Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants: A Case Study from Swat Valley 9819995140, 9789819995141

Citation preview

Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants A Case Study from Swat Valley Ilam Khan

Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants

Ilam Khan

Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants A Case Study from Swat Valley

Ilam Khan Department of Peace and Conflict Studies University of Swabi Swabi, Pakistan

ISBN 978-981-99-9513-4 ISBN 978-981-99-9514-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9514-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

To the brave people of Swat; to the victims of conflicts and those who are struggling for peace

Preface

Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants: A Case Study from Swat Valley is the culmination of years of meticulous research, fieldwork, and deep engagement with the complex issue of post-conflict rehabilitation in Swat, Pakistan. This book delves into the heart of an often-overlooked aspect of counterterrorism and conflict resolution—the reintegration of former combatants into society. Through an ethnographic lens, it explores the challenges and opportunities inherent in this critical process, shedding light on its significance in maintaining peace and stability in conflict-ridden regions. The essence of this study lies in its argument that the absence of a comprehensive and effective rehabilitation program in post-conflict environments can potentially fuel the resurgence of violence and conflict. The book emphasizes that the success or failure of any such program is epitomized by the degree of reintegration achieved. In a landscape where rehabilitation and reintegration are often treated as synonymous, this study distinguishes between the two, highlighting their interconnectedness in the post-conflict context. To provide a comprehensive backdrop for our analysis, the book begins by offering an overview of deradicalization, counterterrorism, and rehabilitation efforts in Pakistan. By doing so, it seeks to provide readers with a broader understanding of the intricate web of militancy and counter-militancy strategies that span the nation.

vii

viii

PREFACE

The theoretical foundations of rehabilitation are thoroughly examined and contextualized within the unique dynamics of Swat Valley. Key concepts such as disarmament, demobilization, reintegration (DDR), and rehabilitation are dissected to reveal their distinct roles in the postconflict landscape. Additionally, this study introduces novel concepts like “controlled environment,” “controlled society,” and “controlled rehabilitation,” adding valuable contributions to the existing literature on peace and conflict studies. Central to this book’s research is its ethnographic approach, which was fortified by extensive fieldwork and in-depth interviews with a diverse array of stakeholders. Notably, this approach unearthed previously unrecognized drivers of militancy in Swat, redefining our understanding of the causes behind the conflict. While conventional wisdom often attributes militancy to factors like religiosity, lack of education, and unemployment, this study identifies five contextually relevant drivers: religiosity, unemployment, power struggle, insecurity, and bandwagoning. These findings challenge established narratives and underscore the need for a more nuanced and context-specific approach to addressing militancy. Furthermore, the book elucidates the categorization of militants by security forces in Swat based on their level of involvement in the conflict. The distinction between hard-core and soft-core militants is explored, with hard-core militants deemed “non-rehabilitateable” and soft-core militants offered rehabilitation opportunities. The existence and operations of rehabilitation centers, such as Sabawoon, Mashal, and Sparly, are meticulously examined, including their administrative structures, staff, educational and vocational programs, and specific provisions for women. A dedicated chapter delves into the critical issue of reintegration, providing insights into the extent to which individuals graduating from rehabilitation centers successfully reintegrate into society. This analysis serves as a crucial indicator of the overall success or failure of the rehabilitation program. Components of reintegration, including social integration, vocational training, post-release assistance, recidivism, and surveillance, are thoroughly explored through interviews and focus group discussions. The study concludes by highlighting the limitations of conducting rehabilitation programs in closed environments under military surveillance in traditional societies like Swat. It advocates for the involvement of the local community in the rehabilitation process, aligning rehabilitation efforts with local traditions and practices. A proposed framework,

PREFACE

ix

termed “restorative jarga,” combines restorative justice principles with Pashtunwali traditions to facilitate community-led conflict resolution and rehabilitation of militants. In summary, Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants: A Case Study from Swat Valley is a comprehensive examination of the multifaceted challenges and opportunities associated with post-conflict rehabilitation. It offers a fresh perspective on the drivers of militancy, the categorization of militants, the operation of rehabilitation centers, and the importance of community involvement in the reintegration process. Through rigorous research and analysis, this book contributes valuable insights to the fields of peace and conflict studies and offers practical recommendations for policymakers and practitioners alike. The following chapters will delve deeper into these intricacies, providing a holistic understanding of the rehabilitation and reintegration landscape in Swat Valley and its broader implications for conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Swabi, Pakistan

Ilam Khan

Acknowledgments

I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude and appreciation to the individuals who have played pivotal roles in the completion of this research project and the publication of my work. First and foremost, I am deeply thankful to the respondents of the interviews conducted for this research. Their unwavering commitment and fearless responses in a sensitive environment have been invaluable in shaping this study. I am indebted to my family, particularly my brothers, with a special mention of Israr Khan, and my beloved mother, Abay. Their constant support and unwavering belief in my potential have been a source of inspiration, motivating me to reach higher and strive for excellence. I am profoundly grateful to Dr. Altaf Qadir, Associate Professor in History at the University of Peshawar, and Dr. Husnul Amin, Professor in the Department of IR and PCS at the National Defense University. Their encouragement and guidance have been instrumental in transforming my scattered knowledge into an organized book on post-conflict rehabilitation. My sincere appreciation goes to Dr. Najimdeen Bakare, Associate Professor, and Dr. Muhammad Makki, Head of Research at the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, CIPS, NUST. Their technical expertise and theoretical insights have been invaluable throughout this research journey.

xi

xii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I must acknowledge the supervision and expertise of Professor Charli Carpenter from the Department of Political Science and Legal Studies at the University of Massachusetts, USA. Her subject specialization has enriched my understanding of the purpose and objectives of my work. I am also thankful to my friends who have supported me in various capacities, especially Dr. Hanif Rasool, AP and HoD of Department of English, Khushal Khan Khatak University, Karak, for his valuable assistant in proofreading of this book, Fazal Saeed, a Development expert, Mehran Wazir, Director of CRPD, Fazal Rabi, Executive Director of JF2 Group of real estate, Raja Mohsin Ali, a dedicated government officer, and Dr. Muhammad Rashid, Assistant Professor at Al-Shifa Tameer e Millat University. Their technical and logistical support has been invaluable. This journey would not have been possible without the collective support and encouragement of these remarkable individuals. I am deeply appreciative of their contributions and look forward to continuing my academic pursuits with their continued guidance and support. 2023

Sincerely, Ilam Khan

Contents

1

Introduction Background of the Conflict in Swat Valley Understanding Conflict in District Swat Research Methodology References

2

Rehabilitation and Deradicalization Efforts in Pakistan: An Account The Government-Based Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programs Deradicalization and Counter-Radicalization Plans Future Plans 2nd Component: Deradicalization of Imprisoned Militants 3rd Component: Protecting Madrassa Students from Radicalization National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) National Security Division (NSD) Armed Forces Institute of Rehabilitation and Medicine (AFIRM) Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA) Semi-Government and Non-Government Deradicalization Programs Understanding Civil-Military Cooperation in Swat

1 6 8 9 13 17 19 22 22 23 23 23 25 25 26 26 28 xiii

xiv

3

4

5

CONTENTS

Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants Program in Swat From Rehabilitation to Reintegration Conclusion References

31 31 36 36

Contextualization of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Open, Closed, and Controlled Societies The DDR Framework Conceptualizing Rehabilitation Rehabilitation as a Process Conclusion References

39 42 44 49 52 56 56

Drivers of Extremism in Swat Valley Understanding Militancy/Talibanization in Swat: Theoretical Underpinning Drivers of Militancy in the Research Setting: The Swat Valley Conclusion References

61

Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants in Swat Militants’ Financial Support Classification of Detainees White, Grey, and Black Militants Hard-Core and Soft-Core Militants Internment Centers The Need for Rehabilitation Drawing the Swat Rehabilitation Program Types of Rehabilitation Centers Administration and Staff Understanding the Process of Rehabilitation Psychological Assessment Schooling and Curriculum Physical Training Religious Training Psychological Training Vocational Training Community Engagement Post-rehabilitation Assistance

73 74 75 75 76 78 79 80 81 83 84 84 85 86 86 87 88 89 91

62 63 70 70

CONTENTS

Monitoring/Surveillance Rehabilitation Program for Women Conclusion References 6

7

From Rehabilitation to Reintegration Social Integration Reaction of the People toward Rehabilitees Vocational and Technical Training: Views of the Public and Rehabilitees Views of the Rehabilitees Community Perception Post-Release Assistance Recidivism Surveillance/Monitoring Surveillance in the Eye of Community Condition of Rehabilitees in Community Public Acceptance and Employment Stigmatization Institutional Support Community views About Rehabilitation Program Conclusion References Rehabilitation in a Controlled Environment: An Alternative Approach Militarized Environment and Its Limitations Measures Taken by the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Importance of a Community-Based Approach Alternative Models The Restorative Justice and Its Multiple Facets The Processes of Restorative Justice Reparation and Compensation in Restorative Justice in the Context of Swat Pashtunwali and Restorative Justice How a Jarga Works? Discussion Conclusion References

xv

91 92 98 98 101 102 103 107 107 108 109 112 114 116 118 118 121 122 124 127 129 131 133 135 136 139 143 146 147 148 150 152 154 155

xvi

8

CONTENTS

Conclusion Conclusion

159 167

Glossary

169

References

173

Index

185

Abbreviations

AFIRM CBOs CDF CPR CTD CVE DDR (RR) DDR DRC DRCs ECP FARC FATA FGD GoKP GoSL IDPs IEDs IRD JIT KP LeT LG LTTE

Armed Forces Institute of Rehabilitation and Medicine Community Based Organizations Civil Defense Force Civil Powers Regulation Counter Terrorism Department Counter Violent Extremism Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion, Rehabilitation and Reintegration Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Democratic Republic of Congo Dispute Resolution Councils Election Commission of Pakistan (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) (Revolutionary armed Forces of Columbia) Federally Administered Tribal Areas Focus Group Discussion Government of Khyber Pashtunkhwa Government of Sri Lanka Internally Displaced Persons Improvised Explosive Devices Iqbal-International Institute of Research and Dialogue Joint Interrogation Team Khyber Pashtunkhwa Lashkar e Tayyiba Local Government Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elaam xvii

xviii

ABBREVIATIONS

M19 MML NACTA NAP NGO NSC NSD PARC PATA PTC PTSD PVTC RJ RRF SSR TDPs TEVTA TNSM TRC TTP UN UNDP UNHCR UNIDDRS US VDCs WB WHAMs

The 19th of April Movement in Columbia Milli Muslim League National Counter Terrorism Authority National Action Plan Non-Governmental Organization National Security Council National Security Division Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation centers Provincially Administered Tribal Areas Parents-Teachers Council Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Punjab Vocational Training Council Restorative Justice Rapid Response Force Security Sector Reforms Temporary Displaced Persons Technical Vocational and Educational Training Authority Tanzim-i-Nifaz-i-Shariati-Muhammadi Truth and Reconciliation Commission Tehrik-i- Taliban Pakistan United Nations United Nations Development Program United Nations High Commission for Refugees United Nations Integrated DDR Standards United States Village Defense Committees World Bank Winning Hearts and Minds

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Abstract This chapter introduces the book which is an ethnographic study of post-conflict rehabilitation program of ex-combatants in Swat Valley, Pakistan. It also serves as the foundation for the book’s questions. It also describes the contextual and historical context of the conflict in Swat Valley and explains why producing this book was vital. A description of research methodology is offered, which shows how primary data was obtained and analyzed. The introduction of the book is crucial to understand the context of the conflict in Swat Valley. The chapter provides definitions of the terms used, which helps the readers who are not familiar with the region. Swat Valley is located in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan and has been a conflict zone for several years. The book aims to explore the conflict in the region and provide an understanding of post-conflict rehabilitation of ex-combatants. Keywords Post-conflict · Insurgency · Militancy · Swat valley

In post-conflict situations, processes like post-conflict rehabilitation and reintegration aid in establishing peace. A rehabilitation program directly influences how long a peace lasts and how sustainable it is (Boyce et al., 2002). However, there are always challenges to identify the willingness for rehabilitation of the ex-combatants. In developing countries, these © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 I. Khan, Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9514-1_1

1

2

I. KHAN

practices are more challenging (Knight, 2008). Therefore, the United Nations (2006) provides assistance to states in developing ex-combatant rehabilitation and reintegration programs. States employ “soft” or “smart” counterterrorism strategies in postconflict situations to mellow the radical behavior of the ex-combatants by employing non-coercive methods (Hoeft, 2015) and soft-counterterrorism strategies such as rehabilitation and reintegration wherein the states adopt both the individual and/or collective rehabilitation programs (Aprile et al., 2011). The individual rehabilitation aims at de-radicalizing the ex-combatants in question (Maedl et al., 2010) who either have surrendered or have been arrested by the security forces during conflict or when the conflict ends. In the organizational or collective rehabilitation strategies, the groups of combatants as a result of some peace settlement with the state pass through rehabilitation, for instance in the Philippines (Francisco and Lara Jr, 2012), in Columbia (Sanin and Penza, 2012) and in Mozzambique (Giustozzi, 2012). However, in Swat, no peace agreement was concluded between the state and the militant groups. Therefore, the state initiated individual rehabilitation program where only surrendered and arrested militants were provided rehabilitation. This rehabilitation program was regulated by the Pakistani military in a controlled environment wherein the activities of the persons in that environment are under control and monitored. The other civilian institutions are restricted to interfere in a controlled environment, as are other national and international humanitarian organizations. Any activity that the controlling body sees fit is permitted. According to some studies, however, military involvement may actually result in a society becoming more militarized, delaying the process and the return to normalcy in a post-conflict environment (Buzan, 1991). In this study, the author conceptualizes rehabilitation centers in the controlled environment of Swat regulated by the military. The rehabilitation facilities make the claim that former combatants require special attention to prevent any recidivism into extremist narratives and ideologies. This book emphasizes upon the former combatants in district Swat where they gone through rehabilitation as “militants” and not as “insurgents.” While the insurgents possess distinct objectives and goals, exhibit strong organization, operate systematically, and employ specialized personnel, their focus is directed towards a clearly defined and wellknown population. Contrarily the phrase, “terrorists” “terrorists” refers to people who operate outside of any organized organization and do not

1

INTRODUCTION

3

adhere to any specific ideology or aim. Additionally, their target population is not clearly stated. The militants, on the other hand, occupy middle between insurgents and terrorists, differing from the insurgents in that they formed some specialized offices but not like the insurgents’ organizational structure and narrative. The offices of the militants are intended to demonstrate their influence on society. Although the militants’ target population is, too, not known, they have a justification for attacking those who stand in their path. For instance, the militants operating in Swat Valley refrained from attacking mosques because of their motive, which was the establishment of Sharia or Islamic law in the region. The phrase of “rehabilitation” has several definitions and connotations, many of which rely on the context and procedure. In this study, rehabilitation is defined in terms of the “humane justice system” (Haney, 2006), which is a procedure for resolving grievances of an irate person or group against the government or community. By using this strategy, the study hopes to guarantee that the concerns of both the local populace and former militants are adequately addressed. Adequate grievance redress indicates that these people receive adequate redress for their concerns rather than just being punished for their acts against the government and society. Equal opportunity in the economy, society, and politics are possible examples, as well as greater participation in community affairs. Consequently, the individuals involved can reintegrate into society as ordinary citizens of their respective state. Rehabilitation programs facilitate a gradual return to normalcy and aid in preventing relapse into criminal behavior within a post-conflict setting (the National Institute of Justice, 2016). Taking the particular context of the conflict in Pakistan, the research of society if international law defines rehabilitation as the process which involves physical, psychological and social measures aimed to rehabilitating a criminal to the position where he no longer yearning or feel compelled to join activities or the groups associated with terrorism (Soofi, 2012). Rehabilitation of former militants in district Swat initiated after the conflict ended in 2009 when the district was controlled by Pakistan army under the legal cover of “The Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulations” (the Institute of Social Justice, 2011), allowing the army to arrange a rehabilitation program for ex-combatants in Swat. The program was run in a “controlled” setting, meaning that only military personnel can manage the setting, and national or international organizations were permitted allowed to intrude. The risk associated with

4

I. KHAN

the delicate nature of the Swat rehabilitation program led to the separation of former combatants from the general community. In addition to being divided apart for rehabilitation, the former combatants are closely watched once they have been reintegrated back into society. This type of rehabilitation is known as “controlled rehabilitation” and, which, is carried out in a controlled setting behind thick walls and rooms with numerous security guards (Yumna, 2015). It presents a novel concept for practitioners and academics that require more investigation. The aim of this research is to answer the questions that the controlled rehabilitation brought up. What, for instance, would be characteristics of rehabilitation programs that are run in a controlled setting? What might the rehabilitation programs in an open setting and those in a restricted one have in common? And, how effective would a rehabilitation program run by civilians be, and what are the possibilities of such a program led by the civilians? The research has found the shortcomings in the current rehabilitation institutions, which fall short of international standards and globally accepted criteria, by examining the case of Swat to establish a contextual understanding of a “controlled society” that can help with the aforementioned concerns. The post-conflict rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants are essential to post-war societies and play a significant role in peacebuilding (Nilsson, 2005, p. 13). For any nation that has experienced a conflict, rehabilitation is still of utmost importance. Every society has a common perception of combatants as angry people who turned to militancy to air their grievances and lessen their relative deprivation (Cloninger and Leibo, 2017). These former combatants were once peaceful citizens, and facilitating their reintegration into mainstream society should be a top priority for every state, as their successful reintegration is vital for promoting a tranquil and progressive society. Valley Swat—a tourist town in North-Western Pakistan that became a hotbed of conflict between the militants and the Pakistan army in 2008– 9—provides an example of how local frustrations along with other factors have caused violent mobilization and militancy. The former combatants languishing in the rehab centers require effective rehabilitation in order to reintegrate as law-abiding citizens. Additionally, purpose of this study is to come up with a viable strategy for the UN to effectively redress the grievances associated with a state’s demonstration of readiness to operate within controlled environment while adhering to international law.

1

INTRODUCTION

5

Studies of peace and conflict, security, and other pertinent fields can all be used to frame this enquiry. While the majority of the available literature in circulation concentrates on the reintegration of former combatants, it ignores how effective that reintegration will be without comprehensive rehabilitation, particularly in a controlled environment. Since their reintegration is a key sign of an effective rehabilitation, this study concentrates on the rehabilitation procedures of ex-combatants. Furthermore, it aims to provide a platform for researchers to explore novel approaches and procedures for rehabilitating former combatants within controlled setting, where post-conflict states may be hesitant to grant open access to peace practitioners, development professionals, and humanitarian organizations. Ex-combatants are typically the aggrieved citizens of a state; along with political and social injustices, relative deprivation causes frustration in people, which are further fueled by (mis)interpretation of religion that results in aggression. In Swat, this was the situation. Post-conflict rehabilitation is essential for reintegrating these angry individuals back into society as law-abiding citizens, which will aid in a positive nation- and state-building process. A state should prioritize locating the issues that prompted its citizens to resort to violence and work to remedy these issues through enhanced rehabilitation procedures. In broader terms, the following five challenges, as pointed out, by Ozerdem (2012) are connected to former combatants in a post-conflict setting: a. The society is demilitarized, and the militants are demobilized. This is necessary to ensure that those who have been rehabilitated are not influenced again by the militants. b. The society is de-weaponized. Since every conflict brings a lot of small arms into which provides potential for another conflict in post-conflict environment? Swat was weaponized during Afghan war when plenty of small arms were supplied to locals for the so-called war against Soviet Union. c. It should be made certain that no ex-combatants return to society without rehabilitation. The mind of a non-rehabilitated combatant might retain an inclination towards his previous disposition. If his grievances are not addressed, he may re-join his old group whenever he finds a chance. d. The rehabilitees (beneficiary) must have economic opportunities or financial support. If a rehabilitee does not have an income source, he might be easily attracted by the militants again.

6

I. KHAN

e. Ensure that entire community is engaged in rehabilitation process. Failure to engage the local community may create hurdles for the rehabilitee. A rehabilitee may face stigmatization into society and ultimately may re-join his old group.

Background of the Conflict in Swat Valley In comparison with neighboring princely states (Rome, 2008) like Dir, Amb, and Chitral (Hay, 1934), the “State of Swat,” formed in 1915, had enjoyed autonomy during the British era and had been prosperous and progressive in terms of education, communication, tourism, and administration. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)’s northernmost district, the Swat, is encircled by the districts of Dir Upper and Lower, Shangla, Kohistan, Malakand, and Chitral. The State of Amb was divided into Kohistan and Shangla (Rome, 2008). In 1969, Swat was granted a special status in the constitution of Pakistan, making it a fundamental element of that nation. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), the province that oversees the area, is known as the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). Due to the state’s seamless Wali 1 control since 1915, there were no social, political, or administrative issues with the new administrative setup. The state of Pakistan maintained the current governance structure with some minor structural adjustments because institutionalization was already in place (Nichols, 2001). In the 1980s, Swat remained unaffected by the Afghan War. Some individuals did, however, enlist as mujahedeen, and upon their return, both the state and religious political parties celebrated and honored them. Sufi Muhammad, who continued to be an inspiring figure and a dynamic leader and who was formerly an active member of a religious political organization, was one of the mujahedeen who returned from the battle. In 1989, Sufi Muhammad started a movement to Islamize the Malakand Division, of which Swat is a district. The movement was known as the “Tanzim-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi” (TNSM) (Rome, 2016), receiving a lot of support from the community and former mujahedeen who were transported to Afghanistan in the 1990s. The campaign, which gained support from the general public, advocated 1 Wali is the head of princely state.

1

INTRODUCTION

7

the implementation of Sharia law in Swat and surrounding parts of the Malakand Division as well as federally administered tribal areas (FATA). In 1994, a military campaign was started to reestablish the government’s authority and prevent further penetration of the movement. As a result, the movement temporarily fell into hibernation (Nichols). Sufi Muhammad renewed his appeal for Jihad when the US and its coalition forces attacked Afghanistan in 2001, and hundreds of mujahedeen traveled to Afghanistan to fight the US and its coalition in 2001–2002. At that time, the government did nothing to thwart Sufi Muhammad’s mission or popularity. Sufi Muhammad was imprisoned in 2006 for his illegal activities (which included contesting the state’s writ). However, his movement, TNSM, continued to operate, and Mullah Fazlullah was sonin-law of Sufi Muhammad who assumed leadership of TNSM. Fazlullah was more charismatic for the people of Swat and more hazardous for the state than Sufi Muhammad. In 2007, when the Tehirik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had become the main anti-Pakistan movement, Fazlullah declared the TNSM’s loyalty to them (Bangash, 2012). After 2007, Fazlullah had practically complete authority over Swat and the surrounding districts of the Malakand division. His group disavowed all allegiances to the government of Pakistan and established its own Sharia law to establish a system of justice and punishment. His fatwa (verdict) designated the army and Pakistan’s parliament as unbelievers, launching a Jihad (holy war) against them (Rome, 2008). The state’s security was put under more and more strain as TTP gained momentum in Swat. The entire Malakand division became a nursery for militants and suicide bombers. The state therefore made the decision to reclaim its authority in the area and launched a military attack against them in Pakistan’s Malakand division in 2009 (Flischure, 2011). Many civilians, members of the security forces, and terrorists were slain before the bloody conflict ended in September 2009 (Temple-Raston, 2013). A significance loss was faced by the valley in terms of lives and infrastructure due to the military operation against militants. Around three million people from the valley forced to leave their homes and relocate to Khyber Pashtunkhwa’s districts. Afterward, the authorities relocated the IDPs within four months, but the infrastructure damage was irreparable. Even though it was challenging, Pakistan managed to bring about a negative peace in Swat despite being an economically underdeveloped nation.

8

I. KHAN

Understanding Conflict in District Swat Despite being separated in timeline, the conflict in Swat needs to be understood in relation to the 1980s Afghan War. Although the backgrounds of conflicts in other regions of Pakistan differ slightly from those in Swat, hence, the overall context of the conflict in Swat is distinct and should be studied independently from conflicts elsewhere in the world. The conflicts in Swat, the Malakand division, and FATA are relatively similar in nature, and they are all being fought against the same enemy: the Taliban. The local tradition has a significant impact on the context of the conflict. Pashtunwali, the collective name for the local custom of Pashtun traditions, is present in every facet of Pashtun life, including times of war and peace, sorrow, and joy. Any interference in Pashtun society, whether it is from the government, a non-governmental organization, or another NGO, must be approved by the people who live there. The military interfered in the local environment in this case of the rehabilitation effort in Swat, but it ignored the local community and its customs. In the context of Swat, it is crucial to increase public trust since, without it, societal conflicts will always be a possibility, especially in the absence of security personnel. Security-wise, Swat is in a distinct situation because it is nearer to Afghanistan, where the Taliban are still engaged in conflict with the US and its allies. One of the deadliest terrorist alliances, the TTP, was based in Swat and was led by Mullah Fazlullah, who was later expelled from Swat by Pakistani security forces and killed in a drone attack in 2018 in Afghanistan. Adding to this, security forces are engaged in conflict(s) with militant groups of a same nature in FATA, which borders the Swat Valley. Last but not least, Swat’s rehabilitation and reintegration programs function in a strictly regulated setting. As a result, dispute resolution is a very murky and evasive procedure. No other national or international civilian group is allowed to intervene without the military’s prior consent, and the military regulates all relations with militants and former combatants. Negotiations and other reconciliation processes between the community and ex-combatants often fall short, which breeds mistrust and makes establishing trust difficult. The Swat case is unique from other cases because of the aforementioned arguments. Day after day, the militants’ message spread throughout Swat. In order to stop the growth of militancy, the Pakistani military engaged in April

1

INTRODUCTION

9

2009, and a deadly conflict ensued that continued for four months (Fleischner, 2011). The period of calm was a negative peace because of the ongoing threat posed by militants, the presence of security personnel, and the malfunctioning of civilian companies. However, this stage was known as the post-conflict phase (Ali, 2009). During this post-conflict phase, civil organizations from around the nation and the world joined state-building initiatives. The rehabilitation of ex-combatants was the only part of peacebuilding that these civilian organizations were kept out of. According to Pakistani legislation, NGOs and other humanitarian groups must get a “no objection certificate (NOC)” from Pakistan interior ministry before engaging in any activity. Humanitarian organizations, including the UN, are unable to carry out their activities directly because Pakistan is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention, which regulates the status of Refugees and related activities, the 1967 Protocol, or the 1954 Convention regarding the status of stateless persons (UNHCR, 2012). With the exception of attempts for reconstruction and peacebuilding in which civilian organizations participated, rehabilitation and later reintegration programs for former combatants in Swat have mostly been managed and supervised by the Pakistan army. Perhaps to avoid international engagement in rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives, the Pakistani foreign office established a new acronym for IDPs (internally displaced persons) for the civilian, who were also victims of the conflict, TDPs (temporarily dislocated individuals) was suggested as the replacement name (Ali, 2015). This new phrase appears to be designed to convey to the international community that these people are not refugees but rather simply temporarily dislocated, and that the state may resettle them without inviting the international community.

Research Methodology In this book, which is a qualitative research, ethnography is used to analyze the post-conflict situation, notably rehabilitation in the Pakistani district of Swat. Although participant observation and ethnography are sometimes used interchangeably, further research shows that ethnography has a broader definition and range of applications. In the social sciences, the term “ethnography” refers to both a method and a writing product of that process, as well as to the active observation of a setting involving the global community (Bryman, 2012, p. 31). In an ethnographic study, the researcher “uses non-observational methods and sources, such as

10

I. KHAN

interviews and documents” in addition to being a participant observer (Bryman, 2012, p. 466). By definition, ethnographic research is a timeand resource-intensive methodology that examines “social interactions, behaviors, and perceptions that occur within social setting” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007). This study finds it challenging to perform a thorough ethnographic study of a setting for this reason. The research has only focused on one specific element of a given social setting. The term “micro-ethnography” refers to the study of a specific element of a social context (Wolcott, 1990). In contrast to participant observation, which necessitates some sort of participation or action on the part of the researcher, “interactive inductive study” involves the researcher directly interacting with the subject. This must be noted as part of the body of ethnography research (Bryman, 2012, p. 447). Due to the rehabilitation institutions’ accessibility issues, it was challenging to research ex-combatants by participant observation in this case. Nevertheless, this study chose to do a micro-ethnographic study through “interactive inductive study.” The researcher not only spent ample time with the rehabilitation center graduates in their community, but he also interacted with them closely, building a level of familiarity that allowed the ex-combatants to feel comfortable providing the researcher with the data he needed for this study. Since it examines the post-conflict rehabilitation initiatives in Swat, this study is qualitative in character. A qualitative study with more flexible and liberal boundaries was chosen by the author since a quantitative investigation could be challenging and dangerous in sensitive environment. The ethnographic study method was chosen by the author in order to investigate the organizational structure, nature, and methods of rehabilitation programs in Swat. This study’s design met the needs of the research effectively. Conducting ethnographic research in societies like Swat has a number of fundamental challenges, one of which is determining whether the society is “closed” or “open” (Bryman, 2012). The Swat society is considered to be “closed.” The setting—“public” or “non-public”—is another difference (Atkinson and Hammersley, 1994). Disciplined societies, such as those seen in schools, organizations, the armed forces, and factories, are considered non-public settings (Deleuze, 1992). The rehabilitation centers that are the subject of this study fall under the category of disciplinary societies or non-public settings. In such a closed setting, it

1

INTRODUCTION

11

was challenging for the researcher to decide between a covert observation/study and an overt engagement. In the beginning, the researcher attempted covert participation to learn more from the main informants, but that was a dangerous task. As Alan Bryman (2012) explains, covert engagement has its own benefits. Since the key informants will not alter their behavior in any way due to being the subject of research or observation, it will provide unique information about a setting. However, in a closed setting, which is also a sensitive setting, both the researcher and the key informants run the risk of dying. The researcher may be accused of being a spy for any foreign agency at any time if covert participation was to be discovered, which could happen at any time. The key informants cannot be asked relevant questions needed for the research during a covert involvement since they might grow suspicious (Bryman, 2012, p. 439). The researcher decided to be overt in his participation as a result. Overt involvement, in this study, refers to the researcher explaining his objectives to only those field personnel who are necessary for the research; these personnel include the key informants and the field guides who accompany the researcher during his field. After actively engaging and establishing a reliable rapport, the researcher successfully conducted interviews and documented notes in the presence of crucial informants. Other challenges that were unique to the Swat region also existed. One of these was the Pashtunwali: the traditions and culture of Swat, which set it apart from other regions in many ways. The challenge in connecting with the female population, which was a component of the research sample, was one problem brought on by this culture. In Pashtunwali, women are only permitted to communicate with their immediate family and are not permitted to leave their homes without a man (mahram). Interviewing the female sample was therefore almost impossible. Identification of potential militants, who blended in with the local population when they were moving freely, was another challenge. Both the interviewee and the interviewer could get hurt. Lastly, there are a lot of security personnel in the Swat region, and they forbid researchers as well as the presence or movement of outsiders (non-locals) there. However, as the researcher acts like a native of the area, these variables didn’t present him with any major issues. However, the taboo surrounding the subject made even well-known locals and key informants reluctant to divulge information. Access to sensitive information and rehabilitation facilities was prohibited by the relevant government departments, which also appeared to be concerned about the study’s potential

12

I. KHAN

security threats. Nevertheless, choosing an ethnographic study has certain advantages. As a local, it was very simple for the researcher to comprehend the context, location, and overall culture under study. This made it easier for the researcher to move around and live within the society under study. Second, any sensitive research needed the researchers’ own interpretations of the people, the environment, the political and social climate, and the conflict itself. Without using an ethnographic study approach, these occurrences cannot be understood. Third, a researcher cannot assume that every question will have an answer from the respondents. Thus, ethnography served as an approach that allowed the researcher to watch and analyze the social realities that were playing out in front of him. The researcher was able to study relevant documents and conduct interviews to add to the responses acquired during fieldwork. The researcher’s ability to do in-depth research was made possible by his knowledge and understanding of the geography, population, language, and customs of the subject area. Focus group discussions (FGDs), questionnaires, interviews, and personal observations are the tools utilized for data collecting. Openended questions were used in the semi-structured interviews. Graduates of rehabilitation centers were questioned on a variety of topics, such as general information about the rehabilitation facilities, the kind of education and vocational training provided, information about sources of income after rehabilitation, social assimilation of the graduates, perspectives on the conflict, community behavior and attitudes toward the respondents following the conflict, and other topics of a similar nature. These inquiries enabled the researcher to evaluate rehabilitation facilities and their efficacy. The researcher was able to gauge the respondents’ level of reintegration into their society by evaluating the performance of the rehabilitation institutes. Four focus group discussions (FGDs) with community members were held. There were between 5 and 8 participants. The participants’ opinions on ex-combatants, rehabilitation facilities, and post-conflict developments in rehabilitation and reintegration were the subjects of the questions posed during FGDs. Also covered in the questions were the participants’ impressions of how engaged and integrated these graduates were in their societies after receiving rehabilitation. These FGD questions allowed the researcher to evaluate the efficacy of the rehabilitation programs in a manner similar to the questions posed to the other sample size.

1

INTRODUCTION

13

Another component of the sample used in the study was composed of relevant stakeholders. Three different stakeholder categories were represented in this sample: community members, NGO practitioners, and government officials. Questions about rehabilitation centers and associated procedures were directed at the officials, while inquiries about graduates of rehabilitation centers, graduates they were familiar with, and perspectives on rehabilitation and reintegration in general were directed at the latter two stakeholders. One of the most crucial and challenging stages of performing ethnographic research is creating questionnaires. The questions in a researcher’s pre-made or ready-made questionnaire cannot all be asked. This study’s questionnaire was adaptive. To allay interviewers’ concerns and secure their participation, several questions had to be amended (Gay et al., 2012, p. 389). This gave the researcher the opportunity to modify the questions in light of the context, society, social mores, security measures, and sensitivity. A single questionnaire wouldn’t suffice for this investigation. The target demographic was separated into four groups by the researcher. These people included women, community members, nuclear families, and ex-combatants. The staff at rehabilitation centers; government officials (civil bureaucrats and military officers) who directly or indirectly dealt with ex-combatants; academia and NGOs; and members of civil society with an interest in rehabilitation and reintegration were also divided into four groups as stakeholders (key informants). For the first target audience category, four different questionnaires were created: one for women, one for community members, one for nuclear families, and one for former militants. For the second category, the key informants, four separate questionnaires were created. But because each of these questionnaires was adaptable, researcher could change the questions to fit the circumstance and gather useful information.

References Ali, M. (2009, June 25). Pending Peace. Retrieved September 23, 2016, from Thoughtline: https://thoughtlines.wordpress.com/tag/operation-rahe-rast/. Ali, Z. (2015, January 6). 2014: From IDPs to TDPs. Retrieved May 8, 2018, from Dawn News: https://www.dawn.com/news/1155081. Aprile, R., Rizzo, S., Romanini, E., De Santis, F., Marsan, S., Rinaldi, G., and Padua, L. (2011). Group Rehabilitation Versus Individual Rehabilitation

14

I. KHAN

following Knee and Hip Replacement: A Pilot Study with Randomized, Single Blind, Cross-Over Design. European Journal of Physical and Rehabilitation Medicine, 47 (4), 551–559. Atkinson, P., and Hammersley, M. (1994). Ethnography and Participant Observation. In N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research (pp. 248–261). London: Sage. Bangash, D. S. (2012). Socio-economic Conditions of Post-Conflict Swat: A Critical Appraisal. Tigah; A Journal of Peace and Development, 2, 66–79. Boyce, W., Koros, M., and Hodgson, J. (2002, November 4). Community Based Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Peace-Building. Retrieved March 5, 2020, from BMC International Health: https://bmcinthealthhumrights.biomedcen tral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1472-698X-2-6. Bryman, A. (2012). Social Research Methods. London: Oxford University Press. Buzan, B. (1991). New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs, 67 (3), 431–491. Cloninger, S. C., and Leibo, S. A. (2017). Understanding Angry Groups: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Their Motivations and Effects on Society. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC. Deleuze, G. (1992). Postscript on the Societies of Control. October, 59, 3–7. The MIT Press. Fleischner, J. (2011, October). Governance and Militancy and Pakistan’s Swat Valley. Retrieved August 14, 2018, from Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/389 0~v~Governance_and_Militancy_in_Pakistans_Swat_Valley.pdf. Lara, Francisco J., Jr. (2012). Settlement without Disarmament in the Philippines: The Unheralded Outcomes of the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement. In A. Giustozzi (Ed.), Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In (pp. 99–112). London: Ashgate. Gay, L. R., Mills, G. E., and Airasian, P. (2012). Educational Research: Competencies for Analysis and Applications. Boston: Pearson. Giustozzi, A. (2012). Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobalization and Rrintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In. London: Ashgate. Hammersley, M, & Atkinson, P. (2007). Ethnography: Principles in Practice . London: Taylor and Francis. Haney, C. (2006). The law and public policy. Reforming punishment: Psychological limits to the pains of imprisonment. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association. Hay, W. R. (1934). The Yusufzai State of Swat. The Geographical Journal, 84(3), 236–246. Hoeft, G. (2015, March). ‘Soft’ Approaches to Counter-Terrorism: An Exploration of the Benefits of Deradicalization Programs. Retrieved June 17, 2018, from

1

INTRODUCTION

15

International Institute for Counter Terrorism: https://www.ict.org.il/UserFi les/ICT-Soft-Approaches-to-CT-Hoeft.pdf. Knight, M. (2012). DDR and SSR. In G. A. Dudouet (Ed.), Post-War Security Transitions: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts (pp. 17– 29). New York: Routledge. Maedl, A., Schauer, E., Odenwald, M., and Elbert, T. (2010). Psychological Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants in Non-Western, Post-Conflict Settings. Trauma Rehabilitation after War and Conflict, 177–213. Retrieved June 17, 2019, from: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-57221_9#citeas. National Institute of Justice (2016, April 10). Recidivism. Retrieved from nij.org: http://www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/recidivism/pages/welcome.aspx. Nations, United. (2006). Handbook on Restorative Justice Program. New York: United Nations. Nichols, R. (2001). Settling the Frontier: Law, Land and Society in the Peshawar Valley, 1500–1900. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Nilsson, A. (2005). Reintegrating Ex-combatants in Post-Conflict Societies. Uppsala: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). Ozerdem, A., and Podder, S. (2008). Reinsertion Assistance and the Reintegration of Ex-combatants in War to Peace Transitions. Bradford: University of Bradford. Özerdem, A. (2012). A Re-conceptualisation of Ex-combatant Reintegration: ‘Social Reintegration’ Approach. Conflict, Security and Development, 12(1), 51–71. Sanin, F. G., and Penza, A. G. (2012). Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobalization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In. London: Ashgate. Soofi, A. B. (2012). Employing the Sri Lankan Rehabilitation Model to Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Framework. Islamabad: Research Society of International Law. Sultan-i-Rome. (2008). Swat State (1915-69) From Genesis to Merger. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Sultan-i-Rome. (2016). Land and Forest Governance in Swat: Transition from Tribal System to State to Pakistan. London: Oxford University Press. Temple-Raston, D. (2013, April 1). Re-educate Militants. Retrieved July 17, 2016, from npr.org: http://www.npr.org/2013/04/01/175706661/pakist ans-ambitious-program-to-re-educate-militants. The Institute for Social Justice. (2011). The Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation, 2011. Retrieved July 27, 2018, from The Institute for Social Justice: http://www.isj.org.pk/the-actions-in-aid-of-civil-power-regulation-2011/. UNHCR. (2012, April). European Country for Origin Information Network. Retrieved March 22, 2018, from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human

16

I. KHAN

Rights: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1004339/2016_1335351758_ 4f9663d12.pdf. United Nations. (2006). Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards. New York: United Nations. Wolcott, H. F. (1990). Making a Study “more ethnographic”. Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 19(1), 44–72. Yumna, R. (2015, September 23). Bringing them home: Pakistan’s Child Deradicalisation Centre Offers Second Chance. Retrieved January 28, 2017, from Dawn News: http://www.dawn.com/news/1208602.

CHAPTER 2

Rehabilitation and Deradicalization Efforts in Pakistan: An Account

Abstract This chapter provides an overview of Pakistan’s deradicalization, counterterrorism, and rehabilitation efforts to better understand the country’s overall militancy culture and counterterrorism strategy. This chapter begins by describing government efforts to develop counterterrorism strategies and then discusses the struggles of NGOs. This chapter argues that Pakistan lacks a national policy framework for the deradicalization and rehabilitation of ex-combatants. Such national framework is critical for post-conflict peacebuilding. The framework should not be security-centered but citizen-centered, with the participation of civil society being crucial. Keywords NACTA · Rehabilitation · Counterterrorism · Militancy · Aggrieved citizens

Pakistan has had a number of asymmetrical conflicts over the course of its brief history, the most of which are based on ethnicity or religion (Dudouet et al., 2012). The conflicts are mostly hidden, but in some regions of the nation they have taken the shape of militancy or terrorism. The actors in the majority of conflicts are typically disgruntled individuals who are fighting for inclusion and seeking satisfaction of their grievances, which might range from religious and ethnic to other © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 I. Khan, Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9514-1_2

17

18

I. KHAN

material and resource-focused. In order to end such disputes, it is necessary to first address the grievances of the aggrieved population before rehabilitating those who participated in militancy against the government. The state requires a comprehensive national rehabilitation policy to do this. However, a review of the literature and statistics from the field show that the country lacks a detailed program for rehabilitation and reintegration. Due to the gap, Pakistan must develop a thorough and “home grown1 ” rehabilitation and reintegration program, taking into account the various circumstances of the conflicts as well as the country’s social and cultural diversity. As an illustration, consider the situation in Sri Lanka, where the national policy advises adopting a rehabilitation and reintegration program that is driven by the local context rather than adopting international ideas (Ratnayake, 2012). The way that Pakistan’s rehabilitation programs are implemented demonstrates how little the government there understands the importance of a comprehensive framework for rehabilitation and reintegration; none of them are aware of the local context of the conflicts, social and cultural sensitivities, or formally established policy frameworks. Both the National Action Plan (NAP) and the National Counter-terrorism Authority (NACTA) deal with security issues, but they give little thought to resolving the conflicts’ underlying issues. As a result, the nation’s policies are predominantly security-focused (securitized) and do not focus on finding answers. However, the state’s efforts to mainstream previously violent organizations by converting them into political groups show that it is willing to take a deradicalization approach, when the Milli Muslim League (MML) under Hafiz Saeed, the leader of Lashkar-iTayyeba (LeT), stood for office in Punjab in 2017 (Marwat, 2017), it served as an illustration of such a transition. There is still resistance to allowing the violent groups to participate in mainstream politics, despite the fact that this is an obvious political solution. Additionally, there are currently no efforts being made to mainstream these radical organizations. The Interior Ministry has declined to grant the MML license to be a political party, and the MML is not registered as a political party with the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) (Pakistan Observer, 2017). The MML has frequently been denied registration, but Pakistan must take 1 The phrase “home grown” rehabilitation means that rather than relying entirely on international norms of rehabilitation, the state should build rehabilitation program to suit the domestic (home) setting.

