Reflections and perspectives: Essays in philosophy 9783111560960, 9783111190259

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Reflections and Perspectives Essays in Philosophy

Reflections and Perspectives Essays in Philosophy by E.D. K L E M K E Professor of Philosophy Roosevelt University Chicago, Illinois

Mouton • The Hague • Paris

Cover-design by Helmut Salden Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 73-81810

© Mouton & Co. 1974 Printed in the Netherlands

We shall not ceasefrom exploration And the end of all our exploring Will be to arrive where we started And know the placefor thefirst time. T.S.Eliot

To Robert A. Snyder

Preface

Several of the essays in this volume were first read to various groups such as philosophy clubs, student-sponsored lecture series, etc. They are in somewhat "lighter" mood than the papers which customarily appear in technical philosophical journals. In my view, philosophy is hard work, and yet it is also enjoyable. And I believe that it is possible to deal with serious topics in a way which makes it possible for the reader or hearer to share in the enjoyment. I have tried to do that in these papers, and I hope that I have to some extent succeeded. The essays fall roughly into three main areas of philosophy: Philosophical method (1-3), philosophy of logic (4-6), and philosophy of religion (7-8). The first, second, fourth, sixth, and eighth of the essays were read to various student groups. The second, third, fifth and seventh essays have been published before, and I am grateful to the editors of various philosophical journals for granting permission to reprint them here. I am also grateful to my former and present students at DePauw University and Roosevelt University and to the Northwestern University Philosophy Club for the invitations to read papers to their groups and for the many stimulating hours of discussion which followed. I would also like to express my gratitude to those who encouraged me to publish these papers in a book and provided help. I would especially like to thank Professors Henry Veatch, M.S. Gram, and Harry L. Golding, Dr. G. Moor, Dr. Robert A. Snyder, and Mr. Truman Metzel. Special thanks are also due to Mrs. Mary Facko who typed the manuscript, to former Deans George Watson, Paul Olscamp and Otto Wirth, and to Dean Ralph Carnes and President Rolf Weil of Roosevelt University. Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Gustav Bergmann, May Brodbeck, and Herbert Hochberg. Philosophically and personally, I remain so indebted to them that I can never hope to adequately repay them.

Contents

Preface 1. How to split a hair without losing your head

1

2. Are philosophical questions linguistic?

14

3. Are 'external questions' non-cognitive?

29

4. A positive and persuasive proof of propositions—perhaps

40

5. The laws of logic

55

6. One and only one logic

64

7. Are religious statements meaningful?

78

8. Living without appeal: An affirmative philosophy of life

96

1. How to split a hair without losing your head1

i If one turns to the works of some of the world's major philosophers, one finds that they are concerned with all sorts of marvelous problems: Whether or not it is true that to be is to be the value of a variable; whether or not the ideal language is extensional; whether or not the laws of logic are inference-tickets; whether or not it is true that in change, it is not merely the somewhat that cancels itself and passes over into another, but that the other itself changes, and that the other of the other, or the change of the changeable, is the Becoming of the Abiding — of the in-and-for-itself Subsisting and Internal. I do not wish to begin with any of these topics; they are all too technical for this occasion. Instead I shall begin with a subject pertaining to the method of philosophy rather than some particular philosophical problem, but in such a way that an application can be made to a particular philosophical thesis. More precisely, I have chosen as my topic: The importance of a certain method in philosophy, and the application of this method towards the solution of a specific philosophical problem. So my main task is to illustrate this method and to try to show that it is an important one. I do not say that it is the only method in philosophy. But I nevertheless do say that it is a very important one. In fact, I think that, with regard to many philosophical problems, this method is so significant that, once it has been employed, one has gone a very long way to the solution of a problem and that perhaps in some cases one has solved the problem. This method is commonly referred to as the method of analysis. Now many people are very suspicious, or even hostile, when they hear the word 'analysis'. They think that one who analyzes breaks things into bits, or that

