Reflections on the Study of Religion: Including an Essay on the Work of Gerardus van der Leeuw [Reprint 2011 ed.] 902797604X, 9789027976048

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Reflections on the Study of Religion

RR

Religion and Reason 15 Method and Theory in the Study and Interpretation

of Religion

GENERAL EDITOR Jacques Waardenburg, University of Utrecht BOARD OF ADVISERS Th. P. van Baaren, Groningen R. N. Bellah, Berkeley E. Benz, Marburg U. Bianchi, Rome H. J. W. Drijvers, Groningen W. Dupre, Nijmegen S. N. Eisenstadt, Jerusalem M. Eliade, Chicago C. Geertz, Princeton K. Goldammer, Marburg P. Ricoeur, Paris and Chicago M. Rodinson, Paris N. Smart, Lancaster and Santa Barbara, Calif. G. Widengren, Stockholm

M O U T O N P U B L I S H E R S · T H E H A G U E · PARIS · NEW YORK

Reflections on the Study of Religion Including an Essay on the Work of Gerardus van der Leeuw JACQUES WAARDENBURG University

of Utrecht

MOUTON P U B L I S H E R S · T H E Η AGUE · PARIS · NEW YORK

ISBN: 90-279-7604-X Jacket design by Jurriaan Schröter © 1978, Mouton Publishers, The Hague, The Netherlands Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge

Dedicated to o u r son George Nicolaas Christophoor on the day of his birth

Preface

T h e papers brought together here constitute, with two exceptions, the texts of lectures delivered at different times and places, between 1970 and 1975, most of them unpublished. They all concern the scholarly study of religion, though they were held before audiences with different backgrounds: in Boston and Leipzig, Warsaw and Providence, Toronto, Bonn and Utrecht. Since the lectures were given by invitation, the subjects vary widely. Yet they all originate in a sincere intellectual concern about the various ways and means by which we study religions and religion. If it is true that such studies have become a need of our time and that they respond to needs of present-day society and culture, we should use our intelligence to reflect upon what we are doing. As they stand, these papers do not pretend to offer a completely new methodology or to give a definite answer to major theoretical questions. They simply express an ongoing reflection on the ways in which we have to deal intellectually with the phenomenon of religion, which reveals itself as being so profoundly human. I hope that this will contribute to the ongoing discussion about method and theory which takes place among scholars and students of religion, and that it will clarify some issues of this discussion. As a contrast and counterpoint to my own considerations, one paper has been added as a tribute to Gerardus van der Leeuw, a scholar who adopted another approach and came to other results. More than twenty-five years after his death he should be remembered as a pioneer who with his phenomenology found his lonely way through that strange world of religious phenomena which fascinated him. One of the underlying intentions of these papers is to plead for fresh research in the field of subjective meaning, in particular when religious meanings are concerned. Several lines of approach may be adopted to carry it out, one of which is that of a new style phenomenological research, the basic outlines of which are given below. In as far as this task is then assigned to phenomenology of religion, this discipline can assume its legitimate function within the study of religion (Religionswissenschaft) in general, and the systematic and comparative study of religion in particular. In its new form phenomenology of religion will reaffirm its hermeneutical character and once more put its confidence in the plain use of reason when concentrating on the problem of religious meanings. The study of religion as conceived of here is an academic and empirical area

viii

Preface

of studies, without a specific philosophical or theological stand. Its aim being to investigate religion, students working in this field need to be good specialists in their particular branch of research. At the same time they should be able to look at the materials with a view to problems which are not restricted to pure literary, historical, anthropological or other kinds of fact finding and factual analysis but are formulated from the wider perspective and angle of the study of religion. Indeed, when dealing with religious materials we ought to be continuously reminded that facts are facts, that they are to be handled correctly, and that they should be explained and interpreted on the level they deserve. T h e papers are published here in the form and style in which they were submitted for delivery at the time, with some minor adjustments in the English idiom. A separate index of the terminology of Gerardus van der Leeuw (Ch. 11) has been added, the references of which are not included in the indices of proper names and subjects. Papers dealing with specific Islamic subjects have been excluded from this volume. I overcame my hesitations to let these papers be printed with the argument that they should be offered for consideration, discussion and debate - to the extent that the problems treated or alluded to are worth such an effort. Among those who kindly invited and encouraged me to put these reflections into words I mention with gratitude the names of Professors J. B. Carman, H.-J. Klimkeit, H. W. Mason, H. R. Moehring, Z. Poniatowski, K. Rudolph and D. Ugrinovitch. I am grateful to Professors A. G. Cryns, R. L. Nettler, M. L. Swartz and P. Staples for kindly correcting the English style and idiom of these papers. Professors Th. P. van Baaren, H. J. W. Drijvers and W. Dupre were willing to read the manuscript in their capacity of Advisers to the series 'Religion and Reason'. Particular thanks are due to my former student Mr. J. J. ten Ham for kindly allowing me to use in the last paper the gist of his findings on the theological ideas of Van der Leeuw, contained in his thesis written in Dutch and submitted at the University of Utrecht. My wife, Dr. Hilary Kilpatrick, most generously did the time-consuming definitive editing work and made the text more intelligible to English-speaking readers. It is most gratifying to both of us to be able to dedicate this book to our son, born on this very day. Thanks are expressed to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences in Wassenaar, for providing the facilities to prepare this book during my stay there in 1974-75. The author is happy to publish these papers as a volume in the series 'Religion and Reason', devoted to problems of method and theory in the study of religion. Amersfoort, 18 December 1976

J. D. J. Waardenburg

PREFACE INTRODUCTION

Part One: Reflections on the Study of Religion 1. O B J E C T I V E

FACTS AND S U B J E C T I V E

MEANINGS

IN T H E

STUDY

OF R E L I G I O N

Introductory; i. Definitions; 2. Aims of the study of religion; 3. Object, subject and subjectivity; 4. Scholarly research; 5. Subjective meanings and objective facts. 2. R E C E N T T R E N D S IN D U T C H S T U D I E S OF R E L I G I O N

Introductory; 1. The tradition in history of religion; 2. Some new orientations in the study of religion; 3. T h e interest in the study of religion; 4. Dutch phenomenology of religion as a heritage; 5. New style phenomenology of religion and phenomenological research; Conclusion. 3 . T H E I N T E L L E C T U A L S I T U A T I O N OF A S T U D E N T OF R E L I G I O N

Part Two: A Plea for Methodological Awareness 4. A N E E D FOR

METHODOLOGY

Introductory; 1. Formulated problems; 2. T h e 'classical' phase; 3. Some critical observations; 4. Other branches in the field; 5. T h e Dutch scene; 6. Some conditions for progress.

χ

Contents

5. T H E QUEST FOR METHOD

Introductory; 1. Situations in which the quest for method can emerge; 2. Two different ways in which it may occur; 3. The reasons why such a quest may occur; 4. Some implications of the quest for method; 5. Why is the quest for method not stated more often? 6. T H E C A T E G O R Y OF F A I T H IN P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L

RESEARCH

Ι. Preliminary remarks; 2. Faith in connection with the subject matter of research; 3. Faith in connection with the subject carrying out research; 4. Faith in connection with the relationship between subject and object of research; 5. Some categories of 'new style' phenomenological research; 6. Faith as a concept in phenomenological research.

Part Three: Phenomenology of Religion Reconsidered 7. P H E N O M E N O L O G Y OF R E L I G I O N : A S C H O L A R L Y D I S C I P L I N E , A P H I L O S O P H Y , OR AN A R T ?

ι. Research on meaning; 2. Phenomenology of religion; 3. Three lines of approach; 4. Larger signification systems and the study of subjective meaning; 5. Understanding; 6. The researcher; 7. Religious and nonreligious quality; 8. Direct expressions and objectified phenomena; understanding a 'religious universe'; 9. Four kinds of phenomenological studies; 10. Research into intentions; 11. Notion of religion; 12. Scholarly character; 13. Phenomenology as an art; 14. Philosophical aspects; 15. Summary. 8. T O W A R D

A

NEW

STYLE

PHENOMENOLOGICAL

RESEARCH

ON

RELIGION

Introduction; 1. The intention as basic concept; examples; 2. Selfdefinitions of phenomenology of religion; 3. Three main questions of phenomenology of religion; 4. Some criticisms to be made of 'classical' phenomenology of religion; 5. Examples of an investigation of intentions; 6. Notes on fundamental questions; Conclusion.

Contents

χι

Part Four: Applications 9. T H E S I T U A T I O N OF P R E S E N T - D A Y R E L I G I O N S

141

Introduction; i. T h e scholarly study of religion; 2. New style phenomenological research on religion; 3. Changes in the realm of present-day religions; 4. A n attempt at interpretation; Conclusion. 10. I S S U E S OF D I S C U S S I O N IN C O N T E M P O R A R Y R E L I G I O N S

163

Introduction; 1. Preliminary definitions; 2. Some issues of present-day religious discussions; 3. T h e search for a sociological interpretation; 4. Religious discussions about modernization; Conclusion.

Part Five: Out of the History of the Study of Religion 11. G E R A R D U S

VAN

DER L E E U W

AS A T H E O L O G I A N A N D

PHENO-

MENOLOGIST

187

i. Biographical data and activities; 2. Publications and archives; 3. Theological development; 4. Theological aesthetics: religion and art; 5. History of religions; 6. Phenomenology of religion; 7. Other written work; 8. Historical context and influence in the Netherlands. REFERENCES

249

INDEXES

1. Index of proper names 2. Subject index 3. Index on terminology Gerardus van der Leeuw ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

255 258 272 281

Introduction

Apart from the essay on Van der Leeuw, all the papers contained in this book consist of more or less personal reflections. They are concerned with the ways in which religion ought to be studied if we want to do justice both to the general requirements of scholarly research and to the meaning which religious expressions, phenomena and institutions convey to those who have to do with them. After my Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion, I thought it might be useful to publish something on what I see as my own approach in this field of research. My student years in Amsterdam in the early fifties, when I concentrated on 'classical' phenomenology of religion, were the starting-point for these considerations. They have developed subsequently through acquaintance with other approaches, through stimulating discussions in places as far apart as Paris and Montreal, Los Angeles and Utrecht, and indirectly through professional work in Islamic studies. Throughout these years I have become more and more interested in the ways in which man has tried, at different times and in different places, to orient and organize his life with the help of religion, and in the many different roles which religion has played among people both as individuals and in society. The book, consequendy, does not contain studies of specific source materials and the papers even hardly refer to such materials. These are papers of abstract reflection on questions such as how to consider the scholarly study of religion, how to envisage religion so as to pursue a fruitful study of it, and how to further a new style of phenomenological research in the field of religion. This reflection is also abstract in as much as no explicit discussion of alternative approaches is undertaken. The arguments have been developed for their own sake and there are not many notes and references. It was not in but after these lectures that discussions with colleagues took place and this accounts for the fact that there are only a few places in which other scholars are mentioned. This certainly reflects the relative solitude of a researcher working in the field of method and theory, although I have tried not to be insensitive to existing theories. Given the fact that this book has its origin in lectures delivered at different occasions for very different audiences, its unity has posed a problem. T h e disadvantage of this composition is that it is not a 'book' in the usual sense of the word, that is a monograph, but the advantage is that the reader can read

2

Introduction

the chapters more or less independently of each other. In the arrangement the chronological development of thought has been sacrificed to a more systematic presentation under four headings. Needless repetitions have been eliminated as much as possible, and of some papers which had been published in English earlier only smaller parts have been reproduced. The major themes running through all these papers can be summarized as: emphasis on the need for method in scholarship, the development of a new style phenomenological research, awareness of the present-day religious situation, the effort to understand the inner structure of the work of a scholar. Behind these different themes there is the basic search for an honest intellectual position on the part of one who happens to be a professional student of religion. If this is an abstract book, the explanation lies in the nature of the problems with which a student of religion is confronted in his research and reflections, and perhaps also in the fact that it represents a more abstract period in my work. It is, in the end, more concrete research which will have to prove the scholarly validity of what has been written down in a reflective mood. The first part, Reflections on the Study of Religion, contains texts of a fairly general nature. T h e first paper, Objective facts and subjective meanings in the study of religion', employs a philosophical approach to a number of issues of the study of religion. T h e contention is that, although fact and meaning are inseparable from each other, a fundamental distinction between them has to be made, especially if interest is focussed on the problem of 'subjective meaning'. Further issues briefly dealt with include the subject-object relationship in the study of religion, the subjectivity of the scholar in this field of research, the demand for objectivity, the rational character of the investigation, and the structural symmetry between religious interpretations of reality and scholarly interpretations of religion. The second paper, 'Recent trends in Dutch studies of religion', traces the main lines of research between 1945 and 1970, with reference to trends of research elsewhere in the West. T h e third paper, ' T h e intellectual situation of a student of religion', has been taken from a contribution to a Festschrift for a distinguished scholar in the field of anthropology of religion, and seeks to portray the mental oudook of a student of religion in the present state of research in this field. The second part, A Plea for Methodological Awareness, is a call to maintain the scholarly character of this area of studies by sticking to methodical self-criticism. I n ' A need for methodology' it is argued that the leading notion in any discussion on methods should be the heuristic principle, that is to say the principle of searching for the best method by which to know a given subject matter and the

Introduction

best theory to define this optimal knowledge. Scholarly research can be arranged along an axis representing different ways of putting problems, and a number of basic positions in the study of religion can be sorted out accordingly. The need to move from factual research to a more philosophical reflection and self-criticism with regard to all-too-easy assumptions and evidences is stressed, and in this connection a development is sketched from the 'classical' study of religion to newer ways of studying as they have developed in the specialized disciplines. The paper concludes with an enumeration of basic tendencies which have been observable in the study of religion in the Netherlands over the period 1968-1973 and some basic conditions for further progress in this area of studies. The second paper in this section is 'The quest for method in the study of religion'. It discusses the situations in which the quest for method can emerge out of concrete research, the fact that this quest may occur as a technical and a theoretical question, the reasons why such a quest for method may occur, some of its implications, and last but not least the question why the quest itself is not stated more often. The third paper, 'The category of faith in phenomenological research' discusses the ways in which the notion of 'faith' arises in the study of religion, with regard to the subject matter under investigation, the person of the researcher, and the relationship between the student and his subject of inquiry. From the discussion it appears that, within phenomenological research, the term should be redefined, and an appropriate definition is proposed accordingly. The third part, Phenomenology of Religion Reconsidered, tries to give an account of the discipline of phenomenology of religion in its classical form over the last hundred years. It is not meant, however, only as a historical description but also as a critical discussion of the discipline's assumptions and aims, in the light of research on meaning. The first paper, 'Phenomenology of religion: A scholarly discipline, a philosophy or an art?', distinguishes between phenomenology as a movement of thought and as a movement of research, although the two are not seen as completely separate. After a short discussion of the concept of meaning, three lines of approach are distinguished, each with its own way to tackle the problem of how to understand religious meaning. Subsequendy, the problem of understanding is broached, with the actual situation of a phenomenologist as a point of departure. In the last analysis, understanding is shown to bear on human intentions directed towards intended objects, through the analysis of facts that hint, within the scope of the subject under study, at what may be called a transcendent reference implicit in them. A fundamental distinction is made between such an analysis of facts which come from the past and one of those produced in the present, since the research facilities are different in each case, even if the scholar's task remains the same. The study of living religion is likely

4

Introduction

to prove most fruitful for new style phenomenological research on meaning. Next, consideration is given to certain objections which deny the scholarly character of phenomenology, such as the disparity in the results reached by different phenomenologists working in the field of religion. Although the discipline's scholarly character is defended, in certain respects it is also recognized to be a philosophy, and an art. T h e next paper, which was a German lecture, 'Toward a new style phenomenological research on religion', elaborates more systematically the way in which classical phenomenology of religion has to realign itself with its own subject matter by concentrating largely on the intentions which are at the basis of both human expressions and human interpretations. T h e successive subjects dealt with are: the intention as a basic concept, selfdefinitions of phenomenology of religion, and some objections to be made to classical phenomenology of religion. In this context examples are given, some fundamental questions present in the discipline since its beginning are reformulated, and the paper ends by discussing some problems which arise once phenomenology of religion has been redefined in the proposed way. It is shown to what kind of investigations new style phenomenological research on religion can lead. Part Four, Applications, contains two papers dealing with the contemporary religious scene. T h e first, ' T h e situation of present-day religions', read both in Western and in Eastern Europe, approaches this subject from the point of view of the new style phenomenological research mentioned above. After having dealt with the particular nature of this kind of research within Religionswissenschaft, issues such as the following are reviewed under the broad heading of changes in the realm of present-day religions: general and worldwide phenomena; phenomena which radically change specific world religions; problems of a non-religious nature which confront these religions; and phenomena concerning changes in human consciousness. An attempt at interpretation is made, with a conclusion arrived at within the framework of a phenomenological investigation in its oudines. At the beginning and end of this paper some more theoretical issues are clarified. T h e second paper, 'Issues of discussion in present-day religions', betrays a more sociological orientation. Discussions in general and religious discussions in particular are seen here as social facts which occur regularly under specific conditions, and this paper deals with the impact which these conditions have on both the form and the content of the discussions. T h e argument is developed with a treatment of some preliminary definitions, and then of issues dealt with in present-day religious discussions in one way or another (modernization, secularization, encounter), and the search for a sociological interpretation of such discussions. Dominant issues in these discussions in different world

Introduction

5

religions and their possible effects are then looked at, and the nature of a sociological interpretation and of content analysis of them is analyzed. As an example, closer attention is paid to religious discussions about modernization and the different positions which can be taken in them. Some conclusions on the extent to which present-day religious discussions arise out of technical, economic and social change round off the paper. T h e fifth part, Out of the History of the Study of Religion, is devoted in its entirety to 'Gerardus van der Leeuw as a theologian and phenomenologist'. Very few publications on Van der Leeuw in English have appeared up to now; in Dutch T h . P. van Baaren and F. Sierksma have made severe criticisms on the basis of Van der Leeuw's handling of empirical data. A f t e r an account of the main biographical data and a reference to bibliographical and archival materials, a large section is devoted to Van der Leeuw's theological development, where a master's thesis by a Dutch theologian is made use of. Van der Leeuw's theological development is held to be of basic importance for any understanding of his phenomenological and more broadly cultural work. T h r e e periods can be distinguished in this development, and the main ideas and concepts are presented according to Van der Leeuw's own interpretation. T h e n his phenomenological work is considered both in relation to his theological ideas and for its own sake; it transpires that for Van der Leeuw phenomenology of religion was fundamentally a theological discipline which he could equally well call 'phenomenological theology'. A f t e r a section on his work as a historian of religions, Van der Leeuw's phenomenological work is analyzed according to its theoretical and methodological assumptions. Further attention is given to the Dutch context of his manifold activities, and in this way a first sketch is presented of a personality whose biography is still to be written. Within the framework of this book, Van der Leeuw is seen as one of the enthusiastic promoters of phenomenology of religion, and as a representative of the discipline in its classical phase with specific theological concerns. I trust that these papers will speak for themselves. T h e y contain various proposals, some of which may be summarized here as follows. We should try to open u p the implicit ' h u m a n ' dimension of religious data by considering them as expressions which allow us to learn about those who have expressed themselves religiously. Such religious expressions can be considered as a special case of human expressions in general. In our research we should pay special attention to the intentions contained in these expressions and search for the direction which such intentions give to man's existence. We should try to interpret religion according to the meanings which specific individuals and groups have derived from it.

6

Introduction

T h e adoption of such proposals will enhance the social relevance of the study of religion, which requires more attention than it has been given until now. This social relevance can be seen largely in the possible contribution which this field of studies can make to the understanding of people of different cultures, traditions, faiths and ideologies, and to a better insight into their inclinations, needs and aims * * A summary in German of the author's position can be found in his 'Religion vom Blickpunkt der religiösen Erscheinungen', in the Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, Vol. 19 (1977), Fase. 1/2, pp. 62-77.

PART ONE

Reflections on the Study of Religion

1

Objective Facts and Subjective Meanings in the Study of Religion* INTRODUCTORY

My first concern as a professional student of religion rather than as a philosopher or theologian is the study of concrete materials: facts and their meaning. But a serious study of these matters cannot but lead to further reflection on the methods and procedures to be followed in our research, and on the larger problems of a more philosophical nature which are imposing themselves in the course of this research. Any scholar who wants to carry out this reflection on a broader basis than sheer facts and personal references runs into problems of philosophy and theology; and this, frankly speaking, is one of the attractive sides of the study of 'things religious', the study of religion. Looking for what is generally valid we have to speak in abstract terms and in a terminology with philosophical implications. Consequently, it is on this level of fairly abstract thinking that we meet philosophical and theological thought, and that a dialogue can start between a professional student of religion and a professional philosopher or theologian, in so far as both face the same or similar problems which they want to resolve. T h e meeting-place itself apparently lies in the realm of 'method and theory in the study and interpretation of religion', which, by the way, is the subtitle of the monograph series 'Religion and Reason' which is devoted to this kind of problems. In this realm of 'method and theory' a philosopher will recognize problems with which he is dealing in his own way; for the student of religion this field not only contains the clues to his own technical investigations, but it also provides (or at least formulates) the very roots of his interests and the impetus which feeds his curiosity and which, in the last analysis by providing the intentions of his very research, will determine the nature of the relationship that he will acquire with his materials and the object under investigation. It is unnecessary to insist here on the relevance of this field of 'method and theory of the study and interpretation of religion', which is the subject of this paper. * Paper read in the Franklin J. Matchette Lecture Series on Humanistic Perspectives in Science, Art and Religion (Boston University 1973-1974) in Boston, Mass., 6 November 1973.

ίο

I.

Reflections on the study of religion

DEFINITIONS

Objective facts and subjective meanings': in order to avoid any misunderstanding in the use of these terms, let me try to clarify rapidly some of these concepts. I would hope that my own usage does not divert too much from that used in what might be called ordinary philosophical language and human intellectual discourse. Objective facts are those data, the existence of which can be ascertained or proved in themselves: either at a certain historical place and time ('specific' facts), or in general as due to occur without regard to a particular place and time ('general' facts; the expression is paradoxical). Subjective facts (as opposed to objective ones) would then be data which exist in the experience of one person or group, but the existence of which cannot be affirmed objectively in themselves, with adequate proof. However, such 'subjective facts' can be registered objectively and labelled as 'existing in so and so's experience'. Objective facts are the basis of scholarship; their factual existence can be proved, and any denial of it can be refuted. But this does not preclude that the meaning or significance which such objective facts may have for different people may vary considerably and that even the perception of and sensitivity for such objective facts may be stronger or weaker among different people, some of whom may even have 'blind spots' which make them deny objective facts which are recognized by common sense and knowledge. The meaning or significance which objective facts have as such, or which is assigned to them by scholarship as their objective meaning, largely depends on the context within which these facts occur, or within which they are seen and appreciated. Facts are elements of reality, which to a certain extent can be known; they are not necessarily reality itself. What we call 'religious' facts are in the first place facts which occur in a context which qualifies them as 'religious' in the view of the culture or the society in question. In the second place, and more precisely, facts are called 'religious' because of the meaning which they have, not only a religious meaning existing in a particular context (culture), but also a religious meaning for certain persons or groups. And here we come to the concept of a religious 'subjective meaning'. A subjective meaning is a significance which is valid for someone or for a particular group. In this way we can speak of the (subjective) meaning of Muhammad for Muslims - Muhammad's significance as it is valid for Muslims. Now, such a significance may be of general validity for all mankind in any place and at any time (for instance the significance of taking food); it may also be valid only within a particular culture or society, and then for a particular person or group. But we are not concerned here with the nature of the significance in itself,

Objective facts and subjective meanings

11

nor can we stop at the profound reasons for the 'fact' that man cannot live without significances and may develop a search for meaning: of his own life, of the world in which he lives, of life and world as he wants them to be. What does concern us, however, from a scholarly point of view, is that specific things and specific persons or groups can have a certain meaning for a particular person or group. As a matter of fact, this 'subjective meaning' should be made an object of investigation. By definition there are no general, but only specific subjective meanings. They exist only for particular persons or groups. Such subjective meanings may be classified in different ways. There are subjective meanings which are linked to specific facts which exist only for particular persons or groups; then there are subjective meanings which are linked to more general facts which have different meanings for different people. We could also say, more philosophically, that subjective meanings may be linked not so much to 'general facts' as to generally valid significances which have to do with the nature of the human condition as such - let us say the significance of human love; although such general significances will have completely different (subjective) meanings for different people, not only individually but also according to their different cultural and other backgrounds. Nevertheless - and I think this is an important point in an adequate study of religion - all human beings somehow have to deal with problems connected with such general significances valid for all mankind, because of man's psycho-biological nature and the overall human condition which define what man can, and cannot, be and do. But however we may classify subjective meanings, it is remarkable to observe that man cannot live without such subjective meanings, even if he will mostly be aware of them on a level of feeling, and be conscious of most of them only by way of implication. Now, what may be qualified, within the whole of subjective meanings, as a religious meaning? At first sight one is inclined to work descriptively: a religious meaning 'touches' some essential part of a person or a group; it has a ' f o u n d i n g ' character in so far as it implies a new start; it puts everything including man's life in a 'fundamental' light or perspective. In cultural history we may say that, in a culture which is religiously oriented, it is the perception and resulting action of religious meanings that will be the basis, the dynamic force, the integrating element of such culture. But, on further reflection, there is something peculiar about a religious meaning which distinguishes it from other subjective meanings; religious meaning apparently cannot be 'fixed' in words or actions. On the contrary, such words and actions are rather 'subjected' to such meaning so that they can merely refer to it, instead of seizing and grasping it. It is fair to say that if a man has to take great pains to express adequately, for instance in words, what

12

Reflections on the study of religion

something of daily occurrence, something ordinary, means to him, and if it is difficult for him to act entirely according to it, man apparently - according to his own experience - is in principle quite unable to express or formulate in a precise way the religious meaning which something has for him, or to act entirely according to this meaning. From the point of view of the study of religion, and probably that of a philosophical anthropology, there is in a religious meaning a 'surplus' value which has some absolute connotation for the people concerned. We may not necessarily characterize this surplus value as being 'mysterious' I would not be inclined to do so a priori - but we should observe this fact and take it into account in a scholarly study of religion that seeks to deal adequately with its subject-matter.

2. A I M S OF T H E S T U D Y OF R E L I G I O N

A crucial point is reached here: when is the scholarly study of religion to be called ' adequate' ? Discussions among scholars of religion have been going on for a long time, and will continue to do so as long as religion remains a subject of scholarly interest, and as long as the study of religion remains scholarly. Some major positions as to subject matter and aim of the study of religion can be enumerated here: 1) the task of the scholar is to establish facts, 'real facts', historical or social, in a critical way (the concern may be with all kinds of facts); 2) relationships between those facts (causal or otherwise) should be ascertained; 3) recurrent relationships or patterns of such facts should be established; 4) the actual meanings of given facts and other data for the people concerned should be understood (for instance by paying special attention to the faith of these people and the way it makes them look at the world and themselves); 5) the various meaning-patterns, religious and non-religious, which are current in a given society at a certain time, and in which people participate actively or more passively should be grasped. As is known, arguments can be brought forward in support of each position; and I would be inclined to grant that each position has its own merits provided it does not claim to be the only way to scholarly truth. Time precludes us from going into several other distinctions which can be made between the ways in which the study of religion has been conceived, depending on whether the research should have a theoretical framework, or should be carried out pragmatically, and whether the scholar himself should or should not be committed to a faith or an ideal beyond simple scholarship. And of course the special disciplines from which

Objective facts and subjective meanings

13

scholars have come, or the specific subject matter on which they have worked, have determined to a great extent the positions they have taken in the study of religion. With these qualifications, I would associate myself with the last two groups of students of religion, where the problem of 'subjective meaning' is pre-eminent. Religious facts are then studied as human - individual or social - expressions which imply certain intentions. Religious expressions in particular can be interpreted as testimonies of something that has some kind of absolute meaning to the people concerned, because they refer to or 'signify' some transcendent significance considered to be of absolute validity. Religion, then, has been the locus of the problem of meaning for man in his search for 'absolute' meaning; consequently, that study of religion ought to be called adequate which does full justice to the character of religion as a provider, or rather founder, of meaning. A method of investigation should be applied that enables us to interrogate our materials in such a way that the facts become transparent, disclosing what they mean to the people involved with them. In other words, we see it as our task to probe deeply into or X-ray facts and patterns of facts in such a way that they become 'phenomena' revealing the very intentions which are implied with them and which they awaken in the people who have to do with them. Our investigations must be scholarly, not only in the sense that facts must be established correctly, but also in the sense that there should be logical support, and moreover a real logical guarantee that our hypotheses and possible theories are legitimate - even if they cannot be proved with complete certitude. This kind of study of religion has a strong communicative aspect: communication, on the one hand, between the scholar and the materials before him with which he must be thoroughly familiar and as if in a situation of interrogation and a sort of 'dialogue'; communication, on the other hand, with other scholars who may approach the same subject matter from a different angle and using different methods.

3. O B J E C T ,

SUBJECT AND

SUBJECTIVITY

A major issue in the study of religion is that of the object-subject relationship, that is to say the relationship between the object of investigation and the subjectinvestigator. I already have suggested that this relationship is determined primarily by the intentions of the scholar, to the extent that they are contained in his methodical and theoretical reflection, and awakened, corrected, stimulated, and so forth by the interpreted materials before him. It is perhaps good to re-

14

Reflections on the study of religion

formulate the old problem of 'objectivity' versus 'subjectivity' in the study of religion in such a way that the dialectical relation between subject and object becomes clear, and the idea of a fixed subject which is confronted with a fixed object is abolished. Instead, there is a dialectical movement, a coming and going between the scholar's interpretation, and the permanent residue of the object or subject matter which escapes this 'total' interpretation and gives rise to new questions and further inquiries on the scholar's part. T o use the terminology of my dissertation, it is the distance between l'image de l'Islam and la realite musulmane which would be, in the case of Islamic studies, the driving force of this dialectical movement. T o return for a moment to the situation of the scholar in the field of the study of religion, and in particular his subjectivity, the role of which has been much in discussion. On the one hand, we must always ask what kind of subjective factors play a role, and to what extent they are conditioned or even determined from outside. On the other hand we have to decide repeatedly what attitude we ought to take towards this apparent subjectivity in all religious studies. T h e suppression as well as the cultivation of this subjectivity have been recommended, and the fervor with which the debate has been conducted shows that, at least in the study of things religious, the problem of the attitude to be taken to the scholar's subjectivity - especially when his own religion, faith, and sympathetic capacities are challenged - has been a crucial issue for some time, not only for the scholars themselves, but also for their pupils, as well as for theologians and philosophers. Yet I would prefer to take here a realistic stand, fully acknowledging and appreciating the existence of the scholar, and not subjecting this reality a priori to any norm, even an absolute ideal of scholarship. We have to acknowledge the 'objective facts and the subjective meanings' of the scholar himself, as they reveal themselves for instance in a biographical approach to his work. The scholar is - whatever he or others may think - a human being: a mind, personality, living in a world which is his own, working within a unique overall' objective' situation (including contemporary ideological trends), possessing his own loyalties and intentions. In other words, the scholar, speaking on a scholarly level, is a reality with different levels; as such a reality he meets the reality of his subject matter, his object of inquiry. Is it not then a basic truth that, just as there are 'levels' in the scholar's existence, so there are also 'levels' in the object of inquiry in so far as this is human too? In the subject and the object of inquiry there is a structure of levels, ranging from the more factual, external and seemingly meaningless to the more complex, hardly factual but extremely meaningful. Realistically speaking, the social sciences

Objective facts and subjective meanings

15

and especially the humanities imply by their very nature a meeting of subjectivities: the subjectivity of the scholar, working through his instruments of investigation; and the subjectivity in the studied object, manifesting itself through its expressions of different kinds. And in neither case can this subjectivity be grasped directly. This problem is still more acute when it is religion which is studied from the point of view of the social sciences or humanities. Religious expressions as contained in the subject matter of study are quite near to the 'subjective realm' of man when he is studied - whatever may be his social conditioning; on the other hand, actual interest in such religious expressions and the study of them is close to the 'subjective realm' of the scholar. This is the reality of the situation. Even if everything possible is done to try to objectify the subject matter completely and to formalize the procedure of investigation so as to eliminate the individual scholar's subjectivity, this still remains a human choice with very definitive purposes conceived by a human mind in view of more far-reaching aims, whether well-chosen or ill-chosen. But in this analysis of the human situation of the scholar facing religious materials, the issue of subjectivity remains a tricky one, simply because this subjectivity, in my opinion, cannot be grasped directly. Even the most intense meeting of subjectivities takes place through objective elements or facts, and can be objectified itself and reduced to a level of facts. The heart of the meeting, however - and I would say the heart of fruitful research - is that of the recognition of subjectivities. And this is one of the reasons, as can readily be understood, why it is necessary to lay so much stress on the communicative element in these studies: communication with the subjectivity expressed in the scholar's materials (for the sake of acquiring knowledge), communication with other scholars (for the sake of seeing the proportions of the knowledge which has been acquired).

4.

SCHOLARLY

RESEARCH

After this realistic look at the scholar's situation, it is possible now to return to the study of religion and approach the core of the argument of this paper. We are all familiar with the old distinction made between a judgment of existence and a judgment of value, and the prescription that these should be separated in scholarly research. Next, questions like the following were raised: should a scholar entirely restrict himself to judgments of existence and refrain from any value judgment at whatever price and under whatever conditions? Does a pure judgment of existence without a value judgment actually exist? In other words,

16

Reflections on the study of religion

does a judgment of existence in fact not imply judgments of value, even if only because of the scholar's categories and models of interpretation which he has chosen himself, and his concepts and presuppositions which have been largely determined by his own contemporary culture and society? Is not all knowledge not only sociologically and psychologically conditioned, but also ideologically determined? As a consequence of these questions and their discussion it appeared as if the lofty ideal of a knowledge which would be generally valid and true could not only not be reached, but would eventually be replaced by another type of knowledge determined in the last analysis ideologically by a Weltanschauung, an ideology, or a theology, or else determined, again in the last analysis, by prescribed material benefits and precise practical applications. In the first case, research would be limited from within, in the second case from without. Let us not underestimate the repercussions of these discoveries of the possible consequences of recognized subjectivity; the subsequent discussions made the building of classical 'objective' scholarship tremble. In our field, for instance, an older type of 'science of religion' was called into question; a number of self-evident assumptions with regard to (religious) truth and reality had to be discarded; an evident and self-sufficient ethnocentrism and religiocentrism had to be abandoned; the whole field of the study of religion had to be deconfessionalized. The study of religion took its place as an autonomous field of studies, closely connected and cooperating with a number of other empirical disciplines. For my part I rejoice over this, and I am inclined to object to converting subjectivity into subjectivism, that is to say making an ideology of the fact of our subjectivity. I would be against employing the argument of the existing role of subjectivity in order to submit the study of religious matters - the study of religion - to any introduction of norms that would in fact impede the autonomy of it as a scholarly study, whatever the flag under which such norms would be introduced. And this not out of love for pure and absolute objectivity, but out of respect for the subject matter to be investigated. In this discussion of the nature of the study of religion, we would like to base ourselves, as much as possible, on reality. The firm foundation of scholarship is that our knowledge should refer to reality, and any knowledge which is not of reality has to be disqualified. We thereby assume that there is an implied and even qualified - relationship of the scholar with reality even before his investigation and reflection start; that through the materials studied such reality is digested in a particular way by the scholar's mind so that he arrives at knowledge; and that he may experience such reality in different ways and forms. All this may lead to knowledge of some kind, but in scholarly knowledge we are

Objective facts and subjective meanings

17

concerned with that particular knowledge of reality which is generally valid insofar as it has withstood the test of reason or experimentation or both. And this scholarly knowledge is characterized, roughly speaking, by: 1) designating, establishing and as far as possible knowing 'facts' or 'elements' in reality; 2) apprehending, deducing and verifying causal and other relationships between a number of those facts: discovering laws and regularities; 3) investigating how people react to these facts, adjust themselves to them, or overcome them by creating new facts. It is in this kind of scholarly investigation - the way in which people relate themselves to facts - that we would locate the study of subjective meanings.' Facts' are to be understood here, as a rule, not as realities in themselves, but rather as known elements of reality. At this point we should say that what is really objective is only reality itself. Man, however, is able to objectify what he perceives, experiences, thinks as reality. Here we have to do with 'objective' in a derivative sense, since it is the result of an objectification by man. But in scholarship it is precisely this kind of objectification which determines what a scholar accepts as' objective reality'. And, conversely, what is really subjective is man's interpretation of reality. This 'subjective' interpretation of reality is fully-acknowledged and made a subject of inquiry in the humanities. Scholarly research dealing with meanings has to start with the facts, establishing them, knowing them as far as possible. In the first place, we apply intelligence to 'objective' reality seen as coherent facts. But, in the second place, we apply it to the 'subjective' meanings which constitute the interpretation of these facts in a given religion. It is precisely intelligence which is able to distinguish between reality as facts, on the one hand, and the human (religious or scholarly) interpretations of it, on the other. And it is precisely intelligence that is able to carry out that dialectical movement between ascertainment of facts and hermeneutical analysis of meaning which we would like to call the backbone of scholarship. As a matter of fact there is a basic structural symmetry between the religion studied, on the one hand, and scholarship on the other. Both have to do with facts which they interpret: the first in order to assign meaning to them; the second in order to reconstitute that meaning in a scholarly way. Religion, in this kind of approach, is largely seen as an interpretation of reality; it poses meaning in, above, beyond or beneath it. And the study of religion as we see it is the endeavor to uncover and to find out that interpretation of reality which religion has given. By distinguishing meaning from factual reality, we are able to have access to the meanings which religion has assigned to reality.

18

Reflections on the study of religion

That this investigation, technically speaking, is beset with difficulties is clear; any book on hermeneutics deals with such problems at great length. In connection with the title of this particular topic it is worth noting that the scholar's attempt to reconstitute a religious interpretation of reality cannot avoid being an interpretation itself, even if the scholar intends to be as faithful an interpreter as possible. The culture of the scholar, the problems and ideologies of his time, his own place in reality and life, his own loyalities and so on, make for a scholarly interpretation which - in its turn - has a basic subjectivity in it. Especially when we look at the history of the study of religion, we are struck not only by the great number of religious interpretations of reality - that is to say by the plurality of religions, but also by the great number of scholarly interpretations of reality that is to say by the plurality of scholarly approaches. And it is interesting to see that the scholarly interpretations themselves are only in exceptional cases purely rational; they frequently have some elements of irrationality, if not in the interpretative construction itself, then in the interpretation's postulates. It would be most edifying to analyze the degree of irrationality of certain scholarly theories or interpretations of religion, and to compare them with the degree of irrationality of the so-called 'irrational' religious interpretations of reality. As far as I am concerned, I think the clue to a proper analysis of religious materials as well as of scholarly interpretations and theories about such materials is the concept of intention. Phenomenological research at least should be directed toward exposing or opening up the intentions contained in human expressions (religious or otherwise) or in human responses (religious or otherwise) to given data, real or imagined. Such research can also be extremely helpful for getting across the intentions which are contained in a given scholarly investigation, in the field of religion or elsewhere. I also would like to see religions not in the first place as doctrinal systems, prescribed codes of behavior and organizational institutions, but rather as sign systems, the elements of which refer to something beyond the empirical realm, at least for the faithful concerned. If we want to stress this signifying capacity of religious data we may speak of religions as signification systems. There is a feedback between the 'signs' communicated to man by a given religion, and the 'intentions' which make themselves felt in man, at least as far as religion is concerned. Research on intentions also has the advantage that it allows the consideration of both religious and non-religious intentions within the same perspective. Whereas classical Religionswissenschaft tended to distinguish between what was called religion and secular reality, the kind of phenomenological research we have in mind will see only a qualitative and not an absolute difference between a

Objective facts and subjective meanings

19

religious and a non-religious intention. It results that the orientation of a given intention, and the corresponding perception and use of given phenomena as signs, are what make such phenomena transparent to the person or group in question and may make them 'religious' to them. With this phenomenological research as envisaged here there is no return to 'irrational' interpretations of religious data; it is, rather, a way of dealing rationally with data that seem to characterize themselves as being irrational. Moreover, this research needs the solid study of facts and is based on the explicitly empirical disciplines. It provides, then, a means to hypothesize rationally about the 'internal aspect' of these facts, understood as the meaning they have for or convey to the people concerned with them. This research is not a rebirth of the subjectivity of the scholar which dominated so much classical phenomenology of religion. It is precisely the rational attempt on the part of the scholar's subjectivity to objectify something which is subjective, either outside or inside himself, and thus the demonstration that it is possible for subjectivity to objectify something given, albeit subjective, which is the crowning achievement of what we call scholarship.

5.

SUBJECTIVE

MEANINGS

AND

OBJECTIVE

FACTS

There now follow some general considerations and conclusions to close the preceding argument on the place of subjective meanings and objective facts in the study of religion. It is best to start with metaphysics. If we assume that consciousness is somehow aligned with being - that is to say if we do not adhere to the extreme idealist, materialist or solipsist position - the very distinction which human consciousness makes between fact and meaning would not only reveal one of the ways in which consciousness functions, but it might very well also imply that reality itself ought to be conceived as comprising one component of being and another of meaning. The relation between Being and Reason, reality and meaning, is an ancient problem with which Greek and Indian philosophers were already wrestling. I just indicate this metaphysical issue. As students of religion, and of man in general, our concern is to observe that man by his nature apparently cannot live without subjective meanings, religious or otherwise, which he assigns or receives; whether we perceive this as his greatness or his misery, as his weakness or his fundamental freedom. In what precedes another problem which leads us to sociology, has not yet been tackled: how to locate a 'subjective meaning' valid for a particular person or

20

Reflections on the study of religion

g r o u p within the society in which they live? O r in more general terms: how to locate specific subjective meanings within the whole range of meanings (or significances) which are offered to man within a particular culture and which lie 'stored', so to say, within the institutions of that culture, a m o n g which the language plays a principal role? A n d what are the factual conditions under which people select certain chosen meanings f r o m this reservoir of significances? O f course, man is not completely passive in this situation: values and meanings recognized as norms or lived realities in a culture are handed over to the newcomers and new generations; but to a large extent the latter are themselves looking for such meanings, and even throughout their lives, re-creating or even creating them themselves. For this study it must be questioned u n d e r which conditions any scholarly investigation of such 'subjective meanings' is possible. W h y should scholarship not limit itself to the faithful study of facts, and at most look for existing 'patterns of facts'? W h y bother at all about subjective meaning, since so many brilliant studies have been made of factual realities? In short: what is the driving force behind this search of ours for subjectivity and this study of subjective meanings? T h e r e are two possible answers at this point. In the first place, it is precisely in the search for what is objectively valid that the realm of subjectivity turns out to be objectively relevant. T h e study of religious facts, especially in living religion, leads logically to the question: what d o these facts, these traditions, these religions mean to the people subjectively? Second, in the attempt to understand others - if we are at all interested in them - it would seem to be insufficient to study their behavior, words and emotions only as facts. It would rather be necessary to try to understand the way in which they interpret the world and themselves, to go to the very roots of this world-interpretation of theirs, through understanding the factual data as expressions of subjectivity, or, technically speaking, as realizations of intentionality. For we would like to submit that this 'subjectivity' can be studied objectively to the greatest possible extent by recognizing that at the root of this subjectivity there are human intentions; and it is these intentions which may be supposed to give such and such a meaning structure to the world. It may be submitted that these intentions can be a subject of investigation, precisely through the realm of subjectivity. A n d this is the second reason of our concern with subjectivity. O u r proposed program of methodical and theoretical as well as empirical research does not intend any implied discrimination against scholars w h o use other procedures and have other aims in their study of religion. T h e r e o u g h t to be a division of labor just as in medical research, where a psychiatrist will concentrate on the subjective psychological component of a case under treatment,

Objective facts and subjective meanings

21

whereas a neurologist will rather investigate the physical aspects, and perhaps prescribe an eventual treatment through drugs. In a similar way, it can be said that there is a need for different approaches by different specialists in the investigation of religion. And it is such a pressing need, particularly at the present, when we cannot avoid putting the question: What is happening in our time? In a period in which societies and their members are changing profoundly, with consequent changes in their outlook on life and reality, research on human intentions, on what is really - in human terms - going on, that is, research concerning itself with 'religion', with 'faith', with 'religious heritage' or whatever name we may like to give it, is not only relevant, I would say it is indispensable.

2

Recent Trends in Dutch Studies of Religion*

INTRODUCTORY1

It was in 1876 that a law on higher education in the Netherlands offered the possibility of establishing chairs for the history of religion in the Theological Faculties of Dutch state universities. This in fact happened soon afterwards at the universities of Leiden, Amsterdam, Groningen and Utrecht, and later also at the confessional universities, the Roman Catholic University of Nijmegen and the neo-Calvinist 'Free University' in Amsterdam. Since 1945 these chairs of history of religion at the state universities have been split into two categories: on the one hand chairs for the religions of Antiquity around the Mediterranean, on the other chairs for the living religions. In conformity with the academic statutes, Christianity has been taken out of the history of religions, which was treated as one discipline, and the study of it has been divided into Biblical Studies, Church History, Ethics and the History of Christian Doctrines, which are of course taught in the Theological Faculties. In recent decades, the terms of reference for the chairs of History of Religion have also included Phenomenology of Religion, and in the last years lecturerships and research positions have been created, in addition to these chairs, in the specialized fields of history and phenomenology of religion. It is interesting to see that since World War II certain other specialized studies of religion have also become possible. There are now some lecturerships for Sociology of Religion and Anthropology of Religion in several Faculties of the Social Sciences, and in some Arts Faculties there are chairs and readerships for the cultural history of certain regions, of which the history of the religion(s) of that region forms a part. Outside the universities, however, there are no teaching or research posts. So much for the institutional side of the study of religion. I would like to say something here about the substance of the study of religion in the Netherlands in the following sections: * Paper read at the Institute of Sociology and Philosophy of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw, 12 June 1974. 1 On the history of the study of religion in the Netherlands in general, see alongside the publications on individual scholars: Van Proosdij (1970), Schreuder (1970), Waardenburg (1972), Yoroi (1969). A definitive study on the subject is being prepared by H. Buning. For continental Europe since 1968 see Waardenburg (1975; 1976).

24

Reflections on the study of religion

1) the continuation of the scholarly tradition, particularly of historical and literary research, which goes back to the 19th century and for certain fields, like that of classical studies, still earlier; 2) some new orientations in the study of religion, the roots of which go back especially to the social sciences, particularly after World War II and some more recent developments in phenomenology of religion, to which we intend to give special attention here. For a better understanding of these developments, however, we have to enter first into a particular question which unfortunately has been rather neglected in dealing with the history of the discipline, namely: 3) the sources of the interest that has existed generally in the study of religion in the Netherlands in the last hundred years. We come then to: 4) Dutch phenomenology of religion as a heritage; 5) new style phenomenology of religion and phenomenological research. We shall conclude with some general remarks about what 'new style' phenomenological research in religion aims at fundamentally, and in what important aspects it is different from the 'classical' phenomenology of religion.

I.

T H E T R A D I T I O N IN H I S T O R Y OF

RELIGION

Within the tradition of the scholarly history of religion we may distinguish three broad areas. (a) There is the study of Oriental and African languages and literatures in the Arts Faculty, a study which remains the inescapable condition for any historical study of the Asiatic and African religions. The center of gravity of these Oriental studies lies in Leiden, and Indian studies are strongly represented in Utrecht. Closely connected with the study of Oriental and African literatures is the study of history, including cultural history and history of religion. Thus, there are, for instance, chairs for Islamic studies, Buddhist studies and the Chinese-Japanese, Indonesian-Malaysian, Indian and African culture areas. Attention is paid to the modern history of these regions. (b) There is the study of the classical languages and literatures of the Greek and Romans, and also of the languages and literatures of the religions of Antiquity of the Mediterranean. The former are obviously studied in the Arts Faculty; the Egyptian, Akkadian and West Semitic languages and literatures are also studied in the Theological Faculty. This latter fact is due to an old tradition, which acquired its definite shape in the nineteenth century, of interest shown by historians of religion in the world in which the Bible has its origin in the broadest sense. This, among other reasons, led to the study of Akkadian, Egyptian, West-Semitic and also Iranian religions by the theologians. It has also

Recent trends in Dutch studies of religion

25

led them to study Hellenism and gnosis in the first centuries of the existence of Christianity. (c) There is the study of biblical and 'contemporary' non-biblical Jewish and especially Christian literature, and of course the study of the literature, history, doctrines and practices of Christianity. These studies are pursued in the Theological Faculties, which in the Netherlands - with the exception of two confessional universities - are part of the state universities and which, consequently, should, as scholarly study of religion, not be bound to confessional positions. In practice, however, the confessional background, or its absence, of students and scholars of religion have indeed played a role, especially if they have been working in the Theological Faculties. These are the three realms of research in the history of religion on the basis of literary and historical study, as it developed in the 19th century and will probably continue to develop in the future.

2. S O M E N E W O R I E N T A T I O N S IN T H E S T U D Y OF

RELIGION

Several examples can be given of new orientations in the study of religion, the roots of which go back especially to the social sciences, and only came into prominence after World War II. (a) The first example is in part a logical effect of the development of the history of religion as a discipline; it is the great interest in iconographic materials for the study of religion and the increasing investigations of pictorial material and art forms other than literature. The sources of the history of religion are not limited to texts and archeological findings. In Groningen, therefore, not only had Professor Th. P. van Baaren's unique collection of primitive art become the main substance of the new 'Anthropological Museum Gerardus van der Leeuw', but also at the Iconographic Institute an elaborate documentation has been brought together on religious iconographic materials from all over the world, with a great collection of photographs and slides, and with a specialized reference library. Professor van Baaren has also taken the initiative in editing the extensive series 'Iconography of Religions' which started in 1970and in which studies with pictorial reproductions on the iconography of individual religions and special periods will be appearing regularly for a long time to come. It may be observed, in this connection, that besides the manuscripts and books in the libraries, and besides the religious iconographic material in Groningen, a beginning has been made in Utrecht and Groningen with a collection of recordings of religious music of different religions.

26

Reflections on the study of religion

(b) It is no accident that iconographic materials are a subject of specialized research in Groningen. This is directly connected with the main interest of the specialization there, in non-literate religions, where work must in fact be carried out to a very large extent with other than written sources. Professor van Baaren links up in this respect with the interest of Gerardus van der Leeuw for the socalled 'primitives' and the older problem of the so-called 'primitive mentality'. We touch here the second example of a substantial new orientation in the study of religion: the elaboration of facts and theories of cultural anthropology as far as this discipline bases itself on empirical fieldwork. I may refer here also to a century-old tradition of Dutch anthropological research in Indonesia which still continues today, and extends to studies in other regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The sheer existence of the former Dutch Indies proved to be a powerful incentive not only to the study of Islam and adat law, but also to the study of the many different ethnic communities which continue to exist in present-day Indonesia. Even if such studies were a part of a period now past, if they were not unprejudiced and in part conditioned and sometimes even determined by political and administrative interests, the fact of the colony itself has awakened a research interest. This same interest has asserted itself more recently under different political conditions and also in other regions of Asia as well as in Africa, and it has rejuvenated itself both from a scholarly and from a human point of view. Such an anthropological interest is to be found at all Dutch universities, although anthropology of religion plays a modest role in it. We could note here four aspects of this new orientation of anthropology of religion in Holland. First, in 1968, the Groningen workinggroup for the study of fundamental problems and methods of science of religion was constituted, with participants from other universities as well. This workinggroup adopts anthropological starting-points to study religion as a function of culture; with the help of corresponding anthropological models it tries to analyze and where possible to explain the function of religious representations and behavior or actions within the context of given cultures. As a result of the group's discussions, there appeared in 1973 the book Religion, Culture and Methodology, edited by Th. P. van Baaren and H. J. W. Drijvers, which shows the application of these starting-points in different branches of the study of religion. Secondly, the problem of the relationship between religion and magic has been treated extensively in the last fifteen years, and the older theories about the relationship have been fundamentally challenged by different Dutch students of religion. The Groningen working-group has now begun to tackle this problem systematically and it also hopes to elaborate this set of problems theoretically from the point of view of different disciplines.

Recent trends in Dutch studies of religion

27

Thirdly, anthropology of religion received a new impetus in Utrecht through the work of Professor J. van Baal, who, in his book Symbols of Communication (1971), offers a penetrating examination of materials and theories of religion in a search for a new theory to explain the homo religiosus anthropologically and understand him accordingly. In this attempt at an interpretation of religion, the author seeks to do justice to the basically symbolic character of each human expression and in particular of each religious expression. T h e fundamental religious orientation should then be understood as a need for communication, or as a system of communication by means of symbols: of people with each other, and of people with reality, whereby nature and culture are brought into a direct relationship with each other. T h e 'scandal' of religion is, according to Professor van Baal, the fact that people believe in a non-empirical reality at all, and that they cannot be talked out of it even by the use of all the rational faculties. Fourthly, it is possible to elaborate, on the basis of present-day theories in cultural anthropology, a mainly functional model of religion so that religion is studied as a function of culture. On this basis, Professor van Baaren would like to replace classical phenomenology of religion by what he calls the systematic science of religion, which he sees as the counterpart of systematic theology. We shall come back later to this important methodical-theoretical position which has its origin mainly in the orientations of social and cultural anthropology, as they are applied in anthropology of religion. (c) As a third example of a new orientation we must mention the renewed interest which sociology of religion has enjoyed for about ten years in the Netherlands. Sociology of religion distinguishes itself from so-called 'ecclesiastical sociology' by the fact that it does not necessarily take its starting-point in the situation of church institutions and does not simply carry out its research in relation to the life of the churches. It is striking that religious demography (Religionsgeographie) is more in the background, whereas methodological arguments and discussions about interpretation occupy a place in the foreground. It is the foundations of sociological research on religion, the methodology and theory of the discipline, that ever and again come back into the center of discussion, and they provide perspectives from which social reality is approached as a whole, including its religion. The discussions in sociology of religion are conditioned partly by the commitments of each sociologist and his basic outlook on social reality, and partly by his personal attitude in matters religious and his view of religion. Consequendy, discussions on these matters have a considerable ideological content. This renewed interest in fundamental problems, which we find in sociology as well as in anthropology of religion, may be called the first aspect of these new orientations in the study of religion.

28

Reflections on the study of religion

Secondly, there is the methodical study of new forms of religion. These new forms of religion are not studied as developments of earlier religion, or as adumbrations of official religion, but are observed and analyzed as social phenomena which function in society for certain groups in certain ways and to whose symbolic value a certain social meaning can be ascribed. A working-group of the Dutch society for sociology of religion, with Professor L. Laeyendecker, has undertaken to carry out a methodical investigation into the problems of the study of certain new forms of religion in Holland. Thirdly, mention may be made of the problems raised by Dr. P. H. Vrijhof with regard to the relationship between popular religion and official religion. Founding his inquiry on fundamental starting-points of phenomenology and the theory of interaction, and interpreting theoretically and, in the last analysis, theologically the progressive secularization of Western society, Dr. Vrijhof arrives at a new appreciation of both traditional and spontaneous popular religion, which in both forms has more social effect than the official religion with its decreasing authority and degree of application. A working-group has been established in Utrecht to study various aspects of the relationship between popular and official religion, and a book on the subject containing papers of participants in the working group is in preparation (Vrijhof, 1978, i.p.). It is necessary for the sociologist of religion to do his utmost to be conscious of his own cultural and social situation and not to play down the student's or the scholar's given or self-chosen involvements as pure subjectivism. Such commitments must be assimilated methodologically into a research and interpretation model. (d) As the fourth example of new orientations in the study of religion in Holland we may think of psychology of religion. Just as sociology of religion is independent of ecclesiastical sociology, so psychology of religion is independent of pastoral psychology, concerning itself with the study of religious man in order to arrive at knowledge of him. In fact, the discussions here, which concern not only the view of society but also the view of man, are no less colored by ideological issues than are the discussions about sociology of religion. Since the number of Dutch psychologists of religion is quite limited, we can give here only two examples of work being carried out. First, research in the field of depth psychology and a behaviorist psychology of perception has been pursued by Professor F. Sierksma (1956). It has concentrated on the question of religious projection treated within the framework of general perception. His denial of the existence of the object onto which a religious projection is directed has given rise to discussion in broad circles. Professor Η. Μ. M. Fortmann (1968) has made similar studies about the problem of projection from a Roman Catholic point of view.

Recent trends in Dutch studies of religion

29

Secondly, investigations have been carried out in Leiden and Amsterdam into questions of religious experience. Present-day varieties of religious experience both inside and outside the churches are investigated empirically. T h e basic question remains open as to how these new orientations in the study of religion are to be interpreted. Apparendy we are not simply dealing here with the introduction of new techniques of research at the level of tools and instruments. O n the one hand, the fact that these new orientations, which are mostly inspired by the social sciences, have arisen at all in the study of religion needs an explanation. It is the direction of research itself which is the point at issue here. On the other hand, the study of religion has in this way been opened to realms of research where it can and must collaborate and cooperate with other disciplines. Subjects like religious expression in pictorial art, the function and symbolism of religion, new forms of religion and the tension between popular and official religion, secularization and religious experience, should be investigated in the present state of knowledge in an interdisciplinary way. In fact the relevance of these new orientations seems to me to lie above all in the fact that fundamental questions are brought under discussion as a consequence; the concept of religion, the aim of the scholarly study of religion, the implicit assumptions of a given approach in the study of religion, and general method and theory formation have become a subject of inquiry and discussion. In this respect we may return to the attempt of the Groningen working-group to evolve a systematic science of religion which carries out research according to the working model that religion is a function or a part of culture. T h e g r o u p seeks a renewal of the science of religion and to combine methodically rigorous empirical research and verification with the formation of specific hypotheses and theories. Here I refer to Professor van Baaren's lecture given in Leipzig in 1969, where he says: 'Whereas the history of religion marched forward with great success and psychology and sociology of religion continued to develop, the comparative study of religion threatened to decline into an era of epigones (EpigonismusY.2 This would have been especially the case in classical phenomenology of religion. T h e wealth of new materials, the development of sociology and psychology, and new trends of research such as structuralism, analytical philosophy and new linguistics necessitate a renewal of the study of religion. According to Professor van Baaren, concrete research should address itself particularly to two types of forms of religious expression: 1) representations, feelings, moods, patterns of behavior, endeavor and action by men with respect to and addressed to certain higher beings and/or powers; 2

T h e quotation is from the original text of the lecture but has not been reproduced

in Van Baaren (1969 a).

30

Reflections on the study of religion

Q) social-ethical representations, feelings, etc., which are proper either to a community or a part of a community, or to individual persons, with respect to and addressed to the world and fellow-beings. Within religious behavior itself a distinction is made between two aspects: symbolic religious acting or behavior, and activities that are considered to be meaningful and suitable both inside and outside the 'religious sector' of the given culture. T h e necessity for a sharp, clear terminology in the scholarly study of religion is stressed, and in other respects too there is much room for improvement. T h e most important thing in this fundamental reconsideration of the older comparative study of religion would appear to be precisely the methodical point of departure, by means of which science proves itself to be science. It is no longer sufficient to juxtapose all those facts which are somewhat comparable in imprecisely defined connections, even if they serve a card-index-system. And it is no more permissible to apply criteria in the systematic study of such facts which are either purely subjective or introduced from outside and theologically or ideologically loaded. T h e materials ought to be explained and understood on their own terms, and it is an important rule therefore that only for certain specific aims can religious representations and forms of behavior be abstracted in scholarly research from the cultural context within which they have their function and meaning. This is not the place to go into the subject of the starting-points of the Groningen working-group. It is enough to add that this systematic science of religion brings classical phenomenology of religion back within the limits of methodical empirical verification. It is also able to integrate and elaborate methodically the findings of sociology, anthropology, psychology, linguistics, and so forth, and also to open up newer theoretical perspectives.

3.

THE

INTEREST

IN T H E S T U D Y O F

RELIGION

T h e Dutch interest in the study of religion arises largely out of an interest in religion as such. We should immediately add, however, that people who are interested in religion are as a rule interested only in their own religion, that is to say, the religion in which they have grown up and which they recognize as normatively valid. Within these limits, scholarly investigation may very well be carried out, but in practically all cases without denying the normative character itself. In such a case, scholarly work largely serves to analyze rationally and present the truth which is held to be normative and which is perceived by means of the religion concerned. Consequently, that religion is studied within the norms

Recent trends in Dutch studies of religion

31

which it imposes itself. Studying other people's religion, however, is an altogether different matter. In part, interest in Holland in the study of religion has been largely determinded by historical factors. With the immediate access of the country to the sea, overseas trade has constituted an important branch of economic life in the country in recent centuries, and this has had several consequences for the psychological orientation of the people. Each commercial nation is characterized by a certain practical attitude; thus a knowledge of foreign languages was necessary for overseas trade and for the practical satisfaction of material requirements. Secondly, people encountered foreign cultures on their travels, one's horizon was broadened by journeys to North and South America, Africa, India and Indonesia, China and Japan. Besides traders, travellers and explorers who were out for adventure and knowledge would try to become acquainted with those cultures and their religions, perhaps not in a very scholarly way but out of a more or less deep, inner impulse. Thirdly, it is an «important fact that during the 19th and in the first half of the 20th century a Dutch colonial administration was confronted with foreign cultures in different stages of cultural development. An ever-growing number of administrators, experts and also scholars was engaged in its service. Moreover, from the vantage point of a certain distance now, the tendency, quite natural at the time, can be observed among travellers and in the colonial administration to identify a foreign or unknown culture above all by its religion, and to interpret and judge it accordingly. Although there were, of course, encounters with real foreign religions, the religious factor was in this way rather overstressed and overvalued, and people found foreign religions cropping up everywhere. The very awareness of a plurality of religions has been for the Dutch, so far as I know, a fact which has been self-evident if not always consciously reflected on, ever since the 16th century. Moreover, there has been a certain tolerance with regard to the different Christian confessions in Holland itself. Fourthly, it is safe to say that the missionaries, whether Protestant or Catholic, in several cases not only made an important contribution to the knowledge of foreign cultures and religions, but also awakened in the country itself a continuous interest in other religions, and kept it alive, even if the adherents of those religions could perhaps not always be converted. In any case, their existence had to be recognized and their religion known. Dutch interest in the study of religion is also partly connected, direcdy or indirectly, with the situation of religion in the country itself. We do not necessarily have in mind the evident fact that a Catholic, humanist, liberal or orthodox Protestant Dutchman who was interested in the study of religion, adopted as the starting-point for his research and his life as a scholar a perspective corresponding

32

Reflections on the study of religion

with that position, or at least not opposed to it. We think, rather, in the first place, of the simple fact that, psychologically speaking, the student's whole interest in other religions is generally concerned in some way with some dissatisfaction with or relativizing of his own religion as it exists on the spot. This religion is bound by place and time, and is, if not always limited or determined by them, then at least conditioned by them. Furthermore, this very religion may sometimes have been a cloak or instrument for other purposes, even when this has not always been perceived. And, like it or not, the student's own religion has been connected with certain historically-given situations and social structures, whether of an institutional or of a more psychological nature, which not everybody can appreciate. It is for such reasons that the student may be interested in other religions which do not immediately show such conditionings, religious failures or social defects. In the second place, as everywhere, we may suppose that in Holland too some people were genuinely interested in the existence of others and sought to get into direct communication with them, or achieved it intellectually by studying their beliefs and customs. But there certainly were religious motivations for the interest in the study of religions too, and they were probably much more influential. Whether religion in Holland be Protestant or Catholic, it has been in any case a rather exclusive affair, well-disciplined, factual and down-to-earth, and on the whole strongly rationalized, thus arriving at a world of experience which is relatively poor in imagination, feeling and sense of universality. Looking at the forms of Christianity to be found in Holland, we may become aware of certain traits of the Dutch character by considering what the people have made out of religion; such forms of religion and whatever else has been bound up with religion were difficult to change. Reactions against such Dutch forms of religion may be basically threefold: either there will be an interiorization, an enthusiastic, fanatic, or merely a vague spirituality; or a fundamental criticism of religion will occur, not only with regard to social abuses but also from the perspective of a radical perception of truth; or the reaction may take the form of an authentic interest in getting to know religions other than those which exist in Holland, and then not as purely ideal images but as realities. Being unsatisfied with Dutch religion leads in the last case, on an intellectual level, to a research interest in another religion, whether this may have existed earlier or may exist somewhere nowadays. I would like to submit that we are here at an important point in our analysis of interest in the study of religion. For in the case of the third alternative, response to dissatisfaction with a given religion or lack of fulfillment throughout, we are forced to speak of the transposition of an existential religious interest into the study of another religion on an intellectual level. We must admit then that, on the basis of this existential religious interest, we have to do with a singular kind

Recent trends in Dutch studies of religion

33

of implicit negation of a given Dutch theology, or of a given Dutch religious experience or form, or we have to do with an implicit comprehensive farewell to the given Dutch religious situation. It would be possible to speak here of some kind of alienation, provoked by the existing religious society, and leading to a singular form of response given by the student who chooses to study other religions. It would be fair to submit that we have in the negative experience of a given religion a key to render certain scholarly interests in the study of religion intelligible. On the one hand, in certain scholarly disciplines which do not touch religion direcdy, such as classical philology, history or anthropology, the said transposition or shift of interest may lead to a sort of secondary concern on the part of the scholar with problems proper to the study of religions. It may also lead to a fully fledged study of the phenomenon of religion. On the level of the humanities, and in a given cultural framework, the scholar may, like the older humanists, thereby appropriate to himself certain values from other cultures and religions by which he is mentally enriched. We suggest that this attitude largely corresponds with the main line of the history of religion as it started in the 19th century, and with the classical orientations in the study of religion. On the other hand, this kind of negative experience of a given religion may lead also, on the intellectual level, to the attempt to unravel religion in all its forms, by means of empirical scientific research. Through the perspective of another sector of reality, such as that of society, culture, or psychological reality, a critical view of religion can be obtained, and a critical attitude towards empirical religion or religion in general may then be acquired from the same source. We would suggest that this attitude largely corresponds with the line of the new orientations in the study of religion which we sketched earlier. Such background elements of negative experience may help to explain, on a psychological level, the interest which has existed in the study of religion in Holland. Besides such psychological elements, and closely interwoven with them, are theological positions; these constitute an important factor. After all, the university appointments for the study of religion take place in the theological faculties, and the candidates are consequendy suggested by theologians who cannot be indifferent to their theological position. It is a fact that Dutch scholars engaged in the study of religion who are living abroad, sometimes as emigrants, and who are consequendy outside the Dutch theological faculties, use and often elaborate theological points of view too. For Catholic scholars the immediate connection between the study of religion on the one hand, and philosophy of religion with its theological background on the other hand, has always been self-evident. Such a combination of both disciplines is institutionalized in the chair

34

Reflections

on the study of

religion

of 'history and philosophy of religion' in the Theological Faculty of the Catholic University of Nijmegen. Interestingly enough, the study of religion at the neo-Calvinist Free University of Amsterdam is specifically not confined to the Theological Faculty: the Institute for the Study of Religion there is an interdisciplinary, interfaculty institute in which three faculties cooperate.3 To sum up, it is perhaps a striking feature of the Dutch interest in the study of religion that quite often it has been connected with a theological intention, and often with a specific theological position. Here perhaps more than in other countries the maxim applies: no interest in religion without theology. Another motive is lack of satisfaction with given religion, which can lead to an interest in the study of other kinds of religion. Besides that we have to take into account a certain realistic bent, which impels scholars in this field to investigate the factual reality behind religious appearances. And inevitably there is the natural desire in a small country to break out of Lilliput, mentally if not physically, and discover and get to know others, their societies and cultures. Precisely in Holland we may expect the need to transcend the given system, even if it is a religious one, both on an individual and a scholarly level.

