelical circuits; Hinduism and India-derived religions; Buddhism; the Sathya Sai Baba Movement; Sikhism and the Baha’i Faith. In Chapter 4, Azhar Ibrahim looks at discourses on Islam in Southeast Asia, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia, and examines their impact on the Singapore Muslim public. He identifies the following as the main

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subjects and issues in the dominant discourses on Islam in Singapore: Islamizing trends in Muslim intellectual and cultural life; the denouncement of secularism and humanism; the advocacy of plurality, diversity and moderation; and the debate on reformism versus traditionalism in which both competitively claim authenticity. He further argues that the [under]development of certain discourses amongst the Muslim public is conditioned by “gatekeepers”, which in turn determines the types and quality of local discourse on Islam. He concludes with a call for critical reflection of both favoured and absent discourses. While the main Christian churches and denominations such as Catholicism, Methodism and Presbyterianism have long established themselves in Singapore since early colonial days, contemporary evangelical Christianity in Singapore that makes the city appear as the Antioch of Asia is the subject of Jean DeBernardi’s investigation in Chapter 5. She provides a brief background on the development of diverse forms of evangelical Christianity in Europe, North America and Singapore, and analyses several common forms of evangelical practice. She also investigates the ways in which contemporary Singaporean Christians interpret the call to be evangelical in their Christian practice, and the local impact of global Christian networks whose leaders often propose innovative Christian practices using mass media and contemporary technologies, but which are sometimes construed by nonChristians as being aggressive proselitization. Because Christian leaders play a crucial role in proposing or rejecting such forms of evangelical practice to their followers, she concludes that the most appropriate response to potentially insensitive forms of proselytization is education and dialogue. In Chapter 6, Vineeta Sinha departs from the “traditional” Hinduism commonly associated with many local Indians, to focus on new religiouslyinspired “India-derived” movements and groups, which have added much diversity to Singapore’s religious landscape since their importation in the mid-1960s and which now attract a substantial number of followers, including from outside the Indian-Hindu community. Many of these groups, including the Ramakrishna Mission, Radha Soami Satsang, Brahma Kumari Raja Yoga Centre, Sai Baba Movement and Sri Aurobindo Society, do not perceive themselves to be “religious” or “non-Hindu” even if some have developed within the framework of Hinduism, and show a considerable variety of beliefs, practices and organizational structures. At the same time they share some generic or common features such as the founder guru; claims to universal appeal and membership by individual choice and a personal quest; “difference” from mainstream, institutionalized religions especially in promoting a de-ritualized stance; a claim to a logical, rational and modernist

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approach to life and spirituality while also asserting a connection with ancient wisdom and tradition; and a focus on the individual and his/her selfdevelopment, at the same time subscribing to the notion of seva (community service) as essential practice. The author also explores the groups’ functioning as conditioned by local multi-ethnicity and multi-religiosity while being connected with centres in India and elsewhere, and offers some explanation for their appeal to English-speaking, literate, middle-class and upper-class professionals and members of different ethnic groups and religious sensibilities. In Chapter 7, Foo Check Woo and Lynette Thomas examine the patterns of conversion within a less known and “new” religion in Singapore that arrived in the 1950s which saw a peak of membership only in the 1980s and 1990s — the Baha’i Faith. The authors’ small-scale study shows Baha’i converts and adherents to be mainly young, English-speaking, middle-class with tertiary education, and Chinese, many of whom were formerly Taoists or Christians but were dissatisfied with their former religions. Many had also converted when they were overseas students in North America, or are Malaysian in origin, while a significant percentage of adherents are from “other” ethnic backgrounds. Their study also examined the decisions among converts to embrace the faith in terms of the attractiveness of its spiritual principles — Progressive Revelation, the Oneness of God and the Unity of Mankind — and its social teachings located in the independent investigation of truth, the need for harmony between religion and science, and the principle of equal opportunities for men and women. Besides shedding some light on this little known community, the study also reveals some of the complex religious, inter-religious and cultural aspects of conversion, particularly at the personal and familial levels. In Chapter 8, Kuah-Pearce Khun Eng also departs from the “traditional” Buddhism commonly associated with many local Chinese to focus on its reformist nature. She examines the processes of religious modernization and Buddhicization within the Singapore Buddhist landscape which has resulted in a movement towards Reformist Buddhism, as well as examines its unifying religious ideology. She also explores the extent to which this development appeals to modern needs and its impact on policy formulation for religious harmony. Chapter 9 by Nagah Devi Ramasamy follows from the earlier chapter on India-derived new religious movements to focus on one such movement — the Sathya Sai Baba. She examines the movement in charities and social service provision as well as its facility in foster multiethnic and multireligious identity amongst Singaporeans, through its philosophy of communal identity construction and seva (community service). She also explores a

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significant development in the local religious landscape: the communal union between the multi-ethnic cum multi-religious memberships existing within the local Sai Baba Movement. Chapter 10 by Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman follows from the earlier chapter on the impact of Islamic discourses in Southeast Asia on Singapore to focus on the local dominant Muslim religious elites or ulama. Using the sociological concept of traditionalism, the author provides rare and valuable insights into the ulamas’ backgrounds and styles of thought as portrayed in their writings found in the Malay media and other sources such as their sermons. She also examines the concretization of their traditionalist mode of thinking in relation to some significant issues and events affecting the Malay Muslim community, such as organ donation and transplant, stem cell research, secular knowledge (versus religious knowledge), reason (versus traditionalism), the wearing of headscarves in schools, the arrests of local Jemaah Islamiyah members and madrasah education. She further looks at how the “new” traditionalist ulama attempt to deal with modern issues such as government and politics, the economy, globalization, poverty and development. Finally, she also discusses the impact and ramifications of the ulama’s traditiionalism on the general development of the Malay community and its political participation within Singapore. As a political force itself, she shows how this religious elite is essentially apolitical but works to be recognized and legitimated as the sole experts and authority on Islam and on knowledge and modern issues affecting the Muslim community, over and above the Malay political leadership. In Chapter 11, Arunajeet Kaur also focuses on a little-known religion — that of the small Sikh community in Singapore. Although the Sikhs are a visible and ostensibly homogenous community due to their unique physical appearance and established places of Sikh worship (gurdwaras), her study reveals a different reality. It points out that, over time since immigration, Sikhs in Singapore have evolved away from the Sikh religious ideals propagated by the religious authorities in original homeland Punjab, with only one-third of local Sikhs maintaining their unique appearance, and a further select minority within this third understanding and practising the religion as institutionalized by the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak Committee (SGPC) in Amritsar, Punjab. Arunajeet’s study charts and explains the evolution of Sikh identity in Singapore, taking us through colonial and post-colonial time periods and major specific phenomenon and issues set within broader social and economic contexts. The picture is at once a story of immigration and settlement and of inter-generational adaptations and changes. The latter are reflected most visibly in the physical differences among the Amrit Dharis,

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Sahaj Dharis and “cropped” and intricately in the identity and community issues involving the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari identity, the gurdwaras’ leadership, language and competing lifestyles for families, genders and youth. The final chapter in this segment on the diversity of Singapore’s religious landscape offers an illustrative example of religious expression in the city. In Chapter 12, Lily Kong explores the ways in which Thaipusam processions — one of the most colourful, organized, and long-lasting religious processions in Singapore — by their very visibility foreground the relationships between the secular and the sacred, while contributing to a construction of identity and community and simultaneously surfacing fractures therein. She examines the secular state’s management of religious processions, including the regulation of time and space for such events as well as over their noise production, and the tactics of adaptation, negotiation and resistance in participants’ responses to the state’s management. She also explores participants’ experience of these processions in terms of two contrasting senses of communitas and fault-lines within “community” based on age, class and nationality; their investment of sacred meanings in these processions and the nature of their “sacred experience”; and the manner in which such activities, associated state actions, and participants’ responses evoke reactions from non-participants. Theme II focuses on religion in schools and among the young. The school being a major site and agent of state and institutional policies as well as of personal development and group dynamics, its religious orientations and influences are important aspects of early religious socialization, experiences and inter-religious encounters among the young. These aspects, as well as religious orientations and shifts among the young themselves, reveal much about religious diversity and change in Singapore. In Chapter 13, Charlene Tan examines the teaching of religion in schools. She first discusses the government’s attempts to teach religious beliefs and practices in Singapore schools for the purposes of inculcating moral values and promoting citizenship education, initially through the compulsory Religious Knowledge (RK) subject introduced to all secondary schools in the 1980s, followed by a new Civics and Moral Education (CME) programme which replaced RK in 1992, and to a lesser extent through National Education (NE) launched in 1997. She argues that the government’s approach of introducing various religions to students in a historical, objective and detached manner makes it difficult for students to imbibe the moral teachings propounded by the religions or be committed to promoting religious harmony. She further argues for the introduction of Spiritual Education (SE) in terms of its enduring value on personal development, its advantage in avoiding the problems and challenges associated with a multi-religious subject, and its

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encouragement to act morally driven by intrinsic reasons rather than for reasons stipulated by the state. The discussion on teaching religion in government and governmentaided schools is followed by an examination of two distinct types of religionrelated education in the Muslim madrasah and the Christian mission schools. In Chapter 14, Sa’eda Buang examines religious education in the madrasah which is expected to offer a curriculum that focuses on religious subjects in keeping with its role as an institution to produce Muslim religious elites. Historically, national and economic development and demands of the state, particularly during the post-World War II period, have necessitated the madrasah to revisit its long-held position as classical curriculum practitioner time and again. An earlier resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism in the early twentieth century also sought to effect madrasah curriculum reform, which was swiftly put in place but short-lived. In recent years, the curriculum purpose of the six remaining full-time madrasah has again come under scrutiny and reformulation, to make them be responsive to larger economic and socio-political transformations. The author examines two main aspects of madrasah education: the socio-historical aspect of madrasah curriculum development and main issues such as syllabuses, subjects and texts; and the underlying philosophical considerations. In explicating on the interplay of socio-educational determinants and principles that affect curriculum planning, she points out that power assertions between elite groups and the Muslim public have directly stunted the growth and progress of early madrasah education and subsequently, even though the curriculum has been in dire need of reform and the Muslim community itself is in need of change in religious and social outlook. She concludes that present challenges to madrasah education are multi-faceted and formidable — not only must there be a formulation of an all-encompassing and yet achievable curriculum purpose that combines a sound philosophy of man and education, mental dexterity, pragmatism, vision as well as a strong sense of humanity, there must also be the ability to galvanize support from various quarters for such a curriculum. In Chapter 15, the role of religion as moral and spiritual “benefits” in the Christian mission schools that came alongside colonialism are given particular focus by Robbie Goh. He briefly traces their historical role and development and ascertains the means by which they achieved a reputation for excellence and maintained that reputation even after independence and the creation of a national school system. Although mission schools have had to negotiate their distinctive character in the light of national educational imperatives and currents, the quality of a distinctive school “spirit” and its “moral” benefits, which have been effected largely through non-curricular or structural means,

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have persisted throughout their history. The result is a distinctive character of mission schools which has been broadly acknowledged to play a significant part in the Singapore educational landscape not only or primarily in academic terms, but also in terms of the “moral” training for which these schools are held in high regard. The author points out that the superior efficacy of moral influence (which arises from the inherently Christian nature of the mission schools) over a Religious Knowledge (RK) curricular approach (in which a multi-religious, pluralistic curriculum is inculcated through abstract classroom dictates), argues for an enhancement of the structural leeway given to mission schools to carry out their project of Christian moral influence. At the same time, he notes that a number of safeguards clearly have to be set in place to protect the religious sensibilities of non-Christian students and to avoid Christian evangelization. Chapter 16 shifts the attention from schools and policies to school adolescents. Picking up on the major trend of religious conversion and switching in Singapore, Phyllis Chew reports on her study of religious switching and knowledge among school adolescents in this chapter. Her study reveals a notable permeation of religious thought in adolescent life with 82 per cent of adolescents identifying themselves as having a religion, primarily the Buddhist, Christian and Muslim faiths. The most common period for adolescent religious switching to occur is between the ages of fifteen and sixteen, with switchers mainly from the Buddhist/Taoists, Christian and Hindu faiths, and often facing parental opposition initially. On the whole, adolescents switch not because of a personal quest for truth but because of peer-group influences and the need to “solve a problem”. The popular choice for a switch is from Taoism to Christianity, and/or from Buddhism to free-thinker status. When the switch is to Christianity, it is also to a church that is youth-focused and that preaches a this-worldly gospel of care, cheer and prosperity. The switch away from the Taoist/Buddhist faiths is because of adolescents’ disenchantment with the practice of their rites/rituals and their inability to operate in the adolescents’ preferred language choice of English or Mandarin. The study also reveals adolescents’ knowledge of religions to be poor, drawn mainly from Internet and chat-room sites and peer groups. At the same time, most are aware of the need to be tolerant of religions in multi-religious Singapore and not to be offensive. The third theme of religion and religious diversity in Singapore relates to that which takes place in one of the most public spaces of information and exchange of views — the media. Two chapters discuss two important religionrelated issues as discoursed through the media — homosexuality and Internet

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use for religious purposes — and surface issues pertaining to the secularreligious distinction in the public sphere and the potentials for religious harm and harmony through cyberspace. In Chapter 17, Kenneth Paul Tan looks at the way the national print media stage-managed public debate in 2003 over the question of nondiscriminatory hiring policies in the Singapore Civil Service with respect to homosexuals. Through a close reading of mostly “pro-gay” and “anti-gay” arguments voiced, in particular the religiously inflected arguments of authorities from the Muslim, Buddhist, Roman Catholic and Protestant Christian communities, he locates obstacles to an open, free, empirically supported, normatively justified and sincere discussion that should ideally characterize a mature public sphere. He suggests that it is the artificial distinction between the religious and the secular, and the insistence on formal secularism that excludes all religious reasons from the public sphere, that has been responsible for a public sphere that is defensive, dogmatic and disengaged, and that distorts the capacity for more open public dialogue motivated by a collective pursuit of higher-order knowledge of what is good. The strict and formal secularism can also have the effect of demonizing religious reasons and transforming them into a defensive discourse, with complexity, subtlety, variety, and engagement being distorted into simple “us” versus “them” modes of reasoning. The author points out that the case study clearly shows that religious people and even authorities can have a range of views ranging from the conservative to the most liberal, but a siege mentality reduces discussion into a battlefield of rigid notions of good and evil and right and wrong, all marked by suspicion and hostility between the forces of religion and secularism. Finally, he suggests that the media can play a more strategic role in stage-managing future public debates to produce and admit more nuanced arguments that destabilize simple “pro” and “anti” modes of discussion, starting with removing the religious/secular distinction in the public sphere so as to free up discussion, remove suspicion and increase good faith in one another. In Chapter 18, Randolph Kluver et al. examine Internet use by Singaporeans for religious purposes. Recognizing that the Internet is becoming a popular medium for gaining access to religious information, teachings, communities and experiences, the authors note that it is a rich source of both useful and false and sometimes inflammatory information about religious faiths. Their study, based on a national survey and interviews with religious leaders, pays attention to the way the Internet might increase or decrease religious understanding and harmony among diverse faith communities.

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Some interesting findings include the following: (1) the Internet has become an important source for religious information and activity in Singapore, in line with global trends; (2) most survey respondents believed that the Internet can be a potential threat to religious harmony; (3) Singaporeans use the Internet more for matters related to their own religion than to learn about other religions; (4) Singaporeans are more likely to use local sites for religious purposes than foreign sites; (5) firm support by Singaporeans and religious leaders for government regulation of the Internet on religious matters; (6) most religious leaders see the Internet as a helpful medium for users to learn both about their own and about other religions; and (7) some religious leaders believe that the Internet provides an easy context for religious conflict through the posting of harmful materials and are concerned over the authenticity of religious information online. Theme IV is about the roles of religious organizations in social services — a domain which many are traditionally strong in and have continued to remain so through a re-invention of themselves and flexible adjustments to the larger multi-religious environment and secular state. Chapters 19 to 22 trace the motivations, roles and activities of Muslim, Buddhist, Christian and Hindu-based organizations in the development of the local social services sector historically and contemporarily. They also discuss the organizations’ collaboration with the state and other selected intra-, interreligious and secular organizations, and the forces and impulses which motivate them to do so. Enon Mansor and Nur Amali Ibrahim, in two distinct sections in Chapter 19, discuss the historical and contemporary roles and activities of Muslim agencies and mosques as social service providers. For Muslim agencies, the majority of their clients remain Muslims, but they also service a sizeable percentage of non-Muslims. They have also established external relationships and collaborations with state agencies and other non-Muslim organizations, both faith-based and secular. Working with non-Muslim organizations seems to be part and parcel of their experiences and a practical necessity, Muslims being a minority. However, they ensure that the collaboration effort is consistent with Muslim beliefs and practices. This section also discusses the internal and external dynamics that contribute to the organizations’ rationale, guiding principles and perceptions in collaborating with non-Muslim organizations, which are also common perceived to be easier to work with in some respects than Muslim organizations. The second section on mosques shows that besides being places for prayers, they are also important institutions which address social issues in the community. The experiences of four different mosques studied reveal a

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huge range of social services offered to meet different needs of various segments of the Muslim population as well as their varied resources, collaborations and leadership and orientations/values. Some common problems faced by mosques in social services provision include insufficient funding, lack of expertise, ineffective use of available resources, and gaps in expectations between mosque staff and congregants. Although the mosques’ social services programmes cater mostly to the Muslims, there are spaces in which interaction between Muslims and people of other religious groups takes place, including those for fostering inter-religious understanding and correcting misperceptions about Islam. In Chapter 20, Sinniah Vivakanandan and Nagah Devi Ramasamy examine the role of Hindu temples in social services. They trace the historical evolution of the temple, from being a focal centre for worship, interaction and safe haven for early Hindu migrant workers to their position as largely places of ritualistic worship by the 1970s. However, temples have been subject to pressures for change towards greater performance of the mandatory seva (service) since the 1980s, such pressures coming from more informed and educated devotees and neo-spiritual movements, loss of youth members unable to identify with rituals, and examples set by organisations of other religions. The authors also identify gaps in current services rendered and offer recommendations for future development of social service by Hindu temples. Chapter 21 by Kuah-Pearce Khun Eng focuses on Buddhist institutions in the delivery of welfare services. She examines the intersection of state ideology and Buddhist ideology which produces a philanthropic Buddhist culture that encourages Buddhist organizations and individuals to become actively involved in charity works and social and welfare services. Concretely, she traces how the Buddhist temple, through its Buddhist Sangha and the Buddhist notion of compassion, has always been simultaneously a sacred and welfare space as it evolved over time, first as home for the destitute and tea house for the needy, and then to benevolence hall, medical free clinic, and provider of shelter and services. Christian churches have historically been involved in social service provision, especially so among those strongly rooted in “social gospel” theology which emphasizes good works for the betterment of humanity as the unique call of Christians. However, in Chapter 22, Mathew Mathews examines the case of Protestant churches in Singapore which, to a large extent, are theologically conservative and traditionally more concerned with “soul saving” than “bread giving” but which, together with church-affiliated social service organizations, form the largest block in Singapore’s social service landscape. He establishes the main types of services they offer: help for families and

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youth; half-way houses, care facilities including hospitals and institutional homes; and facilities for the disabled. He also examines their motivations for involvement — integrating faith and works and obtaining legitimacy vis-à-vis the state and community — and describes how ideological, spiritual and material resources are mobilized. In examining how Protestant churches and their organizations are successful in adapting to the secular state and multireligious society, he also discusses the common perception that their social service provision is a front for proselitization. The fifth and final theme focuses on what probably constitutes the most difficult and challenging about religious diversity: interfaith issues and interaction. Given their inevitability and their potentials for both peace and conflict, it is necessary to understand their specific forms and expressions, and the principles and values by which they are approached by individuals and groups, leaders and laities, and the society as a whole. Four chapters help us towards this understanding. Ten Chin Liew leads the way with a philosophical approach to understanding religious diversity in Chapter 23. He argues for acknowledging the existence of genuine, but sometimes incompatible or even conflicting beliefs about religious matters as our starting point, in order to face a central political issue of the basis on which people with such differences are to live together harmoniously and in cooperation with one another. In his view, the first step is to establish good grounds for religious toleration: having a proper understanding and application of religious beliefs, showing respect for sincere believers of all kinds by letting them lead their lives in accordance with their fundamental values so long as they do not harm others, and rejecting a theocratic state in favour of a secular one. At the same time, he sees mere toleration as being insufficient as it is compatible with mutually tolerant religious groups living compartmentalized lives without any dialogue or interaction. He observes that in Singapore, several other social ingredients have been added in order to avoid this, including housing and educational policies and a meritocratic approach. He argues in particular for a meritocratic society which, properly tempered, provides opportunities for social mobility and encourages the emergence of multiple and criss-crossing social identities whereby religious divisions need not coincide with, and be amplified by, other social divisions. In Chapter 24, Mathew Mathews focuses on a specific area of interreligious interaction: how Christian clergymen negotiate their religion with other religions. This is a particularly valuable chapter, given that the steady growth of Christianity in Singapore, especially the more conservative segment of it, is a cause for concern in terms of inter-religious harmony as this

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category is allegedly more resistant to enter into partnerships with other religious groups and opposed to making concessions and compromises to their exclusivist faith and practice. Through a study of a diverse sample of clergymen, Mathews documents their views on four areas of tension — inter-religious dialogue, inter-religious relations, evangelistic practices and participation in non-Christian ritual — and relate these to various demographic and attitudinal variables. He further demonstrates how clergymen attempt to negotiate the tensions between their evangelistic mission and their need to peacefully co-exist in a secular nation state, by providing theological rationalizations while being always mindful not to dilute their exclusivist stance. In Chapter 25, Lai Ah Eng explores the relatively old and only interreligious set-up in Singapore: Inter-Religious Organization (IRO). She traces the IRO’s historical development and major activities since 1949, as well as examines some of the inherent issues raised and problems encountered in inter-religious relations and collaboration even as such an organization aspires to spread inter-religious goodwill and understanding and share similar values drawn from their respective religious traditions. In assessing its contributions to interfaith awareness, peace and understanding, she argues that the IRO, despite some of its weaknesses and lack of statutory authority, is a necessary inter-religious institution in a multi-religious society. Chapter 26 by Phua Chao Rong, Anita Hui and Yap Ching Wi explores another new dimension of interfaith relations: conscious and active attempts at interfaith engagement among youth leaders. The authors identify some ground realities of youth interfaith engagement in Singapore that have developed largely only the last few years and conclude that this engagement is limited and in need of improvement and better coordination in general. They also point out how the social taboo of religion as sensitive has contributed to the abstinence from and lack of interest in youth interfaith work, while the sensitivities of interfaith engagement potentially compromise its integrity and future development and success. They further identify another important factor limiting the development of interfaith engagement: the intergenerational gaps between leaders (seniors) and participants (youths). Finally, they argue for stronger grass-roots collaborations between faith-based organizations with a clear set of direction, support and guidelines set by governmental agencies, and the leadership and shared knowledge by the long-established IRO. Concretely, they propose a four-phase model for youth interfaith engagement based on friendship, social action, mutual study and intellectual exchange, with the objective being to build a foundation of interfaith youth leaders and a working understanding of various religious teachings.

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The final chapter under the theme of interfaith issues and interaction is, perhaps aptly, one that describes a personal journey of encountering faith and the interfaith, interspersed with scholarly insights on interfaith dialogue and understanding. In Chapter 27, See Guat Kwee traces her journey in ChristianMuslim relations in Singapore and overseas. Her journey had first begun during a stay in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a Christian. That stay led her next to interfaith issues and the Muslim community upon her return to Singapore, and onto graduate studies in the United States where she met scholars and practitioners of interfaith dialogue and obtained a better understanding of the history and contexts of Christian-Muslim relationships. In living and studying together with Muslims, she was able to experience a community bonded by friendship and the pursuit of understanding and peace. She sees an urgent need for Christian-Muslim and other types of interfaith dialogue as a way to build relationships between people of different faiths, with this endeavour encompassing both joint study and scholarship and working together on practical projects. The aim is to overcome mutual ignorance, appreciate shared history and acknowledge collective past wrongs, deal with misconceptions and personal distrust, form friendships, and work together for peace and the common good. Towards this end, the author also offers concrete suggestions for Singapore: the establishment of a centre for dialogue and study of world religions and the creation of “Sister City” relationships to engage Singaporeans of different faiths, traditions and ages.

SOME REMARKS ON RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN SINGAPORE This book does not make strong and firm conclusions about religious diversity in Singapore in view of the huge gaps of knowledge of the highly wideranging and complex landscape. Instead, in its concluding chapter, it identifies some important research and knowledge gaps, and makes some general remarks on the implications and challenges posed by several trends and dimensions of religious diversity for state-society and interfaith relations. These trends and dimensions pertain to the growing binary worldviews of secularism and religiosity and the artificial and antagonistic distinctions made between them; religious expressions in public spaces; religious proselytization and conversion; external religious influences and impacts on local communities; political mobilization by religion and its management by the state; and specific inter-religious issues. The consequent need to clarify, balance and nuance diversity and unity within an “always under construction and in dialogue” approach and the

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complexities and sensitivities of construction and dialogue are also raised. In particular, the section points out that the role of the state, since it is a key player, needs to be carefully considered and managed in seeking the diversityunity balance, as too much diversity can result in divisiveness and fractiousness but too much control can mean state hegemony and repression. At the same time, it calls for going beyond the usual focus on the state to examine diverse religions and religious communities with their own worlds and realities as these offer motivations, fulfilments and meanings of their own which the state cannot or will not be able to substitute. Finally, while potential areas of inter-religious tensions require sensitive management, it is argued that interfaith education, dialogue and collaboration, despite their inherent difficulties, are likely to become an important mechanism and process in seeking the unitydiversity balance and in the ongoing construction of religious harmony. The religious landscape in Singapore and indeed the world can only become more diverse. This book attests to the need, among others, for empirically grounded research and higher order social knowledge and insights into this unprecedented diversity, towards better social understanding and management of religion for the common good of all living in a multireligious at the same time shared environment and nation-state.

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PART I The Landscape of Religious Diversity

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Religious Influences and Impulses Impacting Singapore

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1 RELIGIOUS INFLUENCES AND IMPULSES IMPACTING SINGAPORE Tham Seong Chee

INTRODUCTION A discourse on religion will need to consider three pivotal social institutions and how they interact with each other, that is, society, state, and religion itself. Current international trends would suggest that it is also necessary to view all three social institutions in their broader global context. Among other developments, globalization, has made possible as well as encourage closer ties among the adherents of a religious faith transcending national borders, while simultaneously afford more effective mobilization in support of shared causes and concerns. Major and critical issues that now confront mankind command global or multinational cooperation and this too, has drawn the attention and involvement of religion. Moreover, contemporary majority thinking is towards pluralism in religious belief and in cultural development. The religious impulse then could be of internal as well as external genesis.

Religion, State and Society (1) Looking back, one can detect a criss-cross, up-and-down and to-and-fro trajectory in the evolution of relationships among the three social institutions of society, state and religion. This, at least, is the case of the West, which 3

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continues to exercise extensive influence over much of the world since the Industrial Revolution. How they relate to and have an impact on each other is complex and therefore challenges sociological praxis. For example, in what way can one say that religion is the “cause” and not the “effect” in social, economic and political change? Similarly, what religious impulses can one claim to have emanated from society or even the state? Or, is it the other way round where societal change or intervention from the state has created the impulses for religious change? It could be argued that religion as a “sacred canopy”1 characterized the early societies and rudimentary states. Religion, as it were, was regarded as the sacred cosmos — a divinely sanctioned spiritual-moral foundation for the construction of a God-loving and God-fearing society or state. For example, in medieval Europe, the support of the Roman Catholic Papacy was critical in ensuring political legitimacy to rule. Acts of opposition and disobedience to church authority invited sabotage and, in a worse case scenario, ex-communication. Religion-inspired mapping of society is perhaps exemplified most sharply by classical Hinduism. In terms of religion and society, Hinduism cannot be understood without recourse to the caste system. The central aspect of Hinduism is that of fulfilling duties according to the caste into which one is born. The origins of the caste system go back to the early history of Hinduism when peoples of the Aryan race invaded India. Out of this was constructed the pyramidal caste system: Brahmins (priests), Kshatriayas (warriors) and Vaisayas (farmers and traders), all three considered “twice born” and therefore could participate in rituals and study the wisdom of the Vedas.2 Below these three castes were the Sudras (peasants) who were regarded as “once born”, and below the Sudras were the outcastes, members who not only performed the meanest of tasks but were despised and oppressed. Classical Hinduism, therefore, not only provided the religious justification for social organization but rigidified the status system. In the case of the early history of Islam, religion became the basis of social organization, providing in the process a comprehensive and complete moralethical system for the conduct of life (syariah) from family relationships to the responsibilities of political leadership, the conduct of war, the management of business, care for the poor and destitute, and fulfilling duties to God. The syariah is commonly known as Muslim law, upon which an ethical society in obedience to the teachings of God (as exemplified in the revelations of the Prophet Muhammad and documented in the Qur’an) may be realized. Pious Muslims, in particular therefore, do not differentiate between the “secular” and the “religious”. For them, every thought and action has a religious connection and its permissibility or otherwise should be judged in accordance

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with a religiously sanctioned scale of values. Compared to Christianity and Hinduism, the religion of Islam remains a powerful influence in Muslim thinking on how a spiritually guided moral-ethical society may be constructed. The source of this religious impulse is the Qur’an itself, which Muslims believe to represent the very word of God — sacred, unchangeable and relevant for all times. The moral-ethical philosophy of Confucianism represents another interesting example. Though not a religion (Confucius himself had explicitly denied this), its adoption as the organizing principle for the construction of the state is comparable to the early intention of the major world religions. Both Confucianism as well as the world religions discussed so far were guided by the concern to ensure peace and stability within the state and concomitantly, harmony and social cohesion. Taoism, as it evolved to assume religious significance, did not supplant Confucianism but on the contrary, filled the spiritual vacuum left by Confucianism. Similarly, when Buddhism became an accepted faith in China, its stress on moral-ethical self cultivation harmonized nicely with Confucianism. The impulse of Buddhism was therefore moralethical perfection and the accumulation of merits in order to achieve total release (Nirvana enlightenment) from the cares and temptations of this world. It was also tolerant. The relationships underlying Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism implicitly allowed Confucianism to function as the ideology of the state and as the basis of Chinese secularism. Chinese attitude to religion has in general been “instrumental” rather than ideological. There has never been an instance in Chinese history where attempts were made to create a “heaven on earth”. Chinese religion as it exists today is syncretistic — a combination of folk religion, Taoism, Buddhism and deified Confucianism.

Religion, State and Society (2) Yet, the sacred canopy proved impermanent. Tears and cracks began to appear from the fourteenth century onwards in Europe. Humanist ideas associated with the Renaissance began to take root in Italy. In the sixteenth century, Martin Luther (1483–1546) set in motion the Reformation despite efforts to counter it by the established church (Counter Reformation). The nature of religious practice would henceforth change drastically. Schism reared its head and led to the founding of the future Protestant Church. Luther’s message and later, John Calvin’s (1509–64), was that “Man was answerable to God alone” and not to human agents of God, be they lords or clergy. Papal authority over the laity (society) was therefore, further eroded. By the late seventeenth century, a revolutionary intellectual disposition had crystallized that was to challenge and eventually displace religion’s

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hitherto all-encompassing influence on state and society — the era of the Enlightenment. The torrent of intellectual energy epitomized in the works of Descartes, Locke, Newton, Leibniz, Kant, Goethe, Voltaire, Rousseau, Adam Smith and David Hume, to name the main protagonists, criticized both church and government. Collectively, they altered the then existing worldview founded on religion and in the process introduced a new construction — one that rested firmly on man’s rationality, autonomy and creative genius. In short, man was seen as the master of his own fate. Henceforth, development and the progress of man itself were to depend on his dominance over nature. Instead of the pursuit of divine will and purpose, the universe was reconstructed and impregnated with human meanings. This opened the door for secularization, the separation of religion from the business of the state, and simultaneously the validation of the intellect as the organizing norm for social ascent. No less important were the bursts of scientific and technological activities that followed the Enlightenment. In the process, what science could not explain or prove was regarded as superstition. Scepticism and agnosticism became rampant and further weakened the hold of religion on thought and action. The values and attitudes of the Renaissance, the Reformation and the Enlightenment have remained the intellectual bedrock of Western civilization. Secularization, the cumulative withdrawal of the role of religion in the affairs of the state, could be said to be inevitable given the circumstances. Equally pertinent was the rise of capitalism led by the emerging European bourgeoisie which further eroded the role of religion in matters pertaining to state and society. The characteristics of capitalism as conceptualized by Weber3 were antitraditionalism, rationalism, dynamism and calculated long-term planning to ensure economic gain (the profit motive). The central motif was rationality which was to permeate all areas and levels of life, from the legal system to the political structure, social behaviour, scientific and technological pursuits and management of the economy, labour relations and even philosophy and the arts. Understood this way, capitalism may be said to have strengthened secularism and in the process widened the separation between religion and the state. Thus, from the time of the Industrial Revolution, religion’s influence on the development of the state in Europe waned — a situation which prompted Goethe (1749–1832) to epitomize knowledge and power over religious faith as depicted in the character of Faust. Christianity’s reaction to the rise of capitalism was exemplified in due course by the flowering of Protestant sects — a process that had begun during the Reformation. The development of the printing industry made available 6

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translations of the Christian scriptures that reached out to a much wider and more varied community of believers. This in turn allowed for a diverse interpretation of the Bible and concomitantly the emergence of “new prophets”, charismatic preachers and cult leaders. The ethos of capitalism then, implicitly encouraged religious diversity both because of its values and attitudes as well as its transformative power in social relations and economic practices, that is to say, in the make-up of the social structure and in the new trades and industries that came about. No longer were religious truths taken literally. Be that as it may, the essential driving force of capitalism is the profit motive. While it fulfils the yearnings for “this worldly” comforts, wealth and power, it cannot provide answers to the deeper questions of human existence, that is, the religious and spiritual motivations that are inherent to the human psyche. Moreover, there is also the ugly side manifested by capitalism that protagonists of socialism and communism had tried to expose and ameliorate especially in the early post-war period. Indeed, despite capitalism’s triumph, a residue of communistic-socialistic ideology and practice remains in various guises in countries such as China, Russia, Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba. Capitalism, socialism and communism are “Godless” ideologies. The fact that socialism and communism surfaced to address the perceived inequalities and inequities of capitalism does testify, once again, to the dominating belief that man has all the answers to his needs. However, the negative developments coming out of capitalism and its practice have, as it seems the case, revitalized the religious impulse, especially in countries and regions where poverty, corruption, disease, lack of human rights and bad governance prevail.

RELIGION AND POLITICS IN GOBAL PERSPECTIVE How then has religion adjusted to the challenges posed by the global capitalism in practice? Has it been reactive and adaptive? Have current existential conditions and global uncertainties given religion a new dispensation? Or indeed, is there now a reversal of the process of secularization consequent on the apparent religious resurgence in Asia, Africa, South America, the United States and parts of Eastern Europe including the Russian Federation? What social and political impulses are at play? The situation that religion finds itself does vary from faith to faith, from state to state and from society to society. In Asia, Africa and South America, membership in religious institutions (church, mosques, temples, etc.) has risen. In contrast, in Western Europe, church attendance continues to fall. In the case of America, there is an apparent resurgence of religious fundamentalism (the religious right) in politics and “born again” Christian evangelism. In the 7

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case of Muslim countries, both history and contemporary tensions obtaining between the West and the Muslim world have led to religious radicalism and the hijacking of religion by extremists for political struggle. Equally notable is the rise of religions of “experience” as against religions of “expression”. Others have used such terms/categories as “live religions” as against “conservation/canned religions” and “dynamic” as against “open religions”.4 To be sure, they were alluding to the growth of religions of “emotion” in contrast to institutional religions characterized by “worship and sacrifice, theology and ceremony and ecclesiastical organisation”.5 Whether religions of “emotion” represent a new religious impulse or is adaptive is moot. Finally, there are those who decline any religious affiliation yet declare themselves believers in a personal God (inner religion). What does this mean? What are the precipitating circumstances that have prompted such an attitude? What implications, if any, do these have on religion and the state? There is no doubt that religion and politics are now intertwined as a result of cumulative globalization underpinned by the spread of global capitalism. At the same time, unlike the period of the Renaissance when confidence in human progress prevailed and shaped human response to the challenges of existence, current uncertainties have made many return to religion to seek meaning and direction in their lives. In this connection, two major consequences for religion may be detected as a result. First is the expansion of transnational religious outreach, by the Catholic and Protestant churches (in the early days by missionaries and evangelical groups from the West) and in recent years by Muslim missionary and welfare groups financed by oil-rich Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia. Other countries that have benefited from global capitalism such as Japan and South Korea, have established religious outlets beyond their national borders as exemplified by the Buddhist Soka Gakai and the Korean Reformed Church of Reverend Sun Myung Moon, both examples of “new religions”. Second, the transnational outreach of these major world religions have directly and indirectly forced the state to take steps to ensure that it does not pose a threat to its national development policies, especially in multi-religious states. Globalization then, may be said to have dual consequences: both for the national economy (in the sense that it needs to retain control over the power of multinational corporations to influence local economic and social practices); and for nation-building which obviously involves the management of inter-religious relations and practice. Globalization thus has moved religion to a new but much more uncertain plane at both the national as well as international levels. By the same token, the logic of modern capitalism, characterized by the world as a free market, 8

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is now securely embraced by one and all, engulfing in the process all other ideologies. In this connection, the most potent grand idea of the twentieth century has been that of freedom and democracy — an idea quite in line with the ethos of capitalism, child of the European Enlightenment. No wonder that Francis Fukuyama was moved to declare the “end of history” as if to suggest that liberal democracy would erase all “ideology” based conflicts in future.7

MODERN CAPITALISM AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: IMPACT ON RELIGION As mentioned earlier, intellectually and ideologically, both modern capitalism and liberal democracy make logical bedfellows. However, their impact on various religions and religious practices show significant differences. This is especially true for Christianity and Islam in which, as religions of the prophetic tradition, each has in its evolution striven to create a God-fearing society encapsulated by the “sacred canopy”.

Impact on Islam In the case of Islam, this religious motivation remains a powerful influence in Muslim minds. As mentioned earlier, the concept of secularism, the separation of politics from religion does not exist in Islamic doctrine. No doubt Muslims now live in a variety of existential circumstances and are citizens of a variety of countries practising a variety of political beliefs. In brief, Islam recognizes three existential conditions: (1) Dar al-Islam (literally the abode of peace) where Islam and Islamic law prevails in the territories and countries concerned, (2) Dar al-Harb (literally the abode of war) where Islam and Islamic law is proscribed or where the individual struggles against the will of God, and (3) Dar al-Sulh, also Dar al-‘Ahd (literally the abode of treaty) where treaty obligations made between Muslims and non-Muslims living in the same state or territory allow for the practice of Islam and Islamic law.8 The last relates to Muslims living as a minority within a state. It follows, therefore, that Muslims in various degrees of religious conviction harbour sentiments of an Islamic society governed by the syariah — that system of Islamic law accountable to the Qur’an and later, as Muslim society grew and expanded, incorporating the sayings and traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad. The religious laws of the syariah are the result of the intuitive experience of the Prophet and represent the ethical system towards which Muslims expressed their total submission to the will of God. Islamic 9

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ethics, as stressed by Gibb, is “revealed ethics, not the product of rational speculations or of social experience”.9 This overlap between religion and society found its most perfect form in the first century of Islam’s history when the four “rightly guided” caliphs (Abu Bakar, Umar, Uthman and Ali) ruled over the Muslims. This period of Islamic history is regarded, in ethical terms, as the most perfect by modern-day Muslims, a time when Muslims lived and practised fully the commands of God. It was during this period that a truly ethical society was attained. This yearning for the perfect past continues to have a hold on Muslim thought and thus colour their response and reaction to the exigencies of modern-day life. Followers of traditional Islam not only hark back to the perfect past but believe fervently that by recapturing and reinstating the past, the social evils, injustices and economic disparities of contemporary society would be overcome. For Muslims in general, the life of the first generation of Muslims (salaf ) and the Islamic impulse that gave rise to the civilization of Islam continue to excite and inspire. Perhaps, more than that, it was the form of Islam that was fundamental and pure, untainted by “additions”, “accretions” and “ deviations” as a result of the spread of the religion through conquest or conversion. Hence, a consistent effort on the part of Muslim religious authorities as represented by the ulama throughout much of Islamic history to the present day, has been to expunge contrary beliefs and practices that undermine Islamic monotheism. This was to reach its apex of intensity with the teachings of the Muslim puritan movement in Saudi Arabia, the so called Unitarians (Arabic: Muwahhidun) founded by Muhammad Ibn Abd alWahab (1703–92) in the eighteenth century. There is no doubt that generations of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca and Medinah were aware of his teachings which came to be known as Wahhabism. In this respect, it can be argued that advocates for the establishment of a Muslim theocracy are calling for the reinstitution of the “sacred canopy”. In Islam’s response to the demands of globalization underpinned by modern capitalism, one can detect various forms of religious rationalization. First of all, the vast majority of Muslims desire the fruits of modernization and at the same time believe that they can attain them. The nineteenth and early twentieth century revivalists of Islam had all acknowledged the importance of science in the struggle for advancement. However, this must not result in the erosion of Islamic values and concomitantly their Islamic identity. This means in effect faithful obedience to the laws of Allah (syariah) as espoused by Prophet Muhammad. This also means that the practice of syariah, as mentioned earlier, constitutes the foundation of the Muslim polity and its ethical system. It follows that Muslims in this category share the belief that 10

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answers to all their problems and predicaments for all times are already found in the Qur’an. It is up to its adherents to find them using their God-given intellect. Understood thus, the majority of Muslims are fundamentalists despite the negative connotations that fundamentalism has given rise to in public discourse. Thus, in modern Muslim discourse the terms “fundamentalism”, “revivalism” and “reformism” may be taken to mean one and the same thing. Another form of religious rationalization refers to the thoughts and actions of a radical Muslim minority that is directly opposed to the West and its institutions. These are the religious radicals or so-called “jihadists” referred to in Western media. In Western discourse on Islam, the term “jihad” has been interpreted as “holy war”, an interpretation that is partial but does not address the central meaning of the term. The Encyclopaedia of Islam defines jihad as “a divine institution of warfare to extend Islam into Dar al-Harb, the abode of war/struggle/disbelief in non-Islamic territories or to defend Islam from danger”. According to the sunnah (words and deeds attributed to the Prophet Muhammad), jihad is not lawful unless it involves summoning of unbelievers to belief, that is to say, when unbelievers have accepted either Islam or have a protected status within Islam (dhimmi). Currently, jihad as understood by Muslims in general also means “struggle” within oneself to overcome moralethical weaknesses or to achieve excellence in everyday pursuits. In short, Muslims are reminded by their leaders to see life as a constant struggle for perfection — this at least is the case of Muslims who have embraced modern capitalism and pluralism. However, Muslim radicals are driven more by memories of the past, beginning with the Crusades and extending onto the political manipulations of Arab-Muslim societies in the Middle East in the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century until the present. These manipulations include the ousting of Ottoman control and the subsequent fragmentation of the Arab-Islamic heartland by the British and French colonial forces; the invasion of the Suez Canal in the1950s; American support for Iraq under Saddam Hussein in the war with Iran (ostensibly to check the spread of militant Islam), the covert American support provided to the mujahidin (warriors of Allah) in Afghanistan to oust the Russian occupation of that country (and which the Americans abandoned after having met their objective to check Soviet/Russian expansionism and which subsequently led to the rise of the ultra-conservative Taliban government); the genocide in Bosnia; the plight of the Palestinians; and the invasion of Iraq by the Americanled coalition with the continuing carnage and instability. Further, the perceived restrictions put on the practice of Islam in the West and elsewhere by 11

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followers of the faith is seen as a denial of religious freedom and ipso facto an act against Islam. In the eyes of the radicals, Islam is under “siege” (a Dar alHarb situation) everywhere. Thus, it comes as no surprise that Muslim radicalism is aimed specifically at the West and its institutions including the Christian faith. Muslim radicals not only regard themselves as defenders of the faith but at the same time as “renewers” (mujaddid) in which, according to one tradition (hadith), Allah would send a “renewer” to rouse “drowsy” people back to the fountainhead of revelation and faith. In an important sense, the religious rationalizations of the radicals have swayed sections of Muslims to the detriment of orthodox or mainstream Islam, despite their one-sided, unbalanced, selective, evil or perverse interpretations of Islamic doctrine. A third response is found in the apparent rise in the practice of Islamic mysticism or esoterism. Commonly known as Sufism (Arabic: At-tasawwuf ) it has been described as “metaphysical” Islam or the inner dimension of Islam. It is the science of direct knowledge of God in which its doctrines and methods are derived from the Qur’an and Islamic revelation. In a sense, it is the obverse of doctrinal or intellectual Islam, and allows followers to leap from human reason to knowledge of God. Sufi orders (tariqah or “path”) are founded on the precept that esoterism is inherent in all “true belief ” in God and theoretical knowledge is nothing without “the eye of the heart”. In the history of Islam, all levels of Muslim society, from the most powerful and learned to the most common, have in some degree or other professed Sufism as the path to a complete knowledge of God. Indeed, Sufis played a major role in the early Islamization of Southeast Asia because they were able to tap into pre-existing esoteric impulses associated with Hinduism. Such esoteric impulses are evident in the practice of Javanese mysticism (kebatinan) — a practice which though frowned upon by orthodox Muslims, nonetheless hold sway even among some members of the Indonesian elite. No doubt some movements claiming to show the mystical path to God are suspect and are therefore proscribed by religious authorities. Fourthly, despite mainstream Islam’s insistence on orthodoxy, like Christianity, it has not been able to expunge so called “deviations” (Malay: ajaran sesat/songsang) which usually assume the form of cults led by charismatic individuals who claim special spiritual powers by dint of inheritance, association or command from God or His prophets, in particular the Prophet Muhammad. In Malaysia such cults are not only regarded as a political and religious threat to Sunni Islam (Arabic: Ahl al sunna wa’al jama’a) but also as morally offensive because of the excesses of their leaders. Still, movements regarded by the religious authorities and establishments as “deviationist” continue to be reported from time to time — suggesting another facet of the ongoing 12

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struggle within Islam for the hearts and minds of its adherents in a changing and uncertain world underpinned by globalization and the challenge posed by Western economic and cultural dominance.

Impact on Christianity How then does Christianity compare? In what way(s) has the religious impulse evolved in modern times? And in what forms has that impulse assumed? Needless to say, the most significant difference in the case of Christianity is its full acceptance of the notion of secularism — the clear demarcation between affairs of the state and religious practice, this at least in ideological terms if not in practice. Indeed, the notions of liberal democracy, human rights and free-market economy are now given full rein — a situation that seems to have resulted in a backlash against rampant secularism as witnessed by the gathering political influence of the American religious right. Key issues that have united the American religious right (evangelists, bornagain Christians, traditional Catholics, Southern Baptists, conservative organizations such as the Focus on Family group, Latino evangelists and even orthodox Jews) include: abortion, gay marriages, HIV Aids, euthanasia stem cell research and excessive pornography purveyed by the media and film industry, not to mention the spate of corporate scandals and the perceived threat of Islamic radicals. It is excessive liberty and licence granted in the name of freedom and human rights which the religious right blames as the cause for their prevalence. The fact that some American judges at both the state and federal levels are seen to be too liberal in adjudicating religiously sensitive matters has also raised anger. The issues of abortion, gay marriage, stem cell research and euthanasia hit directly at the core of the Abrahamic faiths. Indeed, Creationism (in opposition to Darwin’s Theory of Evolution) — the worldview based on the teachings of Christianity that it is God who brought order out of chaos, is now enjoying a revival. It can thus be seen that the aforementioned societal developments have provided a powerful impulse for religious reaction, not only in reaction to “rampant” secularism and its underlying processes, but equally in reaction to the threat posed on the future of the church and what it represents. There is then an uneasy tension between state and religion. It would appear that religion is able to re-assert its influence on matters hitherto reserved for the state, to reinstate what one pro-right senator has called “a biblical worldview”. It implies that the order created by man has failed and only a return to the ways of God that the current “chaos” can be overcome. Implicitly, such a reaction is a contemporary indictment of the arrogance of man and the state of mind that had characterized the 13

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Renaissance. The question is: Will the spread of liberal democracy and modern capitalism to other parts of the world, as in the American case, lead to the same outcome? In Europe, in contrast to America, secularism reigns supreme. In the case of Spain and Holland, the “laws of man” seem to have prevailed as when gay marriage is made legal. Holland and Switzerland have legalized euthanasia, despite the opposition of the Vatican, the capital of Roman Catholicism. The Spanish government has also passed legislation to facilitate divorce. In several European countries, issues such gay rights and the right of abortion are decided by parliament. Support for these issues or otherwise depends on sentiments on the ground. And given the lack of religiosity in general, religion-based voting is not on the cards. Instead, in such countries as the United Kingdom, mainstream religion such as the Anglican Church has apparently embraced the ethos of liberalism, human rights and secularism as when it consented to the ordainment of women priests and of late, even women’s appointment as bishops. It also recognizes gay rights as when gay priests are allowed to remain in the church despite opposition from the membership. However, the archbishop of late had spoken of the public’s unhappiness and distaste for the high rate of abortion in the United Kingdom. It would appear that one’s choice of lifestyle is not in contention except the taking of life as in abortion. Yet, in most developing countries outside Europe, religion is thriving. In the Russian Federation, there is a total reinstatement of the Russian Orthodox Church following the collapse of communism. The same has happened in China where the Roman Catholic Church has been reinstated. In Catholic majority countries, the potential for the church to play a political role is ever present should it decide to provide spiritual-moral support to causes perceived to be just. The best example is found in the case of the Philippines where “people power” saw the dismissal of two governments in recent years. The reasons for this are varied: the tolerance or intolerance as the case may be, of the governing elite to the activities of the church; the support of the laity for the church and the church’s resources to mobilize that support; the relative openness of the political system; the historical role of the church in state formation; and last but not least, the church’s willingness or unwillingness to observe to the letter, the biblical maxim “to grant what is due to God to God and what is due to Caesar to Caesar”. What can be said is that by and large, the church in developing countries has not fallen victim to political co-optation. Still, the church’s role is not aimed at capturing political power. Its impulse is also not in reaction to secularism but the result of perceived social and political ills that have come about, such as poverty, misrule and corruption, 14

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abuse and neglect of human rights, and last but not least, moral decay. Be that as it may, liberation theology that guided the response of the Catholic clergy in non-European countries in the past is now being put in question. In Brazil, about 20 per cent of its Catholic population of 97 per cent have switched to the Pentecostal faith while others have turned to Christian evangelism. It would appear that the socialistic-communistic underpinning of liberation theology have put off many of its supporters. Similarly, the recent spate of scandals involving paedophile priests and the issue of celibacy have cast the Catholic church in bad light. In any case, in strictly secular states, the involvement of the church in what are perceived to be secular matters (either real or putative) has been proscribed by law and other means, especially in multi-religious states.

Impact on Other World Religions Compared with Christianity and Islam, Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism by nature of their theologies and geographical provenance are not “world conquering” religions. Islam has the most comprehensive system of ethics within the syariah to constitute the basis of government. As such, the syariah could very well provide what Gibb has termed “a steel framework” for the unification of the entire Islamic community (ummah) — hence the radicals’ call for the re-establishment of the Caliphate to lead Muslims back to the Golden Age. In the case of Christianity, the unifying factor is the theology and doctrines of the church but this too, is subject to some diversity in form and practice. The laws governing Christian states no doubt reflect Christian morals, but they have evolved from an indigenous base and after long years of democratic struggle and constitutional government. Compared to Islam and Christianity, Buddhism’s main doctrinal thrust is that of spiritual self-cultivation (the Four Noble Truths and the Eight-fold Path) and human compassion. Its founder had rejected the world of government and politics to pursue enlightenment, that is to say, release from the world of greed and suffering. In Buddhist states like Thailand, Myanmar and Laos, government and politics remain secular though in the case of Sri Lanka, the Buddhist clergy of late had shown some restiveness as a result of the unsettled internal conflict. No Buddhist political party in Asia such as the Komeita Party in Japan has yet to capture power. In general, Buddhist scriptural teachings served as the basis for the conduct of everyday life rather than political conduct. In the case of Taoism, its founder, an archivist in the Imperial Court, had also rejected the artificial and affected (unnatural) lifestyle of the court and then left to pursue a life of simplicity, close to and guided by the lessons of 15

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nature. Confucianism was a political doctrine founded on moral-ethical concerns that its founder believed was critical to the peace and unity of the divided Chinese rudimentary state. However, like Hinduism, it was not meant to be repeated elsewhere. Both Korea and Vietnam adopted Confucianism as the state ideology after undergoing Chinese imperial rule, both the result of external imposition and later on, acceptance. In the case of Japan, which was never conquered, Confucianism was assimilated into the state’s mode of governance. Hinduism was embraced by the early Southeast Asian states and was largely a peaceful process. In accordance with Hindu cosmology, it provided religio-political legitimacy to the early kings and shaped state-craft. In contemporary times, both Hinduism and Islam in India and Buddhism in Sri Lanka have acquired a degree of political salience. The case of Sri Lanka has been briefly mentioned. In India, Hinduism’s relationship with Islam goes back to early sixteenth century when the Moghuls ruled India. The demarcation of India and the establishment of Pakistan in the middle of the last century, and the bloody clashes that ensued between Hindus and Muslims have left bitterness between the two religious groups. The rule of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party in the late 1990s has resulted in an overt expression of Hindu-based nationalism. The Babri mosque in Ayodhya served as the flash-point for religious conflict because the site of the mosque happens also to be the birth place of Ram, the supreme God, the Hindu model of the ideal man and the seventh incarnation of Vishnu. This assertion of identity on the basis of religion is not new, but it does at the same time pit one religion against another. A similar situation obtains in recent Indonesian history where members of the now banned Laskar Jihad which, in the name of Islam, attacked Christians in eastern Indonesia. Christian places of worship have also been attacked and razed in Jakarta. It is possible that there is also a religious (including racial) dimension in the internal conflict in Sri Lanka — government being in the hands of the majority Buddhist Sinhala-speaking population and the irredentist Tamil Tigers who are mainly Hindus.

RELIGION AND THE STATE: THE CASE OF SINGAPORE This final section attempts to locate Singapore’s position in the overall scheme of things as has been outlined thus far.

Secular State Policy and Religious Diversity Singapore has embraced the politics of pluralism and the values of modern capitalism in its economic pursuits. In governance, it has chosen the path of

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full secularism and the rule of law. In religious and cultural matters, the state has very much left the management of both to their respective adherents except on issues of state interest. What the state has done thus far is to ensure that “no religious groups are involved in politics” and that “religious organizations not stray beyond the bounds of educational, social and charitable work”.10 Other legal instruments to ensure toleration and respect for religious differences are found in the Sedition Act, the Penal Code, the Societies Act, the Newspaper & Printing Presses Act and the Internal Security Act. The 1969 Presidential Council for Minority Rights also guarantees the constitutional rights of minorities in religion, culture and employment. During the colonial period, religious proselytization with the intention to convert Muslims was proscribed as in the case of the Malay States — a step informed by the religious-motivated riots in Singapore in 1915 and 1951 respectively. This arrangement continues to be respected and Singapore remains outside the provision of the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights that provides for freedom of the individual to choose the religion of his/her choice or to change it. Given the extensive power of the state, the religious impulse would of necessity be bounded. All the major religions in Singapore (Buddhism, Christianity, Taoism or Chinese religion, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Sikhism, not to mention Zoroastrianism and Baha’ism) are of external provenance. Therefore, how these religions fare and their positions on social and political issues elsewhere will have either a positive or negative impact on the various religious communities and their perceptions towards each other in Singapore. In particular, present global tensions involving Muslims and Christians and the tensions prevailing in India among Hindus and Muslims have drawn religion onto issues that are otherwise non-religious, to the extent that divisions between secular and religious affairs has become blurred. Furthermore, in the case of Singapore, there are social and psychological strains emanating from the push for economic competition and security within the world of modern capitalism that have given religious institutions a new impulse, and in the process deepen religiosity among their followers. This is perhaps best exemplified in the increase in the number of church, temple or mosque-based organizations ministering to the poor, sick, lonely, homeless, jobless, and those unable to cope with the demands of life. A corollary is that uncertainties and crises resulting from rapid and frequently unpredictable change throughout the world have also intensified the search for meaning and purpose in human existence, and thus deepened religiosity. Among the younger generations of Singaporeans, better education and knowledge of the world (accessible through the internet and the mass media) have given them greater freedom to chart their life pursuits, including their 17

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choice of religion. In this regard, the variety of religions practised in Singapore not only fascinates but equally provokes, given the fact that most Singaporeans claim to have a religion. Equally, other than Christianity, all other religions in Singapore overlap or conflate with race or ethnicity. Fifty-one per cent of Chinese Singaporeans (who form 75 per cent of the total population) are either Buddhists or Taoists (two religions that have co-existed peacefully for a long time); almost the entire Malay population (15 per cent of Singapore’s population) have remained Muslim; and two-thirds of Indian Singaporeans (4 per cent of the total population) continue to practise the Hindu faith. It is also pertinent to note that historically, Chinese attitude to religion was ambiguous. Religion has never assumed the proportion of a political ideology. This probably had a connection with the influence of Confucian teachings which permeated all levels of the society. Whether the new generations of Chinese Singaporeans share this religious attitude today is difficult to ascertain. Still, given the current religious trends and the high incidence of conversion to other religions, this merits further observation. What then, are the dynamics and pragmatics of religious practice in Singapore? Is religion reactive or accommodating vis-à-vis the dominance of the state as exemplified by its legal powers? In what sense has religion made a difference in maintaining peace and harmony in multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-cultural Singapore? And last but not least, is the prospect of religion entering through the back door to influence state policies (such as through the power of the vote) real or a figment of the imagination? In this regard, it is worthwhile to note and be reminded that religion is not merely “faith”; it can generate emotional power such that feelings long dormant can seize the imagination of its adherents under certain circumstances. Be that as it may, current national policies have largely pre-empted potential threats to inter-racial and inter-religious harmony. Secularism has moved religion out of the equation on state matters. The parity of status granted to all the major religions (and now the “new religions” as well) has removed in one stroke, potential inter-religious contentions. Furthermore, religious and ethnic minorities are also granted equal access to public goods: in the allocation of land for the construction of places of worship and devotion; in the care and disposal of the dead; in representation at public functions; in official patronage when religious festivals are celebrated, etc. All these provide comfort and assurance to religionists of whatever faith and add authenticity to the multi-religious policy. The constant reminder that “national identity” must supersede “religious identity” when religious issues of an external provenance threaten harmony is backed up by documented cases of arrest, detention and deportation of trouble makers who use religion to cause mischief and dissension. The 18

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concern for “survival” — a concern that arose following Singapore’s departure from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965 — still reverberates, now in the face of economic globalization and in particular the emergence of Indian and China as economic powerhouses in Asia. Be that as it may, political leaders continue to stress the need for resilience in order to cope with the rapid and constant changes of the global economy on which Singapore’s “survival” depends. This state of mind is shared by most thinking Singaporeans, including religious and community leaders. At the same time, religious leaders are receptive to inter-religious dialogue, this for reasons of goodwill, toleration and mutual adaptation to the legal parameters governing religious practice. There is then a “don’t rock the boat” mindset which contributes to religious harmony. Last, but not least, is the practice of meritocracy in public life — in education and employment. This has ensured that any divisiveness caused by prioritizing religion and race are neutralized. Equally, secularization in governance can be said to have aided the acceptance of the philosophy of pragmatism — a reality that has had an impact on religion’s role in influencing and shaping state policies. Pragmatism as practised has an over-riding economic definition or is governed by economic logic. It is the outcome of the recurring concern for “survival”. This is illustrated by the way the state has handled such contentious issues as abortion, euthanasia, gay rights, stem cell research, donation of human organs and vices such as gambling, prostitution and drug abuse.

Some Contentious Issues Abortion is considered morally wrong by all the major religions. Catholics, Protestant groups and Muslims in particular have expressed concern in the past. However, to overcome religious opposition, the government made a distinction between the rights of a religion and the rights of the individual, in that it would allow “women who want abortions be allowed to get one” guided by his/her conscience.11 This seems to validate the constitutional provision that “a person has inalienable rights to his/her body.” Religious groups, in this regard, are encouraged to preach the message of “conscience” to its adherents. Thus, the pro-life impulse of religion is necessarily circumvented to address the practical consequences arising from unwanted pregnancies, notwithstanding the fact that abortion sometimes is done in order to save the life of the pregnant mother. The pragmatic approach to dealing with pro-life and religion-based objections to state policy is also found in euthanasia. In this the government has passed legislation to enable individuals the right to end his/her life by depositing a signed Advance Medical Directive (AMD) ahead of the event.

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This is on condition that the person was of rational state of mind at the time of his/her decision and that no medical cure was likely or forthcoming, while other safeguards to prevent abuse have also been laid down. There are two contrasting arguments underlying this legal provision. Firstly, the legal provision recognizes the right of the individual to his/her own life. It is up to him/her, if he/she has a religious faith to answer to God. Secondly, in view of the medical cost to both the individual and the government, not to mention the care and concern of the family members should the medical condition linger, the pragmatic consideration has prevailed. The subject of stem cell research also pits pragmatism against religion but in a diametrically different way. As it is known, the promotion of stem cell research has an underlying pro-life motivation. Its primary purpose is to minimize pain and lengthen life through the application of medical science. In this regard pragmatism complements religious doctrine. But at the same time, there is a powerful economic dimension given the fact that there is a huge market for services relating to the discoveries made in stem cell research. A further complicating dimension is that stem cell research touches directly on the use of the human embryo, which proponents of religion declare is “life”. To overcome this objection, the government-initiated Ethics Committee (which included representations of the various religions and which considered their submissions) has published a set of guidelines — the most important being its determination of the point in time when life is said to begin following conception. Pragmatic prioritization also shaped the implementation of the Human Organs Transplant Act (HOTA). This particular issue refers directly to Islamic doctrine which states that the human body is inviolate, being a gift from Allah, and therefore should be kept whole. To circumvent this objection, the state introduced various provisions, the main one being to exempt Muslims from the requirements of the act. Non-Muslims are automatically included in the act, but Muslims have to “opt in” voluntarily in order to be included. The HOTA has been revised to include other human organs besides the kidney to save lives through human organ transplant — a procedure that harmonizes perfectly with religious doctrine. It is on the basis of this argument that caring and pragmatic Muslims in Singapore have formed a society to urge Muslims to support HOTA by “opting in” and at the same time request the government to remove the current provisions aimed at assuaging Muslim sensitivity. The recent announcement of the government to build two “integrated resorts” which would include a casino in each is another indication of state pragmatism. The states’ rationalization for instituting these two projects is 20

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once again based on economic criteria — that it would have a ripple effect on the economy and make Singapore more attractive to tourists in the highly competitive and lucrative tourist market. And in any case, Singaporeans are already indulging in different forms of gambling in Singapore and in neighbouring countries. To soften disquiet from the various religious representations made against the resorts’ set up (which appears to be unified and widespread) the government emphasized that the casino would not be the dominant feature of the resorts. More importantly, it would put in place procedures aimed at limiting access to the casino by locals and at the same time set up facilities to cope with the damaging aftereffects of addictive gambling. Gay rights is still a taboo subject in Singapore despite the clamour from its supporters. Still, the government has shown some shift of late, as when it was publicly announced that there should be no discrimination against the employment of gays in the army and the Civil Service, but gay gatherings would be banned. There is an unequivocal stand among those with religious faiths against recognizing gay culture, a stand informed by developments among their co-religionists in many Western countries. Such recognition would imply accepting the rights of gay couples to marry, adopt children and claim for legal rights hitherto reserved for couples who are man and woman. The gay lifestyle has been closely associated with the incidence of HIV Aids and the government’s guarded approach so far to dealing with this phenomenon has the support of all religions. Still, the rights of gays to employment without discrimination, while morally correct, is also sound in economic terms as it would ensure that all Singaporeans are productively engaged, whatever their choice of lifestyle. The issue of prostitution has engaged the religious leaders of all faiths and denominations for a long time. Prostitution and gambling are regarded as the gravest forms of human moral degradation, not only because doctrinal teachings say so but equally for their multiple negative effects on the family and society. For Muslims the consumption of alcohol is equally condemned because it distorts the mind. And yet, prostitution, gambling and alcohol consumption are regarded as inherent to modern capitalism which treats each of these as legitimate components of the economy. Here again, a pragmatic frame of mind prevails wherein prostitution is regarded as a matter of choice both for the vendor as well as the buyer of such services. The states’ stand seems to be that religion-based moral reservations against prostitution should be built into the church’s/mosque’s/temple’s/synagogue’s sermons to members of their respective congregations and in that way, mitigate the adverse consequences. 21

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The Rise of Religiosity It can be seen that moral issues that can provide religion the impulse to influence and sway government policy is constrained by the twin impact of secularism and pragmatism within the framework of demands imposed by modern capitalism and pluralism. Religion as it were, has to accommodate the claims of the state as a first charge. Does this then affect religious doctrine? What can religion do to offset this? This has to do with the maintenance of the purity and distinctiveness of a religious doctrine in order to preserve its identity as a religious faith in the eyes of its real and potential believers. While religious leaders may be converted to the idea of interreligious harmony, in their daily ministrations they have to ensure that their adherents remain faithful and loyal to their chosen religious faith. Thus, the questions of “conversion”, proselytization and religious “renunciation” need to be addressed. This is especially pertinent in view of the rise in religiosity among the young, and the acknowledgement of all religious faiths that there should be no compulsion or coercion on the matter of religious choice. There is then an unresolved tension between acknowledgement and practice or, alternatively, between inclusiveness and exclusiveness. How the different religions negotiate through this complexity now and in the future will have a shaping influence on society at large. Religion becomes “evil” as Kimball argues, when it makes claims to absolute truths, imposes on followers blind obedience and accepts that the ends justify the means.12 Against this background, there has arisen of late a new religious attitude among some Singaporeans which may be termed “internal/private” religion, that is, belief in a Supreme God or Creator without professing any specific religious faith or formal ties to a religion. It is a form of civil religion, a moral-ethical compass for life in a turbulent world, yet must subsist on the teachings of the main religions in order to have meaning, purpose and direction. Is this then a manifestation of Singapore’s growing cosmopolitan societal make-up characterized by diversity and tolerance? Or is it a contemporary manifestation of the syncretic attitude of the majority Chinese toward religion? Or is this the consequence of deepening secularism, pluralism and the rule of law that puts a premium on the management of life in this world as against life in the hereafter? An important facet of the religious spectrum in Singapore that may have future implications for the state relates to the Chinese community which makes up 78 per cent of the population. Fifty per cent of Chinese Singaporeans declare Buddhism and Taoism as their religion. There is also a high percentage who do not profess any religion, most probably practitioners of Confucianism 22

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or free-thinkers. At the same time, the rate of conversion to Christianity in particular is higher than conversion to Buddhism and Taoism. A major reason for this is the fact that both Buddhism and Taoism together with Chinese folk religion (three components of Chinese religion) were until recently, mainly confined to the observance of rituals connected with the rites-of-passage and calendrical celebrations.13 There is now clear evidence that both Buddhism and, to a lesser extent, Taosim are undergoing a process of reform and renewal which stress doctrine and exegesis, that is, on the philosophical and intellectual aspects of the religion, in order to seek answers to contemporary problems and predicaments. A related aspect is that Chinese families in Singapore exemplify the greatest religious diversity — a situation that can either encourage greater tolerance to religious differences or lead to family conflict which potentially threatens inter-religious harmony. Buddhism and Christianity are the most active religions among Chinese Singaporeans. Both Buddhism and Taoism are inherent to Chinese history and culture whereas Christianity remains the religion of choice among many of the English/Western educated elite. In this regard, Hinduism in Singapore shares comparable experience with Buddhism and Taoism. Finally, as in the developed liberal democracies of the West where new existential conditions have led to the flowering of “new religions”, a comparable development is observable in Singapore as well. What are the reasons for this? What do “new religions” offer to their adherents that established/institutional religions are unable to? And what religious impulses underlie the “new religions”? Does democratic liberalism, because it allows for openness and freedom of thought, empty the universe of coherent meanings and offers instead a multiple and varied search for new anchors among adherents of “new religions”? Or are “new religions” to be regarded as religious revivalism and evangelism combined? One view is to regard the rise of “new religions” as a reaction against secularization on the one hand and, on the other, as the “failure” of established/ institutional religions to meet the emotional needs of their adherents. Secularization has led to disenchantment with the world, hyper-rationalism and a premium put on instrumentality. This has deprived the individual of transcendent perspectives which could provide meaning and purpose for his daily struggle. According to Durkheim, the elementary form of religious experience is characterized by passion and ecstasy: warmth, uplift, revivification, abnormal surge of strength, effervescence, frenzy, transfiguration, rapture, metamorphosis, over-excitement, spiritual exaltation, etc.14 “New religions” are, in that respect, fundamentally grounded on emotions. Are “new religions” then examples of religious renewals, a re-enrichment of the symbolic universe 23

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weakened by secularization and a reaction against ethical religion represented by the established religions, where systematization of doctrine and acclimatization of religious practice in everyday life remain the norms? If so, one could legitimately regard religious renewals as attempts to re-assert emotional experience over a hyper-rationalized world — in short, a form of “de-secularization” protest. With regard to established/institutional religion, modernization and secularization have curtailed or limited its role in shaping and influencing policy decisions of the state, though the need to preserve its doctrinal teachings remain. In this connection, even the religious fundamentalist who is driven to re-institute the sacred canopy is forced to grapple with the demands of modernization and secularization. This, in a sense, has created a religious “market place”. Criticism levelled at established/institutional religion is that it has become too arid and bereft of the emotional depths that drive the religious impulse in new religions. Seen in this way, adherents of “new religions” (especially charismatic movements) are attracted to the new religious language (glossolalia [speaking in “tongues”], touching, embracing, miracle performing, sharing and personal narratives or testimony — a meta language that is both expressive and poetic.15 Indeed, hymns sung are resonant of the beat and rhythm of modern “pop-music” except for the lyrics. This appeals to the tastes, temper and aesthetic dispositions of the youthful who constitute the congregational majority. Can “new religions” be regarded as an important component of modern youth culture born out of deepening secularization pivoted on liberal democracy and modern capitalism? Or, alternatively, are “new religions” cathartic in that they offer relief from stress and work demands of everyday life in modern capitalism? In this, all religions in Singapore in different degrees are offering counselling and pastoral care to mitigate work and relationship problems by recourse to their respective religious creed. In a recent survey Singapore was declared as “a nation of believers” and that religions were “reaping a harvest of believers”. The level of religiosity was recorded at 59 per cent of which 9 per cent said they were very religious and 50 per cent said that they were somewhat religious.16 Among those converted, 34 per cent reported that conversion to a “new religion” gave them meaning and purpose in life, and 38 per cent converted as a result of encouragement from family and friends. Most converted to Christianity (44 per cent) and Buddhism (26 per cent). Thus “new religions” may also be regarded as a reaction to the existential conditions created by the processes of secularization and modern capitalism. They offer their adherents a sense of community closeness, individual 24

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empowerment, healing, fellowship, therapy and a unified experience of awe and submission to God in worship. For some, participation in “new religion” worship may even be “a fashion of the moment” occasioned as it were by the fact that society has become a “market place” for religion.

CONCLUDING REMARKS This chapter has attempted to show how the processes of secularization and rationalization, the outcome of European intellectual development since the sixteenth century, have affected and shaped the relationship between the state and religion on the one hand, and the relationship between religion and society, on the other. These processes have anchored the state as the arbiter in matters pertaining to social organization and religious practice and at the same time fostered the institutionalization of modern capitalism. Globalization entails pluralism, the acceptance of diversity and the rule of law at both the national and international levels. It is the state that enacts laws and enforces them. These laws ensure the orderly development of society as well as the pursuit of religious aims and purposes. Indeed, it is the laws of the state which now provide the “sacred canopy” under which society functions and religion operates. The religious impulse therefore, has to accommodate the overarching power of the state. Still, the adaptive capacity of religion remains vigorous, as witnessed by the growth of “new religions” and the resurgence of the religious right, not to mention the use of religion for political and nefarious aims and purposes. As such, the underlying tension between religion and the state is ongoing, as indeed the underlying tension between the major world religions which in some countries have become more intense. The health and vitality of society then depends on the harmonious and mutually reinforcing roles of religion and the state in managing human affairs.

Notes Views expressed in this chapter are entirely those of the author. 1. Berger, The Sacred Canopy. 2. Srinivas, Caste in Modern India. 3. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism. 4. Wach, Types of Religious Experience; Bastide, Les Ameriques Noires; Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion. 5. Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 452–57. 7. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. 8. Glasse, The Concise Encyclopaedia of Islam, p. 93. 9. Gibb, Studies on the Civilisation of Islam, pp. 196–97. 25

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10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

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Maintenance of Religious Harmony, Cmd. 21 of 1989, pp. 1–12. Ibid. Kimball, When Religion Becomes Evil, pp. 71–126. Tham, Religion and Modernisation, pp. 132–49. Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Hervieu-Leger, “Present Day Emotional Renewals”, pp. 139–47. “God and Us”, Straits Times, Special Report, 16 July 2005, pp. S1–S4.

References Armstrong, Karen. Holy War: The Crusaders and Their Impact on To-day’s World. New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1988. Bastide, Roger. Les Ameriques Noires. Paris: Payot, 1967. Beckford, James, A. and Thomas Luckmann, eds. The Changing Face of Religion. London: Sage Studies in International Sociology, 1991. Bellah, Robert N. “Civil Religion in America”. In Life Styles: Diversity in American Society, edited by Saul D. Feldman and Gerald W. Thielban, pp. 16–32. Boston, Little and Brown, 1975. Berger, Peter L. The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. London: Penguin Books, 1967. ———. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York: Faber and Faber, 1969. Bergson, Henri. Les Deux Sources de la Morale et de la Religion. Paris: PUB, 1946. Douglas, Mary. Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology. London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1970. Durkheim, Emile. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life: A Study of Religious Sociology. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971. Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Gibb, Hamilton A. R. Studies in the Civilization of Islam. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1989. Glasse, Cyril. The Concise Encyclopedia of Islam. London: Stacey International, 1989. Maintanence of Religious Harmony. Cmd. 21 of 1989. Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1989. Peters, Francis. E. The Hajj: The Muslim Pilgrimage to Mecca and the Holy Places. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. Rudolph, Otto. The Idea of the Holy. London: Oxford University Press, 1957. Srinivas, Mysore Narasimhachar. Caste in Modern India and Other Essays. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1970. Straits Times. “God and Us”. Saturday Special Report. 16 July 2005, S1–S4. Swatos, William H. Jr., ed. A Future for Religion? New Paradigms for Social Analysis. London: Sage Publications, 1993.

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Tham, Seong Chee. Religion and Modernisation: A Study of Changing Rituals among Singapore’s Chinese, Malays and Indians. Singapore: Graham Brash, 1985. Wach, Joachim. Types of Religious Experience. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism. London: Unwin University Books, 1971. ———. Economy and Society. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. Yang, C. K. Religion in Chinese Society: A Study of Contemporary Social Functions of Religion and Some of Their Historical Factors. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970.

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2 RELIGIOUS TRENDS AND ISSUES IN SINGAPORE Tong Chee Kiong

INTRODUCTION This chapter presents an analysis of the religious landscape in Singapore, beginning from the early days of its founding to the present,1 using census data. The picture that emerges is one where the society is marked by a high degree of multi-religiosity as well as significant changes in the religious landscape. In different periods, religions have waxed and waned. Some, such as Christianity, have been very successful in recruiting members. Others have seen their membership decline. The data also shows that there is a correlation between religious affiliation and several socio-demographic variables, including age, education, occupation, and socio-economic status. For example, Christians in Singapore tend to be younger, more educated and have a higher socioeconomic status. Obversely, Taoists tend to be older, less educated and come from lower socio-economic groups. This structural differentiation will be analysed and discussed. Another key variable is ethnicity. Despite being a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, religious affiliation is culturally or ethnically structured to some extent. Most Malays are Muslim, most Indians Hindu, and Chinese, to a lesser degree, adopt Chinese religions.

THE EARLY RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE At the point when Sir Stamford Raffles landed in Singapore in 1819, it was believed that there existed an Orang Laut2 population of no more than 150 28

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(Song 1984). This community was believed to have “long been converted to Islam” (Evans 1927). However, other accounts exist. Bartley (1933) suggests that the population was larger, and certainly included Chinese, as there were already gambier plantations owned and cultivated by the Chinese prior to 1819. Bloom (1986) cites some estimated figures: a total population of about 200, consisting of a few Orang Laut families, about a hundred Muslim Malay fisher folk (thought to have settled on the island in 1811), and a community of about forty Chinese pepper and gambier cultivators. The Chinese were likely to have adhered to a form of Chinese religion. As with Islam, archaeological and historical evidence suggest that Buddhism and Chinese religion of some form existed in Singapore prior to Raffles’ arrival. Ke (1984) cites eye-witness accounts of the remains of Buddhist sacred architecture on Fort Canning in 1822, suggesting the existence of a pre-Islamic population in Indianized Southeast Asia, including Singapore. A Chinese temple, Shuntian Gong (Temple of Submission to Heaven), dedicated to the earth deity Dabogong (originally in Malabar Street, but currently settled after several moves in Lorong 29, Geylang), was first built in 1796, according to an inscription inside the temple. It is believed to be the first Chinese temple in Singapore (Lee et al., 1994). Chinese religion took root with the arrival of Chinese migrants, mainly from South China, from the early nineteenth century onwards. Each dialect group began to establish its own presence and develop its own temples as the Chinese community grew in numbers. The Fujians established their own temples (for example, Hengshan Ting at Silat Road, established in 1828); the Teochews established Yuehaiqing Miao in Phillip Street in 1826; the Cantonese erected Haichun Fude Si in 1824; the Hakkas established the Yinghe Guan in 1823; and the Hainanese had a Tianhou temple on Beach Road in 1857. Given the European appearance at the time of Singapore’s founding, a Christian presence would soon become evident, mainly through missionary efforts. In 1821, Reverend M. Laurent Marie Joseph Imbert of the Societe des Mission Etrangeres (the French Mission Society) visited Singapore, en route to China. His one-week stay in Singapore resulted in a letter to the bishop, stating that “there were only twelve or thirteen Catholics in Singapore, who led a wretched life” (in Buckley 1902; Teixeira 1963). The growth of the Catholic population was not confined to Europeans alone. There were also Chinese Catholics who were either converted in Singapore or arrived in Singapore already as Catholics. The latter were usually the wealthier merchants. Aside from the Catholic church, there were also a great variety of other Christian denominations that soon established themselves in Singapore. The earliest non-Catholic Christian presence was the London Missionary Society 29

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(LMS), formed by lay persons and missionaries from various denominations in England (Sng 1993). Missionary work started as early as the founding of Singapore in 1819, with the arrival of Samuel Milton that year. He started a school for Malay and Chinese boys. The next missionary to arrive was Claudius H. Thomsen in 1822. He started classes for both Malay boys and girls by 1828. Apart from LMS, the main Protestant denominations established in the nineteenth century include four main groups — Anglican (1826), Brethren (1864), Presbyterian (1881), and Methodist (1885). Since the turn of the century, various other groups have taken root as well, such as the Seventh Day Adventists (1905), Assembly of God (1926), Lutherans (1927), Salvation Army (1935), Baptists (1937), Bible-Presbyterians (1952), Christian Nationals’ Evangelism Commission (1952), and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (1968) (Tan 1980; Hinton 1985; Sng 1993).3 Hinduism was brought into Singapore by Indian immigrants who came as early as 1819 as part of Sir Stamford Raffles’ entourage. Later immigrants brought their religion with them and established temples very rapidly. Most of the early immigrants were convicts brought to Singapore for construction work (Sandhu 1969) for the coffee and sugar plantations (Mahajani 1960). About 98 per cent of these labour immigrants were from South India (Sandhu 1969). Given that about 80 per cent of the early Indian migrants into Malaya were Hindus, it follows that Hinduism in Singapore is essentially of a South Indian variety. The remaining 20 per cent of the migrants were Muslims, Sikhs and Christians. The first Hindu temple, located in Bras Basah Road, was believed to be founded by one Naraina Pillay from Penang, in 1819. However, it was soon demolished (Tan 1961/62). Another temple was later constructed in 1827, dedicated to the goddess Mariamman, in South Bridge Road. It stands today as the oldest Hindu temple in Singapore.

Present Religious Groups in Singapore Singapore Muslims are primarily of the Shafie school of thought within the Sunni Islamic sect. Adherents to this doctrine are commonly known as orthodox or Sunni Muslims and constitute over 90 per cent of the entire Muslim community today (Farah 1994). As with other Sunnis, Singapore Muslims follow a comprehensive system of community law, the syariah. Christians belong to the Catholic church and a great variety of other Christian denominations, including mainline Protestant churches (Anglicans, Presbyterians, Methodists and Lutherans), neo-Calvinists (Baptists, Brethrens, and Bible Presbyterians) as well as other independent churches. Reflecting the South Indian origins in Singapore’s Indian population, patterns of Hindu religious practice veer towards South Indian styles in the republic. These are

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clearly evident in the way South Indian domestic religious practices, festivals and ceremonial styles prevail over North Indian equivalents. Similarly, there is a predominance of South Indian temples which differ from North Indian ones in design and iconographic style, as well as in separate priesthoods and segregated patronage. Adherents to Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Chinese religion in Singapore sometimes also display evidence of syncretic beliefs and practices infused with local traditions or animism, or are influenced by the religious practices of other world religions. “Chinese religion”, which is used here as a collective term to describe the myriad beliefs adhered to by the majority of the Chinese population, is by far, the most difficult to characterize. The difficulty in characterization is due primarily to the eclecticism of the religion which is reflected in the varied nomenclature adopted to describe it. For example, Elliott (1955) termed it “shenism”. Topley (1954a, 1956, 1961), who has researched the various Chinese religious practices, institutions and associations in Singapore, termed it the “anonymous religion”. Comber (1954, 1955, 1958), in turn, referred to it as the “religion of the masses”. Nyce (1971) characterized it as “Chinese folk religion”. Wee (1976) has attempted to clarify the status of these various strands of Chinese religions by using Buddhism as an organizing base-line. She distinguished between Buddhist systems which refer directly to specific Buddhist canonical traditions (Theravada and Mahayana schools) on the one hand, and those which have no direct Buddhist canonical reference, on the other. Of the latter, there are two groups: “shenism” (no canonical tradition of any kind); and “sectarianism” (with each sect having its own canonical tradition). Ancestor worship is also an important element of Chinese religious practices. It has sometimes been described as an extension of filial piety, an important value in Chinese society and strongly rooted in Confucianist thought. Such is the manifestation of mutual care between generations, as much a part of the relationship between the living and the dead, as it is among the living. In another very important sense, ancestor worship also acts as a “stimulus to morality” (Addison 1925), for the consciousness that the ancestors are watching and will judge and reward or punish according to one’s conduct, heightens the moral sense of the community. Indeed, Addison (1925) and Hinton (1985) argue that ancestor worship is the most important religious phenomenon in the life of the Chinese. However, it is seldom seen as composing a distinct religion (Tamney and Hassan 1987), and is regarded more as a part of Chinese religious life in general. Further, there is also Confucianism. Although it is sometimes argued that Confucianism is not a “religion” but a moral code or philosophical system, Leo and Clammer (1983) noted that in Singapore, Confucius is regarded by some as a specific 31

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deity in his own right, worshipped apart from other deities and constituting the centre of a specific religious complex. Theravada and Mahayana Buddhism are also represented in Singapore, the latter far more so than the former. In addition, a Japanese branch of Buddhism, the Soka Association (formerly Nichiren Shoshu Association up till 1992) is also growing in significance (Clammer 1988).

RELIGIOUS TRENDS 1849–2000 1849 to 1949 Records of religious adherence in Singapore have been kept only intermittently and pre-independence records are mostly silent on religion. The latter is perhaps indicative of a lack of concern on the part of the colonial rulers about the religious inclinations of the population, who were free to subscribe to whichever religion they chose, as long as they did not create problems. The first systematic data available on religion in Singapore is found in the 1849 census. Table 2.1 indicates, even in this early period, that the dominant religion in Singapore was already Chinese religion,4 accounting for 52 per TABLE 2.1 Religions and Population Distribution by Religion in Singapore, 1849–1931 Religion

1849

1911

1921

Buddhism/ Taoism/ Confucianism Islam Christianity Hinduism Sikhism Judaism Others No religion Not stated

27,526 (52.0%) 22,007 (41.6%) 1,861 (3.5%) 1,452 (2.8%) — 22 (0.04%) 23 (0.04%) Not listed Not listed

TOTAL

52,891 (100%) 311,9871(100%) 425,8772(100%)

216,501 (69.4%) 310,163 (72.8%) 53,595 (17.3%) 69,604 (16.3%) 16,349 (5.2%) 21,386 (5.0%) 15,580 (5.0%) 19,772 (4.6%) 146 (0.05%) 1,022 (0.2%) 707 (0.2%) 623 (0.2%) 14 (0.004%) 38 (0.009%) Not listed Not listed 62 (0.02%) 3,269 (0.8%)

1931

411,665 (72.5%) 86,827 (15.3%) 30,068 (5.3%) 31,128 (5.5%) 2,988 (0.5%) 777 (0.14%) 306 (0.05%) Not listed 3,694 (0.7%) 567,453 (100%)

Notes: 1. This total was calculated by adding the total population of each racial group. It left the religion of 8,669 unaccounted for. Some of these might have had no religion which was not a category captured in the data collection. Some of the discrepancy might also be due to inaccuracies in the data collection. 2. This total is higher than the total calculated by adding up the total population in each racial group. This is presumably another case of inaccurate data. Source: Census of Population, 1849, Marriot 1911: Nathan 1921: Vlieland 1932.

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cent of the population. The next largest group was the Muslims (classified in the census as Muhameddans), with 41.6 per cent. At this time, Christianity accounted for a very small proportion of the population (3.5 per cent), and Hinduism (2.8 per cent). One key feature of religion at this point in Singapore’s history is that religious affiliation was pretty much tied to ethnicity, that is, almost all adherents to Chinese religions were Chinese, all Mohammedans were Malays, and all Hindus were Indians. It was only in Christianity that we see some degree of “cross-ethnicity”. The vast majority of Christians then were the Europeans, although there were a few Chinese converts, Eurasians as well as a small number of Indians, particularly from Kerala, who were Catholics.5 The religious picture in 1921, the next available set of data on religion in Singapore, was not dissimilar to the census of 1849. In 1921, the number of Chinese religionists had grown to 69.4 per cent of the population. On the other hand, Islam, as a percentage of the total population had declined to 17.3 per cent. Hinduism grew by 2.2 per cent to 5 per cent of the population. Similarly, Christianity grew to 5.2 per cent. It is important to note that in some ways, the growth trajectories of the different religions are a direct function of the population growth of the different ethnic groups. Between 1849 to 1921, the policy of recruiting indentured labourers to work in the tin mines and rubber plantations in Singapore and Malaya, resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of Chinese, and to a smaller extent, Indian migrants to Singapore. For example, in 1830, there were only 6,555 Chinese living in Singapore. By 1849, the number had grown dramatically to 27,988.6 The period between 1849 and 1921 saw particularly dramatic growth, with over 164,000 Chinese in Singapore in 1901 (72.1 per cent of the total population), and 315,151 by 1921 (75.1 per cent of the total population) (Saw 1970, pp. 56–57). Thus, the early shift in religious orientation was due more to migration rather than any major social changes in Singapore society. For example, in 1921, 97.5 per cent of all the Chinese in Singapore claimed adherence to Chinese religion. Only 2.4 per cent of the Chinese claim adherence to Christianity. Like the Chinese, the changes in religious affiliation among the Indian population were due more to migration rather than religion switching. However, as the Indians migrated from more diverse religious backgrounds, this is reflected in the diverse religious make-up of the Indians in Singapore. In 1921, 61 per cent of the Indians claimed adherence to Hinduism, 29.3 per cent were Muhammedans, and 5.9 per cent were Christians. It should be noted that this religious diversity among Indians in Singapore is still evident in present-day Singapore. This present-day religious diversity continues to 33

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reflect migration rather than conversion, and religious conversion among Hindus remains today, as was then, relatively low. In early Singapore from 1819 to the 1920s, most of the religious groups were primarily interested in looking after their own flocks within their respective ethnic communities. For Islam, Hinduism, Taoism and Buddhism, there was little interest in proselytizing the religions. Christianity, however, being primarily the religion of the English colonizers, had various missionary groups that tried to convert indigenes. Thus, Texiera reports that in 1829, there were over 200 Catholics in Singapore, and by 1832, there were 300 Catholics (Texiera 1963, p. 20). Similarly, Buckley noted that between 1832 and 1838, the congregation witnessed 130 baptisms, (as well as 64 deaths and 20 marriages) (Buckley 1984, p. 247). The growth of the Catholic population could not be sustained if it had been confined to the European population. Chinese converts became a majority in the Catholic profile although the vast majority of the Chinese population remained non-Christians. These Chinese Catholics were converted either before or after they arrived in Singapore, Chinese Catholic arrivals being usually the wealthier merchants rather than the lower class Chinese labourers (Tan 1988, p. 58). Another group that converted to Catholicism in the nineteenth century consisted of Indian migrants. Their presence in Ophir Road led to the establishment of the Church of Our Lady of Lourdes there in 1888, and an adjacent Catholic school of the same name. However, while Christianity had some success in converting the immigrant Chinese and Indians, it made no impact among the Malay population in Singapore. For the Chinese and Indians, accepting Catholicism did not necessarily mean giving up their Chinese or Hindu practices, as there was a high degree of syncretism in the practices of these early Catholics, including the use of vernacular languages in their churches. A group that was particularly open to conversion, particularly to Protestant Christianity, was the Eurasian population.7 Tamney and Hassan argues that colonialism and the concomitant political and economic domination of the British (politically and economically) created a situation in which the British/ European cultural practices ascended to a position of dominance and superiority over the other main cultures (Tamney and Hassan 1987, p. 39). This cultural dominance was spatially manifested in the form of many cultural symbols: the centrality of churches, cemeteries, sport grounds, architecture and so forth. The cultural hierarchy also became institutionalized and embedded in the social consciousness of the people so much so that people would use the symbols of Western culture, such as language and religion for personal or social gratification and advancement. Language was 34

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more readily adopted than religion because it involved less of a redefinition of self, but religion was also adopted by some Chinese and Indians for whom the co-identification of ethnicity and religion was not strong. For Eurasians who claimed past European ancestry and a position of hierarchy just below the Europeans, religion and language were easier to adopt. The census of 1931 paints a similar picture as the census of 1921. Chinese religion remained the dominant religion of Singapore, accounting for 72.5 per cent of the population. The number of adherents to the other religions remained relatively stable, with 15.3 per cent of the total population Muslims (from 16.3 per cent in 1921), 5.5 per cent Hindus (4.6 per cent in 1921), and 5.5 per cent Christians (compared to 4.6 per cent in 1921).

1950 to 1979 The 1931 census was the last census that data was collected for religion; data on religious affiliation was not collected in subsequent censuses until 1980. For example, the report for the 1947 census noted that “no enquiries as to religion was made (as) past experience have shown it to be of little value in Malaya where the entire Malay population is Muhammedan, practically every European and Eurasian is Christian and the great majority of Chinese hold to the national religion of China which some describe as Confucian and others prefer to regard as ancestor worship” (Report of the 1947 Census, p. 123). Similarly, in the 1957 census, although there was data regarding the number of religious organizations in Singapore and religious specialists as an occupational group,8 no data was collected on religious affiliations. This is regrettable as clearly, the period from 1950 to 1979 witnessed significant changes in the religious make-up of Singapore, especially the growth in Christianity and the decline of Taoism. The history and growth of Christianity in Singapore has been delineated by Hinton in three stages (Hinton 1985, pp. 14–28). The first, 1819 to 1930, was characterized as one in which Christianity grew slowly. He suggested that the multiplicity of languages in Singapore during this period made missionary endeavours difficult. Moreover, immigrants expected to return to their homelands after a period in Singapore and were thus not prepared to make permanent and major religious changes. Moreover, the target of Christian missionaries during this period was really China, rather than Singapore. The second period, from 1900 to 1950, was characterized as a period where the “seeds of hope” were sown, as immigrants began to settle down and the temporary immigrant mentality shifted. This meant that some became more open to change and enjoyed greater freedom from traditional ties. Moreover, 35

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this was the period when the first generation of local-born Singaporeans contributed to population growth rather than through immigration, and which, according to Hinton, provided greater opportunities for conversion. The 1950s to 1980s was characterized as a period of “harvest time”. In this period, many new Christian denominations were established in Singapore. New congregations also grew among the older denominations. Moreover, the changes in the educational system, particularly after self government in 1959 and independence in 1963, meant that, increasingly, the English language was more commonly used. Christianity, with its English literature, agencies and missionaries from the West, became more accessible. There was also a tide of missionaries from the United States. The consequence of this was a rise in the levels of proselytization and a growth of main churches and the introduction of new Christian denominations into Singapore.9 This period also saw the introduction of para-church organizations, such as the Overseas Missionary Fellowship (1952), the Varsity Christian Fellowship (1952) and the Youth for Christ (1956). These para-church groups were particularly significant in changing the religious profile of Singapore, as they have, as their primary mission, the proselytization and conversion of Singaporeans. Moreover, these groups, particularly Youth for Christ and the Inter-School Christian Fellowship, targeted the young, especially those in schools. These efforts proved particularly successful, as evidenced, after a period of fifty years, by the resumption of data collection on religion in the 1980 census.

1980 to 1990 The active proselytization by Christians as well as changes in the educational system and the language of education in Singapore was reflected in the changes to the religious profile of Singaporeans according to the 1980 census. Chinese religion remained the dominant religion in Singapore, with 29.3 per cent Taoists and 26.7 per cent Buddhists who were practically all Chinese. However, although still having the largest number of followers compared to the 1931 census, it registered the highest rate of decline as a religious category. Both Islam and Hinduism remained relatively stable, with 10.3 per cent and 3.7. per cent of the total population respectively, and ethnically based, with practically all Malays claiming to be Muslims and all Hindus made up of Indians. Data on “No Religion” as a category was collected for the first time in the 1980 census. It is interesting to note that a significant 13.6 per cent of the population in 1980 claimed to have no religion. In addition, they are primarily 36

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Chinese, particularly the younger Chinese. For example, 15–16 per cent of Chinese below the age of 40 claimed to have no religion, compared to only 8 per cent for those 50 and over. There was a significant increase in the proportion of Christians in Singapore during this period, drawing new members from the Chinese community and to a smaller extent, the Indians. Among the Chinese, the percentage of Christians increased from 2.4 per cent in 1921 and 2.8 per cent in 1931, to 10.6 per cent in 1980. Among the Indians, it grew from about 6 per cent to 12.4 per cent. However, as the demographic profile of the Singaporean population in 1921–31 is qualitatively different from that in 1980, the comparison made should not be interpreted to represent a simple lineal conversion trend. Even so, it is clear that in the intervening fifty years from 1931 to 1980, both Christianity and “No Religion” emerged to become significant categories.

1990 to 2000 As can be seen from Table 2.2, Singapore today still remains a multi-religious society. Buddhism has the largest group of adherents, accounting for 42.5 per cent of the population in Singapore in 2000. The next largest religious group is Islam, which constitutes 14.9 per cent of the population and whose adherents are primarily ethnic Malays. Following closely behind are Christians who form 14.6 per cent of the population. Taoism, which used to be the religion with the most followers in 1980 (30 per cent), has seen a falling number of adherents. It now constitutes only 8.5 per cent of the population. Followers of Hinduism are a minority, with adherents comprising around TABLE 2.2 Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion for the Years 1980, 1990 and 2000 Year

1980

1990

2000

Religion/Percentage Christianity Buddhism Taoism Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion

100.0 10.1 27.0 30.0 15.7 3.6 0.5 13.0

100.0 12.7 31.2 22.4 15.3 3.7 0.6 14.1

100.0 14.6 42.5 8.5 14.9 4.0 0.6 14.8

Source: Census of Population 2000.

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4 per cent of the population from 1980 to 2000. Interestingly, a significant 14.8 per cent of Singaporeans claim to have no religion. While the censuses of 1980, 1990 and 2000 demonstrate roughly the same trends in changes in religious affiliation, there are some significant differences that are worth sketching. First, while Christianity as a religion continues to attract new members (its population grew from 5.3 per cent to 10.6 per cent from1931 to 1980, and to 14.8 per cent from 1980 to 2000), its rate of growth has actually declined. In fact, the fastest growing religion in those intervening twenty years was Buddhism, not Christianity, especially between 1990 and 2000. In Christianity, there has also been a change in the profile of the converts. From 1950 to 1990, Christianity had been most successful in attracting the younger, educated Singaporeans. This has partly to do with the strategy of the churches, in targeting the young as the most fertile ground for growth. However, from 1990 onwards, the churches realized that the outreach among the young may be reaching a saturation point. They began to focus on the large group of older Singaporeans who were open to religious proselytization, adding it to their outreach programme, and changing the way Christianity is presented to this category. Thus, from 1990 to 2000, we see a significant growth in the number of older Singaporeans, especially Chinese, converting to Christianity.

RELIGION AND ETHNICITY As pointed out earlier, one of the more interesting features regarding religious affiliations in Singapore is that religion is closely associated with ethnicity. For example, from 1980–2000 (Table 2.3) Malays have remained religiously homogenous, with 99.6 per cent consistently practising Islam. Islam is in a relatively stable position in terms of number and proportion of its followers, being supported by a relatively cohesive and homogenous Malay community with no sign of significant conversions to other religions. However, the Muslim community is not as ethnically homogenous as is commonly assumed. In 1990, 12.2 per cent of all Muslims in Singapore were Indian by ethnic origin (Table 2.4) and hence were different in linguistic and cultural traditions from the majority of the Muslims who are Malay. In other words, Malays, as an ethnic group, is religiously homogenous, but Muslims, as a religious group, is more heterogeneous. A possible reason for the religious homogeneity among Malays may be the close inter-relationship between Malay identity, culture and religion, to the extent that in Singapore, they are seen as identical. Thus, a Malay who converts to another religion is seen as having given up his culture, and is often ostracized from the community. 38

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TABLE 2.3 Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Ethnic Group and Religion for the Years 1980, 1990 and 2000 Ethnic Group/Religion

1980

1990

2000

Chinese Christianity Buddhism Taoism Other Religions No Religion

100.0 10.9 34.3 38.2 0.2 16.4

100.0 14.3 39.4 28.4 0.3 17.7

100.0 16.5 53.6 10.8 0.5 18.6

Malays Islam Other Religions No Religion

100.0 99.6 0.3 0.1

100.0 99.6 0.3 0.2

100.0 99.6 0.4 0.1

Indians Christianity Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion

100.0 12.5 22.1 56.3 8.0 1.2

100.0 12.2 26.5 53.1 7.1 1.2

100.0 12.1 25.6 55.4 6.3 0.6

Source: Census of Population 2000.

TABLE 2.4 Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over By Religion and Ethnic Group for the Year 1990 Religion Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholic Protestant Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion

Chinese

Malays

Indians

Others

99.6 100.0 88.3 78.1 94.4 1.0 0.2 17.2 98.9

— — 0.2 0.2 0.2 85.5 0.1 0.1 0.2

0.2 — 6.7 11.2 4.0 12.2 99.5 79.4 0.6

0.2 — 4.8 10.5 10.5 1.6 0.2 3.3 0.3

Source: Census of Population 1990.

Religion in the Indian community was relatively stable from 1980 to 2000. Hinduism remained the most popular religion and had the largest following of 55.4 per cent in 2000 (Table 2.3). Although Hinduism was the 39

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religion for slightly more than half of the Indian population, the 1990 census statistics reveal that about 99.5 per cent of the followers of Hinduism were Indians (Table 2.4). This was a clear indication that Hinduism is primarily the religion of Indians than of any other ethnic group. The proportion of Christians who are Indian hovered at around a constant 12 per cent over the past two decades (Table 2.3). Compared to the case of the Chinese where the conversion (to Christianity) trend was strong, the Hindus seem to be able to resist Christian conversion. There are, nonetheless, a significant number of Indians who are Christians. However, this is not due to conversion in Singapore; rather, they had already converted to Christianity in India, and migrated to Singapore where they maintained their religious identity. In a sense, the case of the Hindus is the reverse of the Muslims. As a religious group, it is rather homogenous. However, as an ethnic group, the Indians are relatively more heterogeneous, with a significant number of Muslims and Christians. Hinduism is thus viewed by the other ethnic groups as an “Indian” religion, although a significant number of Indians are not Hindus. In terms of religion, the Chinese display the greatest heterogeneity of all the major ethnic groups. Traditional Chinese religion (Buddhism and Taoism) was still the most significant religion for the Chinese, with followers totaling 64.4 per cent of the Chinese population in 2000 (Table 2.3). In 1990, practically all the followers of Taoism and 99.6 per cent of the Buddhists in Singapore were Chinese (Table 2.4). Thus these two religions were strongly acknowledged as “Chinese” in nature. Since 1980, Buddhism has achieved a steady growth and surpassed Taoism as the main religion of the Chinese in 1990. By 2000, there was a significant increase in Buddhism with as many as 54 per cent of Chinese claiming to be Buddhists (Table 2.4).10 By 2000, Christianity overtook Taoism as the second most important religion among the Chinese after Buddhism. In 1980, Christians made up just 10.9 per cent of the Chinese. This figure increased to 16.5 per cent in 2000 while followers of Taoism declined substantially from 38.2 per cent in 1980 to 10.8 per cent in 2000 (Table 2.3). A sizeable number of the Chinese also claimed to have no religion. This group of non-religionists comprised about 18 per cent of the Chinese population in 1990 and 2000. Of those who claimed to have “No Religion” in 1990, as many as 98.9 per cent were Chinese (Table 2.4). The category of non-religionists, however, must be treated with caution. Many Chinese who claim to have no religion do, in practice, carry out many of the rituals associated with Chinese religion, such as the worshipping of ancestors at home, praying to the gods, or making occasional visits to temples. Some still pray to the gods when faced with personal problems. More importantly, if they were to return to religion, it will 40

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probably be back to Chinese religion. However, it is also true that even if they do continue to practise some of the rituals, the degree of commitment to Chinese religion is generally lower than that of their parents. The linkage between religious affiliations and ethnicity is critical to our understanding of religious change in Singapore. For example, because of the linkage between religion and culture, for both the Malays and to a degree the Indians in Singapore, there is greater resistance to conversion to another religion. For the Chinese in Singapore, religion is less central to their ethnic identity, and community resistance to conversion is therefore lower. It is easier for a person who is dissatisfied with the religion of his/her parents to convert, but the religious options can be more limited. While there are some who convert to Islam, mainly for reasons of inter-marriage,11 Islam is viewed by most Chinese as a “Malay” religion,12 just as Hinduism is viewed as an “Indian” religion. Thus, a Chinese who chooses to convert will more likely turn to Christianity or claim to have no religion.

RELIGION AND GENDER The 1990 census indicated that there were more females (14 per cent) than males (11.1 per cent) professing Christianity, but more males (15.3 per cent) than females (13.3 per cent) who claimed to have no religion. This pattern is especially pronounced among the Chinese, where 15.7 per cent of the females, as compared to 12.3 per cent of the males, professed Christianity. In contrast, 19.4 per cent of the Chinese resident males claimed to have no religion, compared to 16.6 per cent of the Chinese resident females. On the whole, however, there is no significant statistical difference in the correlation between religion and gender. This is interesting if we consider the role of women in Chinese religion. Traditionally, religious Taoist practices, particularly within the confines of the home, are carried out by the women on behalf of the whole family. Religion, in fact, is “women’s work”, and men are really only responsible for public rituals when the family presents a formal face to the public.