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Reflections and perspectives

he analyzes things (perhaps very important things) away, or that he performs idle hair-splitting and logic-chopping. But I assure you that I do not intend to engage in such activities. I prefer wholes to smithereens, for the most part. And I have no desire to remove good, worthwhile things from our world. (I'd be a fool if I tried to do so.) And although I may appear to have a yen for hair-splitting, I insist that I only engage in it when there is some point to doing so, when there is some distinction to be made which illuminates something about the world or our experience and knowledge of it. But just as there are many methods in philosophy, so there are many kinds of analysis. I do not propose to go into all of them here. Nor do I suggest that the form of analysis which I wish to discuss and illustrate is the only proper one. I merely want to say that this particular form of analysis constitutes a very important method in philosophy. I believe that many philosophers have, for centuries, employed it, even though they were not called analysts, and that many use it today. And I maintain that it is worthy of being continued and perhaps even more widely used than it now is. In order to illustrate this method, I am going to select, with regard to a philosophical problem, a certain philosophical thesis, which may or may not be a very significant one, and then show how this method of analysis can contribute towards the solution of that problem. The thesis which I have in mind is: Acts of consciousness, mental awarenesses, mental states, thoughts, sensations, etc., are nothing but electro-chemical impulses in the brain and/or nerves; or, in short, mental states are nothing but brain states. Now you might be thinking, at this point: "What a silly view! Whoever seriously held anything so ludicrous?" Well, I assure you that a famous philosopher at a famous university holds, or at one time has held, this position. Let us call him Mr. Sanderson. Now Mr. Sanderson may object that he either no longer holds this view or that he has never held such a position and that I am misquoting him entirely. Oh well, if that be the case, then let us invent a non-famous non-philosopher to whom we will attribute this position, and let us call him Mr. Simon. Still others may be thinking: "I don't see that there is any longer a problem here. After all, psychologists, neurologists, etc., have shown that this thesis is true." To this I must reply that psychologists and neurologists

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(and anyone else you would care to mention) have shown no such thing. All that some of these eminent men may have demonstrated is that, for psychology as a science, it is not necessary to postulate within that science two kinds of entities, mental as well as physical. Or more precisely, that in order to fulfill the purpose of psychology as a science, the language of psychology need not employ terms designating "mental entities" as well as terms designating "physical entities". Now that's a long shot from showing there are no mental states. A psychologist can no more remove mental states from the universe by his science than he can remove the planet Mars. Once again, the thesis of Simon is: What are commonly referred to as states of consciousness, or acts of awareness, or mental states or processes, including thoughts, sensations, etc., are nothing but electro-chemical brain states. They are the same as brain states. There are not two kinds of ontological entities in the universe — thoughts, etc., on the one hand, and brain states on the other. There is ultimately only one kind of entities. All of these entities are material, being, in our case, certain complex states of the brain. Therefore when we talk about so-called mental phenomena, our discourse, strictly speaking, does not characterize or express any facts over and above material facts. When I say that I am seeing green or thinking about Bertie Russell, there are not two facts involved. The two sentences 'I am seeing green' and 'I am having a certain sort of brain state' express the same fact, namely the fact of there being the brain state occurring.

II Now commonsensically, of course, this thesis seems absurd. Commonsensically, there are, we are inclined to say, two kinds of events or states: Mental events, consisting of thoughts, sensations, etc., and physical events, consisting (in our case) of neural impulses, brain states, etc. O f course, we would not deny, even commonsensically, that there is some relation or connection between the two. And what is this connection? Let us take an example which will bring it out. The other night I was invited to the home of my friends, the Jacobsons. While I was sitting on the sofa snifting my brandy, a superb cognac which my host had poured, I suddenly heard the sound of a meowing which, I have reason to believe, was uttered by the most remarkable, intelligent, frientlycat I have ever known, whose name is Waldo. Now, what happened when I heard Waldo's friendly greeting? Well

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Reflections and perspectives

this is all very complicated, so I had to go to a library and look it up in a technical book. According to this book, what happened went something like this: Sound waves, which are condensations and rarefactions of air, caused particles of air to strike repeatedly on my ear drum, causing it to vibrate. My ear drum is connected by three very small bones to a membrane which covers one end of a spiral tube in what is called the inner ear. The vibration of the ear drum was transmitted through these little bones to the membrane at the end of the tube. And the tube is filled with a liquid known as perilymph, and the vibration in the membrane caused a vibration to pass through this liquid. Inside this tube is still another tube filled with another liquid called endolymph. Now there are tiny hairs which stick out from the walls of the membrane into the endolymph, and the vibrations in the endolymph causes these hairs to vibrate. Furthermore, there is a nerve, appropriately known as the auditory nerve, which is attached to the roots of these hairs. The vibrations of the little hairs caused impulses to pass up the auditory nerve to a certain region of the brain, called appropriately the auditory center. And when the auditory center was stimulated, I heard the cat's meow. It is truly amazing that all this activity could occur in just a fraction of a second, but scientists assure us that it does. Now having got that report, we are, as I said, commonsensically inclined to say that the brain state and all that preceded it is one thing (or at least all of one kind), but the occurrence of hearing the pussycat's meow is another. The brain state, etc., is a physical event, or a series of such, but the auditory sensation, the experience of hearing the meow, is a mental event. And the same holds for all other sensations and for thoughts, memories, and what not. Commonsensically, we would distinguish two kinds of events, physical and mental. And why would we so distinguish them? One of the reasons is that the physical event has a certain attribute which the mental event lacks, namely, it is spatially located. It is, as G.E. Moore would say, following Kant, to be met with in space. The physical event took place inside my head. But the mental event did not occur in my head. Suppose that a surgeon were to cut open my head and examine it at exactly the moment when I heard Waldo's meow. He would see all the states of my brain and perhaps, with sufficiently accurate instruments, be able to distinguish various states of my brain. But he would never find the cat's meow or my awareness of it. Nor would he find any other objects of sensation or thought or the sensations and thoughts themselves.

