Regionalism in Africa and External Partners: Uneven Relationships and (Un)Intended Effects 3031107012, 9783031107016

Citation preview

Regionalism in Africa and External Partners Uneven Relationships and (Un)Intended Effects Edited by Johannes Muntschick

Regionalism in Africa and External Partners

Johannes Muntschick Editor

Regionalism in Africa and External Partners Uneven Relationships and (Un)Intended Effects

Editor Johannes Muntschick Institute of Political Science Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz Bamberg, Germany

ISBN 978-3-031-10701-6 ISBN 978-3-031-10702-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10702-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Regionalism and external actors have become an increasingly important topic in the study of international relations today. Research interest includes mainly the nature of multifaced relationships and modes of interaction that exist between regional organisations and their extra-regional counterparts. It also concerns the impact of asymmetric patterns of interdependence and accompanying imbalance in power, which is a common feature in North–South relations on the country or regional levels, notably in the issue areas of the economy and security. Against the background of these empirical observations and mindful of existing research gaps, the aim of this volume is to analyse the partnerships between regionalisms and external actors and explore the logic of how and why the latter unfold impact on the first. Given the example of the European Union (EU) in Africa, we see evidence for Brussels’ growing external involvement and its influence on various regional cooperation initiatives, regional integration processes and institution-building on the African continent, notably in the issue area of the economy but more recently and increasingly also in security matters. Yet research on this subject is still in its infancy in contrast to the study of (comparative) regionalism and interregionalism, which reflects in a growing body of academic literature. Against the background of a lack of systematic frameworks and theoryinformed empirical case studies, the editor of this volume organised an international research conference on ‘Regionalism in the Global South v

vi

PREFACE

and the EU in Comparative Perspective: The ambivalent Influence of Intra- and Extra-Regional Actors on Regional Integration Processes’ held in Mainz, Germany, in November 2016. Hosted and supported by the International Relations Unit at the Department of Political Science at the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz in cooperation with the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence ‘EU in Global Dialogue’ (CEDI) of the Universities of Mainz and Darmstadt (Germany), the conference was an attempt to bring scholars interested in (comparative) regionalism, regionalism and external actors as well as interregionalism together, for theoretical reflections, debating the role of the European Union on global regionalism and gaining insights into empirical case studies from various regions in the Global South. With scholars from different countries in Europe and Africa attending, the conference was a stimulating and fruitful event with many high-quality presentations and excellent papers. The event sparked further interest in the topic and triggered a process of additional thoughts and research on regionalism and external actors, particularly in the issue area of security that has been rarely dealt with before. This led to the idea of an edited volume that brings together scholars with a shared interest in regionalism and external actors, combined with profound expertise in African regional organisations and security policy. While this has proven to be successful, the aim to further diversify the group of contributors and include some female authors was inconclusive, unfortunately, since those addressed were busily engaged in other research projects at that time. The process of compiling, revising and editing this volume proved to be much more complex and time-consuming than initially expected. During the last stages of the project, the COVID-19 pandemic developed into a scourge of humanity that took many of us by surprise. With lockdowns and other restrictive government measures increasingly and repeatedly in place, the pandemic caused many of us new challenges in job and private life which were sometimes not easy to adapt to. This affected not least working routines. Notwithstanding some difficult circumstances over the past years, however, the process resulted in the publication of this edited volume. I hope that it will contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon of regionalism and external actors, both theoretically and empirically, and help explain the logic of external influence on regional actors. With its geographical focus on Africa and scope on the issue area of security, this volume shall provide a basis for further research on the topic in other world regions and policy fields.

PREFACE

vii

Before expounding the findings of our research endeavour, I shall highlight that this edited volume could not have been completed without the efforts and support of several people and institutions. First of all, I would like to thank all contributors for their interest in the research topic, for sharing their expertise and research findings, and for providing excellent conceptual and empirical input to this volume. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence ‘EU in Global Dialogue’ (CEDI), financed by the European Union, and to Arne Niemann, Head of the International Relations Unit at the Department of Political Science at the University of Main, for funding, supporting and hosting the international conference that sparked the idea for this project. I am also grateful to all those colleagues who attended the conference and provided constructive criticism as paper discussants and/or panel chairs. These are, besides the contributors to this volume, Tobias Hofmann, Arndt Michael, Wolfgang Muno, Mariel Reiss, Jürgen Rüland, Karen Siegel, Andreas von Staden, Mayte Anais Dongo Sueiro, Allan Tatham, Daniele Vintila and Antonia Witt. My special thanks go to Anja Jetschke for her impressive keynote speech on the promise of diffusion approaches for explaining institutional design and policy projects of regional organisations. I would also like to sincerely thank all those who contributed in various ways to the organisation of the conference—namely Laura Hähn, Margit Hartung and Simone Ndongala—as well as our student assistants Svenja Budde and Clara Föller for proofreading and supporting the editorial process. Finally, I am also highly indebted to Anne-Kathrin Birchley-Brun, Ashwini Elango and Anca Pusca of Palgrave for their continuous support, encouragement and great patience as well as to the anonymous reviewers for their inspiring and thoughtful input. Bamberg, Germany October 2021

Johannes Muntschick

Contents

Part I Introduction 1

Introduction and Theorising: Regionalism and External Actors Johannes Muntschick

3

Part II Comprehensive Mapping Studies 2

3

Regional Trade Regimes in Africa: Exploring Organisational Overlap and Externalities Malte Brosig

35

External Actors and Security Regionalism in Africa: A New Dataset on External Funding Fredrik Söderbaum and Sören Stapel

61

Part III Case Studies 4

5

Actors and Ambitions in the European Union’s Security Policies Towards Africa Gorm Rye Olsen France, EU and the Security (Dis)integration of the African Union Habibu Yaya Bappah

83

107

ix

x

CONTENTS

6

Desert Rose or Fata Morgana? The G5 Sahel and Its Partnership with the European Union Julian Bergmann

7

8

Evaluating the Effectiveness of the ECOWAS–EU Interregional Partnership on Peace and Security in the Context of the Mali Crisis Friedrich Plank Causes and Effects of External Support to Regional Organisations: The Case of EU Support to the ECOWAS Commission in Customs and Free Movement Lukas Maximilian Müller

127

155

189

Part IV Conclusions 9

Conclusion Johannes Muntschick

Index

221

239

Notes on Contributors

Bappah Habibu Yaya is a lecturer at the Department of Political Science/International Studies, Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, Nigeria. He has also had extensive practical experience working in the Departments of Political Affairs, Peace and Security and Finance of the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). His research and publications draw on his ECOWAS experience, particularly the Organisation’s institutional development (reforms) and programmes on peace, security, stability and governance, human rights, democracy and development. One of his publications in the South African Journal of International Affairs is titled ECOWAS protagonists for peace: An internal perspective on policy and community actors in peace-making interventions (2018). Bergmann Julian is a senior researcher at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) in Bonn, Germany. His research interests include the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, EU development policy, crisis prevention, conflict management and international mediation. He has published widely on these topics, including in the Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Public Policy, Cooperation and Conflict, European Security, and International Negotiation. He is the author of The European Union as an International Mediator (Palgrave, 2020).

xi

xii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Brosig Malte is Professor in International Relations at the Department of International Relations at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. He joined the Department in 2009 after he received his Ph.D. from the University of Portsmouth. His main research interests focus on issues of international organisation interplay and peacekeeping in Africa. He is the author of The Role of BRICS in Large-Scale Armed Conflicts and Africa in a Changing Global Order: Marginal but Meaningful? both published with Palgrave Macmillan. Muntschick Johannes is a researcher and lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Germany. His research interests include regional and global governance institutions, regionalism and external influence, war economies, conflict management and politics in sub-Saharan Africa. His research has been published in various international and national journals, including the Journal of Common Market Studies and the Politische Vierteljahresschrift. He is the author of the book The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the European Union (EU): Regionalism and External Influence (Palgrave, 2018). Müller Lukas Maximilian is the advisor for the Lake Chad Region for Caritas Germany. Previously, he was a research associate at the University of Freiburg, where he completed his Ph.D. on policy processes in ASEAN and ECOWAS. His work has been published in the Pacific Review, European Journal of East Asian Studies, and German Journal of Political Science. His monograph The Rise of a Regional Institution in Africa. Agency and Policy-formation within the ECOWAS Commission will be published with Routledge in 2022. Olsen Gorm Rye is Professor in international politics at the Department for Social Science and Business, Roskilde University, Denmark. He has written widely on European Union-Africa relations and on EU security politics. Recently, he has published on transatlantic relations and on the foreign policy of the United States. His research has been published in a range of international journals such as Politics and Governance, European Security, Journal of European Integration, Third World Quarterly, Defence Policy and International Politics. Plank Friedrich is a post-doctoral research fellow and lecturer at the Department of Political Science at the University of Mainz, Germany. His main research interests include EU Foreign and Security Policy, peace and

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xiii

conflict studies, comparative regionalism and Africa–EU interregionalism. His work has been published, among others, in International Studies Review, Journal of Common Market Studies, European Security, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Civil Wars, and Journal of Contemporary European Research. He is currently co-speaker of the Early Career Group, International Relations Section of the German Political Science Association. Söderbaum Fredrik is a professor in peace and development research at the School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg. His research interests include comparative regionalism, regional and global governance, politics and development in Africa, and the EU as a global player. Recent books include Rethinking Regionalism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) and Intersecting Interregionalism (Springer, 2014). Together with Sören Stapel, and with funding from the Swedish Research Council, he conducted the project “External Funding to Regional Organizations in Africa”. Stapel Sören is a post-doctoral researcher at the University of Freiburg, Germany. His research interests include global and regional governance, norm and policy diffusion, and overlapping regionalism. He recently published Regional Organizations and Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022) and Comparing Regional Organizations (Bristol University Press, 2020, with Diana Panke and Anna Starkmann). Together with Fredrik Söderbaum, and with funding from the Swedish Research Council, he conducted the project “External Funding to Regional Organizations in Africa”.

Abbreviations

ACLED ACP ADB AEC AfCFTA AfDB AfDF AFISMA AGA AMIS AMISOM AMU APF APSA AQIM ASEAN ASF AU BADEA CAR CDC CE CEMAC CEMOC CEN-SAD CEPGL

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project African, Caribbean and Pacific African Development Bank African Economic Community African Continental Free Trade Area African Development Bank African Development Fund African-led International Support Mission to Mali AU African Governance Architecture AU Mission in Sudan AU Mission in Somalia Arab Maghreb Union EU African Peace Facility African Peace and Security Architecture Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb Association of Southeast Asian Nations Africa Standby Force African Union Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa Central African Republic ECCAS Defence and Security Commission Conseil de l’Entente Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale Comité d’État-Major Opérationnel Conjoint Community of Sahel-Saharan States Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries xv

xvi

ABBREVIATIONS

CET CEWARN CEWS CFA CFSP COMESA CSAMAP CSDP CSS CT Sahel DG DG DEVCO EAC EASF EC ECCAS ECOWARN ECOWAS EDF EEAS EEC EMP EPA ERM ETLS EU EUCAP EUFOR EUMS EUMSS Eurostat EUTF EUTM FMM FOCAC FOMAC FPA FTA G5 Sahel GIZ HR/VP

ECOWAS Common External Tariff IGAD Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism Continental Early Warning System Coopération Financière en Afrique EU Common Foreign and Security Policy Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Sahelian Center for Threat Analysis and Early Warning EU Common Security and Defence Policy Collège Sahélien de Sécurité EU Contre Terrorisme Sahel Intervention EU Commission’s Directorate-General EU Commission’s Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development East African Community East African Standby Force European Community Economic Community of Central African States ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Mechanism Economic Community of West African States European Development Fund European External Action Service European Economic Community Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Economic Partnership Agreement Early Response Mechanism ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme European Union EU Capacity Building Mission EU Force EU Military Staff EU Maritime Security Strategy European Statistical Office EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa EU Training Mission Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa project Forum of China-Africa Cooperation ECCAS Multinational Force of Central Africa Foreign Policy Analysis Free Trade Area Great 5 Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger) German Agency for International Cooperation High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

ABBREVIATIONS

HST ICGLR ICMPD IcSP IDA IfS IGAD IO IOC IOM JAES JF MARAC MERCOSUR MICEMA MICOPAX MIDWA MINUSMA MNJTF MNLA MRU NAFTA NATO NAVFOR NEPAD NGO OAU OCT ODA OECD OFID OHCHR Organ PIP PSC PSO RACC RCA RCC REC REWS RIO

xvii

Hegemonic Stability Theory International Conference on the Great Lakes Region International Centre for Migration Policy Development EU Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace International Development Association (World Bank) EU Instrument for Stability Intergovernmental Authority on Development International Organization Indian Ocean Commission International Organization for Migration Joint Africa-EU Strategy G5 Sahel Joint Force ECCAS Early Warning Mechanism of Central Africa Mercado Común del Sur (Southern Common Market) ECOWAS Mission in Mali ECOWAS Missions in the Central African Republic Migration Dialogue for West Africa UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali Multinational Joint Task Force National Movement for the Liberation on Azawad Mano River Union North American Free Trade Area North Atlantic Treaty Organization EU Naval Force AU New Partnership for Africa’s Development Non-Governmental Organization Organization of African Unity Overseas Countries and Territories Official Development Assistance Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Fund for International Development UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights SADC Organ for Politics, Defence and Security G5 Sahel Priority Investment Programme AU Peace and Security Council Peace Support Operations Regional advisory and coordination cell Central African Republic Regional Coordination Cell Regional Economic Community SADC Regional Early Warning System Regional International Organization

xviii

ABBREVIATIONS

RIP RO SACU SADC SIPRI UAE UEMOA UK UMA UN UNAIDS UNCTAD UNDP UNECA UNFPA UNICEF UNSC US WAEMU WAMU WATIP WB WTO

Regional Indicative Program Regional Organization Southern African Customs Union Southern African Development Community Stockholm International Peace Research Institute United Arab Emirates West African Economic and Monetary Union United Kingdom Union du Maghreb Arabe (Maghreb Arab Union) United Nations Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Development Programme United Nations Economic Commission for Africa United Nations Population Fund United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Security Council United States of America West African Economic and Monetary Union West African Monetary Union German-EU project Promoting West African Trade Integration World Bank World Trade Organisation

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1

Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2

Fig. 3.3 Fig. 3.4 Fig. 3.5 Fig. Fig. Fig. Fig.

7.1 7.2 7.3 8.1

Transformation of a genuine regional dilemma-type situation into a suasion game with attractive external option (for country B) World trade and regions (USD in trillion per annum) Percentage of internal trade per bloc Percentage of internal trade for each REC Share of intra-REC trade of all African trade Regional ODA to regional projects and RIOs (2002–2016) Security-related ODA to regional projects and RIOs (2002–2016) Security-related ODA disbursements according to recipient RIO (2002–2016) Security-related aid disbursements to regional projects by top donors (2002–2016) Security-related aid disbursements to RIOs by top donors (2002–2016) ECOWAS member states Africa–EU and West Africa–EU relations Fatalities in Mali (2011–2015) Causal model underlying exchange of external institutional support

20 43 44 45 50 67 68 69 73 75 162 163 174 196

xix

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 5.1 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 7.1 Table 8.1 Table 8.2

Intra-African trade 2017 (USD in billion and percentages of total trade) Institutional consolidation and externalities The largest five export destinations 2017 Security-related aid activities in regional projects by top donors (per year) Security-related aid activities in RIOs by top donors (per year) AU Budget 2010–2016 Financial Years Comparison of the military and economic strength of G5 Sahel member states EU and member states funding to G5 Sahel countries (in million e) Goals of the partners in the West Africa–EU partnership on peace and security Budgets for regional indicative programs (RIPs) by the EU Commission EU projects conducted with the ECOWAS Commission in the period of observation

51 52 53 72 74 112 141 146 169 197 202

xxi

PART I

Introduction

CHAPTER 1

Introduction and Theorising: Regionalism and External Actors Johannes Muntschick

Over the past few decades, there has been a wave of new regionalism with new or renewed regional organisations being born across the globe. At the same time, the relations and interactions between world regions grew stronger and the modes of institutionalised cooperation between regional organisations (ROs) intensified significantly. There is little doubt that the end of the Cold War paved the ‘road to regionalism’ (Börzel et al., 2012) and that globalisation and growing patterns of regional and inter-regional interdependence had a catalytic effect on new regional integration initiatives. Above all other world regions, the Global South and notably Africa experienced a mushrooming of regionalism in the 1990s. This reflects not only in the sheer number of regional institutions and cooperation projects in a wide array of policy areas but also in the phenomenon of overlapping regionalism that we observe today (Panke & Stapel, 2018).

J. Muntschick (B) Institute of Political Science, Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, Mainz, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. Muntschick (ed.), Regionalism in Africa and External Partners, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10702-3_1

3

4

J. MUNTSCHICK

Many countries and ROs in the Global South, however, show distinct patterns of asymmetric extra-regional interdependence with external actors—mainly in the northern hemisphere—in various policy areas (Muntschick, 2013, 2018). This is most evident in the area of the economy and reflects inter alia in the patterns of trade, foreign direct investment flows or donor funding (see Brosig, Chapter 2; Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3). Whether this pattern of asymmetric extra-regional interdependence is a lasting legacy of colonialism is not entirely clear. It is most evident, however, between African countries or African ROs and their counterparts in Europe (Axline, 1977; Krapohl & Fink, 2013; Stapel & Söderbaum, 2020). Against this background, there is good reason to believe that such a ‘shadow-structure’ of asymmetric extra-regional interdependence has an impact on the emergence, dynamics, institutional design, and performance of regionalism in Africa, the Global South or anywhere else where such patterns exist. Surprisingly, mainstream integration theories have neglected this important external dimension so far. The aim of this volume is to address this research gap and provide theoretical models, theory-informed case studies, empirical insights and explanations on the phenomenon of African regionalism and external actors/partners. While the African continent somehow became a laboratory of regionalism, North-South relations between Europe and Africa also gained momentum increasingly, broadened in scope, and deepened in substance in the recent past. Based on experience and its own success story, the European Union (EU) showed a very keen interest in regionalisms outside Europe (Farell, 2007). This not only led to growing interdependence and interaction but also materialised in various forums and institutionalised cooperation initiatives, trade and partnership agreements, training missions and development support programmes in cooperation with regional partner organisations in Africa. For the latter, Brussels became not only a mentor and strategic cooperation partner but also a key donor and supporter over the recent years. This reflects inter alia in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, adopted in 2007, and various EU-Africa partnership and cooperation programmes such as the 2014 Pan-African programme, the 2004 African Peace Facility (APF), or the 2015 European Union Emergency Trust Fund.1 1 European Commission: Africa-EU cooperation. https://ec.europa.eu/internationalpartnerships/africa-eu-cooperation_en (24 February 2022).

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORISING …

5

It is noteworthy in this context that the field of security and associated regional cooperation projects in Africa have increasingly attracted the attention of external actors, notably the EU, over the past two decades. This is not least reflected in the growing number and volumes of donor supported security-related programmes and projects in African ROs (see Söderbaum and Stapel, Chapter 3). What looks like a paradigm shift in the EU’s cooperation and development policy towards the continent and regionalism in Africa, described by some as a securitisation of development policy and foreign aid (Brand, 2010; Brown & Grävingholt, 2016), clearly emphasises the growing importance of the issue of security in international cooperation initiatives in general and in the EU’s external policy towards its near and far neighbours in particular. The edited volume’s research focus on matters of security is therefore not only topical but also highly relevant. The asymmetric nature of the various dimensions of these (institutionalised) relationships between Africa and the EU implies that Brussels obtained a position of a powerful external actor vis-à-vis its African counterparts, namely ROs, over the recent years. Historically grown disparities, mainly in the realms of economy and security, often dating back to colonial times, have certainly contributed to this structural imbalance and power inequality between both continents. While the EU’s growing interest in African regionalism and its cooperation with and supporting of numerous regional projects with African ownership certainly raised great expectations within the target group, one should neither forget about the EU’s great responsibilities nor the various channels for potential external influence entailed in such cooperative and seemingly altruistic European policies. This becomes even more critical in the politically most sensible policy area of security. The strong asymmetry in the Europe–Africa relationship in combination with a growing intensity of cooperation between the EU and African ROs, namely in security matters such as conflict management, is a key motivation for this volume’s research agenda. Little is known about the details or what works and why in the EU-partnerships with African regionalisms, notwithstanding the existing research gaps on the topic of regionalism and external actors in general. Besides, it remains puzzling whether the EU and its member states are indeed ‘just’ benevolent supporters and donors to regional security cooperation projects in African ROs—or whether there exist hidden ‘dark sides’ inherent to these

6

J. MUNTSCHICK

asymmetric relationships that eventually imply negative side effects or put the much-praised European engagement into perspective. Against this background, the key research objective of this volume is to explore the relation between regionalism and external actors and explain the logic and impact of external influence on regionalism in Africa. Given its key importance, the policy field of security shall be at the centre of the analysis. In this context, the term ‘external’ will be used synonymously with ‘extra-regional’, which refers to a relation to any actor (country or organisation) that is not part of a group that has been previously defined as a (geographically or politically) confined region (Zimmerling, 1991: 57). The academic relevance of the topic has been sketched above and will be further elaborated on in the following sections. Individual chapter contributors additionally highlight the research gaps and the relevance of their research in the context of their specific case studies, thus contributing to the overall picture. The societal relevance of the topic relates to the fact that there is consensus that ROs are of key importance in addressing and solving acute regional security problems and become stabilising factors in Africa in the longer term. Given the strong (donor) dependence of African regionalisms on the EU, it is not least crucial to understand how and why external actors influence regional cooperation projects and integration initiatives, and whether or not external partnerships or support initiatives work. This is associated with questions about institutional effectiveness and goal attainment. Generating systematic knowledge about the logic of regionalism and external actors/influence can help to identify structural areas of concern inherent to such relationships and thus contribute to improving external actors’ policy initiatives and support programmes. Moreover, it can increase awareness in African ROs about the potential risks, gateways and consequences of powerful external actors getting involved and exerting influence.

State of Research: Regionalism and External Actors Regionalism and external actors is an important and increasingly relevant topic in international relations. Taking the example of the EU in Africa, we observe external involvement and influence on regional integration processes and institution-building on the African continent at various

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORISING …

7

levels in many areas in recent years, notably in the economy and increasingly in the field of security. Yet, academic research on this subject is still in its infancy compared to the study of (comparative) regionalism and interregionalism, which is reflected in a growing body of academic literature. The scientific debate on regionalism has been strongly influenced by academic research on Europe and the EU for decades. Accordingly, mainstream regional integration theories have been developed and designed on the unique European case (Haas, 1958; Moravcsik, 1998). With the rise of the so-called new regionalism in the 1990s (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998; Robson, 1993), political science and international relations studies paid increasing attention to this new phenomenon, which showed most dynamics in economically less developed regions in the Global South. Besides the growing scholarly attention and research over the past years, there exist still few theory-driven studies that explicitly aim at analysing and explaining regional integration beyond Europe, which should include attempts to overcome the specific scope conditions and inherent Eurocentrism of mainstream integration theories (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998). The following paragraphs sketch out the advancement of political science research on regionalism over the past years. Systematic research on regionalism outside Europe probably began with the so-called ‘new regionalism approach’ (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998; Robson, 1993). This school of thought focussed on the global South—mainly sub-Saharan Africa—and attempted to analyse and explain regional cooperation and institution-building through a multifaceted approach that also referred to non-state actors, transnational networks, micro-level cooperation and informal institutions. One approach among other innovations was certainly that it recognised the conditions of limited statehood in many parts of the southern hemisphere. Consequently, the focus was not only on the state as a central actor but also on non-state actors and less formalised modes of regional cooperation (Bach, 2003; Grant & Söderbaum, 2003). However, the new regionalism approach did not explicitly consider patterns of extra-regional dependency nor the potential role and influence of external actors. International political economy approaches to the study of regionalism are not inherently Euro-centric and claim universal validity. In general, they assume that an adequate combination of demand and supply factors is crucial for successful regionalism. Driven by an economically motivated demand for regional (economic) integration, regionalism shows

8

J. MUNTSCHICK

institutional dynamics and good performance if demand is met by political supply (Mattli, 1999). Others emphasise that globalisation and the emergence and expansion of global markets are the key driving force for regional (economic) integration and block-building, which countries see as means to meet and master global (economic) challenges (Schirm, 2002). These works take regionalism in the southern hemisphere explicitly into account but fall short to include references to external actors and their potential influence. Moreover, they focus entirely on the economic dimension of regionalism. Theories on diffusion recognised the horizontal dimension in regionalism research and highlighted the importance of interregional relations. Their contribution was to explain how ideas and norms of regionalism spread across the globe and manifested in new or renewed regional organisations in various parts of the world (Börzel & Risse, 2009; Farell, 2007). Based on the key assumption that the EU is the most successful and global model of regionalism, diffusion theory argues that the EU is more or less actively involved in promoting its own model of regionalism to other regions and regional organisations. While theories on diffusion take an external dimension into account, their perspective and explanatory logic are yet rather Euro-centric. Going beyond this weakness, the governance transfer approach assumes that regional organisations rather borrow from a ‘global script’ whereby it is ultimately the (member) states that select and adopt from these global values, norms and standards what suits their needs to consolidate and advance legitimate governance (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2015: 10–14). While this approach contributes to understanding the variance in institutional designs of different ROs across the world, it does not explicitly investigate how external actors exert influence on regionalism. To date, research on interregionalism mostly focused on the EU and its inter-regional relations (Hänggi et al., 2006; Teló et al., 2015). In this context, it explores the nature of inter-regional relationships as well as their role and functions in the architecture of global governance. While the emergence of a new governance space at the interregional level gained scholarly attention, literature on interregionalism does not explicitly conceptualise or investigate the role and influence of external actors on regionalism (Doidge, 2011). Both are rather implicitly part of the research on interregionalism. Due to theoretical eclecticism, however, there is still little systematic and (comparative) empirical research, namely on the logic and impact of interregionalism on regional organisations

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORISING …

9

involved (Grimmel & Rüland, 2015: 42; Mattheis, 2020; Mattheis & Litsegård, 2018). So far, comparably little theoretical or empirical research has considered explicitly and systematically the importance of extra-regional relations and the role and potential impact of external actors and external influence on regionalism. This is surprising given the fact of structural imbalances and asymmetric patterns of interdependence between countries and regional actors across the world, not to forget that power and political influence are key factors in international relations theory and research (Keohane & Nye, 2001; Waltz, 1979). Axline (1977) and Zimmerling (1991) are among the few who noted several decades ago that exogenous factors deserve analytic attention because they are relevant for regional integration processes, particularly in economically dependent and less developed countries and regions. However, only a few scholars explicitly referred to external actors and impact in their research on regionalism, often in an African context (e.g. Brosig, 2011; Haastrup, 2013; Klingebiel, 2005; Lenz & Burilkov, 2017). In terms of theory, Muntschick (2013, 2018) developed a modified situation-structural approach to theorise and explain regionalism and external influence, and applied it to the analysis of regionalism in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) across various policy areas. Other works followed, including an edited volume with comparative case studies and a focus on the economy (Krapohl, 2017). More recently, detailed studies on external donor funding and the finances of regional organisations in the Global South have been published (Engel & Mattheis, 2020; Söderbaum, 2017). In light of the gaps and research state outlined above, there is a strong need for theory-guided and systematic research on regionalism which takes into account the specific nature of extra-regional relationships and the role and impact of external actors. With respect to theory, this implies going beyond mainstream integration theories and inherent Euro-centrism. It also means developing and applying theoretical models that have good explanatory power regardless of geography and the level of socio-economic development. In addition to research gaps in political science theory regarding regionalism and external actors in general, there exists yet comparably little knowledge and academic literature about security cooperation in African ROs. This is surprising, given the fact that the number of conflicts in Africa rose significantly in the past two decades (Palik et al., 2020). At the same time, empirical observation indicates that African ROs have

10

J. MUNTSCHICK

increasingly embarked on institutionalised security cooperation, cooperative military operations and peacekeeping initiatives to address and settle violent conflicts on the continent. Part of the existing academic literature describes in detail the competences and legal frameworks of African ROs (e.g. Söderbaum, 1996; Tavares et al., 2008), while other works focus on their conflict prevention mechanisms and mediation capabilities and practices (Engel, 2012; Furness & Olsen, 2016; Hentz, 2018). Some studies provide empirical details on ROs, notably on the African Union (AU) and its African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (e.g. de Albuquerque, 2016; Engel, 2018; Engel & Porto, 2014). However, they rarely provide theory-driven analyses and usually do not focus on the role and impact of external actors. This also applies for most publications by African scholars (e.g. Apuuli, 2015; Nathan, 2016; van Nieuwkerk, 2006, 2011). Among the welcome exceptions are some recent studies that touch on the topic of external actors and influence insofar as they explore the impact of international organisations on security institutions and cooperative peacekeeping in Africa (Arthur, 2017; Bergmann, 2019, 2020; Brosig, 2015; Diez & Tocci, 2017). In the following sections, this chapter presents some thoughts on terminology and theory. This includes coining key terms to advance a common understanding of regionalism regardless of whether we observe the phenomenon in the Global South or North. Moreover, it introduces a theoretical framework that seems viable to systematically analyse and explain the role and impact of external actors and their influence on regionalism in Africa—and beyond. This may contribute to advance theory-driven research on regionalism and external actors, but it is neither a predefined nor a common theoretical framework that intends to govern the empirical case study analyses of this edited volume. Instead of interfering with the authors’ individual research approaches and sophisticated analytical frameworks, the major objective of the following sections is to propose complementary ideas and contribute valuable theoretical concepts to the debate on regionalism and external influence.

Terminology: Regionalism, Regional Organisations and Regional Governance Speaking of regionalism always implies a clear reference to a certain region. This regional component differentiates regional cooperation from a much broader understanding of international cooperation. In general,

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORISING …

11

a region is a spatial area that shares a set of common characteristics by which it can be distinguished from other areas. In Geography, most definitions of a region generally accentuate geographical proximity (Cahnman, 1944). In Sociology, however, a region is an area with a certain socio-cultural homogeneity in terms of e.g. ethnicity, language, customs or religion (Cox, 1969). The importance of geographical proximity in defining regions, however, is obvious in international politics. The United Nations (UN) geoscheme, for example, divides the world into five macro-geographical regions (Africa, Americas, Asia, Europe, and Oceania)—and each of them into various sub-regions. The UN’s system of regional groupings, which mainly serves to provide for a balanced distribution of membership quotas in UN bodies, such as e.g. the Security Council, also takes into account geographic proximity as the key ordering principle. Regionalism In political science and IR studies, regions are often conceptualised as macro-regions, which are intergovernmental or supranational subsystems within the international system. Their constituents are states that share some degree of interdependence in one contiguous region (Hettne, 2005: 544; Nye, 1968: VII). A good working definition of regionalism should therefore include geographic proximity as a key criterion. Without such a geographic delimitation “the term ‘regionalism’ becomes diffuse and unmanageable” (Hurrell, 1995: 333). It could not be differentiated from any other international group of countries or governance institution. Against this background, regionalism shall be understood as a planned, multilateral and state-led organisation of interdependence within a confined regional space that manifests in various, multidimensional or specific regional projects and accompanying formal institutions (Bach, 2003: 22; Breslin & Higgot, 2000: 344; Stein, 1993: 316). The EU is a good example of this understanding because one can perceive it as a state-driven multi-layered system of nested cooperation projects and issuespecific institutions—sometimes on a variable geometry basis—under the umbrella of a common organisational superstructure and regional governance institutions (Gehring, 1994: 216; Moravcsik, 1998: 15). This state-centric concept of regionalism might be limited in a way, as it does not account for socially constructed and informal regional governance institutions. It acknowledges, however, the fact that states are (still) the

12

J. MUNTSCHICK

central actors in the international system according to major parts of IR literature and mainstream theories. This accommodates the analysis of structural features and causal relations on the macro-level in regionalism research. The dynamic processes that lead to the development and manifestation of regionalism include regional cooperation and integration activities. Regional cooperation is less formal and may occur in any issue area where countries’ actions “are brought in conformity with one another through a process of policy coordination” (Keohane, 1984: 51) to generate mutually beneficial effects. This does not need to include the creation of formal cooperative institutions, which implies that joining or leaving such loose regional cooperation arrangements generally does not entail high adjustment costs for the countries involved. Regional integration, in contrast, is of a more determined and binding character. It implies the establishment of formal institutions and often includes a (partial) transfer of states’ sovereignty rights to a superior, regional level. This corresponds perfectly to Haas’ definition of ‘political integration’, which he understands to be a “process whereby political actors in several distinct national setting are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas, 1958: 16). Such new centres, obviously including regional organisations, may prosper and achieve various degrees of actorness over time—and eventually are important players in the international arena, such as the European Union (e.g. Niemann et al., 2018). Many scholars recognise a rather descriptive classification of the phenomenon of global regionalism into two categories: old and new regionalism (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998; Warleigh-Lack, 2008). According to Söderbaum (2016), there are three types with an additional category of early regionalism preceding old regionalism. Early regionalism refers to the formal and political organisation of regional interactions in pre-modern and modern times. The construction of regions and political communities with a regional focus is indeed an early phenomenon in history and includes geographically more or less confined entities such as empires, kingdoms, trade and military pacts/alliances or other forms of political unions. Voluntary or coerced integration processes led to the formation of early regionalisms such as, for example, the Kalmar Union, Deutscher Zollverein or the West African

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORISING …

13

Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) which was induced by France as colonial power (Söderbaum, 2016: 18–20). Old regionalism is a phenomenon of the Cold War period. It is statecentric insofar as this category of regionalism implies mainly state-led formal institution-building in regions of the global North or South. The integration process is driven by governments and it typically focusses on policy fields such as security, intra-regional trade and socio-economic development—the latter notably in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Söderbaum, 2016: 20–26). Hettne calls this also inward-oriented regionalism (Hettne, 1999: 7–8), because ROs of this type aim particularly for import substitution and trade discrimination against the rest of the world. Examples include the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Southern African Coordination Conference (SADCC). In general, old regionalisms do not overlap and their member states do either form part of the global North or South (Bhalla & Bhalla, 1997: 21). New regionalism, on the other hand, is a phenomenon of the postCold War world and the age of (economic) globalisation. The integration process is often market-driven and aims at regional trade liberalisation, foreign investments and non-discrimination against the rest of the world. New regionalism is therefore sometimes referred to as outward-oriented or open regionalism (Hettne, 1999: 7–8). Examples include Mercosur, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and transregional initiatives such as the Maputo Development Corridor. Their constituents often hold multiple memberships in more than one single regional integration scheme, which leads to the rise of overlapping regionalism—particularly, in Africa and South America (Panke & Stapel, 2018). Apart from that, several scholars highlight the growing multidimensionality and pluralism in the new regionalism. The latter seems not necessarily only state-driven but involves also informal cooperative arrangements and a variety of non-state actors, e.g. from civil society, business and transnational communities with their own (competing) ideas and agendas on regionalisation (Söderbaum, 2016: 26–29). This categorisation of three ideal types with distinct characteristics helps to systematically structure and compare various forms of global regionalism in the course of time. Classic works of other authors designed systematic and well-known typologies of regionalism with a focus on specific policy areas, notably the economy (Balassa, 1961) and security (Deutsch, 1961). Most desirable, however, is a theoretical model independent of time and space and policy area which not only explains the

14

J. MUNTSCHICK

emergence, dynamics and performance of regionalism, but takes into account external actors and their influence explicitly. Maxi Schoeman’s (2002) understanding of regionalism becoming a political project ‘when cross-border transactions, and the perceived need for closer cooperation are recognized by the member states when governments react to these internal and external forces by means of attempting to find a transnational level of governance’ comes very close to this idea. Regional Organisations Regional organisations are presumably the most prominent expression of regionalism in the world. There exist dozens of ROs in virtually every part of the globe—including 40 on the African continent (Panke & Stapel, 2018). A regional organisation generally represents not only ‘the collective’ of its member states in a confined regional space but constitutes also an organisational superstructure that represents and governs all issuespecific regional cooperation projects within that framework (Bach, 2003: 22; Muntschick, 2018: 38–39). In the absence of a consensus definition of a regional organisation in literature, it seems advisable to refer to Lenz and Burilkov (2017: 663) and understand a RO as a “formal international organization composed of three or more geographically proximate states having a continuous institutional framework”. This definition includes the key criteria: geographic proximity and formal institutionalised cooperation between states “based on a formal contract” (Lenz & Burilkov, 2017: 663). Moreover, their definition is indifferent to policy areas and does not take a narrow scope in terms of understanding ROs, for example, merely as economic and market integration projects, which occasionally happens in the international political economy literature. The so-called Regional Economic Communities (RECs), officially recognised by the African Union as building blocks towards African continental integration, count therefore clearly as regional organisations—like the European Union does. Contrary to the somewhat misleading designation, the RECs do not engage exclusively in market integration (see Chapters 4–8 in this volume). It is therefore highly recommended to avoid using the exclusive term ‘REC’ as a generic term for what is in fact better referred to as a specific regional organisation or regionalism in general. Lenz and Burilkov’s (2017) conceptualisation of regional organisations is most welcome but has its own little flaw. It uses a rather inclusive

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORISING …

15

and broad definition, which may become less useful and meaningful visà-vis medium and large international organisations (IOs) that typically comprise three or more geographically proximate member countries, are made for a continuous purpose and are based on formal agreements. The World Health Organisation, the Commonwealth of Nations, the International Organisation of La Francophonie and the former Warsaw Pact are just a few examples of such organisations that would possibly count as ROs according to Lenz and Burilkov’s understanding. The only weak point in their definition stems from a lack of selectivity regarding what clearly distinguishes a regional from an international organisation. Moreover, if both were virtually the same, why would we need a definition of ROs at all? All IOs mentioned above have no explicit regional focus—not to mention a regional integration agenda. They primarily deal with cooperation on a rather general level or in specific policy issues. Geography and geographic proximity are incidental and neither define such IOs nor determine their objectives and institutional design. This is reflected by the fact that IOs without explicit regional focus or agendas usually do not bear references to geography in their official names. Since non-distinctive definitions of ROs and IOs could complicate (comparative) regionalism research and may lead to invalid results, for example, large-n studies and quantitative analyses, we require a more concise definition of ROs. Taking Lenz and Burilkov’s (2017: 663) ideas into account and including a distinct regional component, an alternative innovative definition of ROs could read as follows: A regional organisation is a formal international organisation composed of three or more geographically proximate states with a continuous institutional framework and an explicit regional focus. This focus on ‘the regional’ is substantiated by one or more of the following criteria: a. designated name of the organisation (bears reference to a geographic region/area) b. membership composition (member countries are confined to be part of only one or two neighbouring macro-geographical regions according to the UN geoscheme) c. key policy agenda (key objective is regional cooperation and integration).

16

J. MUNTSCHICK

In other words: if an international organisation corresponds to Lenz and Burilkov’s (2017) basic idea of a RO and additionally fulfils one or more of the ‘regional criteria’ above, one could speak of a truly regional organisation. While some may prefer the term regional integration organisation (RIO) instead, there is no wording prescribed by the editor of this volume, which may occasionally reflect in a rather random use of the three terms regionalism, regional organisation and regional integration organisation by individual chapter authors. These semantic niceties, however, shall not confuse the reader after having read these introductory passages: not least since all case studies in this volume refer to regional organisations as defined above. Regional Governance Critical scholars such as the proponents of the new regionalism approach argue that regionalisation is a continuous process and that regional organisations merely stand for a step in that process of a region-in-the-making. Formal intergovernmental regional cooperation and state-led regional integration schemes, such as ROs according to the definitions outlined above, represent only an early stage in a multilevel concept of regions in that sense. In the course of the process, however, regional organisations may develop into regional actors with their own regional capacity, legitimacy, society and identity independent of the nation state members (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998: 6–7). Scholars belonging to this school of thought often criticise mainstream integration theories for their state-centric conceptualisation of regionalism and the focus on formal institutions. They argue that the nation states experienced increasing problems in managing and solving global challenges for their own benefits since the turn of the millennium and in parallel to an increasing globalisation (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998). Assumingly, this loss of control and capacity to act fuelled a loss of legitimacy, meaning and raison d’être for some states. The phenomenon of limited statehood and state fragility is present in many regions of the global South, namely in Africa (Rotberg, 2003; Zartman, 1995), albeit others argue that ‘the state in Africa’ works and is just different to conventional Western perceptions (Bayart, 1989; Chabal & Daloz, 1999). Nevertheless, it adds to an impression of an allegedly dwindling role of the state in international affairs. Moreover, scholars observed

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORISING …

17

that markets and societies (for example companies, transnational corporations, non-governmental organisations, and other types of societal groups and networks) became increasingly involved in regionalisation processes since the turn of the millennium. This, according to their understanding, reflects in the comprehensive, multifaceted and multidimensional character of the so-called new regionalism (Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998; Robson, 1993). The regional governance approach acknowledges both the role of the state and non-state actors because it covers ‘the various ways in which state, market, and civil society actors relate and come together in different “formal” and “informal” coalitions, networks, and modes of regional and multilevel governance’ (Söderbaum, 2012: 52). Governance can be understood as various institutionalised modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding decisions and rules or to provide collective goods. Governance, therefore, includes elements of structure and process. As a concept, it is not entirely state-centric but rather inclusive in terms of the different types of actors involved and the various modes of institutionalised cooperation and coordination (Börzel et al., 2018: 9). The governance approach by itself does not explain regionalism. It is ‘compatible with the explanatory logic of mainstream theories and strengthens their explanatory power by providing a perspective that systematically incorporates the society-based and informal dimensions in the analysis of structures and processes of regionalism, its emergence, outcomes, and effects’ (Börzel, 2016: 55). Therefore, it is rather complementary to state-centric approaches and offers a useful and broad perspective for a comprehensive analysis and systematic comparison of regionalism across time and space. Accordingly, an innovative regional governance approach could also account for various types of external factors and actors that influence various dimensions and levels, possibly driving or interfering with the emergence, institutional design, and performance of regionalism (Börzel, 2016: 42, 56).

Theory: Explaining Regionalism and External Influence---A Situation-Structural Approach In this chapter, the author presents a theoretical approach for the analysis of regionalism that builds upon the situation-structural model (Zürn, 1992, 1993) for the study of international cooperation. It is innovative as

18

J. MUNTSCHICK

it takes the external dimension and the influence of extra-regional actors on regionalism explicitly into account. Adopting a constraint rationalchoice understanding and approach to international relations, the model refers to game and cooperation theory regarding its basic assumptions. This provides for a modelling of (problem) structures on an abstract macro-level by means of reduction in complexity (Keohane, 1982: 329– 331). For this purpose and against the background of this chapter’s conceptualisation of regionalism as ‘state-led organisation of interdependence within a confined regional space’ as previously outlined above (see page 8), it takes a state-centric perspective which is also based on the perception that states are the central actors in international relations. The Logic of Regionalism: Internal Line of the Argument In general, demand for regional cooperation and integration originates from the structure of the international system and inherent cooperation and collective action problems. The latter are the result of patterns of complex interdependence and international externalities (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Keohane, 1984: 51). Regional coordination and cooperation—depending on the character of the regional cooperation problem— may result in Pareto-superior outcomes for all countries involved, if such a strategy suggested that the expected benefits surpass the payoffs of an uncoordinated status quo (Zürn, 1987: 9–10). Given such a situation, regional institutions help to ‘lock-in’ cooperation arrangements and assure the participants’ compliance and commitment by various means. Game and cooperation theory offer useful opportunities to model regional cooperation problems. Referring to both, Zürn developed his situation-structural approach to the study of international cooperation. He argues that there are mainly four ideal types of problematic situations, where each implies a different predisposition towards cooperation and the emergence of regulative institutions. Cooperation is comparably easy to achieve in problematic situations corresponding to (1) coordination games and (2) assurance games, while it is comparably difficult in those resembling the (3) dilemma type and almost impossible in those equivalent to (4) suasion games. Consequently, it depends mainly on the structure of a regional cooperation problem whether cooperation is likely to happen and whether demand for regulative institutions occurs (Zürn, 1993). It is crucial, however, to model the situation structure of the relevant real-world cooperation problem under investigation most accurately

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORISING …

19

in terms of countries’ preferences and hierarchy of policy options in order to arrive at valid conclusions (Muntschick, 2013). Many scholars agree that ‘power’ is a pivotal context factor in the study of international relations in general or international cooperation and regimes specifically (Zürn, 1993: 70–71). Some argue that a country’s power position rests not necessarily on its military and economic capacity only. Instead, it depends on the pattern of (asymmetric) interdependence on third actors in general, but particularly in specific policy areas. If a country is accordingly dependent on another country due to an asymmetric, unbalanced interdependence and relationship, this implies ceteris paribus a weaker relative power position and less room to manoeuvre compared to its counterpart. The same applies, for example, to a country that is very dependent on a cooperative agreement under negotiation or a state with only limited alternative (policy) options available. On the contrary, a good degree of autonomy, indifference regarding cooperative agreements with third actors or availability of many attractive policy options is constitutive for a stronger relative power position (Keohane & Nye, 2001: 9–11; Moravcsik, 1998: 60–67). Such powerful countries can become key actors in terms of the emergence, institutional design and performance of regionalism as they have the capacity to act as agenda setters and drivers of regional integration dynamics, eventually as benevolent hegemons in terms of bearing the lion’s share of costs involved in the creation and maintenance of the regional collective good (Gehring, 1994: 216). Hence, regionalism and its cooperative institutions reflect not only the structure of underlying cooperation problems but also the relative power position of the member countries (Zürn, 1993: 70). The Logic of Regionalism: External Line of the Argument There is good reason to believe that this logic of regionalism (internal line of the argument) proves valid in every part of the world—regardless of time and space. This is ceteris paribus certainly true. However, there are often considerable structural differences between various world regions. As mentioned earlier, many countries and ROs in the Global South—and particularly in Africa—show distinct patterns of asymmetric extra-regional interdependence with external actors—mainly in the northern hemisphere and particularly in Europe—in several policy areas, namely the economy. This ‘shadow-structure’ of asymmetric extra-regional interdependence provides external actors power and influence and has therefore

20

J. MUNTSCHICK

an (indirect) impact on the emergence, dynamics, institutional design and performance of regionalism in Africa. External influence by extra-regional actors can be understood as a context factor similar to how ‘power’ has been conceptualised according to the internal line of the argument. The difference, however, is that external influence is derived from the pattern of asymmetric extra-regional interdependence between actors within and actors outside the region under concern. Thus, external influence reminds of a dimension of ‘external power’ by extra-regional actors—but this perception falls short. This is because external influence may potentially unfold its impact on various levels of regionalism regarding cooperation initiatives and the integration process (Muntschick, 2013, 2018). Firstly, it can have an ambivalent effect on the inherent structure of a regional cooperation problem. A pattern of strong and asymmetric interdependence between regional and extra-regional actors can shift the genuine structure inherent to a regional cooperation problem towards a more cooperation-aversive situation, thus placing obstacles to regional integration and institution-building. In terms of the situation-structural approach, this is the case when a genuine dilemma-type situation turns into a suasion game structure (Fig. 1.1). This occurs when one or more countries in a region (or members of a RO) opt for an uncooperative strategy on the regional level because they have competing, more profitable extra-regional policy alternatives

Fig. 1.1 Transformation of a genuine regional dilemma-type situation into a suasion game with attractive external option (for country B)

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORISING …

21

available. In other words: if states prefer to cooperate with promising external partners against a background of strong extra-regional relationships instead of opting to (further) engage in (less promising) regional cooperation projects together with their regional counterparts (Axline, 1994: 26; Muntschick, 2013, 2018). On the other hand, a pattern of strong and asymmetric interdependence between regional and extra-regional actors can shift the genuine structure inherent to a regional cooperation problem towards a more cooperation-conducive situation and thus fuel regional integration and institution-building. This can happen when a genuine dilemma or even suasion-type situation transforms e.g. into one reminiscent of a coordination game (Muntschick, 2013, 2018). This is for example the case if extra-regional actors provide external support (side payments, donor funding etc.) to regional actors’ cooperation projects on the condition that the receiving countries follow a strategy of regional cooperation, integration and eventually regional institution-building (Axline, 1994: 24–25). Thus, externally provided support could constitute a regional common pool resource, the access and utilisation of which demands cooperation efforts from the involved countries on a regional level. In the extreme case, therefore, extra-regional actors could significantly fuel regionalism from the outside, while the actual demand from regional actors is negligible. However, this scenario is probably less likely than that of interference or obstruction of regionalism by external influence, as altruistic behaviour is a rare phenomenon in international politics (Muntschick, 2013, 2018). Apart from unfolding an impact on the genuine structure of regional cooperation problems, extra-regional actors may also affect countries’ bargaining power in interstate negotiations on a regional level. A strengthening effect is likely if an external actor supports a certain policy position of a regional actor directly, or if it offers attractive alternative options that are not made available to other countries involved in the regional negotiations setting. On the other hand, a weakening effect can be expected if an external actor places pressure on its regional counterpart to assume a certain policy position, or if it takes action to make potential alternative options less attractive or unavailable (Muntschick, 2018; Sebenius, 1983). Lastly, external influence may affect the performance of regionalism. This happens not only on the level of the situation structure where it is self-explanatory that cooperative regional institutions based on a suasion

22

J. MUNTSCHICK

game will prove less effective than those created to resolve and govern a dilemma-type situation. Beyond the structural level of external influence and its fundamental impact on the performance of regionalism, external actors may address the institutional level directly and contribute to increase performance by, for example, supporting the governance capacity of a RO with financial or logistical means (Muntschick, 2018). While external support may thus provide incentives for regional integration and lower maintenance costs for effective governing institutions, it may also have reverse effects. In extreme cases, externally provided support, namely financial resources, could fuel the emergence of façade institutions that remind of Potemkin’s villages in the sense that they are ineffective in functional terms but useful in attracting a continuous inflow of external donor funding (Gray, 2018; Söderbaum, 2004). Summarising the key assumptions and main insights from this theoretical model, it has become clear that it depends primarily on the specific character of a situation structure whether or not regionalism will develop and prosper. Patterns of strong and asymmetric interdependence between regional and extra-regional actors lift the latter to a relative power position and may unfold an ambivalent impact on regional integration initiatives on various levels. Whether such external influence is obstructive or conducive to regionalism then depends on the intentions, strategies and actions of extra-regional actors and whether this translates into transformations of the inherent structure of genuine regional cooperation problems. As countries and ROs in Africa often display weaker patterns of intra-regional interdependence and stronger (and asymmetric) patterns of extra-regional interdependence than most of their counterparts in the northern hemisphere, notably in economic terms (see Brosig, Chapter 2; Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3; Krapohl & Fink, 2013; Young, 1969: 727), we must expect significant empirical evidence for external influence on regionalism in this part of the world. Keeping these theoretical arguments and rather abstract explanations on regionalism and external influence in mind may open up an additional and enriching perspective for interpreting and understanding the different empirical case studies in this book.

Plan of the Book The aim of this volume is to bring together excellent research on the phenomenon of regionalism and external actors, both theoretically and empirically, and to help analyse and explain the logic of external influence

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORISING …

23

and its impact on regional organisations. In order to explore the relation between regionalism and external actors and the many ways in which they may interact and how external actors exert influence on regional integration processes, institutions and outcomes, this book provides two comprehensive mapping studies and five in-depth case analyses. With its geographical focus on Africa and its scope on the policy area of security, this volume addresses not only a highly relevant topic; but it shall also provide an inspiration and basis for further research on the topic of ‘regionalism and external actors’ in other regions and policy fields around the world. In this first chapter, the volume’s editor Johannes Muntschick has introduced the overall topic and provided insights into the debate on how to understand and conceptualise regionalism as an object of research. This also includes promoting ideas on how to define regional organisations, which are at the heart of most (comparative) regionalism research. A key purpose of the introductory chapter, however, is to create an understanding of the relevance of the topic ‘regionalism and external actors’ from a political science perspective and to provide theory-driven explanations on the interplay and logic of external influence on regional integration processes, institutions and outcomes. The theoretical model proposed by the editor contributes to this debate and offers explanations from the perspective of cooperation theory and the situation-structural approach. Keeping this argument and logic in mind may help to better understand the empirical case studies although the purpose of the editor’s model is explicitly not to provide a guiding theoretical framework for the empirical analyses. In the second chapter, Malte Brosig explores the influence of externalities on regional governance institutions by using the example of organisational overlap of African trade regimes. The phenomenon of overlapping ROs and multiple memberships is a key characteristic of regionalism in the African context, which is distinct from the situation in Europe where the EU prevailed as a single dominant organisation. It is highly relevant for the topic of this book, as overlapping regionalism not only implies interdependence, intersection and externalities for the involved ROs, but particularly in situations where a given RO is exposed to the influence of one or more other ROs as external actors in many ways on various levels. Since most African countries are members of more than one regional organisation, external influence from overlapping ROs

24

J. MUNTSCHICK

may even come from within through countries with multiple memberships. The chapter’s focus on trade regimes in Africa is welcome and corroborates the evidence that such overlaps are much more pronounced and clear-cut in the issue area of the economy than in the area of security. Brosig’s research contribution is therefore highly relevant for this book. In its endeavour to explain the observed phenomenon, the chapter highlights the key importance and influence of significant externalities, which provide incentives to maintain the status quo of largely ineffective overlapping regional institutions. It argues on the example of trade relations that it is mostly the EU, which consolidates the existing situation of overlapping institutions in Africa with its policy of negotiating and concluding trade agreements with sub-regional groupings and countries instead of the existing eight Regional Economic Communities. The following chapter by Fredrik Söderbaum and Sören Stapel connects to this remarkable aspect of EU-African relations and focuses on external donor funding as another, but very different example of asymmetric relations between Europe and Africa. In an attempt to contribute to a more nuanced academic debate about the role of external actors in the promotion of regionalism, both authors go beyond the EU as self-proclaimed key supporter of global regionalism and draw attention to a variety of external actors, which influence and shape African ROs from the outside. They provide empirical evidence in order to unravel and problematise the motivations, roles and effects of external actors in regionalism. Moreover, particular attention is given to external donor support in the issue area of security in terms of ‘security-related funding’. Considering their key research ambitions, the authors develop and present a novel dataset about the external funding of regionalism in Africa. It measures not only external funding to the most important ROs, but also other regional projects outside the framework of such institutions. Key findings include that external donor support to ROs and regional projects increased significantly over time, while figures on the distribution of ‘security-related funding’ imply that many donors are keen to bypass or avoid ROs. External actors are therefore rarely altruistic and neutral sponsors of regionalism. Building on these comprehensive research studies and their unique insights into the overall topic, the following five chapters investigate specific cases of regionalism and external actors by focussing on individual regional organisations in Africa and the role and influence of the EU. While the individual chapters address various levels, subjects and

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORISING …

25

aspects of interdependence and interaction between African regionalism and external actors from Europe, they are nevertheless coherent in as far as all of them focus on analysing and explaining the logic and impact of such external influence in the highly relevant issue area of security. Taking diverse theoretical and case-related perspectives in order to address a clear-cut but more general research puzzle offers substantial benefits in terms of generating additional empirical knowledge and contributing to a better scientific understanding of the phenomenon under observation. This is reflected in the contributors’ complementary chapters that share a common research topic and question. The research by Gorm Rye Olsen is dedicated to the relationship between the EU and Africa—including the African Union. By applying a theoretical foreign policy analysis framework, the chapter aims at generating and consolidating knowledge of the motives, interests and actors involved in the EU’s policies towards Africa in the recent past. This includes finding explanations for the recent changes in Brussels’ foreign and security policies in this regard. In order to do so, the author analyses the perceptions of the key decision-makers and the domestic government institutions that contribute both to policy-making as well as the implementation of the EU’s Africa policy. Key findings include that this policy and the EU’s involvement in security promotion in Africa is mainly the result of French national security concerns in combination with the strong ambitions of two important EU institutions. Following on from the previous chapter, Habibu Yaya Bappah observes major obstacles to building a regional security complex in Africa under the auspices of the AU. This is not least because various external actors interfere and exert influence. In his study, the author focusses on the two most influential ones, namely the EU and France, in order to analyse their role in the security (dis)integration of the AU. The chapter demonstrates that despite funding and positive contributions of the EU and France to the AU agenda, their pursuit of self-interest is undermining the AU through the duplication of regional institutions and policies. Moreover, the EU’s policies and role in African often seems influenced by France, which is acting within the EU frameworks to promote its own national agenda. This apparently undermined important security integration projects of the AU. In the sixth chapter, Julian Bergmann debates the creation and development of the G5 Sahel as response to a deteriorating security situation in the Sahel region in the past decade. The puzzle is why a new

26

J. MUNTSCHICK

regional organisation was created when other overlapping regionalisms have existed for decades. Given this situation, the author analyses the role and impact of the EU and its member states as external actors in promoting the establishment and development of the G5 Sahel. While there is plausible evidence that the G5 Sahel was founded due to an imminent regional cooperation problem based on transnational security challenges, there is also evidence that external support by the EU and its member states fuelled the creation and integration dynamic of the RO. While the G5 Sahel is certainly not an example of dysfunctional symbolic regionalism, it nevertheless faces many critical challenges; not least due to its heavy dependence on external donors, especially the EU. In the following chapter, Friedrich Plank provides an analysis of the interregional security cooperation between West Africa and the EU as an external actor. A key objective is to explore how ROs interact and to identify the conditions for effective partner action on peace and security. Research on the West Africa-EU partnership on peace and security is relevant because regional conflicts in West Africa have increasingly attracted international attention in the past decade. Concentrating on the interregional relations between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the EU with a focus on their engagement in response to the Mali crisis, the author develops a systematic analytical framework for assessing the effectiveness of interregional security cooperation. Findings include that—even though many goals of the engagement in Mali have been achieved—the overall effectiveness of the efforts shows mixed results. Factors such as resource exchange, coherence and coordination processes seem to be favourable conditions for effective interregional interaction. In the last empirical case study, Lukas Maximilian Müller takes a micro-perspective look at regional public administrations as key structures of virtually all ROs in Africa. The author’s contribution is most welcome because academic research on regionalism has widely neglected this important element of African regionalism so far, even though regional public administrations are generally a primary point of contact to external actors. Taking an inter-organisational approach, the analysis of the ECOWAS Commission’s efforts in the areas of customs and migration is evidence that it relies on the EU to externalise policy-making activities it cannot or does not want to handle due to limited capacity and resources. One result is the emergence of parallel structures due to the use

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORISING …

27

of implementing organisations, which work against efforts to strengthen the ECOWAS Commission in these important policy areas. In the concluding chapter, the editor Johannes Muntschick discusses the major findings of the book and highlights the main implications for research on regionalism and external actors. This includes the summarisation of key insights of the seven in-depth case study analyses but also an interpretation of the empirical evidence against theory in an attempt to arrive at basic principles and generalisations.

