Reimagining Security Communities: Systems Thinking Approach for Africa 3030708683, 9783030708689

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Reimagining Security Communities Systems Thinking Approach for Africa Francis Onditi ∙ Gilad Ben-Nun ∙ Edmond M. Were ∙ Israel Nyaburi Nyadera With contributions by General Robert Kariuki Kibochi

Reimagining Security Communities

Francis Onditi · Gilad Ben-Nun · Edmond M. Were · Israel Nyaburi Nyadera

Reimagining Security Communities Systems Thinking Approach for Africa

with contributions by General Robert Kariuki Kibochi

Francis Onditi Riara University Nairobi, Kenya

Gilad Ben-Nun Leipzig University Leipzig, Germany

Edmond M. Were Department of Political Science and Peace Studies Kisii University Kisii, Kenya

Israel Nyaburi Nyadera Department of Government and Public Administration University of Macau Taipa Macau, Macao

ISBN 978-3-030-70868-9 ISBN 978-3-030-70869-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70869-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

The African dream of self-reliance in diverse sectors of peace, security and development is as old as the continent. The realization of such a dream would promote Africa-led initiatives and build a cohesive African society that promotes people’s welfare, foster coexistence, peace and stability. Several initiatives have been mooted on the continent in support of this dream. The establishment of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was the beginning of this journey. Several decades later, the African Union (AU) was revived on 9 July 2002. The AU signifies another era of pan-African unity of purpose. For the purpose of legal framing, the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol entered into force in December 2003. This legal framework identified key pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). APSA is core to the African Regional Security Community (RSC) arrangement. There is no doubt that the African RSC arrangement has endured the test of time in consolidating and responding to the emerging threats to peace and security. The authors, however, identify the myriads of challenges that remain to be addressed. For instance, the uncertainty where habitually, as new peace and security threats arise, the Union/or RECs typically designs new mechanisms aimed at providing ad hoc response to such challenges. They continue to observe that several challenges arise from this cyclical approach to the development of response mechanisms.

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Firstly, this approach usually addresses only limited aspects of the threat— for instance, the military intervention tends to neglect the multifaceted nature of the predominantly intrastate African conflict, hence, failing to incorporate the human security dimensions needed to address the asymmetric threats. Secondly, in most cases, a diplomatic spat arises from the overlapping mandates of actors who scramble to engage in the given situation. In response to these structural challenges, the authors grapple with the fundamental question of what is an effective framework for institutional coordination in responding to the emerging peace and security threats in Africa? They elucidate the viability for integrating the principles of systems thinking (ST) into the RSC with the aim of increasing interoperability of formations, increase coordination and harmonize strategies and policies across RECs and other regional organizations. Their justification for introducing ST in RSC is based on the long tradition of systems innovation encapsulated in Richard Mattessich’s (1982) concept of systemic wholeness, which opts to look at an interconnected complex as a whole rather than a mere sum of its parts. The authors argue that with ST at the centre of the RSC arrangement, collective approach should be conceivable to foster effective consultation among the myriad of actors that often characterizes the continent’s peace and security architecture. Consequently, the ST should be able to promote structural response rather than being reactive and only acting as a stopgap tool based on a short-term coalition of a few countries. In my view, this volume is, therefore, timely to provide not only comprehensive understanding of lessons emerging from the ‘African experiment’ of peace and security, but also offers a new breadth into the APSA. Given the challenges and limitations faced by the United Nations in peacekeeping, and the need to grow African solutions to African problems, lessons documented in this book will provide insights on how to effectively engage and form synergy among the various actors in the peace and security arena. Readers will find this book not only refreshing to read, but also a shift in mindset. This shift has been motivated by the existing grey areas in international peace and security studies, which largely remain Eurocentric. The authors of the book clearly and lucidly decry how the Western theorists of regional security studies are predicated upon a belief that African institutions are incapable of responding to peace and security threats, a myth that the authors ably demystify in various sections of the book.

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It is my sincere hope that this book will be useful to all those concerned with African peace and security architecture, including military strategists, international relations scholars, policy makers, students of military science and those responsible for planning and developing strategies for peace support operations. Last, but not least, I would like to commend the authors of this book for their invaluable contribution to both knowledge and practice. A combination of authors drawn from both the academy and military practice makes the book ideal for both advanced researchers and military practitioners. Ambassador Frederic Gateretse Ngoga Head, Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division African Union, Peace and Security Department African Union Commission Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

About the Book

This book utilizes systems thinking perspective to propose an alternative framework of analysis and practice for the regional security community (RSC) arrangement in Africa. The proposed framework is anchored on the five building blocks of systems thinking (theory of success, creative tension model, hierarchy of choices, levels of perspective and ladder of inferences), to reconfigure the RSC into a holistic Regional Systems Secure Community (RSSC) arrangement. Conventionally, the Buzanian ‘security communities ’ approach has dominated debates on regional security arrangement in Africa. This thinking is based on the assumption that the collective social value system predominant in most African societies would favour communitarian approach when responding to threats. However, this approach has been mired with a myriad of structural limitations—chief among them being the duplication of mandates and lack of coordination in response to peace and security threats. In this book, the authors make an attempt to address this disconnect by drawing on the principles of systems thinking to reconfigure a holistic RSC arrangement. From the holistic approach, the book is simplified for readers to understand the contours of the RSC arrangement in Africa. This landscape is unveiled by analysing and contrasting theoretical and empirical perspectives, using mixed methodologies and approaches. The Reimagining Security Community is an ideal text book for advanced researchers and students of international relations with a bias

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in the African regional area studies, regional security studies and strategic security studies, because of the depth of analysis and the useful policy options for achieving a holistic peace and security framework and practice.

Introduction

Security communities as articulated by Deutsch et al. (1957), and as defined here, are regions in which large-scale use of violence is very unlikely. Similarly, comprehensive security community system occurs where interstate war and civil strife are uncommon (cited in Tusicisny, 2007). In both cases, the common denominator is interstate and interpersonal trust. However, these assumptions have been challenged in theory and practice. For instance, although African regional organizations have made tremendous efforts towards solidifying collective security agenda, otherwise known as ‘security community’, the pattern of response to the myriads of peace and security threats on the continent tends to signal mixed reputation-capability, coordination, interorganizational competition and overlapping issues. Critiques of the current model of intervention (which is often ad hoc and overlapping mandates), have raised concerns that peace and security agenda is usually secondary to the mandate of the regional organizations, and that lack of systematic approach to monitoring implementation of such strategies remains unresolved. Yet, the collective security agenda remains key in deepening the various aspects of the regional cooperation, including peace and security (Acharya, 2001). Nevertheless, these criticisms cannot be wished away, because a common understanding of the regional cooperation for peace and security is core to the notion of ‘security community’ (Buzan, 1991). The concept of ‘security community’ has roots in the Karl Deutschian (1957) theorization of regional security value system (cited in Santos, 2015). It is defined

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as a group of states with a common understanding that conflict cannot be resolved through military force (Laakso, 2005). This premise is established on the understanding that war or conflict is inevitable, and when it happens, the community must find an amicable pathway to peace and stability. Although the theorization of security community draws much more from the Western European nations as they emerged from WWII, the extant formation of intergovernmental arrangements (regional economic communities) in Africa is akin to the Deutschian philosophy of security community. In the African context, security community is characterized as follows: (1) regional organizations make joint decisions on transnational peace and security (2) governments pull together their sovereignty and empower peace and security structures (3) decision-making powers remain vested in the states (4) states pull resources together when the issue at hand is of interest to them. However, there is also a sense of ‘togetherness’ that emerges as states work jointly on peace and security— this value system is known to promote other norms such as democracy, economic liberalism, participation, transparency and social justice (Tusicisny, 2005; Ditrych, 2014). This approach to peace and security has not been without glitches-weak capacity of the community’s secretariat to conduct systematic monitoring of the implementation of joint agreements due to limited financial resources and lack of holistic approach in response to threats. Efforts to address these weaknesses through the African Union Peace and Security Council Protocol are yet to bear fruits. The African Union Peace and Security Council Protocol that entered into force on 26 December 2003, embraces a comprehensive continental agenda for peace and security. The continental peace and security spectrum has a wide range of activities; conflict prevention, early warning, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacebuilding, promotion of democratic principles and humanitarian action and disaster management. These activities are embedded within the broader framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Since APSA’s formation, there have been a plethora of studies and reports tracking its operationalization among other issues, coordination, sustainability, subsidiarity, coherence and partnership. Classic studies of the regional security system take a macro perspective, focusing on broader and strategic issues. However, overreliance on broader issues tends to neglect the micro-level environment factors. In this work, the micro-level salient elements that define the

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‘inside’ of the African Standby Force (ASF) include structure, civil–military relations, processes and institutions. Even the heuristic studies around the question of peace operation get stark in the timeworn approaches in resolving contemporary complex conflicts. Yet, ever since ASF was formed in 2003, the conflict system on the continent has dramatically changed, with insurgency, terrorism and political identity challenges dominating the conflict scene. This renders the old models of conflict resolution obsolete. It is against this background that this work is designed to address policy and conceptual lacuna in the research of AU’s peace support operation (PSO) architecture. The book’s knowledge contribution includes (1) bridging the gap between macro and micro approaches in the study of International/Regional Security; and (2) provides ‘alternative’ models and approaches for addressing complex peace and security scenarios in Africa and beyond. This work was envisaged at a time when the Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram menace was becoming not only a regional issue but also threatening international peace and security. The militant groups were rapidly bringing the battle to the core of the civilian population. They demonstrated their inhuman determination to this cause by conducting fierce attacks on civilians, abductions and executing suicide bombing not only in their operation bases, but also across the region. The Al-Shabaab attack in Kenya and slaying of 147 University of Garissa students on 2 April 2015, was the height of the militants’ lethality. The kidnapping of more than 200 Chibok pupils in 2014 by Boko Haram in Pulka village, Borno state in Nigeria, sparked the debate on the need to review the conventional methods of fighting terror groups. The militant groups are not usually confined in a single territory—they are mobile across borders, either as a war tactic or as a response to pressure from official armed forces. However, it is not clear whether activities of such groups are international or non-international confrontations. This conceptual ambiguity affects the mandate, design and implementation of peace operations. Before we delve deeper into the main issues, it is important to conduct a conceptual clarification on the differences between international armed conflicts (IACs) and the non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). The International Humanitarian Law (IHL) distinguishes between international and non-international armed conflicts. While the IACs exist whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more states, NIACs are protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups. The group’s activities

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can be classified between symmetric conflicts and asymmetric conflicts. This form of conflict poses a challenge to the notions of reciprocity and universal rules of hostilities that are the core of IHL (Maclnnis, 2007). Thus, both the United Nations and the regional bodies such as the African Union (AU) have the direct responsibility to mobilize troops against such groups or legislate resolutions to prevent, manage or respond to socioeconomic and cultural risks associated with all forms of conflicts (Badmus 2017). The United Nations’ Charter signed on 26 June 1945 is mandated to maintain international peace and security. In fulfilling this responsibility, the Security Council may adopt a range of measures, including the establishment of United Nations Peacekeeping operations. The legal basis for such action is found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Charter. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has outlined six categories for the future UN efforts to respond to peace and security threats: (1) preventive diplomacy; (2) peacemaking; (3) peacekeeping; (4) peace enforcement; (5) peacebuilding; (6) sanctions. The United Nations peace operations policy works focus on addressing training-deployment gaps in peacekeeping environment (De Coning, 2010). In fact, studies on peacekeeping tend to concentrate on international civilian capacities (De Coning & Karlsrud, 2011). Yet, the boundary between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement have become even much blurred. Multidimensional peacekeeping operations, where the three (military, police and civilian) components are engaged, are better placed to deal with unforeseen overlaps in mandate. The essence of a multidimensional approach is to offer comprehensive protection to majority of civilians, who often fall victims to asymmetric conflicts. As expected, recent studies indicate most of such conflicts occurred in Africa. The studies suggest that effective solutions to such challenges can be tackled well by African-led peace operations regional arrangements (De Coning & Karlsrud, 2011; De Coning, 2010, 2017). However, continued focus on UN peacekeeping by peace and conflict researchers seems conceptually confusing as well as politically misguided. Much deeper analysis beyond the number of peacekeepers would provide a hint on how well the African peace support operation architecture ought to be reconfigured in order to deal with the complex peace and security situations on the continent.

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Definitions The complexity of conflict system is not a unique phenomenon to the Africa states. The phenomenon is global. It has been witnessed in other parts of the world—Arab Spring, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Iran, Afghanistan. The complexity of armed actors in Colombia, the prolonged fighting in Sri Lanka, the armed violence in Haiti and the insurgency in the Philippines are just but a few examples where hostilities have persisted. However, there exists dispute involving the use of terminologies in a conflict situation, whether, armed or non-armed. In this section, there are six ways in which the conflict system is perceived; international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict, failed state, relative deprivation, root causes and the 3Ds (defence, development and diplomacy). The International Humanitarian Law (IHL) distinguishes between international and non-international armed conflicts (Schroeder, 2018). The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) further differentiates between the two forms of conflict: International armed conflicts (IAC) exist whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more states (Turns, 2006). Non-international armed conflicts (NIAC) are protracted armed confrontations occurring between governmental armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between such groups arising on the territory of a state [party to the Geneva Conventions]. The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a minimum organization. In this case, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) groups and the Al-Shabaab militants remain non-international armed conflict. The major challenge the world is facing now is the evolution of asymmetric conflicts. Wing Commander J.G. Eaton RAF, identifies three terms synonymous with asymmetry; irregular, unconventional and non-traditional (2002). Perhaps, the most comprehensive definition is provided by P.F. Herman, ‘Asymmetric warfare is a set of operational practices aimed at negating advantages and exploiting vulnerabilities rather than engaging in traditional force-on-force engagements’ (1997: 180) (cited in Rubenstein 2009). In the face of asymmetric conflicts, the world has seen a proliferation of armed actors from rebel armies to insurgency cells, governmentlinked paramilitaries to local defence groups. Contemporary command structures tend to be loose, with frequent switches in allegiance (Hansen, 2017). Where structures are formalized, armed groups often present themselves as alternative governments in order to extract money and

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favours from civilians, while hiding behind a facade of legitimacy and agitation for self-determination. Examples of this phenomenon are the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the National Congress for Defence of the People in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. The most shocking development in contemporary conflict is the deliberate targeting of civilians, due in part to the strategic blurring of the lines between combatants and civilians. The former often live or find shelter in villages and refugee camps, sometimes using civilians as human shields. The targeting of civilians most often involves killing, maiming and sexual violence, with claims that these acts are in reprisal for suspected support of the opposition or for attacks by opposing forces. In other instances, combatants force civilians to support their efforts. This support, whether voluntary or forced, places civilians at greater risk of attack by the opposing forces. Armed actors seek to bring the battle more immediately, more systematically and more massively to the core of the civilian population. International warfare is a conflict fought between two (or more) nation states and their armies. In the technical sense, it is a formal status produced by a declaration of war (Eberwein, 1995). It is a form of armed conflict, a main concern for the international community for centuries. The breakup of the Soviet Union led to a shift in the global power grid, with the USA assuming the lone position of a global leader, without the balancing power of the Soviet Union. This event, along with other factors, encouraged different groups to achieve their own autonomy, creating a proliferation of internal conflicts in the 1990s that would become of interest to the rest of the world. The most common form of warfare in the twenty-first century is internal conflict, which is extremely varied in both cause and conduct. It is generated by the actual use of armed force, which must be comprehensive on the part of at least one party to the conflict. It is difficult to apply international humanitarian law in such settings, despite some clear guidance in Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocol II that is specific to non-international armed conflicts. A country may experience more than one internal conflict simultaneously, as different allied or non-allied groups struggle for recognition of their issues. Myanmar, DRC and Sudan provide examples of this. Internal conflicts tend to be fought by small, poorly trained and lightly armed troops that avoid major military clashes, but often direct

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their attacks against civilians as ‘soft targets’ to achieve maximum impact for their cause. As the preceding literature review reveals, the international system, post-Cold War, is marked by an appreciable decrease in interstate conflict. Indeed, ‘most conflicts and protracted political crises today do not occur between sovereign states but are of an internal or regionalized type’ (Duffield, 2000: 73). Despite this decline—amounting to ‘more than 35% during the 1990s…serious armed violence persists in many parts of Asia and Africa’ (Goodhand, 2003: 630). Over the years, a mosaic of theories has been advanced in order to understand casus belli, especially in the domestic context. Why do people rebel? Efforts to unravel this question point to human insecurities; Failed/Failing State, Human Need Theory (HNT), Resource-Curse, the Relative Deprivation (RD) Theory and the Rational Choice Theory (RC) (Alozieuwa 2012). The failure to meet the various dimensions of human needs often negatively impacts the state’s legitimacy, including its monopoly of the use of force; hence are both necessary and sufficient conditions to generate various forms of politically motivated violence, including civil wars (Princeton & Morrison, 2004; Davis, 2007; Piazza, 2008). A failed state is also characterized by other indicators such as low GDP per capita output. Simply put, the rise in civil war in Africa or other developing nations, with such negative indicators in recent times, is explained from this angle (Mentan, 2004; Davis, 2007). Somalia and Sudan, for instance, are widely used examples to illustrate the relationship between a failed or ‘collapsed’ state and internal strife. Somalia, under this theoretical consideration, is often cited. The rationale being how the country provides a safe haven for the Al-Qaeda terrorist network, in view of their influence on Al-Shabaab, among others in the region (Hill, 2005; Newman, 2007; Jones, 2008). To begin with, the adherents of the State Failure, or weak state thesis, uphold that a state’s inability to discharge its due responsibilities provides a fertile ground for civil strife (Newman 2007). By way of definition, a failed state is one that is ‘unable to perform a set of functions taken to be characteristic and definitive of a properly functioning state: to maintain secure boundaries, ensure the protection and security of all the population, provide public goods and effective governance, maintain law and order throughout the territory’ (Jones 2008: 180). The failure to meet these responsibilities often negatively impacts the state’s legitimacy, including its monopoly of the use of force; hence are both necessary and sufficient conditions to generate various forms of politically motivated

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violence, including terrorism (Princeton and Morrison 2004). A failed state is also characterized by other indicators such as low gross domestic product (GDP) per capita output. Simply put, the rise in insurgency in Africa or other developing nations, with such negative indicators in recent times, is explained from this angle (Mentan, 2004). Nonetheless, ‘while weak or failed states might provide an enabling environment for certain types of terrorist groups to operate, additional explanatory variables need to be identified’ (Newman, 2007: 463). Besides, the lack of consensus on what constitutes the ‘failed state’, the theory says little or nothing if applied to civil conflicts such as the Oromo uprising in Ethiopia and the Niger Delta crises in Nigeria, given the explanatory relevance or contribution of the resource-curse theory. The resource-curse theory simply links the emergence of collective violence in that region to the availability of ‘huge natural resource endowments’. The logic of this argument is that these resources often ‘blighten [rather than brighten] the prospects for development by serving as a source of motivation for people either to struggle over scarce resources or form armed groups to engage in conflict in order to exploit the opportunity to loot’ (Obi, 2009: 109). The relevance thereof for the civil conflicts subsists in the notable political highjack of the original struggle, for self-benefiting ends by some individuals and groups. This theory has been offered as an explanation for the conflict in countries such as Somalia. According to this framework, which bears striking resemblance with the relative deprivation thesis, the emergence of civil conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa has been construed through the prism of the deplorable socio-economic conditions. The basis of these two interrelated theories is that unmet needs create frustrations in people, which may propel them towards violence against the perceived (right or wrong) source of their problem. In its ‘preventive deployment’ pillar, ASF is expected to prevent disputes from escalating, prevent ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighbouring areas or states, and prevent resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement. Despite this laid down policy framework on how the standby force is expected to tackle conflict, the inability of the entity to manage, coordinate and integrate multiple components across dimensions to create seamless linkages with other stakeholders and partners have become a critical hindrance. This functional disconnect reinforces the vicious cycle of violence driven by, among other factors, relative deprivation. Let us look at the relative deprivation and root cause more closely.

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The first exponent of the theory of relative deprivation (RD), sociologist J.A. Davis (1959) advanced the theory with reference to two groups, in-group and out-group, with the former referring to the rebel group while the latter refers to the society or the others. Rather than being distinguished by the Marxist notion of ownership of the means of production, these two groups are distinguished based on ‘any identifiable quality such as race, religion and ethnic or economic capability. The perception of the out-group as being well-off triggers a sense of deprivation for the in-group, which might make the latter antagonistic towards the former’ (Gupta, 1990: 53). The sense of deprivation arises ‘when one desires something, compares him/herself with those who actually do have’ the desirable objects, and then feels that he/she ‘deserves the attainment of those objects’ (Gupta, 1990: 54). The most orthodox development of RD in relation to collective rebellion is probably found in the archetypal work of Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (1970) (cited in Gurr, 2015). Essentially, Gurr’s relative deprivation theory closely aligns with Aristotle’s position that the relative sense or feeling of inequality, rather than an absolute measure of inequality, drives political rebellion (Richardson, 2011: 5). In his recent works, Gurr has improved on the idea of relative deprivation, which he now calls ‘grievances and sense of injustice to capture the essence of the state of mind that motivates people into political action’ (Gurr, 2011). On the part of Human Needs Theory, it has also been observed that rather than absolute needs, it is the perception of inequality considered as the cause of those needs that motivate people to resort to violence (Richardson, 2011). Hence, while these interactive behavioural theories offer plausible explanation for the emergence of civil conflicts, each on its own may be too reductive to cast adequate light on the emergence and persistence of conflicts in Africa. As Hutchful and Aning (2004: 200) pertinently noted ‘mono-causal explanation of conflicts may be deceptively attractive or persuasive due to their apparent simplicity, but they are ultimately unhelpful’ given that ‘as conflicts unfold and mutates, so do the motivations and relationships underpinning them?’ This question compels the need for more nuanced thinking to underscore the diverse social economic, political and human rights impetus of civil conflicts-human security.

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Human Security vs State Security The human security (HS)-centred approach to conflict resolution conceptualizes security beyond physical and military parameters, on which the United Nations Security Council tended to focus. A human-centric focus is defined by the old philosophy of liberalism, which places people and the individuals at its epicentre as opposed to state-centric which believes in shaping the country’s foreign policy through the might of the military. Similar to Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata (authorities on human security approach), the liberal school of thought identifies three types of freedom; freedom from fear, freedom from danger and freedom from threat. Over the years, the notion of (in)security has evolved remarkably, especially in the past three decades, with significant conceptual and policy implications for scholars and policy makers alike (Baldwin, 1997). As with many other key terms in the social sciences, security, a largely subjective, complex and multidimensional concept, remains difficult to strictly define. This is more so in a complex conflict environment in sub-Saharan Africa where the challenge of defining (in)security arguably revolves around three interrelated philosophies of the mind: (1) What one considers acts of insecurity might be some else’s source of inspiration (2) Who counts depends on who defines the order of importance (3) For one to be accounted for, it depends on who accounts, how and why. In other words, who benefits? Whereas in conventional intra-conflict situation the struggle between the state and non-state actors dominates the scene, complex mixed war is saturated with networks of security forces who pay allegiance to various leaders, paramilitary groups, warlords, criminal gangs and mercenaries. Much of the intra-conflict situations in Africa, the basic point of departure is either geopolitics or ideological inclination, however, for the complex mixed wars, exclusion, ethnic identities and bigotries are key drivers sustaining civil wars and conflicts. In this type of civil war, humanitarian catastrophes are central tactics of warfare leading to internal displacement and denied access to basic human needs. It is, therefore, difficult to end complex mixed wars, because warring parties are sustained by continuing violence and humanitarian catastrophes. All these culminate into the dilemma that surrounds the concept of ‘security’. No matter how one would want to wish away the relativist perspective on different concepts, various complex factors matter in understanding the

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link between the notion ‘complex mixed war’ and the concept of ‘security’. This distinction is a necessary step in stipulating its meaning and linkages to the notion of human security. As far as Choucri (2002: 100) is concerned, ‘A state is secure to the extent that all three dimensions or conditions for security are in place; and it is insecure to the extent that one or more conditions (or dimensions) of security are threatened or eroded’, thus the question of root causes remains significant to the understanding of civil conflicts in Africa. Basically, the Root Cause (RC) correlates civil conflict activity with ‘underlying social, economic, political, and demographic conditions’ (Newman, 2006: 750). Accordingly, poverty, population explosion, social inequality and exclusion, dispossession and political grievance, as well as oppression and human rights abuse, are highlighted as the independent variables that explain why and how civil conflict occurs. Gersovitz and Kriger (2013) give an account of how economically impaired states are incapable of protecting citizens from the impacts of civil war. A similar study (Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000), reinforces this cause–effect relationship by isolating poverty, failed political institutions and economic dependence on natural resources, as the main drivers of civil war in Africa. In analysing the root cause, BjØrgo (2005: 3–4) rightly differentiated between preconditions and precipitants of various types of conflicts. The former refers to factors that set the stage for civil conflict in the long run while the latter represents the specific events or phenomenon that immediately precede or trigger the outbreak of terrorism. BjØrgo identified four levels of causation, namely [1] structural, [2] facilitators, [3] motivational and [4] triggers. The first level highlights causes that impinge on people’s lives ‘in ways that they may or may not comprehend at a rather abstract macro level’ (BjØrgo, 2005: 3). Some key variables at this level include globalization, rapid urbanization, demographic imbalances and class structure, among others. At the second level are causes characteristic of modern era, which though not primary, that sustain civil wars and conflicts. At the third level are motivational causes pertaining to the ‘actual grievances that people experience at a personal level, motivating them to act’ (BjØrgo, 2005). These are usually the tools that ideologues and political leaders capitalize on in persuading people into action. Hence, ‘motivational causes may also be seen as concentrated ‘symptoms’ of more fundamental structural causes’. Finally at the fourth level are the trigger causes which directly provoke conflict acts, including call(s) for revenge or

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even peace talks so as to undermine negotiation and discredit moderates (BjØrgo, 2005: 3–4). It is not that all factors are necessary. In line with this, and due to this chapter’s focus on human (in)security (social and economic factors), it suffices to admit factors therein that may not all be necessary or given much attention. Like other theories, the RC does not answer all the questionable scholarly appeal(s). A mushrooming literature emphasizes a weak link between sociopolitical and economic structural factors, such as poverty, lack of economic opportunity and terrorism, casting doubts on the efficacy of the root causes thesis (Gupta, 2005: 16). The implication is that since structural deprivations are merely necessary conditions, there is a weak correlation between civil conflict and other forms of political violence and poverty. Hence, as a control measure for civil conflict, the RC thesis is further criticized as infeasible given that certain factors such as media, technology inter alia, which oxygenate civil strife, cannot necessarily be addressed by way of removal. In other words, it leaves us with the pertinent question: how do we mitigate impacts of civil conflicts by removing certain root causal or precipitating variables such as the above-provided variables, which are of vital, if not imperative, status to society? To address some of these peace and security conundrums, the AU has developed both conceptual and policy frameworks for conducting regional intervention, albeit, challenges and lessons as illustrated in the Malian and AMISOM case studies. The Changing Peace and Security Landscape in Africa The nature of conflict in Africa has been complicated by the growing extremist groups that tend to wage ideological war against those perceived ‘outsiders’ to their religion of grievances. The nexus between terrorism and socio-economic variables such as inequality, poverty, social or political exclusion, and education inter alia has been shown to be rather complicated and inconclusive both from the perspective of the individual and the collective (Piazza, 2011: 340). In other words, human security is increasingly becoming critical in dealing with conflicts on the continent. If anything, there are opposing views over the relationship. On the one end of the spectrum, some empirical findings from various contexts seem to disconfirm the view that poverty causes terrorism. In this camp are studies

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based on cross-national data analysis showing that underdeveloped countries by their gloomy socio-economic standings—measured by macroeconomic indicators—are not necessarily more likely to produce terrorists than their middle- or high-income counterparts (Abadie 2006; Piazza 2006; Dreher and Gassebner 2008). In fact, according to Krueger (2007), the view that there is a link between socio-economic condition and terrorism is entirely based ‘on faith’ rather than on ‘scientific evidence’, as some empirical findings suggest that no relationship exists between poverty, education and terrorism. Hence, (Schimid & Jongman, 2005: 6– 7) maintained that ‘a range of socio-economic indicators—illiteracy, infant mortality and gross domestic product per capita–are unrelated to whether people get involved in terrorism’. This view is also supported by the fact that perpetrators of 9/11 were ‘middle-class, educated misanthropes led by a rich religious fanatic’ (Burgoon 2006, 177). The socio-economic driver of Boko Haram terrorism has been contested in favour of other factors including, but not limited to, politics, religious fundamentalism and culture (Adibe, 2012; Alozieuwa, 2012; Hashim et al. 2012). The other aspect that continues to shape the African conflict system is the military sophistication imbued by insurgency groups such as AlShabaab and Boko Haram. In eastern Africa, for example, since the incursion of the Kenya Defense Force (KDF) in Somalia in February 2012 after the United Nations Security Council passed the Resolution 2036, the militants have mutated their tactics to target civilians mainly in northern and coastal regions of the Kenya. With the rapidly emerging insecurity trend in the Horn of Africa, Sahel region, Nigeria and eastern Democratic Republic Congo (DRC), the military forces in the region are unlikely to sufficiently produce soldiers from the traditional academies to match the unimagined complex missions. The new tactics employed by the Al-Shabaab including recruiting educated youngsters, and thriving on political-economic fragility, requires comprehensive approach to both defence and internal policing. From the few militant attacks experienced since 2011, it is obvious that the principle of camouflage and ‘crawling on their belly’ tactics no longer make sense in security operations, at least not for the insurgency and terrorist groups. This means that the peacekeepers should get out of their traditional cocoons and embrace the multifaceted nature of contemporary peace operations. Regional security systems in Africa need to embrace inter-agency approach by laying down the following strategies: First, military commanders in the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centres (PKTCs) have the

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onus of developing training curriculum that endeavours ‘Critical thinking’. Inter-agency approach creates the needed synergy regional PSO. For example, while preparing for the Afghanistan battle, the US Army harnessed such a synergy among all the professions in their military including tapping from the cognitively demanding professions such as geology, agronomy, veterinary sciences, engineering and pest management. It is through this inter-agency approach that they were able to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Afghans. Secondly, although most of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) incorporates civilian personnel in their wok, military counter-insurgency (COIN) remains the only option available for the peacekeepers. One of the elements of an adequate COIN is the inclusion of multinational agencies. Developed nations with long history of insurgency such as Israel and Australia, deliberately allow civilian agencies to lead the effort. This is because while the military ensures security and stability of the country, the civilian and police will be undertaking conflict analysis aimed at addressing the root cause of the problem. For example, in northern Nigeria and north-eastern Kenya, Muslim clerics and Islamic scholars are an important asset for supporting the government’s measures against the insurgent groups. This is an opportunity that these countries shouldn’t lose. Finally, although African military formations recruit professional experts in diverse fields of specialization, due to heavy administrative duties, the force is understandably, struggling to connect the ‘soft’ power to peace operations. The colonial legacy directs that these specialized individuals are prepared for a few field-grade officers, thus leaving over 95% of the military personnel without explicit specialized training in how to reason and think in an insurgency situation. With these specialized officers over-burdened with administrative duties, the Army is neglecting the bottom-up flow of intelligence (observation, chronological thinking, understanding the earth as a complex system, spatial thinking and synthesis) required of the tactician in the modern battlefield space. There are success stories out of inter-agency approach to peace operation. For example, from 2008 to the end of the War in Afghanistan, the US Army, in conjunction with the Army National Guard, developed and employed a technique referred to as the Agricultural Development Team (ADT) to Afghanistan (Macmanus et al., 2015). This team comprised of civilian-soldier’s experts in agribusiness field. As of the end of 2014, nine states had supported the ADT mission that contributed over 680 agriculture-related projects generating $42 million in economic impacts

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for the people of Afghanistan (Minear, 2014). Changing the military’s mindset from conventional to expeditionary soldier while at the same time developing structures and systems that allows inter-agency approach to security issues is key to the African peace support operation (PSO) architecture. APSA in the Foreseeable World Order The world order is under tremendous pressure and the multilateral system that has underpinned this post-Cold War order is being undermined and fragmented. Some bemoan the alleged end of the liberal order, but this order has not always been benign for Africa and other developing countries. In this world order, the growing influence of China on matters of international peace and security is steadfast. In 2019, China begun her reign of chairing the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). At the same time South Africa, Ivory Coast and Equatorial Guinea were the three African countries elected for the two-year term non-permanent membership to the UNSC. In the current world order, the importance of the African Union and RECs in supporting political developments, among others through its Peace and Security Council cannot be overemphasized. The behaviour of the African states elected to the UNSC in relation to other external actors is equally important in determining the future of APSA. Like the USC, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol embraces an expanded and comprehensive agenda that cuts across the PSO gamut. The protocol addresses issues to conflict prevention, early warning and preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding, the encouragement and promotion of democratic practices and intervention and humanitarian action and disaster management (African Union, 2010). All these strands are covered within the five main pillars of APSA. The five pillars include Continental Early Warning System; Peace Fund; Panel of the Wise; Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs); and the African Standby Force. Through the African Standby Force, the AU and subsequently regional standby forces should develop and sustain harmonious working relationship among peacekeeping fraternity—the military, police and civilians. At the heart of the architecture is the Peace and Security Council (PSC) which was established as the standing decision-making organ to be supported by the Military Staff Committee and the New Partnership

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for African Development. There are also structures in place to support the functioning of the AU PSC including the Common African Defence and Security Policy. Although the function of the Common African Defense and Security Policy is to propel interdependence and synergy between different actors including the civilian and police, trends emanating from the AU Commission indicate that the Committee is dominated by military generals with minimum or no civilian and police representation. Similarly, the Joint Chief of Staff within the ASF structure is a military brigadier general, yet the office decides on key policy and operational areas that concerns all components including civilians and police. Strategic disconnections were also observed at the AU level in which a parallel process of setting functioning systems in the RECs/RMs may jeopardize coherence of processes. For the system to function effectively, it requires interaction and synergy among the pillars. It comes out clearly from the given mandates that there is an expectation for a synergistic linkage between the various actors in peace support operation. Understanding the level of coordination between and among the various APSA components is a logical starting point in mapping out the behaviour of ASF, as a political institution. This has implications on capacity of the regional standby forces to intervene in conflict situations (African Union, 2006). The core argument for readers is that the murky relationship between the military and civilian personnel designated for peace support operation within the African Standby Forces has a corrosive implication on the capacities for rapid multidimensional deployment in crisis or conflict situations. Institutional functioning of the ASF structures is crucial in understanding the strategic coordination challenges AU is facing. Institutional coordination is examinable from two perspectives, horizontal and vertical. Vertical coordination refers to the relationship between the AU, RECs and RMs, while horizontal coordination refers to the REC/RM-to-REC/RM interface and that between the various APSA components (African Union, 2010). APSA in its perpetual iteration focuses more on physical security with purely military operation thinking and actions. For example, while the ASF is envisaged as an instrument for peace operations, the emerging security challenges such as terrorism, piracy and improving the governance of security forces in several member states fall outside the remit of the ASF. In other words, the ASF is confronted by a conceptual challenge, which needs to be dealt with if it is to be an effective tool for enhancing civil–military relations for a multidimensional peace operation. Given that

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the various APSA components are developing at a different pace, the level of horizontal coordination has been limited. For instance, the interlocking system that is envisaged whereby the decisions of the PSC benefit from information and analysis from other components such as the early warning systems at the AUC and the RECs has been limited. Although this is partly because APSA is still undergoing the operationalization process, the disjointment problem cascades down to the subregional standby forces. Previous studies have shown that although EASF and the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) have working Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) stipulating standards and guidelines on training quality, each one of these institutions organizes training without a coordinated effort (Onditi, 2015). This anomaly has been found to compromise quality of training and there are no efforts to ensure match between the emerging conflict threats and skill set required to address such security concerns. Comparatively, ECOWAS region was found to enforce commitments to coordinated PSO training between the Commission and peacekeeping training centres, however, lack of direct oversight from the Commission has been attributed to the overlap of functions and duplication of initiatives among PSO actors in the ECOWAS region. This has direct implications on coordination of troops and civilian personnel trained when and whence required for deployment. At another level, the REC/RM interface has been equally limited. This creates a big gap given the overlapping membership in some RECs/RMs and the practical and political implications of such a dynamic. In the EASF region, for instance, member states that belong to more than one REC are faced with resource—human and material constraints in meeting their commitments to the various entities. For example, Tanzania’s dual membership and her tendency in giving preference to SADC definitely limits the capacity of EASF to attain the required human capacities for deployment. On the other hand, although the West African membership to ECOWAS has remained solid, the alignment of Chad and Mauritania to Sahel complicates the West African subregional collective security regime and political processes. Politically, such members tend to put more emphasis on RECs that are more in tandem with their national interests as opposed to geographical proximity, a good example is Tanzania, readers will remember in 2014 Tanzania joined other SADC countries to launch an assault against the M23 militant in eastern DRC. In spite of the spillover effects, emanating from the activities of Al-Shabaab and the

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piracy threats across the shared Indian Ocean, Tanzania has been resolute in joining other EAC members in boosting the troops in Somalia. Despite these challenges, there are some coordination initiatives between the REC/RM and REC/RM on peace and security. For instance, relation between COMESA, EAC and IGAD in the area of peace and security include a Joint Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution (CPMR) programme for East Africa with EAC on Small Arms and Light Weapons and with IGAD on pastoralist conflicts and crossborder issues. The three RECs have jointly developed a programme entitled Regional Political Integration (RPI) and Human Security Support Program (HSSP), on democracy, governance and human security that will be jointly implemented by EAC, COMESA and IGAD. With respect to security challenges posed by piracy off the coast of Somalia, COMESA, EAC and IGAD have jointly developed an action plan against piracy. Moreover, COMESA hosts the Inter-Regional Coordinating Committee (IRCC), which coordinates the various RECs in eastern Africa on EU funding. Efforts are also underway to establish a tripartite coordination mechanism involving COMESA, EAC and SADC. Although the envisaged framework would help to deal with coordination issues in a region that stretches from North through East to southern Africa, the processes and structures being developed are highly donor-driven with short-term goals focusing on finances. The donor dependency syndrome raises pertinent questions of sustainability and ownership of the AU processes, particularly in West and eastern Africa where UN peacekeeping strategy has takeover missions from the African-led initiatives in Mali and Somalia, respectively. Furthermore, Article 12 of the Protocol of the AU Constitutive Act provides for early warning information provided to the Chairperson through the Continental Early Warning System. This is meant to provide the PSC with an opportunity of taking the required action after due consideration of the issues. The Panel of the Wise could be deployed to support efforts of the Peace and Security Council (Article 11). In situations of grave magnitude as envisaged in Articles 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act could trigger some form of intervention. Hence, the ASF was established to deal with such an eventuality (Article 13). Therefore, the rapid deployment capability becomes a critical milestone in the operationalization and strengthening of the APSA.

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Formation of the African Standby Force African Standby Force is one of the pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The AU Constitutive Act of 2002 mandates these structures to develop multidimensional capacities for conflict prevention, management and resolution in their respective subregions. It is, however, important to note that, while some of the ASF structures such as the EASF and ECOWAS have put in place functional military, police and civilian components, recent studies reveal lack of an effective civil–military coordination structures, leading to tensions among peacekeepers (Franke and Esmenjaud 2008). The irony is that, despite the increasing tensions emanating from professional interaction between the military and civilians in peacekeeping missions, pioneers of this idea only hope they could persuade Generals not to create a parallel sphere of influence over the regional mechanism (RMs). Instead, they should cooperate with civilians and police in creating a solid regional security order, namely the African Standby Force based on trust, principles of multidimensionality and beneficial to all involved, not least the military. To understand these dynamics, one has to revisit the question of civil–military relations and its linkages within the regional collective security systems, such as the ASF. The renewed framing of peace operations within the realm of civil– military relations is timely, particularly when viewed from dynamism of the Post-Cold War era. The rise of internal conflicts and asymmetric nature of warfare has seen peacekeeping space tilt towards multidimensional peace operation. Put it differently, there is increased joint operation involving the traditional military as well as civilians and police. Peacekeeping missions or regional bodies that have not yet embraced multidimensional engagement are being compelled by unprecedented war circumstances to involve other actors, other than the military. According to security studies scholars, this trend has been bolstered by the reprisal of asymmetrical conflicts leading to civilian casualties in most parts of the world including Africa (Bellamy and Williams 2010). Although scholars had predicted the necessity for multidimensional approach to security in Africa more than two decades ago (cited in Onditi & Okoth, 2017), unprecedented change of fighting tactics by groups such as the AlShabaab and Boko Haram have targeted civilians and civilian facilities, yet no proportional approach exists to handle such unconventional conflicts on the continent.

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This unprecedented war manoeuvres have out rightly challenged the traditional military operation. Because of this state of affair, peace and security actors are embracing joint planning and operations, thus increasing civil–military interaction. Although there are fewer examples in Africa on civil–military interaction during peace operations, the practical and normative differences among peacekeepers could pose threats to implementation of peace missions. Similarly, increased civil–military interaction within the rubric of multidimensional peace operation could raise the incidences of power relations and behavioural retreat among peacekeepers. This has the potential of eroding potent for multidimensional human capacities required for peace operations. In anticipation of these challenges, the African Union’s (AU) peace and security architecture continues to build the ASF for coordinating multidimensional capacities across the continent. Indeed, both the AU and the United Nations (UN) agree that the development of multidimensional peace operation capacities is central to the protection of civilians who have become the greatest targets during asymmetric wars and conflicts. While this occurrence presents opportunities for the ASF structures to exercise integrated approach to peace interventions, fractured civil–military coordination or absence of it has led to loss of lives and properties. For this reason, multidimensional approach to peace operation closely fits within the existing African regional arrangements. African Union Peace Operation Architecture In respect to the deployment of multidimensional forces, there is consensus among military and humanitarian actors that the success of modern peace intervention is highly dependent on the close relations between the military, police and civilians (Mockaitis 2004). The contribution of this study in part is towards providing insights into how Africanled peace operation missions could be designed and developed better in order to minimize loss of lives and property because of conflicts. The importance of the civil–military cooperation has already been demonstrated in Somalia and Bosnia. The renewed operation in Somalia, beginning in 2012 and the Bosnia’s 1990s operation by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) attest to this need. Although these missions were daunted with some marks of failures, the effectiveness of the protection of civilian mandate was largely attributed to close collaboration between the military and civilian through the concept of ‘winning hearts and

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minds’. For example, the humanitarian workers and development agencies often produced the intelligence necessary to find terrorists. The success of civil–military relationship has been attributed to structured civil–military coordination. Despite the fact that civilians and militaries are increasingly compelled to operate in the same environment, there is limited analysis in existing literature of how their relationship functions in a multidimensional environment. In particular, there is little analysis of how the relationship has been developed within the ambit of the regional standby forces and how this outcome affects the development of the capacity for future regional peace operations. Rather, debates about civil–military coordination tend to focus on narrow humanitarian activities with less analysis and debate on how the relationship might shape the realization of required capacity for peace operation. Multidimensional peace operations are becoming common in both AU and UN peace missions. This type of peace operation has gained popularity because it involves military, police and civilian components working together to lay the foundations for sustainable peace. In addition, multidimensional peace operations go beyond ceasefire agreements and military observation to encompass a strong civilian component for political dialoguing, negotiation and diplomatic settlement of intrastate conflicts. In spite of these positive traits, this type of peace operation poses challenges to the success of peace missions. The normative and structural differences among the diverse actors have led to sour interpersonal relations and even competition between civilian and military entities. One wonders whether the military and civilians are professional colleagues or antagonists. In a multidimensional environment, civil–military tensions arise from normative and practical discrepancies between civilians and the military expectations. For instance, the military’s ‘winning hearts and minds’ approach in operation can easily result in a confusion of roles of civilian agencies and military forces both at the planning stage as well as in the field (Studer 2001). Within a normal range, tension is inevitable in peace missions. Violent conflict may threaten peace missions. In some African-based peace missions such as in Sierra Leone and Liberia, military personnel referred to the civilian agencies as a world of fractured individuals ‘full of weird and wonderful people’. The civilian actors on the other hand viewed the military sector as marked by a variety of traditions and rigidity, sometimes creating debilitating environment in mission areas, characterized by emotional coldness and frequent outburst of anger and

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conflict. Unresolved civil–military conflict may indicate lack of an effective civil–military coordination mechanism, or acts of organized hypocrisy, which eventually leads to failure of peace missions. Multidimensional peace operations are also a large potential contributor to not only the volume of peacekeepers, but also the diversity of expertise required in modern conflict environment. However, capacity issues in Africa’s peace operation platform have remained unresolved. An attempt by ECOWAS in 2012 to lead a multidimensional intervention in Mali was halted and suddenly taken over by the UN, issues of civil–military tensions cited. The situation for AMISOM is worse. For example, in 2010, the Force managed to deploy only fifty civilians and police. When compared to the European Union (EU) and UN’s deployment of 2,000 and 22,000 civilians, respectively (Koops and Tercovich 2016). This points to a lukewarm multidimensional platform. Efforts by the AU and regional standby forces to increase capacities through development of parallel structures such as the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), only leave the PSO environment exposed to more militarization. The question we have to ask is how civil–military tensions impact the ability of the African Standby Force to develop full capability to respond to the complex peace and security challenges. The subject of civil–military relations, especially as it relates to regional/international peace and security can be a complex area of study. There is controversy as to where the responsibility to keep peace lies: the United Nations or regional bodies? Aspirations by Pan-Africanists on important debates such as self-reliance and ‘try Africa first’ are diminishing due to several political, logistical and conceptual limitations. The Basic Principles of Dominatarian Thought Dominance traits are known to hutch ‘power hierarchy system’. Dominance, however, comes with costs of oppression and resentment by the so-called lower ranking members of the community. As a form of political manoeuvre, political elites or bureaucrats apply dominance to gain expediency. This power structure rewards responsive agencies or punishes recalcitrant ones (Abbot, 2007). In some cases, a country may dominate trade without the ability to lead. However, this form of domination remains a major source of economic conflicts and trade wars. A case in point is China’s controversial role in the international trade relations (De Vault, 2002). This behaviour is replicated in most of the RECs. In

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East African Community, the recurrent interstate tensions between Kenya and Tanzania continues to blight possibilities of achieving comprehensive regional integration outfit (IMF, 2016). Kenya, in particular, has been accused of taking the role of ‘great power’ in the region (Busse & Shams, 2003). Although the dominance ‘superpowerism’ could function to caution other ‘weak states’ in the trading bloc, for decades, this has ended up creating ‘trade wars’ and sluggish integration. Despite the efforts to harmonize foreign and security policies, lack of a coherent strategy to manage the structural and institutional imbalances remains unresolved. This leads to perception of some trading partners being too protectionist, while others being perceived too domineering. In fact, the intergroup tensions more often exert pressure on the Partner States to use the ‘unilateral exemptions’ to scuttle any form of trading solutions. One particular partner takes such unilateral and perhaps irrational decisions for fear of dominance. It is therefore imperative to frame discourse on the regional integration from a social-behavioural lens. Dominance, as a concept dominates literature in the Natural Sciences (Charlesworth, 1979), especially concerning its role in shaping the ‘survival’ of species or human population dynamics. Notwithstanding this, social scientists too, have attempted to theorize its application to intergroup relations, prejudice and discrimination (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). On one hand, it is plausible to argue that dominance, as a human behaviour is responsible for entrenching individuals with ‘powerful’ traits. On the other hand, ‘recessive’ or ‘weak’ individuals are reduced to less useful members of the ecosystem. High dominance feeling involves good self-confidence, assurance, high evaluation of self, feelings of general capability or superiority and lack of timidity (Maslow 1939). Indeed, attributes of the social dominance orientation (SDO) theory can be used to predict future intergroup attitude and political behaviour (Ho et al 2012). This theory, therefore, can provide insight for understanding how each state responds to dominant traits. In considering the complexes related to regional integration, it is usual to hear frustrations emerging from the regional secretariats boardroom meetings or regional border points: ‘Kenya is too aggressive for us’ or ‘Tanzania with its trade barriers is not going anywhere…’ or ‘is Burundi a member of the EAC ?’ or ‘why did Uganda decide to redirect their oil pipeline project to Dar es Salaam away from Mombasa?’

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A cultural perspective of dominance presents an interesting relationship in the global system. It explains why powerful countries such as the USA and China are able to dominate the global markets. Why? This is simply because of the ability of these countries to evolve a distinct trading culture. Once a culture is established, what follows is how Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTA) could help to create global welfare and not domination (Anchan, 2012). However, it is still possible that the greatest beneficiary of a welfare culture is considered a ‘dominant actor’. It should be remembered that the PTA negotiating environment strongly favours powerful economic actors like the USA and the European Union. It is natural that dominating trading partners will cascade to become dictators in the international trading relations. This, eventually, creates an asymmetric relationship compelling the Less Developed Economies (LDCs) to bear the title, ‘recessive’. This raises more of moral philosophical questions than it does economics. Serrano et al. in their efforts to understand the international trading networks conclude that the global trading system is yet to achieve ‘real’ trade interdependence (Serrano et al., 2007). The psychological models explaining dominance argues that competition, a product of dominance is sustained by: (a) personality dynamics; (b) individual basic values—anxieties and beliefs; and (c) individual information processing (Otto & Richter, 2018). Yet, others argue that authoritarianism behaviour commonly associated with dominance can post higher organizational productivity (Smither 1993). Both the positive and negative outcomes of dominance as human behaviour fits well in this chapter’s postulation of tensions emerging from the EAC regional integration. Moreover, the revolutionary work of Sigmund Freud (The Library of Congress 1939) on human behaviour is critical in understanding why for instance, regional economic/political or security arrangements such as the EAC do not find it necessary to make rational decisions. Does this reflect the institutional preferences or the individuals’ attitude towards each other? Should there be mechanisms for ensuring that the decisions made in such entities are entirely guided by rational logic and reason? How possible is it to detach political feelings of political elites from the professional mandate of regional organizations? Studies show that in any social or economic ecosystem, domination is perpetuated through social relationships, ethnic cleavages, racial discrimination and national stereotyping (Thompson, 2013). Frank Lovetta (2009) refers to this phenomenon as ‘social power’. All these are manifestations of basic features of groups’ motivation, rather than as a rationally

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held economic or political ideology. Sociologists are in agreement with the view that people or systems that are prejudiced against certain ethnic groups tend to be prejudiced against other nationalities (Loftus, 2008). Similarly, in political arrangements such as the EAC, authoritarian tendencies with conservative views are most likely to construct asymmetric power game leading to domination by one state. In an effort to understand how global trade networks interact, Hanns Hilpert offers a typology of a dominant state (Hilpert 2014). A typical example in the twenty-first century is China’s domination in international trade as the USA did in the 1970s. The positive aspect of this classification comes out strongly when Hilpert caution that although China’s domination in the world trade and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has led to economic tensions and trade wars, these fears are unfounded because the country portrays features of an established actor in the world trade system. This implies that, while the original dominance thinking among social scientists posited a direct linkage between social group formation and evolution of inequalities, evolution of the concept continues to draw relevance in the field of International Relations, particularly in its application to regional economic and political integration. The same concept of dominance is used to explain the evolution of institutions. As a form of dominance, states may decide to legitimize ‘myths’—cultural mores and ideologies being formalized to guide decisions and policy direction (Grossman & Helpman, 1995). Myths legitimization may take various forms: (a) national security, (b) national trade interest and (c) national liberation. The challenge with economic domination is that the other member of a group considered ‘weak’ or less beneficial is usually excluded through stereotype imaging and eventually labelled as ‘a less member’. Such forms of imaging can give rise to negative taste, justifying wars or political jittery. If such imaging relates to economic integration, it might lead to trade wars through the ‘domino effect’. Imaging, at times, can lead to promotion of universal rights. In the regional integration framework, the equal treatment of members may pave way for reduced disparities, increased access to resources, power and legitimacy. Islam Gazi observes that individuals high in social dominance orientation (SDO) are more likely to support social policies promoting the social structures of groups (Gazi 2014). It further claims that such personalities or institutions are linked to lowered tendency to cooperation and increased social distance. Although SDO is predominantly associated with

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psychologists, institutional aspect of the theory opens the door for the current article to examine dynamics of regional integration from a crossdisciplinary lens. As such, concepts such as ‘hegemony’, ‘isolation’ and ‘ideology’ transcends disciplines—Political Science, Sociology and International Relations. In part, this work intends to contribute to the field of International Relations/Studies by framing regional integration processes and outcome within the framework of social dominance. By doing so, we are able to construct an alternative framework for guiding regional integration based on the three Darwinian principles of natural science (1) survival of the fittest, (2) genetic hereditary and (3) likes and dislikes, and how they could be utilized to explain the behaviour of states within the regional security community arrangement. Methodological Considerations The principal source of information and data for this work was the regional, subregional and national institutions, including African Union, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Regional Mechanisms (RMs) and the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centres (PKTCs) across the continent. From these documents one gains both an understanding of the evolving APSA and the prism through which peacekeepers perceived each other. Other primary sources of information and data are the training and planning hubs across the five RECs. It was not possible to exhaust all the RECs and associated structures. Therefore, primary data was obtained from the Nairobi-based International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), the Rwanda Peace Academy (RPA) and the Ethiopian International Peace Keeping Training Centre (EPKTC). The Planning Element/Secretariat of the EASF in Nairobi and the Brigade in Addis Ababa were key to this process. In ECOWAS subregion, the Nigerian National Defence (NDC) and the Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAPKTC) allowed access to their capacity development records. These reports built up on key informants, knowledge attitude and practice (KAP) as well as content analysis added an important perspective to this work. Regional Seminars with the RECs organized by development partners and national governments provided us an opportunity to interact with peacekeepers at various levels. We had an extensive discussion with various experts and officials both at the AU Commission and in the RECs/RMs. The set of interviews added an important material on the strategic and operational dimension of

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the PKTC–RECs/RMs relationship. The generic questions were supplemented by specific questions on the various components of APSA which were tailored to suit the specificity of the REC/RM concerned. The records and actual interaction with peacekeepers, leaders of PKTCs and generals managing the AU peace support operation made it possible for us to obtain a more richly detailed, if not complete, understanding of ASF within the broader framework of APSA during the period 2003– 2015, and indeed, the ten years periodization explored in this book. Documents, seminars and interviews with actors at various levels—tactical, operational and strategic, demonstrate that the initial intention for the establishment of ASF were very candid, and no milestone was spared in the design of the ASF towards realizing a full operational capability. The ASF, was, however, fractured along the way, and files from the two leading RM-EASF and ECOWAS, many of which shed insight on the activities of other PSO activities, provided a detailed picture of meetings, seminars and policy decisions on the future of ASF. Multidimensional peace operations are becoming common in both AU and UN peace missions. This type of peace operation has gained popularity because it involves military, police and civilian components working together to lay the foundations for sustainable peace. In addition, multidimensional peace operations go beyond ceasefire agreements and military observation to encompass a strong civilian component for political dialoguing, negotiation and diplomatic settlement of intrastate conflicts. African Union has experimented the multidimensional peace operation in different parts of the continent. The AFISMA (African-led International Support Mission to Mali) and AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) are two examples in the recent years. However, in spite of these progressive accounts, this type of peace operation poses challenges to the success of peace missions. The doctrinal differences among peacekeepers have led to sour interpersonal relations and even competition between civilian and military entities. One wonders whether the military and civilians are professional colleagues or antagonists. Within a normal range, tension is inevitable, but intense conflict among actors causes insults against each other leading to the collapse of the peace mission. In some African-based peace missions such as in Sierra Leone and Liberia military personnel referred to the civilian agencies as a world of fractured individuals ‘full of weird and wonderful people’. The civilian actors on the other hand viewed the military sector as marked by a variety of traditions and rigidity, sometimes creating debilitating environment in mission areas,

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characterized by emotional coldness and frequent outburst of anger and conflict. Unresolved civil–military conflict may indicate lack of an effective civil–military coordination mechanism, leading to failure of peace mission to deliver on its mandate. Despite the weaknesses associated with multidimensional approach, there has been growing involvement of civilians. As earlier alluded to the AFISMA and AMISOM are examples of peace operation with dual mandate of the military (to act as a fighting force and to contribute to humanitarian relief efforts). Multidimensional peace operations are also a large potential contributor to not only the volume of peacekeepers, but also the diversity of expertise required in modern conflict environment. However, capacity issues in Africa’s peace operation platform have remained unresolved. An attempt by ECOWAS in 2012 to lead a multidimensional intervention in Mali was halted and suddenly taken over by the UN, issues of civil–military tensions cited. The situation for AMISOM is no better, for example, in 2010, the force managed to deploy only fifty (50) civilians and police. When compared to the European Union (EU) and UN’s deployment of 2000 and 22,000 civilians, respectively (Stock & Varwick, 2012), it points to a lukewarm PSO. Efforts by the AU and regional standby forces to increase capacities through development of parallel structures such as the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), only leaves the PSO environment exposed to more militarization. We also utilized systems theory approach to conduct content analysis of records (Mayring 2000) of training outputs, trends and policies set by the African Union to guide evolution of the regional Peacekeeping Training Centres. In order to gain in-depth understanding of the PSO ecosystem, the International Peacekeeping Training Centre (IPSTC) and the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RTPC) were analysed as case studies. The analysis was based on the training trend within IPSTC (2001–2015) and RTPC (2007–2015). Within this period, the IPSTC had trained a total of 22,452 participants, with majority drawn from the Eastern African Standby Force (76%). The rest were drawn from Africa (11%) and globally (13%). Comparatively, RTPC had trained a total of 1480, mainly from the southern African subregion. In applying the content analysis of the PSO training output within the PSO ecosystem, we further demonstrate how the evolution of APSA structures were influenced by various actors through planning and learning within the broader PSO environment.

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Synoptic View of the Current and Future Security Communities in Africa The development of an alternative framework for regional security community, anchored on systems thinking is backgrounded on the need to resolve the uncertainty being experienced by the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), where habitually, as new peace and security threats arise, the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs)/Regional Mechanisms (RMs), typically designs new mechanisms aimed at providing ad hoc response to such challenges. A case in point is the establishment of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) in 2013. Although the mechanism is potentially a solution to the much-needed rapid deployment capability (RDC), the question of how to integrate the ACIRC into the existing AU security structures remains unaddressed. The creation of ACIRC has affected political balance of the current region-based system with the ASF (African Standby Force) at the centre. As such, several challenges arise from this cyclical approach to the development of response mechanisms. Firstly, this approach usually addresses only limited aspects of the threat, for instance, the military intervention tends to neglect the multifaceted nature of the predominantly intrastate African conflict, hence, failing to incorporate the human security dimensions needed to address the unconventional peace and security threats. Secondly, in most cases, a diplomatic spat arises from the overlapping mandates of actors who scramble to engage in the given situation. The central research question is, therefore, what is an effective framework for institutional coordination in responding to the emerging peace and security threats in Africa? How viable is the ‘systems thinking’ approach? Systems thinking (ST) is an innovative approach encapsulated in Richard Mattessich’s (1982) concept of systemic wholeness, which opts to look at an interconnected complex as a whole rather than a mere sum of its parts. With ST at the centre of the RSC arrangement, collective approach should be conceivable to foster effective consultation among the myriad of actors that often characterize the African RSC. Consequently, the ST should be able to promote structural response rather than being reactive and only acting as a stopgap tool based on a short-term coalition of a few countries. Integrating ST in the APSA structure has the potential of transforming the above architecture into a whole part: One that will allow multiple

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opportunities for community members (RECs) and member states to develop systems thinking capacities through joint training activities, field exercises and other collective practices aimed at enhancing regional interoperability. Rather than viewing APSA and RECs as separate entities in the community, the RSC will be conceived as a system. The RSC system will be anchored on Kim’s (2002) systems thinking five building blocks: (1) theory of success; (2) creative tension model; (3) hierarchy of choices; (4) levels of perspective; and (5) ladder of inferences (Stroh 2015). We shall then examine the system from multiple perspectives, and use a broad array of tools to design high leverage interventions for achieving transformative peace and security on the continent. The proposed systems thinking approach to RSC begins by clearly articulating desired scheme of things—processes, connection between parts and the outcome. Chapter 1 begins by providing the main tenets of the Deutschian notion of ‘security communities’ and its application to the African peace and security architecture. It specifically evaluates the Deutschian security community theory which claims that: ‘those states/societies that dwell in a security community had created not simply a stable order but, in fact, a stable peace’. Unlike other regions that have been experiencing relative economic and political stability, large parts of the African continent remain starkly under conditions of intrastate conflicts and different forms of insecurities, including, economic, political, personal and human security deficits. This notwithstanding, the subject of what constitutes security and more specifically the African model of the regional collective security is yet to be appreciated and grasped among students, scholars and policy makers. The next chapter utilizes the regional security complex (RSC) theory, as espoused by Barry Buzan (1991), to explain the context of RSC in the global and regional context. The chapter also evaluates the African RSC arrangement against the Deutschian criteria for the development of RSC. Experiences of other RSC from both the global north and south are reflected upon to unveil global trends, lessons and best practices for a reconfiguration of the RSC anchored on systems thinking. Chapter 3 puts forward an argument, ‘regional security community arrangement in Africa is intricate and that much of the challenges emanates from the overlaps of mandate and duplication of functions’. It contends that addressing this structural challenge would require the African Peace and Security Architecture reconfigured to operate beyond the conventional ‘quick fix’ responses that marked the former Organization of African Unity and now its successor, the African Union. The

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chapter contends that systems thinking would require the major regional actors to think and act in unison in a manifestation of an evolving security community that exhibits what Adler and Barnett (1998) coined as the ‘we-feeling’ and Deutsch (1957) termed as the ‘sense of community’, akin to the regional economic communities (RECs) that were established as institutional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution across the continent. In recognizing the importance of the context to the study of regional security, and application of systems thinking to its operationalization process, the introduction also reflects upon the formation and the journey of the African regional economic communities (RECs). We put forward an argument, ‘beyond pan-Africanism’, which appeared in its African form during the independence struggles of the 1960s, the ambiguity of Africa as a region, or an ‘imagined community’ is the starting point for an analysis of what constitutes the present RSC arrangement. In this analysis we enable readers to understand the normative and geopolitical contradictions surrounding the concept of ‘African region’, thus paving way for elucidating the need for a seamless linkage between the African Union policy organs and RECs, through what this volume coins, ‘Holistic’ approach. Chapter 4 unpacks the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)—structure, processes and experiences. In efforts to unlock the coordination discordance between AU and RECs/RMs, the principle of subsidiarity is central to the operationalization of APSA. The principle is grounded in the idea that sustainable peace is best achieved when conflict resolution mechanisms are driven by those actors who are geopolitically, culturally and logistically closer to the crises. Despite the existence of a regional security community arrangement, it is not always clear how the principle should address conflicts of interest between competing regional organizations and states? Chapter 5 deciphers why it was crucial for the African Union in collaboration with RECs/RMs to operationalize the African Standby Force (ASF) in each of the five RECs within the framework of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). It is argued that ASF, when viewed from a holistic point of view, offers a ‘window of opportunity’ for building an institutional capability towards realization of the African-centred solution (AfSol). As such, ASF structures are part of APSA, thus it is expected to address the complex African conflicts characterized by violent extremism, radicalization, transborder conflict diffusion and regionalization of otherwise national crises. Chapter 6 takes a pan-African perspective to the evolution of the African Peace Support

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Operations (PSOs) by making reference to the initial inspirations of founding fathers of the African continent—Kwame Nkrumah, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, Jomo Kenyatta and Kamudzu Banda, among others. It is observed that, despite this nostalgic memory of the founders of the African continent, experiences of African-led PSOs reveal stark outcome in countries where this model has been deployed—Chad, Burundi, Sudan and Somalia. Chapter 7 utilizes the principles of systems thinking model to propose a reconfiguration of the African RSC framework. Chapter 7 begins by introducing the principles of ST and its application to institutional bricolage. It goes further to identify and develop five elements of ST into various chapters: (a) partnership (Chapter 8); (b) Actors’ relationship (Chapter 9); (c) Dialogue (Chapter 10); (d) maritime security cooperation (Chapter 11); and (e) Personness and dominatarianism (Chapter 12). Chapter 7 observes that since the rebirth of the African Union (AU) in 2002, the APSA has been considered as an epitome of institutional design. In spite of this approval, the African-led peace operation capacities remain below the universal threshold of 1 peacekeeper to 200 civilians. Moreover, there exists no functional mechanism to link generated capacities and regional peace and security needs. This chapter poses fundamental questions that need to be addressed in order to improve the functional status of the RSC in general and specifically the APSA. Is the capacity gap in the APSA attributed to configuration/design of PSO architecture? In our attempt to address this question, we configure the PSO system design undergirded by four principles: (1) fit for purpose; (2) people and systems; (3) systems behaviour and environment; and (4) relationship between AU oversight, RECs/RMs and other auxiliary structures. This paradigmatic reconfiguration is linked to specific organizational experiences such as stakeholder partnerships and processes such as training within the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centres. And as such Chapter 8, identifies a number of technical and political challenges facing the African Union’s journey towards a regional collective security. On the technical side, these include the failure of the multinational endeavour to develop/or operationalize the common doctrine, system, tactics, techniques and procedures and lack of an intermediary command and control structure between AU’s Peace and Security Department and ASF brigades. Politically, there has been lack of well-coordinated activities

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of the RECs. In all these, systems thinking thus comes in handy especially when implementing a regional PSO strategy. However, the effectiveness of the regional PSO strategy depends on the relationship among the various actors operating in the PSO environment. Thus, Chapter 9, documents experiences from the field on how the African-led PSOs are planned and executed on the continent. The chapter argues that the multi-actor approach to deployment in PSO does not always correspond directly with each other’s doctrine. The chapter goes further to develop a systems-based model for analysing PSO actors in an environment proliferated with local, regional and international stakeholders. The model is dubbed, ‘Rim-Center Actors Analytic Framework’ (RICAAF ). Still on the question of systems thinking, Chapter 10 examines the century-old buildup of security concepts, looking teleologically towards achieving Mattessichian’s concept of wholeness. This chapter reflects upon two systems in the course of history. The first (and oldest) system of collective security had emerged initially under the League of Nations (Lord McNair 1936). Hampered as it were by the onslaught of thinkers such as Carl Schmitt and Carl Bilfinger during the interwar period, this system only fully came to the fore after WWII, as enshrined in the UN Charter. The second system of human security (Ogata 1999), emerged during the 1990s, following the atrocities in Rwanda and Srebrenica. Culminating in the highly contentious principle of R2P, recent events such as the forceful toppling of the Gaddafi regime under R2P’s pretext (UNSC Resolution 1973). The chapter develops the third system of security, namely, legal security. It is argued that Africa presents an ideal ground for testing the three systems because of its security challenges. It portends synergizing synchronically the three concepts of security which were born diachronically in different eras. This chapter aims to begin the thinking of merging t hese three systems of security into a Mattessichian conceptual whole of a ‘system of systems’. The ‘wholeness’ of the system can also be applied at a macro level, leading to strategic cooperation. Chapter 11 mirrors the wholeness of the system through the regional maritime security cooperation arrangement—Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and in doing so to shed light on the current state of regional collective security in Africa. Finally, Chapter 12 proffers a theoretical framework for the study of regional integration, that would address the limitations of classical regional integration theories. The foundation of the dominatarian framework is in Onditi’s (2021) dominatarian theory that is anchored on the Darwinian’s three fundamental principles of natural selection—survival

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of the fittest, genetic hereditary and likes and dislikes. In this chapter, we argue that, given the communitarian and human affection nature of African societies, the human factor cannot be wished away in the RSC arrangement, hence, the study of regional security arrangement should be, in part, informed of the human psychological and cultural factors. The conclusion provides our final prognosis by pondering whether the AU will ever attain a ‘regional security community’ status. We conclude that it would be prima facie, because the so-called ‘RSC’ remains a ‘hollow’ dream and could be summarized as utopic, unless systems thinking principles are meticulously integrated into the arrangement.

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Contents

1

1

Regional Security Community Theory

2

Approaches to Regional Security Analysis

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Regional Security Community Arrangement in Africa

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4

African Peace and Security Architecture: Fit for Purpose?

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5

Evolution of the African Standby Force

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African Union-Led Peace Support Operations

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From Security Communities to Security Systems

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8

Partnership in Peace Support Operations

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Building Actors’ Relationship Through Concentric Rims

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A Synchronic Dialogue and the Emerging Concept of Legal Security in Africa

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How to Build Maritime Human Security Systems

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Dominatarianism and Security Community Systems

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Conclusion

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Index

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About the Authors

Francis Onditi heads the School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Riara University, Kenya. Dr. Onditi is also enlisted as a distinguished author/research professor at the Institute of Intelligent Systems, University of Johannesburg, South Africa. He is the 2019 recipient of the AISA Fellowship awarded by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), South Africa, for his tenacious research and scholarly work on ‘positioning African States in the Dynamic Global System’. Dr. Onditi is a widely published pan-African researcher specializing in the geography of African conflict and institutional evolutionary theory. He has published over 60 research papers in peer-reviewed journals, contributed more than 15 chapters in edited books and authored/co-edited 3 books. Gilad Ben-Nun is a Senior Lecturer at Leipzig University’s Research Centre Global Dynamics. He is also a senior scholar at the Leibniz Institute GWZO, where he teaches Global Studies and the History of International Law. A former EU Marie Curie Individual Fellow at Verona University’s law faculty, and a former Ford Foundation Fellow at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, he currently leads Leipzig University’s engagement in the EU-funded PREVEX Consortium studying comparatively Islamic Extremism in the Balkans and North Africa. In 2020, he was awarded the visiting professorship for Israel

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Studies at Ludwig Maximilian University in Munich, in association with the American University in Washington DC. General Robert Kariuki Kibochi is the Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces. General Kibochi was enlisted into the Kenya Defence Forces on 18 May 1979, underwent Officer Cadets Training until 30 March 1980 and was commissioned in the rank of Second Lieutenant and posted to Signals Battalion. He has held various command and staff appointments including his immediate former appointment as Commander of the Kenya Army. General Kibochi has earned a Master’s Degree of Arts in International Studies, Master’s Degree in Computer Based Information Systems, Bachelor’s of Technology in Communication and Electronics Engineering, and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. degree in Peace and Conflict Management. His other professional training includes National Security Studies at the National Defence College (Kenya). Army Command and Staff Course (UK), Overseas Telecoms Engineering Course (UK), Signal Officers Degree Telecommunications Engineering Course (India), Sub Unit Commanders Course, Platoon Commanders Course and Regimental Signal Officers Course, among other training courses. He served with the United Nations as Commander of Kenyan Contingent in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) from 2000–2001; while his decorations include Moran of the Order of the Golden Heart (MGH) and Chief of the Order of the Burning Spear (CBS), among others. Israel Nyaburi Nyadera is a Teaching Assistant at the Department of Government and Public Administration, University of Macau. He is also a doctoral candidate at the Department of Political Science, Ankara Yildirim Beyazit University. He holds an M.Sc., International Relations from Middle East Technical University, and a B.A. Political Science from the University of Nairobi. He has been a visiting researcher at the University of Milan and a Kautilya Fellow with the Indian Foundation. His research interests are International Security, African Affairs and Governance. Edmond M. Were is an Associate Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies currently at Kisii University, Kenya. He has previously taught in Universities in Kenya and Rwanda where he has risen in the ranks of the academia including Moi University,

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Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology and Kigali Institute of Education (now College of Education of University of Rwanda). He was a lead researcher in the DfID-funded EdQual Research Program Consortium on Implementing Education Quality in Low Income Countries and the Small-Scale Research Project on the NEPAD eSchool Project. He is a Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD) and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) scholar. He has widely published articles and coauthored tertiary-level texts in local and international journals and publishing houses.

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1

Fig. 7.1

Fig. 7.2

Fig. 7.3

Fig. 7.4

Fig. 7.5

Relationship among the pillars of the African peace and security architecture (Source Adopted from the African Union’s African peace and security architecture road map) The basic model of open system (Source A modification of Boulding’s [1956] [cited in Wilby, 2006] logic of the three components of a system-Environment, Planning and Learning) Global PSO training impact 2001–2015 (Source Authors’ Construct from the regional PSO training output 2001–2015 [2017]) African regional distribution of PSO training output for peacekeepers, 2001–2015 (Source Authors’ Construct from the regional PSO training output 2001–2015 [2017]) An example of causal loop relationship in a PSO ecosystem (Source A modification of Forrester’s [1961] [cited in Porter, 1962] ‘industrial dynamics’ showing the input-output relationship within the PSO ecosystem) PSO training output in both IPSTC and SADC RPTC per gender (Source Authors’ construct using the existing data among the studied PKTCs [2017])

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LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 7.6

Fig. 7.7

Fig. 9.1 Fig. 9.2 Fig. 11.1 Fig. 12.1

Fig. 12.2 Fig. 12.3

PSO training output among the Military, Civilians and Police in both IPSTC and SADC RPTC, 2007–2015 (Source Authors’ construct using the existing data among the studied PKTCs [2017]) The proposed new conceptual framework for the African RSC anchored on the five building blocks of the systems thinking model (Source Authors’ compilation in re-imagining the New Regional System Secure Community [RSSC]) Understanding actor symmetry using the RICAAF model (Hypothetical) (Source Authors’ construct) Rim-Centre Actors Analytic Framework for Managing Proliferation of Actors in PSO (Source Authors’ construct) The ‘melting point’ for the 3Ds model (Source Authors’ construct) Customs revenue collected by EAC Partner States, 2011–2014 (US$ million) (Source Authors’ construction from the EAC database, 2011–2014) Trends in tourists arrivals, 2011–2015 (Source Authors’ construction from the EAC database, 2011–2015) A Webbed Rim representing the intersection between the three set of theories (Source Authors’ construct)

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278 319 329 403

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List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 5.1 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 9.1 Table 12.1 Table 12.2 Table 12.3 Table 12.4 Table 12.5 Table 12.6

APSA pillars The six ASF scenarios and timelines for deployment Definition of key concepts framing the proposed regional systems security community The IPSTC and SADC RPTC presentation of PSO training output (2001–2015) Construction of actor interactivities in the ASF Ecosystem Differences between RIT and the proposed Dominatarian theory (new) Fiscal developments and prospects (percent of GDP), 2011–2016 EAC external trade indicators, 2012–2016 Number of Air Passengers by EAC Partner States, July 2016 to March 2017 The typology of interest groups and direction of influence towards a country’s domination Translating Darwinianism into discursive elements of dominatarianism

134 168 252 263 331 418 421 422 424 428 431

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CHAPTER 1

Regional Security Community Theory

Introduction Regional security problems have been analysed through various theoretical lenses since the beginning of Karl Deutsch’s 1957 ‘security community’ thought. Deutsch and his collaborators’ analysis of the notion of security community helps in intensive reflection on the viability of the African peace and security agenda since the formation of the OAU and thereafter. Their thoughts are captured in what we have called the ‘Deutschian Model ’. This model was later amplified by Adler and Barnett (1998) and Buzan et al. (1998) in their attempts to anchor the ‘security community’ theoretical arguments in a constructivist perspective. Other attempts have been made to locate the model in the neoliberal perspective and thus justify its relevance to the dominant Western political thought. The task for the academia and policy practice in Africa remains, however, whether the theoretical arguments underpinning the model can inform our understanding and influence the redesign of the numerous attempts to craft a functional regional security community (RSC) on the continent—one that is holistic to address the systemic peace and security threats facing Africa in twenty-first century and beyond. This chapter recognizes the alternative perspective proffered in the security community theory in explaining the trajectory of global politics following the end of Cold War in 1989. It specifically controverted the dominant theories on power competition and alliance building involving © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. Onditi et al., Reimagining Security Communities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70869-6_1

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individual dominant states and focused instead on building compatible communities of states. Such communities would thus share social, economic and political attributes that form the foundation for integration of states and consequent assurance of global peace and renunciation of violent conflict. Deutsch and his research collaborators were convinced that the integration of the entire world as a security community would automatically eliminate war (Deutsch et al., 1957: 124). However, the African peace and security landscape depicts a complex multilayered peace and security architecture built on the fluid principle of subsidiarity. Moreover, the interconnection among the regional actors and the relevant international institutions tends to be disjointed or lacking mechanism for reinforcing each other. This has played a role in the apparent fizzling out of the purpose of a ‘communitarian’ peace and security architecture on the continent leading to duplication of response mechanisms every time new threats arise. A convenient way of classifying theories of regional security community is to categorize them on time dimension. The Cold War period (1945– 1989), witnessed frantic theorizing about global peace and avoidance of future wars. The disciplines of international relations and peace and conflict studies provided the fora for the elucidation of theories hence enriching the discourse on the possible causes and ramifications of war between states (Dougherty & Pfalzgraff, 1971). From the realist conviction of the existence of an anarchic international system manifesting the distribution of power among atomistic states and the constructivist belief that states are embedded in material and normative structures that are capable of generating shared identities and norms, the search for conditions of stable peace has been unrelenting. For advocates of realism and neorealism, and in contradiction to the security community proponents, war remains an assured eventuality that states must always prepare for and that peace is a temporary occurrence arising from the inevitability of balance of power. The Cold War between the East and West was arguably a manifestation of this mode of thinking. The theorizing about a security community of states was, however, not as appealing as those of political idealism and realism (Morgenthau, 1948). Its development waned since the late 1950s coinciding with a more engaging discourse on the balance of power, anarchy in the international system, sovereignty and national interest. The emerging expressions of divergent ideological positioning between East and West ran counter to the idealism expressed in the security community theory. To the

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political realists, shared values and common interests basically denoted the polarized and divisive nature of the international system. In this system, building a security community espousing interstate cooperation or competition was predicated on the pursuit of power driven by national interest. The focus on the atomistic state’s pursuit of self-interest created a complex world in which peace was perceived as a win-lose consequence of competition, balance of power and conflict of interest. This reductionist mode of thinking persisted throughout the Cold War period to be challenged later by the onset of increasing multilateralism that promised expansion of collaboration, consultation and interaction among states. Reductionist thinking influenced political decision-making in many states and characterized the incumbency of a number of emerging regional organizations since 1945. Deutsch and his collaborators perceived the outcome of interstate relations differently and offered an alternative model. Post-Cold War era, beginning 1990, has witnessed shifts in the tools, tactics and mode of conflict in Africa. Asymmetric warfare in the Horn of Africa, northern Nigeria, the Great Lakes Region, Sahel Region and Lake Chad continue to attract global attention. Although the interstate war is outside the global conflict agenda, the transnational nature of conflicts calls for a new theoretical lens to understand the emerging patterns of conflict. Disputed maritime areas and cybersecurity are emerging threat areas that require innovative security design solutions. There are phenomenal cyber-attacks on government agencies, banks and military installations in North Africa, the Sahel and/or Lake Chad Basin. Energy security is increasingly being threatened especially in major oil energy-producing countries. Political instability is coexisting with energy production which in the long run is bound to affect the oil-dependent consuming countries. France is powered up by uranium from Niger. Global demographic changes are yet another major concern to the continent. It is estimated that Africa will have the largest population growth rate on the globe. It is expected to double its population size to around 2.4 billion people by 2050 (Africa Development Bank, 2011). Africa has a young population about 60% being under the age of 25 (UNICEF, 2017).

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It is evident that the actors have changed, the environments have changed, and the methods of warfare have changed but response mechanisms have essentially remained the same since the Agenda for Peace in 1992 identified peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding and preventative diplomacy. Therefore, what lessons should the continent learn from these changes in the behaviour of warfare and conflicts? What are the innovative ways of rethinking regional security community in order to design effective response mechanisms? Is systems thinking approach a viable option? Before we delve into the systems thinking, it is important we understand the essence of regional security community (RSC).

Characterizing Regional Security Communities Regional security communities evolve at regional level among states largely in geographical proximity and influenced by the unique regional social, economic and political context. Territoriality, thus, becomes a significant organizing criterion in the evolution of most RSCs. The regionalization of security has incisively been advanced at the Copenhagen School of Security Studies and in particular by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Japp Wilde in their various texts. They have developed their thoughts on securitization (prioritizing issues on the security agenda) and de-securitization (returning securitized issues to the normal negotiations in the political sphere) more emphatically in the developed world. They focus their train of thought on the ‘region’ and the ‘regional subsystem’ as theatres of securitization and de-securitization. This arises from the realization and recognition, in the first instance, that the international system has largely been compromised by the end of bipolarity as an organizing global force. The balance of power among the superpowers and the dangers of nuclear rivalry influenced by ideological rivalry largely dissipated. States are largely attempting to avoid confrontations as they revert to deal with domestic and regional affairs. There is, therefore, an apparent leadership lacuna at the global level that will take time to be addressed. The recognition of multilateralism and emergence of diffused capabilities of state powers in various regions is becoming the new norm in international relations. Conflict and conflict concerns have consequently been regionalized. In this case, it has been argued that ‘regions will be left to sort out their own affairs’ as a result (Buzan et al., 1998: 9).

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A security community evolves as a distinct territorial subsystem that mirrors the structure of the international system. Regional security systems take the form of regional state systems or grouping that conform to the attributes of Deutschian ‘pluralistic security communities’, the most outstanding one being state sovereignty. Sovereignty of states presumes the capability of states to make decisions in their own security interest. This involves the ability to enter into agreement with neighbouring states to establish a community of compatible and shared security interests and values. Buzan et al. (1998) do equate a region to an international subsystem in their description of levels of analysis of international security. The international subsystem comprises groups of states or nations ‘within the international system that can be distinguished from the entire systems by the particular nature or intensity of their interactions with or interdependence on each other’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 6). They add that the subsystems may be territorially cohesive. In extrapolating the arguments by Buzan et al., Soderbaum and Hettne (2009: 4) argue that the region is a primary level of analysis due to the possibility of regional orders shifting from ‘simple balance of power systems or concerts to more comprehensive communities or integrated polities’. This is more apparent in attempts to address local conflicts. They state that implications and response to local conflicts depend on the nature of the security complex and how problems therein are linked either vertically or horizontally—‘some local conflicts are primarily affecting relations with different forms of higher authority, others may concern political rivalry among ethnic groups or cross border competition for land and other resources’ (Soderbaum & Hettne, 2009: 4). Due to territorial proximity, the interdependence of member states is easily achieved. The formation of regional economic communities exemplifies the attempts of states to pool resources and energies for mutual benefit. This has involved agreements on cross-border flows of capital and labour through the process of deepening regional integration. From the preceding exposition, a regional security community is basically a region in which the large-scale use of violence (such as war) has innately become very unlikely or even unthinkable (Kupchan, 2001; Tusicisny, 2007; Bulling, 2016). In concurrence with the Deutschian arguments, the regional security community is principally marked by a ‘real assurance that members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way’ (Deutsch, 1968: 124). The assurance is manifested in existence of common institutions

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and evolution of a sense of community or ‘we-ness’. In its current usage, it applies to a group of states that enjoy political relations of dependable expectations of a peaceful change. The political relations entail achieving a level of integration among the member states in the security community that would make interstate aggression or disputes, or preparations thereto, a realistic impossibility (Jones, 2008). It thus implies the attainment of strong and acceptable institutions and practices at the regional level that have the capability to assure long-term dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population. The primary political goal of any regional security community is to keep and sustain peace among the participating units (Deutsch, 1968: 31). According to Ole Waever (1998: 71), a regional security community is a ‘non-war community’ and to Tusicisny (2007: 166), a ‘collective arrangement in which its members have reasons to trust that the use of military and economic coercion in their mutual relations is unlikely’. In this community, trust is a principal factor which addresses both predictability and assurance. Predictability gives rise to expectations of consistent behaviour while assurance reduces the possibility of deviant behaviour among members. This resonates with Deutsch’s argument that sovereign entities will ‘develop a sense of community and institutions that are able to create long-term dependable expectations of peaceful change’ (Deutsch, 1968: 123). In a security community, trust binds the processes inherent in sustaining a sense of community. Through trust, participating units expect mutual predictability of political behaviour and responsiveness based on ease of communication among them. In communication, political units are able to transact across sovereign borders and build a social fabric that translates into a sense of community. Furthermore, through cross-border transactions a human community emerges the same way it does in building national communities. The 1950s theorizing on security communities emphasized geographical proximity as a key ingredient in their establishment and especially in the development of ‘networks, interactions and face to face encounters’ (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 33). It was also presumed that conflicts were possible to occur among neighbours and that conflicts do not travel far. Proximate communities have a high chance of cross-border transactions and exchanges which in the long-term tend to build mutual respect and trust. It is further presumed that geographical proximity enhances and ‘generates common interests that derive from a common culture,

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economic circumstances and security concerns’ (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 33). However, proximity does not have to be physical. The constructivist perspective of security communities advanced by Emmanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998) expounds that ‘individuals can organize and define themselves based on markers that are not necessarily tied to space, suggesting something of an imagined region or a cognitive region’ (p. 33). In this case, regions become socially constructed spaces or communities in which there are certain commonalities or shared identities, values and meanings. A typical example is the current North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) whose membership consists of states found in the geographical regions of Asia, North America and Europe. A distinctive feature of a security community is sustenance of ‘a stable peace tied to the existence of a transnational community’ (Bulling, 2016: 90). Such a transnational community must exist within the context of security interdependence that establishes the community as a linked set that differentiates it from the surrounding security regions. Stable peace is the sum total of three characteristics that also feature in the Deutschian explanations of a security community, that is, shared identities, values and purposes; members of that community must maintain constant and close relations and interactions; and members’ exhibition of a reciprocity that expresses a certain level of long-term interest. The members of the security community must as well advocate the expectations of peaceful change that denounces expectation and preparation for organized violence as a means of settling interstate disputes (Adler & Barnett, 1998).

Evolution of the Deutschian Security Community Model The notion of security community was first mooted by Richard van Wagenen in 1952 when he hinted at the possibility of the United Nations becoming a ‘true community’ similar to what the press and other writers at the time were insinuating as the universal society or world community (Van Wagenen, 1965; Vesa, 1999). The establishment of the United Nations Organization (UNO) after WWII had stirred and motivated such thinking about possibilities of evolving an international community that would assure the perpetuation of peace and avoidance of war between nations—in essence enabling the establishment of collective security among states. In 1954, Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon

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gave an address to the United Nations in which he stressed the need within the United Nations (UN) member states of ‘a strong sense of world community before there can be an effective delegation of authority to the United Nations’. He argued for the acceleration of developing a ‘sense of community among men by exploiting the fact that people are the common denominator of all nations, of all culture, and even by emphasizing that men share a common heritage of simple human values and are united in their aspirations for brotherhood and peace and adequate sustenance’ (United States Congress, 1967: 26218). The conceptual arguments evolved further and by 1957 Karl Deutsch and his collaborators definitively advanced its tenets after their research on the political community of the North Atlantic Area. It is instructive to note that Richard Wagenen was part of the research group which interrogated 36 historical cases from Western and Central Europe. Eight cases were later isolated and studied intensively. The cases included USA, the Union between England and Scotland, the breakup of the union between UK and Ireland, the unifications of Germany and Italy, preservation and dissolution of the Hapsburg Empire, the respective union and separation of Norway and Sweden and integration of Switzerland (Thompson, 1958: 531). The writings of Deutsch and his collaborators on centrality of a security community were largely influenced by the social system postulations advanced by the sociologist, Talcott Parsons. Parsons described a social system (society) as a ‘system of interaction of a plurality of actors, in which the action is oriented by rules which are complexes of complementary expectations concerning roles and sanctions’ (Parsons, 1962: 53). Karl Deutsch was among a retinue of writers mostly in the field of sociology who ascribed to the Parsonian social systems functional prerequisites including pattern maintenance by families and household in the reproduction of basic social patterns, values and norms; adaptation to the environment and to changes in the environment by engaging in economic transactions and scientific and technological innovations; goal attainment by the government and integration of the different functions and subsystems into a cohesive and coordinated whole enabled by mass communication, education and religion as cultural subsystems. The four functions ensure social equilibrium even as social systems undergo stress endurance, enhancement of position and eventual disintegration (Dougherty & Pflatzgraff, 1971).

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Parsons’ postulations on social systems influenced writings in political science especially in the analysis of political systems as well as the international system. He argued that the existence of bipolarism exerted pressures and stresses that destabilized and disordered equilibrium in the international system. He thus suggested that the ‘formulation of common values which cut across national boundaries is essential to international order’ (Dougherty & Pflaztgraff, 1971). This would be generated by consensus building that was seemingly enabled by economic development and national independence in many parts of the world. He advocated for procedural consensus, that is, ‘agreement among participants in international politics about the institutions and procedures for the settlement of problems and differences’ (Dougherty & Pflaztgraff, 1971: 108–109). He further argued for the differentiation of interests among peoples in a pluralistic fashion beyond the historic lines of partisan differentiation. This, in his estimation, ‘would enhance the prospects for international stability’ and contribute towards attaining cohesiveness in social and political communities (Dougherty & Pflaztgraff, 1971: 109).

Tenets of the Deutschian Security Community Model The Deutschian security community model, developed by Karl Deutsch and its Parsonian linkage, fundamentally challenged the realist and neorealist argumentations concerning the anarchic nature of the international system. They argued instead that the integration of states is a sine qua non of global peace and security. In their arguments, the nexus between integration and peace is upheld by cultivating a sense of community. The sense of community is a product of ‘we-ness ’ in a community nurtured through shared values among participating political units. Such characterization of a security community resonates well with the social and philosophical characterization of African people and their disparate cultures which converge on the one thing: belief and practice of Ubuntu. Ubuntu has been acknowledged as a philosophy of life in many parts of Africa and an ideology that contradicts the legacies of colonialism and neocolonialism. Its lack of written historicity, however, does not dent its claim to be a universal value depicting common humanity in general and African commonality in particular (Eze, 2011). Ubuntu expresses the human pursuit of life on the basis of ‘umuntungumuntungabantu’ that is ‘a person is a person through other

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persons” or I am a person because you are’, as it is commonly expressed in southern Africa (Rapatsa, 2011: 16). It is an expression of communal solidarity and social interdependence that is sustained by a communitybased interactive ethic where humanity is shaped by mutual interactions. Its value transcends self-interest in favour of communal interest. Being endogenous to African society, Ubuntu provides a framework for social, economic and political interventions that aim to leverage on African core values of respect for human dignity, exhibition of humility, pursuit of livelihoods based on human interdependence, communication and social solidarity. Rapatsa has underscored Ubuntu as an African normative value system with potential to underpin continental conflict resolution and peacebuilding approaches. This is in addition to providing a basis for democracy, cultivating responsible citizenship and creating ‘mutual reciprocity of trust between the state and the individuals’ (Rapatsa, 2011: 15). Fundamentally, it has the potential to link African communities that subsist in different political jurisdictions. Cross-border communication and interaction among the people is the foundation for building communities with shared and compatible values and collective identity. This is bound to impact the interethnic conflicts that have marked the politics of almost all sub-Saharan African countries. The conflicts have focused more on identifiable ethnic markers and resource competition fueled by the pursuit for political domination. The redesign of APSA in the context of Ubuntu introduces a human face in all its civilian and military programmes and in assuring their ownership and sustainability. Being a locally founded and grounded philosophy, it largely challenges the neoliberal win-lose interventions that have characterized conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding programmes on the continent. There is, however, an apparent disconnect between the state and their populations with regard to approaches to peace and security. The populations that are the custodians of African common values lack the avenues to influence decision-making processes for peace and security. The people would opt for pursuit of human security enabling programmes, whereas state organs that comprise the subregional and regional organs tend to be overwhelmed by the state security discourse. As such, peace and security intervention programmes take tangential trajectories that disqualify the participation and voice of the people as key stakeholders. A security community provides the ‘real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their

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disputes in some other way’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 124). Integration thus provides the assurance to member states to coexist in peace. This postulation has been interpreted to focus on social factors as determinants of global politics. The model particularly highlights the import of communal attributes of loyalty, shared values, collective identity and communication in building trust among states. The African context is, however, somewhat complex. Lack of a security community has been evidenced by the incessant intrastate and interstate conflicts that have marked the African security landscape since the 1960s. A number of the conflicts have been extremely violent leading to the commission of heinous crimes defined by international law. This includes conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Nigeria, Somalia, Ethiopia, Uganda, Central African Republic, Mozambique, Burundi, Sudan and South Sudan, among others. Notwithstanding the belief of African people in resolving challenges in the context of Ubuntu and African solidarity, the conflicts have largely been ignited and so sustained by extra-communal political and governance disputes and rivalry. The state and international response to the conflicts has not helped. Most of the conflicts have simply frozen. The possibility of future conflict always remain real as the states tinker with the political equation of building amalgamated domestic security communities and pluralistic integrated security communities. The dependable expectation for peaceful change seems too remote in most of these countries. The lack of ‘real assurance’ for perpetual peace does not, however, infer that African states do not have the will to create a peaceful integrated community. In the elucidations by Adler and Barnett the assurance that conflict will be resolved amicably in pluralistic communities depends ‘on the depth of trust, nature and degree of institutionalization of their governance systems and whether they reside in a formal anarchy or are on the verge of transforming it’ (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 30). Thus security communities can be categorized as loosely or tightly coupled. A loosely coupled security community is simply a group of states with dependable expectation of peaceful change where the member states practise and maintain self-restraint. A tightly coupled security community possesses mutual aid collective systems and has a hybrid system of rules that enable not only domestic but also supranational governance. All states in the pluralistic communities thus subscribe to a collective security system. To a larger extent, thus, African states fall in the category of loosely coupled security communities.

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Nevertheless, deliberate attempts have been made at the subregional level to create economic communities whose impact has been experienced in increased volumes of cross-border economic transactions which most often tends to surpass trade with industrialized Western economies. Intensification of tangible cross-border social and economic transactions provide yet a pedestal from which efforts aiming to build a tightly coupled security community could spring from. The growth and expansion of subregional economic integration communities on the continent have indicated the viability not only of interstate cooperation but also peopleto-people interaction and exchange. Deeper integration remains feasible in addressing economic underdevelopment and provides a functioning pedestal to APSA for constructing a security community with the capability to assure peace and security on the continent. This implies that the peace and security agenda ought to be integrated into the regional economic prosperity agenda instead of being delinked and running parallel to the continental development. From their research they came up with an illustrative definition in which the concept security community was progressively elucidated. They perceived a security community as a group of people which has become ‘integrated.’ By integration we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a ‘sense of community’, and of institutions and practices, strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of ‘peaceful change.’ By peaceful change we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resorting to large scale physical force. (Deutsch, 1968: 123–124)

The model provided a fresh attempt at defining and characterizing the international system from the anarchy focused traditional reductionism that dominated global political thought and practice. The security community concept provided a peek into the form and structure of the international community as a complex system that required strategic reinvention and reengineering. This was more urgent in Western Europe, after the devastation of WWII—and during which the same win-lose political script was being woven in academic thinking and

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policy practice. Most of Africa remained colonial appendages to the imperialist powers that were at the core of the emergent polarized international community. The appeal of the model, however, still lingers into twentyfirst-century Africa with almost all states politically and legally sovereign. On the outset, African states meet the definitional prerequisite of pluralistic security community. However, they are still groping in the dark in search for workable peace and security framework that would ‘assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population’. In the Deutschian model, state sovereignty binds society into an amalgamated domestic security community. The amalgamated security community manifests shared national values, common identity and meanings. These are the launching pads in the search for larger regional communities. Quite a number of African countries are still in the process of nation-building, a process that demands crafting common national ethos, values and identities that make the nation socially, economically and politically distinct. Tanzania, Zambia, Senegal, Kenya and Nigeria attempted to craft distinct national philosophies-based African Socialism and humanism as depictions of the communal way of life of majority of African peoples. These attempts eventually floundered in the face of more powerful neoliberal forces of globalization. The model, however, reiterates and provides an alternative approach to understanding African intrastate and interstate relations with a view to eliminating wars within and among states. By using abductive reasoning it proposes an approach to solve current intrastate and interstate political and economic challenges on the continent. In the above Deutschian definition, we discern three components that characterize systems thinking: elements, interconnections and purpose (McCauley, 2015). We shall address these components in detail in a subsequent subsection ahead. The root of the security community concept explicitly points down to the pluralistic integration of states. It is presumed that ‘a group of people’ implied not just persons but states that have achieved a certain level of integration in which key social and political mechanisms and processes emerge for resolving disputes non-violently. In essence, a security community comprises states that have attained a level of integration that assures citizens of ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’. The focus on the integration of states challenges the African resolve to establish a functional peace and security architecture based on the existing internal structure of member states. The political and social instability and

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relative economic underdevelopment witnessed in almost all the member states of the AU provide challenges to the African will of crafting a security community. More fundamentally, the ‘swing states’, in the efforts to establish subregional security communities, face their own domestic and regional challenges that must first be overcome and resolved. This includes especially Kenya, Ethiopia, South Africa, Nigeria and Egypt. The foregoing analysis points to the fact that subregional security communities on the continent are still in the nascent phase, loosely coupled and do not promise the unequivocal assurance that conflicts within and among member states will be resolved by alternatives to the use of physical force. This is evidenced by cases of political instability within the ECOWAS, IGAD, CEN-SAD, ECCAS, SADC and AMU subregional groupings that have generally attracted regional and international military responses. Deutsch and his collaborators tried to understand the development of security communities from the intensity and types of transactions or functions with them. The conduct of the social, economic and political transactions tends to generate long-term and holistic mutual benefits for the members of the community. Such benefits morph into high levels of trust, shared vision and values. In their research, these attributes were observed in the integration processes between the USA and Canada which had evolved a way of life capable of resolving most of their problems in a peaceful way, notwithstanding the domestic upheavals that preceded the coming into place of a security community comprising the two states. How does this apply to African RSC? The social and economic transactions within the African RSC are still constrained by restrictive national regulations governing cross-border movement. Whereas the RECs promote formal cross-border transactions, the terms of exchange reflect inherent trade barriers that largely restrict the dominant ‘informal’ trade transactions (Bensassi et al., 2017; Rotich, 2014). The formalization of trade favours large firms to the detriment of small-scale transactions. The barriers to trade in favour of the formal sector promote largely the organized formal sector through their national and regional Chambers of Commerce. Interactions among the members of these organizations are sustained through the pursuit of profiteering and capital accumulation. To advocates of deepening regional integration, intensification of such transaction intensifies trust and shared values. Effective functional social and economic transactions thus eventually require functional economic and political institutions that provide

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the framework for further development and diversification into other sectors including peace and security. Furthermore, national borders are tightly controlled with the aim of restricting movement. In a number of countries, visa requirements are still in place for Africans despite the requirement by the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) protocol to ease movement by people and goods across the continent (UNCTAD, 2015). The glue that binds the members of a security community, according to the Deutschian view, involves the compatibility of major values for political decision-making, the capacity for quick and adequate mutual and non-violent response by participating political units to each other’s needs, messages and actions without resorting to violence, and mutual predictability of political behaviour (Deutsch et al., 1957). In the Western political culture, political behaviour is guided by the major liberal democratic values that have evolved over time. Their holistic adoption on the African continent has, however, faced acceptability challenges that have hampered the integration of African states in the global democratic community. Njiofor (2018) argues that there is a disconnect between the universalized Western political values and specific African traditional political values. There are inherent contradictions between political values of individualism and those of communitarianism. He argues for ‘harmonious integration’ of Western into African traditional values in the quest for African development. The integration brings on board the people’s cherished sociopolitical ideals and positive way of life (Njiofor, 2018: 7). The efforts to attain this harmony has remained a puzzle for most African states. The easier alternative has been the adoption of Western democratic values that have influenced political (mis)behaviour and (mal)action on the continent and the inherent discrepancies and deficits in efforts to create a functional African security community. Evolution of widely acceptable and compatible shared political values on the African continent is still a work in progress. It requires intensified nurturing through a process of social learning and changes in political behaviour and attitude of both the leadership and citizens. Change in political behaviour especially entails the subjection of the cherished national political sovereignty to the larger cause of regional integration and establishment of transnational social, economic and political institutions to drive the integration agenda. Fundamentally, the creation and sustainability of a security community depends on the intimate interconnectedness of the political units and the network of communication within the community. Indeed, studies on early warning systems among

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the African regional economic communities (RECs) reveal that the failure of regional organizations to respond timely is not lack of data, rather it is the organizational systems’ weaknesses and political disagreements (Wulf & Dabiel, 2010). The Deutschian model is specifically emphatic that a security community is one that is integrated. Such a community would, however, be either amalgamated or pluralistic. An amalgamated security community evolves out of a ‘formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit’ that exercises legal and sovereign authority over its territory (Deutsch et al., 1957: 124). The USA is given as an example of an amalgamated community. While explaining at length the dynamics underpinning amalgamated security communities, the authors conclude ‘pluralistic security communities to be a more promising approach to the elimination of war over large areas’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 128). They explain further that a pluralistic security community is assured of success and stability when the participating units retain their respective national sovereignty. Until 1977, the East African Community (EAC) was quite a success in integrating the economies of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania based on shared social and economic interests. It was characterized by jointly owned and managed corporations in the transport and communication, finance and banking and education sectors that saw free movement of people and resources across the borders of the three states. Peace and security were naturally and mutually assured in that each member state had dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population. The slow and steady collapse of the EAC introduced spectres of interstate and intrastate disputes and conflicts within and among the erstwhile member states. Uganda laid claim to parts of Kenyan and Tanzanian sovereign territories, Kenya threatened to ensure and tighten Uganda’s landlockedness, Uganda invaded and occupied a part of northern Tanzania, Tanzania closed its border with Kenya and later vengefully invaded Uganda and overthrew the Ugandan military regime. Eventually the EAC Heads of State summits never met to discuss and resolve the emerging disputes. Conflict and insecurity are thus assured in absence of security community or cooperation. The rejuvenation of the EAC in 2000 reinstated regional collaboration and cooperation in security and development in the region (Mathieson, 2016). Even when Uganda laid claim to Migingo Island in Kenyan territorial waters of Lake Victoria, the resolution of the territorial dispute has been approached non-violently. Diplomacy has taken the centre stage to allow for joint administration

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of the island in the spirit of regional integration and good neighbourliness. The economic benefits from renewed EAC led to its enlargement by admitting Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan into the community. The DRC, Somalia and Ethiopia have also registered their interest in joining the EAC. The Deutschian model points to the general finding that pluralistic security communities are capable of large-scale elimination of war especially in contexts where the primary objective of the security community is to keep the peace. Nevertheless, the evidence pointed to a more comprehensive goal of attaining a ‘political community that would not merely keep peace among its members but that would also be capable of acting as a unit in other ways and for other purposes’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 128). The ability to act depended, however, on the understanding of the thresholds of integration which, on one side, required states in the community to perpetually be ready for war in defence of national interests, though they were not committed to it. On the other side of the threshold, the states comprising a security community were no longer supposed to prepare for war. The African RSC has ample evidence in support of foregoing Deutschian assertions. The subregional groupings of states recognized as building blocks of APSA have been reconfigured to escalate the maintenance of peace and security in addition to their erstwhile agenda of economic integration. The peace and security agenda, however, remains a preserve of the subregional standby forces and the civilian components. The equipping of the standby forces depends on the commitments by the individual member states in the host region. This implies that competition in defence spending by subregional member states remains a significant feature of the peace and security agenda. States with disproportionate defence spending will tend to dominate the agenda in the region. This has been the case in the Eastern African Standby Force mechanism that is jointly dominated by Ethiopia and Kenya and leading to siblings rivalry in the eastern African region. Its effectiveness in reacting to political crises in the region (such as the Burundi and Tigray crises) has thus been substantially hampered. There is nevertheless a tendency for the member states to individually prepare for war in defence of national interests even when at the same they actively participate in equipping the regional security mechanism. This phenomena is still evident in SADC, ECOWAS, CEN-SAD, ECCAS and AMU.