4 . D U T C H P H E N O M E N O L O G Y OF R E L I G I O N A S A

HERITAGE

We may distinguish three periods in the history of Dutch phenomenology of religion (cf. Waardenburg, 1972). 1) the pre-World War I period, with C. P. Tiele (1830-1902, teaching at Leiden 1877-1900) and P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye (1848-1920, teaching at Amsterdam 1878-1899 and at Leiden 1899-1916). In this period also the foundation and basic ideas of the work of W. B. Kristensen crystallized (1867-1953, teaching at Leiden 1901-1937); 2) the period between the two World Wars, with G. van der Leeuw (1890-1950, teaching at Groningen 1918-1950) who accomplished in this period his major work. In Leiden Kristensen continued to teach until 1937, when he was succeeded by H. Kraemer (1888-1965, teaching at Leiden 1937-1947). In Utrecht there was H. Th. Obbink (1869-1947, teaching at Amsterdam 1910-1913 and at Utrecht 1913-1939); 3) the period of about 25 years after World War II, with C. J. Bleeker (born 1899, teaching in Amsterdam 1946-1969) and Κ. A. H. Hidding (born 1902, 3

This Institute publishes the Literatuur Bidletin voor Godsdienstwetenschap since 1971; through cooperation with the University of Leeds this bulletin appears in English since 1976 under the title of Science of Religion Bulletin.

Recent trends in Dutch studies of religion

35

teaching at Leiden 1948-1972), with their respective successors J. H. Kamstra and F. Sierkma for phenomenology of religion. In Utrecht H. W. Obbink (born 1898, teaching at Utrecht 1939-1968) was succeeded by D. J. Hoens (born 1920, teaching at Utrecht since 1961) and J. Zandee (born 1914, teaching at Utrecht since 1968). In Groningen there is Th. P. van Baaren (born 1912, teaching at Groningen since 1952). The total period of Dutch phenomenology of religion which is under consideration here covers nearly a century up to 1970. Although it is represented by only a few scholars, it can reasonably be analyzed here as a whole, though there were of course variations which we have treated elsewhere. We will deal with the subject first from a systematic, more philosophical point of view, and then from an empirical, more scholarly point of view. These two views are of course interrelated.

A. From a systematic point of view Dutch phenomenology of religion has found itself involved in an internal problematic which its representatives at the time were probably not themselves sufficiendy aware of, but which has taken its revenge in the course of the discipline's development. It is not without reason that Professor van Baaren (1969) speaks in this context of an era of epigones (Epigonismus). T h e key to this internal problematic appears to lie in the fact that for the student or scholar who addresses himself to religion taken as a subject in itself, as is done in phenomenology of religion, his interest in this field as such cannot be entirely separated from his own more or less conscious idea or ideal of religion. Up to a certain point it is possible to identify this ideal of, or longing for, religion philosophically or theologically, but to a very large extent it is so entangled in the experiential world of the person himself and the norms and ideals proper to the community, groups and society to which he belongs, that he cannot in actual practice objectively treat and appreciate his own attitude, ideals and wishes completely. We would contend, consequently, that the solution of this inner problematic of phenomenology, as a dialectic between, on the one hand, empirically studied religion and on the other the scholar's own ideal of religion or his religious longing, not only offers the possibility of explaining and understanding the classical phenomenology of religion during the period under discussion, but also contains the key for a further improved scholarly study of religion. That this issue has not been clarified completely as yet, is largely due to the fact that, first, classical pheno-

36

Reflections on the study of religion

menology of religion was dealing not only with the interpretation of the realia of religion, but also with the interpretation of religion as a reality. Such interpretations have not been sufficiently analyzed. Second, in the discussions which took place about classical phenomenology of religion, not only methodological questions but also attitudes to life and reality were fundamentally at stake, and neither their basis nor their content were analyzed exhaustively. Because of their own involvement, the students and scholars themselves were only partly aware of what was the real issue and, when thinking about it, they considered it from a theological or ideological angle or in terms of their own view of the world (Weltanschauung). It apparently needed another generation to perceive that their discussions were full of incomprehension or misunderstanding such as threaten most discussions about the study of religion. Thirdly, classical phenomenology of religion, because of the kind of religious involvement of its representatives and the consequences for the discipline, has been almost excommunicated from interdisciplinary discourse. It needed a theoretical assault to put things into order, and to return to the scholarly selfcritical study of religion and develop it further. In retrospect, there has been the lofty ideal of an all-embracing phenomenology of all religions and religious phenomena, but what appears to have been an ideal for one mind may actually become a constraint for another. We may leave aside the question why such ideals of religion and of an encompassing phenomenology of religion arose. Here it suffices to make two observations. First, in classical phenomenology of religion we have less to do with phenomenological research on concrete realia than with an ideal, of a phenomenology of religion, that was itself religiously determined. Second, there was less question of studying religion as a human reality in the broadest sense of the word, than of an ideal of religion which was itself determined by religious criteria. And, tragically, ideals that are religiously determined tend to become absolutized ideas which can in fact only obstruct scholarly research. T h e absolute ideals of the phenomenologists of religion played a trick on them in their professional work. T h e idealization of phenomenology of religion, which led to the invalidation if not abolition of a self-critical philosophy of religion, was fatal to any deeper phenomenological research in the field of religion. However, the discipline seems to have survived this crisis largely due to its idealistic initial stage. This may have borne witness to great enthusiasm, but it did not ensure that justice was done to the human reality of religion. T h e crisis led to a fresh reflection on matters of method. In the study of religion, just as elsewhere, there are various different stages and levels behind a methodological debate. In the last analysis

Recent trends in Dutch studies of religion

37

such a debate, particularly in the study of religion, has to be interpreted as a basic struggle for reality and its interpretation. Dutch phenomenology of religion, as represented in the sixties in its classical form is splitting itself now into three different disciplines, each with its own way of dealing with the available materials: (1) First, we have the empirical, comparative branch of phenomenology of religion, which has developed into the systematic science of religion treated above. It is concerned with the factual aspect of religious phenomena and with their position within structures of a cultural and social nature, from which their objective meaning is to be derived. It is also concerned with the different kinds of relationships existing between religious and other phenomena. (2) Secondly, we have the classifying branch of phenomenology of religion, which has developed into the morphology or typology of religion. It is concerned with the elaboration of structures of a fundamental nature, on the basis of which religious phenomena are to be understood typologically or morphologically. T h e precise character and logical coherence of these structures remains open to further discussion, and various solutions are logically possible. (3) Thirdly, we have the branch of phenomenology of religion which is interested in the meaning of religious phenomena for the subjects involved in them. It is concerned with the meaning which religious expressions have for those who originate them, and with the meanings of religious facts and phenomena for given subjects, whether groups or individuals. This new style phenomenological research on religion is largely a research into intentions and significations. It is basically a study of the aspect of meaning of religious phenomena, and it implies investigation of 'subjective' meanings and 'subjective' connections which are perceived or made by given groups and individuals between facts considered to be 'religious' and other, 'non-religious', facts. Looking back, it would be fair to say that in Holland Chantepie de la Saussaye worked on the second kind of phenomenology, considered as the classification of objective religious facts and their morphological arrangement. V a n der Leeuw also worked on this second kind of phenomenology, but he classified religious facts more typologically, striving after an ideal-typical arrangement. But Van der Leeuw also worked to a large extent on the third kind of phenomenology. With his constant appeal to religious experience as a source of knowledge, he reduced phenomenology in the last analysis to the subjective understanding of contents of meaning, which he considered to exist 'objectively' and to which his phenomenological methodology could give access. In the last analysis, Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion may be called a kind of theology of meaning; the strong accent on the student's own consciousness and religious experience, however,

38

Reflections on the study of religion

tended to lead this kind of phenomenology into the blind alley of introspection and solipsism. It is Van Baaren who has worked especially on the first kind of phenomenology and transformed it into what he calls the systematic science of religion, taking into account recent developments in the social sciences. Elements of the second kind of phenomenology, however, are also present in his work. The three disciplines are part of the systematic and comparative study of religion. B. From, an empirical point of view It is a striking fact that the larger handbooks of phenomenology of religion have been written a considerable time ago by scholars at the height of their knowledge and career. In recent years such books have ceased to appear and it must be admitted that the very number of students and scholars in this field is, if not decreasing, at least limited. T h e generation of those with knowledge of a number of oriental languages and literatures and the temerity to compare a wealth of facts and phenomena from the most divergent religions and cultures received its education before World War II. Apart from methodological problems, to which allusion has been made above, and apart from what may be termed the' technical' side of the question, we would like to enumerate four empirical negative factors that apply to classical phenomenology of religion and make it impossible to continue along its lines: (1) T h e necessity to specialize is a demand inherent in scholarship. On the one hand, in the present state of research, new knowledge in the study of religion as elsewhere can only be acquired through an extreme specialization. On the other hand, a general survey of all known facts in the study of religion is, humanly speaking, impossible; programming the religious facts known today would take many people and many years of computer work. Research directs itself to different regions, individual cultures, facts that are bound to place and time. (2) T h e disintegration of the general concept of religion makes any science of religion, as a comparative, all-inclusive form of research, simply impossible in principle. In philosophy, the old idea of one general concept of religion has been shattered; in scholarship, there is no longer one but a range of definitions of religion. Consequendy, the possibility of a general comparative study of religion, as assumed in classical phenomenology of religion, collapses. We are aware that comparisons are always made from a certain point of view and with a certain aim in view; they thus remain limited to a small number of facts. (3) Religion can be studied in an empirical scholarly way only in and through realia, and in continuous connection with the culture, the social structure and the concrete historical situation of which the facts are part. This is valid for both

Recent trends in Dutch studies of religion

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the facts and their meanings. The kind of study of religion which worked on idealistic premises, which aimed at grasping religion as an idea and wanted to distinguish, if not to isolate, this idea from material reality, has been empirically and analytically destroyed. Just as there is no religion as a pure idea, there are no purely religious facts or phenomena, and so classical phenomenology of religion comes to its logical end. (4) Finally it should be admitted that, compared with the earlier period of general phenomenologies of religion and their systematic assumptions and points of departure, it is nowadays extremely difficult to develop combining, connecting or indeed synthesizing points of view at all. The philosophical presuppositions for such a point of view have to be revised. F. Heiler could offer an ontological scheme for an ecumenical theology of religion; G. Dumezil could discover the structural givenness of the triad at least in the Indo-European realm; M. Eliade could take archaic man and the homo religiosus as a point of departure. But for a critical methodology it is difficult to prove that all this is generally valid, and the condition of all scholarship is its general validity. Given these and other negative factors advanced by empirical scholarship, the methodological objections made from the point of view of philosophy, and various technical difficulties into which we have not entered here, classical phenomenology of religion can be seen to have been a discipline of transition. It had a valid existence for a certain period of time, and in the context of a certain state of scholarship. We have mentioned already three 'children* of classical phenomenology of religion that are taking up the heritage of the discipline. We might add here three solutions to overcome the crisis of classical phenomenology of religion: 1) Scholars can limit themselves to a particular group, family or class of religions, instead of taking all religions, in order to make comparative research scientifically possible. One may think of the group of religions of Antiquity around the Mediterranean, or of the religions which have had their origin in India, or certain groups of non-literate religions. In the course of time, however, the same negative factors which played a role in classical phenomenology of religion, may show up here also; 2) We may point to the possibility of teamwork, where scholars from different disciplines cooperate in the study of a common subject or problem. This demands certain qualities from the scholars involved, and of course the connecting synthesizing points of view must be developed by one person alone, who will, however, present his proposal to the team again for further discussion; 3) A third possibility would be to make a systematic distinction between 'facts'

40

Reflections on the study of religion

and objective connections and relationships between facts on the one hand, and the 'meanings' of such facts for involved or committed groups and individuals on the other. Research on such 'subjective meanings' could be done in different disciplines, among them a 'new style' phenomenology of religion. 5.

NEW

STYLE PHENOMENOLOGY

PHENOMENOLOGICAL

OF R E L I G I O N

AND

RESEARCH

This approach aims at investigating essentially 'subject's meanings', that is to say the meanings which given expressions and phenomena have for given persons and groups who are concerned or involved with them. We may give here some examples of applications of this new style phenomenological research. They are intended to show the possibility of making the theoretical starting-points operational in actual research. A. Analysis of images according to their intentions and intentional perspectives In VIslam dans le miroir de VOccident (Waardenburg, 1970) I attempted to analyze the scholarly work of five prominent Islamicists. In this analysis, on the one hand, the image of Islam contained in each scholar's work was revealed, and, on the other hand, this image of Islam was itself investigated according to each scholar's subjective perspective and subjective research intentions. The connection between the subjective perspective of research and the objective result of research was elaborated. The reverse problem is to analyze the different images that have been developed by Muslims with regard to other religions, ideologies and societies in the course of time. These images must be investigated with regard to both the perspective in which Muslims have evolved them, and their different intentions which manifest themselves especially in the value-elements of a given image. B. Analysis of communication in discussion and role-taking Some years ago, in the Festschrifte for C. J. Bleeker and G. Widengren (Waardenburg, 1969; 1972b), I sought to investigate, with regard to their communicative contents, the discussions which Mohammed, according to the Koranic text, conducted with Jews, Christians and polytheists. It turned out to be possible not only to reconstruct the image, contained in the text, o f ' the partner of discussion', but also to come to certain preliminary conclusions, on the basis of the connection

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between statement and response as it was presented in the text, with regard to what Mohammed, in his own words, experienced as communication. Recently a graduate student in Utrecht made the first attempt to apply the suggested new style phenomenological research in a study of role-taking by some church ministers in Holland (Achterberg, J. R., March 1974). The first results are not unpromising and testify to the fact that an investigation of subjective meaning can be successfully directed not only to discussions but also to processes of role-taking. C. Analysis of religious expressions In the case of a human expression we have to do, generally speaking, both with the problems related to its factual existence and with problems related to its actual meaning. Any investigation of it, consequently, must: 1) pay attention to the fact that someone in a given situation expresses himself or herself at all; the attempt must be made to explain and to interpret this fact as such; 2) seek to discover what the person in question in fact expresses and what kind of message is contained in the expression. The attempt must be made to find what the person wants to express or aims at conveying. Obviously, there is a close connection between the fact and the content of an expression, and this connection has to be ascertained in each case. A typically religious expression is to be viewed, then, as a special case of human expression. In investigating such a religious expression, attention must be directed to at least three elements which must be explained and interpreted: 1) the sheer fact that the expression takes place; 2) the manner in which the expression takes place and the fact that the expression is considered, within a given culture context, to be 'religious'; also the possibility that such a religious expression may not be considered to be 'religious' within other culture contexts; 3) the content of what is actually expressed, or of what the author of the expression wants or aims to convey in it. D. Analysis of signification Given religious expressions in speech, writing, art, and other domains, may acquire an independent existence thus becoming things in themselves which may be institutionalized in connection with other such expressions that have undergone the same objectivizing process. Such different objects may then

42

Reflections on the study of religion

become' phenomena' and constitute for a given society or group of societies what may be called a signification system, which may or may not have a religious character. 'Signification' is understood here in the sense of referring by way of a ' sign' o r ' symbol' to some reality which is non-empirical and is believed in. Such a signification system may be compared to what is called in cultural anthropology a symbol system. World religions and world ideologies fundamentally constitute such symbol and signification systems, although they can lose their symbol or signification function and become sheer 'facts' or 'objects'. It then becomes a problem for further investigation to determine which elements of a signification system actually have a valid relevance and meaning for a particular group or person in a particular place and time, and what meaning the system itself or given elements of the system have for that particular group or person. In the case of Islam we may ask for instance: a) what a given Muslim (or Muslim group) in his (or its) situation understands by his (or its) Islam and how he (or it) interprets that religion; b) which elements of Islam have relevance and meaning for a given Muslim or Muslim group; c) what meaning certain given elements of Islam (for instance certain texts of Koran and Hadith, ritual laws, customs sanctioned as being 'Islamic', etc.) have for given Muslims or Muslim groups; d) what explanation and interpretation can be provided with regard to the occurrence and content of such meanings, on the basis of the historical situation and social structure in which the Muslim or Muslim group concerned happens to be situated. (Comp. Waardenburg, 1974b).

CONCLUSION

It will be evident from the foregoing that this new style phenomenological research cannot view religion as a particular sector of reality. For this approach, religion is considered basically as a subjective interpretation of reality and as a subjective way of acting with regard to reality. New style phenomenological research is then the attempt to probe deeply into, to X-ray analytically this subjective interpretation and way of acting according to the meaning which it has for given persons and groups. Where classical phenomenology of religion was confronted with the alternatives of idealism and materialism and considered the notion of 'meaning' in terms of an 'ideal' - if not always, then at least often - new style phenomenology is confronted with new alternatives, that of meaning on the one hand, and that of fact on the other. Working toward a sound

Recent trends in Dutch studies of religion

43

knowledge of the facts, it will then direct its research especially towards the qualitative aspect of these facts, their meanings, including the 'religious' ones. In this way phenomenology of religion as a discipline has developed from an ideal view, and consequently from the interpretation of the phenomena according to their ideal forms, to a kind of research in reality and consequently to the investigation of the real meaning content of phenomena. It is confronted, as a result, with a problem unknown to it in its idealistic youth. T h e study of meanings which are valid for other people is hardly possible without some temporary 'assimilation' of such meanings on the part of the student. But can the student himself put an end to this 'assimilation' of a meaning? Is he able to guard himself from making the meaning which he has found into an ideal for himseip It is a legitimate question to what extent students of religion, precisely because of their interest in religion to which allusion has already been made, may be themselves under the spell of a certain meaning or of certain meanings of the religion or the religious forms which they investigate. In the idealistic stage the phenomenologist of religion was inclined to consider the subjective meanings which he found as objective ideals or significances in which as a student he participated. In the 'new style' phenomenological research a student will consider the meanings which he finds being valid for people who are different from himself. But how to know these meanings which function in other human universes? T h e problem how to understand a meaning without idealizing it becomes still more acute as soon as we realize that the student of religion investigates not only relative meanings but precisely those meanings which are considered to be absolutely valid and to have an absolute origin. T h e very task of investigating such meanings which have absolute validity for his fellow human beings puts extraordinary demands upon any student of religion who wants to do justice to his material without surrendering himself. Where the idealistic phenomenologist was capable of seeing, more or less naively, especially the positive side of the absolute ideals, that is, those of religion, a new style phenomenologist should be capable of seeing the attractive power as well as the repellent terror of all absolute meanings. As he is a human being himself, he does not see his fellows as functioning machines, terrorized facticity or incarnate ideas. It is precisely the phenomenologist who is able to recognize in religious meanings their ambiguity, both a conferring of absolute meaning and an imposing of absolute terror. In this way new style phenomenology reveals itself as being neither something absolute nor an ideal or an ideology, but rather a way of carrying out research on human absolutes in order to know human reality better. We want neither to idealize religion nor to schematize it, but to know it in its human content, in order to understand it.

3

The Intellectual Situation of a Student of Religion* As the interpretive work of modern scholars shows, the study of religion is much more than classifying so-called 'religious phenomena', though descriptive classifications may be useful in an auxiliary way. If we have learned anything since the times of classical phenomenology of religion, it is the truth that the meaning of a phenomenon is linked to its own context, to the people involved in it, and to the calibre of the scholar. Any real understanding of a religious fact is precluded from the outset if it is isolated from the culture in which it has its place and the people who live with it. As is visible in the studies taking this starting-point new vistas have been opened, of which two may be mentioned here. In the first place, there occurs the problem of what may be called the 'subjective meaning', that is to say, what a given (religious) phenomenon may have meant or may mean to certain groups and persons involved in it. In the second place, there is the more philosophical problem of what may be deduced from the very fact of this meaningfulness of (religious) phenomena, not only with regard to the meaning-conferring capacity of mankind's different religious views, but also with regard to the fact that man, because he entertains such views, tends to be a homo religiosus. Like G. van der Leeuw on the basis of his classical phenomenology, J. van Baal arrives at the age-old problem of man and his religion on the basis of his descriptive anthropology. Both Van der Leeuw (see chapter u of this book) and Van Baal (see Van Beek and Scherer, 1975) have devoted a great deal of their work to the treatment of this problem, however different their approaches and treatments in practice may be. Now that this problem has been posed by at least two scholars of religion, we should continue to investigate religious phenomena as closely as possible, interpret them as human expressions, and attempt a systematic reflection on the phenomenon of religion considered precisely as a human expression. That is to say, the problem of man's religion is redefined as the phenomenon of religion in its relation to the phenomenon of man. What can be said now about the religion or religiosity of a student of religion? What can we say about the religion or religiosity of someone studying * Fragment taken from' Religion and the Dutch Tribe', in Explorations in the Anthropology of Religion: Essays in Honour of Jan van Baal. Ed. by W. E. A. van Beek and J. H. Scherer. The Hague; Martinus NijhofF, 1975, pp. 247-279 (esp. pp. 268-271).

46

Reflections on the study of religion

the religion of a given society, and what relation does the student's religion bear to his understanding of the religion of the people under investigation? The more experience the study of religion as a special field of research has acquired, the less important this question has turned out to be in practice, notwithstanding the many theological and ideological discussions on the subject during the first decades of the discipline's existence, when this problem was raised. It is the student's aptitudes for research, not his religion, which determine the quality of his work and, specifically, whether he has found an approach and perspective which do optimal justice to that aspect of his data which he wants to study. From experiences in the past, as well as on theoretical grounds, it is fair to say that a given religiosity, a-religiosity or anti-religiosity on the part of the student may be a handicap as well as a help to accomplishing a given research task. It all depends on what form this religiosity, a-religiosity or anti-religiosity assumes in the mind, and especially whether it is rigid and its form fixed. In this profession we are not concerned whether a student believes or not, has a faith or not, but whether his particular (ir)religion or (un)faith generates presuppositions which are favorable to accomplishing his research or strip it from the very start of its positive meaning and may even be an obvious barrier to an adequate interpretation and explanation. For this reason it is not a specific faith that matters, but the way in which a possible faith functions within a given research task. And, interestingly, in practice it is much less the student himself who wonders about his faith or his unbelief, than the people around him who may raise nasty questions about his presumed faith or unfaith. Just as there are examples of students who cannot achieve fruitful research because of the consequences of their form of belief in personality traits and mental fixations, so there are examples of students, who, being constantly involved with their surroundings in matters of faith and unfaith (as is usual in theological seminaries and faculties!) have become most seriously handicapped in the pursuit of their research for its own sake. The profession of the scholarly study of religion has established itself now; like other professions, it has the right to exist when the professional work done is of quality and actually bears fruit. And since in other professions people are free to develop their own thoughts on religion and the like, the same rights can be claimed for those belonging to this profession. Van der Leeuw's and Van Baal's lifework is a case in point. Another problem which is often raised in connection with the professional student of religion is that of his being an 'outsider' or an 'insider' with respect to the subject under investigation. We would suggest a solution along the following lines. In the first instance, the student of religion establishes data, ascertains facts and analyzes them. With the help of working hypotheses, models

The intellectual situation of a student of religion

47

or theoretical points of view, he tries to explain and understand these data. In order to do this he will take an 'objective', that is, essentially an object-directed attitude, not only towards the factual data, but also towards the religiosity or a-religiosity of the persons and groups whom he studies. Like a physician who starts taking a pragmatic, object-directed and realistic attitude towards his case under investigation - which is also his professional attitude towards the interaction of people and to the relation of the people with the world around him - the student of religion will take in the first instance the attitude of an outside observer towards the religion he studies. In this he must be detached from its fate whether it rises or falls, externalizes or interiorizes itself, lives or dies. It is his task to analyze the data and ascertain what is happening to the people in a given society, as far as the role of a given religion in it is concerned, especially where the meaning of their existence is at stake. He must make his diagnosis; and if his loyalty should lie anywhere, it is with the people he gets to know and understand through his work, rather than with their particular religion, philosophy or ideology. It is only in the actual carrying out of his research that the student may realize that he has become partly an insider, too; although this may be merely a short period and may have many reasons - for instance, an increased interest taken in the other people, or comparisons made between his observations and his other, mosdy earlier, experiences. T h e result is that, with regard to the data under study, a kind of 'understanding capability' comes into operation, which may even take the form of a sort of mental participation. At this stage, too, the student's striving after objective truth can very well remain unimpaired and his rational capacities can be pushed to their limit, when he can turn back from being a 'half-insider' and resume the status of an 'outsider'. In this kind of research, with a certain degree of involvement on the part of the student, though not at the expense of his faculties, he finds himself to be caught up in creative dialectical tension between his stance as 'outsider' and 'insider' with regard to the subject under investigation. For him the 'outside' is the point of departure. It may be of interest to note in this connection that a similar kind of dialectic exists for those who adhere to a particular religion; here, however, the 'inside' represents the point of departure. T h e student on the one hand, and the adherent on the other, both enjoy a margin of relative freedom which allows them to become conscious of a given situation both from the o u t s i d e - a s 'analyst' or ' o b s e r v e r ' - and from the i n s i d e - a s 'participant' or 'adherent'. T h e general human possibility of moving from the 'inside' to the 'outside' of a given situation (with numerous variations) is realized by a student, so to say, in reverse. Instead of the usual sequence, he is able to move from being an outsider to being an insider (at least partially, and if he wants to), and this

48

Reflections on the study of religion

process may happen in different ways - for instance, through the effect of the imagination (including memories, experiences, etc.) which can be objectified, (and seen as his own imagination), or through the evocation of certain kinds of inter-human interest and 'mental participation' (which can also be objectified) as a result of working on data concerned with other people. T h e curious effect, however, is that in this way the student may somehow arrive at an 'inside' position with regard to the people he studies. From a philosophical point of view, this could be formulated as follows: the student's ex-istence (his ability to detach himself from his own being) and his co-existence with other human beings are conditions enabling him to understand what has meaning for other people. 'Understanding' itself takes new forms at present. It would appear that a time of increasing and very varied interaction - in which people experience a great number of situations with different degrees of participation in them and different ways of reflecting upon them (through actual experience or imaginative experience, as evoked, for example, by reading or by the mass media) - is conducive to a situation in which one can become both outsider and temporary (partial) insider with regard to a given religion, and in which the insider of a given religion can become an outsider as well. It is indeed only in the modern life situation that the whole dialectic of inside and outside can develop itself, since nowadays a great number of people are 'outsiders' with regard to a given ideology, religion or faith, without having to be ashamed of the fact. From a philosophical point of view, there seems to be a clear possibility at the present time of being both insider and outsider with respect to given religions and ideologies, and this may account for the keen interest taken in 'understanding'. It also may generate new kinds of understanding on the basis of a certain inter-human loyalty.

PART TWO

A Plea for Methodological Awareness

4

A Need for Methodology*

INTRODUCTORY

This paper is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment of a given problem. It is rather a more general introduction in which several problems are formulated with a view to discussion. As a matter of fact, methodological problems are secondary problems and they issue out of the more isolated problems of concrete research, which lead automatically to them; all these problems are inter-related. T h e alternative then was either to present a theory of my own or to expose the problems as they can be shown to exist in the present day situation of the study of religion. After some hesitation we opted for the second alternative. The leading thread for this introduction is simply the development which can be observed in the study of religions in this country from the so called classical study of religion up to the 1970's. We want to show here at least some tendencies of this development. A discussion as proposed here only has sense if we are dealing with real problems, that is to say problems with which we are in fact faced in our research, and with methods which we apply in it. Problem and method are not suspended in the air; they are not ideals, but are connected in a very direct way with the subject matter of a piece of concrete research: quantitative data, the quality of certain data on the basis of a particular problem or viewed in a particular light, and so forth. Besides the method seen as a way to approach the subject matter, there are also the research techniques or methods which are used and the general theory, which is part of a theory of science and scholarship, within the framework of which the investigation takes place and on the basis of which hypotheses can be developed; beyond all this, the familiarity which the researcher has with his materials plays a great role. As soon as we start speaking about methods as ideals, and about theories as ideologies, discussion becomes indeed vain: not so much because we speak about method and theory - that is entirely justified - but because we do not speak about them correcdy, that is to say we do not touch their real nature. The sense of a discussion as proposed here is to be found in the way in which an answer is given to the question how we can best know a given subject matter, * Paper read at the meeting of Dutch Society for the History of Religions, 5 May 1973, at Utrecht.

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A plea for methodological awareness

and in what way this optimal knowledge should be defined. T h i s is what we shall call here the heuristic principle. In this discussion we are not only dealing with the question as to which techniques, methods and theories can be used; but also which definitions, assumptions and logical forms may be considered to be valid. It is in such a methodological discussion that the heuristic value of a m o d e of investigation, which is in the centre of o u r attention, is revealed; that is to say the actual contribution of a particular approach or method to the acquisition of knowledge. T h e greater the heuristic value turns out to be, the more important the method concerned. T h a t it is necessary to give a proper consideration to methodological matters apart f r o m the researcher's familiarity with the materials on which he works, and his concern f o r authenticity in his reflections, is self-evident. In this way all kinds of schematization which have come f r o m elsewhere and which threaten to direct, condition or even determine his mind and the spirit of his research can be laid bare. In a positive sense, after having ascertained and registered a number of facts, he can thus continue to impose a certain order, make a certain interpretation and arrive at an adequate interrogation of these facts consciously and freely. T h e r e should be no methodological discussion outside the materials, but neither should there be a methodological discussion without proper consideration. A n d it always holds true that there is no science or scholarship without well-established method. O n e of the most curious things which come to light in analyzing a piece of scholarly research - apart f r o m the nature of the material, that is, the character of the sources at which the investigation is directed - is the completely different ways in which given materials can be approached. This plurality of approaches is in itself a well-known fact, and all kinds of divisions of the scholarly disciplines find their basis in it, including the classical distinction of philological, historical, phenomenological, psychological, anthropological and sociological ' m e t h o d ' in the study of religion. Indeed they are different disciplines which are directed towards the study of religious facts and which have their own spectrum of methods.

A need for methodology

I.

FORMULATED

53

PROBLEMS

Instead of starting from the difference in methods, which would lead to a theory of science and scholarship, we rather prefer to start with the difference in problems, and in this way we arrive earlier at a reflection about research in its full complexity. If we understand science and scholarship as research methodically pursued, then in the final analysis differentiation of scholarly methods in them goes back to a differentiation of the way in which problems are formulated. Defining a problem is the beginning of all investigation. According to this view it would be possible to divide scholarly research according to a sliding scale of different ways of putting problems. On the one hand there is a near absence of problems, and on the other there is practically a superabundance of them. On one side the material is, in the last analysis, not even interrogated on definite questions, on the other it is subjected to an unlimited interrogation. The variable factor on the scale is consequently the complexity of the problems which the researcher works with. Seen from the one extreme, the research may appear in the rising scale to become more and more complicated until it ends in almost total uncertainty, seen in the descending scale, it takes less and less complex forms, until it seems finally to arrive at a certitude almost entirely devoid of problems. It will be clear that in an analysis according to this view the separation between problemless and problem-loaded research runs through all disciplines and sciences, and that this separation also transcends the separation between human and natural sciences. In other words, we have to do here with a methodical model which is independent of the material to which the research is directed, but which, if used correctly, would be capable of laying bare the inner structure of a given piece of research. Precisely because the study of religion has to do in principle with all materials that are or have been religiously relevant for human beings, such a division can be of interest in this field of research. According to this scale, moving from the lower to the higher extreme, we could for instance make a series which would look as follows: a) ascertainment of facts b) ordering of facts c) synthesizing a number of facts within a greater whole d) explaining facts one from the other e) developing hypotheses from which certain sets of facts can be explained f) development of a theory in order to combine hypotheses and develop more of them

54

Λ plea for methodological awareness

g) open questions of a theological and philosophical, sociological and anthropological nature, on the basis of which the materials can be exposed and analyzed h) development of fundamental hypotheses by which the nature of a number of data can be conceived in a new way, or on the basis of which a new sector of reality can be revealed. From this same viewpoint we can arrange a number of basic positions in the study of religion according to a sliding scale: studying religion as a reality in itself or as a function of culture; isolating religious phenomena from their context or studying their relations with non-religious phenomena and facts; maintaining an absolute autonomy of the study of religion or letting it participate in interdisciplinary research; barring or opening up questions which originate in an interpretation of religion arising out of a particular theology, philosophy, concept of society, personal commitment or religiosity of the researcher, and so forth. From an analytical point of view the study of religion, when it is at the bottom of the scale, practically coincides with philology and history of literature, whereas at the upper end of the scale it is characterized by an intense interaction between empirical research and theoretical reflection. This is closely connected with the degree to which objectification is carried through in the spheres of religious phenomena, of their context, of the ideas and concepts of the researcher himself, and of the very movement of thinking. Making a separation in fact and theory between the study of religion and philosophy of religion puts the former at the bottom of the scale; taking into account the mutual relatedness between the study of religion and philosophy of religion reverses the situation and puts the study of religion at the upper end of the scale. Just as the question of the origin of religion has practically disappeared from these studies, so too the question of its essence is disappearing from them. The logical consequence of the elimination of these questions from scholarly discussion is that the methodological discussion is no longer related to religion as such, and consequendy does not end with theories about its nature but with the way in which it has to be seen and studied. In other words, the discussion has become in this way truly 'methodological'. It is interesting to observe that the old main division between the study of religion and the philosophy of religion implied this development. Although the older historians of religions seem not to have realized this, it is precisely this separation that had to lead in the long run to violent methodological confrontations within the study of religion itself, and unfortunately no appeal could be made to a philosophical arbiter for assistance, since the disciplines had been formally separated. It is not only a new dialectic between scholarship and philosophy, empirical

A need for methodology

55

research and theoretical reflection, which then becomes effective with or without a particular commitment of the researcher to his subject matter; the development of research itself has also created a new situation. If a great part of the inspiration of the older research in history of religions - which still continues to produce good fruits - lay in finding new texts of largely unknown religions, and in analyzing new facts which showed either continuities or changes in the history of these religions, much of the present inspiration of the study of religion - although it has not so far led to really startling results - lies in the very discovery of the intrinsic connections between religious behavior on the one hand and the context in which it takes place on the other, and this not only on a cultural and social but also on a psychological and biological level. In this way these religious actions, forms of behavior and other data can be understood out of the historical and structural context: either because the religious behavior is studied as part of a total situation, or because it is studied in interaction with the context. T h e progress of research has thus revealed that the same facts can be interpreted from different perspectives in a scholarly way, and that none of these perspectives need be made subservient to others. The need to move from factual research to a more philosophical reflection and self-criticism, and the need for multi-perspective research and interdisciplinary investigations by groups working as teams, are not independent from what I would like to call the technification of research. The study of religion is no longer only a craft; in addition techniques which to a certain extent can be automatized are now available. They started with card and index systems and now, thanks to computers, we are busy introducing new techniques of information and new calculations of correlations. Closely connected with this fortifying of the technical side of research is its increasing formalization. This formalization embraces not only the negative intention of reducing the researcher's subjectivity but also the positive one of arriving at a new kind of theory formation nourished by a new philosophical orientation; at the coordination of different techniques of research, and especially at a more efficient communication and exchange of the results of investigations. Modern research in the humanities or in the human sciences can hardly be realized without a plurality of perspectives, an exploitation of technical possibilities and formalization, even though it does not become identical with them, unless the aims of research are purely functional or pragmatic. If however this 'modernization' is not carried out in the study of religion, this field threatens either to become a dignified but closed craftsman's guild, or simply to remain a backward area within the whole of the present scholarly research process. In giving a central place to both the theory and the practice of research on religion - in contra-distinction to the essence or the proper nature of religion -

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A plea for methodological awareness

a new basic problem in this field has come to light, which lies behind perspectivism, technification and formalization. This is the problem of the choice of the angle from which the materials are approached. T h e researcher is required to determine his own starting point and angle of approach for a particular investigation through his own intelligence.

2. T H E

'CLASSICAL'

PHASE

When we speak of the 'classical' study of religion, then we mean a way of studying religion in which this problem of the angle does not yet arise, and where, consequendy, on the level of methods, perspectivism, technification and formalization are not carried out consistendy. O n a more reflective, philosophical level, one may say that in 'classical' study of religion the accent has often, but not always, been laid on the objective reality of religion as a phenomenon in itself. Consequendy, in so far as there has been theory formation in the 'classical' study of religion, this has had to do mainly with the nature of religion. In the classical phase in the study of religion the whole question of methodology could be put down as a futile game of sharpening one's knife. T h e serious background of the Methodenstreit was hardly seen, and justice was not done to it. T h e classical history of religions was not only, as all history of religions, a study of sources, but also a 'realistic' interpretation of these sources. T h e source is not only a document or piece of evidence for a series of logical conclusions, but tends in fact to be conceived of literally as a 'source', a way of access to the religious reality, the 'faith', of a people, a culture, a historical period; or it tends to be seen as the means of access to the process of development of a religion as a distinct reality in history. Other, non-religious, sources are in this perspective only auxiliary means, serving to provide information about the historical meaning and place of the religious sources. T h e strength of this 'classical' history of religions was and is to study the religious phenomenon 'religion' historically, that is to say according to the coordinates of place and time in the past. Classical phenomenology of religion became then the ordering of religious phenomena not as sets and series of representations and institutions according to their historical structural development, but apart from place and time, within the whole of religion as a distinct category of values and an objective reality. Discussion took place about the nature of these data, and with this type of phenomenology one could then make certain choices. For instance, religion could be conceived of as an idea within which the phenomena acquire their more or less logical place; it could also be conceived of as a value from which the

A need for methodology

57

phenomena receive their meaning. It could finally be conceived of as an experience which, because of its particular quality, leads to specific religious expressions which a phenomenologist will understand according to their meaning and significance through reexperiencing them in his own mind. The strength of this classical phenomenology of religion was and is to include all religious phenomena within one structure which is meaningful in itself, and which is then identified with 'the' religion. The fact that the classical study of religion still has its representatives at present does not alter the fact that one can seriously criticize it, not only on the basis of research itself, but also on methodological grounds, precisely when it has threatened to absolutize its own methods and theory. Here we only give some methodological and theoretical observations.

3.

SOME

CRITICAL

OBSERVATIONS

With regard to classical history of religions the following critical observations may be made: a) It is a historical discipline and as such not fundamentally different from other branches of history: cultural history, social history, etc. The history of religious institutions and representations is studied in the same way as the history of battles, of social relations, of art and technology. b) If it is held that religion should be studied only in its highest forms one should bear in mind that these forms are part of the general history process and in continuous interaction with other forms. In other words, the history of religions is a specialization within history. It should be integrated with other historical disciplines which study other aspects of history. c) History of religions can grasp what is called religions only in historical and not in 'religious' categories, if it wants to attain results which are generally valid and may consequently be considered of a scholarly nature. Even if religious facts are studied according to the meaning which they have had or had for concrete people or groups, this is always within the field of history, even if the meaning itself transcends historical determinations. d) Living religions can and must be studied in different ways from historical religions, at least to a certain extent. We can study their more ancient history in the same way, but their recent and contemporary history is documented by an abundance of sources; this is mainly due to the possibility of observing and meeting the faithful. Living religion, consequently, is accessible not only via historical documents but also through other sources.

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A plea for methodological awareness

e) The history of religion, studied as an aspect of the historical process, leads to questions which are dealt with in theoretical history: the historical process is grasped here through a reflection about what precedes the research itself. With regard to classical phenomenology of religion the following critical observations may be made: a) In a scholarly discipline the results of any investigation have to be verified objectively on the basis of experience and reason. The disadvantage of using 'religion' as a value category within which the religious phenomena are ordered is that their interpretation then takes place according to the researcher's interpretation of religion as an idea, value or experience; verification is thus rendered difficult if not impossible. b) The problem of objective verification is particularly great when, precisely in classical phenomenology of religion, an appeal is made to the intuition of the researcher as the final court of appeal. Through this appeal to the subjectivity of the researcher verification even becomes, in the last analysis, impossible, so that the results can no longer be proved nor be considered of general validity. c) Because research limits itself in classical phenomenology of religion to religious phenomena, their meaning and their classification, these phenomena are self-evidendy detached from the context within which they are found and within which they function. According to a more empirical view the meaning of these phenomena, however, to a large extent resides precisely in their context. d) Classical phenomenology of religion has had an essentially religious evaluation of the phenomenon 'religion' and this religious evaluation has shown itself in the interpretation of concrete religious phenomena. This interpretation was itself religiously justified. But a religious view of religion makes phenomenology of religion out to be less a product of scholarship than a world view and perhaps a form of religion itself. This becomes evident particularly in the remote attitude which it takes towards the empirical sciences, an attitude which tends to put it outside the critical scholarly community. Over and against these forms of classical history of religions and phenomenology of religion, we can observe at present a newer type of history of religions and the bifurcation of the older classical phenomenology of religion into, on the one hand, 'systematic science of religion' and on the other 'new style' phenomenological research on religion.

A need for methodology

4.

OTHER

BRANCHES

IN T H E

59

FIELD

But the study of religion is more than history and phenomenology, and moreover these are in communication with other disciplines, such as the social sciences and psychology. If the older ethnology, in as far as it dealt with religion, could be considered to be that part of the history of religions that was concerned with t h e ' primitives', with modern anthropology this is no longer possible. Anthropology of religion is a specialization of anthropology, just as history of religions is actually a specialization of historical scholarship. T h r o u g h field research which has perfected itself over the last fifty years, anthropologists have not only put an end to a number of theories about primitive religion which had become absolutized and revealed themselves to be untenable, but have also arrived at a view of religion within the whole of the culture in which it occurs. In this way independent theory formation has slowly started to develop with regard to anthropological research in general, and with regard to the study of a given culture through its different aspects, among them religion in particular. If an older sociology was inclined to design a theory about the origin of religion, modern sociology has a quite different approach. Apart from numerous pieces of research about communal religious behavior, sociologists have been able to expose important connections between social and religious structures, between social and religious changes. T h a t has led to an intense, ideologically-loaded Methodenstreit and to a self-critical formation of theory, where religion was not necessarily explained away sociologically, but where it was rather seen within the framework of the development of society, within the polarity of social institutions and groups, within the field of interactional processes, and so forth. For psychology the same holds true: if older schools put all their efforts into explaining religion, the tendency now is rather to see religion within the framework of psychological developments, which take place in their turn not only within the individual's history but also in a social and cultural context. Here, however, as far as psychology of religion is concerned, we are still at the beginning of a formation of theory and methodology in the proper sense of the word. T h e discipline still seems to be a new-born child. If the social sciences and psychology have had both a direct and an indirect influence on the historical and systematic investigation of religion, there are, in other branches of scholarship, developments which will have a more indirect, but still more fundamental, influence on our knowledge of religion. T h e following elements may be mentioned: a) T h e general theory of science and knowledge, logic and other branches of

6o

A plea for methodological awareness

philosophy which establish the criteria of theory formation, verification, methodology and techniques of research in general. T h e y also make their demands with regard to the general validity of statements and conclusions and to the correctness of definitions. b) Linguistics, which not only in semantic research, but also in structural language analysis, has lead to new points of view which are of great importance for the interpretation of religious expressions in general and of religious communication in particular, c) Biology, which through its concern with the basic functions and structures of man and his acts gives a new view of the basic human structures within which religion functions; d) Economics, which may have a further importance in establishing, like other social sciences, determinations within which religion can function within a given society. T h e r e are also more general trends of research, like structuralism and semiotics, which run horizontally through the different disciplines and can lead, precisely on an interdisciplinary level, to entirely new orientations in research. T h e general tendency is to rid the p h e n o m e n o n of 'religion' in empirical scholarly research of its exclusive character, and to see it as a human phenomenon, avoiding the conclusion that man has necessarily to make a given religion his 'religion'.

5.

THE

DUTCH

SCENE

For a relative outsider it is striking that these developments within the study of religion not only practically all started outside the Netherlands and gained acceptance here only much later, but also that in more than one case a real struggle was necessary to see them accepted at all a m o n g Dutch students of religion. Moreover, quite some time passed before studies which had been made in Holland outside the special field of the study of religion penetrated into that field and were accepted there. In other words, the relative outsider cannot rid himself of the impression that the Dutch study of religion defined itself for a certain time in considerable isolation. I may add to this another point for which I ask your permission. T h e methodological discussion in this country has been, with a few exceptions, determined by the Dutch climate of oppositions: ProtestantCatholic, liberal-confessional, faith-unbelief, one university tradition and the other. Such non-scholarly variables - to put it in the secret language of methodology - which need to be analyzed themselves by sociology of religion, are not

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very conducive to an open methodological discussion in which we have to do with the heuristic value not only of older experience but also of new experimental techniques, methods and theories for the increase of knowledge. This situation has also helped to bring about the fact that in this field of scholarship for the last five to ten years relatively little has been published here. Perhaps I may now mention in a few points some basic tendencies which over the last five years have been observable in the study of religion in the Netherlands and in particular in the history of religions and in phenomenology of religion or systematic science of religion. As a point of departure, one may take the work considered as 'craft': the research work which is done on texts, historical facts and other empirical data, and on which our discipline and field of studies rest. Among those who, beside their own craft, speak about their disciplines in a broader sense too, I see seven basic lines which may vary according to the personalities of the researchers, but which, taken together, show a certain structure. 1) There is a deconfessionalizing of the study of religion and a greater relatedness of the researcher to his subject matter. Closely connected with this is the separation in practice and theory which has been made between science of religion and theology, and which has brought to an end a development which started a hundred years ago. If the study of religion remains a part of the theological faculties in this country, these faculties have to be renamed 'faculties of theology and of the study of religion'. 2) Perhaps as a reaction against an orientation which was markedly idealistic in the time between the two world wars there may be observed a clear anti-idealism at present, in both research and teaching, which now possess a more pragmatic character. The researcher can keep to the 'facts' and not venture beyond them; he can achieve a formation of hypotheses and even a theory which has critical foundations; he can use a critical principle of verification; he can arrive at a reflection in a wider sense but without metaphysically stepping over the line. In all these cases the researcher wants to keep his feet on the ground in his scholarship. 3) In the appropriate studies a process of formalization has been carried through, which makes for a new form of scholarly communication and reduces the role of the researcher's subjectivity; research itself obtains a more impersonal character. 4) The rise and treatment of methodological questions indicate that a number of researchers have accepted the primacy of theory as opposed to factual positivism. The facts are not considered to be things in themselves, but always interpreted things; they are not so much considered to speak, on their own

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initiative, to the 'listener', but rather to 'respond' to questions which the researcher puts to them. 5) An increasing amount of attention is being paid to the context of religious behavior, religious movements and religious phenomena, not only the whole of the culture in which these occur, but also the specifically social, economical, physical and biological contexts. In this way the distance between history of religions and anthropology of religion has become much narrower. If one wants to term religious whatever is considered to be religious in the society under study, then it is necessary to know what is considered to be non-religious in order to carry this out. In this way the possibility of a much more intensive collaboration between the study of religion and the other human sciences (humanities and social sciences) arises. 6) In the study of the recent and contemporary history of the living religions, and in particular the world religions, fresh attention is being given to the question of what meaning these religions have for their faithful and what role they play in the present-day processes of change. The question of what has to be understood by religious change is a problem where the social sciences have their say. My own starting point would be to study religion as a system of meaning or significance assigned by man, and consequently to study it according to its qualitative aspects. According to this kind of new style phenomenological research, the meaning of a phenomenon for a particular subject or a given group of people, that is to say its subjective meaning, can be approached out of the dialectics between 'intentions' as these exist among given people on the one hand, and the (religious) 'sign or signification system(s)' in force in the world in which these people live, on the other. In the second place, the fact itself that in given situations for given people and groups a religious meaning occurs has to be explained. That there is an intrinsic connection between signification on the one hand and communication on the other makes the problem the more interesting. 7) The appeal for interdisciplinary studies increases and acquires great significance. Thus each researcher is willy-nilly carried back to the bases of his own research and to the assumptions of his discipline. In this way too the fundamentals of research in the study of religion can come to the fore and be discussed explicitly.

A need for methodology

6.

SOME

CONDITIONS

FOR

63

PROGRESS

More than the founding fathers of the study of religion may have suspected, the progress of this field of study turns out to have been very slow and difficult. This may be true for science and scholarship in general, but in the study of religion the difficulties appear to be enormous. For further progress a certain number of conditions will have to be satisfied, among which the following may be mentioned: 1) A free inner spirit of research, which is not hampered by pressure on the part of any ideology or theology, in a discipline of scholarship of which the autonomy and integrity have to be guaranteed both in practice and in theory; 2) An amelioration of the conditions under which this research takes place. We do not think only of the documentation systems and possibilities of exchange between researchers, but also of a common resistance to the ranges of daily occupation which are consuming so much professional time in the existing university institutions. It is no accident that the roughly twenty historians of religion who work in this country as civil servants, of whose number scholars abroad are rightly jealous, have hardly produced a book during the last five years. This development can lead to the withdrawal from these institutions of those who can allow themselves to do so in order to follow their interests under other conditions. 3) A better communication of the results of research to others. We have in mind here, in the first place, publications on all levels, including those for the general public which is scarcely well-informed about any religion, including Christianity. In the second place we have in mind an amelioration of the presentation of religions in education and teaching, and in the third place the communication of these results within the university itself. After some years of experience I must say that it is an extremely strange situation that students in Holland can only choose the study of religion as their field, on condition that they have behind them, three years of theological studies in which they have passed examinations. It is wrong that our discipline is taught almost exclusively to theological students; the relative isolation of the theological faculties with regard to other faculties brings the study of religion in the whole of the university in fact into a ghetto situation. As I see it, much of the methodological discussion in the study of religion is essentially a struggle for sound reason, for its recognition, its fruits and its place in culture. If man himself may not always be a reasonable being, research at least has to be based on reason, even if it directs itself to a subject matter which, at

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least in the general use of language, is considered as irrational and not susceptible to reason, that is to say religion. Such reasonable - and rational - research is directed not only to the knowledge of specific facts, but also to the understanding of general rules governing them and connections between them. This may lead to a better insight into the phenomenon of religion, and particularly into the fact that people define certain things as being religious and then experience them accordingly, or the other way round.

5

The Quest for Method*

INTRODUCTORY

'Why are things, including religion, studied as they are, and is it correct to study them in this way in order to reach adequate knowledge of them?' So a freshman will ask. A f t e r his B A he may put another question: ' H o w should this particular material or this particular problem be approached in order to achieve results in research?' A n d some years later, when he is moving on to the PhD degree, other questions will be added: ' F r o m which point of view has a g r o u p of data to be interpreted in order to show their real mutual relationships?' a n d : ' How is it still possible, given the fact that we have to take a certain attitude as our starting point, to come to conclusions which are generally valid?' A n d at the end of his student career the student will ask a last question: ' U n d e r what conditions is it possible to arrive at all at conclusions which are generally valid, conclusions which are meaningful; and what has to be understood in fact u n d e r such meaningful knowledge?' T h e n he is ready to receive the PhD degree: the questions have given him that maturity. A n d this is not only true f o r the few students who have pursued the study of religion, but f o r anyone who wants to continue to do scholarly research. As f a r as the fundamentals of his discipline are concerned, the scholar runs through more or less the same development himself which the discipline itself has passed through before, in the process of teaching or research. Leaving out of consideration now the pedagogical side of the discipline, we may ask what is the situation in the study of religion as f a r as its methods are concerned. It has the pleasure of celebrating at this time 100 years of existence as a recognized discipline in Holland. T h r o u g h o u t these 100 years there has indeed been a thread of methodological discussions, of debates about methods and theories, a thread which in the course of time apparently has not become thinner but thicker. Especially since World War I I the methodological problems in the field of the study of religion have sharply increased, and whole books have been devoted to them. We think here of names as those of Joachim Wach, Georges Dumezil, Mircea Eliade, F. Sierksma, U. Bianchi, J . Kitagawa, H. Desroche, K. Rudolph, W. C. * Paper read at the study-day on Godsdienstwetenschap in Nederland, held at Utrecht, 16 May, 1972.

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Smith, C. Geertz, J. van Baal, R. Baird, P. H. Vrijhof and others. Several symposia have been devoted to these problems, the papers of which have sometimes been published, and at least one international conference has been held on the subject. In what follows we do not want to indicate one particular method or approach, far less to absolutize it, but simply to try to come to a fundamental reflection. We are only concerned to raise the question of the quest for method, to leave it as such and then to reflect on it. This may seem to be rather abstract and dry, because it does not emerge from a piece of concrete research. We are only concerned here with the rise of the quest for method, by which a certain kind of discussion is initiated, and we leave the answer open. In any case we want to avoid thinking according to or in reaction to the authority of others. The important thing for us is the question, and not the answer or an ideology which we want to promulgate. ι. How different the situations can be in which the quest for method can emerge out of concrete research appears, for instance, if we pay attention to the material with which we may be working in the history of religions. A. First of all there is the problem of the sources on the basis of which facts are established. We can think of five different cases: (i) A large variety of religious texts may be present in great abundance; this was the situation for most historians of religion. They may be the Bible or the religious literature on the classics of Antiquity, of the Mesopotamians, the Persians, the Indians, the Chinese or Japanese: history of religions is in this case essentially the study of texts. The problems are here really those of exegesis, when it is the meaning of the texts with which we have to deal, or of historical-critical analysis if we have to do with the historical place of the writings, that is to say with the historical reality which produced them. The first reason that any methodological discussion arose was that at the basis of these same exegetical and historical-critical methods presuppositions and assumptions play a role in the investigations, which have to do with the very way in which one 'considers' the text. Another reason was that we can use a sacred text not only for its own sake, but also as a source for the study of social reality, of the anthropological background, the political conditions, even the cultural pattern of the society in question. The fact that we can study a text not only for its own sake, but also as an auxiliary means for other investigations, has thus brought about a number of discussions of interpretation, which arise around each specific text, and in which certain general methodological questions always are expressed. This

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67

becomes the more interesting if textual data can be supplemented with other, for instance archeological, data. (2) There may indeed be an abundance of data but their meaning is not clear, or it is only one-sided. We may have at our disposal inscriptions in a language which has not been deciphered, or archeological findings of which the interpretation remains dubious, for instance because we do not know whether or to what extent these data had a religious function besides other ones. With regard to such materials, which as such seem to remain mute, so to speak, a great many hypotheses often arise. The probability of a hypothesis depends then not only on the factual data, and on possible analogous facts of which the meaning is certain, but also, for instance, on the margin of probability which we are inclined to assign at all to this or that hypothesis, on the basis of certain general considerations. The consequence is again an essentially methodological discussion. (3) There may be an abundance of data, and their immediate meaning may also be clear. However, when research is pursued, and particularly in the case of the interpretation of the immediate meaning, there may occur certain problems which are more of a hermeneutical than of a purely exegetical nature. This is often the case in texts which relate mystical experiences, gnostical insights, expressions of spirituality, or which concern myths and mythical representations, symbolism in various forms, and magic. There arises then a hermeneutical discussion, which may be different in each particular case, but which expresses certain general problems of interpretation, and there again the quest for method arises. (4) There may be a clear lack of data, not only in a relative but also in an absolute sense. As to the relative sense: even the greatest number of transmitted materials gives rise to questions which, through the lack of more materials, can no longer be answered. This is the case for most religions of the past; most clearly does this become visible if different sources do not correspond with each other or if they contradict each other directly. T h e way in which we deal with the few data of which we have knowledge is again largely dependent on general methodological considerations. (5) A special case for our studies is a religion which has continued until the present day. On the one hand there is then, especially in the case of the world religions, a great quantity of data available from the past; these can be studied as in the first case mentioned above. On the other hand there may be a great number of data from the present, whether direcdy available or potentially recoverable. That is to say when using other methods and other techniques, for instance those of the social sciences and of psychology, we may study the present

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phase of such a religion. Then the question arises to what extent, by way of analogy, we may draw conclusions from this knowledge of the present phase, which can apply to earlier phases of the same or a parallel religion; and here again the quest for the correct method arises. A completely different but scholarly and methodologically important problem is how, on the basis of the communications into which we can enter with the living adherents of such a religion, we can arrive at a better interpretation of the religious life or even the faith of these people, not only in the present but also in the past. These are only five different cases of possible situations with regard to sources within the history of religions; and each case has given rise to its own quest for method. In other respects too, historians of religions find themselves confronted with different methodological problems if they study the history of Christianity, of non-literate peoples, of Judaism and Islam, or of India, China and Japan, of the religions of antiquity or of the world religions during the last 25 years. Such examples of variation in the situation regarding sources can be also given by social scientists engaged in the study of religion. The quest for method arises in quite different situations, according to the materials with which one works. B. This quest can also arise, however, not from one particular fact or from one particular set of facts, via their sources, but from a study which compares, systematizes, or is looking for connections and structures. The situation in which the quest for method then arises is again completely different, especially if a connection is sought with results which have been reached in other disciplines, with the aim of elaborating them independently. In all comparative, systematizing, and synthesizing studies the quest for method arises much more explicidy than in the case of the study of coherently given materials: here with regard to the material itself a certain selection is made, and it cannot be otherwise. The procedures followed by phenomenologists, comparativists, systematizers, structuralists and researchers who have a hermeneutical orientation, tend to encounter distrust on the part of those who study concrete texts, events, actions, etc. and who do not create a reflective distance between them and their materials. To put it the other way round, those researchers who are systematically oriented distinguish themselves precisely by their methodological considerations on logical grounds from those researchers who are more directly bound to their material, who do not recognize a theoretical distance from it. Both in history of religions, and in other branches of the study of religion, it is possible to make a distinction between, on the one hand, all those approaches which are directed to the concrete knowledge of certain individual or coherent

The quest for method

facts and their specific meaning and, on the other hand, all those approaches which are looking for certain connections, theoretically justified, between certain facts. The reason may be that these are all religious facts, or that the scholar seeks to establish connections between particular religious and non-religious facts or constellations. The quest for method occurs, in the case of the approaches which are closely bound to their material, in the course of the investigation; in the case of those approaches which are systematically oriented, where the concern is to find connections between facts, the quest for method apparently arises before the investigation itself, which is logical. The question is then, in a number of variations, under what conditions given connections can be ascertained as being certain or can be subsumed with a reasonable probability within a more general hypothesis or even a theory. It is the rise of this second kind of approach, which looks systematically for connections - causal, functional, finalistic, etc. - which has led to the formation of theory in the study of religion, and given rise to far-reaching methodological discussions. C. Besides the direct study of given materials and the systematically oriented study of connections we may mention a third possible situation, in which the quest for method arises from concrete research. In this case we have to do not only with incidental connections between a number of facts, but with the discovery of a whole field, scientifically demonstrable, in which a greater number of facts can be studied fruitfully. As an example, I think of the study of biblical data not in the framework of religious significance, but in the field of history, or of the interpretation of different kinds of religious behavior not in the framework of their ideal content, but in the field of social reality and interaction, or of the analysis of religious symbols not in the framework of their rational interpretation, but in the field of a reality which has its own anthropological basis, for instance with the hypothesis of archetypes advanced by C. G. Jung. It is clear that, just as the proof of structural connections was considered to be revolutionary by researchers bound to their material, the discovery of a whole field from which a great number of data can be explained and understood will again be revolutionary for those researchers who concentrate on structural connections, which gives rise to numerous fundamental methodological discussions. Consequently, the quest for method is no more simply: under what conditions can certain connections be established, but: under which conditions are we allowed to interpret a given number of facts in terms of a particular field as an aspect of reality. This question is of far-reaching significance, precisely because not only a structure but a whole sector of reality is discovered, proved, and then used as the key for interpretations.

ηο

A plea for methodological awareness

2. Having sketched some basic situations in which the quest for method may arise from concrete research in the study of religion, it is good to indicate two different ways in which this quest for method may occur. A . In the first place it may occur as a technical question within a given discipline. T h e question is then how we have to deal with a problem which arises directly from the materials, in order to arrive at a better knowledge and understanding of them. In fact this question arises in the course of each concrete piece of research, and the solution implies a methodology. We use the concept of methodology here for the way in which we deal with a problem in practice and in practical ways, including the use of such aids as card indexes and computers. In this case of the quest for method as a technical, applied procedure, it can be considered as the knowledge of the specialist, the craftsman, who knows how to deal with his materials, who knows how to cope with a concrete investigation, and who knows the correct technical procedures in order to arrive at more knowledge or insight in the course of it. He is capable of recognizing the problems which occur within his discipline, defining them and solving them on condition that he has the necessary materials at his disposal. Moreover, he can translate the problems which reach him from outside his own discipline into terms of his own discipline to a large extent. T h e o r y formation occurs here on a limited scale, that is to say, in order to arrive at short-term concrete solutions for concrete problems. B. In the second place the quest for method can occur, not only as a technical, but also as a theoretical question: not within, but with regard to a whole discipline or with regard to a particular subject. T h e question here is how we are to deal with the problem, which is put for instance by religious behavior as such or by other religious expressions as such, in the most satisfactory way in order to arrive at an explanation of it, and thus, to achieve understanding and insight. In other words we are not so much concerned here with solving problems with the help of certain procedures or given techniques, but with the development of a new method in order to cope with unprecedented problems. Method here is not technical craftsmanship, but a path which leads to a new kind of knowledge, whether by designing a new hypothesis, or by verifying a hypothesis in a new way. It is this kind of quest for method as basically a question of theory which, in the study of religion, has excited so much discussion. This problem corresponds with what we indicated above as the question of the connection between facts and of a field of facts. It touches the theory of knowledge and is of an epistemological nature. Precisely in the theory of knowledge, however, we are con-

The quest for method

7ι

cerned with what we understand by science and scholarship, and consequently with what we understand by a scholarly study of religion. T h e quest for method in the study of religion as a theoretical question is actually the question of how we take a scholarly stand with regard to religious facts, and what kind of knowledge is possible at all once this stand has been taken. As opposed to the technical quest for the correct method, in the case of the theoretical quest it is not possible to ascertain clearly in advance whether certain concrete problems of research are more or less meaningful. That depends largely on a probable hypothesis or theory, which augments the existing knowledge both quantitatively and especially qualitatively. In such a theoretical question certain fundamental considerations play a role with regard to certain fundamental concepts: for example with regard to the concept of science, whether there is only one method or whether there are more than one which are acceptable from a scholarly point of view. As far as I can see, all this is related to deeper, pre-reflexive notions of reality and truth, experience and reason. 3. Having mentioned certain situations and forms in which the quest for method occurs, it may be useful to ask also about the reasons why such a quest may occur. Sociologists of knowledge come into their own in this respect; I must limit myself to a more psychological view, and to only a few remarks. A. T h e simplest reason why the quest for method may occur is indeed the observation that others too, who use their intelligence, reach valid and relevant results in the same discipline with other approaches, methods, and techniques. Even before there is any disciplinary cooperation, the use of the results of someone else's investigation is already a silent recognition of his way of studying and, which is an essential point, a relativizing of the user's own method. Interdisciplinary communication leads, as we see in practice, not only to methodological questions, but also to methodological discussions. B. A quite different reason for the rise of the quest for method, in the study of religion as elsewhere, is what we may call the 'self-critical impulse' which may lead to the researcher's critical stand, with regard to religion amongst other subjects. For it is of course not the facts themselves, their connection or their field as such, which lead to methodological questions; it is the fact that they are a subject of intellectual questioning. A n d the 'questioner' is the researcher who asks himself whether he has indeed explained or understood something, and how he must go on. It is this typical self-critical impulse which has led not only to the discovery of new facts, but also to the discovery of new methods.

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C. Hypothetically, and quite open for discussions, we may add a third remark. It is precisely when certain religious or non-religious assumptions of reality or truth turn out to be incorrect, that in scholarly research a crisis emerges, where everything depends on the intellectual ability of the researcher to orient himself anew by means of his thinking. More than one methodological discussion bears the signs of a struggle for intellectual survival: the organization of a new kind of research, after old assumptions have been dropped. It would be important to ascertain whether certain methodological crises in the history of the study of religion may be seen in connection with certain cultural crises which in turn have their social, psychological and intellectual forms. O n the other hand, an atmosphere of certainty in a cultural psychological sense would make impossible any fundamental methodological questioning, except as a resistance or a protest. This may sound speculative, of course, and so I would like to change this hypothesis into a concrete question. Does not the present day discussion about methodology in the study of religion have a close relationship with the real changes in religion, and in the place of religion in our own society? It is perhaps worth drawing attention to the fact that this hypothesis would apply particularly in Holland where, just as in Lebanon, we may speak of a kind of syndrome of religions and confessions and where a secularization, logically speaking, would have the greatest consequences. O n e may add that, because of the lack of an independent philosophical tradition in this country, methodological differences are often not so much elaborated in rational ways, as reduced to matters of principle: of world views, of religious convictions, of theological thought. They are even justified on this account. This may be a particular case in Holland, but speaking about reasons generally why the quest for method may present itself, I think that cultural, social, religious, and psychological changes play a great role; exactly which role they play would deserve investigation. Methodological reflections could be seen as a means to master the intellectual crisis which is the result of such a change (for instance an intellectual meaninglessness) through a fundamental reorientation which leads to a new meaningful way of putting problems and so to further meaningful knowledge. T h e present methodological discussions in the social sciences are a good example of this process. 4. A f t e r having indicated certain basic situations from which during concrete research the quest for method may arise, as well as two different ways in which this quest may present itself, and some factors which may explain the rise of methodological questions as such, we must now enter into some implications of the quest for method, especially in the study of religion.