References Apuuli, P. (2015). IGAD’s mediation in the current South Sudan conflict. African Security, 8(2), 120–145. Arthur, P. (2017). Promoting security in Africa through regional economic communities. Insight on Africa, 9(1), 1–12. Axelrod, R., & Keohane, R. (1985). Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions. World Politics, 38(1), 226–254. Axline, W. A. (1977). Underdevelopment, dependence and integration: The politics of regionalism in the Third World. International Organization, 31(1), 83–105. Axline, W. A. (1994). Comparative case studies of regional cooperation among developing countries. In W. A. Axeline (Ed.), The political economy of regional cooperation: Comparative case studies (pp. 7–33). Pinter Publishers and Associated University Press. Bach, D. (2003). New regionalism as an alias: Regionalisation through trans-state networks. In A. Grant & F. Söderbaum (Eds.), The new regionalism in Africa (pp. 21–30). Ashgate. Balassa, B. (1961). The theory of economic integration. Allen & Unwin. Bayart, J.-F. (1989). L’ État en Afrique: La politique du ventre. Fayard. Bergmann, J. (2019). Neofunctionalism and EU external policy integration: The case of capacity building in support of security and development (CBSD). Journal of European Public Policy, 26(9), 1253–1272. Bergmann, J. (2020). The European Union as international mediator. Palgrave. Bhalla, A., & Bhalla, P. (1997). Regional blocs: Building blocks or stumbling blocks? Palgrave. Börzel, T. (2016). Theorizing regionalism. Cooperation, integration, and governance. In T. Börzel & T. Risse (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism (pp. 41–63). Oxford University Press. Börzel, T., Goltermann, L., Lohaus, M., & Striebinger, K. (Eds.). (2012). Roads to regionalism: Genesis, design, and effects of regional organizations. Ashgate.

28

J. MUNTSCHICK

Börzel, T., & Risse, T. (2009). Diffusing (inter-)regionalism: The EU as a model of regional integration (KFG Working Paper, 7). Börzel, T., Risse, T., & Draude, A. (2018). Government in areas of limited statehood: Conceptual clarifications and major contributions of the handbook. In T. Risse & T. Börzel (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of governance and limited statehood (pp. 3–25). Oxford University Press. Börzel, T., & van Hüllen, V. (Eds.). (2015). Governance transfer by regional organizations: Patching together a global script. Palgrave. Brand, A. (2010). The securitization of development—Discursive change and policy shifts. In L. Kovaˇcovská & M. Jeníˇcková (Eds.), Crucial problems of international relations through the eyes of young scholars (pp. 57–78). University of Economics Press. Breslin, S., & Higgot, R. (2000). Studying regions: Learning from the old, constructing the new. New Political Economy, 5(3), 333–352. Brosig, M. (2011). The EU’s role in the emerging peace and security regime in Africa. European Foreign Affairs Review, 16(1), 107–122. Brosig, M. (2015). Cooperative peacekeeping in Africa. Routledge. Brown, S., & Grävingholt, J. (Eds.). (2016). The securitization of foreign aid: Rethinking international development series. Palgrave. Cahnman, W. J. (1944). The concept of Raum and the theory of regionalism. American Sociological Review, 9(5), 455–462. Chabal, P., & Daloz, J.-P. (1999). Africa works: Disorder as political instrument. Indiana University Press. Cox, K. R. (1969). On the utility and definition of regions in comparative political sociology. Comparative Political Studies, 2(69), 68–98. de Albuquerque, A.-L. (2016). The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)—Discussing the remaining challenges. Försvarsdepartementet/Ministry of Defense. Deutsch, K. W. (1961). Security communities. In J. N. Rosenau (Ed.), International politics and foreign policy: A reader in research and theory (pp. 98–105). Free Press. Diez, T., & Tocci, N. (Eds.). (2017). The EU, promoting regional integration, and conflict resolution. Palgrave. Doidge, M. (2011). The European Union and interregionalism. Ashgate. Engel, U. (Ed.). (2012). New mediation practices in African conflicts. Leipziger Universitätsverlag. Engel, U. (2018). The African Union’s twin APSA and AGA agenda? Stichproben, 18(35), 51–71. Engel, U., & Mattheis, F. (Eds.). (2020). The finances of regional organisations in the Global South: Follow the money. Routledge. Engel, U., & Porto, J. (2014). Imagining, implementing, and integrating the African peace and security architecture. African Security, 7 (3), 135–146.

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORISING …

29

Farell, M. (2007). From EU model to external policy? Promoting regional integration in the rest of the world. In S. Meunier & K. McNamara (Eds.), Making history: European integration and institutional change at fifty: The state of the European Union (pp. 299–315, vol. 8). Oxford University Press. Furness, M., & Olsen, G. (2016). Europeanisation and the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management in Africa. European Politics and Society, 17 (1), 105–119. Gehring, T. (1994). Der Beitrag von Institutionen zur Förderung der internationalen Zusammenarbeit. Lehren aus der institutionellen Struktur der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, 1(2), 211–242. Grant, J., & Söderbaum, F. (Eds.). (2003). The new regionalism in Africa. Ashgate. Gray, J. (2018). Life, death, or zombie? The vitality of international organizations. International Studies Quarterly, 62(1), 1–13. Grimmel, A., & Rüland, J. (2015). Regionale Integration als Gegenstand politikwissenschaftlicher Theorien und Erklärungsansätze. In A. Grimmel & C. Jakobeit (Eds.), Regionale integration—Erklärungsansätze und Theorien zu den wichtigsten Integrationszusammenschlüssen in der Welt (pp. 19–53). Nomos. Haas, E. (1958). The uniting of Europe: Political, social, and economic forces 1950–1957 . Stanford University Press. Haastrup, T. (2013). EU as mentor? Promoting regionalism as external relations practice in EU–Africa relations. Journal of European Integration, 35(7), 785– 800. Hänggi, H., Roloff, R., & Rüland, J. (Eds.). (2006). Interregionalism and international relations. Routledge. Hentz, J. (Ed.). (2018). Routledge handbook of African security. Routledge. Hettne, B. (1999). Globalisation and the new regionalism: The second great transformation. In B. Hettne, A. Inotai, & O. Sunkel (Eds.), Globalism and the new regionalism: The second great transformation (pp. 1–24). Palgrave. Hettne, B. (2005). Beyond the new regionalism. New Political Economy, 10(4), 543–571. Hettne, B., & Söderbaum, F. (1998). The new regionalism approach. Politeia: Journal for Political Science and Public Administration, 17 (3), 5–19. Hurrell, A. (1995). Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics. Review of International Studies, 21(4), 331–358. Keohane, R. (1982). The demand for international regimes. International Organization, 36(2), 325–355. Keohane, R. (1984). After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in the world political economy. Princeton University Press. Keohane, R., & Nye, J. (2001). Power and interdependence. Longman.

30

J. MUNTSCHICK

Klingebiel, S. (2005). Regional security in Africa and the role of external support. The European Journal of Development Research, 17 (3), 437–448. Krapohl, S. (Ed.). (2017). Regional integration in the Global South: External influence on economic cooperation in ASEAN, MERCOSUR and SADC. Palgrave. Krapohl, S., & Fink, S. (2013). Different paths of regional integration: Trade networks and regional institution-building in Europe, Southeast Asia and Southern Africa. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(3), 472–488. Lenz, T., & Burilkov, A. (2017). Institutional pioneers in world politics: Regional institution building and the influence of the European Union. European Journal of International Relations, 23(3), 654–680. Mattheis, F. (2020). Regionalism and interregionalism in EU-Africa relations. In T. Haastrup, L. Mah, & N. Duggan (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of EU-Africa relations (pp. 26–37). Routledge. Mattheis, F., & Litsegård, A. (2018). Interregionalism across the Atlantic space. Springer. Mattli, W. (1999). The logic of regional integration: Europe and beyond. Cambridge University Press. Moravcsik, A. (1998). The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht. Cornell University Press. Muntschick, J. (2013). Regionalismus und Externer Einfluss: Stört die Europäische Union die Regionale Marktintegration im südlichen Afrika? Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 54(4), 686–713. Muntschick, J. (2018). Regionalism and external influence: The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the ambivalent impact of the EU on regional integration. Palgrave. Nathan, L. (2016). Community of insecurity: SADC’s struggle for peace and security in Southern Africa. Routledge. Niemann, A., Bergmann, J., Haastrup, T., & Whitman, R. (2018). The European Union as a mediator in peace processes: Motives, roles and effects. International Negotiations, 23(2), 157–176. Nye, J. (1968). Introduction. In J. Nye (Ed.), International regionalism (pp. V–XVI). Brown and Company. Palik, J., Rustad, S. A., & Methi, F. (2020). Conflict trends in Africa, 1989–2019. Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). Panke, D., & Stapel, S. (2018). Exploring overlapping regionalism. Journal of International Relations and Development, 21(3), 635–662. Robson, P. (1993). The new regionalism and developing countries. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(3), 329–348. Rotberg, R. I. (2003). The failure and collapse of nation-states. Breakdown, prevention, and repair. In R. I. Rotberg (Ed.), When states fail: Causes and consequences (pp. 1–49). Princeton University Press.

1

INTRODUCTION AND THEORISING …

31

Schirm, S. (2002). Globalization and the new regionalism: Global markets, domestic politics and regional cooperation. Blackwell. Schoeman, M. (2002). From SADCC to SADC and beyond: The politics of economic integration (Working paper). https://www.alternative-regionalisms. org/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/schoemar_fromsadcctosadc.pdf. Acessed 14 January 2021. Sebenius, J. (1983). Negotiation arithmetic: Adding and subtracting issues and parties. International Organization, 37 (2), 281–316. Söderbaum, F. (1996). Handbook of regional organizations in Africa. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Söderbaum, F. (2004). Modes of regional governance in Africa: Neoliberalism, sovereignty boosting, and shadow networks. Global Governance, 10(4), 419– 436. Söderbaum, F. (2012). Formal and informal regionalism. In T. Shaw, A. Grant, & S. Cornelissen (Eds.), The Ashgate research companion to regionalisms (pp. 51– 67). Ashgate. Söderbaum, F. (2016). Old, new, and comparative regionalism: The history and scholarly development of the field. In T. Börzel & T. Risse (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparaitve regionalism (pp. 16–40). Oxford University Press. Söderbaum, F. (2017). Swedish development cooperation and ownership of African regional organizations. Forum for Development Studies, 44(3), 357– 375. Stapel, S., & Söderbaum, F. (2020). Mapping and problematizing external funding to the AU and the RECs. In U. Engel & F. Mattheis (Eds.), The finances of regional organisations in the Global South: Follow the money (pp. 112–125). Routledge. Stein, A. (1993). Coordination and collaboration: Regimes in an anarchic world. In D. Baldwin (Ed.), Neorealism and neoliberalism: The contemporary debate (pp. 29–59). Columbia University Press. Tavares, R., Baert, F., Fanta, E., Felicio, T., & Rasch, M. (2008). Capacity survey. UNU-CRIS. Telò, M., Fawcett, L., & Ponjaert, F. (2015). Interregionalism and the European Union: A post-revisionist approach to Europe’s place in a changing world. Routledge. van Nieuwkerk, A. (2006). Security co-operation in the SADC. Scientia Militaria, 34(2), 1–20. van Nieuwkerk, A. (2011). The regional roots of the African peace and security architecture. South African Journal of International Affairs, 18(2), 169–189. Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics. Addison-Wesley.

32

J. MUNTSCHICK

Warleigh-Lack, A. (2008). Studying regionalisation comparatively: A conceptual framework. In A. Cooper, C. Hughes, & P. de Lombaerde (Eds.), Regionalisation and global governance: The taming of globalisation? (pp 43–60). Routledge. Young, O. (1969). Interdependencies in world politics. International Journal, 24(4), 726–750. Zartman, W. (1995). Introduction: Posing the problem of state collapse. In W. Zartman (Ed.), Collapsed states: The disintegration and restoration of legitimate authority (pp. 1–11). Lynne Rienners Publishers. Zimmerling, R. (1991). Externe Einflüsse auf die Integration von Staaten. Verlag Karl Alber. Zürn, M. (1987). Gerechte internationale Regime. Bedingungen und Restriktionen der Entstehung nicht-hegemonialer internationaler Regime untersucht am Beispiel der Weltkommunikationsordnung. Haag & Herchen. Zürn, M. (1992). Interessen und Institutionen in der Internationalen Politik: Grundlegung und Anwendung des situationsstrukturellen Ansatz. Leske + Budrich. Zürn, M. (1993). Problematic social situations and international institutions: On the use of game theory in international politics. In F. Pfetsch (Ed.), International relations and pan-Europe: Theoretical approaches and empirical findings (pp. 63–84). Lit-Verlag.

PART II

Comprehensive Mapping Studies

CHAPTER 2

Regional Trade Regimes in Africa: Exploring Organisational Overlap and Externalities Malte Brosig

Introduction This chapter explores the influence of externalities on regional governance by using the example of organisational overlap of African trade regimes. Externalities, unlike in micro-economics, are understood as those conditions which are external to regional organisations but influence their course of action. For this chapter external often means non-African trade origins and destinations. Until today the literature on regionalism and organisational overlap mostly developed in separation from each other. This is a rather unfortunate trend. Indeed one of the key characteristics of regional integration in the African context is its fragmented nature and overlapping organisations. Regional integration in Africa has not led to the establishment of a single dominant organisation as the European Union (EU) has become in Europe but is characterised by a network of

M. Brosig (B) Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. Muntschick (ed.), Regionalism in Africa and External Partners, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10702-3_2

35

36

M. BROSIG

numerous intersecting Regional Economic Communities (RECs). In this regard, African regionalism should be understood as principally consisting of overlapping regional institutions. This perspective has not found entry into mainstream regionalism studies but certainly was always exploring classical questions of regional integration but from a multi-institutional perspective. For this reason, the conceptual point of reference is the literature on organisational overlap (Biermann & Koops, 2017). Regionalism today operates in dense institutional spaces in which it is increasingly difficult to single out individual organisations. The inter-organisational turn has made an important contribution in better understanding how and why organisations overlap and interact. As any interaction constitutes a case of inter-dependence the inter-organisational turn implicitly also conceptualises externalities. In this context, the chapter will show that externalities play an important role in the emergence and maintenance of overlapping organisations which have become a defining feature of African regionalism. Even beyond the African example it is now commonly accepted that the phenomenon of organisational interaction and overlap is not a random feature but cross-cuts many policy areas and regions affecting most if not all international organisations (IOs) and regimes. Overlap is a global trend (Panke & Stapel, 2018). The inter-organisational perspective finds growing resonance and is the main contributor to the recently growing interest in comparative and overlapping regionalism (Börzel & Risse, 2016; Koschut, 2016). Therefore, this chapter uses the inter-organisational perspective as a conceptual and empirical background in order to explore the influence of externalities on regional governance in Africa. Empirically the study focuses on African trade regimes within RECs. The trade regime is thus integrated into an IO which makes a clear differentiation between regime and organisation somehow challenging and the terms are used interchangeably. Institutional overlap and interaction describe a situation in which institutions are overlapping in their membership constituency (states) and their policy activities (e.g. free trade area). As the ineffectiveness of overlapping trade regimes in Africa has been criticised widely (Tavares & Tang, 2011), the empirical puzzle to explore is how could these overlapping regimes be maintained for so long despite their failure to produce significant benefits? It will be argued that inter-organisational research cannot explain this phenomenon adequately due to its predominant emphasis on agent properties as a basic analytical unit when theorising inter-organisational relations. Instead a

2

REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES IN AFRICA …

37

major explanandum for institutional overlap can be found in the influence of significant externalities which provide incentives to maintain the status quo of largely ineffective overlapping regional institutions. Furthermore, the focus on agent properties emanates from an empirical bias of primarily conceptualising organisational interplay on the basis of functional and output driven organisations predominantly using examples from the global North. The chapter proceeds as follows: The subsequent section briefly reviews the inter-organisational turn identifying achievements and gaps in the literature before conceptualising the role of externalities in cases of overlap. At the centre is the question what are externalities, when are they important and what is their potential effect on overlapping free trade regimes in Africa? The following empirical sections introduce a series of descriptive statistics, mostly focusing on trade volumes in order to assess the formulated hypotheses.

The Inter-Organisational Turn In the absence of a single or clearly formulated theory of organisational interaction it is difficult to provide a comprehensive overview. Instead, it might make more sense to single out gaps and blind spots. Empirically the majority of studies focus on a rather small number of regional organisations mostly located in the global North and a small number of global IOs. Among the most prominent ones remain the EU, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the United Nations (UN). Regional organisations of the global South are often only explored in relation to Northern or global organisations. A central position in the IO interplay literature is occupied by the EU which is the organisation attracting the most scholarly attention. In the case of the EU, Southern IOs are often only analysed as part of the EU’s foreign relations or the focus remains on the geographical North altogether when exploring interIO relations (Galbreath & Gebhardt, 2010; Jørgensen & Laatikainen, 2013). Somehow imbalanced is the literature on inter-regionalism which predominately explores inter-regional relations as relations the EU entertains with other regional bodies (Baert et al., 2014; Hänggi et al., 2006). However, especially in recent years, there is a growing interest in exploring inter-IO relations and regime complexity in Africa (Brosig, 2011; Tavares & Tang, 2011) as well as in South America (GómezMera, 2015; Gómez-Mera & Molinari, 2014; Nolte, 2018; Weiffen et al.,

38

M. BROSIG

2013). Still, the literature remains fairly imbalanced and some distance away from exploring a geographically representative share of overlapping organisations. This is surprising as empirically institutional density of regional organisations is a global phenomenon and not confined to a particular world region. The empirical emphasis on organisations of the global North has influenced theory building. The typical organisation explored can be described as rather a function and output-oriented which is endowed with agency and executing its mandated goals. The source for interaction in addition to membership and functional overlap is usually referred to as individual properties of agents. Most explicitly resource dependency theory which is an increasingly popular branch within the inter-organisational turn argues that resource scarcity provides incentives for more organisational interaction as single IOs cannot access all resources they require to operate satisfactorily (Biermann & Harsch, 2017; Brosig, 2017; Gest & Grigorescu, 2010). Resource dependency theory makes great investments in formulating conjectures for interaction by conceptualising for example autonomy losses through interaction, explores the essentiality and complementarity of resources or discusses the size of their demand and supply (Biermann & Harsch, 2017; Brosig & Motsamai, 2014; Galaskiewicz, 1985). Here theory building is mostly based on conceptualising individual actor properties. The lack of certain resources in one organisation can be complemented by the supply of resources from another. Thus organisational interaction is supposed to effectively pool resources to create synergy effects or avoid duplication of effort. Many studies on IO overlap analyse dyadic relations aiming to explore causal conditions for interaction in order to advance theory building and postulate testable hypotheses (Brosig, 2010; Gehring & Oberthür, 2009) and research on overlapping regimes has developed typologies for interaction (Young, 1996). Another example of theoretical innovation stemming from the overlap literature is the observation of the emergence of a division of labour or functional differentiation between overlapping organisations. Organisations are expected to avoid direct overlap in order to minimise unnecessary competition. Indeed hardly can we see more than one organisation doing exactly the same at the same time and place. Usually overlap leads to the carving out of functional niches (Stokke, 2011). This functional differentiation is predominately explained by an analysis of individual actor properties and the ability of actors to adapt and occupy such a functional niche. Theoretically, the niche approach

2

REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES IN AFRICA …

39

is rooted in population ecology and organisation studies (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Alterations in the broader environment in which IOs operate are not conceptualised the focus remains on interacting organisations. External conditions are assumed to be stable and are outside the theoretical framework. There is no doubt that the literature has thus far advanced our knowledge of inter-organisational relations significantly. However, a question to be asked is, to what extent can baseline assumptions of inter-organisational relations such as the focus on agent properties and fairly functional organisations be transferred outside its main empirical application? The rather strong emphasis on form and function when conceptualising organisational interaction is somehow problematic when applied in the African context. In the African environment most organisations are funded externally (see Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3), have few executive functions and still rely more on political symbolism to legitimise their existence than functional outputs (Engel, 2015). Furthermore, as we will see in the African environment the role of externalities is significantly more relevant for interacting organisations as it is the case for organisations from the developed world.

Conceptualising Externalities in IO Interaction While the inter-organisational turn has progressed well what is missing is a conceptual framework which enables us to analytically integrate externalities into the analysis of overlapping and interacting organisations. In this regard, more efforts need to be taken to inquire into the macro conditions for overlap. We know significantly more about the intra- and inter-IO dependencies and their consequences than we know about their external dependencies and their effects on interaction. In the case of organisational overlap externalities are understood as being all those conditions which are external to the interacting organisations but being of causal relevance for their interaction. Organisational interaction describes processes resulting from overlap in which the performance of one organisation is causally linked to another (Oberthür & Gehring, 2011). In principle theorising external conditions for interaction does not need to reinvent the wheel. A rational choice and situation structure approach can work as a starting assumption conceptualising external opportunity structures and the cost–benefit dimension (Snidal, 2012; Stein, 1982). Within the inter-organisational turn we can also

40

M. BROSIG

identify a rational choice-oriented approach which argues in similar ways (Dijkstra, 2017). For example modes of cooperation have been described by reference to returning benefits (Brosig, 2010). Resource dependency theory also speaks about reciprocal interaction alluding to equilibrium outcomes, terms which have been used extensively in the rational choice and cooperation theory literature in international relations. For exploring externalities in interacting regional organisations we should first start exploring what are the rational/functional conditions for them to have an influence on overlap? In principle, the interplay literature (e.g. resource dependency theory) assumes that interaction is triggered by interdependencies. With regard to externalities we have to explore the quality of these dependencies. Accordingly, we can assume externalities to be particularly important if inter-organisational dependencies e.g. between two or more IOs are weakly developed while extra organisational dependencies are extensive. If this is the case agent properties of individual actors are less relevant for understanding inter-organisational relations as a form of regionalism. In the opposite case in which inner-system dependencies are vast but extra system dependencies are weakly developed externalities can be expected to only play a minimal role. This follows a classical rational choice approach in which actors align their action according to opportunity structures determined by their environment and calculate and compare different options before they select the most favourable for them. Accordingly, we can formulate the following hypothesis: The greater external dependencies vis-à-vis internal dependencies of interacting agents, the greater the influence of externalities on agent interaction. Once we have identified the relative importance of externalities versus inner-system returns we can fine-tune the analysis by exploring what particular impact externalities leave on the overlap. As in the case of innersystem organisational interaction the consequences of large-scale external actors on RECs can be manifold (Muntschick, 2012). Thus the question is how do externalities need to be structured to have either a facilitating or inhibiting impact on the proliferation of overlap? From a rational choice perspective, we can assume that externalities can manipulate incentive structures for organisational interaction. What would these incentive structures look like in a situation in which organisations are overlapping? Adopting a free trade agreement with a regional neighbour is unattractive if such an agreement affects the overall trade volume only peripherally. However, an agreement which displays minimal economic gains can still

2

REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES IN AFRICA …

41

be acceptable if externalities can compensate for the minimal benefits realised. For a single state, it might thus be unproblematic to join several regional agreements and create overlap. While the profits might indeed be low, it does not have negative economic consequences if the core of the trade is simply not affected. In this regard, we can draw a connection between the persistence of overlapping trade regimes and the presence of externalities. In the case of consolidated interaction in which we find fewer examples of overlap or separation of action (division of labour) we should expect that externalities are structured differently. As such we would expect them to be less pervasive. As argued above, if overlapping trade regimes in Africa appear frequently and are a function of weak internal but substantial external trade than areas with higher inner-regional trade integration should be accompanied by lower shares in external trade. For the empirical analysis of African trade regimes, the crucial question is what incentive model is the dominant one, intra-African trade versus trading with external non-African partners? If the inner-African trade is the driving force forming and shaping organisational interaction because it delivers the most attractive returns we should expect to find a system which is fairly efficient and consolidated (few trade agreements with little functional and membership overlap). In the opposite case of weak intra- but strong extra-African trade volumes, we can expect to find a fragmented system characterised by institutional proliferation and many overlapping organisations. In the end, the degree of overlap is expected to be relational to the degree of externalities. These assumptions are tested by analysing a number of descriptive trade statistics which focus on inner-African regional trade as well as on trade with non-African sources. The first hypothesis simply aims at exploring whether Africa is an appropriate case study for exploring externalities. Here the chapter examines the trade volumes in Africa and other world regions in order to demonstrate Africa’s exceptional dependency on non-African sources. In a second step, the study explores the consequences of externalities in the African context. At the centre of the analysis is the relationship between overlapping IOs and external vs internal trade flows in Africa. Again a number of trade statistics will be used to explore this relationship. Naturally, trade flows inside and outside of Africa are not fully reducible to either intra-African versus external non-African trade volumes. Such a claim would be too reductionist. There are many intervening variables

42

M. BROSIG

at work which also impact on trade flows and overlap. Here to mention are the spread of deadly diseases, violent conflict, politics, limited diversity of exported goods or poverty, low human development and limited governance capabilities. While these conditions certainly are of causal significance they do not necessarily overrule the impact of externalities. In the end, this chapter aims at demonstrating what impact externalities can have on organisational overlap and interaction which does not discriminate against other conditions but has been neglected by the literature.

Externalities in African Trade: How Relevant Are They? World trade excelled significantly over the last two decades, there is practically no region which could not increase its overall trade. Still, it remains a very unequal and diverse world. Large volumes remain concentrated in developed countries with the EU forming the largest trading bloc followed by NAFTA. African trade in goods increased from $147bn in 2000 to $347bn in 2016 (see Fig. 2.1). However, this had only a minimal impact on its marginal role at the global stage (UNCTAD, 2013: 8). The African share of global exports and imports in the period between 2000–2016 remains low with 2.8% on average.1 This situation increases the likelihood, that externalities are particularly relevant for Africa as the largest volumes are traded outside the continent. This means that most trade relations African countries and RECs have with non-African sources are highly asymmetrical. Not only is Africa’s internal trade weakly developed, but its marginal position in world trade also deprives it of shaping or at least influencing those externalities on which it is overly reliant. The low share of Africa in world trade and the fact that most trade is external to the continent puts Africa at a structural disadvantage. The largest trading partner is often not only placed outside the continent but for the trading partner, Africa often remains a marginal destination. For example, while Europe and Asia are Africa’s largest trading partners making up 62% of Africa’s trade, for both Europe and Asia, trade with Africa only accounts for 3.3% of their total 1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): database, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx. Accessed 1 February 2021.

2

REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES IN AFRICA …

43

Fig. 2.1 World trade and regions (USD in trillion per annum) (Source Own calculation from UNCTAD database)

trade in 2013 (WTO, 2014: 23). In 2016 Africa’s share in all EU trade was rising to 7.5% (Eurostat, 2016). What sets Africa region apart from other regions (e.g. Europe or North America) is its low internal market and trade integration. While trade volumes are increasing globally, internal African trade remains severely underdeveloped. From 1998 until recently Africa’s share of intra-regional trade has changed only slowly from 9% to 18% (see Fig. 2.2). This is forming a stark contrast to the EU which in 2016 was trading 64% internally, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) 50%, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 24%. Only the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) displays a greater external dependency with 13% internal trade. Additionally, WTO trade statistics show that the largest trade partner for the EU, North America, Asia and South and Central America are their own regions, while Africa shows the worst ratio of regional vs global trade.2 2 Ibid.

44

M. BROSIG

Fig. 2.2 Percentage of internal trade per bloc (Source Own calculation from UNCTAD database)

While inner-African trade only makes up a fraction of all African trade, there are visible differences between blocs. The East African Community (EAC) as well as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) trade more than 20% within their own bloc while the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) is just trading less than 2% internally (Fig. 2.3). With the exception of the Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA) larger trading blocs seem to have larger shares in internal trade. Thus the relevance of externalities on overlap is not equally distributed. It is the highest in Central Africa compared to other regions. However, a high dependency on external trade exists for all RECs. In summary, The African scene is dominated by the influence of excessive externalities. Trade with non-African sources is by far more significant, than intra-continental trade. No other continent displays these patterns of external dependencies not even other developing regions. Trade statistics for the continent have shown the trend is clear and fairly robust. Overall increases in world trade had practically no impact on existing trade patterns, meaning very weak internal trade and excessive external dependencies. Although within Africa informal trade plays a significant role and is not reflected in official statistics, it is rather unlikely that the informal trade would be able to counter-balance official records.

2

REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES IN AFRICA …

45

Fig. 2.3 Percentage of internal trade for each REC (Source Own calculation from UNCTAD database)

How Are Externalities Influencing IO Overlap? As the section above could illustrate that externalities are indeed extensive in African trade, this section aims at exploring what effect they produce on questions of organisational overlap and trade integration. Following the hypotheses formulated above, one can presume that a high degree of externalities facilitates the emergence or maintenance of a less consolidated system of trade regimes. Such a regime is characterised by a significant overlap of RECs and low degrees of intra- and inter-REC trade. In the opposite case, lower degrees of externalities can be assumed to be associated to produce a more consolidated system providing fewer incentives for overlap but higher degrees of intra- and inter-REC trade. This section explores if this is actually the case. The analysis will first focus on Africa as a whole and in a second step move to RECs. Organisational Overlap in Africa Regional integration schemes in Africa have developed over several decades since African countries gained independence. As the process of decolonisation was uneven and stretching from the 1950s to the end of the Apartheid regime in South Africa in 1994, sub-regional

46

M. BROSIG

groupings emerged as more dynamic and integrated than Pan-African organisations such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and later the African Union (AU). During the post-colonial time, political and economic links to former European colonial powers remained strong, which complicated the building of a centralised organisation (see Bappah, Chapter 5). Furthermore, sub-regional cultural and political borders on the African continent often remain fictional not matching up with postcolonial borders, fracturing the continent. The often-used geographical distinction between Northern, Western, Eastern, Central and Southern Africa is crude and does not root in any sociocultural or political identities. Instead, these regions are very much politically constructed—they resemble the system of the UN geoscheme. The absence of clear borders between blocs and groups of countries further fragmented regional integration efforts. Thus unsurprisingly regional integration followed a sub-regional approach with many intersections of membership and policy overlap between countries. Today most commonly we can distinguish between 14 different RECs in Africa (UNECA, 2006: 51). Overlap and intersection is a distinguishing feature of African regional integration but it is a phenomenon which is shared globally. The number of regional trade agreements is increasing significantly over time not all of these agreements are located within an organisation and contribute to organisational overlap, for example, bi-lateral arrangements between two countries. However, the proliferation of so many trade agreements is a contributory condition to organisational overlap. With the WTO experiencing an institutional crisis due to the overly long trade negotiations in the Doha round, there is certainly a positive knock-on effect for regional organisations to continue maintaining regional agreements and therewith contributing to existing institutional overlap (Kent, 2010). Institutional overlap practically affects all RECs in Africa. 95% of member states in one REC are also members of another organisation (UNECA, 2006: 51). Only Algeria, Cape Verde and Mozambique are members of only one REC (UNCTAD, 2013: 8). Most of the 14 RECs in Africa have established free trade areas (FTAs), a common market or customs union, however significant differences can be observed between them. Very few have a common currency or are about to introduce one. Even when only looking at FTAs there are differences in detail. For example, rules of origin, which are important to identify the goods that can be traded without tariffs in a FTA, vary between RECs. This

2

REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES IN AFRICA …

47

has been identified as a major negative effect of institutional overlap. In situations in which rules of origin compete with one another the very idea of a free trade area is undermined altogether. In the end, institutional overlap impacts negatively intra-regional trade (Chacha, 2014: 528). Indeed most of the literature agrees that overlap of African trade regimes has largely negative consequences for regional trade (Geda & Krebet, 2007). One recurring problem identified by Davis (2009: 28) is that overlapping regimes can reduce “the clarity of legal obligation, international regime complexity can generate more litigation and contradictory rulings at the enforcement stage”. Rather than creating synergy effects an assemblage of rules has thwarted the prospects for trade liberalisation. When reviewing the history of African regional integration Herbst (2007: 132) has most drastically described Africa as “littered with the carcasses of failed economic unions”. Therefore the issue of rationalising the relationship of RECs to continental integration schemes has been a long-standing one but for very long has not triggered a visible consolidation process (Tavares & Tang, 2011). Only recently can we see progress. Inter-REC relations have grown in substance. Since 2008 tripartite summits between the Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), SADC and the EAC have been organised. At the December 2014 meeting the establishment of a tripartite FTA was agreed (AllAfrica, 2014). An African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has been agreed upon in 2012 and was planned to enter into force in 2017 (AU, 2012), finally giving some credit to the African Economic Treaty of 1991 which develops continent-wide ambitions. However, hardly integration schemes kept promised timelines, significant delays are common. The AfCFTA is no exception. For African trade regimes the distinguishing feature remains organisational overlap and the intersection at a significant scale and dimension and very slow integration at the continental level. States joining an FTA share an interest in advancing their economies. However, the impact of these agreements might be ambiguous. Traditionally the literature refers to at least two effects, trade diversion, in which imports from non-member states are substituted by imports from member states. Thus internal products earn a competitive advantage over external ones. The second effect is trade creation, here inefficient domestic production is replaced by more efficient imports from within the FTA (Sindzingre, 2012: 17). Independent of the question of which model provides more opportunities for development, which is not the focus of

48

M. BROSIG

this chapter, the core of the above argument rests on the assumption that trade flows are influenced not only by the relative competitiveness of members within a FTA but that trade flows are also equally influenced by the relative competitiveness of the FTA to the rest of the world. In this regard externalities are an important condition driving international trade (Venables, 2003). However, these effects can be neutralised in multiple overlapping regimes because those states which are not part of a FTA in one region can offset potential losses by joining another one. While this lowers the attractiveness of single FTAs it provides incentives for other countries to follow suit. The ineffectiveness of African RECs and the need to rationalise relations between them has long been recognised as a desirable goal for example in a large study by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in 2006. With the increasing complexity of the whole system, it is fairly difficult to objectively assess what the specific interaction benefit is. When assessing the African continent as a whole a picture emerges which is congruent with the hypotheses formulated above. First, trade volumes are severely asymmetrical. Externalities are high. In 2017 82% of African trade has been cleared with non-African destinations. Second, within the continent, we can observe the preservation of a trading system which displays significant overlap between RECs affecting all regions and nearly all countries. Third: these overlapping institutions are commonly seen as being economically ineffective. Individual RECs only cover a fraction of the continental trade and are a hindrance to more efficient inter-regional market integration. In the end, current trade structures provide minimal incentives to reform the persisting situation as benefit structures rather favour the status quo, than a large-scale cleaning up and consolidation of overlapping organisations. Such a situation cannot exclusively be explained with reference to inner-regional conditions, for example, power rivalries or low degrees of development. In the case of Africa, organisational interaction is determined by conditions beyond the region itself. The potential benefits from trade liberalisation are mostly not to be realised on the continent but in relation to non-African trade partners. This also means that existing inefficiencies within and between RECs are far less cost-relevant if we include externalities into the calculation. Overlap and competition in the African context are not inconsequential but do not come with high costs.

2

REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES IN AFRICA …

49

In such a context a situation prevails in which ineffective organisational overlap is rather preserved than changed. Such a finding is revealing and in parts contradicts common assumptions made by the inter-organisational turn on the avoidance of institutional competition and emergence of a division of labour and functional differentiation.3 In the case of Africa, the process of carving out functional niches in order to avoid harmful institutional competition resulting from overlapping organisations is halted or slowed down. This situation can best be explained with reference to existing external trade volumes overriding inner-African structures. For the literature on (comparative) regionalism as well as IO interaction these findings are highly relevant as they point to the importance of external conditions in which agent properties are contextualised. An area which has been neglected so far also because much of the literature focuses on Western regional IOs which are on average not only more functional and capable but are also less dependent on externalities (see Fig. 2.2). Externalities at the Cross and Sub-Regional Level This section aims at exploring to which extent the patterns found on the African continent can be replicated at sub-regional level comparing areas of lower and higher externalities with higher or lower degrees of overlap and regime effectiveness inside of Africa. As shown in Fig. 2.3 external trade makes up between 80–99% of all trade for RECs. Thus there is no REC for which the African trade or intra-REC trade is larger than trade with non-African destinations. In all cases we can observe institutional overlap; there is not a single REC which is completely separated from its regional neighbours (UNECA, 2006: 51). However, there is ample variation between RECs. Not only do trade volumes with external actors vary, but we can also observe significant variation in the percentage of intra-REC trade in relation to all intra-African trade. If only looking at African trade shares within RECs we can clearly see the impact of preferential trade agreements through FTAs and other market integration instruments. The majority of RECs cluster around 40– 60% in their share of intra-REC trade of all African trade. Differences between individual RECs are significant, ranging from 95% in the case of

3 Gehring & Faude (2013, p. 120).

50

M. BROSIG

Fig. 2.4 Share of intra-REC trade of all African trade (Source Own calculation from UNCTAD database)

the Mano River Union (MRU) and 11% for SADC (Fig. 2.4). On average internal African trade is sub-regionally focused and this is despite the fact that externalities are large for all RECs. Statistically exploring the potential effect of externalities at the subregional level is a challenging task. Direct measurements are difficult to make. There are no statistics available focusing on inter-REC trade volumes. Given the existing membership overlap between RECs statistics covering trade flows in and out of one REC always also effect trade volumes in other RECs. In Africa, informal trade is assumed to be extensive and not covered in official statistics. This complicates the composition of reliable inter-REC trade data which could be used as an indicator of the degree of consolidation or fragmentation within RECs as a consequence of externalities. If we assume that RECs with a high percentage of intra-REC trade are an indicator for a more consolidated regional organisation and compare this with the percentage of external non-African trade of individual RECs, one is hypothetically able to see the assumed impact of externalities on organisational overlap. Simply said those RECs which are scoring high in Fig. 2.4 should also score high in Fig. 2.3. Even without using statistical analysis, one can see that a correlation between varying degrees of externalities and regional trade integration is difficult to draw.

2

REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES IN AFRICA …

51

Table 2.1 Intra-African trade 2017 (USD in billion and percentages of total trade) RECs AMU CEMAC CEN-SAD COMESA EAC ECCAS ECOWAS IGAD SADC Average

Intra Group 2.95 3.5% 0.9 4.3% 13.85 8.3% 9.36 11.5% 2.75 19.4% 1.44 2.2% 9.15 10.2% 2.71 16% 33.93 19.8% 10.6%

Group with Africa 3.36 3.9% 0.98 4.7% 7.31 4.4% 7.61 9.4% 2.26 15.9% 4.35 6.8% 4.73 5.3% 1.78 10.5% 4.64 2.7% 7%

Outside Africa 79.16 92.6% 18.93 91% 146.5 87.4% 64.38 79.1% 9.19 64.8% 58.64 91% 75.99 84.6% 12.43 73.5% 132.50 77.4% 82.3%

Total 85.47 100% 20.81 100% 167.7 100% 81.34 100% 14.19 100% 64.42 100% 89.87 100% 16.91 100% 171.1 100% 100%

Source UNCTADhttps://unctadstat.uncat.org/wds/TableViewer/tableView.aspx. Accessed 22 March 2019

Indeed, there are only a few instances in which the predicted pattern fits. We can observe that in the case of SADC its dependency on external trade was increasing since 1996. The share of African trade of total trade fell from 34 to 16% which had the consequence that the share of intraREC trade in African trade fell by 18%, an indicator of more inter-REC trade and thus institutional overlap. The SADC case is thus congruent with the hypotheses formulated. But in Table 2.1 we can see that more intra-REC trade does not necessarily lead to more trade with Africa. While the EAC and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) would confirm this assumption SADC contradicts it. A more promising approach is the comparison of levels of institutional performance and degrees of externalities. Here we would assume that higher degrees in externalities are having a negative effect on RECs in terms of their institutional functionality. Haftel (2013) has conducted a large-scale analysis exploring the link between levels of trade and

52

M. BROSIG

Table 2.2 Institutional consolidation and externalities

Group of RECs showing low levels of consolidation Group of RECs showing higher levels of consolidation

Institutionalisation/Economic Scope/Independence (Haftel, 2013: 402)

Externalities (figure three)

AMU, ECCAS, CEPGL, IOC MRU

ECCAS, CEPGL, MRU, CEMAC UMA

COMESA, EAC, ECOWAS, SADC, CEMAC, WAEMU

COMESA, EAC, Group of RECs ECOWAS, SADC, with lower WEAMU, degrees of externalities

Group of RECs with extensive externalities

degrees of regional integration. If we take his data on African RECs and group organisations according to higher and lower levels of economic scope/independence and institutionalisation and compare them with degrees of externalities (Fig. 2.3) we can see these two are linked speaking in favour of our hypothesised effect of externalities (Table 2.2). In the end, when we analyse the available data a mixed picture emerges. While there is some general evidence in favour of the formulated hypotheses, there are also inconclusive results. Still, we can draw an important conclusion, the effect of externalities on organisational interaction corresponds to the assumptions formulated but the effect is not unitary and varies between cases and situations. Most likely the impact of externalities on organisational overlap and interaction is mediated by a number of other variables. Not all of those can be explored within the confines of this chapter which is only using macro trade data. In the end, a detailed qualitative analysis of single cases is surely best able to observe much more closely the relationship between externalities and overlap. However, this was not the main purpose and approach of this study. Still, we can point to a few important conditions. First, there appears to be a qualitative difference between global and African regional trade. The majority of African exports to the world still consist of various commodities (fuels, minerals etc.) while trade with regional neighbours is structured differently. Regional neighbours are often competitors when it comes to the export of commodities and their markets are often too small as a destination for manufactured goods. There is not necessarily always a direct link between the large volumes of external trade and the organisation of inner-regional trade. To a certain

2

REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES IN AFRICA …

53

extent, it tends to operate at different levels, thus increasing the likelihood of ambiguous results. When looking at individual country trading partners (exports) we often find that non-African countries are the largest trading partners but in some cases also neighouring countries (Table 2.3). Thus the forces of external and regional trade go alongside each other but external sources are far more relevant. Second, at the country level, there is great diversity also within RECs. Sometimes the largest African trade partner is the direct neighbour within a REC sometimes it is not. Geographical location and trade flow in some cases cannot be covered by membership in only one REC. This does create conflicting interests at the state level as well as at the level of regional organisations. Under conditions of conflicting interests, it is somehow problematic to assume that externalities have a homogeneous impact. Surely more qualitative research needs to be done in order to process and trace the specific effects of externalities and intervening variables allowing for more details to be integrated into the analysis accounting for the persisting diversity between RECs and countries. Table 2.3 The largest five export destinations 2017 Region

Country

Top five trade partners

South

South Africa Angola Nigeria Ghana Senegal Ivory Coast Kenya Ethiopia Uganda DRC Rwanda Burundi Egypt Algeria

China, USA, Germany, Japan, India China, India, Spain, Taiwan, USA India, USA, Spain, France, Netherlands India, China, Switzerland, Netherlands, UAE Mali, India, Switzerland, UAE, China Netherlands, USA, France, Belgium, Germany Pakistan, Uganda, USA, Netherlands, UK China, Sudan, Netherlands, Switzerland, Somalia Kenya, UAE, South Sudan, DRC, Rwanda China, Zambia, Korea, Italy, Indonesia UAE, DRC, Kenya, USA, Thailand UAE, DRC, Pakistan, Germany, USA UAE, Italy, Turkey, USA, Saudi Arabia, Italy, France, Spain, USA, Brazil

West

East

Central

North

Source https://unctadstat.unctad.org/CountryProfile/en-GB/index.html accessed 22 March 2019

54

M. BROSIG

The Role of the EU and Institutional Overlap Before concluding this chapter it is worth analysing the role the EU is having on the proliferation of regional FTAs in Africa. The EU is the largest trading partner for Africa accounting for 35% of all trade in 2016 or e116bn (EU Commision, 2018). It is thus the largest source and target for African externalities. The EU’s role and influence should not be underestimated in comparison to other external trading actors such as the US, China or India. While Chinese and Indian trade with Africa has increased significantly both countries have not agreed on any bi-lateral FTA with any African actor while the EU has developed an elaborate framework for free trade for the continent. The so-called Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are supposed to replace the Cotonou Agreement which is phasing out in 2020. From the perspective of organisational overlap the shift to EPAs can be assumed to be an important contributing factor cementing the status quo of overlapping RECs at sub-regional level and complicating or at least slowing down the full implementation of the AfCFTA. While the Cotonou Agreement was involving 48 African countries, EPAs are oriented at the sub-regional level. At the moment the process of adopting EPAs is fractured. So far the EU has initialled EPAs with only three RECs (EAC, ECOWAS and SADC) which are in different stages of progress. EPAs with Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana are provisionally applied. Countries in Eastern and Southern Africa, namely Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Zimbabwe and Comoros, signed the ESA-EPA. In Central Africa, only Cameroon signed the treaty, while for Northern Africa a different framework is regulating trade relations (EU Commission, 2022). While it is too early to evaluate the real effect and final composition of membership within EPAs, the principle idea is that trade between EPA members and the EU is expected to expand. A study simulating the assumed effect of EPAs (Mevel et al., 2015) on African integration comes to the conclusion that while trade between EPA groups and the EU will increase significantly intra-African trade is likely to decline as products from African neighbours are replaced by European products. Such a trend would widen existing externalities even further. The assumed impact on organisational overlap might work in two directions. First, the focus of trade deals on the sub-regional and individual country basis rather consolidates the existing institutional fragmentation complicating the implementation of

2

REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES IN AFRICA …

55

the AfCFTA. Second, as EPAs concentrate only on a limited number of RECs externalities provide some incentives for institutional consolidation by elevating the relevance of some RECs over others.

Concluding Observations There is ample evidence that externalities play a significant role for African trade regimes. Trade with non-African destinations in particular the EU is extensively larger than intra-African trade. This is true for the continent and all RECs. Significant variation exists between RECs. Thus there are well-justified reasons to move externalities into the centre of analysis when exploring regional integration and organisational interaction especially when they so far played a marginal role in research. Indeed ignoring externalities risks leaving out important variables which impact organisational interaction. Accordingly, the key question for institutional overlap in Africa is how are externalities influencing patterns of interaction and what are they adding to the existing knowledge formulated by the inter-organisational turn? A fairly robust relationship seems to exist between high degrees of externalities and overlapping RECs when focusing on the continental level. Here the proliferation of so many overlapping but ineffectively working institutions cannot be explained by a process of functional differentiation or division of labour as a consequence of organisational overlap as the literature suggests. However, considering the low trade volumes within the African continent in comparison to external trade flows, the ineffective overlap appears as a lesser issue. Lost benefits because of marginal intra-African trade can be compensated by external sources. This has favoured the status quo, meaning significant and ineffective overlap. For the inter-organisational turn an important analytical value-added has been explored. In order to explain interaction between organisations we should not only and exclusively examine agent properties but also need to integrate externalities. The first hypothesis provides an analytical tool for exploring when externalities are effectual. Accordingly, their effect is a question of its relative size in comparison to inner-system dependencies. In the case of African trade regimes the conventional wisdom of the inter-organisational turn would predict a consolidation of the existing system of overlapping and intersecting RECs because it is ineffectively working and leading to institutional competition. Interacting organisations are expected to carve out functional niches as a consequence

56

M. BROSIG

of overlap. However, without reference to externalities it is difficult to explain the persistence of ineffective overlap. The existing massive externalities easily offset lost benefits from ineffective overlap. At the same time, there are hardly any ways and means to alter this situation due to Africa’s marginal influence on world trade. For its largest trading partners Europe and Asia, Africa is the least relevant trading destination in terms of volumes. Although Europe remains Africa’s largest trading partner for the moment it is increasingly in competition with China which is displaying similar trade patterns to Europe (extracting resources and selling processed goods to the continent). However, because of the historical and political links between Europe and Africa the EU’s influence is more direct and deeper reaching. With regard to trade relations it is mostly the EU which is actively shaping the re-negotiation of trade agreements in the forms of EPAs which are sub-regionally oriented connecting to single RECs or countries and thereby consolidating the existing situation of overlapping institutions. While the overall effect of externalities is more explicit when focusing on the entire continent, it becomes less straightforward when exploring variance on the sub-regional level. Higher degrees of external trade do not automatically lead to more institutional overlap and lower degrees of regional trade integration. The reasons for this may partly be attributed to missing statistical data as well as conflicting trade interests within RECs and between their member states. Still we can draw an important conclusion from this. The impact of externalities is not unitary and externalities are of course not the only variables which impact organisational interaction. In the end, qualitative research is necessary to comprehensively explore existing variations between sub-regions in order to complement the macro data analysis. Finally, exploring externalities in the context of organisational interaction should not be seen as the master variable which explains all types and forms of interaction. It provides the most analytical value added if it is integrated and adapted to the case studies to which it is applied. Externalities can certainly take many different forms and have varying effects. Different world regions and policy areas will produce their own pathways. The main aim of this chapter was to illustrate how influential externalities can be and that there are very good arguments for integrating them into our analysis of organisational interaction for which this chapter has developed a conceptual framework. This, however, is only a first step, many

2

REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES IN AFRICA …

57

more are needed in order to fully and comprehensively understand the role externalities are playing.

References AllAfrica. (2014, October 28). East Africa: Comesa-EAC-SADC tripartite FTA to be launched Mid-December 2014. http://allafrica.com/stories/201410290 518.html. Accessed 25 May 2021. AU. (2012, January, 29–30). Declaration on boosting Intra-African trade and the establishment of a Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA). https://au.int/sites/default/files/docume Assembly/AU/Decl.1(XVIII). nts/29825-doc-declaration_assembly_au_decl1xviii_english.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2021. Baert, F., Scaramagli, T., & Söderbaum, F. (2014). Intersecting interregionalism regions, global governance and the EU . Springer. Biermann, R., & Harsch, M. (2017). Resource dependency theory. In R. Biermann & J. Koops (Eds.), Palgrave handbook on inter-organizational relations (pp. 135–156). Palgrave Macmillan. Biermann, R., & Koops, J. (Eds.). (2017). Palgrave handbook on interorganizational relations in world politics. Palgrave Macmillan. Börzel, T., & Risse, T. (Eds.). (2016). Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism. Oxford University Press. Brosig, M. (2010). Governance between international institutions: Analysing interaction modes between the EU, the Council of Europe and the OSCE. In D. Galbreath & C. Gebhardt (Eds.), Cooperation or conflict? Problematizing organizational overlap in Europe (pp. 29–58). Ashgate. Brosig, M. (Guest Ed.). (2011). International organisation interplay in Africa. South African Journal of International Affairs, 18(2), 143–256. Brosig, M. (2017). Regime complexity and resource dependency theory in international peacekeeping: The example of Somalia and the Central African Republic. In R. Biermann & J. Koops (Eds.), Palgrave handbook on interorganizational relations in world politics (pp. 447–470). Palgrave Macmillan. Brosig, M., & Motsamai, D. (2014). Modelling cooperative peacekeeping exchange theory and the African peace and security regime. Journal of International Peacekeeping, 18(1–2), 45–78. Chacha, M. (2014). Regional integration and the challenge of overlapping memberships on trade. Journal of International Relations and Development, 17 (4), 522–544. Davis, C. (2009). Overlapping institutions in trade policy. Perspectives on Politics, 7 (1), 25–31.