RELIGION AND AGE There is a significant correlation between religion and age in Singapore. For the Chinese, there is also a generational divide, between the religion of the parents and that of their children. While there was an overall decline of Taoism among all the age groups in 2000, the decline was especially marked among the younger generation. Buddhism was popular across all age groups 41

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Tong Chee Kiong TABLE 2.5 Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by Religion, Ethnic Group and Sex for the Year 1990

Males Religion Total Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholic Protestants Islam Hinduism Others No Religion

Total

Chinese

Malays

Indians

Others

100.0 (1,147,993) 30.9 22.4 11.1 4.3 6.8 15.9 3.9 0.5 15.3

100.0 (897,942) 39.4 28.6 12.3 4.1 8.2 0.2 — 0.1 19.4

100.0 (152,730) — — 0.2 0.1 0.1 99.6 — — 0.2

100.0 (86,579) 0.6 — 11.2 7.1 4.1 29.2 51.7 5.8 1.5

100.0 (10,742) 4.3 0.3 62.2 51.7 10.5 26.3 0.7 1.5 4.7

Total

Chinese

Malays

Indians

Others

100.0 (1,128,741) 31.3 22.5 14.0 5.2 8.8 14.9 3.4 0.6 13.3

100.0 (897,883) 39.1 28.2 15.7 5.2 10.5 0.2 — 0.2 16.6

100.0 (147,235) 0.1 — 0.2 0.1 0.1 99.5 — — 0.2

100.0 (71,806) 0.8 — 13.4 8.3 5.1 24.4 53.7 6.8 0.9

100.0 (11,817) 9.2 0.6 59.2 48.3 10.9 23.2 0.7 2.1 5.0

Females Religion Total Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholic Protestants Islam Hinduism Others No Religion

Source: Census of Population 1990.

but still had more adherents among those 55 years and older. Generally, the bulk of Christians tend to be from the younger generation. In 1990, among those aged 55 and above, 11.1 per cent professed Christianity while the figure was 13.2 per cent for those in the 15–24 age group and 14.0 per cent in the 25–34 age group. In 2000, the 25–34 age group still had the highest proportion of Christians (Table 2.6). However, the proportion of Christians in the 15–24 age group (12.8 per cent) was actually slightly lower than that in the 55 and over age group (13.7 per cent) in 2000. This can probably be attributed to the high conversion rates during the 1970s and early 1980s 42

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TABLE 2.6 Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion and Age Group for the Years 1990 and 2000 Religion Total Christianity Buddhism Taoism Islam Hinduism Others No Religion

15–24

25–34

35–44

45–54

55 & over

1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 100.0 13.2 29.1 18.9 17.7 3.6 0.5 16.9

100.0 12.8 38.9 8.4 18.6 3.5 0.6 17.3

100.0 14.0 29.8 18.6 17.2 3.9 0.6 16.0

100.0 15.8 40.2 5.6 15.1 4.6 0.6 18.1

100.0 12.7 32.6 22.8 13.2 3.4 0.5 14.8

100.0 15.7 41.5 6.9 15.7 4.5 0.7 15.0

100.0 11.4 34.2 26.6 12.4 3.6 0.6 11.2

100.0 14.4 44.9 9.9 13.0 3.6 0.6 13.7

100.0 11.1 32.0 29.7 13.8 4.2 0.6 8.6

100.0 13.7 47.4 12.7 12.3 3.5 0.7 9.8

Source: Census of Population 2000.

when the bulk of the younger people were converted. Much of that generation of early Christians would now be in the 55 years and over cohort, resulting in a relatively large percentage of older Christians. Moreover, among the Christians, there has been a change in conversion strategy. Whereas the fastest growing churches were previously the charismatic churches which attracted younger people, proselytization has now shifted focus to the older generation. This is especially with Chinese dialect churches which draw the older dialect-speaking Chinese. A closer look at the Malay age groups reveals that there was no significant relationship between age and religion, the figures showing high levels of homogeneity among the age groups (Table 2.7). There was also little variation within the Indian community across age groups. However, it can be observed that the percentage of Christians was slightly higher among the younger Indians than the older ones, especially those aged 60 years and above (Table 2.8). This is similar to the general trend found among the Chinese, although to a lesser extent. The Chinese community showed a change across the age groups in the three religious categories of Taoism, Christianity and No Religion. Buddhism increased its following and garnered a significant number of adherents among the various age groups. In 1990, 38 per cent of those aged 60 and above claimed to be followers of Taoism. However, the percentage fell to 26.9 among those in the 15–24 age cohort and 23.8 per cent among those in the 20–29 age group (Table 2.7). In 2000, there continued to be a higher concentration of Taoists, believed to be all Chinese, among the older age 43

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Tong Chee Kiong TABLE 2.7 Malay Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by Religion and Age Group for the Year 1990

Religion Total Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholic Protestant Islam Hinduism Others No Religion

Total

10–19

100.0 (299,965) — — 0.2 0.1 0.1 99.6 — — 0.2

20–29

30–39

40–49

50–59

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 (59,387) (84,619) (69,917) (33,135) (25,520) — — 0.1 0.1 — — — — — — 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 – 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 99.7 99.6 99.5 99.5 99.7 — — — — — — — — — — 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1

60 years & above 100.0 (27,387) — — 0.3 0.1 0.2 99.5 — — 0.2

Source: Census of Population 1990.

TABLE 2.8 Indian Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by Religion and Age Group for the Year 1990 Religion

Total

10–19

20–29

30–39

40–49

50–59

60 years & above

Total Buddhism Taoism Christian Catholic Protestant Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion

100.0 0.7 — 12.2 7.6 4.6 27.0 52.6 6.3 1.2

100.0 0.7 — 11.8 7.5 4.3 31.9 48.8 5.9 0.9

100.0 0.6 0.1 12.6 7.7 4.9 25.2 53.8 6.8 0.9

100.0 0.7 — 12.9 7.8 5.1 25.8 52.9 6.5 1.2

100.0 0.9 0.1 12.1 7.9 4.2 28.8 51.3 5.5 1.3

100.0 0.7 — 12.4 8.2 4.2 24.5 54.4 6.6 1.4

100.0 0.7 — 10.5 6.7 3.8 26.2 54.8 5.9 1.9

Source: Census of Population 1990.

groups (Table 2.6). In contrast, Christianity was more popular among the younger Chinese. In 1990, Christianity was professed by 11.8 per cent of the Chinese aged 60 and above, but among those in the 20–29 age group, 16.2 per cent were Christians (Table 2.9). The data shows that the Chinese, especially the younger generation, are abandoning traditional religious practices 44

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TABLE 2.9 Chinese Resident Population Aged 10 Years and Over by Religion and Age Group for the Year 1990 Religion

Total

10–19

20–29

30–39

40–49

50–59

60 years & above

Total Buddhism Taoism Christianity Catholic Protestant Islam Hinduism Other Religions No Religion

100.0 39.3 28.4 14.0 4.7 9.3 0.2 — 0.1 18.0

100.0 38.1 26.9 13.5 4.4 9.1 0.2 — 0.1 21.2

100.0 38.0 23.8 16.2 4.1 12.1 0.2 — 0.1 21.7

100.0 39.3 25.9 15.1 4.6 10.5 0.3 — 0.1 19.3

100.0 40.4 30.2 12.9 5.6 7.3 0.2 — 0.2 16.1

100.0 42.1 34.1 11.9 5.4 6.5 0.2 — 0.1 11.6

100.0 39.5 38.0 11.8 4.6 7.2 0.1 — 0.1 10.5

Source: Census of Population 1990.

for Christianity or have become non-religionists. The proportion of Chinese claiming to have no religious affiliation rose across the age groups. However, as in the previous decade, there was a higher prevalence of non-religionists among the younger age groups (Table 2.10).

RELIGION AND EDUCATION Education appears to be an important factor that differentiates people religiously. In 1990 and 2000, the categories “Christianity” and “No Religion” were positively associated with level of education. Among the non-student population, those with university (and above) qualifications

TABLE 2.10 Proportion Reporting “No Religion” by Age and Ethnic Group for the Year 2000 Ethnic Group Chinese Malays Indians

15–24

25–34

35–44

45–54

55 & over

1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 21.8 22.5 20.6 23.0 17.9 19.1 13.5 16.7 10.6 11.9 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.8 0.7 1.1 0.6 1.1 0.6 1.6 0.5 1.7 0.4

Source: Census of Population 2000.

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registered the highest percentages in the categories of “Christianity” and “No Religion”. In 2000, Christians formed the largest religious group among university graduates (33.5 per cent), although their proportion declined slightly since 1990 (Table 2.11). Another 28.9 per cent of university graduates claimed to have “No Religion”. In contrast, amongst those who had below secondary education, only 6.4 per cent were Christians while 7.7 per cent professed “No Religion” (Table 2.11). While Christianity seems to be found among those with a higher educational attainment, the reverse is true for those who adhere to Taoism. In 2000, the largest group of Taoists (13.2 per cent) came from those with below secondary education. Among those Taoists who had university qualifications, the proportion fell to 2.7 per cent (Table 2.11). Thus the data suggests that better educated Singaporeans, especially the Chinese, tend to abandon their traditional faiths to become Christians or non-religionists. While Taoism has seen a decline among the better educated, Buddhism, on the other hand, appeared to have attracted a significant number of followers among graduates. The proportion of graduates professing Buddhism increased from 15.1 per cent in 1990 to 23.6 per cent in 2000 (Table 2.11). However, the bulk of Buddhists (51.5 per cent) were still those with a lower level of education, that is, below secondary qualifications. The language stream of an individual appears to have a strong correlation with the religious affiliation of the resident population. Those who had an English stream education seemed more inclined to be Christians, while a high proportion of Taoists and Buddhists came from Mandarin stream educational backgrounds. An in-depth survey undertaken in 1988 on 1,025 HDB (Housing Development Board) public housing households also showed a correlation between educational stream and religious affiliation. While 25.4 per cent of those with an English stream education were found to profess Christianity, only 7.1 per cent of those from the Chinese stream schools were Christians (Table 2.12). On the other hand, 67 per cent of those with a Chinese stream education and 73.5 per cent of those with no formal education consider themselves Taoists, whereas only 39.6 per cent of respondents with an English stream education claim to be Taoists (Table 2.13). Thus, just as Christianity is seen as a religion of the English educated, Taoism seems to be correlated with those who had a Chinese stream education. I suggest that those with a higher level of education tend to gravitate towards a religion that fits more closely with their worldview, and which they view as more rational and systematic, rather than follow their parents’ religion which is based on ritual practices and sentiments. 46

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14.1

No Religion

Source: Census of Population 2000.

3.7 0.6

Hinduism

Others

22.4 15.3

Taoism

Islam

12.7 31.2

Christianity

1990

14.8

0.6

4.0

14.9

8.5

42.5

14.6

2000

Total

Buddhism

Religion

20.3

0.5

2.9

12.0

18.2

29.0

17.1

1990

19.3

0.7

3.6

16.2

8.5

37.3

14.3

2000

8.7

0.5

3.9

17.1

29.4

34.1

6.3

1990

7.7

0.5

3.5

17.2

13.2

51.5

6.4

2000

Full time Students Below Secondary

16.9

0.7

3.9

17.3

14.8

30.3

16.1

1990

14.3

0.7

4.1

18.9

5.8

41.6

14.6

2000

Secondary

24.4

0.7

3.1

8.5

13.0

25.7

24.7

1990

20.0

0.7

3.5

11.2

5.5

38.3

20.8

2000

Post Secondary

31.1

0.9

3.5

2.6

7.4

15.1

39.3

1990

28.9

0.9

6.9

3.5

2.7

23.6

33.5

2000

University

TABLE 2.11 Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion and Highest Qualification Attained for the Years 1990 and 2000

Religious Trends and Issues in Singapore 47

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Tong Chee Kiong TABLE 2.12 Educational Stream by Christianity Educational Stream Chinese English No Education Total

Non Christians

Christians

93.0 74.6 96.4 88.8

7.1 25.4 3.7 3.7

Source: Report of the Survey on Chinese Customs and Rites in Singapore, 1988.

TABLE 2.13 Religious Affiliation by Stream of Education

Shenism Buddhism Christianity No Religion Other Religions Total

Chinese

English

No education

67.0 17.2 7.1 7.8 0.9 45.7

39.6 17.5 25.0 16.4 1.4 27.6

73.5 18.4 3.7 4.0 0.4 26.8

100.0

Source: Report of the Survey on Chinese Customs and Rites in Singapore, 1988.

RELIGION AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS As with findings relating to education, the majority of Christians and those who profess to have “No Religion” tend to be from a higher socio-economic background. In 1990, 28.3 per cent of Christians and 24.6 per cent of nonreligionists were found among those in the professional and technical occupations (Table 2.14), which also tend to be more prestigious and better paid. In contrast, only 11.2 per cent of Taoists were found in the same job sectors (Table 2.14). The bulk of Taoists were employed in the production and sales/service sectors, which are viewed as less prestigious. These occupations had low proportions of Christians and non-religionists. Using housing type as another indicator of social economic status, the statistics in the 2000 census reveal a similar trend as with occupation. Christians and non-religionists tend to live in private dwellings and better HDB housing categories, while those living in smaller HDB flats tend to profess Taoism. In 2000, 34.3 per cent of Christians and 24.2 per cent of non-religionists lived in private apartments and houses, while only 4.2 per 48

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TABLE 2.14 Resident Working Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion and Occupation for the Year 1990 Religion

Total

Buddhism Taoism Christian Catholic Protestant Islam Hinduism Others No Religion

30.9 20.9 13.3 4.8 8.5 15.0 3.9 0.6 15.4

Professional Admin & Clerical /Technical Managerial 23.0 11.2 28.3 8.5 19.8 9.0 3.3 0.6 24.6

33.9 18.9 18.7 6.7 12.0 3.4 2.5 0.7 21.9

29.9 13.7 18.0 7.1 10.9 16.2 3.8 0.6 17.8

Sales/ Production Others Service and Related 34.6 25.5 7.8 3.5 4.3 16.1 3.8 0.6 11.6

32.7 27.4 4.7 2.1 2.6 20.6 4.5 0.4 9.7

30.8 18.4 17.8 6.1 11.7 8.8 5.6 0.9 17.7

Source: Census of Population 1990.

cent of Taoists lived in the private residences. The highest proportion of Taoists (11.8 per cent) lived in one and two room HDB flats (Table 2.15).

CONCLUSION From the preceding overview of the religious landscape in Singapore, several trends can clearly be discerned. There has been a substantial growth in the number of Christians, a rapid decline in adherence to traditional Chinese religion, an increase in the number of persons who claim to have TABLE 2.15 Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Over by Religion and Type of Dwelling for the Year 2000

Religion

HDB 1& 2 rooms

HDB 3 room

HDB 4 room

HDB 5 room & Exec

Private Apt & House

1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 Christian Buddhism Taoism Islam Hinduism Others No Religion

5.5 27.8 32.7 16.1 4.7 0.3 12.8

6.8 41.8 11.8 23.7 5.2 0.4 10.5

8.0 32.2 25.1 19.9 3.3 0.4 11.1

9.7 46.3 10.5 16.7 3.9 0.5 12.5

10.0 34.1 23.2 16.2 3.7 0.6 12.2

10.2 46.3 9.8 17.4 3.9 0.5 11.9

20.3 29.4 15.3 11.9 4.0 0.7 18.4

17.4 39.5 6.4 14.3 4.2 0.8 17.4

30.0 26.1 13.2 3.3 3.7 0.9 22.9

34.3 30.1 4.2 2.8 3.6 0.9 24.2

Source: Census of Population 2000.

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no religious affiliations, and some indications suggesting a revivalism in Buddhism. In addition, the findings suggest that the shifts in religious affiliations tend to follow certain demographic patterns. For instance, Christians tend to be younger in age, speak English as a dominant home language, and of higher socio economic status in terms of occupation, income, and housing type. If this survey data is taken at face value, then non religionists share almost the same characteristics as the Christians, except that while Christianity seems to appeal more to the English educated, “No Religion” as a category attracts both English educated and Chinese educated Singaporeans. However, as earlier noted, the category of nonreligionists should be treated with caution as some individuals who claim to be non-religionists still perform certain religious rites. Often, these people are unsure which religion they should identify themselves with and hence regard themselves as belonging to no particular religious group. This suggests that the quantitative surveys on religion may be skewed on the high end for those who claim to have “No Religion”. Taoists, on the other hand, exhibit very different demographic characteristics. They tend to be older in age, speak dialects at home, and have relatively lower socio economic status. In this sense, those who are followers of Taoism are, in demo-graphic terms at least, the opposite of those who are Christians. One of the main features of the current religious scene in Singapore is that the traditionally accepted “boundaries” of the respective religions have become amorphous and ambiguous. The religious ground is shifting. For example, there has been a distinct growth in Christianity and decline in Taoism in Singapore. While their numbers may be comparatively small, the fact that Christianity is most successful among the emerging younger, better-educated and more affluent Singaporeans, means that their dominance may be greater than their numbers suggest. In a sense, if this trend continues, we may find a demographic structure in which religious differences will coincide with language and social class differences. As such, a two prong problem emerges. On one level, we see an intertwining of ethnicity and religion, where the population is differentiated along ethno-religious lines, with Indians being largely Hindus, Malays as Muslims and Chinese as Buddhists and Taoists. On another level, an intertwining of social class and religion, with Chinese from lower socio-economic status being primarily Taoists and those from the higher socio-economic class being Christians and non-religionists.Taking into account the strong emotional sentiments that can be attached to religion, the issues surrounding religious change and conversion, and inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations are fascinating topics for investigation. 50

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Notes 1. This chapter is based on Chapter 2 of my book, Rationalizing Religion: Religious Conversion, Revivalism, and Competition in Singapore (Leiden: Brill, 2007). I would like to thank the editors for permission to reprint this chapter in a slightly revised form. 2. Meaning “sea people”. 3. The precise dates of establishment cited for each denomination have varied from source to source, so the dates represented here are drawn from one of the two sources accredited. 4. At this time, Chinese religion as a category did not exist. In the census, it was categorized as Buddhism/Taoism/Confucianism. However, the colonial authorities had some problems classifying what constituted Chinese religion. In fact, in the report, they noted that many Chinese classified themselves as Confucians, but since Confucianism is a philosophy and not a religion, it is problematic. By the 1921 census, Chinese religions were in fact classified under “Other Religions”. 5. This was true to such an extent that the report of 1921 in fact noted that, “The number of non-Christians among the Europeans and Eurasians and the number of non-Muhammedans among the Malays are so small that the Committee recommended that the only tables to be published in this report should be those dealing with Chinese and Indians.” 6. Chinese migration to Singapore in the early nineteenth century was the result of various push-pull factors. The Chinese that came to Singapore were mostly from the southern provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien, two provinces which were more receptive to migrating because of their early contact with the British tea traders. As a result of the contact, information about a place which offered the opportunity to make a fortune could have been transmitted easily. More importantly, the floods, famines and droughts frequently experienced in China, made life difficult. The natural calamities, coupled with the lack of good credit facilities in rural communities, meant that many peasants were tenant farmers who were often exploited with high rents (Yen 1986, p. 2) China was also characterized by civil unrest; the Taiping Rebellion in 1857–64, the Boxer Rebellion in 1900 and the power struggle between Sun Yat Sen and Yuan Shih Kai; which prevented any form of stable family life. Adding to this misery, the large population and the inability to find employment induced many Chinese to migrate. 7. Eurasians refer to an ethnic community in Singapore that was the result of intermarriage between the British and European men and Chinese, Indian women and other locals. 8. The census noted, for example, that there were 1,536 persons from religious organizations involved in community work and 1,009 persons in the occupational group of kathis, clergy, and related religious orders. 9. The main denominations included Anglicans, Methodists, Brethrens and 51

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Presbyterians and the new Christian denominations, which included the Southern Baptists, Lutheran Church of America, Christian Nationals Evangelism Commission, and the Bible Presbyterians. 10. Given the highly complex nature of Chinese religions, religious affiliations, particularly based on the census data, are more difficult to interpret. Chinese religion, especially popular religion, is a syncretic mix of Taoism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and ancestor worship. For example, based on the qualitative interviews with informants, many Chinese who claim to be Buddhists in fact practise rituals, such as the worshipping of Guan Yin, and Guan Kong, which would generally be considered as Taoist religious practices. In Singapore, however, Buddhism, as a religious label, is seen as being of higher status, and thus many ascribe to this religious label even if they are not, religious speaking, Buddhists. Thus, in analysing the data, there are probably far more Taoists and fewer Buddhists than the census data implies. Due to the process of the intellectualization of religion in Singapore, the Chinese are making a clearer distinction between Taoism and Buddhism as religious belief systems. Buddhists in Singapore, particularly the younger Chinese, are more knowledgeable about the beliefs and rituals of Buddhism. 11. In Islam, a person who marries a Muslim must “convert” to Islam for the marriage to be legally recognized under syariah law. 12. In fact, conversion to Islam, for the older Chinese, is referred to as “jip huan”, which means literally to enter into “Malayness”, and is frowned upon.

References Addison, John T. Chinese Ancestor Worship: A Study of its Meaning and its Relations with Christianity. London: The Church Literature Committee and S.P.C.K., 1925. Bartley, William. “Population of Singapore in 1819”. Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society XI (1933): 177. Bloom, David. “The English Language and Singapore: A Critical Survey”. In Singapore Studies: Critical Surveys of the Humanities and Social Sciences, edited by Basant Kapur. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1986. Buckley, Charles Burton. An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984. Census of Population 1990 Release No. 9: Religion, Childcare and Leisure Activities. Compiled by Lau Kak En. Department of Statistics, 1994. Census of Population 2000: Advanced Data Release. Compiled by Lee Bee Geok. Singapore Department of Statistics. Census of Population 2000: Education, language and religion. Compiled by Leow Bee Geok. Department of Statistics, 2001. Census of Singapore 1849. Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia, no. 4. Reprint n.p.: Krauss, 1950. 52

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Clammer, John. “Singapore’s Buddhists Chant a Modern Mantra”. Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 December 1988, pp. 26–27 Comber, Leon. Chinese Ancestor Worship in Malaya. Singapore: Donald Moore, 1954. ———. Chinese Magic and Superstition in Malaya and Singapore. Singapore: Donald Moore, 1955. ———. Chinese Temples in Singapore. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1958. Elliot, Alan J. A. Chinese Spirit-medium Cults in Singapore. London: Royal Anthropological Institute, 1955. Evans, Ivor H. N. Papers on the Ethnology and Arg∫aeology of Malay Peninsular. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927. Farah, Caesar E. Islam: Beliefs and Observances. New York: Barron’s, 1994. Hinton, Keith. Growing Churches Singapore Style: Ministry in an Urban Context. Singapore: Overseas Missionary Fellowship, 1985. Ke, Zongyuan. “What was it Crawford saw on Fort Canning”. Heritage, No. 6. Singapore: National Museum, 1984. Khoo, Chian Kim. Census of Population, 1980, Singapore; Release No. 9: Religion and Fertility. Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1981. Lau, Kak En. Singapore Census of Population, 1990, Release No. 6: Religion, Childcare and Leisure Activities. Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1994. Lee, Cheuk Yin, Alan K. Chan and Timothy Y. H. Tsu. Taoism: Outlines of a Chinese Religious Tradition. Singapore: Taoist Federation, 1994. Leo, Juat Bei and John Clammer. “Confucianism as Folk Religion in Singapore: A Note”. In Studies in Chinese Folk Religion in Singapore and Malaysia, edited by John Clammer. Singapore: Contributions to Southeast Asian Ethnography, no. 2, 1983. Mahajani, Usha. The Role of the Indian Minorities in Burma and Malaysia, Bombay: Vora, 1960. Marriott, Hayes Census Report of the Straits Settlements 1911. Singapore, 1911. Nathan, Eze. The History of Jews in Singapore 1830–1945. Singapore: Henbilu Editorial & Marketing Services, 1986. Nathan, Julius E. The Census of British Malaya 1921. London: Dunstable & Watford, 1922. Nyce, Robert. “Chinese Folk Religion in Malaysia and Singapore”. The Southeast Asian Journal of Theology 12 (Spring, 1971): 81–91. Roff, William Roff. “The Malay-Muslim World of Singapore in the Late 19th Century”. Journal of Asian Studies 24, no. 1 (1964): 75–90. Sandhu, Kernial Singh. Indians in Malaya: Some Aspects of their Immigration and Settlement. London: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Saw, Swee Hock. Singapore Population in Transition. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970. Sng, Bobby E. K. In His Good Time: The Story of the Church in Singapore, 1819–1992. 2nd edition. Singapore: Graduate’s Christian Fellowship, 1993. 53

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Song, Ong Siang. One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore. London: John Murray. Reprint, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984. Tamney, Joseph B. and Riaz Hassan. Religious Switching in Singapore: A Study of Religious Mobility. Singapore: Select Books Pte. Ltd. for the Flinders University of South Australia, Asian Studies, 1987. Tan, Karen. “The Catholic Church in Singapore”. Unpublished Academic Exercise, National University of Singapore, 1988. Tan, Khong Chew. Church Architecture in Singapore since 1950. Unpublished Academic Exercise, Singapore: School of Architecture, University of Singapore, 1980. Tan, Robert. “The Cultural Landscape of Singapore: A Study of the Growth and Distribution of the Religious Institutions on the Island (1819–1961)”. Unpublished Academic Exercise, University of Malaya, 1962. Teixeira, Manuel. The Portuguese Missions in Malacca and Singapore, 1511–1958. Lisboa: Agencia Geral do Ultra mar, 3 volumes, 1963. Tong, Chee Kiong, Ho Kong Chong and Lin Ting Kwong. Report of the Survey on Chinese Customs and Rites in Singapore. Singapore: Singapore Federation of Chinese Clan Associations, 1988. ———. Rationalizing Religion: Religious Conversion, Revivalism, and Competition in Singapore. Leiden: Brill, 2007. Topley, Marjorie. “Chinese Rites for the Repose of the Soul”. Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society XXXVII (1954): Part. 1. ———. “Ghost Marriages among the Singapore Chinese”. Man LV (1955): 29–30. ———. “The Emergence and Social Function of Chinese Religious Associations in Singapore”. Comparative Studies in Society and History 3, no. 3 (1961): 289–314. Turnbull, Mary C. A History of Singapore 1819–1988. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989. Vlieland, Charles A. British Malaya (the Colony of the Straits Settlements and the Malay States under British Protection, namely the Federated States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang and the States of Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis and Brunei: A Report on the 1931 Census and on Certain Problems of Vital Statistics). London: Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1932. Wee, Vivienne. “Buddhism in Singapore”. In Singapore: Society in Transition, edited by Riaz Hassan. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976, pp. 155–88. Yen, Ching Hwa. A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya: 1800– 1911. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1886.

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3 KEEPING GOD IN PLACE The Management of Religion in Singapore Eugene K. B. Tan

INTRODUCTION We have enjoyed racial and religious harmony since Independence. This does not prove that our social fabric is inherently stronger than other multi-racial societies, or that we are immune to the serious problems which have afflicted so many of them. It only shows the amount of care which has gone into tending it and strengthening it. (Shared Values White Paper 1991, p. 4)

Singapore has enjoyed racial and religious harmony since its independence in 1965. What is not so evident is the tremendous care, effort, and pre-emptive prudence invested in nurturing multi-religiosity as an integral part of Singapore’s multi-racialism framework. Buttressed by the state’s professed commitment to secularism, racial and religious harmony is one of Singapore’s five Shared Values. This stability is jealously guarded by the state especially since rapid modernization has neither resulted in the decline of religious belief nor the downgrading of importance of religious institutions among Singaporeans. Religious faith is a “major part of Singapore’s cultural ballast” and exerts a tremendous pull on Singaporeans (Shared Values 1991, p. 8; Tong 2002). Singapore’s rich religious heritage is also celebrated as a source 55

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of strength, with places of worship attended in large numbers by locals and promoted as tourist sites of interest. Singapore’s architectural landscape, with many prominent religious buildings, is a legacy of religious developments in early modern Singapore history (Lee Geok Boi 2002). Yet, consider the paradox: religion has been selectively co-opted in secular Singapore’s nationbuilding process. Can a strong religious identity co-exist with a strong Singaporean identity? This chapter begins with a description of the multi-religious landscape of Singapore and notes some aspects of the religious state of play. It then examines the institutional and legal framework in the management of religion within the context of an evolving, putative Singapore model of secularism. The policy impulses behind the state’s co-option of religion to reinforce the teaching of moral values, to sustain economic vitality, and to urge the practice of one’s religion in keeping with the secular and multi-racial mores of Singaporean society are examined. It shows that the state engages in a tightrope walk between secularism and control and influence over religion, and religious expression for the purposes of state- and nation-building.

THE RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE IN SINGAPORE The Backdrop of Religious Pluralism Religion has always played a key role in the construction, political legitimation, and national integration of political entities in Southeast Asia. Since the late first millennium, itinerant traders and travellers to Southeast Asia brought with them Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu, and Islamic ideals and traditions. Less commonly appreciated is the fact that these value systems, especially Buddhism and Hinduism, had provided lessons on public leadership, public morality, learning and virtue and the dignity of the individual (de Bary 2004). Later on, European colonialism catalysed the spread of Christianity to Southeast Asia. By the turn of the twentieth century, Singapore was very much the heart of the Muslim world in maritime Southeast Asia. Modernist Islamic ideas, including dissenting ones, emanating from the Arab Middle East were propagated through religious scholars and in Islamic publications originating from Singapore and the region (Roff 1994; Riddell 2001). Singaporeans’ religious affiliation has remained relatively stable over the last twenty-five years. Buddhists constitute the largest religious group, followed by Muslims, non-religionists, Christians, Taoists, and Hindus (see Table 3.1).1 Taking Buddhists and Taoists as a consolidated group, they constitute slightly more than half of all Singaporeans, with the number of Buddhists 56

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TABLE 3.1 Resident Population Aged 15 Years and Above by Religion Faith Buddhism Islam No religion Christianity Taoism Hinduism Others

2000 (%)

1990 (%)

1980 (%)

% change between 1980 and 2000

42.5 14.9 14.8 14.6 8.5 4.0 0.6

31.2 15.3 14.1 12.7 22.4 3.7 0.6

27.0 15.7 13.0 10.1 30.0 3.6 0.5

+ 15.5 – 0.8 + 1.8 + 4.5 – 21.5 + 0.4 + 0.1

Source: Singapore Department of Statistics 2000.

increasing by a significant 15.5 per cent between 1980 and 2000. The growth and revitalization of Buddhism can be attributed to its “intellectualization” and “reformist” trends resulting in it becoming popular with former Taoists. The rise of a canonical form of Buddhism and the rapid decline of rituals and customs (commonly associated with Chinese folk religions) help distinguish Buddhism more clearly from Taoism (Wee 1976; Kuah-Pearce 2003). Younger, better-educated Buddhists increasingly propagate their faith through emulating the outreach and fellowship that Christian churches are noted for. The number of Christian adherents has shown a steady increase since the 1950s. They form the largest religious group among university graduates, with one-third of graduates professing Christianity in 2000. If this pace of growth continues, Christianity will become the second largest religious group by 2010. Christians also tend to be of relatively higher social-economic status (in education, occupation, and income). Half of the Christian population reside in larger HDB flats (viz. 5-room and executive flats), private flats, or houses.2 The higher profile of charismatic Christian churches is manifested in their being “fervent in mission activities, exhibiting strong evangelistic zeal” by the young “born-again” converts. These churches also place emphasis on an experiential religious experience which stresses a personal relationship with God (Kuo, Quah and Tong 1988, pp. 4–5, 12–14). Singaporeans’ religious beliefs also tend to be divided along racial lines. For instance, 99.6 per cent of Malays are Muslims while almost two-thirds of Chinese (64.4 per cent) are either Buddhists or Taoists. Slightly more than half of Indians (55.4 per cent) are Hindus. About half of “Others” are Christians. The Chinese are also far more likely to have no religious affiliation 57

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than Malays and Indians. Linguistically, there is a strong correlation between religion and language. Almost 40 per cent of Christians use English as their home language. Taoists and Buddhists tend to use Mandarin and Chinese dialects while three-quarters of Hindus use Tamil as the home language. Given the strong correlation between race, home language, and religion, Malays, Indian-Muslims and Indian-Hindus tend to demonstrate strong sense of religious group identity. In contrast, ethnic Chinese of different faiths show varying and significant changes in religious group identity (Chan 2003, pp. 14–15). Unsurprisingly, religion has an “underlying influence on nuptiality, fertility, and the population control programme” (Saw 1999, p. 58). Singaporeans are also relatively generous in donating to religious organizations and causes. The National Volunteer and Philanthropy Centre’s (NVPC) 2004 survey revealed that 97 per cent of Singaporeans aged fifteen years or more donated SGD438 million to charities and religious organizations, with 52 per cent of these donations made in the form of church tithes, Islamic zakat, and temple “oil money” (NVPC 2005, pp. 14–18).3

Overview of Religious State of Play in Singapore Buffeted by the continuing global phenomenon of religious resurgence, Singapore is affected by the rise of religious fundamentalism, powerful transnational associational pulls with renewed religiosity of the various mainstream faiths, and new forms of post-traditional/new age spirituality. In response, the government maintains a watchful eye on external influences. It is prepared to move pre-emptively against any threat to social cohesion and harmony (Hill 1999). In the 1980s, liberation theology was closely watched. Today, radical and militant Islam — alongside aggressive evangelization by any faith — is closely monitored. The government operates from the conservative and realist premise that religious harmony cannot be taken for granted and that efforts have to be continually exerted to ensure that moderation and social responsibility prevails in the practice of one’s faith. The government is acutely aware that religious differences tend to reinforce racial and cultural identities and differences. It also recognizes that religion can be a salient but powerful instrument of social change that can be used to rally faith communities, and as justification for subtle opposition and protest against perceived or real socio-economic and political injustices. Increasingly, there is also recognition of the need to develop deeper inter-religious understanding and appreciation especially at the mass level in order to counter religious divisiveness. While Singaporeans’ increased religiosity per se purportedly is not a concern, the perception that 58

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Singaporeans, particularly Muslims, are interacting less with Singaporeans from other faiths, is. This overarching fear and vulnerability ensure that close scrutiny, interventionist surveillance, and ultra-sensitivity to perceived threats are hallmarks of the government’s policy towards religion. Legislation such as the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA) (Cap. 167A), Internal Security Act (ISA) (Cap. 143) and soft-law norms such as the Declaration of Religious Harmony are relied upon in forestalling any religious extremism and interfaith conflicts. Supplementing the pervasive watchfulness is the didactic ritual of remembering ethnic riots in Singapore’s pre-independence history (Hill 2003). This requires that those earlier episodes of ethno-violence “must be engraved — burnt into the collective memory of all Singaporeans: 1969: 13 May, 1964: Prophet Mohamed’s birthday, 1950: the Maria Hertogh riots” (Hansard 1988).4 Despite the diversity, the state of religious and racial group relations is positive pre- and post-9/11 as attested to by the 2001 and 2002 Survey on Social Attitudes of Singaporeans (Chan 2003, 2002). “A certain level of resilience and robustness is evident… [and] Singaporeans continued to be optimistic about the future of race and religious group relations in Singapore” (Chan 2003, p. 11). The 2002 Survey further noted that satisfaction and optimism of race and religious group relations are distinct dimensions such that “high satisfaction with racial/religious group relations does not necessarily imply high optimism about such relations in the future” (Chan 2003, p. 18). The tendency to view everyday phenomenon in ethnic terms is unsurprising given the saliency of ethnic consciousness in popular and official discourse. It reflects a norm of socialization, reinforcing racial stereotypes and differences among the various races. Where the Malay community is concerned, racial and religious identities are not only prominent but also conflated. As 99.6 per cent of Malay-Singaporeans profess Islam, Malays are regarded synonymously as Muslims, and Muslim identity is treated as an integral part of Malay identity. In the last two decades, the religious identifier for Malays has become more prominent. This double affiliation, Malay-Muslim (or “Malay/Muslim” in official Singapore discourse) is of fairly recent vintage — it was not used in the ascription of the Malay community prior to the 1980s — is an indication of the growing significance of religion as a social marker. Within the community itself, such an identity nurtures a greater community self-consciousness of the double bond of race and faith. This resort to the “Muslim” identifier is in part a legacy of the state’s encouragement of recourse to religion as a bulwark against the effects of cultural and moral enervation in the modernization process. By the late 1970s, the government’s 59

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concern with the Malay-Muslim community’s “3D” problem of drugs, divorce, and delinquency was palpable. Malay civil society, Islamic organizations, and the Islamic faith were mobilized to help counter the social and moral decline (Ismail and Abdullah 2000). As Malay and Muslim identities are deemed coterminous, this has resulted in the Malay-Singaporeans’ Islamic identity being more sensitive and less negotiable. Chua and Kwok (2001, p. 116) astutely point out the implications: [T]he tightly drawn “community” boundaries, doubly marked by a sense of “Malayness” and the religious injunctions of Islam, appear to have the effect of reducing individual and sub-group differences within the Malay-Muslim community itself, or at least, not to allow the differences within to be aired outside the community…. [T]he term the Malay community with the Islamic faith as its chief characteristic is used in Singaporean public discourse without any reservation about the referent’s presumed “unity.” One of the consequences of these tightly drawn boundaries is that a general conservatism prevails among MalayMuslims in Singapore. But the conservatism is fraught with ambivalence, torn between the desire to preserve “traditions” and the need to open the community to new bodies of knowledge and economic opportunity.

Global developments after 9/11 have encouraged an affirmation of Muslims’ Islamic identity in solidarity with their co-religionists elsewhere within the global Muslim ummah. Malay-Muslim Singaporeans have generally been unsettled and discomforted by the negative coverage on Islam in the international media, as well as by the non-Muslim perception that Islam condones violence committed in its name. At the same time, as a minority community, Malay-Muslims have become more self-conscious as Muslims, and insecure at the suspicion that they may be sympathetic to Islamic extremism, and have responded by stressing Islamic “moderation”. Even if it reflects social reality, conflating Malay and Muslim identities can be unconducive to deeper social cohesion since it reinforces racial and cultural difference with the religious cleavage. Thus, problems afflicting the Malay community are almost always profiled as racial, cultural, and religious. Although it would be misleading to equate increased religiosity of the MalayMuslims with Islamism (understood here as Muslim political activism), the government’s concern with the Malay-Muslim way of life in recent years is evident. Indeed, it is this conflation of race and religion that constraints the closer integration of Malay/Muslims in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). The government is concerned that primordial loyalties of ethnicity and religion may trump the civic and secular loyalties to the Singaporean nation. 60

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Then Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew (2001) reaffirmed the government’s concern, first publicly enunciated in 1987: We must never put the person in a situation where he may face a conflict of loyalties. I said in answer to a question some nearly two years ago that it is a difficult matter to put a Malay Muslim of deeply religious family background in charge of a machine-gun. We should never have to ask this of anyone. Some of you were disturbed by my frankness. But when I faced crises in the 1960s I could not afford to be wrong. Was this discrimination or was it common sense — a policy of prudence? … For nearly every job, a person’s race and religion are irrelevant. But in the security services, because of our context, we cannot ignore race and religion in deciding suitability.

For the government and the Malay-Muslim community in Singapore alike, the concerns are real. The responsibilities of citizenship require that male Singaporeans, Malay-Muslims included, perform compulsory National Service. Yet their loyalty is regarded as ambivalent (Peled 1998).5 The role of Malay/ Muslims in National Service and the larger national security apparatus remain a major issue. Until this matter is resolved, the common space and nationbuilding mechanism par excellence that national service is touted to be remains a contested symbol of the loyalty of the Malay-Muslims and prevents their meaningful participation as full-fledged citizens. The concerns of government and society were further amplified with the arrest of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist suspects in Singapore in late 2001 and early 2002, soon after 9/11. An atmosphere of mutual suspicion and distrust between Malay-Muslims and non-Muslims hung uneasily. The Malay-Muslims were themselves confronted by self-doubt and ambivalence as to how home-grown extremists could have arisen from their ranks. Against this backdrop is the apparent increased religiosity of believers of other faiths accompanied by insensitive proselytization especially by evangelical Christians. Despite Singapore’s rapid urbanization and modernization, Singapore has not become more secular. Instead, there is now a belated but growing religious sector within Singapore’s civil society that seeks to participate in the public policy discourse, and which draws on their individual religious value systems to inform their choices in the public realm. The Internet and other modes of communication have made the transnational element of religion more visible and the management of religion more challenging. It is no surprise then that the government has spared no effort in seeking to strengthen Singapore’s social cohesion and ensuring that good sense and religious harmony prevail and are enhanced. 61

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THE INSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK The Constitutional Setting Although secularism is a cardinal principle of political governance, the separation of religion and state is not written into Singapore’s Constitution.6 Article 15 of the constitution provides religious freedom and the right to propagate one’s religion as fundamental liberties. So fundamental is such a right that Emergency ordinances promulgated under Article 150 shall not validate any provision inconsistent with “the provisions of this Constitution relating to religion, citizenship or language”. Further, Articles 16(2) and 16(3) provide that every religious group has the right to establish and maintain educational institutions for children and provide such instruction in its own religion, and that no person shall be required to receive instruction in or to take part in any ceremony or act of worship of a religion other than his own. As an overarching commitment to the multi-racial ethos, the Presidential Council of Minority Rights (PCMR) was established as a constitutional safeguard.7 Besides ensuring that the minorities are not discriminated against, the PCMR also plays a key role in the appointment of members of the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony (PCRH). Limited legal pluralism is embedded in Singapore’s English-based common law legal system through some community autonomy for the indigenous Malay-Muslim community. In areas of Muslim personal law such as marriage, divorce and inheritance, Article 153 of the Singapore Constitution provides for legislation (viz. Administration of Muslim Law Act (AMLA) (Cap. 3)) in “regulating Muslim religious affairs and for constituting a Council to advise the President in matters relating to the Muslim religion”. The (Malay-) Muslim community enjoys several privileges not accorded to the other races/ religion. Besides being governed by syariah law in personal matters,8 the community enjoys free tertiary education (qualified in 1989), state support for various aspects of its religious life including the mosque-building programme and the haj (pilgrimage to Mecca), and the appointment of a minister-in-charge of Muslim affairs in the Cabinet.

The Substantive Content of Freedom of Religion: The Belief-Action Distinction Religious freedom under Article 15 is not absolute and unqualified in Singapore. This is not surprising since absolute freedom is a sure and potent recipe for conflict in a multi-religious society. Religious liberty in Singapore is subject to the belief-action distinction: religious beliefs are protected but actions motivated by such beliefs, and which are contrary to Singapore’s laws,

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are not protected. In the mid-1990s for example, there were several wellpublicized cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses, a proscribed group in Singapore, regarding the ambit of religious freedom. The cases largely dealt with whether citizens conscripted into the Singapore Armed Forces could cite their religious beliefs for exemption from military service. In this line of cases, the Court of Appeal emphasized the belief-action distinction: It is therefore not illegal to profess the beliefs of Jehovah’s Witness per se, nor is it an offence to be a Jehovah’s Witness. A citizen’s right to profess, practice or propagate his religious beliefs, even as Jehovah’s Witness, has not been taken away. It is the manner of carrying out these activities that is circumscribed by the relevant orders. (Chan Hiang Leng Colin [1996] 1 SLR 609 at 615; emphasis is mine)

Prima facie, religious beliefs even of a proscribed group are not illegal. However, actions flowing from such religious beliefs are proscribed if they offend against the onerous requirements of public order or public service. The court agreed that National Service is “clearly a secular issue” and conscientious objection is not tolerated since “the whole system of universal National Service will become unstuck” (Hansard 1990c). It also agreed that “the sovereignty, integrity and unity of Singapore are undoubtedly the paramount mandate of the Constitution and anything, including religious beliefs and practices, which tend to run counter to these objectives must be restrained”.9 The jurisprudence demonstrates two key principles: first, that the right to religious freedom has to be balanced against the interests of the larger community; and, second, the state’s central role in restricting the unbridled expression of the right to religious freedom. That community interests take precedence over those of the individual even in the exercise of fundamental liberties was affirmed in Nappalli Peter Williams v Institute of Technical Education [1999], where the Court of Appeal reiterated that in exercising one’s religious beliefs, a citizen’s constitutional right to freedom of religion can be circumscribed if, by the citizen’s actions, the exercise of the right becomes prejudicial to the common good. The court stated that, “Article 15 taken as a whole demonstrates that the paramount concern of the Constitution is a statement of citizen’s rights framed in a wider social context of maintaining unity as one nation” (p. 576). In this case, an employee of a government educational institution refused to take the national pledge or sing the national anthem because of his religious objections. It was held that his actions did not entitle him to constitutional protection since they went against his employer’s policy of encouraging and instilling students’ allegiance to the nation.

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The Legislative Framework There are several key legislations that provide a variety of options as part of the enforcement arsenal in dealing with individuals and groups in the religious realm that pose a public order threat.

Societies Act Under the Societies Act (Cap. 311), a society that represents, promotes, or discusses religious matters is a “specified society” and has to be registered by law. This means that registration of such a society is not automatic and not of right and subject to inquiry by the Registrar of Societies. An unregistered society is deemed to be an unlawful society. This registration requirement provides a powerful mechanism by which the state can proscribe religious groups which are deemed to be “prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order in Singapore”.10 As then Chief Justice Yong Pung How noted, “the basis for the de-registration clearly flowed from the danger of allowing absolute freedom of religion which might create a complete denial of a government’s authority and ability to govern individuals or groups asserting a religious affiliation.”11

Penal Code and Sedition Act The criminal justice system also provides its support for the maintenance of religious harmony (Chan Sek Keong 2000). Chapter 15 of the Penal Code (Cap. 224) provides for criminal offences relating to religion including injuring or defiling a place of worship, disturbing a religious assembly, uttering words or sounds to deliberately wound religious feelings. The Penal Code was recently amended to provide for enhanced penalties for religiously (and/or racially) aggravated offences. Under the Sedition Act (Cap. 290), it is an offence, inter alia, “to promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or classes of the population of Singapore”. In 2005, three bloggers were convicted under the Sedition Act for posting Web-blog comments that were anti-Muslim.

Internal Security Act Where more draconian measures are needed, the government can resort to “pre-emptive” powers under the Internal Security Act (ISA) (Cap. 143) which was originally enacted to deal with the communist insurgency in British Malaya after the World War II. The ISA allows for preventive detention for 64

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renewable two-year periods where “it is necessary to do so” to prevent a person from acting in any manner prejudicial to [the] Singapore’s security and the maintenance of public order or essential services. The ISA has been applied to persons deemed to be agitating racial and religious discord, including the arrests and detention since 2001 of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) suspected terrorists. The ISA was also used in 1987 against alleged Marxist anti-state conspirators which involved mainly Catholic Church activists (Barr 2005).

Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act In a sense, this Bill is a recognition of a retrogression, or potential deterioration, in religious harmony. The Government takes no joy in introducing it….It is not something which we are proud of. We introduce it more in sorrow than with joy. It is to prevent us sliding backward. It is an act aimed at preserving common sense and harmony. (Hansard 1990b)

The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (MRHA) has its genesis in 1986 when the Internal Security Department reported on over-zealous evangelical Christian proselytization and the impact that it had on religious communities competing for membership. This religious fervour was accompanied by the mixing of religion with politics by some groups. Enacted in 1990, the MRHA seeks to legislate religious moderation and tolerance and to keep religion and politics separate (Winslow 1990). It also established the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony, an advisory body comprising lay leaders and religious leaders to advise the President on matters affecting religious harmony. Its main specific functions are to delineate conduct that are regarded as harmful to religious harmony, and to provide recommendations on the issuance of restraining orders by the government, with the president as a check against abuse, against any person inciting, instigating or encouraging any religious group or religious institution to feelings of enmity, hatred, illwill or hostility between different religious groups. In recognizing the power of the pulpit, the MRHA has its focus on religious leaders who “are viewed by the flock and their worshippers as having closer links to God and with an aura of holiness and divinity, make it all the more imperative that if religious leaders want to enter into politics, they come down from the pulpit and participate as citizens” (Hansard 1990a). With gradations of pre-emptive measures, the MRHA widens the options the government can exercise in religious matters that present concerns to public order. The MRHA is less draconian than the ISA and seeks to circumspectly deal with the threat away from the glare of open court proceedings that can inflame religious passion further (Straits Times 2001). 65

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In national security matters, there is judicial support for a pre-emptive approach: In my view, … [the] submission that it must be shown that there was a clear and immediate danger was misplaced for one simple reason. It cannot be said that beliefs, especially those propagated in the name of “religion”, should not be put to a stop until such a scenario exists. If not, it would in all probability be too late as the damage sought to be prevented would have transpired. In my opinion, any administration which perceives the possibility of trouble over religious beliefs and yet prefers to wait until trouble is just about to break out before taking action must be not only pathetically naïve but also grossly incompetent.12

THE PUTATIVE SINGAPORE MODEL OF SECULARISM As religions tend to encompass comprehensive world-views on all dimensions of human existence, the Singapore political leadership has never assumed that religion and politics are distinct spheres of influence and experience. It is acutely aware of the power of religion to mobilize, motivate and enforce behaviour, values, and norms among the faithful. Several features stand out in the relationship between state and religion in Singapore. First, while the secular nature of the government is a given, it is inaccurate to describe Singapore as a dogmatic secular state. The state/government tacitly recognizes that it may be challenged by a largely religious society. Singapore’s secularism does not seek to eliminate religion from the public sphere. Instead, the Singapore model seeks to protect religions from state intervention and vice versa. Yet, the state is deeply involved in, concerned with, and exerts a measured influence over religious matters. It also strives to align the thinking and expectations of the various faith communities on the role that religion can play in Singapore’s development. The political leadership constantly urges faith communities to observe studiously the ground rules for continued harmony. Even as the state actively seeks constructive engagement and partners religion in the state- and nation-building agenda, it ensures that religion does not encroach into the political domain. This desire of the state to induct, yet ensure control over religion, has been characterized as an “often ambivalence stance” (Hill 2004). Second, the government recognizes that the various religions and cultures of Singaporeans can be usefully mobilized for the purposes of nation-building. Through its unique structure, rules and values, religion is a form of “communal action” through which faith communities can either support or obstruct different types of socio-political and economic interactions in the secular world. All this points to a variegated and pragmatic form of secularism — one 66

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that seeks to harness the powerful potential of religion while ensuring that the secular always takes precedence over the sacred in political discourse, public policy and governance. In recent years, the Inter-Religious Organization (IRO), a non-government organization founded in 1949 representing ten religions, has been actively included in the government’s efforts to promote greater religious understanding and harmony (IRO 2001). For instance, government leaders participated in the memorial service and prayer session for the victims of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami disaster. This suggests that the state is conscious and appreciative of the role of religion in helping to cope with the vagaries of life. Third, the state also exerts a symbolic and putative influence on the administration of faiths subscribed to by Singapore’s racial minorities, viz. Islam, Sikhism, and Hinduism. This by no means suggests that the state seeks to influence theological inputs or engage in the doctrinal intricacies of the different faiths. Instead, the state holds the power to appoint some or all office-bearers in these religions’ administrative bodies. This provides the state with the assurance that they are able to positively influence the administration of these faiths in Singapore. The most extensive government influence is on the Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura (MUIS) wherein all office-bearers are appointed by the government. In matters concerning the Hindu faith, there is the Hindu Advisory Board, and the Hindu Endowments Board (Cap. 364), created in 1969, which looks after Hindu religious and charitable endowments. For the Sikh faith, the Central Sikh Gurdwara Board Act (Cap. 357) establishes the Central Sikh Gurdwara Board to manage the Central Sikh Temple, maintain a register of all adult Sikh believers, and to further the welfare of the Sikh community.13 Like the Hindu counterpart, there is a Sikh Advisory Board as well. Fourth, the state recognizes the need for increased vigilance, tolerance and understanding within and among faiths. In such matters that could potentially affect peace and stability, the government has always erred on the side of caution. For example, it did not hesitate to exercise powers of censorship in disallowing the screening of Martin Scorsese’s film, The Last Temptation of Christ. It also banned Salman Rushdie’s book, The Satanic Verses, and it also did not grant a public entertainment license for the English-Malay version of the play, Talaq (Seet 2002) which focused on domestic violence in a Muslim household. All these decisions were made on the basis of not allowing religious tensions to brew. They are underpinned by the precautionary principle — that if more harm than good was likely, then preventive measures are better rather than curative ones. Religious sensitivities can be incited easily and emotions once uncorked cannot be reined in without severely undermining the social fabric and cohesion. It is this philosophy

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that guides the rules for speech at the Speakers’ Corner as well. Any speech that is religious in nature, and which “cause feelings of enmity, hatred, illwill or hostility between different racial or religious groups” is strictly prohibited.14 As the then Attorney-General noted, “preventive law is more effective in realizing the goal of racial tolerance and peaceful existence among its various communities. Preventive laws also prevent small fires from developing into conflagrations that destroy the social fabric and jeopardize national security” (Chan Sek Keong 2000, p. 25). Fifth, the state endeavours to draw a distinction between public and private life in order to preserve its hegemony in the former sphere. It urges the enlargement of “common spaces” as a means of ensuring that Singaporeans continue to interact in the public sphere without the identity markers of religion, language and race becoming stumbling blocks. National schools are common spaces and regarded as a key arena for value formation and national integration. As such, the government has insisted on a common school uniform policy. However, under the “globalising force of the resurgence of Islam”, Muslims are more conscious of modest dressing (Chua 2000, pp. 283–85) and some parents had sought to have their school-going children put on the tudung (headscarf ). In the tudung controversy in 2002, the issue at stake was whether the wearing of the tudung in national schools should be permitted (see Thio 2002; Law 2003a, 2003b). The government’s uncompromising stand was explained thus: The government seeks to expand the common space Singaporeans share. Schools require pupils to wear uniforms, regardless of race, religion or social status. Allowing exceptions would fragment the common space and invite competing demands from different communities.15

In essence, the government regards wearing the tudung in national schools primarily as a symbol of exclusiveness that prevents students from interacting and, consequently, is a threat to national integration. Nevertheless, in deference to Islamic requirements, national schools continue to allow Muslim girls to dress in track pants for physical education classes and have long permitted Muslim pupils and employees time-off to attend Friday mid-day prayers. There is no ban on the tudung at institutions of higher learning. Except for frontline customs and immigration officers, government employees (including teachers) are not prevented from wearing the tudung, and there is no evidence that tudung-clad government employees are isolating themselves in national schools and the workplaces. 68

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Sixth, the public face of religion is evident and is regarded as part of associational life. The government recognizes that the public and private spheres are increasingly fluid, porous and less definitive in an age of globalization, coupled with rapid scientific and technological advancements that result in moral, ethical, and religious issues acquiring a higher profile. Religion and religious groups have a substantive presence in Singapore’s associational life and demonstrate the extent to which religion can help develop social capital. Three examples illustrate this. Singapore’s approach in managing the socio-economic and educational under-performance among the various races has a significant ethnic dimension through the formalization of the ethnic self-help groups. Additionally, for Malays/Muslims, the religious dimension is also significant in two other ethnic self-help vehicles that mainly cater to the Malays/Muslims: (i) MENDAKI (Council on Education for Muslim Children), the first ethnic self-help group, created in 1982, and (ii) Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP) set up in 1991 (Siddique 2001a, 2001b). In contrast, the identities of the other three self-help groups for the Chinese (Chinese Development Assistance Council or CDAC), Indians (Singapore Indian Development Association or SINDA), and Eurasians (Eurasian Association) are avowedly secular in outlook and disposition. Again, this fusion of race and religion elements where the Malay organizations are concerned reflects the recognition accorded to the Islamic identity. Another obvious manifestation of religions’ public face outside of the faith realm is in the provision of social welfare and community services. Officially incorporated into Singapore’s “many helping hands” social assistance framework, these faith-based voluntary welfare organizations (VWOs) play a prominent role in the provision of welfare and social services to the lessprivileged and less fortunate, often on a faith-blind basis. This arrangement benefits both the faith-based VWOs and the government. For the VWOs, it means that they have a legitimate and public profile and are able to play their part in doing good for society in accordance with their religious values.16 For the government, such civic engagement strengthens the social fabric and “does not lock the government into providing welfare services for everyone and at all times…” and gives “the impression of a burgeoning non-profit and voluntary sector in Singapore” (Kadir 2004, p. 331). It is important that policy-makers and VWOs continue to recognize the need for the latter’s delivery of such welfare services be faith-blind and unconditional, and certainly not a subterfuge for proselytization. The role of religious inputs in public policy discourse in Singapore is increasingly evident (Straits Times 2005; Thio 2004b). This is not surprising. 69

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As most Singaporeans regard religion with importance, they will draw on their religious value systems to chart their moral bearings and inform their choices in the public realm. On the part of the government, it is trying to reach out to faith communities, in line with the promotion of active citizenry and a more consultative form of government. Citizens motivated by religious convictions are free to offer their views on policies, laws, the performance of public institutions and the state of morality in Singapore. This coheres with the fundamental liberties of free speech and freedom of religion. However, the rules of engagement are still in a developmental and testing stage. The dilemma is that policy-making sits squarely in the secular realm while religioninspired policy feedback and inputs are in the religious realm. It remains unclear to what extent religion-inspired policy feedback will be factored in future policy-making. Furthermore, while religious groups are entitled to preach their values and beliefs to their communities, they must not mobilize their congregations to be confrontational in their engagement with the state. Neither should religious groups undermine the government’s authority, legitimacy as well as the democratic process. In any case, the government increasingly solicits views from all quarters and has sought to demonstrate that constructive religion-inspired feedback and inputs have a place in Singapore’s political discourse. One can discern this in major issues such as on permitting casino gaming in Singapore and in bioethical issues involving concerns of morality. In these issues, religious groups across the various faiths have provided their considered moral counsel and feedback (for example, Harvey 2004). All major faiths, for example, objected to the proposal to liberalize gaming laws to allow casino gaming. When announcing the decision that Singapore would allow casino gaming, the Prime Minister acknowledged the convictions of those who opposed the casino gambling for religious reasons. However, he pointed out that secular and pragmatic considerations had to prevail in public policy-making in a multi-racial, multi-religious society. National interest is always given priority and the government “cannot enforce the choices of one group on others, or make these choices the basis of national policy” (Lee Hsien Loong 2005). In recognition of their concerns and the need for buy-in by the various faith communities for the policy decision to allow casino gambling, the Prime Minister invited them to work with the government to minimize the social impact.

ROLE OF RELIGION IN NATION-BUILDING While it acutely recognizes the Janus-face of religion, the government seeks to harness religion as a constructive force in nation-building. It is this innate

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ability of religion to inculcate good citizenship, temper the rough edges of secular life by providing a moral anchor, and encourage industriousness, selfreliance, and associational life that the government seeks to harness. It is an enlightened and strategic secularism at work wherein religion is paradoxically very much in public life and yet largely constrained in its ambit in the political sphere (cf. Hill 2001). In establishing the Shared Values, the government was concerned that the national value system had to be compatible with existing cultural and religious heritages in order for it to have popular resonance and acceptance. It recognized that using “any one single religion or culture as the basis for building a common Singaporean identity” would only alienate the other groups. This belief that a society’s moral values can be buttressed by the inculcation of religious values is a long-standing one even if inchoately manifested. As early as 1967, Defence Minister Goh Keng Swee (Hansard 1967) raised the value of using religion as a mode of instruction of moral values: … National Servicemen will receive, in addition to technical training specific to their Branch, instruction in moral values. This will teach them what good citizenship means and explain to them the nature of their social responsibilities. It is my intention, when the training manuals on this subject have been drafted, to seek guidance of the Inter-Religious Council of the Republic, both on the content of moral instruction and on the method of implementation. I am sure that there is a substantial common ground among the great religions of the world, whose values, if imparted to our youth, will make them better men.

By the late 1970s, Singapore’s impressive economic success as a newly industrializing economy led to the quest for an economic development model that could ensure sustainable progress and prosperity. Embedded within this concern was the belief that certain cultural and moral values are fundamental to Singapore’s success (Tan Tai Wei 1994; Tamney 1988; Pereira 2005). Earlier, the Report on Moral Education (Ong 1979, p. 12) noted that “religious studies help to reinforce the teaching of moral values”. The government had concluded that “religions provided the best and the most dependable basis for inculcating moral values in our older children and producing the honest, upright citizens that we would all wish to see.” In 1982, the government announced the introduction of compulsory Religious Knowledge (RK) classes for upper secondary school students (15– 17 years of age) to ensure that the younger Singaporeans did not lose their moral values in the onslaught of Westernization and hedonism. Implemented in 1984, the RK programme aimed to reinforce the moral values taught at earlier stages of the educational curriculum (Gopinathan 1988; Tan Jason

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2000). The government emphasized that religious knowledge was distinct from religious education/instruction and religious propagation. Students in the upper secondary levels were offered six options, viz. Bible Knowledge, Buddhist Studies, Confucian Ethics, Hindu Studies, Islamic Religious Knowledge, and Sikh Studies.17 Foreign scholars were invited to develop the curriculum with Confucian Studies taking prominence (Tu 1984). This foregrounded the salient introduction of an ersatz Confucianism in Singapore’s political governance ethos (Kuo 1996; Lele 2004).18 Within five years of its introduction, however, the government became concerned over the RK programme’s detrimental effect on ethnic relations. The government stated that the RK programme emphasized differences while inadvertently encouraging teachers and students to proselytize and interact with those of the same faith. It also played a contributory role in religious revivalism within Singapore. The government acknowledged that national schools should not impart religious beliefs and that the RK programme was not entirely in accordance with its secular approach nor even-handed in religious matters. The programme was abruptly discontinued in 1990 and replaced by the Civics and Moral Education (CME) programme (Tan and Chew 2004; Tamney 1992).

THE GRASSROOTS AND QUASI-BOTTOM-UP APPROACH In the post-9/11 environment of heightened security consciousness, the government is concerned that Singapore’s social fabric may not withstand the impact of a terrorist attack in Singapore. This was especially so in the aftermath of the arrests and detention of the terrorist JI members in 2001 and 2002. Increasingly aware that a coercive legislative framework has its limitations, the government has sought to chart new directions to engender better inter-racial and religious understanding. It has attempted to do so mainly by translating the concept of tolerance in more grounded and tangible ways. This entails confidence-building and dialogue efforts in two principal forms: the creation of Inter-Racial Confidence Circles (IRCC) at the individual constituency level and Harmony Circles at workplaces and organizations; and the introduction of the Declaration of Religious Harmony. The promotion of interfaith dialogue and interaction highlights the importance of relations at the grassroots even as institutional mechanisms remain dominant (Sinha 2005). These mechanisms themselves also ensure that the government continues to exert a measure of control and influence over issues of race and religion. In January 2002, the government initiated the rapid formation of IRCCs at every constituency. Operating under the auspices 72

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of the government-linked Citizens’ Consultative Committees, the IRCCs are meant to be a more intimate, grassroots-oriented platform to build and to strengthen the trust and confidence among the different races. The IRCCs have organized activities such as visits to places of worship and the celebration of festivities to facilitate inter-ethnic/inter-religious learning and appreciation. It is envisaged that the IRCCs would, in time, offer a viable mechanism to deal with serious racial or religious problems on the ground, if they ever occur. However, the IRCC organizational top-down nature suggests that the state continues to be an indispensable intermediary of sorts in facilitating better inter-racial and inter-religious understanding. Such a development is not surprising, and is consistent with the state’s dominance in managing ethnic relations. Yet, genuine inter-ethnic and inter-religious understanding cannot be engendered by artificially induced interactions from the top down. This is a process that patently needs to be bottom-up. One limited attempt in this direction was the Declaration of Religious Harmony (DRH) which involved various religious leaders. The government-led efforts to craft a code of conduct for faith communities were in essence an attempt to exert moral suasion on the leaders and believers of the various faiths to practice moderation in exercising their beliefs. This entailed clearly laying out the rules of religious conduct and ensuring that they are shared and understood by Singaporeans. In the late 1980s, the government had explored the recommendation of implementing a “Declaration of Principles” through a non-legislative, non-enforceable approach. However, the government decided against it because such “a list of do’s and don’ts to guide religious leaders and members of their flock”, was deemed ineffective. While the MRHA was targeted at religious elites, the DRH’s exhortatory approach sought to appeal to the masses. Its working group, comprising of leaders of the major religious groups, deliberated on the initial draft provided in October 2002 by the prime minister and on 9 June 2003, the DRH was unveiled. As a tangible manifestation of interfaith dialogue, consensus- and norm-building, the DRH signals the tentative movement towards soft-law instruments, to complement the coercive legal approach as part of the management strategy (see also Thio 2004a).

CONTEMPORARY CONCERNS: THE SPECTRE OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND PERCEIVED MALAY-MUSLIM EXCLUSIVENESS Islam in Singapore continues to be perceived as presenting challenges to the government. Religious issues pertaining to Islam that are perceived to be 73

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presenting challenges to Singapore society are regularly profiled in the political landscape. In the 1990s, with the strong accent of Islamic revivalism in Southeast Asia, the Singapore government paid closer attention to the religious dimensions of the Malay-Muslim community, in particular the re-Islamization in daily-life behaviour. Islamic revivalism has also led to the government’s concern with growing exclusivity and a closed Muslim community, even as the Muslim community itself views its increased religiosity as being more indicative of a self-renewal of spirituality rather than the insistence on a particularized system of Islamic values and ethics or as tacit support for a radical or militant form of Islam. The arrest of JI terrorist suspects in Singapore in 2001 and 2002 created an atmosphere of ambivalence, suspicion and distrust of Malay-Muslims by the non-Malays (Desker 2003; Andrew Tan 2002). The terrorism threat from within became an explicit security issue (Ministry of Home Affairs 2003). Put simply, the key concern is the Muslims’ supposed susceptibility to radical and militant Islam. In particular, the multi-racial framework was seen to be under strain in dealing with the Malay-Muslims’ expressions of increased religiosity (Kadir 2004b; Hussin 2005). In response, the government has recommitted itself to the enlargement of the common space, a work-in-progress since 1999. The role of MUIS has become even more critical in ensuring that the religious development of the Muslim community continues to be a positive force for integration and nation-building. To reiterate, one key challenge for Singapore’s multi-racialism is managing the increased religiosity of the Malay-Muslims. In particular, secularism sits uncomfortably with multi-racialism and multi-religiosity in determining the extent to which religious expression, as part of one’s ethnic identity, should be allowed in common spaces. The specific challenge is whether Singapore’s multi-racialism can accommodate the development of a more spiritual orientation by the Malay-Muslims. The concern with a rigid Islamic identity is that it would lead to exclusionary practices and undermine integration. Furthermore, there is fear that the Muslims’ increased religiosity would result in self-segregation, an isolated “micro-community” and an unilateral closing of common space. The government and Muslim leadership continue to urge Muslims to practise their faith in the context of a multi-racial society with “moderation” as the defining attribute. This official encouragement of the development of a Singaporean-Muslim autochthonous practice of Islam places emphasis on moderation, a sensitive recognition of multi-racialism and the need for common spaces and their enlargement. The Singapore approach to promoting “Islamic moderation” and inter-religious understanding is buttressed by the central concerns of social cohesion and religious tolerance. Indeed, having 74

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declared itself “an iconic target”, Singapore is gearing itself for the impact of a terrorist attack on its social fabric even as it seeks to continually forge its national resilience. In light of the JI arrests, the government’s stand is that it is critical for the Muslims to take the “moderate path” — by this is meant not interpreting and practising Islam narrowly and rigidly, not to remain the silent majority but to speak up against extremists and militants who advocate intolerance and extremism. In dealing with the terrorism threat, the focus has been on a binary characterization of the religious state of play facing the Malay-Muslims as one of “radical versus moderate” Islam.19 Nevertheless, Singapore has taken a broad-based community approach in advancing inter-religious tolerance, and more importantly, understanding as well as ensuring that the madrasahs and mosques remain key agents in promoting moderate Islam and national integration. This includes the revamp of Islamic religious education in Singapore’s six full-time and seventy-seven part-time madrasahs to make the religious curriculum relevant to a knowledgebased economy (Noor Aisha and Lai 2006). Through the umbrella, multisectoral Community Engagement Programme, launched in early 2006, Singaporeans of various races and faiths are encouraged to reach out to one another. There is also a transnational dimension through the Asia-Middle East Dialogue for support and engagement in a civilizational dialogue between Asia and the Middle East. This platform also acts as a means by which the Singapore experience is seen as exemplary and applauded by Muslim-majority societies. What is perhaps most significant is the endeavour to forge a distinctive Muslim Singaporean identity embodying the Malay-Muslim community seeing itself as an integral part of Singapore’s “pluralistic and progressive society and a globalized and secular state”.20 To this end, MUIS has been promoting the drive towards a “Muslim Community of Excellence”. In early 2005, MUIS unveiled its proposed “Ten Desired Attributes of the Singaporean Muslim Community of Excellence” with the aim of helping Muslim Singaporeans understand and excel in their dual roles and identities as Muslims and citizens. The objective is to craft an identity that is religious, socially progressive, and open to living as a Muslim minority in a secular, multi-racial and multi-religious Singapore (Mohd Alami Musa 2005a, 2005b, 2005c). The Muslim community is exhorted to be open to a diversity of views and be forward-looking.

CONCLUSION Singapore is simultaneously a profoundly secular and religious society. The rich diversity of multi-cultural and religious life also means potentially competing needs and goals. This chapter has argued that religion has

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multiple roles and a public face despite Singapore being a secular state (not society). In a society where 85 per cent of Singaporeans profess to belonging to a faith, religion forms a core part of many Singaporeans’ identities and value systems. However, religion continues to pose numerous challenges to a multi-racial, secular Singapore. The transnational characteristics of religion, embodied in a global imagined community of faith believers, coupled with revivalist tendencies in all major faiths, also directly impact local religions. Scientific and technological advancements have further brought to the fore ethical and moral issues that demand religion to express its value, doctrinal systems publicly. It is a truism that we must take faith seriously and that keeping God in place is a never-ending work-in-progress. This entails not just merely asserting that religion is important but requires the necessity and appreciation by the state, policymakers, society, and faith communities in understanding the subtleties and complexities in which religion and public life impact each other. Notwithstanding the state’s tendency to rely on moral panic and fear, religion in Singapore has been characterized by a public ethos of tolerance, civility and respect. This rosy picture does not under-estimate the sub-texts of religious competition, the occasional distrust and misunderstanding between religious groups, and religion as a potential challenge to the government’s authority and legitimacy because religion celebrates a higher truth.

Notes Much of the research and writing was done in 2004 and 2005 when the author was based at Stanford Law School and at the Solomon Asch Centre for the Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict, University of Pennsylvania, USA. He thanks the faculty and colleagues at both institutions for the collegial sharing of experiences and ideas. Ms Sonia Moss of the Stanford Law School Robert Crown Library provided assistance in obtaining research materials from various libraries in the United States, Canada, and Britain. The views expressed in this chapter are the author’s alone and the usual caveats apply. 1. In the 2000 Census, the Singapore Department of Statistics regards religion as the “religious faith or spiritual faith of a person regardless of whether or not he regularly attends religious ceremonies in a temple, mosque, church or other religious building. He may or may not practise his faith or belief ”. 2. In contrast, a large majority of Buddhists and Muslims reside in HDB flats. 3. Cf. Transparency International’s Global Corruption Barometer (2004, see pp. 12 and 18 and Table 14) noted that religious bodies were identified, relatively speaking, as one of the more corrupt institutions in Israel, Norway and Singapore. 4. The shorthand “Hansard” will be used in this chapter to refer to Parliamentary Debates Singapore Official Report. 76

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5. Peled perceptively describes the “Trojan horse” dilemma in Singapore’s National Service system as one where the state demands military service of its male citizens yet harbours security concerns and mistrust of the loyalty of MalayMuslims bearing arms. 6. Secularism is understood as the ideology of separating religion and state, and of the state being neutral vis-à-vis the various religious faiths and between religion and non-religion. 7. The PCMR has the general function of considering and reporting on “matters affecting persons of any racial or religious community in Singapore” as may be referred to the Council by Parliament or the government. Its particular function is to draw attention to any bill or to any subsidiary legislation if the council deems them to be a differentiating measure. See, generally, Part VII of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Revised edition). 8. Since August 1999, following amendments to the Supreme Court of Judicature Act and AMLA, the (civil and secular) Family Court has concurrent jurisdiction in selected areas. 9. Chief Justice Yong Pung How in Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1994] 3 SLR 662 at 684. For a case comment, see Thio (1995). 10. The Christian Conference of Asia (CCA) was dissolved under s. 24(1) of Societies Act. The Jehovah Witnesses and the Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity (Unification Church) are two well-known entities that have been deregistered. 11. Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1994] 3 SLR 662 at 688. 12. Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1994] 3 SLR 662 at 683 per Chief Justice Yong Pung How. 13. In 1987, the administration and management of Sikh temples were left entirely to the Sikh community. 14. Clause 3(c)(ii) of the Public Entertainments and Meetings (Speakers’ Corner) (Exemption) Order, made pursuant to section 16 of Public Entertainments and Meetings Act (Cap. 257, 2001 Revised edition). 15. Lim Chee Hwee, Press Secretary, Singapore’s Ministry of Education in his reply captioned, “Malays in Singapore”, The New York Times, 16 March 2002, to the article “By Barring Religious Garb, Singapore School Dress Code Alienates Muslims”, The New York Times, 27 February 2002. 16. This includes participating in Singapore’s National Day parades, see Metraux (2001). 17. A seventh subject, “A Study of World Religions”, was still-born. 18. On Singapore as a “Confucianist society”, see Lee Kuan Yew (2000, pp. 542 and 545–49). 19. On the contested understanding of moderation within the Muslim-Singaporean community, see PERGAS 2004. That Muslim-Singaporeans are “moderate” in their religious views and practice of their faith has been affirmed many times by the political elite: see, for instance, The Straits Times (2002). This is confirmed in the longitudinal national survey on religion (Chan 2002). 77

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20. For a discussion on the initiatives mentioned in this section, see Tan, Eugene (2007).

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Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, edited by Robert W. Hefner, pp. 165–82. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001b. Singapore Department of Statistics. Singapore Census of Population 2000, Advanced Data Release No. 2. Singapore: Singapore Department of Statistics, 2000. Singapore Parliament. Shared Values (White Paper). 1991. Cmd. 1 of 1991. Sinha, Vineeta. “Theorizing ‘Talk’ about ‘Religious Pluralism’ and ‘Religious Harmony’ in Singapore”. Journal of Contemporary Religion 20, no. 1 (2005): 25–40. Straits Times. “6 in 10 Want Religious Input in Policy Making”. 16 July 2005. ———. “Communities Have Drawn Closer”. 20 February 2002. ———. “Govt Reins in Religious Leaders”. 12 May 2001. ———. “Hearing Out Religion in Public Debate”. 15 December 2004. Tamney, Joseph B. “Conservative Government and Support for Religious Institutions in Singapore: An Uneasy Alliance”. Sociological Analysis 53, no. 2 (1992): 201– 17. ———. “Religion and the State in Singapore”. Journal of Church and State 30 (1988): 109–28. Tan, Andrew. “Terrorism in Singapore: Threats and Implications”. Contemporary Security Policy 23, no. 3 (2002): 1–18. Tan, Eugene K. B. “Norming Moderation in an ‘Iconic Target’: Public Policy and the Regulation of Religious Anxieties in Singapore”. Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 4 (2007): 443–62. Tan, Jason. “The Politics of Religious Knowledge in Singapore Secondary Schools”. In Curriculum Politics, Policy and Practice, edited by Catherine Cornbleth, pp. 77–102. Albany, NY: State University of New York, 2000. Tan, Tai Wei. “Moral Education in Singapore: A Critical Appraisal”. Journal of Moral Education 23, no. 1 (1994): 61–73. Tan, Tai Wei and Chew Lee Chin. “Moral and Citizenship Education as Statecraft in Singapore: A Curriculum Critique”. Journal of Moral Education 33, no. 4 (2004): 597–606. Thio, Li-ann. “The Secular Trumps the Sacred: Constitutional Issues arising from Colin Chan v Public Prosecutor”. Singapore Law Review 16 (1995): 26–103. ———. “Recent Constitutional Developments: Of Shadows and Whips, Race, Rifts and Rights, Terror and Tudungs, Women and Wrongs”. Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2002): 328–73. ———. “Constitutional ‘Soft’ Law and the Management of Religious Liberty and Order: The 2003 Declaration of Religious Harmony”. Singapore Journal of Legal Studies (2004): 414–43. Tong, Chee Kiong. “Religion”. In The Making of Singapore Sociology: Society and State, edited by Tong Chee Kiong and Lian Kwen Fee, pp. 370–413. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2002. Transparency International. Global Corruption Barometer 2004. Berlin, 2004.

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Tu, Wei-Ming. Confucian Ethics Today: The Singapore Challenge. Singapore: Curriculum Development Institute of Singapore and Federal Publications, 1984. Wee, Vivienne. “ ‘Buddhism’ in Singapore”. In Singapore: Society in Transition, edited by Riaz Hassan, pp. 155–88. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976. Winslow, Valentine S. “The Separation of Religion and Politics: The Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act”. Malayan Law Review 32 (1990): 327–31. Cases Chan Hiang Leng Colin v PP [1994] 3 SLR 662 (High Court) Chan Hiang Leng Colin & Ors v Minister for Information and the Arts [1996] 1 SLR 609 (Court of Appeal) Nappalli Peter Williams v Institute of Technical Education [1999] 2 SLR 569 (Court of Appeal) Legislation Administration of Muslim Law Act (Cap. 3, 1999 Revised edition) Central Sikh Gurdwara Board Act (Cap. 357, 1985 Revised Edition) Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Revised edition) Hindu Endowments Act (Cap. 364, 1994 Revised edition) Internal Security Act (Cap. 143, 1985 Revised edition) Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act (Cap. 167A, 2001 Revised edition) Penal Code (Cap. 224, 1985 Revised edition) Public Entertainments and Meetings Act (Cap. 257, 2001 Revised edition) Sedition Act (Cap. 290, 1985 Revised edition) Societies Act (Cap. 311, 1985 Revised edition)

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4 DISCOURSES ON ISLAM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE SINGAPORE MUSLIM PUBLIC AZHAR IBRAHIM

INTRODUCTION This chapter highlights and evaluates the discourses on Islam that are found amongst the Singapore Muslim public. Understanding Islamic discourse in Singapore will be limited if one ignores the intellectual, cultural setting of the Muslim world of maritime Southeast Asia in which Singapore is geographically and culturally part of. In highlighting the types of discourses in the region, primarily in Malaysia and Indonesia, which exert some forms of influence on the local discourses on Islam, we are evaluating not only the types of discourse that are present and notably favoured, but also those that are absent and possibly not favoured.1 It is hoped that from this evaluation, we can reflect critically on some of the urgent and important issues in order to enhance the local discourses on Islam, bearing in mind the context and needs of the Singapore Muslim public. Generally local discourse on Islam amongst the Muslim public covers a wide array of subjects and issues, including the following: (1) pietistic devotionalism where traditionalistic understanding of religion forms its core; (2) the debate on reformism versus traditionalism, whereby both compete for the claim of “authenticity”; (3) the call for public (read community) morality 83

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in which deviancy and especially juvenile delinquency has been of some concern; (4) the denouncement of secularism and humanism as Western imports which are deemed as undermining Islam; (5) the Islamizing trends in Muslim intellectual and cultural life; (6) the advocation of plurality, diversity and freedom; and (7) the denouncement of violence and radicalism. These discourses, though discussed and debated amongst the Muslim intelligentsia, inevitably have effects on the thinking of the general Muslim public. However, the (under)development of certain discourses, is conditioned not so much by their strength and viability, but by “gatekeepers” who determine the setting and tone of discourse on Islam locally. This in turn, determines the types and quality of the discourse on Islam in Singapore.

Recent Interest in and/or Fascination about Islam In the post-September 11 era of anxiety over terrorism, we have witnessed a greater interest about Islam. Some are geared towards understanding Muslims better; some attempt to engage a critical discussion of views and ideas within Muslim society; others attempt to ascertain the link between Islam and radicalism/terrorism, while others seek inter-religious understanding,2 where previously few saw the importance of understanding Islam in context in Southeast Asia.3 An engaging critical discourse augurs well for a competition of ideas, especially where it induces a synthesis of perspectives. Today we can observe a steady increase in both quantity and quality of works on subjects pertaining to Muslims, especially those published in English.4 PostSeptember 11 has seen a more robust interest in Islam, to the point where it has created an “Islam industry” in academia and the mass media. There is a basic desire to know if and how Islam in Malay society might contribute or respond to present day radicalism and extremism.5 Some political scientists and sociologists have suddenly become “experts” on Islam or on Muslims in contrast to the pre-September 11 period when the concern for conducting research on Muslims’ religious life was relegated to a less prestigious academic enterprise, or deemed less scholarly.6 However, there remains a relative neglect of the study of the religious life of Singaporeans in general and Muslims in particular. This is because dominant discourse seems to be more interested in addressing present anxiety on religious extremism, moderate Islam and political Islam, all of which focus on whether Islam contributes to violence or offers an apologetic defence of it. This tendency demonstrates an example of the captive mind in the era where academic imperialism is still hegemonic.7 There are several instances where the concern within the discourse raise issues which are altogether irrelevant, imitative, repetitive and even misplaced. A bibliographic survey will indicate

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this. For example, one paper published in a local publication, echoes views that are not unlike the Islamists’ discourse of creating an Islamic state and how “Islam” should treat its non-Muslim subjects, even though ironically, in the local context, Muslims are themselves in a minority position.8 Another paper confidently refers to an index to measure the level of Islamic governance, without even problematizing much of the ambiguity of the concept of “Islamic state”,9 while some others repeat the clamour for Islamization of Malay socio-cultural and intellectual lives10 and the importance of cultivating the right dakwah (the call to make Muslims “better Muslims”).11 Interestingly, joining the chorus are local institutes that have recently developed interests on Islam and Muslims in Singapore and Southeast Asia.12 Institutional and academic discourse on Islam may not necessarily concern or pay serious attention to the types of religious orientations, practices and issues that are of interest to local Muslims themselves. This is partly due to two factors. First, inadequate or irrelevant questions are raised due to academic faddism and captive thinking in current scholarship as noted above,13 that is beset by the (re)production of dominant unthinking perspectives, such as to ascertain how “terroristic” Muslims are, and how their institutions, such as madrasahs, harbour extremist or terroristic tendencies. Second, the paucity and disinterest at the local level in studying local and religious life, as conditioned by the above factors, and because of a secular intellectual milieu where the subject of religion is seldom given priority, which hardly problematizes religious trends and practices.

DOMINANT AND PERIPHERAL THINKING AMONG MUSLIMS IN SINGAPORE Within Singapore’s Malay Muslim community, four broad strands of thinking and discourses can be identified: (a) religious traditionalism, (b) dakwah revivalism, (c) religious reformism, and (d) Sufi spiritualism.14 I will focus on the first two strands as they are dominant among Muslims in Singapore.

Religious Traditionalism and the Promotion of Piety A general survey of Muslim’s public discussion on Islam, be it in Malay or English, indicates a primary concern on aqidah (doctrinal affirmation), ritual practices and right ideas, and therefore the calling for avoidance or aversion of practices or thoughts that could undermine one’s aqidah. Traditionalism refers to “a tendency to cling to vegetative patterns, to old ways of life” and “a tendency to cling to the past and a fear of innovation”.15 A traditionalist-

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revivalists religious discourse is often marked by the concern with issues like aqidah16 and the dangers of deviating from it;17 the meanings of Prophetic Traditions;18 ritualistic laws concerning prayers19 and the warnings against those who neglect it;20 tithe and Islamic inheritance law;21 halal food;22 dressing and modesty especially hijab or tudung for women;23 the moral decadence and social problems of Muslims;24 the enhancement for ritual devotionalism and the importance of moral and good behaviour;25 matters concerning public uncertainty over ritualistic laws;26 the efficacy of the Sunni mazhab as opposed to any other schools of thought or Shiism;27 the (dis)unity of the Muslim ummah;28 the importance of dakwah propagation29 be it to Muslims or non-Muslims; the general explication of the basic teachings to Muslims and non-Muslims alike;30 and biographies of religious personalities.31 Religious instruction is provided by religious teachers (asatizah) whose teachings have wide public appeal not only in mosques and madrasahs but also in the local mass media. Generally, traditionalists claim that they are the true custodians and interpreters of Islam. Their main concern is to promote Muslim piety, both at individual and public levels. Hence morality in the public domain becomes their great concern. The traditionalist thinking basically views that religious piety can only be promoted and sustained if the environment is free from “un-Islamic” elements. Yet, it hardly poses any overt challenge to the status quo, which makes them different from the politically-inspired Islamist who aspires the restoration of syariah in Muslim society or the creation of an Islamic state. In the main, devotional discourse is aimed at promoting correct religious observation. One of its common lament is moral degeneration due to the abandonment of religious teachings and the neglect in providing religious education to the community, especially to youth who are often deemed as “deviant”, “lost” and “deserting” the religion. Thus it is not surprising that the drug addiction and alcohol consumption among Muslim youths are seen as a manifestation of “de-islamization” and therefore calls for a religious solution to this.32 Such demonization of youth for embracing “yellow culture” means little empathy on the issues and challenges that this group encounters. Religious traditionalists see tradition as the perfection of ideas and values formulated in the pristine past as opposed to the corrupted present, and that the reformists’ advocation for change and reformulation of some religious concept is unwarranted and misleading.33 Such a historical and romanticized reading of the past ignores or rejects the intellectual affirmation of present day scholarship which is inclined to see that a critical attitude towards one’s tradition can be as a source of empowerment and dynamism, especially when there is a 86

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contextual discernment.34 At the same time, in recent years, we see asatizah groups (as represented in Singapore Religious Scholars’ Association, PERGAS) increasingly participating in a more intellectual type of discourse,35 partly motivated by their intellectual interests and partly in response to the challenge posed by critical perspectives from contemporary scholars on subjects relating to Islam and Muslims. PERGAS leadership’s criticisms of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies initiatives that brought in two speakers from Indonesia and Malaysia for a public forum is a case in point.36 That episode demonstrates a response by a local group that claims to be a custodian of the religion but that is not comfortable with alternative voices that differ from or are against its own. The advocates of traditionalism and neo-traditionalism are to be distinguished from those revivalists who champion an Islamic alternative. Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, whose works are ironically celebrated in revivalist circles, for instance, criticizes the preoccupation with the creation of an Islamic state and the like. Such thinking, according to him, allows for the neglect of “an Islamic personhood”: “Now it is true that the Ummah and the Islamic state are paramount in Islam, but so is the individual Muslim, for how can the Ummah and the Islamic state be developed and established if individual Muslims…are no longer good Muslims.”37 In general, religious traditionalism more than religious modernism is dominant in the local religious discourse. However, to understand this dominant religious orientation is crucial, not just for a better appreciation and understanding of the religious life of the Malays, but also to highlight the importance, in the context of the increasing interest on Islam discourse, that it is sheer naivety to simply link religious devotionalism with religious radicalism, sometimes even to the point of linking all religious learning conducted informally or through madrasahs with breeding radicalism and terrorism.38

The Dakwah Calling or the so-called Revivalism The dakwah phenomenon that began to appear in the mid-seventies has had an impact on the intellectual discourse of Islam in Singapore. As a socioreligious and cultural phenomenon, it can be explained by the popular religious sentiments that arose from several sources in various Muslim societies since the World War II.39 But its internal dynamics stem from the recurrent call to Muslims to improve their lives and strive towards a more progressive living, through an essentially “Islamic framework” that is imagined as authentic for Muslims. 87

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The dakwah in Singapore initially emerged, like the dakwah phenomenon in Malaysia, within the local university campus, but in the subsequent decades have significantly affected the religio-cultural awareness of the larger Muslim community.40 The dakwah intellectual interest is much like that of ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia/The Islamic Youth Movement) in Malaysia, both in content and pedagogical style. The dakwah phenomenon can be observed in various sectors of Muslim life, at campus, with Muslim student bodies actively promoting and local mosques’ committees, together with a few other Malay-Muslim organizations. Darul Arqam of Singapore for instance, was formed at the height of religious revivalism to facilitate the conversion of non-Muslims to the fold of Islam.41 In general, the dakwah period was characterized by a growing confidence that Islam is the significant solution (if not the solution) for the community’s predicament.42 The concern of guiding “Muslims to become better Muslims” stems from the moralistic injunction of “forbidding evil and enjoining good” (amal maaruf nahi mungkar) as well an outlook to improve the lot of the Muslims through a “return” to Islam. It was also during this period, a time of transition in the processes of modernization and urbanization, that we see an anxiety over a number of issues deemed as needing urgent address. These are: (1) the intellectual development of Muslim undergraduates and the importance of filling the “leadership vacuum”;43 (2) how modern challenges affect or erode Muslim identity;44 (3) the economic participation of Muslims in supposedly “unIslamic” institutions and mechanisms;45 (4) Malay-Muslim educational under-achievement and the need to improve the madrasah education system.46 At the height of the so-called revivalist enthusiasm, there was great faith that the dakwah movement could make a difference in the lives of MalayMuslims, especially through the role of undergraduates and university graduates to lead the community, since this group, as hailed by one writer, is “better equipped with the Islamic concept as an ideology”. As attested in the following rhetorical idealism: if we truly desire the Islamic dakwah movement to move energetically, all existing shortcomings must be eradicated. It is important that we integrate our efforts. For this we need common interest, and towards this we have to unite. We are being confronted by various anti-God “isms”, the first example being communism. Countering communism is a very basic task in Islam as it denies the existence of God. We are also faced with the danger from other materialistic “isms” besides communism. As a person who professes a religion, it is our duty to attack all anti-God movements — with all our resources.47 88

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In short the enthusiasm for dakwah activism echoed the concern and conviction that Muslims need to preserve their identity, and that their participation in modernity is in consonance with religious teaching as long as the participation is not void of spiritual and religious dimensions. Nevertheless there were cautious and critical views of the dakwah activism. As one writer, then a student activist, opined: The emphasis given by Singapore revivalists on the “Islamic State” is yet another reflection of a misfocusing of priorities. While the commitment to the concept and ideal articulated and expressed as practical deeds is understandable for Muslim communities that are majorities in their particular polities, the situation is totally different for those who those that are minorities.48

Indeed, the above remark is still relevant today. We still come across, from time to time, discussions which are highly utopian, such as on how and whether syariah is to be restored and how Muslims can live in a secular state, since there is such an idea that it is only in an Islamic state and environment that Muslims can live “authentically”.49 It was during the dakwah period, alongside an emerging intelligentsia educated and conversant in discoursing in English, that we see an “intellectualization” of Islam discourse and the increasing publication on Islam in English, especially works by “revivalist” figures. The rhetorical South African-born Ahmad Deedat, at one time venerated as an “intellectual hero” with his famous fiery religious debates and open challenges, articulated in English and impressed the post-independent generations who were no longer satisfied with the traditional pietistic calling of their parents’ generations. The dakwah movement that permeated in university campus conducted usrah (informal study circles) for Muslim undergraduates. The campus usrah had always been an avenue for discussion, but the subject matter until then was often concerned with matters of worship and devotion (and perfecting it), rather than on wider socio-cultural issues.50 The undergraduates’ publications of Sedar and later The Fount journals, reflected the state of intellectual preoccupation and interest amongst them in which there was a preponderance of ideas of revivalists from Egypt (Syed Qutb and Hassan al-Banna) and Pakistan (Abu A’la Maududi).51 Outside the campus, youth organizations such Muslim Youth Assembly (HBI), now defunct, were active in initiating discourse on Islam, which saw the publication of Syed Qutb’s Milestone (n.d.) and Muhammad Hamidullah’s Introduction to Islam (1981), popular amongst the enthusiasts of revivalism in Singapore, as well as in the region.52 89

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In summary, the dakwah endeavour is one that advocates socio-political, cultural and intellectual Islamism, and speaks of the need for Muslims to embrace “authenticity” which is imagined to have existed in the glorious past. Indeed, this search for an “authentic” model and identity has been the hallmark in the revivalist period. Where the early reformists (salaffiyah) called for the return to the prophetic “pristine past” yet were accommodating to Western technology and scientific achievements, the revivalists also read the history of the classical past as something truly “Islamic”, to be restored or emulated. But they perceive the modern era as being dominated by Western thought and paradigms, and is secular for Muslims and must therefore be resisted by Muslims. At the same time, they are not all puritan since they have no qualms about consuming the products and achievements of present modernity. They have no problems adopting Western concepts like democracy, social sciences, technology and the like, except that they add an “Islamic” adjective to them, such as “Islamic economics” and “Islamic democracy”). Secularism has become the revivalists’ number one enemy, given their simplistic binary thinking that all ideas and institutions originating from the West is secular/atheistic while theirs is Islamic. This is attested by the many pamphlets that are produced which not only attack secularism as a Western import but also Muslims whom they think are impiously secular. Where decades ago the reformist and modernist groups came under strong criticism by the traditionalists,53 the present-day neo-traditionalists and revivalists portray the reformist/liberal groups as a sell-out or simply outside the fold of Islam.54 Often, in their enthusiasm to impose their “holistic and comprehensive” Islamic mode of thinking and practice, revivalists are insensitive to the prevailing practices and ideas that are found in their society. They celebrate the revivalism of Islam without giving much thought to the cultural and historical contexts and conditioning of certain practices which they are too quick to condemn as un-Islamic. This offends the older generation of Muslims.55

Rhetorics of Cultural and Intellectual Islamization Moreover, revivalists see that Muslims can become true and developed Muslims only with the establishment of Islamic institutions. The present situation where Muslims live in a polity that is yet to be “Islamic” is viewed as darurat, denoting that it is something “permissible” for the time being but has to be changed or corrected ultimately. Therefore, it is not uncommon amongst this group to harbour the notion of creating an Islamic state. In their evangelistic mode, very much through pamphleteering, ceramahs (speeches), and usrahs, they set to embark on cultural Islamization of their society, covering all

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aspects of life they can imagine. Every facet of human issues and problems are offered an “Islamic perspective”. Thus there is much enthusiasm in economics, science, linguistics, education, anthropology, banking, literature and other disciplines that are deemed better when given “Islamic perspectives” and theologically in consonance with the Islamic faith. The International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) based in the United States, spearheaded this Islamization project, which to date remains a rhetorical call with more pietistic concerns than scientific inquisitiveness, and oftentimes props up shoddy perspectives but is protected from scrutiny by virtue of its selfproclaimed “Islamic” perspectives. It is no surprise that young undergraduates, especially those who are not able to make sense of modernity or are poorly informed on the intellectual and modern history of present civilizations, see the propositions of the Islamization of knowledge as viable and efficacious, while modern (read Western) knowledge are considered wayward and problematic.56 In this discourse, theological certainty and the affirmation of faith is its prime concern rather than a scientific and humanistic endeavour to understand man and nature. As a result, theory of knowledge and all its epistemic hairsplitting takes centre stage, rather than pedagogical and sociological theorizing/ praxis geared towards addressing society’s pressing problems. In the anxiety to prove the tauhidic (doctrinal affirmation on the unity of God) superiority of this Islamic science, this project incessantly criticizes Western thought as ungodly, secularist, materialistic, relativistic and the like, as if all in the West think monolithically. Simply put, by demonizing “Western” epistemology, it automatically affirms the validity of the authentic Islamic science, when the very idea that is promoted is actually anti-intellectual and anti-scientific. At a closer look, the preoccupation of Islamizing the sciences demonstrates, on the one hand, a desire to participate in science and to appropriate the fruits of modernity. On the other hand, there is a puritanical tendency that aims to eradicate any kind of questioning of the project’s absolute dogmatism. Its concern for science is even more limited. It is not even exploring and developing science in order to bring Muslim societies out of underdevelopment; it only wants to prove that Western-derived sciences are theologically unacceptable to Islam and therefore a danger to Muslims. Thus it is no surprise that there is no concrete development or advancement that has come about from this much discussed Islamizing of knowledge and science.57 Instead we hear endless narcissistic rhetoric on the supposedly superior Islamic epistemology over Western ones, its favourite target being “Western” relativism which is seen as bad in comparison to its absolutism. Some have even gone on to claim how science was promoted in Islamdom, in contrast to the church’s Inquisition that hampered scientific pursuit.

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This historical romanticism feeds superior feelings based on the glories of a “golden past”, yet remains ignorant of the depressing state of present Muslim societies. In its pious tone, it asserts that science mastered and practised must be directed to serve God; yet it remains arrogant in refusing to address concrete human problems like poverty, malnutrition, underemployment, shortage of land and resources, corruption and many others that have plagued many societies.

The Malaysian Connection And The Indonesian (Mis)Connection The drive towards a re-intensification of religious life is the hallmark of the dakwah phenomenon in Singapore. Dakwah is seen as not only making Muslims better Muslims but also as leading the way for them to attain development and progress. However, unlike its counterparts in Malaysia and Indonesia, the dakwah enthusiasm in Singapore was more marked by activism than intellectualism, even though the dakwah activists who were active in the 1970s such as Himpunan Belia Islam (HBI) could not sustain their vigorous conviction. Generally the Malaysian connection asserts more influence on Singaporean Muslims than the Indonesian counterpart, due to linguistic and cultural affinity, the ease of communication and travel, easy availability and distribution of works, and similar socio-political and intellectual environments between Malaysia and Singapore. The height of the dakwah period in the 1970s saw the prominent leadership of ABIM, religious scholarship with neo-traditionalistic outlook and preachers and scholars well known for their critical views on issues pertaining to Muslim religious life.58 The formation of the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) and International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC),59 saw Muslim Singaporeans enrolling in these institutions of higher learning, apart from the traditional Middle Eastern universities in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan. It is interesting to note that there are more young Singaporean Muslims enrolled in IIUM or ISTAC than in the reformist Indonesian institutions of religious learning such as the Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) where, at the Syarif Hidayatullah campus in Jakarta, the Paramadina circle and other reformistic-liberal groups can be found.60 In short, the Malaysian discourse, which has greater preponderance to the exclusivist tenor commonly found among revivalists, has set the tone for the local discourse, in comparison to the Indonesian reformist-modernist scholarship. Therefore it is not unusual that the local discourses is familiar with revivalist and neo-traditionalist Malaysian scholars of Islam such as Syed 92

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Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, Muhammad el-Muhammady and Haron Din (whose works are commonly available here) than with those reformist-minded Indonesia scholars like Nurcholish Madjid, Harun Nasution, Moeslim Abdurahman and Abdul Munir Mulkhan.61 In fact many prominent ABIM leading figures such as Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Sidek Fadil and Mohd Nor Manuty are well known in local circles and whose works are easily available in local bookstores. In recent years, especially with emerging degree/ diploma tie-ups with Malaysian universities, there is a greater presence of Malaysian scholars of Islam conducting courses in Singapore.62 The connections with Malaysia and Indonesia have led one political scientist to note the following: In Indonesia, Islamization has taken on broader and generally less legalistic forms. There is a thriving liberal Islam movement and a continuing emphasis on “deconfessionalised” or pluralist political discourse. Islamization has not led to a demonstrable rise in Islamism…In Malaysia, by contrast, Islamization has resulted in a more narrow and exclusivist manifestation of the faith. Islamist sentiment is rising, leading to a much wider array of shari’a based statutes….63

Such an observation also tells us about the type of discourse from Malaysia that penetrates or diffuses into Singapore.64 For example, the dichotomous idiom of secular-religious common in Malaysian Islam discourse can also be found in its repetitive expression in Singapore. In contrast, the Indonesian reformistic circles of Harun Nasution, Nurcholish Madjid, Abdul Munir Mulkhan, Moeslim Abdurahman and few others are hardly known in the local discourse on Islam. The young Indonesian Muslim intellectuals who are critical of traditionalism, such as the late Ahmad Wahib and Ulil-Abshar Abdalla, who are bent on re-constructionism, are hardly known here65 except for the denouncements against them by the conservative ulamas in Indonesia. Another obvious absence is the rationalistic theological school of thought (known as Muktazilite) initiated by the Indonesian, Harun Nasution.66 Interestingly, not only are these ideas absent in the local discourse, the Singapore Muslim public is even warned of such works as the local distribution of books on Islam would suggest.67 The lack of exposure to such writing is unfortunate, since the Indonesian critical discourses are fairly grounded in social sciences and pluralistic appreciation of the Islamic traditions, apart from their contextual discernment and tenor in addressing the issues of time and place. In general, there is weak intellectual relationship established with the scholarship of contemporary Indonesian Islam as promoted in the leading 93

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Indonesian Muslim universities and think-tanks. On the contrary, scholarpreachers from Malaysia are well received, albeit still selectively. Malaysian scholar-preachers like Harun Din, Amran Kasimin and Ismail Kamus are household names that are known for their ceramah, workshops and forums. Almost unknown are a group of Malaysian scholars who engage in a much more rigorous and critical scholarship on Islam, such Mohd Faisal Othman, Mohd Nasir Omar, Farish A. Noor, and even the controversial Kassim Ahmad, whose writings are available in both English and Malay.

The Vehemence against Secularism Ever since Syed Muhammad Naguib Al-Attas’ publication of Islam and Secularism, the criticism and condemnation of secularism has become even more popular in the discourse of Islam in the Malaysian and Singapore contexts. The prime target of the revivalists’ critique of the predicament of contemporary society is now secularism. The latter is seen as an antithesis to authentic Islam, which is deemed as a holistic system or way of life that can be the antidote to all modern frailties and excesses.68 One obvious feature of this anti-secularism is the inability to distinguish between the process of secularization in society and secularism as a sociopolitical outlook.69 The dichotomous distinction of the religious and secular is not only intellectually problematic, but also generates psychological anxiety, since the secular phenomenon is deemed as necessarily irreligious or could undermine religion itself. The following statement on the negativities of secularism is expressed in the following article published in Risalah, a PERGAS’ publication: …. pemikiran sekular boleh dihinggapi oleh mereka yang bergelar Muslim jika konsep dan tasawwur Islam yang betul tidak diterapkan kepada mereka. Ini juga adalah kerana ummat Islam, semenjak zaman penjajahan telah pun terdedah kepada sistem pendidikan dualistik. Kesyumulan Islam seolah-olah tidak diakui dalam pendidikan umum, walaupun kebebasan beragama diakui secara dasarnya. [Translation: Secular thoughts can be manifested by those who claim to be Muslims especially if correct Islamic concepts and worldviews are not imbibed by them. This is because the Muslim community since the colonial period has been exposed to a dualistic educational system. The holistic dimension of Islam is not recognised in the education system, even though freedom of religious belief is recognised generally].70

A binary position taken is common as if the ideological trapping of modernity stands between two poles: the Western-derived secular modern system and 94

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the “authentic Islamic” worldview (tasawur). In this thinking, it is imperative that the Islamic alternative takes a stand against the debilitating effects of secularism. Clearly, not only is the dichotomous distinction made between Islam and secularism hardly problematized,71 it is as if when one accepts a secular institution and system, then he/she does not take Islam holistically.

BETWEEN MODERATE AND MEDIOCRE IDEAS Another topic of interest in the post-9/11 environment is to distinguish between the moderation as preached in Islam against those groups that legitimize violence in its name. Explaining such a distinction to the larger public becomes a particularly important challenge. One example is a book published by Muhammad Haniff Hassan entitled Muslim … moderate … Singaporean = Muslim … moderat … warga Singapura.72 On the one hand, the book is a commendable effort in explaining the importance of moderation as a principle in social life, and also to assuage the non-Muslim public that local Muslims are committed to peace and reject radicalism. On the other hand, the breadth and depth of its deliberation leaves much to be desired, as it is beset by many problematic assumptions and reductionism which point to the limitations of the ideas and idioms of currency in the local discourse on Islam. These include the primacy of ulamas whose opinions and deliberations must be sought as they are considered the custodians of Islam and the only legitimate group to give an “authentic” version and explanation on Islam. While claiming to explain Islam’s moderation in a multi-racial context, it also appears as defensive and apologetic. The writer himself speaks as though there is one “representative” interpretation of Islam. Apart from an absence of a thorough and rigorous discussion on moderation, be it in reference to classical and contemporary sources, the book’s leitmotif is more one of ambivalence and inconsistency of argument, rather than a substantive advocation of what constitutes the virtues of moderation. An example from the book illustrates the author’s ambiguity, utopian thinking and exclusivist position: We cannot deny that the legal system in most countries often do not share the philosophy of Islam. Nevertheless, this is not a justification for us to totally reject all existing laws or to love in total disregard of laws…We should not be silent to the policies and laws that are opposed to the principles of syariah. These are the munkar that we are obligated to correct either with our hands, words or at least in our hearts. Now how do we accomplish this? We need to prioritize the issues that have to be addressed based on the degree of the maslahat, mudarat….This 95

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should be accomplished through the process of consultation between various official religious authorities, ulama and religious organizations. Laws that are in conflict with the syariah are of various types….There are a few aspects of criminal laws in Singapore that may be inconsistent with the syariah or Hudud. Nevertheless to change them now would be unrealistic and beyond the capability of existing da’wah work while raising them as issues would be a waste of current resources. In addition, such actions may raise unnecessary oppositions that will complicate da’wah activities and the practice of Islam. On the other hand to neglect or the failure to uphold those laws could result in social problems that will affect the Muslim community as weak. It is also important to note that in areas where there are conflicts, the solution may not necessarily be to promulgate or change the particular laws. Instead in the issue of banking, a better solution would be to offer an alternative to the current banking institutions. With such alternatives, Muslims are able to free themselves of the unIslamic practice while displaying the beauty of Islam (Muhammad Haniff Hassan, 2003 pp. 16–17).