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The Deutschian model emphasized on acquisition of political behaviour that was pertinent to the process of integration and growth of a sense of community. These habits of political behaviour are predicated on the prevailing context in the participating units. The context of integration comprises the background conditions to state capabilities and thus the ensuing integrative behaviour. The capabilities of participating political units will either drive or encumber the integrative process. For example, ‘larger, stronger, more politically, administratively, economically, and educationally advanced political units were found to form the cores of strength around which in most cases the integrative process developed’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 130). The momentum of integration would be sustained by the substantial increase in the capabilities of some or all of the participating political units. The capabilities are in form of exercise of power and responsiveness, that is, the capacity to act as an effective political unit and the ability to control own behaviour and redirect own attention, respectively. This would allow leaders to receive communication from other participating units in the integration process. This finding was more pronounced, though, in amalgamated security communities such as UK, Prussia and Italy. In the African continent such roles are played by what Vanheukelom and Desmidt (2019) have called ‘swing states’. These include Kenya and Ethiopia in eastern Africa, Nigeria in West Africa, South Africa in southern Africa, Angola in ECCAS and Libya, Algeria and Egypt in North Africa. The model identifies the relationship between capabilities and loads especially expectations on the tangible and intangible resources also considered ‘burdens’, required for participating in the integration process. The authors identify a number of burdens that participating units must endure. These include tangible burdens such as ‘military or financial burdens, drains on manpower or wealth; the burden of risk from political or military commitments; costs of social and economic readjustments …’ and intangible burdens including adequate attention, perception and decision-making capabilities of government bureaucracies (Deutsch, 1968: 131). The responsibility of decision-making for larger areas is hence immense for participating political units, especially the more capable ones, but remains a load that must be executed for the attainment of an effective and stable security community. In quite a number of cases, capabilities and loads tend to define the swing state status of dominant states in the region in terms of defining the trajectory of the regional peace and security agenda (Vanheukelom & Desmidt, 2019). The African scene exemplifies

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conflict theatres characterized by multiple actors with varying degrees of burdens and loans. Whereas the swing states carry responsibilities that in most cases reflect their national interests, the involvement of the United Nations (UN) and European Union (EU) has changed the trajectory of conflicts over time. African countries normally contribute the troops and equipment needed in the various conflicts. However, the UN and most specifically the European Union have been responsible for funding the operations. The challenge has been that in quite a number of cases the donors have driven the conflict resolution process instead of the regional organizations. The success of security communities further depends on the ‘motivations for political behaviour and in particular with the values and expectations held in the politically relevant strata of the political units’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 133). There ought to be thus compatibility of values within a larger proportion of the population in the participating political units. Such values entail political, social or economic orientations that drive the population towards attaining the ‘good life’ (which largely defines standards of life, respect for humanity, democratic culture) and in this case pursuit of non-violent conflict resolution. These values must be manifest in the operations of political institutions and in habits of political behaviour. The combination of habits, values and institutions define the way of life of the vast majority of the populations in the security community. This must be distinct from the past including that of neighbours. The political behaviour of African states varies according to the prevailing political context. Since 1999, the African Union has attempted to instil behavioural change by denouncing coup d’états, relative rapid response to political instability, imposition of sanctions and generally adopting the non-indifference principle to conflicts and threats to peace in the member states (Vanheukelom & Desmidt, 2019). Political behaviour in member states has had to abide by the democratic values that have been spelt out in the various subregional and continental protocols (African Union, 2007). The ECOWAS region, for example, has been at the forefront in managing political misbehaviour in the region. It has instilled political discipline in a number of member states including Mali, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Chad and Cameroon. The SADC region has generally been stable since the silencing of guns mainly in South Africa, Angola, Lesotho and Mozambique. Zimbabwe is a work in progress for democratic institutional building after the Mugabe dictatorship. Northern Mozambique is an emerging protracted conflict zone that is gradually

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attracting the attention of the SADC Standby Force. In eastern Africa, notwithstanding the threats from the Big Man Syndrome in a couple of member states, the democratic project is taking root including Somalia where democratic institutional rebuilding is being supported by regional and international cooperation. The challenges of developing compatible democratic values are immense and imply decision-making processes based more on ‘muddling through’ than systematic thinking. Security communities further require, what the authors call, ‘unbroken links of social communication’ not only between the participating political units but also among the social groups in the participating units (Deutsch, 1968: 135). Such links enable broadening of the relevant elite network that is at the core of management of political affairs within the political units and the larger integrated area. By integrating systems thinking in the discourse on security community we discern the central function of communication by the member states in mutual adjustment. This implies the ability for actors to listen to each other and accommodate emerging pressures. Communication determines the behaviour of a security community as indeed ‘systems behaviour is largely driven by shared interests and identity, information, processes and relationships’ (Morgan, 2005). In systems behaviour, shared identity and meaning entails values, core beliefs, competencies, principles, purpose and mission that are key to ‘autopiesis’ or self-organization. Akin to the ‘we-ness’ envisaged in the security community, autopiesis implies the existence of ultimate control structures where there is order, shape and direction of human behaviour (Morgan, 2005: 14). The model examines the role of mutual predictability of behaviour. The authors argue that the participating units ‘must be able to expect from one another some dependable interlocking, interchanging or at least compatible behaviour, and they must therefore be able, at least to that extent, to predict one another’s actions’. Mutual prediction of behaviour is enabled by familiarity and introspection—implying that ‘by looking into their minds they could make a fairly good guess as to what their neighbours would do’ (Deutsch, 1968: 137). According to the authors, mutual predictability is grounded on common culture, common group character or national character. Mutual predictability (looking into their minds) thus throws a spotlight on the nature of system structure that facilitates relationships among system elements. The relationships create interconnections (culture and character) that ensure the sustainability of the system. Mutual predictability, therefore and more fundamentally,

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entails gaining skills to identify and characterize relationships feedback loops among participating units (Arnold & Wade, 2017). Arnold and Wade (2017) argue that high maturity levels in recognizing relationships entail the ‘ability to recognize increasingly non-obvious, more complex and less visible connections’ (p. 10). In addition, high levels of maturity in characterizing relationships entails recognizing how system elements are related, describing the distinctive features of a relationship and developing an ‘increasingly clear and accurate picture of how a relationship works, what its characteristics are, and how strong it is’ (p. 10). Furthermore, identifying and characterizing feedback loops are significant systems thinking skills. In identifying feedback loops, member states need to not only recognize that relationships exist or recognizing their strengths but also to recognize that ‘something different has occurred or is occurring here; something emergent’ (p. 11). The characterization of feedback loops is accomplished in terms of their strengths and properties (reinforcing vs. balancing, as well as delays and other temporal properties). The characterization may start as a highly qualitative estimate of the various features and strengths of a feedback loop, but will become more precise over time. This includes the ability to recognize delays in the system (p. 11). Deploying the foregoing skills within the APSA requires revamping specifically the functions of CEWARN which has been associated with ‘latercomers’ in conflict prevention (Wulf & Debiel, 2009: 3). The revamp ought to emphasize systems thinking skill improvement in ‘the latent stages of a perceived potential armed conflict with the aim at reduction, resolution or transformation’. This focuses primarily on the domains of ‘data collection, data formatting, data analysis with the understanding that there is a relationship and process between these units for the system to operate’ (Wulf & Debiel, 2009: 3). CEWARN and indeed other elements of APSA ought to improve their predictive capabilities that have been adjudged to be weak. Vanheukelom and Desmidt (2019) have argued, in this case, for the need to engage other actors beyond the confines of APSA structural framework. They propose actors that exhibit ‘functional cooperation, problem solving and dialogue’ including ‘specialized non-governmental organizations, think tanks, and research centers’. In their estimation ‘such non-usual suspects are often not on the radar of the formal peace architectures, but can play important roles’ (Vanheukelom & Desmidt, 2019: 3). In all subregions of APSA there are

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specialized research institutions, universities and non-governmental organizations that have research findings from their research mandates and can have great influence on research activities from a systems thinking perspective. The establishment of a security community implies a higher level of solidarity among the people and institutions in the participating units to assure that disputes can only be resolved peacefully. Solidarity among participating units and their populace build the sense of community in breadth and depth. Von Brentano et al. (1954: 53) referred to the challenge of deepening a security community as that of ‘strengthening its cohesive forces’. They inquired into how a sense of community could be developed in depth over a wide enough area to support institutions for the long-term prevention of war. The sense of community is thus a product of comprehensive consensus on critical issues in a political community. The consensus on issues is enabled by communication in the community.

Shortcomings of the Deutschian Model The Deutschian model presumed security communities to be political communities enmeshed in a network of political communication, possessed machinery of enforcement and exhibited popular habits of compliance which have the capability to eliminate expectations of violence in their territories. This assumption governed their research and influenced their chain-linked definition of security communities. Their explanation of the theory dwelt a great deal on characterizing the process of integration in the North Atlantic area comprising politically developed states that have a long history of state formation and nationhood. This was pursued on the assumption that integration in its dual form was an effective pathway to realizing peace within a security community. Outside Western Europe, the application of model, though desirable, faces varied deep-seated social challenges that do not fit the simplified compatible community values identified in the model. Non-western societies tend to emphasize instead compatible and shared interests that that are either historical in nature (historical experiences) contemporary (adoption of neo-liberal democratic values, fear of external influences or onslaught). This has been acknowledged in the establishment of regional security communities in Latin America, Africa and Asia. Their research elaborated, without illustration, on the ‘sense of community’ as the foundation of integration. In their view, a sense of

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community cannot be realized through verbal assent or attachment to explicit and same sets of values in the community. Instead, they argued for shared social attributes and values exhibited across the community including mutual sympathy and loyalties; ‘we-feeling’, trust and mutual considerations; partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; and cooperative action based on mutually successful predictions of behaviour. These values coalesced into ‘a perpetual process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision-making’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 129). The Deutschian sense of community is similar to the Ubuntu principles that need to be actualized through initiatives that build ‘Pan African solidarity from a bottom up perspective’. The African solidarity-based initiatives are more relevant in building positive peace that is based on the normative values that characterize African communal life (Muriithi, 2006). In the conflict and post-conflict contexts characterized by they are less suited to address short or midterm conflict concerns marked by hate, revenge or violent competition for scarce resources. In this case, topdown state-led initiatives such as local peace committees become more relevant in instilling and managing peace. Peace committees tend to have positive impact on local communities ‘by keeping the violence down, solving community tensions, and empowering local actors to become peace builders’ (Issifu, 2016: 142). This role has been acknowledged in various African and Asian countries. In this case, the initiatives carry a hybrid of approaches comprising state directives and the use of local actors. The attainment of negative peace is related instead to restoration of torn relationships as a result of violent communal encounters such as wars, violent disputes or mass murders. In Rwanda, for example, the gacaca courts were relied upon to process hundreds of thousands of former génocidaires for purposes of revealing the facts and truth about the 1994 genocide and seek forgiveness, remorse and reconciliation (Clark, 2012). Though the courts were a reinvention of the traditional court system based on age-old juridical practices, they provided a peek into how winwin cultural institutions could be integrated into the modern win-lose judicial processes in addressing pressing national concerns. These initiatives, however, tend to address long-term conflict dynamics with the aim of transforming the torn relations. The APSA framework is specifically programmed to respond to violent encounters that may or may not lead to unprecedented human catastrophes. It is not designed to address the

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issues concerning cultural institutions and life of African people. These issues nevertheless have had influence on the trajectory of some conflicts in the region. They have thus been left to the national institutions to manage. The APSA design has thus relegated a wealth of cultural resources that could impact the roles of Panel of the Wise, Special Envoys and CEWARN. The model, however, did not address in greater detail the broader systems dynamics inherent in establishing a community characterized by ‘we-ness’. The authors mention in passing the need for compatibility of values and expectations, mobility of persons limited to politically relevant population strata, unbroken links of social communication, a distinct way of life, range of communication and transaction and mutual predictability of behaviour, among others, as important attributes in building a security community. These attributes emerge decades later in the constructivist and regional security arguments advanced by Adler and Barnett (1998) and Buzan et al. (1998), respectively. The Deutschian model has further been interpreted from a Kantian liberal democratic perspective, encapsulated in Perpetual Peace, whereby successful security communities are considered to be democratic societies espousing liberal democratic values such as political liberalization, economic interdependence and adherence to international norms and institutions (Russett, 1998). The appeal of the democratic ideals and values partly prompted the peaceful dissolution of the eastern bloc and spread throughout Europe leading. Accordingly, the pursuit of democratic peace translates into economic interdependence and deference to political pluralism not only in Europe but attests also to its global diffusion. In a security community designed on the basis of Western democratic values, pluralism and individualism would thus underpin community relations and behaviour (Bellamy, 2004). These values have for a couple of centuries been domiciled in the Western world from where they have been propagated to the rest of the world to spread the economic and political benefits of globalization. There is a growing recognition that African countries have fallen short of adhering to the Western democratic values hence necessitating focus on them for purposes of cultivating continent-wide common and compatible political values. The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of 2007 is particularly empathic on engaging African states to cultivate a democratic culture based on popular participation in all facets of life (African Union, 2007).

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In the late 1990s, proponents of constructivism took up the mantle to expound on the security community notion from a sociological perspective, thereby amplifying and clarifying the underlying gaps in the model. The discourse coincided with the end of the Cold War and the need to re-examine the theories explaining bipolarism. Key advocates of constructivism in the security community arguments were Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett (1998). They elaborated on the community aspects of a security community focusing on ‘shared identities, values and meanings; many-sided and direct relations; and exhibit a reciprocity that expresses some degree of long-term interest, and perhaps even altruism’ (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 31). These values, they argued, do not preclude the possibility of disputes or conflicts but depict a community in which social and institutional mechanisms have developed to provide the members with high shared expectations to resolve such disputes or conflicts peacefully. The constructivist interpretation that pervades the Deutschian model poses challenges on the qualification of a region as a security community, especially the regions outside the Western world. A security community may have been imagined in certain contexts in the West especially among democratic states, hence the justification of the democratic peace theory (Jones, 2008). Its attainment may still be in infancy in the rest of the globe especially in culturally pluralistic contexts on the African continent. Nevertheless, building a regional security community remains an alternative to the anarchic international system. It provides an avenue towards building an effective ‘pluralistic’ global community from below in what Johan Galtung termed the attempts at developing a ‘harmony of interests’ (Galtung, 1969). Acharya (1998) also referred to the implications of a security community as ‘a fundamental unambiguous and long-term convergence of interests among actors in the avoidance of war’ (Acharya, 1998: 201). Adler and Barnett (1998), however, emphasize that security communities should aim not only at renunciation of violence but also entrenching habits of peaceful resolution of conflicts. The habits emerge through social learning, as argued in the Deutschian model, and a political governance structure that facilitates their acquisition. This is made more plausible in liberal democratic societies than the available alternatives. To gain further insight into this, they designed a three tier-based framework to complement Deutschian model and elucidated on a security community’s propensity to peaceful change.

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The first tier of the security community framework explains the precipitating conditions towards peaceful change in a security community. This consists of changes in technology, transformations in economic, demographic and migration patterns and changes in the natural environment; development of new interpretations of reality and ability to address external threats. These factors tend to force states in each other’s direction for purposes of mutual benefit that can be attained through ‘face to face interactions, dialogue and policy coordination’ (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 38). The second tier comprises factors conducive to the development of mutual trust and collective identity. These factors are basically structures (power and knowledge) and processes (transactions, organizations and social learning) that facilitate emergence of dependable expectations of peaceful change. Deutsch pointed at how power enables the formation of a core of strengths which helps develop integrative forces and development of the ‘we-feeling’. Knowledge is manifested in the cognitive structures of the community, that is, the ‘shared meanings and understandings such as liberalism and democracy’ (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 39). These structures shape the form and practice of governance in a given security community. The third tier comprises the necessary conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change which is manifested in mutual trust and collective identity. The two are reciprocal and reinforcing. In conventional political realism, anarchy displaces trust. However, in the development of a security community, trust is a condition of peaceful coexistence that requires ‘knowledge and beliefs about the other’. This is a condition of declaring a state friend or enemy established through ‘years of experiences and encounters that shapes the cultural definition of the threat’ (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 46). The development of a security community follows a defined threephased path, which according to Adler and Barnett, is a continuum comprising birth, growth and maturity. This path complements their tier-based framework. The nascent phase in the evolution of a security community depicts the behaviour of the governments as they begin to reach out to neighbours for mutual security, reduce transaction costs of interstate exchange and transactions as they urge for further collaborations. This is a phase of exploration of the other’s potentials and establishment of institutions to ensure mutual intentions are implemented

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and mutual relations are fostered. Of particular importance, is the development of multilateral security organizations manifesting a belief in joint and interdependent security and checks on each other’s commitments and military dynamics. In this phase, a powerful state leading interstate interactions is facilitated by institutions that ‘contain norms and provide mechanisms that make states accountable to each other; institutionalize immediate reciprocity; identify common interests and identities among a selected population and produce charters and agendas and convene meetings and seminars that reflect the attempt to create a binding set of interests and collective future’ (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 52). The attendant phase in the development of security communities is marked by ‘increasingly dense networks of friendly relations; new institutions and organizations that reflect either tight security coordination and cooperation and or decreased fear that the other represents a threat; cognitive structure that promote ‘seeing’ and acting together and, therefore, deepening of the level of trust and the emergence of collective identities that begin to encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change’ (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 53). In this phase, institutionalization of ways of life intensifies and reflects mutual reciprocity, shared interests and collective identity as well as mutual trust and responsiveness. The mature phase manifests domestic and international settings that make the probability of war among states very remote. Adler and Barnett argue that, at this point, regional actors share an identity and entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change that enable the coming into existence of a security community. In this phase the threshold of integration has been crossed, as stated by Deutsch et al. (1957). Deutsch had argued that ‘on one side of this threshold, populations and policy makers considered warfare among states or political units concerned as still a serious possibility, and prepared for it; on the other side of threshold they were supposed to do so no longer’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 128). The indicators of maturity of a security are indicated by ‘a high degree of trust, a shared identity and future, low or no probability that conflicts will lead to military encounters, and the differentiation between those within from those outside the security community’ (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 55). Such indicators include ‘consensual and multilateral decision making, less focus on worse case scenarios within the security community, common definition of threats, and normative discourse within the member states reflecting community standards’ (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 56).

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Adler and Barnett (1998), however, point out in passing, the disintegration of security communities as ‘one of the startling tragedies of the post-Cold War period’ (p. 57). This has been witnessed in security communities where previously coexistent groups or states turned on their neighbours. They argue that the social conditions that shape the development of security communities are the same ones that may lead to their disintegration.

Deutschianism in the African Regional Security Community Key issues emerge in the foregoing analysis of the Deutschian security community model and the prevailing realities of the African regional security community. The model sought to ‘study the possible ways in which men someday might abolish war’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 121). The central problem for their study was ‘how can men learn to act together to eliminate war as a social institution’. They found that that integration, that is, the establishment of a security community, was the ultimate answer and that it was a ‘learning process that took place over a long period of extensive and sustained contact between people from the politically relevant strata of society’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 122). Their prescience on security communities at a time of wide global ideological cleavages hence provides insight on the design and functionality of contemporary regional security communities. For instance, Bellamy (2004: 63) declares that ‘western European security community is the only region in the world that can be unproblematically labelled as a security community’ having been selfconsciously constructed over a number decades and is bound together by a complex web of institutions and relationships (identities, interests and values). Such declaration, intimately linked to the Deutschian definition, provides insight on the need to integrate systems thinking into the redesign and operations of the African RSC. Four distinct areas have been identified to distil further this linkage. It is noted then that the African peace and security community is an inimitable security complex that may not necessarily conform to the Deutschian model or even the elaborate explanation of Adler and Barnett. For instance, polycentricism denotes the existence of multiple intergovernmental (regional) organizations and mechanisms that, in addition, embraces cross membership of states. Whereas this has to a large extent

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complicated the peace and security implementation matrix, it has nevertheless enabled the resolution of numerous conflicts in and between member states. Polycentricism has further been underscored principally by the principles of subsidiarity, burden sharing and subcontracting. In this respect, the respective regional organizations have assumed and owned the responsibility to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts in their regions either ‘on behalf’ or ‘in concert’ with the African Union. The success of the model of decentralized collective security is basically unique for the African continent due to the following ingredients: Sense of Community—An outstanding feature of security communities that leans more to Eurocentric political thought is the ideological recognition of ‘liberal democracy as a yardstick for establishing security communities’ (Russett, 1998). Ideological compatibility among Western industrialized societies has been the most significant factor in building a sense of community. The Deutschian we-ness is expressed in shared values, identity and interest across the liberal democratic leaning societies to the extent that it has been universalized over time and used as a yardstick for global social, economic and political engagement. It has, therefore, come to be believed that democratic values are the preconditions to the attainment of global peace and that the security communities built on the universalized democratic values are more effective in establishing peace among the participating units. Evidence, however, points to some effective security community organizations in Africa, Asia and Latin America, notwithstanding their ideological orientation. Indicative in these regions is insignificant adherence by most participating units to Western liberal democratic values and virtues (Acharya, 1998; Hurrell, 1998; Barnett & Gause III, 1998; Ngoma, 2005; Ogwu, 2008; Jones, 2008; Bulling, 2016). Over time, nevertheless, some of the participating political units exhibit progress towards compatibility of major values relevant to political decision-making, capacity to respond to each other’s needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately and without resort to violence and portray mutual predictability of behaviour. These attributes conform essentially to the nascent and ascendant phases of security community development. This has been witnessed in the actions of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Mali and Cote d’Ivoire, Intergovernmental Agency for Development (IGAD) in Sudan, Southern African Development Community (SADC) in DRC, and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in CAR in Africa.

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Integration and Growth around Core Areas—The Deutschian model links effective integration to the growth around core areas, that is, definite popular habits of integrative political behaviour, and particular integrative traditions and institutions for social groups and states. The interplay of behaviour, traditions and institutions generate social, economic and political capabilities that support integration. Normally these attributes are found initially in stronger political units within the integration area which ‘form the core of strength around which in most cases the integrative developed’ (Deutsch, 1968: 130). The African peace and security scenario points at a cluster of countries that strongly believe in the integration process and building a security complex beyond their national territorial confines. In each of the subregions, we find stronger states (militarily, educationally and economically) that have taken on the mantle of leadership. This ought not to overshadow the upcoming powers in those regions especially if they can lead to sharing the capability burdens. A significant contribution to the discourse on regional security complex development in Africa is by Mellissa Jennings (2017) in her study focusing on the regional security complex in East Africa. She focuses on eastern Africa from the point of ‘ambiguity of Africa as a region or an imagined community’ (Jennings, 2017: 75). She argues that ‘Africa is a continent but not a region, while its members do share some commonalities, as a regional security complex, the states are not interdependent and therefore do not constitute a region’ in the sense of Buzan and Waever (Jennings, 2017: 75). This argument borrows from Russett’s ‘triangle of positive feedbacks’ in which peace is at the centre of a functioning system of liberal democracy, economic interdependence and belief in international law. The system is interactive, mutually supportive and mutually reinforcing at the domestic and international level (Russett, 1998: 371). Resolution of Conflicts and Rising Capabilities —The resolution of conflicts using non-violent capabilities is the ultimate aspiration of every security complex. Often this does not materialize leading to deployment of violent use of force to attain specific goals. For example, NATO, a security organization of avowed democratic states, had to deploy violent force to liberate Kosovo or cause regime change in Libya. The resolution of conflicts is nevertheless accentuated by the nature of communication, interconnection and interdependence among the members of the security complex. In the Deutschian model, effective resolution of conflicts is predicated on the level of integration that is further contingent on

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the capabilities of participating units. It identifies the capabilities to include the capacity to act (power) and ability to control behaviour (responsiveness) (Deutsch, 1968: 131). The resolution of the complex nature of regional and cross-border conflicts on the African continent has been a haphazard exercise that has depended on ‘chance’ or playing a waiting game. In a number of cases, African countries looked upon the international community to play an active role in the intervention. The international community likewise waited upon African organizations to fire the first shot. Conflict fatigue at the international level strengthens the mantra of African Solution to African problem and thus the realization of the establishment of the APSA. Still, among the African countries there was a wait and see attitude towards which country would undertake the responsibility of direct intervention in a number of regional conflicts. The regional institutionalization of intervention into intrastate and interstate conflicts has witnessed robust regional military operations in Somalia, South Sudan, Darfur and coordinated operations against international terrorism. The advent of cyber insecurity poses an additional security threat that the regional mechanisms are yet to come to terms with. The Deutschian model advocates for deeper involvement of powerful states in the regional complex to undertake the responsibility to guide the trajectory of integration in a region. This may be true for a couple of regions but remains far-fetched in others. The SADC region has apparently accepted the hegemonic role of South Africa. This is true for the ECOWAS region too. However, the eastern, central and northern region still experience fluid leadership circumstances that require keen analysis of the interplay of the two capabilities. The analysis will necessitate deployment of skills to identify and characterize the capabilities to assuage hegemonic ambitions exhibited by Kenya and Ethiopia, Angola and Egypt Algeria and Morocco. Important to note are the ambitions of fledgling powers such as Uganda, Eritrea, Djibouti, Chad and Niger and Libya. Whereas conflict resolution seemed a straightforward operation involving the deployment of military and civilian contingents, it becomes more complex when regional dynamics are accounted for. Systems thinking enables the realization of win-win solutions in such complex arenas.

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Pillars of Systems Thinking for Regional Security Community Systems thinking has been demonstrated by Daniel McCauley in his analysis of decision-making for American national security to entail ‘seeing the structures that lie beneath complex issues, and for identifying high from low leverage change elements’ or ‘seeing the parts in the context of the whole’. It allows for ‘seeing interrelationships rather than things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static “snapshots”’ (McCauley, 2015). In the course of APSA’s existence, the African peace and security landscape has mutated to depict a complexity that requires innovative approaches that clearly identify its constituent components which according to McCauley includes consideration of system elements, interconnections and purpose and how the African peace and security system is nested in the wider international security system. He quotes Donnela Meadow thus: You cannot navigate well in an interconnected, feedback-dominated world unless you take your eyes off short-term events and look for longterm behaviour and structure; unless you are aware of false-boundaries and bounded rationality; unless you take into account limiting factors, non-linearities, and delays (McCauley, 2015).

The three basic components of a system can be integrated into the analysis of APSA framework and the African security community in general to facilitate the design of changes, adjustments or implementation of resolutions passed at the Peace and Security Council level. In retrospect, regional security studies, just like political studies, is not devoid of systems analysis, especially as it relates to the work of David Easton (1957). This approach to analysis of security identifies a set or patterns of political behaviours in the construction of political theory. In this work, we have made attempts to formulate a general theory of regional security anchored on the principles of systems thinking. In our considered view, a unified theory of regional security community, should be able to explain the behaviour of regional organizations, hence, compare the role played by different actors within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Also, the main purpose of the holistic theory would be to establish a criterion for identifying the important variables requiring

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investigation in the context of regional security community. Thus, analysis of various problems of regional security would be framed within the following components of systems thinking: Elements States are not the only organizing elements of a security community. Systems thinking requires identification and consideration of non-state actors as well and in the case of the African peace and security landscape to engage community-based actors, dynamics, values and interests in conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding programmes. These elements enable integration and cultivating a sense of community in enacting institutional procedures and processes for peaceful change. The elements enable interactive relations and democratize decision-making processes by engaging the array of stakeholders in the peace and security realms. In a security community, recognition of the array of stakeholders is fundamental in order to attain inclusive decision-making based on broad consultation. It thus enables pinpointing the leverage elements that may as well swing the decision-making process. The elements of a system are the most visible components which in most cases are localized and single-function focused. In the Deutschian security community model, the systemic elements (the group) drive the process of integration and enable cultivation of a sense of community. This group is implicitly a state or a group of states that come together. The implication of integration point to ‘the attainment of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough …’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 123). The institutions and practices implied in Deutsch’s definition comprise a process of institution building (both structure and rules) and behaviour that would define the postulated security community. In systems thinking analysis, structural elements of a system are easily manipulable parts that most often have been targeted to cause changes in complex systems (McCauley, 2015). However, focusing on and manipulating the structural elements, per se, may not promise sustainability and stability of the system. Actually, it may eventually destabilize the system in the process of instituting changes or effecting the policy resolutions. Unfortunately, most policies or resolutions aim to manipulate the basic structural elements in the hope that transformation will be attained.

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A basic structural element in the design of a security community is nevertheless the state. While having the advantage of exercising legal and popular sovereignty, states are the most recognizable building blocks, variously referred to as participating units, of a security community (Deutsch, 1968; Adler & Barnett, 1998). In modelling for the peace and security agenda on the continent or the constituent regional mechanisms of APSA, security designers focused primarily on the state as a principal actor. Notwithstanding the quality of the governance systems in the member states, the AU has identified the state as a significant leverage element in setting the regional security agenda. This ought to be closely re-examined. A powerful state will use its resources to influence the peace and security agenda in the region. A failed or failing state will destabilize the regional agenda and even make it possible for external intervention in the region. Furthermore, states in Africa have enjoyed the advantage of territorial integrity and sovereignty for decades as prerequisites of membership to the AU and its organs. Both principles have been at the core of statebuilding on the continent and formed a substantial political rallying point in conflict management by the OAU and now the AU. The organizations’ adherence to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states has, however, tended to undermine efforts of resolving a number of intrastate conflicts including a couple of interstate conflicts. To this extent, some conflicts have instead escalated so much that they have assumed regional dimensions. Until 1979, instability in Uganda was assumed to be an internal matter of the state. The regime’s excesses prompted unilateral intervention by Tanzanian armed forces to dislodge the military regime. Rwanda was for long a genocide project in the making since 1959. The consequent 1994 mass murder of over 800,000 people, notwithstanding domestic nature, jolted international attention and prompted France’s Operation Turquoise intervention. The DRC has been a sore thumb in the conscience of political development and governance on the continent. Conflict in the country, since the 1960s has acquired not only domestic but also regional and international dimensions. The list is long and growing. In late 2020, the conflict in Tigray was interpreted as a domestic Ethiopian matter that did not deserve the intervention of the AU. Special envoys of the AU were nevertheless dispatched within the first week of the conflict to engage the Ethiopian government and the Tigrayan regional leaders. The overtures were, however, rejected on the premise of it being an ‘internal domestic matter’. It has nevertheless generated a

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humanitarian crisis that the neighbours Sudan and Eritrea including international humanitarian organizations are keenly watching. In retrospect, Eritrea and South Sudan (now independent states) were once domestic matters of the original states. Just as Darfur in Sudan, Casamance in Senegal or Cabinda in Angola are recurrent domestic political issues of the participating units in the respective regional security mechanisms. There is always a chance that these domestic matters instigate state collapse and assume regional and international political dimensions. The potential of social, economic and political instability of participating units must always feature in the factor analysis of regional security. Preponderance of violence and instability of participating units should not be assumed to exist outside the regional peace and security agenda, but ought to be one of the elements in analysing the effectiveness of regional security communities. For a long time since 1963, the African pursuit of a security community has focused on setting up peace and security structures whose outcomes were later deemed dismal. The APSA emerged after the reform of the OAU which was adjudged to have been ineffective in managing the peace and security agenda on the continent. The African Union later designed a multilayered APSA structural framework to effect the peace and security agenda including conflict prevention, mediation and post-conflict peacebuilding. The design relied on an innovative principle of subsidiarity that assured ownership of peace and security initiatives at the regional level while the AU through the PSC retained the authoritative responsibility. In the process, the African Standby Force was established comprising five regional components each comprising principally the states in the host region and subject to the unique regional political and economic dynamics. For example, Vanheukelom and Desmidt have expressed themselves on the phenomenon of ‘swing states’ whose ruling elites tend to influence the dynamics of peace and conflict management in the respective regions to prevent conflict spillovers and hold on to power. In their view, hegemony is exercised by Nigeria, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa and Libya (Vanheukelom & Desmidt, 2019: 5). Similar scenarios can be discerned in the design of the Early Warning System and the Panel of the Wise. In all practical purpose, rarely do other stakeholders get engaged in the dynamics of conflict resolution, peacekeeping or peacebuilding at the regional level.

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The design of APSA, therefore, necessitates strong and visionary leadership at the Secretariat level and the regional mechanisms to manage not only the continental but also the subregional peace and security agenda. Such leadership energizes the complementary roles of the regional mechanisms and draws synergies through collaboration with the Standby Forces, Early Warning Systems, Panels of the Wise and the Peace Fund including other relevant players at the regional level. The design ought to further consider the extent to which the regional mechanism can act on behalf or in concert with the African Union. Such consideration takes care of conflicts of interest between the parties involved in conflict management. This has been apparent in conflict management initiatives within the ECCAS regional mechanism where cases of mistrust between the regional mechanism and the AU forces have impeded the conflict management process specifically in the Central African Republic. The Peace Fund is a critical element of APSA whose effective management assures prompt implementation of the continent’s peace and security commitments. Since the conception of the OAU and the AU, peace and security operations have been hampered by a lack of adequate funding leading to a general reliance on donor funding to-date. The decision by the AU to set up a Peace Fund, to be funded from the import activities of member states, was seen as a more effective way of addressing financial constraints affecting peace and security operations (African Union, 2016). This has nevertheless further been hampered by logistical problems at the state level. Interconnections The Deutschian security community model identifies a web of interconnections that links the key actors in a security community. The interconnections are enabled through established ‘institutions and practices, strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population’ (Deutsch, 1968: 123). These are manifested in political, economic and social exchanges that describe relations within the security community. Effective and sustainable adjustments in systems are assured through recognition of the interconnections of parts. It, therefore, discounts the single unbridled focus on individual elements in favour of relationships and connections among them. In social and political systems, interconnection enables ‘unbroken links of social communication between the

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political units concerned and between the politically relevant strata within them’ (Deutsch, 1968: 135). Further, McCauley (2015) points out, however, that: interconnections are typically invisible and consist of formal and informal relationships. The formal relationships are often expressed through stated processes and procedures; but the informal relationships, inherent within unstated culture, values, and individual personalities, often circumvent and undermine the formal processes. If a system’s interconnections or rules can be changed, then the system may be greatly altered. Policy changes are multi-point solutions as by changing the rules, most, if not all, of the elements are affected in some way (McCauley 2015).

The structural framework of APSA has been interpreted by Franke (2010) as organized complementarity in which polycentricism is recognized. The establishment of the regional security mechanisms and the linkage to the regional economic communities introduced a complex multilevel framework that ought to be rationalized to gain from synergized interconnections (Wachira, 2017). Instead of pursuing single focus agendas, the interconnections would energize the role of each for the benefit of the whole. The state as the principal actor has to address the democratic lethargy that is apparent in almost all states. Matala-Tala (2017) has pointed out that the appeal to adhere to shared values as a guide to the peace and security agenda has been drowned out by state practices that infringe on the AU declared values shared values of democracy and rule of law. He states In Africa, peace still struggles to take root in everyday life following chronic political instability. The regularity with which constitutional changes are made to keep the leading president and government in power, the lack of free elections and the failure to respect pluralism are a hindrance to the implementation of the rule of law, even when several AU values emanate directly from it: the rejection of impunity, political assassination and unconstitutional changes of government. (Matala-Tala, 2017: 31–32)

Reforms in the state governance systems across the continent, therefore, will ‘open the eyes of securocrats’ that see others in the political community and beyond as stakeholders in the regional peace and security initiatives. In essence, democratic regimes possess the will and legitimacy

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to manage peace and security agendas in their respective regional security communities where recognition of diversity and plurality of actors provides effective responses to conflict and political instability. Peace and security will be considered a collective good that eliminates fear of the unknown within and outside the national boundaries. In defining a security community, Deutsch et al. emphasized on integration in either amalgamated or pluralistic communities. This implied the ‘attainment of a sense of community’, that is, the ‘belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 123). The establishment of a sense of community was predicated on efficient interconnections that were animated by frequent communication among social and political units. Formal relationships are interstate processes that enhance formal contacts between officials as well as institutions. Informal relationships are established through a number of social processes, which Deutsch et al. in elaborating on a sense of community, consisted of ‘mutual sympathy and loyalties; of “we feeling,” trust, and mutual considerations; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviour and of cooperative action in accordance with it’. In other words, the authors implied the recognition of the way of life of the people—their culture. A sense of community that was relevant to integration, they summarized, was simply ‘a matter of a perpetual dynamic process of mutual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness in the process of decision making’ (Deutsch et al., 1957: 129). Formal and informal processes are, however, not distinct. They impact and reinforce each other. To what extent is interconnection a feature of APSA? Notwithstanding the inadequacies discerned in the conflict responses on the continent, the African Union (2019), within the APSA framework, has affirmed the formal support and collaborative interconnections developed with the regional mechanisms. Since 2013 when the AU made a declaration to end violent conflicts by 2020 (dubbed Silencing Guns by 2020), efforts have been made to cultivate close collaboration between the AU, regional Mechanisms (RM) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs). The key components of APSA have been capacitated to engage in conflict prevention, mitigation and management including peacebuilding. The tools in the conflict management toolbox include the Continental Early

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Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, Special Envoys and ad hoc mediation panels, deploying liaison offices and ‘special political missions’ in conflict risk countries. The reliance on military intervention, however, implies the inadequacies encountered with the rest of the conflict management tools. This has been witnessed in the response to the activities of the Lord’s Resistance Army, Boko Haram around Lake Chad, Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Multinational Joint Task Force in Benin. It has also been experienced in the apparent docility of the Special Envoy deployment to Ethiopia over the political crisis in the Tigray region (UN, 2020). External actors have been a permanent feature in the peace operations of the African Union. Whereas the peace and security agenda is typically an African business as typified in finding African Solutions to African Problems, external actors have continued to involve themselves either in funding peace operations or through direct and often indirect intervention in specific conflicts (Ismail & Skons, 2014). In a number of cases, the external actors have driven the agenda of peace and conflict management in some African countries, for instance the UN and US involvement in Somalia during the 1990s Operation Restore Hope and French unilateral deployment in conflicts in Francophone states in West Africa including Rwanda in 1994. In other cases, they have worked in concert with the African Union for instance in the conflicts in Darfur in Sudan and Abyei in South Sudan. The external involvement in the African theatre of conflict can, therefore, not be wished away during the design of conflict resolution strategies. Interconnections in systems thinking have also been discerned in the interstate conduct of cultural and economic cooperation especially through the promotion of regional economic integration. The growth of regional economic integration on the continent has been phenomenal as depicted by the number of regional economic institutions and regimes that have sprung up to promote close trade relations among African countries. This amplifies the importance of background conditions and especially the ‘strong economic ties’ that Deutsch et al. identified as helpful for success or failure of integrative processes (Deutsch et al., 1957: 133). In the security communities studied by Deutsch et al. it was found that ‘it was apparently important for each of the participating territories or populations to gain some valued services or opportunities’. In addition, it was essential that the flow of rewards from the cooperation happens over a period of time especially in form of prestige or material benefits. Furthermore, background conditions identified in the model included ‘ethnic or

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linguistic assimilation’ which in Africa’s case may not be so essential as well due to the ethnic and language diversity of the continent. However, these aspects of interconnection among the peoples and institutions in the regional participating units carry specific value in the functioning and consolidation of the operations of the regional institutions mandated with peace and security responsibilities. The emphasis on ‘strong economic ties’ is more relevant to the African RSC as it has been emphasized as the building bloc to continental integration. Purpose The preceding literature highlights the key purpose of a security community to be the resolution of social problems through peaceful change. The security community is expected to provide the real assurance that disputes will be resolved in a non-violent manner, that is, the use of alternative approaches in resolving social problems. Thus it ought to invest in processes that aim to achieve the purpose of achieving and sustaining peace and security in the respective regions. These processes entail ‘institutionalized procedures’ that enable the functions of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding and peace transformation. However, attainment of effectiveness in the functions requires the integration of systems thinking processes especially in enabling the manipulation of the system purpose to fit prevailing social, economic and political contexts. Stuart Burge emphasizes in this respect that ‘when creating a new system or modifying an existing one, it is done in order that the resultant system does something useful … The purpose of a system is a property of the whole and not in any of the components’ (Burge, 2015: 1). Whereas systems exist for a specific purpose, with the passage of time, some systems tend to divert into secondary or unstated purposes. When purposes change, the whole system definitely changes including the capacity and ability of structural elements and their interconnections (McCauley, 2015). Burge refers to this type of system as ‘evolved system’ that has a start date but no definite end date and is designed to evolve into multipurpose vehicles. According to him, a system purpose is designed to logically achieve lower level purposes, in the first instance, which in the case of APSA corresponds with its hierarchical, organized and multilayered complexity and overlap (Franke, 2010).

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The change of system purpose, however, takes time. The transformation of the OAU into the AU occurred at a time when the original purpose and operational modalities of the OAU had virtually been rendered redundant (Thobane et al., 2007). Almost all states on the continent had become politically independent, the informal Frontline States organization had become moribund, democratic credentials and principles were progressively being devalued by incumbent leaders, the principle of non-interference into member states’ affairs was no longer credible, and individual member state economies were increasingly being marginalized at the global level. The African social, economic and political scenario had been characterized by instability in form of intrastate civil wars, marginal contact among states, coup d’états and mass murders culminating into what Tony Blair termed as the ‘scar on the conscience of the world’ (Whelan, 2005). The AU was established to remedy this and refocus continental development by deepening integration for prosperity and peace. This was later aptly captured in its Agenda 2063 (African Union, 2015). In its Agenda 2063 and specifically Aspiration 4, the AU Commission purposed to have a ‘peaceful and secure continent with harmony among communities starting at grassroots level. The management of our diversity will be a source of wealth, harmony and social and economic transformation rather than a source of conflict’. Furthermore, the continent aspires to establish functional mechanisms for peaceful prevention and resolution of conflicts at all levels while prioritizing ‘dialogue-centered conflict prevention and resolution’. Guns were expected to have been silenced by 2020 and a culture of peace and tolerance would be nurtured in all the continent’s children (African Union, 2015: 6). The refocusing of AU agenda necessitated a robust and novel peace and security architecture whose approach to peace and security would be more holistic and less atomistic. The organized complementarity and polycentricism of APSA as alluded to Franke (2010) provides peace and security design challenges to the AU especially that of developing conflict prevention approaches that are devoid of the traditionalism experienced in the past. The complexity of the African conflict environment caused the design of a multilayered peace and security architecture whose operations demand extensive physical and non-physical resources. The regional mechanisms also run the risk of undertaking conflict resolution initiatives albeit autonomously and in direct contradistinction with the objects of the PSC. The engagement of

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some regional mechanisms, more especially AMU and NARC, and IGAD and EASF have a special challenge of unforeseen but interested foreign actors. For example, the Arab League that has interests in North African countries, and the Horn of Africa states of Djibouti and Somalia (King, 1978). It behoves of the security designers, therefore, to consider both the regional and external dynamics of peace and conflict in respective subregions on the continent. In their analysis of peaceful change, Adler and Barnett (1998) stressed on the behaviour of participating units in the face of organized violence. They should not expect nor prepare ‘for organized violence as a means to settle interstate disputes’. This implies that participating units ‘do not undertake—indeed, do not consider—security actions that can be interpreted by others within the community as militarily threatening’ (Adler & Barnett, 1998: 34). There is thus no need for institutionalized unilateral arrangements to secure peace on one’s territory. It is instructive here to note, however, that military spending by African countries has been on the rise in the years between 2000 and 2019. According to the Defense Web (2020), military spending on the continent increased by 17% in 2019. North African countries accounted for 57% of this total amidst ‘long-standing tensions between Algeria and Morocco, domestic insurgencies and continuing civil war in Libya’. Algeria spent far more (44%) than any country in the region. Comparatively, military expenditure in the sub-Saharan region in the same period fell by 2%. South Africa and Nigeria were the highest spenders in their respective security regions. It has been argued that conflict and the fear of it are the major drivers of the volatile nature of military spending in sub-Saharan Africa. In the ECCAS region, the Central African Republic and DRC recorded increased military spending due to the conflicts in the territories. In the Horn or eastern Africa increased military was registered in Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya in the same period due to the activities of Al-Shabaab in the region. Conflict resolution institutions and practices on the African continent have been pursued on reactionary premises. Nevertheless, the existing structure of APSA reflects a mode of preparedness and expectation for the eventuality of conflicts or disputes in participating units at regional level. However, the reactionary attitude in many of the regional mechanisms can be interpreted to mean a lack of preparedness on the part of the APSA framework to nip the conflicts in the bud. This has tended to attract half-hearted belated condign measures that do not necessarily have an impact on the conflict at hand.

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Conclusion The establishment of a continent-wide security complex on the African continent remains a work in progress considering the complexity of the existing cultural, identity and value milieu. The Deutschian model provides a peek into the possibilities of establishing a security complex that conforms to the envisaged interdependence and interconnectedness. The initial attempt at establishing a continent-wide security organization that would address Africa’s security and development concerns did not succeed despite the strong pan-African ideological beliefs and credentials that the leaders of the continent’s independent states possessed. The context of the drive to African unity was so varied that the resultant ideological fissures overwhelmed the shared aspiration of a united Africa. The Cold War effects further erased any dreams of uniting Africans who were presumed to possess shared identities, values and meanings that would have driven the efforts towards an Afrocentric Organization of African Unity (OAU). The OAU resultantly drifted away from the vision of unity as it witnessed interstate and intrastate violence buoyed by the organization’s principle of non-interference and practical indifference at the internal affairs of member states. The Deutschian model highlights the importance of endogenous values and identities in shaping a common goal. This happened in the Western world. The African continent grapples with a clash of civilizations. So far the Western mode of life assisted by the forces of globalization has an upper hand that has swept traditional identities, values and interests under the carpet. The continent’s colonial history introduced a Eurocentric civilization that altered the cultural and political identity of the African personality. The indigenous cultural identity and practices were largely demonized and marginalized through cultural socialization institutions and processes such as the education system and new forms of worship. The clash of traditional and Western civilizations has marked the tragedy of the African’s existentialism to-date. For instance, the introduction of individualism clashed with communocentric practices of African societies. The attempts at developing a security community be it at continental or region levels encounters such realities on the ground. Colonial civilization on the continent necessitated the adoption of new languages of communication that was expectedly the victor’s language. The peoples of the continent today are categorized either as Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone or Hispanophone. These descriptions initially

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influenced the coalescing of states during the formation of regional organizations. Indigenous Afrocentric descriptions such as Bantu, Swahili, Zulu or Arab have been devalued to the extent that they are not the instrumental conveyors of shared identities, values and meanings of the African people. They have been devalued to represent subcultural identities, values and interests. This has happened even as the AU pushes for cultivating a personality based on ‘shared values and identity’ and panAfrican solidarity. Attempts at forming subregional security complexes remain hampered by imposed Eurocentric identities in the first instance. Change needs to happen to enable negotiated interdependence and interconnections among the regional mechanisms on the continent. The African Peace and Security Architecture ought to integrate an innovative approach in the design of its regional initiatives. The adoption of systems thinking enables seeing hidden relationships that tend to escape the design of security initiatives. There is need to incorporate feedback loops in all scenarios in order to unveil unanticipated or unseen circumstances. Systems modelling at the regional level highlights the various roles that pertinent actors play in the various phases of a conflict. It will enable an understanding of the domestic and external actors, their interconnections and the leverage elements that drive conflict. It will enable the redesign of the purposes of the regional mechanisms with an aim of identifying leverage points that may drive change.

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Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). Politics among nations. The struggle for power and peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Muriithi, T. (2006). African approaches to building peace and solidarity. Accessed 20 Dec 2020. https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/african-approaches-tobuilding-peace-and-social-solidarity/. Ngoma, N. (2005). Prospects for security community in Southern Africa: An analysis of regional security in the southern African development community. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. Njiofor, J. (2018). African traditional socio-political ideals, democratic values, and the development of African states. International Journal of African Society, Cultures and Tradition, 6(2), 1–10. Ogwu, U. J. (2008). ECOWAS and regional security challenges. In H. G. Brauch et al. (Eds.), Globalization and environmental challenges. Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace (Vol. 3). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75977-5_62. Parsons, T. (1962). Toward a general theory of action. Harvard University Press. Rapatsa, M. (2011). Ubuntu and capabilities approach: Basic doctrines for calibrating humanitarian action (pp. 15–19). https://doi.org/10.1515/eras2016-0002. Accessed 12 Dec 2020. Rotich, M. (2014). Struggling with formal and informal trade barriers: Challenges facing long distance truck drivers in East African community. Eastern Africa Policy Center. Accessed 20 Dec 2020. https://www.atlasnetwork. org/assets/uploads/misc/Struggling_With_Formal_and_Informal_Trade_Bar riers_in_East_Africa.pdf. Russett, B. (1998). A neo-Kantian perspective: Democracy, interdependence, and international organization in building security communities. In E. Adler & M. Barnett (Eds.), Security communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Söderbaum, F., & Hettne, B. (2009). Regional security in a global perspective. In U. Engel, J. Gomes Porto, & D. Bond (Eds.), Africa’s new peace and security architecture: Promoting norms and institutionalizing solutions. Burlington: Ashgate. Thobane, B., Neethling, T., & Vrey, F. (2007). Migration from the OAU to AU: Exploring the quest for a more effective African peacekeeping capability. Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Supplementa 2. https://doi.org/10.5787/0-0-40. Thompson, K. (1958). Political community and the North Atlantic area: International organization in the light of historical experience. By Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond E. Lindgren, Francis L. Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen. Book Review. American Political Science Review, 52(2), 531–533.

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Tusicisny, A. (2007). Security communities and their values: Taking the masses seriously. International Political Science Review, 28(4), 425–449. https://doi. org/10.1177%2F0192512107079639. UNCTAD. (2015). The continental free trade area: Making it work for Africa. Policy brief No 44. New York, NY: United Nations. UNICEF. (2017). Generation 2030. Africa 2.0. Prioritizing investment in children to reap the demographic dividend. New York, NY: UNICEF. United Nations. (2020). Appointment of AU envoys for Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis an ‘initiative for peace’: UN chief. UN News. https://news.un.org/en/story/ 2020/11/1078272. Accessed 28 Nov 2020. United States Congress. (1967). Congressional record: Proceedings and Debates of US Congress, Volume 113, Part 19. Congressional Record—Senate September 20, 1967. pp. 26218–26220. Vanheukelom, J., & Desmidt, S. (2019). Regional peace architecture in Africa. A reality check (Discussion Paper No. 249). Maastricht: ECDPM. Van Wagenen, W. R. (1965, Summer). The concept of community and the future of the United Nations. International Organization, 19(3), 812–827. https:// doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300012595. Vesa, U. (1999). Prospects of security communities: On the relevance of Karl W. Deutsch’s Contribution. Peace Research, 31(1), 18–25. Von Brentano, H., Davies, C. Dayal, R., Mackay, R. G., Pearson, L. B., & Yang, Y. C. (1954). Expanding the United Nations community: Analysis and proposition by R. W. Van Wagenen. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/000271 625429600112. Wachira, G. M. (2017). Strengthening the peace and governance nexus within the African Union: Enhancing synergy between the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). NUPI Report No 7. Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Waever, O. (1998). Insecurity, security, and asecurity in the West European non-war community. In E. Adler & M. Barnett (Eds.), Security communities. Cambridge studies in international relations (pp. 69–118). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Whelan, R. (2005). Healing the scar of Africa. Accessed 19 Dec 2020. http:// www.civitas.org.uk/pdf/G8.pdf. Wulf, H., & Debiel, T. (2009). Conflict early warning and response mechanisms: Tools for enhancing the effectiveness of regional organisations? A comparative study of the AU, ECOWAS, IGAD, ASEAN/ARF and PIF . Crisis States Research Centre Working Papers Series 2 (49). London, UK: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science. Wulf, H., & Dabiel, T. (2010). Systemic disconnect: Why regional organizations fail to use early warning and response mechanisms. Global Governance, 16(4), 525–547.

CHAPTER 2

Approaches to Regional Security Analysis

Introduction Regional security challenges have been subjected to different kinds of analysis since the beginning of collective security thought. Various explanatory methods and approaches have been adopted to enhance the understanding of regional security regime. An approach is, therefore, a set of orientations to examining peace and security regimes. The approaches are useful in advancing the systematic analysis of the peace and security phenomenon. The systematic examination of the security phenomenon takes place on the basis of a set of assumptions about the importance of certain factors including institutions, value systems, geopolitics and collectivism. By using a particular set of concepts and constructs, a security analytical approach seeks to provide a framework of explanation and prediction. A convenient way of categorizing the different approaches to analysis of peace and security threats is to classify them on the basis of time dimension. Approaches are classified into (a) traditional and (b) contemporary/or non-traditional. Globally, traditional and contemporary threats to the security of a state and the organizations of countries or regions have received significant attention (Bulling, 2016; Paladini, 2019). Traditional security threats, usually military in nature and non-traditional security threats which refer to factors other than military, political and diplomatic conflicts pose a challenge to the survival and development of a sovereign state and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. Onditi et al., Reimagining Security Communities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70869-6_2

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humankind as a whole (Choo, 2020). Examples of non-traditional security threats include cybersecurity, disaster relief, climate change, terrorism, transnational crime and public health epidemics, among others (Bulling, 2016). Mely Caballero-Anthony asserts that the non-traditional security threats tend to be non-military in nature and transnational in scope. Thus, they are neither purely domestic nor purely interstate; they occur at very short notice and spread out rapidly due to globalization; they defy coping mechanisms and are resistant to national solutions. They require regional and multilateral cooperation characterized by the fact that the object of scrutiny is not only the state but the people within and across the countries (Caballero-Anthony, 2007). Burgess (2008) explains that no one state can fend off threats to its security, nor anyone state can manage risks to the safety of its neighbours from both inside and outside of its region. Contemporary security analysis is no longer considered as conditioned only upon geopolitics and military strength, but also on social, economic, cultural, moral, neighbourliness and environmental issues. This underlying reason propels the impetus for a regional security community, that is, the coming together of states to prepare jointly against threats to their internal and external security. The notion of security community was proposed by Karl Deutsch and his collaborators in 1957. They argue that people making up a community are unified by a sense of community, identifying themselves as a particular group, distinct from the rest. Deutsch et al. (1957: 5), in their seminal book: ‘Political Communities and the North Atlantic Area,’ defined a securitycommunity, ‘as a group of people which has become integrated by a sense of community, that is, a belief on the part of individuals in the group that they have agreed on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change.’

The contemporary modes of analysis of peace and security threats have their roots in this communitarian thinking. Their underlying assumption is that members of the community will not fight each other physically, rather they will explore peaceful dispute settlement mechanisms. It needs to be emphasized, however, that this classification is a very crude one— the idea that the community manifests common compatible values as a way of life and will pursue the same political goals remains problematic in most regional security communities, the world over, especially in Africa

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where the lack of a systems approach to planning of security intervention often derails progress towards a common security agenda. Over the years, attempts have been made to resolve the ‘system’ problem in the regional security community arrangement. On this front, Bah (2005) explains that members of the regional security community (RSC) are interlinked by ‘security externality’. Also, he describes a regional system as a ‘set of states affected by at least one transborder, but local, externality that arises from a particular geographical region. A regional security system or complex emanates from local externalities that pose an actual or potential threat to the physical safety of individuals or governments in the other states’. Similarly, constructivists have utilized the contemporary lens to reconceptualize security communities as socially constructed phenomena, imagined or cognitive regions, whose borders transcends traditional geographical borders (Acharya, 1998; Tusicisny, 2007). For example, Australia is a remote member of a wider ‘Western security community’ or members of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) who are geographically dispersed. Acharya (1998) frames the concept of security communities into two regimes. First, the critical structures in the state system are intersubjective rather than material. Second, the state identities and interests are essential parts constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics. Thus, the constructivist approach characterizes a regional security community as follows: (i) states, especially liberal ones, construct security communities sharing similar identities (ii) the shared norms, values and identities created by social interactions makes communities exogenous to the state and lead to overemphasizing the harmony of social relations and (iii) shared values and common identities of the members of security communities guarantee their continuous existence. However, Väyrynen (2000), cautions that the presence of common identities should not be the sole precondition for the emergence of a security community. Rather, as illustrated in the following section, the global system presents a complex value system and interest, hence security communities are unique to different regions.

Traditional Approaches Traditional approaches to regional security cannot be understood separately from traditional threats to regional and international security. Traditionalists view threats to regional security as those that threaten the

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state’s territorial integrity, values and political sovereignty. The state is also seen as the main perpetrator of these threats. Similarly, traditional threats are often viewed as being military-oriented and achieved through means such as armament systems, weapons and the military. There are diplomatic actions such as alliance building and pacts that evolve to strengthen relations among states with similar security interests thus becoming the basis of traditional security cooperation or community. Approaches in examining security communities have been strongly embedded in regionalism and especially geographically shaped regionalism. However, the concept of regionalism has not received much attention from standard IR scholarship. It does not feature in major works of scholars such as Kenneth Waltz’s (1979), Alexander Wendt (1999), or even the debates that have sharply divided (neo) realists and (neo) liberals (Baldwin, 1993). This can be associated with the assumptions of theorists represented by the historian William McNeill (1963) who argue that the world has not, at least since the Westphalia, been subsystem but always been a product of human interactions leading to a global ecumene, world society or interactive zone. That makes examining regional security difficult unless the concept of regionalism is well understood. For purpose of this chapter, we will adopt three levels of examining regional security cooperation and classify them into three categories (traditional, nontraditional, and postmodern). Instead of looking at the regional aspect of security cooperation, we use securitization as the basis of categorizing traditional, non-traditional and postmodern approaches. By adopting this method, we explore the motivation or threats that push countries to form regional security communities and how these are affected by a change in threats and structure of the international system. Using a systems thinking lens we discern the motivations for forming a security community, either from a systems structural or threats perspective. Alliances Perhaps one of the oldest forms of cooperation at the international and regional level, the concept of alliances undoubtedly remains crucial in IR theory. Alliances are designed for purposes of attack or defence (by a form of military means) against an internal or external opponent or threat. According to Snyder’s (1991) view ‘alliances … are formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, intended for either the security or the agreement of their members, against specific other states...’

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(p. 140). Walt (1987) considers it as ‘a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states’ (p. 12). Its significance can perhaps be closely associated with a view of realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau (1959: 169) who opines that ‘the historically most important manifestation of the balance of power... is to be found... in the relations between one nation or alliance and another alliance’. Wright (1965: 773) adds that ‘alliances and regional coalitions among the weak to defend themselves from the strong have been the typical method for preserving balance’. The liberals’ notion of stability is derived from economic interdependence and not military capabilities; alliances do play an important role here too (Oneal et al., 1996). This is because alliances not only facilitate but also influence beneficial and mutual economic gains which in turn lead to stability. Looking at the complexity of the current international arena, perhaps the impact of alliances would be less significant as states are facing multidimensional threats. This approach is highly effective when dealing with a specific threat posed by a specific opponent or enemy. However, a situation where a country faces multiple threats from different actors both from within and outside the states needs a more elaborate approach similar to what we saw emerge in 1950 known as security communities. To a large extent, the traditional approach to building a security community relates to the Deutschian definition (Deutsch et al., 1957: 5). As expressed in Chapter 1, a security community is basically a group of people who have become ‘integrated’. The definition tends to conform to the need to build alliances based on the compatibility of values that reflect a sense of community. Western values, of course, provided the gateway to the formation of Western alliances in the post-Second World War period. This saw the formation of alliances comprising a membership of countries in disparate geographical zones. The result has been a realization, over time, of a culture of peaceful change as envisaged by Deutsch and his collaborators. The process of alliance building, however, created a hegemonic environment that fostered dependence instead of interdependence. This contradicts the systems thinking criterion of interdependence of the parts that assure system functionality, sustainability and stability. The integration of African states into the Western model of alliance building assured not only the global hegemonic ambitions of the USA but also the division of the continent into competing East–West alliances (Coker, 1985). Thus, African countries were labelled according to their

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allegiance to the preferred alliance and determined their access to security and development resources. The continent’s subsequent global marginalization reflects its position in the global political community of states. Thus, from an African perspective, the traditional approach of alliance building dislocated the African desire to build a regional security community founded on the African way of life. The entire Cold War period witnessed a preponderance of disjointed identities and incoherent and incompatible values that did not provide a foundation for cultivating a sense of community. State-Centric Security Community In-depth scholarship on state-centric security communities gained momentum in the early 1950s and is credited to the works of van Wegenen and Karl Deutsch who at the time were attempting to examine the motivations of post-World War II integration among European states. The international environment at the time made such an approach highly plausible given the legitimacy given to means such as annexation or partition of a state by others as a means of maintaining the balance of power. While such actions are not permissible today, given that respect for the sovereignty of states is granted without exemption, in the past, being part of a community of states was one of the most important means of ensuring one’s survival in a rather dangerous international system. Proponents of the idea of security community provided two types of classification namely; the pluralistic type and the other is the amalgamated type. An amalgamated security community occurs through a ‘formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single larger unit’ (Hess, 1995; Deutsch et al., 1957). This explains the formal fusion of two or more hitherto independent units into a single larger unit, with some form of common government after unification. The new form of joint government could be unitary or federal. The USA is a typical example of an amalgamated security community. It became a single government unit by the formal merger of previously independent units. The supreme decision-maker at the centre performs many vital functions, including the provision of security (Crawford, 2006). A pluralistic security community denotes a community where member states maintain ‘the legal independence of formal government’ (Gause, 2013; Deutsch et al., 1957). It explains the coming together of two or more independent units, but each of the units retains its separate government (Pfaltzgraff, 2020).

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Thus, in a pluralistic security community, there are two or more separate governmental units in a single security community. There are two or more supreme decision-makers in a pluralistic security community. The combined territory of the USA and Canada is a typical example of a pluralistic security community (Hyde-Price, 1997). Hyde-Price (1997) observes that any political community was eventually successful if it became a security community, that is, if it achieved integration, be it amalgamated or pluralistic. A political community is unsuccessful if it ended eventually in secession or civil war (Deutsch et al., 1957). The integration of European states had resulted in a large security community consisting mainly of industrialized countries. Unlike other traditional models of collective security such as alliances, interaction within a security community is often characterized by more sustained, intense and comprehensive engagements. It attempts to maximize the gains of the sum of its parts by broadening the scope and mandate of the community to different threats as well as ensuring the risk of conflict among the members is eliminated. Non-European regions such as Asia and Africa have also made efforts to establish security communities through ambitious plans, but most often the concept of security among these groups remains poorly understood. The works of Buzan and Wæver (2003) on the regional security complex (RSC) theory dominate the study of security communities. Between 1998 and 2003, the theory was substantially modified to keep up with the changing trends in international relations and within the international system. In its original form, the theory is largely state-centric and assumes that RSC consists of state actors that are geographically close to each other. Given their regional proximity and the regional nature of threats, proponents of the regional complex theory argue that member states of an RSC comprise specific sets ‘whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another’ (Buzan & Wæver, 2003: 48–49). At the heart of this approach, which strongly leans towards regionalism, are issues touching on insecurity and peace. These concerns lead to relations that are socially constructed with the aim of overcoming collective threats. Noteworthy, although studies on regional integration that began in the 1950s and 60s appeared to focus more on economic development, more fundamentally, these studies were concerned with security and peace (Apuuli, 2016). A majority of these studies presented the African nation

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state as largely incapable of self-sustainability and whose security was assured through cooperation with contiguous states. Traditionally, nonstate actors were not seen as serious rivals to the state as is the case today. Some theories such as functionalism, neofunctionalism and federalism illuminate the assumption of states being threats to regional security. For example, federalism, often considered as a programme rather than a theory, sought to redesign the state as it were. Although federalism was an important motivation for European integration, it was sceptical of nation states. Functionalism, on the other hand, prescribes the source of peace as being above the nation state meaning through a collective community of states. Mitrany (1966) is credited for the idea of functionalism and sought to examine the political level that had the capacity to meet the needs of people. He argued that these needs can best be achieved when efforts are made collectively at the regional level. This includes achieving objectives for security and peace. In other words, both functionalism and federalism view the state as a problem that should be gotten rid of in different means. Furthermore, neofunctionalism focuses on regional building and the advantages that would accrue for the security of its members. Its proponents such as Haas (1958) developed the European regional building theory which Deutsch et al. (1957) had described as ‘the attainment of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population’ (Deutsch, 1988: 194). In other words, Deutsch equates European regionalism to a security community. Given that pluralistic security community has become widespread in contemporary international relations, the connections made between security and integration is one of the vital strengths of the approach they pioneered. Another strength of the approach is that it provides a bridge between the negative and positive concepts of peace. In most cases, some peace researchers, particularly in Germany and Scandinavia, have made a clear distinction between the two concepts. They defined negative peace as the absence of large-scale inter-state war and positive peace as the elimination of structural violence and the development of socially just communities (Wallensteen, 2011). Deutsch and his colleagues focused not only on the negative task of ‘eliminating war’, that is, eliminating largescale organized violence, but domestic political changes delegitimizing war and to the greater international integration and cooperation. Thus,

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they proposed a strategy for building security communities through integration. In effect, they offer an approach for creating the preconditions for a positive peace characterized by responsive and just communities (Tusicisny, 2007). Deutsch et al. (1957) argued that integration requires some form of organization to function. Thus, their work provides a connection to the ‘new institutionalism’, which is essential to their notion of security community. They went on to argue that the way to integration, be it domestic or international, is through the achievement of a sense of community that underpins institutions. Further, they argued that an increased sense of community would invigorate existing institutions, be it supranational or international (Perez, 2009).

Features of Traditional Approach In the traditional approach to formation of security communities approach, characterized by the nature of perceived threats, the state is a central feature. In this approach, and according to Buzan and Wæver (2003), three elements are important in understanding traditional security cooperation, that is, polarity (integration versus anarchy), threat construction processes (de-securitization versus securitization) and relations between the actor (enmity versus amity). In the traditional approach, the main objective of forming regional security communities is to prevent other states from threatening the sovereignty, values and territorial integrity of the member states. This approach gives realists a testing ground for their assumptions which emphasize the volatility of alliance, the high proneness of war, the absence of strong institutions at the international and regional level as well as hard power (David, 1991). Nonetheless, the absence of this institution nor the limited extent of regionalism does not mean that there is anarchy at the regional level. Which would otherwise mean the lack of hierarchy as well as shifting power perceptions and ranking of the regional states. Instead, under the traditional approach, regionalism among states creates a form of heterarchical order. A heterarchy establishes an order system where power is distributed to the extent that the system does not experience domination from any constituent part. According to Miura (2014), a heterarchy possesses a flexible structure made up of interdependent units, and the relationships between those units are characterized by multiple intricate linkages

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that create circular paths rather than hierarchical ones. Heterarchies are networks of actors—each of which may be made up of one or more hierarchies—that are variously ranked according to different metrics. A heterarchy is a multicentric network of heterogeneous actors with distinctive resources and capabilities. Such a structure arguably makes an organization more productive and gives it the ability to adapt to rapid changes. However, they become more effective when their functions are embedded in the systemic structure of the organization to assist in holistic decision-making.

Weaknesses of Traditional Approaches Traditional approaches to regional security face various challenges that necessitate reforms in the way these communities are designed, formulated and implemented. For example, looking at the alliance framework, which is a dominant element of the traditional approach, the impact of anarchy undermines its effectiveness. The lack of exogenous mechanisms to force the implementation of agreements means alliances can only be sustained in as far as the members are willing and able to enforce them. The extent of cooperation mainly depends on the ability of the members in the alliance to agree on a particular course of action. These constraints are not only limited to the practical aspect of the approach but also the weaknesses of the theory. For example, Riker’s (1962) framework, one of the main proponents of the alliance approach, only explains the circumstances surrounding the formation of an alliance but fails to explain the mode of implementation of the ensuing agreements. Furthermore, the traditional approach is challenged by the notion of building a security community. The security community approach attempts to address the challenges that undermined the effectiveness of alliances. For example, the European countries have been able to eradicate conflict among the states but have struggled to deal with conflicts within the states such as the protracted crises in Northern Ireland and Catalonia. Furthermore, the overemphasis of states as the source of threats overlooks other threats such as the COVID-19 pandemic that has affected Europe much harder than other parts of the world, as well as terrorism which continues to manifest itself in major cities of Europe. Human and drug trafficking have also not been sufficiently dealt with despite the EU’s experience in dealing with traditional threats.

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The traditional approach has also been criticized for neglecting nonstate objects as key aspects of security. The most prominent of this is the lack of emphasis on the safety and security of the individual. Newman (2001) argues that contemporary and future discussion of security must encompass human security that includes the goal of protecting individuals’ lives, freedoms and security. Traditional security approaches and the objective of the traditional security community that focus on the survival of the state are seen as failing the core mandate of security by not taking seriously the health, life and material welfare of individuals. This does not mean that state security is inconsequential since the lack of state security has the potential to affect human security. What is important to note is that both human and national security issues are closely intertwined although not mutually exclusive, they tend to be complementary. Given that military threats and responses did characterize the international system and mainstream IR theory such as realism, other threats such as food security, environmental hazards, climate change, resource depletion, underdevelopment and public health are reduced to low political status. Yet increasing globalization and economic interdependence have elevated some non-military issues to become significant domestic, regional and international importance. Thus given the limitation on the traditional approach to recognize other non-military threats and concerns at the national level, the establishment of regional security communities tends to ease their identification, measurement and prioritization. Over the past half-century, there has been a considerable rise in regional security communities (Fawcett, 2010). This provides concrete evidence of the regional security dimension of global security. Before WWII, there were few formal global, regional and other bodies that dealt with security issues. Except for the League of Nations, few institutions dealt explicitly with security issues. Barely few institutions claimed the title ‘regional’, even if they displayed regional characteristics. However, in the aftermath of WWII, the number of security communities has grown steadily. The term regional institution or organization is often used to describe a limited group of countries, usually located within the same geographical area, who come together for cooperation and dialogue. While there is a clear delineation of the function of the institutions to include ‘multipurpose’, that is, economic and security organizations, membership to these organizations cut across continents and includes different countries with different backgrounds, ideology, identity, levels of

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developments and priorities. These many actors lead to confusion when dealing with a crisis. More fundamentally, the traditional approach to the establishment of security communities tends to be biased towards protection largely of the interests of privileged classes and the central government while the interest of ordinary citizens is overlooked. This means that the beneficiaries of the traditional approach to security are the privileged groups in the society as well as the central government institutions such as the military which enjoys increased budget and authority. The traditional approach is thus seen as an ideological approach aiming to maintain sociopolitical and economic structures of a few within the society. By focusing on the state, critiques argue that the social, political and cultural institutions that are instituted in the guise of national security demote citizen’s welfare to secondary needs. Furthermore, focusing on traditional security approaches and systems including regional security communities makes the response to new threats slow and rigid. In an era of threats from nonstate actors, traditional security communities have failed to sufficiently adjust to the new paradigm and dynamics that threaten both the state and non-state actors.

Non-traditional Approach/Contemporary Approaches Having looked at the traditional approach to security and regional security communities, we will examine the non-traditional approach. Indeed, there is a clear distinction between the old wave of regionalism also referred to as regional integration, and the new generation of regionalism. Regionalism is important in distinguishing the nature and characteristics of security communities. Starting from late 1980, there has been a new wave of cooperation and integration among actors at the international level with specific influence from what we consider as globalization. As a result of globalization, there are many ways in which threats, actors and challenges overlap at the regional and international level (Telò, 2013; Bøås et al., 2003; Hettne et al., 1999; Söderbaum & Shaw, 2003). According to Hettne (2002), contemporary regionalism can be understood in two ways. First from an endogenous perspective whereby a large number of different actors in a region shape the nature of regionalism in that area or secondly from an exogenous perspective whereby globalization and

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regionalization are interconnected elements of a changing global system. From these two perspectives, one can establish that the non-traditional idea of regional security communities is being influenced by globalization and that the nature of such communities can traverse geographical and state actors. The most important contribution it has to regional security is that it acknowledges the increasing role of different actors (non-state and state) that are operating in an international system that is largely influenced by different threats and dynamics. This has led to the emergence of more theories and frameworks for analysing regional integration and cooperation among states (Söderbaum & Shaw, 2003). The non-traditional approach acknowledges that while old threats to regional security exist, the world has been experiencing the rise of what can be referred to as non-traditional threats. The impact of these threats have increased in number, casualties, and impact on society and need innovative approaches to deal with them. In addition to military threats, non-traditional threats such as climate change, food insecurity, natural disasters, irregular migration, infectious diseases, smuggling of drugs and persons as well as other transnational forms of crime (Caballero-Anthony, 2010) have begun to feature in academic and policy fields. Although some scholars have argued that the so-called non-traditional threats are indeed not new but could have been obscured by the impact of the Cold War or dominance of traditional approaches, what they do is show that a new era of prioritizing threats and dealing with them has come. Furthermore, the impact of advanced communication and information technology as well as globalization means that these threats can emerge within a short time and rapidly spread to different parts of the world. This means that domestic efforts to overcome these challenges may not be effective enough and will need strengthened multilateral and regional cooperation.

Features of Non-traditional Approaches A comprehensive security community refers to a security community where there is both interstate and inter-societal peace prevailing. Ayoob (2002: 135–137) observes that a comprehensive security community can be best attained when societal cohesion, territorial satiation and political stability prevail within countries as is the case in most industrialized states. In most cases, the absence of the above internal traits leads to interstate violence. In a comprehensive security community, the interstate security dilemma is less due to the uncertainty of the state actors about the

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offensive or defensive intentions of other members. Security dilemma only arises as a result of the prevalence of predatory and malign motives of state actors trying to stabilize their internal and external position (Väyrynen, 2000). This section attempts to describe the characteristic features of an ideal regional security community. The section makes references to the European Union as it is the singular regional security community that comes close to the description of an ideal regional security community in the global system (Väyrynen, 2000). Bulling (2016) like Väyrynen (2000) observes that what makes a regional security community an ideal community is the presence of shared values, identity and similar purposes. The creation of a complex network of space and institutions by the former Western European Union (WEU) for the promotion of shared norms and institutions among the European security community was to achieve the ideals of one Europe (Väyrynen, 2000). In such a security community, there are generous efforts by the intellectual elite, the religious organizations and other non-governmental organizations to promote the idea of shared values, interests and discourage conflict among member states. It is no doubt that the EU has become widely used as an example of an ideal regional security community for other regional sociopolitical constructs. An ideal regional security community is a security community with an institutional guarantee for stable functioning and development, such that the community is regulated based on shared values, norms and identities (Bulling, 2016). Such a community is characterized by deeper integration, due to the totality of cooperation among the member states in various fields and on various levels. The EU is touted as a classic example of a pluralistic regional security community, that is, it is in a mature stage of development, capable of exporting its interaction models and policies of its members to other state actors (Sherengovsky, 2012). Thus, the EU can be referred to as a deeply integrated mature pluralistic security community (Laporte, 2012) and capable of exporting these integration policies to other actors (an example is the Neighbourhood Policy). Sherengovsky (2012) observes that an ideal regional security community has the potential to expand and spread to other areas. This is due to the fact that the member states and citizens of regional security communities tend to transform age-old conflict relations into universally recognized norms and principles of friendly relations. This is made possible by institutional mechanisms that promote continuous alliance. Deutsch et al. (1957) refer to such a phenomenon as ‘interdependent

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social expectations of peaceful change’. The EU has so far proven to be an ideal security community, a classic example of the prospects of security communities in promoting lasting regional peace. According to the Uppsala University Armed Conflict Dataset (PRIO), the conflict between Great Britain and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) troops in 1998, is the only conflict recorded in the post-Cold War security community within the EU (Sherengovsky, 2012). This includes the Catalonia crisis in Spain that has not been effectively resolved since the mid-nineteenth century (Oliveira, 2020). Thus, as an ideal regional security community, the EU identifies itself as an active player in the EU area and promotes among its neighbours the practice of peaceful interactions. An ideal regional security community thrives on mechanisms that promote expansionism through integration. Sherengovsky (2012) argues that the formation of the ‘European security area’ reflects the spirit of promoting a comprehensive security community. The promotion of integration among the European security community is accompanied by further expansion of European borders. However, in contemporary times the EU’s expansionist agenda encounters challenges due to different social, economic, political, cultural, environmental and other factors posed by Balkan states, Turkey and Ukraine (Janos, 2000). Today, expansionism through integration is considered the most effective way of resolving conflict and a precondition for peaceful cooperation between political and social entities. The rise in the number and nature of threats in Africa over the last three decades has shaped the institutional landscape in Africa. These threats and the complexity of their transregional nature is seen as one of the causes for the proliferation of many actors in the continent’s peace and security space. Noteworthy, the attachment of security to development cannot be overlooked when it comes to unjoin other political and security actors in addressing conflicts across the continent. However, increasing dependence on military action is not in line with the narrative of human security often put forth by regional economic blocs. This rhetoric has been used to justify the involvement of RECs in security and conflict matters in the continent promising to address the root causes of the conflict. With underdevelopment, poverty and marginalization listed among the core causes of insecurity, one would see a lot of sense to involve RECs. However, as we will discuss later in the chapter, the lack of socio-economic solutions to conflicts in Africa but rather a focus on

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political, power-sharing agreements in many cases among the protagonists show a failure in the REC’s so-called human security approach. Human security has increasingly become an integral part of national and international security and lack of it accounts for a significant number of conflicts across the world (Nyadera & Bincof, 2019). In Africa, people’s social, political, agricultural, economic, health, as well as environmental vulnerabilities combined with institutional weaknesses, unstable governance, unemployment especially among the young people, and inadequate empowerment of women, increase the possibility of conflict (Busby et al., 2012; Izzi, 2013; Jackson, 2002). Yet existing strategies are meant to respond to conflicts that have broken out rather than addressing the said challenges to reduce the risk of conflict. In most cases, the emerging organization seeks to address one component of the conflict and that leads to a crowded arena as little or no coordination is in place among these actors.

Weaknesses of Non-traditional Approaches While the non-traditional approach (NTA) has several advantages that make it ideal in addressing non-traditional challenges, there are a number of constraints that hinder them from bringing out their full potential. One of the main challenges facing the non-traditional approach is the absence or limited common values among the member states. This does not mean that on paper the organization does not have values, but it is the level of importance and internalization of these values that matter. The nature of current regional security communities is characterized by different forms of diversity, starting with identity, linguistic, religious, economic development as well as cultural differences. More important are the political differences between more democratic countries and those considered to be authoritarian regimes. These diversities undermine the formulation and implementation of similar values within the organizations. The second challenge is the lack of capacity, especially among the developing countries. Given that that NTA relies on a broadened definition of security, there is a need for increased resources to deal with the many issues under their scope. For example, in case of conflict, peacekeeping operations demand huge human resources, financial and military capacity. Many countries’ resources are spread in addressing the growing demands of human security and fulfilling their regional security community obligations. Not surprising that some of the countries are struggling

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to pay their dues to the regional and subregional organizations. In Africa, the AU Peace Fund has often been underfunded. Lack of capacity hinders timely response as more time is spent mobilizing resources during a crisis. In addition, the number and nature of security threats have increased and become more complex needing even more resources. Lack of capacity, therefore, exposes the weakness of the NTA approach as it appears to overlook the ability of security communities to deal with the challenges under the broader scope of security. Another challenge facing NTA is the issue of contested sovereignty. This challenge is not unique to developing countries alone as various states are often reluctant to transfer authority to regional and international organizations. Yet, NTA calls for an increased number of actors (state and non-state) in dealing with the security challenges. More so, if these organizations are to have the authority to make decisions, for example, on when interventions are to be made, then the sovereignty of a country can be threatened. Even when such interventions are to be nonmilitary in nature, the state will always be opposed to any activities that appear to threaten their sovereignty. African countries and leaders tend to jealously guard the sovereignty of their nations even during a crisis. For example, the recent rejection of an African Union-led mediation by the government of Ethiopia as it continues to pursue what it has branded as rebels in the Tigray region, shows that governments would prefer to deal with domestic challenges using domestic mechanisms and not regional arrangements. Related to the above, the presence of many institutions and organizations dealing with multiple issues at a time has led to dependence on ad hoc initiatives. The growing reliance on ad hoc initiatives has become more prominent in recent years yet some observers consider them as worsening the complexity of crisis management in the contemporary world. In most cases, these initiatives have been characterized by the deployment of military troops from different countries to deal with a particular case (De Coning et al., 2016). In Africa, the legal basis for ad hoc operations is based on the idea of ‘intervention by invitation’ and the African Union Constitutive Act Article 3 (e) and Article 4 (d). This approach is often seen as a political statement of solidarity in trying to address threats to collective security . These initiatives are often supported by the African Union but rely on external support too. In some cases, the initiative is often born from subregional organizations thus complicating the decision-making and implementation process. For example, when South

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African Development Community (SADC) proposed the formation of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), to intervene in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and tackle the rebels, the force was integrated into the UN MONUSCO mission in the country which was seen as a violation of the UN peacekeeping principles (Karlsrud, 2017). Another example is the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a counterterrorism ad hoc initiative pursuing Boko Haram. This initiative involves the joint armies of Niger, Nigeria and Chad but relies on funding from the UK and the USA. This complicates any efforts to have a continental effort against terrorism in the continent (Brubacher et al., 2017). But it is not only the overlapping role that these ad hoc initiatives have that directly undermine continental efforts to peace and security, but also inadequate financial resources that remain a challenge in implementing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The lack of financial resources was evident when another ad hoc initiative, Joint Force of the Group of Five Sahel (JF-G5S), sought financial support in a forum held in Paris in 2018 (Rupesinghe, 2018). This also means that since the ad hoc mechanisms operate outside the eight RECs defined as the building blocks for the continental APSA, then the little resources available also tend to be split into different organizations and formations seeking to perform the same task. Franke (2007) opines that NTA has not adequately addressed the problem of competition and rivalry among their members which in turn undermines cooperation. This competition starts down among subregional organizations for example between the AU and the regional economic blocs. Scholars such as Fisher (2014) believe that ‘most of these institutions are simply vehicles for regional hegemons to force their will upon neighbours’. In West Africa, ECOWAS regional bloc has been facing internal rivalry between the Anglophone and the Francophone countries that make up the bloc. In East and Central African subregional organizations, evident tensions are ensuing from the competition as well as political misunderstanding sometimes pushed by border disputes and long-standing historical rivalry. Such tensions are reflected in how these countries behave at the continental level, bringing subregional rivalry to the AU and AU affiliated bodies. A good example is the impact of rivalry among the East African countries on which organization should host the subregional branch of the African Union Standby Force.

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The result of this competition was the formation of an independent East African Standby Force (EASF) which added a new layer of subregional security (Elowson & Albuquerque, 2016; Bayeh, 2015). During crises in the East African region, there are always longer and daunting procedures as well as delayed decision-making with regard to the deployment of the EASF (Oluoch, 2015). Similarly, rivalry within the East African bloc on where the Early Warning Mechanism is to be hosted led to the formation of duplicate Early Warning Systems by IGAD, EASF and EAC. This has made it difficult to have a seamless and timely flow of information and action on the intelligence gathered. The rivalry by RECs in Africa is sustained by the various donor countries and institutions which fund different institutions without looking at the problem of role duplication. For the RECs, maximizing their political relevance and recognition in the international arena seems to be a more important objective than finding solutions to the security challenges in the continent. For example, EASF and IGAD were locked in a battle for supremacy during the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) when IGAD sent 14 officers in the mission (Jacobsen & Nordby, 2012). This may seem insignificant but acts as a signal of how RECs may end up with uncoordinated missions in the future. If persistent, then competition among the RECs will create a crisis within a crisis and therefore an obstacle rather than building blocks to the solution.

Post-Contemporary Approach Despite the existence of RSC characterized by traditional and nontraditional approaches, the events of the last three decades such as the growing number of violent non-state actors with challenging state authorities, global pandemics such as the COVID-19 as well as rapid climate change which threatens food security and health mean that the future can still bring bigger challenges. To better be prepared for potential challenges, policymakers and scholars need to develop better means and mechanisms to deal with current and future problems. One area that has been overlooked by countries especially in the developing world is cybersecurity and related features such as fake news on social media. The influence of cyberspace on a country’s political and social sphere can no longer be overlooked as it can be exploited to cause social instability. Cyber-attacks can have devastating economic and health consequences in a region, yet it does not need a whole military to implement. This

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means that criminal groups and rogue states have the capacity to paralyse the activities of another country through cyber-attacks and fake news. A post-contemporary approach, therefore, not only needs broadening of the scope of threats and how to deal with them, but RSCs also need to function as a system through the adoption of systems thinking approach.

In Search of a New Approach to Peace and Security Analysis The operations of the African Peace and Security Architecture have been based primarily on the aforementioned traditional approaches to security. There is, however, increasing realization for the structure to incorporate non-traditional approaches especially by recognizing the role of the civil society and of late that of digital technology. The capacity to absorb strategies that challenge the primary role of the state remains uncertain of not unwelcome by the member states of the African Union. The complex reality of the conflict landscape on the continent nevertheless demands a post-contemporary paradigm that is forward-looking but appreciates the practices and traditions of the past eras. This paradigm acknowledges the centrality of systems thinking especially in the contemporary complex conflict systems on the African continent. No conflict today can comprehensively be resolved using the tired tools of traditional and non-traditional security approaches. Systems thinking in the regional security community discourse offers a unique approach that seeks to bring different components of a security community into one functioning whole. It acknowledges the challenges that the fast-changing African societies experience and how such changes create new problems that are beyond the capacity of single states or groups of states. Systems thinking thus proposes the collaboration of organizations at the ‘domain’ level with referent organizations supporting the domain (Deutsch, 1988: 92). However, defining systems thinking is not easy as the concept has been redefined and adopted in various disciplines and sometimes incorporates different elements of systems including cybernetics, systems theory, Model-Based Systems Engineering, and family therapy. To understand the concept of systems thinking, I discuss a number of definitions of the approach. According to Kim (1999), systems thinking is ‘a way of seeing and talking about the reality that helps us better understand and work with systems to influence the quality of our lives. In this sense,

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systems thinking can be seen as a perspective. It also involves a unique vocabulary for describing systemic behaviour, and so can be thought of as a language as well’. Kim further discusses the ‘Iceberg Model’ in his systems thinking approach which suggests that within a system events that occur often create a pattern, and that these patterns are produced by a systemic structure. Furthermore, the model suggests that within the systems that are designed by humans, the systemic structure tends to be a result of mental models. Meadows (2008: 11) opines that a system is not merely summing up different elements into a single unit, but the connection of these elements must be organized coherently to achieve a goal. Meadows attaches three important principles to a system interconnection, elements and a purpose or function. System behaviour is generated from a system structure and system behaviour can be revealed over time through a number of events. Similarly, according to her definition, the behaviour of a system is determined by the purpose or the function of a system. Redesigning the APSA from a systems thinking perspective supersedes the traditional thinking processes that created regional mechanisms and recognized regional economic communities without creating the necessary and purpose-laden interconnections among them. Without acknowledging the requisite complex interdependence character of regional security systems, the APSA will still grope in the dark as it trudges in the minefield of conflict resolution on the continent. Linking the two modes of thinking enables recognition of the multiplicity of actors in the continent’s security realm and the multiplicity of channels that the actors need to interact with over time. It resonates well with McCauley’s assertion about systems thinking that enables seeing the structures that lie beneath complex issues, and for identifying high from low leverage change elements’ or ‘seeing the parts in the context of the whole’. It allows for ‘seeing interrelationships rather than things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static snapshots’ (McCauley, 2015).

Features of Systems Thinking The challenges facing current regional security communities especially the traditional and non-traditional approaches can be addressed by adopting a systematic approach that has the following characteristics. Recognizing Interconnections—This is the fundamental base of systems thinking. The approach is characterized by the identification of key links between the system’s components. The most learned people

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lacking systems thinking training have displayed inadequacy of this ability (Plate & Monroe, 2014). More so, the interconnection of actors helps generate greater utility and RSC can benefit from the advantages of interconnection rather than an individual approach. The importance of recognizing interconnection was identified by Deutsch et al. (1957) as a key factor in the creation of a sense of community and thus a security community. They were identified to manifest political, economic and social exchanges that describe relations within the security community. Effective and sustainable adjustments in systems are assured through recognition of the interconnections of parts. In what Franke (2008) termed ‘organized complementarity’ we discern inferences to the requisite interconnections that would be possible both within and among the hierarchical arrangement of APSA, the regional mechanisms, civil society and external actors. The African scene would need to purposely address the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ that is incumbent in a number of AU partner states. By addressing the democratic lethargy, which is one of the main sources of mutual distrust among member states, shared and compatible political values would be fostered that would then engender the basic and necessary interconnections and interactions among African states. Interconnections are the threads that link the nodes of interstate cooperation that will enable the realization of Silencing Guns declaration and the objectives of the regional mechanisms and economic communities. Their recognition forms an advanced kind of literacy that ‘provides insights into how impacts will ripple across the system’ (Plate & Monroe, 2014: 1). Identifying and Understanding Feedback—Several links can merge forming a cause–effect feedback loop (Stave & Hopper, 2007). Systems thinking necessitates the identifications of those feedback loops and interpretation of the impacts of the system’s behaviour (Plate & Monroe, 2014). This is a big problem when actors operate independently without a centralized communication structure. Solving this problem in the current traditional and non-traditional RSC approaches will improve their efficiency significantly. Feedback loops can be either reinforcing or balancing. Reinforcing loops maintain the actions of the system while balancing loops enable start–stop process. The African regional security complex system has essentially suffered from a lack of ability to discern when to engage in reinforcing or balancing feedback loop. The nature of conflicts on the continent has followed a discernible pattern that if balancing feedback loops were

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applied quite a number of them would have been resolved in a short time. Protraction of the conflicts in Sudan, South Sudan, Western Sahara, Somalia, Congo and Ethiopia highlights the inadequacy in conflict analysis at the regional and subregional levels. It points to the reinforcing nature of conflict which would require a distinct form of intervention different from the current ones. Reinforcing feedback loops depict a vicious cycle whose management requires the identification of leverage points that may differ from those identified by interested internal or external parties in the conflicts. Understanding System Structure—The system structure comprises components and links between these components and actors. Systems thinking needs an interpretation of this structure and its influence on system behaviour (Ossimitz, 2000; Richmond, 1994). Acknowledging links and knowing feedback is essential in understanding the system structure. Even though this component has not been acknowledged in Stave and Hopper’s (2007) or Plate’s (2010) taxonomies, it can be denoted as an integration of the two aforementioned components and acknowledged in other significant works (Ossimitz, 2000; Richmond, 1994). The structure of APSA is fundamentally reflecting its continental design informed by the principle of subsidiarity. Whereas the regional mechanisms perform functions on behalf or with the Peace and Security Commission, they have not been empowered as such to perform independent functions unless advised by the PSC. The result has been a couple of effectively functioning and a number of non-functional regional mechanisms. This has caused disjointed decision-making and a lack of adequate response to some conflict cases on the continent. For example, the Standby Force of the ECOWAS and SADC are deemed to be more effective than the rest of the subregional mechanisms. Further, the structure of the APSA tends to ignore the exogenous actors that have undue influence on its operations. These include external funding bodies or the external bodies that represent some members of the AU, for example, the Arab League. There are also external countries that have a direct influence on the conflict management ability of AU member states, for example, Turkey in Somalia and Libya, France in West Africa. The complexity of the conflict terrain necessitates intimate socialization with the nature and motivations of the actors as a precondition for conflict response. Differentiating Types of Stocks, Flows, Variables—Stock is defined as any pool of a resource within a system. It can be viewed as physical, like the number of soldiers available for the standby force, or emotionally like

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the degree of confidence among states within an RSC. Flows refer to the alteration of these levels. Variables are adjustable constituents of the system that impact stocks and flows, such as flow rate and the maximum amount of stock. The ability to distinguish stock, flows and variables and knowing how they behave is a crucial skill of systems thinking and its application in RSC allows for smooth interaction among actors. The APSA ability to sustain the response energy has been a moot discussion point for long. It has pointedly focused on the ability to raise ground troops and the necessary equipment and the accompanying funding. For a long time, the continent relied on the ‘international community’ to respond to the most egregious conflicts on the continent such as Somalia, Rwanda, Ethiopia, DRC, CAR, Western Sahara, Darfur and Lake Chad zone. Response fatigue at the international level prompted the resort to the mantra ‘African Solution to African Problem’ and thus the decision for the continent to engage its resources in managing the conflicts. However, funding and equipment remain the deficit points that, to an extent, conflict instigators take advantage of to incite conflict. They are also the major factors for lack of effective management of the conflicts. APSA requires comprehensive and informed intervention resource planning that enhances effective management of its own conflicts. The ability to identify, manipulate and deploy at short notice will enhance its readiness and raise its reaction profile on the continent. Identifying and Understanding Non-linear Relationships—This component depicts a deviation from both Plate and Monroe’s (2014) taxonomies and Stave and Hopper’s (2007). These components relate to stock and flows of a non-linear nature. Possibly, these components can be grouped under differentiating types of stocks, flows and variables. Separation of non-linear flows into these components is done to evade any confusion in the system and within the RSC. Understanding nonlinear relationships depict the ability to identify the feedback loops and the underlying elements in the loop. It comprises identifying the less obvious relationships or impacts that emerge in the system operations. Protracted conflicts tend to mutate to the extent that less obvious impacts become priority issues that conflate the purpose of intervention responses. This forces actors to change roles in the conflict theatre whereby a hitherto enemy becomes a friend and vice versa. In Africa, the foregoing scenario has occurred in conflict theatres involving Somalia–Kenya relations, Somalia–USA relations, Rwanda–France relations, Ethiopia–Somalia relations during the Cold War period. In peace

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times such scenarios also tend to emerge in regional relations leading to mistrust, backstabbing and even war. For example, the East African Community is characterized by frosty trade relations among partner states. The ability to identify the underlying currents in relations and exchanges including conflicts is thus key to their effective management. Understanding Dynamic Behaviour —This feature focuses on the interconnection of feedback loops, and the influence of the feedback loops comprising of stock, flows and variables result in a progressive behaviour of the system. This behaviour is hard to comprehend without system training (Plate & Monroe, 2014). Anticipated system behaviour has been described by emergent behaviour, an example of dynamic behaviour. To understand the dynamic behaviour, it is important to differentiate categories of stock, flows and variables and also identify and comprehension of the non-linear relationships. If implemented in the RSC system, we can address the challenges of monitoring and evaluations through feedback on the activities that have been implemented. Understanding dynamic behaviour entails appreciation of change over time. Hence it requires a keen understanding of feedback dynamics in the system. The African conflict system has been described as complex. Its ability to cause wide-ranging impacts has been recorded in many countries especially with regard to the intensity of engagement of direct actors, the array of actors, the magnitude of displacement and even the ability to sustain itself. Notwithstanding this, the response structures tend to remain static in that their responses are designed to address mainly traditional conflicts instead of adjusting to changing modes of conflict. The emergence of contemporary threats has generally caught the conflict response structures flat-footed. Their unconventional nature requires novel approaches that go beyond the deployment of traditional military hardware that ends up causing more destruction than envisaged. Such threats include international and cross-border terrorism and cyberattacks. Nevertheless, the response adjustments have been slow in coming. The USA and France have collaborated with the AMISOM and Sahel countries in addressing terrorist threats using drone technology. This has inflicted considerable costs on the terrorist infrastructure over time. The APSA ought to engage in new digital and technological advancement to ensure relevance in the fight of future wars because the future of war and conflict may render redundant the traditional state tools of coercion. Modelling Systems Conceptually—This component is a representation of both Stave and Hopper’s (2007) and Plate and Monroe’s

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(2014) taxonomies deviation, though it seems comparable to Hopper and Stave conceptual model. This component refers to the capacity to conceptualize various compartments of the system and having different perspectives of the system. Such activities extend past the scope of established system models and join the domain of intuitive simplification via different methods which include reduction, transformation, abstraction and homogenization (Wade, 2011). The consciousness accessibility of their compartments can be reduced by perpetual wholes. Theoretically, it allows the elucidation of greater complexity with the mind holding less information of each whole. This skill can have a different perspective that lowers complexity and rules out excess. This is important in dealing with regional security communities that face complex threats and interaction between actors. The African security landscape is complex and requires an alternative conceptual model that reflects this complexity. Its complexity necessitated the application of the principle of subsidiarity that bore the concept ‘organized complementarity’ to demonstrate the web of interactions and interconnectivities that exist in the operationalization of ‘decentralized collective security’. The subregional mechanisms and the regional economic communities emerge as key planks of APSA and, therefore, requiring keen analysis in terms of their linkage to the PSC and other external bodies. The concepts help build a security conceptual model that is only unique to the African security environment. It allows for incorporating unappreciated and less obvious internal actors and external actors in the African conflict theatre including the adoption of new technologies necessary for cultivating peace on the continent. In the final result, the purpose of the conceptual task has to be unambiguous and instrumental in the realization of peace. Understanding Systems at Different Scales—This skill is comparable to that of Richmond’s (1994) forests thinking which includes the ability to consider distinct systems’ scales and systems of systems. Jaradat (2015) develops 14 scales of systems thinking which when synchronized in pairs determine the level at which systems thinkers operate and system operators engage. The levels describe the attributes of systems thinking in complex governance systems. They include level of complexity (complexity vs simplicity), level of autonomy (integration vs autonomy), level of interaction (interconnectivity vs isolation), level of change (embracement of requirements vs resistance to requirements), level of certainty and ambiguity (emergence vs stability), level of hierarchical view(holism vs reductionism) and level of flexibility (flexibility

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vs rigidity). Systems thinkers who design complex governance systems tend to be aware of and understand the range of scales in each level and are expected to lean towards the pair of preferences that foster system efficiency and effectiveness in addressing governance issues. The APSA requires to deploy a systems thinking approach that recognizes the scale ranges and helps design its system to, for example, embrace high levels of human and information interaction (interconnectivity), determine the appropriate level of operational, managerial and geographical dispersion (integration), appreciate the dynamic environment and evolution of needs (evolutionary), have a keen eye on unexpected events that affect the system (emergence), discern a variety of contextual issues and conflicting perspectives (complexity), be wary of incomplete knowledge that leads to lack of confidence in decisions and actions (uncertainty) and flag the lack of understanding of systems behaviour and structure (ambiguity) (Jaradat, 2015: 67). In essence, the APSA should opt to adopt holistic rather than reductionist approaches to the management of its peace and security mandate.

Conclusion Threats to regional and international security have persisted and increasingly become more complex and pose more danger to humans and states. The traditional and non-traditional approaches have offered partial solutions to existing and emerging threats to regional security thus necessitating a rethink in how both state and non-state actors respond to threats. The idea of establishing a regional security community has numerous merits as it allows for possible pooling of resources, intelligence gathering and sharing as well as addressing transnational threats which continue to gain prominence today. Given the significance of regional security communities, our proposed reforms do not seek to eliminate RSC but streamline their efforts. The traditional and non-traditional approaches face numerous limitations including lack of adaptation to new threats, failure to integrate the efforts of different actors to produce sustainable results, the constant problem of duplication of roles as well as insufficient resources. This chapter recommends the adoption of systems thinking as a way of strengthening the role of regional security communities in dealing with challenges. Systems thinking is a ‘set of synergistic analytic skills used to improve the capability of identifying and understanding systems,

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predicting their behaviors, and devising modifications to them in order to produce desired effects ’. From this definition, systems thinking (1) includes the system aspect of systems thinking in RSC, (2) identify the elements of systems thinking, which is important in allocating roles to different entities and (3) examine how these elements are interconnected in the systems, offering a well-integrated approach to dealing with transnational actors. It addresses the problems that arise when different actors independently attempt to solve problems and create a system where energy can be generated and channelled towards resolving specific problems. This approach will benefit regions like Africa that are characterized by several conflicts, complex membership of states to different regional and international entities and constant involvement of many actors in trying to solve a single problem. Systems thinking as a framework will offer the structure that actors can supplement each other’s efforts and achieve bigger goals.

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CHAPTER 3

Regional Security Community Arrangement in Africa

Introduction As argued elsewhere in this work, the regional security complex (RSC) theory borrows heavily from the security community postulations advanced by Karl Deutsch and his collaborators and the classical security complex theory developed at the Copenhagen School of Security Studies developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. Buzan et al. (1998) developed the classical security complex theory in their seminal text entitled Security: A New Framework for Analysis as a continuation of their theoretical developments on the essence of regionalizing security. They trace the security complex theory to the 1980s from a study of South and South East Asian and the Middle East regions. It was pursued on the premise that international security is relational. In their study, they acknowledge the existence of ‘regional subsystems as objects of security analysis’ whose behavioural characteristics are similar to the international system especially with regard to their response to security threats, construction of security interdependence, distribution of power amongst actors and historical relations of amity and enmity. In essence, regional security subsystems manifest the quality of anarchy (Buzan et al., 1998: 11). This chapter argues that the regional security community arrangement in Africa is intricate and complex and requires integrating systems

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thinking in its operations at the continental and regional level. In particular, the African Peace and Security Architecture ought to operate beyond the conventional quick fix response mentality that marked the erstwhile Organization of African Unity (OAU) and now its successor, the African Union (AU). In particular, the civil–military relations ought to be effectively coordinated to mainstream key processes that would facilitate effective intervention in all the conflict phases. Systems thinking nevertheless requires the major regional actors to think and act in unison in a manifestation of an evolving security community that exhibits what Adler and Barnett (1998) christened the ‘we-feeling’ and Deutsch et al. (1957) termed ‘sense of community’. This is the missing context influencing the regional security arrangement on the continent. Considering that a regional subsystem comprises a regional security complex, Buzan et al. define a security complex as a ‘set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 12). Within the complex, relational dynamics vary from being conflictual to peaceful coexistence. The relational dynamics manifest the pluralistic nature of security communities as advanced by Karl Deutsch et al. (1957). In this case, a pluralistic security community ‘retains the legal independence of separate governments’ thus enabling them to exercise their sovereignty over their respective territories but enjoined in a form of integration (Deutsch et al., 1957: 124). Security complexes are thus subsystems that demonstrate miniature anarchies that have distinct structures and patterns of interaction of their own. The building of an African security community structure and process is challenged by the failure to identify and characterize shared values and ambitions that ought to drive the resolution of the complicated and complex conflicts and emergencies on the African continent. Deutsch et al. (1957) argued that values and ambitions are normally propagated by a dominant actor in a region with the capacity to carry extra social, economic and political burdens. The African peace and security architectural context manifests multifaceted scenarios where the subregions depict either single dominant actors, competing dominant actors in a single security complex or competing dominant actors whose actions impede formation of a functional security complex. A couple of regions have capable dominant actors or manifests competing domineering actors whose global and regional outlook and vision tend to contradict each

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other. The remaining regions have covert hegemons whose ability to influence regional peace and security is subject to challenge by other rising regional actors. This state of affairs accelerated and intensified the formalization of the subsidiarity principle within the African regional security arrangement that enabled the outsourcing of peace and security responsibilities to subregional mechanisms. It subsists, nonetheless, amidst a recognition that the building of subregional consciousness and security communities is key to realizing the coveted African regional security community. The African security community arrangement is thus a crucial ‘work in progress’. From their study of North America, Buzan and Waever (2003) later conceived a regional security complex to be ‘a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another’ (Buzan & Waever, 2003: 44). This conception explains ‘the major security concerns’ to be linked to the processes of securitization and desecuritization which are aptly explained in their 1998 seminal text. They identify four components that define the structure, pattern and process of a regional security complex to include (1) differentiation of the units by existing boundaries dividing regional neighbours; (2) existence of an anarchic structure of two or more autonomous units; (3) existence of polarity defining the distribution of power among units; and (4) socially constructed understanding of amity and enmity among the units. The above components facilitate the structural formation of regional security complexes as either standard or centred. A standard RSC has two major powers with a military and security agenda. The interaction among the above four layers may have influence on the dynamics of regional or global politics. At the regional level, it enables the identification of key players in regional political dynamics and how the security complex relates with neighboring security complexes. The focus on the regional security complex highlights the inherent potentials and challenges for states to create functional structures and processes with the ability to pursue a coordinated and coherent system of a secure community.