58

M. BROSIG

Dijkstra, H. (2017). The rational design of IO interaction. In R. Biermann & J. Koops (Eds.), Palgrave handbook on inter-organizational relations in world politics (pp. 97–112). Palgrave Macmillan. Engel, U. (2015). The African Union finances—How does it work? Center for Area Studies (Working Paper No. 6). http://cas.sozphil.uni-leipzig.de/pub lications/publication-list/detail/news/the-african-union-finances-how-doesit-work. Accessed 25 May 2021. EU Commission. (2018). EU trade policy and Africa’s exports. http://trade.ec. europa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/november/tradoc_156399.pdf. Accessed 25 October 2021. EU Commission. (2022). Overview of economic partnership agreements. https:// trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf. Accessed 22 March 2022. Eurostat. (2016). EU-Africa trade in goods 2016. https://ec.europa.eu/eur ostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/EDN-20171129-1?inheritRedirect= true. Accessed 23 October 2021. Galaskiewicz, J. (1985). Interorganizational relations. Annual Review of Sociology, 11, 281–304. Galbreath, D., & Gebhardt, C. (Eds.). (2010). Cooperation or conflict? Problematizing organizational overlap in Europe. Ashgate. Geda, A., & Kebret, H. (2007). Regional economic integration in Africa: A review of problems and prospects with a case study of COMESA. Journal of African Economies, 16(5), 1–38. Gehring, T., & Faude, B. (2013). The dynamics of regime complexes: Microfoundations and systemic effects. Global Governance, 19(1), 119–130. Gehring, T., & Oberthür, S. (2009). The causal mechanisms of interaction between international institutions. European Journal of International Relations, 15(1), 125–156. Gest, N., & Grigorescu, A. (2010). Interactions among intergovernmental organizations in the anti-corruption realm. Review of International Organizations, 5(1), 53–72. Gómez-Mera, L. (2015). International regime complexity and regional governance: Evidence from the Americas. Global Governance, 21(1), 19–43. Gómez-Mera, L., & Molinari, A. (2014). Overlapping institutions, learning and dispute initiation in regional trade agreements: Evidence from South America. International Studies Quarterly, 58(2), 269–281. Haftel, Y. (2013). Commerce and institutions: Trade, scope, and the design of regional economic organizations. Review of International Organizations, 8(3), 389–414. Hannan, M., & Freeman, J. (1977). The population ecology of organizations. American Journal of Sociology, 82(5), 929–964.

2

REGIONAL TRADE REGIMES IN AFRICA …

59

Hänggi, H., Roloff, R., & Rüland, J. (Eds.). (2006). Interregionalism and international relations. Routledge. Herbst, J. (2007). Crafting regional integration in Africa. In A. Archarya & A. Johnston (Eds.), Crafting cooperation regional international institutions in comparative perspective (pp. 129–144). Cambridge University Press. Jørgensen, K. E., & Laatikainen, K. V. (Eds.). (2013). Routledge handbook on the European Union and international institutions. Routledge. Kent, J. (2010). The Doha Blues: Institutional crisis and reform in the WTO. Oxford University Press. Koschut, S. (Ed.). (2016). Regionen und Regionalismus in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Springer VS. Mevel, S., Valensisi, G., & Karingi, S. (2015, June 17–19). The economic partnership agreements and Africa’s integration and transformation agenda: The cases of West Africa and Eastern and Southern Africa regions. Selected paper for Presentation at the 18th Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis. https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/download/7649. pdf. Accessed 25 May 2021. Muntschick, J. (2012). Theorising regionalism and external influence: A situation-structural approach. Mainz Papers on International and European Politics (MPIEP) (Paper No. 2). Nolte, D. (2018). Costs and benefits of overlapping regional organizations in Latin America: The Case of the OAS and UNASUR. Latin American Politics and Society, 60(1), 128–153. Oberthür, S., & Gehring, T. (2011). Institutional interaction ten years of scholarly development. In S. Oberthür & O. Stokke (Eds.), Managing institutional complexity regime interplay and global environmental change (pp. 25–58). The MIT Press. Panke, D., & Stapel, S. (2018). Exploring overlapping regionalism. Journal of International Relations and Development, 21(3), 635–662. Sindzingre, A. (2012). The limitations of European Union’s interregionalism: The example of the economic partnership agreements in sub-Saharan Africa (UNUCRIS Working Papers W-2012/1). Snidal, D. (2012). Rational choice and international relations. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse, & B. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook of international relations (pp. 85–111, 2nd ed.). Sage. Stein, A. (1982). Coordination and collaboration: Regimes in an anarchic world. International Organization, 36(2), 299–324. Stokke, O. (2011). Interplay management, niche selection, and arctic environmental governance. In S. Oberthür & O. Stokke (Eds.), Managing institutional complexity regime interplay and global environmental change (pp. 143–170). The MIT Press.

60

M. BROSIG

Tavares, R., & Tang, V. (2011). Regional economic integration in Africa: Impediments to progress? South African Journal of International Affairs, 18(2), 217–234. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. (UNCTAD). Economic development in Africa 2013. http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ald cafrica2013_en.pdf. Accessed 25 May 2021. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2006). Assessing regional integration in Africa II rationalizing regional economic communities. UNECA. Venables, A. (2003). Winners and losers from regional integration agreements. The Economic Journal, 113, 747–761. Weiffen, B., Wehner, L., & Nolte, D. (2013). Overlapping regional security institutions in South America: The case of OAS and UNASUR. International Area Studies Review, 16(4), 370–389. WTO. (2014). International Trade Statistics 2014. https://www.wto.org/eng lish/res_e/statis_e/its2014_e/its14_toc_e.htm. Accessed 25 May 2021. Young, O. (1996). Institutional linkages in international society: Polar perspectives. Global Governance, 2(1), 1–24.

CHAPTER 3

External Actors and Security Regionalism in Africa: A New Dataset on External Funding Fredrik Söderbaum and Sören Stapel

Introduction Most theories of regionalism stipulate that regionalism and regional institutions are shaped by actors ‘from within’ a particular region either in response to functional demands or outside pressures and norms, such as globalisation or liberal capitalism (Laursen, 2003; Söderbaum & Shaw, 2003). These accounts often underestimate the role that external actors play in developing and shaping regionalism from the outside. It is clear that a great deal of existing research on the role of external actors in

F. Söderbaum School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden e-mail: [email protected] S. Stapel (B) University of Freiburg, Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. Muntschick (ed.), Regionalism in Africa and External Partners, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10702-3_3

61

62

F. SÖDERBAUM AND S. STAPEL

regionalism remains shallow, fragmented or too heavily centered on the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). It would be wrong to contest that the US and the EU have tried to influence regions and regional international organisations (RIOs) for many decades. In fact, during the last century the US has repeatedly tried to shape, undermine, and sometimes even destroy regionalist projects in Latin America and the Caribbean, large parts of Asia, the Middle East and also, to some extent, in Africa (Cook & Husted, 2016; Katzenstein, 2005; MacFarlane, 2004; Molineu, 1986). On a more positive note, the US is often believed to have played a rather progressive role during the early phases of European integration, immediately after the end of World War II. The EU’s role as a promotor of regionalism has also attracted significant scholarly attention (Diez & Tocci, 2017; Muntschick, 2018; Söderbaum & Stålgren, 2010). During the last two to three decades, the EU has developed comprehensive strategies and funding mechanisms to support regionalism and RIOs in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean and to some extent in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. The EU’s comprehensive region-building and inter-regional strategies have developed hand in hand with its self-proclaimed image as the world champion of regional integration, resulting in a special ‘mission’ to build regions and RIOs based on its own image (Baert et al., 2014). As such, the EU’s region-building attempts resemble the ‘civilizing mission’ of European powers to create nation-states after colonialism. The overall aim of this chapter is to contribute to a more nuanced academic debate about the role of external actors in the promotion of regionalism. The study makes three essential contributions. First, it moves beyond a selective focus on the US and the EU. Without dismissing the US and the EU, the study draws attention to a diversity of external actors which influence and shape regions and RIOs from the outside. Second, the study provides empirical evidence in order to unpack and problematise the motivations, roles, and effects of external actors in regionalism. Most external actors declare that they support and fund regionalism in order to help regional actors build their ‘own’ regions and RIOs (Söderbaum & Brolin, 2016). However, this is somewhat disingenuous. A growing body of literature in the field of comparative regionalism emphasises that external actors may not only support regional international organisations in the Global South, but also seek to ‘control’ such organisations from

3

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND SECURITY REGIONALISM …

63

the outside (Buzdugan, 2013; Krapohl, 2017; Muntschick, 2018; Söderbaum, 2016). The third contribution of the study relates to its special focus on external funding, which is usually overlooked by scholars who study the influence of external actors on regionalism. Given that so little is still known about external funding of regionalism, the study concentrates on the case of Africa, where external influence is deepest and the most evident. The intent is not to generate insights that can be generalised to all other corners of the world but to stimulate reflection and future research of an overlooked aspect of contemporary regionalism in the Global South. External actors are rarely altruistic and neutral financiers of endogenous regionalist projects. Instead, most external actors are deeply engaged in the making and unmaking of regionalism and RIOs. The three overall ambitions presented above are operationalised into a novel dataset about the external funding of regionalism in Africa between 2002 and 2016. The dataset measures not only external funding to RIOs (such as the African Union), but also a variety of ‘regional projects’ delivered outside the framework of such institutions. This distinction links back to debates about ‘new regionalism’, which is essential for this volume (cf. Engel et al., 2017; Hettne et al., 1999; Söderbaum & Shaw, 2003). In particular, the distinction makes it possible to go beyond a narrow focus on RIOs in favour of multidimensional processes involving state as well as non-state actors through a range of both formal and informal mechanisms and projects. The analysis carried out in this chapter therefore identifies the many ways donors cooperate with African counterparts, and which counterparts and activities they prioritise. Moreover, given the emphasis on security issues of this volume, particular attention is given to what is here referred to as ‘security-related funding’. Since security and governance are closely related in the African context, especially as far as regional aid is concerned, we consider external funding of ‘security’ and ‘governance’ under one category. Security projects are designed to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, and ultimately to ensure peace (MacFarlane & Weiss, 1992; Nye, 1971). By contrast, funding to governance is geared towards fundamental standards, such as human rights, democracy, the rule of law and anti-corruption measures (Börzel & van Hüllen, 2015; Coe, 2019; Stapel, 2022). As will be detailed below, this focus is further motivated by the sharp increase in recent years of security-related funding to regionalism in Africa.

64

F. SÖDERBAUM AND S. STAPEL

Following on from these general ambitions and delimitations, the study focuses on a series of basic questions: How much funding in official development assistance (ODA) is allocated at the regional level? How much of such a regional ODA is awarded to RIOs and how much is allocated outside of these organisations through regional projects? How much of the funding is directed to security-related issues and how much is directed to other policy areas? Who are the most important donors? How do patterns vary over time and between donors? It is our conviction that future progress in the research field requires consideration of these basic but hitherto largely ignored questions. The chapter is organised as follows: we initially present the motives and methodological considerations related to the dataset. The next section details patterns about where the funding is going, whereas the subsequent section maps the main donors, their preferences and their activities. A concluding section completes the chapter by summarising the main points and sketching potential avenues for future research.

A New Dataset on External Funding of Regionalism in Africa The novel dataset presented in this chapter focuses specifically on ‘regional’ ODA in Africa. Regional ODA is a relatively recent category, which should be distinguished from country-based (national or bilateral) ODA as well as multilateral ODA. It refers to ODA activities that cover two or more countries within the same region or sub-region. These funds are often (but not always) channelled through a regional counterpart, for instance a RIO, a regional non-governmental organisation (NGO), a regional committee or a range of other more flexible and donordriven mechanisms, projects and agencies (Söderbaum & Brolin, 2016; Stapel & Söderbaum, 2020). Some of the aid interventions in this category are ‘multi-country’ in character, which means that they may involve parallel projects in two or more countries with few genuine ‘regional’ links between them. Although regional ODA remains rather limited compared to country-based ODA, its importance should not be underestimated. It is quite indispensable in some regions and policy fields as it makes up large proportions of the budgets of RIOs in the Global South (Engel & Mattheis, 2020). We rely on a dataset on regional ODA in the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System. While there are other data sources, such as AidData,

3

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND SECURITY REGIONALISM …

65

OpenAid and Publish What You Fund, we use the officially accepted statistics reported to the OECD. The OECD data is broad in range and relies on a single classification system. It provides information about annual disbursements instead of committed resources, which is a preferred measure due to the unreliability of committed resources. Furthermore, the database also tracks the number of activities and projects, which allows for a comparison of the average size of projects. All in all, using OECD data facilitates systematic comparison across donors, policy areas and recipients. There are certain limitations with OECD data. For instance, it relies on the willingness of member states to disclose their aid activities and on the quality of their reporting. It is worth mentioning that, historically, there has been systematic underreporting of regional ODA, which can partially be explained by the recent introduction of this category. However, the quality of reporting has gradually improved, and regional ODA is now less likely to be miscategorised. Another limitation is that the dataset contains little information from non-OECD countries, particularly from new donors such as China (Dreher et al., 2013). Furthermore, the dataset remains solely focused on ODA and excludes other types of external funding, such as direct loans and non-ODA funds. While loans are negligible as far as security-related funding is concerned, a considerable amount of funding in the security field is provided as non-ODA. The EU’s African Peace Facility (APF) is a case in point and particularly relevant in this regard. As far as funding of RIOs is concerned, we cover both ‘direct’ transfers to core and programme budgets and what is best understood as ‘indirect’ funding. Indirect funding is provided outside the budgets of RIOs through a range of channels and implementing partners but still contributes to the agenda and work programmes of regional institutions (Söderbaum & Brolin, 2016). From a donor perspective, there are several reasons for choosing indirect over direct funding. Donors can circumvent the ‘political’ nature of RIOs as well as the many administrative and bureaucratic hurdles involved in direct transfers to RIO budgets. They can avoid such perceived obstacles while still contributing to the agenda and work programmes of RIOs via more flexible solutions and implementing partners. By contrast, indirect funding differs from funding to regional projects that by-pass or completely avoid RIOs. Whereas several donors rely on such distinctions, they have been largely overlooked by scholars of comparative regionalism who pay little attention to development aid and

66

F. SÖDERBAUM AND S. STAPEL

development theory. It would be grossly misleading to believe that the different types of funding do not affect power relations between donors and recipients and the way external actors try to influence, ‘control’, or by-pass African RIOs. Finally, we conceive of RIOs as institutionalised forms of cooperation, which takes place on the basis of geographical proximity between three or more states (Goltermann et al., 2012: 5). In line with the research in the field of comparative regionalism, we differentiate between multi-purpose and specialised RIOs (or general-purpose and task-specific RIOs) (Lenz et al., 2015; Söderbaum, 2016). The former takes place in more than one narrowly defined policy area, while the latter is specialised in a policy area, such as health or infrastructure. Drawing on these conventional distinctions in the field, we include 17 multi-purpose African RIOs in our analysis (Panke & Stapel, 2018)—the African Union (AU), eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs)1 and another eight multi-purpose RIOs.2

Patterns of External Funding Regional ODA to Africa amounts to a grand total of USD 45.8 billion between 2002 and 2016. There is a significant increase of annual disbursements over time, from USD 1.5 billion in 2002 to USD 5 billion in 2016. Annual disbursements in recent years correspond roughly to the combined national ODA of three ‘donor darlings’ in Africa: Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda. Yet, distributions vary significantly between RIOs and regional projects.

1 The eight official RECs are: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Community of

Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale (ECCAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). 2 The remaining eight multi-purpose RIOs (which lack the status as RECs) are:

Conseil de l’Entente (CE), Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), Mano River Union (MRU), Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEAMO).

3

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND SECURITY REGIONALISM …

67

The funding of regional projects is significantly larger than funding of RIOs. The accumulated funding of regional projects across all sectors and for the whole period amounts to about USD 42.1 billion, whereas the funding provided to the 17 African RIOs is less than USD 3.7 billion (Fig. 3.1). In other words, funding to RIOs corresponds to about ten per cent of regional ODA as a whole. However, in recent years there has been a drop in funding of regional projects, whereas we have witnessed a sharp increase of annual funding of RIOs. While USD 20 million were disbursed to RIOs in 2002, annual disbursements increased to about USD 410 million by 2016. Although regional ODA spreads over a considerable number of policy fields, security-related funding proves to be rather important and has been steadily growing over time. There is a clear difference between funding of regional projects compared to RIOs. Security-related funding features prominently in the overall funding of RIOs, and corresponds to about 30% of all ODA disbursements to RIOs. By contrast, the relative share of security-related funding of regional projects lies at about 10%. This is not particularly surprising as it is well-known that donors prefer to fund and cooperate with RIOs in the field of security and governance (Söderbaum & Tavares, 2008; Stapel & Söderbaum, 2020). However,

Fig. 3.1 Regional ODA to regional projects and RIOs (2002–2016)

68

F. SÖDERBAUM AND S. STAPEL

scholars have failed to pay attention to the high absolute amounts channelled outside the framework of RIOs. While security-related funding to RIOs increased from USD 7 million to USD 136 million, regional projects in this policy field grew from USD 135 million to USD 439 million between 2002 and 2016 (Fig. 3.2). Moreover, the accumulated amounts of security-related funding of regional projects (USD 4,356 million) outscores that of regional RIOs (USD 988 million) by a factor of four during this time period. However, as mentioned previously, it needs to be recognised that these figures exclude non-ODA funding, which is particularly significant in the case of the AU (Engel & Mattheis, 2020). The security-related funding of RIOs can be further unpacked. Figure 3.3 reveals the significant variation within the group of 17 RIOs. Although 13 out of 17 RIOs receive security-related funding, the amounts of funding differ considerably as a few RIOs receive the majority ODA and many receive very little. The dominance of the AU is significant, and the continental body has attracted five times more funding compared to the second and third in rank (SADC and ECOWAS). Given that the AU peace operations also receive considerable amounts of nonODA funds, the pattern is even more skewed in favour of the AU than

Fig. 3.2 Security-related ODA to regional projects and RIOs (2002–2016)

3

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND SECURITY REGIONALISM …

69

Fig. 3.3 Security-related ODA disbursements according to recipient RIO (2002–2016) (Note Multiple refers to when several RIOs are involved in the same project line)

what is suggested in Fig. 3.3.3 In this context, it is again useful to consider the security-related funding of both RIOs and regional projects (Fig. 3.2). With the exception of the AU, SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, and IGAD, there is a very strong preference in the donor community to by-pass the remaining RECs and other RIOs, and instead fund (donor-driven) regional projects. In sum, this section reveals that we have witnessed a substantial increase of regional ODA during the last fifteen years. Although regional ODA covers a range of policy fields, security-related funding remains important relative to other policy sectors. This is particularly the case of RIO funding as around 30% is security-related. There is a significant variation between recipient organisations. Although 13 out of 17 RIOs receive security-related funding, the bulk of the funds are concentrated to the AU and a group of a few favoured RECs (SADC, ECOWAS, EAC, IGAD). However, absolute levels of security-related funding of regional projects 3 The three continental programmes driven by the AU are categorised under the continental body: the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).

70

F. SÖDERBAUM AND S. STAPEL

is four times that of funding for RIOs. As a consequence, considerable amounts of security-related funding is designed to by-pass or avoid RIOs and thus controlled by donors.

Donor Activities and Priorities This section focuses on the donors and their priorities in externally funding security regionalism in Africa. In doing so, it unpacks the overall patterns of funding by detailing the number of activities per year and disbursements per donor across regional projects and RIOs. In this context, it should be mentioned that the gross total of regional ODA across all sectors (USD 45.8 billion) by 23 donors (RIOs) and 41 donors (regional projects) is spread over more than 60,000 yearly activities4 for the whole time period (2002–2016). With regard to the security-related funding of regional projects, 41 donors5 have reported 10,641 activities, worth a total of USD 4.36 billion during the whole period. There is a considerable variation between different donors. While some of them provide considerable amounts of funding, a large number of donors only provide limited funding. In addition, the donors also rank differently in terms of yearly activities compared to disbursement of funds (see Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.4). Sweden, Canada, the US and Norway are the most active donors in terms of yearly aid activities in regional projects (Table 3.1). There is an overall decrease over time in the number of yearly activities, and most donors peaked during 2009– 2012. The main exceptions are the US, the EU and the United Kingdom 4 Activities should not be confused with (multi-year) aid programmes. A reported activity in the OECD database does not differentiate between the duration of a given aid intervention, and can therefore be understood as project-years. Multi-year activities/projects are reported for every year there are disbursements. Whereas some donor interventions are only one year long, many last for three to five years. 5 The 41 donors are: African Development Bank (AfDB), African Development Fund (AfDF), Australia, Austria, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, EU, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, International Development Association (IDA), Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nordic Development Fund, Norway, Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Fund for International Development (OFID), Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

3

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND SECURITY REGIONALISM …

71

(UK) who are the only donors who have increased their activities in recent years. Compared to the number of yearly activities, the disbursement of funds reveals a different pattern (Fig. 3.4). While Germany is only ranked 7th in terms of yearly activities, it is by far the largest donor in terms of disbursements, with 22% of the total disbursements of security-related regional projects, worth a total of USD 966 million for the whole time period. The EU and the US are ranked second and third, respectively, both with roughly 10% of accumulated disbursements (slightly more than USD 500 million each). A comparison of activities with disbursements reveals that Germany and the EU have the largest projects, whereas donors such as Sweden, Canada and Norway have much smaller projects. Taking into account both the number of aid activities and the overall disbursements allows for comparing the average size of a yearly disbursements. In this regard, Germany outperforms all of the other donors by spending about USD 1.2 million per intervention. It is followed by the EU and the Netherlands (about USD 600 million) as well as Denmark, UK and US (between USD 420 and 450 million). By contrast, Canada, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland distribute less than USD 300 million per project. A different pattern emerges when the focus is shifted to security-related funding of RIOs as opposed to regional projects. A total of 23 donors have contributed to 1,576 security-related activities in RIOs recorded between 2002 and 2016 (worth a total of USD 988 million). However, only a few donors account for the majority of the activities and they dominate both yearly activities and disbursements.6 In other words, Germany, the EU, Sweden, Norway, Canada and the UK (the ‘Big 6’) account for 75% of the yearly activities and 82% of the ODA disbursements to RIOs (Table 3.2 and Fig. 3.5). The average size of disbursement differs widely between donors. The EU, Denmark and Germany spend on average USD 1 million per yearly aid activity. By contrast, the UK, US, Norway, Canada, Switzerland and Austria fund much smaller projects, with an average disbursement of less

6 The 23 donors providing security-related funding to RIO are: the African Development Bank, African Development Fund, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the EU, Finland, France, Germany, the International Development Association, the International Labour Organisation, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.

Sweden Canada USA Norway EU UK Germany Switzerland Netherlands Denmark

Table 3.1

67 13 20 45 19 40 10 8 18 0

2002

63 37 39 32 20 50 9 25 30 1

2003 52 59 28 45 20 43 15 29 34 2

2004 76 40 64 68 27 43 43 35 21 7

2005 100 55 56 73 23 42 51 44 29 11

2006 107 57 131 93 25 58 58 35 24 25

2007 128 93 118 80 33 81 70 61 20 23

2008 99 138 120 57 78 76 96 77 18 35

2009 97 215 93 82 66 40 82 59 19 41

2010 124 184 84 81 95 34 66 63 15 32

2011 141 119 64 87 94 33 67 48 21 28

2012

Security-related aid activities in regional projects by top donors (per year)

101 128 71 81 94 38 59 48 24 22

2013

88 94 86 74 81 30 46 41 30 21

2014

86 82 93 60 76 149 67 40 31 26

2015

100 93 145 48 109 66 75 52 33 23

2016

1429 1407 1212 1006 860 823 814 665 367 297

Sum

72 F. SÖDERBAUM AND S. STAPEL

3

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND SECURITY REGIONALISM …

73

Fig. 3.4 Security-related aid disbursements to regional projects by top donors (2002–2016)

than USD 350,000 per activity. Sweden as well as the Netherlands and Finland (not listed in Table 3.2) fall in between these two groups as they provide an average of USD 500,000 per aid activity. Moreover, donors tend to work with different recipient organisations. All of the top donors initiate more than half of their security-related activities with the AU—except for the US whose ODA benefits mostly ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC. The main donors make the following prioritisations (ranked in terms of which RIO receives the most to the least amount of funding from each donor): Germany: EAC, SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD EU: SADC, ECOWAS, IGAD, EAC Sweden: EAC, IGAD, ECOWAS Denmark: IGAD, ECOWAS, SADC Norway: SADC, IGAD UK: ECOWAS Canada: ECOWAS Finland: IGAD Netherlands: IGAD

Germany EU Sweden Norway Canada UK Switzerland USA Denmark Austria

Table 3.2

1 4 2 4 3 1 0 0 0 0

2002

6 4 7 4 6 2 0 0 2 0

2003 11 6 5 3 6 4 0 0 1 0

2004 0 5 0 0 6 5 3 2 2 0

2005 18 3 19 10 5 5 3 0 3 0

2006 14 6 9 7 7 9 2 1 4 3

2007 27 11 14 13 10 13 3 3 5 5

2008 28 25 20 15 12 9 2 5 4 3

2009 27 30 12 20 38 19 6 5 8 5

2010

Security-related aid activities in RIOs by top donors (per year)

24 24 19 21 31 14 3 6 4 5

2011 20 26 22 18 9 10 7 7 7 9

2012 23 25 13 17 10 12 7 6 6 7

2013

24 25 16 19 1 6 9 4 6 6

2014

32 28 11 18 5 20 10 3 5 4

2015

34 37 17 15 2 10 10 18 3 6

2016

289 259 186 184 151 139 65 60 60 53

Sum

74 F. SÖDERBAUM AND S. STAPEL

3

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND SECURITY REGIONALISM …

75

Fig. 3.5 Security-related aid disbursements to RIOs by top donors (2002– 2016)

Three more general observations can be highlighted in relation to the funding of security regionalism over the past 15 years. First, Germany and the EU dominate the external funding of both RIOs and regional projects in terms of disbursements and, albeit to a lesser extent, number of activities. Given the strong emphasis on the EU as a supporter of RIOs in both academic and policy circles, it deserves recognition that Germany ranks first on both lists. However, the EU’s ODA disbursements to RIOs increased from 2009 and skyrocketed in 2015 and 2016 (USD 43 and 48 million, respectively). Furthermore, as mentioned previously, the EU’s large non-ODA contributions to peacekeeping missions and other security-related projects in Africa are excluded from the dataset. Moreover, the EU and Germany seem to pursue a comprehensive approach to security regionalism in Africa that targets a variety of RIOs as well as broader regional projects. Second, the Nordic countries (Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway) provide regional ODA to both RIOs and regional projects and therefore follow a similar approach as the EU and Germany. However, they differ from the two top donors in two respects. On the one hand, they rather focus on a limited number of benefited RIOs (AU, EAC

76

F. SÖDERBAUM AND S. STAPEL

ECOWAS, SADC and the MRU in the cases of Denmark and Norway). On the other hand, Scandinavian donors tend to provide lower average distributions. Third, the US does not rank among the top funders of RIOs although it has gradually become more active in supporting RIOs. By contrast, the US is strikingly more active in security-related funding of regional projects. The figures underline that the US does not prioritise to work with RIOs in their approach to security regionalism in Africa. Similar insights can be drawn for the UK, Canada and the Netherlands as they all prioritise regional projects in their funding of security-related regionalism in Africa. While these donors also fund RIOs, the focus rather seems on funding activities that by-pass and avoid them.

Conclusion and Avenues for Future Research This chapter has contributed to the research field of comparative regionalism. Its starting point were two general omissions in this literature. First, most scholarly work on regionalism is heavily geared towards intraregional actors and existing research on external actors remains shallow, fragmented or heavily centered on the EU and, to some extent, the US. The second weakness is that there is a paucity of knowledge and data of external funding of regionalism, which is rather surprising since such funding is intensively discussed in policy-making circles. Even if there is a growing literature on the budgets and finances of regional organisations, there is almost a complete lack of insights about their funding levels and priorities. The new dataset of regional ODA presented in this chapter identifies a range of patterns and trajectories of security-related funding to regionalism in Africa. The most important general empirical messages are the following (see appendix for a detailed summary of data): First, regional ODA to both regional projects and RIOs has increased dramatically during the last 15 years. In the broadest sense, the dataset as a whole (all policy fields) covers more than 60,000 activities worth more than USD 45 billion over the time period of 2002–2016. Security-related funding is one of the most important policy fields. Altogether, 41 donors are responsible for 12,100 security-related activities, worth around USD 5.3 billion, when supporting both regional projects and RIOs. Second, the importance of security-related funding differs depending on whether we measure regional projects or funding of RIOs. While about 30% of the funding of RIOs is security-related, the same type of

3

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND SECURITY REGIONALISM …

77

funding to regional projects is only about 10%. Hence, compared to other sectors, a relatively high share of RIO funding is security-related. In absolute terms, however, security-related funding of projects is four times higher compared to that of security-related funding of RIOs, which implies that many donors by-pass and avoid RIOs. The proportions remain rather similar over time. Donors engage with 13 out of the 17 African RIOs. However, they most often turn to the AU, as the primary recipient of security-related funding, and a few favoured RECs. Third, although many donors provide regional ODA on securityrelated issues, the bulk of funding stems from a limited number of donors. Germany and the EU are by far the largest donors in terms of disbursement to both regional projects and RIOs. It should be emphasised that Germany, rather than the EU, is the largest provider of regional ODA in the field of security and governance. The Nordic countries pursue a comprehensive approach to security regionalism in Africa as they provide funding to both regional projects and RIOs. By contrast, the US, Canada, the Netherlands and the UK are significant funders of regional projects. Their importance as providers of security-related regional ODA appears to have been neglected due to the fact that they prefer to eschew RIOs. The insights presented in this chapter result in a few avenues for future research. The first observation is the striking difference in levels of funding of regional projects compared to funding of RIOs. This aspect has been largely ignored by scholars in the field, most likely as a result of the exaggerated focus on RIOs. From this perspective, future research could address questions such as: What explains the high levels of funding of regional projects in contrast to RIOs? Why do donors often by-pass RIOs? Is this related to donor ‘control’ and power or effectiveness? Compared to other policy fields, RIOs receive a high share of securityrelated funding fields. What explains these donor preferences? It might be a result of donors preferring to work with RIOs in this field. However, if the general principle is that donors often by-pass RIOs, why would they channel funding through RIOs in the field of security? Does it imply that donors believe that RIOs perform better in the field of security compared to other sectors? A second cluster of questions deserving attention in future research relates to the considerable variation among donors. While 41 donors are active, why is there a fairly limited number of dominant donors? Why are some donors very active? Why do most donors not prioritise security-related funding? Why are Germany and the EU so dominant?

78

F. SÖDERBAUM AND S. STAPEL

Why does the US prioritise regional projects rather than RIOs? Why does the US increase support to RIOs whereas several other donors reduce their funding of RIOs? Why do some donors favour large and comprehensive interventions, whereas other donors favour a larger number of activities and much smaller interventions? A third cluster of questions is related to the need to build knowledge about the relationships between donors and recipients. The donor community, particularly the most active donors, are motivated by various and shifting interests. However, these interests cannot be fully understood unless the perspectives of their African counterparts are also considered. Donors are rarely able to implement their agendas as they would wish; they have to rely on their African counterparts, who are extremely reliant on external funding. We therefore need more studies of interactions between donors and recipients and the ways in which these relationships affect strategies and outcomes. What are the interests, responses and agencies of the African counterparts? A final cluster of questions relates to the need to better understand how the external funding of RIOs impacts their performance. An idealistic belief is that donor funding is ‘assisting’ African RIOs, but a growing body of literature alludes to potentially problematic effects, with excessive donor dependence resulting in diminished RIO effectiveness, implementation gaps, and the failure of member states to comply with decisions and budget targets (Engel & Mattheis, 2020; Gray, 2013). Hence, it is imperative to better understand what factors render aid to RIOs effective or counterproductive, whether these factors vary across policy sectors, and if there is variation between different donors.

Appendix: Summary of Disbursements and Yearly Activities Security-related Disbursements projects 2002–2016 Disbursements RIOs 2002–2016 Disbursement projects 2016

All sectors

% security of all

4,356.10

42,060.28

10.4

988.09

3,691.36

26.8

439.17

4212.34

10.4 (continued)

3

EXTERNAL ACTORS AND SECURITY REGIONALISM …

79

(continued)

Disbursement RIOs 2016 Activities projects 2002–2016 Activities RIOs 2002–2016 Activities projects 2016 Activities RIOs 2016

Security-related

All sectors

% security of all

136.36 10,657

492.52 55,736

27.7 19.1

1,576

4,348

36.6

882

5,419

16.3

173

438

39.5

References Baert, F., Scaramagli, T., & Söderbaum, F. (2014). Intersecting interregionalism: Regions, global governance and the EU . Springer. Börzel, T. A., & Hüllen, V. (2015). Towards a global script? Governance transfer by regional organizations. In T. A. Börzel & V. van Hüllen (Eds.), Governance transfer by regional organizations: Patching together a global script (pp. 3–21). Palgrave Macmillan. Buzdugan, S. R. (2013). Regionalism from without: External involvement of the EU in regionalism in southern Africa. Review of International Political Economy, 20(4), 917–946. Coe, B. N. (2019). Sovereignty in the South: Intrusive regionalism in Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Cambridge University Press. Cook, N., & Husted, T. F. (2016). The African Union (AU): Key issues and U.S.-AU relations. Congressional Research Service R44713. Diez, T., & Tocci, N. (2017). The EU, promoting regional integration, and conflict resolution. Palgrave. Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., & Nunnenkamp, P. (2013). New Donors. International Interactions, 39(3), 402–415. Engel, U., & Mattheis, F. (2020) (Eds.). The finances of regional organisations in the Global South: Follow the money. Routledge. Engel, U., Zinecker, H., Mattheis, F., Dietze, A., & Plötze, T. (2017). New politics of regionalism: Perspectives from Africa. Routledge. Goltermann, L., Lohaus, M., Spielau, A,. & Striebinger, K. (2012). Roads to regionalism: Concepts, issues, and cases. In T. A. Börzel, L. Goltermann, M. Lohaus, & K. Striebinger (Eds.), Roads to regionalism. Genesis, design and effects of regional organizations (pp. 3–21). Ashgate.

80

F. SÖDERBAUM AND S. STAPEL

Gray, J. (2013). The company states keep: International economic organizations and investor perceptions. Cambridge University Press. Hettne, B., Inotai, A., & Sunkel, O. (1999). Globalism and the new regionalism. Macmillan. Katzenstein, P. J. (2005). A world of regions: Asia and Europe in the American imperium. Cornell University Press. Krapohl, S. (Ed.). (2017). Regional integration in the South: External influence on economic cooperation in ASEAN, MERCOSUR and SADC. Palgrave. Laursen, F. (2003). Comparative regional integration: Theoretical perspectives. Ashgate. Lenz, T., Bezuijen, J., Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2015). Patterns of international organization: Task specific vs. general purpose. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft, 49, 131–156. MacFarlane, N. (2004). The United States and regionalism in Central Asia. International Affairs, 80(3), 447–461. MacFarlane, S. N., & Weiss, T. G. (1992). Regional organizations and regional security. Security Studies, 2(1), 6–37. Molineu, H. (1986). U.S. policy toward Latin America: From regionalism to globalism. Westview Press. Muntschick, J. (2018). The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the European Union (EU). Regionalism and external influence. Palgrave. Nye, J. S. (1971). Peace in parts: Integration and conflict in regional organization. Little, Brown. Panke, D., & Stapel, S. (2018). Overlapping regionalism in Europe: Patterns and effects. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 20(1), 239–258. Söderbaum, F. (2016). Rethinking regionalism. Palgrave Macmillan. Söderbaum, F., & Brolin, T. (2016). Supporting regional cooperation and integration in Africa—What works and why? Expert Group for Aid Studies. Söderbaum, F., & Shaw, T. M. (2003). Theories of new regionalism. Palgrave Macmillan. Söderbaum, F., & Stålgren, P. (2010). The European Union and the Global South. Lynne Rienner. Söderbaum, F., & Tavares, R. (2008). The African Union and the regional economic communities: 3 Scenarios for 2018–2028. Report commissioned by the Swedish Armed Forces (August). Swedish Armed Forces. Stapel, S. (2022). Regional organizations and democracy, human rights, and the rule of law: The African Union, organization of Americas States, and the diffusion of institutions. Palgrave Macmillan. Stapel, S., & Söderbaum, F. (2020). Mapping and problematising external funding to the African Union and the regional economic communities. In U. Engel & F. Mattheis (Eds.), The finances of regional organisations in the Global South: Follow the money (pp. 112–125). Routledge.

PART III

Case Studies

CHAPTER 4

Actors and Ambitions in the European Union’s Security Policies Towards Africa Gorm Rye Olsen

Since the turn of the century, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the establishment of the African Union in 2002, the European Union (EU) has increasingly involved itself in promoting security in Africa. During this period, the EU launched no less than 17 missions within the framework of the Common Foreign and Defence Policy (CFDP). Seven of these missions were military and with “10 out of the 17 operations deployed in Africa, the continent is by far the main CSDP arena for the EU”, as is emphasised by Thierry Tardy (2016: 2). Among the recent remarkable components in the EU’s policy to promote security in Africa were the three military training missions (EUTMs) in viz. Somalia, Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR). The increasing involvement of the European Union in security provision in Africa took place at the same time as the African Union promoted

G. R. Olsen (B) Department for Social Science and Business, Roskilde University, Roskilde, Denmark e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. Muntschick (ed.), Regionalism in Africa and External Partners, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10702-3_4

83

84

G. R. OLSEN

the idea of the need for ‘African solutions to African problems’ (Glas, 2018: 1125ff; Williams, 2007). In 2017, African Union (AU) member countries had deployed troops in a number of different United Nations (UN) peace missions across the continent, sending the signal of support to the idea of ‘African solutions’. African troops were on the ground in Somalia as part of the AU’s Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operation and significant numbers of African military personnel participated in two regional task forces fighting the Lord’s Resistance Army and Boko Haram (de Coning, 2017: 146; Glas, 2018: 1131ff). To a large extent, the heavy involvement of African governments and in particular the deployment of African troops in peace missions and conflict management operations have been financed by the European Union and its special funding mechanism, the African Peace Facility (APF) (Glas, 2018: 1128ff; Tardy, 2016: 3). This chapter gives evidence that the support from outside Africa was indispensable and that it ‘demonstrates the European commitment to African-led security governance’ (Glas, 2018: 1128ff; Tardy, 2016). This study contributes to the academic debate on the relationship between the European Union and Africa, including the African Union by applying a Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) framework. Utilising this particular theoretical framework, the chapter aims at contributing to the existing knowledge of the motives, interests and actors involved in the European Union’s policies towards Africa in the current century. By applying the FPA framework, the analytical attention is drawn to the perceptions of the core decision-makers and to the domestic government institutions within the European Union that contribute to policy-making and to the implementation of the EU’s Africa policy. The chapter deals with answering the question of why the recent changes in the European Union’s foreign and security policy have taken place. It asks two closely interlinked questions. First, why has the European Union involved itself in conflict management in Africa? Second, why has the EU been willing to fund significant proportions of the costs involved in deploying African troops in conflict management missions, considering the official African endorsement of the idea of ‘African solutions to African problems’? The chapter assumes that there is one answer to both questions. It is the argument that national interests of leading EU member states, together with bureaucratic interests embedded in core EU institutions, played the decisive role when it came to decision-making on the possible involvement of the European Union in conflict management in Africa (see also Bappah, Chapter 5). The argument assumes that EU

4

ACTORS AND AMBITIONS IN THE EUROPEAN …

85

institutions such as the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) pursued ‘common European interests’ aimed at proving that the European Union is capable of delivering conflict management in Africa. The remaining parts of this study are organised as follows. First, the analytical framework is introduced. This is followed by the presentation of the dependent variable of the study, namely the EU’s security interventions. The analysis begins with an examination of the international framing of the European Union’s relations to Africa. The four domestic intervening variables are then analysed starting with the scrutiny of the perceptions of Africa among core foreign policy decision-makers. The analysis of the second intervening variable, the location of Africa in the strategic culture of the EU, follows. The third intervening variable is Africa and its position within state-society relations of the European Union. Finally, the role of domestic government institutions within the European Union in policy-making on Africa is analysed followed by the conclusion.

The Analytical Framework and Methodological Reflections This work focuses on the motives, interests and actors supposed to have influenced crucial European Union decisions aimed at Africa within the framework of the Common Foreign and Defence Policy. The study takes an approach to analysing a number of interventions with the aim to identify a pattern of motives, interests and actors that have influenced these cases aimed at promoting security in Africa within the framework of the CFSP. The following cases are examined: First, the naval operations ‘Atalanta’ together with the launch of the EU Maritime Security Strategy, followed by the analysis of the involvements in Somalia, Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR) with special emphasis on the 3 military training missions together with the 2 civilian missions in Mali and neighbouring Niger. Finally, the European interests, motives and actors behind the recently established G5 Sahel organisation are analysed as well. The framing of the research questions locates the analysis within a foreign policy problematic. Foreign policy is defined as “the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor – but usually exclusively – a state in international relations” (Hill, 2016: 4). The definition is assumed to also apply to the European Union, despite of the

86

G. R. OLSEN

fact that it is not a nation state. In this context, it is most important to keep in mind that the EU is a unique organisation combining intergovernmental and supra-governmental characteristics (Hix, 2005: 6, 9, 15, 40). Decision-making within the field of foreign and security policy is formally subject to the principle of intergovernmentalism that assigns a strong position to the individual member state based on the principle that decisions are taken by unanimity among the member states (Hix, 2005: 398ff). It must be noted that the Secretariat of Council of Ministers, the Commission and the newly established European External Action Service (EEAS) are assumed to play an active role in policy- and decision-making on foreign and security issues. Due to the focus of this work, it is pertinent to apply an analytical framework focusing explicitly on foreign policy. Here, the study applies a Foreign Policy Analysis framework inspired by neoclassical realism as “neoclassical realism is, in essence, a theory of foreign policy in that it explains how states construct policy responses to international circumstances” (Ripsman et al., 2016: 81). The deployment of European Union troops in Africa and the financial and logistical support to African peacekeepers are the dependent variable to be explained by means of independent and intermediate variables. The independent variable—or as stated in the above definition ‘international circumstances’—refers to the location of Africa and Europe in the international system, whereas the intervening variables are a number of domestic oriented circumstances assumed to be important for the decisions made. In sum, the explanatory variables involve both international and domestic factors and circumstances. The independent variable and the four intervening variables are considered a model pointing out a number of circumstances and variables deemed to be important for foreign policy decision-making. However, the different categories themselves do not explain anything. In order to promote explanations linked to these five categories, the following separate analyses formulate explanatory hypotheses attached to the presentation of each individual variable, assuming that adding the different explanations produces a convincing explanation.

The Dependent Variable: EU’s Security Interventions in Africa The decision to engage the EU in conflict management in Somalia in 2007 was promoted by a combination of European concerns for terrorism

4

ACTORS AND AMBITIONS IN THE EUROPEAN …

87

and political pressure from the United States leading the EU Council on 23 April 2007 deciding to engage in Somalia (Olsen, 2015: 232f). In December 2008, parallel with the EU support to AMISOM, it was decided to deploy the EU naval force ‘Atalanta’ off the coast of Somalia to contribute to the determent and prevention of piracy. A number of EU member countries contributed to the more than 20 vessels strong operation (European Union, 2008). The European Union continued to increase its involvement at the Horn of Africa and in 2010, in the Foreign Affairs Council, the member states accepted the establishment of an EU training mission (EUTM) in Somalia as part of the EU’s comprehensive approach to Somalia aimed at providing support to the Somali transitional government. EUTM Somalia was the first EU military training mission and its goal was to strengthen the Somali security forces. The mandate of the EUTM has been extended several times. In December 2020, it was extended until the end of 2022 (European Council, 2020). In January 2012, an armed rebellion expelled the Malian army from the northern parts of the country and armed groups established an Islamist regime in northern Mali during the following months. The outside world reacted strongly to the coup and not least to the consolidation of a hard-line Islamist regime in West Africa. On 10 December 2013, the EU Council approved a crisis management concept for a CFSP military mission to Mali. No fewer than 23 EU member states contributed military personnel to the training mission consisting of 200 instructors plus support staff and a protection force. In addition to the EUTM Mali, the EU Council established a civilian CSDP mission, ‘EUCAP Sahel Mali’, to support the domestic security forces—mainly the police— with strategic advice and training in mid-April 2014 (European Council, 2014). A new mandate for the EUTM Mali extended the mission up to May 2024 (EUTM Mali, 2022). As an offshoot of the general European concerns for security in the Sahel and Mali, the European Union agreed to launch a two-year mission in neighbouring Niger in mid-July 2012. The goal of ‘EUCAP Sahel Niger’ was to train and improve the capacity of the country’s security forces to fight al-Qaeda (Pirozzi, 2013: 16–17). It aimed at strengthening the Nigerien capacities to fight terrorism, organised crime and irregular migration. The mission established a field office in Agadez with a permanent presence from May 2015. The international staff consisted mostly of civilian security trainers from EU member states, but the team was also

88

G. R. OLSEN

to have military expertise (EEAS, 2018b). The mandate of the mission was last renewed as of January 2021 for another two years (European Council, 2021). In late 2012, violence broke out once again in the Central African Republic (CAR). Officially, the EU gave high priority to resolving the crisis in the CAR. Nevertheless, it took more than 6 months from the start of the crisis before the European Council declared its willingness to use all relevant instruments including deployment of EU armed forces to stabilise the country (Furness & Olsen, 2016: 115f; Plank, 2017: 493ff). It was not until April 2014, when it was announced that the EU would launch a military operation, the ‘EUFOR-RCA’, contributing to restoring stability in the country. 700 European Union soldiers were deployed in addition to the 1600 French troops that had been in the country since December 2013 (Furness & Olsen, 2016: 115) As part of the implementation of the comprehensive approach, the European Union’s foreign affairs Council in April 2016 decided to establish a military training mission in the CAR, ‘EUTM RCA’. It was expected to provide strategic advice to the CAR defence ministry and general staff (EEAS, 2018a). Finally, in 2014, five countries in the Sahel established the so-called ‘G5 Sahel’ group envisaging to build a 5,000 strong military force aimed at fighting terrorism, organised border crime and human trafficking. A number of international donors including the European Union provided financial support to the ‘G5 Sahel Joint Force’ (see also Bergmann, Chapter 6). The EU funding was provided through the African Peace Facility (EEAS, 2018a). In brief, since the involvement in promoting peace and stability in and around Somalia, the European Union has engaged increasingly in conflict management operations in Africa.

The International Circumstances: The European Union and Africa---Threats and Strategic Environment The independent variable, i.e. the international system or international circumstances, consists of two main elements. First, the systemic variable refers to a number of components: (1) the degree at which threats and opportunities are readily obvious and (2) if optimal policy options stand out or not (Ripsman et al., 2016: 46ff). The second systemic variable refers to the nature of the state’s strategic environment, particularly

4

ACTORS AND AMBITIONS IN THE EUROPEAN …

89

the question of polarity in the international system and, thereby the distribution of power on an international level (Ripsman et al., 2016: 52ff). In the wake of the terrorist attacks on New York in September 2001, the fight against international terrorism became a high priority not only of the United States, but also of the European Union, as was indicated by the first European Security Strategy published in 2003 (European Council, 2003). Since the 2000 Cairo summit between the EU and the African governments was the so-called ‘Africa-EU process’ where the two regions met on a regular basis to discuss issues of common interest. At the second Africa-EU summit held in Lisbon 2007, it was decided to launch the ‘Joint Africa-EU’ strategy, stressing the importance of security. The security agenda increasingly affected the relationship between the two continents, which stood in sharp contrast to the situation prior to the turn of the century. Until the end of the 1990s, the relations between the European Union and Africa were mainly perceived in development terms within the framework of the EU-ACP relationship. Since the implementation of the Cotonou agreement by the year 2000, the focus on new areas of cooperation between the two continents with emphasis on peace, security, migration and good governance increased (Carbone, 2017: 300ff). The strong attention to the promotion of security and the fight against terrorism as well as migration reflected that the European Union was more and more preoccupied with defending the interests of ‘Europe’ (Carbone, 2017: 312, 308). The emphasis on European interests became clearly evident in the EU Global Strategy launched in 2016, where it was stated “we will continue to support peace and security efforts in Africa and assist African Organizations’ work on conflict prevention, counterterrorism and organized crime, migration and border management” (European Council, 2016: 36). The formulations in the Global Strategy reflected that the foreign policy focus on security and Islamist radicalisation was increasingly supplemented by strong attention to migration from Africa, which was buttressed by a highly polarised debate in Europe (Boubeker, 2013; Chafer, 2014: 519, 523). Turning to the question whether optimal policy solutions stand out, the establishment of the African Union in 2002 meant that policy solutions existed at least in theory. Due to the ambitions behind the African Union, it was envisioned that the organisation should play a major role in resolving and managing armed conflicts on the continent. Nevertheless, it was recognised from the onset that the AU lacked a number of important

90

G. R. OLSEN

prerequisites to act as an efficient conflict manager. The AU never was and still is not capable of carrying out peace and conflict management operations in Africa unless it gets considerable financial, logistical and technical support from the international community (Williams, 2007, 2008, 2014). The institutional weaknesses and heavy reliance on actors from outside the continent is most clearly demonstrated by the AU’s finances, where the Peace and Security Department’s external support often accounts for 90 percent of its annual funding (see also Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3). As far as AU staff is concerned, there is general agreement that the organisation remains understaffed. The relative weakness and dependence undermine the autonomy and not least the ability to provide region-led solutions, as demonstrated during the Libyan crisis in 2011, when the African Union suggested a ‘roadmap’ for finding a solution to the conflict in Libya which the members afterwards could not agree on implementing (De Waal, 2013; Glas, 2018: 1129). Elisa Lopez Lucia argues that the European Union actively contributed to undermining ‘local ownership’ to development and security initiatives in West Africa. This was demonstrated in the EU’s Sahel Strategy that presented the regional organisation ECOWAS as an inefficient actor that should be sidelined, and instead replaced by the EU partner with more efficient groups of states (Lucia, 2017). In spite of these weaknesses, the African Union was a crucial partner for many non-African actors, including for the European Union. It was most obvious in a number of crisis and conflict management situations where the African Union and/or individual African countries have deployed troops whereas the EU paid most of costs. The division of labour manifested itself in the cases discussed here, i.e. in Somalia, Mali and the CAR (see also Plank, Chapter 7). In addition, the AU proved to be an important partner for the European Union when it came to managing immigration from Africa. The latter issue was high on the agenda during the 5th African Union-European Union summit in Abidjan in the Ivory Coast in November 2017 (AU-EU/Decl.V, 2017). The most obvious feature of Africa’s strategic environment was undoubtedly the massive and growing Chinese presence across Africa over the past decades. Chinese trade with Africa increased significantly and Chinese investments in infrastructure, oil exploration and extractive industries in general have increased in the same period. China became a big supplier of consumer goods to the African domestic markets (Hodzi, 2018). China slowly became a development aid actor in many African

4

ACTORS AND AMBITIONS IN THE EUROPEAN …

91

countries (Swedlund, 2017). In late 2018, the European Union therefore launched a plan to counter China’s increasing influence in Africa (BBC, 2018). It was also a crucial element in Africa’s strategic environment that China extended its collaboration with the African Union via the ‘Forum of China-Africa Cooperation’ (FOCAC) in recent years, where high-level representatives meet frequently to exchange views. No doubt, the FOCAC was considered a serious challenge to the Africa-EU summits and the frequent high-level meetings between civil servants from the two continents exchanging views on issues of mutual interest. Finally, the growing Chinese engagement in peacekeeping missions in Africa could be looked upon as way of easing the burden of Europe; however, it could also be considered an element in the competition for influence on the continent (Ukeje & Tariku, 2018). In this context, it has to be noted that China established a permanent military base in Djibouti in 2017. China was not the only external actor with a considerable presence in Africa. The growing American preoccupation with the global war on terror led to a significant increase in the military presence of the United States on the continent. The establishment of a permanent base in Djibouti in 2002 was followed by a number of outposts such as camps, port facilities and fuel bunkers in no less than 34 African countries. In addition to the establishment of such more or less permanent bases, US Special Operations Command launched two military training programmes for the region: ‘Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara’ aimed at training African forces and ‘Operations Flintlock’ to jointly exercise US troops with African forces (Burgess, 2015: 2011). Not only the US and states in West Africa participated in these exercises, also France and other European countries joined the training (Cochi, 2016). Around the time, Donald Trump took over power in January 2017, it was estimated that between 6,000 and 7,000 US military personnel were assigned to Africa (Savitsky, 2018). France is the only EU member state that had a prominent position and accordingly significant influence in Africa in the post-colonial era. Africa had a special status in French foreign policy and in the post-cold war era (see also Bappah, Chapter 5); French politicians regardless of political inclinations agreed that it was important to maintain a sphere of influence in Francophone Africa in order to preserve the international power status of France (Chafer, 2014: 514; Vallin, 2015: 93–97). On the other hand, since the mid-1990s, French governments pursued a multilateral approach to the continent (Vallin, 2015: 85–91). The crucial purpose

92

G. R. OLSEN

of the multilateral approach to Africa was burden-sharing with the aim to reduce the financial costs and the risks of France when involving itself in Africa (Charbonneau & Chafer, 2012: 276–280). The shift towards multilateralism made the link between the EU’s and the French Africa policies even more important to the decision-makers in Paris and Brussels as multilateralisation basically meant ‘Europeanisation’ and thus burden-sharing with France’s European partners in pursuing French policy priorities in Africa (Charbonneau & Chafer, 2012: 276–280). Due to the continued important role of France in the strategic environment of Africa, it is worth noting that the French government published a White Paper on ‘Defence and National Security’ in 2013. The White paper argued that the security of France and Europe/the European Union was closely interlinked and that “Europe’s neighborhood”, which included “the Sahel from Mauritania to the Horn of Africa”, was of strategic importance (White Paper, 2013: 54). The White Paper indicated that political instability in the Sahel was not only a threat to “France but certainly to Europe at large” (Chafer, 2014: 514). The perception of a serious threat stemming from Africa could hardly be separated from the presence of large African diaspora communities in France. The diaspora from the Sahel apparently made many French feel that they were ‘on the frontline’, directly facing the challenges from the immigration of Muslims and from terrorism (Chafer, 2014: 523, 519; Hecker & Tenenbaum, 2017: 8–10). Summing up, China—if not a direct threat to Europe—definitely represented a serious competitor to the European influence in Africa. With China’s increasing engagement in peacekeeping and conflict management combined with the close contacts via the FOCACcooperation, the position of the European Union in Africa appeared challenged. On the other hand, the EU was not challenged by the United States and its policies on the continent. On the contrary, even though the level of cooperation between the US and the EU was limited. Inspired by the French White Paper, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa were considered to be of strategic interest to Europe. The strategic significance seemed to stem from terrorism and immigration, including the immigration of potential radical Islamists. In spite of the weaknesses of the African Union, cooperation between the two regional organisations seemed to be the best, if not the only solution to addressing the threats from Africa faced by the European Union.