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Thus from a commonsensical standpoint, we are inclined to say that states of consciousness are correlated with brain states, but that they are not the same as brain states. The two always occur together, in this sense: That thoughts, sensations, etc., never occur in the absence of brain states (so far as we know). In other words, the occurrence of brain states is a necessary condition for the occurrence of mental states. But if one is a necessary condition for the other, then they can't be the same. There must be two kinds of things. Thus awarenesses and mental states are dependent upon brain states, but this in no way allows us to say that those mental events are brain states. To this, Mr. Simon may reply: No, brain states are not merely a necessary condition for the occurrence of so-called mental states. They are also a sufficient condition. In other words, not only is it the case that without some brain state, there is no mental state. It is also the case that whenever there is a certain brain state, there is a mental state. Or, again, whenever a certain brain state occurs, a certain mental state occurs, and whenever a certain mental state occurs, a certain brain state does. Thus the occurrence of a certain brain state is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for the occurrence of a certain mental state. But this means that the two are the same. For example, being a plane figure whose internal angles equal 180 degrees is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for being a (Euclidean) triangle. Whatever is a triangle is a plane figure whose internal angles equal 180 degrees, and whatever is a plain figure whose internal angles equal 180 degrees is a triangle. Thus these two expressions refer to or express the same thing. Now this holds for brain states and mental states too. Therefore the two are the same. There is really only one ontological stuff, not two. Our commonsensical way of speaking is therefore incorrect. When I say that I am seeing green and that I am having a certain brain state, I am really talking about only one fact. The two sentences 'I am seeing green' and 'I am having such-and-such brain state' express the same fact. Here, then, is our problem. Mr. Simon says: So-called mental states are nothing but physical states; the two are the same. We are inclined to say, commonsensically: No, the two are different. How are we to resolve this issue ? Not by pounding on the table or shouting in a loud voice in defence of common sense. Not that I have no respect for common sense. On the contrary, I do. But common sense is only a factor to consider. By itself, it cannot solve the problem. On the other hand, simply giving in to Mr.

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Reflections and perspectives

Simon's view is hardly a solution either. Rather it is an indication that we have merely ignored the problem, due to laziness or too many brandies. How, then, do we resolve the problem? Here is where philosophical analysis comes in. Perhaps there is some confusion in the discussion. Perhaps certain concepts are being used in unclear or ambiguous ways. And maybe there are certain distinctions to be made which will go a long way, if not all the way, towards resolving the problem. I suggest that this is the case with regard to our problem. I suggest that there is a certain expression in the argument which has not been properly analyzed, and that upon analysis of this term, no one, not even Mr. Simon himself, could ever be wowed by his thesis. What is this term? It is the term 'same' in the expression 'same fact', as when Mr. Simon says that there are not really two facts but that sentences which purport to designate mental events as well as those which do designate physical events express the same facts. 2

III Let us take a specific example. At this moment, I am thinking about Waldo (the cat) — thinking about how he likes to watch television, how he loves to jump up on the table when you are not looking and eat up all the chicken, etc. I am also at this moment, there is good reason to believe, having certain brain states — electro-chemical impulses, etc. Let us refer to these simply as x brain states. Then the thesis which we are examining holds that the two sentences Al. I am thinking of Waldo, and A2. I am having x brain states, express the same fact. And again, what I am suggesting is that the problem cannot be adequately resolved without analysis, due to the ambiguity of the word 'same' as it is used in the expression 'same fact'. Let us proceed then with the analysis. The expression 'same' in 'same fact' may be used in several different senses. (I) The first use of the expression 'same' (in 'same fact') involves what I shall call primary sameness. Consider, if you will, my two feet. My left foot and my right foot are different, not the same. They are two, not one. On the other hand, at any given moment, my left foot is — to use a perhaps odd expression — the same with itself. (Likewise for my right foot.) This sort

