Rebranding China: Contested Status Signaling in the Changing Global Order 9781503607866

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Rebranding China

seri es editors Amitav Acharya, Chief Editor American University

David Leheny, Chief Editor Waseda University

Alastair Iain Johnston Harvard University

Randall Schweller The Ohio State University

internat ional board

Rajesh M. Basrur Nanyang Technological University

Brian L. Job University of British Columbia

Barry Buzan London School of Economics

Miles Kahler University of California, San Diego

Victor D. Cha Georgetown University

Peter J. Katzenstein Cornell University

Thomas J. Christensen Princeton University

KhongYuen Foong Oxford University

Stephen P. Cohen The Brookings Institution

Byung-Kook Kim Korea University

Chu Yun-han Academia Sinica

Michael Mastanduno Dartmouth College

Rosemary Foot University of Oxford

Mike Mochizuki The George Washington University

Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University

Katherine H. S. Moon Wellesley College

Sumit Ganguly Indiana University, Bloomington

Qin Yaqing China Foreign Affairs University

Avery Goldstein University of Pennsylvania

Christian Reus-Smit Australian National University

Michael J. Green Georgetown University

Etel Solingen University of California, Irvine

Stephan M. Haggard University of California, San Diego

Varun Sahni Jawaharlal Nehru University

G. John Ikenberry Princeton University

Rizal Sukma CSIS, Jakarta

Takashi Inoguchi Chuo University

Wu Xinbo Fudan University

Studies in Asian Security

The Studies in Asian Security book series promotes analysis, understanding, and explanation of the dynamics of domestic, transnational, and international security challenges in Asia. The peer-reviewed publications in the series ana­lyze contemporary security issues and problems to clarify debates in the scholarly community, provide new insights and perspectives, and identify new research and policy directions. Security is defined broadly to include the traditional political and military dimensions as well as nontraditional dimensions that affect the survival and well-being of political communities. Asia, too, is defined broadly to include Northeast, Southeast, South, and Central Asia. Designed to encourage original and rigorous scholarship, books in the Studies in Asian Security series seek to engage scholars, educators, and prac­ titioners. Wide-ranging in scope and method, the series is receptive to all paradigms, programs, and traditions and to an extensive array of methodologies now employed in the social sciences.

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Rebranding China contested status signaling in the changing global order

Xiaoyu Pu

stanford university press Stanford, California

Stanford University Press Stanford, California © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University Press. Printed in the United States of America on acid-free, archival-quality paper Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Pu, Xiaoyu, author. Title: Rebranding China : contested status signaling in the changing global order / Xiaoyu Pu. Description: Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 2019. | Series: Studies in Asian security | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018035350 (print) | LCCN 2018036823 (ebook) | ISBN 9781503607866 (e-book) | ISBN 9781503606838 (cloth : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: China—Foreign relations—21st century. Classification: LCC DS779.47 (ebook) | LCC DS779.47 .P83 2018 (print) | DDC 327.51009/05 — dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018035350 Typeset by Newgen in 10/13 Bembo Cover photos: (left) Pudong, Shanghai, by night. Raffaele Nicolussi, via Panoramio | Wikimedia Commons; (right) sugar cane on a tricycle, Xinhui district, Jiangmen, Guangdong. “Tongde3Lu” | Wikimedia Commons

In memory of my father, who inspired and supported me for years but didn’t stay long enough in this world to read my first book

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Contents

Acknowledgments 1 Introduction

xi 1

2 Status Signaling in International Relations

16

3 China on the World Stage: Multiple Audiences, Competing Expectations

34

4 Domestic Audience, Nationalism, and Weapons of Mass Consumption

51

5 Red Mask and White Mask: The Charm Offensive, Selective Coercion, and China’s Regional Diplomacy

70

6 Lying Low or Striving for Achievement: Global Financial Crisis and Spin Doctoring in Beijing

86

7 Conclusion

99

Notes Index

109 147

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Acknowledgments

I am thankful for many mentors at Ohio State University, including Bear Braumoeller, Rick Herrmann, Ted Hopf, Bill Liddle, Jennifer Mizzen, Alex Thompson, Alex Wendt, and especially Randy Schweller. I have appreciated all the suggestions from my peers, particularly Bentley Allan, Zoltán Búzás, Austin Carson, Erin Graham, Eric Grynaviski, Marcus Holmes, Jason Keiber, Joshua D. Kertzer, Nina Kollars, Tim Luecke, John Oates, David Traven, Fernando Nunez-Mietz, Jiwon Suh, Joshua Wu, and Chaekwang You. I participated in the Status in World Politics project co-led by Deborah Welch Larson, T. V. Paul, and William Wohlforth, and I appreciated comments from them as well as from David Kang, David Lake, Iver B. Neumann, and Alexei Shevchenko. Thomas Christensen and Alastair Iain Johnston awarded me a fellowship in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program (CWP), and I presented this book project at the CWP annual workshop at Harvard in 2013. I appreciated comments from all participants of the workshop, especially Andrew Erickson, Taylor Fravel, Courtney J. Fung, Todd Hall, He Kai, Scott Kastner, Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Dawn Murphy, Qin Yaqing, Phillip Stalley, Wang Jisi, Xu Xin, and Zheng Yu. Providing valuable feedback for my book proposal were Yong Deng, Ted Hopf, Yinan He, Deborah Welch Larson, Zhiqun Zhu, Jessica Chen Weiss, Robert Jervis, and Randy Schweller. Many more provided comments in different stages of the project: Nhung Bui, Chen Dingding, Chen Yong, Chen Zheng, Chen Zhirui, John Chin, Ja-Ian Chong, Clay Cleveland, John Delury, Lin Minwang, Men Honghua, Han Zhaoying, Andy Wei Hao,

xii

Acknowledgments

Richard W. X. Hu, Tongfi Kim, Cheng-Chwee Kuik, Qu Bo, Li Wei, Liu Feng, John Mearsheimer, Fang Changping, Rosemary Foot, Avery Goldstein, Evelyn Goh, Greg Moore, Tudor Onea, Michael Reese, Ren Xiao, Yul Sohn, Matias Spektor, Oliver Stuenkel, Sun Xuefeng, James T. H. Tang, Tang Min, Jeremy Wallace, Wang Chengli, Wang Chuanxing, Wang Cungang, Wei Zongyou, Yin Jiwu, Xu Bin, Xu Jin, Xue Li, Wu Xinbo, Wu Wencheng, Joel Wuthnow, Yan Xuetong, Zhang Qingmin, Zhou Fangyin, and Zuo Xiying. (I apologize if I have accidentally left anyone’s name off this list.) Tang Shiping has been a constant source of good advice and encouragement. I am indebted to the many scholars who taught me in my early years, especially Steve Brown, Steve Hook, Zhang Ruizhuang, and Zhu Guanglei. Since 2006, I have been hosting a global scholarly Listserv on China’s international relations, and I thank each of the four hundred scholars participating from around the globe. I appreciate Quansheng Zhao for inviting me to join the Global Forum of Chinese Political Scientists, which is a wonderful source of new ideas and inspirations. I am grateful to the many scholars, policy analysts, and officials I interviewed during my fieldtrips in China and Brazil. I am particularly grateful for the grants and fellowships from the Mershon Center of the Ohio State University; Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation; International Activities Committee of the University of Nevada, Reno; and the Center for International Relations at Fundação Getulio Vargas in Brazil. Amitav Acharya and David Leheny are terrific editors for the Studies in Asian Security book series. I thank them, as well as the two anonymous reviewers, for their suggestions. Alan Harvey and Leah Pennywark from Stanford University Press provided guidance during the final stage of the project. Eve Baker and Eric Shibuya read the manuscript, and they also provided helpful comments. The University of Nevada, Reno, has been my home institution since 2013. I am grateful for the collegiality and support from all my colleagues, especially Berch Berberoglu, Bill Eubank, Eric Herzik, Bob Ostergard, Hugh Shapiro, and John Scire. I also thank Ty Cobb for advice and encouragement over the years. Finally, I thank my family. My wife, Hou Ying, and my in-laws, Hou Guangzhong and Liu Mingxiang, have provided enduring support and encouragement. I am indebted to my elder brother, Pu Guoyong, who has shouldered disproportionately greater responsibility in our family. My parents, Pu Jiaxu and Li Sirong, stimulated my curiosity for academic research early on and have supported my aspirations throughout the years. I regret that I haven’t been able to celebrate the Chinese New Year with them for so long.

Rebranding China

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1

Introduction

China is not a superpower; nor will it ever seek to be one. If one day China should change its color and turn into a superpower . . . the people of the world should expose it, oppose it and work to­ gether with the Chinese people to overthrow it. —Deng Xiaoping, speech at United Nations General Assembly, 1974

In November 2015, “China was trumpeting its arrival as one of the world’s great economic powers as the International Monetary Fund elevated the [Chinese] renminbi to the ranks of leading currencies, alongside the dollar, euro, yen and British pound.” Many Chinese elites celebrated the elevated status of the renminbi as another milestone of China’s rise to great power status. Yet a few days later, during the Paris Climate Change Conference, China insisted on its developing country status as Chinese officials noted that “hundreds of millions of people in China are still very poor.”1 Fast-forward to 2017. As protectionist sentiment rises in many parts of the world, Chinese President Xi Jinping actively defends economic globalization on international forums.2 Largely abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s low-profile approach in global affairs, Xi Jinping has implemented a much more ambitious foreign policy, proposing new international institutions and hosting high-profile summit meetings. Some Chinese diplomats have started to talk about China’s leadership in global governance more explicitly. In January 2017, senior Chinese diplomat Zhang Jun commented that “China [would] assume world leadership if needed.”3 A month later, however, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi cautioned against an inflated expectation of China’s global role: “China has no intention to lead anyone, nor does it intend to replace anyone. . . . As the largest developing country, China is moving to work tirelessly for upholding the legitimate rise and interest of the developing countries.”4 During his speech at the Summit Meeting for the Belt Road Initiative in May 2017, Xi Jinping expressed China’s intention to contribute more to global

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d­ evelopment, but Xi also reassured his international audience, “In pursuing the Belt and Road Initiative, China has no intention to form a small group detrimental to stability.”5 In a speech later that year at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Xi Jinping laid out an ambitious blueprint for China’s national rejuvenation, describing China as a “great power” (daguo) or a “strong power” (qiangguo) twenty-six times.6 But Xi also emphasized that “China’s international status as the world’s largest developing country has not changed.” Xi envisions China becoming a “global leader” in innovation, composite national strength, and international influence in the coming decades. He also declared, however, “No matter what stage of development it reaches, China will never seek hegemony or engage in expansion.”7 These declarations are part of a long series of contradictory signals that China has transmitted to the world regarding its preferred status. On the one hand, China continues to struggle for more recognition as a rising great power; on the other hand, China emphasizes its developing country status, sometimes complaining about other nations’ over-recognition of its rise in the international system. The existing research invariably assumes that China wants to have more status, and the duality of China’s status struggle has received little attention.8 Rising powers are expected to be eager to advance their status and prestige. In the late 1990s, the British strategist Gerald Segal said, “At best, China is a second-rank, middle power that has mastered the diplomatic art of theater: it has us willingly suspending our disbelief in its strength.”9 In the first two decades of the twenty-first century, China carefully crafted its image as a strong nation through high-profile projects such as the Beijing Olympic Games, the Shanghai Expo, and the Belt Road Initiative. With the lofty aspiration of a Chinese Dream, President Xi Jinping aims to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. Additionally, in the South China and East China Seas, China has strengthened its maritime claims. According to Admiral Harry Harris, the commander of US Pacific Command, “China is seeking regional hegemony in East Asia.”10 According to Liu Mingfu, a professor at China’s National Defense University, China and the United States will pursue an Olympic-style competition for global leadership.11 Michael Pillsbury, a former Pentagon official, claims that China has a “secret strategy” to replace the United States as the leading world power.12 When asked if Chinese leaders are serious about displacing the United States as the number-one power, Lee Kuan Yew, the founding father of Singapore and one of the most insightful observers of China, replied, “Of course. . . . How could they not aspire to

Introduction

3

be number one in Asia, and in time the world?”13 From these perspectives, it appears that the status competition between China and the United States is inevitable. China’s “diplomatic art of theater” includes another side, however: Beijing sometimes tries to avoid taking a high-profile role. In 2014, the International Comparison Program of the World Bank estimated that China’s economy, on the basis of purchasing power parity (PPP), was likely to surpass that of the United States in size in 2014.14 Instead of celebrating its coronation as the world’s number-one economy, China’s National Bureau of Statistics said that the result was not from official statistics.15 The Chinese media, far from trumpeting the news of China’s expected elevation to the world’s largest economy, downplayed or ignored the announcement altogether.16 In multilateral forums such as the UN General Assembly, Chinese leaders continue to emphasize China’s status as a developing country. While the international audience increasingly views China as an emerging superpower that should take a leadership role, many Chinese elites and the public still hold that China is a developing country and that China should not be eager to take a leadership role in global affairs.17 According to Cui Tiankai, the Chinese ambassador to the United States, “We have been elevated [in the eyes of others] against our will. We have no intention to compete for global leadership.”18 This problem of status over-recognition is not unique to China. The foreign policy expert Manjari Chatterjee Miller says India has a similar problem. While many international observers fret about the pace of India’s rise, the foreign policy elite within India shy away from any talk of the country’s rising status. According to a senior Indian official, “There is a hysterical sense, encouraged by the West, about India’s rise.”19 China sends contradictory signals about its status and role in the twentyfirst century. An assertive China demands greater accommodation of what it considers its core interests in Taiwan, Tibet, and the South China Sea, and leaders of a shirking China urge international audiences to see, not an upand-coming superpower, but a still relatively poor developing country. How a country projects an image of its preferred status is important, and miscommunication of these signals can have serious consequences. The nature and content of the international order in coming decades will partially depend on what roles the emerging powers, especially China, decide to play.20 Is China a challenger or a supporter of the existing global order? Is China a “free rider” as described by President Barack Obama?21 A key element for a peaceful transition of power is the transparency of intentions that allows the established power to accept the greater role played by the rising power. ­Signaling by

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China and recognition of China’s status are therefore crucial. China’s status ­signaling shapes how China deals with many international issues. For instance, should China primarily position itself as a developing country or a responsible great power in the climate change negotiations? China’s complex roles in the international arena led to some inconsistencies that plagued its position during the Copenhagen climate negotiations.22 Historically, rising powers and established powers have had conflictual relationships, partially driven by competition over status. In international politics, status competition between rising and established powers is often thought to be a zerosum game. China’s signaling could influence perceptions of China among its audiences, and those perceptions will influence how other countries respond to China’s changing position. For instance, if China were seeking to grow within the existing order, the Sino-American relationship may not be a zero-sum game, and the United States could largely be willing to accommodate China’s rise.23 If China were seeking to replace the United States as a new superpower, however, a Sino-American conflict might be inevitable.24 In particular, if international status is viewed as positional good, it is a scarce resource that cannot be shared by all nations.25 In recent years, China’s more assertive posturing has partially contributed to rethinking by the United States of its strategy toward China.26

Rebranding of a Conflicted China Beijing’s intentional downplaying of its status, when viewed through the lens of existing international relations theories, appears puzzling; however, the debates in China about its status and role in the world partially explain the puzzle. In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping set a guiding principle for China’s diplomacy, emphasizing that China should “hide its capabilities and bide its time,” a low-profile approach known as the tao guang yang hui strategy in China.27 More recently, the Chinese foreign policy community has been debating what China should signal to both domestic and international audiences.28 Systematic analysis is needed to deepen our understanding of China’s international positioning. Some Chinese scholars conceptualize China’s zaidingwei (repositioning) as an issue of diplomatic transformation (waijiaozhuanxing).29 They debate whether China should play a more active role on the world stage.30 Questions related to these debates include: Is China an emerging superpower or a developing country? Should China continue maintaining a low-profile approach in global affairs? How should China manage its status and responsibilities on the global stage? How should China deal with the US-led global order?31

Introduction

5

According to Wang Jisi and Cai Tuo, two of the most influential international relations thinkers in China, the heated debates over China’s dingwei (positioning) or zaidingwei within China’s foreign policy community are unique because the broader literature of international politics contains no systemic studies of repositioning.32 While Wang’s and Cai’s assessments of the Chinese scholarly literature may be accurate, I argue that repositioning can be analyzed from a more theoretical perspective. The challenge of how a great power adapts to its new status is not unique to China. According to a comparative study of several “shaper nations,” such as Germany, India, China, and Brazil, their national strategy is often distorted by domestic politics, national identity, and economic concerns, making it difficult to develop a coherent strategy to advance their power and status on the global stage.33 Japan has been struggling for status and prestige, measuring its standing against other major powers.34 Russia’s long-term relationship with the West has been shaped by its perceptions of honor: when Russia perceives its honor is recognized, it cooperates with the West; without such recognition Russia pursues independent policies defensively or assertively.35 In international history, rising and declining powers often have difficulty in objectively evaluating their shifting power and how to accordingly adjust policy. Not only does the inherent uncertainty and complexity in the international system constrain the objective assessment of power and status at a national level.36 Domestic politics also complicates the process of strategic adjustments, leading to pathologies such as underexpansion, overexpansion, or underbalance.37 In the late nineteenth century, domestic political fragmentation inhibited the ability of a declining Britain to assess its relative power position accurately.38 Under what conditions will a rising power pursue an overexpansion policy? When and why will a rising power pursue a shirking policy?39 Furthermore, viewed in a broader context, “the logic of positionality” is an important yet largely ignored topic in the international relations literature.40 This book conceptualizes China’s repositioning as a rebranding strategy. Here “rebranding” refers to the efforts of building a new image. Like a rapidly growing company trying to redefine its goal and brand, China aims to project a new image and to establish a new position. In business, rebranding is creation of a name or symbol, or a combination, for an established brand with the intention of developing a differentiated position within the marketplace. These changes are typically meant to reposition the brand, sometimes in an attempt to distance itself from negative connotations of the previous branding.41 Rebranding has been applied in politics and international ­relations.42 The concept is especially popular in the literature related to national image,

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soft power, and public diplomacy.43 I use “rebranding” in this book as a metaphor for China’s diplomatic repositioning, and in this sense it is different from rebranding in business and public diplomacy. As I demonstrate in this book, China’s repositioning on the global stage leads to a more fundamental question concerning China’s definition of identity and interests as well as the design and implementation of its grand strategy. While the Chinese government started the process of rebranding China in the twenty-first century, the debates are far from settled. Thinking of China’s repositioning as a rebranding strategy requires some explanation. In the scholarly literature, China is often viewed as a prestige maximizer with a strong sense of status insecurity, or status anxiety.44 Traditionally, the status concern of rising powers is the gap between their desired high status and others’ recognition of their status. They have psychological and political motivations to close the gap.45 According to power transition theory, the onset of war between a dominant and a rising power grows more likely as the gap in relative strength between them narrows and as the latter’s grievances with the existing order move beyond any hope of peaceful resolution.46 This status discrepancy is widely recognized as a core issue of power transition in international politics. Another problem of status politics, status over-recognition, however, is understudied. China’s grand strategy has no coherent blueprint, and there are competing visions for its emerging roles on the world stage.47 This is not to argue that Beijing has no grand strategy but rather that Beijing’s grand strategy includes contradictory elements.48 China has had a diverse domestic discourse about its international role in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. Officials and scholars in China’s foreign policy circles actively debate the opportunities and responsibilities of being a great power. Thus, China remains a deeply conflicted rising power with a series of competing international identities.49 While Xi at the 19th Party Congress set out a clear development goal for China, that goal has some contradictory or ambiguous elements on China’s international role.50 Domestically, many new actors are now part of a complex foreign-policy-making process.51 Beijing’s signals have been increasingly contradictory. China was clearly a status maximizer in the 1990s, but its rapid rise occurred more quickly than anticipated, and it is unprepared for its new international profile. Because China sits in multiple positions in world politics, China has to manage its conflicted roles. For instance, China has the interests of both a developing country and a developed one, and China is both a weak country and a strong one. With multiple identities, China finds it increasingly difficult to define its interests in a coherent way.52