4

ACTORS AND AMBITIONS IN THE EUROPEAN …

93

Perceptions of Africa Among Foreign Policy Makers in the European Union In the FPA model, the domestic intervening variables refer to the various constraints on and possibilities for the core decision-makers to conduct foreign policy. The first explanatory hypothesis states that perceptions of foreign policy decision-makers are important for understanding and explaining why policy decisions are made. Perceptions are reflected in public statements, strategy papers, speeches and declarations issued by these individuals and their organisations. As already mentioned, there has been the ‘Africa-EU process’ where political leaders from the two regions have met on a regular basis to discuss issue of common interest since the 2000 Africa-EU Cairo summit. This leads Lola Raich to claim “Africa’s strategic standing on the EU’s agenda received a big boost-up since the dawn of the century” (Raich, 2018: 116). At the second Africa-EU summit in Lisbon in 2007, it was decided to launch the ‘Joint Africa-EU Strategy’ (JAES), which stressed the importance of security. The priorities in the JAES were specified in two regional strategies, one for the Horn of Africa and one for the Sahel respectively. The Horn of Africa strategy identified migration, terrorism and criminalisation including piracy as threats to European security (European Council, 2009). The Sahel Strategy aim was to improve “security and development (which) has an obvious and direct impact on protecting European citizens and interests…” (EEAS, 2011). In 2016, the ‘EU Global Strategy’ was launched, stressing the continued preoccupation with conflict prevention, counterterrorism and organised crime, migration and border management (European Council, 2016: 36). Turning to the specific cases, the involvement of the EU in the AMISOM mission was the result of pressure from the United States and the consequence of perceptions of European decision-makers sharing the same assessments as the United States of the threats emanating from Somalia and the Horn of Africa. The EU’s threat perceptions of the region were partly linked to the fear of the creation of a terrorist arch resulting from an alliance between al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram and the al-Shabaab extending from the Sahel to Somalia (EEAS, 2011: 4). The launch of the naval operation ‘Atalanta’ in December 2008 was the response to heavy increases of piracy activities in the waters around Somalia. The mandate of the mission went well beyond the traditional and

94

G. R. OLSEN

limited goals of the EU’s security and defence policy. Marianne Riddervold argues that it was not until the launch of Atalanta and later the adoption of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS) that the EU’s maritime policy took on a strong security and defence dimension (Riddervold, 2018: 7). Because many of Europe’s main security challenges were somehow linked to the sea, it was no surprise that ‘maritime security’ had a prominent position in the ‘EU Global Strategy’ from 2016. In the Strategy, the European Union was referred to as a “global maritime security provider” (European Council, 2016: 41). The strategy argued in favour of extended cooperation between different EU specialised agencies with the aim to “protect Europe, respond to external crises and assist in developing partners’ security and defense capacities” (ibid.: 19–20). Germond states that ‘Atalanta’ was a “demonstration of the projection of the EU’s power both at the practical/military level (…) and at the symbolic level” (Germond, 2011: 574). The very size, impact and centrality of the mission “puts the EU on an equal basis with the US, China, India and Russia” (ibid.). The outside world reacted strongly to the power takeover in Northern Mali by radical Islamists in early 2012. In July that year, EU foreign ministers expressed alarm over deteriorating circumstances in Mali and tasked the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) Catherine Ashton to draw up concrete proposals on how the European Union could assist the authorities in the country. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Foreign Minister Westerwelle and the Defence Minister de Maizière declared Germany’s readiness to take part in a military mission in Mali. Following the October 2012 Foreign Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg Westerwelle stated, “it is in our interests to help stabilize Mali. We have to avoid at an early stage the development of a second Somalia”. During the same press conference, HR Cathrine Ashton echoed Westerwelle by stressing that “we believe there is a real risk for the region if Mali remains an ungoverned space, free for terrorists and drug traffickers to operate” (Spiegel 16 October 2012). At the December 2012 Council of Ministers, it was emphasised that “the EU remains deeply concerned about the serious political and security crisis affecting Mali (…) that poses a threat to the Sahel region (…) and to Europe” (European Council, 2012: 1). The perception of the CAR and of what to do about the crisis in the country, it was probably influenced by the fact that the EU was already significantly engaged in Mali (Furness & Olsen, 2016: 114–116; Plank,

4

ACTORS AND AMBITIONS IN THE EUROPEAN …

95

2017: 498f). The perception contributes partly to the explanation of the hesitancy among the European decision-makers to intervene in the crisis in the CAR. However, the mandate for the military force, the EUFOR RCA clearly contributed to the provision of a safe and secure environment. Friedrich Plank argues that the European decision-makers were motivated, in addition to the official, by so-called ‘unstated goals’ for the promotion of security. One of the unstated goals was the desire to strengthen the EU’s international agency. The ambition went hand in hand with the goal to promote African ownership in peace and security and thereby reduce the EU’s active engagement in these policy fields (Plank, 2017: 494–496, 498f). Apparently, there was a considerable skepticism in Europe about having European ‘boots on the ground’ (Plank, 2017: 498f). The substantial financial and logistical support for the G5 Sahel initiative was motivated by a perception that the region was a serious threat to Europe. In case of increasing instability and violence, it was the perception that Europe was threatened by more migrants, more radicalisation and increasing terrorism (see also Bergmann, Chapter 6). “The French, like the EU, are concerned with how instability would result in migrants and illicit goods flowing to Europe”, was assessed by Professor Bruno Charbonneau, an expert on security issues in the Sahel (Essa, 2017). At an international donor conference for the G5 Sahel initiative in Brussels in February 2018, the European Union pledged to double its financial contributions to 116 million Euros. At the conference, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel explained that the EU’s financial pledges proved the EU’s commitment: “We cannot only start to fight illegal migration in Libya. We have to start in Mali, Niger, Chad. All of Europe is involved”, she said (Carbonnel & Emmott, 2018). The EU Special Representative for the Sahel, Angel Losada, confirmed in an interview that security in Europe was linked to security in the Sahel (Vijsel, 2018). In the interview, it was also stated that the Special Trust Fund of the EU was aimed at addressing migration and the causes of migration in the Sahel (ibid.). Summing up, European decision-makers increasingly perceived Africa as a security issue for Europe and not mainly a development challenge. It was the perception that instability in Africa and in the Sahel in particular would more or less automatically result in instability in Europe due to an increase in immigration combined with the expectation that immigration was linked to Islamist radicalisation.

96

G. R. OLSEN

Africa in the Strategic Culture of the European Union The second explanatory hypothesis states that the strategic culture of a country, and therefore the strategic culture of the European Union, contributes to framing and influencing decisions on foreign and security policies. Also, the strategic culture contributes to constraining a state’s foreign policy behaviour, it is argued by Ripsman et al. (2016: 67). Richard Whitman and Toni Haastrup use strategic declarations and the relevant CSDP operations to indicate what they describe as the ‘strategic behaviour’ of the EU in Africa. The impact of Africa is indicated by three elements, namely the security-development nexus, the human security imperative and the preference for local enforcement i.e. the preference for using African troops to perform military operations (Whitman & Haastrup, 2013: 61ff). Accepting the points of Whitman and Haastrup, there is no doubt that the 2007 Lisbon Africa-EU Summit is crucial for understanding the strategic culture of the EU. At the summit, the two parties decided on the ‘Joint Africa-EU Strategy’, stressing that they agreed to characterise their relationship as a ‘strategic partnership’. The two organisations concluded that the EU and the AU shared a vision that prioritised peace and security “in its own right, not simply as an extension of previous development focused engagement” (Whitman & Haaastrup, 2013: 67). The strategic thinking was spelled out clearly in the ‘Roadmap 2014–2017’, where ‘Priority area 1’ referred to ‘Peace and Security’ and ‘Sustainable and inclusive development and growth’ was placed as ‘Priority area 4’ of 5 (EU-Africa, 2014). Likewise, the EU’s Global Strategy launched in 2016 confirmed the turn from the prioritisation of development towards focusing on security-related issues. For the EU, the security-development nexus was a way of bridging the development priorities of earlier days with its ‘new’ preoccupation with security. The EES of 2003 explicitly recognised that “security is a precondition of development” (European Council, 2003: 2). The 2008 report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy emphasised the duality in the EU’s approach to the security-development nexus. On the one hand, the EU presented itself as being concerned about individual human security yet, on the other hand, it also emphasised that the European Union had to “ensure our security and meet the expectations of our citizens” (European Council, 2008: 2). Thus, stressing the concern

4

ACTORS AND AMBITIONS IN THE EUROPEAN …

97

for human security needs was a way for the EU to ensure that security policies accounted for the long-term development agendas that had characterised the development aid policies of the European community for so many years (cf. Carbone, 2017). By promoting a ‘multi-functional approach’ to Africa, the EU could position itself on the international arena not only as a major actor, but also as a special type of international crisis manager that combined a number of different crisis management tools—from humanitarian to civilian to military within one unique framework (Bagayoko & Gilbert, 2009: 9; Raich, 2018: 213). The multi-dimensional approach to security and development in Africa was supported by a wide range of funding instruments. The most important among these was the European Development Fund for financing the development policies within the framework of the Cotonou agreement, the African Peace Facility (APF) and the Instrument for Stability (IfS). All this leads Lola Reich to conclude that “the African continent fits perfectly within this EU approach” (Raich, 2018: 213). As far as the third element in the strategic behaviour of the EU in Africa is concerned, it has been indicated that the division of labour between the EU and the AU was quite extensive. It was not only in the peacekeeping missions scrutinised here that African military forces carried out local enforcement. The European Union stepped up its involvement in promoting the active participation of African troops in local enforcement by means of the three military training missions (EUTMs) in Somalia, Mali and the CAR and by conducting joint military exercises. Finally, the agreements adopted at the 2017 AU-EU summit on migration from Africa to Europe confirm the preference for local enforcement. Summing up, accepting there exists a strategic culture in the European Union that includes Africa, the security policy pursued by the EU in Africa seems to be in agreement with this particular culture. The declared link between development and security contributes to explaining the comprehensive or ‘multi-functional approach’ to conflict management in Africa intended on giving the European Union a special standing in international peace missions. The same is the case as far as the preference for local enforcement is concerned.

98

G. R. OLSEN

Africa and State-Society Relations Within the European Union The third explanatory hypothesis states that the character of the relationship between the government and the surrounding society is important because it may influence not only decision-making, but also the implementation of government decisions. Specifically, if relative harmony characterises state-society relations, policy-making on Africa is uncomplicated, giving greater room for institutional actors in Brussels to influence decisions. If, on the other hand, the relationship is characterised by polarisation, decision-making is far more complicated because national actors could attempt to profile themselves by influencing decisions. Previously, there was some political attention on Africa and development issues and thereby on development assistance to Africa in a number of European countries’ societies. It was particularly obvious in France, the United Kingdom (UK) and in a limited number of countries in Northern and North-Western Europe (Hoebink & Stokke, 2005). With the increasing merger of policy-making on development assistance and general foreign policy and security issues, it became clear that the common European policy initiatives towards Africa were largely elite driven (Olsen, 2005: 603–605; 577ff). Moreover, the split between the member states and Brussels and the two-level decision-making structure within the European Union complicated and inhibited the influence of civil society organisations on EU decision-making. The separation between the two levels and the general political polarisation within the European Union known as ‘Euro-scepticism’ directed towards policymaking in Brussels no doubt contributed to politicising policy-making by Brussels. On the other hand, the European Union’s Africa policy received little public attention, so it most likely continued to be determined and driven by the elites and especially by the institutional actors in Brussels. Thus, the brief conclusion to the potential impact of state-society relations is limited when it comes to European Union decision-making on Africa. It is due to the character of the policy field that is largely elite driven.

4

ACTORS AND AMBITIONS IN THE EUROPEAN …

99

Africa and the Domestic Government Institutions Domestic government institutions within the European Union, the Commission, the Council of Ministers and its secretariat and the European External Action Service (EEAS) may affect both decision-making and the implementation of policy decisions. Inspired by the theory of ‘bureaucratic politics’, it is the fourth explanatory hypothesis that decision-making processes and the implementation of European Union decisions may be influenced by institutional interests and not only by the national interests of the participating member states, as presumed by the principle of intergovernmentalism. Specifically, the fourth hypothesis states that the Commission and the EEAS in particular pursue common ‘European interests’ in pushing the European Union to take on an active role in Africa as a security provider, which would grant them influence and prestige. Formally, the Commission has no role in decision-making. It has no monopoly of initiative and cannot take cases of non-compliance to the Court of Justice of the European Union (Riddervold, 2016: 355). The European External Actions Service established by the Lisbon Treaty and implemented by 2010 is part of the CFSP organisational structure under the control of the High Representative. Therefore, the member states formally control the EEAS (Riddervold & Trondal, 2017: 38). However, in recent years, i.e. after 2014, officials in the EEAS have increasingly acted independently of member states delegates and ambassadors. Specifically, it was the case during the decision-making process on the Joint Communication and during the process resulting in the launch of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS). According to Marianne Riddervold, the EU maritime external policies are topical and increasingly relevant for understanding EU foreign policies generally (Riddervold, 2016: 356). In this particular policy area, EU member states would be expected to want to maintain their sovereignty, and if the Commission or the EEAS were to exert influence, this would be a clear indication of how the Commission and the EEAS influences the CFSP in general (Riddervold, 2016: 356). The launch of the EU naval mission EU NAVFOR Somalia (Atalanta) can be explained by the active involvement of the Commission and not least by the fact that the Commission commanded the EU’s development aid tools. The combined weight of vast amounts of development money and its many crucial partner countries such as Kenya, Tanzania

100

G. R. OLSEN

and the Seychelles gave the Commission a special position when it came to decision-making. Due to these bargaining chips, the EU was able to reach agreements with a number of countries in East Africa, forming the background to why the member states agreed to launch the EU naval mission. The Commission was also helpful in assisting France, which held the Presidency, in building consensus among member states to decide on the mission (Riddervold, 2016: 359–360; 362–363). Equally, the Commission and the EEAS acted independently of the member states during the decision-making process and the launch of the Joint Communique on EUMSS. The Lisbon Treaty’s call for consistency and better coordination between the EU’s different policy instruments, which as crucial to the ‘Comprehensive approach’, has obviously driven integration between the Commission and the EEAS. It had to do with the fact that the EEAS needed the Commission’s expertise in a number of foreign policy areas, which was most evident in the work on the EUMSS (Riddervold & Trondal, 2017: 42, 39–30). The conclusion on the influence of the Commission and the EEAS on the launch of the Atalanta and the EUMSS is that both were heavily involved in the decisionmaking processes in both cases and thus actually influenced the CFSP (Riddervold, 2016: 366f). While the EU’s policies towards the Horn of Africa was the result of the combined influence of the Commission and the EEAS, the Union’s polices towards West Africa and the Sahel was mainly the result of institutional power struggles between the EEAS and the Commission’s General Directorate for development (DG DEVCO). The EEAS worked in favour of re-orienting the EU’s general policy towards the Sahel, seeking to promote the security priorities laid out in the EU’s Sahel Strategy of 2011 (Lucia, 2017). The EEAS staff also worked for increasingly spending development money to promote the EU’s security goals in the Sahel. The DG for Development resisted these ideas and practices, just as it resisted being turned into an implementing agency for the EEAS and its policy priorities. Nevertheless, the bottom line to the debates and struggles on the Sahel Strategy was that security clearly became an EU priority for the region. Likewise, security became the rationale for protecting EU citizens and the interests of the European Union (Lucia, 2017). The Sahel Strategy explicitly stated that its goal was to “preventing AQIM attacks and its potential to carry out attacks on EU territory (…) Improving security and development in the Sahel has obvious and direct impact on the EU internal security situation” (EEAS, 2011: 4).

4

ACTORS AND AMBITIONS IN THE EUROPEAN …

101

The extended EU involvement in Mali following the unilateral French intervention in January 2013 reflected not only the influence of the institutions located in Brussels. A limited number of prominent member states, such as France and Germany, articulated common European security concerns in Africa as already mentioned. These concerns coincided with the ambition of the EU to present itself as a security provider in Africa, as was emphasised by the launch of an EU military training mission in Mali. Together with the civilian mission in Niger, the heavy involvement in Mali and Niger clearly reflected the depth of the European concerns over the growing threat from Islamic militancy in the region. This new and proactive role of the EU manifested itself also in relation to solving the crisis in the CAR that broke out in late 2012. It is worth noting that the decision to deploy European troops in the CAR was different from the decision-making situation in Mali. In the CAR case, the decision came only after heavy political pressure from France supported by Germany (Furness & Olsen, 2016: 115f), whereas in the Mali case, there was agreement between the institutions in Brussels and prominent member states, such as France and Germany. Summing up, this section has indicated that not only the member states participated in making decisions on foreign and security policy issues in the Sahel and at the Horn of Africa. The Commission and the EEAS were highly active in the decision-making processes. ‘European’ and common interests were pushed forward, thereby promoting and exposing the special role of the European Union as an actor in international peace and conflict management. However, the cases scrutinised here also showed that the domestic government institutions were most successful in promoting the special role of the EU in crisis management in Africa when they were in line with the interests of leading member states such as France and Germany.

Concluding Reflections The chapter raised the question of what can explain the increasing involvement of the European Union in promoting security in Africa. The core argument was that the combination of explicit national interests of a few leading EU member states in combination with institutional interests of a limited number of EU institutions can explain the increasing engagement of the European Union in security promotion. By applying a foreign policy analysis framework, a number of supposedly relevant circumstances

102

G. R. OLSEN

and factors were pointed out. The explanatory value of these factors was supported by the formulation of specific hypotheses attached to each factor or element. The examination of the international circumstances revealed several points. Most importantly, the analysis indicated how much France and French assessments of the situation in Africa coloured the European Union’s understanding of the threats from Africa. In line with the strong influence of France on the perceptions of the situation in Africa, the analysis of the variable ‘perceptions’ confirmed this as far as core decisionmakers argued that the security of Europe was linked to the security in Africa. The scrutiny of the second intermediate variable ‘the strategic culture’ indicated a number of things. Of special interest was the point that the launch of the so-called multi-functional approach was helpful in promoting the EU as a special actor in international conflict management. The third intermediate variable, ‘state-society relations’ did not contribute particular insights into the analysis. Finally, the fourth intermediate variable, ‘the domestic government institutions’ addressed the hypothesis that these institutions may pursue bureaucratic interests of their own. This type of interests may be presented as ‘common’ European concerns that could contribute to strengthening the position of the European Union as a unique actor in international conflict management. In brief, the answer to the question of why the European Union became involved in promoting security in Africa is that it was the result of the combined efforts of a very limited number of member states, notably France, the Commission and the EEAS. Phrased differently, the merger of national security concerns of France and the ambitions of two core EU institutions resulted in the Africa policy of the European Union in the current century.

References AU-EU/Decl.1 (V). (2017, November 29–30). African Union-European Union: Summit. Bagoyoko, N., & Gilbert, V. (2009). The linkage between security, governance and development: The European Union in Africa. Journal of Development Studies, 45(5), 789–814. BBC. (2018). Juncker unveils EU’s Africa plan to counter China. https://www. bbc.com/news/world-africa-45496655. Accessed 12 March 2021.

4

ACTORS AND AMBITIONS IN THE EUROPEAN …

103

Boubeker, A. (2013). The outskirts of politics: The struggles of the descendants of postcolonial immigrations in France. French Cultural Studies, 24(2), 184– 195. Burgess, S. F. (2015). Comparative challenges in securing the horn of Africa and Sahara. Comparative Strategy, 34(2), 202–217. Carbone, M. (2017). The European Union and international development. In C. Hill, M. Smith, & S. Vanhoonacher (Eds.), International relations and the European Union (pp. 292–315). Oxford University Press. Carbonnel, A., & Emmott, R. (2018). Donors pledge $500 million for troops in West Africa’s Sahel. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-africa-securitysahel-eu/donors-pledge-500-million-for-troops-in-west-africas-sahel-idUSKC N1G70J7. Accessed 12 March 2021. Chafer, T. (2014). Hollande and Africa policy. Modern & Contemporary France, 22(4), 513–531. Charbonneau, B., & Chafer, T. (2012). Introduction: Peace operations and Francophone spaces. International Peacekeeping, 19(3), 274–286. Cochi, M. (2016). AFRICOM kick-off operations flintlock to counter Jihadism in Africa. http://www.estonline.eu/en/opinion/sub-saharan-monitor/africomkicks-off-operations. Accessed 12 March 2021. De Coning, C. (2017). Peace enforcement in Africa: Doctrinal distinctions between the African Union and United States. Contemporary Security Policy, 38(1), 145–160. De Waal, A. (2013). African roles in the Libyan conflict of 2011. International Affairs, 89(2), 365–379. EEAS. (2011). Strategy for security and development in the Sahel. http://www. eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf. Accessed 12 June 2021. EEAS. (2018a). Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP): European Training Mission in Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA). European Communities. EEAS. (2018b, August). Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Civilian mission EUCAP Sahel Niger. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headqu arters-homepage/10961/factsheet-about-eucap-sahel-niger_en. Accessed 12 June 2021. EU-Africa. (2014, April 2–3). Fourth EU-Africa Summit. Roadmap 2014–2017. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21520/142094.pdf. Accessed 12 June 2021. European Council. (2003). A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy. European Communities. European Council. (2008). Report on implementation of the European security strategy: Providing security in a changing world. European Communities.

104

G. R. OLSEN

European Council. (2009). A EU policy on the horn of Africa—Towards a comprehensive EU strategy. European Communities. European Council. (2012). Foreign Affairs, 3209th Council meeting. Press Release. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_1 2_516. Accessed 12 June 2021. European Council. (2014). Council Decision 2014/219/CFSP of 15 April. Brussels. European Council. (2016). Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe: A global strategy for the European Union’s common foreign and security policy. European Communities. European Council. (2020). Operation ATALANTA, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Somalia: Mandates extended for two more years. https://www.con silium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/12/23/operation-atalantaeutm-somalia-and-eucap-somalia-mandates-extended-for-two-more-years/. Accessed 12 November 2021. European Council. (2021). EUCAP Sahel Mali: Mission extended until 31 January 2023 and mandate adjusted. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/ press/press-releases/2021/01/11/eucap-sahel-mali-mission-extended-until31-january-2023-and-mandate-adjusted/. Accessed 12 January 2022. European Union. (2008). European Union military coordination of action against piracy in Somalia (EU NAVCO). Council Secretariat. EUTM Mali. (2022). EU Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali). https://eut mmali.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/20220113_Fact-Sheet-EUTMsans-elections-22FEB_ENG.pdf. Accessed 12 January 2022. Essa, A. (2017). G5 Sahel counterterrorism force explained. https://www.aljaze era.com/news/2017/11/g5-sahel-counterterroism-force-explained-171102 071159524.html. Accessed 12 March 2021. Furness, M., & Olsen, G. R. (2016). Europeanisation and the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management in Africa. European Politics and Society, 17 (1), 105–119. Germond, B. (2011). The EU’s security and the sea: Defining a maritime security strategy. European Security, 20(4), 563–584. Glas, A. (2018). African Union security culture in practice: African problems and African solutions. International Affairs, 94(5), 1121–1138. Hecker, M., & Tenenbaum, E. (2017). France vs Jihadism: The Republic in a new age of terror. Ifri. Hill, C. (2016). Foreign policy in the twenty-first century. Palgrave. Hix, S. (2005). The political system of the European Union. Palgrave. Hodzi, O. (2018). China and Africa: Economic growth and a non-transformative political elite. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 36(2), 191–206. Hoebink, P., & Stokke, O. (2005). Introduction: European development cooperation at the beginning of a new millennium. In P. Hoebink & O.

4

ACTORS AND AMBITIONS IN THE EUROPEAN …

105

Stokke (Eds.), Perspectives on European development co-operation (pp. 1–31). Routledge. Lucia, E. L. (2017). Performing EU agency by experimenting the ‘comprehensive approach’: The European Union Sahel strategy. Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 35(4), 451–468. Olsen, G. R. (2005). The European Union’s development policy: Shifting priorities in a rapidly changing world. In P. Hoebink & O. Stokke (Eds.), Perspectives on European development co-operation (pp. 573–608). Routledge. Olsen, G. R. (2015). After Afghanistan: The European Union as security provider in Africa. Global Society, 29(2), 227–242. Pirozzi, N. (2013). The EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management. CCAF. Plank, F. (2017). The effectiveness of interregional security cooperation: Evaluating the joint engagement of the EU and the AU in response to the crisis in the Central African Republic. European Security, 26(4), 485–506. Raich, L. (2018). Security at the centre of post 2000 EU-Africa relations. In P. Frankowski & A. Gruszczak (Eds.), Cross-disciplinary perspective on regional and global security (pp. 113–140). Palgrave. Riddervold, M. (2016). (Not) in the hands of the member states: How the European Commission influences EU security and defense policies. Journal of Common Market Studies, 54(2), 353–369. Riddervold, M. (2018). The maritime turn in EU foreign and security policies. Palgrave. Riddervold, M., & Trondal, J. (2017). Integrating nascent organisations: On the settlement of the European external action service. Journal of European Integration, 39(1), 33–47. Ripsman, N. M., Taliafarro, J. W., & Lobell, S. E. (2016). Neoclassical realist theory of international politics. Oxford University Press. Savitsky, A. (2018). US military presence in Africa: All over the continent and still expanding. https://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2018/08/30/ us-military-presence-in-africa-all-over-continent-still-expanding/. Accessed 12 March 2021. Swedlund, H. J. (2017). Is China eroding the bargaining power of traditional donors in Africa? International Affairs, 93(2), 389–408. Tardy, T. (2016). The EU and Africa: A changing security partnership. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS). Ukeje, C., & Tariku, Y. (2018). Beyond symbolism: China and the African Union in African peace and security. In C. Alden, A. Alao, Z. Chun, & L. Barber (Eds.), China and Africa: Building peace and security cooperation on the continent (pp. 289–309). Palgrave. Vallin, V. M. (2015). France as the Gendarme of Africa, 1960–2014. Political Science Quarterly, 130(1), 79–101.

106

G. R. OLSEN

Van Vijsel, A. (2018). From ‘unhappy marriage’ to ‘living-apart-together’? http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/Blogs/Sahel-Watch-a-living-analysis-of-theconflict-in-Mali/Security-at-home-and-abroad-European-support-for-the-G5Sahel-force. Accessed 12 March 2021. White Paper, F. (2013). Defence and national security. Ministère de la Défense. Whitman, R., & Haastrup, T. (2013). Locating the EU’s strategic behavior in sub-Saharan Africa: An emerging strategic culture? In M. Carbone (Ed.), The European Union in Africa. Incoherent polices, asymmetrical partnership, declining relevance? (pp. 57–76). Manchester University Press. Williams, P. (2007). From non-intervention to non-indifference: The origins and development of the African Union’s security culture. African Affairs, 106(423), 253–279. Williams, P. (2008). Keeping the peace in Africa: Why ‘African’ solutions are not enough. Ethics & International Affairs, 22(3), 309–329. Williams, P. D. (2014). Reflections on the evolving African peace and security architecture. African Security, 7 (3), 147–162.

CHAPTER 5

France, EU and the Security (Dis)integration of the African Union Habibu Yaya Bappah

Introduction Africa is a continent with many challenges and opportunities. Until a decade ago, the continent was more popular with its challenges than its opportunities. The narrative about ‘Africa Rising’ came after many years of identifying the continent as a hopeless case associated with conflicts, poverty, disease, and general underdevelopment. The more positive image of Africa has been promoted by economic analysts and investors: Africa is a continent of opportunity for economic investment and stability. Regional cooperation and integration in Africa reflect a desire of the African states to pool their resources in order to overcome these challenges and open up the existing opportunities of the continent. Among other reasons, the African Union was established in 2000 to replace the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in order to accelerate the political

H. Y. Bappah (B) Department of Political Science/International Studies, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. Muntschick (ed.), Regionalism in Africa and External Partners, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10702-3_5

107

108

H. Y. BAPPAH

and socio-economic integration of the continent (AU, 2000). Integration has been identified by academics and policy makers as a veritable means to overcome the fragmentation of the continent with its small and often (economically) unviable entities (Isik, 2016; Mathews, 2003; Qobo, 2007). However, one of the major obstacles to African integration processes, under the auspices of the African Union (AU), is the existence of multiple regional organisations, which duplicate their own efforts and reduce the prospects of pooling resources and building a bigger, consolidated and more competitive region (see Brosig, Chapter 2). In almost all the five regions of Africa (East, West, Central, North and South) exist at least two regional organisations that pursue essentially the same agenda. One of the objectives of the AU is to “coordinate and harmonize the policies between the existing and future Regional Economic Communities for the gradual attainment of the objectives of the Union” (AU, 2000). In this regard, the AU recognises a specified number of regional organisations in the continent to serve as building blocks for the African Economic Community (AEC) and as bases for the proposed Africa Standby Force (ASF), which is the key peace and security institution designed to undertake peace support operations and tackle insecurity in continental and regional levels. The project of building an economic community (economic integration) and a regional security complex (security integration) in Africa is undoubtedly huge and requires massive financial, technical and logistical investments. That is why several external actors play important roles. In this chapter, I focus on two influential ones: France and the European Union (EU), for their roles in the (dis)integration of the AU. France, a member of the EU and Africa’s major former colonial power, plays a significant and influential role in the continent. This makes it also an important and influential actor in the EU’s external relations vis-à-vis Africa, given France’s military outreach to the continent and its strong economic relationships, control and political influence over the francophone countries (Aniche, 2020: 22; Gregory, 2000). Therefore, the policies of France in Africa have significant effect on the desire and efforts of Africa to coordinate and harmonise its integration processes (Erforth, 2020). The EU, which is a global model of regionalism and a testimony of the benefits of integration, is an important partner of the AU. The EU has inspired and supported the AU in many ways, such as in the promotion of integration norms, principles and institutions as well as the provision of technical and financial assistance (see Söderbaum &

5

FRANCE, EU AND THE SECURITY …

109

Stapel, Chapter 3). Large EU-delegations are based in the major ‘integration capitals’ of Africa, providing substantial technical and financial support to the programmes and projects of the AU and the regional economic communities (RECs). However, the challenge for both France and the EU assistances to the African economic and security integration agenda is in balancing the pursuit of self-interest with the promotion of noble values (Claeys, 2004; Erforth, 2020). This chapter demonstrates that despite the positive contributions of the EU and France to the AU’s agenda, their pursuit of self-interest is undermining the AU integration project through a duplication of regional policies and institutions in Africa.

The AU Security Integration Framework: AEC and APSA The AU security integration project can be understood within the framework of the AEC project and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The two constitute the economic and security integration projects pursued by the AU and its RECs. Together, they form the security integration framework of the continent. The building blocks of the AEC constitute selected RECs, which include the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). The founding document for this project is the African Economic Community Treaty, also known as the Abuja Treaty, which came into force in 1994. However, most of these RECs face competition with at least one rival regional organisation in their domains (see Brosig, Chapter 2). In West Africa, the ECOWAS exists alongside the West African Economic and Monetary Union (known by its French acronym as UEMOA); in Central Africa, the ECCAS faces rivalries with the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) and partly with the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); in Southern Africa, the SADC has to co-exist with the COMESA and some SADC members are also members of the EAC; in East Africa, there is the EAC, the COMESA and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); in North, the Arab Maghreb Union

110

H. Y. BAPPAH

(AMU), which is nearly moribund, has the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) as a rival group (Bappah, 2015). Efforts to harmonise these regional groupings have not succeeded so far. The recognised RECs of the AU continue to face rivalries and competition from other fellow regional organisations (see Brosig, Chapter 2). This slows down the African economic integration project of the AEC with implications for the region’s security integration as well (cf. Hentz, 2009). Moreover, the APSA project was largely designed to align with the logic of the AEC. Within most of the RECs the various components of the African Standby Force were to be established. Since the AU has no force of its own, it has to rely on the regional standby forces for deployment whenever a situation calls for it. The main legal-institutional framework of APSA, the Peace and Security protocol (PSC) of 2003, states the desire of the AU member states to establish: an operational structure for the effective implementation of the decisions taken in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-making, peace support operations and intervention, as well as peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction (AU, 2002: 3).

Thus, it laid the basis for the establishment of the pillars for the peace and security architecture, namely the Peace and Security Council (PSC), the Panel of the Wise, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Peace Fund (Porto & Engel, 2010). The PSC, which comprises fifteen members elected on the basis of equal rights, is a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts (AU, 2002: 3). It serves as a collective security and early-warning arrangement with the task to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa (AU, 2002: 4). The other pillars are to support the PSC based on the provision of Article 2(2) of the protocol (AU, 2002). The Panel of the Wise is a conflict prevention institution designed after the traditional role of the wise men and women in African societies. It is composed of five highly respected African personalities from various segments of society who have made outstanding contributions to the cause of peace, security and development on the continent (AU, 2002: 16). Members are selected by the AU Chairperson in consultations with the member states. The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is a conflict prevention tool used to anticipate and prevent conflict through a system of

5

FRANCE, EU AND THE SECURITY …

111

data collection and analyses (AU, 2002). It involves field monitors and a situation room as well as analysts who work cooperatively to alert the PSC and recommend courses of action to avoid conflict or crises in the region. The African Standby Force is a multidisciplinary contingent. It has civilian and military components in their countries of origin and is ready for rapid deployment—at appropriate notice—to carry out peace support operations and interventions (AU, 2002: 18). The Peace Fund is the key financing mechanism for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security (AU, 2002: 27). The protocol provides that: The Peace Fund shall be made up of financial appropriations from the regular budget of Union, including arrears of contributions, voluntary contributions from Member States and from other sources within Africa, including the private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through appropriate fund-raising activities. The Chairperson of the Commission shall raise and accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa, in conformity with the objectives and principles of the Union (AU, 2002: 27).

In general, the African Union programmes are dependent on external funds (see Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3). The Table 5.1 shows that international partner funds, which are mainly allocated to programmes, consistently surpassed the assessed contributions of the member states. This asymmetric relationship to external actors makes the AU agenda susceptible to external influence (cf. Muntschick, Chapter 1). For APSA, external funding is of key importance, which inevitably gives external interests significant influence in the development of the architecture. The EU African Peace Facility (APF) is the key instrument of the Africa-EU Partnership and a major source of financing the APSA. Since 2004, it provided 2.7 billion e to support the AU, the RECs/RMs and other sub-regional organisations in carrying out peace and security operations with an AU Peace and Security Council mandate (AU, 2018). The EU support comes under three categories: (1) African-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs), (2) Operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and (3) initiatives under the Early Response Mechanism (ERM) (AU, 2018). With support of the EU funds, the five APSA institutions and decisionmaking procedures are largely being replicated within most of the RECs,

250,453,697 256,754,447 274,094,433 278,226,622 395,223,186 393,037,453

416,687,326

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

2016

169,833,340

111,763,676 122,602,045 122,428,670 122,866,637 137,494,831 122,793,882

247,033,986

133,690,021 134,152,402 151,665,763 155,359,986 250,968,913 241,467,369

Assessed International contribution of MS partners $ $ 5,000,000* – – – – 10,912,042** 4,251,479*** 4,730,473**** –

Other budget sources $

*Fund for purchase of Washington Office **Reserve Fund ***Partner fund for operations ****Fund for acquisition of property Source Author’s Compilation of AU Assembly Decisions on the Budget of the African Union, 2017

Total budget $

AU Budget 2010–2016 Financial Years

Financial years

Table 5.1

150,503,875

105,592,676 112,424,627 114,800,243 117,495,898 137,884,958 142,687,88I

Operational cost budget $

266,363,451

144,861,021 144,329,819 159,294,199 160,730,725 257,338,228 250,349,574

Programme budget $

112 H. Y. BAPPAH

5

FRANCE, EU AND THE SECURITY …

113

essentially in order to implement the continental peace and security architecture. In the ECOWAS, for instance, exists the Mediation and Security Council, which performs a similar function as the AU Peace and Security Council. Like the AU, the ECOWAS has a Council of the Wise, Early Warning and Response mechanism (ECOWARN), Peace Fund and the ECOWAS Standby Force. Similarly, the SADC established an Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (Organ) in 1996 as its formal institution with the mandate to support the achievement and maintenance of security and the rule of law in the SADC region (SADC, 2016). It also has a Regional Early Warning System (REWS). In East Africa, there is another Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) under the umbrella of the IGAD. The East African Standby Force (EASF) is developed with the support of three other RECs, namely EAC, IGAD and COMESA. In Central Africa, the ECCAS has a Defence and Security Commission (CDC), a Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC) and an Early Warning Mechanism of Central Africa (MARAC) (ECCAS, 2016). The most important structure of APSA that is currently being developed by the AU and the RECs is the ASF. It is designed to be a multinational and multidimensional force for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa. It is multinational because the forces and resources are drawn from member states of the RECs. It is multidimensional because it is composed of the military, the police and civilians, each saddled with particular roles in the conflict cycle. The building blocks of the ASF are the five regional brigades/forces: the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), East African Standby Force (EASF), SADC Standby Force, ECCAS Standby Force and a proposed North African Brigade under the umbrella of the AMU. Each of the regional standby forces has an onerous work to do in terms of designing and standardising training and doctrines, providing logistics and logistical infrastructure, developing command, control, communications and information systems, assuring sustainable funding, promoting collaboration, cooperation and harmonisation (AU, 2005: 5). This is undoubtedly a daunting task for the RECs. Nonetheless, they are working to make the peace and security architecture operational. Some of the key challenges confronting them, among others, include the duplication of regional organisations and overlapping memberships, the lack of adequate finance and hegemonic competition (Bayeh, 2014; see Plank, Chapter 7). Many international partners of the AU believe in the promise of APSA as a

114

H. Y. BAPPAH

panacea to African peace and security challenges. These partners have been supporting the development of the architecture. Notable among them are the EU, the United States of America, Germany, France, China and Britain (see Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3). Each of these external partners supports APSA in different ways: logistics, training and capacity building, funding, donations of lethal or non-lethal equipment, and others. This chapter focuses on two most enduring actors in Africa’s peace and security landscape, France and the EU, for their ambivalent roles. The next section highlights the inconsistencies.

France and the EU in the Regional (Dis)integration of the AU The EU is the most influential player in the African integration processes and plays an ambivalent role, which contributes to both integration and disintegration of the continent. France occupies a special position in the EU’s agenda towards Africa because of its interests in sustaining economic, political and security ties with the former colonies (Omolo, 2019). Before their independence, France had a compact with the colonies which gave Paris several special preferences regarding the political, commercial and defence processes in the African countries (Busch, 2017). These special relationships and ties include institutions such as the two regional monetary zones, the Franc de la Coopération Financière en Afrique (CFA) currency in West and Central Africa, backed by the French treasury, as well as the maintenance of more than ten military bases in some parts of the continent, which shall protect French economic and political interests (Aniche, 2020: 22). The ambivalent role of France and the EU in developing and integrating the African Union, particularly the APSA, can be demonstrated with regard to the framework of the foreign policy of France towards Africa and its prominent position in the EU project. France’s status as a world power hinges on its ability to influence and control economy- and defence-related matters in the francophone countries in Africa. To continue to maintain that position, France had to transpose its relationships with its ex-colonies into a broader EU context and projects. One of the sticking points in the negotiations leading to the signature of the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 was French concern that

5

FRANCE, EU AND THE SECURITY …

115

the EEC’s free trade agenda could negatively affect its colonial protectionism (Warlouzet, 2008). Therefore, before signing the Rome Treaty, France ensured that concessions were made with regards to its colonies in terms of specific Treaty provisions for development cooperation and aid for overseas territories and former colonies as specified in Article 130 and 131, respectively (Warlouzet, 2008). Under the provisions of the ‘Association of the Overseas States and Territories’ in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, European nations, such as France and Belgium, wished to ensure that their special relationships with former colonies were not disturbed by the European integration project (Toth, 2007). Against this background, and since many years, the EU-Africa relations have been largely defined by the interest and influence of France within the EU—and in Africa (Cumming, 2013; Omolo, 2019). The long association of France and the EU with Africa’s agenda for economic development, political stability, peace and security reflects in the different agreements signed between both continents, namely the Yaoundé Convention, the Lomé Treaty and the Cotonou Agreement. The Yaoundé Convention of 1963 was spearheaded by France within the framework of the (then) European Community (EC) (Toth, 2007). With the accession of Britain to the EC in 1975, a new Treaty was signed: the Lomé Treaty. It brought in other countries from Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific region, later known as Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). Both the Yaoundé Convention and the Lomé Treaty deal mainly with economic issues relating to preferential trade, which mainly assures that raw materials from the ACP are easily exported into the European market. Therefore, for Africa, these agreements essentially maintain patterns of asymmetric interdependence and colonial economic ties in terms of exporting raw materials to Europe and importing processed/manufactured goods (Omolo, 2019). Although lip service was paid to the issue of industrialisation in Africa, it never occurred until a rule by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) ended this preferential agreement in 2000 (Toth, 2007). The Cotonou Agreement replaced the Lomé Treaty and introduced political cooperation between both continents. An annual Africa-Europe summit was instituted at a Summit in Cairo in 2000 with the objective of creating a platform to harmonise the two continents’ key policies, including their security policies (Toth, 2007: 114). Aside from this, the EU established another cooperation platform with North Africa and created the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Toth, 2007).

116

H. Y. BAPPAH

To give effect to the inter-regional relations between the EU and Africa, the European Development Fund (EDF) was created by the 1957 Treaty of Rome as the main instrument for providing development aid to the ACP and overseas countries and territories (OCTs) in the fields of economic development, social and human development as well as regional cooperation and integration. France played a prominent role in the establishment of the EDF, which has been the main instrument for the programming and implementation of the Lomé and Cotonou Agreements. Moreover, Paris was the second biggest contributor of the fund and used its weight in decision-making processes to promote its own interest in Africa (Claeys, 2004; Omolo, 2019). The EU support to the AU regarding economic integration as well as peace and security is mainly channelled through the EDFs, which is currently in its 12th phase. Financed by direct contributions from EU member states, the EDF funds cooperation activities in the fields of economic development, social and human development as well as regional cooperation and integration (EC, 2016). Another instrument used by the EU to support the peace and security programmes of the AU and the RECs is the African Peace Facility, which was established in 2003 with an initial allocation of 250 million e for a period of three years (Toth, 2007). Thanks to EDFs, the AU and its RECs have gradually been able to establish themselves as major political and security actors, engaging in concrete actions, thereby partly actualising their vision of ‘African Solutions to African Problems’. All African-led missions, either of the AU or the RECs, benefitted from EU Funding (EC, 2019a). The AU missions in Sudan (AMIS) and in Somalia (AMISOM), the ECCAS mission in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX) and the ECOWAS Missions in Guinea Bissau and the Gambia, which illustrate the important role played by the AU and the RECs, have enjoyed the support of the EDFs (EC, 2011). Moreover, the African Peace Facility component of the EDF has been used to build the capacity of the AU and the RECs in planning and conducting peace support operations, while the Emergency Response Mechanism endows them with a source of immediately available funds that can be directed to the first stages of mediation activities, fact-finding missions and ad hoc reinforcement of the planning cells of Peace Support Operations (PSO) (EC, 2019a). According to the EU, almost 40 ERM interventions took place in Africa between 2009 and 2018 to the tune of 30 million e. Actions supported through the ERM took place in Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Côte

5

FRANCE, EU AND THE SECURITY …

117

d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Niger, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan (EC, 2019a). These facts undoubtedly highlight the constructive role of the EU as an external partner in African security cooperation and integration. However, the EU does not provide financial assistance and support to African security and economic integration projects for entirely altruistic reasons. The political and strategic interests of the EU as a community and those of its individual member states play a critical role, which may result in destructive actions and negative effects regarding the AU’s own agenda. Some events in the past triggered the EU to strengthen its support to the AU and the RECs in the field of peace and security: These include terror attacks in New York, and similar attacks in Madrid and London or Paris but also the mass migration to the EU. Brussels views state failure or fragility as an important factor in the security equation of both Africa and the EU (Toth, 2007). Hence, the EDF tends to be oriented towards supporting the AU and the RECs to ensure good governance, security, stability, respect for human rights and to adequately respond to humanitarian crisis in their regions. The idea of the EU and European nations is therefore to promote security in Europe with the help of African regional organisations. In 2007, leaders from both continents established the Joint EU-Africa Strategy, which sets out the intention for both continents to move beyond a donor-recipient relationship towards long-term cooperation on jointly identified, mutual and complementary interests. It is based on principles of ownership, partnership and solidarity (EC, 2016). The strategy was borne out of the desire to promote horizontal cooperation through dialogue rather than realpolitik. Despite these efforts of the EU to support the African security agenda, there is evidence that this external partnership—and even the support— may become counter-productive to the extent of actually undermining cooperative African security projects. It seems that the whole AU/RECs integration projects pose some threat to the interest of some member states of the EU, notably France. Although Paris has been a staunch promoter of EU policies in Africa, France’s bilateral interests are often in conflict with the overall EU-Africa relations (Erforth, 2020). Establishing a strong, united and economically independent African Union may eventually displace France by making it lose its ‘grip’ and influence on its ex-colonies. In order to secure its status, France seems to continue to use

118

H. Y. BAPPAH

the EU platform and bilateral actions to promote its own policies, which are often antithetical to the AU project (Omolo, 2019). Some important ways in which France and the EU contribute to the disintegration of the AU integration process include the following: Firstly, supporting the duplication of regional organisations through the EDF. For example, France backed five countries in the Sahel to establish the G5 Sahel under the guise of fighting terrorism. This undermined the African efforts towards building the APSA. France, alongside the EU, promoted the establishment of the G5 Sahel Joint Force, which is an ad hoc security arrangement designed to help the member states fight terrorism in their territories and within limited distances beyond their borders. The G5 Sahel organisation comprises of Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, Mali and Mauritania. Only Chad and Mauritania are not members of ECOWAS, but they enjoy an observer status in the regional organisation. Created in 2014, the G5 Sahel seeks to do what the ECOWAS has been doing in the region for decades, namely the promotion of peace and security—and development. The ECOWAS has more resources and is better equipped to handle these issues as an officially recognised REC of the AU. When the Tuareg rebels in northern Mali aligned with Jihadist elements in the Sahel to overrun part of the country, the ECOWAS attempted to dislodge them by means of deployment of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). However, instead of investing in ECOWAS, which invariably would help strengthening it as building block of the AU, France and the EU turned towards supporting the G5 Sahel, reallocating resources meant for the APSA and the ECOWAS and providing them to the G5 Sahel contraption. Since the commencement of its operations in 2017, about 100 million e from the African Peace Facility were earmarked to support the G5 Sahel: 75 million e for the provision of services, equipment and services to the G5 Sahel Joint Force (implemented through Expertise France); 10 million e to support the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in its logistical and operational support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force on Malian territory; 10 million e for the establishment and implementation of a human rights and international humanitarian law compliance framework for the operations of the G5 Sahel (implemented through the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)) and 5 million e to support the governance structure of the G5 Sahel (EC, 2019b). This, together with other instruments of the EU such as the EU Trust Fund for Africa, acts under the EU’s

5

FRANCE, EU AND THE SECURITY …

119

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace as well as Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in the region (EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali, EU Capacity Building Mission (EUCAP) Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger) and the deployment of EU Member States experts under Article 28, put the total value of EU pledged support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force to about 414 million e (EC, 2019b). This is a significant resource diversion from support to the APSA and the RECs, particularly ECOWAS, which develops a regional standby force under the auspices of the African Standby Force of the APSA. Moreover, the enhancement, deepening and duplication of regionalism under the umbrella of the G5 Sahel framework creates complicating regional side effects and is not contented with pursuing an ad hoc military operation as authorised by the AU. The G5 Sahel overall objectives are ambitious and appear highly familiar: the member states intend to pursue development programmes and projects relating to good governance, infrastructure development, food security and pastoralism, human development and climate change (G5 Sahel, 2014). The ECOWAS, however, deals with the same issues and pursues virtually the same goals. This amount of duplication is a violation of Article 2 (1) of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty which re-affirms the decision of the High Contracting Parties that the ECOWAS shall ultimately be the sole economic community in the region for the purpose of economic integration and the realisation of the objectives of the African Economic Community (ECOWAS, 1993). Institutional duplication of regionalism in Africa also disperses the member states’ limited financial and diplomatic resources, thereby creating resource constrained and donor-dependent organisations (see Müller, Chapter 8). This is however not new. France has historically a habit of fuelling rivalry between the AU’s officially recognised RECs and other francophone organisations. In the ECOWAS region, for instance, Paris encouraged the transformation of the West African Monetary Union (WAMU), which tied the former colonies to France (mainly in terms of economic and currency policy), into a West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) in 1994. This happened just one year after the revision of the ECOWAS Treaty in 1993, which gave ECOWAS as regional organisation more powers and mandate. Since then, the WAEMU has developed into a veritable rival of the ECOWAS in West Africa, duplicating its economic and security agenda (Bappah, 2015).

120

H. Y. BAPPAH

Despite the establishment of the joint Africa-EU strategy in 2007, there continue to exist differences in approach and policy priority between the two continents. Regarding the Sahel, the ECOWAS follows a strategy with which it hopes to address the developmental and security challenges related to the region. The EU developed its own strategy, which mainly deals with the same issue. Corresponding to the ECOWAS, the objective of the EU Sahel Strategy is to support to sustainable and inclusive political and socio- economic development, the strengthening of human rights, democratic governance and the rule of law as well as resilience, as a response to the multidimensional crisis in the Sahel. The enhancement of security in the region through the fight against terrorism, illicit trafficking, radicalisation and violent extremism, remains the key objective of the EU (EC, 2015: 2).

The EU’s Sahel strategy initially focused on only three countries: Mali, Mauritania and Niger. It was later extended to cover Chad and Burkina Faso (EC, 2015: 6). This fits squarely the G5 Sahel countries. The Sahel Regional Action, developed by the EU (see Bergmann, Chapter 6), mentions the G5 Sahel alongside the ECOWAS as one of the regional organisations to coordinate with. Whereas the ECOWAS estimated costs at 4.749 billion US-$ to implement its regional strategy, the EU put its own at 5 billion US-$ for the period 2014–2020 (Helly et al., 2015). France also pursues its own military strategy in the Sahel, which does not necessarily complement those of the UN, AU or ECOWAS. Operation Serval and Barkhane are essentially driven by French interest in the Sahel. Although the French intervention helped in the liberation of Northern Mali from the Jihadists, the structural political and economic causes of the conflict persist. While the UN peacekeepers suffered casualties from attacks by Tuareg rebels, Jihadists and Fula ethno-nationalists, the French were busy with their own military activities, which covered Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. French military getting involved in conflicts in Africa has effectively left the francophone states dependent on French armed forces, which negates the AU principle of ‘African Solutions to African Problems’. There is evidence that the French policies in Africa generated resentments in the continent over the years. Repressive governments and autocratic regimes, which are at the root of many problems on continental and regional levels, often enjoyed French support (Powell, 2016, 2017). Even the CFA-Franc became a target of resistance to French

5

FRANCE, EU AND THE SECURITY …

121

domination. Movements in West Africa such as ‘Urgences Panafricanistes’, ‘France Dégage’ or ‘Y’en a Marre’ in Senegal and ‘le Balai Citoyen’ in Burkina Faso made the abolishment of the CFA a key plank in their campaigns (Konkobo, 2017). Secondly, external meddling and interference by France, acting through the EDFs and the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), contributed to obstacles to the development and implementation of the AU/RECs peace and security programmes and activities. Although the mode of decision-making in the EU institutions and the divergence of views and interests of the EU member states not always make it easy, France is able to harness the EU to pursue French ambitions (Hakala, 2016; see Olsen, Chapter 4). The benefits for France in using the EU root in the legitimacy of action under EU mandate or within an EU framework, but also in saving the costs for pursuing bilateral or unilateral policies because other EU member states contribute to sharing the costs of common EU policies and projects (Hakala, 2016). An example of typical external meddling that thwarts the AU and APSA was the involvement of powerful external countries and regions in the uprisings in North Africa (Arab Spring). France, acting through the EU Council, called for sanctions against Libyan President Ghaddafi on the 23rd of February 2011. Shortly after, on the 25th of February 2011, the French President Sarkozy said Ghaddafi must go (Lindström & Zetterlund, 2012). This set the stage that led the UN authorise the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members to deploy military force to oust the regime of Muammar Ghaddafi in Libya. The roadmap of the AU and its effort to apply an African approach was eventually led to failure, paving the way for a bloody conflict that destabilised the country. A similar scenario played out in Egypt, which ended the long reign of President Hosni Mubarak and brought in the Mohamed Morsi Government under the banner of Egypt’s longest-standing opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood. Eventually, however, President Morsi was ousted from office by a military coup. The AU, which received 15% of its funding from Egypt, suspended the country from the organisation, while the EU remained silent (Adebajo, 2015). This demonstrates that EU interests and realpolitik overshadow the EU-Africa joint strategy and the partnership. Moreover, the EU contributed to a further alienation of the Arab North Africa from the AU through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) initiative and association agreements. Brussels signed the latter individually with Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria. On many issues,

122

H. Y. BAPPAH

such as market integration, migration and fighting terrorism, the EU deals with these countries separately, thereby impeding the AU’s integration efforts in the Arab Maghreb region. Although some potential areas for cooperation and EU contribution to the Arab Maghreb Union were identified, they mainly aimed at benefitting EU businesses and wider interests. These areas include Trans-Mediterranean Transport, EUMaghreb Maritime links and a Common Mediterranean airspace (EC, 2012). Thirdly, French imposition of leadership in African security matters. The French self-perception as a leading actor in Africa’s security affairs impeded the development of African leadership in that regard. French interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic depicted France as a gendarmerie in the francophone parts of Africa (Jacinto, 2013). In a bid to defend the French interventions, President François Hollande argued that the interventions were under the aegis of international organisations and regional blocs, including the European Union (Jacinto, 2013). In 2013, France mobilised African leaders and organised a Summit on Peace and Security in Africa in Paris. About 40 African leaders attended. During the meeting, France pushed for the establishment of a rapid reaction force in Africa to make up for the slow development of the ASF. Paris also offered to train 20,000 African soldiers every year (Jacinto, 2013). Although a good initiative by France, this Summit was basically an effort to demonstrate the power of France, particularly in Africa. The Summit could have taken place within the context of the AU or the RECs rather than by inviting state leaders of the region to Paris. There is clear evidence that France wishes to continue to have influence in Africa in order to be a relevant actor. Former French President Jacques Chirac noted that France is nothing without Africa. As a demonstration of this matter of fact, France maintains the largest network of military bases in Africa. More than 3,000 troops were engaged across five countries in Africa—namely in Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad—as part of the Operation Burkhane (Bender, 2015). Other countries hosting French troops include Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, the Central African Republic and Djibouti (Bender, 2015). Thus, France promotes an agenda within the framework of the EU that undermines the AU’s security integration policies and projects. Other EU member states, however, are not totally complicit as they try to limit the ambition of France. Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister Luigi Di Maio made a comment that France never stopped colonising Africa which impoverishes Africans (France24, 2019),

5

FRANCE, EU AND THE SECURITY …

123

which is an anecdotal testimony of the resistance of some of the EU member states to France’s policies. It also confirms that external influence of France undermines the African Union’s effort to institutionalise an ‘African Solution to African Problems’ by means of the APSA and other instruments.