Thinking a Regional Security Community in Twenty-First Century The quest for constructing a security community on the African continent is not new (Imobighe, 1980). It is only the emphasis that varies. The discourse has over time been driven by radicals and progressives

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centred on whether creating a security community with its attendant institutions and processes should take a continental or regional dimension. The pan-African struggle for the self-determination of African peoples around the world was based on the premise that ‘all relationships are based on centers and margins and the distances from either the center or the margin. When black people view themselves as centered and central in their own history then they see themselves as agents, actors, and participants rather than as marginals on the periphery of political or economic experience’ (Asante, 2009). This was encapsulated in the philosophy of Afrocentricity that was accentuated by perceptions of a shared and common history of ancestry and destiny, colonialism, oppression and discrimination. Since the 1960s, Afrocentricity informed pan-Africanism and reasserting African agency in continental and global affairs. It further informed the vision of establishing a continental economic, political and security regime. Over time, the ideology of pan-Africanism on the continent gradually dissipated in the face of sentiments of national sovereignty and globalization (Kisiangani, 2013). The vision for continental peace and security was nevertheless captured at the formation of the continental Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963. Despite the inherent differences between the progressive but radical Casablanca Group and the conservative Monrovia Group, the OAU was formed as a compromise to, among other things, promote ‘the defense of the sovereignty of the African states; the eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa; and the promotion of international co-operation’ (Mangwende, 1984: 24). The OAU not only sought to guarantee peace in the member states but also become an instrument for the liberation of the colonized states on the continent. These would be achieved in deference to the organization’s principles of sovereign equality of all member states; non-interference in the internal affairs of states; respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each member state and its inalienable right to independent existence; peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration; unreserved condemnation of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighboring states or any other states; absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent; affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs (Mangwende, 1984: 24).

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In spite of the noble intentions inherent in its objectives and principles, the OAU did not wholly succeed in moderating the numerous intra and interstate conflicts on the continent (El Abdellaoui, 2010). In fact, during its incumbency, the continent recorded several instances of coup d’états, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, civil and interstate wars. Some of the conflicts led to the birth of new states while a couple of them have not been resolved to-date. The fact that the OAU could not resolve many of the conflicts on the continent reinforced the perception of the continent as conflict ridden and deficient on the criteria for a security community focused on peaceful change (Schmidt, 2010). Jennings (2017) has asserted that Africa is definitively a continent but not a region that would qualify to be a security complex. It is especially deficient on specific criteria of common history, culture and conflict paradigm with direct interaction between members. She argues that ‘while its members do share some commonalities, as a regional security complex, the states are not interdependent and, therefore, do not constitute a region’ (Jennings, 2017: 75). Other than the formation of the liberation focused loose coalition of Frontline States consisting of Tanzania, Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and the 1993 formation of the Conflict Resolution Mechanism, the OAU’s engagement in hard diplomacy of conflict resolution in member states has been deemed to have been generally ineffective (Schmidt, 2010). The Frontline States later became a committee of the Heads of States of the OAU in 1975 on the admission of Angola and Mozambique to devote their military resources to the liberation war effort against the apartheid regime in South Africa and white minority rule in Southern Rhodesia and South West Africa. The continental strand of the quest for a security complex on the African continent dominated the thoughts of a couple of African leaders immediately after their countries’ independence, notably Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (Legum, 1962). Decades later, leaders such as Muammar Gaddafi, Olusegun Obasanjo and Thabo Mbeki reinvigorated the search for the faded spirit of pan-Africanism by agitating for a united, secure and democratic continent with the creation of continent-wide security and political institutions (Okhonmina, 2009). It was presumed this would effectively position the continent in the evolving New World Order though the approaches were somewhat divergent. The regional strand was pursued by most African leaders who advocated for a practical approach to forming regional bodies as a stepping stone to creating a continent-wide security complex (Mezu, 1965).

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During the formation of the AU in 2002, the gradualist group exemplified by Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Musa Y’Ardua of Nigeria argued for deepening regional integration and strengthening internal governance and growth structures as avenues to addressing peace and security challenges on the continent (Okhonmina, 2009). In fact the formation of the AU was a contemplated convergence of three formations led by Muamar Gaddafi who fronted Pan African Unity manifested in continental governance institutions, Musa Y’Ardua who fronted the security instrument to be created after the Conference of Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation and Thabo Mbeki who fronted the African Renaissance in all its pertinent forms. Each leader’s pet project later contributed to the grand idea of creating rejuvenated continental organization to take charge of Africa’s new security, governance and development agenda exemplified by the Pan African Parliament (PAP), African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) (Moller, 2009). These became the central pillars of the newly formed African Union. The establishment of the African Union saw the creation of a fifteenmember Peace and Security Council that would be responsible for the deployment of peace keeping and rapid reaction intervention missions especially in cases of potential commission of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity on the advice of the Panel of the Wise (Ewi, 2015). The Council would thus contribute to the promotion of peace, security and stability; institutionalize preventative diplomacy and the management of catastrophes and humanitarian actions on the continent (African Union, 2002). The drive for a security mechanism on the African continent is, however, borne out of several concerns that are beyond the management capability of individual states. The continent is still generally insecure, and vulnerable to political and economic shocks. Most of the political shocks require and necessitate interstate effort which can be attained through establishment of subregional mechanisms comprising competent agency of regional states and where necessary supported by the international community. In her advice to the US Defense and Strategic Institute and from an American perspective, Chido (2013) argues that an African military force would not only facilitate the engagement of the USA in African conflicts but would also guarantee security and stability necessary for developing a continental trade regime and enable the identification and ‘encouraging democratic leaders who will entice foreign

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investors by developing the governance structures to enable prosperity and advancement across the region’ (p. 14). More fundamentally the twenty-first century provides new challenges associated with the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution encapsulated in scientific, technological and digital advances that have not been experienced before. The digital advances are especially momentous with regard to national and international security especially affecting the ‘the probability and nature of conflict’ (Schwab, 2016). Schwab argues that warfare and international security have historically been associated with technological innovation. However, ‘modern conflicts involving states are increasingly “hybrid” in nature, combining traditional battlefield techniques with elements previously associated with non-state actors. The distinction between war and peace, combatant and noncombatant, and even violence and nonviolence (think cyberwarfare) is becoming uncomfortably blurry’ (Schwab, 2016). With advancements in digital technology, individuals and groups are enjoining states in causing mass harm to society especially with the use of biological weapons and possible portable nuclear weapons. The race to neutralize these advances that harm people shall be counteracted by even more advances in new modes of protection. This scenario describes the possibilities that present themselves to APSA in attempts to manage conflicts on the continent. Already, war scenarios have emerged with the increasing reliance by states and non-state combatants on drone technology in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel region (Sandvik, 2015). Through precision targeting, attacks have been launched on warlords in the region. Drone hubs have further been established in West Africa and the Horn of Africa to facilitate the fight against terrorism and enhance humanitarian efforts in the regions. APSA has to be in sync with digital developments to make it more relevant in contemporary peace and security contexts.

Mapping the African Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms Beyond pan-Africanism, which appeared in its African form during the independence struggles of the 1960s, the ambiguity of Africa as a region, or an ‘imagined community’ is the starting point for an analysis of what constitutes the African Regional Security Community (RSC) arrangement. The idea that Africa is a ‘region’ has been challenged by critiques

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of collective security approach (Jiboku, 2015). Such contentions are anchored on the understanding that a region constitutes a common history, culture, geographical proximity and conflict paradigm with direct interaction between members. However, there are states on the continent, for instance, Somalia and Sierra Leone, who have hardly had any level of interaction outside of the artificially constructed African Union. Classical scholars (Buzan et al., 1998) on this subject have confirmed this assertion, that Africa is a continent but not a region, while its members do share some commonalities, as a regional security complex, the states are not interdependent and therefore do not constitute a region. One of the major objectives of both the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is to strengthen partnerships in preventing conflict and addressing its root causes, in ways that place communities at the centre and leave no one behind. Building on this, the joint United Nations-African Union Frameworks for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security and the Implementation of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development called for even greater collaboration between the United Nations, African Union and other regional and subregional organizations in preventing conflicts and sustaining peace in Africa. Collectively, these two agendas and two frameworks recognize that regional and subregional organizations can have important comparative advantages and leverage in preventing conflict and addressing its root causes, given their first-hand knowledge of the context, proximity, and existing or potential strong local networks, as well as influence over key players in the region. Similarly, the APSA Roadmap (2016–2020) and the African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by 2020, in highlighting the linkages between operational and structural prevention, equally underscores the need to improve coordination and collaboration with RECs on structural conflict prevention. The APSA Roadmap further identifies gaps and constraints to the effective implementation of the CSCPF, noting among others inadequate resources, need for conflict prevention mainstreaming, and tenuous linkages between the APSA and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) as well as the African Union and the RECs on structural conflict prevention. The Roadmap on Silencing the Guns also highlights gaps bordering on current deficits in the implementation of the myriad of normative instruments adopted by the African Union and the RECs to facilitate structural prevention of conflict. RECs have grown, both in breadth and complexities. The

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2018 joint United Nations-World Bank study on ‘Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict ’ equally highlights the increasing role of regional and subregional organizations in preventing conflict and addressing its root causes. The report underlines that root causes of conflict are mostly characterized by ‘grievances around exclusion from access to power, opportunity and security’. The study also rightly observed that while regional and subregional organizations have emerged as key partners on conflict prevention, they are not without challenges. Recent assessment reports of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) reveal that progress on conflict prevention, especially among the RECs is uneven. These reports also indicate that there are significant variances vis-à-vis the RECs’ mandates, capacity and resources as well as their ability to meet the growing need and demand for their support. These challenges notwithstanding, within the purview of conflict prevention in Africa, there is an increasing demand for the RECs to engage in structural conflict prevention. In general, over the past decades, the RECs have been progressively enhancing their capacity for conflict prevention. They have made considerable progress on operational prevention actions such as early warning, preventive diplomacy and mediation, protection of civilians, prevention of mass atrocities, sanctions, elections observation, prevention of violent extremism and peace support operations. Building on these useful tools, the Peace and Security Council has reiterated the need for renewed focus and enhanced efforts on structural prevention to address the root causes of conflict. The Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework (CSCPF), which was endorsed in 2015 and includes seven (7) markers or indicators for assessing structural vulnerability and resilience responds to this and underlines the importance of a systematic, holistic and coordinated collaboration approach with the RECs in assisting Member States on structural conflict prevention. This recognizes that Member States do have primary responsibility for structural conflict prevention and the RECs have a facilitative role in supporting their Member States in this process. The success of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is hinged on close and functional relationships cultivated between AU, Regional Economic Communities (REC) and Regional Mechanisms (RM). This relationship is built on the principle of subsidiarity. This is a principle that recognizes the social organization of the division of labour especially in large organizations. It simply means that a ‘central authority should have a subsidiary function in carrying out only those tasks that

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cannot be done effectively at a more immediate or local level’ (ECCASCMI, 2016: 6). This implies that official functions should preferably be performed by lower level units of administration, whenever necessary. According to David Bosnich, the tenet of subsidiarity originates from Catholic social thought and ‘holds that nothing should be done by a larger and more complex organization which can be done as well by a smaller and simpler organization. In other words, any activity which can be performed by a more decentralized entity should be’ (Bosnich, 2010). This concept was adopted in the construction of the APSA structure to animate the quest for sustainable peace at regional level on the continent. The quest is premised on the fact that conflict resolution ‘should be led by actors who are culturally, geopolitically and strategically close to the crisis in question’ (ECCAS-CMI, 2016: 4). In this case, the processes of conflict resolution at the regional level were to be led by the RECs since they had better local awareness of the conflict context, more interest in the outcomes, greater flexibility and adaptability, greater legitimacy and ensure sustainability of the peace processes. In a couple of cases where the RECs did not meet the above criteria, alternative regional mechanisms were established but whose membership comprised states in the specific geopolitical and strategic zone. Regional economic communities (RECs) have thus been a natural entry point to the creation of some form of security complex on the African continent. As regional springboards, they have eased galvanizing of regional opinions and action in specific sectoral endeavours. The East African Community (EAC), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD) and Economic Community of West African States (ECCAS) were essentially economic and trade agreements among contiguous states to foster regional integration. They have been acknowledged as building blocks of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (UNECA, 2020). In essence, it strengthens their combined voice in continental and global economic affairs and in the case of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), it strengthened the focus on drought and humanitarian assistance in the Horn of Africa. IGAD later morphed into a regional development organization for the Horn of Africa that further included conflict prevention in the region. Focus on RECs within the securitization discourse is contemplated for the pursuit of economic security as a distinct sectoral objective divorced

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from conventional political security. Regional economic communities fall within the economic security sector that explains the ‘relationships of trade, production and finance’ and how they influence the construction of a security community at regional level and desirably at continental level (Buzan et al., 1998: 7). Economic security within the international subsystem presupposes the securitization of RECs as referent object to enable goods to cross-borders and limit national vulnerabilities (Buzan et al., 1998: 102). The formation of RECs regionalizes economic development and creates interdependencies that help build an economic sense of community. The existence of RECs has been a window of opportunity to engage member states in the quest and consolidation of peace and security in specific regions. Notwithstanding their readiness, the US Africa Command has for long contemplated engaging the RECs in peace, security and stability leveraging on the ‘existing and emerging cooperative structures within the RECs, and even the AU’ (Chido, 2013: 13). At its 3rd Meeting, in May 2003, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the African Chiefs of Defense Staff (ACDS) adopted the policy framework establishing the African Standby Force (ASF) to provide capabilities of enhancing peace and security (African Union, 2003). This force was created under the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) mandating member states to take concrete steps for peace and security in Africa (African Union, 2002), in essence, acceding to the maxim of ‘African Solutions to African Problems’ (Ani, 2019; Lobakeng, 2017). In this policy framework, the AU member states ‘signaled their intention to expand their willingness to take risks for peace and again indicated their readiness to accepting their share of responsibility for ensuring durable development of the Continent particularly in the area of peace and security’ (African Union, 2003: 1). The ASF would deploy African military, police and civilian resources in managing conflicts on the continent in pursuit of its peace agenda including the ability to respond to natural disasters and provision of stability in fragile post conflict states. The ASF’s multidisciplinary contingents are hosted in their countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment at appropriate notice given by the PSC, anywhere on the continent and possibly even abroad (Cilliers, 2008). The ASF deployments are, however, done subject to AU and UN Charter. The force is conceptualized as having quick reaction capacity to respond to crises without being hampered by political and instrumental burdens. It consists of civil–military capacities located in five regions of

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the continent with the capability to undertake peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention missions including interventions in political affairs, human rights, elections and gender issues in affected countries. The establishment of the regional military capacities was done according to the principle of subsidiarity. The ASF envisages a capability to deploy in six scenarios including being the regional advisor to a political mission, leading a regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission, leading a stand-alone regional observer mission, leading a regional peacekeeping force for UN Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions, peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional missions and military intervention (African Union, 2003: 3). The scenarios depict the expected versatility in the ASF quest for robustness in response to the numerous and complex challenges of conflict and insecurity in specific countries and that have wide spillover effects at regional and global levels. However, centripetal disruptive forces are stronger than the will to galvanize African states to pool resources together for a common cause. Such forces are driven by inherent nationalist interests in virtually all the states on the continent that tend to stifle regional integration efforts. Even in cases where the potential exists for successful regional integration, national interests have interfered with the will to cooperate leading to weak integration institutions and processes. The ASF scope of deployment is primarily limited to specific actions within the AU member states that may contribute to commission of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This, of course, is in reaction to the failures attributed to the OAU that led to accusations of indifference, inaction and ineptitude. The lack of intervention capabilities by the OAU reflected on African leaders’ inability to mobilize continental and global resources and attention to address the conditions leading to Genocide in Rwanda, state failure in Somalia, the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and the rebellion in Northern Uganda or even the earlier 1978 Idi Amin’s invasion of Tanzania. The continent, however, still faces military and humanitarian challenges that require the intervention capabilities of ASF. These include political Islamic fundamentalism and extremism in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. The advent of digital technology portends further challenges to the APSA and the ASF on the viable contemporary responses to emerging cross-border digital threats. The effects of these challenges are not only regional but also international in terms of generating refugees, internal displacements and incessant illegal

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migrations. The securitization of these processes will help their prioritization on the AU agenda hence enabling commitment of resources to address them. In 2004, the African Union decided to operationalize the ASF mandate by creating five regional brigades by largely leveraging on the existing RECs. The brigades would be the first responders to natural and manmade emergencies on the African continent in general and specifically in their host regions. The brigades would later morph into a United Nations operation depending on need. The five brigades, otherwise known as ‘Forces’, generally follow the locational design of the regional economic communities (RECs): SADC Standby Force, ECOWAS Standby Force, Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) and Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC).

SADC Standby Force Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) is an economic integration tool comprising 14 member states of the southern African region. Until the early 1990s, the region was destabilized by the apartheid regime of the Republic of South Africa. Since its defeat in 1994, the region has experienced peace and stability except for the inherent instability in Zimbabwe and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the intermittent armed disputes in Mozambique. Currently, Mozambique faces instability occasioned by an Islamic State affiliate in Cabo Delgado Province in the north of the country (Matsinhe & Valoi, 2019). The instability in the DRC has been described as a complex conflict manifesting a convergence of social, ethnic, economic, political and institutional and security factors that converge into a complicated and interconnected web of intractability (Mutisi, 2016). These factors have prompted the intervention of UN, AU, SADC and ICGLR forces over the last forty years. At the outset, the conflict pits government forces against local militias in an effort to exert state presence especially in the East of the country. Some of the local militias, however, enjoy the support of member states of the neighbouring Eastern African Standby Force pointedly Uganda and Rwanda. In 1998, the SADC deployed its Allied Forces composed of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia to engage the destabilizing forces in the country. Later, Burundi and Tanzanian forces joined the war front to enforce peace and stability in the country.

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Prior to the formation of the SADC Standby Force, the region had existing homegrown SADC Mutual Defense Pact signed in 2003 in which member states resolved to ‘unite our efforts towards collective self-defense and the preservation of peace and stability’ in the region (SADC, 2003: 1). The MOU underscored the desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments, and recognized the sovereign equality of all states and their intention to strengthen the bonds that exist among them on the basis of respect for their independence and non-interference in internal affairs. Article 6 states that ‘an armed attack against a State party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such an attack shall be met with immediate collective action’ and the actions taken be reported to the PSC and UN (SADC, 2003: 3). The MOU, however, is emphatic on non-interference in the internal affairs of member states unless at the ‘State party’s own request or with its own consent’ (p. 3). This, therefore, ruled out intervention in case of heinous crimes spelt out in the formation of the ASF. The formation of the SADC Standby Force was a result of the requirements to fulfil the AU vision of creating the ASF and not necessarily the security threats necessitating the states to coalesce around a common security mechanism. According to Johannes Muntschick (2018), there has existed no motivation or regional threat for SADC member states to form a subregional military force. The states enjoyed a somewhat internal security autarky in their territories. He argues that ‘in fact many countries in the region shared the view that the creation of a standing peacekeeping force in the region is neither desirable nor practically feasible’ (Muntschick, 2018: 231). The creation of the standby force was instead the wish of South Africa ostensibly to deepen cooperation among the member states, enable participation and take a lead in international peacekeeping missions. However, ‘South Africa’s motivation behind these efforts was at least as much an interest in the country’s position as the SADC’s lead nation and thereby expand its status as a middle power on a global level’ (Muntschick, 2018: 232). The region today hosts the SADC Standby Force and Brigade (SADCBRIG) that was launched in 2007 through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by southern African leaders to guarantee peace, security and political stability. The Brigade comprises civilian, military and police components and is supported by resources committed by member states. The troops especially are stationed in their own countries and deployed when needed. The Regional Peace Training Centre is

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located in Zimbabwe while Botswana hosts the Main Logistics Depot. The member states agreed that the SADCBRIG will be capable of performing seven key functions including observation and monitoring missions, peace support operations, intervention in a State Party in respect of grave circumstances at the request of a member state party to restore peace and security as provided in the Constitutive act, conflict preventive deployment; peace building, post conflict disarmament and demobilization and humanitarian assistance in conflict areas. The civilian operations of the Brigade include the provision of human, physical and administrative resources, humanitarian liaison and provision of legal advice and protection of human rights to all (SADC, 2007: 6–7). Prior to the establishment of the ASF and SADBRIG, the SADC had hosted the UN Mission in the DRC by 2005 and had in fact had preparations for establishing its own peacekeeping force and a training centre. This was after several regional and international consultations involving SADC as well as African military chiefs. The SADC force would be a standing multinational military force. It saw the launch of operations in Lesotho and DRC (Cillers & Malan, 2005). The SADC is evidently a centred regional security complex fronted and largely dominated by the Republic of South Africa to sustain peace and stability in the region. Drawing on its military and economic might, the region has experienced prolonged peace and stability that have buttressed economic prosperity in the member states. It rallies the member states to build consensus on a number of local (regional) issues and acts in earnest. Though there are virtually no high-level threats that endanger their security, the member states have maintained steady interconnection, especially in security interactions. The intraregional interconnections, however, may not guarantee security to the region especially when the operational design of regional mechanism is limited to southern Africa. There ought to be coordination, and in the spirit of interdependence, with neighbouring regional security complexes, especially if the capability burden is too weighty to bear or the security complex still unable to bear the burden.

ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) ECOWAS, just like the SADC, was created to promote economic cooperation and integration of West African states. It has 15 member states with diverse historical backgrounds comprising British, French and Portuguese

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colonial history with varying magnitudes of neocolonial linkages, especially among French-speaking member states. This has caused a linguistic divide that initially played against the intended regional integration. It ventured into the peace and security realm in 1981 after the signing of a Mutual Assistance of Defense among some member states promising military assistance to the signatories in case of external attack. Fears of dominance by larger states in the Community made Mali, Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau not to sign the protocol. Others, however, joined due to the beneficial presence of Nigeria as a dominant deterrent force. The protocol suffered in its nascent stages from the inherent rivalry between Francophone and Anglophone divides including the existence of an equivalent Francophone community and a defence protocol among the Western African French-speaking states under the sponsorship of France. Further attempts to create a security mechanism in West Africa involved the establishment of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990 to address the political and military challenges in the region. The new outfit was instrumental in pacifying missions in the region until the ECOWAS treaty was revised in 1993 to mainstream peaceful settlement of conflicts, peacekeeping, stability and security at the regional level (ECOWAS, 1993). The ECOWAS region has been defined by the conduct of hard diplomacy in West Africa. It has been effective in waging successful military expeditions in the ever-mutating brutal conflicts in the West African region in the post-Cold War era. It has in fact been involved in more military operations than the other RECs. It was particularly instrumental in pacifying Liberia, Togo, Cote d‘Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Mali, of course with external assistance when needed (Cillers & Malan, 2005). In June 2004, the ECOWAS Defense and Security Committee approved the formation of the ECOWAS Stand-by Force (ESF) as part of the ASF as envisioned in the Constitutive Act. The common approach to resolving the conflicts using common institutions and processes such as ECOWAS and ECOMOG enabled the growth of the region into a formidable security complex. This was facilitated by the security interdependence of the member states coupled with the close cultural and historical ties, and geographical proximity (Bah, 2010). The institutionalization of conflict management through the ECOWAS Protocol on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution and Peacekeeping and

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consolidation of democratic credentials through the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance would qualify the region as a definitive security complex (Bah, 2010).

Geopolitical Context The ECOWAS region comprises a ‘variety of states in terms of territorial size, colonial history, economic strength, internal cohesion and external linkages. It comprises eight Francophone countries, five Anglophone countries and two Lusophone states’. As Odobo et al. (2017) also noted, the region is one that has been plagued by ‘corruption, poverty, underdevelopment, political instability, electoral violence, arms proliferation, military incursion in governance, drug trafficking, territorial disputes, resurgence of ethno-religious conflict, secessionist tendencies and civil wars; all of which stifled ECOWAS’ ability to pursue its economic development mandate’ and also had far-reaching global implications. Consequently, over the last two decades, the region has made tremendous efforts to uphold security and stability, build and sustain peace as well as promote good governance and democratic consolidation as prerequisites for advancing economic development and regional integration (Hartzenberg, 2011). Much progress has been made, albeit with some new challenges. For instance, while the region no longer has civil wars and large-scale conflicts as was experienced in its Mano River region in the late 80s and 90s, new threats and forms of widespread violence have emerged, including piracy, narco-trafficking, farmers-herders’ conflicts, violent extremism and terrorism. Health pandemics like Ebola, which broke out in Guinea Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2015, revealed the fragility and weakness of institutions and infrastructure in especially postwar countries; and underscored the need for greater investment in services and institution building in the region. As part of its democratization efforts, the region has also made significant progress in improving inclusivity in its political and peacebuilding processes. For instance, the opening of spaces for civil society, as well as private sector engagement and participation in peacebuilding, conflict prevention and national dialogues have contributed to fostering cohesion and the sustainability of peace and political agreements. However, there are still challenges relating to the growing youth bulge and need for greater inclusion of youth and women in these processes. In an era of new technological innovations and social media, the need for greater

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youth inclusion is more urgent than ever to sustain the peace gains that have been made. This is critical as mobile adoption has grown rapidly in West Africa, with the expansion of mobile networks to underserved communities and the increasing affordability of services and device costs. According to GSMA Intelligence, ‘by the end of 2017, there were 176 million unique subscribers across the West Africa subregion, across the 15 Member States of ECOWAS. Overall subscriber penetration reached 47% in 2017, up from 28% at the start of this decade’ (GSMA, 2018: 2). Economic growth in the ECOWAS region has been increasing. According to the World Bank, West Africa ranks among the fastestgrowing subregion in sub-Saharan Africa, having grown 6.7% in 2013 and 7.4% in 2014. Of the top 10 fastest-growing economies in 2018 globally, three are in West Africa: Ghana (8.3%), Cote d’Ivoire (7.2%) and Senegal (6.9%) (World Bank 2013). The region is a strategic market and has free trade negotiations with the European Union and China. Paradoxically, however, some of the economic development gains in the region have also been a cause of tensions and instability. This is due to widening inequalities, which has in part increased because the economic growth is neither inclusive nor translated into the creation of decent jobs for especially its increasing youthful and educated populations who are demanding for better lives and livelihoods. Furthermore, the lack of economic opportunities is increasing migration flows from the region and especially intra-African migration within the Burkina Faso to Cote d’Ivoire migration corridor, which as noted by UNCTAD in its Economic Development Report ‘had the largest stock of migrants at 1.3 million in 2017’. While intra-African migration is beneficial for structural transformation in destination countries as well as for realization of the regional integration agenda, it has at times also contributed to instability and conflict as a result of competition over resources and jobs; therefore, it needs to be properly managed. In this respect, ECOWAS has developed a Regional Migration Policy and has instituted the Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA), in collaboration with the European Union, International Organization for Migration, International Centre for Migration Policy Development and the International Labour Organization, to better manage migration in West Africa.

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East African Community and the Eastern African Standby Force The eastern African region hosts two core and influential regional organizations around which discussions revolved for use as an entry point in the establishment of the Eastern African Standby Force: East African Community (EAC) focusing largely on East Africa proper and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) primarily focused on the Horn of Africa but whose membership overlaps into the EAC. The two blocs in the region have a dominant state each of which influences economic and military dynamics in its specific subregion. The interplay of regional dynamics has as a result affected the establishment and operations of the East African Standby Force (EASF). The EAC is the oldest REC having been set up in 1967 and later rejuvenated in 1999. At its founding in 1967, it was the earliest and most ambitious experiment in regional cooperation in Africa, consisting of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda that shared a common colonial political and economic history (Booth et al., 2007). Between 1967 and 1977, it prided itself in running successful regionally integrated economic ventures including having a common currency. Political differences among the leaders fomented its collapse in 1977. After its rejuvenation in 1999, it has not only increased in size to six members (with the admission of Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan) but also deepened economic cooperation towards a common market and hopefully an economic union and political federation. Plans are underway to embrace the DRC as a full member, notwithstanding its membership in the SADC and ECCAS regional blocs. The membership is currently differentiated by introducing Francophone political and economic culture into the organization. In the EAC subregion, however, Kenya is a predominant economy around which decisions of regional economic integration tend to revolve. Article 5 (3) (f) and Article 124 of the 1999 Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community recognize the need for peace and security within the subregion (East African Community, 1999). A number of institutions addressing peace, security and defence were established implying the urgency in the partner states for a functional subregional peace and security regime. In 2006, a regional strategy for peace and security was developed and adopted to guide the EAC-level interventions for peace and security. The Protocol for Peace and Security of the EAC

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of 2013 was later signed committing partner states to conflict and insecurity in the subregion. Article 2 establishes the scope of cooperation in peace and security among the member states in collaboration with international and regional organizations. It commits the partner states to develop common measures and strategies and programmes to combat terrorism, manage refugees, control proliferation of illicit small arms and light weapons, as well as combat transnational and cross-border crimes, including human trafficking (East African Community, 2013: 8). The eastern African region also hosts IGAD that was initially formed in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) to address human security challenges of food insecurity and environmental degradation in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia was the fulcrum state in the region in terms of both vulnerability to the core environmental challenges and potential to respond to them. IGAD currently has a differentiated membership of nine states comprising Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Burundi and Rwanda. These countries have varied colonial histories, ethnicities and levels of economic development among others, having come together to address shared experiences, initially, of food insecurity and drought and later proliferation of small arms, insecurity and instability, regional conflict prevention, management and resolution and humanitarian affairs. Excluding Djibouti, the member states have had varied experiences of military presence from a regional member state, or territorial dispute with the other, and historical claims and injustices. The region’s postcolonial experience is largely marked by instability and insecurity. It thus manifests various magnitudes and patterns of enmity and suspicion among member states. The entry of Kenya into the regional matrix introduced an alternate hegemon to compete with Ethiopia in the economic, peace and security realms. The eastern African region provides a unique but complex conflict context for the ASF. It has experienced intrastate and regional conflicts, a couple of which have remained protracted. It has experienced the Rwanda Genocide against the Tutsi whose effects have had regional security repercussions, the Darfur war and genocide in Sudan that have attracted regional and international intervention, protracted armed ethnic conflict in South Sudan, Al Shabaab war in Somalia, the war in Northern Uganda against the Lord’s Resistance Army and political instability in Kenya, Comoros, Burundi and Ethiopia. The region is by far a standard regional security complex with two major powers that have definitive military

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and economic agenda. The contest between Kenya and Ethiopia for the economic and military domination of the region establishes an anarchic environment in which competing national interests dictate the operational effectiveness and efficiency of regional mechanisms. In essence, it also creates voids that other aspiring hegemons in the region such as Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Djibouti try to fill by flexing their fledgling military muscles under the guise of contributing towards the region’s peace efforts. The Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) was established in 2004 as a component of the African Standby Force (ASF) within the African Peace and Security Architecture (Cilliers, 2008). The ten founding countries signed the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Force. It covers the region primarily comprising members of the EAC and IGAD. Other members such as Rwanda and Burundi also belong to the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). The force’s membership is geographically broad consisting of relatively large member states, a proud never colonized state, a number of coastal countries in the Horn of Africa, two small landlocked Central African states, neo-Stalinist state and two island states. Its security milieu thus remains interesting and unique but is basically characterized by protracted political, environmental and marine security challenges (Desmidt & Hauck, 2017: 4). Unlike the southern, central and West African regions, the Eastern Africa region lacked a legitimately consensual regional mechanism that was dedicated to conflict prevention covering all the countries in the region. This had left conflict prevention, management and resolution responsibilities to individual states which would later coordinate with the AU and the UN. It prompted states like Ethiopia and Kenya to singlehandedly intervene in central and southern Somalia, respectively, without authority of any overarching subregional body. The UN also directly got involved in Somalia with troop contributions from across Africa; a situation which would not have arisen had a functional subregional mechanism existed. The AU had initially opted for IGAD to coordinate the operations of EASF. The inclusion, however, of non-IGAD members and the suspicion of Kenya and Eritrea over the perceived Ethiopian dominance of IGAD complicated the decision-making processes as time went by (Byiers, 2017). Within the region and more especially among the IGAD member states there existed, what Byiers (2017: 13) called, ‘relations of enmity’

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which underscored the lack of a sense of community and interdependence to a large extent. This was exemplified by the venomous relations between Ethiopia and Somalia, Sudan and Uganda and Ethiopia and Eritrea and currently Kenya and Ethiopia. Kenya was the obvious cautiously neutral country at the time (Lindemayer & Kaye, 2009). It led to the formation of a compromise organization—the East African Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) in 2007 to be based in Nairobi and its Logistics Base in Addis Ababa. Later in 2014, the EASFCOM was transformed into a full secretariat (EASFSEC) based in Nairobi and EASF Headquarters as well as Logistics Base located in Addis Ababa (African Union, 2019). The EASF is basically a work in progress, still transforming to get its institutions and processes right especially with regard to hardcore military engagements in conflict theatres in the region. Its role in peace and security remains marginal probably encumbered by its membership structure that is more diverse than the other regional peace and security mechanisms. It has mainly been involved in soft missions related to conflict prevention in Somalia such as sending a fact-finding mission prior to deployment of AMISOM peacekeeping force and participating in the UN Political Office for Somalia, UN Support Office for AMISOM and training needs analysis for the Somalia military forces (Bayeh, 2014). In addition, the EASF has played albeit limited roles in peace missions in Sudan especially pre-deployment training and command and control assistance for UNAMID in Darfur and AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). It has also deployed trained women police officers to the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (Bayeh, 2014). Among the ASF regional mechanisms, the EASF still lags behind in terms of operational efficiency. Unlike the ECOWAS or SADC where there are obvious hegemons around which the other states tend to coalesce, the EASF region has two competing hegemons who incidentally are in a long-term unholy alliance. There is conspicuous disquiet among the members of the perceived military domination of Ethiopia. A couple of other aspiring states seem uncomfortable with her. In the region, there is an apparent hegemonic contest involving major players in peace and security. Though Kenya and Ethiopia seem to be competing for the control of the EASF, there exists a historical mutual defence pact between the two powers that was ratified on 27 December 1964 by the two governments in the presence of the Somali Foreign Affairs Minister (Makinda, 2008; Kabukuru, 2015). The two states undertook to come to the aid of the

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other if attacked by a third party. The pact was directed at containing Somalia’s irredentist ambitions in the region particularly coveting the Somali-speaking inhabited regions of Ogaden in Ethiopia and former Northern Frontier District in Kenya including the Issa-dominated region of Djibouti. The pact created a duality of power enjoyed by the two states that has remained unchallenged since then. Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Burundi and Djibouti have their individual state interests in Somalia and the potential to influence the political and military agenda in the region. Uganda has, in addition, political and military interests in parts of South Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, DRC and the Central African Republic which have seen it deploy troops to protect its interests there. Kenya and Ethiopia too have their respective interests in Somalia. Hegemonic contests do not augur well for the systematic operations of the EASF in the region. It has instilled suspicion, fear, envy and covert operations that are inimical to efforts of building a security complex, security community and cultivation of a ‘we’ feeling among the states and peoples in the region. The peace and security agenda of the EASF have been narrowly defined by the AU whereby regional concerns are not captured in the framework of its establishment. The geographically and politically disparate states forming the EASF face challenges that require innovative approaches that require a proactive and broadened agenda of the regional force. For example, Island and Coastal states experience maritime insecurity and piracy which pose existential threats, small member states face unique governance threats that have regional implications thus necessitating the intervention of the EASF and Burundi’s 2018 political challenges could have activated the engagement of robust Early Warning System and Panel of the Wise mechanisms to forestall the degeneration of the state into its current political form. Some of the EASF member states have frequently engaged in disruptive behaviour that has had negative implications for interstate cooperation in peace and security realm. The disruptions involve disagreements on trade relations especially between Rwanda and Uganda on one hand and Kenya and Tanzania on the other. Since early 2020, Kenya and Tanzania and Uganda and Kenya have engaged in unhealthy war of words related to the implementation of COVID 19 related protocols in their own territories. This has led to trade disruptions and spillover effects that pose potential threats to peace and security among border communities. In the political sector, Somalia and Kenya have a maritime border dispute

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that has been lodged at the Hague based International Court of Justice and a diplomatic row that led to the recall of each other’s ambassadors, Ethiopian troops still occupy parts of Somalia outside the AU mandate, and Eritrea sustains an uneasy peace with Ethiopia. Djibouti has had a diplomatic tiff with Kenya over the election to the UN Security Council non-permanent member seat. Though the process led to the election of Kenya on the Council, no progress has been made to relieve the painful diplomatic setback suffered by Djibouti. Rwanda and Burundi’s political relations have remained on the rocks notwithstanding the change of guard in Burundi. Accusations and counter-accusations still rule the formal and informal airwaves that have poisoned interstate relationships. The foregoing scenarios do not augur well for the operations of the EASF. The force is far removed from helping construct a regional security complex in its contemplated mode. With the high level of fear and suspicion among the member states, it becomes difficult to sustain interconnectedness in security interactions.

ECCAS and the Central African Multinational Force The formation of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) predates the ASF. Due to its structure and history, it became a natural entry point for the ASF in Central Africa. It had been formed in 1983 to foster regional integration in Central Africa with a membership including Chad, Cameroon, Central Africa Republic, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Burundi, and Sao Tome and Principe. The membership consists of states with varying colonial and post-colonial experiences. The majority of the states are Francophone, two Lusophone and one Hispanophone. The region shares a turbulent historical and contemporary political and security experience that has characterized it as fragile, vulnerable and susceptible to coup d’états, cross-border crime, maritime insecurity, electoral violence, rampant trade in small arms and a thriving rebel and militia groupings. It has further witnessed mass atrocities, mass rape, and recruitment of child soldiers (Meyer, 2015). This has been happening in the context of Western fatigue towards Africa and persistent calls by the international community for Africa to resolve its own problems. It naturally evolved into an effective and autonomous regional organization with a committed membership. In 1999, it broadened its economic

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integration agenda by mainstreaming peace and security in its regional protocol at the Malabo meeting. Its Protocol of Peace and Security aims to address the conflicts and political instability that have characterized the region since the 1960s. The protocol facilitated the establishment of the Security Council in Central Africa or Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l’Afrique Centrale (COPAX) with three key instruments: the Commission for Defense and Security, the Central African Early Warning System (MARAC) and the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC) (Elowson & Wiklund, 2011). The COPAX was formally ratified in January 2004 to align with the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture (Tiruneh, 2010). The litmus test case for COPAX has been the Central African Republic which has been a theatre of conflict and instability for a long time and has remained central to the ECCAS peace and security efforts. Prior to the engagement of the ECCAS in the country, the CEMAC (Central African Economic and Monetary Community consisting of Gabon, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of the Congo and Equatorial Guinea) had deployed a regional peace force, the Multinational Force in the Central African Republic in 2002, to promote peace and security in the country. However, in 2008, CEMAC transferred its authority for the Multinational Force to ECCAS under the COPAX which also got engaged in securing the Gulf of Guinea in 2009. The Central African Standby Force (FOMAC) formed in 2002 while the Central African Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC) became operational in 2007 as technical arms of COPAX. MARAC became operational at a time when the region was characterized by poor democratic and human rights credentials. Its responsibilities, however, involved the collection, collation and analysis of data in the member states. Its responsibilities were later decentralized to the individual states whose country reports would be channeled to the regional offices including AU and IGAD. The FOMAC, initially a force of ECCAS, was established as a standby force consisting of national military, police and civilian contingents and resources. It was committed to conducting observation and monitoring missions, and implement peacekeeping and restoration of peace, engage in humanitarian intervention following a humanitarian disaster, enforcement of sanctions as provided for by the existing regulations, preventive deployment, peacebuilding, disarmament and demobilization and policing activities including control of fraud and organized crime (ECCAS, 2002). It conducted several training exercises in the region since 2003 and the

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alignment with the ASF was expected to materialize in 2015. Angola was a major military contributor and player in these exercises including a couple of other states. The relationship between ECCAS and the AU, however, has remained controversial (Institute for Security Studies, 2019). The two bodies tend to operate independently of each other in matters of peace, security and stabilization in the region. This was more pronounced in the case of the Central Africa Republic crisis where the two bodies took turns in taking charge of the conflict in 2013. In several incidents, the AU has tended to take a proactive role in the political crises in Gabon (2018), Republic of Congo (2015) Chad and Burundi (2015) while the ECCAS looked aside. The conflicts in North West and South West Cameroon have attracted the attention of neither the AU nor that of the ECCAS. The ECCAS mission in the Central African Republic is a case study of the complex relationship existing between the subregional body and the AU. The ECCAS had earlier deployed its multinational force (MICOPAX) to the country and established a presence in the country by the time the next conflict erupted in 2012. MICOPAX got involved in the mediation talks between the government and the Seleka rebels, a process that saw competing conflict resolution approaches between the AU and the subregional body. The AU preferred a hardline position against the rebels while the MICOPAX preferred a conciliatory approach taking into consideration the interest of regional states Chad and Republic of Congo. It led to the legitimization of the Seleka rebel regime by the ECCAS. The subsequent negotiations between ECCAS and the AU resulted in the handover of the MICOPAX mission to the Support Mission in the Central Africa Republic (MISCA). However, the mandate of the mission was shared between the two organizations. In effect, the MOU between the AU and ECCAS on the establishment of a regional mechanism was found to be inadequate with regard to the Central African region. In 2013, a new revised MOU was signed in France in which the ‘leadership and composition of MISCA remained largely that of ECCAS countries’ at the expense of the AU (Institute for Security Studies, 2019). ECCAS was of the view that the AU had no realistic picture of the situation in the region hence its insistence to take charge of all political and military processes. There is an apparent lack of trust between the two organizations. Though the AU has taken a proactive role in the mediation process in the Central African Republic, there exists bad blood between them. Nonetheless, the AU wishes the ECCAS to be subordinate to it in matters

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of peace and security. This is bound to affect future peace operations in the region depending on who takes the first shot on the ground. The ECCAS region is basically a standard regional security complex with a dominant Angola and assertive Chad and Republic of Congo. Angola has a strong artillery force that led the intervention mission in the DRC and exhibited its prowess during the regional military exercises conducted in the region. While the region has been marked by intrastate instability in DRC, CAR, Cameroon and Burundi there is virtually no visible interstate enmity. Angola joined the ECCAS in 1999, a time when the regional body was exiting the sleep mode (Can & Maigari, 2019). This was also the year when the member states signed an MOU to incorporate the peace and security mandate in the COPAX. Since then the regional body has remained active in peace and security engagements in the region notwithstanding organizational and financial challenges that it faces.

Arab Maghreb Union and North African Regional Capability (NARC) The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was created in 1989 in Marrakesh, Morocco, as a regional organization consisting of five states (Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and Tunisia) geographically located in the Maghreb region of North Africa. The region is interconnected by religion, language and culture and experienced European colonial domination. The forming of the Union happened five years after Morocco had exited the OAU and at the end of the Cold War implying the influence of external forces rather than regional dynamics in the push for regional integration. Moroccan internal political dynamics could also have played a role in the push for regional approach to regional political issues especially the question of Western Sahara. The AMU aimed to ‘advance economic integration, strengthen cooperation in foreign and defense policies, work towards the progress and prosperity of their societies, preserve peace, justice and equality and achieve free movement of persons and transfer of services, goods and capital … The treaty also established a customs union to be functioning by 1995, a common economic market in 2000, and subsequently a shared security regime’ (Allouche, 2017: 4). Various authors have described AMU as a failed attempt at regional economic and political integration. Allouche (2017) has attributed the

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failure to political rivalry between Morocco and Algeria over the question of Western Saharan sovereignty. Others have attributed it to the subsequent southward shift of the member states attention to join adjacent regional organizations such as ECOWAS, CEN-SAD and COMESA (Ghanmi, 2017). The AMU generally suffered from the challenges of legitimacy and representation due to the absence of Egypt and Western Sahara. For a long time, Morocco was a disinterested member due to its engagements in Western Sahara as an occupying force that faced resistance from other AMU members especially Algeria and OAU. According to Alburqueque (2015), the AMU has never formalized its relations with AU by signing a Protocol on Relations between the RECs and AU. The legitimacy of AMU was also challenged by competing regional mechanisms such as the Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN-SAD) which was initiated at the behest of Muammar Gaddafi. The Community comprises 29 states from north, west and eastern Africa and doubles up too in the realm of peace and security in their region. The AMU had nonetheless been identified to host the North African Standby Brigade as per the subsidiarity principle of the AU. There was, however, a strong need for a regional mechanism to take care of regional peace and security agenda in North Africa. A North African Regional Capability (NARC) was established via a 2007 MOU to be headquartered in Egypt outside the AMU. Libya led the process of realizing the formation of the regional mechanism and thus willing to host the NARC secretariat. The Logistics base would be based in Algiers and Cairo. Morocco was left out of the NARC since it was, at the time, not a member of the AU and its resistance to the membership of Western Sahara to the regional mechanism. North Africa is a region characterized by pathological violence and instability especially international terrorism, armed conflict and unconstitutional changes in power. Libya has experienced anarchy since the murder of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 leading to a protracted conflict between the UN Islamist recognized government and that of the antiIslamist rebel group under General Khalifa Hiftir. Both wings are supported by different states in the Arab League as well as AMU and CEN-SAD. Furthermore, there are conspicuous democracy deficits in key countries especially in Egypt where the crackdown on civil society has exposed the authoritarian hand of the state. The NARC’s standby force has not been operationalized to date and no deployment to any conflict theatre in the region has ever been

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done. This is despite the existence of political instability in Libya, the protracted Western Sahara dispute and the tension between Algeria and Morocco. The region also faces other unconventional conflicts arising from international terrorism and which demand commitments from regional forces. NARC’s development has been hampered by disagreements among member states since 2011. With the secretariat being based in Libya, the security situation has not helped the development of a regional mechanism (Alburqueque, 2015). This occurs in the political context characterized by powerful individual economies and militaries in the region who are large contributors to the AU budget. None of the powers in the region is willing to coalesce around one dominant state. The establishment of an alliance of states with equal military might may be the way out in which the states would be involved in a semblance of balance of power. Interestingly, each of the states believes in its ability to sustain peace in its own territory without external support. Such a scenario may thus not augur well for the growth of a regional body but may be fertile ground for overlays from external forces. This happened during the NATO intervention in Libya, and Turkish, Egyptian and Russian engagement in Libya.

Intergovernmental Authority on Development The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established in 1996 succeeding the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) founded in 1986. Its members are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Uganda. In regard to establishment of a security community, until the recent reconciliation between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the IGAD region was in a state of ‘no-war, no peace situation’ which stifled several potential avenues of cooperation for several years. Similarly, conflicts in South Sudan and parts of Sudan, violent extremism and terrorism due to groups like AlShabaab have caused significant challenges in the region’s peace and security profile. The IGAD countries also have and continue to experience shared challenges of population displacement and movement whether in search of economic opportunities or as a result of forceful displacement due to conflict, natural disasters and droughts. In addition to security challenges of such movement including the movement of small arms and light weapons, it places a burden on the coping mechanisms of receiving communities in terms of natural resources such as available water and

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pasture lands leading to localized conflicts. Migration also continues to be a challenge as often it has been a conduit for criminals to take advantage of and engage in smuggling and trafficking. Economically, according to the African Development Bank Economic 2018 Outlook for East Africa, some of IGAD’s Member States continue to enjoy robust overall economic growth as with recent years. The report notes that in the region’s fastest-growing economies, ‘growth resulted from strong domestic private consumption, public investment in infrastructure, growth in light manufacturing, and growth in agriculture, particularly during periods of good rainfall’. However, the report also notes that some of the region’s ‘commodity-dependent economies, notably South Sudan, have suffered from weak commodity prices coupled with fragility and insecurity’ (African Development Bank, 2018). According to the World Bank, 2018 Doing Business Report, IGAD Member States have made reforms to enable entrepreneurship and improve the business environment. Some of these measures include merging procedures, measures to ease cross-border trade (Uganda), getting access to electricity and credit (Kenya) and simplifying tax payment systems (Ethiopia) (World Bank, 2017). Socio-economically, IGAD Member States belong to the world’s Least Developed Countries (LDCs). According to the UNDP (2016) Human Development Report, other than Kenya, the rest of the IGAD Member States have low human development indices, including lower mean years of schooling, high maternal mortality rates and gender inequalities. The region also has high youth unemployment rates and economic exclusion which creates risks of young people being recruited to conflicts and radicalization. According to the World Bank’s data on mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) as of 2016–2017, access to mobile technology is highest in Kenya with 86 people out of 100 having access and the lowest in Eritrea and South Sudan with 10.2 and 12.0 out of 100, respectively. According to the UNDP 2016 Human Development Report, widespread distribution of mobile phone technology in some parts of the region is accelerating financial inclusion with mobile bank accounts, Kenya leading the way at 58% access, followed by Somalia and Uganda at 35%. At the same time, technology has also made it possible for people to mobilize on social media, hold governments accountable as well as expose localized injustices and lack of governance to a very wide global audience. As with other parts of the world, access to technology

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continues to shape peace and security in the region. Networks of local, regional and global actors continue to use this technology to very actively disseminate information, information that has sometimes been used to manipulate populations towards creating patterns of exclusion leading to resentment, discrimination and alienation based on ethnic, religion or cultural background, contributing to the complexity of local and regional conflicts. In terms of regional integration, some IGAD Member States have multiple REC memberships including in the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which could make it difficult to consolidate economic integration in the region. Similarly, issues of economic complementarity where the IGAD Member States export similar commodities (coffee, tea, livestock, etc.) could be challenging for economic integration. There is progress in physical integration of the region especially in terms of electricity distribution and in rail and road connectivity, a crucial issue, especially for the regions landlocked economies of Uganda, Ethiopia and South Sudan. According to IGAD’s 2016 ‘State of the Region’ report, there are more than thirteen transport corridors that link the IGAD region in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somaliland, Sudan, South Sudan and Djibouti (IGAD, 2016). IGAD’s CEWARN has provided capacity development support to its Member States in many areas. For example, it has supported Member States in establishing their Early Warning Systems; trained staff of the National Early Warning and Response Mechanisms (CEWERUs); provided computers and servers to the Early Warning and Response Mechanisms; and assisted in operationalizing the Situation Rooms. The IGAD Security Sector Programme and the IGAD Centre of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism have collaborated not only in training relevant officials of Member States to ensure compliance with international human rights instruments but also engaged various community leaders in activities to promote rule of law in Member States.

Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa The Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa treaty was signed in Lusaka on 21 December 1981 as a precursor to the Common Market for Eastern and South Africa (COMESA). The treaty establishing COMESA was signed on 5 November 1993 in Kampala, Uganda

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and ratified a year later in Lilongwe, Malawi on 8 December 1994. Its twenty-one Member States are: Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Eswatini, Libya, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Tunisia and Somalia joined in 2018. The COMESA Secretariat is in Lusaka, Zambia. In addition, COMESA has Liaison Offices to Belgium and to the African Union in Addis Ababa. COMESA has also got several independent institutions created to support development and integration, including the PTA bank based in Bujumbura, Burundi; a Clearing House in Harare, Zimbabwe, the COMESA Leather institute in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia; a reinsurance company (ZEP-RE) in Nairobi, Kenya; the COMESA. COMESA has achieved some important milestones in its effort to deepen regional integration. The two most significant are the establishment of a Free Trade Area in October 2000, which now covers approximately half of the member states and the launching in June 2015 of the Tripartite Free Trade Area that brings together member states of the East African Community, Southern African Development Community and COMESA itself. The impetus to deepen COMESA’s work in peace and security preceded these regional integration milestones but was inspired by the recognition of the deleterious impact on regional trade and integration of the conflicts that erupted in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa in 1998. This led to the adoption of several important decisions in peace and security by the Heads of State and governments and the Council of Ministers over a period, beginning in 1999, as will be explained in the next section. The spread of COMESA membership which, as indicated in Table 3, cuts across six other RECs, means that its geo-political context is a microcosm of the overall continental situation. COMESA Member States have not only experienced serious intrastate conflicts but also a few notable interstate disputes. Intrastate conflicts have taken the form or have been manifested in insurgencies by armed groups, rebellion against central government, unconstitutional changes of government, interethnic violence, collapse of state authority, secessionist movements, elections-related disputes and illicit trade in natural resources. At the same time, many states have suffered severe terrorist attacks or remain threatened by terrorism or piracy. The prevalence of small arms and light weapons have worsened many of these intrastate conflicts. Not only have some of the effects of these intrastate conflicts

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had serious negative spillover effects across borders, but there have also been border disputes between a few member states. The peace and security situation in the COMESA region has witnessed marked improvement over the past few years, as several sources of intrastate and interstate tensions or conflicts are on the mend. The improvement is attributable to a combination of intensified regional mediation efforts, national reconciliation, and assumption of power by the new crop of political leaders who are determined to chart new course for their countries. Overall, the positive changes in the peace and security situation in the region hold much promise for achieving deeper regional integration among the member states. COMESA has launched several initiatives and activities to support the work of its Member States on conflict prevention. An important initiative developed by COMESA to support post conflict peacebuilding is the Trading for Peace Programme (TfP) for countries emerging from conflict. The programme uses trade as the mechanism for peace building and has targeted small-scale cross-border traders initially in the Great Lakes Region. It has three components, namely, research on trade flows in border areas; development of information networks; and post conflict reconstruction and development (building infrastructure at the border areas to facilitate easy flow of trade) and enhance peace. The programme was implemented in three phases: phase one focused on research; phase two on trade-related capacity building; and phase three which started in 2010 focuses mainly on strengthening cross-border technical capacity by creating Trade Information Desks. These have been established in the cross-border areas between DRC, on one hand, and Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia, on the other. Sixteen Trade Information Desks (TID) have been created along the various border points. The TID acts as conflict prevention mechanisms in as much as they help in collecting information about trade disputes among small cross-border traders, mostly women, and mediating such disputes. The typical cross-border traders who are harassed or cheated by criminal networks in cross-border trade transactions are mostly women.

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Challenges of the African RSC: Overlaps and Sovereignty Issues The quest for an African regional security complex is innately and structurally fractured due to the hazed adherence to the principle of subsidiarity. The AU’s reliance on the principle of subsidiarity is problematic especially when there is conflict of interest between RECs and the PSC. Though the subsidiarity principle implied that enforcement of AU decisions would be democratized and, therefore, more culturally and regionally accepted, the lack of a coordinated and interconnected approach among the regional mechanisms may defeat the noble peace and security intentions of the AU. The regional mechanisms tend to regard themselves as belonging to the specific region thus rendering conflict intervention region specific. There is a need for each regional mechanism to establish a liaison office in the other regions. This will enhance resource and knowledge sharing that would complement operations on the continent. For example, it would make political and military sense if the ECOWAS brigade or EASF complemented NARC in addressing conflict situations in North Africa. In this case, supra-regional coordination is an untapped resource in the African peace and security processes. Membership to regional economic organizations and security mechanisms should also be resolved. A number of states have dual membership and aspire even for triple membership to economic and security organizations to protect and guarantee their economic and security interests. Notable cases are Angola (SADC, ECCAS), Burundi (ECCAS, EASF, ICGLR), Tanzania (SADC, EAC), Mauritania (ECOWAS, CEN-SAD, AMU), DRC (ECCAS, SADC, EAC), Egypt (Arab League, COMESA, CEN-SAD). Some of the memberships are contradictory to African interests especially the northern African countries that belong to the Arab League. Multiple membership spreads national benefits thinly and remains costly to individual states. It also dilutes the magnitude of psychological and material commitment by concerned states to the regional or continental visions. Maintaining and improving of regional security especially in eastern Africa has revolved around challenges to sovereignty issues leading to intrastate and interstate conflict, resource deficiencies and historical mistrust among member states. For example, the war between Tanzania and Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, conflicts in Sudan and Ethiopia and Ethiopia and Somalia, the war between Ugandan and Rwandan troops

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in DRC, Ugandan troops against Rwandan troops in DRC and Kenyan troops pursuing Al Shabaab in Somalia. However, the greater issue for all states has been the suppression of internal conflict and direct challenges to regime legitimacy. These include Somalia separatists in Puntland & Somaliland; Ethiopian rebellions in Ogaden & Afar; the Uganda civil war in Acholiland; Sudanese disenfranchisement in the South, Darfur and the East; Djibouti’s Afar population seeking greater central government control; Eritrean Islamic fundamentalist movements; the implosion of D.R. Congo; Tanzania’s political struggle and appeasement with Zanzibari separatists; Kenya’s ‘ethnically’ charged political climate, and the battle between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda and Burundi. These security threats have been exacerbated by the uncontrolled flow of arms into and around the region. Regional mechanisms become more problematic when their members also belong to or are under the influence of external regional organizations such as the Arab League of States. Northern African conflicts have proliferated partly due to the interests and preferences of the Arab League. The League does not have a stand on undemocratic change of power among its member states. The African Union, on the other hand, abhors undemocratic change of regimes as stipulated in its Charter on democracy, elections and governance. This has also been enshrined in the Constitutive Charter. The response to the maritime conflict between Kenya and Somalia took a turn for the worse when the Arab League of States, headquartered in Egypt, warned Kenya against territorial claims on Somali maritime territory yet the case has been referred to the International Court of Justice and the AU is adequately seized of the matter (Vidija, 2019). The principle of subsidiarity should spell out the terms of the division of labour between the regional mechanisms and the African Union. The terms should be clear on the roles and responsibilities of the mechanisms and when they can be utilized. The existence of bureaucratic tensions between the regional mechanisms and the AU is a sure encumbrance to the operations of both organizations and the realization of the peace agenda at both levels. The experience of the ECCAS should provide food for thought for the security designers at the AU and in the ASF especially with regard to the balance between practicalities at the regional level and principles at the continental level. The AU has to be categorical, from the outset, on which mechanism will have the primary responsibility for peace and security in a region. Such a mechanism should be representative

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and above the regional rivalries incumbent especially in standard regional securities communities such as EASCOM and AMU or CEN-SAD. In addition, the conflict context has to guide the operations envisaged in each region. This wealth of knowledge exists in the regional research institutions and civil society organizations which the AU seldom consults.

Thinking Systems Thinking for Africa The complexity of conflicts on the African continent demands a novel approach to facilitate their resolution. Whereas most of the countries experience intrastate conflicts, their magnitude tends to evolve into ‘complex emergencies’ which the UNHCR has defined as ‘multifaceted humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is a total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict, and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing UN country program’ (UNHCR, 2007: 103). Complex emergencies have common characteristics in whose core lie conflict and warfare. The characteristics include (Bartels et al., 2016: 1; UNHCR, 2007: 104): • Widespread violence or loss of life and involving massive population displacements as well as pervasive and extensive damage to societies, their infrastructure and their economies. • The underlying causes of complex emergencies are usually complex and dynamic throughout the course of the crises and include political, environmental, economic and demographic instability. • Complex emergencies are often prolonged with the average civil war now lasting at least 10 years. • Delivery of humanitarian assistance is often hindered by political and military constraints, leading to security risks for relief workers. • The majority of victims are civilian with morbidity and mortality highest among vulnerable and unprotected children, women, the elderly, and the disabled. Civilians account for the 90% of war-related deaths from civil strife, genocide and other violations of the Geneva Conventions.

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Almost all the conflicts on the African continent manifest the above characteristics. Representative examples include the 1994 Rwanda Genocide, protracted Darfur Conflict and the Civil war in South Sudan, the protracted war against Al Shabaab in Somalia, the Libyan Crisis, the frosted war of independence in Western Sahara, the emerging war against Islamists in Mozambique, Tigrayan crisis and the frozen Eritrea-Ethiopia border war. These theatres of war require novelty and a coordinated approach in resolving not only the war between the major belligerent antagonists but also the crisis emerging from their militant encounters. It is in this context that the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has been structured and expected to respond. The APSA structure ought to draw on systems thinking to effectively execute its mandate of instilling and sustaining peace and security on the continent. Considering the novelty of establishing APSA in the African Union with the mandate of resolving complex conflicts, integrating systems thinking enables it to conceive and assess the complex conflicts on the continent as interconnected sets of elements that are coherently organized to perpetuate violence and humanitarian crises. Conflicts on the continent have interestingly become predictable to the extent that behaviour patterns of actors in conflict theatres and the likely consequences can be plotted. Their protraction has, however, evaded security planners due to the dynamism that they portray. The assessment of such scenarios informs peace and security planners and workers to imagine the ratio of civil and military commitments to the resolution of the conflict. Systems thinking is ‘a way of understanding reality that emphasizes the relationships among a system’s parts rather than simply the parts themselves’ (Ricigliano & Chigas, 2011: 2). It ‘holds that the ability to see the whole of a phenomenon in its broader context will provide new and different insights than can be gained by looking at each of its component parts individually’ (Ricigliano & Chigas, 2011: 2). In the 2016 CDA Collaborative Learning Manual, systems thinking is ‘a way of seeing interconnectedness of structures, behaviours and relationships in conflicts to help us identify the underlying causes and uncover opportunities for change’ (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2016: 3). It elaborates further that it is beneficial to the actors who wish to intervene in and affect persistent and resistant conflict systems. Systems thinking is thus ‘effective for analysis of difficult, recurrent or intractable conflicts whose solution is not obvious and that involve complex issues and a need for multiple actors to coordinate and see the “big picture,” not just their part

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in it’ (Ricigliano & Chigas, 2011: 3). This is a departure that complements the conventional static conflict analytical frameworks that go for quick fixes and lack feedback loops and factor interconnectedness (Davis, 2011). Systems thinking enables thinking about conflict systems as interconnected, have goals or purposes to achieve, possess dynamic causality, and have feedbacks that reinforce and balance the system functionality. Systematic conflict analysis, therefore, follows a regime that ensures comprehensiveness as opposed to fragmentation and narrowness, comprehensibility as opposed to developing longlists and portability that connects analysis to strategy formulation, planning and programming and monitoring and evaluation (Ricigliano & Chigas, 2011). It is applicable in chronic situations that have resisted repeated efforts to resolve, when the problem has produced multiple, and often contrasting, analyses regarding its sources and ‘solutions, where many actors are involved in addressing the issue but struggle to coordinate efforts, short term and ‘quick fix’ solutions have failed and a variety of stakeholders are applying different approaches simultaneously, without considering impacts on the situation as a whole (CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, 2016: 3, 6). Systems thinking ought to be a programmed activity in the design schedules of APSA. It ought to be integrated into the specific processes of the APSA that deal with regional conflicts. Now that the operational capacity is exercised at the regional level, regional mechanisms ought to integrate systems thinking in their critical processes performed by the military, police and civil missions. These must specifically include the preconflict and conflict escalation phases of early warning and mediation. The operations within the Peace and Security Council, Conflict Early Warning System, Panel of the Wise, and Peace Fund and African Standby Force should be systematically designed and implemented in consideration of the complex conflict systems obtaining on the African continent. It implies the vacation of the quick fix, linear, cause–effect solutions that do not accommodate mental mapping of regional conflicts. It will require the integration of research institutions and universities in the respective regions to complement the role of the regional and continental peace and security organs.

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Conclusions The African security community arrangement is structurally variegated. The context of its architecture prevents it from evolving into an effective structure for managing conflicts on the continent. The membership of the subregional mechanism is similarly diverse and contradicts the criteria of shared common identity and values that are central to the creation of a security community with a sense of community. The ‘we-feeling’ is disjointed and the securitization of issues in the different units is not shared. Nevertheless, the intentions for creating a unified structure with a sense of purpose are recognized. This has been the case since the establishment of the OAU in 1963. Subsequently, a number of regional economic communities were established to address the economic challenges on the continent. The integration of peace and security agenda into the African agenda is, however, new and noble. This has been amplified by the creation of the subregional security mechanisms by the African Union to take charge of the security challenges in the specific regions. The standby force mechanisms, nevertheless, need to shift from the conventional quick fix militaristic expeditions that have marked the history of conflict resolution on the continent. Such escapades have offered band-aid solutions that have not addressed the root causes of the conflicts on the continent. The shift to systems thinking offers a solution that embraces all the actors in conflict theatres as partners in the search for peace and security.

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CHAPTER 4

African Peace and Security Architecture: Fit for Purpose?

Introduction The ‘old world order’ was anchored on Eurocentrism serving as a justification for the occupation and ‘development’ of Africa. The ‘new world order’ is under tremendous pressure and the multilateral system that has underpinned this post-Cold War order is being undermined and fragmented (Khadiagala, 1992; Hyde-Price, 2006; Volman, 1993) through north–south power politics (Mansbach, 1994). Some bemoan the alleged end of the liberal order, but this order has not always been benign for African and other developing countries. In the foreseeable world order, the growing influence of China is steadfast. Moreover, China is setting the global agenda for global cooperation. In this new international relation, African states seem to be a priority on Chinese agenda. In 2019, China begun her reign of chairing the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In this realm of China-Africa relations, the election of South Africa, Ivory Coast and Equatorial Guinea as non-permanent members of the UNSC beginning January 2019 signalled the future of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the increasingly multipolar world order. APSA’s role in this new world order is largely defined by four processes; coordination, sustainability, subsidiarity, coherence and partnership (O’brien, 2000; Møller, 2005). The principle of subsidiarity is an international norm that demarcates responsibilities between various levels

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of a community. The concept has roots in the papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno (cited in Carozza, 2003), A community of a higher order should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order, depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society, always with a view to the common good. (cited in Carozza, 2003: 38)

It is evident that the principle envisages the central role of regional organizations and their relationship with supra organizations in the global peace and security arrangement (Møller, 2005). Specifically, Article 52 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter states that ‘the Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council’ (United Nations, 2015). However, operationalization of the peace and security architectures is not a natural process. In circumstances where this process is incapable of responding to eminent threats, the UN Security Council which has the power to authorize the robust engagement with armed groups can be revoked when necessary (Williams & Dersso, 2015). Oftentimes armed militia are adamant about negotiation but resort to hostility, making it hard for the Regional Organizations (ROs) to conduct peace operations, in such situations ROs generally have to defer to the UN (Williams & Boutellis, 2014). Before we delve deeper into the structures of APSA, it is important to illuminate the implications of the old-world order on the new order in the context of international peace and security. It is a world that was constructed through the subjugation of the fascist and totalitarian powers at the end of WWII. The United Nations organization was the progeny of this endeavour and its primary purpose was to ensure that there was an institutional mechanism that would encourage its members to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that the international peace and security, and justice are not endangered. Through the mechanisms of the Security Council and the General Assembly, the UN was provided with the ability to oversee the peaceful settlement of disputes. Specifically, Article 33 of Chapter VI of the UN Charter (1945) states that ‘the parties to any dispute, the

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continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement’. The Charter of the UN designated the world body as being the primary vehicle with the responsibility to promote international peace and security. In order to operationalize these interventions, the broad range of institutions within the UN system could be utilized. As the institution empowered by the Charter to promote peace and security, the UN Security Council is the most powerful of these institutions and it has a primary responsibility to create and establish the framework conditions for other branches and institutions of the UN system. To this end, Regional Organizations (ROs) are enjoined to contribute towards the peaceful resolution of disputes and the maintenance of global order. Cooperation between ROs and the UN is guided by various principles including the comparative advantage, complementarity and subsidiarity (Yamashita, 2012). As observed by Padelford (1954) decades ago, collaboration between the UN and regional organizations can be circumstantial depending on the prevailing socio-economic and political circumstances. However, such arrangements have also been necessitated by the need for joint states to provide mutual defence and reciprocal assistance to meet the emerging threats to security arising from new range of transnational extremism.

Global Perspectives on the Establishment of Regional Mechanisms Social constructivism posits that ‘actors’ and their behaviour in a given ecosystem shape the world and in turn, the world shapes actors. This means that human relations are inherently social, shape our daily decisions, and influence what and how we would like the future to look like. Indeed, Durkheim is right when he argued that different relations in a particular social order could influence social outcomes. Although international politics is not something that is independent from us, selfdetermination is a development virtue that needs to be cultivated by all regions of the world. Today, the study of African security in the international studies is highly informed by the development of broader structures and institutions that would respond to the uniqueness of the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the adoption of the Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF in 2003, and the subsequent approval in 2004 was

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premised on the understanding that efficient response to the conflict in the contemporary world order requires a regional collective effort. Besides the regionalization of interventions, academics have wondered why WWII had to occur despite the measures put in place by world leaders through the League of Nations to address the world’s most complicated problems after WWI (Benes, 1932). On this issue, Fenwick argues that ‘the failure of the League of Nations is the failure of the plan of collective security embodied in Articles 10, 11, and 16 of the Covenant’ (Fenwick, 1936: 506). The situation remained the same in the early 1990s when the world was exposed yet again to vagaries of genocide in eastern Europe and Rwanda. Besides the strategic failure of the UN missions to avert genocide, there were operational issues within the peacekeeping domain that required attention. For instance, even with the existence of policies and doctrines that address the multidimensionality of contemporary peace operation, the military continues to dominate the peacekeeping operation environment. Although, the UN peacekeeping has demonstrated the ability to reduce civilian killings by increasing the number of military troops to peacekeeping mission (Hultman et al., 2013), empirical evidence continues to emerge to show that by minimizing military dominance, the security dilemma between the belligerents becomes less debilitating, as the buffer of peacekeepers removes each function’s threat of subjugation by the other, hence, reducing the belligerent’s opportunities to commit atrocities. Indeed, the cost of peacekeeping is likely to be lower relative to other military intervention options (Stockholm Peace Research Institute, 2011). With the introduction of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC), which is super-military in doctrine, it is becoming increasingly impossible to entrench the original values of multidimensional peace operations. Some have argued that the characterization of African military-dominated peacekeeping originates from the politicomilitary nature of the conflict system, which often escalates into the outbreak of active armed conflict, thereby inviting the external pressure of interest (Brosig & Sempijja, 2018). Although extricating out of this web of internal-external relation requires the adoption of comprehensive security approach as suggested by Conteh-Morgan (1993), deployment of troops seems not to reduce violence within the five years of deployment. Given these factors, it became apparent that the design of ASF would largely assume the military doctrine. Civilians are viewed as ‘outsiders’

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while the police are regarded as less knowledgeable on matters military. Moreover, the challenges of managing and coordinating civilians, coupled with the difficulty of Member States to deploy police officers outside their borders, create a capacity gap in the ASF (De Coning & Peter, 2018). Further, it makes economic, security and political sense for the states to deploy their armies as peacekeepers during times when they are not occupied at home. All these put together has projected ASF as a militarization entity within the APSA. In sum, the main challenge stems from the doctrine and policy framework of AU. However, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union’s African Chiefs of Defense Staff, is silent on the role of police and civilians. The liaison stream of AU, including the diplomatic core of AU Member States in Addis Ababa, has senior military officers posted as Defense Attachés or Defense Advisers to the Ambassador or Head of the Embassy. Functionally, the Defense Adviser is also the link between AU Headquarters, the Embassy and the Member State on security matters, including policing issues. Effectively, this means even police and policing issues have to be channeled back home through the Ministries of Defense, to whom the Defense Adviser reports. Despite this landscape at AU, the contemporary PSO involves multidimensional activities and assets in which impartial activities of diplomatic, military and civilian work is done to restore or maintain peace in a mandated area of operation. The multidimensional approach undertaken is usually prompted by the involvement of many factions in conflict situations including warlords, non-state actors, militia, criminal elements and armed civilians and not solely by regular armies. The anomalous monism’s argument against militarization of ASF is that although the UN system has pushed back against militarization, this has recreated itself into another form of pragmatism, as Andersen says, ‘primacy of politics will prevail as the hallmark of a new pragmatic UN approach to peace operations’ (Andersen, 2018: 18). Such contention arises primarily from the considerations that if militarization does not offer effective peacekeeping where they are deployed, they remain practically futile. In other words, Andersen’s anomalous monism remains trapped between doctrine and practice.

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Formation of the African Peace and Security Architecture The 2016–2020 Roadmap for the operationalization of APSA notes that there have been constraints to the implementation of the peace and security infrastructure. Chief among these constraints is lack of harmonization and lack of shared understanding of the comparative advantage among the various structures. Although the principle of subsidiary is key in organizing division of labour in overlapping hierarchies, in practice, however, the principle is not effective in ensuring that intervention is done by institutions closer to the crises. It is often linked to several other mutually supportive principles such as the complementarity and comparative advantage. Given the proliferation of regional and international actors in the AU peace support operation, several structures have been developed, forming the pillars of APSA (see Fig. 4.1). The APSA is anchored upon building units, glued at the centre by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC). Besides the PSC, APSA’s mandates, objectives and mission are executed by the following pillars: • • • • •

The African Union Commission; Panel of the Wise; Continental Early Warning Systems; The African Standby Force; African Peace Fund.

Collaboration between the APSA and RECs/RMs is key in supporting effective operationalization and implementation of overall architecture. The underlying elements of the idea of subsidiarity revolve around the relative effectiveness of more immediate levels, but also around organizing relations between different levels involved in processes. As such, the effective implementation of the principle also involves linking to these mutually reinforcing notions, as opposed to notions of centralization. The application of subsidiarity in Africa, especially as it relates to the collaboration with international institutions such as UN, AU and REC are rather dynamic. The principle is typically viewed through a top-down lens: international/regional organizations arm and position their own action through the political space assumed by regional/subregional organizations in PSO processes such as mediation. However, support for the

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Military Staff Commi ee (MISC) Common Africa Defence and Security Policy

Con nental Early Warning System Peace and Security Council

AU Panel of the Wise (with FEMWISE)

African Standby Force

African Peace Fund

Fig. 4.1 Relationship among the pillars of the African peace and security architecture (Source Adopted from the African Union’s African peace and security architecture road map)

principle may also come from a bottom-up perspective. There are situations where RECs are unable to act or are constrained from acting. In such cases, encouraging regional/international support from the perspective of subsidiarity may be a productive way. Table 4.1 shows the five APSA pillars, principles and functions of each pillar.

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Table 4.1 APSA pillars Pillar

Principles and functions

Peace and Security Council (PSC)

AU’s decision-making body with 15-member states on rotational basis It is an early warning organ of APSA Facilitate timely and efficient response Outlined in article 7 of the protocol Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act; and support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major natural disasters Provide timely advice (early warning) on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in the continent to the AUC Chairperson, to be brought to the attention of the PSC in order to develop an appropriate and timely response CEWS coordinates its work with similar structures in the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) Coordinates its work with similar structures in the Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Notably SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD Although RECs have developed extensive networks and systems of early warning in their respective regions, sensitive security information is not systematically shared, hence creating a disconnect between warning and response Consists of five prominent personalities (representing the five regions of Africa), with a track record of contributing to peace, security and development on the African continent Effort is directed towards peace-making and advisory functions, to advise the PSC and the AUC chairperson on all issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa Prevent and manage conflicts by containing their spread or escalation; To support peace processes; To enforce its decisions in cases of grave circumstances; To support peacebuilding activities To undertake humanitarian action, disaster management and reconstruction The ASF is organized in five regional standby forces and is composed of multidisciplinary contingents on standby in their country of origin: ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) SADC Standby Force (SSF) Central Africa Multinational Force (FOMAC) North African Capability

Continental Early Warning System

Panel of the Wise

African Standby Force

(continued)

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Table 4.1 (continued) Pillar

Principles and functions

African Peace Fund

Provides necessary financial resources for peace support mission and other operational activities related to peace and security Financial Regulations of the AU through financial appropriations from AU regular budget, voluntary contributions from member states, and other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals

Source Authors’ construction based on the 2010 APSA Assessment Study Report, African Union

In addition to the five pillars, APSA recognizes the critical role played by AU’s policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). The policy framework for PCRD was adopted in 2006. The policy lays down a pathway for the development of policies and strategies that seek to consolidate peace, prevent relapse to violence and promote sustainable development (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). AU’s PCRD policy as such is envisaged to play a pivotal part in the aftermath of conflict and ensure linkages with national development policies. The policy seeks to improve timeliness, effectiveness and coordination of activities in post conflict countries and to lay the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace. The PCRD policy further provides opportunities to strengthen linkages between APSA and other AU auxiliary structures, such as the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) (Matlosa, 2014). Within this realm, AU’s Peace and Security Department (AU PSD) and Department of Political Affairs (DPA) coordinate efforts to ensure progression from postconflict to development and stability. The transition in Central African Republic (CAR) exemplified a coordinated transition from active conflict to reconstruction.

Unpacking the Pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture Regional integration on the African continent has since the 1960s focused mainly on economic development through the promotion of trade relations among regional partner states in the regional economic

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communities (REC). The regional integration process is mostly linear beginning with a free trade area, followed by a customs union, a common market, economic union and ultimately a political union. According to Hartzenberg (2011) most of the regional economic communities are ‘ambitious schemes with unrealistic timeframes towards deeper integration and in some cases even political union. African regional integration arrangements are usually neighborhood arrangement’ (p. 2). The formation of regional economic bodies became a norm after the establishment of the United Nations Economic Commission of Africa in 1958 to promote among others, the intraregional integration on the continent (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2010). In a couple of RECs on the continent, cultural exchange has also been promoted through tourism and education exchange, in addition to the economic agenda. As such, facilities have been provided that allow for free interstate movement and residence of persons. For all purposes and to a large extent, matters pertaining to state and human security remained a preserve of the national military and political structures in charge of maintaining political sovereignty in individual states. This mandate has severally been expressed by national political leaders as unnegotiable and which must be jealously guarded (Bellamy & Beeson, 2010). The USA affirms, however, that African regional economic communities ought to be transformed to embrace regional security and stability as a priority and precondition for sustainable economic development (Chido, 2013). This became more urgent after the US military and humanitarian debacle in Somalia including the UN mishaps in Rwanda in the early 1990s and the frozen Western Sahara conflict. Consequently, African leaders have increasingly been impressed up on to actualize the African Solution for African Problem maxim by taking charge of efforts to bring peace, security and stability to conflict regions on the continent (Lobakeng, 2017; Ani, 2019). The will to establish a functional continental security community exists. This is manifested in the various attempts to create institutions and mechanisms focused on addressing current and emerging peace and conflict challenges. The consequent declarations point to a desire of having a functional security community that would serve the peace and security agenda on the continent. In particular, the Constitutive Act of the African Union establishes the African Peace and Security Architecture that consists of five key components: Peace and Security Council, Panel of the Wise, Continental Early Warning System, African Standby Force and the Special

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Fund (Dersso, 2010: 6). Other than the declaration to uphold the unity and solidarity of African peoples and defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of African states, the Constitutive Act obliges the African Union to promote peace, security and stability, democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance and protect human and people’s rights in accordance with the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights and other relevant human rights instrument (African Union, 2000). This declaration remains a deliberate paradigm shift from the state-centric to people-centric approach to resolving the endemic continental challenges. Peace and Security Council The Peace and Security Council (PSC) was created as a standing decisionmaking organ of the African Union in accordance with Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act as a ‘collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa’ (African Union, 2002: 4). It is the successor to the OAU Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution which was mandated to make decisions on matters of peace and security. The PSC response specifically consists of capabilities to among other things to ‘anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity, undertake peacemaking and peacebuilding functions in order to resolve conflicts where they have occurred and authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support missions’ (African Union, 2002: 5). The PSC facilitative role in the materialization of the African peace and security architecture extends into providing the ‘capabilities’ to ‘anticipate and prevent’ conflicts including authorizing of actual intervention into the major conflicts on the continent. These roles are played within the context of security interdependence among the member states of the African Union. The integration of systems thinking accords the PSC with the opportunity to establish not only the real causes but also the linking of conflict drivers to possible erosion or lack of the shared African values and trust that should be the adhesive bond among and within African states. In this case, the PSC ought to tap into the values of pan-Africanism by delinking it from the idealistic sloganeering of the colonial past. It ought to integrate its mandate into programming for action in postcolonial contexts that requires the solidarity of African people in resolving

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their problems. This should be a shift from reliance on states as sole actors to a coalition of citizens and national actors in conflict resolution. The provision of capabilities by the PSC ought to go beyond the militaristic interventions that often seem to be readily available. It ought to engage citizens in the anticipation, prevention and mediation of conflicts for the assurance of sustainable peace. It will thus enable drawing on the strengths of shared African values and experiences and address the contradictions that tend to emanate from the competition for scarce resources in many African countries. These actions should be embedded in the operations of the Panel of the Wise, African Standby Force, Early Warning and Peace Fund. This is in accord with Emmanuel Kisiangani’s conviction that the African Union ought to energize pan-Africanism by developing ‘the capacity for common action at the continental level to tackle the issues and challenges of a shared destiny’ and ‘define its authority in a manner that attracts ordinary citizens to its cause. It can do so by transforming its principles, norms and values into practice so that they can have an impact on the lives of African citizens’ (Kisiangani, 2013: 3). The PSC should be the epitome of shared African values and experiences that are of necessity in grounding the mandate of the anticipated African regional security community Panel of the Wise The role of councils of elders as embodiments of wisdom and personifications of authority and inspiration of confidence was recognized as part of African culture for ages. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) frequently resorted to the use of elder statesmen in their own right or as chairmen of ad hoc committees to resolve a number of political and governance challenges in and between member states. The African Union later institutionalized the use of Wise Men and Women in its Protocol on the Establishment of Peace and Security Council to make it a permanent feature of conflict prevention on the continent. At the Ouagadougou, High Level Retreat of the African Union Panel of the Wise in 2012 the delegates affirmed that ‘traditional African societies have always given prominence to holding consultations when searching for permanent solutions for problems confronting their people. The judicious reference to cultural values facilitates appropriate responses and lasting solutions to conflicts which threaten peace and security in Africa’ (ACCORD, 2013: 33). This role has been rooted in African traditions

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and culture of conflict resolution and crisis management and ‘was reserved for men and women with the soundest judgement and who society turned to for moral benefaction’ (Ewi, 2015: 2). The OAU recognized the crucial role of engaging important persons in conflict resolution. It resorted to the use of ad hoc Committees comprising selected, presumably respected, heads of state to address intra and interstate conflicts that marked its three decades of existence. A Committee of the Wise (Comité des Sages) comprising five presidents was first used in 1978 to intervene in the Western Sahara conflict. Other than considering the question of sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of colonial borders, the Committee was mandated with considering all the ‘exercise of the right of the people of this territory to self-determination’ (Ewi, 2015: 7). Several ad hoc committees were also formed based on need such as Ad Hoc Committee on Inter-African Disputes (1977), Ad Hoc Committee on Mercenaries (1967) and the Ad Hoc Committee on Liberation. Furthermore, the OAU also relied on the Good Offices Committee and Fact-finding missions to address some interstate problems. In 1973, the Good Offices Committee addressed the Somali-Ethiopia border dispute and Senegal-Guinea border crisis while a Fact-Finding Committee investigated, for example, the Rwanda–Burundi border dispute. The OAU further relied on individual eminent personalities and their Good Offices to resolve the numerous conflicts in and between its member states. For example, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia mediated the border dispute between Algeria and Morocco, the Nigerian civil war and the Congo crisis between 1963 and 1970. President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya chaired the Ad hoc Commission on the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1964. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia mediated the Kenya and Somalia territorial dispute in 1967. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania was instrumental in the negotiations between Ethiopia and Sudan as well as the Mwanza peace process for Burundi in the 1970s and 1990s, respectively. In the early 1990s, President Nelson Mandela helped to mediate the conflict in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo and President Felix Houphouet Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire brokered the peace agreement in Angola (Ewi, 2015). In 1994 a Panel of Eminent Personalities was formed to investigate the Rwandan Genocide Against the Tutsi which laid blame on the ruling elite in pre-Genocide Rwanda, UN, USA, Belgium and France.

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The OAU relied on the eminent personalities individually or in committees for the peaceful resolution of most of the disputes until its dissolution in 2002. In no case did the organization directly engage member states in the use of force as a strategy for conflict resolution. By relying on African statesmen as mediators in African conflicts and disputes the OAU had, this early, institutionalized the peaceful resolution of conflicts among its members. The resort to resolving of social problems by processes of peaceful change, that is, ‘by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale violence’ is a definitional requirement of a security community. The OAU approach was ad hoc in practice. However, the AU institutionalized the Panel of the Wise as a critical pillar of the peace and security architecture. Article 11 of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council (PSC) establishes a panel of five persons who are ‘highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent’ in support of the efforts of the PSC and the Commission in furtherance of conflict prevention. In execution of its mandate it, among other things, uses its good offices to mediate and broker peace agreements between warring parties and assists in mapping out threats to peace and security by providing regular advice and analysis and requesting the Commission to deploy fact-finding or mediation teams to specific countries. The article, for example, enabled the African Union to establish a Panel of Eminent African Personalities headed by Kofi Annan to mediate the 2007 post-election crisis in Kenya. After 41 days of arduous negotiations between the belligerent political parties, a deal led to formation of a Grand Coalition government and setting up of institutions and processes to address deep-rooted political, ethnic and governance issues including historical injustices (Lindemayer & Kaye, 2009). The regionalization of conflict on the continent has further enabled collaboration between the Panel of the Wise and regional panels of the wise. This has seen their institutionalization of ECOWAS’ Council of the Wise, COMESA’s Committee of Elders, SADC’s Panel of Elders and the IGAD Mediation Contact Group in efforts to strengthen and deepen ‘cross-regional relations and enhancing their capacity to collectively address the scourges of conflict and ensure the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability on the continent’ (ACCORD, 2013: 11–12). The deliberate deployment of ad hoc committees and panels and their institutionalization in the AU establishes the organization as a vanguard of peaceful resolution of conflicts, in the first instance.

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Continental Early Warning System The Early Warning System (EWS), as a security and governance tool, has evolved over a long time encompassing their use in military intelligence and later in disaster management across the globe. Its human security dimension was acknowledged in the 1992 UN Agenda for Peace when it was recognized as an essential element in conflict prevention efforts around the world. However, its adoption as a conflict management tool in Africa can be traced to 1990 when the OAU decided towards a speedy resolution of all types of conflicts on the continent. In 1992, a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was mooted which later in 1993 was adopted in the Cairo Declaration as Central Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The Mechanism was charged with ‘anticipation and prevention of situations of armed conflict as well as peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts during conflict and post conflict situations’. The EWS helps in identifying the leverage points in a conflict system. According to the CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (2016), a leverage point is a place ‘in the system where a small change could lead to a large shift in [the system’s] behaviour’ (p. 38). This is a critical factor in systems thinking whose appreciation within the African theatre of conflict was only recognized in the 1990s. A leverage point eases the effort necessary to solve complex problems in a society. The CDA Collaborative Learning Projects (2016) argues that every conflict system has a goal, vision or paradigm that can be addressed by challenging the dominant mentality in the society towards the system. Its destructive dynamics can be addressed by ‘breaking the chain reactions’ (p. 42). If the system sustains itself on specific channels of information flows, new alternative ones will have to be developed, accuracy and sensitivity to current information have to be improved upon and the citizens need to have ease of access to the available information. Lastly, if the processes and structures that address conflict drivers form a key leverage point then they will have to be improved upon either by, for example, facilitating budgeting or improving the human resource or changing its structure. The EWS, therefore, requires a change in mentality to execute its mandate to enable conflict transformations in many instances. The AU integrated early warning into the African Peace and Security Architecture in 2004. Article 6(b) of the Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council specifically identifies early warning and preventive

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diplomacy as one of its key functions. It states that the Council shall have powers to ‘anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts as well as policies that may lead to genocide and crimes against humanity’ (African Union, 2002: 9). The EWS would be facilitated through collaboration between the Commission, the UN and other relevant state and non-state agencies. Consequently, the EWS was established under Article 12 to consist of a Situation Room that will act as an observation and monitoring centre. Eight regional observation and monitoring units linked directly to the Situation Room were established within the ECOWAS, EAC, SADC, AMU, ECCAS, COMESA, CEN-SAD and IGAD regions. The EWS functions include developing an early warning module with the necessary political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators that facilitate the analysis of conflicts on the continent. The acceptability of the recommendations of the EWS nevertheless requires political will and consideration especially when states react to advance EWS reports about the potential of their actions or inactions to causing conflict scenarios that portend national or regional repercussions. The likelihood of inaction or accusations of political meddling by the AU in member states is definitely high. Peace Fund The funding of continental peace and security operations through either the OAU or the AU has always been problematic since 1963. Out of the current total membership of 55 states, only a minority of states regularly pay in full and on time. The consequence has been the failure of the organizations to respond to some of the needy cases on the continent. In 1993, the OAU created the Division for Conflict Management and an associated financial facility, the Peace Fund. The creation of the Division reflected the OAU’s desire to focus on conflict prevention and leave the task of peacekeeping and post conflict reconstruction to the more able and funded UN. This, however, changed as a result of the respective US and the UN mishaps in Somalia (1991) and Rwanda (1994). By 2000, the Division had become the most important arm of the OAU notwithstanding that 70% of its funding for operations and staffing came from external sources. At the formation of AU, it was realized that the funding of continental peace and security operations was grossly inadequate and reliance on external funding was unsustainable. The Peace Fund was established

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under Art 21 of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council of the AU to finance the AU’s peace and security operations. It covers operational activities such as mediation and preventive diplomacy, institutional capacity and peace support operations. The Fund consists of financial appropriations from the regular AU budget, voluntary contributions from member states, international partners, private sector, civil society and individuals as well through fund-raising activities. The acceptance of external donations would, however, be subject to the AU objectives and principles. Having identified funding as a weak point in the peace and security operations, the AU Assembly adopted the Kigali Financing Decision in July 2016. It resolved to create a sustainable funding mechanism that would charge 0.2% levy on all imported goods entering the African continent and establish an endowment fund to which member states would contribute and be accountable for (Apiko & Miyandazi, 2019). The endowment represents a maximum amount that will be replenished annually as needed. The Peace Fund enables the AU to fully finance mediation and preventive diplomacy activities, institutional readiness and capacity, maintain a crisis reserve facility as well as meet its commitment to finance 25% of its peace operations budget. In 2018, the AU launched and revitalized the Peace Fund whose funds would finance 25% of the Union’s peace and security activities and especially preventative diplomacy and mediation. By then the Fund had accumulated $60m. The commitments by the member states to the Peace Fund are varied. It has been estimated that in general, 67% of the members meet their obligation while 33% either default or partially pay. The formula for payments has not also been agreed upon by all the members leaving deficits in the Fund. The lack of unanimity in running the Fund, therefore, limits the ability of the Union to address the operational challenges of the organization and maintaining peace and security.

APSA and the New Global Order The African Peace and Security Architecture is the ‘nerve center’ for sustainable peace and security in Africa. The New World Order (NWO) frames peace and security in two ways. First, the transition from the two major world wars to the end of the Cold War in 1989; this order defined

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battlefield beyond combatant to include various aspects, including, governance, politics, humanitarians and development. Secondly, regionalization and transnational nature of conflicts and peacebuilding initiatives occasioned the development of peace and security infrastructure leading to the formation of structures such as the Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). RECs/RMs, ushered in the principle of ‘subsidiarity’, as a mechanism to facilitate joint operations between AU, RECs and the United Nations. This section unpacks the aforementioned contextual and normative issues in turn. A historical contextualization of international relations reveals that during the Cold War, power politics and self-interest infiltrated the institutions that were designed to maintain global order. This followed a period between the WWI and WWII in which the idealism that animated the League of Nations was viewed as inimical to the practice of international politics. What sceptics of idealism failed to grasp was that it was normative ideology towards which humanity was perpetually travelling. Its absence in geo-political practice did not necessarily confirm its invalidity. The emergence of fascist and totalitarian regimes in Germany, Italy and Japan confirmed, in the eyes of some observers, that indeed international relations were nasty, brutish and short. However, the collective of countries all around the world to contain the excesses of the fascist and totalitarian regimes provided a demonstration of how humanity could activate its agency and be inspired by certain ideals to remake the world in an image that will uphold their freedom and well-being, as will be discussed further below. Africa has tried to voice its concern about the need for a change within the existing UN system. Specifically, in March 2005, AU issued a declaration known as The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus, which was a statement in response to the Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change which was issued in December 2004. AU issued its position on the UN reform and, in particular, on the reform of the Security Council by noting that ‘in 1945, when the UN was formed, most of Africa was not represented and that in 1963, when the first reform took place, Africa was represented but was not in a particularly strong position’. AU goes on to state that ‘Africa is now in a position to influence the proposed UN reforms by maintaining her unity of purpose’; furthermore, it notes that ‘Africa’s goal is to be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the UN, particularly in the Security Council’.

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The Common African Position enumerates what ‘full representation’ of Africa in the Security Council means by demanding ‘not less than two permanent seats with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including the right to veto’ and ‘five non-permanent seats’. The principle of subsidiarity is particularly important to peace and security. It is founded on the idea that sustainable peace is possible if conflict resolution mechanisms are led by actors who are culturally, geopolitically and/or strategically close to the crisis in question. In the African context, peace operation should, therefore, be directly supported and, where appropriate, led by Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in collaboration with Regional Mechanisms (RMs). The principle of subsidiarity is the central concept underlying APSA. The principle is grounded in the idea that sustainable peace is best achieved when conflict resolution mechanisms are driven by those actors who are geopolitically, culturally and logistically closer to the crises. However, the application of subsidiarity in practice has resulted in mixed experiences. It is not always clear how the principle should address conflicts of interest between competing organizations and states (cited in De Coning & Karlsrud, 2011). Indeed, in many cases, different actors have for their own interests advanced competing interpretations of subsidiarity. Nevertheless, the recent intervention of the Economic Community of Central African State (ECCAS), in the Central African Republic (CAR) offers valuable insights on the extents and limits of the principle. This notwithstanding, Article 52 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter states that ‘the Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council’ (cited United Nations, 2015). However, when the conditions on the ground are not conducive to the operationalization of peace and security, for example in situations where armed militia are violent and hostile, then ROs generally have to defer to the UN Security Council which has the power to authorize the robust engagement with armed groups if necessary. For the UN, what seemed initially to be a resourceful array of mechanisms and processes to resolve conflict were soon to be confronted by the structural limitations and the egotistical imperatives of the superpowers that dominated the Cold War era. The superpowers (USA and USSR) and their client states within the UN framework formed de facto alliances along ideological

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lines and institutionalized a global oligarchy of power. This appropriation of global power manifested itself through the dominance of the Security Council in all major decisions and meant that the UN’s ability to resolve conflicts and build peace became structurally paralyzed by the whims of the most powerful countries in the system, namely, USA, Russia, China, UK and France. Rarely, if at all did the interests of USA or USSR, and subsequently Russia, converge. The greatest threat to international peace and security therefore arose from this latent and ongoing conflict between the UN Security Council’s most powerful members. Power politics as an ideology of interstate relations co-opted the UN and in effect instrumentalized the world body. The Cold War period witnessed over 150 armed conflicts which claimed approximately 25–30 million lives (Wallensteen & Axell, 1993). The notion that any modicum of ‘global order’ existed during this period is derisory and deluded. If we were to issue a scorecard to the UN system for maintaining global order during this period, we would have to adjudicate it as having been an abysmal failure (Jett, 2001). In the climate of East–West competition, the mechanisms and strategies to manage and resolve conflicts and uphold global order relied on coercive political negotiations in the context of the prevailing superpower rivalry. In effect, the involvement of other collective security organizations and third parties was restrained and possible only in conflicts in which the great powers did not have a direct stake or in which they had shared interests. So, even though the UN established what could have served as institutions capable of advancing the quest for global order, it was severely undermined by the exigencies of Machiavellian superpower politics during the Cold War. The effort by world leaders to revive the UN’s global order was thwarted. At the height of corruption within the UN, conflict management and resolution institutions, an attempt was made to revitalize the norms that initially animated the UN. The former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s side as coined in the An Agenda for Peace 1992, was the genesis of contemporary peace operations that combined activities, including, peacemaking and humanitarian intervention (cited in United Nations, 2015). It outlined suggestions for enabling the UN to respond quickly and effectively to threats to international peace and security in the post-Cold War era (Institute for Security Studies, 2015). The 4Ps are identified as follows:

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Preventive diplomacy; Peacemaking; Peacekeeping; and Post-conflict peace-building (cited in Doyle & Sambanis, 2006).

The UN has subsequently made attempts to revitalize the commitment to preventing crises through its adoption of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in 2005, following the annual meeting of the General Assembly. However, this doctrine has also failed to integrate into the practices of international relations. Instead, a culture of ‘reactive’ rather than ‘proactive’ interventions has taken root in the UN peace operations. In the African context, subsidiarity as a principle involves three different levels of actors: between the United Nations and the African Union; between the African Union and various Regional Economic Communities (RECs); and to a lesser extent the United Nations and the Regional Economic Communities directly. All the three organizations have a distinct and valid legal basis for acting in the realm of peace and security among their member states and present different views of how subsidiarity operates. The Security Council and General Assembly have frequently endorsed the role of ROs in peace operations. The partnership between AU and UN for peace operation has received mixed reactions. Some view it as having endured a mere facilitative role to the UN (Ehiane, 2016) while others have identified great power politics and financial constraints as key challenges to the AU peace operations (Williams & Boutellis, 2014). APSA and the RECs/RMs are at the core of this collaboration for the Africa-led peace operation. In the next section, this chapter examines the anatomy of APSA, more specifically: (1) the principle of non-interference and non-indifference; (2) pillars of APSA; (3) APSA and RECs/RMs; (4) New challenges; and (5) the future of APSA. There are considerable limitations in the application of the subsidiarity principle, concerns over the abilities of RECs to conduct complex PSO timely and effectively. Increasing coherence can help to remedy deficiencies. The overlapping mandates of the UN, AU and RECs, also require constant political and technical coordination. Even at the RECs level, there are concerns that if not properly calibrated, the liaison offices within the APSA could be reduced to a mere ‘courier’; a situation that would undermine the intended objective of improving coordination between AU and RECs/RMs in procedural and substantive terms down to the

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standby forces and related structures. Moreover, it is not clear how the reporting procedures for the Liaison Officers are structured. This implies that largely, coordination structures at AU linking down to sub regional standby forces are still weak. The long-term implications of this imprecise vertical relationship to the subregional standby forces are the absence of a harmonized approach in capacity building and consequently compromising the required balance in representation of personnel within the standby force structures. This further entrenches tensions between the military and civilians over who controls what and where with unprecedented consequences on the capacity for peace operation. Regional organizations coordinate PSO under the principle of subsidiarity. As earlier indicated in this chapter, cooperation in PSO is officiated through the MOU between AU, RECs and RMs. Operationalization of APSA is largely influenced by geopolitical and historical inclinations of the sub regions. For example, in eastern Africa, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) existed before the regional mechanism-EASF. Furthermore, the sub region suffers the overlap of membership to various RECs. While the United Republic of Tanzania is a member of EAC and SADC, the country does not belong to EASF. Whereas Burundi and Rwanda are members of EAC and EASF, the two do not subscribe to IGAD membership (Healy, 2011). ECOWAS’s long period of war and conflict demarcates it a prototype for other sub regions to replicate. Although cooperation frameworks such as the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) are not recognized by AU, the formation influences the sub regions’ economic and political landscape. Also, CEMAC legitimizes the covert influence of Western powers, France in particular towards political decisions in Central Africa Subregion. The role of the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) has been challenged, with Rwanda threatening to pull out of the conference. The ICGLR is a formal partner of the African Union and was established under the umbrella of the African Union and United Nations in 2003. RECs have evolved in different ways with different institutional set-ups designed to handle different aspects such as capacity building. However, despite this hope, effective coordination between AU, RECs and the Peacekeeping Training Centers threatens the survival of APSA. REC has its own ‘modus operandi’ as a result of historical foundations, geographic

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location and institutional set-up. Division of labour is decided case-bycase, based on political considerations and informed by a range of factors. This includes: • the partnership with the United Nations and other external partners; • their level of involvement (including funding); • the political positions taken by the government and/or warring parties (including in important AU institutions such as the PSC); • key characteristics of the conflict. As described elsewhere in this work, the complex pattern of conflict in Africa combined with a still-maturing African Union and the challenging triangular relationship between AU, RECs and RMs in the context of the ongoing operationalization of the APSA contributes to the complexity of the African peace operation architecture. Finally, the relationship between the United Nations and the African Union in matters of PSO remains murky. The United Nations ‘Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme for the African Union’ unveiled in 2006 was established to enhance the capacity of the AU Commission and RECs as partners of the United Nations. The creation of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) in 2011 was another major milestone towards in the right direction on UN–AU partnership. Sustaining the AU–UN partnership beyond the Capacity Building Programme that ended in 2016 is key in shaping APSA in the new world order. The UNO/AU has supported the planning and management of AU peace operations and the facilitation of cooperation between African Union actors and the United Nations. A range of operational partnership models between the UN and AU have emerged over the past decade. Hitherto significant challenges remain, key among them, institutional cooperation and financing, rather than case-by-case approaches as preferred by some members of the UN Security Council. The financial reforms at the AU driven by the then Chair, President Paul Kagame, is also central to the transformation of the union. The conceptual ambiguity has refused to disappear in the AU. On one hand, the United Nations prefers to use the term peacekeeping operations, on the other hand, the AU adopts the ‘peace support operations’. It is important to distinguish between these two spaces. AU intervention is based on the ‘unofficial’ principle of sending troops where there is ‘no peace to keep’ yet. This conceptual

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divergence undermines a unity of purpose on strategic deployment and mission mandates and has hampered the re-hatting of AU troops to the UN troops and related transition processes from AU mandates to the UN mandates under the UN Security Council Resolutions. The reform atmosphere initiated during Kagame’s reign as the Chair of the AU provided an opportunity to harmonize decision-making processes and strengthen the spirit of shared responsibilities among various regional and international PSO actors.

APSA Within the Principles of Non-interference and Non-indifference The renewal of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) was responding to the calls of pan-African renaissance for the continent to garner her position in the rapidly changing world order. This push for the revival of pan-Africanism led to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2002. For the purpose of coherence and vertical coordination, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between AU and the RECs in 2008. There were two factors that pushed for the formation of AU and subsequently the five APSA pillars. First, the need to operate within the world political order, especially as outlined in the UN Charter VIII that acknowledges the critical role of ROs in maintaining peace and security. But, also, the changing nature of wars that rocked the continent in 1990s, intrastate conflicts dominated the conflict scene, rendering the old order irrelevant. AU recognized the close link between socio-economic development and security of the continent. The officialization of this linkage and the acknowledgement of the new world order happened when OAU adopted the Declaration on the Political and Socio-Economic Situations in Africa and the Fundamental Changes Taking Place in the World. With this declaration, it became apparent that development was only possible if efforts are directed towards building a continental infrastructure to guarantee an atmosphere of peace and stability. This wave ushered in new thinking within the OAU, that development ought to be approached holistically, embracing universal principles and norms such as human rights, democracy, peace and good governance. Despite the 1990 Declaration, the domain of peace and security was still considered to be the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of member states. Whenever OAU was assumed to intervene in internal disputes or systematic violations of human rights, it declined, insisting on existing principles

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of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs (Article III of the OAU Charter). However, the conflicts in Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone and the genocide in Rwanda revealed this weakness. Political elites and bureaucrats on the continent started pondering on questions such as, is it possible to intervene in crises without compromising the sovereignty of countries? What kind of capacities is required within the continent in order to promote collective responsibility? Solution out of these questions was the transition from OAU to the African Union in 2001. Consequently, a normative shift took place from non-interference to non-indifference. As part of this transition, an infrastructure was thought out that would ensure, coherence, coordination, sustainability and cooperation for peace and security—the African Peace and Security Architecture.