Introduction

7

China has been sending mixed signals about its status in international society. While mixed signals are difficult to avoid in all but the most tightly controlled regimes, they seem especially common in China. Mixed signals pose some challenges for China in projecting a desired image, but they also provide Chinese leaders flexibility as they explore the complicated and challenging paths ahead. China’s mixed signals make it a veritable optical illusion, both a rising superpower and a weak developing country. Unique in current international politics, the rising powers of China and India, owing to the unprecedented sizes of their populations, possess historically unparalleled flexibility in the type of status they can choose to signal. China and India have large economies but are still poor in gross domestic product per capita. No great powers in history have had leading positions in world politics while still in an early stage of economic development as developing countries. China’s two-faced self-presentation to the world, both as a rich rising power and as a poor developing country should be further examined. While China is clearly seeking a higher status through conspicuous infrastructure projects and major inter­ national events, China also occasionally signals a low status. Existing literature can predict status-maximizing behaviors, but research on status-minimizing behaviors of a rising power is neglected. China as a status maximizer is not surprising because power transition theory posits that a rapidly rising great power will maximize its prestige. In reality, however, China is not always signaling a higher status. We see a wide range of signaling behaviors. For instance, China refused to assume a larger role during the global financial crisis in 2008 although very eager to provide assistance to Asian neighbors during the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The Group of Eight, widely regarded as an elite power club, might have considered inviting China to join the group, which would have consolidated China’s great power status, but the consensus within China’s foreign policy circle is that membership would contradict China’s own professed identity as a developing country and that it should not join.53 Creating a Group of Two (the United States and China) would certainly escalate China’s international status, but the Chinese are ambivalent. Some Chinese elites and public like the idea because it would increase China’s international status, but Chinese leaders have publicly rejected it.54

China’s Contested Status Signaling Status politics is complicated in international relations. As the international relations theorist William C. Wohlforth points out, “The process of signaling

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and recognizing status claims is at least as subject to uncertainty and complex strategic incentives as are the security politics with which scholars of international politics are familiar.”55 If China is fundamentally oriented toward gaining higher status within the existing international order,56 it may be easier for the United States to accommodate China. If China’s long-term goal, however, is not to seek higher status within the existing order but to reorganize the fundamental principles of the international order, it will be extremely difficult to engage such a China. In Destined for War, the Harvard scholar Graham Allison argues that China and the United States might be heading toward a war neither wants. The reason is “Thucydides’s trap,” the deadly pattern of structural stress that results when a rising power challenges a ruling power.57 Instead of competing for global leadership, China might avoid taking unwanted responsibilities by focusing on internal development, which would pose a different type of challenge for the international community. The American strategist Joseph Nye calls this the “Kindleberger trap,” wherein a new global power’s failure to provide international public goods can cause international disaster and chaos.58 Signaling occurs when the holder of information takes observable action to make that information available to those who do not have it in order to shape a desired image. The difference between signaling and nonsignaling behaviors is whether the primary aim is to project a particular image.59 If we conceptualize signaling broadly, it can take many forms in social life and international politics. This broad definition of signaling is related to the image- or impression-management approach of sociology, social psychology, and public relations literature.60 In sociology and social psychology, impression management is a goal-directed process in which individuals attempt to control the impressions others form of them.61 This book defines “image management” as an information-transmission process in which people and governments attempt to shape the perceptions of their images in social and strategic interactions. At the individual level, image management is a central aspect of interpersonal relations. As people attempt to control images in social interactions, they define the nature of their personal interaction and their roles in society. In international relations, image management is a central aspect of diplomacy and political propaganda. Through image management, a government defines its roles and the nature of its interactions with the domestic populace and the international society. The book concerns the motivations and strategies of signaling—namely, why and how an emerging power sends different signals.62 Status signals are defined as rituals and behaviors people use to demonstrate their preferred

Introduction

9

social standing in the community.63 In international politics, status signaling is a special type of signaling that aims to demonstrate the kind of standing a state wants to have in international society. Status signaling can be applied to explain international phenomena such as China’s space project, India’s nuclear testing, and US rebalancing in Asia. Throughout the history of international politics, there have been many types of status signals, such as hegemonic wars, military buildups, establishment of new international organizations, hosting of the Olympic Games, and the race to the moon. Status signaling is discussed in psychology, sociology, behavioral economics, and biology, whose findings can be applied to international politics. On an individual level, a nouveau riche has several strategies to use to signal her enhanced social status. She could use conspicuous luxury consumption to symbolize her wealth in some status games;64 however, if her target audience is former college roommates who live in other parts of the world, conspicuous giving to a charitable donation recorded in her alumni magazine would be a better choice.65 In international politics, a rapidly rising power can transform its wealth into status in a similar way. Just like individuals who purchase luxury goods to symbolize their wealth and status, a rising power can use material goods (e.g., building or buying a weapon) to symbolize its preferred status in the international hierarchy. A rising power could also choose to signal a higher status through the provision of public goods in international affairs.66 Drawing on original Chinese sources and theories in social psychology and international relations, I provide a theoretically informed analysis of China’s global repositioning in the twenty-first century. My intent is to move forward the scholarship on Asian studies and international relations theories in several respects. This book provides analysis complementary to yet different from other books on China. It differs from Yong Deng’s insightful analysis of China’s status struggle: Deng’s book focuses on China’s status seeking, while this book focuses on China’s status signaling.67 Deng’s study of China’s status seeking conveys an assumption that China is unsatisfied with its status, whereas my study of China’s status signaling does not come with such an assumption. Deng’s book analyzes China’s foreign policy from 1989 to 2008, whereas this book covers China’s foreign policy after 2008. This book also links the study of China to broader research agendas on status signaling in international relations.68 Thomas J. Christensen’s book The China Challenge provides a fascinating analysis of China but with an eye more on how the United States shapes China’s choices, whereas this book examines China’s internal debates and calculations.69 Using original Chinese sources, William A. Callahan

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a­ nalyzes how Chinese people understand China as a rising great power with a humiliated past.70 Using historical materials, Shogo Suzuki analyzes the sophisticated process in which China and Japan were socialized into the Westdominated international society.71 Suzuki also analyzes how China takes the Western powers as the standard for emulation as it struggles for great power status.72 Zheng Wang provides a detailed analysis of how the past has shaped contemporary Chinese nationalism through education and propaganda.73 My book is different from these studies, which concern China’s struggle for great power status. I instead focus on the duality of China’s struggle as both a great power and a developing country. China’s status of a developing country is largely ignored in these studies and others. In particular, even though Callahan and Wang highlighted a duality of China’s national identity, the duality in their analysis is different from that discussed here. In Callahan’s and Wang’s analyses, China’s duality refers to a desire to restore China’s great power status as well as a need to remember the bitter historical past. Their analysis is insightful, because China’s past will continue shadowing China’s interaction with the outside world. I focus here on a different kind of duality, however: China’s contradictory incentives to project an image of a strong great power as well as that of a poor developing country. As many Chinese elites contend, China must manage its role and image on the world stage. Instead of China’s struggle being for more recognition as a great power, my argument is that China is facing a more complicated challenge of international image projection. China’s challenge is to manage its conflicting roles and images in ways that advance its national interests while not engendering dangerous misperceptions and expectations among its neighbors and the rest of the global community. This book discusses China’s repositioning problem through a theoretical lens of status signaling in international politics. In particular, this book offers a new type of signaling model that helps explain foreign policy behaviors of rising powers. Conventional signaling models in international relations often deal with signaling processes in a context similar to the Cuban missile crisis, focusing on resolve, credibility, and benign intention.74 These signaling models attend to short-term events and do not address the long-term issue of an emerging power’s status and role on the world stage. “Status signaling” refers to a mechanism of information transmission that aims to change or maintain a certain type of status belief among relevant political actors. Status signals can be transmitted through both behaviors and speeches. Throughout history, military victory has largely been regarded as the major mechanism for signaling status. In contemporary international relations, additional mechanisms of

Introduction

11

status signaling include conspicuous consumption, conspicuous giving, and strategic spinning. By explaining the variations of China’s signaling behaviors, the book challenges the conventional wisdom about China’s status struggle. Contrary to offensive realism theory and power transition theory,75 my argument is that China is not always a status maximizer and eager to replace the United States as the new global leader.76 Instead, China tends to play different status games—sometimes emphasizing its status as an emerging great power and other times highlighting its status as a fragile developing country. China’s downplaying of its higher status and its shirking behavior pose different types of challenges for the international community. China’s struggle for higher status is a familiar problem in great power politics and theories of status conflicts.77 Because the Chinese believe that the global financial crisis has led to an American decline, they are more likely to treat American compromise as signs of weakness rather than conciliation.78 From an American perspective, the United States will not easily accommodate China’s assertive demands.79 China’s shirking leads to another problem in international politics.80 The United States needs a confident China as a partner in solving global problems, from nuclear nonproliferation to climate change, but China sometimes shirks a greater role on the world stage.81 I argue that status signaling is a multilevel game, with the state’s leadership pivoting between domestic and several international audiences (e.g., Western, regional, and global South). It is a game played between states and a state’s leadership and its populace. Accordingly, Chinese leaders face pressure from domestic and international audiences to project different images. China’s status signaling is contested domestically as the Chinese debate China’s status and the trade-offs between status and other goals. The book identifies some patterns of China’s contested status signaling behaviors.82 China has a tendency to use low-status signals for instrumental purposes, and its high-status signals are often for symbolic purposes as well as domestic mobilization. When seeking privileges in international institutions, China emphasizes its emerging power status; when shirking responsibilities and seeking solidarity, China emphasizes its developing country status. When targeting the domestic audience, China presents its rapidly rising status; when targeting an international audience, China often presents a reassuring message of its developing country status. To elucidate status signaling, the book takes insights from both constructivist and rationalist approaches and expands the research agenda of status politics. This book is different from most constructivist or psychological approaches to the topic in several respects. I use “status signaling” instead

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of “status seeking” to conceptualize the behavioral patterns of an emerging power. In most constructivist or psychological studies, status-seeking behaviors convey an implicit assumption that the status seeker is unsatisfied with her status, while status signaling behaviors do not come with such an assumption. Most scholars assume that rising powers are unsatisfied with their status, and this status dissatisfaction or status immobility is widely regarded as a major root of international conflict.83 This book identifies another, less studied aspect of status politics: status over-recognition, or status discrepancy reversed.84 The international recognition of a rising power’s status might be too high for its preference, possibly leading to conflicts and problems, especially regarding expectations of the rising power’s roles and responsibilities. Most constructivist or psychological approaches concern the symbolic and ideational motivations of status struggle, but I emphasize the interactions of symbolic and instrumental incentives in shaping a rising power’s status struggle.85 Finally, while existing studies focus on status conflict, this book identifies the conditions in which status signaling can also generate opportunities for cooperation and peaceful change in international politics. By bringing domestic politics back in, the book provides a more nuanced understanding of status concerns in world politics. Existing studies on great power status tend to overlook the important role of domestic politics.86 Some realists argue that China has strong military power, privileged membership in major international organizations, and the largest or the second-largest economy.87 Why should China still struggle for more status?88 While most observers assume that China has a desperate desire for international status, my argument starts with the premise that China’s international status is relationally and institutionally secure. I suggest that skepticism toward the conventional take on China’s status struggle yields a more intriguing question: Given that China’s international status is relatively secure, why do Chinese leaders seem so determined to project China’s strong image as an emerging power? I argue that China’s continual struggle for international status is primarily driven by domestic political calculations. Meanwhile, at the international level, China is concerned about over-recognition of its status for instrumental reasons.

Methods, Cases, and Sources Contemporary China provides a useful set of cases for exploring the plausibility of status-signaling arguments. For each case, I examine the specific mechanism and conflicted roles of China’s status signaling. I also investigate ideational sources of China’s conflicted roles through content analy-

Introduction

13

sis of government documents and interviews of officials and foreign policy analysts. The evidence collected here is about a single country.89 China’s interaction with the world is treated as a theory-generating case instead of just a test of the validity of existing theory. The goal is to link observations of Chinese foreign policy to a larger research agenda in international relations.90 My approach is different from some existing studies. For instance, Yong Deng’s analysis of China’s status-seeking behavior is penetrating and insightful, but it is an explanation of China, not theory building in international relations.91 Admittedly, a book on a single country has a limited external validity. However, the analytical framework of status signaling could be applied to other countries. Elsewhere I have examined the argument of status signaling in India’s foreign policy. India is striving for great power status while trying hard to maintain the image of a developing country.92 Brazil, too, as a dominant player in South America, has always been afraid of being viewed as a hegemon. Thus, Brazilian diplomats try to promote Brazil’s position through the notion of “consensual hegemony,” meaning that the country tries to play a leadership role through organizing multilateral dialogues rather than through explicit coercion.93 In some sense, China’s duality of status struggle is not unique, reflecting as it does the interests and identity of a large developing country with a growing international profile. Despite the limitations of examining one country, a strong case can be made for looking at only China: it might be easy to find within-case variation in China’s signaling behaviors. This study presents findings from Chinese foreign policy at transformative moments in its interaction with the world, seeking to explain China’s multiple audiences and competing images. I take a deductive approach to construct a theoretical framework of status signaling, and the selected cases illustrate the theoretical mechanisms and propositions. There are practical reasons to select these cases, because all cases are politically important in Chinese foreign policy. The book investigates the following cases: China’s naval transformation and military parades reveal the crucial role of domestic politics in status signaling. China’s conspicuous giving in the Asian financial crisis demonstrates the importance of regional audience. China’s strategic spinning during the global financial crisis illustrates the influence of two types of global audiences (the global South and the West). In each case, I analyze the conflicted roles of China and the competing expectations from multiple audiences. When discussing China’s signaling behaviors, I do not assume that China is a coherent actor. Domestic bargaining is part of the signaling game in

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i­nternational interactions. Also, I use “China” to mean the Chinese government, Chinese Communist Party, and Chinese policy elites. When analyzing Chinese materials, I avail myself of insights from both official and quasiofficial materials. “Official” materials are government or party statements and speeches and writings of Chinese leaders. “Quasi-official” materials refer to publications in Chinese international relations journals. I also conducted multiple rounds of field research in China, interviewing think-tank analysts, university professors, and officials.94

Overview of the Book Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical framework of status signaling in international politics. Different incentives from different audiences motivate an emerging power to send different status signals. National leaders can signal the preferred status of their nation through various means. Chapter 2 identifies strategies and tactics of status signaling: conspicuous consumption, conspicuous giving, and strategic spinning. It also highlights the core dilemma of signaling in international politics: in facing competing expectations from multiple audiences, an emerging power must manage its multiple roles on the world stage. Chapter 3 details China’s multiple identities and audiences. Identities include socialist country, developing country, emerging or established great power, and quasi superpower, and audiences are the domestic, regional, global South, and Western domains. While China certainly intends to build a positive image, it has multiple incentives to project different images. Chapter 3 illuminates the motivations for China’s signaling behaviors. Chapter 4 opens with a conceptual analysis of China’s signaling a higher status through conspicuous consumption in international relations. It then turns to the importance of domestic audience and nationalism. The chapter discusses China’s naval transformation and military parade, examining the underlying motivations and comparing the status signaling argument with competing approaches. Chapter 5 analyzes China’s competing images in regional diplomacy. China signaled a higher status as a regional leader through conspicuous giving in the Asian financial crisis, and China has strengthened its charm offensive strategy in recent years. However, China has also defended its maritime claims through selective coercion. The two faces of China’s regional diplomacy pose a challenge to regional order. Chapter 6 analyzes China’s strategic spinning during the global financial crisis. Facing two types of global audiences (the global South and the West),

Introduction

15

China sometimes highlighted its high profile as an emerging great power and other times tried to downplay its profile by highlighting its developing country status. Developing country status serves multiple purposes for China: targeting the West, the developing country status serves as a reassuring message, and it allows China to shirk greater international responsibilities. Targeting the global South, developing country status plays the solidarity card. The tension between China’s great power status and its identity of developing country is bound to increase as China seeks a new role in the twenty-first century. Chapter 7 summarizes the findings and implications for China’s foreign policy, status politics, and signaling in international relations more broadly. Applying the analytical framework of status signaling, the chapter also provides a preliminary analysis of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy in a new era.

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Status Signaling in International Relations

It is clear that states, perhaps even more than people in their everyday lives, want others to hold a desired impression of them. . . . Thus one important instrument of statecraft is the ability to affect others’ images of the state and therefore their beliefs about how it will behave. —Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations

A rising power has various signals available for projecting its preferred image. Historically, a rising power that sought higher status would act assertively. Power transition theory expects that war is more likely when the rising challenger is catching up with the hegemon and is dissatisfied with the existing international order.1 Constructivist and psychological studies of international status also emphasize status dissatisfaction as a driving factor of international conflict.2 Contrary to this familiar story, status signaling is a more complicated matter, particularly today. Rising powers do not always choose to maximize their international status. Sometimes a rising power strategically downplays its status. Determined to sustain their growth trajectory, rising powers tend to be inward-looking states, reluctant to take on the burdens and responsibilities associated with a leading role on the world stage. Building on insights from social sociology, behavioral economics, and international relations theories, this chapter discusses a general theory of status signaling in international relations. The first section examines the role of status in international relations. The second section identifies the similarities and differences between status signaling and other signaling models. The third section provides a typology of status signaling. The final section discusses several propositions of status signaling in international relations.

Status in International Relations Why and how does status matter in international relations? In domestic society, status is the social or professional standing of an individual in relation to

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others. In international relations, status is the “collective beliefs about a given state’s ranking on valued attributes (wealth, coercive capabilities, culture, demographic position, sociopolitical organization, and diplomatic clout).”3 The struggle for status is driven by human beings’ psychological need for self-esteem. Humans and nation-states are motivated not just by power and interest, and they often treat status as having intrinsic value. It is also widely recognized that nation-states care about their status and prestige in international society. In situations of social mobility, people strive for status to get more material resources and benefits.4 In international politics, actors sometimes value status as an end in and of itself along with wealth and power. An experimental study found that people are willing to trade immediate material rewards for status.5 In a typical expressive action to demonstrate preferred social status, some poor peasants in India borrow money to hold lavish wedding celebrations.6 In contrast, a young American lawyer purchases a luxury car not to satisfy a psychological need but rather because she feels that it is a necessary tool: a well-dressed lawyer with a luxury car projects the image of success and competence to new clients.7 Status matters in international relations because the international system is organized hierarchically, by levels of authority and status of nations.8 Contemporary theoretical approaches to international relations assume that anarchy is a fundamental organizing principle in international politics. For instance, according to Kenneth Waltz, the difference between international and domestic politics is that the former is anarchic and the latter is hierarchical.9 The principle of equal sovereignty is an influential norm in contemporary international society. However, many traditional theoretical approaches, including classical realism, power transition theory, and English school, make implicit assumptions about international hierarchy. While some see anarchy and hierarchy as mutually exclusive organizing principles, I take the position that they can coexist within the same international system. The anarchic nature of the international system may strengthen its inequality and hierarchy.10 Unlike domestic societies, in which governments can use welfare policies to mitigate inequality among individuals, international society has no overarching world government that enforces such policies to mitigate differences among nations. Nations are equal in the name of sovereignty, but they are also differentiated by their status, responsibilities, and authority. Status is different from related concepts such as power, capability, and authority. Power is the ability to achieve desired outcomes. A country might be powerful but still not have its desired status in international society. Material capability can provide some basic foundation for gaining status, but it is also

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separated from status. Status is a broader concept than authority, which is a legitimate claim to command backed up by coercive force. Scholars such as David Lake conceptualize status and authority as two distinct types of social goods.11 If they are, authority becomes crucial, while status might be politically irrelevant. I argue, however, that authority can be a special case of status. There are many types of status competitions; a status competition of a zerosum game of who should be the top leader of a country could also be viewed as a competition of authority. However, many other politically important competitions over status are not a competition of authority. While status symbols are often associated with material goods such as luxury brands or space programs, status is fundamentally social and relational.12 Both in social life and in international society, status largely depends on recognition from others. It is an attribute that is primarily located in other people’s minds. No matter what kinds of attributes a person or state may have, they do not automatically constitute status. Furthermore, most of the attributes nation-states are concerned about often are social in nature, such as legitimacy and reputation. These social attributes for nation-states are important, because nations with authority or recognized status do not have to rely on coercive tools to maintain the stability of international order or to promote their national interests. As Robert Gilpin says, “Prestige, rather than power, is the everyday currency of international relations.”13 Just as people in domestic societies achieve status in various ways and the criteria of status change over time and across societies, status in the international system also varies, and states have engaged in all sorts of competitions to gain status. Traditionally, military capabilities and victory have been a major mark of status and prestige in international politics. However, prestige and status are not derived from military strength alone; ideological appeal, economic growth, and technological innovation can also be sources for achieving international status and respect.14 Different criteria rank countries, and states that seek to have a distinct positive national identity choose different strategies to achieve status, including competition, emulation, or creativity.15 One important question in the twenty-first century is whether great powers still regard military capabilities and wars as a major tool for gaining status or standing.16 While status is a universally valued attribute, different cultures value it differently. In countries and cultures where saving face and honor matter a lot, status anxiety may matter much more than in those societies where human dignities are valued more than social ranking.17 Also, political actors at different times regard different things as status symbols.18 The investigation of

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status signaling will help us understand the emerging trends and processes of international change. Some raise the aggregation problem when discussing status in international politics. If each individual has a different preference, how can we aggregate those preferences into a national preference?19 Applying social psychological theories in international politics can take two routes. The first is anthropomorphization of the state.20 Political leaders and people tend to anthropomorphize nation-states in diplomacy and in public propaganda by assuming that they are people and thus attributing agency to them. The second route does not assume a unitary nature for states, instead viewing the collective preferences of a state’s citizens and political elites as motivation for international status.21 I take the second option by assuming a model of domestic-international interaction.