2

REHABILITATION AND DERADICALIZATION EFFORTS …

19

a cue from other nations that have faced a similar situation in the past, such as Central America, where the evolution of an armed group into an electoral opposition was witnessed (Allison, 2006). Some of the rehabilitation and reintegration efforts made by Pakistan and other NGOs are discussed under.

The Government-Based Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programs According to a Pakistani official, at least in terms of the total number of nationwide rehabilitation facilities, this country has the largest rehabilitation program in the world. It has also been reported that the Saudi Arabian administration recruited Pakistani professionals to assist with the development of the Saudi rehabilitation program.2 The Pakistani provinces of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Sind, Punjab, and erstwhile FATA all have active rehabilitation programs, rehabilitation programs, but none of them are coordinated under a single national policy framework and are operating on their own. Similar rehabilitation initiatives are being carried out in Swat under the direction of the Pakistani Army. Rastoon (to bring back), a rehabilitation facility that was constructed in district Shangla, Malakand division, close to Swat and similar nature of programs in FATA. However, Rastoon has ceased operations due to a lack of funding. In addition to this, there are rehabilitation programs for the Waziristan regions of Mir Ali, Wanna, Bara and Nwe Sahar at Bajaur (Khan, 2015). It was revealed during an inquiry that Nwe Sahar is no more functional due to limited resources.3 The rehabilitation initiatives in North Waziristan and Khyber are effectively running and have a track record of assisting a significant number of ex-combatants rehabilitate. According to a representative of the Bara rehabilitation center, since 2012, five hundred ex-combatants have received rehabilitation at the Bara Rehabilitation Center alone.4 While reviewing the literature on rehabilitation and reintegration programs in Pakistan, the researcher came across a number of initiatives with names like Sabawoon, Mashal, Sparlay, Rastoon, Nwe 2 Respondent # 15, in-person interview, station Swat, April 2, 2017. 3 Respondent # 3, in-person interview, Lahore, March 27, 2017. 4 Respondent # 15.

20

I. KHAN

Sahar, and Heila (Khan, 2015, 2016). During a field visit, only Sabawoon, Mashal, and Rastoon were found to be operating; the others may not have been put into place or may have ceased to function due to a lack of funds and other resources. The institutions and programs initiated in 2009 when the conflict ended in Swat were set to establish a unified counterterrorism and deradicalization program into society. It was determined that such operations were necessary because Pakistan was home to thousands of terrorists and numerous terrorist organizations. According to Abdul Basit (2015), Pakistan’s measures to combat radicalization and violent extremism are as follows: (a) Deradicalization which includes the Swat and Punjab programs. (b) Madrassa Reforms, National Action Plan 2014, counterterrorism operations, and Pakistan Protection Act 2014 are all part of the effort to combat radicalization. Both hard and soft-core measures to combat terrorism and extremism are mentioned in the aforementioned captions. The military, state security services, and in some situations, such in Punjab, the police, are the only ones that carry out the extreme measures. Both the government and NGOs take an active role in soft measures. Government representatives and those who work in the field of peace and conflict studies share the opinion that it is very challenging to identify terrorists since extremist narratives are deeply ingrained and have permeated society. Rehabilitation facilities cannot treat the entire population of society. A thorough deradicalization effort for the entire society is required for this (Basit, 2015). Provincial law enforcement agencies are dedicated to the de-radicalization of former combatants, while nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are initiating research projects and programs aimed at de-radicalizing society. Sadly, the government has not devised a comprehensive national deradicalization or rehabilitation strategy for former combatants; instead, it has created a few institutions and a counterterrorism strategy. The institutions and programs established are as follows: Counterterrorism Department (CTD) Each province has a counterterrorism department (CTD), which is overseen by the provincial police force. The researcher tried to get access CTD in each province but was unable to get sufficient data. While the CTD in Sind provides some information, it is often inefficient in Baluchistan and KP. Only Punjab CTD has successfully implemented a deradicalization and rehabilitation program, however, it has also ceased operations since 2016 (Ahmed and Rafique, 2013).

2

REHABILITATION AND DERADICALIZATION EFFORTS …

21

Certain issues and opinions were clearly enunciated in the detailed material from CTD Punjab that the researcher received during an interview with an official of the same department and based on an unpublished document of the department. Motivations The department claims that terrorists are distinct from other criminals and that some of them are motivated by ideologies that have real grievances and religious motives that support their goal. Some people join terrorist organizations to temporarily avoid being caught; however, over time they end up staying on as permanent members in order to satisfy their material or spiritual requirements. Violence becomes a necessary urge for them to survive when they have no other option. In addition to hard-core militants, there are also facilitators and supporters who are susceptible to being drawn in and joining the terrorist organizations. All terrorists cannot be apprehended, held captive, killed, or dissuaded from engaging in militancy. For a variety of reasons, especially in a religiously conservative community, they cannot be found guilty. Deradicalization and rehabilitation attempts become imperative in such a situation. The document further says that with the withdrawal of ISAF/ US forces from Afghanistan, many militants will lose their jobs as a result. Numerous domestic militants have only ever been taught how to fight and kill. Therefore, deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration are crucial to preventing these homegrown militants from joining terrorist organizations (Basit, 2015). Approved Counterterrorism Strategy The Punjab government established a counterterrorism policy on July 31, 2010, with the aim of preventing terrorist attacks. As a result, the counterterrorism department (CTD) was reorganized and given the authority to combat terrorism in all of its forms (Manan, 2010). The addition of new duties included gathering information that could be used for action, registering cases, conducting investigations, monitoring militant organizations and madrassas, and de-radicalizing Jihadists and ex-militants. In addition to this, the Punjab Security Board’s deradicalization committee, led by the chief minister of Punjab, was established, and a counterterrorism strategy was authorized. Law enforcement agencies’ capacities were also increased, and strategic intervention areas (such as social sector reforms) were identified (Manan, 2010).

22

I. KHAN

Deradicalization and Counter-Radicalization Plans The CTD Punjab is working under three components: a. Deradicalization and vocational training programs for former militants/Jihadists. b. Deradicalization for imprisoned militants in prisons. c. Counter-radicalization of madrassas students. Together with the Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA), the deradicalization and counter-radicalization program is developed. Each training and course lasts for three months. Technical and vocational instruction, religious discussion, ethical material, and psychiatric counseling are among the course’s topics. Each trainee will provide Rs. 60,000 over the course of these three months, which covers travel, training, and a stipend to maintain his family. There is no post-training financial aid available, although small businesses can operate with an interest-free loan of up to Rs. 50,000. According to Ahmed and Rafique (2013), CTD is in charge of keeping an eye on participants’ post-training behaviors and determining their likelihood of recidivism. A technical/vocational training module offered by TEVTA and a religious and psychological training module provided by religious experts and psychiatrists make up the two modules of the three-month training program. Moderate Islam is being taught by religious experts from the Tablighee Jama’at.5 The Punjab Social Welfare Department teaches classes on moral principles. The CTD supervisors frequently attend each class to assess the rehabilitees’ progress. Three batches totaling 311 students have successfully completed this course since the program’s start up until July 2012. Despite the loan not being disbursed as initially promised for the training, the Punjab government ultimately approved it, albeit with a delay. Future Plans In July 2012, the first stage of deradicalization was finished, with 311 participants receiving technical and psychological training. Due to

5 A group of preachers in Muslim community.

2

REHABILITATION AND DERADICALIZATION EFFORTS …

23

budgetary limitations and the fact that the program’s beneficiaries, militants who were imprisoned and students in madrassas, received training at the same time, the first component of the program was not fruitful. Due to its lack of success, CTD came to the conclusion that the program should be split into two parts: one for militants who are currently in prison and another for madrassa pupils. 2nd Component: Deradicalization of Imprisoned Militants Many terrorists are being held in jails, primarily in Lahore and Rawalpindi. The CTD Punjab intends to include these prisons in its deradicalization campaign. In order to examine the terrorist population, psychologists, educators, and religious experts will visit prisons. This program will also involve the terrorists’ family members. This program’s module is presently being created.6 3rd Component: Protecting Madrassa Students from Radicalization Thousands of students are being housed in the 11,023 registered and unregistered madrassas in Punjab. All of these madrassas will now be able to enroll in vocational training programs, thanks to collaboration between CTD Punjab, TEVTA, and the Punjab Vocational Training Council (PVTC). These initiatives are designed to make it easier for madrassa students to get employment once their study is complete. Given that madrassa students live in a strict religious atmosphere, this intervention is crucial. The programs were initially designed with the province’s largest madrassas in mind, but they will also be expanded to include other, smaller madrassas. These madrassas are anticipated to be gradually integrated into regular education7 (Basit, 2015). National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) Despite being officially constituted in 2009, the National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) did not begin operations until it was ratified

6 Note: No further information is available about the status of the program. 7 Note: no further information is available about the status of the program, but TEVTA

is doing its job very well around the country and is not limited to madrassas.

24

I. KHAN

by the national assembly in 2013. Unfortunately, NACTA had a severe human resource shortage in its early years. It only had four representatives in 2015, including the national coordinator. This prevented it from working properly. However, the government has made significant improvements since 2016 in terms of its finances and human resources. There are currently roughly 60 people working with NACTA at the officer ranks, which is a substantial development. The mission of NACTA is to assist in the rehabilitation and reintegration of former militants into society. Practically speaking, hardly much has been accomplished, and most improvements are still confined to paperwork.8 Rapid Response Force (RRF) or an operational force is not present in NACTA. Likewise, NACTA doesn’t have a provincial branch. Provincial police and army units will serve as NACTA’s operational units because they are the first responders in that area. NACTA had initially intended distinct operational units and RRF at the provincial level. This choice was made because NACTA found it challenging to maintain a separate force. Additionally, it was impracticable to maintain the military on alert constantly because terrorist attacks may occur anywhere in the country. Maintaining a distinct unit was also impractical due to budget restrictions and the uncertain frequency of terrorist occurrences. It was therefore agreed to name surrounding police and army units as the RRF of NACTA. Each province also established local provincial arrangements to share accountability for this quick response. The Punjab province has a robust counterterrorism infrastructure in place, including a counterterrorism team (Basit, 2015). The majority of the other provinces have their own counterterrorism organizations; however they are understaffed and underfunded. Punjab is the province with the best anti-terrorist infrastructure, followed by Sind, Pashtunkhwa, and Baluchistan.9 NACTA solely has an advisory, coordinating, and policymaking capacity. In terms of rehabilitation, the provinces—with their existing facilities—can be more significant than NACTA. The reply continued by saying that in his opinion, provincial departments are more pertinent for rehabilitation and reintegration.10

8 Respondent # 20, in-person interview, Islamabad, December 21, 2017. 9 Respondent # 18. 10 Respondent # 20.

2

REHABILITATION AND DERADICALIZATION EFFORTS …

25

None of the deradicalization initiatives taking place in Swat, Punjab, or elsewhere across the nation are overseen by NACTA, despite being intended to be. They are autonomous and get funding from the provinces. However, when required, NACTA receives all information from these locally administered programs. The interviewee retorted that NACTA even does not play our advising role in provincial rehabilitation programs. Even though the NACTA’s most recent report (2018) acknowledges the necessity for rehabilitation programs, no coordinated approach is presented there. In NACTA, the rehabilitation program is essentially ignored (NACTA, 2018). NACTA does not oversee or carry out the National Action Plan (NAP), the most well-known counterterrorism strategy, but rather the National Security Division (NSD). In terms of advice and information, NACTA is assisting NSD. Rehabilitation is not included in NAP, a 20-point policy. However, it stated that “counternarratives” must be addressed, implying that NAP has a deradicalization program. National Security Division (NSD) The National Security Council (NSC) of Pakistan formed the National Security Division (NSD) in 2014 to manage the nation’s general security. In addition to working with international partners on national security challenges, this division is in charge of developing national security policy (Haroon, 2018). The National Action Plan (NAP), the most popular policy in the nation, was created in December 2014 in response to the attack on the Army Public School, which left 140 children dead. There isn’t any more information available on the composition and duties of this department. Armed Forces Institute of Rehabilitation and Medicine (AFIRM) The AFIRM, Rawalpindi, is responsible for treating PTSD in both military personnel and civilians on a national level (ISPR, 2013). Children who witnessed the attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar are one example of this. More than three thousand patients are being treated at this facility right now. Additionally, the clinic offers prosthetic limbs to those who were wounded during the conflict. This rehabilitation facility, unlike any other in the nation, is self-sufficient for its requirements and is

26

I. KHAN

solely dependent on financial and other support from the Army.11 Instead of helping former combatants with their careers or their mental health, AFIRM wants to help them with their physical or mental health. Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA) Founded in 2013 by an Act, the Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA) is a national organization. The goal of this program is to prevent radicalization among the nation’s youth by giving them technical and vocational training that will enable them to work in small businesses. Radicalization is known to be less likely to occur when people are employed and have stable financial situations. All nationwide technical and vocational training programs are managed and governed by this organization. This institution was founded in 2013 with the intention of lowering youth unemployment in Pakistan so that they wouldn’t be influenced by and susceptible to the extremist narratives of terrorists (TVETA, 2016). The reason, although, this application was not designed with DDR in mind, its features have helped to reduce and eradicate extremism from society.

Semi-Government and Non-Government Deradicalization Programs Numerous semi-governments or non-government organizations are in charge of deradicalization initiatives across the nation, although as was already said, they are focusing on the general populace rather than militants or former combatants. These organizations play a crucial role in deradicalization even though they do not plan programs for the rehabilitation or reintegration of former combatants. These organizations are focusing on a variety of deradicalization activities, but their catchphrases are changing the current curricula in madrassas and schools and promoting “peace education” (Minhas, 2018). According to them, bringing radical and extremist minds into society may be prevented from joining violent groups by educating the population about peace and teaching them fresh methods of dispute resolution. Unfortunately, the majority of the NGOs functioning in Pakistan that were getting

11 Brig. Sher Akber, in-person interview, Islamabad, August 27, 2017.

2

REHABILITATION AND DERADICALIZATION EFFORTS …

27

financing from foreign countries or donor organizations have been blacklisted by the government due to security concerns. However, numerous organizations continue to function under the auspices of No Objection Certificates (NOCs) issued by Pakistan’s interior ministry. Even though all organizations could not be listed here, a few standouts are; In 2008, the International Islamic University Islamabad (IIUI) upgraded the Iqbal-International Institute for Research and Dialogue (IRD) to a stand-alone division. IIUI also operates a school under the name of Da’awah Academy in addition to IRD. Conferences, workshops, and seminars are among the many programs that IRD and Da’awah Academy run. Distinguished religious academics and educators from around the nation and worldwide are invited to participate in the programs at these two sister institutions of IIU. Critical thinking, deradicalization, sectarian and religious harmony, coexistence, and many other topics more pertinent to the discussion of conflict and the causes of religious conflicts are among the themes of these programs. Additionally, they provide a variety of events where people of various sectarian and religious origins are asked to find a path to peace, cooperation, and deradicalization. Their attention is on society as a whole, not on the former militants. On its website, the IRD states that it “has offered intensive courses on issues like “Media and Ethics” and “Critical Thinking” and they have partnered with academic institutions, think tanks, and civil society organizations. Through their outreach initiatives, they collaborate with regional academic and civil society organizations to deliver public lectures and seminars at district offices around Pakistan. To reach a larger audience, the Institute has also started a number of publications (IRD, 2018). The initiative Sabawoon (new dawn) is funded and supported by the Hum Pakistani Foundation, a national NGO with a Lahore office and Dr. Fereeha Paracha as its director as part of NGOs’ contributions to deradicalization efforts in Swat. This organization serves as the parent to over 20 other organizations. Right now, this oversees practically all of the nation’s programs for psychological rehabilitation, including Sabawoon (Seymour, 2011). In a symposium, Dr. Paracha said that 180 young people had received rehabilitation and been successfully reintegrated into society by 2011. These juvenile were actively engaged in terrorist activities. They included some suicide bombers. Julie McCarthy (2011) mentioned in a news piece that UNICEF is funding this rehabilitation program. However, it was revealed in conversations with the official

28

I. KHAN

Sabawoon representatives that no such funding is available and that the Pakistan army has been sponsoring all of these restoration initiatives. Tolana, which translates to “gathering,” is an NGO-sponsored deradicalization initiative run by the Paiman Alumni Trust. Tolana is a method that uses community mobilization, active citizenship, and social cohesion to counteract extremist tendencies in young people as well as in their families. Leading peace campaigner Mussarat Qadeem is one of the co-founders of the Paiman Alumni Trust (Paiman, 2017). Paiman established a center in Islamabad and ran programs for the rehabilitation of young ex-combatants between the years 2014 to 2016. However, Paiman was afterward prohibited by the security forces due to security concerns. According to Minhas (2018), the Paiman Alumni Trust presently runs peace education programs in Peshawar and Karachi. In addition to these, there are a few more NGOs that indirectly try to de-radicalize society, but none of them are involved with the rehabilitation or deradicalization of ex-combatants. In the discussion above, the author tries to identify a number of organizations and efforts operating in Pakistan to counteract violent extremism (CVE) and de-radicalize individuals. By educating people about peacebuilding, peaceful coexistence, and pluralism, all of these projects aim to de-radicalize the extremist behaviors of followers of terrorist or extremist groups into society. A clear, comprehensive national policy for the rehabilitation of ex-combatants that would enable their rehabilitation and reintegration into society was not found, the researcher found through his analysis. There are however programs on a provincial level, such as the CTD under the provincial police authority, but the government have not taken these programs seriously. All of these efforts have now collapsed due to a lack of financing, resources, and government interest. The comprehensive rehabilitation program is one of many programs supporting the former combatants that are active in district Swat. Later chapters have covered a thorough description of these projects, Sabawoon, Mashal, and Sparlay, which are currently underway in district Swat.

Understanding Civil-Military Cooperation in Swat After discussing about Pakistan’s efforts at rehabilitation and deradicalization, it is important to comprehend civil-military cooperation in Swat. In most nations around the world, civil-military collaboration has emerged as a key concern for both the armed forces and civilian aid organizations (Biorzoska and Eharhart, 2008). In a post-conflict setting, both

2

REHABILITATION AND DERADICALIZATION EFFORTS …

29

civilian and military workers have different approaches to fostering peace, and there are several instances where it is challenging for them to come together on a given topic. Their organizational structures are incompatible; their organizational cultures conflict, and even if the goal of promoting post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction is shared by these sets of actors, their interim objectives and their methods of achieving them also differ. Soldiers are supposed to stabilize the situation, if necessary, through the use of military force while the civilian workers improve the life standard of local population. (Biorzoska and Eharhart, 2008)

The fact that cooperation between these two groups of employees cannot be separated in a post-conflict setting is another reality. While civilians continue to extend and strengthen their efforts to promote peace, the military stabilizes the fragile situation (Kasselmann, 2012). The problematic situation is when civilian aid is used to further military goals in post-conflict settings (Greenwood and Balachandran, 2014). In every post-conflict situation, scholars and practitioners agree that civil-military interaction is essential, but they disagree on who should be in charge and whether they should act as a team or individually, with the military or civilian actors taking the initiative. These two groups of workers should cooperate on the job, or else they should keep their distance. Additionally, in a post-conflict setting, civilian employees or military personnel should perform non-military tasks (Franke, 2006). The military should provide support, but it is also considered that the military stabilizes the issue or conflict while civilian employees bring about peace. As a result, civilians should autonomously conduct non-military jobs without military interference. On the other hand, some academics contend that situational factors also affect civil-military collaboration and interaction. For civilian workers, carrying out their duties will be challenging in harsh circumstances (Franke, 2006). According to them, civilian personnel should remain in a subservient position to the military in post-conflict context (Franke, 2006). The compromise should be that both groups of employees cooperate and communicate about their actions, moves, goals, intentions, and strategies (Kasselmann, 2012). The military should not get involved in any way with civilian enterprises; nonetheless, both the military and the civilians should firmly adhere to the “no-harm” doctrine (Biorzoska and Eharhart, 2008). Both governmental and non-governmental organizations should provide a forum where both groups of employees can engage

30

I. KHAN

in discussions about crisis avoidance, security, and peacebuilding (Biorzoska and Eharhart, 2008). Before entering the field to carry out any project, military personnel and civilian aid workers must have a mutual understanding of one another (Kasselmann, 2012). Since its inception, Pakistan’s civil-military relationship has experienced both successes and setbacks. For example, the nation has experienced a number of Martial Laws, which have been justified by the failure of the civilian administration to provide effective leadership. Due to its role in the last two decades, when Pakistan was hit by natural disasters, armed conflict, and instability, the military is becoming more and more penetrating in Pakistani society (Greenwood and Balachandran, 2014). During this time, the military was able to serve in both a humanitarian and military capacity. The governments of Pakistan, it is stated in a research released in an Islamabad-based think tank, “have less to fear from any external army than from their own” (PILDAT, 2017). The military is expanding its reach while the civilian government’s space for intervention and policymaking is contracting. Take, for instance, the peacebuilding and development initiatives in Swat, Balochistan, the former FATA, and other conflict-affected Pakistani districts. The military made the claim that it was dangerous for civilian workers to work in sensitive regions, particularly those that were affected by terrorism. Civilian agencies have been treated as secondclass citizens since the 2005 earthquake, when the military intervened to “win hearts and minds” among the populace by providing disaster relief (Greenwood and Balachandran, 2014). In areas affected by militancy where military strictly controlled access, this subordination of civilian relief workers persisted, leaving the civilian agencies with no alternative but to cooperate with the military (Greenwood and Balachandran, 2014). This military’s dominant position persisted during the relocation as a result of military operations in Swat and erstwhile FATA, where access to the affected areas was restricted. The Civil Power Regulations 2011, a law passed by the then government that gave the military administration the legal authority to oversee the civil and political administration, has further strengthened the subordination of civilian employees and agencies (the Institute of Social Justice, 2011). Besides military operations, the military also started a number of civilian-related programs, including as reconstruction, dialogue, rehabilitation, and reintegration in all conflict-affected regions. One of the places devastated by the violence is District Swat, where the military has started rehabilitation programs for former militants called Sabawoon,

2

REHABILITATION AND DERADICALIZATION EFFORTS …

31

Mashal, and Sparly in addition to other restoration initiatives. Civilmilitary coordination in this rehabilitation programs is also confusing. A military officer denied receiving any aid from the civilian government, but a civilian government officer revealed that the GoKP is responsible for covering the full cost of this rehabilitation program. When the researcher requested admission to rehabilitation clinics on another occasion, the military declined the request on the grounds that only the civil government had the ability to grant authorization; yet, the civil government’s reply was the opposite. The researcher has noticed and concluded that the military controls the majority of post-conflict activity, particularly any deals with militants or ex-combatants. As a result, both the environment and the rehabilitation facilities are referred to as controlled environments and controlled societies, respectively.

Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants Program in Swat There is no denying that post-conflict peacebuilding is a lengthy, challenging process that necessitates both authority and money. The Pakistani military oversaw the creation of a rehabilitation program for former combatants following the Swat conflict. With backgrounds in psychology, theology, and technical and vocational education, the military hired civilian educators. The ex-combatants in their care are educated by civilian teachers in accordance with rules set forth by the military. These programs received financial backing from the civil administration (Rana, 2011). However, this rehabilitation attempt followed no defined policy structure. Three rehabilitation facilities—Sabawoon, Sparlay, and Mashal —introduced the program in 2009. These rehabilitation institutions are also known as deradicalization centers (Basit, 2015). The number of former combatants housed in these facilities is unknown; however, a small number of them have undergone rehabilitation.

From Rehabilitation to Reintegration Reintegration is mentioned as a step in the recovery process. Even though they cross, the two are unmistakably different. According to Melissa Lefas and Junko Nozawa (2016), these concepts are widely employed interchangeably in the DDR literature that has already been published. Sometimes, reintegration and rehabilitation are viewed as two distinct concepts (Knight, 2008). Anders Nilsson (2005, p. 27) defined reintegration as “a social process aiming at the economic, political, and social

32

I. KHAN

assimilation of former combatants and their families into civil society.” Furthermore, Nilsson has not made a clear distinction between the phrases. Additionally, the UN claims that DDR is an umbrella term for all activities, such as reconciliation, rehabilitation, and other similar ones, and has not distinguished between these concepts in its integrated DDR guidelines (United Nations, 2006b, p. 02). This shows that despite the fact that the two terms are used separately, literature fails to appropriately differentiate between them. Reintegration is greatly influenced by the manner in which rehabilitation is carried out, and successful rehabilitation’s indicators can be inferred from reintegration. Rehabilitating ex-combatants who have willingly given up their weapons or been imprisoned during a conflict aims to help them reintegrate society. Although there is no separate literature on it, reintegration is a process that begins with the disarming and demobilization of militants and ends with the reintegration of these demobilized militants after they have undergone rehabilitation. The main objective of DDR is to prevent an armed group from engaging in an armed uprising against the state (Knight, 2012). Reintegration is a drawn-out process in which former militants acquire citizenship, stable job, and support (Knight, 2012, p. 18). Even while it cannot be called a DDR program, the security forces did start one with the aid of the civilian administration in Swat. However, this policy has drawn criticism since it largely ignores R, or reintegration, and primarily emphasizes DD, or disarmament and demobilization. The majority of the militants have not been reintegrated because the Pakistani army disarmed and disbanded the militants who fled from Swat, gave themselves up, or were killed. This shows how “DD” is implemented, but not “R.” As was previously said, PATA, the provincial administrative structure that oversees Swat, failed to offer the residents justice or other social services. Additionally, the state exalted Afghan War soldiers, which contributed to their enormous popularity there. These societal inequities gave the glorified militants an opening to fill in the gap left by the state authority; in exchange for local support, they promised to provide law and order. The Taliban were able to establish a firm presence in the region through the local TNSM’s alliance with the TTP and the organization’s rapidly expanding support base. As they delivered swift justice, the Taliban gained popularity in the area and their numbers grew. They also began to pursue anyone in society who they felt posed a danger to their fame and authority. The promise of power and status that came with

2

REHABILITATION AND DERADICALIZATION EFFORTS …

33

joining the ranks of the Taliban and the inducement of justice provision emerged as the two main drivers of joining in the Taliban movement. From 2006 to 2008, the Taliban had complete control of the region. In the absence of state-run broadcasting, they saw an opportunity to further expand their reach by starting their own FM radio stations. Their popularity and power were significantly influenced by these radio stations. Collectively, the lack of appropriate structural frameworks, poor state management, poor governance, and carelessness of the mass population eased all such growth. All of these elements contributed to the widespread inequity and suffering that further fostered dissatisfaction, which in turn fueled (mis)interpretation of religion that finally led to grievances masked as support for the Taliban. With such a backdrop, the rehabilitation of ex-combatants and general normalization of society take on even greater urgency. The state has made steps to help ex-combatants get back on their feet, but the situation in Swat has remained dire. The administration’s failure to comprehend the local context, its compliance with accepted and worldwide DDR standards, and its emphasis on performing rehabilitation in a controlled atmosphere that stays distant from local realities may all contribute to the lack of progress. The failure of the policy makers to consider each of these aspects continues to be a barrier to the DDR’s success in Swat. Despite the fact that a rehabilitation program has already begun in Swat, fieldwork done as part of the current research reveals considerable gaps between theory and practice. Recidivists have a propensity to retrace their steps back into violent and extreme participation when their attempts at rehabilitation fail to successfully integrate them into society on a social and economic level. The researcher was unable to find Sparlay, an initiative in the region with a similar focus on rehabilitation family members of former militants, a particular endeavor. In order to fill these gaps and guide policy, our research has attempted to draw some lessons from effective rehabilitation programs around the world, including Sri Lanka, Columbia, and Nepal where ex-combatants successfully reintegrated into society. In order to develop a different strategy that might be used to better address rehabilitation in the context of controlled societies like Swat, the research also adhered to the UNDDR Standards (2006) (but in the context of a controlled society). In light of the Swat backdrop, especially, providing transitional justice is a crucial component of ex-combatants’ successful reintegration into society. One of the factors influencing the Taliban’s power in the region

34

I. KHAN

is their pledge to provide speedy justice. To stop further insurrection and increase the likelihood of rehabilitation, the State must retake this domain of providing justice. In general, bringing justice to both the victims and the criminals is closely related to post-conflict rehabilitation. This transitional justice (RJ) can help win hearts and minds (WHAMs) for the community as a whole as well as the victims/offenders in particular. This study also employs the restorative justice approach to provide victims and offenders with fair justice. The victims in this study are the citizens of the Swat district, while the criminals are ex-militants. The restorative justice processes are contrasted with those of the local traditional justice system in the subsequent chapters of this book. During the field investigation, the researcher found that imposing any legal system or providing rewards and penalties appeared to raise community resentment and discontentment. So, community participation in transitional justice is still crucial. Theoretically, restorative justice offers a framework in which community participation may be ensured in addition to conventional DDR processes to achieve the best results. Restorative justice (RJ), a bottomup approach, ensures that the community is involved in the process. By enabling the criminal, victim, and community to reach an understanding that the damage caused will be fixed. This procedure promotes dialogue, teamwork, and compromise, which ultimately aids in the rehabilitation of the criminal. “Any program that uses restorative processes and seeks to achieve restorative outcomes” is what the United Nations defines as restorative justice (United Nations, 2006b). Even yet, this definition does not sufficiently define the term and is still ambiguous. In accordance with Tony Marshall (1999), restorative justice is “a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offense come together to collectively resolve how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implications for the future.” The phrase is defined by John Braithwaite (2003) as reestablishing the balance between victims, offenders, and the community in a very succinct but thorough manner. According to the United Nations (2006b), a “restorative process” is any procedure in which the victim and the offender, as well as any other people or members of the community who were impacted by the crime, actively participate in the resolution of issues that arise from the crime, typically with the aid of a facilitator. In this context, “other community members” refers to the close relatives, elders, and acquaintances of the victims and criminals. According to Braithwaite’s (2003) extensive

2

REHABILITATION AND DERADICALIZATION EFFORTS …

35

definition of restorative justice conferences, these conferences operate by convening the offender, individuals with a significant concern for the offender, and those who place importance on the offender’s esteem. This typically includes both immediate and extended family members, but is not restricted to them. The negotiators work to ascertain the causes of the crime and lessen the victims’ feelings of retaliation. Then they discuss potential compensation for the loss and any safety measures that need to be done to prevent reoffending (Braithwaite, 2003). People now turn to customary or traditional methods of justice to deal with crime and disorder in society because modern court systems are insufficient to defuse and settle interpersonal disputes. In this sense, restorative justice provides some hospitable methods of conflict resolution (United Nations, 2006a). The Pashtunwail 12 system used in Swat is similar to the RJ approach, which is a community-based strategy for resolving disputes. Employing this strategy as a rehabilitation method in the social setting of Swat can be advantageous because it has the advantages of being more formal and being widely accepted. Community engagement in rehabilitation is also necessary to check recidivism. Without community involvement the state needs some extra efforts in order to monitor the graduates of the rehabilitation institutes and stop them from recidivating, strict monitoring and checks are implemented. But if the rehabilitation programs are poorly run, the chances of recidivism remain very high. The Swat program is still lacking in two important areas. The absence of evaluation by authorities, national or international, who can assess the program and guarantee its efficacy, is the first cause for concern. The program continues to be financially weak and does not get support from any foreign humanitarian groups, with the exception of the British High Commission and UNICEF, which solely applies to Sabawoon. To operate successfully and deliver long-lasting effects, a rehabilitation program must be evaluated by a third party and funded by outside sources. Since 2009, a small number of rehabilitees have been released from these facilities. According to realistic estimations found during the current study, thousands of militants were connected to the TTP Swat chapter; nevertheless, rehab institutions have so far only helped hundreds of 12 Pashtunwali is the Pashtun way of life. It is an umbrella term, covering all codes of Pashtun culture and tradition in it. The most relevant codes of Pashtunwali with restorative justice are; Jarga, Nanwati, Kushunda, and Salweshti.

36

I. KHAN

people, according to a representative of a rehab center. The rest of the ex-combatants’ whereabouts are still unknown. There are still unanswered questions about their recovery and the danger they might bring to society. This study aims to determine how local populations have responded to the reintegration of ex-combatants. The state’s involvement in ensuring community engagement and networking becomes even more crucial when taking into account the local population’s animosity against the former militants. The fact that Swat is a closed environment that upholds traditional law like Pashtunwali, which adhere to concepts like badal or revenge, must also be taken into consideration. Under this system, the offender is required to pay compensation, regardless of what the ruling authority decides, unless the offender seeks an apology from the victim. Another crucial element of Pashtunwali is the apology, known as Nanawati or requesting apology. The study is also concentrating on how to interpret the current ex-combatants rehabilitation program in the Pashtunwali-defined setting.

Conclusion This research will make an initial effort to include best practices from internationally implemented rehabilitation programs while keeping in mind the particulars of rehabilitation in Swat. This study will attempt to provide answer to the question that how military-led controlled rehabilitation programs affect the program’s efficacy in this strictly controlled environment. By doing this, the study will make an effort to offer a functional rehabilitation framework that incorporates elements from two different systems of rehabilitation and is applicable to both national and global contexts.

References Ahmed, M., and Rafique, Z. H. (2013). Deradicalization and Rehabilitation Efforts Analysis of Anti-terrorism Activities in Pakistan. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (IJH&SS), 2(1), 115–124. Allison, E. M. (2006, Winter). The Transition from Armed Opposition to Electoral Opposition in Central America. Latin American Politics and Society, 48(4), 137–162. Basit, A. (2015). Countering Violent Extremism: Evaluating Pakistan’s CounterRadicalization and Deradicalization Initiatives. IPRI Journal, XV (2), 44–68.

2

REHABILITATION AND DERADICALIZATION EFFORTS …

37

Biorzoska, M., and Eharhart, H. G. (2008). Civil-Military Cooperation in Postconflict Rehabilitation and Reconstruction. Germany: Development and Peace Foundation. Braithwaite, J. (2003). Restorative Justice: Theories and Worries. Australia: The United Nations Asia and Far East Institute (UNAFI) for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI). Dudouet, K., Giessmann, H., and Planta. (2012). Deficits and blind spots in existing approaches to post-war security promotion. In H. G. Dudouet, PostWar Security Tranistions (pp. 30–42). New York: Routledge. Franke, V. (2006). The Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in Stability Operations. International Journal of Peace Studies, 11(2), 5–25. Greenwood, L., and Balachandran, G. (2014). The search for Common Ground: Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan. United Kingdom: Humanitarian Policy Group. IRD. (2018). Iqbal International Institute for Research and Dialogue (IRD). Retrieved April 2, 2018, from International Islamic University Islamabad: http://www.iiu.edu.pk/?page_id=3718. Kasselmann, H.-J. (2012). Civil-Military Cooperation: A Way to Resolve Complex Crisis Situations. Prism, 4(1), 17–29. Khan, I. (2016). Relevance of Radio in Social Construction in FATA: A Case of Bajaur Agency. Quest of Pakhtun Identity at Pak-Afghan Border Land. Peshawar: SBBU Peshawar and AWKU Mardan. Khan, S. A. (2015, September 14). Deradicalization Programming in Pakistan. Retrieved October 28, 2017, from United States Institute of Peace (USIP): https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/09/deradicaliza tion-programming-pakistan. Knight, M. (2012). DDR and SSR. In G. A. Dudouet (Ed.), Post-War Security Transitions: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts (pp. 17– 29). New York: Routledge. Knight, W. A. (2008). Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: An Overview. African Security, 1(1), 24–52. Lefas, M., and Nozawa, J. (2016). Rehabilitating Juvenile Violent Extremist Offenders in Detention: Advancing a Juvenile Justice Approach. The Hague: International Center for Counter Terrorism (ICCT). Manan, A. (2010, September 25). Counter Terrorism Department Formed. Express Tribune. Marshall, T. (1999). Restorative Justice: An Overview. Research Development and Statistics Directorate, Home Office. London: Crown Publishers. Marwat, A. J. (2017, October 14). Militants Going Mainstream. Retrieved June 3, 2018, from Pakistan Observer: https://pakobserver.net/militants-goingmainstream/.

38

I. KHAN

Mccarthy, J. (2011, July 25). Pakistan Bids to Change the Minds of Swat Radicals. Retrieved April 5, 2018, from NPR: https://www.npr.org/2011/07/ 25/138560612/pakistan-bids-to-change-the-minds-of-swat-radicals. Minhas, K. (2018, March 19). Pakistan’s deradicalisation programmes. Retrieved June 01, 2018, from Pakistan Observer: https://pakobserver.net/pakistansderadicalisation-programmes/. NACTA. (2018). National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines. Islamabad: National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). Nilsson, A. (2005). Reintegrating Ex-combatants in Post-Conflict Societies. Uppsala: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). Paiman. (2017). About Paiman Alumni Trust. Retrieved June 13, 2017, from Paimantrust.org: http://paimantrust.org/about-paiman/. Pakistan Observer. (2017, October 11). ECP Dismisses Milli Muslim League’s Request to Register as Political Party. Retrieved June 3, 2018, from Pakistan Observer: https://pakobserver.net/ecp-dismisses-milli-muslimleagues-request-register-political-party/. PILDAT. (2017). Future of Democracy: Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan. Islamabad: PILDAT (Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transperancy). Rana, M. A. (2011). Swat Deradicalization Model: Prospects for Rehabilitating Militants. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS). Ratnayake, M. G. (2012). Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in the Post War Sri Lanka. Retrieved August 19, 2017, from Kotelawala Defence University: http://www.kdu.ac.lk/southern_campus/images/doc uments/symposium/symposium2012/papers/ts/RehabilitationandReinteg rationofExCombatantsinthePostWarSriLanka._.pdf. Seymour, K. (2011, July 17). De-radicalisation: Psychologists’ War Against Militants. Retrieved August 19, 2017, from the Express Tribune: https://tri bune.com.pk/story/211479/de-radicalising-rehab-psychologists-war-againstmilitants/. The Institute for Social Justice. (2011). The Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation, 2011. Retrieved July 27, 2018, from The Institute for Social Justice: http://www.isj.org.pk/the-actions-in-aid-of-civil-power-regula tion-2011/ TVETA. (2016). Technical and Vocational Education and Training Authority. Retrieved November 11, 2017, from Technical and Vocational Education and Training Authority: http://www.tvetauthority.go.ke/139-2/. United Nations. (2006a). Handbook on Restorative Justice Program. New York: United Nations. United Nations. (2006b). Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards. New York: United Nations.

CHAPTER 3

Contextualization of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

Abstract This chapter envisions the definition and actual application of rehabilitation. This is done as both a concept and a process, in light of other related conceptions known in the substantial literature on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). These concepts have also been described in the context of Swat Valley, emphasizing the importance of distinguishing between rehabilitation and reintegration. The chapter also conceptualizes Swat society as a closed one in which rehabilitation institutions have been discovered as “closed society.” Keywords DDR · Controlled society · Closed society · Controlled rehabilitation

It is critical to keep in mind that post-conflict rehabilitation requires a complex approach rather than a simple one. It includes numerous policies, initiatives, and programs. It is a long process, and in addition to the government apparatus, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local, national, and global humanitarian groups, as well as multilateral organizations, are all involved. Rehabilitation ought to be viewed in a broader context as a transition from an antiquated type of government to a new, modern, democratic, and more pluralistic society; it ought to be considered as a movement toward a society where not only former combatants © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 I. Khan, Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9514-1_3

39

40

I. KHAN

but all sectors can come together for nation-building (Janzen, 2014). Rehabilitation also extends beyond the rebuilding of infrastructure and society as well as the reintegration or restoration of former combatants. Demilitarizing the detached individuals is the main goal of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), as well as its expanding programs and researches (Janzen, 2014). The “angry groups” of the community that have armed themselves against the state or authority are these disengaged individuals. According to Cloninger and Leibo (2017), these are the groups driven by ethnic or religious tension, persistent socioeconomic inequalities, or political marginalization by the government or those in positions of authority. The DDR process is thought to be the most successful post-cold war strategy for resettling these irate groups or persons and reintegrating them into society (Janzen, 2014). DDR is a drawn-out and challenging procedure that addresses a wide range of post-conflict concerns and regions, such as reintegration, rehabilitation, reconstruction, resettlement, and many more. The field of DDR is littered with several overlapping terminologies which result in a conflation of stages and cross-cutting mandates. Taxonomy hence demands that the various and overlapping R’s (namely Reinsertion, Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Resettlement) be clarified, to impart preciseness to the concept of reinsertion in terms of timing, scope and the nature of activities involved. (Ozerdem and Podder, 2008)

The purpose of this study is to comprehend rehabilitation, which cannot be comprehended without a comprehensive analysis of DDR. This study draws connections between the three R’s within the larger DDR (RR) framework. Reinsertion, rehabilitation, and reintegration are the three R’s. In this study, rehabilitation and reintegration are given particular attention. The reinsertion phase has received significant attention in the DDR literature and has been examined in great detail, but this study contends that there is a terminological issue in the current literature that conflates reinsertion with rehabilitation. Reinsertion is like “first aid” that ex-combatants receive in military detention centers for a very short time—between four and six weeks. The detainees are not given any educational, psychological, or vocational training during this phase. Then, these detainees are moved to specialized facilities where they receive instruction in education, psychology, and employment (Zerdem and Podder, 2008). “Rehabilitation centers” are the name given to these specialized,

3

CONTEXTUALIZATION OF DISARMAMENT …

41

highly developed, and equipped facilities. The length of stay at these facilities might range from three to twelve months or, in some cases, even two years. Following a psychological evaluation of former militants, the psychiatrist establishes this phase to gauge their readiness for reintegration into society (Buxton, 2008). The three Rs—reinsertion, rehabilitation, and reintegration—are occasionally mixed together in the DDR literature. The pre-integration phase is either referred to as reinsertion by academics and practitioners, rehabilitation is left out, or the educational, psychological, and vocational trainings are included in the reintegration phase instead of rehabilitation phase. Although rehabilitation is a part of both reinsertion and reintegration, it should be understood and researched separately. It is crucial to describe and comprehend the conflict in the context of Swat before recognizing a post-conflict environment. A common definition of conflict suggests that it arises when two people or organizations hold opposing opinions and viewpoints. Conflict has been described by some academics as an occasion that culminates in structural or physical violence, which frequently leads to the disintegration of normal life (Miller, 2005). Conflict is distinguishable from competition because the majority of definitions include examples of conflict, struggle, or collision. Conflict is characterized as the pursuit of an objective through opposing strategies (Horowitz, 1985, p. 95). Conflict is described as “processes that starts when one party believes that another party has negatively impacted or is about to negatively impact something that the first party cares about” (Leao, 2018). This definition was provided for the purposes of the current study. To define the “post” phase of a conflict is a topic of debate among academics and practitioners of peace and conflict studies. When militants defeated, there may be a brief period of cold (negative) peace, but the impression of threat persists until the community resumes its regular social, political, and economic activities. In a post-conflict setting, these initiatives frequently go hand in hand with development of institutions and infrastructure (Brown et al., 2011). Graham Brown et al. (2011) suggested the peace millstones as: End of violence and hostilities; drafting peace agreement between the actors of the conflict; launching DDR; restoration of refugees and IDPs; establishing functional state institutions; achieving reconciliation and social integration; and restoration of economy.