Many of the views expressed are problematic, for example: (1) that syariah laws are the only legitimate laws to be upheld by Muslims; (2) that the prevailing economic arrangements are un-Islamic; and (3) the simplistic equating of syariah with hudud.73 Neither is Islamic banking referred to as a more Islamic alternative anywhere when discussed and its viability is accepted at the surface level only.74 It also gives the impression that all Muslims (or Islam) have a single monolithic view on the subject of politics, law, economics, etc. For instance, the book claims that “the legal systems in most countries often do not share the philosophy of Islam.”75 But is there the legal system that Muslims should subscribe to, and was there ever one in history? Such a position is akin to the Islamists’ claim of “Islamic perspectives” on the state, economy, politics, culture and the like. Moreover, contemporary institutions of politics and economics are simply denounced and brushed aside as “unlslamic”, without any justification of what is inherently “un-Islamic” in these institutions and how “Islamic” their alternatives are. Moreover, the book does not fundamentally espouse the importance and significance of moderate views vis-à-vis extremist ones, but is more a defensive reminder that nowhere should Muslims compromise their religious conviction, especially when encountering issues that affect the larger society. For instance, on the question of syariah (invariably understood as hudud) Muslims should take the following position: The issue of moderate Muslim and others pertaining to Muslims in Singapore will become more critical in the future. Soon we should 96

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expect Muslims in Singapore to be required to make their stand on the issues of the Hudud law and establishment of an Islamic state. With a clear concept of moderate Muslims, Singaporean Muslims should be able to explain concepts like national integration, social integration, nation building and the Singapore identity, which are often posed by non-Muslims. Nonetheless, in this process, we should not ingratiate ourselves by trying to please all parties or specific groups. We have to be clear on the areas in which we disagree on, and where disagreement exists, we should uphold the principles of peaceful process, law and harmonious ties with society. (Muhammad Haniff Hassan 2003, pp. 6–7)

However, the following can be asked: (1) Does “non-acceptance” mean a doctrinal compromise or irreligiosity?76 (2) Is there one single opinion that syariah, especially its hudud manifestation, should be accepted by all Muslims? That the book claims to represent “Islam” also reflects exclusivist thinking even though it claims intellectual and religious openness. Finally, despite the repeated affirmation of the need to be contextual even amongst the religious circles, there is hardly any concrete discussion on the realities of contemporary society and how institutional and individual agency can offer and/or impede moderation. In other words, the moderation that is advocated is still a normative assertion, and its analysis is hardly being put in the context of today’s realities. Basically the book argues that moderation is enjoined by Islam, but care and qualification must be made so that this moderation is not in conflict with religious precepts. Herein lies the main problem of such apologetic and idealistic deliberations in many religious discourses — of being more committed to textual adherence than being sensitive to contextual needs. Here, a perceptive view of the Indonesian scholar Hasyim Muzadi, also a leader of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), is relevant: [The] apologetic attitude tends to be normative and idealistic. It seems to wish for the ability to address all problems of humanity by adopting, formally and directly, religious doctrines as written in the holy book. This is the reason that this attitude tends to disregard reality. Even when they see reality, whatever they see must be succumbed to the orthodoxy of religious texts. This attitude is taken as a defense mechanism to protect them from outside threats, challenges, and criticisms.77

The Preacher Sets the Pitch In a religious discourse marked by religious devotionalism the existence of religious forums, lectures and sermons remain largely centred on doctrinal 97

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affirmations and pietistic and moralistic advocations. Certain subjects predominate over others. For instance, there are more lectures and forums that highlight virtuous women as pious wives and mothers,78 instead of deliberating on the subject of Muslim women’s challenges in modern contexts and patriarchal biases.79 Subjects of eschatological narrations, fantastical miraculous feats as experienced by great religious personalities and the warning of the imminent coming of the Day of Judgement are, from time to time, impressed upon the Muslim public, instead of engagement in issues and challenges facing contemporary Muslim society.80 The height of the dakwah era saw overseas preachers like Ahmad Deedat of South Africa and Imran Hoessein of Trinidad enticing the local Muslim audience with their captivating and thundering evangelical predictions and imaginings. Interestingly, such speakers, especially Imran Hoessein, were invited several times, which suggests the general inclination and receptivity towards the eschatological imaginings about the imminent end of the world with the coming of a messiah. Apparently, when such claims were repeated again and again, there were hardly any critiques made by the religious authorities or amongst the educated Muslim intelligentsia. The call for preparedness for the coming of the end of the world is not just an eschatological explication but surely has psychological ramifications on the local Muslim public. At a time when Singaporean Muslims need to be informed and exposed to the importance of accommodation and creativity in adjusting and adapting to the challenges of modernization, they hear instead religious preachers who, without responsible qualification, doom the present reality as an antithesis to Islam. Furthermore, when such rhetoric is made in salvational tones, it is likely to attract more of those who have adjustment problems or are despaired by the current situation. It was also in the context of the evangelical Christian missionaries’ attempt to proselytize among the local Malay community in the late 1970s and 1980s, which caused much anxiety and dissatisfaction, that Ahmad Deedat’s fiery speeches became popular and his books and speeches widely distributed in some local bookstores, even until today. At present, the local religious discourse is still being enamoured by moving sermons and speeches of preachers from Indonesia. A.A. Gym of Indonesia is currently a favourite household name, where the equally gifted preachers, Zainuddin M.Z. and Habib Sheikh al-Jufri used to be. From Malaysia preacher-scholar personalities like Ismail Kamus, Prof. Harun Din, Dr Hassan Ali, Muhammad el-Muhammady and Dr Masitah Ibrahim are as popular as ever both in media and lavish forums and seminars. 98

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A Selective Bibliographic World The availability of literature related to Islam is also conditioned by its dominant discourse. Popular and devotional religious writings seem to dominate the market. Recent publications are hardly of any serious studies about Malay-Muslim society of Singapore.81 Books written in Malay are mainly from Malaysia and Indonesia, in which the revivalist and neotraditionalist writings predominate. In many cases, it is easier to find works that criticize Muslim reformism and liberalism by conservative/ Islamist writers than those by reformists and liberals.82 Their apologetic and defensive tenor is reminiscent of the journalism and pamphleteering on Islam in the 1970s and 1980s. Translations of exclusivist and revivalist works are also easily available, such as those by Maududi, Maryam Jameelah and Syed Qutb. One significant addition today is the various works by Sheikh Yusuf Qardawi, which range from critiques against secularism to issues on women, syariah, terrorism and many other legal fatwas.83

SCHOLARSHIP AND INTELLECTUAL CHALLENGE IN ISLAMIC DISCOURSE Internal intellectual dynamics also contribute directly to the Islamic discourse in Singapore. In this, the presence of a critical pool of leading intellectuals is crucial. For example, in the 1970s and early 1980s, Syed Hussein Alatas, who lectured and lived in Singapore then was active in writing, publishing and giving talks both within and without campus. His book Kita Dengan Islam, Tumbuh Tidak Berbuah (Islam and Us: A Growth Without Fruit, 1979) is a collection of critical essays that focused on the problems of Muslim societies of today, especially in the Malay-Indonesian context. His book Biarkan Buta (Let Them Be Blind, 1974), a compilation of debates between MUIS and himself on the issues of organ donation that were published in Berita Harian, was the first intellectual challenge against a religious administration, questioning openly the justification for the prohibition of organ donation by the local fatwa ruling council.84 Alatas was also known for his sociological and critical diagnosis of society’s problems and challenges, and is an example of a public intellectual who demonstrates the commitment to speak truth to power. Nowadays however, the local Muslim intelligentsia is generally not at the forefront of discourse even though it has more exposure to reformist, revivalist or liberal ideas. There is also greater receptivity to traditionalist and revivalist 99

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discourses, while modernist and reformistic ones are kept at a distance, perhaps occasionally read, quoted and acknowledged, but hardly promoted publicly. A selective discourse is at work here and group ideology and interest may well explain this. As gatekeeper and custodian of Islam, the religious circles (asatizah/ulama) determine what is legitimate and authentic discourse. Even Muslim professionals who are not confident of their own knowledge about Islam readily consult the asatizah/ulamas. The challenge of intellectualizing the discourse on Islam depends on two inter-related factors. The first is that religious scholars move beyond religious devotionalism into research and deliberation on how religion affects society and vice versa. The second is the opening up of spaces for Muslim intellectuals and the educated public to engage in critical and pluralistic perspectives on the challenges that the local community is facing. In recent years, MUIS has been active in inviting scholars of contemporary Islam to give talks to the local Muslim public, such as Asghar Ali Engineer, Tariq Ramadan, Abdullahi An’Naim, and Chandra Muzaffar.85 This is a good step, though selection of lecture themes is critical so that the scholars’ expertise can be tapped to give insights into local issues,86 alongside the local intelligentsia’s discernment of their own problems and contexts. If in the past, this was predominantly led by religious preachers, today they are mostly academics who have taught in Euro-American universities. However, these talks are exclusively in English which, while much welcomed by English-medium audiences, is inaccessible to the Malay heartlanders whose medium of religious deliberation is primarily Malay. Here, there seems to be a disjuncture in which more educated and English-speaking groups are exposed to contemporary international Muslim scholars, whereas a significant majority are limited in their exposure to only religious preaching and instructions by local and regional religious teachers who focus primarily on devotional religious life, rituals, and sometime mysticism.87 As religious traditionalism predominates in the religious discourse, the space for reformist and critical discourses on Islam is much circumscribed. Generally, revivalist thinking since the 1970s has brought some changes in the choice of lifestyles, practices and ideas amongst the Muslim public. However, they are essentially not different from the traditionalists’ standpoints, apart from showing more interest in diverse topics and concerns that affect Muslims. The dakwah preoccupation amongst student organizations in campuses and in Malay Muslims non-government organizations (NGOs) like Jamiyah88 and Darul Arqam means there is little space and recognition for intellectual discourse on Islam, since the main concern is to ensure and preserve the intensification of Muslims’ religious life. 100

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The current intellectual opening up among local religious teachers and elites will determine the future discourse on Islam in Singapore. Even as more asatizah engage in the discussion of socio-political and cultural issues that affect the community, this does not necessarily mean an automatic improvement in the quality in deliberation. As long as there is a persistent dichotomous view between the “religious” and the “secular” sciences, the asatizah themselves are denied of an intellectual culture that can provide critical and creative insights. Nor should they be expected to be the “expert” or sole authority on every topic of societal concern ranging from medical ethics to banking operations and moral decadence. Muslim intellectuals in their various capacities as academics and professionals can contribute towards a more substantive, critical and contextual discourse on Islam that is particularly cognizant of and sensitive to local needs. What is also needed is the participation of concerned citizens in the discourse. Within a diversity of interpretations and engagement, there can be no single group that can claim exclusive rights to the interpretation or representation of Islam. An intellectual environment unfettered by the fear of censure by a moral authority must first be created as a public space for critical engagement and deliberation. Moreover, the quality of critical discourse can only be improved with serious engagement of contexts and multi-disciplinary perspectives. Content-wise, a rigorous, critical engagement with the Islamic religious and intellectual traditions of the past and present is necessary, going beyond current romanticism and apologetics. Last but not least, participation by all, without the fear of being morally excluded and labelled as unfaithful to the religion, must exist in all public discourses.

CONCLUSION The voices of critical perspectives are few and far in between. Intellectual discourse can only emerge if there is an engaging and critical environment for an exchange of ideas and that are always being corrected and reformulated based on contextual needs. If the intelligentsia itself remains intellectually insular, confining religion to the domain of ritual perfection and piety,89 then one cannot expect a high degree of intellectual deliberation and creativity. The latter is further hampered if there is a pervasive sentiment of anti-intellectualism and imitative scholarship or lack of interest, especially among the middle classes, who are better educated and have access to intellectual resources. As in many other societies, there is no monolithic discourse on Islam in Singapore. This chapter highlights the dominant types of discourse that have 101

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emerged within the local Muslim community. Furthermore, being in a similar linguistic and cultural space, Singapore Muslims’ discourse mirrors and is very much influenced by their Malaysian traditionalist and revivalist counterparts.90 The reformist or modernist Indonesian and even Malaysian discourses are hardly known or well received. Including the critical perspectives from Indonesian Islam, which integrates perspectives from the social sciences, would enhance the local discourse in breadth and depth.91 This would also be a positive response to the regular call for the opening of spaces for critical multi-perspectives on Islam: “the tradition of a healthy debate within the community, as found say in places such as Indonesia and Iran, is central to the very essence and spirit of Islam.”92 The pedagogical aspects of how Islam is being taught and discussed are as important as the contents. The issue is as much one of critical depth as expanding the breadth of discussion. A discourse that is primarily concerned with devotional commitment to religious precepts is inevitably an instructional one and in many cases involves memorization which in turn hampers creativity and critique. A civic and democratic kind of orientation within the religious discourse is therefore needed in order to mitigate the exclusivist and ahistorical thinking from dominating the intellectual landscape.93 Likewise, an intellectual discourse which neglects or is prejudicial to religion will not be able to comprehend the dynamics of a particular society in which religion is central to its worldview and practices. Most significantly, the study of Islam in Singapore cannot afford to ignore the historical, geographical and cultural contexts in which Singaporean Muslims are located and feel they belong. In the midst of the anxiety to comprehend how Islam is manifested in Malay-Muslim society, its contextual and particular understanding must be recognized before we readily import foreign experts and consultants from far away contexts to tell us about Muslims and Islam in Singapore and the region, under the false assumption that all Muslims think, (re)act and feel uniformly regardless of time and space.94

Notes The author wishes to thank Dr Lai Ah Eng and Dr Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman whose encouragement is always inspiring. Views expressed herein remain solely the author’s responsibility. 1. For a general survey on studies on Malays and Muslims of Singapore, see Syed Farid Alatas, Keadaan Sosiologi Masyarakat Melayu (Singapore: Association of Muslim Professionals, 1997); Hussin Mutalib, “Muslim Studies in Singapore”; Abdullah Alwi Hj Hassan, “Islam di Singapura: Satu Pengenalan”. 2. See Syed Farid Alatas, “Islam and the West after September 11, 2001”. 102

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3. See Houben, “Southeast Asia and Islam”, pp. 149–70; Stark, “Beyond ‘Terrorism’ and ‘State Hegemony’, pp. 307–27; Rahim, “The Road Less Traveled: Islamic Militancy in Southeast Asia”, pp. 209–32. 4. These are not new since there are several academic studies and publications on Malays and Islam carried out at the Department of Malay Studies, NUS. Amongst others are theses by Chandra Muzaffar, Tham Seong Chee, Shaharuddin Maaruf, Sa’eda Buang, Sharon Siddique, Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman, Azhar Ibrahim and a few others. Refer to Department of Malay Studies Handbook, NUS, 2004. 5. See for instance, Tan “Terrorism in Singapore: Threat and Implications”, pp. 1–18; Desker, “The Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Phenomenon in Singapore”, pp. 489–507. 6. See Shaharuddin Maaruf, “The Social Sciences in Southeast Asia: Sociology of Anti-Sociology and Alienated Social Sciences”, in Syed Farid Alatas, ed., Reflections on Alternative Discourses from Southeast Asia, pp. 88–103. 7. On this subject see Syed Hussein Alatas, “Academic Imperialism”, pp. 32–46. 8. Read Muhammad Haniff Hassan, “Clarifying the Concept of Dar Al-Islam & Dar Al-Harb and the Relationship between Muslims & Non-Muslims”, pp. 3–7. 9. Muhammad Haniff Hassan, “Towards an Index of Islamic Governance”. 10. Zhulkeflee Hj. Ismail, “Melayu Baru”, pp. 3–5. A contrasting view, also in response to Islamization of Malay cultural lives, can be found in Imran Hashim, “Changing Nature of Malay Identity”, pp. 16–17. 11. Mohamad Hannan bin Hassan, “Dakwah Bukan Hanya Usaha Menyampaikan Islam Sahaja”, pp. 9–12. 12. Also, consider the research, forums and publications initiated by local MalayMuslim organizations such as Research Institute of Malay Affairs and Centre of Contemporary Islamic Studies. In recent years, there have been several initiatives made by local organizations, including MUIS, to organize conferences on Islam and Muslims. 13. See Syed Hussein Alatas, “Intellectual Imperialism: Definition, Traits, and Problems”, pp. 23–45. 14. This point is deliberated by Azhar Ibrahim in “Critical Perspectives on Contemporary Islamic Thought”. 15. Karl Mannheim, “Conservative Thought”, pp. 95, 99; see Towler, The Need for Certainty: A Sociological Study of Conventional Religion. 16. Mohd Abdai Rathomy, Tiga Serangkai Sendi Agama: Tauhid, Fiqih, Tasauf; Haji Mohd Taha Suhaimi, Qadha’ dan Qadar: Rukun Iman yang Keenam; Ahmad Sonhadji Mohamad, et al., Pengetahuan Ugama Islam; Osman Jantan, Pedoman Ilmu Tauhid. 17. Abu Bakar Hashim, “Akidah Islamiah”. 18. Syed Ahmad Semait, Hadis Qudsi: Analisa dan Komentar and Kuliah Subuh: Pada Membicarakan Hadis 40. 103

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19. 20. 21. 22.

Mohd. Ikram Mohd Ariff, et al., Boy Meets Tekong: NS Guidebook for Muslims. Adam bin Ismail, “Hukum Bagi Orang Yang Meninggalkan Solat”, pp. 5–6. Syed Isa Semait, Panduan Ibadat Zakat; Firdaus Yahya, Huraian Ilmu Faraidh. Mohd. Salleh Daud, trans., Halal dan Haram dari Pandangan Al-Quran dan Sains. Ridzuan Wu, A Glimpse into the Islamic Discourse on the Use of Headscarves. Osman Jantan, “Pengabaian Tanggungjawab dan Pencemaran Diri Meruntuhkan Nilai-nilai Agama dan Moral”. Ahmad Sonhadji Muhammad, Pendidekan Budi Pekerti, 2 vols.; Yaacob Elias, Islam dan Pedoman Hidup; Habsah Senin and Firdaus Yahya, Zikir dan Doa Pilihan. Haji Daud Ali, Kemusykilan Agama di Radio; Syed Abdillah Ahmad Aljufri, Anda Bertanya Saya Menjawab (Kemusykilan Agama); Dzulkifli Mohammed, Masalah Terkini di dalam Islam: Siri Kemusyikilan Agama 3. Prosiding Seminar Ahli Sunnah dan Syi’ah Imamiyyah: Aspek Persamaan dan Perbezaan. Anjuran Pusat Pengajian Umum, UKM, Bangi 1993; Abdullah Fahim Hj Ab. Rahman, “Konsep Ahli Sunnah Waljamaah dan Kedudukannya di Malaysia”. 6 (1986). Politik Melayu dan Penyatuan Ummah. See Ridzuan Wu, ed., Readings in Cross-cultural Da’wah. Singapore: The Muslim Converts’ Association of Singapore; Muktamar Dakwah, Anjuran Jawatankuasa Haiah Dakwah. See Understanding Islam; Moulavi M. H. Babu Sahib, Know Islam. Syed Hassan bin Muhammad Al-Attas, Umar bin Abd al-Rahman: kisah dan sejarah al-Qutub al-Anfas al-Habib Umar bin Abd al-Rahman, pengasas Ratib alAttas; Mohd Taha Suhaimi, Sejarah Hidup Syeikh Muhammad Suhaimi. See Wu, “Erosion of Islamic Identity”, pp. 68–76; Mutalib, “Masalah Belia-belia Kita: Islam Jalan Penyelesaian”. See Ibrahim Abu Bakar, Islamic Modernism in Malaya: The Life and Thought of Sayid Syekh Al-Hadi 1867–1934. Compare this to Wan Muhammad Ali & M. Uthman El-Muhammady, Islam dan Modenisma. The dynamic aspect of the tradition has been highlighted before by Shaharuddin Maaruf, “Some Theoretical Problems Concerning Tradition and Modernization Among the Malays of Southeast Asia”. Refer to Konvensyen Ulama Pergas 2003. PERGAS’ criticized the institute for its invitation to Zainah Anwar of Sisters in Islam (Malaysia) and Ulil Abshar-Abdalla of Jaringan Islam Liberal in Indonesia. See their papers in Political and Security Outlook 2003: Islam: The Challenge from Extremist Iinterpretations, Singapore: ISEAS, 2003. See Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas, Islam and Secularism. See Azhar Ibrahim, “An Evaluation of Madrasah Education: Perspectives and Lessons from the Experiences of Some Muslim Societies”, pp. 93–124. See Chandra Muzaffar, Islamic Resurgence in Malaysia; Zainah Anwar, Islamic Revivalism in Malaysia: Dakwah Among the Students.

23. 24. 25.

26.

27.

28. 29.

30. 31.

32. 33.

34.

35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 104

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40. Refer to A. B. Shamsul, “Inventing Certainties: The Dakwah Persona in Malaysia”, pp. 112–33. 41. See Ridzuan Wu, The Call to Islam: A Contemporary Perspective. 42. This was a period of greater confidence amongst the Muslim undergraduate community that saw its role as being to uplift the welfare and development of the local Muslims. See M. Dzulqifly Muhamad, “The University of Singapore Muslim Society”. In recent times, the Muslim Students’ Society at the National University of Singapore has demonstrated a similar sentiment. See “Summary Report: Meeting with Malay Members of Parliament”, The Fount Journal Issue 2, 2000, pp. 123–26. 43. Ibrahim Hassan, “The National University of Singapore Muslim Society — Challenges Ahead”. 44. Ridzuan Wu, “Erosion of Islamic Identity: The Singapore Challenge”. 45. Fazida A. Razak and Jamari Mokhtar, “‘Riba’: Responses of the Muslim World and Singapore Muslims”. 46. Hussin Mutalib, “Education and Singapore Muslims: An Overview of the Issues, Parameters and Prospects”, pp. 1–14; Zainul Abidin Rasheed, “Islamic Education in Singapore”, pp. 19–23. 47. See Maarof Salleh, “Aspects of Dakwah in Singapore”, pp. 24–25. 48. Bohari Jaon, “Reconsiderations: An Introspection on the Islamic Revival in Contemporary Singapore — Its Genesis and Orientation”, pp. 19–38. 49. Muhammad Haniff Hassan, “Negara Islam — Satu Pandangan”, pp. 3–5. 50. Perhaps a summary by Sidek Baba says it all: “The subject discussed cover the issues of ibadah, the importance of knowledge, the relevant meaning of jihad, the significance of iman, understanding of shariah, rights and duties of the youth, the importance of family life and parenting among others”. See “The Study-Circle (Usrah) Movement of Malaysia: A Collaborative Approach to Islamic Learning”, Muslim Education Quarterly 19, no. 2 (2002): 4–12. 51. See M. Kamal Hassan, “The Influence of Mawdudi’s Thought on Muslims in Southeast Asia: A Brief Survey”, pp. 429–64. 52. As early as the Seventies, works by Syed Qutb and Abdul Ala’ Maududi were already popular and circulated amongst the Malay speaking intelligentsia as reflected in the publication of Jernal Jihad a university journal from Malaysia. See Abu A’la Maududi, Islam dan Kemajuan Moden. 53. See The Real Cry of Syed Shaykh al-Hady. With Selections of His Writings by His Son Syed Alwi al-Hady, edited by Alijah Gordon. 54. Refer to Hafiz Firdaus Abdullah, “Membongkar Aliran Islam Liberal”, pp. 7–9; M. Shiddiq al-Jawi and Jakfar bin Hj. Embek, “Usul Fiqh Islam Liberal?” Risalah, pp. 13–15. 55. A point noted by Mohamed Abu Bakar in “Generasi Muda dan Kesedaran Islam: Konflik dan Integrasi dalam Masyarakat Melayu”, pp. 51–59. 56. Read Zhulkeflee Hj. Ismail, “Ilmu-Suatu Renungan: Pengetahuan atau Pengertian”, pp. 3–5. 57. Read Fazlur Rahman, “Islamization of Knowledge: A Response”, pp. 1–11. 105

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58. They are Syed Hussein Alatas, Chandra Muzaffar, Shaharuddin Maaruf, Faisal Othman, Farish A Noor, Zainah Anwar and Rustam Sani, among others. 59. ISTAC was founded by Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas. See Mona Abaza, “Intellectuals, Power and Islam in Malaysia”. 60. See Andi Faisal Bakti, “Paramadina and Its Approach to Culture and Communication”, pp. 315–41. 61. Perhaps the only ideas of Nurcholish that were made known locally were through the publication of “Pemahaman Terhadap Adjaran Islam Dan Masaalah Pembaharuannja pada Zaman Sekarang”, pp. 61–68. Since Muhammad Kamal Hassan’s scathing critiques of Nurcholish’s ideas, they are no longer easily accepted by the Malay-speaking discourse on both sides of the Causeway. Refer to Muhammad Kamal Hassan, Muslim Intellectual Responses to “New Order” Modernization in Indonesia. 62. One such scholar is Wan Mohd Noor, a former lecturer from ISTAC. Wan Mohd Noor is also a consultant to several local religious and educational organizations. See his book, Budaya Ilmu: Satu Penjelasan. 63. See Greg Fealy, “Islamization and Politics in Southeast Asia: The Contrasting Cases on Malaysia and Indonesia”, pp. 165–66. 64. A common theme noted in local Muslim publications such as Risalah by PERGAS. 65. See Zuhairi Misrawi and Novriantoni, Doktrin Islam Progresif: Memahami Islam Sebagai Ajaran Rahmat. 66. See Martin and R. Woodward with Dwi S. Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu’tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol and Fauzan Salleh, Modern Trends in Islamic Theological Discourse in 20th Century Indonesia. 67. It is not easy to find works by liberal groups in local bookstores and public libraries. Instead we easily find books that criticize the latter. See Hartono Ahmad Jaiz and Agus Hasan Boshori, Menangkal Bahaya JIL dan FLA. Compare this with M. Muhsin Jamil, Membongkar Mitos Menegakkan Nalar: Pergulatan Islam Liberal Versus Islam Literal. See also Muhammad Ali, “The Rise of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in Contemporary Islam”, pp. 1–27. 68. Since the publication of Syed Muhammad Naguib al-Attas’ Islam and Secularism, the idea that the current secular arrangement is not “Islamically holistic has been adopted by various groups to suit their very own ideological agendas. Another fatal criticism on secularism was Muhammad Kamal Hassan’s thesis that primarily targeted Nurcholish Majid’s ideas. 69. See Bassam Tibi, Islam and the Cultural Accommodation of Social Change. 70. “Cabaran Sekularisasi dan Globalisasi Barat kepada Harakah Islamiyah Nusantara: Perspektif Singapura”, Risalah 4 (July–Sept 2001) (author unknown). 71. Such topics have gained much attention within Indonesian circles. See Mohamed Arkoun’s Islam Agama Sekuler: Penelurusan Sekularisme dalam Agama-agama di Dunia. 72. Muhammad Haniff Hassan. Muslim … moderate … Singaporean = Muslim … moderat … warga Singapura. 106

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73. This subject is best discussed by Khaled Abou El Fadl, Speaking in God’s Name: Islamic Law, Authority, and Women. 74. On the critique of Islamic banking, refer to Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World. 75. See Muhammad Said Al-Ashmawy, Against Islamic Extremism: The Writings of Muhammad Said al-Ashwawy. 76. Abu Bakar Hamzah, Kafir Sebab Perlembagaan. 77. See Hasyim Muzadi, “Same Faith, Different Names: Islam and the Problem of Radicalism in Indonesia”, p. 97. 78. See Mohd. Salleh Daud, Pedoman Isteri; Syed Ahmad Semait, 100 Tokoh Wanita Terbilang. 79. See Suzaina Kadir, “When Gender is Not a Priority: Muslim Women in Singapore and the Challenges of Religious Fundamentalism”, pp. 109–33. 80. The growing market for such miraculous narration of Sufistic figures are couched in popular Sufi imaginings. Read Johar Buang, Hari Terakhir Seorang Sufi and Berjalan di Atas Udara. 81. Two recent local works are worthy of mention as participants’ views on Islam in Malay society: Suratman Markasan, Bangsa Melayu Singapura Dalam Transformasi Budayanya and Maarof Salleh, Tambak Minda: Mengamat Perkembangan Islam Semasa. 82. Read Eickelman and Anderson, “Print, Islam and the Prospects for Civic Pluralism: New Religious Writings and Their Audiences”. 83. Many of Qardawi’s works in Arabic have been translated into Malay, published in Malaysia and Indonesia and distributed here. See Yusuf Qardhawi, Bicara Soal Wanita; Problema Kemiskinan: Apa Konsep Islam; Halal dan Haram dalam Islam; Pertentangan Islam dan Sekular: Sekular Pasti Tersungkur. 84. Syed Hussein Alatas, Biarkan Buta. 85. Refer to Saeed, Muslims in Secular States; Abu-Rabi, Contemporary Islamic Intellectual History. 86. Academic discourse has also been initiated by other Muslim organizations such as the Association of Muslim Professionals which, through its research subsidiary RIMA, with the support of Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF), held a seminar in 2005 on “Covering Islam: Challenges and Opportunities for Media in the Global Village”. In 2004, Centre for Contemporary Islamic Studies (CCIS) and KAF organized the “International Seminar on Islam and Democracy: The Southeast Asian Experience”. 87. See Shaharuddin Maaruf ’s critiques on the religious establishment of monopolistic tendencies in “Religion and Utopian Thinking among Muslims of Southeast Asia”, Paper presented at 4th ASEAN Inter-University Seminar in Social Development, 16–18 June 1999, Prince Songkla University, Pattani, Thailand, pp. 1–22. 88. For a brief survey of Jamiyah’s activities, read Petra Weyland, “International Muslim Network and Islam in Singapore”, Sojourn 5, no. 2 (1990): 219–54. 89. One study has shown that the local religious leadership has an inclination only 107

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91.

92.

93.

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to read literature pertaining to devotional Islam — see Mohd Salleh Lamry, “Perlakuan Komunikasi Elit Agama Tempatan: Satu Kajian Etnografi di Sabak Bernam, Selangor”, Jurnal Antropologi dan Sosiologi 16, 1988, pp. 41–62. For example, Malaysia’s Islam Hadhari is identified as in consonance with MUIS-initiated “Ten Desired Attributes”. See Abbas Mohd Shariff, “Nilai ‘Risalah Islam’ dan “Islam Hadhari’: Ke Arah Pembinaan Insan Mulia”, in Kamsiah Abdullah et al. (eds.), Budaya: Memeluk Akar Menyuluh ke Langit (Singapore: Jabatan Bahasa dan Budaya Melayu, NIE, NTU, 2006). For the reformist Indonesians on the other hand, the deliberations on civil society and role of religion in social transformation spur greater intellectual response. Read Bahtiar Effendy, “Wawasan Al-Quran tentang Masyarakat Madani: Menuju Terbentuknya Negara-Bangsa yang Moden”, Paramadina 1, no. 2 (1999). The Indonesian intellectual discourse is marked by three main concerns. According to Bahtiar Effendy, these are: (1) reformulation in religious thought, (2) political and bureaucratic reforms and (3) social transformation. See “Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktek Politik Islam di Indonesia”, Prisma, 5, May 1995, pp. 3–28. Yaacob Ibrahim, “The Variety and Diversity in Islamic Practice”, in Perspectives on Doctrinal and Strategic Implications of Global Islam, Part I, Global Islam: Doctrinal and Strategic Implications, Singapore: ISEAS, 2003, p. 3. A point also raised in Azyumardi Azra, “Recent Developments of Indonesian Islam”, Indonesian Quarterly XXXII, no. 1 (2004): 10–18; Abdullah Saeed, “Towards Religious Tolerance Through Reform in Islamic Education: The Case of the State Institute of Islamic Studies of Indonesia”, Indonesia and the Malay World 27, no. 79 (1999): 177–91. See Edward W. Said, “Impossible Histories: Why the Many Islams Cannot be Simplified”, Harper’s Magazine, July 2002.

References Abaza, Mona. “Intellectuals, Power and Islam in Malaysia: S.N. Al-Attas or the Beacon on the Crest of a Hill”. Archipel 58 (1999). Abbas Mohd Shariff. “Nilai ‘Risalah Islam’ dan ‘Islam Hadhari’: Ke Arah Pembinaan Insan Mulia”, in Budaya: Memeluk Akar Menyuluh ke Langit, edited by Kamsiah Abdullah, et al. Singapore: Jabatan Bahasa dan Budaya Melayu, NIE, NTU, 2006. Abdullah Alwi Hj Hassan. “Islam di Singapura: Satu Pengenalan”. In Islamika: Eseiesei Sempena Abad ke-15 Hijrah, edited by Lutpi Ibrahim. Kuala Lumpur: Sarjana Enterprise, 1981. Abdullah Fahim Hj Ab. Rahman. “Konsep Ahli Sunnah Waljamaah dan Kedudukannya di Malaysia”. Jurnal Pendidikan Islam Bil. 6, 1986. Abdulfatah Haron Ibrahim. Ajaran Sesat: Gerakan Sulit Wujudiah-Batiniah di Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1988. 108

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Abu Bakar Hamzah. Kafir Sebab Perlembagaan. Kuala Lumpur: Media Cendiakawan, 1992. Abu Bakar Hashim. “The Madrasahs in Singapore: Past, Present and Future”. Fajar Islam 2 (1989): 27–35. ———. “Akidah Islamiah”. In Muktamar Dakwah. Organized by Jawatankuasa Haiah Dakwah Singapura, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura. Singapore: MUIS, 1986. Abu-Rabi, Ibrahim M. Contemporary Islamic Intellectual History: A Theoretical Perspective. MUIS Occasional Papers Series, no. 2, 2006. Adam bin Ismail. “Hukum Bagi Orang Yang Meninggalkan Solat”, Risalah Bil. 1, Jan–Mac 1997, pp. 5–6. Ahmad Sonhadji Mohamad, et al., Pengetahuan Ugama Islam. Singapore: Pustaka Nasional, 1968. Ahmad Sonhadji Muhammad. Pendidekan Budi Pekerti. 2 vols. Singapore: Almaktab Attijari Asshargi, 1963. Ahmadiah Qadiani di Muka Pengadilan. Singapore: MUIS, 1971. Alatas, Syed Hussein. Biarkan Buta: Sekitar Perbahasan Ilmiah Mengenai Derma Cornea-mata Dengan Majlis Ugama Islam. Singapore: Pustaka Nasional, 1974. ———. Kita Dengan Islam, Tumbuh Tidak Berbuah. Singapore: Pustaka National, 1979. ———. “Intellectual Imperialism: Definition, Traits, and Problems”. Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 28, no. 1 (2000): 23-45. ———. “Academic Imperialism”. In Reflections on Alternative Discourses from Southeast Asia, edited by Syed Farid Alatas. Singapore: Centre of Advanced Studies and Pagesetters Services, 2001. Alatas, Syed Farid. Keadaan Sosiologi Masyarakat Melayu. Singapore: Association of Muslim Professionals, 1997. ———. “Islam and the West after September 11, 2001”. In Islam and the West, Conflict and Dialogue: September 11th and Beyond, edited by Stephanie Rupp. Singapore: University Scholars Programme, National University of Singapore, 2002. ———, ed. Covering Islam: Challenges and Opportunities for Media in the Global Village. Singapore: The Centre for Research on Islamic and Malay Affairs (RIMA) and Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAF), 2005. Al-Attas, Syed Hassan bin Muhammad. Umar bin Abd al-Rahman: Kisah dan Sejarah Al-Qutub Al-Anfas Al-Habib Umar bin Abd al-Rahman, Pengasas Ratib al-Attas. Singapore: Masjid Ba’alawi, 2001. Al-Ashmawy, Muhammad Said. Against Islamic Extremism: The Writings of Muhammad Said al-Ashwawy, edited by Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998. Aljufri, Syed Abdillah Ahmad. Anda Bertanya Saya Menjawab (Kemusykilan Agama). Singapore: Pustaka Nasional, 2001. Andi Faisal Bakti, “Paramadina and Its Approach to Culture and Communication: An Engagement in Civil Society”. Archipel 68 (2004): 315–41. 109

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Malaysia and Indonesia”. In Islam in World Politics, edited by Nelly Lahoud and Anthony H. Johns, pp. 165–66. New York: Routledge, 2005. Firdaus Yahya. Huraian Ilmu Faraidh. Singapore: Deehaz Services, 2002. Freire, Paulo. Letters to Christina. New York: Routledge, 1996. Gee, James Paul. “What is Literacy?”. In Becoming Political: Readings and Writings in the Politics of Literacy Education, edited by Patrick Shahnon. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1992. Gordon, Alijah, ed. The Real Cry of Syed Shaykh al-Hady: With Selections of His Writings by His Son Syed Alwi al-Hady. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Sociological Research Institute, 1999. Habsah Senin and Firdaus Yahya. Zikir dan Doa Pilihan. Singapore: Deehaz Services, 2002. Hafiz Firdaus Abdullah. “Membongkar Aliran Islam Liberal”. Risalah Bil 14 (July– Sept 2005): 7–9. Hartono Ahmad Jaiz and Agus Hasan Boshori. Menangkal Bahaya JIL dan FLA. Pustaka Al-Kautsar, 2003. Hasyim Muzadi. “Same Faith, Different Names: Islam and the Problem of Radicalism in Indonesia”. In Indonesia Matters: Diversity, Unity, and Stability in Fragile Times, edited by T. D. Nguyen and F. J. Richter. Singapore: Times Editions, 2003. H.O.K. Rahmat Sh. Pencemaran Akidah di Nusantara. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1983. Houben, Vincent J. H. “Southeast Asia and Islam”. The Annals of the American Academy 588 (July 2003): 149–70. Hussin Mutalib. “Masalah Belia-belia Kita: Islam Jalan Penyelesaian”. In Muktamar Dakwah. Organized by Jawatankuasa Haiah Dakwah Singapura, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura. Singapore: MUIS, 1986. ———. “Education and Singapore Muslims: An Overview of the Issues, Parameters and Prospects”. Fajar Islam 2 (1989): 1–14. ———. “Muslim Studies in Singapore”. In Muslim Social Science in ASEAN, edited by Omar Farouk Bajunid. Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Penataran Ilmu, 1994. Ibrahim Abu Bakar. Islamic Modernism in Malaya: The Life and Thought of Sayid Syekh Al-Hadi 1867–1934. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1994. Ibrahim Hassan. “The National University of Singapore Muslim Society — Challenges Ahead”. Sedar 1978–80. Imran Hashim. “Changing Nature of Malay Identity”. Karyawan 6, no. 1 (2005): 16–17. Johar Buang. Hari Terakhir Seorang Sufi. Singapore: IMO Productions, 2000. ———. Berjalan di Atas Udara. Kuala Lumpur: Percetakan Zafar, 2003. Lily Zubaidah Rahim. “The Road Less Travelled: Islamic Militancy in Southeast Asia”. Critical Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (2003): 209–32. M. Dzulqifly Muhamad. “The University of Singapore Muslim Society”. Sedar: Journal of Islamic Studies, 1971–75. 111

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M. Muhsin Jamil. Membongkar Mitos Menegakkan Nalar: Pergulatan Islam Liberal Versus Islam Literal. Pustaka Pelajar, 2005. M. Shiddiq al-Jawi and Jakfar bin Hj. Embek. “Usul Fiqh Islam Liberal?”. Risalah Bil 14 (July–Sept 2005): 13–15. Maarof Salleh. “Aspects of Dakwah in Singapore”. Sedar (1975–77): 24–25. ———. Tambak Minda: Mengamat Perkembangan Islam Semasa. Singapore: Anuar Othman & Associates Media Enterprise, 2005. Mannheim, Karl. “Conservative Thought”. In Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966. Martin, Richard C. and Mark R. Woodward with Dwi S. Atmaja. Defenders of Reason in Islam: Mu’tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol. Oxford: Oneworld, 1997. Maududi, Abu A’la. Islam dan Kemajuan Moden. Translated by Marzuki Haji Mahmood. Bangi, Selangor: Ikatan Studi Islam, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1984. Mohamad Hannan bin Hassan. “Dakwah Bukan Hanya Usaha Menyampaikan Islam Sahaja”. Risalah 1 (January–March 1997): 9–12. Mohamed Abu Bakar. “Generasi Muda dan Kesedaran Islam: Konflik dan Integrasi dalam Masyarakat Melayu”. Ilmu Masyarakat 3 (1983): 51–59. Mohd Abdai Rathomy. Tiga Serangkai Sendi Agama: Tauhid, Fiqih, Tasauf. Singapore: Solo Enterprises, 1981. Mohd Ikram Mohd Ariff, et al. Boy Meets Tekong: NS Guidebook for Muslims. Singapore: MUIS and PERDAUS, 2000. Mohd Salleh Daud, trans. Halal dan Haram dari Pandangan Al-Quran dan Sains. Singapore: Bismi Publisher, 1995. ———. Pedoman Isteri. Singapore: Bismi Publisher, 1994. Mohd Salleh Lamry. “Perlakuan Komunikasi Elit Agama Tempatan: Satu Kajian Etnografi di Sabak Bernam, Selangor”. Jurnal Antropologi dan Sosiologi 16 (1988): 41–62. Mohd Taha Suhaimi. Qadha’ dan Qadar: Rukun Iman yang Keenam. Singapore: Ikhlas Percetakan, 1982. ———. Sejarah Hidup Syeikh Muhammad Suhaimi. Singapore: Da’wah Printing, 1994. Muhammad Haniff Hassan. Muslim … Moderate … Singaporean = Muslim … Moderat … Warga Singapura. Singapore: Perdaus and Al-Khair Management Board, 2003. ———. “Towards an Index of Islamic Governance”. Paper presented at IDSS on 17 May 2006. ———. “Clarifying the Concept of Dar Al-Islam & Dar Al-Harb and the Relationship between Muslims & Non-Muslims”. Risalah 7 (April–June 2004): 3–7. ———. “Negara Islam: Satu Pandangan,” Risalah 7 (April–June 2003): 3–5. Muhammad Kamal Hassan. “The Influence of Mawdudi’s Thought on Muslims in Southeast Asia: A Brief Survey”. The Muslim World 93, nos. 3 & 4 (2003): 429–64. 112

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———. Muslim Intellectual Responses to “New Order” Modernization in Indonesia. Kuala Lumpur: DBP, 1982. Muhammad Ali. “The Rise of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) in Contemporary Islam”. American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 22, no. 1 (2005): 1–27. MUIS. Understanding Islam. Singapore: MUIS, 2002. Muktamar Dakwah. Anjuran Jawatankuasa Haiah Dakwah. Singapore: MUIS, 1986. Muslim Students’ Society (National University of Singapore. “Summary Report: Meeting with Malay Members of Parliament”. The Fount Journal, no. 2 (2000): 123–26. Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman and Lai Ah Eng, eds. Secularism and Spirituality: Seeking Integrated Knowledge and Success in Madrasah Education in Singapore. Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies and Marshall Cavendish, 2006. Nurcholish, Madjid. “Pemahaman Terhadap Adjaran Islam Dan Masaalah Pembaharuannja pada Zaman Sekarang”. Sedar: A Journal of Islamic Studies, no. 3 (1971): 61–68. Osman Jantan. Pedoman Ilmu Tauhid. Singapore: Pustaka Budaya, 1981. ———. “Pengabaian Tanggungjawab dan Pencemaran Diri Meruntuhkan Nilainilai Agama dan Moral”. In Muktamar Dakwah. Organized by Jawatankuasa Haiah Dakwah Singapura, Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura. Singapore: MUIS, 1986. PERGAS. “Cabaran Sekularisasi dan Globalisasi Barat kepada Harakah Islamiyah Nusantara: Perspektif Singapura”. Risalah 4 (July–Sept 2001). ———. Konvensyen Ulama Pergas 2003. Organised by PERGAS on 13–14 September 2003 at Assyakirin Mosque Auditorium, Singapore. Prosiding Seminar Ahli Sunnah dan Syi’ah Imamiyyah: Aspek Persamaan dan Perbezaan. Anjuran Pusat Pengajian Umum. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 1993. Politik Melayu dan Penyatuan Ummah. Kuala Lumpur: ABIM, 2002. Qardhawi, Yusuf. Problema Kemiskinan: Apa konsep Islam, translated by Umar Fanany. Singapore: Pustaka Nasional, 1980. ———. Pertentangan Islam dan Sekular: Sekular Pasti Tersungkur, translated by Haji Juanda bin Haji Jaya. Selangor: Maktabah Al-Qardhawi, 1999. ———. Halal dan Haram dalam Islam, translated by Syed Ahmad Semait. Singapura: Pustaka Islamiah, 2002. ———. Bicara Soal Wanita. Bandung: Penerbit Arasy, 2003. Rahimin Affandi Abd Rahim. “Traditionalism and Reformism Polemic in MalayMuslim Religious Literature”. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 17, no. 1 (2006): 93–104. Rahman, Fazlur. “Islamization of Knowledge: A Response”. American Journal of Islamic Social Science 5, no. 1 (1988): 1–11. Saeed, Abdullah. “Towards Religious Tolerance Through Reform in Islamic Education: The Case of the State Institute of Islamic Studies of Indonesia”. Indonesia and the Malay World 27, no. 79 (1999): 177–91. ———. Muslims in Secular States: Between Isolationists and Participants in the West. MUIS Occasional Papers Series, no. 1 (2005). 113

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5 GLOBAL CHRISTIAN CULTURE AND THE ANTIOCH OF ASIA Jean DeBernardi

INTRODUCTION As a network religion that spans the globe, evangelical Christianity is one of the most important social movements of the last two centuries. As a consequence of evangelism and missions, Christian communities exist in all parts of the world, and Christian leaders often pronounce their religion a universal brotherhood. But evangelical Christianity is highly diverse and plural, with networks that are multiple and overlapping. The term “evangelical” does not describe any particular group or denomination, but rather tends to be applied to a variety of churches and organizations formed in the eighteenth century or later under the influence of widespread revivalist movements. As a religious movement, evangelical Christianity has changed over time, but nonetheless continues to have at its core a “remarkably constant” set of features (Bebbington 1989, p. 4). Scholars of evangelical Christianity commonly cite David Bebbington’s formulation of these persistent features, which are: “conversionism, the belief that lives need to be changed; activism, the expression of the gospel in effort; Biblicism, a particular regard for the Bible; and what may be called crucicentrism, a stress on the sacrifice of Christ on the cross” (Bebbington 1989, p. 3). Mark Noll observes that these traits “have never by themselves yielded cohesive, institutionally compact, or clearly demarcated groups of Christians”, but they do identify “a large family of churches and religious enterprises” (Noll 2001, 116

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p. 13). One recent study estimates that out of two billion Christians in the world, 650 million are evangelical (Noll 2001, p. 278). Evangelical Christians living in multi-cultural, post-modern North America and Europe are aware that attempts to convert others to their religion may cause offence or lead to the charge of intolerance. Indeed, some Christian theologians and historians now conclude that proselytism is based on absolutist assumptions of divine election that no longer have a place in a diverse, pluralistic world. Many Christians now participate in interdenominational and inter-religious dialogues, seeking to build unity rather than division, and theologians like Taiwanese Presbyterian Choan-Seng Song (1990 [1979]) have proposed alternatives to the exclusive Christian doctrine of salvation, emphasizing for example the development of an Asian theology contextualized in Asian philosophy and culture.1 But Song’s views are not widely popular in Singapore, where most churches are evangelical and missionminded. I base this paper on ethnographic research conducted between 1995 and 2005, including interviews in 2004 with key Christian leaders whom I asked to comment on contemporary Christianity in Singapore. But before deeper consideration to contemporary forms of Christian practice is given, let me briefly consider the history of the development of evangelical Christianity in Singapore.

EVANGELICAL CHRISTIANITY IN SINGAPORE: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW The history of Christianity in Singapore is directly related to the rise of the non-conformist Protestant denominations of Britain, Europe, and North America. Space constraints do not permit a detailed discussion of these denominations, but it is important to point out several important innovations promoted by non-conformist Christians as they have also had an impact on Christianity in Singapore. First, they engaged in privately-funded philanthropic work, including the establishment of institutions of public education, orphanages, and the practice of private fund-raising. Second, whereas national religions were connected with the state using religious hierarchies to draw a social boundary between different national groups, they sought to overcome national boundaries by creating networks that transcended dynastic boundaries. Third, evangelical Christians also promoted a form of individualism when they emphasized the inner reformation of the self.2 The Protestant involvement in foreign missions began to gain momentum in the early nineteenth century. As European imperial expansion offered an 117

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“open door”, evangelical Christians expanded their ambitions to include the conversion of so-called heathens and pagans, and through missionary efforts funded by private donation Christianity became a religion of empire. The European Christians took as their mandate Jesus’ command to “Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature” (Mark 16:15).

Early Churches in Singapore In the early years of British imperialism in South and Southeast Asia, the Anglican church was the official church of the East India Company. Anglican chaplains primarily served the British population, including military and naval personnel, but from time to time some launched missionary efforts. But most of the missions in the region were the work of Catholics, the oldest denomination in the region, having arrived with Portuguese conquest of Malacca in 1511 (Roxborogh 1992), and non-conformist Protestants, the majority of whom were Scots or English, but whose numbers also included Germans, New Zealanders, Canadians, and Americans. Dutch missionaries also introduced Christianity in the East Indies (Indonesia) in particular after the nineteenth century when pietist revival in Europe led to the promotion of new forms of missionary activity. Among the earliest Protestant missionaries to Singapore were congregationalists associated with the London Missionary Society’s (LMS) Ultra-Ganges Mission, which was active from 1819–44 (Harrison 1979). When the LMS relocated its mission to China after the first Opium War, their mission effort was taken over by independent, Brethren, and Free Presbyterian missionaries. From the 1880s onwards, Methodist missionaries began to develop educational and social ministries, laying the groundwork for a highly successful and influential Christian school system. In 1928, a mere fourteen years after its founding in American, the Assemblies of God successfully launched a mission, introducing American-style Pentecostalism to Singapore, and in 1937 the Overseas Chinese Baptist Church (Swatow) was established. Other denominations followed, and when the communist revolution in 1949 forced missionaries and missionary agencies to leave China, many relocated to Singapore and Malaya, further intensifying the Christian presence in the region.3 Although many of the Protestant missionaries sought to learn Asian languages and worked in a mission field, their day-to-day practices were otherwise quite similar to those that non-conformist evangelical Christians deployed in European cities to address social problems arising from migration, industrialization, and poverty. From the outset, Christian missionaries involved 118

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themselves in providing education in vernacular languages (although English often proved more popular), offering free or low-cost medical assistance, and sheltering and educating orphans. In the 1930s, new waves of evangelical revival impacted Singapore, but these came not from America or Europe, but from China, and took some of their vital energy from the rise of Asian nationalism. John Sung, the son of a Methodist preacher in Fujian Province, had studied at Union Theological Seminary in New York, where he encountered and rejected liberal theology. After his return to China he made seven evangelistic visits to Singapore, where he influenced the development of a number of Chinese Christian churches (Sng 2003 [1980], pp. 172–79). Chinese evangelist and author Watchman Nee (1903–72) adopted the Brethren model of the autonomous local church, and urged Chinese Christians to establish indigenous churches built with local resources. Chinese members of the Little Flock movement who migrated to Singapore, Malaya, and the Philippines propagated Watchman Nee’s local church movement, and in 1932 founded a Christian Assembly in Singapore (Tan 1980, p. 9). In the 1960s, Kong Duen Yee (a.k.a. Mui Yee), a born-again Hong Kong movie actress, staged a highly successful revival campaign that introduced Pentecostal practices like speaking in tongues, prophecy, and healing to participants in Chinese Christian churches. As a consequence, some leaders in those churches left to form independent charismatic local churches in Singapore and Malaysia, including the influential Church of Singapore which lays claim to the distinction of being Singapore’s first independent charismatic church.

Churches in Singapore in the Post-Independence Period In the post-independence period, new waves of revival originating primarily in North America had enormous impact on English-educated Christians in Singapore. Many recall the staging of two major mass events in Singapore: the Billy Graham Crusade of 1978, which ensured the prestige and influence of American-style evangelical Christianity, and a national Bible Rally organized in 1982 by the Full Gospel Christian Businessmen’s Fellowship (FGCBF). The latter cooperated with 100 churches to organize and sponsor the event, inviting Korea’s Paul Yonggyi Cho as the main speaker (Sng 2003 [1980], p. 296). Because the FGCBF worked outside the parameters of regular Christian denominations, the group was highly successful in introducing to Englisheducated Singaporean Christians many practices associated with an emergent charismatic movement, including speaking in tongues and prophecy. But 119

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when participants attempted to introduce these practices into their churches, divisions arose, leading members to depart, often to join new independent charismatic churches. Decades later, the so-called “Signs and Wonders” movement associated with John Wimber and Peter Wagner proved far less divisive. Many Singaporean churches accommodated internal differences by the simple expedient of organizing separate services for traditional and charismatic forms of worship, the latter youth-oriented and incorporating contemporary Christian music. In recent decades, Singaporean Christians have founded a number of popular independent churches, including several growth-oriented megachurches with enormous Sunday meetings that break into cell groups during the week. These huge meetings are often simultaneously broadcast in a number of auditoriums, and Singapore’s titanium-clad City Harvest Church even provides its services as live webcasts on its website. Although they may be identified as charismatic in light of their emphasis on such practices as speaking in tongues and being slain in the spirit, Singapore’s independent charismatic churches undoubtedly continue to maintain the four distinctives of evangelical Christianity: conversionism, activism, Biblicism, and crucicentrism. Many support impressive programmes of missionary training and outreach both locally and in the Southeast Asian and East Asian regions. In North America, denominations that scholars typically categorize as mainline Protestant like Anglicans, Methodists, Lutherans, and Presbyterians are internally diverse, with evangelical and non-evangelical wings. But Singaporean Christian leaders unanimously observe that in Singapore the non-evangelical wing of mainline Protestantism is virtually non-existent. Meanwhile, in the post-colonial period, the Anglican church in Singapore has incorporated charismatic forms of Christian practice and engages in evangelical outreach. Some speculate that the turn towards charismatic and evangelical practices has been a strategy by which Anglican leaders in Singapore and Malaysia seek to shake off negative associations with colonialism, as the Anglican church remains, after all, England’s national church. Meanwhile, Methodist Bishop Dr Robert Solomon recently provided leadership in the work of the Methodist Missions Society in five countries in the region, and was a leading participant in the Singapore Centre for Evangelism and Mission (SCEM) 2005 GoForth Missions Conference.

Singapore, the Antioch of Asia Singaporean Christians, proud of their contribution to world missions, often describe Singapore as the Antioch of Asia, alluding to a multi-ethnic city located in what is today Turkey that was the cradle of Christianity in the first

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century A.D. In addition to church or denominationally-based mission programmes, Singapore also hosts a number of local, regional and international missionary organizations, training institutes, Bible schools, and mass media outlets. To give a small sampling, these include the headquarters of the Overseas Missionary Fellowship (OMF) International, the present-day successor to Hudson Taylor’s China Inland Mission, and the offices of the regionally-focused Asia Evangelistic Fellowship (AEF). Missionary training institutes include the Asian Cross-Cultural Training Institute housed in a Brethren Bethesda Pasir Ris Mission Church, which attracts students from throughout East and Southeast Asia. Among many Christian mass media organizations is the Far East Broadcasting Associates (FEBA), an international, non-denominational Christian radio network that broadcasts throughout East and Southeast Asia. Singapore also has a number of inter-denominational organizations, including the National Council of Churches in Singapore (NCCS), which has many objectives such as providing “an agency through which the Government of Singapore may consult the Council on matters of common concern to its members” (NCCS 2004, p. 7), the Evangelical Fellowship of Singapore, and the Singapore Centre for Evangelism and Mission (SCEM).

GLOBAL AND LOCAL FIELDS OF PRACTICE Most of the innovative Christian teachings and practices that have passed around the world in the last decades of the twentieth century have passed through Singapore, including the spiritual warfare movement, the Health and Wealth gospel, and the Alpha course. Influential Christian leaders like John Wimber, Kenny Hagin, and Peter Wagner promote such programmes globally through lecture tours, books, and the internet.4 Singapore’s Christian leaders are keenly aware that they may utilize innovative practices and teachings to mobilize interest and participation, and many make selective use of elements drawn from the competing theologies now in circulation. But they undoubtedly combine these new practices with Christian practices inherited from their training and from previous waves of revival. Singapore’s 450 or so Protestant churches exist within a local nexus of relationships that includes a range of different denominations, from the conservative Bible Presbyterians and Brethren to the Methodists, Anglicans and Presbyterians. As Many Faces, One Faith — a 2004 book published by the National Council of Churches of Singapore — points out, these churches also maintain global links through historic ties, ethnic congregations, the training of overseas pastors and church workers at institutions like the Singapore Bible College and Trinity Theological College, and involvement in overseas

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missions (NCCS 2004, pp. 110–30). Although connected with groups elsewhere, each of these also has its own local history and lineage, and some Christian churches have been identified with Singapore’s Anglo-Chinese elite since the colonial era. At present, Christian-run schools like those run by the Methodist church are regarded as being among Singapore’s best primary and secondary schools, and many senior government officials in the civil and military services and in business are Christians. Some Singaporean Christian churches proudly celebrate the depth of their unique heritages with the publication of well-researched, handsomely produced commemorative volumes and histories (see also NCCS 2004). Nonetheless, under the powerful influence of global Christian trends, denominational distinctions are losing ground. One Christian leader described Singaporean Christianity as practising a widely popular form of “globalized Christianity” with the result that diverse denominations now employ very similar styles of worship. Another leader described a trend towards using public relations management models to “grow” churches, including the striking mega-churches that accommodate astonishing numbers of worshippers every Sunday. Mega-churches like City Harvest, for example, make highly effective use of the Internet to promote themselves in an intensely competitive urban market, advertising to the world that “here is success, here is power”. These churches have enjoyed particular success with Singaporean youth. One pastor noted that thirty years ago, Singaporean Christians would simply attend a church close to where they lived and often would make a lifetime commitment to a denomination, but that today the Singapore church scene is a “buffet” where Christians make use of the light rail system, expressway and car to seek a church that met their needs. Singaporean leaders also commented on the use of entertainment to draw Christians to churches like City Harvest, where the pastor’s wife is a well-known pop singer, but also the use of magic shows by Faith Community Baptist Church’s (FCBC) Lawrence Khong, who reportedly regards mass media as the “pulpit of the world”, and seeks to employ it for the task of “sowing and reaping”. One leader commented that “the Sunday show is designed to entertain,” adding that people went to church to network and look for business partners.

CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF EVANGELICAL CHRISTIAN PRACTICE Although contemporary evangelical Christianity is diverse in its programmes, I discuss here seven major emphases that are global in their reach but which 122

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find local expressions in Singapore. These are redemptionist-evangelical theology, lifestyle or self-help evangelism, social service-evangelism, crosscultural or inter-cultural evangelism, evangelism where you live, Biblicism, and lay leadership training. I briefly describe these below.

Redemptionist-evangelical Theology The theological interpretation that motivates the strongest evangelical reading of the Bible for Protestants is dispensational pre-millennial theology, which is based upon a reading of Bible prophecy that in fact only became current in the nineteenth century (Ryrie 1953, 1996; Kyle 1998). According to this reading of the Bible, God’s chosen people were the Jews, and many of the prophecies regard the Jewish people. When many Jews refused to accept their Messiah, however, God’s grace was extended to the gentiles, and here is where the period of church history begins. The figure of Christ is central to this history — Christ is the head and the church is the body. Christ and his church come together in the communion ceremony but will only be permanently reunited when the church is “raptured” into heaven, and Christians anticipate this rapture (a term invented in the nineteenth century that has no exact equivalent in the Bible) as an almost mystical climax to Christian history. Although in Britain this reading of the Bible was associated with the Brethren movement, North American fundamentalist Christians widely adopted and promoted it. Despite the doubts expressed by many thoughtful Christians, a version of pre-millennial theology continues to have widespread influence, although Christians today know it through the fictional writings of authors like Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins, whose works include the wellknown 1995 novel, Left Behind. This immensely popular novel offers a fictionalized account of the rapture, which sweeps the believers to heaven, leaving non-believers behind on earth to face the apocalypse known as the Tribulation. We also find the influence of pre-millennial eschatology in books not specifically focused on end-time thinking like Rick Warren’s The PurposeDriven Life (2002). Although the pre-millennial theology has widespread currency due to the influence of popular media, nonetheless, it is only one of several theological interpretations available to evangelical Christians. One leader noted, for example, that he favoured a millennial view, observing that for him the evangelistic motivation derived from the Great Commission and the evangelical view of salvation. 123

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Lifestyle or Self-help Evangelism Singaporean evangelical Christians sometimes focus on converting others, but also continue a very old Christian tradition of using the Christian “grace message” to promote reform of the self towards holiness, an intimate experience of God, and greater self-perfection. Rather than seeking to proselytize nonChristians, lifestyle evangelism often takes on the challenge of inspiring nominal Christians to become active and to seek internal transformation. For example, the popular Alpha course proposes that participants seek to “build a relationship with God” and to personally experience spiritual gifts. Originally developed at Holy Trinity Brompton, London and described by its promoters as a course in basic Christianity designed to evangelize non Church-goers, the Alpha course now maintains websites in twenty-three countries, including Singapore (see alpha.org 2005). In testimonials to the course on the Singapore website, participants report that after taking the Alpha course, they were able to give up smoking, improve their health, and find forgiveness in relationships (see alpha.org.sg 2005). A second prominent contemporary example of self-help evangelism is Joel Osteen’s 2004 book, Your Best Life Now: 7 Steps to Living at your Full Potential, which quickly reached number one on the New York Times bestseller list and which Osteen and his wife have promoted on the talk show circuit. In this book, Osteen describes a Christian path for individuals who seek to realize their “full potential” so that they can become “happy, successful, fulfilled individuals” (Osteen 2004, p. ix). In Singapore, many popular Christian leaders offer similar messages. For example, Joseph Prince of New Creation Church offers in his on-line publications, an essay that recommends that Singaporeans “seek the kingdom of God” if they wish to be stress-free and healthy (Prince 2004).

Social Service Evangelical Christian churches in Singapore also continue the nineteenth century tradition of offering social services, including education, medical aid and diverse forms of philanthropic activity. For example, the Methodist church in Singapore runs a number of highly regarded government-aided schools, some established in the nineteenth century. Philanthropic efforts include recent inter-denominational effort to raise funds for Saint Luke’s Hospital for the Elderly which was built in 1996, and numerous outreach programmes sponsored by individual churches. The most extensive and impressive of these is Touch Community Services which is associated with Faith Community Baptist Church. Their website notes that “Our mission is to establish and provide for the needy and disadvantaged in our society an

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integrated network of community-based services that strengthens the family, believing that every individual is unique and capable of reaching his or her highest potential”, thereby directly addressing the goal of social amelioration (Touch Community Services 2004).

Cross-cultural or Intercultural Evangelism Singaporean Christians of many denominations avidly contribute to support missionary activities, subscribing to the notion that they are at the cutting edge of “Operation World” (Johnstone 1993). Their leaders express the desire to be at the forefront of the movement to reach “unreached peoples and groups”, and outreach may further include investing resources to provide special religious services for Indonesian (understood to be Muslims) and Filipino (assumed to be Catholics) guest workers in Singapore. Missionary activities now take a number of new forms. One advertisement for a missionary training centre notes that missionaries now include “nonresidential missionaries, urban church-planting, international teams, holistic ministries, and the great challenge of the 10/40 Window”. For example, Singaporean Christians often mention “tent-making”, which refers to the practice of seeking to convey the Christian message while travelling or working in places like China. Some Singaporean church members become involved in programmes offering diverse forms of short-term charitable support, and while so engaged may pass on Christian materials to individuals whom they meet (a practice sometimes described as “friendship evangelism”). Audiovisual media offer new possibilities for evangelism, including cassette tape ministries, radio programming, and most spectacularly the global distribution of the “Jesus” film, a two-hour docudrama that has been dubbed into 977 world languages (including at least one Chinese tribal minority language) and shown over six billion times.5 One Christian leader further reported that in 2004, over 500 Singaporean Christians served overseas on a long-term basis, some of whom were trained specialists offering highly valued skills. For example, since 1996, a Singaporean medical doctor from a Brethren assembly, together with his wife, has been organizing three-month training courses for village doctors in China, a contribution recognized in 2001 with a Yunnan Friendship Award (Sng 2003 [1980], pp. 343–44). Since the majority of Singaporean Christians are ethnically Chinese, many churches and organizations focus their evangelistic outreach efforts on China. Singaporean Christian leaders report that they enjoy excellent relations with the Chinese government, which recently sent a delegation to Singapore to study how the government and church work together. The United Bible Societies (a global network of 141 Bible societies) recently collaborated with

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the China Christian Council to establish the Amity Printing Company in Nanjing, which since 1988 has engaged in legal Bible printing and distribution. The Amity Printing Company has now printed over 49 million Chinese Bibles and Testaments at a subsidized cost for sale through Chinese churches and distribution centres — a development that the Bible Society of Singapore hails as a “modern miracle”. Since 1991 Singapore’s Trinity Theological College has been involved in training students from mainland China (Sng 2003 [1980], p. 342).

Evangelism Where You Live (I): Community Outreach Singapore’s Christians also do the work of evangelism at home. Because the government limits tracting and open-air proselytizing, evangelical Christians must find other strategies to enact the requirement that they seek to influence the non-Christian “other” to accept the Christian message. This commonly involves the organization of church-based outreach events to which members invite non-members (although one leader reported that these events rarely resulted in conversions). In a recent book, Pastor Lawrence Chua further proposes a programme of community penetration designed to reach Singaporean heartlanders who do not fit the typical profile of Christians, who tend to be well educated, English-speaking and financially better off (Chua 2004, p. 31). His proposals for evangelical activism involve finding reasons to knock on doors in high-rise residential blocks, and ways to introduce the Christian message through friendship evangelism. Some Christian leaders instruct their members to take advantage of every opportunity to proselytize, even providing them with workbooks where they may keep a log of persons whom they sought to convert, from parents and grandparents to friends and fellow workers. Indeed, this may be the most controversial aspect of their practice, since the conversion of one or more family members may result in conflict, and outreach to strangers risks offending practitioners of other religions. But Singaporean Christian ministers and leaders are increasingly aware of these risks.

Evangelism Where You Live (II): Prayer Evangelism In the 1990s, a network of charismatic Christian leaders introduced and promoted a number of innovative forms of prayer, including praying for nations, spiritual warfare prayer and prayer-walking. The contemporary sources for these forms of prayer evangelism may be found in the writings of authors like Peter Wagner (1991, 1998) and also in widely popular works like Patrick Johnstone’s Operation World (1993) and George Otis Jr.’s Strongholds of the 126

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10/40 Window: Intercessors Guide to the World’s Least Evangelized Nations (1995). Many Christians in Singapore are aware of (and some enthusiastically promote) these practices, including members of non-charismatic denominations that tolerate a modicum of third wave charismatic practices as a way of avoiding schisms and the loss of members.

Biblicism We also find in contemporary Singapore a renewed Biblicism expressed in the emergent popularity of Bible study among educated, professional Singaporeans, who equate advancement in their religion (like advancement in their careers) as involving continuous study. Such studies may be undertaken in churchbased Bible study classes or cell groups, or by joining a local branch of the inter-denominational Bible Study Fellowship International, which offers a seven-year programme of Bible study with the goal of enhancing an individual’s relationship with God. Evangelical Christians have traditionally emphasized not only reading the Bible but also communication skills in the form of Bible exegesis and effective exhortation.

Lay Leadership Many evangelical Christian churches emphasize lay involvement, and have long fostered the development of lay leaders through the assignment of responsibilities like the teaching of Sunday school classes or the leading of Bible study or cell groups. A more recent development is the attempt of evangelical Christians to integrate their work with their faith, sometimes taking time off work to do theological studies at institutions like Vancouver’s Regent College which offers courses “to assist people wanting to deal with issues of spirituality, priorities, leadership and mission in the workplace” (Regent College 2005–06). At the same time, Christian leaders are emerging who are not pastors, and more Singaporean churches have pastors in suits and ties than in clerical robes, blurring the boundaries between the lay and the cleric.

CONTEMPORARY EVANGELICAL STRATEGIES IN SINGAPORE The Social and Legislative Setting According to the 2000 census, 42.5 per cent of Singapore’s population identify themselves as Buddhist, 14.6 per cent as Christians (both Protestant and Catholic), 14.8 per cent as non-religious, and 8.5 per cent as Taoist. 127

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For Christians, the goal of church growth has been elusive. Many leaders ascribe the stagnation of the last fifteen years to two main factors. The first is the government’s prohibition on the organization of religious youth groups and religiously-oriented activities in schools. The second and perhaps more important is the increasing popularity of Buddhism. Like Christians, many contemporary Buddhist organizations forge international links, draw on huge financial resources to acquire land and build facilities, use methods of mass appeal, and take a modernized approach to their activities. Singapore’s Taoists have also begun to modernise their practices, and have renewed their connections with prestigious Taoist institutions in China like Beijing’s Baiyun Guan. As mentioned above, Christian activism — the “expression of the gospel in effort” — is deeply ingrained in the evangelical Christian interpretation of the Bible, an interpretation that profoundly informs Christian programmes of proselytism and outreach (Bebbington 1989, p. 3). In addition to supporting missions, Singapore’s evangelical Christians believe themselves to have a responsibility to do the work of evangelism at home. As Simon Coleman has observed of charismatic Christians in Europe, proselytism is often not so much about converting others as it is about reinforcing one’s commitments by pronouncing them to others under the guise of proselytism. Consequently, he concludes that “[m]issionisation is not merely a matter of attempting to transform the potential convert, but also — perhaps even primarily — a means of recreating or reconverting the charismatic self ” (Coleman 2003, p. 17). In contemporary Singapore as in Europe, many practices that have a proselytizing aim have as their primary audience not the absent unconverted but the gathered believers who collectively enunciate their intentions. But Singaporean Christians engage in the imperative to preach the gospel to all nations in a rather different field of practice from what Coleman describes for Europe. A Singaporean Christian’s social environment may include family members who maintain private shrines in their homes for devotion to their favorite Hindu or Taoist deities, Buddhas or Bodhisattvas, secular European co-workers, and neighbours in Housing Development Board high-rise flats whose multi-ethnic composition is legislated by the state. As a result of this state-guaranteed diversity, their neighbours probably will include Malay Muslims, Catholics, Hindus, and Taoists. Undoubtedly, the potential for inter-religious and indeed intra-familial conflict exists when Christians seek to make converts of non-Christians in such a diverse context. In multi-ethnic and multi-religious Singapore, state legislation and sanction set the formal conditions affecting various aspects of religious practice, 128

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including proselytization and evangelism. Freedom of religion is constitutionally guaranteed, but is also informed by concern to maintain racial and religious harmony. Article 15 of Singapore’s Constitution is entitled “Freedom of Religion”, and provides that “Every person has the right to profess and practice his religion and to propagate it” (Singapore-Constitution 1995). But Singapore’s Societies Act requires that all religious groups must be registered, and the government has de-registered some groups, including the Singapore Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Unification Church. In 1982, the government proposed to promote moral values in secondary schools through “Religious Knowledge” classes offering six different options (Bible knowledge, Buddhist studies, Hindu studies, Islamic religious knowledge, world religions, and Confucianism). But the programme was cancelled in 1990 after it was found that teachers, including Christian ones, were using the classroom as a site for proselytization. In 1990, the government further enacted the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act as a means to respond to perceived threats to religious harmony, including insensitive Christian and Muslim proselytism and entry of religious groups into the political arena. If a complaint is lodged and an individual deemed to have infringed the Religious Harmony legislation, the response is often cautionary, but the penalty may be more severe, including prosecution, fine or imprisonment, and restrictions on the individual’s exercise of leadership in a religious group (see also Kuah-Pearce 2003, pp. 145–65). As a consequence, Christians must exercise considerable discretion in their outreach efforts. For example, Christians now label some potentially sensitive publications distributed by their churches “For Christians Only”, to avoid the charge that they are proselytizing non-Christian populations. Since the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001, the government has revisited the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act, and also enacted a Declaration on Religious Harmony. The latter is not a legal document but rather an ethos or code for conduct that “affirms the values that have helped to maintain religious harmony in Singapore; and serves as a reminder of the need for continued efforts to develop stronger bonds across religions in Singapore” (Channel News Asia 2002).

Diverse Outreach Programmes At present, Christian churches and organizations engage in diverse programmes of outreach to Singapore’s non-Christians, or “pre-Christians”, as some have termed them (see Chua 2004). These include church-planting and community care, especially in Singapore’s predominantly non-Christian 129

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heartland, education, childcare, eldercare, hospital visitation, marriage counselling, and the (re)introduction of services in Mandarin and in Chinese dialects like Hokkien, Hakka and Cantonese. When the government launched the formation of “Inter-racial Confidence Circles” which seek to encourage multi-ethnic interaction in order to build trust and bonding, some Christians organized their own “circles of friendship” to encourage peer mentoring and to help one another to “pastor the community”. Meanwhile, one charismatic leader noted that in 2004, members of the Singapore Kindness Movement promoted “World Kindness Day”, seeking to revive the kampong (village) spirit of the past “by intentionally blessing a neighbour with an act of kindness”. Many leaders expressed the opinion that reaching youth was crucial for the long-term vitality of Christianity in Singapore. One leader noted with discouragement that the current social climate was permissive and worldly, and that many young people were disinterested in religion. He observed that it was impossible to reach youth at home by knocking on doors, and that Christians could not longer reach them through their schools. He added that for many years, Christians had sponsored youth-oriented organizations in schools and universities, including groups like Inter-School Christian Fellowship, Youth for Christ, Campus Crusade for Christ, the Navigators and the Varsity Christian Fellowship. But the government banned these organizations from primary and secondary schools, with the sole exception of the Girls’ and Boys’ Brigades which have Christian roots but are nonetheless deemed acceptable. Despite these government-imposed limitations, recent letters to the Straits Times Forum suggest that for some non-Christian Singaporeans, overzealous proselytism in schools, including “verbal assaults on other religions”, remains an issue (Yawning Bread 2005). Some Singapore Christians use chance encounters with strangers as an occasion for proselytism, while others approach family members and involve family ties. To explore these forms of evangelism, during April and May 2004, I informally interviewed a random sample of ten Chinese and two Malay Muslim taxi drivers. I found that the Malay drivers were reluctant to discuss religion. The Chinese drivers, by contrast, were typically expansive on the topic of religion. They included one practising Buddhist, one Chinese immigrant who had been converted to Christianity after a construction site accident, and eight who practised Chinese popular religion. One of the popular religionists complained that he did not know much about his religion since no one had taught him. Another, whose daughter was Christian, described Chinese popular religion somewhat uncomfortably as “idol worship”. Four of the popular religionists had attended Christian 130

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services at the urging of their children and had considered becoming Christian. One was very concerned that his Christian children would not know how to perform Buddhist or Taoist ceremonies for their ancestors, and contemplated conversion for that reason. On the other hand, another who had seriously considered conversion commented that the person had to have a miraculous experience before they would truly convert. Many recommended to me their favourite places of worship, which ranged from tiny God of Prosperity temples to the more impressive Christian churches, including City Harvest’s new titanium-clad church. The single convert was the migrant worker from China whose foot had been shattered in an accident. Charismatic Christians had visited him in hospital and prayed for him, and when he able to walk again sooner than expected after five surgeries, he had chosen to join their church. He reported with a mixture of sadness and anger that since his conversion some of his brothers and sisters would no longer speak with him. Two taxi drivers reported distressing encounters with customers who ridiculed their charms for safe driving. One said that some young Christians who were his passengers had told him that his charm was just wood and was useless. He commented that they should not have done that since it hurt him, but that he did not know how to argue with them. Another said that young Christian passengers who had taken his taxi had told him that his Buddha was just wood and stone, and that he should accept Jesus instead. His response was to invoke the Hokkien proverb, “I’ve eaten more salt that you’ve eaten rice!”, emphasizing their youth and lack of experience. At the same time, several of the drivers highly praised the churches for their work with youth and their promotion of moral values. On subsequent visits to Singapore in 2004 and 2005, other taxi drivers have confirmed that they commonly encounter Christian passengers who seek to convert them. As discussed above, evangelical Christianity in its original form sought to revive Christianity and to turn nominal Christians into “heart” Christians who lived their religion. But transferred into a crosscultural setting, Christian revivalists sometimes label non-Christian religions “inauthentic” and “ineffective” forms of religious belief — a practice that has the potential to cause deep offence.

Christian Responses to Local Cultures Many Singaporean Christian leaders are aware that the Christian message is one that some find intolerant in a multi-cultural, multi-religious setting. After all, certain forms of Christian theology and practice draw a firm boundary between the saved and unsaved. This boundary is further hardened 131

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when Christians refuse to participate in non-Christian rituals including, most importantly, funeral ceremonies and the rituals associated with the veneration of ancestors. Although tensions do exist, we also find significant congruencies between local cultures and Christianity. One highly-trained Christian leader insightfully commented that his denomination fit well with both Chinese and Indian cultures since it taught that the individual must fulfil their family and social responsibilities, be accountable to the group, and conform to the expectation of its members. He further noted that the activist aspect of evangelical work, including an emphasis on missions, appealed to the Chinese since many had a strong entrepreneurial spirit and enjoyed seizing opportunities. Finally, he observed that, whereas English-educated individuals sometimes adopted the Western culture of rebellion and anti-authoritarianism, traditional Chinese culture still taught the honouring of authority. Other leaders discussed strategies by which the Christian message could be contextualized or indigenized in Chinese culture. One charismatic-oriented leader commented that his church had an active programme of outreach to the Chinese in Singapore’s predominantly non-Christian heartland, and that they had adopted three guidelines for that work. The first is not to belittle Chinese culture as superstitious but to call on Chinese Christians to practise Chinese culture privately as individuals. The second is to make use of important festivals as a way of contextualizing the church. For example, some Singaporean churches now use the Mooncake Festival and Chinese New Year as opportunities for community outreach, making visits to non-Christians to offer mooncakes and red packets. (The converted Chinese taxi driver had participated in these programmes, and reported that Taoists sometimes just loudly shooed them away, and would not take any invitations or gifts). The third is to emphasize the similarity between Biblical and Chinese values like respect for elders, care for society above self, and viewing the Christian community as a (social) body. Meanwhile, several leaders stressed the notion that Christianity was an Eastern not a Western religion, and one mentioned the potential rhetorical usefulness of the widely-read book, The Discovery of Genesis: How the Truths of Genesis Were Found Hidden in the Chinese Language, whose authors claim that the stories of Genesis were graphically preserved in Chinese characters (Kang and Nelson 1979). Although these practices suggest an accommodation to Chinese culture, nonetheless in the 1980s and 1990s, conversion from traditional Chinese religion in many churches entailed a strictly enforced requirement that new converts put away or even destroy their idols in what is sometimes termed a “bridge burning” ritual of conversion. As one leader observed, new 132

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Chinese Christian converts typically have a family altar displaying statues of deities like the Goddess of Mercy in their homes, and the church expects them to make a transition by removing or destroying these items. Some churches send a “converting team” to the home to remove them the day after an individual professes his or her conversion. Indeed, one lay leader reported to me in 1997 that his church had required a new convert to smash porcelain images worth over $6,000 that he had kept in his home. Needless to say, those who practise Chinese popular religious culture may find this kind of act upsetting and disrespectful. Although the requirement persists that converts make a transition from their previous religious practices, some churches report taking a gentler approach nowadays by, for example, simply praying for the person to ask the pastor to remove the idols. Meanwhile, one charismatic leader reported that the ritual of removal also has a spiritual dimension since “if the household worshipped it, the spirit will be on the premises and we must get them to go even if the idol is removed”. He reported that the pastor exercised his Godgiven authority to command the spirit to go away.

PRAYER EVANGELISM IN THE 1990S In this section I discuss several innovative forms of prayer evangelism that became popular in Singapore in the 1990s. During this period, charismatic Christian leaders Peter Wagner and George Otis organized and led a remarkable global movement named “AD2000 and Beyond”, which participants described as a movement of movements and a network of networks. As the year 2000 approached, they sought to mobilize evangelical Christians worldwide for the task of world evangelism. As one important aspect of their programme of global mobilization, their leaders proposed ten forms of innovative prayer, including spiritual warfare, spiritual mapping, and the AD2000 Prayer Track (Wagner 2000). Christians provide extraordinary levels of financial support to local charitable outreach, churchplanting, and global missions, but they also regard prayer as crucial to their success in making converts. Consequently, these programmes and proposals found enthusiastic acceptance among a number of influential Singaporean Christian leaders (see also DeBernardi 2008).

Spiritual Warfare During research visits to Singapore in 1997 and 1999, I found spiritual warfare to be one of the most discussed forms of prayer evangelism, and that 133

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many books and pamphlets on this and related topics were widely available in Singapore’s Christian bookstores (DeBernardi 1999, 2005). These included several influential books by Peter Wagner (1991, 1994, 1998), and also a book by critic Chuck Lowe (1998), who concluded that the practices associated with spiritual warfare were extra-Biblical. Perhaps anticipating objections, Wagner claimed to have been directly inspired by the Holy Spirit, noting that he and other Christian leaders sensed in the early 1990s that “the Holy Spirit is saying, ‘Prepare for warfare’ ” (Wagner 1991, p. 3). Although addressed to a Christian audience, in a multi-religious context like Singapore, the militant rhetoric of the spiritual warfare movement was one that was potentially offensive to non-Christians whose deities (whom one author termed “cultural ethnic demons”) were the likely targets of spiritual warfare prayer. As contextualized in Singapore, these forms of prayer undoubtedly reinforced the boundary between the supplicant’s own beliefs and practices and those of other religions, especially Asian polytheistic ones such as Hinduism and Taoism. In one of his earliest publications on spiritual warfare, Wagner proposed that unconverted regions of the world were under the control of territorial spirits rooted in specific “geographical areas and population centres” (Wagner 1991, p. 3). Citing Biblical precedents, he proposed a constellation of practices designed to help Christians in their battle to overcome these territorial spirits. As a first step, prayer warriors perform spiritual mapping (which one charismatic Christian explained as a diagnostic practice designed to help identify what kind of prayer and other help a community might need), and seek to identify the territorial spirits responsible for the failure to convert non-Christians. Wagner proposed that once Christians had identified the local territorial spirits that were impeding the task of evangelism, they should engage in three activities that took them into the larger world to attack spiritual strongholds. The first is prayer walking, in which Christians walk inconspicuously in small groups to pray at targeted areas identified as spiritual strongholds (for example a red light district, a bar-filled street or a temple). The second is the prayer march, in which Christians gather en masse to process through city streets to a site where they hold a well-publicized rally. The third is the prayer journey, where Christians travel in groups to visit powerful “spiritual strongholds” that transcend local communities, like Ephesus and Mount Everest. In 1997, for example, Wagner and his team of prayer intercessors undertook a secret prayer journey to Mount Everest, whose Nepalese and Tibetan names meant “Mother of the Universe”, They called their campaign “Operation Ice Castle”, and scaled Mount Everest where they “assaulted” the “seat of 134

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the Mother of the Universe” — a wall of ice 6,000 metres high (Wagner 1998, p. 37). George Otis’ popular 1995 book, Strongholds of the 10/40 Window: Intercessors Guide to the World’s Least Evangelized Nations, provides specific guidelines to identifying spiritual strongholds, and recommends a form of intercessory prayer termed “praying through the 10/40 window” (or “praying through the window”). According to Otis, the term 10/40 refers to countries that lie within the area from 10 degrees to 40 degrees north of the equator, including Northern Africa, the Middle East, India, China, and Mainland Southeast Asia. This area, Otis notes, “is littered with an astonishing diversity of natural and man-made sacred sites” which are “important points of contact with the spirit world”, but also “targetable elements in the Enemy’s deceptive web” (Otis 1995, p. ii). Additionally, as the book’s cover notes, “the 10/40 Window contains the birthplace of every major non-Christian religion on earth — Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Taoism, Confucianism, Bahai, Sikhism, Judaism, and Jainism.” Strongholds of the 10/40 Window also has specific entries by nation which provide detailed information on local spiritual strongholds so that intercessors can target them in their prayers. There is no entry for Singapore, but the entry for Malaysia proposes that intercessors pray over specific “Spiritual Power Points” like the Shah Alam Mosque near Kuala Lumpur and Penang’s Snake Temple and also during spiritual events like the Hindu festival Thaipusam and the Islamic Ramadan (Otis 1995, p. 156). Those who engage in spiritual warfare sometimes travelled to such sites to pray against specific deities, and also time their visits (and their intercessory prayers) to coincide with special events like festivals or the Muslim fasting month.6

Prayers and Deliverance Many Singaporean Christians interviewed in 1997 and 1999 for this research were familiar with and favourably disposed towards the constellation of practices associated with the AD2000 and Beyond Movement, including spiritual warfare, spiritual mapping and praying through the 10/40 window. In response to these proposals, for example, a small interdenominational group of high-level Christian leaders, including charismatic Christians and Anglicans, conducted spiritual mapping of the island. As an active participant in Peter Wagner’s spiritual warfare network, Pastor Lawrence Khong of Faith Community Baptist Church also led a Singaporean delegation to the 1998 Global Conference on Intercession, Spiritual Warfare, and Evangelism in Guatemala City, an event that drew over 5,000 participants. 135

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Starting in 1995, a number of charismatic Christian leaders also formed an AD 2000 and Beyond United Prayer Track in Singapore. Participants gathered for forty-day prayer fasts at Singapore’s Anglican Cathedral, and on 1 July 1997, the launch date of one of these forty-day fasts — participants further participated in PrayerWave Asia, a “partnership of prayer networks all over Asia” to offer a “chorus of prayer on behalf of the hundreds of unreached people groups in Asia” (Prayerwave Asia 1997). In the weeks that followed, participants gathered to collectively “pray for nations”, and also divided into small groups to pray for the world’s diverse countries and “unreached people groups”. At the conclusion of the forty-day prayer fast in 1997, seventy-two churches and Christian organizations (the majority of which were charismatic in their practices) cooperated to organize the National Day Festival of Praise at Singapore’s Indoor Stadium, an event that coincided with Singapore’s National Day celebration. The date 9 August was the day of a coordinated event — Citywalk, whose organizers gave participants a set of six maps marked with walking tours of downtown Singapore that identified prayer points, including Parliament House, banks and financial houses, shopping malls and entertainment centres, as well as Sir Stamford Raffles’ landing site and statue. The event ended with “Citylight”, a programme of coordinated prayer whose beginning was timed to coincide with the strike of the national anthem during Singapore’s National Day Parade. The AD2000 and Beyond network was dismantled in 2001, but the LoveSingapore network continues to organize 40-day prayer fasts, and handsomely produced prayer guides are available for downloading from their website (LoveSingapore 2006). The emphasis on prayer evangelism persists, but community outreach now takes new forms. In a recent publication, for example, one of LoveSingapore’s influential leaders recommends that the Christian engage in “united fervent prayer” as a “spiritual weapon”, observing that “only prayer can tear down the strongholds in the minds of the unsaved”. But the author also recommends that the Christian perform deeds of kindness in order to overcome community resistance (Chua 2004, pp. 76–77). Practitioners of prayer evangelism and spiritual warfare vividly imagine the deities of non-Christian religious practices as demonic opponents whom Christians should seek to overcome in a war waged against dark principalities. Indeed, some charismatic Christians deem a wide range of Chinese cultural practices to be demonic, from martial arts and deity worship to traditional Chinese medicine, qigong and acupuncture. Consequently, it is not surprising that although interest in spiritual warfare has declined, the deliverance ministry — which Wagner described as “ground level spiritual warfare” — continues to be widely popular. 136

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Deliverance is the practice of using prayer and spiritual authority to command and bind spirits that Christians believe to be troubling individuals. Many charismatic pastors view the ministry of deliverance as crucial for those who were dedicated to a god or a goddess in their youth, and require the new convert to actively repudiate those ritually created bonds. The spirits that practitioners of the deliverance ministry seek to repudiate are not limited to those of Chinese deities. At a recent ritual performed in Singapore, the ecclesiastically high-ranking participants exorcised the spirits of snakes, martial arts, freemasonry and colonialism, in a psychologically-oriented ritual that seemed to be as much about driving out the past as dealing with spirits.

CONCLUSION In the post-9/11 environment in Singapore, the government’s efforts to promote awareness of and sensitivity to issues regarding religious harmony have led many Christian leaders to become aware of the potential problems that insensitive evangelism can cause. In my interviews with Christian leaders in 2004, I sought to ascertain the status of spiritual warfare theology in Singapore’s Christian community. I found that most of those interviewed expressed concern over the militant, aggressive flavour of spiritual warfare rhetoric, and of the practice of prayer walks designed to conquer Singapore’s territory. As one person insightfully commented, the language of spiritual warfare was not “positive”, and furthermore was “out of place in an Islamic context where they talk about jihad”. Although charismatic Christians continue to engage in forms of “power evangelism” involving healing and prophecy, spiritual warfare prayer and prayer walks appear to have been superseded by an emphasis on activities that a charismatic leader described as more “personal and personable” forms of “genuine good neighbourliness”, including both individual acts of kindness and “special community blessing events”. Some also engage in the organized practice of “community penetration” by giving gifts to non-Christians during Chinese festivals, singing Christmas carols in the open spaces between HDB high-rise flats, or prayer walking with the aim of breaking down “invisible walls” (see Chua 2004). As discussed above, Singapore’s evangelical Christians devote significant financial resources and time to activities like spiritual self improvement, Bible study, social services, community outreach and missions. Although prayer evangelism may be a less central aspect of evangelical practice, and although spiritual warfare prayer in particular may not play a significant role in the religious practice of most Christians in Singapore today, nonetheless globally 137

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spiritual warfare remains a vibrant and influential practical theology. Indeed, novels that promote the mentality of intra-religious struggle continue to hold sway over the imagination of many North American Christians, many of whom have offered highly negative judgements of Islam since 9/11. Probably no form of government control can prevent the circulation of these judgements, which the media widely reports and which are easily available on the Internet. The government of Singapore has already placed limits on and seeks to control extreme forms of aggressive and/or insensitive proselytizing. But as the interviews with taxi drivers reveal, even a brief conversation may be perceived as hurtful. Because the role of Christian leaders is crucial in proposing innovative forms of evangelical practice to their followers or rejecting them, the most appropriate response to potentially insensitive forms of proselytism is education and dialogue, including the continuation of inclusive inter-religious dialogues among religious leaders.

Notes The research on which this chapter is based was funded by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, the University of Alberta Humanity, Fine Arts, and Social Sciences Research Fund, and the Institute of Policy Studies. Special thanks are due to the IPS project coordinator Dr Lai Ah Eng, and to the Christian leaders who agreed to interviews with me in April and May 2004, and who offered comments on an earlier draft of this chapter, including Professor Simon Chan, Reverend Lawrence Chua, Dr Lee Soo Ann, Dr Bobby Sng, Bishop Dr Robert Solomon and Bishop Hwa Yung. Their insights inform this chapter on many points, but in order to protect their anonymity, their comments are attributed to “Christian leaders” rather than using their names or titles. I also wish to thank a number of non-Christian contacts whom I interviewed informally, including Victor Yue, Master Lee Zhiwang, and Ms Tan Zhixia. The author takes sole responsibility for the accuracy of the content and the views expressed. 1. C. S. Song has been an active leader in the World Alliance of Reformed Churches which affirms missions as one of its basic commitments, but which emphasizes that Christians in different times and places have enriched their understanding of the Gospel “with their own religious and cultural heritage” (WARC 1996). 2. For further information on the development of non-conformist Christianity in Europe and North America, see Bebbington 1999; Binfield 1977; and Ward 1992. 3. On the history of Christianity in Singapore, see DeBernardi (n.d.); Goh 2003; Hunt, Lee, and Roxborogh 1992 (this study focuses on Malaysia but includes

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some discussion of Singapore); National Council of Churches of Singapore (2004); and Sng (2003 [1980]). The prominence of evangelical Christian authors on the bestseller list is one measure of their success. Indeed, the sale of Christian books accounts for 36 per cent of the $4.2 billion-a-year Christian products industry (Johnson 2005). This information was taken from the Jesus Film Project website: . For example, the organizers of the 1998 Global Conference on Intercession, Spiritual Warfare, and Evangelism in Guatemala City, which drew 5,000 participants, scheduled the conference to coincide with the feast day of the Mayan saint known as San Simon (or Maximon). The conference convener, El Shaddai’s Harold Caballeros, claimed that evangelical Christians had liberated a small market town from this powerful territorial spirit, and on the final day of the conference, the organizers took fifty bus-loads of participants to Amolonga, carefully orchestrating a collective “Triumphal Entry” into the town (see DeBernardi 1999).

References Alpha.org. (accessed 5 August 2005). Alpha.org.sg. “Alpha Stories”. (accessed 5 August 2005). Bebbington, David. Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1989. Binfield, Clyde. So Down to Prayers: Studies in English Nonconformity 1780–1920. London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1977. Channel NewsAsia. “Need to Tackle Proselytism when Drafting Religious Code: Minister”. , 2002 (accessed 10 June 2006). Chua, Lawrence. CP 101: Reaching the Under-Reached: A Handbook for Community Penetration. Singapore: Living Sanctuary Brethren Church, 2004. Coleman, Simon. “Continuous Conversion? The Rhetoric, Practice, and Rhetorical Practice of Charismatic Protestant Conversion”. In The Anthropology of Religious Conversion, edited by Andrew Buckser and Stephen D. Glazier, pp. 15–27. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2003. DeBernardi, Jean. “Spiritual Warfare and Territorial Spirits: The Globalization and Localization of a ‘Practical Theology’ ”. In Religious Studies and Theology 18, no. 2 (1999): 66–96. ———. “Christianity and Chinese Religious Culture in Singapore: Anthropological Perspectives”. In Facing Faiths, Crossing Cultures: Key Trends and Issues in a Multicultural World, edited by Lai Ah Eng, pp. 178–225. Singapore: Institute of Policy Studies and SNP-Reference. 2005. ———. “Asia’s Antioch: Prayer and Proselytism in Singapore”. In Proselytization

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Revisited: Rights Talk, Free Markets, and Culture Wars, edited by Rosalind Hackett. London: Equinox Publishers, 2008. ———. “If the Lord be not Come”: The Brethren Movement in Singapore and Penang, Malaysia. Unpublished manuscript, n.d. Goh, Robbie B. H. Sparks of Grace: The Story of Methodism in Asia. Singapore: Methodist Church in Singapore, 2003. Harrison, Brian. Waiting for China: The Anglo-Chinese College at Malacca, 1818-1843 and Early Nineteenth-Century Missions. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1979. Hunt, Robert, Lee Kam Hing, and John Roxborogh, eds. Christianity in Malaysia: A Denominational History. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Press, 1992. Hwa, Yung. Mangoes or Bananas? The Quest for an Authentic Asian Christian Theology. Oxford: Regnum Books International, 1997. Johnson, Christine D. “Christian Retailing”. (accessed 5 August 2005). Johnstone, Patrick. Operation World. Carlisle: OM Publishing, 1993. Kang, C. H. and Ethel R. Nelson. The Discovery of Genesis: How the Truths of Genesis Were Found Hidden in the Chinese Language. Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1979. Kuah-Pearce, Khun Eng. State, Society and Religious Engineering: Towards a Reformist Buddhism in Singapore. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003. Kyle, Richard. Awaiting the Millennium: A History of End-time Thinking. Leicester: Inter-varsity Press, 1998. LaHaye, Tim and Jerry B. Jenkins. Left Behind: A Novel of the Earth’s Last Days. Wheaton: Tynedale House Publishers, 1995. LoveSingapore (accessed 5 June 2006). Lowe, Chuck. Territorial Spirits and World Evangelism? : A Biblical, Historical and Missiological Critique of Strategic-Level Spiritual Warfare. Ross-shire, Great Britain: Mentor/OMF, 1998. National Council of Churches of Singapore. A Guide to Churches and Christian Organizations in Singapore. Singapore: NCCS, 2003. ———. Many Faces, One Faith. Singapore: NCCS, 2004. Noll, Mark A. American Evangelical Christianity: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publisher, 2001. Osteen, Joel. Your Best Life Now: 7 Steps to Living at your Full Potential. New York: Warner Faith, 2004. Otis, George Jr. Strongholds of the 10/40 Window: Intercessors Guide to the World’s Least Evangelized Nations. Seattle, Washington: YWAM, 1995. Prayerwave Asia. “July First 1997”. Singapore: AD2000 United Prayer Resource Network, 1997. Prince, Joseph. “Becoming Stress-Free and Healthy”. Solid Rock. December 2004. (accessed 10 August 2005).

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Regent College. “Marketplace Institute at Regent College: Vocation Institute, A Resource of Regent College”. http://www.regent-college.edu/academics/ marketplace/index.html>, 2005–06 (accessed 10 August 2005). Roxborogh, John. “The Roman Catholic Church”. In Christianity in Malaysia: A Denominational History, edited by Robert Hunt, Lee Kam Hing, and John Roxborogh, pp. 1–33. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1992. Ryrie, Charles C. The Basis of the Premillennial Faith. Neptune: Loizeaux Brothers, 1953. ———. “Dispensationalism”. In Dictionary of Premillennial Theology, edited by Mal Couch, pp. 93–98. Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 1996. Singapore-Constitution International Constitutional Law Document Status. , 24 March 1995 (accessed 5 June 2006). Sng, Bobby E. K. In His Good Time: The Story of the Church in Singapore, 1819–2002. 3rd ed. Singapore: Bible Society of Singapore and Graduates’ Christian Fellowship, 2003 [1980]. Song, Choan-Seng. Third Eye Theology. Revised ed. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1990 [1979]. Tan, Charles K. H. The Teaching of Witness Lee and the Local Church (The Church in Singapore) Evaluated. B.A. Research Paper, Singapore Bible College, 1980. Touch Community Services. , 2004 (accessed 10 August 2005). Wagner, C. Peter. “Territorial Spirits”. In Territorial Spirits: Insights on Strategic-Level Spiritual Warfare from Nineteen Christian Leaders, edited by C. Peter Wagner, pp. 43–50. Chichester: Sovereign World, 1991. ———. Spreading the Fire: A New Look at Acts — God’s Training Manual for Every Christian. Ventura, California: Regal Books, 1994. ———. Confronting the Queen of Heaven. Colorado Springs: Wagner Institute for Practical Theology, 1998. ———.“Summary Report: AD2000 United Prayer Track”. , 25 June 2000 (accessed 10 July 2006). Ward, William Reginald. The Protestant Evangelical Awakening. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Warren, Rick. The Purpose Driven Life. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2002. Yawning Bread. “Our Christian Jihadists”. October 2005 (accessed 10 December 2005).

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6 “RELIGIOUSLY-INSPIRED”, “INDIA-DERIVED” MOVEMENTS IN SINGAPORE Vineeta Sinha

NAMING A ‘NEW’ PHENOMENON: A QUESTION OF TERMINOLOGY In the course of research for this chapter, I discovered an interesting collection of theoretical works on the subject of “new religious movements” (NRMs), four of which were especially eye-catching: The Historical Dictionary of New Religious Movements (2001), edited by George D. Chryssides; The Oxford Handbook of New Religious Movements (2004), edited by James R. Lewis; Encyclopedia of New Religious Movements (2005), edited by Peter B. Clarke and Encyclopedia of New Religions, New Religious Movements, Sects and Alternative Spiritualities (2004), edited by Christopher Partridge. It is significant that in the year 2006, a student of the field of “new religions” has access to an accumulated body of resources such as historical dictionaries, encyclopedias, handbooks and guidebooks in addition to an astonishing array of empirical data about NRMs across the globe and sophisticated theorizing about a subject that, only a short fifty years ago, was still in its infancy. This suggests three important points: (1) the phenomenal global growth of “new religious movements”, especially in the second half of the twentieth century, (2) the huge scholarly interest in the phenomenon as well as creative attempts to make sense of it, and (3) the institutionalization 142

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of this sub-field of study in the social sciences. Expectedly, the emergent field is not defined by consensus; instead, the vibrant debates within have raised fundamental questions about definitions, concepts and modes of theorizing this new phenomenon. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to enter these discussions in detail; only one strand of the conversation is relevant to the present purpose: the question of definitions. Scholars agree that something “new” is happening in religious domains globally, and that novel and innovative expressions of religiosity are not only asserted by participants but also that different kinds of evidence for this are pervasive. A primary challenge is to figure out how this “new” religious style is to be discoursed and theorized, and this entails addressing the following questions: How are these individuals (with a new religious style) who have organized themselves into collectivities and their religious ideas to be denoted? Do they constitute a new religion? Are they, in fact, religions at all? What should the emergent groups be called? A range of alternatives have not only been offered — sect, cult, new religious movement, alternative spirituality, alternate religious tradition, religious reform movement — but are themselves also disputed and contested. A good example is the description “cult” — which is rejected by many scholars on grounds that it carries negative connotations, is thus pejorative and, most importantly, does not accurately represent the substance and intent of many of the groups encapsulated under the label NRMs. The description “new religious movements” seems to have emerged from the list on offer as a safe, neutral and legitimate choice and is increasingly used in scholarly discourses on the subject (Arweck 2002; Barker 1989; Beckford 1986; Bromley and Hammond 1987; Clarke 2006; Gordon 1995; Wilson 1999). The literature also attests to the variety and complexity within the broad category of NRMs, with examples cited from practically all major religious traditions and all corners of the globe (Clarke 2005; Partridge 2004). This chapter focuses on a sample of such movements of the Indian variety and their presence on the island nation-state of Singapore. Scholars have argued that “the phenomenon of new religious movements is itself not new in the history of Hinduism” (Sharma 1986, p. 220), highlighting further the classical, medieval and pre-independence periods in Indian history as having given rise to a variety of novel religious movements (Majumdar 1953; Sarma 1944; Sen 1961 cited in Sharma 1986, p. 220). Academic interest in the emergence of new religious movements” in India, is itself not recent but has engaged scholars since at least the 1940s.1 The range of such movements has often been catalogued under “pre-independence” and “post-independence” moments of Indian history. In the former category, the end of the nineteenth century saw the advent of the Arya Samaj and Brahmo 143

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Samaj movements, the Ramakrishna Mission as well as the Theosophical Society. Their appearance on Indian soil was far from a random event. Rather, the contributing factors were multi-dimensional and complex. Scholars have detailed the dynamics of Indian social life and the complex interplay of India’s political, social, economic and religious components (Ambroise 1982; Farquhar 1967; Panikkar 1963), leading to the genesis of these groups which certainly defined themselves as “new”, “unorthodox” and “different” in challenging socio-cultural and religious traditions. The movements in this period were explicitly defined by the spirit of reform, and aimed in particular to revolutionize Hinduism, ridding it of caste, idolatry, its backward social customs such as sati, child marriage and prohibitions on widow re-marriage, etc; and thus to “modernize” the religion. In the post-1947 period, a different set of India-derived movements have been listed, including the Sai Baba movement, Hare Krishna movement, Divine Light Mission, Sri Aurobindo Society and Transcendental Meditation. Apart from distinguishing the movements on the basis of dates and periodization, the more salient point is that the rationale driving preindependence movements (such as the Arya Samaj and the Brahmo Samaj) was decidedly different from the agendas of the groups that have emerged in India (and in the United States through Indian input) through the 1960s, 1970s and beyond. The 1960s have been defined as a period dominated by counter-cultural and anti-establishment trends, especially in the industrialized parts of the world, but clearly not exclusively so. The questionings about the nature of religion, its place in the modern world and the kind of religiosity that is appropriate for such a context were being asked in developing, nonindustrialized parts of the world as well, including in India. Students of Indian religion have viewed the rise of NRMs in India in the 1960s and 1970s as a response to such intense questionings. To date, the scholarly output that theorizes the emergence of such movements has been phenomenal. Interestingly, the object of study in question has been named and renamed over time and the corresponding conceptual terminology and theoretical apparatuses have been constituted and reconstituted, framed by such descriptors as “neo-Hindu” (Babb 1974; Menon 1983; Partridge 2004; Woodhead 2002) groups, “Hindu religious movements” (Ambroise 1982), “Hindu-related movements” (Knott 1985), “new religious movements” (Clarke 2005; Coney 2000), and “New and/or Neo-Hindu NRMs” (Clarke 2006). The rather awkward and admittedly inelegant title of this chapter, “religiously-inspired, India-derived reform movements”, instead of reproducing the existing terminology, was necessitated both by conceptual considerations as well as the nature of ethnographic material from Singapore. 144

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While not denying some usefulness of existing descriptions, my view is that umbrella terms like “neo-Hindu groups”, “Hindu religious movements” and “new religious movements” tend to obscure the rich diversity of spirituality, belief and practice to be found within this cluster. The result is that one may miss the considerable variety and some significant internal differences by subsuming a number of groups under one linguistic and conceptual banner. My own choice does not at the outset necessarily characterize the various groups in terms of “religiosity”, “non-religiosity” or “anti-religiosity”. It is a descriptive term which acknowledges that the movements were founded and inspired by an attachment to a set of religious and philosophical precepts and geographically emanate from the Indian sub-continent. It holds these groups together while at the same time indicating that they differ internally. Most importantly, a majority of the movements I have examined in Singapore expressedly distanced themselves from the label “religion” and some of them, from the term “Hindu” itself. They also do not see themselves “reformist”, “radical” or politically driven. Describing them using terminology such as “neo-Hindu”, “Hindu reform movements” or even “religious movements” new or otherwise, are problematic as they run contrary to the self-descriptions of followers and, more importantly, to their explicit rejection of the labels “Hindu” and “religion”. It is thus important to consider alternative ways of representing these movements analytically, hence the formulation “religiouslyinspired, India-derived movements”.