Status Signaling in International Relations If we conceptualize signaling in a broad sense, it has many forms, in both social life and international politics.22 Signaling occurs when a holder of information takes observable action to make information available to others in order to shape a desired image. If we take a dramaturgical perspective on signaling, social interaction can be thought of as a play, with actors, performances, settings, scripts, roles, and so forth. Signaling can take many different formats.23 For instance, emotional behaviors of political leaders may be manipulated to shape a desired international image or to strengthen bargaining leverage in an international crisis.24 Emotional behaviors can have important implications for strategic interactions and for signaling in particular.25 Status signals are discussed in psychology, sociology, behavioral economics, and biology. For instance, in a competitive market environment, the status of a firm can become informational on the basis of which third parties make inferences about the quality of the firm.26 In domestic society, status signals are defined as rituals and behaviors people use to demonstrate their preferred social standing in a community. Status signaling uses a subset of signals to convey the information that a state is asserting a particular standing in international society. In a general sense, status signaling is the mechanism of information transmission that aims to change or maintain a status belief among relevant political actors. All signaling models involve information transmission and image projection. In international politics, signaling is a kind of communication, in which a state’s language and behaviors are aimed at influencing the perceptions and

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actions of others.27 Not everything a country does is signaling behavior. The difference between signaling and nonsignaling behavior is that signaling is primarily concerned about the projection of image. For instance, an upgrade in military capabilities during a war is not signaling, although winning a war could help build image.28 Signaling is important in all kinds of strategic interactions, and it can help mitigate potential conflicts. Biologists find that signaling can play an important role even in animal behaviors. Why would a gazelle waste time and energy bounding straight up instead of running away when it meets a wolf ? According to one biological theory, the gazelle is signaling to the predator that it is able to outrun it. The wolf, learning that it has lost its chance to surprise the prey and that this gazelle is in excellent shape, decides to look for easier prey.29 The gazelle has successfully implemented a deterrence strategy through credible signaling of its capabilities and strengths. Signaling mitigated a potentially deadly conflict between prey and predator in the animal world. In international politics, signaling can reduce uncertainty in a security dilemma, differentiate a defensive state from an offensive one, send credible threats in coercive diplomacy, and promote necessary cooperation in multilateral organizations. Signals are most likely to broadcast credible and reliable information when they are costly to the signaler to the point that a different kind of actor would be unable or unwilling to make them.30 In the job market, for instance, employers are more likely to hire college-educated applicants than those with only a high school diploma because a college degree is a costly signal of the job seeker’s resolve and ability to learn.31 For animals, those of greater biological fitness signal their status during mate selection by means of handicapping behaviors.32 In social life, the consumption of expensive brands and luxury goods is often intended as a costly signal to convey the consumer’s status as a wealthy individual.33 Signaling in international politics often relies on costly signaling.34 For instance, to signal credible resolve during crisis bargaining, it is important to make a distinction between cheap talk and costly signals. James Fearon distinguishes between two types of costly signals that state leaders can use to credibly communicate their foreign policy interests to other states. “Leaders might either (a) tie their hands by creating audience costs that will be paid ex post if they fail to follow through on their threat or warning or (b) sink costs by taking actions such as mobilizing troops or stationing large numbers of them abroad that are financially costly ex ante.”35 Likewise, in international politics, some projects—space programs, nuclear weapons, and aircraft carriers, to name a few—are intended as costly signals of great

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power status, because they require enormous capabilities and resources that most countries do not possess. If such projects were to become normal and widespread state behaviors, they would no longer confer great power status. A relatively new signaling model in the literature of international relations, status signaling differs from other models in several respects. Its purpose is not to signal a benign intention in an inherently uncertain anarchy; nor does it signal credibility in crisis bargaining. Instead, the purpose of status signaling is to demonstrate a state’s preferred ranking in the international society. Through status signaling, relevant political actors (such as rising powers or the reigning hegemon) aim to maintain or change the status beliefs about themselves in the international hierarchy. While the status need of nation-states is neither benign nor aggressive in principle, the need for a particular status may become problematic. Because status often depends on the intersubjective recognition of others, the need for inflated status may appear threatening and aggressive to others. In other words, while status demand is simply one of the fundamental motives of state behaviors in international politics, the need is not inherently legitimate, and the legitimacy largely depends on the social and political context of the status demand. For defensive realists, signaling benign intentions is crucial to reducing inherent uncertainty in international anarchy.36 Through signaling intentions, nations can mitigate a security dilemma or promote necessary cooperation.37 To be more specific, costly signals and reassurance strategies can mitigate international conflicts. Signaling benign intentions is crucial not only for defensive realists but also for institutional theorists. Alexander Thompson developed a theory of strategic information transmission to explain why powerful states often channel coercive policies through international organizations: their involvement sends information about the coercer’s intentions and the consequences of the coercive policy to foreign leaders and their public, information that determines the level of international support offered to the coercing state.38 The relationship between status signaling and domestic audiences is also different from that in other signaling models. In the coercive bargaining model, the domestic audience is often an intervening variable and the international audience is the primary target. In contrast, the domestic audience is the primary target in some status signaling behaviors and the international audience is an intervening variable. In the coercive bargaining model, the domestic cost generates credible threats in the crisis bargaining process. For instance, a leader who backs down incurs domestic costs, and these enable other leaders to learn an adversary’s true preferences concerning settlement versus war.39 The notion of audience cost is applicable not only to ­democracies but

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also to autocratic leaders who try to signal their resolve in diplomatic bargaining.40 Studies on status signaling will provide a new tool to examine states’ seemingly symbolic behaviors from a rationalist framework. Most rationalist signaling models assume that signaling has clear instrumental goals without considering the symbolic values of the signaling. A theory of status signaling, however, would take a position of thin rationality while treating the symbolic factors seriously and making strategic sense of them.41 Status signaling could shed new light on bargaining in twenty-first-century world politics. Conventional signaling models in international relations focus on resolve, credibility, and benign intention, often in a context similar to the Cuban missile crisis, and do not address an emerging power’s long-term status and role on the world stage. For instance, as noted previously, defensive realism assumes that the purpose of signaling is to differentiate a benign state from a threatening or aggressive state. One of the major debates between defensive and offensive realists is whether states are fundamentally security seekers or greedy states.42 Greedy states are those that seek national goals beyond the basic security of their territory. In power transition theory, it is critical to understand whether a rising power is a status quo power or a revisionist power. Revisionist powers are rising powers that are unsatisfied with their status in the international hierarchy and seek to overturn the fundamental rules of the game in the international order. In power transition theory, desire for enhanced status is the root of international conflicts. As many studies indicate, acquiring status is one of the fundamental motives for state behaviors, and nation-states often treat status as a primary goal together with other motives such as security and wealth. Since all states pursue some nonsecurity goals (e.g., honor, prestige, and status), the categorization of nonsecurity goals as greedy is problematic.43 The problem of rising powers is not their drive for status and prestige; it is how far these rising powers would be willing to go for their enhanced status. I recognize that the relationship between status and signaling is complicated, and I must make a distinction between status signaling and status acquisition. In some contexts, status is the ultimate goal. In others, status is sought to achieve other goals or is the unintended consequence of doing something.44 For instance, an actor who has always tried to perform well in his movies eventually achieves status by winning an Oscar. But the actor did not perform well to achieve status. If status is largely the unintended consequence of some behaviors, these behaviors are better viewed as status acquisition instead of status signaling.

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Status Signaling: Typology and Implications A rising power can use material goods (such as a weapons system) to symbolize its preferred status in the international hierarchy. Similar to making charitable donations, providing public goods in international affairs is a useful strategy to signal a desired status in international society. Status signaling behaviors can be categorized by the means used to achieve status: through materialistic consumption, conspicuous giving, fighting, or spinning.45 They can also be categorized by purpose: those with an instrumental objective and those with an expressive objective.46 Since status is an unobservable or intangible social aspect, individuals tend to use materialistic consumption of luxury goods to symbolize their desired status in society. While the concept of status has a long tradition in sociology, the concept of the status signal was pioneered by Thorstein Veblen and further developed by Fred Hirsch and Robert Frank.47 The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s work on distinction bears a resemblance to Veblen’s work on the leisure class.48 These scholars highlight the negative impact of conspicuous consumption of luxury material goods on welfare and growth. In economics, status signaling was originally discussed as conspicuous consumption or positional goods.49 According to Veblen, people of the leisure class consume luxury material goods to show off or pretend their association with a certain status. Individuals overconsume these material goods, resulting in wasteful conspicuous consumption.50 Hirsch developed a related concept of positional goods, which are socially limited. He states, “Consumer demand is concentrated on particular goods and facilities that are limited in absolute supply not by physical but by social factors, including the satisfaction engendered by scarcity as such.”51 This social limitation of positional goods may be derived from psychological motives, notably envy, emulation, or pride. Satisfaction is derived from relative position alone, from being in front or from others being behind. Command over particular goods becomes an indicator of such precedence in its emergence as a status symbol.52 Michael Spence’s “market signaling” conceptualizes how consumption behaviors can serve as a status signal.53 Status signaling is also related to “identity economics,” in which people’s understanding of their identities shapes their choices in economic decisions.54 According to Frank, concerns about relative position lead to many socially undesirable outcomes, including wasteful spending patterns.55 Conspicuous consumption as a status signaling tool has important implications for international politics. Weapons, such as nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers, can symbolize great power status. International relations

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t­heorist James Fearon argues that consumption is a useful starting point to conceptualize state motives.56 Status signaling is not necessarily always competitive and wasteful. Sometimes status signaling behaviors are compatible with community norms and benefit the whole community. At the individual level, people have a strong desire to belong to a group or a community. Status hierarchies often emerge in cooperative social interactions to achieve a common goal.57 In daily life, philanthropy and blood donations are examples. In these cases, people might want to demonstrate their usefulness to a group to signal their status.58 Thus, rich people can signal their status not only through conspicuous consumption of material goods but also through charitable donations, or conspicuous giving.59 People have different motives for donating to charity; however, the desire to demonstrate wealth and to socialize with individuals of the same or higher social status is an important driving factor of charitable giving in many cases.60 Compared with conspicuous consumption, conspicuous giving has advantages in signaling status.61 While conspicuous consumption is often viewed negatively, charitable giving nearly always makes a good impression. Because of the existence of counterfeit brand products, ownership of luxury goods can be difficult to observe.62 Charitable donations may be especially good signals to people who belong to a peer group whose members cannot see the luxury goods of another member. The case of the woman making a charitable donation to impress her distant former college roommates is an excellent example of this. For individuals, communal sharing brings a variety of social rewards such as reputation and social status. For nation-states, provision of public goods or foreign aid is an important part of statecraft that enhances international status and image. Conspicuous giving, or communal sharing, is not necessarily altruistic, however, and may be due to social influence, because political actors are pursuing social rewards and avoiding social sanction.63 People and nations fight for various reasons, status being one of the most important. Fighting sometimes is a means to get other valuable resources such as power and territory, and other times it serves as an end. The struggle for status or standing has been a major source of international wars.64 People enjoy winning and dominating in competitive games, even when there is no obvious material reward.65 At the individual level, dueling is an extreme case of achieving status through fighting. Nations may fight for status, even though the fighting would bring risks to the nation without obvious material rewards. Fighting can communicate an actor’s status belief and facilitate the diffusion of that belief among relevant actors in a social system. In this sense,

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fighting and war are ritualistic.66 Fighting can send a message of who is superior to a wider social community. In international politics, hegemonic wars have been the major mechanism for deciding who should have the authority and status to rule in the international system. Hegemonic wars generate the common knowledge or the status beliefs of who is superior in the international system, similar to that of the Crown’s ceremonies establishing the common knowledge of a country’s supreme ruler.67 A nation-state can signal its status through strategic spinning. At the individual level, “spinning is when a person telling a story emphasizes certain facts and links them together in ways that play to his advantage, while at the same time downplaying or ignoring inconvenient facts.”68 In the same way, great powers can pursue strategic spinning. A rising power might signal a lower status to reassure neighbors, shirk responsibilities, and express solidarity with and woo support from lower-status groups or nations (such as developing countries or the Third World).69 Status signaling can have instrumental or expressive objectives. Individuals or states with an instrumental objective signal their status to get valuable resources such as power and material rewards. In pursuing expressive objectives, they seek status as an end in itself to demonstrate who they are or who they want to be. There are two types of conspicuous consumption: instrumental conspicuous consumption and expressive conspicuous consumption. In some situations, lavish consumption expenditures, while appearing wasteful, might involve some rational instrumental calculations. “To the extent that wearing the right watch, driving the right car, wearing the right suit, or living in the right neighborhood may help someone land the right job, or a big contract, these expenditures are more like investments than like true consumption.”70 According to some biological and psychological studies, the instrumental calculations of conspicuous consumption are rooted in biological evolution. Status signaling is documented in animal behavior. Among chickens housed in small groups, the top-ranking rooster always starts to crow first, followed by its subordinates in descending order of social rank.71 The gazelle seeming to waste time and energy by jumping up instead of running away is signaling to the predator that it is able to outrun it. It is not just showing off; rather, the demonstration is an instrumental move designed to preserve its life. The wolf will now look elsewhere for a meal.72 While status signaling can serve an instrumental purpose in some contexts, it is also a type of expressive demonstration of who we are or want to be. In this sense, status signaling is similar to the logic of expressive choice. People may sacrifice their material interests to express their aspirational identities. In

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other words, conspicuous consumption does not serve any instrumental purpose but can satisfy a person’s psychological need. Individuals expressing and reaffirming, to others and to themselves, who they are through actions such as voting or purchasing are exercising expressive choice. For instance, consumers choose to purchase particular goods and voters to support a particular political party in part motivated by their understanding of what it means to be someone in possession of those goods or in support of that party. Through their participation, these voters and consumers express who they are and attach themselves to a collective organization they feel is like them and reflects their interests or values.73 According to Tibor Scitovsky, people enjoy overconsumption; seeking and getting desired goods is pleasurable.74 In his book The Joyless Economy, he discusses two sources of displeasure: one is too much stimulus (pain) and the other too little stimulus (boredom). In affluent societies with widespread comfort and ennui, people might hopelessly try to buy happiness with money. After the basic needs for food and housing are satisfied, people try to make themselves happier through buying more goods, which can lead to wasteful overconsumption. The insights from The Joyless Economy can be applied to international politics to understand the residual conventional arms races in a new era of great power peace.75 Because nuclear deterrence partially assures basic survival, great power wars become increasingly unlikely, and “ennui becomes us.”76 Why, then, do great powers still try to upgrade their conventional weapons?77 Hightech jet fighters and aircraft carriers for great powers are as McMansions and large SUVs are for consumers in affluent societies; they satisfy instrumental needs for physical security or deliver excitement and happiness. The drive toward spending on an otherwise useless good comes from the desire to enter clubs and benefit from a social status effect.78 In joining a club, an individual can gain a certain social status. Spending on a conspicuous good emits a signal. The joint incentives of club goods and social status induce people to overspend on conspicuous goods. Similarly, for some countries eager to acquire nuclear weapons, the motive is not only survival but also admission into an exclusive club.79 The value of nuclear weapons as a status symbol is debatable today.80

Propositions Throughout the history of great power politics, military victory has been viewed as a critical way to achieve status in international politics. In the twentyfirst century, with its lesser threat of a great power war, emerging powers have three strategies remaining for demonstrating their status on the world stage:

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conspicuous consumption, conspicuous giving, and strategic spinning. Taking into consideration both domestic and international incentives—most studies have ignored the role of domestic politics—this section outlines the propositions that guided the research undergirding this book’s empirical chapters. In international relations literature on signaling, it is often assumed that nation-states are rational and coherent actors. Domestic politics provides both challenges and opportunities for building a theory of status signaling. If we reject that nation-states are unitary actors, how can we talk about the interactions of signaling between states? For instance, if different groups in China push to send different signals, how can we discuss China’s status signaling? Admittedly, there is a real tension between the assumption that states are rational and coherent and the reality of domestic political cleavages. It is important to bring domestic politics back into the study of status concerns in world politics for a number of reasons. People have a “multiple audience problem.”81 That is, a person needs to present different images to different audiences, often at the same time. Signaling is received by multiple audiences, whether this is intended or desired by the sender. Because, as Garrett Hardin notes, in a system “we can never do merely one thing,” and it is difficult for a sender to prevent unwanted audiences from observing the signal.82 For national leaders, signaling is tantamount to playing a tricky “two-level game” that juggles domestic and international audiences.83 Domestic politics is a factor in status signaling at the international level. Leaders or governments send various signals to domestic and international audiences. Domestic constituents may be concerned about the status or prestige of their country, and status signaling is often connected with a domestic political struggle for legitimacy. For rapidly ascending states, in particular, the domestic audience often trumps the international one. As Jack Snyder observes, “Among the great powers, domestic pressures often outweigh international ones in the calculations of national leaders.”84 Because rapid development usually generates dangerous social and political dislocations, and because future growth and internal stability often require fundamental political reforms, leaders of rapidly growing states confront intense internal pressures, whether from rising domestic expectations, heightened nationalism, or fears of descending into long-term stagnation. At a minimum, some domestic constituents and opposition groups within the rising power will express genuine or politically motivated concerns about the status of their country, thereby connecting status signaling at the international level to a domestic political struggle for legitimacy.

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Domestic politics can also be treated as an intervening variable. A rational theory of signaling in international relations would give us a normative theory of how states act strategically, given the constraints of the international environment.85 Bringing domestic politics back into the calculation could help us close the gap between the idealized rational signaling model and the more complex and realistic process of signaling. On the role of multiple audiences and domestic politics in status signaling, I propose the following: Status signaling behaviors face a multiple audience problem, and for rising powers, the domestic audience is more important than the international audience. Status signaling is correlated with material resources that people or countries have. The higher a person’s income, the greater that person’s propensity to purchase luxury goods to signal her status. Conspicuous consumption of luxury goods has nuances. According to a study of consumer behaviors with respect to luxury brands, consumers come in four types, based on their income level and consumption patterns.86 Patricians are extremely rich people who avoid loud brand signals to symbolize their wealth. In other words, they want to avoid being misconstrued as people who use salient luxury brands to differentiate themselves from the masses. Instead, patricians purchase extremely expensive but less salient brands to signal to other patricians. Parvenus are also rich, but they do not have the cultural capital necessary to interpret the subtle status signals. They tend to use loud signals (salient luxury brands) to find other “haves” to associate with. Poseurs are highly motivated to consume for the sake of status, but they do not possess the financial means to readily afford authentic luxury goods. Thus, poseurs are prone to buy counterfeit luxury goods. Proletarians are not motivated to consume for the sake of status.87 The stratification of consuming behaviors seems to have intuitive implications for understanding the status signaling behaviors of nation-states. Barry Buzan defines three status hierarchies (superpowers, great powers, and regional powers) and describes their different capabilities and roles in international society.88 Nation-states stratified by material capabilities and international standing have different patterns of status signaling behaviors. Intuitively, we can see that the status signaling behaviors of established superpowers resemble those of patricians, and emerging and rising powers resemble parvenus and poseurs, respectively. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union played many status games that other countries could not afford to play. “The United States was the billionaire among the world’s countries and, unlike the others, operated free of the need to distinguish carefully between necessities and luxuries. If building another missile or aircraft carrier

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or rescuing a particular country was important, the United States could afford to do it.”89 On the role of material resources in status signaling, I propose the following: The more material resources a country has, the more likely that the country will signal a higher status in the international hierarchy. Material resources alone do not determine how people or countries signal their status, for example, poor families borrow to put on lavish wedding celebrations. Some consumers, who do not have enough financial resources to buy real luxury goods, buy counterfeit luxury goods to pretend to be associated with higher social class.90 According to some psychological studies, powerlessness fosters a compensatory impulse to restore power and status, and powerless people prefer to signal status to others through visible and conspicuous consumption.91 The international relations scholar Richard Lebow defines a “parvenu” great power: psychologically insecure with strong motive to show off their power and status.92 For countries like India and China, historical trauma and national humiliation at the hands of Western colonial powers constructed a postcolonial ideology that pushes these countries to strive for more power and status.93 These psychological and international relations studies all indicate that a strong sense of insecurity creates a strong motivation to show off status. This does not explain why leaders of some countries that have achieved higher status still signal a strong image of high status. I argue that it is necessary to bring domestic politics back into the investigation to determine the source of insecurity. International status signaling and domestic insecurity have a high correlation. On the role of domestic insecurity in status signaling, I propose the following: The more domestically insecure a country, the more likely its leaders are to signal high international status to boost domestic legitimacy. The preceding points discuss the reasons a country is likely to signal higher status. The following propositions explore how a country could signal its status without fighting a war. Most nations recognize the importance of maintaining an effective military, and the result often has been a wasteful escalation of expenditures on armaments, the logic of which is similar to that of conspicuous consumption for individuals.94 Just as newly independent nations are eager to acquire weapons to symbolize their modern statehood,95 an emerging great power builds weapons for status signaling. On the role of conspicuous consumption in status signaling, I propose the following: (1) If the primary goal for acquiring a weapon is to signal a higher status, domestic support for that acquisition will be positively correlated with increasing