42

I. KHAN

The above-mentioned approach is called a “process oriented approach” to post-conflict environment (Brown et al., 2011). In continuation of the discussion, in Swat, a study mentioned that 90 percent of IDPs had returned to their homes as of August 2009, where the militants were vanquished in 2009 and IDPs had allowed returning to their homes (Shaheen, 2009). Despite the lack of appropriate rehabilitation and reintegration processes, the phase in Swat can be referred to as “post-conflict” because state institutions are operational and other restoration activities have been started. When state security forces enter a conflict zone and declare victory over militants, the post-conflict era officially begins. Following this, state institutions launch reconstruction and development initiatives. Activities in a post-conflict setting include reconciliation, mediation, and transitional justice processes (Mundy, 2014). In the case of Swat, the military started operation against the militants in May 2009 and continued for four months. During this time, the security forces either defeated or disbanded the militants, at which point they declared victory (Ali, 2009). In Swat, this stage is referred to as the post-conflict period since it marks a significant return to normalcy. Post-conflict processes, accompanied by democratization, decentralization, and market liberalization, are specifically the processes that help societies shift from war to peace (Brown et al., 2011). In post-conflict situations, the international community makes an effort to achieve these goals through the processes of peacebuilding, reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reintegration. In a post-conflict situation, it is essential to rehabilitate former militants and then reintegrate them into society since doing so makes way for other post-conflict peacebuilding measures (Ball, 2006).

Open, Closed, and Controlled Societies Sociologists primarily divide societies into “open” and “closed” categories. According to the division, there are social classes within society. According to Popper (2011), an “open” society is one in which a person has the choice to choose their social class, advance up the social ladder, or fall to a lower social class. A “closed” society, on the other hand, is one in which a person’s social status is fixed at birth and cannot be changed during his life, such as a “caste” in which he is unable to move up or down (Popper, 2011). Economic dimensions can be added to these concepts. A

3

CONTEXTUALIZATION OF DISARMAMENT …

43

“closed” society is one in which the economy is nationalized, whereas an “open” society is one in which there is economic liberalization (Gwartney and Lawson, 2001). A “society of control” (Deleuze, 1992) is a third form of society that fits with the context of the current topic. People are constantly being watched and their every move is being examined in the society that is under control. They are bound by a number of laws and regulations, and they risk punishment if they disobey them (Crain, 2013). This society of rules and laws was initially referred to as the “disciplinary society” by Michel Foucault (Deleuze, 1992). Foucault (1995) used the examples of schools, hospitals, jails, and families, the military forces, and factories to show how people might live in orderly environments while still adhering to the laws and standards of their particular society. This orderly society began to observe the person even outside of this community, thereby expanding its sphere of influence; this new evolved society then became a “society of control” (Deleuze, 1992). In a society of control they are, to the best of their ability, observing everything we do, but they don’t really want us to think about it; instead, they want us to accept it as an unconscious reality and not to worry (Crain, 2013). George Orwell does a great job of explaining this concept of a “society of control” in his classic book “1984,” where he coined the phrase “The Big Brother is Watching You” (Orwell, 1948, p. 3). When compared to the societies that have already been mentioned, the idea of a “controlled society” is very different. It is the society in which a higher power regulates people’s interactions and communications. This society has no rules or norms, and neither is it disciplined. After careful consideration, this study chose Swat’s rehabilitation facilities as an example of a “controlled society.” No civil organization is allowed to communicate directly with ex-combatants in the setting because the Pakistani army supervises the actions of the rehabilitees (Khan, 2015). When ex-combatants are freed from facilities, they are placed under observation and are not permitted to move freely or maintain contact with anyone without permission. The idea that “Big Brother is Watching You” rules social discourse, and the graduates (who have been let out of the centers) are terrified to maintain any relationships or go to other places in the country without permission. However, in Deleuze’s society of control—as previously defined—the individual is not prohibited from keeping contacts or restrained from moving; instead, he is only under surveillance. This is also in contrast to Foucault’s disciplinary society, where an individual is bound by norms and regulations.

44

I. KHAN

Although instructors in a controlled society are civilians and financial and other material support is provided by the government or other civilian groups, the entire text and context is under the direction of a higher authority. Only the material supplied by the in charge is taught by the civilian instructors. On the other hand, the overall context of a controlled society is militarized through military controlled cells, guarded by military personnel, controlled by extracurricular activities, and the controlling authority within the boundaries of the society codifies ethics and the concepts of good and bad. In a controlled society, national, international, and other civilian groups are prohibited from interfering unless the controlling power that rules that society explicitly permits it. In order to prevent their already flexible minds from being swayed by the extremist narratives circulating in society once more, the authorities of rehabilitation institutions, who favor this restricted status, believe that excombatants, as the recently reintegrated graduates of rehabilitation, need special attention. Some criticisms hold that the instructors at the rehabilitation centers in Swat are civilians and that the Pakistani military just manages them. The researcher contends that the military controls the entire system, at least in the minds of those who have undergone rehabilitation. For instance, military personnel may transport former combatants to rehabilitation facilities, take them to their homes, and supervise their monthly attendance and monitoring. An excellent example is the term “surrender,” which is exclusively used for militants who surrender to the military and not for those who “self-integrate.”1

The DDR Framework With “Boutros-Ghali’s” report to the United Nations (UN) in June 1992, often known as the “agenda for peace,2 ” the idea of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) emerged in the post-Cold War era. As the foundation for the DDR process, the agenda conceptualizes peacebuilding in a post-conflict environment (Knight, 2008). The confidence building measures (CBMs) of the mid-1980s and early 1990s are where the concept began, according to Desmond Molloy’s (2017) 1 Combatants who resettled without undergoing rehabilitation were termed, “selfintegrated.” They re-enter the community without altering their previous narratives or approaches. 2 The whole report can be found at http://www.un-documents.net/a47-277.htm.

3

CONTEXTUALIZATION OF DISARMAMENT …

45

in-depth analysis of the theory and execution of DDR. CBMs have since developed into a part of DDR (P-37). According to Muggah (2009), “the disarmament and demobilization activities were exclusively conceived by and for military establishments and shaped by the geopolitical imperatives” prior to the 1980s. With “Boutros-Ghali’s” report to the United Nations (UN) in June 1992, often known as the “agenda for peace,” the idea of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) emerged in the post-Cold War era. As the foundation for the DDR process, the agenda conceptualizes peacebuilding in a post-conflict environment (Knight, 2008). The confidence building measures (CBMs) of the mid-1980s and early 1990s are where the concept began, according to Desmond Molloy’s (2017) in-depth analysis of the theory and execution of DDR. CBMs have since developed into a part of DDR (P-37). According to Muggah (2009), “the disarmament and demobilization activities were exclusively conceived by and for military establishments and shaped by the geo-political imperatives” prior to the 1980s, according to the history of DDR that can be traced back to that time. In Namibia, the first official DDR operation started in 1989–1990 (Muggah, 2009). The Brahimi Report (2000) thoroughly recognized the connection between socioeconomic development, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding, as well as the provision of financing for DDR (Knight, 2008). DDR is defined as “a process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures, and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods” (United Nations, 2006). Disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion, rehabilitation, reconciliation, reconstruction, and reintegration are all post-conflict measures that were combined into the concept of DDR (United Nations, 2006). According to academics like Molloy, “DDR is a concept which places weapons beyond use, in the context of improving community security through social and economic investment in the community” (Molloy(b), 2008). DDR’s goal is to weaken an armed group’s capability so that it cannot wage an armed insurrection against the government (Knight, 2012). Ball (2006) defined it similarly to DDR as: (a) Demilitarization of official and unofficial armed groups by regulating and reducing the possession and use of arms, disbanding non-state armed groups, and reducing the size of state security services and (b) Assisting former combatants in their reintegration into society. DDR can be viewed as

46

I. KHAN

a five-stage process that entails the following steps: disarming, assembling, discharging, short- to medium-term reinsertion, and long-term reintegration (Ball, 2006). Whether DDR is a theory or a method depends on the circumstances. When addressed in academic settings, it is a concept; when put into practice, it is a process. The DDR themes that appear to have academic literature support have been designated by the UN; Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programs. Demobilization is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centers to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized which is called reinsertion. Reinsertion is the assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of excombatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. Reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year, while reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development. Re-integration is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often necessitates long-term external assistance. (United Nations, 2006, p. 02)

The DDR adapts to the situation as it changes. For instance, in Afghanistan, DDR is more focused on the security sector than the social. The process encompasses both political and economic domains, unfolding in three key phases. Initially, it focuses on building trust with the community and combatants as a precursor to negotiation. The second stage involves the demobilization of combatants, registration of their weapons,

3

CONTEXTUALIZATION OF DISARMAMENT …

47

and ensuring security guarantees for their movements. Finally, the third step is dedicated to granting ex-combatants and the community access to agricultural, educational, and vocational training opportunities (Bahman et al., 2012). The first two stages of DDR in Afghanistan are focused on persuading ex-combatants to engage in dialogue, demobilization, and reconciliation. Community development and recovery, which is classified as the reintegration phase with a narrow emphasis, make up the third stage. The DDR cannot be implemented in its entirety in every circumstance. DDR implementation requires the consent and willingness of the locals, notably ex-combatants. However, there are instances where this was not done, such as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where the Congolese army invited the non-state armed group, the Forces for the Democratic Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), to be disarmed and demobilized rather than to sign a peace agreement or ceasefire (Shepherd, 2012). The DDR was carried out in the DRC using a military-technical strategy, and non-state actors were not thought to be involved in the process (Shepherd, 2012). Since neither the government nor the non-state actors were committed to the process, the DDR process in Sudan failed to provide the desired results (Giustozzi, 2012, p. 15). The peace accord between the Philippines’ government and the Moro non-state armed group was successfully inked. Unfortunately, disarmament and demobilization were not included; only reconstruction and rehabilitation were. The security of the Philippines was subsequently threatened by this failure to limit armament (Francisco and Lara Jr, 2012). Quite similar to Afghanistan, where the conflict is still raging, DDR has been used in Columbia to resolve an ongoing conflict (World Bank, 2018). According to United Nations, (2006), Integrated DDR Standards, the government of Sri Lanka has successfully carried out the DDR process there with the help of the international community. For instance, the rehabilitation program in Sri Lanka follows the “six + 1” model, with the first stage being recreational and allowing combatants to engage in extracurricular activities, followed by the “social and cultural rehabilitation,” “spiritual and religious engagement,” “vocational training,” “education,” “psycho-social integration,” and finally, “community engagement” (Dharmawardhane, 2013). This procedure addresses almost all aspects of rehabilitation, and it is regarded as a successful rehabilitation program because it has allowed all LTTE ex-combatants who were either arrested or surrendered to be reintegrated into society with

48

I. KHAN

no subsequent terrorist attacks. As a result of their affiliation with various political parties and organizations, the majority of the ex-cadres now operates their own enterprises and takes part in political activities (Martin, 2017; Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights, 2009). Through their regional or sister organizations, the UN and WB have started more than sixty DDR projects all over the world, but they all have some fundamental differences from one another (Giustozzi, 2012; Shepherd, 2012). In Columbia, the M19 paramilitary has been successfully reintegrated, while DDR techniques are being used to cope with the armed FARC cadres. Despite the continuous battle, the government’s machinery continues to run well. The DDR has been put into practice by being properly institutionalized and by adhering to a strategy of appeasing the paramilitary forces (Sanin & Penza). With the passage of time and the necessity for expediency, the DDR process is changing and has absorbed numerous new elements. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, or D-D and R, were the only elements of the classic DDR (Greene et al., 2008). In order to help former combatants transition and bridge the gap between demobilization and wider reintegration, the demobilization phase was divided and reinsertion was added during the dawn of the twenty-first century (Greene et al., 2008). Second generation of DDR is another name for this stage (Molloy, 2008(b)). With the addition of more “Rs,” namely repatriation, reinsertion, and rehabilitation, the third generation of DDRRR began in 2002 (Shepherd, 2012). The UN, WB, or their sponsored organizations have continued to play a role in DDR implementation up until this point, working along with host governments. The community was excluded from the process. The DDR of the future generation is an advocate for involving the community. Understanding the social and political context of the area is crucial before executing DDR programs, and the “approach should serve to identify the differences in social dynamics” (López et al., 2015). DDR should not come before the political process (Muggah, 2009). A sequenced intervention was found to be a necessary component of the war-to-peace transition, and every DDR was expected to be responsive to local circumstances (López et al., 2015). In order to do this, the UN and other donor organizations are working to create a system that would allow the host state to locally own the DDR (Molloy, 2008(b)). Building

3

CONTEXTUALIZATION OF DISARMAMENT …

49

a good relationship with the community is essential when an armed organization becomes a political party, as seen in Mozambique and several other Latin American nations (Giustozzi, 2012). The “fourth generation” peacebuilding theorists argue for a larger role for civil society in the DDR process since in the majority of situations, non-state actors or ex-combatants are protected and helped to engage with the state or security forces (Giustozzi, 2012). According to Antonio Giustozzi (2012), the next generation is likewise on the lookout for neo-liberal and developmental ideas. The former strategy emphasizes bolstering ex-combatants’ finances in order to relieve them of concern about “reintegrating into poverty” once more, whereas the later strategy emphasizes addressing the conflict’s underlying causes, which necessitate fundamental reforms to society.

Conceptualizing Rehabilitation A broad program rehabilitation has varied definitions and applications across institutions, groups, and academic disciplines. Additionally, it has different meanings based on the context in which it is used and the field being studied (McPherson et al., 2015). Rehabilitation has been covered in clinical and medical studies where the participants have either had physical or psychological illnesses. The use of this word can therefore be viewed as more applicable to the medical or clinical fields of study than to any other (Robinson and Crow, 2009). Even in the past, the concept of rehabilitation was employed to rehabilitate physically or mentally abusive people who, if left untreated, would become a burden to others or society as a whole (McPherson et al., 2015). Rehabilitation is defined as “the restoration of an individual to his fullest physical, mental, and social capabilities” in the medical sciences (Villalba, 2011). There are two main goals of medical (or disabled) rehabilitation: reduce dependency, increase function, and help disables reintegrate into their lives and communities and reduce the burden on society that the return of so many “dependent” and “disabled young men brought” (McPherson et al., 2015). In their research, criminologists and criminal justice scholars have also covered the idea of rehabilitation, with an emphasis on various prison systems around the world (Robinson and Crow, 2009). Criminal scientists define social rehabilitation as the procedure used to reintegrate an offender into society. Social rehabilitation is a concept that looks both ahead and backward for offenders since, just as

50

I. KHAN

the social context is important for comprehending transgressions, it is also important for comprehending the processes of desistance and rehabilitation (Robinson and Crow, 2009, pp. 124–125). In a similar vein, war studies have focused on the rehabilitation of mentally disturbed soldiers and civilians (Medeiros, 2007) as well as the landless and displaced people (Thukral, 1996). In addition, human rights campaigners are in favor of “rights-based thinking for the assessment and treatment of offenders” (Marshall, 2011). In order to help these men reintegrate into their communities as honorable and socially acceptable people, this study focuses on the rehabilitation of ex-combatants in post-conflict contexts. To put the situation in perspective, a dictionary’s broad definition of rehabilitation can be useful. In accordance with the Oxford Dictionary, rehabilitation is “the action of restoring someone to health or a normal life through training and therapy after incarceration, addiction, or illness” (Oxford, 2016). The many sides of rehabilitation are revealed by this definition from the dictionary, which not only calls for the “subject” to be rehabilitated but also the backing of the community where the subject is anticipated to be reintegrated or rejoined. However, it is essential to appreciate the fundamental ideas of rehabilitation and its intended outcome, which is to prevent “Recidivism” (Justice, 2016). Therefore, rehabilitation is the process of dealing with the repercussions of protracted conflict (Pantev, 2006). It basically entails preventing it from happening again and maybe deterring the conflict’s protagonists from returning to their pre-war behavior. In the latter half of the twentieth century, academics and professionals alike promoted the idea of criminal offender rehabilitation, arguing that the offender should also be treated as a community member with the right to rehabilitation and reintegration into society like regular citizens (Cullen and Gilbert, 2013). Therefore, when defining rehabilitation, it is crucial to take into account both the views of the criminal (in this case, excombatants) and victim. Giving offenders a second opportunity at leading normal lives and addressing the causes that drove them to enlist in the militancy in the first place are the goals of the rehabilitation process. The Research Society of International Law comes to the conclusion that rehabilitation is a process in which the ex-combatants are restored to a status in which they no longer have a desire or need to participate in activities or groups associated with terrorism (Soofi, 2012). Rehabilitation involves the implementation of physical, social, and psychological measures.

3

CONTEXTUALIZATION OF DISARMAMENT …

51

For the sake of this study, the term has been defined, however, in the context of the post-conflict rehabilitation of ex-combatants, where it is a process for removing the animosity that has grown in the minds of furious people or groups toward the state or community. Rehabilitation, as was previously said, can take on a variety of forms, including mental, psychological, and physical rehabilitation. This process also attends to the complaints of former combatants and aids the competent authorities in reintegrating them by providing them with the same chances to work, live, and prosper as other state citizens. Since these former combatants committed crimes during the conflict, whether willingly or unwillingly, the general public typically views them as enemies. The distinction between them and regular criminals is that these men believed they were acting in the interests of some greater goal and ideological righteousness (Robinson and Crow, 2009). Their rehabilitation would therefore need to place a greater emphasis on psychological and ideological aspects than that of a typical offender in society. Reintegrating former combatants is crucial to the effectiveness of a rehabilitation program in a post-conflict scenario, and empirical studies have demonstrated that rehabilitation reduces the likelihood of recidivism and yields better results than just punishing offenders (Ward and Maruna, 2007). The combatants should be treated humanely and given the opportunity to become regular state citizens because they are part of the community (Cullen and Gilbert, 2013). Any conflict has a significant effect on the community in which it takes place (Pantev, 2006). According to the Liberals, in these circumstances, retaliation or punishment will only aggravate grievances, especially those of the former combatants, for whom they had originally taken up arms. Additionally, according to them (Cullen and Gilbert, 2013), incarceration makes offenders more susceptible to victimization. Promotion of human welfare should be the goal of rehabilitation (Ward and Maruna, 2007). Retributivism, on the other hand, is simply the idea that wrongdoers should be punished because they merit it as a result of the wrong they have committed, according to Robinson and Crow (2009). Continued from Cullen and Gilbert (2013); The conservatives are convinced that rehabilitation leads to the coddling of criminals and thus lowers the costs or pains of crime. From their vantage, this undermines the deterrent and protective powers of our criminal justice system and results in a higher crime rate. The conservatives thus conclude that society’s futile efforts to treat criminals in a more humane manner are

52

I. KHAN

fostered at the expense of the increased victimization of good, innocent citizens; it is time that we ceased worrying about the criminals and started worrying about society.

Practitioners and academics have diverse opinions and suggestions about rehabilitation, including whether or not to punish the criminal and whether to integrate the former combatant as a peaceful member of society. According to Haney’s (2006) contention that before punishing the offender it is necessary to identify the contextual causes of the crime (Robert), this study highlights that the combatants in a conflict are typically influenced by some external agendas and they are merely the “puppets” of external or internal agents. Therefore, if they surrender to the state’s authority then they should not be treated as militants but should be rehabilitated on the basis of humanitarian considerations (Robinson and Crow, 2009). According to the study’s findings, which support the aforementioned contention, the ex-combatants were brainwashed with radical ideas from an extreme religious ideology, which grew more lethal as a result of the state’s complicit negligence and ultimately forced them to join the militant ranks. These former combatants have submitted after the battle in Swat and are repentant for their prior decisions. Rehabilitation should therefore be employed as the logical next step to help the former combatants normalize and reintegrate into their society (Ward and Maruna, 2007). The fact that the majority of these ex-combatants, in the case of Swat, had dependent and jobless family members, such as spouses and kids; hence, rehabilitation becomes imperative. Punishing one combatant can end up punishing the entire family. When one combatant is punished, the entire family may also be punished. This can exacerbate local conflicts and criminal activities. Rehabilitating former combatants would be required by a human justice system (Haney, 2006). In addition to rehabilitation, a restorative justice system approach can improve odds of delivering justice and assuring community involvement, while laying the groundwork for a sustainable strategy that also lessens the strain on the state’s judicial and penal systems. Rehabilitation as a Process Reintegration and rehabilitation are often used interchangeably. However, a thorough examination of DDR reveals that the process of post-conflict peacebuilding consists of two different parts. First, rehabilitation is the

3

CONTEXTUALIZATION OF DISARMAMENT …

53

process through which former combatants are given the knowledge and coping mechanisms they need to survive, such as education, training, and counseling, all of which are often carried out inside specialist facilities. Second, reintegration is the outcome of what is learnt in the rehabilitation process and its expression into society, since while defining rehabilitation; one considers it is a process through which former combatants are re-assimilated into society. With this straightforward explanation, it is clear that one term refers to the “process” and the other to the “outcome.” Reintegrating the war-torn society into its original form is the ultimate goal of rehabilitation programs. Finding out how reintegration is defined and what its goals are in the available literature is vital for further clarification. Reintegration is not often discussed individually in the literature. The literature on DDR included the majority of the information on reintegration. It is plainly obvious from the UN approach to DDR that while DDR cannot terminate the conflict or stop the violence, it does create an atmosphere that is favorable for the other post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives to take place (United Nations, 2006). Reintegration is described in DDR as the process by which a former combatant transitions to civilian status. Ex-combatants obtain long-term employment in local communities through a social and economic process (Knight M., 2012, p. 18). According to Anders Nilsson (2005, p. 27), reintegration is “a social process aiming at the economic, political, and social assimilation of excombatants and their families into civil society.” It takes time, and the former combatants typically require ongoing assistance. The post-conflict processes are defined and elaborated by the UN, which prioritizes disarmament before moving on to demobilization, reinsertion, and finally reintegration. Ex-combatants receive temporary assistance during the demobilization phase known as reinsertion before beginning the drawnout process of reintegration. By giving former combatants an alternative to traditional means of subsistence, it aids in addressing security issues (United Nations, 2006). Reintegration is the process by which former combatants become citizens, secure stable jobs, and generate money. Reintegration primarily occurs in local communities and is a social and economic process with an open time period. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility and often involves long-term external help (United Nations, 2006, p. 03). According to this definition, reintegration is an outcome that follows rehabilitation.

54

I. KHAN

Following the completion of the rehabilitation program, the rehabilitees receive additional support known as reintegration. Although it defines each concept separately, the literature also demonstrates how distinct the two ideas are. The UN integrated DDR Standards, which define reintegration, make this discrepancy clear. The pre-text of the document states: The UN shall use the concept and abbreviation “DDR” as a general term that incorporates associated operations, such as repatriation, rehabilitation, reconciliation, and so forth, which aim to promote reintegration. In order to be effective, these activities should be incorporated into the overall idea and, when needed, the planning of the reintegration processes (United Nations, 2006, p. 02). Reintegration, rehabilitation, and related concepts are the activities carried out to promote peace in post-conflict settings. Reintegration, as a more general notion, includes rehabilitation as well as other elements like repatriation, reconciliation, and security sector changes. The literature on both rehabilitation and reintegration highlights the idea that the former should fall under the latter because rehabilitation is a larger framework than reintegration. Prior to reintegration, rehabilitation is prioritized in the post-conflict peacebuilding process, opening the door for additional peacebuilding initiatives. According to another definition, “[r]eintegration programs involve economic, psychosocial, educational, and vocational assistance help former combatants and their dependents become socially and economically engaged” (López et al., 2015). This definition is lacking because the term “engaged” is used incorrectly; it should be changed to the phrase “reintegrated.” Reintegration was described as the process by which the combatants “change their status from ‘combatants’ to ‘civilians’ and altering violent activities and adopt the way which is sanctioned positively by the community” (Bahman et al., 2012) in a study on the DDR program in Afghanistan. The lack of a clear separation between the notions of rehabilitation and reintegration in this formulation causes confusion once more. According to the DDR’s goals, it must be implemented in order to foster trust between conflict players and the community, avert the possibility of new conflict, and provide the conditions for reconstruction, social capital, and reconciliation (United Nations, 2006). Only “R” is the focus of DDR’s ambitions. Disarmed and demobilized combatants receive the necessary education and training to reintegrate into society as regular citizens and contribute to the cause of peace. Two ideas are conveyed in this statement. Education and training are considered “rehabilitation,”

3

CONTEXTUALIZATION OF DISARMAMENT …

55

and working to establish peace as a regular citizen is considered “reintegration.” According to the DDR literature, the DDR process includes disarming, demobilizing, and finally reintegrating the combatants into society. Since this literature does not outline how these combatants are to be reintegrated, rehabilitation remains a murky subject. They have through a process, according to the literature. Reinsertion and rehabilitation take place right away following demobilization. Although it ought to have been a top priority in DDR, this is the phase of DDR that has been consistently disregarded and given very little attention. Demobilization is followed promptly by “reinsertion,” which is an immediate response to rebuild the war-scattered society. The UN uses the term “reinsertion” to describe the assistance given to former combatants following demobilization but before the more prolonged process of reintegration. In order to help former combatants and their families with their basic needs, this type of transitional aid was created (United Nations, 2006). Assistance is given to the detainees while they are being held in military detention cells during the demobilization process. Reinsertion often referred to as resettlement and rehabilitation previously was viewed as a part of the reintegration phase even though it actually takes place during the demobilization phase, according to Ozerdem and Podder (2008). When institutions and infrastructure have been damaged as a result of a conflict, both international and domestic security agencies undertake a policy of “winning hearts and minds” to pave the way for promoting peacebuilding initiatives. Reinsertion is the stage where it tries to win over people’s hearts and minds, particularly those of ex-combatants. This is comparable to the “first-aid” provided to demobilized former combatants. This is comparable to the “first aid” provided to demobilized former militants. During demobilization, ex-combatants and their families receive transitional aid, which including food, housing, clothing, medical care, short-term job training, education, and essential too-kits. This period is extended up to a year (United Nations, 2006, p. 02). Reinsertion and rehabilitation are misunderstood in this explanation of UN in the IDDRS-2006. The ex-combatants are held in military confinement facilities during demobilization where they are investigated and given prompt aid. The detainees may not be able to receive both educational and vocational training during this time. In internment camps, it is challenging to offer the necessary time, materials, expertise, and equipment for this educational and vocational training phase. The rehabilitation phase, which begins when the prisoners (ex-combatants)

56

I. KHAN

are transferred from military custody to specialized facilities, should be distinct from this phase. These specialized facilities are referred to as rehabilitation centers where the reintegration of the prisoners into society is made possible through the rehabilitation process.

Conclusion By drawing attention to the fuzzy distinction between rehabilitation and reintegration, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the concepts are unclear in the literature now in use and that rehabilitation comes before reintegration, which is not a process in and of itself but a result of rehabilitation. One of the intriguing issues is “controlled society,” a novel concept in peace and conflict studies that merits more investigation. The international DDR and its suitability for the Swat Valley post-conflict circumstances were examined in the chapter’s final sections. It is demonstrated that the international process cannot be entirely followed. It is important to comprehend every facet of the conflict in its writings; the UN should define DDR in context.

References Ali, M. (2009, June 25). Pending Peace. Retrieved September 23, 2016, from Thoughtline: https://thoughtlines.wordpress.com/tag/operation-rahe-rast/. Bahman, Zuhra, and Torjesen, S. (2012). Double Disillusionment: Disengaging from the Insurgency in Afghanistan. Norway: Center for Peace Studies, University of Tromso. Ball, N. (2006). Disarmament, Demobalization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles. The Hague: The Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Brown, G., Langer A., and Stewart, F. (2011). A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments: An Overview. London: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE). Buxton, J. (2008). Reintegration and Long-Term Development: Linkages and Challenges. Bradford: University of Bradford. Cloninger, S. C., and Leibo, S. A. (2017). Understanding Angry Groups: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Their Motivations and Effects on Society. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC.

3

CONTEXTUALIZATION OF DISARMAMENT …

57

Crain, C. (2013, July 30). Living in a Society of Control. Retrieved July 27, 2018, from The Msntle Thought: http://www.mantlethought.org/philosophy/liv ing-society-control. Cullen F. T., and Gilbert K. E. (2013). Reaffirming Rehabilitation (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis. Deleuze, G. (1992). Postscript on the Societies of Control. October, 59, 3–7. The MIT Press. Dharmawardhane, I. (2013). Sri Lanka’s Post-Conflict Strategy: Restorative Justice for Rebels and Rebuilding of Conflict-Affected Communities. Terrorism Research Initiative, 7 (6). Foucault, M., (1995). Discipline and Punish – The Birth of the Prison. Vintage Books. New York. Lara, Francisco J., Jr. (2012). Settlement without Disarmament in the Philippines: The Unheralded Outcomes of the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement. In A. Giustozzi (Ed.), Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In (pp. 99–112). London: Ashgate. Giustozzi, A. (2012). Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobalization and Rrintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In. London: Ashgate. Greene, O., Hiscock, D., and Flew, C. (2008). Integration and Co-ordination of DDR and SALW Control Programming: Issues, Experience and Priorities. England: University of Bradford. Gwartney, J. D., and Lawson, R. (2001). Economic Freedom of the World 2001 Annual Report. Canada: The Fraser Institute. Haney, C. (2006). The law and public policy. Reforming punishment: Psychological limits to the pains of imprisonment. Washington, DC, US: American Psychological Association. Horowitz, D. L. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. Janzen, R. (2014). Guatemalan Ex-combatant Perspectives on Reintegration: A Grounded Theory. Canada: The Qualitative Report. Justice, T. N. (2016, April 10). Recidivism. Retrieved from nij.org: http://www. nij.gov/topics/corrections/recidivism/pages/welcome.aspx. Khan, S. A. (2015, September 14). Deradicalization Programming in Pakistan. Retrieved October 28, 2017, from United States Institute of Peace (USIP): https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/09/deradicaliza tion-programming-pakistan Knight, M. (2012). DDR and SSR. In G. A. Dudouet (Ed.), Post-War Security Transitions: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts (pp. 17– 29). New York: Routledge. Knight, W. A. (2008). Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: An Overview. African Security, 1(1), 24–52.

58

I. KHAN

Leao, R. (2018, March 21). Conflict Negotiation. Retrieved March 21, 2018, from Quizlet: https://quizlet.com/168663207/chapter-14-conflictnegotiation-flash-cards/. López, Rodríguez Maivel, Andreouli, Eleni, and Caroline, Howarth. (2015). From Ex-combatants to Citizens: Connecting Everyday Citizenship and Social Reintegration in Colombia. Journal of Political and Social Psycology, 3(2), 171–191. Martin, M. (2017). Sri Lanka’s Ex-combatant Rehabilitation Programme: Reconstructing Gendered Identities. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 12(1), 79–84. McPherson, K., Gibson, B. E., and Leplège, A. (2015). Rethinking Rehabilitation: Theory, Practice, History—And the Future. New York: CRC Press and Taylor & Francis. Medeiros, E. (2007). Integrating Mental Health into Post-Conflict Rehabilitation: The Case of Sierra Leonean and Liberian ‘Child Soldiers’. Journal of Health Psychology, 12(3), 498–504. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/ 10.1177/1359105307076236. Miller, C. E. (2005). A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies (2nd ed., M. E. King, Ed.) Addis Ababa: University for Peace. Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights. (2009). National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lank. Colombo: Government of Sri Lanka. Molloy (b), D. (2008). DDR : A Shifting Paradigm & the Scholar /Practitioner Gap. Ottawa: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. Molloy, D. (2017). Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Theory and Practice. London: Kumarian Press. Muggah, R. (2009). Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War. London: Routledge. Mundy, J. (2014). Transitional Justice Algeria and the Violence of National Reconciliation. In D. B. Mundy, The Post-Conflict Environment: Investigation and Critique (pp. 103–134). Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Nilsson, A. (2005). Reintegrating Ex-combatants in Post-Conflict Societies. Uppsala: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). Orwell, G. (1948). 1984. London: Oberon Books Limited. Oxford. (2016, April 12). Rehabilitation. Retrieved from Oxford Dictionaries: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/rehabilitation. Ozerdem, A., and Podder, S. (2008). Reinsertion Assistance and the Reintegration of Ex-combatants in War to Peace Transitions. Bradford: University of Bradford. Pantev, P. (2006). Introduction: Conceptual and Terminology Issues of PostConflict Rehabilitation. In V. A. Sofia (Ed.), Post Conflict Rehabilitation (p. 5). Vienna: Study Group Information.

3

CONTEXTUALIZATION OF DISARMAMENT …

59

Popper, K. (2011). The Open Society and Its Enemies. London: Routledge. Robinson, G., and Crow, I. (2009). Offender Rehabilitation: Theory, Research and Practice. London: Sage. Shaheen, S. (2009, August 28). 90pc IDPs Have Returned to Swat: UN. Retrieved July 3, 2018, from thenation.com.pk: https://nation.com.pk/28Aug-2009/90pc-idps-have-returned-to-swat-un Shepherd, B. (2012). The Case of the FDLR in DR Congo: A Technical Drift. In A. Giustozzi (Ed.), Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In (pp. 73–86). London: Ashgate. Soofi, A. B. (2012). Employing the Sri Lankan Rehabilitation Model to Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Framework. Islamabad: Research Society of International Law. Thukral, E. G. (1996, June 15). Development, Displacement and Rehabilitation: Locating Gender. Economic and Political Weekly, 31(24), 1500–1503. United Nations. (2006). Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards. New York: United Nations. Villalba, Dr. C. S. (2011). Rehabilitation as a Form of Reparation under International Law. London: RDRESS. Ward, T., and Maruna, S. (2007). Rehabilitation. London: Routledge. World Bank. (2018). Reintegration of Ex-combatants Project. Washington DC: Not Published.

CHAPTER 4

Drivers of Extremism in Swat Valley

Abstract The chapter covers the main causes of militancy and extremism in Swat valley, stressing the opinions of the respondents gleaned from primary and secondary sources. In order to achieve this, the researcher conducted a thorough field investigation in the Swat Valley, recording his own observations for this chapter. The chapter places the conflict in perspective by classifying the militants and elaborates on conceptual ideas and the many sorts of ex-combatant rehabilitation facilities created in accordance with ex-combatant types, understanding the conflict’s context—the area and duration of the conflict—is crucial before starting a discussion about rehabilitation in Swat. To have a thorough grasp of rehabilitation, it is vital to comprehend these dynamics of the conflict. The forces and factors that drove the locals toward Talibanization or militancy are the sole topics covered in the current chapter. Keywords Talibanization · Militancy · Religiosity · Power struggle · Bandwagoning

The chapter describes the processes and causes of militancy’s radical and extreme tendencies using an ethnographic research approach. The interviews with locals, stakeholders, and conflict actors serve to validate the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 I. Khan, Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9514-1_4

61

62

I. KHAN

findings from the ethnographic study. These actors included both militants who are currently no longer engaged in combat and security agency employees.

Understanding Militancy/Talibanization in Swat: Theoretical Underpinning Generally speaking, studies of the factors those contribute to militancy in Swat focus on factors like poor literacy rates, underdevelopment, greed in the job market, and religiosity (see, for instance, Ahmed and Rafique, 2013). For example, according to the greed versus grievances hypothesis, violent conflicts may be caused by such factors, but they are not the primary cause of the conflict in Swat; rather, they serve to feed it (Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2007). In contrast, one of the primary causes of society’s “power struggle” examined in this paper is Gurr’s (1970) idea of relative deprivation. These factors are prevalent and are involved in practically all global conflicts. In the Swat context, these drivers might be partly accurate, but they are not necessary. The stakeholders generalized these factors for Swat out of convenience, but a deeper understanding of the conflict in Swat reveals certain distinct factors. Swat may not be a good fit for Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) greed theory. As was previously said, institutionalization was already in place when Pakistan incorporated the former state of Swat (Nichols, 2001). The education ratio (among men) in Swat remains higher than in other districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province (ASER-Pakistan, 2011). Despite the low rate of female education in district Swat, women’s contributions to the conflict were minimal because they were not actively involved (Fair and Ali, 2018; NCHD, 2013); even so, women have donated money to the militants, though the motivation for this donation is up for debate (Khan, 2016a). Jehanzeb-College, a prominent institution, was founded in 1952, several years before Swat joined Pakistan (Jehanzeb-College, 2019). The populace was educated similarly to the rest of the country prior to the state’s accession and held higher positions in the military, bureaucracy, and other state institutions because the then state of Swat possessed a lot of schools and hospitals (Sultani-Rome, 2008). Therefore, it is unjust to assert that a major contributing factor to the conflict in Swat was illiteracy or a lack of knowledge. In a similar vein, Paul Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) greed hypothesis contends that the rebel group receives combat personnel from unemployment or

4

DRIVERS OF EXTREMISM IN SWAT VALLEY

63

poverty. Applying this greed hypothesis to the Swat conflict calls for some justification regarding the people’s access to land and their commercial endeavors.

Drivers of Militancy in the Research Setting: The Swat Valley The valley of Swat is renowned for its beauty and unspoiled geography, which has drawn visitors from all over the world. Similar to this, anthropological research demonstrates that the Swati people are amiable, peaceful, and have a soft nature. Many artists, writers, poets, singers, actors, and actresses who have made significant contributions to the artistic and literary corpus of Pashto language, literature, and culture have come from this country. Similar to this, Swat district’s handicrafts are well-liked in both domestic and international markets (Orakzi, 2011). There were 450 tiny woolen factories in Swat before to the start of the conflict, according to one interview, and 18,000 women in Swat were employed solely in the cosmetics sector, according to another study (Khan, 2016b). The products of the land are quite well-liked across the nation. The majority of individuals worked in the hotel industry, agriculture, and handicrafts. The amount of poverty in Swat was quite low. It is true that the conflict has caused all of these enterprises to shut down. However, it would also be unfair to claim that one of the main causes of the violence in Swat was a lack of development or unemployment. Religiosity is considered a foremost fundamental among the drivers for conflict in Swat (e.g., Ahmed and Rafique, 2013; Azam and Fatima, 2017). This study gives a negligible space for religiosity as driver for conflict in Swat. In the similar study of greed and Grievance of Collier and Hoeffler (2004) grievance is considered most appealing factor for internal conflict or civil war because of religious divisions (sectarianism) and inequality in the expression of religion. In Swat, there is no religious diversity; the vast majority of people are followers of a single religion or sect, while other religions or sects are either insignificant or invisible. It is true that religion is utilized to inflame the war, and because of the militants’ use of religious narrative and slogans, the public has supported them financially through donations to charities (Orakzi, 2011). However, these charitable endeavors and donations were made for the Madrassa’s building, not for the militancy of the militants. This study discovered that while some religious narratives were employed as rhetoric during the conflict’s latent stage, they quickly lost

64

I. KHAN

their effectiveness and vanished entirely from society (e.g., Glazzard et al., 2015). The causes of militancy may be numerous, and they may all apply to a variety of conflicts; for instance, Schmid (2013) highlighted a number of causes of radicalization that result in militancy and extremism. These drivers may have some knowledge of the Swat situation, but they cannot be regarded as indispensable. The researcher came at the following conclusions after conducting a thorough ethnographic study in Swat district. Understanding the militants and how the locals became militants is provided by the debate that follows. The idea that there was no particular cause or story behind the militancy in Swat evolved from the conversation. On the basis of their personal interests, people joined the militant organization. According to Professor Sultan-e-Room, no particular philosophy drove the people of Swat toward militancy. Some were forced to become militants by militants, some were on parole, some were fighting for power in society, and some got involved in it to protect their families’ quality of life and means of subsistence.1 The following provides a description of “Talibanization” in Swat since it varies depending on the situation and should not necessarily be understood broadly. Locally, the term “Talibanization” is used to refer to militarism or militancy. Even one respondent asserted that most of the insurgents were outsiders. On the other hand, locals were either murdered at the onset of the conflict or imprisoned in military prisons.2 He went on to say that if someone has issues against the state and community, they will join militancy. These militants weren’t religious extremists in terms of ideology. Majority of these militants were smugglers, drug dealers, drug users, or person with weak social background. A small number of Madrassas students were involved. There were certainly some Mullahs or clerics who led this militancy, but they were involved in crimes since before the onset of the militancy.3 Hussain Shah Qail, who was angry with the local elites, is an example of a person who had personal grievances against the government. Due to crimes done against them or their family by the elite, his younger brother committed suicide. Although Qail opposed violent movements, he backed

1 Professor Sultan e Room, in-person interview, Swat, July 24, 2017. 2 Respondent # 04, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017. 3 Respondent # 04.

4

DRIVERS OF EXTREMISM IN SWAT VALLEY

65

Pervez, a Taliban leader who drove the elites out of the region. Qail thought that the local elites were to blame for his family’s suffering and his brother’s passing.4 According to a senior Khwazakhela political figure, the Taliban in Swat were not “Swati-Taliban”.5 They were imported to the area. Locally, they were supported and joined by Tanzim-e-Nifaz-eShariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), or, (organization for the establishment of the law of the Prophet Mohammad), though they were few in number. The intention of the Fazlullah group was not to acquire weapons or use force to further its objectives. The effort to secure Sufi Muhammad’s release was nonviolent. These strangers later joined him and took him and his companions hijacked. To receive pay, the locals became militants. Some of them were criminals and were wanted by the police. They could take use of the chance to defend themselves from police raids. Some people joined the group with the intention of exacting revenge on the powerful people in society. The Talibanization of young people had become widespread by the time the military campaign was scheduled to start in the previous phase. Most people sent family members to join the Taliban in order to protect their families. One respondent stated that he “was planning to send one of [his] family members to join Taliban as it was the need of those days” if the military operation had not begun in 2009.6 Another resident of the town believed that because these militants in Swat have not been brainwashed, they do not qualify as “militants.” They just use violence to protect their own interests and do not promote any philosophy; as a result, they do not require rehabilitation or reintegration. One of the main justifications for joining the military was personal animosities. Within the society, there were social disputes over land, with uncles, cousins, and other relatives. To exact retribution on the oncestrong elites, the weak turned to militancy. According to another reply, they would be safe as long as the military or other security personnel are stationed nearby, but they would never be able to socialize with the locals since they do not want to be affiliated with these former combatants in

4 Hussain Shah Qail, in-person interview, Islamabad, September 9, 2018. 5 Shaukat, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 27, 2019. 6 Respondent #05, In-Person Interview, Mingora, July 23, 2017.