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of sameness and difference are basic. They can hardly be explicated. They can only be immediately apprehended. Now let us consider when sentences designating one or the other or both of my feet would express the same fact. Take: B1. My left foot is in this shoe (at time tl). B2. My left foot is in this shoe (at time tl). B1 and B2 obviously express the same fact. But CI. My left foot is in this shoe. C2. My right foot is in this shoe, equally obviously, in this use of'same fact', do not express the same fact. In this use of 'same fact', two sentences express the same fact if and only if they are two tokens of the same type. Let us call this use of 'same' in 'same fact' 'same-1'. Same here means identical. Then we have seen that B1 and B2 express the same-1 fact, whereas CI and C2 do not express the same-1 fact. Now what about A1 and A2? Do they express the same-1 fact? Again, obviously not. For they are not merely two tokens of the same type. Hence we may conclude that when Mr. Simon says that the two sentences Al. I am thinking of Waldo. A2. I am having x brain states, express the same fact, he cannot possibly mean that they express the same-1 fact. He cannot possibly mean that the fact expressed by Al is identical with that expressed by A2. There is a use of'same' and 'same fact' which is a special case of the first use. Consider: Dl. Ike defeated Stevenson. D2. Eisenhower defeated Stevenson. Dl and D2 are not explicitly two tokens of the same type. But they are reducible to two tokens of the same type via the identity sentence, 'Ike is (is of identity) Eisenhower'. I.e., 'Ike' and 'Eisenhower' both name the same-1 individual. Thus, for example, one can substitute, via the identity sentence, 'Ike' for 'Eisenhower' in D2 and thereby get two tokens of the same type. Can Al and A2 be construed as an instance of this special case of same-1? Again, obviously not. For Al and A2 do not constitute a pair of sentences in which there occur two names which designate the same-1 individual. (II) We have now seen that in no case do Al and A2 express the same-1

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Reflections and perspectives

fact. Let us now turn to another use of 'same' and 'same fact'. Two sentences may describe different (that is, non-same-1) facts and yet have this relation to one another: That one of them is true if and only if the other is, and one is false if and only if the other is. Such sentences are called synthetically extensionally equivalent and may be said to express the same fact. But they do not express the same-1 fact, so let us say they express the same-2 fact. Consider the two sentences: El. Violets are blue. E2. Sugar is sweet. El and E2 describe two different states of affairs. Yet it happens to be the case (although it might have been otherwise) that whenever El is true, E2 is true, and vice versa. They are thus synthetically extensionally equivalent (although they are not analytically equivalent). Since two different states of affairs are involved, the two sentences do not express the same-1 fact, but they may be said to express the same-2 fact. To be sure, in the case of El and E2, it seems peculiar, from the standpoint of ordinary language, to speak of them as expressing the same fact at all (in any sense). Well, I think that ordinary language may be all right for some purposes — everyday communication, etc. But I do not hold that there is anything sacred about ordinary language. And I think that appeals to ordinary language as some sort of criterion are often tedious, futile, and irrelevant to the solution of many philosophical problems. Thus I do not find it alarming to speak of El and E2 expressing the same fact. If you do, then all I can say is: You are apparently confusing same-2 with same-1. Make the distinction, and then you shouldn't find it so strange. Let us now go back once more to examine A1 and A2 with respect to sameness-2. Mr. Simon holds that they express the same fact. We saw that they do not express the same-1 fact. Do they express the same-2 fact? Quite likely. As far as we know, it is highly probable that, for all mental states, there are correlated certain brain states. Thus whenever I am thinking of Waldo, I am, no doubt, having an x brain state, and when I am having an x brain state, I am, in all likelihood, thinking of Waldo. To my knowledge, no one has ever demonstrated this, but it seems possible. Thus A1 and A2 very likely are related in such a manner that, whenever the one is true, the other is, and vice versa. Therefore, since the two are extensionally equivalent, they express the same-2 fact. But all this means, so far, is that, as a matter of fact, when you have the one, you have the other, and when you have the other, you have the one. It does not mean that mental states are the same-1 as brain states.