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e­ conomic resources, not with increasing security threats. (2) If the primary goal for acquiring a weapon is to signal a higher status, that weapon will not be the most costefficient tool to deal with the country’s security challenges. (3) If the primary goal for acquiring a weapon is to signal a higher status, official statements about the acquisition will emphasize the connection between the weapon and its implications for status. While many status competitions are zero-sum games, status signaling is not necessarily always wasteful and can be a non-zero-sum game. If status is regarded as a scarce positional good in an absolute sense, status competition is a zero-sum game.96 According to this view, the pursuit of status is inherently competitive because status is relative and scarce. This implies that great power competition is positional; as one state gains status, another loses it. This zero-sum view of status competition includes the notion of a “club good.”97 A club is “a voluntary collective that derives mutual benefits from sharing one or more of the following: production costs, the members’ characteristics, or an impure public good characterized by excludable benefits.”98 Owing to congestion, or crowding, club members are rivals for the club goods’ benefits; one member’s use of a club good decreases the benefits or the quality of service available to other members. In social life as well as in international politics, members of elite groups may restrict membership to preserve their status and privileges. If anyone can become a member of the club, then membership is not worth much.99 Power clubs of international politics include the Group of Seven, the club of primarily Western industrialized economies, and the United Nations Security Council, with its permanent five members. People striving for more status can promote cooperation instead of competition. While many rich people demonstrate their social status through conspicuous consumption of luxury goods, others choose to be philanthropists, trying to demonstrate their usefulness and status through conspicuous giving. Similarly, great powers signal preferred status by conspicuous giving, such as foreign economic aid, loans, and humanitarian relief efforts during natural disasters. Engaging in conspicuous giving implies that signaling status (or projecting a particular image) is a major motivation. Conspicuous giving by foreign donors, however, does not necessarily mean that the donors have no instrumental calculations. When and why would a nation-state pursue conspicuous giving? At the individual level, the fundamental motive for conspicuous giving is that the contributor has a strong sense of belonging to a community and a desire to demonstrate her usefulness to it. People have different understandings of social communities, and thus their sense of morality and communal obligations are different. For instance, according to the Chinese sociologist Fei Xiao-

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tong, traditional Chinese society is organized following a mode of Chaxugeju, which is a differential mode of association.100 This social mode is composed of distinctive networks spreading out from each individual’s personal connections. Social relationships in China possess a self-centered quality. Like the ripples formed from a stone thrown into a lake, each circle spreading out from the center is more distant and insignificant. Hypothetically, if a country views its relationship with other countries as a differential mode of association, its sense of obligation differs among regions. For instance, contemporary China has a sense of belonging and membership in the Asian regional community that is different from that with the West. If China does not feel it belongs to the Western community, it will be less willing to contribute to it. Conversely, if China has a strong sense of belonging and membership in the Asian community, it will be more willing to demonstrate its usefulness and status within that community. On the role of conspicuous giving in status signaling, I propose the following: The stronger the feeling a country has that it belongs to a community, the more willing it is to pursue a conspicuous giving strategy to signal its status in it. Now I turn to how and why rising powers try to downplay their profile and status. I argue that they can pursue a strategic spinning strategy. Spinning is all about emphasizing some facts and deemphasizing others to portray one’s position in a positive light.101 Strategic deception is a widely observed phenomenon in international politics. As economics literature discusses, a symbol of social status can be manipulated to build a desired image through deceitful consumption behaviors.102 Nation-states and their leaders have incentives to misrepresent their true intentions to achieve strategic advantages.103 In international politics, however, spinning is different from lying.104 For instance, although it is impossible for Chinese officials to deny that China became the world’s second-largest economy in 2010 (on the basis of exchange rate ­measurement), there is room for spinning in terms of emphasizing other aspects of China’s international ranking. In the 1990s, China was a prestige maximizer to exaggerate its strength to gain bargaining leverage, but China in the twenty-first century sometimes downplays its capabilities and sometimes intentionally emphasizes its weakness. This type of behavior is better conceptualized in international politics as spinning and not lying. While China is still a prestige maximizer in certain circles, its spinning strategy is contextual and utilitarian. When a rising power wants to highlight its enhanced status to gain privileges, it emphasizes its strength (such as the total size of the economy); when a rising power wants to shirk greater responsibilities, it emphasizes its ­weakness

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(such as a relatively low gross domestic product per capita). A rising power might have different possible selves. In psychology, “possible selves” represent “individuals’ ideas of what they might become, what they would like to become, and what they are afraid of becoming, thus providing a conceptual link between cognition and motivation.”105 The possible selves thesis is somewhat consistent with the societal constructivist argument that domestic society shapes the range of foreign policy choices at the international level.106 China’s several possible selves are the collectively shared ideas of what China might become, what China would like to become, and what China is afraid of becoming. For instance, China might like to become a “brand new China,”107 with a reassuring, good image of being forward looking. China might be afraid of becoming or being recognized as backward looking and threatening. There are strategic reasons to highlight different aspects of these identities. In other words, there are reasons why strategic ambiguity characterizes diplomatic signaling, and it may be a deliberate attempt to retain flexibility. Rising powers pursue different strategies in different stages of their rising. If status in income hierarchies is like other things that yield satisfaction, people will differ substantially in the sacrifices they are willing to make to attain it. Variations in earning power are likely to cause differences in demands for status. Beyond some point, the extra satisfaction begins to diminish. As discussed previously, a feeling of powerlessness fosters a desire to restore power, and the powerless use conspicuous consumption to signal status to others. Multiple factors shape the aspiration for status, including both material capabilities and ideational factors. I argue that rising powers in an early stage will pursue a different type of status spinning compared with rising powers in their late stage. On the regularities of status spinning in international relations, I propose the following: (1) A rising power will initially try to exaggerate its strength and later try to downplay its strength and highlight its weaknesses. (2) When a rising power projects an image of status in the eyes of the established powers in the security domain, it is more likely to signal a lower status to reassure others. (3) When a rising power wants to enhance its status to gain more privileges, it will exaggerate its strength; when a rising power shirks greater responsibilities, it will downplay its strength. (4) When a rising power aims to consolidate political support from a lower-status group, it will signal a lower status to gain or hold solidarity with the lower-status group.

Summary Status signaling demonstrates the ranking or standing a state wants to have in international society. A nation-state has choices as to which signal to use to project its preferred image.

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While power transition theory expects that status competition is a chief source of international conflict, status signaling behaviors of a rising power are more complicated. A rising power sometimes highlights its strength and other times voluntarily emphasizes its weakness. It is crucial to understand the variations of status signaling behaviors instead of assuming a rising power always maximizes its status. Material resources are positively correlated with signaling of high status in international relations, but they are not the only important factors. It is important to bring domestic politics back in. Status signaling behaviors face multiple audiences, and the domestic audience is often more important than the international audience. International status signaling is closely tied with the domestic legitimacy of ruling elites. The more domestically insecure a country, the more likely its leaders will signal high international status to boost domestic legitimacy. Status competition is often viewed as a major source of conflict, but status signaling can also generate cooperative behaviors. At an individual level, enhancing status in a community can generate prosocial and cooperative behaviors, and so also in international relations.108 A rising power can signal its status in many ways. A rising power might use material goods (such as certain weapons) to symbolize its preferred status in the international hierarchy. Providing public goods is useful for signaling preferred status in international society. International status and prestige have been traditionally derived from military capabilities and victory. In such a world, there is a limited amount of status to go around, and its scarcity is what makes status competition a zero-sum game. But as the sociologist Joel Best argues, Americans have experienced an era of status affluence, and there are far more opportunities for individuals to gain status than in the past.109 Because status is social and cultural, there are multiple social worlds in the international system. Each social world judges its members and assigns them status according to its own criteria. People or nations can create their own social worlds, and they acquire the ability to mint their own status.110 Status is not always a scarce resource in international society, and a rising power can play multiple status games. That said, status affluence does not mean that rising powers do not compete for status. It just means that rising powers in the contemporary world can have more flexibility to gain status.

3

China on the World Stage Multiple Audiences, Competing Expectations

We should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative, and better communicate China’s message to the world. —Xi Jinping, speech at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, November 2014

China seems to be obsessed with image building in the twenty-first century. “National image,” “public diplomacy,” and “soft power” have become buzzwords in China’s foreign policy.1 Like a rapidly growing company trying to redefine its position, contemporary China is also repositioning, or rebranding, itself to project a new image and to establish a new status. This rebranding is full of uncertainties. A nation making status signals is presumed to have a clear idea of the status it wants to have and what kinds of images it wants to project. In China, status signaling is contested because the Chinese leadership and domestic population do not have a consensus on China’s position on the world stage. Extravaganzas such as the Beijing Olympic Games and the Shanghai Expo may be partially due to China’s economic growth: as China’s economic growth boosts its confidence, Chinese views of the country’s role in the world shift. According to Yan Xuetong, the dean of the Institute of Modern International Relations at Tsinghua University, a rich country does not automatically become a respected great power. According to Yan, China should be a better leader in the international normative order so that it can compete with the United States.2 With its own version of exceptionalism, China is striving for a unique and respected status in the world.3 While China has emerged as an impressively powerful nation in the twenty-first century, many Chinese still feel that China lacks the appropriate status and respect from the outside world.

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China’s image projection is sometimes contradictory and confusing. On the one hand, China is seeking to project an image of a strong great power. On the other hand, China sometimes appears to be unready for its sudden high profile in global affairs. An analysis of China’s identities and audiences reveals incentives behind China’s signaling behaviors and why China is projecting multiple images. This chapter discusses the sources and context of China’s image concerns and then analyzes in detail China’s multiple identities and audiences.

Beijing’s Image Concern The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a long tradition of promoting a positive international image through “foreign propaganda” (duiwai ­xuanchuan). As early as 1936, Mao was urging propaganda workers to promote stories of the Long March as a triumph of the CCP rather than as a military retreat.4 Promoting a positive image on the world stage has been a top priority of the Chinese government since the early 1990s. This is partially driven by the desire of the Chinese government to overcome its international isolation and to consolidate domestic legitimacy after 1989. China has invested significant resources to build soft power across a broad range of activities and institutions. China’s State Council Information Office, a cabinet-level agency, coordinates China’s media and exchange organizations to “go out” (zou chuqu) and establish a foothold in the international media environment. Chinese media outlets have become more modern, professional, and influential. Chinese businessmen have attempted to purchase internationally known media outlets, partly to promote a more pro-Beijing image to international audiences.5 The term “soft power,” originally coined by the Harvard professor Joseph Nye, is more popular in China than it is in the United States. Many articles, books, and state-funded projects concern how China could strengthen its soft power.6 In addition, China has tried to strengthen its public diplomacy, including increased research funding on the subject and establishment of quasi-government organization of public diplomacy.7 To promote Chinese language and culture, China has opened hundreds of Confucius Institutes around the world.8 Existing studies of China’s image building have three limitations. They often focus on how China is trying to project a benign image, ignoring the more complex strategic incentives of image projection in international politics. The benign image is not always the most desired image of a rising power. Sophisticated strategic incentives project a tough image, through

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e­ ither ­deception or coercion, to increase a government’s bargaining leverage. Almost all studies of China’s image projection focus on China’s desired image of being good and benign and few study its more complicated strategic incentives. But as Robert Jervis emphasizes, states sometimes want to be feared or to be seen as irrational to achieve strategic advantages.9 For instance, the extremely hawkish voices of some Chinese military officers appearing in the Chinese media have confused international observers. If the Chinese government wants to build a benign image, why would it allow these hawkish voices? According to one analysis, these hawks are more appropriately viewed as propaganda to shape perceptions by domestic and international audiences.10 The Chinese major general Luo Yuan has stated that hawks and doves in China’s public discourse should be viewed as a “carefully coordinated opera” in which “some sing the red mask [good cop], others sing the white mask [bad cop].”11 In other words, for strategic reasons, China does not want to give the international audience the impression that China is only benign. A rising great power wants to be feared sometimes. Thus, an understanding of China’s strategic incentives must encompass more than China’s benign image projection. Existing studies of image building do not to pay enough attention to China’s national interests. Most studies seem to assume that national image and national interests are two separate goals and that image building is a noninstrumental goal. True, people or nation-states sometimes strive for a particular image as an end in itself, but image building could serve instrumental goals. In social life, conspicuous consumption of luxury goods can serve the instrumental purpose of projecting an image of success (and therefore, capability) for young lawyers. For nation-states, image building can serve both expressive and instrumental goals. Instead of seeing image building and national interests as two separate goals, I look at how considerations of national interest influence image concerns. Furthermore, I draw on insights from Erving Goffman for viewing image projection in international politics as a socially embedded game that maintains an appropriate balance between socially driven behavior and instrumentally driven behavior.12 Goffman conceptualizes individuals as performers engaged in manipulative presentations of self and framing. These actors are constrained by the script and the consistency requirement of their role in a particular cultural context. Goffman’s dramaturgical approach has great potential to theorize normative performance in world politics. In an international community, states are strategic actors following the constitutive norms and rules of the community to maintain their good standing. Despite this, international culture does not automatically shape the behaviors of states,

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and political actors are usually more responsive to domestic demands and pressures than to international norms and obligations. Goffman’s approach provides the dialectical framework connecting strategic manipulating actors and effective social constraints on strategic action and, thus, the appropriate relationship between manipulation and morality.13 Finally, most studies focus on China’s international image, and consideration of projecting an image to domestic audiences is largely missing.14 For China, the domestic audience may be more important than thought. This book addresses this imbalance by discussing the strategic incentives of China’s signaling in front of both domestic and international audiences. China’s signaling is a sophisticated multilevel game, and China has competing incentives for projecting different images to these different audiences. China wants to project a benign image to reassure its neighbors and the established powers. China’s response to the Tiananmen Square protests tarnished its international image, and the Chinese government wants to mitigate the negative image. In particular, the Chinese government has strong instrumental calculations behind its campaign for soft power and public diplomacy, and its most important rationale is strengthening the legitimacy of the CCP.15 The following sections discuss China’s multiple identities and audiences.

China’s Multiple Identities In social interactions, the self-narrative of identities is the foundation of image projection. As individuals have multiple selves, a nation also has different narratives of national identities.16 China does not yet have a fixed identity. As the China expert David Shambaugh notes, China is a conflicted state with a political discourse grounded in several competing ideologies and narratives.17 Regarding China’s national identities and status, Chinese scholars and strategists are actively debating what kind of role China should play on the world stage. By analyzing Chinese materials and interviewing Chinese policy analysts, I have identified the following narratives of China’s identities as the most important. China is a socialist country with Chinese characteristics. The key feature of the Chinese system is that the CCP is the ruling party. While it is debatable to what extent China’s economic and social policy is still “communist,” the CCP-dominated system has profoundly shaped China’s calculations of national interest and grand strategy. As Yuan Peng, an influential strategic scholar in Beijing, says, “Westerners sometimes exaggerate China’s socialist

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characteristics and revert to the label ‘communist,’ while at other times ignoring China’s socialist nature and dealing with it as if it were purely capitalist. Neither caricature adequately captures the complex nature of the Chinese economy, development model or social policies.”18 As in any country, China’s domestic political system has profoundly shaped how it leaders think of national interest and national security. According to the former Chinese top diplomat Dai Bingguo, regime security is the CCP’s top priority in defining national interest. Following regime security are sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the stable development of China’s economy and society.19 According to Wang Jisi, the dean of International Strategic Studies at Peking University, Chinese leaders are especially sensitive to domestic disorder caused by foreign threats.20 China is a developing country. Whenever Chinese leaders meet their foreign counterparts, they often say that China is “the largest developing country” (zuidade fazhanzhong guojia). While China’s economy is the second largest in the world, many indicators reflect a lower development level. For instance, China’s gross domestic product per capita, balanced regional development, and indexes of the quality of life are still far behind industrialized countries. Even though China’s social and economic indicators continue to improve, China’s identity as a developing nation will hardly change in the next decade or two. China is an “emerging great power” (xinxing daguo), or “rising power” (jueqi guo), as one of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Originally a purely economic description by the investment bank Goldman Sachs, “BRICS” has become shorthand for a group of influential great powers. BRICS countries hold summits, discuss core political and economic issues, and have attempted to build a development bank.21 “Emerging power” has become a buzzword in Chinese discourse of international relations. My analysis of journals in the China National Social Sciences Database reveals that journal articles with the words “emerging powers” have increased dramatically in the last ten years.22 Unlike many American scholars who doubt the potential of the BRICS countries,23 the Chinese foreign policy community is overall enthusiastic about their increasing influence.24 Some BRICS countries, such as Brazil, have experienced economic problems. BRICS cooperation could help in Brazil’s domestic economic recovery, and China is an increasingly important trading partner for Brazil.25 The BRICS countries are increasingly a diplomatic grouping rather than a financial concept. As a BRICS country, China is actively participating in multilateral initiatives for increasing the voices of emerging powers in global af-

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fairs. Although Chinese academic discussions of China as a rising power had emerged earlier,26 the Chinese government started to acknowledge China’s rising power status more explicitly in 2013 and 2014. The Chinese leader Xi Jinping proposed a “new type of great power relations” with the United States, warning that Thucydides’s trap might lie in wait otherwise. From this perspective, China is positioned as the number-two power in the international pecking order, and managing tensions with the number-one power is an increasingly urgent matter for China.27 International observers often view China as an emerging power, ignoring that China is an established great power. China’s great power status is based on both self-narrative and objective indicators. Most Chinese elites and public do see China as one of the great powers in the international system. Deng Xiaoping once said, “In the so-called multi-polar world, China too will be a pole. We should not belittle our own importance: one way or another, China will be counted as a pole.”28 China is a great power because of its hard power profile, including geographical size, population, economic clout, and military capability. China is a key member in global institutions, including permanent membership on the UN Security Council (UNSC), which is a primary symbol of China’s great power status. China’s established great power status has policy implications. For instance, regarding Brazil’s intention to become a new permanent member of the UNSC, China is reluctant to fully support Brazil.29 China and Russia are established powers on the UNSC, and Brazil and India are emerging powers that seek a more important role.30 With the other established powers on the UNSC, China worries that an expanded council would reduce the power and authority of the existing powers. BRICS countries do not necessarily share the same interests on important policy issues. China as a quasi superpower is a relatively new idea in China’s foreign policy community. As more and more people around the world begin to view China in this way, some elites in China also emphasize China’s potential as an emerging superpower. While China has the potential to be a superpower, being one of the informal Group of Two, that status is controversial in China. Some Chinese scholars support the idea of China as a superpower, but Chinese officials typically do not embrace this notion. For one thing, superpower status has a negative connotation in China’s diplomatic discourse, because it is associated with imperialism and hegemony. In addition, both Chinese elites and the public seem to understand the difficulties and uncertainty in achieving superpower status. China has been the predominant power in East Asia for thousands of years, and Chinese regard China’s leading status in the region as being natural

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i­nstead of challenging the status quo.31 This historical power asymmetry has shaped the relationship between China and its neighbors. In the past, neighboring countries paid tribute to the Chinese empire in return for security and material rewards. The historical legacy of China as a regional leader continues to influence contemporary debates on Chinese foreign policy. While China’s official discourse always claims that China has neither the capabilities nor intentions to build a Sino-centered regional order, some international relations observers have deep suspicions about China’s long-term intentions regarding the regional order.32 When making decisions and projecting images, China must consider all these competing identities, posing challenges for Chinese decision makers. The foreign policy process has further complicated China’s signaling behaviors. Chinese top leadership calculates the trade-offs of China’s different identities, and China’s government agencies use different aspects of China’s identities and status to defend or advance institutional or bureaucratic interests. For instance, China’s Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Environmental Protection, and Commerce clearly have different priorities and preferences among themselves on China’s foreign policy.33 Regarding China’s repositioning on the global stage, China’s self-narrative is just half the equation, and the other half is how its multiple audiences see China’s message. The next sections describe these audiences.