COMING TO SINGAPORE Historians have argued that the presence of Indian populations in significant numbers outside the Indian sub-continent is the outcome of involuntary and voluntary migration (Gosine 1993; Jain 1993). Religious beliefs and rituals were initially carried overseas in the form of personal spiritual attachments rather than as organized groups or movements. While such groups as the Arya Samaj and Brahmo Samaj have been present in locales outside India since the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the presence of “new religious movements” in the Indian diaspora was the direct outcome of the more recent and second wave of migration of Indians, and is largely a post-World War II phenomenon. Both in the “classical” and contemporary moments, these migrating communities have been defined by a strong sense of religious pluralism as well as ethno-linguistic differences and regional variations. The appearance of “reform movements” (rooted in South Asian religious traditions) outside the Indian sub-continent (especially in the “West”), occurred 145

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largely after World War II (Coney 2000), and typified the period between the 1950s and the 1970s. What accounts for the contemporary presence of these movements in Singapore? An important starting point is the recognition that these movements were imported into Singapore from India, with the exception of such groups as Divine Light Mission, Transcendental Meditation and International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), which arrived here from the United States of America. Was their importation a historical accident and when does this happen? At this point, one needs make a distinction between the formal organization of the group as a society in the Singapore context and the presence of individual devotees and followers of these movements. It is reasonable to surmise that, informally, devotees of various Indian gurus and adherents of the guru bhakti tradition would have pre-dated the formal organization of these groups in the local context. Thus ideas, philosophies and the ritual base of these groups would expectedly have been present first and foremost in the form of personalized spiritual attachments. Many of the early followers of these groups came from the North Indian Hindu communities — such as the Punjabi, Sindhi, Bihari and Uttar Pradeshi linguistic groups. Subsequent to their arrival in Singapore and in enlarged numbers, an administrative requirement under the Societies Act made it necessary for them to be officially recorded as “registered societies”, before they could operate as religious or spiritual groups and engage in particular activities. This gave the movements a legitimate and official status and they drew more members from both the local and expatriate populations. The formal registration of these arriving movements from India is not recorded earlier than the 1960s, starting with the Arya Samaj and the Ramakrishna Misson in 1962. Through the 1970s and 1980s, the importation of these movements into Singapore intensified, as seen by their respective dates of registration (see Table 6.1). What is further striking is that the importation of such groups is certainly not a thing of the past but very much defines the contemporary moment as well. This bears testimony to the burgeoning pace at which new religious movements continue to emerge from an Indian context. Additionally, their presence in Singapore reveals the global nature of these movements in finding adherents and supporters in places outside India, not just amongst ethnic Indians but sometimes appealing more to non-Indians and non-Hindus. In Singapore, far from disappearing, forms and modes of religious expression have persisted despite its modern and secular outlook. Here, attachment to religion is strongly discernible, as seen in census data over at least the last fifty years, and confirmed by social science analyses of the local religious scene (Tong 1992; Kong 2005). Today, every major religious tradition 146

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TABLE 6.1 “Religiously-inspired”, “India-derived” Movements in Singapore Name of Movement

Date of Registration

1) Amriteswari Society, M.A. Center 2) Art of Living Centre (Shri Shri Ravi Shankar) 3) Arya Samaj, Singapore 4) Brahma Kumari Raja Yoga Centre 5) Chinmaya Seva Centre 6) Eckankar Satsang 7) Geeta Ashram 8) Kala Mandir (Temple of Fine Arts) 9) Radha Soami Satsang, Beas, Singapore 10) Raghavendra Swami Mandali 11) Ravidas Satsang Sabha 12) Sri Aurobindo Society 13) Sree Narayana Mission 14) Shirdi Sai Baba Sansthan, Singapore 15) Shri Krishna Mandir 16) Sri Paramhans Advait Mat Society 17) Sri Ramakrishna Mission 18) Sri Ram Chandra Mission 19) Sadhu Vaswani Centre, Singapore 20) Shiv Mandir Shree Shree 108 Baba Chunninathji Singapur Sat Sang 21) Sree Sathya Sai Seva Samithi 22) Sree Gnianananda Seva Samajam 23) Transcendental Meditation

1996 2000 1962 1981 1990 1979 1972 1968 1980 2006 1957 1972 1948 2005 1997 1985 1962 1994 1985 1972 1975 1972 Exact date could not be verified

in Singapore has within it a full religious spectrum from very orthodox, traditional religious orientations to independent spiritual clusters and new religious movements. For instance, an account of the Singaporean brand of Hinduism, as manifested in the observance of such festivals as taipucam (Thaipusam), Timiti, Sivaratri, Krishna Jayanti, Diwali, Ponggal, Dussehra, Holi, etc., would be incomplete without due attention to a range of “Indiaderived” groups which enjoy a popular local following. Some prominent examples include the Ramakrishna Mission, Radha Soami Satsang, Brahma Kumari Raja Yoga Centre, Sai Baba movement, Sri Aurobindo Society, Amma’s Society and the Art of Living Centre. My earlier research2 (Sinha 1985) has pointed to the considerable variety of belief, practice and organizational structures that typify these eight groups. 147

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Introduced into Singapore since the 1960s, the “India-derived” movements by now attract a substantial number of followers, from both within and outside the Indian-Hindu community. However, despite this long presence, sociological and anthropological understanding of India-derived reform movements in Singapore is limited. The field suffers from academic neglect and has only received negligible attention, primarily from research students in tertiary institutions. While the latter have attended to ethnographic details of single movements, no overall, comprehensive structural account of these groups is as yet available. On the other hand, there is at least some literature on “homegrown, Hindu-related” organizations (Sinha 2005).3

BACKGROUND AND SCOPE OF RESEARCH An initial curiosity about the fate of the eight movements I had researched in 1985 prompted this present study on “India-derived” movements. A survey of the contemporary scene, using data from the Registrar of Societies and my own fieldwork, generated a large and comprehensive list which made it possible to map this field. During my recent fieldwork, I enumerated twentythree movements across Singapore (including the eight from my previous research, one of which is not registered), the earliest of which was registered in 1948. However, only fifteen were contacted and surveyed for this research. Some groups could not be contacted, although they are still registered and thus assumed operational, while several others declined participation in the project. While most of the groups were enthusiastic about the research and were more than happy to offer information, a few were more guarded and tentative in their responses. It should be borne in mind that, even though all religious organizations and associations have to be registered as a society or a company before they can function legitimately, many groups (some “unregistered” and others “deregistered” or “dissolved”) continue to operate in informal, diffused and non-organized modes. Religious/spiritual groups may be refused registration or dissolved for a variety of reasons. All registered societies are expected to adhere to a body of rules and regulations as specified in the Societies Act. Under this act, the stated mission and objectives of religious societies should not work against national interests and disturb public peace in any way. Should the latter be perceived to be the case, the society in question could be de-registered. Despite these legalistic and bureaucratic requirements, the enthusiasm amongst Singaporeans for founding religious groups, institutions and organizations, including importing a branch of a religious movement from the outside, remains high. In the case of the movements I researched, it was not difficult for me to establish their presence and to locate their 148

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representatives. Almost all of these groups are registered (either as a society or a company) and basic information (date of registration, contact numbers, address and premises of operation) about them is available from public records and the Internet, which proved a very useful tool for sourcing information. Many operate websites while their publicity material are also available in local Indian restaurants and cultural associations. These “India-derived” groups are visible and conspicuous locally. Some have had a presence here for some four to five decades; some older ones have diminished in importance while other “new” ones have surfaced. Some of the more recent arrivals are more integrated into “mainstream” Hindu domains (of temple worship and domestic Hinduism), drawing freely and openly from the ritual base, belief structure and sacred texts therein, such as Amma’s Society, Shri Krishna Mandir and Chinmaya Seva Centre, which utilize texts such as the Bhagvad Gita and the Guru Granth Sahib. These newer groups have no objections to being perceived as “Hindu”, and are much more engaged with local Hindu domains. In fact, having emerged from mainstream Hinduism, these groups promote some aspect of the philosophy, ritual complex or sacred literature of this religious tradition. Their emphasis is less on reform, radicalism and the assertion of differences within Hinduism, and more on refocusing attention on specific aspects of the religion such as yoga, meditation, seva, self-development and acquiring experiential knowledge. This cluster of movements is different from another set (including Radha Soami, Eckankar Satsang, Divine Light Mission, Sai Baba, Transcendental Meditation and Brahma Kumari, Raja Yoga, etc.) that are self-consciously eclectic, syncretic and universal, as they do not want to be identified either as a religious group or as part of Hinduism. My focus here is the particular manifestation of religiosity of the cluster of “India-derived” groups that may or may not perceive themselves to be “religious” within the multi-ethnic, multi-religious and secular framework of the modernist nation-state of Singapore. Thus, the varying religious styles in this block of movements are examined, as well as the level and mode of institutionalization therein. This entails exploring relations between religious beliefs, religious experience, and religious practice and the kind of consciousness thus generated. The study of social and economic backgrounds of adherents of a “small” group, always of great sociological interest, is particularly so in this study. This is in view of the fact that these movements appeal to categories of English-speaking, literate, middle- and upper-class professionals from different ethnic groups and religious sensibilities. This in turn raises a secondary research concern: Is there a “fit” between the aspirations and expectations of middle classes and the specific spiritual and philosophical claims carried in the principles of such groups? 149

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Another primary concern in this research is to explore the day-to-day functioning of these groups in Singapore. Expectedly, this would be conditioned by specific readings of the local scene, with regard to its multiethnicity, multi-religiosity as well as the emphasis on the need for interfaith dialogue and religious harmony. I use specific examples to illustrate the particular responses the groups have made in order to function effectively in Singapore, while at the same time are being plugged into concerns that emerge from their connections with centres in India and elsewhere. The research required different kinds of data, thus necessitating recourse to a variety of data collection and analysis strategies. The methodological approach here was grounded in an ethnographic and qualitative logic, while the analytical stance is comparative and sociological. To study the distribution of these movements, a qualitative survey was undertaken to procure particular kinds of historical, organizational, institutional and demographic data about them. In addition, face-to-face in-depth interviews with selected members at all levels of organization within these movements generated invaluable data. The material for this chapter was obtained through fieldwork carried out between May and September 2005. Data were collected through participation observation, direct personal interviews with adherents of these movements and as well as a review of literature generated by the movements themselves.

CHARACTERISTICS OF “INDIA-DERIVED” MOVEMENTS A broad set of features that the groups share on the basis of self-definition can be abstracted from this research. First, the founder of each movement is seen as a guru/teacher. The groups claim a universal appeal, and membership is by individual choice and an outcome of personal quest. A majority of the groups claim to be “different” from mainstream, institutionalized religions, especially in promoting a de-ritualized stance towards spirituality. Furthermore, the groups claim to offer members a logical, rational and modernist approach to life and spirituality, while also asserting a connection with ancient, timeless wisdom and tradition. While the focus is on individual self-development, the notion of seva (service) to the community and self-development are considered equally essential.4 Although my research does indicate a variety of attitudes, beliefs, and styles of behaviour within the same block of movements, they nonetheless share the above traits which are briefly elaborated below.

Guru-founder: Importance as Spiritual Guide and Teacher The founder of each movement is seen as a guru/teacher, whose importance continues in varying degrees in contemporary times. The guru does not

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merely provide spiritual guidance but, more importantly, helps individuals cope with problems of daily secular living. Thus a guru, by his or her own example, shows individuals the way to proper action, that is, behaving in ways so as to eliminate one’s accumulated karma as well as to prevent the accumulation of further karma. The quotation, “What a Guru does is more important than what he tells us” (Brent 1972, p. 17) would apply to most of these movements. Weber’s concept of an “exemplary prophet”, which he thought to be important in prophetic movements of an ascetic or mystical nature (Peacock 1955, p. 92), is also applicable to, and illustrated by, the groups in question. In some cases, one encounters a living guru; in others the founding figure is valorized as a spiritual guide and in yet others, a guru has reached Samadhi and is deified and worshipped by followers. Not all gurus are male; some prominent founders and spiritual leaders (Amma’s Society, BK Raja Yoga, Sahaj Yoga) are women who are extremely popular gurus.

Claims to Universalism The movements strongly assert their openness to one and all, without discrimination. This is logically relates to an emphasis on the individual person, further reinforcing the claim to universality and to being unconcerned with ascribed statuses. The movements explicitly reject all association with caste identity and purity-pollution issues. While the movements are open to all, regardless of age, gender, religion, ethnicity and political affiliation, those groups that profess to be monotheistic (for example, Radha Soami Satsang) or are exclusivist, insist on a formal initiation ceremony for group membership. Others do not think initiation to be an important criterion for group membership, as the notion of “belonging” to the group is more fluid. Those with a monotheistic orientation show a need for closed-group formation and an insistence on boundaries, and it is important for a believer in a monotheistic framework to declare the supremacy of his or her commitment over other available orientations. This tendency of such groups to form group boundaries provides a contrast to the “openness”, flexibility and tolerance — characteristics of “traditional” Hinduism.

Membership through Individual Choice and Personal Quest Entry into and commitment to a particular group is asserted as being the result of a personal quest. Consequently, there is an implied notion of “rebirth” or second birth, which accords a new spiritual identity and status upon the individual. This also relates to their very groupness, and negates the idea of being born into the group. Membership in a group is a matter of self-

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declaration by an individual, in contrast to what happens in the traditional Indian-type religion with its emphasis on membership by birth within groups — caste, sub-caste, tribe, village and family. The individual has the ability to decide for himself or herself how to manage his or her life, which suggests adherence to a self-centred orientation.

Claims to Being “De-ritualized” With the exception of a few, all the movements express a drive and leaning towards plainness and simplicity. The emphasis is on a minimal, unadorned, non-elaborate approach to divinity. With some exceptions (Sai Baba movement, Amma’s Society, ISKCON) all other groups make claims to being anti-ritual or at least to a de-ritualized approach to divinity. For example, with respect to Hinduism, the aim is to get rid of elaborate religious paraphernalia, the emphasis being on believing and understanding rather than simply doing. Some examples of rituals that are rejected and criticized include the performance of arccanai, yaagam and homam within the context of theistic Hinduism. These are seen to be “unthinking” and imitative religious behaviour which are not based on understanding and appreciation of spirituality but on habitual and customary practices. Practices that are considered legitimate include personal meditation, attending satsang, talks, workshops, educational lectures and symposia and bhajan sessions. The claim to be “de-ritualized” allows groups to assert and mark a difference from “traditional Hinduism”, which is understood as an orthodox and temple-based practice.

“We are Not a Religion or a Religious Group” The conception of what “religion” is or is not has been redefined by the groups especially those that reject the “religious” dimension altogether. “Religion” may be interpreted variously by actors in varying situations (as in the case of Radha Soamis). Generally speaking, these groups regard “religion” as something that one enters by birth, family or caste denomination. Hence, to them, whatever is a matter of individual personal choice cannot be “religion”. There is a strong rejection of mainstream religiosity, particularly Hinduism, including all that it is perceived to represent — its institutions (for example, Hindu temples, Brahmin priesthood and mediation with divinity), caste and notions of ritual purity and pollution and its “excessive” ritualism.

Claims to Possess a Logical, Rational and Modernist Stance These movements are deliberately and consciously “founded” by particular individuals and their formation can be dated historically. Also, as this is a 152

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recent phenomenon, the adherents make explicit claims to being “modern”, by re-interpreting or modifying established religious traditions so as to generate new and more modern revisions. This cluster of attitudes expressed by them can be interpreted as “modernist” in orientation, if modernism is regarded as a particular mode of grappling with reality that sees itself as consciously breaking from a ”traditional” mode of doing things. This sort of consciousness is modernist especially because of its emphasis on the ability to achieve a religious status rather than being ascribed one (Bellah 1964), and because of its highly rationalized stance towards life. For Max Weber, the dominant process in the transition from what he calls “primitive” to ”modern” religion is rationalization — which is reflected in varying degrees in the groups examined. They all claim a logical and rational approach to fundamental human concerns (such as the nature of ultimate reality or divinity and the relationship of humans to divinity), grounded in a systematic and studied attitude and, most importantly, it is based on evidence available to all through personal experiential verification. Yet, it is interesting that the groups also draw upon an ancient, spiritual tradition to which they claim a connection. This longevity of ideas becomes the basis for legitimacy and efficacy of their philosophies.

Complementarity of Perspectives: Transcending Religious Boundaries In line with the asserted universalism and non-particularism of the movements, one sees in many of the groups a concomitant emphasis on a complementarity of spiritual perspectives. While several of the groups reject the label “religious”, and opt for the more acceptable “spiritual” alternatives, the local leaders of these groups are also aware that “religious” identities are primary in Singapore and that multi-religiosity defines this society. Thus, a common refrain in the discourse is the idea that “we are not just for Indians or Hindus, we are open to people of all ethnic groups and religions.” The groups are aware that they carry “Indian”/“Hindu” sounding names, and that they are viewed as being connected to these labels. There is thus an explicit attempt to transcend religious boundaries and demonstrate their openness to all. At an articulated level, the groups may reject institutionalized religiosity and the label “religion”, but in practice there is often considerable overlap in membership and commitment between the followers of orthodox “temple type” Hinduism and Sikhism, and adherents of the newer groups. There are, of course, important exceptions to this and variation is to be expected, depending on the degree of flexibility and acceptance of the particular group and the attitude and interpretations of the individual members. This overlap in membership shows

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that there are no sharp divisions between the practitioners of theistic, orthodox Hinduism and self-proclaimed “modernists”, and that much interaction is in fact present. It is possible to identify two such categories of movements here: some are more exclusive and insist on singular, declared membership and allegiance (for example, Radha Soami and Shirdi Baba Sansthan “only believe in No. 1 not No. 2”5), while others are less concerned with drawing and maintaining boundaries of the group and members are free to come and go as they please, and also go elsewhere. Some groups demand exclusive allegiance (such as the Shirdi Sai Baba group) but members are also participants in “other” types pf religious behaviour without feeling anxiety or discomfort; this translates into practice the notion of “complementarity” of religious perspectives.

Emphasis on Seva and Self-development Given the emphasis on achieved identities and statuses, practically all the movements privilege the individual and his/her spiritual development. The ultimate goal of membership in the group is to assist an individual attain a level of spiritual growth and self-realization. Yet, seva through mainly voluntary work is seen as intimately connected with the development of individual spirituality. Thus, almost all the groups, especially in the present, define their agendas in terms of explicit engagement with local communities. This translates into different sorts of voluntary and service-oriented work, ranging from operating old folks’ homes, orphanages, donation of time and other resources, offering counselling services for youths, prisoners, food donation programmes, and free educational services. This dimension of the “work” performed by these movements is imperative not just from the viewpoint of their own agenda, but is particularly crucial in the local context for another reason. Increasingly, the leadership of these movements has realized that, in order to acquire legitimacy and approval within the community, it is important that they are not seen exclusively as a “religious” or “spiritual” group, but also as being concerned with broader social, cultural, and economic concerns of the local community. As such, these groups also present themselves as a “welfare society”, which includes a concern with spiritual issues but is not exclusively defined by them. This lesson/realization is especially relevant for groups that want to formalize their presence in the local context. It is ironic that the very rejection of the label “Hindu” by a particular group could actually work against itself in specific instances. At least one movement did not gain approval for offering counselling for prisoners, on grounds that it 154

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was not a “Hindu” group, while several Hindu temples could offer this service without any problems.

Diverse Backgrounds of Followers Structurally, the groups are interesting in terms of the socio-cultural, religious and economic profiles of the followers. Again, while variation within the block of movements is to be expected, some broad features can be identified. In terms of numerical strength, a “small” group size is observed — where membership and participation is evident in hundreds rather than in thousands. Members are largely from middle-class and upper, middle-class backgrounds and are English-educated professionals. There are exceptions to this such as the Sai Baba movement which attracts a substantial number of non-English speaking, Chinese participants. Despite the Indian connection (both geographic and ethnic), and the association with Hinduism and, in some cases, Sikhism, the groups see significant participation from non-Indian and non-Hindu communities. Thus, despite numerical dominance of ethnic Indians, one sees a sizeable multi-ethnic, multi-religious representation in the various groups locally. In fact this ability to transcend ethnic and religious boundaries is highlighted by local leaders and members as proof of a group’s universal appeal and the relevance of its teachings. The group is also seen to be “successful” if it can indeed attract members outside the Indian and Hindu fold. In terms of gender, the movements report more participation by women rather than men. Members are generally older in their thirties and upwards; I did not encounter a predominance of members in their teens or twenties. Young children are present due to parental involvement. Registration procedures in Singapore require at least 60–70 per cent of the founding committee to be Singaporean. As such, these groups are initiatives led by citizens but once founded, they draw members of the Indian and non-Indian expatriate communities as ordinary members as much as they do locals.

SOME SOCIOLOGICAL INSIGHTS The discussion thus far describes the local presence and following of movements that have originated outside Singapore. It is impossible to offer a general set of factors to account for the popularity of all the movements in Singapore. Each movement has a history — both in India and Singapore — which merits detailed study for a fuller understanding while offering some insights, and also raises many more questions that need to be pursued. 155

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In the following section I abstract from my ethnography some themes and problematics for broader sociological reflection.

Local and Global Connections The movements are mainly imports from India and are not indigenous to Singapore, but have over time become more and more embedded in, and engaged with the local scene. My data show that while the groups must, by necessity, have a firm local grounding, they also reveal global orientations. While travelling well, the reality is that they originated elsewhere — something the group members are quite conscious of. Additionally, branches of these groups exist all over the world. For instance, the Sai Baba group, Transcendental Meditation, Eckankar Satsang, Radha Soami Satsang, Amma’s Society and ISKCON now have a worldwide presence, with members on all continents and who are not just limited to ethnic Indians. The local groups reveal a solidarity, not only with the “headquarters” in India but also with other branches that are scattered globally, and interact with them through a variety of initiatives, including the latest communication technologies. This simultaneous attention to local and global contexts is a challenge to the groups they have to come to terms with in their day-to-day functioning. How this dual focus translates into practice locally and with what impact, if any, varies with each of the group in question, and is an important arena of consideration. For instance, are there any tensions that emanate from this dual attention? Does the local context assume greater importance, given the demands and exigencies of day-to-day existence?

Inter-religious and Interethnic Dimensions, Effects on Local Hinduism Having done research in this domain in the 1980s, it strikes me that the language of “reform” and absolute “difference” (from other religious traditions) that was freely expressed then was somewhat muted and subtle some twenty years later. In the current discourse, we still hear “we are distinct from traditional religions” assertions. However, the tone of overt disapproval and criticism of “other religions” were noticeably absent. For example, in my earlier research, I commonly heard that Hindus are “idol worshippers” and that Hinduism encourages “blind faith” and is “too superstitious and ritualistic” — a sentiment not as often articulated in the present. There was also some distancing from the idea of being “reformist” and “radical”, especially as a religious group. When I probed further, the fear of being viewed as an “extremist” religious group or a “cult” surfaced as explanatory factors. This 156

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wariness, contextualized within a post-9/11 climate, is perhaps unsurprising. Although some groups staunchly expressed their autonomy and difference from all other groups, many more highlighted the commonalities and overlaps in terms of agendas, interests and philosophies both with other such groups and with “traditional” religions. This is highly significant sociologically. It says something about the self-consciousness amongst group members and particularly leaders: that they are located and have to function within a multiethnic, multi-religious context which privileges and promotes religious pluralism and harmony, and is a way of negotiating religious differences that might lead to conflict and tension. Whether this stance generates genuine inter-religious appreciation and acceptance of religious differences is a separate issue. Given that the movements do appeal to a broad cross-section of Singaporeans from different religious backgrounds, the following questions are pertinent: Do these groups’ activities facilitate interfaith dialogue in a post-9/11 climate? How do the followers of these groups describe their membership to these groups? I would argue that responses to these queries further our understanding of the discourses of inter-religious dialogue and religious harmony which are currently dominant in the religious landscape of Singapore. The preponderance of Indians and Hindus in these groups is hardly surprising. One question that surfaces here is the relationship between “ ‘Hindus’/‘Hinduism’ ” and the followers/teachers of these groups. How are these movements positioned within the broader context of Singaporean Hinduism? What kinds of interaction exist within these constitutive strands? What is the effect of the presence of these Indian movements on traditional, temple-type Hinduism? Some of the movements have indeed become part and parcel of Singaporean Hindu domains, through interaction with Hindu organizations and Hindu temples. At the same time, the movements I surveyed do provide a meaningful contrast to a strong core of theistic, temple-based Hinduism. It is interesting to ask if there are tensions in this co-location of diverse religious orientations. Many of the groups in question steer away from being associated with “Hinduism” or “Sikhism” despite carrying names associated with religious traditions and the fact that the founding inspiration of the gurus did obviously draw from the teachings and philosophies of these religions. My research suggests that this association is avoided as it is seen as being somewhat “restrictive”, working against the assertion of “difference” and the claim to universalism. Large numbers of local non-Indians and non-Hindus are attracted to these groups which present their teachings as “universally applicable” and not confined to any specific ethnic, religious or cultural heritage. How do “Hindu” 157

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members of these groups interact with “others” and who constitute this latter category? How do they understand “religion” and how is it redefined, particularly in view of the fact that many of these groups categorically state that they are not a “religious group”? The tight association between ethnic and religious identities in the local discourse may be weakened, given the non-Indian and non-Hindu membership of the groups. My data suggests that followers have little difficulty negotiating their ethnic and religious identities, and seem to cross carefully drawn racial and religious boundaries easily. While some of the groups do interact with the Hindu Endowments Board (HEB), the Hindu Centre and some of the Hindu temples, many others do not have any such connections and work independently.6 Nor do they associate with other similar movements. There are also examples like the Sai Baba which stresses syncretism and complementarity of all religions, although to an observer, some dimensions of the group’s religious activities are perceived to be embedded in practices and rituals of Hinduism (for example, the singing of Sai bhajans which invoke the names of Hindu deities such as Siva, Vishnu, etc.). In this context, the idea of being unique and unlike others is strongly expressed, such as ”we are different, not like any other group here”. As far as the general Hindu population is concerned, I encountered isolated cases in which Hindus did not want to associate themselves with followers of these new groups and argued that their teachings were not part of Hinduism. Given the phenomenal visibility of gurus and spiritual teachers from India in Singapore, some members of the Hindu community are sceptical about the authenticity and spiritual value of particularly the “newer arrivals”, many of whom were referred to as “frauds” and “cheats”.7 There is disapproval of some of these movements, but even here a tolerant and “live and let live” attitude, typically associated with Hinduism, prevails. Additionally, the groups in question do not challenge established religious authority overtly. Nor do they offer themselves as alternatives to existing religious traditions but only as supplements to them. Some examples of this are the Sai Baba movement, the Ramakrishna Mission and the Sri Aurobindo Society. These Indian movements came to Singapore as innovations. Prior to their arrival, there already existed an established inherited Hindu tradition in Singapore. There is no evidence that these new directions in Indian religious thought have become or have ever been a divisive force in Singapore. Within the local context, some of these movements have no inhibitions in interacting with the larger Hindu domain. However, there are exceptions to this. For instance, the Hare Krishna movement and the Divine Light Mission are groups that are not registered officially but elicit mixed feelings both from 158

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official bodies and lay persons. Generally speaking, Hindus in Singapore do not seem worried by the occurrence of modernist Indian movements here. Some say that it is precisely in the nature of “Hinduism” to be all-embracing, eclectic, syncretic and unconcerned with boundaries. The Indian membership in these movements is to be expected. Since the local branches of the Indian movements maintain links with the headquarters in India (and also elsewhere), there is a general orientation away from Singapore and towards India. For Indians this is not a problem because kinship ties in the past and present with India provide familiarity with the sub-continent. However, in the light of a substantial non-Indian membership of these Indian movements, it would be interesting to examine how the nonIndian members handle this orientation towards India. For instance, there is evidence that many ethnic Chinese in Singapore have become Sai Baba devotees. Since the personality of Sai Baba holds the group together, devotees frequently make trips to India to visit him. Visiting a guru’s ashram resembles a pilgrimage, and this is true for members of other movements too. With respect to the Chinese Sai Baba devotees, it is also interesting how they have adjusted to the ritual activities of the movement and how the organization has responded to this cluster of members by innovating, for example, in composing Sai bhajans in Mandarin and English and including these in their weekly bhajan sessions to be sung by all followers, Chinese and non-Chinese.

The Appeal of New Movements It is impossible to offer a general argument as to why these movements appeal to so many individuals. Almost every person I spoke to had a unique and “miraculous” tale to relate with regard to his or her conversion to the group. My data point to the complexity of issues involved in affiliation to a religious or spiritual group. The movements in Singapore now attract a substantial number of “devotees” and some of the movements in question are overtly missionary in wanting to increase membership and spread the “word’, while others are unconcerned about making new converts or enlarging their numerical size. Overall, the rising popularity of these movements can be partially located in the way these movements present themselves and their obvious appeal to potential members. That “ours is a spiritual path, leading man to God. We are not a religious cult” is a sentiment echoed by adherents of several movements. The claim by a group that it is not “religious”8 group, but a “spiritual” one which attends to the individual and his/her spiritual needs, facilitating self knowledge through experience and experimentation, is certainly a factor. Such a claim appears to be based on the rational, scientific 159

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and objective, and is significant in the local context where the attraction to rationalized religiosity has been reported in all the major religious traditions (Tong 1992). Historically, Hinduism (as well as Buddhism and Jainism) has grown by absorption and assimilation rather than by rejection and elimination. It is asserted by members that the philosophy of the new movements is their universal applicability, not clothed in any specific ethnic, religious or cultural heritage. In other words, no direct links between ethnicity and “religious” or “spiritual” affiliations are made. Thus, neither religion nor ethnicity are perceived to be barriers to membership in movements of this kind, again stressing the element of personal autonomy (free from inherited and ascribed traditions and identities) in making a spiritual choice. The movements seem to appeal to a particular group of individuals, namely the English-speaking, literate, middle-class professionals. It is my view that to some extent there is a fit between the aspirations and expectations of middle-class individuals and the specific claims made by these movements. Here, I am referring to the modernist attitude portrayed by the movements and the progressive, modern, rationalist and objective stances of some middle-class individuals. This does not suggest that only middle-class individuals find the philosophy of the new movements appealing. I hypothesize that individuals who are concerned about locating meaning behind their actions (religious or otherwise), not following tradition blindly, and having some control over their destiny, would be attracted to movements of this kind precisely because they provide alternative methods of dealing with the problems, spiritual or otherwise, confronted under conditions of modernity. Even such groups as the Arya Samaj, which was founded with an explicit desire to bring the misguided Hindu back to the “true” Hindu path, in today’s Singapore, no longer carries out this mission and plays a more diffused social, cultural and educational role.

Social Services While my research focus was not designed to pay particular attention to the social service dimension of the movements in question, it became clear as my fieldwork progressed that this was a most essential component of the “work” the groups perform locally. One is particularly struck by the latter in view of the groups’ primary concentration on the individual self and his/her spiritual growth and development. There is an increasing presence of the movements in the public sphere, both in Singapore and globally in being concerned with concrete issues grounded in the realities of a temporal existence. The emphasis on seva, is concretized through a range of social service and voluntary tasks 160

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undertaken by members in educational, cultural, welfare-related and charitable activities, as part of their spiritual development and work. This concurrent attention to the self and the other seems to require a delicate balancing act. The focus on one’s spiritual state requires an inward orientation while the social service dimension calls for an external, societal engagement. This move from the private realm to the public/civic space is also interesting in view of the sharp separation of the “religious” domain from other, especially “political” spaces in Singapore, and the clear circumscription of the religious domain here. The social service component of the “work” performed by these groups clearly signals that they are addressing and responding to a larger socioeconomic, political and cultural issues they perceive to be prevalent in society, such as poverty, unequal access to resources (educational, medical and nutritional and social and cultural capital), and the presence of needy people and groups in society. Seva brings them forcefully in to the realm of civil society, and raise attendant tensions inevitable in this process.

SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS It has been quite typical to examine the NRMs using terminologies and concepts for analysing religious institutions and organizations, however these movements have been named or defined in the literature. There is a strong awareness in the scholarly community that one is witnessing something different and novel in the realm of religiosity and those new conceptual tools are necessary to theorize this domain. Scholars have noted here a discursive shift from “religion” to “spirituality” (Clarke 2006), calling for a clarification of fundamental conceptual categories, in particular the former category. Substantively, the NRMs, including the ones discussed in this chapter, offer an inner directed religiosity, where the primacy of the self and experiential spiritual knowledge over textual knowledge are prioritized. They offer an alternative mode of conceptualizing one’s relationship to the divine, in addition to being unconventional in allowing the self to construct an appropriate, relevant and desirable spirituality. There is tremendous appeal in this formulation as indicated by the large numbers of followers the movements attract. The India-derived movements examined here do provide a meaningful contrast to the strong core of theistic, temple-based, domestic, festival-oriented Hinduism in Singapore. Yet, institutionalized Hinduism is not under threat from the presence of these NRMs and their growing numbers. It is interesting that a few of the movements self-consciously define themselves not in religious terms but in the language of “spirituality” and “lifestyle choice”, and assert 161

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their distinction from institutionalized religions — a position they share with NRMs from other religious traditions as well. As the research on these “Indiaderived” movements has demonstrated, the raw materials used to create a “new” philosophy and theology can be traced to one or more of the mainstream India-based religious traditions such as Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism and Jainism, while sometimes also drawing upon ideas from monotheistic religious traditions such as Islam and Christianity. This explains their eclecticism and syncretism. Despite this ancestry, they are also clear innovations within a realm of inherited religious and cultural traditions. Even in the midst of these innovations, the element of guru bhakti tradition, a link with the devotional strand of Hindu religiosity, is strongly discernible in the very constitution of these groups. My broader research on Hinduism in Singapore reveals the centrality of a guru or spiritual advisor in the journey towards self-development, in both NRMs and the wider community of Hindus. The difference is that the devotion is either directed at a living guru who leads by example, or a founder guru who has attained Samadhi and has also been deified. Historically, Singapore has been and continues to be a fertile ground for the sustenance of “traditional” religions as well as novel “religious” movements — both local and imported. In fact, given the history of Singapore and the constitution of its population by migrant groups, the island has been defined by religious pluralism since the mid-nineteenth century. Even more so today, as my research has demonstrated, a strong sense of choice and religious experimentation defines the local religious domain as Singapore hosts a vast array of religiosities across a number of diverse religious traditions which make it possible for the existence of the official, institutional variety and the myriad innovative interpretations of popular religions. Yet, while private religiosity is constitutionally guaranteed and is indeed largely unregulated, the relevant authorities are more circumspect about collectivized expressions of religiosity in the public domain, and these are thus subject to a variety of regulations and constraints. Interestingly, the physical location of Singapore assumes a different kind of strategic importance today, and is in fact focal in facilitating different kinds of religious and spiritual traffic to routinely pass its shores. Thus, it is not uncommon for spiritual leaders of many of these India-derived movements to stop over to deliver lectures and to meet with their followers in Singapore, en route to North America or Europe. The gurus are therefore regularly visible and have a presence, and they are in fact much more accessible to their followers in the local context than they would be in India, given the size of the local community. 162

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As mentioned, these NRMs are a global, transnational phenomenon. However, this globality is not a new feature but one that has defined them since their very inception. These movements have certainly travelled well and this has contributed to their success. Clearly, one can no longer ignore the presence of “new” forms of religiosity in the modern world, and neither is this a passing moment. Even as new religious groups have risen and disappeared, others have taken their place.

Notes 1.

2.

3.

4.

Some examples of early works on the subject include: Brent 1972; Colpe 1978; Eschmann 1974; Farquhar 1967; Gonda 1965; Mangalwadi 1977; Pannikar 1963; and Sarma 1944. My undergraduate honours thesis research (Sinha 1985) focused on an ethnographic account of the Radha Soamis in Singapore, with attention to eight India-derived groups and their local functioning. Social science and historical accounts of Hinduism in these regions remind us of the “Indian connection” as the basis for recognizing pluralism within the realm of practice. However, there is yet another dimension that adds to the pluralism that is routinely recognized in local manifestations of Hinduism — the advent and input of what is refer here as “home grown” Hindu groups. These “home grown” groups display attempts to formulate specific versions of Hinduism and represent responses to the exigencies of the local situation, demonstrating an engagement with specific socio-cultural, political, ethnic and religious forces current in Singapore. The three “home grown” groups are: (1) Krishna Our Guide (registered in 1968), (2) The Hindu Centre (registered in 1978), and (3) Sri Samayapuram Mariamman Pillaigal (registered in 2005). A case is made for viewing these as instances of indigenous innovation — constructed with an awareness of local conditions but utilizing an inherited, imported religious tradition as the base — in which select features of Hinduism are highlighted, culminating in an attachment to varied styles of religiosity within the domain of Singaporean Hinduism. It is interesting to hear how some groups describe themselves. The following images are abstracted from the group’s publicity brochures and other literature (which incidentally in Singapore are regularly published in the four official languages — English, Malay, Tamil and Mandarin), published by the groups themselves. The Shirdi Sai Baba Sansthan (Singapore) aims “to be a non-profit making society that propagates ‘spirituality’ as opposed to religion, whiel retaining independence from any particular religion, opening membership to people across religions, classes and races”; Sahaj Marg (The Natural Path) is taught and practised under the auspices of the Shri Ram Chandra Mission, which defines

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itself as “a non-profit organization”. The Mission was established in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh in 1945 by the “Grand Master of the System” — Shri Ram Chandra. Sahaj Marg is described as “a system of practical training in the spirituality of Shri Ram Chandra. It is in essence the well-known Raja Yoga (yoga of the mind — a system of modern life) remodelled to suit the needs of modernday life. The practice is simple, without rituals or ceremonies, and is central to the heart”; The Chinmaya Seva Centre in Singapore “is part of the global Chinmaya Mission which carries out the humanitarian work of its preceptor, H.H. Swami Chinmayananda”. It defines itself as “an organization dedicated to providing individuals from all backgrounds, the knowledge enshrined in the original scriptural texts of India.” The Sree Narayana Mission presents itself as “a charitable organization” named after Sree Narayana Guru, a philosopher and social reformer, who valued “community togetherness and international brotherhood”. In Singapore, the mission “through its numerous welfare programmes has benefited the Singapore aged, sick and infirm regardless of race, culture, creed or religion. In addition to providing community service, the Mission also promotes educational and cultural activities”. This is a reference to Shirdi Sai Baba, No. 1 and Sathya Sai Baba, No. 2; the members of the Shirdi Sai Baba Sansthan in Singapore do not acknowledge any links between the two individuals and members are expected to adhere to this belief as part of the group’s teachings. ISKCON operates out of the Lakshminarayan Temple, a Sai Baba group holds some activities in Krishnan Temple, and previously held weekly bhajan sessions at the Perumal Temple. Specific names of gurus and groups were overtly mentioned critically in this context, and I was not requested to keep these references confidential. However, these concrete references have been omitted here in the interest of sensitivity. Here, “religion” is reduced to its institutionalized, orthodox dimension and thus seen to be tradition-bound, limited, oppressive and above all, “traditional”, as explained to me by informants to mean “old fashioned” and “rigid”.

References Ambroise, Yvon. “Hindu Religious Movements: A Sociological Perspective”. Journal of Dharma 7, no. 4 (1982): 358–73. Arweck, Elisabeth. “New Religious Movements”. In Religions in the Modern World: Traditions and Transformations, edited by Linda Woodhead, et al., pp. 264–88. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. Babb, Lawrence. “Patterns of Hinduism”. In Singapore: Society in Transition, edited by Riaz Hassan, pp. 189–204. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976. Barker, Eileen. New Religious Movements: A Practical Introduction. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1989. Beckford, James A., ed. New Religious Movements and Rapid Social Change. London: Sage Publications, 1986. 164

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Bellah Robert Neeley. “Religious Evolution”. In Sociology of Religion, edited by Roland Robertson, pp. 262–92. Penguin Books, 1964. Brent, Peter. Godmen of India. New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972. Bromley, David G and Phillip E. Hammond, eds. The Future of New Religious Movements. Macon, Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1987. Chidester, David. “Being Human: Symbolic Orientation in New Religious Movements”. Journal of Dharma 7, no. 4 (1982): 430–51. Chryssides, George D., ed. Historical Dictionary of New Religious Movements. Lanham: The Scarecrow Press Inc., 2001. Clarke, Peter B. New Religions in Global Perspective. London: Routledge, 2006. ———., ed. Encyclopedia of New Religious Movements. London and New York: Routledge, 2005. Colpe, Carsten. “Syncretism and Secularisation: Complementary and Antithetical Trends in New Religious Movements”. History of Religions 17 (1978): 158–76. Coney, Judith. “New Religious Movements led in the West by South Asians”. In The South Asian Religious Diaspora in Britain, Canada and the United States, edited by Harold Coward, et al., pp. 55–73. New York, State University of New York Press, 2000. Eschmann, Ancharlott. “Religion, Reaction and Change: The Role of Sects In Hinduism”. In Religion and Development in Asian Societies, pp. 143–57. Colombo: Marga Publications, 1974. Farquhar, John Nicol. Modern Religious Movements in India. New York: Macmillan Company, 1967. Gonda, Jan. Visnuism and Saivism: A Comparison. London: Athlone Press, 1965. Gordon, Melton. “The Changing Scene of New Religious Movements: Observations from a Generation of Research”. Social Compass 42, no. 2 (1995): 265–76. Gosine, Mahim. “The Forgotten Children of India: A Global Perspective”. In Global Indian Diaspora: Yestderday, Today and Tomorrow, edited by Jagat K. Motwani, et al., pp. 11–28. New York: Global Organization of People of Indian Origin (GOPIO), 1993. Hertel, Bradley R. “Church, Sect and Congregation in Hinduism: An Examination of Social Structure and Religious Authority”. Journal for The Scientific Study of Religion 16, no. 1 (1977): 15–26. Jain, Prakash C. “Five Patterns of Indian Emigration”. In Global Indian Diaspora: Yestderday, Today and Tomorrow, edited by Jagat K Motwani, et al., pp. 29–33. New York; Global Organization of People of Indian Origin (GOPIO), 1993. Knott Kim. Hinduism in Leeds. Leeds: University of Leeds, 1985. Lewis, James R., ed. The Oxford Handbook of New Religious Movements. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. Majumdar, Ramesh Chandra, ed. The Age of Imperial Unity. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bahvan, 1953. Mangalwadi, Vishal. The World of Gurus. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1977. Menon, Subhas. An Ethnographic Study of a Neo-Hindu Group. Unpublished Academic Exercise: National University of Singapore, 1983. 165

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Panikkar, Kovalam Madhava. The Foundations of New India. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963. Partridge, Christopher, ed. Encyclopaedia of New Religions, New Religious Movements, Sects and Alternative Spiritualities. Oxford: Lion Book, 2004. Peacock, James L. Consciousness and Change: Symbolic Anthropology in Evolutionary Perspective. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1955. Sarma, Dittakavi Subrahmanya. Studies in the Renaissance of Hinduism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Benares: Benares Hindu University, 1944. Sandhu, Kernial Singh. Indians in Malaya: Some Aspects of Their Immigration and Settlement Patterns (1786–1957). London: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Sen, Kshit Mohan. Hinduism. Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1961. Sharma, Arvind. “New Religious Movements in India”. In New Religious Movements and Rapid Social Change, edited by James Beckford, pp. 220–39. London: Sage Publications, 1986. Vineeta Sinha. “Modern Indian Movements: Religious and Counter-religious”. Academic Exercise, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, 1985. ———. “Unraveling ‘Singaporean Hinduism’, Seeing the Pluralism Within: A Look at Three ‘Home-grown’ Hindu Groups”. Paper presented at the International Symposium on ‘Cultural Diversities and Nation-States in a Globalizing Age’, 1–2 September 2005, National University of Singapore, 2005. Tong Chee Kiong. “The Rationalization of Religion”. In Imagining Singapore, edited by Bah Kah Choon, Anne Pakir and Tong Chee Kiong. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992. White, Charles. “The Sai Baba Movement: Approaches to the Study of Indian Saints”. Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 4 (1972): 863–78. Wilson, Bryan, ed. New Religious Movements: Challenges and Response. London: Routledge, 1999. Woodhead, Linda, et al., eds. Religions in the Modern World; Traditions and Transformations. London: Routledge, 2002.

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7 BAHA’IS IN SINGAPORE Patterns of Conversion Foo Check Woo and Lynette Thomas

INTRODUCTION There are at least 2,000 adherents of the Baha’i Faith in Singapore today. The Baha’i Faith is the youngest of the world’s independent religions and the Baha’is are followers of Baha’u’llah (meaning “Glory of God”), the ProphetFounder of the Baha’i Faith. This religious community has been registered in Singapore as an independent religious entity since 1952 (Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Singapore, 1998), yet little is known about this nascent community. The Baha’i Faith in Singapore had its beginnings in 1950 with the arrival of Dr and Mrs Shirin Fozdar from India (Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Singapore, 2000). By 1952, there were a total of twelve declared believers, which was sufficient for the Baha’i community to form the first Local Spiritual Assembly. The election of the first governing body for Baha’i affairs took place in April 1952 and the Local Spiritual Assembly was duly incorporated in July of that year (Inter-Religious Organization, Singapore 2001). There is neither priesthood nor clergy in the Baha’i Faith (Effendi 1974). The administration of the Baha’i world community is based on the unique system of Houses of Justice (or Spiritual Assemblies), which extends from the local to the international level. These elected bodies are responsible for ministering to the needs of the individual as well as the community at large. 167

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There have been very few studies carried out on the Baha’i community of Singapore. An academic exercise (Yeo 1980) focused on the phenomenon of witnessing from the angle of boundary maintenance, by looking primarily at the structure of the Baha’i community through a predetermined framework of a sectarian movement. Chew (1997) is a descriptive and research-oriented study focusing mainly on a comparison of Taoism and the Baha’i Faith and the former’s impact on the latter. Chew (1996) has also written on the emergence of the Baha’i Faith in Singapore but more from a historical rather than cross-sectional perspective. The Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Singapore has also published a brochure on the Baha’is in Singapore but the information is largely general and historical in nature. In 2001, the InterReligious Organization (IRO) published a book comprising short accounts of the nine major religions in Singapore, including the Baha’i Faith, but these accounts describe the main features of religion rather than about its believers. The Association of Baha’i Studies, a committee of the Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Singapore, has published six volumes of its journal The Singapore Baha’i Studies Review (1996–2001). The journal comprises scholarly articles on comparative religion and contemporary humanistic issues from a Baha’i perspective. Ong (2000) has also written on Mrs Shirin Fozdar, a well-known Baha’i in Singapore as well as an early advocate of the women’s movement, and through her, we have had a glimpse of the workings of the early Baha’i community of Singapore. Nevertheless, her account is largely personal and anecdotal and centres only on one personality. As the Baha’i Faith has been established in Singapore for only slightly more than fifty years, it is estimated that at least 80 per cent of its 2,000 adherents are first-generation Baha’is. It is therefore particularly appropriate at this juncture of the growth of the Baha’i community of Singapore to understand what motivated the first generation Baha’is to switch from their previous religious affiliation or, if they had no particular religious affiliation, to declare themselves as followers of Baha’u’llah. This study attempts to understand the pattern of conversion among the Baha’is in Singapore over the last forty years or so and to redress some aspects of the lack of common knowledge about the Baha’i Faith in Singapore. More specifically, the study attempts to answer the following questions: 1. Are the teachings of the Baha’i Faith especially attractive to an economic, social or ethnic group? 2. When and where did the respondents declare their belief in Baha’u’llah? Are the teachings of the Baha’i Faith especially attractive to the youth, adult or elderly? 168

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3. Are there key messages in the Baha’i teachings and/or significant actions of the Baha’i community of Singapore that resonate with a significant number of its membership?

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Definition Conversion in the context of this study may be defined as the process of leaving a religious organization for that of the Baha’i Faith. It also covers those Baha’is who, at the point of declaration in their belief in Baha’u’llah, had already left their previous religious organization or who had no previous affiliation with any religious organization. This definition is not ideal because conversion is clearly an inner process differing from one individual to another, and one that goes beyond the outward declaration of belief, which in the case of membership in the Baha’i community of Singapore, involves the signing of a declaration card. Is signing the declaration card the defining moment that signals an individual’s belief in Baha’u’llah? Or is it a gradual and growing conviction in one’s mind that life’s meaning and purpose lie in the direction as described by that particular religion? Can one distinguish between an authentic conversion and one with ulterior motives? Bearing in mind these difficulties, we are nonetheless adhering to this practical definition of conversion.

Methodology This study relied on a questionnaire survey and case studies. The use of a questionnaire survey facilitated reaching out to a bigger group of respondents with structured questions and bounded answers, and allowed for statistical analysis of the responses. The face-to-face interviews in the case studies complemented the more quantitative questionnaire survey by fleshing out the skeletal frame of the information obtained through the questionnaire.

Questionnaire Survey The questionnaire was divided into four sections (see Appendix 8.1). The first section covered the current personal data of the respondents. Its objective was to obtain a typical profile of the respondent and insights into whether the teachings of the Baha’i Faith are especially attractive to a particular economic, social or racial group. The second section was to obtain the personal data of the respondent’s spouse, to supplement the profile of the respondent. The 169

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third section gathers data of the respondent at the point of declaration. This data helps to answer the second question as to when and where did the respondents declare their belief in Baha’u’llah, and whether the teachings of the Baha’i Faith are especially attractive to the youth, adult or elderly. In the fourth and most important section, the questions covered various aspects of the respondents’ religion and religious conversion. The target in the distribution of the questionnaire was to obtain responses from 100 first-generation Baha’is (about 5 per cent of the total Baha’i population). The prospective respondents were chosen randomly during the period May to October 2004. The questionnaire was either posted to them or handed to them personally by this chapter’s writers. Although the intent was to obtain a random sampling of respondents, in reality the sample set was drawn from the more active members of the Baha’i community of Singapore. This was partly because not all its members were contactable and partly because many of those contactable did not fill out the questionnaire. Eventually, 105 questionnaires were received, of which 102 were deemed complete or almost complete with all essential details and were accepted.

Case Studies Of the 102 accepted respondents, a total of sixteen (10 per cent) were chosen as case studies. Respondents from different former religious backgrounds (as well as from the category of no religious affiliation) were selected to ensure a representative sample. Altogether, five Taoists-Buddhists, four Christians, three with no religion, two Hindus and two Buddhists were interviewed. The interviews were conducted in the respondents’ homes, each lasting an average of thirty minutes. They were tape-recorded and subsequently transcribed to facilitate collation, processing and analyses. The interviewees were assured of the interviews’ confidentiality and were briefed on the purpose of the study before they agreed to be interviewed. On the whole, interviewees were willing to share intimately their feelings about their conversion, itself an intensely personal affair and one subject to many influences and pressures. The following questions were used as guidelines: 1. What was your religion prior to declaration? 2. Describe what you did as a follower of that religion? 3. Could you share with us the periods of time when you were staunch in your previous faith and when you were not? Were you at all unhappy in your previous religion? 4. Were you investigating other religions before converting to the Baha’i Faith? 170

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5. Can you share with us how much you know about other religions? 6. Was there anything in the Baha’i Faith that prevented you from becoming a Baha’i? 7. What was the “tipping point” which made you decide to become a Baha’i? 8. Was there any inter-generational impact when you became a Baha’i? Sometimes, additional questions were added to the list in order to clarify information provided by the interviewees.

QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY FINDINGS Current Profile of Respondents Fifty-five (55) respondents were female and forty-seven (47) were male. The median age range of all respondents was 40–49. The female respondents had a median age range of 40–49 while the male respondents had a slightly higher median age range (45–54). The majority of respondents were Chinese (74.5 per cent) based on their parents’ ethnicities. None of the respondents had Malay parentage while 8.8 per cent were of Indian parentage. Only 2 per cent were of mixed parentage (Chinese-Indian or Indian-Chinese) while a significant proportion of the respondents (14.7 per cent) were of other ethnic parentage (other than Chinese, Malay and Indian). A slightly small majority of respondents were Singaporeans (65.7 per cent). Malaysians with permanent residence status (12.7 per cent) and other permits (6.9 per cent) made up 19.6 per cent while other nationalities with permanent residence status (10.8 per cent) and other permits (3.9 per cent) made up a significant 14.7 per cent. Taking into consideration both the ethnicity and nationality profiles of the respondents, it is therefore not surprising that there is a significant visual presence of a diversity of races and nationalities in the Baha’i community of Singapore. The majority of the respondents (62.7 per cent) had tertiary education; 53.9 per cent had a university degree while 8.8 per cent had a diploma. The proportion of male respondents with a tertiary education (42 per cent) was higher than that of the female respondents (31 per cent). In the Singapore Census of Population 2000 for resident non-students aged 15 years and over, the proportion of population with tertiary education (polytechnic, other diploma and university) was only 22.8 per cent (16). Although the sampling was probably not representative of the whole Baha’i community of Singapore, 171

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this is still an indication that the education level of the more active members of the Baha’i community in Singapore, if not all its members, was significantly higher than the general population in Singapore. At the time of the survey, none of the respondents were unemployed although there were 13 homemakers, 7 retirees and 2 students (21.6 per cent). A significant majority of the employed respondents (70 per cent) held a professional, technical or managerial position (62.9 per cent), which is reflective of their high education levels. The majority of the employed respondents worked in the “other services” industry (56.3 per cent). The ratio of respondents staying in Housing and Development Board (HDB) flats to those staying in other types of dwelling is 62:38 as compared to the typical ratio of 85:15 for the general population of Singapore. However, as more than 90 per cent of the respondents consider or perceive themselves as middle-class, the lower ratio of 62:38 for HDB to other types of dwelling is not unexpected. When the type of dwelling is combined with the language most frequently spoken at home for the respondents, the results are quite interesting compared to that of Singapore Census of Population 2000 for HDB flat dwellers. The majority of the Singapore population staying in HDB flats speak Chinese dialects (50 per cent) followed by Mandarin (36.6 per cent) and then English (18.3 per cent). However, the trend for the Baha’i respondents staying in HDB flats is in the opposite direction: the majority speaks English (60.3 per cent), followed by Mandarin (19 per cent) and then Chinese dialects (17.5 per cent). Most of the respondents (91.2 per cent) considered themselves as middleclass while only 1 per cent considered themselves as rich. Close to 70 per cent of the respondents were married and 84 per cent of their spouses were Baha’is. It is reasonable to assume that if both husband and wife profess the same religious beliefs, there would be greater mutual support and the couple would be more active in their religious community.

Profile of Respondents at Point of Declaration The peak decade during which the respondents declared themselves Baha’i (31.4 per cent) was the 1980s, while 84.3 per cent of respondents declared during the three decades stretching from 1970s to the 1990s. As the Baha’i Faith came to Singapore only in 1950, the early years in Singapore did not see a significant growth in the number of adherents. It was only after the second decade of the establishment of the Baha’i Faith that the numbers surged to 26.5 per cent among respondents. 172

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The declarations took place mainly in Singapore (60 per cent) and Malaysia (23 per cent). One interesting observation is that there was a sizeable number of respondents who had declared while in the United States (5 per cent) and Canada (3 per cent), while none of the respondents had declared while in the United Kingdom which was a more popular destination for students from Singapore and Malaysia till the late 1980s. It would seem that the believers in the North American continent were more proactive in teaching the faith as compared to those in the United Kingdom. The median age range of all respondents was 40–49 while the median age range of all respondents at the point of declaration was 20–29. This correlates well with the peak decade of declaration in the 1980s, which was about twenty years ago. Based on the nationality of the respondents at the point of declaration, there was an obvious movement of Malaysian Baha’is to Singapore in the intervening years, with many of the Malaysian Baha’is subsequently taking up Singapore citizenship or permanent residence. Comparing the educational status of the respondents at the point of declaration with their educational status at the time of the survey, many respondents have clearly moved on from their secondary and upper secondary levels of education to tertiary levels of education. When comparing the current education status of the respondents with the general Singapore population, it is conjectured that the higher educated members of the Baha’i community of Singapore are significantly more active. It is also highly plausible that the active members of the Baha’i community of Singapore have, in accordance with the teachings of the faith, placed great importance on education, and have thus gone on to attain higher levels of education. This movement up to higher levels of education in the intervening years is also reflected in the comparison between the employment status of the respondents at the point of declaration and their current employment status. Many who were students at the point of declaration had moved on to professional, technical or managerial positions. Most of the respondents (82.4 per cent) considered themselves middle class at the point of declaration while none considered themselves rich. There were more poor respondents (17.6 per cent) at the point of declaration, who have since moved up the economic ladder. Only 24.5 per cent of the respondents were married at the time of declaration as many of them were still schooling, and the median age range of all respondents was 20–29 at the point of declaration. This indicates the attractiveness of the Baha’i Faith to the young. 173

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Religious Status of Respondents at Point of Declaration The largest group of respondents (41.2 per cent) who declared themselves as Baha’i did not have a religious upbringing or considered themselves as not having a religion, at the point of declaration. Of this group, about 9.5 per cent were probably dissatisfied with their previous religious beliefs and had ceased these beliefs or left their previous religious organizations for some time already, and thus, considered themselves as having no religion. However, in the case study interviews of those who had declared themselves as not having a religion at the point of declaration, all responded in the affirmative when asked the question: “Did you believe in God or a divine Creator or a Universal Consciousness?” It is interesting to note that the next largest group of respondents was from the Buddhist tradition (40 per cent), followed by respondents from the Christian tradition (17.6 per cent) and the Taoist tradition (16.7 per cent). When examining the religious status of the parents of those respondents without religion, it was found that the majority of their parents were Taoists (54.8 per cent). This reinforces the earlier point made that respondents with no religion at the point of declaration were already dissatisfied with their previous religious beliefs, including those of their parents.

Investigators of Religious Truth Of greater significance is the fact that 65 per cent of all respondents were investigating religious truth. This was as high as 71 per cent for respondents who were previously Buddhists (13.7 per cent of total respondents) and 69 per cent for those previously with no religion (41.2 per cent). Clearly, the majority of respondents were searching for religious truth and decided to embrace the Baha’i Faith. Additionally, 72 per cent of the respondents knew of another religion other than their own prior to conversion. This was as high as 83 per cent for respondents from the Hindu tradition. Yet even among the respondents from the Christian tradition (who are generally known to avoid contact with other religions) a majority (56 per cent) knew something about another religion. The best-known religion was Christianity (57 respondents) followed by Buddhism (40 respondents) and Islam (22 respondents). It is also interesting to note that for the respondents with a religion at the point of declaration, their religion was very similar to those of their parents except for the Christians. It is clear from the survey that one-third of the respondents who were previously Christians were first generation Christians, as none of their parents were Christians. 174

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Many of the respondents first heard of the Baha’i Faith from friends (37 per cent), family and relatives (27 per cent) and colleagues (11 per cent). Others (5 per cent) heard from acquaintances and teachers (4 per cent). This trend is related to “connectivity”, with the connectivity with friends obviously the highest. Interestingly, about 9 per cent first heard of the faith from strangers.

First Impressions of the Baha’i Faith The first impression respondents about the Baha’i Faith were generally neutral among half the respondents (49.0 per cent), and low in the negative (4.9 per cent) and high in the positive direction (46.1 per cent). More respondents from the Christian tradition were impressed with the faith than not. This same trend was also apparent among the respondents from the Taoist tradition. The respondents from the Buddhist tradition were non-committal, and the same trend to a less extent was true among the respondents with no religion. For those mainly former Christians who reacted negatively to the faith upon first hearing it (4.9 per cent), the main reason given was that the Baha’i Faith is a cult. This can be largely explained by the Christian belief that “Christ is the only Way”. There were however several reasons as to why many of the respondents reacted favourably to the faith when they first heard of it. The fundamental teachings of the Baha’i Faith, namely the oneness of God (that is, there is only one God and all religions worship the same God), progressive Revelation (that is, different prophets come at different times of history to bring the message of God) and the unity of mankind (that is, all human beings are equal irrespective of gender or race), resonated with the self-cultivated beliefs of the respondents. The majority of the respondents (65 per cent) were searching for religious truth and many of them had studied other religions before they encountered the Baha’i Faith, and had arrived at the same tenets by themselves. However, it is also true that many of the respondents who reacted very positively were impressed by the conduct of the Baha’is who taught them the faith. The respondents used statements like, “very courteous, pleasing and internally beautiful teacher”, “gentle, courteous, always smiling Baha’is”, “conduct of the Baha’i volunteers” and “enjoyed the freedom to ask questions”.

First Meeting of Respondent with the Baha’is It was usually within a year that most respondents had their first meeting with Baha’is after first hearing about the faith. Thereafter, the probability of 175

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respondents who would attend a meeting with Baha’is after the first year dropped steeply. However, the duration between the first meeting and the declaration of the respondent was more gradual, although a significant proportion (40 per cent) declared within a year of attending a meeting with the Baha’is. The first meeting with the Baha’is usually took place in the home of the Baha’is (55 per cent) and in the Baha’i Centre (31 per cent). The activity during the first meeting however, did vary considerably. The main activities were firesides, nineteen-day feasts, social gatherings and holy days celebrations.

Investigation of the Faith The spiritual teachings of the Baha’i Faith mainly prompted many of the respondents (34.3 per cent) to investigate the faith. It was followed by the fulfilment of prophecies (22.5 per cent) and its social teachings (20.6 per cent). The faith’s spiritual teachings touched the hearts of respondents with no religion and those from the Buddhist tradition to a lesser extent than those with other religions prior to the conversion. The fulfilment of prophecies, as expected, mainly prompted respondents from the Christian tradition and those who had studied Christianity in the course of their investigation. The social teachings resonated most with those with no religion and from the Taoist and Buddhist traditions. The majority of the respondents investigated the faith through self-study (62 out of 102 respondents) and by attending firesides (61 out of 102 respondents). The least popular method of investigation was through correspondence (5 out of 102 respondents). Of the spiritual teachings of the Baha’i Faith, the most attractive was on progressive revelation (37.3 per cent) followed by oneness of God (25.5 per cent) and the unity of mankind (22.5 per cent). These three teachings are also the most basic tenets of the Baha’i Faith. Other teachings such as life, death and the soul, prayers and meditation, faith, and greatness of the day, attracted far fewer (less than 5 per cent for each). Of the faith’s social teachings, the principle of the independent investigation of religious truth was considered the most attractive social principle by 33.3 per cent of respondents. This principle was appreciated equally by both male and female respondents. It was followed closely by the principle of the harmony of religion and science (26.5 per cent) and by the principle of equal opportunities for men and women (20.6 per cent). The principle of harmony of religion and science resonated more with the male 176

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respondents, while the principle of equal opportunities was almost exclusively appreciated by female respondents. Investigating the Baha’i Faith, the majority of the respondents (52 per cent) were touched by the truth in Baha’i teachings. A smaller proportion (21.6 per cent) saw the translation from teachings into action by Baha’i friends and were encouraged to continue their investigation. Another 16.7 per cent — more females than males — were encouraged to continue their search by relatives and friends.

FINDINGS FROM CASE STUDIES As listed in detail in an earlier section, questions raised with the sixteen selected interviewees as in-depth case studies revolved around their religious backgrounds prior to conversion, decisions in converting to the Baha’i Faith, and the impact of their conversion on relationships with parents. As conversion from a previous particular faith is a central theme, the case studies are presented below according to the interviewees’ previous religious backgrounds.

Taoists Most of the five respondents from this background cited family obligations to follow the religious practices of their parents, such as visiting the temple celebrating festivals, ancestor worship, funeral rites, and burning “Hell money”. This obligation is especially enjoined upon the eldest son, and in one case the respondent was expected to assist her mother as temple medium. Most of the respondents stated that the various practices were devoid of meaning for them and that they really only performed them out of obedience to their parents. One former Taoist did not consider his family to be particularly religious, although they did follow practices such as ancestor worship and occasional visits to the temple. Prior to becoming a Baha’i, he did not consider himself a staunch Taoist, mentioning in fact that he only prayed with joss sticks rather reluctantly. Another respondent mentioned only that there were bound to be periods when she was staunch and others when she was not. One interviewee, who has been a Baha’i for over fifteen years, remembers that he was staunch in a certain sense only when he was a child but, as he matured, he found these practices somewhat meaningless but carried them out in deference to his mother and the family. An interviewee with a similar outlook mentioned that she also took part in the various rites out of obedience to her 177

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parents, rather than considering Taoism as a religion in which she was staunch or weak. Another noted that he was fairly staunch right up to the time he was in secondary school and university, although he was also questioning some of the beliefs such as how other faith communities were viewed, the question of many deities versus one God, and the lack of documentary evidence for some of the beliefs and doctrines. With regard to obstacles faced in becoming Baha’is, two interviewees cited parental objections and one of whom also found the Baha’i laws an obstacle, another feared at first that it might be a sect, while a fourth feared it might clash with his then religion. Overcoming these obstacles was difficult for some. The interviewee who cited laws as one of the obstacles to his accepting the faith found them “troublesome” but admitted he was reacting to how he was brought up, as the eldest son, to be obedient to certain rules and regulations. He was also worried about his parents’ objections. Similarly, another interviewee was concerned that she would in some way go against her mother’s religion by embracing another faith. A third interviewee was initially asked by her parents to make sure she was not getting involved in a cult or sect. Another interviewee took four years from first hearing of the Baha’i Faith to declare himself a Baha’i, when he realized there was nothing that contradicted what he had been brought up to believe. When asked what tipped the balance in favour of becoming a Baha’i, one interviewee mentioned being struck by the concept of progressive revelation. Another interviewee could not identify a tipping point, but simply felt there was “a time of ripening or when you are ready”. She also felt the Baha’i Faith was logical and not in opposition to the principles of Taoism or any other religion. A third interviewee identified two factors as the tipping point: the behaviour or example of his Baha’i friends, and the life of Baha’u’llah. For another, it was a gradual process that took about three years of investigation before he was “on the brink” and felt impelled to make a decision one way or the other. Another interviewee, however, took a very short time to make the decision to become a Baha’i and declared her faith on only the second meeting, after being told that there is a difference between an admirer and a believer who has to “practise what they believe”. Inter-generational impact was a significant factor in determining when the interviewees became Baha’is. One said that his parents felt that it was a foreign religion that had no resonance with Chinese culture. However, his deliberate attempts to appease his parents (by continuing to use the joss sticks, for example) and the fact that Baha’i laws prohibit alcohol, drugs and sexual relations before marriage helped reduce his parents’ objection to the faith. Another interviewee encountered some opposition from her mother 178

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during the investigation phase and both parents warned her to check that it was not a cult or a sect. Out of respect for her parents, she did not become a Baha’i for about two years. Respect for his parents was also very important to another interviewee who had encountered some opposition from his family when he started first attending Christian activities, as he was then not supposed to continue participating in the various Taoist rites. However, he found nothing in the Baha’i Faith “that contradicts ancestral worship” but there is “a lot of stress on unity”. Similarly for another interviewee, placating his parents was important in helping them accept that conversion to the Baha’i Faith would not lead to disunity and conflict. Conversely, one other interviewee did not experience much family objection in the months following her conversion. However, if there was a discrepancy in how she behaved and the teachings of the faith, then would they question her.

Christians For one of the four former Christian interviewees, the practice of Christianity had lapsed because she was unable to reconcile herself to some of the teachings of the Church. Another had become somewhat disenchanted with her denomination and, prior to becoming a Baha’i, had spent three years attending other churches of various denominations. When not actively attending church activities, she continued to pray and read the Bible. A third respondent considered himself a “born-again” Christian, and was actively involved in church activities and individual practices such as prayer and reading the Bible. The fourth was a practising Methodist at the time of conversion. Of the three active church-goers, one was disturbed by the lack of unity — even overt racism — that she detected in the congregation, but the other two were happy with the faith. For three out of the four interviewees the message of the Baha’i Faith made an immediate impression and they became Baha’is very quickly. For one, there was no real perceived obstacle, but when pressed it was felt that the name Baha’i sounded Middle Eastern and that was associated with fanaticism. However, the Baha’is she met impressed her so much that this initial apprehension disappeared. Another perceived no obstacle at all and in fact took a very short time to decide to become a Baha’i. When pressed, he admitted that there was a slight resistance but it was towards organized religion in general. For the third interviewee there was no resistance at all. She was introduced to the faith, read some books about it and found that it resonated with what she already believed in. The fourth interviewee found the key intellectual challenge was to determine the truth of Baha’u’llah’s claim 179

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to be the return of Christ. In addition he had formed very close bonds with members of the Methodist Youth Fellowship and this emotional closeness made the decision to become a Baha’i difficult. Some of the interviewees took very little time to decide to become a Baha’i — one decided within half an hour of asking the question “What is the Baha’i Faith?” The tipping point for her was simply “a desire to open my mouth and ask”. On further probing, she mentioned that she did not feel as if she was “switching faiths” and saw it more as “a natural development”. The claim by Baha’u’llah that He was the fulfilment of Christ’s prophecy that He would return was the tipping point for another interviewee who had considered the claim and was convinced of its truth. Another said that he was not actively searching when he was “suddenly” introduced to the key principles and teachings of the Baha’i Faith. His conversion was almost immediate as he did not think “there would be anything to prevent me from saying yes”. The teaching about Progressive Revelation was cited as the tipping point for the fourth interviewee, which she described “was something that I had believed in my heart … and it just seems to all fall into place”. One of the interviewees said that she had far less problems after becoming a Baha’i than after becoming a Christian, since she could still participate in Taoist prayers and eat the food prepared for the various rituals. Her parents also met the Baha’is when they came to help out on the farm and this helped to reduce any perceived objections. Another said there was very little in the way of negative inter-generational impact. His father, a Christian, was in fact very open and encouraging and his mother felt that a religion that believes in “universal fellowship” was acceptable to her. One interviewee said that her parents were against her becoming a Baha’i and indeed until today, they do not discuss it. For another interviewee, however, there was no issue as his parents had already passed away by the time he became a Baha’i.

Free-thinkers Although not espousing any particular religion at the time of conversion, these three interviewees were asked a qualifying question: “Did you believe in God or a divine Creator or a Universal Consciousness?” All responded in the affirmative. Only one mentioned having been brought up a Roman Catholic as this made it easier to attend a convent school. These interviewees were also asked: “Since you believed in God, why were you not a follower of any particular religion?” or “Were you curious about religions or investigating any in particular?” The former Roman Catholic had left the faith because of her perception that the believers were not following a way of life that matched the 180

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teachings, and because she had met pious members of other faiths. She had begun to investigate more about Buddhism. Another interviewee was confused by the number of religions all claiming to be the way to God and was investigating Christianity and Buddhism. The third had attended some Christian rallies and camps and had some Christian friends. Two out of the three free-thinkers claimed there were no obstacles to their accepting the Baha’i Faith. One expressed that she “just took time to investigate”, and the other also said that “it was quite easy … to accept the faith” after investigating. The third mentioned that the “Muslim sounding names, places” scared her off because she had “always viewed Muslim things as fanaticism”. However, she overcame this by reading the Baha’i writings, to which she was attracted. The poetry and images of the Baha’i holy writings were what “really attracted” and influenced her most in her decision to become a Baha’i. For the other two, it was the teachings on life after death that tipped one towards the faith, and simply the fact that it felt right at the time to become a Baha’i. In terms of inter-generational impact, it was very positive for one, as the faith “stresses so much on harmony in the family life … tolerance of differences and mutual respect to each other”. A second responded that there was no resulting conflict with parents at the time of conversion as she was already married by then.

Hindus Of the two interviewees, one was already not practising any of the rites or rituals, was not particularly staunch and had no strong beliefs about any religion. If anything, his belief was in the oneness of all religions, although he was not looking seriously at any other religion. The other interviewee performed the ritual daily prayers, fasting, and going to the temple, but felt unhappy with her faith, primarily because she was told she could only pray through the priest rather than directly. She felt attracted to other religions such as Christianity through the personage of Jesus Christ and Islam through listening to the chanting of Qur’anic verses. Both interviewees expressed having virtually no obstacles to accepting the faith. The first had married a Baha’i and saw through her example how the faith was “a religion that was uniting the world together” — something that he already felt comfortable with. The example of his wife was what tipped the Baha’i Faith in his favour. For him, there was no inter-generational impact because his family “was not too concerned about what I was following”. The second was searching, even beseeching God to give her a religion she 181

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could believe in. Her intense desire for a religious belief found the teachings of oneness of God and oneness of religion to be what tipped the balance. She was fifteen at the time of her conversion and her mother was not aware of what religion she was following, although she told her that she noticed “she can see some changes in me”.

Buddhists One of the two interviewees attended Buddhist temples instead of accompanying her parents to Taoist temples, and attended classes for a time. The other stated that on the one hand he had respect for the monks and helped out when there were big festivals, but on the other hand he could not understand why the monks and believers could not be on an equal footing. He also found it hard to comprehend the teaching on reincarnation. The other interviewee was brought up in a Buddhist family and went to the temple every week when she was schooling. She also fasted and observed the ritual prayers. However, she only felt staunch during the annual Buddhist fasting period when fasting was coupled with prayers. There were other times when she noticed there was bickering and backbiting among the members of the community, and this led to a certain amount of disillusionment. The first interviewee admitted knowing “a bit only” of other religions, for example, some of what she termed “surface” issues of Taoism through visits to the temple. The other began an investigation of Christianity during secondary school through peer influence. However she was discouraged from investigating Buddhism by her friends, and from having anything to do with Islam by her father. She reported that it took a month from the time she heard of the faith for her to become a Baha’i. Her initial reaction to the faith was one of concern because the names were “so Islamic” and she grew up having been taught that “Muslims were bad people”, but this was overcome through her attraction to the “essence of the teachings” as well as the writings of the central figures of the faith. The “need to give something of myself personally” and finding that in the Baha’i Faith was cited was the main reason for her becoming a Baha’i. The other interviewee also had some misgivings initially when hearing about the faith as she found the names “very foreign” and unfamiliar. In fact she first thought it was a cult, but this did not deter her from contacting the Baha’is to find out more. A strong desire to “make a fresh start” and choose between the religion of her upbringing and the Baha’i Faith was the tipping point for her. When she became a Baha’i there were no objections by her parents because she continued to go to the temple with them as a gesture of support. However, there was a certain amount of censure from her sisters who 182

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are Christians “and really believe — until today — that I am worshipping Satan”. Her parents had no objections, simply a concern that the Baha’i marriage ceremony would be recognized. In summary, the case studies illuminate the issues of conversion from one faith to another and offer, albeit limited, insights into religious feelings about various religious communities in Singapore. In general, many who professed a particular faith before their declaration as Baha’is really no longer held particularly strong convictions or they were already questioning some of the practices of their prior religions. This was mainly true for those of every religious background except the Christians, three out of four of whom were actively and mindfully practising their faith. The free-thinkers, though not espousing any particular religion, were definitely not atheists as all of them professed a belief in God. Another feature was that when they were younger, they did not question the religious practices of the family, but rather accepted and took part in the various rites and rituals. Later on, even when questions surfaced, these practices often continued out of a sense of deference to the older generation or the faith community to which they belonged. It seems that for most interviewees, the Christians being a notable exception, the deeds of the believers often did not match the standards set by the holy texts which were what led to their disaffection or disillusionment. The lack of deep knowledge of other religions among the interviewees is noteworthy. In many cases (about half the interviewees), it was merely a lack of interest, while some were actively dissuaded by family members from deviating from the family tradition. However, there were a few who were actively reading up about other faiths and all three free-thinkers seemed to know more about other religions either through schools, camps to which they had been invited by friends, or self-directed learning. The main factors which tipped the interviewees in favour of the Baha’i Faith were the conduct of individual Baha’is and the teachings of the faith, particularly the principle of Progressive Revelation and other spiritual principles. Some could not care to pinpoint a direct causal link, but found themselves ready to accept the faith after a period of getting to know about it. While nearly half of them found no obstacles to their becoming Baha’is, others were initially fearful that it was either a cult or sect, or that it was somehow connected to Islam (which they associated with fanaticism). Some also felt that there might be parental objections to their becoming Baha’i, while only one had a problem “giving up” the former religion. The majority of the interviewees reported a positive reaction on the part of their parents to their becoming Baha’is. In large part, this is because the 183

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new Baha’is helped to placate their parents by continuing the various rites and rituals expected of them. This is often in direct contrast to other religions, notably some branches of Christianity, which often expressly forbid it. Often, such families had had conflictual experiences when those members who had converted refused to perform such practices as burning joss sticks or going to the temple. Where there was opposition from the family, most Baha’i converts had taken a soft approach and either not brought the faith up for discussion, or continued to practice the rites of the family religion out of respect.

CONCLUDING REMARKS One of the aims of this study was to determine whether the teachings of the Baha’i Faith are especially attractive to particular sectors of society. The findings suggest that those who consider themselves English-speaking and middle-class and have tertiary education are more attracted to the faith. Most of the respondents working in “other services”, that is, non-technical, nonmanufacturing and non-business sectors, as knowledge professionals and include such professions as civil servants, teachers, medical workers, social workers, insurance agents, etc. Perhaps such professions are more peopleoriented, allow more time and opportunity for investigation, and are more grounded in philosophy than some other vocations and therefore more open to considering different worldviews and thus different religions. As to whether the Baha’i Faith is attractive to particular ethnic groups, no clear conclusion can be drawn since a majority of the respondents (74 per cent) were of Chinese origin, which reflects the proportion in the Singapore population as a whole. What is clearer is that Chinese Baha’is who were formerly Taoists or Christians were dissatisfied with their former religions. It is also noteworthy that a significant percentage (14.7 per cent) may be of “other” racial parentage. This is a reflection of the attractiveness of the principle of the oneness of humanity enshrined in Baha’i writings. The second question was which age group was more drawn to the Baha’i Faith and the place of their declaration as Baha’is. The median age of the respondents was in the 20–29 year age bracket, indicating that young adults who are newly independent appear to be most likely to declare their belief in the religion. It may be surmised that this is because it is during their twenties that they are between family responsibilities, as it were — more independent from their parents than before and not yet tied down with families of their own — and so with the relative freedom to investigate their aims and purpose in life. It is also interesting to note that many of those (17 per cent) who declared their belief as Baha’is outside Singapore and Malaysia did so in 184

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North America (the United States and Canada). This may indicate that the Baha’is of North America were, at least at that time, more proactive in teaching prospective followers about the faith. A third research question was whether there are any key messages in the Baha’i teachings and/or significant actions of the Baha’i community of Singapore that resonate with a significant number of its membership. The spiritual teachings which most attracted them to the faith were the three basic principles — Progressive Revelation, the Oneness of God and the Unity of Mankind. It is interesting to note that those from Christian backgrounds were also attracted by the fact that Baha’u’llah is considered by Baha’is to be the fulfilment of biblical prophecies. Some of the social teachings were also significant in converts’ decision to embrace the Baha’i Faith. These include the independent investigation of truth and the need to have harmony between religion and science. This would also appear to corroborate the finding that those with higher levels of education are more inclined to accept the faith. A high proportion (all women) cited the principle of equal opportunities for men and women as being a draw factor, and for a number of respondents, the principle of putting the teachings of the faith into action was significant. In fact, many mentioned the qualities of their contacts as being a significant pull factor in favour of their accepting the faith. All respondents mentioned having a positive first impression of the Baha’i community. It is also interesting to note that the time of their first meeting with Baha’is to the time of their declaration was usually one year or less. Although this study is relatively limited in scope, being based on a small sampling of the Baha’i community of Singapore, it has nonetheless shed some light on this little-known community. It has also revealed some of the religious, inter-religious and cultural aspects of conversion, particularly those related to self needs, family relationships and religious/social teachings of the faith. This not only contributes to our knowledge of the Baha’i community, but also of the complex processes of conversion and inter-religious dimensions involved in multi-cultural and multi-religious Singapore, particularly at the personal and familial levels.

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APPENDIX 7.1

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESEARCH PROJECT WITH THE INSTITUTE OF POLICY STUDIES (Editor’s note: The layout and spacing which appear in this questionaire do not correspond with that in the original questionnaire)

SECTION 1 — CURRENT PERSONAL DATA OF RESPONDENT Name: Address:

Singapore

Phone (Home):

(Mobile):

Email: Best day/time to call if we need more information to complete questionnaire:

1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

Sex: Male

❑

Female

❑

Age: 15–19 30–39 50–59 75 >

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

20–29 40–49 60–75

❑ ❑ ❑

Ethnicity: Father Chinese Indian Malay Others

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

Mother Chinese Indian Malay Others

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

If Non-Singaporean Singapore PR Others

❑ ❑

Nationality: ❑ ❑ ❑

Singaporean Malaysian Others

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1.6

187

Highest Education Level Attained: Primary ❑ Upper Secondary ❑ University ❑ Occupation:

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

Professional/Technical/Managerial Clerical/Sales/Services Production & Related Labourers Others 1.7

1.8

1.9

❑ ❑

Secondary Polytechnic

Industry: Manufacturing Other Goods Industries Hotel & Restaurants Financial Services Other Services Industries

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

If Not Working Unemployed Retired Student Homemakers

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

Construction Wholesale & Retail Trade Transport & Communications Business Services

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

Housing: HDB Flat Condominium & Private Flat Semi-Detached

❑ ❑ ❑

Other Public Flat Terrace House Bungalow

❑ ❑ ❑

Perceived Economic Status: Poor Upper Middle Class

❑ ❑

Lower Middle Class Rich

❑ ❑

Mandarin Tamil Malay

❑ ❑ ❑

Married Widowed

❑ ❑

1.10 Language Most Frequently Spoken at Home: English ❑ Chinese Dialects ❑ Other Indian Languages ❑ Others ❑ 1.11 Marital Status: Single Divorced/Separated

❑ ❑

If married, number of years married:

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SECTION 2 — CURRENT PERSONAL DATA OF SPOUSE (IF APPLICABLE) 2.1

2.2

2.3

Age: 15–19 30–39 50–59 75 >

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

Ethnicity: Father Chinese Indian Malay Others

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

2.5

❑ ❑ ❑

Highest Education Level Attained: Primary ❑ Upper Secondary ❑ University ❑

Mother Chinese Indian Malay Others

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

If Non-Singaporean Singapore PR Others

❑ ❑

Secondary Polytechnic

❑ ❑

Occupation: Professional/Technical/Managerial Clerical/Sales/Services Production & Related Labourers Others

2.6

❑ ❑ ❑

Nationality: Singaporean Malaysian Others

2.4

20–29 40–49 60–75

Industry: Manufacturing Other Goods Industries Hotel & Restaurants Financial Services Other Services Industries

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

If Not Working Unemployed Retired Student Homemakers

Construction Wholesale & Retail Trade Transport & Communications Business Services

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❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

Baha’is in Singapore

2.7

189

Religion: Hindu Zoroastrian Taoist Muslim Baha’i

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

If Baha’i, when did he/she declare? (Year): 2.8

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

Jew Buddhist Christian Sikh No Religion

Where:

Number of Children:

SECTION 3 — PERSONAL DATA AT THE POINT OF DECLARATION 3.1

When did you declare? (Year):

3.2

Age: 15–19 30–39 50–59 75 >

3.3

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

3.5

20–29 40–49 60–75

❑ ❑ ❑

If Non-Singaporean Singapore PR Others

❑ ❑

Secondary Polytechnic

❑ ❑

Nationality: ❑ ❑ ❑

Singaporean Malaysian Others 3.4

Where:

Education Level Attained Then: Primary ❑ Upper Secondary ❑ University ❑ Occupation: Professional/Technical/Managerial Clerical/Sales/Services Production & Related Labourers Others

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

If Not Working Unemployed Retired Student Homemakers

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

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3.7

3.8

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Industry: Manufacturing Other Goods Industries Hotel & Restaurants Financial Services Other Services Industries

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

Construction Wholesale & Retail Trade Transport & Communications Business Services

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

Housing: HDB Flat Condominium & Private Flat Semi-Detached

❑ ❑ ❑

Other Public Flat Terrace House Bungalow

❑ ❑ ❑

Perceived Economic Status: Poor Upper Middle Class

❑ ❑

Lower Middle Class Rich

❑ ❑

Mandarin Tamil Malay

❑ ❑ ❑

Married Widowed

❑ ❑

Language Most Frequently Spoken at Home: English ❑ Chinese Dialects ❑ Other Indian Languages ❑ Others ❑

3.10 Marital Status: Single Divorced/Separated

❑ ❑

If married, number of years married:

SECTION 4 — PERSONAL BELIEFS AT THE POINT OF DECLARATION 4.1

4.2

Your religion prior to declaration: Hindu ❑ Zoroastrian ❑ Taoist ❑ Muslim ❑ Baha’i ❑

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

Jew Buddhist Christian Sikh No Religion

If you had a religion, had you already left the religion: Yes ❑ No ❑

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4.3

If yes, why did you leave?

4.4

Were you on an independent search after religious truth then? Yes ❑ No ❑

4.5

Did you have knowledge of other religions besides your own? Yes ❑ No ❑

4.6

What other religions did you investigate? (May tick more than one) Hindu ❑ Jew ❑ Zoroastrian ❑ Buddhist ❑ Taoist ❑ Christian ❑ Muslim ❑ Sikh ❑

4.7

Were you the first in your family to become a Baha’i? Yes ❑ No ❑

4.8

Were you the first male/female in the family to become a Baha’i? Yes ❑ No ❑

4.9

Did you feel then that you were leaving your previous religion? Yes ❑ No ❑ Why?

4.10 Parents’ Religions: Father Hindu Jew Zoroastrian Buddhist Taoist Christian Muslim Sikh No Religion

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

Mother Hindu Jew Zoroastrian Buddhist Taoist Christian Muslim Sikh No Religion

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4.11 When did you first hear about the Baha’i Faith?

(mm/yy)

4.12 From whom did you first hear about the Baha’i Faith? Father ❑ Mother Husband ❑ Wife Son ❑ Daughter Relative ❑ Friend Colleague ❑ Acquaintance Teacher ❑ Stranger Book ❑ Magazine Newspaper ❑ Radio Television ❑ Internet 4.13 What was your first impression?

Positive ❑

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

Neutral ❑

Negative ❑

4.14 If positive or negative, please give reasons:

4.15 When did you attend the first Baha’i meeting?

(mm/yy)

4.16 Where was that meeting held? 4.17 What was the occasion for that meeting? 4.18 What was your first impression of the meeting? Positive ❑ Neutral ❑ Negative ❑ 4.19 If positive or negative, please give reasons:

4.20 What aspect of the Baha’i Faith first prompted you to investigate it? (Tick only one.) Life of Baha’u’llah ❑ Fulfilment of Prophecies ❑ World Order of Baha’u’llah ❑ Spiritual Teachings of Baha’u’llah ❑ Social Teachings of the Baha’i Faith ❑ Other (please describe): 192

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4.21 How did you investigate the Faith? (You may tick more than one.) Self study of Baha’i books ❑ Face-to-face discussions with a Baha’i friend ❑ Correspondence with a Baha’i friend ❑ Attend firesides ❑ Attend public talks ❑ Join study circles ❑ Other (please describe): 4.22 Which spiritual teaching attracted you most? (Tick only one.) Oneness of God ❑ Progressive Revelation ❑ Unity of Mankind ❑ Life, Death & the Soul ❑ Prayers & Meditations ❑ Greatness of this Day ❑ Other (please describe): 4.23 Which social teaching attracted you most? (Tick only one.) Harmony between religion and science Equal opportunities, rights and privileges to men and women Elimination of the extremes of wealth and poverty Seeking spiritual solutions to economic problems Compulsory universal education Adopting an international auxiliary language The independent search for truth Sustaining a balance between development and environment Establishing a world federation Other (please describe):

❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑ ❑

4.24 In investigating faith, what motivated to continue your search? (Tick only one.) Truth of Baha’u’llah’s teachings Relatives and friends, who were Baha’is Translation into action of Baha’u’llah’s teachings by the community Other (please describe):

❑ ❑ ❑

4.25 What finally made you decide to declare as a Baha’i?

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References Baha’u’lláh.The Kitab-i-Aqdas. Translated by the Universal House of Justice, 1993. Mona Vale, Australia, 1873. Census Population of Singapore. Singapore: Department of Statistics, Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2000. Chew, Phyllis Ghim Lian. “Life, Death and Immortality: The Taoist Religion in Singapore”. The Singapore Baha’i Studies Review 2, no. 1 (1997): 59–90. ———. “The Emergence of the Baha’i Faith in Singapore (1950–1972)”. The Singapore Baha’i Studies Review 1, no. 1 (1996): 23–48. Inter-Religious Organization. Religions in Singapore. 3rd ed. Singapore 2001. Ong, Rose. Shirin Fozdar: Asia’s Foremost Feminist. Singapore, 2000. Singapore Baha’i Studies Review 1–6 (1996–2001). Shoghi, Effendi. God Passes By. National Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of the United States, New Edition, 1974, pp. 213–19. Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Singapore. The Baha’i Faith, Singapore. Singapore, 1998. Spiritual Assembly of the Baha’is of Singapore. The Baha’i Faith: 50 Years in Singapore. Singapore, 2000. Yeo, Hock Choon. Baha’i Community: A Study of Identity Consolidation with A Special Focus on Witnessing. Academic Exercise, National University of Singapore, 1980.

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8 DIVERSITIES AND UNITIES Towards a Reformist Buddhism in Singapore Kuah-Pearce Khun Eng

INTRODUCTION: REINVENTING A SYNCRETIC BUDDHISM Singapore is made up of originally migrant populations that arrived during the early nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A vast majority of the Chinese migrants were peasants who came from the two coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian in South China. When they arrived, they brought along their cultures and religion and reproduced them in a colonial environment, including knowledge of a syncretic Chinese religious belief system which was a composite mixture of Buddhism, Taoism and Chinese folk beliefs.1 Scholars of Chinese syncretic religion refer to this form of syncretism in various terms. For example, Tan called it “Chinese religion” (Tan 1995, p. 139), while Elliot termed it “Shenism” (Elliot 1955). Wee noted that the majority of the Singaporean Chinese Buddhists were in fact practising Chinese religion with Buddhist elements (Wee 1976, pp. 155–88), while in my own work, Elliot’s definition of Shenism is adopted here, as the Chinese continually termed their religious act as “bai shen”, literally “praying to the gods”. This syncretic system presents the Chinese cosmological worldview with a synthesis of Taoist and Buddhist metaphysical ideas, with Confucianism providing the moral base. It is therefore essential to explore the intersections of the Taoist, 195

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Buddhist, Confucianist and Shenist universes to understand how the early Chinese viewed their belief system.2 These syncretic religious rituals continue to be practised by the older generation Chinese in Singapore. According to Watson, the Chinese were concerned with the ritual practices rather than the ideological purity of their religious practices (Watson 1988, p. 5). Religion was seen to serve an instrumental function rather than for expressive spiritual needs, although at times the two came hand-in-hand. The result of such practices was the emergence of various types of religious cults, some Buddhistic while others are Taoist and Shenist in nature. Thus, we see a proliferation of the cults of Guandi, Ancestors, Heaven, Heavenly Mother or Empress, Goddess of Mercy (Guanyin), Dabogong (Great Paternal Uncle) and others since the days of early immigration and which have continued into the present (Kuah-Pearce 2003, pp. 33–49). It should also be noted that during the colonial years, there was also a small group of Singhalese migrants who came to Singapore as labourers to work primarily on the roads and railways. They, too, brought along a syncretic brand of Theravada Buddhism into Singapore, which was again interspersed with Sri Lankan folk religious practices. This author’s research on Buddhism started in the mid-1980s during which the main bulk of data was collected using a questionnaire survey and ethnographic interviews conducted in 1984–85. A total of 250 Chinese of different age groups were interviewed and they were selected from people who visited various temples. A standard questionnaire was also issued to 260 Reformist Buddhists to tap their views and 126 monks and nuns were also interviewed extensively.

VARIETIES OF BUDDHISTS3 As religious communities in Singapore are undergoing religious modernization and rationalization, it comes as no surprise that the Chinese in particular are beginning to become more aware of their religious affiliation and to distinguish between Buddhism and syncretic Chinese religion. This is reflected in the 1990 census survey which found that 31.8 per cent of household heads surveyed labelled themselves Buddhists and 23.8 per cent are Shenists (Chinese traditional beliefs)/Taoists (Department of Statistics 1994, p. 63). Likewise, the 2000 census shows an even greater increase of Buddhists in Singapore and a corresponding decline in Taoism/Chinese traditional beliefs. Within the Chinese community, 54 per cent of Chinese called themselves Buddhists while only 11 per cent are practitioners of 196

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Taoism and Chinese traditional beliefs (Department of Statistics 2001 (2), p. 112; Kuah-Pearce 2003, p. 246). At the organizational level, there are over 100 Buddhist and BuddhistTaoist temples in Singapore. Many Chinese temples are of a combination of Buddhist and syncretic Chinese religion, the largest of which is the Phor Kark See Temple. There are also several Theravada temples, a popular one of which is the Mangala Vihara Buddhist Temple. Apart from these, there are also several lay Buddhist organizations such as the Cheng Beng Buddhist Temple, Singapore Buddha Sasana Society and Singapore Buddha Yana Organization. All these Buddhist temples and associations are members of the Singapore Buddhist Federation, an umbrella body that provides leadership for the Buddhist community in Singapore. According to Wee, believers of canonical Buddhism and Chinese religion can be grouped into three categories namely, the “unambiguous Theravada and Mahayana Buddhists who are aware of Buddhist theology; nondifferentiating ‘Buddhists’ who make use of both canonical Buddhism and Chinese syncretic religions; and unambiguous practitioners of Chinese syncretic religions” (Wee 1976, p. 169). However, with religious modernization and changes, it is possible to identify the following categories of syncretic Buddhist practitioners: Shenist-Taoist-Mahayana Buddhists, Mahayana Buddhists, Therevada Buddhists, Reformist Buddhists and Nichiren Shoshu Buddhists.

Shenist-Taoist-Mahayana Buddhists A sizeable number of Chinese practise Shenism and Mahayana Buddhism, especially the older generation. From an earlier survey in the mid-1980s,4 over 70 per cent of those in this category are fifty years old and above, with over 65 per cent of these practitioners women. They visit both the Shenist/ Taoist and Buddhists temples. There are several characteristic features of the Shenist-Taoist-Mahayana Buddhists. First, they are predominantly Chinese dialect-speaking and attend rituals that are conducted by dialect-speaking monks. When they encounter various problems such as mundane domestic affairs, illnesses, emotional and psychological problems, and social and marital discords, they would consult a Taoist priest or spirit-medium and go to a Buddhist temple to pray for assistance. Second, they neither attend one temple nor go to temples on a regular basis. Individuals often visit temples only when the need arises. Participation is purely on a voluntary basis. This is reflected in the 1990 census which shows that 62.3 per cent of the Buddhists and 66.5 per cent of 197

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the traditional Chinese believers/Taoists visited temples only occasionally. In contrast, over 50 per cent of Christians and the Muslims make weekly visits to the church and mosque respectively (Department of Statistics 1994(6), p. 69). Third, these Chinese syncretic religious believers visit different temples as they are not bound to one temple. Individuals visit different temples for different purposes to help solve their religious and mundane problems. As such, many such temples do not have members but believers, xin-tu. Of the 260 respondents surveyed, over half said that they have visited different Shenist and Buddhist temples and requested various ritual services. As such, temple membership is, in fact, a recent invention. Only with Reformist Buddhism has there been an increasing push for adherents to become members of a Buddhist organization. Here, membership is through formal application and one becomes a member through the payment of a subscription fee. The Shenist-Taoist-Mahayana Buddhist boundary is a flexible and elastic one capable of incorporating everyone in it. Because of its non-membership requirement, one can move in and out of membership readily. In the early years, it was assumed that one is Shenist-Mahayana Buddhist unless declared otherwise. This allowed for the ethno-religious link imposed by the Singapore state, which neatly slotted 67 per cent of the Chinese into the Shenism/ Taoism and Buddhism category (Department of Statistics, 2001 (2), p. 112).

Mahayana Buddhists Since the mid-1980s, as a result of religious modernization and rationalization, individuals have experienced a high level of inner tension as a result of having to choose between Shenism and canonical Buddhism. According to Weber, a radical religious ethic can develop depending on the level of tension and the resolution sought. As such, especially among those younger age groups, they have chosen canonical Buddhism. From the 1984–85 questionnaire survey and ethnographic interviews, 90 per cent among those who have declared themselves as Buddhists are Chinese Mahayana Buddhists. In the differentiation from Shenists, Mahayana Buddhists take the vow of paying homage to the Triple Gem (Buddha, Dharma and Sangha), san-guiyi which is administered by a monk. This symbolic transformation is symbolized by the adherents being given Buddhist names, fa-ming which they use on special occasions. By becoming Buddhist, they acquire a new identity and join formal membership of one or more Buddhist organizations. They are expected to participate in temple activities regularly, contribute financially and assist the temples in their activities. About 60 per cent of Mahayana Buddhists surveyed were in the age group 50–59 and over 198

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60 years, 20 per cent were in the age group 30–49 years and 15 per cent in the age group 20–29 years. Even though they are formally Mahayana Buddhists, some might still occasionally resort to Shenist and Taoist rituals when the need arises. But they are dissuaded from consulting spirit-mediums and engaging in animism, and are encouraged to remove Chinese syncretic religious icons and statues from their home altars. A majority of these Buddhists now have only a home altar devoted to Buddhist deities and their ancestors. It is to be noted here that the shift from Shenism to Mahayana Buddhism is a gradual process. This is especially so with the privatization of religion as argued by Luckmann, in which the theological focus is now being confined to the private individual sphere (Luckmann 1967). In Singapore, Mahayana Buddhists are being subjected to this process of religious privatization and secularization, made possible as a result of the socio-political and economic stability in post-independent Singapore that liberates adherents from the concerns of mundane living and re-channels their energies on individual spiritual pursuits. Buddhism, with its focus on karma and afterlife, allows for spiritual fulfilment.

Theravada Buddhists Within the broad Theravada Buddhist tradition in Singapore are the Singhalese, Thai, Cambodian and Burmese sub-traditions. The Thai, Cambodian and Burmese sub-traditions are patronized mainly by the Chinese. Southeast Asian monks of these sub-traditions, especially Thai monks, are reputed for their magical acts and are widely consulted. The small community of Singaporean Singhalese have their own Theravada temples and Singhalese monks who cater to this community. There is also a small group of Straits Chinese Theravada Buddhists who build their own temples and hired Singhalese monks to provide spiritual guidance. Individual Theravada Buddhist households and individuals become members through membership subscription. Among the Straits Chinese Therevada Buddhists, the main language of communication is English and Malay, including between monks, laities and among members, while religious services are conducted in Pali language. Malay is most common among the elderly members as it is traditionally the mother-tongue of the Straits Chinese while English is spoken by the younger members. Today, members speak a mixture of Malay and English. Another feature is the regular weekly religious service, attended on the whole by 85 per cent of members of a temple. On most occasions, all family members will attend the service together. It is thus not uncommon to find family members 199

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of different generations attending the service together. Yet another feature is the focus on both Buddhist theology and social activities for a temple’s members. Among the younger members, 95 per cent attended Buddhist classes and were well-versed with Buddhist Dharma. In recent years, many have also joined the Reformist Buddhist movement to promote scriptural Buddhism to the public.

Reformist Buddhists Since the 1990s, Reformist Buddhists have become a formidable group within the Buddhist community. However, they are not homogenous but fall within two broad categories: the Mahayana Reformist Buddhists and Theravada Reformist Buddhists. Within the Mahayana reformist group is an increasingly influential sub-group based on Tibetan Buddhist tradition whose members call themselves the Tibetan Mahayana Reformist Buddhists. However, increasingly Reformist Buddhists prefer to be known as non-sectarian in their approach, and call themselves “Buddhayana” to signal their adherence to non-sectarianism. Reformist Buddhists are attracted to Reformist Buddhism for the following reasons. First, they rejected a God-created world which they argue features notions of superior versus inferior and authority versus subordination. In place, they favour the egalitarian approach of Buddhism. Second, they believe in personal effort in the attainment of enlightenment, instead of dependence on an omnipotent God. Many are well-educated and highly successful middle and upper middle-class Buddhists whose personal efforts in religious spiritualism can be regarded as what Weber terms “the path of mastery” to religious asceticism. According to Weber, it is precisely the mastery of the individual life and social conditions that is highly favourable to the development of a new religious ethic, that of Ascetic Protestantism. In his argument, Ascetic Protestantism allowed an individual to realize his or her religious commitment in a secular world without the need to renounce and lead a monastic life (Weber 1958). In this sense, choice of practice among the Reformist Buddhists is thus very much determined by their understanding and interpretation of Buddhism, which is shaped largely by their intellectual background. They are able to read books on Buddhist philosophy, Buddhist psychology and the like with much ease. Through Buddhist texts and books, they are able to focus on those Buddhist teachings that they feel are relevant to their needs and put them into practice. They also hope to encourage others to follow them through their exemplary behaviour. In these ways, they have 200

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embarked on a gradual process of restructuring Buddhist practices, placing emphasis on the Dharma and meditation. The practices of Reformist Buddhists appeal to like-minded educated Chinese of professional backgrounds. It is thus not surprising to see an increased number of better-educated middle-class and younger Chinese attracted to Reformist Buddhism. Overall, this process of rationalization and restructuring of Buddhism has a class overtone attached to it. Reformist Buddhists have established lay Buddhist organizations that are popular among the younger and better-educated Chinese. The survey findings of five lay Buddhist organizations with 260 respondents show that over 70 per cent of the members belong to the 20–40 years age group; about 15 per cent are less than 20 years old with the remaining 15 per cent over the age of 50 years. Over 80 per cent of them have ten to twelve years of education and 12 per cent have tertiary education. About 75 per cent of the Reformist Buddhists surveyed practised Reformist Buddhism for five years or less and are thus very new to its practice. Among them, there are slightly fewer men than women, with 35 per cent male members. Furthermore, it is possible to distinguish between the English-speaking and the Chinese-speaking Reformist Buddhists with their respective lay organizations, even though they are all bilingual. In post-colonial Singapore, English language continues to be accorded an elite and hence higher status vis-à-vis other languages. Thus, the English-speaking Buddhist lay organizations too assume a higher status. However, since the 1990s, the promotion of Mandarin by the state has led to Mandarin now being considered as a highstatus language, all the more so with the globalizing impact of the Mandarin language today. As such, today the Chinese-speaking Buddhist lay organizations have also established a niche for themselves. The language divide also correlates with the socio-economic statuses of the members. English-speaking members mostly consider themselves as middle and upper middle-class. In terms of occupation, 15 per cent have professional qualifications and work as doctors, engineers, computer analysts and teachers; 30 per cent have technical qualifications; 20 per cent have management qualifications and are managers and management personnel; while 30 per cent have secretarial and clerical skills. A gender divide can also be seen where a majority of the women work as clerks and secretaries in the private sector. On the other hand, about half of the Chinese-speaking reformist Buddhists regard themselves as middle-class while the other half see regard themselves as lower middle-class. Some 65 per cent of those from the middle-class come from a business background and run small- and 201

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medium-sized family businesses or business partnerships with others. Others are in managerial, technical and service positions. The lower middle-class are in technical, clerical and secretarial positions.

Nichiren Shoshu Buddhists Since the late 1970s, an imported Buddhist sect, Nichiren Shoshu, has emerged in the Singapore Buddhist scene and gained substantial members. Today, it is entrenched in the local Buddhist landscape. Its substantial membership has been saved through its ability to attract disenchanted Shenists who want a change in their religious affiliation in a new sectarian group (Wilson 1982). As a lay organization, Nichiren Shoshu functions as a new Buddhist sect with exclusive membership, monopoly of religious truth, equality among its members, voluntary membership, sanctions against members, absolute loyalty and acts as a protest group (Wilson 1982, pp. 91–91). In the initial years, its members came from working-class backgrounds and this is still true today, although in recent years, some members also come from the middle classes. It is able to attract members because of its aggressive proselytization, simplistic ritual practice, exclusive membership and well organized social activities (Kuah-Pearce 2003, pp. 257–60). Today, the sect has embedded itself securely in the Singapore society with a stable membership population through both religious and social activities, including participation in the National Day Parade, the Vesak Celebration and other cultural events. Its primary objective is to be socially relevant, with a simplified Buddhist teaching of the Lotus Sutra to attract members.

EMERGING REFORMISM IN THE BUDDHIST COMMUNITY Since the early 1980s, many among the younger Chinese population have found fault with the syncretic Chinese religious belief system in three main aspects. First, they find that this belief system consists only of ritual practices, and hence theologically, they find it ill-equipped to meet their spiritual needs. Many also question the usefulness of the rituals that surround the various practices both at home and at the temples. They find that many Buddhist temples provide and reinforce syncretic ritual practices that are non-Buddhistic, irrational and meaningless in helping them to gain deeper understanding of the Buddhist teachings and spiritual cultivation. Second, they question the role of the Buddhist order of monks and nuns (Sangha) in a modern Singapore. They regard the Sangha as catering to the expressive and ritual needs of the older generation of Chinese migrants, and indeed it is often regarded as a 202

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religion of the elderly, with the temples functioning as old men’s and particularly, old women’s clubs. Third, younger Chinese see the Sangha as catering primarily to the “dead” instead of to the living. This is so because of the focus on funerary rites performed by the monks and nuns. Overall, as a result of the changing needs and demands of the younger and more educated generation, Chinese syncretic religion and syncretic Buddhism are undergoing processes of religious modernization and rationalization to become more in tune with modern needs. In this process of religious transformation and reform, three main actors are involved: the lay community, the Sangha and the Singapore state. In Reformist Buddhism, the central focus veers away from syncretism and ritualism and instead, focuses on ideological purity and Buddhist teachings. Here, ideological purity means the purging of all non-Buddhistic elements but encompasses various Buddhist traditions. As such, it is possible to identify two types of Reformist Buddhists. First, there is the non-sectarian Reformist Buddhists who have taken on a non-sectarian approach and prefer to call their practice as “Buddhayana”, instead of the conventional sectarian names such as “Mahayana”, “Theravada” or “Varjayana” Buddhism. In so doing, Reformist Buddhism adopts relevant and selected scriptural tenets from the different Buddhist traditions that best suits the needs of the adherents and answers their contemporary spiritual and social needs. Second, there are the Mahayana and the Theravada Buddhist reformists whose primary focus is not the attainment of enlightenment, but with thisworldly needs. To them, enlightenment through monkhood is only one path to salvation. The pursuit of spiritualism in a lay person’s capacity as well as becoming engaged in humanistic activities such as socio-welfare activities, are also means of attaining enlightenment in this world. In this sense, Reformist Buddhism can be linked to the development of Engaged Buddhism. However, unlike Engaged Buddhism in some parts of the world which encourages its adherents to become social and politically conscious and engaged in the social development of the community, Reformist Buddhism in Singapore takes on the welfare and charity role without encouraging political activism. In general, Reformist Buddhism in Singapore can be seen as a scriptural and social religion where the adherents are both knowledgeable about religious doctrine as well as are actively involved in socio-welfare and cultural types of works, caring for cultural development as well as the needs of the underprivileged people in society. This is consistent with the “bodhisattva ideal” expounded under the Mahayana tradition, which is most commonly invoked in the pursuit of various socio-welfare activities by the Reformist Buddhists. 203

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Central Tenets of Reformist Buddihst Teaching5 Among the various Reformist Buddhist groups, the exposition of Buddhist teaching, Dharma, is of paramount significance. The key scriptural tenets that are expounded to the adherents and the general public are: (1) the doctrine of causation, that is, the Four Noble Truths; (2) the theory of karma, Rebirth and Merit-making; (3) Morality and Ethics; (4) Buddhist Work Ethics; (5) Compassion and Humanity; and (6) the Eight-fold Path. The primary idea behind these Buddhist teachings is to teach the Reformist Buddhists to understand the causal relationship between life, suffering and death. Let us explore briefly these key Buddhist teachings.

The Doctrine of Causation The key teaching in Buddhism is on causal relations: that of causality and that of the causally-conditioned phenomenon (Kalupahana 1976, p. 26) in all spheres including psychic, moral, social and spiritual (ibid., p. 27). The four main characteristics of causation are objectivity, necessity, invariability and conditionality that are tested throughout the life process (ibid., pp. 26–27). The theory of causation attributes the cause of suffering to craving and attachment of the material and sensual kinds, which is the result of ignorance. It also teaches that only through pure thoughts and eradication of cravings and attachments can humans be free from suffering. This theory is the Four Noble Truths, which explains that all material things, social processes and human emotions are impermanent and clinging to them causes suffering (dukkha). But in our social existence, it becomes almost impossible to let go of materialism and human emotions. In Buddhist teachings, the Eight-fold Path directs an individual out of suffering by adopting right views, right aspiration, right speech, right actions, right livelihood, right exertion, right mindfulness and right concentration.

The Theory of Karma and Rebirth Related to the theory of causation is the notion of karma and rebirth. Buddhism argues that sufferings are the result of bad karma, which is caused by negative actions of body, speech or mind. All actions have a cause and an effect. Thus good actions result in good karma while bad ones result in suffering. Thus, the present actions of an individual will determine the 204

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outcome of one’s rebirth in one of the six realms of existence within the Buddhist cosmology: the human, heaven, asuras, animal, hell and pretas planes of existence. Doing good deeds will ensure that an individual is reborn in the human realm and with a good karma in the next life. To ensure a human rebirth, individual needs to perform merit-making to accumulate merits for good karma. Most Buddhist societies have made merit-making an important part of Buddhist practice. In Southeast Asia and South India, alms-giving to Buddhist monks and the acceptance of alms by the monks will accrue merits to the givers. Other acts that will accrue merits to the givers include making donations for temple building and temple repairs, as well for the community good. When a son becomes a monk, he also accumulates merits for himself and his parents. Merit-making is also important for the deceased ancestors to ensure a rebirth in the human world. Individuals, but more often monks and nuns, transfer merits to the dead through special prayers at the request of the living kin. Merit-making is thus regarded as an insurance policy to ensure a good karma for the individual in the present and future.