Conclusion The economic and security integration of Africa through the AU is susceptible to external influences, which limits its progress. The EU is a major actor in the promotion of the AU programmes, providing both funding and technical assistance. However, the role of the EU in Africa is largely influenced by France, whose great power position in the world hinges on a further perpetuation of its post-colonial relations with Africa. For this purpose, and acting within the EU’s frameworks for development, foreign and security policy, France strives to promote its own agenda in Africa, which often undermines the AU’s economic and security projects. With specific focus on the APSA, France foiled the development of the African security architecture through the promotion of rival organisations, meddling in African conflicts, and imposition of leadership in security matters in the continent. Therefore, although credit can be given to France for making African security and development agenda prominent within the EU system, Paris has only done so to sustain her colonial relations in the continent, which often than not contradict intra-African security initiatives.

References Adebajo, A. (2015). Interview with Dr Adekeye Adebajo, Executive director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution. AFRICA YEEAS, Newsletter of EUAfrican Affairs. Aniche, E. T. (2020). Pan-Africanism and regionalism in Africa: The journey so far. In S. O. Oloruntoba (Ed.), Pan Africanism, regional integration and development in Africa (pp. 17–38). Palgrave. AU. (2000). ConsAtitutive act of the African Union. https://au.int/sites/ default/files/pages/34873-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2019. AU. (2002). Protocol relating to the establishment of the peace and security council of the African Union. http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/psc-protocol-en.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2021. AU. (2005, March 22–23). Roadmap for the operationalization of the African standby force’ experts. Meeting on the relationship between the AU and

124

H. Y. BAPPAH

the regional mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/C4BC0E63E EA32DBDC1256FE1004D4476-au-gen-23mar.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2021. AU. (2018). African peace facility, Africa-EU partnership. https://www.afr ica-eu-partnership.org/en/financial-support-partnership-programme/africanpeace-facility. Accessed 19 November 2021. Bappah, H. Y. (2015). Inter-regionalism as a mechanism for the harmonization of Africa’s regional integration projects. In A. O. Olutayo & A. I. Adeniran (Eds.), Regional economic communities: Exploring the process of socio-economic integration in Africa (pp. 7–22). CODESRIA. Bayeh, E. (2014). The Eastern Africa standby force: Roles, challenges and prospects. International Journal of Political Science Development, 2(9), 197– 204. Bender, J. (2015). France’s military is all over Africa. Business Insider. http:// www.businessinsider.com/frances-military-is-all-over-africa-2015-1. Accessed 19 November 2021. Busch, G. (2017). Is the U.S. taxpayer paying for French neo-colonialism in Africa? Lima Charlie Media. https://limacharlienews.com/mena/france-usafrica/. Accessed 19 November 2021. Claeys, A. (2004). ‘Sense and sensibility’: The role of France and French interests in European development policy since 1957. In K. Arts & A. K. Dickson (Eds.), EU development cooperation: From model to symbol (pp. 113–132). Manchester University Press. Cumming, G. D. (2013). Nicolas Sarkozy’s Africa policy: Change, continuity or confusion? French Politics, 11(1), 24–47. EC. (2011). The African peace and security agenda. European Commission Press Release Database. https://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11571_en.htm. Accessed 19 November 2019. EC. (2012). Supporting closer cooperation and regional integration in the Maghreb: Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions. https://eur-lex. europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012JC0036&fro m=ga. Accessed 19 November 2019. EC. (2015). Council conclusions on the Sahel regional action plan 2015– 2020. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21522/st07823-en15.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2021. EC. (2016). European Development Fund (EDF). http://ec.europa.eu/europe aid/node/1079. Accessed 19 November 2021.

5

FRANCE, EU AND THE SECURITY …

125

EC. (2019a). African peace facility fact sheet: Emergency response mechanism. https://africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/apf_factsheet_-_ erm.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2021. EC. (2019b). EU support to G5 Sahel joint force: African peace facility factsheet. Africa-EU Partnership. https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/ files/apf_factsheet_-_g5_sahel.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2021. ECCAS. (2016). History and background. http://au.int/en/recs/eccas. Accessed 19 November 2021. ECOWAS. (1993). Revised treaty. ECOWAS Secretariat. Erforth, B. (2020). Multilateralism as a tool: Exploring French military cooperation in the Sahel. Journal of Strategic Studies, 43(4), 560–582. France24. (2019). France summons Italian envoy after Di Maio’s ‘unacceptable’ Africa comments. https://www.france24.com/en/20190121-france-rec alls-italian-envoy-di-maios-africa-comments. Accessed 19 November 2021. G5 Sahel. (2014). Convention portant creation du G5 Sahel. https://www.g5s ahel.org/images/convention.pdf. Accessed 19 Novmber 2021. Gregory, S. (2000). The French military in Africa: Past and present. African Affairs, 99(396), 435–448. Hakala, J. (2016). French Africa strategy in the European union. Bachelor’s Thesis submitted to Tallinn University of Technology. https://digikogu. taltech.ee/et/Download/a061afeb-2e93-48c2-b0b0-e75b2ec2fee9. Accessed 19 November 2021. Helly, D., Théroux-Bénoni, L.-A., Galeazzi, G., Maïga, I., & Ouédraogo, F. (2015). Sahel strategies: Why coordination is imperative. Institute for Security Studies, Policy Brief (76). https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ PolBrief76Eng.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2021. Hentz, J. J. (2009). The Southern african security order: Regional economic integration and security among developing states. Review of International Studies, 35, 189–213. Isik, G. (2016). Why regional integration is so important for resource-driven diversification in Africa. World Bank Blogs. https://blogs.worldbank.org/ trade/why-regional-integration-so-important-resource-driven-diversificationafrica. Accessed 19 November 2021. Jacinto, L. (2013). Africa-France summit opens in Mandela’s shadow. Franc24. http://www.france24.com/en/20131206-africa-france-summit-opens-man dela-shadow-hollande-security. Accessed 19 November 2021. Konkobo, L. (2017). African protests over the CFA ‘colonial currency’. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-41094094. Accessed 19 November 2021. Lindström, M., & Zetterlund, K. (2012). Setting the stage for the military intervention in Libya decisions made and their implications for the EU and NATO.

126

H. Y. BAPPAH

Swedish Defence Research Agency. https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOIR--3498--SE. Accessed 19 November 2021. Mathews, A. (2003). Regional integration and food security in developing countries. Food and agriculture organization of the United Nations. https://www. files.ethz.ch/isn/98933/PAPER145H.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2021. Omolo, C. (2019). The Africa-EU relations and regional integration in Africa: Reassessing EU’s influence on Africas’s integration project(s). L’europe En Formation, 388, 27–50. Porto, G., & Engel, U. (2010). The African peace and security architecture: An evolving security regime? In U. Engel & G. J. Porto (Eds.), Africa’s new peace and security architecture: Promoting norms, institutionalizing solutions (pp. 143–160). Ashgate Publishing. Powell, N. K. (2016). How French intervention contributes to instability. Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/west-africa/201602-01/flawed-strategy-sahel. Accessed 19 November, 2021. Powell, N. K. (2017). Battling instability? The recurring logic of French military interventions in Africa African Security, 10(1), 47–72. Qobo, M. (2007). The challenges of regional integration in Africa in the context of globalisation and the prospects for a United States of Africa. Institute for Security Studies (ISS), ISS Paper (145). https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/ site/uploads/Paper145h.pdf. Accessed 19 Nov 2021. SADC. (2016). Organ on politics, defense and security. http://www.sadc.int/ sadc-secretariat/directorates/office-executive-secretary/organ-politics-def ense-and-security/. Accessed 19 November 2021. Toth, N. (2007). Historical duty or pragmatic interest? Notes on EU and AU security issues. African Security Review, 16(3), 112–116. Warlouzet, L. (2008). France and the negotiations for the Treaty of Rome (1955–1957). Université Paris IV-Sorbonne. https://www.cvce.eu/content/ publication/2008/3/18/b5e074bc-e1fa-486f-9c85-be1ebeffa806/publis hable_en.pdf. Accessed 19 November 2021.

CHAPTER 6

Desert Rose or Fata Morgana? The G5 Sahel and Its Partnership with the European Union Julian Bergmann

Introduction The countries of the Sahelo-Saharan region—geographically located inbetween North and West Africa—are confronted with enormous political, economic and societal challenges. Many of these countries have witnessed violent conflicts on their territory, often having destabilising effects on the wider region. A major example are several rebellions of the Tuareg in Northern Mali, with the latest escalation in 2012 leading to a severe political crisis and the spread of a jihadist insurgency that could only be stopped by French military intervention. In neighbouring Niger, there is an influx of thousands of refugees fleeing from Northern Nigeria where the terrorist organisation Boko Haram is fighting a war both against the Nigerian government and the local population. In Mauritania, armed

J. Bergmann (B) German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS), Bonn, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. Muntschick (ed.), Regionalism in Africa and External Partners, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10702-3_6

127

128

J. BERGMANN

terrorist groups have put the security situation in the country under severe strain, including through the 2010 terrorist attack on the presidential palace in Nouakchott (Elischer, 2019a, 2019b). On a regional summit on 15–17 February 2014, the Heads of State of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger took the joint decision to enhance their cooperation for promoting security and development within and across their five countries. Ten months later, they signed an intergovernmental treaty that establishes a regional organisation—the G5 Sahel (“le groupe de cinq pays du Sahel”)—with a permanent secretariat based in Nouakchott, Mauritania. The creation of the G5 Sahel is a recent example of the “mushrooming” of regional cooperation schemes that has been observed across the Global South since the 1990s, including on the African continent (Söderbaum, 2016; Walther, 2018). On the one hand, the emergence of the G5 Sahel has been interpreted as a response to the incapability of existing regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU) to address the security situation in the Sahel in a timely and adequate manner—particularly after the political crisis in Mali in 2012 (Grebe, 2018). On the other hand, the countries of the Sahelo-Saharan region are already participating in a number of regional initiatives, such as the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Nouakchott Process and the ECOWAS (Iratni, 2017; Lebovich, 2017a, 2017b). In this situation of overlapping memberships in regional organisations, the five Sahel states’ decision to create another regional organisation in 2014 needs to be explained. In doing so, this contribution addresses two main research questions: (1) How can we explain the creation and evolution of the G5 Sahel? (2) And what role have the European Union (EU) and its member states played in promoting the creation and evolution of the G5 Sahel? To address the two research questions, this chapter is structured as follows. First, it develops a conceptual framework to explain the emergence of regional organisations. Second, it introduces the reader to the G5 Sahel in terms of its objectives, institutional architecture and most important policy developments. Third, the remainder of the chapter is devoted to the empirical analysis, providing an explanation of the emergence of the G5 Sahel based on favourable regional conditions, demands from the G5 Sahel member states and the vital support by the EU and its member states.

6

DESERT ROSE OR FATA MORGANA? …

129

Conceptual Framework: Conditions of Regional Cooperation This chapter adopts the definition of regionalism by Börzel and Risse (2016: 7) who define it as “a primarily state-led process of building and sustaining formal regional institutions and organizations among at least three states”. While the term institutions refers to sets of norms, rules and procedures that govern the behaviour of actors and may influence their identities and interests, the authors understand regional organisations as formal institutions with a minimum degree of actorness. Following Börzel’s (2005) distinction between the level and scope of regional organisations, regional cooperation is here understood as primarily intergovernmentally organised relations between states within a region, without any transfer of authority to the regional organisation and its organ. In contrast, the key characteristic of regional integration is, indeed, the transfer of authority and sovereignty to the regional level— although the degree of this authority transfer may vary considerably from one regional integration project to another (Börzel & Risse, 2016: 8). To analyse the evolution of the G5 Sahel, this chapter adopts a regional governance perspective as a framework concept (Börzel, 2016; Söderbaum, 2004). As Söderbaum (2013: 52) notes, regional governance captures “the various way in which state, market, and civil society actors relate and come together in different ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ coalitions, networks, and model of regional and multilevel governance”. A regional governance perspective thus broadens the analytical horizon for understanding how the interaction of state and non-state actors across multiple levels (global, regional, national) shapes the emergence, design and effectiveness of regionalism. The governance approach thus overcomes the state-centric bias of many traditional theories of regional cooperation and integration and allows to account for the role of non-state external actors, such as the EU and ECOWAS, in shaping regionalism in the Sahel. Moreover, a governance lens opens up the possibility to give more attention to non-state actors and transnational challenges, which is particularly relevant in the context of regional security in the Sahel (Kacowicz & Press-Barnathan, 2016: 297). As the regional governance approach per se does not provide a substantive explanation for regionalism, however, it needs to be combined with specific explanatory approaches. This contribution probes the plausibility of two competing explanations for the evolution of regional organisations:

130

J. BERGMANN

a rationalist-functionalist perspective, and a hegemonic stability theory (HST) approach. From a rationalist-functionalist perspective, there needs to be a problematic situation that provides structural incentives for states to initiate regional cooperation and create accompanying institutions (Muntschick, 2012: 6; Taylor, 1987: 19). The problematic situation is a result of complex interdependence between states and can be driven by factors both exogenous and endogenous to the region. For example, the demand for regional security governance can be conditioned by— actual or perceived—external security threats such as extra-regional great power intervention or extra-regional transnational security actors such as terrorist groups; or it might emerge due to endogenous threats stemming from actors within the region, be it an emerging regional hegemon or domestic and transnational actors who threaten the stability and survival of existing political regimes (Kacowicz & Press-Barnathan, 2016: 300– 302). As Söderbaum (2004: 425–428) has argued, states may also see regional cooperation as a means to boost their sovereignty and legitimacy, putting a strong emphasis on formal and absolute sovereignty—“that is, the maintenance of existing borders, and the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs—because it enhances the power of the governing political elite and its ability to stay in power” (Söderbaum, 2004: 426). Apart from the actual existence of these factors creating demand—thus generating political pressures—for advancing regional cooperation, it is also important that relevant actors perceive them as legitimate and compelling (Niemann, 2006: 31). However, the demand for regional cooperation alone—and relevant actors perceiving it as legitimate and compelling—is often not sufficient to explain the creation of regional organisations. The role of extra-regional actors is often an important part of the explanation, but it also makes the explanation of the emergence of regionalism much more complex (see Muntschick, Chapter 1). From a rationalist-functionalist perspective, external actors can provide important additional incentives for regional cooperation and help to overcome collective action problems that exist within regions. External influence can also have a strong catalysing effect on intra-regional demands for regional cooperation. The prospect of substantial resources provided by international donors to regional cooperation projects may considerably change the cost-benefit calculations of states concerning the establishment of a regional organisation, particularly if the expected foreign aid aims to support regional programmes and

6

DESERT ROSE OR FATA MORGANA? …

131

initiatives that can also be used to boost the government’s sovereignty and legitimacy. This is most likely the case if foreign aid is not tied to strong conditionality. At the same time, the role of external actors is not conducive to regional cooperation per se, as external actors can also have a disrupting effect on regional cooperation projects (Muntschick, 2012). In other words, it is also possible that external actors may reduce the incentives for regional cooperation through their interventions. Thus, we need to account both for potential positive and negative effects of extra-regional actors’ influence of regional cooperation projects. The scope of this contribution does not allow to test systematically if a rationalist-functional perspective provides the sole or best explanation of the emergence and design of the G5 Sahel. Nevertheless, alternative explanations still need to be considered in order to weigh the strengths and limitations of a rationalist-functional approach. Hegemonic stability theory suggests that a hegemon—within or outside the region—provides the incentives and substantial amount of resources for regional governance arrangements. A regional hegemon could “bear the initial high costs of creating new arrangements, offer side payments to states reluctant to participate, as well as mobilise its material power and commitment to reassure hesitant states about possible defections and cheating” (Kacowicz & Press-Barnathan, 2016: 303). Hence, the subsequent analysis also investigates to what extent one of the five member states of the G5 Sahel acted as a regional hegemon and thus provided the main impetus for establishing their joint regional organisation. Moreover, another alternative explanation would be that an extra-regional hegemon has played a decisive role in establishing the G5 Sahel. As this contribution focuses particularly on the EU and its member states, it is analysed to what extent the latter took the role of an extra-regional hegemon to induce the creation of the G5 Sahel.

The G5 Sahel---A Regional Organisation for Promoting Security and Development Objectives and Ambitions In recent policy reports and media coverage of regional cooperation in the Sahel, the G5 Sahel is often conflated with the G5 Sahel Joint Force. While the latter is an important part of the organisation and the most important manifestation of security cooperation within the G5 Sahel, it

132

J. BERGMANN

would be misleading to conceptualise the G5 Sahel as a pure military cooperation project. As it will be demonstrated below, there is indeed an imbalance between the efforts and resources invested in the security pillar of the G5 Sahel compared to its development policy pillar. However, focusing solely on the security dimension of the G5 Sahel would neglect both the high potential of regional cooperation projects to promote sustainable development in the Sahel and the G5 Sahel’s clearly spelled-out ambitions to pursue this objective. Similarly, conceptualising the G5 Sahel as an “ad hoc security mechanism” (see Grebe, 2018; Venturi, 2017) is also misleading. The creation and operationalisation of a permanent secretariat in Nouakchott suggests that the G5 Sahel can be conceived as fulfilling the minimum criterion of regional organisations as “having a street address” (Börzel & Risse, 2016: 7), which implies that the G5 Sahel goes beyond an “ad hoc” project. Although the creation of the G5 Sahel occurred in parallel to the emergence of the ad hoc regional security cooperation mechanism to fight Boko Haram—the Multi-national Joint Task Force (MNJTF)— the G5 Sahel has an institutionally more advanced set-up and a politically more ambitious mandate, going beyond the collective, temporary fight against terrorist groups. Hence, the G5 Sahel can rightly be described as a regional organisation with an ambitious mandate and a permanent institutional structure. In light of these two general observations, a closer look at the objectives and institutional architecture of the G5 Sahel and its recent efforts of institutional and policy consolidation is warranted. To start with, the Founding Charter (hereafter: the Charter) of the G5 Sahel—the “Convention Portant Creation du G5 Sahel” that was signed on 19 December 2004—defines the mandate and objectives of the regional organisation. The primary objective of the G5 Sahel is to respond to the security and development challenges in the Sahel region and secure peace, security and sustainable development within and across all five member states (G5 Sahel, 2016: 3). More specifically, the Charter defines four key objectives: (1) to guarantee the conditions of development and security within and across its member states; (2) to offer a strategic framework of intervention that allows to improve the living conditions of the populations; (3) to reconcile/unite development and security, as well as democracy and good

6

DESERT ROSE OR FATA MORGANA? …

133

governance in a regionally and internationally mutually beneficial framework of cooperation; and (4) to promote inclusive and sustainable regional development (G5 Sahel, 2014: 4; own translation from French original).

To implement these broad objectives, the five states pledged to reinforce peace and security within their region, develop infrastructure in terms of transport, energy and telecommunications, improve the conditions of good governance within their countries and strengthen the resilience of their populations by guaranteeing food security and human development. However, the 2014 Founding Charter is rather vague concerning the short to medium-term objectives and concrete actions envisaged for the G5 Sahel to pursue. Two years later, the G5 Sahel’s Permanent Secretariat published the “Strategy for Development and Security of the Countries of the G5 Sahel” (hereafter: the Strategy for Development and Security), which was based on a mandate given by the Heads of States of the five countries at the February 2014 summit. Based on an analysis of the political, economic and societal challenges the five countries are facing, the strategy further specifies the organisation’s main objectives and priorities to be addressed in four sectors: defence and security, governance, infrastructure, and resilience and human development (G5 Sahel, 2016: 22–27). Concerning the organisation’s objectives, the main difference to the 2014 Charter is that the Strategy for Development and Security adds the objective of regional economic integration, particularly in relation to the integration of transport and energy infrastructures, and the access to information and communication technologies (G5 Sahel, 2016: 20). Moreover, the Strategy signals more strongly the G5 Sahel’s alignment with regional and international cooperation frameworks, citing the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the African Union’s Agenda 2063 as major reference points (G5 Sahel, 2016: 19, 30). Institutional Architecture of the G5 Sahel The institutional architecture of the G5 Sahel is purely intergovernmental in nature and thus similar to many other regional organisations in the Global South, consisting of a Conference of the Heads of States, a Council of Ministers, a Permanent Secretariat, a Defence and Security Committee and national committees that are tasked to coordinate the actions of the G5 Sahel within the member states. The Conference of the

134

J. BERGMANN

Heads of States is the supreme decision-making body of the organisation, which is responsible for deciding over the broad strategic directions and actions of the organisation, and convenes on an annual basis. The Council of Ministers is the main political body to implement the policies of the organisations. Moreover, it prepares the strategic decisions and directives to be decided by the Heads of States. Interestingly, the Charter specifies the Council of Development Ministers as the primary configuration of the Council, although the past Council sessions have also included the ministers of foreign policy and/or defence policy. The Permanent Secretariat’s main role is to implement the decisions of the Council of Ministers, under whose authority it is placed. The secretariat is led by a SecretaryGeneral who is appointed for a four-year term. It is assisted by a group of national experts on the four G5 Sahel priority areas—security and defence, governance, infrastructures and resilience (G5 Sahel, 2014: 4–6). A key responsibility of the Permanent Secretariat is to implement the 2016 Strategy for Development and Security and ensure its follow-up and evaluation. Moreover, the Permanent Secretariat is the main administrative body of the organisation, responsible for all aspects concerning its technical, operational, logistical and financial management. As of spring 2019, the Permanent Secretariat comprises about 20 staff members (Desgrais, 2019: 16). Finally, the Defence and Security Committee comprises the Chiefs of Staff of the five member states and is the main organ preparing the Council of Ministers’ decisions on security and defence issues (see G5 Sahel, 2014). In sum, the institutional structure of the G5 Sahel demonstrates that the organisation is an intergovernmentally organised regional cooperation framework rather than an instance of regional integration. Although there is a supranational body—the Permanent Secretariat—tasked with the implementation of the G5 Sahel Strategy for Development and Security as well as the overall management of the organisation, there is no degree of integration observable in terms of transfer of authority and sovereignty to the regional level. The Permanent Secretariat is placed under the full authority of the Council, and thus represents primarily an implementing agent of intergovernmentally decided policies.

6

DESERT ROSE OR FATA MORGANA? …

135

Two Main Flagship Projects—The Joint Force (JF) and the Priority Investment Programme (PIP) Since the launch of the G5 Sahel in 2014, the leaders of the five member states have primarily worked on two major initiatives: the G5 Sahel Joint Force (Force Conjointe du Groupe de cinq pays du Sahel), and the Priority Investment Programme (PIP). The decision to create the Joint Force (JF) was first taken at the summit of the Heads of State in N’Djamena in November 2015 (G5 Sahel, 2015: 2). While first operations between the armed forces of individual G5 Sahel member states and the French military operation took place between 2015 and 2017, the gradually deteriorating security situation in central and northern Mali reinforced the pressure on the G5 Sahel to move forward the idea of creating a joint military force (Lebovich, 2017a). In February 2017, the G5 Sahel Heads of State announced the operationalisation of the JF in terms of creating a force of 5,000 troops and police officers divided into seven battalions and operating in three sectors: an eastern sector across the Niger-Chad border; a central sector across Mali, Burkina Faso Niger; and a western sector across the Mauritania-Mali border (Crisis Group, 2017: 1–2). The JF is mandated to fight against terrorist groups, cross-border organised crime and human trafficking. At an extraordinary G5 summit in July 2017, which was also attended by French President Emmanuel Macron in order to signal France’s strong political backing of the initiative, the member states of the G5 Sahel officially launched the JF. In the meantime, the AU Peace and Security Council approved the JF’s strategic concept of operations in April 2017, while the UN Security Council adopted a resolution welcoming the JF initiative in June the same year (African Union, 2017; United Nations Security Council, 2017). Concerning the funding of the joint force, the international community has pledged substantial contributions at a donors’ conference in December 2017 as well as in subsequent meetings—with the EU contributing e100 million of the initial e424 million foreseen for the force’s first year of operation (Crisis Group, 2017: 6; see below). However, it remains an open question whether the pledged contributions will be sufficient to bear all the costs incurred by the force (Lebovich, 2018; Penney, 2018). The second major flagship of the G5 Sahel is the Priority Investment Programme (PIP), which was presented at the December 2018

136

J. BERGMANN

International Conference of the G5 Sahel and its international cooperation partners in Nouakchott. The PIP is the G5 Sahel’s main vehicle to implement the 2016 Development and Security Strategy and was prepared by the Permanent Secretariat, which is also the main organ responsible for coordinating its implementation together with the five states’ national authorities and technical agencies. For the first phase of the PIP between 2019 and 2021, the Permanent Secretariat identified forty projects in four priority areas—defence and security, governance, resilience and human development, and infrastructure—to be co-funded by the G5 Sahel member states and its international partners (G5 Sahel, 2018; see also section below). In sum, the G5 Sahel has undergone a phase of substantial consolidation since its creation in 2014. With the creation of the Joint Force and the establishment of the PIP for 2019–2021, it has initiated two major flagship projects that aim to put into practice the organisation’s ambition of promoting security and development in the Sahel. However, the G5 Sahel has also been described as a “very fluid and constantly changing organisation” (Crisis Group, 2017: 1), as the vision for its priorities and ambitions has undergone several changes. Concerning its scope, the G5 Sahel initiative started as a regional organisation with a strong development component, thus going beyond a sole regional security governance mechanism (Bøås, 2018: 6–7; Crisis Group, 2017: 1). However, security efforts have been strongly prioritised in the last few years, partly also driven by the international community’s strong interest in them. With the 2016 Strategy, economic integration has first come up as a third field main objective of the organisation, although it remains unclear to what extent the five countries will be seriously pursuing this objective.

Explaining the Creation and Evolution of the G5 Sahel The empirical analysis of the evolution of the G5 Sahel draws on documents issued by the G5 Sahel, the European Union and the United Nations; eight interviews with EU officials and member state representatives and think tank experts conducted between September 2017 and March 2019 in Bonn, Brussels, Addis Ababa and via Skype; media reports, and secondary literature, including academic research and policy-oriented studies. The subsequent section argues that the evolution of the G5 Sahel can be explained through three sets of factors: regional context

6

DESERT ROSE OR FATA MORGANA? …

137

conditions, demands from within the G5 Sahel member states, and the influence of extra-regional partners, with a focus on the European Union and its member states. Regional Context—A Regional Power Vacuum as Antecedent Condition One main explanatory factor for the creation of the G5 Sahel is the regional power vacuum that prompted the five Sahel states to form their own regional organisation in 2014. This vacuum emerged due to two factors: the long-standing rivalry between Morocco and Algeria that rendered existing cooperation schemes largely dysfunctional; and ECOWAS’ failure to provide credibly for longer-term stability in the Sahel region, particularly during the 2012 Malian crisis. First, political rivalries among Maghreb states, particularly Morocco and Algeria, have dominated regional politics in the Sahel for a long time. This has rendered the emergence of regional cooperation projects with the simultaneous participation of both countries relatively unlikely (Iratni, 2017; Lebovich, 2017a, 2017b). In 1998 the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi had initiated the establishment of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), which includes the G5 Sahel member states and is now led by Morocco, but excludes Algeria (Sturman, 2003). CEN-SAD is among the least developed regional organisation projects on the African continent, not going substantially beyond a free trade mechanism (Elischer & Erdmann, 2012). Similarly, the Moroccan-Algerian standoff has also rendered the Maghreb Arab Union (UMA)—which was founded in 1989 and includes Mauritania as the only member state among the Sahel countries—dysfunctional for many years (Eke & Ani, 2017). Algeria, on its own, has initiated security cooperation with Mali, Niger, and Mauritania in the framework of the “Comité d’État-Major Opérationnel Conjoint” (CEMOC), which brings together the Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces of the four countries, but has not gone beyond loose coordination in military affairs. In the regional organisation most relevant for the Sahel states, ECOWAS, Algeria and Morocco are not

138

J. BERGMANN

participating, while only three of the five G5 states are members on their own (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger).1 Taken together, the long-standing rivalry between Morocco and Algeria had led to a situation in which there existed no functioning regional body that the G5 Sahel member states perceived as being the right regional arena to pursue their interests to a sufficient degree. The existing institutions were either dysfunctional or severely hampered by the strong rivalry between Algeria and Morocco (Bøås, 2018: 6). As Boserup and Martinez (2017: 3) put it, “although facing severe security threats, the powers in North and East Africa have thus proved incapable of producing a coherent and regional response” to the challenges in the Sahel. Hence, it is clear that if the five Sahel states wanted to enhance the cooperation between their countries, they had to circumvent the AlgerianMoroccan rivalry and thus the previously existing regional cooperation structures (Lebovich, 2017a). At the same time, the fact that the creation of the G5 Sahel circumvented the Algeria-Moroccan standoff also means that the organisation has been facing serious scepticism from the two countries—Algeria in particular. The country has been very reserved towards the G5 Sahel because it perceives the organisation as a competitor to another regional security governance project—the Nouakchott Process to enhance security cooperation and the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the Sahelo-Saharan region. The Nouakchott Process, initiated by the African Union and led by Algeria, is widely perceived as being more legitimate than the G5 Sahel because it is an initiative under the auspices of the AU. Reportedly, Algeria has made its support to the G5 Sahel conditional on the latter’s integration into the Nouakchott Process (Crisis Group, 2017: 10). Second, and related to the first factor, the failure of ECOWAS to provide a regional response to the 2012 Malian crisis also contributed to the regional power vacuum that created favourable conditions for the five Sahel states to create their own regional organisation. Initially, ECOWAS had responded relatively quickly to the advance of Tuareg rebels and jihadist fighters from the north towards central and southern Mali and the military coup that had overthrown the Malian government in March 1 Although Morocco applied for ECOWAS membership in 2017 and ECOWAS member states agreed in principle on its accession to the regional organisation in June 2017, Morocco has not officially joined the organisation, yet.

6

DESERT ROSE OR FATA MORGANA? …

139

2012 (see Plank, Chapter 7). The regional organisation suspended Mali’s membership in ECOWAS after the Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré had been overthrown, and imposed travel bans and banking restrictions on the leaders of the military junta in Bamako; it asked neighbouring countries to close their common border crossings with Mali; and it initiated a mediation process under the lead of Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Campaoré. Moreover, ECOWAS prepared the deployment of a regional military force, the ECOWAS Mission in Mali (MICEMA), in consultations with the AU, the UN and other international partners. However, the mission was never deployed, due to a set of factors within and beyond ECOWAS, including a lack of available funding and resources to put the mission on the ground, the resistance among Malian actors against an ECOWAS intervention, the lack of leadership from ECOWAS members such as Nigeria in pushing for the deployment of MICEMA, and Algeria and Mauritania’s objection of an ECOWAS military intervention—both of them not being ECOWAS members (Caparini, 2015: 7–10; Crisis Group, 2013: 2–8). Moreover, while the mission was stuck in the planning phase for several months, jihadist groups further advanced towards Bamako, which ultimately prompted the French military intervention “Serval” by the request of the Malian government. MICEMA thus never developed beyond the planning stage and was replaced by the wider AU initiative to deploy an African-led International Support Mission to Mali, AFISMA, that was later integrated into the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (see Plank, Chapter 7). Hence, despite its successes in mediating a settlement to Mali’s political crisis, ECOWAS’ failure to put an own intervention force on the ground meant that it lost a significant portion of influence on the management and stabilisation of the conflict in Mali. The consequences of this failure can still be felt today as ECOWAS remains largely side-lined from the international management of the Malian conflict (Tisseron, 2016). In fact, it was not before July 2018 that the G5 Sahel’s Permanent Secretariat and the ECOWAS Commission signed a Memorandum of Understanding in the areas of capacity building, community development and early warning (ECOWAS, 2018). As Grebe (2018: 3) notes, “the creation of the G5 Sahel must therefore also be understood as a response to the military and political deficiencies of ECOWAS”. In sum, the combination of the Algerian-Moroccan stand-off in the Sahelo-Saharan region and its consequences for regional cooperation, and ECOWAS’ failure to provide an adequate response to the conflict in Mali,

140

J. BERGMANN

created a situation in which the recourse to existing regional governance arrangements for promoting security and development within and across their countries was largely unattractive for the five Sahel states (SIPRI, 2018; Tisseron, 2016). In other words, this regional power vacuum provided an important antecedent condition for the creation of the G5 Sahel. This fact notwithstanding, the establishment of the G5 Sahel, however, cannot be understood without accounting for the drivers for regionalism from among the five member states of the G5 Sahel, which is the focus of the subsequent section. Drivers from Within the G5 Sahel Region From a rationalist-functionalist perspective, there needs to be a problematic situation that provides structural incentives for states to initiate regional cooperation (Muntschick, 2012: 6; Taylor, 1987: 19). The problematic situation is a result of complex interdependence between states and can be driven by factors both exogenous and endogenous to the region. In the case of the creation of the G5 Sahel, this problematic situation was primarily created by transnational security challenges such as terrorism, transnational organised crime and political instability resulting from state weakness—in the border zones in particular. Jihadist extremism and terrorism in the border zones of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso constituted an imminent threat to the political elites of these three states. The Tuareg rebellion in Mali in 2012 that put the Malian state to the brink of collapse clearly demonstrated the strength of the security threat the Sahel states were facing. Notwithstanding, there also exist severe developmental challenges as regards to human development and an immense youth bulge (UNDP, 2018; UNECA, 2017: 21). However, while these developmental challenges have already persisted for a longer period of time, the evidence suggests that the security challenges posed by jihadist and extremist groups, exemplified by the 2012 Malian crisis, stand out as the primary problematic situation that prompted the Sahel states’ interest in fostering their regional cooperation (interviews 1, 5; Crisis Group, 2017). However, this does not mean that developmental challenges have been no concern for the five Sahel states. Rather, addressing jointly security and development challenges—both being strongly linked to each other, particularly in the border zones within and between the countries—has

6

141

DESERT ROSE OR FATA MORGANA? …

Table 6.1 Comparison of the military and economic strength of G5 Sahel member states

Burkina Faso Mali Chad Mauritania Niger

GDP (gross) in US-$ Billion, 2017

GDP (per capita, PPP, int. $), 2017

12.9 15.3 10.0 5.0 8.1

1,862.2 1,941.2 2,213.5 3,949.7 1,016.6

Military expenditure (% of GDP), 2015

Armed forces personnel, 2016

HDI rank, 2017

Net ODA received (% of GW), 2017

12 3.2 2.6 4.1 2.2

11,450 39,850 17,800 20,850 10,700

183 186 182 159 189

7.4 6.7 9.1 5.8 15.2

Source own compilation based on World Bank databank & 20I8 Human Development Report

ever been the main objective of the G5 Sahel (Founding Charter; 2016 Strategy). An alternative explanation for the creation of the G5 Sahel according to hegemonic stability theory would be the promotion by an intra-regional hegemon, pushing for regional cooperation and providing the incentives and a substantial amount of resources to establish a new regional governance arrangement. However, a rough comparison of several indicators for military and socio-economic strength of the five countries shows that they are all placed at a similar level, and none of the five states can be conceived as a regional hegemon based on extraordinary military and/or economic strength (see Table 6.1). Moreover, none of the five states has been willing to share an extraordinarily large proportion of the financial burden of the costs incurred by the G5 Sahel Joint Force or the investments foreseen in the framework of the PIP. Rather, the five states pledged contributions of e10 million each to the initial budget of the JF, which has been set at e423 million for its first twelve months of operations in 2018. In contrast to the MNJTF, which is heavily backed up by financial contributions by the regional hegemon Nigeria,2 the G5 Sahel lacks a donor from among its members who would be willing and able to shoulder a major financial burden concerning the costs for the deployment of the joint force (Crisis Group, 2017: 5; 2 Nigeria pledged e100 million out of the estimated e700 million of its initial budget; see Assanvo et al. (2016: 7–8).

142

J. BERGMANN

Penney, 2018). This is also reflected in the five countries’ contributions to the first phase of the PIP 2019–2021. As a basic principle, the G5 Sahel member states agreed that ten per cent of the investments for the forty priority projects in the four sectors—defence and security, governance, resilience and human development, and infrastructure—should be borne by contributions from among its members. According to the Concept Note presented at the December 2018 conference with the G5 Sahel’s international partners, this goal has been achieved, although the ten per cent share only relates to the four sectors and not to individual projects within a specific sector (G5 Sahel, 2018). However, a closer look at the defence and security sector reveals that the G5 Sahel member states have only pledged contributions to nationally owned projects. Interestingly, all genuinely regional cooperation projects—such as the creation of a Regional Police Academy, the creation of a G5 Sahel Defence College, the creation of the Sahelian Center for Threat Analysis and Early Warning (CSAMAP) or a project supporting the Sahelian Security College—are not financially supported by the G5 Sahel member states (G5 Sahel, 2018: 6). In other words, this indicates that the five states are willing to contribute financially to the investment programs in the framework of the G5 Sahel, but only if these programs benefit directly their national agendas. This strong focus on pursuing the national interests within the G5 Sahel framework is also evident when looking at the envisaged investments for national infrastructures at the amount of e1,200 million, six times higher than the planned investments for resilience and human development, and even 13 times higher than the investments in governance initiatives.3 This imbalance in terms of focus is another indication that the G5 Sahel member states perceive their organisation primarily as a vehicle for financially boosting their national initiatives—in the field of security and defence as well as in terms of infrastructure projects. The interview evidence gathered for this contribution tentatively confirms this conclusion, as interviewees from the side of EU member states have referred to the G5 Sahel primarily as a means created by the five Sahel states to attract additional international funding (interviews 3, 4, 7, 8). Taken together, the absence of a regional hegemon from among the G5 Sahel member states, their unwillingness to make substantial 3 Interestingly, the proposed investments in governance initiatives focus almost exclusively on the empowerment of the youth, and do not address other important governance aspects such as the promotion of human rights and good governance.

6

DESERT ROSE OR FATA MORGANA? …

143

investments in genuinely regional cooperation initiatives, and the purely intergovernmental structure of the organisation provide support for the hypothesis that the G5 Sahel has primarily been created as a means to boost the sovereignty and legitimacy of its member states’ governments. Moreover, the empirical findings also suggest that the member states perceive the organisation as an important vehicle for attracting additional international funding for their national investment projects and thus creating further revenues. In other words, the evidence tentatively suggests that the G5 Sahel can be primarily understood as a case of sovereignty-boosting regionalism (Söderbaum, 2004). At the same time, the findings also suggest that the external actors have provided substantial support to the G5 Sahel, which is further investigated in the subsequent section. The European Union and Its Member States: Key External Drivers of the G5 Sahel The European Union and its member states, France in particular, have been a key supporter of the G5 Sahel since its creation in 2014 (see also Bappah, Chapter 5). In the literature, some authors even attribute the establishment of the regional body to a French initiative, although French officials have been eager to emphasise that its existence is primarily due to the initiative of the presidents of the five G5 Sahel member state (Crisis Group, 2017: 1). While it might be impossible to provide a definite answer to the “maternity” question, the evidence suggests that France and the European Union as a whole provided a substantive impetus for the creation of the G5 and have strongly supported it from the beginning of its existence. Shortly after the adoption of the EU’s Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel (hereafter: EU Sahel Strategy) in 2011, the EU started to test regional approaches to tackle the various challenges of the Sahel countries (Helly & Galeazzi, 2015: 4). The most prominent initiative in this regard was the Contre Terrorisme Sahel Intervention (CT Sahel) project that aimed to support national counter-terrorism capacities and also included the establishment of a Sahelian Security College (Collège Sahélien de Sécurité, CSS) in 2012 as a regional component, in which Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso participated. According to an EU official, the CSS was an important initiative because it represented the first genuine regional cooperation effort and provided the basis for the

144

J. BERGMANN

creation of the G5 Sahel two years later (interview 1). Although the CSS was initially restricted to three countries, Mauritania and Chad joined the CSS in 2015 when it was formally integrated into the institutional structures of the G5 Sahel. Since then, however, the CSS has remained a “virtual institution without staff and location” (Desgrais, 2019: 83), although the issue of location was, at least, resolved by its re-opening in Bamako in September 2018. Apart from the CSS initiative, the evidence suggests that EU and member state officials played a decisive role in consulting the governments of the five states on the creation of the G5 Sahel. Although it is relatively uncontested that there was also a clear demand for further regional cooperation articulated by the Sahelian countries themselves—Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso in particular given the joint security challenges these countries have been facing—the EU and its member states quickly responded to this demand and strongly supported the countries in transforming this demand into an institutionalised structure for regional cooperation (interviews 4, 5, 6). Going beyond the actual decision to establish the G5 Sahel in February 2014, the subsequent analysis focuses on how the EU has sustained its support to the G5 Sahel that has been essential for the organisation to further evolve during the last five years. Three types of EU support to the creation and functioning of the G5 Sahel can be distinguished: endorsement, assistance and coordination (cf. Müller & Cornago, 2018). In terms of endorsement, the EU has demonstrated its recognition of the G5 Sahel through its interaction with the organisation and their institutions, particularly with the G5 Sahel Council of Ministers. The High Representative Mogherini has established a permanent political dialogue with the foreign ministers of the five countries through annual meetings and publicly welcomed the countries’ decision to launch the Joint Force in 2017. Moreover, providing substantial financial assistance to the G5 Sahel Joint Force and the PIP, the EU has backed up its political endorsement of the G5 Sahel as a legitimate regional player with concrete deeds (see below). At the United Nations, France sponsored several UN Security Council Resolutions on the G5 Sahel, the most important one being resolution 2359 (2017) that welcomed and endorsed the G5 Sahel Joint Force (United Nations Security Council, 2017). Moreover, France has strongly lobbied for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to adopt a resolution to allow for UN funding of the Joint Force, which

6

DESERT ROSE OR FATA MORGANA? …

145

has, so far, been opposed by the United States (Kelly, 2019; Lebovich, 2017a, 2017b: 5). In terms of substantial assistance, the EU has provided both financial and operational support to the G5 and its two main projects, the Joint Force and the PIP. To start with, the EU—excluding pure bilateral support by EU member states to the G5 Sahel countries—has provided more than e4 billion support through its various instruments, including the European Development Fund, the African Peace Facility, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and its humanitarian aid budget (see Table 6.2). While these figures also include the bilateral aid provided by EU institutions to the five countries, the EU has also delivered distinct support to the two main flagships of the G5 Sahel, the Joint Force and the PIP. Through the African Peace Facility—financed by the European Development Fund—the EU has provided e100 million of support to the Joint Force between 2017 and 2018: e75 million to the French agency Expertise France for the provision of services and equipment to the G5 Sahel Joint Force, e10 million to support MINUSMA in providing logistical and operational support to the Joint Force, e10 million to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for the establishment and implementation of a human rights and international humanitarian law compliance framework for the operations of the Joint Force, and e5 million in support of the governance structure of the G5 Sahel. The share of the EU’s contribution to the Joint Force is thus one fourth of the overall initial budget for 2017 and 2018 (European Commission, 2018a: 2). Concerning operational support to the G5 Sahel Joint Force, the Council of the EU on 20 June 2017 decided on the civil-military regionalisation of its CSDP missions and operations in the Sahel—EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali, and EUTM Mali—and established a regional coordination cell (RCC) under the authority of the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The RCC was comprised of internal security and defence experts both based in Bamako, Mali and at the EU delegation of the other G5 Sahel member states. In a second phase launched in February 2019, the RCC was transformed into a regional advisory and coordination cell (RACC) and moved to the G5 Sahel headquarters in Nouakchott for providing strategic advice on security and defence issues, in concert with

229 113.3 196.6 154.5 54.2 181.5 929.1

EUTF (2017–2018)

8.6 78.4 4,300.6

23.8 9.8 22.5 13.7 100 100

512.1

512.1

IcSP (2015–2018) APF (2017–2018) Humanitarian Aid (2017–2018)*

Source own compilation based on the 2019 Annual Report on the EU Regional Action Plan for the Sahel

* no figures for individual country-level available

2,681

686 542 665 628 160

EDF (2014–2020)

EU and member states funding to G5 Sahel countries (in million e)

Niger Chad Mali Burkina Faso Mauretania Regional Total Total EU and EU member states

Table 6.2

4,900.84

961.27 133.72 1,804.3 831.31 183.36 986.88

Total bilateral aid of EU member states (2014–2018)

146 J. BERGMANN

6

DESERT ROSE OR FATA MORGANA? …

147

EUTM Mali staff members already deployed at the Joint Force Headquarters based in Mali, Niger, Mauritania and Chad (Council of the European Union, 2019). Apart from the funding through its various development cooperation instruments as shown in Table 6.2, the EU has also pledged contributions to the G5 Sahel’s PIP at the December 2018 international donor conference in Nouakchott. Here, the EU pledged an additional amount of e125 million of funding for various PIP projects, with e70 million alone for the stabilisation of the G5 Sahel border areas channelled through the EUTF (European Commission, 2018b). In terms of coordination, the EU and its member states have played a leading role in the Sahel Alliance, which is an important coordination hub for the international donors engaged in supporting the countries of the Sahel region. The Sahel Alliance was officially launched by France, Germany and the EU on 13 July 2017. Since then, other major donors and international cooperation partners have joined the initiative: the African Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank (WB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Spain, UK, Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark and the Netherlands. The main objective of the Sahel Alliance is to improve the coordination and effectiveness of the development policies of its members towards the G5 Sahel countries as well as to promote innovative modes of implementation, including mechanisms to support private sector investments. The Sahel Alliance has not generated new funds directed towards the Sahel, but rather serves as a forum to coordinate the more than 600 projects that its members have been implementing or plan to implement in the five Sahel countries. The projects, which amount to an overall envelope of e9 billion for the period 2019– 2021, focus on six different sectors: (a) education and youth employment, (b) agriculture, rural development and food security, (c) decentralisation and basic services, (d) energy and climate, (e) governance and (f) domestic security (Sahel Alliance, 2019). However, the Sahel Alliance was not a direct response to the emergence of the G5 Sahel and its need for external support. Rather, the Alliance is primarily a donor coordination forum that has been driven by the objective to reinforce coordination among the international partners of the Sahel and intensify the efforts to deliver tangible results towards the stabilisation and development of the Sahel countries (interview 3). Nevertheless, the members have realised the need for establishing a closer

148

J. BERGMANN

formal relationship with the G5 Sahel, which has resulted in a Memorandum of Understanding between the Permanent Secretariat of the G5 Sahel and the Sahel Alliance, which aims to foster synergies and closer coordination in both institution’s efforts to promote security and development in the Sahel. Although this is a positive first step, observers point to the need for further follow-up on this objective towards making the Sahel Alliance an important external stimulus for further regional cooperation—and possibly integration—among the five states (Bergmann, 2019: 30; Desgrais, 2019: 120–128). In sum, the tentative evidence suggests that the EU and its member states have been key drivers and supporters of the evolution of the G5 Sahel in terms of endorsement, financial and operational support and multilateral coordination. Although it is difficult to ascertain if the EU’s support for G5 Sahel was a sufficient condition for its creation in the first place, it seems reasonable to assume that the EU’s support for the organisation within the last five years was decisive for its evolution, particularly in terms of the financial and operational support for its two flagship initiatives, the JF and the PIP. Tying these findings back to the theoretical propositions developed in section II, the analysis suggests that the EU and its member states set important stimulating incentives for the evolution of the G5 Sahel, which is in line with a rationalist-functional explanation. There is less evidence for the hypothesis that the EU acted as an extra-regional hegemon that bore the bulk of the costs for creating the G5 Sahel, offering side payments to reluctant states and mobilising its power resources to reassure hesitant states about possible defections and cheating. Nevertheless, this is also to say that—from a counterfactual point of view—it is hard to imagine that the evolution of the G5 Sahel would have been possible in the same way if it was not for the strong support by the EU and its member states, particularly by the bigger member states such as France and Germany.

Conclusions and Outlook: A Desert Rose to Blossom or Shrivel? Three key preliminary findings emerge from the empirical analysis, which need to be further corroborated in future research. First, there is plausible evidence for the proposition that the creation and evolution of the G5 Sahel can be best explained through a rationalist-functional

6

DESERT ROSE OR FATA MORGANA? …

149

lens, understanding it as a response to imminent, transnational security challenges threatening the governments of the five countries. While these security challenges represented the problematic situation necessary for regional cooperation to emerge, it was further exacerbated by a regional power vacuum, the latter being caused by the dysfunctionality of existing regional institutions and the problems of ECOWAS to lead on the management of the crisis in Mali in 2012. Moreover, the findings suggest that G5 Sahel has primarily been created as a means to boost the sovereignty and legitimacy of its member states’ governments, whereas their interest in genuine regional cooperation—or even integration—beyond the security and defence sector has its limits. Second, external support by the EU and its member states has been decisive for the creation and evolution of the G5 Sahel. Through its endorsement of the G5 Sahel, the financial and operational support provided as well as its important coordination role vis-à-vis other international partners, the EU has played a major role in putting the G5 Sahel “on track”. While it is hard to discern whether the evidence on the EU’s support for the G5 Sahel speaks rather for a rationalist-functional or a realist explanation, it is evident that the EU has been key to induce and foster the regional cooperation between the five states in the framework of the G5 Sahel. Third, and related to the second point, the G5 Sahel is a manifest regional organisation that has undergone a significant evolution since its creation in 2014. The G5 Sahel is indeed no dysfunctional “façade organisation” and is thus far away from constituting a case of “symbolic regionalism” that does not go beyond nice rhetoric on regional cooperation (Söderbaum, 2013: 13). Rather, although it is often termed an “ad hoc security mechanism” by policymakers and scholars, it has created permanent institutional structures and developed a portfolio of development projects that suggest that it is here to stay at least for a while. At the same time, we should also not neglect that the organisation faces several significant challenges (see Desgrais, 2019). Concerning the JF, external observers as well as EU and member state officials question the effectiveness of this regional military force (Crisis Group, 2017; Penney, 2018; Rupesinghe, 2018). At the same time, the JF faces severe financial problems as there is currently no permanent UN/AU funding mechanism in place for financing its operations, which makes the JF highly dependent on the ad hoc contributions of external donors, in particular by the EU and its member states. Similar problems can be seen with regard to the

150

J. BERGMANN

PIP, which has been described as a collection of “autonomous projects at the drip of international donors” (Desgrais, 2019: 77). Moreover, there are also problems with regard to the coherence both between the security and development pillars within the organisation and between the G5 Sahel’s own initiatives and those of its external partners, implying that the organisation’s potential for fostering sustainable development in the Sahel region has yet to be fully exploited (Desgrais, 2019: 100, 120–128). The G5 Sahel’s strong dependence on external support, in particular provided by the EU and its member states, thus creates doubts about the sustainability of this organisation, which is also regarded with suspicion by other regional actors such as ECOWAS and the African Union. The announcement of the Malian military junta in May 2022 to withdraw from the G5 Sahel renders the future of the organisation even more uncertain (Africanews, 2022). Only if the G5 Sahel manages to strike a reasonable balance between preserving its autonomy vis-à-vis other regional and international actors and cooperating with them for the sake of the stabilisation and sustainable development of the Sahel region, it will prove that its creation will also serve the human security and individual development prospects of its populations, particularly within the border zones.

References Africanews. (2022, May 16). Mali withdraws from the regional anti-jihadist force G5 Sahel. https://www.africanews.com/2022/05/16/mali-withdraws-fromthe-regional-anti-jihadist-force-g5-sahel/. Accessed 17 May 2022. African Union. (2017, April 13). AU peace and security council: 679th meeting. Communiqué. http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/679th-com-g5sahel-13-042017.pdf. Accessed 14 January 2021. Assanvo, W., Abatan, J. E., & Sawadogo, W. A. (2016). Assessing the multinational joint task force against Boko Haram (West Africa report [No. 19]). Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/upl oads/war19.pdf. Accessed 14 January 2021. Bergmann, J. (2019). Testfall Sahelregion: EU-Außenpolitik im Spannungsfeld von Sicherheit, Entwicklung und Migration. Political Science Applied, 9, 28– 30. https://www.psca.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/PSCA_Issue_IX_F ebruar_2019.pdf. Accessed 14 January 2021. Bøås, M. (2018). Rival priorities in the Sahel—Finding the balance between security and development (Policy Note [No. 3]). https://reliefweb.int/sites/ reliefweb.int/files/resources/Policy%20Note%20on%20Sahel_Final%20Vers ion.pdf. Accessed 14 January 2021.

6

DESERT ROSE OR FATA MORGANA? …

151

Börzel, T. A. (2005). Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2), 217–236. Börzel, T. A. (2016). Theorizing regionalism: Cooperation, integration, and governance. In T. A. Börzel & T. Risse (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism (pp. 41–63). Oxford University Press. Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2016). Introduction: Framework of the handbook and conceptual clarifications. In T. A. Börzel & T. Risse (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism (pp. 3–15). Oxford University Press. Boserup, R. A., & Martinez, L. (2017). Beyond Western Sahara, the SahelMaghreb axis looms large. In R. Ojeda-Garcia, I. Fernández-Molina & V. Veguilla (Eds.), Global, regional and local dimensions of Western Sahara’s protracted decolonization. (pp. 143–163). Palgrave Macmillan. Caparini, M. (2015). The Mali crisis and responses by regional actors (NUPI Working Paper [No. 849]. Norwegian Institute for International Affairs (NUPI). Oslo. https://nupi.brage.unit.no/nupixmlui/bitstream/handle/ 11250/302501/NUPI_WP_849%2bMarina%2bCaparini.pdf?sequence=3& isAllowed=y. Accessed 2 August 2022. Council of the European Union. (2019, February 18). Sahel: EU takes further steps to better support the security of the region. Press Release. https:// www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/02/18/sahel-eutakes-further-steps-to-better-support-the-security-of-the-region/. Accessed 18 February 2021. Crisis Group. (2013). Mali: Security, dialogue and meaningful reform (Report [No. 201]). https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/mali-sec urity-dialogue-and-meaningful-reform. Accessed 14 January 2021. Crisis Group. (2017). Finding the right role for the G5 Sahel joint force (Report [No. 258]). https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/bur kina-faso/258-force-du-g5-sahel-trouver-sa-place-dans-lembouteillage-securi taire. Accessed 14 January 2021. Desgrais, N. (2019). Cinq ans après, une radioscopie du G5 Sahel. Des réformes nécessaires de l’architecture et du processus décisionnel. Observatoire du monde arabo-musulman et du Sahel: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. https://www.frstrategie.org/web/documents/programmes/observatoire-dumonde-arabo-musulman-et-du-sahel/publications/201913.pdf. Accessed 14 January 2021. ECOWAS. (2018, July 24). ECOWAS, EU partner to ensure peace and security in the Sahel region. http://www.ecowas.int/ecowas-eu-partner-to-ensure-peaceand-security-in-the-sahel-region/. Accessed 2 August 2022. Eke, J. U., & Ani, K. J. (2017). Africa and the challenges of regional integration. Journal of African Union Studies, 6(1), 63–80. Elischer, S. (2019a). Contemporary civil-military relations in the Sahel (West African Papers, 19). OECD Publishing.