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73

A. It is a much discussed question whether there can exist a special method for the study of religion. T h e treatment of this question corresponds in broad oudine with what is understood by religion. If religion is considered to be essentially a specifically qualified experience, then a kind of divinatory intuition is proclaimed as its particular method; if it is considered to be a spiritual ideal, then a phenomenological contemplation of essence and forms of manifestation can be proclaimed to be the appropriate method; if it is considered to be a function of culture, then the existence of a separate method for the study of religion is denied in favor of methods as they are used for instance in cultural anthropology. If it is considered as an anthropological particularity which has to do with the very constitution of the human being, then the existence of a special method is denied in favor of methods like those used in biology and physical anthropology; if religion is considered to be essentially a reality of faith, then it is presupposed that the researcher will have a faith if not as a method, then at least as a condition for fruitful research. In this way 'the quest for method in the study of religion' is largely a quest for the right view of religion. B. Another question which is much discussed is whether there are one or more methods in the study of religion. In the first generations of historians of religions we find repeatedly that for the study of religion two methods exist; the theological and the historical, the latter standing for what we would call now 'scientific study of religion'. It has gradually become clear that one can follow not only historical but also anthropological, sociological, psychological, and other approaches in the study of religion. It all depends on the facts or the aspects of study. In the coming decades the number of fields in the study of religion may be enlarged, since we can view the phenomenon of religion under various aspects. I would not like to deny a priori that, from the point of view of philosophy of religion and of theology as well, a kind of research of religion as such would be possible. Scholars of religion may pay due attention to this matter. C. A n important factor in the history of the study of religion is that the number of authentic questions of method, arising from the progress of research itself, has been limited. Many of the impulses which have advanced this field of study have come from outside it; they seem to have had their origin outside research as properly defined. Answers to questions of a theological nature have been sought from the materials of the study of religion: for instance the question of the origin and essence of religion, the question of the existence and/or revelation of a god. A n d answers to critical questions with regard to religion have also been sought from the same materials. T h e study of religion has made the attempt,

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in as far as it was able, to provide answers, often responding in the second case with a kind of apologetic of religion. A great deal of the history of the problems dealt with in the study of religion was above all part of the cultural, mental and spiritual climate of the West in the second half of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century. Interestingly, the problems of that West itself have hardly been touched upon in the young field of studies in religion: the official study of religion as a discipline has not made a real study of the religion in the culture in which it had arisen. T h e problems which it has investigated touch indeed essential values of the West and particularly of empirical Christianity here, but the concrete research which it has carried out has been done mostly in other cultures and as a matter of fact, has been rather innocent over the West itself. Criticism of the Christian religion has come from other quarters than from scholars of religion. Consequendy the study of religion has been part and parcel of the West, but has found itself within this West in a kind of marginal position since it could not be but distrusted by the wider circles of Christianity. It has had, in addition, a certain marginal position in a scholarly sense as well, not only with regard to theology proper, but also with regard to those empirical disciplines which work on the harsh reality, instead of the religious dreams, of mankind. D. T h e quest f o r method in the study of religion is at the same time the question of its aims. I do not mean here 'super-aims' as a general unmasking, fighting, or destroying of all religion, or their opposite: a defence, a glorification or a deepening of all religion. Nor do I want to deal with the personal needs which may exist in the case of the scholar of religion, varying from simple curiosity, a desire f o r another kind of life, or the fascination by that which is strange - religious, mysterious - to those religious impulses which may give to the professional work with religious materials of all times and places such a high tension. Instead I prefer to stay with the wisdom of the profession itself: 'It is foolish to be for or against religion although one cannot refrain from having one's thoughts about what one studies'. A f t e r all, in the aim of the study of religion we are not concerned with the individual, personal aims of the scholars of religion. If the question about the method adopted in the study of religion is not put only in a technical or theoretical sense, then there is the implied problem whether or not, behind the concrete research, one or more aims exist in regard to which the study of religion accomplishes a function. Such aims may be the cultural and social, or religious and theoretical, meaning of the discipline in our cultural situation; or the contribution of mutual understanding which it may make to the intercultural and inter-religious life; or the formation of an elite

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which works on a world-wide level on the ultimate meaning of everything, taking an all-encompassing view of all the religious possibilities of mankind; or the contribution to world development for the sake of a more humane existence of mankind, where religion with its centuries-old value systems may be placed to the service of the development of society and the strengthening of its humane dimension. Or, on the contrary, the history of religion may be written' in reverse', as the history of atheism; it may then contribute to the future possibility that mankind will be delivered from its illusions and will arrive at an adequate appreciation of its real problems. T h e relevance of the study of religion: this is the first question which our present-day students put with regard to this discipline, and it is a question which is implied in the 'quest for method' when this is made not only in a technical or in a theoretical sense but in a broader perspective. We do not want to give answers here, but we must be lucid with regard to the question. E. It is a legitimate problem whether the quest for method occurs in a particular sense in the study of religion. If it is the case that religion is the field of the irrational par excellence, then a scholarly student of it is sharply limited in advance, even if no conflict occurs between rational science and scholarship on the one hand, and irrational religion on the other. In the history of the discipline opinions on this matter have been deeply divided, mostly for reasons which are outside the scope of the study of religion itself. With some exceptions the majority of researchers have not wanted to master the whole of religion but have worked on particular problems: for instance the problem of the definition of religion had to be faced, the fact that 'religion' only exists in 'religions', or still better in 'religious phenomena' which are indissolubly connected with their cultural context. T h e scholarly study of 'religion' became then in the first place a study of religious documents, in the technical sense of the word: texts, observed actions and statements, archeological findings, architecture, artifacts, and so on. So the question of hermeneutics and exegesis was raised, and also the question of the general framework within which religious expressions are to be interpreted. A next step was 'classical' phenomenology which offered an enormous inventory and classification of all kinds of religious phenomena, with attempts at some global interpretation. A n d some time later, after cultural history, cultural anthropology led to the study of religions within their respective cultures. A s has been said earlier, it is probable that 'the quest for method' in the study of religion has a particular meaning which it would not have in other disciplines.

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F. A l l this does not alter the fact that, in connection with the quest f o r method in the study of religion in the sense of theory of k n o w l e d g e , we must m a k e some basic decisions, so l o n g as we want only to e m p l o y scholarly criteria - like e x p e r i e n c e and reason - in such a study. A m o n g these decisions are the following: a) w h e t h e r , a n d to what extent, religion should stand apart f r o m the rest of reality: exactly w h a t it is that then stands apart, and w h e t h e r this can be k n o w n at all, p e r h a p s with the help of a 'special m e t h o d ' , which h o w e v e r w o u l d then stand outside the normal communication of the scholarly disciplines; b) w h e t h e r ideological points of view can be i n t r o d u c e d into the study of religion, or w h e t h e r certain conclusions reached by the discipline, or even the discipline itself, can be e m p l o y e d ideologically. ' I d e o l o g i c a l ' is used here in a f o r m a l sense, a n d may be o r t h o d o x or liberal, as well as new-theological, dialectical o r non-dialectical materialist, agnostic, gnostic, with or without religious principles; c) w h e t h e r it is desirable to introduce o n e particular logical system which will then d e t e r m i n e to a large extent the scope and r i g o r of the conclusions which can be arrived at within this field of studies; d) w h e t h e r it is desirable to w o r k with one particular concept of science, or to leave r o o m f o r other concepts a n d applications of scholarship a n d science within the whole of the study of religion; e) w h e t h e r the question of what religion is should be left o p e n o n principle, and if so which f r a m e of r e f e r e n c e should be e m p l o y e d in interpreting it, such as a 'societal' or ' c u l t u r a l ' system; f) w h e t h e r a particular concept of m a n as h u m a n being should be used, and what this implies f o r the way in which a stand is taken with regard to the people w h o have expressed themselves religiously and w h o are the subject of study. 5. B e f o r e closing this p a p e r o n the quest f o r method in the study of religion, there still remains at least one logical question: why is the quest for method not stated more often? First, this seems to be related to the student's loyalty to the teaching of the masters f r o m w h o m he has benefited and the desire to continue it in his own research; the discipline which he must impose u p o n himself in o r d e r to master a large quantity of materials without s u p e r f l u o u s questions; the d o m i n a n t concepts about the discipline in professional circles, w h e r e deviations are hardly tolerated; certain stereotyped answers to the question of what scholars of religion in fact d o a n d why, answers which have a m o r e or less ideological content. B u t there are also less psychologically oriented answers which are possible,

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which would explain why in many cases the quest for method, at least in a theoretical sense, is not put at all. T h e r e may be a great stress on excellency of craftmanship, there may be authentic natural interest in and need for direct knowledge of facts and phenomena, possibly with a certain helplessness in the face of complicated theories and hypotheses which are less than certain; there may be an ideal that gives a higher meaning to any knowledge and understanding of religious phenomena; there may be a closed world view or, paradoxically enough, a closed doctrine of methods (methodology!), which rules out the quest for method as a question in advance; and last but not least there may be an instinctive distrust of any sovereign use of reason, as compared with direct, factual knowledge of and familiarity with the materials, possibly combined with experience and intuition. This last idea of research in fact gives the study of religion a certain problem-free character and can end up as a kind of scholarly common sense which is simply bewildered by the problematics of methodologists. A nice example of this is the work of W. Brede Kristensen (see Waardenburg, 1972a, esp. pp. 145-161) for whom, in his own words, method is something strictly personal, which anyone must acquire for himself. What he may have meant is not what we understand here by 'method', but that quite familiar and perhaps intimate dealing with the sources which we at the present time tend to call the 'dialogue' of the researcher with his data, and to which no one else has, or can gain, admittance. It is more or less a tradition in the Netherlands that the scholar has had such a silent dialogue with his religious materials, without much speculation or passion. But this has had as its consequence that, once the quest for method presented itself, it arose not from an internal, purely theoretical point of view, but out of a fundamental criticism or protest, which was nourished by an equally fundamental questioning about religion as it exists on this very spot in Dutch polderland. T h e moment in the course of research at which ' the quest for method' arises is in fact a critical moment, a moment of crisis in continuing research. As such, the quest for method is a part of scholarship itself, as a continuous internal correction of navigation. Any rupture of the intrinsic connection between research and reflection causes subsequent ulterior damage to the discipline. In the last analysis, what is at stake here is the authenticity of the researcher who has the right to question. In precisely this sense, the quest for method in the study of religion is not only its crisis but also its purification.

6

The Category of Faith in Phenomenological Research*

We will restrict ourselves here to the problem of the use of the concept o f ' faith' in the field of the scholarly study of religion. Moreover, we will look into this matter f r o m a phenomenological point of view, aware that phenomenological research is only one of the different approaches in the study of religion, and that other approaches may lead to other ways of using the concept o f ' faith', religious and otherwise. Even with these limitations, the subject is still highly complex; so much so that we would prefer to put here some questions and make some proposals here, while adopting the self-critical approach of phenomenology in its new style to the problem of meaning. T h e r e can be no question here of claiming to give a definite solution. Our proposal is made in a perspective where the concept of ' f a i t h ' is defined in a phenomenological way, and the assumptions and nuances with which, f o r example, the German Glaube, the Dutch geloof, the French foi and croyance and the English ' b e l i e f and ' f a i t h ' are charged in ordinary religious linguistic usage are left aside. We will treat the subject in the following six parts: 1. Preliminary remarks 2. Faith in connection with the subject matter of research 3. Faith in connection with the subject carrying out research 4. Faith in connection with the relationship between subject and object of research 5. Some categories of 'new style' phenomenological research 6. Faith as a category in phenomenological research. * Paper read at the Xllth Congress of the Internationa] Association for the History of Religions, at Stockholm, August 1970. A first English version was published in the Proceedings of the XHth International Congress of the International Association for the History of Religions (Stockholm, /970). Edited by C. Jouco Bleeker, Geo Widengren, Eric J. Sharpe. Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1975, pp. 305-315.

8o

I.

A plea for methodological awareness

PRELIMINARY

REMARKS

If we want phenomenology to be a scholarly discipline, and if we want to claim a general validity for its findings, o n e of the most intricate problems is that of the concept of 'faith'. O n e of the reasons for this state of affairs is that ' f a i t h ' itself has been a religious concept. In the monotheistic religions a n d specifically in Islam and Christianity the notion of faith has played a m a j o r role; in Protestantism especially it has been the central concept (justification by faith). It has been absolutized f r o m time to time, a n d in the West it functions basically as a theological concept which is linked to a certain notion of God and of revelation. F u r t h e r m o r e , for most Western people, including those who are not religious themselves, the notion of faith is indissolubly connected with the notion of man as a person. It is then legitimate to ask whether this concept can be used at all in the scholarly study of religion. Many discussions on method and theory in the field go back to different positions taken by scholars with regard to this very problem. But hardly anyone has tackled the problem of ' f a i t h ' in the study of religions as the problem of redefining it as a possible scholarly category. Behind the current use of the word ' f a i t h ' there is a definite normative element: the idea that, somehow, we can know what ' f a i t h ' is or that we ought to know what it is, or that we at least should know what it ought to be. It is assumed in the West that we should achieve it, or anyhow that we should not lose it. This is a theological problem, and it remains as such an open question; and maybe even a mystery, since 'faith', religious or otherwise - at least an individual's faith - is not a thing, an object, something isolated in itself or something which we can isolate. O u r discipline has suffered too much already u n d e r such normative ideas; for example, the idea that we can or should know what religion really is. We should not repeat the same mistake with regard to the notion of faith. First of all, great care must be taken in the choice of words. In what sense can we speak at all of the ' f a i t h ' of other people, that is to say of people who are different f r o m ourselves? And in what sense can we speak of the study of 'faiths' in the plural, that is to say, of those fundamentals of the religious attitudes of different people that can be subsumed u n d e r o n e common denominator? If the expressions 'one's own faith', 'faith of other people' and 'faiths' in the plural easily lead to misrepresentations of something that is rather subde, then how can we, in o u r scholarly work, legitimately h o p e to attain a knowledge of it which is generally valid? O n e of the assumptions here is that the scholarly speech about faith is f u n d a mentally different f r o m the believers' speech about it. F u r t h e r m o r e there is no

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reason a priori to throw the concept overboard. It is also assumed that a scholar who uses the concept has to be self-critically aware of the meaning, the way and the intention in or with which he uses the word 'faith'. Again, especially in contact with other people, he has to make clear that for purposes of research he habitually uses current concepts in a particular way which is different f r o m the ordinary daily usage. In this paper we take the basic problem of phenomenology to be: how to know with reasonable certainty - or at least with reasonable probability - the significance of the data which we study for the communities or individuals involved with them? This requires research on meaning. Behavior, speech, art, and so on carry meaning with them and consequendy, they should also be investigated in this respect. On this view, any research into faith will not deal with faith as a metaphysical entity in itself, but always with faith as it has existed in a given culture, among certain people at a particular time and place, and how it has manifested itself in their expressions. In most cases we have to proceed by inference from data of different kinds, but there is sometimes direct evidence for such faith. For instance, when man in a certain situation has made a definite appeal to it. But even then we still should ask in each case whether this faith has functioned indeed according to its intentions, or whether it has served as a cover for something else. And a general question like 'the place of faith' in world history may be as fascinating as the question of 'the role of love' in world history; but it can be answered only through the investigation of specific instances. Let us conclude these preliminaries with two remarks on our notion of reason: a) Philosophically speaking, we would hold that reason does not and cannot succeed in arriving at an adequate grasp of faith, one of the reasons being that faith itself cannot be made an object. T h e closer reason reflects on faith, the more it turns out to arise itself out of faith. And the 'objects' to which faith refers are not objects or facts in the ordinary empirical sense of the word, but rather phenomena that are linked to faith and to some extent can bring about a movement of faith. Moreover, this faith itself transcends the reality of empirical 'objects'. b) Speaking from a scholarly point of view, we would hold that the only sure way to arrive at any knowledge about faith is by means of investigating direct or indirect testimonies which are bound to concrete 'expressions'. Our research is able to grasp such testimonies as expressions only to the extent allowed by the available evidence. The major question is then: how do we discover the meaning of such testimonies? And since as scholars we are not supposed to have direct access ourselves to the reality to which these

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testimonies testify, we have to proceed in our interpretation of such testimonies on the basis of their human context. We come now to our subject proper. Time permits only the presentation of a framework, but this is enough to elucidate the terms of the problem.

2.

FAITH

IN C O N N E C T I O N W I T H T H E S U B J E C T

MATTER

OF

RESEARCH

One of the major questions here is whether or not a possible faith existing behind given religious expressions can be a subject of inquiry, and if so, how this should be carried out. a) Empirical research has to do with objects as facts: texts, representations, ideas, monuments, artifacts, works of art, directly observed speech and behavior, and so forth. Such facts can be investigated for their meanings taken as objects in themselves or in a context: this is particularly evident in the case of texts, but it also holds true for other religious facts. b) From a strictly empirical point of view it can be contended that such facts and meanings are not necessarily linked with faith. They are then considered as, for example, products of imagination, intelligence, professional skill; their function is assessed according to biological, psychological, economic, social, or other needs and necessities. The notion of faith does not enter into the picture of empirical considerations. A strictly rational point of view confirms this basic rule that our research cannot establish any necessary link between these facts and their meanings on the one hand, and a hypothetical faith which might exist 'behind' such facts and meanings on the other hand. Supposing indeed that there is or can be a real faith behind these facts and meanings, neither empirical nor rational research will have access to it. c) Scholarship which is critical towards others and itself will, moreover, observe that a number of statements and affirmations made by scholars about the faith of other people are, when it comes to the essentials, in fact more revealing for the spiritual qualities of the scholar and the climate of his milieu than for bringing into the open a quality of faith existing 'behind' the religious facts. Consequendy, the existence of such a quality could be denied altogether. In fact, the least we can say here is that any possible perception of someone else's faith is filtered through the spirituality of the observer, that is the network of his own faith, religiousness, religion, philosophy, and so on - whether it has a positive or negative effect on the perception itself.

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d) T h e r e appears to be a larger degree of objectivity and possibility of verification in the reconstitution of a given religious universe than in the perception of the faith of a given culture, community or person. It certainly remains a reconstitution, but that can be carried out methodically on the basis of given evidence, and any hypothesis or provisional conclusion can be verified. O n the basis of a careful study of given religious facts and their meanings it will be possible in a number of cases, especially in present-day situations, to reconstitute the mental universe of a given group or individual, so long as documentary material is available and a critical method is applied. Such a universe appears to be, basically, a field of significances (champ de significations) showing certain basic intentions that correspond with the given needs and problems of the people concerned. Whereas if a 'faith' forms the subject matter only incidental perceptions - which are highly valuable but none the less subjective - can be achieved, with regard to a religious universe there is the possibility of a reconstitution which remains largely subjected to norms of critical scholarship and which is, consequently, more objective in its results.

3.

FAITH

IN C O N N E C T I O N

W I T H THE SUBJECT C A R R Y I N G

OUT

RESEARCH

One of the major questions here is whether or not a faith on the part of the researcher himself should be a requirement for fruitful research, a) T h e r e is no reason to assume that if the researcher has a specific religious faith or none at all this can in itself lead to better results in the study of religion. T h e very fact that the presentations of some scholars w h o work with an explicit faith show more daring misinterpretations of the material than profound insights makes the critical scholar tend to prefer the work of those who are not explicidy religiously committed themselves. T h e r e is reason to distrust a priori the work of those who interpret their material according to pre-conceived schemes of reference or closed systems of interpretation, sometimes religiously determined or sanctioned, or who - precisely by limiting all truth to one particular ultimate truth which they confess themselves in a particular way - are precluded from grasping the truthful character, the authentic claim, and so the real significance of the phenomena studied. Analytically speaking, the problem of the researcher who is himself explicidy religiously involved is that a number of assumptions or statements which he makes are beyond logical control; they appear to preclude correction because they are religiously motivated, held or sanctioned.

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b) However, when speaking of a possible faith which the researcher adheres to, there is still r o o m f o r great variety. For instance, it may consist of an adherence to a given set of doctrines, moral prescriptions and ritual practices of the truth of which one is convinced. It may be a particular kind of creative, mystical, or metaphysically paradoxical way of existing. It may be the religious venture of an individual, which can take a theological articulation. Again, in each case the relationship of such a faith with the research work itself, its psychological motivations, its intellectual questioning, and so on, will be different. T h e field of research may thereby obtain an almost complete autonomy, so that it is the faith in the research itself which becomes the faith of the scholar. O n the other hand, even if in a particular case a certain faith might be conducive to fruitful research into certain problems or phenomena, there are of course many more and more essential requirements f o r such research in the field of religious meanings. In the last analysis, it is not a particular faith that will stand in the way of scholarly research on religion, but certain obscurantist mental attitudes such as stubbornness and self-righteousness, or mystification a n d idealization, which hardly can be corrected if they are combined with religious pretentions. c) Furthermore, it is important to note that the subjectivity of the scholar contains the very source of his interests and intentions, and is related to an existential realm. It will determine, for instance, the kinds of things which he is inclined to put any faith in, or can hardly put faith in at all. O n this level, it is not only a specifically religious faith, but any faith, on the part of the scholar that plays a role in original research. T h e r e is some truth in the saying that a scholar should be a doubter and maybe even a sceptic; at least it secures him against uncritical assumptions and acceptances which g o back to too naive a faith. B u t there is also truth in the saying that he should have at least some faith, even if only in the direction of his own pursuits. d) O n the basis of what has just been mentioned we would like to submit that it is a methodical requirement that religious p h e n o m e n a be studied by people not only of different specializations but also of different characters and backgrounds. O f course we d o not mean thereby an adherence to different given philosophies or theological systems; on the contrary, what is required is an active autonomous reflection by each student. As a result, the phenom e n a studied as evidence will be seen not only in their manifold aspects but also in their different meanings to different people.

The category of faith in phenomenological

4.

FAITH

IN C O N N E C T I O N

WITH THE RELATIONSHIP

S U B J E C T A N D O B J E C T OF

research

85

BETWEEN

RESEARCH

One of the major questions here is whether research on religion should have basically the character of an interfaith relationship. a) The proposition assumes that the researcher adheres to religious faith of such a kind that he is able not only to reconstitute the mental universe potentially contained in the materials before him but also to perceive a religious faith behind these materials. It implies that he is both moved himself by a faith and really interested in the faith of another given person, community or culture. b) A specific situation may occur in the study of the living religion of a given group or individual, when these make their religious faith explicit with an appeal to others to adhere to it. In the study of such an appeal there are then the alternatives either to study it as a datum which is meaningful in itself, or to carry out further research in a communicative attitude carrying on a dialogue with the data during which the researcher incidentally may have to explain himself. Of course, for the historian of religion this is an extreme case, but such a situation often occurs in the social sciences and psychology. T h e response given by every researcher to this alternative depends largely on the extent to which he wants to involve himself. c) After what has been said about some of the difficulties in perceiving a faith behind given religious expressions and about some of the ambiguities of a faith held by the researcher, there is hardly need to stress the absolute necessity for caution in the study of living religion on an interfaith level. After all, the ambiguities are doubled here since two parties are involved, and if it is true that faith can only be perceived by faith, it is equally true that the chances of distortion are greater than in the study of data as objects in themselves. Already the 'choice' of the 'other', and the way in which such a choice is made, has enormous consequences for the study of the 'other', unless it goes no further than doing laboratory experiments with religious people. Of still greater consequence is the kind of communication which is established with the' other'; if it is established in some way on false foundations the results of the study will become distorted. d) Although the problem of interfaith research has become more real now through the possibility of meeting and living with people of different religious backgrounds, it goes back a long way. Its basic ethos arises out of the idea that all human believers are by their very nature confronted with one divine reality. This idea has indeed given a powerful impetus to the study of religion, since on the basis of it research can be carried out to learn what other

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people have already discovered of that divine reality, and finally in order to learn about the reality itself. A m o n g some scholars there has been an underlying notion that the study of religion can open up to the researcher himself, and consequendy to his culture, the consciousness of dimensions of life and reality which have been lost in modern industrialized society, e) In the case of direct interfaith studies, especially with the basic ethos just mentioned, it is unavoidable that the other is interpreted in the light of the researcher's own faith. T h e reason is ultimately the involvement of his complete personality in this kind of interfaith research. He may be quite philosophically minded, reflecting on human existence as such, or he may have ethical aims and motivations to ameliorate human conditions and communication. In either case his study of religion is carried out, in the last analysis, with a view to something beyond scholarship itself. This of course happens in the case of any faith, religion, ideology or conviction held by a researcher, unless he has declared science to be an absolutely autonomous province, guarding it jealously and resisting the intrusion of any considerations beyond scholarship itself. This would mean that he has put faith in scholarship for scholarship's sake.

5.

S O M E C A T E G O R I E S OF ' N E W

STYLE'

PHENOMENOLOGICAL

RESEARCH

After these preliminary remarks and this discussion of the dimensions of the problem of 'faith' in the study of religion, we might feel inclined to eliminate the notion of faith altogether from the study of religion and to restrict research in this field to empirical fact-finding and rational theory-building. T h e realities of faith would then simply fall outside the scope of scholarly research. Of the different specialized disciplines concerned with the study of religion, phenomenology as a systematic discipline has from its inception shown a considerable concern for this question of faith. One of its founders, Pierre Daniel Chantepie de la Saussaye (see Waardenburg, 1972a, esp. pp. 136-144), read a paper at the very first International Congress for the History of Religions held in Stockholm in 1897 on the subject 'Die vergleichende Religionsforschung und der religiöse Glaube': T h e Comparative Study of Religion and Religious Faith. (This paper was published separately in Freiburg im Breisgau in 1898. It was later reprinted in a volume of essays where it is easily available: see Chantepie de la Saussaye, 1909). It would be worthwhile to trace the way in which different

The category of faith in phenomenological research

87

phenomenologists of religion have formulated this problem of scholarship and faith, and to see what kind of solutions they have had in mind. There is no need here to enter into the discipline of Phenomenology of Religion in its different variations, which are well known. We only want to stress the existence not only of phenomenological classifications, schemes and syntheses, but specifically of phenomenological research as the study of those human expressions in different times and places, which had or have a religious meaning or value to the people concerned, according to what they themselves understood or understand by 'religion'. So we are here concerned with the study of religious meanings, of human religiosity and of the religious mental universes which man has made throughout history. Scholarly speaking, the gods have lived in the faith of the believers, and we have no other way of knowing what these gods have meant to man than by reconstituting the religious universe in which they occupied the summit, the center or the foundation, and then perhaps by achieving some 'subjective' perception of a faith which sustains such universes. In phenomenology of religion, our interest is to know what kind of people have believed in what kind of gods and other 'things' under which circumstances. If the road which we must travel in order to arrive at a scholarly answer to this question is a long one, we should not fail to take it nevertheless and we should not anticipate the answer. A distinguishing feature of such new style phenomenological research is that the meaning of the religious facts or phenomena is here not only studied as a meaning which they have as objects in themselves or in their context, but also as a meaning which they have for people, that is to say they are studied on a level of intentions. T h e ' facts' of empirical research are here interpreted as human 'expressions', that is to say as the specific traces of human problems, ideals, dreams and aspirations. If there is enough documentary material, we may reconstitute as a hypothetical probability some of the religious intentions which prevailed, or prevail, in a given society at a given time, and of which the religious phenomena that then occurred or occur may be considered to provide evidence. Let us stress the wording 'as a hypothetical probability' since phenomenological statements have to be constantly verified and checked by factual research. In phenomenology there has been a development both on the level of reflection and on that of research. As phenomenological reflection has moved over the last fifty years from metaphysics to human existence, so phenomenological research is developing from the search for timeless essences to a search for meanings inside time, including those meanings which have a religious quality for the people involved.

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6.

A plea for methodological awareness

F A I T H AS A C A T E G O R Y IN P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L

RESEARCH

From such a phenomenological point of view, a religion can be seen as a field of significances (champ de significations) underneath which there runs a network of basic intentions. But such intentions and the subsequent significances can only be grasped through the study of the specific religious phenomena which convey meanings to the people involved with them. If, phenomenologically speaking, a religion is a system of significances which has one or more absolute points of reference, it may also be said that, phenomenologically speaking, religion originates at the moment when man expresses himself religiously, that is to say when this expression of his carries a religious meaning for him. When trying to grasp such meanings in a scholarly way we can at least manage to guess them with reasonable probability. Viewed in this way, the concept of religious faith would indicate the 'happening' of a religious meaning to people, that is to say the perception of a religious signification and the subsequent modification of behavior. For strict phenomenological research, 'faith' would be a limit-concept (Grenzbegriff) since it indicates the origin of the (religious) meanings which are subject to investigation. 'Faith', consequendy, is taken here in a different sense from the one which it has in theology or in ordinary language. Defined in this way it is a term open enough to be used fruitfully in phenomenological research, as a scholarly, not as a religious, concept.

PART T H R E E

Phenomenology of Religion Reconsidered

7

Phenomenology of Religion A Scholarly Discipline, a Philosophy, or an Art?*

It is a privilege to have the opportunity to discuss some aspects of a discipline which has the glamor of youth about it, that is, the glamor of the age of transition from adolescence to adulthood, as I would like to call the state of Phenomenology of Religion at the present time.

I.

RESEARCH

ON

MEANING

In fact, there is some irony in the attempt to say something meaningful about the study of meanings. What do we mean, what do we intend, when we carry out investigations into the fields of meaning of, for instance, art, or social existence, or religion, specifically within our discipline? How do we proceed in our research into the meaning of a phenomenon which has religious meanings for groups and individuals in a given society? I do not say that phenomenology can solve the problem of religious meanings. Someone claiming this would make of it an ideology or even a religion itself. But I would say that phenomenology can make a contribution to a scholarly search for what people understand as having' religious' meanings in different traditions, times and places. The term 'phenomenology' is the catchword of a movement both in philosophical and in scholarly research. All its representatives, however much they may be at variance with each other, are concerned, in some way or another, with the consciousness which man acquires of the world, of others and of himself; with the relationship between man on the one hand and the world, others and himself on the other hand; and with the way in which human expressions, among them religious ones, can be understood against the background of such fundamental relationships. As a movement of thought, phenomenology tries to come to an understanding of man within a philosophical anthropology. As a movement of research, phenomenology tries to classify specific sets of phenomena - including * Paper read at Brown University, Providence, R.I., 25 March 1969. Some parts of this paper were published earlier in 'Research on Meaning in Religion', in Religion, Culture and Methodology, ed. by Th. P. van Baaren and H. J. W. Drijvers. The Hague-Paris: Mouton, 1973, pp. 110-136, in particular pp. 110-113, H9- I 2 7 and 130-132.

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religious phenomena - in such a way that it does justice to their expressed meanings. What do we understand here by 'meaning'? There are several interpretations of this concept, and each interpretation leads to a particular idea of 'understanding'. I would simply make clear for the moment that the term 'meaning' can be used in at least two completely different senses. On the level of thought, a meaning is an explicit or implicit connection which is made between different phenomena, thus assembling them into meaningful structures. In this case, 'meaning' is above all an interpretative category. On the other hand, on the level of research, there is the 'meaning' which a specific phenomenon had or has for a specific group or individual, and about which that individual or group can express himself. In this case 'meaning' is not an interpretative category, but the contents of an expression. So we have to distinguish two kinds of meaning: the first being an interpretation by means of our own philosophical and scientific language, the second contained in the religious or other expressions which we are investigating. Although the one cannot occur without the other, for analytical purposes we must keep them by definition distinguished: as a meaning, or significance, contained in a human expression, and as a meaning, or means, by which we understand that human expression. We would restrict still more the first kind of meaning, that contained in a human expression, to the meaning which such an expression has for the people concerned, either the author of the expression or those who become involved with the objectified phenomenon resulting from this expression. The objective classification and study of religious data necessarily leads to this problem of their 'subjective' meaning for the people concerned with them. This problem is evident in the renewed interest in hermeneutical questioning, and it also finds expression in the titles of books like The Meaning of Religion, by W. Brede Kristensen (i960), and The Meaning and End of Religion, by W. Cantwell Smith (1963). It is especially in the latter study that much attention is devoted to the question of the meaning of religious data for those who are concerned with them or committed to them. This was less the case in what we would like to call the 'classical' type of phenomenology of religion, where research on meaning in religion to a large extent coincided with the search for objective general patterns, coming down to basic mental or philosophical structures in the world of religious phenomena. The question which we put here is of a slightly different nature, namely to what extent can we grasp 'subjective' meanings, that is to say the significance of certain concrete religious data to certain people. In thus asking what someone else 'means by' what he or she expresses, or what something 'means f o r '

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someone other than ourselves, we understand the concept of 'meaning' in a specific sense. And so in what follows we shall use the word 'meaning' in this restricted sense of 'subjective meaning' as 'contents of meaning for someone'. The word 'significance' here refers to the objective side of meaning, its source, and the word 'signification' indicates a specific reference which a significance or a meaning makes to a signified reality as a tertium datum in the signifying process. If we say, for instance: 'nature means happiness to Peter', the meaning which imparts itself to Peter is that of 'happiness', while it is 'nature' that, to Peter, has the significance of happiness. And if we say: 'nature means the happiness of paradise to Peter', 'nature' has the signification of 'happiness of paradise' by referring specifically to a paradisal reality. Much confusion can be avoided, moreover, if we separate methodically and rigorously all research on 'subjective meanings', with which we are concerned here, from that on meanings as they may exist in themselves, metaphysically, or meanings as they may exist either for the scholar personally or as categories of his scholarly interpretation. In our interpretation we always attribute meanings to facts; consequendy, there are no 'pure' but only interpreted facts. Yet we must methodically distinguish our interpretations, as meanings, from the facts themselves. On the assumption that man is a being who attributes and receives meaning, our contention is that, although meaning and fact can be distinguished analytically, everything within human culture always has both a factual aspect and a meaning aspect. It is, by the way, only in a civilization like the modern Western one, impregnated by science and its objectifications, that it has been possible not only in thought but also in experience to make a separation between both aspects, a consequence of which has been the development of scholarly research and of technology. This very distinction between fact and meaning poses the question of meaning in a new way. Indeed, the actuality of research into meaning has to do, on one hand, with the immensely increased factual knowledge which we command at present and, on the other, with a certain crisis in Western civilization where older accepted patterns and systems of giving meaning are apparently in the process of dissolving themselves, whatever may be the reason for this. And the present interest in research into meanings for others than ourselves has to do not only with natural curiosity, but also with the gradual emergence of the category of 'the other'. This is an important factor in any interest in knowing the culture, religion, and world of experience (life world) of other people. Our contention is that, among the various disciplines dealing with hermeneutical and semiological problems, which have to work together in the study of subjective meanings, a contribution can be made by a 'new style' phenomenological research in so far as this views human expressions, including religious ones,

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with reference to human intentions. T h e old adage of phenomenology, back to the data (zurück zu den Sachen), should be reformulated here as: back to the basic intentions. In this new style phenomenological research, the meaning of given data for given people should be the focus of interest in the first place. A phenomenologist thus tries to analyze structures of intentionality in a way which is parallel to that of a radiographer X-raying the human body down to its bones, a psychoanalyst laying bare the emotions of the unconscious, or a structural anthropologist analyzing social reality to finds its structures. In the second place the search should be for a coherent hypothesis or theory to solve problems connected with the intentions of a given set of data; such a hypothesis or theory has then to be verified in subsequent empirical research. T o study 'religion' in this phenomenological perspective is to reconstruct religious meanings on the basis of the available documentary materials, with particular attention being paid to the intentions of which these materials give evidence. At this point I should perhaps say that the whole phenomenological enterprise, to me, is a scholarly form of the human quest for meaning as such. If we may consider as one of the outstanding characteristics and capacities of man his ability to convey or to receive meaning - and to search for meaning - then phenomenology is the discipline which investigates the meaning of a specific phenomenon to a specific person, a person who is different from the scholar himself. I shall skip now the question of what we can understand by 'religion', but I shall come back to it after the argument which follows, through which I hope to be able to make clearer what we understand by 'phenomenology of religion'.

2.

PHENOMENOLOGY

OF

RELIGION

T h e origins of phenomenology of religion lie in the discipline of comparative religion. One of the characteristics of this discipline is the search for and comparison of parallels. Such a search was often carried out in order to explain certain features in the Old Testament, New Testament or in early Christianity, by comparing the historical background of Ancient, Semitic or Hellenistic religions, where similar features could be found. If the possibility of historical borrowings was excluded, then at least it could be shown that certain features of Christianity which were thought to be unique could in fact be found elsewhere. In both cases Christianity's claim to be 'the absolute religion' was challenged in a particular way. But there could be yet another inspiration behind the search for parallels: the idea that mankind is engaged in a common search for truth,

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and that each of mankind's religions constitutes an endeavor in this search for absolute truth. Behind the search for parallels, there was also the desire to find points of convergence. We shall not go into the objections which were raised against this approach. For example, it was pointed out that we cannot compare parallel phenomena from different religious traditions without taking into account each phenomenon's specific geographical, historical and social context. Phenomenology, then, deepened the purely comparative approach by questioning afresh both the meaning of religious phenomena and our approach to its discovery. As it has developed, phenomenology of religion has become a branch of the systematic study of religion. Like the phenomenology of art, language, eroticism or social existence, our study of religion deals with a subject which has always been held to be particularly irrational. This new branch of learning attempts to push back the frontier of the irrational and to gain access to its subject-matter by investigating structures of meaning which are proper to it, and in the light of which religion as an expression of meaning or significance becomes comprehensible. In the first stage of the discipline's existence phenomenologists were almost too enthusiastic about the whole enterprise, both about religion itself and about their own findings. In the light of certain new 'absolutized' categories, such as the Holy, the Completely Different (das ganz Andere), Power, unexpected connections were seen and hitherto unknown meanings perceived or at least suspected. On the other hand, there was also great confidence in a nearly absolutized intuition, by means of which the researcher would be able to grasp what was called the essence or perhaps the reality of religion. Looking back now upon those beginnings of phenomenology, we may say that, at that time, the approach, which was marked by a strongly idealistic bent, consisted of an unconsidered application of a basically religious intuition to a certain choice of factual materials, a choice made with the help of a certain ideal of what 'real religion' was, could, or should be. What was lacking most was self-criticism and an appeal to reason and scholarly discussion. Again, since any link between phenomenological research and phenomenological thought was severed, the early phenomenologists went to work, each within his own universe and largely subjectively, producing a number of statements which could be justified ultimately only on religious grounds. At present, our task ought to be, in addition to empirical research, not so much enthusiasm as self-critical reflection. On this basis a coherent and accurate phenomenology can be built up, which will be more than the mere result of an 'infallible' intuition or the harmonious linking together of facts and ideals to conform to the researcher's subjectivity. Besides the historical, social or economic explanation of a number of facts in

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a religious setting, the core of our work is the understanding of their coherence and religious meaning to the people involved. If I may use some examples from present-day discussions in Holland about a possible understanding of religious meaning, we can distinguish, broadly speaking, three different lines of approach to this question.

3.

THREE

LINES

OF

APPROACH

In the first place there are what we may call the 'religious intuitionists'. They hold that, after all, a religious meaning can only be known through an immediate divinatory capacity on the part of the researcher, a gift of grasping what is essential which can be called 'intuition'. This school contends that the core of our job is to be found in an immediate, super-rational self-revelation of the essentially irrational essence of the phenomenon. Although scholars who hold this view use the technical terms of epoche and 'eidetic vision' for that activity, in fact they deprive the terms of their epistemological implications and base themselves on religious premises, giving only small credit to reason. In the second place, there are what may be called the 'empiricists'. They contend that the whole procedure of phenomenological understanding has no scientific character whatsoever. They take upon themselves the task of describing the phenomena correctly, analyzing their elements, and placing them in a rational classification system. The essence of their position consists only in the explanation of facts; according to this view, because of the inevitable subjectivity of the researcher, understanding falls outside scholarship altogether. Thus compared with the religious intuitionists, the empiricists are more modest in their claims, but they would not acknowledge phenomenology as a province above the domain of empirical facticity. According to them, phenomenology in the old sense was a philosophy or even poetry of religion. In the third place there are those whom we may call the' philosophically-minded' researchers, because they want to put certain fundamental questions before embarking on the actual empirical research. They contend that a philosophical investigation ought to precede the empirical research, concerning itself in the first place with the concepts with the help of which the empirical research is carried out. But it also concerns a'preliminary discourse' about the fundamental structures of man, world, and transcendence in their relationships. This school holds that only on the basis of such philosophical anthropological investigations the actual facts and phenomena can be meaningfully studied and interpreted. It is unnecessary to say that there are gradations between the intuitional,

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empirically defined and philosophically defined positions in actual research. Rather than looking at the scholars we can look at the subject-matter; a number of subjects must be exhaustively investigated by empirical methods, certain subjects demand a preliminary philosophical investigation, while in certain cases one could not dispense with at least some religious sensitivity on the part of the scholar towards his subject.

4. L A R G E R

SIGNIFICATION

SUBJECTIVE

SYSTEMS A N D THE STUDY

OF

MEANING

T o return to the problem of subjective meaning, much research done on ideologies and belief, value and action systems, both on a theoretical level and in the analysis of concrete societies and their religions, can be continued as research o n ' subjective meaning'. Here an important fact is the self-evident validity of such ideologies, or at least great parts of them, for the people concerned: they are not questioned in a fundamentally critical way, and their meaning is simply available to the adherents who may 'receive' it. This fact of self-evident validity may be explained through some justification of the system to its adherents on the basis of what may be held to be absolute; any negation of such an 'absolute' can take place only with difficulty and would logically imply a change of ideology or religion. Apart from the history and structure of the ideology itself, a further question of 'subjective meaning' open to investigation is why at certain places and times certain parts of the ideology have had or have significance for certain people, and why at other places and times specific other parts are felt to be significant. We must assume that an appeal arises out of the system, an appeal which may bring about openness and acceptance on the part of the adherents. This openness may lead to a subjective reflection also on 'meaning' and may result in man acquiring a new way of understanding himself. T h e reception of this meaning by some people and not by others, the difference in the significance of the same item for different people, and the varying responses to this significance at different times and places even while it is fully acknowledged, are important problems both for concrete research and for the formation of a general theory. T h e basic methodological question here is how we can analyze the ideational content of a given religious expression or phenomenon in such a way that the meaning which it has for the people concerned, as well as the appeal which is behind it, can be ascertained. We come here to the problem of understanding.

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UNDERSTANDING

T h e problem of 'understanding' has been and is a central issue in the study of religion, and especially in phenomenology of religion. We cannot deal here with the many ways in which this problem has been tackled from different angles. It is here approached from the actual situation of the student whose task it is to search for the meaing of human religious expressions. This situation can be defined as being that of a researcher A, who is confronted: - either with certain facts, a, b, c etc., which are direct or indirect expressions of an unknown person X, or of an unknown group of people Χ, Υ, Ζ etc.; - o r with a certain person B, or a certain group of people B, C, D etc., who produced the known facts a, b, c etc. and who may express themselves in the future by the facts x, y, ζ etc. In our research we have to conclude: - in the first case from the facts a, b, c to the unknown person X or the unknown group Χ, Υ, Ζ etc.; - in the second case from the facts a, b, c etc. to the person(s) B, (C, D etc.) and vice versa; and from both the facts a, b, c etc. and the person(s) Β (C, D etc.) to the possible future facts x, y, ζ etc. which, by the way, may very well be expressed by Β (C, D etc.) under our own direct or indirect influence. Although in both cases we seek the meaning of facts, it goes without saying that our procedure and our possible results will be completely different in the two cases. It is a fundamental rule that research into religious meanings in religions of the past is different from research into religions of the present. We can say, of course, that this is the difference between historical research (in our case using mainly texts as evidence) and anthropological research (using mainly direct observation and interviews). But we can also learn from this difference about the different ways in which meanings can be understood. Let us analyze the situation a little further, and show thereby the task of a phenomenologist. In both cases we are dealing with religious expressions or phenomena which were or are meaningful to at least one person, implying a direct relationship between this person and his (religious) expression or between this person and a given religious phenomenon. Now it is at this point that a riddle lies: is there nothing beyond the man and his religious expression, his prayer, for instance, or beyond the religious phenomenon, the statue, for instance, and the man before it? Of course this question remains a riddle; it may even be a riddle to the man himself. Yet, from

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a phenomenological viewpoint something can be said, and I think we have here an example of the usefulness of phenomenology. If we study religion as a human reality, we can safely state that a prayer has a meaning and so does kneeling before a statue. We may even affirm that we have access, albeit partial, to this meaning through the words contained in the prayer or the behavior before the statue. A n d on further analysis it becomes evident that there is an intention, or more than one intention, contained in the meaning: the intention of the man who prays in this particular way, or who adores in this particular way. What the phenomenologist is after is to uncover, within the meaning of the prayer, the intention(s) which make the man pray, which have taken shape in the manner in which he prays. A phenomenological analysis of such a prayer, or of a set of prayers by the same person, can allow us to guess with reasonable certainty the intention(s) of the man behind the meaning of the words, on condition that there is enough material. T h e same holds true for the adoration of the statue: in both cases an analysis in depth should be able to bring to light a whole religious universe; and it may even get a glimpse of the man's object of intention, that is to say the sort of reality to which the man addresses himself. Perhaps I may quickly summarize what we have found by saying that the phenomenologist tries to understand 'religious meanings'. Any religious expression or behavior with regard to a religious phenomenon can be read not only in terms of its literal meaning or its actual form, but also in terms of one or more human intentions which produced it, after which it took its actual shape in the words or elements of the specific expression and behavior. It is assumed that, in addition to their direct meaning, these words and elements ' r e f e r ' to a direct intention. Thus, part of the task of phenomenological understanding is to grasp such intentions. We shall stop here and not go into phenomenological theory which must assume that beyond the immediate relationship between man and his expression there is a still more direct relationship between man and his intention; that the expression is meaningful because of what the man wants to express, or what he has in view when expressing himself; also that the intention - a n d certainly the 'intended o b j e c t ' - i s not immediately made clear to the researcher, but hinted at or designated by the facts to which he has immediate access. That, finally, it is the 'transcendent reference' of such facts which shows them to be what we could call, from a phenomenological point of view,' religious'. It is clear that the grasping of the intention and the intentional object is and remains scholarly guesswork.

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Phenomenology of religion reconsidered

THE

RESEACHER

Let us come back now to the situation of the researcher. If, as in the first case mentioned above, he has to deal with known facts stemming from unknown individuals, he has only a limited number of checks on any hypothesis on his part - checks which are all indirect. The unknown people cannot be questioned and any extension or correction of given interpretations is dependent upon new facts which may happen to be found and used and which may or may not have a connection with the facts already given. The absence of living persons implies that no new facts or expressions can be produced, and that the interpretation of the existing facts depends to a large extent on the questions which the researcher wants to resolve with the help of them. Yet under certain favorable circumstances a phenomenologist will be able to detect intentions by recognizing the' reference' character of his facts, should he want to read them at that level. But there is another feature of the situation of the researcher in this first given case, that of given facts stemming from unknown persons. The facts which are at his disposal are rarely direct religious expressions of individuals or groups which they have made themselves. In the great majority of cases he is dealing with religious phenomena, like statues, liturgies, myths, rituals, with which such individuals and groups have been faced, but which were created by others. And because of their 'objective' character it is therefore much more difficult to guess the intentions of those who made them and certainly of those who have been confronted with them. In the few cases where some sort of search for intentions has been carried out until now there has often been the pitfall of finding 'hidden wisdom and secrets' which the researcher had presumed he would find. Yet I think that a phenomenological analysis of the texts, monuments, works of art and so on which are still available, together with their context and background, will be able to discover in a number of cases certain intentions behind these expressions. My main argument for the existence of such intentions is, first, that these phenomena have been created at all, and second that they all have something to do with powers, spirits, gods and goddesses, that is to say intended objects par excellence. As for the situation of the researcher in the second case, because of the existence of both facts and persons he has immediately a most valuable check at his disposal. Even in his absence new expressions will continue to occur and new facts be produced which he can use. And when he is present, of course, he can hold conversations, put questions like 'what do you mean?', or just live with the people concerned in an attentive frame of mind. He can hardly ignore the human reference of the material he studies. But what, in our sense, is most

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important, is that in the case of living religions the researcher is dealing with people expressing themselves in whatever way it may be. And so he can see the other side of religion which usually remains a closed book to the historian - the immediate reactions of living people to religious phenomena, and the occurrence of religious expressions which are not necessarily recorded in literature. But for all that, the task of knowing or at least guessing what things mean to the people concerned is no easier. Those involved do not look on themselves, their expressions or their situations in life as facts in the way the researcher views them. Asked about their meaning, they may be too surprised to be able to answer; however, it is highly unlikely that anyone, when asked, will answer that something may be meaningless, even if he is embarrassed at being unable to explain the implicit meaning. There is yet another factor which complicates the phenomenologist's research. Since his task is to investigate the meaning of both religious expressions and phenomena which are religious to a people living with them and uncover their intentions, the researcher becomes more or less involved in that a number of facts in the community become meaningful to him. In history this may happen in his study, in the social sciences it can and probably will happen in reality. Again, we have to stop here without reflecting on this situation, in which the phenomenologist himself passes through different relationships with his world, allowing him to see that world from different positions, and to reflect on the meaning which specific things may have for different people, and may even have in themselves or completely lack. And in addition to phenomenological 'techniques' certain human resources are necessary in order to catch a glimpse of, or in other words, to guess what things religious in this world mean to the people involved on the level of intentions. The problem of understanding is as old as Adam and Eve, and the word 'understanding' itself is in fact used in many senses, which vary from a particular theory and method of scholarly hermeneutics such as das Verstehen to an ethical attitude with regard to human relationships. We may assume that the act of understanding is performed by different individuals in different ways; that the ways a philosopher, an artist or a scholar understand something differ; and that even the various scholarly disciplines have their own ways of explaining and understanding.

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7.

RELIGIOUS AND NON-RELIGIOUS

QUALITY

It would seem to be a difficult art to understand religious meanings in the way we have just discussed. One point is that by questioning the available data, we have, on the one hand, those expressions and phenomena which have a religious value in the judgment of the society concerned and, on the other, those facts and phenomena which are considered to be either divorced from the realm of religion altogether or at the most on the periphery of it. This distinction is in practice very difficult to make in societies where religion remains integrated in the structure of social life, and where all kinds of social, aesthetic, and artistic meanings have religious overtones. It must be admitted that in an earlier phase of phenomenological research the investigators tended not only to separate the so-called religious from the non-religious facts and factors - including those of an economic, social or even cultural nature - but also that they were tempted to concentrate exclusively on things religious. T h e r e were many reasons for this, and it would be beyond our scope to go into a discussion of them. At present I would say that it is precisely in terms of a sort of dialectic between what is religious and what is not, between the 'sacred' and the 'profane', that our understanding of religious expressions and phenomena can become real, doing full justice to the earthly context of the religious meanings and intentions. This implies that a phenomenologist should have more than a superficial acquaintance not only with philological and historical research, but also with the work of sociology and anthropology. And phenomenological theory should not fall into the trap of isolating religious meanings from other meanings, religious elements from non-religious ones, and religion itself from the total situation in which it occurs. Before coming to the point where phenomenological understanding includes philosophical and artistic traits, I would like to point to at least two major difficulties in the process of understanding which have to do with language. I leave here aside the problem of how to translate words from one language correctly into another. First, the scholarly concepts with which we work come out of a Western cultural and religious tradition. In order for them to do justice to the religious expressions and phenomena of other cultures, and to be usable by scholars coming themselves from other cultural traditions, they have to be examined. T h e terms with which facts and meanings, and a fortiori religious meanings, are investigated should be of a precise and subtle nature. Second, the meaning of an expression can only partially be rendered in a purely descriptive way; it is in the nature of the subject-matter that the scholar, once he has understood that meaning, speaks about it as something which is, at least virtually,

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' true'. In other words, as a scholar he becomes, at least for a moment, a witness of what he has understood. We can come now to the central theme of this lecture.

8.

DIRECT

EXPRESSIONS AND OBJECTIFIED

UNDERSTANDING

A 'RELIGIOUS

PHENOMENA.

UNIVERSE'

In ordinary matters it is said that, to understand someone, you have to enter into his universe. T h e same holds true for religion; however, the implications of it have to be worked out analytically. For the sake of clarity, we will first restrict ourselves to direct religious expressions. We have said before that understanding the meaning of a direct religious expression implies an understanding of what this expression means to the person concerned, and that the core of this meaning, phenomenologically speaking, is the intention which has given rise to the expression. We have also said that this intention cannot be grasped immediately, but only indirecdy, by using elements of the expression as' references' o r ' hints'. Now in my opinion the scholar's whole effort to interpret what we have called the religious meaning, intention and intended object of the religious expression, implies the reconstitution of a mental universe on his part, a universe which is aligned upon what appear to be the basic problems of the culture or person studied, and which also reflects the direction from which a solution of these problems may be hoped to come. In other words, the scholar attempts to reconstitute the existential problems and the transcendent references or openings which lie behind the specific expressions he is investigating. My hypothesis is that the success of this effort to understand largely depends on his ability to reconstitute the religious universe to which the expression testifies at least temporarily, and to interpret this expression in the light of what is transcendent in it or what we may call its religious background. I would hope that this hypothesis may be worth considering. T h e attempt has several times been made to state what the understanding of a religious expression actually is. I have tried to offer you a phenomenological analysis of it, and I think this method is all the more adequate since the main task of any phenomenology is the understanding of meaning. A discussion along phenomenological lines will help to elucidate the problem of how we can understand religion at all, and how we should proceed in practice. We would like now to extend what we have said about the understanding of direct religious expressions to those religious phenomena of a so-called' objective' nature, such as rituals, symbols, liturgies, statues, with which individuals and groups are confronted. Empirical studies try to find out what are the religious

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phenomena which exist in a given society at a given time. It is our task to investigate then the meaning which these phenomena have in the given society, or at least for certain groups or even individuals in it. Again, this is an investigation of meaning, but in this case not of direct expressions, but of given religious facts with which people were or are involved. This is a more complicated problem, because many of these religious facts continue to exist in successive cultural periods in which their meanings change, until they are abolished at the moment that they are considered to have become meaningless or just' wrong',' false'. Here again there are sharp differences between the treatment of past and living religion. In the first case the people to whom these phenomena meant something are absent and only rarely do we have testimonies about the meaning experienced. Our understanding starts here with what the data about these phenomena convey to us with regard to their meaning. However, under favorable circumstances, that is to say when a relatively great number of such data is available, we may be able to 'reconstitute' the religious universe and get an idea of religious meanings and intentions connected with those data, even though direct religious expressions are absent. Etymological, semantic and of course historical research has indeed given positive results in this direction, sometimes supplemented with the help of comparative research including present-day findings of sociology and anthropology. But it is clear that the study of living religion with direct religious expressions will prove to be particularly fruitful for phenomenological research, because the following conditions are present: 1) the self-expressions which we have already discussed, 2) the religious phenomena which can be studied as they developed historically with changing meanings, as just mentioned, 3) the people to whom these phenomena may mean something, and who can be questioned about them or whose behavior can be studied. T o sum up, we have come to the following results: 1) a phenomenologist's primary concern is with the meaning of religious expressions and religious phenomena, 2) the possibilities of his research depend in part on whether he deals with phenomena and with direct expressions of a religion of the past, or if he investigates a religion which is still alive at the present time, 3) most fruitful for phenomenological research would seem to be the study of living religion, where religious expressions occur at present which can be compared to similar expressions in the past of that particular religion and also to similar expressions in other religions at the present time, 4) in the process of understanding, there is a reconstitution of the background

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or universe of the investigated expressions and phenomena, with regard to which the meanings and intentions of the latter can be brought to light.

9.

FOUR

KINDS

OF P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L

STUDIES

I would suggest making the following differentiation suitable to phenomenological studies. First there is the general phenomenology of religion, which can also be called the morphology or typology of religion. It is the careful description of religious facts, a comparison between them to distinguish the similar and the dissimilar, and a rational classification of them on the basis of empirical analysis and descriptive categories. In principle, all religious phenomena should find a place in such a general morphology, typology or phenomenology of religion. Second there is, as distinct from the general phenomenology, a 'special' phenomenology. Here research is confined to a specific set of phenomena. This can be, on the one hand, one of the classes which were distinguished in the general phenomenology, for instance vegetation gods, different kinds of sacrifice, various types of shamans. But on the other hand, the chosen set of phenomena may also constitute the religious facts of a given society or group of societies, for instance the religion of a particular African tribe or a group of religions of Antiquity. In this case the meaning of such phenomena is investigated in the context of one particular society or a group of societies. T h e question is then raised whether these facts or part of them show some inner coherence with each other and with other facts of the culture of which the particular religion is part. If so, a search is made to establish the basic structures of this coherence, and the structure of the religious world or universe of which they are part and which contains its meaning in itself. It can be seen that we are here involved with that investigation of religious meaning and research into intentions, about which we have just spoken and to which we shall continue to give attention here. Such investigations may result in discovering certain meaningful structures which underly life in the society or group of societies concerned. Third, there is the area of reflective phenomenology. Both the procedures which are in fact followed in classification and analysis, and the fundamental questions of any study of religion, like the relation between things religious and non-religious, or the phenomenon of religion as such, here form the subject of reflexion. In other words, this is partly methodology and partly theory. Fourthly and lastly, there is what I would like to call a more existential phenomenology of religion. Here the starting points are not the expressions and

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Phenomenology of religion reconsidered

phenomena themselves - as in the first two cases - or questions of method and theory - as in the third case - but human life as such with its inherent properties, qualities, possibilities and problems. Investigation is here directed towards the ways in which mankind in different circumstances - from early hunting societies to modern industrial societies - has responded religiously to problems which it encountered. Particular attention can be given to the ways in which man has been able to develop, religiously or non-religiously, potentialities which were given with his existence and of which he became aware in certain conditions. Such would be the range of phenomenological investigations in the field of religion, as I see it. We shall now pay some special attention to the research into intentions which plays an important part in such investigations.

IO. R E S E A R C H

INTO

INTENTIONS

T h e study of subjective meaning in religion consists, to a considerable extent, of the analysis of religious expressions and phenomena as to their intentions. Just as culture implies some surplus value of art and religion, play and inter-subjectivity, which reveal intentions within and beyond the need for sheer organic survival, religion gives some absolute justification, foundation or at least validity to certain aspects of that culture. Like other meanings, the forms of human awareness which have to do with ultimate sense and nonsense become intelligible in the light of intentions which phenomenological research seeks to lay bare. This demands on the student's part an elaborate knowledge of the total factual context within which such meanings occur. It then requires the analysis as to the intentions of a set of coherent expressions, whatever may be their ways and forms. In order to be able to distinguish such intentions, the student must develop a kind of feel for the 'intended objects' to which these intentions refer, through a thorough acquaintance with the ideals and aspirations, illusions and frustrations, which are expressed in his materials. Next, the student has to check and verify his reconstruction or reconstitution of what has functioned as subjective meaning at a given place and time, by means of his empirical data and through logical reflection and verification. T o be sure, such a research into intentions comes down to a new style phenomenology of religion which is fundamentally distinct from what we called the 'classical' phenomenology of religion. The following key concepts can be of use, provided that their meaning be defined lucidly. The epoche is the suspension of the student's 'natural world', his openness to the essential problems of human existence, and his focussing on the specific object of his interest and investigation.

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T h e quest for what is essential is basically a problem of significance or meaning. If religious data are understood as expressing, among other things, a religious meaning, a proper distinction should be made between direct expressions on one hand, and transmitted expressions or phenomena proper on the other hand. With regard to direct expressions the search would be made for what has given rise to such an expression and for its specific content. With regard to transmitted expressions the search would be made for what has been their significance for different people at different times and places, as a range of meanings within a formal structure. In this new style phenomenological research, intentionality is understood as the very fact of the existence and functioning of intentions as a fundamental feature of all human reality. In order to be able to arrive at any valid interpretation of intentions, the phenomenological analyst, parallel to the psychoanalyst in his particular field, will himself have to go through a process of catharsis in order to arrive at a level of intentionality. He will then be attentive not only to the existing cultural forms which allow of certain religious expressions, but also to those mechanisms of repression at work within each society with regard to deviant or at least divergent intentions which seek to express themselves in the face of those intentions which are generally admitted. Thus, new style phenomenological research may be called a psychoanalysis of cultural and religious expressions in terms of man's intentionality. A n important element in any such phenomenological analysis is the distinction between the different layers of significance in which the expression is imbedded. If, in the case of a religious phenomenon, one of these layers is what may be called that of its religious significance or meaning, a rigorous methodical distinction has to be made between the religious significance which the phenomenon has to given people in a given culture, and the religious or other meaning which the student himself, on the basis of his experience, might be inclined to attribute to it. This kind of research with regard to subjective meaning can be carried out, in principle, just as well by those who investigate the phenomenon from the standpoint of the outsider to the tradition within which it occurs as by those who have been involved in that particular religious tradition, on condition that the same objectification process is carried out by both types of students. Equally, the conclusions both of religiously committed and of religiously uncommitted students, in so far as both have gone through the same objectification process, should be taken into account. Characteristically, research into intentions, if carried out correctly, will make it possible not only to see different shades of significance - religious and otherwise - in one and the same religious phenomenon, but also to distinguish such meanings methodically from each other, so

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Phenomenology of religion

reconsidered

that one and the same phenomenon can be seen from different angles. Moreover, a comparative study can be made of the different expressions which certain human existential data or problems have found in different cultures and their religions, and of the various solutions which have been proposed according to different intentions dominating in these cultures. If it is the fact of something signifying some other 'absolute' reality which indicates the presence of religion, a religion can be viewed as a great signification system, and thus as a system whereby a number of people can find potential meaning. It is in this way that we are able to understand better the structures of those religions which stretch beyond one particular group or culture. They have cores of significance designating something which has absolute validity for the believers concerned and transcends empirical reality. Through their specific cores of significance they provide a universe of discourse, a meaningful communication beyond the given local cultures. This enables the people concerned to pursue a common discourse on the basis of what is held to be a common body of evidence or implicit self-evidence, thanks to the common recognition of an 'intended object' as supreme truth and value. And it seems to be through the communication of appeals or messages via the symbolic cores of significance that the people concerned can communicate with reality and with each other, and that a religion may be said to be a communication system as well as a signification system. T h e concrete functioning of a religion as a signification system, and specifically as a system which offers meaning, seems to be possible within a given culture only through an institutionalization which allows certain well-determined reference-channels for transcendent or fundamental meaning. In the course of a religion's history a process of institutionalization and de-institutionalization goes on, parallel to and in an inner tension with the emerging or weakening intentions of persons and groups, and it is this tension which provides for continuing development.

II.

NOTION

OF

RELIGION

After this attempt to give an idea of phenomenology and its way of understanding, and of phenomenology of religion as a scholarly discipline, the question which was left on one side at the beginning can be raised: 'What are we to understand by "religion" in this approach?'. I believe that, from a descriptive point of view, a particular religion may be considered to be a specific, often complicated, system of meanings or significances, which have one or more symbols or points of reference to what might be called the transcendent sources

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of these meanings, or better the 'intended object(s)' of their intention(s). Of religion as such, in this way, no definition can be given. We might say, however, that through religious meaning man has a sense of a source of meaning, and that the religious experience appears to give man 'roots' in meaningful reality. Could it be said that this 'taking root' (enracinement) is absolute in the sense that human existence, as a consequence of it, becomes able to recognize at least part of reality and existence as religiously meaningful? It is in part the different notions of religion which make for the striking differences between the major handbooks of phenomenology of religion. In part such differences are, of course, also due to the chosen materials, their arrangement, and certain predilections on the part of the scholar. For many of these differences are due to different results obtained in the empirical research of the authors. An argument can even be made of this situation to deny the scholarly character of phenomenology as such and to count it as philosophy or as art.

12.

SCHOLARLY

CHARACTER

In defending the discipline against this charge, I would say, first of all, that it is still rather young, rather concerned with itself, and rather enthusiastic. Looking back upon its past history, one cannot but smile at certain claims made by a first generation of phenomenologists. Consequendy, it should now be suggested that our course be more careful. The facts ought to be classified after a careful examination of their elements and of the context in which they occur. This, in turn, would imply that phenomenology would become more a descriptive and analytical and less a visionary enterprise. Again, we are much better aware of the great number of subjects which still have to be studied in monographs, and of the connections between religious meanings on the one hand and cultural, social, economic and even technological conditions on the other. Not only the known historical facts, but also our knowledge of the role of religion in society are too limited by far to allow any definite kind of phenomenology of religion. I would prefer to speak of phenomenological researches or investigations into certain chosen themes and subjects, preferably in collaboration with scholars working in other disciplines. I would, however, end my plea by saying that, after all, phenomenology is a consistent and reasoned effort to arrive at a systematic treatment of religion one of those sectors of reality which, by its very nature, resists rational inquiry by claiming, so to speak, a divine justification for its vaunted irrationality. If it

ι ίο

Phenomenology of religion reconsidered

is not a fact-finding discipline, it is an interpretative one, trying to make facts transparent and revealing their meaning. It is right to be proud of this kind of intellectual conquest of religion. When we call phenomenology of religion a systematic discipline, this is meant in a double sense. O n the one hand, we describe, analyze and classify religious phenomena according to their various features, with a rational justification for our principles of classification. O n the other hand, we try to find the meaning of religious expressions and of religious phenomena to the people concerned, again, with a rational justification of our procedure for understanding and of the results at which we arrive. In the first case we analyze and classify facts formally, in the second case we understand and structure them according to their intentions. We compare and we try to comprehend, justifying the enterprise in rational terms. In this way the scholarly character of phenomenology can be defended.

13.