Domestic Audience For China, the domestic audience is often more important than conventional wisdom assumes. The international relations literature often treats the domestic audience as a factor that increases bargaining credibility in coercive diplomacy. In fact, the domestic audience is at times the primary targeted audience in status signaling, not just a variable or factor to increase international bargaining leverage. While the international distribution of power is clearly shaping China’s foreign policy, political elites in Beijing are constantly concerned about their domestic agenda and domestic audience, in addition to investing significant resources to build a positive international image on the world stage. The international audience is the contextual or intervening variable, and what the CCP cares most about is its image at home. Through projecting a powerful image on the world stage, the CCP aims to strengthen its legitimacy and prestige in front of its domestic audience. Why is the image of a strong and respected great power so crucial for the CCP? The answer is related to domestic legitimacy and nationalism in China.

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Like many other nations, China has its own exceptional narrative and myths of ancient glory and pride. In modern history, the strong and prosperous China was destroyed when the West invaded and defeated the Qing empire. This was the start of China’s so-called century of humiliation. The nationalist theme of “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (zhonghua mingzhu weida fuxin) has been a major theme for several generations of Chinese political leaders, including Nationalist leaders Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek and Communist Party leaders Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. Any political party or leader who wants legitimacy in modern China must redress the century of humiliation and pledge to restore China’s rightful place as a powerful nation in the world.34 The goal for all Chinese political elites is their determined pursuit of fuqiang, “wealth and power.” This abiding quest for a restoration of Chinese greatness came to define modern Chinese nationalism and political legitimacy, and it remains the key to understanding many of China’s actions in the twenty-first century. For instance, in a statement to mobilize domestic support for CCP rule that had more than a whiff of nationalism, Xi Jinping remarked that “everyone is talking about the China Dream,” and that “realiz[ing] the great renewal of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history.”35 The role of the domestic audience could also help explain another angle of Chinese politics. China watchers have been long puzzled by the resilience of the Chinese political system. Westerners who assume that multiparty elections are the only source of political legitimacy question how the CCP maintains its legitimacy without transparent and competitive elections. Critics have predicted the CCP’s collapse on these grounds for decades.36 The CCP’s carefully crafted image and the attention it pays to its domestic audience give it legitimacy even in the absence of competitive elections. Although social unrest is increasing in areas of China, the CCP has still largely enjoyed a relatively high level of support among the Chinese public. While economic growth has boosted the CCP’s legitimacy, that is not the only crucial factor; nationalist credentials are equally important. The CCP maintains power not only because it has delivered economic growth, which gives it performance-based legitimacy,37 but equally because of the significant role of Chinese nationalism. When the CCP built the Monument to the People’s Heroes at the center of Tiananmen Square in 1949, it included a frieze depicting the struggles of the Chinese to establish the People’s Republic of China. The first carving of the frieze depicts an event from 1839: the public burning of imported opium by the Qing dynasty’s official, Lin Zexu, which triggered the first Opium War. China’s subsequent loss to the

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­ ritish ­inaugurated the century of humiliation. In the following one hundred B years, China suffered countless wars and famines. Today, the Monument to the People’s Heroes remains the most significant symbol of the CCP’s national authority. This narrative of the CCP’s role in saving and modernizing China is a more durable source of its legitimacy than the country’s economic performance. It explains why, even at the worst times of the party’s rule in the last six decades, including the disastrous Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, the CCP was able to keep the support of mainstream Chinese long enough for it to correct its mistakes.38 Nationalism has been an integral part of the legitimacy of the CCP. Nationalism was originally a mobilization tool to consolidate CCP power. In a new era, nationalism has become the social glue that unifies China and consolidates the CCP’s rule. When new challenges to its legitimacy arise, the CCP uses strategies such as patriotic education of youth and propaganda campaigns to glorify the history of the party and strengthen national identity. Through this approach, the CCP has justified the continuation of the oneparty system in the post–Cold War era. In the new era, the CCP is pursuing conspicuous projects to enhance its prestige. In business, China is mobilizing resources to build large passenger planes that will rival Boeing and Airbus. In education, it is developing worldclass universities. In military projects, China commissioned in 2012 its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, a refurbished carrier it purchased from Ukraine as an unfinished ship in 1998.39 At the ceremonial launching of the Liaoning, Premier Wen Jiabao read the congratulatory letter of the CCP, highlighting three implications of the aircraft carrier: It is a milestone in China’s military modernization. It is a symbol of “comprehensive national power” (zhong he guoli). It could “stimulate national spirit” (zhenfen minzu jingshen). Significant military buildup has important strategic implications for security and order. But the way the Chinese government organized the aircraft carrier’s launch surely had the domestic audience as its primary target. The official statement from the Chinese government liberally emphasized the domestic mobilization function of the aircraft carrier project.40 In addition, the Chinese government is investing many sources to improve soft power and public diplomacy. The purpose is not simply to improve China’s international image but also to consolidate CCP’s legitimacy and authority at home.41 Above all, to legitimate the CCP’s rule in contemporary China, the Chinese government and the CCP want to send two messages to the domestic audience: the CCP is the only political force that can defend China’s national honor, and the CCP is the only political force that can hold China together

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as a unified and strong nation. These two messages have a strong nationalist element, which has become the major source for legitimacy of the CCP. As analyzed by William Callahan, the CCP tries to combine the narrative of China’s past humiliation with China’s return to its rightful place on the global stage. This has generated a duality in China’s identity: a humiliated ancient power and a rapidly rising power. China has become a “pessoptimist nation.”42 As China increases its global presence, the risks and responsibilities associated with increasing status have also generated heated discussions in China. Does China always struggle for higher status? I argue that it does not and that another duality of Chinese national identity is emerging in a new era.

Regional Audience in East Asia From October 24 to October 25, 2013, Beijing held a major conference on peripheral (regional) diplomacy (zhoubian waijiao). Participants included all seven members of the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and leaders from some of China’s largest financial and economic enterprises. The attention on China’s regional diplomacy at such a high-level meeting was unprecedented. The meeting laid out some long-term goals of China’s regional diplomacy. President Xi had conducted a four-nation state visit to Central Asia in September 2013. During his stop in Kazakhstan, he called for a new Silk Road with enhanced infrastructure and financing for energy, trade, telecommunications, and regional development. Before the conference, Xi and Premier Li also participated in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Indonesia and the East Asia Summit in Brunei in October. Their attendance at these high-profile meetings might have had two impetuses: correct gaffs in China’s diplomacy in the region between 2009 and 2010 and restore momentum to China’s regional diplomacy. In July 2010 at the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Ministers Conference in Hanoi, the Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi said, “China is a big country and other countries are small countries, and that’s just a fact.”43 For many decades, formal diplomatic statements from China had emphasized the equality of countries, whether small or large, rich or poor. Thus, Yang’s remark might be one of most undiplomatic statements a senior Chinese diplomat has ever made. From the perspective of China’s regional diplomacy, Yang’s remark appeared to reveal a Chinese imperialist tendency or big power mentality toward regional neighbors. Yang’s remark may have been an integral part of the message Chinese leaders wanted the regional audience

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to hear. After all, Yang’s statement was factual. This asymmetry of power and status had shaped the relationship between China and the region for thousands of years. Some scholars of East Asian international relations even regard this power asymmetry as a key factor in maintaining a peaceful and hierarchical order in East Asia.44 China today is not the historical Chinese empire; more importantly, the distribution of power in East Asia has shifted, and the geopolitics has become more complicated. East Asia in the past and today is crucial in Chinese diplomacy and foreign policy and is regarded as the priority for China’s diplomacy. Whether China is seeking to become a regional hegemon in East Asia has important implications for international politics in general and Sino-American relations in particular.45 China’s strategic fear is that an outside power will establish military deployments around China capable of encroaching on China’s territory.46 Countries on China’s periphery have been the main arena of Chinese foreign relations. Keeping this periphery free of potentially hostile great power presence and pressure is a long-lasting effort by China that shows an understandable wariness toward outside powers.47 The United States has been the leading power in the Asia-Pacific region since World War II and does not want to be pushed out of Asia by an exclusionary bloc.48 As China’s power and status grow in Asia, the United States sends signals to its allies and friends meant to maintain its credible commitments and status in the region. “Because the United States regards Asia as the most important region in the world for long-term U.S. interests, there is special sensitivity to the potential long-term significance of Chinese actions in Asia that suggest that the PRC is either assuming a more hegemonic posture toward the region or specifically seeking to constrain the American presence and activities there.”49 China sends two types of messages to regional audiences. One message is to reassure neighbors that China will be a peaceful and cooperative regional power and that its rise is not an emerging threat but provides more opportunities for development to regional countries. A similar message, meant to regain its regional leadership role, is in China’s provision of public goods to regional order. The second type of message removes any impression that China cannot defend its claims in territorial disputes. While China wants to build an overall positive image as a cooperative and peaceful great power in regional order, any great power has a strategic incentive for being feared rather than loved. These different messages with different goals clearly conflict with each other. For instance, on the one hand, China wants to reassure its neighbors about its peace-

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ful intentions so that a rising China will not face a balancing coalition from regional countries. On the other hand, China also wants to maintain its credibility for coercion or deterrence so that it will not lose bargaining leverage in territorial disputes. China’s desire to be a regional leader also generates fear and uncertainty, and some regional powers worry that China will try to reestablish a Sino-centric regional hegemony. China has a differentiated strategy toward different regional actors: for some regional audiences, China wants to demonstrate its benign image as a regional partner and leader; for other regional audiences, China wants to be feared rather than liked.50 We cannot assume that China will always want to build a positive and benign image in the region. Signaling to both domestic and international audiences complicates things. Signals to the domestic audience can generate uncertainty and anxiety among regional countries. For instance, Xi Jinping’s allusion to the Chinese Dream, targeting the domestic audience to build legitimacy and political mobilization, causes regional audiences in East Asia to worry that China might have an expansionist goal of rebuilding the tributary system in East Asia. This partially explains the confusing signals about its status and role in Asia that China sends.51

Audience in the Global South Before his summit with President Obama in California in 2013, Xi Jinping spent the first week in June on a trip to Latin America, with stops in Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica, and Mexico. Before that, President Xi’s first trip abroad as head of state was to Africa in March 2013. In his speech to Tanzanian politicians, Xi contended that China was helping Africa grow. Xi told his audience in Tanzania that his government remained committed to strong ties with African countries. “This will not change at all because of China’s own growth and rising international stature,” he said. “I can clearly tell all my friends here that under new circumstances, the importance of Sino-African relations will not decline, but will instead rise.”52 Xi Jinping devoting so much time so early in his visit to Africa and Latin America underscores a continuing theme in Chinese foreign policy. China frequently points out that it is the world’s largest developing country, and Africa has the world’s largest number of developing countries. China sees its future as intertwined with the world’s developing countries, and Africa has become an increasingly important target of Chinese active diplomacy. In terms of China’s diplomatic strategy, the developing world, or the global South, is viewed as “the foundation” (jichu) of China’s diplomacy.

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The global South is important for China because it has been traditionally regarded as the political basis of China’s international support. As China expands its interests globally, the developing world becomes a crucial source to satisfy China’s growing economic and energy needs. Sharing similar identity helps countries build relationships. To consolidate its relationship with developing countries, China emphasizes its own identity as a developing country. China is traditionally viewed as a leading power among developing countries, and their political support has been an important foreign policy asset for the PRC. As long as there is a hierarchy in international politics, a leading power needs followers for legitimacy, normative preferences, and prestige. An emerging leading power gains political support for greater legitimacy and prestige by increasing its followers. To perform successfully, any leadership in global governance must be accepted by some followers, and the leaders must credibly include interests or ideas of potential followers into the leadership project.53 Thus, a rising great power can consolidate its political influence by emphasiz­ ing its identity as a developing country. South–South solidarity has long con­ stituted a core component of Chinese foreign policy.54 China has always de­ clared it stands with the developing world, and its global South policy, although influenced by diverse factors, has been largely shaped by China’s domestic priorities. A developing country identity has always been an important theme in China’s diplomacy.55 During the Cold War, China competed vigorously with the Soviet Union to woo developing and communist countries,56 gaining its seat at the United Nations largely because of much support from the developing world. China’s identity as a developing country has intensified since the end of the Cold War. China in the Mao era was determined to export revolution, even to the detriment of its relations with many Third World countries, but in the late 1970s, Beijing started national economic reforms, and China gradually abandoned its image of a radically revolutionary power. In the 1990s, the developing world had a new meaning for China, as it attempted to break through the isolation that resulted after the Tiananmen Square protests while looking for an alternative reference group after the collapse of the communist bloc.57 As China’s economic growth continues, economic interest and natural resources have been a new major driving force behind China’s engagement with the developing world.58 Closer economic relations with the developing world have helped China strengthen its political influence there. Thus, while its relations with the developing world were weakened in the initial stage of the reform and opening age, China’s national identity as a developing country remains mostly intact.

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China’s national identity has evolved, and it is increasingly a country with conflicting identities.59 As China becomes the second-largest economy and a major player in the world economy, is it still a developing country? Lowell Dittmer states, “The truth may be that China, like a young adult, is now more confused about its national identity than it was when it was more radical and less developed. To some extent this confusion has affected images of China among other countries as well.”60 In the opening and reform era, China’s economy has developed rapidly, but China has been hesitant to give up its identity as a developing country, which in social and economic ranking put it in a lower-status group.61 The identity of “developing country” has been a useful tool to consolidate support from other developing countries. This partially explains why China is unwilling to join a higher-status group such as the Group of Seven, which is primarily composed of Western industrialized countries.62 Thus, China aims to send two messages to the global South audience. On the one hand, China signals it is a developing country to indicate solidarity with the global South; on the other hand, China signals it is the representative voice from the global South. China seeks to reframe and rebrand a unique leadership role. According to Deng Xiaoping, China should maintain a low-profile approach and avoid taking a leadership role (budangtou), even among the developing countries. By seeking to be the voice of the developing world, China is acting like their de facto leader in global bargaining, but at the same time China also avoids claiming a formal leadership status on the world stage.

Audience in the West On January 17, 2011, one day before Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States, a short promotional video called Experience China made its debut on six giant screens at New York City’s Times Square. The video featured ordinary as well as internationally known Chinese people. It was a part of a wider public relations campaign the Chinese government launched in the United States to promote a modern and benign image of China. However, then and now, a cooperative and benign image is not the only message the Chinese government wants to send to the Western audience. During the drama of the US government shutdown and looming debt default, China’s Xinhua News Agency published an article on its English website, clearly targeting international audiences. The article proposed that China and other emerging powers should not take US leadership for granted, and China

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should consider building a “de-Americanized world” if the United States continued in its irresponsible approach to its finances.63 On human rights issues, China is also no longer a passive recipient of international criticism, and points out Western countries’ human rights failures. For example, China has responded to US government reports on its human rights practices by issuing its own report on human rights issues in the United States surrounding gun violence, racial and religious discrimination, increasing income gap, and the abuse of power by security agencies.64 China has also raised human rights issues related to Muslim minorities and immigrants in talks with Germany and other European countries. While Chinese criticism may seem hypocritical or even laughable, it suggests that China is beginning to take the international human rights system more seriously, another indication of its desire to be viewed by the West in a certain way. Reaching audiences in the West is crucial for China. For the Chinese, the West has been a source to both emulate and resent, sometimes simultaneously and also in a way that has changed over time. China still regards the West as the seat of dominant power and as being more prosperous and advanced. China’s struggle for modernity has always been measured relative to the Western countries, and China is still trying to emulate the West in some respects.65 In the early twentieth century, many Chinese elites regarded science and democracy as essential tools to make China a more prosperous and modern country, and those tools came from the West. Even the concept of communist revolution came from the West, although the CCP has always emphasized the indigenous remaking of Marxist ideas. China has continued to learn from the West. The opening and reform initiated by Deng Xiao­ ping has emphasized learning ideas of market economy, management, and ad­ vanced technology from the West. This was the same with the popular Chi­ nese saying of “linking up with the international track” (yu guoji jie gui). China’s attitude toward the West has changed from the Mao era to the contemporary era. In the Mao era, the West was the main target of ­China’s resentment. In the reform era, seeking the recognition of the West (the United States in particular) has been a crucial goal of China’s foreign policy.66 The global financial crisis of 2008 changed perceptions among some Chinese elites about the shifting balance of power between China and the West. Some Chinese elites think that China’s political model has challenged dominant Western ideas.67 That said, a more nuanced understanding of the so-called China model is that China does not reject all Western ideas and that China has taken a selective and pragmatic approach to learning ideas from the West, such as market economy and free trade.68

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The West has also been a major source of resentment and fear for China. The Western powers are central to the Chinese historical memory of the century of humiliation. In the post–Cold War era, Chinese elites feared that the outside influence of the West could damage China’s national unity and political stability. The dynamics of power transition have also shaped China’s relationship with the West, particularly US-China relations. While an established power worries about challenge from a rising power, the rising power worries about the strategic pressure and possible containment or balancing from the established power. For this reason, it is crucial for China to reassure the West about its long-term intentions. China sends several conflicting messages to the West. On the one hand, China signals that it is not a threat to the existing Western-dominated international order. While China is dissatisfied with some elements of the current order, it does not seek to overthrow the existing rules of the game. Instead, it works within the existing order and so continues to build positive images of itself in the Western media and the domestic public. On the other hand, China also wants to demonstrate that it is different from the West. China is hesitant to join in any club that is open purely to the Western industrialized countries.

Summary China works to build a positive image on the world stage. But the reality is more complicated: China has incentives to project different images to various audiences. China has several identities with conflicting roles. The six major narratives of China’s identities include socialist country, developing country, emerging or rising power, great power, superpower, and regional power. The dimensions of China’s national identities provide China some flexibility to deal with different audiences but makes China’s signaling process less ­coherent. The domestic audience in China is more important than conventional wisdom assumes. The CCP is carefully managing its image in front of both its domestic audience and its international audience. Nationalism is an indispensable source of CCP legitimacy. The CCP has used all kinds of strategies to boost its prestige in front of its domestic audience and maintain its legitimacy despite challenges at home and abroad. While much existing international relations literature treats the domestic audience as an intervening variable, I argue that the domestic audience is the primary targeted audience in some signaling.

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China is sending signals about its image to different audiences. The challenge for China is that all audiences are receiving all China’s signals.69 Although Xi Jinping’s message of the Chinese Dream clearly has the domestic audience in mind, the signal of Chinese renewal alarms some regional audiences in East Asia. Because East Asian countries worry about reestablishment of Chinese hegemony in the region, regional powers might try to strengthen security alliances with the United States. In this scenario, one signal for domestic consumption might have widespread implications on the international stage. One of the most important items in Chinese strategic discussion is the coordination of “two major games” (liangge daju) between domestic policy and international policy.70 However, it is often difficult for Chinese leaders to construct a coherent strategy or to send coherent signals to both domestic and international audiences.