66

I. KHAN

any way. The respondents claimed that these former combatants would be held accountable for their acts once the military left the area.7 An ex-militant who was asked about the cause of the militancy stated that the conflict was not fought to establish Sharia or Islamic law but rather was a cunning game played by the government. “We joined this movement because we were honest individuals who were not aware of the political whims. Although we had admitted our errors and turned ourselves in to the security forces, we are still dealing with terrible accusations and stigmatization. Most innocent people are detained during this battle in Swat.”8 Before the military operation started in Swat, majority of the people joined Taliban to protect their families and honor, according to a resident of Mingora who was describing the causes of the growing support for the Taliban. The Taliban stood on the one side and the security forces on the other, but the Taliban had more willpower than the security forces. People joined the Taliban because they believed that the state may be supporting them, according to the locals. They included one of the respondent’s neighbors, who frequently begged him to join the Taliban. Everyone in Swat would be a member of the Taliban if the campaign against these Taliban had not been started in 2009. The public today laments that the government took too long to take action against the Taliban.9 While the Taliban could have been halted when Fazlullah started preaching militancy on his radio, a local instructor said that the government was not earnest about preventing their invasion of Swat. Fazlullah called himself Amir-ul-Momineen (the leader of the Muslims). When he was patrolling on horseback with many horses moving behind him, he drew a crowd. No sane person at the time, including [me], did not feel any pity for the Taliban since we all know that criminal activity lurks around every corner. Mullah Fazlullah was a simple laborer, he said, and it was dubious how he gained power suddenly; the entire process had been murky from the start.10 At first, even many with higher education supported him and his organization, but when he labeled the Pakistani

7 Respondent # 17, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 24, 2017. 8 Respondent # 08, in-person interview, Mingora, February 2, 2018. 9 Dr. Ihsan, in-person interview, Mingora, February 4, 2018. 10 Kamal, in-person interview, Peshawar, August 3, 2017.

4

DRIVERS OF EXTREMISM IN SWAT VALLEY

67

military as an infidel (enemy of Islam), along with those who practice religion but do not proclaim Jihad, the public turned away.11 The Taliban did, in fact, lie. They told lies all the time. The Pakistani Army entered Swat at one point and the Taliban declared that NATO forces had attacked the region. To win over the locals’ sympathies was the goal. But once they knew the reality, everyone realized that the Taliban are liars.12 A female doctor shares a comparable tale of her nephew enlisting in the militancy. The security authorities abducted her nephew while he was in his teenage on suspicion of connection with the Taliban. Although he spent some days with Taliban. He was a suicide bomber for the Taliban. The family was not aware of her nephew’s involvement with the Taliban when he was about 13 years old. To gain power and honor in society was the driving force behind joining the militancy. Her nephew made the decision to join the Taliban since they were in power and people were afraid of them. As he rarely followed religion, he was not indoctrinated on the basis of religion. A 13-year-old youngster has no interest in religion and has no knowledge of it. His motivation was a desire for power and jumping on the bandwagon, which turned out to be a trend as many people joined the Taliban.13 Families were frequently unaware that their children were participating in terrorist activities at the start of the conflict; otherwise, these families could have returned their children home. But these families were unable to request the return of their children when the Taliban assumed control as the only major force in the country. These families also experienced a sense of security as a result of a family member joining the Taliban. Based on the numerous factors that contributed to someone becoming a militant, the researcher established five major groups of militants in light of the aforementioned debate. While there is a lot of academic study on the causes of extremism or what motivates people to enlist in the militancy, such as illiteracy, poverty, religious extremism, anthropological approaches and field data are used to supplement this knowledge. According to this study, the five main factors are: (1) religiosity, (2) unemployment, (3) power struggles, (4) security concerns, and (5) bandwagoning.

11 Kamal. 12 Respondent # 11, in-person interview, Swat, August 8, 2017. 13 Dr. Nazakat, in-person interview, Qamber, February 4, 2017.

68

I. KHAN

1. Religiosity The Afghan War is the origin of the first category. The state and society both extolled the virtues of the wartime veterans. They proudly led a distinctive and noticeable lifestyle while donning distinctive outerwear. These veterans were referred to as “Qumandaan14 ” or commanders, and they enjoyed this title. The majority of the TNSM members in Swat and the Malakand division led first by Mullah Fazlullah and then by Sufi Muhammad were combatants in the Afghan war. Since they were the “Ghazis”15 of the Jihad against the Soviet Union, they had esteem in society. Following 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan, many veterans once more joined the Jihad (holy war) against the US. The general public first embraced them heartily and gave them moral, material, and monetary support (Guardian, 2001). The conflict broke out in Swat when these veterans issued verdict against Pakistan’s alliance with the US. With this announcement, they lost the support of the locals but gained the fervor of the religious sector of the population, particularly madrassas. When these veterans became “targeted persons,” unnamed spy agencies could simply find them and utilize them for their own purposes.16 This was the first group of militants in this study. The religious sentiments at initially attracted “targeted people” to Talibanization, who later rose to the rank of commanders in Taliban. 2. Unemployment Later, after receiving funding and other resources, these veterans allied themselves with foreign intelligence agencies and turned against the Pakistani army. The majority of respondents agreed that the community’s young “unemployed” people followed the veterans. Youth without jobs were easily accessible in society. The militant leaders gave the unemployed cash payments each month in exchange for joining their group. 14 Local commander within a larger group of fighters. 15 Ghazi is the survivor of Jihad; those who fought Jihad and were not martyred are

called Ghazis. 16 Respondent # 17.

4

DRIVERS OF EXTREMISM IN SWAT VALLEY

69

3. Power Struggle These terrorists first targeted the unemployed group before moving on to the society’s weaker members. The militants promised them dominion over the “respected class” of society. The people who were “excluded” in this scenario were the weak because they were attempting to define their identity and place in society. Numerous Pashtun communities have been around for years, but they are not considered to be part of the Pashtun people. The Pashtun are revered and seen as superior to other groups. These groups include several more, such as Mian, Mullah, Nayee, and Akhunzada. They are collectively referred to as “religious functionaries” or “Ghareeb.17 ” The younger generation was drawn in by the Taliban’s freedom to carry weapons without limitation. This type of “bandwagoning” resulted in all of the young people joining militancy. Ghareeb joined the militant organization in an effort to advance in society. These societal fault lines gave rise to a fight for control that the insurgents skillfully manipulated. This group, which the researcher classified as “power-struggle,” made up around 35–40% of all militants. 4. Security Concerns According to the researcher’s results, the fourth group is quite important. When the excluded and unemployed joined militant groups, they began executing anyone they perceived as a threat and demanding payment in the form of money, ransom, and other contributions such as men, food, shelter, and clothing. The militants were in charge of the entire valley at the time. They were made to accept protection payments from the villagers. In the case that they were unable to pay for protection, the citizens were told to send a member of their family as a contribution to their ranks. The citizens had to choose between the two options. Those with little money made the decision to join the Taliban. Taliban members did not have to pay and were safe. They gained power in society as a result of being Taliban members. This is classified as a “security issue,” which accounted for about half of the insurgents in Swat.

17 Ghareeb is Pashtu word. It is textual meaning is poor but contextual meaning is weak.

70

I. KHAN

5. Bandwagoning The Taliban controlled the “justice” and “punishment” systems in Swat Valley, which made it impossible for the young people in the community to be impartial. Youth began to join the militancy as a trend. The younger generation was drawn in by the Taliban’s freedom to carry weapons without restrictions. This type of “bandwagoning” resulted in all of the young people joining militancy.

Conclusion The research can safely say that there are at least five groups of militants that may be established on the basis of the reasons for embracing militancy, based on the interviews and field data. These consist of: Religion is the first issue, followed by unemployment, power struggles, security concerns, and bandwagoning.

References Ahmed, M., and Rafique, Z. H. (2013). Deradicalization and Rehabilitation Efforts Analysis of Anti-terrorism Activities in Pakistan. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (IJH&SS), 2(1), 115–124. ASER-Pakistan. (2011). District Report Card-Education, Swat. Retrieved December 17, 2019, from ASER Pakistan: http://aserpakistan.org/doc ument/aser/2012/drc/kp/Swat.pdf. Azam, Z., and Fatima, S. B. (2017). Mishal: A Case Study of a Deradicalization and Emancipation Program in SWAT Valley, Pakistan. Journal for Deradicalization (JD), 1–29. Collier, P., and Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers, 56, 563–595. Fair, C., and Ali, H. (2018). Women and Support for Terrorism in Pakistan. Terrorism and Political Violence, 30(6). 962–983. Glazzard, A., Sasha, J., and Emily, W. (2015). Conflict and Countering Violent Extremism: Literature Review. Working Paper Royal United Services Institute. Guardian. (2001, October 27). 5,000 Pakistani Tribesmen to Join Taliban. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian. com/world/2001/oct/27/afghanistan.terrorism1. Gurr, T. (1970). Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

4

DRIVERS OF EXTREMISM IN SWAT VALLEY

71

Jehanzeb-College. (2019). History of Jehanzeb College Swat. Retrieved September,17, 2019, from Info Jehanzeb College: http://www.admission. hed.gkp.pk/page.php?college_id=39&page_id=4902. Khan, I. (2016a). Relevance of Radio in Social Construction in FATA: A Case of Bajaur Agency. Quest of Pakhtun Identity at Pak-Afghan Border Land. Peshawar: SBBU Peshawar and AWKU Mardan. Khan, I. (2016b). Post Conflict Rehabilitation in Swat: A Feminist Approach. Global Gender Perspectives (pp. 1–11). Lahore: Lahore College for Women University. Murshed, S. M., and Tadjoeddin, M. Z. (2007). Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflicts. United Kingdom: MICROCON Working Paper No. 2. Retrieved March 13, 2018, from Murshed, S. M. and Tadjoeddin, M. Z. (2007, September). Reappraising the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict (2007). MICROCON Research Working Paper No. 2: https://ssrn.com/abstract= 1116248. NCHD. (2013). Adult Literacy Report 2012–2013. Retrieved October 16, 2019, from National Commission for Human Development (NCHD): http://nchd. org.pk/ws/downloads/Progress%20Report%20ALP%202012-13%20(1).pdf. Nichols, R. (2001). Settling the Frontier: Law, Land and Society in the Peshawar Valley, 1500–1900. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Orakzi, S. B. (2011). Conflict in the Swat Valley of Pakistan: Pakhtun Culture and Peacebuilding Theory-Practice Application. Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 6(1), 35–48. Schmid, D. A. (2013). Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. The Hague: ICCT Research Paper. Sultan-i-Rome. (2008). Swat State (1915–69) From Genesis to Merger. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

CHAPTER 5

Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants in Swat

Abstract The chapter explains militancy, militants, and the many categories of militants. It describes how the Joint Interrogation Team (JIT) classified suspects as White, Grey, or Black. The chapter next describes the many sorts of rehabilitation institutions that were constructed based on the types of detainees, which were Sabawaoon, Mashal, and Sparly. The chapter expands on the need for rehabilitation before going into the process within rehabilitation centers, based on primary data acquired from the field in the form of interviews, FGDs, and personal observations. Keywords Rehabilitee · Hard and soft-core militants · Rehabilitation centers · Deradicalization

After a conflict has been overcome, nations attempt to create a policy framework to address the challenges of the post-conflict environment. Priority has been placed on policies and initiatives for the rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants (López et al., 2015; Knight, 2008). Pakistan’s situation, however, is unique. Although the government has created counterterrorism and laws to combat terrorism, there is no overarching national strategy for the rehabilitation and reintegration of former militants. At best, military commanders at the local level develop rehabilitation methods in accordance with the circumstances and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 I. Khan, Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9514-1_5

73

74

I. KHAN

the commander’s preferences (Ahmed and Rafique, 2013). The situation in district Swat, where there is no formal policy for the rehabilitation and reintegration of former militants, is comparable. The context and nature of the post-conflict rehabilitation in Swat are explained in this chapter. The chapter was produced in consideration of primary information that was gathered from interviews on the ground. The information that is currently available on the rehabilitation processes and programs in Swat is insufficient to explain these rehabilitation projects.

Militants’ Financial Support A response to a question on the funding of the militants said that initially, the militants were paid on a monthly basis and that “hidden hands” supported the terrorists in Swat. On radios and at mosques, they aired appeals for donations from the general public.1 They made donations requests in bazaars and other public gathering places. Naturally, the goal of this gift was to boost the movement, but it also made them more popular and made it easier for them to infiltrate other areas. The first donation was given by their own people in secret when the Taliban began collecting funds in bazaars. It was merely intended to provoke support from the general public. They even contributed in lacs prompting the people for contributions. In Khwazakhela bazaar, they collected charity on daily basis. A commander of militants would make the announcement that “O people! We are collecting charity for Sharia.” The community had never known who had made the first donation to the charity box. Actually, they were the ones who used the common people as a source of inspiration and emotional blackmail in exchange for contributions.2 Women from the community contributed Mullah Fazlullah. According to a female respondent, she “saw two beds full of jewel in Taliban markaz. Taliban requested donations for the sake of Din (Islam), not for their own use. They received calls from Mullah Fazlullah for implementation of Islamic law and financial support for madrassas via radio.”3 Indeed, women made significant contributions. These ladies are currently subject to stigma. They are told that “your jewelry is now firing” by the phrase

1 Respondent # 02, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 25, 2017. 2 Respondent # 17. 3 Respondent # 11, in-person interview, Swat, August 08, 2017.

5

REHABILITATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN SWAT

75

“da staso ka’ali di os dazeegi.” These women are ashamed of what they did and claim that they believed they were helping to fund terrorist activities rather than the construction of mosques. The majority of women in Swat are now hesitant to make any kind of donation, even those that are mandated by our religion to be made to mosques.4

Classification of Detainees Detainees who had been detained and those who had voluntarily turned themselves in were the two main types kept by security forces. The former were apprehended following a conflict with security personnel or during searches, whereas the latter were handed over by the community or family or were people who voluntarily handed themselves over to security personnel. In the second case, it is important to recognize the community’s role in the rehabilitation process. A combatant first turned himself in to his family or community, who then took him or her to the security authorities. The surrendered are typically only held for a brief period of time before being freed. There are several programs for civilians (noncombatants), such as vocational trainings, while there is a deradicalization program for ex-combatants, according to a military official who interacts with ex-combatants.5 An ex-combatant initially has a psychiatric evaluation during which he is assigned to one of three categories: black, grey, or white. He goes through a deradicalization procedure in accordance with his involvement. At the facility, he receives a variety of vocational and skill-development trainings. Depending on the psychiatrists’ evaluation at the institute, the deradicalization procedure could take anywhere between six months and two years.6 White, Grey, and Black Militants The sub-categories of militants are created during the initial examinations of the combatants who have been apprehended or turned over. 4 Respondent # 12, in-person interview, Mingora, February 05, 2018. 5 This revelation of army officer provides further clarification between Black and Grey;

i.e., those combatants who had arrested in a fight are fall under Black category while those who surrendered voluntarily are fall under Grey. The Grey are passing through rehabilitation and not Black. 6 Lt. Col. Atif, in-person interview, Islamabad, January 08, 2018.

76

I. KHAN

In the security forces’ internment centers, the probe typically lasts six to fifteen days. If it can be established that a combatant has participated in terrorist operations, attacks on civilian targets, government institutions, or the destruction of public infrastructure, he is labeled as “black” when he is initially identified. Such combatants are detained in internment facilities, jails as punishment, or other places as determined by the authorities. As their penalty is essential to appease the public who want accountability, this type is not sent to a rehabilitation facility. If they are released without being punished, ordinary individuals will start to doubt the government.7 The fiercely radical groups of warriors known as “grey” combatants are those who joined the ranks of the militants and took up weaponry but did not engage in violent acts. They are ardent propagandists for the terrorists’ ideologies. Combatants of this kind are delivered to treatment facilities. “White” refers to the third group. They are the ones who have helped the insurgents and helped with any logistical or material support. This group is released after a week because, in the majority of cases, the militants forced them to do so. Hard-Core and Soft-Core Militants When detained or surrendered, militants underwent psychiatric testing and questioning from the intelligence agencies. Two processes are involved in this assessment, according to a military official: first, a combatant is interrogated when they are captured, and then they are brought in front of a Joint Interrogation Team (JIT). All civil and military security agencies, including the military, police, and intelligence, make up the JIT.8 Hard-core militants are those who have engaged in violent confrontations with law enforcement, attacks on civilian targets, and destruction of public facilities including bridges, schools, and roads. This category is created during the investigation from the combatants who have been apprehended and are labeled as “black.” Due to their perceived threat to the state and the general population, they are consequently transferred to prisons or detention camps. During psychological

7 Respondent # 3, in-person interview, Lahore, March 27, 2017. 8 Respondent # 3.

5

REHABILITATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN SWAT

77

assessment they are affirmed as “non-rehabilitateable”9 and needing punishment. According to a representative of a rehabilitation facility, they have both hard-core and soft-core ex-militants. They are handled in accordance with the level of damage they have produced. The centers receive voluntarily surrendered ex-combatants. When someone is arrested, they are sentenced to a set period of time in jail before being taken to a center for rehabilitation. The soft-core are individuals who voluntarily submitted to the police or the community, and those who, upon arrest, were discovered to have engaged in fewer violent crimes against the police or the general population. They fall within the categories of “grey” or “white.” Both “white” and “grey” are mild militants, although white are simply the category that has become radicalized as a result of being exposed to the militants’ narrative, while grey are those who have been discovered participating in some acts alongside the militants. After a preliminary investigation, the white are released, whereas the grey are transferred to rehabilitation facilities for rehabilitation. The black group “is like a snake and should be killed,” a community elder said. In any other location, you risk the black biting someone else if you leave him unattended. He went on to add that this categorization is entirely inaccurate. The military has classified white people as black, and vice versa.10 Former Taliban members who killed civilians here in Swat have occasionally been cleared by the security forces and reintegrated. Contrarily, there are those who are suffering in the Black group but who were only impacted by the militant’s narratives. In this case, the community members often met with senior military officers and advised them to reassess the standards they used to categorize insurgents. He continued by saying that they recommended to the authorities that the JIT should form a committee in each village. A member of the ex-militant’s family, a Mullah or priest from the village, a Nazim from the region, a police officer, and another political activist should be on the committee. This committee can aid in determining the degree of the person’s involvement

9 Those who engage in severe terrorist acts against law enforcement and the general public are non-rehabilitable. Their punishment was made mandatory because if these people were released without being held accountable, civilians would start to distrust and question the security services. 10 Respondent # 05, in-person interview, Mingora, July 25, 2017.

78

I. KHAN

and the appropriate form of punishment.11 Dr. Arshad Ali said that white militants are individuals who joined the Taliban merely to save their families, which supported previous respondent’s argument. When the Taliban controlled Swat, they abducted people for ransom and killed some of them as retaliation for intergroup animosity. They joined the Taliban in order to defend their family from kidnapping and to maintain a balance of power with their opposing community. They merely wanted to protect themselves; they were not Taliban followers on an ideological or political level12 Dr. Arshad tells the tale of a friend of his: He worked for the government and vehemently opposed the Taliban. He endured numerous instances of Taliban beating, humiliation, and disdain. He was once robbed while returning some bags from a bazaar. His entire town would eventually ally with the Taliban. He understood that joining the Taliban was the only option to defend himself and his family from disgrace, and he did so for his survival. Later, after rising to the rank of commander, this guy relocated to Peshawar and then to the Khyber agency. He had been in touch with me up to that point by phone. When I was living in the hostel at Malakand University, he paid me frequent visits. I once told him to stop being so militant. You don’t realize how powerful we are, he retorted. We have control of the Khyber and will shortly move on to all of Pakistan. He said, “I can’t surrender because I know my fate and how severely the army treats Taliban.” He hasn’t contacted me in the past four years; maybe he was dead or might be in Afghanistan.13

Internment Centers These are transient investigating units set up in nearly every security forces cantonment. When combatants are arrested, they are taken here for a preliminary inquiry. The classification of the combatants is made here. Grey people are transferred to rehabilitation facilities, White people are released, and Black people are sent to cells and dealt with in accordance with the law.

11 Respondent # 05. 12 Dr. Arshad Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017. 13 Dr. Arshad Ali.

5

REHABILITATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN SWAT

79

The Need for Rehabilitation A detailed interview was conducted with close friend and assistant of the co-founder of Sabawoon rehabilitation center. The latter was assassinated by the militants in October 2010. He was questioned regarding the need for and potential approaches to former militants’ rehabilitation. He retorted that people don’t have access to basic amenities and live in appalling conditions in Swat’s remote areas. It is apparent that these individuals will join militancy in those situations where there is a lack of high-quality education and the dominant narrative is one of the Taliban. The parents were informed that their children would get food, lodging, clothing, and occasionally a monthly stipend after being summoned for religious instruction. Poor parents took advantage of the opportunity and sent their children to madrassas where the Taliban utilized them as human shields in terrorist attacks. They (the Taliban) only permitted children between the ages of 10 and 18 since older youngsters were more difficult to exploit.14 According to their ages, these children were discovered to be divided into three groups: 9–12 years old, 12–15 years old, and 15–18 years old, when security authorities stormed these madrassas and imprisoned the youngsters. Taliban maintained these groups apart in different madrassas. The first group, consisting of children aged 9–12, was being prepared to reinforce their community’s narratives (ideological force). The second group, consisting of youths between the ages of 12 and 15, was intended to train suicide bombers, and the third group, which included enthusiastic and passionate youth, was also training suicide bombers.15 The militant’s grouping approach proved incredibly effective, and in just over two years, the Taliban were able to tighten their grip on Swat. These madrassas were discovered in remote areas of the Swat valley after the military operation, when security forces had cleansed the whole region of insurgents. In order to operate these camps (madrassas), the word “Dar-ul-Uloom” was employed. There were various student populations in those camps, including 15, 20, and so on. 84 students were first recovered from those madrassas by security personnel. Prior to the security danger in big cities, it was originally intended that these young people would be moved to Mardan, a neighboring region of KP, for deradicalization. However, Swat 14 Professor Mumtazuddin, in-person interview, Mardan, November 08, 2017. 15 Professor Mumtazuddin.

80

I. KHAN

was chosen instead for their rehabilitation training. As a result, Sabawoon was built in Peeran, Malakand Division, and Rastoon, a second rehabilitation facility of a comparable sort, was built in Shangla District. It was a Sabawoon subsidiary organization, although it wasn’t directly under Dr. Farooq’s control. At the main Swat-Shangla route, Rastoon was created for the radicalized residents of Shangla district. Community or Village Defense Committee (VDC) involvement in this initiative grew over time. This community identified the local families who had been impacted and asked the military to set up rehabilitation programs for them.16

Drawing the Swat Rehabilitation Program Rehabilitation centers, as described in earlier chapters, are the places where former fighters receive rehabilitation before being reintegrated into society as law-abiding individuals. After the violent conflict in Swat came to an end in 2009, the Pakistani army started a rehabilitation program. An army official observed that there is coordination in paperwork only (on paper), however very little in practice, when it comes to undertaking rehabilitation. All overhead costs for the rehabilitation center are meant to be covered by the government; however, no such money is accessible. Even the National Action Plan (NAP), the most widely used counterterrorism policy, makes no mention of or provision for rehabilitation facilities. Actually, civil government is in charge of rehabilitation. Demobilizing the combatant and, if he is captured, turning him over to the police for further action is the military’s responsibilities. But neither the military nor the civilian government take themselves seriously. Rehabilitation needs to be taken seriously, and only civil government should be in charge of it. A different representative of a rehabilitation center, in response, said that the civil administration is giving this center financial and material support as well as provided eight teachers. These initiatives are formally under the control of the provincial administration.17 The three rehabilitation facilities in Swat that are known to be administered by the Pakistani army are Mashal (the light), Sabawoon (the dawn), and Sparlay (the spring). There are no NGO-sponsored facilities in Swat. The names are given in Pashtu because Swat is home to a large Pashtun

16 Professor Mumtazuddin. 17 Respondent # 15.

5

REHABILITATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN SWAT

81

community. Project Sabawoon focuses children, Project Mashal targets adult captives, and Project Sparlay focuses the relatives of those who are being held captive (Rana, 2011). During the researcher’s field trips, there was no evidence of the existence of the Sparlay rehabilitation center, and the graduates and important informants discovered came from the Sabawoon and Mashal facilities. The researcher visited the locations of the first two (but was not let inside). A reply claimed that Sabawoon is in Peerano, Malakand, and Mashal is in the Paithom Hotel in Wali Bagh, Mingora. He was unaware of Sparlay or any other programs, though.18 When asked about treatment facilities, a member of the community mentioned that during an army raid to purge the region of terrorists, some hard-core militants were captured. However, some militants were forced to join, while others enlisted for their own security and voluntarily gave themselves up. There were also juveniles among these moderate militants who underwent rehabilitation in the military compound in each village. These were modest centers spread across numerous villages, but they weren’t recommended rehabilitation facilities. The length of the stay varied, ranging from 20 days to six months. After being evaluated psychologically, they were released.19 These informal, unofficial hubs were also constructed by unit commanders in army units. The types of centers mentioned by Respondent # 11 were present even though the researcher was unable to find them. In every military installation, the researcher did find internment facilities, where people are subjected to initial questioning that can last up to 30 days.

Types of Rehabilitation Centers Only children are rehabilitated at Sabawoon. When questioned, the Sabawoon Rehabilitation Center’s founding member, Dr. Mumtazuddin, admitted that till 2009 there was no plan of deradicalization throughout the country. The Pakistani army discovered the necessity for their deradicalization after it detained 84 juveniles in Swat. Dr. Farooq, Dr. Farooq, a renowned psychiatrist who was later assassinated by the militants in

18 Dr. Ihsan. 19 Respondent # 11.

82

I. KHAN

2010, provided aid to security forces in the establishment of Sabawoon for juvenile detainees at Peerano, Malakand division.20 Azam and Fatima (2017) have studied the Mashal center in-depth where adults are held as prisoners in this facility. An initial interrogation is the first step in the categorizing process that occurs once a combatant is detained. He is delivered to a joint interrogation team (JIT) in the subsequent stage. The JIT is made up of representatives from all security agencies, including the military, police, and intelligence. He is now classified as black, grey, or white. He is either imprisoned in an internment facility or brought to criminal court depending on the degree of his involvement if it is determined that he is a black combatant, often known as acute, engaged in significant operations against the civilian population, the government, or security personnel. The combatant is taken to a rehabilitation center (Mashal ) to go through the rehabilitation processes if he is discovered to be “grey,” that is, participating in the ideological or logistical support of militants. The detainee is released without being subjected to any more scrutiny or incarceration in the third stage, the “white” category.21 Mashal is also known as Paitham, which was a federal government-run facility for vocational training. The center was raided and destroyed by the militants at the start of the conflict. Later, the security forces took back control of the facility and converted it into Mashal, a rehabilitation facility. At Mashal facility, former combatants who were older than 18 are supposed to receive rehabilitation. Similar to TEVTA, the center also offers the rehabilitees psychological, technical, and vocational trainings.22 This center opened a second location in Barikot. The people who had been detained took a range of classes, from psychiatric to professional, teaching them carpentry, tailoring, and business management, among other skills.23 In Khwazakhela, Swat, there isn’t a military rehabilitation facility because there aren’t as many militants there. Paitham is the sole treatment center in Mingora, Swat. They impart technical and vocational

20 Professor Mumtazuddin. 21 Respondent # 03. 22 Professor Mumtazuddin. 23 AnwerAnjum, in-person interview, Mingora, July 25, 2017.

5

REHABILITATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN SWAT

83

training, patriotism, and modern education. Additionally, the rehabilitees receive instruction in subjects including computer science, carpentry, electrical training, tailoring, and agriculture. Rehabilitees are shaped into decent citizens by Paitham.24 The most significant rehabilitation facility, known as Sparlay or Spring in English, is where the family members of former militants have to be trained and deradicalized in order to give rehabilitees with a tranquil and deradicalized environment. This center was proposed for Swat but never materialized, possibly due to a lack of funding. In conversations with former militant, it was criticized that the government did not provide for their families while they were in detention in internment camps and later rehabilitation facilities for years.25

Administration and Staff The Pakistan army manages and oversees the rehabilitation facilities in Swat while the bulk of the teachers inside these rehabilitation centers are civilians. Experts in their professions, such as psychiatrists, teachers, technical and vocational instructors, and religious scholars, were employed by the military. An employee indicated that while civilian employees are independent inside the facility, the military is under the direction of the general administration. Shams Mohmand indicated that the security setup is highly strict, especially considering that it is a military installation. He is a senior journalist who visited Sabawoon and spoke with both the personnel and the rehabilitees.26 To obtain approval through the proper channels, it took him two months. “At Sabawoon, I only discovered youngsters. After being welcomed by the administrator, I met with the entire staff and roamed the entire center. The structure and the classrooms reminded me of our educational facilities. These centers had no televisions, movie theaters, or other similar amenities. The roles of the clergy and psychiatrist are significant. The way they were instructing was incredible.”27 The teaching staff is local and has been employed by the

24 Dr. Arshad Ali. 25 Respondent # 14, in-person interview, Mingora, May 01, 2017. 26 Shams Momand, in-person interview, Abbottabad, July 22, 2017. 27 Shams Momand.

84

I. KHAN

civil authority, which also pays their salary, according to another official. There are now eight teachers working at this facility. Depending on the extent of each person’s recovery, as determined by his psychological assessment, the time frame for each rehabilitee ranges from three to six months.28

Understanding the Process of Rehabilitation The researcher found two rehabilitation facilities functional in Swat, i.e., Sabawoon and Mashal which serve juveniles and adult ex-combatants respectively. Interviews with former combatants, members of the community, administrative and teaching staff, as well as the researcher’s own observations, have all been used to acquire information about the procedures at these facilities. An officer of Mashal revealed that the daily schedule comes after a morning assembly parade session in which army men also take part. After a break for tea and a session with religious academics, they continue on to their practical trainings. After finishing these, individuals are permitted to take a little nap before engaging in psychological interactions with psychologists and psychiatrists. To assess rehabilitees, psychiatrists use a variety of questions. Every facet of a rehabilitee is evaluated, and until he is proven to be free from his prior narratives, he remains at the rehabilitation center.29 Psychological Assessment A combatant’s engagement in militancy is first evaluated by the military to determine the extent of his arrest or surrender, and then he is evaluated by a psychologist. At this point, the detainee is evaluated, and based on his psychological condition, a period of stay at the center, as well as the kind of educational and vocational training, is allocated. Former combatants who have willingly handed themselves in are placed in the center, whereas those who were detained during the conflict are first sent to jail before being sent for rehabilitation. Every step a rehabilitee takes in the center is evaluated, and exams are done every three months to see if he has received enough vocational, psychological, and religious training to

28 Respondent # 15. 29 Respondent # 22, in-person interview, Mingora, August 03, 2017.

5

REHABILITATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN SWAT

85

be reintegrated into society. For this examination, the authorities have a module that allows them to identify the areas where the detainees still fall short and those where they are improving. Others have been released in as little as three months after displaying improvement, while some former combatants who were admitted from the beginning are still being monitored in the facilities.30 Schooling and Curriculum At Sabawoon, there is a formal education system for children that are registered to the regional Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISE). The Sabawoon facility has opened an elementary school. “Yes, there are juveniles beyond the age of fifteen who are illiterate, thus the center offers them vocational training. We only gave young people formal education courses. We have young people taking the Board examinations right now. We also help them financially so they can enroll in schools.”31 Classes are held in the morning at the center, and vocational trainings are held in the afternoon. However, this schedule was only observed when these rehabilitees were housed in different buildings. As a result of a decline in the number of rehabilitees and a shortage of instructors, this schedule is no longer adhered to.32 Shams Mohmand adds, “I also questioned whether you teach similar courses to everyone.” Generally, they conducted similar courses in a class, they responded, but when they felt that a particular student was falling behind and needed additional attention in a separate class, the administration set up a special class of 30 minutes for him.33 The institution has set up special classes for children where government instructors from colleges and schools come to instruct them. Nearly 30 adolescents are already enrolled in the centers, where they are being taught subjects equivalent to those found in grades 7, 8, and 9. Speaking about her little relative, a woman revealed that he attended school in a rehabilitation facility for over three years.

30 Respondent # 15. 31 Respondent # 15. 32 Respondent # 15. 33 Shams Momand.

86

I. KHAN

He completed his Higher Secondary Education (HSSC) at home after completing his Secondary Education (SSC) at a rehabilitation facility.34 A graduate of the Mashal Center admitted during an interview that there was no formal education offered there, although, he has heard that at other youngsters rehab facility (Sabawoon), they are taught curricular courses. He further added that they were taught a Pakistan Studies course. Additionally, lectures on social and economic stability were offered to us. These lectures were delivered by guest lecturers or outside experts. Additionally, there was a regular teaching staff as well as regular classes were held. There were regular Dar-s-Quran and Hadith 35 classes, speech contests and sports in the evening, all the rehabilitees were free at the center.36 Physical Training The rehabilitees would begin their day with a challenging activity after being awakened early in the morning. After finishing their workout, they participated in an “assembly parade” in the rehab facility’s ground. These gatherings would include the national anthem and a group prayer. The physical trainer (PT), who was always a military man, led a brief physical activity during the assembly parade. Following the assembly, the juvenile rehabilitees attended different classes akin to those found in regular schools, while the adults received vocational training. The time for a lunch break would be at 1:00 PM on the clock. All of the rehabilitees were given permission to play a game of their choice following lunch and some relaxation. Typically, only cricket and football were offered as sports.37 Religious Training In morning lesson for all rehabilitees, the religious scholar recited and translated the Holy Quran while adding some interpretations. Following the assembly, the inmates participated in the translation and memorization of the final 10 chapters of the Quran as well as the recital and

34 Dr. Nazakat. 35 Dar-S-Quran and Hadith are the religious scriptures. 36 Respondent # 07. 37 Respondent # 14.

5

REHABILITATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN SWAT

87

memorization of six Kalmas.38 They also talked about memorizing and translating texts from the Quran that address Jihad and nonviolence. Religious scholars correctly translated these Jihad and peace scriptures, which the Taliban had previously mistaken as being directed against the government and Pakistani army.39 One of the officers revealed, “we came across cases where detainees were unaware of the fundamentals of Islam; such as, prayers, recitation of Quran, and Jihad.” They were ignorant of Islamic law, or Sharia. In their imaginations, they will suffer tremendous penalties for not making prayers. After spending some time in this facility, their ideas about the incentives and penalties in Islam have altered. These formerly radicalized individuals are now more moderate, performing on stage in front of us while singing, dancing, giving speeches, and playing instruments without hesitation. The detainees were involved in different extracurricular activities. The center has called many singers for entertainment purposes.40 A graduate of Mashal rehab center confirmed weekly musical nights at the center.41 Psychological Training Another respondent said, “Technical and vocational trainings are conducted in Paitham/Mashal, where they impart contemporary knowledge and patriotism. In Paitham, a decent citizen actually comes prepared.”42 Another graduate continued, “We were taught Pakistan Studies, learned about the history of developed countries, particularly Switzerland, and studied biographies of national heroes. Every morning, we performed the Dua’a (prayer) and sang the national anthem.”43 With a graduate of Mashal rehab center, Janan, stated that in the morning he was given physical exercise, followed by memorizing of the final ten chapters of the Quran, six Kalmas and translation of those verses in the Quran that concentrate on Jihad and peace. He was also provided short novels and history books, as well as lessons on Pakistani philosophy and 38 Some obligatory versus in Islam. 39 Respondent # 23, in-person interview, Mingora, August 04, 2017. 40 Respondent # 15. 41 Respondent # 14. 42 Dr. Arshad Ali. 43 Respondent # 07.

88

I. KHAN

the national anthem, Dua’a. The books covered histories of prosperous countries like Switzerland.44 An official disclosed that these psychological evaluations take place every three months. These are used to assess a person’s ability to reintegrate and reenter society. The officer continued that they evaluate a combatant through a special module designed for assessment purpose and it is tried to find the improved and weak aspects of the combatant. Some of the combatants are released when they are satisfactory in the assessment while many are still housed at this center since this center started functioning.45 Vocational Training Adults do not receive a formal education, but they can pursue vocational programs like those for electricians, plumbers, auto mechanics, and carpenters. The rehabilitees who are under 50 years old receive vocational training. Those over 50 are given training in agriculture and other related professions.46 Another respondent conformed that trainings are provided trainings are provided to the housed ex-combatants at the center; including, tailoring and computer skills.47 Every rehabilitee is subjected to psychological assessment daily to a psychiatrist. To assess rehabilitees, psychiatrists use a variety of questions. They are evaluated on all counts, and they remain in the rehabilitation center unless their prior narratives are erased.48 A graduate of the Mashal rehab center who is currently running his own business, said, At the center, we received a variety of vocational training, such as instruction in tailoring, welding, electrical work, honey production, etc. I took part in an electrical training program, which was incredibly helpful to me because I am now running this electrician shop using the knowledge I gained there. I was first position holder in this training course and was awarded ten thousand rupees in cash. We were provided certificates, acceptable in every institution where required. We are certified, now, in the

44 Respondent # 23. 45 Respondent # 15. 46 Respondent # 15. 47 Dr. Arshad Ali. 48 Respondent # 15.

5

REHABILITATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN SWAT

89

courses were taught at the center. There were different vocational trainings for different rehabilitees, depending upon a rehabilitee interest and his educational background. The literate rehabilitees were also provided computer skills. By and large, the trainings provided at the center were helpful to run small businesses.49

Another Mashal graduate, however, claimed, “only three skills were taught at this center: carpentry, tailoring, and electrical. We were free to select from them. Personally, I studied carpentry.”50 Community Engagement Every rehabilitation program must have community involvement as a foundational element. The community and ex-combatants establish a bond and trust as a result of this procedure. The same as was done in the Sri Lankan rehabilitation program, community participation does not just involve bringing the community to the rehabilitation center; it also involves bringing the rehabilitees into the community. The former combatants in Sri Lanka received many round trips throughout the south and took part in numerous activities. They also paid visits to the parliament, other official buildings, the airport, and parks in Sri Lanka. They interacted with various communities and religious leaders while on these visits. The locals greeted these ex-combatants with open arms (GoSL, 2013, pp. 39–40). However, there are legal process place in Swat where only nuclear family members could meet the inmates. The KP home ministry must first provide authorization to the application. The concerned commander would then refer to the in charge of the related facility after being forwarded by the government.51 This resulted in a lengthy and challenging process. The researcher himself went through the process to get into the rehabilitation facility but the attempts were unsuccessful. According to a representative of Mashal Rehabilitation Center, “the community must first ensure before releasing a rehabilitee that the man would not cause any problems for the community. We also hope

49 Respondent # 07. 50 Respondent # 14. 51 Respondent # 03.

90

I. KHAN

Sareeshta,52 will accept us. We follow Sareeshta’s instructions whether they accept or refuse a rehabilitee.”53 A different official clarified, however, that “we do not invite family members at the center because the rehabilitees, including adolescents, adults, and old rehabilitees, are visiting their homes every other weekend. Family members are therefore not required to be invited to the center. At the facility, we assist a rehabilitee in every way to reintegrate into society.”54 A local elder said that the military keeps captured combatants in an unidentified location. Nobody is aware of his location or the family he belongs to. In order to inform his family of his whereabouts, the army makes calls to them after he completes the specific inquiry in the internment center. And as a result, they could visit him. Only the nuclear family is permitted to get together, and only once a week. Until the Army certifies that the offender is now rehabilitated during the last stages of rehabilitation, no other community members or family members are invited.55 When reflecting on his personal experience, an ex-combatant who graduated from Mashal Rehabilitation Center said, “Every civilian access to the center was prohibited, although there were occasions during my three months there as inmate when I communicated with my family three times. Additionally, we were permitted to contact home once each week. We were not permitted to leave the center or even access to the market.”56 According to one military official, a rehabilitee wouldn’t pose a threat to the community because he fought the Army rather than the community. De-weaponizing the area would also ensure that no graduate would get suffer in the absence of the Army. However, the majority of the locals believed that these terrorists were responsible for the bloodshed and casualties, and that if the Army withdrew, there might be civil unrest as a result. 52 Sareeshta is the local name for peace committee. These peace committees are popularly known as Village Defense Committees (VDCs). The VDCs are formed by the security forces and are responsible for the security of their village. They also perform the duty of espionage for security forces. 53 Respondent # 15. 54 Respondent # 24, in-person interview, Mingora, April 22, 2017. 55 Respondent # 04. 56 Respondent # 07.

5

REHABILITATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN SWAT

91

Post-rehabilitation Assistance The rehabilitees receive a variety of skills, according to the administrators. According to their skill sets, the center provided them with laptops, sewing machines, etc., one official remarked. He added that they also provide tool kits packed with everything he would need to start his own business when he rejoins society. Although there are rare instances where the center gave aid, such as when the center built homes for some excombatants, but the center do not provide them with financial support. From this center, we supplied all of these supports.57 When question asked about any assistance from the center or any other institution, a Mashal graduate stated that one of the fundamental flaws of this center it does not provide any financial or material support to its graduates. After leaving the facility, no one is given any money or materials. He continued, “In start, they promised that they would help us start enterprises and support the graduates in getting employment, but afterwards, they did not offer any assistance in this regard.”58 Regarding the support to be provided for business and financial to the rehabilitees, an elder from the community spoke negatively to the officials. The elder retorted that he was unable to find any documentation of the authorities’ claims that they were doing everything possible to help the graduates.59 After getting vocational training at the PARCs (Protective Accommodation and Rehabilitation facilities), people from the public corporate sector were invited to a number of job fairs that were held across Sri Lanka. They hired graduates from these PARCs who are currently leading stable financial lives (BCGR, 2017).

Monitoring/Surveillance In addition to utilizing ex-combatants for diverse tasks, a monitoring system is required to prevent recidivism. However, when former combatants learn that they are being tracked by state security organizations, this becomes a problem. Alternative approaches to doing this might be smarter, though; Sri Lanka serves as a very good example. In an interview a military officer from Sri Lanka suggested that even being released from 57 Respondent # 24. 58 Respondent # 07. 59 Dr. Arshad Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 23, 2017.