PHENOMENOLGY

AS

AN

ART

This having been said, one additional thought can be offered: that there is something of an art, too, in the phenomenological enterprise. This is meant to be a positive formulation. First of all, the fact has been stressed that we consider religious phenomena to be human expressions; even those objectively given entities such as buildings, thought systems and rituals have been at one time 'expressions'. Now, it is striking that a great deal of what we call religious expressions often has, beside its religious aspects, an aesthetic aspect too. Since such expressions may be supposed to come f r o m a deeper level of human existence, they are akin to what are now called creative expressions. So in the very nature of the subject matter there is some relationship between religion and art. Second, we stressed the role of the researcher in his search for the meaning of the phenomena he studies. Now, to discover the meaning of something for someone else, one must - to say the least - be sensitive to that meaning oneself, in a receptive way. We speak of the 'art' of interpretation; and of the 'probability guess' with regard to meaning. T h e implication is that there is something o f ' art' and something of 'philosophy' in this kind of phenomenological research. When we speak of the reconstitution of a religious universe, as a prerequisite for any understanding of religious meanings, the implication is that in this stage of research the imaginative faculty is used. A n d when we mention the possibility of an active self-involvement on the part of the researcher in the facts and

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meanings studied, the implication is that the researcher, even if only temporarily - as an actor we might say - takes the role of one of the people he studies. Finally, when we speak of the understanding of religious expressions, this would seem to be hardly feasible unless the expression of one person or g r o u p becomes an impression to another person, somewhere on the same level of existence. T h e implication is that the researcher must be able, not only to receive different impressions on different levels, but also to digest them adequately in order that he may arrive at an understanding of them.

14.

PHILOSOPHICAL

ASPECTS

In matters of expression and impression, and of meaning, it can be argued that we are in a realm of art and philosophy, but without becoming, for that matter, unscientific. In a way, we are faithful here to the nature of our subject-matter, inasmuch as we seek an understanding at all. T h e r e is another point. Phenomenological thought takes as its point of departure the natural immediacy of man and reality, which allows an investigation of the fundamental structures of the life-world of man. T h e element of immediacy, which is proper to phenomenological understanding and to art - not to speak of religion itself - and which seems to be the gateway for phantasy and arbitrariness, is itself a subject for philosophical reflection. A n d in this way, once more, I would deny that the artistic and philosophical features of a phenomenology of religion impede its scholarly character and contend that the philosophical and artistic side of the enterprise keep each other in balance, and enhance the very range of scholarly research.

15.

SUMMARY

In this paper I did not delve into the more generally known aspects of phenomenology of religion as one can find them in any handbook: that is, the attempt to arrive at a maximum of objectivity by means of the epoche, the suspension as far as possible - of one's prejudices and presuppositions, and the opening u p of oneself for the essentials, beyond place and time, of the phenomena under study. These and other procedures reduce the number of presuppositions on the side of the researcher: in our case the idea, for example, that one knows at the outset what religion really is, or what real religion is. Possibly because it suspends judgments of reality and truth, the epoche favors the formulation of new

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hypotheses with a maximum of objectivity, hypotheses which, of course, should be checked against the results of further empirical research. Another leading idea in phenomenology is that of the intentional nature of man's consciousness, from which it follows that everything human, and certainly all expressions, are significant, although it may be a hard and sometimes impossible task to find the meaning or to uncover the intention in a particular case. At any rate, the art, discipline and thought of a phenomenologist is to ' read' the significance of the things for the people who deal with them. It is a quest for meaning, for connections and for the right 'theory' or reasonable view. Empirical research on all available materials is the conditio sine qua non of the study of religion. During such research, when we want to do justice to the materials studied, certain problems arise which can be identified as problems of meaning. In order to arrive at any understanding of religious phenomena which goes beyond their factual classification, they have to be seen as expressions of people, and the significance of such expressions has to be sought out. Any understanding of such meanings which claims to be scholarly - though it may have an artistic and a philosophical aspect as well - should be able to justify itself rationally. This, in turn, implies a theory about the phenomenon of religion which can be fruitfully developed by phenomenological reflection. Phenomenology of religion shows itself to be a scholarly discipline inasmuch as it has its own coherent methodology, and is able to enter into discourse with other disciplines on the basis of reason and experience. It is a philosophy insofar as philosophical issues are implied in its methodology and it is able to reflect rationally upon its subject-matter and critically upon itself. Finally, it is an art inasmuch as the phenomenologist makes use of his faculty of imagination and is, through his perceptions of meanings, creative himself.

8

Toward a New Style Phenomenological Research on Religion*

INTRODUCTION

In order to treat our subject adequately, we are speaking here less as historians of religion than as phenomenological analysts. We are not concerned here with the debate between theology and phenomenology of religion, or between history and phenomenology of religion, or even with criticisms of phenomenology of religion made by other disciplines within the broad area of the study of religion, like sociology, anthropology or psychology of religion. We put ourselves before the task to arrive at a judgment, which as such is the consequence of a norm proper to the discipline itself. In other words, what we are doing is exercising an inner self criticism at the very heart of phenomenology of religion, a self criticism that testifies to the fact that this discipline is not a matter of technical perfection alone, but that it has its own spirit. Or rather, that a phenomenologist of religion has both an analytical and a constructive mind. There is one remark to be made at the outset, which is a necessity arising out of our aim to formulate some essential notes on phenomenological research of religion. As a matter of fact, one often hears the reproach addressed to phenomenology of religion that it is a discipline essentially without a solid basis. So we may ask ourselves how it would be possible, precisely for phenomenologists of religion, to say something that is essential and that is valid as a scholarly statement about this very phenomenology of religion. We shall come back to this and other reproaches which are partly justified. But before doing so it is important first to formulate that essential rule or principle according to which we can dare to say something 'essential '. We do not thereby look at phenomenology of religion in its own process of becoming, that is to say as being part of the intellectual history of Europe and having its historical place within the inner discussions and debates proper to this intellectual history. We ought rather to look at phenomenology of religion in an essential way, and it seems * Paper read at the University of Marburg, 20 April 1972. The German text was published as' Grundsätzliches zur Religionsphänomenologie' in Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie xiv, 3 (1972), pp. 315-335· A shortened Polish version appeared as ' W sprawie fenomenologii religii. Uwagi zasadnicze' in EuhemerPrzeglqd Religioznawczy, 1974, nr. 3 (93), pp. 73-87.

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to me that this ought to be done by means of the conception of intention. And the phenomenon to which the intention directs itself ought not to be interpreted in the first place as a phenomenon making its presence felt to the mind of the scholar himself, but on the contrary as a phenomenon that exists for someone else, for another society or for another culture than that of the scholar himself. Let us look at this proposition somewhat more closely. In the study of human life, be it personal or social, be it one's own or someone else's, be it in the present or the past, we can always distinguish among the given facts some data that had or have in this personal or social life some special meaning for the people concerned which goes beyond the meanings of ordinary daily life. Such data are qualified facts and they have a particular position within the world of the people's every-day life. They consist of activities, representations, and stories, or of certain concrete things, animals and human beings, that distinguish themselves from the other facts of life by a certain 'surplus value'. Usually the meaning aspect surpasses the factual aspect and is much more important than it. Consequently, such qualified facts perform in the given life-world of a person or of a society a function which has its basis in empirical reality, and they also constitute what we are used to indicate by the term of symbol system. In one word, these qualified facts perform a symbolic function. Just as, when arriving in another country that we would like to know better, we will look for those things which apparently are of major importance for the inhabitants, when we study another culture, and certainly when we come across the problem of religion, we will have to look for what happens to have for the people concerned a surplus value. The search for and discovery of such meaningful facts is done in part on the basis of what strikes the scholar directly in terms of resemblance and contrast with his own culture of which he becomes aware then in a new and particular way, and in part on the basis of his effort to discover an inner structure within the given culture and religion and to understand the connections and coherences within the whole. In the first case it is perhaps of interest to point out that the resemblance and contrast that strike the scholar not only refer to external isolated facts of the world of the scholar and of the culture under investigation, but that they also refer to deeper layers, such as, for instance, the respective ways in which these meaningful facts are classified within each culture concerned. For the study of religion, it is particularly important to realize that the classification of these facts, which is usually done in the West according to the categories of art, religion, morality and play, does not correspond as such with the categories of classification used in other cultures. The search for resemblances and contrasts, therefore, has to go beyond the simple comparison of isolated facts, a comparison which may be necessary in such

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intercultural or interreligious studies, but which is yet insufficient to arrive at real knowledge.

I.

THE

INTENTION AS B A S I C

CONCEPT

So the problem arises: 1) in which ways we should discover these facts with surplus value within the whole of the factual data; 2) how we should see these facts in their connections with each other and other facts; 3) how we can grasp the explicit or implicit meaning which they have for the people concerned in that particular culture. For the student of religion this problem is still more specific: 1) how to find out to what extent certain facts have a religious meaning for the people concerned besides their everyday meaning; 2) how do those facts that are religiously qualified relate among themselves and with the other 'non-religious' data; 3) what is the content of that particular religious meaning for the people concerned, both explicidy and implicitly. This whole set of problems is concentrated for the student of religion in the really ' essential' question in which way the scholar may have access, even approximately, to that surplus value, that is to say in this case, to that religious meaning. A number of attempts have been made to answer this question, but nearly all of them come up against the objection that the phenomenon that was the subject of inquiry was absorbed within the life- and worldview of the particular scholar himself, rather than that this scholar made the effort to transcend his own personality in order to assimilate himself to that particular phenomenon. Actually, in order to be able to arrive at this latter achievement it is imperative to use what might be termed a divining-rod, not itself bound to the world in which the scholar lives, but able to distinguish certain meanings in such a way that they can be studied with regard to their own content in their own context, at least approximately. Consequendy, research moves here from stressing the factual knowledge of a datum toward grasping the meaning of this datum for the people concerned with it. Among the various considerations possible we would like to mention here three which appear to be important when we are looking for such a divining-rod in order to grasp religious meanings.

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T h e first consideration concerns the fact that, if it is true that the problem of and the quest for meaning runs through the whole of human life, this very problem and quest concentrates itself precisely in that sphere that we are used to call 'religion'. In other words, it is precisely in religion that the problem of meaning is understood and put as a problem of ultimate meaning. T h e second consideration concerns the important role which the notion of meaning, as a statement about the 'final' meaning, plays within religion as such. Phrased differendy, it is precisely within the religious realm that a ' final' meaning is suspected and possibly also experienced. For the people concerned, religion appears to be, before all else, a realm of meaning. Consequendy, if we are looking for a divining-rod in order to grasp the religious meaning of a datum for the people concerned, we must look for something that: 1) is basic to the very concept of meaning and significance itself; 2) has a formal character insofar as it does not impose one particular meaning or specific significance on the given materials; 3) is conducive to further scholarly research and verification. A third consideration concerns the basis of any research insofar as this has to do with any human reality at all. Any reading of meaning, and so any interpretation of human behavior or human expressions, presupposes something that makes such behavior or such expressions understandable, and so something that is to be looked for primarily not in the scholar himself, but in the other party that is the subject of inquiry. This is particularly true for the religious expressions of a person or a community. What is it in fact that we are looking for, when reading or interpreting human expressions and objectivizations? The answer to this question may well provide a key which, together with the preceding considerations, could indicate both the divining-rod itself and also the subject that we want to investigate with its help. It is our contention that this is the case with a particular concept that is used in the realm of several fields of piety and spirituality, and that has been further developed, first in scholastic thought, but then also in later philosophy including that of phenomenology and existential thought. We are proposing here the concept of intention, which should be consciously reintroduced as a central concept in any analysis of human reality, and certainly in phenomenological research in the field of religion insofar as this discipline is concerned with understanding religious expressions. The consequence would be the scholarly rule that the understanding of human expressions, including religious ones, really requires that we look for their intention or intentions. A presupposition is here that human reality, insofar as it is human, is directed or intended reality,

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and should be read and interpreted as such. All human reality, no matter whether it is given in the objectivizations of society, art, or religion, or whether it is given in material or ideal entities, should consequently be seen as a tremendous interaction of human intentions, which interaction would be the proper subject of the scholarly interpretation of human reality. Research during the last decades in this field has often concentrated on the structure of religious data, or the structure of society in which these religious data are to be found. It appears to us that for research the concept of intention is at least as important as the concept of structure, and that, at least in the study of religion, the concept of intention logically precedes the concept of structure. For in the study of a religious structure, besides its empirical determinations, we come across its fundamentally distinct character, its aim, its finality. So the structure refers here to a dynamic of what is intentionally given, while presupposing this dynamic. And it is therefore hardly accidental that, whereas a considerable amount of work has been done with regard to structures and substances, the possibilities for investigation on the level of intentions are still practically wide open. It would seem to us that an investigation of intentions behind religious expressions is absolutely necessary if one wants to arrive at an adequate understanding of such expressions. T h e 'surplus value' of religious phenomena, their qualified meaning for the people concerned, is to be looked for in intentions which are directed toward something which, to these people concerned, has an absolute value: an intended 'object' that transcends daily 'ordinary' life.

Examples I would like to give here three examples which may clarify the possibility of applying the proposed research of intentions in the field of religious phenomena, in the first place according to traditionally given problems. a) Religions representations. An investigation of the different representations of God and the divine which exist, that wants to bear fruits, cannot be satisfied only with bringing together all parallels which can be found under this heading somewhere on earth, and with concluding the investigation with a more general classification. On the contrary, scholarly research only starts at this point. It would be unsatisfactory, too, only to explain the concrete representations on the basis of their economic or social context, or to analyze their function exclusively within it. It has not been investigated up to now why all this should have led to representations of a ' g o d ' or of something 'divine'. Rather, in phenomenological research we should see a representation of a god as a form (Gestalt) given to an object to which - and this is the interesting point - a religious intention is

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directed, and through which a relationship with this object establishes itself on the part of the people concerned. b) Religious ideals. There exists an immense number of ideals which represent a better human communion and society, where and whenever this may take place. We can, of course, make a sort of inventory of the forms which such ideals have taken, and speak for instance of messianic, Utopian and paradisiac representations or ideas. We can compare these ideals one with another, and we can arrive at some classification which is more or less comprehensive. But the task of scholarly research should not be exhausted by this. We can of course also try to explain such ideals, for instance from the factual situation of the society concerned. But by no means has justice thus been done to the aim and to the actual force of the ideal in question. In phenomenological research we should consider a religious ideal rather as a particular shape given to a deep-seated longing or dream which has its own intention and to which the people concerned respond in certain specific ways. The various shapes or forms given will differ according to place and time, and they will also show different concrete meanings. The interesting point of the religious ideal is given precisely with the absoluteness of its intention c) Ritual action. Let us take sacrifice as an example. It is possible to identify the different ritual sacrifices, as they are known to us from the history of religions, according to their elements and to arrive at a more or less comprehensive classification of them. In this way, however, very little has been said in a scholarly way and the significance or even relevance of such a classification for scholarly research is limited. It is also possible to give a functional explanation of certain sacrifices, for instance by indicating why at certain occasions a particular sacrifice is offered and what such a sacrifice means in social and economic terms for the society concerned. But, even then, hardly anything has been said about what has caused people to act in this curious way. In phenomenological research we should rather ask what intentions come to light in this behavior on certain occasions, and how a religious moment may thus occur. The interesting point, precisely, of a religious sacrifice, whether it be enacted ritually or otherwise, is that its intention is directed toward something that somehow has an absolute relevance for the participants; this relevance may contain an inherent necessity, which justifies the sacrifice and may even subordinate it to an absolute imperative.

Toward a new style phenomenological research on religion

2.

SELF-DEFINITIONS

OF P H E N O M E N O L O G Y

OF

119

RELIGION

T o the extent that literary and historical research, anthropology and sociology, geography and psychology as autonomous disciplines are concerned with facts that can be qualified as being religious in a particular society, and to the extent that these disciplines investigate these facts as well as their relationship to other, non-religious, facts according to literary, historical, and other criteria, they ' specialize', so to say, in literary study of religion, history of religion, anthropology of religion, sociology of religion, geography of religion and psychology of religion. They can thereby apply certain procedures, amongst them phenomenological analysis, in order better to grasp the religious data and do them scholarly justice. In this way the general study of religion should be considered as a field of studies in which a number of distinct disciplines come together in collaboration whenever they have to do with data that are religiously qualified. How and what is here the place and task of phenomenology of religion? This discipline has been defined by different students of religion in so many ways that it is exceedingly difficult to arrive at a common conception of it among phenomenologists. In fact, the worst reproach which can be levelled at phenomenology of religion in its classical form is to have been responsible for turning religion, and thereby also phenomenology of religion, into a pure ideal. Indeed, phenomenology of religion has tended to become a religious ideal itself. The lack of reflection and of reflective self criticism as to the epistemological status and possibilities which the phenomenological movement within the study of religion has assigned to itself is undoubtedly one of its weakest sides. Among six Dutch phenomenologists of religion, for instance, we are able to distinguish no less than five completely different ways in which phenomenology of religion has been understood, and this in a small country over a period of only some seventy years: a) In the first place phenomenology of religion has been understood as a classification of 'objectively' religious phenomena from different religious traditions. The emphasis here is on comparative research and general categories of classification. Through this procedure, religious data are placed in different classes. Each class of data distinguishes itself from the others by certain common traits, and within each class the data are distinguished according to their elements. In this sense phenomenology of religion has an encompassing, comprehensive and encyclopedic nature, and can be compared with Linnaeus' classification of the plant world. The ideal is to find the proper classification of a number of facts of a ' religious' nature, and in that way distinct from all other (non-religious) facts. b) In the second place, phenomenology of religion has been understood as the

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search for basic characteristics or fundamental ideas in different religious traditions. Such a characteristic or idea, if shared by more than one religious tradition, allows these traditions to be placed in one group, distinguishing itself by the basic characteristic or fundamental idea in question. In this way different groups of religions are distinguished and described according to the common characteristic or idea. If this basic feature is of a fundamental nature, one might better speak of a common religious apprehension or of a common religious orientation with respect to it. c) In the third place phenomenology of religion has been understood as a classification of religious phenomena within the framework of what is held to be the fundamental structure of religion. The phenomenon of religion is here comprehended basically by means of an idea reflecting religion's basic structure. The procedure requires that this idea-structure be separated into its elements, and that the concrete religious phenomena are then fitted into this schematic framework. d) In the fourth place phenomenology of religion has been understood as being the distinction, discernment, and subsequent understanding of connections between religious data within the framework of what is held to be a basic structure of religious man. Different mentalities, attitudes or anthropological structures are distinguished with specific possibilities of thought and perception. Man's religious expressions are interpreted in their particular connections against the background of the idea of a homo religiosus and his basic nature and structure. e) Finally, phenomenology of religion has been understood as the history and development of religious consciousness in the course of time. Criteria are introduced in order to measure the particular 'stage' of a given religious phenomenon or religious orientation within the framework of a general structure of development of the religious consciousness or of consciousness as such. With this fairly superficial sketch of different ways in which phenomenology of religion has been understood by phenomenologists, we have only referred to Dutch students of religion. It would be easy to enlarge this catalogue by adding names like those of Rudolf Otto, Friedrich Heiler, and Alfred Bertholet in Germany, Raffaele Pettazzoni in Italy, Edvard Lehmann in Sweden and Joachim Wach in North America. Among those living outside Holland I would think of scholars like Kurt Goldammer and Gustav Mensching, Geo Widengren and Mircea Eliade. About the diversity of the ways in which phenomenology of religion has been understood there can be hardly any doubt. On the other hand it is fair to say that, notwithstanding this diversity, a number

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of common features can be noted, held explicitly or recognized implicitly, by which 'classical' phenomenology of religion identifies itself: a) Religion is conceived basically of as an autonomous value category. T h e affirmation of the autonomous character of religion and religious faith and the rejection of any kind of possible, even methodical, reduction of religion to something other than 'religion' (without denying the role in it of non-religious factors) is a common basic attitude. b) Facts considered to be 'objectively' religious as such are brought together from different times and cultures. They are taken from the specific context in which they occur, on the ground that they distinguish themselves as 'religious' from the other, non-religious facts. They are then compared with their corresponding parallels and brought together within a general encompassing framework. c) Comparisons and classifications of religious facts are made on a basis which is thought to have universal validity and to be comprehensive. This may be done by means of a typology according to types or ideal types held to be universal, or by means of a classification according to classes with certain common features, characteristics or elements. d) An attempt is made to lay bare among the religious facts, that is to say within the total realm of religious phenomena, certain basic structures. This may be done on a historical basis according to time sequences, or it may be done by means of ideal meaning structures (Sinnstrukturen) or forms (Gestalten). T h e connection of parallel religious facts according to such basic structures is also supposed to show fundamental structures belonging to religion properly speaking. e) There is an endeavor to determine the meaning or significance of religious phenomena within the value category of religion as such. This may be done by means of an ideal structure of religion conceived of as an idea, or by means of an experience of or insight into what is held to be the essence of, or essential to, religious reality. f) Finally, classical phenomenology of religion refrains from founding itself on a strict rational basis and from philosophical reflexion. It strongly accentuates the religious experience or sensitivity of the student of religion, and accepts as a part of its methodology an immediate intuition on the part of the scholar. This intuition should be able to penetrate into what is held to be the irrational side of religious experience, as the deepest foundation of religion itself. We may perhaps add to this that many discussions about phenomenology of religion as a view of religion have revealed heavy emotional involvement and are consequently of little relevance for research purposes, particularly when scholars have taken absolutist positions. Furthermore, through the abundant application of the comparative method to all kinds of materials and the hope that in this

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way the essential structures of religion can be discovered, the proper investigation of intentions has been seriously neglected, although it is stringently demanded by any really phenomenological analysis. T h e opinion that the essence is to be studied by means of a juxtaposition of formal structural connections, and that an essence may be considered to be the objective meaning of a formal structure, is partly to be held responsible for this state of affairs. T h e common intention of all phenomenology of religion (to apply this concept now in our present analysis) has been the understanding of data which are religiously qualified, in such a way as to present them according to the manner in which they manifest themselves to the student who is particularly attentive to them, that is to say, who is attentive to what they express of intentions. We have to do here with a kind of scholarship that can give full credit to the use of reason and does justice to religion as an expression of human intentions, studying it analytically in order to lay bare these intentions.

3. T H R E E

M A I N Q U E S T I O N S OF P H E N O M E N O L O G Y

OF

RELIGION

It is impossible to enter here into all the questions with which phenomenology of religion is confronted. Much attention has already been given to certain specific problems such as, for instance, the role of the student of religion's personality, presuppositions, commitments and involvements, or the process of understanding, with its structures as units of meaning. We shall limit ourselves here to indicating three main questions which until now have been given too little attention, although they are fundamental. We think here of the problems of the view of religion, the view of religious phenomena, and the view of the relationship both between religion and religious phenomena, and between religious phenomena themselves.

A. What ought to be viewed as religion? T h e question as to what should be called 'religion' has often been answered by phenomenology saying: it is anything that presents itself as such. In this way, however, the problem is only shifted, because the question remains: what presents itself, under what circumstances and conditions, to whom, and of course: how is it to be known? In theology it is demanded that religion should be determined in terms of the relationship between man and God. In other words, the theological problem is: in what manner should we reflect on God in connection with the fact of religion

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as human reality? This old problem has been placed in a new light, not only because of the rise of the study of religion as an autonomous field of research, and through the radical separation between the scholarly study of religion on one hand and theology proper on the other, but also because of the fact that only a few thinkers have proved to be at all capable of bringing these two autonomous disciplines into a relationship to each other that is rationally satisfactory. On one hand the study of religion, as a scholarly endeavor, investigates anything concerning religion under its human aspect; on the other theology, according to its very intention, will be bent on guaranteeing the absoluteness of God and viewing him as transcendent to religion. At least this holds true for the monotheistic religious traditions. As far as phenomenology of religion and its view of religion are concerned, the fact is significant that it has always refused to give a clear definition, at the outset of its research, of what it understands by religion. It took as its point of departure that what is 'religious' should make itself palpable and self-validating; the phenomenologist should 'receive' what presents itself. We have, however, to acknowledge, for the sake of honesty, that in this operation, so to say outside the conscious will of the phenomenologist, a predefinition or predetermination and even an implicit theory of religion with an implied definition of what is the essence of religion, or essential to it, have played a tremendous role. This very fact may be indicative for the limitations proper to the endeavors of phenomenology as such. T h e very interpretation of religion according to the categories of 'essence' and 'manifestations' is a splendid example of it. Although the phenomenologists of religion refused to take rationalphilosophical or scientific-empirical determinations into their concept of religion, nevertheless the majority of the classical phenomenologists of religion fell back on religious experience as a starting-point, thus refusing to carry back such an experience completely to 'non-religious' determinants. Others took their point of departure in the idea of religion being an autonomous value category in itself and conceiving the structure of religion in terms of a given idea, without however founding this idea philosophically, so that it became a tool of schematization. In a number of cases the primordial character of religious experience and the autonomy of religion as a value category were combined positions held by phenomenologists of religion. As a matter of principle, however, as stated at the beginning, we have to determine religion as a reality of meaning (Sinnwirklichkeit) if we want to work phenomenologically. We have to investigate religion, through phenomenological research, in those specific meanings which are acknowledged by a person, a group or a society to be 'religious' in certain given concrete data.

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B. How ought the relationship between religion and its manifestations

to be viewed?

T h e very manner of formulating the problem is itself already characteristic for what we call here for the sake of simplicity 'classical' phenomenology of religion. The concept of religion is not defined here by means of abstracting from empirical data, but is thought to represent an autonomous value entity which is valid in the realm of scholarly investigation. As a consequence, religious data tend to be interpreted, independendy of their concrete context, with regard to this value entity of religion which by its very definition transcends such concrete empirical data. One can fairly say that, for all classical phenomenology of religion, it is this value entity of religion as such (be it as an experience, a concept or an idea), that constitutes the very source of meaning of religious data, not only in hermeneutics but also in their objective reality. It is this same value entity that makes such data religious at all and allows them more or less of a share in the idea of religion. T h e religious manifestations are here held to be transparent with respect to religion itself, viewed as transcendent reality. This classical way of formulating a bifurcation between religion on one hand and religious manifestations on the other can be interpreted in an idealistic way, in the sense that it is the idea which correlates religion as a value with religious data as value manifestations, or can even be constitutive of both of them. Most phenomenologists of religion have interpreted this bifurcation, however, in the old sense of hermeneutical research, that religious data ought to be viewed against the background of religion as something spiritual, if the student wants to come to any understanding at all of them. Here the very bifurcation between religion and religious manifestations is a device to allow for a spiritual kind of understanding. In the light of what has been said at the outset it should be clear, however, that true phenomenological research in the field of religion, as far as it is looking for intentionality, cannot first separate religion and manifestations, and then correlate them with each other. This is precisely an unphenomenological way of proceeding and it is regrettable that so many self-styled phenomenologists of religion have not been aware of this error. Phenomenological research has less to do with religion as such than with religious data which are investigated, through research on the intentions expressed in their occurrence, in terms of the meaning content which they have for a specific person, group or society. Phenomenology of religion is basically the investigation of religious meanings, and it is impossible for phenomenology to make a separation between the reality of human life on one hand and religion as an absolute value on the other. Such a separation would make the very research impossible.

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C. How should the relationship which exists between religious data themselves, considered as religious manifestations, be seen? From its very beginning, phenomenology of religion has considered as one of its main tasks the search for a relationship which may exist between religious data according to their very nature, abstracted from their time-sequence, local determination and socio-cultural context: that is to say apart f r o m the coordinates of place and time. This comes down to the problem of how one can show relationships existing between data from quite different cultures, times and places in a generally valid way, and to what extent one can prove with absolute certainty that such relationships exist. Closely connected with this problem is the question of which categories of reference one should resort to, in order to make credible, for instance, that striking resemblances and similarities between specific data or between particular series of data cannot be considered to be merely accidental. Various disciplines have denied the sense and even the possibility of such an investigation where, as a matter of principle, no immediate causality can be proved to exist. Each study of 'indirect causalities', such, for instance, as parallel functions, common psychic constellations or identical ways of behaving in similar conditions (where it is assumed that, speaking in scholarly terms, what is the same in different times and places will produce the same results), was distrusted in principle. Against objections made to such investigations, however, it must be contended that a student has the right to assume that the relationships which he constructs between data by way of scholarly hypothesis may be proved to exist in fact. In our work we presuppose that the aim of the investigation is relevant for scientific research as such, that the criteria which are applied do not conflict with reason or experience, and that the insertion of a datum into such a hypothetically-constructed relationship refers back to the valid, logical foundation of the whole operation and the conclusiveness of the proofs. As a matter of fact we would have serious objections to the so-called scholarly objections which call into question the possibility of constructing relationships between certain given data outside the coordinates of time and place. T h e very negation of this possibility implies an idea of science and scholarship which may be valid for and within a specific discipline or set of disciplines, but is of too limited a nature to claim to be valid for all science and scholarship. In the last analysis this is, of course, a problem of the general theory of scientific research. Which kind of relationships between religious data have been constructed until now in phenomenology of religion? I would like to mention here four ways in which such classifications have been made, at least among some Dutch phenomenologists of religion:

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a) There is the usual way of classifying data, by which what is formally similar is brought together according to external features, component parts or constitutive elements. Subdivisions can be made again through further analysis of the different classes into more specific features, parts or elements. The way in which a particular datum is inserted into the whole of such a classification system of course says very little about the meaning which it has for the people concerned. b) The situation becomes different when the classification is no longer of a formal nature, but when actual contents are taken into consideration. This happens for instance, when the classes are supposed to refer back to certain essential structures of being and meaning. They then refer to particular objective basic structures, for which they are, so to say, transparent or for which they may even have a mediating function. It is clear that even with such basic structures little has been said about the concrete meaning which a religious datum has for the people concerned. c) T h e classification can also be carried out by way of a typology. It is the type or ideal type which functions here as a unit of meaning, and to such a type more or less meaning can be assigned. We can distinguish at least three different cases. First, the type can be indicated simply by the general scholarly concept which points to a particular class. Second, it can be identified by means of the name which is current in a particular culture, that of the student, or some other specific one, and which can serve as the name of this type. Third, the type can be considered as an ideal type, that is to say as a construction on the part of the scholar; such an ideal type does not in fact occur in reality, but with the help of it a number of facts or data which do so occur can be brought together in a way significant for further research. We see here a growing density in the concept of meaning, which acquires in the three cases an increasing strength. As an ultimate position in terms of the strength of meaning of a type we may quote Van der Leeuw's phenomenological research, whereby types are constructed on the basis of a meaning experienced by the phenomenologist himself as objectively existing, and this meaning is then added to, if not imposed upon, the real data and facts through the types. d) A fourth kind of relationship which can be constructed between religious data, phenomena or facts is one which has been designed on the basis of an idea, and specifically an idea of the basic structure of religion as such. The different data and facts are then interpreted according to their meaning in the framework of the scheme deduced from it. Here we have to do not with a classification or typology, but with the content of an idea which is supposed to coincide with the reality of religion, not because it is supported by theoretical reflection but

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because it seems to provide a grasp on religious reality by means of an evident idea according to which the facts are interpreted, or a scheme into which they are fitted. T h e very idea within whose confines the religious data are brought together as a totality has become here in the last analysis not only the ideal unit of meaning but also the definition of religion as such. Everything is raised here into the realm of the ideal.

4.

S O M E C R I T I C I S M S T O BE M A D E OF PHENOMENOLOGY

OF

'CLASSICAL'

RELIGION

Let us conclude our considerations about what we called 'classical' phenomenology of religion with some criticisms of this approach in the study of religion. a) Without denying the possibility that intrinsic relationships may exist exclusively between religious data from different times, places and cultures, we would say that such relationships are not the only ones to be studied. In its search for relationships and connections, scholarship will have to take into account all available data, not only the religious ones. T h e r e is no legitimate scholarly reason to consider data which have a religious meaning to people as constituting a separate realm, just as there is no legitimate scholarly reason to consider what is called religion in different cultures and societies as constituting an autonomous reality. Consequendy, we would prefer research to be done on the relationships between data in a given culture which are religiously qualified and data which are not so qualified within that society, rather than the investigation of direct relationships between religious facts in different cultures. As a matter of fact, we are not so much concerned with finding relationships between isolated facts (although quite a few phenomenologists have tried to do so), as with discovering certain relationships between larger constellations of data where no a priori distinction ought to be made between facts which are religiously qualified and those which are not. In the search for such relationships hypotheses are to be made, for instance, on the basis of fundamental structures proper to man or to human society as such, or on the basis of a fundamental consciousness proper to individuals, communities or even mankind as such. In the study of such constellations of data we shall have to consider what we want to call 'facts' and how we define them, and also the question of the different ways in which facts can be interconnected or related to each other. b) Classical phenomenology has been much less fundamental than its stress on

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religious experience and on religion as a value category would lead one to believe. From different quarters reproaches have already been made that phenomenology of religion does not take sides, that phenomenologists have no attitude except the 'epoche' as a suspension of judgment, that phenomenology occupies a dubious position in between existing scholarly disciplines, and that, last but not least, it allows unreflected presuppositions and norms to be glimpsed through its categories and its specific idealizations. One may also think of criticisms that classical phenomenology has in fact played an ideological role within the study of religion, through being a kind of anti-theology or mirror-theology in the service of a given theology, or, precisely through the 'epoche', a kind of apologetic if not of a particular historical religion, then at least of an idealized religion or of the fact of religion as such. Indeed, we would like to contend that classical phenomenology of religion has, in the last analysis, presented an interpretation of religion instead of researching into it. This interpretation of religion by 'classical' phenomenology of religion finds its place besides other existing schemes and models for the interpretation of the fact of religion. c) It has often been objected that behind classical phenomenology of religion a particular theological inspiration or impulse is to be noted, although phenomenology as such is not an approach linked to any religious dogma or ideological doctrine. Critics have observed that the way in which phenomenologists have spoken and presented their materials has actually been an indirect form of preaching with clearly apologetical overtones. We would like to submit that the position of classical phenomenology has been fundamentally ambivalent and ambiguous; and that the phenomenologists, if they want to be considered as serious scholars, have either to unmask themselves and stand revealed as theologians proper, or emancipate themselves from all theological presuppositions. It is interesting to observe that a similar dilemma existed, mutatis mutandis, at the beginning of the study of religion itself. d) Classical phenomenology of religion, in its resistance to positivistic reductions of religion, has in fact reduced religion, if not to 'non-religion', then at least either to a purely religious experience or to a purely religious idea. This reduction has taken place in three different ways: 1) by the very fact that it has not investigated the causal relationships which actually exist between religious facts and structures on the one hand and non-religious ones on the other. This neglect of scholarly investigation has been justified in the name of a pretended autonomy and irreducibility of religion as such. This pretension, however, has as its consequence the isolation of religion from human reality, religion being treated as if it were an alien 'manifestation';

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2) by the very fact that it laid too much stress upon the explicit or implicit ideal contents of religion, and thus the behavioral and institutional aspects of religion have been neglected; 3) by the very fact that it has dissolved or even isolated religious expressions and objectivizations from the general historical processes and the social total structures in which they have taken place, or from other kinds of human expression, such as, for instance those of art and play. This objection is strengthened by the fact that classical phenomenology has not only reduced religion to an experience or an idea, but that this experience or idea is supposed to have the nature of a value and has, in the last analysis, been absolutized. Consequendy, classical phenomenology of religion has finally been incapable of recognizing and investigating a-religiosity, unbelief or atheism as an authentic human possibility. We may add, that religion has not only been considered a value category in itself, but also that it has been presupposed that religion is and ought to remain generally existing and universally human. e) Allusion has been made already to a fourth objection against classical phenomenology: that scientifically it is insufficiently founded. This becomes clear through the fact that a number of statements have been made regardless of their implications, that many assertions have been made without sufficient proofs, that a normative basis for proving things in a way with general validity is lacking and that consequendy convincing proofs are impossible. As a result, the generalizations of classical phenomenology of religion do not apply to the concrete facts of specific religions, and the hypotheses as developed by classical phenomenology of religion do not really make religious data intelligible and certainly do not explain them. This intellectual confusion has been aggravated by the fact that phenomenologists of religion have hardly entered into any scholarly discussion with other scholars, and have in fact failed to counter their scholarly objections with adequate scholarly arguments. It must now be admitted that the foundation of the assertions made by phenomenology of religion has not been clearly stated, that the criteria of judgment have not been clearly defined, and that the notion of the' irrational' has offered escape routes which have allowed phenomenologists of religion to shirk the criticism of specialists in other disciplines, with the obvious danger that they would place themselves outside any scholarly communication at all. f) Finally the serious objection has to be made that classical phenomenology of religion simply has not been sufficiendy reflective, that it has alienated itself too much from philosophical phenomenology while retaining its name, and that

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classical phenomenologists have often had an ostrich-mentality when it comes to all its philosophically-minded critics. So phenomenology of religion has become a more and more naive enterprise, losing not only its scholarly, but also its intellectual status. In fact, if judgment is suspended (epoche) with regard to reality and truth, and if it is desired that only the phenomena themselves speak, we have to do, after all, with an inauthentic philosophy that occupies itself with an inauthentic reality and truth. T h e serious consequence of this is that meaning and significance in the interpretations of classical phenomenology of religion have been outside of truth, no less. Moreover, the total neglect of the category of the 'other' and of 'otherness', and of its essential relevance to phenomenological research, has led this classical phenomenology of religion outside human communication and into a kind of solipsism. If viewed philosophically, classical phenomenology has lacked a self critical foundation and has neglected or wrongly put the question of the intentions which ought to have been its real subject of inquiry and investigation.

5.

EXAMPLES

OF A N I N V E S T I G A T I O N

OF

INTENTIONS

A f t e r having treated classical phenomenology of religion as a way of collecting, classifying and structuring isolated religious data, and having formulated our objections to this approach, we would like to pass on to a 'new style' phenomenological research in religion which takes intentions as its object of inquiry and investigations. We started this paper with the question as to what rule or principle we should use in order to analyze phenomenology of religion critically as to its aims, and also to make concrete phenomenological research possible and legitimate in the different disciplines working in the study of religion. Several considerations led to the choice of the concept of intention as such a basic instrument in the attempt to grasp religious and other human expressions according to their original meaning, and so to pass beyond the limits within which classical phenomenology of religion had defined itself. T h e present problem is how phenomenological research in the field of religion, as the investigation of intentions, can develop after the 'classical' phase of phenomenology of religion which we just described. We have mentioned already three examples of such research, according to older problems and applied to well-known subjects like religious representations, religious ideals, and religiousritual behavior. At present we would like to formulate some new problems which lend themselves perfectly to phenomenological research according to the

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proposed lines, and of which we must say that they at least partly have fallen outside the range of vision of classical phenomenology of religion. There are many such problems and we limit ourselves here to enumerating four of them, before closing with some basic questions concerning our own fundamental concept. A. Confrontations between religions As in the case of different worlds of thought and life which confront each other in daily life, we may also say in the case of the confrontation of different confessions, religions and ideologies, both in the past and at present, that we have to do with more than the simple meeting of different interests and different ideas. In fact, in any confrontation deeper layers of human reality come to the open, which have often remained hidden until that time. It is quite feasible to interpret such confrontations as a crossing of certain intentions of the different parties involved, and to explain details of them accordingly. Such intentions contain essential aims and finalities in the life of the people and communities concerned. A phenomenological analysis, as envisaged here, would be able to bring to light these intentions, out of the given situation of confrontation and the mutual responses of the parties. Such a situation is the more appropriate as a point of departure, since the participants themselves, through the crossing of their intentions, arrive at a new consciousness and understanding, if not definition, of their respective situations and standpoints, and can also arrive at an insight into the extent to which they are able in some way or another to transcend themselves and their position. An interesting concrete subject of such investigation of intentions is, for instance, the way in which any party forms its image of another one. The very image indeed, which one has of the other, shows, if properly interpreted, in part what the other party itself says and does, and refers in part back to the participant's own intentions. Since the essentials of such a confrontation are situated precisely in the realm of intentions, such a confrontation has to be interpreted preferably from a starting-point in this realm. We have to do here finally with an encounter of people who have their own human intentions. B. Religion and institution It has been observed several times how much the study of religion busies itself actually in principle and in practice with the remains, or at best the records of religion. Not only in the history of religion but also in other branches of the study

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of religion new, living religion often falls outside the field of actual studies, as a consequence of the way in which scholarship is generally conceived and organized. Another factor is that the study of religion is largely concerned with religious expressions and objectivizations as subjects in themselves, without much reference to the realities of human and social life which these data express. The consequence is that living religion, inextricably bound to complex overall situations, has been largely ignored. This is the more regrettable, since the interpretations which have been given of living religion in psychology or the social sciences have been made largely according to models of satisfaction of needs, functional behavior, processes of action and reaction, and so forth, without putting first of all the question of the meaning which things religious have to the people concerned. Consequently, the categories of our scholarship, even within the field of the study of religion, are not always adequate for the interpretation of a religion which is coming to life before our very eyes, and mutatis mutandis the same holds true of the religious life within a given historical and institutional religion at the present moment. In both cases, that is to say new and present-day institutional religion, we have to do largely with forms of spiritual searching which have often been only half expressed, or with dreams and ideals whose contents and essential elements are to be found precisely in the realm of intentions; the beginnings and the finalities are here more important than the factual realizations. In noninstitutionalized religion we find all kinds of expectations, hopes, aims, callings, choices, and so on, within the realm of a curious spiritual freedom; in this field such expressions can be best interpreted starting from their intentions. And with regard to institutional religion, it should be noted that the institutions to a large extent either keep alive and strengthen existing intentions among the participants, or even inspire and evoke them. Indeed, in every religion, in as much as it contains an institutional setting, there are certain interactions between the people and communities on the one hand, and the institutions and new institutionalizations with their representatives on the other. It seems that in principle, by means of careful research as to intentional contents, living religion can be interpreted within the field of tension between intentions and institutionalizations or institutions respectively. And also, to the extent that the materials allow us to do so, religious movements of the past can be investigated more closely as to their intentions, for instance with regard to their future expectations at the time.

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C. Religion and the world T o the extent that we have any access to the religious life of other people and communities in past and present, through its expressions, our attempt will be to understand it. We try to do this first on the basis of the explicit aims which in a concrete case played a role, but then we will look behind these aims for the underlying intentions. It is these intentions which can make intelligible to us the fact of a person or a community adopting a certain form of self-expression in given situations, and the reasons for it. Such an investigation of intentions would be able to interpret a great deal of religious life, including religious behavior, not only through the clash of different intentions with each other, or through the conflict between intention and institution, but also through the clash between intention(s) and world, in which case the world's essential role is to offer resistance to the aspirations. Much, both inside and outside religion, finds its origin indeed in such a clash between intention and world. Conversely, many expectations and ideals of a religious nature have faced a crisis precisely because of such a clash, the result of which can be a shifting or even a decline and cessation of the intention itself. Like interactions between intentions, and between intention and institution, interactions between intention and world can also be a fruitful subject of phenomenological research.

D. Religion, non-religion and qtiasi-religion Our fourth example is especially interesting. It is in fact given, with the nature of the case, that the very concept of intention is capable of overcoming the absolute separation between what is religious and non-religious, as this has been advanced by classical phenomenology of religion. We are allowed to assume that intentions can adopt different qualities, so that they are qualified in different ways, and can thus move or extend from the ordinary realm into the religious realm, from the world of everyday life into that of religious life, and vice versa. We may indeed assume that quite a number of intentions originating in ordinary daily life can take a more or less religious direction, in other words: a more or less strong religious 'potential'. This means that the intended object in some way or another obtains an absolute aspect or even an absolute character for the community or person concerned, a process which we are used to call an absolutization. There are a number of movements, on the one hand, that are called semi-religious; there are a number of groups with religious forms, on the other hand, that are called non-religious or secular. Both kinds of phenomena can be

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studied lucidly and interpreted intelligently by means of the rules of an investigation of intentions. Here and elsewhere, truly phenomenological research, as the interrogation of human expressions about their intentions, can offer interesting results both in the history of religion and in other disciplines in the field of the study of religion.

6.

N O T E S ON F U N D A M E N T A L

QUESTIONS

In the 'new style'phenomenological research the major concern is to lay bare explicit and implicit intentions, the presence of which must be assumed as a scholarly hypothesis of considerable probability. In some cases it is not too difficult to find such intentions, but in many it is not easy to uncover them. Without going further into the general problem of human intentionality and of its anthropological foundation, I would like to conclude with three basic questions with regard to religious intentions.

A. To what extent can intentions be grasped when it is said that they are not of an essentially factual nature? Even when an intention is not itself measurable or quantifiable, it is a factor leading to the expression of a person or of a group. And these expressions have a factual nature and are verifiable empirically. T h e intention is, so to say, the interpretative key to such expressions. Although the hypothesis of the existence of such intentions has already provided an important incentive for research of this kind in the interpretations of the literary and historical disciplines, it seems that the immediate living expressions of the actual present lend themselves particularly well to analysis as to their intentions. We not only have the possibility of communication with the living person or group, but can also observe the reactions which are expressed to other intentions, to institutions, or to further obstacles that arise in the path of the suspected intention. We can equally well know, at least approximately, where this intention has religious aspects. In a number of cases it will be difficult, both in the past and at present, to trace the basic intentions with complete certainty. What can be done, however, is to look for them. T h e investigation of intentions is essentially a particular way of interrogating the available materials.

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B. To what extent can we speak of an absolute moment with regard to intentions? Except in the case of self-deception pursued to the bitter end, a religious intention would distinguish itself from other intentions through the absolute quality which the intended object has for the people involved, and particularly for the participants. In other words: we may assume behind every religious deed and/or word an intention referring to a particular intended object which in turn gives a meaning in a fundamental sense to that action or saying. How difficult it is in practice to interpret such a religious intention accurately according to its content will be testified to by any confessor; he will not, however, doubt its very existence. In such investigations much depends on whether we can ascertain and grasp with certainty that which has an absolute force or awards absolute significance in the eyes of the given person or community. In other words, the problem comes down to how we can find out where something becomes transparent for the participants, with respect to transcendence. During one lifetime this point may shift or be entirely lost; it may also show up again somewhere in an unsuspected way. These investigations also reveal how close a connection is to be found between, on the one hand, the absoluteness of the object concerned, and, on the other, the absoluteness of the link which connects man with this intended object. What is absolute itself (speaking descriptively) evokes what is absolute. T h u s we have to consider that we are not here dealing with something which is absolute in itself, but always with something which is absolute for one or more persons and bestows significance upon their existence. Of course this is also valid for the investigation of religion in the past.

C. How do we advance from the investigation of intentions to a new view of religion? T o this perhaps most important question, not only of the study but also of the view of religion, one could briefly suggest the following answer. Human reality, according to this outlook, constitutes itself essentially as a reality of intentions. All human expressions, physical and mental, have to do with intentions through which explicit or implicit meaning can become apparent. The object of such intentions is a (subjective) reality of meaning, that is to say: meaning is known by it and meaning derives from it. Phenomenologically speaking, in religion the object of the intention has become transcendent to man and has an absolute quality for the participant(s) and other people concerned. That is to say, in all essential points and moments community and individuals can fall back on an absolute source of transcendent meaning of some kind. On this basis the common ordinary every-day life can become justified, so to speak, through the units of

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meaning that award significance to man. Such units of meaning have to do with the intended object and can make themselves palpably valid at any moment. Indeed, in his religion man finds himself confronted with a signification system that offers unlimited possibilities of meaning to him. Man has here a certain freedom to interpret such meaning himself.

CONCLUSION

A phenomenologist of religion works in the first place upon religious phenomena, but he cannot avoid saying something about religion as a phenomenon as well. However, the problem is how he approaches this phenomenon. Classical phenomenologists have made the attempt to understand religion in terms of essence and manifestations. Empirical students of religion have observed that religion consists of facts which are not basically different from the facts which they study in their respective empirical disciplines. Social scientists made the attempt to assess religion and its function in society according to their respective theoretical models which they have developed of society. Generally speaking, it can be proved that the interpretation of religious data, not only by classical phenomenologists, but also by empirical scientists, is closely connected with their concept of religion, and this concept goes back again to a certain notion and view of religion. Here I would submit that the phenomenologist has a responsibility. In order that the religious data should not be forced into a pre-designed scheme of religion, his discipline has the eminently critical function of analyzing and investigating further the concept of religion wherever it occurs in a discipline. But he also has to offer a pertinent positive contribution arising out of his investigations of intentions. This holds especially true for those intentions which are stamped as being 'religious' and with regard to which the available materials are consulted. In this view of intentional reality as the basis of man's world, religion will have to be considered as an immense signification system referring to something 'beyond' and of an absolute appeal. Religious reality will have to be considered as a reality which bestows or confers meaning and significance on man in as much as he believes in it, and this meaning or significance will have an absolute quality deriving from the absolute quality of the reality it stems from. Non-religion is simply conferring of meaning and significance stemming f r o m ' intended objects' (intendierte Objekte) that are not held to be religious; they may be transcendent but they do not claim to have an absolute quality.

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A phenomenological reconstitution of a religious world with its values and intentions, to the extent that it results from empirical investigations, rests essentially on the way of interrogating given materials with respect to the problematic of human existence. Indeed, phenomenology of religion may testify to a predilection for metaphysical questions and religion as existential reality; it is essentially directed, however, to the human content, the human substance of reality. Behind the intentions, it is with his fellow-beings, both past and present, that the student seeks to communicate.

PART FOUR

Applications

9

The Situation of Present-day Religions*

INTRODUCTION

The present theme may be exemplified in the following question: in what ways and to what extent can we, if we carry out phenomenological research in the field of religion, say something about present-day changes with regard to religion? This question concerns not only changes which take place in the West, but also transformations of world and local religions elsewhere in the world. Our question concerns not so much the problem of changes from one kind of religion into another, as the problem of transformations from religion into non-religion, or from non-religion into religion. In a word: what is the present situation of the religions on earth? The answers that are commonly given on this question are quite different, depending on whether they are given from religious or from a-religious standpoints, and whether they are given by people who have a faith or not. What, then, has scholarship to say in this matter? Anyone confronted with the question just formulated becomes particularly aware of how exceedingly difficult it is to look at religion without, at the same time, consciously or unconsciously applying a norm, without attempting to make a comparison with what somehow represents an ideal for him. T o be concerned with religion really means in almost all cases to react or respond to religion, either positively or negatively, ideologically or emotionally, by affirmation or denial. Given this fact, the scholarly study of religion proves to be a test of reason. And if we also take into consideration that we are not concerned here only with the application of a prefabricated scheme or with the development of a theory of religion as such, then it becomes more and more clear how little we still know of this subject which is under investigation. Surely, people have quite often pretended to 'know' what religiosity, faith or belief is; but this is not scholarly knowledge. Even when we have investigated the objective forms of religion in an empirical way, we have still not necessarily grasped the inner movements in * Paper read at the University of Bonn, 17 January 1973, and at the University of Leipzig, 7 June 1973. T h e German text was published as 'Religionen der Gegenwart im Blickfeld phänomenologischer Forschung' in Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie x v , 3 (1973), pp. 304-325. In the translation a few lines of the original text have been omitted.

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and behind these forms. We may say, in a sense, that the study of religion is a kind of study which unceasingly renews itself and must do so. Indeed, since the student of religion must always reawaken his awareness of what he is studying, his study runs little risk of becoming stale. It is probably superfluous to state once more that the scholarly study of religion does not look at the particular religion under investigation primarily as divine revelation, as a true doctrine, or as a norm for the individual's behavior. This study approaches religious phenomena rather as something unknown, as something peculiar, not to say quite remarkable. If we consider that religion basically consists of, and perhaps essentially is, a bond or a network of relationships, then the student in his research, precisely with the help of reason, is breaking through these bonds; he objectifies and analyzes. A n d the basic question which accompanies us in this kind of study is the continuous self-interrogation: 'With regard to what do we objectify?' and ' O n what basis do we analyze?' In the last analysis this means: 'What kind of truth are we looking for?' A scholar who is interested in people and their religion, and so in religion as a human phenomenon, and who addresses himself moreover to so-called ' subjective' religion, faces the difficulty that this lies precisely within what is called in daily speech 'the religious realm', which implies that, by its very nature, it is inaccessible to direct observation and experiment. Only its expressions can be known and can on the whole be studied. At present, however, religious expressions tend not only to become increasingly restricted and scarce but also to become more and more stereotyped, even in other parts of the world. How can we know what happens, with the help of such expressions, and how do we avoid the risk of lapsing into some kind of negative or idealizing description conditioned by pre-conceived ideas, and of letting our investigations become dependent on a judgment without rational foundation? This problem is particularly acute when we are working on present-day religion, but it also applies to the study of earlier forms of religion. My contention is that, as students of religion, we ought not to be for or against religion, that is to say, we ought not to be partial in our studies. It is our task to investigate religion where it occurs, taking as our point of departure the assumption that students and scholars, whether they be religious or a-religious, may enter into communication by the very fact of being human.

The situation of present-day religions

1.

THE

SCHOLARLY

STUDY

OF

143

RELIGION

It is to be noted that in our usage the word' religion' has undergone a considerable shift of meaning. From an earlier significance, according to which religion as such is directed toward God and encompasses and penetrates the whole of world and life, and is seen as something given with human nature, providing it with a proper dimension of profundity, its meaning has shifted in the last hundred and fifty years. Religion has now become, for instance, something which, although being itself outside ordinary daily life, confers meaning and significance on it; given this fact, it can be rejected in favor of something else which assigns or confers meaning, or in favor of a negation of meaning in any general sense. So it becomes apparent, even in daily speech, that man has discovered a new freedom with regard to religion. A similar shift of meaning is to be noted in the use of the plural 'religions'. On the one hand, they were understood as different systems together with the cultures to which they appertain, so that cultural history should be understood primarily as the history of religions. With the help of this concept of 'religions' certain distinctions can be made, for example between religions of nature and of the mind, or traditional religions and religions with a historical founder. These, like other classifications of religions as systems, run parallel to the concept of religion itself understood as 'system' where distinctions can be made such as those between the objective institutional system and experienced subjective religiosity, between system and human faith, or between system and divine revelation. On the other hand, a new meaning of 'religions' develops in the 20th century and is closely connected with the view that we can find people with and people without a religion. In this case religions are no longer independent, historically given systems with the respective cultures belonging to them; rather, they are seen as aspects of certain cultures. Such and other meanings of 'religion' and 'religions' may be useful for expressing the plurality of religions, or for stressing the contrast between those who possess or do not possess a religion. But are they also useful for treating our question: What is the situation of religion today?

2.

NEW

STYLE PHENOMENOLOGICAL

RESEARCH

ON

RELIGION

It would seem that a certain new style phenomenological research can make an interesting contribution to the discussion about the present-day religious situation. I would submit that the usual way in which 'religion' and 'religions' are conceived of and therefore the usual way in which the materials are studied

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may be very valuable, and may even have stimulated a demand for a number of investigations and studies. Unfortunately, however, it practically excludes from the outset an adequate treatment of our question: What is the situation of religion at present? I am convinced that we must succeed in developing first of all a way of questioning, if not of acquiring insights, through which we can treat and also pardy answer our question as to both form and content. What then distinguishes the new style phenomenological starting-point from the empirical methods as applied in literary, historical and social sciences research? And what results can we expect eventually of it, not only for the formulation of the question, but also for dealing with it and answering it? In a formal sense, this kind of research distinguishes itself by the fact that its starting-point is not a general concept of religion which is applied to a specifically 'religious' reality, whether metaphysically, metasocially or metapsychically. Parallel to this, religious experience is not here considered as the experience of something absolute, existing in itself, or of an absolute reality which is given with human nature. In this new orientation towards the concepts of religion and religious experience, the new style phenomenological research in religion distinguishes itself explicidy from classical phenomenology of religion. Differing in this respect from a number of other empirical disciplines, such research not only investigates causal, final and functional relationships between facts, but also devotes attention to meaningful connections (Sinnzusammenhänge) which are made or discovered by individuals or social groups. In practice, the search for such meaningful connections is carried out inside or even through an extension of the empirical disciplines. It is a characteristic fact that human reality is taken into consideration, the adjective 'human' being here understood essentially as meaning-giving, or, where appropriate, meaning-receiving. In this way the question: 'What is the situation?' is transformed into the question: 'What meaning is given?' As far as contents are concerned, this trend of research does not simply restrict itself to describing facts as such, although these constitute the basis for its studies. The principle subjects of interest are rather: (i) the relevance, significance and possible meaning of such facts for the people concerned; and (2) the question of why precisely these facts in given conditions are in this way relevant, significant and meaningful to these people. In a word, the attempt is made to move forward into the meaning-dimension of human reality. It is consequendy of secondary importance whether the point at issue is the existence of symbols of a psychological and social reality or that of specific phenomena of 'surplus-value', in art, religion, play or morality. It follows from what has been said that such phenomenological research can

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make a positive contribution within the study of religion in general. Its immediate starting-point is the problem of so-called 'subjective' meaning, which we can specify as follows: 1) Where, when and how does a particular datum have a certain religious meaning for specific people? 2) In which way does such a perception or experience of religious meaning work itself out in the structures of attitudes to reality and behavior with regard to reality? When speaking here of 'reality', we take this to encompass the individual as well as other people. 3) Where, when and in what way do changes occur in such structures, especially when they have been institutionalized? 4) What effects do such changes have for, or upon any new comprehension and experience of a 'religious' meaning? 5) What can we say about the human capacity to grasp religious meanings at all? This may extend from organic interference by means of drugs to cryptic allusions in mysticism, literature and art. 6) What is the relation between a core or center of meaning in a religious signification system and the distinct perception of meaning, or in other words, how should the individual and social construction o f ' meaningful connections' (Sinnzusammenhänge) be interpreted? What is important here is that phenomenological research in the field of religion is no longer an oudook on religion which is based on a general concept of 'religion', a general 'religious' experience, or a general 'religious' a priori that can be logically deduced. New style phenomenological research in this field becomes rather the investigation of religious qualities of human acts, behavior, or attitudes. The very way in which the material is approached arises as a logical consequence of the quest for, or the question of, meaning. We want to investigate where a search for meaning occurs, where a meaning (and especially a religious meaning) is grasped, and where action and thought take place as a result. Moreover we want to try to explain it when this happens. On closer consideration we see in such investigations some essential philosophical-anthropological assumptions and presuppositions, of which some can be characterized as follows: a) Human reality, in so far as it is human, is essentially and profoundly intentional. The intentions themselves are continuously interacting with the 'conferers of meaning' (Sinngebungen), for instance those dominant in a given society or community, which are received from outside, and they also communicate with similar intentions on the part of other people and groups. I would be tempted to say that, in a case where intentions are not only veiled but

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practically or virtually absent, we have to do with a human reality that has fallen into decay or anyhow is suffering from some malaise. b) In the process of man's bestowing and receiving of meaning, which is to be seen as a consequence of human intentionality, so-called signification systems which are present and culturally and socially recognized play a central role. T h e y function as a sort of reserve of potential bearers of meaning, a reserve on which man can always, or at least in certain conditions, call or fall back upon. c) What we are used in everyday speech to call 'religions' has been discussed above. Whether we see these religions as systems or as a function of different cultures, they are in this perspective immense signification systems which distinguish themselves from other, non-religious signification systems by the sheer fact of possessing some transcendent reference point which has an absolute relevance or an absolute meaning for the people in question, because it is itself a source of meaning. d) What we call in daily speech 'religion' is, in this perspective, essentially a quality of meaning or significance with some absolute reference point. Within the world of facts it is, accordingly, something fluid which establishes or affirms more or less coherent connections of meaning (Sinnzusammenhänge) and stimulates a type of behavior corresponding more or less to them. Religion as a signification system allows for a meaningful rooting (enracinement) in reality. Religion as meaning is something which emerges; like love, it seizes a person, and not merely in an esthetic sense. e) T h e fact that meaning is experienced is an assumption of this phenomenological research, but the experience itself cannot be grasped and falls outside the realm of research. As a matter of fact, it is the interpretation of experience, that is to say the meaning that is conferred on it, which is the subject of an investigation carried out in a rational way. f) Phenomenological research in this sense is essentially an investigation of intentions, that is to say, it looks for the meaning which given data have for certain people, and the data acquire meaning for the simple reason that these people have certain intentions. For a phenomenological investigation along these lines, we can here formulate at least four consequences deriving from the foregoing assumptions: 1) T h e problem of meaning which holds good for people is at the center of attention, rather than the problem of the existence, past, present and future, of the religions as such; 2) T h e peculiarity of religious expressions in the whole of human behavior and thought rather than their self-evidence is an underlying interest;

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3) The inner movement proper to religious expressions and therefore the unpredictability of people's possible reactions to historical and social conditions in religious ways is at the center of interest, rather than the determinations and predictability of these religious expressions; 4) It is a sincere and unprejudiced attitude, rather than a neutral one, which characterizes the student of religion in matters of religious contrast, conflict and strife. In fact, a scholar should not exclude the possibility that his conceptualization and knowledge of religion may have consequences for the future of religion. His stand with regard to it, however, will not be ideologically determined and his own intention is not to bring about particular changes in it, but to know and understand it while observing changes.

3.

CHANGES

IN T H E R E A L M OF P R E S E N T - D A Y

RELIGIONS

The preceding remarks must here suffice to give a general idea of what we would like to understand by phenomenological research in the field of religion. Our question is, then: What can we say about the present-day situation of religions, when we study them in this perspective? How are they to be considered at the moment with regard to the problem of meaning? It is worth turning our attention first to some general contemporary phenomena which are of major importance for any assessment of the present situation of religions, before proceeding to a first attempt at interpretation. As mentioned before, for the present subject we are especially interested in those phenomena which are indicative of a change. Such changes can take place in religious institutions and institutionalizations, as well as in the meaning or significance they hold for people. However, there may also be changes with regard to the form and content of human expressions and their religious quality, and new kinds of expressions may arise too. The phenomena which we would like to take into consideration are: in the first place general and worldwide ones. Secondly, there are phenomena of redirection of intentionality, overturning concrete world religions. Thirdly, there are problems of a non-religious nature, which have appeared and which religions have to come to terms with or give adequate answers to. And in the fourth place there are specific phenomena which concern human consciousness itself at present.