152

J. BERGMANN

Elischer, S. (2019b). Governing the faithful: State management of Salafi activity in the Francophone Sahel. Comparative Politics, 51(2), 199–218. Elischer, S., & Erdmann, G. (2012). Regionalorganisationen in Afrika – eine Bilanz (Working Paper, No. 3). https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/han dle/document/30964/ssoar-2012-elischer_et_al-regionalorganisationen_in_a frika_-_eine.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2012-elischer_et_ al-regionalorganisationen_in_afrika_-_eine.pdf. Accessed 14 January 2021. European Commission. (2018a). The African peace facility factsheet: EU support to G5 Sahel joint force. https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/ files/apf_factsheet_-_g5_sahel.pdf. Accessed 14 January 2021. European Commission. (2018b, December 6). The European Union’s partnership with the G5 Sahel countries. Press Release. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-rel ease_MEMO-18-6670_en.htm. Accessed 14 January 2021. G5 Sahel. (2014, December 19). Convention Portant Creation du G5 Sahel. https://www.g5sahel.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/images_con vention.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2022. G5 Sahel. (2015, November 20). Communiqué final du sommet des chefs d’état du G5 Sahel. https://oses.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/Communiqu% C3%A9%20final%20Sommet%20NDjamena%202015.PDF. Accessed 2 August 2022. G5 Sahel Secrétariat Permanent. (2016, September). Stratégie pour le Développement et la Sécurité des Pays du G5 Sahel. https://www.g5sahel.org/wp-con tent/uploads/2020/06/SDS_G5S_VF.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2022. G5 Sahel Secretariat Permanent. (2018, October). Sahel priority investment program (PIP/ G5 Sahel). First Phase 2019–2021. https://www.railwaysa frica.com/assets/projects/PIP_G5S_EN__VF.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2022. Grebe, J. (2018). Kooperation oder Konkurrenz? Sicherheit in Westafrika zwischen ECOWAS und G5. FES Frieden und Sicherheit. http://library.fes.de/ pdf-files/iez/14954-20181220.pdf. Accessed 14 January 2021. Helly, D., & Galeazzi, G. (2015). Avant la lettre? The EU’s comprehensive approach (to crises) in the Sahel (Briefing Note, 75). https://ecdpm.org/ wp-content/uploads/BN-75-EU-Comprehensive-Approach-Sahel-February2015.pdf. Accessed 14 January 2021. Iratni, B. (2017). Security challenges and issues in the Sahelo-Saharan region: The Algerian perspective. Dialogues: Sécuritaires dans l’espace Sahélo-Saharien: FES Peace and Security Centre of Competence Sub-Sahara Africa. http://library. fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/fes-pscc/14012.pdf. Accessed 14 January 2021. Kacowicz, A. M., & Press-Barnathan, G. (2016). Regional security governance. In T. A. Börzel & T. Risse (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism (pp. 297–322). Oxford University Press.

6

DESERT ROSE OR FATA MORGANA? …

153

Kelly, F. (2019, February 6). G5 Sahel leaders again call for UN assistance to fund joint force. https://thedefensepost.com/2019/02/06/g5-sahel-jointforce-leaders-call-un-funding/. Accessed 25 March 2021. Lebovich, A. (2017a). Bringing the desert together: How to advance SahelMaghreb integration (ECFR Policy Brief, 224). https://www.ecfr.eu/pub lications/summary/bringing_the_desert_together_how_to_advance_sahelo_ maghreb_integration_7215. Accessed 14 January 2021. Lebovich, A. (2017b, June 16). Serious questions remain over G5 Sahel military force. https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_serious_questions_rem ain_over_g5_sahel_military_force_7300. Accessed 25 March 2021. Lebovich, A. (2018, March 8). G5 Sahel: Much done, more to do. https://www. ecfr.eu/article/commentary_g5_sahel_much_done_more_to_do. Accessed 25 March 2021. Müller, P., & Cornago, N. (2018). Building peace through proxy mediation: The European Union’s mediation support in the Libya conflict (EIF Working Paper, 2018) (1). http://aei.pitt.edu/93259/1/wp2018_01_final.pdf. Accessed 25 March 2021. Muntschick, J. (2012). Theorising regionalism and external influence: A situation-structural approach. Mainz Papers on International and European Politics, 2. https://international.politics.uni-mainz.de/files/2016/01/ Muntschick_mpiep02.pdf. Accessed 25 March 2021. Niemann, A. (2006). Explaining decisions in the European Union. Cambridge University Press. Penney, J. (2018, December 16). The G5 Sahel force, failing the region and failing itself . https://www.passblue.com/2018/12/16/the-g5-sahel-forcefailing-the-region-and-failing-itself/. Accessed 25 March 2021. Rupesinghe, N. (2018). The joint force of the G5 Sahel: An appropriate response to combat terrorism? Accord Conflict Trends, 2018 (2). https://www.accord. org.za/conflict-trends/the-joint-force-of-the-g5-sahel/. Accessed 14 January 2021. SIPRI. (2018). Establishing a regional security architecture in the Sahel. https:// reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/sipri.org-Establishing%20a% 20regional%20security%20architecture%20in%20the%20Sahel.pdf. Accessed 14 January 2021. Söderbaum, F. (2004). Modes of regional governance in Africa: Neoliberalism, sovereignty boosting, and shadow networks. Global Governance, 10(4), 419– 436. Söderbaum, F. (2013). Rethinking regions and regionalism. Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, 14(2), 9–18. Söderbaum, F. (2016). Old, new and comparative regionalism. In T. A. Börzel & T. Risse (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism (pp. 16–40). Oxford University Press.

154

J. BERGMANN

Sturman, K. (2003). The rise of Libya as a regional player. African Security Review, 12(2), 109–112. Taylor, M. (1987). The possibility of cooperation: Studies in rationality and social change. Cambridge University Press. Tisseron, A. (2016). A quoi sert le G5 Sahel? Note d’actualité, 40. http://ins titut-thomas-more.org/2016/07/30/securite-et-developpement-en-afriquea-quoi-sert-le-g5-sahel/. Accessed 14 January 2021. UNDP. (2018). Human development index 2017 . http://hdr.undp.org/en/com posite/HDI. Accessed 14 January 2021. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2017). ECA Sahel study: Conflict in the Sahel region and the developmental consequences. http://rep ository.uneca.org/handle/10855/23474. Accessed 14 January 2021. United Nations Security Council. (2017, June 21). Resolution 2359 (2017). Adopted by the security council at its 7979th meeting. http://www.securityc ouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96 FF9%7D/S_RES_2359.pdf. Accessed 14 January 2021. Walther, O. (2018). Regional integration. In T. Binns, K. Lynch, & E. Nel (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of African development (pp. 286–299). Routledge. Venturi, B. (2017). The EU and the Sahel: A laboratory of experimentation for the security–migration–development nexus. IAI Working Papers, 17 (38). https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/eu-and-sahel-laboratory-experi mentation-security-migration-development-nexus. Accessed 14 January 2021.

Interviews Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview

1—EU official, Brussels, June 2017. 2—EU official, via skype, September 2017. 3—EU member state official, Brussels, December 2018. 4—EU member state official, via Skype, January 2019. 5—EU official, Addis Ababa, March 2019. 6—EU official, Addis Ababa, March 2019. 7—EU member state official, Addis Ababa, March 2019. 8—Think tank expert, Addis Ababa, March 2019.

CHAPTER 7

Evaluating the Effectiveness of the ECOWAS–EU Interregional Partnership on Peace and Security in the Context of the Mali Crisis Friedrich Plank

Introduction Parallel to a mushrooming of regional integration projects across the world since the early 1990s there has evolved a resurgence of studies on regional powers, regionalism and regional institutions (Acharya, 2014; Acharya & Johnston, 2007; Börzel & Risse, 2016; Fawn, 2009; Katzenstein, 2005; Söderbaum, 2016). The (comparative) study of regional organisations (ROs) as a research agenda has grown and scholars increasingly paid attention to external actors and their influence on regionalism (Farrell, 2009; Haastrup, 2013c; Muntschick, 2018). Interactions between ROs have created a complex web of interregional relations which

F. Plank (B) Department of Political Science, University of Mainz, Mainz, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. Muntschick (ed.), Regionalism in Africa and External Partners, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10702-3_7

155

156

F. PLANK

considerably shapes international relations. Moreover, the number and scope of policy fields addressed by interregional relations has equally increased to cover a more diverse set (Telò, 2015: 74). In a globalised world these policy fields are increasingly characterised by their complex and transregional character. This is particularly evident with regard to the security realm. As transregional perceived security challenges such as terrorism, regional conflicts and migration require interregional cooperation. While the web of region-to-region cooperation has grown considerably in scope and intensity with the new wave of regionalism in the 1990s, interregional security cooperation is particularly relevant in the context of Africa–European Union (EU) relations. Regional conflicts, low development and terrorist activities have led to increased migration from Africa to the EU and since then European ties to Africa have risen to the top of the agenda. These challenges seem to exceed the resources of individual states or organisations, making an orchestrated response necessary (Biermann & Koops, 2017: 14). In response, security has been “interregionalised” within the partnership between Africa and the EU (Haastrup, 2013a: 59), referred to as “security by proxy” (Nivet, 2006), or as “tool for security governance” (Lopez-Lucia, 2012). The Africa–EU partnership on peace and security is specifically implemented between the European Union and the African Union (AU) in cooperation with the various Regional Economic Communities (RECs)1 on the African continent. Since 2003, the EU has substantially supported African capacity building in the security sector (see also Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3) and the partners have conducted peace operations jointly, such as in Somalia, Mali and the Central African Republic. Recently, the EU has emphasised its commitment to interregional cooperation with Africa in the Global Strategy and as a response to the asylum crisis in Europe, Brussels seeks to intensify and deepen Africa–EU relations further on. The growing relevance of interregional cooperation as a topic in international politics has also attracted the attention of academics and substantial efforts have been made in analysing 1 The AU recognises eight RECs in Africa representing different (sub)regions: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel–Saharan States (CEN–SAD), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

157

interregionalism (Baert et al., 2014; Doidge, 2011; Hänggi et al., 2006; Rüland et al., 2008; Söderbaum et al., 2005; Telò et al., 2015) and Africa–EU relations in particular (Brosig, 2011; Carbone, 2013b; Haastrup, 2013b; Mangala, 2013a; Muntschick, 2018). However, academic knowledge with regard to two rather important aspects of interregional relations remains limited, yet: 1. Despite the fact that interregional cooperation has grown in intensity and scope and that capacity building constitutes a major objective of the EU–Africa partnership and has been intensively funded through the African Peace Facility (APF), scholars have paid little attention to the effectiveness of these interregional cooperation measures, yet (but see Plank, 2017). In addition, academic (conceptual) knowledge of how to measure effectiveness in interregional relations is poorly developed. The impact and performance of interregional as well as inter-organisational cooperation has been barely analysed so far. 2. Moreover and quite astonishingly, research has so far only to a limited extent focused on theory-driven analyses of interregional cooperation between Africa and the EU, despite the empirical richness of Africa–EU cooperation on peace and security. So far, our knowledge on how these complex relations work in practice, what constitutes interregionalism concretely and how the informality of many processes related to region-to-region cooperation can be addressed empirically and theoretically, is limited. Acknowledging these research gaps, this study attempts to provide an analysis of interregional security cooperation between West Africa and the EU as an external actor. Its main objective is to analyse how regional organisations interact with each other and how this interaction impacts the effectiveness of the interregional efforts conducted by both partners. I seek to investigate how the partners coordinate with each other both formally and informally and attempt to trace conditions for effective action in peace and security conducted by the partners. Analysing the West Africa–EU partnership on peace and security is relevant since West African regional conflicts such as the Boko Haram uprising in the Lake Chad region or migration policy towards the region have received growing international attention and because relations between

158

F. PLANK

the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the EU constitute a main part of the interregional web between Africa and Europe. The attention of the EU towards West Africa has increased in the recent years, for instance with reference to migration and security challenges (Ceccorulli & Fanta, 2013; Fioramonti & Nshimbi, 2016; Raineri & Rossi, 2017). In this study, I will particularly focus on the ECOWAS–EU relations as the main framework of relations between West Africa and the EU, notwithstanding recent enhancements of regional groups such as the G5 Sahel and the Multi National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) (Henneberg & Plank, 2020; see Bergmann, Chapter 6). Interregional relations between the EU and these groups are rather nascent yet and an evaluation of joint operations would be rather prematurely. In assessing the interregional security cooperation between the partners, I place a particular emphasis on the joint cooperation in response to the Mali crisis. Drawing on notions of effectiveness provided by regime theory and research on EU foreign policy, I develop an analytical framework for assessing the effectiveness of interregional security cooperation. The twodimensional conceptualisation of the dependent variable includes both internal (goal attainment) and external (problem-solving) perspectives on measuring effective action empirically. The concrete interaction of the partners is traced rather inductively by specifically examining conducive and constraining conditions for effective interregional security cooperation. This is put into practice by using a wide range of data, including case-specific media reports, official documents, interregional partnership agreements and joint decision documents of the regulatory bodies of the Western Africa–EU relationship. In addition, I refer to 26 semi-structured expert interviews with decision-makers and independent experts conducted in Abuja, Addis Ababa, Brussels and Nairobi. The chapter is divided into five sections. I will outline the partnership between the EU and Africa in the field of peace and security, outline the theoretical framework used in this study, focus on the goals of the partnership, point to the effectiveness of joint efforts and conclude with a discussion of the findings.

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

159

The Africa–EU Partnership on Peace and Security Quite a number of regional organisations and regional groups have been established in Africa in the last decades. As far back as in the 1970s and 1980s, attempts to create regional arrangements increasingly featured prominent among African elites and in particular the African diaspora. Originating from outside the continent during the colonial rule, PanAfricanism2 emerged as a powerful idea which promoted the general aim of African unity (Ajala, 1973; Thompson, 1969). Since the 1990s we can observe dynamics towards increased regional cooperation in Africa. Concurrently, with the mushrooming of African regionalism and the increasing development of the EU external affairs in particular since the treaties of Maastricht and Lisbon, the European Union’s engagement in Africa has grown. Generally, the ties between the EU and Africa have long been dominated by trade and development issues through the partnership agreements of Yaoundé and Lomé, signed with the Africa-CaribbeanPacific (ACP) group of states (detailed see Farrell, 2010; Söderbaum & Stålgren, 2010). However, with a changing international context and the low development of the ACP states, a re-thinking of the EU–ACP cooperation gained ground (Carbone, 2013a: 4). The early agreements of the Africa–EU partnership clearly emphasised development as the main area of cooperation. Despite this original focus, Africa–EU relations increasingly focused on security issues with the signature of subsequent agreements, in particular the Cotonou Agreement (2000) and its revisions of 2005 and 2010. The interregional partnership between Africa and the EU set out in the Cairo Declaration and the related Plan of Action of 2000 were the first clear statements concerning the inclusion of peace and security and addressed issues such as terrorism, regional conflicts, state failure and migration. In this regard the first Africa–EU Summit in 2000 constitutes a significant moment of the interregional partnership beside the symbolic character of the declaration (Olsen, 2006). The real novelty in Africa–EU relations, however, has been the attempt of the EU to pursue a common approach to Africa for instance outlined in the EU’s Africa Strategy (European Union, 2005). In this strategy, the

2 Pan-Africanism has been described as “an ideology that is difficult to define because of its amorphous character, but which involves at least an aspiration to realize or recapture the dignity, freedom, autonomy and (or unity of Africans and/or of people of African descent” (Walraven, 1999: xvii).

160

F. PLANK

EU committed itself to address Africa as “one entity” and to “further reinforce the basic principles that govern this relationship, most prominently equality, partnership and ownership” (European Union, 2005). The strategy constitutes a novel approach to set a framework for a more consistent EU policy towards Africa which moves beyond the principles embedded in the ACP–EU relationship. During the second EU–Africa Summit in December 2007, the partners finally yielded the Joint Africa– EU Strategy (JAES) (European Union (EU) & African Union (AU), 2007b) which has laid the foundation for a long-term strategic partnership setting out specific targets (interview B). The partnership was to be based on a shared vision and “consensus of values, common interests, and common strategic objectives” (European Union (EU) & African Union (AU), 2007b: 2). It consists of eight cooperation areas, most prominently peace and security cooperation. The JAES is the main document of the Africa–EU partnership on peace and security usurping the preliminary agreements which to a great extent focused on economic development. As Haastrup notes, “[p]rior to the adaption of the JAES, EU-Africa cooperation on peace and security was practically absent” (Haastrup, 2013a: 48). Joint Action Plans as part of the JAES include information sharing, consultation, capacity building and support by the EU Commission through the European Development Fund as major components of the partnership (see Mangala, 2013b). Every action plan includes a specific paragraph on peace and security as the first sub-header of the partnership. The Africa–EU Partnership on Peace and Security identifies three priority actions outlined in the First Action Plan (European Union (EU) & African Union (AU), 2007a: 2): ● Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security; ● Full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture; ● And predictable Funding for African-led Peace Support Operations. Among others, they foresee the establishment of regular dialogue, consultations between institutions and organs of the two organisations, joint assessment missions, exchange of experience and a direct EU intervention in conflicts on a case-by-case analysis (Brosig, 2011: 3). Africa–EU security cooperation is embedded in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as the main body of implementing peace and security on

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

161

the continent. It is meant as a structure that provides for peace and security and lays the foundation for “African solutions to African problems” (see Bappah, Chapter 5). It incorporates a political decision body, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which legitimises and coordinates the other elements such as the Panel of the Wise, an African Standby Force or the African Peace Fund. With the main components of the APSA, such as the standby force, still under construction, and with reference to the dependency of the African partners on external funding (see Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3), the EU plays a major role in Africa (Williams, 2014: 150). For instance, the AU–EU partnership on peace and security is still very much shaped by resource dependency as the joint engagements in the Central African Republic and Somalia show (Olsen, 2014; Plank, 2017; interview R). Within the framework of the APSA, the African Union is tasked with the coordination and organisation of matters on the highest level and it has the lead in crisis management (interview G). However, the structure heavily relies on the support by the RECs of the five regions (North, South, East, West and Central). Each of the RECs has to provide for a standby force, contribute one member to the Panel of the Wise, establish early warning systems and help to implement the APSA in the regions. In this regard, the EU has also developed strong interregional ties to some of the RECs in particular those who have developed a rather high and ambitious mandate in peace and security. As such, the ECOWAS became the main target of interest for the EU’s efforts in West Africa and it has been at the centre of the EU’s attention in terms of interregional cooperation (see Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3). This is because the RO has a proven track record in peace and security, already conducted peace operations, influenced the development of the APSA considerably, and clearly emerged as an important security actor in Africa. Therefore, security in West Africa is very much a domain of the ECOWAS (Piccolino & Minou, 2014: 116). The ECOWAS, which has been founded by the Lagos agreement in 1975, comprises 15 West African states as members. The organisation has its headquarters in the Nigerian capital Abuja. Originally, the main focus of the ECOWAS was to become a regional integration mechanism with custom union and common market objectives. However, regional conflicts have repeatedly been a concern for the RO, which can be considered as one of the most integrated sub-regional organisations in Africa (Francis, 2009: 92). With reference to regional conflicts in West Africa,

162

F. PLANK

the ECOWAS increasingly expanded its competences and capacities in the security realm and has intervened in crises such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali or, more recently, in The Gambia (detailed see Francis, 2009) (Fig. 7.1). With the multiple conflicts and crises in West Africa and the Sahel region, the EU has increasingly acknowledged the security-driven regionalism of the ECOWAS and intensified the interregional cooperation (Piccolino & Minou, 2014: 117). Supporting the ECOWAS in its objective to manage conflicts has increasingly become relevant for the EU and this engagement has even grown in the context of the asylum crisis in Europe. Dialogue between the EU and the ECOWAS started in the year 2000 with a first ministerial meeting in Abuja. Since then the partners have conducted peacekeeping jointly and cooperated in a multitude of conflict-related areas (Fig. 7.2).

Fig. 7.1 ECOWAS member states (Source own compilation)

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

163

Fig. 7.2 Africa–EU and West Africa–EU relations (Source own compilation)

The partners hold biannual ministerial meetings which are accompanied by formalised and informal meetings and coordination processes in Brussels, Abuja and within the high-level dialogue. The EU’s support to the ECOWAS has been channelled through the Regional Indicative Programs (RIPs) and within the framework of the African Peace Facility (APF) which was established in 2003 and has since then developed into the key mechanism for implementing the Africa–EU cooperation on peace and security. In addition, peace and security efforts of the ECOWAS have been supported through the Rapid Response Mechanism such as in the case of the mediation in Côte d’Ivoire (Lopez-Lucia, 2012: 19). In general, the West Africa–EU partnership is also frequently embedded in a tripartite alliance between the EU, AU and ECOWAS as regional groups and the United Nations (UN) which has been described as nexus (Haastrup, 2013b; Rein, 2015). In addition, major colonial powers such as France or the United Kingdom still play a major role in the region (see also Bappah, Chapter 5). Despite this complex environment in which security policy takes place,3 this study focuses on the ECOWAS– EU relations as the main framework of the West Africa–EU partnership. 3 There are also other organisations focusing on issues of peace and security. For

instance, the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) under the umbrella of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC). The MNJTF has been formed in particular to fight the uprising of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region and constitutes another security actor in West Africa. With reference to the age of the organisation, the relations between the MNJTF and the EU are rather weakly developed so far.

164

F. PLANK

With regard to the effectiveness of the West Africa–EU relationship I will in the following briefly outline my theoretical framework for this study.

A Framework for Evaluating Interregionalism and External Influence Interregionalism has been described as an “empirical concept that explains the network of interregional arrangements that currently permeate the international system” (Haastrup, 2009: 288). Interregional relations have been defined as a process characterised by the widening and deepening of interactions between regions which is politically intended and actively implemented (Roloff, 2006: 18–20). In particular, scholars concentrate on types of interregional relations such as bilateral interregionalism, transregionalism (Rüland, 2002: 3) and hybrid interregionalism (Rüland, 2010: 1272). Interregional relations between regional organisations (ROs) are often referred to as “pure interregionalism” (Van Langenhove et al., 2012: 19) but might also be centred on an internally focused, capacity building style of interregional relations and an externally focused, globally active form of region-to-region cooperation (Doidge, 2009, 2014: 46–48). In this contribution, I draw on Hänggi who describes the external relations of ROs with counterparts as the prototype of interregional relations, whereas he locates ties between ROs and third states as border cases of interregionalism (2006: 34). In the context of interregionalism, the influence of external actors on regionalism focuses primarily on counterparts such as the EU. Acknowledging the leading role of the European Union as external influencer of regionalism in the world, most scholars of interregionalism have so far included the European Union in their analyses while only a few focus on interregionalism without the EU as one of the partners under investigation.4 Although the focus of the research on region-to-region cooperation has been criticised frequently (Camroux, 2011; Robles, 2008; Staeger, 2016), “EU-centred interregionalism” (see Doidge, 2011: 8; Ribeiro Hoffmann, 2016: 603) still constitutes the main avenue for the study of interregional cooperation. While I assume that interregional relations with the EU constitute not necessarily a “one sided affair” (Kingah, 2006: 69), in 4 For instance, the study of Aggarwal and Kwei on Asia–Pacific economic cooperation (2006) or the study of Ferabolli who focuses on the Arab-South American relations (2016).

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

165

line with many others, this study involves the European Union as main influential external actor in the network of security cooperation between Africa and Europe. There exists a great body of studies on interregional relations. Scholars have particularly focused on EU–Asia relations since interregionalism seems to be most developed there (Doidge, 2007, 2011; Marchi, 2016; Shu, 2015). Africa–EU relations have been analysed as well (Carbone, 2013b; Fioramonti & Kotsopoulos, 2015; Haastrup, 2009, 2013b, 2013c; Mangala, 2013a). Significant contributions are the works of Haastrup (2013b) and Mangala (2013a), who both sharpen the current state of Africa-EU research beyond the notion of Africa as part of the African and Caribbean Pacific states. The interregionalisation of security has brought about substantial changes in Africa–EU relations and the coordination and interaction have increased substantially (Haastrup, 2013b: 169–171), notwithstanding recent decreases in formal and informal coordination processes (interviews N, O, R). Assessing the Effectiveness of Interregional Security Cooperation As previously outlined, the effectiveness of ROs with regard to the relations between regional entities and external actors has only been examined to a limited extent so far. Drawing on recent research on EU effectiveness in security-related areas (Bergmann & Niemann, 2015; Peen Rodt, 2014), preliminary work on interregional effectiveness (Plank, 2017), and Young’s (1994) widely cited conceptualisation of regime effectiveness, I include both internal and external perspectives in my conceptualisation of effectiveness. Internal effectiveness, which is conceptualised as goal attainment, assesses whether the interregional partner organisations as the main bodies under research have successfully achieved their objectives. I assume that goals can be either mandated or overarching goals. Mandated goals refer to the mandate of the action, whereas the overarching goals point to more general objectives of the ROs which are often not mentioned explicitly. Concerning specific operations of interregional cooperation in West Africa, the mandates are of particular importance for assessing the effectiveness. In line with recent research, I assume that low, medium and high levels of goal attainment are possible (Bergmann & Niemann, 2015: 961; Oberthür & Groen, 2015: 1324):

166

F. PLANK

● High level: all mandated and overarching key objectives achieved; ● Medium level: most of the mandated and overarching key objectives achieved; ● Low level: a few of the mandated and overarching key objectives achieved. In order to assess the goals not specifically mentioned in official documents, I additionally compare these objectives with media reports and interviews I conducted with policy makers. External effectiveness evaluates whether the cooperation of the interregional partners generates conditions conducive to the management of security challenges. Goal attainment as internal perspective which measures the extent to which goals are attained over time, is often tenuously linked to problem-solving as external perspective, since there might be unstated goals by the actors (Young, 1994: 144). Thus, it refers not only to the goals of the intervener but to an external perspective on conflict management (Diehl, 1994: 34; Peen Rodt, 2014: 25). Conceptualisations of effectiveness tend to privilege the EU which has a specific focus on evaluation processes (interview K) while African conflict management specifically targets the containment of violence (interview J). Interregional efforts are effective from an external perspective when they limit the continuation, diffusion, escalation or intensification of violent conflicts. Such an external perspective is promising and relevant since goals can be characterised by least-ambitious mandates.

Assessing the Effectiveness of ECOWAS–EU Cooperation in the Mali Crisis The crisis in Mali which erupted in 2012 has its roots in a complex conflict setting involving a multitude of actors. Three distinct but to a great extent interrelated conflicts coalesced to create a serious crisis that affected the whole Sahel region and prompted international response. Firstly, the secessionist Tuareg rebellion under the National Movement for the Liberation on Azawad (MNLA); secondly, an attempt of Islamist groups to gain military control over Mali and impose Sharia law, and thirdly, a constitutional and political crisis which peaked in the 2012 coup of a democratically elected government by the Malian military (Francis, 2013: 2; Okemuo, 2013: 235). In early 2012, the MNLA, which has been

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

167

striving for a secessionist state in Northern Mali for decades, captured several towns in Northern Mali and thus gave proof of the inability of the Malian government under President Touré to manage the new rebellion. When disgruntled soldiers organised a coup in March 2012 which deposed the government and suspended constitutional rule directly before planned elections in April 2012, the Tuareg movement sided with the Islamist jihadist group Ansar ed-Din and was able to make use of the coup. The strategic opportunity of a rather ill-prepared Malian state authority enabled the rebellion movement to seize control of the whole of Northern Mali. Moreover, the strategic military alliance between the Tuareg and the Jihadists in which Ansar ed-Din increasingly emerged as the dominant force managed to capture the main Northern cities of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, imposed Sharia law in the historic city of Timbuktu and declared the Islamic State of Azawad. In response to these developments, a transitional government of national unity headed by Prime Minister Diarra was formed in August 2012 (Francis, 2013: 3). However, the political crisis endured since for instance Malian elites and the military opposed international interference. This changed dramatically in the beginning of 2013 when the Jihadists and their allies captured the central city of Konna and planned to attack the capital Bamako. The immediate threat to the capital prompted international military response with the French intervention one day after the seizure of Konna which was supported by Malian troops, the ECOWAS-led African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) and other Western countries. The EU supported AFISMA, coordinated donor activities and deployed its own mission, the European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali). The Goals of ECOWAS–EU Cooperation in the Context of the Mali Crisis With reference to the overarching goals, the Africa–EU Partnership on Peace and Security identifies three priority actions outlined in the First Action Plan (European Union (EU) & African Union (AU), 2007a: 2). These goals of the interregional partnership can be extrapolated to West Africa as well:

168

F. PLANK

● Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security; ● Full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture; ● And predictable Funding for African-led Peace Support Operations. In the context of ECOWAS–EU relations, overarching goals of the EU with regard to the EU–West Africa relations place an emphasis on the EU’s international agency and to encourage convergence towards and within Africa as a whole (Rodt & Okeke, 2013: 221, interview H). Interregional engagement of the EU can also be related to establishing “security by proxy” (Nivet, 2006; Skeppström et al., 2015; interview A) and African ownership in peace and security issues (interviews C, D). Moreover, interregionalism also serves as a value on its own (interview D) which can be explained “[…] by a self–image that leads it to ‘give’ the EU to a world hungry for its presence” (Söderbaum et al., 2005: 371). With regard to West Africa, a more recent and explicit overarching goal is the reduction of migration to the EU. The recently enhanced efforts of the EU in the Sahel region (see also Bergmann, Chapter 6) which seek to limit migration to Europe have been intensified through the Sahel strategy and the EU Emergency Trust Fund established after the 2015 Valetta summit on migration. Finally, migration has become a major goal of the EU in Africa (interviews R, Y). Overarching goals of the ECOWAS refer to financial and logistical support to the organisation’s activities in the region. Hence, it is important that the EU continues to support the development of the APSA (interviews L, R). For the ECOWAS decision-makers it is very important to manage the security challenges and threats in the region (interviews Y, Z). In this regard, security is perceived as part of a security-development nexus in which development of the region plays a major role. This nexus which has been identified as a relevant issue in Africa–EU relations by many scholars (Bagoyoko & Gibert, 2009; Furness & Gänzle, 2017; Haastrup, 2013b), increasingly rose to the top of the agenda in the complex web between security policy, economic integration efforts and societal processes within the West African countries (Table 7.1). With regard to the mandated goals of the EU towards the Mali engagement, the Regional Indicative Programs, which regulate the foreign aid and financial support by the European Union on a five-year basis, laid out specific objectives. Whereas initially the EU’s engagement in West Africa did not explicitly focus on the ECOWAS, the latest 2014–2020

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

169

Table 7.1 Goals of the partners in the West Africa–EU partnership on peace and security

Mandated goals

Overarching goals

EU

ECOWAS

Interregional partnership

● Capacity building of ECOWAS Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security ● Support to ECOWAS intervention in Mali ● Stability in the region ● Reduction of migration to Europe ● Strengthen the EU’s international presence ● African ownership

● Restoration of territorial integrity of Mali ● Protection of civilian population ● Provision of humanitarian assistance

● Capacity building of Malian forces

● Stability in the region ● Addressing securitydevelopuient nexus ● Support by the EU

● Enhance dialogue oil peace and security ● Full operationalisation of the APSA ● Predictable funding for peace operations

Source own compilation

RIP clearly indicated its prominent role in peace and security. It sets out two specific objectives within the priority area of peace and security: (1) strengthening mechanisms to promote and maintain peace and stability and post-crisis operations. This objective explicitly focuses on the ECOWAS. Through four components, the EU seeks to build capacity and develop the expertise of the ECOWAS’s Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, support the organisation in the exercise of mandate within the APSA, build capacities in the areas of conflict prevention and mediation, and support the ECOWAS in interventions. (2) The second main objective focuses on the support of regional initiatives to address security threats and challenges. It encompasses four components which include to strengthen coordination and cooperation of security services, to implement the ECOWAS strategies on maritime security and for the Sahel, and to implement specific programs in the security realm in the region (European Commission, 2014: 7). The RIP for West Africa outlines the goals of the EU in the partnership in detail, specifically mentioning which components should be implemented. The EU’s

170

F. PLANK

focus on the ECOWAS as main security actor in the region is repeatedly emphasized (European Commission, 2014: 16–21). With reference to the mandated goals of the ECOWAS, the UN mandate is of particular importance. In Resolution 2085 the UN Security Council mandated the AFISMA with the following tasks: a. To contribute to the rebuilding of the capacity of the Malian Defence and Security Forces, in close coordination with other international partners involved in this process, including the European Union and other Member States; b. To support the Malian authorities in recovering the areas in the north of its territory under the control of terrorist, extremist and armed groups and in reducing the threat posed by terrorist organizations; c. To transition to stabilization activities to support the Malian authorities in maintaining security and consolidate State authority through appropriate capacities; d. To support the Malian authorities in their primary responsibility to protect the population; e. To support the Malian authorities to create a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees; f. To protect its personnel, facilities, premises, equipment and mission and to ensure the security and movement of its personnel (United Nations, 2012).

Overall, the mandated objectives of the ECOWAS sought in particular to restore the territorial sovereignty of Mali, to provide for protection of the population, and to create conditions conducive for the provision of humanitarian assistance. The interregional partners had the mandated goals to engage in capacity building for Malian and regional forces. The next section interrogates, in how far mandated and overarching goals of the interregional partners have been attained. Internal Goal Attainment Both the ECOWAS and the AU were involved in the resolution of the Mali crisis from the beginning as they imposed political, diplomatic and economic sanctions after the coup and mobilised international support not to recognise both the separatist Azawad state and the military junta (ECOWAS, 2012). When the threat of the rebellion to Bamako

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

171

became immediate, the ECOWAS member states deployed troops on 17 January 2013 starting with Nigerian forces (ThisDay, 2013) which were supported by troops from Burkina Faso one week later (Reuters, 2013). The operation Serval of the French military included a 4,000 strong force with massive air support and was able to recapture the territories seized by the rebellion in a very short time. The operation was bolstered by Malian forces as well as AFISMA troops which stabilised the areas the French soldiers had liberated. Overarching goals of the interregional partnership between West Africa and the EU very much refer to the general objectives of the Africa– EU relations. In fact, there has been established an enhanced dialogue between the partners. A high number and frequency of meetings between the ECOWAS and the EU have been established such as formal highlevel meetings twice a year, weekly update meetings, a technical and strategic meeting every six months, consultations between the ECOWAS and various development partners twice a year, and many informal dayto-day exchanges between the EU Delegation in Abuja and ECOWAS staff (interview X). Specific focal points (interview Y), daily contact also with the inclusion of ECOWAS member state representatives (interview T) and a professional working level (interview I) have been mentioned as efficient coordination procedures. With regard to coordination between West Africa and the EU more generally, the partners meet regularly in high-level discussions (interview X). Beside the formal consultations within the framework of the Africa–EU Summits and the regular ministerial meetings, a wide range of dialogue fora have been established so far. In West Africa, the APSA is to a great extent operationalised from a formal perspective. This operationalisation which foresees for instance the establishment of regional standby forces and early warning systems is closely linked to predictable funding for West African-led peace operations which constitutes another major objective of the partnership. In general, the ECOWAS is perceived as well developed in the peace and security realm (interviews M, N, U, W) while other regional groups such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission have only recently been engaged in peace and security matters. When evaluating its overarching goals of the partners in the Mali crisis, it becomes quite clear, that the EU did only to a limited extent achieve these objectives. While some state that EU emerged as political actor during the crisis (Davis, 2015), the role of the EU has been rather limited. In fact, the massive French intervention which was perceived as

172

F. PLANK

rather unilateral was a key factor. In contrast to other operations in which France “Europeanized” its own efforts (Furness & Olsen, 2016: 108), the engagement of the EU was rather comprehensive. However, the EU which is perceived in West Africa mainly as a donor, managed to increase its visibility and capacities to support regional efforts (interview Z). In particular with regard to a continual objective of the EU in its relations to Africa, the interregional response to the Mali crisis reveals a quite negative result. Whereas an African ownership in peace and security constitutes a major goal, the African partners were only to a limited extent capable of managing the crisis on their own. The French intervention and the continuing presence of European troops in Mali have also been a response to the limited success of African initiatives, in particular impaired by innerAfrican quarrels between the AU and the ECOWAS and their lack of funding which resulted in the transfer to an UN-led mission which still faces severe challenges in its capability to manage the stabilisation of the country. In addition, a growing security-migration nexus emphasised by the EU in particular with regard to the Sahel region and West Africa has resulted in degraded Africa–EU relations more generally (interviews N, O, R). Likewise, the overarching objectives of the ECOWAS have only been achieved to a limited extent. Despite the security-driven approach of the EU in response to the Mali crisis which has been eagerly expressed as putting security before development (interviews Y, Z), support to the African-led engagement in Mali has been limited. Notwithstanding the EU’s engagement as a donor, as the EU organised an international donor meeting in Brussels on 5 February 2013 and the direct support to the deployment of AFISMA via the African Peace Facility (Francis, 2013: 8), the troop-contributing countries had to a great extent to finance the operation on their own and were heavily dependent on technical and logistical support by the US and EU member states (interviews P, Y, Z). In a second step, this analysis evaluates in how far the mandated goals of the ECOWAS, the EU, and the partnership as a whole have been achieved. First, when evaluating the restoration of the territorial integrity of Mali as a major objective of the partners, it becomes quite clear that the intervention made the insurgents’ Islamic State of the Azawad collapse. In particular the heavily equipped French troops and their air superiority made the rebels withdraw (interview T). Whereas the French and Chadian troops, the latter supporting the French intervention on the ground, liberated the areas occupied by the rebels in almost three weeks

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

173

(Francis, 2013: 5), the African-led intervention secured these areas and enabled their allies to move forward. In parallel to the engagement in the Central African Republic, there was a division of labour (Plank, 2017: 498). However, while the Operation Serval is clearly a success in the short term because of clear goals, coordination and an effective use of military force (Boeke & Schuurman, 2015), a mid-term evaluation might reveal a more pessimist evaluation. The latter has been particularly emphasised with regard to an engagement of French, German and other European forces which presently cooperate with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). While the transfer of AFISMA to the UN-led mission secured the funding of the troops deployed by the regional states, a major incentive to engage permanently, UN operations are in general rather peacekeeping than peaceenforcement missions and in this regard limited when confronted with counter-insurgency (interviews P, Q). This has created serious obstacles for the response to the problems in Northern Mali (interview T). A second major objective of the ECOWAS engagement was the protection of the population. As Fig. 7.3 shows, deathly violence against civilians has been on a limited level in Mali, notwithstanding the fact that the imposed Sharia law in the North had serious consequences for the population and the fighting led to over 500,000 refugees and internally displaced persons. Moreover, the fear of the rebellion overtaking Bamako constituted, despite its actual relevance, a major reason for the engagement of regional and international forces in Mali (Bergamaschi, 2013: 6). In fact, the engagement of the partners led to a considerable decrease of violence against civilians which had its peak in the early 2013. Moreover, the intervention was successful in limiting the effects of the fighting on the population. With regard to support for Malian authorities in the provision of a secure environment, the engagement of the partners, notably the ECOWAS, achieved conditions for political stabilisation at least in the mid-term. The ECOWAS successfully proposed and carried out mediation efforts and political stabilisation activities after the coup which put serious pressure on the military junta (interview Z). The provision of humanitarian assistance as third mandated goal of the ECOWAS was quite successful under the circumstances of security risks in Northern Mali. Others argue that the increased use of military means lowers the EU’s impact on peaceful conflict resolution in the region, as the lost impartiality hinders its chances for civilian success (Lavallée & Völkel, 2015). However, the EU released e178 million from 2012 to

174

F. PLANK

Fig. 7.3 Fatalities in Mali (2011–2015) (Source own compilation based on the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project [ACLED])

2014 which was in particular directed to emergency needs and to secure access to basic services such as health care and water (Furness & Olsen, 2016: 113). The humanitarian assistance to the North, for internally displaced persons and for refugees from neighbouring countries, has been identified as achieved objective (interview Z) although the approach of the interregional partners was clearly driven by security concerns. A mandated goal of the partners as a whole constitutes capacity building for the Malian forces and authorities whose incapacities were a major factor for the uprising in the North and their takeover of 2/3 of the country. In order to train the Malian armed forces, the EU set up the EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali which initially sought to train two battalions. Overall, 23 member states participated in this mission which has so far trained over 11,000 Malian soldiers. In addition, the EU Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) supports civilian Malian authorities such as police forces in the provision of a stable environment. While the EUTM has been described as a success, the lack of equipment and specific training exercises with new equipment have been identified as major obstacles to a full capacity of the Malian forces so far. Since the EU can only support regional and local forces with non-lethal equipment through the European Development Fund (EDF), a specific

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

175

support with lethal military equipment is referred to as very important as well (interviews S, U, Y). In sum, the specific missions of the EU and the interregional support to the Malian authorities have contributed significantly to the capacity building of the Malian security forces. However, the Malian government is still not capable to provide a safe environment on its own, in particular in the North (interview S). External Goal Attainment With regard to the level of violence as an indicator for the external goal attainment of the interregional partners, it is important to distinguish between battle-related events of violent action, and violence which specifically affected the civilian population. Overall, it is of particular relevance, in how far the interregional efforts led to a stabilisation of the country and enabled the government and the Malian authorities to regain control over strategic important areas. Whereas we can see an increase of battle-related violence in the beginning of 2013, when the French troops intervened and the AFISMA deployed forces in the country, the partners were not able to decrease intense fighting in the course of the rebellion in 2014 and 2015 (see Fig. 7.3). Overall, the external effectiveness is rather high, since violence against civilians decreased and the fatalities caused by fighting were on a rather low level compared to other conflicts. Overall Degree of Effectiveness of the ECOWAS-EU Engagement in Mali In sum, an empirical analysis of the interregional response to the Mali crisis indicates that the partners have achieved their goals only at a low to medium level. The mandated goals of the partners were successfully achieved in the short term since the partners managed to restore the territorial control over large parts of Mali, made the rebels withdraw and provided for humanitarian assistance, support to Malian authorities, and protection of the population rather fast. In the mid-term, the ongoing fighting in Mali with the spread of Islamist activities throughout the region (interview Y) still constitutes a major threat to the region as a whole. Whereas the threat of an “Afghanistanisation” of Mali seems to have been avoided (Francis, 2013: 13), terrorist activities still remain a challenge in the North of Mali and the border regions in the Sahel. The overarching goals have also only to a low extent been achieved. From an

176

F. PLANK

external perspective on effectiveness, the analysis shows that the partners were able to considerably reduce the level of violence. The engagement was effective, thanks to France’s intervention as rather bilateral external actor and because of the African support to it. However, with regard to the continuation of violence, it was not possible to entirely quell the rebellion. A total containment of the Islamist rebellion, however, might not have been a main objective since the insurgents could spread to other parts of the Sahel region, causing another case of rebellion à la Mali (interview T). The next section will outline how the interregional efforts in response to the Mali crisis worked out in practice and highlight conducive and constraining factors for effective action of the interregional engagement.

Conditions for Effective Interregional Security Cooperation in Response to the Mali Crisis An overall assessment of the effectiveness of the West Africa–EU partnership comes to the conclusion that the cooperation has proven to be effective in terms of ending the perceived threat of an Islamist Mali and both partners managed to meet the mandated goals of the operations to quite some extent in the short term. The external effectiveness was rather high in the short term, while insecurity and a destabilised Northern part of Mali still prevail. However, the overarching goals were achieved to a limited extent. In the following, I will outline conducive and constraining factors for the effectiveness of the interregional engagement while specifically examining the practice of the partnership, e.g. how the partners interacted with each other. Conducive Factors to the Effectiveness of the Partners’ Engagement As a major conducive factor to the engagement, the division of labour between the French troops which quickly liberated the areas occupied by the rebellion and the AFISMA mission which secured these areas has proven to be effective. From an operational perspective, this division of labour enabled the French troops to quickly move forward and paved the way for humanitarian assistance (interview Z). With this support and an exertion of pressure on international level, the legal preconditions for the engagement were fairly well developed (interview Z). In general, the EU´s engagement in Mali can be described as an uploading of French national

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

177

interest to the EU institutions which adopted the rather military-focused approach of France (see Olsen, Chapter 4). In sum, the EU’s approach to the crisis constitutes a rare example of a comprehensive engagement with the use of a wide range of crisis management tools including humanitarian aid, a civilian mission, a training mission and interregional support and coordination. The fact that 23 EU member states participated in the EUTM clearly shows their convergent preferences (Furness & Olsen, 2016: 113). Moreover, the EU support included a wide range of diplomatic activities such as moral, encouragement and technical measures which have been referred to as important as well (interview Z). Despite the fact that the EU’s notion of security is linked to migration at present time (interviews R, Y), the convergence of the profiles of the ECOWAS on the one hand and the EU on the other hand is rather high. Both partners have developed mutual understandings of how to engage with a security challenge such as in Mali (interview Y). Generally speaking, a division of labour as it occurred in Mali, which has been further developed in the response to the 2013 crisis in the Central African Republic (Furness & Olsen, 2016; Plank, 2017: 498), has proven to enable effective interregional crisis management. A growing convergence of the partners has been particularly achieved through intense contacts between staff from both organisations both in terms of quantity and quality. Also, the coherence both within the EU and within the ECOWAS, e.g. regarding the involvement of EU and ECOWAS member states, is remarkable. The AFISMA mission was composed of forces from 13 ECOWAS member states which has been referred to as a success by its own (interview Y). Overall, the intense contacts between the interregional partners have substantially increased the convergence of their profiles and the willingness of their member states to engage in crisis management. This is also related to the common perception of security threats. The Mali case has paved the way for two developments regarding interregional cooperation in conflict management more generally: a division of labour between the partners on the ground and the development of bridging missions. The latter refers to an initial deployment of an African-led operation which is then transferred to an UN-led mission. While the latter has been adapted in other cases such as the CAR and might serve as a model for future engagements (interviews Q, S), it has nevertheless also quite substantial negative consequences. In Mali, among other conditions, the transfer to the UN-led MINUSMA constrained the effectiveness of the efforts of the interregional engagement.

178

F. PLANK

Constraining Factors for the Effectiveness of the Crisis Management in Mali The study also indicates that in particular three conditions constrained effective interregional cooperation: (1) the capacity of the African partners (2) an ill-developed resource exchange (3) and paucity in the coordination both among interregional and regional partners. While the ECOWAS has been referred to as an organisation with huge ambitions in peace and security and with well-developed mechanisms to crisis management (interviews R, X), ECOWAS decision-makers emphasise that the lack of a political framework, e.g. a common understanding by both the ECOWAS and the external actors, constituted a constraining factor for the effectiveness of the efforts in the context of the Mali intervention (interviews Y, Z). Moreover, the organisation still has problems with regard to its personnel (Piccolino & Minou, 2014: 24). The lack of a framework for managing EU funding is also a constraining factor which made the EU send experts in order to train ECOWAS staff in managing these funds (interview Z). From an operational perspective, the logistic bases of the ECOWAS were not operational at the time of the intervention which is why the AFISMA troops had to rely on airlifts provided by the EU and the US (interview Z). In general, the AFISMA operations also clearly showed weaknesses of the ECOWAS member states and the regional deployment mechanisms, namely with regard to the equipment of the troops which heavily relied on external provision of support. The ECOWAS troops were ill-equipped in a general sense (interview I) and there has been a lack of fundamental resources such as food, water, shoes or standard military equipment (interviews Q, Y). The criticism of the role of President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, who was in charge of mediation efforts between the rebels and the government in Bamako, has also been referred to as underlying challenge for intra-institutional coordination efforts (Bergamaschi, 2013: 5). In sum, the Mali case highlighted some of the shortcomings of the ECOWAS (Maiangwa, 2017: 104) and the French intervention has been referred to as clear sign of these shortcomings (interview V). As second constraining factor hampering the effectiveness of the interregional efforts is the inadequate resource exchange in the context of the Mali engagement in particular with regard to the lack of equipment of the AFISMA troops. In this regard, an effective interregional cooperation would have been particularly dependent on resource exchange enabling

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

179

the African forces to combat. Although the EU provided funding for AFISMA, this support has been described as minor and the troopcontributing countries had to finance the operation to a great extent on their own and/or received the funds very late (interview V), which is also related to discrepancies between the AU and the ECOWAS. In general, the paucity of resources has been a major challenge throughout the engagement (interview Z), regardless of research having highlighted the importance of resource exchange between partners as major condition for effective interregional security cooperation (Motsamai & Brosig, 2014; Plank, 2017). There was an absence of appropriate mission support which led to the mission being supported by the US via depots in Freetown, Sierra Leone (interview Z). Finally, the handover to the UN was in particular driven by funding issues—which decreases the likelihood of effective action since the UN is not capable to conduct peace enforcement (interviews P, Y). The idea of an African bridging mission for a (subsequent) UN-engagement roots in inadequate funding conditions while an objective of troop-contributing countries is to receive financial support. Repeatedly, the troop contribution has been referred to as business activity (interview P). The transfer to the UN, however, is said to have led to serious problems of the mission, namely that the forces were preoccupied with self-protection activities (interview Y). A third main constraining factor for the effectiveness of the interregional efforts constitutes the lack of regional and region-to-region coordination. In particular the discrepancies or rivalries between the AU and the ECOWAS over the lead in Mali hampered a coordinated response. Double structures such as Special Representatives (interview Y) and an unclear distribution of competences, which also seriously shaped the funding processes, had direct effect on the capacities of the troops (interviews V, Z). In addition, the Malian authorities’ reluctance to accept an external interference, which blocked ECOWAS´ military efforts for a long time, has been referred to as coordination challenge as well (interview Z). The operational coordination was dominated by France as an external actor. In particular in the beginning of the intervention, the Chadian and French troops did merely act without consultation of the AFISMA troops, and it took some time and direct interference by highranked ECOWAS staff to provide at least for liaison officers and access to information (interview Z). In sum, the engagement in Mali has shown several constraining factors which hampered its effectiveness to a considerable degree. The practice of

180

F. PLANK

interregional cooperation, which is to a great extent implemented within the Delegations and the day-to-day exchanges in Abuja, Addis Ababa and Brussels is hampered by particular interest as well as intra-regional contestation which has been described as “subordination” rather than “substitution” (interview Z). General problems in the implementation of the APSA constitute challenges for the Africa–EU partnership as a whole. But also from a Brussels’ perspective it became quite evident that the interregional response to the Mali crisis had limitations in terms of effectiveness due to inadequate funding by the EU and severe difficulties in the resource exchange of the partners.

Conclusion This study has examined the ECOWAS-EU engagement in response to the Mali crisis and addressed the question of how external actors and regional organisations interact with each other and how this interaction impacts the effectiveness of the partnership. With regard to the practice of region-to-region cooperation I have shown that in particular informal contacts and day-to-day interaction constitute the main avenues of cooperation (see also Plank & Niemann, 2017). In specific operations such as in Mali does a lack of coordination and the use of these informal channels, such as operational exchange and resource provision, shape the effectiveness of the actions. Whereas the mandated goals of the engagement in Mali have been achieved to a great extent and the partners were able to address the violence and the Islamist threat quite successful, the overall effectiveness of the efforts has remained on a low to middle level. This is particularly evident with regard to a mid- to long-term evaluation. Problems in coordination, resource exchange and regional capacity had a negative effect on the performance of the partners, despite a high convergence of their profiles and a remarkable coherence of the interregional actors. In fact, the latter point to a decreasing asymmetry in security issues as specific objective of interregional relations (interviews E, F). The fact that Northern Mali still faces security challenges which threaten the entire region roots also in the described problems of the interregional intervention, especially in the context of an increased engagement of EU member state and the shortcomings of the MINUSMA mission. Theoretically, the analysis has shown that factors such as resource exchange, coherence as well as coordination processes might constitute conducive conditions for effective interregional interaction. In addition, potentially

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

181

constraining factors such as the (insufficient) capacities of the partners, an ill-developed resource exchange between them, and paucity of coordination both among external actors and regional partners might be relevant for donors, decision-makers and scholars interested in external actors and interregional relations. As such, taking account of theoretical assumptions provided by inter-organisational research (Biermann, 2011; Koops, 2017; Motsamai & Brosig, 2014; Plank, 2017) might constitute a fruitful path for a conceptualisation of how interregional relations work in practice. This study has been a first attempt to link two strands of literature that barely speak to each other in this regard.

References Acharya, A. (2014). Global international relations (IR) and regional worlds: A new agenda for international studies. International Studies Quarterly, 58(4), 647–659. Acharya, A., & Johnston, A. I. (Eds.). (2007). Crafting cooperation: Regional international institutions in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press. Aggarwal, V. K., & Kwei, E. (2006). Asia-Pacific economic cooperation (APEC): Transregionalism with a new cause? In H. Hänggi, R. Roloff, & J. Rüland (Eds.), Interregionalism and international relations (pp. 67–84). Routledge. Ajala, A. (1973). Pan-Africanism: Evolution, progress and prospects. A. Deutsch. Baert, F., Scaramagli, T., & Söderbaum, F. (Eds.). (2014). Intersecting interregionalism: Regions, global governance and the EU . Springer. Bagoyoko, N., & Gibert, M. V. (2009). The linkage between security, governance and development: The European Union in Africa. Journal of Development Studies, 45(5), 789–814. Bergamaschi, I. (2013). French military intervention in Mali: Inevitable, consensual yet insufficient. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 2(2), 1–11. Bergmann, J., & Niemann, A. (2015). Mediating international conflicts: The European Union as an effective peacemaker? Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(5), 957–975. Biermann, R. (2011). Inter-organizational relations: An emerging research program. In B. Reinalda (Ed.), The Ashgate research companion to non-state actors (pp. 173–184). Ashgate. Biermann, R., & Koops, J. (2017). Studying relations among international organizations in wold politics: Core concepts and challenges. In J. Koops & R. Biermann (Eds.), Palgrave handbook of inter-organizational relations in world politics (pp. 1–46). Palgrave Macmillan.