Threats to the Operationalization of APSA The relationship between Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms and the African Union is defined by Article 16 of the PSC Protocol (2002) as well as the 2008 MOU, recognizing RECs/RMs in supporting APSA in its mandate. While there are anecdotes of coordination between AU and RECs/RMs, the cooperation framework is ambiguous on the relationship: who does what when. Decision-making processes too, are less clearly defined. This relational ambiguity poses serious challenges for institutional policy coordination when it comes to issues regarding the deployment of peacekeeping forces. The actors of the APSA ecosystem have a wide variety of tools at their disposal, ranging from issuing sanctions, calling parties to negotiations, to deploying peace support operations. Most often, a combination of tools is used to address conflict situations at varying points in time. These tools can also be deployed to undo the internal ambiguity in order to increase linkages and coordination. While efforts are being made by the AU leadership to ensure APSA operationalizes, complications to effective functioning of APSA remain. There are three major categories of complications facing APSA today: (1) the missing link between the AU and the RECs/RMs; (2) subsidiarity; and (3) financing peace operations.

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The Missing Link Between AU and the RECs/RMs Due to ambiguity of mandates and geopolitical power struggle among the APSA structures, there exist perennial problems over competence between AU and RECs/RMs. In Mali for example, AUC challenged ECOWAS’ leadership to handle the crisis (Weiss & Welz, 2014). AU argued that as the crisis affected the south of Lybia, which is an area outside ECOWAS, it was to be considered within AU’s sphere of competence. The Mali crisis revealed the discordance between AU and RECs/RMs. This disagreement pointed to lack of common purpose and hierarchical problems. The problem did not stop with Mali. In December 2015 AU’s top decision organ (PSC) decided to deploy civilian protection force to Burundi without internal and external consultations with EAC and UNSC putting bare how APSA structures are in discordance. The Principle of Subsidiarity There are considerable limitations in the application of subsidiarity principle, concerns over the abilities of RECs to conduct complex PSO timely and effectively. Increasing coherence can help to remedy deficiencies. The overlapping mandates of the UN, AU and RECs also require constant political and technical coordination. Even at the RECs level, there are concerns that if not properly calibrated, the liaison offices within the APSA could be reduced to a mere ‘courier’; a situation that would undermine the intended objective of improving coordination between AU and RECs/RMs in procedural and substantive terms down to the standby forces and related structures. Moreover, it is not clear how the reporting procedures for the Liaison Officers are structured. This implies that largely, coordination structures at the AU linking down to sub regional standby forces are still weak. The long-term implications of this imprecise vertical relationship to the subregional standby forces are absence of a harmonized approach in capacity building and consequently compromising the required balance in representation of personnel within the standby force structures. This further entrenches tensions between the military and civilians over who controls what and where with unprecedented consequences on the capacity for peace operation. The RECs have evolved in different ways, with different institutional set-ups designed to handle different aspects such as capacity building. However, despite this hope, effective coordination between AU, RECs and the Peacekeeping Training Centres threatens the survival of

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APSA. REC has its own ‘modus operandi’ as a result of historical foundations, geographic location and institutional set-up. Division of labour is decided case-by-case, based on political considerations and informed by a range of factors. This includes the partnership with the United Nations and other external partners; their level of involvement (including funding); the political positions taken by the government and/or warring parties (including in important AU institutions such as the PSC); and key characteristics of the conflict. Financial Complications Although the AU’s comprehensive reforms stand to address the funding gap, the continental body continues to suffer the ‘burden of external funding’. Plans to address this challenge were flagged out during the January 2015 AU Assembly that adopted a proposal by AU finance ministers to increase member states’ contributions to AU’s operational budget to 100%, to the programme budget to 75% and to the peacekeeping budget to 25%. The plan was rolled out in 2016 and September 2018, progress was noted, with the member states’ contribution hitting 66% (US$260m), compared to partners US$130m (34%). This is funding for operations and programmes excluding PSO. AU’s funding architecture is proliferated with external partners. Within the tripartite partnership between the AU, UN and EU, peace operations on the continent have been carried out mainly by international partners. Through bilateral arrangement, AU’s peace operations activities have also been funded by USA and China. Whereas the USA is the largest bilateral donor of UN and AU peace operations in Africa, EU’s funding is the most structural partner to the AU, with most of the support directed to RECs/RMs and the African Peace Facility (APF). The APF was set up in 2004 in the framework of the EU-AU partnership (Williams & Boutellis, 2014), as a follow up to the 2003 summit. The European Development Fund (EDF) funds AU through the Cotonou Framework of Agreement to handle three main activities; capacity building, PSO and the development of early warning response mechanism. Nevertheless, with the appointment of the former African Development Bank director Donald Kaberuka as the High Representative for the African Peace Fund, it is expected that AU funding architecture will significantly change, to one that is predictable and flexible to support AU-led PSO. The Kaberuka task force is backed by the

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Common African Position on the Report of UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) (cited in Engel, 2015). The period between 2016 and 2018 was instrumental to the operationalization of the African Peace Fund. The plans to adopt a 0.2% levy on eligible imports has received positive reception from the AU Member States: if implemented is an achievement towards Africa’s selfreliance. The plan was adopted from the 2006 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Common External Tariff (CET) framework. It is estimated that this levy would amount to contributions of USD 65 million per year by each of the continent’s five regions and was expected to increase to $80m per region by the year 2020. The actual implementation of this funding infrastructure remains the key question. Moreover, compared to the cost of running the continental missions, the projections fall way below the threshold. For example, AMISOM’s yearly budget alone amounts to $1 billion a year. There are a number of funding alternatives, for example although the Tobin tax regime could see levy of between 0.1 and 0.5% on all currency deals and on international financial transfers. The tax is however too small to fill AU’s financial gap in PSO. This notwithstanding, the recently enacted Continental Free Trade Area with the hope that it will increase the volume of trade, the Tobin tax regime could be viable over time. For example, with over a trillion dollars being transferred internationally each business day, a transfer tax of just 0.1% would yield a sum large enough to fund the entire AU peace operation. It is estimated that the tax could easily generate in excess of between $150 and 300 billion annually.

Conclusion: Watching APSA Through the ‘Binoculars’ APSA is one of the institutions developed by AU to enhance peace, security and stability on the continent through coordination, coherence of structures and sustainability. Since its establishment through the Peace and Security Council Protocol 2002, APSA has forged close networks with RECs and RMs and more recently with regional Peacekeeping Training Centres as part of the infrastructure for peace operation. This notwithstanding, strengthening APSA’s coordination is work in progress. The overlapping mandates and competition have been unravelled in missions such as in Central Africa Republic (CAR), Mali and Somalia where the African-led PSO has been tested in the new world order

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proliferated with international organizations. One way out of this coordination and relational challenge is to sustain capacity building and realign divisions of labour among RECs as relates to AU. Peace and Security Council is the APSA’s ‘nerve center’. The PSC has primarily adopted an emergency-driven approach since its establishment and continues to struggle to adopt a more preventive approach despite mechanisms in place (such as the Panel of the Wise and the Continental Early Warning System among others). A number of countries are increasingly protracted with no clear sight of a long-lasting solution, including the Somalia, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. These countries are taking up most of the African Union’s (and RECs) time, absorbing precious resources to take effective steps on conflict prevention. These conflicts all have their roots in a crisis of governance and lack of a solid social contract between the government and its citizens. It is, therefore, imperative that AU in liaison with RECs adopt comprehensive approaches to PSO. AU’s reform agenda put more emphasis on finance and strengthening peace and security infrastructures. Thus, the establishment of the Mediation Support Unit (MSU) will require further investments in conflict prevention and governance under the APSA. On a similar note, the 2014 slogan, ‘silence the guns by 2020’, under the auspice of the AU’s Vision 2020 adopted following a high-level retreat on the theme in late April 2014 in Durban, South Africa, remains a narrative. While it seems unlikely that the African Union and its Member States will be able to achieve a conflict-free continent by 2020, wide mobilization and reinforced efforts to operationalize the APSA are essential. The APSA Roadmap 2016–2020 provides a significant opportunity to achieve this. Finalized in December 2015 and officially launched in April 2016, the roadmap outlines a set of five strategic priorities and indicators to measure these objectives. The five strategic priorities are: (1) Conflict prevention; (2) Crisis/conflict management; (3) Post-conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding; (4) Strategic Security Issues; and (5) Coordination and Partnerships. Monitoring the results on these strategic priorities as well as the APSA actors’ interventions, which ECDPM has been doing since 2013, is a key element of documenting and tracking the APSA’s progress and contribution to peace and security on the continent. Also, conceptual issues on the connection between early warning and direct response systems need to be improved. Finally, APSA’s Roadmap unveils opportunities for strengthening PostConflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) and the African

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Governance Architecture (AGA) at the strategic level. As part of the new APSA Roadmap, a Multidimensional Committee on PCRD was established in order to interact with international actors on the continent on PCRD. A PSC Standing Committee has also been established in order to monitor actors and provide support to affected countries. Through AU’s Situation Room infrastructure, regular briefing sessions of the PSC are expected to assure the political oversight and support to PCRD interventions. There is also a direct link between PCRD with AU member states through the ministerial committees on PCRD. In other words, the APSA Roadmap 2016–2020 provided the ‘binoculars ’ through which AGA and APRM institutional linkages could be effected and offer in-depth perception and improve visual acuity by giving policy makers multiple sets of structures to implement the African Union mandate of peace and security. On this note, the future of APSA in the Africa-led PSO is an ‘axis’ to deal with the complex conflict system on the continent. However, the caveat is ensuring their exist mechanisms for building lessons learnt from field missions on application of norms and principles such as subsidiarity, comparative advantage and complementarity in a way that brings the entire system under one roof.

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Ani, N. C. (2019). Three schools of thoughts to ‘African solutions to African problems’. Journal of Black Studies, 50(2), 135–155. Apiko, P., & Miyandazi, L. (2019). Self-financing the African Union: One levy, multiple reforms (ECDPM Paper No. 258). Available at https://ecdpm.org/ publications/self-financing-african-union-one-levy-multiple-reforms/. Benes, E. (1932). The League of Nations: Successes and failures. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1932-10-01/lea gue-nations-successes-and-failures. Accessed 3 Dec 2020. Bellamy, J. A., & Beeson, M. (2010). The responsibility to protect in Southeast Asia: Can ASEAN reconcile humanitarianism and sovereignty? Asian Security, 6(3), 262–279. Brosig, M., & Sempijja, N. (2018). Does peacekeeping reduce violence? Assessing comprehensive security of contemporary peace operations in Africa. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 7 (1), 1–23. Carozza, P. G. (2003). Subsidiarity as a structural principle of International Human Rights Law. The American Journal of International Law, 97 (38), 38–79. Chido, D. (2013). From chaos to cohesion: A regional approach to security, stability and development in Sub Sharan Africa. Carlisle: US Army War College— Strategic Studies Institute. https://vufind.lib.lehigh.edu/Record/1393582. Accessed 8 Dec 2020. Conteh-Morgan, E. (1993). Conflict and militarization in Africa: Past trends and new scenarios. Conflict Quarterly, 13(1), 27–47. De Coning, C., & Karlsrud, J. (2011). Preparing and mobilizing civilian capacity for the future recommendations for implementing the Guehenno Report. Policy Brief 2. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/145015/NUPI%20Policy%20B rief%20no.%202.pdf. Accessed 5 Dec 2020. De Coning, C., & Peter, M. (2018). United Nations peace operations in a changing global order. Palgrave Macmillan. Dersso, S. A. (2010). The role and place of the African Standby Force within the African Peace and security architecture. ISS Paper 209. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 1–21. https://issafrica.org/research/papers/the-roleand-place-of-the-african-standby-force-within-the-african-peace-and-securityarchitecture. Accessed 8 Dec 2020. Doyle, M. W., & Sambanis, N. (2006). Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Ehiane, S. (2016). Mission with hindrance: African Union and peacekeeping operations. Journal of African Union Studies, 5(1), 113–135. Engel, U. (2015). The African Union finances-how does it work? (Working Paper Series of the Center for Area Studies No. 6). Universitat Leipzig. https:// www.bookdepository.com/African-Union-finances-How-does-it-work-UlfEngel/9783865839565. Accessed 5 Dec 2020.

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Ewi, M. A. (2015). The African Union panel of the wise: An assessment of its role and significance as a mechanism for conflict resolution and mediation in Africa, 1–34. https://doi.org/10.13140/rg.2.1.2251.2087. Fenwick, C. G. (1936). The failure of the League of Nations. The American Journal of International Law, 30(3), 506–509. Hartzenberg, T. (2011). Regional integration in Africa (Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-14). World Trade Organization (pp. 1–26). https://www.wto. org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201114_e.pdf. Accessed 27 Sep 2020. Healy, S. (2011). Seeking peace and security in the Horn of Africa: The contribution of the inter-governmental authority on development. International Affairs, 87 (1), 105–120. Hultman, L., Kthman, J., & Shannon, M. (2013). United Nations peacekeeping and civilian protection and civil war. American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4), 875–891. Hyde-Price, A. (2006). Normative power Europe: A realist critique. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(2), 217–234. Institute for Security Studies. (2015). AU summit: Review of outcomes on pressing peace and security issues. https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/ausummit-review-of-outcomes-on-pressing-peace-and-security-issues. Accessed 3 Dec 2020. Jett, D. C. (2001). Why peacekeeping fails. New York: Palgrave. Khadiagala, G. M. (1992). Thoughts on Africa and the new world order. The Round Table, 81(324), 431–450. Kisiangani, E. (2013). AU and Pan Africanism: Beyond rhetoric, pp. 1–3. https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/au-and-pan-africanism-beyond-rhetoric. Accessed 8 Dec 2020. Lobakeng, R. (2017). African solutions to African problems: A viable solution towards a united, prosperous and peaceful Africa? (Occasional Paper 71). Pretoria: Institute of Global Dialogue. https://media.africaportal.org/doc uments/Occassional_paper_by_Remofiloe.pdf. Accessed 8 Dec 2020. Lindemayer, E., & Kaye, L. (2009). A choice for peace? Story of forty-one days of mediation in Kenya (pp.1–39). New York: International Peace Institute. https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/KenyaM ediation_IPI2009.pdf. Accessed 8 Dec 2020. Mansbach, R. W. (1994). The global puzzle: Issues and actors in the world politics. Boston, MA: Houghton Miffin Company. Matlosa, K. (2014). The African Union’s African governance architecture linkages with the African Peace and Security Architecture. GREAT Insights Magazine, 4(1). https://ecdpm.org/great-insights/peacebuilding-statebuil ding/african-unions-african-governance-architecture-linkages-african-peacesecurity-architecture/. Accessed 5 Dec 2020.

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CHAPTER 5

Evolution of the African Standby Force

Introduction In 2003, African Chiefs of Defense and diplomats gathered in the Coastal City of South Africa, Durban, to deliberate on the formation of a common and coherent African military doctrine. Thereafter, in 2004, they adopted the policy framework for the African Standby Force (ASF). Within this framework, a multidimensional capability comprising the military, civilians and police components was agreed upon (Warner, 2015). The ASF was established as the implementation arm of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). Its main purpose was to ensure trained formations and troops, including police and civilian personnel, are rapidly made available for deployment to the African Union (AU)mandated peace operations. It is important to note that the formation of ASF happened at the backdrop of a complex peace and security landscape on the continent. Scholars have described African conflict system as multiple, transboundary and political which often leads to humanitarian catastrophes (Raleigh, 2014). These conflicts are usually driven by several structural factors, poverty, human rights, violations, bad governance, corruption, ethnic exclusion and small arms proliferation. In other words, it is futile for any arm of government to send soldiers to kill demonstrators agitating against their failed government, yet the state has responsibility to address the plights of its citizens. This implies that

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there is a thin boundary between conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcement. Peace interventions are rarely limited to one type of activity, whether United Nations (UN)-led or conducted by intergovernmental organizations such as the African Union (AU). The various layers of intervention are expected to be mutually reinforcing. However, the AU’s ability to combine these activities effectively remains limited and this has, in some cases, resulted in critical gaps in the regional response to crises that have threatened international peace and security. The subregional peace operation formations, whether used piecemeal or isolation, have failed to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict that thereby reduces the risk of conflict recurring. Although some experts such as Cedric de Coning (2017) have hope that the capacity of the AU and subregional organizations to deploy peace support operation (PSO) has significantly increased since the formation of the ASF, evidence from the key crises zones on the continent seem to agree with Linda Darkwa (2017) that, although the ASF was declared ready in 2016, it is yet to fully deploy. This strategic approach by the AU in tackling peace and security threats seem to reconcile with the situation on the continent. This is because, at the heart of most armed conflicts, is control over territory and the people and resources found within it. The system of nation states is central to this struggle for control. The nation state system rests on countries recognizing two fundamental concepts: ‘territory’ (a defined area of land and/or water that is considered to be in a state’s possession) and ‘sovereignty’ (a state having independent authority over a territory) (Morgenthau & Thompson, 1993). Armed actors wage the struggle for territorial control, but civilians will assert repeatedly, that their wish is simply for peace and security to go about their daily lives. Today, the study of African conflict in International Relations is highly informed by the development in the field of Peace Studies that was born shortly after WWII. We shall remember that the main motivation for the birth of Peace Studies was largely because of the failure of a range of social and internationalist movement to prevent the outbreak of two world wars within twenty-five years. Since 2003, the African Union, within the framework of Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has been developing protocols and frameworks for a common security policy on the continent. However, operational capacity of the African peace operation

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remains limited in the face of rising demands and expectations. Therefore, attaining effective peacekeeping operations capacity in Africa will take time. However, the APSA institutions when viewed from a holistic point of view offer a ‘window of opportunity’ for building an institutional capability. The African Standby Force (ASF) is one of the five pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) established in 2003 and adopted during the African Chiefs of Defence and Security meeting in Durban, South Africa, in 2004 (African Union, 2013). The ASF concept was to be replicated across the continent, as follows: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Standby Force (ESF); Eastern African Standby Force (EASF); Southern African Development Community (SADC) Standby Force; the North Africa Regional Capability (NARC); and the Central Africa Multinational Force (FOMAC). Besides these five structures, the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) protocol embraces an expanded and comprehensive agenda that cuts across the spectrum of PSOs. The ASF was initially conceptualized as a rapid deployment capability (RDC) to enable AU peace and security structures to respond to emerging crisis, timely and efficiently (Dersso, 2010). The RDC has since been integrated into the regional mechanisms. As such, these regional structures are part of the peace and security architecture (Franke, 2007), expected to address multiple issues beyond military operation. APSA addresses a wide range of issues across the spectrum; early warning and preventive diplomacy, conflict prevention, peacemaking and peacebuilding, the encouragement and promotion of democratic practices and humanitarian and disaster management interventions. It is, therefore, obvious that within this gamut of issues, deploying ‘boots and berets’ alone cannot offer an effective response to contemporary peace and conflict threats facing the continent (Aall, 2000). Similarly, the APSA Roadmap (2016–2020) and the African Union Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by 2020, in highlighting the linkages between operational and structural prevention, equally underscores the need to improve coordination and collaboration with RECs on structural conflict prevention. The APSA Roadmap further identifies gaps and constraints to the effective implementation of the CSCPF, noting among others inadequate resources, need for conflict prevention mainstreaming and tenuous linkages between the APSA and the African Governance Architecture (AGA) as well as the African Union and the RECs on structural conflict prevention. The

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Roadmap on Silencing the Guns also highlights gaps bordering on current deficits in implementation of the myriad of normative instruments adopted by the African Union and the RECs to facilitate structural prevention of conflict. The development of these peace and security structures is part of the AU’s efforts to take charge of African affairs, including matters of peace operation (Franke & Esmenjaud, 2008). Of course, this development is part of the Africanization and ownership movement to cultivate the culture of self-reliance and minimize external overdependence (Franke, 2006a). With this in mind, many efforts have been made by the AU to intervene since the first AU peace operation in Burundi in 2003, the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur in 2004 and the mission in Somalia in 2007 (Murithi, 2009). These efforts were made on the understanding that ongoing conflicts in Africa require a new concept of intervention, one that is not only fast, reliable and effective, but also multidimensional (civilians, military and police) in its composition. The former UN Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his 1992 An Agenda for Peace, argued for proactive peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention (cited in United Nations, 2000). Thus, ASF and its subregional structures present such an opportunity for African countries to tackle their challenges within this institutional arrangement as and when authorized by the United Nations (Gelot et al., 2012). Ideally, the linkages between the various pillars of APSA should provide for effective coordination of plans and actors to intervene effectively in conflict. Within the APSA framework, it was envisaged that once established, the ASF will consist of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and military components based in their respective countries but ready for fast deployment to conflict zones anywhere in Africa and possibly even outside the continent (Dersso, 2010). However, effective command and control of the ASF require a multidimensional and integrated approach to manage a host of technicalities. The technicalities range from the establishment of an appropriate Africa-wide diplomatic and political engagement in election-related crises to the installation of an integrated and interoperable command, control, communication and information system (C3IS), as well as an infrastructure to link deployed units with mission headquarters (Burgess, 2011). These inadequacy of operation resources, are not unique to the African institutions; historically, even the United Nations peacekeeping missions operating globally have experienced inadequate expertise, logistics and diplomatic resources (Osmancavusoglu,

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1999). However, the unpredictability of funding and lack of political will from African leadership, have particularly been singled out as major problems facing the ASF operationalization and sustainability (Oluwadare, 2013). Although the ASF structures have the potential to contribute substantially to addressing asymmetric warfare on the continent, it cannot entirely overcome such challenges given that the overall force strength of the ASF is itself limited. The outcome of the AMANI AFRICA II Field Training Exercise, seems to have had no impact; it did not restore the possibility of a stronger ASF nor did it promise to ensure an integrated force. The exercise took place at the Army Combat Training Centre in the Northern Cape, South Africa, October/November 2015. Although, the ASF was declared ready in 2016, with exception of ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), thus far, the ASF and its subregional structures have been neither consistent in policy dialogue to reflect the personnel composition of the force, nor has there been a satisfactory conceptual analysis of its evolution (Bah et al., 2014). The formation of the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity (ACIRC) in 2013, introduces yet, another complication to the African peace and security architecture. Contrary to the multidimensional milieu of ASF, ACIRC is founded on military doctrine (Cocodia, 2016). Besides undermining financial and expertise investment already put in ASF, experts have cast doubt that ACIRC would promote ‘force integrity’ and ‘task cohesion’, which are major ingredients for efficacy in PSO. Efficacy is augmented by the cultural and social affinity (Moller, 2005), attributes that are only prevalent in a multidimensional environment that was set to embody the ASF.

The Genesis of ASF: Doctrine and Policy Framework The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the African Union is seen as a landmark event in the institutionalization of intergovernmental political and collective security structures on the African continent. The adoption of the AU Constitutive Act in July 2000 and of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council in July 2002, marked critical steps in building Africa’s capacity to address the challenges of peace, security and stability on the continent. In particular, the Peace and Security Council Protocol set out the African Peace and

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Security Architecture (APSA), designed as a set of institutions and standards to facilitate conflict prevention, management and resolution. The APSA is underpinned by two main considerations. First, there is the principle of ‘non-indifference’. This means that the AU can be seized with all situations that may threaten peace and security on the continent, including intervening in a member state in cases of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, or at the request of a member state, to restore peace and security. Secondly, given that the ‘African solutions to African problems ’, do not exclude the development of partnerships with other international actors, particularly the United Nations, the AU has a collective responsibility, in collaboration with the UN Security Council, for the maintenance of regional peace and security. Under the protocol, the Peace and Security Council is the main decision-making within the architecture, modelled on the UN Security Council. It is composed of 10 representatives of the AU member states and of five representatives from five Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Advised by a Military Staff Committee (MSC) if necessary, its principal task is to provide effective responses to crisis in Africa. The AU Commission, a role that parallels that of the UN Secretariat, conducts the day-to-day work on peace and security issues. The Peace and Security Council appoints a Commissioner for Peace and Security, who leads the Peace and Security Department (PSD) of the AU. The PSD is subdivided in turn into five divisions, the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Division, the Conflict management and Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Division, the Defense and Security Division, the PSC Secretariat and the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD). The PSOD is responsible for planning, launching, sustaining and liquidating peace support operations of the AU. It is also charged specifically with the operationalization of the ASF, ‘including the elaboration of relevant policy documents and the coordination with relevant African structures and AU partners’. Division tasks involve policy and procedure development, ‘coordinating with’ the Regional Economic Communities and AU member states in establishing the ASF and being the primary contact point within the AU for the RECs and states on peace support operations matters. The division is composed of four units: Policy Development; Plans and Operations Unit; Capability Development; and Mission Support Unit.

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The AU legal framework for the establishment of the African Standby Force envisages multidimensional civilian, police and military components to be held on standby in their countries of origin in five regions within the AU. Thus, in 2005, the ECOWAS Chiefs of Defence Staff adopted the Operational Framework for the ESF as a directive for the development of the ESF in accordance with the AU Road Map (Onditi et al., 2016). Given the historical account of the West African region, the preparatory stages of the ECOWAS Standby Force can be traced from Article 26 of the 1999 Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (Onditi et al., 2016). During the same year, the Eastern Africa Member States signed a Memorandum of Understanding that led to the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) as a constituent organization of the African Standby Force. Although Eastern Africa region experiences some of the worst forms of conflicts and now complex PSO in the Horn of Africa, the focus of regional leaders has been mild on developing a collective regional security system compared to ECOWAS robust structures. The ASF Policy Framework, para 3.14, envisages a civilian administration component and a range of substantive civilian components, as well as a standby roster that will aid the recruitment and deployment of civilian experts (De Coning & Kasumba, 2010). The Civilian Dimension Policy Framework builds on the recommendations made in the ASF Policy Framework and describes the functions that will be performed by civilian components in most AU PSOs. It further illustrates that in AU PSO the substantive civilian functions include Political Affairs; Public Information; Planning and Coordination; Human Rights; Humanitarian Liaison; Legal Advice; Conduct and Discipline; Child Protection; and Gender. In addition, civilian personnel will also play roles in the following areas: Rule of Law; Electoral Affairs; Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration; Civil Affairs and Security Sector Reforms (De Coning & Kasumba, 2010). The AU’s Peace and Security Council is designed to provide mandate to the ASF missions themselves. Missions are under the authority of a Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (SRCC), who appoints a force commander, commissioner of police and head of the civilian components. While there are MoUs between the AU and RECs and RMs governing force generation, the individual RECs have

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not signed MoUs with their own members for the deployment of their troops, a critical gap when the objective is a rapid deployment capacity.

The Six ASF Scenarios for Deployment As one of the key components of the APSA, the ASF is meant to consist of standby multidisciplinary contingents stationed in their respective countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment as soon as required. The ASF is meant to be able to undertake a range of actions, from observation and monitoring missions, humanitarian assistance, to more complex PSO missions, intervention in a member state in grave circumstances, or at the request of a Member State, to the restoration of peace and security, preventive deployment and peacebuilding as illustrated in the AU’s six scenarios (see Table 5.1). The ASF was initially designed to be operational by 2010, and the readiness of the force would be affirmed by a joint exercise, AMANI. There have so far been three roadmaps to monitor progress and define fixed objectives for the establishment of the APSA framework. The first roadmap ended in 2005; the second was designed for a timeline of objectives to take place from July 2005 to June 2010; and the third is in effect until 2015. In keeping with the APSA framework, the roadmaps outline the objectives obtained in the previous phases, then set a list of concrete Table 5.1 The six ASF scenarios and timelines for deployment Scenario 1—Deployment on AU/Regional military advice to a political mission within a 30-day timeframe Scenario 2—Deployment of an AU/Regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission within a 30-day timeframe Scenario 3—Deployment of a stand-alone AU/Regional observer mission within 30 days Scenario 4—Deployment of an AU/Regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions and peacebuilding within a timeframe of 30 days Scenario 5—Deployment of an AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers within 90 days with the military component being deployed within 30 days Scenario 6—Deployment of an AU intervention mission, for instance in genocide situations where the international community does not act promptly—14 days with robust military force Source Adopted from the EASF policy documents

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targets to complete within the specific timeframe. These objectives are classed by themes, such as advocacy, capacity building and logistics. Roadmap I set goals that dealt mostly with initial formation of the ASF, obtaining pledges of support from the various RECs, constructing a basic set of documents and formally establishing the regional standby brigades (the name was later changed to ‘forces’). Roadmap II was designed to improve response mechanisms for each of the six scenarios of the standby forces through both regional and continental exercises. The roadmap also identified the need to expand the forces’ multidimensionality beyond their narrow military focus. Lastly, Roadmap III sought to establish mission headquarters and planning elements (PLANELMs) in each region. The objectives of Roadmap III are described as ‘work in progress’. The priorities have been to: improve civilian capacity; fine-tune the rapid deployment capability (RDC); increase awareness and commitment from the member states and RECs/RMs; develop a continental communication strategy, Standard Operating Procedures (SOP); methodology and Rules of Engagement (ROE), and hire civilian staff to implement them; establish a Continental Logistic Base with equipment and supplies; and improve overall multidimensionality. Each of these priorities contributes to the overall objective of conducting various exercises, including the AMANI II, a command-post exercise (CPX). This happened in November 2014 in Adama, Ethiopia. The focus of this roadmap was to finalize the operationalization of the ASF, by building on the remaining goals from Roadmap I. Many objectives in Roadmap I were not addressed in the original timeframe (2005–2010). These objectives include: The need to advocate the purpose and utility of the ASF to the African people and the international community; Increase the multidimensionality of each REC; Develop a roster system; Improve upon the communication systems to ensure a strong command and control system on missions; and Establish an ASF Health System. At this point, the public position of AU officials was that ‘significant’ work at regional and continental levels has gone into setting up ASF planning elements and progress has been made in identifying military capabilities and in developing civilian and police capabilities. So for some, the ASF has increasingly come to resemble the envisaged multidimensional PSO capability. For others, application of the ASF concept has been limited to such actions as the deployment of about a dozen staff officers to AMISOM in late 2011 and the use of the ASF concept in developing the deployment of AFISMA in Mali. The Command Post Exercise (CPX) and the Field

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Training Exercise (FTX) held in Adama, Ethiopia and Lesotho, respectively, at the end of 2014 attested to the fact that achieving absolute FOC by 2015 or even beyond remains a dream. There are strategic and operation issues that the pathway to FOC continues to face technical, funding and logistical issues. They do not have strategic lift capacities and they are missing many transport and intervention capacities—airplanes, armoured vehicles, helicopters, radios, sometimes guns—all the materials—there is a big question mark over that. In a study to establish the relationship between civil–military relations and evolution of PSO capacities, Onditi and Okoth (2016) identified numerous issues that are preventing the ASF from achieving the Durban vision. On the technical side these include the failure of a very multinational endeavour to develop common doctrine, system, tactics, techniques and procedures and the lack of an intermediary command and control structure between the AU’s Peace and Security Department and ASF brigades. Politically, a crucial missing ingredient has been adequate levels of interstate and inter-REC/REM cooperation. Lastly, African foreign financial and technical overdependence remains a paradox, the postcolonial legacy remains a significant elephant in the room; specifically, French colonies in Central, North and West Africa. However, the most pressing issue for the future of ASF lies in the invention of the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity (ACIRC).

Political Behaviour of the ASF Ecosystem While the AU and UN have made considerable progress in establishing a good working partnership at the political and policy levels, the relationship between the AU and RECs/RMs have been identified as particularly important for enhancing preventive diplomacy and mediation in Africa. On this note, the principle of subsidiarity is framed in three levels: United Nations and African Union; African Union and Regional Economic Communities; and United Nations and Regional Economic Communities. Peace processes often fail because they have been negotiated by political elites. The agreements reached often neglect to identify and meaningfully address the drivers of conflict that affect the communities they are meant to represent. One of the keys to effective peace processes is the degree to which they engage local and national institutions, strengthen inclusive relationships, and build resilient state and

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non-state capacities, especially among women and youth. In this context, a key priority is sustained investment in building inclusive national and local capacities for preventive diplomacy and mediation. Ad hoc initiatives falter and tend to fail in the long term. The AU reform proposals recognize that addressing the REC/RM– AU relationships, and trying to resolve some of these long-standing tensions, is critically important for the efficient and effective functioning of the APSA and hence, ASF. There are a number of best practice examples, for instance when ECOWAS, with the support of the AU and UN, were successful in resolving the crisis in the Gambia in January 2017 without any bloodshed. Similarly, close coordination between SADC, the AU and UN contributed to a more coherent international response to managing the political tensions in Madagascar and preventing it from becoming a violent conflict. The Panel of the Wise Network, that forge interlinkages between the AU’s Panel of the Wise and similar bodies at the REC/RM level, is a further example of how the AU and RECs/RMs can leverage synergies. As these examples show, preventive diplomacy and mediation is most effective when the international community is able to achieve a level of coherence in their approach to a given situation that enables them to speak with one voice. In this context, enhancing the relationship between the AU and the RECs/RMs has been identified as one of the priority areas that can significantly enhance Africa’s capacity in the areas of preventive diplomacy and mediation. The RECs/RMs and AU relationship can learn from the way the AU and UN have been able to shift their relationship towards a strategic partnership based on comparative advantage. Following that example, the RECs/RMs and the AU might consider regular and institutionalized meetings at the political level between the PSC and its REC/RM counterparts, including joint missions to continental trouble-spots. Drawing on the AU–UN experience, participants underscored that cooperation at the political level can be complimented with regular and institutionalized meetings between the senior leadership of the AU and the RECs/RMs, and desk-to-desk information sharing exchanges. The AU and RECs have reported that the practice of exchanging liaison officers has improved coordination, and the role of the liaison officers could be further strengthened. The AU and RECs/RMs can also consider a much closer working relationship. The Office for the Special Advisor for Africa (OSAA) has a mandate to enhance coherence and convergence

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across the UN system when it comes to the UN’s policies and partnership with Africa. OSAA is thus especially well positioned to support and encourage the strategic relationship between the UN, the AU and RECs/RMs, including the support the UN can provide to enhancing the AU and REC/RM relationships. Strategic support at the institutional level is key in unlocking the linkages, however, in order to have a coherent peacekeeping ‘force’, it is imperative that a functional relationship is established and sustained at micro level. Three factors are, therefore, important in understanding the political order of ASF ecosystem. Cognitive Dissonance Proponents of the cognitive dissonance theory argue that when people experience psychological dissonance, they strive to manage it by changing behaviours and cognitions or adding new cognitive elements. This implies that in order to achieve logic within a system the organization must define its values on the basis of knowledge, beliefs and attitudes. In view of these organizational values, Festinger argues that the magnitude of the dissonant relation between elements would be greater where values and norms are not adhered to. The ASF structures can decide to utilize the diverse knowledge of both civilians and the military for the organizational benefit, inversely, if the utilization of such values is skewed against certain elements, then skewed political decisions in an organization is inevitable. Nevertheless, that this is not always the case. Individuals may change behavioural cognitive elements, environmental cognitive elements or add new cognitive elements to reduce dissonance. This also applies to complex peace missions such as AMISOM, it is possible that continuous accusation of the military of human rights violations may tilt their political behaviour to have more civilians and police as peacekeepers. It is the onus of individuals or institutions to strive and create balance of values, norms and practice, otherwise, excess pressure might be induced to create a state of balance. The other aspect that defines organizational consistency and change was brought forward by Aronson and Mills (1959). The duo argues that depending on the prevailing values in an organization, people with inferior influence are likely to change their ideological orientation to concur with the superior one. This concurs with the principle of congruity. In view of this postulation, it is worth noting that armed forces have traditionally been dominated by the military as peacekeepers, this has

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developed a set of norms. This implies that ‘new-comers’ (civilians and police) in this field are most likely to show tendency to change and flow with the military tradition. Although Aronson and Mills (1959) rightly observe that institutions are organic, this should be interpreted with some level of reservation. The dynamics within ASF structures seem to suggest that ‘new-comers’ have a limited chance of changing the system. Much of the conception on individual and organization behaviour is applicable to a variety of disciplines such as peace and security. For instance, once a decision is made, individuals should take responsibilities for such decisions, or should be able to handle the consequences of rejecting a choice. For example, establishing consonant relations between the military and civilians within the ASF ecosystem would mean that each individual appreciates the roles of each other in order to complement their duties as peacekeepers. Although consonance thinking maintains optimism that individuals are likely to accept decisions and coexist harmoniously, this may not be the case in military-political setting where the decisions are determined through strops of hierarchy. For example, the planning in the Ministries of Defense (MoD) under which PSO institutions falls is not congruent with organizational desires of humanitarian agencies. Yet, both institutions are governed by normative and values binding them to protect civilians, upholding human rights principles and ensuring restoration of peace and stability in war-torn countries (Hultman et al., 2013). Organizational Hypocrisy The second aspect of political order is organizational hypocrisy. The concept of organizational hypocrisy has gained wide usage in the field of international peacekeeping since the seminal work of the organizational theorist Brunsson (1989) and Krasner (1999). The concept deals with issues of power, trust and network complexities (Jackson, 2015) that define the different types of relations—interregional, international or individual. Organizational hypocrisy is developed from an institutionalist organizational theory but widely used in disciplines such as international relations. More recently the organizational hypocrisy has been applied by political scientists in probing the hypothesis around the inconsistencies observed within the UN peacekeeping doctrine and practice (Lipson, 2002). The concept has proved particularly relevant in understanding global collective security systems and the politics of

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power that was witnessed during the early period of post-Cold War. A typical example is narrated by Lipson from both the African and eastern European experience of war. He observes that the difficult experience of UN peacekeeping in countries such as Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia called for doctrinal and organizational reforms with political support from various constituencies against the backdrop of inadequate capacities by the UN. The call for reforms within the UN and other peace and security organizations such as the AU is adequate proof that such institutions may exhibit tendencies of inconsistency as they navigate through challenging moments of conflict between norms and law. In a similar circumstance, organizational theory as advocated by DiMaggio and Powell (1991) caution us that the logic of consequences and appropriateness can clash. Empirically, African PSO institutions are statist, virtually dominated by the military elites and political manoeuvres. Hence tend to guard what we coin, ‘decision-making protectionism’, to overarching military policies, standards and procedures that govern such institutions. The outcome of this protectionism policy from the leadership of such institutions is inefficient in all aspects of capacity building. Since such institutions are influenced by the host states and led by the military generals who are under a compromised civilian control of state political leadership, the entire organizational system tends to respond through what Brunsson refers to as ‘organized hypocrisy’. The organizational hypocrisy framework puts emphasis on structures and processes established to satisfy the different requirements in conflict. Within the realm of regional security systems, Centres of Excellence (CoE) were established to respond to the need to have multidimensional peace support personnel, but this is not the case in the ASF structures, CoE seems to have evolved into another layer of a politico-military structure, similar to the National Defense Colleges (NDCs). A preserve of the politico-military elites. In fact, for those located in ethnically divided societies such as Kenya, institutions such as the International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) is just but a preparatory ground for those earmarked to take over the golden high ranking military positions. Foreign Policy Decision-Making Political psychologists have observed that political leaders constantly experience fundamental dilemmas of political decision-making, particularly

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those that concern matters of war and peace (Renshon & Renshon, 2008). That is because what leaders see is, to a substantial extent, filtered through the multiple, though inconsistent, lenses of their own psychologies and beliefs. Such a judgement could however suffer significant cognitive limitations. In order to maintain objectivity of decisions on critical matters of foreign policy, they must strive to harmonize such decisions in order to fit into strategic and political demands of a nation and the region. In view of psychological and cognitive platforms of reality, Renshon and Renshon (2008) argue that such medium of decisionmaking are shaped by mechanisms rooted within an individual’s character and psychology, sets of assumptions that buttress inferences of belief system, operational norms and the everyday shortcuts taken in information processing. This contradicts the Rationale Actor Model (RAM) in decision-making which is premised on the understanding that objectivity decision-making structures and processes lead to ‘good judgement’ and ‘high quality’ political decisions. This theoretical underpinning is consistent with the earlier assertion that the African PSO ecosystem is to a large extent influenced by values obtained through the various levels of socialization among the uniformed and non-uniformed peacekeepers. For instance, while a soldier is trained to kill the enemy, a civilian peacekeeper trained in human rights law would prefer subjecting the enemy to a legal process to determine the course of action. These are normative discrepancies with practical implications on the outcome of any peacekeeping mission. From this perspective, it is plausible to argue that many of the biases observed in the regional security systems are the result of a very basic self-referential framing posture in which the decision-makers, in this case military executives and political elites own views, values, history, psychology, and understandings are the starting point and prism of information perception and processing. In view of this cognitive dissonance leadership positions, scholars have raised legitimate questions about how accurate decision-makers are in coming to their judgments. Salient examples, cut across questions pertaining to the use of force, training-deployment disconnect and exclusive decision-making processes, yet, asymmetric warfare continues to deepen in the continent. For instance, the political decision by the Kenyan government to pursue the Al-Shabaab in 2012, has left the country more vulnerable to the fatalities of the extremist group than it was before the Kenya Defense Force (KDF) joined the AMISOM. While it is true that in certain political spaces, no one particular actor is more powerful than the

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rest, the power asymmetries within the larger APSA is manifested in three layers: first, at the micro national level, the political elites make decisions mainly based on the prevailing political climate without proper reference to the country’s foreign policy tenets. Secondly, at the macro regional level, the domineering state among Partner States has more political leverages than those considered ‘weak’ states. Finally, the meso level, in which the military tends to dominate key political decisions at the expense of the entire peacekeeping community. All these levels have implications, wide and deep—state–state relations, collective security system, resource allocations and, more importantly, peace and security integration processes. This political order remains a challenge to realization of a well-functioning regional security system, largely because APSA remains military-centric. In 2014, moving forward, EASF has initiated and accomplished several milestones and set goals at the same time. One of the key milestones was for the Force to prioritize those activities geared towards attaining the revised FOC by December 2014. The Force has also initiated engagement with partners in support of the path towards FOC. Furthermore, the EASF Assembly (Summit) held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea on 26 June 2014, strengthened the need to facilitate force deployment and establishment of Peace Fund similar to the ECOWAS one. During the 17th Ordinary Session Council of Ministers Meeting held on 22 August 2014 in Kigali, Rwanda, the Ministers endorsed a proposal to organize a Donor Conference in March 2015. The strategic partners identified by the EASF include European Union; UK; Germany; Netherlands; Nordic countries including Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway. The complexity of the prevailing peace and security architecture, commonly referred to as, the ‘hot-spot’ such as the Horn of Africa (HOA), compels the need for multilateral arrangement for responding to the emerging peace and security threats. David Francis has described the complex conflict system in Africa as the ‘Fire in the Next Door’ (Francis, 2007). Whereas the security challenges in the region would bolster the need for development of structures in Africa, the non-interference foreign policy, and protectionism projected by countries across the continent, continues to breed tensions between various institutions. A perfect example is the tussle between the IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) and EAC on who among them has the overall peace and security mandate in the subregion. This is not healthy for a regional security mechanism, as it yolks the capacity of the regional organizations effectively intervenes in crises situations. Another complication to

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a common doctrine of peace and security is lack of effective coordination for an external foreign policy, which implies that countries are free to develop their bilateral cooperation initiatives with foreign agents as opposed to a collective regional bargain. One challenge that continues to remain unaddressed is the different stages of development among the ASF subregional structures. However, all the five structures are required to embed Committee of the Chiefs of Defence Staff; Early Warning System; the Assembly of the Heads of States and Government; Council of Ministers of Defense and Security. EASF and ECOWAS both have Planning Element and Brigade assigned with the responsibility of planning support for peace operation and crisis management and force preparation, respectively. Logistics Base (LOGBASE) is also common to both EASF and ESF. The logistics base receives personnel and materials for training and operations of the standby force. Based on the diverse geopolitical context, EASF structure also contains the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism that oversees implementation of EASF policies, mobilization of resources, dissemination of information and liaison with AU, RECs and other non-state actors. On the other, hand, ESF enjoys the benefit of other structures within the ECOWAS Commission that serves not only the regional mechanism but also the entire Community. The traditional and religious leader’s role in mediation and negotiating conflicts is key among the APSA’s Council of the Wise. In ECOWAS Security Council that draws inspiration from the 1990 ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) played a critical role in resolving the Liberian conflict that erupted in 1989. Following weeks of unproductive talks with various faction leaders in July 1990, the SMC took the bold step of establishing and deploying the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The ECOWAS military component is divided into the Task Force and the Main Force operating within the geographic locations in East led by Nigeria, West led by Senegal and the logistics battalion. The strategic location of Kenya makes it ideal for the EASF Secretariat in Karen, Nairobi, comprising of the planning element and all the three components under the coordination mechanism, while the brigade headquarter is located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Although there exists some level of coordination in the two subregional mechanisms, interstate power relations has persistently affected the Force’s ability to deploy rapidly and easily. Police component of the Force is generally expected to provide advice, control and contribution to reform, restricting and

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rebuilding of the national police and other law enforcement agencies. Within the ECOWAS Standby Force, other than the regular police who are within the department for Political Affairs Peace and Security, their gendarmerie officers are at the ESF HQ. The Civilian Component of the regional standby force draws their legitimacy and mandate from the various regional and international legal instruments and policies. In West African Standby Force, for example, the need for civilian component is articulated within the 1999 Protocol Relating to the Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (Onditi et al., 2016). Owing to lack of field experience in eastern Africa, development of the Civilian Component largely borrows from the Civilian Component Policy Framework of the ASF. On specific structures, both EASF and ESF have three key components, namely: the military, police and civilian component that were all supported by Mission Support. The inclusion of the police and civilian components by the standby forces is driven by different factors. For example, for ESF, participation of police and civilians in planning for PSO not only reflects global best practices in complex PSOs but draws heavily from the lessons learnt by ECOWAS in the peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau under ECOMOG (Onditi et al., 2016). Conversely, the EASF’s activities towards full operation capability have been externally driven by experiences from UN peacekeeping environment. Guidance in development of the Force in eastern Africa is largely drawn from the AU peace support doctrine of 2006 without any regional practical experiences except for the AMISOM mission, which is still budding (Fitz-Gerald, 2017). Except for Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, most countries in eastern Africa have kept passive engagement to the regional peacekeeping platform. Kenya became more active and tilted her foreign/military policy in 2012 by undertaking military intervention in Somalia to fight the militant group Al-Shabaab. The African Union Mission in Somalia with capability of over 17,000 troops is newly established in the face of emerging threats from the Al-Shabaab group. In contrast with West Africa, eastern Africa has a plethora of overlapping regional organizations including the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community and the South African Development Community (SADC). Although the AU defines eastern Africa as a region composed of some 13 countries, it does not have an overarching

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and integrated conflict prevention, management and mitigation framework similar to West or Southern Africa. As a result, the AU mandated the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), on an interim basis, to coordinate the efforts of the region towards the establishment of an East African Standby Force (EASF). The North African Regional Capability (NARC) draws mandate from the 1989 Treaty establishing the Arab Marghareb Union (AMU). However, although the has a provision concerning ‘contributing to preservation of peace based on justice and equity’, there has been no progress towards imbuing the organization with either the mandate or institutional structures for peace and security, in general, or conflict prevention in particular. The lack of progress in this area has been attributed to the regional dynamics in which two of its Member States have been held diverging positions over the situation in Western Sahara. Nevertheless, a confluence of factors, explained in the preceding section, appears to be rekindling the interest of Member States on peace and security. This is in addition to Morocco’s rejoining of the African Union in January 2017. FOMAC is responsible for observation and monitoring of ceasefire arrangements, preventive deployment, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, enforcement of sanctions, humanitarian interventions, disarmament and demobilization, combating of organized crime and policing. FOMAC consists of police, gendarmerie, military and civilian contingents, and is a component of the African Standby Force (ASF). The activities of FOMAC are administered and managed by the EMR, which keeps an inventory of forces approved by the COPAX Council of Ministers, as FOMAC contingents are required to remain in their home countries until called upon for trainings or deployment. Information on the number and categories of personnel on the FOMAC inventory of forces was unavailable during this study. The 1992 Treaty establishing the Southern African Development Community created the following organs, namely: Summit of Heads of State and Governments; Council of Ministers; Standing Committees of Senior Officials; a Secretariat and a Tribunal. Following the review of the institutional structures of SADC and subsequent amendment of the Treaty at the Windhoek Extraordinary Summit in 2001, under the provisions of Article 9 of the Treaty Amendment, the following institutions were established: Summit of Heads of State and Governments; Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation; Council of Ministers; Sectoral

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and Cluster Ministerial meetings; Standing Committees of Senior Officials; Secretariat; the Tribunal and SADC National Committees. In the same year, the Heads of State and Governments also signed the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, which sets out the institutional arrangements for the coordination of policies and actions in the areas of politics, defence and security. The main institutional structures created in the Protocol are: The Chairperson of the Organ; the Troika; the Ministerial Committee of the Organ; the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee; and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee. A Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ (SIPO) was first prepared in 2003 which articulated the guidelines for the implementation of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation. The above presented APSA/ASF ecosystem draws conceptual inspiration from Samuel Huntington’s (1957) theory of civil–military relations. Whereas traditional peacekeeping focuses on ceasefire agreement and political settlement, using the military model, multidimensional peace operations common with African missions, comprise a mix of military, police and civilian components working together to lay the foundations of a sustainable peace. According to the Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations, a multidimensional peacekeeping operation would traditionally perform two functions: (i) ease tensions between hostile parties; and (ii) create space for political negotiations. Similarly, the Brahimi report identified key elements of multidimensional peacekeeping including that they … must be part of a more comprehensive strategy to help resolve a conflict by taking into account its regional dimension, and addressing the political, economic, developmental, institutional-building, humanitarian and human rights aspects. (United Nations, 2000: 22–25)

Likewise, the AU peace support operations’ doctrinal aspiration defines multidimensional peace operations as initiatives that involve the military, police and civilians to address diplomatic, political, military issues, in the social and security sectors and consolidating economic development. In essence, peacekeeping should refer to a range of interventions intended to address conflicts and security issues through activities performed by civilians, the military and police, whose working relationship is critical. It is on this basis that some of the leading scholars on this subject (Huntington,

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1957) identify linkages between the state, society and military as key to understanding how peace and security institutions function (Janowitz, 1960). However, in the context of a regional security system operating in a complex conflict system and the impact of post-Cold War circumstances, civil–military relations can also depict processes, structures and patterns of decisions undertaken by peacekeepers within a defined geopolitical space. These processes take place in various platforms, chief among them is through training, conferencing and, more important for the soldiers, exercises. It is expected that this ecosystem progressively builds ‘trust’ based on their respective comparative advantages to achieve the peace mission (Laura, 2011). However, this is not always the case among the ASF structures. Absence of positive interaction or hostile relationship between the military and civilians has retrogressively engendered a power struggle among peacekeepers leading to a cultural disconnect and sluggish attainment of a full operation capability, capable of arresting crisis efficiently. In some cases, the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage clash, leading to ineffective intervention, yet both the AU and UN embrace triangular cooperation (Rein, 2015). For instance, even though the tenets of subsidiarity states that ‘sustainable peace is possible if conflict resolution mechanisms are led by actors who are culturally, geopolitically and strategically closer to the crises’, this wasn’t the case in Central Africa Republic, Somalia, Mali, the support of the UN and other international actors have been resourceful in most of the peace missions.

Why the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis Was Bound to Fail In May 2013, five months after French troops bypassed AU efforts to respond to the Islamist takeover of northern Mali and intervened to reverse the rebel push into the south of the country; the AU established a new crisis response military force embedded at the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Initially promoted by South Africa, headlines about the new initiative spoke of the AU preparing ‘shock troops’ and ‘New “super” combat brigade’, while asking if this augured the creation of an African military power elite. The objective of the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity is to provide Africa with a strictly military capacity with high reactivity to respond swiftly to emergencies upon political, decisions to intervene in

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conflict situations within the continent. The aim is to establish an efficient, robust and credible force, which can be deployed very rapidly, able to conduct operations of limited duration and objectives or contribute to creating enabling conditions for the deployment of larger AU and/or UN peace operations. The establishment of ACIRC will be contingent on the setting up of military capabilities, force multipliers and resources from the continent. To this end, assessment will be conducted and units meeting specific training and equipment standards will be certified and put under a Force Rostering System (FRS). ACIRC deployment will be subject to the appropriate decision-making processes of the relevant AU organs. Based on this statement, though AU is optimistic that the force will create robust and credible force, the need to continue building structures and resourcing is paramount for its success. The roles envisaged for ACIRC are ‘stabilisation, peace enforcement and intervention missions; neutralisation of terrorist groups, other cross-border criminal entities, armed rebellions; and emergency assistance to member states within the framework of the principle of non-indifference for protection of civilians’. According to the AU, the ACIRC will support a standby force of 5000 troops, in the form of tactical battle groups of 1500 personnel. These are to operate under a centralized command, have suitable combat and combat service support, with a minimal initial autonomy of 30 days. It should enable the continent to provide an immediate response to crises in the short term, while allowing for a political solution to the crisis or, where appropriate, the adoption of measures for a mandate consolidation and expansion under a fresh mandate by the PSC and/or the UN Security Council. Looking at the mission of this new arrangement at the AU, it is evident that the force would only be made up of capacities of a handful of African military powers rather than the more collective and multidimensional response envisaged in the African Standby Force. Since the ACIRC has exclusively a military component, it could be a challenge for NGOs and other humanitarian agencies to implement joint projects aimed at increasing multidisciplinary approach to PSO. Institute for Security Studies (ISS) expert Andre Roux warned that, ‘…The AU runs the risk of creating a duplicate capability at great cost to the contributing states. This would also undermine the ASF brigades’ capabilities, which are constituted, provided, financed and controlled by the regions. Furthermore, having regional forces with regional authorization processes allows for consensus, political authorization, and checks and balances. Removing

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these would leave a great deal of power in the hands of the AU secretariat, the AU Peace and Security Council and the small “club” of willing-andable ACIRC countries, like South Africa—which could then be described as the new “policemen” of Africa. The question of funding remains, the question of capacities remain, because no African country has the capacity to mobilise strategic lift of the magnitude required in a matter of days, without resorting to a big power like the USA, France, the UK or even China’.

Theories of Regional Evolution Regional formations are organic in nature—just like organic matter, they are conceptualized, born, grow and die. Some pass-through complete cycle, while others evaporate before they celebrate their first birthday. Yet others outlive their usefulness. The role of the military in the militarization of a regional security community (ASF) needs no explanation since it is one of the integral aspects of the regionalization of security in APSA. Therefore, the militarization of ASF will be analysed with reference to systemic factors; dominance, culture, organizational, normative and institutional. Dominance Several models have been put forward for considering domination in any social interaction. Before we delve deeper into the drivers of dominance, we would like to examine the thinking behind ‘dominance’ as a social construct. Dominant traits are known to hutch ‘power hierarchy system’. Dominance, however, comes with social costs of oppression and resentment by the so-called lower ranking members of the society. As a form of political manoeuvre, political elites or bureaucrats apply dominance to gain expediency and patronage. This power structure rewards responsive agencies or punishes recalcitrant ones (Abbott, 2007). In some cases, a country or individuals may dominate an ecosystem without the ability to lead. However, this form of domination remains a major source of interpersonal conflicts. Although the acts of dominance could function to caution other ‘weak’ players in the ecosystem, in the regional security arrangement in Africa, for decades, the relationship between the military and civilians has been

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asymmetric. Despite the efforts to harmonize foreign and security policies, lack of a coherent strategy to manage the structural and institutional imbalances remains unresolved. This leads to perception of some players on matters of peace and security being too weak, while others being perceived as too domineering. In fact, the intergroup tensions more often exert pressure on the Partner States to use the ‘unilateral exemptions’ to scuttle any form of solutions to the regional peace and security mechanism. It is, therefore, imperative to frame discourse on the regional security mechanism from a social-behavioural lens. Dominance is the most common construct that can explain human behavioural interaction. As explained in detail elsewhere in this work, dominance, as a concept dominates literature in the Natural Sciences (Charlesworth, 1979), especially concerning its role in explaining ‘survival’ of species or human population dynamics. This notwithstanding, social scientists too, have attempted to theorize its application to intergroup relations, prejudice and discrimination (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). On one hand, it is plausible to argue that dominance, as a human behaviour is responsible for entrenching individuals with ‘powerful’ traits. On the other hand, ‘recessive’ or ‘weak’ individuals are reduced to less useful members of the ecosystem. High dominance feeling involves good self-confidence, assurance, high evaluation of self, feelings of general capability or superiority and lack of timidity (Maslow, 1939). Indeed, attributes of the social dominance orientation (SDO) theory can be used to predict future intergroup attitude and political behaviour (Ho et al., 2012). This theory, therefore, can provide insight for understanding how the military relates with police and civilians in an intergroup formations such as the regional security community—ASF. A cultural perspective of dominance presents interesting relationship between different regional formations. It explains why powerful countries such as the USA and China are able to influence regional security community. But proliferation of foreign militaries in the African peacekeeping environment seems to elicit mixed reactions. According to Jowell (2017), this interaction exacerbates internal patrimonial dynamics. Even though foreign militaries’ intention is to increase capacities of African militaries to respond to multifaceted conflict threats, foreign militaries end up forming elite relationship, and in some situations imposing external norms and values to the local formations. Why? This is because of the ability of these foreign militaries to evolve a distinct mode of socialization that dominates the ecosystem. The best scenario would be, once a culture

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is established, in this case a culture of interdependence, what follows is how regional arrangements such as ASF socializes with external counterparts such as NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) could help to create global interdependence and not military domination (Anchan, 2012). However, it is still possible that the greatest beneficiary of a welfare culture is considered a ‘dominant actor’. It should be remembered that the NATO’s negotiating environment strongly favours powerful military actors such as the USA. It is natural that dominating military entity will cascade to become dictators or imposters, even in foreign land. This eventually creates an asymmetric relationship compelling the Less Endowed Military (LEM) entity to bear the title, ‘recessive’ actor. This raises more of moral philosophical questions than it does military. The psychological model of dominance is perhaps the most ideal perspective for understanding why the military dominates the ASF. Psychologists argue that competition, a product of dominance is sustained by; (a) personality dynamics; (b) individual basic values-anxieties and beliefs and; (c) individual information processing. Yet, others argue that authoritarian behaviour commonly associated with dominance can post higher organizational productivity (Smither, 1993). Both the positive and negative outcomes of dominance as human behaviour fits well in explaining civil–military tensions in the ASF. Moreover, the revolutionary work of Sigmund Freud (The Library of Congress, 1939) on human behaviour is critical in understanding why for instance, regional economic/political or security arrangements such as the EASF or ECOWAS do not find it necessary to make rational decisions to have both civilians and military contribute to peace operation planning and execution. This dilemma elicits interesting questions, does this reflect the institutional preferences or the individuals’ attitude towards each other? Should there be mechanisms for ensuring that the decisions made in such entities are entirely guided by rational logic and reason? How possible is it to detach political feelings of political elites from the professional mandate of regional organizations, especially those dealing with peace and security?

How Did the ASF Evolve? In addressing the above questions, a comparative study of peacekeeper’s behaviour within the APSA arrangement by Onditi (2015), identified four ‘waves’ leading to the domination of the military within the ASF ecosystem: cultural wave, organizational wave, normative wave and institutional wave.

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Cultural Wave The military and civilians are in constant conflict in most settings—reconnaissance phase of peace operation as well as in active peace missions. Regardless of the status of the level of capacity development at the regional mechanism, serious conflicts between key stakeholders in PSO often lead to poor planning and or even failure of a peace mission. These conflicts are attributed to immense cultural and perceptional differences, organizational structures and operational differences as well as normative differences (Franke, 2006b). In this fashion of things, the reconnaissance phase of peace operation is a period of metamorphosis, a period of distress, when professional ego overrides the collective regional mandates of ASF (Franke, 2006b). Such sociopolitical orientation has the greatest influence on the relationship between the military and other non-state actors (Ataman, 2003). During the reconnaissance phase, on one hand, the civilians struggle to maintain their identity by avoiding control from the military commanders. The military on the other hand, sees the civilians as a ‘small’ partner on matters of PSO and may continue to exercise oversight over them. The civilians try to free themselves from the military domination and authority that surround them. In some cases, the military resent the isolationist behaviour they observe in their civilian counterparts. They look up on it as a rebellious attitude, insubordination, discretion and a possible ‘death trap’ for PSO planning processes. Indeed, conflict management scholars, have observed that, while the civilians within the ASF structures would like to carry on with planning based on the idea of freedom from the bondage of ignorance, the conservative nature of the military prefer to resist these changes so that their civilian counterparts remain away from planning for military operation (Francis, 2007). Military domination is a long-winding process. The authoritarian mood coupled with rules that are set without consulting the civilians, punitive measures employed to tame civilian liberal approaches further reduce harmony between the military and civilians. However, as the civilian components increase and acquire more support from other ‘external’ stakeholders including donors, they begin to question such standards and the rationale for the military control (Huntington, 1995). The military wanting to maintain unquestionable control over their civilian counterparts will experience tensions because civilian personnel want to be in charge of their affairs. These cyclical conflicts might turn into verbal

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arguments, hostility, struggle, disagreements or an incompatibility in values and norms. Eventually, the military conquers space by controlling important decision-making processes. Cooperation for peace operation is key in enhancing effectiveness of peacekeepers. Cooperation between the civilian and military elements involves integrating traditional military capabilities into a collective response to human needs (Franke, 2006b). At the outset, civilian and military actors share the long-term goal of promoting human security and developing conditions for societies marked by conflict to transition back to peaceful and stable structures. Initially, civil–military relationships were formed in the field, when troops stepped into fill gaps in civilian capabilities. In response to the growing complexity of operational requirements, states are increasingly recognizing the working relationships between the military and civilian actors and are now developing their own doctrines specifying the nature of Civil–Military Coordination (CIMIC). The rapidly changing humanitarian space is increasingly allowing peacemaking activities (relief, peacebuilding and reconstruction missions) to compel military and civilian actors to operate in the same space thereby challenging the very principles that guide their conduct—impartiality, neutrality and independence. Civilians and humanitarian actors usually belong to either international organizations (IOs) including UN agencies, or international, regional or local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). During peace operations and disaster relief, IOs interact primarily with official government institutions and less directly with the local population. In order to administer aid more effectively, collect and disseminate information, and recommend or take action on the ground, IOs benefit from partnering with the military. Operationally, many NGOs have moved beyond the traditional relief objectives of providing food, water, shelter and emergency health measures to monitoring human rights, substituting for local government, and encouraging the creation or reconstruction of civil society by bringing together the conflicting parties. The more the NGOs interact with parties to the conflict, the more roles overlap with military is created leading to suspicion and mistrust among them. Even though the military is the logical partner for security provision, contemporary military functions are steadily increasing in complexity and oftentimes overlap with those of civilian aid providers. For instance, military officers have successfully participated in negotiating ceasefires and peace settlements in Mozambique, Angola and Bosnia (Guttieri,

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2004). In addition, armed forces have monitored ceasefires and elections, enforced no-fly zones and demobilization efforts, secured relief convoys and supported civilian actors by providing logistical support, establishing camps for displaced persons, and lending engineering expertise to reconstruction projects (Rana, 2004). Civil–military cooperation can effectively bridge the gap between the intervention force and the relief organizations and civil institutions, and can become an effective force multiplier (Mockaitis, 2004). In spite of the potential benefit that could be experienced by positive civil–military relationship, the efforts to deconflict the roles have remained elusive, not only at the planning stage, but also in the peace operation theatre. Moreover, recognizing the potential of CIMIC for undermining the neutrality and independence of humanitarian organizations and NGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), began already in the early 1990s to advocate the concept of ‘humanitarian space’, which describes the ability of humanitarian agencies to ‘work independently and impartially without fear of attack in pursuit of the humanitarian imperative. This means that they are free to assist populations in need, and are not constrained by political or physical barriers to their work’ (Sida, 2005). In theory, at least the military becomes involved in humanitarian operations only in extremis, where people are dying, or at risk of dying, and only the military can save them (Sida, 2005). In practice, however, NGOs are especially concerned with military forces undertaking assistance work as part of their strategy to ‘win the hearts and minds’ of the local population. The military objectives behind this strategy include enhanced force protection and information gathering because of gaining the people’s trust. The military’s ‘hearts and minds’ approach can easily result in a confusion of the role of humanitarian agencies and military forces on the ground, hence, leading to a perception of military dominance. In some instances, while the military has emphasized the need for ‘complementarity’ in this new situation, humanitarian groups have been wary of its impact on their ability to remain impartial, neutral and independent (Sedra, 2004). The debate on pragmatism in delivering assistance to the civilians versus the humanitarian norms and principles has gained momentum in the twenty-first century. This has been occasioned by conflict situations in Africa. The debate is controversial. For example, on one hand, some scholars feel that military encroachment on humanitarian space is a violation of both peacekeeping rules of engagement

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(RoE) (Miller, 1997). On the other hand, Dobbins et al. (2005) have observed that modern warfare requires not only competency on military manoeuvre but also political and diplomatic tools in order to foster sustainable peace and stability. Moreover, commentaries have observed that military professionals had been significantly less committed to participating in Operations Other Than War (OOTW) in combat (Franke & Lindy, 2001). Indeed, the nature of missions and the perceptions of what it means to be a soldier are changing. Unlike most Cold War missions, which were either combat or non-combat in nature, peacebuilding or stability operations cannot be classified easily. They typically require military forces to simultaneously fulfil combat and non-combat functions and coordinate their efforts with partner militaries and a host of civilian relief organizations. As multidimensional PSO gains operational importance, a growing number of military officers seem to accept the duality in the function of peacekeeping formations. They include contribution to humanitarian assistance, in addition to their primary role—a fighting force (Rana, 2004). Confirming to this trend, Tomforde (2005) found out that younger soldiers define their role more in light of peacekeeping missions and, therefore, share the view that ‘a real soldier’ needs to have been deployed at least once. Despite the growing acceptance of the widening operational space, inconsistencies and contradictions persist. Yet, the prospect for an integrated PSO is largely influenced by cultural and perceptional differences, similarities or dissimilarities of organizational structures as well as the normative differences. The importance of institutional culture in militarization of regional security community cannot be overemphasized (Minear et al., 2000). This premise is generally in line with Samuel Huntington’s assertion that Western militaries are paid, trained and equipped to use organized and regulated violence to accomplish objectives set by democratic governments. The military places high value on command and control, clear lines of authority, discipline, accountability prioritizes logistics, i.e. guaranteed functioning under the most adverse circumstances, with the necessary ‘force protection’ to carry out tasks. The military’s institutional culture is characterized by considerable investments in human resources management, including extensive training at all levels, redundancy of staff, conducting lessons learnt exercises and where possible, well-rehearsed responses in the field. By contrast, humanitarian organizations tend to be less hierarchical, place higher priority on process. That is, how objectives

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are accomplished. They generally view redundancy as needless duplication of efforts. Moreover, relief workers tend to see themselves as non-violent people who have dedicated part of their lives to assist the less fortunate whose most formidable task oftentimes consists of building consensus among conflicting parties without favouring one side or the other. In any case, agencies and other development organizations would find it difficult to maintain the dividing line without hurting those they are expected to serve in conflict situations. These cultural differences contribute not only to discrepant mutual expectations, but at times, also to disillusionment of other actors depending on which party is disgruntled. In his assessment of the Bosnia operation, Minear et al. (2000) report that military officials were surprised by the small number of relief workers assigned to complete particular humanitarian tasks, while aid workers wanted to utilize what they considered the ‘idle capacity’ of military contingents deployed as a necessary reserve for unexpected emergencies. Minear et al., further criticize the lack of understanding between institutions at the operational level. They are critical of the military for failing to understand that for example, OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)) is not an operational agency, that the World Food Program is not an NGO, the GTZ (German Society for Technical Cooperation) is a bilateral aid agency and that the ICRC is none of the above. Yet, this distinction is equally important for the military. For example, formations such as the ARRC (Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps) and AFOR (Albanian Force), lack the competencies in humanitarian operations. Inherently, human rights-based civilian individuals or organizations are likely to experience unease working with military forces, especially if those forces served non-democratic governments with unsavoury human rights records. Moreover, Weiss’s (1999) study in Iraq confirms that the more closely civilian agencies are associated with an unpopular military force, the less room for manoeuvre the agency has and the more the military continues to dominate the PSO scene. Soldiers, on the other hand, oftentimes regarded NGOs as undisciplined and their operations as uncoordinated and disjointed (Aall, 2000). In Somalia (UNOSOM II), for example, the military expected civilian agencies to support its objective of enforcing order, while the civilian agencies wanted the military to supplement their efforts of delivering aid

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(Jeong, 2005). Given its concern with ‘mission creep’, the military tends to favour conditions where it can go in, provide technical assistance or logistical support, and then get out quickly. This can be problematic as this approach rarely considers the long-term management implications of military infrastructure projects for the civilian population. For instance, in Somalia, the US military deployed its own engineers and support troops to rebuild roads and other infrastructure at a time when Somalis desperately needed jobs. However, the military entity was not interested in hiring Somalis because it wanted to complete the mission quickly and feared that involving ‘untrained’ locals would unnecessarily prolong the reconstruction efforts. Military units, by their very nature, are trained to respond to and operate in a ‘low context culture’ relying on directives, specific orders and standard operating procedures (SOPs) that are communicated clearly down the hierarchy. This stands in stark contrast to the ‘high context’ cultural and operational requirements of complex emergencies where non-verbal signals, family or ethnic status, age, gender or ethnic differences, or social roles and expectations carry a lot of meaning. The concepts of low and high cultures were first articulated by anthropologist Edward Hall (1976), in his theory of cultural differences, which assumes a strong linkage between culture and communication. Interactions and communication in a given culture are determined by the social context in that culture, i.e. the networks of social expectations that shape a person’s behaviour (Liu et al., 2015). Similarly, Jeong’s (2005) concludes that an effectiveness PSO is dependent upon intercultural commitment across the conflict spectrum—prevention, management, post-conflict situation and the normalization of relations between adversaries through confidence-building measures to the creation of a stable political order and sustainable democratic relations. Organizational Wave Basic to the organizational role is the ability to harmonize the different world views of the military and civilian entities. In this comparison, the military is considered as straight jacket, while the civilians are viewed as flat-headed entities with flexible approaches. The organizational structures of peacekeeping forces and NGOs are typically polar opposites. The command structures in the military are centralized and vertical with clear and well-defined lines of authority flowing hierarchically from top

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to bottom. The chain of command is typically structured so that it can respond quickly and promote fast and efficient decision-making. Unlike civilian flat decision-making structures, the military decisions typically include finite deadlines and mission-specific rules of engagement that guide the entire operational structure from senior decision-makers to the behaviour of soldiers on the ground (Rubinstein, 2003). Concerning organizational infrastructure, ASF structures still lack platform for allowing transformation of peacekeepers to a multidimensional approach. Although the ASF Policy Framework has articulated the specific steps towards achieving a multidimensional force, the rate of transformation among the African regional peacekeepers still lags behind. This sluggish change from military-dominated operation to a multidimensional PSO has partly been attributed to inadequate social infrastructure that would enhance sociocultural and ideological adaptation among the military and civilian entities (George, 2002). Studies have shown linkages between effective organizational coordination and conformity to the context (De Coning, 2010). In spite of this conventional wisdom, the ASF continues to experience technical, operational, coordinational and lack of political will that would transition the formation into a fully capable force (Burgess, 2011). These challenges have activated the demand for a specific mechanism that is bedrocked on the African sociocultural and political dynamics. The greatest concern, however, is that whereas the military personnel continue to perform duties beyond their mandate, the humanitarian agencies are still locked in their ‘humanitarian principles’ shell, oblivious of the risks posed to the civilian population in the face of asymmetric conflicts across Africa. Although Cedric de Coning attributed this inconsistency to scarcity of civilian peacekeepers (De Coning, 2010), the question of whether the existing civil–military coordination mechanisms are effectively designed and utilized remains unattended to. Moreover, civilian-led agencies that focus on relief and development commonly promote participatory and collaborative working relationships that presuppose informal management and the ability to adjust objectives and activities quickly to sudden changes in civilian needs. About structures, more evidence exists to show that humanitarian agencies, especially smaller ones, in part because of constraints of size and resources, do not usually strive for ‘unity of command’ but rather for what Rubinstein (2003) has termed ‘camaraderie of command’. Instead of the common modus operandi of highly bureaucratized organizations

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that assign well-defined tasks and responsibilities to individuals, the more fluid structures of many NGOs require all to contribute their efforts and expertise. In addition, other levels of differences include resource availability utilization, accountability and transparency. Humanitarians’ work is widely accountable to donors, private constituents and their beneficiaries and, therefore, tend to favour transparency even in relation to belligerents. This organizational bureaucracy and culture does not operate in isolation. It is surrounded by microcosmic world of values and norms. Normative Wave Peacekeeping is a risk exercise that requires meticulous planning and precision decision-making within certain prescribed code of behaviour. Gourlay’s (2000) fears of the deployment of civilian peacekeepers without an effective coordination mechanism, concurs with Volker Frank’s assertion that, humanitarian organizations have expressed concern about the impact of civil-military cooperation on their ability to remain impartial, neutral, and independent in fulfilling their core tasks. As a result, the lines between neutral peacekeeping and relief efforts and non-neutral peacebuilding and reconstruction activities have become increasingly blurred, thereby raising dangers and risks especially for civilian actors. (Franke, 2006b: 6)

This is largely illustrated by the 1949 Geneva Convention and its 2 Additional Protocols of 1977, representing the international community’s attempts to humanize war. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) specifies that: ‘Measures are considered humanitarian if they meet the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. In theory, humanitarian aid is supposed to reach all victims of crises and disasters and save lives while mitigating human suffering. As such, it is to be administered impartially and unconditionally without discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, sex, age, nationality or political affiliation. Given this very general understanding of these principles, the scope and nature of legitimate action remains open-ended and at times ill-defined. Traditionally, the military entity has been designed for pursuit of national political interests to accomplish governmental objectives using force. As such, military action is always political in nature. Military

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missions are legitimized through the political process, but ideally also by reference to international law and broad-based international support. As a result, legitimacy is much more confined. When the United Nations Security Council authorizes a peacekeeping mission, the Council has to specify the scope of the mandate and the nature of legitimate action clearly, e.g. the supply of food, medicines, shelter and health care for disaster victims. Impartiality is also a fundamental organizing principle for the military in providing humanitarian assistance. For peacekeepers, the Handbook on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2003) specifies, ‘impartiality may mean that all parties to a conflict are treated in the same way based on international law and Security Council resolutions and that sanctions may be imposed or enforcement action taken against spoilers. For humanitarian staff, however, impartiality means that emergency life-saving assistance and protection be provided to the needy civilian population, regardless of their political affiliation. Tactically, the Handbook, explains further, peacekeepers may, on occasion, need to keep a particular faction at arm’s length or under sanction (for example, for violation of a Security Council resolution). At the same time, it may be tactically important for humanitarian staff to maintain close dialogue with the same faction to ensure access to civilians under their control. Strategically, in places of active conflict or where access is contested, it is critical for humanitarian workers to be able to reach beneficiaries regardless of how the peace process evolves. An effective PSO requires: (1) Unity of effort and coherent response from civilian and military actors alike; (2) Clearly, stability operations in response to complex emergencies present significant challenges to response efforts; and (3) Oftentimes, humanitarian and PSO efforts may at times be at odds. Consequently, an effective PSO becomes a management challenge on the ground that requires civilian and military, as well as local and international actors to work together. In view of these challenges, Gourlay (2000) recommends that peacekeepers should anticipate differences, attempt to avoid conflicting approaches, communicate clearly, share information and undertake common analysis and in a best-case scenario, agree on a strategy. All these, however, must be guided by some rules, procedure and value system-institutions.

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Institutional Wave Some scholars have argued that competition that arises because of institutional evolution does not necessarily bring about an asymmetrical relationship between civilians and the military in PSO environment (Schiff, 1995). Instead, tiered development of capacities for operation intervention can be potential drivers of further evolution of a multidimensional force. However, the historical and political diversity of African subregions suggests otherwise. That institutional evolution has not been unidirectional, but rather is a result of ad hoc processes. Moreover, institutional theorists have observed that contexts characterized by legal and institutional pluralism have created greater opportunity for divergence in institutional evolution (Lecoutere, 2011). To this end, research has shown that pragmatic problem solving and the processes of institutional evolution do not necessarily assume similar patterns of development. Instead, problem solving and the processes of institutional evolution happen in a socially embedded way. This means that accumulation of capacity for PSO does not only depend on the traditional providers of security (the military), but a combination of resources to create synergy. On a similar note, Samuel Huntington argues that the balance of power and respect between civilian and military groups creates effective civil– military relations that could transform peace intervention architecture. Attaining a balance in highly clandestine is, however, complex. Nevertheless, CIMIR theorists (Franke, 2006b) maintain that the balance of power could be sustained through partisan neutrality of the military and subordination of the military to the civilian authority. Nielsen (2005), while applying Feaver’s (2003) civil–military problematique provides theoretical arguments on the influence of civil–military relations on the effectiveness of a military institution. Nielsen (2005) asserts that civilian control is best in times of high external threat and low internal threat, worst in the times of low external threat and high internal threat. In the same line of argument, Nielsen (2005) concluded that firm civilian control existed during the Cold War and mixed in the post-Cold War period. The question is, is it possible for a military formation to become more effective without any loss of civilian control? However, what Nielsen (2005) fails to allude to is the fact that post-Cold War period, intrastate conflicts continues to dominate the scene, hence calling for interdisciplinary approach to peace operation. In contemporary Africa, conflicts are characterized by complexity, multiple

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parties, blurred boundaries, blurred distinctions between combatants and civilians and greater numbers of civilian casualties. There are often many interveners attempting to manage the conflict, including international, regional, national and community level state and non-state actors. Responses are just as complex as the causes. For example, intervening security forces (international military and police) are required to assume responsibilities for which they were not prepared and to operate in domains in which they were not trained (IBCR, 2013). Military forces may find themselves carrying out activities traditionally conducted by police forces or civilians and vice versa to police and civilians. Therefore, in order to develop a coherent relationship between military means and political ends, civilian control becomes essential to military effectiveness including shaping the military doctrine and operational procedures. However, like the founding works of Huntington (1957), Janowitz (1960), and Feaver’s (2003) formulation helpfully puts both effectiveness and control at the centre of the civil–military relations research agenda. In the context of ASF framework of peace and security, the challenge is no longer civilian control but military domination. Political ideologies influence regional security mechanisms. Moreover, Gourlay (2006) observes that efforts by the UN to develop an in-house rapid deployment civilian capacity have not been successful due to several factors including insufficient commitment, which undermines its credibility and efficiency. Based on Gourlay’s (2006) analysis, it is plausible to argue that there exists a relationship between staff recruitment and rapid deployment. Nevertheless, the two mechanisms have been distinctively described by the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations as being apart. For example, a number of UN reports on peace support operations recommend that the ‘standby’ model enhance the greatest level of predictability and timeliness for civilian capacities. This assertion agrees with the UN Security Council Resolution 2086 of 2013 on multidimensional peacekeeping. The resolution reiterates the need for combined efforts, and the important role that regional mechanisms could play in conflict management. Varhola and Varhola (2012), while examining the challenges and prospects of regional engagements in Africa, noted that most African-based regional organizations lack a democratic framework and subsequently poorly structured conflict resolution mechanisms. However, Varhola and Varhola (2012) point out rightly the dilemma that regional standby forces may be experiencing, emphasis on democratic principles may be limiting to other systems such as the military that do not necessarily uphold such principles.

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Implementation of ASF: A Technical or Political Issue? The AU’s strategic role has evolved beyond fostering and preservation of unity, solidarity and continental cooperation to embrace coordination of peace and security capacities. The continental body coordinates initiatives by Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) towards developing peace operation capacities. Such initiatives include training and field-based exercises, such as the AMANI Exercises. The ASF AMANI II Exercise was concluded in South Africa on 13 November 2015 with the rather disconsolate message from the Head of peace support operation division (PSOD), Mr. Bam Sivuyile that ‘generating forces is not a technical issue, it is a political issue’. In what seemed contradictory when asked to comment on the relationship between the African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and ASF, Mr Sivuyile responded, ‘the issue with ASF is not numbers, it is whether they are properly trained and equipped’. Reflecting back on the two statements given by the Chief of PSOD, the political and capacity issues faced by the ASF are closely intertwined. It is not surprising to encounter such illogicality within the African PSO environment. In fact, conceptual inconsistency has been cited as one single challenge derailing attainment of a capable ASF (Tomforde, 2005). On a similar note, the African regional peace and security integration aspirations continue to experience cognitive shortcuts, conceptual distortions and practical inconsistencies. All these translate into endemic problems around norms and values leading to stagnation of the continent. Some of these values include good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice, rule of law and the need to be inclusive. Indeed, these norms and values are the very substance of the union in spearheading regional integration across the continent. The former OAU gave greater credence to African liberation of the continent from colonialism and other forms of domination, and consequently highly prized non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. Realizing the constraints this placed on the institution’s integration agenda and its ability to be responsive to the needs of Africans, there was a concerted shift from non-interference to non-indifference. The aim of the new AU was to address Africa’s challenges by focusing on democratic governance, human rights, peace and security, development, enhanced integration, greater participation of African peoples, and the elimination of impunity

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and interference in the massive violations of human rights. The Constitutive Act adopted in 2002, enunciates this shift and establishes a network of organs aimed at achieving these objectives. In addition, the African Union has other institutions (organs and treaty bodies) set up by treaty mechanisms. The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are considered building blocks of the AU and have a pivotal role to play in the integration agenda, as well as in operationalizing various elements of the AU peace and security architecture. The RECs Protocol provides for the formalization, consolidation and enhanced cooperation between the Union and the RECs. However, there is little harmony between the organizational structure of the RECs and the AU. The eight RECs officially recognized by the AU are expected to nurture the five regional mechanism (RMs). The sixth regional mechanism recognized by the African Union is the Diaspora. The Diaspora is considered a vital component towards achieving the objectives of the AU Constitutive Act. It is valued for its potential to mobilize ‘the requisite scientific, technological and financial resources and expertise for the successful management of the programmes of the African Union Commission. The Diaspora is considered a key stakeholder in the AU’s Strategic Plan 2009–2012 and is a standing agenda item at every summit. The AU convened a Global Diaspora Summit on 25 May 2012, in South Africa. But, the AU cooperation with the UN and other international agencies has been crippled by the challenges of external overdependence on financial and technical resources (Williams & Boutellis, 2014). Among the key factors identified, issues that require attention in order to Africanize the APSA architecture are conceptual inadequacy and financial ownership of processes leading to the development of an African-led PSO model.

Recalling the ‘Ethnic Vibes’ at the IPSTC in Nairobi The Peacekeeping Training Centres of Excellence! That is how they are referred. When one pays them a visit on a relatively busy day, you will notice an armature of flags, denoting either a line-up of donors or countries represented in the training platform. When you make an effort to pay a glance at the training session you will come across discussions around subjects such as protection of civilians, culture, rule of law, conflict analysis, human rights, child protection, governance, crisis management,

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etc. They host an average of thirty (30) participants drawn from the ten EASF member states. If you happen to be a good observer you will not miss to see inscriptions labelling those who have paid the centre a visit in the past. The most noticeable thing is the overwhelming uniformed personnel criss-crossing their ways clutching files in their arms. When visiting for the first time you might think the soldiers are on a military expedition or on a recruitment drive. The civilians will be seating strategically behind everyone, perhaps to avoid eye conduct with the military generals who are oftentimes inimical of the civilian presence. The police participants on the other hand will be covertly struggling to occupy edge side seats along the gangway to give way to the rather intimidating military officers in berets and insignia. This is the image of a Centres of Excellence in Nairobi! Yes, and fine, it is, but according to whom? By what standards? Under what quality criteria? These questions continue to elicit debate on whether some of the PSO training centres comply with the international peacekeeping training standards. The debate has also opened a new line of questioning the professional ethics of leadership of these centres and the common denominator of the debate is that the centres are basically tribal cocoons. Their operation standards depict images of pseudo-academic institutions structured to perpetuate state machinations with a great deal of old ethnic politics, commonly practised in Kenya. There are also quality issues. It is farcical that the civilians recruited spend significant amount of time stuck in computer screens on the pretext of doing research! What comes out of this naïve exercise is a bunch of recycled information. Once this crummy information is clutched together, stakeholders are then called into witness presentations, inform of ‘research symposium’. Put all these together one would not be comfortable classifying some of these institutions as ‘Centres of Excellence’. Their fashion of politics, administration and management resembles the proverbial state of tomfoolery exclusive clubs. These centres are definitely not anywhere near some of the cutting-edge premier institutions such as the USbased United Nations Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI) or the famous Centre of Excellence for Stability Police (COESPU), based at the Royola, Rome, Italy. It would be difficult to match these two centres, for example, with those in eastern Africa. The internal operation of these institutions and leadership resembles a combination of military autocracy and ethnic bigotry. Hence, you will not be accused of referring to them

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as ‘Centres for Militarization and Exclusion against Civilians & Society (COMECS)’. For example, since its establishment in 2002, the IPSTC’s Directorship has been held by one ethnic group representing the national political collusions. The general image and mediocrity among these institutions has something to do with ethnic prejudices. Among the PSO institutions in eastern Africa, IPSTC carries the brand of discourse of ethnic identity and ethnic homogenization. Polarization of these institutions with ethnic discourse has turned social and administrative actions ethnic. Some scholars have argued that ethnicity is about more than cultural and symbolic action, perspective, discourse or a way of interpreting what is around us. In this view, interpretations are linked to specific dynamics of political, economic and coercive power for which these institutions provide fertile soil. The constant manufacture of ethnic threats by ethno-national elites is mirrored by administrative and political actions reform perceived as disruptive to existing politico-administrative power, itself based on the ethno-national division of the country. It is no surprise that those working at the IPSTC centre in Karen, Nairobi, do not belong to the ethnic group of the ruling class or the top leadership of the centre will certainly detect the deeper roots of ethnic prejudice among the staff who largely belong to the same ethnic grouping. On many occasions when the centre leadership talks to those perceived ‘outsiders’ he is compelled to tell them for example, about some Luo ‘friend’ or colleague he knows whom he has always thought was such a wonderful individual! In other circumstances, the Director of the centre will mention some famous Luo professor or a military general everyone would recognize, extolling that person’s virtues. More often they would refer to an individual by ethnic symbol such as ‘Jaduong ’ (translated from Luo dialect to mean an elderly or respected person), rather than address one in an official manner. The unfortunate situation about this insincerity is that these ethnic bigotries try too hard to prove their openminded tolerance, when in real sense such expressions are hypocritical and insincere. Someone would wonder, if they were truly liberated from the bonds of ethnicity and tribalism, why can’t they talk freely about any topic without constantly recycling back to some ethnic-related subjects. The greater concern is that this ethnic enmity and lack of trust determines levels of relationship among those working within and without the PSO environment.

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Conclusion This chapter has argued that while the African Standby Force presented an ideal framework for enhancing multidimensionality of capacities for responding to peace and security challenges, the framework lacked the wholesomeness of structures, systems and institutions. As such, enforcing the principles of systems thinking within such a varied environment proved difficult for implementers of the model. We have also noted that the tactical and ideological diffusion of military tradition in which structures and processes are developed and tilted towards military domination on matters that would be best handled by civilian or police has contributed to the sluggishness of the ASF in achieving full operation capability by 2015. One such structure developed by the AU and seen to be in competition with ASF is the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). The disguise in developing ACIRC is that it provides an opportunity for the states to conduct rapid deployment as the ASF process continues. Yet, what would be required to have a successful African-led PSO model is reconsidering the design of ASF so it conforms to the principles of a multidimensional approach. In some circumstances, the retired military person in civilian mood assumes civilian roles masquerading as either ‘protection’ or ‘human rights’ experts. These professional dishonesty and political manipulations of peace and security structures do not necessarily reflect the doctrine of a multidimensional force as originally configured. It, therefore, indicates that ASF structures across the continent are not yet capable of deploying a multidimensional force in the near future. It is worth noting that ASF is not the overall solution to African conflicts but rather a fundamental element in finding a solution. Its success is challenged by, among others, the fact that the capability of the regional structures and RECs is very uneven and there is no clarity concerning mandating authority. The existing MOU between AU and RECs seem less effective in enforcing the roles and powers of each entity. As a result, there is lack of clarity about whether the AU needs to negotiate with RECs/RMs on the use of the brigades that they have raised and maintained. If this is going to be the case, there is no doubt that it will complicate matters. Additionally, it is a fact that some of the regional standby forces have a rich experience and an advanced level of capability while others do not. It is not clear whether the AU is able to provide the necessary guidance to bring all forces up to standard. Finally, the

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traditional firefighting operations and narratives about resource scarcity and exclusionary tactics employed by generals against new transformative approaches to PSO are likely to continue dominating plans in Addis Ababa as well as in all other five regional standby forces in the coming decades. APSA is one of the institutions developed by the AU to enhance peace, security and stability on the continent through coordination, coherence of structures and sustainability. Since its establishment through the Peace and Security Council Protocol 2002, APSA has forged close networks with RECs and RMs and more recently with Regional Peacekeeping Training Centres as part of the infrastructure for peace operation. This notwithstanding, strengthening APSA’s coordination is a work in progress. The overlapping mandates, and competition have been unravelled in missions such as in Central Africa Republic (CAR), Mali and Somalia where the African-led PSO has been tested in the new world order proliferated with international organizations. One way out of this coordination and relational challenge is to sustain capacity building and realign divisions of labour among RECs as relates to the AU. Peace and Security Council is the APSA’s ‘nerve center’. The PSC has primarily adopted an emergency-driven approach since its establishment and continues to struggle to adopt a more preventive approach despite mechanisms in place (such as the Panel of the Wise and the Continental Early Warning System, among others). A number of countries are increasingly protracted with no clear sight of a long-lasting solution, including the Somalia, South Sudan and Democratic Republic of Congo. These countries are taking up most of the African Union’s (and RECs) time, absorbing precious resources to take effective steps on conflict prevention. These conflicts all have their roots in a crisis of governance and the lack of a solid social contract between the government and its citizens. It is, therefore, imperative that AU in liaison with RECs adopt comprehensive approaches to PSO. The AU’s reform agenda put more emphasis on finance and strengthening peace and security infrastructures. Thus, the establishment of the Mediation Support Unit (MSU) will require further investments in conflict prevention and governance under the APSA. On a similar note, the 2014 slogan, ‘silence the guns by 2020’, under auspice of the AU’s Vision 2020 adopted following a high-level retreat on the theme in late April 2014 in Durban, South Africa, remains a narrative. While it seems unlikely that the African Union and its Member States will be

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able to achieve a conflict-free continent by 2020, wide mobilization and reinforced efforts to operationalize the APSA are essential. The APSA Roadmap 2016–2020 provides a significant opportunity to achieve this. Finalized in December 2015 and officially launched in April 2016, the roadmap outlines a set of five strategic priorities and indicators to measure these objectives. The five strategic priorities are: (1) Conflict prevention; (2) Crisis/conflict management; (3) Post-conflict Reconstruction and Peacebuilding; (4) Strategic Security Issues; and (5) Coordination and Partnerships. Monitoring the results on these strategic priorities as well as the APSA actor’s interventions, which ECDPM has been doing since 2013, is a key element of documenting and tracking the APSA’s progress and contribution to peace and security on the continent. Also, conceptual issues on the connection between early warning and direct response systems need to be improved. Finally, APSA Roadmap unveils opportunities for strengthening the AU’s strategic institutions, among them the Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) and the African Governance Architecture (AGA). As part of the new APSA Roadmap, a Multidimensional Committee on PCRD was established in order to interact with international actors on the continent on PCRD. A PSC Standing Committee has also been established in order to monitor actors and provide support to affected countries. Through the AU’s Situation Room infrastructure, regular briefing sessions of the PSC are expected to assure the political oversight and support to PCRD interventions. There is also a direct link between the PCRD with the AU member states through the ministerial committees on PCRD. In other words, the APSA Roadmap 2016–2020 provided the ‘binoculars ’ through which an effective institutional linkage between the APSA, AGA and APRM, could be attained. On this note, the future of APSA in the Africa-led PSO is an ‘axis’ to deal with the complex conflict system on the continent, however, the caveat is ensuring there exist mechanisms for building lessons learnt from field missions on application of norms and principles such as subsidiarity, comparative advantage and complementarity.

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CHAPTER 6

African Union-Led Peace Support Operations

Introduction In the parlance of International Relations, the subject of African affairs is sometimes considered incomplete without deep reflections on the nostalgic memories of how the African founding fathers such as Kwame Nkrumah, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, Leopold Sedar Senghor, Jomo Kenyatta and Kamudzu Banda, collectively conceived the future of the Africa continent. What would they have loved to see? Functional systems or value system? They were optimistic that Africa would be the beacon of hope to promote unity, solidarity, cohesion and cooperation among the peoples of Africa and African States. All these would melt to moot a functional system anchored on African values. This vision was nurtured in the light of the multifaceted challenges that confronted, and continues to inflict the continent and its people of social, economic and political pain. These leaders realized that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development and that they needed to promote peace, security and stability. The leaders were also determined to lead on strengthening institutions in order to sustain values of democratic governance and cultural heritage. As observed elsewhere in this work, the structural challenges facing the realization of the African dream motivated the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) through the 2003 Policy Framework. The aim of the ASF was to plan,

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coordinate and oversee the development of multidimensional and multidisciplinary peace support operation (PSO) capacities that would take on the challenges posed by the ever-changing and complex peace and security environment in Africa. Today, after more than 50 years of political independence and a century of existence, most African states are characterized by a multiplicity of ethnic groups that continuously cling to identity affiliations and ethno-religious sentiments. The forces of cultural, religious and ethnic striving are not only mutually reinforcing but also constantly self-regenerating, leading to interregional enmity, suspicion and violent conflicts (Haynes, 2007). The ethnic and religious differentiations, if not animosities, cultural differences are often being ‘instrumentalized by ethnic entrepreneurs as to a means to gaining access to political and economic resources’ (De Soysa, 2002: 396). In addition, the culture of ethno-religious thinking by which many Africans tend often to read ethnic and religious meanings into events in different parts of the continent has often fueled suspicion and mistrust, translating to hatred and varying degrees and forms of social conflict. This is understandable under the theory of social conflict which essentially argues that social divisions impact negatively on political behaviour (Seymour & Rokkan, 1967). For instance, the Boko Haram, Niger Delta insurgencies and the Al-Shabaab extremists in Nigeria and Somalia, respectively, often reinforce this view. The harmful legacy of colonialism is integral to understanding Africa’s conflict and hence, the winding challenges of developing fully operational African-led peace operation. Many conflicts across the continent own their explanation to the colonialist’s arbitrary and greedy hodgepodge (or division as it were) of various diverse ethnic groups irrespective of the variety of historical, political, cultural, as well as the religious affinities of these groups. What is more, the politics of colonialism also means that the colonized African states have to share common enemies with its colonizers, thereby becoming part of its wars, as redolent of the fact that many African countries ‘acted as ideological proxies for the East and West’ during the Cold War (Okumu, 2007: 29). Yet beyond colonialism, postcolonial African leaders have often sustained the faulty foundation laid by colonialism, thereby aggravating the socio-economic and political demise in Africa (Alemazung, 2010). The factors at play in this regard cover the gamut of elite manipulation and conspiracy, leadership deficit, ethnic manipulation, religious bigotry, and the ethnicization of politics as well as the politicization of

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ethnicity, inter alia (Ake, 1976). Other non-negligible factors include the adverse effects of globalization. Essentially, the negative impact of this link on domestic governance is particularly illuminating as far as the dynamics of Africa’s interstate conflicts, including ethno-religious conflicts, are concerned (Cronin, 2003). Prevailing internal factors such as systemic corruption and mismanagement, which continues to engender overwhelming human security challenges ranging from epic unemployment rates, alarming environmental degradation, poverty, cannot be arrested only through military operation. The formation of the African Standby Force within the broader framework of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) reflects the above-described complex challenges facing the continent of Africa. Traditional peacekeeping operations or military counter-insurgency do not play a direct role in these myriads of political, social, economic and governance issues to resolve the conflict. No wonder some traditional peacekeeping operations are deployed for decades before a lasting political settlement is reached between parties. This chapter, therefore, gives an account of the evolution of the peace support operation (PSO) from an African perspective.

Evolution of the African Peace Support Operations In 1949, the first peace support operations were conceived and implemented by Lester Pearson and Dag Hammarskjold, the Canadian Permanent Representative to the UN and the then UN Secretary-General, respectively. This was because of foresight and creative interpretation of the UN Charter. Since then, the UN and indeed the AU peace operations have become the most prevalent form of peace operations in Africa (De Coning, 2007). In the same breath of discussion, it is important to note that the UN Charter provides the terms of reference for the various elements of the UN and for regional arrangements and agencies in fulfilling this responsibility. Although the Charter makes no specific reference to PSO, the three chapters which most relate to PSO are; Chapter 6, that deals with the pacific settlement of disputes, Chapter 7, that refers to such actions by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security, and Chapter 8, that encourages settlement of disputes by involving regional arrangements. By 2017 the African Union’s contribution to the UN’s peacekeeping was 50%. This notwithstanding, the ambiguity as to whether the AU’s stability agenda

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can be considered as peace enforcement or operation continues to bedevil the partnership between the UN and AU. Peace operations take place when the UN or other bodies are authorized to deploy military, police and civilian personnel to monitor not only the implementation of peace agreement or ceasefire, but also conduct other activities intended to prevent further escalation of conflicts (De Coning, 2007). The first UN observer mission was deployed in Palestine under the name the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) after the first Arab/Israeli war from June 1948 until the end of the 1950s. The early missions were intended to be nothing more than a symbolic presence, consisting of lightly armed or unarmed military personnel from around the world, deployed to ‘internationalize’ an interstate conflict, and raise the political costs of a resumption of war once a ceasefire had been reached. In 1960, the UN was tasked to establish a massive operation in the Republic of the Congo. Its scope and mission was unprecedented in an era otherwise known for its small-scale and limited peace operations. At its peak, the UN Operation in the Congo had more than 20,000 troops and 2000 civilian technical experts (the same size as the largest contemporary UN peace operation in Africa). The conflict in the Congo resulted in the death of 250 UN peacekeepers, including the then Secretary-General Dag Hammarsköjld, who died in a plane crash. After this disastrous experience, the conventional wisdom in 1964 in international circles was that the UN would never again deploy a peace operation mission in a civil war situation. Indeed, during the Cold War period that followed, all peace operations missions undertaken were of the classical interstate ceasefire monitoring type, for example, the missions in Kashmir, Cyprus, Lebanon, the Golan Heights and the Sinai desert. The end of the Cold War resulted in a new period of hope in the UN and new types of expanded peace operations were undertaken in the early 1990s in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia and Mozambique. These missions went much further than the classical observer-type missions did in that, they assisted parties to implement comprehensive ceasefire and peace agreements. In the case of Namibia and Cambodia, they temporarily oversaw the transitional arrangements. However, UN’s records indicate that the experiences of the UN in the mid-1990s, especially the failure to act in Rwanda in 1994 and the fall of Srebrenica in 1995, resulted in many doubting the future role of UN peace operations. Some European countries opted rather for subregional peace operations through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This wave of ideas penetrated the

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African Union’s strategic thinking. As such, the AU, with the specific objective of enhancing the management of conflicts, it was necessary that the regional body formalizes its relationship with the UN. The need for a collective regional security approach was also necessitated by the deteriorating security situation after the Cold War and intensity of internal conflicts that were ravaging the continent. Both academic and policy discourses agree that there are five activities that comprise PSO. The 5Ps are: 1. Preventive diplomacy; 2. Peacemaking; 3. Peacekeeping; 4. Peace enforcement; and 5. Peacebuilding. In some conflict situations, humanitarian and relief activities are also part of PSO (Hough et al., 2006). The conceptual landscape of PSO is wide and deep. In this field is not uncommon to come across concepts such as complex emergencies and complex peace operation. They mainly apply to humanitarian environment where the state may not have the internal capacity to stabilize the situation thereby seeking international intervention. The Interagency Standing Committee (IASC) defines a complex emergency as a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict, which require an international response that goes beyond the capacity of a single or ongoing UN country programme. The consequence of such a situation is a sharp rise in civilian mortality and total breakdown of institutions such as rule of law. Policy Analysts have argued that the emergence of a complex situation automatically warrants a complex peace operation (De Coning, 2007). Usually, complex peace operation intervention processes are fragile; hence, humanitarian and relief needs become priority on the agenda. This necessitates the enhancement of civil–military relationship. The United Nations Mission in Liberia in August 2004 provided a typical example of complex peace operation that required the involvement of military, police and civilians in responding to humanitarian needs in a more coordinated manner. The UNMIL is considered a successful case of a coordinated response because there were deliberate efforts to have different components including rule

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of law (police), humanitarian coordination (civilians), force commander (military) as well as several other civilians actors. Engaging regional mechanisms (RMs) can even be more complex compared to the UN missions. This is because the RMs are mired with politics of neighbourliness and interests, hence no guarantee that the principle of subsidiarity can be a success. The Casablanca Vision The concept of African Standby Force (ASF) begun way back in 1961 among the Casablanca group led by the founding President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah. African leaders, therefore, envisaged the establishment of an African High Command (AHC) primarily to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the newly independent African States. The foundations for this structure had been laid during the AllAfrican People’s Conference in 1958. In our view, this was basically a military construct with three objectives: to defend the states against the disadvantageous military pacts with the Cold War powers; to offer African states a feasible alternative to disadvantageous military pacts with the Cold War powers; and to spearhead the liberation of areas under colonial and white supremacist control. Indeed, the idea of a pan-African military force seems to have begun as early as 1922 (Franke & Esmenjaud, 2008). Progress on the advancement of the African force was thwarted by suspicion among the leaders. The idea was not endorsed by majority of the leaders leading to the establishment of an alternative structure referred to as the Defence Commission. In the absence of a common solid defence structure to manage post-independent threats, the Organization for African Unity (OAU) occasionally undertook or endorsed less complex ceasefire monitoring missions such as the Bamako Ceasefire Commission (1963). The pan-African peacekeeping force that operated in Shaba Province of Congo (Kinshasa) in 1978–79 was the first OAU peace support operation undertaking, followed by the Chadian operation (1979–82) which was also the only OAU peacekeeping venture of a complex nature during this period (Cilliers & Malan, 2005). The adoption of the ASF Policy Framework in 2003 and the subsequent institutionalization of the multidimensional approach in May 2004 led to the establishment and strengthening of regional standby forces with a view to enhancing African-led response to conflicts across the continent (African Union, 2010). At this point, it is important that we examine the

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interaction between ASF and other structures within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). At the heart of the architecture is the PSC which was established as a standing decision-making organ to be supported by the Military Staff Committee and the New Partnership for African Development. There are also structures in place to support the functioning of the AU PSC including the Common African Defense and Security Policy. Although the functions of the Common African Defense and Security Policy is to propel interdependence and synergy between different actors including the civilian and police, absence of the substantive civilian personnel to the Committee on defence and security at the AU level is violation of Article 13 of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) protocol that advocates for an integrated African force. Similar discrepancies seem to be replicated at the Regional Mechanisms (RMs). For example, the position of Joint Chief of Staff in the ASF structures has been reserved for military personnel, yet this position is key in making critical decisions that affect not only the military, but also civilians and the police. A coherent joint civil–military strategy has the ability to not only neutralize the belligerents, but also put structures in place to protect vulnerable groups such as women and children through the protection of civilian strategy (Appiah-Mensah & Eklou-Assogbavi, 2012). Furthermore, Article 12 of the Protocol of the AU Constitutive Act provides for early warning information provided to the Chairperson through the Continental Early Warning System. This is meant to provide the PSC with an opportunity to take the required action after due consideration of the issues. The Panel of the Wise could be deployed to support efforts of the Peace and Security Council (Article 11). In situations of grave magnitude as envisaged in Articles 4 (h) and (j) of the Constitutive Act could trigger some form of intervention. Hence, the ASF structures were established to deal with such eventualities (Article 13). As a result, the rapid deployment capability becomes a critical milestone in the operationalization and strengthening of the APSA. The Akosombo (Ghana) meeting on 10–11 December 2009 reiterated the need for internal synergy among the ASF components as well as partnership between AU and development actors. This would enhance multidimensional capacity of the ASF structures to enable them to respond to a multitude of peace and security challenges in their respective regions and beyond (African Union, 2010). However, coordination and cooperation among the military, civilians and the police is critical for this synergy to be realized.