4

Domestic Audience, Nationalism, and Weapons of Mass Consumption

Mo Yan was awarded Nobel Prize in literature. This symbolizes the prosperity and progress of Chinese literature as well as China’s increasing comprehensive national power and international influence. — CCP’s letter to congratulate Mo Yan’s Nobel Prize in Literature, October 2012 Our development of an aircraft carrier . . . will have profound implications for our military modernization, the strengthening of national defense and comprehensive national power, and inspire national morale and patriotism. —Premier Wen Jiabao, remarks at the launching ceremony of China’s first aircraft carrier, September 2012

In 2012, China commissioned its first aircraft carrier—the Liaoning.1 That same year, the Chinese writer Mo Yan was awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature. It is hard to imagine that the launching of China’s first aircraft carrier and China’s first Nobel Prize in Literature could have any similarity: one was a strategic military program, and the other was an international honor for individual writers. In 2012, however, both events were celebrated in the Chinese media as achievements symbolizing China’s “national comprehensive power” (zhong he guoli). Projecting a capable image to the domestic audience provides legitimacy to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the new era. Nationalist credentials and propaganda are therefore crucial in consolidating that legitimacy.2 According to the CCP’s narrative, its role in restoring China from the century of humiliation is a durable source of its legitimacy.3 In the 2010s, the CCP pursued conspicuous projects to boost its prestige. On September 3, 2015, Beijing held a high-profile military parade to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. Through such a high-profile event, the CCP

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wanted to send the message to the Chinese public that the century of humiliation was over, and today’s China is reclaiming its rightful great power status.4 Shortly after Xi Jinping took his position as the new general secretary of the CCP, he made a speech at the historical museum of the Chinese revolution. In this speech, Xi reviewed Chinese revolutionary history, including how China was defeated by the Western powers and how the CCP saved China. Then he called for the Chinese people to struggle for the “renewal of the Chinese nation” in pursuit of the Chinese Dream, saying, “To realize the great renewal of the Chinese nation is the greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history.”5 Chinese leaders have long justified their authority and legitimacy through slogans, and the Chinese Dream is the latest version. Since the end of the last Chinese dynasty in 1911, national leadership has adopted political slogans, often of ardent national revival and also moral instruction. While China’s economic growth since 1978 has brought huge benefits to vast numbers of people, it has also brought rapid changes to China’s society, which lead many to decry a deepening moral vacuum and confusion over values. In choosing a slogan like the Chinese Dream, Xi aims to strengthen his personal authority as well as CCP legitimacy within China. To enhance China’s international status, China can pursue three strategies: emulation, competition, or social creativity.6 The general theory of status signaling could explain rising powers’ signaling of both higher and lower status,7 and this chapter addresses how a rising power signals to a domestic audience a desire for higher status. Within the realm of consumer culture, many individuals define themselves through conspicuous consumption of particular material products. This to-have-is-to-be logic, when applied to international politics, could help explain the urge of rising powers to undertake status-laden projects.8 Conspicuous consumption of material goods that combines emulation and competition signals higher status in both social life and international politics. Unlike most existing studies on status politics, this chapter highlights the domestic political calculation behind China’s status-laden projects instead of focusing only on international and psychological incentives. This chapter argues that many of China’s high-profile programs are weapons of mass consumption— conspicuous projects, whether military or public. Through attracting and absorbing the attention of the masses, conspicuous programs strengthen the legitimacy and authority of the CCP in the eyes of the domestic public. Since the 1990s, China has been pursuing many statusladen conspicuous projects. We see evidence of conspicuous consumption in the Beijing Olympics and the fashionable skyscrapers in many Chinese cities. These instances are easy to spot. The harder cases of conspicuous con-

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sumption are those found in military affairs, because one would expect their causes to be rooted in national security, not international status.9 Thus, if we can identify conspicuous consumption as a causal driver in military affairs, we gain confidence that conspicuous consumption matters in other more likely issue areas within international relations.10 I do not assume that all these projects are wasteful investments that have no instrumental value. Rather, this chapter demonstrates that domestic political calculations shape when and how these programs are developed. Differing from many studies on status politics, my study acknowledges the instrumental implications of these programs. My argument is that these military projects are primarily concerned about the posturing of China in regional and global affairs.11 It is very difficult to identify true military necessity in the age of great power relations when war is not an imminent possibility. Thus, status signaling affects priorities of when and why China might develop some weapons and when and how China might demonstrate these weapons. I do not claim that status signaling is the only factor in China’s weapons acquisition process.12 For instance, China’s development of antiship ballistic missiles might relate more to the perceived geopolitical threat since the late 1990s than to China’s desire to achieve great power status.13 These types of weapons are different from the high-profile aircraft carrier project. Some strategists see little value in these military projects, but I am not arguing that they are simply wasteful investment with only symbolic value. The chapter opens with a conceptual analysis of status signaling using weapons of mass consumption. Then it turns to the importance of domestic audience and nationalism. The chapter discusses two military-related events in China: Beijing’s launching of its aircraft carrier in 2012 and military parade in 2015.14 They illustrate when and why Beijing intends to conspicuously develop and demonstrate its new military programs in front of domestic and international audiences. Finally, this chapter discusses the implications of these projects for China’s role on the world stage.

Status Signaling and Weapons of Mass Consumption Just as the nouveau riche use conspicuous luxury consumption to symbolize newly acquired status, rising powers use material goods to enhance their status in the international hierarchy.15 While the argument that weapons acquisition is important for international status is not new, most existing studies largely ignore the crucial role of domestic political calculations.16 This book emphasizes that conspicuous consumption in international politics is

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a complicated “two-level” political game.17 Weapons acquisition as a status signal targets both internal and external audiences, and the domestic audience is sometimes more important than we assume. In peacetime, a conspicuous project such as the Olympics may serve as a useful weapon of mass distraction to boost the leadership’s domestic prestige and legitimacy.18 While military projects such as aircraft carriers usually have important strategic implications, the way that a government demonstrates its weapons systems indicates that weapons of mass consumption are also important for influencing the domestic audience. Conspicuous consumption has two purposes: instrumental and expressive. In domestic society, lavish consumption expenditures serve a rational instrumental goal. Some consumption behaviors by lawyers and businesspeople project an image of capability and are more like investment than real consumption.19 In international politics, instrumental conspicuous consumption is a motive for acquiring advanced weapons such as nuclear weapons and aircraft carriers. By contrast, expressive conspicuous consumption describes a situation in which people sacrifice their material interests to express who they are or who they want to be. The primary goal of this type of conspicuous consumption is to satisfy one’s ideational needs. Expressive choice occurs when individuals communicate and reaffirm to others and themselves who they are through actions such as voting or purchasing certain goods. For instance, consumers choose to purchase particular goods and voters to support a particular political party because of their understanding of what it means to be someone in possession of such goods or in support of a particular party.20 In international politics, cultural activities, such as the Beijing Olympics and the Shanghai Expo, fall under the category of expressive conspicuous consumption. Whether motivated by instrumental or expressive purposes, status signaling can be done in many ways, and China engages in several types of status signaling behaviors. China’s space program has been an especially strong feature in the government’s campaign.21 In the diplomatic arena, China is establishing new regional organizations and forums, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), to strengthen cooperation among emerging powers.22 These not only symbolize China’s great power status but have specific instrumental purposes. Other activities, however, should be viewed as expressive choices. In 2008, China promoted its prestige by hosting the Beijing Olympics. Though ostensibly a sporting event, the games were treated in Japan, South Korea, and China as a conspicuous status signal— one that expressed the enormous wealth of the

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East and its rightful front and center place on the world stage.23 Symbolic activities such as these have important domestic political implications when projection of a positive image strengthens the legitimacy of the ruling party.

Conspicuous Consumption as Status Signaling Arms races are typically explained as a function of uncertainty and competitive security-seeking behavior under anarchy. This is the familiar spiral dynamics story, grounded in security dilemma logic and told by both offensive and defensive realists.24 Cultural perspectives complement but do not replace this standard realist explanation, for they too share the assumption that security is the primary motivation for arms acquisitions. Recognizing that, traditionally, there has been a single international hierarchy based on military power, consensus on this matter is not terribly surprising. Yet in theory and recent practice, the possibility exists for many hierarchies, opening up new space for social creativity among status seekers.25 Thus, whereas the United States still prioritizes military power as the essential source of status, Germany and Japan have pursued national security policies that deemphasize military instruments as a means of achieving national objectives.26 China, for its part, presents an interesting mixed case: it consistently signals that it desires a peaceful rise to great power status while it steadily upgrades its military capabilities.27 In social life, the propensity to seek status is largely correlated with the material resources people have. According to a study of consumer behavior, consumers types are based on their income level and consumption patterns.28 The higher a person’s income, the greater that person’s propensity to purchase luxury goods to signal status. This insight could have parallels in international politics. The more material resources a country has, the more likely it wants to signal a higher international status. China’s increasing ambitions in the last two decades largely correlate with the rise of China’s economic power. Nation-states are stratified according to their different material capabilities, and so they exhibit different patterns of status signaling behaviors. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union played status games that other countries could not afford.29 Emerging and rising powers emulate superpowers in their weapons acquisitions.30 For India and China, the symbolic value of certain advanced weapons systems is as important as the instrumental values achieved by them. Thus, India, seeking to become the world’s largest buyer of weaponry, is expected to spend $100 billion on military acquisitions by 2021, even though its security environment shows few signs of worsening in the foreseeable future.31 Likewise, China sees value in achieving manned

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space flight forty years after the United States and the Soviet Union even though the project comes with an exorbitant price tag and no obvious tangible benefits. China’s pursuit of manned space flight is a manifestation of its quest for improved international status, a necessary prerequisite for admission into the superpower club.32 As discussed in Chapter 2, if the primary goal of acquiring a particular weapons system is to signal enhanced status, then (1) domestic support for the arms project will be positively correlated with economic growth and not necessarily a heightened security threat, (2) the particular weapon will not be the most cost-efficient means to deal with the country’s security challenges, and (3) official statements on weapons acquisition will make the explicit connection between the weapons system and the symbolic value for status. National leaders and governments confront complicated pressures and different incentives from both a domestic audience and a variety of international audiences. China’s international audiences include regional audiences in Asia, developing countries, and established powers such as the United States. International status signaling often arises from a domestic political struggle for legitimacy. Bolstering the country’s international status satisfies domestic prestige needs by consolidating the legitimacy of the ruling party or the ruling political coalition. At the international level, signaling high international status helps a rising power maintain or gain privileges and special rights in various international institutions. Sometimes, the international audience is merely an intervening variable between status signaling and the domestic target, which explains why the choice, from an international viewpoint, may appear sub­ optimal. National leaders have difficulty signaling only to targeted audiences, so signaling behaviors often appear contradictory. China’s status-laden projects have international implications, but they perhaps have more important implications for China’s domestic politics. Facing new challenges to its legitimacy, including the lowest rates of economic growth in over three decades, the CCP glorifies the history of the party to consolidate national identity. Above all, status is an important factor driving China’s military modernization process. But status is not all. The process is clearly shaped by multiple factors, including China’s rethinking of its global roles as well as China’s bureaucratic politics.

Status Signaling and China’s Naval Modernization China has engaged in a sustained drive to create a modern military, increasing its defense budget by double-digit percentages each year since the 1990s. This

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is not to become a primarily military power like the former Soviet Union but is primarily a product of its internal economic growth, which facilitates multiple dimensions of Chinese power.33 To be sure, China’s military modernization has strategic and instrumental purposes. Nevertheless, the struggle for status must be considered among the most important motives driving the process.34 For instance, the official document on China’s military reform, released in 2016, states China should build a strong military “commensurate with its international status” (yu guoji diwei xiangchen).35 This indicates that international status is one of the explicit goals for China’s military modernization, but not the only one. China’s military modernization has been shaped by perceived security threats, its expanding overseas interests, its rethinking of its global roles, and its bureaucratic politics. In his speech at the 19th National Congress of the CCP, Xi projected that, by the middle of the twenty-first century, China’s armed forces would be fully transformed into “world-class” forces.36 To fulfill that goal, China appears determined to develop a world-class blue-water navy.37 The status of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been enhanced in the military structure of the PRC, and the power projection capabilities of the PLAN have been growing steadily. On December 26, 2008, a blue-water convoy composed of two destroyers and one depot ship was sent to the waters off the Horn of Africa to fight piracy—the very first time that the Chinese Navy had participated in a combat expedition. China is also obtaining solid and widespread access to overseas logistical support. The construction of an aircraft carrier is an integral part of China’s naval transformation.38 In 2011, China tested its first aircraft carrier and is expected to build several carriers in the coming years.39 In 2017, China launched its first domestically built aircraft carrier.40 In early 2018, it was reported that China has started building its third aircraft carrier and plans to have four aircraft carrier battle groups in service by 2030.41 China’s naval strategy has undergone two major shifts: from near-coast defense to near-seas active defense in the mid-1980s and recent far-seas operations. As the strategies have become more active, PLAN capabilities have increased from limited capabilities for coastal defense to more expansive ones to operate more effectively in China’s near seas.42 China’s determination to build a blue-water navy will have important implications for international relations. The existing explanations highlight different motives for China’s aircraft carrier projects: prestige, bureaucratic politics, and strategic logic.43 Robert Ross argues that China’s aircraft carrier project is a suboptimal choice because China is a continental power. Thus, China’s aircraft carrier project symbolizes prestige and is largely driven by

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Chinese “naval nationalism.”44 Some suggest that interservice competitions within the Chinese military have played a role in promoting the aircraft carrier project. Other scholars suggest that China’s development of a navy reflects changes in China’s threat environment and expanded Chinese national interests.45 I argue that status signaling for instrumental purposes provides a more convincing explanation. Status signaling is a middle ground approach that tries to bridge the gap between purely instrumental and symbolic perspectives. The status-signaling argument proposes that China’s aircraft carrier project cannot be understood purely from a traditional security perspective.46 From a defensive realism perspective, a security-seeking state should adopt competitive arms policies only under certain restricted conditions; otherwise, it should exercise restraint.47 From the standpoint of security maximization, China’s decision to build an aircraft carrier makes little sense. First, domestic support for the aircraft carrier project is positively correlated with China’s economic growth, not with increasing security threat. In the 1980s and 1990s, China’s hesitation to acquire aircraft carriers was largely due to a lack of funds; Chinese leaders decided to delay military modernization to focus, instead, on economic development.48 According to Liu Huaqing, the commander of the PLAN from 1982 to 1988, the financial and economic resources of China could not really support China’s pursuit of a carrier, and Liu expected that the project would be delayed until 2000.49 Today, the Chinese government possesses an abundance of economic resources that can be directed toward a military buildup. Yet no urgent security problem justifies aircraft carriers: China’s main security challenges come from territorial border disputes, and most of them have already been settled peacefully.50 Even if the Taiwan issue erupts in military conflict, the building of an aircraft carrier is not the most efficient way for China to strengthen its war-fighting capabilities. While aircraft carriers might provide some limited military utility in a hypothetical Taiwan-related conflict, they are not considered critical for Chinese operations under any scenario. Because Taiwan is within range of land-based Chinese aircraft, there are many alternative strategies that can maintain China’s deterrence more efficiently than one that involves aircraft carriers.51 A more cost-efficient approach for China would be to continue pursuing an asymmetrical strategy, including the deployment and development of antiship missiles and submarines.52 The cost of building and operating aircraft carriers is sufficiently high that a credible investment by the Chinese navy would divert funds from the current naval program.53 For these reasons, some Chinese security experts argue that a blue-water navy is an inefficient defense strategy

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for China in the twenty-first century.54 If not managed prudently, China’s aircraft carrier project might lead to an arms race in East Asia that would jeopardize China’s security environment. Status motivation is a salient factor in China’s military modernization process. Aircraft carriers are widely regarded as symbols of great power status, and China’s carrier project is closely related to domestic debates over its identity as a great power. Of the nine countries that operate aircraft carriers, most have only one carrier and have not adopted carrier warfare innovation.55 China’s official statements highlight the rationale of carriers as status symbols. For instance, the Chinese defense minister Liang Guanglie explained that one reason China should build an aircraft carrier was because, among all the great powers, China alone did not have one.56 True, China, given its geopolitical environment, may be viewed strictly as a continental power.57 The distinction between continental and sea powers, however, is not always a fixed one; whether a great power acts as a continental or sea power partially depends on how political elites view the role of their country. In the very first decades of the fifteenth century, the Chinese admiral Zheng He led a series of maritime expeditions. Zheng He’s naval exploration was not strategically driven and it did not add any new colonies to China’s Ming dynasty. It was, instead, a status symbol of the Chinese empire. Over the course of a decade, however, China’s overseas ventures were scrapped by high officials in Beijing anxious not to divert resources from meeting the Manchu landward threat in the north and that a seaward-bound open-market society might undermine their authority.58 This choice confronts many great powers. A traditionally continental power could choose to develop its naval power, but that could be costly if continental threats exist. Far from deterring Chinese ambitions to acquire carriers, their high costs and barriers assist in fulfilling the CCP’s purposes because status signals, in principle, must be costly to be reliable. A spokesman for China’s Ministry of National Defense said that aircraft carriers are “a reflection of a nation’s comprehensive power.”59 Compared with other naval powers in history, China is not a unique case of correlation between its economic resources and the strength of its naval power.60 China’s aircraft carrier project might be a strategic decision for status-­ signaling purposes; that is, conspicuous consumption with two instrumental, not purely symbolic, purposes:61 one international, the other domestic. While acknowledging the symbolic values of aircraft carrier projects, I argue that China’s has important international motivations driven by its transformation from a regional to a global power. My argument differs from other

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explanations that take a strictly symbolic perspective on naval power.62 The crucial decision to build an aircraft carrier was reportedly made in conjunction with President Hu Jintao’s announcement of revised “military strategic guidelines” (junshi zhanlue fangzhen).63 According to President Hu, safeguarding China’s expanding national interests should be a part of the PLA’s new mission.64 This trend is related to China’s rethinking of its expanded role in global security. According to Peking University professor Wang Jisi, the Chinese government has adopted a comprehensive understanding of security that incorporates economic and nontraditional concerns with traditional military and political interests. Chinese military planners have taken into consideration transnational problems (piracy and terrorism) as well as cooperative activities (UN peacekeeping operations).65 Aircraft carriers could improve China’s power projection capabilities and leverage its bargaining power over South China Sea claims with its Southeast Asian neighbors.66 Even if China’s aircraft carrier has mostly symbolic value in the short term, the strategic implications will become more salient in the long term as China builds more carriers. That China has been trying to build another aircraft carrier indicates that there are strategic calculations behind China’s carrier building.67 Rather than treating great power status as the only motive of China’s aircraft carrier project, China’s carriers can serve both expressive and instrumental purposes. Regarding the latter, aircraft carriers increase China’s ability to defend regional interests in contingencies not involving the United States. China has territorial disputes on the sea with a number of Asian countries, and a strong blue-water navy would strengthen China’s bargaining leverage in these disputes. Moreover, aircraft carriers would help protect China’s expanding overseas interests, and they would also increase China’s status and prestige by facilitating its engagement in various nontraditional missions. But while they may serve all of these instrumental purposes to some extent, aircraft carriers are, at best, an exceedingly inefficient way to achieve these goals and, at worst, counterproductive for China’s security concerns. The aircraft carrier project also serves an important domestic function: it is a status signal targeting China’s domestic audience to legitimize the CCP’s rule. From ancient Chinese emperors to contemporary Communist Party leaders, Chinese rulers have demonstrated China’s power and status inter­ nationally to secure their legitimacy domestically.68 In the opening and reform era and especially after the Tiananmen Square protests, nationalism has become more pronounced. As the China expert Thomas Christensen famously said, “Since the CCP is no longer communist, it must be even more

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Chinese.”69 The CCP and its leaders must take into consideration domestic opinions, and thus the CCP appeals to nationalist sentiments both to consolidate its power base in the military and to strengthen its support among the public. The building of aircraft carriers is one of many conspicuous projects that the CCP pursues to boost its prestige at home and abroad.