182

F. PLANK

Boeke, S., & Schuurman, B. (2015). Operation ‘serval’: A strategic analysis of the French intervention in Mali, 2013–2014. Journal of Strategic Studies, 38(6), 801–825. Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (Eds.). (2016). The Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism. Oxford University Press. Brosig, M. (2011). The emerging peace and security regime in Africa: The role of the EU. European Foreign Affairs Review, 16(1), 107–122. Camroux, D. (2011). Interregionalism, a critique: The four levels of EU-ASEAN relations. In A. Warleigh, N. Robinson, & B. Rosamond (Eds.), New regionalism and the European Union: Dialogues, comparisons and new research directions (pp. 201–217). Routledge. Carbone, M. (2013a). EU-Africa relations in the twenty-first century: Evolution and explanations. In M. Carbone (Ed.), The European Union in Africa: Incoherent policies, asymmetrical partnership, declining relevance? (pp. 3–23). Manchester University Press. Carbone, M. (Ed.). (2013b). The European Union in Africa: Incoherent policies, asymmetrical partnership, declining relevance? Manchester University Press. Ceccorulli, M., & Fanta, E. (2013). The EU and multilateral governance of migration in North and West Africa. In S. Lucarelli, L. van Langenhove, & J. Wouters (Eds.), The EU and multilateral security governance (pp. 165–183). Routledge. Davis, L. (2015). Reform or business as usual? EU security provision in complex contexts: Mali. Global Society, 29(5), 260–279. Diehl, P. F. (1994). International peacekeeping: With a new epilogue on Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia. Johns Hopkins University Press. Doidge, M. (2007). Joined at the hip: Regionalism and interregionalism. Journal of European Integration, 29(2), 229–248. Doidge, M. (2009). European Union interregionalism and the capabilityexpectations gap. Asia-Pacific Journal of EU Studies, 7 (1), 1–18. Doidge, M. (2011). The European Union and interregionalism: Patterns of engagement. Ashgate. Doidge, M. (2014). Interregionalism and the European Union: Conceptualising group-to-group relations. In F. Baert, T. Scaramagli, & F. Söderbaum (Eds.), Intersecting interregionalism: Regions, global governance and the EU (pp. 37– 54). Springer. ECOWAS. (2012). Emergency mini-summit of ECOWAS heads of state and government on the situation in Mali. http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/reports/communiques/ emergency_mini-summit_of_ecowas_heads_of_state_and_government/com final_mali_2012.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2021.

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

183

European Commission. (2014). European Union—West Africa regional indicative programme 2014—2020. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/ files/eeas-2015-rip-west-africa_en.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2021. European Union. (2005). EU strategy for Africa. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0489&from=EN. Accessed 20 September 2021. European Union (EU), and African Union (AU). (2007a). Joint Africa EU strategy: First joint action plan (2008–2010). http://www.africa-eu-partne rship.org/sites/default/files/documents/jaes_action_plan_2008-2010.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2021. European Union (EU), and African Union (AU). (2007b). The Africa-EU strategic partnership. http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/ files/documents/eas2007b_joint_strategy_en.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2021. Farrell, M. (2009). EU policy towards other regions: Policy learning in the external promotion of regional integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 16(8), 1165–1184. Farrell, M. (2010). From Lomé to economic partnership agreements in Africa. In F. Söderbaum & P. Stålgren (Eds.), The European Union and the Global South (pp. 65–88). Lynne Rienner Publishers. Fawn, R. (2009). Regions’ and their study: Wherefrom, what for and whereto? Review of International Studies, 35(S1), 5. Ferabolli, S. (2016). Regions that matter: The Arab-South American interregional space. Third World Quarterly, 38(8), 1–15. Fioramonti, L., & Kotsopoulos, J. (2015). EU-Africa interregional relations and the role of South Africa. In M. Telò, L. L’Estrange Fawcett, & F. Ponjaert (Eds.), Interregionalism and the European Union: A post-revisionist approach to Europe’s place in a changing world (pp. 325–336). Ashgate. Fioramonti, L., & Nshimbi, C. (2016). Regional migration governance in the African continent: Current state of affairs and the way forward. Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden. http://www.sef-bonn.org/fileadmin/Die_SEF/ Publikationen/SB/sb_studie-2016_en.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2021. Francis, D. J. (2009). Peacekeeping in a bad neighbourhood: The economic community of West African states (ECOWAS) in peace and security in West Africa. African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 9(3), 87–116. Francis, D. J. (2013). The regional impact of the armed conflict and French intervention in Mali (NOREF Report). Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/163177/f18726c3338e390 49bd4d554d4a22c36.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2021. Furness, M., & Gänzle, S. (2017). The security-development nexus in European Union foreign relations after Lisbon: Policy coherence at last? Development Policy Review, 35(4), 475–492.

184

F. PLANK

Furness, M., & Olsen, G. R. (2016). Europeanisation and the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis management in Africa. European Politics and Society, 17 (1), 105–119. Haastrup, T. (2009). A security actor in a changing world? The EU in Africa. In F. Laursen (Ed.), The EU as a foreign and security policy actor (pp. 281–298). Republic of Letters. Haastrup, T. (2013a). Africa-EU partnership on peace and security. In J. Mangala (Ed.), Africa and the European Union a strategic partnership (pp. 47–68). Palgrave Macmillan. Haastrup, T. (2013b). Charting transformation through security: contemporary EU-Africa relations. Palgrave Macmillan. Haastrup, T. (2013c). EU as mentor? Promoting regionalism as external relations practice in EU–Africa relations. Journal of European Integration, 35(7), 785– 800. Hänggi, H. (2006). Interregionalism as a multifaceted phenomenon: In search of a typology. In H. Hänggi, R. Roloff, & J. Rüland (Eds.), Interregionalism and international relations (pp. 31–62). Routledge. Hänggi, H., Roloff, R., & Rüland, J. (Eds.). (2006). Interregionalism and international relations. Routledge. Henneberg, I., & Plank, F. (2020). Overlapping regionalism and security cooperation: Power-based explanations of Nigeria’s forum-shopping in the fight against Boko Haram. International Studies Review, 22(3), 576–599. Katzenstein, P. J. (2005). A world of regions: Asia and Europe in the American imperium: Cornell studies in political economy. Cornell University Press. Kingah, S. (2006). The revised cotonou agreement between the European Community and the African, Caribbean and Pacific States: Innovations on security, political dialogue, transparency, money and social responsibility, Journal of African Law, 50(1), 59–71. Koops, J. (2017). Inter-organizationalism in international relations: A multilevel framework for analysis. In R. Biermann & J. Koops (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of inter-organizational relations in world politics (pp. 189–216). Palgrave Macmillan. Lavallée, C., & Völkel, J. C. (2015). Military in Mali: The EU’s action against instability in the Sahel region. European Foreign Affairs Review, 20(2), 159– 185. Lopez-Lucia, E. (2012). A tool for security governance: How is the EU fostering and shaping ECOWAS security and defence regionalization process? (17. GR:EEN Working Paper). http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/ green/papers/workingpapers/no.17_lopez_lucia.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2021.

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

185

Maiangwa, B. (2017). Assessing the responses of the economic community of West African states to the recurring and emerging security threats in West Africa. Journal of Asian and African Studies, 52(1), 103–120. Mangala, J. (2013a). Africa and the European Union A strategic partnership. Palgrave Macmillan. Mangala, J. (2013b). Africa-EU strategic partnership: Historical background, institutional architecture, and theoretical frameworks. In J. Mangala (Ed.), Africa and the European Union a strategic partnership (pp. 15–45). Palgrave Macmillan. Marchi, L. (2016). The EU’s role in developing security cooperation with Myanmar at the ASEAN regional forum: 2004–2008. European Security, 25(2), 197–215. Motsamai, D., & Brosig, M. (2014). Modeling cooperative peacekeeping: Exchange theory and the African peace and security regime. Journal of International Peacekeeping, 18(1–2), 45–68. Muntschick, J. (2018). The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the European Union (EU): Regionalism and external influence. Palgrave. Nivet, B. (2006). Security by proxy? The EU and (sub- )regional organisations : The case of ECOWAS. European Union Institute for Security Studies. Oberthür, S., & Groen, L. (2015). The effectiveness dimension of the EU’s performance in international institutions: Toward a more comprehensive assessment framework. Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(6), 1319– 1335. Okemuo, G. (2013). The EU or France? The CSDP mission in Mali the consistency of the EU Africa policy. Liverpool Law Review, 34(3), 217–240. Olsen, G. R. (2006). The post September 2001 security agenda: Have the European Union’s policies towards Africa been affected? In G. Bono (Ed.), The impact of 9/11 on European foreign and security policy (pp. 153–176). Brussels University Press. Olsen, G. R. (2014). Fighting terrorism in Africa by proxy: The USA and the European Union in Somalia and Mali. European Security, 23(3), 290–306. Peen Rodt, A. (2014). The European Union and military conflict management: Defining, evaluating and achieving success. Routledge. Piccolino, G., & Minou, S. (2014). The EU and regional integration in West Africa: What effects on conflict resolution and transformation? (Regionconf Working Paper Series 5). http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/index.php?eID= tx_nawsecuredl&u=0&g=0&t=1421492121&hash=d37e60959a972b1569 ba15bbc5803851e0973fe1&file=fileadmin/Uni_Tuebingen/Fakultaeten/Soz ialVerhalten/Institut_fuer_Politikwissenschaft/Dokumente/diez/Projekte_ Diez_RegioConf/Pretoria_Feb14_final.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2021.

186

F. PLANK

Plank, F. (2017). The effectiveness of interregional security cooperation: Evaluating the joint engagement of the EU and the AU in response to the 2013 crisis in the Central African Republic. European Security, 26(4), 485–506. Plank, F., & Niemann, A. (2017). Impact of the agent’s environment on discretion in the field of EU conflict resolution. In T. Delreux & J. Adriaensen (Eds.), The prinicipal-agent model and the European Union (pp. 131–156). Palgrave. Raineri, L., & Rossi, A. (2017). The security-migration-development nexus in the Sahel: A reality check (IAI Working Papers 17). Istituto Affari Internazionali. http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1726.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2021. Rein, C. (2015). Enhancing peace and security in Africa through institutional cooperation. Contemporary Security Policy, 36(2), 267–295. Reuters. (2013). Mali Islamists suffer split as Africans prepare assault. https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-rebels/mali-islamists-suffer-split-as-africansprepare-assault-idUSBRE90M16T20130124. Accessed 20 September 2021. Ribeiro Hoffmann, A. (2016). Inter- and transregionalism. In T. A. Börzel & T. Risse (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism (pp. 600–618). Oxford University Press. Robles, A. C. (2008). The Asia-Europe meeting (ASEM): The theory and practice of interregionalism. Routledge. Rodt, A. P., & Okeke, J. M. (2013). AU-EU ‘strategic partnership’: Strengthening policy convergence and regime efficacy in the African peace and security complex? African Security, 6(3–4), 211–233. Roloff, R. (2006). Interregionalism in theoretical perspective: State of the art. In H. Hänggi, R. Roloff, & J. Rüland (Eds.), Interregionalism and international relations (pp. 17–30). Routledge. Rüland, J. (2002, July 5–6). Inter- and transregionalism: Remarks on the state of the art of a new research agenda. Paper presented at the Workshop on Asia-Pacific Studies in Australia and Europe: A Research Agenda for the Future. https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstr eam/1885/41664/3/ruland2.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2021. Rüland, J. (2010). Balancers, multilateral utilities or regional identity builders? International relations and the study of interregionalism. Journal of European Public Policy, 17 (8), 1271–1283. Rüland, J., Schubert, G., Schucher, G., & Storz, C. (Eds.). (2008). AsianEuropean relations: Building blocks for global governance? Routledge. Shu, M. (2015). Countering terrorism: Challenges and opportunities in ASEANEU cooperation. In M. Telò, L. L’Estrange Fawcett, & F. Ponjaert (Eds.), Interregionalism and the European Union: A post-revisionist approach to Europe’s place in a changing world (pp. 87–108). Ashgate.

7

EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ECOWAS–EU …

187

Skeppström, E., Hull Wiklund, C., & Jonsson, M. (2015). European Union training missions: Security sector reform or counter-insurgency by proxy? European Security, 24(2), 353–367. Söderbaum, F. (2016). Rethinking regionalism. Palgrave. Söderbaum, F., & Stålgren, P. (2010). The limits to interregional development cooperation in Africa. In F. Söderbaum & P. Stålgren (Eds.), The European Union and the Global South (pp. 141–158). Lynne Rienner Publishers. Söderbaum, F., Stålgren, P., & Van Langenhove, L. (2005). The EU as a global actor and the dynamics of interregionalism: A comparative analysis. Journal of European Integration, 27 (3), 365–380. Staeger, U. (2016). Africa-EU relations and normative power Europe: A decolonial pan-African critique: Africa-EU relations and NPE. Journal of Common Market Studies, 54(4), 981–998. Telò, M. (2015). Three reasons for reasserting the autonomy of a regionalist and interregionalist research agenda. In M. Telò, L. Fawcett, & F. Ponjaert (Eds.), Interregionalism and the European Union: A post-revisionist approach to Europe’s place in a changing world (pp. 67–83). Ashgate. Telò, M., Fawcett, L., & Ponjaert, F. (Eds.). (2015). Interregionalism and the European Union: A post-revisionist approach to Europe’s place in a changing world. Ashgate. ThisDay. (2013, January 17). Nigeria: Air force sends war planes to Mali Thursday. https://allafrica.com/stories/201301170615.html Thompson, V. B. (1969). Africa and unity: The evolution of Pan-Africanism. Longmans. United Nations. (2012). Security council resolution 2086 10 January 2013. http://www.un.org/press/en/2012/sc10870.doc.htm. Accessed 20 September 2021. Van Langenhove, L., Abass, A., & Baert, F. (2012). The EU as a globalregional actor in security and peace (The EU-GRASP Final Integrative Report). UNU-CRIS. http://i.unu.edu/media/unu.edu/publication/ 27154/Final-Integrative-Report3.pdf. Accessed 20 September 2021. Walraven, K. V. (1999). Dreams of power: The role of the organization of African unity in the politics of Africa, 1963–1993. Ashgate. Williams, P. D. (2014). Reflections on the evolving African peace and security architecture. African Security, 7 (3), 147–162. Young, O. R. (1994). International governance: Protecting the environment in a stateless society. Cornell University Press.

188

F. PLANK

Interviews (Interview Number; Function Interviewee; Location and Date) Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview 2017. Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview Interview

A—EU member state representative6 , Brussels, 12 October 2015. B—EU member state representative, Brussels, 12 October 2015. C—EU official, Brussels, 13 October 2015. D—EU official, Brussels, 13 October 2015. E—EU member state representative, Brussels, 14 October 2015. F—EU official, Brussels, 14 October 2015. H—EU official, Telephone, 27 November 2015. I—EU member state representative, Cologne, 19 January 2017. J—African member state representative, Nairobi, 22 February 2017. K—African member state representative, Addis Ababa, 27 February L—AU partner representative, Addis Ababa, 28 February 2017. M—EU member state representative, Addis Ababa, 2 March 2017. N—EU official, Addis Ababa, 7 March 2017. O—EU official, Addis Ababa, 7 March 2017. P—EU official, Addis Ababa, 8 March 2017. Q—UN official, Addis Ababa, 8 March 2017. R—AU official, Addis Ababa, 9 March 2017. S—EU member state representative, Addis Ababa, 10 March 2017. T—African member state representative, Abuja, 24 May 2017. U—EU official, Abuja, 25 May 2017. V—ECOWAS partner representative, Abuja, 26 May 2017. W—Independent expert, Abuja, 30 May 2017. X—EU official, Abuja, 1 June 2017. Y—ECOWAS official, Abuja, 2 June 2017. Z—ECOWAS official, Telephone, 24 June 2017.

CHAPTER 8

Causes and Effects of External Support to Regional Organisations: The Case of EU Support to the ECOWAS Commission in Customs and Free Movement Lukas Maximilian Müller

Introduction As the literature on the influence of external actors on global regionalism grows, certain types of external influence gained more attention than others. Research exists on the trade policies of external actors and their effects on regional integration (Hulse, 2016; Krapohl & Muntschick, 2009; Muntschick, 2016). Various studies have investigated external partners’ contributions to peacekeeping and security in Africa (Brosig, 2010; Klingebiel et al., 2008; Vines, 2013). One type of external partner influence that has remained conspicuously absent from the research, however, is the provision of support to distinctive regional institutions by external

L. M. Müller (B) Caritas Germany, Abuja, Nigeria e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. Muntschick (ed.), Regionalism in Africa and External Partners, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10702-3_8

189

190

L. M. MÜLLER

actors. The European Union (EU) and other actors provide for development projects that directly support the functioning of and reforms within regional organisations (ROs) across the world (see also Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3), targeting specific organisational structures within ROs. Despite frequent calls to investigate these programs more closely (Schulz & Lombaerde, 2009b), they remain generally uninvestigated. This is due to the technical nature of these development programs as well as our lack of knowledge about what specific parts of the ROs they actually target. The majority of ROs in the Global South, notably in Africa, remain black-boxed in most comparative regionalism studies. Regional parliaments, courts of justice and secretariats across Africa tend to feature in most studies in a perfunctory fashion, information on them usually restricted to their roles as mandated within treaties. This is most clearly the case for regional public administrations such as RO secretariats and commissions. Regional courts of justice attract attention (Alter et al., 2013; Staden, 2016) through their provision of case information and judgment, and regional parliaments attract attention (Alumona & Azom, 2019; Costa et al., 2013; Ogbonnaya & Ogujiuba, 2015) through open sessions, their relationships to the electorate, and inter-parliamentary cooperation. Regional public administrations, meanwhile, are usually the least visible regional institutions to observers and analysts. This is a major research gap, as regional public administrations are a key structure of all ROs on the African continent. They are also frequently the primary recipients of the institutional support provided by external actors. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is widely considered as one of the institutionally most highly developed regional organisations in the world. The ECOWAS Commission, as its regional public administration, is endowed with significant funds and a supranational mandate to match. Nonetheless, the organisation has seen the provision of significant external institutional support, primarily from the EU. This contribution focuses on the activities of the ECOWAS Commission in the areas of Customs and Migration and addresses the causes as well as the intended and unintended consequences of EU institutional support in these areas. Taking an inter-organisational approach, I will highlight the logics of resource dependence and transaction cost that underlie the relationship between the ECOWAS Commission and the EU.

8

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL …

191

Regional Public Administrations and Institutional Support---Two Neglected Phenomena Most of the research on external support to regional organisations in the Global South—including Africa—has taken an EU-centric approach. Studies in the field of comparative regionalism tend to be mainly concerned with the effects that external actors have on regionalism (Börzel, 2016) rather than the mechanisms. Many studies subscribe to the premise that regional organisations tend to structurally converge with the EU over time (Jetschke & Lenz, 2012; Lenz, 2012). External institutional support is frequently referred to as a potential driver of EU external influence on other regional organisations (Jetschke, 2013; Schulz & Lombaerde, 2009c). While some studies have theorised causal processes of how external support may impact ROs (Duina & Lenz, 2016; Lenz, 2012), there is a notable lack of empirical studies illustrating the mechanisms through which this external support is received by ROs and how it actually impacts them. Studies on external support from a bottom-up perspective are still largely missing in the field. The prevailing focus on the supply side of external support to regionalism hinges on the fact that information is more easily obtainable from the EU side than from the counterpart organisations. This relates to another significant issue: We know little about how the international organisations in Africa actually operate. Scholarly research on regionalism in Africa and the Global South still mainly emphasises its intergovernmental dimension, neglecting the international organisations that many ROs have actually set up (Gray, 2018). In addition, most research on ROs in Africa and their constituent regional institutions focuses very strongly on formal mandates. This is problematic, because information on these organisations’ activities is scarce and often outdated. In addition, existing studies have highlighted significant differences between formal mandates and the actual functioning of regional organisations (Mair, 2001; Tieku, 2017; Vinokurov & Libman, 2017). Taken together, this leaves us with two significant research gaps in comparative regionalism and the impact of external partners: (1) the role of distinctive regional institutions as recipients of external institutional support, (2) de-facto organisational functioning and the effect of external support programs on regional governance. A better understanding of these two features should have positive repercussions for the study of comparative regionalism. First of all, it should permit a

192

L. M. MÜLLER

more nuanced understanding of ROs in Africa, which are often treated as conceptually ambiguous entities consisting of intergovernmental and supranational dimensions. Secondly, knowledge of RO functioning should also contribute to the emerging research agenda on funding of ROs in the Global South. African ROs derive significant chunks of their revenue from external support programs (see Stapel & Söderbaum, Chapter 3). The intended and unintended consequences of this support remain underinvestigated. The investigation of external institutional support programs would also contribute to the study of interregionalism. This field is primarily concerned with the forms and functions of interaction between ROs (Hänggi et al., 2006). In the past years, however, there has been a pervasive view in the field that interregional relationships have overall failed to meet the observers’ expectations (Baert et al., 2014; Camroux, 2010; Doidge, 2011). The disappointing dividends resulting from high-level interregionalism have been attributed to a lack of actorness on the side of the Southern partners (Fehrmann, 2014)—or at least to the significant asymmetry between the degree of actorness of the EU and its interregional partners (Doidge, 2011; Hulse, 2016). Doidge (2011) has highlighted that cases of persistently low actorness of ROs in the Global South gave rise to what he calls “capacity-building interregionalism”, which is characterised by external actors’ efforts to strengthen organisations through institutional support programs. Since Doidge’s study, however, more recent interregionalism research has continued to conduct research focused on the concept of actorness, generally arriving at similar conclusions that have already been reached more than ten years before. This focus on high-level declaratory cooperation, namely Free Trade Areas (FTAs) and other political agreements, is at odds with the reality of interregional cooperation. In fact, the most frequent interactions between the EU and other regional organisations do not occur at high political levels resulting in agreements on economic and political cooperation, but instead take the shape of institutional support programs. These mainly involve various regional institutional entities, most frequently the EU Commission on one side and regional public administrations such as the ECOWAS Commission on the other. Besides some efforts to more deeply investigate these attempts to build RO capacity (Schulz & Lombaerde, 2009a), empirical investigations of interregional institutional support remain scarce. We continue to lack empirical knowledge on whether institutional support by the EU or other

8

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL …

193

actors truly strengthens the actorness of ROs in Africa. We also do not fully understand the impact of these programs on the functioning of ROs more generally, such as how they strengthen regional public administrations vis-à-vis their member states, for instance. Providing this knowledge would enrich research on interregionalism in various ways. Fundamentally, it should revive a research agenda that has come to be seen as overly limited in its scope and methods. Opening up the research agenda to distinctive regional institutions and institutional support programs would widen the understanding of interregionalism and go beyond the limiting actorness paradigm. It appears as if comparative regionalism and interregionalism may converge around very similar issues: What is the agency of distinctive regional institutions in external partner relations? What is the effect of external institutional support on these institutions?

Why Do Regional Institutions Accept External Institutional Support---An Inter-Organisational Approach Despite attempts to theorise why external support is provided and how it may affect organisations (Börzel & Risse, 2009; Duina & Lenz, 2016), comparative regionalism and interregionalism still lack the tools to explain why regional organisations accept programs and their conditions. To explain this, inter-organisational theory provides a theoretical approach that is mindful of the interaction between organisations as self-directed agents. Inter-organisational theory has emerged as a rather recent research program in international relations (Biermann, 2011; Franke, 2017). The theoretical strand can highlight relationships between different organisational entities, explain what relationships matter, how and why they are created, and why they persist. This study grounds its analysis on two theoretical propositions of interorganisational theory, which is (1) the impact of resource dependence on the relations between organisations and (2) the existence of transaction costs that are managed within these relationships. The first theoretical proposition is that interregionalism follows the logic of resource dependence of the South on the EU or other external partners, which operates as a scope condition for external institutional support. The second proposition is that interregionalism follows a transaction cost logic, which

194

L. M. MÜLLER

means that organisations seek to externalise the costs of certain activities. By this token, ROs in the Global South—including Africa—engage in interregionalism to externalise costs for activities for which there is insufficient regional desire or need. Thus, external institutional support programs are vehicles for ROs to conduct activities for which external actors bear the costs.

Resource Dependence Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) suggests that power accrues to those who control resources that are needed by an organisation, creating asymmetries between both actors. According to this logic, interregional relationships emerge because each partner pursues resources that can only be attained by interacting with external actors. Past studies have already identified resource dependence as a key explanatory variable in the interaction between regional organisations (Brosig, 2011; Franke, 2017). By this token, the intensity of institutional cooperation is tied to the level of resource dependence of one or both actors involved in the relationship. Since resource dependence is asymmetrical by nature, it enables one actor to exert power in the relationship by attaching conditions to the resources that it provides. In this work, resource dependence is seen as a scope condition, required for external institutional support programs to emerge in interregional relationships characterised by resource asymmetries. Resource dependence applies to institutional support to ROs as follows: The modest nature of RO budgets in Africa and the Global South forces organisations to engage with external partners to mobilise resources for their functioning. This particularly applies to regional public administrations, whose mandates tend not to be matched by adequate budgets. While resources are primarily financial, they may also include knowledge resources such as particular policy expertise or technical assistance. The RO institutions may make different choices regarding which external partners to draw resources from, as different regions see different external partners being engaged at different intensities. Due to the emergence of new external players on the African continent, ROs have seen the number of potential partners increase over the past years. The United States under Barack Obama, for example, has been a significant supporter of African regionalism and regional institutions, as well as China under Xi Jinping.

8

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL …

195

The concept of resource dependence itself only leads up to the explanation of why institutional support programs may be accepted by ROs. To get a full explanation of why programs are accepted and under which conditions, it is necessary to consider the concept of transaction cost.

Transaction Cost The logic of transaction cost is concerned with the cost of providing a good or a service using internal or external mechanisms of procurement. Transaction cost theory provides an explanation for why organisations exist and why they outsource activities (Ketokivi & Mahoney, 2017). According to Coase (1992), organisations emerge in order to reduce transaction costs and will expand as long as the organisation’s activities can be performed at lesser costs within the organisation than by conducting activities using external providers. Through the lens of transaction cost, regional institutions, including regional public administrations, may be seen as entities created with the aim of reducing policy-related transaction costs, solving collective action problems for their member states. Transferred to the context of ROs, the theory suggests that activities may be conducted and funded by organisations themselves while others may be provided through external agents. External institutional support is one way to externalise transaction costs of regional policies to actors outside the region. From the RO’s perspective, activities may be conducted at little or no cost by outsourcing them to external agents. Regional public administrations may then act as arbiters of regional goods provision through inter-organisational relationships. In the absence of external partners bearing transaction costs, we would expect ROs to either have to bear higher transaction costs or to conduct fewer activities (Fig. 8.1).

Support to Regional Public Administrations---A Global Phenomenon African ROs vary widely in power, autonomy, and capacity of their regional institutions. This is also true for regional public administrations, which vary significantly across the continent (Hooghe et al., 2017). What unites most regional public administrations is that they rely, to different degrees, on external partnerships to fund their activities and programs (see

196

L. M. MÜLLER

Fig. 8.1 Causal model underlying exchange of external institutional support

Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3). Because of the developmental character of many ROs in Africa and the central role that they play in processes of regional coordination, secretariats and commissions are the organisational units where influence by external actors may be most concentrated within ROs (Engel, 2017). All significant regional institutions on the African continent, such as the African Union (AU) and the ECOWAS Commission, as well as the secretariats of the East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) have received substantial institutional support. Despite a general trend towards a diversification of actors in African development funding (Greenhill et al., 2016), the largest share of external institutional support programs is still provided by the EU and its member states. The EU itself has also acknowledged these institutions as key partners in various regional development programming documents, notably in its Global Strategy of 2016 (European Union, 2016). Institutional support to regional organisations has been a feature of the development cooperation policies of Western countries for more than a decade. The EU has begun to significantly fund regional integration since its 7th European Development Fund (EDF) envelope (Piccolino & Minou, 2014). Still, these programs gained only little attention due to their opacity and their technical nature (exceptional works exist by Pietrangeli (2009) and Martin (2009)). One of the reasons why these

8

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL …

197

programs have not yet been investigated may be because African regional institutions are opaque. A study on the ECOWAS Commission, for instance, notes that information about the activities and structure of the organisation is hard to come by, setting limits to any research targeting this organisation (Gänzle et al., 2018). In addition, due to the developmental context of many African countries, regional support programs may appear less unique in a broader perspective, representing only some development cooperation projects among many. How can we map the significance and proliferation of EU regional integration support across the African continent? For the regional level, the key documents are the Regional Indicative Programs (RIPs), which offer development cooperation guidelines for three African regions, all of which harbour one or several ROs. The funding envelope for the period 2014–2020 has a strong focus on regionalism support as well as regional institutions (Herrero & Gregersen, 2016). This is also visible in the growth of these envelopes between the last funding period and the current one (see Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3) (Table 8.1). The RIPs are not solely tools to provide funding to ROs but the envelopes are also frequently used to disburse funds to the member states of ROs. The RIPs are interesting not just because of their financial content, but also due to the objectives described within them, to which regional public administrations can provide input. The planning documents are negotiated between the European Commission and the regional authorising officers of the African ROs, which are generally the Secretary Generals of the ROs in question (ECOWAS External Table 8.1 Budgets for regional indicative programs (RIPs) by the EU Commission1 Region

Central Africa East Africa, South Africa, Indian Ocean (EA-SA-IO) West Africa

Timeframe 2008–2013

2014–2020

e165 Million e645 Million e597 Million

e350 Million e1332 Million e1150 Million

1 Data retrieved from: European Community (2008a, 2008b, 2008c) and European Union (2015a, 2015b, 2015c).

198

L. M. MÜLLER

Partner, 2017i). Negotiations frequently include regional public administration staff and political appointees such as directors and commissioners. This illustrates that regional public administrations play a very specific role in region-to-region relations, making them less state-centric than the literature suggests. Following the negotiation of the financial envelopes, regional public administrations such as the ECOWAS Commission frequently play a role in implementing the activities agreed upon. It has been noted by other researchers that the negotiation process nonetheless remains heavily EU-centred (Herrero & Gregersen, 2016). Representatives of the EU and ECOWAS themselves, on the other hand, have highlighted that African regional organisations are able to influence priority areas (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017k, 2017n; ECOWAS External Partner, 2017i). In sum, the priorities of the plans should be judged as an amalgamation of preferences of the RO leaderships and those of the EU Commission. From the outside, the RIPs appear fairly generic, with trade facilitation and support to the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) being mentioned in all of them. But many of them contain particularities related to the needs of the region, such as a strong focus on peace and security in the case of the West African RIP. Since EU funding for migration management to Africa has skyrocketed only recently, the RIPs do not include migration as a policy priority, although projects have been launched in some cases, such as in West Africa. The structures, objectives, and support needs of African ROs are vastly different, requiring significant adaption to local conditions. In the following, the reality of external institutional support will be highlighted in the case of the ECOWAS Commission, which should be seen as a critical case to answer the research questions.

The ECOWAS Commission---A Critical Case of External Institutional Support To answer any questions on the role of regional public administrations and external institutional support, ECOWAS is a case that deserves closer attention. This is because of its progress in institution building as well as its funding situation. ECOWAS is known for its successes in regional peacekeeping and conflict prevention (Aning, 2010; Hartmann, 2013; Mair, 2001). Meanwhile, the organisation has also been active in other areas such as trade integration and free movement and migration (Bisong, 2019; Bolarinwa, 2015). Among African regional organisations,

8

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL …

199

ECOWAS is generally considered the most successful regional project as well as the regional economic community with the highest degree of institutionalisation (Hooghe et al., 2017). This also reflects in the institutions that ECOWAS has set up, first and foremost its Commission, which is the second-largest organisational structure in African regionalisms in terms of staff, after the AU Commission. Still, only little research deals with ECOWAS’ regional institutions, with existing studies (Hartmann, 2013; Kufuor, 2006; Mair, 2001) focusing rather on the inter-state dimension of West African regionalism. Specific works on the ECOWAS Commission have been published only over the last few years (Bappah, 2014; Gänzle et al., 2018). Set up in 1975 as an Executive Secretariat, the Commission has since undergone several reforms. The most important one is the transformation into a Commission in 2005, which endowed the organisation with the mandate to initiate its own policies (Hooghe et al., 2017). Beyond agenda-setting and formulation duties, however, the Commission has increasingly begun to act as a supporter in matters of policy implementation, which it does by engaging the member states as a facilitator of trainings, sensitisations and capacity-building activities. This increasing role regarding implementation is driven by a multitude of factors such as a long legacy of non-compliance with various ECOWAS protocols by member states and an increasing demand on the Commission to play a developmental role. External institutional support contributes to this trend by providing the institution with funding for activities. The transformation of the Commission also led to organisational reforms, including horizontal differentiation in its areas of activity, including directorates on humanitarian and social affairs, infrastructure, gender, energy and the private sector. The ECOWAS Commission has over 300 professional staff, distributed across 13 Commissioners’ offices, which are headed by political appointees. Due to contradictory demands of member states, the ECOWAS Commission has been stuck in perpetual reform, which results in the organisation having no official organogram. Another unique feature of ECOWAS and its Commission is its funding mechanism. The entire ECOWAS Community, including its five institutions and ten specialised agencies, is funded by the community levy, which is a 0.5% levy on all imported goods. This funding mechanism has been called a potential blueprint for other African ROs, influencing the AU reforms proposed by Paul Kagame in 2017 (Apiko & Aggad, 2018). ECOWAS does not release a public budget, which makes an

200

L. M. MÜLLER

estimation of the institution’s financial situation reliant on the triangulation of other data sources. The community levy should provide the ECOWAS institutions with a budget of above $300 million per year (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017h). Persistent economic crisis in Nigeria combined with unilateral moves by its government, notably its refusal to apply the levy to petroleum imports as well as a tendency to transfer its contributions late, have led to a significant reduction of both the planned and the actual budgets (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017h). While the 2014 budget was scheduled to reach $294 million, only $145 million were mobilised, due to a lack of community levy payment arrears (ECOWAS Commission, 2016). The budget decreased to a more realistic $161 million in 2016, which still faced significant problems, given a mobilisation rate of 40% after the first half of the year (ECOWAS Commission, 2016). In 2017, the Commission struggled to collect community levies amounting to $86 million (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017h). In 2017, the community levy had only been sufficient to cover 70% of the ECOWAS budget (Chikelu, 2017). The 2016 Financial Controller’s Interim Report, providing the most detailed insights into ECOWAS’ finances, is a telling document regarding ECOWAS’ ability to mobilise the levy, recording mobilisation rates of 62% and 40% in 2015 and 2016. An interview partner confirmed a mobilisation rate of 60% in 2017 (ECOWAS Commission, 2016; ECOWASCommission Official, 2017h). Apart from this, the report also dispels any notions of external institutional support making up for the budget shortfalls. In the 2014, 2015 and 2016 budget years, the partner contributions amount to 6.5%, 9.9% and 7.4%, respectively (ECOWAS Commission, 2016). This was mirrored by interviewees’ statements, which argued that the EU’s funding mechanisms were too arduous and too bureaucratic and that public funding commitments were usually larger than what was actually disbursed (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017f, 2017h). Considering all this, the ECOWAS Commission remains the African RO with the most convincing ability to fund itself. ECOWAS Commission officials are very eager to emphasise the organisation’s financial independence from external partners (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017j, 2017m). Still, its de-facto financial independence in terms of funding programs as opposed to just institutional overhead has been doubted by observers (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017j). It appears as if, when it comes to its policy-relevant activities, the Commission could more

8

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL …

201

heavily rely on partner funds than the figures suggest. This makes it a particularly interesting case study to gain insights regarding the purpose of institutional support programs. Given the information provided on the difficulty of obtaining EU funding and the generally low amount of external funding for organisational overheads, it is unlikely that the Commission accepted institutional support for financial reasons only. The Commission’s mandate and capacity should enable partners to attach to a well-established and functional organisation. This opens the possibility for strengthening existing policy processes rather than establishing new ones. Because of this, the ECOWAS Commission can be categorised as a critical case for the study of external institutional support (Eckstein, 1975; Flyvbjerg, 2006). If the logic of resource dependence and transaction cost applies to an organisation as autonomous as the ECOWAS Commission, less autonomous regional public administrations may act in a similar fashion. The EU institutional support to ECOWAS is large and growing, with the 11th EDF envelope including more and bigger projects than the previous 10th EDF. The ECOWAS–EU relationship, as outlined in the 2014–2020 RIP (European Union, 2015b), focuses on three priority areas as well as one non-focal sector: (1) Peace, security and regional stability, (2) Regional economic integration and support for trade, (3) Resilience, food and nutrition security and natural resources, (4) Institutional support to regional organisations. Support for priority area (1) includes support to the ECOWAS Commission’s peace and security directorates, support for ECOWAS commitments under the African Peace and Security Architecture, as well as the implementation of the ECOWAS Strategy for the Sahel. Priority area (2) focuses, among other things, on the implementation of the ECOWAS–EU Economic Partnership Agreement, the expansion of the common market as well as free movement and right of establishment. Table 8.2 provides an overview of the most significant EU projects with strong involvement of the ECOWAS Commission. Beyond the consolidated programs, the EU also provided ad-hoc support, for instance to the ECOWAS’ peacekeeping missions (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017f). The EU’s institutional support projects are notable for two features: They involve implementation agencies very prominently and they are tied to expectations of cost and activity mainstreaming. The reason for using implementation agencies relates to ECOWAS’ financial management practices, which makes it difficult for the EU to disburse funds

202

L. M. MÜLLER

Table 8.2 EU projects conducted with the ECOWAS Commission in the period of observation Project name

Policy area targeted

Indicative amount

Implementing organisation

Implementation period

EU Support to ECOWAS Regional Peace, Security and Stability Mandate (EU-ECO WAS PSS) Support to ECOWAS Public Finance Management Reforms Support for the Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa (EMM) Promoting West Africa Trade Integration (WATIP)

Peace and Security, Organisational Reform

e27 million

Transtec, UNDP

2016–2019

Organisational Reform

e8.9 million

ECORYS, GOPA

2016–2019

Free Movement and Migration, Humanitarian and Social Affairs, Statistics

e26 million

IOM, ICMPD

2014–2019

Customs and Trade Integration

e10 million (+1 million from German government)

GIZ

2014–2018

directly (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017b). The EU approach ensured that funds provided by the EU would be used for activities and could be disbursed more quickly, but it created issues for the ECOWAS Commission. Since implementation agencies employ their own staff and conduct their own operations, many of their built-up capacity and activities bypassed the ECOWAS Commission, as will be discussed in the following two sections. This is one of the significant unintended consequences of external institutional support. It is also why institutional support projects were frequently described as not adding value to the ECOWAS Commission because funds wre mainly managed by the implementing agencies (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017h, 2017m), creating issues of institutional ownership. Most external institutional support projects explicitly stated in their action documents that activities conducted within the projects were to be continued after the conclusion of the funding envelope. But this was

8

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL …

203

often regarded as impossible from within the Commission, which was in constant efforts to replace existing with new partner support (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017a, 2017e). Given the fact that partner support remained external to the institution, combined with ECOWAS budgetary constraints, made expectations of an expansion of the Commission’s activities unlikely. The projects mentioned in Table 8.2, if managed by ECOWAS directly, would add more than e18 million per annum to ECOWAS’ budget. Mainstreaming these activities would mean at least a 10% year-over-year budget increase, which remains unlikely under the given circumstances. The externalisation of institutional support projects also explains the relatively low percentage of recorded partner contributions to ECOWAS’ budget. Given the large funding envelopes, the projects would be expected to make a larger dent in the Commission’s budget otherwise. It is important to remember that the EU is just one financial contributor among many. For a closer investigation of the institutional support programs, this study focuses on support under priority area (2) of the RIP, which includes support to the operations of two directorates of the ECOWAS Commission, namely Customs and Free Movement.

EU External Institutional Support in the Directorate of Customs Given its status as an economic community, one would expect ECOWAS to have been particularly active in the areas of trade and customs integration. In reality, however, progress in both areas remains weak, with intraregional trade remaining relatively low—although official statistics do not account for informal trade (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017g). In customs and trade integration, the key policies are the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme (ETLS) as well as the Common External Tariff (CET), which have been in place since 2003 and 2013, respectively. While the ETLS has been implemented in principle, utilisation by companies in the member states remains scarce (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017d). The ETLS has also been criticised by external partners due to its peculiar structure for a trade facilitation scheme, requiring individual product approval rather than enabling free trade in principle (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017h). In addition to the two main trade facilitation policies, ECOWAS has introduced the Fiscal Transition Program with the aim of supporting CET adoption in member states, providing policy

204

L. M. MÜLLER

options to shift fiscal policy from customs revenues towards domestic excise and value-added taxes (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017l). The ECOWAS Commission had been involved in the formulation of all the above policies, having played a role in analysing policies of other organisations, primarily the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), with the aim of identifying policy blueprints (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017l). While some policies such as specific directives under the fiscal transition program and a customs code to accompany the CET were still to be formulated, the Commission was concerned with advancing the implementation of the existing policies. Unfortunately, given the task to support implementation and compliance in the member states, the responsible Commission directorate was significantly understaffed and underfunded, having only a core staff of three, including the director. This was typical, with three being the average staff size per directorate within non-security related ECOWAS Commission directorates. The three officers were responsible for the two policy areas of the ETLS and the CET. The fiscal transition program should have been the responsibility of another section, but there was no designated staff assigned due to a lack of funding (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017c). In the area of Customs, ECOWAS has demonstrated its willingness to bear certain transaction costs, develop relevant policies and contribute to adopting them in the member states. Implementation constraints, mainly due to national implementation resistance from ministries and customs agencies (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017d, 2017e), however, posed persistent challenges to the ECOWAS institutional apparatus. The Commission capacity was under strain given the responsibility to support implementation of the ETLS, adoption of the CET and formulation of directives under the Fiscal Transition Program (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017e). Under these constraints, external support programs provided significant capacity to the Commission and allowed ECOWAS to externalise the costs and some activities related to policy implementation in the area of Customs. Besides the EU, the US also supported the directorate. The joint European-German support project, Promoting West African Trade Integration (WATIP), was the major external partner project involving the Customs Directorate, running from 2014 to 2018. It was implemented by the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) and focused on the implementation of the ETLS and the

8

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL …

205

CET (EU Delegation to Nigeria & ECOWAS, 2018). Despite the EU’s explicit preference to support the adoption of the EU-ECOWAS EPA, the WATIP project was largely consistent with existing ECOWAS policy priorities. In fact, the WATIP was so coherent with the existing activities of the Customs directorate that a high-ranking ECOWAS official noted that “[…] all our activities could be under WATIP” (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017e). This highlights the agency of the region in steering its own integration process rather than the theorised power of support programs that allegedly diffuse EU-style integration policies. More direct EU support to the EPA implementation, meanwhile, was provided through different EU programs, but on a much smaller scale (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017k). Obviously, support for the CET and the ETLS is also supportive of a future EPA adoption, although not directly related to it. The institutional support focused mainly on policy implementation, in the shape of study preparation and data collection on the ETLS (EU Delegation to Nigeria & ECOWAS, 2018) as well as the training of national-level staff in applying the ETLS and CET regulations (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017d). The project also provided support for the drafting of the customs code and fiscal transition directives, as well as ETLS approval monitoring by seconding staff to the Customs directorate. GIZ seconded four staff directly to the Directorate of Customs to assist with cross-checking of ETLS applications, the formulation of directives on excise and value-added tax and the formulation of the Customs Code related to CET implementation. In addition, it provided three technical assistants to the Directorate, tasked with facilitating national-level trainings and other project activities (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017d). Given the fact that the Commission’s activities in Customs mainly pertain to a formulation of policies, the primary policy-related costs for ECOWAS in connection with customs integration are in the areas of implementation and monitoring. The WATIP project supports Commission agency in all three areas, thereby significantly widening the directorate’s scope for agency. It is certainly clear why the ECOWAS Commission would agree to the provision of such a program, as it is coherent with the ECOWAS member states’ as well as the Commission’s policy priorities. It also enables the Commission to become more active in policy implementation while keeping policy-related transaction costs equal, since they are being borne by an external partner. The build-up of staff and

206

L. M. MÜLLER

policy-making capacity of the directorate may, however, also become subject to questions due to the externalisation of costs and activities. While the WATIP project certainly led to a strengthening of the organisation’s capabilities, it also carried several unintended consequences. First, the project, due to its temporary nature, only provided expanded capacity to the ECOWAS Commission for a certain period of time. This is where the dark side of the transaction cost logic of external institutional support comes into view. As the project allows for the externalisation of enforcement costs, questions remain over activity mainstreaming. Since EU support has led to a tripling of staff of the Customs directorate, the Commission will struggle to continue the project activities given its current financial constraints. It is therefore questionable whether such institutional support projects truly contribute to strengthening capacity. The emergence of a follow-up support project by the EU takes away credibility from ECOWAS’s potential efforts to internalise the project’s transaction costs. While officially, project activities were due to be taken over following their conclusion (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017g), the EU appeared to prepare for a continuation through an upcoming project in collaboration with the Netherlands and the United States (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017h, 2017l). Another point of criticism is the fact that the project supports existing policies and policy-making activities of the Commission, neglecting fundamental faults in existing ECOWAS policies. Even temporarily bearing the enforcement and monitoring costs by external partners may not contribute much to regional cooperation in the absence of adequate enforcement mechanisms within the ECOWAS institutional framework (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017d).

EU External Institutional Support in the Directorate of Free Movement and Migration ECOWAS is unique among African regional organisations with its historically strong focus on free movement and migration policy from an early stage of its development. The 1979 Protocol of Free Movement, complemented by four supplementary protocols between 1985 and 1990, set an early precedent in West Africa, enabling all ECOWAS citizens to enter, reside and establish in member states, at least on paper. But implementation of the protocol has been piecemeal (FMM West Africa, 2017), with non-compliance being widespread at border crossings throughout

8

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL …

207

the region and citizens regularly harassed. Even the most basic element of the Free Movement Protocol, the right to free entry, remains problematic, with a lack of compliance at the level of border checkpoints and immigration services (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017b). The right to residence and establishment are even more difficult cases, with various studies highlighting member state non-compliance (Awumbila et al., 2018; Bolarinwa, 2015; FMM West Africa, 2017). In 2006, calls for tougher regulation of migration became louder and were answered with the development and adoption of the ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration in 2008, which outlined priorities on regular and irregular migration as well as gender and development dimensions (ECOWAS Commission, 2008). The policy, however, lacks an action plan and concrete harmonisation targets, which is why the responsible directorate has made interventions to formulate a more actionable regional migration policy. The ECOWAS Commission remains the institution responsible for overseeing the implementation of the regional policies on migration. Given the state of ECOWAS’ migration policy, the Commission, similar to the area of customs, is involved in a variety of activities, ranging from the development of additional policies, to implementation support for existing ones. Given the importance accorded to migration by the ECOWAS member states initially as well as from the EU more recently, the organisation is under some pressure to improve regional coordination processes in the area. It is not clear whether the Commission can credibly provide these activities, having only three professional staff, including the director. The staff work on the areas of free movement and tourism, as well as cross-border cooperation, which have one senior officer assigned to each. Besides the implementation support for existing agreements, the Commission is also involved in the formulation of additional policies, such as for instance ECOWAS identity documents, and a regional crossborder program (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017b, 2017i). The directorate also executes other policy-related activities, such as facilitating the annual Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA), the primary regional migration dialogue. Given the implementation issues that migration policies are facing at the national level, the directorate appears to be at the limits of its institutional capacity. The institution requires additional resources to effectively provide support to implementation in the member states. Particularly in the case of migration, the implementation challenge is daunting as problems include a lack of actionable data as well as limited civil society

208

L. M. MÜLLER

involvement (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017e; FMM West Africa, 2017). The development of national migration policies has lagged behind what is stated in regional documents (ICMPD & IOM, 2016). Fundamentally, the responsible national agencies have remained complacent. Under these circumstances, the Commission has an incentive to externalise implementation costs. The EU institutional support provides such an opportunity for externalisation. With a view towards the compliance issues in regional migration governance, ECOWAS enjoyed support from the EU-funded e26 million Support for the Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa (FMM) project. The project, implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Centre for Migration Policy development (ICMPD), involves the ECOWAS Commission but carries out significant activities beyond the purview of the Commission. The project, implemented from 2014 to 2019, mainly had the nationallevel implementation of existing free movement policies, the development of a regional migration policy as well as inclusion of non-state actors as its objectives (EU Delegation to Nigeria and ECOWAS, 2018). More specifically, the FMM included action lines on border management, migration data collection, technical assistance to national institutions, and strengthening regional dialogue through the MIDWA (FMM West Africa, 2014). The project objectives do not match as coherently with the portfolio of the target directorate as in the case of the WATIP project and the Directorate of Customs. Other project activities included other Commission directorates, still others were conducted without involvement by the Commission (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017c). This can be explained by the challenging context of free movement implementation, particularly the lack of data and the need to involve civil society as well as the broad mandate of the Commission’s Free Movement Directorate, including tourism and cross-border cooperation. To expand the Commission’s formulation activities, the project contributed to the drafting of a regional migration policy as well as to action plans and implementation guidelines for other policies (EU Delegation to Nigeria & ECOWAS, 2018). To support the directorate’s facilitation role, the project supported the reviving of the MIDWA and instated the Commission as its secretariat (IOM, 2015). To support its implementation support role, the project’s demand-driven facility provided a mechanism for member state agencies involved in migration to request trainings by policy experts pertaining to aspects of ECOWAS

8

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL …

209

migration policy (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017e). Beyond this, the FMM also provided migration data collection capacity building to the ECOWAS Commission as well as to the member states (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017e). The project also included a civil society grant component, through which additional smaller-scale projects could be carried out. To support project coordination, the FMM seconded three staff to the ECOWAS Commission directly. But the substantial project work was being conducted by the two implementing agencies, who had at least 12 additional staff (FMM West Africa, 2014, 2019). Given the broad range of activities under the FMM, the Commission was essentially able to externalise costs related to policy-formulation and particularly implementation support. In the case of the FMM project, activities were also included that had not previously been conducted by the Free Movement Directorate. While it is clear why the Commission would accept such an institutional support project, questions remain regarding the sustainability of the activities conducted and the ownership by ECOWAS. Given the only partial involvement of the Free Movement Directorate, the support project appears to strengthen the organisation less than in the case of the WATIP. On the other hand, it is also understandable why large parts of the project had to be externalised, given the scope of objectives. Nonetheless, the long-term prospects of increased ECOWAS actorness in free movement and migration must be questioned due to the unsustainable nature of the project modalities. The unintended consequences of the FMM project are similar to those resulting from the WATIP, although with a few variations. The involvement of implementation agencies and the establishment of parallel structure, while likely given the limited absorption capacity of the ECOWAS Commission, leads to issues in mainstreaming of policymaking costs and activities. The difference in the area of Free Movement is that the EU has planned no adequate follow-up project (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017a) and that project activities target different actors than in the case of customs. Unlike WATIP, the FMM has been called a one-off project, with no successive funding envelope planned by the EU delegation. The EU representatives have voiced expectations that various activities will be mainstreamed by the ECOWAS Commission after the conclusion of the project (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017a). The FMM project’s design was described as aiming towards the fostering of bottom-up demand for a continuation of the project activities, by member states and civil society. The expectation was that project stakeholders in the member states would

210

L. M. MÜLLER

continue to demand project activities beyond the end of the support project (ECOWAS External Partner, 2017e), leading to an internalisation of transaction costs by ECOWAS. Personnel from the Directorate of Free Movement, however, have been vocal that ECOWAS is unable to fund project activities within their directorate and that they will be unable to continue activities in the absence of partner funding (ECOWAS Commission Official, 2017a). For this reason, the main activity of the directorate in 2017, a year and a half before the project deadline, was the organisation of donor roundtables with the aim of obtaining funds from various partners to continue activities. As the EU appears to have moved towards a bilateral approach in what is now called migration management (Tubiana et al., 2018), the prospects for EU-supported and ECOWAS-led regional policymaking in free movement and migration appear to be dim.

Conclusion This case study of the ECOWAS Commission provides valuable insights regarding the impact of the EU’s support to regionalism and regional public administrations in Africa. It is clear that institutional support projects depend as much on the agency of the regional institutions themselves as on the agendas and mechanisms applied by the external partners. In the areas of customs and migration, the ECOWAS Commission relies on the EU to externalise certain policymaking activities that it cannot or does not want to provide itself due to limited capacity and resources. This externalisation, however, has led to the creation of parallel structures through the use of implementing organisations (see also Bappah, Chapter 5), calling into question future ownership as well as a strengthening of the ECOWAS Commission in these policy areas. While the case of customs highlights that institutional support can be fully coherent with the regional vision of economic integration and provide financial support over long periods, the policy area of migration appears different. Here, due to a long-standing but ultimately weak regional policy base, characterised by a lack of data and civil society involvement, external institutional support programs do not fully cohere with regional policy objectives. This expansion of policy activities through external support calls into question the sustainability of ECOWAS’ regional-level activities in migration beyond support programs. Given the EU’s move towards migration management bilateralism in West Africa, West African regional migration policy may be under threat.

8

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL …

211

It is important to keep in mind that the ECOWAS Commission remains a case of rather low resource dependence. In case where resource dependence is larger, we should expect the provision of institutional support programs even in the absence of a clear transaction cost logic, e.g. projects that the regional organisations do not need and own. In cases where resource dependence is lower, the logic of transaction cost may come into play more strongly. In general, the EU approach to regional integration support should be questioned. The creation of parallel structures to ROs is unlikely to build regional actorness in the long run (see also Brosig, Chapter 2). This contribution has highlighted the value of breaking down interregional relationships and external support to ROs into their constituent parts, identifying the actors involved, concrete projects, mechanisms of support and their consequences. Utilising an inter-organisational approach should enable future research on such relationships under conditions of asymmetry between actors. This theoretical approach is useful in the turn away from a state-centric focus on ROs and the turn towards analysis of ROs as international organisations. Lastly, the approach allows for an analysis of a larger spectrum of external actors involved in regionalism support. Despite the specific focus of this contribution, the EU is not the only partner involved in supporting ECOWAS since the US is another key player. Employing an inter-organisational approach should allow future research to compare these actors in a way that EU-centric approaches may not accomplish.

References Alter, K., Helfer, L., & McAllister, J. (2013). A new international human rights court for West Africa: The ECOWAS community court of justice. American Journal of International Law, 107 (4), 737–779. Alumona, I. M., & Azom, S. N. (2019). Institutional capacity and regional integration: Reflections on the composition and powers of the ECOWAS parliament. In S. O. Oloruntoba & M. Muchie (Eds.), Advances in African economic, social and political development. Innovation, regional integration, and development in Africa: Rethinking theories, institutions, and policies (pp. 137–155). Springer. Aning, E. K. (2010). Investing in peace and security in Africa: The case of ECOWAS. Conflict, Security & Development, 4(3), 533–542.