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Understanding the level of coordination among the APSA components at the AU and the RECs/RMs is a logical starting point in mapping dynamics of civil–military relations, which has implications on the capability of ASF structures to intervene in conflict situations (African Union, 2010). The main argument in this chapter is that the murky relationship between the military and civilian personnel designated for peace operations in the ASF structures has negating implications on the availability of capacities for rapid multidimensional deployment in conflict situations. There seems to be a level of coordination among the APSA pillars, as it relates to the operationalization of the ASF and CEWS. The level of coherence in the development of these components is more advanced than the other two components (the Panel of the Wise and the Peace Fund). This is partly explained by the fact that the ASF and the CEWS have clearly articulated roadmaps, thereby providing more structured bases for their operationalization. For instance, the AU and the RECs/RMs have worked closely in the development of the doctrine and policy instruments for the ASF (De Coning, 2017). Moreover, AU’s ‘situation room’ functions effectively as a result of timely relay of information from the subregional early warning systems. While there are still some gaps in the development of various ASF structures, coordination has proved much easier due to the existence of clear roadmaps. In the same breadth, quarterly meetings between the AU and the RECs on the CEWS would even make significant progress if civilian-based agencies such as Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) are adequately represented. This would ensure mainstreaming of human security perspectives as well as state security issues that usually take precedence in such meetings. Although anecdotal coordination has been spotted among the ASF structures both in Addis Ababa and in RMS, this is not necessarily the case with some of the leading ASFs. It has been observed that while the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) has instituted communication channels through the liaison office based in Karen, Nairobi, this position is held by either retired or serving military officers. For example, the liaison office is held by a military brigadier general, which means that outreach to civilian organizations or supporting civilian initiatives within the force may be compromised due to normative and practical orientation of the military personnel. Moreover, exercises considered as conditions for enhancing integration of peacekeepers such as Command Post Exercises (CPX), Field Training Exercise (FTX) are never full-fledged multidimensional training due to imbalanced representations of the components.

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There are concerns that if not properly calibrated, the liaison officers could be reduced to couriers, an approach that would undermine the intended objective of improving coordination between the AU and the RECs/RMs in procedural and substantive terms down to the standby forces and related structures. Moreover, it is not clear how the reporting procedures for the Liaison Officers are structured. This implies that largely, coordination structures at the strategic level are still wanting. The long-term implications of this imprecise vertical relationship to the ASF structures such as EASF and ECOWAS Standby Force are lack of a harmonized approach in capacity building and consequently compromising the required balance in representation of personnel. This further entrenches tensions between the military and civilians over who controls what and where, with unprecedented consequences on the ability of the PSO institutions to develop, mobilize and coordinate multidimensional capacities. Beyond the ASF and CEWS, there appears to be limited dexterity among the other APSA components. Institutional disconnect within the ASF is overbearing. For instance, direct linkage between the PSC, Panel of the Wise and similar structures in the RECs/RMs is lacking. Although ECOWAS Standby Force has instituted the Panel of the Wise in its structure, it is still ad hoc without supportive policy and strategy. Given the envisaged functions of the Panel of the Wise, operationalization of this structure would greatly increase civil–military relations as those serving on the panel are prominent individuals mainly with civilian background. In light of this, there is a general consensus among the RECs/RMs that the AU Commission needs to play a more strategic leadership role in improving coordination in the overall operationalization of APSA (Addy & Atuobi, 2009). Given the arrangement of APSA in its current iteration focuses more on physical security with purely military operation thinking and actions. For example, while the ASF is envisaged as an instrument of peace operations, the emerging security challenges such as terrorism, piracy and improving governance of security forces in several member states fall outside the ASF arrangement. In regard to external environment, critiques of the notion of Africanization and ownership have pointed out that from selective support and hidden agendas of the international community to the reluctance and ulterior motives of African countries themselves, severely restrict the extent to which effective ownership can be proclaimed (Franke & Esmenjaud, 2008). In other words, the ASF structures such as the EASF

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and ECOWAS which have shown some significant progress in the institutionalization of multidimensional approach are perennially confronted with both conceptual and practical dilemmas. In order for this institutionalization to be an effective framework for enhancing multidimensionality of the African forces, these dilemmas need to be dealt with. Towards a Multidimensional PSO The last two decades have witnessed renewed agitations both in politics and academia that time has come for Africans to manage their own affairs including issues of governance, peace and security. Of particular interest has been the evolution of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and especially the development of a multidimensional African Standby Forces (ASFs). However, the transformation of ASF and the regional mechanisms (RMs) from military operation to a multidimensional force—comprising the military, police and civilians—is still elusive. Some policy analysts have attributed this deficiency to inadequate financial resources (Cilliers & Hedden, 2014), while others have expressed optimism that the African Union (AU) peace operation platform has performed well by boldly intervening in the most dangerous conflict situations such as Somalia with a view to fostering stability on the continent (De Coning et al., 2015). While the increasing agitation for African solutions has received attention ever since the transformation of OAU to AU in 2002 (Segui, 2013), the underlying concept of multidimensional force constantly seems to have been ignored, rather than critically examined. Some authors have highlighted the importance of evaluating peace operations in relation to policy formulation and development (Towle, 2015), while others have noted discrepancies between the different components of peacekeeping and the need for joint, international, multinational and inter-agency approach to peace operation (Anderson & Walton, 2008). Despite the fact that most parts of Africa have been experiencing unconventional conflicts and wars with military intervention experiencing operational challenges, there have been neither consistent attempts to evaluate applications of the multidimensional approaches, nor a satisfactory conceptual appraisal of the concept of multidimensional force and especially its evolution. ASF was established during the meeting of the African Chiefs of Defense Staff in Durban, South Africa, in 2004. Interestingly, existing policy studies have concentrated more on peacekeeping capacity gaps (De Coning & Karlsrud, 2011), instead of spurring

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debate on the transformation of peace and security institutions from military operation to multidimensional approach, especially within the African peace and security institutions. As a result, there exists a gap in knowledge on the institutional evolution of the AU peace operation environment, particularly in regard to attitude and behaviour of various peacekeeping components towards each other. In addition to this lack of policy and academic rigour in spurring debate on the evolution of AU peace operation, the concept of multidimensional force has not been understood, even though AU has developed various policy briefs on this concept. Moreover, the concepts of peacekeeping and peace support operation have not been properly operationalized despite their continued use and presence among the peacekeeping formations. Both terms are used interchangeably and sometimes even synonymously. These terms are, however, grounded on different norms and values, hence applied differently. Traditional peacekeeping operations are intended to support peacemaking between states by creating the political space necessary for belligerent states to negotiate a political settlement and are, therefore, characterized by ceasefire agreements and military observations. Multidimensional peace operations on the other hand comprise a mix of military, police and civilian components working together to lay the foundation of a sustainable peace (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). Similarly, peace support operation (PSO) has a strong civilian component that includes civil administration, humanitarian agencies, police and justice officers like was the case in Liberia and Cambodia. The essence of a multidimensional approach is to offer comprehensive protection to majority of civilians who often fall victim of conflict. Although the African Standby Forces (ASFs) structures have made strides towards developing a multidimensional force, many scholars and practitioners are sceptical about the possibility of attaining a Full Operational Capability (FOC) by 2015 or even beyond (Williams, 2013). FOC would mean an integrated force comprising the military, civilians and police. Although Laura (2011) reminds us that developing good civil– military relations is a precursor to reforms in peace and security in Africa, normative and practical discrepancies between the military and civilians continue to widen the gap between them, thus increasing doubt as to whether a multidimensional force on the continent is attainable. It is against this backdrop of scepticism that this chapter is mainly concerned with the question, whether the AU PSO environment has evolved into multidimensional capacities or it has been militarized further? To address

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this question, this chapter is structured into three major parts. The first develops the hypothesis by interrogating the African Standby Force as a framework for multidimensional approach to peace operations. This is followed by an analysis of constraints faced by the AU PSO environment. Based on these challenges, the third section presents structural conditions that currently restrict Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) from constructively engaging the AU. The conclusion elaborates on the plausibility of changes to the AU PSO environment and identifies a number of concerns that may inform further analysis. The concept of Civil–Military Relations (CMRs) means different things to different people and institutions. While some of the leading scholars (Huntington, 1957) identify the relationship between the state, society and military as key to understanding how peace and security institutions function (Huntington, 1995), in this chapter CRM would mean a level of trust between the military and civilians that naturally allows free exchange of information. In the same measure, a trustworthy civil–military relationship should be sustained through a mechanism that allows participation of all the components in planning for peace operation within the ASF structures, with special focus on Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) and the ECOWAS Standby Force. The absence of this relationship would engender a power struggle between the military and civilians, leading to a cultural disconnect and skewed development of peace operation capacities. CMR is directly related to the concept of multidimensional approach to peace operation in two ways. In the first instance, the military, police and civilians should be seen collectively planning and conducting joint operations by reinforcing each other’s skills and expertise. Secondly, the military, police and civilians ought to engage in integrated peace support operation training and field-based exercises. These trainings and exercises are organized and conducted within the peacekeeping/peace support operation training institutions in collaboration with Regional Mechanisms. In the EASF region, the peacekeeping training institutions include the Nairobi-based International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC); Rwanda Peace Academy (RPA) and the Addis Ababa-based Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC). In the ECOWAS region, the Nigerian National Defense College (NDC) serves as the strategic training platform for the region. Also, the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana is

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considered operational while the Bamako Peacekeeping Training Centre (EMP) in Mali serves the tactical needs of the region. The multidimensional approach within these institutions is expected to foster both peacekeeping and peace support operation (PSO) capacities. However, while PSO is conceived to comprise multifunctional operations including diplomatic, military and civilian and, therefore, associated with the AU missions, peacekeeping is directly attributed to UN peace interventions (Linjn & Dundon, 2014). The two can form a hybrid of politico-military activities including armed control, conflict resolution and humanitarian relief. There is a thin line between the two concepts. It is, however, important to note that for the African PSO, there exist grey areas that would require a combination of activities at all levels of planning as well as in conflict theatre. This chapter focuses on activities, initiatives, structures and processes that are carried out at the planning stage of the AU peace operations. While the ASF is expected to set policies and procedures for achieving the Full Operation Capability (FOC) by 2015, the Regional Mechanisms (RMs) are implementers. Each of the five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have the responsibility to nurture their respective RMs. The existing RMs include Eastern African Standby Force (EASF), ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), SADC Standby Force (SSF), Central Africa Multinational Force (FOMAC) and the North African Regional Capability (NARC).

Fundamental Principles of Peace Support Operation Peace support operation evolved from traditional peacekeeping that focuses primarily on a military model of observing buffer zones, monitoring ceasefire agreements and supporting disarmament plans subsequent to interstate wars, to a multifaceted model where civilians and the military coexist to build peace across the entire conflict gamut-prevention, management and post-conflict reconstruction activities (Durch et al., 2003). In the same breadth, consent of the parties, neutrality of the peacekeepers and minimum use of force, are generally applied for the purpose of self-defence, as the key principles for an intervention within the framework of traditional peacekeeping. However, there exist differences in the interpretation and usage of the main principles of neutrality and impartiality. For example, whereas the military’ interpretation of impartiality simply means non-allegiance to either parties, humanitarian actors

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would distribute foods, medicines, clothing and other basic necessities without discrimination on the basis of race, political affiliation, ideological orientation or colour. In this chapter we examine four key principles critical for the planning and implementation of a PSO strategy: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Impartiality and Neutrality The principle of impartiality is the cornerstone of PSOs. It is crucial to maintaining the consent and cooperation of the main parties. Such operations must avoid activities that might compromise their image of impartiality. Impartiality refers to non-discrimination and proportionality or non-prejudicial attitude towards conflict parties. This means that activities of PSOs must be regarded as not discriminating towards either side of the parties to the conflict. Indeed, Chapter 7, Article 40 of the UN Charter, provides the legal basis for impartiality in peacekeeping by stating the following: ‘In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned’. Consent of Parties Peace operation actors are also supposed to be deployed with the consent of the main parties to the conflict. The principle of consent requires a commitment by the conflict parties to a political process as well as the political will to accept the mandate of the operation. This concept is important because it ensures that a PSO does not become party to the conflict (De Coning, 2007). Without adequate consent, a PSO risks being drawn into the conflict and will ultimately gravitate towards peace enforcement and away from its fundamental role of keeping the peace. The concept of consent also directly impacts the credibility of a PSO and conflict resolution. Trends in armed conflicts across Africa indicate that there is a surge in asymmetric armed groups, which pose difficulties and danger in seeking consent from such groups before engaging in PSO or military operation. In the ECOWAS region, the Boko Haram terrorizes villages in northern Nigeria, yet the Government has the duty to protect

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the population at allcosts. The Al-Shabaab group in Somalia has waged war against the international community because of defending their religious ideology, yet the countries affected have a duty of supporting the Federal Transition Government of Somalia to address the transboundary conflict. Trends in the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) research indicate that armed non-state actors often believe that international law and the international legal and security architecture, are inherently or practically biased against them (Geneva Academy, 2014). This means that the contestation that often exists between the non-armed groups and the incumbent regime complicates the opportunity to seek consent. Local Ownership and Accountability PSOs should not be divorced from the needs of the local environment. Thus, local communities should be made aware of the mandate and role of the PSO through various processes including local media, community liaisons officers, civil affairs officers as well as a credible civil–military coordination mechanism (De Coning, 2010). Public information offices also play a major role in handling public enquiries from local citizens. PSOs should also be accountable for their actions to the populations and other entities such as the civil society. There should be mechanisms for oversight on the conduct and activities of PSOs. Respect for Human Rights and Protection of Civilians: PSOs must uphold International Human Rights Law, most importantly the standards contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. PSOs should be conducted in full respect and seek to advance human rights through the implementation of their mandates. Respect for such considerations is critical to the success of PSOs and the maintenance of positive perception of peacekeepers by community members. Gender Equality Although the gender protection policy exists at the AU level specifically to advise the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission (SRCC) on the effective implementation of Security Council Resolutions, EASF and ECOWAS Standby Forces are yet to institutionalize and mainstream gender stance in their policies and practice. Most of the

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Peacekeeping Training Centres across the regions have managed to institutionalize gender issues into their operational activities, but, such efforts are largely donor-driven, hence no linkage of such practice to the regional rosters.

African Union Experience in Peace Support Operations Although the UN paved way for Peace Support Operation in 1960 by deploying a mission in Congo, the Organization of the African Union (OAU) had mandated a peacekeeping operation in 1981 in its quest to address the armed conflict in Chad. Furthermore, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with the support of the OAU had mandated two peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990 and 1997, respectively. On 19 January 2007, the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) mandated the deployment of an AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) to fight the extremist militant group Al-Shabaab (African Union, 2013). ECOWAS envisages that the region will be established on the need to ‘create a borderless, peaceful, prosperous and cohesive region, built on good governance and where people have the capacity to access and harness its enormous resources through the creation of opportunities for sustainable development and environmental preservation’. On the other hand, the EASF founding vision is based on the quest ‘to contribute to regional and continental peace through regional conflict prevention, management and resolution capability able to respond effectively to crisis within its borders and across the African continent’. The core outcome of the collective regional security system is, therefore, to develop a common African defence and security doctrine as was articulated during the inaugural Summit of the African Union, held in Durban, South Africa, in July 2002. The ASF position on the PSO is clearly affirmed, to develop an effective capability, capable of responding to challenges threatening stability, security and cooperation on the continent. Furthermore, the AU legal framework for the establishment of the ASF envisages multidimensional civilian, police and military components to be held on standby in their countries of origin in five regions within the AU. Thus, in 2005, the ECOWAS Chiefs of Defence Staff adopted the Operational Framework for the ESF as a directive for the development of the ESF in accordance with the AU Road Map (Onditi et al., 2016).

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Given the historical account of the West African region, the preparatory stages of the ECOWAS standby force can be traced from Article 26 of the 1999 Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (Onditi et al., 2016). During the same year, states in the eastern part of the continent signed a Memorandum of Understanding that led to the establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) as a constituent organization of the ASF. Although Eastern Africa region experiences some of the worst forms of conflicts and now complex PSO in Somalia, the focus of regional leaders has been mild on developing a collective regional security system compared to ECOWAS robust structures. Indeed, the complexity of the prevailing peace and security architecture in some parts of continent regarded as ‘hot-spot’ such as the Horn of Africa (HOA), Great Lakes Region (GLR), further compels the need for multilateral arrangement for responding to the emerging peace and security threats. The conflict scenario on the continent has been described as the ‘Fire in the Next Door’ (Jackson, 2009). Surely, the seemingly infinite wars against the terror elements commonly associated with Somalia, the unending ethnic and boundary conflicts raging in the new Republic of South Sudan and the protracted Ethiopia-Eritrea border dispute and the agony of electoral contestations in Kenya and Uganda. These are just but a few of the ‘thorn in the flesh’ issues that continue to trouble the continent. The AU in collaboration with Regional Economic Communities (RECs) has had a share of the challenges undertaking peace operation since the 1980s. The operation has always been guided by the principle of ‘respecting sanctity of human life to intervene in conflict situations on the continent amid financial challenges. The case of peace operation in Chad, Burundi, Sudan and Somalia presents an intriguing experience for the continent. Chad The decision to send a peacekeeping force to Chad was reached by the OAU Standing Committee on Chad meeting in Lome, Togo, in January 1981 (Amate, 1986). The immediate trigger of the intervention was the civil war raging between forces of sitting President Goukouni Weddeye supported by Libya and Hissene Habre. The civil war situation was further complicated by the announcement of a merger between Chad and Libya forming one country. The OAU peacekeeping force was to

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be comprised of forces from Benin, Togo, Congo and Guinea. The OAU intervention took place within the context when the organization was discussing proposals on the establishment of an OAU Defence Force. Earlier on in April 1979, the OAU’s Defence Commission had met in Addis Ababa at its 6th ordinary session and agreed that ‘it was not only desirable but necessary that the OAU should have an inter-African military force to be known as ‘OAU Defence Force’ (Amate, 1986: 179). The role of the OAU Defence Force was spelled out as to, among others, provide peacekeeping and observer forces in the vent of conflict between OAU member states. Due to sovereignty concerns, the force would have no role in conflicts within member states. So it came as a surprise that an OAU force was being proposed to intervene in a civil war situation. Amate has observed that the decision to mount a peacekeeping mission in Chad was taken ‘without much thought being govern to the financial and other problems to be overcome before it could be implemented’ (Amate, 1986: 180). Nevertheless, the establishment of the peacekeeping force was significant in many ways (Sesay, 1991) including: first, it was interpreted as an attempt by the OAU to arm itself with some teeth having been accused in the past of behaving like a ‘toothless bulldog’ which could only bark and not bite. Secondly, the mission was seen as a solid demonstration of the determination by the African states to find ‘African solutions to African problems’, to try ‘Africa first’, so to speak, to shield the continent from Great Power intervention and rivalry. Put simply, as Sesay observed, the OAU could not fund the force it had put together (Sesay, 1991). The estimated cost of the force annually was to be between US$150 million and US$300 million. As a result of failure to raise funds for the force, in February 1983, four months after the force’s deployment in Chad, the OAU admitted its inability to fund it and appealed to the UN Security Council to come to its aid. The UN eventually set up a special fund for the force based on voluntary contributions to raise US$35 million (Sesay, 1991). In the end, due to lack of funds, Guinea and Togo that were supposed to deploy troops could not. Secondly, once the contributing states were sure that the OAU was not in a position to fund the force, their attitude and commitment to peacekeeping exercise changed. Nigeria, which was providing the largest contingent and the force commander, was the first to start withdrawing its troops in May 1982, a month before the OAU deadline of 30 June 1982. The OAU Chad mission is considered to have been a total failure that the

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organization did not undertake any peacekeeping mission for the rest of its life. As it has been observed by Engel some of the regulations that governed the Union’s predecessor, the OAU, have remained valid including the formula that regulates member states’ contributions to the budget (Engel, 2015). In principle, therefore, the budget is covered by contributions from member states raised in accordance with the scale of assessments of the United Nations: This was based on the following elements and criteria: (a) estimates of gross national income; (b) average statistical base periods of three to six years; (c) conversion rates based on market exchange rates; (d) a debt-burden approach; (e) a low per capita income adjustment of 80%; (f) a minimum assessment rate of 0.001%; (g) a maximum assessment rate for the least developed countries (LDCs) of 0.001%) a maximum assessment rate of 22%. However, in June 2015, the AU Assembly Summit, held in Johannesburg, South Africa, adopted a new scale of assessment. The new scale is based on the principles of solidarity, equitable payment and capacity to pay in a way that ensures no single country bears a disproportionate share of the budget (cited in Arthur, 2017). Burundi The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was the first peace operation taken on by the AU. After a lengthy civil war, Burundi’s warring parties signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in Arusha, Tanzania, in August 2000. AMIB was launched in April 2003 with a mandate to: oversee the implementation of the ceasefire agreement; support disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration initiatives; create conditions enabling a follow-on UN peacekeeping force; and contribute to political and economic stability of Burundi. The mission was authorized a total strength of 3500 military and civilian personnel (Williams, 2009a: 100). South Africa acted as the lead nation contributing the bulk of the troops together with Ethiopia and Mozambique. AMIB faced a number of problems including that of finance. The total cost of the mission was estimated at US$134 million. However, by late 2003, the head of the mission’s operations Mamadou Bah was reporting that of the $120 million required to fund AMIB’s operations for a year, only $20 million had been made available (Williams, 2009a: 101). Eleven months into AMIB’s existence, contributions and pledges represented only 27% of its budget (Touray, 2005: 652). Moreover, the UN did not contribute

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to the mission’s budget. This led some to conclude that the mission was cash-strapped (Touray, 2005). Partly due to financial difficulties, AMIB was terminated in June 2004 and was succeeded by the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB). Sudan The crisis in Darfur Sudan escalated in 2003, upon which the AU took a decision to send a peace support mission there. The complex structure in Darfur implied that stepping into the conflict was a bold step reflecting the AU’s political determination to follow through on its commitment to non-indifference to intrastate conflicts on the continent (Reyna, 2010). AU monitors started arriving in Darfur in June 2004, in a prelude to a much larger deployment of peacekeepers in October of that year and the near doubling of the force by the following summer. By early 2006, the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) had almost 6000 military and 1500 police in the field. AMIS was the second peace support mission mounted by the AU. The mandate of AMIS included monitoring a Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) that had been agreed by the parties—the government of Sudan, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)—to the conflict in Darfur. In the context of this chapter, as Ekengard has observed AMIS could not have been realized without outside support (Ekengard, 2008: 36). The European Union (EU) as an organization, and its members bilaterally provided support to the mission. The EU’s largest contribution came as financial contributions to cover most of AMIS’s costs amounting to e300 million (Ekengard, 2008). In addition the EU member states contributed e200 million through bilateral channels (Ekengard, 2008). The mission also received support from the USA which focused on humanitarian aid, and provided almost half of the funding for humanitarian aid from the international community in the period 2004 and 2006. It also paid a private contractor PAE which provided logistics to AMIS. While the EU financial support was indispensable for sustaining AMIS, the ad hoc manner in which it was disbursed created a measure of uncertainty. In August 2005, the financial situation of AMIS became so acute to the point that AU officials decided to raise their concerns over the lack of financing in the press. In fact, the AU reached the extent of begging the donor countries

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to come up with more money (IRIN, 2005). Partly due to the financial difficulties experienced by AMIS, the mission was transformed to the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in June 2008. Somalia In January 2007, the African Union (AU) launched its fourth peace operation: the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). AMISOM was mandated to support Somalia’s fragile peace process and protect the individuals involved in it; help the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to consolidate its authority in Mogadishu; and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the repatriation of displaced persons. The initial authorized strength of AMISOM was 8000 troops. The operation received pledges of 1800 soldiers from Uganda, 1600 from Burundi, 850 from Nigeria, 350 from Ghana and up to 1000 from Malawi (Williams, 2009b: 519). However, only the Ugandans were present before December 2007, when a company of 100 Burundian soldiers joined them. As of 2017, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya are contributing to the AMISOM mission. Sierra Leone also had a battalion serving in AMISOM but it was withdrawn when the Ebola outbreak ravaged the country in 2014. From the very beginning, the AU has struggled to finance the AMISOM mission. Thus, it has had rely on financial assistance from the EU and several Western states, and later the UN. The EU has been the main contributor to the AMISOM operation. For example, in total, between 2007 and September 2016, the EU committed nearly e1.05 billion to financially support AMISOM. The various non-AU sources were required to support AMISOM because the AU’s member states have not provided the funds necessary to implement the official system of financing the AU’s peace operations. The Protocol stipulates that the AU member states that contribute troops and police to AU peace support operations bear the costs during the first three months. The AU would subsequently then reimburse these contributing countries within a maximum period of six months and then proceed to finance the operation. Unfortunately, this system has never worked in practice. AMISOM’s initial financial costs, therefore, fell directly on the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs): from 2007 to 2011 there were only two of them,

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Uganda and Burundi. The TCCs received considerable financial assistance from several partners—notably the EU, USA and UK—as well as assistance from a private firm, Bancroft Global Development (Williams, 2017a). While bilateral donors provided most training, equipment, and mentoring support for the TCCs, the EU provided the allowances for AMISOM’s uniformed personnel as well as some other forms of support. Up until 2016, the annual cost of running AMISOM was approximately US$900 million (Williams, 2017b). The funding mechanism and adopting measures to reduce its financial risks in case the AU does not comply with the EU’s financial of AMISOM has been problematic due partly to the capricious behaviour of some of the donors. For example, the EU has taken several decisions about how it pays AMISOM allowances, placing a cap on the amount it pays towards those allowances, and adopting measures to reduce its financial risks in case the AU does not comply with the EU’s financial standards. Specifically, with regard to the payment of allowances, in January 2016, the EU, which pays for all the allowances for AMISOM troops reduced its payment by 20%, from $1028 to $822 per soldier, per month (Lorenz & Koigi, 2016). Also there have been delays in the payment of AMISOM peacekeepers in the field with some troops going without pay for months.

Regional Interventions: The Malian and AMISOM Case Studies The AU has instituted relatively marginal but progressive measures towards developing a multidimensional component of the ASF. A combination of defence, diplomacy and development, allows for settlement of disputes through peaceful means, but if that fails, intervention may include the use of military force. On a similar note, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) engendered a significant shift in the humanitarian paradigm, placing responsibility on humanitarian actors to increase their work in the field, improve their quality of reporting and increase advocacy to protect civilians. Both the AFISMA (African-led International Support Mission to Mali) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), are two formations with greater degree of pan-African values, established to address the previous challenges that the AU faced in early days in its efforts to promote regional security community through peacekeeping missions such as the Chadian one in the 1980s. In this section, we assess the challenges and gains made by the AFISMA and AMISOM, respectively.

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African-Led International Support Mission to Mali After the overthrow and killing of Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi in October 2011, well-armed Tuareg combatants that Gaddafi had recruited into the Libyan military returned to Mali and joined other Tuareg tribesmen in the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). The Tuaregs are scattered across the North of Mali. Their poor economic situation, distinct language, identity and difficult relations with black African Malians, who were once enslaved by northerners, led to several rebellions in the past, the last one ending in 2009. Distrust between already divided communities has been aggravated by recent droughts and the resulting scarcities of water and adequate grazing grounds for livestock. The central government has had neither the capacity nor the political will to administer the sparsely populated North properly. Lacking a central authority, the region has become the main trafficking route towards Europe of tobacco, drugs and illegal immigrants. The separatist MNLA soon managed, with the help of Ansar al-Dine, an Islamist group mainly comprised of Tuaregs, to take control of an increasing part of the North. The rift between the MNLA and Ansar al-Dine might not be primarily one of ideology. To overcome Algerian opposition to an intervention, the original operation planned by ECOWAS was put under AU authority—not without some resistance from ECOWAS, which was still providing the military battalions. To soften the opposition of the ex-junta in Mali, the AU gave Malian forces a lead role in the planned operation. To placate the UN and concerned Security Council members, it drafted a joint strategic concept of operations emphasizing Malian leadership and stressing the need for a coordinated and sustained support by the UN. The concept contained short- and medium-term objectives such as ‘an inclusive democratic process in Mali, restoration of the country’s unity and territorial integrity, reform of its defence and security sectors and addressing the structural challenges facing the wider Sahel’. This opened the way for resolution 2085 of the UN Security Council, which provided the legal mandate for the mission, even though it stressed that an operation to reconquer the North should only take place after the training of the Malian army and the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) forces as well as the submission of a progress report. The Islamist groups had managed to take control of most of the MNLA’s territory in the North and to begin to impose a literal interpretation of

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Sharia law. Many human rights violations were reported and important world cultural heritage was destroyed, through attacks on Sufi shrines and the destruction of religious and other manuscripts in Timbuktu. In January 2013, the Islamist rebels decided suddenly to march on Bamako, before the arrival of any AFISMA elements in the country. France, the former colonial power in Mali, decided to intervene militarily in response to a request from the interim Malian government to halt the southernbound attack. Opération Serval rapidly routed the Islamist advance and then shifted to seek out the remnants of the insurgents in remote areas of the North. That a non-African power had to intervene was seen as a humiliating blow to African leaders and as an imperialistic approach by France, particularly by the members of ECOWAS. AFISMA had to speed up its deployment. By early March 2013, over 6000 AFISMA troops from eight West African countries as well as Chad had been deployed to Mali under a Nigerian commander. Pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 2100, AFISMA transferred authority on 1 July 2013 to the UN-led United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilization au Mali, MINUSMA). At the time, AFISMA troops were redeployed under the command of the UN peacekeeping force. MINUSMA’s mandate included the stabilization of primary population centres and the protection of civilians. The African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) had a Protection of Civilians mandate and was the first AU mission to have an approved Protection of Civilians policy. It also had groundbreaking provisions for the human rights training of troops pre-deployment. During the operation, there were numerous strategic and operational challenges that AFISMA had to grapple with. First, as late as June 2013, no standard operating procedures on how to deal with children affected by armed conflict were in place for any of the armed forces operating in Mali. The Malian Armed Forces or AFISMA troops had not received substantial child protection training, even though human rights observers from ECOWAS and from the AU were finally arriving in Bamako. The draft agreement on SOPs for the Malian Armed Forces remained unsigned. While transfers of children caught up in the conflict from AFISMA or Malian forces to civilian actors generally took place, this was because of the ‘good will’ of involved parties, and was not automatic.

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The African Union Mission in Somalia The Cold War saw Somalia (a US proxy) competing with neighbouring Soviet-backed Ethiopia for supremacy in the Horn of Africa. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Somalia’s strategic importance diminished and the country’s military regime weakened. In the same year, a coalition of various clans backed by Ethiopia overthrew the regime of Said Barre (Kusow, 1994). Among the militia groups leading the rebellion were the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). They soon began to clash for control over the capital; particularly the armed factions led by the USC commander General Mohamed Farah Aidid and the interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed. The massive displacement of people that ensued, in combination with a serious drought, contributed to a large-scale famine in the country. In April 1992, the UN stepped into help secure access for humanitarian relief (the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), then the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and UNOSOM II) (Kusow, 1994). However, warlords soon attacked the peace operation and the humanitarian relief workers. Hassan Aidid’s faction began assaulting UN contingents, which threatened his hegemony. Consequently, the USA launched a separate military operation to neutralize armed opposition to the peace operation. However, an aggressive but fruitless search for Aidid resulted in collateral damage to civilians, seriously compromising the relationship between the foreign troops and the Somali people. An intervention to capture Aidid turned to disaster in 1993 when 18 US soldiers were killed, and some of their bodies were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, a widely broadcast event that had a deep impact on US public opinion (Kusow, 1994). Consequently, the USA withdrew its troops from Somalia and, six months later, the whole UN peace operation followed suit. An important consequence of the UN and US failure in Somalia was that for several years Washington and the UN were reluctant to involve themselves militarily in African conflicts. The indirect involvement of the USA in Somalia was only renewed at the end of the 1990s, with a narrow counterterrorism perspective, after the bombing of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The perpetrators were helped by Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, a Somali Islamic group that grew in importance with the fall of Barre’s regime. At the

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end of the 1990s, however, it lost most of its positions inside Somalia and many of its fighters travelled to Afghanistan to fight there (Barakat & Zyck, 2010). In 2003, young hardliners from Al-Ittihad Al-Islami separated from the old guard who wanted to create a political front, and joined an alliance of Sharia courts, the Islamic Court Union (ICU), where they served as its youth militia—Al-Shabaab in Arabic. The young fighters rose to prominence in the battle to take the capital and the rest of the country from the Transitional National Government (TNG). The TNG was put in place in 2000 with the support of the USA and through the mediation of East Africa’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), an eight-country regional economic community encompassing the countries of the Greater Horn, minus Eritrea. Initially planned to be under the responsibility of East Africa’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the operation was transferred to the AU level, because IGAD was not capable of managing such a large and complex enterprise. Moreover, Somalis were against further military intervention by neighbouring states. In response, an AU peace support operation (PSO), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), was mandated in January 2007. However, few countries were willing to commit troops, especially in such a high-risk environment. Moreover, a large segment of the Somali population saw the TFG as one faction in the conflict, and its ally Ethiopia, which fought a war with Somalia in 1977, as an occupying force. There was also the feeling that Ethiopia was trying to impose its will on the AU. For a long time, the 1700-member Ugandan battalion was the only substantial contingent of AMISOM, even though the AU mandate called for 8000 troops. Different African states pledged to deploy troops, but many failed to deliver on their promises due to a lack of political will or because of financial and logistical challenges. The vacancy rate, the difference between the mandated personnel level and the actual level on the ground during AMISOM’s first three and a half years was thus high—all very different from what had been calculated that a complete multidimensional peace mission in Somalia would ideally require—at 35,000 personnel. AMISOM also suffered from difficulties of integration and interoperability between the different national contingents at the tactical level, but also due to differing higher-level strategies and priorities. The peak of mission tensions in AMISOM was witnessed when the Burundian soldiers registered resentment over a Kenyan being placed in the deputy commander’s position, when Burundi had been involved in

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AMISOM longer and suffered more casualties. To counter this problem, the AU has established a Joint Coordinating Mechanism at Ministerial Level (JCM) and a Military Operations Coordination Committee (MOCC) at the level of chief of staff. According to AMISOM, UN Security Council Resolution 2036 authorizes it to deploy 17,731 uniformed personnel, including police, into Somalia (De Coning & Peter, 2018). Currently the military component is made up of troops from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti and Kenya deployed in four sectors covering south and central Somalia. The police component currently has 363 police officers from Nigeria, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone, Ghana and Gambia. These include a senior leadership team, individual police officers and two Formed Police Units of 140 officers each (De Coning & Peter, 2018). The unpreparedness of certain troops was another recurring difficulty. During the first four years, AMISOM achievements have been mitigated. However, in 2011, a refurbished AMISOM and the TFG eventually pushed Al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu. Building on this success, they began operations with the help of Kenyan forces to reconquer the south and later on sectors were created to accommodate all the troops. However, they continued to face regular attacks from Al-Shabaab. In 2012, Kenyan troops were absorbed into AMISOM, which now numbers about 18,000 personnel, including police and civilian elements. Ethiopian forces are reported to have been involved in the killing of street children, in cutting throats, torture and rape cases, as well as indiscriminate sniper fire. Ethiopian National Defense Forces also reportedly used phosphorus bombs in April 2007, which killed 35 civilians and 15 Al-Shabaab. The TFG also allegedly committed widespread human rights abuses, at least until the establishment of the new government in September 2012. AMISOM was also reportedly involved in abuses, especially due to their indiscriminate counter-attacks. Some members from Al-Shabaab have said they enrolled in the Islamist armed group to take revenge against AMISOM bombardment tactics. There has been a substantial upsurge of Al-Shabaab’s forced recruitment of children since mid-2010 to replenish its dwindling ranks. Several witnesses spoke of children serving as ‘human shields’ for fighters during some of the most intense fighting in Mogadishu. Children, including those too young to carry weapons, were aggressively coerced and threatened into serving as suicide bombers. Finally, in May 2013, an explicit Protection of Civilians objective was introduced in the AMISOM mandate. Despite this progress and the dire need for protection of civilians in most of the AU-led PSO, no

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civilian casualty tracking, analysis and response process is in place. Another important point, whatever the mandate, is the necessity of resources to implement it. This is even more the case for the Protection of Civilians, which requires dedicated and substantial capacities. The fact that, for the first three and a half years, a huge vacancy rate existed between the number of forces authorized in the AMISOM mandate and the forces on the ground did not push the AMISOM forces to care too much about civilians. Until August 2012, more than five years into the mandate, AMISOM had less than 100 police personnel. In June 2013, AMISOM had 25 civilians in Mogadishu and 35 at their headquarters in Nairobi. Yet, the AU Policy on the Multidimensional PSO encourages deployment of more civilian and police personnel, particularly in a complex environment where human rights violations and fragility of the state continue to ‘add salt’ to the already volatile conflict situation.

Challenges and Prospects Ahead What implications does the ‘political order’ within the African Standby Force structures have on the development of the African-led peace support operation? The general rule for the success of peace mission is that the type of political order established must promote local ownership. The relationship between the peacekeepers, bureaucrats and the political elites should be done within the broader framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (Badmus, 2017). Oliver Richmond’s 2018 article, ‘Peace and the formation of political order’, concludes that formation of a political order has direct implications on the international peace architecture and its evolution. As part of the transformation from the Organization of the African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in 2002, Peace support operation (PSO) institutions (regional bodies, regional mechanisms, the African Standby Force and Peacekeeping Training Centres) were established to support the AU and member states in developing multidimensional capacities (civilian, police and military) for deployment in crises situations. In order to achieve this strategic goal, PSO institutions strive to balance governance structure guided by the principles of democracy, equity and inclusiveness. Ordinarily, these institutions should strive and establish an atmosphere in which both the military and civilians would work together towards a common goal (Abiew, 2003). Whereas the PSO institutions have made significant gains in increasing their regional visibility, it is of greater

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concern that some of the ASF structures have evolved into ethnic and statist institutions, excluding the otherwise key players such as the civil society organizations. As a result, these institutions have been ‘ethnified’. This clientele approach to the administration of peace operation remains at the core of political discourse and controversy in the African region. Social diffusion of this ethnified institutions has turned to be the norm for managing these regional institutions. It is no wonder, the ill-trained individuals working in those institutions are recycled to protect the narrow interest of the ethnified leadership. In what he calls ‘patrimonial military institutions’, Marco Jowell (2018) reiterates that the foreign military assistance in Africa is subverted for national and in some cases for internal reasons as opposed to intended aims. The seemingly domestic political dynamics have retrogressive ramifications on the formation of regional security systems in Africa. Despite the fatal reality of the threat posed by the ethnified peace and security processes, the stakeholder’s perception has been actively contrived by the Centre’s tribal jingles to believe that local solutions to the regional problem suffice. This is found to be thoroughly fallacious because those hired by the so-called Centres of Excellence to ensure effective linkage between training and conflict landscape are not necessarily engaged to provide professional services, but to form part of the ‘inside’ clientele patronage or mafia in blocking any move to open up the institutions to new comers who may offer better solutions in addressing peace and security challenges facing the region. It is evident that the PSO institutions within the framework of ASF serve a constricted nationalindividual interest of respective states represented by the military elites as a preserve of the dysfunctions of the regional political institutionalism. All this happens within the oppressive realism perpetuated by the state through the military vanquishers against those perceived ‘outsiders!’ Yet, professionalizing PSO institutions can be an effective way of promoting the attainment of the full operation capability, capable of protecting civilians. This is the traditional way of gauging peacekeeping effectiveness. In short, the success is pegged on the mission’s ability to maintain the peace or to protect lives for a set time period (Sandler, 2017). However, more recently multiple criteria are raised for evaluating peacekeeping, particularly in the complex African PSO environment, steeped with governance issues, tensions among players and unconventional warfare. Paul Williams

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(2009b) uses efficiency and productivity variables in evaluating the political relevance of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC). This chapter is, however, concerned with question of political order within the ASF and how such an order affects the entire PSO architecture. The following section examines four aspects of the political order established within the ASF ecosystem; political behaviour, implementation of the ASF’s milestones, ethnification of the ASF, military verses civilians and conclusion. Impressing diversity (ethnic and professional) is a key component in the process of developing PSO capacities in Africa. Unfortunately, the machinations of exclusion, ethnic conspiracies and relational problems seem to have dominated these processes among the key PSO actors in eastern Africa. This is manifested at the planning level, during training and in day-to-day running of these institutions. The greater concern is that the national management of these centres seems to be an extension of the national ethnic enmity that dominates the politics of countries such as Kenya. That said, there is much room for the AU and Regional Mechanisms to provide leadership and develop policies that have the potential to increase participation of civilians and specifically CSOs in key decisionmaking processes. The African PSO environment and in particular the Eastern Africa Standby Force, has made significant efforts in generating capacities of peacekeepers. However, normative and practical dissonance continues to delay full participation of civilians and police in key decisionmaking avenues pertaining to PSO. Moreover, the domination of military within the PSO institutions have blighted possibilities of attaining multidimensional capacities. To this end, the outcome of the plausibility probe conducted for this chapter has been positive. In the first instance, there appears to be empirical support for the proposition that the observed dynamics in the African PSO institutions are driven by acts of organized hypocrisy. In regard to the implications of civil–military tensions for theory and policy, it is evident that structures established to guide development of integrated PSO capacities have been altered in favour of the military. As a result of this military domination, the observed inconsistencies between the decisions and actions may not be due to the failure of the PSO institutions’ bureaucracy, but due to a well-orchestrated top-down plan by the member states through the military elites as part of political control over security institutions. Theoretically, this scenario challenges perspectives that portray PSO institutions as subject to rational design to achieve

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a more effective cooperation strategy by reducing decision-making asymmetries. In this case, the civilians and police are the losers. It then requires further research to understand the sources of these asymmetries. If it is the case that the strategic design of coordination is the key source of the observed organizational pathologies, then investment and analysis should focus on addressing gaps within the AU policy instruments such as the African Standby Force. However, this should be on the basis of understanding that there exists a systematic diffusion of norms and directives from Addis Ababa down to the regional PSO institutions. If this flow of norms and directives is random or the other way round (from subregional to the AU level), then analysis in addressing institutional pathologies should begin with peace support training centres of excellence and the African Standby Forces. Transformation is usually desirable to humanity, but is also most difficult to achieve. A few empirical studies, mostly in the context of UN international peacekeeping, have explored the dynamics of interaction between civilians and the military operating in the same space and time. But, instilling and sustaining good relations between the military and civilians in a PSO environment poses structural and relational challenges. For the last ten years since the AU decided to reorganize its peace and security architecture, its efforts and that of the RECs/RMs towards building a coherent and integrated force have faced both political and technical challenges (Lotze, 2015). As a result of these tensions, PSO initiatives have missed golden opportunities of responding to peace and security threats comprehensively. For instance, although Africa has recorded increased (65%) deployments of peacekeepers, including multidimensional since 2004, lessons learnt from such peace operations indicate that tensions exist between the military and civilians. Reports from AMISOM in 2014 paint a damning picture of both the military and civilian peacekeepers. While the military describes civilian-based agencies as a ‘bunch of fractured individuals’, civilians perceive the military as state operatives or ‘strait jacket personages’, steeped in the tradition of rigidity whose image is tainted as a result of engaging in sexual abuse against those they are expected to protect. After the 1990s, Africa, as well as other parts of the world, has seen an increase in the engagement of both the military and civilians in peace missions. The purpose of engaging both entities is to lay the foundation for sustainable peace, which includes the establishment of liberal democratic political systems and societies within states (Abiew, 2003).

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Ideally, this state of affairs can be achieved by enhancing the development of strong civilian components that include civil administration, humanitarian agencies, police and justice expertise (Bellamy & Williams, 2010). The ultimate goal of such peace missions is to create conditions for the impartial enforcement of a political settlement of a dispute. Although this transformation within the AU institutions was critical in creating a conducive environment for soldiers and civilians to work together in peace missions, empirical reports have indicated that the civil–military tensions among the African PSO institutions have deepened over the last decade since the establishment of the policy framework for guiding the development of the African Standby Force (ASF) in 2003 (Eastern Africa Standby Force, 2014). Moreover, there appears to be no good news about the development and operationalization of ASF across the five RECs and RMs. Indeed, analysts have observed that although the AU and RECs/RMs had the political will to have the ASF fully operationalized by December 2015 and despite the sanctioning of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) in 2013 the breeding ground has led to deeper competition (Lotze, 2015). This is simply because, while the ASF is a multidimensional capability which combines both the military and civilian capacities for intervention, the ACIRC is a military formation dominated by military doctrine and procedures. Problems of African institutions have been studied extensively. The ASF is not only a key pillar of the APSA, but is also considered a channel through which the RECs/RMs can develop multidimensional capacities for deployment. This notwithstanding, it is noted that more than a decade after its formation, this African model suffers from duplication, poor competition, overlap and rivalry between its key players, the military and civilians. Even in circumstances where the model was tested with some level of progress, such as the fight against the Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa, analysts have faulted it for not adhering to the original ASF concept (Lotze, 2015), instead, the quarrelsome attitude between the military and civilians has ensued. The civilian peacekeepers and other humanitarian agencies offering services in AMISOM have been frustrated and their safety barely guaranteed by the uniformed personnel.

Conclusion Although some of the ASF subregional structures such as the EASF and ESF have made efforts in institutionalizing the mandatory areas of civilian component, initiatives towards building an African-led PSO architecture

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lacked links to the emerging peace and security needs and the that the notion of AfSol is diffused in the proliferation of donor cloud of funding and capacity development. There was also a general feeling that civilian capacity-building process was not competency-based and this was partly a source of tensions with military who often felt that civilian contribution to planning and training took ‘schoolish’ approach as opposed to field-based experience. According to the Civilian Dimension Policy Framework developed in 2006, a multidimensional PSO should comprise the following capacities: Political Affairs; Public Information; Planning and Coordination; Human rights; Humanitarians Liaison; Legal Advice; Conduct and Discipline; Child Protection and Gender. Other capacities outlined by the Framework include Rule of Law; Electoral Affairs; Disarmament, Demobilization and communication. Civilians have a role to play in all types of PSOs, ranging from conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. As mission mandates are increasingly complex in Africa, much input is usually required at the pre-deployment stage on issues surrounding mounting, managing and exiting of complex peace operations. The role of civilians and police is key since the pre-deployment processes have far-reaching implications on the overall performance and success of the mission.

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Sandler, T. (2017). International peacekeeping operations. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(9), 1875–1897. Segui, N. R. (2013). Appraising the role of the AU in Somalia. Issue No. 42 ISS Peace and Security Council report, p. 8. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/168 543/PSC42Jan13E.pdf. Accessed 5 Dec 2020. Sesay, A. (1991). The limits of peace-keeping by a regional organization: The OAU peacekeeping force in Chad. Conflict Quarterly, 11(1), 7–26. Seymour, M. L., & Rokkan, S. (1967). Party system and voter alignment. New York: Free Press. Touray, O. A. (2005). The common Africa defence and security policy. African Affairs, 104(417), 635–656. Towle, N. (2015). Evaluating peace support operations to enhance international policy. Peace and Conflict Studies, 22(1), 60–80. Williams, D. P. (2017a). Continuity and challenge in war and conflict in Africa. Center for Security Studies July 2017. ETZ Zurich. https://css.ethz.ch/en/ services/digital-library/articles/article.html/ca4e4f42-f754-4436-91ed-086 2db6afa71. Accessed 5 Dec 2020. Williams, P. D. (2017b, January 16). Paying for AMISOM: Are politics and bureaucracy undermining the AU’s largest peace operation? Center for Security Studies. http://isnblog.ethz.ch/security/paying-for-amisom-are-pol itics-and-bureaucracy-undermining-the-aus-largest-peace-operation. Accessed 5 Dec 2020. Williams, P. D. (2009a). The African Union’s peace operations: A comparative analysis. African Security, 2(2), 97–118. Williams, P. D. (2009b). Into the Mogadishu Maelstrom: The African Union Mission in Somalia. International Peacekeeping, 16(4), 514–530. Williams, P. D. (2013). The African Union Mission in Somalia and civilian protection challenges stability. International Journal of Security and Development, 2(2), 1–17.

CHAPTER 7

From Security Communities to Security Systems

Introduction Since the re-establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has been esteemed as an epitome of institutional design in the AU. In spite of this approval, the African-led peace operation capacities remain below the universal threshold of 1 peacekeeper to 200 civilians. Moreover, there exists no functional mechanism to link generated capacities and the required peacebuilding interventions. In view of this capacity problems, the APSA structures in collaboration with regional Peacekeeping Training Centres in 2003 initiated capacity enhancement initiative. Despite this institutional evolution, the expected increase in capacities of peacebuilders remains minimal. This rarity of capacities has been attributed to challenges related to the design of peace support operation (PSO) ecosystem. We argue that while APSA has made strides in institutionalizing capacity development processes, the principal paradox remains, too much capacities, yet too little peacebuilders are available in real time for deployment, particularly skill sets related to civilian and police capacities. With the institutionalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) at the beginning of the Millennium, many thought that the African Union’s (AU) conventional ad hoc approach to conflict management had come to an end. However, in the first decade of the Millennium, this hope became bleak as the continental body begun to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. Onditi et al., Reimagining Security Communities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70869-6_7

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show the signs of ‘institutional bricolage’, by responding to the conflicts ‘creatively’ (Cleaver, 2002), yet structurally constraining in terms of capacities of appropriate peacekeepers and sustainability (Williams, 2011). The negative externalities of this institutional creativity are what systems design scholars refer to us, systems entropy (Bailey, 1990; Leighninger, 1978). Within AU, this systems failure can be typified by the establishment of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises ACIRC in May 2013 (Warner, 2015). The existence and refocus of AU bureaucrats on ACIRC continue to threaten the future of the decade old African Standby Force (ASF). This institutional arrangement dominated policy deliberations during the 50th Anniversary of the Organization of the African Unity (OAU)/African Union (AU) of the African Heads of States and Government on 25 May 2013 at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa (African Union, 2015). It is, however, important to note that the quest for an African-led peace operation initiative as illustrated during this summit is not a recent phenomenon. The need for an African solution became profound in 1990s when the United Nations (UN) failed to avert the deadly atrocities of the time in countries such as Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was on the basis of this strategic gap that the then OAU and later the AU decided to establish its own internal conflict management mechanisms and peace support operations (PSOs) capacity. In the same breadth, APSA’s strategic road map 2016–2020 was adopted with the strategic pillar three on ‘post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding’, vehemently emphasizing the need for the AU and Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs) enhance structural coordination towards increased capacities in support of African states emerging from conflicts and wars (African Union, 2015). The role and centrality of APSA as defined by the 2002 Protocol Relating to the establishment of Peace and Security Council (PSC) comprise the following pillars: (1) The Continental Early Warning; (2) The African Standby Force; (3) The Panel of the Wise; and (4) The Peace Fund. At the subregional level, Regional Mechanisms are developed along the structures of Regional Economic Communities. The five RMs are: ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF); Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF); SADC Standby Force (SSF); North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) and the Force Multinationale de I’ Afrique Centrale (FOMAC). This reflects the systems design of APSA as enshrined in the PSC Protocol, which conceptualizes a comprehensive agenda for peace and security. Thematic areas of

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operation include conflict prevention, early warning and preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding. In recognition of the fact that political tensions contribute significantly to instability, the protocol lays structures that allow for democratic practices (Bah et al., 2014). It also envisaged that an African-led PSO should provide capability to handle humanitarian action and disaster management (El Tarabousi et al., 2016). Although the 2013 ASF assessment paints a progressive African PSO and that the capacities for peace operations have increased in numbers and quality (AU, 2013). The ASF plans to attain rapid deployment capability (RDC) by 2015, remains a white dream. To this end, anecdotes of structures have been developed to harmonize the ASF, however, the introduction of parallel structures such as the ACIRC, is viewed as an institutional contradiction as its doctrine is largely militaristic (Cocodia, 2016), yet the doctrinal principle of ASF is anchored on the need to develop a pan-African force with diverse capabilities-multidimensional. Moreover, critiques of Gambari-led assessment team on ASF, observe that the outcome was meant to pacify the chiefs of defence and heads of AU member states (Warner, 2015). Such political compromise does not only give the AU bureaucrats an opportunity to forge ahead with institutional bricolage, but more significantly blights the would be an African-led intervention that would ensure peace and stability of the continent. This implies that at the behest of the inconsistent institutional engagement, the emerging APSA will continue to experience the unprecedented challenges of the ongoing asymmetric conflicts and rapid relapses of several countries into active conflict (Bertocchi, 2012; Handrahan, 2004; Bangura, 2016). In this chapter, we conceptualize APSA as a security system. Thus, APSA is defined as a strategic design of systems comprising of norms, structures, values and processes employed by the AU and associated subregional structures to achieve peace and stability through conflict management and peace support operations. In this chapter, APSA ecosystem, thus performs its task through three normative pillars: (1) Planning; (2) Learning; and (3) Environment. Planning involves processes of resource allocation and control within the PSO ecosystem (RECs, RMs and Peacekeeping Training Centres). Learning denotes the feedback mechanisms between the primary actors in PSO capacity building (in this case Peacekeeping Training Centres) and the broader PSO environment including peacekeeping missions, the peacebuilding architecture and the conflict response strategies put in place by various actors-governments, the United Nations and the AU. To this end, we recognize the fact that APSA’s institutions

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are broad and wide to be handled in a single discussion such as this one. Thus, in this chapter we will focus on the devolved component of APSApeace support operation ecosystem. The PSO ecosystem comprises: (1) the Regional Economic Communities; (2) the Regional Mechanisms; and (3) Peacekeeping Training Centres; and other related professional institutions such as the African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA). The first section frames the discussion by linking the theory of systems thinking and approaches to the regional security community thought.

Systems Thinking Approach Given the systemic and structural challenges facing the African Regional Security Community (RSC) arrangement, a unified theory of regional security systems (RSSs), should be able to explain the behaviour of national and regional security regimes. The theory would also be useful in comparing different regional security systems. Systems thinking offers a unique approach that seeks to bring different components of a ‘system’ into one functioning whole. It acknowledges the dissonances and the fastchanging societies experience and how such changes create problems that are beyond the capacity of a single entity or organization. System thinking for regional security community, thus proposes collaboration of organizations at the ‘domain’ level with different organizations supporting the domain (Deutsch, 1968: 92). Systems thinking can be useful in improving regional response to contemporary threats to peace and security, however, if the approach is narrowly applied, it can reinforce what Epstein calls a ‘militant ignorance’, because it incorporates different elements of systems including cybernetics, systems theory, Model-Based Systems Engineering and family therapy (cited in Williams & Hummelbrunner, 2010). Kim (1999), defines systems thinking on the basis of three things: (1) processes that support quality of life; (2) a perspective; and (3) a unique method of describing systemic behaviour. All these builds into what Kim coin, ‘iceberg model’, in which system events create a pattern, and that these patterns are produced by a systemic structure. Furthermore, the model suggests that within the systems that are designed by humans, the systemic structure tends to be a result of mental models. Since events and patterns are produced by systemic structures, representing an iceberg typology and the existence of events at the top means that what we often observe is just the ‘tip of the iceberg’. For instance, the complex decision-making process at the African Union is often mired

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with power politics of who is who among the member states with the so-called ‘big brothers’ overshadowing the ‘smaller sister’ states. A case in point was the push and pull between the Republic of South Africa and her allies and those rallying behind Nigeria to propose and oppose respectively, the formation of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). Richmond Barry (1994) equates systems thinking to the art and science of making reliable inferences about behaviour by developing an increasingly deep understanding of the underlying structure. Indeed, Richmond’s approach allows the policymakers and planners of peace and security to have both a deep and wider view of the threats. Meadows (2008) on the other hand offers an interesting perspective of systems thinking. Meadows (2008: 11) opines that a system is not merely summing up different elements into a single unit, but the connection of these elements must be organized coherently so as to achieve a goal. Meadows attaches three important principles to a system; interconnection, elements and a purpose or function. The interaction between the three aspects here shows that system behaviour is generated from a system structure and system behaviour can be activated and sustained through a number of events. All in all, the behaviour of a system is determined by the purpose or the function of a system. Senge (1990), views systems thinking as a discipline that builds interrelationship. In this case, a successful regional security community strategy should embody patterns of change rather than static snapshots. The issue of interrelationship raises the question of structural bases of a system. Although the approach is primarily interested in the relationship between entities, this mode of thinking regional security does not address what can be called the main structures of the regional security system-interconnectedness. This shortcoming can be addressed through meaning and methods. In Sweeney and Sterman’s (2000) definition, meaning of systems thinking and methodological archetype offers a framework for analysing dynamic complexity systems, akin to those making up the seven pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture. In this regard, a configuration of systems based regional security arrangement should comprise the following elements: Identify flow and stock relationships; Ability to determine how interactions of agents over a time shape a particular system’s behaviour; To be able to represent and discover feedback process identified in the hypothesis for monitoring behaviour within

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a system; To be able to identify and understand delays as well as their impact; and Identify non-linearities. This framework helps to explain the purpose of systems thinking; however, it has been criticized for failing to explain the value of assessing the dynamic complexity, which we identify as being crucial in solving various systems problems. But this definition stands out as it attaches importance to the skills necessary to advance and implement systems thinking approach. Designing Systems Within a System The definitions presented above, and which cut-across several disciplines are largely focusing on what systems thinking constitutes or is made of. Attention seems to be on the components that make up the approach rather than what systems thinking does. Few of these definitions also explain how systems thinking becomes a system and how to build systems within a system. To address these gaps, a holistic systems-based security community should be anchored on three considerations (1) include the Table 7.1 Definition of key concepts framing the proposed regional systems security community Concept

Definition

System

Combinations or groups of interdependent, interrelated or interacting elements forming collective entities To acknowledge as being a particular thing A distinctive synergy, which is the interaction of elements in a way that, when combined, produce a total effect that is greater than the sum of the individual elements Skills that give the capability to articulate, visualize and solve both uncomplicated and complex challenges and concepts and make sensible decisions which are based on accurate and available information. These kinds of skills would include demonstration of one’s ability to apply logical and systematic thinking to collect and analysing information, testing and designing solutions to challenges and formulating plans To portend as a deducible consequence To be utterly familiar with and clearly apprehend the nature, character or subtleties of To plan, contrive or elaborate adjustments and changes

Identify Synergistic

Analytical skills

Predict Understand Devise modifications Source Authors’ compilation

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system aspect of systems thinking, (2) identify the elements of systems thinking and (3) examine how these elements are interconnected in the systems. Therefore, a more holistic definition of systems-based regional security community would be, ‘a set of synergistic actions, patterns and modes of thinking used to improve the capacity of planners and policymakers within the regional security arrangement to identify and understand the interconnectedness of the system, increasing its predictability and constantly devising modifications to them in order to design the most desirable response mechanism’. The merits of this definition are in its utility and applicability. The definition of concepts in Table 7.1 further expands the meaning of the concept.

Open Systems Theory and PSO Ecosystem When peacekeepers gather together for a training, for example, on promoting community cohesion in ethnically divided societies, it implies several things: (1) a need has been identified within the broader peace operation ecosystem; (2) resources have been mobilized (input); (3) expectations are set to harness the anticipated skills attained by peacekeepers (transformation); and (4) deploying the trained peacekeepers (output) timely to respond to the emerging peace and security threats (feedback). This art and science of communication that occurs among interdependent units working in harmony to adapt to an ever-changing environment is what the German philosopher, Georg Hegel describes us ‘systems theory’. Some of the Hegel’s ideas have been employed in subjects related to sociology, legislation, historicism and political science. In day-to-day life, people make numerous references to political systems, social systems, cultural systems and criminal justice systems, among many other systems (Wagner, 2010). In regard to PSO ecosystem, a system would comprise a set of entities (training, research, conferences, planning, deployment) along with some pattern of interaction (power relations, decision-making processes and strategic partnerships) among them. Jay Ogilvy believes that a system comprises four elements (Ogilvy, 2013). The first is objects—the parts, elements or variables within the system. In the conceptualization of this chapter, the physical set of a training facility or the doctrine that guides PSO training or both form part of the material and intellectual resources required to have an effective training outcome. Second, a system consists of attributes—the qualities

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or properties of the system and its objects, for example, what informs the training curriculum for the peacekeepers? What are the quality assurance mechanisms put in place to ensure effectiveness of PSO training? Third, a system is composed of internal relationships among its objects, how do the various peacekeeping actors relate? How about the power relations between the military, civilians and police? Fourth, systems exist in an environment, who are the PSO actors and how do their pattern of interaction affect the peace and security architecture? If well designed, systems could shape the evolution of PSO governance institutions for accountability. To appreciate such evolution, a conceptualization of institutions is required that allows the understanding of how events such as training, implementation of policies and deployment of personnel to PSO environment can ignite processes of institutional evolution towards conflict prevention, management, conflict resolution and post-conflict reforms. It is, therefore, more appropriate to approach institutions as institutionalized pattern of behaviour that are constantly made and remade through people’s consultations, decisions and practices (Cleaver, 2002). When it comes to addressing the issues of trainingdeployment discrepancies in the African PSO, the evolution of military operation into multidimensional PSO seeks to reform the peacekeeping environment, to engage diverse actors, the military, civilians and police, working harmoniously to achieve the goal. This reform leads to organically evolving PSO governance structure. As part of reforms by the PSO structures, the multidisciplinary approach to PSO introduces a new style of peace operation planning, decision-making and deployment. A system can be considered to be closed or open (Von Bertalanffy, 1950). On one hand, a closed system does not interact with its environment. In this sense, it suffers from dereliction or social entropy (Overbury, 1973). It does not take in information; such a system is likely to diminish its usefulness due to lack of feedback mechanisms. For instance, lack of functional mechanisms for information sharing between peacekeeping missions and PKTCs implies that training initiatives are not necessarily tied to the emerging peace and security needs. On the other hand, an open system receives information, required to engage the internal and external environment. Social scientists have observed that openness increases its likelihood to survive and prosper (Popper, 1945). From a managerial science perspective, there are several features that characterize a system (Mele et al., 2010). In fact, for PSO environment, institutional reforms may benefit from open systems because the components

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are perceived as progressive and exhibit the following features; whole and interdependence, ability to create an enduring chain of influence among other PSO players, self-regulated and control in ensuring quality of PSO training as well as goal-oriented training. Moreover, the balancing act and the ability of actors and decision-makers in PSO to adapt to change is key in reforming the APSA. Although systems are regarded as the most objective structures, they can also be disrupted, by spoilers or through a convoluted environment. The various forms of networks within a system (PSO environment) can also destabilize the system, hence leading to institutional entropy (Checkland, 1997). It is for this reason that systemic perspective caution that breaking system into elementary parts does not provide a comprehensive understanding of institutional function, instead analysts need to apply a broader vision to underline their holistic functioning. Therefore, in this chapter, our conceptual framework and methodological approach collate the various components of the African PSO ecosystem; PKTCs, RECs and RMs. In addition, we acknowledge the fact that the African PSO ecosystem is influenced by global actors, including the United Nations, bilateral and multilateral actors. Classification of these institutions as part of the PSO ecosystem is based on the fact that over time, they have developed a medium of interaction at various levels, Memorandum of Understanding as well as service provider–client relationship (Alter, 2008). In this relationship, the AU provides the policy oversight to the PSO ecosystem. In view of this systems set up, it is plausible to argue that theoretically, the African PSO ecosystem is characteristic of an open system. In this chapter we apply the open systems theory (OST), also known as the socioecological approach to understand why the African PSO ecosystem persistently experiences scarcity of peacebuilding personnel. Yet there exists an institutional arrangement mandated to build personnel capacities for deployment in PSO situations. In order to dissect the question of training-deployment discrepancy, it is imperative that we understand the OST’s building blocks. The conceptualization in this chapter is premised on the understanding that the feedback mechanism in an open system is well placed to explain the PSO institutional evolution. As earlier alluded to in this chapter, the OST is underpinned by three key organic processes: (1) planning; (2) environment; and (3) learning (Emery, 2000). Although von Bertalanffy’s (1950) is rightly regarded as the Father of Open Systems Theory, his conceptualization is limited to people as ‘biological bodies’.

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It is true that this conceptualization places human beings as part of the physical universe, but when we view systems from social science epistemological optic, it becomes inevitable that getting the deeper meaning of systems requires sociocultural and political meanings. In other words, systems can also be conceptualized from an institutional and organizational perspective, power relations, decision-making processes as well as institutional reforms. For example, the PKTCs are set up to fulfil a specific goal-build capacity of PSOs in response to the emerging and the complex APSA. In circumstances when these institutions are not able to respond to peace and security threats, particularly asymmetric ones, then questions of institutional reform can be well addressed through a social science perspective. Thus, in this chapter, we explore Andras Angyal’s (cited in Emery, 1993) ideas, principles and assumptions on OST to address the overall question of institutional bricolage within the African PSO ecosystem. The conceptualization of this chapter, thus, requires social science lens that accurately analyses and explains not only the human reality, but also how institutional evolution within the PSO ecosystem can facilitate or limit peacebuilding efforts. To achieve this, the conceptualization of the African Union PSO ecosystem must be based on Angyal’s concept of open system (cited in Emery, 2013). Contexts such as the African PSO ecosystem, however, have also shown that system and environment and the sum of their interaction are mutually determining and governed by institutions, commonly known as the rules of the game. For the purpose of argument in this chapter, these rules of the game shall be referred to us laws (L). Laws are able to influence capacity-building processes, for example, by determining the type of training required, what aspects of knowledge management are required in time and space, how should the PSO exercises be designed to reflect the realities of the emerging peace and security architecture, what type of partnerships and professional development is needed by whom. In view of this systems example, this chapter postulate that, when the system (designated ‘L1’) acts upon the environment (designated ‘L2’), the outcome informs the pattern of resource allocation and utilization of the output (planning (L3). When sum of the endogenic processes of the system is acted upon through a structured feedback mechanism, it is considered as ecological learning (designated L4). This chapter employs the four open system theory building blocks to develop four basic assumptions on the African PSO ecosystem: (1) system; (2) people; (3) directive correlation; and (4) organizational design principles (see Fig. 7.1).

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Fig. 7.1 The basic model of open system (Source A modification of Boulding’s [1956] [cited in Wilby, 2006] logic of the three components of a system-Environment, Planning and Learning)

In this section, the article has framed PSO ecosystem within the rubric of an Open System Theory (OST). Although, the African PSO ecosystem collectively is regarded as a ‘system’, why the persistent scarcity of peacebuilders? It is more than a decade since the establishment of APSA and subsequent development of capacity generation strategies and mechanisms, however, full operationalization of the ASF is yet to be realized. This chapter, however acknowledges the underlying principles of a system. In this regard, output of the system depends not only on the input– output relationship among the various elements, but also, the nature of interaction among the actors and the elements that comprise the broader operation and strategic environment. It is against this understanding that the next section analyses the broader PSO ecosystem, at the same time drawing lessons from other regional peace and security architectures, with specific reference to the Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) institutional structures (Narine, 2008).

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The Principal Paradox This chapter employs Open Systems Theory to examine a wide variety of both external and internal contexts that impact on the realization of a firm African Peace and Security Architecture. This discussion is anchored on the understanding that APSA is mainly shaped by various socio-economic and political dynamics, mainly related to electoral violence. In addition to electoral violence, the APSA experiences varying levels of violence from local and community violence to national conflicts and civil wars and interstate conflicts. The most prolific is low-level conflict that is habitually caused by a confluence of ethnic or tribal animosity, a scarcity of vital resources and competition over political power in winner-takes-all systems. While the case of South Sudan typifies a low-level conflict that has trapped communities in a spiral of violence characterized by insecurity and retaliatory attacks, the case of Somalia and Sudan remains local-level conflict destabilizing communities it affects with national and regional consequences. This chapter found out that not only can this form of peace and security architecture retains unpredictable environment, but immensely contributes to the failure of regional institutions such as the APSA to stabilize into full-fledged institutions. Hence, the next section gauges the plausibility of the four main assumptions that underpins OST to explain the observed training-deployment discrepancy within the APSA: (1) fit for purpose; (2) people and systems; (3) systems behaviour and environment; and (4) relationship between the AU oversight and RECs/RMs. APSA: Fit for Purpose? In this chapter, the first assumption postulated that all systems have permeable boundaries (Emery, 2000). This implies that logical formulation of a given system must be constructed as a whole. The permissive nature of social systems denotes the capacity of an organization to develop what we call a ‘Fit for Purpose’ structures. In other words, if APSA as an exogenic environment demands that Peacekeeping Training Centres produce more of civilian peacekeepers to handle ‘soft issues’ of PSO such as mediation, political settlements, dialogues and psychosocial support, then the OST principle, expresses the unique relationship between the system and the environment. In this situation, PKTCs will have to ‘learn’

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from the broader peacekeeping environment and develop internal mechanisms to respond to the emerging multidimensional capacity need. To this end both training platforms have demonstrated this permeability by building clientele system beyond their respective subregions. For example, from 2001 to 2015, although majority (71.65%) of trainees at the IPSTC were drawn from the eastern Africa region, 28.35% were global participants (see Fig. 7.2). The African PSO ecosystem is also characterized with interregional capacity linkages, with participants drawn beyond East African Community (EAC) ranging from Djibouti and Seychelles represented by 1% each to the majority (56%) of participants being drawn from the host country, Kenya (see Fig. 7.3). Although features of IPSTC as a capacity-building institution represent an open system with two major dimensions of interaction (national, regional and global) among peacekeepers, it would appear that despite this system configuration, the regional APSA continuous to experience scarcity of peacekeepers, particularly civilians. As a result, the PSO system continues to produce elements that do not match the emerging peacebuilding needs in the region. An interview with the EASF leadership shed some light on this issue:

Fig. 7.2 Global PSO training impact 2001–2015 (Source Authors’ Construct from the regional PSO training output 2001–2015 [2017])

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Fig. 7.3 African regional distribution of PSO training output for peacekeepers, 2001–2015 (Source Authors’ Construct from the regional PSO training output 2001–2015 [2017])

From the Police, it was noted that concentration for 2014 was for FPUs who were not trained in previous years. Formerly, the police trainings focused on UNPOC Pre-deployment trainings there is no specialized training of the IPOs. The high number of the civilian training was attributed to the fact that member states sometimes send the same individuals for different trainings. So in reality the number may seem to be high but the same people attending trainings could have been counted more than once. (Key Informant Interview with EASF Head of Civilian Training in Adama, Ethiopia, 20 November 2015)

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Moreover, the result implies that capacity implication for this approach is that during PSO deployment, African Regional Mechanisms may have a challenge to deploy the right capacities yet they have massively invested in training. Difficulties in accessing trainees became manifest during a training evaluation exercise that comprised a team drawn from the regional experts. In this study, the respondent’s turnover was 50% (cited in Onditi et al., 2016). The team leader, Colonel Paul Otieno of Kenya Defense Force (KDF) reiterated that, the delay and subsequent rush in planning the field visits adversely affected the availability of key informants during the field interviews. On a similar note, when conducted for interview on the issue of training-deployment gaps, an independent consultant on PSO had this to say: It is imperative for EASF to demonstrate that all the efforts put into the trainings bear fruit by ensuring that there is a direct linkage between training and any exercises conducted such that those components who are already trained are given the first opportunity to demonstrate their learning. Using untrained staff in exercises such as CPX defeats the purpose of the big efforts put into training. This means better coordination and technical support to the National Focal Points (NFPs) in the member countries. (Key Informant Interview with senior EASF PSO consultant in Adama, Ethiopia 18 November 2014)

The notion of multidimensional capacities is especially interesting when APSA is considered as a permeable system. Within the rubric of ASF, multidimensional peacekeeping doctrine allows for entry of unconventional actors in the PSO environment, including civilians working to restore confidence among the affected communities as well as capacitating the host government to develop structures to allow ‘rule of law’ (Capstone Doctrine: 97). When viewed from PSO perspective, this approach fulfils the following needs: (1) It aims at establishing liberal democratic political systems and harmonious societies within states; (2) They combine robust military forces capable of limited peace enforcement tasks if a ceasefire breaks down; and (3) It has a strong civilian component that includes civil administration, humanitarian agencies; and police and justice officers as well as security sector reforms (SSR) to ensure that demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) process is undertaken effectively (Bellamy & Williams, 2010).

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Although this approach has been described as being able to respond to multifaceted crises efficiently and effectively, particularly in responding to political crises such as the crises in Burundi and South Sudan (Apuuli, 2015). Paul Williams and Arthur Boutellis have faulted it, first, as lacking consensus in partnership between the Africa Union and the UN in peace operations and secondly, regular clash of philosophies, priorities and practical approaches between the two councils (Williams & Boutellis, 2014). Moreover, the ASF platform through which such an arrangement would thrive, could not attain a Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) as earlier planned for 2015, instead, the establishment of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC ) seem to have bounced against the modest progress made so far by ASF. People and Systems Secondly, OST assumes that people (defined as a sub-set of the broader system) can accomplish two important functions within the broader system (Ackoff & Emery, 1972): (1) that people/purposeful system can produce the same outcome in different ways in the same structural environment; and (2) people/purposeful system has the capability to produce functionally different outcomes in the same and different structural environment. It is also assumed that people as part of the system have the will and are motivated to constantly act responsibly (Chein, 1972). People can also change the environment to suit the current needs or meet future demands. This chapter conceives people as part of both the endogenic and exogenic system component of the African PSO, hence, they are also acted upon by that environment, insofar as they maintain the intellectual capability to make necessary adjustments to the system. Hence, given adequate resources, people can influence the external environment to adapt and develop the necessary resilience for balancing the broader environment. However, the contrary is also true that people’s capability can be limited by external forces, leading to systems maladaptation of failure. Although the training trend from both regions indicates an increasing number of peacekeepers trained (Table 7.2), availability of these capacities for deployment for peacebuilding processes remains elusive. It should be noted that people are also idealistic in nature. In situations where people in a system are confronted with difficult choices to make, the power of imagination is critical in planning for tomorrow (Emery, 1977). Planning for PSO is expected to improve predictability of

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Table 7.2 The IPSTC and SADC RPTC presentation of PSO training output (2001–2015) Year

IPSTC

SADC RPTC

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Total

45 77 248 279 555 970 790 580 1854 2530 2378 2707 3286 3418 3525 22,452

0 0 0 0 0 0 228 109 296 176 50 198 91 183 149 1480

Source Authors’ construct using the existing data among the studied PKTCs (2017)

deployment and ameliorate the mobilization of multidimensional capacities for a wide range of PSO activities. Yet the expected benefits are rarely realized because of the problems related to clientele approach to management of African peace and security institutions (Vines, 2010). Moreover, RECs and RMs are mandated to liaise with PKTCs as interlocutors in developing capacities. In eastern Africa, for example, EASF has a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Nairobi-based International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC). However, within this arrangement, there exists no cogent working relationship with the EAC, hence leading to deeper cynical relationship between, for example, Kenya and Tanzania. In regard to PSO planning in EASF and SADC, subregions, the recently instituted ACIRC hardly offers any institutional harmony to the APSA, instead, it seems to have been a product of a distrustful African geopolitical relations. This institutional discordance has in fact eroded the ASF’s potential of building a pan-African multidimensional capacity. Therefore, the power of imagination within the PSO ecosystem seems to bear negative externalities leading to the development of parallel structures such as ACIRC, with high risks of survival emanating from political

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tensions (Esmenjaud, 2014), between the so-called the ‘power house’ of Africa-Nigeria vis-à-vis South Africa. Systems Behaviour and the Environment Thirdly, systems behaviour and environment are necessary conditions for the subsequent occurrence of a certain event or achievement of a goal (Emery, 2000). In other words, the internal system (the PKTCs) and the broader PSO ecosystem are correlated in terms of direction. For example, within this systems thinking, it is expected that a functional relationship exists between PKTCs and peace missions and other mediation platforms, and as a result, the peace missions recommendations to PKTCs is to synchronize their training methodologies and systems to match the peace and security threats. At output level, it can be postulated that an increase in the number of trainees increases the number of peacekeepers or mediators, and an increase in the number of peacekeepers improves peace and security conditions, so, this is a reinforcing loop as illustrated in Fig. 7.4. The situation in the region, seems to reveal flip side of the theory, though. In a similar study, Onditi et al. (2016) shows that while some of the regional mechanisms such as EASF and ECOWAS standby forces have made a tremendous effort to generate multidimensional force through training the translation from training to deployment remains low, particularly for civilian and police personnel. As a result, the transition rate for the military is highest 103 (62%) compared to civilians’44 (30%) and police with the least transition rate of 27 (21%). Although, the military was found to record the highest (60) number of untrained peacekeepers on the exercise, civilian and police components remain under represented. This was partly attributed to lack of structures and systems for maintaining database and uncoordinated efforts among stakeholders involved

Fig. 7.4 An example of causal loop relationship in a PSO ecosystem (Source A modification of Forrester’s [1961] [cited in Porter, 1962] ‘industrial dynamics’ showing the input-output relationship within the PSO ecosystem)

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in building capacities of peacekeepers. It implies that the low rate of transition among the police and civilians and lack of systems for ensuring deployment of the right skills are all attributed not only to a system’s failure, but also laxity in policy intervention. For example, even though the number of women trained has been increasing for both IPSTC and RPTC, lack of civilian deployment policy continues to float them in the labour market. Yet, the lack of peacekeepers constitutes a significant obstacle for peace operations to fulfil their mandates. The UN operations globally were as of late 2008 short of about 18,000 people, or 20%, of the authorized level of more than 90,000 troops and military observers. The average vacancy rate of international civilian staff for the UN operations between 2005 and 2008 has been around 22%. The vacancy rate for police force during the same period was 34.17%. In 2008, the UN was short of 6000 police and 8000 civilians for its peacekeeping operations, authorized to a level of a total of 17,500 and 27,600 respectively. Down the road in 2005, the mission to South Sudan (UNMIS) had only deployed 40% of its authorized personnel within the same time period, a mere 3600 people. DPKO’s 2008 annual review points to high vacancy rates for the UNAMID mission in Darfur, with a discrepancy between authorized and deployed staff. On the contrary, an increase in trainees stagnates the number of mediators and peacekeepers, and then the peace and security situation, remains unstable or deteriorate, so, this is a balancing loop as illustrated in Fig. 7.4. The latter could occur in a system, leading to what this chapter describes as institutional entropy. In regard to generation and growth of multidimensional capacities for PSO, this can be analysed in three levels: First, exponential growth is representative of positive feedback loops. Second, is the goal seeking, in which case, the mode of behaviour correction action eliminates any discrepancies between the state of the system and the set goal. Third, oscillation refers to the behaviour in which the outputs vary around some average value in a repeating pattern. In an oscillatory system, corrective actions are taken to eliminate any discrepancies; but in contrary with goal seeking, in an oscillatory system, the state of the system overshoots and undershoots its goal. But, in the context of PSO ecosystem, overshooting the goal, for example, producing several civilians for peacebuilding processes does not necessarily lead to peace and stability. Although both institutions had increased the number of courses offered from two (2) in 2001 to 156 in 2015, leading to diversified skill

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sets among the civilians, police and the military, the linkages between the trained individuals and the processes are key in utilizing the developed capacities. The African PSO ecosystem is however, affected by the global processes, particularly within the UN system. For instance, the systemic bottlenecks pertain to faults in the design of how the DPKO/DFS and other actors recruit peacekeepers. Since the empirical material of this study stems from trainees’ own perception of the situation, we are able to say something about the relative importance of individual versus systemic bottlenecks. The above data indicates that individual bottlenecks are important: the categories ‘other professional commitments’, ‘not applied’, ‘lack of skills’ and ‘motivation to apply’ explain 49% of the non-deployments. Here, the nature and structure of the DPKO/DFS’s recruitment system is the most crucial factor. Moreover, the informality and patrimonial nature of the recruitment to serve within the AU PSO, also contributes to the ironical absence of personnel to undertake peacebuilding process, especially women, even though, the trend has been growing for women peacekeepers (Fig. 7.5). The OST, espouses that, the functional relationship and cooperation between the internal system and the broader environment, includes adaptive and maladaptive relations (Mele et al., 2010). A typical example 300 242

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is the institutional arrangement of the peace and security architecture of the AU. The AU established an Africa-wide integrated and interoperable Command, Control, Communication and Information System (C3Is). The RECs and AU signed a comprehensive Memorandum of Understanding at the January 2008 Summit in Addis Ababa to increase cooperation and collaboration between them in the implementation of the continent’s peace and security agenda. The MOU is underpinned by the principles of subsidiarity, complementarity and comparative advantage. Accordingly, a particular peace operation is meant to be conceived and managed by the most competent institutional level for the situation in question. In practice, instead of real subsidiarity, key African regional powers and the most capable RECS are actually providing political and security leadership and filling AU capacity gaps. This is contrary to the setup system, which is the ASF. As one of the key components of the APSA, the African Standby Force is meant to consist of standby multidisciplinary contingents stationed in their respective countries of origin and ready for rapid deployment as soon as required. Deployment of troops, however, seems to deviate from this system and bilateral arrangementbased personal relationships among political leaders seem to be reshaping the APSA. Relationship Between the AU and RECs/RMs The fourth and final assumption is that responsibility for coordination and control in an open system is located at least one level above where the training, learning or planning is being done (Emery & Trist, 1965). In this theoretical perspective, one of the organizational design principles, predicts that a system is governed by asymmetrical dependence. Thus, the actors in the systems are autocratic or bureaucratic, it is a master–servant relation in action. The interaction among PSO actors, the oversight bodyAU, is assumed to have the right and responsibility to impose directives to the presumed junior actors-RECs, RMs and PKTCs. Even within the internal PSO ecosystem, notably, Peacekeeping Training Centres, the relationship is one of military dominance over civilians and police. In fact, controls might be sloppy or tight but the principle is the same (Fig. 7.6). These rigid structures depict a masculine military tradition that perpetuates gender inequalities. The persistent challenge of weak coordination has driven scholars to conclude that the very failure of AU to concretely develop common doctrine, system, tactics, techniques and procedures and

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the lack of an intermediary command and control structure between the AU’s Peace and Security Department and ASF, poses institutional threats to what would have otherwise represented an indigenous systems design of an African Peace and Security Architecture (Apuuli, 2016). On this note, the institutional design within APSA that gives RMs and RECs powers to develop capacities for peace operations is expected to increase capacities in response to the dynamic peace and security threats (Ancas, 2011). The role of AU affiliate structures in ensuring functioning of the PSO ecosystem is critical. For example, the African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA) is a pan-African association of 18 member institutions offering training on aspects of PSO. APSTA serves as the African Chapter of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). Although the functional relationship between APSTA and PKTCs has seen development of ‘soft’ training areas such as ‘gender’, the linkages are based on personal relationships and manoeuvers, thus, questioning its sustainability and enforceability of the policies to ensure an effective capacity development among PKTCs. As of May 2013, APSTA had 18 member institutions including African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), South Africa; (2) African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations (AFDEM), Zimbabwe; (3) Cairo

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Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA), Egypt; (4) Environmental Aid Nigeria (EAN), Nigeria; (5) Ethiopian International Peace Support Operations Training Centre (EIPSOTC), Ethiopia; (6) Impact for Development and Change (IMPACT), Nigeria; (7) International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), Kenya; (8) Institute for Security Studies (ISS), South Africa; (9) Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), Tanzania; (10) Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Ethiopia; (11) Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Ghana; (12) Legion Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), Ghana; (13) Mali Peace Keeping training School (EMP), Mali; (14) National Defense College of Nigeria (NDC), Nigeria; (15) Nigeria Army Peacekeeping Centre (NAPKC), Nigeria; (16) Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC), South Africa; and (17) SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC-RPTC), Zimbabwe; and, Malawi Peace Support Operations Training Centre.

The ASEAN Family’ System Model of Security Cooperation The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN ), commonly referred to us ‘ASEAN Family’ is a regional institution formed in 1967, by 1994, it had six member states: Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei. Vietnam joined in 1995; Laos and Myanmar in 1997; and Cambodia in 1999. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, institutional bricolage, is usually constructed from existing institutions, style of thinking and sanctioned social relationships (Stewart & Deneulin, 2002; Cleaver, 2002; Carstensen, 2015). Although various regional blocs are shaped by distinct geopolitical and historical paths, this chapter considers regional peace and security architectures as sociopolitical systems, hence, the need for cross-learning. Clustered around the Association of South East Asia Nations, East Asia’s multilateral regional security institutions have played and are still playing a significant role in the management of peaceful change (Gilman, 2015; Hanegraaff et al., 2016). Unlike APSA, the ASEAN family seems to have established a functional regional peace and security system. One of the innovative measures put in place by the ASEAN in stabilizing the otherwise turbulence region lies in the paradigmatic case of inclusive institutional balancing through

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the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (Narine, 2004). It is through such forums that some of the most influential nations such as USA are engaged in resolving Asian peace and security issues. There is no country in ESAC subregion that does not subscribe to any of the established regional economic blocs or peace and security mechanisms. Regional approach to peace and security has become sine qua non for any country that seeks to stabilize or conduct effective peacebuilding activities. Conversely, realization of this condition in ESAC has remained lukewarm. The ‘ASEAN family’, however, has proved helpful in improving interstate trust, inclusive conflict resolution mechanisms, managing peaceful regime change and somewhat helpful in fixing the challenge of discordance through enhanced coordination mechanisms, as illustrated in this section (Narine, 2004). First is building trust among actors. Although the ASEAN region experiences military brinkmanship in the East and South China Seas, as well as recent border clashes between Thailand and Cambodia (Chachavalpongpun, 2012), the regular consultations and forums have fundamentally built trust across the region. Since 1994, ASEAN member states have held annual consultations on security with 17 policy dialogue partners in the ASEAN Regional Forum. Since 1997, ASEAN members have held separate meetings with China, Japan and South Korea in a framework called ‘ASEAN Plus Three’ (APT). Since 2005, a more inclusive version of APT has existed called the East Asia Summit (EAS). In addition to China, Japan, and South Korea, the EAS comprises India, Australia and New Zealand. In November 2011, the EAS was joined by the USA and Russia. In recent years, another important forum for the discussion of security matters has been the China–ASEAN Special Relationship. Other forums with regional impact include; ASEAN Plus Japan, ASEAN Plus Korea, ASEAN Plus India (Friedrichs, 2012). The latent border tensions between Kenya and Somalia over the sea boundary and Uganda-Kenya disputes over who owns the Migingo Islands in Lake Victoria can be improved by deepening cross-border cooperative initiatives aimed at improving interstate trust (Hartfiel & Job, 2007; SIPRI, 2011). Lack of interstate trust results into an ‘anarchical society’ of sovereignty-minded nation states where confidence needs to be systematically built and maintained because unconditional trust would be too risky (Bull, 1977). From its inception, ASEAN has had a positive record of confidence building. As Helen Nesadurai has pointed out, ‘confidence building has been the hallmark activity of regional forums

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such as the ARF in its first decade’ (Nesadurai, 2009). In fact, one of the most important achievements of ASEAN during the first few years after its founding in 1967 was its contribution to the diplomatic reconciliation of Indonesia and Malaysia (Yuzawa, 2010). Studies on African institutional legitimacy have revealed relationship between political trust and stability of a state to consolidate mediation processes (Hutchison & Johnson, 2011). In order to strengthen regional cooperation and diffuse distrust, it is important for the ESAC’s bilateral relations to be embedded in multilateral platforms. Learning from the ASEAN’s ‘Six Party Talks’, is an important case in point (Honghua, 2010). This is certainly not to say that the Six Party Talks have eliminated distrust between North Korea and its neighbours. Nevertheless, the ‘Talks’ can be key elements of ‘soft power’, if well employed, can build a modicum of trust among the key determinants of stability in ESAC, for example, the latent suspicion between South Africa and Mozambique and the unending sea border disputes between Kenya and Somalia. The strategic interest by global powers, namely USA, China, Japan and Russia over the Indian Ocean water spaces intently justifies their stake in the ESAC’s regional peace and security architecture. Some scholars may view this as external interference (Thonke & Spliid, 2012; Soderbaum, 2004), but the effects of globalization on matters of peace and security may be too weighty to be handled by a single nation. The IGADs’ mediation process during the crisis in South Sudan that began in 2013, modelled an IGAD-plus mediators, however, the effectiveness and sustainability of such a structure within the prevailing conditions in South Sudan was in doubt due to several factors; the formal institutions of power-sharing in South Sudan have been incapable of overcoming the belligerent and self-interested motives of the leading political elites (Seymour, 2014). The IGAD-Plus mediators included; IGAD member states, AU High Level ad hoc Committee, the TROIKA, China, AU Commission, European Union, United Nations and IGAD Partners Forum. The second element is the style of conflict resolution. Although the ASEAN outfit in East Asia has been unable to contribute to the resolution of acute interstate conflict, the complexity of interstate conflicts in the entire region offers useful lessons on how regional institutions such as APSA structures could galvanize mixed response, including employing multilateral and bilateral actors, who are not necessarily part of the African regional peace and security ecosystem. For example, although ASEAN is

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unable to resolve conflict surrounding North Korea and South Korea nor the conflict between China and Taiwan however, the various offshoots of ASEAN; the ARF, APT and EAS provides useful multilateral avenues to dialogue and eventually resolve intractable conflicts in the region (Emmers, 2010). Although, ESAC region has not experienced acute conflicts such as those between North Korea and South Korea as well as that of Thailand and Cambodia, such arrangements could offer opportunity for members of EAC and SADC to meet on the sidelines of the African Union summit that happens bi-annually to coordinate and evaluate the effectiveness of APSA structures in managing and resolving conflicts. For example, then-U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates met his Japanese and South Korean counterparts on the fringes of the 2009 meeting of the ShangriLa Dialogue to coordinate responses to the latest events in the North Korean nuclear crisis (Weissmann, 2010). The situation in South Sudan, for example, presented an opportunity through the IGAD-Plus mediation in which the international diplomacy was applicable in rejoining the incumbent regime with the former Vice President, Dr. Riek Machar. This has happened a couple of times in the Taiwanese case. For example, the strategic triangle connecting the USA with China and Taiwan has thus far kept the situation from escalating. In post-2015 election under the leadership of Tsai Ing-Wen, the government of Taiwan, may be reconsidering its relationship with main land China, nevertheless, the situation is still very much characterized by a diplomatic triangle of bilateral relationships (Ling et al., 2010). APSA in its current iteration focuses more on physical security with purely military operation thinking and actions. Conflict resolution, however requires medium-term and long-term strategies and policies, such as confidence- and nation-building. For example, while the ASF is envisaged as an instrument for peace operations, the emerging security challenges such as terrorism, piracy and improving the governance of security forces in several member states fall outside the remit of the APSA. In other words, the ASF is confronted by a conceptual challenge, which needs to be dealt with if it is to be an effective tool for enhancing peace and stability. The respondents had this to say: The critical point here is to ensure the conceptualization of APSA is flexible so that it can be recalibrated as and when needed. The flexibility advanced in this instance is twofold. First, it is important for the AU leadership in

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collaboration with sub-regional standby forces to provide space for reconceptualisation of the APSA in order to capture issues and developments in the 21st Century. Second, it is critical for the AU to be flexible to allow for a bottom-up approach as that would ensure that the APSA is aligned with the needs within the sub-regions regions and geopolitical differences across sub-regions is addressed at planning level. (Key Informant Interview at the Peace Support Operation Division of AU, Addis Ababa Ethiopia, 21 July 2014)

The involvement of IGAD in the regional conflict resolution is premised on the very basis of overlapping membership as well as the need to accommodate newly created states such as South Sudan. Somalia also contributes to the EASF. Whereas IGAD itself is composed of seven countries, the discussions on EASF initially included all 12 countries in the AU definition of the region, until the recent decision by Tanzania and Mauritius to contribute to the ASF as part of SADC. The current members of EASF include; Burundi, Rwanda; Uganda; Kenya; Sudan; Ethiopia; Djibouti; Comoros; Seychelles; and Somalia. The United Republic of Tanzania and the Indian Ocean island Madagascar are observers. By the time of writing this thesis, the new Republic of South Sudan stood high chances of being admitted to the subregion given its geopolitical proximity and trade relations that the country has been developing particularly with Kenya. The glaring institutional discordance among the APSA structures in ESAC seems to erode ingredients for resolving acute intrastate conflict. As we have seen, the ASEAN family has a positive track record with regard to confidence building and peaceful change. It is true that ASEAN has a record of conflict mitigation through confidence building and the constructive engagement of China (Weissmann, 2010). Jayadeva Ranade (2013) tries to contextualize the South China Sea along the psychological warfare in which China seeks to cast off humiliations of the past and regain its ‘lost’ territories and self-perceived rightful status, views repossession of the disputed territories as recognition of its predominance in the region. The third element is peace and security inclusivity. The existence of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) compliments the traditional actors in the region. SAARC comprises eight member countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka), nine observer countries, a geographic expanse covering the whole of the South Asian subcontinent, ranging

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from the Hindu Kush in the north to the Maldives in the South, a total of 1,980,992 square miles and of 1.6 billion people, making it the largest regional organization population wise in the world (Mukherjee, 2014). However, these numbers seem less impressive when looking at the negative political and socio-economic developments in the region and the role SAARC has played so far in addressing these. Traditional, but also nontraditional security challenges could serve as an area in which regional multilateralism could make a difference in South Asia. A model of a ‘South Asian Security Strategy’ along the lines of the ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS), provides a learning ground for ESAC countries in developing an equivalent (Eastern and Southern Africa Security Strategy-EASS) to serve as a crucial building block towards a common ESAC’s peace and security architecture. ESAC region continues to experience, transnational extremisms, a security model along the principles of SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (Michael, 2013). A definitive case of inclusive institutional balancing is the ARF. They complement but by no means replace the traditional US-centred security regime. As China’s influence continues to rise, ARF seems to offer the most effective mechanism for creating offshore power balance by drawing the USA in the ASEAN conflict spectrum (Buszynski, 2011). The fourth element is the question of coordination and institutional discordance. Institutional coordination is key in understanding the functional relationship between APSA and its subregional structures (Rein, 2015). Although there exist some linkages among the APSA structures, for example, as it relates to the operationalization of the ASF and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The level of coherence in the development of these components remains ad hoc, for example, both the EASF and SADC standby force’s ‘situations rooms’ is not optimally utilized to allow timely and effective relay of information from the local community to the national or regional level. Beyond the ASF and Continental Early Warning Systems (CEWS), there appears to be limited dexterity between the other APSA components. For example, the linkages between PSC, Panel of the Wise and similar structures in the RECs/RMs are mainly based on personal relationship, other than institutional liaison and coordination. Given the envisaged functions of the Panel of the Wise, operationalization of this structure would greatly increase trust between both components as well as member states. Yet enforcing decisions of the PSC is largely determined by members who trust each other. Like any other region in the world African regionalism suffers duplication and

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institutional discordance. Yet, the ASEAN level of coherence is worth emulating. It appears that ASEAN family’s activities trickle down to utilize regional summits (Capling & Ravenhill, 2011). As such, ASEAN-centred regionalism is a compliment to and a synergy of , but not a competitor nor substitute for each other. The later features remain cancerous to African regional integration process, including on matters of peace and security within APSA. The final factor is regime change. While regime stability is primarily a domestic concern, international cooperation in general and regional institutions in particular play significant roles in furthering this end (Jones, 2011). Similarly, other scholars have observed that the primary role of a regional entity should be towards state-building by enhancing the sovereignty of their members (Narine, 2011). In fact, the USA has recently gained diplomatic attractiveness because of Washington’s declared intention to start re-engaging in East Asia and reinforcing military cooperation with regional stakeholders such as Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore (Clinton, 2011). There is no denying that particularly in ESAC, there are stable democracies such as Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi. Some ESAC countries such as Uganda, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Angola, have become flawed democracies. Nevertheless, in this region there is still an overwhelming prevalence of authoritarian developmentalism such as Rwanda, Sudan and intensive fragile states such as South Sudan and Somalia deeply concerned with regime transition and stability (Reyntjens, 2016). In Ethiopia, for example, some scholars are sceptical of the 2015 parliamentary elections in which the long-ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), attained 100% of the seats, yet the antiterrorism laws and harsh restrictions on media and civil society are faulted for silencing dissent voices (Mengesha, 2016). Under the logic of authoritarian developmentalism, the greatest challenges to regime stability are loss of legitimacy and the inability to control domestic dissent. These can be caused by widespread economic discontent and/or the inability of a regime to quell various challenges to its authority such as democratic opposition or insurgent movements. At least in the short term, international cooperation offers two ways to prevent this from happening and thus enhance regime stability: (1) promoting prosperity to enhance economic security; and (2) buttressing coercive capacity to safeguard state security. Although with limited effect, through the ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN countries are trying to promote

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the economic integration of Southeast Asian nations. The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), concluded in 1992, is the most prominent case in point, but after two decades its contribution seems still relatively limited (Emmers & Ravenhill, 2011). The second way in which international cooperation can prevent threats to domestic stability is the collaborative management of non-traditional security threats. Promoted by China, the term ‘non-traditional security’ is basically a code for mostly authoritarian regimes collaborating against whatever non-military issue they perceive as a transnational threat undermining their domestic stability (Aris, 2009). At the same time, however, the principle of non-interference as embedded within the AU structures places a practical challenge on higher level collaboration to counter such non-military threats. For example, until 2012, Kenya’s contribution of military support to AMISOM was seen as anathema. However, ESAC countries could learn from the ASEAN structures such as ASEAN Plus Three-APT, which combines various countries with diverse democracies; first, it includes two consolidated democracies, namely, Japan and South Korea. Moreover, the EAS further includes India, Australia and New Zealand. The ARF additionally includes the USA, Canada and the European Union (Kim, 2011). The benefits of such a variegated regional peace and security architecture with external players, is that a region is able to put checks and balances against abuse of power by authoritarian regimes, at the same time, presence of large consolidated democracies provides platforms for fragile states such as South Sudan, Somalia, Burundi to transition from military regime to full democracies.

A New Framework for a New Paradigm Over the years, the number of actors and militant activities in Africa has been on the rise, increasing the complexity of APSA. Consequently, the need for change in response mechanisms is increasing and becoming more complex and multifaceted. This complex peace and security architecture require a response mechanism that is holistic and which manifests its broad whole. On the issue of the holistic approach to African security, Manu Lekunze’s (2020), work illuminates the importance of approaching from a human security (economy, politics, environment, personal identity and governance) perspective. The APSA, however, has been organized into compartments based on political organ systems. A compartmentalized unit system is inherently ill-suited to provide a comprehensive

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multifaceted response to the dynamic peace and security threats that span multiple geographical loci (RECs: EAC, ECOWAS, SADC, ECCAS and Maghreb) and thematic areas (conflict prevention, management, mitigation and resolution). As alluded to by Barry Buzan and Waever (2003), it is difficult to treat each one of these set of units independently. Indeed, Lekunze’s (2019), work on complex adaptive systems advances the systems approach to African security by developing a macro security system (economic, social and environmental) as the basis for curing the perennial security challenges on the continent. The current book, however, does not dwell on the macro environment, rather, it makes an attempt to understand how the various parts of the system are designed and operate inwardly. This book utilizes institutional theoretical frameworks to understand and explain how the various elements of the AU policy organs and the emerging APSA are created, diffused or adopted over space and time and how they fall into decline and disuse (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Powell & Kwasi, 2005). In an effort to address this conceptual inconsistency in the design and operationalization of the African RSC arrangement, this book utilizes ST as an alternative framework for designing regional peace and security response mechanism of security communities. In doing so, it contributes to the debate as to how best one can alleviate many of the current design challenges inherent in the African RSC vis-à-vis the emerging threats. The authors of this book consider that ST approach enables interaction of important strategies (security communities, collective thinking and regionalism), hence leading to an improved optimization of the performance of the APSA. Below is the straight jacket structure of the current African Peace and Security Architecture (see Fig. 7.7). Integrating ST in the APSA structure has the potential of transforming the above architecture into a whole part: One that will allow multiple opportunities for community members (RECs) and member states to develop systems thinking capacities through joint training activities, field exercises and other collective practices aimed at enhancing regional interoperability. Rather than viewing APSA and RECs as separate entities in the community, the RSC will be conceived as a system. The RSC system will be anchored on Kim’s (2002) systems thinking five building blocks: (1) theory of success; (2) creative tension model; (3) hierarchy of choices; (4) levels of perspective; and (5) ladder of inferences (Stroh, 2015). We shall then examine the system from multiple perspectives, and using a broad array of tools to design high-leverage interventions for achieving

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Fig. 7.7 The proposed new conceptual framework for the African RSC anchored on the five building blocks of the systems thinking model (Source Authors’ compilation in re-imagining the New Regional System Secure Community [RSSC])

transformative peace and security on the continent. Our proposed systems approach to RSC begins by clearly articulating desired scheme of things processes, connection between parts and the outcome (see Fig. 7.7). Figure 7.7 is a system mapping of our newly developed conceptual framework for an African regional Security Systems Community (RSSC), anchored on the five systems thinking building blocks: Theory of success —We envisage that increasing the quality of relationships between the various AU policy organs and subregional structures (RECs), will cause an increase in the quality of collective thinking, which in turn causes an increase in the quality of collective action, causing an increase in the quality of results, which improves coordination. For example, rather than recreating regional mechanisms (e.g. the EASF Standby Force, ECOWAS SF, etc.), why not consolidate such capacities in a single Force to be owned by the entire African regional security community with contribution from the AU member states, something akin to

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NATO. This is because developing subregional mechanisms require enormous resources, and most of the time not all member states have the resource endowment to make regular contribution. Creative tension model —In the current configuration of the African regional security community, and in particular the APSA, the AU is fixated on discretely resolving conflicts within each one of the RECs’s geographical loci, rather than clearly defining the interconnectedness of the threats and reimagining systems to resolve the crisis. In our proposed ST approach, this book illustrates how to focus on a clear, system-wide vision of what the community wants to create leads to a generative, energy-producing and comparative partnership for conflict resolution. For example, it should be normalized to have an arrangement for maritime security expertise from SADC (South African Development Community) being deployed in the Horn of Africa to fight piracy in the Western Indian Ocean. Of course, all these should be done in consultation with the host region or state. Hierarchy of choices —Building on the second block above, the AU should make efforts to create seamless relationships between and within the structures. This vertical and horizontal relationship should be reflected in the AU’s vision, purpose, strategies, tactics and activities in addressing continental peace and security threats. Proponents of ST observe that partnerships and communities that are committed to a compelling purpose consistently apply a set of values that define them and have a clear shared vision for the future they would like to create and are more likely to succeed in their strategies, tactics and operations (Kim, 2002). Levels of perspective—One major challenge facing the African RSC is lack of systematic structures for monitoring progress as they implement peace and security strategies. Where such structures have been instituted, for example in peacekeeping missions, there exists no direct linkage between theory and practice. For instance, for a long time there has been a gap between the quality of demand and supply of peacekeepers. Whereas regional peacekeeping training centres continue to train personnel, certain expertise in the peace mission has never been filled. The future RSC will, therefore, have to be reconfigured considering three interrelated elements; systematic structures, mental models and the vision. Ladder of inferences —This illustrates how organizations, communities or individuals should or should not draw generalizations from experiences. It is a common practice within the African RSC, even when certain

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models or operational procedures no longer serve the continent well, the peril is that such models continue to be used. In other words, instead of learning from previous experiences, there is a tendency to reinforce the existing models without seeking alternative explanations or practices. Nevertheless, in our proposed systems thinking approach to RSC, deep systems change will require reflective examination of the mental models and constant experimentation of ideas through what we can term as the ‘African peace and security experiment ’, within the broader framework of what we imagine as the Regional Systems Security Community (‘RSSC’).