China’s Victory Day Military Parade The morning of September 3, 2015, China held a lavish three-hour military parade in Beijing to celebrate the seventieth anniversary of the end of  the Sino-Japanese war. Participating in the event were twelve thousand PLA troops, along with over a thousand troops from seventeen countries. More than five hundred items of weaponry and about two hundred aircraft were on display at the parade. Chinese President Xi Jinping inspected the troops and made an important speech. This grandiose military parade generated significant discussion in the international media.70 It marked the first time Beijing held a military parade other than on National Day (October 1), and the question remains as to why. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, China has held parades only on National Day. Top leaders Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao presided over high-profile military parades in 1959, 1984, 1999, and 2009 respectively. China’s parade in 2015 was the first major parade since Xi Jinping took power as the top leader of China. The CCP used the occasion of the parade to project an image of solidarity of the top leadership to the domestic public. Xi Jinping was the central figure of the day’s events. Former presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao and other former members of the Standing Committee attended the event. While the military parade sent important signals to multiple audiences, the domestic audience was the primary targeted audience. The main objective was domestic political mobilization, stirring up nationalist sentiment to buttress the CCP’s legitimacy and Xi Jinping’s authority.71 The parade had much to do with China’s military reform under the leadership of Xi Jinping.72 According to Cheng Li, a leading scholar on Chinese elite politics, the military parade was a grand political show “aimed more at enhancing Xi’s absolute authority over the PLA than at displaying the capabilities of the Chinese military itself.”73 The military parade showcased the entire Chinese military; each branch participated. For PLA elites, the 2015 military parade was a chance for Xi to consolidate his power and prepare for military reform. In a widely circulated article published in People’s Daily, Wang Jian, the deputy chief commander of the 2015 military

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parade, stated, “This military parade is for the demonstration of loyalty. The military parade should first and foremost demonstrate the immeasurable loyalty and absolute support of the PLA to CCP Central Committee and to President Xi.”74 For Xi, the parade could help improve the PLA’s domestic image with the people in the aftermath of his anticorruption campaign, through which the PLA experienced a dramatic personnel change. Senior PLA leaders such as Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou were indicted on corruption charges, which had a huge impact on the PLA. The parade could serve to strengthen solidarity after the political shock of the changes. It was also a power exercise showing Xi Jinping’s absolute control of the PLA. After the military parade, Xi implemented an ambitious military reform package. Xi wanted the Chinese military not only to acquire modern military technology but also to upgrade doctrine, training, and recruiting. During the military parade, Xi announced a cut of three hundred thousand troops in the PLA, consistent with the PLA’s longer-term effort to shift from a military of quantity to one more of quality. The reduction frees up resources that can be reallocated to better pay, additional training, and equipment acquisition. The long-term reduction is particularly important to the Chinese in light of ongoing concerns over its economic outlook.75 To the broad masses, who enjoyed the parade’s spectacle and celebrated the victory anniversary, Beijing wanted to send a clear message: the CCP saved China from national humiliation in the past, and it can defend China’s national security and honor on the world stage in the present. Some of the public seemed to get the message. A Tsinghua University student in Beijing said, “The parade is politically necessary. It will tell the people that China is now a strong country. And it will also somehow make the people respect the government.”76 Others, however, paid more attention to the fashion style of China’s first lady, Peng Liyuan, rather than the political meaning of the parade. Peng’s stylish red dress became an Internet sensation, and some Chinese e-commerce websites quickly added the same dress to their inventory so Chinese women could buy it.77 The parade also commemorated the 120th anniversary of the Sino-­Japanese War (1894 –1895). That war saw China suffer a humiliating loss, including the destruction of the Chinese Northern Fleet. The lesson learned was that China should build a modern and strong military force. During his speech at the military parade, Xi Jinping spoke of China’s past humiliation and the contemporary renewal of the Chinese nation: This great triumph crushed the plot of the Japanese militarists to colonize and enslave China and put an end to China’s national humiliation of suffering successive defeats at the hands of foreign aggressors in modern times. This great triumph

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re-established China as a major country in the world and won the Chinese people respect of all peace-loving people around the world. This great triumph opened up bright prospects for the great renewal of the Chinese nation and set our ancient country on a new journey after gaining rebirth.78

Given the high stakes of the military parade in 2015, Beijing made great efforts to make sure it went smoothly. Many public facilities were temporarily closed. Beijing’s Subway Line 1 was shut down, and 256 bus lines in Beijing were placed under tight transport restrictions. According to the minister of the Environment, Chen Jining, clean air was necessary to project a good image of the parade and the capital city.79 To ensure blue skies for the parade, half of Beijing’s cars were barred from the streets, and thousands of industrial firms suspended or cut production to reduce emissions. The factory shutdowns and road closures temporarily cleaned the air for the parade. While playing mainly to the domestic audience, Beijing was also sending a message to international audiences. The display was a chance to generate goodwill among China’s close partners, a number of whom sent delegations to take part in the event. It was also meant to impress potential adversaries like the United States and Japan by selectively revealing capabilities. Xi Jinping’s purpose was not to provoke a war with the United States but to awe its international adversaries into acquiescence regarding Beijing’s core interests.80 With respect to Japan, China was countering what it perceived as a revival of Japanese militarism under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. One message was clearly aimed at the United States: military intervention in the western Pacific will come at great cost. The parade displayed a significant amount of advanced weapons, including some of China’s most potent, such as the DF-21D (the so-called carrier killer antiship ballistic missile). The intentional inclusion of a weapon touted as targeting aircraft carriers was for signaling deterrence. Beijing revealed armaments that an opponent would take seriously.81 The seventieth-anniversary parade sent strong messages to multiple audiences. The Chinese domestic public was informed that under the CCP’s leadership China was reclaiming great power status. The military parade had an external military function, that of deterring potential adversaries from challenging China’s interests in East Asia. But I argue that the deterrence function of a military parade is limited. As discussed previously, the PLA senior officers and Chinese media explicitly emphasized the domestic political function of the parade. For every military development in China, there are always countermeasures from other countries. But the Chinese government tends to showcase Chinese weapon systems even before they become operational, indicating that the domestic audience is more important than the international

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audience. Regime security is the primary drive in the CCP’s calculation of national interests.

Weapons of Mass Consumption and Their Implications In many competitions over status in international politics, contestants compete for what in the end must be a fixed number of favored positions in some hierarchy. The payoffs depend much less on performance against some absolute standard than on performance in relation to each other. When the stakes are high, contestants may succumb to irresistible pressure to make heavy investments that in the end turn out to be mutually offsetting. The weapons acquisition of a rising power might lead to backlash from the hegemon and other powers, the logic of which is the spiral model of a security dilemma, in which enhancing security actually undermines it and leads to cyclical escalation.82 If status is perceived as positional goods, material investments (such as military buildup) to enhance a country’s status threaten or reduce the status of another country. If the other country responds by expending resources to increase its own status, a return to the original status hierarchy is possible. Critics might doubt whether the status dilemma is a valid analogy to the security dilemma. If states are striving for security as well as status, it is hard to say that the investment for status is really a dilemma.83 After all, the state demanding more status through weapons acquisition will be recognized as a competitor and thus will achieve its desired status. This recognition of great power status comes at a cost but not in terms of status. From this perspective, the rising power gets its new status, and there seems to be no dilemma the way there is in a security dilemma with its spiral model. In the status situation, the demand for status achieves status as a peer competitor; it just does not come for free. However, I argue that, from a theoretical perspective, the status dilemma could exist if survival is almost guaranteed and both sides struggle for their preferred status instead of for security. If one state decides to invest materially to increase its status and the other state responds accordingly, the original status hierarchy will obtain even if each side has invested to strengthen its status.84 China’s military projects have been strongly supported by domestic audiences and have generated complicated responses from regional and global audiences. While China’s military modernization has led to tensions and anxiety in the East Asia region, it also presents an opportunity for China to play a larger role and to share more responsibilities in global affairs. China’s military modernization runs the risk of increasing the perception of China

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as a threat in Asia, which, in the short term, will likely cause many Asian countries to strengthen their alliances with the United States.85 It will also cause many countries in the region to purchase more weapons.86 Over the long term, however, if China establishes a formidable military and offers to provide security protection for some regional countries, then American hegemony in Asia would indeed be threatened. Moreover, if China establishes its own sphere of influence in Asia, it would most likely provoke a zero-sum competition with the United States over legitimate regional and global authority.87 Such competition between China and the United States could risk re-creating the Cold War bipolar system, at least in the AsiaPacific region. That noted, a competitive bipolar system is not inevitable. Precisely what kind of international order eventually emerges in East Asia depends largely on how the United States and China envision their roles in the Asia-Pacific region. Some strategists claim that a contest for supremacy between the two countries is inevitable and already under way.88 The crucial question is whether a rising China seeks regional hegemony. If it does, what are its features? If it does not, how could China reassure the international community that it will not seek to destabilize the current system while still achieving its rise? For instance, while Chinese senior officials often emphasize that China does not seek a sphere of influence, China’s carrier project could trigger a naval arms race driven by status-dilemma dynamics. The competition is about not the survival of the United States and China but their appropriate status and authority in the emerging East Asia order.89 The American security expert Robert Ross suggests that a measured US military response would be a necessary signal to China: “Most important will be timely acquisition of the next generation of power-projection surface ships to succeed the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. This will be a necessary signal to Chinese leaders of the futility of their expansive and costly naval ambitions.”90 If the problem is not rooted in a security dilemma, then it is crucially important for the United States and other regional actors to understand precisely what triggers China’s need to signal higher status through weapons acquisitions. China’s naval nationalism targets its domestic and regional audiences. As Ross points out, these naval nationalist projects are mainly for the purpose of “seeking greater domestic legitimacy.”91 If the United States overreacts, that would surely strengthen nationalist voices within China, poisoning the political atmosphere for Sino-American cooperation in several key areas of grave concern to both countries. Of course, it has been long debated in US foreign policy circles whether a tougher or softer approach would be more

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likely to get more cooperation from China, and such debate will not end soon.92 Given China’s determination to build aircraft carriers and the dangers of a full-blown naval arms race, an urgent task for both the United States and China is to engage in a serious and prolonged dialogue on the appropriate role of their navies in the region. Similar to China’s aircraft carrier project, China’s military parade received mixed reactions from multiple audiences. The military parade enjoyed huge domestic support from the Chinese public. Through the military parade, Beijing intended to project the transformation of China from a semicolony into a rich nation with a strong military. This great power status is what generations of Chinese leaders have tried to achieve. The demonstration of military capabilities has led to mixed reactions from the international audience. The United States has a range of countermeasures against Chinese weapons. Chinese leaders must carefully balance the demonstration of strength at home and peaceful reassurances on the international stage. How the United States should respond to China’s military modernization effort is a key question in US defense planning. While China’s military modernization complicates Sino-American relations, China’s naval power does not pose a direct threat to US naval primacy in the near future. Indeed, in any potential Sino-American naval confrontation, China’s aircraft carriers would be little more than a vulnerable target. The alternative strategy of access denial is a far more efficient and effective way for China to provide for its security. The United States has no interest in heightened tensions with China, and China can certainly find better ways to spend its new wealth than on a naval arms buildup. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates pointed out in 2011, “I think that the Chinese have learned powerful lessons from the Soviet experience, and they do not intend to try to compete with us across the full range of military capabilities. But I think they are intending to build capabilities that give them a considerable freedom of action in Asia, and the opportunity to extend their influence.”93 If China does decide to make a push to strengthen its blue-water navy, the United States will surely push back with equal or greater force—not primarily because of the military implications of a Chinese naval buildup (that is, a heightened security dilemma) but rather because China would be signaling a challenge to America’s dominant status in Asia (a heightened status dilemma in the region). As some security experts notice, “The primacy challenge of China’s aircraft carrier project to the US navy is perceptional rather than operational.”94 If China’s military modernization is partially driven by the aspiration for higher status, that might also create opportunities for cooperation between

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China and the international community. Regarding China’s aircraft carrier project, the key question is not whether the aircraft carrier itself is a new weapons system for China but how China will use its aircraft carrier.95 Great power status is not free; it comes with global responsibilities and obligations. Thus, China’s aircraft carrier provides an opportunity for the United States to bolster its maritime cooperation with China. As Robert Kaplan argues, China’s navy is largely rising in a legitimate manner: to protect economic and rightful security interests, as America has done, rather than to forge a potentially suicidal insurgency force at sea.96 More generally, as China continues to modernize its military capabilities and demand greater status commensurate with its growth in power, the United States can ask in return that China become a responsible stakeholder willing to play a larger role in managing global problems, including maritime security issues. China may respond, “It’s your order, you manage it!” Or, signaling a lower status, “We are merely a poor developing country— one not remotely close to being your peer competitor or junior partner.” The official view, delivered by Xi Jinping in a 2015 speech, is that China should firmly defend the international order and system with United Nations Charters as the core principles, consolidate the victory after World War II, promote an open world economic system, and oppose protectionism in investment and trade. On the basis of conditions in China, China should stick to developing country status and promote our interests together with those of many developing countries. Maintaining a balance between rights and responsibilities, we should not only see what we need from the world but also realize the expectations of the international community for our country.97

Xi declared China is getting stronger on the international stage. China should not only contribute but also have a greater voice in shaping the global governance structure.98 But China does not yet have a fixed position or identity.

Summary Understanding the grand strategy of any great power requires starting with the domestic politics of that country.99 Since the end of the last Chinese dynasty in 1911, anyone with pretensions to national leadership has adopted a rhetoric of not only ardent national revival but also moral instruction, such as Xi Jinping’s call for the Chinese people to work for rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and a Chinese Dream. For political reasons, the CCP has been trying to project a capable image to its domestic audience through many conspicuous projects. International status is central to the Chinese nationalist narrative, which supports the CCP’s

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legitimacy. Xi Jinping has initiated projects and policies to enhance China’s international profile. Beijing has placed particular emphasis on achieving a new type of major power relations that involves a more equal footing between China and the United States. Xi’s first state visit to the United States and his first major speech at the United Nations were intended to project a capable and respected image on the world stage. China’s decision to build aircraft carriers has generated debates on China’s strategic intentions in the region. The purpose of its aircraft carrier project is puzzling only if viewed as China seeking to maximize its security. A Chinese aircraft carrier poses little or no threat to American naval supremacy and would be, at best, an inefficient means for Chinese security. A suboptimal choice in terms of China’s security seeking, the aircraft carrier project is, more accurately, conspicuous consumption for status signaling. Costly and expensive weapons systems such as aircraft carriers and space programs can send signals of great power status: not every country can afford to build those weapons. Unlike conventional consumption behaviors, conspicuous consumption as status signaling in international politics is a complex political process that involves multiple audiences and sometimes produces incoherent grand strategies. China’s aircraft carrier project, while not the most efficient weapon to defend China’s security, is still not a wasteful investment. It serves several instrumental purposes. China’s carriers increase China’s limited power projection capabilities, strengthen its bargaining power in the South China Sea, and expand its navy’s capacity to fulfill nontraditional security missions. Thus, China’s aircraft carriers have both symbolic and instrumental value. China’s military parade tried to project a powerful image to the Chinese public. Beijing intended it to project a transformation of China from the nation of a century of humiliation into a strong power in the twenty-first century. Rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is a major political theme in modern Chinese history, and the military parade is just one recent episode in its demonstration. For the international audience, the demonstration of military capabilities must be managed carefully. Military projects and displays obviously have instrumental and strategic implications. I am suggesting that when and how they are demonstrated indicate the domestic political calculations of Chinese leaders. While the demonstrations of China’s weapons are primarily driven by domestic demands to signal great power status, these projects have faced complex responses from regional and international audiences. The regional audiences in East Asia are concerned that China’s military buildup and naval expansion will strengthen

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China’s expansionist tendency to become a regional hegemon. However, unlike in historical East Asia, when China’s primacy was taken for granted and recognized as being natural and legitimate, contemporary China’s status and authority is uncertain and not a consolidated regional hegemony. China’s intentions in the region regarding its desire to be a regional hegemon (and the type of hegemon it would be) are still not clear. The aircraft carrier project has added more suspicions over China’s intentions and has the potential to damage China’s successful reassurance strategy in the region begun in the late 1990s. The responses from the United States seem to be a mixed story. On the one hand, the United States certainly has concerns about rapid growth of China’s military buildup. While China’s aircraft carriers cannot compete with their American counterparts in the foreseeable future, some analysts still worry about China’s long-term transformation from a land power to a sea power. According to this view, if China expands its naval power, Sino-­ American conflicts over the seas will become inevitable. A cautiously optimistic view on China’s naval expansion is that if China’s naval power rises peacefully and responsibly, then this rise will produce more opportunities for Sino-American cooperation on the sea. China should therefore be encouraged to play a larger role on the world stage. The competing expectations from multiple audiences illustrate the core dilemma of China’s repositioning in the twenty-first century. Depending on the ever-changing nature of its internal and external environments, China will continue struggling for a status and role that it will find most comfortable and beneficial.

5

Red Mask and White Mask The Charm Offensive, Selective Coercion, and China’s Regional Diplomacy

China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor. —“National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017”

East Asia has been the main arena of Chinese foreign relations. As the predominant power in East Asia for thousands of years, China has constantly worried that an outside power will establish military bases around China’s periphery capable of encroaching on China. At the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, in Shanghai in 2014, President Xi Jinping unveiled a new “Asian security concept,” calling for Asian security to be left to Asians.1 Xi’s speech generated some speculation that China would seek to exclude America from Asia. In the twenty-first century, China has been pursuing a more assertive foreign policy in Asia and beyond. The United States has been pushing back against China. While some might think the status quo of US-China relations is sustainable, an increasing number of strategists have expressed pessimistic views.2 Some American scholars advocate a much more competitive strategy toward China, and others prescribe accommodation with China to avoid long-term rivalry.3 For some strategists, rivalry between the United States and China seems to be inevitable. Despite China’s reassuring diplomatic rhetoric, many believe that China is trying to push America out of Asia. Admiral Harry Harris, the commander of US Pacific Command, said in 2016, “I believe China seeks hegemony in East Asia.”4 Many existing studies concentrate on how declaring higher status will generate great power conflicts,5 but a great power can signal higher status through many behaviors, some of which could contribute to international cooperation.6 This chapter discusses China’s regional diplomacy through the framework of status signaling in international politics. In terms of diplomatic

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signals, China has tried to reassure its neighbors that it will be a peaceful and cooperative regional power and that its rise provides more opportunities to regional countries. While China wants to build an overall positive image, it also wants to maintain coercive credibility to defend its national interests, particularly its maritime and other territorial claims. China continues to seek benign leadership via regional diplomacy,7 but its turn toward assertive diplomacy seems to be different from its earlier cooperative actions in the Asia-Pacific region. Some experts have noticed the contradiction of China’s regional strategy,8 and there is no consensus on how to interpret the motivations and mechanisms of China’s regional strategy. Why is there such a contradiction in China’s international image? How do we explain the shifting of China’s image from the late 1990s to the present? What are the driving factors of the assertive turn in Chinese foreign policy?9 Through an analysis of China’s status signaling behaviors in the Asia-Pacific, this chapter analyzes China’s two faces in regional diplomacy. The first section reviews the existing arguments on China and East Asian order. Then the chapter discusses status signaling through conspicuous giving, using China’s response to the Asian financial crisis as illustration. The chapter then discusses the assertive turn in China’s regional diplomacy.

The Rise of China and the East Asian Order In recent years, the relationship between a rising China and East Asian order has been a source of endless speculation and debate. When the Cold War ended, many scholars offered a pessimistic prediction for East Asia. Aaron Friedberg argued that the emergence of a multipolar international system would generate conflict in East Asia.10 Richard Betts argued that the shifting balance of power in East Asia and the rise of China in particular would lead to instability in the region.11 Offensive realists such as John Mearsheimer argued a prosperous China would not be a status quo power in East Asia and would instead try to become regional hegemon. The United States has a strong interest in preventing China from becoming a regional hegemon, and thus Sino-American security competition is inevitable.12 According to these international relations scholars, China and the United States have fundamentally different goals in East Asia: China wants to regain primacy in Asia, and the United States wants to maintain the status quo. Rejecting this extremely pessimistic view, I argue instead that the following characteristics of East Asia have shaped China’s rise in a regional context: Order in East Asia is not a spontaneous order.13 Spontaneous order ­assumes

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that order occurs naturally, following balance-of-power logic. Rather than China’s becoming a malign regional hegemon, some argue that China’s rise will enhance a largely stable East Asian order.14 Despite rising regional tensions, the pessimistic predictions that Asia would experience an increased arms race in the post–Cold War era have largely failed to materialize. Contrary to standard formulations of realism, East Asian countries do not appear to be balancing against a rising China.15 Even so, some countries have security concerns, and they are largely pursuing a hedging rather than a balancing strategy against China.16 Some even argue that the logic of balance of power does not apply in East Asia because Asian international relations were historically hierarchical, and China’s neighbors were used to China being the dominant player in the region.17 In establishing their order, East Asian nations have been much more cooperative and peaceful than most assume and created a dynamic trade and a network of multilateral institutions. Because of these liberal factors, East Asian order remains peaceful even if the power structure is shifting.18 China’s rise has also brought opportunities for many Asian countries, which benefit from economic cooperation.19 The economic interdependence between China and its neighbors mitigates conflicts and contributes to peaceful relations. China has actively participated in multilateral institutions of Asia and has been socialized into the existing East Asian order.20 Through participating in multilateral institutions, China has gradually learned international norms and rules of the game. China’s participation in multilateral institutions can ameliorate China’s non–status quo elements in its strategic preferences and foreign policy. At the very least, it can socialize China into a system in which it will seek to achieve its preferences in ways that are not primarily confrontational. The consensus of Chinese leaders in the late 1990s was that China should create favorable international conditions for continuing China’s domestic growth while reducing the risk that other countries would see a rising China as a threat.21 The East Asian order is not an imposed order dominated by one country. The region is moving toward a bipolar system, instead of a US-­dominated region. The rise of China creates a dilemma for many countries in East Asia because there are two versions of an East Asian order: economic order versus security order. While many regional countries have strengthened their economic cooperation and interdependence with China, they also have a deep suspicion about China’s strategic intentions, and many have subsequently strengthened their military ties with the United States. According to the American strategist John Ikenberry, “Economically, most East Asian

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countries increasingly expect their future economic relations to be tied to China. In terms of security, most of these countries continue to expect to rely on American alliance protection.”22 Thus, the hub-and-spokes alliance system with the United States is stable and sustainable.23 China’s influence in economic affairs in Asia has not pushed out American military power and diplomatic influence. Although the United States is still the nation with the most power in the region, Washington cannot unilaterally shape Beijing’s choices in the long term. The United States must maintain a delicate balance of both deterrence and reassurance in Asia, and Washington is limited in how it can shape Beijing’s choices. Given China’s historical experience with Western powers, change would better come from within China than from foreign pressure. Such pressure might lead to a backlash for China’s reformers. Also, the SinoAmerican relationship is a two-way interaction rather than a one-way street. While some American strategists might have suspicions about Xi Jinping’s “new type of great power relationship” (xinxing daguo guanxi), it is unwise to reject these proposals just because they are made in China. It is better for the United States to deal with Chinese initiatives and ideas on a case-by-case basis. The United States calls for China to be a responsible stakeholder in the US-China relationship, and through proposing a “new type of great power relationship,” China seeks to codefine the bilateral relationship. Ultimately, it might not matter much whether an idea originates from the United States or China. Furthermore, China will increase its voice in setting a global agenda, and its quest for equal partnership with the United States will “no longer be the outsized claim of a vulnerable country.”24 Instead of a US-shaped bilateral relationship, US-China relations might eventually enter into a stage of “coevolution,” meaning a negotiated relationship as “both countries pursue their domestic imperatives, cooperating where possible, and adjust their relations to minimize conflict.”25 Xi Jinping proposes new major power relations with the United States. American officials and scholars have reservations about the idea. A major critique is that the proposal advocates an old-style sphere of influence. Critics see this as China’s Monroe Doctrine in Asia and a bargaining tool to make the United States accommodate China without China having to compromise. While concerns about China’s desire for new major power relations may be legitimate, what the United States and China make of it is what matters.26 The key issue is whether the United States is willing to respect China and treat it as a great power in the region. On the other hand, it is counterproductive to view the proposal as merely creating a Chinese sphere of influence

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in Asia. For several decades after the Cold War, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has had the most active role in promoting regional cooperation. Its goal was to prevent the United States and China from gaining a significant foothold in Southeast Asia.