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Applications

Α. General, worldwide phenomena Not only in the West and in Eastern Europe, but also in the Afro-Asian-Latin American world, people are trying in various ways to stand back from given and self-evidently accepted religious traditions and institutions. The aims may be different: to reinterpret them, reject them, rediscover them in the present situation, or magnify them emotionally or ideologically, and so on, but the fact of standing back is there. This means that new, different and more subjective religious outlooks and ways of behavior are generated. This process which has already been known for a considerable length of time and is most simply to be identified by the split occurring between two opposed terms, the so-called 'modern' and 'traditional', makes itself felt through different symptoms. One may think of the reinterpretation of history or of certain elements of a religious tradition in the light of present-day values or values which are sought in terms of the future. It is also possible that certain elements of the tradition simply cease to have any consequences, or are consciously suspended, assuming they have not been automatically left on one side by cultural and social changes, or are simply consigned to oblivion. An important part is also played by the formation of a new idea of one's own religion, a new conceptualization of it which may lead to its being either idealized, reduced to essentials, or quite often made into an ideology, all changes which bring with them a fundamental reinterpretation. In many ways too, non-religious ways of conferring meaning are appearing. These have existed at all times, but what seems to be particularly striking nowadays, especially in the West and in Eastern Europe, is that many sectors of life which were formerly endowed with a religious meaning and significance, are now felt and experienced in pragmatic, utilitarian or instrumental ways, but not specifically religiously. From the point of view of religion, this is seen as a withdrawal, either as a natural, even unavoidable course of human existence, or as a commitment to a value system which may be positive in itself, but which has no religious quality as such. In organized religion this manifests itself as so-called apostasy or defection, which is often reduced to and explained by a rebellious free decision of the will. In fact we have to do here with the so-called secularization process, which takes different forms in different religions and has not only social but above all spiritual aspects and implications, insofar as a number of religious intentions cannot realize themselves in a secular society. With reference to the West we need only think of the almost completely autonomous development of technology, science, economy and politics, which have certain connections with the said secularization. In the Third World this process has to do with a strong current of ideologization and with active political debate. Everywhere in the world we can find the impact of this process expressed in

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literature and in other art forms. In general we can say that certain social and cultural forms which are not religious are arising alongside or in opposition to a given religion, that is to say, these forms are not religious in the sense of the given tradition. This does not exclude a religious validation of a different nature, on the contrary. Secularization in certain cases may very well be a transition stage towards the conferring of new religious meanings, but it remains one of its characteristic traits that the new conferring of meaning may be non-religious as well. On the other hand we must keep an eye open for the rise of new religions nowadays, distinguishing themselves from traditional religion. We are not thinking only of the Third World, for instance Japan or Africa, but also of the Western world, and it is interesting to note that in new forms of religion we have to do not only with sects or with the splitting off of churches. Besides the variants existing within a given religious tradition, we can recognize, by means of a subsequent analysis, genuinely new forms of religion of a syncretistic nature. For the people concerned the question may not only be to get back to the origin of a given religion, but rather somehow to be able to take a new attitude towards a new future with the help of an inspiring idea of origin. It also frequently happens that, as in the case of meditation techniques in industrial society, new human needs call forth new religious practices. In such new religions we are not only dealing with a transition from an older form of religion to a newer one; there may also be a sudden change from non-religious to religious. The kind of continuity which may exist is not always clearly perceptible, and new religions cannot be explained in all their details and certainly cannot be generally predicted. Both in the case of the rise of subjective religion within an objective religious tradition and in that of the dissolution of a religion or the rise of new religions, we can ascertain among existing religious traditions a certain incapacity to face adequately the problems with which man has to wrestle nowadays, whether in the first, second or third worlds. The older answers to problems of life and existence which are not only culturally conditioned but may be supposed to be proper to mankind as such, answers which are contained within traditions perhaps thousands of years old, can no longer unconditionally satisfy people at the present time, who have new, hitherto unknown problems, or new ways to redefine old problems. Often these traditions are no longer recognized as a potential source of meaning. An excess of traditional religion can be experienced as oppressive, or even as a code of laws that works more to subjugate than to enlighten. Such an excess of religious pressure can very well be ascribed to the manipulations of a religious or political leadership which tries to veil truth and reality. In complete contrast to the situation in former times, it may happen

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Applications

nowadays that the religious man, and not the irreligious man comes to occupy a fairly isolated position within society. In a world made subject to radical scientific inquiry man perceives ever more sharply, beyond the great religious views of reality with their vast syntheses, the great antinomies of human existence as it experiences and interprets itself. It may be added that the very knowledge of religion, as it has been obtained through objectification and analysis in the different branches of the study of religion, has itself started to bring about changes in given religions. B. Phenomena of redirection, overturning concrete world religions After having dealt with some general phenomena of religious change we want to suggest some observations on the problematics of the quest for meaning within the different religious traditions or religions. It seems that religion finds itself in the most rapid and radical process of change in the case of the non-literate religions. Wherever the so-called primitive societies under influence from outside have been drawn into a unique and, in human terms, necessary process of development, their religions are doomed, at least in the forms in which they still existed up to about World War II. Where ancient indigenous structures of culture and religion are in decay, new creations, often of a syncretistic nature, can be found beside transitions to the more fixed forms of constituted world religions. Here, indeed, the number of new religions, new movements of religious revitalization and new independent religious movements is practically infinite. The problems arising in this process are apparently assimilated to a large extent religiously, or ideologically with religious reference points, at least as far as the legitimation of the proposed solutions is concerned. In Japan the separation between state and Shinto in 1945 changed the situation fundamentally. With the collapse of the old relation between patriotism and patterns of religious meaning a number of flowering new religions, with their own rituals, doctrines of salvation and techniques of meditation have arisen here, with new forms if not always new contents. If in wide circles the belief in God and the gods seems to have been eclipsed, there remains the care for equilibrium and insight on the part of the individual, who is at the same time completely open to the modernization of work and public life. As a kind of laboratory of possible combinations of advanced development and religion, Japan, like the United States after World War II, is unique. Its interest is the greater because of the influence proceeding from meditation techniques which begins also to be experienced in the West. Since the revolution in 1949, the Chinese tradition has experienced a similar

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confrontation with a powerful, anti-religious state ideology, as Russian Orthodoxy experienced after 1917. But the Chinese government appears to have taken still stronger action against religion than the Soviet government did before 1942, since not only politically but also administratively there appears to be no possibility for independent religious institutions and clergy to exist. It is all the more interesting to observe, therefore, that Maoism in its absolute application apparendy not only shows structural parallels with the moralistic-social Confucianism of ancient times (with which, accordingly, it clashed), but has also been obliged to appeal in its vocabulary, through reinterpretations, to ancient Chinese ethical and social beliefs. Like Russia and Japan, China is the scene of a new departure: a departure which is accelerating after events that must be considered by and for the ancient society as a politico-religious catastrophe. If already in the nineteenth century more modern trends were becoming visible within Indian religion, so-called Hinduism, the religious situation in India changed fundamentally only after the independence of 1947, through the migration of a great number of Muslims to Pakistan and the proclamation of the secular state. The proclamation of the equality of all citizens including the untouchables before the law of the state, and the gradual lessening of the absolute character of the caste system have here implied a religious change. Moreover there is the interesting feeling of the superiority of Indian-Hindu spirituality over the outside world, the other religions and the so-called materialistic West, and thence the claim to absolute tolerance. Like Japanese Zen and Chinese Maoism, the practice of Yoga and the idea of the ashram community have exercised a tremendous attraction on the West. Religion itself seems to be exposed to a process of decay similar to that elsewhere, because of the weakening of religious leadership and the failure of a central organization; nevertheless new religious movements can always take shape around new leaders. Thanks to the nearly infinite possibilities of adopting position within Indian religion, every Indian can somewhere find himself a spiritual home. If, after the events in Japan, China, Korea, Tibet and Indochina, the so-called Asiatic tranquillity seems to have come to a definite end, among the world religions Buddhism has received the greatest blow; in China it seems to have been shattered even at the institutional level. What changes the Buddhist religious tradition will experience in the future is, of course, impossible to say. As an attitude to life Buddhism may in any case be considered to correspond to a basic need of human existence, that is to say the need to be detached from one's immediate surroundings. It is perhaps possible to explain thus the fact that Buddhism is at present experiencing movements of growing social awareness in

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Applications

Asia and that, in particular through its appeal to reason and insight, it is also acquiring in the West a number of sympathizers, even if they often keep silent. Islam is the second largest world religion, and at the same time the religion which has the strongest influence in the Third World. Islam is confronted with the singular problem that it claims to be able to prescribe, on the basis of a revelation, the precise structures of the ideal society. This has given rise not only to an infinite number of more or less Utopian Islamic ideologies for nearly every realm of life, but also to its having a political influence in the Third World countries to an extent hardly experienced by any other religion. The rapid Islamization of greater parts of Africa and also of Indonesia, for instance, has to do with the fact that the population is convinced that it is procuring itself access not only to a concentrated religious truth, but also to a worldwide civilization and way of life which is neither that of the Western nor that of the Eastern block. In the face of the tremendous Islamic civilization of the past, however, beyond all ideology there is an unmistakable disillusionment with and because of recent and contemporary history, a disillusionment manifesting itself in a greatly expanded apologetic over and against the West. The reaction to the West has taken here both political and religious forms of which current Islamic ideologies provide abundant evidence. Mysticism, a hundred years ago still widespread, can at present be found only here and there. Religious law is in the process of adapting itself painfully and presents problems to modern needs. A continuing characteristic of this religion still remains its social concern, bound up with religious ideals, a concern that has direct and indirect ideological and political consequences. Although one of the smaller religions in terms of numbers, Judaism should not be omitted from the list, because of its present ideological and also political relevance. Already in the last century a split between reformists and traditionalists had occurred in the Jewish community in the West, and in modern times there could come about a vital reinterpretation of religious Jewish ways of life. The greatest change here has been that after some two thousand years, Judaism is no longer everywhere a minority religion as a result of the foundation of the state of Israel. The emigration to America, the catastrophe of the European Jews, and the foundation of the new state have had their consequences for the Jewish religious experience and have had a strongly secularizing effect. Nevertheless Judaism as a cultural heritage has an influence throughout the Jewish community. Precisely because of the vital problems of the last century and a half, and the relative openness towards the outside world of the goyim, ethics in the modern world have remained here a question that is very much alive. As the last in the series and as the largest world religion we may mention

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Christianity, which until recently has been practically identified with Western culture and society, including those of Eastern Europe. We can only touch here on a few of the many problems with which the churches of this religion are confronted, each one according to its nature. We may think of the organization and the self-confidence of the Roman Catholic Church, of the ecumenical endeavors after confessional strife, of the attitudes of superiority that go back in part to colonial times but also have ideological roots, of the far-reaching secularization not only in Eastern Europe but also in the West. We think equally of the deep and scarcely measurable theological and ethical problems of our days, of the responsibilities incumbent on Christians according to their own religion at the present time, of the variety of their situations and interests in the different countries of the world.

C. Problems of a non-religious nature In a few words, we have to do here with general changes in the realm of human life, changes that place individuals, societies and mankind before problems which did not exist at the time when the present-day world religions originated and were hardly known before the time of Napoleon. Such problems are pressing for answers, if not solutions, although in fact the religions were and are able to offer feasible answers and solutions only to a very inadequate degree. Here we do not only have in mind problems of religious life but also a number of problems of human behavior and action, and consequently of ethics. A few indications may suffice to suggest the lines along which we are thinking. First there is the development of technology and, as its basis, the development of the sciences in general, both natural and social. Whereas the sciences have taken nature and society as the subject of their investigation and have consequently had to relativize or reject views of it which were religiously founded, technology has led to a control, if not domination over this nature and society which has affected and attacked religious forms of behavior as well. T h e changes brought about by technology in the conduct of human life have placed man before tremendous new problems. Second, there is the rise of new and modern ideologies in societies in the process of modernization. Although they often have had a religious inspiration, in practice they function in competition with the given religions and in a number of cases they deny the right of such religions to any existence. One of the effects of the rise of such political, social and economic ideologies has been that often a religion has been forced to occupy itself both at the level of theory and praxis with the problems posed by such ideologies, and has therefore arrived at new

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orientations and interpretations itself. Another effect has been that a number of religions have come to constitute or express themselves ideologically, and in quite a few cases have in fact shaded off into ideologies. Third, the acceptance of alien models and norms, intensified by modern communication systems, has brought about a kind of ideal world of representations which does not correspond with man's real needs and precisely for that reason has inevitably led to an alienation from man's own reality and a helplessness in the face of the need to establish norms for actual behavior. Partly because political or other interests have promoted this, an illusory world has been able to arise which in many respects has caused the religious world of representations to disintegrate. It is not alien ideology but unbridled fantasy which is here a threat to dominant religion. Fourth, not only in the 'second' and the 'third' world, but also in the Western countries, the quickly growing power of the state has had particular effects on the religions. Where it is in the interest of the state to maintain itself and to expand its influence, there is every reason for an official state ideology to arise. Especially where religion cannot develop any counter weight in the form of power in a spiritual and social sense, the state interest will take ideological forms and try to force a religious tradition to reinterpret itself, if not stricdy to transform itself. Fifth, planned development, technical, economic, and social, is a process which now underlies every society, but it leads, particularly in the so-called developing countries, to comprehensive changes in a relatively short time. Industrialization, equal rights for all, increased welfare, the limitation of working hours, medical provisions, have immense effects on the religion of a particular society, especially when they are backed by norms which have penetrated into the general consciousness and are kept alive by the communication media. The role which religion plays in society will change accordingly. Sixth, the sheer necessity to survive will impose ever new norms on man, norms which have been hitherto unknown and will go largely beyond the norms valid until now which have a religious foundation. We may think of the ceaseless peace efforts as well as armaments, of the necessary limitation of births, of the fight against pollution and the plea to preserve equilibrium in the biological world. Such problems, and many others, have been practically unknown in the religious traditions, and have hardly been accorded their full importance there until the present day, notwithstanding the pretensions and claims with which a number of these traditions have invested themselves.

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D. Changes in human consciousness Apart from the probability that, in the course of the development of the human race, there have been fundamental changes in human consciousness which express themselves in the religious realm amongst others, we can ascertain that, with the present transition from traditional to modern societies, the highest demands are put upon the human mind. If it wishes to avoid becoming blunted and destroyed, it must be capable not only of adapting itself, but also of orientating itself ever anew in order to comprehend new situations and grow in insight. The act of taking a more distant stance towards the past, not only superficially but in a deeper sense as well, and of abandoning ancient religious culture, in short the very act of moving away from a religious past, with its particular norms, representations and patterns of behavior, is certainly one of the most difficult tasks incumbent on mankind. Much confusion, not only in the West but also in the Third World, is due to the transition from a society bound to religious values to a society where labor and capital, and the struggle for human values are functionalized. Those who refuse to adopt the ways of life of modern industrial, and indeed automized society, must find and develop their own way of life creatively, without this hampering the functioning of society. Together with technical development in the different societies, the main problem of creativity appears to be how both to bring about radical changes for the better and to guarantee the preservation of the proper nature and identity of these societies. Here we come up against the ethical question of selecting a life-style within the antinomies of modern human existence: powerlessness despite the capacity to control, imitation despite creative energy, unbelief despite a need for faith. At this point we touch a still deeper layer of consciousness than that of creative effort and ethical distinction, that is to say certain limits that are apparently placed on the human capacity to believe, taken in its largest sense. Whereas for thousands of years certain kinds of belief, trust and devotion in life have been presupposed, nurtured and developed, we are standing nowadays, as far as I can see, in a completely new situation. On the one hand, scholarly research has shown that belief, religious or not, is bound to particular situations and can be fostered or destroyed as it were, on purpose. On the other hand, we stand before the unprecedented situation where man, for his own survival, can almost be forced not to believe anything anymore, to avoid either disillusionment or the loss of his freedom. This holds particularly true in situations where the capacity for belief is misused or where belief implies closing one's eyes to truth and reality. As a defence against lies and illusions we fortunately possess the capacity for unbelief,

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and there is even an intermediate possibility of substitute belief; we have to recognize, however, that it is more often unbelief that overcomes man than man w h o controls his unbelief. In the end this may lead to a situation where man ceases to have any correct idea of what religious belief or religion once were or what they once meant to man. W e would like to interpret explicit atheism largely as an attempt on man's part to transcend religion, and so as the end of a certain type of religion, if not of a certain kind of belief within the realm of h u m a n consciousness. A c c o r d i n g to this view, it would seem to be equally true that authentic religious belief is an exception and that it will become more and more difficult to discover genuine religion.

4.

AN

ATTEMPT

AT

INTERPRETATION

It may be asked what such a general description and mere enumeration of certain series of data, which can either be observed in religions themselves or affect them directly or indirectly, in fact have to d o with phenomenological research, which claims to work with signification systems, structures of intention and projections of meaning. It might also be a d d e d that the choice of these data betrays either arbitrariness or specific concerns on the part of the author, and that the theories which have been developed and elaborated successfully, particularly in the social sciences, in order to explain the relationships and connections between these and other data, have been neglected here. A t worst, it may be objected that we have simply arrived at the very position which we have just refuted, that is, the understanding of religions as entities in themselves, and the understanding of religion as a reality which distinguishes itself f r o m all other reality. O r it may be objected that in this treatment of the subject we have fallen into the trap of registering unmethodically, and even uncritically, what strikes us personally, with our presuppositions and assumptions, our antipathies and sympathies. What we have in fact d o n e is to consider the world religions as cultural, historical and also social units. T h i s has been necessary in o r d e r to make clear those points at which, if compared with a still recent past and looking f o r regularities and structures, we are now faced with the fact of 'change'. W e have of course made a selection f r o m a m o n g the data, but this was no arbitrary selection. All the above-mentioned p h e n o m e n a concern the basic fact of religious change, albeit in different ways. It may be a question of particular religions or religion in general, of facts or the meaning and significance of these facts, of problems which now concern mankind on a worldwide scale, or of new orientations of h u m a n consciousness that have p r o f o u n d consequences for the

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phenomenon of religion itself. We have noted down those phenomena of redirection with regard to religion which have struck us, but always as the legitimate concern of phenomenological research, constandy referring to the meaning or significance which these reversals have for particular people concerned with these religions. And we would like to claim that, because of the observation of actual meanings, this approach is more matter-of-fact and less tendentious than many theories which somehow contain an ideal of religion or of an absence of religion. I would say that as phenomenologists we are not so much concerned with whether we have to do with a phenomenon of apostasy, secularization or conversion, although we have to give some name to it, as with what the person or group concerned testifies about the phenomenon. They can discover its experience to be both a liberation from what does not make sense and a successful search for what does seem to make sense; this experience can be both a liberation from folly and an access to understanding. T h e investigation of what people understand by meaning is here designated by the term 'phenomenological research'. Phenomenological research in religion is thus the investigation of what people say about the ultimate conferring of meaning, about an origin of meaning and significance. Phenomenological research strives to open up a perspective in which expressions of meaning become observable and intelligible. Consequendy, when we want to consider present-day religions in the focus of phenomenological research, we are dealing with a kind of research that distinguishes itself from the study of religious phenomena in their factually historical, economic, social and cultural context and connections. However, it cannot be too much stressed that this kind of research presupposes all the other scientific disciplines as well as numerous investigations made by them. Put more pregnantly, we would say that the question of the subjective meaning or significance occurs in scholarly research only within the strict limits of the empirical disciplines: consequendy, these have to precede such phenomenological research. In general, the problem of the subjective meaning or significance can best be treated in close collaboration with the empirical disciplines, on the one hand, and with reflective phenomenology on the other hand. Cooperation with the latter is all the more necessary when reflective phenomenology itself refers to phenomenological analysis and its methodology. After years of generalizing, classifying and idealizing, the phenomenological approach should now be made operational in concrete research in the field of religion. With regard to such a phenomenological research into present-day religions we would here like to submit the following propositions: ι) Human ability to communicate stretches beyond the confines of the different religions, especially when people are confronted with common facts or problems.

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In concrete terms, even in the West foreign cultures are nowadays no longer exotic objects for orientalists and museums. We have an existential relationship with African art as well as with Japanese meditation, with the sufferings of the Vietnamese population, whether they be Buddhist, Catholic or Marxist, as well as with the paralyzed situation of Jewish Israelis and Muslims or Christian Arabs. Not only is this greater ability to communicate a practical consequence of the improvement of means of communication, but the separations which had been effected on numerous different grounds are apparently much less absolute than had formerly been thought. The whole problem of absolute distinctions and separations in fact arises in the end mainly from a religious or ideological point of view. 2) Equally, communication between people starting out from different religious positions has become nowadays a matter of course. T h e forms of this communication may be very different; nowadays it can be cultivated consciously in the so-called religious dialogue by specialists, and one may find not only an ecumenical meeting within a given religious tradition, but also here and there a common practice among members of different religious traditions, as for instance between Christian and Buddhist monks. 3) In our time, there are numerous opinions and convictions that enter into the realm of the religions more or less as self-evident truths, and increasingly leave their mark upon structures of religious meaning. Formerly commercial, political, and other practical relations existed between people of different religions. Nowadays ideas of a normative nature have developed which run through a number of religions as common themes and values, although they may be interpreted differently in different contexts. Such widely-held values, proper to what is commonly called 'world opinion', have become part of a new common sense, and are often accepted by the religious communities; although they may also decrease in value or even be rejected by religious consciousness or interests. This is most clearly apparent in the case of the various universal, or at least international, ideologies of different kinds which are increasingly imposing themselves, and over and against which the religions, both in their classical forms and in the forms of popular religion, find themselves losing ground. This important fact, unfortunately enough, has been too little taken into account in the investigation of present-day religions. 4) Although this may not yet be very clear at present, it would seem that we ourselves are the products of a period of time in which religion as a value and a form of reality, has been overestimated in comparison with the rest of reality, at least phenomenologically speaking. This holds true not only for the Western world but also for different world religions, and this view has imprinted itself in many respects upon the general orientation of the classical study of religion.

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Let us give a small and innocent example. The important role which people have been inclined to attribute to the religions in world history, at least within the discipline of the history of religions, has a close connection with the overevaluation of religion as such, whether in a positive sense as in missionary circles, or in a negative sense as in positivist thought. This overevaluation of the role of religion does not correspond with the actual facts which we have at our disposal concerning the present state of the world religions, and it must be subjected to criticism precisely through phenomenological research. Speaking as phenomenologists, we cannot but state that religion has an inherent tendency to overestimate its own role and importance; from a religious point of view, by its very definition, the matter will of course be seen differently. There is for instance the generally held opinion that people were formerly much more religious than they are nowadays; this may be true, but one should then define what one wants to understand by 'religious'. Only with such a definition would it be possible to make perfectly clear what is meant by the statement that man at present is less religious than in the past. There is certainly a real problem here, of which we simply indicate two aspects. On one hand we can speak of a kind of mutation of man's understanding of himself, a mutation which is conditioned not only through the development of reason and its application in scholarship and science, but also, above all, by the new demands of the realities of life, demands which are essentially imposed upon man by a world transformed by technology for better or worse. The understanding of oneself, of fellow human beings and of the world is in a process of radical transformation, not only in the West but throughout the world. At the present time what appear to be entirely new kinds of relevance, views of significance, structures of meaning and so on have acquired validity. In a quite extraordinary way new norms and values not only become accessible to everybody through the communications media, but are also presented as being self-evident; such values are worked out ideologically and applied politically. This does not exclude their rejection by certain given groups on grounds of quality or otherwise, but in terms of numbers, such groups remain minorities with at best limited influence. Religion as our forebears knew it is at an end. This is one side of the picture. On the other hand we should also be attentive to the 'other side' of things and people in a secular society, a side which is seldom formulated explicitly and cannot be defined, and which certainly does not reach the communications media. There are indeed forms of longing and needs which, although on a quite different plane from rationality and functionality, are conjured up by them. Where a depth psychologist speaks of the realm of the unconscious, or a structuralist of the realm of fundamental and barely explicit social structures,

i6o

Applications

a phenomenological analyst is concerned with the so-called realm of intentions, comprising the intentions of human existence. Such intentions make themselves valid in the expressions of life. If they are directed religiously, they will make themselves valid even when the secular society suppresses them. It is our sincere conviction that, just as there is a mechanism of sexual repression, there is a repressio religiosa. This may happen not only in secular societies but also in religious societies, insofar as such societies selectively admit only certain religious intentions and exclude others which then tend to be suppressed. In any case we are then dealing with quite singular and indirect expressions which are often difficult to interpret. In order to find themselves in an industrialized society people can take refuge in leaders, ideas and forms of behavior and action which possess an explicit or implicit religious character, even though the individuals themselves may not be conscious of their own intentions and certainly not of their religious character. Quite different are the present-day conditions of religion in the Third World. Due to their situation, these conditions differ from those of religion in the 'first world' where Christianity finds itself in a secularized society, and from those in the 'second world' where Christianity has been declared a dead end by the dominant ideology. In Africa, Asia and Latin America, however, religion has perhaps been less discredited. We should even recognize a vitality which places these societies at the threshold of life, so to speak, and in general makes a separation between the religious realm and the other sectors of life impossible. Religious forms of expression are here closely connected with other forms of expression of the unconsciousness which by their very nature have symbolic contents. The whole way of life differs from that in the West, where there is a much greater rationalization. Political leaders often also have a religious role or function. With increasing social and economic development, powerful dynamic forces are liberated which work themselves out religiously and ideologically above all. We may observe, correctly, that much of this is a reaction, whether against the West, the recent past, or the old self. This does not however detract from the fact that in these revitalization processes and movements religion plays an important role and fulfills a necessary function. The people involved react in religious ways. Compared with this, religion plays a small and ill-defined role in social life in the West. In the 'second world' the role and limits of religion are more clearly defined. In phenomenological research, religion ought to be studied under the aspect of its subjective meaning, that is to say what it means and signifies for specific people. On this view, 'religious' and 'non-religious' denote mainly different shades of meaning. Religion is seen in the first place as a rooting (enracinement) of so special a nature, that for the people concerned a shade of meaning which

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possesses an absolute reference point arises out of it. Meanings are closely connected with conditions of relationship, and more specifically with given ways of communicating and participating. The question of the role of a specific religion in a specific case, by comparison with what might have happened in a like case without any religion, and the question of the content of meaning of a religious transcendence to which people address themselves, whether as an escape or an anchor, are among the most interesting problems of phenomenological research in the field of religion.

CONCLUSION

We would contend that in phenomenological research, precisely through the distinction made between fact and meaning, the so-called absolute oppositions between religious and non-religious, sacred and profane, are transcended. This means that they are reduced to a qualitative difference in the human perception of meaning, together with its resulting outlook and corresponding action or behavior. As we have seen, new problems, particularly important for the present time, can be investigated in this perspective. In this branch of the study of religion, our interest concerns in the last analysis man, whether he expresses himself religiously or not at a certain time. The paradox is indeed that a religiously expressive form can be subservient to a non-religious intention, and that, conversely, a non-religious expression can obtain a religious meaning in a given context. This shows that the phenomenological analyst of contemporary religion has to work on non-religious expressions too, in order to be at all able to understand what religion may be, or what 'religious' may mean, in a given case. If our interest lies in man, the question at the back of our research is what people, other people, have done or are doing with their existence. Man is thus to be understood through his problems of meaning and the proper function of religion is, phenomenologically speaking, to confer meaning in given personal or social levels and problems of life. It is presupposed thereby that the problem of meaning can be approached and possibly answered by man both in a religious and in a non-religious way. What is now then the situation of religion? The question has remained largely open, but it has become, nevertheless, somewhat more accessible to research. I consider religious change and the change of religions, together with technological change, to be the most important aspect of the overturning of an ancient world that is not so far behind us. The forms of the new world will to a large extent depend on the ways in which people stemming from religious traditions which

IÖ2

Applications

are sometimes not only hundreds but thousands of years old wish to tackle the problems of this present-day world. To what extent they will use religious means, faith, ethics and meditation for this task is an extraordinarily interesting question. However they may set about it, because of the development, modernization, and functionalization of life the question of meaning presents itself nowadays in new ways. If it is true that a religious period in the classical sense is coming to an end, then our scholarship, in so far as it investigates expressions of man's spiritual striving not only in the past but also at the present time, must also investigate whether and to what extent something becomes manifest in certain expressions, both from the classical time of religion and from the present time, which, although not structurally explicit, must be interpreted according to its intentions as real and genuine religion.

10

Issues of Discussion in Contemporary Religions*

INTRODUCTION

The present paper intends to offer a contribution to sociological research on religion, by focusing on religious discussions considered as a social fact. Such discussions may be seen as a special kind of social interaction in which those taking part either hail from different religious traditions and belong to different religious communities, or belong to the same religious community and have a given religious tradition in common. It is to be hoped that the study of religious discourse and of the specific topical issues that are located in it will constitute a contribution to the sociology of religion. The history of the religions of mankind shows a great number and variety of religious dialogues in the widest sense of the word. Of some we still have records or other written accounts, and in certain cases good documentation of the situational context in which such discussions took place also exists. In Asia there were elaborate discussions: in India in Vedic times, in the Buddhist community, and among Hindus; there were many discussions between religious masters in countries like ancient China and Japan, as well as discussions between these masters and their pupils or political leaders. In the Western religions, one is reminded of the theological discussions which took place in Christianity and in Islam as well as in Judaism, and of the juridical discussions in particular in the two latter religions. One may think of the apologetic literature, especially in Christianity and Islam, as forms of continuous discourse in which the adherents of these religions were involved, actually or at least intellectually, with people of other religions and ideologies. In countries like Lebanon and Holland, neverceasing religious discussions have been part of the cultural heritage, with important social and political consequences. Indeed, many examples can be given of very different kinds of discussions throughout the history of religions: between people of different religious traditions, between people of one common religious tradition, and between people with and without a religion. Such discussions can bear directly on typical religious issues, often with practical consequences, or start with practical issues, exploring their religious or philosophical background. * Paper read at the Vlllth World Congress of Sociology (Research Committee on Sociology of Religion), Toronto, 19 August 1974.

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Such discussions, even the most abstract and theoretical ones, are social phenomena worthy of further study. Religious sociologists may direct themselves especially to those religious discussions in which sociological factors contribute to the explanation of such discussions, either in their general occurrence or in given historical situations. As examples, mention may be made of the continuous discussions on a great number of subjects in Christianity between the preChalcedonians or monophysites and the Chalcedonian part of the ancient Church; between the Catholics and the Orthodox, between the Protestants and the Catholics. One may think of the splitting up of Christianity into a great number of churches and sects, with many discussions among them and within each one. These may seem to concern purely theological or liturgical issues, but in fact they had important other consequences as well, not only for social and political behavior, but also for guaranteeing the autonomy and expressing the ideological self-sufficiency of the different groups. Other examples of religious discussions with a clear sociological background are those in which one party tried to prove its monopolistic possession of absolute truth and thereby its general excellence and superiority over the other(s), discussions in which the parties were involved in a struggle for worldly power, or discussions which took place between missionaries and indigenous people, the first representing Western civilization, the latter the party to be 'civilized'. T h e r e are societies in which discussing religious matters is part and parcel of appropriate and normal conversation and behavior, and where religious discussion is an effective means of upholding and developing a given religious culture. It is illuminating to analyze the 'ritual' aspects of many religious discussions which presumably have to take place in order to affirm views and positions already adopted without apparently changing anything; they simply function to reinforce previously-established religious convictions. A sociological background is also evident in the present stress on interconfessional and interreligious dialogue, as a search for communication. O u r own interest in religious discussion as a social phenomenon has been awakened by a continuous trend of such discussions throughout Dutch intellectual history, and continued by research into relations existing between Islam and the rest of the world. A n indeed striking awareness, among its inherents, of Islam's Tightness and superiority can be observed in the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, and in the permanent call made by the former to the latter to convert to Islam by unfolding a network of arguments designed to convince them of this fact. This attitude is well-known in all discussions arising between groups with different revelations and myths. Islam distinguishes itself here, however, by having a scripture, a rational articulation, a claim to universal validity and a spectrum of

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ideologies that have a religious reference. It may be further argued that Islam has an inherent tendency and inclination to religious discussion, even with outsiders, and that particular patterns of argumentation have developed. The whole problem of religious discussion becomes here primarily a matter of sociological interest, as soon as it is clear that one has to look into the specific political and social relationships existing between certain Muslim and non-Muslims groups. Only then may one find out why a discussion actually took place at a particular time and place; why it took a particular form and used specific arguments; what function the discussion performed in establishing the proper relations between Muslims and non-Muslims and how it helped shape Muslim consciousness and self-consciousness in the process. It is interesting to note the number of religious discussions which have taken place between Muslims and non-Muslims as the intellectual expression, if not the verbal structure, of a whole process of social confrontation and interaction. This may imply that a really genuine exchange of views, a deepening of insight or a conversion should be seen as exceptions to the rule of standard patterns of behavior and argumentation. Parties and individuals would seem to escape from such patterns only if one or more of the parties in the discussion had succeeded in personalizing their respective rules in the discussion, and if the more or less fixed image that one party held about the other had been replaced by a more personal perception. Then the real questions could be formulated intelligibly and perhaps discussed in view of new solutions. Investigations like these belong to the sociology of communication: where two parties speak to each other there is action and reaction through words. Verbal communication is a special case of interaction between people, and we may suppose that those involved in a discussion respond to a need for interaction, whatever may be the kind of relationship they have with each other. There are, of course, many aspects to an interaction through discussion. We may look at what is expressed by the communicating parties as being relevant, meaningful, true and real to the speakers themselves. We may also try to determine what aims such a discussion is attempting to actualize and assess the results of this kind of interaction in that perspective. The discussing parties themselves may have various intentions: to convince the other party, to express themselves with arguments valid for the other party, to make themselves understandable to the other party, or simply to express themselves in the presence of any other party. We may be attentive to what happens to the discussing parties themselves, to their relationship during and after the discussion, and to the repercussions of such a discussion on the groups to which the parties belong and which they may represent. In many instances, however, groups with different ideologies, religions

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and ways of life are not practically affected as such by incidental discussions of some members with outsiders. Sociologically, it remains an important problem how to explain and analyze adequately the social infrastructure of discussions between parties representing different ideological systems, with or without a religious basis or reference. What is really relevant in the process of interaction may turn out in actual cases to be very different f r o m what is relevant to the consciousness of the discussing parties themselves.

I. P R E L I M I N A R Y

DEFINITIONS

A discussion is called 'religious', first, if it concerns topics that are considered to be religious, or to have a religious meaning or value, by at least one of the discussing parties. Secondly, a discussion is called 'religious' when at least one of the discussing parties refers to problems that are considered to be religious problems, or when he hints at realities that are considered to be 'religious' realities, even if such problems or realities are not discussed explicitly as such by the parties in question. In most cases there will be no doubt about the 'religious' nature of a discussion, since the parties involved represent groups or positions of a recognized religious character, and since the discussion itself may have been organized explicitly u n d e r religious auspices. Often it is at least one of the parties that is explicitly religious, or claims to be so, and does everything possible to press the other party into a religious corner or bring the discussion on to religious topics as such. If certain values or realities are considered by at least one of the discussing parties to be of a religious nature, we call the discussion touching such values and realities a 'religious' discussion. Important in this respect is the aspect of the meaning which a religious discussion has. It turns out to be two-fold: on the one hand, the discussion bears on subjects that have a religious meaning (values, realities, experiences, etc.); on the other, it carries in itself a religious meaning for at least one of the parties concerned (seriousness, existential involvement, sense of the presence of something absolute, etc.). Consequently, such a discussion has a religious meaning for the participants as well as in terms of its actual content. It may even be submitted that a discussion that bears on religious subjects, but which is not felt by the participants to have some kind of religious meaning itself, cannot properly be called a religious discussion. T h e problem, however, is that such religious meaning is 'felt' by the people concerned rather than defined in a precise sense. We would like to submit that if the meaning which is 'felt' has some absolute quality for the party involved (which makes it a 'religious' meaning for him) we

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have to do with a distinctive mark of religious discussion as distinct from philosophical and scholarly discussion. Some further remarks may be added here. A religious discussion presupposes a religious view of reality, and it is from the perspective of such an underlying view that religious statements make sense; otherwise they are very easily misunderstood, or may even be considered to have no sense at all. Indeed, the sense or meaning of such statements lies in their being directed beyond the data as facts in themselves. It is a particular way of being directed, the possession of a particular intention which appears to be characteristic of religious statements, and the underlying intention(s) may be clarified precisely through discussing such statements and then through the ensuing religious discussion itself. The result of such a discussion may be then not only an improvement in the information given and obtained by the discussing parties, but also a transformation of perspective or even the discovery of a radically new point of view by one or by both of them. Consequently, the effects of religious discussion as a form of social interaction are at least in part unpredictable. It is fair to say that religious statements, as they are used in religious discussion, do not describe empirical verifiable reality; they rather interpret this reality, offering a view or expressing a reflection upon it which may take the form of myth or doctrine. Consequently, the sense of a religious discussion is not to be found in the empirical truth or untruth of the myths and doctrines brought forth in the discussion, but rather in the particular way of speaking about reality and truth. Our analysis should be directed toward disclosing the various basic views and perspectives of the discussing parties, that is to say toward discovering their basic intentions. Religions are considered here as human views of reality and truth, views which can be analyzed, like any oudook on, and interpretation of, reality. To sum up, religious discussions can be studied both according to their empirical social reality and as the confrontation and communication of views, outlooks and interpretations of reality. Individuals, groups and whole societies differ considerably both with regard to what is considered to have a religious meaning and with regard to what is considered to be the specific content of that meaning. In the last analysis it is certain basic intentions that determine what is considered to be 'religious' or 'religion' by particular individuals, groups or societies.

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S O M E I S S U E S OF P R E S E N T - D A Y

RELIGIOUS

DISCUSSIONS

Religious discussions have gone on until the present day. In Muslim countries we find fervent discussions about the role which Islam should play in a modern state and society, and a number of Islamic ideologies have been developed which express different views on the subject. Hindus discuss not only metaphysics and ritual but also social organization; Buddhists discuss not only ways of liberation but also social philosophy and ethics. Among Jews not only the prescriptions of the Judaic religion but also the meaning of Israel are subjects of discussion; the various schools of meditation have developed their own ways of discussing individual and social life. Among Christians, religious discussions are endless; not only on doctrinal and ecclesiastical matters, but also on the social implications of faith and on ethical issues in general. On a larger scale too, the relations between Christians, Jews and Muslims, and between religious people in general, are becoming a new subject of discussion beyond the traditional classificatory schemes. The sociological interest of such present-day religious discussions lies primarily in their growing concern for social reality, including political issues like the Middle East conflict and the Vietnam war, anti-racism and different liberation movements. Apart from topics of a more political nature, three large areas of social reality can be discerned that are subjects of discussion in nearly all religious traditions today: 1) Facts of change, development and modernization of society; in other words, the fact that social reality is part of history and that it is caught in a movement beyond the explicit control of those involved and their leaders. Things change, and this change is generally identified as a process of progress or of regression. In whatever ways this fact may be approved or denounced, for religious people in particular it is a subject of continuing discussion. They have to take an attitude to it, since change not only affects man and society, but also the traditional interpretations of reality as offered by the different religions. At its heart lies the problem of whether man can or should be (ir)religious in changing times. 2) The fact of the progressive secularization of contemporary society, in connection with modernization or other changes. Different interpretations and evaluations of this process have been given, and it has led to much discussion among religious people. Those who identify religion with a religious tradition handed over from the past, tend to identify the process of secularization with a decline in religion as such. Whereas discussions on modernization center

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on what is happening to society, it would seem that the focus of discussions on secularization is the religious values themselves: it is not what happens to society but what happens to religion which is here the center of interest. Discussions on this subject are found in all religions and they express a growing consciousness that religion itself changes and, consequently, that it can no longer be absolutized in itself. This is considered to be a critical event; one possible solution is to reinterpret religion philosophically or to replace religion by an ideology. 3) T h e fact of increasing encounters occurring between people who come from different religious traditions and who are under the necessity to come to terms with each other. This means, negatively, that they should co-exist without hurting each other too much; and, positively, that they may arrive at a mutual understanding of each other's position and where possible come to a cooperation in the field, for instance, of social action. Two kinds of discussion develop then: one about the fact of meeting people of another religion or ideology, and the other between the people of different religions and ideologies themselves. It is sociologically interesting to observe new codes of behavior and new methods of discussion which arise out of the plurality of religions and ideologies, and out of the increasing chances of meeting people with different attitudes to life. Within the religious traditions themselves, the fact of the others who are 'outsiders' and the attitude to be taken to them is becoming subject to more or less discrete discussion. With regard to such general subjects or themes one should make a careful distinction. There are, on one hand, discussions that take place within given situations, that concern concrete data and take different forms in different societies; on the other hand, discussions take place on the basis of general principles and on a wide scale among people throughout a number of societies. The latter variety of discussions will have a more universal character and it will be linked to the basic views of worldwide religious and ideological traditions; these discussions will also be slightly influenced by the way in which the given religion or ideology is discussed and interpreted elsewhere in the world. It is not always easy to appreciate the relevance of such religious discussions and the value of the arguments used. The empirical scientist or pragmatic sociologist may wonder that so much intellectual effort has been invested in matters about which no verifiable and generally valid conclusions can be arrived at, and he himself may react adversely to the fact of such discussions. He sees that, with regard to the perception of reality and to ethical decisions, statements are made on a basis of arguments drawn from some absolute reality, and actions are performed under the sanction of some absolute authority. It may indeed seem

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to him that religious discussions are a sort of escape from reality as it is factually given, and that they make things more complicated than is required on a pragmatic level of interpretation. And above all, he may be irritated by the self-conceit and arrogance, the obstinacy and intolerance that characterize many of these discussions. It is only through further inquiry that the internal logic of such discussions will come to the fore. So in the analysis of a religious discussion a careful procedure has to be followed in order to make sense of it without choosing sides. One has to reconstruct the conceptual frame of reference within which the discussion takes place, as well as its historical context. One must assess the presuppositions and intentions that are common and those that are different among the parties involved in the discussion. One has to be familiar with the problem that is under discussion, see it in its actual social context, and then step or rather swing over from the reality of the problem to the arguments used in the discussion. Fortunately, a number of religious discussions have been recorded afterwards in a reflective form, so that they can be interpreted as philosophical discussions with religious arguments. But many religious discussions which are known are anything but philosophical, and are clearly expressive of personal experience and commitment or of social and political pressures of different kinds, often with emotional overtones. Moreover, especially in religious discussions carried out by representatives of institutions having their own systems and ideologies, prefabricated models of argumentation may be used, so that the so-called discussion comes down in practice to the right use on both sides of standard arguments that have been developed in advance. Such intellectual defence positions may hint at ideological positions that are also closed and self-defensive.

3.

THE

S E A R C H FOR A S O C I O L O G I C A L

INTERPRETATION

A. Dominant issues Mention has been made already of three major areas of social reality that are subject to discussion in nearly all religious traditions today: social change, secularization and culture contact, implying the encounter of people of different faiths and convictions. Other issues and themes are more specific for particular religious traditions. When Catholics in Holland, for instance, have elaborate discussions on subjects like the place of the laity, the celibacy of the priesthood, or the theology of liberation, such discussions are to a large extent the outcome of a changing social reality and they constitute an attempt by Catholics as such to grasp reality again,

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albeit in a different way from before. One of the consequences of a revolutionary change in social reality has been a changing self-view of the Catholics; a religious discussion among them has thus become unavoidable, both to redefine the common Catholic identity and to define a new social reality when viewed by Catholics who have thus redefined themselves. T h e ferment among Dutch Catholics in the last ten years or so is indeed worthy of attention on the part of sociologists of religion, and it would be a fruitful field for the study of religious discussion. In a sphere of uncertainty, largely due to recent social changes, discussions have started on topics one would never have dreamt of even in the 1950's. In part people are becoming aware of assumptions and presuppositions which they did not realize earlier and against which they tend to revolt at present. Partly it is a settling of accounts with a past felt to have been alienating. Partly also it is a reconsideration of the very values for which and the faith by which people are living, and through discussion these values are redefined. Behind this redefining process there appears to be a search for identity. In addition, behind the social fact of Dutch and other Catholics discussing among themselves one can discern a social dynamic brought about by an unprecedented scientific and cultural revolution. Authoritative worldwide ideologies of a religious nature cannot but be shaken seriously by such a 'revolution'. There is much to be said for looking at recent discussions among Jews about Jewish identity in a similar light. For them, social reality has changed to such an extent, especially in the last thirty years, that this nearly perennial discussion could not but take new forms; as always it is their self-view and identity that are at stake. Whereas a hundred years ago similar discussions revolved around the problem of assimilation, they focus now on problems of survival and liberation, in which the existence of the state of Israel plays a major role both real and symbolic, religion as such being much less subject of discussion. Among Muslims, religious and ideological discussions have also been provoked by changing social reality. The more Muslim countries achieved independence and the more they were confronted with problems of social construction, the more Islam too became a subject of discussion in terms of the contribution it could make towards the building of a just society. If anywhere, it is in Islam that political independence, changes in society and the impact of the technological revolution have had immense consequences for the way in which people are interpreting and partly redefining their religion, Islam. It is possible to discern in many quarters a development from a religion of commandments and prohibitions, of doctrinal and moral simplicity, and of a faith of absolute transcendence to a religion fervendy discussed as the basis of a just and humane society, as the absolute norm for social justice and as the middle term between the extremes

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of capitalism on the one hand and communism on the other hand. Under the impact of changing social reality, Islam has developed in the direction of a whole spectrum of religious ideologies and ideals that are in a complicated dialectical relationship with social interests and needs. One may contend that Islam, which is being changed through the new self-view of a number of Muslims, through its ideals serves precisely to redefine social reality in new Muslim terms; very much as Catholicism, being changed through the new self-view of a number of Catholics, through its ideals may serve to redefine social reality in new Catholic terms. Behind the change in self-view and the corresponding change in the conceptualization of one's religion, and behind the redefinition of social reality as a consequence of such changes, these religions are faced with the problem of Muslim and Catholic identity in modern times. I do not feel qualified to enumerate dominant issues of discussion in present day Buddhism or Hinduism, or in Japanese and other Asian, African and Latin American religions. For Catholicism, Judaism and Islam at any rate it may be submitted that their often fervent discussions at the present time are to a large extent expressions of societies that are going through profound social change, mainly due to the impact of science and technology. Their internal discussions reflect or express movements within the social body: movements of rejection of the older religious tradition, of an individual or common search of identity of the members, of a reconsideration of transmitted values with a partial rediscovery and a partial rejection, and of a reformulation of a given faith. Evidently, such discussions are of an ideological nature; they seem to represent attempts by old societies to transform themselves into new ones, or at least to revitalize themselves by means of value-charged ideas. These ideas, confused as they seem to be at first sight, nevertheless constitute the prism through which a new social reality is being defined. T h e modern communications media make these discussions relevant to the masses living within the reality which is in the process to be redefined. When the issues mentioned here are discussed, they signify, for one reason or another, a problem to the parties concerned or in any case to one of them. This problem should be the focus of our investigation. Putting it in abstract terms, for any analysis the key question is whether and in what ways the parties involved have defined the problem which is at the origin of their discussion. If the parties cannot arrive at a common solution to the problem, the logic of the discussion should be that these parties express at least their respective ways of approaching the problem and that they mention and offer arguments for their respective solutions as they envisage them. The discussion itself, as a form of social interaction, may then of course take different forms which may vary from the tone of a pleasant conversation to the use of pressures of various kinds in order to enforce a

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specific view or solution. It is interesting to note in this connection that most cultures have established specific settings for public discussions on serious matters, so as to guarantee that each party can give his or her opinion there freely without hinderance. In certain cases the setting may be such that the really serious matters are not discussed at all. B. Possible effects of religious discussions The results of a discussion may have different bearings: 1) The immediate participants will be concerned primarily to achieve for themselves clarity with regard to the issue discussed, to collect, elaborate and digest a number of data and a number of aspects of such data, in order to achieve their own understanding and insight, and to reach a decision and take action. Especially in religious discussions participants can hardly expect that the parties involved will come to complete agreement on all points, since in religious matters people have difficulty in changing their ideas and practices completely, as far as their own conviction, insight or faith is concerned. T h e parties will participate primarily in order to shape, formulate and spread their own convictions, or to establish a certain basis from where they are able to act perhaps in common or otherwise along their own lines. 2) Within the group where such a discussion takes place, and certainly when it concerns a religious discussion, people will exchange their ideas on what is essential to themselves and to the group as such. In discussing a particular issue they will be dealing indirectly and sometimes directly with what they consider to be the meaning and sense of life. As a consequence the group, through the medium of an internal discussion, tends to search for, or to recognize, the validity of a common truth and the evidence of a given reality, and may then be ready to act accordingly. Members of the group find each other and themselves, and possibly their common intention(s), in the 'happening' of the (religious) discussion in which they are all involved. 3) Religious discussion, consequently, is a constituent factor in religious group formation; people's viewpoints and positions become clear and those who share certain views and positions will join together. It would seem that, at the present time at least, no conscious religious group formation is possible without (religious) discussion. Futhermore, that, once such a group has been formed, to an important extent continuing religious discussion will contribute to the coherence of the group which has constituted itself. Such discussion tends to develop common convictions on the basis of common loyalties and intentions, and so it will deepen the ties between people.

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4) Discussions bearing on issues of contemporary social reality both imply and lead to action explicit or implicit, positive or negative, with regard to this reality. It is interesting to note that often at the end of religious discussions direct public actions may be avoided, but that attitudes to that effect have been shaped. T h e history of religion is full of what may be called indirect religious responses - on the basis of religious communication - to given social facts and events; many of these responses later appear to have been inadequate and a number of them have in fact represented an escape from what was felt to be a danger to established religion. Upheavals and revolutions, for instance, have been a problem for any religion held to be immutable, and the way in which social changes have often been discussed 'religiously' in religious circles shows that many aspects of reality too have been held to be immutable and unchangeable, with religious arguments being advanced. One may then submit that, on the whole, religions have dealt not directly, but indirectly, with the problems with which the people have been involved in their daily lives. Moreover, religious action has never been meant simply to give pragmatic solutions to given problems; it has always implied at the same time solutions to other problems that are not of an empirical nature. Consequently, seen from a pragmatic point of view, religious action issuing from religious discussion has been only exceptionally adequate to the empirical nature of a given problem; but it can be adequate to the more profound nature of the problem once people are convinced that this is its true and real nature. 5) Perhaps most important are the effects of religious discussions on the level of motivations and intentions. These effects lie between the poles of, on the one hand, a hardening and fundamentalization of the position taken at the outset and, on the other, a reinterpretation or even a complete revision of the original position. The first attitude would prevail in closed religious communities with strong social control, where any major change is seen automatically as a threat against which refuge must be sought with the absolute, and where the norms maintained are held to be absolute. Discussions within such groups and with the outside world may hardly be called' dialogue' since they just reinforce the position taken, with a clear absolutist tendency. The second attitude, on the contrary would lead to self-relativization and self-criticism and would create new motivations for further thought and action. Here is openness towards dialogue, with a clear readiness to revise the position once taken. In respect of the present subject it is to be noted that this second attitude tends to liberate deeper intentions, to align the participants with a future, and to prepare them to initiate necessary changes.

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C. Towards a sociological interpretation A sociological interpretation of religious discussions will go beyond the particular dominant issues and the possible effects of such discussions. T o be specific, it will try to interpret such discussions in terms of the society in which they occur, paying attention not only to the specific idea and value system(s) prevailing in that society, but also to its social structure(s) and to the elements of the situation in which such a discussion arises. Whether, for instance, discussions on purely metaphysical subjects are not only held, but also socially recognized, will largely depend on the extent to which a given society or a given group within that society allows for this kind of discussion to take place; this is a sociological problem in itself. Although in general only a small number of people will be interested in such discussions, there are societies in which such issues are quite naturally a subject of conversation and discussion. These may be called more 'religious' societies, without prejudice to the question of whether such discussions function to avoid discussions on more concrete subjects and on life problems (which would characterize such societies as conservative and as perhaps incapable of dealing with issues of changing social reality), or whether such discussions have a positive symbolic character and actually provide solutions for concrete problems, though formulated in religious language, and may even open perspectives for a further treatment and possible solution of such problems (which would characterize such societies as progressive and capable of dealing with issues of changing reality). It is, of course, important to know whether a given discussion has arisen spontaneously or has been deliberately organized; and if so, by whom and with what purpose. Our interest lies in the fact that issues of contemporary social reality in certain societies can be a subject of religious discussion, and that religious and pragmatic arguments used in such a discussion may not be opposed to each other, but may go hand in hand. It is sociologically important to see that religion in a number of societies is at all able to face reality as it presents itself and to discuss it. We do not wish to express any prejudice here with respect to the question of whether in a specific case religious arguments are used to justify or to legitimate decisions which have been taken basically for pragmatic reasons (in which case religion tends to play a conservative role), or whether in a given case religious arguments actually open u p a value system that not only allows for realistic decisions to be taken but also recognizes both pragmatic and more far-sighted arguments (in which case religion tends to play a progressive role). In this

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respect, it should be noted that, in numerous religious communities, all issues, including those which sociologically speaking have nothing to do with religious values, are usually discussed religiously within the total framework of the idea and value system of that specific community. The social structure of the society where a particular issue is under discussion not only confers sensitivity to it on the parties directly involved, but also has its influence on the fact that the issue comes under discussion and on the way in which it is discussed. Wilfred Cantwell Smith, for instance, in his Modern Islam in India (1943) lucidly analyzes the 'modern' idea of Islam as it had developed among tradesmen in India with business interests in British trade. This'modern' idea of Islam made Islam not only acceptable to the West but also to those tradesmen who wanted to be modern themselves. A classical example is that of the discussions of the prophets in ancient Israel with the peasants and cattlebreeders about the status of their fertility deities and about the value of their worship of them; theologians and philosophers too in all religions have often fought against popular religion and superstitions current in their times. The theology of liberation in Latin America is a theological stand in favor of those who are exploited over against those who practice exploitation. Confucian ethics served for a long time to support the inner structure of the Chinese empire, and the Protestant-Catholic discussions, at least in their beginnings, were carried out by those who challenged and those who defended the religiously legitimized and established social order of the time. In many religious societies social movements of a revolutionary character have made use of ideologies derived from the prevailing religions. Consequently, the sociological analysis of any religious discussion has to take into consideration both the social structure of the society in which that discussion occurs, and the ideological tools which the current religion provides to the different groups of that society, particularly the lowest classes, minority groups and foreigners. The concrete situation in which a particular religious discussion takes place is also highly relevant from a sociological point of view. Councils - Buddhist and Christian - are cases in point. They were meant to discuss issues on which the religious community was divided and eventually to restore unity by defining common doctrine and common religious practice as well as by branding heretics; they were often convened by the central authority of the political or religious organization in the country. It is interesting to note that discussions among Dutch Catholics on basic issues of faith, morality and Church organization expanded quickly, precisely at the moment when Vatican II opened up the legitimate possibility for them. The concrete situation allowed them; until then the Dutch Catholic province had been one of the most obedient in the Church. It would

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seem that problems had previously been present under the surface, but that they could only come to the fore and be discussed openly once such a discussion had been legitimized by the appropriate Church authorities. It may be argued that the moment at which large scale religious discussions start within a given society is often indicative of a social crisis within that society at the time; such a crisis may have been preceded by an incubation time, but it bursts out into the open at the moment when the very fact of remaining hidden would prevent the society from finding a solution for what has become an unbearable problem. The very fact that a religious problem is brought forward for open discussion has indeed a therapeutic effect in a religious society, and it apparently has a vitalizing function for a number of groups in that society. Sociological analysis has to direct its attention not only to such a process but also to inquire, more basically, why (1) a given issue is treated as a religious issue at all, and why (2) there is a common recourse to dialogue (albeit within the framework of the given idea and value system) rather than another form of interaction or influence, so that the socio-psychological conflict behind the problem would simply be suppressed by military or political power; or, less violently, by some form of coercive social control. The forces brought into play by the very fact of discussing an important religious issue have to be subject to analysis as well. There may be a regression to a common faith or ideology; there may be an exploration of a broader framework under which the different standpoints can be subsumed; there may also be a discovery of the provisional and relative character of the often pretentious solutions proposed at the outset by existing religious parties. Such a discussion may lead, above all, to a process of interaction that may have any other than simply religious consequences. It allows in any case for an exchange of views and of ideas even when the interests of the parties are opposed to each other; the very fact of such an exchange of ideas implies that these ideas concern something that constitutes a problem to all parties concerned. D. Discussion analysis The central problem for any analysis remains, however, the structure of the discussion itself and what may be considered to be the core of such a discussion. Although the immediate initiative for a specific religious discussion may come from outside and be supported by political or religious authority, it is the willingness of the discussing parties to meet each other which is the basic internal motivation. This motivation itself indicates an ethical element of the discussion, in so far as the parties concerned are prepared to confront each other; this

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implies certain risks with regard to their own position but also opens possibilities with regard to communication with others who have their own ideas and views. There are a number of other elements too: whether the discussion has been organized institutionally and, if so, what the structure and nature of the organization is; it is important to know on whose immediate authority the meeting takes place and what aims or purposes were implied when the meeting was convened. It is, of course, essential to know what the actual interests of the discussing parties are, not only with regard to the discussion itself, but also their social interests and motivations in the widest sense of the word. It is also necessary to know what practical possibilities of action are open to the discussing parties, and whether the situational context would allow eventual common action. Another important element is the nature of the groups to which the discussing parties belong and to which they extend their loyalty; to what extent they are bound to represent these groups, and to what extent they can speak on their own authority. A further point is whether or not the discussing parties adhere to ideologies or religions that are considered in advance to be mutually exclusive. An essential piece of information is whether the parties are equal to each other in terms of knowledge, intelligence, power and status. Religious discussions nowadays have a less formal character than was the case at the medieval caliphal court of Bagdad, but still the manners and customs prevailing in the respective societies of the discussing parties will largely determine the forms by which the latter can communicate with each other. In practice, it is often the pressure of given circumstances or the presence of a specific cause to be defended that brings together people of different convictions who want to undertake a common action which should bear fruits. Among intellectuals, real discussions often take place in writing, and the authors may hardly meet each other. Mention has already been made of some themes, general and specific, around which present-day religious discussions evolve. The very fact that a particular issue is discussed by people of different views and standpoints suggests that the core of that issue represents a problem for both parties; in the last analysis it is this problem that has given rise to the discussion. Consequently, an adequate analysis of a religious discussion, as far as its core is concerned, implies first of all a study of the precise nature, including the social and emotional aspects, of the problem under discussion, independent of the way in which the parties define the problem themselves. Secondly, such an analysis demands a study of the views (religious and otherwise) which the discussing parties have of this particular problem as well as an assessment of the reasons why it is a problem at all to them; an analysis of the way in which they define the problem may provide important clues. Thirdly, attempts must be made to explain the views of the discussing

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parties sociologically and to unravel the socio-psychological reasons why the issue represents 'objectively' a problem to the discussing parties. It may not be superfluous to note that the discussion itself is not resolved by such a sociological analysis, and that the problem itself cannot be solved by it. Only the parties themselves can determine the terms in which they want to define, view and possibly solve the problem; if they want to do this in religious terms, no final argument can be brought forward to them to abandon these terms, if they sincerely believe them to be correct. The logic of a discussion demands the freedom of the parties involved to choose the terms under which each one wants to envisage reality; otherwise the discussion itself would lose its meaning and could be replaced by a solution of power, involving oppression. Religious discussions, then, may testify to the diversity of man's mind. Naturally, there are also psychological elements in a religious discussion. First of all there should be some social contact beyond words, since a relationship between human beings is implicit in any discussion. Second, such a discussion often represents a striking rationalization of views that are mostly accepted not on rational grounds, but for emotional reasons, or by way of accepted tradition, specifically when such views have a vital significance to the people concerned. Third, there are common implicit assumptions in any religious discussion which are part of a common culture, of certain common situations in which the discussing parties find themselves. Fourth, whatever the parties' ideas and their respective formulations may be, there is the simple but basic fact that each party accepts certain values. These values, and the corresponding value systems and their perceived meanings, may be very different; indeed a certain difference is given with the fact of the discussion itself. This implies, however, that neither of the parties is able to take a view that encompasses the value and meaning systems of everyone involved. And so they are, and remain, involved in the situation of discussion which they may interpret in their own ways but which has, like any situation of social interaction, its own direction. Logically speaking, a religious discussion is only definitely broken off when one of the discussing parties manipulates the ultimate against the other, that is to say when he uses the ultimate as a weapon.

4.

RELIGIOUS

DISCUSSIONS ABOUT

MODERNIZATION

As mentioned before, for all religious traditions modernization as a social reality represents a problem, since it implies change. Consequently, we find within all religions at the present time discussions going on about the issue of what to do

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about a society that finds itself in a process of modernization. The fact that this modernization is discussed by religious people may be considered to be a reaction to the modernization process as well as an aspect of this very process itself. The terms by which ' modernization' is defined and the manner in which it is understood by people of a given religious tradition are directly correlated with the way in which they view their own religious tradition and ultimately with the way in which they view and understand themselves, that is, their identity. The crucial point then seems to be the stand which people in general and the discussing parties in particular adopt with regard to the religious tradition in which they grew up. There appear to be three major possibilities here: ι) There may be a bursting out from the tradition through an idealism projecting itself into the future. The past is felt to have been a period characterized by introversion and inactivity, and an appeal is made to openness of mind and to conscious action. Such attitudes can be observed with regard to all religious traditions, although the ideal which is viewed positively will take different shapes in different religions, and in different groups within one given religion. Always, however, a selection is made from the many elements of the tradition, and those elements selected are reinterpreted along the lines of the new religious view, which in its turn reinterprets the whole tradition. This attitude implies for the people concerned the discovery that religion, if understood rightly, can be a positive help towards establishing a modern society. The ideologies which are developed along these lines are in the last analysis religiously motivated and of an idealistic nature. 2) There may be a breaking out from the tradition through a revolt annihilating the past. After this past, felt to have been a period of stagnation and oppression, a new source of movement erupts which sets aside what has been handed down in tradition, and in particular religious tradition. These attitudes too can be observed with regard to all religious traditions, and the failure of the latter is then proudly demonstrated. The past reality which is viewed negatively will again take different shapes in the different religions, and also in different groups within one given religion. That which is projected positively as its opposite into the future may vary accordingly, but it will be channeled according to the ideology that is adhered to. This attitude implies for the people concerned the discovery that there are values other than traditional religious ones that are able to enhance positive action toward establishing a modern society. The ideologies which are developed along this line are opposed to religion as such, and they are themselves inspired by other than 'religious' motivations as traditionally defined.

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3) T h e r e may also be a more or less conscious continuation of the religious tradition itself, with incidental changes and redefinitions. These are meant as necessary adaptations to a modernization process which is considered to have its own autonomous movement, to a large extent independent of the will of the religious leaders or the faithful. In this case, too, a reinterpretation of certain parts and elements of the religious tradition is made, but only pragmatically, without a reinterpretation of the tradition in its entirety. This tradition indeed continues to be recognized as having a certain validity in itself, even if a number of particular items are no longer applied in practice. Such an attitude implies for the people concerned the recognition of religious change, the recognition that religion is flexible to a certain extent; the degree to which this flexibility is admitted depends on the extent and the nature of what is considered to be invariable and unchangeable. Besides these three major attitudes, there is of course always a fourth possibility: the continuation of a given tradition without change, whatever changes may be taking place in society. This attitude can be realized in practice only by a group of strong conviction and of small size which wants to keep itself at a distance from changing society, which is viewed negatively. But such a group will often be able to act as a pressure group which appeals to the absolute validity of certain religious norms and ideals that are accepted nominally in society, and it will always tend to judge and condemn the present state of affairs in the light of these norms and ideals. In the three major orientations mentioned above, the given religious tradition and by extension religion in general are subject to discussion, and this discussion is correlated to the discussion on modernization. This correlation is of vital interest for our investigation. Another rule can be observed which is equally important. When a religious discussion has as its subject the religious tradition which prevails in the society in question, the discussing parties themselves, even when they also explicitly discuss modernization or secularization in their society, are apparently to a very limited degree conscious of the fact that their very own attitudes toward tradition are largely determined by their social position in the modernization process set into motion. A n d a third rule can be found: as soon as the concern of the discussing parties is with their religion, they are hardly conscious of themselves being at all determined by non-religious processes. A sociological analysis here obtains its full weight in so far as it is able to correlate the attitude which the discussing parties take with regard to the religious tradition, with the social position at which these parties arrived through the modernization process. Even when the attitudes in the discussion may be inferred

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largely from the social position of the parties, these have a certain margin within which they can experience, become conscious of, define and modify their position. T h e way in which they may do so will depend not only on their own experience and intelligence, but also on the available social philosophies and ideologies that offer the tools for such a modification. Sociological research may try then to correlate a person's definition of his own position with his actual position, and look next for the connections between this actual position, on the one hand, and his attitudes toward his religious tradition and toward modernization and secularization, on the other. If carried out in this manner, the sociological analysis of a religious discussion on modernization and tradition will lead to important theoretical results too. The self-perception of the discussing parties will thus be of crucial importance.

CONCLUSION

Further to what has been said before, some conclusions may be added with regard to the search for a sociological interpretation of present-day religious discussions in so far as they are one of the effects of technical, economic and social change. 1) When the whole of reality changes rapidly because of these fundamental ' material' changes, as it does particularly in developing countries, the interpretation of reality current in the religious traditions of these countries has to change as well. This implies the occurrence of discussions that bear not only on what happens 'in reality', but also on the interpretation of this reality, including the religious framework of interpretation. Such discussions, consequently, will revolve especially around the interpretative categories and values and the corresponding norms of action as they are found in the existing religious traditions. This implies that these traditions themselves have become a subject of discussion. 2) When, as at present, communications increase rapidly between people coming from different religious and ideological backgrounds, there may be either a refusal or an acceptance of a concomitant interaction. In the first case, religious discussions within the then closed community tend to be dominated by fundamentalist positions where the principles of the given idea and value system are absolutized. In the second case, discussions with regard to the various existing religions and ideologies will be part of the process of interaction with persons and groups coming from other religious and ideological traditions. Such discussions may stress for instance the particular solutions that are offered by these various traditions, in order to solve the problems which

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beset mankind when reality changes. T h e y may also stress the common situations and processes with which men have to cope, whatever may be the different religious, cultural and ideological traditions in which they have been raised. 3) Any religious discussion will be concerned with values, their acceptance or denial by different people. In part such discussion will bear on problems of truth, reality and human life as envisaged within one tradition, among the members of the community for their own sake. In part such discussion will also take place with people from other religious traditions, within a context of cultural contact and interaction. Especially in the latter case such a discussion cannot but lead, at least among the parties concerned, to a reconsideration of values in the traditions from which they stem, leading to rediscovery, redefinition, rejection, and so on. This very discussion about values is itself part of a process of transformation of tradition. 4) In order to analyze the specific interpretations of social reality which are provided by the parties to a religious discussion, and in order to analyze the specific definitions that these parties give of their own position in connection with their self-perception, the analyst has to make clear explicitly what he himself understands by social reality and how he defines it. He has to do this independendy of the definitions and interpretations which are given by the parties themselves in the course of their discussion and which are the subject of investigation. T h e correctness and value of a scholar's own definition of social reality can be ascertained by the extent to which it allows him to understand the definitions and interpretations given by the discussing parties, and also to explain why they arrived at their respective absolutizations. We touch here upon more theoretical issues of human conflict and communication, and have to interpret religious or ideological discussion as a special case of human interaction. 5) T h e interest of the study of contemporary religious discussions for the general theme of this meeting, ' T h e scientific and cultural revolution and its effect on religious development and problems', may be summarized as follows: a) Scientific thought brings about a radical change to religious oudooks; b) T h e application of scientific thought in technology brings about change in the world, which imposes in its turn the necessity for change in religious oudooks. T h e various responses which are given within the different religious, cultural and ideological traditions to the change of reality should be a subject of inquiry; c) T h e present cultural changes imply such a radical change of human

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consciousness that one may speak of a cultural revolution questioning the existing cultural traditions. To the extent that there is such a revolution in and through science and culture, there will also be a similar revolution in religion and in the religions as traditionally defined; d) Within the religious traditions such a process of change leads to discussions concerning rediscoveries, reinterpretations, revisions and rejections of religious traditions as a whole or of elements of them. These discussions, and the different definitions and interpretations which they contain, are illuminating for the changes which occur nowadays in man's religious consciousness and in his relations with other people and with the world; e) The study of discussions that take place in contemporary religions should be broadened through the study of other aspects of present religious change. Such a study ought to be carried out by a number of specialists. As a first step in such a study a sociological survey has to be made of the current religious situation in the different countries of the world.

PART FIVE

Out of the History of the Study of Religion

11

Gerardus van der Leeuw as a Theologian and Phenomenologist*

I.

BIOGRAPHICAL

DATA

AND

ACTIVITIES

Gerardus van der Leeuw was born on 19 March 1890 as the eldest son of Gerardus van der Leeuw Senior (1861-1922) and Elisabeth Antoinette Nelck (1863-1949). Three years later a daughter was born, and in 1905 a second son, who died prematurely at the age of five. G. van der Leeuw Sr. was then bookkeeper at the public office of customs and excise duties (Invoer en accijnzen); he became in 1905 deputy inspector in the office of public inspection on the observance of the law on alcoholic drinks (Staatstoezicht op de naleving van de drankwet); these were both government offices. He was of a family from the Hague, and he was a sidesman (collectant) and later deacon (diaken) in the Dutch Reformed Church (Nederlands Hervormde Kerk) in the Hague. His wife came from an Amsterdam family and had been teaching in an infant school in the Hague until their marriage in 1889. A f t e r his primary education in the Hague, Gerardus J r . attended the municipal grammar school in the Hague (Stedelijk Haags Gymnasium) f r o m 1902 until 1908. This gymnasium had been founded in 1832 and in the years that Van der Leeuw was a pupil there, Dr. T h . van Aalst was rector, and among the teachers were Dr. A. J. Barnouw, Edward B. Köster, and Dr. E. F. Kossmann, who were wellknown. Other pupils in these years were, for instance, P . J . van Eijck (later professor of Greek in Groningen), Martinus Nijhofi (later poet), Victor van Vriesland (later author), Alexander Loudon (later diplomat). Somewhat later Gerardus van der Leeuw Jr. also made the acquaintance of H. C. Rümke (later professor of psychiatry and neurology in Utrecht) with whom he developed a lasting friendship. In 1907 the school moved f r o m the Westeinde to the Laan van Meerdervoort in the Hague. During the festivities held at that occasion a performance of an adapted version of the medieval play Beatrijs, which had been written by the young Gerardus van der Leeuw, was given. This provided early evidence of * For the theological part of this paper (section 3) I am greatly indebted to J. J. ten Ham's doctoraalscriptie: G. van der Leeuw, Ontwikkeling en grondstructuur van zijn theobgie [G. van der Leeuw, Development and Basic Structure of his Theology], University of Utrecht, Faculty of Theology, May 1973, 107 pp. Part of the phenomenological section of this chapter (section 6) has been published earlier in Numen, Vol. xix, Fasc. 2-3 (Aug.-Dec. 1972), pp. 162-183. For texts of Van der Leeuw, see e.g. my Classical Approaches, Vol. I, pp. 398-431 (Waardenburg, 1973).