92

I. KHAN

prison, these former combatants would still feel imprisoned. Additionally, they will lose faith in the government and experience psychological inferiority to other citizens or a sense of second-class citizenship. In this light, the government’s decision to include these former fighters into the Civil Defense Force (CDF) is an intriguing approach. They are now the villages’ guardians. Agriculture projects and other social development initiatives are also managed by this CDF. One of the objectives was to keep an eye on these graduates while they were serving in the CDF. By recruiting them into the CDF, the government was able to accomplish this goal without personally monitoring or spying on them. Through this mechanism the ex-combatants might not be aware that they are being watched. The Swat situation is special since any interaction with suspicious people outside of the center could lead to recidivism, making it necessary for intelligence agencies to watch over the graduates. However, it might be more beneficial to do it subtly, as an example, use Sri Lanka.60

Rehabilitation Program for Women Female ex-combatants have a special section in every DDR and/or rehabilitation program worldwide (Detraz, 2012, p. 84; Hudson, 2005). They are providing multiple platforms where they can play their roles which, ultimately, make them reintegrate into society. For instance, the female ex-combatants of the Colombian guerrilla organization M19 began their political campaign by displaying the slogan “Women nothing is possible without you” (Patino et al., 2012). As stated by Pizaroo, the head of the M19 women’s wing and afterward a political figure, “if we know how to manage household budget, we would also be able to manage that of the nation” (Grabe, 2004), according to an ex-commander of M19 named Versa Grabe. They were referred to as the “Women of April” to support the idea that women should advocate for peace (Patino et al., 2012, p. 52). Because of their political engagement, Colombian women’s issues—such as health, education, and child care—have been highlighted in reintegration initiatives. Not only for ex-militants but also for those women who were mentally impacted by the conflict, this considerable leadership position of women contributed to the achievement of win– win outcomes. However, Swat is a particular circumstance. In this case,

60 Brigadier Jayanath (SL), in-person interview, Islamabad, November 12, 2017.

5

REHABILITATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN SWAT

93

the social context is different, which changes the nature of the conflict. Women did not actively participate in the conflict in Swat. Women in Swat were compelled by the social climate to coexist as mothers, spouses, and daughters alongside the militants. These women can be termed as “obliged victims” that bears a new idea and can be further studied. In Swat and other Pashtun-dominated areas, the majority of women are ignorant of the conflict dynamics and even the actors that were involved. Another problem with cultural context is that it prevents women from receiving rehabilitation at a facility that is not near their homes. Unless she is staying with a close relative for a day or two, a lady cannot live away from her family. According to a military official, women in Swat are becoming more radicalized as a result of their moral and material support for militants. As wives, moms, and sisters, they continued to live among the militants. The extremists have received jewelry, clothing, and even the children of women. Unfortunately, administration lack any kind of facility for rehabilitation or other mechanism to de-radicalize them. There are NGOs working in Swat to help women in general, including by offering technical and vocational trainings. This job of NGOs is appraisable. Pakistan army, in its personal capacity, is doing well but special program for women is not included in overall policy framework.61 The facility had skill-development programs, an employee observed; however it lacks an effective rehabilitation program. He further added that they have established many vocational centers in various villages. At this main center they have female psychiatrists for the purpose to locate those women who remained part of the militancy in any capacity. The female psychiatrics make visits to the villages where they try to find affected women and the suspected homes where radicalized women live. Numerically, these psychiatrists made 1500 visits between 2010 and 2017. The psychiatrics visit the radicalized homes just because these women cannot be housed at the facility because of the cultural sensitivity which doesn’t allow women to stay outside their homes. The suspicious ladies are summoned to a certain site in the hamlet (often a house), where they are given group trainings and awareness campaigns. Some of the women are suspected and have been found allegedly involved in the conflict. These women are under special observation by the psychiatrists along

61 Respondent # 03.

94

I. KHAN

with material assistance to them. The employee was saying further that they have established vocational centers at every tehseel of the district.62 According to a local elder, women in Swat were not sufficiently radicalized to take up arms. He came up with an example from his home and was saying, “let me tell you the story of my home. My mother, wife and sisters would have labeled me an infidel if I had not been listening to the ‘Mullah Radio’.63 My mother and the other females in my home used to listen to Mullah Radio while I watched television. They frequently argued with me. In Swat, women made a significantly larger contribution to militancy than men did. These contributions took the shape of jewelry, money, or clothing. The female listener of Mullah Radio was one of the primary factors in the militancy’s penetration. However, women were not actively involved in violent activities. There was no violent behavior among women. Additionally, I can confirm that there are vocational centers where women can receive various types of vocational and technical training but no rehabilitation facilities for women.”64 Another person while speaking about women involvement stated that “as for my information, none of the woman is detained by the security forces under, in my knowledge, is arrested by involvement in militancy.” It is a fact that women contribution was higher and, they are facing stigmatization in the community; like, “da staso ka’ali di os dazeegi,” means, “this is your jewel which is firing.” The contributions became a source of embracement for those women. The women feel sorry for their contributions as they contributed for madrassas and mosques and for the militant activities by the militants. The current state of affairs prevents women even from making contributions to mosques, which is required by our religion. They are, now, aware that their contributions and support for militants was a contributing factor in this carnage. The women, who had never left Swat, were forced to live in tents as their families lost loved ones, their homes were destroyed, their businesses failed, and they were forced to flee their homes.65

62 Respondent # 15. 63 FM radio was launched by the militants that played a vital role in penetration of

militancy and its narratives. I will discuss the role of this radio in detail later in this book. 64 AnwerAnjum. 65 Respondent # 12.

5

REHABILITATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN SWAT

95

A senior journalist based in Swat shared his experiences regarding women association with the conflict. He was saying, “Swati women are modest and sincere. They are away from national and international media and do not having any exposure. We have been attempting to establish a radio station in Swat since 1994 to inform the local population on local, national, and international political and social issues, but no one has listened to us. There was a gap for electronic media in Swat when Mullah Fazlullah stepped in and fills that gap in 2007 by launching Mullah Radio. Fazlullah started targeting women in his speeches airing from Mullah Radio and profoundly influenced by his rhetoric sermons. My wife is a Master degree holder, even she became the follower and became regular listener of the radio.” The journalist narrated the story of a lady suicide bomber; My friend Shahid’s wife was the first female suicide bomber. She wrote me a letter and requested that I publish. The letter was an appeal for women to engage in Jihad. She identified herself as a Fidai (a term for a suicide bomber) in the letter. She requested in the letter for all of women in Swat to become Muslim martyrs. After her husband Shahid was later detained by security personnel, the woman left the Taliban and began working to get her husband’s release. She once contacted me and begged for her husband’s release. She was sobbing while on the phone and lamented the absence of her husband while her young son needs his father at home. I tried my sources after her call and got confirmation that her husband has been killed in an encounter. I got in touch with Shahid’s wife once again to let her know not to head out to any offices because he had passed away. She didn’t regard my assertions as true. Later, four months later, when I enquired about her location, I was informed that she had married a member of the military by the person I had gotten in touch with to assist her in getting her husband released.66

Women of Swat are straightforward and can have their minds changed to any desired state. In agreement to this, a respondent said that they were persuaded by Fazlullah’s rhetorical speeches but did not become radicalized. Women made charitable contributions in the form of jewelry, clothing, money, and other items. Since they were not radicalized, they do not require any rehabilitation.67 However, it is clear that losing their 66 Fayaz Zafar, in-person interview, Mingora, July 25, 2017. 67 Respondent # 12.

96

I. KHAN

homes, businesses, and most significantly, their family, had a psychological impact on every woman in Swat. They require either psychological care or rehabilitation in this situation. A community elder was partially agreed with this statement that women in Swat were radicalized and was saying, “My father forbade radio listening in our house. In his speeches, the Mullah on the radio was quite charming and eloquent. The Swat population was attentively listening to Fazlullah’s sermons.” The radio initially broadcast religious sermons and Quran translations, but as time went by, the transmissions turned around. People used to tune in to this radio to learn who was slain, where they were killed, and why. People began listening to the radio to find out if their relatives’ names were on the Taliban’s list of targets because the Taliban used to broadcast such names. The sentence was made public and stated on the radio, like, O Mr! You are criticizing Taliban; so prepare for the repercussions. Or, sometimes, it was aired, O, you! You are not in good terms with Mr. XYZ, make amend with him right away or we will come after you. Fazlullah worked on women initially and used his rhetorical talks to entice them to Jihad in order to advance his social status. Even before to the start of the military campaign against militants, these women were supporting the Taliban. However, as they began killing people, the females’ backing waned. The lack of education had greatly influenced women by the Taliban narratives. A different respondent shared a similar account, saying, “My sister-in-law was severely affected. I once received money and gold from her to contribute to the Taliban’s fund, but I chose not to. She thanked me and said, “You have done well,” indicating that she was no longer a fan of the Taliban, when I later informed her that I had not added her payment to the Taliban fund due to military involvement.”68 In Swat, Taliban abused women mentally. They treated women insensitively and harshly. In this regard, a respondent recounts an incident where the Taliban insulted a woman and her husband for not wearing burqa (traditional veil), even though the lady was wearing a shawl. “Even I was often humiliated of by them. They were looking at the collar of clothing to see if it was fashioned in the suggested way or in the English shirt collar style. Men’s pants were likewise checked, and if anything was discovered below the toe, the offender would receive punishment. One’s hair was

68 Respondent # 09, in-person interview, Mingora, February 04, 2018.

5

REHABILITATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN SWAT

97

immediately cut if he did not have a cap on.”69 Taliban lost support and popularity in Swat as a result of this, which was the pinnacle of their humiliation of the local populace. A female gynecologist spoke about her encounters and experiences caring for women whose husbands died in battle. She stated that women are psychological sufferers who are depressed. Many guys from my community joined the Afghan Jihad. The majority of them left their homes and never returned. They are killed in confrontations in Afghanistan between Afghan and ISAF soldiers. Tragically, their wives are still at home waiting for them. They are not permitted to marry because of the religious obligations. They have been waiting for their husbands for years, some waited for more than 15 years. Their lives are ruined; suffering from mental depression. These women are lacking resources including money for fulfilling their basic needs.”70 The same experience was mirrored by another respondent, who said the ladies are not politically aware enough who even voted for the first time in 2013 elections in the history of this locality. They were unsure about whom to vote for. These ladies are skilled artisans/handicraft, and their goods are in high demand across the nation. During the conflict, the handicraft centers started to dysfunctional. Since the government is not helping to develop their handicraft sector and they have no other means of income, they established their business on a self-help basis.71 It is essential to rehabilitate any women or families that stayed with extremists. The emphasis should be on the economic aspect of rehabilitation as well as psychosocial reintegration because the women and children endured trauma and now need rehabilitation to heal from that trauma. The NGOs, especially the women-focused Awrat Foundation and other groups like it, should get involved in the rehabilitation of women. They should oversee projects that generate income so that they can receive both cash incentives and pain relief. Rehabilitating and restoring women should be one of the components of a peace agreement. Female leaders are created by local NGOs, who also encourage their engagement. They exist

69 Respondent # 11. 70 Respondent # 12. 71 Respondent # 09.

98

I. KHAN

in villages and have small groups and community-based organizations (CBOs). Such women’s rehabilitation activities must be implemented at the village or school level.72

Conclusion Everyone received a similar level of rehabilitation at the facilities. To address the pertinent issues of ex-combatants, no distinction is made. This, additionally, makes reintegration challenging as grievances-based rehabilitation is required. Since everyone who underwent rehabilitation underwent an identical process, it may be referred to as a “controlled process.” The rehabilitation in controlled setting with controlled process can be termed as a “controlled rehabilitation.” Controlled rehabilitation does not indicate that rehabilitation is not being done, although it is an example of a controlled society. Due to access restrictions for civilian and humanitarian organizations, this society lacks adequate funds and other resources necessary for effective rehabilitation. The state then puts this program into action by making use of the funding and resources at its disposal. A state emerges from conflict must overcome numerous obstacles. Controlled rehabilitation could fail because of a lack of funds and resources. Controlled rehabilitation is preferable to that carried out by international players if a state has sufficient resources, if it is done properly, with the necessary backing and scrutiny from any third party. In controlled rehabilitation, the state is more knowledgeable than outside parties about the context and the nature of the conflict. International players will adhere to the same criteria throughout the world as outlined by the UN in its integrated DDR, which may be inappropriate in a particular context.

References Ahmed, M., and Rafique, Z. H. (2013). Deradicalization and Rehabilitation Efforts Analysis of Anti-terrorism Activities in Pakistan. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (IJH&SS), 2(1), 115–124. Azam, Z., and Fatima, S. B. (2017). Mishal: A Case Study of a Deradicalization and Emancipation Program in SWAT Valley, Pakistan. Journal for Deradicalization (JD), 1–29. 72 Respondent # 12.

5

REHABILITATION OF EX-COMBATANTS IN SWAT

99

BCGR. (2017, December 13). Details of Reintegrated Child Ex-combatants as at October 2014. Retrieved December 13, 2017, from Bureau of Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (BCGR), Sri Lanka: http://www.bcgr.gov.lk/reinte gratred_ex_child.php. Detraz, N. (2012). International Security and Gender. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. GoSL. (2013, May 31). Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants. Retrieved August 19, 2016, from Bureau of Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (BCGR): http://www.bcgr.gov.lk/docs/Rehabilitation%20of%20Ex-Combat ants%20(Compiler%20-%20Brigadier%20Dharshana%20Hettiarrachchi).pdf. Grabe, V. (2004). Peace Processes 1990–1994. In M. Garcia-Duran (Ed.), Accord: Alternatives to War: Colombia’s Peace Processes (14, pp. 38–45). London: Conciliation Resources. Hudson, H. (2005). Doing’ Security as though Human Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the Politics of Human Security. Security Dialogue, 36(2), 155–174. Knight, W. A. (2008). Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: An Overview. African Security, 1(1), 24–52. López, Rodríguez Maivel, Andreouli, Eleni, and Caroline, Howarth. (2015). From Ex-combatants to Citizens: Connecting Everyday Citizenship and Social Reintegration in Colombia. Journal of Political and Social Psycology, 3(2), 171–191. Patino, O., Grabe, V., and Gracia-Duran, M. (2012). The M19’s reinsertion process: Challenges and Lessons. In G. A. Dudouet (Ed.), Post War Security Transition: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts (p. 43). New York: Routledge. Rana, M. A. (2011). Swat Deradicalization Model: Prospects for Rehabilitating Militants. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS).

CHAPTER 6

From Rehabilitation to Reintegration

Abstract This chapter looks into the process of reintegrating former combatants who have returned to their communities after undergoing rehabilitation. The author has also looked into how the villagers reacted to the rehabilitation graduates and how they were eventually accepted into society. The author has also talked about the stigmatization of recently rehabilitated individuals as well as the chances of recidivism. The researcher can gauge Swat’s rehabilitation program’s level of success and fill up any gap by analyzing the process. Using this information, one can then determine the kind of rehabilitation that can be successful in tightly controlled society. Additionally, the chapter examines several facets of reintegration. Keywords Rehabilitation · Stigmatization · Recidivism · Reintegration

The analysis produced in this chapter can be used to comprehend the reintegration process in the context of a distinctive, controlled society like Swat, which provides an unheard-of illustration of post-conflict reintegration. The Swat example provides fresh perspectives on the challenges and poses fresh queries about the efficacy of rehabilitation and reintegration. This chapter tries to provide light on all of these many facets of post-conflict rehabilitation and reintegration using Swat as an example. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 I. Khan, Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9514-1_6

101

102

I. KHAN

We emerged from a life of misery and death. Now that there is light in our lives, we have a fresh lease on life.-a Sabawoon alumnus.1

To help reintegrate persons in the Swat valley who had previously participated in militant activities, the authorities launched a special kind of rehabilitation program. The Sabawoon, Sparlay, and Mashal initiatives represent further divisions of this Swat rehabilitation initiative. The previous chapter covered the program in great detail. The reintegration of former combatants was a successful outcome of the Swat rehabilitation program, according to the studies that are now available. These claims are based on the quantity of former combatants who have graduated from rehabilitation centers. However, there is a lack of credible evidence that can be used to support such claims (Afridi, 2016). Only the Sabawoon center in Swat has rehabilitated over 200 adolescents for rehabilitation (Rafi, 2015). According to a recent report, more than 2500 ex-combatants who have received rehabilitation to date, 200 among them solely come from the Sabawoon institution (Basit, 2015). The authorities at rehabilitation institutes reportedly had a 99% success rate during the researcher’s field interviews, but these figures cannot be verified because there was no independent assessment (Khan, 2015). Furthermore, there is no reliable source that might estimate the specific number of former combatants housed in these rehabilitation facilities. It is important to note, nevertheless, that the program’s success should not be judged just on the basis of a person’s completion of rehabilitation at one of these facilities. Instead, the effectiveness of the rehabilitation and ultimately reintegration of these former combatants into society can better indicate success or failure. Reintegration cannot be quantified; however, there are qualitative metrics that can be used to gauge how well the rehabilitation program is working. Some of these standards and requirements will be further explained in the section that follows.

Social Integration Reintegrating ex-combatants into society is the purpose of rehabilitation, as was addressed in the earlier chapters. Social integration is the key element of reintegration that significantly lowers crime rates (Griffiths et al., 2007). The other elements of reintegration may be easily 1 Shams Momand.

6

FROM REHABILITATION TO REINTEGRATION

103

attained if an ex-combatant succeeds in social integration. The researcher discovered conflicting views and anecdotes about the reintegration of rehabilitation graduates into society during fieldwork in Swat. Due to the serious damages that these ex-combatants had done to their individual communities, the study discovered that a bulk of the community members were not willing to accept these graduates back into society. However, a military respondent believed that a rehabilitee would not pose a threat to the community because ex-militants fight was against the community but rather with the army. He also acknowledged that because the region had been de-weaponized, a rehabilitee would not be a threat to the community and that the presence of the army would ensure their personal safety. The army kept providing protection to the ex-combatants in the interim, likely to protect them from community hostility and alleviate their fears. The army kept providing protection to the ex-combatants in the interim, likely to protect them from community hostility and alleviate their fears.2 Undoubtedly, the majority of the residents of the area agree that all of the losses suffered by the community were caused by the militants.3 They concurred with the military officer that the rehabilitees are safe so long as the military is around. However, if the military leaves this area, there is a risk of inter-communal conflict.4 Notwithstanding the claims, the researcher encountered numerous rehabilitation center graduates who were leading regular lives in their communities. The claim that the ex-combatants are leading normal lives is supported by the researcher’s observations and conversations with locals who attested to their normal way of life. Additionally, rehabilitees with strong familial ties and tribal affiliations have been rehabilitated without any issues, whereas those without such histories have trouble reintegrating.

Reaction of the People toward Rehabilitees When the families of rehabilitees were asked about their social interactions, they provided the researcher with their experiences and views. According to a response, her nephew has a typical life and frequently

2 Lt. Col. Atif. 3 Dr. Ihsan. 4 Respondent # 05.

104

I. KHAN

gossips with his cousins, but he interacts with hardly anyone else in society and usually keeps to himself. She continued by saying that her kid is one of his friends among the cousins.5 The researcher spoke with Janan, who is a successful case study of reintegration. After his release, he got married, and he now has a lovely family life. Despite being aware of Janan’s past and having a home in Karachi, his father-in-law did not object to the marriage because Janan had been successfully deradicalized and reintegrated into his community.6 There are success stories of rehabilitation; however, there are many that present different picture. In this setting, not all graduates find relief readily; many experience setbacks in their attempts to reintegrate. For instance, some rehabilitees choose to isolate themselves from society after being released, communicating primarily with other rehabilitees or inmates. One such instance involves a rehabilitee from Mingora who was kicked out of his house by his family on claims that he had contact with ex-combatants. Despite receiving treatment, his family reported that he still had radical views. A respondent at Mingora described his interactions with ex-combatants. He said that when he once inquired about one of their sons, the ex-combatant’s father became abusive and eventually revealed that his son had been disowned. The same is true for Ibraheem, another rehabilitee, who, despite his rehabilitation, still maintains positive thoughts about militancy.7 An elder voiced his displeasure with the rehab process. One of his relatives in Khwazakhela joined the Taliban and participated in the plundering and destruction of the Hujra belonging to the VDC member and local chairman. When the security forces returned him to the community after rehabilitation, the chairman was cautious to reintegrate him into society. He complained that the person had degraded him and destroyed his Hujra. He expressed his rage by saying, “How can I bear and let him into the community?” The respondent expressed his concern that it would be extremely difficult for these former combatants to reintegrate into society.8

5 Dr. Nazakat. 6 Shaukat Ali, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 24, 2017. 7 Respondent # 9. 8 Respondent # 02.

6

FROM REHABILITATION TO REINTEGRATION

105

It is frequently the case that persons who reintegrate into society are rejected by the community. The reintegration of former combatants also causes polarization in society, with the moderate people on one side and the ex-militants (sometimes with extremist narratives) on the other. The moderates showed a predisposition to be unforgiving given the severity of the ex-combatants’ conduct and their psychological effects. One community member retorted angrily, “My father passed away while we were relocated due to a military operation. We were unable to bury my father in our hometown; why is my father’s grave not in Swat? I will never forgive them (the ex-combatants).9 Similar expressions found common among the people within the community.” Despite being followed by military officers, an elderly guy punched and slapped a person at the market, according to a senior journalist who witnessed the incident. When questioned, it was discovered that the same individual had previously served as a Taliban commander but has since undergone rehabilitation and integration. The elderly guy responded, “how can a person who destroyed my house walking around in the market, I cannot bear it” when asked why he did what he did.10 Such a case serves as an example of how challenging the rehabilitees’ road to reintegration might be. Another older man revealed the story of an ex-combatant who now resides in Bandagai. He underwent rehabilitation, but the residents did not want him to remain in the community. The rehabilitee complained to the military about the villagers. The military warned the villagers that if they did not let him stay, they would all be transported to an internment camp. He was finally permitted to reside in the community after the people finally gave in to pressure. Following such instances, the villagers frequently express uncertainty and raise concerns regarding the military’s position with regard to the excombatants; they are discouraged and question why the ex-combatants are given priority over them. However, it could be better for everyone if the community made an effort to accept the rehabilitees rather than rejecting them.11 The rehabilitees were given similar questions concerning life after rehabilitation, and they replied that the community is not willing to welcome them as regular community members into society. They confront

9 Respondent # 02. 10 Shams Momand. 11 Respondent # 17.

106

I. KHAN

a number of stigmas since the community is suspicious of their prior involvement with the militants. On the one hand, the community holds animosity toward them, and on the other, they endure military humiliation and are frequently delayed at military checkpoints. An elder and social activist reacted by saying that society is hasty in its dealings of these former combatants. Since society is aware that these former combatants were innocent and were detained without cause (other than a personal affinity for the Taliban), society should support them. The real offenders have escaped. These people who have undergone rehabilitation are angry with the government for doing little to assist them. Assistance may be provided on a moral, social, political, or even material level. The issue also exists in our culture. Political activists or people who get along well with security personnel are acting as spies for them within the community. They included VDC members who exposed and labeled innocent persons as militants in front of the security forces in order to exact personal revenge.12 In order to keep them from recidivating, one respondent said that the community should welcome them (the rehabilitees) after rehabilitation. Since it was the society’s social behavior that initially drove them toward militancy (the impoverished and grieving joined militancy), the community needs to reform how it acts toward them. The community should no longer view the rehabilitees as militants because they no longer possess radical impulses. They have received state punishment and have completed the rehabilitation process. They should be accepted by the community now that they are respectable as normal people.13 The respondent said that one should not bring up one’s past as a militant when asked how the community should accept them. They should not be made aware of their former militant status. They ought to be welcomed into social gatherings and treated with compassion. Even if they have previously committed crimes against their community, they deserve to be entirely pardoned. The community has to understand that the state has already punished them enough. In addition to social acceptance, they must to be kept busy with routine tasks.14 Here, the question will rise that how a community will accept such persons with open heart when

12 Respondent # 8. 13 Dr. Arshad Ali. 14 Dr. Arshad Ali.

6

FROM REHABILITATION TO REINTEGRATION

107

they are responsible for the damages of the community? For the community to be ready to treat ex-combatants with respect there needs to be some kind of education and engagement program.

Vocational and Technical Training: Views of the Public and Rehabilitees While examining the information that is currently available on rehabilitation, the researcher found that one of the four fundamental components necessary for any rehabilitation program is vocational and technical trainings, with the other three being social integration, religious instruction, and psychological education. Each facility provides ex-combatants with vocational and technical training tailored to their requirements and interests, as was discussed in the chapter before. In this section, the training programs provided at the centers are described. The respondents in this part consisted of Sabawoon and Mashal rehabilitation institution graduates as well as members of the local community who have a close link with these graduates through nuclear family, friends, or other connections. Views of the Rehabilitees An electrician who received training at Mashal Rehabilitation Center and now operates a shop claimed during an interview that he now makes a living as an electrician. He claimed that the facility gave him a reward of 10,000 rupees for the first position in the training course. After completing the program, they received certificates, which made them recognized and certified electricians and allowed them to apply to any school, he said. The graduate declared that they are legally certified now in the courses we attended at the facility. Depending on the students’ educational backgrounds, the vocational trainings were tailored differently for each trainee. Depending on the students’ educational backgrounds, the vocational trainings were tailored differently for each trainee. Literate people also received computer training. Overall, the center’s vocational training programs aided in managing small firms. However, one respondent questioned the center’s failure to provide graduates with material or financial help. The organization had initially committed to helping these graduates launch enterprises and offer support for finding jobs, but

108

I. KHAN

after their discharge, they provided no such assistance.15 Mashal, a fellow graduate of the same facility, admitted that despite having received their training there, they do not have the money to launch a firm. The majority of those receiving rehabilitation are unemployed or engaged in menial work with pitiful pay.16 The researcher also saw cases during one of the field visits where graduates were either not provided with any technical or vocational training or were not utilizing their newly obtained professions for daily employment. One such case is “Janan,” a graduate who spent six months in the Mashal Rehab center without receiving any training. Another graduate claimed that the rehabilitation provides only three different kinds of vocational training: carpentry, electrical skills, and sewing. The answer stated, “I have experience in carpentry, but I currently work as a cab driver since I lack the funds to open my own business. I have not received any support, either material or financial.”17 Community Perception According to a representative of the Mashal Rehabilitation Center, the facility offers computer skills, welding skills, carpentry skills, tailoring skills, etc. In addition, it provides computers, sewing machines, and a toolkit with the appropriate tools for the skill that a rehabilitee learned at the facility. This official’s statement supports the aforementioned viewpoint of the rehabilitees. The supply of these instruments will assist these graduates manage their own businesses when they return to society, he continued, as the authorities have recognized that they are financially vulnerable. Due to a shortage of funding, the organization cannot provide them with financial support, but in some instances, it has built homes for some former militants.18 The community members supported the rehabilitation programs, but they also believed that three to six months of training would not be enough to prepare an ex-combatant for the competitive labor market, where many university graduates are unemployed. In response to a

15 Respondent # 07. 16 Respondent # 08. 17 Respondent # 14. 18 Respondent # 15.

6

FROM REHABILITATION TO REINTEGRATION

109

comment on the subject, a senior journalist from Swat said that these recovering individuals receive no support or assistance in managing enterprises or locating employment, and with these short training courses, no institution welcomes them because other experienced people area readily available. “With the training he received at the rehabilitation center, I have never heard of a rehabilitee operating a business.”19 The discussion regarding vocational and technical trainings above suggests that simply giving ex-combatants training at a rehabilitation center is insufficient for their reintegration into society. They require particular financial and material help, as well as moral encouragement to find job in society. This can only be accomplished if the government provides enough funding to these rehabilitation facilities, as was the case with the Saudi Arabian government, which helped over 4000 people who were receiving rehabilitation (Ahmed and Rafique, 2013). Even while this is beneficial, there are countries with extra funds and those without, which accounts for the striking differences between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. One way to ensure that integration is not just a matter of policy or merely short-term courses at the centers is for the government and local communities to offer venues specifically made for the rehabilitees to put into effect whatever knowledge they have received from the center. Helping them engage in high-quality vocational activities and produce high-quality products would not only captivate the public but also diminish stigma and remove the notion that former combatants are useless.

Post-Release Assistance As previously noted, providing vocational and technical trainings will be ineffective unless the individuals receive material and financial support as well as moral support. Assistance after release is crucial to helping rehabilitees reintegrate into society since it assists in starting enterprises and securing employment that ensures ex-combatants’ financial security and, in turn, promotes better integration. Independent researchers conducted a study on the Mashal Rehabilitation Center and spoke with 47 of its beneficiaries. The center is purportedly giving the trainees one-time financial and material support,

19 Fayaz Zafar.

110

I. KHAN

per the study’s findings (Azam and Fatima, 2017). One of the beneficiaries reportedly received material and monetary support after leaving the rehabilitation center, according to a Swat-based journalist. He continued, “I know some have received auto-rikshaws, and to some, the center has extended assistance in running small businesses.” These recipients received material assistance rather than cash grants. They were probably supported by NGOs via the security forces, in my opinion.20 He continued by saying that people who received assistance now have their own businesses and has tranquil lives. There is no threat of recidivism.21 Another reply echoes this claim and adds that aid is delivered by donor organizations, primarily USAID and FID, via the Pakistani army.22 A military officer in a rehabilitation program emphasized the need for post-release support for a more successful reintegration. Unfortunately, many graduates receive no support after leaving the rehabilitation center. They ought to offer self-sufficient employment and help with businesses and assurance of life and honor. Rehabilitation would be meaningless otherwise.23 Another Mashal Rehabilitation Center administrator acknowledged the necessity for assistance after release and affirmed that the facility assists its graduates in every way possible to reintegrate into society. He continued by saying that if individuals do not receive assistance in starting their own businesses and obtaining employment, extreme organizations may start to follow them or revert to their previous behaviors.24 The general method and official conduct at the center, as well as the instruction he had received, were reviewed favorably by a Mashal Rehabilitation Center alumnus who had received training in electrical work. However, he expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of material or financial assistance for this center’s graduates. Auto-rikshaws were offered to some graduates, but not all, he said. “The rehabilitation center looks great on paper, but in practice it offers no financial or material assistance.”25

20 Anwar Anjum. 21 Anwar Anjum. 22 Fayaz Zafar. 23 Respondent # 3. 24 Respondent # 15. 25 Respondent # 07.

6

FROM REHABILITATION TO REINTEGRATION

111

A citizen from Matta, Swat, claimed that the rehabilitation graduates he knew did not receive any assistance after his release. It is possible that they are not informing the community about this, but the graduates thought there was no assistance. He added that the Taliban had previously paid these former combatants, so if the former combatants find it difficult to live without such support, they should be given all the assistance and support possible to stop recidivism. According to the reply, someone who is working or running a business cannot have a criminal mindset.26 Another Mashal alumnus categorically denied any assistance or support being given by the center. “Neither financial assistance nor material support is extended to us,” he bemoaned. There was going to be a ceremony at the place when we were ready to release from the facility. Prior to the photo shoot with high-ranking military and government leaders, we were given brand-new attire, footwear, and hats. To our surprise, following the ceremony, the new clothes, shoes, and caps were withdrawn from us and we were let go with those old clothes. That was the most embarrassing incident for me.”27 An elder of the community revealed details about his relative, Shan, who completed rehab but was not given any money or loans by the center. The sole favor the security forces rendered to him was preventing the destruction of his home, despite the fact that militants’ homes are sometimes demolished as a form of retribution. The Afghan War was fought by Shan’s father. The security agents also detained his father. Both were later released, and they now operate small stores in their village.28 Expert in DDR Nisar Malik praised the post-release support and assistance and recommended placing ex-combatants in domestic or local companies to help them develop their skills. He believed that doing this would enable them to acquire the skills needed to support themselves. He continued by saying that the tools and other assistance needed to launch their own small companies must be provided by the government. It is crucial to give those entrepreneurial opportunities and vocational training. Banks should offer interest-free loans to rehabilitation center graduates so they can launch their enterprises when they rejoin society. Bank

26 Respondent # 11. 27 Respondent # 14. 28 Respondent # 17.

112

I. KHAN

loans ought to be made available to those who have finished vocational training.29 The integration of ex-combatants back into society is always facilitated by post-release care and assistance. People who have completed rehabilitation programs in Swat have complained that they are not given enough assistance to reintegrate into society. Government and community help are both essential for a successful reintegration.

Recidivism The chances of ex-combatants rejoining their former groupings must be discussed because this chapter focuses on reintegration. Some residents of the community were upbeat about this and didn’t anticipate any recidivism. They believed that the militarization of society had ceased and that people now understood clearly what was good and harmful. They shared the opinion that a former militant would not encounter any radical incentives to return to militancy if he returned to society after rehabilitation. Because, the security forces disbanded and demobilized the militants who were moving free in society. They believed that their society had evolved to be accepting and welcoming. However, additional steps are required to eliminate any potential for recidivism. For a better and more peaceful society, the government should keep an eye on the spread of hate speech and hate literature. Rehabilitees shouldn’t be allowed to go back to the former areas where they were victimized by militancy, like madrassas.30 The existence of drug dealers and traffickers in Swat, who took advantage of the children for their own gain, was another element in the militancy there. The youth that participated in this activity adopted illicit behaviors and developed a habit of making money illegally. Another respondent believed that these young people later turned to militancy to maintain a consistent flow of revenue for their requirements. An official of Mashal Rehabilitation center was certain that a graduate would be unable to join his previous group. The representative said, “An agreement is signed with him at the time of his discharge. He first swears that he won’t repeat the same offense.” Additionally, he is required to present two guarantors from his family or

29 Nisar Malik, in-person interview, Islamabad, December 25, 2016. 30 Dr. Arshad Ali.

6

FROM REHABILITATION TO REINTEGRATION

113

from his community. In the assurance oath, he also acknowledges that his two homes would be demolished as a punishment and that if he resumed his past illegal actions, he would be required to pay the security forces one million rupees. Finally, the security personnel have the power to shoot him on sight if they discover him engaging in similar criminal activity. The official added that two rehabilitees from the same center were arrested again after being discovered making contact with militant groups in Afghanistan.31 The researcher attempted to identify signs of recidivism in a Mashal graduate, but the graduate said, “I am a member of a political organization that fights for Islamic law in Pakistan.” He further added that he has realized that political struggle is the only way to bring about change. He owed to struggle for establishing Sharia through a formal political platform.”32 This demonstrates how crucial political participation is in reducing recidivism; when a person participates in politics, he or she gains confidence that they can accomplish any goal by working within the framework of their political party. A senior journalist discussed recidivism and his experiences visiting rehabilitation centers. He predicted that graduates of Paitham (Mashal) would be more likely than Sabawoon to commit crimes again.33 He explained that Sabawoon had the advantage of harboring juveniles, whose minds were easy to mold due to their malleability, in addition to handling the rehabilitation process extremely successfully. The psychiatric care for adult ex-combatants in Paitham, in contrast, was more challenging than that for young people. However, recidivism may be avoided if adequate post-release assistance and support were given. He emphasized the necessity of de-radicalizing society as a whole, saying that if a rehabilitee were returned to a culture with extremist tendencies, it would not take long for him to re-join his former group.34 A professor who had been keeping track of all the changes in his community refuted the idea that society was becoming more radical. He said that due of the stringent regulations, no one could spread hate speech or literature (which would cause the population to become more radicalized) while the Army was present. “I have

31 Respondent # 15. 32 Respondent # 07. 33 Respondent # 07. 34 Anwer ANjum

114

I. KHAN

never seen or heard of anyone who could create such hate literature or deliver hate speech,” he continued. In most mosques, loudspeakers are also prohibited. Hate speech and literature were very widespread when the Taliban were in power, but given the current political and security climate, people would never ever accept any speech or literature that encourages extremism or militancy. Now, militancy is flatly rejected. People and places, including madrassas, are being closely watched. Nowadays, parents are apprehensive while sending their kids to madrassas. People remove their children from such madrassas if a preacher is seen to be teaching extremism in them.35 The explanation above shows that there is little chance of recidivism and emphasizes the success of rehabilitation and reintegration. Field investigations did, however, turn up some instances of recidivism. During a military operation in North Waziristan, one respondent described the cases of two Mashal graduates who, after receiving rehabilitation, went back to their old habits and were slain as a result. In addition to the cases mentioned above, such incidents raise some concerns regarding the effectiveness and results of rehabilitation programs..

Surveillance/Monitoring The most debated issue during the fieldwork was post-release surveillance or monitoring. Regarding surveillance and its role in aiding reintegration in the post-release milieu, there were two opposing viewpoints. The surveillance procedure is a collaborative endeavor between the local community, security personnel, and rehabilitation authorities. Both military and civilian actors and stakeholders must work together. After being released into society a rehabilitee is under the observation of the Pakistani Army and intelligence services. A rehabilitee is first receiving the psychologists’ approval then introduced to the army commander of his assigned area of duty after completing his training at the rehabilitation center. The rehabilitee is given to the community members, village elders, or Village Defense Committee (VDC) members after they have been summoned to the army facility. They receive guidance on how to interact with the rehabilitee from the community. The rehabilitee is released back into society after this first stage, but he is required to maintain regular attendance

35 Dr. Arshad Ali.

6

FROM REHABILITATION TO REINTEGRATION

115

at the army center or nearby police station, at first once a week, then once a month, and so on. When the security forces call for him, he must make sure to be there. Additionally, he is not permitted to leave the area without first receiving consent from the relevant army commander.36 The rehabilitee is under surveillance for up to two years after being discharged from the rehabilitation facility. A representative of Mashal rehab facility said that the facility has a dedicated surveillance crew. The center retains a rehabilitee’s phone number and other contact information after he has finished his rehabilitation and been returned into society. His whereabouts are frequently sought for by the center by making phone calls him on his cell phone. The graduates are also required to attend the center on a weekly and eventually a monthly basis. The monitoring staff at the center visits the residence of a rehabilitee if he skips his weekly or monthly visit and inquires as to why he wasn’t there. If a rehabilitee wants to go to another city or abroad, special permission is needed. He will be required to give details about his visit, such as the reason for his trip, how long he plans to stay, and when he returns, he has to appear in a police or army facility close by.37 When discharged into society, rehabilitees are subject to an intense follow-up system, according to other responders who also affirm comparable surveillance patterns.38 Their social interactions and activities are being watched for at least a year.39 An ex-combatant claimed to not be under any surveillance when questioned.40 A different graduate claimed, “I didn’t know I was being watched, but when I went to Mardan (another district), I knew I was being followed. The facility called me after I got home and inquired about my visit.”41 Rehabilitee Janan said that he is allowed to travel to any city in the country with permission from security officials, but he must visit his local army checkpoint once a week.42 According to security force officials and DDR specialists, maintaining law and order is impossible without surveillance and monitoring. The 36 Lt. Col. Atif. 37 Respondent # 15. 38 Shams Momand. 39 Dr. Ihsan. 40 Respondent # 8. 41 Respondent # 14. 42 Respondent # 23.

116

I. KHAN

soft-core actors are needed to be monitored properly, according to a DDR specialist, while the self-integrated or voluntarily surrendered should be assessed for symptoms of recidivism if they are having any.43 He continued, “I have noticed that some former combatants are selling their equipments, provided when they were released from the center, and are re-joining their former group. Monitoring of these graduates is compulsory after their release, and patrolling is required also in some particular areas.”44 The representatives of the rehabilitation institutions stated that if left unchecked, rehabilitees might be approached by their former friends in addition to making contact on their own. Extremist narratives continue to permeate society, and because of their unstable brains, they are readily drawn back to their former habits. Surveillance in the Eye of Community Families of former combatants, community people, and certain stakeholders all have very varied views on monitoring and surveillance. They believe that these individuals should be released into a free environment and allowed to live with their families and siblings in order to rebuild their social, familial, and political life.45 The regular attendance, checks, and requests for permission to leave their areas, among other things, according to an elder, turn these former combatants into permanent workers of the security forces and prevent them from living as free citizens for the rest of their lives.46 Due to this surveillance, the rehabilitees themselves feel ostracized. They feel like they are still in detention and are tired of going to the police and security stations. These rehabilitees, according to a political activist in Swat, are also enlisted in Das Numberi (Section 10 of the criminal law).47 They are required to frequently mark their attendance under this provision. These attendances were initially taken by the military, but

43 Nisar Malik. 44 Nisar Malik. 45 Adeel Ahmed Shah, in-person interview, Mingora, May 4, 2017. 46 Respondent # 10, in-person interview, Khwazakhela, July 24, 2017. 47 Das-numberi or the “tenth” is a section in criminal law for the criminals in which they are bound to present themselves in police station and they are not allowed to go near to any government facility.

6

FROM REHABILITATION TO REINTEGRATION

117

eventually transferred to the police. He continued, “In my opinion, a person shouldn’t be forced to the point where he might want to rejoin his former group. It is unethical and unfair that the monitoring has taken their liberty and freedom.”48 A respondent who has a relative who has completed rehabilitation revealed another instance of stigmatization. She added that although the graduate himself would be under investigation in the incident of a terrorist attack, her family would not have to deal with such issues because of the graduates’ prior conduct. Security personnel detain him for a period of two to three days. She complained the army’s actions of house search, which were taken without consent or prior knowledge.49 The problem of target killings by unidentified people was at people was at its height in Swat after the conflict. The community hypothesized that the culprits are the combatants who self-integrated into the community, i.e., without undergoing rehabilitation. Security personnel are unaware of them, and they continue to harbor the same extremist views. They pose the greatest threat to future security. The community also expressed displeasure with the security forces lax oversight of these militants who had incorporated themselves into society. When this issue was brought up with a representative, he responded that the intelligence agencies are aware of these self-integrated people. He continued, “I don’t see they will pose any threat to the security as they are in small number and confined to specific areas as well. In the previous two and a half years, they have not caused us any problems. The intelligence agencies also inform us of their entry into society, and they are likewise given extra surveillance.” He continued that yes, there have been instances where militants have surrendered without following the correct procedures set forth by security personnel, but on the flip side, they have greatly aided us in rehabilitation, in identifying militants, and in bringing those who have surrendered to the center.50 Officials claim that these “self-integrated” combatants also act as detectives by sharing information about chemical weapons, IEDs and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the locations where these weapons were kept. They communicate frequently with the

48 Respondent # 2. 49 Respondent # 12. 50 Respondent # 15.

118

I. KHAN

army but do not go to the rehabilitation facilities. The security personnel proclaim them safe.51 On the issue of monitoring and surveillance of rehabilitees, there are conflicting opinions in Swat. The community and other stakeholders value the supervision of these rehabilitees, but the rehabilitees and their families view it as a sort of stigmatization. They are being mentally restrained by the security forces. They get vilified in their community as a result of unannounced raids on their houses. Consequently, reintegration is doubtful due to surveillance. Another, it is a form of “imposed rehabilitation and reintegration.” Monitoring shouldn’t be necessary during the reintegration phase for a successful rehabilitation.