Morality and Ethics Within Buddhist teaching, morality and ethics featured prominently. Among the Reformist Buddhists, they focus on the five groups of vices, namely: (1) taking life, both of oneself and of others; (2) taking what is not given; (3) wrong indulgence in sensual pleasure; (4) falsehood; and (5) use of intoxicants (Kalupahana 1976, p. 58). To the Reformist Buddhists, Buddhist moral teachings should provide guidance to one’s daily existence and hence, the need to follow these rules strictly so as not to commit wrongdoings such as killing, lying, intoxicant drinking, adultery and stealing. However, individual reformists interprets these moral teachings in their own ways so as to cater to their own needs and modern living, which may be liberal or fundamental in approach to religious dogma. The fundamentalist reformists tend to interpret these moral ethical values in an orthodox and literal manner, while the liberal reformists adopt an interpretation which allows for a wider range of interpretations and actions. In most cases, certain values that can be applied to modern living are followed while others are less emphasized. For example, killing is often interpreted as avoidance of all kinds of animals in their diet and confining their food intake to a vegetarian one. In recent years, this is also linked to the animal rights movement. Thus, Reformist Buddhism is also linked to Engaged 205

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Buddhism in their championing actions for animal rights. A second offspring of this is the championing of non-violence and peaceful actions in social activism. The Buddhist values and arguments against sexual misconduct and the need to observe Buddhist morality are widely used nowadays in their efforts to help stop the spread of AIDS. Lying is a common act in everyday life and Reformist Buddhists interpret this act liberally and accept the act that telling “a white lie” is acceptable if no harm is caused. However, stealing is not acceptable to the Reformist Buddhists. Finally, the use of intoxicants is often viewed as a bad habit leading to addiction and the cause of marital and family disharmony, social discord, violence, and child and wife abuse. Half of my respondents regarded social drinking as acceptable.

Buddhist Work Ethic Another Buddhist teaching is that of hard work, honesty and loyalty to one’s occupation. However, occupations that encourage cheating and dishonesty are undesirable. Reformist Buddhists regard professions such as law and commerce as likely to compromise morality. But many also accept that such professions are part of modern life and development and as long as those who are in these trades treat others fairly, feel that they should not be penalized by the Buddhist community. The Reformist Buddhists also argue for more compassion and understanding in the workplace, and that superiors have the responsibility to look after their workers. To them, an ethical workplace is where workers are treated fairly in terms of remuneration and working conditions.

Compassion and Humanity Compassion has been the hallmark of Buddhism which emphasizes the need to help all sentient beings. The existence of the category of bodhisattvas, such as Bodhisattva Alvalokeitsvara (Guanyin Pusa) and Mahabodhisattva Kistagarbha (Dizhangwang Pusa) in the Mahayana tradition, spells out universal needs for compassion and humanity to all irrespective of their ethnicity, social background and status. To the Reformist Buddhists, they put this into practice by having kind thoughts and kind actions and actively supporting various types of charity and welfare works for their own community and others. Many give donations as well as provide active participation to various welfare causes, thereby generating a religious philanthropic culture within the Singapore context. 206

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The Eight-fold Path (Aryio Atthangiko Maggo) In Buddhism, understanding the causes of suffering is one small step towards gaining enlightenment. To enable one to move out of suffering, Buddhism prescribes the Eight-fold Path where, by following the eight moral virtues laid down, one is able to move out of suffering, or at least lessen suffering (Kalupahana 1976, p. 59). The eight moral values include right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right living, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration (ibid., p. 59). If one is able to practice these eight moral values in daily life, then it is possible for an individual to eliminate physical, sensual and material desires and reach a stage of selflessness. This selflessness will ultimately lead to the cessation of all future births, allowing one to enter Nirvana. While Nirvana is the coveted goal of all Buddhists, for the Reformist Buddhists, all observations of Buddhist ethics and morality are aimed at attaining spiritualism in this life. They believed in the process of self-cultivation of “an inner-worldly asceticism” that will lead to a “this-worldly rational adjustment” (Weber 1958), which will lead them on the path towards enlightenment.

CONTAINING TENSIONS AND ENHANCING DIVERSITIES IN HARMONY Religious modernization and rationalization have to contest with forces of orthodoxy. While there is general consensus among the primary actors over the need to rationalize and Buddhicize Chinese syncretic religious practices and to eliminate syncretic elements from Buddhist practices, there is also resistance to change. Resistance comes from both the conservative quarters of the laity and the Sangha population who find it hard to cope with all the changes pertaining to reformism. Among the Shenist-Taoist-Mahayana Buddhists, many who have been brought up to understand the significance of ritualism and have less concern for Dharma, find it difficult to understand the sudden switch to an austere and ritual-less type of practice. This is especially so for the elderly laity whose piety is based on their ability to carry out the rituals to the most minute detail. Likewise, orthodox monks and nuns who were trained to be erudite in ritual performances and religious liturgy have found it hard to cater to the new needs of a new generation of literate and intellectually curious Buddhists. Tensions also exist within the Sangha for the following reasons. First, some monks and nuns oppose the rapid pace of reformism. Second, others call for the retention of religious rituals including the syncretic elements, 207

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arguing instead for a Buddhist reinterpretation of these ritual practices. Third, contestation of leadership between the ritualist and reformist camps within the Sangha often arise. The traditional authority structure given to the elderly ritual-erudite monks and nuns have given way to a new leadership structure based on scriptural knowledge which favour the younger reformist monks and nuns. This has aroused dissatisfaction not only among certain sectors within the Sangha, but also among the elderly adherents who have long association with and support for some elderly monks and nuns. Among the reformist members themselves within the Sangha, there is also much contest for leadership and power, which has also resulted in rising tensions within the reformist camp. Despite these growing tensions and the temple as a place of contestation between the reformists and the orthodox camps and within the reformist camps, there are few open and public conflicts. This can be attributed to several reasons. First, between the orthodox and reformist camps, it is generally agreed that the supportive nature of Shenist-Taoist-Mahayanist Buddhists towards reformism have helped to avert any kind of overt conflicts. Second, the reformists have also attempted to understand the reasons behind the reproduction and continuation of syncretic Chinese religious practices in modern day Singapore. Instead of calling for the elimination of these syncretic practices, we are now witnessing a reinterpretation of these practices and their symbolic significance as part of a cultural tradition within the Chinese community on the one hand, and Buddhicization of some of the cultural meanings of these practices on the other. In this sense, what we are witnessing is a gradual separation of elements of the culture from elements of religion, although the two can come together. In modern Singapore, this separation of culture and religion is becoming more distinct with the privatization of religion rapidly taking place, and with individuals claiming personal religious faith as opposed to kinship-based or community-based religious faith. Privatization of religion involves the individual becoming conscious of the religious ideology and embracing it in a conscious manner for their personal spiritual needs and development. Luckmann sees the development of a private religious sphere within the individual as the most significant religious change that has taken place in the twentieth century (Luckmann 1967, p. 101). Among Singaporeans, there are those who increasingly regard their religious belief as an integral part of their private domain and not the concern of others, including their family members. Along with this is the understanding of individual freedom of worship and faith. As a result of this privatization of faith, we witness large numbers of 208

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young people switching religions. Among the non-Christians, a large number are turning to Christianity and others to Reformist Buddhism. Among the Christians, some have switched to Reformist Buddhism while others have moved to other Christian denominations. A third reason for non-open conflict is the approach of monks and nuns in adopting different strategies to cope with the needs of both the traditionalists and reformists. In many temples, ritualism continues to be conducted but at the same time, shifting its focus to Dharma teaching and meditation to cater to the new needs. They are able to do so as a result of the separation between the religious and the cultural elements as well as the reinterpretation of the ritual elements. For example, the Buddhist interpretation of death and ancestor worship differs from the Chinese Confucian interpretation. Irrespective of this, the temple continues to be a central focus catering to the dead and to ancestor worship, with the proliferation of collabariums, memorial halls and the numerous ritual services for them. To perform these ritual services, the temples also continue to rely on the ritual experts while turning to a small group of local reformist monks for Dharma exposition and meditation skills. Some temples import monks primarily from mainland China and Sri Lanka for the Mahayana and Theravada temples respectively. Thus, despite tensions, on the whole the different factions within the Buddhist community at large and each temple in particular adopt a policy of accommodation and avoid overt conflicts. They usually resolve tensions in an amicable manner. For those unable to resolve their differences, the tendency is for the reformist quarters to split off from their parent temple and form their own organizations. This is true for both the lay Buddhists and the Reformists monks and nuns. There are numerous lay Buddhist organizations with lay leadership and which function without a monastic leader, and they are extremely popular among the young people. Likewise, young Reformist monks who feel constrained by the traditional structures often move out of their temple and start their own Buddhist organizations, bringing along with them the reformist adherents. The result of this has been the rapid proliferation of lay Buddhist societies since the late 1980s.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS TOWARDS REFORMIST BUDDHISM Today, we see diversities within the Buddhist landscape which comprise reformists and traditionalists on the one hand, and who are differentiated by their sectarian and sub-sectarian labels on the others. Despite these diversities 209

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however, they are able to coordinate their activities and cater to the needs of the diverse groups of adherents at localized and community levels without open conflict. The global and local movement towards Reformist Buddhism has great implications for a multi-ethnic and multi-religious Singapore society. First, it is regarded as a private religion and hence its focus is on individuals and their religiosity. Reformist Buddhism too engages in proselytization but subtly. There is thus always a need for Reformist Buddhists to be moderate in their proselytization efforts in order not to raise religious tensions in a multireligious Singapore. Second, among the different factions within the Buddhist community, there is a need to balance the differing needs of adherents in order that tensions do not spill out and become open and serious conflicts. Third, Reformist Buddhism needs to avoid the pitfalls of fundamentalist and radical religious groups. They need to emphasize on collaboration both within the Buddhist community and with other religious groups. At the national policy level, it is imperative for the state to take into consideration the diversities within the Buddhist landscape in its policies so as to create an equal playing field for the different traditions and sectarian groups. Likewise, as Buddhism straddles different ethnicities, national and local policies (at the community levels) should take into consideration the diverse ethnic backgrounds of Buddhists. Third, national and local policies support collaborations both within the Buddhist community, as well as between the Buddhist and other religious communities, especially in the area of social and welfare activities. In short, religious variations and diversities should be recognized and given equal treatment. At the same time, national and local policies could provide various types of incentives to encourage both intra- and inter-religious collaborations. In a highly globalized world, it is imperative for us to understand how the diverse Reformist Buddhist movement in Singapore is plugged into the global circuit and connected through a web of religious networks at local, regional and global levels and the implications of these networks on the local movement. It is inevitable that Singapore-based Buddhist groups will network with other Buddhist groups throughout the world and indeed, many have established strong global connections. Religious networking is an important process to enhance each group’s religious capital and to tap into the experiences and expertise of their counterparts elsewhere. This is particularly so in the discharge of Buddhist Dharma as well as the educational, charity and welfare work conducted by these religious groups. At the same time, the global Buddhist movement has entered a new phase of development and demands social justice through a heightened sense 210

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of social consciousness, in what some scholars term “Engaged Buddhism”. Engaged Buddhism emphasizes on social justice for all and is very concerned about the development of individuals and groups within a community. Engaged Buddhism can also become politically involved and seeks social justice. In some ways, this form of Engaged Buddhism is akin to Christian Liberation Theology movements that fight against social injustices for the wider community. Thus, many engaged Buddhists have become involved in social developmental and welfare projects that aim to help the poorer and marginalized groups within the community. This trend may be expected to grow locally and globally. The state also needs to take into consideration the increasing globalization of all religious groups in Singapore, and Buddhism is no exception. Here, the state can tap into two areas. The first is to encourage the development of niche areas on a transnational level, such as the development of religious charity and welfare works. Increasingly, as religious institutions in Singapore are no longer working only within its national boundary, they can be encouraged to develop strategies and structures that allow them to synergize with their overseas counterparts. This will encourage more collaboration which will lead to better understanding among the various religious institutions and their adherents. Second, the state can encourage transnational cross-religious communications and collaborations. This will enhance inter-faith dialogue and thereby lessen tensions and conflicts among religions. Third, the state needs to adopt a sensitive approach to the treatment of Buddhism and other religious groups in order to cultivate their trust, so that they do not feel discriminated against and possibly develop antagonism towards the state. In sum, the state should adopt a sensitive and all-encompassing policy to encourage religious synergy among the various traditions within the Buddhist religion and in collaborations across religions for the good of the humanity. The above policy approaches are important for religious diversity and harmony. As Marx said, “religion is the opiate of mankind” and so religion shall stay in the psyche of the people, irrespective of their class and wealth statuses. The flourishing of the various religious groups and traditions will add more meaning and flavour to the social landscape of that community and of the wider society. Religion and religious groups can be harnessed for the social good, especially in the delivery of charity, educational, social and welfare works. Both the Buddhist community and the Singapore state can implement policies towards this end. Relevant state policies can further encourage and reinforce this niche created by the Buddhist community. It is also imperative that the various actors within the Buddhist community — 211

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the lay Buddhists, lay Buddhist leaderships, members of the Sangha and the state work hand-in-hand to maintain intra- and inter-religious harmony.

Notes The author wishes to acknowledge partial funding from the Institute of Policy Studies for this chapter’s research and to her research assistant Ng Pei Fuen for assistance with this research. The author also wishes to acknowledge Marshall Cavendish International for permission to use materials and reproduce sections from her book published under the Eastern University Press imprint. All views expressed herein are entirely those of the author. 1. For a discussion on the reproduction of Chinese syncretic religion in Singapore, see Kuah-Pearce, State, Society and Religious Engineering: Towards a Reformist Buddhism in Singapore, chapters 1 and 2. 2. For a discussion of the various universes, see Kuah-Pearce, ibid., pp. 21–35. 3. This section is adapted/reproduced from my book, State, Society and Religious Engineering, pp. 246–60. 4. All figures cited in this discussion are from this survey unless otherwise stated. 5. This section is adapted and reproduced from my book State, Society and Religious Engineering, pp. 218–25.

References Bellah, Robert N. “Reflections on the Protestant Ethic Analogy in Asia”. Journal of Social Issues (1963): 52–60. ———. Beyond Belief: Essays on Religion in A Post-Traditional World. New York: Harper and Row, 1970. ———, ed. Religion and Progress in Modern Asia. New York: The Free Press, 1965. Bellah, Robert N. and Hammond, Philip E. Varieties of Civil Religion. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980. Benjamin, Geoffrey. “The Cultural Logic of Singapore’s Multiculturalism”. In Singapore: Society in Transition, edited by Riaz Hassan, pp. 115–33. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976. Caplan, Lionel, ed. Studies in Religious Fundamentalism. London: Macmillan Press, 1987. Chen, Kenneth K. S. The Chinese Transformation of Buddhism. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973. Dayal, Har. The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature. Delhi: Motilal Banardidass, 1978. Department of Statistics. Singapore Population of Census 1990: Religion, Childcare and Leisure Activities. Statistical Release 6. Singapore: Singapore National Printers, 1994.

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———. Singapore Population of Census 2000: Education, Language and Religion. Statistical Release 2. Singapore: Namic Printers Pte Ltd, 2001. Elliot, Alan J. A. Chinese Spirit Medium Cults in Singapore. London: LSE Monograph on Social Anthropology 14 (1955). Fenn, Richard K. “Towards a New Sociology of Religion”. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 11, no. 1 (1972): 16–32. ———. Toward a Theory of Secularisation Monograph 1. Connecticut: Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, 1978. Goh Chok Tong. Speeches. Vol. 16, 1992. Ikeda, Daisatsu Dialogue on Life. Vol. 1. Tokyo: Nichiren Shoshu International Centre, 1976. ———. Dialogue on Life. Vol. 2. Tokyo: Nichiren Shoshu International Centre, 1977. Kalupahana, David J. Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976. Kuah, Khun Eng. “State and Religion: Buddhism and Nation-Building in Singapore”. Pacific Viewpoint 32, no. 1 (1991): 24–42. ———. “Maintaining Ethno-Religious Harmony in Singapore”. Journal of Contemporary Asia 28, no. 1 (1998): 103-21. Kuah-Pearce Khun Eng. State, Society and Religious Engineering: Towards A Reformist Buddhism. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003. Ling, Trevor. “Religion”. In Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, edited by Kernial Singh Sandhu and Paul Wheatley, pp. 692–709. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Luckmann, Thomas. The Invisible Religion. New York: Macmillan, 1967. ———. “Theories of Religion and Social Change”. Annual Review of the Social Sciences of Religion 1 (1997): 1–28. Overmyer, Daniel L. Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in late Traditional China. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1976. Rawski, Evelyn S. “A Historian’s Approach to Chinese Death Ritual”. In Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China, edited by James L Watson and Evelyn. S. Rawski, pp. 20–36. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. Saso, Michael R. Taoism and the Rite of Cosmic Renewal. Seattle: Washington State University Press, 1972. Singapore Census of Population 1990: Religion, Childcare and Leisure Activities. Statistical Release 6. Singapore: Department of Statistics, 1994. Smith, Christian. The Emergence of Liberation Theology. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991. Soothill, William E. The Three Religions of China. London: Curzon Press, 1973. Spencer, Robert F., ed. Religion and Change in Contemporary Asia. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971. Spiro, Melford E. Buddhism and Society. New York: Harper and Rows, 1970.

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Tamney, Joseph B. and Riaz Hassan. Religious Switching in Singapore: A Study of Religious Mobility. Singapore: Select Books, 1987. Topley, Marjorie. “The Emergence and Social Function of Chinese Religious Associations in Singapore”. Comparative Studies in Society and History 3, no. 3 (1961): 289–314. Watson, James L. “The Structure of Chinese Funerary Rites: Elementary Forms, Ritual Sequence, and the Primacy of Performance”. In Death Rituals in Late Imperial and Modern China, edited by J. L. Watson and E. S. Rawski, pp. 3–19. Berkeley: California University Press, 1988. Weber, Max. The Religion of China. New York: The Free Press, 1951. ———. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958. ———. The Sociology of Religion. London: Associated Book, 1966. Wee, Vivienne. “ ‘Buddhism’ in Singapore”. In Singapore: Society in Transition, edited by Riaz Hassan. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976 Weller, Robert P. Unities and Diversities in Chinese Religion. London: Macmillan, 1986. White, James W. The Soka Gakkai and Mass Society. California: Stanford University Press, 1970. Wilson, Bryan R. Religion in Sociological Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982.

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9 THE SATHYA SAI BABA MOVEMENT IN SINGAPORE Its Service Mission and Philosophy of Communal Identity Construction Nagah Devi Ramasamy

INTRODUCTION A fundamental observation in the sociological study of religion has been the rise of new religious movements and cults. Many scholars have attributed this phenomenon to the decline or the gradual secularization of traditional religions like Christianity (Nelson 1987; Johnstone 1997). History may have envisaged that religion has relentlessly come into focus as a struggle between the good old forces of institutionalized churches and disorder-seeking sects and cults. However, an intermediate ground-seeking innovation has been casting its shadow whilst the writings of the dominant discourses inspired by religious fervour continue. Carrying the popularly coined brand name of New Religious Movements (NRMs), they have continued to exist for long despite minimal writings on them. Beckford (1986) writes that “the idea of a religious movement implies an organized attempt to introduce changes in religion” (p. x). Often reformist in orientation, the term “movement” can be said to denote shifts in people’s religious beliefs, ideas and conceptions which they were so used to in the older organized religious orientations.

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What necessarily sparks the interest in these spiritual movements? Marshall (1994) points out that NRMs often tend to be syncretistic in nature, borrowing elements from many different religious and philosophical traditions. Sociologists in addition have made claims that such movements satisfy the psychological and social needs of young and modern people seeking a meaning in life, something they often fail to find easily within the mainstream religious traditions. The religious economy thesis has dominated the discursive field of religion in the field of sociology with much success in the study and analysis of religious and cult movements both in the United States and Canada (Stark and Bainbridge 1985). However, it has been unable to account for the spread of other spiritual movements such as the Sathya Sai Baba movement and its global outreach. The religious economy thesis primarily lends itself to Christian and Western discourses. What is implicitly evident here is the operation of a Eurocentric bias with regards to Western exclusivist and religious conversion (Pereira 2005, p. 1). In a nutshell, the concept of the religious marketplace implies that the conversion of an adherent requires the rejection of the parent religion, as is evident in sects, or the radical departure from established religions as is often characteristic of cults (Stark and Bainbridge 1985). Most of the literature on NRMs support this claim by asserting that new religions “break with existing religious traditions to create something that did not previously exist…, mixing bits and pieces of various distinct traditions” (Hexham and Poewe 1997). However, Pereira (2005) observes that such a premise has been ineffective in accounting for highly pluralistic new religions that have originated in Eastern traditions such as the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON), Soka Gakkai International and Sri Sathya Sai Baba movements. Tong (2007) contends that the popularity of new religious movements such as the Sai Baba movement lies in an isomorphic fit between traditions of the new movements and the prior religions of adherents. These movements, while assimilating various distinct religious and traditional artefacts, ultimately draw from traditions within the broader framework of an existing parent religion.

Growth of Spiritual Movements in Independent Singapore Singapore seems to be a fertile ground for the development of novel and modern movements, both of local and imported origins, of a religious and spiritual nature (Sinha 1985, p. 1). In spite of the dying trend noticed in cases of a few new religious or spiritual movements, many others have survived 216

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both the onslaught of proselytization from institutionalized religious traditions as well as expulsion by the state. These movements (such as the Ramakrishna Mission, Brahma Kumari Raja Yoga Centre, Sri Aurobindo Society, Sai Baba movement and Radha Soami Satsang) have garnered for themselves a huge following and recognition not only from the government but even from the distinguished spiritual leaders representing the mainstream religious traditions. The Inter-Religious Organization (IRO) of Singapore formed in 1949 for instance, reported its intention to embrace spiritual movements such as the Sai Baba movement under its umbrella body, in addition to its core of ten religions — Hinduism, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity, Islam, Sikhism, Jainism and the Baha’i Faith (Straits Times, 16 February 2003). The Singapore state is renowned for its tight surveillance and monitoring of the developments and activities of various religious groups, especially of the newly budding spiritual movements, to ensure that the ethno-religious fabric does not get eroded by inter-religious conflict. The Religious Harmony Act came into effect on March 1990 as a consequence of concerns raised with regard to religious proselytization by evangelical religious Christian groups. The act specifically seeks to control religious proselytizing behaviour as well as contain the use of religion for pushing any political agenda. Sinha (2003b, p. 172) notes the advice given by the state to religious groups from the onset: “To make religious beliefs and ideology socially and politically relevant, while at the same time discarding outmoded religious attitudes, so as to align well with the contemporary needs”. From the state’s point of view, excessive religious fervour, missionary zeal and religious assertiveness (Sinha 2003b, p. 173) are not tolerated and handled with an iron grip. When separatist leanings start to clash with nationalistic imperatives, societies tend to face risk of official disbandment. In general, the government while being interventionist in orientation, is committed to a secular multi-ethnic state with the ideal of managing the citizenry according to its hegemonic discourse. The Singapore state is a secular, religiously-neutral state and therefore does not take the side of either majority or minority religions, dealing with problems of a religious nature in a bureaucratic manner (Kuah 1998, p. 105).

BACKGROUND OF STUDY Choice of Study Whilst literature exists on established institutionalized religious traditions in Singapore, there is a considerable lapse in the case of neo-Hindu, reform217

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oriented spiritual movements. My initial interest to focus on the Sathya Sai Baba movement was motivated by the observation of this deficit in academic work on reformed Hinduism as practised in Singapore.1 This is despite the fact that spiritual movements originating from India within the broader framework of Hinduism have, in the recent past, travelled internationally and established permanent bases in many countries including Singapore, and have gained immense popularity and massive attraction amongst people. Often such spiritual movements have been characterized as carrying neoHindu religious identities or Hindu-oriented neo-reformed identities because they tend to fulfil certain traits associated with religious or social reform movements of their preceding parent religion, Hinduism. The Sathya Sai Baba movement is one of the more successful among the imported spiritual movements in establishing a permanent base in Singapore. Officially registered in 1975, the movement grew quickly with an estimated number of Sai devotee population of 15,000 in 1980 (Khoo 1980, p. 4). Early detailed ethnographic studies on the movement’s structure and organization in Singapore were undertaken by Menon (1983) and Khoo (1980). Comparative contributions are also available from Malaysia (Lee 1982 and Kent 1999, 2005). Santhosh (1997) documented some structural changes and significant expansions in the movement’s activities since Menon’s study in 1983, which included the expansion of the centres from three to twelve around the island. It was estimated there were several thousand Sai Baba followers in Singapore as at 1995, according to the ex-vice president of one of the main centres. The expresident of the Sathya Sai Central Organization of Singapore (SSCOS) mentioned in an interview with the Straits Times that there were approximately 10,000 members in the local scene in 1998 (Straits Times, 23 May 1998). To date, there are fourteen Sai centres situated in various locations within Singapore. These fourteen centres are overseen by SSCOS, the central coordinating body. Many of these centres broke from the parent centre formed in the 1970s to establish their own bases to ensure greater autonomy in operations as well as to fulfil the needs of locale-specific membership. While many of the Sai centres operate out of Hindu temples, a small number operate with some degree of autonomy in different areas throughout the island. In particular, they have managed to adapt their structural and organizational patterns to suit their local environment especially in the realm of rituals, operation bases, membership patterns and other socio-cultural practices.

The Study’s Focus Largely drawing from the works of Menon, Lee and Kent, this study focuses on two aspects of the Sathya Sai Baba movement in Singapore

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which have yet to be researched sociologically: (1) its role as a neo-reform oriented movement in charities, and (2) its multi-ethnic and multi-religious membership. Such a case study can contribute to the larger understanding of NRMs. The study was conducted during the period August 2004 to April 2006. The methodology involved in-depth interviews and discussions with members and devotees of the movement, often conducted in an informal manner with a brief probe guide. In addition, naturalistic and participant- observations were conducted at the field sites. Respondents were largely forthcoming with their answers. The charitable aspects of the Sai Baba and other spiritual movements have rarely been explored sociologically. Most of their core objectives are the attainment of individual self-development and spiritual realization. At the same time, the notion of seva (Sanskrit term for “service”) to the community is considered essential. This guiding philosophy, which translates itself locally into pragmatic practices of a voluntary nature, logically raises two principal questions. First, why do these spiritual movements devote so much resources and efforts into seva2 if spiritual self-realization of the individual self is the ultimate goal? Second, why have these spiritual movements been so successful especially in urban modern societies, particularly in contrast to certain mainstream institutionalized religions? The Sathya Sai Baba movement in Singapore involves the participation of a large proportion of Chinese and Indian devotees in most centres. In the midst of seeking to understand the particular kinds of interfaith and interethnic dialogues that might possibly arise from such active participation, the research asked major questions regarding issues of identity. Certain taken-for-granted identity markers such as “movement”, “Hindu-based” and “neo-Hindu” were problematized, and ethnographic scrutiny of these terms in the practices of the movement undertaken.

Objectives and Methodology The objectives of the research were twofold: (1) to examine the role of the Sathya Sai Baba spiritual reform-oriented movement in the sector of charities and social service and to identify the drivers behind the organization’s motivations in social service, and (2) to study the movement’s facility in fostering multiethnic and multireligious identity amongst Singaporeans through its philosophy of communal identity construction. Specific aspects highlighted include the following: (1) history of the Sathya Sai Baba movement; (2) documentation of the Sai Baba Organization in the arena of charities and social services; (3) significant socio-religious inclinations in the promotion of social services, and (4) representation of the intra-faith union between the

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multi-ethnic and multi-religious memberships within the local movement. Methodologically, in-depth interviews were conducted with ten out of the total fourteen centres in Singapore, and data from these centres form the backdrop of the discussion.3 This provides a comprehensive and qualitative perspective into the pertinent issues concerned with qualitative data espousal. Naturalistic and participant observations and in-depth interviews encompass the main methodological tools.

HISTORY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SATHYA SAI BABA MOVEMENT The Founder and His Charisma Sathya Sai Baba (1926– ) is extolled as one of the most popular saints in India, where he originated, as well as globally. He is a male spiritual leader (also known as guru, “the dispeller of darkness or heavy with wisdom”). A small figure enveloped in a long-flowing orange garb and donning a prominent Afro-hairstyle, he exudes a strong radiance. Known for his appealing and practical sense-making spiritual teachings and intellectual discourses, he is made famous by the very nature of his miracle-performing actions. These include the spontaneous creation of vibuthi (sacred ash), accessories (watches, chains, rings, books and photographs), consumptive items (sweets, foods, fruits and flowers), and religious objects (talismans, crucifixes, phallic lingam icons) with the casual wave of the hand. He seems to have established for himself a superlative reputation as a renowned miracle worker. He is also famed for miraculous cures and accomplishment of surgeries from a distance with help from his materialized ashes, at times even extending to cases of resurrection of the dead. He is said to have left ash footprints in his devotees’ houses without ever having entered the premises (Bowen 1997, p. 175). These very acts are envisaged by his devotees as evidence of his divinity and his appeal factor. The god-man, whose movement does not possess any strict formal boundaries or definite membership lists, attracts a loose collection of mortals to his philosophy of life. The trusts which exist in his name always receive large amounts of donations which are used to establish devotional centres, publishing of books and magazines, as well as Sathya Sai educational institutes all over the globe. In addition, the trusts sponsor charitable activities which include running homes and healthcare centres for the needy, providing educational opportunities for poor children, feeding the poor and working as relief agents during natural disasters. Sathya Sai Baba was born Sathya Narayana Raju on 23 November 1926 to a Kshatriya (warrior) caste family. His birth was reported as being heralded 220

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by mysterious sounds in the family home. A seer priest interpreted these as a sign of a beneficent presence and foretold of an auspicious birth (Kent 2005, p. 37). His official biographer Kasturi (1973–75) writes “the young Sai Baba exhibited extraordinary powers from the time of his birth and he would materialise objects for his friends and even locate possessions they had lost. In addition, he showed unusual talents in the learning and performing arts of drama, music, dance and writing” (ibid). In 1940, at the tender age of fourteen,4 he had declared to his village men that he was Sathya Sai Baba (Sai Baba of Truth),5 the reincarnation of an earlier version of a god-man and guru known as Shirdi Sai Baba (1856–1918), also a miracle worker (Swallow 1982, p. 125) who had combined both Muslim and Hindu prayer modes of expressions and garnered both Muslim and Hindu followers.6 Sathya Sai Baba made a second claim in 1963 that he was an incarnation of Shiva the Hindu deity (one of the central figures of the Hindu Trinity and one of the two main gods of devotional Hinduism). It is interesting to note here that Sathya Sai Baba was practising autonomy and authority here through his claims. As noted by Sharma (1986), the doctrine of incarnation (taking on of avatars) did not exist in Saivism (unlike Vaishnavism’s specialty of incarnations). Sathya Sai Baba was ultimately playing his cards well, for the concept of incarnation went well with the Vaishnavite masses (Gonda 1970).7 By this means, he was connected to a renowned past and he sustained and built upon the respectability and authority as accrued by the previous Sai Baba. However, he still had to introduce some innovation in his form of “practice” so as to distinguish himself from the previous one. He ultimately dropped the Islamic associations and instead placed greater stress upon elements adopted from the Hindu-based Saivite tradition. According to his own testimony, he claims he will live to the age of 96 (until year 2022) and thereafter reincarnate anew as Prema Sai Baba (Sai Baba of Love) who shall be born in the Mandya district of Karnataka state of India. In 1966, “Prasanthi Nilayam”, Sathya Sai Baba’s ashram (abode) was declared a legal township by the Indian government. Literally translated as “Abode of Peace”, this ashram is located at Sathya Sai Baba’s birthplace in Puttaparthi and serves as the headquarters of his movement. Sathya Sai Baba has been noted to be one of the most popular living saints among the masses in Central India and his picture is found in shrines throughout the land (White 1972, p. 868). There are also numerous temples dedicated to him throughout India. He was an obscure religious figure until the 1960s and 1970s when his fame spread through India and abroad (Lee 1982, p. 128). Prasanthi Nilayam is like a global community where devotees of various nationalities such as Croatians, Britons, Italians, Australians, Russians, Japanese, Americans and Asians gather to see their guru during 221

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darshans (darshan means to have a sight of the divine) and in doing so experience a special form of communication.8 Lee writes that while there is no discernible Muslim influence in Sathya Sai Baba’s movement, he continues to preach about the unity of all religions. Sai Baba himself philosophizes that “the easiest path to salvation is through bhakti (devotion)”. He is quoted as having said: “If at all you want to label me, then call me Premaswarup (Love). Love is the keynote of harmony” (New Straits Times, 4 May 1997). Sathya Sai Baba has been a crowd winner for the masses of India because he has not excluded anyone on the basis of caste, class, gender, race or religion. While Hinduism in India is applauded for allowing greater freedom of belief than in any other metaphysical system (Senghass 2002, p. 59), it, however, undergrids the caste law system in which the karmic law prevails and each person is ascribed into a caste from birth. Sathya Sai Baba’s teachings come as a new movement which translates from the parent religion of Hinduism, but rejects caste hierarchy and caste laws. Neither are women excluded from the god-man’s planned agenda — an appealing approach at a time when reforms for the uplifting of women are taking place. The Hindu character of India is evident in his movement. He preaches tolerance — a much desired trait Indians look up to as preached and practised by nationalist figure Mahatma Gandhi. Sathya Sai Baba is noted to have made a connection with the godhead, Shiva, because of the very fact that the latter is associated with the status of “destroyer” and with influence over determining cosmic changes. The Shiva identity entitles Sathya Sai Baba to make his presence felt in a globalizing era where society is undergoing widespread and rapid social change, in which he seems to connote the presence of a global authoritative figure who is here to stay and introduce changes into the world. The Sathya Sai Baba movement is regarded as being able to maintain contact with India’s rich traditional heritage and at the same time face the modernity rapidly taking over India. Sathya Sai Baba uses the concept of kaliyuga to make his points. According to the Hindu tradition of cosmology, humanity goes through four yugic (Age) cycles, the last and most negative being the kaliyuga period (age of iron) when the world comes to an end and righteousness has diminished and evils are unleashed. The kaliyuga is characterized by a progressive breakdown of civilization and morality, and this can only be remedied by a new divine incarnation. Sathya Sai Baba asserts that he took on the current incarnation so as to save people from these catastrophic times. Interestingly, his imagery of worldly ascetism directly confronts the ideals of the cosmopolitan middleclasses, for he claims these people are most in need of spiritual regeneration if the world is to be reformed (Kent 2005, p. 39). 222

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Sathya Sai Baba’s followers and the organizations that he has founded are involved in many service projects around the world, including schools, free healthcare provided through state-of-the-art hospitals, and water projects serving thousands in the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. In his home village of Puttaparthi itself, there is a medical university, a world religious museum and a hospital. All services are being provided free of charge. The Sathya Sai Baba movement, since its inception, has also grown globally and taken on a transnational identity. While Sathya Sai Baba has never left his abode in India except for one rare instance, his followers and devotees have since established hundreds of centres in various countries. The grandest ashram in Southern India is popular enough to warrant its own airport (The Age, 2001). According to official statements, by 1979 alone, the total number of followers was said to be over two million (Hummel 1985). Currently, it is claimed there are over 1,000 Sai centres established in over 176 countries throughout the world (Hindustan Times, 23 November 2005). Also, membership has been enhanced through the numerous websites which have been devoted to the Sai Baba movement worldwide.

The Structure of the Organization The structure of the non-political and non-profit Sathya Sai Organization can be likened to a pyramid-shaped hierarchical model with many levels. At the top level is the central organizational body at the Prasanthi Nilayam in India comprising the central office, the all-India president and the international chairman. At the second level there are nine zones and ninety-four regional organizations under each of which are grouped several countries. Office bearers hold short-term appointments (all office bearers will ordinarily not hold office for more than two years, but are eligible for re-appointment for a further extended period of two years). One or two coordinators appointed by the international chairman are responsible for each region. At the third level are the central councils and co-ordinating committees in every country (a central council is set up where there are at least ten centres and a coordinating committee where there are less than ten but more than three centres). The chairman of every central council is to be appointed by the international chairman on the recommendation of the central coordinator concerned. The main duties of the central council are to promote the setting up of centres and groups, to act as an over-steering body to guide and supervise the various organizational activities of the centres/groups in their jurisdiction, and to maintain liaison between the central coordinator and centres/groups. At the fourth and final level are the local centres. Any group of devotees not 223

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numbering less than nine and desiring to engage themselves in activities under at least two of the three wings of the organization, namely spiritual, educational and service, may constitute themselves into a Sai centre and apply for affiliation to the central council concerned. The ladies wing and youth wing are two relatively new initiatives added to the existing threewing structures. In Singapore, all the Sathya Sai Baba Centres are registered as required by law under the Registrar of Societies (ROS) Act.9 According to the Government Gazette of 2001, all centres were registered under the broader category of “religion”. In the latest check from the ROS on-line system, their categorization was not explicit. However, in my research, the distinction between “religions” and “spiritual” often cropped up among my informants, and respondents believed the centres are most probably registered under either the “religion” or the “spiritual group” reference categories while a few assumed they were categorized under “welfare”. The significance of this difference becomes clear where the branding of the movement as a “religion” is refuted as shown in a later part of this chapter.

The Teachings The movement has a charter of its own and all centres are expected to follow the rules and regulations that fall within it.10 Every member ought to undertake sadhana (spiritual discipline) as an integral part of his daily life and abide by the “nine codes of conduct”11 which include strong emphasis on daily meditations and prayers (both at individual and mass prayer sessions), participation in education programmes known as Educare conducted by the organization for children and adults, and participation in community services. Sathya Sai Baba preaches a foundation of five basic values: truth (sathya), right conduct (dharma), peace (shanti), love (prema) and non-violence (ahmisa). He emphasizes the unity of all major religions and advocates that all lead to God. The organization undertakes activities that are spiritual (devotional singing, study circles, public lectures, seminars, meditations, etc); educational (such as balvikas which are Sai spiritual educational classes conducted for young children of devotees, Education in Human Values programmes now known as Educare, combined with character development for students in the age group 6–15); and service-related (examples include medical check-up camps, blood donation drives, visits to hospitals, old age homes, etc). In addition, Sathya Sai Baba recognizes that man is a social animal and due to his existence in society, has obligations to the state. He thus emphasizes ten principles12 which include respecting all religions equally and practising 224

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charity while maintaining right conduct. These principles appear “secular” yet at the same time are compatible with spiritual realization. Parallels betwen moulding of “self ” and “nation” as well as respect for the larger community are further drawn from these principles. Santhosh (1996) argues that these secular acts are key to the understanding of the attractiveness and the growing membership of the movement in Singapore. The movement has two logos. The logo of the International Sai Organization symbolizes the five core human values, and is depicted by a central “world religions” Sarva Dharma stupa (sarva means “entire” and dharma means “righteousness” and “morality”), with a lotus atop it. The lotus is the movement’s signature logo. Its five petals originally symbolized the five world religious traditions, namely the om sign of Hinduism, the sickle moon and star of Islam, the Christian cross, the flames of Zoroastrianism and the wheel of Buddhism. At the centre of the lotus flower emblem is an Indian oil lamp (Kent 2005, p. 58). The central positioning of the Indian lamp seems to suggest Baba’s deepest philosophy that at the core of all human experience is an Indian formulation of enlightenment. But this became a problem in Malaysia when the Malaysian Sai Organization attempted to register their centres with the authorities and were turned down because including Islam under the emblem was deemed unacceptable (ibid.). The organization then decided to change the lotus emblem and include the five core principles instead for the Malaysian case. This initiative was subsequently accepted by the global Sai Baba organizations. During the 6th World Conference of the Sathya Sai Baba Organization in 1995, the decision was made to adopt the emblem with the five human values, and to include a sixth religion to the original list — Judaism, represented by the Star of David.

Performance of Seva Sathya Sai Baba’s devotees credit his ability to inspire millions of people all over the world to the most fundamental of all positive human actions — seva (service) to all, without any pretensions. The importance of charity in Sai teachings is reiterated by slogans such as “Love All Serve All” and “The hands that serve are holier than the lips that pray”. As pointed out by Kent (2005, p. 67), charity offers a means of reformation that does not challenge existing patterns of power distribution but instead spiritually empowers actors within it. As such, the Sai Baba movement worldwide is explicitly marked by the proliferation of its social services and welfare activities (Menon 1983). It organizes trips to homes, collects and distributes grain and clothing for the 225

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underprivileged (ibid.), and runs public programmes for moral and cultural betterment such as charity activities in hospitals, children’s homes, the opening of free medical clinics and blood donation drives. In India alone, the movement has contributed to technical and medical colleges and provided drinking water facilities to the Ananthpur district. Its Project Water in 1994 provided drinking water to 731 villages in the district at a cost of Rs. 300 crores (The Hindu, 2005). In Singapore, with the rising number of Sai centres in the last decade, additional welfare services have been organized (see Appendix 9.1 for details), such as the opening of a free specialist outpatient medical clinic in 199613 (open to all needy people, not just Sai Baba followers) and blood donation drives, in addition to the establishment of youth wings and youth classes. The SSCOS formed in 1980 asserts that its main objective is to carry out charity work, its main guiding tenet being “to give selfless service without seeking fame or reward”. Its volunteers also help victims of natural disasters by sending food parcels and other necessities. They have also set up homes such as the Sun Love Nursing Home and the Swami Home. Interviews conducted with selected centres revealed that all three wings (spiritual, educational and service)14 are given paramount importance, but provision of welfare services has been practised passionately by the movement ever since the inception of the first centre. Following recommendations as laid out in the charter, the Singapore movement has thus far been heavily involved in hospital volunteer work, charity drives, help to orphanages, homes for the handicapped, the destitute and elderly, and blood donation drives. While most projects are the initiatives of individual centres, particular projects are designated by the SSCOS and carried out at a national level. These include large-scale blood donation drives, food distribution projects such as the Sai Action for Family Relief of Needy (SAFFRON) project (an initiative where selected needy households are recommended by voluntary welfare organizations such as SINDA to the centres, which in turn adopt them and provide them food provisions) and ad hoc services. During such drives, information is disseminated to the various centres and volunteers are sent to help carry out the large-scale projects. Individual intra-centre initiatives include the adoption of homes (such as the Sun Love Home), counselling for inmates at Changi Prison (on a weekly or monthly routine), service projects and volunteer works at the Institute of Mental Health wards (monthly), supply of food and clothes provisions for needy families, seva activities at several homes which includes feeding, cleaning and entertaining the patients on a monthly or bi-weekly basis (such as in the Sun Love Home, Tampines Home, Jenaris Home, Meranti Home, Villa Francis Home, Bukit Batok 226

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Home and Moral Home), adoption of individual families called the Narayana Seva, as well as big-scale dinner projects for the aged such as during Chinese New Year. Within each centre, each committee is allowed to practise autonomy on the use of available resources for philanthropic activities. It is to be emphasized that funding for these events are never solicited, as this goes against the Sathya Sai Baba’s charter and principles. Resources are pooled on a voluntary basis and only if a planned activity meets the budget is it given the directive to be carried out.

Socio-religious Inclinations Why do individuals who join the Sathya Sai Baba movement for personal spiritual guidance eventually move into the community sphere to deliver social services for the welfare of others? Religious and ethical values have always played a role in contributing to philanthropy, such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism and Parsism (Hodgkinson and McCarthy 1992). Tong (2007) surmises that “religious groups provide important social support in a country whose leaders do not support state welfarism” (p. 241). For the Sai Baba movement, embracing the social service aspect is a potential reinforcement tool for its highly heterogenous membership. As Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) pointed out, “religion” is society’s consciousness of itself. This consciousness is manifested through “representations collectives” — those ritual actions in which the whole of a human community assemble to ratify, celebrate and reinforce their unity (Greeley 1982, p. 127). Likewise, charity can be understood as one of the tools of religious bonding. Service to man is seen to transcend everything else and uplifts both giver and receiver, but most importantly it bonds society. The function of religion then, is to act as a connecting force for people to integrate and function as a whole. When engaged in seva, social distinctions evaporate. There is no more need for a common language, a common religious affiliation nor a common set of values for they trail off during the actual manifested activity of charity work. This seva wing of the movement is thus seen to be ostensibly divorced from all religious association. In my research, the commitment to social service provision by the Sai Baba movement appears highly impressive. Informants revealed personal dilemmas between family commitments and the movement’s and their decision to choose the latter, and moving from the initial personal spiritual journey towards community service. Even non-believers are aware of the movement’s social work, while almost all ex-devotees interviewed gave full support to Sai Baba’s charitable works even as they held different opinions about his authenticity. 227

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In general, NRMs are increasingly popular because the communal bonding they experience while engaged in seva addresses the effects of rapid social change, the aftermath of modernization as well as cultural alienation suffered in urban societies (Kent 2005). Ancient traditions that appear to be losing relevance are most often updated and strengthened through service (Reader 1996). Juergensmeyer and McMahon (1998) note that in the case of seva, it is a concept originating from a development in Hinduism known as dana (the transfer of property according to sastric or classical text rites so as to reach a fit recipient). An important religious mode of expressing love for the deity or guru, the ideology translates itself into the accrual of karmic merit. Seva is often seen as the key to achieving a higher spiritual plane, and soon becomes an integral aspect of spirituality and undertaken to benefit society as whole (Vivakanandan and Nagah Devi 2008). A relatively late entry into Singapore, the involvement in social services by the Sathya Sai Baba movement seems to supersede that of established older religious traditions such as Hinduism. “[T]here is a general consensus that Hindu temples ought to do more for charity … It was felt that some of the Hindu spiritual organizations are doing excellent social services that could be emulated by temples.” (Ibid.) The Sathya Sai Baba movement’s success in seva can be attributed to the obligation factor: Seva is not an option but mandatory. While not all starting initiates have entered the centres with the passion to deliver in the community sphere, they gradually develop the passion to translate the Sai teachings into pragmatic application such as through charity. At the national level, welfare assistance from the Singapore Government is provided only as a last resort. To reduce the welfare burden on the state and to preserve funds for developmental purposes, the Singapore government has adopted, since independence, a welfare policy that emphasizes the principles of individual responsibility (Cheung 1992, p. 455). The Sathya Sai Social Service (4S) Singapore is a voluntary welfare organization (VWO) and member of the National Council of Social Services (NCSS). Born out of the parent Sathya Sai Organization, this VWO is secular in nature, professionally managed, well funded and centrally coordinated. While carrying the brand name of the Sathya Sai Organization, the VWO has been able to deliver seva to the community efficiently without amalgamating the spiritual or religious sentiments in its delivery. “They are two sides of the same coin….” says a committee member of the oldest centre, the Sri Sathya Sai Society of Singapore from which the 4S initiative took place. He further mentions “both our society and 4S are sister bodies. We provide an environment for spiritual development. The natural progress ought to be towards the community spheres. 4S provides new projects for volunteers such as ours from this centre.” For the initiated, the whole process of gathering and communicating 228

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in the sphere of welfare helps to build up the shared meaning systems the volunteer devotees introduce into their lives, once they make the decision to follow the movement.

Identity Markers The Movement as a Fluid Construct The term “movement” is treated here as a fluid construct as most often the New Age movements that arise in reaction to established traditional religious institutions are considered free-flowing and flexible. These movements are often characterized by a network of believers and practitioners who are enjoined by somewhat similar beliefs and practices which they add on to whichever formal parental religion they follow. When dissatisfied with what the parents’ religious tradition has to offer, most people tend to yearn for a personal, spiritual experience often through books, educational centres or spiritual teachers. Most often a New Age movement is a boon for many, as without clear demarcations such as membership lists, dogmas, holy text or formal clergy, it is indeed a refreshing change for many who seek a personal individual experience. Kent (2005) sees such movements as addressing social change and cultural alienation in a modern nation state by providing a sense of meaning and local belonging to the person. New religious movements also tend to transcend nationalism by stressing universalism. They help to overcome the disintegrating potential of geographical separation and create an “imagined community” of limitless bounds (Anderson 1991). Mass society theory (Kornhauser 1959) argues that social movements occur in mass societies, especially industrialized societies that involve bureaucratic organizational structures that create impersonal environments. Such societies tend to lack social groups that provide people with a sense of meaning to the community, leaving individuals feeling alienated, deprived and marginalized. In the case of the global Sathya Sai Baba movement, it creates a morally charged experience for many of its followers. Sai Baba is turned to as a form of redress and escapism. In the crisis of modernity, a modern god-man like Sai Baba emerges as a powerful centrifugal force of redress, accommodating the modern world especially when faith becomes a matter of personal preference.

An Inclusive Structure As pointed by Kuah (1998, pp. 104–05), religion and religious affiliations in multi-ethnic and multi-religious Singapore have been taken to coincide with ethnicity, and thus for the sake of social and political stability, the Singapore

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government has adopted a policy of multi-racialism and multi-religiosity. This has come about through the official mode of categorizing people into the CMIEO15 model which implants the notion that every Singaporean rightfully belongs to a particular race.16 The reality of this multi-racialism has meant that the management of tensions has been precisely the management of relations between the ethnic groups (Clammer 1998, p. 3). In the treatment of various religions, the Singapore government’s declared policy is to be accommodating or neutral (insofar as this is possible) (Thio 2001). The structure of the Sathya Sai Baba congregation in the multi-ethnic and multi-religious context of Singapore seems very inclusive. It not only seems to practise and preach religious and ethnic inclusivism, but allows for adherents to maintain their parent religious affiliations or current religion and practices (for example, Christian adherents to the Sathya Sai Baba movement can retain their Christian faith). They are, in fact, highly encouraged to do so through teachings such as “if you are a Christian, be a better Christian. If a Moslem, be a better Moslem. You don’t need to renounce your faith”. This new movement neither demands rejection of previous religion nor the adoption of radical new ideas as traditional religious concept of conversion implies. A member of the movement effectively would not only occupy a place in both his parent affiliated religion (old) and this new spirituality (new), but makes conventional notions on religious membership and practised rituals unproblematic (Pereira 2007). In Singapore, there is a large presence of various sub-groups of various faiths within each ethnic group (Christians, Roman Catholics, Protestants and Methodists among the Chinese, for instance). Such sub-groups would not face any pressing issue with the commonality they share under the Sai Baba identity. For this reason, the Sai Baba movement tends to gain more acceptance amongst Singaporeans compared to numerous other neo-Hindu religious or spiritual movements.

The “Hindu” Label as Problematic Earlier scholarly literature labelled the Sathya Sai Baba movement as either “Hindu-based” or “new religious movement” or even “neo-reform oriented movement”. The first has been refuted by its members who insist assiduously that their movement is in no way a religious or a Hindu-based movement, unlike movements such as ISKCON and Transcendental Mediation (TM) which are widely acclaimed as derivatives of popular Hinduism. While “Hindu” in origin in its worship practices due to borrowed elements from Sanskritic Hinduism (Menon 1983), the Sai Baba movement denies any specific allegiances to Hinduism or to any institutionalized religion per se. Instead, it 230

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declares itself a movement which focuses on a mission leading to divine conscience through respect of universal and spiritual teachings and preaching of universal humanitarism. Hence, while remaining a Hindu control base in India, the movement at the broad-spectrum level incorporates non-Hindu and non-Indian members as devotees, thus giving the movement its multiethnic, non-sectarian and syncretic identity.17

A Plural Community The Sathya Sai Baba movement, while part of a pattern of innovations and developments from early Hindu traditions, has managed to adapt its structural and organizational patterns to its local environment such as in the arena of rituals, multi-ethnic membership and other socio-cultural practices. In Singapore, most of the centres’ presidents interviewed declared that “the Sai organization is a non-religious, multi-racial worldwide organization dedicated to promoting welfare services and human values”. The emphasis is on “nonreligious” and “welfare services”. The local centres also maintain that Sai Baba is neither a Hindu nor an Indian guru for the Indian masses. Instead, they regard him as a universal god for all, and while his origins and bases are in India, he has become a transnational and global enigma. This in essence allows for a common space to be constructed where people of different ethnicities and religions can mingle and interact. Sai Baba, while recognized as the spiritual guide, is forthright in relinquishing any sole proprietorship over the discourses he preaches. This attitude holds an uncanny resemblance to syncretic and inclusive Hinduism, and might be the key (the spiritual plurality) to the appeal of his works in the global terrain. As expressed: Every believer is allowed to believe in being on the right part. It is however presumptuous, arrogant and blasphemous to believe that another is on the wrong one. Believe and let believe, pray and let pray are fundamental attitudes which animate the ecumenical spirit among the world religions. This attitude itself is however not a religion; it conveys to the mind a spirit of tolerance which ought to motivate, lead and guide all religions. (Sri Sathya Sai Central Council of Malaysia Publications (SSSCCM), ‘Year of Truth’ Publications, Malaysia, 1996).

Thus, while Sai Baba’s imagery and the style of worship adopted by his devotees are often read as distinctly Hindu (Kent 2005, p. 42), he opens up the possibility for all to participate using their own familiar religious and cultural forms, and the clear distinction that exists between Hinduism and monotheistic, exclusivist religions such as Judaism, Christianity and Islam is 231

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maintained by the movement. Additionally, the idea of religion being global as related to the global movements of people and the transnational acceptance of religious ideas (Juergensmeyer 2003) is particularly applicable to the Sathya Sai Baba movement. In terms of practice, no hardcore, rigid laws or rules exist for initiation into the Sai Baba movement. Even in the realm of consumption, there is immense diversity in the practice of refraining from meat. There are Hindus who eat meat and yet others who are vegetarians (Senghass 2002, p. 57). Likewise, in the movement, vegetarianism is considered a desired ideal but remains a personal choice rather than a mandatory condition for initiation into the movement. In Singapore, most centres congregate within Hindu spaces. The very spatial occupation of the centres within Hindu temple grounds, the singing of devotional songs largely in the Sanskritic medium during bhajans, dedication of songs to Hindu godheads as well as performance of certain Hindu rituals with the arathi (camphor flame) tends to give the impression to the nonIndian public that it is a Hindu movement. It did not help either when Sai Baba first made the claim that he was an incarnation of Shiva, the Hindu deity. But most devotees (mainly the Indians) defend the usage of certain Hindu-oriented ritualistic traditions during bhajan as the outcome of the situation as practised back in India. Sai Baba further extends the bhakti devotional tradition of Hinduism into his teaching philosophy. He claims he is one with Krishna, Jesus Christ, Buddha, Prophet Muhammad and so forth. At some Sai Baba centres, this is clearly depicted by the presence of various religious symbols such as the Christian cross, the statue of Buddha and figurines of Kuan Yin (Chinese Goddess of Mercy) and the Virgin Mary. The god-man allows for the possibility to ratify a limitless number of specific forms through their ultimate manifestation. While many of the major Sai centres in Singapore operate out of Hindu temples, a small number operate with some degree of autonomy in different areas, serving different ethnic enclaves and adapting to their structural and organizational patterns to the local environment. Melton (1995) asserts that new religions often take on either a more traditional or pietistic variant of a dominant religious perspective, using cultural and religious artefacts that are known to them or have been predominant. These movements utilize locally present elements with the new “artefacts” and develop newer variants of their parent religious forms. In Singapore (and Malaysia), the availability of a multiplicity of ethno-linguistic and religious resources has indeed ensured that the Sai Baba movement has adopted different structural and organizational forms in relation to the social ecology. This can be noticed in the adoption of Chinese innovation within the framework of 232

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Hindu rituals in the bhajan rituals such as singing of Chinese/Mandarin songs, positioning of Taoist deities at the altar and doing away with the arathi at some centres where there is higher Chinese membership. Some Chinese devotees are attempting to scale down the practice of Hinduoriented rituals by introducing more English songs as well as the mentioning of other god names apart from that of Sai Baba. The need to separate itself from a temple-oriented Hindu religion as well as its branding as a ritualistic movement is pressing for the movement in Singapore. One of the presidents of the centres stated: Sathya Sai Baba movement has to adhere to its highly secular orientation while spreading the spiritual faith across [to] the people. At the same time they need to make attempts to conform to the cultural and environmental specifics of the locales they travel to.

He explained that the reason why many centres started out their activities within Hindu temples grounds was because of their lower rental costs in landscarce Singapore. Furthermore, as pointed out, Hinduism is open in terms of acceptance of other religious forms. Cost and the land-scarcity aside, the mere thought of renting a space in a Roman Catholic church or a mosque is unthinkable. Also, since the movement originated in India, more Indians would have at least heard of the name Sathya Sai Baba, compared to the nonIndians, and it made sense for the centres to be situated within a Hindu temple ground. The latter also allows for better exposure for the movement and for its recruiting process. The fact that many of the current members were introduced into the movement either through friends, relatives or personal visits whilst attending prayers in the Hindu temples attests to this. Nonetheless, there are crucial differences between the modes of worship of Hinduism and the movement’s. For one, there is a lack of presence of an immediate mediator in the movement, unlike the immanent presence of the Hindu Brahmin priest found in Hindu temple worship. In the case of the movement, it is a direct and personal connection to god that is encouraged. This is attractive for many of the educated members who tend to look upon ritualistic forms of worship with disdain. Also, there are no universal codified forms of texts or scriptures (at least, not in the literate sense of the word as all Vedic scripts are sanskritized in their original). The need to distance themselves from a religious group, as discussed earlier, can be made sense of here. This separation from Hinduism as a set of formal dogma and formalized worship practices and rituals allows for the inclusion of non-Indians as well as spreads the movement’s appeal through the “spiritual” label which is felt to be more 233

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open, available and universalizing. The movement’s practical approach in using English as a medium of communication is also more attractive to the more educated.

A Middle Class Following There are two main categories of membership for all centres in Singapore. The formal membership form the first category and can be divided into two groups. The first group is composed of the committed and associated personnel, as determined by official statistics. The second group consists of each centre’s affiliated devotees who are ordinary members. The second category is the unofficial or loose membership which is much more difficult to estimate. These nominal members may be in general agreement with the Sai Baba movement’s beliefs and practices but maintain peripheral affiliations. There are many Chinese and Indians who may acknowledge Sai Baba as divine and powerful without necessarily worshipping him but just have a simple picture of him in their home, and may not participate in the centre’s activities. These followers may also attend bhajans and social service events all over the island. The centres currently keep membership records at least to fulfil a requirement by the Registrar of Societies Act. But even then, there are no confirmed figures in certain centres. Batstone (2001) attributes this lack of clearly defined community to the modern “network society” of the twenty-first century, where traditional notions of community are offset by “transitional sites that offer relationships, good[s] and services which appeal to a small part of ourselves” (ibid., p. 22). There seems to be an over-representation of the English-educated, middleclass groups in the centres researched. While the movement endeavors to transcend all social divisions — ethnic, religious and class — it is evident that the working class, non-English educated Indians are largely absent from its congregations, at least in terms of official membership. They are also relatively absent from the leadership strata. The current presidents and leaders of the various centres are, to a large extent, English-educated professional elites from high socio-economic backgrounds. Some Chinese leaders head the centres with largely Chinese membership. Whilst the bhajans are conducted customarily in Sanskrit, the dominant form of interaction is in English. This class membership, which has been documented in earlier academic work done two decades ago, appears unchanged. This contrasts with membership in India where the movement’s appeal pervades all classes and where membership is predominantly of the working classes. Another reason for this difference could be due to the backgrounds of those from the low-income 234

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strata in Singapore who are used to ritualistic worship in Hindu temples. The discourses of Sai Baba are interpreted largely as practical, sensible and scientific and always translated into English, which tends to cut them out but which are more attractive to the English-educated professional elites.

The Sai Family as a Global Entity Sai Baba devotees actively employ kinship terminology in their everyday relations with one another. This is of importance precisely because Indians and non-Indians become conceptually united in one single family of brothers, sisters, aunties and uncles. Devotees in addition utilize the Sai greeting “Sai Ram” (Sai refers to the divine mother and Ram to the hero of the Hindu epic Ramayana, also the epitome of male righteousness). Adoption of such symbolic traits of identification through a common dress code (primarily all-white or white and pink attire), adhering to a verbal address code system whereby kinship and communal ties, such as the “brother-sister” vocabulary, are established and mass meditations and bhajans all help to reinforce this unity. Through the metaphor of the family, the movement recreates itself as a united global community. Sai Baba is represented both as the divine father and mother, as well as healer for his devotee offsprings all over the globe. This is important because members of diasporic groups that are politically and numerically weak in their adopted lands finally have an identity to hang on to as an alternative. Despite its universal identity, the Sai philosophy at the more localized centres have a higher tendency to neglect any such concerns and lack steadfast notions on universal membership, focussing predominantly on servicing the needs of their local membership instead. For instance, while the ritual types in India have to adhere to the followers there (largely Indian Hindus), those in the Singapore setting are modified for the local movement’s multi-ethnic followers. Literature on NRMs thus far has dealt with their international travel but little on how they proceed after the initial foothold has been established in the host countries (Pereira 2005, p. 4). This is especially of interest when the latter are highly plural, with socio-ethnic and linguistic enclaves and multicultural cities, such as in Singapore’s case. Clarke (2000) noted that the process of networking through places of worship of institutionalized religions like Hinduism is an essential “period of quarantine” for NRMs. Individual members are active agents involved in the process of “assimilation and digestion” (White 1972). While they are attracted to the Sai Baba movement because of its “universal appeal” (Sinha 1985) and consequently join it to meet certain 235

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needs, their needs vary significantly because of members’ different ethnic and religious backgrounds. A parallel development worthy of study is interfaith relations and dialogue which have become a significant issue in the post-9/11 global environment. Local interfaith dialogue has most likely been transformed in recent years yet little known. The Sathya Sai Baba movement in Singapore offers an excellent site of investigation in this domain because of its multiethnic and multi-religious membership within the larger multi-religious society.

CONCLUSION The Sathya Sai Baba movement has a vast potential to promote understanding and development as evidenced through its successful recruiting of devotees and volunteers into its spiritual and welfare programmes. High-spirited, motivated and dynamic members of each centre contribute to the strength of the movement. The religious-spiritual climate as well as the founder’s charismatic leadership has allowed the movement to grow in size as well as enabled it to retain its hold on the devotees. The proportion of dropouts from all centres seems rather insignificant compared with the number of new devotees. The mobilization of devotees to expand their participation into the social service arena is enabled by the collective effervescence of a communal identity constructed over time through spiritual practice. There is a highly vibrant and interactive relationship between members in each centre as they work in unison towards common goals and agendas in social service delivery and communal bonding. Collective consciousness has definitely attained a high level within this local movement, especially at the intra-centre level, but is difficult to conclude so at the inter-centre level as interaction between the various centres is limited except during the major five national functions held annually. The time and amount of commitment involved in organizing small-scale activities within each centre does not allow much time for organizing bigger activities together with other centres, as this requires more coordination and inter-communication. Moreover, different centres have different agendas and needs to fulfil. Seeking a common ground with regard to planning of social service activities proves to be an arduous, uphill task at times. However, Sai Baba’s teachings restated as “unity in diversity” in Singapore’s context is manifested strongly as a whole and can still be further developed between the centres, with the goal of achieving mutual understanding so that more and better service and welfare-oriented projects can be introduced to serve the needy. A movement exudes centrifugal, organic energy which, when harnessed by the right leadership, will maintain its course but when disrupted by weak 236

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leadership can change drastically its flow. Many neo-reform oriented spiritual movements have split up and lapsed soon after their establishment. The Sathya Sai Baba movement ought to be credited for its successful growth especially in two arenas: charity-mindedness as well as communal-spiritedness. Accommodating and sensitive to the needs of the devotees (such as in issues regarding conversion), this spiritual movement has contributed to the moral condition of people. Assistance and support to the movement’s welfare projects by private corporate organizations as well as state bodies will enable the movement to further contribute to society. After all, the ability of religion or spirituality to galvanize the community into action is enormous.

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Sri Sathya Sai Baba Centre (Queenstown)

Sri Sathya Sai Baba Centre (Changi) Sri Sathya Sai Baba Centre of Singapore (Everton) Sri Sathya Sai Baba Centre (Katong)

Sathya Sai Mission Sri Sathya Sai Baba Centre (Bartley)

Name of Society

17.11.97

18.7.95

9.1.82

18.7.97

2.4.97

4.12.84

Official Date of Registration

1977

1982

1985

Year of Informal Initiation Member’s House/ Sathya Sai Baba Centre Building (Moulmein) Sree Ramar Temple (Changi) 20 Everton Road/ Muneesvaran Temple (near Everton) Sai Kindergarten (Katong)/ Sri Senpaga Vinayagar Temple (Ceylon Road)/House Sri Muneeswaran Temple (Commonwealth)

Current Operating Venue(s)

Saffron Project (adopted 3 homes) Institute of Mental Health wards Chai Chee tuition projects Counselling at Changi Prison

1. Provisions for 120 needy families 2. Dinner for senior citizens during Chinese New Year 1. Seva activities at 3 homes (Sun Love Home, Tampines Home & Moral Home) 1. Counselling at Changi Prison every Sunday 2. 3 families adopted under the Narayana Seva 3. Visits to old folks’ homes during June school holidays

1. 2. 3. 1.

Seva Activities

Figures unavailable. Executive Committee: 10–12 50–60

60

20

25

Registered Membership (Approximate)

BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE SATHYA SAI BABA CENTRES IN SINGAPORE

APPENDIX 9.1

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Sri Sathya Sai Society (Singapore). Shri Sathya Sai Seva Samithi (Singapore)

1.12.92

Sathya Sai Centre (Singapore) (Moulmein Rise) Sathya Sai Centre (Singapore) (Selegie) Sri Sathya Sai Prema Nilayam Sathya Sai Seva Centre

8.11.75

23.11.96

10.10.95

22.8.95

19.11.84

Sri Sathya Sai Baba Service Centre

1967

1996

1990

1984

Sathya Sai Baba Centre Building (Moulmein)

Yoga Centre (the hall premise)

Sathya Sai Baba Centre Building (Moulmein)

Sri Krishnan Temple (Waterloo Street)

1. 6 Families adopted under Saffron Project 2. Tampines Home for the Aged 1. Seva at Sathya Sai Social Service (4S) VWO 2. Food distribution to homes monthly 3. Clinic (run under 4S) 4. Ad hoc Services (e.g. painting of old folks’ homes) 5. Saffron Project

1. Visits to the Sun Love Home

1. Social Service at Jenaris and Meranti Homes once a month 2. 2 families adopted under Saffron Project Initiative 3. Senior Citizens’ Night Dinner for 2,000 aged old folks during Chinese New Year period

continued on next page

20 Committee members

25

50

300 The Sathya Sai Baba Movement in Singapore 239

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April 2006

Sri Sathya Sai Society (Telok Blangah) Sathya Sai Central Organization (Singapore) SSCOS National University of Singapore Students’ Sathya Sai Society

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Source: Research Data (2005–06).

4.6.2002

23.11.93

31.7.97

Official Date of Registration

Sri Sathya Sai Centre (Woodlands)

Name of Society

2001

1983

1991

Year of Informal Initiation

National University of Singapore

Sri Ruthra Kaliamman Temple (Depot Road) 20 Everton Road

Sri Arasakesari Sivan Temple (Sungei Kadut Avenue)

Current Operating Venue(s) Seva Activities 1. Saffron Project (1 family) 2. Narayana Seva 3. Visits to various homes (Narayana Mission, Villa Francis Home, Bukit Batok Home) 1. Visits to homes (e.g. Adopted Sun Love Home)

APPENDIX 9.1 — cont’d

40

14

40–60 (core membership), 130–150 (registered and loose membership) 400–500

Registered Membership (Approximate)

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Notes I wish to thank the current and ex-committee members of the Sathya Sai Central Organization of Singapore (SSCOS), executive committee members, devotees and members of the various Sri Sathya Sai Baba Centres in Singapore for their enthusiasm and convivial support and assistance in the completion of this project. I also extend my appreciation to Associate Professor Vineeta Sinha for her invaluable guidance, Mr Vivakanandan Sinniah for his constructive comments and Dr Lai Ah Eng for her supportive assistance. All views expressed herein remain my sole responsibility. 1. Scholars have noted that Hinduism itself is an under-researched religion from sociological and anthropological perspectives (Arumugam 2001; Tong 1989; Wee 1989). Many of the studies of Hinduism in Singapore are dated and based on ethnographic fieldwork. See, for example, Babb (1974, 1976), Rajah (1976), Purushotam (1977), Manokara (1979) and Sinha (1987). More recent works include those by Sinha (1989, 1993, 1994, 1997, 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b). Examples of the few recent studies of neo-Hindu and reformed Hindu movements include those by Dhinagaran (1988), Khoo (1980), Menon (1983), Santhosh (1996), and Sinha (1985). Most studies on Hinduism and neo-Hinduism are unpublished academic exercises. 2. For instance, the sect of the Radha Soami Satsang as a whole does not participate in any social service activities as this is related to the belief that one can best help others by only helping oneself. It is also a “non-interfering” mode of consciousness, in that a person is responsible for only his or her own karma (defined by Hindus as the law of morality) and no one else’s (Sinha 1985, p. 40). 3. Refer to Appendix 9.1. 4. While various interpretations and accounts prevail, Kent (2005) points out that in one version he was bitten by a scorpion while according to another, he suffered an epileptic attack. He fell unconscious and remained so for several hours. After awakening, his behaviour alternated between elation and depression before he finally disclosed his divine identity. It was subsequently explained as him having left his body to rescue a devotee elsewhere (Kent 2005, pp. 37–38). 5. “Sai” is a reference term for mother, “Baba” for father and “Sathya” for truth. Santhosh (1996) writes that the word “Sai” was also used by the Bauls, a sect of mendicant devotees of Vishnu to describe “a man of supreme perfection who does not see any differentiation in the world” (Murphet 1982, p. 62). Also, “the name signifies the true union of the male and female aspects of the universe” (Bassuk 1987, p. 87) and a divine mother-father figure to his devotees (Murphet 1982, p. 62). 6. This historical person, a fakir (a term used to describe the Godhead) was revered by many Hindus and Muslims as a saint (White 1972, p. 869). Shirdi Sai Baba had declined to reveal his caste, religion or family history other than to reply “Kabir” when asked what his religion was. Kabir is the name of a wandering Hindu devotionalist saint of the fifteenth century who had professed sympathies 241

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7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

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with the Islamic Sufi tradition and had promoted harmony between Hinduism and Islam as well as other non-Hindu religions (Kent 2005, p. 39). Why was Sathya Sai Baba making this claim of reincarnation? Swallow (1982) notes that this “reincarnation status” enables Sathya Sai Baba to get access to a heritage which derives from a number of saintly and ascetic religious traditions” (Swallow 1982, p. 13). This gave him the much-needed publicity for which he did not have to build from ground level up. The Prasanthi guide states: “Darshan is a concentrated devotional experience when you are given the chance to meet pure divinity face to face. Be receptive to his message for you. Empty your mind of wavering worldly thoughts. When Bhagavan Baba passes, fill your eyes with the Godly form. Be attentive to his effect on you.” (New Straits Times, 4 May 1997). A society is defined in the Societies Act as a club, company, partnership or association of ten or more persons, whatever its nature or object, and not already registered under any other law. There should be ten or more persons in the society before it is liable for registration under the Societies Act–Registry of Societies Electronic System (ROSES). A Permanent Charter granted by Bhagawan Sri Sathya Sai Baba to the Sri Sathya Sai Organizations, at the Third World Conference (The 1981 Charter of the Sathya Sai Organization And Rules and Regulations booklet). The nine codes of conduct are: (1) Daily meditation and prayer. (2) Devotional singing/prayer (bhajans) with members of his family once per week. (3) Participation in the educational programmes conducted by the organization for children. (4) Attendance at least once per month at group devotional programmes conducted by the organization. (5) Participation in community service and other programmes of the organization. (6) Regular study of Sai literature. (7) Putting into practice the principles of “Ceiling on Desires” and utilize any savings thereby generated for the service of mankind. (8) Speaking softly and lovingly with everyone with whom he comes into contact. (9) Avoiding talking ill of others especially in their presence. The ten principles (Santhosh 1996) are as follows: (1) Treat as sacred the land in which you were born. Have patriotism to your nation but do not criticize other nations or put down others. (2) Respect all religions equally. (3) Recognize the Brotherhood of Man and treat all as brothers. Love all. (4) Keep your house and surroundings clean for this will promote hygiene and health and help you.

242

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14. 15.

16. 17.

243

(5) Practise charity, but do not encourage beggars by giving money. Provide them with food, clothing and shelter. Help them in other ways but do not encourage laziness. (6) Never give a bribe or take a bribe. Do not yield to corruption. (7) Curb envy and jealousy, expand your vision and outlook. Treat all equally regardless of caste and creed. (8) Do as much as possible by yourself though wealthy and having servants. Do service to society in person. (9) Have and cultivate love for God and fear of sin. Abhor sin. (10) Never go against the laws of the land. Follow these diligently both in word and spirit. Catering to the poor, especially the elderly, the clinic is staffed by volunteer specialists and funded by donations from devotees. Aside from a whole floor set aside for its clinic, its facilities include accommodation for overseas visitors, a library, a meditation room and a prayer hall. The clinic also has an operating theatre for minor procedures (Straits Times, 4 October 1995). The Ladies Wing and Youth Wing are two relatively new initiatives added to the existing three-wing structures both in the local and global scene. The CMIEO (Chinese, Malay, Indian, Eurasian and Others) model provides a neat categorization for the administrative management of a plural Singapore society. Classification by race is part of its baggage inherited from the British colonial administration which determined race on the basis of place of origin, language and physical characteristics such as skin colour, and which adopted the system for the convenience of census taking and other bureaucratic exercises (Purushotam 1995). Terms such as “race”, “ethnicity” and “culture” are often used interchangeably in political discourse (Benjamin 1976). In the case of Malaysia, Lee’s study (1982) revealed that the Sathya Sai Baba movement there showed an openness towards religious innovations and syncretism amongst its multi-ethnic (mainly Indians and Chinese) devotees even as it showed the presence of strong Hindu roots, and that the lower-class Indians had difficulty in assimilating with the upper middle-class Indians within the movement.

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Swallow, D. A. “Ashes and Powers: Myth, Rite and Miracle in an Indian God- Man’s Cult”. Modern Asian Studies 6, no. 10 (1982): 123–58. Thio, Li Ann. “The Secular Trumps the Sacred: Constitutional Issues Arising from Colin Chan Vs Public Prosecutor”. In Singapore, edited by Garry Rodan. Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001. Tong, Chee Kiong. Religious Conversion and Revivalism: A Study of Christianity in Singapore. Singapore: Ministry of Community Development, 1989. ———. Rationalising Religion: Religious Conversion, Revivalism and Competition in Singapore Society. Leiden: Brill, 2007. Vivakanandan, S. and Nagah Devi, R. “Hindu Temples in Charities and Social Services”. In Religious Diversity in Singapore, edited by Lai Ah Eng. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008. Weber, Max. The Religion of India: the Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism (trans.), edited by Hans H. Gerth and Don Martindale. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1958. Wee, Vivienne. Secular State, Multi-Religious Society: The Patterning of Religion in Singapore. Unpublished manuscript, 1989. White, Charles J. “The Sai Baba Movement: Approaches to the Study of Indian Saints”. Journal of Asian Studies 31, no. 4 (August 1972): 863–78. Newspaper Articles/Annual Magazines/Websites Charter of the Sathya Sai Organization and Rules and Regulations (for Overseas Countries), 1981, pp. 3–27. Hindustan Times. Sri Sathya Sai and His Mission. 23 November 2005. New Straits Times. “In the Home of Sai Baba”. 4 May 1997. Registry of Societies Electronic System (ROSES), . Sri Sathya Sai Central Council of Malaysia Publication (SSSCCM), 1996. Selected annual magazine publications. Straits Times. “Agency has Many Charity Projects”. 23 May 1998. ———. “Have Faith in Dialogue”. 16 February 2003. ———. “Singapore, Vatican to Work for Harmony among Faiths”. 1 July 2006. ———. “Specialist Free Clinic at New Sai Baba Centre to Begin Operating Next Year”. 4 October 1995. The Age. “Mediating on a Passage to India”. 22 December 2001. The Hindu. “Water Education, Need of the Hour”. 23 January 2005.

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10 THE MUSLIM RELIGIOUS ELITE OF SINGAPORE Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman

INTRODUCTION Background of the Muslim Religious Elite It is generally understood that there is no clergy in Islam. What exists is a body of religious elite called the ulama that provides leadership in matters pertaining to religious belief and practices in the Muslim community. It is maintained that their emergence is the result of social necessity as there is hardly any system of belief that does not comprise a group of individuals forming a class of the selected few whose task is to provide leadership in that aspect.1 The ulama exercise considerable influence in Muslims’ religious and cultural life. By virtue of their training in the religious sciences, they believe that they are the spiritual and intellectual custodians of Islam. Hence they define problems affecting the community which they regard as falling within the ambit of the religion. They also attempt to provide solutions based on what they consider as the divine law. Generally the Muslim community perceives the ulama as pious and the authority on everything connected with Islam. Many are revered for their devotion, concern for Muslim solidarity and propagation of the virtues of Islamic teachings and values. The ulama propagate their ideas and teachings through established religious institutions such as the madrasah. They also conduct organized religious classes, either in mosques or within the confines of private homes. 248

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Their thoughts are also disseminated via the mass media by way of regular contributions to television and radio programmes and the Internet.2 Pages or columns in the Malay daily also publish their writings at least twice a week. Their sermons and writings on Islam are sold commercially in the form of tapes and printed materials. Furthermore, they are often invited to speak at religious forums and seminars organized for the Muslim public by various Malay-Muslim organizations. Amongst them are leaders of tarikat (Arabic meaning “way”) or religious orders. Individuals and groups including Malay leaders and professionals encourage their participation in the Malay-Muslim community’s affairs over issues ranging from education to the problems of the Knowledge Based Economy (KBE).3 Moreover, they are consulted and their advice sought by members of the community on numerous matters, including family life and marital conflicts; parenting, various social problems like delinquency, drug addiction, teenage pregnancies and marriage and illnesses of sorts, to name a few.4 The ulama also provide fatwa (religious opinions) on modern issues and problems confronting the community. It is pertinent to note that the members of the religious elite are not only confined to the local ulama. In fact, Indonesian and Malaysian religious teachers are just as popular, if not more, judging by their appearances and participation in the various talks, lectures and sermons on Islam organized in Singapore. It is an over-generalization to suggest that the religious elite in the Muslim community is a homogenous entity; individuals and groups differ in some respects in their religious orientation, theological interpretations and religious opinions. Nevertheless, they are characterized by certain common factors. Essentially, they propagate a largely similar and continuous corpus of religious knowledge which includes theology, law, metaphysics and history. This is made possible by its perpetuation in the traditional religious institutions which they attend. The places where they receive religious instruction are the madrasah or theological schools and institutions of higher learning found in Muslim countries, such as Al-Azhar in Egypt. Essentially, their style of learning is characterized by the passing or transmission of knowledge through repetition, memorization and access to texts through commentaries.5 On the whole, they are not sufficiently exposed to or have sufficient grounding in modern knowledge which is predominantly a Western product. Many amongst them are also not well versed in the English language although they have a command of Arabic. Their knowledge of the modern world is derived essentially from works by Muslims themselves. They also rely heavily on translation works from Arabic or from books written in Malay.6 Their main source of livelihood is in the teaching and propagation of religion. Some also serve as religious officials in the various mosques and the religious 249

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bureaucracy, while others are engaged in trades and businesses related to the practice of religion such as the haj and umrah pilgrimages as well as halal food and other consumer products. While variations exist in their styles of thought and religious orientations, the influence of traditionalism is dominant. The traits and manifestations of traditionalism and their impact on the community’s adjustment to the demands and challenges of the contemporary world will be examined.

TRADITIONALISM AMONG THE MUSLIM RELIGIOUS ELITE As a style of religious belief, traditionalism is characterized by a deep sense of cherishment for religious traditions received from savants of the past. These traditions, derived from a selection of the vast and rich diversity of sources are deemed as the totality of traditions received. They are upheld and applied without justification for the bases of their selection, to the exclusion of other conflicting traditions on similar issues or differing constructions of similar traditions. Being the product of pious savants of the past, the entire body of these selected traditions are deemed complete, infallible and not to be questioned. If any part of these traditions is doubted, it is as if the whole body of it is at risk. Traditionalists cannot or do not care to justify what they believe, their mode of thought distinguished by a strong sense of “obligation” and of the “necessity of believing rather than what is believed” that has no place for doubt. The cognitive style of the traditionalist is one of unquestioning acceptance of authority, the implicit plea being that questions should not only be asked but thrust away under the lock and key of a trustworthy authority. Since the main concern is to keep the religious tradition intact, traditionalism is characterized by opposition or reluctance to change and is always on alert to press any attempt at innovation back into the established mould.7 Hence, traditionalism is at odds with the emphasis on reason in the search for truth and the maintenance of a critical and an inquiring spirit. It is also characterized by the overriding tendency to attach significance to literal expressions of religious teachings as developed in specific socio-historical conditions of the past, at the expense of the absolute and eternal ethical principles which underlie them.8 Traditionalism is thus perhaps one of the greatest limitations of the dominant ulama who generally subscribe to the dogma that religious traditions inherited from scholars of the past are, as a whole, absolute, immutable and binding. Accompanying this belief is the notion that these sacred traditions being complete, infallible and perfect must be guarded and preserved. But the 250

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preservation is not characterized by intellectual endeavour and reasoning. On the contrary, they depict unquestioning acceptance of traditions which, though regarded as complete, are actually a selective range within the vast and diverse body of religious traditions. In this style of thought, there is no place for attempts at distinguishing ideas or teachings which are the products of specific socio-historical epochs and their underlying universal moral and ethical principles. This conditions responses to problems which strongly reflect a tendency to be bound by the letter of religious traditions, rather than their impact on man. Given such orientation, one cannot therefore expect to see in traditionalism a deliberate striving for reform or the application of reform ideas. Because traditionalism breeds an attitude that clings more to the past for solutions than the present, it has the effect of fossilizing religious thought, rendering it incapable of adapting to the demands and needs of contemporary society. This problem has been highlighted long ago by prominent Muslim reformers. Shakib Arsalan, for instance, in his work, Our Decline and Its Causes, lashed at the blind dogmatism and obscurantism of religious traditionalists who insist on hackneyed conventions. It is they, he maintained, who obstruct suitable reforms for the improvement of society’s well-being. Because of their failure to adapt Islamic teachings to the demands of the modern world, they reduce it to a religion of other-worldly occupations and are thus responsible for the poverty and indigence of the Muslims.9

Traditionalism and Organ Donation and Transplant One stark illustration of traditionalism is reflected in the response of the dominant religious elite towards the issue of organ donation and transplant in Singapore via two fatwa passed by MUIS (Majlis Ugama Islam Singapura, the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore) in 1973 and 1988 respectively. Though fatwa, unlike law, are non-binding, they nevertheless influence thinking, behaviour and attitude of individuals. Organ donation is a novel problem never encountered by Muslims in the past. Hence, the advice and guidance of the religious elite were sought on its permissibility. The first fatwa prohibited the donation of the organs of the dead to the living who required them, whilst the second allowed for it on grounds of necessity (darura) but subject to certain pre-conditions, namely, consent of the donor’s potential beneficiaries (waris). It is pertinent to note that while the subsequent fatwa lifted the prohibition on grounds of exigency, it did not abrogate the underlying theological arguments that formed the basis for the first fatwa. This means that the rationale which sanctioned prohibition in the first fatwa remains 251

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unchanged. These responses reveal the traditionalists’ strong unwillingness to depart from a highly selective construction of specific sources of religious traditions used as justification for the fatwa. Inferring from certain selected verses of the Qur’an, hadith and fiqh, the ulama pronounced the following major grounds for prohibiting organ donation: donating one’s organ for transplant is an act of self-destruction or the infliction of pain on oneself; danger (caused by organ failures) cannot be eliminated by another danger (surgery to remove one’s organ for donation); all the organs of man constitute an amanah (responsibility) from God and therefore will be queried in the hereafter. Donating one’s organ violates this trust and assumes that man considers himself the master of them; a deceased Muslim has to be honoured by burying his body intact, respectfully without tampering any part of it.10 Traditionalism is manifested not only in the refusal to consider divergent interpretations of religious sources hinging on fundamental values of Islam, such as the sacredness of life, charity, generosity, compassion and humanity relevant to the issue, it is also revealed in the lack of concern for the moral implications of the verdict. This mode of belief implies that law is the prerogative of God and has nothing to do with the needs and problems of human beings. Decisions were made by the theologians without the benefit of adequate understanding of the facts about organ transplants and their procedures and without the engagement of expert opinions on aspects that were beyond their purview before passing the fatwa. Furthermore, the lack of effective consideration for diverse religious opinions on the issue is a further manifestation of the traits of traditionalism. Prior to the first fatwa passed by MUIS, several Muslim societies had already permitted organ donation. Yet, none of their arguments or rulings were consulted. The danger of this reactive mode is also revealed in the negative impact of the fatwa on the representation and image of the Muslim community within the context of a multi-cultural and multi-religious society urging for organ donation on humanitarian grounds. Apart from reducing the Muslims to being a passive community of receivers of organs and not their donors, it also tarnishes the image of Islam as a religion that fails to cherish essential humanitarian values and modern science beneficial to mankind.11 Traditionalism is also evident in the pre-condition for waris (guardian) and the perception of the lawful category of waris whose consent must first be obtained by individuals wishing to pledge their organs for donation in the second fatwa. This pre-condition reveals the attitude towards individual judgement based on altruism and moral values prescribed in Islamic teachings. While Islam respects and upholds the creative and spiritual vocation of the human personality and empowers man with the authority and power over all 252

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things in the universe subject to fundamental humanitarian principles, the insistence on the consent of waris as the overriding factor in validating individual decision in organ donation without justification in lieu of opposing sources and traditions is clearly revealing of traditionalism.12 Furthermore, the category of waris deemed lawful, adapted essentially from traditional Muslim law pertaining to family matters, such as marriage and inheritance, further illustrates the problem of traditionalism in contextualizing the issue and the priority accorded to literal application of law. Though the most recent amendment to the fatwa has allowed for MUIS to assume the role of waris thereby extending the category, it remains a pre-condition for organ donation.

Traditionalism and Stem Cell Research The above traits of traditionalism persist in yet another recent fatwa passed by the Fatwa Committee of MUIS on the permissibility of the use of human embryonic stem cells not more than two weeks old for purposes of research. Made in relation to the request by the Singapore Bioethics Advisory Committee for a response from the Muslim community on this permissibility, the fatwa allowed the use of embryonic stem cells for purposes of research. The basis for this fatwa is essentially theological, relying solely on two sources, namely, a juristic opinion and a tradition ascribed to Abdullah bin Mas’ud. The cited juristic opinion conveys the view that there is nothing in the syariah that regulates human embryos except when it is implanted into the womb, strongly suggesting that the matter is open ended. The cited tradition provides a theological opinion on the stages of man’s creation. According to this tradition, man is created in stages, first, in the womb of the mother for forty days, consecutively developing into a clot of blood in the next forty days, then into a piece of flesh at the end of the same period. Upon the 120th day, an angel is sent with the divine mission of granting the foetus a soul, and determining his destiny in terms of wealth, life span, misfortune or happiness. Inferring from these authorities, the Fatwa Committee ruled that a foetus less than four months old, whether existing inside or outside the womb, has not begun “life” though it survives in its specific stage of physical growth.13 These justifications reveal the traits of traditionalism that strongly condition the tendency to apply traditions of the past to resolve a contemporary novel issue without adequate consideration for all its ramifications. The tradition and juristic opinion selected in this case cannot be said to provide clarity of values for guidance strongly grounded in fundamental religious 253

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sources. It is a theological construction which strongly implies that life begins only upon the 120th day of conception. More pertinently, the traditionalist orientation is clearly reflected in the oblivion to contemporary ethical problems and dilemmas in the discourse on human embryonic stem cells confronting modern man.14 Equally pertinent, the traditionalist mode is manifested in the lack of consideration for the implications of the fatwa. The fatwa in effect positively sanctions human embryonic stem cell research for Muslims for a period that far exceeds what many other religious, secular or humanistic groups would permit, that is, not more than fourteen days, not to mention those who completely denounce such research on the grounds that life begins at the very point of fertilization. This means that while others would completely object to, or exercise an extremely cautious attitude towards such novel experimental research, the reasoning exemplified by the Fatwa Committee goes well beyond generally accepted limitations.

Religious versus Secular Knowledge The attitude of the ulama towards knowledge, characterized by a strong tendency to dichotomize it, based on a distinction between the profane, or what is commonly referred to as secular knowledge on the one hand, and religious knowledge on the other, is another illustration of traditionalism.15 Muslims are thus constantly urged to strike a balance between the two types of knowledge. Yet this dichotomy is itself a construct, as has been highlighted by Muslim reformers calling for a rightful interpretation of the idea of knowledge more than a century ago. Attacking the perception of the traditionalists, they have pointed out that for those who have studied the Koranic verses it should be obvious that the words corresponding to knowledge and wisdom occurring therein have the same sense in which they are commonly used to denote worldly knowledge as well. In fact verses of the Qur’an on this subject are more numerous than those relating to prayer and other acts of piety. Also, those with knowledge and wisdom do not refer only to people learned in subjects like prayer and fasting, but also of the rains, plants, mountains, living beings and the principles underlying their creation.16 This dichotomy is also accompanied by the attempt to rank or prioritize “spiritual” knowledge as having a more important status than “worldly” or “secular” knowledge — an opinion based on an unquestioning acceptance of selective interpretation of scholars of the past. By virtue of this belief, not only is a fundamental distinction made between knowledge of this world and that which grants man salvation in the Hereafter, traditions accorded to the 254

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Prophet Muhammad are often cited to convey this hierarchy. An example is provided by one in which the prophet is believed to have proclaimed that “those whom Allah wants to bless will be given knowledge of religious matters.”17 Such knowledge is understood as referring to “spiritual” knowledge per se. Furthermore, the dominant interpretation of the term alim (learned) to refer only to the ulama who are versed in the religious sciences is consistent with the attitude towards other types of knowledge.18 Thus, it is constantly reiterated that the fundamental knowledge which Muslims must seek is knowledge of God and his attributes, the problem of predestination, ethical principles that ought to guide his life and deeds, and the system of comprehensive laws that covers all aspects of life, that is, man’s relationship with God as well as man’s relationship with man. This knowledge is considered complete and binding and contributes towards the making of good Muslims. That which falls outside this sphere is deemed secular or worldly knowledge which, according to some, must be accepted with caution. Examples of knowledge regarded as secular include ideas and thoughts that relate to modernism, individualism, rationalism, pragmatism and socialism. Muslims are even told that these knowledge and ideologies are in conflict with Islam and should not be pursued since they will mislead them from the Truth.19 This hierarchy of knowledge has unhealthy implications for the Malay/ Muslim community. It creates ambivalences towards the assimilation and absorption of modern knowledge and hampers mastery of knowledge of man and society. It also leads to an over-emphasis on pietism and the afterlife which, as one scholar noted, has inundated the minds of the Muslims out of proportion to science, technology, economics and other aspects of modern civilization.20 The dichotomization and ranking of knowledge by prioritizing “spiritual” knowledge conditions the preoccupation of the religious elite with matters of the after-life. Sermons reveal grave concern with the theme of death and man’s preparation for the hereafter. Muslims are constantly reminded that they must seek knowledge of the hereafter if they wish to ensure their personal salvation. Such often reiterated perceptions are effectively captured in the following views of one prominent ulama: Knowledge which man possesses is taught by God whether it is knowledge of this world or the other world. Man is certainly advanced in this worldly knowledge but for the Muslims they must also possess knowledge of the afterlife in order to salvage them in the Hereafter.21

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A recent forum organized by a mosque entitled “Is it Easier for Females to Enter Heaven?” is another illustration of this fixation. Sometime in 2005, another forum with the emphasis on divine retribution was organized for the general Muslim community on the theme of “Punishment Meted to the Inmates in Hell”. Furthermore, the theme of life after death, particularly the question of the Last Day (kiamat akhirat) and issues related to it, such as divine retribution, commonly recur in the columns of the local press. An ustaz (teacher) who contributes frequently to the press even ranked life after death into several stages. He asserted that belief in life in the grave after death is an integral aspect of faith in the unseen and it is just as fundamental as the obligation of believing in heaven and hell, the angels and Judgement Day. For those who do not believe, punishment meted to them in their burial hole will indeed be so grievous that their violent screams can be heard by all creation except man.22 Some of these ulama also maintain in their sermons that it is the neglect of the questions of heaven and hell which has made the Muslims backward. Hence they lash at Muslims who fear or are more concerned with physical suffering, illiteracy, attrition, famine, poverty and material impoverishment rather than the question of Hell. The theme of the temporariness of this world as opposed to eternity, which also recurs consistently in religious sermons, is a further manifestation of this fixation.23 An extension of the theme of preparation for the hereafter constantly reiterated by the traditionalistic religious elite is the need to acquire knowledge for one’s spiritual development. This obligation has been interpreted to mean knowledge of religious injunctions, sin and blessings (dosa/pahala), the permissible and prohibited (haram/halal) and rituals, the performance of which marks one’s piety and devotion and ensures one’s personal salvation. Thus the overriding concern in discussions on modern issues such as partaking in investments or insurance schemes is sin and damnation in the hereafter.24 Similarly the problem of interest is often tackled as a theological issue, rather than as ethical issues of exploitation or oppression and whether or how these manifest in the operation of modern financial institutions. Religious sermons and writings reveal a constant preoccupation and over-emphasis on rituals. Newspaper columns and sermons particularly during the month of Ramadan remind Muslims to perform certain rituals which would multiply God’s blessings on them.25 To obtain a bigger share of the divine grace, certain types of rituals are encouraged to be performed on particular days and times of the year. The community is also inundated with a proliferation of religious classes intended to refine and purify the performance of rituals which have intensified in recent times. Hence such ceramah (talks) on themes such as “Sembahyang secara Rasullullah” (prayers according to the Prophet Muhammad) which 256

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means not merely prayers (which many Muslims are acquainted with), but its refinement according to the way in which it is believed to have been performed by Prophet Muhammad. Similarly, numerous classes are held to teach potential pilgrims the rituals associated with the haj and umrah which also emphasize a great deal of memorization of prayers. The emphasis on rituals is also manifested in the emergence of religious institutions created to train Muslims to become hafiz or, one who can memorize the Qur’an.26

Traditionalism and Reason Traditionalism is often accompanied by a general attitude of ambivalence and at times scepticism towards reason as manifested in writings touching on reason as a tool for understanding and applying religious teachings. While acknowledging the fact that akal or reason is God-given, aspersions are often cast on reason which is considered a double edged sword. For instance, in the attacks by the Fatwa Committee against Alatas for advocating the use of reason in determining new problems faced by the community in the context of the discourse on organ donation, the members of the Committee maintained that if reason was used, then all matters prohibited by religion would inevitably be allowed because reason can be used (or rather abused) by Man to justify any practice.27 Yet, while reason can be misused for negative, harmful or destructive purposes, to mistrust reason because of the possibility of its misuse by certain individuals or groups is absurd. It connotes that reason cannot be used as a basis by man to adapt his religious understanding to new or novel situations that confront him, which inevitably limits the role of religion in life. Coupled with this view is the argument constantly reiterated that Man must therefore accept religious traditions passed down to him unquestioningly, for everything that has been decided in the past is complete and infallible. Thus, in discussions on reason, the recurring message is that reason is to be applied for the purpose of remembering God and acknowledging His superiority. To the traditionalist, remembrance of God means accepting traditions and knowledge as passed down without question and that only those who do so will be granted divine blessings. This is couched in statements such as the following related by a popular ulama in his weekly column in the Malay Daily: Islam is not a dogmatic religion. All the teachings of the past can still be applied today. It is a religion relevant to all. It is consistent with reason and Allah has revealed that it is a religion which has been propagated by 257

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the earlier prophets…. By referring to the Traditions, Muslims will be saved from error and blessed with divine blessings.28

Hence he cautions Muslims not to adopt the attitude of berpandai-pandai (trying to be smart).29 Such assertions promote an orientation that hardly leaves any scope for critical thinking. They convey the perception that Islam reveals all truth, and knowledge of this truth takes the form of a “completed tradition” to which there could not be any meaningful addition. In this way, the claim of the Qur’an that Islam is complete is taken to mean in fact the completion of all truth. Thus, any such attempt to interpret Islamic teachings to novel situations or ideas is seen to be a deviation from the right path, or a heresy. In this way, knowledge becomes perceived not as advancement from the known to the unknown. In fact, the traditionalistic mould as illustrated in the above comments assumes that there is nothing new in the modern world which has not been already anticipated in the past. It is as if society is a closed system in which anything novel can be tackled by referring to determinations in the past.30 It is also implied in the reasoning that new ideas or thought cannot bring about betterment of society because the knowledge of the illustrious scholars of the past is perfect. It then becomes the duty of all right-minded persons to resist these innovations. This identification of the use of reason to deal with novel situations, which is seen as potentially harmful to Godgiven knowledge, seems to be a natural result of the illusion of finality. Man is therefore not to contextualize his religion in light of the problems of his age. This attitude is woven into the belief of the “hierarchy of authority” found amongst the religious elite. By virtue of this dogma, the scholars and religious personalities of the past are always regarded as superior in terms of their knowledge and understanding of religion compared to those of the present. For the traditionalistic religious elite, this means a continuous regression back into their glorious history in which constant mention is made of theologians and philosophers like Al Ghazali or Ibn Taimiyyah. The contributions of these scholars are undoubted. However with traditionalism, this regard for past legacy is out of proportion to the appreciation of contemporary scholars who have contributed in their diverse fields towards the advancement of humanity. This impedes efforts at nurturing and developing contemporary thinkers and philosophers grounded in modern knowledge relevant to contemporary problems.31 Though perhaps unintended, such constant alluding to these constructs undermines the role of reason and experience from the world of man. It 258

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obstructs a Muslim’s ability to understand his religion and his creator better. Doubts cast upon reason will open the door to fanaticism, unquestioning loyalty to authority and irrationality. As one scholar maintains: It is reason which seeks to apply religion in a historical context taking into consideration various actual demands and concrete problems. Without the use of reason, man would be limiting his wisdom and application of religion. When religion is kept out of many important areas of life, through abandonment of reason, the vacuum is quickly filled by other types of thinking inimical to unity and harmony. It is due to the failure of man to effectively incorporate religious values and thinking into his social organization and institutions that the field is left open to philosophies conducive to violence and radicalism. When religion fails to influence society in its social life, individualism, nihilism, relativism and unbridled materialism will take root. Without the influence of religion man’s mental equilibrium is upset and he is quick to transfer his loyalties to destructive forces in society.32

The neglect of reason can thus bring about the disastrous consequence of not only a shrinking of the intellectual horizon of the community but also the impoverishment of its spiritual life. With its insistence on the unquestioning approach to religion, traditionalism is at odds with the conception of man as a rational and morally responsible being with a value by himself. Passages in the Qur’an that deal with the human situation describe the ultimate dignity of man as the vicegerent of God. The Qur’anic vision of man encourages him to use his reason as an instrument of self liberation and self realization.33 These elements of religious humanism based on reason surrounding the notion of man are, however, not shared by the traditionalists whose dominant view of man as portrayed in their writings is one who is a weak victim of his natural surroundings, constantly threatened by his passion, temptations and pleasures of the flesh. His worst enemy, so says a prominent religious leader, is Satan, whose sole aim is to weaken man and lead him astray, thus constantly plaguing him with evil desires that seek to deviate him from the right path.34 Sermons focus on his weaknesses giving rise to disobedience, destructive tendencies, ungratefulness and arrogance in human history.35 This notion of the limitation of man is reinforced by comparing him to other creations. For instance, one prominent ulama whose thoughts are regularly featured in newspaper columns maintains that man is “such an insignificant being who can hardly feel the earth’s constant rotation and movement”. As a creation of the Almighty he is extremely weak and is compared to that of “an ant below the foot of an 259

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elephant”. Furthermore, the acknowledgement of man’s dynamism is often equated with belittling the omnipotence of God. Thus man is constantly reminded to use his reason to acknowledge God’s greatness at all times.36 Such consistently repeated messages have the effect of clouding the significance and dynamism of the individual. One can hardly expect serious reform ideas to arise if such perceptions of man and reason are often espoused to reinforce the completeness and infallibility of tradition. It also breeds the negative effect of minimizing the importance of developing the individual personality as a force in the process of socio-historical development. It is not doubted that every change in society is preceded by individuals or groups of people who embody and assimilate the ideal values which they desire to develop, whether in the realm of morality or in other spheres of the development of society. However, the constant negative devaluation of man at the expense of emphasizing his positive attributes hampers the cultivation of this progressive spirit.

TRADITIONALISM AND PROBLEMS OF THE MODERN WORLD More recently, the dominant ulama have attempted to deal with issues which fall outside the traditional matters of their concern such as ethics, rituals, morality and devotion.37 They have proceeded to tackle problems of the modern world, including economic and political systems as well as modern knowledge and social problems. One reason that accounts for this extension of focus is possibly the expectation and demand for their guidance and direction on modern issues and problems confronting the community. For example, in economic matters, prominent members of the religious elite have been appointed to committees and boards that provide advice pertaining to the legitimacy of modern investments and economic schemes for the growing number of Malay investors who wish to partake in or manage such ventures. However, even in dealing with these novel issues, the solutions they offer reveal the predominance of traditionalism. Such solutions are mainly characterized by the consistent attempts at regressing into the past to confront the developments of the modern world. For instance, in response to the issue of KBE, a very prominent ustaz wrote to the Malay press asserting that Muslims already possess a more comprehensive and spiritually superior system, which he calls the “Islamic Based Economy” (IBE). He maintains that KBE is not only a small part of IBE, it may also not be totally compatible with it. In his opinion, IBE which had been established since the founding of Islam, is developing slowly for lack of opportunities due to the secular nature of the 260

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state. He also urged the community to look into IBE as the way to development, citing that Islamic insurance or takaful and Islamic banking are compatible with IBE.38 Sharing this view was another prominent religious leader who maintained that KBE is not novel since Islam consistently emphasized the importance of seeking knowledge. He also cautioned Muslims not to confuse KBE with the attainment of economic goals per se. The Muslims, he maintained, must view it as a programme for the development of the character of man according to his fitrah (nature). Failure to recognize this would lead to decadence that corrupts society, such as the glorification of materialism as exemplified by Western culture.39 Such understanding of contemporary economics as manifested in the above reactions reveal a more fundamental and pervasive limitation, namely, the unfamiliarity of these ulama with Western or modern knowledge. This handicap deprives them of a good grasp of contemporary thought and experiences that are taking place in the world today. It also impedes them from accessing and assimilating the contributions of modern knowledge and the broad currents of contemporary ideas pertaining to the problems of the modern world. Furthermore, the difficulties in capturing the variety of opinions expressed on a particular issue or problem on various subjects found in the thought and scholarship of contemporary thinkers reinforce the problem. The problem arises when they attempt to diagnose the issues of the modern world which extends beyond their traditional areas of their expertise.