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his interest in literature and in music and the plastic arts. He also had at this time organ lessons and would later be known for his skill on this instrument. Gerardus van der Leeuw was president of the League of Hague Gymnasium pupils (Bond van Haagse Gymnasiasten) which had been founded in 1904, and participated in summer camps organized by the Dutch League of Gymnasium pupils (Nederlandse Gymnasiastenbond). In 1908 he graduated from the gymnasium in the arts section (alpha) with distinction in all subjects except for mathematics. For matters of religion, Van der Leeuw from his 14th year onwards attended confirmation classes given by Dr. J. H. Gerretsen, Minister of the Dutch Reformed Church in the Hague, a man known for his liturgical concern and his deep spirituality. The Van der Leeuws attended the Kloosterkerk where Dr. Gerretsen used to conduct services, and the minister visited them often at home. Gerardus van der Leeuw was confirmed by Dr. Gerretsen in 1908, the year of his graduation. Dr. Gerretsen has had a great influence on Van der Leeuw, both as his spiritual father and through his ideas on liturgy, for he was the first who strove after a liturgical renewal of the Dutch Reformed Church. G. van der Leeuw wrote himself a biography of Dr. Gerretsen (1942). Van der Leeuw was able to study theology in Leiden thanks to a scholarship. During his studies (1908-1913) he lived at his parents' home and traveled daily from the Hague to Leiden. He became a member of the theological society (dispuut) Concordia Resparvit Crescent, where he made friends with men such as E. van Ruitenberg and D. A. van den Bosch. Van der Leeuw must have been interested in the different disciplines in the theological faculty, but he was particularly attracted by the history of religions and by phenomenology of religion, which were taught by W. Brede Kristensen. So from his first year on he took the courses of ancient Egyptian offered in the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy by Dr. P. A. A. Boeser, and for his final examination (doctoraal examen) he chose history of religions as his main field. Phenomenology of religion at the time was not yet a discipline legally recognized as a separate field of studies. Just as ]. H. Gerretsen may be called Van der Leeuw's master in religion, W. B. Kristensen may be considered to have been his master in the study of religion (see Waardenburg, 1972a, esp. pp. 145-161). Van der Leeuw must have undergone, moreover, the influence of P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye who had taught himself history of religions at the Municipal University of Amsterdam from 1878 until 1899, and who taught subsequendy ethics and the 'encyclopaedia of theology', that is, a survey of the theological curriculum for first year students, until 1916 (see Waardenburg, 1972a, pp. 136-144). Van der Leeuw was then a member of the Nederlandse Christen Studenten Vereniging, which was part of the World Christian Student Federation. In his later student years Van der Leeuw

Gerardus van der Leeuw as a theologian and phenomenologist 189

moved to a more liberal theological position than when he started out, with an 'ethical' religious standpoint which held the balance between confessional orthodoxy and liberal modernism. After his final theological university examination (doctoraal exameri) in 1913, Van der Leeuw received the opportunity to continue his studies for two semesters in Germany (1913-14). During the winter semester (October 1913-February 1914) he studied Egyptian in Berlin with A. Erman and K. Sethe who had just finished a new edition of the pyramid texts, and took advantage of the cultural life in the German capital. During the summer semester (March 1914-July 1914) he studied theology and history of religions in Göttingen, where he worked with Wilhelm Bousset. Van der Leeuw returned to the Hague just before the outbreak of World War I, and prepared his dissertation while living at his parents' home. He defended his Th.D. thesis Godsvoorstellingen indeoud-Egyptischepyramideteksten [Ideas of God in the Ancient Egyptian Pyramid Texts] at the University of Leiden, in the Faculty of Theology, on 15 March 1916, where W. B. Kristensen was his promotor. In this dissertation Van der Leeuw also investigated the representation of 'impersonal power' in the ancient Egyptian religion. On 27 April 1916 he married Anne Catharina Snoeck Henkemans (1 June 1890-19 May 1946), who was then a student of theology in Leiden, the church ceremony being conducted by Dr. J. H. Gerretsen in the Kloosterkerk. The families were already friends and the couple had known each other from an early age. Mr. Snoeck Henkemans had been a wine merchant originally, but later became alderman in the Hague and a member of Parliament for some time. In the course of time three sons were born of this marriage. Shortly afterwards in the same year, 1916, Van der Leeuw took a pastorate and was confirmed as a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church by Dr. J. H. Gerretsen in the village of 's Heerenberg not far from Arnhem. He was responsible as a pastor for the community in 's Heerenberg itself as well as for the Dutch community in Emmerich on the other side of the border; he taught moreover at the grammar school (gymnasium) in Doetinchem for prospective theological students. Amid the reality of his pastoral work he was aware of the necessity of theology, and so he wrote during those years his Historisch Christendom [Historical Christendom], which appeared as a book in 1919. He also found the time to study after the ancient Egyptian religion, ancient Greek religion. Shortly before the summer of 1918 Van der Leeuw was appointed, at the age of 28 years, as the successor to I. van Dijk, to the chair of the History of Religion and the History of the Doctrine of God, with responsibility for the 'encyclopaedia of theology', in the Faculty of Theology, and for Egyptian language and literature in the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy in Groningen. On 25 September 1918 he presented his inaugural address on Plaats en taak van de godsdienstgeschiedenis in

ι go

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de theologische wetenschap [The Place and Task of the History of Religions in Theological Scholarship]. In this lecture he presented the history of religions as a theological discipline and pleaded the indispensability of the history of religions for theology. His official teaching duties were to change several times, History of the Doctrine of God being omitted and replaced, after World War II, by Phenomenology of Religion. After 1940 he also taught liturgies for interested students within the framework of the courses given on behalf of the Dutch Reformed Church. Between 1918 and 1949, a large number of publications appeared by his hand, of which the following are his major works (apart from the translations and the editions after his death): — Historisch Christendom [Historical Christendom], 1919. — Wegen en Grenzen. Studie over de verhouding van religie en kunst [Roads and Boundaries. A Study concerning the Relation of Religion and Art], 1932; enlarged second edition 1948. — Phänomenologie der Religion [Phenomenology of Religion], 1933; enlarged (French) edition 1948. — Inleiding tot de theologie [Introduction to Theology], 1935; enlarged second edition 1948. — De primitieve mensch en de religie. Anthropologische Studie [Primitive Man and Religion. An Anthropological Study], 1937. — (together with K. Ph. Bernet Kempers) Beknopte geschiedenis van het Kerklied [Short History of Hymnology], 1939; enlarged second edition, 1948. — Liturgie [Liturgies], 1940; reprinted 1946. — Der Mensch und die Religion. Anthropologischer Versuch [Man and Religion. An Attempt at Anthropology], 1941. — Uren met Novalis [Meditation Hours with Novalis], 1943; reprinted 1945. — Sacramentstheologie [Theology of the Sacrament], 1949. In the course of these years Van der Leeuw was for some time President of the Ethische Vereniging (Religious Ethical Society) in the Dutch Reformed Church, founder and president of the Liturgische Kring (Liturgical Circle), one of the leaders of the Vereniging Kerkopbouw (Society for Church Renewal) and later Gemeenteopbouw (Community Renewal). He also was a member of the Commissie voor de Nieuwe Nederlands Hervormde Kerkelijke Gezangenbundel (Committee for the New Dutch Reformed Church Hymn-Book) between 1932 and 1938. He was Rector Magnificus of the University of Groningen in 1934-35 and a member of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences from 1936 on. He was also a member, and later President, of the Groninger Orkest Vereniging (Groningen Orchestra Society) and of the Nederlandse Bach Vereniging (Dutch Bach Society). He played the organ

Gerardus van der Leeuw as a theologian and phenomenologist ι g ι

and had a good voice for singing; he was familiar with the history of art, with Dutch and German (and also French) literature; and he was artistically gifted. A new period started after World War II in 1945. In the summer of 1944 Van der Leeuw had written his Balans van Nederland [Evaluation of the Present Situation in the Netherlands], which appeared as a book in 1945, in which he gave an account of the country's situation. Then, in the first months after the war, Van der Leeuw, who had been an adherent, like his father, of the Christelijke Historische Unie political party (Christian Historical Union), participated, together with numerous Christians, in the re-alignment of a segment of the Christian political parties with the newly founded socialist Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party), of which he became a member. This party was the successor of the Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiders Partij (Socialistic Democratic Workers Party) of before 1940. He became Minister of Education, Arts and Sciences (Onderwijs, Künsten en Wetenschapperi) in the first post-war Dutch Cabinet, with Ir. W. Schermerhorn as Prime Minister, and'held this post from 24 June 1945 until 3 July 1946. As such he was concerned with organizing the Ministry after the war and with an active cultural policy of support given to artists (some were even appointed by him at the Ministry), of establishing the national foundation Radio Nederland in Overgangstijd (Netherlands Broadcasting in the transition period) as opposed to the pre-war private broadcasting associations, of revising the orthography of the Dutch-Flemish language, of improving teachers' salaries, of renewing higher education, of founding the Nederlandse Jeugdgemeenschap (Dutch Youth Community), and so on. This all rested on a broad cultural vision, intended to intensify the cultural life of the country. After this year in government service Van der Leeuw recorded in a book the plans and ideals he had had, which appeared under the tide of Nationale Cultuurtaak [The National Cultural Task] in 1947. He took up again his work in Groningen and embarked on a great number of activities. He was one of the founders and editor in chief of the monthly Wending [Turning], and one of those who drafted the Proeve van Omschrijving van de Hervormde Eredienst [Attempt at Describing the Reformed Worship Service]; he was moreover a member of different committees within the Dutch Reformed Church. In the field of scholarly organizations Van de Leeuw was one of the founders and President of the Dutch Society for the History of Religions, and one of those who took the initiative in organizing the first post-war International Congress for the History of Religions, which was held in Amsterdam in September 1950. He was President of this Congress and was chosen as President of the International Association for the History of Religions, which was founded on this occasion. He became a foreign member of the Koninklijke Vlaamse Akademie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone

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Künsten in Belgie in Brussels, and of the Accademia dei Lincei in Rome. In 1946 he received an honorary doctorate at the Philosophical Faculty of the Masaryk University in Brno (Czechoslovakia). Already before the war he had been offered the chair of history of religions in Amsterdam and in Utrecht, and after the war an attractive offer was made to him by the University of Chicago, but he stayed in Groningen. In 1948, 1949, and 1950 he participated in the Eranos meetings held annually in the summer at Ascona, and he spoke in 1950 at the first post-war German congress for the history of religions in Marburg. In other respects too, Van der Leeuw had various responsibilities. He traveled several times to America. From 9 April until 28 June 1947 he accomplished a mission at the request of the Dutch Ministry of Education, Arts and Sciences with a view to a future cultural treaty between the Netherlands and South Africa. In December 1949 he was again in South Africa for the unveiling of a Voortrekkers monument. He also participated in a congress of European Federalists. In this post-war period, in 1949, there appeared a major work by his hand, which he himself considered as his real achievement, Sacramentstheologie [Theology of the Sacrament]. Van der Leeuw suffered from poisoning of the kidneys and was taken into the Utrecht Academic Hospital in September, 1950, where his friend H. C. Rümke was working. It was here that he passed away on 18 November. After a great liturgical mourning service in the Kloosterkerk - which with its liturgical services had taken the place of the Duinoordkerk destroyed in the war and which had played a role throughout his life - led by J. A. Kwint, the funeral ceremony took place on 22 November 1950 at 'Oud Eik en Duinen' in the Hague. Among the speakers was the Prime Minister, Dr. W. Drees, who sketched the significance of Gerardus van der Leeuw as a national figure inside and outside the Netherlands. The name of Van der Leeuw was given to the 'G. van der Leeuw Stichting' in Amsterdam (for religious art) and the Anthropological Museum 'Gerardus van der Leeuw' in Groningen. Just as there is a need for a detailed biography of G. van der Leeuw as a person in his time, a careful study of his theological ideas, his religious and cultural activities, and his literary, and many-sided artistic work is called for in order to do justice to his oeuvre. The following may be a contribution to such a study. Most scholarly research on Van der Leeuw has until now been done by non-Dutchmen.

Gerardus van der Leeuw as a theologian and phenomenologist

2.

PUBLICATIONS

AND

193

ARCHIVES

The most complete bibliography of his publications is that composed by W. Vos under the tide of 'Dr. G. Van der Leeuw. Bibliographie zijner Geschriften' and published in Pro Regno Pro Sanctuario (1950). This book, edited by W. J. Kooiman and J. M. van Veen, contains a great number of contributions from authors in Holland and abroad. It was offered to Vän der Leeuw on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday on 19 March 1950, shortly before his death. For bibliographical data on and of G. van der Leeuw, see also Heerma van Voss (January 1952, and 1951-1952) and Waardenburg, 1974a, pp. 149-156. T o the latter's list of publications on Van der Leeuw should be added Bickermann (1935); Ten Ham (1973); Noordmans (1956); Van Peursen (April 1952); Sierksma (1975) and Waardenburg (1977a, with publications on Van der Leeuw complementary to the list of 1974a). Comp, also De Willigen (1951); and Sierksma and Van der Leeuw (1949). The total number of publications by Van der Leeuw amounts to about 650. A project, started already during his lifetime to publish a number of his articles together has not been realized. The University Library of Groningen is in possession of archival materials concerned with Van der Leeuw. They contain nearly all his publications which were catalogued by his pupil F. Sierksma, who happened to be librarian in Groningen at the time, and the major part of his papers including a number of letters received by him, and some copies of letters he wrote.

3.

THEOLOGICAL

DEVELOPMENT

G. van der Leeuw's work demonstrates, in the course of more than thirty very productive years, a theological development which makes his theology fall into different phases, and prevents its being seen as all of a piece. In this way the main lines which run through the whole work and constitute its basic structure are thrown into relief: but from his theological thought it is also possible to throw light on the place and function which are assigned to history of religions and phenomenology of religion, art and other cultural studies in Van der Leeuw's work, since these can best be understood out of the author's total view on life.

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A. First period a) T h e first period of Van der Leeuw's thought starts with Historisch Christendom [Historical Christendom], written between 1916 and 1918 and published in 1919. This period may be called that of the 'ethical' theology. Out of this period also dates his Ethisch: Modem of Orthodox? [Ethical: modern or orthodox?], of 1923. In Dutch 'ethical' theology, which goes back to the middle of the 19th century, the Christian faith is experienced and reflected upon in a personalistic-'ethical' way. With this publication Van der Leeuw stands manifestly in the line of 'ethical' theology: theology is described as a form of 'faithful scholarship' whereby God is understood as a Person and the relationship between God and man occupies the central place as a religious-ethical relationship between one person and another. In human experience and thought a metaphysical background, briefly indicated as 'the irrational', becomes palpable and perceptible; it is recognized as such by faith and it is seen as referring to the Eternal, to God. In order to be experienced the Eternal has to reveal himself, that is to say he has to enter into temporality; here he is seen and experienced by faith as the Absolute: the Absolute in history. Van der Leeuw proceeds to his theological thought from the boundary of human thinking, through the faith experience in time of what is Eternal. Throughout his life this problem of the manifestation of the Eternal within temporality was central, and it found its answer in the givenness of the incarnation of God in Christ. b) In this ethical period Van der Leeuw locates the recognition of the incarnation in the faith experience of the absolute, as it is made by the individual faithful and the community. Out of thfr history of his own personal relationship with God, man reaches out toward Jesus Christ, as connecting what is metaphysical-eternal and what is ethical-personal within history. T h e personal experience of Christ is the absolute point of departure from which the problem of miracles, for instance, is treated among others; all miracles have to be seen and accepted as such on the basis of the 'central' miracle of the unification of the divine and the human, of eternity and· nature in the absolute Person, Jesus Christ, in history. Out of the central datum of the history of salvation the other miracles of creation and providence are to be interpreted and understood. Consequendy, creation and providence are determined on the basis of soteriology; the Mediator of salvation is understood by Van der Leeuw explicitly also as the Mediator of creation. In this way Van der Leeuw's christology has cosmic and metaphysical significance. First, the tension in which man lives on the boundary (namely in the realm of history) of the realm of nature and the realm of God's Kingdom

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can only be resolved by faith in a miracle. Secondly this miracle is explained as the harmonious coming together of God and man in the datum of the Incarnation. Thirdly, by means of this doctrine of the harmonious incarnation connected with the doctrine of the mediator of creation, it becomes theologically possible to establish a synthesis of all that is divine, eternal and absolute on one hand with all that is human, temporal and relative on the other hand, and that on the basis of the 'harmonious tension' between creation and new creation in the Incarnation. This too is a fundamental pattern for the whole of Van der Leeuw's further theological work. The basis of faith is not the historical forms but the actual experience of what Van der Leeuw calls the 'supra-historical' (transcending history within history itself, 'übergeschichtlich') Christ. So the old opposition between the 'idea' of the eternal Christ (transcendent God) and the earthly Jesus of Nazareth has been transcended, since for Van der Leeuw both are united in Jesus Christ who is historical as well as supra-historical: the concern of faith is that of the 'mystical' communion with the supra-historical, that is the living Lord. For Van der Leeuw the center and core of faith, consequently, is the revelation of the supra-historical in Jesus Christ. The Holy Spirit is thereby not distinguished from Christ; the Spirit is nothing else than the living Lord himself. c) Ethics, too, rest on eschatology while pointing also to this world: the new Realm, brought by Christ, demands to be fulfilled. However, faith may not anticipate; man cannot but live on the boundary between two worlds and in his religion has to be patient. He is aware of the eschatological dimension of life, that is to say he experiences a limit and a tension in historical reality, whereas, conversely, this 'higher' reality manifests itself within historical reality. We find here again Van der Leeuw's stress on incarnation: T h e center of Van der Leeuw's theology is his harmonious doctrine of the Incarnation and his notion of the personal experience of Christ. T h e central place of the Incarnation is situated between the two poles of Creation on one side and Fulfillment on the other side. T h e connection with the Creation is made by means of the doctrine of the Mediator of Creation, whereas the relation with the Eschaton is established by means of the 'irrational', suprahistorical, etc. in history. On one side everything in reality strives toward the eschatological borderline; on the other side there is a penetration of the Eschaton into earthly reality. Both moments come together, in the experience of faith, in Jesus Christ (Ten Ham, 1973, p. 16).

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From the realm of nature, Van d e r Leeuw arrives at the realm of history, a n d f r o m there at the realm of God. Parallel to this is the triad of Creation, Incarnation a n d Eschaton. T h e connection between the Incarnation a n d the Creation is formulated in the doctrine of the Mediator of creation, that between the Incarnation and the Eschaton is expressed by what Van der Leeuw calls in different ways the irrational, the salvation-historical (heilsgeschichtlich), the supra-historical, the eschatological and the miracle in history, h u m a n life and culture. T h e experience of the eschatological boundary in reality does not, f o r Van d e r Leeuw, remain limited to personal ethics but occurs at all levels of h u m a n culture. In this way he can bring together science (scholarship) and theology, and later also art and religion. An important motif t h r o u g h o u t Van der Leeuw's work is his pastoral concern with m o d e r n m a n in the crisis of Western culture a n d civilization. O u t of m o d e r n man's experience, Van d e r Leeuw seeks to point to faith, by analogy with his pointing f r o m the experience of faith to the Incarnation. In Van der Leeuw's view, religious experience has its own character of incarnation; just as the believer experiences in his own heart the power of Christ as Saviour and concludes f r o m it that such power can only be explained as coming f r o m God a n d not f r o m something created, in the same way m a n concludes, f r o m experiencing in his life something that he cannot explain out of his own being, that something quite different exists f r o m which his new experience, even in some cases his new life, stems; and this is called ' G o d ' . Van d e r Leeuw arrives at God out of the experience of faith a n d out of what is beyond the borderline of h u m a n thought. Basic to the life of faith is the p a r a d o x of faith, that is the weak move on the part of m a n and the strong act on the part of God. This paradox is the expression of the tension of life itself: between the old and the new, between the h u m a n and the divine. A n d this paradox in its turn goes back to the paradox of the Incarnation which can be seen in the whole of history, which means that faith perceives Christ everywhere in history. d) Ethical theology in this sense can play on the one hand an active role in historical-critical research and, on the other, out of the faith of heart, see in the history of Israel and of Christianity a history of salvation. Such a theology leads in this way to what might be called a junction of historical scholarship and dogmatic theology. Van der Leeuw then interposes phenomenology between both in o r d e r to facilitate the transition f r o m the first to the second. But in contrast to all purely scriptural a n d purely rational theology, this theology aims at doing justice to the whole of life and at describing it in all its contradictions of belief and unbelief, the knowledge of God a n d the knowledge

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of daily experience. Because of his broad conception of science and culture and through his immense knowledge, this description received a magnificent formulation on the part of Van der Leeuw. But the whole effort and the description itself are and remain based on his Christian anthropology of the brokenness of life, in the tension between creation and new creation; this tension is seen in the datum of the Incarnation. Whereas, according to Van der Leeuw, the liberal modernists take man as their point of departure, and orthodoxy God, he consciously makes the effort to combine both lines:' We start with man, but we start with God too' (Ethisch: modern of orthodox?, p. 17). Van der Leeuw accentuates the second, and he uses the concept of 'ethical orthodoxy' in order to indicate that being 'ethical' implies being akin to modernism in matters of culture and to orthodoxy in stricdy religious matters. 'As "ethical" people we find ourselves between the kingdom of God and culture, between what God builds and what we are building. And the deepest note in our heart is: " May His Kingdom c o m e . . . " . But we have to stand there where God has put us: " I n the midst of our own realm'" (ibid., p. 23). B. Second period a) The second period in Van der Leeuw's theological thinking starts when he undertakes to transform personal religious experiences in the 'ethical' sense into a verstehen in the methodological scholarly sense. What was in the first period a matter of personal experience obtains in the second period the form of 'intelligible structure'; the experience of faith becomes the experience of verstehen. If in the first period it was the theologian's experience of faith as a member of the Christian community, which connected historical and dogmatic theology, then it is now the 'phenomenological' theology which constitutes for Van der Leeuw the connection between historical-exegetical theology on the one hand and dogmatic-systematical theology on the other. Whereas in the first period given theological problems were solved in a historical systematical manner with an appeal to the personal experience of faith, these problems are now solved phenomenologically in a combination of historical and systematic points of view, brought about with the help of the method of verstehen. While historical scholarship is concerned with knowledge of the facts, and dogmatic theology with the ultimate meaning, phenomenological theology is concerned with the meaning of a (Christian) datum according to the experience of the (Christian) community, that is to say according to its meaning structure for that community. Just as in the first period 'ethical' theology is intended to describe the faith or religious consciousness of the Christian community, or both,

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in Van d e r Leeuw's second period ' phenomenological' theology is intended to describe (the meaning of) religion in general, even beyond the boundary of the Christian community and Church. In other words, Van der Leeuw's phenomenological theology, in the last analysis, is an extension of his 'ethical' theology to the whole of religion. T o put it differendy one may say, following T e n H a m , that out of Van der Leeuw's total (ethical) conception of theology three levels of theology have now split off: the first is historical and concerned with facts, the second is dogmatic-systematical a n d concerned with the ultimate meaning, whereas the main line of ethical theology - being the study of the faith and religious consciousness of the community - extends itself into the third or phenomenological theology concerned with understanding (verstehen) the m e a n i n g of the p h e n o m e n a according to this faith and religious consciousness. Verstehen itself takes place by means of an experience, an experience constituted by an objectively given structure of meaning which transcends individual persons. This verstehen experience on the phenomenological level distinguishes itself however f r o m the experience of revelation on the dogmatic level. Whereas the latter has to d o directly with the g r o u n d of verstehen itself, as revelation of ultimate meaning, the verstehen experience has to d o with the meaning structure existing in itself but directed toward a last, ultimate meaning. T h e religious a n d theological experience of a meaning structure (a structure of meaning with the help of which we verstehen) points to a final, ultimate sense or meaning. This pointing to mediation is called by Van der Leeuw the 'eschatological' character of each experience of meaning; it has a mediating function. Ultimate meaning is that m e a n i n g by which man himself is understood (by God); this meaning is to be explained f r o m the saving fact of the Incarnation. T h e same eschaton is seen as completed or fulfilled on the phenomenological level, and is seen as a point of d e p a r t u r e or presupposition on the theological level; there is an overturning of the psychological category of the borderline experience and its renewal as the theological category of the revelation experience. Just as Van d e r Leeuw's doctrine of incarnation expresses an (eschatological) relation of tension, so scholarship a n d theology find themselves, in his approach, in a similar relation of tension. Theology then, according to Van d e r Leeuw, consists of the triad of historical theology (ascertaining and explaining facts), phenomenological theology (understanding the meaning of facts, pointing to the ultimate sense or meaning in Christo) and dogmatic theology (making this ultimate sense, as contained in the dogma of incarnation, explicit). b) This second period of Van der Leeuw's theological development may be said to begin with an article 'Strukturpsychologie und Theologie' [Structural Psychology

Gerardus van der Leeuw as a theologian and phenomenologist

ι gg

and Theology] of 1928. He anticipates here his later development, particularly his last book Sacramentstheologie [Theology of the Sacrament] of 1949, by stating that it is essential for the sacrament that the split between the subject and the object of religion be removed. At once, however, he adds that this unification of subject and object in the Christian faith is given alone in the Incarnation, which accordingly has to count as the central fact of the Christian faith. Van der Leeuw takes then a critical attitude with respect to what he considers to be the 'spiritualism' of the Calvinistic doctrine of the sacraments, because in his opinion not sufficient justice has been done to the reality of the Incarnation; this, by the way, is also his objection to a 'spiritualistic' theology centered on the Word of God. In Van der Leeuw's description of the sacrament here the same lines can be found as in his later theology of the sacrament; such as: 1) his position taken with regard to the primitive, Roman Catholic, Reformation and romantic experience of the sacraments; 2) his phenomenological division of sacramental life according to certain basic structures of religious experience: the magic structure, the mystical-pantheistic structure, and the eschatological (way o f ) being directed toward ultimate meaning. When applying the same method to problems of church doctrine and dogma in this article, Van der Leeuw states that on the phenomenological level, where the question of truth has to be suspended, the concern is not the truth or untruth of a doctrine, but its genuineness or spuriousness. He equates this with the question as to whether and how such a doctrine finds a place within the total structure of dogmatics or of Christianity. This question concerns a structural relationship, where Van der Leeuw applies as his criterion the genuineness of the experience of meaning in the act of verstehen, out of which intuitive evidence may be inferred. c) What Van der Leeuw writes here about the phenomenological approach suggests that the structural relations which have been oudined and constructed by Van der Leeuw are not just of a formal and objective nature, but that they obtain their content through the experience of faith of the author, who does or does not ascertain an evidence of genuineness. We would like to stress that this accent on subjectivity in Van der Leeuw's phenomenology chiefly goes back to an equally accentuated subjectivity in the 'ethical' theology out of which Van der Leeuw's phenomenology largely arose. In ethical theology it was not so much the 'truth' of Revelation taken in itself, but rather the genuineness of the revelation experience of the theologian which was the last criterion; in Van der Leeuw's phenomenology it is the phenomenologist's personal experience of

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meaning which settles the matter in the verstehende reconstruction. It is fair to say, with Ten Ham, that Van der Leeuw, in his second period, from being an 'ethical' theologian, has become a verstehend phenomenologist. Further on in the work of Van der Leeuw there is an analogy to be found, between not only the contents of his faith (creation - incarnation in faith experience - eschaton) and the structure of his theology (historical theology which ascertains; phenomenological theology which understands or versteht; eschatological or dogmatic theology which explains revelation), but also between the structure of his theology and that of his model of science and scholarship (factual objectivity, understanding by subjective interpretation, and the boundary of science and scholarship which is that of revelation and faith). Thus Van der Leeuw ultimately equates the eschaton of faith and of scholarship with each other. d) Such conditions are elaborated in the Inleiding tot de theologie ([Introduction to Theology], 1935; augmented, 2nd edition 1948), which must be considered as the main theological work of his second period, and as the principal statement of the way in which he conceived of theology as a field of disciplines. It is a formal, not a material, introduction, moving from science and scholarship to theology, from the general to the particular. In the second edition the author notes that, systematically speaking, this is in fact the wrong order, but he explains that he wants to take this point of departure in the given cultural and intellectual situation of his time and of the so-called 'modern' thought which has established itself with ideas of general science and scholarship, and of general culture. With this starting-point the book reveals an apologetic and pastoral intention. Moreover, the problem of the right order is itself of a general character, since there will always remain open two roads for the human mind. (1) In the 'General Part' of his Inleiding tot de theologie, Van der Leeuw treats the division of knowledge and disciplines. His concept of science and scholarship, which started out by being ethical and personalistic, has developed in this book into an existential concept of scholarship, in which science and scholarship find an eschatological boundary in theology. T h e thought of Antiquity and of 'primitive' man are thus highly idealized. The author rejects Abraham Kuyper's separation between the science and scholarship of the 'natural' man, on one side, and that of the 'reborn' man on the other side, arguing that being reborn may very well be largely unconscious and that it is not feasible to ascertain the general presence of 'reborn' life: the datum of 'being reborn' is not a fact from which one can proceed in scholarly research. Although Van der Leeuw strives after a form of 'faith scholarship', he tries to preserve the relative independence of both science and theology. He makes a sharp distinction between the natural sciences,

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on the one hand, and the cultural sciences or humanities on the other. In his opinion, however, a discipline like psychology finds its place on the borderline of both kinds of sciences and is, accordingly, aware of both causal and intelligible relations, using both erfassen and verstehen. As to epistemology, Van der Leeuw distinguishes a hierarchy of paths of knowledge in the triad: (1) erfassende (fact ascertaining and explaining) disciplines; (2) verstehende (fact understanding) disciplines, and (3) the search for an 'ultimate sense or meaning' in metaphysics and theology. In this scheme, phenomenology finds its place as a verstehende Erlebniswissenschaft (scholarship which concentrates on experience with a view to understanding them) between the erfassende Ereignisuiissenschaft(scholarshipwhich seeks to establish and explain facts), on one hand, and metaphysics and theology (direcdy concerned with problems of ultimate meaning) on the other hand. Theology, for Van der Leeuw, functions as the norm ('queen') of all sciences. It is fair to say that Van der Leeuw's existential conception of science and scholarship implies that he interprets the scientific-scholarly effort as 'one phase in man's reaching himself, a process in which, by always transcending himself, he tries to advance to the limit of his possibilities' (Ten Ham, 1973, p. 31). In this way science and scholarship pass into an existential-philosophical anthropology, and this for Van der Leeuw in its turn passes into theology; since man, to the extent that he comes to orient himself, actually arrives at God. Van der Leeuw bases his 'eschatological' view of science and scholarship on this point of departure. What he calls the 'eschatology of science' implies a limit of science, both downward and upward. T h e lower limit lies at the point where there is not yet a ' conscientia' and consequendy no possibility of either attaining consciousness or a human existence. The upper limit lies where the possibility of existence passes into reality of it, and where for Van der Leeuw knowledge and understanding turn into being known and being understood. He maintains: 'All science leads to God and all science starts from God' (Inleiding, 2nd ed., 1948, pp. 92-93). Since theology takes into account the eschata, with the beginning and end of all knowledge, it is the science par excellence, whereas all other science is only 'interim science', every problem of which can ultimately be reduced to a theological question. ' In the reduction to theology every scholarly problem is recognized as originating in God's creation and receiving an answer in God's new creation' (Ibid., p. 95). Finally, without any problem, Van der Leeuw's science and scholarship, and his existential philosophical anthropology merge into theological anthropology and into theology as such, the core of which is constituted by his theology of creation and the new creation. In the fact of man's being a creature the theological ground and justification of science and culture is given.

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Speaking about the character of theology itself, Van der Leeuw starts from the dilemma of theology conceived as knowledge either of God or of religious man. Behind this we find the basic problem of the relation between Revelation and religious experience, as a problem that occurs again and again in Van der Leeuw's work in various forms such as that of the relation between dogmatic theology and historical scholarship, supranaturalism and historicism, the relation between the eternal and the temporal, the divine and the human, and so on. His solution is that theology speaks neither about God as a given object, nor about religion or religious experience: 'It speaks about God's actions' (Inleiding, 2nd ed., 1948, p. no). This statement implies that Van der Leeuw has moved to a more 'objective' theology of revelation than in his first period. His 'ethical' theology has developed into an 'existential' theology, in which the 'ethical' experience of faith has become a n ' existential' experience of revelation .But again it is the subjectivity of the believer that ultimately settles the matter as to the objectivity of revelation. From the vantage point of theology, the eschaton is fundamental to Van der Leeuw's thought on the relation between theology, scholarly disciplines and human existence. He divides theology into three parts (historical, phenomenological and systematic) and brings them together in a triangle. Given the analogy between Van der Leeuw's theology, his hierarchy of scholarly disciplines and his existential anthropology, Ten Ham constructs a 'pyramid of sciences' in order to represent Van der Leeuw's scheme (Ten Ham, 1973, p. 25, comp. p. 34). The three sides of the 'pyramid of science' (that is to say, theology, scholarly disciplines, and human existence) are each constructed out of triads in their turn. These are, for theology: history (known facts), phenomenology (understanding), dogmatics or systematic theology (faith); for the sciences: natural sciences (erfassen), humanities including psychology and phenomenology (verstehen), and philosophy with theology (explaining the 'ultimate meaning'); for human existence: nature (without 'human' existence), possible existence and realized existence. According to Van der Leeuw, the eschata of the three sides (dogmatics with faith; philosophy-theology with ultimate meaning; realized existence) coincide in the apex of the three-sided pyramid. He states as a matter of principle that this apex is in fact the proper fundamental basis. It is for apologetic, pastoral or other reasons that he ascends in practice from the general to the particular, according to a hierarchical structure. This two-way traffic, in principle down from God and in fact up from man, is typical of Van der Leeuw, and the basis of it is correctly described in the statement: 'In this two-way traffic the eschatological tension and transvaluation in his thought again manifest themselves' (Ten Ham, 1973, p. 34).

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In a way Van der Leeuw himself acknowledges that it was just a pedagogical device on his part to begin the Inleiding with science and scholarship in general, and then to proceed by determining the place of theology. In actual fact, theology is the starting-point on the basis of which the attempt to understand the character and nature of (general) science and scholarship must be made. From this point of view Van der Leeuw's scholarly work itself also deserves the verdict that it is a seemingly scholarly work carried out from apologetic and pastoral motives; its theological points contain its real message. Furthermore, this implies that Van der Leeuw's books have to be read in two directions: from the beginning to the end (from the standpoint of methodology and theology), and in the reverse order (for principles and theology). This two-way traffic arises out of the eschatological tension between science and theology in Van der Leeuw's work, a tension which can be reduced again to the basic theological tension between Creation and New Creation in the Incarnation. Van der Leeuw defines theology as a Church discipline, in the sense that the authority in theology is the living Church: not the Bible (Holy Scripture originates only through the Canon fixed by the Church) and not the Church as an institution. By taking the 'living Church' as the norm of theology, he develops further the criterion of his first, ethical-theological period, namely that of the living faith of the Christian community (as opposed to the 'external' authority of the Scripture) into a criterion which is bound to the Church. If it is fair to say that the Incarnation is for Van der Leeuw the center and basis of all theology, we should recognize that he never identifies theology with Incarnation, that is to say Revelation. He tries to keep them separate with the aid of his doctrine of the Holy Spirit, whom he identifies with the resurrected Lord in his Church, the 'living Lord' who is for Van der Leeuw the same as the 'Christ of faith' in whom the subjective and the objective aspects of faith and Revelation coincide. Van der Leeuw holds that only a theology of Incarnation can at the same time be a true theology and find the road from Revelation to the world. There are at least three demands put upon such a theology: (1) it should recognize the Eschaton in the fact of the created nature of things; (2) it should recognize the necessity for the sanctification of created reality; (3) it should elaborate the fact of the Incarnation with all seriousness. Only such a theology of the Incarnation, or theology of Re-Creation as Van der Leeuw also calls it, is at the same time open to all the realities of life and conscious of being 'queen of the sciences' (regina scientiarum) so that 'its law is the constitution of all scholarship, its rule the fundamental rule' (Inleiding, 2nd ed., 1948, p. 128). Creation and Re-Creation are here not only separation and critical judgment, but also formation and

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cultivation through the Word of God, which, as the incarnated Logos, is also the basis of the Re-Creation. T h e domain of theology then lies in the tension between Revelation and human expression. This tension is itself an echo of the same harmonic tension in the chord of the Incarnation. In the last analysis, the basic pattern which we find in Van der Leeuw's thought has a trinitarian basis. The theological foundation for all his thinking is given with his interpretation of the dogma of Trinity and specifically of the fields of action of its three Persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, respectively in the range of Creation, Re-Creation and Fulfillment. The Incarnation is for Van der Leeuw central to the extent that he sees the Fall and the Cross in the first place only as a negative and disturbing element in created reality; there is much less question here of the doctrines of justification and reconciliation. Pneumatology as the doctrine of the Holy Spirit is not developed independently, but remains an aspect of christology (where the Holy Spirit is seen as the Living Lord) and of the doctrine of Creation (recapitulation of Creator by Spiritus). Christology and pneumatology are formulated by Van der Leeuw fundamentally in the categories of Creation and Re-Creation, through the Incarnation which is connected with the Creation by means of the notion of the Word of Creation or of the Mediator of Creation and with the Eschaton by means of the notion of Creator-Spiritus. T h e real moment and core of salvation is situated in the ('harmonious') Incarnation and the Resurrection. As a consequence Van der Leeuw succeeds in preserving the ' natural' reality, including science and culture, as Creation and Re-Creation of God, without recourse to a natural theology. The same theology of Incarnation is at the basis of the theology of the sacrament presented by Van der Leeuw fourteen years later. (2) In the' Specialized Part' of his Inleiding tot de theologie, Van der Leeuw deals with the structure of the disciplines of theology according to its division into three branches of theology, each of which has its own approach. We can deal here with these three branches without going into all the details. (i) Historical theology (erfassend). This branch can be called 'theological' only because of the ultimately theological point of view from which Van der Leeuw considers the historical sciences, and through which they find norms in theology and finally the Church. Historical thought thus becomes essentially Church history, although the Church as such cannot be grasped historically. Van der Leeuw sees it as an important task of this historical theology to ascertain the relationship, which for him is eschatological, between Christendom (as a historical entity, as opposed to the Gospel as a theological entity) and the other religions. As a theologian he seeks to start here with the notion of the ' realization of the

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W o r d of God in history' (that is to say in the religions), and to investigate this by studying concentrically: the ' p e o p l e s ' in the branch of the Ethnica (praeparatio ethnica), the O l d Testament (praeparatio judaica), and Christendom (predicatio Christiana). All three circles are e n d o w e d with the Divine Presence t h r o u g h the Incarnation. In this connection V a n der L e e u w enters u p o n the issue of the so-called natural theology, hotly debated at the time. In a way he takes a middle position between Karl Barth and Emil B r u n n e r . Against Barth he d e f e n d s the right of a 'natural' theology to exist, but in the sense of a theology of creation a n d re-creation; on the other hand he rejects the ' n a t u r a l ' foundation of B r u n n e r ' s theology, on the basis of the dialectical relationship between creation and covenant. In any case V a n der Leeuw rejects the nature-supernature dichotomy (natura-supernatura); there is only creation (creatura). Creation in its turn is understood as a notion derived f r o m the o r d e r of salvation; creation a n d redemption (as re-creation) together constitute salvation. T h e so-called potentia obediential is given in creation, and is possible t h r o u g h the unity of creation and re-creation. T h e so-called point of connection (Anknüfpungspunkt) is not given with universal nature but with God's creative grace. It is interesting to observe how V a n der L e e u w extends certain lines of the older ethical theology here. In the first place a line runs f r o m this ethical theology to existential theology, starting f r o m the personal, that is to say 'existential', anthropological point of departure of the ethical theology. In the second place a line can be traced f r o m this ethical theology to dialectical theology, through its 'paradoxical', that is to say 'dialectical', and christo-centric core. T h i s dialectic is then applied in the idea of the 'two roads' in theology which come together in V a n der Leeuw's christology. T h e chapter in question can be seen as his indirect treatment of the problems s u r r o u n d i n g natural theology; it first appeared as an article in 1941 and was later inserted into the second, revised edition of the Inleiding tot de theologie of 1948. T h e idea of the two roads is the idea of communication in two directions, which figures in V a n der Leeuw's theology as an expression of the eschatological tension between the world of G o d and the world of man, two worlds which are united in the Incarnation. 1 T h e first road is the properly theological one. T h e theo1 Theology and phenomenology, for Van der Leeuw, are two roads which are both mandatory for the theologian: 'For the theologian, who exists between the two realities of Revelation and world, there open two roads which lead him to the goal and which he travels all through his life: the road from Revelation to the world, thus the road going down; and the road from the world to Revelation, going up. These two ways are not one way which is traversed in different directions. There are two of them, and both are equally

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logian who takes this road, starting out from revelation, has nevertheless to remain conscious of the fact that the other road also exists and he must not remain deaf to science and culture. T h e second road is the road of man who, taking the world as his point of departure, is moving away towards a boundary beyond which he becomes aware of God. This road from the world to the boundary of revelation is unavoidable according to Van der Leeuw, and constitutes the essence of being human. For him, man is fundamentally homo religiosus, on the basis of his eschatological awareness; the theological basis of this religious anthropology he considers to be given with man's being created, with his being a creature (creatura). According to Van der Leeuw the general knowledge of God is founded on the Christian one, not vice versa; he indicates possibilities to develop this idea in the doctrine of Christ as Mediator of Creation or as Logos Spermatikos. Van der Leeuw rejects an exclusive choice either for a revelation or for mundane, secular reality. T h e very notion of revelation demands the belief that worldly reality can be the bearer of divine revelation; on the other hand it is not possible to 'believe' in a worldly reality which claims to bring man to God. Van der Leeuw's theology of two roads is in fact based upon a kind of 'sacramental' notion of revelation according to which worldly reality functions as the bearer of divine revelation. This sacramental character of revelation, and together with it the idea of the two roads in theology, go back in Van der Leeuw's thinking to the tension given in the Incarnation, which he interprets as the basic form in history of the eschatological tension between divine and human reality. (ii) Phenomenological theology or the study of religion (verstehend). Under the tide 'study of religion' (godsdienstwetenschap) Van der Leeuw treats here phenomenological theology, which provides the opportunity of avoiding making a choice between 'the generalization of concepts of Greek idealism and the so-called scriptural narrowing of those same concepts' (Inleiding, 2nd ed., 1948, p. 176). If this phenomenological theology is passed over, dogmatics risks becoming a system in a vacuum. If, on the other hand, this phenomenological theology is necessary and lead to the goal, where God and Divine matters can be discussed. T h e two ways neither cross nor run p a r a l l e l . . . T h e first road is the properly theological o n e . . . Only from the event of Revelation can we direct ourselves to the happenings of the w o r l d . . . T h e second road we call that of the science of religion, that is, human knowledge concerning r e l i g i o n . . . ' (Van der Leeuw, 1941, pp. 17fr. and 19482, pp. 163-165, translation by John B. Carman, April 1965, pp. 25-26).

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seen as an end in itself, without leading to systematic theology, then there is a risk that a psychological aestheticism will be the final result. It is significant that the major part of this chapter is largely devoted to structural psychology which, for Van der Leeuw, is the chosen instrument to reach 'understanding'(i>mte/ien), and to the relationship of this structural psychology to preaching. Van der Leeuw indicates here, among other things, the religious 'boundary character' of the soul which he describes as the point of connection within man with all that could link him with an 'other' world, and he appreciates it as a divine possibility in man. In a fragment which was added in the second edition of the book, he goes somewhat deeper into the relationship of psychology, anthropology, and 'natural' theology. This foreshadows the third phase of Van der Leeuw's theological thinking, where there is a strong accent on philosophical and theological anthropology. We should not forget, however, that this 'anthropological' character of Van der Leeuw's theology arose from the older 'ethical theology'. According to Van der Leeuw, psychology can be reduced to anthropology in the philosophical (and theological) sense. Moreover, all theology is anthropological, just as all anthropology is in the last analysis theological. Theological anthropology is the true 'natural theology' and is based on christology, with an appeal to Romans 5: 12-17. In this way Van der Leeuw delineates his position with regard to dialectical theology. Van der Leeuw sees the relationship between phenomenological and dogmatic or systematic theology basically as that of question and answer. According to him, phenomenological theology always encounters certain phenomena and structures which can only be understood eschatologically; examples are life, guilt, faith, the Church, and the Gospel itself as a theological datum. At these points dogmatic theology starts. In phenomenological theology itself we have to do only with formal patterns of meaning; the possible theological contents or 'surplus-value' are here disregarded, in the case of both non-Christian and Christian phenomena. However, as a believing Christian, Van der Leeuw applies this phenomenological reduction, as it might be termed, more explicitly to the Christian than to the non-Christian phenomena. And from the first, Christian ones, he then directs the reader to Christian theology. Consequendy it is correct to say that his concept of structure is in fact given a Christian-theological and a subjective content (Ten Ham, p. 43). Although from a formal methodological point of view the different branches of historical and phenomenological theology have their own autonomy with regard to dogmatic or systematic theology, these branches finally receive their substance from Van der Leeuw's theological viewpoint which is itself determined in the last analysis by his dogmatic or systematic theology.

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(iii) Dogmatic or systematic theology (eschatological). In this third part of his Inleiding tot de theologie Van der Leeuw treats a number of stricdy theological, specialized disciplines of which we can mention only a few here. Biblical theology has as its main task to bring about a connection between the historical interpretation and the theological interpretation of the Bible. In this sense Van der Leeuw apparendy sees it as having the same function as phenomenology, that is, it provides the link between historical scholarship and dogmatic or systematic theology. Although Van der Leeuw says that he makes use of a special method in phenomenology, we may conclude from the fact that he says that Biblical theology is predominandy theological in its nature, that his phenomenology too, in virtue of its function, bears a predominandy theological character. Besides the Theologia biblica, the Theologia symbolica too, as the theology of the different confessional groups and churches, has the function of forging the link between historical and dogmatic or systematic theology. Like the former, the latter consists of the three phases of exegetical-historical research, comparison of structures, and the evaluation of the different confessions on the basis of the central dogma of the Incarnation. For Van der Leeuw the understanding of the essence of other confessions is possible only ' . . . in as far as Christian existence recognizes itself in them' (Inleiding, 2nd ed., 1948, p. 230). Perspicaciously, T e n Ham observes that, if we replace 'confessions' here by 'religions', the same holds true for Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion. 'His "understanding" of the essence of the non-Christian religions does not go beyond what his own "Christian existence" permits'. He adds: One might contend that Van der Leeuw's study of religion (godsdienstwetenschap) as 'phenomenological theology' is by definition valid only within Christianity and should have limited itself to it. From the viewpoint of his 'Christian existence' he can never see in other religions anything but (foreshadowings o f ) ' Christian' structures, just as he could see the theological surplus-value only in the case of 'Christian' phenomena (Ten Ham, 1973, p. 46). T h e proper Theobgia dogmatica is defined by Van der Leeuw as the 'scholarly discovery of the movement (dynamis) of the dogma of the C h u r c h ' (Inleiding, 2nd ed., 1948, p. 233). As distinct from his first period, Van der Leeuw stresses here the normative, ecclesiastical character of dogma and dogmatic theology. In dogmatic or systematic theology the paradoxal nature of theology, that is to say the 'basic form of the Incarnation', comes most clearly to light, namely as the encounter of 'human learning' (science) and 'divine meaning' (Revelation). 'Incarnation' is the theological name for the communication between both.

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From the point of view of systematic theology, Van der Leeuw, from being a ' paradoxal'-christocentric ethical theologian in his first period, developed into an existential-'dialectical' incarnation theologian in his second period. T h e whole of systematic theology is thus practically reduced to the christological dogma of the Incarnation. The other specialized disciplines, too, reveal just as other aspects of systematic or dogmatic theology do, the 'basic form of the Incarnation': Theologia ethica (where dogmatic theology and ethics relate to each other as Incarnation and Resurrection), the Theologia politica, the Theologia liturgica (doctrine of the Church's worship, whereby liturgy is considered as an office or function). It is actually in liturgical theology, as a hymn of praise, that the proper nature of theology comes best to light; in Van der Leeuw's eyes theology is finally liturgy, and the real apex of the theological pyramid is for him liturgical theology. We must leave aside the other specialized disciplines, except for saying that in homiletics, catechetics and Theologia poimenica (pastoralia) again and again the basic form of the Incarnation can be found, and that apologetics does not constitute an independent specialization. Van der Leeuw states explicitly that an apologetic element will pervade all theology (Inleiding, 2nd ed., 1948, p. 260). This applies, consequently, not only to his phenomenology of religion (phenomenological theology) but also to the whole of his theology and to his scholarly method, which has an evident catechetical or apologetic character. There is reason to assume that Van der Leeuw's pyramid of knowledge (fact-understanding-faith), with its theological background, not only holds true for scholarship in general and theology in particular, as he sees them (with the well-known 'triangle'), but also indicates the structure of each specialized theological discipline (so T e n Ham, 1973. P· 5°)· C. Third period The third period in Van der Leeuw's theological work concentrates upon the theology of liturgy and the sacraments. Parallel with it runs an increasing concern with questions of theological and philosophical anthropology based on the central datum of the Incarnation. He had already been interested for some time in the problem of a primitive mentality, following the footsteps of Levy-Bruhl and others. He deals with it from a phenomenological angle and elaborates his views in De primitieve mensch en de religie (1937), with a theological excursus at the end. a) His philosophical and theological views on man are developed more system-

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atically in Der Mensch und die Religion. Anthropologischer Versuch (1941). He extends here certain lines visible already in his ethical and phenomenological periods. The relation between God and man is here central; one term cannot be thought of without the other, and in this tension the history of mankind (history of salvation) and of the individual person takes place. Already in his Inleiding tot de theologie Van der Leeuw based his concept of science and scholarship on an existential anthropology, which relates dialectically to a theology of creation and re-creation in which the 'natural' is defined as 'creature-like'. T h e basic pattern was here one of creation-incarnation-eschaton. In Der Mensch und die Religion this basic pattern is maintained, but the tension between God and man has become the point of departure, and is then treated according to the basic form of the Incarnation. This relation between God and man is here determined 'sacramentally' by Van der Leeuw. T h e basic form appears already in the division of the book itself, which consists of two parts: 'Mensch und Gott' and 'Gott und Mensch'. The first part deals with man (world, homo ludens, death), man in the process of becoming (body, soul, creature), speaking about man ('anthropology'), man and God (image of God, sacrament). T h e second part deals with the relation of God to body, soul and creature, and then with 'the myth of man'. (1) In the first part of Der Mensch und die Religion Van der Leeuw states that 'anthropology', as it speaks about man, starts when man turns away from the world and from God, and addresses himself to his own being. He holds that God and world cannot be thought of as existing in themselves but only in an existential relationship with man. On the one hand man's relation to God is investigated (theologically) on the basis of 'faith'; on the other hand his relation to the world is investigated (phenomenologically) on the basis of 'understanding' (verstehen). Both theology and phenomenology point toward (theological-philosophical) anthropology. Van der Leeuw's anthropology, consequently, is not a descriptive study of human phenomena, but because of its theological point of departure it becomes an open-ended doctrine about man. That is to say, it refers to an ideal image of man and it functions normatively with regard to the interpretation of concrete human expressions. So it is stated, for instance, that in man's process of becoming the hope of rebirth is connected with the irrevocability of death. Religion is viewed as an existential frontier experience of encountering Power; that Power by which religion distinguishes itself is of an existential nature and is essentially the power of Life and death. Van der Leeuw concludes from the fact that human existence is continuously a possibility which has to be realized, that the fact of being man eo ipso can be envisaged not only as a datum in itself but also in the light of something over above this, and that 'something' has a

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religious character. For him there can be no human existence without religion, and the true anthropology is that of reborn man; both birth and rebirth are thus considered to be God's work. Not only human existence but also culture has this profoundly religious root; however, we cannot go into that here. From the frontier experience of human existence and the religious root of culture, Van der Leeuw then passes on to theology. T h e very ease with which he does so can be seen as one of the consequences of the older ethical theology. But, as Ten Ham points out, this comprehensive way of thinking theologically, as was done in ethical theology, reached a crisis with Van der Leeuw when he perceived a theology of 'objective' revelation. T o the extent that his own theological thinking grew more objective (in his case as a theology of incarnation and not as a dialectical theology), first phenomenology and then later anthropology could split themselves off from theology (as Van der Leeuw understood it then), but without emancipating themselves completely. In his view phenomenology largely remained a Christian anthropology, and anthropology remained essentially Christian theology. He could maintain this, justifying himself theologically on the basis of his christology. This implies, for the interpretation of his work, that the existential anthropology, psychology and phenomenology function in actual practice as a ' substructure' for his theology, into which he wants to absorb the order of creation (creatura). He can do so by putting much stress on creation and re-creation (the former interpreted on the basis of the latter) in the 'superstructure'. Although phenomenology and anthropology have been split off from Van der Leeuw's later and more 'objective' theology of revelation, they still continue to function within the whole framework of theology as a systematically reflected discipline with various branches. Unlike the relation between nature and supernature, that between substructure and superstructure in Van der Leeuw's thought is a relation of reversal. In the same way as in 'The two roads of theology' (1941) there is in Der Mensch und die Religion (of the same year) a reversal of the road leading from man to God as sketched above (from anthropology to theology) to the road leading from God to man (from theology to anthropology). T h e point at which the reversal takes place is that of Revelation, and Van der Leeuw works this out in his doctrine of creation and re-creation. Anthropology, considered as speaking about man, is then essentially christology. Speaking by man about man follows upon a prior speaking by God, and this speech or word of God is Christ. Consequently, man becomes man because this is predetermined by the fact that God has already become man. Faith in a new reality within reality is for Van der Leeuw faith in the sacramental reality of the new creation (or re-creation) as given in Christ. The proper nature of creation and re-creation can be under-

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stood both formatively and critically; this runs parallel to the relation of tension between creation and re-creation in the Incarnation. The whole argument comes to a head in Van der Leeuw's doctrine of the image of God. T h e image of God is for Van der Leeuw the theological expression of the humanuni, i.e. what it is to be human. An 'image' is the concrete form, the manifest essence of a given reality. Van der Leeuw then states that revelation and manifestation take place by means of an image. The image as such is a 'symbol' of which the immediate reality coincides with another reality. So in the last analysis the religious image has a sacramental reality, and this sacramental reality has as its basis Christ's becoming man, Christ's incarnation. It is fair to say, with Ten Ham, that for Van der Leeuw an 'image' is a (phenomenological) meaning-structure out of which an (ideal) type, and consequently an 'ideal image', is formed. Wanting to do justice to the reality of the image of God, Van der Leeuw considers it to be a possible object of faith; it has been bestowed upon man as God's creature, and it again becomes a reality in the re-creation. In man after the Fall, the image of God is merely the image of the Crucified One, the figure of the servant, and this is now the image of God present in man. The image of God as an object of faith is conceived by Van der Leeuw to be a'sacramental' possibility, because the image has a sacramental reality. With regard to culture the consequence is that man has to carry out the task of exerting control not only as the bearer of God's image but also in the form and the figure of the servant. A consequence of this obedience of faith is a Christian's positive duty to participate in culture. Van der Leeuw's thought on the creation of man after the image of God has also been expressed in a separate publication, Het beeld Gods [The image of God] of 1939. He states here that in the image of God, we are dealing with an analogia fidei: a given possibility in God is realized through the image of God in Christ. God has a hidden, sacramental image, a greatness in humiliation. In the new creation (re-creation) man is re-created towards this image, in the sacramental reality of faith. On the other hand, with the datum of the image of God man has also the possibility of anthropomorphism: man can imagine God in a human form because God has taken himself this form. In these considerations about God's image in man a natural theology is 'baptized' so that it becomes a theology of creation. T h e figure of the Cross has a sacramental meaning, that is, the Cross involves the extension of the Incarnation, which is itself the basic form of the relation between God and man. Van der Leeuw views the sacramental reality of the new creation as the work of the Holy Spirit, but the stress here is completely on Christ's resurrection. In theological terms, he considers that the 'game' of human existence is itself a sacrament. Human life is not only on the way to becoming a sacrament: it proceeds from the sacrament.

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And, after all, it was once itself a sacrament, that is, in the layer of primitive foundations. (2) In the second part of Der Mensch und die Religion, Van der Leeuw describes the relation of God to man's existence (his being body, soul, creature) as this relation manifests itself in man's experience. T h e relationship between God and man is expressed, for instance, in a corporeal relationship, in a spiritual relationship, and in the relationship of created to Creator as a service by God which is not man's own, but only God's possibility as Creator. Man is again spoken of by means of an image, that is, a myth, where the stress can be put on man's body, soul, or his being creature. For Van der Leeuw the story of Jesus Christ is the last and all-encompassing myth of man; in Christ man finds at one and the same time himself and God. Christ is the beginning and end of all speech about man, because in him the condition for any anthropology, namely rebirth, becomes reality. So in Van der Leeuw's anthropology there are two movements: one from the creation (birth) and one from the re-creation (rebirth). Both roads join in the Incarnation, the field of tension between creation and Eschaton. T h e relationship between Divine and human reality is designated by Van der Leeuw ever more explicidy as sacramental, and it is expressed in image and symbol. In the last ten years of his life, the sacrament became for Van der Leeuw increasingly the formulated principle of the whole of reality and of his whole theology. This may in fact be considered to have been the consequence of the very reduction of all contrasts of the Divine and the human in theology and science, and also between theology and science, to one relation of tension, which is to be found in the basic form of the Incarnation. This relation of tension then continues in the sacrament. b) T h e second direction in which Van der Leeuw's theological thinking moves in this third phase, parallel with his increasing practical work in the Church, is that of liturgy. Van der Leeuw's attention to liturgy goes back to his spiritual father J. H. Gerretsen, who wanted to make clear, precisely in the 'ethical' group, the fundamental significance of the living faith of the Christian community, through the instrument of liturgical practice. Van der Leeuw continued this line both in liturgical reflection and in practice, and he incorporated it in his attempt to effect a spiritual revival in the Dutch Reformed Church. T h e handbook Liturgiek [Liturgies] of 1940, 19462, which he wrote for the Liturgical Circle, is its expression. Essentially it is a theological book, and in the part about the theology of the sacraments it contained not only the basis of Van der Leeuw's liturgical theology but also the core of his book which appeared under that tide in 1949.

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For Van der Leeuw it is the task of liturgical theology always to compare the liturgy, as the ex officio fixed form of communication between God and the Church, with the original basic form of that communication, the Incarnation. The Incarnation contains both the formative principle and the shattering of this principle in the crucified figure of Jesus Christ. Seen in the light of revelation, liturgy is the core of the Christian's life, since human life is thereby taken up into God's activity. In his liturgical theology Van der Leeuw opposes on the one hand the denigration of form (as it can be found in certain branches of Protestantism), and on the other hand a liturgical conservatism (which is for him the end of worship). He aspired to a reform of the existing liturgy both by Rome and by the Reformation, holding as he did a view in which preaching and liturgy are two kinds of proclamation which are complementary to each other and which are both sacramental. This demands a revision of the current theology of the sacraments to the point where all liturgy in all its parts will be sacramental 'in Jesus Christ'. Thus its center is the Lord's Supper, after which come the other sacramental acts, from which baptism and the other sacraments evolve directly. Preaching, on the other hand, is for Van der Leeuw also essentially sacramental, that is, he views it as the proclamation ex officio of the forgiveness of sins, by means of the proclamation of God's grace. In public worship liturgical communication takes place between God on the one hand and a human community on the other hand, which, however, since it is the body of Christ, is at the same time God's. That is to say, the Church is a sacramental phenomenon, in the same way as, for instance, Van der Leeuw's whole view of 'religion' may be called 'sacramental'. A prerequisite for this sacramental character of Church and worship is the Office (ambt; comp. German Amt)·, all the faithful are, according to Van der Leeuw, office bearers by virtue of baptism, and later confirmation. Proper worship is eternal heavenly worship; on the basis of the Incarnation, however, there is also earthly worship, where the heavenly liturgy receives a form in time and place, by word and music. One might have expected a greater alignment of Van der Leeuw, in this respect, with Eastern Orthodoxy, but apparently his contacts with it could only be extremely limited before 1950. c) T h e third line of this period of Van der Leeuw is the theological thinking on the sacraments. In his Liturgiek of 1940, and earlier in his phenomenological work, Van der Leeuw contends that for primitive man each elementary human activity has a sacramental meaning. He regrets the fact that in modern times a certain idealistic spirituality has taken aversion to the idea that a 'thing' could possibly

Gerardus van der Leeuw as a theologian and phenomenologist 215

be a carrier of Divine self-communication, and has thus turned away from the basic form of the Christian faith, which is the Incarnation. Van der Leeuw, then, 'rediscovers' the sacrament; in the Christian notion of sacrament he turns the category of 'nature' into those of 'creation' and 'recreation'. Sacramental reality not only has its origin in the first creation, but has passed through the second creation (re-creation). As in theology and anthropology, Van der Leeuw also sees in the sacrament a joining of two movements of life. One of them is the human movement which wells up as a power of nature, out of which the 'natural sacrament' grows; the other is the divine movement which descends upon man and the world as God's power of creation. Both movements meet in the Church. The Christian sacrament then consists of two elements; first, the (natural) material or creatura, second, the (divine) form which is God's deed and God's word, which makes the action into a real sacrament. According to J. J. ten Ham, there would be in this Aristotelian doctrine of the sacraments a parallel to Van der Leeuw's harmonic doctrine of Incarnation. In this third period of Van der Leeuw's theological development, where an 'objective' sacramental theology is developed out of the objective concept of revelation and the subjective experience of faith, the latter or subjective experience still continues, in the last analysis, to play a large role. Throughout Van der Leeuw's whole theological development his thinking continues to revolve around the same problem, the joining of subject and object in religion: man and God, faith and revelation. This may happen through a personal experience of Christ, or through that of being understood in a religious sense, or through the religious reality of the sacrament. In all three cases, which correspond with Van der Leeuw's three theological 'periods', this junction is held to be possible only on the basis of and through the Incarnation. Van der Leeuw's major work in this field is the Sacramentstheologie [Theology of the Sacrament] of 1949, which he himself must have considered as his theological legacy. The book is subdivided into historical-exegetical, phenomenological, theological and liturgical sections; so it is the first larger practical application of the 'ascending' method advocated in the Inleiding tot de theologie. On a smaller scale such an application had been made already in Het beeld Gods (1939). The theological basis of the book is the scheme of creation-incarnationeschaton. As mentioned before, the basic lines of this theology of the sacraments had already been given or at least foreshadowed in the article'Strukturpsychologie und Theologie' (1928), in the Phänomenologie der Religion (1933) and in the Liturgiek (1940). Now Van der Leeuw rounds it off and elaborates on it, so that the development from ethical theology to incarnation theology, and from incarnation theology to sacramental theology, becomes clear. Van der Leeuw

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himself suggests as important factors in the development of the latter in the years shortly before: existential philosophy with its vision of man, the new appreciation of matter and palpable reality, and a better insight into what constitutes a symbol. And as far as the Church is concerned, there may be added the liturgical movement, a new awareness of the Church and new ways of professing one's religion. T h e book consists of four parts with which we can only deal here succincdy. T h e first, historical-exegetical part treats the biblical data on the sacraments, and also the role they have played in church history. In the ancient Church the ritus was primary and represented a source of doctrine; under sacramentum was understood each palpable sign with which a word of salvation (heilswoord, Heilswort) was connected. The absolute necessity for a theology of the sacraments only arose when the sacrament had lost its self-evident primary character and had to be justified. In his exegetical work, Van der Leeuw explains his position with regard to the relationship between Scripture, Tradition and preaching: the point of departure is Scripture, but it stands in a close relationship with Tradition as well as with the preaching of the whole Church. It is only in the ritual of the Eastern Church that the way of thinking as it was found in Antiquity with regard to the objective validity of the sacrament as real' symbol', has been well preserved. As always, Van der Leeuw seeks to do justice to creation and ascertains for instance 'that God in the sacrament honors the whole creation' (Sacramentstheologie, p. 82). He also seeks to continue the 'material' way of thinking of Antiquity, saying that the point of the sacrament is the operation of the Holy Spirit on the elements; the Holy Spirit is understood here as the material pneuma of Antiquity. According to Ten Ham, Van der Leeuw's physical interpretation of the sacrament may have to do with his interpretation of the incarnation as a unio physica (Ten Ham, 1973, p. 78). T h e second, phenomenological part of the book describes the sacrament as a phenomenon, that is to say, it describes it as it appears and shows itself in the world. Symbols as such are given with the human mind; they have been bestowed on man, who does not invent or devise them himself. Through the reality of symbols the religious experience can be built into the texture of the individual's life, and this is the function of rites. And just as phenomenology has its place between the reality of history and that of faith, so the 'sacramental symbol' finds itself between human reality on the one hand and divine reality on the other. Van der Leeuw defines the sacrament as a phenomenon as follows: A sacrament, viewed as a human phenomenon caused by a human intention, is an elementary act which man performs, while conscious of the fact that he

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effects through it something in a quite different sphere (Sacramentstheologie, p. 136). Van der Leeuw goes on to distinguish five different structures of the experience of the sacrament: magical, mystical-pantheistic, psychological, mystical-extatic, and that of the Christian faith. He distinguishes in the form of the sacrament three structural elements: materia, forma and actus. His starting point is the Church's doctrine of the sacraments, which he extends in practice to the sacrament in general. T h e relationship between grace and creatura in the sacrament, according to which the creatura is a resemblance or 'parable' of God's world, fluctuates between two poles throughout the history of religions: the resemblance is considered to have its basis either in an action of God who creates and re-creates the creatura (this is the Christian faith), or in an identity of both (this is pansacramentalism). With Ten Ham we may conclude that, in the last analysis, theology in Van der Leeuw's eyes is essentially sacramental, that the history of religions and phenomenology of religion are for him essentially a history and phenomenology of what have been sacramental realities for man. And the doctrine of Incarnation underlies them all. Similarly, his anthropology and aesthetics may be called essentially a sacramental anthropology and aesthetics. In his phenomenological treatment of the sacraments one by one, Van der Leeuw starts in each case with the experience of a certain surplus value in man's 'ordinary' activity (birth, eating, death, etc.). This surplus value results in the sacrament, which may acquire either a 'pan-sacramental' structure or that of the historically given Christian sacrament. When dealing with the sacrament of the Word, Van der Leeuw suggests that a phenomenology of the word would in fact be equivalent to a phenomenology of religion. This throws a particular light on his own phenomenological studies, which may be interpreted as the attempt to re-echo in words mankind's religious experience of sacramental reality. Significantly, notwithstanding his previous evaluation of the image, he states here explicitly: 'The essence of the phenomenon is the word' (Sacramentstheologie, p. 182). The very fact of the sacrament consequently has a great relevance for philosophical and theological anthropology; man turns out to be able to reach the essence of things, of himself, of the world and of higher powers only via something else. T h e sacrament, then, is deeply rooted in the essential nature of man, so far as man is in search of 'the essence'. The third, properly theological part of the Sacramentstheologie fixes first of all the content of the concept of the Christian sacrament. We have seen that for Van der Leeuw the Incarnation, understood as a concrete psycho-physical event, is the basic form of the Christian life of faith. There is a direct link between on

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the one hand Incarnation and Creation, and on the other the sacrament, and this renders the creatura as created reality capable of becoming sacramental (sakramentfähig). The actual encounter with Christ consequently takes place as a mystery within the sacrament, understood as an eschatological miracle. Van der Leeuw goes on to give the following theological definition of the sacrament: Sacraments are elementary activities of life, re-created by God in order that they should become bearers of the true presence of Christ's redemptive work, from his conception to his resurrection, and of its application to the life of the Church (Sacramentstheologie, p. 249). Van der Leeuw can view creation as God's game, so that there is for him an essential 'play element' too in the sacramental ritus. T h e different sacraments are manifest forms of the one basic sacrament, namely the incarnate, crucified and resurrected Christ. It may be noted in this connection that Van der Leeuw interprets the unity of Christ's person as both a unio physica and a unio sacramentalis. Ten Ham observes that this formula provides him with the possibility of extending the incarnation sacramentally over the whole of created reality (Ten Ham, 1973, p. 84). In other words, the sacrament contains the solution for the very problem which runs through the whole of Van der Leeuw's work, namely the relationship between subject and object of faith and religion. Theologically the sacrament is distinguished, then, by an eschatological tension between Creation and Re-Creation (Incarnation). Van der Leeuw interprets the realis praesentia as a representatio in which the representation and the represented, the sign and the signified, coincide. As mentioned earlier, he replaces the ancient concepts of 'nature and grace' by 'creation and re-creation' or 'creation and grace'. The very possibility that something may become a sacrament has its foundation, in his view, in the power of the Incarnation; the creatura is in this way created anew to the possibility of serving God, but it is also affected by the judgment implied in the figure on the Cross. Van der Leeuw is convinced that the image of God in creation and in the new creation exists as an analogia fidei. It is perhaps not superfluous to say that basic to his view of the sacraments is his view of the office (ambt), of which baptism is the foundation, that is to say the general priesthood of the faithful, which unfolds itself in the special offices. Man appears at first sight to be the sole agent of sacramental activity, but it is actually God who is here the real actor (agens). Needless to say, the sacramental activity is at the same time a juridical act for Van der Leeuw. T h e fourth, liturgical part of the book offers a number of concrete practical applications of this sacramental theology in liturgical practice. Summarizing Van der Leeuw's sacramental theology in a few lines, we may

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say that he holds that Church and community participate in the treasures of the Kingdom of God in a sacramental way. He sees sacramental theology as being both tkeologia cruris and theologia gloriae, and he does not want to force a contrast or opposition between the two. According to Ten Ham (p. 88), the essential point of Van der Leeuw's theology may be situated in the relationship between the (fallen) creation and the new creation or re-creation in the Incarnation. Van der Leeuw links creation with new creation in a 'harmonious', 'physical' (Aristotelian, cosmical) or 'sacramental' idea of the unity of the two natures in the person of Christ in the Incarnation. He does not oppose Word to Sacrament, since both can be traced sacramentally back to the Incarnation (Ten Ham, p. 89).