Condition of Rehabilitees in Community The interviewees were asked about the general condition of former combatants after they were discharged from rehabilitation centers. They shared stories of friends, neighbors, or family members who remained involved in violent groups. A few former combatants were also asked about their lives after being reintegrated into society. Both positive and negative aspects of the process of rehabilitation and reintegration exist. The vast majority of responders was positive and believed the program was effective, but it needed to be expanded to include as many former combatants and their families as possible. Additionally, they agreed to receive special treatment from the state after their release in the form of moral, financial, and material support. The interviewee’s comments revealed some themes, some of which are listed below. Public Acceptance and Employment According to an elder who made the observation about ex-combatants and was saying that as far as he is aware, none of the ex-combatants who have established enterprises are engaged in any illegal activity. However, after leaving the rehabilitation facility, they encountered a different issue: the CTD (anti-terrorism department) detained them again and accused them of various offenses. They were then detained and only afterward freed following the formal legal procedure. The ex-combatants become

51 Respondent # 15.

6

FROM REHABILITATION TO REINTEGRATION

119

very frustrated. Despite spending years in detention camps, they were being shunned. The following were the phrases used by a number of ex-combatants to describe their situation: “we were certified clear and peaceful by the security forces, hence, there should no longer any monitoring, accusations or arrests.”52 Additionally, this demonstrates weaknesses in coordination between civilian and military departments, or police and military, as a person should not be harassed with additional inquiry and penalties if security personnel pronounce them to be clear. This demonstrates that there is still a lack of confidence between security officers and former militants. This was demonstrated by a specific occurrence in which local police again detained all of these rehabilitated ex-combatants during the 2013 elections.53 “these former militants cannot be assimilated through soft-core measure; like, teachings, trainings, or discussions,” an official said while outlining the situation. Psychological education alone is insufficient unless it is accompanied by prospects for employment. Just for a little while, the state will keep an eye on them, but after that, they will figure out how to make a living, which may involve joining one of their former militant organizations.54 At the electrician shop he started after receiving training at the rehabilitation facility, a Mashal rehabilitee was contacted. He told the interviewer that he was very content and felt comfortable in his position. “The respondent continued,” as far as I know the rehabilitation centers receive huge amount of funding from the government as well as from international organizations.” I have often asked them to help us with our enterprises, but the responses we get from the government are not adequate. “We only ask for a small amount of aid in growing small enterprises rather than property or a significant sum of money.” Another rehabilitee made a similar statement, saying that he had three school-age children but was unable to afford to pay for their education. He said that despite receiving vocational training at the facility, he lacked the funds to use those skills to launch a business. He voiced concern for his children’s future and school expenses.

52 Respondent # 02. 53 Respondent # 02. 54 Dr. Arshad Ali.

120

I. KHAN

Another rehabilitee who was staying away from his village in Mingora at a friend’s house remarked that even though he had his own house and land in Taghwaan, he was unable to get there until absolute peace was restored. The entire village is open and tranquil for everyone, but not for me, he sobbed. He further added, “People in the community, notably VDC members, have complained to me that they are afraid of me whenever I make plans to travel there. Security personnel have pronounced me “clear” in the paperwork, but in reality, the community won’t let me remain in my own house.”55 One of the ex-combatants sobbed as he described how he had been trained as a carpenter at the center but had to drive a cab to provide for his family on a daily basis. He was imprisoned for two years, followed by six months in a rehabilitation facility. His family borrowed money from friends and family at this time to provide daily bread for the kids. After being freed, he was attempting to make amends. He lamented the lack of funds he had to launch his own carpentry firm. He asked for at least a scheme to help rehabilitees acquire bank loans for small enterprises in the absence of government aid.56 A resident of Mingora reported the post-release condition of his five relatives who had successfully completed treatment. He asserted that while two of them were unemployed and without jobs, the other two had been sent by their families to work abroad and send money back home. The security forces barred the man’s bride from traveling to her spouse since she lived in Swat, yet one of them recently married his cousin. The husband is likewise unable to go home because he is on the security forces’ watch list. The reply continued, “I know this individual to be cognitively alert and intelligent. The fifth rehabilitee that I am aware of resides at home with his family since they are financially stable, thus he is not in need of a job or a career.”57 A resident of the community revealed details about his acquaintance, who worked as a barber before joining the Taliban. He received rehabilitation and went back to work. The interviewee continued that he has recently met him where he found him happy without any worries.

55 Respondent # 8. 56 Respondent # 14. 57 Respondent # 9.

6

FROM REHABILITATION TO REINTEGRATION

121

However, he will make sure to show up every week at the adjoining security forces checkpoint.”58 Overall, the rehabilitees’ condition was deemed to be in good shape; nevertheless, the lack of post-release support and assistance has left them struggling to manage their own enterprises and employment. Stigmatization One of the primary barriers to reintegration for rehabilitation graduates is stigmatization. Everyone in the community is familiar with these rehabilitees. The researcher discovered that in some circumstances, people detest the notion of maintaining any kind of contact with them or offering them job. However, they typically reintegrate by marrying and starting their own enterprises. Stigmatization, according to a military official, is not a major problem. “The Taliban actually exaggerated this, as they threatened all of the surrendered and even killed some of them to prevent the surrender of other Taliban,” he continued.”59 However, there are a lot of songs and poems that are well-known in the community that denigrates these excombatants. Along with poems and songs, these ex-combatants are also subjected to harassment and humiliation because of their slang names. Among the names are Tasleem bibi, a female name for the surrendered, Salender, which means “surrendered,” Saleety, which means “the tagged one,” and many others. The expression “da staso ka’ali di os dazeegi,” which translates to “this is your jewels which fire now,” is used to stigmatize women who backed militancy by providing contributions. The rehabilitees complained of being treated unfairly in society when questioned about the behavior of the community. People are hesitant to maintain any kind of connection with them. By naming them at military checkpoints, the military also denigrates them. One of the ex-combatants remarked, “I cannot go to my own house since the community does not allow me to stay at my house.”60 Another respondent also voiced concerns about the security forces’ conduct and surprise raids at the home

58 Respondent # 11. 59 Lt. Col. Atif. 60 Respondent # 9.

122

I. KHAN

of one of her cousins who had remained with militants. She revealed that each time a terrorist act occurred, this raid at their home occurred.61 The official responded when the researcher asked about tactics and responses to this circumstance, “We do hear about stigmas, but we are working hard at the rehabilitation center to have these rehabilitees ready to deal with it. We inform them that the name “salender” literally means “surrender,” which signifies an oath to submit to law enforcement and security agencies. There shouldn’t be any embarrassment in it because this is your own army and government, and we have all first bowed to God. At the center, we provide them with enough education to enable them to deal with social stigmas.”62 Elders and professionals in the community agree that it is best to avoid talking about these ex-combatants’ militant pasts in order to prevent stigmatization and create a healthier environment for reintegration. They should not be made aware of their former militant status. Particularly in social settings, they should be welcomed with open arms. They deserve to have all the losses they’ve brought about pardoned. The society ought to understand that they have been penalized by the government. They should also be kept busy in businesses. These persons who have undergone rehabilitation will be hardly connected to society if they run their own firms. Additionally, these recovering individuals ought to respect others and express regret for any wrongdoing. After all, if they still carry the germs of militancy, then society will not accept them back.63 Institutional Support A successful reintegration requires collaboration between governmental entities, assistance from local NGOs, and humanitarian organizations. Every successful rehabilitation program worldwide, including those in Colombia (López et al., 2015), Nepal (Dahal, 2006), and Sri Lanka (BCGR, 2016), includes this coordination. The Columbia Agency for Reintegration (ARC) works with a variety of institutions (in the public 61 Respondent # 12. 62 Respondent # 15. 63 Lt. Col. Atif.

Dr. Arshad Ali. Dr. Ihsan. Nisar Malik.

6

FROM REHABILITATION TO REINTEGRATION

123

and private sectors) to provide rehabilitees with space for better reintegration (López et al., 2015). Although the Khyber Pashtunkhwa (KP) government, which is primarily in charge of the reconstruction work in Swat, provides financial support to the military. Collaboration with other organizations and organizations that might provide both monetary and material help is, however, incredibly limited. In order to accommodate the rehabilitees after they have completed technical and vocational training in rehabilitation facilities, cooperation from private organizations and factories is required. The Pakistan Technical and Vocational Education Training Authority (TVETA), which excels in this field, is not a part of the rehabilitation program and does not prioritize ex-combatants. However, it is a great idea for society as a whole since it allows young people the chance to start their own enterprises and provides them with training, which in turn helps to de-radicalize society and young people in particular. Collaborating with government’s worldwide and local non-governmental organizations, the National Vocational and Technical Training Commission (NAVTTC) supports the Technical Education and Vocational Training Authority (TEVTA).64 Unlike Colombia, where they are welcomed in all enterprises and local establishments, the people of Swat remain leery of doing business with ex-combatants despite the fact that they have been given rehabilitation.65 However as “the different forms of institutional support evident in the rehabilitees’ social context were highlighted as a valuable contributing factor for successful reintegration” (López et al., 2015), this inclusion is a crucial component of rehabilitation. Only a small portion of those rehabilitees who had the support of their nuclear families were able to support themselves by, for example, running a shop, driving a cab, or working as an electrician, and the majority of individuals questioned for this study were unemployed. However, the majority were either unemployed or working for low wages. In addition to forming a safety net of relationships from which participants can seek and also offer support, the institutional support perceived by being socially active as members of families, students, workers, program participants, volunteers, active neighbors, etc., also makes it easier for participants to reassert their civilian identity and to

64 Dr. Arshad Ali. 65 Respondent # 8.

124

I. KHAN

have opportunities for recognition as citizens, rather than ex-combatants, by various sectors of society (López et al., 2015). The assistance of the NGO, Hum Pakistani Foundation, which offers its services in the Sabawoon rehab center, is a good illustration of this institutional support in Swat (Rafi, 2015). This group, however, lacks the autonomy to carry out a rehabilitation program on its own and is instead under the control of the security forces. Community views About Rehabilitation Program The researcher tried to investigate the common perceptions in Swat regarding the rehabilitation processes, rehabilitees, and their reintegration into society. There was an angry response all around. For the most part, they thought adult ex-combatant rehabilitation programs were a waste of time and resources. They believed that these militants, who voluntarily joined the militancy, are responsible for all destructions. Even if the government had spent months educating them and kept them in detention for years, they would still be the same extremists since they actively took part in the looting and murder of community members.66 On the other hand, a friend of Janan who underwent rehabilitation said that while Janan had a very rigid demeanor and publicly denounced the government and its institutions, he transformed into a genuinely nice and loving individual after his recovery. Janan was given fresh life through rehabilitation. If not, he would have joined the “black” category of militants because his friends who did not cooperate with the security forces were suffering the repercussions.67 A person undergoing rehabilitation said, “I was confined in an internment center by the security forces for three years without any communication with the outside world or my family. I frequently considered exacting revenge for my three years in jail. However, once I was sent to a rehabilitation facility, I could see the issue clearly. I realized that being placed in custody was the appropriate punishment for my disobedience of the law and the community. I learned that this is our own military here after spending six months in a welcoming environment with the military. My need for vengeance has since transformed to cooperation in the rehab

66 Respondent # 16. 67 Respondent # 11.

6

FROM REHABILITATION TO REINTEGRATION

125

facility. In terms of reintegrating former combatants, I affirm that the rehabilitation program is doing an excellent job.”68 Many of the respondents were having opposing view and considered the graduates as permanent employee of the security forces and were skeptical of rehabilitation programs. Such respondents claimed that rehabilitation served as a resource for potential proxies.69 Another resident admitted that while he was unaware of the inner workings of rehabilitation facilities, he was aware that the rehabilitees there were well-known. Since they did not consider the ex-combatants being rehabilitated, the majority of community members were unhappy with the rehabilitation processes. “The people I know maintain the same behavior, attitudes, and strategies even after receiving rehabilitation. When someone is imprisoned for years before being asked to undergo rehabilitation, how is that person supposed to be rehabilitated? He may agree for the time being, but he will always wait for the proper moment and chance to exact revenge,” according to a reply.70 While questioning a community member at Mingora, similar remarks were heard. The rehabilitees hardly interact with the community members after their release from rehabilitation center. They are interacting only with the persons with whom they had previously spent time in jail or a rehabilitation facility. He continued, “One of them, as far as I know, has not maintained contact with his own family and his family is still upset with him. Even after he undergone rehabilitation, his family claimed, “He still feels the same as he did before.”71 ,72 Ibraheem, another rehabilitee, expressed the same emotions following recovery without changing.73 The respondents said that the Taliban in Swat were just interested in furthering their own objectives and were not concerned with Sharia or Islamic law for the land. One of the main motivations for joining Taliban was personal animosity. Within the society, there were social disputes, particularly over property, between uncles, cousins, and other family members. To exact revenge, the weaker embraced militancy. None 68 Respondent # 07. 69 Respondent # 10. 70 Respondent # 9. 71 Dr. Arshad. 72 Shaukat. 73 Respondent # 9.

126

I. KHAN

of them would face any difficulties in the post-conflict environment unless they had killed someone. However the military’s presence was the only thing that would keep these ex-combatants safe.74 Some local residents had a different viewpoint on these people who had undergone rehabilitation. A respondent added; let me add without hesitation, these graduates are in service of espionage for security forces.” More so than any other member of our community, they are treated with respect. The military pays attention to their (ex-combatants) concerns and takes action. The military quickly resolves their problems and tribulations.75 According to a researcher and commentator on war and peace in Pakistan, the Taliban (ex-combatants) and Pakistani military personnel share similar ideologies. “Since this (the Jihad) narrative was created by the military, developed by the military, and is currently being restored by the same institution, we should look at the grassroots. Irony exists in this. A narrative could slam with a counter-narrative. I am concerned about how these former militants might be rehabilitated using the same philosophy. Army is currently collecting firearms from these ex-militants by providing them with another.”76 When the researcher spoke with a rehabilitee, he overheard a similar tale. He claimed that while fighting his own troops, he had committed a serious transgression, but that “I realized that I was wrong.” He also said he would fight alongside the soldiers to save the nation.77 Due to their continued love of guns, the behavior of rehabilitees shows that they have not been deradicalized. The detainees have not been demilitarized during the rehabilitation process. One could argue that this rehabilitation is merely a change from one state to another. As in Sri Lanka, where just two terrorism-related occurrences were recorded after the introduction of a rehabilitation program in 2010, a successful reintegration also reduces and eradicates instances of terrorism. On the other side, the issue of targeting local elders and VDC members is at its height in Swat. Unknown assassins have targeted and killed numerous bystanders. There is a feeling of menace and insecurity. The number of missing people is at an all-time high, and the presence of

74 Respondent # 10. 75 Respondent # 17. 76 Mehran Wazir, in-person interview, Islamabad, November 16, 2017. 77 Respondent # 23.

6

FROM REHABILITATION TO REINTEGRATION

127

security forces and their checkpoints is anything but a reliable sign that reintegration efforts are failing. Military should be removed from the post-conflict regions, and where the rehabilitation programs being implemented which is a civilian job. Although it was not permitted, the Police in Swat could easily handle the situation. Conflict in Swat grew more intense as a result of military action. The military intervened and took control of all national authorities, including the judiciary, the police, and even the economy. Through this interference, the social fabric has been shattered, and the military is now without an alternative. The whole conflict of the region has been securitized. The checkpoints were put in place to reduce violence; however, it has since become clear that they actually increase it, as seen by the rise of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement or PTM.78 The traditional bottomup method of rehabilitation, community involvement through elected bodies, and police empowerment are the greatest options in the situation of Swat. The strongest power that could maintain social harmony is the police. Police are better trained than the military to deal with civilians.79

Conclusion The topic of reintegration in a controlled society has been attempted to be explored by the author. Swat Valley has been conceptualized as a case study for a controlled society. This chapter’s main goal was not to examine reintegration in its entirety, but rather to establish it as a crucial metric for assessing the effectiveness of rehabilitation. This chapter’s topic started with ex-combatants’ social integration, which is regarded as essential to any program for their reintegration. Divergent answers were discovered by the researcher from both the community and the former militants who undergone through rehabilitation. The conversation then moved on to the second most crucial element, which involved understanding income creation resources based on the vocational and technical training that graduates of rehabilitation institutions received. Although the majority of respondents acknowledged that they received vocational training, they were dissatisfied with the post-release support and assistance because the majority of ex-combatants had received such training but were unable

78 Dr. Husnul Amin, in-person interview, Islamabad, January 02, 2018. 79 Dr. Husnul Amin.

128

I. KHAN

to open their own enterprises owing to a lack of funding. The majority of respondents, according to the researcher, agreed that there are no prospects of recidivism, although complaints still exist. Recidivism cases have also been reported in Swat, which raises additional concerns about the effectiveness of the rehabilitation procedure. The rehabilitation institutions ignore the problem of social stigmatization as a barrier to social integration. The study also discovered that following international standards makes rehabilitation in a controlled society better. Since the centers in Swat were unable to cover the program’s costs and the graduates were reintegrated into society on their own, the international standards could not be upheld there. These ex-combatants have a higher risk of recidivism without sources of money generating. Lack of political education and awareness is a crucial element in the rehabilitation program of Swat. Ex-combatants were shown to be more integrated when they joined a political party. The political party is a platform where they can pursue their objectives through nonviolent means. There is a risk of intercommunal animosities and confrontations, as the Swat community has proven. The security forces reunite these rehabilitees but do not reintegrate them. The community did not take part in the rehabilitation process in any way. Leaving the community out of the settlement process could lead to further fault lines for future violence, given the resentment the community has toward the ex-combatants. The Pakistani army has made a commendable effort overall to assist in rehabilitation. The program did not, however, result in a successful reintegration. The general public, professionals, and program graduates believed that this rehabilitation program could be more successful if it were managed by the civilian administration. Some people made the argument that no government entity should get involved in rehabilitation programs; instead, the community should take care of this task while the government provides the community with material and financial support. The following chapter explores an alternative approach to rehabilitation that incorporates the local community. The chapter proposes a method for reconciling Pashtunwali with the “restorative justice” approach. This reduces the role of the government while placing the entire burden of rehabilitation on the community. Because an excombatant must reintegrate into society following rehabilitation, hence, the community’s engagement is crucial to the process. Additionally, this strategy is more appealing and less expensive.

6

FROM REHABILITATION TO REINTEGRATION

129

References Afridi, S. A. (2016). Pakistan’s Counterinsurgency: Military and Civilian Approach. Strategic Studies, 36(3), 21–37. Ahmed, M., and Rafique, Z. H. (2013). Deradicalization and Rehabilitation Efforts Analysis of Anti-terrorism Activities in Pakistan. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (IJH&SS), 2(1), 115–124. Azam, Z., and Fatima, S. B. (2017). Mishal: A Case Study of a Deradicalization and Emancipation Program in SWAT Valley, Pakistan. Journal for Deradicalization (JD), 1–29. Basit, A. (2015). Countering Violent Extremism: Evaluating Pakistan’s CounterRadicalization and Deradicalization Initiatives. IPRI Journal, XV (2), 44–68. BCGR. (2016, April 13). Rehabilitation Program in Sri Lanka. Retrieved from Bauru of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (BCGR): http://www. bcgr.gov.lk/history.php#bookmark8. Dahal, D. R. (2006). Nepal: Preparation of National Resettlement Policy Framework. Kathmandu: National Planning Commission. Griffiths, Curt T., et al. (2007). The Social Reintegration of Offenders and Crime Prevention. Ottawa: National Crime Prevention Centre. Khan, S. A. (2015, September 14). Deradicalization Programming in Pakistan. Retrieved October 28, 2017, from United States Institute of Peace (USIP): https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/09/deradicaliza tion-programming-pakistan. López, Rodríguez Maivel, Andreouli, Eleni, and Caroline, Howarth. (2015). From Ex-combatants to Citizens: Connecting Everyday Citizenship and Social Reintegration in Colombia. Journal of Political and Social Psycology, 3(2), 171–191. Rafi, Y. (2015, September 23). Bringing them home: Pakistan’s child deradicalisation centre offers second chance. Retrieved from Dawn News: https://www. dawn.com/news/1208602.

CHAPTER 7

Rehabilitation in a Controlled Environment: An Alternative Approach

Abstract This chapter discusses an alternative approach to rehabilitation in a controlled setting like Swat valley. When one learns about the shortcomings in the current approaches to rehabilitation, notably those that were implemented in the Swat region, the need for establishing an alternate approach becomes apparent. The study discovered that the rehabilitation program run in Swat lacks uniformity and policy coherence. It primarily adopts a mixed strategy that combines elements of several strategies adopted from numerous rehabilitation programs performed around the world, with the majority of its components coming from UNIDDR 2006. The researcher came to the conclusion that the existing rehabilitation strategy is not appropriate for the nature and context of the conflict in Swat after examining the nature and context of the society in relation to that conflict. Swat’s situation is different, making it contextually incompatible with other countries’ approaches. Keywords Rehabilitation · Controlled environment · Alternative approach · Community-based approach · Restorative Jarga

The Pakistan army is in charge of managing the rehabilitation in Swat, making it a special case. As a result, the military now has complete authority over rehabilitation, which limits access for data gathering and © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 I. Khan, Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9514-1_7

131

132

I. KHAN

evaluation by outsiders or civilian entities. This study found that these facilities are not enough to house many ex-combatants. Another oddity was how effortlessly “self-integrated1 ” ex-combatants were assimilating into society. The future safety of society may be put in peril by this unrestricted movement and social contact. Although it could come across as alarmist, ex-combatants who have not received the required rehabilitation might still be seduced and recruited by violent groups. The researcher also discovered that financial issues prevented the rehabilitees from fully reintegrating into society; graduates of these centers had little to no financial support for starting their own small businesses, and there were few opportunities to further develop the skills they had learned at rehabilitation centers after their rehabilitation. Additionally, a lot of radicals and extremists have started skulking around the community. These individuals also require rehabilitation since they have the potential to affect recently reintegrated graduates. Additionally, the researcher learned through the discussions with residents that the community did not entirely approve of the rehabilitation programs. They continued to view the former combatants as their foes because of the damage they had wreaked during their time of militancy. The aforementioned community involvement will give the program ownership and make it possible for the community to build relationships with the former combatants. Additionally, the rehabilitees lamented their isolation from the community and stigmatization and prejudice, particularly in the job market. The need for a workable alternative strategy is critical in light of these flaws, which define the present centers. This necessity is also known to the government. Because it will be less complicated to implement, a less expensive alternative technique should be adopted in this circumstance. The current rehabilitation strategy in Swat is also criticized for being closely regulated by the security agencies and securitized. The establishment of security is the primary focus of the rehabilitation program in Swat, and the humanitarian aspect is given very little attention. For instance, the security sector is the only driver behind the surveillance of former combatants and the formation of Village Defense Committees (VDCs). Although the former combatants have been disarmed and demobilized, little attention has been paid to assisting them in reintegrating into Swat society. 1 Combatants who have “self-integrated” into society without undergoing rehabilitation. They re-enter the community without altering their narratives or approaches.

7

REHABILITATION IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT …

133

While rehabilitation is crucial and demands some extreme mechanisms, the humanitarian aspect must not be overlooked. Restoring communal cohesion and assisting ex-combatants in reintegrating into society are, after all, the main objectives of rehabilitation, both of which are basically humanitarian activities. It is therefore difficult to undervalue the significance of civil institutions. Civilians are essential participants in any rehabilitation program because they are most suited to take up the responsibility and carry out the humanitarian components. In light of the Swat society’s environment and traditions, a community-based approach that incorporates these into rehabilitation programs will be more gratifying. The traditional approaches to negotiation and conflict resolution must not only be combined but also correctly used to a significant degree in order to be on par with the modern concept of “restorative justice.” In Swat, there is a customary practice known as the Pashtunwali, which is a code of conduct for Pashtuns. Pashtuns have faithfully followed Pashtunwali traditions throughout their history, and this is especially true of the Pashtuns of Swat. For locals who are attempting to reconcile centuries-old traditional law with the new approach, the new laws and procedures for discussions, conflict resolution, and peacebuilding are complex and perplexing.2 A relatively new idea for peacefully and productively resolving disputes is restorative justice (RJ). The traditional model, in contrast to the first, employs a bottom-up strategy that incorporates the community in the process. The traditional paradigm gives the victim, offender, and community the chance to come to a resolution while promoting the offender’s rehabilitation by allowing them to sit down together to heal their wounds.

Militarized Environment and Its Limitations The international community and humanitarian organizations emphasize the necessity of bottom-up or community-based approaches in contemporary times. These methods are advised for practically all problems, from business to peace and conflict to health (Khasnabis et al., 2010). Utilizing a community-based approach to carry out the rehabilitation of ex-combatants is a novel concept. In other words, it is carried out by a civilian organization. However, detractors of this community-based

2 Dr. Husnul Amin.

134

I. KHAN

strategy believe that because rehabilitating ex-combatants is a dangerous task, the security forces or military are the best institution for carrying out rehabilitation and eventually reintegration.3 According to the majority of studies, rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives supported by the military have not been successful in improving results, as seen in Afghanistan (Bahman and Torjesen, 2012) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (Shepherd, 2012). The process of rehabilitation and reintegration is regarded to be more successful in situations when citizens are involved. The rehabilitation programs in Sri Lanka (Dharmawardhane, 2013) and Colombia (Sanin and Penza, 2012) come the closest to proving this assertion. The majority of military rehabilitation programs are delivered in specialized facilities, which is an issue. This does not imply that the military has not performed its duty of rehabilitation or reintegration, however. This is due to the fact that the military not only secures the facilities but also assumes responsibility for the entire rehabilitation process, viewing it primarily from a military perspective and reducing it to a military engagement. As a result, the general public has little to no access to the institutions. The argument that rehabilitation is impossible in a cell that is walled off and watched over by troops brandishing weapons is another argument against the conventional approach to military rehabilitation. In a militaristic approach, the radical narratives cannot be transformed liberal.4 Rehabilitees are segregated from the community and are not permitted to interact with it at the institutions, which have a martial atmosphere. It is impossible to address the grievances of the community as a result of this division, which exacerbates gaps. Therefore, it is crucial that the community participate in rehabilitation and reintegration. Any rehabilitation program’s success or failure is determined by how well former combatants integrate back into society. This highlights the importance of the civilian in the rehabilitation process. A rehabilitation program cannot be deemed successful until the community agrees and welcome a former combatant back into its folds, or, to put it another way, permits the reintegration of ex-combatants into society.

3 Respondent # 15. 4 Mehran Wazir.

7

REHABILITATION IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT …

135

Measures Taken by the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (GoKP) recognized the value of community involvement after realizing that the Pashtun society had a well-established traditional system known as Pashtunwali that may be used for a variety of objectives. This plan might reduce the workload of the police and the judiciary while saving the government time and money. The programs GoKP started to involve the community are listed below. The goal of publicizing these GoKP initiatives is to demonstrate that the province has long practiced various forms of community engagement. In order to resolve conflicts and disputes at the community level, KP Police in the province developed the Dispute Resolution Councils (DRCs) program. Every police station should have a DRC made up of 21 local residents. Elders, retired civil and military officers, former civil and military officers, educators, lawyers, and other professionals are a few examples. Their responsibilities include settling disputes amicably, gathering information, and aiding police investigations (KP Police, 2014). The document states the following regarding certain DRCs: The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, characterized by ‘Pashtunwali’ code, has preserved its traditions and culture for centuries. These cultural values, today, find themselves woven in its social fabric. The tradition of resolving disputes amicably through the intervention of ‘elders’ has been age old and quite a revered one. However, the infestation of militancy and terrorism in this area not only disrupted the law and order situation but also destroyed a strong tradition of dispute resolution through reconciliation. With a mission to revive this revered tradition of dispute resolution through restorative justice, KP Police has taken this initiative of Dispute Resolution Council. (KP Police, 2014)

These councils are only permitted to investigate cases that the police refer to them. Consequently, the police have control over them. Currently, these DRCs solely serve as dispute resolution committees; they are not responsible for rehabilitation or reintegration. To broaden their use to rehabilitation and reintegration, study and funding are required. Another organization in this chain is the Parents Teacher Council (PTC), also referred to as School Management Committees School Management Committees in the province. Eight people that are elected to the PTC make up this group. The school principal, usually acting as

136

I. KHAN

the council’s secretary, includes five members elected from the school area and two nominated by the six previously mentioned (Nasir et al., 2013). PTC’s goal is to involve parents in their children’s education and to keep them updated on their development and activities. This council is also highly beneficial in ensuring children’s security and safety in their homes, schools, and playgrounds (Hussain and Naz, 2013). This council involves the parents in their children’s education and allows them to monitor their children’s whereabouts and activities. Positive outcomes have come from the implementation of PTC since it expands accountability to include parents in addition to the ministry of education and instructors. If any development work is required at the school, such as the building of new rooms or walls or the improvement of sanitation, the committee is in charge of managing it. These committees have the authority to file a complaint with a higher official regarding any teacher.5 The aforementioned examples were emphasized to demonstrate how citizen involvement is already prevailing in KP province in many programs aside from rehabilitation and reintegration. By looking at the aforementioned cases, officials have concluded that managing any program in Pashtun-dominated areas will be simple if the locals are involved according to their custom. The modern titles for the centuries-old Jarga, a significant code in Pashtunwali, are councils and committees. The goal was to demonstrate that the aforementioned DRCs and PTCs are effective in their respective fields; nevertheless, it is not necessary for them to be rehabilitation committees. Similar committees or councils can be helpful for rehabilitation and reintegration.

Importance of a Community-Based Approach Launching a rehabilitation and reintegration program in a controlled environment is virtually ever successful, particularly in cases when donor organizations and foreign communities are not providing enough support. States that have just come out a conflict cannot organize and provide the necessary resources for a comprehensive rehabilitation and reintegration program (UNDP, 2007), in which case it is important to comprehend the nature of the society. This sense of community is crucial to

5 Baz Muhammad, in-person interview, Mardan, September 13, 2017.

7

REHABILITATION IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT …

137

the effectiveness of rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives in Swatstyle society. The community can easily handle this strategy with less resources and costs. In transitional justice, when both victims and criminals receive justice to redress their grievances, rehabilitation is also seen as a component. The concept of community is divisive among academics and practitioners of peace and conflict studies. The idea of community, according to Basia Spalek’s definition, “includes both individual and collective identities and dynamics that are influencing and being influenced by them.” Community could be seen as a place of belonging made up of a variety of links, including those that are “geographic, imaginative, emotional, political, and other” (p. 30). As a result, community serves as a context for shaping, experiencing, expressing, and debating both individual and group identities. One definition of community given by some academics is “A group of people with diverse characteristics who are linked by social ties, share common perspectives, and engage in joint action in geographical locations or settings” (Cobigo et al., 2016). According to a thorough definition provided by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) in its operations book (2008), “community” can also be defined as a group of people who recognize themselves or are recognized by outsiders as sharing common cultural, religious, or other social features, backgrounds, and interests, and that forms a collective identity with shared goals. However, in this study, the concept “community” is used to refer to the group of individuals who share similar norms, beliefs, languages, and identities and who reside in a certain geographic area. This brief definition merely provides a frame of reference for this research and doesn’t go into further detail. A community must be involved in post-conflict development, rehabilitation, and reintegration. It is important to keep in mind that community involvement in the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants only serves to interact with the “angry-men” of the community. In other words, the community can only deal with militants and cannot do so with outside non-state actors or terrorists. Since the bulk of the militants in Swat are a part of society, the process of their rehabilitation and reintegration cannot be successful without including the community. In order to strengthen their roots in the community, militants always use the tactic of “winning hearts and minds” with the community (Spalek, 2012, p. 32). State institutions should follow suit. There are many sympathizers and adherents to militant’s narratives within society, and thus the state institutions

138

I. KHAN

must sever the link between society and militants. Because the militants are members of the society and must return there after rehabilitation, a community-based approach to rehabilitation and reintegration becomes imperative. Another debate “failed reintegration” is the subject between academics and practitioners of peace and conflict studies. They questioned if the focus on reintegration should be on both ex-combatants specifically who constitute a threat to the community’s security or to society at large, or on both simultaneously (Oluwaniyi, 2018). Reintegration of individuals and communities, however, is imperative for the development of post-conflict societies and the promotion of peace (Oluwaniyi, 2018). Because both the individual and the community suffer equally during a conflict, it is necessary to address both groups’ grievances. The World Bank (2018) is working on a project in the Central African Republics (CARs) that focuses on the reintegration of individual ex-combatants and makes the case that doing so lessens the threat to society’s general security. However, nations that give individual ex-combatants more importance than the entire society experience a failure in reintegration as a result of the community’s dissatisfaction with the ex-combatants’ privilege. The community may retain reservations about reintegrating former militants into society if it is not given the opportunity to do so. In the meantime, the revitalization of social capital and the general welfare of society receive less attention (Oluwaniyi, 2018). As demonstrated in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Liberia, societies that prioritize individuals over community in reintegration also grant freedom to gangs and criminal groups that participate in crimes, kidnapping, drug trafficking, and the use of illicit weapons (Oluwaniyi, 2018). Community-based reintegration is essential in post-conflict situations since the conflict destabilizes the societies, making it difficult for the excombatants to return to a stable and improved society. In the Niger Delta, where ex-combatants underwent proper rehabilitation after a process of community and ex-combatant reconciliation, which is followed by a program for ex-combatants’ community development, Oluwaniyi (2018) acknowledges that the approaches for reintegrating the individual and the community have both been successfully used. In the discussion above, it is being debated whether the community, former combatants, or both should be the focus of reintegration. This study, however, makes

7

REHABILITATION IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT …

139

the argument for empowering the community to serve as a rehabilitation and reintegration agency in addition to promoting community reintegration. Participation by the local population in rehabilitation and reintegration will also contribute to a reduction in radicalization in the region as a whole. The “greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long run” is always the local populace and culture (Leaderach, 1997). Buzan and Waever (2003) also emphasized the value of resolving disputes using traditional approaches. They claim that the state is the referent object in contemporary conflicts, while experts generally agree that all conflicts emerge inside society and should be resolved within society. The indigenous approach should be used to resolve disagreements while keeping the society in mind as a referent object. Additionally, despite the increasing westernization of the world and its formal and legalistic approaches to conflict resolution, indigenous values are not only still relevant but frequently the most appropriate in many circumstances (Adebayo et al., 2014). The UN also supports using indigenous methods to resolve conflicts and other post-conflict challenges. Due to their frustration and dissatisfaction with the formal judicial or justice system in the majority of the world’s nations, people are more inclined to employ traditional or customary ways of justice to deal with crime and disorder. In this sense, restorative justice offers some hospitable ways to resolve disputes and other post-conflict problems.

Alternative Models There are many ways the community can be involved in post-conflict peacebuilding. The following ideas are some ways to involve the community in the restoration process. A. Rehabilitation based on Punjab CTD Program The Punjab model for rehabilitation programs was preferred by the majority of the stakeholders who were city-based, working in various research centers, NGOs, and some journalists. The deradicalization and rehabilitation program, which focuses on members of various extremist groups in Punjab as well as the extremists in prison in various jails in Punjab, has been initiated by the Punjab Police Counter-Terrorism

140

I. KHAN

Department throughout the province.6 The initiative produced positive results, but due to funding limitations, it was put on hold. Instead of using the military, this initiative works with the local police force and residents. A comparable initiative may be launched in Swat, but it would require a sizable budget and might suffer the same fate as the Punjab scheme.7 Even though the majority of programs depend on funding from foreign donors, it is not always easily available. Utilizing local resources would be the other, if not the only, choice if foreign support is not forthcoming.8 B. Appointment of Psychologists in Schools The community suggested an appealing program which states that psychologists may be appointed in the schools. Every school should have a psychologist on staff, and each hamlet should have a counseling center. The proponents of this theory contend that because of protracted conflict and the pervasiveness of religious fanaticism in society, society as a whole has undergone some radicalization. The madrassas and mosques are free to host speakers on any topic because the State has not monitored them. In order to address this problem, psychologists will evaluate both schoolchildren and radical residents of the community.9 Extremist or radical behavior can be readily persuaded and reformed after it has been identified. The village’s counseling center will care after the community and offer counseling to the angry residents and disgruntled youth. As the education ministry is regarded and seen as being non-political, it should control these psychologists and counseling institutes at the village level.10 C. The Role of Family in Rehabilitation

6 Respondent # 18. 7 Shams Momand. 8 Respondent # 3. 9 Shams Momand. 10 Respondent # 15.

7

REHABILITATION IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT …

141

This is a good proposal that t locals and the ex-combatants in Swat have put forth. The community-based rehabilitation, which is quick and affordable, is most relevant when done through the families of extremists. An ex-combatant who is in support of family-based rehabilitation argued that if people had respected and listened to their elders in the beginning, there wouldn’t have been any violence, extremism, and radicalization. He continued by saying that although elders frequently spoke of peace and advised people to avoid becoming Talibanized, many did not heed their advice. The majority of the seniors were murdered simply because they opposed radicalism and discouraged young people from joining the ranks of militants.11 Another community member made a similar response that deradicalization could be possible through the families of former combatants only. The ex-combatants are more attentive to the caution of their parents.12 An example of a family-based deradicalization and rehabilitation story Nazir Ahmed was held position of Taliban commander. The security forces summoned the residents and warned them that if Nazir did not surrender, they would take action against him and that the entire village might be in danger. The villagers forced his family through a Jarga to bring Nazir back. His kin worked for the government and ran businesses. His father and uncle, as well as other members of his family, followed to bring him back to the hamlet. He was threatened with leaving the village permanently unless he took his wife and kids with him. He could not take children with him and ultimately surrendered first to his family and then to security forces He was detained for a few days before being freed after paying a fine to the government. In Peshawar, Nazir is currently managing a store.13

However, not every family in a community is savvy enough to keep their members from joining in the ranks of militants. The researcher discovered several connected stories in Swat. This family-based deradicalization strategy could be enhanced by providing pertinent trainings and awareness seminars. These trainings can cover topics like how to prevent children and young people from becoming radicalized, what news, discussions, gatherings, and programs should be set up to help radicalized and 11 Respondent # 15. 12 Dr. Ihsan. 13 Nazir Ahmed, in-person interview, Peshawar, June 14, 2017.

142

I. KHAN

former combatants recover, as well as how to keep other young people away so they would not (re)join the militants. Such discussions and information sharing can aid in the rehabilitation process. During a Focus Group Discussion (FDG), a member presented his son’s story; My son was attending a madrassa close to my house to study. The madrassa staff was made up of law-abiding civilians and was not involved in any radicalism. On Fridays, my kid used to visit. But after that, he skipped home for two weekends in a row. I asked to the madrassa, and they said he hadn’t been there for the previous two weeks. I realized that one of his teachers is connected to militants. After being pursued and threatened, the teacher admitted that he was in a training facility for militants. He was prepared for a suicide assault when we arrived there in a hurry. We saved him and returned him back to home. Then, the elders of the village expelled the teacher from the madrassa and from the village too.14

The story demonstrates a family and community-based approach. For instance, the family was involved in persuading their son to bring back him home while the community (Jarga) was active in removing the convicted instructor from the madrassa and even the village. Even though meddling in madrassas affairs is highly difficult, it is achievable when society as a whole takes action. D. Rehabilitation and Reintegration through Local Elected Bodies In a FGD, a respondent revealed that the traditional Pashtunwali code was being undermined by the appearance of new institutions. Therefore, the future generation may not find rehabilitation through Pashtunwali appealing. However, local strategies are still very important in the Swat region. The Village Council serves as the fundamental element of the Local Government (LG) system that the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (GoKP) has previously implemented throughout the province (GoKP, 2013). It is in charge of the village’s development. The elected village council may function best if its purview is expanded to include additional topics. For instance, it may be given the authority of a magistrate and

14 Focus Group Discussion (FGD), Qamber, August 8, 2017.

7

REHABILITATION IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT …

143

have its authority expanded to community policing. These local organizations can monitor their individual villages using this technique. There is little chances that local bodies will be dominated by wealthy or prominent members of the community because they are elected bodies. In rare circumstances, the local bodies may also be empowered the authority to declare an emergency whenever needed.15 These local organizations can monitor radicalization and extremism in the area using the power of policing. These bodies, if given the aforementioned authority, can be crucial in rehabilitation and reintegration since they serve as community representatives and have the power to persuade or coerce people to act in certain ways. These councils could be referred to as Jarga in an effort to allay local concerns and appease residents. As a conclusion, the study can argue that Pashtunwali and restorative justice—modern and traditional approaches, respectively—may both be used to incorporate community perspectives while allowing some room for the state institutions. The debate that follows will first define RJ before drawing a composite account of RJ and Pashtunwali.