How the New Paradigm Should Look like Any attempt to appreciate the systems approach to regional security arrangement must, first of all, grasp the concept of systems thinking that is embedded in the wholeness of structure. The following are the eight elements of systems thinking that will be required in forging a system based regional security arrangement: Recognizing Interconnections—this is the fundamental base of the systems thinking. The skill is characterized by identification of key links between the system’s components. Identifying and Understanding Feedback—several links can merge forming a cause–effect feedback loop (Hooper & Stave, 2008). The RSSC, will, therefore, necessitate the identifications of those feedback loops and interpretation on the impacts of system’s behaviour on both the regional and individual state’s peace and security status. Understanding System Structure—the system structure comprises components and links between the various components. The RSSC design should, therefore, acknowledge these linkages. In this subsystem, feedback loop is essential for ensuring early warning information gathered timely and response done rapidly. Differentiating Types of Stocks, Flows, Variables—stocks are defined as any pool of a resource within a system. The financial resources required for the security system to function must be linked to the activities and other response mechanisms. Flows refer to the alteration of these resources and other levels of the system. Variables are adjustable constituents of the system that impact stocks and flows. For instance, response time and resources must be measurable and quantifiable. Identifying and Understanding Non-Linear Relationships—this component relates to stocks and flows of a non-linear nature. The main

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reason for configuring the system as non-linear is the very nature of conflict in Africa. The various conflict systems are irregular, hence calling for admixture of responses. Understanding Dynamic Behaviour—the interconnection into feedback loops, and the influence of the feedback loops comprising of stocks, flows and variables results in a progressive behaviour of the system. Reducing Complexity by Modelling Systems Conceptually—this component refers to the capacity to conceptualize model various compartments of the system and having different perspectives of the system. According to Arnold and Wade (2015), the consciousness accessibility of their compartments can be reduced by perpetual wholes. Theoretically, it allows the elucidation of greater complexity with the mind holding less information of each whole. Planning for peace and security within this realm allows for different perspectives that lower complexity and rule out excess in the regional security system. Understanding Systems at Different Scales—this skill is comparable to that of Richmond’s (1994) ‘whole forests ’ thinking, which includes the ability to consider distinct systems’ scales and systems of systems. The interconnectedness among these components of systems thinking is an ideal representation of a complex system such as the PSA could be reinforced to improve the effectiveness of response to various peace and security threats facing the Africa continent and elsewhere.

Limitations of Systems Approach A security community exists when a group of states and/or territories come together and exhibit some degree of willingness to cooperate in addressing common threats to peace and security of regional nature. The security system, can therefore be defined as a set of tools, ideas, rules, values and norms indicative of some predictable and regularized method of regional security problem-solving. Although the systems approach marks an improvement on earlier approaches to RSC arrangement, with greater explanatory value when applied to the analysis of functioning regional security system, its application will not go without criticism. One of the main challenges is free ridership. If an effective regional security system is to be established, member states will be required to respond to their obligations and responsibilities. This includes timely payment of their annual subscription fees which is essential in facilitating

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the smooth running of the system. Most African regional security communities suffer insufficient funding, due to various factors, delays or fail by member states to uphold their financial obligations. This in turn affects the ability of an organization to function as a system. Free ridership will certainly be of concern since security tends to be a public good that members may expect to benefit from despite contributing. Also given that conflicts pose a problem of geographical spillover effects, neighbouring countries will certainly have to respond, therefore, there will be little motivation to make financial contributions to the system. Other forms of contributions include personnel and equipment. Given the high cost of military equipment and challenges of deploying troops to the continental security system, some countries’ contribution to the continental force would be less than others. Second limitation of the system is it requires high level of sophistication to plan and implement. This may not be a big problem given the growing quality of human resource in the continent and possible support from partners. However, as discussed elsewhere in this work, appointment in most African regional organizations is a function of clientele patronage. The risk of undermining merit in the recruitment of personnel is real. This can be a negative feedback on the systems approach, however, with an established network of communication and standard operating procedures, the RSSC should have mechanisms for acquiring, selecting and vetting individuals to such entities. Similarly, enforcing a system among states may limit or be limited by state sovereignty. This is because decision-making will need to be centralized to allow rapid response to some of the existing and emerging security threats. Some countries may be reluctant to fully commit to the set of agreements or refuse to abide to the established operation procedures. To that end, establishing ‘systems within a system’, is key to ensuring member states are bound by the agreements and treaties. Finally, differing political and personal ideologies could also cripple the functions of a well-intended regional security system. In the recent years, the emergence of populist ideology and nationalism has had a big impact on multilateralism with ripple effects on various dimensions of regional integration. Countries that have elected populist leaders have ended up withdrawing from a range of international agreements and norms threatening the existence of some international and regional organizations. The same has also been witnessed in Africa in the recent past when ‘cold’ differences between President John Pombe Maghufuli of Tanzania and

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the Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta over the models of integration‘gradualist ’ vs. ‘rapidist ’. In the initial stages of the EAC establishment, the ideological sharp differences between President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya led to the collapse of the Community in 1977. The current African political landscape is characterized by a mixture of democratic and authoritarian governments which may not interpret events within the security system in the same way. The current thinking in regional security arrangement is to develop a whole stream of peace and security analysis using the RSSC analytical framework discussed in this chapter, as to give the African Peace and Security Architecture, a mostly interactive, non-linear relationship and epiphenomenal character.

Conclusions The discussion in this chapter has demonstrated that there has been a surge for the need of peacekeepers over the last decade meaning that there is a prima facie need for training initiatives. However, training is inefficient if it does not also result in an improvement in the ability of the UN to deploy more peacekeepers. This raises two questions. On one hand, does the African-based Peace Support Operation institutions such as the Peacekeeping Training Centres and the ASF, take sufficient advantage of this surging need for peacekeepers and rosters to realign their training base? On the other hand, do training initiatives and rosters do enough to encourage and support their alumni in the period between training and deployment? Most of the training initiatives on the continent including the IPSTC and the SADC RPTC have recorded an impressive training rate, however, most training initiatives in the past and the regional PKTCs no exception, continue to operate on the assumption that it is their responsibility to produce capacities, and the AU’s responsibility to recruit and deploy, this is part of the institutional principal paradox of the African-led PSO. In resolving this policy and operational congruence, the PSO ecosystem will have to develop partnership relationship with other PSO structures, such as the African Peace Support Trainers Association, so as to respond to challenges of institutional dissonance.

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CHAPTER 8

Partnership in Peace Support Operations

Introduction Although partnership for peace and security is an old norm in the international system, dating back to 1960s, unilateral behaviour among states presents both opportunities and challenges to international relations, including peace and security. The protectionism and nationalistic tendencies by political elites among some of the leading global powers in the West have increased illiberal discriminatory practices, posing threats to multilateral nature of the global system (Linn, 2018). Unilateralism is not only confined to matters of peace and security, but it traverses across all facets of life; slows global economic growth, recurring global financial crises, perpetuating inequality and sustaining deprivation (Costa, 1985). Multilateralism, which is the bedrock of international partnership requires states to adhere to the international norms and respect the international institutions. To the contrast, unilateralism is hostile to partnership, where a single state can influence how international relations can be conducted (Tago, 2017). Therefore, understanding partnership in the international relations might give a hint on how the international society develops institutions, norms and regimes. Of particular importance to the study of international relations is the collaboration between the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) for peace and security. It is acknowledged by both the UN and AU that it would be difficult if not impossible for a single organization to respond to the complex but © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. Onditi et al., Reimagining Security Communities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70869-6_8

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also multifaceted peace and security risks. Partnerships are thus indispensable to the success of both international and regional peace interventions. The UN charter and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) provide guidance on how to manage relationship with partners in all levels of peace operation. The United Nations is no longer the only actor on matters of peace and security. The AU, Regional Economic Communities (RECs), European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have all singly or collaboratively executed peace operations. Also, important to note is the growing involvement of regional agencies and arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security, as envisaged in this chapter of the UN Charter. This development has developed new opportunities for combining the capabilities of the UN and other external actors to manage complex peace and security scenarios. In several instances, troops and police deployed as part of regional organization-led peace operation have been ‘re-hatted’ upon the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operations. In some instances, the UN peacekeeping operations consisting of civilian and police personnel have been deployed alongside forces under the command of a regional organization. The AFISMA (African-led International Support Mission to Mali) was a perfect example of collaboration between the AU and UN in responding to regional crises in the ECOWAS subregion. There is justification for the AU–UN collaboration in peace operations. The first rationale is pegged on the overall UN mandate of ensuring peace and security prevails across the globe. Thus, for the last few decades the UN Security Council’s agenda has been occupied by peace and security challenges in Africa. Second, both institutions recognize that the UN Security Council has the primary—but not exclusive— responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, including in Africa. But, third, both institutions acknowledge that, alone, neither can cope with the multitude of peace and security challenges on the continent. Both institutions now also recognize that while the AU is an important source of political authority for conflict management in Africa, on its own it lacks the necessary material and financial capabilities to take decisive action to resolve these problems, as was highlighted once again by the ongoing crisis in Mali (Williams & Boutellis, 2014). The structural weaknesses facing regional organizations make it difficult for the regional mechanisms (RMs) to develop a sustainable partnership

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with international actors (Apuuli, 2016). The nature of these ‘weaknesses’ is sometimes magnified because of the overlap between the various organizations pursuing similar goals with almost non-existent coordination mechanism. No wonder, intervention of ECOWAS in Mali stopped midway before realizing the plans against Islamist-led insurgency in Mali. Similarly, AMISOM’s (African Union Mission in Somalia) successes in pushing back insurgents in Somalia, has gradually sunk into interstate and inter-agency struggle, some threatening to withdraw their troops outside the agreed exit strategy. In both missions, reports of widespread human rights abuses and excessive loss of civilians have been attributed to lack of key civilian expertise to provide advisory services to the mission leadership on how best to handle asymmetric fighters. At the AU level, the formation of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC) initiative is another deviation from the ASF plans of building regional force that is integrated to tackle unconventional conflicts emerging on the continent. With South Africa, Ethiopia and Uganda as leading participants, the ‘temporary’ ACIRC now being discussed could possibly replace the stunted ASF as the intervention tool of choice for some major African military powers with interests and reach from southern Africa into central Africa and the Horn. Although initially Nigeria did not endorse the ACIRC arrangement, ECOWAS’s effectiveness in dealing with Boko Haram and other insurgency groups in the Sahel and West Africa is to a large extent depended on how the regional mechanism forge partnership with actors within the continent and external. The AU has innovated what we could call ‘tailor-made’ mechanisms to respond to specific challenges. For example, the ad hoc arrangements, LRA Task Force, which relied on several individual states cooperating in a joint intervention that was eventually sanctioned by the AU. Whatever military or political configurations the AU Commission is reinventing, the greatest concern is that the PSO architecture being manufactured within the AU would require to address both systemic and structural problems; great power politics, international normative context and the inequalities among actors, notably, in the AU–UN relations. Regional organizations such as the European Union (EU), African Union (AU), the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organisation for the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also have an important role to play in pursuing global order. Specifically, Article 52 of this chapter of the UN Charter states

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that ‘the Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council’. However, when the conditions on the ground are not conducive to the operationalization of peace and security, for example in situations where armed militia are still projecting violence, then regional organizations generally have to defer to the UN Security Council which has the power to authorize the robust engagement with armed groups if necessary (Murithi, 2013).

Global and Interregional Cooperation Models While in initial stages of PSO, regional mechanisms deploy on its own, this is not always the case. At a latter stage of conflict resolution, the principle of complementarity or comparative advantage may set in. Regional mechanisms are likely to operate jointly or in close cooperation with the AU as well as in close cooperation with UN. It is also acknowledged that in some instances, the sub-regional peace initiatives may be taken over by the AU or the UN, depending on the context and circumstances. The proliferation of protracted intrastate conflicts in Africa witnessed the attempts by several actors, including intergovernmental and regional organizations to resolve these conflicts. This has created a culture of staggered or layered response to conflict, which meant that regional organizations, and then later the United Nations would do the initial attempts. As such, the 1990s is known as the era of ‘cooperative security’ in Africa. African regional organizations and the African Union responded to the United Nations’ constraints by developing and enhancing their own peace and security architecture. The growing cooperation between regional mechanism, the AU and the UN in preventive diplomacy and conflict management has witnessed past peacekeeping ECOWAS PSOs being ‘re-hatted’. It is likely that as peacekeeping in West Africa evolves, there would be a need to fill the gap created by UN missions when they exit post-conflict countries, signalling the beginning of the process of ‘reverse re-hatting’. The strategy of transfer of PSOs from one entity to another acknowledges the relative strengths and limitations of the different institutions. It is evident among the regional standby forces notably ECOWAS, that the model of sharing responsibility for PSO with the UN is becoming viable. The model is common among European Union institutions, involves a

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sharing of responsibilities between organizations. Within EASF region, one such structure, visible in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and in Somalia, involves a main mission, with the support of technical support missions (ex: training of security forces or help in security sector reform). Another model is the presence of a main PSO and the presence of an outside military formation or rapid reaction force, as it had been witnessed in Somalia, especially with the US military capability, Mali and for the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). Within the spirit of Pan-Africanism and African renaissance that continues to sweep the continent, it is ripe to deepen interregional cooperation among RECs/RMs. It was long predicted by Shaw (1975) that the threat posed by terrorism, civil wars, transnational crime and drug trafficking in this region has necessitated the evolution and development of mechanisms for security and cooperation in West Africa. Conflicts in this region have regionalized formations and causes, which makes it imperative to implement a common security agenda. It appears that, as regional bodies develop towards operationalization of the Force for practical deployment, official participation of civilians in planning and theatre diminishes, as has been the case with ECOWAS during the deployment in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 1990 and 1997 respectively. The deployment of troops in Somalia under AMISOM was characterized by a similar trend, in which civilians were rendered jobless as the KDF soldiers indulged into humanitarian work as they pacified several towns. The recent deployment in Mali and Guinea-Bissau (2012–2014) also indicates that the composition and behaviour of troops was largely military dominated. This is likely to be catastrophic among PSO actors, particularly about how the concept was conceptualized at the AU. All these continue to threaten the relationship between the military and civilian agencies operating in peace missions. Trends in the global peacekeeping reports indicate that, in 2013, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) reiterated the importance of a comprehensive and coordinated approach encompassing governance, security, humanitarian, human rights and development aspects to address the root causes of challenges to peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel Region. An example of such an approach is the West Africa Security Cooperation Initiative (WASCI), which recognizes that violent conflict in the region is exacerbated by criminal networks that are multidisciplinary and transnational. In eastern Africa, IGAD has been taking

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lead in facilitating mediation and political dialogue between parties to conflicts including the intra-conflicts in the Republic of South Sudan. The International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) creates a platform within which countries of the Great Lakes and eastern Africa develop mechanisms for resolving transnational conflicts. Such initiatives are ideal for resolving interpersonal relationship between the military and civilians as they are developed with a comprehensive prism beyond ‘boots and berets’. United Nations The UN remains a key pillar of international peace and security. Chapter 6 of the UN Charter provides for this global body to intervene in situations where international peace is threatened. In addition, Chapter 7 of the UN Charter also allows the UN to utilize necessary force to maintain or restore international peace and security. Recognizing that the requirements of regional peace are too grand for the Regional Mechanisms to shoulder alone, EASF and ECOWAS standby forces have acknowledged the need for partnership and collaboration with the UN. Therefore, the concept of shared responsibility (SRe) between the UN and regional organizations has emerged as a strategy of ensuring the effective management and resolution of regional conflicts. In the process, this strategy has proved to enhance working relationship between the military-and civilian-based agencies. African Union The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the current continental organization in 2002 was given impetus by the reality of conflict in the region as well as the need to respond in a coordinated approach. The experience of conflicts, instability and insecurity in several parts of the continent, including the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes and the Sahel region, insurgency groups in Nigeria, the political stalemate in Guinea-Bissau necessitate focused and dedicated efforts by the African Union to restore peace and security. The complexity of conflicts in Africa demands an articulate African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), with a series of interdependent instruments able to implement the wide range of actions needed for the maintenance of peace and security in the continent, from early warning to post-conflict reconstruction.

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Based on the principle of subsidiarity, the AU can either facilitate actions being done at the subregional level, or play the role of the direct implementing agency in collaboration with either ECOWAS or EASF standby forces depending on the geographical location of the conflict. The promotion of unity and solidarity among the member states and peoples of Africa is anchored on partnership between governments and all segments of civil society, in particular women, youth and the private sector. In order to strengthen solidarity and cohesion among the peoples of Africa, the AU espouses the principle of collaboration and partnership. The establishment of the AU in 2002, the continental body has been involved in several peace support operations, deploying troops from member states in an effort to stabilize conflict zones. Through PSOs deployed notably in Burundi (AMIB), Sudan (AMIS/UNAMID), Somalia (AMISOM) and Mali (AFISMA), the AU has demonstrated political will and practical capacity to intervene in conflict situations where the UN has either been unwilling or unable to intervene timely. Interregional Collaboration In addition to the collaboration between ECOWAS and the United Nations on Gambia in 2016, described in the preceding sub-section on collaboration with the African Union, there has been collaboration between ECOWAS and various entities of the UN system in organizing events on ECOWAS Human Rights Day represents an important contribution to that effort. ECOWAS leaders declared 16 January as Human Rights Day. ECOWAS collaborated with UNESCO and UNICEF in staging an event under the theme ‘Rights to Education’ in Liberia on ECOWAS Human Rights Day in 2018. The establishment of the Network of National Human Rights institutions (NNHRI) in ECOWAS was undertaken with the support of the West Africa Office of OHCHR. ECCAS has had long-standing and sustained partnership with the United Nations, especially with UNOCA-including in the context of UNSAC. The organization has also partnered with other United Nations entities on conflict prevention-related actions, such as with UNESCO and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). With respect to UNSAC, which was created by the United Nations General Assembly in 1991, at the request of Central African Member States, ECCAS and UNOCA jointly organize the expert and ministerial meetings of UNSAC.

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IGAD has collaborated with UNDP in articulating the Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism. This Strategy, which initially covers the period 2018–2023, will target groups and drivers of violent extremism. Its focus will be on helping to build the capacity of member states to develop and implement strategies to counter violent extremism, both by enhancing the capacity of National Counter-Terrorism Units and adopting legislations to address terrorism and extremism; and engage civil society organizations, private sector enterprises and the youth in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism. Another important area of collaboration between IGAD and the United Nations that stretches as far back to the years immediately after the creation of IGAD is in monitoring and reporting on the sanctions regime (arms embargo) imposed on Somalia since the collapse of the central government in 1991. Following the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1907 of 23 December 2009 to also impose an arms embargo against Eritrea, the scope on monitoring and reporting on arms embargo was expanded to cover two of IGAD member states. Consequently, IGAD makes two yearly reports to the Security Council: An Interim Finding submitted usually in April, and a Final Report, usually in the period October–December. SADC and UN collaborated extensively in the articulation and implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In particular, SADC points to the deployment of the SADC Force Intervention Brigade in DRC as offering an opportunity for SADC to work with other stakeholders in gradually removing or diminishing structural conflict factors in that country. UNWOMEN has been very supportive of SADC work on gender issues. UNWOMEN provided financial support for the articulation of the Regional Strategy for Women, Peace and Security and has further indicated its willingness to support the efforts of member states in the region in developing their national action plans on women, peace and security. The Arab Maghreb Union’s (AMU) collaboration with the United Nations is mainly through the Economic Commission for Africa. A Study of Youth in the Maghreb Region was undertaken with the help of the Economic Commission for Africa and the Islamic Development Bank Regional Office in Rabat in 2012. The purpose of the study was to assess the viability for quick impact project (QIP) as part of preventive diplomacy against the aggressive movement by the Muslim brotherhood,

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fuelling the Arab Spring. AMU has also requested ECA to help it conduct a study on the Impact of Membership of Member States in multiple RECs. Furthermore, AMU has requested ECA to conduct a study on how to harmonize AMU strategy and decisions with Agenda 2063 and Agenda 2030 on sustainable development goals. AMU confirms that the United Nations has interactions with member states of AMU on conflict prevention but not with, or under the auspices of, AMU. The East African Community’s (EAC) work on Promoting Youth Employment in Agriculture has benefited considerably from technical and financial support from the FAO. As part of its work in the MASE programme, EAC has benefited from the support of UNODC in ensuring that the trials of pirates arrested before the launching of the MASE programme are conducted in accordance with international best practices in such circumstances. The International Police (INTERPOL) has assisted EAC in training 240 officials from five Partner states (excluding South Sudan) and three other countries (Mauritius, Seychelles and Somalia) in key areas of investigation, namely general investigation, forensic investigation. International Partners Besides institutional-and region-specific opportunities, the regional economic communities can exploit opportunities that exist in the larger international community, especially with the United Nations. The African Union and the United Nations signed the Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security in April 2017. The framework explicitly states that ‘in line with the Africa Peace and Security Architecture, this relationship (with the UN) also encompasses the regional economic communities/regional mechanisms, who will be consulted on this framework in a second phase of discussions, along with the rest of the AU Commission and the wider UN family’. This provides an important entry point for the regional economic communities to be involved in, and derive all the potential benefits from, the implementation of the joint framework. The International community, governments and donors provide important forms of support to PSOs through several strategies, including providing the necessary robust diplomacy to secure a viable, lasting peace accord. In addition, the international community and donors play the essential role of institution multilateral and bilateral punitive measures should conflict parties fail to comply with a ceasefire or peace agreement.

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These actors also play an important role in strengthening the capacities of organizations that deploy PSOs as well as troops contributing countries, either through financial or technical support. Non-Governmental Organizations Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil societies are usually the main actors on the ground providing basic services in peacetime, but also when conflicts break. They are among the main actors on the international stage and have become key pillars in building and maintaining sustainable peace, as increasingly recognized by the UN, AU and RECs. They provide essential services to the population, thus are indispensable partners in governance, development and peace and security. There are a diverse range of NGOs with different areas of focus including promoting peacebuilding, engaging in development programmes, providing humanitarian aid, human rights advocacy, as well as research and training services to peacekeepers. Vibrant civil society organizations in West Africa were borne out of the determination by populations to deliver a coordinated response to the threat of armed conflict. Civil society organizations (CSOs), including faith-based groups, student associations, labour movement, women’s groups and nongovernmental organizations in West Africa were critical in building coalitions towards the restoration of peace in the region. Women’s groups in West Africa have notably played key and positive roles in pressurizing protagonists to engage in peace talks, and in post-conflict reconstruction processes. At the level of the UN, AU and RECs, there are existing civil society platforms, such as the Economic Social Council (ECOSOC), to allow for collaborative engagement of PSOs and civil society. Civil society can be utilized by PSOs as capacity builders and as the bridge between the peacekeeping missions and the local community. To this end, ECOWAS has been collaborating with civil society organizations, including women, the youth and religious groups as well as the media, to engage more effectively in preventive diplomacy. These organizations must also assist the ESF by building bridges and providing the platform for the implementation of regional normative frameworks for peace and security.

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Corporate and Civil Sector Increasingly, the corporate and civil sectors also have found space and expression in PSO spaces. The debate about the role of such non-state actors in peace support operations has gained prominence within the UN, AU and RECs. The private sector notably is increasingly contributing towards the holistic approach to peace support operations. Global entities such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could thus play positive roles by addressing economic dimensions of armed conflict and building economic and social well-being. Additionally, private companies, multinational corporations and local businesses represent the other face of the corporate sector. While in much of Africa the private sector has sometimes contributed to instability and conflict, the changing and expansive nature of peace support operations requires that the corporate sector play an integral role towards reducing vulnerability, promoting socio-economic well-being as well as facilitating post-conflict reconstruction and development. The UN Secretary-General’s Global Compact Initiative epitomizes the efforts that are designed to help businesses contribute to global sustainable development. With this recognition of the role of the corporate sector in PSOs, it is important to prevent the negative involvement of business actors in conflict situations and to ensure that businesses operate appropriately and that they do not intensify conflict situations. This can be done by developing codes of conduct for the operations of businesses in conflict and post-conflict situations. The support from the private sector is critical towards enhancing the capacity and overall effectiveness of troops. The collaboration between ECOWAS Commission and the West African Network for Early Warning program (WANEP) has been frontier for capacity development for conflict prevention. WANEP being civilian-based organization, the partnership forms the basis for developing bilateral engagements between the military and civilians on matters of PSO. This perhaps explains the reason for the observed advancement in the West African early warning and functioning systems for data collection and sharing compared to the EASF’s ‘Situation Room’ concept that is not near operationalization.

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Lessons Learnt and the Way Forward Peace support operations may take a variety of forms, depending on the scale of the continuum from peace through war as well as on the needs on the ground. Although individual mandates and objectives may vary, every PSO must not only help establish security on the ground, but also create conditions for lasting peace. The spectrum of tension covers the continuum from peace through war. A peace support operation can occur at any point on that spectrum. Regional mechanisms decision-makers and planners can take several actions to prevent peace from deteriorating into crisis and to war. It is established that although in theory, consent must be given before PSO intervention, emerging trends indicate that this is not possible in intra-conflicts where belligerent groups fight the existing regime, as is the case in EASF and ECOWAS regions. Such situation even requires a more comprehensive approach that involves military, civilians and police. This section reflects on the African experiences in conducting PSO from two dimensions: (1) political decision-making; and (2) partnerships from within. Political Dimension In ECOWAS region, PSO activities began in 1990 when the subregional body established the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), an intervention force that was designed to bring stability to Liberia. Since then, ECOWAS has had a number of experiences in peacekeeping which included deployment in Sierra Leone, GuineaBissau and Côte d’Ivoire. Relatively, ECOWAS peace support operations have been deemed as largely successful in ensuring ceasefires and forbearing peace agreements (Francis, 2007). Although each region generally depicts different geopolitical uniqueness, several factors certainly affect the success of PSO across regions. Such factors are both internal and external to PSOs. Internal factors include the following: peacekeeping mission structures, mission mandates, combatant resources and capacity and conduct of peacekeepers. External factors include the conflict parties’ commitment to peaceful settlements, support from the regional and international community as well as support from local communities. The mission structures of peace support operations have a bearing on how the mission succeeds in keeping the peace and facilitating the restoration of stability. It is, therefore, not by surprise that ECOWAS Commission

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recommends that in today’s more complex peacekeeping environment where multidimensionality and interoperability are encouraged, it is important for PSOs to have civilian leadership which is supported by the military commander and police commissioner. Such a structure will ensure that PSOs respond effectively to the fluctuating peace operation environment. The success of PSOs largely depends on political will, perception of international and local community as well as management of dynamics on the ground. Given the political reality of PSOs, peacekeeping mission leadership and governance are crucial success factors. As such, one of the key organizational elements that affect the success of an operation is the selection of the Head of Mission. Both EASF and ECOWAS mechanisms envisage the Head of Mission to be an individual who has political expediency, requisite experience, qualifications, integrity and cultural fluency, including understanding the language of the country of deployment. The two forces recognize the fact that such qualities are necessary because the Head of Mission is responsible for the broader success of the peacekeeping mission and is the individual who is tasked with ensuring that the conflict parties remain committed to dialogue and coordinating the military, police and civilian elements of the PSO while galvanizing and maintaining international support. More often, the mandate of a peacekeeping mission determines how peacekeepers on the ground are able to operationalize the quest and support for peace. Many peacekeeping missions have failed due to lack of context-responsive mandates. However, ECOWAS interventions have had the challenges of lack of clear mandate for their operation. For instance, the ECOMOG mission in Liberia lacked a clear and robust mandate that could be operationalized based on the dynamics of the conflict and which was flexible enough to allow the troops to oscillate between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. This made ECOMOG lose a number of its personnel, who came under rebel attacks at the initial stages of the operation. The UN has notably made mandates more flexible, as to allow missions to follow closely evolutions on that ground in rapidly changing situations. In contemporary conflicts, peacekeeping missions need to have expansive mandates that go beyond the traditional objective of ‘keeping peace’. This means that peacekeeping forces should not only act as buffer zones against belligerents, but should also be able to facilitate

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a conducive environment for peace agreement formulation, peace agreement implementation, facilitation of political transition and promotion of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction enterprises. Some of the lessons learned from the ECOMOG interventions were that the internal difficulties that plagued the ECOWAS intervention forces threaded the success of the PSOs. In Liberia, for instance, ECOMOG troops were confronted with the problem of effective command and control structures and a lack of sufficient knowledge of the local terrain. This was exacerbated by the infighting among the Generals and senior civilian administrators, a development, which was responsible for weakening the cohesion and effectiveness of ECOMOG at the initial stages of its deployment. In eastern Africa, there has been distrust among the AMISOM peacekeepers particularly between the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) and the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) as to which country should be given priority in leadership of the mission. Furthermore, the intervention in Liberia was affected by lack of clear guidelines on the handling of joint operations by the UN, AU and ECOWAS. This is compounded when there are competing lines of command, control and coordination and there is lack of uniform professional standards of discipline within the various troops comprising a PSO. The intervention in Liberia was affected by these dynamics, which led ECOMOG to be at times unable to respond to the guerrilla tactics adopted by the rebels. Additionally, the absence of police contingents and civilian experts at the initial stage of ECOMOG’s deployment in Liberia derailed the advances of this peacekeeping mission. Peacekeepers are the visible face of PSOs. As such, their interpersonal cooperation and relation is important in determining the success of peace missions. However, what has tended to happen in the past decades has been a decline in the positive perception of peacekeeping missions as some peacekeepers have allegedly and notably been involved in uncivil acts such as corruption, sexual violence and crime. In Liberia, for instance, allegations that ECOMOG was taking sides with some local rebel groups also deflated some of the confidence of the populace in the peacekeeping force. As a result, ECOMOG was not seen as completely neutral and impartial especially as its personnel provided support to the rebel forces. The perception of peacekeepers as ‘conflict parties’ was further compounded by the lack of sufficient diplomatic and civilian complement to the military operations. The credibility of the AMISOM peacekeepers was eroded in the face of allegations that peacekeepers were

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conducting charcoal business through the Port of Kismayu. This was not taken well by the local community who feel exploited by the peacekeepers who are expected to uphold the principle of proselytism, which prohibits exploitation of vulnerable population in peace missions. Corruption is also a major threat to the success of peacekeepers. A 2013 Report by Transparency International highlights that the threat from corruption during peacekeeping operations puts the long-term success of international interventions at risk. Negative practices by peacekeepers such as corruption ultimately curtail the political and military successes of PSOs as communities question the relevance of peacekeeping missions. To generate respect and gain the trust of the local communities, PSOs should have well capacitated and disciplined peacekeeping personnel, and these include military, police and civilians. As such, the preparation, planning, mandate design, deployment and execution of PSOs should incorporate capacity-building initiatives that target misconducts by peacekeepers. PSO policies should clearly articulate the position on inimical practices by peacekeepers and should suggest practical strategies for addressing problems such as corruption and sexual violence in peacekeeping missions. In addition, ECOWAS should liaise with regional peacekeeping training centres to ensure that they provide meaningful and sustainable guidance on how peacekeepers can engage in proper conduct, including preventing corruption in the mission as well as in the host nation. External Actor’s Dimension The question of overlap and duplication in AU is a perennial one. The AU is in front of developing short-term capacities to respond to the emerging conflict situations. For example, the AU Assembly initiated the process to create the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) in 2009. The PSC subsequently developed a mandate for the initiative in collaboration with the participating countries that was authorized by the Council. It involves a Joint Coordinating Mechanism chaired by the AU’s Commissioner for Peace and Security and the defence ministers of the participating countries, the Regional Task Force of 5000 troops, and a Task Force headquarters. The current troops on ground are largely military with very limited police involvement and no civilian on board. In May 2012, ministers

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adopted measures for operationalizing the RTF, including the nomination of Sector Commanders, the handover of national contingents to the RTF Commander and the development of mission documents-Concept of operations, Rules of Engagement, Strategic Directives and Standard Operating Procedures on the treatment of persons suspected to belong to the LRA by the RTF. The ministers also agreed the AUC should convene a Support Forum for the RCI-LRA, which would include interested African countries as well as bilateral and multilateral partners to mobilize support for the Initiative. The UN Security Council has endorsed the PSC mandate through a Presidential Statement and called on the UN to support the RCI-LRA. The regional task force (RTF) reached approximately 3500 troops comprised of contributions from Uganda (UPDF), South Sudan (SPLA), Central African Republic (FACA) and Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) (International Bureau of Children Rights, 2013). Although, the RTF Force has received support from the UN agencies such as UNICEF and INGOs in developing their multidimensional capacities through training and training resource development, the Force’s ability to embrace such initiatives is limited due to their mandate. The mandate is designed precisely to neutralize the LRA group. The responsibility to protect is not explicit within the mandate. Though the force’s efforts to collaborate with INGOs and UN agencies have been growing, it is evident this relationship is likely to be thwarted by lack of clarity to the extent of their engagement with other activities outside the mandate. The politicosecurity situation in South Sudan and CAR are the major threats to the RTF efforts. According to an official from the RTF base in Yambio: The recent coup in the Central African Republic and the violence clashes between the Seleka and the Task Force contingent in the Obo sector is creating space for the LRA to regenerate its forces and intensify its attacks against the civilian population. (Key Informant Interview with the AU Regional Task Force in Yambio, South Sudan, 18 August 2014)

Colonial legacy remains an important, but also a troubling partner for the African PSO. The African former colonies continue to influence key decisions on matters of peace and security across regions. In May 2013, five months after French troops bypassed AU efforts to respond to the Islamist takeover of northern Mali and intervened to reverse the rebel push into the south of the country, the AU announced it was looking

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at the establishment of a new, but temporary, crisis response military force. Initially promoted by South Africa, headlines about the new initiative spoke of the AU preparing it ‘shock troops ’ and ‘New “super” combat brigade’, while asking if this augured the creation of an African military power elite. The African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity (ACIRC) would support the ASF subregional structures of 5000 troops, in the form of tactical battle groups of 1500 personnel. These are to operate under a centralized command, have suitable combat and combat service support, with a minimal initial autonomy of 30 days. The AU announcement stated, ‘The objective of the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity is to provide Africa with a strictly military capacity with high reactivity to respond swiftly to emergencies upon political decisions to intervene in conflict situations within the continent’. The aim is to establish an efficient, robust and credible force, which can be deployed very rapidly, able to conduct operations of limited duration and objectives or contribute to creating enabling conditions for the deployment of larger AU and/or UN peace operations. The establishment of ACIRC will be contingent on the setting up of military capabilities, force multipliers and resources from the continent. To this end, assessment will be conducted and units meeting specific training and equipment standards will be certified and put under a Force Rostering System (FRS). ACIRC deployment will be subject to the appropriate decision-making processes of the relevant AU organs. Based on this statement, though AU is optimistic that the force will create robust and credible force, the need to continue building structures that are multidimensional may be shut down and that this wave is likely to down-scale to regional standby forces. Elitist approach to regional peace and security is an exclusionary exercise against civilians. Given the level of development within ECOWAS and EASF, the greatest concern is that the two Forces might adopt the concept of ACIRC, hence, deviating the whole idea of SF and this runs the risk of creating a duplicate capability at great cost to the contributing states. One of the AU officials had this to say: The new initiative, which would be dependent on the capacities of a handful of African military powers rather than the collective response, envisaged in the African Standby Force, would effectively bypass and duplicate the work that has gone into ASF development. Since the ACIRC has exclusively a military component, hence contravening Article 13 of the AU

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PSC Protocol establishing the ASF. (Key Informant Interview with Senior AU Official, Addis Ababa, 5 April 2014)

The need to coordinate and harmonize capacity-building initiatives by PKTCs has been pursued by ASF structures. One such outcome is the African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA). The African Peace Support Trainers’ Association (APSTA) is a pan-African association of 18 member institutions offering training on aspects of peace support operations. Members include training institutions that are designated as centres of excellence by the various regional communities and mechanisms. APSTA serves as the African Chapter of the International Association of Peacekeeping Training Centres (IAPTC). The Annual General Meeting (AGM) governs APSTA where the member institutions serve as the constituent units. An Executive Committee elected from the members function as a board. Located in Nairobi, APSTA has a Secretariat with six staff members and is led by a retired colonel. Through a 2008 Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), APSTA is meant to collaborate with the AU Peace Support Operations Division in support of the Operationalisation of the African Standby Force. However, a recent assessment of the organization found that after 10 years of existence, it has yet to live up to its promise as a standard-setting and harmonizing body for African peace support training institutions (IBCR, 2013). In response to some of the structural challenges facing the Association, APSTA is seeking to revise the existing MOU with the AU to build on the current link with the PSOD. It also aims to broaden its engagement with the Chairperson of the AU Commission, the chairs of the Committee of Permanent Representatives of Member States and of the Peace and Security Committee. This is in addition to the Departments of Peace and Security, Political Affairs, the Directorate of Women and Gender Development, the Citizens’ Directorate (CIDO), the AU’s Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), and other Commissioners and Directors. The implication of this collaboration would be enhanced linkages between the members of the Association and the ASF and thus supporting achievement of the ASF Policy Framework on integrated approach to development of capacities. In the meantime, the Association is loosely coordinating PKTCs with very limited influence on the quality of PSO training. Given the civil society angle to the Association, it would have been a useful institution in enhancing civil-military relations, however, inadequate resource

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and human capacity and donor-driven syndrome, remain unresolved. Efforts by the Association to improve training and coordination have been met with power relations between regions and among the different components. It is evident that the direction of the Association is greatly influenced by the military approach, as the two-consecutive leadership in a span of ten years have been retired military personnel. Military generals whose ethos and practical approaches penetrate the organization’s strategic direction also dominate the Board of Management. Even though some of the PSO structures are designed to increase interoperability among the regional standby forces and between the different components, the notion that peace intervention is a military affair still dominates decision-makers and the pattern of existing structures does not indicate a path towards an integrated PSO across the regions.

Conclusion This chapter has identified a number of technical and political challenges. The technical side includes the failure of a very multinational endeavour to develop common doctrine, system, tactics, techniques and procedures and the lack of an intermediary command and control structure between the AU’s Peace and Security Department and ASF brigades. Politically, a crucial missing ingredient has been adequate levels of interstate and inter-REC/REM cooperation. The varied geopolitical and sociocultural histories of the EASF members and dual membership of some countries in the region discourage progress in the region. Evidence is emerging pointing to greater ‘solidarity’ among ECOWAS members and high levels of commitment to funding the regional security effort. Another study suggested some ECOWAS member states are less enthusiastic and are suspicious of Nigerian ambitions to be the regional hegemony. The postcolonial influence of countries by their respective former colonies is also undoing to the progress made by the West African standby force. Moreover, trends in literature have identified a number of technical and political challenges. On the technical side these include the failure of a very multinational endeavour to develop common doctrine, system, tactics, techniques and procedures and the lack of an intermediary command and control structure between the AU’s Peace and Security Department and ASF brigades. Politically, a crucial missing ingredient has been adequate levels of interstate and inter-REC/REM cooperation.

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Last but not least, African financial support has been largely missing (Williams, 2010). At the level of the regional standby forces, a 2010 assessment of the institutions’ strengths and weaknesses concluded that in relation to the EASF there were internal tensions and conflicts within members states, piracy in Somalia, shortfalls in committed troops from member states, and a general lack of political, diplomatic and military cohesion in the region (Williams, 2010). This implies that the concept of integrated planning and collective regional security systems remains elusive. Hence, civil–military tensions are likely to continue rocking efforts to build capacity for deployment within the ASF framework. The varied geopolitical and sociocultural histories of the EASF members and dual membership of some countries in the region discourage progress in the region. The same study pointed to greater ‘solidarity’ among ECOWAS members and high levels of commitment to funding the regional security effort. Another study suggested some ECOWAS member states are less enthusiastic and are suspicious of Nigerian ambitions to be the regional hegemon. The postcolonial influence of countries by their respective former colonies has created ‘saturation’ point, peeling back gains made by the AU dream of building a truly African PSO architecture anchored on the principles of systems thinking and dynamics.

References Apuuli, P. K. (2016). Establishing the full operation capability of the East African standby force: Challenges and opportunities. Insight on Africa, 8(1), 1–17. Costa, A. M. (1985). Multilateralism under threat: Causes, impact and the policy debate on government intervention in trade. Journal of Policy Modeling, 7 (1), 181–217. Francis, D. (2007). Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems. Ash gate. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/27313250_Uniting_A frica_Building_RegionalPeaceandSecuritySystems. International Bureau of Children’s Rights. (2013). Assessment of knowledge, attitude and behavioural change among security and defense forces. Montreal: IBCR. Linn, J. (2018). Recent threats to multilateralism. Global Journal of Emerging Market Economies, 9(1–3), 86–113. Murithi, T. (2013). Handbook of Africa’s international relations. International Handbook, 1st Edition. Routledge. Shaw, T. (1975). Regional cooperation & conflict in Africa. International Journal, 30(4), 688.

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Tago, A. (2017). Multilateralism, bilateralism and unilateralism in foreign policy. Politics Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. https://www.pollux-fid. de/r/cr-10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.449. Accessed 5 Dec 2020. Williams, P. D. (2010). Enhancing civilian protection in peace operations: Insights from Africa. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Research Paper No. 1, National Washington, DC: Defense University Press. Williams, P. D., & Arthur Boutellis, A. (2014). Partnership peacekeeping challenges and opportunities in the United Nations-African Union relationship. African Affairs, 113(451), 254–278.

CHAPTER 9

Building Actors’ Relationship Through Concentric Rims

Introduction Systems approach, specifically, actor–network theory-based approach to understanding the complexity of relationship between regional organizations (ROs) can be helpful in harnessing the synergy presented by such diverse organizations. This can prove particularly helpful in understanding how political systems work and the decision-making processes from such interactions. Of central importance in respect to the study of ROs is that actor–network theory provides a lens through which to view the role of systems thinking in shaping political processes. Key to this shaping process is the role in contributing to a more holistic appreciation of the complexity of ROs in their collective peace and security mandate. In practice, such approach can be useful in providing experiential lessons and tools required whenever the community is required to respond to any given threat in time and space. Thus, this chapter is in search of a mechanism for fostering decision-making symmetry in an actor-proliferated peace support operation environment. Experience and research on the subject of actor’s cooperation or lack of it in peace operation indicate ambiguity and lack of useful guidelines regarding cooperation among various actors (Rietjens, 2008). In what seems to be a deliberate move, the military are often ‘blind’ to other actors operating in the area and their cooperation is frequently supply based rather than demand-driven. The multi-actor approach to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. Onditi et al., Reimagining Security Communities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70869-6_9

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deployment in PSO does not always correspond directly with each other’s doctrine. Additionally, there is no direct correlation between the military and civilian approach, the interpretation of the same set of rules and procedures can be completely different. This leads to disunity of purpose in the field, an increasing resentment against each other and a prolonged conflict. Both the UN and AU have made efforts in addressing these structural challenges. For example, considering developing a Combined and Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre dedicated to the continuous development of the AU PSO doctrine. However, despite this effort, different interpretation of Rules of Engagement (ROEs) by various actors has seriously undermined the progress made by ASF and subregional structures to restore peace on the continent. While ‘proliferation of actors’ is a major concern in Africa’s peace operation policy and practice, due to its convolution effect, most authorities agree that the menace has not been adequately addressed (Rietjens, 2008). A combination of mistrust, dialectical norms, varied world view and lack of commitment by the various actors have often eroded the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. This is of course part of what Andrea Ruggeri et al. (2013) described as the ‘conditional effect of robust peacekeeping’. Nevertheless, both the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) have made efforts to address these structural challenges, for example, considering the development of a Combined and Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre dedicated to the continuous development of the AU PSO doctrine. However, despite this effort, different interpretation of Rules of Engagement (ROEs) by various actors has seriously undermined the progress made by the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in operationalization of the African Standby Force (ASF) to restore peace and stability on the continent. The African Union, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) have over the years invested in efforts to balance the influence of various actors to harness the potential synergy created out of such partnerships. African PSO institutions have made tangible progress in developing and implementing key policies for dealing with conflict across the spectrum, through collaboration at various levels. Likewise, they have been implementing a range of programmes to address structural causes of conflict, such as programmes on inclusive governance, rule of law, security sector reform, electoral assistance, gender equality, women and youth empowerment, climate change and resource management and capacity building for national institutions. There has been

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significant policy activism on the question of whether the ASF can sustain the AU’s peace operation intervention. However, this policy debate seems to suffer from a knowledge deficit on how diverse actors, sometimes with overlapping mandates, continue to influence the growth or erosion of the ASF. African regional and subregional organizations, as well as African civil society organizations, are increasingly working to prevent conflicts, address the root causes and sustain peace, for example by developing their respective institutional capacities for PSO. Furthermore, mindful of the fact that Member States have the primary and ultimate responsibility for conflict prevention, these actors are also bolstering their efforts to assist countries in preventing conflict and sustaining peace, on the basis of subsidiarity, comparative advantage and complementarity. In this context, there has also been increasing focus on the African RECs as key actors in PSO, given their role as building blocks of the African Union, as well as the foundation of RMs. However, in spite of these efforts, the RECs still face several challenges. For instance, their conflict prevention efforts are still largely reactive rather than proactive, as these tend to focus more on existing conflicts or crises rather than potential conflicts. Besides, there are disparities among the RECs in terms of their institutional capacities to prevent conflicts or to provide support to RMs for PSO efforts. This disparity is a direct result of the differences in their respective geopolitical contexts, as well as their institutional mandates and resources. Unfortunately, the very nature of the postcolonial states remains incompatible with the deep-rooted neo-patrimonialistic style of political economy of the continent. The disparity exists not only among RECs but also within each REC due to skewed allocation of resources among its internal organs, which undermines the REC’s overall institutional capacity to address the root causes of conflicts in a holistic manner. RECs are keen to address these challenges and enhance their institutional prevention capabilities. However, the AU and RECs/RMs cannot accomplish this mandate alone. Building partnership is key in implementing global frameworks such as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Goal 16), the UN Secretary-General’s Vision on Prevention, the AU’s Agenda 2063, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) Roadmap (2016–2020), the AU Master Roadmap on Silencing the Guns by 2020 and the AU Continental Structural Conflict Prevention Framework. This proliferation of actors in peace operations

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presents complications—duplication, hierarchies and sometimes ambiguity in mandates. The AU, through the oversight of APSA, has initiated efforts to coordinate the various actors; however, the question of how the various partners influence the decision-making in ASF structures remains unaddressed. While there are several models and approaches developed in social sciences to explain the role of actors in different organizational contexts, this study argues that proliferation of actors in the African Peace and Security Architecture is a key reason why such regional institutions fail to perform their core mandates. Stadtfeld et al. introduce the network actor model (DYNAM) for explaining coordination of actors. However, their focus on coordination of two actors in a tie limits the application of their statistical model to the rather complex proliferation phenomenon that the current paper unveils (Stadtfeld et al., 2017). Pah-Wostl develops a similar model (Actor-based Analysis and Model), specifically for aiding decision-making in a complex environment (Pahl-Wostl, 2017). Although this model addresses the fundamental question of how to link the human, environment and technology into a holistic entity for efficiency, the APSA’s dynamics are well explained through a macro-model that examines both the internal and external forces that have hindered the survival of the African Standby force. Rounsevell et al. (2012), propose socioecological systems (SES) model as an alternative governance structure and feedback mechanism. The challenge of narrowly concentrating on human behaviour as the main agent in decision-making as espoused by Rounsevell, is that the macro-factors responsible for shaping the strategic positioning of APSA is blighted. Therefore, this chapter explores a new model for analysing PSO actors and their decision-making influence with the view of fostering symmetry in decision-making processes. To this end, we put forward the Rim-Centre Actors Analytic Framework (RICAAF) to aid this new thinking towards understanding the influence of different actors in the African peace operation ecosystem

Actor’s Balance Sheet: A Theoretical Power Game? Both the behavioural characteristics of the PSO actors and the broader peace and security environment in which these actors operate are key in determining the future of an African PSO. Moreover, a broader theoretical view of actors’ interests, both within and outside Africa, is useful as it can provide useful information on the effectiveness of PSO. On

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this issue, military strategists have affirmed that modern security systems must produce ‘thinking soldiers’. The ‘thinking soldier’ is required not only to possess the qualities of a strategist, but also to attain mental adaptability and an intellectual agility to plan and execute missions in an ever-changing environment (Stewart, 2015). When the civil–military relationship is viewed from a strategic angle, the allegiance of the military to the civilian political elites is mainly determined by interest and responsibility (Feaver, 2003). Nonetheless, this relationship is not constant and depends on whether the military continuously obeys the authorities or not. It may also depend on the type of political regimes (Brosig, 2011). That is probably why political leaders with dictatorial tendencies are likely to increase the presence of the military in decision-making processes, with the aim of counteracting alternative views (De Waal, 2014). In this case, therefore, the military is used to achieve a higher political goal. Indeed, researchers have established that countries with high poverty indexes and lower state legitimacy are more likely to contribute troops to regional peacekeeping (Victor, 2010). Perhaps, this is to subvert voices dissenting against authoritarianism. All these outcomes determine who among the member states has the most influence and decision-making clout on matters of peace and security. But such conclusions should be considered with caution. Studies from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), for instance, have pointed to the power of ideas from a wide range of actors’ ‘best practices’ in handling potential regional catastrophes and civil wars, as opposed to political economy per se (Adeleke, 1995). The understanding of interactivities among actors in African PSO is central to this chapter. On the matter of linkages between actors, Rebecca Schiff asserts that cooperation between civilians and the military should be mandatory and that this could be achieved by focusing on dialogue, accommodation and shared values (Schiff, 1995). This phenomenon is not unique to African setting. In Latin America and Southeast Asia, for example, understanding the behaviour of actors in peace missions is crucial in two ways: first, it helps to explain the institutional and cultural conditions that affect relationships between the military, the political elites, and society at large; and second, it helps to lay a foundation for peace and stability as both the military and civilians are able to agree on fundamental principles (Demirel, 2003). Hence, this chapter explores interactivities and influences on the evolution of the ASF. Organizational evolution is largely dependent on how in sync actors are with

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other units within the larger establishment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This implies that an institution is composed of norms and values from actors (investment, associations, government and collaboration) (March & Olsen, 1984). In other words, organizations need legitimacy from the various levels of actors in order to function effectively. But legitimacy has been defined as the general perspective that organizational actions are desirable, proper and appropriate within the environment’s system of norms, values and beliefs (Cilliers & Malan, 2005). In regard to organizations’ legitimacy, it is worth noting that effectiveness of organizations in delivering on their mandates is influenced by both internal and external actors (Amenta & Ramsey, 2010; Zucker, 1977). For instance, if the ASF is perceived by primary stakeholders (the state) as illegitimate, this hampers its evolution and service delivery. Critics of the notion of the African-Centred Solution (‘AfSol’) have raised serious concerns about the AU’s capacity to intervene in its member states when humanitarian atrocities are perpetrated by governments against their own people. The lack of trust among primary actors is a clear indication that the diversity of actors in PSO poses a productivity challenge. Thus, this chapter presents a complex environment with both harmonious and dichotomous relationships between actors. As such, the most effective way of understanding these linkages and dissonances is by appreciating the complexity of the actors who form a web-like network in what this chapter coins the Rim-Centre Actors Analytic Framework (RICAAF). RICAAF, as a framework for analysing actors’ behaviour, can be considered as an analytical tool for deconstructing the complex peace and security environment with the aim of creating actor typologies. The actors in the African PSO interact in various ways: as competitors, spoilers and outliers. Several models have been presented for considering actors’ decisionmaking processes in an actor-prolific environment. Cook and Kenny (2005), offer a generic framework—the actor–partner interdependence model (APIM)—for measuring bidirectional effects in interpersonal relationships. While useful, this model fails to address the inter-organizational relationship balance of interest at stake—a vital consideration influencing decisions, partnerships and cooperation. Moreover, the APIM examines only the narrow relationships between intimates and how this relationship sustains interpersonal security. However, strategic security within a regional security community requires a broader perspective of how actors, in the form of institutions, organizations, individuals and states, relate to

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each other. While basing my assumptions on the APIM’s main theoretical underpinnings (security and relationship), we have coined the new RICAAF framework (Fig. 9.1), which classifies actors in four di-centric levels: (1) primary; (2) secondary; (3) tertiary; and (4) meta-tertiary actors (see Fig. 9.1). These elements will form the main structure of the chapter within each section certain components of RICAAF will be identified, in which to consider as positive (promoting the values of ASF) and negative (degrading the values of ASF) influencers. The interaction of these

Fig. 9.1 Understanding actor symmetry using the RICAAF model (Hypothetical) (Source Authors’ construct)

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components will be developed into a conceptual methodology that may prove useful in focusing PSO thinking on actors; it will also offer an approach for considering RICAAS framework within the broader APSA framework.

Key Assumptions Underpinning the RICAAF Model Assumptions are as important as the research problem in any scientific inquiry. Although assumptions are usually outside researcher’s ‘control’, they are required in order to sustain the ‘Letter and Spirit’ of research. In this chapter, we have developed four assumptions to guide the understanding of how each concentric (Fig. 9.1) relates to the other to produce a whole ‘RIM’ of relationship among key actors in the peace operation. This concentric interactivities among the actors in different levels will form the main structure of the paper: within each section, certain components of RICAAF will be identified, which can be considered as positive (promoting the values of ASF) or negative (demoting the values of ASF) influencers. The interaction of these components will be developed into a conceptual methodology that may prove useful in focusing PSO thinking on actors. We will also offer an approach for considering the RICAAF framework within the broader APSA framework. Here, we discuss the ways in which RICAAF model could be generalized for application in other regional organizations. There are four basic assumptions to enhance the applicability of the model in Fig. 9.1: • Scaling up: aggregating the various types of actors and their behaviour to a higher representational level, such that former entities are represented as concentric rims; • Scaling out: applying the same model across a larger spatial extent by contextualizing the various sub-entities that are unique to a region or continent; • Nesting: representing higher level processes as aggregate models that influence actor behaviour at lower scale levels, e.g. institutions (AU) that oversee lower level structures (RECs and Peacekeeping Training Centres), can mitigate on constraints or institute rules that influence actor behaviour at lower level; and • Interactivity/synergy: each agent acts to produce a combined effect greater than the sum of their separate effects. Actors are designed to complement each other in a complex fashion of resources, expertise and institutional bricolage.

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The foregoing assumptions are key in understanding why proliferation of actors within the APSA poses structural challenges to systems thinking approach within the regional security community architecture.

Tensions Among Actors in PSO In view of these unbecoming relationships between actors, whatever political support the AU might have attempted to offer was likely undermined by the interests and agendas of these states. This scenario grounds the view that neighbouring states have an impact on domestic conflict, as well as on the outcomes of peace operations (Solomon, 2012). Without the inherent ingredients of thought leadership among those driving the African agenda, the ASF or African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) would be as seriously incapable as the Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique sous conduite africaine (MISCA). A soul-searching moment for African leaders would be to reflect on how to debunk the foreign intervention that overrides the failures of African interventions to sustain PSO. A typical example is the so-called ‘Operation Sangaris’ mounted by the French military in the Central African Republic (CAR). This ‘invisible hand’ (external intrusion) into the African peace and security issues seems to be riding on certain structural weaknesses within the African institutions (Peter, 2015). The question remains, should the AU remain entangled in duplicating structures or should it, instead, concentrate on fine-tuning strategies to make the ASF more responsive and ready for rapid deployment? The ASF and ACIRC may be considered as products of ‘trial and error’. Nonetheless, as they have been in existence for over ten and three years, respectively, analysts have politically constructed some differences, both in concept and practice. These are: (1) while the ASF relies on member states pledging capabilities to regions, which in turn make these available to the AU when required (Lotze, 2015), the ACIRC relies on member states pledging capabilities directly to the AU, hence bypassing the regions; (2) whereas the ASF is a multidimensional capability that can be deployed across a range of scenarios, the ACIRC is a relatively smaller military force, intended to be deployed in an intervention context only; (3) while the ASF operates on the basis of funding and support arrangements with non-African partners, the ACIRC is intended to be an exclusively African undertaking, with operating costs borne by the AU member states and the contributing countries themselves, and support

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arrangements provided largely by the contributing countries; and (4) the ACIRC was formed to rely on the capacities of a handful of African military powers, such as the South African army, rather than the more collective response envisaged by the ASF. This would effectively bypass and duplicate the work that has gone into ASF development. Since the ACIRC is exclusively a military component, it could be a real challenge for non-military actors and civil society organizations (CSOs) to work with them due to the possible loss of autonomy and control over PSO activities. Yet, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol establishing the ASF, Article 13(4), reiterates the establishment of standby multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian, police and military components for rapid deployment, and in part reads: In undertaking these functions, the African Standby Force shall, where appropriate, cooperate with the United Nations and its Agencies, other relevant international organizations and regional organizations, as well as with national authorities and NGOs. (Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union)

A study conducted with more than 200 military and humanitarian aid officials with experience on the ground in Kosovo found major differences in institutional cultures (Minear et al., 2000). Indeed, Rubinstein et al. have observed that cultural interoperability among members of an integrated mission can present challenges to the functioning of a mission. Issues have especially emerged from missions such as Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia on horizontal interoperability of peacekeepers (Rubinstein et al., 2008). The military places high value on command and control, clear lines of authority, discipline and accountability, and it prioritizes logistics, that is, ‘guaranteed functioning under the most adverse circumstances, with the necessary “force protection” to carry out tasks’. The military’s institutional culture is characterized by considerable investments in human resources management, including extensive training at all levels, redundancy of staff, conducting ‘lessons learned’ exercises and, where possible, well-rehearsed responses in the field. By contrast, humanitarian organizations tend to be less hierarchical and to place higher priority on process. That is, how objectives are accomplished. They generally view overstaffing as needless duplication of resources. Moreover, relief workers tend to see themselves as non-violent people who have dedicated part of their lives to assist the less fortunate and

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whose most formidable task often consists of building consensus among conflicting parties without favouring one side or the other. These cultural differences contribute not only to discrepant mutual expectations, but at times, also to disillusionment among other actors, depending on which party is disgruntled. In their assessment of the Bosnia operation, Minear et al. (2000), report that military officials were surprised by the small number of relief workers assigned to complete particular humanitarian tasks, while aid workers wanted to utilize what they considered the ‘idle capacity’ of military contingents deployed as a necessary reserve for unexpected emergencies. Minear et al. further criticize the lack of understanding between institutions at the operational level: Humanitarians insist on distinctions between and among themselves. They are critical of the military for failing to understand that for example, OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)) is not an operational agency, that the World Food Program is not an NGO, the GTZ (German Society for Technical Cooperation) is a bilateral aid agency, and that the ICRC is none of the above. Yet distinctions that are equally important for the military, for example, between ARRC (Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps) and AFOR (Albanian Force (NATO) are often lost on humanitarians.

Other scholars have also observed that cultural differences are a major hindrance facing peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era (Aall, 1996). Inherently, human rights-based civilian individuals or organizations are likely to experience unease working with military forces, especially if those forces serve non-democratic governments with ‘unsavoury human rights records’. Moreover, Weiss’s (1999) study and recent events in Iraq confirm that the more closely civilian agencies are associated with an unpopular military force, the less room for manoeuvre the agency has and the more problematic and contentious Civil–Military Co-operation (CIMIC) on the ground becomes. Soldiers, on the other hand, often regarded non-governmental organizations as undisciplined and their operations as uncoordinated and disjointed. Although the NGO role in the UN peacekeeping started as early as 1945 when the UN recognized its role stating that …..its mandate is based on cooperation with civil society (Charnovitz, 1997). NGOs have however been seen to lack the right

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balance between international and local actors, and as such perceived as elitist actors in peace operation (Stahn, 2001). In the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), for example, the military expected civilian agencies to support its objective of enforcing order, while the civilian agencies wanted the military to supplement their efforts to deliver aid (Jeong, 2005). Given its concern with ‘mission creep’, the military tends to favour conditions where it can go in, provide technical assistance or logistical support, and then get out quickly. This can be problematic, as this approach rarely considers the long-term management implications of military infrastructure projects for the civilian population. For instance, in Somalia, the US military deployed its own engineers and support troops to rebuild roads and other infrastructure at a time when Somalis desperately needed jobs. However, the military entity was not interested in hiring Somalis because it wanted to complete the mission quickly and feared that involving ‘untrained’ locals would unnecessarily prolong the reconstruction efforts. Similarly, Mockaitis (2004) recalls an incident in Kosovo where an American officer forced a decision over what colour to paint a youth centre, ‘leaving the NGO to spend the next month sorting out the mess’. Based on his experience, Mockaitis concludes that the strong desire on the side of military actors to solve problems quickly often creates more problems and that ‘the line between “can do” and “bull in a China shop” is small indeed’. Gourlay (2000) agrees that these examples confirm that the military’s approach is focused on short-term, non-participatory and decisive action. The approach is primarily informed by security, rather than by the long-term development considerations that shape the operational activities of many civilian activities. Military units, by their very nature, are trained to respond to and operate in a ‘low context culture’, relying on directives, specific orders and standard operating procedures (SOPs) that are communicated clearly down the hierarchy. This stands in stark contrast to the ‘high context’ cultural and operational requirements of complex emergencies, where non-verbal signals, family or ethnic status, age, gender or ethnic differences, and social roles and expectations carry a lot of meaning. The concepts of low and high context cultures were first articulated by anthropologist Edward Hall (cited in Hornikx & Rob, 2017), in his theory of cultural differences, which assume a strong linkage between culture and communication. Interactions and communication in a given culture are

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determined by the social context in that culture, that is, the networks of social expectations that shape a person’s behaviour. In the same vein, an effective PSO requires a thorough intercultural understanding and an enduring commitment that ranges from stabilization of the post-conflict situation and normalization of relations between adversaries, through confidence-building measures, to the creation of a stable political order and sustainable democratic relations. Earlier on, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the UN Secretary-General, observed that international organizations and NGOs whose mandate includes conflict resolution, reconciliation, reconstruction and nation-building, tend to strengthen and solidify peace. Despite the availability of the apparent ‘blueprint’ on how to handle post-conflict situations, we have seen South Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Burundi remaining ‘tethered’ in fragility, and sometimes peacekeepers being massacred for lack of an expanded mandate or outright refusal of militants to cooperate in negotiating with official uniformed personnel. The organizational structures of peacekeeping forces and NGOs are typically polar opposites. Command structures in the military are centralized and vertical with clear and well-defined lines of authority flowing hierarchically from top to bottom. The chain of command is typically structured so that it can respond quickly and promote fast and efficient decision-making. Unlike with civilian flat decision-making structures, military decisions typically include finite deadlines and mission-specific rules of engagement that guide the entire operational structure from senior decision-makers to the behaviour of soldiers on the ground. By contrast, the organizational structure of most NGOs is horizontal and fluid, based on a consensus approach and allowing for considerable decision authority to be left to fieldworkers. Concerning social infrastructure, the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) and ECOWAS still lack a platform for allowing the transformation of peacekeepers to a multidimensional approach. Although the ASF Policy Framework has articulated the specific steps towards achieving a multidimensional force, the rate of transformation among African regional peacekeepers still lags behind. This sluggish change from a military-dominated operation to a multidimensional PSO has partly been attributed to inadequate social infrastructure that would enhance sociocultural and ideological adaptation among military and civilian personnel. Yet, inadequate preparation by peacekeepers has negative implications on their physical, cognitive, emotional and social status.

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Studies have shown linkages between effective organizational coordination and conformity to the context (De Coning, 2007). In spite of this conventional wisdom, the outcomes of UN-led peacekeeping initiatives still reveal challenges related to the inability of peacekeeping components to cope with each other in the mission area, thereby demanding a specific mechanism that is embedded in African sociocultural and political dynamics. Although the EASF has managed to establish a coordination mechanism at its Secretariat in Nairobi, full integration of civilian and military components is yet to be realized. For the ECOWAS standby force, the existence of the three components (military, police and civilian) within the ECOWAS Commission does not necessarily denote coordination, even though a recent assessment on the status of cooperation among the regional PSO actors revealed that some anecdotal coordination among these institutions exists (IBCR, 2010). This only serves to mobilize financial resources and no candid effort is underway to enhance the capacity of the standby force towards an effective civil– military coordination mechanism. Hitherto, such a mechanism would ensure positive working relationships between the military and civilians during planning and actioning of PSO. Relief and development agencies commonly promote participatory and collaborative working relationships that presuppose informal management and the ability to adjust objectives and activities quickly to sudden changes in civilian needs. In his appraisal of the various organizations, Jeong (2008) observes that ‘the efficiency of small NGOs depends on a minimum administrative overhead without the necessity of a formal management structure’. Considering the hierarchical nature of most intergovernmental institutions, such as regional standby forces, assessment may provide a clue to the nature of the relationships that exist between military establishments and humanitarian agencies in eastern and West Africa. In regard to structures, more evidence exists to show that humanitarian agencies—especially smaller ones, in part because of constraints of size and resources—do not usually strive for ‘unity of command’, but rather for what we coin here ‘camaraderie of command’. Instead of the common modus operandi of highly bureaucratized organizations that assign well-defined tasks and responsibilities to individuals, the more fluid structures of many NGOs require all to contribute their efforts and expertise. In addition, other differences include resource availability and

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utilization, accountability and transparency. The military’s ability to mobilize massive resources and deploy significant numbers of personnel to anywhere virtually overnight has become the envy of many humanitarian organizations, which often experience difficulty finding the necessary number of qualified staff to deploy. Humanitarian organizations are found to be accountable to donors, private constituents and their beneficiaries, and, therefore, tend to favour transparency even in relation to belligerents. For the military, transparency is obviously limited by national security interests and accountability is more limited to their respective defence ministries and parliaments. Peacekeeping is a risk exercise that requires meticulous planning and precision decision-making. The normative foundations underlying stability operations supersede the laws of war. This is largely illustrated by the 1949 Geneva Convention and its two Additional Protocols of 1977, representing the international community’s attempts to humanize war. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) specifies that: ‘Measures are considered humanitarian if they meet the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. In theory, humanitarian aid is supposed to reach all victims of crises and disasters and save lives while mitigating human suffering. As such, it is to be administered impartially and unconditionally without discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, sex, age, nationality or political affiliation. It is also to be administered neutrally without any political agenda. Impartiality and neutrality are indispensable for ensuring access by aid organizations to the “victims” on all sides of the conflict’. Given this very general understanding of these principles, the scope and nature of legitimate action remains open-ended and at times ill-defined. Traditionally, the military entity has been designed for the pursuit of national political interests to accomplish governmental objectives using force. As such, military action is always political in nature. Military missions are legitimized through the political process, but ideally also by reference to international law and broad-based international support. As a result, legitimacy is much more confined. When the UN Security Council authorizes a peacekeeping mission, it has to specify the scope of the mandate and the nature of legitimate action clearly, for example, the supply of food, medicines, shelter and healthcare for disaster victims. The rules of engagement provided to forces on the ground operationalize the

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mandate further and very specifically instruct soldiers on appropriate and inappropriate courses of action. Impartiality is also a fundamental organizing principle for the military in providing humanitarian assistance. For peacekeepers, the Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations specifies, ‘impartiality may mean that all parties to a conflict are treated in the same way based on international law and Security Council resolutions and that sanctions may be imposed or enforcement action taken against spoilers (United Nations, 2003). For humanitarian staff, however, impartiality means that emergency life-saving assistance and protection be provided to the needy civilian population, regardless of their political affiliation’. Tactically, the Handbook explains further, ‘Peacekeepers may, on occasion, need to keep a particular faction at arm’s length or under sanction (for example, for violation of a Security Council resolution). At the same time, it may be tactically important for humanitarian staff to maintain close dialogue with the same faction to ensure access to civilians under their control. Strategically, in places of active conflict or where access is contested, it is critical for humanitarian workers to be able to reach beneficiaries regardless of how the peace process evolves’. An effective PSO requires unity of effort and a coherent response from civilian and military actors alike. Clearly, stability operations in response to complex emergencies present significant challenges to response efforts. Humanitarian and PSO efforts may at times be at odds. Consequently, an effective PSO becomes a management challenge on the ground that requires civilian and military, as well as local and international, actors to work together. In view of these challenges, peacekeepers should avoid conflicting approaches, communicate clearly, share information and undertake common analysis and, in a best-case scenario, agree on a strategy. However, unfortunately, this structural dynamic cannot be effectively understood in the current narrow framework of actors. It is timely that PSOs develop a comprehensive model to assist in understanding their actors.

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Developing the RICAAF Model The operational environments of African PSOs are wide in scope, institutional arrangement and themes. For the purpose of this chapter, actors are classified as: (a) primary actors, comprising the AU, RECs and RMs; (b) secondary actors, comprising the Peacekeeping Training Centres (PKTCs) and other African-based think tanks; (c) tertiary actors, including the UN and other humanitarian and development agencies, mainly working on PSO projects; and (d) meta-tertiary actors, comprising bilateral and multilateral partners, mainly through diplomatic missions. The impact of these agencies to the PSO architecture is dependent on several factors, including financial capability, strategic interests, foreign and security policies and organizations’ cultures and systems of values (Apuuli, 2016). Depending on their areas and depth of influence, these institutions pose certain levels of risk to the realization of full operational capability of the ASF. Depending on their levels of power and influence, the influence

Fig. 9.2 Rim-Centre Actors Analytic Framework for Managing Proliferation of Actors in PSO (Source Authors’ construct)

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of each agency can pose high, medium or low risks (Buzan, 1984) to the growth and development of the AU PSO environment. Using the RICAAF framework (see Fig. 9.2), we provide a breakdown of actors in relation to their interaction with the broader PSO ecosystem. The RICAAF tool is not only useful in aiding the understanding of relationships between peacekeepers in an actor-prolific environment, but also the level of influence of each actor to the entire African PSO ecosystem. Although this tool portrays a ‘flat’ image of the relationships between various actors, salient hierarchies exist in regard to the level of influence on the PSO architecture. For example, observation within PKTCs indicated that even though bilateral partners (diplomatic missions) typically seconded only a single officer to the centres, they nevertheless occupied important roles in developing the ‘culture’ (doctrines and other standard operating procedures) of the ASF compared with the national staff. The international actor’s influence through resources, power of diplomacy and level of expertise ranked highly on the scale of influence within the PSO architecture. But the PSO institutions also perpetuated the external actor’s influence through patterns of dependency—via technical assistance, financial support and colonial legacies. Constant reference to external manuals by these centres continues to threaten the ownership and confidence of African peacekeeping experts to cultivate AfSol within the PSO institutions. Table 9.1 provides analysis of some of the interaction and divergence among the key actors in a typical African PSO environment.

Initially the concept was supported by all AU member states

It is embedded within the ECOWAS Commission, hence has a direct link to member states and the society Relatively advanced civilian component with direct links to the main peacekeeping training centres—International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC) and RPA Multiplicity of membership creates opportunities for enhanced peacekeeping capacities with wider cultural background—Anglophone and Francophone

Geopolitical homogeneity

African Standby Force (ASF)

Economic Community of West African States Standby Force (ESF)

Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF)

North African Regional Capability (NARC)

Central Africa Multinational Force (FOMAC)

It is the main decision-making body

African Union Peace and Security Council

Primary

Strengths

Organization

Construction of actor interactivities in the ASF Ecosystem

Classification of actors

Table 9.1

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(continued)

Multiplicity of membership creates unnecessary completion and duplication of efforts, e.g. Burundi and Rwanda have obligation to contribute troops to both EASF and FOMAC Double oversight by both the Economic Community of Central Africa (ECCAS) and the Central Africa Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) is a paradox Lack of solid structures to utilize capacities being generated by the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA)

Its composition of ten AU member states representative can lead to skewed decisions Its leadership is dominated by the Military Staff Committee (MSC) Lack of an effective top-down coordination mechanism The relationship between the ASF and RMs/RECs is fluid and erroneously based on personalities and not structures The phenomenon of hegemony perceived of Nigeria and the tussle between the Anglophone and Francophone creates more tensions in the region State-centric approach locks out CSOs, hence the force lacks fresh ideas for developing integrated capacities

Weaknesses

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The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) Peace Support Operation Division (PSOD) Peacekeeping Training Centres (PKTCs)

Think Tanks

It has the potential of deploying military force within a short time in a crisis situation

Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

Secondary

Unified by the Arab culture

Organization

Classification of actors

It is a potential coordination mechanism and the link between the ASF and RMs/RECs for generating capacities and mobilizing them for deployment They have direct linkage with ASF structures and PSOD for coordination They include: the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre, Accra, Ghana; the International Peace Support Training Centre in Nairobi; the Nigerian National Defence College in Abuja; the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre in Harare, Zimbabwe; the Ecole de Maintien de la Paix ALIOUNE Blondin Beye, in Bamako, Mali; and the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA), Cairo, Egypt Provide evidence-based policy advice and technical support. They have potential in enhancing engagement of CSOs to the PSO platform. Those working closely with AU PSO actors include: the Institute for Security Studies (ISS); African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and Peace Building Mission (AFDEM); African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA); African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)

Strengths

(continued)

Table 9.1

Most of these think tanks are externally funded, hence technical support to AU PSO is usually ad hoc with strings attached

Lacks the legal and operational capacity to enforce deployment of forces including civilian and police from AU member states Lack of funding sustainability and inability to generate training that respond lucidly to the emerging peace and security Training programmes are driven by donor requirement as opposed to the needs of each region

No clear linkage with the Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA) It is a military force and lacks structures for multidimensional capacity generation

Weaknesses

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Classification of actors

Strengths

Structures for harmonization and coordination of PSO training centres. As of May 2013, APSTA had 18 member institutions: (1) the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), South Africa; (2) African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations (AFDEM), Zimbabwe; (3) Cairo Regional Centre for Training on Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping in Africa (CCCPA), Egypt; (4) Environmental Aid Nigeria (EAN), Nigeria; (5) Ethiopian International Peace Support Operations Training Centre (EIPSOTC), Ethiopia; (6) Impact for Development and Change (IMPACT), Nigeria; (7) International Peace Support Training Centre (IPSTC), Kenya; (8) Institute for Security Studies (ISS), South Africa; (9) Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), Tanzania; (10) Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS), Ethiopia; (11) Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), Ghana; (12) Legion Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), Ghana; (13) Mali Peace Keeping Training School (EMP), Mali; (14) National Defence College of Nigeria (NDC), Nigeria; (15) Nigeria Army Peacekeeping Centre (NAPKC), Nigeria; (16) Peace Mission Training Centre (PMTC), South Africa; (17) SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (SADC-RPTC), Zimbabwe; and 18) Malawi Peace Support Operations Training Centre

Organization

The African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA)

(continued)

With over 18 members to coordinate, the Association lacks the legal tools and operational oversight over its members

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Organization

Includes UN agencies and entities and other humanitarian and development organizations

Includes multilateral and bilateral arrangements made between international organizations or states with various areas of collaboration. They include the European Union, China, USA, Nordic countries, NATO and other arrangements in support of funding or technical assistance

Classification of actors

Tertiary

Meta-tertiary

Source Authors’ construct

(continued)

Table 9.1

Potential for transfer of technology, models and alternative approaches to PSO

They have the resources and technical expertise in their respective thematic areas

Strengths

The main limiting factor is the inflexibility of the universal humanitarian principles: neutrality, impartiality, independence, and apolitical. Ability of humanitarian workers to interact and work with military forces in conflict situation is limited by these principles Their continued support to the AU and RECs/RMs perpetuates external overdependence and threatens the philosophies of Africanization and ownership of African affairs

Weaknesses

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Does the Evidence Support the RICAAF Model? The evolution of the ASF is driven by both structural and institutional interactions between various actors. Actors with different roles proliferate in this environment. The RICAAF tool has demonstrated that interaction of actors is not necessarily consistent with the ASF policy framework, nor the principles of Pan-Africanism. As such, both strategic and operational capability gaps, including the inability of the AU-led PSO to conduct a rapid deployment, remain a major challenge (Williams, 2013). These factors, however, are linked to the relationship between the PSO environment and actors. First, one of the predictions suggested in the theoretical part of this chapter was that the military is a professional force because it remains politically sterile and neutral. Since the military is a professional and apolitical force, civilian control of the military should never be in doubt. This is undeniably compatible with the notion of the professional supremacist or the tenets of the ‘normal theory’ in which society expects complete subordination to military authority in the political realm. This finding contrasts the trend in the literature that the perceptions of what it means to be a soldier are changing. Unlike most Cold War missions, which were either combat or non-combat in nature, peace support operations cannot be classified easily. They typically require military forces to think beyond the visible mighty in order to simultaneously fulfil combat and non-combat functions and coordinate their efforts with partner militaries and a host of civilian relief organizations. It implies that a growing number of peacekeeping formations seems to accept the military’s emerging dual responsibility: to act as a fighting force and to contribute to humanitarian relief efforts, especially as the ‘Cold War’ generation of officers is being replaced by a generation of officers who spent their formative years deployed in the complex emergencies of the Balkans, Somalia, Sierra Leone or Afghanistan. The challenge persists though, in the coordination of efforts between military forces and civilian relief agencies. The second theoretical expectation is that the assortment of ideas that informs the political belief results from interaction between the military and civilians, either directly or through ideologies. Through such interaction, institutions and organizations should be able to classify persons and explain the observed behaviour, or go further, to objectify them as part of social settings. Is there any evidence within the ASF via which those social

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settings have influenced processes? The conceptualization and subsequent adoption of the ASF Policy Framework in 2004 led to the establishment and strengthening of the regional standby forces to enhance African-led intervention (African Union, 2010). To this end, the ASF structures were established in accordance with the 2002 Constitutive Act of the AU and the Protocol for the establishment of the PSC (African Union, 2012). The Brigades were established in 2004 and successively transformed into respective Forces in 2007. Among other areas of capability development in readiness for full operational capability, the ASF structures endeavoured to develop a military force and a trained police element maintained on standby in member states, as well as some adequately trained personnel for the civilian component. Also, the ASF is expected to maintain coordinated capacities through a database system awaiting possible deployment across the conflict spectrum in any part of Africa. The African institutions mandated to drive this dream have been described as dysfunctional and clogged. One of the reasons given for lack of operationalization of the ideas and concepts is the lack of structures for coordination. Although the APSA under the leadership of the PSC instituted the ASF to coordinate and oversee the development of replicate structures within the five RECs, coherence and unity of purpose among regional organizations is yet to be achieved. Third, evidence demonstrates that group dynamics are a product of the social system shaped by shared values of a particular organizational culture. The different levels of socialization promote or demote the development of this culture. For there to be a stable and integrated force, the AU PSO environment must develop functional structures of coordination, communication and exchange of information between military entities and humanitarian agencies. While, anecdotally, the ASF structures have managed to establish some coordination structures at their respective Secretariats, full integration of civilian and military actors at a micro level is yet to be realized. The EASF and ECOWAS standby forces have been described as the most progressive of all the five. They have established policies and standard operating procedures for operationalization of the ASF. The full operational capability timeline had been marked for 2015. However, the 2013 Ibrahim Gambari team report alluded to the fact that there are conceptual and political challenges that impacted on the operationalization of the ASF (Cocodia, 2016). In part the report reads, ‘The lack of consistent standards and harmonized training further impacted on the effectiveness of the police and military’. Even in cases where training

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of civilians and police is successful, the question still lingers. Can these capacities be mobilized and available at the short notice of 14 or 30 days stipulated by the AU peace operation scenarios? It is unlikely at this stage that either the ASF or ACIRC is capable of mounting a multidimensional force in response to numerous peace and security threats. For all these, a central question is how the ASF structures expect to promote a multidimensional force while creating a military-heavy structure that is not responsive to the inclusion of civilian and police actors. The fourth prediction was that whereas external and internal actors may project their initiatives towards PSO institutions as noble, their actual activities reflect deep-rooted selfish interests at the expense of beneficiaries’ expectations. These hypocritical tendencies may increase civil–military tensions, hence sustaining military domination. Increasingly, evidence exists to show that despite international organizations providing training to peacekeeping training centres in Africa for the last decade, 90.9% of these trainings have benefited the military. Among those trainings, 80.0% were conducted by the UN Missions, 85.7% by NGOs/the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and 87.2% by peacekeeping training centres located in Africa (Onditi, 2015). The result reveals that both the regional bodies and international community continue to perpetuate militarization of PSO through their various PSO training programmes. Concerning the behaviour of visible actors, the overdependence of ASF structures no external funding is not necessarily developing the AU PSO model. The peacekeeping training centres are generally endowed with financial resources, not because they have developed internal funding mechanisms, but because they are largely externally funded, as noted by one of the interviewees: For the centres of excellence to be sustainable they have to secure a steady flow of clients, and diversify courses based on the real needs in the region. Otherwise, we shall create another ‘white elephant’ extremely dependent on external forces. With overdependence, it is obvious that we cannot innovate because centres will be serving interests of those who plant the seed. Independence of resource is also independence of mind. (Interview with a PSO trainee at the International Peace Support Training Centre, Karen, Kenya, October 2015)

Like any other development initiative in Africa, funding overreliance seems to affect both operational and strategic environments within

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PSO institutions. For example, the International Peace Support Training Centre’s (IPSTC’s) resource mobilization strategy revealed that a large proportion (60%) of the budget is provided by bilateral partners compared with only 22% by the Kenyan government in the form of military personnel, land and other capital assets. The remaining 18% of the budget is provided by international NGOs. The fifth hypothesis is that there is a strong relationship between the impact of individual and organizational values and norms in transforming the content and form of institutions. In order to understand how these dynamics play out within the AU PSO environment, we deconstruct the two schools of thought that are known to be driving the AU decision-making processes—gradualists vs. immediatists. It is ironic that both schools of thought (held by bureaucrats) are sceptical of engaging civil society organizations in critical decision-making processes on peace and security. Other approaches to regional integration, including bilateral and continental-wide options, exist. Still, analysts have observed that the challenge lies not necessarily in the grounding of integration, but in real political commitment and mistrust among leaders of the AU member states. Finally, since the configuration of ACIRC does not fit in any of the RECs, it is free from the tussles of subsidiarity and regional hegemonic brawls. The ACIRC was designed to provide Africa with a strictly military capacity with high reactivity to respond swiftly to emergency situations. This was based upon political decisions to intervene in conflict situations within the continent. Yet, mistrust and cynicism are two things that Africans will have to deal with in order to make headway in all aspects of development, including peacekeeping. With a long history of mutual animosity and of fostering insurgencies in each other’s territories, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), for example, was plagued by distrust among its member states. This happened at a time when unity was required in order to quench conflicts in one of its members, CAR. As reported by human rights organizations, this phenomenon played a huge role in incapacitating MISCA (International Crisis Group, 2011). Against the very principles of solidarity that cement the AU membership, during this period the governments of Chad and Sudan played a direct role in supporting the Seleka rebels.

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Conclusion Discussion in this chapter has demonstrated that, although the relationship among PSO actors presents a ‘flat’ image, the influence of each actor to the PSO architecture is asymmetrical. The concern is that this asymmetric relationship has ramifications on the effectiveness of interventions to the myriads of conflicts. Even though most of these factors seem unlikely to change any time soon, we have provided some insights for the AU PSO stakeholders for understanding and utilizing the actorprolific nature of the African peace operation environment. In view of the disconnect between the ASF and other structures such as the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), there is a need for a supportive policy and comprehensive strategy. In light of this, there is a general consensus among the RECs/RMs that the AU Commission needs to play a more strategic leadership role in improving coordination of the overall operationalization of not only APSA in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, but also at subregional level, without necessarily micromanaging RMs and RECs.

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CHAPTER 10

A Synchronic Dialogue and the Emerging Concept of Legal Security in Africa

Introduction As global security challenges mount, the century-old twofold construct of collective security and human security, begins to show its limitations. Born diachronically in the 1920s and the 1990s, both concepts have been articulated and applied by states and international organizations in search for that elusive of qualities—a reduction in aggression and armed conflicts. In search of systemic wholeness, the signs of a new security regime are beginning to emerge; one which in coordination with the two existent concepts of collective and human security could contribute further to global security’s Mattessichian wholeness (Mattessich, 1978). This new concept—is international legal security. In what follows, we wish to further develop its thinking and role within systems thinking, in this case within an African context. To do so, we propose to examine the specific African genealogies of both collective and human securities, while uncovering some of the conceptual deficiencies which brought about their recurrent failures. We begin this chapter with two brief historical surveys of collective and human securities. Temporally, both regimes emerged as the direct results of the phenomenon known as ‘treaties after traumas’: conditions whereby international mobilization materialized due to the impetus of immediate traumas recently experienced at a global scale (Ben-Nun, 2019). For collective security, the traumas were those of WWI and WWII. Human © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. Onditi et al., Reimagining Security Communities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70869-6_10

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security’s founding traumas came about during the wars of the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War (Ben-Nun, 2020). The older system—collective security, had emerged under the League of Nations (Lord McNair, 1936). Hampered as it were by the onslaught of interwar thinkers such as Carl Schmitt, this system only came into full fruition after WWII, as in the 1945 UN Charter. Human security emerged as a response to Rwanda and Srebrenica (UNHCR, 2000), with its auxiliary principle of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) (UNHCR, 2000; Evans & Sahnoun, 2002). Yet it to saw its demise once it was used as the prime pretext for forceful regime change in Libya, abused as it were by intervention-hungry Western countries. Stemming from these identified shortcomings, we propose some initial ideas as to how one might embed legal security’s three basic tenets: legal certainty, legal objectivity and judicial competences, into the daily workings of collective security and human security regimes. The alarming weakening of the prohibition over the use of force in international affairs, between the 1999 Kosovo campaign (absent a UN Security Council mandate), the illegal 2003 US invasion of Iraq (absent that same mandate), and the 2011 Libyan regime change (in stark abrogation of the 2011 UNSC 1973) has firmly reaffirmed the need for legal security’s conceptual elaboration. Its embedding via a systems thinking approach could well help reign in state aggression, while remaining in sync with the laudable humanitarian objectives of human security and collective security’s required state-based approaches. We conclude by proposing some indications on how to merge these three security systems into a conceptual ‘system of systems’.

Collective Security’s African Genealogy: Colonial Aggression and Military Occupations Collective security was born after WWI, and was first articulated within the League of Nations’ Covenant Art. 16. In its idealized version as in the Briand–Kellogg Pact of 1928, it was supposed to do away with war and state aggression altogether (Hathaway & Shapiro, 2017). States were supposed to act collectively against any given aggressor, whose attack on one was to be deemed as an attack on all (Stromberg, 1956: 251). While the Kellogg Pact was signed outside of the League’s purview, it did come to incorporate, for the first time, all the world’s powers, including the USA (who never became a League member) and the Soviet Union (who only joined in 1934 until the outbreak of WWII). The Kellogg Pact was

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but one component of a global system of collective security instruments enacted during the interwar period. Alongside the League’s Covenant, this system also included regional collective security instruments such as the Montevideo Principles of the Organization of American States (OAS) from 1933, and other European-based elements such as BENELUX structural neutrality. This myriad of instruments was designated as ‘collective’ both for systemic and substantive reasons. Substantively, it bound one state’s precariousness before aggression making that the responsibility of all states—‘collectively’. Yet it was also a collection of different instruments, some regional, other global, which cumulatively built up global security. This, in fact, was the first time where a ‘systems thinking approach’ of sorts was ever applied multilaterally at the international level. More than anything else, it was events in Africa, from 1935 onwards which would bring down the entire system of collective security (Mazower, 2012: 141–142). All revolved around a perennial challenge which continues to perturb collective security officials to this day: state aggression which manifested itself in instalment and prolongation of Neighbouring Military Occupations (NMOs). The long-standing international law of military occupation, which is over one hundred years old, did not (and still does not) distinguish between NMOs and occupations lead by forces belonging to powers geographically afar (so-called ‘classic occupations’). In theory, the same international legal stipulations apply to both types, be it for the US’ occupation of Iraq in 2003 or that of Turkish forces who have recently occupied Northern Syria since 2016 (Benvenisti, 2012). Lo and behold, one cardinal difference which distinguishes NMOs from ‘classic occupations’ concerns historical claims which the occupier voices vis-à-vis the land occupied—a feature overtly absent from all ‘classical occupations’. While there was no doubt that the US’ would eventually end its occupation of Japan after 1945, or Afghanistan after 2001, less than two years after Turkey’s invasion of Northern Syria, the Turkish interior minister clearly stated that these occupied lands formed: ‘part of the Turkish homeland dating back to the last Ottoman parliament of 1920’ (Barwari, 2019). The first major challenge to the validity of collective security occurred back in the early 1930s, when Japan came to occupy Manchuria, in what came to be known as the first aggressive NMO since the coming into being of the League of Nations’ global collective security regime. At the heart of the problem with NMOs lies a crucial conflation of legal terms: sovereignty versus military occupation that ought not to confer any

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sovereignty, as per the maxim: ‘there is not one atom of sovereignty in the authority of the occupying power’ (Oppenheim, 1917: 374). One should note that at least in international legal terms, Oppenheim’s clear distinction between occupation and sovereignty, between forceful territorial usurpation and legally recognized territorial title has remained the international gold standard (Gross, 2017: 20). As we will see, it is precisely the contribution of the new legal security regime, within the more general framework assisted by a systems thinking approach, which could diffuse such legal conundrums and drive conceptual clarity forward. The distinctive quality of NMOs concerns their legal and ontological murkiness. Military occupation, as it was originally envisaged, was to be administered by the occupier in an entirely temporary manner, ending either upon the true sovereign’s return, or with an internationally agreed upon legitimate transfer of sovereignty. As such, it was a tool geared towards the forestalment of aggressive conquest, in that it prevented legitimate title from being immediately transferred to an aggressor immediately upon his conquest’s onslaught. The 1928 Kellogg Pact, which outlawed conquest as a national policy, was thus a key moment in this ‘demise of conquest’ (Korman, 1996: 133–301). Yet beginning with Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1931, it is NMOs critical legal murkiness which would deal the deathblow to the League of Nations’ collective security regime. As Japan launched its occupation of mainland China (a League founding member), most other members decided to turn their heads, and not pressure Japan to end its occupation there. The only state which was vehemently opposed to Japan’s semi-permanent occupation was the USA. For America, the 1928 conclusion of the Briand–Kellogg Pact (which it initiated), signalled a crucial phase in the international community’s efforts to limit state violence as manifested through aggressive military usurpations. By laying down its hard 1932 ‘Stimson Doctrine’ of non-recognition of territorial acquisition by force, named after the US Secretary of State who called out Japan’s illegal occupation, the USA would come to carry the torch of collective security until after WWII when it chaperoned the UN Charter with its anti-aggression potencies. By refusing to recognize Japan’s forceful conquest, non-recognition became the paramount hindering element preventing the transfer of sovereign title over aggressively seized territory to the aggressor. Yet all that was in the making. In the meantime, Japanese occupation in Asia did not sufficiently shake the League of Nation’s collective security regime. In

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contrast: similar subsequent events which unfolded in Africa would bring the League crashing down. Few events were as harmful for global collective security during the interwar period as Italy’s invasion and annexation of Ethiopia from October 1935 onwards. In contrast to previous occupations such as France’s hold over the Rhineland and Japan in Manchuria, Italy had never set foot in Ethiopia, in part due to its humiliating defeat in the hand of Ras Alula back in 1895–1896 (Erlich, 1996: 175–193). Of the four African states who were League members, Ethiopia was the sole country never to be colonized by Western powers. Absent any casus belli on Ethiopia’s behalf Italy invasion of it triggered the most direct and lethal challenge to the League’s entire collective security regime. Yet rather than attempting to block Italy, the League’s custodians France and Britain opted to try and appease Italy by partitioning Ethiopia under the terms of the Hoare–Laval Pact of December 1935. The first people to fully grasp the implications of events in Ethiopia, and the first ones to comprehend their radical qualitative difference from any previous systemic challenges were international jurists. In his inaugural lecture upon taking up the Whewell chair of international law in Cambridge in 1936, Lord McNair did not mince his words. Aptly titling his lecture ‘Collective Security’, McNair began by applauding the League’s initial imposition of economic sanctions upon Italy due to its aggression against Ethiopia. Yet far from being naïve, he warned that the sanctions in and of themselves might not be sufficient to drive Italy out, thus critically harming the maintenance of collective security (McNair, 1936). McNair’s wish for a further strengthening of the League’s collective security measures never materialized. By May 1936, four months after that inaugural lecture in Cambridge, Italy had already annexed Ethiopia in full. On the 30th of June 1936, in a rare feat of historical foresight, the Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie took to the floor at the League of Nations Palais des Nations in Geneva to deliver what was to become the League’s requiem: The question is not simply to find a solution to the problem of the Italian aggression…It is collective security - it is the very essence of the League of Nations that is at stake. (Hazan & Berchtold, 2019: 310)

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Yet no one heeded emperor Selassie’s warning. Driven by its desire to maintain security within Europe, the League lifted the economic sanctions it previously imposed on Italy. Perhaps more importantly, the League’s members (France, Britain and many other governments) opted to recognize Italy’s sovereign title to Ethiopia. In doing so the overt and clear distinction between military occupation and sovereign title was swiftly abolished. Territorial appropriation via aggressive conquest, the forestalment of which had triggered the conceptual enactment of military occupation’s legal regime in the first place, had prevailed. The international community which bestowed its recognition over Italy’s illegal aggressive conquest of Ethiopia, subsequently recognized Germany’s forceful Anschluss of Austria and later the Sudetenland (both in 1938), just as much as it recognized Germany’s illegal aggressive conquest of Bohemia and Moravia a year later. Turkey’s invasion and occupation of the Sanjak of Alexandretta in French-mandated Syria soon followed suit, accompanied as it were by the League of Nation’s official decision to allow each individual member to legally determine its recognition of Turkey’s violent motions in Syria. Italy’s 1939 annexation of Albania duly served as the last straw before Germany’s invasion of Poland in September which triggered the official outbreak of WWII. For Ethiopia of course, WWII already began back in 1935–1936, as Italy decided to employ the usage of chemical weapons (mustered gas), which killed between 15,000 and 50,000 Ethiopian civilians (Sbacchi, 2005: 51; Grip & Hart SIPRI, 2009: 3). One signal trait of genealogies is that they leave behind substantive traces; red threads of evidence which if observed might highlight some forgotten aspects of great historical events. Back in June 1936 as he prepared to deliver his speech to the League’s assembly in Geneva, Haile Selassie intended to speak in French, the language of international diplomacy at the time. Yet once scorned and heckled by Italian fascist journalists and spectators present in the chamber, Selassie decided to revert and delivered his speech in Amharic, the native language of his besieged and usurped Ethiopia. The filmed footage of this event, along with its heckles, and Selassie’s Amharic discourse, can still be viewed today thanks to its live recording on film (Reuters, 1936). And thus, one of the most important speeches in collective security’s entire history, in defiance of international aggression, and in lamentation of its premature burial, was carried forth by one of the fathers of African independence, in a native African language (Amharic), whose ancient Geez alphabet stood side by

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side with one of the modern occidental languages of colonialism, on the pages of Selassie’s delivered speech (see image 1). When all was set and done, it was on African soil, and against an African issue that Alea iacta est (‘the die had been cast’). Ethiopia was collective security’s Rubicon. And few people understood that better than international law’s prince of darkness—Carl Schmitt. On the 19th of June 1936, following the official annexation of Ethiopia by Italy, and absent any critique from the League of Nations, Schmitt and his associates at the Nazi legal division of the German foreign ministry had concluded that from the point of view of international law’s bindingness, the League’s Covenant had effectively ‘gone into cardiac arrest’. It no longer had any legal meaning but merely a declarative one (Toppe, 1998: 58, n. 181). As the renowned historian A. J. P. Taylor exclaimed, it was Italy’s subjugation of Ethiopia, and the League’s acceptance which effectively ‘killed it’ (Taylor, 1991: 128). Few people saw this coming with such vigour as Carl Schmitt. To the layman, Schmitt’s name immediately associates with his role as the chief Nazi legal apologist, the ‘Kronjurist’ to use the exact German term (Mehring, 2009; Bendersky, 1983). Yet Schmitt only became a Nazi supporter during the early 1930s. Before that, during the 1920s he held a long and extremely distinguished career as the archetype conservative international legal voice who saw through the League’s false idealism and its international political hypocrisy. The dilemma concerning the League’s true nature has engaged scholars for decades now, and will probably continue to do so for some time to come. For some, it was the true harbinger of egalitarian internationalism since its ‘Wilsonian Moment’ (Manela, 2007). For others, the League personified the deplorable and unabated continuation of colonialism under the guise of other names such as Protectorates and Mandates (Pedersen, 2015). Yet back in the early 1920s, few people dared to question the League’s intellectual honesty. Amid the traumas and destruction of WWI, and the overt Victorian optimism which oozed out of the inkwells of writers such as Gilbert Murray and H.G. Wells, who spoke enthusiastically about ‘The War that will End War’, support for the League during the early 1920s was almost unanimous (Wells, 1914). Yet Schmitt was born and raised in the Rhineland. And it was here that he observed first hand the falsehoods implicit in the rhetorical jargon which was being propagated by the League’s diplomats, so as to masquerade the true political realities of vile conquest and colonial

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subjugation which the League officially opposed, yet actually continued. Speaking before an audience in Cologne in April 1925, six months before the signing of the Locarno Pact (October that year), and in the midst of the worst phase of the French and Belgian occupation of that native Rhineland, Schmitt unmasked the true consequences of the League’s false usage of international legal terms. The old Continental European method of political annexation no longer fits the modern world… In this time of imperialism, other forms of territorial appropriation (“Beherrschung”) have been construed…one example are the so-called Protectorates…another term to recall concerns Germany’s colonies [e.g. East Africa & Namibia] which the allies have annexed, or have taken over as their own colonies, and have termed them as Mandates. (Schmitt, 1925: 28–29—author’s translation from the original German)

Concerning the Rhineland’s seemingly never-ending military occupation, Schmitt noted that it had become the substitute to hardcore conquest, precisely because that occupation was open-ended, and was intended by the French to continue ad perpetuam: ‘Concerning the occupation of German provinces, of which the Rhineland is the central example…these occupations’ durations are drafted so as to allow for their recurring one-sided prolongation…At the end of the day, Poincaré’s renowned thesis that the 15 year countdown towards the end of the Rhineland’s occupation has not even begun is worthwhile recalling here. (Schmitt, 1925: 33—author’s translation from the original German)

Schmitt’s general understanding of the terminological abuses of legal terms propagated by the League would prove all the more salient as the interwar years unfolded (Rasch, 2008). As years progressed, so did the antinomies escalate between Schmitt’s views and those of the League’s ardent supporters such as Hans Wehberg (Wehberg, 1931). As Japan invaded Manchuria, it was Wehberg who first conceded that Japan did not breach the Briand Kellogg Pact, since it engaged in the ‘Military Occupation’ of Manchuria, as opposed to its full-out conquest under a declared war of aggression: war or military occupation: according to existing international law [e.g. De lege lata], in the case of the Chinese-Japanese conflict, one can only speak of a military occupation and not of war as such. (Wehberg, 1932: 2)

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Schmitt had no quells and quarries in duly referencing his opponent’s view verbatim (Schmitt, 1933: 139–140). Japan’s abhorrent ‘Rape of Nanking’ five years after Wehberg and Schmitt’s exchange would render superfluous the entire debate as to whether Japan’s actions on mainland China amounted to conquest or not, once the winds of victor-generated genocide began blowing (Chang, 2012). By the late 1930s, nothing anymore was called what it really was. The abuse of words and international legal terms had become commonplace. Italy could use mustered gas in its war of aggression against peaceful Ethiopia, for the sake of her colonial subjugation. Yet that conquest would become all but legal from the international point of view. Japan could sack China’s capital, annihilate its male population and mass rape its female inhabitants for the sake of stoking fear, with female rape used as a tool of psychological warfare, yet this was not to be labelled war but merely ‘military occupation’. The road to Auschwitz, and Dachau, and Bergen Belsen was thus paved in part thanks to the complete divorce of international legal terms from their objectively substantive meanings. In their wake—the intellectual ashes of collective security were turned to dust. It would take the full scale of WWII, along with its unprecedented human carnage, wholesale genocides, and the first-time usage of nuclear weapons to bring back the appreciation for the dovetailing between political realities and their corresponding international terms. This in essence was the thrust of the realist provisions instilled into the UN Charter, such as the Veto power for permanent Security Council members (Art. 27), and the council’s concrete power for military intervention as per Chapter 7 art. 42. The UN’s revised system of collective security, with all its pitfalls and shortcomings, is still the one which serves us today.