4.

THEOLOGICAL

AESTHETICS:

RELIGION

AND

ART

Just as in science and culture, and in man's existence as a human being, Van der Leeuw looks for roads leading from man to God in the field of art too. 'Again and again he comes up against boundaries in this search, but he also opens an eschatological perspective which, when valued anew by faith, turns out to be the presupposition of all this human endeavor' (Ten Ham, p. 90). And just as he sees real science as finally religious, so real art is for him religious art. The sacramental tension between the subject and object of religion can be found, according to him, in the relationship between art and religion too. It has its origin in the fact of the 'two roads': the road from man to God and the road from God to man, which culminates in the tension of the incarnation with its extension in the sacrament. T h e theological basis of Van der Leeuw's sacramental aesthetics is again the field of tension between creation-incarnation-«sc/iaton. In his main book on the subject, Wegen en grenzen [Roads and Boundaries, 1934, 19482, 19553], the art forms of dance, drama, word, image, architecture and music are treated first phenomenologically, then theologically. T h e properly sacramental moment in these different art forms is to be found in the eschatological connection between reality and activity, both human and Divine. In his theological aesthetics, Van der Leeuw searches for what essentially unifies art and religion, beauty and sacredness. Beauty is for him sacred, but sacredness is more than beauty. He describes four structures which can be found in the relation between art and religion: (1) the identity of the two in primitive cultures; (2) consecrated religious art with an external connection between art and religion (considered as a transitional structure); (3) the contrast between the two as an antithetical structure (as an aspect of the fragmented character of modern culture); and (4) religious art as a 'service' by which a new unity can come about.

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The creative love which is at the origin of the fourth structure goes back to the creative love of God. Van der Leeuw also offers here a theological 'hierarchy' of the arts, in which the image occupies the central place, since theologically the incarnation is the central fact. In this connection he briefly resumes his theology of God's image in man, and the problems given with creation and re-creation which he seeks to solve essentially in a 'sacramental' way. According to him, in theological aesthetics too, the creation can only be treated out of the Redemption to the Kingdom of God, and that sacramentally. The art in which the form of creation itself is recognizable participates in this' sacramental' character (Wegen en grenzen, 3rd (posthumous) ed., 1955, p. 364). Theologically, the unity between art and religion exists only in an eschatological sense; they represent parallel lines which only meet at infinity, that is to say they find each other in God. Whereas Van der Leeuw assumes the eschatological essence of science and religion to be identical, he does not think this the case with regard to the eschatological essence of art and religion; there is a difference between 'the Other' in art and 'the Absolute Other' in religion. But each work of art designates something beyond its boundaries and is in that sense religious. For Van der Leeuw, true religious art is to be found there where the lines and outlines of God's creation can be recognized in the artist's creation;'... the figures of art and religion are to be hailed as a revelation of God's greatness, when God gave himself to this human world, took human form and lived as a man among men. The Incarnation means our redemption, in this sense too that the world and our work in it are not necessarily meaningless but can be bearers of Divine revelation' (Wegen en grenzen3 1955, p. 375). The unity of art and religion lies there '.. .where alone we know unity, in the doctrine of the Incarnation' (ibid., p. 371). There is a clear parallelism in Van der Leeuw's ideas of the relation between art and religion or theology, and of the relation between sciences and religion or theology. We have mentioned already that he practically identifies the eschata of science and religion with each other, but that he is more prudent in seeking to identify the eschata of art and religion with each other. This unity can only be seen with the eyes of faith. Throughout Van der Leeuw's work, the 'roads' from creation to eschaton, and from eschaton to creation, always meet - and visibly so via science and art, anthropology and theology - in the eschatological tension between the creation and the new creation, that is to say in the Incarnation.

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5.

HISTORY

OF

221

RELIGIONS

In the scholarly world and internationally, Van der Leeuw is mostly known for his studies in history of religions and phenomenology of religion. In the field of history of religions, ancient Egyptian religion was V a n der Leeuw's specialization. His scholarly publications based on the study of source materials in this area extend through his whole life; a bibliography of them has been composed by M. S. H. G. Heerma van Voss (1951—1952; janvier 1952). We may mention especially his dissertation Godsvoorstellingen in de oud-Aegyptische pyramideteksten [Representations of God in the Ancient Egyptian Pyramid Texts, 1916], Achnaton, Een religieuze en aesthetische revolutie in der veertiende eeuw voor Christus [Akhnaton. A Religious and Aesthetic Revolution in the Fourteenth Century before Christ, 1927], De godsdienst van het oude Egypte [The Religion of Ancient Egypt, 1944], Egyptische eschatologie [Egyptian Eschatology, 1949], and a number of articles and papers delivered at the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences. Another area in which Van der Leeuw liked to work was that of ancient Greek religion, for which he also had a particular affinity. His Goden en menschen in Hellas [Gods and Men in Ancient Greece, 1927] is well known, and so are papers he read in the Academy on Greek religion, ancient Roman religion, and the ancient Christian Church. So in history of religions Van der Leeuw was active in the first place in the area of the religions of Antiquity and the classical religions. He worked in the second place on the religions of non-literate peoples, though without fieldwork and from secondary sources. He tried to give a place in his phenomenological work to some current theories in this area such as those of L. Levy-Bruhl, after reinterpreting them in certain ways; however, he completely rejected the hypothesis of an original monotheism (Urmonotheismus) as developed by W. Schmidt. But his interests in this area were largely of a philosophical and theological (anthropological) nature. He searched for the religious substrata in psychic and cultural life, for the structures of participation, mythical thinking and magical behavior which he supposed could be found in all religion, and which would indicate a religious 'possibility' inherendy given to man. It is presumably for this reason that he assigned such great significance to the concept of mana and to the notion of Power as such in his studies on religion. Mana indicates the experienced reality of power, and the concept of Power as a constituent element of religious experience, with a (later) sacramental background, is the fundamental category of Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion. T h e fact that this is not an empirical category but rather a normative, though experienced,

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value, has led to some confusion about the real nature and intention of his Phänomenologie der Religion. After World War II, Van der Leeuw became interested in the studies of C. G. Jung, who was also concerned with this religious undercurrent in the psyche of mankind. A few publications may be mentioned on the subject of non-literate peoples' religions: La structure de la mentalite primitive (1928), L'homme primitif et la religion (1940; a Dutch edition had appeared in 1937), and a number of articles. Van der Leeuw also took the initiative in the preparation of the twovolume work De godsdiensten der mensen [The Religions of Mankind, 1940-41, 19482] to which a number of specialists contributed, some of them from outside the country. It was to be the Dutch standard work of history of religions; he wrote for it the articles on non-literate ('primitive') religion and Greek religion.

6.

PHENOMENOLOGY

OF

RELIGION

A. General Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion was an open-ended enterprise and found its written expression in a number of articles and in his three books Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Religion of 1925 (a Dutch edition, Inleiding tot de godsdienstgeschiedenis had appeared in 1924), Phänomenologie der Religion (1933, with later English and French translations, and posthumously with a new German edition and Italian and Polish translations), and Inleiding tot de Phaenomenologie van den godsdienst [Introduction to Phenomenology of Religion, 1948], which is a revision and extension of the first book of 1924 on the subject. In the preceding pages, we have already mentioned the historical development of Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion out of his ethical theology, as well as its connections with his later theological and philosophical anthropology, and his liturgical and sacramental theology. We have also paid attention to the theological nature of his phenomenology of religion as a 'phenomenological theology', and to its function as a transition between historical and dogmatic or systematic theology, within the framework of the whole of theological disciplines as he developed it. We will limit ourselves here to some remarks about his phenomenology of religion taken in itself. The three-fold division God-Man-Relation between God and man is fundamental to it. The relation between God and man, which was a central issue in the whole of Van der Leeuw's thinking, is inevitably the basis of his phenomenological work. His main work of 1933 is an expansion of the Dutch Inleiding of 1924, not only in the sense that more materials had been

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included, but also in the sense that a typology of the historical religions and their founders was added to it and certain chapters were subdivided: the treatment of father and mother religion in the first part, the expansion of the second part with subjects like representation and community, the subdivision of the third part into sections on outward and inner action and the typology of forms of subjective religious experience, which was put under the latter section. Moreover, the fourth part was called in 1924 'Directions of religious thought', but became in 1933 ' T h e world'. T h e large 1933 edition also has the 'Epilogomena', which were first intended to be printed as prolegomena at the beginning of the book, and which are especially important with regard to what Van der Leeuw understands by 'phenomenon' and 'phenomenology'. There are further small extensions and refinements in the French translation, which required a reworking by Jacques Marty (authorized by Van der Leeuw); it appeared in 1948 as La religion dans son essence et ses manifestations: Phänomenologie de la religion (1948; posthumously reprinted). Whereas in the large Phänomenologie der Religion (1933) a treatment of the objects of religious experience according to ideal types generally prevails, in Van der Leeuw's later phenomenological work, especially in the Inleiding tot de phaenomenologie van den godsdienst (1948), and in the phenomenological part of the Sacramentstheologie (1948), we find him attempting to structure the material also on the basis of man's fundamental attitudes: 'mythical', 'magical' and so on. Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion starts out from theology, a fact which is evident not only from his theological work as indicated above (implying a 'phenomenological theology') but also from his phenomenological work considered in itself. First, it follows from his placing that work within the encyclopaedia of theology, as he did right at the start of his scholarly career, in his inaugural address Plaats en taak van de godsdienstgeschiedenis in the theologische wetenschap [Place and Task of the History of Religion in Theological Scholarship] of 1918. And another point which becomes evident here is that his phenomenology of religion grew out of the older discipline of the 'History of the doctrine of God', that is to say the older 'natural theology'. Second, the fact becomes clear from the 'ascending' movement of meaning structures within the ideal types, and also of the ideal types among themselves, up to Christ as the primary source of meaning. Similarly, there is the 'ascending' movement from the basic human attitudes to that of the Christian faith structure. Third, it appears clearly from the exclusion of all theologically important phenomena (like incarnation, guilt, Christ) from phenomenological research, precisely because they have a normative function for the whole of phenomenology. Fourth, it becomes clear from the methodology which states that all understanding leads to, or is transposed into, a theological 'com-

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prehendedness', 'being-understood'. T h e phenomenological experience then becomes directed by a theological norm, the faith experience of Christ as Lord. Religious experience, including the phenomenologically-descriptive experience, is interpreted then 'sacramentally' by Van der Leeuw as the experience of the eschatological 'religious Power', which can obtain will and form and with which man can communicate. Here understanding passes into witnessing. T h e 'sacramental' experience of reality on the one hand, and the tension between the subject and object of religious experience on the other, which are at the basis of Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion, find their theological foundation and justification in his interpretation of the doctrine of the incarnation. Phenomenological experience and understanding were themselves considered by V a n der Leeuw as a pre-eminently human attitude, a human characteristic which has been given neither to God nor to the animals. Consequendy, Van der Leeuw saw phenomenology as not only a scholarly method, an established discipline and a primordial philosophy, but in the first place as a way of existing, being and knowing that is given with human life as such. Thus, his phenomenology should not be seen as an empirical, inductive and verifiable science, which it never claimed to be. It is rather, on the one hand, a method determined by theology and philosophy for describing human experience in general and religious experience in particular, and on the other an indirect expression of the personality and in particular the religious existence of the phenomenologist Van der Leeuw himself.

B. Methodology Verstehen. In order to arrive at a better understanding of Van der Leeuw's phenomenological work, it will be necessary to go somewhat deeper into his methodology as he developed it. Van der Leeuw aimed at a study of religion primarily concerned with 'understanding', and this understanding of religion was for him part of a general attitude of understanding towards reality. T h e technical term for this understanding in Van der Leeuw's phenomenology is verstehen. How did Van der Leeuw reflect upon this verstehen?2 In an article of 1926, 'Ueber einige neuere Ergebnisse der psychologischen Forschung und ihre Anwendung auf die Geschichte, insonderheit die ReligionsSince Van der Leeuw in his phenomenological work uses a particular way and technique of 'understanding', the technical term for which is the German verstehen as used by Van der Leeuw himself, we prefer to keep to the German wording. T h e first critical study about V a n der Leeuw's verstehen was made by F. Sierksma (1952). 2

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geschichte' [On some recent achievements of psychological research and their application to history, in particular the history of religion], Van der Leeuw starts by relativizing the principle of explanation in scholarly research. Since any explanation tends to give absolute validity to one single system of interpretation, it implies a violation of reality by forcing it in a methodical strait-jacket of one single principle and method. Rather than explanation, understanding should be the aim of the study of religion. In the same way as this has happened in psychology, in historical research too a movement in this direction should take place, since both disciplines are concerned with the study of persons, in which study the 'subjectivity' of the researcher is not only an unavoidable but also an indispensable datum. In order to become understood, the object should be allowed to affect the researcher as a whole, and this should be done deliberately. Van der Leeuw accounts then for some achievements reached in this way in psychology, in the work of Karl Jaspers (1913), Eduard Spranger (1914,1924,1926, 1927), and Ludwig Binswanger (1922,1927). 3 T h e student has to achieve empathy (Einfühlung), making an effort to let his object be 'object' as little as possible and to let it pass into the subject. That is to say, he has to transpose (verstehen) himself into his object and re-experience it. As a result, he reaches a reality which is not the spatial-temporal one, but which is rather a psychological one - the stream of consciousness which is to be understood from within. Van der Leeuw equates this with the 'stream of life' and compares the phenomenological analyst with a trained swimmer who is familiar with such a stream. He takes the psychological phenomena as they present themselves. He does not comprehend their factual existence, but contemplates their essence; and he analyzes them in an intuitive and not a rational manner. He is not so much concerned with the empirically comprehensible events, as with those events that are 'directly' intelligible in their 'general' being; such events are 'psychological'. On the part of the phenomenologist, there should be, first, spontaneously warm, self-denying devotion to the object, and then 'intuitive abstraction' or epoche. In this way, the 'essence' of the object can be grasped. 4 Interestingly enough, there is no fundamental difference between the observation of one's own ego and that of someone else: the 'contents' of consciousness being the same, it is only the 'act' 3

There are also many references to Paul Hofmann (1925a and 1935b). By phenomenological analysis ' . . . the object is not grasped and dissected into its elements, but viewed in its essence, so that we may discern what is part of its essence and what is n o t . . . When in this way the object has revealed itself in its uniqueness, it must further be established how the elements, which together make it up, are interrelated'... ' T h e criterion in all cases is the evidence (Evidenz) through which it is not so much we who discover the object, but the object that manifests itself to us' (Van der Leeuw, 1928a, p. 322). 4

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of observation which makes the difference. There is no basic difference in the objective experience of something by one person or by another. Next, the search is for 'structural relations' (verständliche Zusammenhänge), that is, the meaningful whole of the contiguous empirical situation and of the phenomenologically clarified essences. Such structural relations are established on the basis of 'evidence' as a criterion. This presupposes an intuitive insight into what is essential, typical, meaningful, and such an insight is near to artistic talent. As a matter of fact, the process of verstehen implies two different kinds of understanding which are brought together: a 'static-phenomenological' and a 'genetic-structural' understanding. T h e first visualizes the objects as they are as separate elements, and arrives at their phenomenologically clarified essences. T h e second sees them as they follow upon each other, thus visualizing the structural connections (verständliche Beziehungen) between these elements. By the ' geneticstructural' understanding, the individual images, as yielded by the 'staticphenomenological' abstractions, are seen as a living unity and experienced as such. When the process of verstehen is complete, the static essences become structural relations, and these are seen as 'ideal types'. Such ideal types are a 'reflection' of phenomena in the mind; they are images which combine certain processes and relations into a unified whole, which is at once 'experienced' and 'understood'. Meaning and reality. It is important to realize, that for Van der Leeuw this way of understanding cannot claim to represent reality; it only represents a 'unified living meaningfulness' (eine einheitliche lebendige Sinnbezogenheit). It is this meaningfulness which is experienced and understood; and, characteristically enough, it has as such a normative nature. T h e stress on the normative character of the 'ideal types' is typical of Van der Leeuw's idea of understanding; 'ideal types' are structural relations combined into an experience that stands as normative against reality and that makes this reality' understandable '.5 Besides the common human 'empirical' experience, Van der Leeuw claims for the phenomenologist a second, 'constructing' experience; 6 just like the artist, the phenomenologist has 5 If, according to V a n der Leeuw, verstehen is normative, it is this in an ideal-typical sense: an ideal, meaningful, understandable' stream' (Verlauf) is placed underneath the unknown primal experience (Urerlebnis). This 'primal experience' as subject of investigation cannot be reached by a simple re-experiencing, but only by verstehen (Van der Leeuw, 1928a, p. 322). 6 ' B y "experience" (Erlebnis) is implied an actually subsisting life which, with respect to its meaning, constitutes a unity' (Religion in Essence and Manifestation, p. 671). Van der Leeuw's concern is with what becomes palpable of this' life' in such experience. O n the basis

Gerardus

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a double register of experiencing reality. T h e latter's specific task is to make life understandable by means of a ' constructing' experience of a normative character. By means of such an experience the 'structure' of a person or of an event becomes evident. 7 A n d in the reverse way, a structure as a 'unity of meaning' is not intellectually constructed, but it is an 'experienced construction'. 8 T o be capable of such experiencing demands a psychological self-education on the part of the phenomenologist. In the article 'Strukturpsychologie und Theologie' [Structural Psychology and Theology] which appeared two years later and which was meant for theological readers (Van der Leeuw, 1928a),Van der Leeuw elaborates further on his psychological method, which he calls nevertheless 'phenomenological' in the wider sense that this word has in the work of Paul H o f m a n n and Karl Jaspers. He admits that it would be also possible to speak of psychology instead of phenomenology of religion. 9 T h e method i s . . .'an attempt to re-experience a certain unity as such, to transpose oneself into an object as an organic whole'. 1 0 In this method, the focus of attention has shifted from historical and metaphysical interests, which aim at discovering 'reality' or 'truth', to verstehen. T o put it strongly, perhaps too strongly, the goal of knowledge is replaced by the goal of of a religious experience, the world, for example, can become a 'manifestation'. Consequently, Van der Leeuw's phenomenology is directed towards a particular kind of experience; this experience has a spiritual quality and is an 'experience of understanding' whereby it gives access to the domain of primal experience. This specific experience always designates a structure, i.e. things are understood in a particular meaningful connection (Sinnzusammenhang), and it is directed" towards something (gegenständlich gerichtet). The distinction between the primal experience (Urerlebnis) which is itself inaccessible and the constructing experience which makes the primal experience and the reality at least 'understandable' by imposing a design on it, experiencing a structure in it, is basic to Van der Leeuw's phenomenological work. It results in an expansion of the 'self of the phenomenologist. 7

It manifests itself as an ideal-typical entity which is not a 'fact' but a 'meaning', i.e. a norm imposed on reality, which makes this reality, which is in itself unknowable and unintelligible, understandable. 9 The 'experienced construction' or 'constructing experience' is autonomous and constitutes itself on account of 'signs' indicating a meaningful whole. 9 'Instead of speaking of "study of religion" (Religionswissenschaft) and ot phenomenological theology, one could also continue to speak of psychology of religion, if only it could be certain that this psychology of religion has nothing to do, and can have nothing to do, with what is presented to us as psychology of religion from America and elsewhere. In other words, our concern is with psychology of structure (Strukturpsychologie) in Dilthey's sense' (Van der Leeuw, 1928a, pp. 324-325). 10 Ibid., p. 322.

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understanding, that is, a k n o w i n g . .directed by the norm of the meaning that asserts itself'. 11 Van der Leeuw alludes here to a metaphysic which is implicit in verstehen in general, as he conceives of it, but specifically in his idea of verstehen of religious experience. In all understanding an activity of what is understood is somehow palpable, a kind of revelation of meaning. In the religious experience what is understood reveals itself as the ultimate basis of understanding itself. Consequently, the last term of verstehen is not 'understanding' but 'being understood'; verstehen itself is, in the last analysis, of a religious nature. Phenomenological theology. In this article of 1928, Van der Leeuw launches his project of a 'phenomenological theology', which he frankly equates with Religionswissenschaft. Such a theology would be concerned neither with the factual events nor with the ultimate content of religious data, but with their ' meaning in the experience of the community of believers' 12 or with something as 'a matter-to-be-understood' (Verständlichkeit). Van der Leeuw would like to see such a phenomenological theology as an intermediary stage between historical and systematic theology. It would have a broader approach than that of literary, historical or psychological research; it would be a systematic but not a theoretical or dogmatic discipline; finally it would move neither in the sphere of empirical nor in that of ultimate realities, but only in the sphere of the meaning of the religious phenomena that are to be understood. The discipline deals with the uniqueness, the singular being and the genuineness of a religious phenomenon, and it gives it a place within a total structure. It brackets the phenomenon, however, with regard to the ultimate values; renouncing the empirical-historical or the metaphysical-theological problem of truth, it limits itself to the problem of meaning or significance. It functions, however, between historical and metaphysical questions, leading from the former to the latter. In this way phenomenology is theologically relevant because it makes theological doctrines 'understood' as meaningful, as true. It is evident that Van der Leeuw here employs the phenomenological enterprise in the service of theology. Structure and meaning. In his Inleiding tot de theologie [Introduction to Theology] published in 1935, Van der Leeuw goes somewhat deeper into the matter of verstehen, in connection with the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, Eduard Spranger and Martin Heidegger. 13 Real understanding, he says, is only possible in the 11 12

Ibid., p. 323.

' . . .ihrem Sinn im Erleben der gläubigen Gemeinde', Ibid., p. 324. 13 Van der Leeuw (1935), 2nd ed., 1948, pp. 59-79. We use here especially what is written on pp. 66-68. Beyond the four contemporaries mentioned around note 3, Wilhelm Dilthey stands in the background of Van der Leeuw's attempt to base the study of religion

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framework of 'all-embracing ideal structures' (übergreifende Geistesstrukturen). Each individual structure is understood within such ideal connections of the ' objective mind' (objektiver Geist) in Dilthey's sense; such connections surpass what is individual. O n the other hand, real understanding is only possible on the common basis of a 'circle of communication' (Sphäre von Gemeinsamkeit) in Dilthey's sense. This is the 'circle of understandability' (verstaavhaarheidskring) outside of which no understanding is possible. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, understanding applies to the entire person; not only a free consciousness, but the whole existence of the subject is involved and active in the act of understanding. In the last resort, 'a man's understanding is identical with his being within the world', and a structure is a 'meaning which has been made explicit of such being within the world' (Van der Leeuw (1935), p. 68). W h e n meaning is the gate of access to the reality of primal experience through a constructed experience, and consequently the entrance gate to the world, structure is the 'imprint' (geprägte Form) on reality, which makes this reality understandable to us. For Van der Leeuw such a structure constitutes the essence of the phenomena. 1 4 It is an organic whole in which each part performs a function which is meaningful to the whole, whereby the composition and performance of each part are conditioned by the whole, and thus intelligible only on the basis of the whole. A structure can be discerned by the particular meaning which is understood by it and through reality. Characteristically enough, Van der Leeuw considers that this meaning is to be found between object and subject, that it is like a network which the human mind casts over reality in order to understand it. T h e methodological consequence of this view is that there are as many scholarly approaches as there are meanings attached to a certain segment of reality. Van der Leeuw distinguishes, then, three 'spheres' in the whole of the cognitive methods: (1) that of 'comprehending' (erfassend) research; (2) that of 'understanding' (verstehend) research; (3) that of research related to an 'ultimate meaning' which, however, can never be grasped definitely by man. All scholarly disciplines have their share in each of these three spheres, although in different ways and in different degrees. on verstehen. It would require a study in itself to see the place of V a n der Leeuw within the whole movement of verstehen in thought and scholarship, in the decades before World War II. Van der Leeuw mentions Heidegger's Sein und Zeit incidentally, and still less Husserl from primary sources. 14 In terms of meaning, a structure is an 'interconnection of meaning' (Van der Leeuw, 1933, English translation, p. 673). In terms of reality and meaning, a structure i s ' . . . reality significantly organized' (Ibid., p. 672).

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The 'Epilegomena' of iggj: Verstehen. In the well-known ' E p i l e g o m e n a ' of Religion in Essence and Manifestation,15 the G e r m a n edition of which a p p e a r e d in 1933, the author gives a reflective account of his way of verstehen in general, a n d of verstehen of religion in particular. W e may confine ourselves to m a k i n g s o m e points which have particular significance in the light of what has g o n e b e f o r e . First, we resume some points relating to verstehen generally, which furnish, so to say, a blueprint of V a n d e r L e e u w ' s o w n mind in process of verstehen: 1) T h e subject of investigation is the p h e n o m e n o n , simply defined as ' w h a t a p p e a r s ' . T h e fact of something's a p p e a r a n c e constitutes its being a ' p h e n o m e n o n ' ; the entire essence of the p h e n o m e n o n is given in 'its a p p e a r a n c e to s o m e o n e ' . V a n d e r L e e u w does not analyze what kind of mind perceives the p h e n o m e n o n , nor u n d e r which conditions this happens. 2) P h e n o m e n o l o g y arises as soon as the ' s o m e o n e ' starts talking about what ' a p p e a r s ' and discusses it. A f t e r e x p e r i e n c i n g it, o n e may c o m e to an understanding of it and bear witness to it: both t o g e t h e r constitute ' p h e n o m e n o l o g y ' in the full sense of the w o r d . ' P h e n o m e n o l o g y is the systematic discussion of what appears.' ( V a n d e r L e e u w , 1933, English translation, p. 683.) 3) A presupposition of p h e n o m e n o l o g y is that the immediate, the primal experience, is never given again o n c e it has passed. Since an immediate access to one's o w n life or to life itself is impossible, o n e must content oneself with a ' r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ' of the primal e x p e r i e n c e . 4) ' S t r u c t u r e ' is reality meaningfully organized. T h e m e a n i n g belongs in part to reality itself and in part to the person w h o tries to understand it. ' M e a n i n g ' is t h e r e f o r e an inner connection between u n d e r s t a n d i n g (by the subject) and intelligibility or understandability (of the object). 5) Real u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' d a w n s u p o n us'. It gives access to the reality of primal e x p e r i e n c e , the entrance to which is ' m e a n i n g ' . A n individual e x p e r i e n c e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g may be called an 'experiential unity'. 6) Verstehen extends over several 'experiential unities' simultaneously. Various individual experiences of u n d e r s t a n d i n g like these b e c o m e coordinated subsequently within the experience of some wider connection or ideal structure. 7) Individual experiences are linked together in such wider connections by m e a n s of 'ideal types', the instruments of verstehen. For V a n d e r L e e u w , the ' w i d e r connections' are in fact types. T h e p h e n o m e n o n , once it has a p p e a r e d , continues to subsist as an image; this image is d e e p e n e d itself and grows 15

T h i s is the English translation of V a n d e r L e e u w (1933). V a n d e r L e e u w w r o t e also

a smaller p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion: Inleiding

tot de godsdienstgeschiedenis [Introduction to

the history of religion] (1924); second, completely revised edition: Inleiding

tot de phaeno-

menologie van den godsdienst [Introduction to p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion] (1948).

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8)

1) 2) 3) 4)

5)

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through further similar phenomena, that is, phenomena of the same type. Between these similar phenomena there are 'structural connections' and they constitute an 'ideal type'. Reflecting on his experience of such 'ideal types', Van der Leeuw observes that they have no reality in place and time, but have another sort of reality. That is to say, they possess their own life, their own meaning and their own law. And, what is most important, they 'appear' in their turn as ideal types, and the individual phenomena 'appear' in connection with these ideal types. Stages of phenomenological treatment. We would like to summarize in the same way the so-called 'stages' of phenomenological treatment as described by Van der Leeuw. They do not in fact follow chronologically one upon the other: Classification in the assignment of names to the phenomena that have become manifest and appeared; Sympathetic experience of a phenomenon which has appeared as its interpolation in one's own life; 1 6 Putting the empirical and the ultimate reality and truth of the phenomenon in suspension as epoche or restraint of judgment; 1 7 Discernment of ideal types comprehending phenomena through structural relations, as a clarification of what has been observed; further arrangement of ideal-typical interrelations within some wider whole of meaning; Hermeneutics of the 'logos' or 'ratio' of what is manifested in an often intangible experience, or expressed in an appearance or utterance. By means of verstehen, chaotic and obstinate reality can be seen as a manifestation or revelation; an empirical, ontological or metaphysical fact can be seen as

16 It is interesting to note that Van der Leeuw does not speak here of 'empathy'. His point of departure is: '"Reality" is always my reality, history my history' (p. 674). So the 'interpolation of the phenomenon in one's own life' is only a conscious intensification of what is 'natural'. Next, he takes his distance from it in the epoche. There is an evident tension between 'participation' and 'distance', which Van der Leeuw used not only as a methodological tool, but which he considered to be an anthropological structure, putting it as 'primitive' over and against 'modern' mentality. 17

Van der Leeuw apparendy uses the term epoche in different senses, which are only remotely related to the meaning it has in Husserl's work. Generally speaking, epoche is for Van der Leeuw the 'attitude of understanding'. It indicates the relationship of verstehen between subject and object. It implies a distance between both which is of a particular kind: guaranteeing the autonomy of what is understood, allowing the object to be seen both in its internal structure and within broader connections, preventing the subject from falling into the traps of empiricism and metaphysics. There are several other connotations of the epoche in Van der Leeuw's work.

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something which is given or a 'datum'; an object can be seen as living speech, and rigidity can be seen as a form of expression; 6) Empirical research in order to control and correct what has been understood phenomenologically; 7) Testimony of what has been manifested and then understood. 18 Van der Leeuw explicitly states here that the goal of verstehend pure objectivity, that is to say: to have access to the facts themselves. In the phenomenological experience of such facts, he searches for purely objective meaning in order that all violence to the facts - be it empirical, logical or metaphysical - may be excluded. 19 Verstehen of religion. Given this idea of verstehen, how does Van der Leeuw conceive of a verstehen of religion? Throughout his work, he looks at religion in two different ways: as experience and as revelation. T h e relation between these two determines also the relation between phenomenology and theology: 20 1) Religion can be observed as an intelligible experience, which is a human phenomenon and can be studied as such. So we can come to an understanding of religion from a human point of view. 21 2) Religion can be considered to be incomprehensible revelation, a revelation which is not a phenomenon and cannot be studied; the essence of religion in this sense can only be grasped from God's point of view, and it cannot be 18 Perhaps the 'testimony' was the natural effect of the experience of verstehen. J. Hermelink contends in his Verstehen und Bezeugen (München: Chr. Kaiser, i960) that this was the ultimate aim of verstehen for Van der Leeuw, and that it contains the whole theological view behind Van der Leeuw's phenomenology. Van der Leeuw submits himself that speech has to put in words all that has manifested itself. Speech had for him a metaphysical and theological quality. 19 In his 'Confession scientifique' of 1946 (published in Numen, 1, 1 (January 1954), pp. 8-15), Van der Leeuw summarizes the phenomenological method as classification, selection and penetration by means of introspection; he mentions that it has found application in history, theology, art, etc. T h e proper object and aims of phenomenology - being the essence of religious phenomena - are then defined by him significantly as the 'unity of life and what is lived' ('.. .cet £tre qui n'est ni l'experience comme telle ni le fait-en-soi, mais l'unite indissoluble des deux, de la vie et du vecu', p. 12). 20 See note 1, p. 205. 21 In Van der Leeuw's view, religion is one of the consequences of the fact that man does not accept life as it is given to him: he seeks 'power' in life, something that is superior. In this search, man's life extends itself, and ' . . . religion is the extension of life to its uttermost limit' (Van der Leeuw, 1933, English translation, p. 679). Another consequence of man's refusal to accept the given life is his endeavor to find 'meaning' in life and to arrange this into a significant whole. So he makes culture and ' . . .seeks ever further for constantly deeper and wider meaning' (Ibid., p. 679).

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known. Though revelation itself is not a phenomenon, man's assertion about what has been revealed to him, however, is a phenomenon and can be studied. According to Van der Leeuw, religion as experience, that is, as 'ultimate experience', can be understood only because the act of verstehen itself, if pursued to the end, is ultimately religious. Consequently, both in the experience of being understood and in the experience of understanding - which in their contents are one, according to Van der Leeuw - there is some 'other' reality, and this other reality is the same for both. In the case of the religious experience, this is the foundation of revelation; in the case of the experience of verstehen this is the foundation of understanding. 'For all understanding that "gets to the bottom" of something ceases to be understanding before it reaches that bottom, and recognizes itself as a "becoming understood". In other terms, all understanding, irrespective of whatever object it refers to, is ultimately religious: all significance sooner or later leads to ultimate significance' (Van der Leeuw (1933), English translation, p. 684). It is indeed characteristic for Van der Leeuw that, given the fact that the norm of understanding is evidence (Evidenz), this evidence, when it concerns religious data, is seen by him as a 'readiness for revelation' (Ibid., p. 685; this is quoted from E. Przywara). One cannot but conclude that, according to this scholar, the student of religion should receive some kind of divine revelation, just as there had been some revelation to the authors of the phenomena studied. Categories of analysis. T h e categories of analysis of his phenomenology of religion are summarized by Van der Leeuw in his Sacramentstheologie of 1949 in a twofold distinction: 1) Religious phenomena receive their name through the ideal types to which they belong and which constitute their form of meaning; 2) Religious phenomena receive their contents of meaning through certain fundamental religious mental structures which are of a philosophical-anthropological nature. Van der Leeuw distinguishes, in fact, 'magic', 'mystical pantheistic', 'psychological interiorized', 'mystical-ecstatic', and 'faith' structures. This amplification and precision of the formal categories of the 'ideal types' with the material categories of the 'mental structures' 22 must be taken into account in any definite judgment of his phenomenological work. It allows for religious phenomena to be treated not only according to the ideal type to which they belong, but also according to the different religious oudooks in which they occur. 22

There are elements of such 'mental structures' in Van der Leeuw (1933) and there is a first elaboration in Van der Leeuw (1937).

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Discussion of Van der Leeuw's notion of' verstehen'. T h e r e is something sacred about the notion of verstehen as Van der Leeuw uses it, which is the very center of his phenomenological work. It posits an access to the realm of primal experience, though by reconstruction, and it has, ultimately, a religious character. T o strive after verstehen is a religious goal. With this verstehen he created a discipline and he developed a specific methodology for it. A certain weakness in Van der Leeuw's thought on verstehen is that he does not distinguish between the experience which has to be understood and the experience which is inherent in the act of understanding. In the same way he does not distinguish between the significance of a phenomenon for the believers concerned and the meaning which it acquires for the understanding scholar. Another weakness is that Van der Leeuw's phenomenology presupposes an objective mind, that is, an objectively structured whole of objective meanings to which the scholar ascends through his self-induced experiences of structures and ideal types. It would seem that the objectivity of the meanings in Van der Leeuw's phenomenology was not doubted by him, because of the religious character of verstehen. O n the one hand, it is the quest for an ultimate, a final meaning; on the other hand, there is some divine revelation in it when it extends 'to the g r o u n d ' (in Van der Leeuw's words), as there is some divine revelation in religious experience. T h e act of verstehen has a religious foundation, and the actual switch from 'understanding' to 'being understood', which is so characteristic of Van der Leeuw, may be seen as a dialectic between the subject and object of verstehen, a dialectic which takes place in a religious dimension. Would it be too much to say that Van der Leeuw developed a 'natural theology' within the act of verstehen itself? It is probably also this religious character of verstehen - its becoming nearly a cult of the experienced phenomena, a Religion of the Phenomena - which causes the most critical question of the reality of subject and object of understanding never to be put by Van der Leeuw except in religious terms. In this phenomenology all attention is given to the Phenomenon, which is separated from its context, introduced into the mental universe of the phenomenologist, and made a building-stone in the construction of the ideal types. If positivism tends to reduce reality to isolated facts, and to separate subject and object rigorously, then Van der Leeuw's phenomenology tends to reduce reality to phenomena of the mind clustered into ideal types, and to stop questioning subject and object in favor of religious meanings taken nearly as absolutes in themselves. It is significant, indeed, that in his phenomenology of religion Van der Leeuw is mainly concerned with the understanding of isolated phenomena, impressions of consciousness or units of meaning, which are methodically experienced in a

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particular way. T h e r e is an obvious pre-selection of the phenomena which are recognized to be meaningful, and there is an obvious isolation of their religious meaning from their social, functional, material or other significance. This kind of understanding does not take place through an interrogation of the phenomena; they are simply visualized in structures and stored in ideal types. 'Understanding' for Van der Leeuw is, in the last analysis, the pursuit of the psychological experience of meaning and the comprehension of the contents of experience in a realm of ideal typical structures. In fact Van der Leeuw's phenomenology of religion confronts the reader with the problem of meaning. For him, 'meaning' is a third term between objective facticity and subjective evaluation; and this notion of 'meaning' has determined his treatment of the significance of religious phenomena. By making his interpretations not only in theology but also in phenomenology in view of an ultimate meaning, he arrives at a frank absolutization of the whole notion of meaning. 23 T h e significance of the phenomena is cut off from the people f o r whom it is or was valid, and there is a neglect of the role of human intersubjectivity in any understanding. T h e experience of understanding has thus become a lonely religious experience, the results of which can be attested but hardly discussed. C. Phenomenology in a broader context Theological framework. In his inaugural Plaats en taak van de godsdienstgeschiedenis in de theologische wetenschap [Place and Task of the History of Religion in Theological Scholarship] of 1918, the basis of Van der Leeuw's later work is outlined. It can be considered as presenting his fundamental position on the relationship of history and phenomenology of religion to theology, from which he would never deviate. T h e object of investigation for the history of religion is the one phenomenon of religion. Religion is a reality apart which has to do with God; notwithstanding its diversity it has a unity which has to do with both God and man. In the history of religion, rather than religions, this unity is more or less accepted as self-evident; but in the phenomenology of religion the whole effort is directed towards making this unity explicit. Although the various religions are historically different, they are psychologically a unity; in all religion there is a common ground, and all religion refers to one and the same activity of the human mind. A phenomenological study is directed towards understanding the phenomenon of religion as such. It includes in principle all that presents itself as religious, compares it and searches f o r affinity 'in the psychological, not in the 23 This kind of phenomenological 'metaphysics' of meaning is less pronounced in his publications after 1945.

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historical sense.. .Its procedure is psychological' (Van der Leeuw (1918), p. 7). Since the subject of investigation is the psychological foundation of what is religious, the method has to be psychological in order to do justice to its subject matter. In order to achieve this, the religious phenomena must be understood 'out of themselves', and for this the investigator needs intuition, besides knowledge of the language and history. Consequently, the unity of religion is supposed to be situated in a ' psychological foundation'; and when Van der Leeuw says that he works 'psychologically' he means: to discover affinities in a 'psychological' sense, and to penetrate into the 'psychological' foundation of religion. Where history establishes facts, phenomenology aims at understanding their significance or meaning; both studies complement each other. Phenomenology is thus the art of seeing connections, of understanding. This understanding proceeds by way of extension. Starting with what has most affinity, it goes on to what is further away and foreign. This also holds true for the understanding of religion; the starting point is what is known to be religious, one's own religion, and the attempt is made to arrive, via what is related to this, at what is further away and foreign, and so to reach a wider and wider understanding of religion. With respect to this starting point, Van der Leeuw lays down as a norm for the scholar as a person: 'It must be demanded from the scholar in the field of religion that he be religious himself (Van der Leeuw (1918), p. 14). Van der Leeuw denies the possibility of being without presuppositions and having an absolute objectivity in the field of religious studies; a point of view is unavoidable and students in this field should be lucid about it. They should have clarified their presuppositions and know where they stand and from what angle they look at religion. Van der Leeuw then pleads to put the study of religion within the whole of the theological disciplines. He proclaims the Christian faith to be normative for his study of religion. 'The Christian faith', h o w e v e r - a n d this is important to note - 'is not a particular doctrine, dogma or personal faith; it is to be established by theology through the description of the 'believers' consciousness', that is, the faith of the Christian community in the past and at present, on the basis of a participation in this faith'. ' Theology' is for Van der Leeuw a descriptive discipline, and in principle the theologian does with Christianity what the phenomenologist does with religion as a whole. He pleads then for a study of religion which is relevant to practice and has an immediate connection with life. Since evaluations are necessary, the historian cannot work without philosophical or theological reflection; there should be a combination of historical and systematic work. For its selection and classification of phenomena, phenomenology must receive from

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theology the norm of'the faith of the Christian community' (Van der Leeuw (1918), p. 18). The results will be: 1) that the proper character both of Christianity and of other religions, will be made clearer; 2) that a systematic separation will no longer be made between Christian and non-Christian phenomena; 3) that knowledge, both of what is general for mankind and of what is specific to Christianity, will be pursued, so that the unique place of Christianity will be made clear 24 and Christianity can become conscious of itself as a concrete historical religion; 4) that special attention will be paid to everything in religion which has to do with human life. In commenting on this inaugural address one might say that the old problem of the relation between faith and knowledge is put here in terms of the relation between personal Christian faith and the desire to understand religion. Just as everything which is religious finally finds its basis in God, so all understanding of what is religious finally goes back to faith in God. Understanding presupposes faith. As far as we can see, Van der Leeuw never departed from this principle in his later phenomenological and theological work, and he applied it in his anthropology and aesthetics as well. His very initial position, however, would give rise to an interesting dialectic between his theological (and liturgical) and his anthropological (and phenomenological) thought, converging in the problem of the relation between God and man. Van der Leeuw's theological and anthropological thought is to be seen as both a deepening of and an answer to his phenomenological work. In this way, too, what has been said earlier about Van der Leeuw's theology is relevant for the place of his phenomenology of religion within a theological framework. 25 A concrete and final application of Van der Leeuw's view on the theological disciplines, including phenomenology of religion, is to be found in the book Sacramentstheologie [Theology of the Sacrament] of 1949, more than thirty years 24

Phenomenology of religion, in Van der Leeuw's wording, has here the old vocation of the theologia naturalis. Indeed, in various respects, phenomenology of religion functions for him as a natural theology. 25 In practice his phenomenology has an anthropological and theological starting-point. In the' Confession scientifique' of 1946, he calls phenomenology of religion an autonomous discipline with its own field, hinting at philosophical or religious anthropology. 'The study of religious phenomena leads unavoidably to the study of religious man. And religious man is not a man apart, but simply man seen in the religious perspective' (Numen, ι, 1 (1954), p. 12).

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later. The second part of the book offers a phenomenological treatment whereby 'historical factual reality' (treated in Part One) and the 'factual reality of faith' (treated in Part Three) are suspended in order to view sacrament as it appears in the world, as a phenomenon. The author is concerned here w i t h ' . . .what the place of sacraments is in the world, that is to say, in the material world and in the world of human intentions' (Van der Leeuw (1949), p. 133). The function of phenomenology is to make valid the earthly reality of the sacraments. In general terms one may contend that for Van der Leeuw the function of phenomenology is to make valid the earthly reality of what is theologically relevant of religion. Phenomenology and anthropology. Van der Leeuw's interest in non-literate peoples - or rather their mentality (see, for instance, Van der Leeuw (1928b and 1937)) - and their religion is closely connected with his general phenomenology of religion and the anthropology in which it results. He can be credited with having put Levy-Bruhl's work on primitive mentality in a phenomenological framework; though he may be blamed for having neglected the empirical side of'the problem. Be that as it may, when Van der Leeuw speaks of anthropological structures as different structures of human existence, it can safely be said that he was not doing research on behavior and thought as subjects in themselves. The data which he found in secondary sources were only useful for his general considerations: that a distinction between 'modern' and 'primitive' mentality is to be conceived of in terms of the distance experienced between subject and object; that the structures as such can nowhere be found in actual reality; that under the general structures partial structures can be distinguished, with a number of aspects; that connections can be established between 'primitive' ways of experiencing and 'religion' in the more general sense of the word, and so on. We have to do here with a philosophical-theological anthropology which is elaborated in Der Mensch und die Religion. Anthropologischer Versuch [Man and Religion. Attempt at an Anthropology], published in 1941. We dealt with this book already in connection with Van der Leeuw's theological development; reference is made here only in view of its connection with the author's phenomenological work. Man as such is virtually identified with homo religiosus; man as man-in-becoming is in a state of sin; the awakening of man's consciousness is a fall. Such statements show that Van der Leeuw was less concerned with descriptive anthropology than with a doctrine of man as a religious being, which is also underlying his phenomenology of religion. His interest in the 'primitive mentality' is probably to be seen in the same light. First of all, he experienced a sort of horror of an abstract, individual mind moving cut off from the world;

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he also knew the nostalgia of an outlook which recognizes both a d e e p e r unity of subject and object, and something deeper in man which has little chance to develop in m o d e r n industrial society. T h e n , V a n der L e e u w had a platonic idea of science, considering theology a n d philosophy to be the sciences p r o p e r , which gives to the whole of his scholarly work a theological and philosophical character. Again, there is behind his views on 'primitives' a kind of rehabilitation of them on the human and religious level, after many a denigration of primitive man and of naturalistic religion. V a n d e r L e e u w was much concerned with the unity of mankind and could use the concept of mental or anthropological structure in o r d e r to relativize obvious differences. His aim was not to know primitives, but to interpret the p h e n o m e n o n ' m a n ' and indirectly himself. 2 6 W h e t h e r dissolving man into mental structures and arranging his expressions into ideal types is the best phenomenological solution possible is another question, but it is fair to look for the basic intentions of V a n der Leeuw's work in order to explain his interests, to explain why this scholar selected the particular p h e n o m e n a he studied, and why he understood them in the particular way he did. O n e of the main weaknesses of V a n der Leeuw's anthropology is certainly the fact that he did not make a distinction between man as he can be studied empirically, man as he o u g h t to be or 'is' on a deeper level, and man according to his o w n self-interpretation. In this way his book on primitive religion could have an explicitly theological ending. Phenomenology and art. Similar objections must be made with regard to V a n d e r Leeuw's phenomenological understanding and interpretation of art, w h e r e he used absolute categories too. H e r e , however, he was at least nearer to the sources as is shown by his main work on the subject, Wegen en grenzen [Roads and Boundaries], which appeared in 1932, had an enlarged second edition in 1948, and a revised posthumous edition in 1955. T h e author is m o r e conscious here of the limitations of his phenomenological method and keeps closer to the fundamental question: H o w d o I understand it? T h e basic problem of this original study is: to what extent can art be 'holy'; and, conversely: to what extent can the realization of the holy be 'art'? Here, the relations between religion, Christian or otherwise, and the arts are treated historically, phenomenologically and theologically. V a n der L e e u w has been one of the few Protestant theologians to present a theological aesthetics besides his liturgical interests. In his position 26 Th. P. van Baaren (June 1957) has shown that the actual relationship between Van der Leeuw's concept of 'primitive mentality' and the living people of non-literate societies is very loose indeed. He criticizes Van der Leeuw, and classical phenomenology of religion in general, on an empirical basis. Compare also Van Baaren (1969).

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of a ' theologian of the incarnation', in the last analysis, is to be f o u n d the common intention of his phenomenology of art, religion, and the sacraments. Phenomenology of a phenomenologist. Phenomenology had a great significance for V a n der Leeuw. A m o n g many other things which may help to explain his enthusiasm for it, it provided a solution to the problem of the separation of subject and object (Subjekt-Objekt-Spaltung), it provided an alternative to a scientific explaining away of religion, it combined both scholarly and religious points of view within the field of 'understandability'. A n d last but not least, it had an eminent theological task in presenting a 'check to the theologian's tendency to interpret data in the light of the peculiar conceptions of himself or his own religious community', 2 7 and in p r e p a r i n g and facilitating the transition f r o m historical critical scholarship to systematic theology. It is with reason that in our considerations about V a n der Leeuw's work his theological development was treated b e f o r e his phenomenological work. A study of his theological thought appears in fact to be mandatory for a correct understanding of his phenomenology. 2 8 T h e r e are striking parallels between certain views of the Christian faith and church and certain insights into religion as an anthropological structure and quest f o r meaning. For this phenomenology, his stress on creation, his later development of a theology of incarnation, and his ideas on revelation are all relevant. His classification of religious phenomena, his a r r a n g e m e n t of fundamental religious structures, and the culmination of his p h e n o m e n o l o g y and anthropology in a specific Christian faith have theological roots. T h r o u g h o u t his work, there are d e e p personal religious motivations: the desire to g o f r o m the finite to the infinite; to abolish the separation of subject and object; to envisage a cosmos of harmony; to cultivate certain forms of religious experience; and to find that 'unity of life' f o r which he was looking in religion and art. 29 His double interest in phenomenology (anthropology) and theology, his double self-interpretation as man and as minister of the Church, together with his many roles, activities and commitments, each pursued with great dedication and enthusiasm, suggest a complex personality behind this professional phenomenologist, w h o was moreover theologian, historian of reliQuoted from John B. Carman (April 1965), p. 31. This is the correct point of departure of Jan Hermelink's study (i960). 29 Van der Leeuw wanted to connect religion and society, Christianity and culture, theology and the Arts and Sciences. His interest in 'primitive mentality' is linked with a nostalgy for a unity of life; his interest in Greek culture is linked with a similar nostalgy for harmony. 27

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gions, man of letters and arts, musician, cabinet minister, 'servant of God and professor in Groningen ',30

7· O T H E R W R I T T E N

WORK

Besides purely religious subjects, as treated in his theology and his phenomenology of religion, Van der Leeuw always devoted much attention to subjects of literature and art, and from the end of the thirties he became more attentive to cultural problems in his country and later to general cultural problems of the war and postwar period. Here too, faith and religion are included in the picture. One may think of publications like Die Bilanz des Christentums (1947; a Dutch edition had appeared in 1940 with later reprints), Balans van Nederland [Balancesheet of the Netherlands, 1945], Nationale cultuurtaak [The National Culture Task, 1947], Menswording en cultuurverschuiving. Een anthropologisch probleetn [Anthropogenesis and the Shifting of Culture. A n Anthropological Problem, 1948], and also the contribution 'Muziek en Literatuur' [Music and Literature] of 1950. Of his more personal studies we may mention - besides his work of spirituality Dogmatische brieven [Letters about Dogmatics] of 1933, his sermons and suchlike - books like Jan Hendrik Gerretsen (1942, about his spiritual mentor), Uren met Novalis [Meditation Hours with Novalis] of 1943, and his scholarly publication Vriendschap met God [Friendship with God] of 1938. T h e r e is a considerable number of publications on music by his hand, which have been left undiscussed here. A n important autobiographical fragment which furnishes certain clues to his life's work is his 'Confession scientifique' of 1946, published posthumously in Numen 1, 1 (1954), pp. 8-15.

8.

H I S T O R I C A L C O N T E X T A N D I N F L U E N C E IN T H E NETHERLANDS

During the period of G. van der Leeuw's life (1890-1950), the Netherlands went through a series of profound changes, both socio-economic and technical, and intellectual, cultural, spiritual and religious. In order to do full justice to the work of Van der Leeuw as a whole, and not only to a selection of his writings, one would 30 This is the title of the life sketch of G. van der Leeuw by his student Fokke Sierksma (1951). Compare Sierksma (1975).

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have to consider it within the context of his time. This is the more necessary since his work was in fact concerned not only with questions of theology and scholarly research, but also with a number of contemporary religious, cultural and later also social problems. It would be necessary, in fact, to investigate what kind of response Van der Leeuw's work contains to the great problems which prevailed in his time, and not only within the Netherlands. In this connection it should be borne in mind that Van der Leeuw received his own education before 1914, and that he can be situated as far as some of his starting-points are concerned in that pre-war period. Next, the period of the twenties and thirties in the Netherlands and Western Europe (particularly Germany), with its intellectual, cultural and religious currents, should be taken into consideration. An analysis should be made of the influence which the years 1940-45 (and to some extent already 1914-18), with the hiatus they brought about in Dutch cultural and religious life and the general life style of the country as it was before the war, had on his position and commitments, especially in the last ten years of his life. His growing commitments in the Dutch Reformed Church, starting already in the twenties but increasing in the late thirties and the forties, are a case in point. After 1945 they were to involve him also in ecumenical contacts and activities; he explicitly welcomed the chance to participate in problems of national and European culture in the critical years after 1945 which placed him within a much broader historical context than that of most scholars, generally speaking. As a heritage of the nineteenth century, and also after the separation of the neo-Calvinist (Gereformeerde) churches, the Dutch Reformed Church was characterized by considerable tension between the modernists and the orthodox. The young-Ethical movement (jong-ethischen) as a group took a kind of third road, since they stressed the fact that Divine revelation does not exist in a vacuum but directs itself to and is perceived by the ethos, the spiritual existence, or rather essence, of man. Man's personal relation of faith to Christ as Lord, and a practice of life which is based on this relationship, occupies a central place here, and from this experience the consciousness of man, with regard not only to the expression of Word and dogma but also to the function of reason, was seen as relative and put back into proportion. Leaders of this group, which constituted the Ethische Vereniging (Religious Ethical Society) within the Dutch Reformed Church, were theologians like P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye (Leiden), J. J. P. Valeton (Utrecht), J. H. Gerretsen (The Hague) and J. A. Cramer (Utrecht). Van der Leeuw emerged from this circle, and he felt himself most at home here until World War II. He was a member of this movement for some years and also President of the Ethische Vereniging. In his student years he underwent a certain

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shift from a more confessional to a more liberal or modernist orientation, which continued during his years as a church minister (1916-18). During his professorship in Groningen he developed, as we have already observed, a growing attention to the 'objective' side of religious experience, in liturgy, office and sacrament. After World War II this 'objective' side came to be central for him; this theological thought then concentrated more and more on the sacraments. The increasing interest in liturgical forms and renewal in the Dutch Reformed Church after World War I was carried forward by ministers like H. W. Creutzberg and J. H. Gerretsen and it was vigorously promoted by Van der Leeuw and ]. N. Bakhuizen van den Brink. It may be contended that Van der Leeuw developed from 'ethical' to 'high church' through the liturgical movement; this unusual liturgical development at times rendered him theologically suspect. He was not quite trusted either by the modernist left or by the orthodox right, and certainly not by the dialectical theologians, followers of Karl Barth, who arose in the mid-twenties and steadily grew in influence. Although Van der Leeuw was manifestly influenced by Karl Barth, and made a certain response to his theology, there are clear indications that he interpreted an exclusive dialectical theology of the Word as an attack on his work - certainly in the iconoclastic, 'revolutionary' forms which the Barthian group took in the Netherlands, as they roughly put aside what they felt to be contrary to the claims of their theological master. It would be imperative to investigate the theological position of Van der Leeuw within the context of the theological and religious trends and currents of his time, with due attention to those issues where he did not accept existing theological positions. It would be necessary to study in this light, too, how he treated those great problems which were in the air in his time: the relation between Christianity and culture, Christianity and the non-Christian religions, Church and religion, faith and unbelief, the point of connection between God and man, and so forth. The originality of Van der Leeuw's stand as a creative theologian unattached to established schools of theology deserves a special study by a qualified church historian. What were the historical roots of Van der Leeuw's interest in history and phenomenology of religion? In the Netherlands, the very interest in foreign religions probably goes back to commercial activity and the subsequent acquisition of colonies, which brought about a certain openness towards worlds other than that of Dutch polderland, and made here and there for some kind of encounter with groups and persons of other religions and cultures. Both the trends of the Ethical Movement and of the Modernists had, beside their general openness to culture and modern life, an openness to and an interest in knowing other religions. This may have been due to an appreciation of the relatively little value

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of humanity's thoughts about the Eternal and the Divine, and consequently the paying of special attention to religious experience as the point of connection between man and God. It may also have been due to a broadening of the notion of revelation and a greater appreciation of reason. In both cases, however, religion was the focus of attention, rather than culture or society. P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye emerged from the first, and C. P. Tiele from the second trend. As to Van der Leeuw, he came from the ethical trend, but had a great openness towards what was considered to be general modernism, that is, excluding the extreme modernist position on the religiously ' f a r left'; in this way he could theologically be interested in religions outside Christianity. Of decisive importance, however, was a third factor, the influence of the teaching and the person of the Norwegian (and later naturalized Dutch) scholar W. B. Kristensen, who had been called to Leiden in 1901 to the chair of history of religions and who also taught phenomenology of religion. Van der Leeuw studied for his graduate work with Kristensen and prepared his doctoral dissertation under him. The particular commitment which Kristensen had to the materials of the religions of Antiquity which he studied can be found in Van der Leeuw's theologically and personally committed study of religion, in the guise of structural psychology. It is quite interesting to observe that Van der Leeuw's committed study was not quite recognized by Kristensen, who thought himself to be as objective as possible, and branded Van der Leeuw as being touched by 'subjectivism' and reproached him for 'psychologizing' (Kristensen, 1919). A certain misunderstanding between Kristensen and Van der Leeuw, which has been observed by numerous pupils, is due not only to a different concept of scholarship (although Kristensen rationalized it in this way), but also to the sheer fact of two differing commitments which were made with regard to religious materials according to the deeper intentions and spiritual needs of the two scholars as persons. Van der Leeuw's extraordinary openness to and assimilation of philosophical, psychological and other currents of the time could not be appreciated by Kristensen, who preferred to concentrate exclusively upon his ancient sources. The enthusiasm, not to say inspired character, of the study of religious phenomena, however, had been transferred from the master to the pupil; and that the brilliant pupil was not always understood by the master is of secondary importance. Van der Leeuw himself felt akin to historians of religion like N. Söderblom, R. Otto, F. Heiler and W. Otto, who, via their own religious experience and sensitivity, tried hard to penetrate into the religions they studied in order to arrive at an understanding 'from within'. This linked up with similar attempts in other disciplines to arrive at an understanding 'from within: earlier by W. Dilthey in historical research, by K. Jaspers and L. Binswanger in

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psychiatry, by E. Spranger in psychology, and by L. Levy-Bruhl in the study and interpretation of primitive ways of thought and behavior. W. B. Kristensen did the same in his study of the religions of Antiquity. It would be necessary in further research on Van der Leeuw to locate him in the context of a whole current in the humanities of the twenties and thirties, which set verstehen, as a specific kind of understanding, as the aim of its scholarship. This understanding was then often considered to be a kind of appropriation of the subject matter under investigation within the scholar's own life and experience, who saw it as his task to enter into a part of his subject matter and to understand it in this way. In V a n der Leeuw there was the honest attempt to understand and the sincere desire to transmit to others what he had understood himself, as an enrichment of the mind and a broadening of life. Needless to say, there can be no question here of locating V a n der Leeuw in the intellectual life of his time. In a sense he was less a critical intellectual than an intuitive and imaginative visionary mind, for whom not only facts but also ideas could become' phenomena'. A m o n g other things, it is precisely the capacity to experience elements of reality as separate phenomena and to construct a universe of meanings connecting them, which gave him a place apart from the existing trends, and which hampered the communication with such intellectual trends beyond the point at which Van der Leeuw's mind itself was saturated with them. Within the Faculty of Theology at the University of Groningen, V a n der Leeuw felt himself most at one with his colleagues J. Lindeboom and W. Aalders. It is interesting to note that often he first launched his ideas in addresses outside the university, for instance in conferences and meetings of the Nederlandse Christen Studenten Vereniging (N.C.S.V.), a body affiliated to the World Christian Student Federation. Something may still be said about Van der Leeuw's real influence in the Netherlands. His message reached the laymen probably more than the theologians. Although he was admired by many, he himself was apparendy too much of a personality in the country to be followed on any larger scale, and he was not one to constitute his own school or to organize his admirers. Even when he spoke and acted in larger circles and maintained contacts in his country and abroad on a wide scale, he was not the person to develop techniques to gain acceptance for his ideas; for such aims he was too much of an individualist. In church life he was sometimes met with distrust, and in some cases even avoided as a dangerous figure. Being a more or less free theologian, he could hardly be understood and certainly not verstanden according to his intentions in a theologically bound climate of thought where everyone had to be identified according

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to trends, schools and authorities. Especially after 1945, f o r various reasons his theological work lacked a sounding-board in the country, and with a few exceptions his main theological work, the Sacramentstheologie (1949) was hardly discussed, which was probably hard f o r him. Historically speaking there has been a perceptible lack of effort in the Netherlands to reach an understanding of Van der Leeuw's work, and since his death nearly all contact with it has been broken off. This misunderstanding of the understander may be interpreted as a symptom of a more general break in Dutch cultural history in the years after World War II. When we look into his theological and phenomenological work and its possible influence, the relative loneliness of Van der Leeuw strikes us. Whereas he had committed himself to the incorporation of the study of religion (godsdienstwetenschap) within the framework of theology, with a kind of methodological autonomy within a sphere allotted to it by theology, theology itself underwent the strong influence of systematic-dogmatic schools in the twenties and thirties, and developed in such a way that it did away with nearly all interest in different religions as entities in themselves. A n d , on the other hand, in the generation after V a n der Leeuw, godsdienstwetenschap did away with all theology, of which it was loath to undergo any influence any more whatsoever. Van der Leeuw's search f o r an integration of godsdienstwetenschap and theology, just like his synthetic view of theology, was contrary to the spirit of his time and could only fail. Similarly, his phenomenological work has had but little influence in professional scholarship. In part his approach was too different f r o m that of literary and historical studies to be taken u p by professional historians of religion. T h e progress of scholarship with its continuous specialization and refinement, and its progressive reduction of the scholar's subjectivity, was contrary to the dream of Van der Leeuw's synthetic work, to his stress on the cultivation of personal experience on the part of the scholar, and particularly to his introduction of theological aims within scholarly research. In part the very discipline of godsdienstwetenschap has in fact been a discipline of lonely scholars with their individual ways of understanding religious phenomena, or f o r that matter any phenomena at all. Van der Leeuw's phenomenology manifested great enthusiasm, but it lacked central ideas and logical problems to be pursued step by step; it also lacked a critical evaluation of the results obtained, and there was no real contact with other empirical and more critical disciplines. If V a n der Leeuw nevertheless stands out so f a r as a phenomenologist above the generation of those who came after him in the discipline, then this may be due to something profoundly spiritual. Phenomenology of religion, which was f o r Van der Leeuw, as it had been f o r Kristensen, a creative activity corresponding with his mind, was

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subsequently made into a kind of profession of classifying religious data with no originality and much repetition. It is only when a critical scientific method based on empirical procedures gives its judgment with fewer theological and philosophical assumptions about man than had been the case with Van der Leeuw, that we are obliged to see his phenomenological work as having too high aspirations, and as containing too many serious scholarly errors. This does not detract from those passages in it which not only testify to broad views but also present striking results of immediate insight and vision. Van der Leeuw followed closely what appeared in his time and tried to assimilate this as much as possible in his own work, trying to keep it up to date. His theological framework did not impediment his scholarly work in this respect. With due acknowledgement of considerable differences between them, we may mention as pupils of Van der Leeuw the names of W. A. Bijlefeld, F. Sierksma, C. L. Tuinstra, J. M. van Veen, The influence is difficult to ascertain with any scholarly precision. It is the problems alluded to by Van der Leeuw which probably constitute the real significance of his work. From a scholarly point of view, we think in this context of the problem of hermeneutics and that of understanding other people's religious experience in particular, the question of the unity of mankind and of a religious substructure in human life and culture as far as it is 'human', the problem of the immediate (whether artistic or religious) experience of reality and its deformation by theoretical abstraction. From a theological point of view there is the problem of creation and new creation, of religious experience and faith, of belief and unbelief, of the consequences of different kinds of theologies of incarnation. The very function of phenomenology of religion in the work of Van der Leeuw, as a descriptive intermediate discipline between an empiricalhistorical and a normative-systematic theology, is justified precisely on the basis of his synthesizing theology of incarnation. Just as there is a need for a detailed biography of Gerardus van der Leeuw as a person in his time, there is equally a need for a more careful study of his theological and religious ideas in their historical context, on the basis of which his work can be properly appreciated. This would be a challenge for a younger scholar to take up.