The New Muslim Traditionalists The problem is aggravated when these ulama consume ideas of the new breed of Muslims traditionalists who assume expertise in both Islam and modern knowledge. They write on topics as diverse as government and politics, modern economy, globalization, poverty and development, all according to their notion of an Islamic perspective. Their concerns and perspectives on modernity and its impact impress some quarters as relevant to the cultural life and progress of the Muslim community. Included within this group are academics, graduate students, journalists and activists who are the products of Western-styled universities where they pursue Islamic studies as well as disciplines such as economics and political science. Some examples of the institutions of learning where they are trained include international Islamic universities in the region as well as in the West. They do not possess the religious influence and legitimacy of the traditional ulama, nor are they exposed to or trained in traditional religious sciences like law (fiqh) or theology. In these areas, they generally share the opinions and authority of the 261

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traditional ulama. However, they write and deliver lectures on themes which differ fundamentally from the latter. These include what they call the Islamic economic system, Islamic investment and banking, Islamization of knowledge, Islamic government and politics or siyasa, and secularism. The thrust of their thinking is that modern knowledge and systems differ fundamentally from what they perceive as Islamic ones, thereby establishing dichotomies and even conflicts between the two. Their concerns and perspective echo the views of a larger movement of Muslim academics and activists who are sceptical of Westernization, secularism and science in the name of Islam and whose works are characterized by the belief in the lost utopia, a golden past superior to other epochs of history.40 The fact that their writings are given space in the media and that they are invited to speak at forums, workshops or lectures organized by the various Malay-Muslim organizations point to their growing popularity. Unlike the dominant traditionalist religious elite however, this group does not command broad-based support and following here. However, the ulama’s lack of familiarity with Western thought and modern knowledge results in the tendency to acknowledge the ideas of this emerging group as the beacon for guidance on issues of Islam and the modern world. Although the new group deals with modern issues, their thinking reveals a variant of traditionalism. In their attempt to refer to the past for solutions to present problems, they share a similar orientation with the ulama. However, unlike the latter, they utilize the labels and terminologies of modern systems or concepts, interweaving them into their construction of an Islamic past with the overriding aim of demonstrating that not only was a concept, principle, knowledge or institution found back then, they are also more superior to the present. However, far from being intellectual in terms of their insights, reasoning and perspective, their arguments are generally rhetorical. Apart from the simplistic and selective attempt to create fundamental differences or dichotomies between what they perceive as the Western secular systems and Islam, this group also evaluate the former to be devoid of spirituality while the latter is considered morally and ethically superior. Illustrations of their views are found in the regular contributions to the Malay press in which they allege that an Islamic state had emerged during the era of the Prophet Muhammad, governed by a comprehensive system of laws and many other matters pertaining to government and politics. In all these contributions, the overriding intention is also to show that these laws and institutions are superior to existing ones based on the Western model in terms of their humanitarian ideals and values. That the West is seen to be a latecomer to arbitration or mediation in the settlement of disputes and that the 262

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principles underlying the United Nations Charter, for instance, have been predated by the principles found in the Medina “Constitution”, are some instances of the type of evaluation found in these writings.41 This group also dabbles in Islamizing knowledge, economics and systems. Their writings deal with issues which they maintain have been spearheaded and worked out clearly and comprehensively 1,400 years ago. These include the question of price determination, principles underlying insurance (takaful) and contract, the concepts of productivity and value add, research and development, and as a recent addition to this long list of economic themes, globalization. They discuss these issues rhetorically, weaving into them the questions of man’s spiritual nature and moral reform. Writing in the local Malay daily, they invoke tenth century Muslim philosophers and theologians such as al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah for which they transpose modern economic terminologies. They even evaluate their opinions as being superior to modern economic principles and theories, since not only the material aspects of development but also the spiritual needs of man are taken into consideration. Their overriding intention is to prove that Islam has provided a system that is perfect and applicable for all times, and that the whole body of knowledge called modern economics, for instance, is inadequate, faulty and limited in terms of its goals.42 This preoccupation with the past shrouds the sense of relevance of issues that renders these writers’ discourse ahistorical. For instance, we find littered in their present day discourse, theological debates pertaining to the permissibility of residing in a non-Muslim country, holding positions in a non-Islamic government and working with a “non-pious” government. On such issues, they dabble at length into traditions, verses of the Qur’an and historical examples which they select and apply as if these historical problems and choices that confronted the early believers of the seventh century Muslims are applicable to the Singaporean Muslim community today regardless of its cultural and historical experiences. Thus Muslims, whose religious life in Singapore have been characterized by its long history of adaptation to and acceptance of the institutions of the state and society, are urged to opt for peace and tolerance as the bases of relations with others, as these are the “original basis of relationship” with non-Muslims in Islamic history. Similarly, they delve into juristic classifications of countries into Darul Islam, Darul Harbi (territory of war or inhabited by non-Muslims and governed by those who have declared war on Muslims) and Darul Aman (territory with peace accord with an Islamic state) found in the tenth century or earlier period of Islamic history, dabbling in conflicting juristic views and resolutions for 263

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Singapore’s Muslims since they claim these issues “may shape how Muslims evaluate and relate to the countries where they are staying”. Although they themselves do not subscribe to these classifications, they nevertheless import them at length and take pains at explaining them away by offering justifications, including theological ones.43 The fact that these issues are irrelevant to the Muslim community of Singapore, who have originated from this region and who have all along accepted the sovereignty of the state and its institutions, are hardly considered in the discourse. In consuming the views churned out by this new group of Muslims, the religious elite reinforce their own traditionalistic outlook. This is illustrated, for instance, in an article by a prominent religious leader on the topic of the differences between Western government and Islam.44 Here, Machiavelli is taken to represent Western political thought. Based on their reading of his thought, the ulama concluded that in Western political thought the sole aim of politics is to establish and entrench power and ideological interests. Furthermore, any means including fabrication or deception can be employed to justify that goal. This form of politics is said to be in conflict with Islamic political thought which is based on the belief in God and ethical principles, such as consensus, justice and the appointment of good rulers distinguished by their sound knowledge, temperance and faith. Coming from an ulama, the reference to Machiavelli and perceptions of the modern political system is indeed novel and is revealing of its source.45 This scepticism towards modern institutions and the strong tendency to transpose Muslims back to the past has serious implications for the community. It ignores the complexities of society spanning several centuries and man’s contributions to it in terms of the evolution of concepts, ideas and institutions in dealing with the problems of his age. In short, it obliterates completely the different periods of historical time and man’s life struggles and contributions within these. The result is not only an erroneous understanding of problems but also a sense of indifference to history and society. While the past is reconstructed in a highly selective manner, the present contributions of man are not only misunderstood or ignored; they are also devalued. The influence of such ideas can breed an attitude of distrust and scepticism towards existing ideas and institutions, and creates ambivalences and contradictions towards the assimilation of contemporary ideas and constructive works. It conditions Muslims to take a back seat or, worse still, regress into the past while other societies are at the forefront of development. For after all, why should Muslims participate in developing this world by seriously engaging in constructive reforms when the past has shed clearer light and universal solutions relevant for all times to overcome man’s existential problems? 264

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Traditionalism and Politics It is pertinent to note that even though utopian mentality hinged on the superiority of the golden past with all its ideal institutions is, in some instances, accompanied by activist ideology aimed at transforming the actual world so as to cure it of its ills, this trend is absent in the local context. There is no indication of such orientation with specific political goals or strategies devised to take power and authority away from the state amongst the religious elite or those they refer to for ideas on the modern world. In this context, the new traditionalists with a passion for the golden past are devoid of that machinery or objective. Those who echo the claims of an Islamic state or economic system are not in the pursuit of establishing an alternative divine order on earth. They do not seek to wrest control or contest for political power within the state, nor is it in their agenda to espouse a radical transformation of existing society for an alternative based on Islam, as is the case with some Islamist parties or movements in the Muslim world. On the whole, they are content to confine their influence to traditional religious institutions within the state.46 Their perception of the rights and position of Muslims within the context of Singapore is a clear illustration of their apolitical stance. They perceive their role largely as ensuring the creation of responsible Muslim leadership to administer and manage the religious life of the community. This is confined to teaching religious rituals, administering charity (helping the weak and indigent), managing wakaf (endowments), zakat, (charity), baitulmal (common fund), haj matters, determining the beginning of fasting and Hari Raya and other religious obligations of the Muslims. Their standpoint as reflected in their writings is that so long as Muslims can practice their faith freely without having to compromise their belief in the fundamentals of Islam, they are content.47 This stance is also clearly reflected in the thought of the Singapore Islamic Scholars and Religious Teachers Association (PERGAS) on issues such as secularism, the Islamic state and the application and implementation of the syariah. Though views on these issues posit radical rhetorical differences between existing institutions and Islamic ones, and though they maintain that Islam is a “comprehensive religion” touching all aspects of life — government and the people, the state and land, justice and law, knowledge, production of wealth, morals, ideology, ibadah (worship) (which implies that Muslims must necessarily reject in principle the secular state) — they nevertheless utilize theological justification for exemption (rukhsah). According to them, given the non-ideal situations confronted by Muslims as a minority 265

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which renders the practice of “Islam in totality” impossible, acceptance of the status quo is advocated. This is particularly so since, in their opinion, “freedom of religion is guaranteed” in Singapore and “secularism is in the form of a neutral government that does not take the side of any religion in order to ensure inter-racial harmony”. Similarly, while they rhetorically essentialise the “Islamic state”, they accept the notion that the “Islamic state” differs little from the modern system of governance prevalent today. Furthermore, though they assert that “democracy” differs from “syura” (consensus) in terms of the extent of powers given to the people (in the latter system, people can only make laws that have not been determined and not in contradiction to the Qur’an and traditions), they nevertheless accept parliamentary democracy since it fulfils the conditions of “consensus”. Moreover, while upholding hudud (laws on punishment) and its implementation as religious obligations and hence compulsory for Muslims, they subscribe to the view that being a minority in Singapore, Islam excludes them from this obligation. Their stance on these various issues reveals traits of traditionalism in the sense that they dogmatically rely on selective religious opinions of pious savants of the past and assume finality of their views in principle. They uphold these authorities of the past but abstain from applying them due to political realities.48 The response of traditional religious elites to the issue of wearing the tudung (headscarf ) in schools is another clear example of their apolitical stance. The fatwa passed by MUIS is clear on the point that wearing the tudung is a matter of religious obligation for girls who have attained puberty, but seeking knowledge and education is a fundamental obligation and should a conflict arise, the priority of the Muslim is towards the latter. The fact that tudung for girls in schools has never been an issue for contention amongst Muslims all these years renders support to their stance although they subscribe to the belief that the tudung is wajib or obligatory for Muslim girls.49 Clearly, members of the dominant religious elite were not in support of a confrontational approach on the issue. That the religious elite embrace support for and cooperation with political leadership is also obvious in their recent response to the arrests of the suspects of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). In fact, PERGAS and other religious groups, in condemning terrorist activities in the name of Islam, have expressed unanimous support to the call by Malay leaders for greater supervision and checks over religious teachers. MUIS’ objective of devising and planning a system of appointment and recognition of religious teachers towards this end is met with their strong approval and support.50 Such a 266

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response is yet another manifestation of the long-standing close cooperation and non-confrontational relationship which characterizes the religious elites’ relationship with political authority. While there is clearly acceptance of the sovereignty of the state and its institutions, the constant emphasis on the implicit dichotomy between “Islamic” systems and institutions and existing “secular” ones can breed an attitude of ambivalence towards the latter. Reiterating demarcations and differences between these is not completely conducive towards promoting a positive stake in existing institutions and collaborating towards their development that is beneficial to all. For instance, insisting that theologically hudud, though compulsory for Muslims to implement, can take a back seat in view of political realities, not only belies an attitude that punishment legalized by the state is not consistent with Islamic principles of justice, it also conditions a passive attitude towards these laws. Such attitude can hinder Muslims not only from being at ease with existing institutions but from contributing effectively to their development.

LEGITIMIZATION OF TRADITIONAL RELIGIOUS ELITES While the above examples show that the religious elite in Singapore is apolitical, it is maintained that their overriding ideological quest is recognition as the experts and authority on Islam and, more recently, on modern issues and knowledge affecting the Muslim community.51 Within these areas, they consciously protect their interest as the guardians of Islam vis-à-vis other groups within the Muslim community. Utilizing traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, such as the one that proclaims that “the ulama are the heirs of the prophets”, the religious elite confer upon themselves the status of guardians of religion. Insulting or belittling the ulama is tantamount to “insulting or belittling the Prophet Muhammad”.52 Their response to the call by the government for moderates within the Muslim community to speak up against terrorism provides another window for traditional elites’ conscious attempt to protect and guard their status as the spokesman for Islam. Hence, members identify themselves as “moderates” and also maintain that only they can represent the authentic Islam and protect it against the onslaught of potent contemporary challenges, namely the influence of “alien” ideologies and worldviews harmful to it. Heuristically, this is conveyed by lashing at the “insignificant” impact made by others outside their circle in alleviating this challenge, as conveyed by the following assertion of PERGAS: 267

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Thus far efforts to counteract such false understanding (of Islam) did not have significant impact, because they were made by individuals whom certain detesting parties do not accept as representing a unified stand from Muslim groups. This is especially so when the efforts do not come from the scholars and religious elite. (PERGAS, 2004, p. xxix)

Those outside the group who attempt to speak about Islam are criticized as “voices that may lack proper knowledge of Islam”.53 Because they have been celebrated instead as a proponent of the true teachings of Islam, misrepresentations of the religion remain rife. The emphasis on the overriding necessity for collective opinion on matters of Islam over views expressed individually provides yet another example. It is intended that within this collectivity, their status as guardians of truth is reinforced as it is they the ulama who will assume the role as spokesman on Islam. In this respect, their selection and construction of traditions pertaining to the significance of jemaah (community of believers), has the effect of conferring upon them authority on Islam, since the jemaah is perceived by them, to refer to the ulama whom, as they maintained, “Allah has guaranteed will not all collaborate to engage in error”. Hence, they insist on “moulding an integrated community and yet preserve diversity of views” through a collective articulation of Islam. Religious traditions are selectively utilized to convey the importance of unity of the community of believers (jemaah) and the present moment for the Muslim ummah (community) to live as in a jemaah, since they argue that the biggest problems and misfortune of the Muslim ummah is disunity, which accounts for Muslims’ low social, economic and political standing.54 This selection and construction of traditions that denounces individualism and the unwillingness to accept or deal with diversity of views expressed by individuals in their own right is consistent with the traits of traditionalism. Insistence on the overriding importance of collective opinion through a selective interpretation of the jemaah traditions is taken as representing the Islamic position, without need for justification or reference to other religious sources that emphasise principles of individual morality and accountability for one’s own thought, deeds and actions. Response to changes perceived as threatening their interest provides further evidence of the traditional elites’ concern to guard their position as custodians of religion. The protest over the appointment of a Western-trained judge as the president of the Shariah Court sometime in 1992 is illustrative of this view. Utilizing the Malay media and the mosque, a prominent religious leader expressed his unreserved grievance, arguing vehemently that the Shariah 268

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Court as a religious institution which administers God’s laws should not be headed by one who has neither the expertise nor knowledge of the syariah (Laws). Verses from the Qur’an and hadith were invoked as warning to the community that misfortune will befall on those who are led by the ignorant, that is, those without knowledge of the laws and the religion.55 Recent issues pertaining to the madrasah and compulsory education and the wearing of the tudung in schools also offer stark examples. The religious elite’s reaction was to some extent precipitated by what they perceived as the interference of Malay political leaders in their traditional domain of authority. In other words, Malay political leaders were viewed as attempting to usurp their role as the key advisors to the government on matters pertaining to the religious life of the community which they consider themselves the custodians of. Thus, in the statement on their stand on the tudung issue, PERGAS stressed that whatever statements relating to religious rulings concerning the Muslim community should only be made by those qualified in this field.56 By implication, PERGAS is of the view that only religious leaders have the right to speak on Islam. Outside this domain, they have never challenged or contested the Malay political leaders’ opinions or authority. On the issue of madrasah and compulsory education,57 the dominant religious elite did not challenge the government’s concern for compulsory education and national integration. The emotional outbursts directed against the Malay political leaders who had spearheaded the discussion and suggested possible alternatives to the madrasah were more likely to have been motivated by what is perceived as an attempt to override the ulama’s role. This explains the accusations directed at the Malay political leaders who were criticized for speaking on an area of Islamic education of which they have no expertise in. The remarks made by religious officials to the then Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong are also telling of their wish to be the ones who should be consulted on this matter. As a prominent religious leader from PERGAS asserted: On hindsight we sympathize with Mr. Goh for being disadvantaged in not getting the full and clear picture of the madrasah issue directly from us and other Islamic organizations. With his suggestion of setting some kind of standard, it now becomes the duty of this Muslim community to discuss the future of the madrasah rationally and responsibly.58

In fact, from the very beginning PERGAS had maintained that it was committed to work with the government on the issue. It even suggested the possibility of twinning the madrasah with nearby government schools for 269

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common subjects to prevent closure of the institutions. It was clear that when they were subsequently consulted, dissatisfaction and grievances eased. Thus, though the decision of the government was to allow only those madrasah that satisfied the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE) benchmark to continue to exist (which clearly implied the possibility of closure of some of them), the religious elite was agreeable and expressed their satisfaction with the decision. Their reaction reveals attempts at retaining their traditional authority, even if it meant making fundamental changes to the madrasah which have long served as a base for the perpetuation of the religious elite’s influence and authority within the Muslim community.

CONCLUSION This chapter has examined traditionalism as a dominant style of religious belief of the Muslim religious elite in Singapore. It is not intended to be an exhaustive appraisal of the ulama’s ideas and views or the diversity of orientations amongst them which is certainly beyond the scope of the chapter. Probing into the style and aspects of religious belief in concrete issues allows us to understand the selection and persistence of certain ideas and issues that engage the Muslim religious elite, and how these condition their responses to the challenges of the modern world.

Notes All views expressed herein remain the sole responsibility of the author. 1. Alatas (1954). “Some Problems of Leadership in Islamic Societies”. 2. See, for instance, . 3. For instance, at the Knowledge Based Convention in 1999, the ulamas were invited to join in all except one working committee and to provide recommendations. 4. See, for instance, a prominent religious teacher’s advice to Muslim counsellors in Berita Harian, 20 April 2001. 5. Some of the problems of the mode of traditional learning in religious schools have been highlighted by Hoodbhoy (1992, pp. 123–26). Refer also to Azhar Ibrahim’s article in Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman and Lai Ah Eng (2006, Ch. 4). 6. Some of these traits have been highlighted by Alatas (1954) and which remains applicable today. 7. Towler (1984, Ch. 2). 8. These traits opposed to traditionalism are consistent with modernization discussed by Alatas (1972, Ch. 2). 9. Arsalan (1944, pp. 68–69). 10. Alatas (1974, pp. 10–14). 270

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11. For a good discussion of contrary views, refer to Alatas (1974, p. 37) and Moulavi M. H. Babu Sahib (1991). 12. For a discussion on the right of the individual in organ donation, refer to Moulavi MH Babu Sahib (1999, pp. 32–35). 13. MUIS fatwa. 14. Some of these ethical concerns and issues are discussed in Transcripts of the Presidential Council on Bioethics in . 15. A good example of this dichotomy is found in MUIS, Friday Sermon: Islam the Official Religion of Allah, 29 June 2001. 16. Arsalan (1944, pp. 85–89). Refer also to Alatas (1976, pp. 63–67). 17. MUIS, Friday Sermon, 29 June 2001. 18. Harun Din (1977, pp. 147–48). Refer to the criticism of this view of the term alim by S. H. Alatas in Berita Minggu, 23 June 2002. 19. See, for instance, the views of Harun Din (1977, pp. 167–58). 20. Alatas (1977, p. 83) 21. Berita Minggu, 23 June 2002. 22. Berita Harian, 13 July 2001. 23. The Muhammadiyah Association. Friday Sermon: A Balanced Islamic Community, 13 September 2002. Also see MUIS, Friday Sermon: Balancing Duniya and the Akhirat, 28 December 2001. 24. Berita Minggu, 30 June 2002. 25. Berita Harian, 1 December 2001. 26. See the report in Berita Harian, 30 April 1999, 2 January 2000. 27. Alatas (1974, p. 40). 28. Berita Harian, 21 March 1999, 23 June 2002. 29. Ibid. 30. See, for instance, the argument of Khundmiri, Alam (2001, p. 48). 31. Alatas (1979, pp. 86–89). 32. Maaruf (1980, pp. 52–58). 33. See the discussion on this theme by Khundmiri (2001, pp. 58–59). Refer also to Rahman (1989, Ch. 2). 34. Berita Harian, 4 January 2002. 35. MUIS, Friday Sermon: From Strength to Weakness: The Cycle of Life, 18 May 2001. 36. Berita Harian, 21 March 1999. 37. Some of their major concerns are surmised in MUIS, Friday Sermon: The Characteristics of A Successful Person, 24 August 2001. 38. Berita Harian, 5 March 1999. 39. Berita Harian, 28 February 1999. Refer also to article on 5 August 1999. 40. For a substantive discussion of such writings, refer to Tibi (1998). For a portrayal of some of this style of thought, refer to Maaruf (2001, Ch. 6). 41. Berita Harian, 3 May 2002; 19 April 2002; 10 May 2002; 6 July 2002; 23 and 30 August 2002; 6 and 13 September 2002. 42. For some examples, refer to Berita Harian, 12 October 2001; 2 November 2001; 271

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43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

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4, 11, 18 and 25 January 2002; 1 February 2002; 8, 15, 22 March 2002; 5 April 2002; 3, 17 and 31 May 2002; 7 and 14 June 2002; and 28 September 2002. PERGAS (2004, pp. 185–257). Berita Harian, 26 January 2001. See, for instance, the view of Mutalib (2001). PERGAS (2004, pp. 91–179). See also MUIS, Friday Sermon, 18 October 2002. Refer, for instance, the article by Semait (1991, pp. 10–14). PERGAS (2004, pp. 104–28). See, for instance, the position of PERGAS in . 8 January 2002. . 22 January 2002. MUIS. Friday Sermon, 21 April 2000. MUIS. Friday Sermon, 31 August 2001. PERGAS (2004, p. xxix). PERGAS (2004, p. 292). Berita Harian, 6 November 1992. PERGAS (2004, p. 347). For details, see various chapters in Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman and Lai Ah Eng, eds., Secularism and Spirituality. See Straits Times, 6 May 2000.

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Khundmiri, Alam. Secularism and Modernity. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2001. Maaruf, Shaharuddin. “Negative Attitudes towards Religion”. In One God, Many Paths. KL: Aliran, 1980, pp. 52–58. ———. “The Social Sciences in South East Asia: Sociology of Anti-Sociology and Alienated Social Sciences”. In Reflections on Alternative Discourses from SEA: Proceedings of the ISA Regional Conference from Southeast Asia, edited by Syed Farid Alatas. Singapore: Centre for Advanced Study and Pagesetters Services, 2001, pp. 88–103. Mernissi, Fatima. The Veil and the Male Elite. New York: Basic Books, 1991. Moulavi M. H. Babu Sahib. The Islamic Point of View on Transplantation of Organs. Singapore: Yusuf Publications, 1991. MUIS. Friday Sermon: From Strength to Weakness: The Cycle of Life. 18 May 2001. ———. Friday Sermon: Islam the Official Religion of Allah. 29 June 2001. ———. Friday Sermon: The Saviours of Our Ummah-Our Ulama. 21 April 2000. ———. Friday Sermon: The Contributions from Ulama. 31 August 2001. ———. Friday Sermon: Hudud Dalam Islam. 18 October 2002. ———. Friday Sermon: The Characteristics of A Successful Person. 24 August 2001. ———. Friday Sermon: Balancing Duniya and the Akhirat. 28 December 2001. Muhammadiyah Association. Friday Sermon: A Balanced Islamic Community. 13 September 2002. Mutalib, Hussin. “Misperceptions of lslam and the Muslims: Making Sense of the Jaundiced Views of Westerners”. In The Past in Our Future: Challenges Facing Muslims in the 21st Century. Singapore: Fount, National University of Singapore Muslim Society, 2001. Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman and Lai Ah Eng, eds. Secularism and Spirituality: Seeking Integrated Knowledge and Success in Madrasah Education in Singapore. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2006. PERGAS. Statement. Singapore: PERGAS, 2004, pp. 91–179. PERGAS. Statement. . 22 January 2002. PERGAS. Statement. . 8 January 2002. Presidential Council on Bioethics. Access to discussions on varied issues on stem cell research. . Rahman, Fazlur. Major Themes of the Quran. KL: Islamic Book Trust, 1989. Semait, Syed Isa. “Amalan Islam Dalam Sebuah Negara Sekular”. Working Paper no. 2, 1990/91. Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore, 1991. Straits Times. “Pergas Grateful for PM’s Assurance”. 6 May 2000. Tibi, Bassam. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Order and the New Islamic World. London: University of California Press, 1998. Towler, Robert. The Need for Certainty: A Sociological Study of Conventional Religion. London: Routledge, 1984.

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11 THE EVOLUTION OF THE SIKH IDENTITY IN SINGAPORE Arunajeet Kaur

INTRODUCTION Sikhs are a minority ethnic community in Singapore, making up 7,000– 12,000 out of the four million total population of Singapore.1 They are a visible community in Singapore due to their unique physical appearance and established places of Sikh worship known as gurdwaras. However, like many other Sikh communities within the larger Sikh diaspora, the Sikhs in Singapore are in constant negotiation between their identity as Sikhs and their integration into the social cultural mainstream of Singapore. The label “Sikh” is a religious one. It denotes a people who originated from Punjab and who adhere to the spiritual teachings of the Sikh gurus. The Sikhs portray a sense of homogeneity as a community because of their unique appearance in which the men wear turbans by requirement and because of the institutionalization of their religious practices. The Sikhs adhere to established standards of an ideal Sikh, which are encoded in rules regarding conduct known as Rehat Meryadas. These codes of conduct are upheld by religious authorities in Amritsar, Punjab, such as the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak Committee (SGPC) that advises and attempts to represent the accepted consensus on Sikh religious practices and the management of Sikh places of worship worldwide. However, in the actual practice of Sikhism, particularly amongst the Sikhs residing outside of Punjab, there is a great divergence from the ideals proselytized by the Sikh religious authorities in the Punjab. This 275

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divergence reveals the Sikhs to be far from homogenous and as a community that is fraught with divisions. Although the Sikhs who endeavour to maintain the ideals as promulgated by the seats of religious authority in the Punjab may be in control of gurdwara management committees and main Sikh organizations, they tend to be in the minority in the case of Singapore. This chapter aims to analyse the gap between the prescribed Sikh identity as advocated by the seats of Sikh religious authorities in the Punjab and disseminated by local Sikh institutions in Singapore and the actual reality in the practice of the Sikh faith. It seeks to answer two questions: (1) How do those who identify themselves as Sikhs relate to the religion as it is practised in the gurdwaras in Singapore? (2) To what extent are Sikhs in Singapore able to practise Sikhism as advocated by the Sikh religious authorities in Punjab?

RESEARCH ON SIKHS IN SINGAPORE The Sikhs in Singapore have been actively researched and documented. Soam Datt, in his work, A Sikh Community in Singapore, highlights that despite the egalitarian ideals of the Sikh faith, the Singaporean Sikh community is divided along caste and class lines which were a reflection of the hierarchical structures inherited as part of an original Punjabi cultural identity.2 Bibijan Ibrahim further explores these caste, class and factional divisions, in particular, the sharp division between the Jats (land owning Sikhs) and the Mazhabis or Chura (similar to the untouchable caste). Another notable source of the divide amongst the Sikhs was the rivalry amongst the Majha, Malwa and Doaba Sikhs. This phenomenon occurred as result of the tendencies of the early Sikh migrants to congregate with kinsmen from specific geographical locations in the Punjab, who were from the Majha, Malwa and the Doab regions.3 Seva Singh Gandharab documents the history of the early Sikh pioneers.4 Tan Tai Yong’s Singapore Khalsa Association5 as well as Iqbal Singh Sevea’s research The Evolution of the Sikh Religious Institutions of Singapore both provide detailed narratives of the development of Sikh institutions of Singapore. Iqbal Singh Sevea6 describes the establishment and development of Sikh gurdwaras along the lines of caste and factional differentiations and analyses the reasons behind the emergence of seven gurdwaras in Singapore catering to the needs of a population of only 12,000. This situation was a result of rivalries amongst the various Sikh factions that caused the initial Sikh organizations and places of worship to splinter, leading to the creation of the 276

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current seven venues of worship. Satvinder Singh expands on this in his research, Sikh Organizations and Sikh Identity in Singapore,7 and explores the evolution of the Sikh identity in Singapore by examining the origins, goals and development of Sikh institutions since 1900. Though prior research has documented some aspects of the history and development of the Sikh communities in Singapore, there is an absence of the voices of ordinary practising Sikhs in the historical narratives. This research aims to fill that void by relating their experiences and perceptions of the Sikh institutions and the Sikh faith.

Approach and Methodology Three methods were adopted to obtain information and views: a survey, in-depth interviews and a forum. The survey was designed and conducted to determine the depth of understanding of Sikh religious beliefs and practices amongst the Singaporean Sikhs (See Appendix 11.1). Simple questions were asked if they knew what the SGPC represented or what the significance of certain rituals was during regular mass prayers. The survey was distributed at the Central Sikh Gurudwara langgar (free food) hall during the Besakhi celebrations held in April 2005 with the hope that it would draw a wide range of responses, since this was the main annual festival Sikhs celebrated that attracted crowds who would not normally frequent the Sikh place of worship.8 However, the survey was of limited success as many participants took to asking their friends and relatives for the “right” answer to questions that required personal responses. The second method adopted was in-depth interviews using a set of interview guidelines (see Appendix 11.2). Such interviews were conducted with 213 Sikhs over the period of a year in 2004. Sikhs from all walks of life and ages were involved, including Sikhs in gurdwara committees and organizations. This method proved fruitful as the interviewees were candid and spoke openly of their personal experiences. They also revealed common sentiments about aspects of religious practice which will be explained later. However, most interviewees chose to remain anonymous as they did not want to face any possible repercussions from members of community for their honesty. The third method was the organization of a youth forum on 23 April 2005, in collaboration with a local Sikh youth group the Sikh Sewaks Singapore. The youths who attended were asked to express their sentiments on being a Sikh in Singapore. 277

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WHO IS A SIKH? A convenient starting point on the evolution of Sikh identity is history. The Sikhs’ original homeland is the land of Punjab — home to the ten gurus from whom Sikhs attained their creed and to whom they devote their allegiance.9 The first guru, Nanak, initiated a pacifist movement preaching the need to reform Hindu practices of his time and promote peaceful co-existence between Hindus and Muslims. The movement took on a rebellious stance when the Mughal authorities persecuted the fifth guru. The sixth guru installed himself as the sacha padshah (the true emperor) in defiance of the Mughal emperor and carried two swords at his waist (Miri, Piri) marking spiritual and temporal authority.10 This militancy was taken further with the initiatives of the tenth guru, Gobind Rai (Singh). During the lifetime of the tenth Sikh guru, Sikhs faced the animosity of the Mughal government and Hindu hill rajas. To ensure their survival as a community, Guru Gobind Singh ordained a brotherhood of the khalsa (pure) that partook in the amrit (baptism) and was distinguished by the donning of the five kakars (5 Ks) emblems,11 which consisted of a kirpan (dagger), kach (drawers), kanga (comb), kesh (unshorn hair) and kerah (a steel bangle). All Sikhs who partook in this amrit were considered to be Amrit Dhari and the pure (Khalsa) Sikhs of the guru. Since it was the Khalsa Sikhs who occupied centre stage throughout the late seventeenth and eighteeenth centuries, the danger exists that “Sikh history is Khalsa history”.12 However, to equate the Sikh with Khalsa would ignore the majority of Sikhs consisting of the Sahaj Dhari (slow adopter), Nam Dhari (Sikh sect that believes in the continuation of a line of gurus beyond Guru Gobind Singh, the tenth guru), Nirankari (Sikh sect started by Baba Boota Singh in 1929) and RadhaSoami Satsang (Sikh sect started by Baba Jaimal Singh in 1891).13 Scholars such as Harjot Singh Oberoi believe that in the Punjab up till the nineteenth century, “the boundaries between the center and periphery of Sikh tradition were extremely blurred and that there was no single source of authority within the tradition, there were several competing definitions of a Sikh.”14 He asserts that social and ritual practices were largely governed by village and clan cultures and not so much by the framework of a single religious community.15 Oberoi also points out that besides the Khalsa tradition, Sikhs had other options which were rooted in Indic culture. Examples of these would be Sanatan Dharma,16 which was considered to be an elitist version that combined Puranic and Sanskritic literature with the teachings of the ten gurus, and popular religion which entailed believing in superstition, witchcraft, memorials, astrology, visitations to shrines and devotion to village saints (pirs).17 McLeod affirms that Sikhism 278

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probably started out advocating a reformed way of life already in existence and was not an exclusive one. He substantiates this by pointing out that Guru Nanak was not preaching a distinct doctrine but was merely giving “clear and attractive expression to doctrines and ideals which had developed within the sant tradition of Northern India”.18 McLeod views the Sikhs as a product of an evolving identity that was shaped by the historical and cultural circumstances that gave rise to the tradition of the Khalsa, but doubts that the boundaries of defining a Sikh could simply be limited to this code. The crystallization of the dominant Sikh identity as the Khalsa, can be attributed to the work of the Singh Sabha reformation movement of the nineteenth century, particularly to its Tat Khalsa sector.19 The Tat Khalsa reformers were scholars such as Bhai Kahn Singh Nabha, Bhai Vir Singh and M. A. Macauliffe, who produced writing that was responsible “for moulding and recording a version of the Sikh tradition which remains dominant in intellectual circles to the present day”.20 Their message was to “recognize that the Guru created a separate community, free from superstition and true to the doctrine of the divine Name and that all who seek membership in the Guru’s community must accept the Guru’s Rehat (Code of Conduct) and that each must accordingly become a Sikh of the Khalsa”. Any other variation was portrayed as a degenerate form of the religion. Oberoi maintains that the Tat Khalsa, made up of the educated elite, was influenced by Western ideals of monotheism and the need for clearly defined categories. The political, economic and cultural changes unleashed by the British administration of Punjab in the 1880s started a rivalry for jobs in the administration amongst urban professionals and “religious ideology provided a useful means of elbowing out those who were perceived as adversaries”.21 The Muslims and the Hindus were undergoing similar transformations through the efforts of the Aligarh movement and the Arya Samaj, and the Sikhs “did not wish to lag behind”.22 The Tat Khalsa were extremely successful in propagating their version of Sikh identity through building schools, colleges, orphanages, compiling archives, founding journals and historical societies, publishing popular material in the form of handbills and newspapers, as well as homilies delivered by priests, preachers and missionaries who were members of the various Singh Sabhas.23 The Tat Khalsa’s ultimate victory was as an outcome of the 1925 Gurdwara Reform Movement which led to the British authorities conceding that the principal gurdwaras should be transferred from their hereditary incumbents (mahants)24 to elected members of the community. This precipitated the emergence of the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak Committee (SGPC), an organization set up to manage the gurdwaras, and its political wing, the Akali Dal. Since 279

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both bodies adhered to the Tat Khalsa school of thought, it marked the institutionalization of the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari identity over a more plural understanding of Sikhs and their identity.

WHO IS A SIKH IN SINGAPORE? In Singapore, the role of gurdwaras and issues of identity among the Sikhs have evolved ever since their immigration to Singapore in the nineteenth century. There are seven gurdwaras in Singapore today. The Central Sikh Gurdwara Board (CSGB) Singapore is in charge of the the Central Sikh Gurdwara and the Silat Road Gurdwara. These gurdwaras draw Sikhs who are non-partisan in the practice of their faith. The CSGB is a gazetted statutory board recognized by the Government of Singapore. The CSGB’s official website states that its objectives include creating awareness and inculcating the practice of the Sikh way of life and to lead the Sangat (the congregation of the Sikh gurus) to become and remain Amrit Dhari (those who partake in the baptism of the tenth guru, believe in the brotherhood of the Khalsa and maintain the five kakars). Although none of the Sikhs in control of the gurdwara management committees could clearly explain or maintain a consensus as to what was meant by “a Sikh way of life”, it is quite clear that the CSGB encourages Sikhs to become Amrit Dhari in accordance with the ideals that were originally propagated by the SGPC to uphold the Khalsa identity. Sikhs are generally differentiated as Amrit Dharis or Sahaj Dharis (the slow adopters). In Singapore, the latter category can be sub-divided into three groups, depending on the level of divergence from the Sikh Rehat Meryada that was institutionalized and propagated by the SGPC. The first group includes those who maintain the physical appearance of an Amrit Dhari Sikh but are unable to achieve the rigours of the necessary daily prayers and the donning of all five kakars. The second group would refer to those who keep up only a semblance of the physical appearance of the Amrit Dhari Sikh. For example, men may wear turbans but trim their facial hair and the ladies may wear their hair long but still trim and remove bodily hair. The third group, especially with reference to the men, are known as the “cropped”. They believe in the Sikh scriptures but are totally clean-shaven and they do not wear turbans but may choose to wear the kerah. The Amrit Dharis are rare in Singapore. This is evident through the very few numbers who sign up for the annual baptism during the Besakhi festival in April and the relative difficulty of locating an Amrit Dhari (who is 280

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relatively easy to identify due to the obvious physical appearance) at mass prayers. Besides the Sikh priests from the Punjab, even the Sikhs in the gurdwara management committees admit to not being Amrit Dhari. Although the CSGB may advocate the Amrit Dhari lifestyle, the reality in Singapore is that the majority are Sahaj Dhari and the numbers of those who are “cropped” and who trim their hair are increasing. This is a reflection of the Sikh identity that has been evolving away from the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari ideal since Singapore’s independence from the British and that has been facing new challenges resulting in different lifestyle choices.

Sikh Identity in Singapore under British Rule The first Sikh immigrants who arrived in significant numbers in Singapore in the early twentieth century were part of the colonial policing structure.25 In the early 1880s, they made up the Sikh Police Contingent stationed at Pearl’s Hill and were also part of the Tanjong Pagar Dock Police Force. Those who could not get recruited into the police forces were employed as watchmen. Sikhs were valued by the British for their employment in the police force as they were recognized as one of the “martial races” of India. The British were aware that what endowed the Sikhs with a martial spirit was not some inherent ability but the Khalsa ideal as founded by the tenth Sikh guru, and made it compulsory for Sikhs recruited into the police force to take the baptism of the tenth guru and become Amrit Dhari, as part of the police regiment’s discipline. The rehat meryada (code of conduct) of the Amrit Dhari was then enforced and maintained by the British officers during regular inspection. This helped the early Sikh migrants, who were largely part of the colonial security forces, to maintain a Khalsa version of the Sikh identity. Other Sikhs who came as fare-paying passengers to Singapore established themselves in entrepreneurial pursuits such as by becoming merchants, moneylenders, shopkeepers and textile merchants. The first-generation Sikh immigrants were from Punjab and came at a time when the Singh Sabha reformation movement and the efforts of the Tat Khalsa in the Punjab were at its peak. They were influenced by the rhetoric of the Singh Sabha reformation movement and sought to establish similar organizations in Malaya and Singapore. Besides, it was common for most migrants in Singapore at that time to maintain a greater affiliation with their land of origin, Punjab, as Singapore was only a place to eke out a living and they might decide to return to their homeland. It was understandable then that the early Sikhs retained as much of their religious and cultural beliefs and practices. 281

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As the Sikh population in Singapore grew, Sikhs began to build their places of worship, gurdwaras, in various parts of Singapore, based on regional, caste and class affiliations.26 The level of understanding of the Sikh religion among early immigrants was, however, relatively limited. They were aware of the rituals associated with Sikh worship but were uninformed of the significance of the Sikh scriptures. Punjabi was the lingua franca of the early Sikhs but the Sikh scriptures were written and recited in GurMukhi. They thus relied on gurdwara gianis (priests) as mediators of the religion. Most of these priests were schooled in the Tat Khalsa tradition and therefore imparted the doctrines of Punjab’s Singh Sabha reformation movement and later the SGPC, thereby perpetuating the Khalsa ideal of Sikhism. Religion played a central role in the lives of the early immigrants. There were few alternative activities to occupy them, and going to a gurdwara and being accepted in its social setting was important to them. The early Sikh community was also relatively small in number but the opportunity for interaction was relatively high. Shaving and the cutting of hair was taboo, even if one was not able to maintain the routine of daily prayers. The tight social circle exerted communal pressures on the Sikhs to maintain their physical manifestations of religiosity and identity, making it difficult for them to deviate from any the Sikh ideals as propagated by the Punjab religious authorities.

Sikh Identity in Singapore in the Early Independence Period As the grip and influences of the British era waned and society in Singapore began to cope with challenges of nation-building and economic survival in the post-independence period, Sikh identity began to move away from the ideals maintained by the respective religious authorities in Punjab. Kernial Singh Sandhu, in his address to the Sikh community at the Seminar on Sikh Youth and Nation Building on 19 March 1989 organized by the Sikh Advisory Board, aptly summarized the Sikhs as a society in transition with the following comment: … the Sikhs in Singapore, like many of their brethren elsewhere, are a community undergoing serious erosion of traditional values and spiritual life, and in the danger of slipping into cultural anomie if the current trend of the largely mindless change among them persists.27

This early independence period was marked by certain major changes for the Sikhs in Singapore. First, the British disbanded the Sikh Police Contingent. 282

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The prominence given to Sikhs in the policing of Singapore diminished, together with other elements of the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari identity. Second, employment prospects in Singapore were to evolve beyond traditional ethnic niches and this necessitated the Sikhs to compete for jobs with ethnic others and to work in environments where they were a minority. These changes had tremendous impact on the local Sikh identity. As Sikhs were exposed to various career opportunities, their patterns of social interaction were no longer limited to their own ethnic community. As a minority, Sikhs were naturally keen to gain social acceptance by other ethnic communities. Many Sikhs, especially the turbaned men, found this a challenge. Although attaining employment was easy, Sikh men found it difficult to mix with their colleagues due to their different appearance. They were the butt of teasing and sometimes felt alienated from peers and colleagues. Sikh individuals encountered a high level of ignorance with regard to Sikh religious practices and even as to who Sikhs actually were. They were mistakenly labelled as Bengali or Mangali from Bengal (Bengali). In the 1960s and 1970s, the traditional association of Sikhs as being fearsome and therefore suitable for the policing of Singapore was still fresh in the minds of other ethnic communities and this did not help their social image. As a result, a noticeable number of Sikh men took to either being clean-shaven or “grooming” by trimming their facial hair for a more “presentable” appearance. Many interviewees of the age group affected by the social challenges of the 1960s and 1970s admitted that even if they did manage to endure these challenges without resorting to these measures, they did so out of familial pressure to “remain Sikh” or out of respect for their elderly first-generation immigrant parents rather than out of a sense of religious obligation. Among Sikh women, particularly those of the second and subsequent generations, many had attained sufficient education to enable them to join the workforce. In fact, Sikh families were keen that the women became wage earners so as to contribute to family incomes. Encountering a multiethnic workforce led to certain transformations in the psychological and the social aspects of the lives of these Sikh women. They adapted their traditional fashion sense to their working environment, setting a trend of discarding their traditional salwar kameez (Punjabi suit) for skirts and blouses. Sikh women removed body hair and shaped their eyebrows to reflect feminine grooming standards of the day. The adoption of shorter hair lengths and hairstyles was a gradual move for Sikh women, as short hair was associated with less desirable moral standards. On the whole, with financial independence, Sikh women gradually began to assert their own lifestyle choices. 283

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For married and working Sikh couples, their joint incomes made it possible for them to purchase HDB (Housing and Development Board) flats under the government’s public housing scheme. This had the larger effect of dispersing traditional Sikh ethnic enclaves (for example around the Silat Road Gurdwara) as well as reconfiguring extended family units to nuclear ones. This was significant as there was now less opportunity for the enforcement and inheritance of traditions and values from grandparents and other older family members. During the 1960s and 1970s, it was common for both parents in a Sikh family to be involved in their careers and hence not to focus much on a Khalsa/Amrit Dhari way of life. Living away from the direct influence of older family members diminished opportunities for social interaction with kin who could have maintained an environment suitable for the maintenance of traditions such as keeping one’s hair, the recitation of daily Sikh prayers and understanding Sikh values. It disrupted the continuance of familial, cultural or religious values. Working parents in nuclear families found it extremely inconvenient to maintain children’s long hair which involved hygienic requirements and constant grooming entailing the tying of thresh knots for the male child and long plaits for the female child. Many parents themselves had diverged from the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari appearance by becoming clean-shaven and were reluctant to maintain a hirsute physical appearance for their children. Socially, the conditions and hence the priorities of second-generation Sikhs were vastly different from the first-generation immigrant Sikhs. They attended ethnically mixed schools and worked in similarly mixed settings. Their social interactions began to extend beyond the Sikh community. As they were the minority if not the rarity, they had to understand and adapt to the lives and cultures of other ethnic groups. Their worldview was to shift away from being a Khalsa/Amrit Dhari or even Punjabi-centric one. This is not to say that there was total assimilation but that the priorities of the Sikhs began to shift away from religion and centre on pragmatic concerns such as career success, leading materially comfortable lives and getting along with others in Singapore. As their ties with Punjab and the significance of maintaining cultural and religious values that would have gained them social acceptability there diminished and their destinies became tied up with Singapore, so too the emphasis on adhering to Sikh ideals. Apart from their unique physical appearances, Sikhs in Singapore understood their religion to have very little divergence from other religions in terms of its values. Sikh values such as truthful living, humility and service are all doctrines that are considered universal. When second-generation Sikhs in Singapore were asked if they were failing to transmit Sikh values to their 284

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children by not frequenting the gurdwara and teaching them the recitation of Sikh prayers, the reply was often that it sufficed to ensure that their children grew up as “good” people, stayed out of trouble with the law and hopefully achieved a financially comfortable and fulfilling life. Many associated frequent visitations to the gurdwara and the ability to recite prayers or sing Sikh hymns as an “extra’ or “bonus”, if one could afford the time. The language of the scriptures was considered poetical and difficult to understand and it required effort to study or recite them. For the majority of the Sikhs interviewed, the study of Sikh scriptures and religious doctrine was a task for priests who offered prayers and made supplications on their behalf. The gurdwara increasingly became a place just to fulfil one’s rites of passage in life, such as birth, marriage and death ceremonies. Some interviewees admitted that they visited the gurdwara only if they had problems or wanted a wish fulfilled. Even then, their attendance at the regular congregational prayers was not required. Increasing standards of living enabled Sikhs to be able to afford televisions, tickets to the cinema, radios, later VCRs and currently, cable and the Internet. Popular media, as expected, had a tremendous effect in weakening the tenacity with which Sikhs could practice their religion. In the late 1970s and 1980s, the Sikh community in Singapore was beginning to be affected particularly by American media and Hindustani movies. The gap in the transmission of Sikh familial, traditional and religious values in nuclear families was often filled by the lifestyles, values and culture offered by the media. This trend was to escalate as modes of entertainment became more sophisticated and exposure to global cultures more varied. It was realized that the “hero”-type persona in popular media was very seldom, if ever, an Amrit Dhari with a turban. As media began to play a significant role in shaping society, the image of the Amrit Dhari, or even the ordinary Sikh who maintained a turban or his or her hair was not found to be appealing. There emerged an understanding amongst Sikhs that the youth who did retain their hirsute physical experience did so either because they came from “traditional” families that kept up the pressure to maintain the physical appearance or they had been really “touched by the hand of God” and were pursuing an absolute adherence to the tenets of the tenth guru — this being an exceptional case. The lack of appeal of the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari identity since the 1960s was to precipitate psychological expectations and social patterns of behaviours with regard to dating and attraction to the opposite sex. Male interviewees admitted that they stood to lose out to the “cropped” Sikhs in their appeal to the opposite sex if they maintained their turbans. “Cropped” Sikhs were, and are still, envied in being attractive to the opposite sex not only within 285

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the Sikh community but also among other ethnic groups. This was a key reason many of the male interviewees gave, in explaining why they gave up on keeping their hair during their teenage years. The Sikhs in the gurdwara management committees also admitted that those who gave up their turbans rarely did so in their adult life. Instead, they usually made this decision in their teens when they were becoming more socially aware of their appeal to the opposite sex. The pressure to depart from the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari identity usually grew in the late teens when Sikh males were given more liberty to explore their social lives. This opportunity took them into environments such as nightclubs and pubs, making it important for their social esteem to appear appealing according to standards propagated by the popular media and popular notions of modernity. Increased standards of living therefore allowed Sikhs to afford lifestyles evolving around entertainment, activities and social interaction which drew them away from religious centres of the gurdwara. As Sikhs stopped frequenting the gurdwara, they were increasingly able to distance themselves from its required religious etiquette since the societal gaze and hence pressure to retain a Khalsa/Amrit Dhari ideal was gradually lifted as there was now little opportunity for interaction and hence potential objections from Sikhs who frequented the gurdwara. Sikhs took to coming to the gurdwara only during special occasions or upon the invitation of relatives in which case their presence was usually appreciated, whatever their appearance or religious outlook. By the mid-1970s, Sikh leaders in control of the Sikh organizations and gurdwara management committees were aware of the growing inability of their organizations to encourage Sikhs in Singapore to subscribe to the religious ideals that were propagated from Punjab. Leaders of these organizations took every opportunity to address and ameliorate the declining awareness of the waning Khalsa/Amrit Dhari image. In a 1978 article, “Wither Singapore Sikhs?”, Mehervan Singh addressed the issues that had begun to challenge the Sikhs, such as drug addiction and the perceived increase in juvenile delinquency amongst Sikh youths. 28 More importantly, he highlighted the inability of the gurdwara and its management committees to sustain Sikh religious ideals: up to the present day only two main objectives appear to have been pursued with zeal by the Sikh community — mandir banaune and langar pakaune (construction of temples and preparation of food). There is ample evidence of kirtan (hymn singing), patth (reading of scriptures), katha (exposition of scriptures), vyakhian (sermons) and lectures on Sikh 286

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history and religion … many boys and girls between the age of fifteen and twenty-five do not go to the institutions at all. Sikh leadership appears to give no thought to the reasons for this state of affairs. Obviously the kirtan, patth, katha and lectures are not understood by the youth… A radical change is needed from an undue emphasis on preparing food, to moral and spiritual uplift of the Sikh youth. Of what use will all the beautiful temples and kitchen services [be] if the majority of the Sikh youth drift away from them? The management[s] of all Sikh institutions have to tighten their belts, to put in more efforts to hold the interest of the youth in the language they understand and at the level they are.

Other individuals such as Bhajan Singh, a retired school principal, felt that the reason for the declining ability of the community to retain its socioreligious heritage was because Sikh youths had lost touch with the Punjabi language. It was realized as early as the 1960s that all Sikhs born in Singapore were enrolled in English-medium schools.29 They were also exposed to the various media and contexts of social interaction that promoted the usage of the English language. There were no provisions for the young Sikhs to learn their mother tongue, Punjabi, as a second language within the Singapore education system. This had led most Sikhs to opt for learning Malay as a second language. The consequences of this was a lack of understanding among Sikh youths of their own identity and to underperform academically, since they found Malay difficult to learn as it is not their mother tongue.

Sikh Identity in the 1980s By the 1980s, Sikh identity issues had become the main concern of the community. In a bid to manage this “identity crisis”, a Sikh resource panel led by Bhajan Singh was organized in the late 1980s to address these issues. The resource panel consisted of twelve professionals who made presentations to the Sikh community and the government .The panel felt that “Sikhs did not identify with their community and its institutions; they knew little about their heritage; they were not learning Punjabi, the ancestral language and the language of the Sikh scriptures.”30 The outcome of the panel’s efforts were two specific initiatives that were significant in redressing the lack of understanding and practice of the Sikh ideals amongst the Sikhs in Singapore. The first initiative was taken during 1983–89 when the Sikh Advisory Board worked to persuade the Ministry of Education to include Sikh Studies as part of the Religious Studies programme in schools. The Sikh Advisory Board was keen to ensure that Sikh Studies was offered as an option in the Religious Studies curriculum even if they had to 287

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prepare the teaching material, train the teachers and pay the costs of running the Sikh Studies option themselves.31 The second initiative of mooting and enforcing Punjabi as a second language to be recognized at all levels within the Singapore school education system was projected as a community effort. On 30 December 1990, the Sikh Education Foundation was launched in late 1989 to steer the government’s approval of Punjabi as a second language. The government had given its approval based on the understanding that the Sikhs were to produce their own teaching materials, organize the classes, train the teachers and absorb the costs of the entire programme.32 In September 1991, the Sikh Education Foundation updated on the progress of the programme by stating that: … from the very beginning, professionalism has been the hallmark of the Punjabi Language Programme. Surveys were conducted to find out how many children were interested in learning Punjabi … teachers were interviewed and only those who met the stringent requirements set by the Sikh Advisory Board were selected … much has been achieved over the past one year. However we cannot afford to rest on our laurels. There is more work to be done if we want our programme to flourish…. However we have no doubt that, with the grace of God and cooperation of one and all from the community, we will be able to develop a Punjabi Language Programme that the Singapore Sikh Community can be proud of.33

Apart from the efforts of the Sikh Advisory Board and the Sikh Education Foundation, there were also notable attempts by small groups of youths to organize Sikh religious activities such as samelans (youth camps) and inspirational sessions. One such youth group was the Sikh Sewaks formed in the late 1970s. In the late 1990s, certain gurdwara management committees also encouraged the establishment of youth wings such as the Singh Sabha Youth Wing and the youth wing of the gurdwara located at Katong. In the 1990s, the efforts of an inspiring Sikh priest (giani) Nirmal Singh, to teach gatka (ancient Sikh martial art), paid off as he was able to draw a talented pool of youths eager to attend his classes. At the same time, Sikh organizations constantly organized activities and events to showcase the Sikh cultural and religious heritage.

Sikh Identity in Singapore since the Late 1990s Despite the attempts of some Sikhs involved in local Sikh organizations to revive amongst Sikhs in Singapore the passion to learn about and practise 288

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Sikh ideals, a sense of apathy remains. Those interviewed understood that the Sikhism proselytized by the Sikh leaders was only one particular interpretation of Sikhism. Interviewees had no reservations about being shaven and not being as well-versed or informed about the Sikh scriptures, yet considered themselves as Sikhs. They were content with their approach to Sikhism as long there was a spiritual avenue to facilitate their daily lives. On the whole, they gave several reasons as to why they remained uninspired to maintain the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari way of life.

The Role of Religion The most common reason given by the Sikhs interviewed is that life is too fast-paced and rigorous in Singapore to pause and reflect on how they could become “better” Sikhs. Living in Singapore and coping with the challenges of the education system as well as achieving success at careers and jobs preoccupy most Sikhs. They prefer to indulge in leisurely activities that offer them relaxation and help improve the quality of their lives, instead of subjecting themselves to the discipline of maintaining a unique physical appearance and regime of prayers. Many are drawn to New Age inspirational methods such as meditation, yoga and reading on the Internet and through books about not only Sikhism but other religions as well. The interviewees felt that they are more learned and sophisticated in their worldview in comparison to their forefathers who did not enjoy the level of exposure and self-help that is currently available. They felt that their forefathers had no other avenues for their spiritual, psychological and emotional needs besides subscribing to the authority of the Sikh religious organizations. However, they did admit that they still believe in the divinity of the Sikh scriptures (Sri Guru Granth Sahib) and would not choose conversion as this was the religion they were born into. This combination of adherence to the Sikh scriptures and seeking self-help from other sources reveal that the practice of the religion is becoming a personal affair which entails personal fulfilment rather than communal approval. This has loosened the hold of gurdwara management committees in managing and influencing the lives of Sikhs in Singapore, much less shaping their religious identity.

The Diminishing Importance of the Gurdwara in Imparting Sikh Religious Doctrine Sikh interviewees from different generations revealed a common distaste for the management committees of the Sikh organizations, with a range of 289

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views offered. It was alleged that certain individuals in the committees were holding positions to assert a sense of self-importance rather than to serve the community while some others were considered to be of doubtful moral standards even though they maintained the physical appearance of an ideal Khalsa/Amrit Dhari. Specific cases of management committee leaders and members engaged in the very vices that they preached against were even cited. It was also pointed out that the gurdwara committees were made up of older members who were reluctant to allow younger members of the community to actively contribute. Furthermore, they reflected male dominance. Women were absent in these management committees despite the availability of qualified Sikh women. The management committees of these gurdwaras are generally not admired and this has contributed to the lack of involvement and ownership the ordinary Sikhs might have towards the gurdwaras. Some youths interviewed also felt that the management committees of the Sikh organizations did not reflect the contemporary values of society but a conservative and orthodox approach to Sikhism instead, which they did not wish to associate with. In this, the role of the gianis (priests) is particularly problematic. The gianis are hired by the local gurdwara management committees to attend to the recitation of daily prayers in the gurdwaras, singing of Sikh hymns (kirtan), conducting relevant ceremonies during mass prayers and preaching (kattha). They thus play an integral role in presenting and mediating the religion to the masses. However, most of the Sikhs in Singapore do not relate to these gianis who are Amrit Dharis and who are all hired from India. These gianis are not able to express themselves comfortably in any other language other than Punjabi, while most Sikhs in Singapore speak English. The gianis are hired on a contractual basis and when the contract expires, they usually return to India or elsewhere within the Sikh diaspora. These gianis usually do not make an effort to integrate with the locals as they feel their time here is limited. This makes the execution of their duties very impersonal. Furthermore, these gianis are not accorded the respect that priests of other religions usually receive. They are not considered to be more learned in the religion or capable in imparting the wisdom of the Sikh gurus. It is reputed that children in India who were not capable in their academic studies usually enrolled themselves into religious training to become gianis. Furthermore, these gianis are usually from the villages of Punjab and are perceived to have a limited understanding of contemporary urban life. Besides gianis, parcharaks (preachers) trained at specific derahs/taksals (Sikh religious academies) tour gurdwaras to relate the wisdom of the Sikh scriptures. However, their language of communication and use of anecdotes are difficult for 290

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ordinary Singaporean Sikhs to relate to. Due to this gap between these religious mediators and the general Sikh population, the Sikh religious institutions are unable to influence the practice of Sikhism among Sikhs in Singapore. Furthermore, Sikh youths who do maintain an interest in their heritage choose to rely on the Internet, take private tours to Punjab and conduct their own research as they are keen to arrive at their own answers. The strong reliance and respect the early Sikh immigrants had for the gurdwaras, which empowered these Sikh organizations to represent and determine Sikh identity, no longer hold true for Sikhs in Singapore today.

The Limited Success of the Punjabi Language Programme and Youth Groups to Inspire a Religious Renaissance The efforts of the Sikh Education Foundation to organize and sustain a Punjabi Language Programme have been massive and admirable. However, it is doubtful if they have succeeded in re-inculcating the prescribed Sikh values and heritage. A survey of the students in these Punjabi classes showed that only 20–30 per cent of the students kept their hair. The majority was “cropped” despite the constant reiteration during curriculum time to emphasize the importance of keeping one’s hair as a Sikh. An interviewee revealed that instead of witnessing a readiness amongst the young Sikhs attending Punjabi classes to keep their physical form, the reverse had actually happened. The “cropped” students had been more successful in influencing their turbaned friends to cut their hair. It is debatable whether the noble objective of reviving the usage of Punjabi amongst Sikhs has been successful. Punjabi language teachers interviewed admitted that it was an uphill task to compete with the usage of English, which by 1989 had already become the language spoken by Sikhs in homes, schools and at work. Instructions to written assignments were written in English. Passages were recited in Punjabi and then explained in English. Students interviewed admitted that even during Punjabi classes, they made no serious attempt to speak the language. However, they could now understand their grandparents and the usage of the language in popular entertainment but still found it difficult to understand the Sikh scriptures. Further steps have been taken to inculcate Sikh values during the Punjabi language classes through the “Sikhi” programme. However, the response to this programme has been apathy due to the students’ reluctance to learn more about Sikh religion and heritage. The common response given by interviewees was that it was informative to find out about the lives of the Sikh gurus and Sikh history but they could not relate it to their lives in 291

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Singapore. When parents were asked why they had opted for their children to take Punjabi as a second language, many admitted that they thought it would be easier for their children to cope academically with Punjabi compared to Malay or Chinese, and not because they felt it was a medium for the transmission of culture and heritage. Likewise, youth wings and youths in the Sikh Sewaks face limited success at their religious camps and activities. Attendances at religious camps seldom exceed a hundred. The Sikh Sewaks admit that they have to be innovative to “market” their camps as outdoor adventure experiences so as to entice youths to attend. This is because youths have “better” things to do than spend their time learning about religion and are preoccupied with schoolwork and pursuing their hobbies and extra-curricular activities. Most Sikh youths interviewed claimed that they led sufficiently fulfilling lives. Those drawn to the religious camps admitted that they attended the camps to interact and spend time with their Sikh friends than to learn about the religion.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS Sikhs in Singapore associate themselves with the religion because they are born into Punjabi/Sikh families. It suffices for them to have a place of worship, to seek blessings or solace and to carry out traditional events such as births, marriages and death ceremonies. Sikhs have a very pragmatic, flexible and open approach to religion. They agree that the Amrit Dhari path of being a Sikh is ideal but feel it is not realistic within the context of Singapore to adhere to such an ideal. Many “cropped” interviewees do not feel any less of a Sikh than others who wear turbans as they feel that it is more important to have a sound moral character. Sikhs no longer feel the need to subject themselves to communal approval should they fail to achieve the ideals deemed as not essential to their daily lives. Furthermore, Singapore society has become more sophisticated and educated with rising educational standards and greater exposure to the media. Sikhs who do not adhere to the physical forms of the Khalsa/Amrit Dhari ideal do not fear being marginalized by religious authorities who have little influence over their lives. Gurdwara management committees need to adopt a more pragmatic and liberal perspective to the religion that accommodates the needs of the Sikhs in Singapore instead of adopting a sense of exclusivity. If they continue to rigidly propagate Sikh ideals that are far removed from the realities of life of Sikhs in Singapore, the gap between ordinary Sikhs’ self perceptions and group identity and the ideals upheld by the religious authorities will only widen. 292

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Gianis have a special role to play. Attempts should be made to sponsor the education of local Sikhs to become gianis. They should be given a respectable salary and allowed greater interaction with the Sikh congregation. Their image would also improve if they were more highly educated and they would be admired for the wisdom on Sikh values, instead of being regarded as mere mechanical executors of duties. The image of the Sikh religion as it is currently being practised and propagated is not appealing to Sikh youths. The management committees of Sikh organizations should liberalize to be more representative of the Sikh population in Singapore. Instead of remaining exclusive, they should encourage the participation of individuals who are not only qualified to manage the execution of relevant duties but are also passionate about the heritage of the religion regardless of gender, age, familial connections and physical appearance. This will encourage Sikhs to develop a sense of ownership and personal involvement in representing Sikhs and their community, instead of adopting an apathetic stance. It will also encourage the community to want to learn about Sikh values and to appreciate their own heritage instead of feeling daunted by it. APPENDIX 11.1 SURVEY ON SIKH IDENTITY IN SINGAPORE

1.

Can you explain what is the significance of Baisakhi?

2.

Do you know about the SGPC (Shiromani Gurdwara Parbhandak Committee) in Amritsar? If yes, could you explain what you know about this organization?

3.

Could you list the name of the ten Sikh Gurus?

4.

How often do you come to the Gurdwara?

5.

Why/When do you come to the Gurdwara?

6.

Do you know who is represented in the gurdwara management committees?

7.

Do you take an interest in the election of members of the gurdwara management committees? (Please give a short explanation for your answer)

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Do you think gianis play an important role in understanding Sikhism? (Please give a short explanation for your answer) 293

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Do you understand the significance of Ardas?

10.

Are you able to understand when the gianis recite from the Sikh scriptures or sing kirtan?

11.

Who do you turn to when you need spiritual guidance?

Thank You

APPENDIX 11.2 INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

1.

Who do you think is a good Sikh?

2.

How do you respect and live within the Sikh faith?

3.

How important is the gurdwara in your life? Why do you come to a gurdwara?

4.

How do you relate with the gianis in the gurdwara?

5.

Could you give me a brief about your religious ideals and ideas as a Sikh in Singapore?

6.

What do you feel of the gurdwara management committees?

7.

If you were interested in finding out more about Sikhism, where or who would you approach?

8.

If you needed solace in facing life’s challenges, where do you go?

9.

How do you relate to God?

10.

Do you understand and recite Sikh scriptures?

11.

Do you know who/what is the SGPC?

12.

Do you know what is the Amrit?

13.

Do you think it is important to take the Amrit?

14.

What is the Khalsa?

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15.

Do you participate in the Sikh community’s activities?

16.

What do you feel about the activities organized by the Gurdwara Committees or youth Groups?

17.

Do you know about the Sikh Advisory Board and its role? What do you think about it?

18.

Do your children/you attend Punjabi classes as organized by the Sikh Education Foundation?

19.

What is your experience of Punjabi classes?

20.

Do you think that keeping your hair is important to being a good Sikh?

21.

What is the role of women in Sikh organizations in Singapore and what do you feel about it?

Notes The author would like to thank the “ordinary” Singapore Sikhs who freely gave of their time and candid opinions to help her derive her conclusions for this chapter. Among the 213 Sikhs interviewed, she would like to especially thank the following prominent members of the Sikh community for their time and contribution to this research: Jagjeet Singh Sehgal, J. S. Bandal Singh, Bhajan Singh, Dr Berinderjeet Kaur, Balbeer Mangat, Karpal Singh Malhi, Jarmal Singh, Jagjit Singh Sekhon, NavinPal Singh, Surjit Singh and Professor Kirpal Singh. Views expressed herein are entirely the author’s. 1. There is no official consensus as to how large the number of Sikhs is in Singapore. This is a rough estimate put up by the Sikh community. For official purposes they should be classified as Indians. However many opt to be classified under “Others”. There are a number who have also classified themselves as Sikhs under the category of race. 2. Datt, A Sikh Community in Singapore. 3. Ibrahim, Study of Sikh Community in Singapore. 4. Ghandharab, Early Sikh Pioneers of Singapore. 5. Tan, Singapore Khalsa Association. 6. Sevea, The Evolution of Sikh Religious Institutions in Singapore. 7. Satvinder Singh, Sikh Organizations and Sikh Identity in Singapore. 8. Free food kitchen. 9. The ten Gurus in succession being, Nanak (1469–1539), Angad (1504–1552), Amar Das (1479–1574), Ram Das (1534–1581), Arjun (1563–1606), HarGobind (1595 –1644), Har Rai (1630–1661), Hari Kishen (1656–1664), Tegh Bahadur (1621–1675), Gobind Singh (1666–1708). 295

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10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

Khushwant Singh, A History of the Sikhs. McLeod, The Evolution of the Sikh Community: Five Essays, p. 84. McLeod, Who is a Sikh?, p. 46. Ibid., p. 113. Oberoi, The Construction of Religious Boundaries, p. 419. Ibid. Ibid., p. 101. Ibid., p. 140. McLeod, Who is a Sikh?, p. 7. This began with the formation of the first Sabha in 1873 in Amritsar. It was initially made up of titled gentry, affluent landowners and noted landowners. Subsequently, hundreds of these Sabhas were to spring up throughout the Punjab. The Tat Khalsa sector emerged out of the Lahore Singh Sabha. McLeod, Who is a Sikh?, p. 72. Oberoi, op. cit., p. 423. Ibid., p. 424. Fenech, Martyrdom in the Sikh Tradition, Playing the Game of Love, p. 15. Mahants are individuals who were considered administrators as well as priests of the temple and who adhere to practices that seem largely Hindu to the Tat Khalsa sector of the Singh Sabha movement. The first Sikhs to arrive in Singapore were convicts of the British Empire, the most prominent of them being political prisoners Nihal Singh (popularly known as the Sikh holy man, Bhai Maharaj Singh, whose revered shrine is in the Silat Road Sikh Temple) and his attendant, Kharak Singh. Nihal Singh and Kharak Singh were brought to Singapore in July 1850 and interned at the Outram Road Jail. The “convict era” came to an end in 1860 due to protests by resident Europeans in the Straits Settlements. The first gurdwara was actually built by the British for the Sikh Police Contingent at their Pearl’s Hill Barracks to fulfil their spiritual needs and contingent ceremonies. As the Sikh civilian population expanded, the Central Sikh Temple was established at Queen Street in 1912. Gurdwara Sahib Sri Guru Singh Sabha at Wilkie Road, established in 1918, eventually was to be dominated by Sikhs from the Manjha region in the Punjab. Gurdwara Khalsa Dharmak Sabha at Niven Road witnessed a congregation of Sikhs from the Malwa region while in 1927, 50 Sikhs from the Doaba region set up the Gurdwara Pardesi Khalsa Dharmak Diwan. In 1924, the Sikh policemen built the Silat Road Sikh Temple, which still exists till today at its original site. In 1953, the Sikhs of the business community initiated the Gurdwara Sri Guru Nanak Satsang Sabha at Katong. The current gurdwara at Yishun is an amalgamation of two earlier gurdwaras: the gurdwara at Sembawang, traceable back to 1925 and associated with the Sikh police and employees of the Naval Base, and the gurdwara at Jalan Kayu, established in the 1930s by Sikh employees at the Seletar Air Base.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25.

26.

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27. Seminar Report on Sikh Youth and Nation Building, 19 March 1989, at the Regional English Language Centre, organized by the Sikh Advisory Board. 28. Mehervan Singh, “Wither Singapore Sikhs?” (Unpublished article, 1978). 29. Verne A. Dusenbery, “Socializing Sikhs in Singapore: Soliciting the State’s Support”. In The Transmission of Sikh Heritage in the Diaspora, edited by Singh Pashaura and N. Gerald Barrier. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 1996, p. 118. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. The Singapore Sikh, September 1991.

References Dusenbery, Verne A. “Socializing Sikhs in Singapore: Soliciting the State’s Support”. In The Transmission of Sikh Heritage in the Diaspora, edited by Singh Pashaura and N. Gerald Barrier. New Delhi: Manohar Publishers & Distributors, 1996. Datt, Soam. A Sikh Community in Singapore: A Study of the Life of a Residential Group of Sikh Families, Their Structure of the Social History of the Individual Members, Their Interrelationship with One Another and with Outside Families, The Influence of Caste and Class in Their Lives. Academic Exercise: Department of Sociology, University of Singapore, 1964. Fenech, Louis E. Martyrdom in the Sikh Tradition, Playing The Game of Love. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000. Ghandharab, Seva Singh. Early Sikh Pioneers of Singapore. Singapore Khalsa Association, 1986. Ibrahim, Bibijan. Study of Sikh Community in Singapore. Academic Exercise: Department of Sociology, National University Singapore, 1982. McLeod, W. H. Who is a Sikh?: The Problem of Sikh Identity. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989. McLeod, W. H. The Evolution of the Sikh Community: Five Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976. Oberoi, Harjot. The Construction of Religious Boundaries: Culture, Identity, and Diversity in the Sikh Tradition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Sevea, Iqbal Singh. The Evolution of Sikh Religious Institutions in Singapore. Academic Exercise: Department of History, National University of Singapore, 1999. Singh, Satvinder. Sikh Organizations and Sikh Identity in Singapore. Academic Exercise, Department of Sociology, National University Singapore 1994. Singh, Khushwant. A History of the Sikhs. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. Singh, Mehervan. “Wither Singapore Sikhs?” Unpublished article, 1978. Tan, Tai Yong. Singapore Khalsa Association. Published for The Singapore Khalsa Association by Times Books International, 1988. The Singapore Sikh, September 1991. 297

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12 RELIGIOUS PROCESSIONS Urban Politics and Poetics Lily Kong

INTRODUCTION Processions have traditionally been an integral part of religious life. They are often among the most visible of religious activities in public spaces and, to that extent, have the greatest opportunity for contact with secular activities and religious practices of other faiths. Because they tend towards the “spectacular” and symbolic, the potential for conflict is heightened. As events which attract crowds, the possibility of violence and aggression is real, as the experience in many countries reminds us. The politics of such events must be understood to avoid the troubles apparent in different parts of the world. At the same time, to understand the politics of processions, it is imperative to understand the meanings and values invested in such events — in short, the poetics — not least because it enables policy-makers and enforcement agencies to become aware of what sacred meanings are negotiable and what should remain fixed values. Much of the geographical literature on processions addresses secular processions, including national parades (Kong and Yeoh 1997), and community parades such as the Carnival in London (Jackson 1988; Lewis and Pile 1996), the Rose Parade and the Doo Dah Parade in Pasadena, California (Lawrence 1982). The literature which is closest to the subject matter on religious processions deals with pilgrimages (see Kong 1990, 2001). Indeed, there are many similarities between the nature and experience of processions and 298

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pilgrimages, though the latter is at a larger scale, often traversing greater distances, involving greater commitment of time and possibly enduring more privations. Insights drawn from existing literatures therefore, are from the literature on both secular processions and religious pilgrimages. How has modern society and its many secular influences impacted on the practice of processions? Campo (1998, p. 42) forcefully argues that … the modern nation-state, the world capitalist system, steel, plastic, the telephone, the locomotive, the automobile, the airplane, the television, and — yes — the computer are making it possible for greater numbers of people in more cultures to learn about, travel to, and see more sacred places faster than at any other time in human history. A significant result of this has been that the number and variety of sacred places have also increased dramatically.

Following this observation, it would appear that processions and pilgrimages continue to be a significant aspect of religious experience in the contemporary world. What, though, is the nature of this experience? In particular, in modern cities where functionalist urban planning may come up against sacred pilgrim sites, and where Hindu, Jew, Buddhist, Christian and Muslim may live cheek by jowl, what sorts of conflicts have to be negotiated in the continued performance of such religious practice? This question is explored using the multi-cultural, multi-religious case of Singapore, a modern city and officially secular state where all the major world religions are represented and where many more new variant religions are emerging. This analysis may be characterized as a focus on the micro-politics of urban life and its conflicts, and is pursued on the basis that such micro-politics is constitutive of the macro-politics of religious conflicts, manifested in religiously-based wars and unrest, such as in Palestine, Northern Ireland, South Asia and so forth. Such macro-politics, I would argue, have historical roots, but are also daily constituted and reinforced through a micro-politics of friction that often appear less dramatic, less serious, less pressing than the drama and spectacle of macro-politics, but which nevertheless are very real and influential for their role in the warp and woof of everyday life.

PROCESSIONS AND PILGRIMAGES: SOME APPROACHES As indicated earlier, there is a literature on the phenomena of religious pilgrimages and one on secular processions. These two sets of writings offer inspiration and insights to my analysis. 299

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Pilgrimage is a “social construction and, inevitably, a cultural product” (Graham and Murray 1997, p. 389), in the same way that the sacred is imagined and articulated within cultural practice. The cultural product must, in turn, be understood in relation to its social, political and historical contexts. The multi-disciplinary literature on pilgrimage recognize this social and cultural construction, and in so doing, also acknowledge how social relations are (re)enacted or challenged during pilgrimages, resulting occasionally in conflict but also in the reinforcement of community and identity. Due to the influence of anthropologist Victor Turner (1974), pilgrimages are thought to temporarily bring together individuals disparate in age, occupation, gender, ethnicity, social class, power and wealth. Pilgrimages bond together, “however transiently, at a certain level of social life, large numbers of men and women who would otherwise never have come into contact” (Turner 1974, p. 178). Pilgrimages therefore function “as occasions on which communitas is experienced and as journeys toward a sacred source of communitas which is also seen as a source of healing and renewal” (Eade and Sallnow 1991, p. 203). Pilgrimage, in this sense, is a liminal experience, involving abrogation of secular social structure. For example, Dalbert (1991) describes how, during Catholic pilgrimages to Lourdes, well persons in the groups treat those who are ill like saints, inversing some of the social relations observable in everyday life. Similarly, Young (1993) argues, on the haj, social relations depart from that in daily life in that women are not secluded, are not subject to the authority of men (other than that of the neutered aghawat, that is, chieftains), and are not less involved in commerce than men. The inversion of everyday social relations is also evidenced in symbolic terms, as when the hierarchy of the church is turned upside down in the case of Medjugorje. The Catholic church is such that the authorities lead and teach lay persons and the authorities are invariably adult, male clergy. At Medjugorje, the visionaries are young, predominantly female and lay persons — those who “traditionally have little voice in the church” (Jurkovich and Gesler, 1997, p. 460). On the other hand, scholars such as John Eade and Michael Sallnow (1991) argue that pilgrimage is a pluralist experience, a realm in which there are competing religious and secular discourses, leading to the reinforcement of social boundaries and distinctions rather than their dissolution. Graham and Murray (1997) are well persuaded by this argument, and illustrate how it is the case through a study of the Christian pilgrimage to Santiago in northwest Spain. The Camino, as it is popularly known, is appropriated differentially by different groups, investing diverse meanings that are sometimes conflicting with one another. First, the Catholic church continues to attempt to stamp its papal authority and the importance of the 300

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spiritual over secular values. Second, the Council of Europe calls upon Santiago to remind people of the ideals of European integration, designating it the European Capital of Culture in the year 2000. The motif symbolizing the Camino — the pilgrimage route — is designed to represent the roads of Europe symbolically joining and leading to Santiago, no longer a ceremonial centre of Spanish nationalism. Third, governments of the regions through which the pilgrimage route passes have sought to market it, engaging in a process of image production and material practices. This represents the “economic commodification of heritage” (Graham and Murray 1997, p. 399). Beyond these official discourses, there is also a “vigorously disputed set of non-official social distinctions” (Graham and Murray 1997, p. 404) regarding what constitutes a “true pilgrim”, from those who see it as personal privation, from a puritan perspective to the liberal/humanist view that “correct” attitudes towards pilgrimage are sufficient without the need to heighten suffering (Graham and Murray 1997, pp. 402–405). The multiple meanings of the pilgrimage route give rise to tensions and conflicts, as the authors argue in another paper (Murray and Graham, 1997). In particular, the modification of religious meanings as a result of tourism reveals the conflicting motivations and demands of pilgrims and tourists. Thus, Santiago de Compostela’s dominant religious meaning as a pilgrimage destination became modified into a city of culture; the Cathedral of Santiago from a place of prayer and worship to a heritage attraction; the Feast Day of St James from ritual to special event tourism; relic touching from devotion to good luck/the wishing well; the Compostela from expiation to certification of achievement; pilgrim ways from penance/punishment to self-renewal and off-road adventure trails and so forth. Pilgrimage routes and sites even become embellished, as when a new site is introduced along the route to attract tourists, such as the dinosaur footprints mythically linked to the hoof marks of St James’ horse! Such commercialization is also apparent in the famous Catholic site, Medjugorje. Shopkeepers set up their wares near the church grounds to capitalize on the presence of pilgrims, producing unofficial religious articles which has created tensions with local church officials. Warring ethnic groups have emblems which have also been commercialized (for example, badges and pins with their symbols) and sold alongside rosaries and Madonna statues. New cafes, bars and pizzerias have been introduced, resulting in the “look and feel of a beach resort”, creating placelessness and inauthenticity (Jurkovich and Gesler 1997, pp. 462–63). These studies illustrate the multiple meanings and pluralist experiences associated with pilgrimage routes and sites, at times co-existent in peaceful if uneasy parallel, at other times conflicting in both discursive and material 301

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realms. Religious processions, at a scale smaller than pilgrimages, nevertheless encapsulate many of the issues confronted in pilgrimage analysis, and indeed, are not unlike the experience of secular processions, of which analyses exist of pageants, parades and carnivals. Drawing from a range of studies, it may be said that parades and processions “[serve] as a means to focus attention of private people on their collective life and the values they [espouse] through it” (Goheen 1993, p. 128). Their performance in public streets turn them into “a particular space, a landscape that could be exploited effectively through the collective performance of particular rituals to communicate, legitimate, and politicize values” (Goheen 1993, p. 128). Not only do they mark out space, such “civic rituals” also represent “time apart”, for they are “time separated from the normal activities” (Goheen 1993, p. 128). These rituals also stress shared values and reinforce group cohesion by emphasizing belonging. Further, “parades and other forms of mass public ritual [may be] characterized as demonstrations of community power and solidarity and serve as complex commentaries on the political economy or urban-industrial social relations” (Marston 1989, p. 255). As Kaplan (1984, p. 189) explains: Civic rituals, closely associated with a sense of community in cities such as Barcelona, often cut across class lines. Whether organized for religious, folkloric, or political reasons, urban pageants carried with them a measure of solidarity that surpassed the elements of ritual content.

On the other hand, these events may also reflect the spatial constitution of symbolic resistance, achieved through the symbolic reversal of social status (Jackson, 1988). They offer a temporary respite from normal relations of subordination and domination, and thus, offer a potential platform for protest, opposition and resistance (Jackson 1988, p. 222). In the case of Notting Hill Carnivals in London, authorities strive to keep the carnival to the road because of its potential as a threat to the social order (Jackson 1988, p. 223), reflecting the spatial strategy associated with power and control. Yet, as Jackson (1988, p. 216) points out, the symbolic reversal of social status during a carnival should not be confused with subversion because it only serves to reaffirm the permanence of the social hierarchy. What the carnival offers is a temporary respite from normal relations. In this way, the carnival is a “social leveller”, allowing for “a harmless release of tension, and a force for social integration” (Jackson 1988, p. 215).

Fieldwork Context Thaipusam is celebrated in many parts of the world by ethnic communities hailing from South India, such as Fiji, Mauritius, Trinidad, Durban in South

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Africa, Toronto in Canada, Malaysia and Singapore. In places like Chennai (formerly Madras) in India and Jaffna in Sri Lanka, the event is an important celebration for Tamil communities. The festival marks the birthday of Lord Subramaniam, one of the sons of Shiva. The spectacle of the event revolves around a device called a kavadi carried by many of the participants along a processional route. Some participants may even pierce themselves with skewers or attach hooks to their bodies. The processions are generally accompanied by music and chanting. Some participants also enter a religious trance during the procession. Generally, those who take part in the procession do so as a form of thanksgiving for prayers answered. In Singapore, Thaipusam is a colourful annual event which has evolved over the years, as has the state’s management of this public event. Religious processions in Singapore are carefully monitored and managed, a caution rooted in an unfortunate historical episode. On 21 July 1964, during a procession celebrating the birthday of Prophet Muhammad, riots broke out as the Malay-Muslim procession passed through Kallang, a predominantly Chinese populated area. Different accounts exist on how the riots started. One account suggests that someone threw a bottle at the participants. Another suggests that someone jeered the participants, leading to a fight. Yet another has it that the riots were politically motivated (National Archives website: . Whatever the cause, given this historical precedent, a range of measures has been put in place to manage public processions, including Thaipusam. Two Hindu community leaders closely associated with the Thaipusam festival shared many insights into the organization of the kavadi procession. Annually, two to three months before Thaipusam, an application has to be made by the Hindu Endowments Board (HEB) on behalf of the two temples involved (each marking the starting and ending point of the procession respectively) and participating devotees, to the police to obtain a permit to hold the procession. Additionally, along the processional route are usually tents set up by Hindu devotees, serving either water or milk to those participating in the procession. Tent owners also have to apply to the police for permits after seeking endorsement from the HEB. Following these applications, the police will convene a meeting with the HEB and representatives from the two temples to discuss the ground rules and the problems encountered during the last festival, with a view to proposing ways of addressing the problems. Almost 10,000 participants can be expected annually, with more than 8,000 carrying milk pots, and more than 1,000 carrying kavadi. Additionally, there are many more who set up tentage, and others who help the devotees. With this scale of events, the temples have a 303

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huge logistical task. The two temples thus issue “Rules, Regulations and Conditions Governing Thaipusam” which are constructed to observe state rules pertaining to assemblies and processions (encapsulated in the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance Act and its related subsidiary legislation), and to help the temples manage the event. Individual kavadi carriers have to buy tickets from the temples to participate in the procession and pay a fee to defray the cost of organizing the event and handling the logistics. Big kavadi carriers pay more because they “take up the most space and need the most supervision” (Straits Times, 23 December 1999). Kavadi carriers have to inform the temples of the size and weight of their kavadis, which should not exceed certain limits (4 metres from the ground up and 2.9 metres in diameter), so as to ensure that they will not pose safety hazards, either to traffic or street wires. Devotees carrying milk pots may leave the Perumal Temple from 2.00 a.m. onwards on Thaipusam Day but kavadi and ratham (shrines on wheels) have between 7.00 a.m. and 7.30 p.m. to leave the Perumal temple. At the other end, the doors of the Thendayuthapani Temple will be closed at 10.00 p.m. When tickets are issued at point of payment, devotees are given specific times when they should assemble at the starting point, in order that the crowds may be managed. Further, all forms of musical instruments (traditional or otherwise) and recorded music/songs are not allowed along the processional route, and only holy music is allowed within the temples’ premises. The temples’ rules end with a warning that any infringement of the rules by devotees and/or supporters will be subject to prosecution by the police and the devotees being barred from participating in future Thaipusam festivals. From the perspective of the Hindu Endowments Board (HEB), as expressed by one of its officers: “We try to follow the rules and regulations as closely as possible because we do not want to lose this privilege like what happened to the Mohammad procession” (personal interview, 27 June 2001). Historical precedence — the 1964 procession celebrating Prophet Muhammad’s birthday which erupted into riot and led to its subsequent discontinuation — becomes the basis on which the Hindu leadership submits to contemporary state regulatory forces. Over a number of years from 1999, this writer has been an observer of Thaipusam festivals, and have interviewed participants and observers about a range of issues, from their experience of the procession to their reactions to some of the strictures introduced over time. Participants ranged from those who carried kavadis and milk pots to those who helped organize the event to those who assisted their friends and family members. Observers included 304

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both Hindus and non-Hindus along the processional route. Pseudonyms are used below where verbatim quotes are shared.

Religious Processions and the Making of Social Relations Susan Davis’ (1986, p. 6) description of nineteenth century Philadelphia parades as “public dramas of social relations” provides an apt perspective for examining the Thaipusam procession in Singapore. Just as the nineteenth century parades “define who can be a social actor”, Thaipusam is both an occasion for boundary-making and one for reinforcing social ties, in particular, religious community, family and friendship ties. As an occasion for boundary-making, observations of Thaipusam remind us that a community is not devoid of internal tensions, and is not always characterized by homogeneous or even consensual traits, experiences and views. Thus, boundaries are both internal to the Hindu community as they are between the Hindu and other communities in multi-religious Singapore. The procession brought to surface conflicts and tensions within the community, which are evident in two main ways. The first is the latent discontent with a prominent foreign worker population in Singapore. In this particular instance, the foreign Indian worker population, foregrounded in a public performance such as Thaipusam, is attributed with crowdedness and disorderliness. One interviewee complained that the procession had become very protracted, with many delays, because of the increase in the number of kavadi carriers, and the larger crowds. He attributed this to the increase in the number of foreign workers participating. Another intimated that “Thaipusam has been spoilt” because of the intrusion and rowdiness of “foreign elements”. Not all interviewees, however, blamed the foreign workers. Many pointed fingers at “the younger generation” instead. Like several other interviewees, Kalpana, a clerk in her late 30s, blamed the “youngsters”, “the way they dance, the way they cheer, the way they change those movie songs to God songs”. Boundarymaking thus drew on age, class and nationality as divisive factors. Second, the consciousness of “self ” and “other” was also evident through repeated references to boundaries between the Hindu community and other communities. These references revealed awareness of the power of this very public display of Hinduism to shape public perceptions about the Hindu community, and also offered the occasion for the “other” to show an understanding of and sensitivity towards the Hindu community. In the former instance, Hindu interviewees referred again to the unruly behaviour of some young Hindu boys in the processions, and expressed deep regret that 305

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“you have other races watching you, so when all these happen, it gets wrong ideas into people’s heads about us” (Selva, aged 40). In the latter instance, some interviewees expressed disappointment at the lack of understanding and respect by other communities of the sacredness of the event: Frankly speaking, it is okay for them to watch but I think there are members of the public who are not dressed properly and who don’t behave well. I think this is kind of a distraction. We feel very offended when we are participating, you know. It is something that you don’t like to see during the processions. We like somebody to be more pleasant, more properly attired rather than like coming all the way as though you are going for a show, going for a disco. I think in my case, I don’t like it (Shamala, late 30s).

Inasmuch as the procession foregrounded occasions of internal and external boundary making, it was also an opportunity for the reinforcement of family and friendship ties and the reaffirmation of community identity. At the most fundamental level, the commitment to Thaipusam was viewed as a total family obligation, from pre-festival joint fasting and cleansing, to the provision of help and support during the procession itself. The most pronounced assertion of the role of the family was expressed by Mano, who has participated annually in Thaipusam for twenty-seven years. He says: I have seen cases where people take it just for granted. Ah, everybody carrying, I also can carry and everything. After they start walking, they just collapse. Just cannot fulfil the route. And some of them, you can see, when you’re piercing, you can see them pinching because it’s painful. It’s hurting them and everything so. I wouldn’t really say whether they did fast properly or not, but I know there’s something wrong. Something is not right. Something is wrong in the family. Maybe they did not fast. Maybe in the house, in the family, something is wrong. When I want to carry the kavadi, the whole family joins in. We all fast together.

Like him, Mohan, also a frequent participant in Thaipusam, talks about how his son fasts with him prior to the event: My son also tries not to bring back chicken rice or something and eat there. He knows we have the house clean for this festival. He said, “I will join my father, be a vegetarian”.

This family involvement has the effect of bringing the family together, as Rama, a 41-year-old participant points out: 306

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Usually, there is family involvement. Normally when we are involved, the family also has to follow the fast so that the house is kept clean and the prayers are done. It is a discipline, so it is not like, this only has to do with my family member, so I just don’t bother. So it is, like I say, it brings the family together and I think also brings them spiritually together because everybody is helping each other.

Such family participation extends to the day of the procession itself, during which family and friends provide both practical and moral support. Practically, Mohan shares insights into the physical difficulties that one might encounter during the procession, and the need for help: Just say for example, this big chariot which I carried, which I’m carrying. For some reason, if I can’t pull it, somebody can help me to push. And if this big kavadi I’m carrying, for some reason I cannot carry, balance myself, the people all round, four of them, could hold me and you know…[help to] adjust it or just carry. And in the worst case, if you really cannot walk, they can dismantle it and bring you to the temple in whatever way they could help. Yes you need them to help because you will never know. While you’re walking, the kavadi is about three metres high. All of a sudden, a strong wind may come. The whole thing can just…you may just fall out. When I’m pulling a chariot, you may find a small stone on the road and it will get stuck on the wheel. I can’t come and lift it up you know, so I need friends and family to be around me to help me …That’s why it’s not just you yourself. I may be in the procession, but everybody is helping, also participating in this holy festival. And they are getting themselves involved in it one way or another.

Spiritually and emotionally, Rama acknowledges the need for support when the journey gets long and delayed: The procession is about four kilometres and at some point of time, there would be a jam, and we have to wait for two-and-a-half, three hours. During that period, family is there or friends or relations to give you the moral boost. So it is a group of friends.

But the strengthening of social relations is not confined to pre-existing family and friendship ties. The sense of community among participants and well-wishers is enhanced through the cheerful support given to participants completing the thanksgiving journey. As 23-year-old Vani shares: 307

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Usually what happens is that after you are done with your procession, let’s say you have already reached the temple, then it is when…that means you have finished your task already, right. So then, it doesn’t have to be someone that you know. You can also carry on and cheer, cheer along with everybody else, even if it is strangers. It does not have to be someone you know. We cheer other participants along, to encourage them to the finish.

When probed, Vani and others were clearly conscious of myriad subgroups, such as the boisterous youths and burgeoning foreign workers, and indeed expressed their annoyance and disapproval. Yet, their enthusiasm and support for participants, particularly when nearing the destination, co-existed with their awareness of social differences. They would not admit to a sense of egalitarian association, of sameness that spells the abrogation of social structure, after the manner of Turner’s (1974) communitas. Rather, it was a sense of support for those who have made sacrifices and bore the privations of the journey, not unlike support for sportspersons on the track or field. This did not amount to a numbing heap of emotions that culminates in “carnivalistic misalliances” where the lofty is combined with the low, the great with the insignificant, the wise with the stupid (Folch-Serra 1990, p. 265), offering “temporary liberation from the prevailing truth …” (Bakhtin, 1968, p. 10). The experience of communitas, long accepted in many anthropological writings about pilgrimage, did not replicate itself in the context of the Thaipusam procession in Singapore. This may suggest that pilgrimages and processions, because of the differences articulated above, are not directly comparable, but it may also suggest that the sense of sameness and egalitarian association may be a somewhat romanticized interpretation of the pilgrim experience.

RELIGIOUS PROCESSIONS AND THE NEGOTIATION OF POETICS AND POLITICS The making of social relations aside, religious processions also exist at the nexus of “poetic” performance and public politics, the negotiation of which forms the analysis in this section. Conceptually, the material is framed in terms of the negotiation of soundscapes, timescapes and landscapes, reflecting the multiple dimensions of the processional phenomena.

Negotiating Aural Space That Thaipusam occupies aural space and derives significant meaning from the manufacture and consumption of sound may not have been so apparent 308

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if that aspect of the event did not become subject to policy and policing. No interviewee failed to discuss the significance of music and/or chanting to the creation of the appropriate atmosphere, and as an integral part of the ceremony. Many took pains to explain the place of music in religion and in this particular public performance. All spoke of the value of music in relation to its enforced absence in the context of Singapore’s Thaipusam. Pany, an organizer of the event, shares this perspective: Music is part of religion. If you notice, the drums, the long pipes played during prayers…traditionally, music, dances, language were performed in the temples, where culture was propagated. For the kavadi carriers, the music is to let them forget the pain and let them concentrate and to fulfil their mission, which is to carry the kavadi and milk offered to the deities.

However, over the years, restrictions have been placed on the noise level generated at public events, and as highlighted earlier, music and songs are disallowed along the processional route. This reflects a larger policy in Singapore which is translated and experienced in a variety of contexts. For example, the traditional call to prayer in rural settings and small Muslim communities used to be made through a loudspeaker in the local mosque. This became regulated because population growth and urbanization in Singapore, with its new social set-up, had caused such sound production to sometimes be regarded as intrusive by those who are not co-religionists or involved in the particular events (Lee 1999). State regulations on “noise pollution” were therefore introduced, including turning the loudspeakers inwards towards the mosque rather than outwards, specifying acceptable noise levels for events such as Chinese operas, funeral processions, church bells, music during weddings, in record shops and places of entertainment. Even state-endorsed and state-encouraged nation-building activities, such as the recitation of pledges in schools, were subject to these rules. Thus, the injunction on “noise” production during the procession may be understood within this context. As a consequence, the desired “poetic” value of music as expressed by participants is curtailed and has become embedded in a quest for aural space in religious activity. This politics of sound and space is in turn expressed in a variety of ways, from the most supportive to actions which attempt to circumvent the intent of the law. Elaborations below will demonstrate the range of reactions. At one end of the spectrum, Vani expresses full support for the regulations: 309

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I fully support the government doing this … because teenagers especially tend to take advantage if there are no rules, so they made the whole procession look like a hooligan get-together because they would dress in black and they end up taking garbage cans and turning them upside down like playing drums. So what happens was that it led to unnecessary fights because you have a lot of gangs here and a lot of gangs there and compete who can make more louder noise and stuff like that. So these were all unnecessary and you can find policemen arresting people. This is not supposed to be done when you are doing something sacred going on there. So after the restrictions were imposed, you can’t find things like that now and it looks more festive.

Others accept but without the same sense of support, such as Rama, who points to Singapore’s perceived political culture of compliance: I think we just learn… you know we Singaporeans are so obedient. Okay I mean, as long as we feel that government says we obey, you know. So I think that’s no problem. We may complain, we may complain but ultimately we still follow the rules.

Yet others hope for change, emphasizing the religious value of music and song, believing that “singing those holy songs” help the kavadi carrier to concentrate his attention on God, because “the moment the music stops, his mind will wander” (Selva). Two kavadi carriers share their experience thus: You see when I walk in the procession without any music, I feel frustrated. Very. But when you hear the music, there is somebody singing about the Lord with the beautiful words and everything, and you automatically forget everything around you and you just gracefully dance with the music and I think that’s the best thing to do (Mohan). On that day, from my personal experience, you hear the group singing with the music and they are singing religious hymns. You feel in touch with it physically and spiritually and also you don’t think of the weight, you don’t think of the pain or whatever. You are very focused because the atmosphere, the environment, the music, the air, the sound, they will give you spiritual upliftment. And then some people get into a trance because probably they get carried away by the music and are so deep in concentration that they get carried away and they start dancing (Rama).

While Selva believes the effect is “more psychological”, Shamala believes it is spiritual, for “we believe that when we chant and call the Lord, the Lord will 310

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take away his pain”. Kalpana, in turn, highlights the performative element of the procession as “an offering to the god”. In contrast, others are quite vituperative in their response. Mano, a vocal participant with clearly strong views, offers a strong critique, and reveals the appeals that have transpired: We asked the temple and everything. They said no, they said it’s against the law. Most of them, some of them, even myself, sometimes I say walking like that, it’s just like attending a funeral with no music and all. Makes us feel like that. Sometimes I should say with so many regulations and everything, so after a while you’re fulfilling the vows and everything, you should do it happily. Wholeheartedly. Not with the thinking, cursing somebody. There’s not music or anything so I hope the government will consider all these people’s request. We have written in to the temple and asked them. As you can see, people are behaving better nowadays, some of the people, maybe slowly they will give you music or they can even put a music round maybe 100 metres because it’s quite a religious day and it’s recognized in the world as well. Everybody knows that Thaipusam is a very grand thing so maybe we should think of something, compromise somewhere and then make everybody happy. I hope something will work out.

For some, the appeal is built on the logic that if there are those misbehaving, action should be taken against them rather than to have a blanket ban on music, thus calling on the authorities to be more discriminatory in their strategies of management. Finally, in a fairly circular way, some interviewees point out that it is because musical instruments are banned that there are those who circumvent that by using empty tin cans and dustbins for improvization, thus resisting sanctions in symbolic ways: These guys use dustbins. So when they see the police officer, they just put it down. After that they just pick it up again (Shamala). …previously you were allowed to carry drums and all that so when they banned the drums and all that some of them started taking empty tins and knocking because it still makes the music you see. It’s because if you confiscate the drum, they lose the drum. But if you want to confiscate the tin, they say, take the tin, feel free. Because it’s just an empty tin, because they wanted the music, and there was no music (Mohan).

Thus, the ban on music led to the creation of improvised sound, which in turn led to the perception amongst other participants and observers of a 311

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lack of respect and religious values, thus ironically prompting their support of the ban.

Negotiating Sacred Time Inasmuch as the poetics and politics of soundscapes are negotiated in the construction of an aurally defined sacred space, so too has the bracketing of time come to shape the practice of religion. In the history of religion, days and times of the day have traditionally been set aside for religious practice, what Eliade (1959) has referred to as “sacred time”. Sacred time is thus that time during which religion is foregrounded, and is to be set apart from secular time. In contemporary society, the time that is marked out as sacred is again a negotiated outcome between secular and religious agents. This is evident at two levels in the context of Thaipusam in Singapore: (1) in the official appointment of public holidays tied to religious festivals and (2) in the allocation of time for religious activity in the public sphere. Indeed, apart from the choice of the day, other aspects of managing that time are much more guided by pragmatic secular considerations than religious ones. In the official Singapore calendar, a series of public holidays are identified, corresponding to religious and cultural festivals: Vesak Day (Buddhist), Hari Raya Puasa Aidilfitri and Hari Raya Haji (Muslim), Deepavali (Hindu), Good Friday and Christmas (Christian), and New Year’s Day and Chinese New Year. There are, additionally, the secular public holidays, Labour Day and National Day. While clearly acknowledging the multi-religious profile of the Singapore population, the choice of religious festivals that deserve public holiday status in many ways defines the extent of religious activity and participation that is facilitated for particular religious groups. Thus, several interviewees commented on how the lack of a public holiday for Thaipusam created difficulties for them. Shamala, for example, explains the inconveniences as she was not able to take time off work, and therefore had to participate in the procession very early in the morning or late in the evening. This in turn posed other problems — the extra cost of transportation in the early hours of the morning, recalling that milk pot bearers could start at 2 a.m. (“you have to pay double charges unless you have people to help you”), and the congestion in the post-work rush hour (“tempers flare for those in the traffic jam held up by us”). This is echoed by Pany who recounts as follows: It is not a public holiday so everybody does it early morning …they get ready and start the first journey at 2 a.m. and hopefully they can get back by 5 and they can report to work, you see. Or they do it in the evening 312

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and when they do it in the evening, it ends very late. It can end as late as 12 or 1 a.m., causing a congestion and traffic jam at the entrance of the other temple so these are the inconveniences. I think because there is no public holiday, and the working people would try to finish it in the morning. I believe that if it is a holiday, then there is a free flow in the morning around 9 to 11, there will be people participating. But because of these restrictions, there is heavy traffic. There is heavy traffic early in the morning and heavy traffic late in the evening.

While the sacred day is not marked out in the secular calendar as a public holiday, the bracketing of time within the day itself is guided by temple regulations based on pragmatic considerations of crowd control and safety, as well as by self “regulation”, again based on the pragmatics of tropical, urban living. Temple regulations stipulate that those carrying milk pots may start at 2.00 a.m. though kavadis and rathams may only begin at 7.00 a.m., with the last participant beginning at 7.30 p.m. This bracketing of time is based essentially on pragmatic considerations, to spread out the activities over as many hours as possible to avoid congestion, and to have those with the bigger paraphernalia of kavadis and rathams out on the streets only after the break of light. Additionally, participants further bracket the time in view of the hot afternoon sun in tropical Singapore, so that few take to the streets during the afternoon hours. Whereas scholars of religion have written abundantly about sacred time as set apart from ordinary time, during which religious activities are propitious, in the context of Thaipusam processions, apart from the identification of a sacred day, which hours of the day particularly attract religious activity and which represent “down time” is more guided by pragmatic considerations than by religious ones.

Negotiating Sacred Pathways The processional route, as indicated earlier, begins from Sri Srinivasa Perumal in Serangoon Road and ends in Sri Thendayuthapani in Tank Road, a journey of some four kilometres. The former is in the heart of Singapore’s Little India district, and the journey brings participants past a number of temples in that district. Previously, the route was symbolically significant because participants would wind past the Kaliaman Temple1 (known as the “mother’s temple”), and the Sivan Temple (known as the “father’s temple”) in Dhoby Ghaut. Devotees passing these temples would therefore pay homage to the “mother” and “father”. However, the Sivan temple was relocated from the Dhoby Ghaut area to a temporary site next to Sri Srinivasa Perumal in 313

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1984 and then to a permanent site in Geylang East in 1993. This move occurred because of the construction of a mass rapid transit station where it stood and, despite appeals to the contrary, was relocated. Since 1993, the deity Siva has been brought annually to the Perumal Temple on the eve of Thaipusam, staying there until the night of Thaipusam. This allows devotees to pay homage to the “father” from the start of the procession, before passing by the “mother” en route to Sri Thendayuthapani. In short, despite the community’s investment of symbolic meaning in the Sivan Temple and its location, secular priorities prevailed, and ritual adjustments were introduced to manage secular changes that impact on religious practice. This might be contrasted to observations of the value of symbolic meaning over pragmatic considerations in some other contexts. For example, Berger (1968, quoted in Davis 1985, p. 266), highlights that the routes that public processions take are symbolically important because they “[signify] a ‘capturing’ or taking over of various parts of the city”, the outcome of the sheer numbers of marchers “transform[ing] the areas through which they march into a ‘temporary stage’ on which they dramatize the power they still lack”. In this account of Thaipusam, however, the state’s control of the processional route and the resultant modifications to religious practice suggest that significant priority is given to secular needs over the symbolic meanings invested by a religious community. That the “capture” of space is neither symbolic nor real but prescribed and regulated tampers the “crowd power” that the processional literature presents.

CONCLUSION Since 1964 when the procession celebrating Prophet Mohammad’s birthday erupted into a riot, Singapore has been carefully managing public expressions of religion, and indeed, other processions involving assemblies of people and public displays of spectacle. This is understandable, particularly given how the preceding analysis endorses the view that processions are arenas for competing religious and secular discourses, and are multi-vocal, of social and political significance. In focusing on the social and political dimensions of procession, this chapter has illustrated how social relations (including family, friendship, and inter- and intra-community ties) are reinforced, challenged or watched over through participation in the event. It has also demonstrated how belief in egalitarian association on account of common participation in the event and mutual support among participants is misplaced. It is concluded therefore, 314

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that the traditional concept of communitas associated with pilgrimages and the notion of solidarity, belonging and group cohesion in processions perhaps remain relevant in some ways, but may have been over-extended in a somewhat romanticized notion of egalitarianism and bounded community. Politically, the processions are occasions when meanings are balanced and negotiated by state, temple and individual. These meanings may revolve around the significance of sound in religious experience and the associated symbolic resistance to state prohibitions and temple regulations. They may be about the secular acknowledgement of religious time through suitable bracketing out of that time in the secular calendar. They may involve the ritual adjustments made to accommodate state modifications of sacred pathways. In all of this, the politics at work is not that of overt confrontation or party politics or grand strategy, but one of everyday negotiations and local level “tactics” (de Certeau 1984). Given Singapore’s freedom of worship policy, time and space have been available for adherents to participate in the procession (despite some inconvenience). Participants have also been able to re-negotiate meanings and values, finding ways to make music and pay homage to the “father” god. As a consequence, one of the conditions for the violence and aggression sometimes associated with religion in general and such events in particular, is removed. However, the seeds of some dispirited and sometimes exasperated disappointment are present, directed at the constraints on religious musicmaking, the perverse and unintended encouragement it gives to rowdy noisemakers on the pretext of creating an aurally-defined sacred atmosphere for participants, the crowdedness of the event which lends itself to a channelling of frustrations towards “foreigners” and “youngsters”, and the absence of an acknowledgement of this religious event on the secular calendar, which is deemed to further contribute to early morning pre-workday crowdedness. Together, they have not seemed sufficient to constitute severe discontent. Nevertheless, it is imperative that these sources of irritation and discontent are recognized, with potential adjustments made to policy as circumstances change, for example, when the number of participants and observers grow or when the profile of participants change. Finally, that religious experience is a multi-faceted one bears emphasis here. The geographer of religion is therefore required to go beyond a focus on the religious landscape of churches, temples, mosques, synagogues and so forth, which has hitherto been the primary focus. Certainly, sacred space is defined visually and materially through landscapes, but it is also constituted of soundscapes and timescapes, as the aural and temporal also contribute to the marking out of sacred space. Religion, to that extent, is an integrative 315

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institution, and religious experience may be best understood as a wholly integrated one, of sight, sound, emotion, and time. It is only with this understanding that secular rules and regulations may be crafted to achieve pragmatic secular ends, particularly in multi-religious urban contexts, while respecting religious imperatives.

Note Earlier verions of this paper are available as Kong (2005, 2006). 1. Kaliaman is the consort of Siva.

References Bakhtin, Mikhail. Rabelais and His World. Helene Iswolsky (trans.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,1968. Campo, Juan Eduardo. “American Pilgrimage Landscapes”. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 558 (1998): 40–56. Davis, Susan. G. Parades and Power: Street Theatre in Nineteenth Century Philadelphia. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986. De Certeau, Michel. The Practice of Everyday Life. Steven F. Rendail (trans.). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Eade, John and Michael J. Sallnow, eds. Contesting the Sacred: The Anthropology of Christian Pilgrimage. New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, 1991. Eliade, Mircea. The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion. Willard R. Trask (trans.). San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1959. Folch-Serra, Michael. “Place, Voice, Space: Mikhail Bakhtin’s Dialogical-Landscape”. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 8 (1990): 255–74. Goheen, P. G. “The Ritual of the Streets in Mid-19th-century Toronto”. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 11 (1993): 127–45. Graham, Brian and Michael Murray. “The Spiritual and the Profane: The Pilgrimage to Santiago de Compostela”. Ecumene 4 (1997): 389–409. Jackson, Peter. “Street Life: The Politics of Carnival”. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 6 (1998): 213–27. Jurkovich, James M. and Wilbert M. Gesler. “Medjugorje: Finding Peace at the Heart of Conflict”. The Geographical Review 87, no. 4 (1997): 447–67. Kaplan, Terence. “Civic Rituals and Patterns of Resistance in Barcelona, 1890– 1930”. The Power of the Past: Essays for Eric Hobsbawm, edited by P. Thane, G. Crossick and R. Floud, pp. 173–94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. Kong, Lily. “Geography and Religion: Trends and Prospects”. Progress in Human Geography 14, no. 3 (1982): 355–71. ———. “Mapping ‘new’ Geographies of Religion: Politics and Poetics of Modernity”. 316

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Progress in Human Geography 25, no. 2 (2001): 211–33. ———. “Religious Processions: Urban Politics and Poetics”. Temenos, Finnish Journal of Religion 14, no. 2 (2005): 225–49. ———. “The Politics and Poetics of Religion: Hindu Processions and Urban Conflicts”. In Negotiating Urban Conflicts: Interaction, Space and Control, edited by L. Berklmg et al., pp. 85–98. Verlag. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2006. Kong, Lily and Brenda S. A. Yeoh. “The Construction of National Identity Through the Production of Ritual and Spectacle: An Analysis of National Day Parades in Singapore”. Political Geography 16, no. 3 (1997): 213–39. Lawrence, David. “Parades, Politics and Competing Urban Images: Doo Dah and Roses”. Urban Anthropology 4, no. 2 (1982): 155–76. Lee, Tong Soon “Technology and the Production of Islamic Space: The Call to Prayer in Singapore”. Ethnomusicology 43 (1999): 86–100. Lewis, Claire and TevePile. “Woman, Body, Space: Rio Carnival and the Politics of Performance”. Gender, Place and Culture 3, no. 1 (1996): 23–42. Marston, Sallie A. “Public Rituals and Community Power: St. Patrick’s Day Parades in Lowell, Massachusetts, 1841–1874”. Political Geography Quarterly 8 (1996): 255–69. Murray, Michael and Brian Graham. “Exploring the Dialectics of Route-based Tourism: The Camino de Santiago”. Tourism Management 18, no. 8, pp. 513–24. Turner, Victor. Dramas, Fields and Metaphors. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974. Young, William C. “The Ka’ba, Gender, and The Rites of Pilgrimage”. Middle East Studies 25 (1993): 285–300.