212

L. M. MÜLLER

Apiko, P., & Aggad, F. (2018). Analysis of the implementation of the African Union’s 0.2% levy—Progress and challenges (ECDPM Briefing Note 98). ECDPM. Awumbila, M., Teye, J., & Nikoi, E. (2018). Assessment of the implementation of the ECOWAS free movement protocol in Ghana and Sierra Leone: Made West Africa. University of Ghana. Baert, F., Scaramagli, T., & Söderbaum, F. (Eds.). (2014). Intersecting interregionalism: Regions, global governance and the EU . Springer. Bappah, H. Y. (2014). The evolution of ECOWAS towards a supranational organization (Dissertation). Amadu Bello University. Biermann, R. (2011). Inter-organizational relations: An emerging research programme. In B. Reinalda (Ed.), The Ashgate research companion to non-state actors (pp. 173–184). Routledge. Bisong, A. (2019). Trans-regional institutional cooperation as multilevel governance: ECOWAS migration policy and the EU. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 45(8), 1294–1309. Bolarinwa, J. O. (2015). The ECOWAS free movement protocol: Obstacle or driver of regional integration? Insight on Africa, 7 (2), 154–168. Börzel, T. A. (2016). Theorizing regionalism: Cooperation, integration, and governance. In T. A. Börzel & T. Risse (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism (pp. 41–63). Oxford University Press. Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2009). Diffusing (inter-) regionalism: The EU as a model of regional integration (KFG Working Paper Series, 7). KollegForschergruppe (KFG) “The Transformative Power of Europe”. Brosig, M. (2010). The multi-actor game of peacekeeping in Africa. International Peacekeeping, 17 (3), 327–342. Brosig, M. (2011). Overlap and interplay between international organisations: Theories and approaches. South African Journal of International Affairs, 18(2), 147–167. Camroux, D. (2010). Interregionalism or merely a fourth-level game? An examination of the EU-ASEAN relationship. East Asia, 27 (1), 57–77. Chikelu, C. (2017). Parliament adopts an ECOWAS 2018 draft budget heavily reliant on CL. Leadership Newspaper. https://leadership.ng/2017/11/28/ parliament-adopts-ecowas-2018-draft-budget-heavily-reliant-cl/. Accessed 14 May 2020. Coase, R. H. (1992). The institutional structure of production. American Economic Review, 82(4), 713–719. Costa, O., Dri, C., & Stavridis, S. (Eds.). (2013). Parliamentary dimensions of regionalization and globalization: The role of inter-parliamentary institutions. Palgrave Macmillan. Doidge, M. (2011). The European Union and interregionalism: Patterns of engagement. Ashgate.

8

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL …

213

Duina, F., & Lenz, T. (2016). Regionalism and diffusion revisited: From final design towards stages of decision-making. Review of International Studies, 42(4), 773–797. Eckstein, H. (1975). Case studies and theory in political science. In F. I. Greenstein & N. W. Polsby (Eds.), Addison-Wesley series in political science: Political science, scope and theory (pp. 79–138). Addison-Wesley. ECOWAS Commission. (2008). ECOWAs common approach on migration. ECOWAS. ECOWAS Commission. (2016). Financial controller’s 2016 interim report. ECOWAS. Engel, U. (2017). Headquarters of international organizations as portals of globalization: The African Union Commission and its peace and security policies. Comparativ, 27 (3–4), 151–170. European Community. (2008a). Communaute Européenne-Afrique Centrale Document de stratégie régionale et Programme indicatif régional pour la période 2008–2013. European Community. (2008b). European Community-West African regional strategy paper and regional indicative programme 2008–2013. European Community. (2008c). Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean—European Community regional strategy paper and regional indicative programme 2008–2013. EU Delegation to Nigeria and ECOWAS. (2018). National and regional aid operations managed by the EU delegation to Nigeria and ECOWAS. European Union. (2015a). Afrique Centrale-Union Européenne Programme Indicatif Régional Pour La Période 2014–2020. European Union. (2015b). European Union—West Africa regional indicative programme 2014–2020. European Union. (2015c). Regional indicative programme for Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean (EA-SA-IO). European Union. (2016). Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe: A global strategy for the European Union’s foreign and security policy. http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_r eview_web.pdf. Accessed 14 May 2021 Fehrmann, T. J. (2014). Die Effektivität interregionaler Kooperation. Nomos. Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five misunderstandings about case-study research. Qualitative Inquiry, 12(2), 219–245. FMM West Africa. (2014). Free movement of persons and migration in West Africa. FMM West Africa. (2017). Immigration and border management baseline assessment. https://fmmwestafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ en-IBM-Baseline-Assessment-Report.pdf. Accessed 14 May 2021.

214

L. M. MÜLLER

FMM West Africa. (2019). Support to free movement of persons and migration in West Africa. https://fmmwestafrica.org/. Accessed 14 May 2021. Franke, U. (2017). Inter-organizational relations: Five theoretical approaches. In Oxford research encyclopedia of international studies. https://doi.org/10. 1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-99. Accessed 14 May 2021. Gänzle, S., Trondal, J., & Kühn, N. S. B. (2018). “Not so different after all”: Governance and behavioral dynamics in the commission of the economic community of West African States (ECOWAS). Journal of International Organizations Studies, 9(1), 81–98. Gray, J. (2018). Life, death, or zombie? The vitality of international organizations. International Studies Quarterly, 62(1), 1–13. Greenhill, R., Prizzon, A., & Rogerson, A. (2016). The age of choice: Developing countries in the new aid landscape. In S. Klingebiel, T. Mahn, & M. Negre (Eds.), The fragmentation of aid: Concepts, measurements and implications for development cooperation (pp. 137–151). Palgrave Macmillan. Hänggi, H., Roloff, R., & Rüland, J. (2006). Interregionalism and international relations. Routledge. Hartmann, C. (2013). Governance transfer by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): A B2 case study report (SFB-Governance Working Paper Series, 47). DFG Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 700. Herrero, A., & Gregersen, C. (2016). Prospects for supporting regional integration effectively: An independent analysis of the European Union’s approach to the 11th European development fund regional programming (ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 192). ECDPM. Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Lenz, T., Bezuijen, J., Ceka, B., & Derderyan, S. (2017). Measuring international authority. A postfunctionalist theory of governance: Volume III . Oxford University Press. Hulse, M. (2016). United we stand, divided we fall—Actorness and effectiveness of ECOWAS and SADC in interregional negotiations for economic partnership agreements (Dissertation). Radboud University Nijmegen. ICMPD & IOM. (2016). A survey on migration policies in West Africa. ICMPD / IOM. IOM. (2015). Migration dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA). https://www. iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/policy_and_research/rcp/ MIDWA/MIDWA_Overview_EN.pdf. Accessed 14 May 2021. Jetschke, A. (2013). Regional integration support by the EU in Asia: Aims and prospects. In T. Christiansen, E. J. Kirchner, K. Jørgensen, & P. Murray (Eds.), The Palgrave handbook of EU-Asia relations (pp. 226–243). Palgrave Macmillan.

8

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL …

215

Jetschke, A., & Lenz, T. (2012). Does regionalism diffuse? A new research agenda for the study of regional organizations. Journal of European Public Policy, 20(4), 626–637. Ketokivi, M., & Mahoney, J. T. (2017). Transaction cost economics as a theory of the firm, management, and governance. In Oxford research encyclopedia of business and management. https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/978019022 4851.001.0001/acrefore-9780190224851-e-6. Accessed 14 May 2021. Klingebiel, S., Blohm, T. M., Eckle, R., Grunow, K., Heidenreich, F., Mashele, P., & Thermann, A. (2008). Donor contributions to the strengthening of the African peace and security architecture. Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE). Krapohl, S., & Muntschick, J. (2009). Two logics of regionalism: The importance of interdependence and external support for regional integration in Southern Africa. In J. M. Kaunda & F. Zizhou (Eds.), Furthering Southern African Integration: Proceedings of the 2008 FOPRISA Annual Conference (pp. 3–17). Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis (BIDPA). Kufuor, K. O. (2006). The institutional transformation of the economic community of West African states. Ashgate. Lenz, T. (2012). The EU’s inescapable influence on global regionalism (Dissertation). University of Oxford. Mair, S. (2001). Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Regionale Integration und Kooperation in Africa südlich der Sahara, Teil II . Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). Martin, D. (2009). Toes in the water: The ‘makability’ of ASEAN and European Commission support to economic integration in Southeast Asia under the ASEAN-EU programme for regional integration support (APRIS). In M. Schulz & P. de Lombaerde (Eds.), The EU and world regionalism: The makability of regions in the 21st century (pp. 83–100). Routledge. Muntschick, J. (2016). Explaining the influence of extra-regional actors on regional economic integration in Southern Africa: The EU’s interfering impact on SADC and SACU. In U. Lorenz-Carl & M. Rempe (Eds.), Mapping agency: Comparing regionalisms in Africa (pp. 77–95). Ashgate. Ogbonnaya, U. M., & Ogujiuba, K. (2015). Regional parliamentary assemblies in Africa: Challenges of legitimacy of authority and status of operation. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 21(4), 553–573. Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (2003). The external control of organizations: A resource dependence perspective. Stanford University Press. Piccolino, G., & Minou, S. (2014). The EU and regional integration in West Africa: What effects on conflict resolution and transformation? German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA). Pietrangeli, G. (2009). Support regional integration and cooperation worldwide: An overview of the European Union approach. In M. Schulz & P. de

216

L. M. MÜLLER

Lombaerde (Eds.), The EU and world regionalism: The makability of regions in the 21st century (pp. 9–44). Routledge. Schulz, M., & de Lombaerde, P. (Eds.). (2009a). The EU and world regionalism: The makability of regions in the 21st century. Routledge. Schulz, M., & de Lombaerde, P. (2009b). EU support to regional integration worldwide and the ‘makability’ of regions: Conclusions. In M. Schulz & P. de Lombaerde (Eds.), The EU and world regionalism: The makability of regions in the 21st century (pp. 287–292). Routledge. Schulz, M., & de Lombaerde, P. (2009c). Introduction. In M. Schulz & P. de Lombaerde (Eds.), The EU and world regionalism: The makability of regions in the 21st century (pp. 1–8). Routledge. Staden, A. V. (2016). Subsidiarity, exhaustion of domestic remedies, and the margin of appreciation in the human rights jurisprudence of African sub-regional courts. The International Journal of Human Rights, 20(8), 1113–1131. Tieku, T. K. (2017). Governing Africa: 3D analysis of the African Union’s performance. Rowman & Littlefield. Tubiana, J., Warin, C., & Saeneen, G. M. (2018). Multilateral damage: The impact of EU migration policies on central Saharan routes. Clingendael Netherlands Institute for International Relations. Vines, A. (2013). A decade of African peace and security architecture. International Affairs, 89(1), 89–109. Vinokurov, E., & Libman, A. (2017). Re-Evaluating regional organizations— Behind the smokescreen of official mandates. Palgrave Macmillan.

Interviews ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS

Commission Official (2017a, June 30). Abuja. Commission Official (2017b, July 4). Abuja. Commission Official (2017c, July 17). Abuja. Commission Official (2017d, July 24). Abuja. Commission Official (2017e, July 24). Abuja. Commission Official (2017f, July 28). Abuja. Commission Official (2017g, August 7). Abuja. Commission Official (2017h, September 6). Abuja. Commission Official (2017i, September 6). Abuja. Commission Official (2017j, September 8). Abuja. Commission Official (2017k, September 14). Abuja. Commission Official (2017l, September 18). Abuja. Commission Official (2017m, September 21). Abuja. Commission Official (2017n, September 22). Abuja. External Partner (2017a, June 8). Abuja.

8

ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS ECOWAS

External External External External External External External External External External External

Partner Partner Partner Partner Partner Partner Partner Partner Partner Partner Partner

CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF EXTERNAL …

(2017b, June 13). Abuja. (2017c, June 14). Abuja. (2017d, June 15). Abuja. (2017e, June 16). Abuja. (2017f, June 30). Abuja. (2017g, July 13). Abuja. (2017h, August 23). Accra. (2017i, September 8). Abuja. (2017j, September 8). Abuja. (2017k, September 15). Abuja. (2017l, September 22). Abuja.

217

PART IV

Conclusions

CHAPTER 9

Conclusion Johannes Muntschick

The world witnessed a wave of new and renewed regionalism since the end of the Cold War, which fuelled growing interest, new academic research and debate in political science and IR. Most studies focussed on Europe and regional integration dynamics in the EU over decades, which led to mainstream integration theories such as Neo-Functionalism (Haas, 1958) and Liberal Intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998) dominate the field of regionalism research. In parallel to the mushrooming of regionalism in the Global South, however, students and scholars increasingly looked beyond Europe and realised that Euro-centric approaches had difficulties to help them understand and explain regionalism in Latin America, Asia and especially Africa. It was obvious that basic economic and political conditions prevailing in Europe, such as e.g. a high level of socioeconomic development or liberal democracies with strong state capacity, were weak or simply did not exist in most regions of the Global South, namely in Africa.

J. Muntschick (B) Institute of Political Science, Johannes Gutenberg University of Mainz, Mainz, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. Muntschick (ed.), Regionalism in Africa and External Partners, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10702-3_9

221

222

J. MUNTSCHICK

Given the strong economic and political dependency of many countries and regional organisations on external actors in such world regions, namely in the issue areas of security and economy but also in terms of any other donor-funded programmes and projects, implies for plain structural reasons a constant state of vulnerability vis-à-vis such external actors and their policies, actions and influence, but also to exogenous shocks in general. Hence, regionalisms and their member states in the Global South, especially in Africa, face not only typical cooperation problems on regional level but additionally significant challenges related to (attempts of) exertion of influence by third actors from outside their own region. This influence may take different forms and intensities, depending on the policy area and degree of dependency, but is mainly of a political or politico-economic nature. Externally induced challenges, problems and struggles that unfold negative impact on regional level, which is not necessarily the result of external actors’ malicious intent, will for structural reasons less likely occur and affect their counterparts in the northern hemisphere. This holds true for unequal donor-recipient relationships and regarding more or less conditional grants provided by more or less benevolent external actors as well. However, at times, even Europe was and is affected by patterns of asymmetric extra-regional relations and subject to external influence, albeit less constant and intense. Examples include the role and impact of the US in fuelling early regional economic integration initiatives in Western Europe with the support of the Marshall Plan funds (Hitchcock, 2010). In general, however, empirical observation points to fundamental differences between many regions in the Global South and North which puts mainstream Euro-centric views on regionalism into perspective. The academic literature on the so-called New Regionalism was innovative insofar as it looked beyond Europe and explored regionalism in the Global South, namely in Africa. Moreover, it emphasised the role of non-state actors, transnational networks, culture and the social construction of regions and (in)formal institutions (Bach, 2003; Hettne & Söderbaum, 1998; Robson, 1993). While this approach has not been without criticism, the New Regionalism research agenda and literature deserve a special merit for broadening the perspective of regionalism research by including the Global South in general and Africa in particular. Around the same time, international political economy schools of thought attempted to explain the emergence of regional economic blocs across the globe (Mattli, 1999; Schirm, 2002). Focussing on trade and investment

9

CONCLUSION

223

flows in times of globalisation, this research was innovative insofar as it also took efforts to analyse regionalism beyond Europe. However, it took a very narrow perspective and focussed only on the economy in terms of theory and case studies. Research and literature on diffusion did not have such problems. It attempted to explain how ideas and norms of regionalism spread across the globe and manifested in new or renewed regional organisations in other parts of the world (Börzel & Risse, 2009; Farell, 2007). This was innovative insofar as it took a horizontal dimension and interregional relationships into account. A weakness of this approach, however, was its inherent Euro-centrism because it understood the EU as a model of global regionalism. This brief outline shows some of the key dynamics of theory-informed regionalism research of the past three decades. It is noteworthy, however, that there exists very little academic research that takes extra-regional actors and external influence on regionalism into account. This is surprising given the fact that regionalisms in the Global South, which unmistakably show distinct patterns of dependence and various unbalanced relationships to external actors, have increasingly attracted scholarly attention over the past few decades. Besides a great number of descriptive works from the field of area studies, we still lack systematic, theory-driven and comparative research on regionalism and external actors/influence to better understand this phenomenon. Besides earlier works (Axline, 1977; Zimmerling, 1991), which seem to have been overlooked by most of the academic community, only a few recent research studies address this highly relevant topic in terms of theory-building (e.g. Muntschick, 2013, 2018), comparison (e.g. Engel & Mattheis, 2020; Krapohl, 2017), or specific case studies (e.g. Bergmann, 2020; Brosig, 2011; Diez & Tocci, 2017; Klingebiel, 2005; Söderbaum, 2017). The objective of this edited volume is to add momentum to the academic research on regionalism and external actors from a political science perspective. Its geographical focus is on African regionalism and its relationships to external actors from Europe because this is where the phenomenon of external influence is most pronounced due to the existing patterns of asymmetric interdependence and related imbalance of power. Against the background of the increasing importance of security cooperation between African ROs and the EU in combination with the ongoing debate about a securitisation of development aid (Brown & Grävingholt, 2016; Stapel & Söderbaum, Chapter 3), the book put the policy area of security at the centre of attention. This choice for ‘security regionalism’ is

224

J. MUNTSCHICK

also motivated by the lack of academic research on this increasingly relevant and burning issue that is often at the heart of African ROs and their activities. In terms of terminology, the book prosed a rather classical definition of regionalism as planned, multilateral and state-led organisation of interdependence within a confined regional space that manifests in various, multidimensional or specific regional projects and accompanying formal institutions (Bach, 2003: 22; Breslin & Higgot, 2000: 344; Stein, 1993: 316). Research on state-led regionalism usually puts a focus on research questions exploring the (1) emergence and drivers, (2) the nature of its institutional design and (3) effectiveness and performance of regionalism. All contributors to this volume address to varying degrees these sub-questions in their specific empirical case studies amidst their overall research objective to analyse and explain the role and influence of external actors on regionalism. Since most case studies in this volume deal with state-led regionalism and highlight the meaning of intergovernmental interaction and cooperation, it seems reasonable to acknowledge the key importance of the state in the African context. This is not least because the central, most recognised, and most dynamic manifestations of African regionalism are obviously the African ROs. Hence, it seems reasonable to adopt and follow an understanding of regionalism as outlined in this volume (see Muntschick, Chapter 1) in the field of international relations studies and regionalism research. In addition, the introductory chapter proposed a general understanding of regional organisations as “formal international organisation composed of three or more geographically proximate states having a continuous institutional framework” (Lenz & Burilkov, 2017: 663). This seems reasonable in the African context as well. Most empirical case studies in this volume put ROs such as e.g. the AU, ECOWAS, or G5 Sahel at the centre of analysis (see Chapters 4–8). This is not surprising given the fact that ‘security’ counts as ‘high politics’, which is a classical domain of the state according to political science and international relations research. Other contributions in this volume explicitly referred to the RECs, mainly in an economic context (see Brosig, Chapter 2), or with regard to specific security cooperation programmes and projects under the umbrella of ROs (e.g. Chapters 4, 6, 7). This gives evidence that states are the key actors, namely with regard to regional security cooperation, and that a focus on state-led, formal ROs seems reasonable in order to analyse the logic of regionalism in Africa at heart. Whether

9

CONCLUSION

225

the editor’s proposed criteria on how to define ‘the regional’ in ROs (see Muntschick, Chapter 1) might prove useful deserves further research on the phenomenon in other parts of the globe. While it was explicitly not the intention of the editor to provide a specific theory or confined analytical framework to which all individual contributors to this volume must adhere in their empirical case studies, it was nevertheless his aim to elaborate and present a valuable theoretical approach to the study of regionalism and external actors/influence to better understand this phenomenon. Taking reference to game theory and the situation-structural approach (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985; Zürn, 1993), this theoretical model to the study of regionalism argues that it depends mainly on the specific character of a situation-structure whether regionalism will develop and prosper or not. Patterns of strong and asymmetric interdependence between regional and extra-regional actors may put the latter in a relative power position vis-à-vis their regional counterparts and offers opportunities to exert influence. Whether such external influence has a positive or negative impact on regionalism depends on the intentions, strategies and actions of extra-regional actors and whether and how this ultimately manifests in transformations of the inherent structure of genuine regional cooperation problems. Even though the situation-structural model is inherently state-centric, which we learned is not that bad in the African context, its key argument and main assumptions on regionalism and external actors/influence apply for equivalent situations with non-state actors or informal structures and power asymmetries as well. This connects to the regional governance approach (Börzel, 2016) which seems indeed useful in broadening the perspective and strengthening the explanatory power of the situationstructural model sketched above. While the empirical case studies have shown that the most relevant external actors to regionalism in Africa are states and other ROs, namely European states and the EU, referring to the regional governance approach could help to account for additional external dimensions and actors beyond the state which may unfold impact on various dimensions and levels of African regionalism. This leads to the idea that a situation-structural model of regional governance institutions, which takes external actors and influence into account, is perhaps what comparative regionalism research needs to further investigate this phenomenon in the future.

226

J. MUNTSCHICK

In sum, the two main objectives of the editor’s proposed theoretical model are as follows: On the one hand, it may act as inspiration and theoretical blueprint for further academic research on the phenomenon on global level. On the other hand, it may act as an additional and enriching ‘background perspective’ for interpreting and understanding the different empirical case studies in this book.

Empirical Findings: The Ambivalent Impact of European Actors on Regionalism in Africa In order to address the overall research topic and generate findings and insights that may lead to generalisations and theory-building, the book brought together excellent scholars from Africa and Europe with their high-quality research contributions that explore the phenomenon of regionalism and external actors/influence from different perspectives with different focal points. This proceeding broadens the scope of analysis and is complementary insofar as it combines quantitative and qualitative research studies, which reflect in two comprehensive mapping exercises and five in-depth case analyses. One key finding is the existence of strong and asymmetric interdependence between African regionalisms and external actors, namely the EU. Malte Brosig focussed in this research on African trade regimes within the RECs which are de facto integrated in the respective ROs (see Brosig, Chapter 2). Given the puzzling observation that there exists a proliferation of overlapping and underperforming regional trade regimes on the African continent which are maintained but obviously fail to provide significant benefits, the author explored the causal link between externalities and overlap in African ROs. For the empirical analysis several descriptive trade statistics on intra-regional African trade as well as trade with non-African external partners were analysed. The results are clear and simple: Inner-African as well as intra-regional trade within the RECs is generally low and trade with external non-African partners accounts for the lions’ share in most African countries and all RECs. Since these trade patterns are highly asymmetrical, African regionalism is prone to influence by excessive externalities (Brosig, Chapter 2). This has an interfering, possibly even undermining effect because Brosig finds evidence for a causal relationship between high degrees of externalities and overlapping RECs. The argument is that low intra-regional trade patterns and lost regional benefits can be compensated by external (trade-)relations

9

CONCLUSION

227

and resources. Accordingly, overlapping regionalism and duplications of often mutually incompatible regional integration agendas persist despite being ineffective. Lastly, Brosig’s research highlighted that the EU as an external actor has possibly consolidated the existing situation of overlapping institutions in Africa with its policy of negotiating and concluding trade agreements with sub-regional groupings and countries instead of with the officially recognised RECs. Söderbaum’s and Stapel’s research (see Chapter 3) corroborates Brosig’s empirical evidence of a strong and asymmetric relationship between African ROs and external actors, however, from a different perspective: Their focus is on patterns of external donor funding to the most important ROs, but also to other regional projects delivered outside the framework of such institutions, in the increasingly important issue area ‘security and governance’. A key finding includes that the most important ROs in Africa, the EAC, ECOWAS, SADC and IGAD, are extremely dependent on external donors from Europe. The asymmetry in this relationship constitutes a power imbalance for structural reasons. This provides opportunities for an extortion of influence by external actors. However, the authors’ comprehensive dataset on external funding of regionalism in Africa revealed much more: Firstly, regional official development assistance (ODA) to both ROs and regional projects has significantly increased over the past years, particularly with regard to security-related projects. Secondly, a large share (30%) of total external funding provided to ROs is security-related. This and the fact that donors engage with most ROs on the African continent on security-related matters highlights the key role of state-led regionalism in this issue area of ‘high politics’. Unsurprisingly, the AU as the largest African RO received the lion’s share of external security-related funding. Thirdly, there is empirical evidence that the majority of regional ODA for security-related projects is provided by a rather small number of external actors: Germany and the EU. The findings of Söderbaum and Stapel give not only evidence that ‘security regionalism’ in Africa attracted increasing attention in external donors and their funding policies, but also that African ROs act as key addressees and recipients in this respect. From a structural perspective, one could possibly expect the most external influence on African ROs by those external actors that have been identified as their key donors. Since many ROs, however, receive security-related

228

J. MUNTSCHICK

funding from several external donors, duplications, policy-related or institutional overlaps as well as suboptimal project effectiveness are likely if donor coordination and policy coherence are low (see Brosig, Chapter 2). This trade- and particularly donor funding-related pattern of a strong and asymmetric relationship between African regionalisms and external actors from Europe is a recurrent topic in all empirical case studies. The latter give strong evidence that financial resources and capabilities are key determinants for inequalities in the relationships and external partnerships between African and European actors, thus being ultimately responsible for fuelling imbalances of power and creating opportunities for exerting external influence. While this general finding is maybe not very surprising, it is noteworthy that asymmetric relations in terms of military power seem to be of secondary importance, surprisingly even in the issue area of security and regarding security-related (inter)regional cooperation projects. This observation, however, could mainly be EU-specific because Brussels as an external actor often lacks a truly consistent and coherent common security and defence policy, not to speak of common EU defence minister and joint EU armed force. Although Bappah (see Chapter 5), in particular, points to France’s (military) power and geostrategic interests in Africa, his and other case studies (e.g. Chapters 4, 6 and 7) largely argue that external power and influence vis-à-vis regional actors mainly roots in the strong politico-economic capacity of external actors, which enables them inter alia to provide financial, logistical and material support for their weaker counterparts. The growing perception of Africa as a security issue to Europe in important EU member states and decision-makers is highlighted by Gorm Rye Olsen’s in-depth research contribution on the EU-Africa relationship and actors and ambitions in Brussels’ security policies (see Olsen, Chapter 4). Given the growing number of EU security interventions in Africa, e.g. in Somalia, Mali, Niger or the Central African Republic, the chapter developed a foreign policy analysis framework in order to analyse and explain the motives, interests and actors involved in the EU’s policies towards promoting security (cooperation) in Africa in the recent past. Against the background of the analytical framework, Olsen looked inter alia at international circumstances and put a focus on the perceptions of Africa among the key foreign policy-makers in the EU as well as on the domestic government institutions within the EU (e.g. the Commission, the Council of Ministers or the External Action Service) which are in a position to considerably contribute to policy-making and implementation

9

CONCLUSION

229

of the EU’s security policy towards its African partners. Regarding international circumstances, his research found evidence that the EU became increasingly suspicious about China’s engagement in Africa. Notably France, a key member state of the EU with traditional strong relations and influence in Africa, feared the rise of a serious competitor to its own status and ambitions on the continent. Moreover, EU decision-makers regarded Africa increasingly as a security threat to Europe which reflects not least in the debate on the securitization of development aid (see Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3). This reflects also in the proactive role of the EU, namely the Commission and the External Action Service, regarding the launch of the mentioned security missions to Africa. Hence, the EU’s recent engagement in security promotion in Africa is mainly the result of French national security concerns together with strong ambitions and a proactive role of two important EU institutions. Habibu Yaya Bappah’s in-depth analysis of the AU’s security integration agenda and framework partly arrives at similar conclusions. However, it provides a more critical assessment of the role and impact of the EU— and notably France—on regional integration dynamics and institutional effectiveness. In line with Brosig’s findings (Brosig, Chapter 2), he sees strong rivalries and competition between the recognised RECs which shall serve as regional building-blocks for the AU’s ambitions to establish an African Economic Community (AEC) as well as stations for the African Standby Force (ASF). They are at the heart of the AU’s agenda towards continental integration and, according to Bappah, the creation of an institutionalised regional security complex can only be understood in the context of the AEC framework and the African Peace and Security Structure (APSA). Both constitute the economic and security dimension of continental integration that the AU aims to achieve with the help of the RECs (see Bappah, Chapter 5). Due to the strong dependence of the AU’s budget on external donor support, provided mainly by the EU and channelled via the EDFs and particularly the African Peace Facility (APF), the APSA is extremely prone to external influence by its European donors. Notwithstanding Brussels’ substantive donor funding and Europe’s continuous and ostentatious assertions to support the AU’s agenda on security integration, notably regarding various missions led by the AU and/or specific RECs such as e.g. in Somalia, the Central African Republic or Sudan, Bappah finds clear evidence that reality mainly shows a different, less positive picture. The EU contributes to a disintegration of

230

J. MUNTSCHICK

the AU’s security integration process and is more or less directly responsible for the weak performance of the APSA because EU funding supports the duplication of partly competing regional organisations. The reallocation of financial resources to the benefit of the newly created G5 Sahel, which otherwise could have been used to support the well-established ECOWAS as a key driver of AU security integration, stands as a prominent example for the EU’s interfering external impact on African regionalism. According to Bappah (see Chapter 5), this happened not accidentally but is mainly the result of France’s national security policy towards Africa. The latter is still governed by a combination of realpolitik in tradition of the old Françafrique as well as by neo-colonial ambitions that aim at limiting the capacity of African ROs—and thus preserve French influence on the continent. Hence, the EU as an external actor had ambivalent, rather undermining impact on security integration in Africa. Julian Bergmann’s study on the G5 Sahel and its partnership with the EU corroborates these findings, although from a different perspective and accordingly with more positive conclusions. Adopting a rationalistfunctionalist perspective with reference to the situation-structural and regional governance approach (Börzel, 2016; Muntschick, 2013), his research addressed two key questions: How to explain the creation and integration dynamics of the G5 Sahel? What role and impact had the EU and its member states as external actors in promoting these processes? Firstly, Bergmann highlights that the G5 Sahel is clearly an intergovernmental RO, which not only justifies his choice for a state-centred theoretical research approach but also the key importance and central role of states in African regionalism. With regard to his main research puzzle, Bergmann’s in-depth analysis found evidence that a regional power vacuum and related security threats produced the underlying regional cooperation problem that the five member countries aimed to address with the formation of the G5 Sahel. This security-related cooperation problem was on the one hand the result of a long-standing rivalry between Algeria and Morocco which paralysed the existing Arab Maghreb Union. Moreover, the ECOWAS seemed to be unable to provide for regional stability and security in the 2012 Mali crisis. Accordingly, there was demand for functional cooperation on the ground of a regional cooperation problem. The fact that no member country of the G5 Sahel was in the position of a regional hegemon resulted in a lack of a regional driver for integration. However, this was compensated for by external actors: The EU and its member state France in particular played a decisive role

9

CONCLUSION

231

in the creation of the G5 Sahel (see also Bappah, Chapter 5). Significant external funding to the RO, its member countries and the two G5 Sahel flagships, the Joint Force and the PIP, fuelled integration dynamics and institutional performance. Thus, external influence by the EU had a catalytic and significantly positive impact on the emergence, dynamics and institutional effectiveness of the G5 Sahel. The circumstances of its foundation, the lack of a regional driving force and its extremely strong donor dependence on the EU, however, raised questions about its sustainability—not least in consolidated regional security actors such as the AU and ECOWAS (see Bergmann, Chapter 6). An analysis of interregional security cooperation between West Africa and the EU as an external actor was also at the centre of Friedrich Plank’s comprehensive research contribution. It includes an interesting remark on how to build a bridge between interregionalism and research on regionalism and external actors insofar as part of the literature on interregionalism seems to conceptualise the latter in terms of the ROs external relations with their counterparts (see Plank, Chapter 7). His key objective, however, was to explore how ROs interact and to identify conditions for effective action in cooperative peace and security arrangements conducted by the partners. Concentrating on the interregional relationship between the ECOWAS and the EU, Plank developed a systematic analytical framework for assessing the effectiveness of interregional security cooperation on the example of the Mali crisis. Empirical evidence shows that the mandated goals of the ECOWAS-EU engagement in Mail have been achieved. The overall effectiveness, however, showed mixed results and a rather mid- to lower-level of performance. While conducive conditions for effective interregional interaction and cooperation include factors such as resource exchange, coherence and coordination processes, constraining factors seemed to relate to partners’ capacity, poor resource exchange between partners as well as weak coordination between regional and external partners, notably donors (Plank, Chapter 7). It is noteworthy that this case study analysis corroborates the findings of other studies in this volume which also highlighted the interfering and constraining effects that uncoordinated (donor) policies and actions had on regionalism and integration agendas in Africa (e.g. Brosig, Chapter 2; Olsen, Chapter 4; Bappah, Chapter 5). Going beyond state-centric approaches and opening the ‘black-box’ of regionalism in Africa, Lukas Maximilian Müller provided rare and very valuable research on regional public administrations which are at the heart

232

J. MUNTSCHICK

of every RO. Secretariats or other key administrative bodies are of major importance regarding policy-making, implementation and institutional effectiveness of ROs because they generally act as ‘motor for integration’. Not least, regional public administrations are usually the primary point of contact to external actors. Given the strong dependence of all African ROs on external donor funding (see Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3), their role is even more crucial. Referring to inter-organisational theory, Müller analysed causes and effects of external support to ROs and provided a comprehensive analysis of EU support to the ECOWAS Commission. His findings indicate that the latter is comparably well-staffed and experienced various organisational reforms. More importantly, the EU financial support to ECOWAS is large and increased over the past years besides the fact that the ECOWAS has the most convincing ability to fund itself. Interestingly, the EU institutional support to ECOWAS involves implementation agencies prominently and is tied to expectations of cost and activity mainstreaming (see Müller, Chapter 8). His detailed analysis of EU support to two directorates of the ECOWAS Commission, namely Customs and Free Movement, gives evidence that ECOWAS relies on the EU to externalise (and finance) policy-making activities that it cannot or does not want to provide itself because of lack of capacity and resources. This externalisation and the mobilisation of external actors and their specific donor policies, however, led to parallel structures, duplications and overlaps due to the increasing (and seemingly required) involvement of implementation agencies. This not only raises questions about ownership and donor-influence of externally funded projects in African regionalisms but corroborates—from a different perspective—empirical evidence on how the EU as an external actor undermined and/or weakened institutional capacity and effectiveness of the ECOWAS (see Bappah, Chapter 5).

Implications for Theory and Policy Advice The comprehensive and in-depth empirical research analyses provided meaningful insights to various important cases of regionalism in Africa and a nuanced picture of the role and influence of external actors, namely the EU and its member states. While each individual study has its own important results and key message, they offer additional insights that, pooled together, contribute to better understand the logic of regionalism and external actors/influence.

9

CONCLUSION

233

Firstly, the empirical case studies confirmed that stronger patterns of asymmetric interdependence between regional and external actors imply greater opportunities for external actors to exert external influence. Brosig highlights this important insight on the example of the overlapping RECs that value their voluminous trade-relationships with non-African partners higher than the marginal ones with their regional counterparts (Brosig, Chapter 2). Such structural asymmetries allow external actors, who are in African contexts usually in the better position of these imbalanced relationships, to exert power and influence. In case of the overlapping RECs, it was the EU who enticed African countries to form sub-regional groupings in order to negotiate attractive interregional EPAs regardless of the RECs’ own ambitions and borders. Other studies in this volume highlight the strong influence of the EU on regional security integration agendas, projects and activities which can be best explained by the strong donor dependency of virtually all African ROs on funding from external partners (see Chapters 4–8), notably provided by the EU and individual European countries (see Söderbaum & Stapel, Chapter 3). Hence, external actors and factors are always an intervening condition that may unfold impact on the regional level in contexts of African regionalism. Secondly, there is evidence that external actors had a distinct supportive impact regarding the emergence, dynamics and performance of regionalism. In case of the G5 Sahel, the EU supported the genuine demand in five African countries to institutionalise regional security cooperation and fuelled the RO to such a degree with donor funding that it remains questionable whether it will survive without external support (see Bergmann, Chapter 6). Here is clear evidence that the situation structure of a genuine regional cooperation problem transferred to a more cooperation-conducive situation thanks to the EU’s financial resources that not only covered most of the RO’s maintenance costs, but also acted somehow as a common pool resource for the G5 Sahel members. Olsen (Chapter 4) and Plank (Chapter 7) found also evidence for the proactive role of the EU, which mainly used financial resources to deepen interregional EU-Africa relations and promote security integration on continental and regional levels. The relative degree of success of various peace and security missions in Africa, either carried out by African ROs or in cooperation with the EU, give evidence that external support had a positive effect on the performance and effectiveness of several regional security integration arrangements and cooperative initiatives in Africa.

234

J. MUNTSCHICK

Thirdly, there is evidence that external actors had an interfering and undermining impact on the dynamics and performance of African regionalism. As highlighted by Brosig (Chapter 2), strong externalities contribute to persisting overlapping regionalism and weaken institutional performance in the ROs concerned. While this is mainly the result of the structure of intra-and extra-regional economic relations and not necessarily of an intended policy of the external actors involved, several in-depth empirical studies arrived at conclusions that highlight the negative effects of external influence on African regionalism. The EU’s policy towards security integration under the umbrella of the AU gives an example of how an external actor, mainly driven by the national security interests of France, contributed to disintegration dynamics via the duplication of competences and institutions in rival ROs (see Bappah, Chapter 5). Several key insights of the empirical analyses by Plank (Chapter 7) and Müller (Chapter 8) point to a similar direction: While it is not necessarily an external actor explicitly and directly undermining regionalism in Africa, it happens, however, often rather gradually and slowly. External actors, for example, provide funding to their favourite regional actors in order to fuel the emergence of institutions, drive integration processes and enhance their performance to the disadvantage of overlapping or competing regional institutions. The duplication and overlap of externally fuelled regional policies, competences and institutions, either beyond the ‘borders’ of a RO or even within its own regional public administration, is possibly the most damaging impact of external actors on regionalism in Africa. The fact that often several different donors support the same or at least similar security-related regional projects and initiatives in a single African RO contributes to this problem and causes institutional ineffectiveness, likewise as the lack of sufficient donor coordination and coherence in development policies. Against the background of the situation-structural model, it seems that a provision of external donor funding, namely by the EU, offered many actors on various levels in African ROs attractive ‘external options’ beyond their own regional institutions; either in a competing ‘external’ but overlapping RO, or beyond. Thus, these actors became deviant members of their own institutions (so-called ‘Rambos’) and as a result genuine regional dilemma-type situations transformed into suasion-games with negative implications such as institutional ineffectiveness and weak performance. To avoid such situations and promote integration and success in African regionalism, external actors are advised to enhance coordination

9

CONCLUSION

235

and coherence of their development programmes and become more sensitive about the potential negative effects of their external involvement with regionalism in Africa. This includes to identify and recognise potentially incompatible programmes and arrangements in regional institutions. In sum, it seems that external actors’ involvement with regionalism in Africa proved to be most successful when it built upon existing regional initiatives born out of genuine regional cooperation problems and demands of African countries. While this volume gave clear evidence of the ambivalent effects of European external actors and their influence on regionalism in Africa, a key message is nonetheless that it depends primarily on the nature and conditions of ‘the regional’ whether and how ‘the external’ finds access points and unfolds a supportive or undermining impact.

References Axelrod, R., & Keohane, R. (1985). Achieving cooperation under anarchy: Strategies and institutions. World Politics, 38(1), 226–254. Axline, W. A. (1977). Underdevelopment, dependence and integration: The politics of regionalism in the Third World. International Organization, 31(1), 83–105. Bach, D. (2003). New regionalism as an Alias: Regionalisation through TransState networks. In A. Grant & F. Söderbaum (Eds.), The new regionalism in Africa (pp. 21–30). Ashgate. Bergmann, J. (2020). The European Union as international mediator. Palgrave. Börzel, T. (2016). Theorizing regionalism: Cooperation, integration, and governance. In T. Börzel & T. Risse (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of comparative regionalism (pp. 41–63). Oxford University Press. Börzel, T. A., & Risse, T. (2009). Diffusing (inter-)regionalism: The EU as a model of regional integration (KFG Working Paper, 7). Breslin, S., & Higgot, R. (2000). Studying regions: Learning from the old, constructing the new. New Political Economy, 5(3), 333–352. Brosig, M. (2011). The EU’s role in the emerging peace and security regime in Africa. European Foreign Affairs Review, 16(1), 107–122. Brown, S., & Grävingholt, J. (Eds.). (2016). The securitization of foreign aid: Rethinking international development series. Palgrave. Diez, T., & Tocci, N. (Eds.). (2017). The EU, promoting regional integration, and conflict resolution. Palgrave. Engel, U., & Mattheis, F. (Eds.). (2020). The finances of regional organisations in the Global South: Follow the money. Routledge. Farell, M. (2007). From EU model to external policy? Promoting regional integration in the rest of the world. In S. Meunier & K. McNamara (Eds.),

236

J. MUNTSCHICK

Making history: European Integration and Institutional Change at Fifty: The state of the European Union (pp. 299–315). Oxford University Press. Haas, E. (1958). The uniting of Europe: Political, social, and economic forces 1950–1957 . Stanford University Press. Hettne, B., & Söderbaum, F. (1998). The new regionalism approach. Politeia: Journal for Political Science and Public Administration, 17 (3), 5–19. Hitchcock, W. I. (2010). The Marshall plan and the creation of the West. In M. P. Leffler & O. A. Westad (Eds.), The Cambridge history of the Cold War volume 1: Origins (pp. 154–174). Cambridge University Press. Klingebiel, S. (2005). Regional security in Africa and the role of external support. The European Journal of Development Research, 17 (3), 437–448. Krapohl, S. (Ed). (2017). Regional integration in the Global South: External influence on economic cooperation in ASEAN, MERCOSUR and SADC. Palgrave. Lenz, T., & Burilkov, A. (2017). Institutional pioneers in world politics: Regional institution building and the influence of the European Union. European Journal of International Relations, 23(3), 654–680. Mattli, W. (1999). The logic of regional integration: Europe and beyond. Cambridge University Press. Moravcsik, A. (1998). The choice for Europe: Social purpose and state power from Messina to Maastricht. Cornell University Press. Muntschick, J. (2013). Regionalismus und Externer Einfluss: Stört die Europäische Union die Regionale Marktintegration im südlichen Afrika? Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 54(4), 686–713. Muntschick, J. (2018). Regionalism and external influence: The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the ambivalent impact of the EU on regional integration. Palgrave. Robson, P. (1993). The new regionalism and developing countries. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(3), 329–348. Schirm, S. (2002). Globalization and the new regionalism: Global markets, domestic politics and regional cooperation. Blackwell. Söderbaum, F. (2017). Swedish development cooperation and ownership of African regional organizations. Forum for Development Studies, 44(3), 357– 375. Stein, A. (1993). Coordination and collaboration: Regimes in an anarchic world. In D. Baldwin (Ed.), Neorealism and neoliberalism: The contemporary debate (pp. 29–59). Columbia University Press. Zimmerling, R. (1991). Externe Einflüsse auf die Integration von Staaten. Verlag Karl Alber.

9

CONCLUSION

237

Zürn, M. (1993). Problematic social situations and international institutions: On the use of game theory in international politics In F. Pfetsch (Ed.), International relations and pan-Europe: Theoretical approaches and empirical findings (pp. 63–84). Lit-Verlag.

Index

A African, Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP), 115, 116, 159 African Development Bank (ADB), 147 African Economic Community (AEC), 108–110, 229 Africa–EU cooperation, 157, 163 partnership, 26, 111, 156, 157, 159, 160, 163, 167, 169, 176, 180 relations, 156, 157, 159, 165, 168, 171, 172 African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), 118, 139, 167, 170–173, 175–179 African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), 10, 109–111, 113, 114, 118, 119, 121, 123, 138, 160, 161, 168, 169, 171, 180, 229, 230 African solutions, 84

African Standby Force (ASF), 108, 110, 113, 122, 229 African Union (AU) mission in Somalia (AMISOM), 84, 87, 93, 116 mission in Sudan (AMIS), 116 peace and security council (PSC), 110, 111, 161 aid activities, 65, 70, 71, 74 disbursement, 73, 75 security-related, 72–75 Algeria, 46, 121, 137–139, 230 al-Qaeda, 87, 93 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU, UMA), 109, 110, 122, 230 armed conflict, 89 asymmetry, 5, 180, 192, 211, 227 Atalanta, 85, 87, 93, 94, 99, 100 B Boko Haram, 84, 93, 127, 132, 157 budget, 64, 65, 78, 141, 145, 194, 199, 200, 203, 229

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 J. Muntschick (ed.), Regionalism in Africa and External Partners, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10702-3

239

240

INDEX

Burkina Faso, 120–122, 128, 135, 138–140, 143, 144, 171, 178 C Central African Republic (CAR), 83, 85, 88, 90, 94, 95, 97, 101, 116, 177 Chad, 95, 118, 120, 122, 128, 135, 144, 147, 157, 171 China, 54, 56, 65, 90–92, 94, 114, 194, 229 collective good, 17, 19 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 85, 87, 99, 100, 121 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 13, 47, 109, 113, 196 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), 83, 87, 96, 119, 145 Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC), 109 Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), 110, 128, 137 conflict management, 5, 84–86, 88, 90, 92, 97, 101, 102, 166, 177 studies, xiii Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN), 113 Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), 110 cooperation theory, 18, 23, 40 crisis management, 87, 97, 101, 161, 177, 178 D decision-maker, 25, 84, 85, 92, 93, 95, 102, 168, 178, 181, 228, 229 definition of

regionalism, 11, 129, 224 regional organisation, 14, 15 Denmark, 71, 75, 147 dependency, 7, 38, 40, 41, 43, 44, 51, 161, 222, 233 development aid, 65, 90, 97, 99, 116, 223, 229 cooperation, 115, 147, 196, 197 funding, 196 policy, 5, 132 programme, 119, 190, 196, 235 diffusion, 8, 166, 223 dilemma-type, 18, 20, 22, 234 disintegration, 114, 118, 229, 234 domestic government institutions, 25, 84, 85, 101, 102, 228 donor funding, 4, 9, 21, 22, 24, 78, 227–229, 232–234 support, 5, 24, 229 E Early Response Mechanism (ERM), 111, 116 Early Warning Mechanism of Central Africa (MARAC), 113 East African Community (EAC), 44, 51, 54, 69, 75, 109, 113, 196, 227 East African Standby Force (EASF), 113 economic interdependence, 115 strength, 141 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) commission, 26, 27, 139, 190, 192, 196–211, 232 directorate of customs, 205, 208 early warning and response mechanism (ECOWARN), 113 mission in Mali (MICEMA), 139

INDEX

mission in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX), 116 Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), 54–56, 198 ECOWAS–EU cooperation, 167 effectiveness, 6, 26, 49, 77, 78, 147, 149, 157, 158, 164, 165, 176–180, 224, 228, 229, 231–233 Ethiopia, 53 Euro-centrism, 7, 9, 223 European Development Fund (EDF), 116–118, 121, 174, 196, 201, 229 European External Action Service (EEAS), 85, 86, 99–102 European Union (EU) capacity building mission (EUCAP), 119 commission, 54, 160, 192, 197, 198 council, 86, 87, 121 Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), 145, 147 force (EUFOR), 95 Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS), 94, 99, 100 military staff (EUMS), 145 Naval force (NAVFOR), 99 training mission (EUTM), 83, 87, 97, 145, 147, 174, 177 EU-Africa cooperation, 160 partnership, 4, 157 relations, 115, 117, 233 exports, 42, 51 external actors, 4–10, 14, 19, 22–27, 40, 49, 61–63, 66, 76, 108, 111, 129–131, 143, 155, 164, 165, 178, 180, 181, 189–192, 194, 196, 211, 222–228, 230–235

241

donor, 9, 22, 24, 227, 229, 232, 234 effectiveness, 166, 175, 176 funding, 24, 63, 65, 75, 76, 78, 111, 161, 201, 227, 231 influence, 5, 6, 9, 10, 20–23, 25, 63, 111, 123, 189, 191, 222, 223, 225, 227–229, 231, 233, 234 institutional support, 190–196, 198–202, 206, 210 partnership, 6, 117, 195 support, 21, 22, 26, 90, 147, 149, 150, 191–193, 204, 210, 211, 232, 233 externalities, 18, 23, 35–37, 39–42, 44, 45, 48–51, 53–56, 226, 234 external partnership, 228 extra-regional actors, 18, 20–22, 130, 131, 223, 225 interdependence, 4, 19, 20, 22 F fatalities, 175 financial assistance, 108, 117, 144 resources, 22, 228, 230, 233 Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), 84, 93 France, 13, 25, 91, 92, 98, 100–102, 108, 109, 114–123, 135, 143, 144, 147, 148, 163, 172, 176, 177, 179, 228–230, 234 Free Movement of Persons and Migration in West Africa project (FMM), 208, 209 Free trade area (FTA), 36, 46–49, 54, 192 funding, 24, 25, 62–65, 67–71, 73, 75–77, 84, 88, 90, 97, 113, 121, 135, 139, 142, 143, 145–147, 149, 171–173, 178–180, 192,

242

INDEX

197–200, 202, 204, 209, 227, 230, 233, 234

G G5 Sahel, 25, 85, 88, 95, 118–120, 128, 129, 131–141, 143–149, 158, 224, 230, 233 game theory, 225 German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ), 204, 205 Germany, 71, 75, 77, 94, 101, 114, 147, 148, 227 Global South, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 19, 62, 64, 128, 133, 190–192, 194, 221–223 goal attainment external, 158, 175 internal, 158, 170

H hegemon, 19, 130, 131, 141, 143, 148, 230 Hegemonic stability theory (HST), 130, 131, 141 high politics, 224, 227 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), 94

I implementation, 25, 54, 78, 84, 88, 89, 96, 98, 99, 116, 118, 121, 134, 136, 145, 147, 180, 199, 201, 204–209, 229, 232 imports, 42, 47, 200 Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), 66 institutional support, 190, 192, 194–196, 201, 203, 205, 206, 208–211, 232

Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), 119, 145 Instrument for Stability (IfS), 97 integration theory, 4, 7, 9, 16, 221 interaction, 3, 4, 25, 26, 36–42, 48, 49, 51, 55, 56, 129, 144, 157, 158, 165, 180, 192–194, 224, 231 interdependence asymmetric, 4, 9, 19–22, 115, 223, 225, 226, 233 economic, 115 extra-regional, 4, 19, 20, 22 interference, 21, 121, 167, 179 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 69, 73, 109, 113, 156, 196, 227 International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), 208 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), 66 International Development Association (IDA), 70 International Organization for Migration (IOM), 208 inter-organizational turn, 36–39, 55, 56 interregional actors, 180 partnership, 158, 159, 167, 171 relations, 8, 26, 155–158, 164, 165, 180, 181 interregionalism, 7, 8, 157, 164, 165, 168, 192, 193, 231

J Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES), 93, 160 Joint Force (JF), 135, 136, 142, 144, 145, 147, 231

INDEX

L legitimacy, 16, 121, 130, 131, 143, 149 Libya, 90, 95, 117, 121 logic of regionalism, 6, 19, 224, 232

M Mali, 26, 83, 85, 87, 90, 94, 95, 97, 101, 118, 120, 122, 127, 128, 135, 137–140, 143–145, 149, 156, 158, 162, 166, 168, 170–180, 228, 230, 231 mandate, 87, 93, 95, 111, 113, 119, 121, 132, 133, 161, 165, 169, 170, 190, 199, 201, 208 mandated objectives, 170 Mano River Union (MRU), 50 Mauritania, 92, 118, 120, 122, 127, 128, 135, 137, 139, 144, 147 Mercosur, 13 ECOWAS Mission in Mali (MICEMA), 139 ECOWAS Missions in the Central African Republic (MICOPAX), 116 Migration Dialogue for West Africa (MIDWA), 207 military expenditures, 141 mission, 87, 94 operation, 10, 88, 96, 119, 135 strength, 141 Morocco, 121, 137, 138, 230 Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), 118, 139, 145, 173, 177, 180 Multi-national Joint Task Force (MNJTF), 132

243

N Netherlands, 71, 73, 76, 77, 147, 206 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), 69 new regionalism, 3, 7, 12, 13, 16, 17, 63 Niger, 85, 87, 95, 101, 117, 118, 120, 122, 127, 128, 135, 137, 140, 143–145, 228 Nigeria, 127, 139, 141, 200, 205, 208 North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), 43 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), 121 Norway, 70, 71, 73, 75 O Official Development Assistance (ODA), 64 regional, 64–67, 69, 70, 75–77, 227 security-related, 64, 65, 68, 69, 77, 227 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 64, 65 organizational overlap, 35, 36, 39, 42, 45–47, 49–51, 54, 55 Organization of African Unity (OAU), 46, 107 overlapping regionalism, 3, 13, 23, 36, 227, 234 Overseas countries and territories (OCTs), 116 P Peace and Security Council (PSC), 110, 111, 113, 135, 161 peacekeeping, 10, 75, 91, 92, 97, 162, 173, 189, 198, 201

244

INDEX

Peace Support Operations (PSO), 116 performance, 4, 8, 14, 17, 19–21, 39, 51, 78, 157, 180, 224, 230, 231, 233, 234 power position, 19, 22, 123, 225 relation, 66 Priority Investment Programme (PIP), 135, 136, 141, 142, 144, 145, 147, 148, 150, 231 problematic situation, 18, 130, 140, 149

R Regional Coordination Cell (RCC), 145 Regional Early Warning System (REWS), 113 Regional economic community (REC), 199 regional governance approach, 17, 129, 225, 230 Regional Indicative Programs (RIPs), 163, 168, 197, 198 regional public administrations, 26, 190, 192–195, 197, 198, 201, 210, 231 research gap, 4–6, 9, 157, 190, 191 resource dependence, 193–195, 201, 211 rivalry, 119, 137, 138, 230

S securitization, 223, 229 security complex, 25, 108, 229 cooperation, 5, 9, 26, 117, 131, 132, 137, 138, 156–158, 160, 165, 179, 223, 224, 231, 233 institution, 10, 108

situation-structural approach, 9, 18, 20, 23, 225 situation-structure, 18, 22, 225 Somalia, 83–88, 90, 93, 97, 99, 116, 156, 161, 228, 229 South Africa, 45 Southern African Customs Union (SACU), 66 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 9, 44, 47, 50, 51, 54, 68, 69, 73, 76, 109, 113, 196, 227 sovereignty, 12, 99, 129–131, 134, 143, 149, 170 state-society relations, 85, 98 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 140 strategic culture, 85, 96, 97, 102 suasion-game, 20, 234 Sudan, 117, 229 summit, 47, 89–91, 93, 96, 97, 115, 122, 128, 135, 159, 168 Sweden, 70, 71, 73, 75

T terrorism, 86–89, 92, 93, 95, 118, 120, 122, 140, 143, 156, 159 threat, 88, 92–95, 101, 102, 117, 130, 138, 140, 167–170, 175–177, 180, 211, 229, 230 trade agreement, 24, 41, 46, 49, 56, 227 inner-African, 41, 44 inner REC, 44 internal, 41–45 regime, 23, 24, 35–37, 41, 45, 47, 55, 56, 226 transaction costs, 193, 195, 204–206, 210

INDEX

U Union du Maghreb Arabe (UMA), 44 United Kingdom (UK), 71, 98 United Nations (UN) conference on trade and development (UNCTAD), 42, 46 development programme (UNDP), 140, 147 Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), 48 population fund (UNFPA), 70 security council (UNSC), 144

245

United States of America (US, USA), 114 W WATIP (Promoting West Africa Trade Integration), 204 West Africa–EU relations, 163 West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA, WAEMU), 13 West African Monetary Union (WAMU), 119 World Bank (WB), 147 World Trade Organisation (WTO), 115