The Restorative Justice and Its Multiple Facets The history of managing the consequences of conflict is extensive (Pantev, 2006). Restorative justice has existed in a variety of forms and processes throughout the history of law for as long as there have been conflicts (Garkawe, 1999). Restorative justice has been used throughout history. It is impossible to fully characterize this phrase with just one meaning because it is so complex (Garkawe, 1999). Experts and scholars have tried to offer a definition that nearly explains the phrase, nevertheless. According to the United Nations (2006), restorative justice is “any program that uses restorative processes and seeks to achieve restorative outcomes.” This does not fully explain the phrase and is still uncertain. According to Tony Marshall (1999), restorative justice is “a process where all the parties with a stake in a particular offense come together to resolve how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implications for the future.” According to John Braithwaite (2003), the phrase means “restoring the balance between victims, offenders, and the community.” According to these definitions of restorative justice, the phrase suggests

15 Dr. Husnul Amin, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), Islamabad, January 2, 2018.

144

I. KHAN

that there must be two parties involved in the negotiation process; victim and offender must be present, in order to find a way to reconcile the concerns of both the victim and the offender. The importance of the community’s members will be covered in the later sections of this chapter. When the state built a facility known as a reformatory to treat criminals under a semi-military regime in the nineteenth century, it gave rise to the contemporary rehabilitation centers found all over the world (Campbell, 2005). The reformatories established educational and vocational programs, and based on the behavior of the offenders, they might be released early. The reformatories also have the practice of classifying inmates (Campbell, 2005). This reformatory strategy is used by treatment centers in Swat. Prisoners are segregated into hard-core and soft-core groups at the centers, which offer educational and vocational training. However, later on, the reformatories promoted punishment for inmates, which led to the eventual reemergence of retribution (Campbell, 2005). The second theory, restorative justice, was developed in the 1970s to address several flaws in the formal legal system’s criminal law, which was based on retributive justice for the rehabilitation of criminals so that they might be reintegrated into society. There are several rehabilitation programs already in operation throughout the world; however restorative justice has a wider scope than criminal law (Zehr, 2009). According to RJ proponents (O’Hara and Robbins, 2009), the formal legal system focuses primarily on the culprit and ignores the victim. The victim, the perpetrator, and the community are all involved in the processes in restorative justice. The data indicates that restorative justice empowers victims, offenders, and communities to take part in the procedures and influence how the community responds to the offense. This procedure increases public confidence in the legal system and may even lower the reoffending rate (Gabbay, 2005). The restorative justice procedures are typically carried out through conferences. According to Howard Zehr (2009), “disrespect breeds disrespect.” Respect is shown to both the perpetrators and the victims during restorative conferences. The offender’s immediate family is also present at these conferences so that the criminal won’t feel alone. In solitude, he can experience guilt about his deeds and can hesitate to reintegrate into his community. The restorative conferences provide offenders the most opportunity to communicate their opinions and justifications for the crimes they have committed. As a result of include the offender in the negotiation process, this procedure shows respect for the offender and

7

REHABILITATION IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT …

145

ultimately provides him authority. For reasons of wealth, ethnicity, or sex, he is not overlooked. Both the offender and the victim become responsible individuals as a result of this empowerment, and they work to find a constructive solution to the problem (López et al., 2015). There are numerous examples of restorative justice replacing criminal law worldwide. The majority of nations are working to formalize restorative justice practices as a way to deal with criminals. The state-run victim compensation fund was first established in New Zealand in 1963, the US then launched its first compensation program in 1965 in California (Bright, 2018). The bulk of the European countries were also included in the program’s extension, including the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Ireland, France, the UK, and Norway (Bright, 2018). Since victims and offenders had more opportunity to voice and discuss their opinions there than in jails, the North NSW and Canberra Youth Conferences in Australia were found to be more successful (López et al., 2015; Garkawe, 1999). The Sierra Leonean Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) (2003), Peruvian TRC (2003), and Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor (2005) were among the commissions in Africa and Asia that were given the authority to investigate the causes and aftereffects of conflicts while focusing on peacemaking and post-conflict rehabilitation (Friedman, 2013). Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed noted that many individuals perished during the 1996–1997 Cairo, Egypt, bombings. The leaders of the known extremist organizations were jailed by the authorities. These organizations had disseminated violent material throughout the nation, which encouraged an extremist narrative among the populace. Professors from Al-Azhar University taught them nonviolent lessons in prison. After being freed, they changed their philosophy and began writing nonviolent literature. That rehabilitation program has been regarded as successful. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Philippines, and Colombia are among the nations that have admitted the shortcomings of paternalistic16 reintegration programs and are now focusing on a more participatory approach to rehabilitation and reintegration (López et al., 2015). The participation of former combatants, receptive community members, and local and national stakeholders

16 Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed, Discussion in a meeting, Islamabad, April 12, 2018.

146

I. KHAN

including elders and religious leaders is ensured by these participatory approaches (Buxton, 2008). The Processes of Restorative Justice A restorative process is defined by the United Nations as “any process in which the victim and the offender, and where appropriate, “other community members” affected by a crime, participate together actively in the resolution of matters arising from the crime, generally with the help of a facilitator” (United Nations, 2006, p. 9). The phrase “other community members” refers to friends, elders, and nuclear family members of the victims and perpetrators. The detailed definition of the restorative process provided by Braithwaite (2003) is as follows: Restorative justice conferences work by inviting victims and supporters (usually family supporters) of the victim to meet with the offender and the people who care most about the offender and most enjoy the offender’s respect (usually including both the nuclear and extended family, but not limited to them). Within this negotiation, the consequences of the crime, drawing out the feelings of those who have been harmed. Then they discuss how that harm might be repaired and any step that should be taken to prevent reoffending. (Braithwaite, 2003)

When it comes to its actual use, restorative justice is regarded via a theoretical perspective. The majority of stakeholders believe that restorative justice for rehabilitation and reintegration will fail if a criminal cannot receive compensation. Restorative justice implementation may be challenging in nations where indigenous society or traditional laws are not strictly adhered to. However, restorative justice can be applied there because it integrates the community because Swat residents still follow their traditional laws, rituals, and values. Participation by the community in post-conflict rehabilitation and reintegration serves as the vertebral column for the social, economic, and political aspects of the society (López et al., 2015). Pashtuns make up the bulk of the population in Swat, and they adhere to the Pashtun way of life, or Pashtunwali. Many of the principles of restorative justice are shared by Pashtunwali. According to Howard Zehr (2009), a professor of restorative justice, restoration,

7

REHABILITATION IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT …

147

accountability, and involvement are the three core elements of restorative justice: first, repair the harm inflicted by the perpetrator (restoration); second, encourage proper responsibility for addressing needs and repairing the harm (accountability); and third, involve the victims as well as the community in the restorative processes.

Reparation and Compensation in Restorative Justice in the Context of Swat To bring two parties to negotiations or conferences, both must agree (Gabbay, 2005). The agreement may, after it is finalized, “include reparation, restitution, and community services, the purpose of which is to fulfill the individual and collective needs and responsibilities of the parties, achieving reintegration of the victims and offenders” (United Nations, 2006). Reparation as an apology One of the fundamental principles of restorative justice is apology. Before beginning discussions, all sides agree that the perpetrator will be pardoned and the victim will grant forgiveness. Financial Restitution The prevalent restorative justice practice has continued to be monetary reparation. The criminal is required to make restitution to the victim for the injury he caused, whether in cash or in any other manner as agreed upon during talks. Reparation as community Services If it is decided during the talks that the offender will perform community service or offer services to the victim, then this punishment is given to the offender in the case that they are unable to restitute the victim. Compensation by the State Most nations have adopted the practice of providing compensation to both victims and criminals (Bright, 2018; Garkawe, 1999; Friedman, 2013). For restorative justice, they have built various institutions and

148

I. KHAN

host conferences. Modern nation governments have a duty to look after their populations. Liberals think that the state exists for the person and should act in accordance with what the people feel is feasible. To support former combatants in their rehabilitation, the goal of prison rehabilitation programs is to facilitate their successful reintegration into society by addressing underlying issues and providing necessary skills and support for a positive and constructive future. In a similar vein, the state ought to help the criminal pay back the victims for the harm they suffered. Pakistan has already begun to support the victims of the conflict’s losses. International donors provide support to the state, which then disperses that assistance as aid to the victims. Now, if the state wishes to improve restorative justice, it should promote its use and provide compensation to the victims in accordance with Jarga decisions. The government should establish a special “compensation fund” and formulate a policy to enable it to recompense both conflict victims and criminals. The eligibility based on the type of the conflict should be expressly stated in the policy. Community disputes shouldn’t be covered by this compensation fund because there could not be enough money available. The government will use this fund to make up for the losses suffered by both the victims and the offenders in terms of the economic, societal, and political.

Pashtunwali and Restorative Justice Pashtunwali is referred to the Pashtun way of life. Thus, Pashto is not just a language but also a way of life for a population of Pashtuns nation, residing across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. It is an all-encompassing word that encompasses the majority of Pashtun cultural norms and values. The Jarga, Nanawate, Kushunda, and Lashkar or Salweshti norms of Pashtunwali with restorative justice are the most pertinent ones. Gohar (2014) described Jarga as “community-based fact-finding and acting like a modern jury. It steps in to stop the violence, pinpoint the problems, and find a solution through arbitration or mediation while also promoting rapprochement and rehabilitation” (Gohar, 2014). Despite having several varieties, Jargas operate according to the same principles. A Jarga is often referred to when both parties, who are present throughout the processes, concur. Before making a conclusion based on Pashtun customs, Jarga considers the arguments from both sides. Similar principles apply to the restorative justice process, in which the parties

7

REHABILITATION IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT …

149

and the community collaborate to resolve the conflict and rehabilitate the victim and offender. Although they may come from other areas and tribes, the Jarga members are often called from the same area (the proximity of the victim and the offender). The sole distinction between a restorative conference and a Jarga is that in the former, the parties to the conflict reach a resolution, but in a Jarga, arbitration and mediation are conducted simultaneously. Formation of a Jarga The village or tribe’s elders form the traditional Jarga. The Mullah/Imam of the village mosque, the Nazim of the neighborhood or village councilor, a police officer from the pertinent police station, members of the nuclear families of both the victim and the offender, and two or three community elders must all be present when assembling a Jarga according to the restorative justice model. The term “committee,” “Jarga,” or the term “peace constituency,” as proposed by John P. Leaderach (1997), should be used to refer to this organization. But the word “Restorative Jarga” might better capture the body’s context-specific significance. The ex-combatant will be looked into by this committee (Restorative Jarga), which will also look into any losses he may have caused to a family, community, or state as a result of his engagement in militancy. This Jarga will determine the ex-combatant’s placement in the categories of white, black, and grey as well as the appropriate level of restitution or punishment. As a part of his community, this Restorative Jarga will have a greater understanding of the complaints of ex-combatant as well as his wrongdoing.17 The rationale behind enlisting the aforementioned community members in Restorative Jarga is that it is imperative to include the excombatant’s family members to prevent discrimination and ensure that the community thoroughly hears and responds to his problems. The local imam or cleric frequently commands a great deal of respect, his comments is accepted in Pashtun society, and he is well acquainted with the community. His presence is so required. Additionally, the Restorative Jarga may occasionally require religious direction and reference, in which case his presence is required. An officer of the law enforcement must be present to carry out the Jarga’s decision and to serve as a witness 17 Anwer Anjum.

150

I. KHAN

to the ex-combatant’s rehabilitation. The other participants are essential to represent community involvement and provide reassurance to the community that the criminal has been punished. How a Jarga Works? If the Jarga is summoned, its jurisdictions may be Nanawati or Kushunda (only in cases of rehabilitation); more information is as follows; Nanawati: or begging for forgiveness. The Jarga decides that the criminal will apply for forgiveness of his offense. The perpetrator is required to abide by Jarga authority and will ask for forgiveness. The decision to accept or reject the criminal’s apology then rests with the victims; however, customarily the offender is accompanied when seeking forgiveness by community elders. In accordance with Nanawati, the offender visits the victim’s home to ask for forgiveness or, in the event that a victim’s relative has passed away, enters the cemetery and remains there until the offender is forgiven. In severe situations, the perpetrator sends ladies to the victim’s home to demand an apology. If none of these methods are adopted, the offender follows the decision of the Jarga.18 Its authority may be expressed in monetary or land’s terms. The entire community is invited to a public meal when the victim agrees to pardon the criminal, with the offender typically footing the bill. By using indigenous customs, the victim and perpetrator can be made amends and reintegrated. Since the apology is one of the tenets of restorative justice, this Nanawati custom can be applied there and made into a formal process for rehabilitation and reintegration. An example of successful Nanawati from South Waziristan; A Taliban militant had been assaulted by the kids. Taliban arrived and kidnapped numerous children of the tribe, holding them captive for almost three days while abusing them. The tribe was enraged and sought to exact revenge (badal ) on the Taliban. The confrontation could become more violent, other tribes in the region realized. They got involved and assembled a Jarga of 120 people. The Taliban were required by Jarga to abide by the Nanawati Code, seek restitution for their actions, and provide the

18 Mehran Wazir.

7

REHABILITATION IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT …

151

victims 12 buffaloes as compensation. The conflict was therefore settled, and the victims received rehabilitation.19

Kushunda: the one who was expelled in English. Kushunda, which entails the offender leaving his community of residence and not coming back for a predetermined amount of time or for the remainder of his life, may be chosen by Jarga within its jurisdiction in place of Nanawati. The rest of the offender’s family is kept secure and honorable by doing this. When a criminal is not under the control of the security forces, his family members are put into custody in accordance with the current Swat rehabilitation plan. The victim will be pleased that Kushunda has been made an offender, and the rest of the family will be secure. An example from Bajaur Agency; Kushunda Nisar Khan has been residing in Islamabad since 2012. In the district of Bajaur, there had been animosity between two tribes for 70 years. On both sides, a number of individuals were murdered. In 2012, Jarga put an end to the hostility and chose to make one tribe member a Kushunda in retaliation for the other tribe’s wrongdoing. To appease the victim tribe after one of its members was killed, Nisar Khan, a member of the offender’s tribe, was made Kushunda. Nisar Khan now resides in Islamabad, and the tribes in Bajaur coexist peacefully.20

This technique enables the community to see the former combatant during the restorative justice process. The restorative Jarga will determine both the crime’s nature and the penalty. The former combatant will be made a Kushunda and banished from the region. His extended family and the neighborhood will coexist peacefully. According to the results of the field survey, there is a dread of inter-communal violence in Swat because the Pashtun never forget their enemies and always seek after Badal (revenge). Due to the presence of security personnel, the community is currently silent, but as soon as the security forces depart, the community will exact revenge on any wrongdoers who were rehabilitated. Salweshti or Lashkar: Salweshti, known as “the forty” in English, is a permanent body made up of community volunteers who carry out the Jarga’s authority. In several Pashtun regions, Salweshti’s potency varies. 19 Mehran Wazir. 20 Nisar Khan, in-person meeting, Islamabad, March 8, 2017.

152

I. KHAN

This body when consists of twenty men is known as Shalgon in the North. The volunteer members of the tribal militia known as Lashkar,21 this tradition-based combat group is referred to as “Tribal Militia” in English. Such force deters criminals inside the tribe or defends the community from outside aggressors. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult for the offender(s) to disobey the Jarga’s decision. The offender or offending tribe becomes the adversary of the entire community if Jarga’s decree is violated. Jarga represents the entire community. This standing force can be replaced while adhering to restorative justice by the community police. The “restorative Jarga” ought to have a police officer, as was previously stated. The choice made during the restorative process will be carried out by the police officer.

Discussion A violent conflict has a significant effect on the local community. It can be particularly challenging to resettle people to begin handling their own difficulties during rehabilitation in various situations (Pantev, 2006). The most practical option for reintegrating ex-combatants is the restorative justice approach to rehabilitation. The more appealing aspect of restorative justice’s guiding premise is the involvement of the community or ordinary people. If restorative justice is used during a conflict, local combatants can be quickly and respectfully rehabilitated before being reintegrated back into society. However, in the context of Swat, it is to be mentioned that the restorative justice deals with the conflicts between individuals, while the conflict in Swat was between the individual and the state.22 However, since the ex-combatants are reintegrating into society, restorative justice should be used. As a result, the conflict should be seen as one between the community and the individuals (ex-combatants), rather than between the state and individuals. The outcomes of the rehabilitation program won’t be beneficial if society does not agree to accept them. Second, the community is carrying out the state’s duties in this Restorative Jarga. By resolving the grievances of both the victim and the criminal and delivering swift

21 Lashkar or civil militia is the volunteer force composed of community members that executes the Jarga decision. 22 Dr. Arshad Ali.

7

REHABILITATION IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT …

153

justice in a less expensive method, it lessens the pressure on governmental institutions and may even assist to boost the economy. Another critique on RJ relates to security, i.e., the threat to the ex-combatants who have surrendered, and threat to the community members.23 Without the assistance of governmental institutions, the formation of the restorative Jarga and the implementation of its decisions are impossible. The state institutions will offer this local organization security as well as financial support. Additionally, the concept of lashkar, or civil militia, has already been established in Pashtun society and might be used in Restorative Jarga processes and decisions. Making a strong policy is difficult because of the mismatch in the civilmilitary power structure in Swat with regard to counterterrorism and reintegration. The National Action Plan of 2014 and the Civil Powers Regulations of 2011 dominated military intervention with civil and political institutions. In restorative justice, the community is involved in the offender’s rehabilitation. Therefore, strengthening local government will support a balance between civil and military power and support restorative justice practices. Conversations, both formal and informal, with radicalized and extremist-minded community members help dispel the myths they have created. Both official representatives and the government respect formal dialogues, while informal conversation encompasses debates in classrooms, the media, bazaars, hujras , mosques, and other places where people congregate. Additionally, these discussions ought to cover several extremist narratives rather than focusing only on one sort of militant. The dominant discourse has allowed the extremists’ narratives to spread, and hence, new narratives (or counter-narratives) are needed to counter them. Communities should be encouraged to create constructive discourse rather than using prisons or rehabilitation centers as long-term solutions to counteracting extremism or radicalization. In addition to conversation, a range of official and informal measures can be used to encourage inclusion in the community. The ex-combatants’ involvement in informal groups of friends, sports, work, volunteering, and associations is experienced as valuable networks that serve the purposes of reintegration, (re)identification with nonviolent groups (or the normal civilians), and so facilitate spaces for civic participation (López et al.,

23 Respondent # 15.

154

I. KHAN

2015). According to Lundy (2014), what is happening at the global and community levels of society has an impact on resilience at the national level. The majority of confrontations start at the societal level. The best approach to handle these conflicts is through indigenous conflict resolution techniques; extended to rehabilitation, and reintegration. Academics and practitioners in the field of peace and conflict studies have put a lot of effort into societal conflict management and resolution, but less focus has been placed on rehabilitation and reintegration. One of the most effective and straightforward approaches of social conflict management is restorative justice. Indigenous post-conflict rehabilitation and peacebuilding strategies require more attention from research institutions and other peace and conflict studies stakeholders. Every society has its own unique norms, beliefs, and traditions, which are frequently, included into conflict resolution and rehabilitation strategies for handling conflict and promoting healing. It is possible to improve conflict resolution results by recognizing and utilizing such indigenous mechanisms, as well as to reduce the strain that these processes have on state institutions and resources. Most experts agreed that a community-based approach to rehabilitation was best for post-conflict management in Swat. However, the researcher received a range of views on this approach. Some argued that the former combatants are constant threat to society and cannot be managed by the general populace; only a strong institution like the military can maintain control over them. This view was largely established by terrorists’ ability to kill powerful people in society (some of whom were assassinated out of personal hatred). This study suggests, however, that traditional approach should be used in conjunction with other strategies in order to combine their greatest qualities and provide the best outcomes.

Conclusion The approach has suggested in this chapter, i.e., the community-based approach accommodates traditional institution under a contemporary mechanism. However, there are certain difficulties with this approach. In Swat case, such a strategy questions the security agencies’ authority and limits their ability to meddle in the business of the public. The fact that this program is unprecedented presents another challenge. It might take some time and trial and error to determine the specifics of the nature and

7

REHABILITATION IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT …

155

structure of the program. Not to mention, it will call for the finest efforts from all stakeholders involved in the process of rehabilitation. Although this approach may encounter challenges, more research and practice will likely help it become more efficient.

References Adebayo, Akanmu G., Benjamin, J. J., and Lundy, B. (2014). Indigenous Conflict Management Strategies; Global Perspective. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Bahman, Zuhra, and Torjesen, S. (2012). Double Disillusionment: Disengaging from the Insurgency in Afghanistan. Norway: Center for Peace Studies, University of Tromso. Braithwaite, J. (2003). Restorative Justice: Theories and Worries. Australia: The United Nations Asia and Far East Institute (UNAFI) for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI). Bright, C. (2018). Victims Compensation Fund. Retrieved June 20, 2018, from Center for Justice and Reconciliation: http://restorativejustice.org/restor ative-justice/about-restorative-justice/tutorial-intro-to-restorative-justice/les son-3-programs/victim-compensation-fund/. Buxton, J. (2008). Reintegration and Long-Term Development: Linkages and Challenges. Bradford: University of Bradford. Buzan, B., and Waever, O. (2003). Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. London: Cambridge University Press. Campbell, K. M. (2005). Rehabilitation Theory. In M. Bosworth, Encyclopedia of Prisons and Correctional Facilities (pp. 831–834). Thousand Oaks: Sage. Cobigo, Virginie, Martin, Lynn, Mcheimech, and Rawad. (2016). What Is Community? An Evidence-Based Definition for Participatory Public Health. American Journal of Public Health, 91(12), 2002. Retrieved from: https:// www.researchgate.net/publication/11630209_What_Is_Community_An_Evi dence-Based_Definition_for_Participatory_Public_Health. Dharmawardhane, I. (2013). Sri Lanka’s Post-Conflict Strategy: Restorative Justice for Rebels and Rebuilding of Conflict-Affected Communities. Terrorism Research Initiative, 7 (6). Friedman, R. (2013). Transitional Justice and Conflict Transformation in PostWar Societies: Practical and Ethical Implications. London: King’s College London. Gabbay, Z. D. (2005). Justifying Restorative Justice: A Theoretical Justification for the Use of Restorative Justice Practices. Retrieved July 18, 2016, from International Institute of Restorative Practices: http://www.iirp.edu/pdf/jus tifyingrj.pdf.

156

I. KHAN

Garkawe, S. (1999). Restorative Justice from the Perspective of Crime Victims. Retrieved July 13, 2016, from Australian Legal Information Institute: http:// www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/QUTLawJl/1999/4.pdf. Gohar, A. (2014). Jirga: An Indigenous Institution for Peacebuilding in the Pukhtoon Belt of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In J. J. Akanmu and G. Adebayo (Eds.), Indigenous Conflict Management Strategies: Global Perspective (pp. 183–193). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. GoKP. (2013). Local Government Act, 2013. Retrieved July 13, 2017, from Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (GoKP): http://lgkp.gov.pk/wp-con tent/uploads/2015/12/Local-Government-Act2013-Urdu.pdf. Hussain, S. Naz, S. (2013). The Assessment of Parent Teacher Councils in Primary Schools of District Mardan. HOPE Journal of Research, 1(1), 122–138. Khasnabis, C., et al. (2010). Community-Based Rehabilitation: CBR Guidelines. Geneva: World Health Organization (WHO). KP Police. (2014). Dispute Resolution Council (DRC). Retrieved April 13, 2018, from Khber Pakhtunkhwa Police: http://kppolice.gov.pk/drc/. Leaderach, J. P. (1997). Sustainable Peace in Divided Societies. Washington, DC: USIP. López, Rodríguez Maivel, Andreouli, Eleni, and Caroline, Howarth. (2015). From Ex-combatants to Citizens: Connecting Everyday Citizenship and Social Reintegration in Colombia. Journal of Political and Social Psycology, 3(2), 171–191. Lundy, B. (2014). Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Social Conflict in GuineaBissau’s Fisheries. In J. J. Akanmu G. Adebayo, Indigenous Conflict Management Strategies: Global Perspectives (pp. 151–165). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Marshall, T. (1999). Restorative Justice: An Overview. Research Development and Statistics Directorate, Home Office. London: Crown Publishers. Nasir, M., Farooq, R. A., and Ali, A. (2013). Role of Parents in Strengthening of Parents Teachers Councils (PTCs) in Schools in KPK, Pakistan. Educational Research International, 2(2), 128–133. Nations, United. (2006). Handbook on Restorative Justice Program. New York: United Nations. Oluwaniyi, O. (2018). The Challenges of Reintegration in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Case of Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region. New York: Social Science Research Council (SSRC). Pantev, P. (2006). Introduction: Conceptual and Terminology Issues of PostConflict Rehabilitation. In V. A. Sofia (Ed.), Post Conflict Rehabilitation (p. 5). Vienna: Study Group Information. Robbins, E., and O’Hara, A. (2009). Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both Victim and Social Needs. Law and Contemporary Problems, 72(2), 199–217.

7

REHABILITATION IN A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT …

157

Sanin, F. G., and Penza, A. G. (2012). Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobalization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In. London: Ashgate. Shepherd, B. (2012). The Case of the FDLR in DR Congo: A Technical Drift. In A. Giustozzi (Ed.), Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In (pp. 73–86). London: Ashgate. Spalek, B. (2012). Counter-Terrorism Community- Based Approaches to Preventing Terror Crime. London: Palgrave Macmillan. UNDP. (2007). The Challenges of Restoring Governance in Crisis and PostConflict Countries. Vienna: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. UNHCR. (2008). A Community-Based Approach in UNHCR Operations. UNHCR. Switzerland, p. 14. United Nations. (2006). Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards. New York: United Nations. World Bank. (2018). Reintegration of Ex-combatants Project. Washington, DC: Not Published. Zehr, H. (2009, October 22). Restorative Justice; What’s That? Retrieved July 13, 2016, from International Institute for Restorative Practices: http://www. iirp.edu/article_detail.php?article_id=NjMx.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusion

Abstract The primary goal of this study was to analyze the many facets of the Swat Valley rehabilitation program and to design a comprehensive rehabilitation plan in a controlled setting. The researcher assessed the level of reintegration of ex-combatants into society by using it as one of the main indicators in studying rehabilitation. The book concludes that rehabilitation is necessary for reintegration and vice versa. It also stated that when society is closed and the rehabilitation environment is controlled, reintegration is unsuccessful. To accomplish this, an alternative strategy, namely a community-based approach, must be used. This communitybased approach is named as “restorative jarga” in Pashtun society and is based on restorative justice ideas. Keywords Rehabilitation · Reintegration · Community-based approach · Restorative jarga

The Swat region is dominated by ethnically Pashtuns. The Pashtuns are known for their distinct traditional code of life known as Pashtunwali or Pukhtoonwali. This traditional code gives a unique but lower status to women, who are not allowed to socialize with alien men or move alone or to meet any non-relative male person. Where the Constitution did not fully apply, the government of Pakistan ruled the Swat valley under © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 I. Khan, Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9514-1_8

159

160

I. KHAN

special laws. Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) was the term used to describe the entire region. Under the Action in Aid (Civil Power Regulations), which repealed the majority of PATA legislation, the military intervened to put an end to militancy. This law allows the military for ongoing monitoring of various construction projects as well as the tracking of people’s whereabouts in the valley. The military has implemented a rehabilitation program in this setting, where the ex-combatants are rehabilitated behind the institutional walls, without any contact with the community, and are maintained under rigorous monitoring even after release. The researcher referred to the rehabilitation centers as “controlled societies” and the entire community as “controlled environments” as a result. The regulated traditional and constitutional laws, rules, and environment form the foundation of the controlled society and environment. Further discussion focused on how the concept “rehabilitation” is defined in the Swat setting. The researcher then made an effort to distinguish between the ideas of rehabilitation and reintegration. These concepts’ definitions have been listed under the more general DDR concept. The definition of the term “disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration” (DDR), which has been found to vary depending on context, has initially been a topic of discussion. The ensuing conclusion states that there cannot be a single DDR program that is accepted in every conflict or post-conflict situation. When adopting DDR, the social structure and the conflict’s nature are very important, and these structures and natures have frequently led to variances in DDR definition. The two contested phrases, rehabilitation and reintegration, needed to be defined in order to be understood. The phrases rehabilitation and reintegration overlap in the DDR literature and have not been adequately distinguished from one another. The study has distinguished the two terms as is required. According to the research, rehabilitation is a process that helps a former combatant to reintegrate. Reintegration is the result of the rehabilitation process. Rehabilitation is therefore a prerequisite for reintegration. Reintegration will be successful if rehabilitation is carried out well, and vice versa. The DDR was explored in the second chapter’s final section in relation to Swat, the research’s case study. This study came to the conclusion that although the worldwide DDR criteria are somewhat followed, there are numerous flaws that show they are incompatible with Swat society. Swat’s conflict differs from conflicts in other parts of the world in terms of its nature.

8

CONCLUSION

161

Swat’s geography is crucial in determining DDR and other post-conflict developments. This study included a succinct overview of further rehabilitation and deradicalization initiatives in Pakistan. The researcher has talked about both official and non-governmental organizations that run programs for rehabilitation and deradicalization. The study discovered that only the security agencies are permitted to handle the rehabilitation of former combatants in Pakistan. The majority of the work done by NGOs is in soft measures like training programs and deradicalization and counterextremism initiatives for societies. Additionally, this study discovered that Pakistan lacks a national policy framework or program for rehabilitation and reintegration. However, over the past ten years, a number of national counterterrorism structures and strategies have been formed. The National Counter-Terrorism Authority (NACTA) is the most prominent counterterrorism organization, while the National Action Plan (NAP) is the most popular counterterrorism law. Although not present at the federal level, provincial levels have programs for the rehabilitation and reintegration of former combatants. Under the direction of Punjab Police, a successful deradicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration program is run in the province of Punjab. The Punjab Police’s Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) oversees and manages this initiative. It was discovered during the fieldwork; all of Pakistan’s provinces have similar programs, but none of them were found to be operational. Their biggest source of dysfunction is the provincial governments’ failure to provide a budget. Due to a lack of funds, the program in Punjab has also been put on hold. The Swat rehabilitation program is described in great depth as well. Why did the locals become militants was the key query. Details about the many types of people who joined militancy are also offered, in addition to the reasons why they did so. Five categories of the militants were determined using information gathered on the field. This classification was developed because to the various factors that led people to become militant, such as religion, unemployment, power struggles, security concerns, and bandwagoning. Religion encouraged militancy through honoring Afghan War veterans, who were able to gain support from the public and plant the first militancy-related seeds in society. Taliban were able to build their ranks by offering people basic requirements and revenue in exchange for providing them with manpower by promising unemployment in the

162

I. KHAN

area, particularly among young people, which prepared the door for militancy. People in the area were fighting for strength and control as a result of the power struggle, which was guaranteed if a family member joined the militants. In an effort to outnumber one another, rival clans and families started sending their men to join the Taliban. The number of militants dramatically increased as a result of this power struggle. The Taliban’s solicitation for volunteers or donations was made in response to the security crisis. The people suffered serious repercussions as a result of failing to deliver either one. Most residents of Swat were unable to contribute, thus they were obliged to enlist in the ranks of the militants in order to protect their own lives, families, and property. Another element that contributed to the Swat militancy’s explosive rise was bandwagoning. The youth in particular were drawn to militants because of the social position, power, and supremacy that came with it. Joining the Taliban became popular, and their numbers quickly grew. There is also a thorough description of the different categories of inmates. The authorities separated the militants into various categories who were detained by the security forces during a confrontation or who gave themselves up voluntarily. The hard-core and the soft-core militants were initially separated into two major groups. This could also be categorized into the following three main groups: White, Grey, and Black. It was discovered that only soft-core militants, or white and grey, were eligible for rehabilitation. Further research found that only grey militants received real rehabilitation. The white militants were released because they were just people who influenced by the militants narratives. While not engaging in direct combat with state forces, the grey militants did engage in some militancy and offered some material and intellectual assistance to other militants. Hard-core or black militants were either killed in battle, fled the area, or were treated harshly after being apprehended in accordance with land law. This study also looked into three different types of Swat rehabilitation facilities: Sabawoon, which focuses on the rehabilitation of young ex-combatants, Mashal, which deals with the rehabilitation of adult excombatants, and Sparlay, which concentrates on the rehabilitation of the ex-combatants’ families. But everyone received a similar level of rehabilitation at the facilities. There was no differentiation made to address the rehabilitees’ grievances (which later caused problems with reintegration). As a result, the rehabilitation process was consistent throughout

8

CONCLUSION

163

centers and all inmates underwent what might be referred to as a “controlled process.” The term “controlled rehabilitation” refers to this type of rehabilitation in regulated societies with controlled processes. Controlled rehabilitation does not mean that rehabilitation is not being done; rather, it refers to a society in which access to civil society and humanitarian groups is strictly regulated. State law enforcement authorities frequently take the lead and have a greater understanding of the nature and circumstances surrounding the conflict. However, one drawback of this seclusion is that such tightly controlled societies lack adequate finance and other means for effective rehabilitation. The state then organizes this program with the minimal finance and resources that are available, as a state that has experienced violence is frequently resource-constrained. Controlled rehabilitation might not be successful as a result. Therefore, controlled rehabilitation is only wise when states have significant resources. For such a method of rehabilitation to be successful, it is also necessary for a third party to properly assess and monitor it. The absence of female rehabilitation in the Swat rehabilitation program represents a significant flaw. The author of this ethnography searched for a rehabilitation facility for women in Swat for more than three years without success. Around the world, every DDR or rehabilitation program has a specific portion and thereby provides female ex-combatants. Swat’s situation was unique. The conflict’s nature was rendered by the differences in the social settings. Since women in Pashtun culture are expected to stay at home, therefore, ladies in Swat did not actively participate in the battle. However, on the other side, because of the same Pashtun social nature, mothers, daughters, and wives were compelled to stay with these militants. The social environment does not permit women to receive rehabilitation at a facility that is not near their homes. This paucity of female rehabilitees was also a result of the absence of female combatants; none of the women were detained by the security forces as they did not actively take part in militancy. Indirectly, however, women did contribute by giving money, jewelry, and occasionally even by donating their children for recruitment. The ladies who made these gifts are now stigmatized in their society, where stigmas like “da staso kaali di, os dazeegi,” which translates to “this is your jewel that fires,” are directed at them. The loss of their homes, businesses, and loved ones did have a psychological impact on them even though they do not need rehabilitation or deradicalization. They do need psychological care or rehabilitation in this situation.

164

I. KHAN

The chapter goes into great detail about rehabilitation by revealing the aforementioned evidences. The researcher made an effort to assess the degree of reintegration of the former combatants back into their communities in order to determine the effectiveness of the rehabilitation institutes. In Swat, rehabilitation has been studied and analyzed using reintegration as an indicator. As a result, chapter six of the book explores reintegration into controlled societies. The researcher made an effort to pinpoint the key facets and characteristics reintegration in local communities in Swat. Social integration, technical and vocational trainings, post-release assistance, recidivism, monitoring, and stigmatization were among the key components. The researcher thoroughly examined these factors and discovered some conflicting opinions from both the general public and rehabilitation facility graduates. Social integration is a crucial component of rehabilitation that determines whether a program is successful or not. It was noted that the rehabilitees in Swat were not effectively socially acclimated. Two obstacles to social integration were identified: a lack of government support for helping rehabilitees and a lack of community enthusiasm in welcoming these rehabilitees back. The graduates were subject to discrimination. The majority of the time, the community was reticent to maintain any kind of connection with these rehabilitees. This was due to the fact that the rehabilitees (ex-combatants), who were largely to blame for all of the communal losses, were viewed as enemies of the community. An extensive investigation showed that the community was not involved in the rehabilitation efforts, and hence, their grievances went unresolved. As a result, the community’s and ex-combatants’ were not addressed. Additionally, the community members have every right to view these ex-combatants as adversaries rather than fellow citizens given the way the state treats them. Community involvement, however, is essential for social integration. The government must persuade the locals that these former combatants are “angry men” who need to be reintegrated into society. Economic stability is also required for social inclusion, in addition to discussion. The graduates receive technical and practical training, but they receive little assistance in finding jobs or starting their own businesses. The community’s stigmatization of them makes it more difficult for them to find employment locally; the majority of them are either turned away or given jobs with low pay, and they struggle to make ends meet. The postrehabilitation phase also presents other challenges too. One of these was

8

CONCLUSION

165

the ongoing, stringent monitoring and surveillance. Many of the grads voiced their complaints about overzealous monitoring and spying. Their meetings, gatherings, and travels were monitored. Although it is advantageous to monitor the recently reintegrated ex-combatants and can assist reduce recidivism, this surveillance may hinder their social integration. Graduates also expressed dissatisfaction with the weekly attendance policy and unannounced home visits and security force searches. Anywhere in the nation, terrorist incidents result in unannounced arrests as well. According to the ex-combatants, such events cause mistrust and further stigmatization. The present research developed an alternative, “community-based” strategy for the rehabilitation and reintegration of former militants as a result of the examination of source data and community responses. Most respondents recommended a strategy of community involvement when asked about the nature and type of rehabilitation. Some respondents recommended a family-based strategy where the nuclear family remains the only actor for deradicalization and rehabilitation within the larger context of community-based rehabilitation and reintegration. Some responders recommended properly institutionalizing the current strategy, as employed by the Punjab police’s Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD). The use of local elected authorities for rehabilitation and reintegration was another option. The idea of keeping the military out of the rehabilitation process was yet another one. Instead, a plan for enlisting the police was proposed. One practical method for rehabilitation and reintegration was seen to be the police working with locally elected bodies. These recommendations have some strong justifications, but they also call for in-depth investigation. In light of these conclusions, current research proposes an alternate strategy that blends the regional tradition of “Pashtunwali” and the wellrecognized strategy of restorative justice. Both of these strategies share many of the same procedures and legal frameworks. In accordance with the principles of restorative justice, the perpetrator and victim should be brought together for negotiations while the community is present. Justice is served by this procedure for the perpetrator, victim, and community. Similar to Pashtunwali, matters are decided in front of the victim and the offender by a Jarga made up of community members. It is essential to address both conventional and modern approaches to the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants by combining Pashtunwali and restorative justice. “Restorative Jarga” is the name that might be given

166

I. KHAN

to the new local entity created as a result of this strategy. The Nazim of the area or village councilor, the Imam (prayer leader in the neighborhood mosque), members from every family, a police officer from the nearby police station, and elders, if necessary, will all be represented in the Restorative Jarga. Family relatives of the victims must be present. The ex-combatant’s engagement in militancy, the level of that involvement, and the harm done to the community or state will all is investigated by the Restorative Jarga. This Restorative Jarga can also determine the ex-combatant’s classification (White, Black, or Grey) and the appropriate punishment. Since the Restorative Jarga is made up of members of the community, it can make better decisions. The Pashtunwali codes other than Jarga that are most pertinent and useful in this restorative method are. These consist of Lashkar, Kushunda, and Nanawati. Depending on the circumstances, all or some of these codes may fall under Restorative Jarga’s purview. As part of restorative justice, the offender may be sentenced to reparation in the form of an apology, financial restitution, community service, or state compensation. These choices may also be included in the Restorative Jarga. In addition to these options, the Restorative Jarga may request an apology from the offender or ask him to leave the area to avoid causing a racial or religious conflict. If the offender refuses to follow the Restorative Jarga’s decision, he will be forced to do so by the Qaumi Lashkar (civil militia). In Pashtun culture, Lashkar has a proud past. This customary lashkar should be transformed into a Restorative Jarga, and the local police force, along with a few community volunteers, should be charged with carrying it out. The Community Police are required to maintain the community-based nature of the process at all times. A compensation fund at the local and state levels may be necessary to compensate victims on behalf of the offenders in order for a Restorative Jarga to be effective and functional. The majority of criminals lack the resources to make restitution; hence the creation of such a compensation fund is necessary. Additionally, there should be a clear procedure for allocating this “compensation fund” that specifies the requirements for eligibility. The nature of the disagreement should be taken into account while determining this eligibility. Conflicts between communities should not be compensated. The government should use this money to make up for the losses suffered by both the victims and the offenders in terms of the economic, social or political. Charities from the community may

8

CONCLUSION

167

be an easy way to contribute to this fund in addition to the government funds provided to the compensation fund.

Conclusion This study opens fresh areas for investigation in terms of rehabilitation and offers fascinating insights into the Swat culture. The philosophy of restorative justice along with utilization of local customs, known as Pashtunwali, offers an alternative to the rehabilitation and reintegration techniques to be used in Swat, as well as potential solutions that may be much more applicable to the Swat context than earlier attempts. In conclusion, this study represents a significant step forward in the field of rehabilitation and provides intriguing insights into the Swat culture. The introduction of the concept of controlled rehabilitation sparks new avenues for exploration and research. It underscores the potential for a unique approach to rehabilitation and reintegration that combines the principles of restorative justice with the utilization of local customs, such as Pashtunwali, which could be more suitable for the Swat context than previous methods. The amalgamation of restorative justice and the traditional Pashtun jarga system into what we term “restorative jarga” offers a promising framework for acceptance and implementation of these ideas within the local community. This innovative approach not only holds promise for Swat but also paves the way for further investigation and adaptation in diverse cultural and societal contexts beyond Swat. The implications of this study extend beyond the borders of Swat, as it serves as an exemplar for practitioners and academics in the fields of peace and conflict studies. It presents a compelling case for the applicability of this approach in other cultures and societies, offering the potential to promote healing, reconciliation, and reintegration on a broader scale. As we move forward, it is essential to continue exploring and refining the concept of controlled rehabilitation and restorative jarga to create a more inclusive, just, and harmonious world.

Glossary

Amir ul Momineen: The leader of the Muslims. Badal: Badal or revenge in English is one of the basic tents in Pashtunwali. It has both positive and negative connotations; i.e. when someone help another person in difficult time then it is obligatory on the second person to do help of that person in his difficult days. And, in negative, the other way round. Black, Grey and White Militants: The militants when surrendered or arrested then they are passed through a joint interrogation team (JIT). This team categorizes a militant according to his involvement in the conflict. If a combatant is found allegedly involved in terrorist activities and is involved in attacks on civilian, government agencies and destruction of public infrastructure are categorized as ‘black’. The ‘grey’ are the combatants aggressively radicals who had taken guns and had joined the militants’ ranks but are not involved in violent activities. And, ‘white’ are the people who have supported the militants and have been involved in any material or logistic support. Dar-ul-Uloom: The ‘house of Knowledge’ in English, refers to religious seminary. Das-numberi: Das-numberi or the tenth, is a section in criminal law for the criminals in which they are bound to present themselves in police station and they are not allowed to go near to any government facility. Elder/Mashar: Mashar or elder in English (but not limited to) is the person who has power of and understanding of decision making. © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 I. Khan, Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9514-1

169

170

GLOSSARY

Ex-combatant: The combatant who leave his militant rank(s), arrest or surrender to security forces. FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas, a belt consist of seven administrative agencies and six FRs (frontier regions), situated at the north-west of Pakistan, bordering with Afghanistan. The border length of FATA with Afghanistan is about 1400 kilometers and called Durand Line. Graduate ex-combatant: An ex-combatant when complete his course at rehabilitation center then he is graduated from that center. The time period of the course is from three to 24 months; depending on the psychological evaluation of a rehabilitee. Hard Core Militants: Hard-core are the acute militants who are involved in direct clashes with security forces or violent attacks against community and destruction of public infrastructure including, roads, bridges, schools etc. During investigation, this category is formed from the arrested combatants where they are labeled as ‘black’. Imam: Imam is one who is heading prayer in the mosque. Insurgency: Insurgency have specific objective(s) and clear goals. The insurgent groups are well-organized, having specialized personnel (offices) who work in a systematic way. Insurgents’ target population is defined and clear. Jarga: “Is community-based fact-finding and it acts like a modern jury”. Kushunda: ‘The expelled-one’ in English. Jarga in its jurisdiction may decide Kushunda that the offender will leave the community and the area of his residence and will not return home for a specific period or for life. Lashkar: Is a standing body that consists of the volunteers from the community that execute the jurisdiction of the Jarga. Madrassa: Are religious seminaries where Islamic education is given to the students. Mashal: The lamp/light in English, the name of a rehabilitation center for adult combatants. Militants: The militants fall in the middle of insurgents and terrorists. Militants have some structure and follow some vague narrative. They also establish some specialized offices but not like insurgents. These offices are just to make their presence in a society. Their target population is also not defined but they make a definition for the population who become barrier in their way; for example, in Swat, militants did not attack mosques as their narrative was establishment of Shariah in Swat.