Human Security’s African Genealogy: R2P’s Rwandan Rise and Libyan Demise The second global security regime to be examined here concerns human security. A product of the 1990s, this concept emanated from a distinct counter-balancing reaction to collective security’s overemphasis upon state centrality. With its focus on human development, ‘freedom from fear’, and ‘freedom from want’, human security received its broader application in Pakistani developmental visionary Mahbub ul Haq ul Haq’s blessed work for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 1994). As UNDP launched their human security report, the 100-day

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long genocide in Rwanda was already in full swing (BBC, 2019). A year later, UNDP hardly wrapped up its successful advocacy work in human security’s favour at the UN’s World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen, before the Srebrenica genocide hit the news. To be sure, human security did not emerge ex nihilo. With post-Cold War conflicts from East Africa to the Balkans and the Caucasus being characterized as civil wars within states, existing collective security measures originally designed to tackle conflicts between states seemed structurally incompatible to these new wars. After all, collective security’s limitations from intrastate interventions were firmly grounded in Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, which was crystal clear about the inviolability of nation state sovereignty: international law’s ‘Westphalian sacred cow’. Simply put, and with the single caveat of intervention under Chapter 7 of the Charter (habitually reserved for wars between states) the UN was strictly unauthorized to intervene in domestic matters of its member states. Yet as Rwanda and Kosovo would prove, getting any agreement on a Chapter 7 authorization for military intervention to be deployed within state boundaries remained a contentious affair. The great clash between collective security’s state-centred logic and the people-centred logic of human security broke out in full force during NATO’s Kosovo bombing campaign against Serbia (March–June 1999). Frustrated after years of reticence by a cautious UN Security Council, as atrocities repeatedly surfaced in the Balkans, NATO decided to not even try and acquire a UN mandate for its military action. With a third of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population already refugeed, the alliance resolved not to waste precious time. As General Mike Jackson explicitly stated: ‘a humanitarian disaster loomed if the refugees were forced to remain in the mountain camps through a Balkan winter’ (Jackson, 2007: 304–305). NATO would ‘go it alone’. In its wake, Kosovo would also trigger the UN collective security system’s metaphorical ‘cardiac arrest’. It would also serve as the foreplay to NATO’s disastrous pattern of conduct in Iraq, and Libya. It is thanks to historical hindsight, that we nowadays ought to see NATO’s Kosovo campaign for what it was: a crucial felix culpa (an error with happy consequences) for the Balkans, yet which would carry forth disastrous consequences for global international security. The direct and causal link between NATO’s successful intervention in Kosovo, and the US and UK’s illegal Iraq war has been firmly confirmed by scholarship. Norrie MacQueen speaks of the Kosovo ‘approach that would famously

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be repeated four years later concerning Iraq’ (MacQueen, 2011: 163). Ann Orford is even more explicit: Kosovo, and later Iraq, represented a possible dystopian future in which powerful states or coalitions of the willing side-lined the UN and took its place as the representatives of humanity. (Orford, 2011: 33)

As Orford majestically demonstrated, the birth of the principle of Responsibility to Protect (‘R2P’) was inextricably linked to the international community’s failure to bridge between the old collective security and the concept of human security. Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo were UN failures precisely because there was no bridging between these two security regimes. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) convened by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2001, was mandated to come up with precisely this bridging via a systems thinking approach: between the old and the new. Unsurprisingly, Part 2 of the ICISS Commission Report which was aptly titled: ‘A New Approach: The Responsibility to Protect’, carried as its third pillar the title ‘Human Rights, Human Security and Emerging Practice’ (ICISS, 2001: 11–19). The very the Raison d’être of this type of military intervention, which was clearly illegal under the old collective security regime, was now called for by human security. R2P came to bridge this gap between the two systems by legalizing what was hitherto implicitly illegal—military intervention within states. The international community in the last decade repeatedly made a mess of… ‘humanitarian intervention’: coercive action against a state to protect people within its borders from suffering grave harm. There were no agreed rules for handling cases such as Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo at the start of the 1990s, and there remain none today…. It is only a matter of time before reports emerge again from somewhere of massacres, mass starvation, rape, and ethnic cleansing. And then the question will arise again in the Security Council, in political capitals, and in the media: What do we do?… In this new century, there must be no more Rwandas. (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002: 99–100)

And human security was now called upon to stand centre stage, pushing collective security into the limelight, given the latter’s overt humanitarian failures:

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The increasing influence of the concept of human security has also played a role: what matters is not just state security but the protection of individuals against threats to life, livelihood, or dignity…a large and growing gap has been developing between international behaviour as…in the statecentred UN Charter…and evolving state practice…which now emphasizes the limits of sovereignty. (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002: 102)

The first international organization to officially endorse R2P as part of its governing principles was the African Union (AU). In March 2005, some six months before the UN General Assembly (AU, 2005: 6). Importantly, it was the position of African states, as stated by the AU, that R2P should come under the workings of its collective security regime. According to the AU’s explicit reading, there was no on-par relationship between collective security and human security, in stark contrast to NATO’s ‘go it alone’ approach in Kosovo. Instead, a clear hierarchical subordination of R2P application’s was expounded, as it was placed ‘underneath the roof’ of collective security: any recourse to force outside the framework of Article 51 of the UN Charter and Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act, should be prohibited. (AU, 2005: 6)

One should note here that the UN General Assembly’s own endorsement of R2P, within the 2005 world summit’s final document, was far weaker in substance, and far more nebulous in its prescribed application of R2P’s, than that of the AU: …collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. (UN World Summit, 2005: 30)

This sounded like nothing more than a verbatim reiteration of the collective security clauses under Chapter 7 Art. 42 of the UN Charter. As if Rwanda had never happened. Had Srebrenica come about all over again, there would be little reason to believe the UN would act any differently

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than in its previously failing pattern. In contrast under the terms of Art. 4 (h) of its Constitutive Act, the AU could: …intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. (AU, 2000: 7)

The UN has no such clause in its Charter, whose amendment will most probably not take place any time soon. The discrepancy between Evans and Sahnoun’s lofty words over the pages of Foreign Affairs in 2002, which openly pleaded for that: ‘there must be no more Rwandas’ seemed impossible to bridge with the UN’s World Summit Outcome document of 2005. Yet there was one more factor which began contributing to R2P’s dilution and loss of moral credibility: the West’s growing appetite for military interventions the world over. And nowhere was this more blunt and painful than in the US’ and the UK’s 2003 illegal invasion of Iraq. At the heart of this issue lies the usage of state aggression, and to what end. From the late 1990s onwards, the US’ hegemonic position as a single uncontested power within a monopolar world brought about its increased resort to aggressive military interventions. In their recent accounts of the past quarter century, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have convincingly uncovered the US’ blunt retreat from the prohibition over the use of aggressive force in international affairs, which manifested itself in American preferences for harsh military interventions. These began in 1999 in Kosovo, continued in 2001 in the unauthorized US-instigated regime change in Afghanistan, went on to the illegal Iraq war (2003), and culminated in the 2011 illegal regime change in Libya (Mearsheimer, 2018; Walt, 2019). This pattern of behaviour contrasted sharply with the US’ policies immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989). In the Cold War’s immediate aftermath, unwarranted aggression’s such as Iraq’s 1990 baseless invasion of Kuwait, saw the USA mobilize a very broad UN coalition against Saddam Hussein, which even included armed forces from neighbouring Arab states, pursuant to support the UN received from its regional partner—the League of Arab States. Correspondingly, the USA under the leadership of Bush the father remained faithful to its international mandate, as it returned Iraq to its internationally recognized border, yet aptly refrained from forcing any Iraqi regime. In hindsight,

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the single term administration of George Herbert Walker Bush seems to have been one of the most intelligent, moderate and politically sensitive US administrations during the twentieth century. In stark contrast to that first Gulf War, following the successful conclusion of the 1999 Kosovo campaign, the USA clearly developed an appetite for liberally instigated regime change. This it undertook in its 2001 post 9/11 invasion of Afghanistan. While a good case could be made for the US’ pursuit of Al-Qaeda terrorists and Bin Laden on Afghan soil, in breach of Afghan sovereignty (pursuant to the self-defence prerogatives enshrined in Art. 51 of the UN Charter), no such argument could be made for the full-on overthrow of the Taliban as a US-engineered regime change, which lacked any UN Security Council mandate to that effect. Yet once in Kabul, regime change had declaratively become the US’ policy of choice. One need not spend too many words on the vile illegality of the US and the UK’s 2003 war in Iraq. Suffice it to mention the fact that in 2004, UN Secretary General Annan explicitly called out its illegality (MacAskill & Borger, 2004; Guardian, 2004). The UK government’s own legal adviser, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, had maintained that absent a clear UN Security Council mandate, the US–UK invasion would be illegal, would amount to aggression, and would expose the UK to possible charges of war crimes (Dodd, 2004). In 2010, the UK investigation Panel for Iraq confirmed that initially, Lord Goldsmith—the UK’s Attorney General at the time admitted to changing his views, from an initial vision of illegality, to a vision of legality, so as to suit the US and UK’s leaderships (BBC, 2010). In all probability, no intervention has done more harm to R2P’s universal adoption than this principle’s conceptual abuse under NATO’s 2011 military intervention and obtrusive regime change in Libya. To have the USA and the UK go to an illegal war in Iraq back in 2003 was one thing. Yet to have the UN Security Council endorse R2P as part of its reasoning for military intervention in Libya, only to get it manipulated by the USA and the UK for their own historically vindictive purposes against the Libyan regime of Muammar Gaddafi was an entirely different ‘kettle of fish’. The US’ and the UK’s betrayal of the terms of their UN mandate over military intervention in Libya, which they vowed would not be abused for the sake of regime change, yet which half way through officially morphed into the ousting of Gaddafi, came to embody not only the US’ long-standing retreat from the prohibition over the use of force

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in favour of armed interventions, but also ‘the West’s’ most despicable intellectual dishonesty. Under the strict tenets of R2P’s three pillars, the sole objective which could justify military intervention under its third pillar (‘Timely and decisive response’) was for the stopping or prevention of four specific crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing (UNGA-R2P, 2009: 22–28). Regime change—was most certainly not an objective in and of itself within R2P’s framework. Yet that is precisely what the US and the UK’s intervention in Libya turned it into. NATO’s intervention in Libya, which instilled a no-fly zone over that country, and which was accompanied by naval bombardment, was just as much a ‘coalition of the willing’ as Kosovo and Iraq were. Yet in contrast to the latter, NATO’s intervention in Libya enjoyed the full legal mantle of the UN Security Council’s mandate. Under the terms of resolution 1973, in its point 1, following the explicit reference to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (armed coercion of states), NATO’s prime objective was clearly articulated. It was to achieve a ceasefire in Libya as soon as possible (UNSC, 1973/2001: 2). The underlying reasoning for this was explicitly spelt out in R2P terms: Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population. (UNSC 1973/2001: 2) Italics in the original

As mentioned already in the introduction, the first pillar upon which the concept of legal security depends relates to international legal certainty. One measure of such certainty, or the lack thereof, concerns voting patterns in the UN Security Council. Notably, in the case of Libya, UNSC 1973 received five abstentions, including two from Veto-wielding permanent members (Russia and China) along with the abstention of the long-standing UN Security Council’s ‘unofficial’ 6th permanent member, whose beyond-reproach-integrity has rendered her this unofficial status— Germany. Barely achieving the required two-third majority threshold, UNSC 1973 was pretty much as contentious as it gets, short of an open veto. On the day of the vote over UNSC 1973, it was Vitali Churkin’s prophetic voice, as the long-standing and highly respected Russian Ambassador to the UN, which sounded the alarm bells regarding NATO’s upcoming intervention in Libya:

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…the League of Arab States turned to the Security Council with a request that it take immediate measures to ensure the protection of the civilian population…including a no-fly zone…the draft was morphing before our very eyes, transcending the initial concept as stated by the League of Arab States…Responsibility for the inevitable humanitarian consequences of the excessive use of outside force in Libya will fall fair and square on the shoulders of those who might undertake such action…. If this comes to pass… the cause of upholding peace and security throughout…North Africa and the Middle East will suffer. (UNSC Meeting 6498, 2011: 8)

The fact that Russia did not Veto UNSC 1973, and that it urged China to do the same, as a token of goodwill to the request by the League of Arab States, went unheeded in Western capitals. Rather than sticking diligently to UNSC 1973s letter, half way through its application, after it became clear that Gaddafi’s forces no longer posed a threat to civilians in Benghazi, both the USA and the UK decided to obfuscate the true and original intentions of UNSC 1973, as they opted to use it as an opportunity for what they thought would be their own favourable regime change in Libya. Understanding full-well the disastrous international consequences of such a move, US Secretary of Defence Robert Gates urged both the USA and the UK not to go down this intellectually dishonest route. Gates dreaded the consequences for future Russian—occidental cooperation. Yet to no avail: The high-water mark came in March 2011. When Mr. Obama decided to join an allied bombing campaign in Libya… Medvedev agreed not to block it at the United Nations Security Council… what started as a humanitarian mission turned into regime change…“The Russians felt they had been played for suckers on Libya,” Mr. Gates said. “They felt there had been a bait and switch. I said at the time we would pay hell ever getting them to cooperate in the future.” (Baker NYT, 2013)

In October 2011, Russia and China vetoed any UN Security Council action on the carnage which Assad was inflicting upon his own people in Syria. Precluding any doubts as to why they would no longer authorize NATO to act under the pretext of R2P with the Security Council’s approval, ambassador Churkin left no room for interpretation: The situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan experience. The international community is alarmed by

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statements that compliance with Security Council resolutions on Libya in the NATO interpretation is a model for the future actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility to protect. (UNSC Meeting 6627, 2011: 4)

In September 2016, the UK’s House of Commons released its investigative report on the complete collapse of Libya and it is becoming a failed state hotbed for Islamic extremists due to the deliberate Gaddafi regime change. Asked by the parliamentary investigative committee as to whether the object of British policy in Libya was civilian protection or regime change, Lord Richards—Chief of the UK’s Defence Staff simply replied that: ‘one thing morphed almost ineluctably into the other’ (UK Commons, 2016: 21). Read with Vitali Churkin’s prophetic foresight, what seems most plausible is that regime change was in the US and UK’s sights all along. R2P was merely the legal pretext. If it convinced the Russians—then so be it. And if R2P would forever be sacrificed as a result of this intellectual dishonesty, then Après nous, le déluge (‘After us, the flood’).

Legal Security: In Search for the Global Security Regime’s Third Systemic Pillar In the remaining paragraphs of this chapter we wish to begin to draw out some of the basic tenets of what am tentatively terming as ‘International Legal Security’. These tenets stem from the experiences and crucial shortcomings which have been elaborated in the previous parts of this study with regard to existing security regimes—collective security and human security. As shown above, collective security’s key pitfall, from the late 1920s until its ultimate demise in the run up and during WWII, was its tendency towards terminological obfuscation. Once colonialism had been terminologically supplanted by ‘Mandates and Protectorates’, and once aggressive conquests had been exchanged for the more seemingly neutral and implicitly temporary term of ‘Military Occupations’, the League of Nations entire machinery of international policymaking came tumbling down. The UN’s collective security regime which developed after Auschwitz and Hiroshima, which was far less utopian than its interwar predecessor, was also far more prone towards realism and power politics. The veto

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powers bestowed upon permanent members of the UN Security Council’s, as enshrined in Art. 27 of the UN Charter, and the concrete ability to command military enforcement as per that Charter’s Chapter 7, also brought about the highly fruitful (yet somewhat unintended) consequence of world powers speaking their minds in coram publico. Gone were the days of the League of Nations’ niceties towards Haile Selassie, while behind his back the Hoare–Laval Pact envisaged Ethiopia’s sacrifice on the alter of appeasement before Italian fascism. The UN was much more about ‘calling a spade a spade’. Ambassador Zorin’s attempt to hide behind the UN diplomatic technicalities could not save him from Adlay Stevenson’s direct exposure of Soviet mistruths during the 1962 Cuba missile crisis. Neither could Collin Powell’s overt lying about the false existence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction in 2002. Certainly, the USA could ‘go it alone’ war in Iraq. Yet it could not secure a UN Security Council resolution for it. This international public aspect of collective security, as embodied in the Security Council’s continuous true exposure of events, is probably the single most important trait of contemporary ‘democratic diplomacy’, in its stark contrast to the days of the League of Nations where appearances trumped over realities (Nicolson, 1961; Ben-Nun, 2018: 101–103). In a similar manner, human security, which came about during the 1990, and which translated into R2P, was brought down by what I term as policy hijacking. Once R2P was vested with the power to legitimize military intervention, it could be hijacked for the sake of other far less-worthy policy agendas (as in the case of Libya’s regime change). And just as terminological obfuscation brought down the League of Nations, so did policy hijacking bring down R2P, which today—after Churkin’s prophecy had materialized in full, has devolved into little more than a dead international footnote. Terminological obfuscation and policy hijacking. These are the two initial challenges which a new regime of legal security would have to answer, were it to begin filling the current gaps of today’s global international security regime using a systems thinking approach. This bids two methodological questions: • What might be legal security’s basic building blocks? • Who should be the people or body executing it?

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By firstly setting out some parameters for the first question: what legal security really is, one might be better positioned to answer the second question: who ought to do it. The literature on the notion of legal security is rather scarce. The few writings which do exist by eminent thinkers such as Gustav Radbruch (1878–1949) speak first and foremost about legal security as a spinoff of legal certainty (Radbruch, 1932). The basic idea here concerns the certainty of anticipation for a verdict’s outcome. Given free institutions of a fair basis, similar judicial circumstances and outcomes, under similar legal infractions of the law, ought to lead to similar legal consequences, irrespective of who the people are: rich or poor, their ethnic or religious backgrounds, or indeed their gender. At heart, legal certainty is closely associated with equality, as significantly elaborated upon many years later by John Rawls’ notion of Justice as fairness (Rawls, 1985: 227). Much of these ideas have already been incorporated into modern constitutions, most notably by officials who were designated to draft those constitutions for countries emerging from dictatorship into democracy as in the case of Spain (Peces-Barba, 1995). A second feature which discerns legal security concerns its prevention of arbitrariness and retroactivity. Individuals (or states for that matter) who took decisions in total accordance with the law’s written letter at a certain given point in time, and have done so in true faith, while adhering to the two basic ethical principles of equality and universality, should be shielded from subsequent changes of law (or doctrine) which were introduced at a later era. A new reading of reality or normativity ought not to effectuate change retroactively, simply because circumstances have changed much later. This aspect of protection from the arbitrariness of retroactivity has recently been reiterated by the Portuguese Supreme Court in its upholding of the rights of women who undertake a surrogate pregnancy role for other couples (Violante, 2019). We will see below just how important the application of this principle really is especially in vital questions concerning territorial disputes between states who derive their previously engineered borders from previous colonial-era treaties— a condition which impacts squarely virtually all African states, all Middle Eastern ones and many Asian countries too. The third feature I would like to stress concerns technical and thematic competence of the people and bodies destined to facilitate legal security’s execution. In a sense, this feature comes to serve as the key bridge between the answer as to the question of what legal security is, and the

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question who ought to do it. The people who should be legal security’s executing agent—should be international judges, at both regional courts, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and even more importantly, at the longest standing often overlooked international tribunal—the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). International judges—plain and simple. If there is one central ‘Plaidoyer’ this chapter wishes to make it is to involve, engage and bring in international judiciaries into international conflicts and security challenges in real time! Rather than simply bringing in international judges post eventum to a conflict, as a judicial dispute settlement mechanism, once the fighting has subsided and the carnage already inflicted, the introduction of international judges as facilitators can generate (and indeed has generated in the past) some remarkable results. The introduction of international judges directly into conflict settings, which usually and invariably entail ample measures of power-political features, would serve as the prime example of the effectuation and execution of legal security. Examples of the positive prospects which could come about thanks to the introduction of legal security as a third parallel pillar to collective and human securities are in abundance, especially in Africa. By all accounts, and notwithstanding the recent new civil war in Tigray, or the still-contested status of Badme, the Ethiopia–Eritrea Claims Commission, and the Eritrea–Ethiopia Boundary Commission, both of which were set up under the auspices of the PCA, have demonstrated a proven success in ameliorating conflictual conditions, to the point where their confidence building opened the door for further political active peacemaking in the Horn of Africa, between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2018. One would probably require the length of a complete volume, at the very least, in order to adequately cover the ICJ’s own positive contribution to African disputes. Its 1986 successful determination of the boundary between Mali and Burkina Faso is a case in point. Perhaps even more so, was the ICJ’s successful resolution of the Libyan-Chad war over the Libyan-occupied Aouzou Strip, which was returned to Chad following the court’s 16–1 verdict which was immediately effectuated just sixty days after the judgement in April 1994. The ICJ’s 2002 ruling which effectively transferred the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula back to Cameroon, and resolved that country’s border demarcation with the powerful Nigeria around Lake Chad has followed this successful pattern of the ICJ’s involvement (Koskenniemi, 2005: 576–579).

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Lastly on this point, Uganda’s holding to account by the DRC via its victory against it at the ICJ, due to Uganda’s military occupation of Ituri province (which was entirely set up by Uganda on sovereign Congolese territory), is one of the few places where the powers of legal security, have come to the fore in the most troublesome of regions—the Great Lakes (Okowa, 2006). To begin with, one should note the fact that the ICJ was called in by the DRC ‘in real time’, on the 19th of June 2000, as the second Congolese war was in full swing, just four months after the UN’s deployment of troops under MONUC. The ICJ’s immediate entry into the thick of events, with its emergency issuance of provisional measures to prevent both parties from committing atrocities on 1 July 2000 is important, precisely because atrocities continued. Legal security, which was triggered here by considerations of human security (prevention of war crimes and genocide) could not operate without the forces of collective security—the 5,000 MONUC troops. Both the UN, and the AU negotiators, could have relied far more heavily on the validity and credibility they had just received from the ICJ to implement a far stronger force into the conflict—deriving their justification from the provisional emergency measures ordered by this highest, most respected and irreproachable global international court. Legal security means the validation of courses of action in crux times. Yet just like any domestic court, the ICJ has no troops. It relies on collective security tools to effectuate its decisions. Systems thinking’s wholeness can mobilize collective security’s enforcement measures, marry those with human security’s people-centred ethos, while being correctly complimented by legal security’s prospective potencies. The legal security mantle offered by the ICJ in DRC vs. Uganda exposed the wide potential of legal security from one more perspective namely: from the complete willingness and truthful desire of international judges, animated by humanitarian and universalist inclining to come forth and offer their help—open and unincumbered. Judges, when they are truthful, do not evade hard questions and situations, but work hard to try and say something meaningful in the wake of great challenges. If ever there was an international challenge, then the now sixty-years old conflict in the Congo, and more broadly in the Great Lakes—is it. Yet faithful to its mission, in DRC vs. Uganda, the ICJ most certainly did not ‘beat around the bush’:

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The fact that the dispute was multifaceted, involving a large number of other States and rebel groups, and in essence affecting the public order of the entire Great Lakes region was not lost on the Court. It nevertheless defined its task as the resolution of a discrete set of bilateral legal issues, as defined in the actual dispute submitted by the two parties before it. In taking this approach, the Court… held that it will not refuse to examine a narrow legal dispute simply because it was a marginal aspect of a much larger political question. (Okowa, 2006: 751)

One ought to carry on at length on this point, which for the scarcity of space cannot be fully developed here, yet which should certainly foray into other world regions beyond Africa. The comparative dovetailing of courageous judicial action from other cases of the ICJ’s intervention in ‘hot’ conflicts involving mighty world powers, would highlight just how much strength is required from judges when they are asked to administer their judicial impartiality while facing up to huge political pressures and the wrath of those powers. The case in point here would surely be the ICJ’s 1986 verdict in Nicaragua vs. The USA, which as I have demonstrated elsewhere—serves as the bedrock for all judicial applications of international humanitarian law in armed conflict, under the most universalist of all international treaties—the 4th Geneva Convention for Civilians (BenNun, 2020: 218–220). It is also, the case par excellence where the ICJ spoke truth to power, in real time, and in the midst of Cold War conflicts which were tearing apart Latin American countries.

Conclusion: Towards a New Regime of International Legal Security For several years now, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) chooses one word, every year, which has either newly come into the dictionary, or whose meaning has been so revised so as to demand its definitional reframing. In 2016, that word was ‘post-truth’. The OED defined this adjective as: relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief. (OED, 2016)

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Little could the OED’s linguists anticipate just how relevant their 2016 term would actually become in 2021. With a reticent president standing by as a mob of demonstrators, animated by false conspiracy theories which that president intentionally propagated, takes over Capitol Hill killing police officers there, one should consider the needs for legal security domestically, just as much as internationally. For at the end of the day, one must acknowledge that the saving grace which singlehandedly prevented the possibly creeping, and hitherto unimaginable, overthrow of American democracy—was the US judiciary. It was the US’ courts system, both at state levels, and most certainly at the US’ Federal niveau which saved the day. There is much to be learnt from recent American experiences, both domestically, and internationally. In a globalized world which is continuously becoming more and more interconnected, the realms of the domestic and the international are constantly moving closer (if not already overlapping in some areas). Just as with the interwar period’s collective security regime, so in 2020 at the domestic level, terminological obfuscations, which masquerade truths by widely substituting them with overt falsities (‘the election was rigged’) can become lethally dangerous. They hold the potential of bringing down entire governance structures. When states engage in policy hijacking as all Western democracies did in NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, the damage to international humanitarian causes is felt the world over. Russia’s trauma of being ‘played for suckers on Libya’ would be revisited with a vengeance in Syria eight years later, as both Russia and China refused even the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria—if this were conducted outside of Russia’s immediate control (UNSC, 2019). Gross international mistakes last a lifetime. In the meantime, much life is lost. R2P’s policy hijacking has resulted in more death, not less. One can only wonder what the beloved and well respected Mohamed Sahnoun thought of the abusive usages of his R2P concept in Libya (Sommaruga, 2018). It is with these considerations, and under these historical experiences, that this chapter pleads for the instigation of a legal security regime, which would compliment existing collective security and human security regimes, looking to achieve a Mattessichian wholeness of sorts (Mattessich, 1978). The inherent potential of introducing international judges as facilitators into hard conflict situations, in ‘real time’ (as opposed to post eventum), and with strong coordinative faculties with collective and human security regimes, is a potential calling to be unlocked. The prospects for the amelioration of such conflicts, via this

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approach becomes evident when one considers collective and human securities’ structural weaknesses, which can be remedied, and ought to be improved by the further development and eventual introduction of a global regime of legal security. On the 23rd of January 2020, the ICJ, for the first time in its history, issued an immediate order for provisional measures against Myanmar’s campaign of ethnic cleansing against its Muslim Rohingya minority. Triggered by an interstate application tabled to the court by an African country half way around the globe (Gambia), in demand for the immediate enforcement of the terms of the 1948 Genocide Convention, the ICJ acted swiftly, immediately and most importantly unanimously like never before. The rapid and dramatic action by the ICJ did not escape venerable journalists: In a momentous and unanimous decision, the international court of justice… imposed emergency “provisional measures”… intervening in Myanmar’s domestic affairs by instructing the government…to respect the requirements of the 1948 genocide convention… The ICJ’s orders are binding on Myanmar and create legal obligations that must be enforced…The orders are automatically sent to the UN security council. (Bowcott & Ratcliffe, 2020)

The ‘African context’ of the ICJ’s ruling did not end with Gambia’s motion: The decision was read out by the court president, Abdulqawi Yusuf…For just over an hour, Yusuf read out the ICJ’s findings in a clear and deliberate speech that culminated in the court’s four remarkable conclusions. (Bowcott & Ratcliffe, 2020)

To the average reader, the fact that the ICJ’s president presided for the first time over the ICJ’s immediate application of the Genocide Convention which overtly over-rode state sovereignty, is probably dramatic in and of itself. Yet to the historian of international law, these last lines are nothing less than revolutionary. A Somali-born international jurist, who climbed the international legal ladder to become the president of the world’s highest court, administers an immediate and forceful measure against an Asian state, with the entire world’s other judges unanimously behind his decision to breach state sovereignty—and this: one hundred years after that court’s establishment.

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One can only imagine the reaction of Dionisio Anzilotti, the original author of the world court’s statute, who presided over it between 1928 and 1930, had an alien from Mars landed on earth one hundred years ago and told him what would unfold. That a Somali-enslaved subject from the colony controlled by Anzilotti’s native Italy, from where Italy launched her aggressive conquest of Ethiopia in 1935, would become the president of the world’s court which Anzilotti established, would probably have seemed to him beyond imagination. That today, both the court’s president (Abdulqawi Yusuf—Somalia) and its vice president (Xue Hanqin—China) emanate from countries which back in 1920 were fully or partially colonized, that four of the Court’s current judges are African by birth, two Muslim, one Christian and one Jewish, would simply not be possible back in 1920. That the court’s vice president is a woman— would probably be equally unimaginable to Anzilotti, given that women were only firstly admitted to Oxford University the year of the court was established. It would still take another eight years until 1928 before women would even receive the full right to vote in England. In his last published work, Antonio Cassese, the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia’s founding president, and one of the most important international jurists of the past half-century spelt out clearly the ICJ’s progress, and its representativeness for legal security’s conceptual way forward: The current success of the ICJ among many states, particularly developing and middle-sized states, is no doubt one of the few positive hallmarks of the current international society. (Cassese, 2012: 239–240)

Unlocking legal security’s potential for the improvement and betterment of the international community, especially under a systems thinking approach, in tandem with collective and human security regimes is a key challenge for the here and now. Upholding and forwarding the conceptual, as well as practical, debate concerning legal security’s effectuation seems more and more like a necessity. As a famous general expounded in his native Québécois French, as he refused to leave Rwanda in those dark days of 1994, and took to work in favour of humanitarian internationalism: Peux ce que veux. Allons -y (‘We can – that which we want. Lets go’) (Dallaire, 2003: xviii)

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CHAPTER 11

How to Build Maritime Human Security Systems

Introduction The intersection between blue economy and maritime security has been studied for decades. Some of the leading scholars in the field of maritime studies (Voyer et al., 2018) have theorized this relationship and proffered both conceptual and policy frameworks that are ideal for harnessing the richness of seas and oceans. For instance, the growth cycle opines that blue economy (BE) creates demand for maritime security capabilities, this in turn reinforces the environment for increased investment, leading to sustainable growth and development. The growth model is, however, not a panacea for maritime security cooperation. As rightly explained by Onditi and Yates (2021), the reverse can also be true if security capabilities and assets are not effectively harnessed to safeguard the enablers of blue economy, the limited resources will not permit investment, this condition reproduces the environment of ‘lack’ leading to poverty. The counterproductivity in the blue economy sector can also occur when the governance of the maritime sector is compromised, leading to the inability of shipping policies to address challenges related to environment, piracy, security, safety, economic vandalism and inexorable competition from well-established global shipping facilities (Roe, 2013). Yet the potential of maritime space is enormous. It is estimated that 90% of world trade is steered through maritime domain which is faced by insecurity in the form of restricted sea lines of communication, safety of maritime operators © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. Onditi et al., Reimagining Security Communities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70869-6_11

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(sailors, seafarers), safety of sea vessels/crafts, illegal fishing in territorial waters and pollution of the sea environment. The African Union’s Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) which was drafted in 2016 recognizes the centrality of maritime security within the AU’s Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) of the Security Architecture of Africa Peace. AIMS provides albeit, ambitious and loose strategic framework for security achievement in the continental maritime domain. East Africa maritime space is subjected to a number of threats which include terrorism, piracy, illicit trading, small arms and light weapons proliferation, illicit drugs smuggling, human trafficking, environmental degradation among others. Kenya, for example, only has a liminal maritime security strategy and therefore the maritime domain is not formally integrated into the national security policies and strategies. Lack of a maritime strategy increases this domain vulnerability, inefficiency and ineffectiveness of security sector organizations. This factor also militates against optimal exploitation of the proposed Kenya’s BE. Given Kenya’s commitment to develop its BE, research focused on information necessary for improving maritime domain awareness and mainly the security is timely. Stable and secure Kenya maritime domain will promote national interests as well as facilitating movement of international vessels along the Indian Ocean. However, policy makers lack reliable information for risks assessment and mitigation in the complex and uncertain maritime environment (Schbley & Rosenau, 2013). Timely information and evidence-based decision-making process are crucial for enforcement of existing laws and regulations on maritime security. This chapter is informed by Regional Security Complex theory which focuses on the structure of global security (Buzan, 2003). The idea of ‘regional security multiplexes’ covers how safety is bundled in physically formed regions. Safety fears do not foldaway well over spaces and coercions are therefore in record likely to be regional. The safety of regional actors interacts with other actors, with deep safety interdependence in a region, though not amid regions, hence defining regional safety and security as an interesting area of study. This thinking will frame this chapter in exploring pragmatic maritime strategies and policies to guide the planning and operations in the Kenya’s maritime domain.

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Global Perspectives on Regional Security Community The African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), through strategies incorporating the bottom-up realities of working together among member states have been keen on developing an integrated maritime security and blue economy structures across the continent; the focus has been on joint resource extraction, boundary demarcation, sharing information especially sensitive information on naval capability (Hattendorf, 2000). Reconciling between the visions and realities is obliging interstate collaboration at the crucial stage of implementing maritime strategy. The 2050 AIMS contains potentially transformative and innovative concepts like the Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa (CEMZA). During the 9/11 outcome of the attacks on the USA, various international and local controlling powers reacted to universal security attention through commencing a procedure of safeguarding their stock chains, homelands and jobs. Clarity from this outbreak in the seafaring sphere is that there are numerous perceptions on the matters of seafaring safety that has become particularly evident in the security context (Teo, 2007). The prioritization of measures in maritime security directs to the precise query of to what level is piracy and terrorism a hazard to shipment in the waterway? Further, whose accountability is it to instrument the safety measures, relating to the argument on burden sharing ? (Bateman, 2006). Lastly, precisely how do these precautions get implemented and in specific, what cooperation step is necessary? The diverse views in this discussion mirror the many values, urgencies and distresses of interested parties. The various prioritization views of safety regarding other concerns of importance in the seafaring field were patent at the IMO in September 2006 meeting convened in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, meant to develop programmes and mechanisms to enable cooperation in protection the channels of Malacca open to triangulation and safe, not excluding the likely burden sharing choices. Three coastal states outlined the several schemes they desired to cooperate on and enactment involving concerned shareholders (Osnin, 2005). Yet, not any of the schemes drawn linked to sinking the risk of piracy and naval extremism, dominant in the safety schema through the 9/11 policy of the USA. All projects were relatively

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engrossed in safety improvement and conservation defence in the channels. For instance, one suggestion was the replacement and preservation of navigation utilities in the straits, while the last was the wrecks elimination in the Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) in the channels (Brandon, 2000). This underscores the opinion of the coastal states of Malaysia and Indonesia, which address the threats of maritime terrorism and piracy being of minimal significance than refining navigational welfare in the channels and seafaring capital protection (Malaysian Department of Marine, 2005). It similarly mirrors the opinion of these federations that the hitches of terrorism and piracy are inland matters; best diminished through internal hard work, while in some conditions, narrowed to local aid. A possible suggestion on naval safety in the channels whose priority is to safeguard the sea routes is through the Maritime Security Initiative developed within regions which will contribute force to undertake operative interdiction in the marine ranks that have communication prone extremists attacks. This concept is a supreme obligation and right of the coastline federations of littoral states to ensure navigation welfare and safety in shared waters. Though the coastal federations desire to edge the ‘internationalization’ of the passages that will continue to avert every unswerving involvement in its preservation through peripheral authorities, they do not entirely desire to take up the costs affliction linked with this accountability, mainly as it contains safeguarding the sea routes compared to the dangers of maritime terrorism and piracy, additionally in the provision of environmental protection and maritime safety (Raymond, 2004). Current demands by the coastal federations for ‘burden sharing’ in the passages steered yet again to a condition wherein it is said that the USA tried to ‘internationalize’ safety in the shipping canal (Praetorius et al., 2010). The law of the Sea and Security in East Asia points out Problem Involvement in the Straits. The USA’s position on the Straits, seems like it neglects the Jakarta Statement as it anticipates the documentation of regions of aid by the coastal federations and assigns a foremost title role to the user states. Contrary, nationwide priorities and concerns correspondingly command the maritime security measures enactment at the regional level, predominantly on the acceptable level of cooperation. For instance, marine guards in the pathways of Malacca have been restricted to being only synchronized guards and not what other operative routine would prefer, combining duties with an endowment for crossborder pursuit. The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating

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Piracy (ReCAAP) is another instance with the point that the treaty has not been signed and approved by Indonesia and Malaysia, notwithstanding the fact that they were amid the 16 states that sprang the agreement in 2004, dubbed, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia. Broadcast information indicate that the Indonesian regime is indomitable to defer consent of ReCAAP with the believes that it impinges on the three coastal states’ sovereignty that protect the Strait of Malacca (Lanteigne, 2008).

Cooperation in the Indian Ocean The paradigm of resource economics finds home in regional settings or what political geographers have called Rimland (Doyle, 2018). A classic example of Rimland is the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) (Doyle, 2018; Wagner, 2013). The IORA has fronted the BE idea on the premise that growing this sector is not only economically viable, but it is a potential infrastructure for promoting a people-centred approach to development. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) defines BE as a subset of the ocean economy, involving economic sectors, assessing the cost environmental damages, and ensuring ecological balance (Doyle, 2018). Nevertheless, the scope of BE is much wider and deeper than economics of things. On a similar note, IORA makes a clear distinction between the concept of BE and more traditional ocean and coastal economy models. IORA defines the ocean economy as a segment of an economy, which is dependent on the ocean for the inputs required for production. The ocean economy does not necessarily need to be located on the coast or in the oceans. The coastal economy, by way of contrast, includes all economic activities taking place on or near the coast and is thus defined in geographical terms. It is on this basis that members of the IORA have established strong BE: namely, Seychelles, Mauritius, India and Australia (Rumley et al., 2012). Global institutions such as the World Oceans Council, the Australian Government, the United Nations, the World Wildlife Fund, the Partnership for the Environmental Management of the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA) and the European Union have defined BE based on the economic model and on an industrial prism (UNCTAD, 2016). Optimists, such as Sujantha Sosale (2014), are hopeful that regional frameworks such as the IORA have the potential of creating coherence in the connectivity of regions.

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The global oceanic space, the vast body of water that covers about 71% of the Earth, is geographically divided into four distinct named regions, based on historical, cultural, geographical and scientific reasons: the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian and the Arctic. However, the Southern (Antarctic) is increasingly becoming recognized by many countries— including the USA—as the fifth ocean basin (United States Department of Commerce, n.d.). The Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans are the most commonly known. The ocean is the single largest natural asset on the planet representing about 99% of the earth’s living volume and numerous benefits to humanity (Hudson, 2018). These benefits range from trade and economic development, tourism to transportation, peace, and security (including food security), and health. In 2015, the ocean ‘shared wealth fund’, defined as the total asset base of the ocean from which annual economic production (for example, the gross marine product) is drawn was estimated at US$24 trillion, providing goods and services worth $2.5 trillion (Obura, 2017). Collectively, the oceans constitute the world’s seventh-largest economy by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Hoegh-Guldberg, 2015: 60). The global ocean economy, defined by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to comprise all ocean-based economic activities (Hudson, 2018), including industries, and goods and services provided by marine ecosystems, is projected to reach US$3 trillion by 2030. The Indian Ocean is the third-largest Ocean in the World. It is historically known for international commerce. It was the route for European expansion in the late fifteenth century and a competing ground for European explorers and Arab traders for the sea lanes between Europe, Middle East, India and China. Sea-borne empires by European powers laid the basis for their colonial rule in Africa and Asia by utilizing the Indian Ocean while resources from the colonies to the motherland in Europe were channelled through the Indian Ocean. Even today, global trade for industrialized countries in the West and emerging economies in Asia depend on the maritime route and sea lanes of the Indian Ocean, in particular, the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) region which connects North America, Europe and Asia. The region has been and remains of global strategic importance due to its rich natural resource base, and in recent times, emerging challenges such as maritime security, for instance, in the Horn of Africa. The shared wealth fund of the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) region, comprising ten countries—Comoros, France, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique,

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Seychelles, Somalia, South Africa and Tanzania—alone is estimated at US$333.8 billion with a gross economic value of US$20.8 billion annually (Obura, 2017: 64). With abundant resources, the Indian Ocean maritime space provides many opportunities for economic growth and job creation for its littoral states. In global power politics, the Indian Ocean remains a strategic space for both traditional powers (the USA, UK and France) and emerging powers (China and India) that have economic and military interests in the region. Currently, the maritime space within the Indian Ocean is characterized by myriads of geopolitical and naval activities. In addition to the piracy in the Horn of Africa region and the presence of US naval base at Diego Garcia, the region has become a showground for demonstrating expanding power capabilities of both China and India, considering China’s increasing engagements into Africa and India’s upcoming naval base on the Mauritian archipelago of Agaléga. The potential of the oceans and seas in fostering economic development has motivated the formation of member-based organizations, institutions and structures for cooperation on the ocean and seas among states sharing or with interests in the water bodies. This is in addition to the (climate change) risk posed by the exploitation of the ocean’s resources. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is currently the major organization that seeks to promote development, cooperation and trade within the Indian Ocean. IORA is a member-based organization proposed by India, Mauritius and South Africa in 1995 and established in 1997. According to the IORA website, as of March 2020, IORA comprised 22 members sharing the Indian Ocean rim (Australia, Bangladesh, Union of Comoros, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Seychelles, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Yemen) and nine Dialogue Partners (China, Egypt, France, Germany, Japan, UK, USA, Turkey and South Korea). The Indian Ocean Tourism Organization (IOTO) and the Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG) have observer status. Cooperation in the Indian Ocean is in the interests of all states whose economies are critically dependent on its waters and sea lanes. Cooperation in IORA covers both strategic economic, political and security dimensions. Nevertheless, IORA Member States vary in terms of political and socio-economic development and are geographically located thousands of miles from each other. Though there is a history of trade and

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cultural exchange spanning centuries, the common identity at the centre of cooperation is the mutual sharing of the waters of the Indian Ocean. Moreover, most of the IORA countries are non-cooperative and have searelated disputes. For instance, Kenya and Somalia are embroiled in conflict over a maritime dispute, there is a likely possibility of maritime terrorism. Additionally, apart from South Africa, most of the African maritime states in the Indian Ocean have weak naval capacities which can only access about 5-nautical miles of their 12 nautical mile exclusive economic zones (EEZ), which is a worrying trend for the region. Traditionally, African states paid less attention to the maritime security domain due to their lack of investment in the ocean. However, many African countries are beginning to pay attention to the oceans as the ocean emerges as an important economic zone due to its blue economy potentials, the threat posed by piracy to oceanic activities and the challenges of illegal fishing in their exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Kenyan President, Uhuru Kenyatta, has in the past admitted that the lack of naval capacity was in part responsible for illegal and unregulated fishing by foreign vessels in Kenyan waters and EEZ (Republic of Kenya, 2015). Proper surveillance and equipment are necessary to monitor the activities of distant-water fishing fleets operating within a nation’s EEZ (FAO, 2015). To understand a region, it’s important to define or map it. The next section looks at various attempts to define the Indian Ocean region.

Understanding the Indian Ocean Rim Generally, the geography of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) appears to be clearly defined by the extent of its waters and the stretch of its coastline; running from South Africa via the Arab Sea, South and East Asia to Australia. Efforts have been made to map the IOR. These range from historical studies of the region’s precolonial and colonial era and anthropological studies of its segments (Sosale, 2014: 156–170). Historical studies conceptualized the idea of the Indian Ocean World, taking into account sea-oriented links—trade routes and ports—that created a web of connections between Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia in the precolonial, colonial and post-colonial periods (Bose, 2002). Historian Bose defined the IOR as an ‘inter-region’ rather than a ‘region’, seeing the region as an ‘inter-regional arena of political, economic, and cultural interaction’ (Bose, 2002: 372). Sosale argues that the term ‘interregion’ ‘suggests more fluidity for analysis than the term “region”’,

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which Bose argued, ‘connotes a more rigid enclosure’ of the IOR space (Bose, 2006 in Sosale, 2014: 158). The formation of the IOR ‘interregional arena’ follows the shared political, economic and demographic history of the region (Bose, 2002). Before colonization, inhabitants of the region utilized pre-existing interregional networks for various social and economic purposes. These pre-existing interregional networks were ‘utilized, molded and reordered’ before being ‘rendered subservient’ by colonial powers, but never torn apart until they came under severe strain in the 1930s (Bose, 2002: 372). The notion of pre-existing interregional networks is supported by scholars who note that for certain chronological periods, the Indian Ocean can best be described as ‘an ocean of islands’, that is, ‘a geohistorical entity of which the constituent parts were geographical and geopolitical islands’ (Margariti, 2013: 199). Defining the Indian Ocean as an ‘ocean of islands’ takes into consideration the expanding maritime commerce beginning with the tenth century and onwards, a period characterized by the formation of independent, autonomous or semi-autonomous communities that would play a significant role in the articulation of trading and other networks in the Indian Ocean (Margariti, 2013: 199). Many of these communities were based on geographical islands which utilized land and sea spaces that connected with other island and non-island communities (Margariti, 2013: 199). In economic terms, it can be said that beginning with the interaction between these ‘islands and non-island communities’ the Indian Ocean rim gradually developed as a vital trade and commerce route, in the precolonial, colonial and today, considering its geostrategic location midway between three continents—Africa, Asia and Australia and transcontinental Europe. The region’s cultural demographics are defined by circular migratory patterns of these traders (Asians, Europeans and Middle easterners), and later forced migrants (for example, slaves from East and southern Africa) and temporary migrants (for instance, indentured workers from India and other Asian countries) who worked and later settled in the region. Politically, areas in the region sometimes fell under one colonial sovereign, administering them at a particular time, which shaped aspects of their post-colonial identities. For example, the IOR region which formed part of the British Empire or those administered under the British Overseas companies such as the British East Africa Company, in colonial British East Africa Protectorate countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, or the French legal and cultural influence in countries such

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as Mauritius and Madagascar. During colonization, Britain attempted to network (map) its overseas ‘Empires’ through communication media— the telegraph and wireless technologies—to serve the administration’s political, economic and policy goals in the region (Sosale, 2014: 156– 170). Towards the end of colonization in the 1950s, the strategic region around the east coast of Africa, midway between Africa and India was detached to form a British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) in 1965. This is reflective of the strategic importance of the region to the British, in addition to other Dialogue Partners, and their attempts to exert control within the region then, and today. The Pro-locational security-based construction of the region has generated several emerging concepts. First, the concept of the Indian Ocean Region, which embraces all 51 states bordering the Indian Ocean before narrowing down to IORA and its Member States. Second, the East Indian Ocean (EIO) which was promoted by Australia, and third, the Indo-Pacific concept which centred on recognizing the relevance of regional powers (especially India) in fostering cooperation within the region vis-à-vis other nations (Indonesia, Japan and the USA, among others) (Rumley et al., 2012: 2–3). Ideologically, linking the Indian Ocean with the Pacific was meant first, to advance India’s Look East Policy from the mid-1990s, second, bolster India’s claim to be part of the Pacific Region as it was not a member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and third, to strengthen cooperation with the USAXE “United States of America (USA)” vis-à-vis China (Wagner, 2013: 8). The founding of the IORA in 1997 presented new definitions of the IOR Region. From the standpoint of intergovernmental circles or among independent nations that constitute the IOR, joint exploration of the region for commerce, and emerging maritime security and sustainable development, for example in the blue economy, denotes renewed interest for regional cooperation in the Indian Ocean. To this end, the Indian Ocean can be defined or seen as a ‘space’ for cooperation. The cooperative mechanism initially appeared to be accentuating the classical dimension of the ocean (Fenn, 1926), seeing the Ocean through a transnationalist territorial perspective (Miller, 1995, 2007), for example, conceptualizing cooperation based on the ideology of the shared ‘territory’ of the Indian Ocean. But in the modern system of state cooperation, where regional or transnational organizations, for example, the European Union (EU), can define and enforce norms and influence the adoption of those norms beyond their territories, cooperation within a defined territory succeeds

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when accompanied with a shared ideology. To illustrate, scholars such as Manners (2006) have argued that the European Union applies its normative power ‘normative foundations of the European project’ in her external relations to reshape internationally accepted norms by influencing external partners’ conception of ‘normal’ behaviour in pursuit of a just global order. The idea of regionalism has succeeded in the European Union in comparison to other regions, and contemporary regional economic formations are in many ways conceptualized following the EU model of economic integration. As noted above, governmental or intergovernmental definitions centre on ‘regional cooperation’ and resonate with the classification of the IOR as an interregion (Bose, 2006). Taken together, these definitions present implications for locational determinism of the IORA, and the origins of the Association as a cooperative platform for nations either sharing or with interests in the Indian Ocean space.

Origins of IORA In the early 1990s, an era of increasing regionalism, the proliferation of regional initiatives across the world influenced proposals for closer cooperation among Indian ocean littoral states (Wagner, 2013: 8). Initial calls for cooperation originated from South Africa which was emerging from international isolation caused by its apartheid policies. In the period leading to independence in 1994, South Africa was interested in initiatives that would bolster its image in the unfolding post-Cold War liberal era. India was a strategic ally. Like South Africa, India had been isolated from global markets due to autarchy, and to integrate into the global economy, it had liberalized its economy in 1991 (Thakur, 1996). Furthermore, India had been a strong supporter of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. According to the High Commission of India in South Africa (2017), India was the first country to sever full diplomatic relations (commercial, cultural and sports) with the apartheid government in South Africa in 1946 and worked consistently to put the issue of the apartheid on the agenda of multilateral organizations including the United Nations, Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Then South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha visited India in November 1993 to restore diplomatic relations after South Africa had ended its institutionalized apartheid. During the visit, both states identified the need for closer cooperation in areas of interest such as the Indian Ocean. Botha’s visit

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was followed by a visit by President Nelson Mandela in January 1995. In his visit, Mandela proposed the establishment of a trading bloc in the Indian Ocean, remarking that ‘the natural urge of the facts of history and geography should broaden itself to include the concept of an Indian Ocean Rim for socio-economic cooperation and other peaceful endeavors’. Mandela further noted that ‘recent changes in the international system demand that countries of the Indian Ocean shall become a single platform’ (Rumley & Chaturvedi, 2015). South Africa and India soon emerged as hotspots for discussions on closer cooperation within the Indian Ocean rim with most debates taking place within academic institutions (Campbell & Scerri, 1995). For South Africa, closer cooperation presented an opportunity for the post-apartheid government to diversify its foreign relations after periods of international isolation while positioning itself as an emerging regional power. South Africa had also been previously excluded from geographically based regional organizations such as the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) and the ideology-driven non-aligned movement (NAM) co-founded by India. South Africa was only accepted into both organizations after it obtained full democracy in 1994. Previously excluded from regional initiatives in the Asia Pacific, and with the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) losing its momentum, India saw new forms of South– South cooperation, especially the Western Indian Ocean region, as viable alternatives to its ‘Look East’ policy (later renamed ‘Act East’). The policy’s political attention had been mainly geared towards countries in the eastern side of India despite most of India’s diaspora, border conflict (for example with Pakistan), energy interests (crude oil, petroleum) and the core of its maritime security challenges existing on its west (Mishra, 2019: 2). From India’s perspective, securing the Western Indian Ocean was as important as securing the east (Mishra, 2019: 2), a view that has gained prominence in recent years. President Mandela’s proposal for collaboration in the Indian Ocean was enthusiastically welcomed by both India and Australia (Rumley & Chaturvedi, 2015). Two initiatives led by Mauritius and Australia led to the actualization of regional cooperation. The first meeting was launched by Mauritius in March 1995 under the banner of The Indian Ocean Rim Initiative (IORI) to elaborate the prospects for intensified Indian Ocean Rim cooperation. Consultations involved government officials, business representatives and academia from seven countries—Australia, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Oman, South Africa and Singapore. This seven-country

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caucus formed the core group that later established the Indian Ocean Rim Association in Mauritius in March 1997 with seven additional members— Indonesia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Singapore, South Africa, Tanzania and Yemen. A subsequent initiative by Australia, the Perth Conference on the International Forum for the Indian Ocean Region (IFIOR) was held in June 1995. During this time, Australia’s focus on the region was mostly related to perceived opportunities in the emerging markets in the region, especially in India and South Africa (Rumley, 1999). The IFIOR had enlarged participation of 22 countries and a strong transnational approach. Following the two initiatives, the Association was formally constituted in 1997 as the Indian Ocean Rim—Association for Regional Co-operation (IOR–ARC) with its headquarters in Mauritius. The Association later amended its founding Charter and changed its name to the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) at the 13th Council of Ministers in Perth, Australia in 2014. Successful regional cooperation requires effective organizations backed with strong institutional structures and mechanisms. The next section examines IORA’s constituting institutions and structures and how they facilitate cooperation.

The IORA Regional Cooperation Architecture Principles IORA members adopted the fundamental principles outlined in its Charter. First, cooperation is based on the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-interference in internal affairs, peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit (Charter of the Indian Ocean RIM Association, 2018). Second, membership is open to sovereign states within the rim that are willing to abide by the charter; admission of membership and expansion of the Association occurs through a decision by the Member States. Third, decisions and issues on all matters at all levels are taken based on consensus; but issues that are likely to generate controversy and impede regional cooperation efforts (including those of a bilateral nature) are excluded from discussions at the level of IORA. However, the Charter makes no effort to define ‘controversial issues’. Fourth, cooperation within the framework aims to reinforce, complement, and be consistent with members existing or future bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral obligations. As such, rights and obligations entered or accorded to members in other economic or trade arrangements

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do not automatically apply to member states of the Association. Fifth, the goals and objectives of the association are to be achieved through a member-driven approach. Finally, members are expected to promote the principles of good governance to ensure the smooth implementation of such goals and objectives. Objectives The central objective of IORA is ‘to promote sustained growth and balanced development of the region and the Member States, and to create common ground for regional economic cooperation’. The objectives focus on areas of economic cooperation which provide maximum opportunities for the development of shared interests with the potential of reaping mutual benefits and include supporting trade facilitation and liberalization; promotion of foreign investment; scientific and technological exchange; tourism; migration of natural persons on a nondiscriminatory basis; and development of infrastructure and combined efforts to alleviate poverty, among others. To align with the re-emergence of global emphasis on the geostrategic importance of the Indian Ocean, in 2011, the IORA identified and prioritized cooperation in six areas: (i) Maritime Safety and Security; (ii) Trade and Investment Facilitation; (iii) Fisheries Management; (iv) Disaster Risk Management; (v) Academic, Scientific and Technology Cooperation; and (vi) Tourism and Cultural Exchanges. The Association promotes cooperation in these areas by encouraging collaboration between trade and industry, academic institutions, scholars and member states without discrimination or prejudice to rights and obligations of Members under other regional cooperation arrangements. Furthermore, structures such as the Indian Ocean Dialogue (IOD) emphasize the need to strengthen cooperation through dialogue. The Association aims to formulate shared strategy and common positions in international fora on issues of mutual interest. The Institutional Structure of IORA The institutional structure of IORA and its cooperative model is defined by its Charter. The Council of Foreign Ministers (COM) is the apex political body. The Council meets annually and periodically as mutually decided to formulate policies, review the progress of cooperation

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and make decisions on new areas, and matters of common interest. The Council elects a Vice-Chair who serves two-year terms. The Chair, in consultation with the Member States, is responsible for proposing elements and themes for discussion during IORA meetings. While Member states decide on the admission of new members, the Council may grant the status of Dialogue Partners or Observer to other States or organizations with interest and capacity to contribute to the mission of IORA. A troika consisting of the present chair, the vice-chair and the previous chair is established to ensure a smooth transition and implementation of objectives. The second-highest body is the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) composed of senior government officials from the Member States. The CSO meets annually or as required to review the implementation of Ministerial decisions in collaboration with high-level institutions: Working Group on Trade and Investment (WGTI), the Indian Ocean Rim Business Forum (IORBF) and the Indian Ocean Rim Academic Group (IORAG), Working Group’s on Women’s Economic Empowerment (WGWEE), Maritime Safety and Security (WGMSS), the Blue Economy (WGBE), Core Group on Tourism (CGT) and The Indian Ocean Dialogue (IOD). The Working Group of Heads of Mission (WGHM) consisting of Heads of Diplomatic Missions of IORA Member States based in an agreed country meets to review the work programme presented by the Chair of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). The Current WGHM is in Pretoria. The IORA operates an administrative Secretariat headquartered in Mauritius headed by a Secretary-General. The Secretariat and Member States (as well as Dialogue Partners) cooperate through National Focal Points established by each member state to coordinate the domestic implementation of regional objectives and activities. Members are responsible for paying an annual membership fee set by the Council of Foreign Ministers, which also addresses issues of non-payment. In 2008, the COM established a Special Fund with the principle aim of acting as a financial mechanism for facilitating the implementation of projects adopted by the Association. The IORA regional cooperation architecture has been responsible for various successes as well as challenges facing effective cooperation in the IOR region, as will be discussed later in the chapter. In the face of these elaborate cooperation structures, it’s important to consider what informed cooperation in IORA, considering the geographical vastness of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The next section explores determinants

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informing cooperation of regional organizations among nations lacking close geographical proximity. Situating the debate within the diversities among the IORA Member States, it explores whether cooperation in IORA is driven by geography (location) or ideology (non-locational factor).

What Binds: Geography or Ideology? As aforementioned, the formation of regional organizations is usually guided by common principles. Member States of the IORA have several commonalities and diversities in economic, cultural and political attributes that could strengthen or weaken their cooperation. One of the most diverse and geo-strategically important regions of the world, IORA Member States vary in terms of area, population and levels of economic development. In terms of geography, the region is diverse, consisting of countries from three continents. The land size of IORA nations ranges from Australia with 7.7 million square kilometres to Seychelles, with only 455 square kilometres. Interestingly, despite their small land sizes, small island IORA member states have EEZs bigger than their land sizes. For example, Mauritius has a landmass of 2040 square kilometres but an EEZ of 1.3 million square kilometres. Similarly, Seychelles has a landmass of just 459 square kilometres compared to its EEZ size of 1.4 million square kilometres (Attri, 2016). The Member States represent more than half of the 51 littoral states of the Indian ocean. They encompass and could be divided further into subregions (Australasia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia and eastern and southern Africa) and belong to other regional geographic groupings within the sub-groups (such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to name a few). Demographically, the Indian Ocean is home to nearly 2.7 billion people, which is one-third of the world’s population. India has the largest population of more than 1.3 billion (about 61% of the region) while Seychelles has the lowest population, less than 100,000 people. The three largest countries—India, Indonesia and Bangladesh—account for about 80% of the region’s population (Colgan, 2017: 10). In many ways, the region is the future. The average age of citizens in the region is under 30, in contrast to 38 in the USA and 46 in Japan (Jeffrey, 2019). The

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existence of this large and young population could transform the region into the next growth hub and consumer base, but also means that Indian Ocean states, especially the island states, must find effective ways to utilize the ocean’s resources to create employment and sustainably develop their economies. Moreover, the interaction between the population and oceans, is both cause and effect. For instance, climate change-related natural disasters such as tsunamis and strong tropical storms have periodically posed challenges and worsened livelihoods in small islands like Mauritius, and sometimes in coastal and hinterland states. In March 2019, floodwaters caused by cyclone Idai off the coast of Mozambique damaged property and displaced populations in Mozambique and hinterland countries, Malawi and Zimbabwe in southern Africa. All these mean that regional cooperation is necessary for exploring ways of effective utilization of oceanic resources and to mitigate the effects of climate change on the oceans and the littoral states, for instance. Economically, the IORA represents a heterogenous mix of developed, developing, Least Developed Countries (LDC) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). The Association comprises industrially advanced Australia and India, to Madagascar, Mozambique and Comoros which are among the poorest countries in the world, in terms of Gross National Income (GNI) based on purchasing power parity (PPP). According to World Bank Data, in 2018, Australia and India had a GNI of US$1389 trillion and US$2691 trillion PPP, respectively. In contrast, Madagascar had a GNI of US$13.455 billion PPP, Comoros US$1.185 billion PPP and Mozambique US$14.442 billion PPP. Nonetheless, the economies of many IORA countries have experienced rapid expansion since the formation of the organization. India is the fastest-growing economy in the region and the world, and the region is witnessing economic growth as investors seek opportunities in the region (Jeffrey, 2019). Emerging concepts such as the Blue Economy have revitalized interests for cooperation in IORA (Attri & Bohler-Mulleris, 2018). Member States are united in their shared interest in the ocean and its sustainability, and climate change and environmental sustainability remain central to the work of IORA. The fourteenth Council of Ministers meeting in Australia in 2014 recognized the blue economy as a high priority area for cooperation, and it is envisaged that the Blue Economy development could be elevated to become the agenda for IORA given the significance of the sector as a vehicle for economic development (Attri & Bohler-Mulleris,

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2018). Significant attention is paid to the large territory created by the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of the Indian Ocean. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the 1982 agreement establishing the EEZ extends the Zones up to 200 nautical miles from the shoreline. The agreement grants the coastal state adjacent to the zone exclusive rights to resources (including fisheries and minerals) found within the zone. Member states share a common interest in utilizing the EEZs to facilitate employment in the region through a sustainable blue economy, for example, through trade and tourism. Indian Ocean member states have an estimated combined total of 26.8 million square kilometres of EEZ, which exceeds their combined land size, estimated at 19.9 million square kilometres (Attri, 2016; Colgan, 2017: 13). On the other hand, the seven dialogue partners in the IORA hold possess a combined EEZ of 35.5 million square kilometres. The combined total EEZ controlled by IORA members and its dialogue partners is estimated at 62.3 million square kilometres, which represents about 45.49% of the world’s exclusive economic zones (Attri, 2016). Individual states have their EEZs, with thirteen of the twenty-two member states having EEZs larger than their land area; smaller island nations such as the Maldives and Seychelles have EEZ/land area ratios that are in the thousands. Beyond national jurisdictions, there remain nearly 44 million square kilometres in the Indian Ocean which is theoretically available to all states (Colgan, 2017). The IORA Member States aim to cooperate on the utilization of their EEZs as well as this ‘collectively owned’ zone. Given the large size of the world’s EEZs controlled by IORA members and dialogue partners, IORA is strategically placed to play an important role in spearheading cooperation in the blue economy realm. To this end, IORA has been instrumental in facilitating blue economy conversations. The IORA has held numerous conferences to explore ways of cooperation in the Indian Ocean which have resulted in numerous blue economy-related declarations. Among others, these include the Mauritius Declaration on the Blue Economy (2015) which seeks to harness oceanic and maritime resources to drive economic growth and the Jakarta Declaration on Blue Economy, which provides guiding principles and recommendations on how member states should exploit their blue economy (EEZs). In November 2018, Kenya, an IORA member state, hosted the first-ever global conference on the blue economy, the Sustainable Blue Economy Conference. This is indicative of the significance given to the blue economy, not only globally, but for the Indian Ocean region.

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The Indian Ocean is central to the existence of and cooperation in IORA. But as the most common bond among IORA member states, it presents a ‘peculiar legitimacy’ problem for the existence of IORA and its member states (Wagner, 2013: 9). Compared with land territories, the ocean is a public good and meaningful cooperation on shared oceanic resources can effectively be achieved through cooperation with the international community. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), littoral states have no legitimate claim beyond their respective national 12-nautical mile zone and delineated Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). The IORA is subject to and bound by UNCLOS but seeks to foster cooperation throughout the Indian Ocean, beyond these delineated zones, through cooperation and interaction with others within the international system of states. The Jakarta Declaration on Blue Economy, issued in May 2017, provides a set of guiding principles and recommendations for the Member States in developing approaches to the blue economy and sustainable development of their EEZs. The guidelines require member states to sustainably develop their blue economy or exploit their EEZ zones in accordance with the 1982 UNCLOS, and other international conventions and instruments related to the activities in the oceans and seas (IORA, 2017). For instance, the Member States, in collaboration with Dialogue Partners where possible, are required to perform environmental impact assessments before engaging in relevant deep-sea mining activities and fulfill relevant obligations to ensure effective protection of the marine environment from any harmful effects of deep-sea mining. Obligations can be fulfilled by inter alia, engaging the United Nations and its specialized agencies as articulated in the Durban Communique of the 17th Council of Ministers Meeting in October 2018 (IORA, 2018). Nonetheless, while ‘regionalism’ presents an opportunity for cooperation among states within a geographical rim, the narrow sense of the term presents a misleading concept with regard to maritime regions when littoral states lack sovereignty over an area they wish to represent (Wagner, 2013: 9). This is true when IORA seeks to foster cooperation in the Indian Ocean broadly, beyond member states’ 12-nautical mile zone and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). In the face of this perceived ‘legitimacy challenge’, does ideology come to the rescue? Most international or transnational organizations with members drawn from across the globe including the United Nations (UN), among others, are based on shared ideology or common interest. IORA’s formation was strongly

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based on ideological vision espoused by President Nelson Mandela. The role of shared ideology in becoming a member of a regional institution is seen in South Africa’s initial exclusion from regional formations within its immediate geographic proximity such as the SADC, at a time when the ruling apartheid government’s domestic and foreign policy interests misaligned those of these geographic formations. Besides, South Africa was only admitted to the ideology-driven non-aligned movement (NAM) after the end of apartheid rule and its achievement of democracy in 1994. Historically, the Non-Aligned Movement presents a good example of ideology-driven cooperation. In many ways, the non-aligned movement’s unity and successful initiatives before the 1990s reflect the power of ideology-driven cooperation among countries in different localities. The Movement coalesced developing nations from across all geographic regions of the world who professed non-allegiance to any of the conflicting eastern or Western blocks (and their ideologies) during the Cold War (Smith, 2013; Prashad, 2013). Despite their geographical distances, these nations shared a history of colonization and common ideology in the fight against imperialism, and all forms of foreign aggression and hegemony. The BRICS Forum (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), is a contemporary example of ideology preceding geography as a determinant for regional cooperation. Though BRICs nations are part of the ideologically conceived ‘Global South’ (Prashad, 2013), geographically, they are separated by many miles and belong to the southernmost part of the world (Brazil and South Africa), northern-most part of the world (Russia) and eastern-most part of the world (China and India). Nonetheless, these countries are united in their common desire to exert influence in world affairs (BRICS, 2016). In the past, ideologically driven cooperative frameworks based on shared interests or common agenda in the Indian Ocean Region have included the Indian Ocean Marine Affairs Cooperation Council (IOMAC) established in 1985 for cooperation in marine resources and environmental issues. Cases also exist where ideology has failed to foster cooperation in the region. In 1971, Sri Lanka proposed to enhance security cooperation in the region by declaring the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (IOZOP) to avoid superpower rivalry and ban nuclear weapons in the region through the General Assembly Resolution 2832 (1971) (United Nations, 2015). However, the initiative failed full implementation due to, among others, conflicting interests among several Members of the United Nations AdHoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (USA,

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Russia, India and Pakistan) which led to a cancellation of an envisaged United Nations Conference on the Indian Ocean (Kumar, 2000: 282– 285). The first major cooperative institution in the region, the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), established in 1982 to promote economic cooperation among East African island states of Comoros, Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles and Reunion (a French overseas territory) is mainly geographically driven. Non-locational factors such as strengthening regional cooperation in economic and commercial sectors are also central to cooperation in the IOC as much as they affect cooperation in the oceanic space. The IOC has objectives that closely resemble the objectives of IORA. But unlike IORA, members of the IOC are full island states with close geographical proximity, similar historical and demographic dynamics and common natural resources and development issues.

Lessons for the African Regional Security Community Like most regional organizations, the IORA appears to have elaborate institutional features. But despite being a major regional association, over the past two decades of its existence, IORA’s achievements remain modest with countless challenges. For example, the politics of population, culture, economy and regions affect Southeast Asia and East Africa. The eastern Africa periphery of IORA is insecurity-prone, characterized by an unstable social and political environment, with several IORA member states (Somalia) having failed political systems. Moreover, conflicts and instability in Somalia, Yemen and Iraq threaten peace in the region while the protracted conflict between India and Pakistan has posed a continuous challenge. More recently, a maritime border dispute between Kenya and Somalia is testing the organization’s legitimacy as an avenue for regional cooperation on Indian Ocean maritime issues. But as we shall see, the IORA shies from engaging in bilateral disputes between its members. Still, the IORA has initiated various projects following a model where one or several countries coordinate different issues. In the initial Work Programs, India supported business, Mauritius coordinated standards, and accreditation development while Oman sponsored seaport infrastructure upgrades and management. India and Mauritius also funded the creation of the Chair of Indian Ocean studies. The model of one member acting as a focal point for a sector of cooperation seems effective. Apart

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from IORA, other regional organizations utilizing this model include the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC). But is IORA’s regional cooperation model worth emulating by other regional formations? Examining some of the success or challenges of IORA over the years provides useful lessons from which best practices may be derived. Compared to her regional peers, IORA is the only pan-Indian Ocean grouping comprising countries from three continents with varying sizes, economic strengths, languages and a population of about two billion people. To reflect its regional dynamics, the IORA expanded its membership from fourteen member states at inception in 1997 to twenty members when it celebrated its twentieth anniversary in 2017. Consequently, the Association can be said to comprise the region; it is composed not only of littoral states but incorporates major users of the sea lanes of the Indian ocean—the USA, China, Japan, Egypt, the UK, France and Germany—as dialogue partners. Involving major powers has expanded the influence of the association. For instance, it formally obtained observer status at the United Nations Generally Assembly (UNGA) when the Assembly unanimously approved Resolution A/RES/70/123 on 14 December 2015 granting IORA observer status at the General Assembly (United Nations, 2015). The concept of Dialogue Partners, while fostering inclusivity, reflects ideology. Even though some Dialogue Partners possess physical interests or assets in the Indian Ocean (for example the joint UK–US naval base at Diego Garcia), they are geographically located in continents thousands of miles away. Many of these nations, except for France and Britain who possess some territory in the IOR region, share the common concern of maritime safety and security in the Indian Ocean space. Given the vast geographical distances between its Members, such as the distance between Kenya and Singapore or the distance between members and Dialogue partners, for example, the USA and India, IORA could be regarded as an International Organization addressing specific maritimerelated issues such as the management of the Indian Ocean rather than a regional body. Kaplan (2010) observed that the Ocean remains a global public good with no traceable history, unlike land. This view strengthens the argument on non-locational determinism of cooperation within the framework of IORA. Member States share the concern for maritime safety and security, trade, and economic development in areas such as the blue economy.

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The strength of non-locational factors such as ideology and ‘shared interests’ in regional cooperation is also seen in the participation of IORA members in adjoining regions and other organizations addressing specific functional issues. Countries participate in multiple regional formations to maximize their benefits. The IORA Charter emphasizes the need to strengthen cooperation among members and with Dialogue Partners to foster collective voices or develop shared strategies in global economic issues. However, Member States engagements in other groupings such as the G77, which most developing countries perceive as more suitable platforms for the promotion of shared interests, may distract attention from its pan-regional context. Strengthening ideology around shared interests will go a long way in fostering IORA’s pan-regional context, especially in the area of maritime security. IORA’s founding agenda was trade and development-oriented and lacked a security aspect. Even its primary socio-economic agenda appeared dormant for several years and only received much attention in the era of blue economy debates. This is evident in the concerted move towards cooperation in the Blue economy and its six priority pillars—Fisheries and Aquaculture, Renewable Ocean Energy, Seaports and Shipping, Offshore Hydrocarbons, and Seabed Minerals, Marine Biotechnology, Research and Development and Tourism. Nonetheless, the economic rise of Asia and rising stakes in and across the seas by regional and extra-regional states could transform the region into a theatre of global power rivalry. The US naval base at Diego Garcia, midway between Mauritius and India, India’s rising blue water capabilities and China’s cumulative investments through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in IOR and non-IOR littoral states have meant that the Indian Ocean Rim member states must partake in regional security. Additionally, non-state actors present non-traditional security challenges in the region. For instance, piracy in the Horn of Africa and southeast Asia constantly threatens sea lanes of trade and communication. Bearing these concerns, in 2012, IORA elevated maritime safety and security as the top priority area for cooperation and subsequently adopted a Maritime Declaration in October 2015. The first meeting of the Heads of Government of IORA countries in Jakarta, Indonesia in March 2017 occurred under the theme: ‘Strengthening Maritime Cooperation for a Peaceful, Stable and Prosperous Indian Ocean’, denoting the significance of the security realm of cooperation.

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According to Ruchika Rishi, then Director for Maritime Safety and Security in the IORA, prioritizing maritime safety and security was necessitated by the interlinkage between the ocean and trade flows (Rishi, 2018: 64). Indeed, the success of the blue economy, a priority development sector for most littoral states, is highly dependent on the safety and security of the seas. Compared to her peers, the Indian Ocean region requires concerted efforts towards security cooperation: half of the world’s container ships, one-third of the global bulk and cargo traffic and two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments pass through her waters (Attri & Bohler-Mulleris, 2018: 1–12). The Working Group on Maritime Safety and Security (WGMSS) was established in September 2018 to enhance cross-border cooperation and sharing of knowledge and best practices to secure the Indian Ocean as a peaceful, stable and prosperous region. The mutually beneficial, consensus-based, evolutionary and nonintrusive approach to regional cooperation has fostered stable relations among IORA members at the pan-regional level. In the face of economic, political and cultural diversity, cooperation among IORA member states has progressed without conflict. Many regional organizations are fraught with bilateral conflicts that have hampered decisionmaking at the regional level. In the East African Community, for instance, bilateral disputes between and among members have hampered prospects towards the formation of a long-envisioned political federation. In the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC), differences between Botswana and Zimbabwe, and South Africa and Zimbabwe often appear to derail cooperation in politically contentious issues such as democracy and human rights. For IORA, governance structures appear strong and effectively enforced. By excluding bilaterally controversial issues from discussions, IORA effectively prevents controversies that would create conflict and impede cooperation at the regional level. In January 2000, when Egypt and Japan were formally accepted as the first dialogue partners, applications of Pakistan and France were rejected. France had applied due to its sovereignty over the island of Reunion but was rejected since the Charter stipulates that only sovereign members are eligible for membership. France has a history as a maritime power in the region. Most of its island territories (for example Mayotte and Reunion) are in the region, and French has influenced some of the region’s population and culture; in IORA member countries such as Madagascar, Mauritius and Comoros. Though France was admitted as a Dialogue Member in 2011, it is still

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negotiating for full membership. On the other hand, India objected to Pakistan’s application due to a long-standing tension between India and Pakistan in the disputed region of Kashmir. During the eighteenth meeting of the Council of Ministers in Durban, South Africa in 2018, an application by the Maldives was approved while that of Myanmar was objected by South Africa due to pressure from human rights groups over the Rohingya Crisis. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) defines the Rohingya crisis as the mass migration of Rohingya people (mostly Muslims) from Rakhine State, Myanmar, to escape decades of systematic discrimination, statelessness and targeted violence by the state of Myanmar which amount to crimes against humanity. Rohingya refugees escaping violence from Myanmar have migrated to Southeast Asian countries—Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand—which are member states of IORA. For instance, Bangladesh has the largest concentration of Rohingya refugees—over a million people. Media reports indicate that Bangladesh and Somalia had previously opposed Myanmar ahead of the Committee of Senior Officials meeting over the Rohingya question (Mitra, 2018). However, they were convinced by India to drop their objections given the bilateral nature of the matter in an association, which restricts bilateral issues from its multilateral platform. Similarly, Mauritius initially objected to Maldives’ application following the latter’s decision to vote against a Mauritius’ sponsored resolution in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Mauritius was calling on the General Assembly to refer the sovereignty dispute over the Chagos islands to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for an advisory opinion. The Chagos is an area in the Indian Ocean administered by the UK as British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) but claimed by Mauritius. Similarly, there are no records that indicate whether the maritime border dispute between Kenya and Somalia, which has been referred to the ICJ has been considered at the IORA level, even though the association excludes bilateral issues involving member states from discussion at the pan-regional level. The above examples indicate that the consensus-based decision-making means that opposition from even one country can derail any proposal. The consensus-based decision-making and exclusion of controversial issues from discussion help avoid conflicts. But in effect, states often find it more appropriate to resolve problems bilaterally rather than on

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a pan-regional level, with two or more states. In the end, integration at the pan-regional level is substantially undermined. The Indian Ocean Dialogues (IOD) was designed as a forum for discussing issues of common interest in an open and free manner by key representatives of member states in an attempt to build the confidence necessary for addressing such issues. Examples of past dialogues include the Perth (2015) and Padang (2016) Consensuses, which stressed maritime safety and security cooperation, eventually leading to the adoption of a Maritime Declaration. Nevertheless, IORA’s processes still appear inclusive even though such inclusivity is not broad enough to include all littoral states sharing the Indian Ocean or adjacent waters. Undeniably, the Indian Ocean is a region of interest to both littoral states and extra-regional states, most of which are global powers. Ideology and a shared interest in trade and economic development have fostered inclusive cooperation in the maritime safety and security realm. However, while IORA provides an enabling platform for discussions, contradicting interests among its members and dialogue partners make it difficult to promote effective regional cooperation. The great American geo-strategist of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Alfred Thayer Mahan, stated at the time that: ‘whoever controls the Indian Ocean dominates Asia’ as ‘the destiny of the world will be decided in these waters’ (Shu, 2018: 8). With a rising Asia and enlarged importance of the Indian Ocean, these sentiments remain as relevant today as they were at the time they were proclaimed. In addition to their diversity, contradictions among IORA members and dialogue partners exist between emerging powers (China and India); between traditional powers and emerging powers; and historical contradictions between countries (Shu, 2018: 179). These contradictions have the potential of derailing regional stability and cooperation in priority areas like security. Exploring new institutional arrangements could help ensure contradictions such as the conflict between India and Pakistan (historical), India and China (emerging powers), and between traditional powers (mostly dialogue partners) and emerging powers such as the economic competition between China and the USA (historical), Indiado not hinder objectives of cooperation. Major powers can act as both a driving and dragging force in regional formations they partake. IORA’s future development depends on its ability to contain the role of global powers in its framework. The eighteenth Council of Ministers adopted a

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Declaration on Guidelines for Enhancing Interaction with Dialogue Partners in IORA which acknowledges the contribution of dialogue partners and their importance and commitment in assisting IORA in creating a stable and prosperous Indian Ocean region as underlined in the Jakarta Concord (IORA, 2018). Instead of a single hegemony, a core group of countries consisting of South Africa, Mauritius, India, Indonesia and Australia takes the lead in many initiatives. This lack of dominance has contributed to stability and cooperation. In contrast, in other regional organizations such as the EAC, one member (Kenya) is often accused of dominating and reaping more from the integration. IORA has held numerous conferences, workshops and meetings of the Council of Ministers. No single IORA meeting has been postponed or cancelled due to bilateral conflict between or among member states, even though these conflicts exist. In contrast, the EAC was forced to postpone its twentieth summit thrice due to conflicting bilateral issues among certain member states. Other structures like the Working Group Model and research institutions are already effectively utilized in regional formations in Africa with much success compared to the IORA. The IORA Secretariat also plays a pivotal role in the success of its programmes and objectives. Though the Secretary-General is appointed for a term of five years, the Chair rotates every two years ensuring strong accountability and clear progress on the Work Plans. Nonetheless, the ‘voluntary basis’ of cooperation limits commitments and active participation of governments and actors involved in IORA. Priority is increasingly being given to the blue economy area of cooperation which offers many economic opportunities. The exploitation of blue economy resources requires cooperation since the environmental risks that could undermine the achievement of blue economy goals are not limited to individual states; its main characteristic being water, the ocean can be described as a ‘moving’ shared resource and following this description, risks triggered in one region can easily be transported to other regions. To illustrate, if multiple States across the Indian Ocean region pursue similar marine activities and expansion plans, the cumulative effects are likely to exceed the carrying capacity of the ocean (Techera, 2019). Though there have been efforts to establish frameworks to regulate exploration of EEZ or blue economy resources, the IORA is yet to establish collaborative, harmonized or legally binding agreements that guide member states in the implementation of blue economy agendas.

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Individual member states have developed different laws and policy frameworks to guide the exploration of their EEZs, paying reference to international maritime and environmental laws such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). But the legal landscape remains fragmented (Attri, 2016; Techera, 2019). IORA can play a role in facilitating the development of comprehensive, coherent and cohesive regulatory frameworks to guide its member states in the development of their legislation and blue economy plans. At present, the development of harmonized frameworks in the Indian Ocean broadly is hampered in part by the Africa/Asia divide, and in some cases Middle East/Africa/Asia/Pacific divisions which have resulted in differing collaborations and cooperative agreements between states in these regions (Techera, 2019). The differences in sizes, developmental status and legal systems and socio-cultural backgrounds have also hampered harmonization of important regulatory frameworks. The IORA member states together with its dialogue partners possess about 45.49% of the world’s exclusive economic zones (Attri, 2016). The Jakarta Declaration on Blue Economy provides useful guidelines and recommendation to member states, but more needs to be done to develop coherent and harmonized regulating frameworks that govern exploitation and management of blue economy resources at the regional level since the environmental risks posed by exploitation of blue economy resources are not limited to one member states. Interestingly, in the absence of harmonized regional regulations, individual IORA states are taking the initiative to develop joint regulations. In the Indian Ocean, Mauritius and Seychelles have emerged as role models in the sustainable exploitation of blue economy resources. In the presence of fragmented regulatory frameworks to regulate the exploitation of blue economy resources, Seychelles and Mauritius have developed joint frameworks to jointly manage their EEZs (Attri, 2016).

How to Handle Maritime Insurgency and Piracy Analysis in this chapter reveals that for an integrated design of a maritime security and blue economy, there must be a strategy for a high multilevel degree of coordination and close partnership of government agencies, stakeholders and private organizations. The multilevel degree could be through an approach that is Multi-Pronged that requires a follow up that is close in nature to vessel owners, the enforcement agencies and

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the operators of port facility in the reviewing of security measures for ships and the port waters, considering that maritime security issues are not a one-country issue that it can address solely hence, requiring concerted efforts and cooperation from around the world, the approach works with maritime counterparts to establish stable regimes on maritime security and share best practices. Efforts to address threats in maritime security generally call for further maritime domain, subregional and regional cooperation through numerous significant multilateral initiatives. Lessons adoptable from Asia Pacifica pursue on issues of maritime security and strategies are that, regional efforts and bilateral cooperation are paramount. The economic segregation zone in the regional East African coast is immense and offers a prosperity of wealth including fish stocks, gas and oil stashes hence highly reliant on the maritime zones for well-being economically. Active military presence in the zone has seen the combating of organized crime for a number of years although in parallel with other counterterrorist organizations, conventional exercises and missions. Kenya has ideally been suited in the provision of interdiction capacity task as of current in the Indian Ocean. If the navy is tasked properly with the direction and right policy in place, it could further the stemming of narcotics flow helping the eastern Africa region. Additionally, proper managing of the EEZ, the East African region that has countries, which are landlocked that rely heavily on sea transport and unhindered sea lines of communications (SLOCs) are key in the development of an integrated maritime security and blue economy. Through the large volumes of trade quantities and value transported through ocean, the security besides monitoring of SLOCs is vital. Therefore, it is not conceivable for a single state to manage expansively and deliver SLOCS with safety. There is need for more to be done, in joint actions and collaboration regionally, to manage the SLOCs safety. Most countries agree on this view with recommendations that the respective Governments in the East African region that benefit from the Indian Ocean use, committing and contributing to the development of a regime that shall see joint operations development and cooperation regionally towards enhancing the security and vessels protection through the use of SLOCs. Although, there are contextual uniqueness that makes it difficult to generalize, Australia has an Ocean Policy that for years has promoted sustainable development through ecologically sound initiatives, at the same time ensuring aquatic biological variety protection. An ideal strategy

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on oceans should include the defence role of protecting the interests of a state and sovereign rights is an urgent requirement and needs to be developed. It is significant for governments when developing maritime security and blue economy to take into account, explicit national Oceans Policy reference. There could be immense regional benefits on having a single Ocean Policy for the Western Indian Ocean region. The Gulf Council Cooperation (GCC) countries should also be part of this regional effort. Kenya being a central state in the region needs to take a lead in the development of an ocean policy that covers the national and regional scope. The policy should go further in the provision of regional leadership in the SLOCs management hence covering the east African coastal region interests with recognition of the national activities that affects neighbouring countries’ marine jurisdictions. Kenya and neighbouring regional states need to have the ocean policies. Merchant shipping has a role in the maritime strategy that is critical. Conventionally, merchant shipping has supported defence objectives. In the AU’s initial stages of operations in peacekeeping in Somalia, the Ugandan troops and tanks were transported to the Kismayo port by the use of merchant ships across the Mombasa port in an effort to support the requirements for heavy lift. In the defence planning, it is important to be mindful of lift capability, as it significantly contributes to the achievement of the overall security objectives. With the growing appetite for Blue Economy, ship-owners associations and the Kenya seafarers need to suggest to the government to create incentives meant to offshoot Kenya’s growth of merchant fleet. This should be a matter of concern for the state that national security and defence can rely on non-Kenyan merchant ships to meet its objectives. An additional concern on merchant shipping and port security is the vulnerability to terror attacks that has increased the risk through the use of vessels that are alien flagged. Most states including Tanzania are open to the serious risks in accessing the US market because of dependence on low-cost shipping that are foreign with foreign crew. Upon the eventuality of this situation, there shall be serious trade implications for trade regionally. It is, therefore, important that the new Kenyan legislations and regulations outline the merchant shipping role towards this form of support. However, considering the contextual dynamics of every subregion, we construct what we believe is the alternative ‘reality’ of a achieving a ‘melting point’ for the three pillars required in order to address maritime security (see Fig. 11.1).

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Fig. 11.1 The ‘melting point’ for the 3Ds model (Source Authors’ construct)

Figure 11.1 foretells the convergence nature of 3Ds approach, which many acknowledge overrides its weaknesses, resides precisely in the fact that: The whole is more than the sum of its parts. Hence, this chapter ultimately advocates for leveraging adaptable knowledge, especially regarding the obvious need for inter-agency cooperation (human and material resource) in countering both insurgencies and piracies along the African coastlines. It is arguable that herein lays the security-development nexus, minding the widening utility of the concept of security in Africa, considering especially how the direct and indirect developmental challenges, aggravated by the piracies, can impact on the management of security in areas infected by insurgency.

Conclusion This chapter attempted to explore the drivers behind cooperation in the IORA by examining whether cooperation was founded and based on locational factors (such as geography) or non-locational factors (such as

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ideology). Considering geography, the region is disadvantaged given the vast distances among both its members and even dialogue partners. Ideologically defined shared interests in trade and economic development, the blue economy, sustainability of the ocean and maritime safety and security continue to guide cooperation. The single location factor important in the cooperation is the Indian Ocean. Even so, IORA’s founding ideology and successful attempts to foster inclusive regional cooperation in the absence of locational advantages (such as land) is a testament that location alone does not determine regionalism. The East African Community (EAC) is often considered among the most integrated economic regions in Africa. Despite the close geographical links among its member states and shared cultures and languages, in addition to regional security challenges, ideological differences and mistrust among leaders have undermined the achievement of the longheld ambition of forming a political federation (EAC Secretariat). If we look to IORA, would exclusion of often ideologically controversial bilateral issues from EAC summit deliberations help the EAC overcome some of its challenges? Though this is worth considering, attention should be paid to the aforementioned challenges it has posed to IORA. A focus on locational proximity can sometimes limit cooperation to nations closely connected by land. However, as the examples of the NonAligned Movement, the G77, the BRICS Forum and the IORA show, shared ideology encourages and strengthens cooperation in the absence of geography. The USA leads in international security (especially the fight against terror) efforts and participates in the IORA as a Dialogue Partner due to the shared interest in the promotion of maritime safety and security. The EAC region is fraught with terrorism and other security challenges. Would the participation of the USA in the EAC as a full member, dialogue partner or observer (depending on the existing model of participation) augment regional antiterrorism and security agendas beyond the present technical and financial support? To proponents of geographical proximity, this view may appear far-fetched while advocates of ideology would see the historical and future relevance of such a suggestion in enhancing regional cooperation in security.

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References Attri, V. N. (2016). Sustainable ocean development and capacity building: Leaving no one behind. Keynote Address Delivered at One-Day Conference on Capacity Building for Sustainable Development for the Ocean Economy on June 29, 2016 & One-Day Workshop on Ocean Acidification on June 30. https://www.iora.int/media/23885/sustainableoceandevelopm entandcapacitybuildingcios.pd. Accessed 13 July 2020. Attri, V. N., & Bohler-Mulleris, N. (Eds.). (2018). The blue economy handbook of the Indian Ocean region. Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa. https://www.africanbookscollective.com/books/the-blue-eco nomy-handbook-of-the-indian-ocean-region. Accessed 5 Dec 2020. Bateman, S. (2006, March 20). Burden sharing in the straits: Not so straight forward. RSIS. https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/772-burdensharing-in-the-straits/#.X8uGdukzafU. Accessed 5 Dec 2020. Bose, S. (2002). Space and time on the Indian Ocean Rim: Theory and history. In F. L. Tarazi & C. A. Bayly (Eds.), Modernity and culture from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, 1890–1920 (pp. 365–388). New York: Columbia University Press. Bose, S. (2006). A hundred horizons: The Indian Ocean in the age of global empire. London and Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Brandon, J. J. (2000, December 28). Piracy on high seas is big business. International Herald Tribune. https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/29/opi nion/IHT-piracy-on-high-seas-is-big-business.html. Accessed 5 Dec 2020. BRICS. (2016). Eighth BRICS summit, GOA declaration. https://infobrics.org/ documents/2016/. Accessed 5 Dec 2020. Buzan, B. (2003). Regional security complex theory in the post-Cold War world. In F. Soderbaum & T. Shaw (Eds.), Theories of new regionalism: A Palgrave Macmillan Reader (pp. 140–159). New York: Palgrave. Campbell, G. R., & Scerri, M. (1995). The prospects for an Indian Ocean Rim (IOR) economic association the South African. Journal of International Affairs, 2(2), 11–37. Colgan, C. (2017). The blue economy of the Indian Ocean: Context and challenge. Journal of Indian Ocean Rim Studies, 1(1), 7–37. Doyle, T. (2018). Blue economy and the Indian Ocean Rim. Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 14(1), 1–6. FAO. (2015). Fishery and aquaculture country profiles: The Republic of Kenya. https://www.fao.org/fishery/facp/KEN/en. Accessed 5 Dec 2020. Fenn, P. T. (1926). Origins of the theory of territorial waters. The American Journal of International Law, 20(3), 465–482. Hattendorf, B. J. (2000). Naval policy and strategy in the Mediterranean: Past, present and the future. Routledge.

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High Commission of India, South Africa. (2017). India South Africa relations. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/36_South_Africa_Dec ember_2017.pdf. Accessed 15 July 2020. Hoegh-Guldberg, O. (2015). Reviving the ocean economy: The case for action2015. Geneva: WWF International. https://www.wwf.de/fileadmin/fmwwf/Publikationen-PDF/WWF-Report-Reviving-the-Ocean-Economy.pdf. Accessed 15 July 2020. Hudson, A. (2018). Blue economy: A sustainable ocean economic paradigm. United Nations Development Programme. https://www.undp.org/content/ undp/en/home/blog/2018/blue-economy-sustainable-ocean-economic-par adigm.html. Accessed 15 July 2020. Indian Ocean Rim Association. (2017, May 8–10). Jakarta Declaration on Blue Economy: Declaration of the Indian Ocean Rim Association on the Blue Economy in the Indian Ocean Region, Jakarta, Indonesia. https://www.iora. int/media/8218/jakarta-declaration-on-blue-economy-final.pdf. Accessed 15 July 2020. Indian Ocean Rim Association. (2018, November 2). 18th IORA Council of Ministers and related meetings. IORA News. https://www.iora.int/en/eve nts-media-news/news-updates-folder/18th-iora-council-ofministers. Accessed 15 July 2020. Jeffrey, C. (2019, January 14). Why the Indian Ocean region might soon play a lead role in world affairs. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/ why-the-indian-ocean-region-might-soon-play-a-lead-role-in-world-affairs109663. Accessed 15 July 2020. Kaplan, R. D. (2010). Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the future of American power. New York: Random House. Kumar, K. (2000). Indian Ocean as a zone of peace: Problems and prospects. New Delhi: APH Publishing House. Lanteigne, M. (2008). China’s maritime security and the “Malacca Dilemma.” Asian Security, 4(2), 143–161. Malaysian Marine Department. (2005). Total of ships registered in Malaysia by type and weight, 2001–2005. Port Klang: Jabatan Laut Malaysia. Manners, I. (2006). Normative power Europe reconsidered: Beyond the crossroads. Journal of European Public Policy, 13(2), 182–199. Margariti, R. (2013). An Ocean of Islands: Islands, insularity, and historiography of the Indian Ocean. In M. N. Peter (Ed.), The sea: Thalassography and historiography (pp. 198–229). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Miller, D. (1995). On nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Miller, D. (2007). National responsibility and global justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mishra, A. (2019, November). India-Africa Maritime Cooperation: The case of Western Indian Ocean (Observer Research Foundation, Occasional Paper

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Rumley, D., Doyle, T., & Chaturvedi, S. (2012). Securing’ the Indian Ocean? Competing regional security constructions. Journal of the India Ocean Region, 8(1), 1–20. Schbley, G., & Rosenau, W. (2013). Piracy, illegal fishing and maritime insecurity in Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania. Alexandria: CNA. Shu, M. (2018). The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IOR): Achievement, potential and limitations. In T. Niblock, A. Talmiz, & D. Sun (Eds.), The Gulf States, Asia and the Indian Ocean: Ensuring the security of the sea lanes (pp. 169–184). Berlin: Gerlach Press. Smith, B. C. (2013). Understanding third world politics: Theories of political change and development. Red Global Press. https://www.macmillanihe.com/ page/detail/Understanding-Third-World-Politics/?K=9781137003256. Accessed 5 Dec 2020. Sosale, S. (2014). Mapping and modernizing the Indian Ocean Rim: Communication technologies under colonial Britain. Global Media and Communication, 10(2), 155–176. Techera, E. (2019). Achieving Blue Economy goals: The need for improved legal frameworks across the Indian Ocean. Seychelles Research Journal, 1(2), 5–18. Teo, Y. Y. (2007). Target Malacca straits: Maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30(6), 541–561. Thakur, R. (1996). The politics of India’s economic liberalization agenda. Agenda: A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, 3(2), 207–217. United Nations. (2015). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 7 December 2015: Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. United Nations, A/RES/70/22. https://undocs.org/en/ A/RES/70/227. Accessed 5 Dec 2020. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (2016). Trade and development report. New York and Geneva: United Nations. https://unctad. org/. Accessed 5 Dec 2020. Voyer, M., Schofield, C., Azmi, K., Warner, R., Mcllgorm, A., & Quirk, G. (2018). Maritime security and the blue economy: Intersections and interdependences in the Indian Ocean. Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 14(1), 28–48. Wagner, C. (2013). The Indian Ocean Rim-Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR–ARC): The futile quest for regionalism? Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 9(1), 6–16.

CHAPTER 12

Dominatarianism and Security Community Systems

Introduction Regional integration (security) discourses have traditionally been dominated by two main schools of thought: (1) security community; and (2) regionalism approach. These approaches are rooted in the works of some of the distinguished theoreticians on the subject of regional integration and international organizations (Mitrany, 1948, 1965; Haas, 1964; Hettne, 1991; Soderbaum & Shaw, 2003). No doubt these scholars are terrific and have eminently contributed to the theorization of regional studies, but when we reflect upon Africa’s integration vision and the current status, all we see are fundamental questions as to why, despite all the coveted conjectures, plans and strategies, the continent remains disintegrated and stark in the twentieth century. It appears that either predictions made by these theoreticians are too materialistic and have been passed by time, or this set of theories and approaches is simply a contextual misfit. Either way, what we are witnessing among the African organizations is a failure of systems to function effectively to foster the very purpose (United States of Africa) of these organizations as envisaged by the founding fathers such as Mwalimu Julius Kabarage Nyerere (1963). Classical theorists are a group of scholars who believe ‘state’ is the primary actor in regional integration. But the conceptual problems of regional integration are not limited to classical thinking. Bjorn Hettne and Fredrik Soderbaum (1998) positioned the notion of ‘regionness’ at © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. Onditi et al., Reimagining Security Communities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70869-6_12

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the heart of regional studies in their seminal piece, ‘The New Regionalism Approach’. However, what they claim to have been an effort to clarify concepts in this field seem to have masked the problems in what they coin ‘regional complex communities’. This obscurity tends to lock out the role of ‘personalities’ and ‘state domination’ in understanding the why and how of regional integration processes. Although regionalists would want us to believe that the best way to achieve an integrated region is by engaging diverse stakeholders, studies have revealed deepseated tensions between state machineries and civil society organizations (Soderbaum & Shaw, 2003). Such studies expose deficiencies in the classical regional integration theories as discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter. And so, this sort of broad-based configuration of regions by both classics and regionalists presents deeper complications to international relations scholarship in general and, more specifically, to regional studies. Considering the new developments across the globe, such as the tendency for countries to adulate unilateralism and the unheeded challenges of regional organization’s overlaps in Africa, neither the classical theoreticians nor regionalists seems to be resolving the integration quandary. In fact, some critiques have branded the proliferation of theories in the studies of regional integration as a step backwards from the initial thinking (Draper, 2012). For instance, we see Hettne and Soderbaum (1998) moving away from studying regionalism as a ‘distinctly’ different set of human interactive phenomena and try to frame it as part of the universe, when they link regionalism to globalization. Unfortunately, the universality of things tends to be too general to address the complex contextual challenges in Africa. Hettne’s (1991) view of new regionalism as a multidimensional process involving multiple actors, including non-state actors who operate at different levels of the global system, is mind-boggling. But what he offers as an ‘alternative’ thinking approach lacks contextual fitability. He constructs the world by mixing geopolitical differentiation criteria and social constructivism. This approach presents an ontological complication. At the end of the day, when countries undergo various forms of integration, they do not necessarily dissolve into homogenous communities. Claiming that integration leads to a ‘solution’ of regions is a fallacy of non-causa pro causa (causal fallacy). Indeed, such a theory would imply that all partner states in a regional organization are equal in all aspects. In Africa, regional economic communities (RECs) are ‘mixtures’ and not

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‘solutions’. As such, Hettne’s thought of regionness presents yet another conceptual misfitability. The purpose of this analysis is not to engage in the debate of why Africa has not been transformed into an integrated entity, but rather it is to unleash the potential of an alternative thinking on how to enhance the conceptual grasp of the integration process. The pan-African ideology envisaged regional economic integration as the gateway for African states to overcome not only the destructive politico-economic legacies of the Berlin Conference (1884–1885), but also as a tool to unite Africans across the globe (Tavares & Tang, 2011). The Lagos Action Plan and the Abuja Treaty established in 1980 and 1991, respectively, are examples of panAfrican structures established to promote regionalism and to deal with market deficiencies, fragmentation of national markets and disenchanted political systems. The problem of conflicting interests has existed since the days of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Padelford, 1964). All these are iterations of David Mitrany’s functionalism, in which cooperation among states is viewed as a pathway to creating a peaceful and stable Africa. Obviously, therefore, this chapter is largely exploratory on the meanings and contextual (mis)fitability of the new thinking (dominatarianism) as an alternative theoretical framework for understanding the triadic components of regional integration. In order to achieve this objective, this chapter is organized as follows: after introducing the conceptual and policy quandaries surrounding regional integration processes, section II examines the limitations of the classical regional integration theories in explaining the ‘personness’ aspect of the process. Secondly, the chapter presents empirical studies to demonstrate how the various forms of dominatarianism are created and re-created within the Jumuiya. Thirdly, the chapter introduces the discursive ontologies of the dominatarianism theory. Finally, the conclusion is a reflection of how meanings are created from the Darwinian ontologies of natural sciences into the social science regime and its application to regional integration studies.

Classic Regional Integration Theories: Critical Reflections There is no doubt that the regional integration theoretical (RIT) framework remains one of the most effective bodies of knowledge that scholars of international relations apply to theorize and analyse the ever-changing

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nature of regional integration architectures. Be it the Mercosur in South America, the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), the European Union (EU) or the African Union RECs, its role in explaining both the materialistic nature of cooperation and the geopolitical configuration of integration is solid. In fact, the emergence of the ‘new regionalism approach’ (Hettne & Soderbaum, 2006) is a confirmation that this field of study is steadily evolving. We also know that classical theoreticians have promoted accountability and transparency as key ingredients for a productive regional integration process (Mkandawire, 2001). In this approach, the integration process—whether economic or political— is gauged in terms of how the regional bloc performs according to the criteria applied to its modern Western bureaucratic equivalent. As aforementioned in this chapter, this analysis is not designed to wade through the muddy waters of Africa’s politics or patrimony. Rather, it is intended to propose a dominatarian theory for understanding the process of integration as a human behavioral-centred process. But before introducing the proposed dominatarian theory, this section provides a critical appraisal of the regional integration theories in two paths: (1) classical regional integration theories; and (2) a new regionalism approach. Classical Regional Integration Theories For the last five decades since Ernst Hass (1964) theorized the notion of ‘integration’, the terms ‘political actors’, markets and ‘institutional processes’ have dominated scholarship in the studies of regional integration. But beyond these terminologies, ‘integrateness’ and ‘regionness’ are intellectual social forces that draw inspiration from the ‘democratic peace hypothesis’ as advanced by Jack Levy (1994) as the link between liberalism and cooperation. David Mitrany’s (cited in McLaren, 1985) functionalism is not a departure from this framework of thinking. On this account, we agree with some of the RIT’s propositions, for example, the assertion that regional organizations will be bound by rules and procedures in furtherance of their mandate, and that positive incentives would compel member states to refrain from using force (Kelly, 2005). This thinking draws largely from the institutional bricolage (practices, rules, relationships, norms and symbols). But looking at the evolution of EAC from 1967 through to 1977 when the bloc collapsed, abrogation of rules was not anywhere near being the cause of its failure. Rather, ideological confrontation seems to have been the main cause of the EAC collapse.