References

Achterberg, J. R. (March 1974), De predikant als' akteur'. [The minister as 'actor']. Doctoraabcriptie University of Utrecht, Fac. of Theology. Baal, J. van (1971), Symbols for Communication: An Introduction to the Anthropological Study of Religion. Assen, Van Gorcum & Comp. Baaren, Th. P. van (June 1957), 'De ethnologische basis van de faenomenologie van G. van der Leeuw' [The ethnological basis of G. van der Leeuw's phenomenology], Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift, 11(5): 321-353. - (1969a), 'Systematische Religionswissenschaft', Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift, 24(2): 81-88. - (1969b), 'Are the Bororo parrots or are we?', pp. 8 - 1 3 in Liber Amicorum: Studies in Honour of Prof. Dr. C. J. Bleeker. Leiden, E. J. Brill. Baaren, Th. P. and Drijvers, H. J. W., eds. (1973), Religion, Culture and Methodology. Papers of the Groningen Working-Group for the Study of Fundamental Problems and Methods of Science of Religion, T h e Hague-Paris, Mouton (' Religion and Reason', vol. 8). Beek, W. E. A. van, and Scherer, J. H., eds. (1975), 'Bibliography of Publications by J. van Baal up to 1975', pp. 296-303 in Explorations in the Anthropology of Religion: Essays in Honour of Jan van Baal. T h e Hague, Martinus Nijhoff ('Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde', 74). Bickermann, E. (1935), Ά propos de la phenomenologie religieuse', Revue des Etudes Juives, Tome 99: 92-108. Binswanger, Ludwig (1922), Einführung in die Probleme der allgemeinen Psychologie. Berlin, J. Springer. - (1927), 'Verstehen und Erklären in der Psychologie', Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie, 107: 655-683. Carman, John B. (April 1965), ' T h e Theology of a Phenomenologist. An Introduction to the Theology of Gerardus van der Leeuw', Harvard Divinity Bulletin, 29 (3): 13-42· Chantepie de la Saussaye, P. D. (1909), 'Die vergleichende Religionsforschung und der religiöse Glaube', pp. 337-367 in Portretten en Kritieken. Haarlem, F. Bohn. Fortmann, Η. Μ. M. (2nd ed. 1968), Als ziende de Onzienlijke: Een cultuurpsychologische Studie over de religieuze waarneming en de zogenaamde religieuze projectie [Like seeing Who cannot be seen: A study in cultural psychology about religious perception and the so-called religious projection]. Three parts in four volumes. Hilversum, Paul Brand.

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References

Ham, J. J. ten (May 1973), G. van der Leeuw: Ontwikkeling en grondstructuur van zijn theologie [G. van der Leeuw: Development and basic structure of his theology]. Doctoraalscriptie University of Utrecht, Fac. of Theology (107pp.). Heerma van. Voss, Μ. S. Η. G. (1951-1952), 'Lijst der geschriften van Prof. Dr. G. van der Leeuw betreffende het oude Voor-Azie en Egypte'. [List of publications by Prof. Dr. G. van der Leeuw concerning the Ancient Near East and Egypt], Jaarbericht Ex Oriente Lux, 12: 126-129. - (janvier 1952), 'Necrologie G. van der Leeuw. Bibliographie egyptologique', Chronique d'Egypte, 27, no. 53: 140-141. Hermelink, Jan (i960), Verstehen und Bezeugen. Der theologische Ertrag der'Phänomenologie der Religion' des G. van der Leeuw. München, Chr. Kaiser Verlag. Hof mann, Paul (1925a), Das religiöse Erlebnis. Seine Struktur, seine Typen und sein Wahrheitsanspruch. Charlottenburg, Pan-Verlag. - (1925b), Allgemeinwissenschaft und Geisteswissenschaft. Charlottenburg, PanVerlag. Jaspers, Karl (1913), Allgemeine Psychopathologie. Berlin, J. Springer, 2nd ed. (revised) 1920, 3rd ed. (revised; used by Van der Leeuw) 1922. Kooiman, W. J. and Veen, J. M. van, eds. (1950), Pro Regno Pro Sanctuario. Nijkerk, Callenbach. Kristensen, W. B. (1919), 'De inaugureele rede van Professor van der Leeuw', Theologisch Tijdschrift, Vol. 53 (1919), pp. 260-265. - (i960), The Meaning of Religion. T h e Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 2nd ed. 1968. Leeuw, G. van der (1918), Plaats en taak van de godsdienstgeschiedenis in de theologische wetenschap. Groningen-Den Haag, J. B. Wolters. - (1924), Inleiding tot de godsdienstgeschiedenis. Haarlem, Erven Bohn. A second, completely revised and actually new edition was published in 1948 under the tide of Inleiding tot de phaenomenologie van den godsdienst. Haarlem, Erven Bohn. A German translation of the first edition appeared under the tide of Einführung in die Phänomenologie der Religion. München, 1925. A German translation of the second Dutch edition of 1948 was made and edited posthumously by Η. C. Piper (1961), and appeared under the same title in München. - (1926), 'Ueber einige neuere Ergebnisse der psychologischen Forschung und ihre Anwendung auf die Geschichte, insonderheit die Religionsgeschichte', Studi e Materiali di Storia delle Religioni, 2(1): 1-43. - (1928a), 'Strukturpsychologie und Theologie', Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, N.F. 9: 321-349. - (1928b), La structure de la mentalite primitive. Paris, Alcan. - (1932), Wegen en Grenzen. Studie over de verhouding van religie en kunst. Amsterdam, H. J. Paris, 2nd ed. (considerably expanded) 1948, 3rd ed. (revised and edited posthumously by E. L. Smelik) 1955. This third edition has been translated into German by Mrs. A. Piper (1957): Vom Heiligen in der Kunst. Gütersloh, Carl Bertelsmann. From this German edition an English translation has been made, which appeared in 1963 under the title of Sacred and Profane

References

251

Beauty: The Holy in Art, with a preface by Mircea Eliade (New York and Nashville, Abingdon Press and Holt, Rinehart & Winston; London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson). - (1933), Phänomenologie der Religion. Tübingen, Mohr (Siebeck), 2nd ed. 1956 (this German edition was posthumously revised and enlarged on the basis of the French edition of 1948), 3rd ed. 1970 (reprint of the second German edition). T h e English translation was made by J. E. Turner (1938): Religion in Essence and Manifestation: A Study in Phenomenology. London: Allen & Unwin. Of this English translation an American pocket edition appeared in 1963 in two volumes, with 'Appendices' incorporating the additions of the second German edition of 1956, made by Hans H. Penner (Harper Torchbooks T B 100 and 101. New York and Evanston, Harper & Row). Later reprinted in U.S.A. A French translation was made by Jacques Marty (1948), incorporating additions made by Van der Leeuw to the first German edition of 1933. This translation and edition were approved of by Van der Leeuw in his ' Avantpro pos de l'edition fran 2 39 η · Bagdad, 178 Baird, R., 66 Bakhuizen van den Brink, J. N.,243 Barnouw, A. J., 187 Barth, Karl, 205, 243 Beatrijs, 187 Beek, W. E. A. van, 45η. Berlin, 189 Bernet Kempers, Κ. Ph., 190 Bertholet, Alfred, 120 Bianchi, U., 65 Bickermann, E., 193 Binswanger, Ludwig, 225, 244 Bleeker, C. J., 34, 40, 79η. Bond van Haagse Gymnasiasten, 188 Bonn, 14m. Bosch, D. A. van den, 188

Boston, 9η. Bousset, Wilhelm, 189 Boeser, P. Α. Α., i88 Brno, 192 Brunner, Emil, 205 Buddhism, 151-2, 172 Buddhist(s), 151, 163, 168, 176 Buning, Η., 23η. Bijlefeld, W. Α., 247 Carman, John Β., V I I I , 206η., 240η. Catholicism, 172 Catholics, 4, 164, 170, 171, 172, 176 Chantepie de la Saussaye, P. D., 34, 37, 86, 188, 242, 244 Chicago, 192 China, 150-1, 163 Christelijke Historische Unie, 191 Christianity, 74,80,94, 153, 160,163, 164 Christians, 168 Concordia Resparvit Crescent, 188 Confucian, 176 Confucianism, 151 Cramer, J. Α., 242 Creutzberg, H. W., 243 Cryns, A. G „ V I I I Desroche, H., 65 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 227η., 228, 228η., 229, 2 44 Doetinchem, 189 Drees, W., 192 Drijvers, H. J. W., V I I I , 26, 91η.

256

Index of proper names

Duinoordkerk, 192 Dumezil, G., 39, 65 Dupre, W „ VIII Dutch, 35-37, 60, 119-120, 125, 246 Dutch Reformed Church (Nederlands Hervormde Kerk), 187, 188 , 189, 190, 191, 213, 242 Dutch Society for the History of Religions, 191 Dutch Society for Sociology of Religion, 28 Dijk, I. van, 189 Eastern Church, 216 Eliade, M., 39, 65, 120 Emmerich, 189 Eranos Meetings, 192 Erman, Α., 189 Ethische Vereniging, 190, 242 Eijck, P. M. van, 187 Europe, 4, 23η., 113, 148, 153, 242 European,192, 242 Fortmann, Η. Μ. Μ., 28 Free University of Amsterdam, 23, 24 Geertz, C „ 66 Gemeenteopbouw, 190 Germany, 242 Gerretsen, J. H., 188, 189, 213, 242, 243 Göttingen, 189 Goldammer, Kurt, 120 Groningen, 23, 25, 26, 34, 35, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 241, 245 Groningen Working-Group, 26, 29, 3°

Groninger Orkest Vereniging, 190 the Hague, 187, 188, Ham, J. J. ten, VII, 195, 198, 20i, 209, a n , 212, 219

189, 192 5, 187η., 193, 202, 207, 2°8> 215, 216, 218,

's Heerenberg, 189 Heerma van Voss, Μ. S. Η. G., 193, 221 Heidegger, Martin, 228, 229η. Heiler, F., 39, 120, 244 Hellenism, 25 Hermelink, Jan, 232η., 240η. Hidding, Κ. Α. Η., 34 Hinduism, 151, 17 2 Hindus, 163, 168 Hoens, D. J., 35 Hofmann, Paul, 225η., 227 Holland, 23-43, 63, 65, 72, 96-97, 163, 170-171, 246 Husserl, Edmund, 231 n. Iconographic Institute at Groningen, 25 India, 151, 163, 176 Indonesia, 26, 152 Institute for the Study of Religion at the Free University of Amsterdam, 34 International Association for the History of Religions, 191 Islam, 26,40,42,80,152,163,164-165, 168, 171-172, 176 Islamic, 132 Israel, ancient, 176 Israel, state of, 152, 171 Japan, 149, 150, 151, 163 Jaspers, Karl, 225, 227, 244 Jews, 152, 168, 171 Jewish, 171 Judaism, 152, 163, 168, 172 Jung, C. G., 69, 222 Kamstra, J. H., 35 Kerkopbouw Vereniging-, 190 Kilpatrick, Hilary, VIII Kitagawa, J., 65 Klimkeit, H.-J., VIII Kloosterkerk, 188, 189, 192

Index of proper names

Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Westenschappen, 190, 221 Koninklijke Vlaamse Akademie voor Wetenschappen, Letteren en Schone Künsten, 191-192 Kooiman, W. J., 193 Kossmann, E. F., 187 Koster, Edward B., 187 Kraemer, H., 34 Kristensen, W. Brede, 34, 77, 92, 188, 189, 244, 246 Kuyper, Abraham, 200 Kwint, J. Α., 192 Laeyendecker, L., 28 Latin America, 160, 176 Lebanon, 72, 163 Leeds, 34η. Leeuw, G. van der, V I I , 5,26,34,37, 45, 46, 126, 187-247 Anthropological Museum 'Gerardus van der Leeuw', 25,192 G. van der Leeuw Stichting, 192 Leeuw Senior, G. van der, 187 Lehmann, Edvard, 120 Leiden, 23, 24, 29, 34, 35, 188, 189, 244 Leipzig, 29, 141η. Levy-Bruhl, L., 209, 221, 238, 245 Lindeboom, J., 245 Linnaeus, 119 Liturgische Kring, 190, 213 Los Angeles, 1 Loudon, Alexander, 187 Marburg, 113η., 192 Marty, Jacques, 223 Masaryk University, 192 Mason, Η. W., V I I I Mensching, Gustav, 120 Moehring, H. R., V I I I Muhammad, 10, 40 Montreal, 1 Muslims, 10, 40, 42, 164-165, 168, 171, 172

257

Napoleon, 153 Nederlandse Bach Vereniging, 190 Nederlandse Christen Studenten Vereniging, 188, 245 Nederlandse Gymnasiastenbond, 188 Nederlandse Jeugdgemeenschap, 191 Elisabeth Antoinette Nelck, 187 Neo-Calvinist (Gereformeerde) Churches, 242 Netherlands, 3, 23-24, 27, 241, 242, 243- 2 44. 245, 246 Nettler, R. L., V I I I Noordmans, O., 193 Nijhoff, Martinus, 187 Nijmegen, 23 Obbink, H. T h „ 34 Obbink, H. W „ 35 Orthodoxy, 151, 164, 214 Oud Eik en Duinen, 192 Otto, Rudolf, 120, 244 Otto, Walter, 244 Pakistan, 151 Paris, 1 Partij van de Arbeid, 191 Pettazzoni, Raffaele, 120 Peursen, C. A. van, 193 Poniatowski, Ζ., V I I I Proosdij, B. A. van, 23η. Protestantism, 80 Protestants, 164 Providence, R. I., 91η. Przywara, E., 233 Radio

Nederland in Overgangstijd, 191 Reformation, 214 Roman Catholic Church, 153 Rome, 214 Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences, 190, 221 Rudolph, Kurt, V I I I , 65 Rümke, H. C., 187, 192 Ruitenberg, E. van, 188

258

Index of proper names

Russia, 151 Scherer, J. Η., 45η. Schermerhorn, W., 191 Schmidt, W., 221 Schreuder, Ο., 23η. Science of Religion Bulletin, 34n. Sethe, K „ 189 Sharpe, Eric J., 79n. Shinto, 150 Sierksma, F., 5, 28, 35,65,193,224η., 24i η., 247 Smith, W. Cantwell, 65-66, 92, 176 Snoeck Henkemans, Anne Catharina, 189 Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiders Partij, 191 Söderblom, Nathan, 244 South Africa, 192 Soviet, 151 Spranger, Eduard, 225,228,244-245 Staples, P., V I I Stedelijk Haags Gymnasium, 187 Stockholm, 79n., 86 Swartz, M. L „ V I I I Tiele, C. P., 34, 244 Toronto, 163η. Tuinstra, C. L., 247

2.

SUBJECT

Ugrinovitch, D., V I I I U.S.A., 150, 152, 192 Utrecht, 1, 23, 24, 25, 28, 34,35,51 n„ 65η., 187, 192 Utrecht Working-Group, 28 Valeton, J. J. P., 242 Vatican II, 176 Veen, J. M. van, 193, 247 Voortrekkers Monument, 192 Vos, W., 193 Vriesland, Victor van, 187 Vrijhof, P. H., 28, 66 Waardenburg, G. N. C., ν Wach, Joachim, 65, 120 Warsaw, 23η. Wending, igi West, the, 2 , 7 4 , 8 0 , 1 1 4 , 1 4 1 , 1 4 8 , 1 5 0 •53> '55. !58> !59> l6o > ' 7 6 Western, 93, 149, 158, 164, 196 Widengren, Geo, 40, 79n., 120 Willigen, Α. de, 193 World Christian Student Federation, .88, 245 Yoroi, Κ., 23η. Zandee, J., 35

INDEX

S e e also the Index on termii absolutization, 133 alienation, 33 analytical philosophy, 29 Andere, das ganz, 95 angle of approach, 56 anthropological Dutch — research, 26-27, philosophical — investigations, 96

ι Gerardus van der Leeuw anthropology of religion, 23, 26, 27, 59 Antiquity, 216 See also under: religions of Antiquity apostasy, 148, 157 approaches need for different — in the investigation of religion, 21

Subject index

approaches (continued) — which are fact finding and which are looking for connections, 68-69 areligiosity, 129 ashram, 151 assumptions of reality and truth, 72 atheism, 129, 156 history of religion and of —, 75 Barthian group in the Netherlands, 243 belief, capacity for, 155 Bible, 203 biology, 60 catharsis, 107 causalities, indirect, 125 champ de significations, 83, 88 church institutions, 27 classification(s), 3 7 , 1 1 2 , 1 1 9 , 1 2 5 - 1 2 7 categories of —, 114 climat of oppositions, Dutch, 60 colonial administration, 31 Commissie voor de Nieuwe Nederlandse Hervormde Kerkelijke Gezangenbundel, 190 communication, 2 7 , 8 5 , 1 3 4 , 1 3 7 , 1 4 2 , 157, 158, 161, 164, 165, 182-3 — and signification, intrinsic connection between, 62 analysis of —, 40-41 human —, 130 — with the living adherents of a religion, 68 — within a signification system, 108 communications media, 159, 172 comparative — method, 121 — religion, 94-95 — studies, quest for method in, 68-69 — study of religion, 29, 30,38, 108

259

consciousness, intentional nature of man's, 1 1 2 conversion, 157, 165 Councils, religious, 176 critical methodology, 39 critical view of religion, 33 cultural anthropology, 26, 27, 42 cultural — context, 30, 45 — crisis in connection with a methodological crisis, 72 — history, 1 1 , 143 — history, Dutch, 246 — revolution, 184 culture, 114 — context, 170 European —, 242 religion as a function of —, 242 developing countries, interpretation of reality in religious traditions of, 182 development, 154, 162, 168 dialectical theologians, 243 dialectical theology, 205, 207, 243 dialogue, 77, 174, 177 — with the data, 85 discussion — as a form of social interaction, 172 definition of the problem under —, 172 involvement in the situation of —, 179 economics, 60 ecumenical — contacts, 242 — theology of religion, 39 ecumenism, 153 eidetic vision, 96 empirical research, 82, 112 relation between — and theoretical reflection, 54

26ο

Subject index

empirical studies, 103-104 empiricists, 96 epigones, 29, 35 epoche, 96, 106, 111, 128, 130 essence, study of, 122 essential concept of — , 113 quest for what is — , 107 ethical movement, Dutch, 243-244 ethical theology, Dutch, 194-197, 199, 205, 211 ethischen, jong-, 242 ethnocentrism, 16 exegesis, 66 existential transposition of an — religious interest, 32-33 experience negative — of a given religion, 33 — which has to be understood and — of understanding, 234 See also under: religious experience explanation, 96 expression(s) — and impression, 111 — as testimonies, 81-82 direct and transmitted — , 107 See also under: religious expressions facts, 10, 17, 61 — and their interpretation, 17 ascertainment of — , 17 ascertainment of connections between — , 69 direct relationships between religious — in different cultures, .127 distinction to be made between — and their meanings, 2, 9, 19, 39-40, 42-43, 93 internal aspect of — , 19 — interpreted as human expressions, 87

meaning aspect and factual aspect of — , 114 objective — , 10 objective — and subjective meanings, 2, 9-21 reference character of — , 100 relations between — , 127 religious — , 10, 13 religious v. non-religious — , 1 2 1 subjective — , 10 — with a surplus value, 114, 115 — with and without a religious value, 102 faith — and reason, 81 — as a limit-concept, 88 category of — , 3, 79-88 perception of — , 82-83, 85 phenomenological definition of —, 88 familiarity with the materials, 51,52, 77 Federalists, European, 192 field, discovery of a, 69 form (Gestalt), 117, 121 formalization of research, 15, 55,56, 61 godsdienstwetenschap relation between — and theology in Holland over the last sixty years, 246 See also under: study of religion goyim, 152 hermeneutical — analysis of meaning, 17 — problems, 67 — research, 124 hermeneu tics, 18, 101, 124, 247 heuristic principle, 2, 52 Higher Education in the Netherlands, law of 1876 on, 23 historical — critical analysis, 66

Subject index

historical (continued) — processes, 129 — research, 98 history of religions, 143, 159, 163 chairs for —, 23 classical —, 56 critical observations on classical —, 57 - 58 Holy, the, 95 homo religiosus, 27, 39, 45, 120 human answers to the problems of — life and existence, 149 antinomies of — existence, 150, 155 changes in — consciousness, 1 5 5 156 — consciousness, 19 deeper layers of — reality, 131 implicit — dimension of religious data, 5 — intentionality, 134, 146 — intentions, 20 interpretation of — expressions looks for intentions, 116—117 meaning-dimension of — reality, 144 nature of — reality is intentional, '45 — reality, 135, 144, 146 — reality as intended reality and as interaction of intentions, 116—117 — reality of religion, 36 religion studied as a — phenomenon, 60 religious discussion as a case of — interaction, 183 research on — absolutes, 43 research on — intentions is indispensable, 21 separation between — life and religion, 124 significant character of all — expressions, 112

261

humanities — of the twenties and thirties, 245 — or human sciences, 55 hypothesis(es), 70-71, 100, m - 1 1 2 , 125. «27 probability of a —, 67, 87 iconographic materials, 25, 26 Iconography of Religions, 25 ideal type(s), 121, 126 idealism, 42, 180 idealization, 84 ideational — content of a religious expression or phenomenon, 97 identity, Jewish, 171 ideology(ies), 16, 97, 1 3 1 , 165, 169, 170, 176, 180 international —, 158 Islamic —, 152 new and modern —, 153-154 official state —, 154 religion made into an —, 148, '54 — of a religious nature, 171 social —, 182 theories as —, 51 world —, 42 ideologization, 148 illusory world, 154 image-formation, analysis of, 40, •31' i65 immediacy, natural, 1 1 1 industrialized society(ies), 86, 106, 155, 160 institutionalization, 41 intellectuals, 178 intended object(s), 99, 100, 106, 108, " 7 . 133. '35- i 3 6 absoluteness of —, 135 intention(s), 4, 5, 13, 18, 19, 87, 99, 134-13 6 . l 6 o > i 6 7- 1 74 — can adopt different qualities, '33 concept of —, 1 1 4 - 1 1 8

262

Subject index

intention (continued) concept of — and concept of structure, 117 dialectics between — and a sign or signification system, 62 examples of the investigation of —

I

30_I34

feedback between — and signs, 18 grasping of — as scholarly guesswork 99, 103 human —, 20 human reality as intended reality and interaction of —, 116—117 interpretation of human expressions looks for —, 1 1 6 - 1 1 7 investigation of — as a particular way of interrogating the available materials, 134 network of basic —, 88 — not of a factual nature, 134 religious and non-religious — seen within the same perspective, 18 research into —, 106-108 research on human — is indispensable, 21 scholar's —, 13 search for —, 100 intentional nature of human reality is —, 145 — reality, 136 intentionality, 107, 124 human —, 134, 146 structures of —, 94 interaction, theory of, 28 intercultural studies, 115 interdisciplinary studies, 62 interfaith research, 85-86 interpretation closed systems of —, 83 interreligious dialogue, 164 interreligious studies, 115 intersubjectivity, 106, 235 introspection, 38

intuition, 58, 77, 95, 96, 121 intuitionists, religious, 96 irrational frontier of the, 95 notion of the —, 129 rational study of what is considered to be —, 63-64 — side of religious experience, 121 irrationality — claimed by religion, 109 elements of — in scholarly interpretations, 18 Islamization, 152 judgment of existence, 15-16 judgment of value, 15-16 knowledge ideologically determined —, 16 scholarly —, 16-17 sociologically etc. conditioned —, 16 theory of —, 70-71 language, 102 Leeuw, scholarly work of G. van der apologetic and pastoral motives, 203 basic intentions, 239 response to the great problems of his time, 242 subjectivity, 199 See also the Index on terminology Gerardus van der Leeuw levels, structure of, 14 liberation, experience of, 157 life situation, modern, 48 life-world, 93, 114 limit-concept (Grenzbegriff), faith as a —, 88 linguistics, 29, 60 liturgical movement, 243

Subject index

magic, 26 man, phenomenon of — and phenomenon of religion, 45 mana, 221 Maoism, 151 materialism, 42 meaning — and fact, 2. See also under: fact and meaning — as an ideal, 42 conferrers of — (Sinngebungen), >45

experience of — , 146 growing density in the concept of — , 126 human quest for — , 94 ideal — structures (Sinnstrukturen), 121 increasing strength of — , 126 non-religious ways of conferring — , 148-149 objective — , 10 probability guess with regard to — , 110 problem of — concentrated in religion, 116 quest for — and question of — , 145 reality of — (Sinnwirklichkeit), 123 religious meaning, 11-12,166-167 ambiguity of — , 43 'happening' of a — , 88 research into — , 98 scholarly access t o — , 116-118 understanding — , 96-97, 99 research on — , 91-94 study of — , 43 subjective meaning(s), 9-10, 13, 40, 45, 92, 93, 145, 157, 160 conditions of investigation of — , 20 research on —, 17, 97, 106-108 specific — , 11 — within a society, 19-20

263

transcendent — , 135 two kinds of — , 92-93 value entity of religion as such constitutes a source of — of religious data, 124 meaningful connections (Sinnzusammenhänge), 144, 145, 146 meditation schools of — , 168 — techniques, 149, 150 meeting between people from different religious traditions, 169, 170 metaphysics, 19 method, comparative, 121 method, quest for, 3 — as a technical question, 70 — as a theoretical question, 7071 — in the study of religion has a particular meaning, 75 rise of the — , 65-77 Methodenstreit, 56, 59 methodological crisis in connection with a cultural crisis, 72 methodological reflections as a means to master an intellectual crisis, 72 methodology critical — , 39 discussion about — in the study of religion and its connection with changes in religion, 72 need for — , 51-63 methods as ideals, 51 Minister(try) of Education, Arts and Sciences, 191, 192 missionaries, 31, 164 modern v. traditional, 148 modernists, 243 modernization, 150, 153, 162, 168 attitudes toward tradition and social position in the — process, 181

264

Subject index

modernization (continued) religious discussions on — and tradition, 179-182 monophysites, 164 m o r p h o l o g y of religion, 37, 105 mystification, 84 non-religion, 136 non-religious expressions, study of, 161 object-subject-relationship, 13-15 objectification, 54, 107 — in scholarship, 17, 142, 150 objectifying something which is subjective, rational attempt of, 19 objective attitude as an objectdirected attitude, 47 objectivity p u r e and absolute — , 16 — versus subjectivity, 14 objectivizing process, 41 Oriental studies, 24 ' o t h e r ' and of 'otherness', category of the, 130 outsider and insider, position of, 46-48, 107 outsiders, attitude to, 169 participation, 161 perspectivism of research, 55-56 phenomena, 13, 42 religious — , 45, 58 'objective' character of — , 100 objectively — , 119 religious evaluation of concrete -.58 surplus value of — , 117 transparency of — , 19 phenomenological — analysis, 99, 107, 157 — reflection, 87 — research, 18, 87 rationality of — , 19

scholarly character of —, 109-110 — research new style, 87, 91-112 — research new style in the field of religion, 1, 37, 58, 113-117, 130-134, 143-147, 157 critical function, 136 examples of applications of — . 40-42 some philosophical-anthropological assumptions and presuppositions of — , 145 view of religion in — , 42, !35-!36 f o u r kinds of — studies, 105-106 phenomenologist, involvement of a, 101 phenomenologists of religion absolute ideals of — , 36 Dutch — , 119-120, 125 — in the idealistic stage of the discipline, 43 phenomenology, 28 — as a movement of research,

9 I_ 9 2 — as a movement of

thought,

91 basic problem of — , 81 ideal of an all-embracing — of all religions and religious phenomena, 36 reflective — , 105, 157 ' special' — of a specific set of p h e n o m e n a , 105 phenomenology of religion, 3-4 — and theology, 128 — as a branch of the systematic study of religion, 95 — as a creative activity, 246 — as a religious ideal, 119 — as an interpretative and systematic discipline, 110 — as investigation of religious meanings, 124 apologetic overtones of — , 128

Subject index

phenomenology of religion (continued) classical — , 1, 4, 29, 30, 34-40, 42, 45. 56-57. 92. 124, 144 — alienated itself too much f r o m philosophical phenomenology, 129-130 — as a discipline of transition, 39 — as an interpretation of religion instead of doing research into it, 128 c o m m o n features of — , 121 critical observations with regard to — , 58, 127-130 generalizations of — , 129 hypotheses of — , 129 ideological role of — within the study of religion, 128 in — religious data receive meaning f r o m the value entity of religion as such, 124 solutions to overcome the crisis of — 39-fo theological inspiration or impulse behind — , 128 development of — as a discipline, differences between the major handbooks of — , 109 Dutch — , 34-40 emotional involvement of discussions about — , 121 existential — , 105-106 five different ways of understanding of — , 119-120 ideal of a — that was itself religiously determined, 36 idealistic initial stage of — , 36 idealization of — , 36 implicit theory of religion in — implied a definition of what is essential to religion, 123 impossibility of any definite kind of — , 109

265

inner self-criticism of — , 113 intention of all — , 122 internal problematic of — , 35-37 interpretation of religious data in — is closely connected with the concept of religion used, 136 new style — , 106-108 no definition of religion in — , 123 state of adolescence of — , 9 1 three lines of approach of — , 96-97 philosopher, professional, 9 philosophers, G r e e k and Indian, 19 philosophical — and theological thought, 9 — investigation preceding empirical research, 96 lack of an independent — tradition in Holland, 72 philosophy of religion, 73 plurality of approaches, 52 popular religion, 176 — and official religion, 28 positivism, 234 Power, 95 p o w e r of the State, 154 prayer, 98, 99 pre-Chalcedonians, 164 pre-reflexive notions of reality a n d truth, 71 primitive mentality, 26 problems, scale of different ways of putting, 53-56 psychoanalysis of cultural and religious expressions, 107 psychologizing, 244 psychology — of religion, 59 — of religion in Holland, 28-29 structural — , 244 reality, 16-17, 234 non-empirical — , 27, 42

206

Subject index

reality (continued) reduction of —, 234 view of —, 167 reason notion of —, 81-82 struggle for —, 63-64 reference point, 146, 161 references of expressions, 103 religiocentrism, 16 religion — and institution, 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 — and the world, 133 — as a communication and signification system, 108 —as a function of culture, 26, 27, 2 9 — as a phenomenon, 136 — as a signification system, 108, 136 — as a system of communication, 27 — as a system of significances, 88 — as autonomous value category, 1 2 1 , 123, 128 — as locus of the problem of meaning, 13 adherents of a particular —, 47-48 basic structure of —, 126 change of —, 169 changes in — and connection with the discussion about methodology in the study of religion, 72 concept of —, 144 concept of — not defined by classical phenomenology of religion, 124 — consisting of a network of relationships, 142 contemporary —, 161 critical view of —, 33 dialectic between empirically studied — scholar's idea(l) of —, 35~3 6notions of —, 109 different

dissatisfaction with one's own —, 32. 33 essence and manifestations of —, 123 fundamental structure of —, 120 general concept of —, 38 — held to be irrational, 75 human reality of —, 36 idea and reality of —, 126-127 idea of knowing what — really is, 111 ideal of —, 95 ideal structure of —, 121 idealization of —, 148 — in Holland, 3 1 - 3 3 institutional —, 132 institutionalization and deinstitutionalization of a —, 108 interpretation of — according to the meanings which specific individuals and groups have derived from it, 5 living —, 3, 85, 132 morphology of —, 37, 105 new conceptualization of one's own —, 148 new —, 132 new forms of —, 28 no definition of —, 109 non-institutionalized —, 132 notion of —, 108-109 objective reality of — taken as a phenomenon in itself, 56 originating of —, 88 over-evaluation of —, 158, 159 phenomenon of —, 105, 112, 120 phenomenon of — and phenomenon of man, 45 positivistic reductions of —, 128 realia and idea of —, 35-36, 38-39 — studied as a human phenomenon, 60 present-day —, 142

Subject index

religion (continued) present-day changes with regard to —, 141-162 proper function of —, 161 real and genuine —, 162 reduction of —, 121 reduction of — to essentials, 148 reductions of — to pure experience or pure idea, 128-129 relationship between — and art, 110 relationship between — and its manifestations, 124 religious evaluation of —, 58 scholar's own ideal of —, 35-36 a — seen as a champ de significations, 88 — still litde known, 141 structure of — as a given idea, 123 — studied as a human reality, 99 subjective —, 142 symmetry between —and scholarship, 17 transformations from — into non-religion and vice versa, 141 treatment of past and living —, 104 view of —, 122-123 views of — and their consequence for the choice of methods to study it, 73 the word —, 143 religions — as aspects of certain cultures, 143 — as human views of reality and truth, 167 — as sign systems, 18 — as signification systems, 18 — of Antiquity, 23, 24, 39, 105, 2 4 4 . 245 — of the past, 67 changes in present-day —, 147-156

267

confrontations between —, 131 contemporary —, 163-184 history of —, 143, 159, 163 living —, 23, 57, 62, 67-68 new —, 149, 150 non-literate —, 26, 39, 151 plurality of —, 31, 143, 169 syndrome of — and confessions in Holland, 72 treatment of past and living —, 98 the word —, 143 Religionswissenschaft, classical, 18 See also under: study of religion religious — a priori, 145 religious and non-religious, 102-103 — as different shades of meaning, 160 opposition between —, 161 separation between what is —, 133. what is considered to be —, 62 — action, 174 — apprehension, 120 — arguments, 175 — behavior, 30 — behavior in interaction with the context, 55, 62 — belief, 156 — change, 62, 156, 161, 181, 184 — communities, 176 — conflict, 147 — consciousness, 120 religious data implicit human dimension of —, 5

interpretation of — closely connected with the concept of religion used, 136 relationship between — 125-7 relationships between — and non-religious data in a given culture, 127

268

Subject index

religious (continued) — demography (Religionsgeographie), 27 — dialogue(s), 158, 163 — discourse, 163 religious discussion(s), 163-184 — as a form of social interaction, 163, 167 — as social facts, 4, 163 — on contemporary social reality, 174, 175-177 analysis o f — , 170, 177-179 definition of — , 166 definition of the problem of a — , l79 effects of — on motivations and intentions, 174 influence of the social structure of a society on — , 176 issue of — as a problem for the parties involved, 178-179 possible effects of — , 173-174 Protestant-Catholic — , 176 psychological elements in a — , 179 relevance of — , 169-170 ritual aspects of — , 164 — and social crisis within a given society, 177 sociological interpretation of — , 175-177 — experience, 29,37,123,128,144 religious expression(s), 13 — as a special case of human expression in general, 5 aesthetic aspect of — , 11 ο analysis of — , 41 difficulties of interpreting — , 142 direct — , 98, 100, 103-104 symbolic character of — , 27 two types of — , 29-30 — facts, ι ο, 13 — group formation, 173 — ideals, 118

— — — — —

man's basic structure, 120 movements, 132 music, 25 orientation, 120 oudooks and scientific thought, 183 — past, 155 — pressure, 149 — problem and its discussion, 177 — projection, 28 — qualities investigated, 145 — representations, 117-118 — response to problems, 106 — response to social facts and events, 174 — revitalization processes, 150, 160 — societies, 175, 160 — statements, 167 — transcendence, 161 — universe, 99 attitudes towards one's — tradition, 148, 180-181 continuation of a given — tradition without change, 181 discussion about — tradition and about modernization of society, 181 monotheistic — traditions, 123 new problems for — traditions, 154 reconsideration of — traditions, 184 reconstitution of a — universe, 83, 87, 103, 104, 110 reconstitution of a — world, 137 things being defined and experienced as — , 64 reflections, authenticity in a researcher's, 52 repressio religiosa, 160 repression, 107 research — on religion and interfaith relationship, 85-86

Subject index

research (continued) — techniques, 60, 70 communication of the results of 63 historical-critical — , 196 intrinsic connections between — and reflections, 77 methodical model of — , 53-54 technification of — , 55, 56 researcher(s) active self-involvement of — , 110-111 authenticity of — , 77 critical stand of — with regard to religion, 71 divinatory capacity of — , 96 situation of — , 100-101 systematically oriented — and — who are more directly bound to their material, 68-69 revolutionary movements, 176 ritual action, 118 rooting (enracinement), 109, 146, 160 sacred and profane dialectic between — , 102 opposition between — , 161 sacrifice, 118 schematization, 52, 123 schemes of reference, preconceived, 83 scholar — as a witness, 103 dialectic between — 's idea(l) of religion and religion empirically studied, 35-36 existence of a — , 15 faith of a — , 83-84 human situation of a — facing religious materials, 15 intentions of a — , 13 personal needs and aims of a — of religion, 74 scholarly research crisis in — when certain assump-

269

tions of reality and truth turn out to be incorrect, 72 kinds of - of religion, 53-54 scholarly study of religion profession of the — , 46 terminology in the — , 30 scholarship consequences of — for changes involving the future of religion, 147, 150 problem of — and faith, 86-87 symmetry between — and religion, 17 science as an absolutely autonomous province, 86 science of religion and theology, separation between, 61 sciences, 153 scientific general theory of — research, 125 — thought and religious outlooks, 183 'second' world, 160 secular v. religious societies, 160 secularization, 28, 148, 149, 153, 157, 168-169, 170, 182 self-critical impulse of a researcher, 71 self-critical reflection and scholarship, 82, 95 self-criticism, methodical, 2, 3 semiotics, 60 sense and nonsense, ultimate, 106 sexual repression, 160 sign(s), 42 feedback between — and intentions, 18 sign or signification system(s) and intentions, dialectics between, 62 significance concept of — , 93 cores of — of a signification system, 108 layers of — , 107

αηο

Subject index

signification analysis of —, 41-42 concept of —, 42, 93 intrinsic connection between — and communication, 62 — system(s), 42, 146 social change, 170 social reality, 27, 168-169 interpretation of — and definition of one's own position, 183 redefinition of —, 172 scholar's definition of —, 183 social sciences, 38, 59, 62, 101 social structures, 129 sociology, 19 sociology of religion, 23, 27-28, 59, 163-166 solipsism, 38, 130 source(s), 56, 66-68 specialization, 38 state interest, 154 statue, 98, 99 structuralism, 29, 60 structure concept of — and concept of intention, 117 inner — within a culture or religion, 114 structures of being and meaning, 126 student of religion attitude of a —, 147 autonomous reflection of a —, 84 dialogue between a — and a philosopher or theologian, 9 existence and co-existence of a —, 48 intellectual situation of a —, 45-48 involvement of a —, 47 professional —, 9 religion or religiosity of a —, 45-46 students religiously committed and uncommitted, 107

studies, pragmatic character of, 61 studies of religion, Dutch, 23-43 study of religion — as an autonomous field of studies, 16, 123 — as a test of reason, 141 aims of —, 74-75 basic positions in —, 54 classical —, 56-57 classical —, methodological and theoretical considerations about, 57-58 communicative aspect o f — , 1 3 , 1 5 comparative —, 29, 30, 38, 108 deconfessionalization of —, 16, 61 division between — and philosophy of religion, 54 function of — for an ulterior aim, 74-75 ghetto situation of — in the university, 63 human reference of the material of —, 100 a hundred years of — in Holland, 65 ideal of religion in — determined by religious criteria, 36 ideological points of view introduced in —, 76 impulses and questions for — coming from outside, 73 inspiration of the — past and present, 55 interest in the Netherlands in —, 3°-34. 243-244 marginal position of — in the West, 74 modernization of —, 55 new developments in —, 60-62 new orientations in —, 25-30 normative ideas in —, 80 relationship between — and theology, 123 relevance of —, 6, 75

Subject index

study of religion (continued) some basic tendencies in — in the Netherlands over the last five years, 61-62 some basic decisions in the —, 76 some conditions f o r progress of - . 63

special method for the —, 73 subject matter and aim o f — , 1 2 - 1 3 — taught in Holland almost exclusively to theological students, 63 theological intention in —, 34 — via one's own religious experience, 244 — with a view beyond scholarship itself, 86 subjectivism, 28, 244 subjectivity, 16 — as objectively relevant, 20 — in religious studies, 14 — in the studied object, 15 objective study of —, 20 — v. objectivity, 14 — of the researcher and scholar, 14, 15, 18, 19, 55, 58, 84, 96, 246

surplus value, 12, 106, 144 survival and necessity to survive, 154. 155 symbol(s), 27, 42, 144 symbol system, 42, 114 syncretistic nature, 149, 150 systematic science of religion, 27,29, 3°. 37. 3 8 ' 58 systematic theology, 27 teamwork, 39 technification of research, 55, 56 technological change and technology. «53. '59. 161. '83 theologian, professional, 9 theologians, dialectical, 243 theological Faculty(ies), 23, 24, 25, 33- 46. 61

271

theology, 73 dialectical —, 205, 207, 243 encyclopaedia of —, 188 ethical — in Holland, 194-197, 199, 205, 2 1 1

theories as ideologies, 51 theory, 112 central place of both — and practice of research on religion, 55 — formation, 55, 59, 60, 70 primacy of — as opposed to factual positivism, 61-62 — of science, 59-60 T h i r d World, 155, 160 transcendence and transparence, '35 transcendent as 'religious backg r o u n d ' , 103 transcendent reference of 'religious' facts, 99 travels, 31 truth, mankind engaged in a common search f o r —, 94-95 typology, 121, 126 — of religion, 37, 105 unbelief, 129, 156 capacity for —, 155 unconsciousness, forms of expression of the, 160 understand, to, 103, 104 understanding, 3, 98-99, 101, 102 — at present, 48 — capability, 47 experience of the act of —, 234 — ' f r o m within', 244 mutation of man's — of himself, »59 new forms of — at present, 48 — others, 20 rational justification of scholarly —, 1 1 2

reality of subject and object of —, 234

272

Subject index

university institutions, conditions of work in, 63 Urmonotheismus, 221 values and meanings, handing over of, 20 verification, 30, 58, 60, 83 verstehen — as an ethical attitude, 101 — as aim of scholarship, 245

3.

I N D E X ON T E R M I N O L O G Y

Weltanschauung, 16, 36 world ideologies, 42 world opinion, 158 world religions, 42, 156 Yoga, 151 Zen,151 zurück zu den Sachen reformulated as 'back to the basic intentions', 94

G E R A R D U S V A N DER

actus, 217 aesthetics, sacramental character of, 217 agens in the sacrament, God as, 218 analogia fidei, 212, 218 Anknüpfungspunkt, 205 anthropological (phenomenological) and theological thought, dialectic between, 237 anthropology, 209, 210-213, 222 — as Christian theology, 211 Christian — , 197 relationship of — , psychology and natural theology, 207 sacramental character of — , 217 science and scholarship passing into existential-philosophical — , 201 theological — , 201, 207 theology and phenomenology pointing to — , 210 anthropomorphism, 212 Antiquity, 200, 216 apologetic and pastoral intention, 200, 203 apologetics, 209 appreciation of Van der Leeuw's work by W. B. Kristensen, 244

LEEUW

art and religion, eschatological essence of, 220 art is religious art, real, 219 arts, hierarchy of the, 220 baptism, 214, 218 beauty and sacredness, 219 Biblical theology has a same function as phenomenology, 208 Christendom, 204 Christian existence, 208 Christology, 194, 211 Church, 215, 216 — as a sacramental phenomenon, 214 ancient — , 216 dynamis of the dogma of the — , 208 Eastern — , 216 theology as — discipline, 203 classification, 231 communication, circle of (Sphäre von Gemeinsamkeit), 229 confirmation, 214 conscientia, 201 consciousness, stream of, 225 contents of faith and structure of theology, analogy between, 200

Index on terminology Gerardus van der Leeuw

Creation — and Fulfillment, 195 — and grace, 218 — honored in the sacrament, 216 Incarnation-Eschaton as basic pattern of theology, 210, 215 connection between — and Incarnation, 196 eschatological tension between — and New Creation (Recreation), 195, 203, 204, 211, 212, 215, 218, 220 Mediator of — , 194, 195, 204, 206 relationship between the fallen — and the New Creation (Recreation) in the Incarnation, 219 theological basis of — -Incarnation-Eschaton, 219 Creator-Spiritus, 204 creatura, 205, 206, 215, 217, 218 — as order of creation, 211 Cross, 212, 218 cultural sciences or humanities, 201 culture, 212, 219, 232η. religious root of — , 211 deed, God's, 215 dialectical theology, 205, 207, 211 Divine and human reality, relationship between, 213 Divine self-communication, 215 dogma of the Church, dynamis of the, 208 dogmatic or systematic theology, 208-209 empathy (Einfühlung), 225 empirical research, 232 Epilegomena of 1933, the, 223, 230-231 epoche, 225, 231, 23 m. erfassen, 201, 202, 229 erfassende Ereigniswissenschaft, 201

273

eschata, theology taking into account the, 201 eschatological boundary (borderline), 195, 196 eschatological view of science and scholarship, 201 eschatology, 195 Eschaton, 195, 202, 203, 204 — of faith and scholarship, 200 connection between — and Incarnation, 196 essence, 225 static — , 226 Eternal within temporality, manifestation of the, 194 ethical orthodoxy, 197 ethical theologian to incarnation theologian, development from, 209 ethical theology, 194-197, 202, 205, 211, 215, 222 evidence (Evidenz), 225, 226 — as a readiness for revelation, 2 33 existence, human, 202 existential — anthropology as a substructure for theology, 211 — conception of science and scholarship, 201 — philosophy, 216 — theology, 202 experience — of faith, 197 — of revelation, 198 — of the supra-historical (übergeschichtlich) asbasis of faith, 195 — of understanding (verstehen), 198, 227η. constructing — , 226-227 definition of — as Erlebnis, 226 empirical — , 226 eschatological character of each — of meaning, 198 faith — of Christ as Lord, 224

274

Index on terminology Gerardus van der Leeuw

experience (continued) five structures of the — of the sacrament, 217 frontier — of human existence, 211 personal — of Christ, 194, 195 phenomenological — , 224 primal — (Urerlebnis), 226n., 227η., 230, 234 religion as existential frontier — of encountering Power, 210 religious experience, 196, 216, 223, 225 — as experience of the eschatological 'religious Power', 224 basic structures of — , 199 growing attention to the objective side of — , 243 relation between — and revelation, 202 sacramental — of reality, 224 subjective — of faith, 215 sympathetic — , 231 tension between subject and object of — , 224 — to be understood and — of understanding, 234 experiential unity, 230 explanation, principle of, 225 faith — and knowledge, 237 — and understanding, 237 — in a new reality within reality, 211 Christian — structure, 217, 223 eschaton of — and scholarship, 200 ethical experience of — , 202 experience of — , 197 experience of the supra-historical (übergeschichtlich) as basis of faith, 195

man's relation to God investigated on the basis of the — of the thinker, 210 paradox of — , 196 Fall, 212 forma, 217 genuineness of a doctrine, 199 godsdienstwetenschap, 206 — as phenomenological theology, 208 Gospel, 204 Greek culture and idealism, 206, 240η. heilsgeschichtlich, 196 Heilswort, 216 hermeneutics, 231 historical theology, 204-206 history — and phenomenology, 236 — of religions, 190, 221-222 — of salvation, 196 relationship of — andphenomenology of religion to theology, 235-237 Holy Spirit, 212, 216 relation between — and Christ, 195, 203 homo ludens, 210 homo religiosus, 206, 238 humanum, 212 ideal structures, all-embracing (übergreifende Geistesstrukturen), 229 ideal type(s), 223, 233, 234 — as instruments of verstehen, 230 definition of — , 224 no reality of place and time of — , 231 normative character of — , 224 idealistic spirituality, 214 image, 212, 213, 217, 220, 230 — of God, 212, 218 ideal — of man, 210

Index on terminology Gerardus van der Leeuw

Incarnation, 195-199 passim, 203-209 passim, 214-220 passim, 224 — as a unio physica, 216 basic form of the — , 208, 209, 21 o, 213 connection between — and Creation, 196 connection between — and Eschaton, 196 doctrine of harmonious — , 195, 219 harmonious doctrine of — , 215 paradox of the — , 196 — recognized in the faith experience of the absolute, 194 theology of — , 203-204, 211, 215 influence in the Netherlands, Van der Leeuw's, 245-246 intelligible structure, 197 intention(s) basic — of Van der Leeuw's work, 239 human — , 216, 238 interest in history and phenomenology of religion, historical roots of Van der Leeuw's, 243 introspection, 232η. intuition, 236 irrational, the, 194, 196 Kingdom of God, 197, 219, 220 knowledge — and faith, 237 — of God, 206 division of — and disciplines, 200 pyramid of — : fact-understanding-faith, 209 life human — and sacrament, 212213 power of — and death, 210 two movements of — , 215 literature and art, 241 liturgical theology, 214, 222

275

liturgies, 190 liturgy, 213-214 — as the core of the Christian's life, 214 Logos Spermatikos, 206 Lord's Supper, 214 man fundamental attitudes of — , 223 God's image in — , 220 ideal image of — , 210 — becoming — , 211 myth of — , 210, 213 natural and reborn — , 220 relation between God and — , 194, 210, 213, 222, 237 mana, 221-222 materia, 217 matter-to-be-understood (Verständlichkeit), 228 meaning, 230 — and reality, 226-228 — as a network cast over reality, 229 absolutization of the notion of — , 235 — between object and subject, 229 central problem of phenomenology is that of meaning or significance, 228 eschatological character of each experience of — , 198 man's seeking for meaning, 232 problem of — , 235 search for ultimate — or sense in metaphysics and theology, 201, 202 ultimate — , 198, 229 meaningful connection (Sinnzusammenhang), 227n. meaningfulness, unified living, (eine einheitliche lebendige Sinnbezogenheit) as object of experience of understanding, 226

276

Index on terminology Gerardus van der Leeuw

mental structures, religious, 233 mentality primitive — , 238, 239η., 240η. primitive over and against m o d e r n — , 23m., 238 m e t h o d s , three spheres in the cognitive, 229 modernists, liberal, 197 motivations f o r p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion, personal religious, 240 music, 241 natural reality, 204 natural sciences, 200 natural theology, 204, 205, 207, 223 relationship of — , psychology and a n t h r o p o l o g y , 207 — within the act of verstehen, 234 nature and supranature, 205, 211 objective m i n d (objektiver Geist), 229, 234 O f f i c e (Amt), 214 o r t h o d o x y (Protestant), 197 pansacramentalism, 217 participation a n d distance, tension between, 231 n. phenomenological categories of — analysis, 233 dialectic between — (anthropological) and theological t h o u g h t , 237 — m e t h o d , 232η. relationship between — and dogmatic theology, 207 stages of — treatment, 231-232 phenomenological theology, 206-207 — as an extension of ethical theology to the whole of religion, 198

— as an intermediary stage between historical-exegetical scholarship a n d dogmaticsystematical theology, 196, 197, 201, 228 — as Religionswissenschaft, 228 phenomenologist attitude of a — , 2 2 5 e x p e r i e n c e of a — , 227n. ' s e l f ' of a — , 227n. p h e n o m e n o l o g y , 223, 230 — — — —

and a n t h r o p o l o g y , 238-239 and art, 239-240 and history, 236 a n d theology pointing to anthropology, 210 — as a Christian anthropology, 211 — as a substructure f o r theology, 211 — as a theology of meaning,

37 — as verstehende Erlebniswissenschaft, 201 function of — is to m a k e valid the earthly reality of what is theologically relevant of religion, 238 relationship of — and history of religion to theology, 235237 significance of — f o r V a n d e r L e e u w , 240 p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion, 190, 222-241 — as an a u t o n o m o u s discipline, 237 n. — as a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l theology, 222 — as a psychology of religion, 227, 227η. function of — , 247 — fundamentally a theological discipline, 5 m e t h o d o l o g y of — , 224-235

Index on terminology Gerardus van der Leeuw

phenomenology of religion (cont.) other names f o r — are: Religionswissenschaft, phenomenological theology, psychology of religion, 227n. phenomenology of the word equivalent to p h e n o m e n o l o g y of religion, 217 psychological procedure of — , 235-236 spiritual dimension a n d creative activity in — , 246 theological basis and nature of — , 222, 223 theology gives the faith of the Christian community as n o r m to — , 236-237 — within a theological framework, 237 phenomenon, 223, 230, 234 interpolation of the — in one's own life, 231 pneuma, 216 pneumatology as an aspect of Christology, 204 positivism, 234 potentia obedientialis, 205 Power, 221-222 praeparatio ethnica, 205 praeparatio judaica, 205 preaching, 214, 216 predicatio Christiana, 205 priesthood of the faithful, general, 218 primitive(s) — man, 200, 214 — mentality, 209 rehabilitation of — , 239 psychology, 201 — as a substructure f o r theology, 211 relationship of — , anthropology and natural theology, 207 structural — (Strukturpsychologie), 207, 227η.

277

realis praesentia, 218 reality — as my — , 231 reduction of — , 234 rebirth, hope of, 210 Re-Creation, theology of, 203 Redemption, 220 religion — as existential frontier experience of encountering Power, 210 — as experience and as revelation, 232-233 — as the extension of life to its uttermost limit, 232η. — as seeking power in life, 232η. ancient Egyptian and G r e e k — , 221 f o u r structures of the relationship between — and art, 219 joining of subject and object in — , 215 psychological foundation of — , 236 relationship between subject a n d object in — , 218 scholar of — should be religious himself, 236 unity of — , 235 religions of non-literate peoples, 221, 222, 238 representation, 218 Resurrection, 204, 209 Revelation, 211, 215 — and world, 205η. existential experience of — , 202 experience of — , 198 genuineness of the — experience of the theologian, 199 objectivity of — , 202 relation between — and religious experience, 202 sacramental notion of — , 206 tension between — and h u m a n expression, 204

278

Index on terminology Gerardus van der Leeuw

Revelation (continued) theology of objective — , 2 1 1 rites, 216 ritus, 216, 218 roads — from man to God, 219 two — in theology, 205-206, 211, 219 sacrament, 199 definition of — as a phenomenon, 216-217 direct link between — and Incarnation with Creation, 218 five structures of the experience of the — , 217 God as agens in the — , 2 1 8 human life and — , 212-213 one basic — , 218 relationship between grace and creatura in the — , 217 — rooted in the essential nature of man, 217 theological definition of — , 218 sacramental — reality, 215 — reality of the New Creation (Recreation), 211-212 — reality of the religious image, 212 — theology, 215, 222 sacraments, 214-219 Aristotelian doctrine of the — , 215 Calvinistic doctrine of the — , 199 necessity for a theology of the — , 216 sacramentum, 216 sakramentfähig, creatura as, 218 sanctification, 203 scholar of religion should be religious himself, 236 scholarly problem reducible to a theological question, every, 201

scholarship eschaton of — and of faith, 200 existential concept of — , 200 faith(ful) scholarship, 194, 200 tension between — and theology, 198 science — and scholarship based on an existential anthropology, 21 ο — is finally religious, 219 analogy between model of science and structure of theology, 200 eschatology of — , 201 identity of the eschatological essence of — and religion, 220 platonic idea of — , 239 relation between theology and — and scholarship in general, 203 theological ground and justification of — and culture, 201 sciences, pyramid of, 202 theology as queen of the — , 201, 203 Scripture, 216 servant, 212 society, modern industrial, 239 soul, boundary character of the, 207 spiritual dimension and creative activity in phenomenology of religion, 246 spiritualism, 199 structural connections (verständliche Beziehungen), 226, 231 structural relations (verständliche Zusammenhänge), 226, 231 structure — and meaning, 228-229 — as an experienced construction, 227 — as essence of the phenomena, 229 — as imprint (geprägte Form) on reality, 229

Index on terminology Gerardus van der Leeuw

structure (continued) — as interconnection of meaning, 229 n. — as reality significantly organized, 229n., 230 — as a unity of meaning, 227 analogy between — of theology and contents of faith, 200 analogy between — of theology and model of science, 200 concept of —, 207 study of religion (godsdienstwetenschap), 206 — as phenomenological theology, 208 — within the framework of theology, 246; comp. 206, 208 subject and object separation of — (Subjekt-ObjektSpaltung), 240 unification of —, 199 subjectivity, 199 — of the believer, 202 — of the researcher, 225 substructure and superstructure in Van der Leeuw's work in a relation of reversal, 211 supra-historical (übergeschichtlich) as basis of faith, experience of the, 195 surplus value, 207, 217 theological —, 208 symbol(s), 212, 213, 216 systematic or dogmatic theology, 208-209 testimony, 232 theologia — biblica, 208 — crucis, 219 — dogmatica, 208-209 — ethica, 209 — gloriae, 219 — liturgica, 209 — poimenica, 209

279

— politica, 209 — symbolica, 208 theologian of the incarnation, 240 theological — aesthetics, 219-220, 239 — anthropology, 201, 207 dialectic between — and anthropological (phenomenological) thought, 237 — surplus-value, 208 theology — and phenomenology pointing to anthropology, 210 — as a descriptive discipline, 236 — as liturgy, 209 — as queen of the sciences, 201, 203 analogy between the structure of — and the contents of faith, 200 — consisting of a triad, 198 — of creation and re-creation, 210 dialectical —, 205, 207, 211 dogmatic or systematic—, 208-209 — doing justice to the whole of life, 196 encyclopaedia of —, 223 — essentially sacramental, 217 ethical —, 194-197, 202, 205, 2 1 1 , 215, 222 historical —, 204-206 liturgical —, 214, 222 'living Church' as the norm of —, 203 natural —, 204, 205, 207, 223, 234 natural — becoming — of creation, 212 necessity for a — of the sacraments, 216 objective sacramental —, 215 paradoxal nature of —, 208 phenomenological — as an intermediary stage between historical-exegetical scholar-

28ο

Index on terminology Gerardus van der Leeuw

theology (continued) ship and dogmaticsystematical — , 196, 197, 201, 228 phenomenology as a substructure for — , 211 — of re-creation, 203 relation between — and science and scholarship in general, 203 — speaking about God's actions, 202 synthesizing — of incarnation, 247 systematic or dogmatic — , 208-209 tension between — and scholarship, 198 three branches of — , 204-209 three levels of — , 198 triangle of — divided into three parts, 202 ' two roads' in — , 205-206,211,219 tradition, 216 trinitarian basis of Van der Leeuw's thought, 204 Trinity, 204 two-way traffic, 202 types as wider connections, 230 unio physica, 218 unto sacramentalis, 218 unity of Christ's person, 218 understandability, circle of (verstaanbaarheidskring), 229 understanding, 229 — as aim of study of religion, 224, 225 — eschatologically, 207 — for Van der Leeuw, 235 genetic-structural — , 226 — leading to being understood, 223-224, 228, 233, 234 — non-Christian religions, 208 — presupposes faith, 237

— proceeds by way of extension, 236 reality of subject and object of — , 234 static-phenomenological — , 226 Verständlichkeit, 228 verstehen, esp. of religious experience, 197-202 passim, 206, 207, 210, 224-231 passim act of — is ultimately religious, 233 discussion of Van der Leeuw's notion of verstehen, 234-235 experience of — , 198 goal of — is pure objectivity, 232 — in the Epilegomena of 1933, 230-231 man's relation to the world investigated on the basis of — by the thinker, 210 movement of — in thought and scholarship of the twenties and thirties, 229η. natural theology within the act of — 234 normative element of — , 226η. — of religion, 232-233 religious character of — , 234 Word — and Sacrament, 219 — of God, 204, 205, 215 sacrament of the — , 217 world eschatological tension between — of God and — of man, 205 worlds boundary between two — , 194, 195 worship, heavenly and earthly, 214

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to acknowledge here his gratitude for the kind permission granted by the respective editors and publishers to reproduce in this book, in English translation or in a more idiomatic English version, some previously published texts: 1) Ch. 3: 'The intellectual situation of a student of religion' (pp. 45-48). This was part of the article' Religion and the Dutch tribe', published in Explorations in the Anthropology of Religion: Essays in Honour ofJan van Baal(e sp. pp. 268-271), ed. by W. E. A. van Beek and J. H. Scherer. This is Volume 74 of the Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, published by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1975. 2) Ch. 6: 'The category of faith in phenomenological research' (pp. 79-88). This was previously published as 'The category of faith in new style phenomenological research' in Proceedings of the Xllth Int. Congress of the I.A.H.R. (Stockholm, igyo) (pp. 305-315), ed. by C. J. Bleeker, G. Widengren and E. J. Sharpe, published by E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1975. 3) Ch. 7:'Phenomenology of religion: a scholarly discipline, a philosophy, or an art?' (pp. 91-112). The fragments of pp. 92-94,97-101,103-105 and 106-108 were previously published on pp. 110-113, 119-124, 124-126 and 130-133 as part of the paper 'Research on meaning in religion' in Religion, Culture and Methodology, ed. by Th. P. van Baaren and H. ]. W. Drijvers (Religion and Reason, 8), published by Mouton, The Hague, 1973. 4) Ch. 8: 'Toward a new style phenomenological research on religion' (pp. 113-137). This was previously published as 'Grundsätzliches zur Religionsphänomenologie' in Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, Vol. 14, Fase. 3 (1972), pp. 315-335. 5) Ch. 9: 'The situation of present-day religions' (pp. 141-162). This was previously published as 'Religionen der Gegenwart im Blickfeld phänomenologischer Forschung' in Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie, Vol. 15, Fase. 3 (1973), pp. 304-325. 6) Ch. 11: 'Gerardus van der Leeuw as a theologian and phenomenologist' (pp. 187-247). Part of this paper (pp. 224-241) was previously published as part of the article ' Religion between reality and idea: A century of phenomenology of religion in the Netherlands' (esp. pp. 224-241), published in Numen, Vol. 19, Fasc. 2-3 (1972), pp. 128-203.

Religion and Reason Method and Theory in the Study and Interpretation of Religion

ι. Category Formation and the History of Religions by Robert D. Baird (University of Iowa) 1971, XII+178 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-6889-6

2. Western Religion A Country by Country Sociological Inquiry, ed. by Hans Mol (McMaster University) 1972, 642 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7004-1

3+4. Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion Aims, Methods and Theories of Research, by Jacques Waardenburg (University of Utrecht) Vol. ι: Introduction and Anthology 1973, xiv+742 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7226-8

Vol. 2: Bibliography 1974, vm+332 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7971-5

5. Religion as Anxiety and Tranquillity An Essay in Comparative Phenomenology of the Spirit, by J. G. Arapura (McMaster University) 1972, viii+146 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7180-3

6. The Cardinal Meaning Essays in Comparative Hermeneutics: Buddhism and Christianity, ed. by Michael Pye and Robert Morgan (University of Lancaster) 1973, 204 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7228-1

Religion and Reason

283

7. Logique et Religion L'Atomisme logique de L. Wittgenstein et la possibilite des propositions religieuses. Including 'Logic and Religion', a shortened and adapted English version of the text, par Jacques Poulain (Universite de Montreal, Canada) 1973, 228 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7284-2

8. Religion, Culture and Methodology Papers of the Groningen Working-group for the Study of Fundamental Problems and Methods of Science of Religion, ed. by Th. P. van Baaren and H. J. W. Drijvers (University of Groningen) 1973, 172 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7249-4

9. Religion and Primitive Cultures A Study in Ethnophilosophy, by Wilhelm Dupre (University of Nijmegen) 1975, x+356 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7531-0

10. Christologies and Cultures Toward a Typology of Religous Worldviews, by George Rupp (Harvard University) 1974, xiv-I-270 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7461-4

11. The Biographical Process Studies in the History and Psychology of Religion, ed. by Frank E. Reynolds (University of Chicago) and Donald Capps (University of North Carolina at Charlotte) 1976, xn+436 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7522-1

12. The Study of Religion and Its Meaning New Explorations in Light of Karl Popper and Emile Dürkheim, by J. E. Barnhart (North Texas State University) 1977, xiv+216 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7762-3

284

Religion and Reason

13. Studies in the Methodology of the Science of Religion ed. by Lauri Honko (University of Turku) 1978, approx. 600 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7854-9

14. Structure and Creativity in Religion Hermeneutics in Mircea Eliade's Phenomenology and New Directions, by Douglas Allen (University of Maine) With a Foreword by Mircea Eliade 1978, xvm+270 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7594-9

15. Reflections on the Study of Religion Including an Essay on the Work of Gerardus van der Leeuw, by Jacques Waardenburg (University of Utrecht) 1978, xii-I-284 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7604-X

16. Interpretation and Dionysos Method in the Study of a God, by Park McGinty (Lehigh University) 1978, viii+262 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7844-1

17. Principles of Integral Science of Religion by Georg Schmid (Teachers College, Chur, Switzerland) 1978, approx. 200 pages. Clothbound ISBN: 90-279-7864-6

Other volumes are in preparation Mouton Publishers

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