GLOSSARY

171

Mullah or Maulana: The clergy, these are synonyms. Nanawati: Pleading for pardon in English. The Jarga when decide that the offender will seek pardon of his crime he has done. Non-rehabilitateable: Non-rehabilitatables are those who involved in acute terrorist activities against security forces and civilians. Their punishment became compulsory as if these persons are set free without punishment, this will create distrust and doubt among civilians over security forces. Nwe Sahar: The ‘new dawn’ in English, a rehabilitation center in district Bajaur. Paitham: Paitham and Mashal are the names of single rehabilitation center. Paitham is the name of the building where project Mashal is launched. Therefore, mostly local people called it Paitham rehabilitation center. Pashtunwali: Is the code of conduct of Pashtuns. In Pashtunwali, every aspect and movement of life is defined and there is specific code for every activity; of marry and grief; of love and enmity. PATA: Provincial Administered Tribal Areas are administered by the GoKP. These are situated at the north of Pakistan which consists of seven districts. Qumandaan: The commander of a small armed group or commander at local. Rastoon: To ‘bring back’ in English, the name of rehabilitation center located in district Shangla. Rehabilitation centers: The specified locations, surrounded by walls, for conducting rehabilitation programs for the ex-combatants. Rehabilitees: Is the ex-combatant who is passing through rehabilitation. Restorative-Jarga: The restorative justice process when conducted in Jarga is termed as restorative-jarga. Sabawoon: The Dawn in English, the name of juvenile rehabilitation center in Swat. Salweshti and Shalgon: Similar to Lashkar but here number of the executing body is defined; i.e. salweshti (forty) or shalgon (twenty). Sareeshta: Sareeshta is the local name for peace committee. These peace committees are popularly known as Village Defense Committees (VDCs). The VDCs are formed by the security forces and are responsible for the security of their village. They also perform the duty of espionage for security forces.

172

GLOSSARY

Self-integrated: ‘Self-integrated’ are those who do not pass through rehabilitation. They re-join the community without any change in their narratives or approaches. Soft core militants: Soft-core are the mild combatants who merely supported the militants or their ideology. They were also found in logistic and material support to the militants but they were not involved in any aggression or violent activities against civilians, government or security forces. Sparlay: The Spring in English, the name of the rehabilitation center for the family members of ex-combatants. Tablighee Jumaat: The religious group which does not have any criterion for recruitment but people joins this group voluntarily to spread Islam and they consider it is an obligatory duty. This is the largest religious group in Pakistan. Talibanization: In the local context, Talibanization is perceived and understood as militarization or militancy. Terrorists: Terrorists are those who do not follow any specific ideology or goals. Terrorists also do not have any systematic structure of operation. Their target population also not defined. Voluntarily Surrendered: The combatant first surrendered to his community or family and then the community brought them to security forces. This type of combatants surrenders without fighting with security forces. Wali: Wali was the head of princely state.

References

Abdullah, A., Resetraits, H., and Umir, L. (2011). Peace Research: A Practical Guide and Stories from the Field. Costa Rica: University for Peace. Accessed on March 3, 2019. Retrieved from: https://tribune.com.pk/story/54242/ counter-terrorism-department-formed/. Adebayo, Akanmu G., Benjamin, J. J., and Lundy, B. (2014). Indigenous Conflict Management Strategies; Global Perspective. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Afridi, S. A. (2016). Pakistan’s Counterinsurgency: Military and Civilian Approach. Strategic Studies, 36(3), 21–37. Ahmed, M., and Rafique, Z. H. (2013). Deradicalization and Rehabilitation Efforts Analysis of Anti-terrorism Activities in Pakistan. International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences (IJH&SS), 2(1), 115–124. Akber, A. (2016, March 31). P’s Dispute Resolution Councils Settled Nearly 6,000 Cases Over the Last Six Months. Retrieved April 14, 2018, from Dawn News: https://www.dawn.com/news/1248887. Ali, M. (2009, June 25). Pending Peace. Retrieved September 23, 2016, from Thoughtline: https://thoughtlines.wordpress.com/tag/operation-rahe-rast/. Ali, Z. (2015, January 6). 2014: From IDPs to TDPs. Retrieved May 8, 2018, from Dawn News: https://www.dawn.com/news/1155081. Allison, E. M. (2006, Winter). The Transition from Armed Opposition to Electoral Opposition in Central America. Latin American Politics and Society, 48(4), 137–162. Aprile, R., Rizzo, S., Romanini, E., De Santis, F., Marsan, S., Rinaldi, G., and Padua, L. (2011). Group Rehabilitation Versus Individual Rehabilitation following Knee and Hip Replacement: A Pilot Study with Randomized, Single © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 I. Khan, Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9514-1

173

174

REFERENCES

Blind, Cross-Over Design. European Journal of Physical and Rehabilitation Medicine, 47 (4), 551–559. ASER-Pakistan. (2011). District Report Card-Education, Swat. Retrieved December 17, 2019, from ASER Pakistan: http://aserpakistan.org/doc ument/aser/2012/drc/kp/Swat.pdf. Atkinson, P., and Hammersley, M. (1994). Ethnography and Participant Observation. In N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research (pp. 248–261). London: Sage. Azam, Z., and Fatima, S. B. (2017). Mishal: A Case Study of a Deradicalization and Emancipation Program in SWAT Valley, Pakistan. Journal for Deradicalization (JD), 1–29. Bahman, Zuhra, and Torjesen, S. (2012). Double Disillusionment: Disengaging from the Insurgency in Afghanistan. Norway: Center for Peace Studies, University of Tromso. Ball, N. (2006). Disarmament, Demobalization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles. The Hague: The Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Bangash, D. S. (2012). Socio-economic Conditions of Post-Conflict Swat: A Critical Appraisal. Tigah; A Journal of Peace and Development, 2, 66–79. Basit, A. (2015). Countering Violent Extremism: Evaluating Pakistan’s CounterRadicalization and Deradicalization Initiatives. IPRI Journal, XV (2), 44–68. BCGR. (2016, April 13). Rehabilitation Program in Sri Lanka. Retrieved from Bauru of the Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (BCGR): http://www. bcgr.gov.lk/history.php#bookmark8. BCGR. (2017, December 13). Details of Reintegrated Child Ex-combatants as at October 2014. Retrieved December 13, 2017, from Bureau of Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (BCGR), Sri Lanka: http://www.bcgr.gov.lk/reinte gratred_ex_child.php. Bergold, J., and Thomas, S. (2012). Participatory Research Methods: A Methodological Approach in Motion. Historical Social Research, 13(1), 1–32. Boyce, W., Koros, M., and Hodgson, J. (2002, November 4). Community Based Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Peace-Building. Retrieved March 5, 2020, from BMC International Health: https://bmcinthealthhumrights.biomedcen tral.com/track/pdf/10.1186/1472-698X-2-6. Braithwaite, J. (2003). Restorative Justice: Theories and Worries. Australia: The United Nations Asia and Far East Institute (UNAFI) for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI). Bright, C. (2018). Victims Compensation Fund. Retrieved June 20, 2018, from Center for Justice and Reconciliation: http://restorativejustice.org/restor ative-justice/about-restorative-justice/tutorial-intro-to-restorative-justice/les son-3-programs/victim-compensation-fund/.

REFERENCES

175

Brown, G., Langer A., and Stewart, F. (2011). A Typology of Post-Conflict Environments: An Overview. London: Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE). Bryman, A. (2012). Social Research Methods. London: Oxford University Press. Buxton, J. (2008). Reintegration and Long-Term Development: Linkages and Challenges. Bradford: University of Bradford. Buzan, B. (1991). New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs, 67 (3), 431–491. Buzan, B., and Waever, O. (2003). Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. London: Cambridge University Press. Campbell, K. M. (2005). Rehabilitation Theory. In M. Bosworth, Encyclopedia of Prisons and Correctional Facilities (pp. 831–834). Thousand Oaks: Sage. Cloninger, S. C., and Leibo, S. A. (2017). Understanding Angry Groups: Multidisciplinary Perspectives on Their Motivations and Effects on Society. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC. Cobigo, Virginie, Martin, Lynn, Mcheimech, and Rawad. (2016). What Is Community? An Evidence-Based Definition for Participatory Public Health. American Journal of Public Health, 91(12), 2002. Retrieved from: https:// www.researchgate.net/publication/11630209_What_Is_Community_An_Evi dence-Based_Definition_for_Participatory_Public_Health. Collier, P., and Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers, 56, 563–595. Crain, C. (2013, July 30). Living in a Society of Control. Retrieved July 27, 2018, from The Msntle Thought: http://www.mantlethought.org/philosophy/liv ing-society-control. Creswell, J. W. (2006). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Traditions. London: Sage. Cullen F. T., and Gilbert K. E. (2013). Reaffirming Rehabilitation (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis. Dahal, D. R. (2006). Nepal: Preparation of National Resettlement Policy Framework. Kathmandu: National Planning Commission. Deleuze, G. (1992). Postscript on the Societies of Control. October, 59, 3–7. The MIT Press. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2019, August 13). Development Approaches to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE). Retrieved from: https:// dfat.gov.au/: https://dfat.gov.au/aid/topics/development-issues/Pages/dev elopment-approaches-to-countering-violent-extremism.aspx. Detraz, N. (2012). International Security and Gender. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Dharmawardhane, I. (2013). Sri Lanka’s Post-Conflict Strategy: Restorative Justice for Rebels and Rebuilding of Conflict-Affected Communities. Terrorism Research Initiative, 7 (6).

176

REFERENCES

Fair, C., and Ali, H. (2018). Women and Support for Terrorism in Pakistan. Terrorism and Political Violence, 30(6). 962–983. Fleischner, J. (2011, October). Governance and Militancy and Pakistan’s Swat Valley. Retrieved August 14, 2018, from Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/389 0~v~Governance_and_Militancy_in_Pakistans_Swat_Valley.pdf. Friedman, R. (2013). Transitional Justice and Conflict Transformation in PostWar Societies: Practical and Ethical Implications. London: King’s College London. Gabbay, Z. D. (2005). Justifying Restorative Justice: A Theoretical Justification for the Use of Restorative Justice Practices. Retrieved July 18, 2016, from International Institute of Restorative Practices: http://www.iirp.edu/pdf/jus tifyingrj.pdf. Gagnon, I., Carlo, G., Friedman, D., Lisa, G., and Grant, L. I. (2009). Active Rehabilitation for Children Who Are Slow to Recover Following Sport-Related Concussion. Brain Injury, 23(12), 956–964. Retrieved from: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.3109/02699050903373477. Garkawe, S. (1999). Restorative Justice from the Perspective of Crime Victims. Retrieved July 13, 2016, from Australian Legal Information Institute: http:// www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/QUTLawJl/1999/4.pdf. Gay, L. R., Mills, G. E., and Airasian, P. (2012). Educational Research: Competencies for Analysis and Applications. Boston: Pearson. Giessmann, H., and Dudouet, K. P. (2012). Deficits and Blind Spots in Existing Approaches to Post-War Security Promotion. In H. G. Dudouet (Ed.), PostWar Security Transitions (pp. 30–42). New York: Routledge. Giulianotti, R. (1995). Football and the Politics of Carnival: An Ethnographic Study of Scottish Fans in Sweden. International Review for the Sociology of Sport, 30(2), 191–220. Giustozzi, A. (2012). Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobalization and Rrintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In. London: Ashgate. Glazzard, A., Sasha, J., and Emily, W. (2015). Conflict and Countering Violent Extremism: Literature Review. Working Paper Royal United Services Institute. Gohar, A. (2014). Jirga: An Indigenous Institution for Peacebuilding in the Pukhtoon Belt of Pakistan and Afghanistan. In J. J. Akanmu and G. Adebayo (Eds.), Indigenous Conflict Management Strategies: Global Perspective (pp. 183–193). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. GoKP. (2013). Local Government Act, 2013. Retrieved July 13, 2017, from Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (GoKP): http://lgkp.gov.pk/wp-con tent/uploads/2015/12/Local-Government-Act2013-Urdu.pdf. GoSL. (2013, May 31). Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants. Retrieved August 19, 2016, from Bureau of Commissioner General of Rehabilitation

REFERENCES

177

(BCGR): http://www.bcgr.gov.lk/docs/Rehabilitation%20of%20Ex-Combat ants%20(Compiler%20-%20Brigadier%20Dharshana%20Hettiarrachchi).pdf. Grabe, V. (2004). Peace Processes 1990–1994. In M. Garcia-Duran (Ed.), Accord: Alternatives to War: Colombia’s Peace Processes (14, pp. 38–45). London: Conciliation Resources. Greene, O., Hiscock, D., and Flew, C. (2008). Integration and Co-ordination of DDR and SALW Control Programming: Issues, Experience and Priorities. England: University of Bradford. Griffiths, Curt T., et al. (2007). The Social Reintegration of Offenders and Crime Prevention. Ottawa: National Crime Prevention Centre. Guardian. (2001, October 27). 5,000 Pakistani Tribesmen to Join Taliban. Retrieved February 19, 2018, from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian. com/world/2001/oct/27/afghanistan.terrorism1. Gwartney, J. D., and Lawson, R. (2001). Economic Freedom of the World 2001 Annual Report. Canada: The Fraser Institute. Hammersley, M., and Atkinson, P. (2007). Ethnography: Principles in Practice. London: Taylor & Francis. Haney, C. (2006). The Law and Public Policy. Reforming Punishment: Psychological Limits to the Pains of Imprisonment. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Haroon, A. I. (2018, April 5). Advisory Board of National Security Division of Pakistan starts working. Retrieved May 7, 2018, from Dispatch News Desk (DND): https://dnd.com.pk/advisory-board-of-national-security-division-sta rts-working/140988. Hay, W. R. (1934). The Yusufzai State of Swat. The Geographical Journal, 84(3), 236–246. Hoeft, G. (2015, March). ‘Soft’ Approaches to Counter-Terrorism: An Exploration of the Benefits of Deradicalization Programs. Retrieved June 17, 2018, from International Institute for Counter Terrorism: https://www.ict.org.il/UserFi les/ICT-Soft-Approaches-to-CT-Hoeft.pdf. Horowitz, D. L. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hudson, H. (2005). Doing’ Security as though Human Matter: A Feminist Perspective on Gender and the Politics of Human Security. Security Dialogue, 36(2), 155–174. IRD. (2018). Iqbal International Institute for Research and Dialogue (IRD). Retrieved April 2, 2018, from International Islamic University Islamabad: http://www.iiu.edu.pk/?page_id=3718. ISPR. (2013, March 16). Press Release. Retrieved October 11, 2017, from Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR): https://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp? o=t-press_release&date=2013/3/16.

178

REFERENCES

Janzen, R. (2014). Guatemalan Ex-combatant Perspectives on Reintegration: A Grounded Theory. Canada: The Qualitative Report. Jehanzeb-College. (2019). History of Jehanzeb College Swat. Retrieved September 17, 2019, from Info Jehanzeb College: http://www.admission.hed.gkp.pk/ page.php?college_id=39&page_id=4902. Justice, T. N. (2016, April 10). Recidivism. Retrieved from nij.org: http://www. nij.gov/topics/corrections/recidivism/pages/welcome.aspx. Khan, I. (2016a). Relevance of Radio in Social Construction in FATA: A Case of Bajaur Agency. Quest of Pakhtun Identity at Pak-Afghan Border Land. Peshawar: SBBU Peshawar and AWKU Mardan. Khan, I. (2016b). Post Conflict Rehabilitation in Swat: A Feminist Approach. Global Gender Perspectives (pp. 1–11). Lahore: Lahore College for Women University. Khan, S. A. (2015, September 14). Deradicalization Programming in Pakistan. Retrieved October 28, 2017, from United States Institute of Peace (USIP): https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/09/deradicaliza tion-programming-pakistan. Khan, U. K. (2016). Deradicalization in Pakistan. Retrieved June 2, 2018, from Center for Peace, Security and Development Studies (CPSD): www.cpsd.org. pk/research-article-6.php. Khasnabis, C., et al. (2010). Community-Based Rehabilitation: CBR Guidelines. Geneva: World Health Organization (WHO). Knight, M. (2012). DDR and SSR. In G. A. Dudouet (Ed.), Post-War Security Transitions: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts (pp. 17– 29). New York: Routledge. Knight, W. A. (2008). Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding in Africa: An Overview. African Security, 1(1), 24–52. KP Police. (2014). Dispute Resolution Council (DRC). Retrieved April 13, 2018, from Khber Pakhtunkhwa Police: http://kppolice.gov.pk/drc/. Lambourne, W. (2009). Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 3(1), 28–48. Lara, Francisco J., Jr. (2012). Settlement without Disarmament in the Philippines: The Unheralded Outcomes of the GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement. In A. Giustozzi (Ed.), Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In (pp. 99–112). London: Ashgate. Leaderach, J. P. (1997). Sustainable Peace in Divided Societies. Washington, DC: USIP. Leao, R. (2018, March 21). Conflict Negotiation. Retrieved March 21, 2018, from Quizlet: https://quizlet.com/168663207/chapter-14-conflictnegotiation-flash-cards/.

REFERENCES

179

Lefas, M., and Nozawa, J. (2016). Rehabilitating Juvenile Violent Extremist Offenders in Detention: Advancing a Juvenile Justice Approach. The Hague: International Center for Counter Terrorism (ICCT). López, Rodríguez Maivel, Andreouli, Eleni, and Caroline, Howarth. (2015). From Ex-combatants to Citizens: Connecting Everyday Citizenship and Social Reintegration in Colombia. Journal of Political and Social Psycology, 3(2), 171–191. Lundy, B. (2014). Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Social Conflict in GuineaBissau’s Fisheries. In J. J. Akanmu G. Adebayo, Indigenous Conflict Management Strategies: Global Perspectives (pp. 151–165). Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Maedl, A., Schauer, E., Odenwald, M., and Elbert, T. (2010). Psychological Rehabilitation of Ex-combatants in Non-Western, Post-Conflict Settings. Trauma Rehabilitation after War and Conflict, 177–213. Retrieved June 17, 2019, from: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4419-57221_9#citeas. Manan, A. (2010, September 25). Counter Terrorism Department Formed. Express Tribune. Marshall, T. (1999). Restorative Justice: An Overview. Research Development and Statistics Directorate, Home Office. London: Crown Publishers. Martin, M. (2017). Sri Lanka’s Ex-combatant Rehabilitation Programme: Reconstructing Gendered Identities. Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 12(1), 79–84. Marwat, A. J. (2017, October 14). Militants Going Mainstream. Retrieved June 3, 2018, from Pakistan Observer: https://pakobserver.net/militants-goingmainstream/. Mccarthy, J. (2011, July 25). Pakistan Bids to Change the Minds of Swat Radicals. Retrieved April 5, 2018, from NPR: https://www.npr.org/2011/07/ 25/138560612/pakistan-bids-to-change-the-minds-of-swat-radicals. McPherson, K., Gibson, B. E., and Leplège, A. (2015). Rethinking Rehabilitation: Theory, Practice, History—And the Future. New York: CRC Press and Taylor & Francis. Medeiros, E. (2007). Integrating Mental Health into Post-Conflict Rehabilitation: The Case of Sierra Leonean and Liberian ‘Child Soldiers’. Journal of Health Psychology, 12(3), 498–504. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/ 10.1177/1359105307076236. Miller, C. E. (2005). A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies (2nd ed., M. E. King, Ed.) Addis Ababa: University for Peace. Ministry of Disaster Management and Human Rights. (2009). National Framework Proposal for Reintegration of Ex-combatants into Civilian Life in Sri Lank. Colombo: Government of Sri Lanka.

180

REFERENCES

Molloy, D. (2008). DDR: A Shifting Paradigm & the Scholar /Practitioner Gap. Ottawa: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre. Molloy, D. (2017). Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Theory and Practice. London: Kumarian Press. Muggah, R. (2009). Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War. London: Routledge. Mundy, J. (2014). Transitional Justice Algeria and the Violence of National Reconciliation. In D. B. Mundy, The Post-Conflict Environment: Investigation and Critique (pp. 103–134). Michigan: University of Michigan Press. Murshed, S. M., and Tadjoeddin, M. Z. (2007). Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflicts. United Kingdom: MICROCON Working Paper No. 2. Retrieved March 13, 2018, from Murshed, S. M. and Tadjoeddin, M. Z. (2007, September). Reappraising the Greed and Grievance Explanations for Violent Internal Conflict (2007). MICROCON Research Working Paper No. 2: https://ssrn.com/abstract= 1116248. NACTA. (2018). National Counter Extremism Policy Guidelines. Islamabad: National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). Nasir, M., Farooq, R. A., and Ali, A. (2013). Role of Parents in Strengthening of Parents Teachers Councils (PTCs) in Schools in KPK, Pakistan. Educational Research International, 2(2), 128–133. National Institute of Justice (2016, April 10). Recidivism. Retrieved from nij.org: http://www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/recidivism/pages/welcome.aspx. Naz, S. H. (2013). The Assessment of Parent Teacher Councils in Primary Schools of District Mardan. HOPE Journal of Research, 1(1), 122–138. NCHD. (2013). Adult Literacy Report 2012–2013. Retrieved October 16, 2019, from National Commission for Human Development (NCHD): http://nchd. org.pk/ws/downloads/Progress%20Report%20ALP%202012-13%20(1).pdf. Nichols, R. (2001). Settling the Frontier: Law, Land and Society in the Peshawar Valley, 1500–1900. Karachi: Oxford University Press. Nilsson, A. (2005). Reintegrating Ex-combatants in Post-Conflict Societies. Uppsala: Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). Nyborg, I., Nawab, B., Khan, K., and Ali, J. (2012). Rural Development in Swat, Pakistan: Understanding Food and Livelihood Security in Post-Conflict Contexts. Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Department of International Environment and Development Studies. Norway: Norwegian University of Life Sciences. Oluwaniyi, O. (2018). The Challenges of Reintegration in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: The Case of Nigeria’s Niger Delta Region. New York: Social Science Research Council (SSRC).

REFERENCES

181

Orakzi, S. B. (2011). Conflict in the Swat Valley of Pakistan: Pakhtun Culture and Peacebuilding Theory-Practice Application. Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, 6(1), 35–48. Orwell, G. (1948). 1984. London: Oberon Books Limited. Oxford. (2016, April 12). Rehabilitation. Retrieved from Oxford Dictionaries: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/rehabilitation. Özerdem, A. (2012). A Re-conceptualisation of Ex-combatant Reintegration: ‘Social Reintegration’ Approach. Conflict, Security and Development, 12(1), 51–71. Ozerdem, A., and Podder, S. (2008). Reinsertion Assistance and the Reintegration of Ex-combatants in War to Peace Transitions. Bradford: University of Bradford. Paiman. (2017). About Paiman Alumni Trust. Retrieved June 13, 2017, from Paimantrust.org: http://paimantrust.org/about-paiman/. Pakistan Observer. (2017, October 11). ECP dismisses Milli Muslim League’s request to register as political party. Retrieved June 3, 2018, from Pakistan Observer: https://pakobserver.net/ecp-dismisses-milli-muslimleagues-request-register-political-party/. Pantev, P. (2006). Introduction: Conceptual and Terminology Issues of PostConflict Rehabilitation. In V. A. Sofia (Ed.), Post Conflict Rehabilitation (p. 5). Vienna: Study Group Information. Parsons, A. (2003). Burned area emergency rehabilitation (BAER) soil burn severity definitions and mapping guidelines. USDA Forest Services Department. Retrieved from: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi= 10.1.1.485.9254&rep=rep1&type=pdf. Patino, O., Grabe, V., and Gracia-Duran, M. (2012). The M19’s reinsertion process: Challenges and Lessons. In G. A. Dudouet (Ed.), Post War Security Transition: Participatory Peacebuilding after Asymmetric Conflicts (p. 43). New York: Routledge. Pretty, J. L., Harrison, S. S. C., Shepherd, D., Smith, C., Hildrew, A. G., and Hey, R. D. (2003). River Rehabilitation and fish Populations: Assessing the Benefit of Instream Structures. Journal of Applied Ecology, 40, 251–265. Rana, M. A. (2011). Swat Deradicalization Model: Prospects for Rehabilitating Militants. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS). Ratnayake, M. G. (2012). Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Ex-combatants in the Post War Sri Lanka. Retrieved August 19, 2017, from Kotelawala Defence University: http://www.kdu.ac.lk/southern_campus/images/doc uments/symposium/symposium2012/papers/ts/RehabilitationandReinteg rationofExCombatantsinthePostWarSriLanka._.pdf. Robbins, E., and O’Hara, A. (2009). Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both Victim and Social Needs. Law and Contemporary Problems, 72(2), 199–217.

182

REFERENCES

Robinson, G., and Crow, I. (2009). Offender Rehabilitation: Theory, Research and Practice. London: Sage. Sanin, F. G., and Penza, A. G. (2012). Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobalization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In. London: Ashgate. Sanin, F. Gutierrez, and Penza, A. G. (2012). Columbia’s Paramilitary DDR and its Limits. In A. Giustozzi, Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In (pp. 113–132). London: Ashgate. Schmid, D. A. (2013). Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review. The Hague: ICCT Research Paper. Seymour, K. (2011, July 17). De-radicalisation: Psychologists’ War Against Militants. Retrieved August 19, 2017, from the Express Tribune: https://tri bune.com.pk/story/211479/de-radicalising-rehab-psychologists-war-againstmilitants/. Shaheen, S. (2009, August 28). 90pc IDPs Have Returned to Swat: UN. Retrieved July 3, 2018, from thenation.com.pk: https://nation.com.pk/28Aug-2009/90pc-idps-have-returned-to-swat-un. Shepherd, B. (2012). The Case of the FDLR in DR Congo: A Technical Drift. In A. Giustozzi (Ed.), Post-Conflict Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Bringing State-Building Back In (pp. 73–86). London: Ashgate. Soofi, A. B. (2012). Employing the Sri Lankan Rehabilitation Model to Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Framework. Islamabad: Research Society of International Law. Spalek, B. (2012). Counter-Terrorism Community- Based Approaches to Preventing Terror Crime. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Spiked-Online. (2013, May 16). What’s so Liberal About Rehabilitation? Retrieved June 9, 2016, from Spiked-Online: http://www.spiked-online.com/ newsite/article/13623#.V1ntsKJlDIU. Sultan-i-Rome. (2016). Land and Forest Governance in Swat: Transition from Tribal System to State to Pakistan. London: Oxford University Press. Sultan-i-Rome. (2016). Land and Forest Governance in Swat: Transition from Tribal System to State to Pakistan. London: Oxford University Press. Temple-Raston, D. (2013, April 1). Re-educate Militants. Retrieved July 17, 2016, from npr.org: http://www.npr.org/2013/04/01/175706661/pakist ans-ambitious-program-to-re-educate-militants. The Institute for Social Justice. (2011). The Actions (in Aid of Civil Power) Regulation, 2011. Retrieved July 27, 2018, from The Institute for Social Justice: http://www.isj.org.pk/the-actions-in-aid-of-civil-power-regulation-2011/.

REFERENCES

183

The National Institute of Justice. (2016, April 10). Recidivism. Retrieved from nij.org: http://www.nij.gov/topics/corrections/recidivism/pages/wel come.aspx. Thukral, E. G. (1996, June 15). Development, Displacement and Rehabilitation: Locating Gender. Economic and Political Weekly, 31(24), 1500–1503. TVETA. (2016). Technical and Vocational Education and Training Authority. Retrieved November 11, 2017, from Technical and Vocational Education and Training Authority: http://www.tvetauthority.go.ke/139-2/. UNDP. (2007). The Challenges of Restoring Governance in Crisis and PostConflict Countries. Vienna: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. UNHCR. (2008). A Community-Based Approach in UNHCR Operations. UNHCR. Switzerland, p. 14. UNHCR. (2012, April). European Country for Origin Information Network. Retrieved March 22, 2018, from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1004339/2016_1335351758_ 4f9663d12.pdf. United Nations. (2006a). Handbook on Restorative Justice Program. New York: United Nations. United Nations. (2006b). Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards. New York: United Nations. Villalba, Dr. C. S. (2011). Rehabilitation as a Form of Reparation under International Law. London: RDRESS. Ward, T. (2011).Human Rights and Dignity in Offender Rehabilitation. Journal of Forensic Psychology Practice, 11, 103–123. Ward, T., and Maruna, S. (2007). Rehabilitation. London: Routledge. World Bank. (2018). Reintegration of Ex-combatants Project. Washington, DC: Not Published. Yumna, R. (2015, September 23). Bringing them home: Pakistan’s Child Deradicalisation Centre Offers Second Chance. Retrieved January 28, 2017, from Dawn News: http://www.dawn.com/news/1208602. Zehr, H. (2009, October 22). Restorative Justice; What’s That? Retrieved July 13, 2016, from International Institute for Restorative Practices: http://www. iirp.edu/article_detail.php?article_id=NjMx.

Index

A Advocate, 48, 92 Aggrieved citizens, 5 Aid, 1, 3, 5, 22, 28–32, 34, 55, 77, 82, 119, 142, 148 Apology, 36, 147, 150, 166 Assess, 22, 35, 84, 88, 163, 164 Assistance, 2, 46, 53–55, 91, 106, 109–111, 113, 124, 153, 164 Authority, 7, 28, 30–32, 36, 40, 44, 52, 67, 75, 76, 79, 84, 85, 91, 102, 108, 114, 127, 136, 143, 145, 150, 151, 163

B Behaviors, 2, 3, 10–12, 22, 28, 50, 94, 106, 112, 125, 140, 144 Black, 75, 77, 78

C Circumstances, 13, 18, 29, 46, 47, 51, 56, 73, 92, 121, 132, 139, 143, 163, 166

Civilian, 2, 4, 7–9, 25, 29–32, 44–46, 53, 54, 75–77, 80, 83, 90, 114, 119, 123, 127, 128, 133, 134, 142, 153 Civil-military cooperation, 28 Civil militia, 152, 153, 166 Civil Power Regulations, 30, 160 Coexistence, 27, 28 Collective rehabilitation, 2 Combatants, 2, 4, 5, 44, 46, 51, 52, 54, 55, 68, 75, 76, 78, 80, 82, 88, 117, 132, 151, 152 Committee, 21, 77, 90, 135, 136, 149 Community, 3, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 28, 34, 40, 44, 45, 47, 50, 70, 77, 89, 90, 103–107, 111, 114, 118, 121, 125, 127, 132, 134, 136–139, 141, 143, 146, 147, 149–153, 164–166 Community-based rehabilitation (CBR), 141, 165 Compensation, 35, 36, 145–148, 151, 166, 167

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 I. Khan, Rehabilitation, Deradicalization, and Reintegration of Militants, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-9514-1

185

186

INDEX

Compromise, 29, 34 Conceptual, 127 Conceptualize, 2, 44, 45, 127 Conflict, 2, 3, 5, 8, 12, 17, 20, 27, 29, 35, 41, 47, 52, 56, 62, 63, 68, 75, 84, 93, 127, 133, 137–140, 143, 148, 149, 151, 152, 154, 160, 166, 167 Context, 3, 8, 10, 18, 33, 36, 39, 43–45, 48, 50, 74, 93, 101, 137, 152, 167 Contextual, 4, 52, 69 Controlled environment, 2, 4, 5, 31, 36, 136, 160 Controlled rehabilitation, 4, 36, 98, 163, 167 Controlled setting, 4, 5, 98, 159 Controlled society, 4, 31, 33, 43, 44, 56, 101, 128, 160, 164 Cooperate, 29, 30 Counseling, 22, 53, 140 Counter-narrative, 25, 126 Counterterrorism, 20, 21, 24, 25, 80, 161 Counterterrorism department (CTD), 20–23, 28, 139, 165 Criminal, 3, 34, 49–52, 65, 66, 111, 116, 138, 144, 145, 147, 148, 150, 151, 166 Curricula, 26 D Demobilized, 5, 32, 46, 47, 54, 55, 112, 132 Deradicalization, 18, 20–23, 26–28, 31, 75, 81, 141, 161, 165 De-radicalize, 28, 93, 123 Disarmament, 32, 45–47, 53, 160 Disarmed, 32, 47, 54, 132 Displaced, 9, 50 Dispute, 8, 18, 26, 35, 65, 133, 135, 139, 148

Domestic, 18, 21, 55, 63, 111 E Electoral, 19 Employment, 23, 40, 46, 91, 108–110, 119, 121, 164 Ethnicity, 17, 145 Ethnography, 9, 10, 12, 163 Evaluated, 35, 81, 84, 88 Evaluation, 35, 41, 75, 88, 132 Ex-combatants, 1–3, 5, 8, 10, 12, 13, 19, 28, 31, 33, 36, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 55, 75, 84, 89, 91, 92, 102–105, 107, 109, 111, 112, 115, 118–124, 126–128, 132, 133, 137, 138, 141, 149, 152, 153, 160, 162, 164–166 executing, 48, 69 Extremists, 2, 20, 26, 28, 64, 93, 97, 105, 113, 116, 117, 124, 132, 139, 141, 145, 153 F Facilitators, 21, 34, 146 Facility, 19, 25, 80, 82, 85, 86, 93, 107, 110, 115, 116, 144, 163, 164 Families, 11, 32, 33, 46, 52, 53, 55, 65, 67, 69, 75, 78, 80, 89, 90, 94, 103, 104, 118, 120, 125, 141, 142, 146, 149, 151, 162, 165, 166 Federally administered tribal areas (FATA), 7, 8, 19, 30 Former combatants, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 20, 26, 28, 31, 39, 40, 45, 51–53, 55, 66, 82, 84, 89, 92, 102, 104, 106, 109, 111, 116, 118, 125, 132, 134, 141, 145, 151, 154, 161, 164

INDEX

Former militants, 3, 22, 27, 30, 33, 36, 41, 42, 55, 73, 74, 83, 106, 112, 119, 122, 127, 165 Framework, 18, 19, 34, 40, 54, 93, 161, 167 Frustration aggression, 5

G Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (GoKP), 31, 135, 142 Grey, 75–77, 82, 149, 162, 166

H Hard-core militants, 76 Harmony, 27, 127 Home-grown, 18 Hujra, 104, 153 Humane, 3, 51 Humanely, 51 Humanitarian, 9, 30, 35, 39, 132, 133, 163 Humanitarian organizations, 2, 5, 9, 98, 122, 133

I Ideological, 51, 78, 79, 82 IDPs, 7, 9, 41, 42 Imprisoned, 7, 22, 23, 32, 64, 79, 82, 120, 125 Inclusion, 17, 123, 153, 164 Individual rehabilitation, 2 Individuals, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 17, 40, 43, 46, 63, 66, 76, 77, 79, 84, 87, 105, 109, 116, 120, 123, 132, 137, 138, 143, 147, 152 Infrastructure, 7, 24, 40, 41, 55, 76 Initiatives, 9, 10, 19, 23, 25–28, 30, 31, 33, 39, 41, 42, 53, 55, 73, 80, 92, 102, 135, 137, 140, 161 Insurgents, 2, 3, 69, 76, 77, 79

187

International, 2–4, 9, 18, 25, 42, 47, 55, 56, 95, 98, 119, 128, 133, 148 Internment center, 76, 90, 124 Interpretation, 12, 86 Intervention, 21, 23, 30, 48, 135, 153 J Jarga, 35, 141, 143, 148–152, 165–167 Jihad, 7, 67, 68, 87, 95–97, 126 Jihadists, 21, 22 Justice, 3, 32–34, 52, 139, 143, 153, 165 L Literature, 5, 18, 19, 31, 32, 40, 46, 53–55, 112, 114, 160 Logical, 52 M Madrassa, 20, 22, 23, 26, 68, 79, 94, 114, 142 Majority, 5, 24, 31, 41, 49, 53, 63, 68, 75, 90, 103, 118, 123, 127, 134, 139, 145, 154, 161, 166 Militancy, 4, 8, 18, 30, 63, 64, 66, 67, 70, 84, 94, 106, 112, 114, 125, 160, 162, 163 Militants, 2–5, 8, 21–23, 26, 32, 41, 42, 62, 64, 67, 69, 70, 74–76, 81, 94, 106, 117, 126, 137, 161, 162 Militarization, 112 Militarized, 2, 44, 133 Military, 2, 7, 8, 13, 29–31, 44, 55, 65, 67, 76, 79, 81, 84, 91, 96, 103, 105, 106, 114, 121, 126, 127, 134, 135, 153, 160, 165 Mujahedeen, 6, 7

188

INDEX

N Narratives, 2, 20, 26, 44, 63, 79, 88, 116, 126, 134, 137, 145, 153 Nation, 4, 9, 17, 19, 25, 27, 28, 30, 49, 73, 145, 147, 148 National, 2, 3, 8, 18, 24, 25, 27, 35, 39, 44, 53, 87, 88, 95, 145, 154, 161 Negotiations, 8, 133, 144, 146, 147, 165 Non-governmental organization (NGO), 8, 9, 13, 19, 26–29, 39, 93, 97, 161 Non-rehabilitateable, 77 O Open society, 10, 42, 43 Organizational rehabilitation, 2 Outcome, 34, 50, 53, 92, 102, 136, 152, 154 P Pakhtunkhwa, 6 Paramilitary, 48 Pashtun, 8, 35, 69, 135, 148, 151, 153, 163, 166, 167 Pashtunwali, 8, 11, 35, 36, 128, 133, 142, 143, 146, 148, 165, 167 Peace, 1, 2, 5, 9, 26, 28, 41, 47, 55, 90, 92, 137, 139, 154, 167 Peacebuilding, 4, 9, 28, 30, 31, 42, 44, 45, 52–54, 133, 139, 154 Peace settlement, 2 Perspective, 12, 13, 50, 134, 143, 146 Physical, 3, 26, 41, 49, 51, 86, 87 Policy, 18, 19, 25, 28, 32, 33, 73, 93, 148, 153, 161, 165 Political, 5, 12, 18, 40, 48, 65, 77, 92, 106, 113, 116, 128, 146, 153

Political parties, 6, 18, 48, 49, 113, 128 Post-Cold War, 40, 44, 45 Prisons, 22, 23, 49, 64, 76, 139, 145, 153 Programs, 1, 2, 4, 18, 19, 22, 23, 25, 31, 33, 35, 47, 54, 89, 92, 98, 102, 110, 122, 123, 125, 127, 128, 132, 134, 136, 138, 143, 145, 159–161, 163, 164 Psychiatric, 22, 75, 76, 82, 93, 113 Punishment, 7, 43, 70, 77, 96, 106, 113, 124, 144, 147, 149, 166 Puppets, 52

R Radical, 2, 18, 26, 52, 61, 76, 104, 106, 112, 134, 140 Radicalized, 77, 80, 87, 93–96, 113, 141, 153 Ranks, 24, 33, 52, 68, 69, 76, 78, 141, 161, 162 Recidivism, 2, 22, 35, 50, 51, 91, 92, 110–114, 116, 128, 164, 165 Reconciliation, 8, 32, 41, 42, 45, 47, 54, 138, 167 Recovery, 31, 45, 47, 84, 124, 125 Reforms, 21, 49, 106 Refugees, 9, 41 Rehabilitation, 1–5, 8–10, 12, 13, 18–20, 24, 25, 27, 28, 31–33, 35, 36, 39, 41, 44, 47, 49–52, 54, 55, 73–75, 77, 80, 81, 83, 86, 90, 96, 98, 101–103, 106, 108, 109, 111, 113–116, 118, 119, 122–126, 128, 132–139, 141, 144–146, 152, 154, 159–165, 167 Rehabilitee, 5, 6, 84, 88–90, 103–105, 108, 109, 113–115, 120

INDEX

Reinsertion, 40, 41, 45, 46, 48, 53, 55 Reintegration, 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, 12, 13, 18, 19, 24, 30–33, 40, 41, 45–47, 50, 53, 54, 56, 92, 101, 102, 105, 114, 118, 123, 127, 134, 137–139, 145, 159–161, 164, 165, 167 Rejoin, 91, 111, 117 Religiosity, 62, 63, 67 Repatriation, 48, 54 Repercussions, 50, 96, 124, 162 Representatives, 19, 20, 24, 28, 36, 77, 80, 82, 89, 108, 112, 115–117, 143, 153 Restoration, 28, 31, 40–42, 139, 146, 147 Restorative conferences, 144, 149 Restorative Jarga, 149, 151–153, 159, 165–167 Restorative justice (RJ), 34, 35, 128, 133, 139, 143–149, 151–154, 159, 165–167 Retribution, 65, 111, 144 Retributive justice, 144

S Security, 2, 4, 7–9, 12, 18, 25, 28, 32, 42, 45, 47, 49, 54, 62, 66, 67, 75–79, 81, 82, 90, 91, 95, 106, 110, 112, 113, 115–118, 120–122, 124, 126, 132, 138, 151, 153, 161–163, 165 Self-integrate, 44 Sharia, 3, 7, 66, 74, 87, 113, 125 Smart counterterrorism, 2 Society, 2–5, 10, 12, 13, 20, 27, 28, 32, 33, 39, 40, 42–45, 49, 52, 53, 56, 67, 69, 98, 102, 104–106, 109, 112, 114, 121–123, 127, 128, 132, 135,

189

138, 139, 146, 152, 154, 159, 163 Society of control, 43 Socioeconomic, 40, 45 Soft-core militants, 76 Soft counterterrorism, 2 Soldiers, 29, 32, 50, 97, 126 Specialized, 3, 40, 56, 134 Strategy, 2–4, 20, 21, 25, 33, 35, 41, 47–49, 73, 128, 132, 133, 141, 154, 165 Surrendered, 2, 47, 75–77, 116, 117, 121, 141, 153 Sustainable, 1, 46, 52 Swati-Taliban, 65 T Taliban, 8, 32, 33, 65–67, 69, 74, 78, 79, 95–97, 111, 121, 125, 141, 150, 161, 162 Talibanization, 62, 64, 65, 68 TDPs, 9 Technical, 22, 26, 31, 82, 83, 93, 94, 107–109, 123, 127, 164 Tehirik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), 7, 8, 32, 35 Terrorists, 2, 3, 8, 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 48, 67, 74, 76, 77, 90, 122, 165 Trainee, 22, 107, 109 Training, 12, 22, 23, 26, 40, 50, 54, 55, 79, 84, 87, 88, 91, 107–109, 114, 119, 127, 142, 161 Transition, 18, 39, 48, 53 U United Nations (UN), 2, 4, 32, 34, 44, 45, 48, 53, 55, 56, 139, 143, 146 V Victimization, 51, 52

190

INDEX

Violence, 5, 21, 30, 41, 53, 63, 65, 127, 128, 141, 151, 163

Violent, 4, 18, 26, 33, 62, 76, 77, 94, 118, 132, 145, 152

W Weapons, 32, 45, 46, 69, 117, 134, 138 White, 75–78, 82, 149, 162, 166 Win hearts and minds (WHAMs), 30, 34