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Agrippah Mugomba (1978) confirms this view in a paper he wrote barely a year after the bloc collapsed in 1977, arguing that: For the first time in its 14-year history, the Organization of African Unity has been divided along sharply defined ideological demarcations in its attempt to resolve pressing disputes. The member states appear to be moving away on divisive issues from accommodation on the basis of common interests to confrontation based on ideological and other inclinations. A number of recent developments (including the collapse of EAC) indicate the extent to which the cardinal principles of unity and solidarity in purpose have been eroded. (Mugomba, 1978: 261)

Although legal scholars have put forward a strong case identifying legitimacy as the main ‘cancer’ facing integration of the African organizations such as the EAC (Oluoch, 2009), it is clear that the core challenges facing African organizations and by extension RECs are deeply rooted in ideological orientation—personalities, values and interests. The material aspect of integration seems to have been a mere proximal cause of failure among RECs. Unlike the material approach, human-centred analysis of regional integration espouses the role of social forces such as dominance. Indeed, political economists have asserted that as a form of dominance, states may decide to legitimize ‘myths’—cultural mores and ideologies formalized to guide decisions and policy direction (Grossman & Helpman, 1995). Myth legitimization may take various forms: (a) national security, (b) national trade interest and (c) national liberation. This chapter proposes several methodological logics that can be applied when analyzing regional integration using the dominanarianism lens. Among the regional economic communities (RECs), one could argue that in economic domination, if country ‘A’ is considered ‘weak’ or less beneficial, it is likely that this group member will be excluded through stereotype imaging and eventually labelled as ‘a lesser member’. Such forms of imaging can give rise to negative perceptions, justifying wars or political jittery. If such imaging deepens, it might lead to trade wars through the ‘domino effect’ (The Economist, 2008) and a feeling by the weak state A that the rest of the members are dominating. On a similar note, Ernst Haas’s (1964) neofunctionalism encourages plurality of actors in the regional integration process. Four decades later, Haas (2004) still defends the significance of powerful institution pillars of successful regional integration architecture. He goes further to suggest

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the important role that ‘statesmen’ could play in providing political will to the process of integration. Fair enough! The problem of entrusting integration process to ‘statesmen’ is that the line between political rhetoric and ‘real’ development to the people becomes blurred. The approach has been attributed to the drifting way of integration benefits from ordinary citizens to business tycoons and political elites. In their attempts to ‘treat’ the challenge arising from having to entrust regional integration to statesmen, Keohane and Nye (1987) mooted the ‘interdependency’ thought, focusing on the place of strong institutions. Nye and Keohane’s proposition was a masterpiece and a well-thought-out idea during the 70s when most of the African states had just attained independence and it was necessary for them to link up to the international stage. In fact, one of the drivers of integration was ‘fear’ of relapsing into neocolonialism. We would not have a problem with Nye and Keohane’s argument of having powerful statesmen play a key role in the integration process. It is quite straightforward and logical. However, the paradigmatic examples of the initial collapse of the EAC in 1977 and the misfunctioning ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) present the most unheeding pathology in African organizations. As Nye and Keohane themselves admit that ‘power’ is obsolete, it would be simplistic to imagine that individual politicians or business tycoons would shoulder the liabilities of a region. In theorizing individual power as a driver to integration, the most constructive way would be to shift from ‘power’ as the material motivation to ‘personness’ guided by values, genes, attitudes and interests. This is where the dominatarian theory offers alternative thought, that perhaps, the ‘personness’ enterprise should be core to the conceptualization of regional integration. This chapter has developed a web-like rim that illustrates how the various components of integration interact with each other in a web-like structure as opposed to the current structure that reflects a triad of the three elements economy, institution and politics. Caballero’s (2009) diagnosis of the problems associated with statesmen-led regional integration using the case of Mercosur in South America paints a gloomy picture of this approach. In this modality, supranational institutions bestow decisions directly to the presidents or the relevant ministers and not the regional institutions. Given that the EAC integration process follows this modality, it will not be surprising that the region shares in the litany of challenges facing all other intergovernmental entities—unfulfilled commitments and ideological differences. This fact

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unravels an important lacuna and deficiency in the classical RIT approach: how possible is it to separate personalities from the process? How do you disentangle individual interests from collective regional Jumuiya interests? How do you deal with statesmen with ‘powerful’ ‘traits’ who eventually influence key decisions in the region? Andreas Hasenclever and his colleagues (1997) attempt to address these questions through the hegemonic stability theory. But the idea of hegemonic stability is too adamant that no stability can exist in a region without installing a hegemon. The assumption that the emergence of hegemons is a precondition for building a secure community is blind to the fact that states will always protect their sovereignty. On this issue of sovereignty, White House and Strazzari (2015) allude to the fact that the process of constructing regions can be contested by states on the account that regionalization denies them the opportunity to exercise control and self-rule. With reference to the case study in this chapter, the perception that Kenya is the hegemony in the Jumuiya suffers both intrinsic and systemic problems. A lack of central authority would make it unrealistic to perceive Kenya or any other state becoming hegemony. This happens often because no state is willing to take up the extra material cost of offering regional leadership. However, these challenges do not find a home in other regional formations. For example, in North America, the USA has maintained the ‘lead’ in the newly formed USA–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) (formerly NAFTA). For this reason, we feel that neofunctionalists such as Peter Draper’s (2012) analysis of the significance of a hegemony seem to apply directly to the West’s neoliberal setup. In the EU for example, Germany, and France, have been recognized as hegemons without contention from the other EU members. Hence, the success of this model in North America and the EU has something to do with liberal international economic order, a factor that may not work in African regional integration as most states are still engrossed in patrimonial vestiges. Transnationalism (commonly known as the security communities’ approach) makes some interesting hypotheses about how wars and conflict get delegitimized in a regional community. Some of the advocates of this theory, including Karl Deutsch (1968), make causal connections between societal behaviour and political decisions. There is a point of convergence between Deutsch’s theoretical framework and the psychological elements and identity. Deutch hypothesizes that transactional solidarity among states in a region produces a sense of security through

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what he calls ‘we feeling’. Deutsch’s idea was later utilized to explain the role of democratic gains of the 1980s that ended up eliminating wars in the 90s. Well, this does seem to follow the Wilsonian thesis of liberal peace that worked well in northern America and Western Europe. However, one wonders why, despite the existence of this framework for decades, African states—even those with advanced regional collective communities such as ECOWAS—have continued to experience civil wars and insurgency. In a span of two years (2016–2017), for example, Africa accounted for 50% of the full-scale wars worldwide (Conflict Barometer, 2017). Regionalism Approach The idea of rethinking classical regional integration theories in 1980s and 90s arose as an alternative thinking framework as a mechanism for addressing the challenges of globalization from a regional perspective. This was particularly important for the global south as most economies were undergoing the effects of structural adjustment programs (SAPs). Bjorn Hettne (1991), who is one of the key pioneers of this thinking, was trying to reconstruct Europe in the post-Cold War era. Hettne argues that regional integration goes beyond economics, to embody cultural, social and political aspects of the society. Later on, Hettne was joined by Fredrik Soderbaum and Timothy Shaw (2003) to strengthen the argument that political communities are constructed through regional interactivities. Hettne’s approach seems to be an advancement of globalization scholarship from below. He tries to link regionalism to the global system by arguing for greater participation of civil society entities. In other words, globalization could be achieved through regional integration—it becomes the proxy tablet for achieving structural global transformation. Unfortunately, the attempts by empirics to illustrate Hettne’s point of view by linking globalization to the economic instability in pre-independence Africa (Milanovic, 2006) fails to acknowledge the changing African vision and development models that greatly impacted the integration process. On this issue, De Melo and Tsikata (2003) fault the linear model of integration applied to Africa. But as demonstrated in this chapter, problems of integration are deeper than the material drivers. Leaving out attitude, value systems, and personalities is like building a mosque with a crucifix on top. Hettne’s proposition of the significant role of civil society in integration hangs over the difficult relational atmosphere in Africa. The

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relationship between African organizations and civil society has been disharmonious. In Malawi for example, even though the country transitioned from dictatorship to a multiparty system, the government-CSO relation remains fraught (Makumira, 2011). It seems to me that the Tocquevillian thesis that CSOs are likely to survive in fragmented societies (Spires, 2011) does not apply to African states. What Hettneism fails to capture is the complexities in the regional integration matrix brought about by personalities and other human-centred factors. Nevertheless, Hettne introduces to the debate the term regionness that defines regions’ identities. It is easier to liken Hettne’s point here to what we coin in this chapter as dominance superpowerism. For instance, historically, Kenya has been accused of taking the role of the ‘great power’ in the community (Busse & Shams, 2003). Although the dominance ‘superpowerism’ could function to caution other ‘weak’ states in the trading bloc, for decades this notion has ended up creating ‘trade wars’, tensions and sluggish integration. Regionalism proposes the creation of a regional community. However, in the case study of the Jumuiya, despite efforts to harmonize foreign and security policies in the region, a lack of a coherent strategy to manage the structural and institutional imbalances remains unresolved. This leads to the perception of some trading partners of being too protectionist, while others being perceived as too ‘domineering’. In fact, the intergroup tensions more often exert pressure to the Partner States to use the ‘unilateral exemptions’ to scuttle any form of trading solutions. States are compelled to adopt such unilateral and irrational decisions for fear of dominance by the ‘other’. With all this conceptual incoherence, it would be constructive, therefore, to mirror the process of regional integration from a human-centred approach. This is because the contemporary integration dynamics cannot be explained exhaustively through previous RIT theories and the regionalism approach which emphasize materialism, rigid structures, power relations and globalization at the expense of the ‘personness ’ factor. In order to have a sense of how the dominatarian theory stems out from the classic theories, Table 12.1, provides the differences to other conventional theories. From Table 12.1, it is clear that the classical RIT theories and regionalism approaches are not sufficient to explain some of the emerging dynamics in African regional organizations. In the case of the Jumuiya, there have been unending trade-related frictions between Kenya and Tanzania, for example. Despite the shared history and geography,

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Table 12.1 Differences between RIT and the proposed Dominatarian theory (new) Variables

Classical theories

Regionalism

Economy

• Economic materials • Symbolism are the main driver • Economy is an of integration integral part of the • Trade liberalization socio-cultural systems • States device • Economic mechanisms to interdependence survive in the market

Institutions

• The informal cooperation among statesmen • Build strong institutions • Processes are regulated through rules of the game

•

• •

•

Politics

• Focus on state’s interest • Geostrategic rationality of things • Supranationalism and intergovernmentalism • Hegemonic stability • Power distribution and rationality in decision making

•

•

• •

•

Dominatarianism

• Economics of things is inherent in the genes and behavior of individuals • Economic aggression and superiority complex • Powerful individuals create agonistic interaction as survival tactics Regionalism and • Fosters intergroup historical interaction attitude and social of states power Non-state actor’s • Individual belief role is key system, values and social relationship Regional complex interdependence and • Trust and regional society benevolent leadership Socio-cultural construction of ideas • Discursive nature of ideas • Focus on the person The end is to as the main source achieve a globalized of social power world system • Personalities and Territorial identity individual identities influences shape the processes regionalism • Love and assurance Voluntary cooperation • Adaptation and survival tactics Regional space and geography key in • Sense of equity regional integration Interconnections between the national communities

Source Authors’ construct based on the discursive ontology of regional integration concepts

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members of the Jumuiya have pursued diverse dimensions of ethnic policies, which breeds the perception that Kenya dominates over the rest of the Partner States (Miguel, 2004). However, the personality issues arising from the interaction among states in the Jumuiya cannot be understood in the conventional materialistic rubric. Worse still, the new regionalism approach to regional integration has compounded this thinking by drawing in an assortment of pillars—culture, politics and social. This logic seems to me ‘too high’ and ‘too low’. It is like flying an aircraft in the stratosphere (~40,000 feet above sea level) without provisions for oxygen masks—the pilots are bound to lose consciousness and the plane will crash. But at the same time, flying too low exposes the plane to higher air resistance. A middle point is required in order to sustain the journey. Likewise, there seems to be a lacuna between the RIT and regional approaches, but before we introduce dominatarianism as the new intervening theoretical framework, the following section examines the elements of integration triad in the Jumuiya; economy, institutions and politics.

The Two Dimensions of Dominance The theory predicts that while all countries in a trading bloc have a comparative advantage in the integration processes relative to the other trading partners, there will be one with more advantage. Hence, integration processes will tend to favour the most powerful states. These outcomes often degenerate into geopolitical tensions over time, with adverse impact on integration order. In this section, we attempt to address Frederick Abbott’s (2007), fundamental question, how a dominant trade species emerges. We address in turn the aspect of economic domination and of the relationship mediated by institutional capacity (interest groups). Economic Domination On the economic front, there is reasonable evidence for the contention that Kenya’s trade performance is higher than the rest in the EAC trading bloc. At the same time, some countries in the bloc have performed well. Still, Kenya enjoys the benefit of well-established institutions such as interest groups. However, the ways in which institutional capacity (interest groups) mediates the economic performance within the EAC

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Partner States trading regimes appear to be complex. Our analysis of the six EAC Partner States suggests the following insights about how economic performance and institutional capacity (interest groups) affect the outcome of a regional integration process. While the EAC Development Strategy Report 2016/17–2020/21 represents Kenya dominating the economic performance, the overall picture presents a region in stiff competition (EAC, 2014). During this period, Kenya’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew on average by 5.5% compared to Rwanda’s and Tanzania’s 7.2 and 6.7%, respectively (EAC, 2014). According to the EAC Development Strategy Report 2016/17– 2020/21, Kenya had the highest per capita income estimated at about US $1500, followed by Tanzania at US $979, Uganda at US $744 and Rwanda at US $723. Our discussion of whether Kenya dominated economic performance in the EAC trading bloc is hinged on six elements: (1) Free Trade Area; (2) trade flows; (3) transport infrastructure; (4) tourism sector; (5) energy sector; and (6) geopolitics. First, the implementation of Free Trade Area (FTA) does not necessarily produce the same effect on each member state. Some countries may be capable of achieving higher performance than average increase from free trade. Alexander Darku (2009) performed ‘gravity model’ analysis establishing that during the period 1996–2009, Uganda dominated trade in the subregion. Further meta-analysis by Steven Buigut shows that Tanzania’s imports had increased substantially from around $100 million in 2002 to over $400 million in 2007 (Buigut, 2012). The same case applied to Rwanda, whose imports have increased from around $60 million to over $300 million. Buigut attributed this performance to the implementation of the Customs Union. However, during the same trading period, the implementation of the Customs Union did not have a significant concomitant effect on Kenya’s exports. Nevertheless, Kenya experienced an anticipatory increase in her exports to the EAC bloc of about 86%. This was in spite of the fact that Kenya’s exports to the EAC Partner States were not granted immediate duty-free status. Overall, during this period, Kenya did not necessarily dominate trade; Tanzania had in fact seen a significant improvement in her intra-regional trading performance. The second element driving economic performance in the region is trade flows. According to the EAC Second Development Strategy, 2001– 2005, the large volume of exports from Kenya could have reflected increased demand from neighbouring states catalyzed by an economic

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boom (UNECA, 2016). Conversely, Partner States such as Uganda, historically dependent on Kenya mainly for industrial products, had caused the large disparity in the latter years. The lack of product complementarities among the EAC Partners makes them experience low intra-trade (Hoekman et al., 2017). Yet, other studies reveal that Africa’s relatively low level of trading can be attributed to its low productivity (Tavares & Tang, 2011). According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), during 2005–2014, intraAfrican trade was only around 11–15% of total trade flows compared to 45–50% in the European Union and 45–50% in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) area (UNCTAD, 2016). The Asia free trade area trade flows were even higher (59–62%). It is expected that the most powerful nation in a trading FTA creates prospects for favourable fiscal development. However, during the period 2011–2016, Kenya experienced the highest levels of budget deficits (see Table 12.2). Tanzania has a relatively better position in internal trade attributed to stable exports relative to the overall economy (see Table 12.3). According to the EAC Development Strategy, 2016/17–2020/21, during the period 2012–2016, Kenya and South Sudan posted the highest levels of budget deficits, −7.3 and −19.8, respectively. The overall deficit in the region, on average has varied between 4.4% in 2013 to 6.2% in 2015 (see Table 12.3). Table 12.2 Fiscal developments and prospects (percent of GDP), 2011–2016 Partner state

General government total revenue

General government expenditure

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Burundi Kenya Rwanda South Sudan Tanzania Uganda EAC

38.7 19.5 25.3 25.6

33.8 19.1 23.2 16.8

31.4 19.7 25.5 21.9

28.1 19.8 24.2 27.2

21.9 19.3 24.7 21.0

15.0 20.2 23.6 30.5

42.2 23.6 26.2 21.0

37.5 24.2 25.7 31.6

33.2 25.4 26.8 24.8

31.8 27.2 28.3 34.1

27.2 27.5 27.5 39.4

21.2 27.5 26.0 50.3

15.6 15.7 15.5 14.9 14.5 15.9 19.1 19.8 19.4 17.9 17.8 19.6 14.5 13.4 12.5 13.2 14.9 14.4 17.2 16.4 16.5 16.5 17.6 18.0 19.0 17.6 18.1 18.3 18.0 18.4 21.5 22.3 22.4 23.5 24.2 23.8

Source Adopted from the IMF WEO, April 2017 (Note 2016 is estimate)

7.2 18.4 16.6 18.4 16.4 34.0 18.5

5.9 20.1 19.3 16.5 18.4 21.0 16.9

5.6 20.6 18.2 15.8 19.0 61.0 23.4

7.4 19.9 18.9 18.6 16.6 30.7 18.7

Source Adopted from the IMF Regional Economic Outlook 2017: sub-Sahara Africa

8.8 19.4 20.4 19.9 15.4 28.0 18.7

46.7 33.0 31.3 35.5 34.0 34.1 35.8

41.8 30.2 29.6 33.2 32.0 29.9 32.8

2013 37.3 28.3 27.4 32.9 33.2 31.6 31.8

2014

37.5 27.0 30.4 27.9 35.6 28.9 31.2

2015

29.0 25.8 27.7 25.5 37.1 64.8 35.0

2016

9.4 20.9 19.9 22.2 13.9 9.3 15.9

Average (2012–2016)

1. Burundi 2. Tanzania 3. Uganda 4. Kenya 5. Rwanda 6. South Sudan Average (regional)

2016

2012

2015

Imports of goods and service (% GDP)

2014

2012

Partner state

2013

Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)

Table 12.3 EAC external trade indicators, 2012–2016

38.5 28.9 29.3 31.0 34.4 37.9 33.3

Average (2012–2016)

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During the same period, Kenya had heavily invested in infrastructure (the Standard Gauge Railway, SGR), while the Republic of South Sudan was experiencing protracted political instability and humanitarian catastrophe. Hence, the two governments experienced the wide gap between revenue and expenditure. Challenges associated with political instability and nation-building are not new to the EAC integration process. Nevertheless, these challenges were mild, as Kenya maintained a steady revenue flow reaching the high of US $11,514.7 (see Fig. 12.1). The third element is the access to and utilization of transport infrastructure. The region has experienced progressive annual growth rate of 5% in infrastructural development since 2004 (UNCTAD, 2016). As a result, the number of international passengers increased from 3 million (2012) to 6.5 million (2017). However, of the 12 major international airports in the region, Kenya owns 4. During the period July 2016 to March 2017, Kenya handled 6,986,760 passengers compared to Tanzania (3,948,000), Burundi (86,449), Rwanda (237,692), and Uganda (769,000) (see Table 12.4). The high performance of Kenya in this sector is attributed to several structural and systemic milestones such as establishment and utilization of the EAC Unified Flight Information 14000 12000

Kenya

10000 8000 Tanzania

6000 4000

Uganda

2000 Rwanda Burundi

0 2011 Kenya

2012 Burundi

2013 Rwanda

Tanzania

2014 Uganda

Fig. 12.1 Customs revenue collected by EAC Partner States, 2011–2014 (US$ million) (Source Authors’ construction from the EAC database, 2011–2014)

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Table 12.4 Number of Air Passengers by EAC Partner States, July 2016 to March 2017 International airport Bujumbura International Airport Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) Moi International Airport Eldoret International Airport Kisumu International Airport Kigali International Airport Julius Nyerere International Airport Kilimanjaro International Airport Amani Karume International Airport Entebbe International Airport

Total number of passengers

Aircraft movements

Cargo (in Tons)

86,449

2114

1050

5,456,452

81,846

177,439,722

1,066,544

17,204

2,276,788

176,012

7134

8,926,970

287,752

5917

237,692

7490

2233

2,360,000

77,000

15,700

630,000

20,750

2700

958,000

64,000

1825

769,000

14,516

10,096

–

Source Authors’ construct from the EAC database

Region (UFIR), adoption of the EAC Regulation for Liberalization of Air Transport Services and a clear Road Map for Operationalization of the EAC Agreement on Aviation Search and Rescue. Moreover, Kenya seems to have created more borders that are common, for the broadband interconnections, compared to any other country in the region. Kenya was among the first countries in the trading bloc to beat the 17 June 2015 deadline for the completion of ‘digital migration’ (UNCTAD, 2016). The fourth element is tourism sector. The sector’s contribution to GDP is highest in Tanzania (14%) and lowest in Burundi (4.3%). Tourists’ arrival in Kenya declined significantly from 1,823,000 in 2011 to 1,181,000 in 2015. During this period, Rwanda (1,300,000) and Uganda (1,303,000) dominated the tourism market in the region (see Fig. 12.2). Kenya’s retrogression on this indicator was attributed to the changing country’s foreign policy that deployed the Kenya Defence Force (KDF)

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2,000,000 1,800,000 1,600,000 1,400,000 1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0 2011

2012 Burundi

Kenya

2013 Rwanda

2014 Uganda

2015

Tanzania

Fig. 12.2 Trends in tourists arrivals, 2011–2015 (Source Authors’ construction from the EAC database, 2011–2015)

in Somalia in 2012. Consequently, the country became more vulnerable to the Al Shabaab terror group in retaliation attacks. The tourism sector staggered and the country lost its economic dominance grip to Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania, which experienced steady growth in tourist arrivals (see Fig. 12.2). Fifth is energy sector. Energy sector is considered critical to transforming the region’s framework of what is commonly known as ‘power pool’. According to the EAC Development Strategy 2016/17–2020/21, between 2011 and 2015, the installed capacity of hydroelectricity and geothermal for Kenya increased by 2.9 and 9.3%, respectively, while the other Partner States’ remained constant (UNCTAD, 2016). Installed capacity for thermal electricity decreased by 63.9% in Tanzania while in Kenya it increased by 11%. However, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania registered decline in generation of thermal electricity in the margin of 45.4, 21.1 and 8.4%, respectively. Kenya, however, still led on geothermal power generation by 55%. The role of energy is essential to the economic performance of a country. On this front, Kenya is considered as the ‘lead’ nation in the region. The notion of ‘lead’ nation gives rise to what we coin in this chapter as DITR alternative theory. This provides an alternative thinking to the theories that dominate Regional Integration Studies, such as the theory

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of hegemonic stability (Gilpin, 2000). The theory of hegemonic stability states that ‘a hegemon is central to maintaining adherence to liberal international economic regimes, and by extension liberal peace, by underwriting the costs of maintaining the regime rather than coercion’ (Joseph, 2001). In our new thinking—‘DITR, the most powerful state influences the rest of the members through institutional strength and economic resources’. The DITR theory is premised on the understanding that the convergence between the domestic complex interactivities with national interests determines which state influences the others most in the regional integration ecosystem. Finally, geopolitical dynamics can affect regional integration. A country’s influence in the integration ecosystem is shaped by its capacity to fund such regional organizations. Kenya is one of the principal contributors to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) contributing 27.7% in 2016 alongside Ethiopia and Sudan contributing 29 and 28.5%, respectively (UNECA, 2016). During the same year, Kenya’s contribution to the EAC wealth stood at 39% followed by Uganda’s 21%. According to the Africa Regional Integration Index report of 2016, Kenya’s relations and performance across the three regional organizations (COMESA, EAC and IGAD) were sterling, hence sustaining her dominance trait. Kenya profits most with shares of 95 and 93% of total trade creation and diversion, respectively (UNECA, 2016). This asymmetric regional trade relation poses a real threat to the EAC trading bloc, which would collapse if the issue of trade imbalances between Kenya and the rest of the Partner States were not adequately addressed. According to the International Monetary Fund Directorate of Trade, statistics indicates that in 2015, Kenyan exports to Tanzania and Uganda were 477 million US dollars and 633 million US dollars, respectively (IMF, 2016). Therefore, in terms of economic performance, Kenya remains the dominant economy. The country enjoys powerful negotiation leverages put forward by fairly developed and diverse interest groups (Bizuneh et al., 2018). Institutional (Interest Groups) Domination Some analysts have argued that countries in regional trade relations stand to gain when they allow more multiple-stakeholders on the Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) beyond the state (Freud & Ornelas, 2010). Looking within the EAC trading bloc, we can observe that each country

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has developed institutional (interest groups ) capacity required for trade negotiations. However, the level of influence and strength of each interest group varies across countries as illustrated in this subsection. A country’s influence is driven by both endogenous and exogenous factors. According to Jan Beyers et al., endogenous groups are stateowned parastatals or have direct contacts with the executive (Beyers et al., 2008). They work closely with the government and are consulted regularly on a number of issues whereas exogenous work outside government circles. As seen from the previous discussion in this chapter, Kenya has benefitted more from unilateral exemptions on the CETs (Bunder, 2018). This is mainly attributed to the involvement of the country’s diverse interest groups in the CET negotiations. Indeed, effective trade policies are likely to emerge from competition between the lobbying actions of different interest groups. Kenya’s interest groups are more actively involved in the CET negotiations. Unlike Tanzania and Uganda, Kenya’s political class has strong linkages with the private sector. This relationship makes it possible to have producers access the regional market. This clientele type of relationship between Kenyan businessmen and political elites is deeply connected with ‘tribal segmentation’, leading to rent-seeking and patronage activities (Burgess et al., 2010). Moreover, the proximity of Kenya’s private sector to the government gives them a better access to the negotiation table as compared to Tanzania and Uganda’s. A solitary focus on interactivities of pressure groups is key in understanding how the different group typologies have evolved the Kenyan regional trade landscape into a dominant Partner State (see Table 12.5). From Table 12.5, we can see that KAM (Kenya Association of Manufacturers) works closely with Kenya’s government. The strength of interest groups in Kenya is clearly reflected in the prowess of negotiations on CET by the KAM members. In the EAC regional trading bloc, KAM is considered the most influential negotiation partner on tariff matters. Contrary to this, the Tanzanian counterpart, Confederation of Tanzania Industries (CTI) and Uganda’s Manufacturers Association (UMA) do not have such influence. For example, CTI has a very low membership of only about 300 of 2000 industrial companies with more than 10 employees. This has led to a ‘free rider’ problem and disjointed lobbying actions. UMA, on the other hand, suffers capacity constraints. Interestingly, other interest groups such as the Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA) and the Tanzanian Private

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Table 12.5 The typology of interest groups and direction of influence towards a country’s domination INFLUENCE High

Low

IMPORTANCE

High High Profile Insiders

Low Profile Insiders

Prisoner Groups

-Kenya Association of Manufacturers (KAM) -Kenya Private Sector alliance (KEPSA) -Uganda powerful producers -Tanzania private firms with political connections -Kampala City Traders’ Association (KACITA) Potential Insiders

-Tanzania Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA) -Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF)

-Ministries of East African Community -Ministries of Foreign Affairs -State-owned companies

Outsiders by necessity

Ideological Outsiders

-Exporters -Confederation of Tanzanian Industries (CTI) -Uganda Manufacturing Association (UMA) -Food processing industries -Kenya National Farmers Federation (KENAFF)

-MNCs e.g. Lafarge Company -Consumer groups -Small manufacturing industries in Tanzania and Uganda -Tanzania and Uganda Farmers

European Union

Low

Source Authors’ construction based on literature survey

Sector Foundation (TPSF) impede CTI’s organization, yet they should be working in coherence. This has led the private sector to use personal connections with politicians to negotiate on CET. Some well-connected importers from Tanzania are able to push for their interests using informal networks. Capacity constraints within the UMA have made Uganda’s producers to engage directly with the President on trade policies. In fact, the Kampala City Trader’s Association (KACITA) is more influential in tariff negotiations as compared to UMA, which is the representative of Uganda’s manufacturers. On the contrary, KAM is the only representative of the manufacturing sector in Kenya and almost all producers lobby through the Association. In addition, KAM is well connected to politicians and boasts of high technical capacity. The Association has employed various activist designs throughout its evolution, sometimes acting as policymaking organ or regulatory body, mainly driven by the domestic politics. This is found to be a major source of Kenya’s domination, consequently, intimidating weaker States in the region.

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Another exogenous factor is the ‘intergovernmentality’ of African regional integration processes. In the EAC trading bloc, although, the Ministries in charge of EAC affairs are involved in CET negotiation platforms, the ultimate decisions lie with the EAC Council of Ministers. This affects inwardly looking trading Partner States negatively. On this front, Kenya gains as its companies have subsidiaries in Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda. This is very evident in the finance, telecommunications and retail sectors. Kenyan firms such as Safaricom, Kenya Commercial Bank, Equity Bank and Kenya Airways are increasingly expanding across the regional market and pushing for their interests on the regional trade policies. Indeed, market players who are organized in lobbying for favourable policies across a larger geographical space tend to dominate the market. Undoubtedly, Kenya’s institutional (interest groups) capacity to negotiate business deals in her favour are stronger than any of the other five Partner States are. Based on this finding, it is plausible to argue that Kenya continues to dominate the market, not only because of the high value primary and secondary goods exports, but also because of the robustness of her interest groups. Finally, Kenya’s progressiveness in both economic performance and institutional capacity (interest groups) continues to create tensions and cynicism to the extent that the other Partner States generate excuses for not complying with rules and policies of regional integration. This will actively impede regional integration. The intra-regional relations discordance emanating from Kenya’s dominance presents not only a policy lacuna, but also a theoretical dilemma, as to whether ‘dominance’ should be constructed as an aspect of comparative advantage or should be treated in literature as a negative externality resulting from states’ interactivities.

Dominatarianism: Systems Approach to Analysis of Regional Integration Amid the limited ontological linkages between the Darwinian (natural science) interpretation of ‘dominance’ and its induction into social science, and in particular its application to the evolution of regional organizations, it is worth exploring meanings and relationships. We have explored ideas in this chapter with the hope that this ‘ideation’ process will strengthen not only the way scholars conceive the integration process, but also how ordinary people and policy makers perceive, analyze, plan and even strategize for regional integration. The notion of dominance

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can help us to better conceptualize regional integration itself, increase the possibilities of contextual fitability of interventions and find better ways of managing human behaviour that seem to wield deeper influence on decisions about integration in Africa. In this exploration of meanings and relationships, one might wonder, what is the theory of change? In my proposition, we put forward some hypothetical causality relationship: if we recognize the dominatarian value rather than the regulatory value of persons, economy, institutions and politic, then we would be in a position to concretize the role of various elements in the process of regional integration, hence achieve actualization of the process. We present this in a form of web-like rim (see Fig. 12.1), that we have formulated in this paper as: Person + Economy + Institutions + Politics = An Integrated Regional Society. But before we expound on this formulation, we would like to lead the reader into appreciating the philosophical origin and structure of the proposed dominatarian theory. In our day-to-day life, we sometimes wonder why things are the way they are. We question events, actions, and oftentimes, we marvel at the interdependency and interrelationship of things in the universe. You would wonder how tiny aquatic flora and fauna survive in the deep sea despite all the waves that have the capability of destabilizing a ship that weighs several tons. Life is also full of paradoxes: have you ever wondered why human beings have the tendency of doing ‘wrong’ things even when they know what to do rightly? In fact, the more rules and regulations exist, the higher the likelihood that man will default them. Studies on the connection between human biology and culture reveal that bio-cultural factors determine events in human life, such as ‘likes’ and ‘dislikes’ and how human beings value the physical and social environment (Berns & Atran, 2012). Through experimental biology, Darwinian thinkers have come to conclude that biology and culture are yoked together such that feelings of ‘hate’ or ‘love’ are critical causes of conflicts (McLaughlin & Hermit, 2017). All these scientific and social fascinations of the universe are motivated by ontology, the nature of things and their relationships. It is not uncommon to have people feeling they are ‘dominated’ by others and feeling unsafe or even living in fear. In her latest article, Catarina Kinnvall (2019: 285) refers to this state as ontological insecurity, where the emotional response occurs in the form of anxieties and fear. In any case, throughout human history, people have experienced tensions emanating from competition over scarce resources, supremacy wars and

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societal stratification. The perceptive aspect of dominance is easily identifiable in our day-to-day life. For example, people with hairy skin, strongly built bodies, tall and loud and coarse voices are generally inherently perceived as dominant individuals. This perspective can create identity frame or even civil wars. We have seen domination by the so-called bigger tribes causing wars, conflicts and genocide. In Europe, for example, Adolf Hitler’s feeling of representing a superior race drove him to eliminate the Jewish tribe for fear of being dominated by the ‘otherness’. Domination is both a natural phenomenon and a social construct. The Darwinian ontology follows three main philosophies: first, individual organisms evolve by natural selection; second, individuals more suited to the environment are more likely to survive; finally, adaptation is the presumed mode of survival, allowing organisms to reproduce and pass on their heritable traits to the future generation (McLaughlin & Hermit, 2017). Social science, however, goes beyond addressing the question ‘what’ to tackle the ‘how’. In this case of regional integration, Darwinian philosophy is relevant because the biological processes govern human behaviour, our perceptions, interpretations and reactions to cultural or political events. Understanding these processes is key in tackling political processes: If people are part of culture, and biology informs culture, it follows that biology is cultured in people because people are cultural animals. In this chapter, however, dominatarian theory is confined to the discursive ontology of ‘personness’ relevant to regional integration processes: economy, institutions and politics (see Table 12.6). Institutions are key components of integration; however, they are nothing without people at the centre. For example, those who feel Table 12.6 Translating Darwinianism into discursive elements of dominatarianism Ontologies

Economy

Darwinian (natural science) Discursive (social science)

Survival for the fittest Genetic heredity

Like and dislike

Market performance

Power

Source Authors’ construct

Institutions

Value system

Politics

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are dominated cannot experience the domination without the dominant dominating the dominated. In other words, the institutional (values and norms held by people) aspect of the dominatarian triad is key to establishing meanings and relationships. The Darwinian interpretation of ‘dominance’ places the notion in the natural sciences epistemologies (Charlesworth, 1979). Indeed, dominance shapes the ‘survival’ of species and the human population. However, the sociology of dominatarianism differs in a significant way from classical Darwinian followers who limit cause and effect to the relationship between biology and cultural conflicts (McLaughlin & Hermit, 2017; Berns & Atran, 2012). Our proposition is precisely what the social science finds meaningful in the concept of domination, that is ideas can produce institutions, personality and shape politics. Based on this logic, we identify five ways through which ideas are be created into policy and practice: (1) Generation of ideas is defined by social forces—it could be political discourses or policy utterances; (2) In order to achieve this social force, people engage their intellectual capacities; (3) As they engage in this intellectual activity, they are limited to how far they can go by several factors, rules, norms and value systems; (4) These rules, norms and values are capable of facilitating or baring creation of ideas; and (5) If ideas are created, they can cascade into policies and practice. With this intellectual engagement, people take positions and interests. Sometimes interests become outrageous and exert tensions among the group. Expansive interest is not limited to feelings, rather it gains social force and political actions. The other group members could interpret this excessive social force as ‘dominance’ behaviour. In their efforts to understand human behaviour, MacGue and Bouchard (1998) found out that personality and interest are human characteristics of a heritability nature. Indeed, genetic scientists have established that behavioural manifestations such as a sense of equity, love, trust, economic behaviour and politics are partially hardwired and influence human actions (Ebstein et al., 2010). More specifically, Carlos Drew (1993) found that dominance can produce agonistic interactions leading to acts of aggression and hostilities. The relevance of these philosophies highlights the constructive role of dominatarianism in addressing gaps in social and political dimensions of regional integration. But the interpretation of aggression should be done with care as the character of being aggressive is not necessarily a sign of hostility.

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If we sheepishly condemn ‘aggressors’ as hostile or destructive, we fall into the trap of representational fallacy—placing more emphasis on the significance of language (Dyke, 2007). Yet, through moral realism, we know that sometimes things happen the way they do due to spatiotemporal coincidence. The indispensability argument would, therefore, agree with the psychological line of thinking that brings forth personality dynamics, individual basic values (anxieties) and belief systems as true descriptions of dominance (Sheri et al., 2012). Yet, others argue that authoritarian behaviour commonly associated with dominance can lead to higher organizational productivity (Smither, 1993). The revolutionary work of Sigmund Freud (cited in De Sousa, 2011) on human behaviour is critical in understanding why, for instance, regional economic, political or security arrangements such as the Jumuiya do not find it necessary to make rational decisions. In view of this contrast, anyone would contest that dominance is neither good nor bad, and there is no one particular state or individual that can claim dominance over dominance. Hence, when studying regional integration, it is critical that draw some lessons from social structural analysis (Gazi, 2014) as it relates to institutionalism. It tells us how, for example, terms such as alliances building, hegemony, isolation and ideology, are constructed and made to function in a political system. The Jumuiya is a political system. The other dominatarian triad is economy. Here, the importance of global trade networks can be a source of information for functional analysis of domination in the global system (Hilpert, 2014). But also, the interpretation of economic dominance can be value-laden; a dominating state in the global trading activities will vary according to spatiotemporal factors and relations with other norm-setting states or organizations. In this regard, the ontological components of economic dominance are mutually reinforcing. While dominance can be interpreted as sparing no opportunity to reap from the system, the acts of dominance do not necessarily imply exploitative acts. And that is why, in a constructive relationship, the dominating state can offer public goods to the less powerful states. However, African RECs do not always conform to this hypothesis. SADC, for instance, remains paradoxical in that despite South Africa’s dominance in the region, the country has failed to resolve the economic crisis in Zimbabwe (Alden & Soko, 2005). On the global scene, China positions its dominance in the international trade through loans and infrastructure development to African states, as

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the USA did in the 1970s. The positive aspect of this classification comes out strongly when Hilpert (2014) confirms that although China’s domination in the world trade has led to economic tensions and trade wars, these fears are unfounded because the country portrays features of an established actor in the world trade system. The notion of domination can also be utilized in the global power balance matrix. For example, on one hand, the USA might label China as a dominating global trade, yet on the other Russia might embrace Chinese trading behaviour as a model for the world. Therefore, dominance is in the beholder’s eye and feelings. In fact, in real terms, nothing is dominant, unless it is perceived so. In other words, the notion of dominance is not inherent, rather it is created by the dominated. The final dominatarian triad is politics. When put in the social science microscope, we see dominatarianism reproducing intergroup power relations, prejudice and discrimination. These political values are created and re-created through intellectual activities such as bilinguistics (HemandezChavez et al., 1978), and feminism (Haley & Hansely, 2009). Human interaction produces social power in the form of images and metaphors that influence the way things ought to be (decisions, plans and strategies). As such, individuals with high self-esteem are likely to bear ‘powerful’ traits and hence sway decisions in their favour. Weak individuals are (dis)used as less useful members of human ecosystem. This ontological perspective should be interpreted with caution because we have to acknowledge the effects of ontological fallacy and representation fallacy. High dominance feelings involve good levels of self-confidence and selfassurance, a high evaluation of self, feelings of general capability or superiority and lack of timidity (Maslow, 1939; Ho et al., 2012). The proposed dominatarian theory, therefore, could provide five insights for managing global or regional processes: understanding of how each state responds to Partner States that seem to bear the dominant traits; dominating trading partners could evolve to become hegemons in the regional or international trading relations; dominance as a sign of power, justifying the exercise of authority in the regional governance structure (Von Staden, 2016); domination of one country in a regional bloc that may lead to coercive or benevolent leadership with wider implications beyond economics (Hulse, 2016; Ikenberry, 2005); and dominance could be

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useful in gaining control over the formal and informal integration structures, processes, rules, regulations and compliance procedures (Yarbrough & Yarbrough, 1992). This acknowledgement highlights the negative externalities of politics as an element of the dominatarian triad. These negative forces manifest through various social relationships: ethnic cleavages, racial discrimination and national stereotyping (Thompson, 2013). Frank Lovetta refers to this phenomenon as ‘social power’ (Lovetta, 2009). All these are manifestations of the basic features of group motivation, rather than as a rationally held economic or political ideology (Chingarande et al., 2017; Buigut, 2012). Besides this political economy of things, sociologists agree with the view that people or systems that are prejudiced against certain ethnic groups tend to be prejudiced against other nationalities (Loftus, 2008). With the insights generated in this chapter, the type of functional analysis that is relevant to the new dominatarian theory is systematic and anthropocentric. This sort of cross-disciplinary approach to analyzing issues is a creative style of solving complex problems. I regard the quandary in regional integration as a complex one. As an anthropocentric analysis, the ‘personness’ element becomes key, as opposed to material and physical descriptions of events and activities. We have proposed a web-like rim as an analytical tool that presents the relationships between the four components of the dominatarian theory: (1) economy—material resources; (2) institution—values, norms; and (3) politics—power relations. The fourth component with the new theory, the ‘personness’ (feelings, attitudes, perception), is an additional element intermediating between the RIT and regionalism approach in a web-like rim as seen in Fig. 12.3.

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Fig. 12.3 A Webbed Rim representing the intersection between the three set of theories (Source Authors’ construct)

Conclusion This chapter has shown that regional integration processes have been greatly influenced by material forces (economics), institutions and politics. However, as a way of understanding integration from an ideational flow of things, the new theoretical framing hypothesizes that the process itself is embedded in the ‘personness’ of things—ideas, culture, identity, norms and value systems. That integration itself is not possible without the ‘person’. In fact, the humanness which is known to be part of the person’s genes cannot exist in a vacuum, except in the ‘person’; therefore, the ‘personness’ in the integration process is as central to the process as the integration itself. On the basis of this thesis, this chapter, through discursive ontology, reconstructs the regional integration through the dominatarian

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lens. This approach to thinking integration has the potential of shifting the focus of integration from the materialistic nature of things and politics to the very core of human society, which is the person. A few lessons can be drawn from the dominatarian theory as it relates to Darwinianism in this chapter. While the term dominance has been a preserve of natural sciences, and in particular biological sciences, its meanings and relationships have proved that it can also be applied to international relations and regional integration studies as well. It brings out clearly why the ‘personness’ element is crucial in regional integration as it influences decisions through biological reactions and perceptions. Moreover, in applying dominatarianism, we learnt that persons can be attributed ‘stateness’ and ‘regioness’ in much the same way actors are. This is reflected in utterances such as, ‘the role of pressure groups in market integration’, ‘President Maghufuli is a dictator’, ‘President Museveni is behaving like a regional president’, President Uhuru Kenyatta is too business-oriented’, ‘President Paul Kagame is a benevolent dictator’, etc. In the same flow of thought of ‘personness’, strong personalities in the states they represent and regions they belong to can be said to dominate in the global system. Therefore, in this alternative thinking on how future discourses on regional integration studies ought to be framed, the definition of dominance needs to capture the human behavioural aspects of regional integration and ideation. Based on the findings and analysis in this chapter, here are two possible ways of thinking about dominance as a proposed new theory of regional integration. First, there is a need for both administrative and policy interventions for resolving the regional trade imbalances and political tensions. The administrative mechanisms include financing, infrastructure and policies, regulatory frameworks and policies. Second, the effect of dominance is not limited to the individual bearer of the dominance traits; rather, such features spread quickly to cover wider space within the structures of the state and regional formations.

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Conclusion

In March 2008, the Under-Secretary-General for United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno, applauded efforts made by the UN to offer the world one of the most needed peacekeeping arrangement in response to the increasingly complex world order. Guehenno reiterated that reforms within the UN peace operation were aimed at ensuring that civilians, police and the military have access to clear, authoritative guidance on the nature of tasks they are required to perform (United Nations, 2012). As pointed out by the Under-SecretaryGeneral, the broadening of international peace and security from military to include non-military issues and its deepening from state security to human security (HS) captures and corresponds with the trajectory of insecurity in most parts of Africa. The traditional security agenda with its Weberian underpinnings and assumptions predicated on the monopoly of use of legitimate force by the state and other external forces has always endured questionable relevance and validity on a continent in which such monopoly has either never existed or not been legitimate. It is however important to note that, the UN’s definition of ‘security sector’ recognizes other security actors beyond the state. Since 1990s, there have been debates on the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. Some studies show that the UN is ineffective in halting conflict and pursuing peace (Hultman et al., 2013; Jett, 2000).

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Yet others have revealed conditions under which peacekeepers operate to reduce hostilities (Diehl et al., 1998). But also, there are methodological problems; many studies simply dichotomize the presence or absence of an operation in a given year (Jett, 2000), assuming the capabilities of missions do not change over time or that context does not bear any impact on the outcome of such operations. This comes with limitations. For instance, omission of diversity across missions or failure to factor in contextual uniqueness might complicate mandates, personnel commitments and force capacities. It was against such complications that the African Union thought of an African-led peace operation. To this end, the African-led peace support operations have made tremendous efforts in the development of peace doctrines and standard operation procedures, including (1) the principle of non-indifference and the readiness of the AU member states to deploy troops in PSO; (2) the development of the ASF including its mission scenarios and requirements for deployment; and (3) the comparative advantage of using front-line states as troops contributing countries under the guidance of the AU in collaboration with UN. Despite this impressive achievement, the African security community is yet to achieve an integrated system that puts all the components of the peace and security architecture together into a system whole. Our diagnosis reveals that the African Union uses the reductionist models to respond to various peace and security threats. The challenge with reductionist approach is that, it is unable to fully depict or allow the interventionists to broadly understand, the new emerging complex and dynamic peace and security scenarios. In other words, as the founding “father” of systems thinking, Barry Richmond (1994) alludes, ‘people embracing systems thinking position themselves such that they can see both the forest and the trees’ (cited in Arnold & Wade, 2015: 671). Likewise, when it comes to matters of peace and security, without ST, the interventionists are unable to not only misdiagnose the problem but are likely to deploy wrong response. ST has the potential of establishing the practice of coordination between the AU and RECs, with respect to establishing peace missions and mandating PSOs. Notably, an ST modality is required for how to determine a mandating authority for political missions to ensure those initiatives obtain the maximum political support from the AU member states and other regional and international stakeholders. With the exponential growth and demand for artificial intelligence (AI) in peace operations, comes a growing need for systems

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thinking in the AU’s and RECs to tackle the complex peace and conflict scenarios. Now, more than ever, systems thinking models are needed to design interventions for an increasingly complex, regionalized, globalized, conflict system of systems future in which everything from the Sahel conflict system to Great Lakes conflict system to the Horn of Africa’s will produce ripple effects throughout the globe. Based on this reasoning, it could be strongly argued that all people at the AU and RECs/RMs decision-making roles should have a solid grasp on systems thinking in their day-to-day endeavours. Thus, the overall question addressed in this work concerns structural evolution of the regional security community (RSC) and how systems thinking could enhance the functional capability of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The precedence set by the UN Peacekeeping Operations on how entities should manage complex peace and security situation elicited an interesting question as to why tensions persisted between civilians and the military. One of the factors is (mis) trust and philosophical disconnection between the military and civilians. However, it is important to note that among the peacekeeping fraternity, the causes of tension between the military and civilians are context specific. They include organizational structures and institutions; cultural and policy differences; operating principles and norms; professional and world view differences; political and career interface. Contrary to the popular notion that institutions cause tensions directly, evidence emerged to illustrate how organizational structures and processes influence behaviours of those interacting with the system or institutions. This explains why authoritarian political regime is likely to generate considerable resentment even when the policy frameworks insist on inclusive decision-making process. Military personnel drawn from such regimes are most likely to create animosity with their civilian counterparts, compared to a relatively liberal democratic regime. Hence, democratization of ASF and other PSO institutions is not sufficient towards attaining full operational capability. Three things are essential to this process: domination, capacity building and actors. Military Domination—Even though both the United Nations and the African Union PSO doctrine recognizes the need for an integrated peace operation, this is not the case with ASF subregional structures as a cross section of peacekeepers still believe that the military is a strong player on matters peacekeeping. The bitter part of this is that, if power struggle between the military and civilians is not managed, it jeopardizes

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the ASF journey. Given an opportunity, the military institution or individuals serving within this institution could exploit differences within the institutions or civilian structures to frame policies into what they would like to see or cause high friction within the system. This poses risks of politicking peacekeeping missions. In order to harmonize the situation, mechanisms aimed at establishing cohesion between the parties and sensitization to allow the military and civilians mix and work collaboratively over long period of time might be of great importance to the future of peace operations. Within the complex operating context, the core functions of a multidimensional United Nations peacekeeping operation are to: (a) Create secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights; (b) Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country level in a coherent and coordinated manner; (c) Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance. Close coordination with these actors and institutions is, therefore, essential. The uncertainty that surrounds the supply and demand for peacekeepers raises questions on the viability of the ASF. At strategic level, the inter-organizational tensions in eastern Africa involving regional bodies (EAC, IGAD, COMESA and EASF) limits possibilities of realizing a comprehensive mechanism to respond to complex peace and security situations. On the contrary, the ECOWAS’s comprehensive mechanism for conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security is nuanced to allow for plurality of actors beyond the security sector. In both EASF and ECOWAS standby forces, there exist no clear mechanism for representation for Police and Civilian components at the highest policymaking organs, a factor that creates an instinctive military domination of the ASF subregional structures. For instance, in the ad hoc Standing Committee of Experts designated by the EASF, civilian representation is dismal with no police component being represented. During the expert’s workshop held from 11 to 13 March 2013 in Kampala,

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Uganda. Out of the 10 Member States representing EASF Heads of States and Governments, 7 were military of the rank of Colonel and only 1 civilian represented the Government of Uganda. Allocation of resources to various entities and equity at the ASF remains an area of concern. Inequalities are observed in budgetary allocations across components. Inequitable resource allocation to the forces was a source of tensions among peacekeepers. During the financial year 2012/2013, the military component with staff of 17 (16%) out of the total 106 was allocated USD 492,000 representing 21.40% of the total EASF budget (USD 2,289,528) FY 2012/2013. This was significantly high compared to the civilian and police who were allocated USD 118,800 (5.19%) and USD 146,400 (6.39%) respectively. Put together with other paramilitary structures, armed forces received the highest amount 1,014,084 (44.29%) compared to the police and civilians combined, USD 265,200 (11.58%). In regard to the number of employees, the military with a total of 17 staff also surpasses police and civilians combined with a total of 10 staff (Onditi, 2015). Institutional capacity building and adaptation of peacekeepers—It is a concern that participation of political, non-state actors such as civil society organizations has continued to narrow in the regional Peacekeeping Training Centres (PKTCs). Although the EASF and ECOWAS in collaboration with AU Peace Support Operation Division (PSOD) and PKTCs have undertaken considerable effort in developing training guidelines, doctrines and standards, there are considerable coordination issues. Institutional relationship, lack of clarity on training content, standardization, incoherent partnership architecture and competition for funding opportunities remain the major bottle necks affecting capacity development. More so, the 2004–2013 data on PSO training shows that out of the total 9126 participants trained between 2004 and 2013, ECOWAS accounted for 6163 (67.5%) of the PSO trainees. Within the same period, EASF trained 2963 accounting for only 32.5%. The military personnel were the most trained individuals in EASF region at 1869 (63%) followed by civilians at 750 (25.3%). Police were the least trained in the region with only 344 accounting for 11.6%. In ECOWAS region, there was an even distribution of trainees. On the same note, trained civilians accounted for 39.5% (2434) followed by the military at 35.5% (2248) and lastly police, accounting for 24% (1481) (Onditi, 2015). In regard to the institutional capacity, a trend is emerging within the APSA structures to initiate short-term capabilities to respond to

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the emerging conflict situations. For example, AU Assembly initiated the process to create the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord’s Resistance Army (RCI-LRA) in 2009. The PSC subsequently developed a mandate for the initiative in collaboration with participating countries that were authorized by the Council. It involved a Joint Coordinating Mechanism chaired by the AU’s Commissioner for Peace and Security and the defence ministers of the participating countries. The Regional Task Force (RTF) was designed to hold 5000 troops and a Task Force Headquarters based in Yambio, south-western region of South Sudan. Further, the African Immediate Crisis Response Capacity (ACIRC) intent to generate 5000 troops in the form of tactical battle groups of 1500 personnel. This structure was established in 2013 under a centralized command made to attain a suitable combat and combat service support with a minimal initial autonomy of 30 days. The greatest concern here is the peeling back of the gains made since the establishment of the ASF in 2003, since the ACIRC is based on military doctrine. Peacekeepers are more curious in identifying themselves with their own professional category, i.e. the military, police and civilians. This could predict positive engagement with the out-group, in this case such individuals have greater propensity for sociocultural adaptation. However, identification with the host nation did not predict sociocultural adaptation to it. It is, therefore, an indication that the adaptation of the ASF peacekeepers interacting either at the PKTC centres or at the Forces HQ related more to their professional groups than to their inter-professional mix. This implies that individuals are more inclined towards fending for their needs than building a regional image of the force that addresses their professional mandate as opposed to an integrated formation. Patterns of inter-professional tensions may suggest that identification to one’s original culture (to mean either military or civilian or police) rather than abandonment of one’s professional culture was desirable for acculturating individuals and groups. The military as an institution is still central to matters of peace and security irrespective of the geographical context and occupational affiliation. The notion that comes with the terms such as ‘operation’, ‘civil–military coordination’ seems to sway the thinking of actors that an intervention is simply stopping fighting. However, an African peace support operation architecture is unlikely to result in a sustainable peace unless accompanied programmes designed to prevent the recurrence of conflict:

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(a) Restoring the state’s ability to provide security and maintain public order; (b) Strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights; (c) Supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory processes; (d) Promoting social and economic recovery and development, including the safe return or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees uprooted by conflict. The Role of International Actors —The role of international community in promoting multidimensionality of the ASF is in doubt for the last twelve years (2003–2015). While the international community was supporting a change of knowledge attitude and practice (KAP) among the military forces through military and police training programmes, such initiatives continued to perpetuate militarization of PSO ecosystem. In all the trainings that took place within a span of ten (12) years, 80% were those conducted by the UN Missions, 85.7% of NGOs/UNICEF and 87.2% of peacekeeping training centres provided child protection trainings for peacekeeping personnel (Onditi, 2015). Capacity building initiatives by the PKTCs indicated a daunting trend. 94.2% of the total trainees were military compared to 65.70 and 62.80% police and civilians respectively (Onditi, 2015). This outlook casts doubt as to whether efforts to attain multidimensional regional capability are feasible. The continuous engagement of the international community on development of the force’s structures and processes, particularly in EASF has perpetuated overreliance on external donors and technical support. This development continues to threaten the philosophy of African-Centered Solutions (AfSol). Moreover, capacity-building institutions conducting training, coaching and policy development do not necessarily follow the ASF policy guidelines including those regarding PSO training. Hence, the outcome of training does not correspond to the emerging peace and security risks. Worse still, PSO architecture is thinning and giving way to a military operation. Both EASF and ECOWAS standby forces were not able to deploy a multidimensional force by 2015 due to lack of essential civilian capacities.

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Towards A System-Wide Security Mechanism The ECOWAS Peace Fund and the Council of the Wise gave the West African Force leverage to connect directly with the community and recognize non-executive members of the society to contribute to peace processes. The EASF an elitist institution focused on development of structures, rules, procedures and norms believed to guide their processes. In fact, most of the structures were militaristic in nature: they include Coordination Mechanisms; the Brigade Head quarter; the Planning Element; and the Logistics Base. These structures within EASF symbolized the might of the military and by extension the state. This contravenes the ASF Policy Framework on a multidimensional approach to conflict resolution and management. The key driving forces in regional integration were security dependent. The transnational nature of conflicts had led many countries both in EASF and ECOWAS regions to rethink their security strategies. For example, the swinging of the Boko Haram between north-eastern Nigeria and western Chad, the terrorist acts by the Al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa and the unending violence against civilians by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in eastern and central Africa attest to the need for a collective security system. Unlike the common understanding that the formation of a regional security system is a function of economic organizations, plans and practice reveal otherwise. Collective security is in fact the process of combining both military and political strategy. In West Africa, for instance, until the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, there was insufficient security interaction. ECOWAS linked together the whole block of coastal states Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. It is noted that this development was not because Nigeria produces oil, but the power projected by the regional power house Nigeria humbled the rest of the countries in the region to be led by Nigeria on matters ranging from economy to peace and security. Unlike in eastern Africa, the main West Africa regional security dynamic has remained unipolar. Although formation of a regional organization such as ECOWAS does not necessarily indicate existence of a matching regional security complex, the evolvement of the Community into military-political security justified labelling West Africa as a protocomplex. The development of EASF, on the other hand, was detached from the Regional Economic Community-EAC and, therefore, the Force had emerged out of the need to address the security challenges that EAC

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was unable to respond to. The willingness of states such as Seychelles and Comoros from the Indian Ocean, non-members of the EAC, also occasioned the need to have a regional force uniting around the Indian Ocean. Integrated missions are designed to facilitate a coherent, system-wide approach to the peace operation activities. The challenge of managing an integrated mission is compounded by the need to ensure that there is some degree of coordination between the United Nations and the range of non-United Nations actors who are often present in conflict and post-conflict settings. The effectiveness of institutional coordination is constrained by several factors. They include; conceptual issues, the dichotomy by civil–military cooperation and co-existence during peacetime and combat, philosophical differences, leadership wrangles, and lack of harmonized regional security systems as well as lack of a regulatory civil–military coordination framework. However, integration does not mean that all actors on the ground should be physically infused under a single structure. Integration among peacekeepers cannot simply be imposed by an edit from above but is achieved through a constant process of dialogue and negotiation between the actors concerned. The disconnect between various components of the security system requires institutional civil—military coordination framework (ICMCF). The elements include concepts and constructs that would demilitarize the forces; stakeholders; harmonization of regional security system; mode of getting stakeholders’ views and interest; source of intellectual capital. These concepts were applied in constructing what would suffice as a model framework for coordinating military forces and civilian agencies for a multidimensional PSO. It is a concern that a large proportion of PSO training programmes taking place within the PKTCs do not necessarily correspond to the regional peace and conflict needs and principles. The process of recruiting and delivering on training is market driven as opposed to a systematic identification of the problem and solution. The selection for trainees does not follow any systematic process but is based on informal relationships between roster managers and applicants. This has negative implications for the quality of capacities available for deployment. The term ‘force’ is part and parcel of the African peace support operation architecture. In military science, the term ‘force’ means sophistication and military advantage gained by effectively applying human skills, technology and hardware to defeat the enemy on the battlefield:

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The involvement of other non-military entities such as civilian and police would be treated as multipliers to support the strategic military objective. Although the concept ‘Force’ is frequently used by all components at the regional standby forces, the concept appears to be inadequately understood by both PSO actors as well as humanitarian agencies. (Focus Group Discussion in Nairobi, 12 July 2014)

The military’s view of the term maintains rooting in the military science to mean material assets and sophisticated psychomotor manpower skills applied to win a war. Most of the military’s description of what the term ‘force’ means, seems to borrow a lot from the work of Robert Green (2007). In his work, the 33 strategies of war, Green, reiterates that the sure way of winning a war is segmenting the ‘forces’. Observations and discussions with both police and civilians indicated that, it is the very perception around the term ‘force’ that peacekeepers are not sure whether civilians should be part of a PSO. Suggestions have been made by various actors towards building new concepts that will be inclusive of all the regional standby forces’ entities. In the course of my research in eastern and West Africa, we had identified several possible alternative terms. They include, ‘formation’, ‘capacities’, ‘capabilities’ and ‘assets’. In my estimation on how the different terms are perceived, ‘the more civilians and the military continue to interact, the more forms of perception are developed’. Since the formation of the ASF structures through the Policy Framework of 2004, several physical and social structures have been developed. Tensions are heightened whenever one component tries to exercise power over the other. Our observation during the research indicates that, ‘When you interact with the military, it is like the kinetic mode of “pushing” and “pulling” forces in the environment, just as demand and supply determine the frequency and intensity of spatial processes that involve the ecosystem of goods, services and people’. For example, a defiant civilian or police peacekeeper who does not necessarily wish to be controlled by the military may be forced to hate military and their mode of operation. This ‘hate’ may deepen leading to the opposing individuals forming rebellious alliances in solidarity against the domineering force. In other words, another ‘force’ is evolved in response to the master ‘force’. Such trend could degenerate into formations of several poles of ‘forces ’ with the ‘Force’ dissociating to create separate peace support operation architectures. This might lead regional bodies into security anarchy since the

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mission to have an integrated ‘force’ will have been detracted. Our theorization of ‘power balance’ in the ASF structures led us to develop scenarios, for a model, we coin as, ‘Ants Model of Relationship (AMR)’. This thinking likens the processes within the ASF to the behaviours of highly organized creatures such as ‘Ants ’. Ants live in colonies and lead closed system lifestyle. Although Ants are insects with animal instinct, their behavioural pattern can be likened to system dynamics being witnessed within the ASF. The point of convergence between the Ants and ASF as a regional security system is that both are very inflexible to allow changes within their respective systems. For example, Ants are known to be too protective of the queen that any other deviant views even by members of the colony are not welcome. Likewise, this is typical of military-dominated systems. ASF, being a military-led regional security system fits in this analogy. These structures were established to advance multidimensional approach to peace and security in response to asymmetric wars and conflicts. However, within a decade, the development of structures within this system has deteriorated into rigid military arrangements with limited civilian influence. As a result of this rigidity, interaction among actors (the military and civilians) has produced mixed outcome. In order to effectively theorize the spatiality or ASF, the field of geography and Space Physics became useful to me. The works of Abler et al. (1971) and Isaac Newton, the geographer and the physicist respectively was key. Chisolm (1975) and Tidswell (1976). Indeed, Newton’s theory of physical space stated that, ‘every particle of matter attracts every other particle of matter with a force proportional to the mass of each and to the universe; square of the distance between them’ (Abler et al., 1971). Ablers’ and Newton’s world view were influenced by enthusiasm of how tangible objects and space interacted. Similarly, we postulate that social phenomenon such as decision-making processes and resource allocation in a political environment such as EASF and ECOWAS follows patterns of interaction that reflect sociopolitical realities, similar to what the two scientists describes in their thesis as ‘attraction’. In the last decades the asymmetric relationship between the military and civilians has remained largely in favour of the former. The domination of the military is what creates the ‘square of the distance between them (military) and the civilians’. In other words, the ‘force’ of the military multiplies geometrically, while that of the civilians remain constant or diminishes disproportionately. However, our observation throughout the research

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revealed that individuals portray same behaviour pattern when placed in institutions and structures with clearly defined objects and purpose. For example, the interaction between the military, police and civilians within the regional standby force were found to produce certain ‘energy’ or capacities that could transform conflict situations into peace or resolute. In our thesis, the outcome of interaction between the military and civilians in training socialization is, therefore, theorized as ‘gravity’. In the fashion of strategic security studies, ‘gravity’ is the active ‘force’ required to neutralize belligerent groups posing threat to peace and stability. In other words, for the ASF to produce proportional force against the enemy, this must be done in an integrated manner in order to harness the maximum force. The interaction among the military, civilians and police were examined analytically by identifying elements that relate to each other to produce the required energy/force for restoring peace in a given conflict situation. In order to calculate the Index of Influence (IOI), there is need to determine the level of interaction between the three components. Therefore, to calculate the rate of interaction among the Military (M), Civilian (C) and Police (P), each component is determined as the ratio of the total staff of the regional standby force. In order for the formula to be applied to a real situation, we conducted simulation exercises with actual or potential peacekeepers drawn from PKTCs in EASF and ECOWAS. Appropriate variables were identified. Further simulation with peacekeepers generated the data and formulated what we coined as, ‘The Functional Strength’. The Functional Strength (FS) can be used to measure the human resource strength of a component within the ASF. In order to consider other factors in determining the FS, we directly measured the FS through index of influence (IOI). This technique could be used to measure the degree to which a component within the ASF or any other institution is better placed to influence key decisions and hence determine the outcome of a social-political process. The outcome of the simulation revealed a relationship that, ‘the higher the Index of Influence (IOI) the greater the degree of policy influence’. In the case of ASF, organizational department with majority of highly influential professionals is likely to greatly determine decisions across departments. And so, it is not necessarily the number of such individuals, but the effectiveness of their influence on other potentially ‘opposing’ individuals.

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The following illustrates computation of Index of Influence: I = C/T × 100/1 where I = Degree of Influence to policy processes C = Number of professional categories in the component T = Total number of staff in the whole Force To determine the functional strength (FS) of EASF for the three components, namely the military, civilians and police, the indices are worked out as follows: i. (a) Military I = C/T × 100/1 = 30/40 × 100/1 = 75% ii. (b) Civilian I = C/T × 100/1 = 5/40 × 100/1 = 12.5% iii. (c) Police I = C/T × 100/1 = 5/40 × 100/1 = 12.5% Based on the above computation, it is clear that the indices for civilian (12.5%) and police (12.5%) remain low compared to military (75%) in EASF. This implies that at any one given time, the decision-making process is likely to tilt towards the military thinking. As such, influence of civilian and police within the ASF is gradually eroded, not through physical fighting, but the power of influence. In the second example, a determination was made about the FS of IPSTC across the military, civilians and police based on field data. i. Military I = C/T × 100/1 = 196/247 × 100/1 = 79.4% ii. Civilian I = C/T × 100/1= 45/247 × 100/1 = 18.2% iii. Police I = C/T × 100/1= 0/247 × 100/1 = 0% From the two examples, it was evident that both the FS and the Index of Influence (I-I) for the military are high. Thus, are able to influence policymaking processes. In some cases, such as the example of IPSTC, there exists no police officer to influence policies. This model could be replicated and used to predict the outcome of policy processes within collective security systems. Are there possibilities for reforms? It is evident from this analysis that militarization of ASF structures and processes is bound to continue and that ASF’s full operational capability seems to be a utopic proposition. It will, therefore, be in the interest of all PSO actors to make bold steps to

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revisit the concept of multidimensional, particularly the terms of ‘force’. This is a conceptual problem which could be tackled by contextualizing doctrines that inform operations within the political and sociocultural realities of the continent, rather than the application of universal concepts blindly. For example, the 1990s civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone greatly informed the doctrinal formation of ECOWAS standby force to develop comprehensive mechanisms that would address not only state security but also human security challenges that were facing the region at that time. Moreover, the cynic attitude that exists between military elites and CSOs is a symptom of clientele politics within the African PSO ecosystem, leading to exclusion of civilian agencies on matters of peace and security. The African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA) is an ideal platform for enhancing participation of non-military individuals in decision-making processes. Lack of political commitment to the philosophy of Pan-Africanism is perpetuated by self-interested agitations by some African leaders seeking to shield themselves from global obligations. As a result, a resource vacuum is created leading to proliferation of external donors and technical assistance. In view of this development, PSO actors at all levels should make deliberate efforts in strengthening governance mechanisms such as the AGA (African Governance Architecture) and APRM (African Peer Review Mechanism). For this approach to benefit the majority of African people, the processes should be led by pan-African civil society organizations. If these mechanisms are left in the hands of the political class or bureaucrats they are bound to be abused and fractured by the same political bigotries expected to protect the values of African people. That notwithstanding, the future of African Peace Support Operation Architecture should be put in ‘binoculars ’. It is not possible to absolutely stop institutional challenges such as self-interests, conflict and wars on the face of the earth. But, human race will continue to bear the brand of conflicts and wars. It is, therefore, imperative to continue thinking new models for mitigating, managing and resolving conflicts. Thus, thinking and policy intervention is required in areas such as doctrine, institutional reforms, how we conceptualize actors, systems thinking as well as approaches to some of the most deleterious wars/conflicts in the twenty-first century, such as insurgency and terrorism. But institutional fragility/entropy within the AU seem to be the most threatening risk

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to the African vision of attaining a fully operational ASF. The formation of the ACIRC (African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises) for example, was such a threat to the initial conception of the multidimensional ASF. That slight institutional setback notwithstanding, in 2018, the then Chair of the African Union, Rwandan President Paul Kagame, outlined promising reforms towards making the AU financially stable and reliable. Some of the reforms targeted the Peace fund to support Conflict Prevention, Mediation Support Unit (MSU) and the Peace Support Operation. In fact, by September 2018, the AU member states contribution towards operation and programme budget had hit US $269 million (66%). This implies that the donor/partner contribution had significantly reduced to US $ 130 million (34%). This (in)dependency shift is viewed as a transformation of the continent towards a self-reliant, United African States (UAS).

Possibilities for a Holistic Systems Approach: A 3Ds Model Military counter-insurgency operations is a product of post-colonial African states, characterized by persistent insecurity and cyclic conflict caused by factors ranging from struggle over resources, unequal wealth distribution, gross human rights abuse, governance issues as well as identity politics (Keller, 2014; McCauley, 2014). These issues are often linked to the deleterious legacy of distorted political economy deepened by years of military dictatorships and corruption (Onuoha et al., 2020; Amuwo, 2009). Related to the issue of political and ideological identity is the phenomenon of ‘insurgency’ that characterizes several African states such as Angola, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria. Globally, the insurgency network structures are centrifuged under common ideologies, shared languages, culture and religious extremism (Kilcullen, 2005; Cardenas et al., 2018). More often, the groups alienate themselves from the mainstream socio-economic and political systems of the society. In some cases, fear of marginalization is often rife in the contestation for the control of state power given the influence of political power over socio-economic welfare as clearly illustrated in the case in Nigeria. This approach is based upon (but not reducible to) the ‘Hearts and Minds’ (HAM) approach as popularized in Malaya in 1952 (Smith, 2001). During this time British High Commissioner to Malaya, Gerald

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Templer, famously remarked that ‘the answer [to the uprising] lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people’ (Cohen, 2014: 1). The main tenet of HAM is the indispensability of winning the supports of the populace to implement counter-insurgency strategies. It is considered crucial in addressing the state legitimacy crises in insurgency-ridden zones. Hence, for instance in Afghanistan, HAM was demonstrated as ‘humanitarian and development operations performed mainly by military units or civil–military hybrids in order to increase stability through good faith and thereby increase the legitimacy of the government of Afghanistan, as well as the international presence’ (Egnell, 2010: 289). In social sciences, it is important to remember that there is relationship between meaning and actions. Therefore, the kind of scientific explanations attached to 3Ds to explain its meaning and action are functional explanations. The criteria for validity of such explanation are based upon their utility and not upon claims exclusivity against other concepts, which, in the case of insurgency may provide useful explanations that illuminate different dimensions of (in)security as illustrated within the cyclical 3Ds architecture. Development The first argument revolves around the non-negligible development–security nexus. The insurgency phenomenon has a socio-economic dimension that gives rise to social unrest and reaction. The essence of development, for instance, through economic support, is to ‘persuade the population to support the government instead of the insurgents’ (Grandia et al., 2009: 14). Hence, the building of effective administrative capacity and institutions for the provisioning of security, basic needs and services in a manner which is perceived as legitimate by the local population is crucial to an effective sustainable counter-insurgency (Grandia et al., 2009: 19). Akin to this, HAM approach as demonstrated in the 3Ds architecture, stresses development as a precursor to security. It is for this reason that Egnell’s (2010) observed that concerning the tendency to construe development from the perspective of linear trajectory, and the implication thereof in turning development to a means rather than an end, in and of itself. However, the development sort herein is not only construed as a means to an end (such as peace and stability) but it is also an end in and of itself. It is construed as a necessity for well-being, stability and peace, which

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forms part of the overall end, being development (including security) in the broadest sense. Studies on the Afghan recovery processes (Suhrke, 2007), echo the creation of the Development Zones (ADZs) as an enabling factor. External aid and support combined with a few agricultural initiatives gave rise to economic growth, while the local government service delivery capability was being enhanced (Grandia et al., 2009: 38–42). More importantly, as (Grandia et al., 2009: 42) explained, the development projects such as agriculture, geared towards poverty reduction are easier to integrate into the community’s systems, hence, promoting ownership by the insurgent groups. The two pertinent reasons for these include (1) that the insurgents may not destroy it because it is not of foreign origin, thus facilitating its sustainability; and (2) boosts the perception of the local governments among the populace in terms of its ability to ‘care for their survival and well-being ’. Furthermore, Grandia (2009: 45) noted there was a balance between the development and aid efforts by the international organizations. Thus, improving human security may also result in economic activities opening of markets and creating market opportunities for produce from insurgent’s alternative pre-occupation. The confrontational nature of communities that are heated by insurgency may require extra efforts through negotiation and dialogue (diplomacy). Diplomacy The second notion is ‘diplomacy’. Diplomacy, especially preventive diplomacy (PD) is hardly disconnected to the idea of development. The object is persuasion that can solidify the allegiance of the population to the government or switching it from insurgents. This also is about governance. It is about reducing, if not eliminating, the existence of ungoverned areas, through soft power rather than military operation. Indeed, ‘once warfare is connected to both development and diplomacy, strategic and tactical military decisions can have a lasting impact on long-term objectives’ (Grandia et al., 2009: 45). In the same vein, the diplomatic element in 3Ds pertains to the efforts of the counterinsurgents to neutralize external assistance to the insurgents and, at the same time, mobilize outside support for their own cause. For instance, its operationalization in Afghanistan included the launching of the Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) in 2007, with the mandate to

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improve governance for the attainment of stability (Grandia et al., 2009: 38). It is within such climate that negotiation and political settlement can arguably foster stability and peace. On its own, diplomacy may not always yield this result; hence, the relevance of the integration with the military dimension (defence). Defence The final element is defence. It must be noted that the success of diplomacy and development is hardly possible without the military firm hold on the violence of insurgency at least for a period. Hence, the defence element of 3Ds encompasses the wide range of military tasks including eliminating those who commit atrocities, peace enforcement or coordinating disaster response to attaining peace and stability. This is the most common approach to conflict around the world. Meanwhile, in the 3Ds framework, it means more. It means the nearness of the military to the people. Akin to this (Kilcullen, 2006), underscore the importance of being present to the population-being there for people: Presence should be established by living in close proximity to the population, through frequent patrolling on foot, night patrolling and sleeping in local villages. This type of activity, though seemingly dangerous, will establish links with locals and increase human intelligence – thereby increasing the security of the counter-insurgents. (cited in Egnell, 2010: 291)

The inadequacy, if not lack, of such presence not only makes the operationalization of the other Ds less effective, but also difficult. In the case of Nigeria, this has resulted, for instance to the re-capture of territory by the insurgents. The use of HAM in the 3Ds to counterinsurgency is not necessarily a panacea for mitigating impacts of insurgency. Not only is it open to a variety of (mis)interpretation, ranging from mere appeasement of the people through softness and goodwill to the population without stamping of authority through the use of force, it is also not immune to misapplication. However, its broader operationalization, especially, through the 3D reduces this weakness tied to a narrower conception of legitimacy, which has meant that ‘counter-insurgents have had preconceived ideas about what needs and grievances to address rather than to actually listen to the local population’ (Egnell, 2010: 292).

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The Benefits and Criticism of the 3Ds Model The 3Ds model is arguably a comprehensive counterinsurgency framework both in long and short term in Nigeria since the ‘ability to bear all instruments of national and coalition power and influence upon a problem in a timely, coordinated fashion (i.e. diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) is increasingly essential to achieving effective results’ (Leslie et al., 2008: 1). Meanwhile, in the need to avoid some of the challenges it has faced elsewhere such as Afghanistan and Iraq, 3Ds in Nigeria must be predominantly engineered from within the national security system to take adequate cognizance of internal sociocultural nuances, while leveraging on external support where available and possible. The relevance of the HAM, as operationalized through the 3D, lies in its emphasis on the civil–military cooperation (CIMIC) anchored essentially on good governance with the aims of depriving the insurgents the oxygen to breath, namely the population. The population’s support may be due to an affinity with, or coercion from, the insurgents and/or the combination of both (Kilcullen, 2006). Hence, a healthy balance of hard power with soft power helps to bring the population into the picture of COIN, since people are key to understanding and addressing the root causes of the insurgency. This dynamic, to some extent, is an improvement over its misinterpretation and misapplication in the narrative of colonial withdrawal largely rooted in the legal-rational conception of legitimacy. As far as governance is concerned, the HAM approach within the larger framework of 3Ds brings to the fore two basic but critical political factors behind insurgency, namely, bad administration and the lack of administration (Grandia et al., 2009). Both are glaringly obvious in Nigeria and impact negatively on peace and security architecture of the country. It is emerging that, the 3Ds concept can be useful in interrogating which developmental, diplomatic, as well as defence initiatives are likely to prove effective in Nigeria’s COIN efforts considering the limited utility of the military approach as a sole tactic. Importantly, in this study, the 3Ds are not limited to intervening force or external force, but proffered to the host nation’s force, namely Nigeria. In other words, lessons drawn from the 3Ds approach are to be carefully and cautiously tailored into Nigeria’s national security system, in particular the COIN. No doubt the 3Ds as operationalized in countries such as Afghanistan suffered from several challenges including lack of adequate integration, its principles are useful when treating the multifarious aspect of modern

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insurgency; which are markedly different from conventional wars. Nevertheless, its strength lay in ‘the shared responsibilities and planning’ that it promotes among various agencies (Olsthoorn et al., 2015: 264). Its general emphasis on human security is pertinent and is of relevance to the ‘alternative’ strategies we have proposed in the conclusion of this work comprehensive approach within the broader framework of 3Ds. This is particularly so due to the multidimensional nature of insurgency, ranging from material, ethnic, religious, to ideological demands such as those experienced in the insurgency zones. The Dutch 3D COIN seems to have been mainly popularized in Afghanistan and Iraq. By implication, the assessment of its applicability and efficacy in long term is anything but easy due to the limited environment where it has been operationalized. Some critiques have observed that ‘impression that operations in Afghanistan very seldom embody all 3Ds they either focus on development/diplomacy or on defence, not both as an integrated approach’ (Grandia et al., 2009: 8). It is emerging that the continued application of M-COIN in a complex political economy environment is misdiagnosis, leading to persistency of the insurgency problem. However, 3Ds approach if well organized around principles of good governance and development can treat insurgency. It is also evident that operationalization of the 3Ds mix is largely dependent on the country’s context. As such, contexts with strong governance and robust social and political systems, conflicting interests are managed and ways found for groups to pursue their goals peacefully; but in situations of fragility where there is poor governance and weak political and social systems such as Nigeria, grievances, disputes and competition for resources are more likely to become violent. Consistent with literature on the 3Ds COIN, the near absence of well-coordinated institutions for COIN in Nigeria can be problematic. Furthermore, the compelling view that insurgents and terrorists evolve rapidly in response to countermeasures, so that what works once may not work again, and insights that are valid for one area or one period may not apply elsewhere calls for a development of flexible and context-relevant countermeasures towards the two insurgencies. Minding these challenges thus, the operationalization of the 3Ds should leverage on lessons from elsewhere rather than a ‘blind’ adoption of everything 3Ds. For instance, the CIMIC (civil–military relations) thrust of the 3Ds COIN arguably underscored the utility of developing solid partnerships with reliable local allies, in order to design, in concert with those allies, locally tailored

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measures to target the drivers that sustain the insecurity and thus to break the cycle of violence. This involves the combination of the socioeconomic measures, diplomacy and military force to deal comprehensively with insurgency. Finally, the extent of a nation’s military sophistication, which is sometimes a reflection of the level of development, is some relatable determinants of the extent of this challenge for states. The consistency of this view with the ideas of the Comprehensive Approach (CA) in counterinsurgency is appreciable. In this regard, global doctrine on security, broadly views COIN as those activities that encompass military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken to defeat an insurgency. With the requisite political will, Nigeria can indeed borrow adaptable lessons from the above conclusion in addressing the seemingly different but considerably similar insurgencies in the Niger Delta and north east, especially from a political economy dimension. Thus, attaining a robust and sustainable COIN, socio-economic root causes and the negative developmental impact of the insurgencies have to be clearly diagnosed, prescribed and treated simultaneously, using the compressive approach, preferably the 3Ds.

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Egnell, R. (2010). Winning ‘hearts and minds’? A critical analysis of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. Civil Wars, 12(3), 282–303. Grandia, M., van der Meulen, J., & Catigani, S. (2009). The 3D approach and counterinsurgency. A mix of defence, diplomacy and development. The case of Uruzgan. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5f55/0bbb2ce3cadc374 3761235bd89c1e30df746.pdf. Accessed 10 Aug 2020. Greene, R. (2007). The 33 strategies of war. Penguin Books. Hultman, L., Kathman, J., & Shannon, M. (2013). United Nations peacekeeping and civil protection in civil war. American Journal of Political Science, 57 (4), 875–891. Jett, D. (2000). Why peacekeeping fails. Foreign Affairs (Council on Foreign Relations), 80(5). https://doi.org/10.2307/20050311. Keller, E. J. (2014). Identity, citizenship, and political conflict in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Kilcullen, J. D. (2005). Countering global insurgency. Journal of Strategic Studies, 28(4), 597–617. Kilcullen, J. D. (2006). Counter-insurgency redux. Survival, 48(4), 111–130. Leslie, A., Gizewski, P., & Rostek, M. M. (2008). Developing a comprehensive approach to Canadian Forces operations. https://cradpdf.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/ PDFS/unc204/p802756_A1b.pdf. Accessed 10 Aug 2020. Lewis, W. M. (2014). Is poverty the root cause of Boko Haram violence? Available at: http://www.geocurrents.info/geopolitics/insurgencies/poverty-rootcause-boko-haram-violence. Accessed 11 Aug 2020. McCauley, J. F. (2014). The political mobilization of ethnic and religious identities in Africa. American Political Science Review, 108(4), 801–816. Olsthoorn, P., Bollen, M., & Lobbezoo, E. (2015). The comprehensive approach and the problem of exiting civil military cooperation: Lessons from Uruzgan. In Netherlands annual review of military studies (pp. 247–270). The Hague: Springer. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6265078-7_10. Accessed 5 Dec 2020. Onditi, F. (2015). Civil-military relations influencing viability of multidimensional peace-support capacities within the African standby force. Ph.D. Dissertation, Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology. Onuoha, C. F., Nwangwu, C., & Ugwuezze, M. I. (2020). Counterinsurgency operations of the Nigerian military and Boko Haram insurgency: Expounding the viscid manacle. Security Journal, 33, 401–426. https://link.springer.com/ article/10.1057/s41284-020-00234-6. Accessed 10 Aug 2020. Richmond, B. (1994). Systems thinking/systems dynamics: Lets just get on with it. System Dynamics Review, 10(2–3), 135–157. Smith, S. (2001). General templer and counter-insurgency in Malaya: Hearts and minds, intellegence and propaganda. Intellegence and National Security, 16(3), 60–78.

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Suhrke, A. (2007). Recosntruction as modernization: The post-conflict project in Afghanistan. The Third World Quarterly, 28(7), 1291–1308. Tidswell, V. (1976). Patterns and processes in human geography. London University Press. United Nations (2012). Civil affairs handbook. New York: UNDPKO.

Index

A Abbott, Frederick, 419 Abdulqawi Yusuf, Court President, 366, 367 Abyei, 39 Adama, Ethiopia, 260, 261 Addis Ababa, 91, 102, 112, 308 Afghanistan, xv, xxiv, xxv, 335, 345, 355, 356, 458, 459, 461, 462 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS), 374, 375 African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), 293, 307, 448, 457 African-Centered Solutions (AfSol), 449 African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), 138, 140, 268 African Civilian Response Capacity for Peace Support Operations (AFDEM), 268 African Development Bank (ADB), 153

African Governance Architecture (AGA), 135, 156, 163, 203, 456 African High Command (AHC), 214 African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), xxxvii, xxxviii, 230–232, 292, 297 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), xii, xxv–xxx, xxxvi–xlii, 10, 12, 17, 21, 23, 24, 31, 32, 34–38, 40–42, 44, 66, 68–75, 82, 86–90, 92, 101, 105, 117, 118, 127, 128, 131–133, 135–137, 141, 143, 145, 147–156, 161–166, 168, 171, 176, 177, 180, 183, 185, 198, 202, 203, 211, 215–218, 236, 240, 247–249, 251, 255–259, 261, 263, 267–269, 271–277, 279, 283, 445, 447 African Peace Fund, 153, 154 African Peace Support Trainers Association (APSTA), 456 African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), 456

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. Onditi et al., Reimagining Security Communities, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70869-6

467

468

INDEX

African Socialism, 13 African solutions, 201 African Standby Force (ASF), xiii, xviii, xxv, xxvi, xxviii–xxx, xxxii, xxxvii, xxxix, xli, xlii, 91–96, 100–102, 104, 106, 115, 118, 161–174, 177–186, 192, 196, 197, 201, 248, 249, 257, 261–263, 267, 268, 272–274, 283, 314–322, 325, 329, 330, 335–337, 339 African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), 265 African Union (AU), xiii, xiv, xxii, xxv, xxvi, xxviii–xxxii, xxxvi–xlii, xliv, 14, 19, 24, 29, 34–39, 41, 44, 65, 66, 68, 70, 71, 82, 86, 88, 89, 91–94, 101–106, 108, 109, 112, 114–117, 119, 131, 132, 135–138, 140–144, 147–156, 161–172, 174, 177–183, 197, 198, 201–203, 291–297, 299– 301, 304–310, 314–316, 318, 320, 321, 329, 330, 336–339, 374, 375, 444, 445, 447, 448, 456, 457 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), xxii, xxxii, xxxvii, xxxviii, 67, 73, 102, 169, 172, 175, 178, 293, 295, 297, 304 Afrocentricity, 84 Agenda 2030, 299 Agenda 2063, 41, 88, 299 Agronomy, xxiv Aidid, Mohamed Farah, 233 Akosombo, 215 Alemazung, J.A., 210 Al-Ittihad Al-Islami, 233, 234 Al Qaeda, xvii, 356 Al Shabaab, xiii, xv, xxiii, xxix, xxvii, 100, 115, 117, 175, 178, 210, 223, 224, 240, 450

AMANI AFRICA, 165 AMANI II, 169, 197 Amharic, 348 Andersen, R.L., 131 Anglophone, 43 Angola, 139, 457 Angyal, Andras, 256 Annan, Kofi, 140, 220, 353, 356 Ansar al-Dine, 231 Antonio Cassese, 367 Anzilotti, Dionisio, 367 Aouzou Strip, 362 Arab, 212 Arab League, 71, 108, 114, 115 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), 90, 107, 108, 114, 116 Arab Sea, 380 Architecture, xiii, xiv, xxv, xxxix, xlii, 128, 132, 140, 149, 153 Armed civilians, 131 ASEAN family, 269, 270, 273, 275 Asia, xvii Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 293, 412 AU Constitutive Act, 165, 198 Auschwitz, 351, 359 Australia, xxiv, 51, 377, 379–382, 384, 385, 388, 389, 399

B Bakassi Peninsula, 362 Balkans, 63, 335 Bamako ceasefire, 214 Bam, Sivuyile, 197 Bancroft Global Development, 230 Bangladesh, 379, 388, 397 Bangura, I., 249 BBC, 352, 356 Belgium, 139 Bellamy, A., 219, 240 BENELUX, 345

INDEX

Bergen Belsen, 351 Berlin Conference, 411 Berlin Wall, 355 Bertocchi, G., 249 Big brother, 251 Big Man Syndrome, 20 Binoculars, 154, 203 Biological bodies, 255 Bloodshed, 171 Blue economy (BE), 373–375, 377, 380, 382, 389–391, 394–396, 399–402, 404 Bohemia, 348 Boko Haram, xiii, xxiii, xxix, 66, 210, 222, 293, 450 Boots and berets, 163 Bosnia, 174, 187, 190 Bosnich, David, 90 Botswana, 85, 95 Boutellis, A., 128, 147, 153, 262 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 146, 164, 325 Briand–Kellogg Pact, 344, 346 Burgess, S., 164 Burkina Faso, 98 Burundi, 93, 99–101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 112–115, 139, 148, 152, 164, 178 Buzan, Barry, 81

C Cairo Declaration, 141 Cambodia, 212, 219, 322 Cambridge, 347 Canada, 55 Capitol Hill, 365 Casablanca Group, 84, 214 Catalonia, 58, 63 Ceasefire, 179, 180 Cedric de Coning, 162, 192

469

Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC), 93, 104, 105, 163, 179 Central African Republic (CAR), 135, 145, 154, 321, 338 CEWARN, 21, 24, 111 Chad, 66, 224–226, 232 Chief of Defense Staff, 161, 163, 167 Child protection, 167, 198 Children Rights, 306 China, xxv, xxxii, xxxiv, xxxv, 98, 270–274, 276, 378, 379, 382, 392, 394, 395, 398 China-Africa relations, 127 Civil–military cooperation (CIMIC), 461, 462 Cold War, 2, 3, 25, 43, 54, 61, 72, 107, 143–146, 189, 195, 210, 212–214, 233, 335, 344, 355, 392 Colombia, xv Colonel, 447 Colonel Paul Otieno, 261 Colonialism, 210 Combat brigade, 181 Combined Exclusive Maritime Zone of Africa (CEMZA), 375 Command Post Exercises (CPX), 216 Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 140, 142, 446 Conteh-Morgan, E., 130 Council of Ministers, 176, 179, 429 Council of the Wise, 450 Counter-insurgency (COIN), 457, 458, 460–463 COVID 19, 58, 103 Criminal Tribunal, 367 Cuba, 360 Cybernetics, 250 Cybersecurity, 50, 67 Cyberwarfare, 87

470

INDEX

D Dachau, 351 Darfur, 31, 35, 39, 72, 164, 265 Darku, Alexander, 420 Darkwa, Linda, 162 Darwinian, 411, 429–432 Declaration (1990), 150 Democracy, xii, xxviii, 10, 26, 29, 30, 37 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), 139, 295, 298, 306, 457 Deutschian model, 1, 13, 16–18, 22, 24, 25, 28, 30, 31, 43 Deutsch, Karl, xi, xl, 50, 54, 81, 82 Diplomacy, xv, 4, 16, 163, 170, 171, 294, 298–300, 459, 460, 462, 463 Disarmament, 95, 105, 179, 221 Displaced persons, 229 Djibouti, 100, 101, 103, 104, 109, 111, 112, 115, 259, 273 Dominance, xxxii–xxxv, 61, 183–185, 188 DPKO, 265, 266 Drugs, 61 Durban, 161, 163, 170, 202, 218, 224 Durban Communique, 391 Durkheim, 129 E Early warning, xxv, xxviii, 89, 118, 137, 138, 141, 142, 153, 155, 163, 203, 215, 249, 280, 296, 301 East African Community (EAC), 16, 17, 90, 99–101, 111, 112, 114, 259, 263, 272, 277, 283, 388, 396, 399, 404 Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), 93, 99, 101–104, 114, 446, 447, 449, 450, 453–455

Eastern bloc, 24 Ebola, 97, 229 Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC), 148 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), 90, 99, 104–107, 114, 115, 142, 145 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), xxvii, xxix, xxxii, xxxvi–xxxviii, 14, 17, 19, 29, 31, 66, 71, 90, 93, 95–98, 102, 108, 114, 140, 142, 148, 152, 154, 163, 165, 167, 171, 176–178, 185, 224, 225, 231, 232, 248, 264, 277, 278, 292–297, 300–305, 307, 309, 310, 317, 325, 326, 336, 446, 447, 449, 450, 453, 454, 456 Ecosystem, 247, 249, 250, 253, 255–257, 259, 263–268, 271, 283 ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 96, 177, 178, 302–304 Egypt, 14, 18, 31, 379, 394, 396 Elections, 24, 37 Electoral violence, 258 Eminent African Personalities, 140 Emperor Haile Selassie, 347 Engel, U., 154 England, 8 Environment, 249, 253–258, 261, 262, 264, 266, 276, 277 Epstein, 250 Equity Bank, 429 Eritrea, 100–102, 104, 109, 110, 112, 114, 117, 298 Esmenjaud, R., 214, 217 Ethiopia, 71, 72 Ethnic vibes, 198 Eurocentrism, 127 Europe, 7, 8, 12, 22, 24, 130

INDEX

European Union (EU), 58, 62, 63, 98, 271, 276, 292–294 Evolution, 165, 170, 183, 195 Ex-junta, 231 Ezulwini Consensus, 144 F Federalism, 56 Field Training Exercise (FTX), 216 Fit for purpose, 258 Foreign policy, 174–177 France, 139, 146, 148 Francophone, 39, 43, 66, 96, 97, 99, 104 Franke, B., 214, 217 Free Trade Area (FTA), 136, 420, 421 French military, 321 French troops, 306 G Gaddafi, Muammar, 85, 108, 231, 356, 358, 359 Gambari, 249 Gambia, 171, 366 Garcia, Diego, 379, 394, 395 Gates, Robert, 272 Gender, 167, 191 General Assembly, 128, 147 General Mike Jackson, 352 Geneva, 347, 348 Genocide, 85, 86, 92, 100, 116, 117, 130, 137, 142, 151, 351, 352, 354, 355, 357, 363, 366 Geology, xxiv Geopolitical relations, 263 Geopolitics, 49, 50, 420 German Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ), 323 Germany, 8, 176 Ghana, 85, 98

471

Global order, 129, 144, 146 Goukouni Weddeye, 225 Governance, 86, 87, 97, 103, 110, 115 Grandia, M., 458–462 Great Lakes, 296, 445 G77, 395, 404 Guehenno, Jean-Marie, 443 Guinea-Bissau, 295, 296, 302 Gulf War, 356 H Haas, Ernst, 409, 413 Hague, 104 Hall, Edward, 324 Hammarskjold, Dag, 211 Hapsburg Empire, 8 Hearts and minds (HAM), 188, 457, 458, 460, 461 Hegel, Georg, 253 Helicopter, 170 Hettne, Bjorn, 409–412, 416, 417 Hispanophone, 43, 104 Hissene Habre, 225 Horn of Africa (HOA), 87, 90, 92, 99–101, 112, 167, 176, 225, 233, 240, 445, 450 Humanitarian space, 187, 188 Human rights, 161, 167, 172, 173, 175, 180, 187, 190, 197, 198, 201 I Iceberg model, 69, 250 Idi Amin, 92 India, 270, 273, 275, 276, 377–379, 381–385, 388, 389, 392–395, 397–399 Indian Ocean, xxviii, 271, 273, 279, 374, 377–384, 386, 388, 390–394, 396–401, 404

472

INDEX

Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG), 379 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), 377, 379–391, 393–400, 403, 404 Indian Ocean Tourism Organization (IOTO), 379 Indonesia, 269, 271, 275, 376, 377, 379, 382, 388, 395, 397, 399 Industrial Revolution, 87 Institutional bricolage, 248, 249, 256, 269 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 14, 29, 42, 90, 99–101, 105, 109–111, 140, 142, 148, 176, 179, 295, 298, 446 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 188, 193, 327 International Conference for the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), 148 International Court of Justice (ICJ), 362–364, 366, 367 International Humanitarian Law (IHL), xiii–xvi International Monetary Fund (IMF), 301 International Police (INTERPOL), 299 Iran, 379 Iraq, xv, 190, 344, 345, 352, 353, 355–357, 360, 461, 462 Ireland, 8 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 63 Islamic, xxiv, 233, 359 Islamic Court Union (ICU), 234 Islamic fundamentalists, 115 Israel, xxiv, 212 Italy, 8, 18 J Jakarta, 376, 395, 399

Japan, 270, 271, 276, 345–347, 350, 351 Jewish, 367 Jumuiya, 411, 415, 417, 419, 433

K Kaberuka, Donald, 153 Kabul, 356 Kagame, Paul, 149, 150, 437, 457 Kampala, 428, 446 Kamudzu Banda, xlii, 209 Kashmir, 212 Kaunda, Kenneth, 139 Kenya, xiii, xxiii, xxiv, xxxiii, 99–104, 109–112, 115, 139, 140, 259, 263, 269–271, 273, 275, 276, 283, 374, 378–381, 384, 390, 393, 394, 397, 399, 401, 402 Kenya Airways, 429 Kenya Commercial Bank, 429 Kenya Defense Force (KDF), xxiii, 175, 261 Kenyatta, Jomo, xlii, 139, 209, 283 Kenyatta, Uhuru, 283, 380, 437 Kinnvall, Catarina, 430 Kisiangani, Emmanuel, 138 Kismayo port, 402 Kosovo, 322, 324, 344, 352–357 Kuwait, 355

L Laden, Osama Bin, 356 Lagos, 411 Latin America, 22, 29 League of Arab States, 355, 358 League of Nations, 59, 130, 144, 344–349, 359, 360 Legal Advice, 167 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), xvi

INDEX

Liberia, xxxi, xxxvii, 295, 297, 302–304 Libya, 344, 352, 355–360, 365 Light weapons, xxviii, 374 Lord Goldsmith, 356 Lord Richards, 359 Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), 293, 306, 448, 450 Lusophone, 43, 97, 104 M Machar, Riek, 272 Machiavellian superpower politics, 146 Madagascar, 171, 378, 379, 382, 385, 389, 393, 396 Mafia, 237 Maghreb region, 298 Maghufuli, John Pombe, 282, 437 Mahbub ul Haq, 351 Malaysia, 269, 271, 375–377, 379, 397 Maldives, 379, 390, 397 Manchuria, 345–347, 350 Mandela, Nelson, 139, 384, 392 Mano River, 97 Maritime, 279, 373–376, 378–382, 384, 390, 391, 393–398, 400–402, 404 Maslow, H.A., 184 Mattessichian, 343, 365 Mauritius, 377–379, 382, 384, 385, 387–389, 393, 395–397, 399, 400 Mbeki, Thabo, 85, 86 McNair, Lord, xliii, 344, 347 Mercosur, South America, 412, 414 MICOPAX, 106 Middle East, 378, 400 Migingo Island, 16, 270 Migration, 61 Military, xiv, xvi, xx, xxiii–xxvi, xxix–xxxii, xxxvii–xxxix, 49,

473

50, 52, 53, 59–61, 63–65, 67, 73, 313, 314, 317, 321–328, 335–338, 443, 445–461, 463 Military operation, 211, 217–219, 222, 233 Militia, 128, 131, 145 Mitrany, David, 409, 411, 412 Mkandawire, T., 412 Mockaitis, T., 324 Mogadishu, 229, 233, 235, 236 Mombasa, 402 Monrovia Group, 84 Morocco, 107–109 Mozambique, 378, 379, 385, 389 Murray, Gilbert, 349 Musa Y’Ardua, 86 Museveni, Yoweri, 437 Muslim brotherhood, 298 Muslim Rohingya, 366 Mwanza peace process, 139 Myanmar, xvi, 269 N Nairobi, 177, 198–200, 216, 220, 233, 236 Namibia, 212 Naval base, 379, 394, 395 Nazi, 349 Neorealism, 2 Neo-Stalinist, 101 Nepal, 273 Nesadurai, Helen, 270 Netherlands, 176 New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD), 86 Newton, Isaac, 453 New World Order (NWO), 85 New Zealand, 270, 276 Nicaragua, 364 Niger Delta, xviii, 210, 463 Nigeria, 3, 11, 13, 14, 18, 35, 42 Nkrumah, Kwame, xlii, 85, 209, 214

474

INDEX

Non-traditional approach (NTA), 49, 60, 61, 64–69, 75 North Africa Regional Capability (NARC), 93, 107–109, 114, 163, 179 North America, 83 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), xxx, 7, 30, 51, 185, 292, 323 Northern Cape, 165 Northern Ireland, 58 Norway, 8 Nuclear weapons, 392 Nyerere, Julius, xlii, 139, 209, 283, 409 O Obasanjo, Olusegun, 85 Offshore Hydrocarbons, 395 Ogaden, 103, 115 Ogilvy, Jay, 253 Okhonmina, S., 85, 86 Okoth, P.G., 170 Oluwadare, A.J., 165 Oman, 379, 384, 393 Onditi, F., 167, 170, 178, 185, 224, 225, 261, 264, 447, 449 Open systems theory (OST), 253, 255–258, 262, 266 Operation Sangaris, 321 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 1, 34–36, 41, 43, 82, 84, 85, 92, 107, 108, 119, 138–142, 150, 151, 296 Organization of American States (OAS), 345 Ottoman, 345 P Padelford, N., 129 Pan-African, 411

Pan Africanism, 84, 85, 137, 138, 335 Panel of the Wise, 24, 35, 36, 39, 86, 103, 118, 171, 202, 215–217, 248, 274 Para-military, 447 Parliament, 327, 345 Partnership for the Environmental Management of the Seas of East Asia (PEMSEA), 377 Peace, xi–xiv, xxii, xxiv–xxvi, xxviii– xxxii, xxxvii–xlii, 1–3, 6–13, 15–19, 22–25, 28–30, 32–42, 82–84, 86–91, 93–109, 111–115, 117–119 Peace architecture, 2, 13, 21, 41 Peacebuilding, xii, xiv, xxv, 137, 141, 144, 147, 213, 241 Peace Fund, 36, 65, 138, 142, 143, 248 Peace interventions, 162, 195 Peacekeepers, 300, 302–305, 322, 325, 328, 330 Peacekeeping, xiv, xxv, xxvii–xxix, 4, 10, 33, 35, 40, 211, 213, 214, 218–222, 224–227, 230, 232, 237, 239, 241, 249, 254, 259, 261, 265, 279 Peacemaking, 4, 40, 137, 141, 146, 147, 213, 219, 241 Peace support operation (PSO), 162, 163, 165, 167–170, 173–175, 178, 182, 186, 189–192, 194, 195, 197–203, 444, 445, 447, 449, 451, 452, 455, 456 Pearson, Lester, 211 Philippines, 269 Piracy, xxvi, xxviii, 373–376, 379, 380, 395, 400 Pirates, 299 Poland, 348 Police, 443, 446–449, 452, 454, 455 Policy framework, 209, 214, 240

INDEX

Portuguese Supreme court, 361 Post-election crisis, 140 Postmodern, 52 Poverty, 161 Power struggle, 445 President Ali Mahdi Mohamed, 233 President George W. Bush, 355 Preventive diplomacy, xii, xiv, xxv, 142, 143, 147, 213 Protocol(s), xxv, xxviii, 15, 19, 96, 103, 105, 108, 138, 141, 143, 151, 215, 225, 229, 248, 249 R Radbruch, Gustav, 361 Rapatsa, M., 10 Realism, 2, 26 Regional Economic Communities (REC), 87–91, 93, 96, 99, 108, 111, 112, 114, 119, 314, 315, 320, 329, 336, 338, 339, 375, 444, 445 Regional security community (RSC), 445 Relative deprivation (RD) theory, xvii, xix Religious fundamentalism, xxiii Rhineland, 347, 349, 350 Richmond, Barry, 251, 281 Richmond, Oliver, 236 Rim-Centre Actors Analytic Framework (RICAAF), 316, 318–320, 329, 330, 335 Rome, 199 Rubicon, 349 Ruggeri, Andrea, 314 Russia, 146, 270, 271 Rwanda, xliii, 11, 17, 23, 34, 39, 92, 93, 99–101, 103, 104, 112, 113, 115, 117, 130, 136, 139, 142, 148, 151, 174, 176, 178, 212, 344, 352–354, 367

475

S Saddam Hussein, 355 Safaricom, 429 Sahel, 3, 87, 92, 293, 295, 296 Said Barre, 233 Sanctions, xiv, 8, 19 Sanjak, 348 Schmitt, Carl, 344, 349–351 Scotland, 8 Seabed Minerals, 395 Security, 1–20, 22, 24–44, 49–70, 74, 75, 373–375, 378, 379, 382, 384, 394–396, 398, 401–404 Security architecture, 254, 256–258, 267, 269, 271, 274, 276 Security Council, 128, 144–147, 177, 194, 328 Security Council in Central Africa (COPAX), 105, 107, 179 Security studies, xxix, 32, 454 Seleka rebels, 338 Sempijja, N., 130 Senghor, Leopold Sedar, 209 Serbia, 352 Seychelles, 259, 273, 377, 379, 388, 390, 393, 400 Shaba Province, 214 Shangri-La Dialogue, 272 Sharia, 232, 234 Shaw, Timothy, 409, 416 Shock troops, 181 Sierra Leone, xxxi, xxxvii Silence the Guns, 70, 163, 202 Singapore, 269, 275, 379, 384, 385, 394 Situation Room, 142, 156 Six Party Talks, 271 Small arms, 161 Small sister, 251 Social power, xxxiv Soderbaum, Frederik, 409, 410, 412, 416

476

INDEX

Soft issues, 258 Soft power, xxiv Soft targets, xvii Somalia, 88, 92, 100–104, 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 117, 136, 139, 142, 151, 154, 155, 210, 218, 223, 225, 229, 233–235, 379, 380, 393, 397 South Africa, 161, 163, 165, 181, 183, 197, 198, 202, 379, 380, 383–385, 392, 396, 397, 399 South African Development Community (SADC), 66, 71, 248, 263, 269, 272–274, 277, 279, 283 Southern African Development Community (SADC), xxvii, xxviii, xxxviii, 14, 17, 19, 20, 29, 31, 90, 93–95, 99, 102, 114, 163, 171, 178–180 Southern Rhodesia, 85 South Sudan, 11, 17, 31, 35, 39, 448, 457 South West Africa, 85 Sovereignty, xii, 162 Soviet Union, xvi, 344 Spain, 361 Srebrenica, xliii, 212, 344, 352–354 Sri Lanka, 379, 392 Strait of Malacca, 377 Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army/Movement (SPLA/M), xvi Summit, 176, 198 Superpowerism, 417 Sweden, 8 Swing states, 14, 18, 19, 35 Switzerland, 8 Syria, xv, 345, 348, 358, 365 Systemic corruption, 211 T Taiwan, 272 Taliban, 356

Tanzania, xxvii, xxviii, xxxiii, 85, 92, 99, 103, 114, 115, 139, 148, 263, 269, 273, 275, 282, 283, 379, 381, 385, 402 Taylor, J.P., 349 Territorial dispute, 139 Territory, 162 Terrorism, xiii, xviii, xxi–xxiii, xxvi, 50, 58, 66, 73, 87, 97, 100, 108, 109, 112, 272, 374–376, 380, 404 Thailand, 269, 270, 272, 379, 397 Timbuktu, 232 Tocquevillian thesis, 417 Tribunal, 179, 180 TROIKA, 271 Tuareg tribesmen, 231 Turkish, 345

U Ubuntu, 9–11, 23 Uganda, xxxiii, 92, 93, 99–103, 109–115 Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF), 304, 306 UK House of Commons, 359 UN Charter, xiv, xliii, 91, 292, 293, 296 UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 337, 449 UN General Assembly, 297, 354 Union of Comoros, 379 United Arab Emirates, 379 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 98, 377 United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 110, 298 United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), 232

INDEX

477

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 323 United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), 324 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), xx, xxiii, xxv, xliii, 104, 127–129, 145, 146, 149, 150, 152, 327, 344, 352, 356–358, 360, 366 United Nations (UN), xiv, xxx, xxxii, 128–132, 136, 139, 141, 142, 144–150, 152–154, 314, 322, 323, 325, 328, 329, 337 United States of America (USA), 8, 14, 16, 39, 53, 54, 66, 86, 91, 136, 139, 142, 145, 146, 191, 233, 295, 324, 344–346, 352, 355–359, 365, 375, 376, 378, 379, 382, 394, 395, 398, 402, 404, 426 University of Garissa, xiii UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 102 UN Missions, 449 UNOCA, 297 UN Women, 298 Uppsala University, 63 USSR, 145, 146

W Waltz, Kenneth, 52 Warfare, 3, 4, 27 Warlords, 131 Warner, J., 161 We-feeling, 23, 26, 82, 119, 416 Weissmann, M., 272, 273 Weiss, T.G., 152 We-ness, 6, 9, 20, 24, 29 Western Sahara, 71, 72, 107–109, 117 Westphalia, 52 Westphalian, 352 Wildlife Fund, 377 Williams, Paul, 248, 261, 262 World Bank, 98, 110 World Food Program (WFP), 190, 323 World Summit, 352, 354, 355 WWI, 144, 343, 344, 349 WWII, xii, 7, 12, 59, 128, 144, 343, 344, 346, 348, 351, 359

V Vietnam, 269 Violence, xi, xv–xx, xxii Violent extremism, 89, 97, 109

Z Zambia, 85, 112, 113, 139 Zimbabwe, 85, 93, 95, 112 Zucker, L., 318

X Xue, Hanqin, 367 Y Yamashita, H., 129 Yambio, South Sudan, 306 Yemen, xv, 379, 385, 393 Yugoslavia, 322, 367