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PART II Religion in Schools and Among the Young

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13 FROM MORAL VALUES TO CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION The Teaching of Religion in Singapore Schools Charlene Tan

INTRODUCTION To many people, “religion” is an emotive word. It is therefore not surprising that the teaching of religion in schools elicits strong responses from people. For example, Kazepides avers that religious beliefs do not and cannot aim at enriching and developing the human mind; instead they lead to people living “under an absolute, palpable tyranny” (1983, p. 264). On the other hand, policymakers in England and Wales, in making religious education compulsory in state schools, see it as morally educative and socially beneficial for students (Hand and White 2004). Given the fact that Singapore is a multi-religious society and that some form of religious teaching exists in the schools, it is intriguing and pertinent to explore the teaching of religion in Singapore schools. This chapter discusses the attempts by the government to teach religious beliefs and practices in Singapore schools for the purpose of inculcating moral values and promoting citizenship education. It points out the shortcomings of the current approach used in the teaching of religion in schools, and explores Spiritual Education (SE) as a possible alternative. 321

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THE CONTEXT It has been argued that the Singapore government has adopted a secular stance towards religious institutions, and expects all religions to adjust to the state ideology (for example, see Ling 1987; Ackermann 1999). A number of researchers have also pointed out that religion is taught in Singapore schools with the aims of promoting moral values, social cohesion and national unity (for example, see Tan 1994; Chew 1998; Tan 2000; Tan and Chew 2004). Religious studies were formally introduced to all secondary schools as a compulsory subject known as Religious Knowledge (RK) in the 1980s. To understand why RK was introduced in 1984, it is important to know the challenges and needs during that period. The bold measure to introduce RK was due to both push and pull factors. Under the “push” factors, there was an expressed concern that the young in Singapore were susceptible to what was perceived to be negative Western moral values. Government leaders at that time believed that industrialization, urbanization and modernization had led to increasing social problems and the abandonment of traditional values (Gopinathan 1980; Tan 2000). A second push factor was the general dissatisfaction with the way moral education was being taught in the schools. A number of criticisms were levelled against the teaching of moral education in the “Report on Moral Education” published in 1979. In terms of content, the report found the presentations in the Civics textbooks “generally dull and somewhat factual and dogmatic” (Ong 1979, p. 5). It criticized the teaching of moral values as too didactic, with many do’s and don’ts without adequate justification for these injunctions. There was also insufficient explanation and illustration of the moral values and attitudes to be inculcated. Even when stories of great historical and religious leaders were used, the report noted that it was “just a narrative of historical events with factual biographical information on the personages in question” (ibid., p. 5). To aggravate the problem, the report found that both teachers and students did not treat moral education lessons seriously because they were not examination subjects. Similar concerns were raised in another report by a team of educators led by Dr Eng Soo Peck, then the Head of the School of Professional Studies at the Institute of Education. It noted that the lessons were teacher-dominated where the students were unable to discuss and provide meaningful feedback, and further hampered by the psychological cultural barrier of articulating one’s feelings to others. The recommendation was for the content to relate to the students’ experiences and interests. The report also highlighted the lack of 322

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a clear-cut reference point or theoretical framework to make the teaching of moral values coherent and convincing: Most of the programmes lack a conceptual framework to provide a basis to organise the concepts and guide the selection of content. The result is a conglomerate of values or concepts that are strung loosely together without any attempt to organise them in sequence or order (Eng 1981, p. 45).

The above set the background for the “pull” factors towards RK where the spotlight was on the role of religion in moral education. In contrast to the unfavourable review of moral education taught in secular schools, the 1979 report spoke favourably of moral education programmes in mission schools. Arguing that religious studies helped to reinforce the teaching of moral values, it concluded that the teachers in mission schools were able to teach more persuasively because of their strong religious background. Subsequently, Bible Knowledge and Islamic Religious Knowledge were accepted as examination subjects for upper secondary students in 1979. Three committees were also set up to introduce Muslim, Hindu and Buddhist Studies to schools (Tan 2000). In 1982, the government formally announced the introduction of RK to all upper secondary students (Secondary Three, Four and Five) with effect from 1984.

RELIGION AND MORAL VALUES RK was taught in all secondary schools from 1984 to 1989. Students had a total of six options: Bible Knowledge (in English), Islamic Religious Knowledge (in English and Malay), Buddhist Studies (in Chinese and English), Confucian Ethics (in Chinese and English), Hindu Studies (in English), and Sikh Studies (in English). Parents were allowed to freely choose one of these six RK subjects for their children to study from Secondary three onwards. All students had to continue with the subject when they progressed to Secondary Four (for Express course students) or Secondary Five (for Normal course students), and could offer it as an elective subject at the GCE “O” Level Examinations and use the grade obtained to gain admission to pre-university classes (CPD 1988). The government was in charge of the curriculum design, staff training and assessment of RK, although various religious organizations were consulted in the preparation of the teaching materials. It is also important to point out that as the study of religions was potentially sensitive, the government stated from the beginning that there should be no attempt by RK teachers to preach, proselytize or engage in religious activities. 323

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Given that RK was meant to support the moral values the government wanted to inculcate in the young, there was a strong emphasis on RK’s moral aspects. For example, the Ministry of Education (MOE) stated that Buddhist Studies aimed to help students “acquire the qualities of moral awareness, social responsibility and psychological maturity” (CPD 1988, p. 14). For Confucian Ethics, it was pointed out that pupils should know “the importance of self-cultivation, the different Confucian forms of life and the network of human relatedness”, while students taking Hindu Studies are expected to “acquire some basic moral precepts” (ibid., p. 14). Similarly, the studying of Islamic Religious Knowledge aimed to help students “acquire right values that will lead to moral uprightness and meaningful living”, while the studying of Sikh Studies aimed to help students “acquire desirable moral values and codes of behaviour” (ibid., p. 15). The only exception, interestingly, was Bible Knowledge where there was no mention of any moral component. Instead, the course outline stated that the subject aimed to help students “understand and appreciate the significance of the life and teachings of Jesus Christ through the study of the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles” (ibid., p. 14). The reason for this exception was that Bible Knowledge, which was already introduced in 1979 as an optional subject in schools, was set by the Cambridge Examinations Syndicate in England and not by the Ministry of Education in Singapore (ibid., p. 10). However, RK was withdrawn after 1989 due to several reasons. The government explained that the exclusive study of one religion by students had emphasized religious differences and led to proselytization (Remaking Singapore Committee 2004). The teaching of RK also coincided with the broader trend of religious revivalism and shifts in the 1980s. The concern by the government that RK may have contributed to this trend of religious zeal was confirmed by studies conducted by Kuo, Quah and Tong (1988). They reported that the introduction of RK, especially Buddhist Studies and Bible Knowledge, had unintentionally attracted the young to these religions (also see Tong 1989). By highlighting the more rational aspects of these religions in RK, they appealed more to young people who were willing to give up what they perceived to be “illogical” and “superstitious” traditional Chinese religions (Tong 2004).

RELIGION AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION RK was subsequently replaced by a new Civics and Moral Education (CME) programme in 1992. Some religious beliefs and practices were also included in National Education (NE) which was launched in 1997. Unlike RK, CME 324

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is not an examination subject although it is compulsory for the students. The focus of CME is citizenship education where students are inculcated national values for economic and political socialization (Chew 1998; Tan and Chew 2004). One of the modules for CME is Community Spirit which has the aim of “fostering a greater sense of belonging to and care for the community, as well as cultural and religious appreciation” (CPDD 2001). To promote religious appreciation, key religious beliefs and practices are taught in the CME textbook. Students are instructed in the Secondary Three CME book that it is important to know about the beliefs and customs of others so that they can help to promote and maintain racial and religious understanding and harmony (ibid., p. 15). They are introduced to the basic beliefs and practices of the various religions through interesting and fun activities such as completing crossword puzzles, filling in the blanks and drawing pictures and symbols. To ensure that students will not be judgemental or negative towards other religions, the book asks students to identify and write down some of the common values taught in the major systems of beliefs in Singapore. The learning point is spelt out thus: “Each system of beliefs may be based on different fundamental beliefs and practices, but ALL emphasise universal values” (ibid., p. 21). The main religious festivals of the different religions are also mentioned: Baisakji, Christmas, Deepavali, Hari Raya Puasa, Qing Ming, Vesak, Zhong Yuan Jie. That the focus is on the promotion of religious harmony rather than an exploration of the religious teachings is seen in the exercise where students are asked the following question: Think of a festival that you celebrated with a friend of a different racial or religious background. Reflect on how this celebration has helped you to know your friend better and complete the exercise below (ibid., p. 26). To help students put their religious knowledge into practice, they are given an etiquette guide relating to certain important religious customs and rules of behaviour. This includes guidelines on diets, meal etiquette, offering of gifts, and appropriate behaviour and dress codes at weddings, funerals and places of worship. However, the guidelines are brief and do not explain the rationale behind the dos and don’ts. Students are also asked how they can be sensitive to the needs and feelings of people of other religions, and how this helps to foster better relations. Factual knowledge of the religions previously covered in RK is incorporated into the CME syllabus, although in a less detailed and potentially less divisive manner (Chew 1998). In alignment with the government’s policy not to impart religious beliefs or induce religious experience, various religious teachings are presented in a historical, objective and detached manner. Exclusive and controversial claims are omitted, and potentially offensive words and 325

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issues like hell, condemnation and the fate of those who subscribe to other religions are left out. For example, the notes on Christianity explain that Jesus Christ “came as man to show mankind what God is like and what God wants from them, and to bring salvation to all” (ibid., p. 44). But there is little elaboration on why mankind needs salvation — a topic that is unavoidably linked to the Christian doctrines of sin, hell and redemption. The notes also stress on the need for Christians to love God and others through acts of love. But what is omitted is that Christians are commanded to love non-Christians by sharing their faith with them in the hope of converting them. The topic of religious conversion, of course, is highly sensitive in multi-religious Singapore, and is understandably omitted from the notes. But how then can a Singaporean Christian balance his or her religious duty to evangelize on the one hand, and his or her civic duty to preserve religious harmony on the other? This and other thorny but real issues and dilemmas faced by adherents of different religions are not addressed in the course notes. The notes also do not discuss, clarify or dispel any misconceptions the public may have of certain religions. The importance of religious understanding and harmony is also highlighted in NE. Launched in 1997, NE aims to develop in all Singaporeans national cohesion, the instinct for survival, and confidence in the future. One of six messages of NE is the preservation of racial and religious harmony. The government hopes to achieve this by infusing NE across subjects in the curriculum, and subjects such as Social Studies, CME, History, Geography and General Paper are identified as particularly suitable for the infusion of NE. Special days such as Racial Harmony Day (21 July) and International Friendship Day (third working Friday of Term Two) are also celebrated in schools. To preserve religious harmony, the NE website includes write-ups of different religious festivals such as Ramadan, Hari Raya Puasa, the Hungry Ghosts Festival, Easter, and Deepavali. Different religious festivals are briefly and descriptively presented in the form of “what”, “who”, “where”, “why” and “how”. For example, in the description of Vesak Day, the website explains the “what” (it commemorates three major events in the life of Siddharta Gautama Shakyamuni Buddha: his birth, enlightenment and Nirvana), “when” (it falls on the full moon of the fourth lunar month of the Indian calendar), “who” (the Buddhist community in Singapore is made up of various sects), and “how” (general rites and rituals practised on that day include the chanting of mantras and the pouring of perfumed water over the Buddha’s statue as a sign of respect and devotion, etc.). Neither the metaphysical meaning of “enlightenment” and “Nirvana”, nor the religious significance of chanting the mantra or pouring perfumed water over the Buddha’s statue, is elaborated. It 326

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is therefore difficult to see how the study of various religions is effective in helping students to have a sufficiently accurate understanding of any particular religion.

REFLECTIONS ON THE TEACHING OF RELIGION IN SINGAPORE SCHOOLS Two observations can be made about the government’s use of religion in education. The first is its assumption that there is a direct correlation between religion and morality. The government withdrew RK due to contingent reasons which prevailed at that time, and not due to its repudiation of the philosophical justification of religious education. In fact, then Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated that the government still believed in the rationale of reinforcing the moral education that students had received in their earlier years through a major religion (Parliamentary Debates, 54, 6 October 1989, cols. 579, pp. 622–25, quoted in Tan 2000, p. 93). A number of writers have pointed out how religion(s) can help a person to think and act morally. Moulavi avers that “it is a fact that moral education cannot succeed without religious education, because morality has its foundation and root in religion” (1987, p. 8). Haydon (1997) argues that religion beliefs provide the wider framework of meaning for moral demands to be experienced. Jesuit priest Dr (Rev) Robert Balhetchet, who was involved in preparing the secular moral education programme in Singapore, explains that there is an added dimension for Christians to be moral as they believe that goodness comes from God (Straits Times, 22 October 2002). By underscoring things that are metaphysical and transcendent, most religions also promote “less pragmatic and utilitarian attitudes and dispositions [such] as faith, hope, charity, forgiveness, chastity and so forth” (Carr 1995, p. 95). Some parents also share the belief that religious knowledge is salubrious for their children’s moral development. It is reported that non-religious Chinese parents in Hong Kong are keen to send their children to religious schools because they perceive that these schools have more effective moral education (Cheng 2004). In their empirical research, Taris and Semin (1997) also conclude that the religious faith of mothers helps in the transmission of moral values to their children. They note that widely shared and objectively important core values such as caring, honesty and fairness are passed down from the mothers to their children. However, it is important to note that the mere teaching of religious knowledge does not automatically translate into greater moral commitment. The positive effect of religion on morality depends on other factors such as 327

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religious orientation and level of education. In an empirical study on how religiosity affects moral development, Ji (2004) concludes that the degree of devout commitment to traditional religious doctrines and beliefs is conversely related to the likelihood that Christians act at the principled-level of moral reasoning. This means that a fervent believer who holds dogmatically to teachings from his or her religious leaders is less likely to reason morally and act independently. This can be potentially dangerous if the religious beliefs are not shared by others in the society, or worse, are detrimental to society at large.1 The second observation on the government’s use of religion in education concerns its approach adopted in the teaching of religion in schools. There are two main approaches in religious education: teaching for commitment, and teaching about commitment.2 The first approach, “teaching for commitment” or the confessional approach is traditionally used in ancient churches to encourage the learners to embrace the faith. Such an approach has been criticized as being unscientific and indoctrinative, making the learners uncritical and dogmatic (Kazepides 1983; Carr 1996). This approach is also inconsistent with the demands of a knowledge-based economy where students are expected to be critical and creative thinkers.3 The rejection of the confessional approach has given rise to the “teaching about commitment” approach. This approach concentrates on different social and cultural expressions of spirituality, rather than induction into substantial spiritual beliefs (Carr 1996). The “teaching about commitment” approach is the approach adopted by the Singapore government. In taking this approach, the government has explicitly distinguished “religious knowledge” from “religious instruction”, and clarified that the former aims to inform the students “about the religion, its founder or its origins, and the universal moral teachings and main beliefs of the religion” (Parliamentary Debates, 41, 3 March 1982, col. 373; quoted in Tan 2000, p. 86). As pointed out earlier, various religions were discussed in the materials for RK, CME and NE in a historical, objective and detached manner (Hill and Lian 1995; Kuah 1991; Gopinanthan 1999; Tan 2000). This “teaching about commitment” approach has, however, met with a number of objections. The most common criticism is that it does not represent the true character of religion in its Herculean quest to avoid any religious point of view. By being predominantly informational, the result is that a truncated version of the religion is presented (Carr 1996). Moran (1994) adds that this approach is neither possible nor desirable since one cannot fully understand religion without a minimum level of personal interest 328

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in it. Consequently, it distances children from directly apprehending the religious experience. Indeed, the multi-faith approach may lead to “a position of extreme relativism in which all belief systems are included in a value free hotch-potch” (Cox, quoted in Bates 1996, p. 96). This approach also does not ensure that the teacher will not teach the religion in a prescriptive and biased manner. Bartkowiak points out that “a teacher could, deliberately or inadvertently, teach comparative and historical material on religions in a manner that amounts to the teaching of a particular religion” (1999, p. 199). Overall, this approach makes it difficult for the students to acquire sufficient religious knowledge for them to appreciate the major religions in Singapore, and to imbibe the moral teachings propounded by these religions.

EXPLORING THE OPTIONS Multireligious Education If the descriptive, objective and sanitized version of belief systems under the “teaching about commitment” approach is eschewed, how then can the same materials be presented in a lively, powerful, and yet acceptable way? One possibility is to introduce a multi-religious subject where students learn about the various religions from a prescribed textbook in schools. This option was considered back in the 1980s and was suggested again in recent years (for example, Remarking Singapore Committee 2004; P. Tan 2005). But it was rejected by the Government in 1989 due to practical constraints which still exist today. As Dr Tony Tan, then Minister for Education explained in a speech in Parliament on 20 March 1989: [T]here was disagreement among the various religious bodies as to which religions should be included … Once settled on the religions, the Ministry found that no one could agree on which aspects of which religion should be included for study … Indeed, the Ministry could not find any academic, either in Singapore or overseas, who was brave enough to try and write a textbook on this subject which should be simple enough to be understood by secondary school students. The final blow came when the Ministry realized that, even if the syllabus could be agreed and materials developed, there was no possibility of finding teachers who would be sufficiently conversant with the main principles of five or six religions to the extent that they could confidently present a fair and unbiased picture to their students (quoted in Remaking Singapore Committee 2004, p. 2).

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The challenges mentioned remain. To illustrate the difficulty of producing a textbook generally acceptable to adherents of all religions, it is useful to look at the materials produced by the Inter-Religious Organization (IRO). The IRO’s materials are not used as textbooks but they give us a glimpse of what a book to promote religious understanding and harmony may look like. One of its publications is Religions in Singapore where nine religions (Baha’i Faith, Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism, Taoism, and Zoroastrianism) are included. Essays on each of the nine religions were drafted by IRO members who are adherents of the respective religions (Inter-Religious Organization 1999, p. 3). The strength of the book is that it goes beyond the mere description of the various religions to elaborate on various religious concepts. For example, there is a clear exposition of the Buddhist teaching of suffering. The reader is introduced to a systematic treatment of the cause of suffering, the six realms in which one may be reborn, the four unavoidable physical sufferings — birth, old age, sickness and death — and three forms of mental suffering — separation from the people one loves, contact with people one dislikes, and the frustration of desires. The IRO book is also instructive in addressing key issues of concern and controversy as viewed by a particular religion. For example, the section on “War and Peace, Code of Ethics” for Islam explains: It is therefore shocking that some quarters of the media are trumpeting that Jihad means Holy War. Jihad is any all-out but legitimate effort to remove any kind of evil whether it is corruption, ignorance, superstition or the enemy occupying one’s country’s territory. To propagate the teachings of the Quran peacefully is a Jihad, while the Greater Jihad is to fight one’s evil desire, the ego within (Inter-Religious Organization 1999, p. 135).

However, giving more liberty to the subscribers of various religions to promote their religions may give rise to some unintended negative consequences. For example, different writers can make a number of competing claims in praise of their own religions which may not go down well with adherents of other religions. For example, the writer for Zoroastrianism in the IRO book writes: “Zoroastrians are world famous for their honesty, integrity, compassion and charity. It is very difficult to equal the charitable spirit of Zoroastrians” (ibid., p. 63). There is also the use of emotive words and value judgements in the section on Christianity which may cast the religion in a bad light: 330

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A tragedy of Christian history is that the one church of Jesus Christ is fragmented into many churches. Today there is wounded unity in the body of Christ. Undoubtedly this happened because Christians preached their own message instead of heeding the gospel call to repentance and service (ibid., p. 121).

The readers, particularly the Christians, may prefer a less controversial and objective account. In another example, the textbook for CME describes the existence of different Christian denominations as follows: Today, there are many denominations of Christians such as the Anglicans, Catholics, Lutherans, Methodists and Presbyterians. All of them basically believe in Jesus Christ but their interpretations and emphases are different in certain aspects (CPDD 2001, p. 45).

Some Christians and Catholics may also disagree with the book’s classification of the Roman Catholic church as a “denomination”. In writing a book that is generally acceptable to adherents of all religions, there appears to be a tendency to minimize or overlook the fundamental differences among the religions in the attempt to emphasize their commonalities. For example, another publication by the IRO reports a religious representative at one IRO meeting praying as follows: “Oh Lord, the different paths which men take through different tendencies, various though they may be, various though they may appear, crooked or straight, all lead to Thee” (quoted in Inter-Religious Organization 1987, p. 28). In the opening address at the IRO meeting, another representative said: Many are the names of God and infinite the forms that help us to know Him. By whatever name and form you desire to know Him, in that very form and under that name you will see Him. Different creeds are but different paths to reach the one God (quoted in Inter-Religious Organization 1987, p. 5).

While some religions may indeed teach that there are different paths to reach the one God, there are other religions, supported by their sacred texts, which strongly believe that their way is the only way to salvation. For a multireligious textbook to be acceptable by all religions, it should accurately reflect the teachings of the various religions, including the exclusive claims, while promoting religious appreciation and harmony at the same time. Clearly, this is a daunting task for any textbook writer and teacher of religious education in schools. 331

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Spiritual Education (SE) Another option is Spiritual Education (SE). The common association of Religious Education (RE) with the “teaching for commitment” or confessional approaches has led some writers to favour SE over RE. The distinction between SE and RE, of course, depends on what one means by “religion” and “spirituality”. The common understanding of religion is that it consists of “a set of ethics, doctrines, organizational hierarchies, and the history of any particular religion” (Minney 1991, p. 388). On the other hand, spirituality is understood as “a function of appreciation or reflection upon ideals or goals which are both apt for positive moral evaluation and concerned with those aspects of human experience which attempt to reach beyond the mundane and the material towards what is transcendent and eternal” (Carr 1995, p. 90).4 It is a distinctive capacity for the individual to make sense of oneself within a wider framework of meaning and see oneself as part of some larger whole (Hill 1989; Minney 1991; Haydon 1997). SE aims to help students acquire insights into their personal existence which are of enduring worth, attribute meaning to their life experiences, and value a non-material and transcendental dimension to life (NCC 1993; OFSTED 1994). Key aspects of spiritual development include a sense of awe, wonder and mystery, feelings of transcendence, search for meaning and purpose, and self-knowledge (Erricker 2000). Spiritual development may include but is not confined to any set of religious beliefs, institutionalized belief system, or any realm of worship. Although the term “spirituality” is popularly associated with certain religions and trends such as the Kabbalah and the New Age movement, there is no necessary connection between SE and these religious manifestations. Schools can promote SE through all areas of their curriculum, ethos and climate (OFSTED 1994). Spiritual development could take place in various subjects across the curriculum, especially the arts — literature, poetry, drama, painting and music. Carr avers that the arts “have a key part to play in communicating or explicating the sense of a connection between the temporal and the eternal, the finite and the infinite, the material world and the world of the soul, in human affairs” (Carr 1995, p. 95). Universal themes and values from both religious and non-religious sources may be introduced to encourage students to reflect on, internalize and apply the moral values learnt. For example, the poems of English Romantics such as Wordsworth and Coleridge, or those of local poets such as Edwin Thumboo could be used to help students explore the themes of love, self-fulfilment and worship. Spirituality can be promoted in the students when appropriate feelings are aroused by, 332

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and desired values are inculcated through, natural or man-made disasters and tragedies (Robson and Lonsdale 1987). For instance, a sensitive discussion of the Ethiopian famine, the Asia tsunami tragedy or the Bali bombings could prompt students to reflect on concepts and values such as human nature, justice, compassion and social responsibility. What then is the place of religion in SE? There is a close relationship between SE and religion as the search for a wider framework of meaning for SE usually leads one to explore religious beliefs and practices. SE could include religious understanding and appreciation, albeit in a less formal and structured way. Instead of teaching religions in their institutionalized form, religious beliefs and practices are presented with the aim to develop an empathetic awareness of and reflective approach towards the various religions. This is in line with the survey result of 1,025 Singaporeans by Community Development Feedback Group (Straits Times, 17 January 2004). It shows that there is a need for more informal approaches towards religious understanding that would exploit natural points of congregation. More dialogue among adherents of different religions to clear any misconceptions and deepen one’s understanding of other religions is also encouraged. This has already been carried out by some organizations to promote racial and religious harmony. For instance, a group of non-Muslim students learnt first-hand about the Muslim way of life by visiting mosques during Hari Raya Haji, learning the meaning of halal, and witnessing how sheep were humanely sacrificed during the ritual called the Korban (Straits Times, 24 February 2002). Being in an authentic setting rather than learning from the textbook helped them to appreciate why that religious festival is important to Muslims. In another event, 216 youths attended a three-day Ramadan camp organized by the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) and the Southeast Community Development Council (Straits Times, 30 November 2000). The camp allowed the participants to interact informally with Muslim leaders and provided the opportunity to ask questions and clarify any misconceptions they may have about Islam. There are a few reasons why SE may be a viable option for schools in Singapore. The most obvious advantage is that SE avoids the problems and challenges associated with a multi-religious subject, as mentioned earlier. Secondly, there is also less concern that SE will accentuate religious differences and contribute towards religious tensions and conflicts. SE is also more palatable to those who are agnostic or atheistic. A survey by Kuo and Quah in 1988 shows that 23.7 per cent of Singaporeans claimed to have no religion while the 1990 census reports the figure to be 14.5 per cent (Tong 2004). Another advantage for introducing SE to schools lies in the close relationship 333

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between SE and moral values. Spiritual development is characterized by reflection, attribution of meaning to experience, and an emphasis on a nonmaterial dimension to life and intimations of an enduring reality (OFSTED 1994). Such an approach which helps students to transcend “the fashionable utilitarian values of the everyday” (Minney 1991) is particularly relevant in the Singapore context in which the dominant ideology and the approach towards moral education have been described by several researchers as functionalist or utilitarian (for example, see Gopinathan 1980; Vasil 1984; Chua 1985; Tan 1994; Chew 1998; C. Tan 2005). Commenting on the teaching of moral values in Singapore schools, Gopinathan (1980) writes: Without exception the stress is on how useful the set of prescribed values would be to the nation, how the individual needs these values to be a useful member of his society, and how adherence to these values guarantees survival for him and his nation. … Nothing is heard in the Singapore context of the humanising effect of moral education for the individual, its integral place in a conception of education as a liberating and selffulfiling process (Gopinathan 1980, p. 178).

SE in schools may help fulfil the need for spiritual development as seen in the trend among Singaporeans to go beyond material pursuits to find deeper meaning in life. This is exemplified in the Singapore 21 Survey which revealed that “having a happy family” was the most popular definition of success among young people. This was followed by “doing well in one’s job or studies” and “being knowledgeable and well-informed” (quoted in Teo 1998). It was also reported that more well-educated and young Singaporeans are opting out of well-paying careers to go into full-time Buddhist, Taoist, Muslim, Christian and Catholic ministries (Straits Times, 14 May 2005). If SE is incorporated into the school curriculum, it may also help to iron out the inconsistency currently existing in the CME syllabus. Tan and Chew (2004) note that the CME syllabus for primary and even lower secondary levels help students to progress from Kohlberg’s Level One to Two of moral development.5 This is achieved by helping students to move away from solely self-regarding motives towards greater awareness of communal interests. But there is no progression to the next level which is characterized by authentic moral motivation and reasoning where the motive is morally intrinsic. In fact, Tan and Chew argue that the CME’s emphasis on pragmatism and relativism entails the sliding back to Kohlberg’s Level One of acting on selfregarding motivation. SE could rectify this by encouraging students to aim towards more Kantian considerations where one acts morally because of intrinsic reasons, and not purely because of utilitarian reasons stipulated by 334

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the state. At the same time, SE may help to address the shortcomings of the moral education programme highlighted in the 1979 and 1981 Reports. As mentioned earlier, the content used in moral education then was found to be too factual, dogmatic, without a theoretical framework, uninteresting and irrelevant to the students. The pedagogical approach was also criticized as too teacher-centred and didactic. In contrast, SE is student-centred — it focuses on the student’s own construction of meaning in his or her life through personal reflection, experience, and exploration of both religious and nonreligious phenomena. Through a liberating and self-fulfilling process, SE could provide the humanizing effect of moral education and citizenship education for the individual. To argue for the introduction of SE in schools is not to deny that there may be practical challenges involved. For example, it may not be easy for schools to promote SE consistently through their curriculum, ethos and climate, and to infuse SE into various subjects across the curriculum. Time and effort are also needed to prepare suitable materials for SE, and to train teachers to teach SE. But since SE does not require a systematic study of the various religions in Singapore, it avoids the problems of deciding which religions to be included in the teaching materials, which aspects of which religion to be included for study, and finding teachers who could confidently teach the religions in a fair and unbiased way.

CONCLUSION Religious understanding and appreciation are of utmost importance in multireligious Singapore. In a rapidly changing world, it is increasingly difficult for Singaporeans to confine religion to the private sphere. A recent survey shows that a majority of people in Singapore — six out of ten — wants the government to consider religious beliefs when making policy (Low 2005). This is because national policies and debates on issues such as stem cell research, organ donation and casinos are intricately linked to moral and religious considerations (Lim 2005). This chapter has shown that religious beliefs and practices are taught in an informational, historical and truncated fashion in Singapore schools. It is argued that the “religious knowledge” or “teaching about commitment” approach makes it difficult for the students to imbibe the moral teachings propounded by various religions and to acquire religious appreciation needed in citizenship education. The advantage of the “teaching about commitment” approach is that it ensures that religion does not, to use Kazepides’ word (1983), “tyrannize”, so there is little worry that religious teaching will accentuate religious differences or cause inter-religious 335

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problems in Singapore. But such an approach is also ineffective in making religion morally educative and socially beneficial for students in Singapore. With the rise of extremist groups using religion to further their terrorist agendas, it is heartening to note that there have been some frank discussions on the rise of religiosity among Muslims and other religious groups, and on ways to keep the various religious communities together (Fernandez 2005). But more needs to be done to maintain religious harmony and to dispel any religious prejudices and animosity. A case in point is the recent incident where two men who posted inflammatory remarks against a particular religion were convicted under the Seditious Act. What is disturbing is that although they are young Singaporeans who have learnt about moral values in schools and have friends who subscribe to that religion (Chong 2005; Nadarajan 2005), they remain so extreme and misguided in their views towards that religion. How can students be equipped with the ability to reflect on their own spiritual and religious inclinations, discuss these issues in a critical yet matured manner, and uphold religious harmony in Singapore? The introduction of SE to Singapore schools — where students are encouraged to be spiritually, morally and religiously reflective and sensitive — may be a step towards achieving this goal.

Notes The author would like to thank Dr Lai Ah Eng, Dr Jason Tan and the Institute of Policy Studies for their support, and participants at the IPS workshop for their helpful comments. Views expressed in this chapter are entirely those of the author. 1. For further discussions on the relationship between religious and moral education, see Wright 1983; Greer 1983; Cox 1983; Sealey 1983; Theron 1984; Callan 1989; Kunzman 2003a; 2003b; Nucci 2003. 2. This does not mean that there are only two approaches in the teaching of Religious Education (RE). Different writers have used different terms to categorize the different approaches. For example, Sealey (1985) identifies four main approaches: (1) Confessional RE (2) Neo-confessional RE (3) Hidden-confessional RE and (4) Implicit RE. The Schools Council Working Paper no. 36 in England identifies three approaches: (1) Dogmatic or confessional approach (2) Antidogmatic approach and (3) Undogmatic or Smart’s phenomenological approach (Bates 1996). Thiessen (1993) refers to three main approaches: (1) Teaching for commitment (2) Teaching about commitment and (3) Teaching from commitment. In his survey of the current pedagogies of religious education, Grimmit (2001) identifies seven types of pedagogical models: (1) Liberal Christian Theological, Experiential, Implicit Models (2) A Phenomenological, Undogmatic, Explicit Model (3) Integrative Experiential and Phenomenological Models 336

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4. 5.

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(4) Human Development, Instrumental, Learning About, Learning from Models (5) An Ethnographic, Interpretive, Multi-faith Model (6) A Revelation-centred, Concept-cracking, Trinitarian Christian Realist Model and (7) A Literacy-centred, Critical Realist Model. It should be pointed out that although the confessional approach was traditionally associated with religious institutions, this does not mean that that it is the only way for a person to be committed to a religion. In fact, critical understanding is compatible with religious commitment, at least for the major religions in the world today. For example, a Christian needs to personally understand the tenets of the Christian faith and enjoys a living relationship with God, rather than blindly accepts the religious teachings from the leaders without any personal devotion to God. To quote from Laura and Leahy, “an authentic faith is an autonomous faith” (1989, p. 259). For more discussions on SE and its relationship with RE, see Carr 1995, 1996, 1999; Mackenzie 1998. According to Kohlberg (1981, 1984), there are three levels of moral development: the pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional. Each level has two stages. Level One is the pre-conventional level where the person thinks and acts from solely self-regarding motives, motivated by the fear of punishment and the desire for rewards. At Level Two, the conventional level, the person goes beyond the self to consider the good of community and preserve the rules of society. The last level is the post-conventional level where the person progresses towards authentic moral motivation and reasoning, guided by abstract ideals rather than societal rules.

References Ackermann, Andreas. The Social Engineering of Culture and Religion in Singapore. DISKUS 5 (1999) (accessed 17 February 2005). Bartkowiak, Julia. “Fear of God: Religious Education of Children and The Social Good.” In Having and Raising Children, edited by Uma Narayan, pp. 193–207. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania University Press, 1999. Bates, Dennis. “Christianity, Culture and Other Religions (Part 2): F H Hilliard, Ninian Smart and the 1988 Education Reform Act”. British Journal of Religious Education 18 (1996): 85–102. Callan, Eamonn. “Godless Moral Education and Liberal Tolerance”. Journal of Philosophy of Education 23 (1989): 267–81. Carr, David. “Towards a Distinctive Conception of Spiritual Education”. Oxford Review of Education 21, no. 1 (1995): 83–98. ———. “Rival Conceptions of Spiritual Education”. Journal of Philosophy of Education 30 (1996): 159–78. 337

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———. “Spiritual Language and The Ethics of Redemption: A Reply to Jim Mackenzie”. Journal of Philosophy of Education 33 (1999): 451–61. Cheng, Roger H. M. “Moral Education in Hong Kong: Confucian-parental, Christianreligious and Liberal-civic Influences”. Journal of Moral Education 33, no. 4 (2004): 533–51. Chew, Joy O. A. “Civics and Moral Education in Singapore: Lessons for Citizenship Education?” Journal of Moral Education 27, no. 4 (1998): 505–24. Chong, Chee Kin. “Racist Bloggers Jailed”. Straits Times, 8 October 2005. Chua, Beng Huat. “Pragmatism of the People’s Action Party Government in Singapore”. Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science 13, no. 2 (1985): 29–46. Cox, Edwin. “Unfinished Agenda: A Comment on the Special JME Issue on the Relationship of ME and RE”. Journal of Moral Education 12 (1983): 149–56. Curriculum Planning and Development Division. Civics and Moral Education. Pupil’s Book, 3A. Singapore: Ministry of Education, 2001. Curriculum Planning Division. Guide Book for Principals on the Implementation of Religious Knowledge Subjects. Singapore: Ministry of Education, 1988. Eng, Soo Peck and Team. State of Moral Education in Singapore Schools. Occasional Paper nos. 17. Singapore: Institute of Education, 1981. Erricker, Clive. “A Critical Review of Spiritual Education”. In Reconstructing Religious Spiritual and Moral Education, edited by Clive Erricker and Jane Erricker, pp. 36–58. London: RoutledgeFalmer, 2000. Fernandez, Warren. “So, Who’s Afraid of the R Words?” Straits Times, 5 March 2005. Gopinathan, S. “Moral Education in a Plural Society: A Singapore Case Study”. International Review of Education 26, no. 2 (1980): 171–85. ———. “Religious Education in a Secular State: The Singapore Experience”. Asian Journal of Political Science 5, no. 2 (1999): 15–27. Greer, J. E. “Religious and Moral Education: An Exploration of Some Relevant Issues”. Journal of Moral Education 12 (1983): 92–99. Grimmitt, Michael. “Pedagogies of Religious Education for Today and Tomorrow: Identifying Their Principles, Procedures and Strategies”. In Developments in Religious Education, edited by Tony Dodd, pp. 1–23. Hull: The University of Hull, 2001. Hand, Michael and John White. “Is Compulsory Religious Education Justified? A Dialogue”. Journal of Education & Christian Belief 8, no. 2 (2004): 101–12. Haydon, Graham. Teaching About Values: A New Approach. London: Cassell, 1997. Hill, Brian V. “Spiritual Development in the Education Reform Act”. British Journal of Educational Studies 37, no. 2 (1989): 169–82. Hill, Michael and Lian Kwen Fee. The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore. London and New York: Routledge, 1995. Inter-Religious Organization. Harmony Among Religions. “Addresses Given at the Parliament of Religious Organization by the Ramakrishna Mission in Singapore”. Singapore: Inter-Religious Organization, 1987. 338

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———. Religions in Singapore. Singapore: Inter-Religious Organization, 1999. Ji, Chang-Ho C. “Religious Orientations in Moral Development”. Journal of Psychology and Christianity 23, no. 1 (2004): 22–30. Kazepides, Tasos. “Is Religious Education Possible? A Rejoinder to W. D. Hudson”. Journal of Philosophy of Education 17 (1983) 259–65. Kohlberg, Lawrence. Essays on Moral Development, I: The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and The Idea of Justice. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1981. ———. Essays on Moral Development, II: The Psychology of Moral Development. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984. Kuah, Khun Eng. “State and Religion: Buddhism and Nation-building in Singapore”. Pacific Viewpoint 32, no. 1 (1991): 24–42. Kunzman, Robert. “Religion, Ethics and the Implications for Moral Education: A Critique of Nucci’s Morality and Religious Rules”. Journal of Moral Education 32, no. 3 (2003a): 251-261. ———. “Rejoinder to Nucci’s ‘Morality, Religion and Public Education in Pluralist Democracies’ ”. Journal of Moral Education 32, no. 3 (2003b): 271–73. Kuo, Eddie C. Y., Jon S. T. Quah and Tong Chee Kiong. Religion and Religious Revivalism in Singapore. Report prepared for Ministry of Community Development, October 1988. Laura, S. Ronald and Michael Leahy. “Religious Upbringing and Rational Autonomy”. Journal of Philosophy of Education 23 (1989): 253–65. Lim, Lydia. “Emerging Role of Religion in Politics?”. Straits Times, 23 April 2005. Ling, Trevor O. Buddhism, Confucianism and the Secular State in Singapore. Working Papers no. 79. Singapore: Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, 1987. Low, Aaron. “6 in 10 Want Religious Input in Policy-making”. Straits Times, 16 July 2005. Mackenzie, Jim. “David Carr on Religious Knowledge and Spiritual Education”. Journal of Philosophy of Education 32 (1998): 409–27. Minney, Robin. “What is Spirituality in an Educational Context?”. British Journal of Educational Studies 39, no. 4 (1991): 386–97. Moran, Gabriel. “Two Languages of Religious Education”. In Critical Perspectives on Christian Education: A Reader on the Aims, Principles and Philosophy of Christian Education, edited by Jeff Astley and Leslie J. Francis, pp. 40–47. Leominster, Herefordshire: Gracewing Fowler Wright, 1994. Moulavi, M.H.B.S. “The Islamic View”. In Harmony Among Religions. Addresses given at the Parliament of Religions Organised by the Ramakrishna Mission in Singapore, pp. 8–11. Singapore: Inter-Religious Organization, 1987. Nadarajan, Ben. “Bloggers say They Have Many Muslim friends”. Straits Times, 8 October 2005. National Curriculum Council. Spiritual and Moral Development: A Discussion Paper. London: National Curriculum Council, 1993. 339

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Nucci, Larry. “Morality, Religion and Public Education in Pluralist Democracies”. Journal of Moral Education 32, no. 3 (2003): 264–70. OFSTED. Spiritual, Moral, Social and Cultural Development: An OFSTED Discussion Paper. London: Office for Standards in Education, 1994. Ong Teng Cheong and Moral Education Committee. Report on Moral Education 1979. Singapore: Ong Teng Cheong and Moral Education Committee. 1979. Remaking Singapore Committee. Changing Mindsets, Deepening Relationships. A Report of the Remaking Singapore Committee, 2004. Robson, Jill and David Lonsdale, eds. Can Spirituality be Taught? London: ACATE & BCC, 1987. Sealey, John, A. “Religious Education: A Component of Moral Education?” Journal of Philosophy of Education 17 (1983): 251–54. ———. Religious Education: Philosophical Perspectives. London: George Allen & Unwin,1985. Straits Times. “Non-Muslim Teens Try Fasting for a Day”. 30 November 2000. ———. “Priest Who’s No Mr Morality”. 22 October 2002. ———. “Learning First Hand the Muslim Way of Life”. 24 February 2002. ———. “Why Can’t we be Kawan-kawan?” 17 January 2004. ———. “Keepers of the Faith”. 14 May 2005. Tan, Charlene. “Driven by Pragmatisim: Issues and Challenges in an Ability-driven Education”. In Shaping Singapore’s Future: Thinking Schools, Learning Nation, edited by Jason Tan and Pak Tee Ng, pp. 5–21. Singapore: Prentice-Hall, 2005. Tan, Jason. “The Politics of Religious Knowledge in Singapore Secondary Schools”. In Curriculum Politics, Policy, Practice. Cases in Comparative Context, edited by Catherine Cornbleth, pp. 77–102. Albany: SUNY, 2000. Tan, Peter Kok Wan. “Put Religious Education on Curriculum”. Straits Times, 14 October 2005. Tan, Tai Wei and Chew Lee Chin. “Moral and Citizenship Education as Statecraft in Singapore: A Curriculum Critique”. Journal of Moral Education 33, no. 4 (2004): 597–606. Tan, Tai Wei. “Moral Education in Singapore: A Critical Appraisal”. Journal of Moral Education 23, no. 1 (1994): 61–73. Taris, Toon W. and Gun R. Semin. “Passing on The Faith: How Mother-Child Communication Influences Transmission of Moral Values”. Journal of Moral Education 26 (1997): 211–21. Teo, Chee Hean. Crisis as Refining Fire. Keynote address at the 3rd Polytechnic forum held on 29 September 1998. (accessed 17 February 2005). Theron, Stephen. “Are Our Attitudes to Moral and to Religious Education Mutually Inconsistent?” Journal of Moral Education 13 (1984): 17–21. Thiessen, J. Elmer. Teaching for Commitment: Liberal Education, Indoctrination and Christian Nurture. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993. 340

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Tong, Chee Kiong. Religious Conversion and Revivalism: A Study of Christianity in Singapore. Report prepared for the Ministry of Community Development, August 1989. ———. “The Rationalization of Religion in Singapore”. In Imagining Singapore, edited by Ban Kah Choon, Anne Pakir and Tong Chee Kiong, pp. 290–309. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004. Vasil, Raj. Governing Singapore. Singapore: Times Books International, 1984. Wright, Derek. “Religious Education from The Perspective of Moral Education”. Journal of Moral Education 12 (1983): 111–15.

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14 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AS LOCUS OF CURRICULUM A Brief Inquiry into Madrasah Curriculum in Singapore Sa’eda Buang

INTRODUCTION In the context of Singapore, the madrasah has been understood as a religious school or religious educational institution, be it at the preparatory (kindergarten) stage, primary, secondary or post-secondary levels. The madrasah has therefore been expected to offer a curriculum which focuses on religious subjects to stay true to its sanctity as a religious institution. Such curricular content for the madrasah has been construed by many Muslims to be sound and logical to producing Muslim religious elites and its key educational objective. However, the issue of curriculum content of madrasahs in Singapore has been receiving public and national leaders’ attention since the 1980s as a result of their less than satisfactory academic performance compared to that of national schools in the annual national examinations. There has been a growing concern over the madrasah’s peripheral position in the overall scheme of national development and economic progress. Scores of public forums and discourses took place within and amongst the madrasah fraternity, religious elites, interested individuals and organizations on the future and survival of madrasahs, particularly soon after the political leaders’ 342

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announcement of the introduction of compulsory education for the six madrasahs. Out of such flurry of opinionated exchanges and public engagements are demands for more reforms along the line of national schools’ curriculum, much to the traditionalists’ discontent. The traditional camp argues that such reforms could blur the very basis of madrasah’s existence as the repository of religious education and erode its religious character. The articulations between contending parties, including those who are neutral but whose interest lies in the continued existence of madrasahs in whatever form, posit varied concerns. These range from the quality of teaching and learning in madrasahs, infrastructures and support structure or the lack of it and archaic pedagogy, to alleged socio-political engineering that could lead to the madrasahs’ exit from the Singapore educational landscape. Putting all the pieces of arguments and articulations together as one whole, one realizes that the curriculum of the madrasah becomes the focal point of interest. While much effort is on the way to reformulate the madrasah curriculum in the context of the ever-changing and borderless world, there is a need to understand the underlying philosophical and socio-religious make-up of the early curriculum planners and the social context of their planning. Essentially, the Muslims’ very defence of the traditional or classical curriculum has its roots in the ideation of curriculum formulation in the socio-historical past. An investigation of the tradition of curriculum inquiry forms the major focus of this chapter. The discussion looks at the madrasah curriculum at both philosophical and operational levels. The perspective of operational curriculum here is eclectic in both the static and dynamic nature of curriculum.1 However, due to space consideration, it is not possible to present details of syllabus contents in this chapter; hence, only selected examples will be included. The curriculum, as a field for study and action, consists of three main dimensions: purpose, substance, and practice (Foshay 1987, 1988). The intent to accomplish something (a purpose), by offering some experiences, skills and knowledge (the substance), and by fitting the learning method or pedagogy to actual students (educational practice) as well as the interactions among these three dimensions, make a curriculum. The identification of purpose logically precedes the provision of substance to render a curriculum relevant and meaningful to the needs of the individual, group or community. Curriculum purpose, substance and practice will be frequently used in this discussion. Curriculum inquiry is concerned with answering specific questions related to any of the domains of curriculum practice (curriculum policymaking and evaluation, curriculum programme development, and curriculum change and enactment) about which knowledge and understanding is sought 343

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(Short 1991, pp. 7–8). This discussion seeks to understand religious curriculum development of the madrasah and its challenges, over the course of time in Singapore. It is acknowledged that to comprehend curriculum development and factors affecting such development as a complete and unified whole, a single form of inquiry is far from sufficient. Multiple forms of inquiry are therefore attempted. In cognizance of space limitation, selective and relevant forms of inquiry, integrative, critical, historical, normative and philosophical, are adapted often concurrently and at times singly where appropriate. While curriculum development involves composite changes, including the resistance of and acceleration for changes, inherent in the inquiry here is the quest to uncover stumbling blocks for religious curriculum reforms.

CLASSICAL CURRICULUM AND CULTURAL REPRODUCTION Classical theory of curriculum, sometimes called the Old Humanists,2 promotes the transmission and conservation of cultural heritage, which is made up of pure (rather than applied) knowledge in traditional forms. This form of curriculum values knowledge for its own sake, emphasizing its purity and aesthetics as opposed to utilitarian knowledge, which is viewed as inferior. Such traits are evident in the early madrasah’s curriculum purpose and rationale. The formulation of curriculum purpose or educational goal of the early madrasahs or other earlier religious educational institutions such as the pondok (literary means hut, derived from the Arabic funduq which means an inn or hotel, and here referring to Muslim boarding schools) or pesantren (also loosely defined as Muslim boarding schools prevalent in Indonesia) was relatively homogenous throughout the Malay archipelago for various reasons. Many researchers point to the purpose of producing individuals who are subservient to God and knowledgeable in Islam and who will ultimately become Muslim clerics or religious teachers — as the curriculum purpose or educational goal commonly held by many early religious schools in Southeast Asian countries.3 Epistemologically, that Islam is a religion that confers the seeking of knowledge as obligatory of every Muslim is undeniably the basis for the formulation of such educational goal. Knowledge in Islam has been referred to the “recognition of the proper places of things in the order of creation, such that it leads to the recognition of the proper place of God in the order of being and existence” (Al-Attas 1980, pp. 17–19). Inherent in the concept are order and proper sequencing of things so that they are placed in their proper position, reflecting their worthiness for that position. It has been argued that this need to position types and branches of knowledge is without 344

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exception. Moreover, although time is infinite, physical space and physical and financial resources for education are otherwise. Due to this consideration, knowledge to be learned in religious schools had therefore been categorized and prioritized, and syllabus planned for ideological and educational development and practical reasons. In ascertaining the domains of knowledge and its hierarchy, in term of importance and therefore sequence for instruction, Muslims in this region were generally very much influenced by the taxonomy of knowledge promulgated by classical Muslim scholars such as Ibn Sina, Al-Arabi, Ibn Khaldun and particularly the twelfth century Muslim scholar of Baghdad, Al-Ghazali.4 In his taxonomy, Al-Ghazali distinguishes knowledge into two bodies: religious sciences or sacred knowledge and non-religious sciences or profane knowledge. Al-Ghazali epitomizes syariah or religious sciences, particularly on tauhid (articles of faith) which includes the essence and attributes of God, at the apex of the strata or fardhu ain (compulsory rituals and theology that must be learned and practised by every individual), whilst other sciences such as usul fiqh or principles of jurisprudence, arithmetic and natural sciences are regarded as praiseworthy or profane knowledge. A few others such as magic and talismanic sciences are considered undesirable or blame-worthy and therefore not regarded as curriculum. At the macro level, Al-Ghazali’s division of knowledge merges to achieve a picture of totality where the two bodies of knowledge meet because they require each other to be complete, meaningful and practical. The early madrasah however, emphasized the micro aspect of the taxonomy where the division was taken to be final in essence and structure, with one branch of knowledge considered inferior and therefore omitted. The taxonomy failed to be seen as a complete whole; each division strengthening each other. This misconception impaired curriculum soundness of the early madrasahs in the region, in terms of substance and practice. A number of studies have concluded that this misconception was entrenched deeply even in the present madrasah curriculum and led to the latter’s reductionism in the scope of knowledge.5 Consequently, the pedagogical aspect of the curriculum had also been reduced to the level of memorization and blind acceptance, contrary to the use of rational and inquisitive mind celebrated by the intellectual tradition of classical Muslim scientists and scholars up to twelfth century.6 Al-Ghazali had further proposed that, while the seeking of knowledge is important, the teaching of religious knowledge is superior and a vocation that receives divine blessings.7 Such a high regard for the position of the teaching and learning of religious knowledge is not problematic in itself. However, the conception of knowledge becomes problematic when the body of profane 345

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knowledge is inferred as less superior. This dichotomy of knowledge — of the sacred and profane — has remained central in Muslims’ conception of knowledge and reinforced further by the processes of socialization. Madrasah curriculum, in this instance, had served as a vehicle for such cultural reproduction and dichotomy of knowledge. Socio-historically, the preservation and promotion of the common purpose of madrasah education to producing religious elites was also possible due to a number of factors. One was the transnational profile of the students in religious classes, pondoks or madrasahs which were usually led by well-known religious scholars who mostly had received further education at the Grand Mosque of Mecca or Masjidil Haram. More often than not, these teachers were also leaders of numerous tarikat (which means the spiritual path, representing the inner dimension of Islam) that had gained popular in the early twentieth century.8 It was therefore not an unfamiliar scene to see many Siamese males studying Islam in popular centres of Islamic education such as Kelantan or Trengganu, or Kelantanese males in Palembang or Patani and vice versa. After completing their studies, these graduates would establish a school in their home land, replicating their alma mater to the last detail in the areas of purpose, substance and practice. Should curriculum adjustments be introduced, they were in the areas of substance and practice, and only to a slight degree. These common traits in curriculum substance are evident in the use of kitab kuning (literally means yellow scriptures), which refers to a body of classical religious canons, throughout the region including Singapore. This aspect will be discussed in much detail later. The second factor was that religious education was seen as the last bastion against the religious and political encroachment of the colonials.9 The need to strengthen Muslims’ faith through religious education gained tremendous momentum with the introduction of English and vernacular schools which were construed as threatening the fundamental belief, sociopsychological make-up and way of life of Muslims. To defend the purpose and substance of religious education against the colonials’ onslaught had never been more urgent and the madrasah served this function effectively. The process of replicating the prevalent madrasah prototype served as a pattern which was repeated throughout the region until post-colonialism or the onset of each country’s independence when progress and national integration through a national education system became the main sociopolitical and economic thrusts of each nation. The formation of the earlier madrasahs in Singapore in terms of purpose, substance and practice, was fashioned in the same way. One specific instance was the establishment of 346

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Madrasah Bustanul Arifin in Coronation Road in the 1940s by Ahmad Sonhaji Mohammad, replicating the educational purpose, substance and practice of Perguruan Agama Islam Rengat (Rengat Islamic Religious Teaching College) in Rengat, Indonesia.10 In addition, the emergence of Singapore as a centre for religious learning in the early twentieth century had attracted many to study or establish their madrasahs here. Madrasah Assibyan, formed in 1901 and believed to be the first madrasah in Singapore,11 is said to possess the characteristics, in terms of substance and practice, of the prevailing madrasahs12 in the region, to infer replication. Student profile includes locals and those from various states of Malaysia. Inadvertently, the curriculum purpose of producing a continuous supply of religious clerics to protect the religion and to guide the Muslim community had led to the establishment of more than fifty privately or community-funded madrasahs or religious schools, both formal and informal, up to early 1970s.13 However, except for a handful, almost all of these madrasahs are now defunct.

CURRICULUM FOR SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION The unquestionable value of specific “religious” knowledge as justified by the elaborations above, characterizes the classical or traditional curriculum of madrasahs. Such emphasis on this specific knowledge, owing to its long-held traditional “value” and importance and the negation towards “other” knowledge, remained unchallenged until the spread of Pan-Islamism in the region and the establishment of Madrasah Al-Iqbal in 1907 by Muslim reformists such as Syed Sheikh Al-Hadi. The early twentieth century onwards witnessed the revival and flourishing of Muslim reformists’ ideology in Singapore and Malaya but one which was seen by the traditional religious elite as a challenge to the religious institution of learning, customs and traditions and, most importantly, to the traditional elites’ status quo. Proposed reforms for religious education curriculum by the reformists were construed by the traditional religious elite as religious decadence. The reformists’ refusal to submit to the well-established classical curriculum practice sparked the long drawn polemic between the Kaum Tua (the traditionalists) and Kaum Muda (the reformists).14 To the reformists, the classical curriculum’s purpose and practice were static and unresponsive to its social context. Despite fierce retaliation from the traditional religious elite at the societal and personal levels, the PanIslamic reformist ideology greatly influenced the thinking of some religious scholars and led to a shift in the statement of purpose which consequently 347

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influenced the substance of the new curriculum. In a departure from the classical curriculum, the reformists posited curriculum as a potent agent of social change and social reconstruction. The group aspired to establish an educational institution that would emphasize the importance of knowledge and offer balanced education and the application of rational thinking, with the hope of producing students who would be life-long learners, loyal to the country and dedicated to serve humanity. Such curriculum reform initiated by Madrasah Al-Iqbal15 was based on its philosophy of education: Education is the doorway to one’s faith, and knowledge is the ‘sun’ that covers darkness. This is the secret that only the wise can comprehend. Knowledge is the weapon to achieve one’s success amidst one’s continuous struggles in life; it is the prerequisite that enables man to achieve his goal to proclaiming victory and excellence. Knowledge is the treasury of truth and pool of wisdom; it is the true path that leads us to perfection. It is the light that will illuminate the whole country if it fills man’s heart and intelligence.16

The departure of the reformist curriculum statement of purpose from that of the classical depicted the urgency to reconstruct the Muslim community towards political independence, progressive socio-economic and religious outlook through the use of reasoning and the courage to exercise independent thinking. Such educational purpose endeavoured to effect reformation in all areas of Muslims’ lives, from the mundane aspects to the extent of reevaluating and revalidating the religious norms and opinions of the day, based on reasoning and reference-analysis on authentic sources of knowledge, in this case the Qur’an, the tradition of the Prophet, ijma ulama’ or scholars’ consensus, while taking into account the social context within which an opinion is formed. The traditional religious elite’s dominance in curriculum design and unresponsiveness to the backwardness of the Muslims in the cognitive, socio-economic and political spheres were critically analysed and subsequently rejected by the reformists. A progressive curriculum content or substance was consequently designed to respond to the critical needs of the community. The new curriculum content was much in contrast to the fixed and long-established curriculum of Qur’anic reading and the teaching of fardhu ain, as practised by most religious classes in Singapore and the region. Madrasah Al-Iqbal radically included non-religious subjects such as arithmetic, geography, Malay language, English language, town planning and general science into the madrasah curriculum to propagate the idea of the unity of knowledge and balanced education. This was a far cry from the subjects and syllabus offered at Madrasah Assibyan, 348

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established earlier in 1901, which offered the reading of the Qur’an, lughah (Arabic grammar), tauhid (pertaining to basic Islamic faith to affirm the Oneness of Allah), and mahfudzat (a body/codex of the Muslim scholars’ traditions), wirid or chants and verses for supplication — a curriculum substance that could be considered as the prototype for Muslim religious schools or institutions in Singapore in the pre and early twentieth century. The heavy concentration on the study of theology, rituals and the teaching of fiqh which was devoid of practical consideration of the current socioeconomic and political contexts, had rendered this curriculum prototype less able to equip the Muslims with skills and knowledge to be progressive. This had led to the call for reform, but as has been mentioned earlier, the Madrasah Al-Iqbal was short-lived. The interplay between the threatened status quo of the religious elite (Roff 1967) and the Muslim community’s reluctance to effect normative change for reform led to Madrasah Al-Iqbal’s downfall after one year of its inception in Singapore. Another deciding factor was the lack of financial support for the madrasah. The same fate also befell Madrasah Al-Hadi, founded in 1917 in Malacca by the same reformist, Syed Syeikh Al-Hadi. Again, under the traditional community’s pressure, it had to be closed down after operating for only two years. Nevertheless, Madrasah Al-Iqbal’s spirit of reform has remained as the guiding principle for the latterday madrasahs, and this continued struggle for reform can be traced in the latter-day madrasahs’ curriculum which will be discussed later. The above discussion highlights the impact of determinants and principles of curriculum development as two pillars decisively affected the degree of success or failure of a madrasah curriculum.17 For example, manpower requirement for the effective implementation and preservation of classical curriculum was relatively less problematic. Religious teaching as a vocation assumed great respect from the community and had ensured a steady pool of religious teachers as manpower resources. Similarly, the demand for religious education remained high. However as the case of Madrasah Al-Iqbal showed, the reformist educational purpose to achieve socio-religious reconstruction can be thwarted by the principle of cultural reproduction as a tool for maintaining the traditional religious elites’ dominance. Thus, even as the demand for religious education remained constant and manpower requirement was steady, the issue of curriculum principles continued to be unresolved. Indeed, even after independence, the madrasah curriculum remained largely out of touch with the socioeconomic challenges of industrialization and growing complexity of urbanization, adhering instead to the long-held curriculum’s purpose, substance and practice. Since then, coercion and/or self-responsiveness to 349

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rapidly changing socio-economic and political environments have led to the curriculum of the present-day madrasahs undergoing changes. The interplay of social context and the underlying philosophy of education that affect the present madrasah’s changing curriculum will be discussed next, but prior to this, the curriculum’s substance in the pre-Independence period as a tool for cultural reproduction will be briefly discussed.

THE TEXTS FOR CULTURAL REPRODUCTION As pointed out earlier, the process of replication expedited the application of a classical curriculum in the Southeast Asian region. The prevalent interpolation between schools of thoughts such as the Sunni-Shiite and Mu’tazilat-Sha’ariJabariah-Qadariyah elsewhere in the region had little impact on the selection of curriculum content of the early madrasahs in Singapore. The decision to select, include and develop “what” subjects and syllabus was in the hands of individual religious clerics or teachers who mostly conformed to the prominent school of thought, the Shafie doctrine. The curriculum prototype from around the region, namely Indonesia, Patani and Malaya, was abundant and highly regarded by the madrasahs in Singapore. As pointed out earlier, these clerics were mostly products of the pondoks or religious schools in one of these countries, hence the adoption and replication of their curriculum substance and practice in Singapore. Although records of an early religious curriculum in Singapore are few, scattered and still heavily reliant on oral history, these accounts throw some light on the nature of the early religious curriculum in terms of its philosophy, pedagogy or teaching and learning practices. While non-exhaustive, Ahmad Sonhaji Mohammad’s (Abdul Samad Haji Junied 1999, pp. 297–99) listing of 22 religious texts18 predominantly used in religious classes and madrasahs in early Singapore until independence not only depicts the scope, width and depth of religious syllabus. It also underscores the strong influence of Patani (Thailand), Aceh and Banjar (Indonesia) Muslim scholars’ religious thoughts on the Muslims’ religious education and practices in Singapore. For instance, fifteen of the texts (68 per cent) used in Singapore up to late 1980s were Kitab Kuning (literally meaning yellow scriptures) which were also called as Kitab Jawi (Jawi scriptures).19 These kitabs were written by Muslim scholars of the said areas as early as 163420 but mostly in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Kitab Jawi, written in the classical Malay language using Arabic characters, functioned as a major source of Islamic knowledge in the Malay Archipelago. The selected texts used in Singapore’s formal religious schools 350

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and non-formal religious classes covered six main components of religious knowledge such as the Qur’an, hadith (the Prophet’s traditions), tauhid (theology), fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), mahfudzat and lughah. At least two similar texts on theology, Kitab Usul al-Din (The Source of Religion) written by Muhammad Mukhtar b. Atarid al-Jawi al-Batawi of Bogor, Indonesia in 1905 and Kitab Faridat al-Fara’id penned by Ahmad b. Muhammad Zayn al-Fatani, a renowned Muslim scholar from Patani, Thailand, widely used as canons in the pondoks in Kelantan from 1910 to 1957 (Che Awang bin Che Harun 1995, pp. 53–54) were also used by Singapore madrasahs. Early religious teaching in madrasahs was mainly based on the Shafie doctrine, the school of thought predominantly adhered to by the Muslims in the archipelago up till the present. The study of tauhid, aqidah (belief ), or ilmu sifat (knowledge on the attributes of God) as espoused by the school of Ash’ari21 (935 A.D.) formed the locus of interest and characterized the way religion was mainly taught and learned. Integral to the subject of tauhid were the attributes and essence of God and His messengers, jinns22 and angels. Elaborations on the creation of the universe, the world and man, including the character and position of man vis-à-vis the world and the Creator were studied as part of the body of tauhid. To know, memorize and be able to recite the twenty attributes of God was expected of every learner of Islam. Although thoughts on social, political and economic aspects of life were offered in the study of fiqh, hadith and mahfudzat, they were presented from the social context of Muslim society as one homogenous entity. Almost absent in the content of early religious teaching were the complexities and realities of living in multi-cultural and multi-ethnic societies, as were the demands of modernization. Living under colonial political hegemony also gave Muslims little impetus to correct the imbalances of socio-economic and political power through the educational machinery of the madrasahs. The colonial policy of non-interference in religion and customs provided the Muslim community with a false sense of security even though the traditional elite’s real political power had been effectively stripped by the colonial rule. Furthermore, as cultural reproduction was the main aim of religious schooling, what was inherited from the past was passed on with solemn obligation. In this case, the maintenance and continuation of socio-religious order and hierarchy through the domain of knowledge was strongly put in place in the madrasah by the traditional religious elite, and this greatly influenced the madrasahs’ curriculum content. It is also important to remember here that one of the curriculum’s educational objectives was the creation of a desirable man in the professions of the Muslim cleric and 351

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religious teacher. This aspiration was held in reverence amongst the Muslims in Singapore,and until 1973, a record of fifty-two madrasahs were set up in Singapore, either privately by wealthy individuals or by religious organizations or the Muslim community.23 At the same time, it is important to remember that the idea to reform the curriculum was attempted by a number of madrasahs, particularly after postIndependence in 1965. This attempt was reflected in the madrasah’s curriculum content. For example, Madrasah Aljunied offered eighteen subjects, such as fiqh, hadith, mastalah al-hadith (science of methodology of the hadith), tafsir, tarikh (Islamic history), dianah (religion), tahzib, qira’ah (the reading of Qur’an), nahu (Arabic grammar), saraf, Qur’an, tajwid, tauhid, lughah, mahfuzat, mutala’ah, and two non-religious subjects, viz., geography and arithmetic. The now defunct Madrasah Bustanul Islamiah24 offered eleven subjects, viz., fiqh, saraf, tauhid, tarikh Islam, Qur’an, tajwid, hadith, and four non-religious subjects, geography, reading, history and arithmetic. The geography syllabi covered the Malay Peninsula, while the history syllabi encompassed the Malay world. Besides Arabic, Malay language was offered. At the same time, both madrasahs used at least five similar religious texts.25 On the whole, although the curriculum content has undergone changes particularly in recent years, the classical curriculum’s purpose has nonetheless remained largely unchanged, and its conscious preservation has led to the continuation and promotion of cultural reproduction.

TECHNOCRATIC UNDERCURRENTS OF MADRASAH CURRICULUM In recent years, the curriculum’s purpose of the six remaining full-time madrasahs in Singapore has been reformulated to inject dynamism into them and to be responsive to larger economic and socio-political transformations. Madrasah Al-Ma’arif Al-Islamiah, for example, pronounces its philosophy of education as: To provide an education that is balanced and synchronises, dynamic and flexible, based on Al-Quran, Assunah and Al-Ijma, including field research development and development of ijtihad in Islamic laws so that the students will become relevant to any community they are in.26

Based on its vision to produce excellent students in accordance with Islamic perspectives, the madrasah outlined its curriculum purpose(s), viz., to produce students who are pious muslimahs, appreciative of Islamic values, who are 352

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moral, possess love for knowledge and learning, proactive, productive towards themselves, families, community and country, and able to achieve excellent results in major examinations such as the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE), Thanawi 4, General Certificate of Education (GCE) ‘Ordinary’ and ‘Advance’ Level examinations. The madrasah’s philosophy of education underscores the premier position of rationality and therefore, ijtihad (the use of one’s independent reasoning on a point of law not explicitly covered by the Qur’an or the sunna) in its curriculum design. Balanced education, both in terms of religious and non-religious subjects, is offered to producing excellent students in terms of academic performance and moral character. The curriculum purpose clearly indicates its goal to producing individuals who can function as sources of knowledge and Islamic legal advisors,who will be able to meet and overcome the challenges of the modern world, and be at par with other communities in the labour market. Such a curriculum purpose is a far cry from the classical curriculum of the earlier madrasah. Religious elitism is redefined and expanded to include not only the religious scholars but also any professional who is well-versed in Islam and hence able to implement ijtihad in religious matters. The madrasah attempts to be wholesome in its curriculum, detailing every specific goal, in terms of intelligence, academic performance, religious development, moral character, personal skills, and social function, of its subject (students). One may also notice the madrasah’s strong tendency to be pragmatic, forward looking and socially conscious, in the statement of purpose. In short, the curriculum purpose reflects its technocratic character by taking into account the functional needs of the nation, particularly of economic and technological progress. It acknowledges and conforms to the meritocratic hierarchy of Singapore society and its values of utilitarianism, pragmatism and technological development. The same could be said of other madrasahs’ present-day curriculum. Having identified the undercurrent in the present madrasah’s curriculum purpose as being technocratic-pragmatic, one may ask what is left of religious education and the need to enrich the spiritual domain of students? Madrasah Al-Ma’arif asserts that religious education remains important as the main business of madrasahs, although overtly the number of religious curriculum hours has been reduced to cater for the inclusion of nonreligious subjects such as mathematics, English language, Malay language, Malay literature, geography, social studies, additional mathematics, general paper and science. The teaching of tauhid, fiqh, akhlak, hadith, sirah (Islamic history), tafsir, Qur’an, usuluddin (theology) and syariah continues to be offered although in a compressed form, in terms of content and time, under 353

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the umbrella of religious study. In the case of Madrasah Al-junied, the modular system has recently been introduced as a solution to the problem of curriculum time allocation.27 For instance, tauhid and fiqh are offered in Semester One while sirah and akhlak are offered in Semester Two of the primary level curriculum. Such an innovative strategy is taken to ensure the number of hours apportioned for non-religious subjects are equivalent to the allocation in national schools, a factor that the madrasah believes to be crucial in its effort to achieve the target passing rate in the national examinations.28 Once again, pragmatism drives the madrasah to be conscious of factors such as substance and practice to achieve its curriculum purpose, and more importantly, its survival. At the same time as pragmatism and utilitarian seem to be the order of the day, religious education is assured of its presence in the madrasah education system. Two more madrasahs, Madrasah Al-Ma’arif and Madrasah Wak Tanjung, have in 2004 gained accreditation from the premier Al-Azhar University in Cairo, besides Madrasah Al-Junied. A religious education track is also now being offered up to post-secondary level in the three madrasahs, to cater to students with aptitude in Arabic language and religious education. Besides Al-Azhar, students on the religious track may pursue basic degrees in other Islamic universities in Malaysia and the Middle Eastern countries. How different is the teaching pedagogy for religious subjects to nonreligious ones? This question is imbued with the implicit assumption that there are differences in terms of methodology and quality of teaching and learning, or are they? Many discussions on the madrasah have revolved around the concern over the dominant use of memorization and rote learning even in the latter-day madrasah. This concern is not without valid reason. For instance, memorization of the Qur’an is carried out in madrasahs from Secondary One to Secondary Four levels. However, the issue that is more pertinent than memorization per se is the function of such a teaching method and its relevance in a strategy of creative learning and teaching. Some madrasah religious teachers acknowledge the constraint of delivering subjects like tauhid (the unity of God), by using role play as an example of a creative teaching strategy. In this instance, an equally creative strategy such as experiential learning by observing nature and its phenomena is considered more appropriate and effective.29 The subject nature of fiqh, on the other hand, gives madrasah teachers a lot of room to role-play so that the complexity of Islamic law could be comprehended in its simplified and practical version.30 The use of the Internet and electronic devices in the teaching and learning of religious education is also becoming more evident. What remains certain is whether 354

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these innovative examples and practices will become the norm, consistently applied across all madrasahs and at all levels, or be the exception. When translated at the level of curriculum substance, the current madrasah curriculum demands an equitable apportion of time, space, infrastructure and attention for both religious and non-religious subjects. Inherently, it further demands relevant teaching pedagogy that supports rational thinking, an inquisitive mind and creativity to render the curriculum purpose and content meaningful and achievable. These are the challenges that the madrasah needs to address effectively, lest the curriculum purpose remains a statement of non-operationalized goals. Judging from the responses of one principal,31 the madrasah looks set to meet these challenges head-on with various intervention and coping strategies despite the lack of finance and school infrastructure to harness effective teaching and learning opportunities.

CONCLUSION Madrasah curriculum development has not been linear, as evident from the socio-historical narration and analysis of this chapter. It is also evident that a set of curriculum may thrive and another be abolished due to power assertion of elite groups and public opinion. The combination of these two factors had directly stunted the growth and progress of early madrasah education and subsequently, even though the community was in dire need for socio-economic reform. The failure of Madrasah Al-Iqbal to survive illustrates the failure of an educational institution to effect changes in the religious and social outlook of its community through relevant strategies despite the call for curriculum reform. The symbiotic relationship between the madrasah and the community to influence and educate each other has failed to take place due to lack of effective strategies, including the power of persuasion. The example also underscores the argument that structural and physical change is relatively less problematic than the normative shift in one’s mentality. This can be a lesson for madrasah curriculum planners. Challenges faced by the madrasahs in Singapore are multi-faceted. The formulation of an all encompassing and yet achievable curriculum purpose requires a sound philosophy of man and education, mental dexterity, pragmatism, vision, as well as a strong sense of humanity. To galvanize support for such a curriculum is a challenge that must be faced and overcome. The bigger challenge is to ensure the realization of such a curriculum in terms of curriculum content and practice, lest it remains just an ideation that cannot be concretized. The madrasah must deliver on this. 355

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Finally, whether the role of the madrasah curriculum is to maintain cultural reproduction, to promote social reconstruction or to pragmatically expedite socio-economic progress and academic excellence, it is evident that religious education remains its locus.

Notes 1. The static curriculum is the planned and written syllabus and activities in classrooms, while the dynamic nature of curriculum is the result of the interaction of developed plans for school study with the backgrounds, personalities, and capacities of students in a transactional environment created by teachers and schools for the benefit of students as well as for the better implementation of the plan (Longstreet and Shane 1993). 2. Ernest, “Education, Philosophy and Science”. Oxford Reference Online. (accessed on 4 April 2006). 3. To cite a few, see Khoo, Malay Society and Hasan Madmarn, The Pondok and Madrasah in Patani. 4. Abu Hamid Muhammad Al-Ghazali (died in 505 A.H./1111 A.D.) is regarded as the reformer (mujaddid ) of the fifth century of the Islamic era. Endowed with encyclopaedic knowledge and a saintly character, Al-Ghazali extended his accomplishments over various fields or learning such as ethics, logic, dogmatic theology, and Islamic jurisprudence. The creative part of his life can be broadly divided into an early period, and a later period when he became a mystic. Most of his later works are exclusively ethical in nature, and deal with that morality which will ensure ultimate happiness. For further reading, refer to Muhammad Abul Quasem, The Ethics of Al-Ghazali: A Composite Ethics in Islam. 5. See Syed Farid Al-Atas, “Knowledge and Education in Islam”, pp. 176–77. 6. See Syed Khairudin and Dayang Siti Aishah, “Estranged From the Ideal Past: Historical Evaluation of Madrasahs in Singapore”, pp. 249–60. 7. Al-Ghazali, The Book of Knowledge, p. 20. 8. Most popular tarikat practised in early Singapore till 1980s were Tariqah ‘Alawiyah, Tariqah Al-Qadiriyyah Wal-Naqshabandiyyah, followed by other tarikat such as Ash-Shaziliyyah, Al-Idrisiyyah, As-Saman, Ad-Darqawiyyah and Ar-Rifa’iyyah. See Abdullah Alwi Haji Hassan “Islam di Singapura: Satu Pengenalan”. A number of these tarikats were popular in Kelantan in the second half of the nineteenth century, for example Tareqat Ahmadiyyah, Nakhsyabandiyyah, Syatariah, Syazzaliyyah. See Nik Abdul Aziz bin Haji Nik Hassan “Islam dan Masyarakat Kota Bharu di antara Tahun 1900–1933”, pp. 29–30. 9. Ahmad Sonhadji bin Mohammad Milatu. He narrates the role of the madrasah in injecting the spirit of nationalism and anti-colonialism during World War II and the British Occupation. 356

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10. Suratman, Menyongsong Arus, pp. 40–44. 11. Researchers such as Abdul Samad bin Haji Junied (1995), Abdullah Alwi Haji Hassan (1981) and Muhd Nor bin Hasbun (undated) conferred Madrasah As-Sibyan as the first privately registered religious school or madrasah in Singapore. In his research on religious institutions in pre-Independence Singapore, Muhd. Nor bin Hasbun related the establishment of Madrasah Assibyan in 1901 by Ustaz Mohamad bin Mohamad Said in his home, which is opposite the Sultan Mosque. Although the religious class was home-based, Muhd Nor opined that the establishment could still be considered as madrasah due to the very nature of the curriculum contents which were similar to those run by later madrasahs. See Muhd Nor bin Hasbun, Pengajaran Agama Islam di Singapura, pp. 11–12. 12. Muhd Nor Hasbun, ibid., p. 12. 13. Ibid., pp. 16–19. 14. For further discussion on the conflict and religious polemic between the “Young Faction” or Kaum Muda and “Old Faction” or Kaum Tua see Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism, pp. 66–67. 15. Besides Syed Sheikh Al-Hadi, co-founders and teachers of the school were Tuan Haji Abas Mohamad Taha, Raja Mohamad Said bin Mohamad Tahir and Syed Mohamad Bin Aqil bin Yahua, who was believed to be a Sufi-mystical leader (tarikat). See Muhd Nor bin Hasbun (undated), op. cit., p. 13. 16. Quoted from Abu Bakar Hamzah, Al-Imam: Its Role in Malay Society 1906– 1908. Translation is mine. 17. The determinants are manpower requirement, the demand for education and the learners; principles which refer to situation-analysis, objectives, learning experiences, learning content, learning opportunities and evaluation. 18. See Abdul Samad bin Haji Junied, Perkembangan Pendidikan Islam di Singapura, Satu Kajian Kes Madrasah Al-Junied Al-Islamiyyah (1970–1990), pp. 297–99. 19. See Mohd Nor Ngah (1982, p. vii). 20. Assiratul Mustaqim (The Straight Path) was written in 1634 by Sheikh Nuruddin Muhammad Jailani bin Ali Hasan Ji bin Muhammad Humaid Ar-Raniri, a renowned Muslim scholar from Aceh. Ibid., p. 5. Ahmad Sonhaji Mohammad (1987) opined that the text was written earlier, in 1597. Many similar classical texts have also been and are currently widely used in madrasahs and pondoks in Southern Thailand. See Hassan Madmarn (1999), op. cit., p. 43. 21. Founded by al-Syaikh Abu Hasan al-Ash’ari and Abu Mansur al-Maturidi. 22. The root-verb is janna, which means “he or it concealed” or “covered with darkness”. In the usage of the Qur’an, which is different from the usage of primitive folklore, the term jinn has several distinct meanings. The most commonly encountered is that of spiritual forces or beings, which precisely because they have no corporeal existence, are beyond the perception of our corporeal senses: a connotation which includes “Satans” and “satanic forces” as well as “angels” and “angelic forces”, since all of them are “concealed from our senses”. See Muhammad Asad, trans., The Message of the Quran, pp. 994–95. 357

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23. See Muhd Nor Hasbun, op. cit., pp. 16–19. 24. Madrasah Bustanul Islamiah was set up by one religious teacher, Ustaz Ishak, in 1946 at Jalan Alsagoff, Geylang Serai. See Muhd Nor Hasbun, ibid., pp. 23–26. 25. Al-Ghayah Wattakrib for fiqh, Hadith Arbain (40 hadith) for hadith, Noor Al-Yaqin (Light of Conviction) for tarikh al-Islam, Hidayah al-Mustafid for tajwid and Tauhid al-Khaliq (Believe in the Creator) for tauhid. Factors such as lack of suitable texts, the popularity of the chosen texts or the desire to replicate a more established madrasah such as Madrasah Aljunied, have probably led to the use of similar texts. Interestingly, kitab jawi such as Al-Ghayah Wattakrib by Sheikh Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Mustafa al-Fatani and Abdullah al-Fatani, and ‘Umdah As-Salik were still being used by the madrasahs until the late 1970s, highlighting the strong influence of the regional Muslim scholars’ religious thoughts in Singapore’s madrasah education. 26. Madrasah Al-Ma’arif Al-Islamiyah, (accessed on 4 April 2006 and 1 August 2006). 27. Source from Madrasah Aljunied. Interview on 6 July 2006. See also Madrasah Aljunied Al-Islamiah, Student’s Handbook, p. 27. 28. Compulsory Education was enacted in 2000 and implemented in January 2003, requiring Singapore citizens of school going age and residing in Singapore to attend and complete their education in national schools for a duration of six years (from Primary One to Primary Six). After much discussion between the government and madrasah officials, madrasahs had been conditionally exempted from this Act. However the madrasahs were given eight years, until 2008, to achieve the minimum passing standard in the core subjects such as Science, English and Mathematics in the Primary School Leaving Examination (PSLE), failing which madrasahs will no longer be allowed to teach these subjects and their students will no longer be exempted from compulsory attendance in national schools. See Mukhlis Abu Bakar, “Between State Interests and Citizens Rights: Whither the Madrasah?”, pp. 37–39. 29. Source from Madrasah Al-Ma’arif, interview on 20 July 2006. 30. Ibid. 31. Interview with the Madrasah Al-Ma’arif ’s principal on 20 July 2006.

References Abdul Samad Haji Junied. Perkembangan Pendidikan Islam di Singapura, Satu Kajian Kes Madrasah Al-Junied Al-Islamiyyah (1970–1990). Singapore: AFIA Media International, 1995. Abdullah Alwi Haji Hassan. Islam di Singapura: Satu Pengenalan. In Islamika. Kuala Lumpur: Sarjana Enterprise, 1981. Abu Bakar Hamzah. Al-Imam: Its Role in Malay Society 1906–1908. Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1991. 358

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Abu Bakar Hashim. “The Madrasahs in Singapore —Past, Present and Future”. Fajar Islam 2 (1989): 27–35. Agamah Ibrahim, ed. Inspiration. 50th Anniversary Commemorative Magazine of Madrasah Al-Ma’arif. Singapore, 1987. Ahmad Fahmi Yusoff. The Nature and Role of Current Day Madrasahs in Singapore. Research Exercise, Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore, 1991. Ahmad Sonhadji Mohammad Milatu, Oral History, accession no. 2001, reel no. 14, National Archives Singapore. Al-Atas, Syed Farid. “Knowledge and Education in Islam”. In Secularism and Spirituality: Striving for Integrated Knowledge and Success in Madrasah Education in Singapore, edited by Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman and Lai Ah Eng. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish for Institute of Policy Studies, 2006. Al-Attas, Syed Muhammad Naquib. Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education. Jeddah: King Abdulaziz University, 1979. ———. The Concept of Education in Islam: A Framework for an Islamic Philosophy of Education. Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM), 1980. Al-Ghazali. The Foundation of the Article of Faith (A Translation with notes of the Kitab Qawa’id Al-Aqaid of Al-Ghazali’s Ihya’ Ulumiddin). Nabih Amin Faris (trans.) Lahore: Sh. Mohamed Ashraf, 1963. ———. The Book of Knowledge. Nabih Amin Faris (trans.) Lahore: Sh. Mohamed Ashraf, 1966. Apple, M. Ideology and Curriculum. New York: Routledge, 1990. Azyumardi Azra. Pendidikan Islam: Tradisi dan Modernisasi Menuju Milenium Baru. Jakarta: Logos Wacana Ilmu, 2000. Che Awang Che Harun. Metod Pengajian Akidah dalam Pendidikan Pondok di Kelantan pada Zaman Keemasannya dari 1910M hingga 1957M. Fakulti Usuluddin, Akademi Pengajian Islam, Universiti Malaya, 1996. Chee, Ming Fui. “The History of Madrasah Education in Singapore”. M. A. Thesis, National University of Singapore, 2000. Dayang Istiaisyah Hussin. “School Efficiency and Nation Building in Singapore: Analysis of Discourses on Madrasah and Why Madrasah Stand Out from National Schools”. M. A. thesis, National University of Singapore, 2003. Ernest, Paul. “Education, Philosophy and Science”. In Science, Technology, and Society, edited by Sal Restivo. Oxford University Press, 2005. Hasan Madmarn. The Pondok and Madrasah in Patani. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia Press, 1999. Hikmatullah Babu Sahib. “Islamic Studies in Singapore: Past Achievements, Present Dilemmas and Future Directions”. Paper presented at the International Seminar on Islamic Education in the ASEAN: History, Approaches and Future Trends, organized by College of Islamic Studies, Prince of Songkla University, 25–28 June 1998, Pattani, Thailand. 359

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Khoo, Kay Kim. Malay Society: Transformation and Democratisation. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1991. Longstreet and Shane. Curriculum for a New Millennium. U.S.: Allyson and Bacon, 1993. Madrasah Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiah. (accessed 5 April 2006). Madrasah Aljunied Al-Islamiah. (accessed 5 April 2006). ———. Student’s Handbook. Singapore, 2006. Madrasah Al-Ma’arif. (accessed 5 April 2006). Madrasah Al-Ma’arif. “Religious Education Syllabus, Secondary One to Four”. (Singapore: Madrasah Al-Ma’arif, own printing for internal circulation). Madrasah Wak Tanjong Al-Islamiah. (accessed 4 April 2006). Mohd Nor Ngah. Kitab Jawi: Islamic Thought of the Muslim Scholars. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982. Mohd Daud Hashim. Religious Institutions amongst the Malays of Singapore: A Comparative Study of a Rural and Urban Area. Academic Exercise, Department of Social Studies, University of Malaya, 1958. Muhammad Asad, trans. The Message of the Quran. Gibraltar: Dar Al-Andalus, 1980. Muhd Nor Hasbun. Pengajaran Agama Islam di Singapura. Selangor: Kolej Islam Melaya, 1969. Muhammad Abul Quasem. The Ethics of Al-Ghazali: A Composite Ethics in Islam. Malaysia: Quasem, 1975. Mukhlis Abu Bakar. “Between State Interests and Citizens Rights: Whither the Madrasah?”. In Secularism and Spirituality, Striving for Integrated Knowledge and Success in Madrasah Education in Singapore, edited by Noor Aisha Abdul Rahman and Lai Ah Eng. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish for Institute of Policy Studies, 2006. Nik Abdul Aziz Haji Nik Hassan. “Islam dan Masyarakat Kota Bharu di antara Tahun1900–1933”. In Islam di Malaysia. K.L.: Persatuan Sejarah Malaysia, 1979. Norman Suratman. Menyongsong Arus. Singapore: Pustaka ASB Mohamad, 1997. Pasuni Maulan. Masyarakat Islam Singapura. Selangor: Kolej Islam Malaya, 1967. Roff, W. The Origins of Malay Nationalism. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya, 1967. Roslinda Sahamad. Facing Up to the Challenge: Madrasahs of Modern Singapore. Academic Exercise, Department of Malay Studies, National University of Singapore, 1995. Saeda Buang. “Pendidikan Islam di Singapura: Lingkaran Falsafah, Wawasan dan Matlamat” [Islamic Education in Singapore: The Cycle of Philosophy, Vision and Mission]. Paper presented at the International Conference of Malay Language 360

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and Cultural Premiership, organized by Asian Languages and Cultures, National Institute of Education/Nanyang Technological University, July 2003. Siti Masyitah A. Rahman, ed. Al-Istiqamah. 60th Anniversary Commemorative Magazine of Madrasah Al-Ma’arif Singapore, 1997. Short, Edmund. C. Forms of Curriculum Inquiry. N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1991. Syed Khairudin and Dayang Siti Aishah. “Estranged from the Ideal Past: Historical Evaluation of Madrasahs in Singapore”. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 2, no. 2 (August 2005): 249–60. Zainah Alias. The Goals of Madrasah Educational System in Singapore: Obstacles and Recommendations. Academic Exercise, Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, 1998.

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15 MISSION SCHOOLS IN SINGAPORE Religious Harmony, Social Identities, and the Negotiation of Evangelical Cultures Robbie B. H. Goh

INTRODUCTION This paper briefly traces the historical role and development of mission schools in Singapore, to ascertain the means by which they achieved a reputation for excellence and maintained that reputation even after Singapore’s independence and the creation of a national school system. Although mission schools have had to negotiate their distinctive character in the light of national educational imperatives and currents — including the Religious Knowledge curriculum in the 1980s and the racial-religious climate which surrounded it — the quality of a distinctive school “spirit” and its “moral” benefits have persisted throughout the history of mission schools. This, to judge from the large body of responses on the role of mission schools (ranging from ministerial comments to the responses of teachers and alumni of the schools themselves), has largely been effected through non-curricular or structural means which permit such non-curricular influences to be communicated. The result is a distinctive character of mission schools which has been broadly acknowledged to play a significant part in the Singapore 362

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educational landscape, not only or primarily in academic terms, but more in terms of the “moral” training for which mission schools are held in high regard. The superior efficacy of moral influence (which arises from the inherently Christian nature of the mission schools), over a Religious Knowledge curricular approach (in which this Christian nature has to give way to a multi-religious, pluralistic curriculum inculcated through abstract classroom dictates), argues for an enhancement of the structural leeway given to mission schools to carry out their project of Christian moral influence. Clearly, a number of safeguards have to be set in place to protect the religious sensibilities of non-Christian students. With these safeguards in place, however, the implications of the socio-historical development of mission schools in Singapore would appear to argue for a policy allowing such schools to structure an enhanced Christian influence into their modus operandi, even as schools from other religious traditions (such as the Buddhist schools) be similarly allowed to enhance their religious aspects, with an eye to the moral development of students.

MISSION SCHOOLS IN COLONIAL SINGAPORE Mission schools played a central role in the educational landscape of colonial Singapore from the latter part of the nineteenth century onwards. Before this, the colonial government did little to establish a broad educational system. Raffles himself thought that there should be “an Institution of the nature of a Native College” teaching native students in their “mother tongue” — this was the basis of the “Singapore Institution” that was established in 1823 and later renamed Raffles Institution (Chelliah 1947, pp. 12–16). Yet the colonial government deemed that “the native inhabitants of Singapore” were not of “that state of civilisation and knowledge which would qualify them to derive advantage from the enlarged system of education” which the Singapore Institute represented (Crawford, cited in Chelliah 1947, p. 19). Caught between the distant apathy of the Calcutta administration and an uncertain educational policy in Singapore, colonial educational initiatives in the Straits Settlement in the 1830s and 1840s could at best be described as desultory. Matters improved after 1867, when the Straits Settlements (Singapore, Malacca and Penang) became colonies directly under the colonial office, rather than coming under the control of the colonial government in Calcutta, and more money was invested in a broad-based system of schooling. Although the emphasis was still on the teaching of vernacular languages, by 1875 a number of “branch English schools” (whose expenses were entirely defrayed by the government) were teaching in a combination of English and vernacular 363

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languages. After 1900, a new model of government schools was followed, in which vernacular education was gradually relegated to the lower levels, and instruction directly in English came to the fore (Chelliah 1947, pp. 54–57). Struggling to provide adequate school facilities for the growing demand among native children, the colonial government was only too happy to allow mission societies to set up schools. The roots of mission education in Singapore are found in the work of the Anglican London Missionary Society (LMS), which operated a number of small schools from the time of Singapore’s founding in 1819. However, the “weak beginnings” of these earliest mission schools, together with the fact that the Anglicans were very much focused on China rather than Straits Settlement missions, saw the closing down of the LMS schools in 1847 (Kong et al. 1994, p. 3). It was only in the latter part of the nineteenth century, when the size and strategic importance of the settlement of Singapore became clearer, that concerted educational missions came to be established. Earlier mission schools operating in the latter part of the nineteenth century include the Anglican St Margaret’s School (established in 1842, and one of the few of the original Anglican schools to survive) and St Andrew’s School (1862); the Catholic St Joseph’s Institution (SJI) (1852), Convent of the Holy Infant Jesus (CHIJ) (1854), and St Anthony’s Canossian School (1894); the Methodist Anglo-Chinese School (ACS) (1886), Methodist Girls’ School (MGS) (1887) and Fairfield Methodist School (1888), and others. All started in very humble premises (usually rented shophouses in the Chinatown area), with very small initial enrolments (MGS initially had nine students, ACS thirteen students, CHIJ thirty-nine students), and all were the result of missionaries collaborating with and enlisting the aid of native philanthropists and community leaders. The missionary societies were unabashedly evangelical in their intentions for these schools. Although the schools were often advertised to the community as educational opportunities without mention of any religious element, it was certainly clear in the minds of the missionaries themselves that their purpose was to exert a Christian influence upon their charges. ACS, for example, arose when Methodist missionary William Oldham happened to chance upon the Celestial Reasoning Association established by Chinese businessman Tan Keong Saik, for the purpose of improving speaking and debating skills in English. This ultimately led to a proposal that Oldham teach the sons of these businessmen, and the new school was announced by the following handbill distributed in Chinatown: The Anglo-Chinese School is to be opened in Amoy Street, No. 70, on 1st March 1886. Chinese will be taught from 8 a.m. to 12 p.m. and 364

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English from 1.30 p.m. to 4 p.m. Apply to the superintendent W. F. Oldham, care of Lim Kong Wan and Son, 21, Malacca Street. (Lau and Teo 2003, p. 10)

Yet, although academic goals (particularly the acquisition of competence in English) were the means of Oldham’s interaction with this group of Chinese businessmen and were clearly foregrounded in the advertisement for the school, Oldham in his own mind was absolutely clear about the “underlying Christian character” of the school he had founded, and conducted “daily chapel service and Bible lessons which all pupils attended” (Lau and Teo 2003, p. 16). Oldham’s wife Marie, in a magazine article of 1907, elaborates on the importance of evangelism in the life and work of the school when she says that “there ought not to be any discrimination between evangelistic and educational work; each can be as educational or as evangelistic as the one in charge chooses to make it” (cited in Lau and Teo 2003, p. 15). This Christianizing influence seems to have been held in common, to varying degrees, by all the early mission schools; certainly the Catholic schools were very much concerned with “spreading the Catholic faith”. Indeed, in the early decades of the CHIJ, “the emphasis was very much on moral and domestic rather than academic education” (Kong et al. 1994, pp. x and 64). While the missionaries might have been sensibly strategic (to varying degrees, according to the individual and to the circumstances) in not throwing their evangelical aims in the faces of their clientele, they were certainly consistent in maintaining that evangelism was the bedrock of their educational projects. Obviously, the element of religious conversion and the cultural deracination and loss this might be associated with in the minds of certain sectors of the native population, were sensitive topics which the mission schools had to negotiate quite carefully. It would appear that as a general principle, the schools and their leaders avoided any declaration of their evangelical aims which might come across as provocative or be taken out of the context of their educational project as a whole, while nevertheless making that evangelical dimension as transparent as possible in their day-to-day operations. Certainly the public perception of the mission schools was that their goal was as much the moral transformation of their pupils as the academic one, if not more so, as can be seen by the remarks of one of a group of journalists who toured the ACS in 1888: the lads not only gain a commercial education calculated to fit them for English business, but are brought under a moral influence that is far more important and of inestimable value; and none the less real, because it is unobtrusive in its action (reprinted in ACS 1929, p. 6). 365

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Even the governor, Sir Cecil Smith, at an 1890 prize-giving ceremony, commended ACS on its “what might be called, for want of a better word, moral teaching” (Lau and Teo 2003, p. 16). This Christian moral influence exerted by mission schools on its students continued to be registered in the public consciousness many decades into the life and work of the schools. A 1935 Straits Times editorial, for example, singles out and commends mission education for the fact that it has upheld and is still upholding moral standards at a time when Confucius is rejected by the younger generation of China, when domestic and social conditions are becoming steadily weaker among all Asiatic communities, and when subtle influences such as the cinema are playing upon adolescent minds. Those influences are not necessarily bad, but youth needs to be taught how to evaluate them, and in that instruction it may fairly be said that the Christian missions are playing an admirable and necessary part. (cited in Ho 1964, p. 53)

It does appear, nevertheless, that the Chinese community who formed the largest part of the student body of the mission schools, may not have fully understood the ramifications of a mission school education. The “Isaiah episode” that confronted ACS in 1896 would suggest as much: a letter published in the local newspapers by one “Isaiah” called attention to the “proselytizing” work done by the school, and accused the school of breaching (what the author saw as) the original understanding between Oldham and his Chinese supporters (Teo and Lau 2003, p. 16). Although the controversy was bitter enough to cause a fall in the school’s enrolment, this was of a fairly small magnitude (from 624 to 515 students), and did not stop the school’s rapid growth in the following years (ACS 1937, p. 30). The generally pragmatic attitude among the Chinese community in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries may have been summed up by the Chinese writer of a letter to the Straits Chinese Magazine in 1897, who believed that “a good English education is no doubt the best legacy a Chinese or any other parent in the British Empire can leave to his children” (cited in Loh 1975, p. 55). To this inherently Westernizing influence of Anglophone education, the religious influence of the mission schools did not appear to add an especially odious dimension. Song (1984, p. 292) indeed argues that Isaiah did not speak for the majority of the Chinese families whose sons were studying in ACS, since “the average non-Christian Chinese parent” was “perfectly indifferent as to what his children were taught in school”. While this may perhaps be putting it a little too strongly, the manner in which ACS bounced back from the “Isaiah episode”, and its subsequent rapid growth 366

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(even after the spectre of proselytization was thrust to the fore) lend some weight to the claim that Chinese parents were actually fairly tolerant of the moral project of the mission schools and the Christian religion with which that project was inextricably intertwined. It is worth reiterating that the mission schools did not see their moral function as a separate, separable and ancillary aspect of their academic project, but as being part and parcel of the same project. In the words of thenConference Secretary of the 1957 Commission on Christian Education, T. R. Doraisamy, “we teach religion because it makes education complete” (cited in Ho 1964, p. 137). Doraisamy, who had a long involvement with education in Singapore and specifically with religious education, and who later became Bishop of the Methodist Church in Singapore, observes that “the earliest mottos of religious education propounded were ‘To put education into religion and religion into religion’ and ‘The soul of education is the education of the soul’ ” (Doraisamy 2004, p. 192). In many instances, religious instruction in mission school during the colonial period was not an adjunct or option, but structured into the everyday life and curriculum of the schools. At ACS, chapels lasting twenty to thirty minutes were held every day, the sessions consisting of hymn-singing, reading and explanation of the Bible, and prayer. All students were expected to be present, except for “the boys who object, and whose parents object” (Ho 1964, p. 138). This excuse clause for students with serious objections (or whose parents had) to Christian activities was in a very real sense an integral part of the mission school culture. While the schools had to consider their Christian influence as a vital part of school life and thus to be applied to the student population in general as an overall part of school culture, this could only be sustained if there was a corresponding respect for students’ or parents’ objections. Christian influence would be nugatory without choice, even if that choice had to be exercised as a deliberate exclusion on the part of certain individuals from activities (such as chapel) which the school as a whole undertook. The manner and extent to which religious instruction of this sort was carried out seemed to vary from school to school. At the CHIJ, it was decided that “no public funds should be used for the purpose of proselytizing”, and so the fact that the school received government aid meant that “religious instruction was possible only before and after official school hours” (Kong et al. 1994, p. 72). Notwithstanding this, “religion pervaded the school’s atmosphere”, with daily prayers in the mornings and afternoons and before each class, although catechism was confined to Catholic students (Meyers 2004, p. 58). Individual schools may have gone through periods of difficulty in reconciling religious and academic life. St Andrew’s School, for example, 367

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struggled against “secularization” in the early decades of the twentieth century, when the decline of the Anglican mission control over the school meant increased pressure to foreground secular education. Nevertheless, the continued agency of the school chaplain and religious activities during “out-of-school hours” indicated the school’s continued commitment to bring its students to the “valuable knowledge … of Our Lord Jesus Christ” (Kovilpillai 1963, p. 16). Much of the religious impact of the mission schools, moreover, goes far beyond the more formal institutions of chapel and Bible instruction, and pervades the schools through the personal conduct, beliefs and inter-personal relationships of the Christian staff of these schools. The recurring note which sounds through most if not all of the historical records and reminiscences of the mission schools is of the memorable and life-changing influence exerted by the personal conduct and beliefs of the mission school teachers. Thus Meyers (2004, p. 59) describes the nuns of CHIJ as “exemplars of discipline” who could always be seen working, teaching or praying in the chapel. Their physical presence, their gentle but firm leadership and their dedication to their mission created a religious atmosphere and imposed a sense of discipline.

At the opening address of the 1977 Seminar on Moral Education in Catholic Schools, Senior Minister of State for Education Mr Chai Chong Yii remarked that “our ultimate success in attaining our national goals will rest…on the moral quality of our people,” and that “a great deal of this process [of moral education] takes place informally and sometimes even incidentally through all the contacts and inter-relationships which the children have with adults in the course of their every day lives” (Chai 1977). In the Catholic tradition of mission education, much of the distinctive moral atmosphere lies in the personal lives and work of the “religious” (nuns and priests) who made such a great impact on their students. In the words of Joseph McNally, long-time educator in the Christian Brothers’ schools in Singapore, “most of all [the old boys] recall their wonderful teachers and the love that bound them all together” (McNally 1980, p.76). While the Protestant mission schools may have had less of a culture of the “religious” as teacher, they similarly noted the fundamental role played in moral education by the general atmosphere of school life, and the role played by Christian teachers in creating this atmosphere. In an article in the Methodist periodical, the Malaya Message of 1930, Ho Seng Ong, the then principal of 368

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ACS Malacca, speaks against the “numbers” mentality of measuring school output, and asks instead that we “inquire into the number of Christ-like teachers, if we must have our numbers” (Ho 1930, p.14). Since “changing men’s and women’s lives is a very slow process”, the emphasis in considering moral education (and mission schools in general) should not be on quick curricular “results”, but on the “religious person” of the mission school teacher (Ho 1930, p. 14). Other non-curricular means of imparting a specifically Christian and often Biblically-derived set of values included the mechanisms of the boarding house (which, because it catered to the whole lives of its boarders, had more leeway to assert a Christian influence without the constraints faced in the classroom alone); the use of communal discourses such as was found in school magazines, songs and speeches, which could insert Christianized moralizing elements within the aegis of an articulation of a corporate school spirit or tradition; and of course the individual acts of (Christian-inflected) counselling, advice and moral influence which stand at the interstices of formal religious instruction and informal personal interaction (Kovilpillai 1963, p. 45; Kong et al. 1994, p. 79; Goh 2001; Meyers 2004, pp. 73, 85).

MISSION SCHOOLS AFTER INDEPENDENCE: THEIR PLACE IN SINGAPORE’S MODERNIZING PROJECT Significantly, this sense of the distinctive nature of the mission school “spirit” and its resulting effect on the moral life of its students in general, persists long after Singapore’s independence and through various national educational policies and initiatives. After achieving independence from the British in the 1957 Federation of Malaya Act, Singapore (which remained a part of Malaysia until separation in 1965) embarked on a process of educational expansion in the 1950s and 1960s, creating more schools to meet the rising need for elementary education (H. C. Chai 1977, pp. 15, 30). The creation of a large number of government schools not only threatened to reduce the relative significance of mission schools in the Singapore educational landscape overall, it also put pressure on mission schools to conform to a national education agenda which was very much dictated by the requirements of nation-building, and to which the government schools naturally conformed very closely: the national education system is intimately involved in nation-building and the evolution of a Singaporean identity. Schools are mandated to implement educational policies formulated to achieve national political, cultural and economic goals and priorities. (Chew 1997, p. 75) 369

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Yip et al. (1997) categorize the first few decades of educational development in Singapore into several phases. The initial phase was in the late 1950s and 1960s, in which Singapore’s transition to independence necessitated the responsibility for providing broad-based education as a “basic human right”. A second period saw “qualitative consolidation” in the 1960s and 1970s, in which the educational agenda, in addition to consolidating earlier changes, also had to serve the goals of strengthening technical education and “building a socially-disciplined cohesive Singaporean society”. The third period, during 1979–84, was one of “refinements and new strides” marked by the new language policy at one end and the creation of the Gifted Education programme on the other. Following this, the move “towards excellence in education” in 1985–90, aimed at the development of the “whole person”, and included measures such as the move to single-session schools starting in 1986, the implementation of pastoral care in 1988, and the introduction of independent schools since 1988. Within these broad educational phases and national agendas, Singapore schools were also called upon to fulfil particular tasks of social regulation, of which the Religious Education programme was perhaps one of the most complex and demanding, given Singapore’s multi-ethnic and multi-religious context and the inherent need to preserve order and harmony. Gopinathan (1995) traces the evolution of religious education in Singapore schools from its origins in the perceived need to enhance “social cohesion, political identity and loyalty to the state”, through the “Education for Living” programme introduced in 1974, the “Being and Becoming” programme introduced in 1981, and the “Religious Knowledge curriculum” which ran from 1984 to 1989. Gopinathan (1995, pp. 20, 23) notes that although the Religious Knowledge curriculum — which involved the classroom teaching of select specific religions plus a “World Religions” option for those students who did not want to choose a specific religion, and a policy in which any school had to offer an option if at least twenty students requested it — was initially implemented to forestall an “incipient moral crisis” among Singapore’s youth. However, it was withdrawn in 1989 due to a new “heightened consciousness of religious differences and a new fervour in the propagation of religious beliefs”, to which it was believed the Religious Curriculum had contributed. The 1987 Marxist Conspiracy, in which its alleged mastermind Vincent Cheng and other “plotters” took shelter “under the cover of para-church organizations affiliated to the Catholic church”, also raised the spectre of a politicized religious sentiment emerging out of a climate of inter-religious competition and zeal (Lee 1989). 370

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These variegated stages and manifestations of religious education posed several problems to schools, including (and perhaps especially) the mission schools. Tan (1997, p. 101) sums up some of these problems: in terms of material, it was difficult to separate religion from the teaching of religion, with a “prescriptive” element “glorifying” particular religions tending to insert itself in the material; teachers with strong religious convictions had difficulty teaching other religions; on the other hand, some teachers tended to teach their own religions with a zeal which was often perceived as proselytizing; and religious bodies on their part objected to what they perceived as the inadequate training received by teachers, and thus the inappropriate ways in which their religions were taught. From the point of view of the mission schools, it could easily be seen that the Religious Knowledge curriculum was a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it gave a curricular aspect to the Christianizing influence which was always part of their raison d’être. On the other hand, not only did the new curriculum necessitate the teaching of other religions in mission schools (whenever there was a demand for these), it also put the work of Christian evangelism at risk, by formalizing and intensifying a kind of intra-curricular competition with other religions. Ironically, the role and perception of mission schools in the development of modern Singapore would appear to suggest the unsuitability of a curricular approach for the schools’ main task of moral influence. In many ways, the work and structures of mission schools in post-independence Singapore continue from the situation of the schools in the colonial period: their distinctive brand of Christian morality, where effective, was largely carried out through the personal and informal agency of dedicated Christian teachers, rather than through any explicit curricular teaching and influence. The extent to which Christian elements were an important part of the corporate life of the school — in the boarding-house routines, assemblies, chapels, talks, counselling and prayers — varied from school to school, and always had to take cognizance of the plural religious sensitivities represented by their student bodies, particularly after the passing of the Religious Harmony Act of 1990 which (in a deliberately broad articulation intended to have a cautionary effect) made it an offence “to cause ill-feelings between different religious groups” (MITA 1992, p. 1). Mission schools had to be ready to excuse from any kind of Christian activity students from other religions who expressed objections, but this was in various ways and to various extents true of the mission schools in the colonial era as well. Perhaps the biggest difference in the life and work of the mission schools in modern Singapore, when contrasted to colonial times, was the general 371

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decline in the numbers of “Christ-like teachers”, in the words of Ho Seng Onn (1930, p. 14), and the effect this had on the general level of spiritual commitment and Christianizing influence in the mission schools as a whole. With the early phases of infrastructural development and “qualitative consolidation” in the Singapore education system in the 1960s and 1970s, the priority fell on producing good-quality education in a large number of government schools. The result was the gradual decline in the necessity for Christian educational missionaries whose lives were given in response to a social need. While the mission schools in the colonial period were bolstered by the presence of educational missionaries (from England, America, Australia and elsewhere) who had dedicated their lives to the Christian influence of young men and women through education, this practice effectively ceased after independence. The introduction of school rankings in 1992, which was only the confirmation of a larger trend to emphasize academic results at the expense of most other non-curricular aspects of student life, also served to discourage and dissuade “religious” teachers who saw their primary purpose as lying precisely in these other non-curricular parts of the educational process. The relatively limited prospects for career advancement and related perquisites in mission schools, when compared to the increasingly expanding sector of government schools, also posed a stumbling block to teachers thinking of a career in mission schools (ACS 1986, pp. 144–45, 181, 189; Kong et al. 1994: 187; Ang 2004). It is significant that this aspect of interpersonal moral influence and its abiding importance in the mission school project over the years, is not just the rhetoric of the schools themselves (in which case sentimentalism and selfpropagandizing might naturally be suspected), but also of key government leaders closely concerned with the education project in the decades after independence. While there were certainly attempts to make the mission schools toe the national line of promoting “the widest common area of understanding” and “jelling the various ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups into a uniform distinctiveness” (then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew 1968), there was also repeated recognition of the distinctive “spirit” of the mission schools, which was one that was not reducible to aspects of their curriculum or formal rituals and structures, and yet was seen as highly effective in shaping the moral character of many generations of students. The prime minister himself noted that “senior masters and principals of mission schools are men moved by deep religious convictions….They care for the pupils under their care, as if they were their own children” (Lee 1970). The then Senior Minister of State for Education Tony Tan, himself an alumnus of a mission school (SJI), acknowledged that “the government has long recognized 372

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the positive role that the mission schools can play in the education of our youth,” to “inculcate Christian values in the children under their charge” (Tan 1980). Addressing the ACS community, Dr Tan went so far as to say that “it is your responsibility to cultivate in your students the ambition to live a decent life, to be unselfish, to uphold Christian ideals and in general to recognize their responsibility to their fellowmen and to the nation” (Tan 1980). On another occasion, he commended the Catholic Christian Brothers’ schools for “that education of the spirit”, the “moral education, religious education” which are “very much in the forefront at these schools”, and which “give our children the moral compass which will guide them through life” (Tan 1984). While it might be objected that these comments are to a certain extent inspired or necessitated by their context (they are often made while addressing mission school alumni and communities), the very fact that Singapore’s political leaders repeatedly go on the record with such comments, particularly in Singapore’s carefully objective political culture and the government’s constant eye on religious harmony, is already significant. Moreover, it is not merely the generally positive effect of mission schools on the Singapore landscape which is highlighted (although that is part of the import), but specifically the mission school brand of moral influence which comes (to the minds of these politicians) precisely from the characteristic “spirit” of these schools, rather than in any separable content or programmes. In this distinctive Christian moral influence, the general perspective of government leaders agrees with that of the mission school leaders in placing the overwhelming emphasis on the personal qualities of teachers themselves. As then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew said in a slightly different context (of education in general), “the most important person is the man who is in charge of the boy” (Lee 1966). Other government leaders over the years have applied this to the role of mission schools in particular, insisting that the character of a school, the attitudes which are formed in its students, the values which they absorb are all dependent on the type of teachers who teach in the school. This is, to my mind, the key which sets the mission schools apart and makes them different from other schools. (Tan 1980)

Teachers in mission schools make a distinctive impact not so much (or not merely) through their curricular contributions, but through their personal qualities. Thus, for Dr Tan, one of the chief qualities of inspirational ACS teacher H. M. Hoisington (who taught there from 1919 to 1939) was the fact that “he inspired his pupils in the noble desire to live aright” (Tan 1980). 373

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Dr Tay Eng Soon (Minister of Education) felt that moral education was acquired “by unconscious assimilation” and “emulation”; while insisting that “there is definitely a place for systematic and orderly learning” in the classroom, he also maintained that “much can be achieved through informal activities to inculcate good attitudes and habits” (Tay 1981). These informal activities not only include the “character development” that was derived through formal extra-curricular activities (such as uniformed groups and student leadership activities), but also “the teacher’s interest and care for his or her pupils’ work or problems”, which “can teach untold lessons on human relationships, respect and concern to the pupils” (Tay 1981). Dr Tay went as far as to say, reiterating a now-familiar tenet in government attitudes to moral education in schools, that “the moral tone of any school is set by the principal and his teachers” (Tay 1981). Thus government attitudes to mission schools in the era of educational modernization and nation-building consistently recognize the distinctively “Christian” quality of mission school education and the moral legacy they effectively impart to their students. It was the “distinctly Christian Institution” which was well-placed to “provide boys with good moral and good habits”. There was not only a recognition that this distinguished (although this stopped short of an explicit claim that this made mission schools superior) the mission school from others, but also that the Christianizing element was inevitable, and an inextricable part of the mission schools’ process of moral training: If at the same time, boys are influenced by the example of their Christian teachers to want to become Christians themselves, so much the better….This aim of the pioneers of ACS is as valid today as it was a 100 years ago….If ACS ever loses this missionary vision, then ACS would be no different from any good secular school. That would be a loss indeed. (Tay 1986)

This Christianizing moral influence, both the Christian educationists and political leaders agree, is pervasive, not confined to or specifically inculcated through curricular and formal extra-curricular means but in large part conveyed through a kind of spiritual character or atmosphere permeating the school as a whole. Inasmuch as it could ever be pinned down, it resided in a range of “informal and ad hoc activities” in which students and teachers interacted, and in which the distinctive element was the “dedicated Christian teacher” (Tay 1981; Tay 1986).