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(III) Let us now turn to a third use of 'same' and 'same fact'. Two sentences may, in their predicate terms, designate two contingently coexistensive classes and thereby may be said to express the same-3 fact. Take these two sentences: Fl. L.B.J, is (a) human. F2. L.B.J, is a featherless biped. It happens that the two classes, human and featherless biped, are coextensive. (We are omitting, with Russell, the possibility of plucked chickens.) Any individual who falls into one of the classes falls into the other. Thus any two sentences, such as Fl and F2, which predicate these characteristics of any given individual, may be said to express the same-3 fact. Now, of course, Fl and F2 also express the same-2 fact. But they go further than that. They are not merely extensionally equivalent. They are extensionally equivalent and they designate two coextensive classes populated by the same number of members. Hence they express the same-3 fact as well as the same-2 fact. Do they express the same-1 fact? Of course not. Fl does not say anything about featherlessness or bipedness. What about A1 and A2? Do they express the same-3 fact? If all you mean by A1 and A2 is: al. I am a member of the class of things who is thinking about Waldo, and a2. I am a member of the class of things having x brain states, then the answer is: Yes, Al and A2 express the same-3 fact. But this does not mean that Al and A2 express the same-1 fact. That is, it does not mean that mental states are the same-1 as brain states. To think they are is to confuse same-1 with same-3. They are very different. In order that we may be clear about this, let us consider another case. Suppose that all women who at some time or other fell into open manholes are women who at some time or other gave birth to triplets, and vice versa. Then if upon hearing that my friend Mrs. Murphy, a member of both classes, gave birth to triplets, it would hardly be appropriate for me to send a telegram saying "Congratulations upon having fallen into a menhole". What she merits congratulations for on this occasion is the birth of the triplets. Thus again, the two facts involved are different, i.e., not the same-1. Similarly, the two facts expressed by Al and A2 are not the same-1.

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R eflections and perspectives

(IV) Let us now turn to a fourth use of'same' and 'same fact'. The term 'red' directly refers to a color. The physicist speaks of red in terms of light rays or waves, etc., and may misleadingly say that red is light waves of such and such length. That is, of course, false. Light waves may cause colors, or be a part of the cause, or be a condition for the existence of colors, but light waves are not the same-1 as colors. I often see red, but I have never seen light waves. However the physicist can indirectly refer to red by the phrase 'the color with the longest wave length' (in the visible spectrum). Consider now the following two sentences: G1. The color of this book is red. G2. The color of this book is the color with the greatest wave length. Then we may say that G1 and G2 express the same-4-fact. They do not, obviously, express the same-1 fact. They do express the same-2 fact, but again, they go beyond this. G1 and G2 are not merely extensionally equivalent. It does not merely happen to be the case that when the one is true, then the other is, and vice versa. This is, of course, true. But the point is that G1 involves a direct reference to red, and G2 involves an indirect reference, in this case by designating that which is the cause or part of the cause of red, or a condition for red. Hence much more is said here than in the case of'Violets are blue' and 'Sugar is sweet'. Sentences which have this relation of direct vs. indirect reference may be said to express not only the same-2 fact, but also the same-4 fact (but not the same-1 fact!). What about A1 and A2? As we saw, they do not express the same-1 fact. Do they express the same-4 fact? No. No one has ever been able to show that having an x brain state is an indirect way of referring to my mental state of Waldo in the way in which the color with the greatest wave length is an indirect way of referring to red. However, in the language of psychology there could occur another sentence than A2 which does have this relation to Al. 3 Consider these two sentences: Al. I am thinking of Waldo, and A3. I am (he is) thinking-of-Waldo. When I say 'I am thinking of Waldo', I am directly describing a certain mental state of mine. A psychologist who adopts any sort of behavioristtype position cannot do this. Mentalistic terms are not part of this scientific vocabulary. However, the psychologist can introduce into his objectivistic scientific language a complex term, 'thinking-of-Waldo', which contains neither the term 'thinking' nor the term 'Waldo'.4 This term, 'thinking-of-

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Waldo', is then defined dispositional^ by means of terms referring to certain physical states of myself (including my verbal behavior) which accompany my state of consciousness when I think of Waldo. My term 'think' refers to a mental state (so does the psychologist's term 'think' when he is not practicing his science). The scientist's complex term 'thinking-ofWaldo' refers to behavioral and environmental facts (including the noises I utter). Hence at this point we may say that, whereas A1 and A2 do not express the same4 fact, certainly A1 and A3 do express the same-4 fact. However A1 and A2 do not express the same-1 fact, nor do A1 and A3 express the same-1 fact. (y) Finally, let us turn to one other use of 'same' and 'same fact'. Call it same-5. Consider these two sentences: HI. Henrietta Hassenpfeffer went to Rome or to Athens. H2. It is not the case that Henrietta Hassenpfeffer neither went to Rome nor to Athens. HI is an instance of the schema 'p or q\ H2 is an instance of 'not both (not-/? and not-g). These two forms are logically equivalent. I.e., the expression \p or q) if and only if