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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY The historical experience and evolution of the mission schools, the (at best) limited success of formal religious knowledge training in schools, the abiding need for moral training of some sort or other in Singapore society — all these suggest the need for a policy which mixes laissez-faire freedom (within broad parameters and with certain clearly-defined limits) on the one hand, and a basic curricular framework on the other. The very complexities and sensitivities of religious education in a multi-religious society and the problematic nature of moral influence as a whole, pose daunting problems to any policy position. This is all the more an argument for a policy with a light touch, which builds on proven and acknowledged methods of moral influence as exemplified by the history of the mission schools, while avoiding a prescriptive enforcement which can only tend towards religious fractiousness and controversy. While this chapter has drawn on the historical lessons of Christian mission schools specifically, it would appear that the general lessons to be learnt could also be applied to any well-run mission school from any of the main religious traditions. The basic tenet of such a policy would be to recognize the efficacy of the moral influence and “spirit” imparted in mission schools (whatever their religious affiliation), which derives precisely from their specific religious base, and to permit and indeed encourage schools to enhance this influence. Such encouragement might take the form of priority postings which match teachers of a certain religious persuasion with appropriate mission schools through certain mechanisms (interviews, the evidence of written statements of teaching purpose and philosophy, a probationary period if necessary) to ensure the matching is more real than accidental or apparent. A priority policy need not, of course, preclude teachers of other religious affiliations (or none whatsoever) from joining a mission school if places are available, although it does mean that such schools are empowered and encouraged to fill the majority of its staffing positions firstly with suitable teachers of the appropriate religious background. A partial return to and encouragement of the spirit of the “religious” (in Catholic schools) or the dedicated missionary-teacher (in Protestant ones) could take the form of the creation of official posts of spiritual counsellors. These would be full-time Christian workers of appropriate spiritual and psychological training and who would exert a moral influence in the situations requiring more formal counselling, as well as in the important but less formal situations of everyday school life. This form of living, practical and personal

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moral influence, if the historical examples drawn from mission schools are to be believed, has the potential to exert a lasting impact in ways that outlast the abstract lessons of formal instruction alone. While such work is still carried out by dedicated, caring and spiritually-motivated teachers (and a handful of Christian workers) in mission schools today, the generally heavy academic workload and scarcity of resources (including funds and workers) mean that many opportunities for exerting a living and personal moral influence on students go begging. Other means of a religious-based moral influence — the daily life and interactions of the boarding school, assemblies in the nature of chapel services, corporate prayer and hymn-singing, corporate discourses in the form of school magazines, speeches and talks — are already in place and practised to various extents in different mission schools today. These, if they are encouraged together with the other proposed measures, would create a very pervasive and clearly-defined “religious atmosphere” in mission schools. While this would prevent “receptive” students (those in need of moral instruction and guidance, and who would not object to the religious bases of such interventions) from falling through the cracks, it would also place considerably more religious influence on certain students who would not welcome it. This would seem to be the inevitable consequence of an effective moral atmosphere in schools. While unreceptive students can still opt out of formal religious sessions in the classroom and corporate rituals, it would be increasingly difficult for them to do so in the wide variety of informal settings in such religiously-empowered mission schools. It seems to be an inevitable corollary of effective moral education that even students who might not be receptive to the influence of a particular religion would still be exposed to it to a certain extent, and indeed this is probably the case in most mission schools as things stand at present. In the words of Tan Hye San, one-time Principal of St Anthony’s Boys’ School, parents thinking of sending their children to a mission school “must know that we teach religion and if they wish to send their children to us they must accept our schools as such” (1977, p. 31). Students who (or whose parents) find this enhanced religious atmosphere unacceptable, would probably be best advised to enrol elsewhere from the very beginning (that is, when the child enters primary one), and should if necessary be permitted to transfer to a suitable government school. The experiences of the religious knowledge programmes would seem to suggest that formal religious instruction poses more problems than it is worth, particularly in the matter of religions being taught by teachers who do not subscribe to that religion, or hold strongly to other religious beliefs. This consideration, together with the limited enrolments of mission schools (and 376

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thus the limited numbers of students falling under their moral influence), would seem to necessitate a basic non-religious ethical or moral training programme in all schools. As a supplement, and in the same spirit, a basic “religious diversity” module might also be incorporated which would present information on the different major religions in as neutrally-weighted and objective a manner as possible, and which would call attention to similarities between religions as the basis for a moral theory as well as for religious harmony in a multi-religious society such as Singapore’s. As Tan (1997, p. 104) says, “allowing religious awareness to develop informally away from the context of school moral education might prove advantageous” as “the practice of teaching religion in the name of moral education could send the misleading message that religion is reducible to secular morality”. This is not only prompted by the need to avoid “zealous evangelization”, but also by the need to instil a wide-reaching moral influence in young Singaporeans. If the historical lessons from the mission schools are to be believed, this will be of much less enduring impact than the religiously-inspired formal and informal influence. Nevertheless, it will serve to provide at least a basic ethical template or guide for the majority of students. Again, if the testimony of mission schools is anything to go by, then the enhancement of their religious brief will only increase their popularity and demand among those parents who value their distinctive brand of moral training. If this proves to be true, then a judicious expansion of the popular mission schools over time, with the support of government funding, would also increase the moral output in a manner driven to a certain extent by religiously-neutral market-like factors. Indeed, this is already happening, as evidenced by the recent set-up of ACS (International) and the proposed SJI (International) within the larger economic aim of making Singapore an international education hub. At the same time, any possibility of over-zealous evangelism in schools could be proscribed in certain ways. First, a corresponding enhancement of the opting-out rights (at least as far as formal religious sessions are concerned) of students with other religious beliefs — even to the extent of disciplinary and punitive measures levelled on teachers and school workers who wilfully and repeatedly transgress by failing to heed those rights — would set very clear limits to the extent of evangelical activities. The enhancement of the religious atmosphere of all mission schools, regardless of their religious affiliations, would level the playing field at least in terms of policy and developmental potential, and help to forestall a climate of religious contention and politicization. Policies facilitating the transfer of disaffected students and even staff members from mission schools wherein they encounter repeated problems would help remove the tension points of cross-religious encounters, 377

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and make for a generally more open and non-confrontational dialogical religious climate. Also, the general shift in emphasis from curricular to noncurricular (personal, living, practical) moral influence, would mean the effective channelling of much of religious influence to the less volatile (or at least less widespread) area of personal and informal inter-relations, instead of the more contentious realm of classroom teaching and the curriculum. While it cannot be proven until it is tried and the results become clear, it does seem that clearer demarcation and liberalization of religious zones in the respective enhanced mission schools might actually alleviate competitive and politicized evangelism in schools. In this way, mission schools, called upon to declare their religious intents and practices in open ways, and resting their popularity in significant part on their ability to effect a lasting moral influence that is noted and consumed by the public, would find their main calling in the refinement of moral service and influence and reach the majority of receptive students. This path of “least resistance” should also steer schools away from the contentious, troublesome and costly “proselytization” or “zealous evangelization” of students with other religious convictions, within the larger religious landscape of Singapore.

References ACS Magazine. Singapore: Anglo-Chinese School, 1929. ———. Singapore: Anglo-Chinese School, 1937. Hearts, Hopes and Aims: The Spirit of the Anglo-Chinese School. Singapore: Times Books, 1986. Ang, Glenn. “Challenges Facing Mission Schools in Singapore: An Interview with Brother Paul Rogers FSC”. (accessed 1 August 2005). Chai, Chong Yii. “Opening Address”. Delivered at the Seminar on Moral Education in Catholic Schools, Singapore; Catholic Schools’ Council and Catholic Teachers’ Movement, 9–10 July 1977. Chai, Hon-Chan. Education and Nation-building in Plural Societies: The West Malaysian Experience. Canberra: Australian National University, 1977. Chelliah, D. D. A History of the Education Policy of the Straits Settlements with Recommendations for a New System Based on Vernaculars. Kuala Lumpur: The Government Press, 1947. Chew, Joy Oon Ai. “Schooling for Singaporeans: The Interaction of Singapore Culture and Values in the School”. Education in Singapore: A Book of Readings, edited by Jason Tan, S. Gopinathan, and Ho Wah Kam, pp. 75–91. Singapore: Prentice Hall/Simon and Schuster, 1997. Doraisamy, Theodore R. My Cup Runneth Over: An Autobiography. Singapore: Select Publishing, 2004. 378

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Goh, Robbie B. H. “Composing the Modern Nation: Mission School Magazines, Narrative Models and Cultural Typologies in Colonial Singapore”. Journal of Commonwealth Literature 36, no. 1 (2001): 59–73. Gopinathan, S. “Religious Education in a Secular State: The Singapore Experience”. Asian Journal of Political Science 3, no. 2 (1995): 15–27. Ho, Seng Ong. “Our Schools — Their Purpose and Problems”. Malaya Message. June 1930. ———. Methodist Schools in Malaya: Their Record and History. Petaling Jaya: Board of Education of the Malaya Annual Conference, 1964. Kong, Lily, Low Soon Ai, and Jacqueline Yip. Convent Chronicles: History of a Pioneer Mission School for Girls in Singapore. Singapore: Armour Publishing, 1994. Kovilpillai, Daniel. A Short History of St Andrew’s School: 1862–1962. Singapore: S.N., 1963. Lau, Earnest and Peter Teo, eds. The ACS Story. Singapore: Concordia Communications, 2003. Lee, Hsien Loong. “Speech at the Inauguration of the Parliament of Religions Organised by the Ramakrishna Mission, 30 April 1989”. National Archives Singapore. Lee, Kuan Yew. “Speech at a Meeting with Principals of Schools at the Victoria Theatre on 29 August 1966”. National Archives Singapore. ———. “Speech at the Reunion Dinner of St Andrew’s Old Boys’ Association, 7 September 1968”. National Archives Singapore. ———. “Address at the Christian Brothers Old Boys’ Association Annual Dinner, Celebrating the 118th Anniversary of the Founding of St Joseph’s Institution, 6 June 1970”. National Archives Singapore. Loh, Philip. Fook Seng. Seeds of Separatism: Education Policy in Malaya 1874–1940. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975. McNally, Joseph. “The Brothers’ Influence on Education in Singapore”. A Sign of Faith: La Salle Brothers’ 300 Years 1680–1980. Singapore: De La Salle Brothers, 1980. Meyers, Elaine. Convent of the Holy Infant Jesus: 150 Years in Singapore. Penang, Malaysia: The Lady Superior, 2004. Ministry of Information and the Arts (MITA). The Need for the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act. Singapore: MITA, 1992. Song, Ong Siang. One Hundred Years’ History of the Chinese in Singapore. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1984. Tan, Hye San. “The Expectation of the Church, Parents and Catholic Schools’ Principals, of Catholic Education in Singapore”. Delivered at the Seminar on Moral Education in Catholic Schools, 9–10 July 1977, Singapore; Catholic Schools’ Council and Catholic Teachers’ Movement. Tan, Tan Wei. “Moral Education in Singapore: A Critical Appraisal”. In Education in Singapore: A Book of Readings, edited by Jason Tan, S. Gopinathan, and Ho Wah Kam, pp. 93–104. Singapore: Prentice Hall/Simon and Schuster, 1997. 379

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Tan, Tony Keng Yam. “Speech at the ACS Founder’s Day Dinner, 1 March 1980”. National Archives Singapore. ———. “Speech at the Christian Brothers’ Old Boys’ Association Annual Dinner at the Shangri-La Hotel, 15 May 1984”. National Archives Singapore. Tay, Eng Soon. Speech to Velts Seminar at Merlin Hotel, 29 May 1981. National Archives Singapore. ———. Speech at the Anglo-Chinese School Centennial Dinner at the World Trade Centre, 1 March 1986. National Archives Singapore. Yip, John S. K., Eng Soo Peck, and Jay Ye Chin Yap. “25 Years of Educational Reform.” In Education in Singapore: A Book of Readings, edited by Jason Tan, S. Gopinathan and Ho Wah Kam, pp. 4–31. Singapore: Prentice Hall/Simon and Schuster, 1997.

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16 RELIGIOUS SWITCHING AND KNOWLEDGE AMONG ADOLESCENTS IN SINGAPORE Phyllis Ghim-Lian Chew

INTRODUCTION A study of religion in adolescence is important because today’s youths are the adults of tomorrow — their behaviour, attitudes and beliefs affect the political, economic and social future of a nation. Adolescence is characterized by many biological, cognitive and social changes which constitute a transition into adult life. Growth can spur changes in how adolescents are viewed and treated by their parents and peers as well as changes in how adolescents view themselves and are viewed and treated by their parents, peers and others. It is a period when they not only encounter society’s expectations of them, but also have a strong need to find intimacy and friends. Religion or more generally, religiosity begins to play a large part upon how these potential adults view the world. Important questions pertaining to identity and meaning begin to surface. However, research on religious development in adolescence is a much neglected area, as can be observed by the lack of research and surveys available until recently. Tong (2002) has documented anthropological and sociological studies on Hinduism, Christianity, Hinduism and Chinese religion in Singapore written in English in the last 150 years. These studies have mostly focused on more apparent aspects such as rituals or festivals. Although Christianity is 381

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practised by only 14.6 per cent (Leow 2001) of the population, more research has been undertaken on it than on other religions. However, these studies have been more of religious sociology rather than the sociology of religion. In all these, very few systematic surveys or studies were undertaken and as far as this writer is aware, no research on religious switching among the adolescent school-going population has been documented. There has been however, some research of religious conversion among students in tertiary institutions, but mostly on Christianity and Buddhism (for example, Tamney and Hassan 1987). Hence, this study appears to be the first such study and is thus important although preliminary and exploratory in nature. A reason for the scarcity of research on this area is because studies of switching or conversion have received little respect from scholars since they are often assumed to be a supernatural phenomenon. Also, when someone says that he has “switched”, whether this is an authentic or inauthentic conversion as it is difficult to distinguish between the two. While the study is aware of this problem, it will accept all declarations of switching as authentic and sincere.

Background of Study Objectives and Definitions There are two broad goals in this study. The first is to understand the nature of religious switching by adolescents. It uncovers the conditions existing prior to conversion that seemed meaningfully related to the change, in the sense that these conditions constituted a problem that switching or conversion was meant to solve. What was the basis of choice of an adolescent’s religious ideology? Accordingly, the more specific objectives relating to this broad goal are: • • • • •

How and why do adolescents switch and to which religion? Did this switch encounter any opposition from family members? Is there a correlation between a dominant language at home that influenced religious switching? How do switchers describe themselves? Are there significant variations in response between age groups 13–14, 15–16, and 17–18?

The second goal is to investigate how much adolescents know about religions in Singapore. The specific objectives are:

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What and how much does an adolescent know about religions in Singapore? How much does a switcher know about his “new” and “old” religion? Are there significant variations in responses between age groups 13–14, 15–16, 17–18?

In this study, the term “switching” is preferred to the more commonly used term “conversion”. “Switching” is defined as the leaving of a religious organization for another. It means a “turning about”, a definite change of front, a passing from one state of being to another altogether different one, as a definite or specific activity. On the other hand, “conversion” is a more heavily loaded term. Conversion also connotes a dramatic event or a gradual and growing conviction in one’s mind that life’s meaning and purpose lie in a particular direction. “Switching”, on the other hand, connotes a more sociological phenomenon rather than a religious experience. It refers to a more haphazard, quicker process, somewhat akin to the “switching” of schools or jobs.

Methodology To ensure that there is a sufficient basis for valid general conclusions, data was collected from different sources. Four research tools were utilized: (1) quantitative questionnaire analysis; (2) qualitative case study of switchers; (3) participant observation; and (4) focus group discussion. A three-page questionnaire (see Appendix 16.1) was administered to 2,801 students of ages 12 to 18 from six secondary schools (four government and two government-aided), so as to allow for statistical generalizations. Out of the 2,801 questionnaires, 22 were void — being illegible or blank, leaving 2,779 returned questionnaires. The questionnaire was designed in such a way so that it would not be too lengthy as to be tedious for the respondents yet not too short as to be inadequate for the research purposes. The following key information was solicited from the first part of the questionnaire: 1. Respondent’s background information 2. Use of languages at home and in their daily lives 3. Religious affiliations of respondents and their family members, and reasons for switch of religion if any. (Respondents are deemed to have “switched” if their religions differ from any one of their parents). 4. Questions on Civics and Moral Education (CME).

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The second part of the questionnaire required students to write as much as they knew on the nine main religions of Singapore, listed alphabetically. Students were instructed to write on any aspect of the religion, including main teachings and principles, for example, festivals, ceremonies, administrative structure and any stories associated with that religion. Respondents were asked to leave the spaces blank if they knew nothing about the particular religion. The data was then computed and its collation organized according to age group rather than the institutions concerned, so as to maintain the latter’s confidentiality.

The Case Study Interviews During the week that the questionnaire was administered, the researcher gave an audio-visual presentation to the entire school cohort during the assembly period on the societal contributions that major religions have made to the people of Singapore. At the end of the presentation, the researcher referred to the study she was undertaking as well as the questionnaire which she would be implementing in the respective classes during the CME period. She announced that students who would like to share knowledge of their new faiths with the researchers could give their names to their respective CME teachers during the CME period. In this way, we were able to obtain interviews with a total of eighty-nine switchers from the six schools. Interviews were scheduled in the weeks following the implementation of the questionnaire. Interviewers were briefed on the study’s objectives and reassured of their anonymity. They were also counselled to maximize possible benefits and minimize potential harm in the topics they spoke about. The interviews were tape-recorded and the findings transcribed. Interviewers were given a guideline of the following three types of questions to cover in the course of the interview (See Appendix 16.2): 1. Warming-up questions 2. General questions 3. “Switch” questions Warming up questions such as “Describe yourself ” and “What makes you happy?” helped begin the interview in a personable and friendly manner. They also provided the necessary backdrop for the interpretation of each individual’s data. General questions established the “religious” framework of the interview and also tested adolescents once again on their knowledge of the religions of Singapore, reinforcing the information already gathered in 384

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the second written part of the questionnaire. “Switch” questions find out the context behind adolescents’ religious switching. In analysing the transcripts and listening to the taped voices, this author was concerned not just with what was said but also with questions such as: “What are the voices in the text?”, “Who are the various speakers?”, “How directly do they speak?”, “Which ones are paraphrased, or anonymous?”, “Who speaks for whom?” In other words, the concern was with the chains of reasoning in a discourse and how the implementation of specific linguistic choices operates to bring about a specific interpretation. Often, interviewees were unable to express all that they mean in a fully explicit way and most of the assumptions they expected their readers to share with them were left implicit. Hence, in interpreting the data, the redundancy and repetitiveness in the text were also looked at as a way to discover themes and the relation between themes.

Participant Observation and Focus Group Discussion To establish the socio-historical framework for the interpretation of the data, the heads of departments and principals of each school were interviewed with regard to its policy and culture. These discussions were important to get some sense of the insiders’ points of view, as well as to keep a check on the danger of reading too much into the questionnaire or the tape script. Publications on the school and those produced by the school, for example, the school annual and the students’ newsletter, were also read, as were few lunches eaten at the school canteen so as to imbibe the atmosphere of the school. Last but not least, the author also managed to speak to a few teachers in each school. A focus group discussion was subsequently held with two CME teachers from two participating institutions. Some samples of the interview data (especially those found problematic) were shared from which some conclusions regarding the phenomenon of religious switching among adolescents could be reached.

FINDINGS FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRE Religious Backgrounds and Religious Switching Table 16.1 shows the percentage of respondents by age group and religion. There were a total of 2,779 respondents, with 881, 914 and 980 in the age groups 13–14, 15–16, 17–18 respectively. Of the 2,779 respondents, only 158 (5.7 per cent) have actually switched religion. Switching occurs throughout adolescence, although the most number of switching occurs in age group 385

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Phyllis Ghim-Lian Chew TABLE 16.1 Number and Percentage of Respondents and Switchers by Age Group and Type of School

Age

13–14

15–16

17–18

Type of school Govt Govt- Aided Govt No. of respondents 451 430 433 Percentage of respondents 16.2 15.5 15.6

Govt-Aided 481 17.3

Total no of respondents

914

881

No. of switchers % of switchers

19 4.2

20 4.7

32 7.4

Govt 980 35.3

Govt-Aided 0 0 980

38 7.9

45 4.6

0 0

Total number of respondents: 2,779

15–16, with 7.4 per cent and 7.9 per cent of switchers in government and government-aided schools respectively. One hypothesis is that the type of school may play a part in the social conditioning. However, the rate of switching in government-aided schools is not significantly different from that of government schools in our sample, so this hypothesis is not supported. Table 16.2 shows the percentage of respondents by age group and religion. Religiosity appears alive and well as almost 82 per cent of adolescents believe in some sort of deity. Most of the respondents defined themselves as Buddhists (34.93 per cent), Christians (19.4 per cent) and Muslims (14.5 per cent). Adolescents who defined themselves as Taoists were a surprisingly low 8.4 per cent. The lower figures for Hindus and Sikhs (3.7 per cent and 0.3 per cent respectively) correlate respectively with the racial composition in Singapore. There were no respondents in our sample from the Jewish, Baha’i and Zoroastrian faiths. A note of explanation is needed on the higher percentage of Buddhists — while many adolescents may define themselves as “Buddhists” (usually after their parents), case study interviews reveal that they are more often than not “syncreticists” usually of the Mahayana variety, which is a form of folk religion in the sense that it contains many elements and deities that are not strictly Buddhist at all. This is not surprising as previous studies on Buddhism in Singapore have shown a disparity between the Buddhism in literature and that practised by the Chinese — which is a range of beliefs related to Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, ancestor worship and folk beliefs. Comparing Table 16.2 with comparable figures from the Singapore Census of 1980, 1990 and 2000 (Table 16.3), one finds that Buddhism and Christianity have been on the increase in the last three decades while there has 386

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TABLE 16.2 Percentage of Respondents by Age Group and Religion Age Group

Religion Buddhist Faith Taoism Christian Faith Islam Hindu Faith Sikh Faith Jewish Faith Baha’i Faith Zoroastrian Faith No religion

13–14

15–16

17–18

Average

36.3 8.4 18.0 15.0 4.0 0.3 0 0 0 18.0

34.0 8.9 20.1 14.2 3.7 0.2 0 0 0 18.9

34.3 7.5 20.1 14.4 3.5 0.5 0 0 0 19.8

34.9 8.3 19.4 14.5 3.7 0.3 0 0 0 18.9

Total number of respondents: 2,779

TABLE 16.3 Percentage Comparison of Data Sample with Singapore Census 1980, 1990 and 2000

Religion

Adolescent sample, aged 13–18

Population Aged 15 and over (cf Leow 2000, p. 33)

2004 study

2000

1990

1980

34.9 8.3 19.4 14.5 3.7 18.9 0.3

42.5 8.5 14.6 14.9 4.0 14.8 0.7

31.2 22.4 12.7 15.3 3.7 14.1 0.6

27.0 30.0 10.1 15.7 3.6 13.0 0.6

Buddhist Faith Taoism Christian Faith Islam Hindu Faith No Religion Others

been a corresponding decline in Taoism. This may therefore account for the relatively low number of adolescents who define themselves as Taoists (8.3 per cent). However, relative to the census figures, there are fewer adolescents in our sample who are Buddhists (34.9 per cent versus 42.5 per cent) while there are more adolescents who are Christians (19.4 per cent versus 14.6 per cent). This discrepancy can be explained by the fact that respondents used in the census are aged 15 and over, while respondents from this particular study are in the age group 13–18. We can therefore surmise that there are significantly more Buddhists and Christians among the adolescent population than the 387

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adult population of Singapore, and that Buddhist and Christian faiths are significantly more popular among the Chinese youths than Taoism. Table 16.4 shows the percentage of grandparents, parents and respondents by religion. Across three generations within a family, one discerns a marked decline in the numbers of Buddhists and Taoists. Older members of a family are more likely to be Taoists, than younger ones. While Kuo, Quah and Tong (1988) have observed that the decline in Taoism corresponds to an increase in Christianity, in the research sample, however, it corresponds to an increase TABLE 16.4 Percentage of Grandparents, Parents and Respondents by Religion Grandparents

Total %

Buddhist Faith

Taoism

Christian Faith

Islam

Hindu Faith

FreeThinker

Others

1376 49.5

542 19.5

222 8

403 14.5

83 3

153 4.5

0 0

111 4

392 14.1

17 0.6

103 3.7

525 18.9

8 0.3

Parents Total %

1084 39

364 13.1

408 14.7

403 14.5

Respondents Total %

970 34.9

231 8.3

539 19.4

404 14.5

Total number of respondents: 2,779

in both Christianity and Buddhism. The sample also shows an increase across three generations in the number of Christians and free-thinkers. The figures for Islam and Hinduism remain relatively constant, presumably because these are minority religions, and Islam in particular is considered the religion of the Malays. Hence, religious switching has by and large been confined to the Chinese and Indian populations of Singapore.

Main Trends in Religious Switching by Respondents Table 16.5 shows the percentage of switchers from one religion to another. Buddhism/Taoism are conflated as one category where switchers are concerned. This is because, as previously explained, although the switchers usually 388

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TABLE 16.5 Percentage of Switchers by Religion From Religion

To Religion

Number

Percentage

Christianity Buddhism (Soka) Others (Wicca) Free-Thinker

95 9 5 29

60.1 5.7 3.2 18.4

Christianity

Buddhism Free Thinker

2 9

1.3 5.7

Hinduism

Christianity Free-Thinker

2 2

1.3 1.3

Free-Thinker Status

Christianity Buddhism

4 1

2.5 0.6

158

100

Buddhism/Taoism

Total Total: 158 (5.7% of sample)

identify themselves as “Buddhists”; closer examination during the interviews discloses that they are actually syncreticists. Adolescent switchers fall within only three religions: Buddhism/Taoism, Christianity and free-thinkers. Most of the switchers came from the Buddhism/ Taoist category. They either switched to Christianity (60.1 per cent) — the most popular choice — or to being free-thinkers (18.4 per cent). Another 5.7 per cent of them had switched to Soka Buddhism and 3.2 per cent had switched to “Wicca”, a religion unfamiliar to the researcher at that time. Subsequent research found Wicca to be a form of popular witchcraft. However, the five who had switched to Wicca were all from the same school and therefore this choice of switch is likely to be a localized one within a certain educational institution, rather than generalized across Singapore educational institutions. There were also switchers who were originally Christians and free-thinkers. Another 1.3 per cent of switchers had switched from Christianity to Buddhism and 5.7 per cent from Christianity to free-thinker status. In addition 2.5 per cent of free-thinkers had switched to Christianity and 0.6 per cent to Buddhism. One notes that the shift is always from Taoism, Buddhism and/or Hinduism to Christianity, and not the other way round. This may be because Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism are basically not proselytizing religions. Similarly, there is a shift from Taoism to Buddhism and not the other way 389

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round. When Christians and Hindus switch, however, they tend to switch to free-thinker status rather than to the other faiths, something which indicate a disillusionment of religion in general. A free-thinker can also switch to any of the religions but usually it is to Christianity and Buddhism. One also notes that Malays do not switch religions. Islam is an “inherent” part of Malay culture. Hence, the greatest number of switchers comes from the Chinese and Indians whose cultures do not link race to religion. Table 16.6 shows the percentage of switchers in terms of “dominant language/dialect spoken at home”: 26.8 per cent spoke only English, 26.8 per cent spoke predominantly Mandarin, 33.1 per cent spoke English/Mandarin equally (more commonly known as code switching) and 10.1 per cent spoke dialects. In contrast, in the category “language used most often by yourself ”, 66.7 per cent listed English, 3 per cent listed Mandarin and 10 per cent practised code switching. These figures appear to herald the death of dialects as an inter-generational language as well as point to a dismal future for Taoism/Buddhism, which are often conducted in dialects or Mandarin. In contrast, Christian groups conduct their activities predominantly in English. The conversion from syncretistic Buddhism/Taoism to the Soka religion can also be explained in terms of language since the latter conducts services in English for their youths. Soka Buddhism has also romanized chanting for adherents who are unable to read Pali.

Religious Knowledge Table 16.7 shows the percentage of respondents by level of knowledge of Singapore religions. For statistical purposes, every respondent’s comments TABLE 16.6 Percentage of Switchers in Terms of Language Used Predominantly Predominantly Predominantly Equal use of Others English Mandarin dialects English/ (%) (%) (%) Mandarin (%) (%) Dominant language used at home

26.8

26.8

10.1

Language use most often by yourself

66.7

3.0

0

33.1

3.2

30

0.3

Total number of switchers: 158 Note: The situation is actually more complicated than that displayed above because different languages or varieties are used with different members of the family.

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TABLE 16.7 Percentage of Respondents by Level of Knowledge on Religions in Singapore Respondents Age group

881

914

984

12–14

15–16

17–18

Number

%

Number

%

Number

%

511 120 283

55.9 13.1 31

550 129 305

55.9 13.1 31

218 56 640

23.9 6.1 70

304 80 600

20.9 8.1 61

512 137 265

56 15 29

669 128 187

68 13 19

475 165 274

52 18.1 30

581 157 246

59 16 25

55 9 850

6 1 93

167 0 817

17 0 83

119 795

13 87

138 846

14 86

18 896

2 98

30 954

3.1 96.9

9 905

1 99

10 974

1 99

Buddhism General Comments Specific Comments No comments

415 53 423

47.1 6 48 Taoism

General Comments Specific Comments No Comments

175 45 661

19.9 5.1 75 Christianity

General Comments Specific Comments No Comments

485 123 273

55.1 14 31 Islam

General Comments Specific Comments No Comments

432 114 335

49 12.9 38 Sikhism

General Comments Specific Comments No Comments

35 9 837

4 1 95 Jewish Faith

Gave a comment Left blank

79 802

9 91

Zoroastrianism Gave comment Left blank

44 837

5 95 Baha’i Faith

Gave comment Left blank

9 872

1 99

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under each religious category were individually identified and re-categorized into three analytical categories: “general comments”, “specific comments” and “no comments”. “General comments” were so classified if they referred to relatively superficial aspects of the religion such as a description of forms and dress. Respondents’ general comments on religion were often confused with “culture” and “race”. In addition, some comments may not be factually accurate. Some typical comments on religions under this category include the following: •

•

•

Buddhism — “believe in Buddha”; “it is about filial piety”; “Buddha is a prince from India and Buddha is their God”; “most are Chinese” and “it is associated with monks”. Islam — “celebrate Hari Raya”; “eat halal food”; “cannot eat pork”; “they go to mosques”; “their marriages take place in the void deck”; and “some of them are terrorists”. Christianity — “they believe in Jesus”; “they go to church and sing hymns”; “they celebrate Christmas”; and “they speak English”.

“Specific comments” were more in-depth. Comments were classified as specific if they refer to some distinguishing features of the faith, for example, the naming of the prophet-founder of the religion; the narration of some principles or practices pertaining to the religion or the recounting of some socio-historical comment not too commonly known. These comments are often accurate. Some typical specific comments on religions include: •

•

•

Buddhism — “Man under the tree got enlightenment… became a Buddha and founded a religion”; “Asoka spread it”; “deals with peace, karma and sacrifice”; and “believe in reincarnation”. Christianity — “they pray to the Lord Jesus Christ and believe that only through him they will reach heaven”; “They believe in the Holy Trinity, Good Friday, Christmas and Easter”; and “They marry in church and follow the Ten Commandments”. Islam — “They read the Qur’an and worship Allah”; “They must go to Mecca once in a life-time” and “They pray five times a day”.

Under the category “No comments”, respondents do not give any comments and have not written anything in the space allotted to the particular religion. The comments were grouped into one of the three age groups and then statistically counted. The results were then tabulated in 392

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Table 16.7 as a means to analyse the level of knowledge possessed by adolescents on Singapore religions. Table 16.7 shows that the average adolescent in Singapore knows very little about religions in Singapore. This is despite their learning of religions during the CME period. Most of what they have written have been classified under “general comments” or “no comments”. Even where respondents have given “specific comments”, most of them appear to have been regurgitated from textbooks, for example, “Gautama Siddhartha started this religion. He found peace and stability while sitting under the Bo tree. He asked everyone to follow him.” Under “specific comments”, there is a tendency to give highly factual details, such as those relating to place of origin, size and those overlapping with race. One student even drew a column of comparative religion with its respective icons and festivals, much like a textbook layout. Most of the comments were related to festivals and symbols. Some of the specific comments were related to doctrinal repetitions rather than a more neutral account. The following are some examples: •

•

“Christianity believes in Holy Trinity — Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Father sent son to earth to wash away sins. Those who believe will be saved. Those who haven’t accepted may be converted. What to do to be saved? Pray, read Bible, do quiet time, believe in Jesus.” “Jesus Christ came down to earth to die for our sins and rose again on the third day.”

Of all the religions, Islam, Christianity and Buddhism are the better known with more specific comments on them (an average of 15.6 per cent, 14 per cent and 10.3 per cent respectively). However, most students who gave specific comments of their own religion gave only general comments or no comments of other religions, showing a lack of knowledge or of disinterest in religions besides their own. Free-thinkers on the other hand, left most of the sections blank. Age-wise, although those in the 17–18 age group gave more comments, those in the 15–16 age group gave more specific comments and which were knowledgeable ones, compared to their younger and older counterparts. One reason here could be that there is a chapter on religious diversity in the Secondary Three (average age 15) textbook. The assessment for CME is also not as important as the other subjects and is not taken as seriously as other school subjects. In the case of older adolescents (ages 17–18), it is likely that they have forgotten most of what they learnt from the CME at lower secondary levels. 393

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Where the minority Jewish, Zoroastrian and Baha’i Faiths were concerned, the responses were tabulated into two analytical categories, that is, “gave a comment” or “left blank”. This was because most of the respondents did not fill anything in these sections. Of the minority religions, there is a comparable amount of knowledge on the Jewish Faith where specific comments are concerned (12 per cent). The very low percentages of “specific comments” for the Zoroastrian and Baha’i Faiths (3.3 per cent and 1 per cent respectively) could be because these faiths do not appear in their CME textbooks. Comments for these minority religions differed startlingly in their “quality” of knowledge. The following are some examples: • • •

Baha’i Faith — “it is the youngest independent world religion. The important laws are individual discipline and development of daily prayers”. Zoroastrianism — “the basic tenets of this religion are ‘good thoughts, good deeds and good words’ ”. Judaism — “Star of David”; “still waiting for the Messiah to come and believe he will come as a King”; “Believe they are God’s chosen people”; and “they go to the synagogue to pray”.

Some of those comments classified as poor in quality are: • • •

Baha’ism — “mixture of Christianity and other faiths”; and “sounds like the Dalai Lama people”. Zoroastrianism — “new age occult”; “faith healing”, “sign of Zorro”, and “they pray to the sun and the stars”. Judaism — “Shylock”, “Jews hate Christians”, and “killed by Nazis during the war”.

There appears to be an attempt to “guess” with regard to the lesser known faiths even if the guesses do sound rather far-fetched. This could be because some of the CME teachers had advised them that the researcher wanted to assess, through the questionnaire, how much their particular school knew about the religions in Singapore.

FINDINGS FROM THE INTERVIEWS Self-Description, Happiness and Free Time The first set of questions was warm-up questions about the adolescents themselves. When asked to describe themselves, adolescents did so mainly in terms of appearance, for example, “I am a boy and I am very tall.” However, 394

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by the time they reached the ages 17–18, they described themselves in a variety of ways. About 40 per cent of them defined themselves either by race or religion, for example. “I am not religious but I have morals”; and “I am a Chinese Christian”. Some 30 per cent defined themselves by qualities or characteristics such as “I am easy-going, open-minded, an average guy” and “I am cute and bubbly, fun-loving”. Another 5 per cent of them did so by gender, such as “I am a girl, and I study at xxxx”; 5 per cent by their school, such as “I am a xxxx school student and I love my school”; and the remaining 10 per cent by psychological interpretation, such as “I am usually stressed out by the exam” and “I have very little self-confidence but I can be very enthusiastic at times.” As to “what makes them happy” and “what they do during their free time”, most adolescents confided that they really appreciate “a bunch of trustable friends”. It is crucial for them to be accepted. They confess to a liking for excursions with friends, such as watching movies and eating fast food at the Orchard Cineplex. “Happy activities” usually include shopping for teenage clothes and accessories, such as at the Heeren Plaza. “Hanging out and laughing together” is also important. Boys in particular love playing or watching sports. Both sexes confess to dabbling with electronic games, especially those on the Internet. The Internet is also a resource for downloading movies and music they like. Many of them participate in on-line diaries (blogging) on the Web. was named as one such site which adolescents frequent and which is used as a preferred way to keep in touch with friends and finding out about people who share similar interests. Indeed, a typical answer to “What makes you happy?” might appear as “Someone being there for me — when I’m happy they share, and when I am sad, they comfort me.”

Knowledge and Perceptions of Religions in Singapore The second set of questions consists of “general” questions which were designed to discover the depth of adolescents’ perceptions and knowledge of religions in Singapore. The lack of knowledge of religions in Singapore, beyond the superficial characteristics, found in the survey was confirmed in the case study interviews. When asked how many religions there were in Singapore, 91 per cent of them listed four and named them as Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. It is likely that the respondents were thinking here of the four main races of Singapore and their corresponding overlaps with the four main religions. The remainder (9 per cent) said there were either five or six religions, and they included Sikhism and Taoism to the list. Zoroastrianism, Jewish Faith and Baha’i Faith appear to be too unfamiliar 395

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and esoteric for them. In addition, when the interviewer asked whether they had heard about the Inter-Religious Organization (IRO), all of them gave a resounding “No”. The question “Have you or your friend ever mentioned that any religion is not a good one?” was designed to gauge the level of religious tolerance amongst adolescents. It was found that Singapore adolescents generally possess a high level of religious tolerance. A majority of 76 per cent said that they do not ever talk about religion and stressed that it was very important to be tolerant of other religions: • • •

“We don’t talk about religion. It is sensitive. We talk about other matters.” “Me and my friends, we respect all religions.” “We try not to talk bad about other religions although we are critical.”

It is interesting to note here that “tolerance” here is construed as not “talking about it” — which is a way of avoiding possible causes of conflict. Tolerance did not mean sincere respect, understanding or knowing something of each other’s religion so that common grounds can be found. Instead, in responding to this question, many adolescents made the effort to go beyond the thrust of the question or a single statement reply, and to include explanatory or sometimes “defensive” responses such as: • •

•

“My best friend is Malay and she taught me about halal food. We enjoy each other very much.” “In primary school I used to go for Christian fellowship and there will be pastor talk, singing, games, activities. But it is not compulsory to join the Christian club in my school. So there is no forcing!” “In CME, we already learn about races and religion! Therefore, we don’t need to talk about such things since the textbook already teaches us this.”

This implies that adolescents are somewhat cognizant of the overlap of racereligion constructs, and the interview sees them responding beyond the call of the question. Singapore adolescents also reveal a keen sense that religious experiences are personal and not to be shared publicly. One may conclude that the CME component in secondary school has been influential here, as adolescents are in general cognizant of the need to show respect to sentiments concerning race and religion. However, it must be noted that a sizeable 24 per cent of the sample admitted that their friends have mentioned that some religions are “not good”. When asked to elaborate, we found that most of the “not good” 396

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perceptions referred mainly to Christianity, Buddhism/Taoism, Islam and Hinduism, and not so much to the Sikh, Jewish, Zoroastrian and Baha’i Faiths — probably because the latter group of religions are less well-known and have relatively fewer followers. Switchers, while protective and optimistic of their new faiths, had some reservations regarding other faiths. For example, a switcher to Buddhism (from free-thinker status) had this to say about Christianity: “Buddhism is a peaceful religion and not aggressive. No need to be embarrassed about not giving. Christians always collecting money … have to donate a part of your salary. Annoying talk to you when you are shopping. However, although they annoying they are polite.” Occasionally, responses against other faiths are emphatic, quite emotional and less clear, and the interviewee is unable to go into the details, probably because of the lack of suitable words to describe the emotion. For example, “We hate Christians! Don’t ever invite me to church!” Switchers are also prone to having a negative perception of their former faiths. A switcher to Christianity had this to say about Buddhism (her former religion): “Very scary. God goes into your body when you are in a trance and things like that” and “I don’t like to go to temple because there, you have to do everything yourself.” Once again, comments such as “God goes into your body” shows that this respondent is characteristically unable to distinguish between the practices of syncretism and Buddhism. The second quotation also shows an alienation from the temple since one has “to do everything yourself ”, implying perhaps that in the alternative faith (Christianity?), things are done for them or done in a group. The “not good” comments pertaining to Hinduism include “Hinduism — skewers”; and “Hindu — Tamil gangster — very ugly, I try to change my thinking because I know it’s not right to be prejudiced.” For Islam, the popular association of terrorism with it also surfaced: “Muslims — they may be terrorists or friends of terrorists.” Also, particularly noticeable was the fact that many comments were directed against the other denominations of their own (new or minority) faiths. Newer denominations such as the X Church, Y Church and the Z Church collected the bulk of the criticisms, such as: “X Church has an underground church and manipulates people”; “Y Church — child sacrifices”; and “Z Church is more like a convenience club”. In one government-aided school, the divide between the Catholics and Protestants came up noticeably: “This is a Catholic school — they disapprove of Christians — they tell me sarcastically ‘Oh, enjoy your Bible study!’ They believe Mother Mary can save us but we believe in Jesus. I prefer to be a Christian.” Some switchers to Soka Buddhism (5.7 per cent) refer to the fact that: “Soka talk bad about Nicheiren and vice versa.” On the other hand, a syncreticist 397

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Buddhist youth admits hearing that “Soka is Japanese and you know the Japanese conquered Singapore.” As to the question on whether they would like to find out about other religions, 92 per cent answered in the affirmative with 8 per cent in the negative. Adolescents showed that they were open, curious in nature and loved to experience new things. When asked how they would like to go about finding out other religions, 64 per cent said they would do so from the Internet, 28 per cent from friends, 4 per cent from visiting places of worship and 1 per cent through other means. The Internet appears to be an important source of information for adolescents because of its ease of accessibility and the privacy available in the receiving of the information (see Table 16.8). TABLE 16.8 Ways of Finding out about Other Religions How would you find out about other religions?

%

From the Internet From friends Visiting places of worship Others

64 28 4 4

Reasons for Switching Religion The switch questions in Appendix 16.2 centre on the assumption that switching always has a context — possibly a “pull” or “push” factor. The Christian faith seems to be the overwhelming choice for adolescents to switch to (See Table 16.5). The case study interviews found inter-personal influences, in particular peer group support and “fellowship”, as the primary “pull” factor behind the switch. These “pulls” include Christian friends bringing them to church, Christian friends in organizations such as the Boys Brigade and worship services in schools, and reflect the importance of friendship and the need for company for adolescents. The study also corroborates Kau et al.’s (2004) study on the values, lifestyles and aspirations of Singaporeans, which showed that “warm relationship with others” has the highest value for those aged 15–24. The following are examples from the study reflecting the value and need for warm relationships: We have a Christmas party, welcoming party, youth fellowship — pastor tells us what to learn and we can make friends there. Otherwise, at home 398

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I am tightly controlled, studies at home, no going out with peers — so this is my opportunity. xxx church — I am so scared and embarrassed but they are so friendly. They ask “do you find this nice?” “Don’t be scared if we speak in tongues.” “They put words across in a nice manner — well spoken and like ordinary people. Very friendly. They tell me what is going on in church, I don’t even have to ask. Pastor xxxx is strict but very caring and loving. He looks after us like we are children. Makes us feel at home. First time I was awkward but everybody there makes me feel I belong. I treat xxxx church as my home and when I go down there to study, sit in caffi, take study materials, revise, eat and drink. With my cell group members, I play games, praise and worship, sermons, testimonials of what God has done for us since we last met and refreshments.

The problem of “embarrassment”, “being scared”, or “being lonely” is a recurring theme in the interviews. It is a state where they desire to meet peers but are unable to do so because they are shy, withdrawn or introverted. Loneliness appears to be quite a widespread phenomenon among adolescents. Weekends and holidays are the loneliest time for the students and these periods find adolescents on the phone chatting up friends. As one adolescent put it when asked why she had switched, “There’s no special teaching I like. It’s like a personal one-to-one. Special relationship: like a best friend relationship.” A second “pull” factor is the need to solve a stressful situation. The adolescents may face a threatening or fearful situation, or has a problem to be solved, and this is managed by making an alliance with supernatural forces. “I see my brother healed”, says a new adherent to Christianity. Miracles of healing, good luck for the examinations and other answered prayers are benefits which are attractive, most referred to the lack of a God or “good” God or teaching good values in Taoism/Buddhism: “I believe in God”; “Teaches us about God and values”; and “I have a sweet feeling. Every time I go, I understand what is God. God teaches you to become good people, don’t tell lies, don’t do bad thing.” They also dislike certain rites and practices which they describe as “meaningless”, “illogical” and “irrational”: “They (Taoists) want to become rich, buy lottery ticket, my father always does that” and “Buddhist rites which I have to do — Chinese New Year — have to go to temple to pray, refrain from eating beef, ghost festival — burn incense, until, luckily, my house renovated, then my parents threw out the idols.” There is also a lack of information given to children brought up in a Taoist/Buddhist home: One respondent said, “I 399

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am a free-thinker because nobody has talked to me about religion, including my parents who are Buddhists.” Despite such common perceptions of Taoism, all religions in reality do foster an alliance with God or the supernatural. It is obvious then that in the homes where the switchers came from, there was a failure of caretakers to convey this to their children. It does appear that the church, much more than the temple, is interested in youths as complete people and a distinctive group and treats them as such. There are cell groups in churches which prioritize the building of relationships. There is also the teaching of a God who is personal and caring like a friend. Compared to a temple, the church offers a liturgical experience, communion and mission involvement. Youths are often drawn to dynamism and charisma and to youth-centred and needs-oriented activities where they can find people who are open, attentive, caring and friendly. In contrast, Taoist/Buddhist parents, many of whom are lowly educated or semiliterate, do not know much about their own religion and hence are unable to explain the main tenets of their beliefs to their children. There is also the “doit-yourself ” attitude in Taoism/Buddhism. The lack of written canonical scriptures also does not help the situation as syncretistic practices depend much on oral tradition. A minority (3.1 per cent) of switchers have converted to free-thinker status from Christianity and Buddhism (see Table 16.5). Reasons for the switch are quite different from those in the opposite direction and they include the following comments: “I don’t believe in all that stuff ”; “I don’t want to be tied down”; “I believe in science, not superstition”; and “As long as I believe in myself, I am alright.” Free-thinker status is associated with “independence”, “hardwork” and “self-reliance”, inferring perhaps a belief that adherents of religions are not so inclined, having to rely on a supernatural deity. It is associated with rationality and being “scientific”. In our interviews, we also found that free-thinkers tend to have independent views of themselves as coming from “strong” even if “poor” families. It is interesting that comments mention “poor” — does this imply that religionists (the Christians?) are materially richer and therefore can afford the “indulgence” of belief? They also mention “strong” — does this imply that people who believe in a religion are “weak”? Free-thinkers also have a less humble, more ambitious vision — many of them wanting to join professions such as law, medicine and psychology: “I learn to be independent because my family don’t help me much as we are poor… I learn to be strong”; “I study hard, I come from a poor family. I cannot afford to take up religion”; and “As free-thinker I don’t think God exists and I have never seen God. But I respect all religions.” 400

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There are also switchers from syncretistic backgrounds to Soka Buddhism (5.7 per cent). Soka practices social welfare similar to those adopted by the Catholic church. It produces and disseminates apologetic literature in English. It has a bookshop, a Buddhist library, clubs in university campuses and has adopted some Christian practices, such as having a board of directors outside of the temple, listing services (chanting and meditation) on Sunday, and provision of a hymn book. The reason given for the switch is not so much the need for friends but the need to solve a problem. According to some switchers: I used to cry every night. It is always very dark. I am always alone. Chanting is good for all kinds of problems … especially in the night. When I talk to Gohonsong, I feel so much better. I’m peaceful now. I am not afraid of night time. I see that my friend has so much success in her study and everything in her life went smoothly. I ask her to help me. She introduced me to prayers, chanting and meditation which help her. It helps me also. I have so many problems but now I feel much better. I can go to school now — before I always absent.

The sample also saw a small 3.2 per cent of adolescents switching to Wicca (see Table 16.5). The researcher was initially not aware of such a practice. On further investigation, the researcher learnt that this is a reconstruction of pre-Christian traditions in Ireland, Scotland and Wales, and comprises mainly of witchcraft and spells. In a focused group discussion with the teacher of these five cases, we concluded that since these switches came from only one school in a working-class area, it is more likely to be an isolated phenomenon. It is also likely a case of one student with a group of close friends in the school practising their new-found faith or a spillover from the popular Harry Potter book and movie series.

Sources of Religious Initiation among Religious Switchers We found that the majority of switchers (63.3 per cent) first learnt of their new faiths from peers (see Table 16.9) who are either classmates or schoolmates (46.3 per cent) or family members and friends (17 per cent). Often, the school friend happens to be someone close to them, or someone who accompanies them to the school canteen or school co-curricular activities (CCA) regularly. In one government-aided school, there was also the added phenomenon of a youth pastor in the school or the teacher counsellor who introduced religion to them. Adolescent switchers from this school 401

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Phyllis Ghim-Lian Chew TABLE 16.9 Percentage of Interviewees in Relation to Their Introducers Introducer

% of interviewees

Classmate or schoolmate Other friends e.g. family friend, tutor Family or relative Teacher, school counselor, etc.

46.3 17 31.7 7.3

Total

100

Total number of interviewees: 89

mentioned the influence of the daily prayers during assembly as well as the weekly mass. Two switchers recalled that they found the Christian faith through the school counsellor. Family members and friends were also influential. 31.7 per cent switched after being influenced by family members (a brother or sister) or a relative (aunties, uncles, cousins) (See Table 16.9). Family “friends” may include tutors or a friend of their sibling as well as their Filipino domestic helper. A significant proportion reported that during the holidays, the cousins would get together and that they would be invited to attend church services. Subsequently, they felt very comfortable with the service and decided to be baptised. On other occasions, a Christian aunt would visit, take them shopping and stop by her church along the way. Switches usually occur within the first three months (37.5 per cent) or immediately after acquaintance with the new religion (25 per cent) (See Table

TABLE 16.10 Percentage of Interviewees in Relation to Switching Time Time

% of interviewees

Within a month 1–3 months 3–12 months Over a year Total

25 37.5 12.5 25 100

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16.10). For those who took over a year (25 per cent) to switch, it was usually a case of having first learnt of the faith in primary school, resulting in a fleeting or lasting impression that would be later rekindled by a peer during adolescence. Most adolescents needed to feel comfortable emotionally (rather than intellectually) before they switched. Once they liked “the feeling”, they would almost always switch. One switcher described her experience thus: As for the time factor, first time I went to xxxx church to check it out — they were all so self-centered so I get a bad impression — offensive — the pastor puts the message very loudly, impulsive and very firm. Not a good feeling. Second time I went, I felt much better. Things began to make sense. I continue the service and then I became the first in my family to become a Christian.

Parental Opposition to Switching When we asked the switchers whether they encountered opposition from their parents, about half of them said they encountered reprimand or disapproval, such as in the following cases: “xxxx church — yes, immediately I got a big scolding from Mum when I went to church”; “My mother minded me going to church and when she sees me reading the Bible she is very unhappy because it takes away time from my studies”; and “She wants me to be a Taoist but I don’t know why — they never explain. Funny… but they were the ones who sent me to the Christian school because they know it has a better standard and they have heard about it.” However, about half of those who admitted to opposition from their elders also recounted that after a period of time, their parents would normally relent. Acceptance came usually after a passage of time, or a noticeable improvement in the switcher’s character or grades. Two respondents said: In the beginning Mum objected but I showed her testimonies of miracles happening to me e.g. I lost my wallet left it in a cab — but I prayed and the taxi driver bought it back to me! This miracle impressed me! Another time, I have a headache, my heart compressed, I was in pain, I started to pray, the pain went away. And then there was my results — I study hard under the grace of God, I get good results. At first they are not happy but when they see my character really change — I was more polite and less moody — they also don’t say much anymore. 403

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Singaporean parents often have no real theological reasons against the faith of the new religion, as they are likely to know as little about the new religion as their children. The reason for their objections is usually a practical one, that is, fear of the loss of time, which might impede the child’s future educational opportunities. Two respondents shared thus: “My mother always say: it’s a waste of time going to church, better to study” and “Father not willing — refused my baptism — did not allow me to spend time with my religion — he said I must have a balance between education and religion.” At the same time, the adolescents themselves are extremely cognizant of the importance of studies and schooling, and they reveal indirectly that these factors must be properly addressed before the switching can be acceptable to their families and themselves. “As long as I continue to pass my exams, they don’t really care” is the common comment. There is also the accompanying fear among parents of a loss of filial piety (mutual care between generations) should the switch to Christianity bring with it a discontinuation of ancestor worship and death rituals. However, if this is resolved and if the switcher still visits the temple with siblings and parents, and does the daily rites, parents are often accommodating. “As long as I do the Buddhist rites, they really don’t mind”, said one adolescent. The other half of the switchers did not encounter any opposition from their parents. From this, we may conclude that Singapore parents are by and large religiously tolerant. This tolerance could be because religion for the Chinese is not a part of ethnic identity. In addition, Taoism is also not a definitive or proselytizing religion and there is a tendency to be accommodating and inclusive. Said one adolescent: “I asked my father many times about Taoism. He doesn’t say much but he says it’s something like ‘Christian’ and I can go to church as long as I don’t get baptised.” A lack of parental opposition can also be attributed to “familiarity” and “comfort zones” as reflected by this remark: “No, because all my siblings are Christian or we have relatives who are Christians and so being a Christian is no big deal.” It must be noted that the lack of opposition may be on the high side because some adolescents chose to keep their new faiths from their parents. When asked why they kept it a secret, the answer was usually a fear of disapproval or a matter of indifference and non-communication with their parents: “I am afraid they will scold me as they don’t like anything new” and “My parents leave me to myself — they don’t even know I am a Christian”. 404

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IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS There is a notable characteristic of religious identification in adolescent life, with 82 per cent of adolescents surveyed identifying themselves as belonging to a religion, having been brought up by parents who define themselves as such. Most adolescents identify themselves as Buddhists, Christians or Muslims, especially so if the parental-child relationship is close. Data from interviews tells us that for many (63 per cent), their parents are the significant other. The need to study and get good grades is very important to Singapore youth, as is the desire to please parents whenever possible. We may surmise that parental influence on religious choice is the single strongest factor in religious development in adolescents since only 5.7 per cent has switched religion by age eighteen. Adolescents’ knowledge of religions in Singapore has been found to be poor, being mainly superficial and sketchy. Nevertheless, they are remarkably tolerant of religions in Singapore and careful not to cause offence. However, their tolerance is based on ignorance and fear rather than a world-embracing knowledge of the different faiths in Singapore. This is a potentially unstable situation, and it might be productive here to rethink the CME religious component as one that could teach similarities between different world faiths, rather than the current teaching of religions in adjunct with racial or national sensitivities and civic duties. In addition, the IRO does not appear to be fulfilling its potential where Singapore youths are concerned. For one, none of our interviewees have heard of it. In this respect, the IRO, in cooperation with relevant government ministries, should initiate or promote publicity work among the youths or within the educational system, to promote a more balanced multi-faith culture, based on actual knowledge. Adolescents describe themselves as “fun-loving”, “energetic”, “lonely” and “sensitive”. Being with friends and having a “sense of belonging” is very important. Youths are open to religious ideas and keen to learn more. However, most are at a loss as to the ways and means of discovering the similarities and differences between religions. The Internet is cited as their major resource, especially the chat-rooms. Peer groups ranks second as a source of information. The government and relevant organizations need to look into creating more social activities for youths to interact and feel at home, as well as to be aware of the powerful influence of the Web in the propagation of religious ideas. Switchers comprised 5.7 per cent of the cohort and they come from three of the nine main religions in Singapore, namely Buddhism/Taoism, Christianity and Hinduism. There is also a minority of youths from free-thinker families 405

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who adopt a religion. The popular choices for a switch are Christianity, Buddhism and free-thinker status. The study found that there are significantly more adolescents who are Buddhists or Christians than has been revealed in the 2000 Census. When youths switch to Christianity, it is also to one which is youth-focused in its mission and which preaches a this-worldly Gospel of care, good cheer and prosperity. It must be noted that the seemingly conservative figure of 5.7 per cent may, if placed on a geometrical scale for ten years, grow to an absolute number that will become significant. Already at only 5.7 per cent, the syncretistic Taoist/Buddhist segment of Singapore is a “threatened species” and a change in the religious landscape is imminent. The percentage of switching is also likely to be a percentage or two higher. For one, this study has only counted numbers of actual switchers, and not those close to switching or those who chose not to reveal highly personal information, for fear of drawing reprimand or attention to themselves. For another, the questionnaire has not been able to capture data on whole-family switching or on one-parent-cum-child switching. For example, two cases where the father is a Taoist but the mother and adolescent (in this case, the adolescent) have both become Soka Buddhists or Christians were not captured in the data. This is because the study only defined adolescent switchers as those whose religion differ from either one of their parents (see questions 8–11, Appendix 16.1). The highest proportion of switchers comes from the Buddhist/Taoist faith. The “push” factors here are disenchantment with the practice of rites/ rituals and the lack of knowledge on these faiths either from the temple or their parents. It has also to do with operating in the language that youth themselves have confessed that they are most comfortable in — English and Mandarin (Chew 2006). To stem the tide of adherents moving to greener pastures elsewhere, the Taoist/Buddhist groups need to accelerate their move towards a more canonical context by stripping away the more superstitious elements of their faiths. The putting up of Internet sites, formation of clubs in schools, use of music and chanting and the use of English in their services, would certainly appeal to youths. It is recommended that the Taoist population rationalize its operations and conduct them in either Mandarin or English for youths so as to retain them. Adolescents switch not because they have commenced on a personal quest for truth but usually because of peer-group influences, emotional support received and the need to solve “a problem”. Switching allows a rapid integration into a network of relationships. The time taken to switch is often short — within the first three months. The switching is almost always an “emotional” rather than an “intellectual” one. It is seldom that a switcher can explain theosophically or theoretically why they have chosen a particular faith 406

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over that of another. Not a single switcher referred to the holy writings or scripture as the reason for their switch, although some did say they liked the inspiring stories in the scripture. Adolescence is a period when the quest for self-esteem and self-confidence is uppermost. It can also be a period of confusion — a time of “identity crisis”. The self-centred need to be “saved” is a psychologically appealing one. A gospel of prosperity rather than one of sacrifice is attractive to Singapore adolescents, many of whom are trying to find out who they really are. Any religious organization which recognizes this important transitional phase and which structures their activities according to the needs of their adolescent clients will fare well in attracting and keeping them. The study also found that the most common time to switch is between the ages of 15–16, a period that could lead to either a solidification of their faith or a departure from it. Bearing this in mind, state authorities could ensure regular counselling and promotion of activities catering to youths’ emotional and intellectual needs. Why do Singapore adolescents choose to switch to Christianity over that of other faiths? Obvious reasons such as instrumental rewards or useful economic contacts have been proposed (for example, Tamney and Hassan 1987), but these reasons pertain more to older youths rather than to adolescents. The study found that peer group influence and crisis management help effect a switch, especially in mid and late adolescence, where parental monitoring and control is lessened. However, there can be other relevant reasons, other than those given by the switchers themselves, as to why Christianity is their prime choice. The first has to do with the missionary or proselytizing nature of the Christian faith. Second, Christianity has been transplanted so often that it now appears to be an acultural religion and therefore the most obviously “modern” and “global” choice. Relative to the other faiths, Christianity appears to be the best organized and has networks which allow youths to develop personal relationships with unusual speed. Further studies should be undertaken on the implications of the rise of “modern” Christianity and Buddhism at the expense of traditional Chinese religion. This study has been at best preliminary and limited by time and space constraints. Future research can look more in-depth at the connection between language and religion. This chapter has mentioned the correlation between the language used most often (English) and the rise in the switching from Taoism (a dialect-based religion) to Christianity (which is predominantly English-based). In addition, more in-depth case studies, especially longitudinal ones, will be beneficial in clarifying the often hazy context behind adolescent religious switching. It has been found that adolescents change their answers according to the phrasing of the question, the place of the interview, or to a 407

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change of interviewers. Biological and psychological changes during this period also mean that switching can occur not once but a number of times, or even to and fro from one religion to another. Certainly, research questions geared toward identifying key trends, dimensions and issues relevant to national, inter-religious and intra-religious levels should be of priority. APPENDIX 16.1 THE QUESTIONNAIRE (Note: Actual questionnaire layout provides more lined spaces for filling in)

CIVICS AND MORAL EDUCATION SURVEY 1.

Class

2.

Race

3.

Age

4.

Sex

5.

Language/dialect spoken at home

6.

Language/dialect used most often

7.

Grandparents’ religion or denomination (e.g. Taoist, Buddhist, Catholic, etc.)

8.

Father’s religion or denomination

9.

Mother’s religion or denomination

10.

Your religion or denomination

11.

If your religion or denomination is different from that of your father or mother, write a little about why you have switched religion:

12.

Do you like CME as a subject? If yes, give reasons If no, give reasons

13.

Name two values learnt in CME

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How much do you know of these religions? Write as much as you can in the space below. (You may leave a blank if you do not know anything about it). You can include things such as main teachings, main practices e.g. festivals, ceremonies, administrative structure and stories associated with religion, etc. Baha’i Faith Buddhism Christianity Hinduism Islam Jewish Faith Sikh Faith Taoism Zoroastrianism

APPENDIX 16.2 GUIDELINES TO INTERVIEWERS Warming-up Questions: 1.

Describe yourself. What makes you happy? How do you spend your free-time?

General Questions: 2.

How many religions are there in Singapore? What do you think of the work of the Inter-Religious Organisation (IRO) in Singapore? Do you or your friends ever mention that any religion is not a good one? If so, which one? What are their reasons? Would you like to find out more about other religions? How will you go about it?

Switch Questions: 1.

Describe the first meeting of your new religion. Who brought you there? Are you the first in your family to become …… (name of new religion)? How old 409

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were you? Did you encounter parental opposition from your parents? What was your first impression of your new religion? How long did it take for you from the time you heard of the new religion to switch? What do you like particularly of your new religion?

Note This study was undertaken in 2004. The author would like to thank her two research assistants for their help in the transcriptions and statistics; the two focused group discussion members for their help in the analysis of the data; and the principals of the six schools, who gave permission to collect the data. Views expressed in this chapter are entirely the author’s.

References Leow, Bee Geok. “Religion, Educational Attainment and Use of English at Home Table 18.6”. Census of Population. Advanced Data Release No 2. Singapore: Department of Statistics, 2001. Chew, Phyllis Ghim-Lian. “Language Use and Religious Practice: The Case of Singapore.” In Explorations in the Sociology of Language and Religion, edited by Tope Omoniyi et al. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2006. Kau, Ah Keng et al., eds. Understanding Singaporeans: Values, Lifestyles, Aspirations and Consumption Behaviour. Singapore: World Scientific, 2004. Kuo, Eddie, C. Y., Jon Quah, and Tong Chee Kiong. Religion and Religious Revivalism in Singapore. Singapore: Ministry of Community Development, 1988. Tamney, Joseph and Riaz Hassan. “An Analysis of the Decline of Allegiance of Chinese Religions: A Comparison of University Students and Their Parents”. In Analysis of an Asian Society, edited by R. Hassan and J. B. Tamney, Unpublished chapter, 2005. Tamney, Joseph. Religious Switching in Singapore: A Study of Religious Mobility. Singapore: Select Books, 1987. Tong, Chee Kiong. Dangerous Blood, Refined Souls: Death Rituals Among the Chinese in Singapore. Cornell University: Ph.D. dissertation, 1987. ———. “Religion”. In The Making of Singapore Sociology, Society and State, edited by Tong, C. K., and Lian Kwee Fen. Singapore: Times Media Pte Ltd., 2002.

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PART III Religion in the Media

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17 RELIGIOUS REASONS IN A SECULAR PUBLIC SPHERE Debates in the Media about Homosexuality Kenneth Paul Tan

INTRODUCTION A secular public sphere is neither in practice nor in theory a straightforward arrangement. For one, the distinction between the religious and the secular is a false one. Secularism has religion-like qualities, even dogmas, rituals, cults of personality and leaps of faith; just as religions can be, and have been in history, tolerant, inclusive, self-reflective, self-critical, adaptable, philosophically rigorous and even radical. Instituting strict formal secularism can have the effect of distorting free and open communication in the public sphere, by excluding legitimate religious reasons and thereby eliciting a defensive and even fundamentalist reaction from religious communities. A conceptually false dichotomy in this way turns into a battle line, preventing real discussion and debate. An insistence on formal secularism is therefore at least partly responsible for a distorted public sphere that is defensive, dogmatic and disengaged. The formal secular public sphere in Singapore cannot be understood without considering the mass media. With its long-standing role as a key nation-building tool of the government, the media has the power to shape what can be said in the public sphere, determine how and when it is said, and 413

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decide who gets to say what, all according to the parameters laid out by the state. This chapter examines the role of the national media in admitting religious reasons and arguments into the secular public sphere, looking closely at the way that it stage-managed public debate in 2003 over the question of non-discriminatory hiring policies in the Singapore civil service with respect to homosexuals. This was an issue that the then prime minister (PM) had raised in the international Time magazine in an interview probably meant more for the attention of prospective foreign talent hesitant about working in sterile Singapore, but turned into an issue that sparked some heated reactions from Singaporeans. This sympathetic acknowledgement (though by no means the decriminalization) of homosexuals by the government in 2003 signalled increased levels of openness perceived by some religious communities as moral degeneration and even a betrayal of the government’s moral basis of authority. Anglican Bishop John Chew told his Singaporean congregation in their newsletter (also archived online): Singapore has to be a “fun” city attractive to its own and open to the world, so they argue, albeit with moderation but evolution as time and tide of society norms change. In order to be globally attractive and competitive, society has to loosen up and be in tune and in line with the progressives, the so call “mature”, so they say. In the midst of all these, for God’s faithful people, Paul’s sentinel call should be voiced and heard clearly once again: “Do all things without grumbling or questioning, that you may be blameless and innocent, children of God, without blemish in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation, among whom you shine as lights in the world, holding fast the word of life…” (Phil 2.14–16; also 2 Tim 4.1–4). But don’t get Paul wrong! He is challenging us to build up extra robust capacity over the childish level of debate and controversy, and it could not be more timely and urgent.1

The claim here is essentially that this generation in Singapore has become “crooked and perverse” because the government initiated a “childish level of debate and controversy” in favour of the “progressives” but has excluded the views of the religious communities because of formal secularism. This jeremiad — one of several that were preached from pulpits and published in the press — can have the effect of summoning a level of conservatism that goes beyond what is normally held by well-meaning and “right-thinking” individuals, leading to a conservative backlash by “God’s faithful people” that may have significant electoral consequences. It is also costly for the government to lose the general support of religious organizations since they have taken the lead 414

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in charities and voluntary welfare work, and have in this way freed up government resources. Religious organizations, if provoked, could argue for a stronger public voice that seems more commensurate with their significant public contributions. These are considerations that would certainly enter into the government’s calculations as it manages the processes of social change and, in particular, what can be seen as gradual liberalization. This chapter discusses the impact that secularization and religious responses to it has had on the nature of public debates about liberalization in general, and homosexuality in particular, as they appear in the media.

HIRING HOMOSEXUALS IN SINGAPORE’S CIVIL SERVICE: THE START OF THE DEBATE In June 2003, Time magazine carried a lead story that quoted the then PM Goh Chok Tong as saying that the Singapore Civil Service would hire openly gay people, even for sensitive positions.2 In many ways, this was a significant moment in Singapore’s public sphere. For the first time, a government minister, no less than the PM himself, actually initiated discussion of a topic traditionally regarded as taboo. While it is possible that Goh had unintentionally blurted out the topic, it is more probable that it was strategically broached as a reply to the interviewer’s suggestion that foreigners may not want to work in Singapore because of the perception that it is a boring place. Significant also was Goh’s sympathetic view of homosexuals as people who are “born that way”, and therefore incapable of choosing their sexual “orientation”. This view clearly contradicts the position that homosexuality is a question of choice, a position that has been argued fiercely by antihomosexuality organs of many Christian churches. Goh had also expressed hope that Singaporeans would be tolerant of everyone regardless of their sexual orientation. The Time article raised the hopes of members of the homosexual community in Singapore who had been opposing homophobia in the form of a conservatism that has denied homosexuals full equality before the law. Nevertheless, a number of limitations in Goh’s pronouncements raised the level of scepticism. First, homosexual acts, even between consenting adults in the privacy of their own homes, remain illegal, and censorship of homosexual themes and characters (including, ironically, those that are positive and educationally oriented) remains tight. A second limitation is the way Goh continued to insist that Singaporeans are conservative and therefore not ready for change, identifying in particular the Muslim community as the main conservative objectors. This has been the most frequent argument used by the 415

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government against liberalization, but it is somewhat flawed when one considers how its nation-building efforts have really only been successful because of its capacity and will to lead as an initiator of necessary change. In other words, the government cannot wait for the people to change before it acts, but should instead take the lead in helping to change mindsets if, indeed, change is what it really wants in the first place. An indiscriminate policy of censoring homosexuality, in fact, does the reverse and contributes to widespread and habitual prejudices against homosexuals. Many Singaporeans were also sceptical about Goh’s progressive view of homosexuality, as they felt that it was really performed for the purposes of attracting foreign talent and a response to economist Richard Florida’s famous arguments that link openness and diversity with creative capital and economic success. Only a year earlier, the Straits Times had run a story which reported how [Richard] Florida is not impressed by cities that emphasise only the needs of traditional nuclear families. He notes that the leaders of many cities want to cater exclusively to married couples with stable family lives in the middle and upper-income brackets. But this is not the way to build a great city, because “a successful city needs a range of options to suit all kinds of people”, most importantly young talent.3

Some Singaporeans even believed that Goh’s words were yet another example of how the government treats foreigners better than its own citizens, and will in fact bend over backwards to court them.4 Some members of conservative religious communities articulated concerns that materialism would completely overtake morality, while other more progressive Singaporeans lamented that the prospect of equality for homosexuals depended on economics rather than any fundamental respect for homosexuals as human beings. Gay activist Alex Au, a leading figure in the gay group, People Like Us, and the webmaster of Yawning Bread,5 takes an even more sceptical view of Goh’s hints at liberalization: The Government wanted to create the aura of a more tolerant and openminded society, so that the hoped-for knowledge economy could get enough knowledge workers on board to give Singapore a bit more oomph. The Time magazine episode was like a “wayang show”. No real substance; just tarting up the exterior appeal. Like a prostitute changing the colour of her lipstick from last year’s shade to hook a few more passing johns, but enter her boudoir and she’s as frigid as ever.6

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Nevertheless, the situation suggested clear strategies for gaining acceptance in society, including the strategy of speaking the language of economics when making any kind of claim for the homosexual community. For instance, gay rights advocates can highlight the importance of the pink dollar (and, connected with this, the pink vote). They can also show how the law, by excluding homosexuals from spousal and other benefits, may turn an ageing community of sexual minorities into future dependents on state welfare.7 But just as gay activists were developing strategies for gaining acceptance, the anti-gay lobby also took the opportunity to evolve strategies of its own. Both of these were reflected in the mass media’s responses and letters to the press following the PM’s interview.

MEDIA RESPONSES AND LETTERS TO THE PRESS Generally, the Singapore media responded to Goh’s remarks with what seemed like surprisingly gay-positive messages. An editorial in the Straits Times, for example, argued that “it is as ‘natural’ to be a heterosexual as it is to be a homosexual” and that “ ‘[b]laming’ someone for being homosexual is equivalent to faulting that person for simply existing”.8 However, the same article went on to caution that [m]any religions — or more precisely, segments of many religions — explicitly prohibit homosexuality. These views are sincerely held, and no society, not even avowedly secular ones like the US, can ignore them. If Western Europe, Canada and Australia are any indication, attitudes towards homosexuality will change in the long term. But the process cannot be forced.

Even the New Paper tabloid reported sympathetically about a Singaporean gay couple wanting to get married in Canada.9 In the same issue, the paper also quoted the organizer of (now, ironically, disallowed) Nation03, an annual gay party that attracted people from all over the world, as saying that the party was a sign that Singapore “as a country has moved towards being a society highly tolerant of diversity… [and Singaporeans] are a lot more tolerant than we give them credit for”.10 Also in the same issue, the paper presented the results of a poll that showed 31 out of 60 Singaporeans approving of gay marriages (although the headline “Firm ‘No’ To Gay Marriages: Poll” was misleading).11 Most significant of all were two television programmes: a Mandarin programme OK, No Problem on Channel U, and a Malay programme Detik

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on Suria Channel, both presented on the same evening of 30 August 2003. Adopting popular sit-com and talk-show formats and recorded in a food court in Ang Mo Kio (a public housing estate in the Singapore heartlands), the Mandarin programme sought to dispel myths about homosexuality and homosexuals. The programme ended with an emotional interview with an adult male who described the struggles and difficulties that he and other Singaporeans faced “coming out”.12 The Malay programme presented a very balanced range of views on homosexuality in Singapore, even revealing that there were “more than 300 web pages specially for homosexual Muslims [whose] aim is to give support and space for communicating. Furthermore, most of these pages assure that the homosexual lifestyle is not necessarily in conflict with Islam”.13 The Singapore media, particularly the English language media, also published a large number of letters following their own reports on the Time article. These letters mostly articulated clearly pro-gay or (often religiously inflected) anti-gay arguments. It would appear that the media managed the debate in a balanced way, always presenting letters from both sides of the argument and even taking care to present the views of people from the four official racial groups of Chinese, Malays, Indians and Others. Typical of the pro-gay contributors was the Straits Times reader Alan Lau who wrote that “we should treat people who are different from us with the same degree of humanity and respect, even if we don’t agree with their point of view. What exactly is so immoral about that?”14 These sorts of open-minded viewpoints were also balanced by very vigorous anti-gay letters. Fifty-five year-old Chinese physician Lim Han Nan wrote that homosexuality “defies human nature. If people of the same sex want to be friends, that’s fine. But not if they become lovers. We should not encourage them by legalising homosexual acts”.15 The Straits Times reader Phiroze Abdul Rahman assumed that homosexuality is a departure from basic, religiously determined gender roles, and is a negative influence from other countries that should not be mistakenly accepted as part of Singapore’s progress. He urged gays to rethink the way they live, being man or woman. Getting back to religion or the basics of sex is the right thing to do. And, hopefully, they would realize that they have to change. They should not allow themselves to be blinded by other parts of the world where the gay community is accepted, nor jump onto the bandwagon on the pretext of evolution of a country or people’s maturity.16

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Another reader, George Lim, wrote in to the Straits Times to say: [w]e also believe in a God who loves both the heterosexual and the gay, but He hates the sin of immorality… Our society, including religious groups, has been bending backwards towards tolerance of immoral behaviour. A government that does not appease the wishes of its people may not last long. On the other hand, many people still expect our Government to take sound and responsible action to protect young citizens from the corrupting influence of immoral behaviour. I am concerned about the consequences of the Government’s action. Firstly, the Government has shown quite clearly by its action that it has lost its moral authority… I am surprised that leaders of religions like Islam and Christianity have not voiced their disagreement openly. These two religions have very strong views about the right behaviours where human sexuality is concerned. Religions play an important role in society and it is most ironical and sad that religious leaders are refraining from making their stand known publicly in matters of sexual morality.17

Lim adopted a familiar strategy of presenting a compassionate God who loves the sinner but hates the sin; and so homosexuals must “choose” a moral lifestyle. But of greater significance was the veiled threat that he made to the government, insinuating that faith communities have almost reached the limit of their tolerance for the immoral ways allowed by the government, and as the government loses its moral authority, it might also lose its electoral support from the people. Lim also presented a veiled threat to religious leaders whose moral authority will similarly be eroded if they continue to take a passive approach to the spread of immorality in Singapore.

HOMOPHOBIA AND RELIGIOUS RESPONSES IN SINGAPORE “Homophobia” has been a dominant way of interpreting any resistance to policy shifts that appear to favour the homosexual community. In Singapore, homophobia rarely takes the form of physical violence. At least in public, homophobic expressions usually do not directly victimize the people who are homosexual. Instead, homophobic expressions usually appear as communitarian arguments and justifications for containing homosexuality as an unnatural, mistaken or dangerous lifestyle choice that is harmful for the homosexual as well as society at large. In Singapore, typical examples of this include arguments that connect homosexuality with non-procreative sexuality,

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and therefore with threats to a population’s capacity to reproduce itself. These threats can easily be yoked onto the existing discourse of low fertility in Singapore that says low birth rates lead to a reduction in the size of the future workforce and defence force, and this in turn has devastating consequences for the future economy and security of Singapore.18 According to such arguments, the heterosexual family is valued not only for its procreative function but also because the family is imagined to be a key Asian value, and it is in fact one of the five national shared values codified in Singapore in the late 1980s. Conservative sections of religious communities often insist that homosexuality is a choice and one of many bad choices available to individuals who value their liberal autonomy. Homosexuality is also often linked to a kind of decadence associated with the liberal West and the negative influences of globalization in general. As such, the argument can very readily turn into one about homosexuality as a threat to the nation’s future, its culture, and its value system. It is often very difficult to understand why some conservative sections of religious communities appear to be so obsessed with homosexuality as if there were nothing else more “evil” in this world to militate against. Can it be understood as an over-compensation in a time of systemic gender-insecurity? Is this obsessive response some kind of return of the repressed? Is homosexuality just the right kind of deviance that helps to define more clearly, and thereby re-inscribe, the structures of patriarchy? Or is it a way of targeting convenient enemies to strengthen the moral authority of religious leaders, as a kind of moral scapegoating to ensure solidarity and obedience? Just as the government’s public attitude towards homosexuals will depend on political motivations that balance the need for openness in the new creative economy and electoral pressures from a perceived conservative majority, it is likely that the attitudes of some conservative religious community leaders towards homosexuals are also politically motivated. While many anti-gay letters published in the newspapers were written by ordinary Singaporeans with religious convictions, a number of letters originated from people considered to be recognized authorities within the various faith communities. The following are a few significant examples.

Islam In the interview that PM Goh gave for the Time article, only the Muslim community in Singapore, oddly, was identified as the conservative objectors to homosexuality. On the contrary, three years before that, a long article in the Straits Times of 27 May 2000 on homosexuals in Singapore featured the 420

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response of authorities from the three major religions of Islam, Buddhism and Christianity. In that article, Ustaz Murat Mohd Aris, manager of the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore’s Office of the Mufti, was quoted as saying that: Islam views homosexual behaviour as a sinful act, which is a symptom of the decadence of society. It is a perverted means of satisfying natural urges. Homosexuality degrades a person and is a most unnatural way of life… Homosexuality is contrary to every natural law of human life. It runs counter to the morals, purposes and institutions of a procreative society. Individuals with homosexual behaviour require psychological or medical treatment.19

In the same article, Masagos Zulkifli, president of Perdaus (Association of Adult Islamic Religious Students), was quoted as saying that homosexuality is certainly a real issue that must be addressed, but not by way of officially recognising that to lead a homosexual life is acceptable… it destroys the traditional family unit. It also goes against the policy to encourage Singaporeans to have more children.

As such, Masagos argued, homosexuality is inconsistent with Singapore’s official vision of the family as a basic institution of society and, as an “anything goes” lifestyle, will undermine society’s basic structure. He warned that the government should not “be seen to promote social practices that are not acceptable by the religious groups here”. The episode on homosexuality in the Malay programme Detik mentioned earlier included a segment with Fatris Bakaram, Assistant Mufti and Head of the Mufti Office. He began by echoing Islam’s total opposition to homosexuality, ending with another assertion that homosexuality is a sickness: There are no theologians who differ or give a different view about the unlawfulness of the matter… To expand reproduction and continue the line of mankind in a legitimate way in a situation of purity. But when the sexual contact, or same-sex contact occurs in an environment which cannot produce offspring, then in the face of Islam, it is considered as something which breaches the heavenly duty, something which cannot be accepted… an illness which must be cured, medicated.20

However, reminding viewers that “the Prophet never taught us to ridicule”, he went on to take a more balanced approach, which the Straits Times reported as 421

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[calling] on Muslims to take the middle road, between condemning gays and taking the attitude that “what will be, will be, it’s their choice”… It’s the best way for the community to tackle problems without alienating itself from the changes affecting Singapore.21

Similarly, in a sermon prepared by the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS) and read by religious leaders during the Friday lunch-time prayers at mosques, MUIS declared that: a Muslim cannot look down onto others or feel proud and arrogant of himself. Instead he should be looking at others with mercy and kindness, with the intention of guiding him back to the right path… While it is true that this [homosexual] act and lifestyle is not acceptable in Islam, our duty towards them is not to curse and insult them but to get close to them and to give them advise and encouragement so that they will leave this unhealthy and unacceptable lifestyle so as to attain Allah’s acceptance and forgiveness. It is true that leaving behind such a lifestyle is a great challenge and of grave difficulty, however, it is not entirely impossible so long as there is still faith and belief in Allah s.w.t.22

The Straits Times described this message as practically identical to an official statement issued by the Christian churches at about the same time, reporting how Muslim religious leaders yesterday spoke out against homosexuality, saying it is a sin in Islam. They urged Muslims, in a sermon prepared by the Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), not to humiliate and ostracise gays in their community, but to reach out and coax them to give up their lifestyle. The position is similar to that of the National Council of Churches of Singapore, which gave essentially the same message to Anglicans, Methodists and Presbyterians, among others.23

Buddhism In 2000, the Venerable Shi Ming Yi, secretary-general of the Singapore Buddhist Federation, was quoted in the same article in the Straits Times of 27 May 2000 as saying that he had never discussed homosexuality since “there is nothing on the matter under the five Buddhist precepts”.24 However, three years after, in response to the Time article, Shi was quoted as saying “[o]f course, as a religion, we do not think that homosexuality is right… But we should still respect [homosexuals] and try to help them as much as possible. We would extend them a hand of compassion”.25 422

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In an effort to make sense of this contradiction, Alex Au led a group to meet with Shi for an exchange of ideas. In his reflections on the dialogue session, as published on the Yawning Bread website, Au recalled how Shi immediately confirmed that Buddhist scriptures did say nothing about homosexuality, but went on to explain that he said his religion did not think that homosexuality was right “because he was reflecting the general opinion of Buddhists in Singapore, who were mostly Chinese-speaking and who felt that homosexuality was somehow unacceptable. Parents would not look kindly upon their children being gay”. According to Au, Shi explained that: it was not realistic to move an entire body — the Buddhist congregation — except by tiny little steps. If he had put out a radical, purist, gayfriendly one, he would have been shunned by other monks and Buddhist opinion leaders. More hardline ones would have disavowed his statement and issued sterner ones. And he would lose what leverage he had to gently move Singapore Buddhists to a better understanding of the issue.26

Shi’s strategy, it would seem, was motivated by an assumption that most Buddhists are culturally conservative Chinese Singaporeans, rather than by the Buddhist capacity to be neutral towards and therefore tolerant of homosexuality. However, more “theological” (rather than cultural or political) reflections on homosexuality and Buddhism can be found on a website called Heartland that describes itself as “a Buddhist Fellowship… for gay people in Singapore” whose main aim is “(1) To help each other relate Buddhist teachings to our lives and to being gay, (2) To encourage each other to practice the Dharma actively, (3) To help each other improve the understanding of the Dharma, through practising together”.27 Initiating a range of cyber-discussion topics such as the Buddhist view of sexual desire in homosexuality and heterosexuality, the webmaster of Heartland makes an appeal to his audience: Just as Buddha had, in the Kalama Sutra, invited us not to accept societal norms, traditions, values and teachings blindly, without first testing and experiencing them yourself for its beneficial qualities, I would like to invite you to do so here too.28

Roman Catholicism and Protestant Christianity Generally, some segments of Christian communities have provided the most developed anti-gay arguments and strategies. Most of these arguments tend 423

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to be based on literal interpretations of scripture, particularly the references made by St Paul. According to these interpretations, homosexuality is sinful because the Bible directly says so, even though it was written in a very different historical, cultural, literary and intellectual context from today’s. The arguments also try to refute claims that homosexuals are born that way and therefore refute the argument that God cannot condemn what he has made in his own image. Stressing that homosexuality is a choice rather than something people are born with, the anti-gay arguments sometimes attempt to disprove the existence of a “gay gene” by drawing selectively from what is really an inconclusive body of scientific research.29 Sometimes the arguments focus on the notion that being homosexual (even if it is accepted as a natural biological condition or orientation) is not the problem, but practising gay sex (a choice of action or behaviour) is. These arguments open the way to suggesting that the publicly visible spread of homosexual lifestyles can influence innocent young people to become homosexual, a preventative claim. These arguments also open the way to reassuring homosexuals that Christians are asked to love the sinner but hate the sin, and then convince (and provide community support for) homosexuals to choose a heterosexual lifestyle in line with the notion of humanity’s fall from grace and the redemption that can return him or her to a true purpose,30 that is, a curative claim. Often, it is argued that homosexuality, in particular the notion of gay marriages and households, degrades the sanctity of the heterosexual family and of procreative sexuality both of which are imagined to be essential values of Christianity. These are also often articulated with an alarmist vision of a society in decline. Generally, Goh’s announcement in the Time article did not appear to provoke a forceful public response among Roman Catholic authorities in Singapore, although the Catholic Church has taken a clear line towards homosexuality in the wider society, in particular with regard to the institution of marriage. A 2004 report by the Vatican Council for the Family was extracted and reproduced in Catholic News, distributed mainly to the Roman Catholic parishioners in Singapore, in which the council asserted in the section on homosexuality that: [two] people of the same sex are not capable of conceiving and adopting a child, nor are they in a psychic condition to approach the meaning of conjugal love or ensure the symbolic parental function from a human viewpoint, much less be a reference point in children’s education. In these situations some valid principles are wiped away, such as the higher good of the child, and subjected to possible dangers. It is necessary to present in a more in-depth way the truth and the clear reasons that lead 424

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to disapproving of de facto couples, as well as those of the same sex, and the presumption to adopt children, and reaffirm that homosexuality is a tendency, not a sexual identity, and so it cannot take part in the foundation of the social bond that the couple and the family represent.31

Local Catholic authorities have regularly denounced homosexual marriage and non-procreative sexuality. In 2000, an article in the Straits Times on homosexuality in Singapore quoted Redemptorist priest Father Bernard Teo’s explanation that: [t]he Catholic Church doesn’t accept homosexual activities as a right because sexual activity has a special procreative meaning attached to it. But people with gay orientation are to be respected as persons in their own right…. We will never recognize homosexual marriages, but how far society can tolerate, that’s a subject for debate.32

Also very clear in the Catholic approach is the insistence that homosexuals be respected first as human beings. In a Channel NewsAsia programme, educationist Brother Michael Broughton articulated a humane concern for homosexuals who often end up hating themselves: As part of education, we try to tell our boys not to prejudge people… your homosexual friend could be the one in the rugby team, your rugby captain could be a homosexual, and you do not know … so you’ve got to prepare and open their minds to consider… but for the boys who have such a sexual orientation, it’s always a problem, because they are always a minority group, and you got to salvage them from self-loathing or self-hate…. non-acceptance of themselves, of who they are.33

Similarly, Father Teo, recognizing that many homosexuals do lead “respectable lives” and have contributed greatly to church and community, explained the need “to educate people that [homosexuals] have rights to their dignity… because a lot of people suffer when things are not clarified”.34 Protestant Christian churches seemed to respond more forcefully towards the Time article. One of the more hard-line responses came from retired Methodist pastor George Wan who compared homosexuality with drug addiction and accused the government of ignoring religious groups and distorting morality by accepting the unnatural behaviour of homosexuals: What kind of morality are we inculcating in Singapore when we implicitly condone homosexuality? What kind of signals is the Government sending 425

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to its citizens? Being in a multi-religious society, shouldn’t the authorities heed the moral teachings and reservations of religious groups? I am not condemning homosexuals and lesbians. We should sympathize with them and help them, as we do with drug addicts. But we must never condone their unnatural behaviour.35

In what seemed like an effort to prevent a Christian anti-gay campaign from going out of control, the National Council of Churches of Singapore (NCCS) representing about 150 Anglican, Methodist, and Presbyterian churches issued a formal statement on homosexuality that would serve as a rational and authoritative beacon for practical Christian morality. The NCCS addressed its concerns not only to its Christian congregations but also, “as concerned citizens, to the society in which we belong”. Here, it is important to note that Christians see themselves as witnesses to the (pagan, secular) world, and so it is their duty as Christians to speak their truth more widely, in this case, as concerned citizens. In this regard, it is not surprising that the statement, reported in the Straits Times and the Today newspaper, continued to transgress the secularist thesis by re-asserting that the NCCS is “committed to serving our nation by helping to preserve and promote wholesome values and lifestyles that will contribute to the well-being of our society”. The NCSS’ overall approach was quite typical. It based its total opposition to the sin of homosexuality on Biblical standards but distanced itself from homophobia by defining this as a rejection or hatred of homosexual people and by reaffirming homosexuals as “persons of worth and dignity”. It then presented the Christian church as a “caring community and a sanctuary” where people struggling with homosexual desire may receive God’s forgiveness and grace, and be transformed by him. The NCCS then dismissed any attempts to prove scientifically that homosexuality has a biological basis. Agreeing that homosexuals should not be discriminated against in terms of employment, the NCCS nevertheless would not accept that: society should be re-ordered or allowed to evolve to the extent that eventually homosexual practice is endorsed, permitted or encouraged as an alternative lifestyle. In this regard, we urge our government to maintain: (a) current legislation concerning homosexuality; (b) its policy of not permitting the registration of homosexual societies or clubs; (c) its policy of not allowing the promotion of homosexual lifestyle and activities.36

Although the statement by NCCS, particularly its anti-discrimination stance, was generally interpreted as a positive public attempt to control the 426

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burst of thoroughly homophobic and militant responses from a few Christian churches, it still contained arguments that pro-gay activists are considered to be dangerous and regressive. In a reply that was sent to the various media but not published, Eileena Lee, Kelvin Wong and Alex Au argued that by “asking a secular State to frame its laws and policies in accordance with its [religious] beliefs”, the statement “breaches the separation of Church and State, is an attempt to impose Christian values upon non-Christians, and is interference in our politics”. As such, it threatened to “damage the tolerance and harmony we have built up over the decades, and are still trying to enhance and deepen as we move forward”.37 Similarly, homosexual support group Safehaven published its rebuttal on gay website Fridae.com, arguing that: …the Christian faith is but one of many faiths in our nation, which clearly lays down the principle of the separation of church and state. To call upon the state to legislate private morality runs against this fundamental principle that has stood the test of time not only in Singapore but elsewhere. As a secular state, Singapore needs to take into account all factors that will contribute to the continued viability of Singapore as a socio-economic entity. The need to embrace diversity and tolerance is now becoming an urgent matter of national interest if Singapore is to continue succeeding in the new millennium…. It is time for segments of the Singaporean Christian community to drop the gay bogeyman so that Singapore can catch up with the rest of the developed world…. In associating acceptance with a “re-ordering” of society, the NCCS statement ignores the fact that gay Singaporeans have contributed, are contributing and will continue to contribute to the wellbeing of their families, their faith communities as well as their nation.38

What is especially important to note here is that Safehaven is a Christianbased homosexual support group. Like many other Christian homosexual support groups in Singapore, Safehaven demonstrates clearly that not all Christians share the anti-gay beliefs and strategies that seem to dominate the public image of Christian faith communities. In the same rebuttal, Safehaven argues that: there are many Christians and an increasing number of denominations globally including segments of the Methodist and Anglican denominations who disagree with the position of the NCCS regarding homosexuality. These individuals and churches having read the Scriptures carefully bearing in mind the Spirit of Christ, believe that 427

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the Christian faith can and does affirm that gay Christians may live fully as Christians and as gay people. For these Christians and for us, there is no theological or spiritual conflict. We call upon the NCCS to recognize the existence of this diversity even within global Christianity… The affirmation of the human dignity of the gay person means that the NCCS must also affirm the right and obligation for each person, gay or otherwise, to work through their own moral position based on their understanding of the Bible.39

In fact, there are even mainstream Christian authorities with no formal affiliation to homosexual organizations, such as former Methodist bishop Reverend Dr Yap Kim Hao, who disagree with the hard-line position on homosexuality expressed in the NCCS statement. In a letter published in the Straits Times, Reverend Yap described homosexuals as “normal human beings”. Citing a range of studies by professional mental health organizations, he argued against attempts to convert homosexuals into heterosexuals since these methods have not been proven to be effective but they instead cause tremendous psychological harm. He believed that it is much more important to help homosexuals “become comfortable with their sexual orientation and understand the societal response to it”. In the same letter, Yap quoted Singaporean Seow Choon Leong, a professor of Old Testament Language and Literature at Princeton Theological Seminary, as saying: I also used to believe homosexual acts are always wrong. Listening to gay and lesbian students and friends, however, I have had to rethink my position and reread the Scriptures. Seeing how gay and lesbian people suffer discrimination, face the rejection of family and friends, risk losing their jobs, and live in fear of being humiliated and bashed, I cannot see how anyone would prefer to live that way. I do not understand it all, but I am persuaded that it is not a matter of choice… I have reconsidered my views, I was wrong.40

Closing the Debate After more than a month of intense debate in the public sphere over Goh’s comments about hiring homosexuals in the civil service, the discussions quickly subsided with the annual National Day Rally speech in which Goh distanced himself from any gay cause, warned gay activists not to incur the wrath of conservative Singaporeans, reassured the faith communities and complimented them on their responsible input on the matter, and urged Singaporeans to move on to more important matters: 428

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As for my comments on gays, they do not signal any change in policy that would erode the moral standards of Singapore, or our family values. In every society, there are gay people. We should accept those in our midst as fellow human beings, and as fellow Singaporeans. If the public sector refuses to employ gays, the private sector might also refuse. But gays too, need to make a living. That said, let me stress that I do not encourage or endorse a gay lifestyle. Singapore is still a traditional and conservative Asian society. Gays must know that the more they lobby for public space, the bigger the backlash they will provoke from the conservative mainstream. Their public space may then be reduced./I am glad that conservative Singaporeans and religious leaders have made known their views on the matter, clearly but responsibly. I hope we will now move on and focus on more urgent challenges.41

CONCLUSION This case study reveals that faith communities in Singapore often have much in common when they respond to what they see as an instance of formal secularism threatening to swing Singapore to a materialist and pragmatic extreme, and to a degenerate place where there is no room for any kind of public morality at all. In fact, it would seem as if the main fault-lines lie not between religious communities (usually thought to be the main source of inter-religious conflict and violence that has prompted the theory and practice of secularism), but rather, between the religious and the secular. On the other hand, formalizing a public secularism that excludes all religious reasons from the public sphere can effectively distort the capacity for more open public dialogue motivated by a collective pursuit of higher-order knowledge of what is good. A strict and formal secularism can have the effect of demonizing religious reasons and transforming them into a defensive discourse. Complexity, subtlety, variety and engagement are distorted into simple “us” versus “them” modes of reasoning. In the case study, it is clear that religious people and even authorities can have a range of views that are anything from conservative to the most liberal. However, a siege mentality reduces discussion into a battlefield of rigid notions of good and evil and right and wrong, all marked by suspicion and hostility between the forces of religion and secularism. The capacity to step into “other people’s shoes”, that is, to think with empathy and an enlarged mentality, is severely diminished. As statistics continue to reveal high levels of religiosity in Singapore,42 religious communities become, unfortunately, cast as a rigid and conservative moral mainstream, even though conservatism per se is not necessarily inherent in these religious traditions, theologies, and practices. Indeed, as indicated 429

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above, there is even in practice much evidence of common ground, at least where according homosexuals the human dignity that they fully deserve is concerned. It is politics that often deeply polarizes arguments in such a way as to destroy the common ground on which better arguments might be built. The case study also shows how the media has tried to stage-manage the debates between pro-gay and anti-gay voices to achieve a peaceful outcome and progress towards open-mindedness, while containing the indignation of more conservative sections of religious communities. Managing this balance is a thoroughly complex responsibility and one that should include producing and admitting a more complex range of voices that do not merely fall into “pro” and “anti” camps. Otherwise, discussion will remain partisan, and the same partisan arguments are likely to be re-articulated should another “gay issue” be raised in the near future. The media can play a more strategic role in stage-managing future public debates to produce and admit more nuanced arguments that destabilize simple “pro” and “anti” modes of discussion. For a start, removing the religious/secular distinction in the public sphere (and the prejudices and fears that undergird it) may have the beneficial effect of freeing up discussion, removing suspicion and increasing good faith in one another as well-meaning and intelligent citizens.

Notes The author wishes to thank the Institute of Policy Studies for its support, and also Gary Lee Jack Jin for his research assistance. Views expressed in this chapter are entirely those of the author. 1. Chew, “Shaping of Maturity”, Diocesan Digest, September 2003, (accessed 14 August 2005). 2. Elegant, “The Lion in Winter”, Time Asia, 30 June 2003. 3. Ibrahim, “‘Making Room for the Three Ts”, Sunday Times, 14 July 2002. 4. Yeo, “Local Gays, Foreign Gays”, Today, 5 July 2003. 5. Yawning Bread is a masterfully designed website that carries Au’s socially and politically critical writings on issues mostly related to the gay community. Through his meticulous, lucid and vivid arguments, Au takes pains to point out rhetorical contradictions, illogical arguments and hypocritical positions in the public sphere, drawing from a wealth of examples from history and other countries. By taking official rhetoric at face value, Au seizes on contradictions between rhetoric and practice and within rhetoric itself, in order to effect changes. The website serves as an effective public educational platform. In the context of a surprisingly large number of Singapore gay community on-line discussion groups (at last count, there were almost thirty such groups under Yahoo alone), its leading role in gay activism is not insignificant. The website also maintains a comprehensive archive of news reports and letters to the press 430

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6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

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(with the webmaster’s annotations), a resource that has proved to be most helpful in the research for this chapter. Au, “Gay Civil Servants Redux”. See, for example, discussions in Lo and Huang, eds. People Like Us. Straits Times, “Editorial: About Gay Tolerance”, 5 July 2003. Joyce Lim, “With This Ring, I Thee Wed…”, New Paper, 6 July 2003. Calvin Low, “No Mardi Gras, Says PM”, New Paper, 6 July 2003. Aaron Low and Marcel Lee Pereira, “Firm “No” To Gay Marriages: Poll”, New Paper, 6 July 2003. Petrus Tan, “Gay Tutorial on Chinese TV”. Au, “Gay Tutorial on Malay TV”. Alan Lau, “Gays Are Still People”, Straits Times, 9 July 2003. Li, “Employing Gays in Civil Service: A ‘Tiny Step Forward’ ”, Sunday Times, 6 July 2003. Phiroze Abdul Rahman, “I Am Disturbed By Just The Thought That Gays Are Ordinary People”, Straits Times, 15 July 2003. George Lim, “Government Should Rethink Hiring of Gays”, Straits Times, 15 July 2003. Amy Tan, “Singapore Gays Find Tacit Acceptance but Some Seek More”, Reuters, 1 July 2001. Ng, “Do Gays Have A Place In Singapore”, Straits Times, 27 May 2000. Au, “Gay Tutorial on Malay TV”, op. cit. Straits Times, “MUIS Spells Out Its Stand On Gay Issue”, 1 August 2003. “Belief and Practice”, Islamic Religious Council of Singapore website, 1 August 2003, (accessed 14 August 2005). Straits Times, “MUIS Spells Out Its Stand On Gay Issue”, 1 August 2003. Ng, op. cit. Li, op. cit. Au, “Reflections on a Meeting with the Venerable Shi Ming Yi”, Yawning Bread. . Ibid. Au, “Playing Fast and Loose with Science”, Yawning Bread. Tan Kim Huat, “Christianity and Homosexuality”. Vatican Council for the Family, “Conclusions of the XVI Plenary Assembly, 18–20 November 2004”, p. 16. Ng, op. cit. Au, “CNA Special Assignment: Homosexuality; Transcript of Homosexuality Segment”, Yawning Bread. Ng, op. cit. Wan, “Don’t Condone Unnatural Behaviour”, Straits Times, 18 July 2003. National Council of Churches of Singapore, “Statement on Homosexuality”, 29 July 2003. 431

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37. Lee, Wong, and Au, “NCC’s ‘Statement on Homosexuality’ Breaches the Separation of Church and State”. 38. Safehaven, “Statement in Response to National Council of Churches’ Statement on Homosexuality”. 39. Ibid. 40. Yap, “No Reason to Condemn Gays”, Straits Times, 18 July 2003. 41. Goh, “From the Valley to the Highlands”, National Day Rally Speech, 17 August 2003. 42. Lim and Low, “Nation of Believers”, Straits Times, 16 July 2005, Saturday Special Report, pp. 2–3.

References Au, Alex. “CNA Special Assignment: Homosexuality; Transcript of Homosexuality Segment”. Yawning Bread, September 1999. (accessed 14 August 2005). ———. “Gay Tutorial on Malay TV”. Yawning Bread, July 2003.