Conspicuous Giving as Status Signaling In 2015, Beijing launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a multilateral development bank. China has a 30.4 percent share of AIIB’s equity, followed by India (8.5 percent), and Russia (6.7 percent). AIIB symbolizes China’s rise as a financial superpower, guiding the world’s biggest infrastructure financing institution.27 The AIIB could satisfy growing demand from Asian countries for new infrastructure. Some American officials view the AIIB as a challenge to existing institutions such as the World Bank or International Monetary Fund and reportedly tried and failed to persuade major American allies not to join the AIIB. Fifty-seven countries decided to join as founding members, including key American allies such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and South Korea. The American reaction to AIIB was widely viewed as misguided.28 The American overreaction might be based on the outdated assumption that the influence of an emerging power is always a threat to the established power in a zero-sum game. Admittedly, China decided to establish AIIB not only for symbolic reasons such as international status and legitimacy but also for practical reasons, such as boosting economic growth and expanding diplomatic influence. China’s motivation for the AIIB is best explained in the wider context of China’s Belt Road Initiative (BRI), creating a China-led economic, diplomatic, and security system. BRI has great potential to transform China’s domestic and foreign policy.29 Asia needs investment to develop its infrastructure. Working through a multilateral institution can reduce fears of Chinese dominance and depoliticize the institution. Multilateral institutions can alleviate concerns that the resources are being used to further a single state’s agenda. Dissatisfied with existing institutions, China has long claimed that emerging developing countries should have a greater say in running the International Monetary Fund and other pieces of the international economic system. The creation of the AIIB illustrates an important dimension of China’s status signaling in international relations. As discussed in Chapter 2, not all status politics is a zero-sum game. A rising power has many ways for signaling a higher status, some contributing to regional stability and cooperation. Status signaling by individuals sometimes is to demonstrate their preferred status in

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a community through conspicuous giving to charity.30 In international politics, a great power can demonstrate its leadership and preferred status through provision of public goods. It should be noted that conspicuous giving is not necessarily driven by purely altruistic motives. A great power taking on a larger role in international affairs can also get social rewards. As Robert Gilpin has said, “Empires and dominant states supply public goods that give other states an interest in following their lead.”31 The relationship between status signaling and provision of public goods is understudied.32 This chapter redresses the imbalance in studies of international status by examining how status signaling promotes cooperation in a regional context rather than how status drives international conflict.33 As Gilpin argues, there are three major sources of great power legitimacy in international politics: a widely accepted ideology, the provision of public goods, and military victory.34 Any successful leadership must have a followership whose interests or ideas are considered. For instance, the emerging powers of Brazil and India increasingly express their desire for leadership in global governance, such as bids for permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Emerging powers, however, sometimes fail to achieve their goals because they do not include the ideas and interests of potential followers in their leadership p­ rojects.35 Providing public goods in international affairs is a valuable strategy to signal a desired status in international society. Sometimes, however, domestic audiences want their government to devote resources to improving their social welfare instead of promoting status and prestige through expensive foreign aid programs.36 Domestic politics can constrain international public goods provisions. When both domestic and international audiences expect an emerging power to take a larger role, status signaling through conspicuous giving is likely a successful strategy. Compared with other status signaling strategies, conspicuous giving in international politics has several advantages. Conspicuous giving that contributes public goods and to the stability of regional order increases the legitimacy of the donor states in international politics and therefore reduces the odds of a negative response. Conspicuous giving is also a good reassurance strategy for regional neighbors, signaling the benign intention of an emerging power and mitigating potential conflicts.

Two Faces of China’s Regional Diplomacy In the spring of 2016, an unusual public spat between a Chinese senior diplomat and the top editor of a well-known tabloid set off debate on Beijing’s foreign policy. In a speech at China Foreign Affairs University, Wu Jianmin,

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a former ambassador to France, said that the tabloid, Global Times, often promoted hawkish views and printed “very extreme articles.” Wu suggested that Hu Xijin, the chief editor of Global Times, was ignorant of global affairs. In response, Hu Xijin referred to Ambassador Wu as a “dovish Chinese diplomat.” Hu argued that the hawkish voice of Global Times could promote China’s national interests.37 Wu and Hu represent two sides of China’s foreign policy: one emphasizing China’s peaceful rise and integration with the world and the other emphasizing confrontations with the West and nationalist sentiments in China. That dovish and hawkish voices coexist within China’s foreign policy community is not contradictory.38 The coexistence of different voices could also be viewed as Beijing’s coherent strategy to project two faces in foreign policy.39 As discussed in Chapter 3, image projection is a complicated strategic behavior shaped by both international incentive and domestic politics. Following Erving Goffman, China’s regional diplomacy could be viewed as political performance on the world stage.40 Individuals project different images in social life, and their behaviors are similar to those of actors on a stage. Like actors in the Peking Opera, China intentionally projects two faces, red mask (good cop) and white mask (bad cop).41 The red mask is generous and kind; the white mask is negative and ruthless and generates fear. China uses the red mask to project an image of a benign leader that contributes to peace and prosperity in the region. When it uses a white mask, China wants to be feared, which gives it the credibility of deterrence and ability to defend its claims. China’s power is growing, and the two faces in China’s regional diplomacy pose challenges for East Asian order and international relations. In calculating domestic and international incentives for sending signals, China’s performances are constrained and shaped by interest calculations and normative considerations. While reassuring regional countries about its peaceful intentions, China is also striving to maintain its credibility of coercion. China has differentiated strategies toward regional actors: for some regional audiences, China wants to demonstrate its benign image as a regional leader; for other regional audiences, China wants to be feared rather than liked. Presenting an irrational image could serve a rational purpose, and most great powers have two faces in diplomacy.

China’s Red Mask: T   he Charm Offensive and Benign Leadership in East Asia The red mask is China’s preferred image as a benign leader in Asia. Because providing public goods is an important source of leadership in international

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politics, I examine when and why a rising power is willing to provide public goods in international affairs. The consensus of Chinese leaders in the late 1990s was that China should create favorable international conditions for continuing domestic growth but also reduce the risk that other countries would see a rising China as a threat.42 China has tried to reassure its neighbors that it is not an emergent threat but an opportunity. Many scholars call China’s policy toward Asian neighbors “charm offensive” diplomacy.43 The first wave of the charm offensive was launched in 1997 during the Asian financial crisis and lasted approximately ten years. Xi Jinping’s proactive regional diplomacy is the second wave of the charm offensive.44 China’s response to the Asian financial crisis demonstrated its efforts to project an image of benign leadership. In 1998, China took an active and responsible role by declaring it would not devalue the renminbi. China also voluntarily provided assistance to rescue its Asian neighbors, and reinforced that gesture a few years later by proposing a China-ASEAN free-trade agreement. China’s response was widely praised by the international community and was a transformative moment in China’s foreign policy. After the crisis, China was actively involved in regional diplomacy and participated in many regional institutions. Initially, the Chinese government underestimated the Asian financial crisis, only understanding the scope of the crisis when the Hong Kong dollar came under speculative attack in October 1997.45 After the fall of Hong Kong’s stock market, China responded swiftly. The Chinese government refused to devalue the Chinese currency.46 Coastal provinces such as Guangdong with export-driven industries opposed the no-devaluation policy, but these local and sectoral interests were counterbalanced by more powerful central leadership.47 The financial crisis convinced China that it needed to play a more active role in the region to protect Chinese interests and wealth. While economic interest was certainly important in China’s response, projecting a responsible power image also was important. The International Monetary Fund asked China to contribute to its Thai support package, but the Chinese leadership wanted to deal with Thailand directly, contributing US$1 billion in its own Thai support.48 It was an opportunity for China to improve its prestige and image. Chinese officials also became more interested in the establishment of regional institutions. Although China did not support Japan’s proposal to create the Asian Monetary Fund,49 China found itself increasingly drawn into closer cooperation with South Korea and ASEAN nations. Thus, during the latter part of 1997, China projected the image of a responsible regional power through prudent responses, continued growth drives, and financial assistance to the region.50

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China’s response to the Asian financial crisis was a transformative moment when understood in the wider context of China’s active regional diplomacy. Since the late 1990s, China has changed its earlier position and has pursued a proactive policy toward regional integration. China now actively participates in most of the regional institutions and forums in the Asia-Pacific region, such as ASEAN+1 (ASEAN and China), ASEAN+3 (ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea), and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). It has even initiated some new institutions in the region.51 At an October 2013 work forum, Xi Jinping outlined a four-part philosophy to guide China’s second wave of the charm offensive: convey or realize amity, sincerity, mutual benefit, and inclusiveness. These are all positive features and generally resonate with earlier approaches to nearby states.52 Charm offensive diplomacy has achieved some positive effects. The East Asia region has not descended into intense security competition as predicted; instead, an interim order continues to prevail.53 Rather than becoming a malign regional hegemon, China signals its intention to bring stability and peace to East Asian order. Contrary to the expectations of standard formulations of realism, East Asian countries do not appear to be balancing against a rising China, and some seem to be either joining the bandwagon or hedging.54 While China has indeed learned international rules of the game, that does not mean it accepts them all: China has accepted some rules and pushed for reforms and revisions regarding other rules. I do not argue that China was motivated purely by status concerns in its response to the Asian financial crisis. It was driven by multiple motivations. Initially, economic and instrumental calculations lay behind China’s decision to respond. After receiving feedback and even complaints from ASEAN countries, China readjusted its policy and took a more active role in dealing with the crisis. Later on, the Chinese government realized the Asian financial crisis provided China with a good opportunity to project an image of a responsible great power in the region.55 China’s response is closely related to its efforts in building an image of responsible great power in the 1990s.56 Projecting an image of responsible great power was an important motive for China’s strategy during the financial crisis. After the crisis, the Chinese government began to openly embrace the idea of playing a larger role in the region and began referring to itself as a “responsible power” (fuzerendaguo) frequently. For instance, the annual review by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1999 opens with “The image of China as a peaceful, cooperative and responsible power becomes more salient.”57 Chinese President Jiang Zemin also emphasized that China should

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reassure the surrounding small powers and take a responsible and cooperative policy toward them.58 By taking a responsible regional policy, China has increased its status and influence in the region. Some might argue that China’s cooperative policy after the Asian financial crisis was driven by calculation of material interests, not necessarily the considerations of international image and status. Admittedly, there were important considerations for material interests. Collapse of the economies of Hong Kong and Thailand would have had damaging effects for China’s economic stability, and China also faced enormous international pressure. More likely, in this case, China’s interest calculations were compatible with China’s efforts of projecting a responsible great power status. The status consideration to project a responsible image was still indispensable because it shaped the way China responded to the crisis. The explanation that China used the crisis for status signaling is not generally incompatible with one based on instrumental reasons. In other words, status signaling through conspicuous giving could promote the national interests and influence of a rising power. Strategic use of trade policy and foreign aid can often expand the diplomatic influence of an emerging power.59 Competition with Japan for regional leadership was also an important consideration. China and Japan have a very complicated relationship because of geopolitical, historical, and economic reasons, and both want the leadership of the East Asian region. They are important trading partners, and both sides have strong incentives to cooperate with each other. Politically, however, they have deep mistrust because of historical memory and territorial disputes.60 In contrast to arms races, however, competing for regional leadership in a nontraditional security issue is not expected to add more tension to the regional order. China’s response to the financial crisis is a crucial case of status signaling with compatible expectations from multiple audiences. Domestically, policy proposals of China’s leaders were largely supported by powerful bureaucracies in the central government agencies.61 For East Asian economic cooperation, the Chinese leadership was less constrained by public opinion and thus more willing to take an active international role. Chinese society believes China should play a larger role in the East Asian region while understanding that China should have some hesitation toward that role. According to the Chinese scholar Yan Xuetong, Chinese elites and the general public share the two following beliefs: China’s rise is rightfully regaining China’s lost status, and its economic achievements will not be fulfilled until China resumes its lead in East Asia. Chinese consider the rise of China as a restoration of fairness, and

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the Chinese people take the rise of their nation for granted.62 Also as the Harvard professor Alastair Iain Johnston points out, in the 1990s China was acting not like a security maximizer but like a prestige maximizer.63 Thus, Chinese elites and the public largely supported China taking any opportunity to improve its power and status in the region. Internationally, most expect that China should take a more responsible leadership role in the region. Regional states would welcome China’s contribution to regional stability and order. China’s responsible behaviors have rebuilt China’s image in the region by projecting a rising China with greater opportunities for the regional countries, which reduced the appearance of China as a threat. This strategy is consistent with China’s reassurances to its neighbors since the end of the Cold War. Its responsible behaviors have strengthened cooperation with ASEAN countries and have improved China’s diplomatic relationship with them. Before the mid-1990s, China had a troubled relationship with several ASEAN countries because of historical mistrust, territorial disputes, and economic competitions. After the Asian financial crisis, China’s influence has dramatically expanded in Southeast Asia.64 However, in recent years, China’s relationship with ASEAN countries has been clouded by new tensions, especially regarding the South China Sea.

China’s White Mask: Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy Chinese leaders say China does not seek hegemony in regional and global affairs, stressing their belief in sovereign equality among nations and projecting a benign image in the region. However, many observers have argued that China’s regional policy has become more assertive. A stronger China defending what it views as its territorial and maritime interests increases the uncertainty and insecurity of its neighbors, who grow increasingly wary of China’s long-term intentions. As a result, some of China’s neighbors try to improve ties with the United States and strengthen their own military capabilities.65 Has Beijing moved away from its reassurance policy? While acknowledging some changes in China’s regional diplomacy, I argue that we should not overestimate the degree of change in China’s assertive turn. China’s coercive diplomacy has a long history and is not new foreign policy. After all, great powers want to be both loved and feared in international politics. While China wants to build an overall positive image as a cooperative great power, it also wants to maintain some level of coercive credibility to defend its claims. China has strong incentives to maintain its white mask.

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In foreign policy, China historically has used coercive diplomacy or military force to achieve its goals. In many instances, Beijing implemented a calculus of signals. China would first deter an adversary from taking actions contrary to Chinese interests by threatening the use of military force; if deterrence failed, China justified its use of military force as being defensive. This deterrence pattern was applied in each of the major instances in which Beijing has resorted to military force, including the Korean War in 1950, Sino-Indian border dispute in 1961–1962, Sino-Soviet border dispute in 1968 –1969, and China-Vietnam war in 1979.66 Beijing follows a pattern of incremental escalation, typically using a variety of official protests and press comments to signal its resolve. If the crisis persists and Beijing perceives its interests are not satisfactorily taken into account, Beijing’s statements include increasingly explicit warnings of military force. This approach has been employed consistently despite the sweeping changes in China’s international and domestic environment.67 China has used various statements to signal its resolve; it also has adopted low-risk behaviors to defend its claims. Most of China’s twenty-first-century behavior could be viewed as defensive assertiveness instead of offensive assertiveness. China has not suddenly changed its policy on those issues. China has more capabilities and stronger willingness than previously to defend its existing sovereign claims when challenged by its neighbors.68 That said, maintaining defensive assertiveness is not necessarily less challenging than offensive assertiveness for regional order, particularly in territorial disputes. China’s official statements have often made clear that China should safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the CCP meeting on regional diplomacy in 2013, Xi Jinping mentioned the need for China to safeguard “national sovereignty, security, and development interests” as part of periphery diplomacy.69 On China’s handling of territorial disputes, Foreign Minister Wang Yi in March 2014 issued a statement that is moderate but still emphasizes territorial integrity: “We will never bully smaller countries, yet we will never accept unreasonable demands from smaller countries.”70 Military sources often make the strongest assertions of the need to defend China’s maritime sovereignty. For instance, “[US Defense Secretary Charles] Hagel criticized China’s air defense identification zone over the East China Sea as provocative and unilateral” in an interview with a Japanese news­paper while attending an ASEAN meeting. In response, Fan Changlong, vicechairman of China’s Central Military Commission, said to Hagel a few days later, “I can tell you frankly, your remarks made in the ASEAN defence ministers meeting and to Japanese politicians were tough, and had a clear purpose.

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The Chinese people, including myself, are dissatisfied with such remarks.”71 This tough talk of Chinese military leaders aims to clarify China’s resolve and interests. Besides official statements, China takes concrete actions to defend its territorial and maritime claims. Analysts call recent Chinese behavior in maritime disputes “salami slicing.”72 Beijing is attempting to strengthen its claims incrementally, without making a move dramatic enough to justify a major response by others at any given moment. For instance, in territorial and maritime disputes such as over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands and the South China Sea, China has strengthened its maritime capabilities and sent more ships and airplanes into those regions. China has also begun to use economic sanctions to coerce other countries into backing down in territorial disputes. China has not changed its policy regarding the disputed territories but is becoming more assertive largely because it has more resources and stronger willingness to defend its claims. Chinese efforts to keep its periphery free of potentially hostile great power presence represent a long-lasting desire stemming from a wariness of outside powers.73 The case of the US naval ship Impeccable illustrates China’s motivations and tactics in its competition with the United States. On March 8, 2009, “five Chinese vessels shadowed and maneuvered in close proximity to the . . . Impeccable. . . . China’s strategy, designed to motivate the US to cease surveillance operations near its [China’s] militarily sensitive areas in the South China Sea, included three components: (1) the use of military provocation, (2) a coordinated media campaign, and (3) a challenge to US interpretations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”74 Its international image alone does not fully explain China’s assertive actions; the domestic audience is also behind China’s tough image and its white mask. China’s assertiveness could be a result of a mix of confidence on the international stage and insecurity at home, especially with respect to Chinese nationalism. While China’s nationalism has been a major factor in Chinese foreign policy, it seemed to be more pragmatic before 2008, when the government made effective efforts to control popular nationalism.75 Since then Chinese nationalism has taken a “strident turn.” “Enjoying an inflated sense of empowerment” after the global financial crisis, and “terrified of an uncertain future due to social, economic and political tensions at home, the communist state has become more willing to play” the “popular nationalist” card “in pursuing the so-called core national interests.”76 Furthermore, an increasing number of bureaucracies and interest groups have entered into the Chinese foreign-policy-making process, including the military, mass me-

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dia, energy companies, exporters of manufactured goods, and provincial party elites. These developments have complicated China’s diplomacy. While top officials in Beijing might have a more accurate assessment of China’s global position, China’s nationalist voices have overestimated the scope and speed of China’s rise, creating a heated political environment. To maintain long-term regime legitimacy and social stability, Chinese leaders sometimes take a tough stand in foreign policy to boost the CCP’s domestic prestige.77

Summary The status signaling of a rising power does not necessarily lead to conflict with great powers. An emerging power has many strategies for signaling its preferred higher status, and some of these strategies could promote cooperation. While status can be established in part through material elements (e.g., economic and military capabilities), it fundamentally depends on social recognition from others. Despite the competition between the United States and China, not all China’s behaviors are competitive. A rising power demonstrates leadership through conspicuous provision of public goods. All leadership must have some followers, and an emerging power builds its leadership and legitimacy by taking into consideration the interests and values of its followers. Also, when domestic and international expectations are consistent with a foreign policy initiative, that initiative contributes to implementation of a coherent grand strategy. Economic and political factors explain China’s response during the Asian financial crisis, and status signaling provides a comprehensive and compelling explanation of its motives. China’s decision not to devalue the renminbi, its provision of aid to Asian neighbors, and its subsequent active diplomacy in the region were at least partially driven by China’s strong desire to project an image as a responsible great power. China’s response to the Asian financial crisis was a successful implementation of a peaceful-rise strategy. The policy consistently met expectations from both domestic and international audiences. China’s active diplomacy concurred with domestic expectations for China to play a larger role in regional affairs. China in the 1990s was a prestige maximizer, taking whatever opportunities it saw to increase its power and status. Many central government agencies supported China’s decision to play an active role in regional affairs. In terms of public opinion and domestic interest group politics, there was little domestic opposition to China’s regional diplomacy. ­Internationally, ­China’s active diplomacy has both boosted China’s image and reassured neighbors that China can make great contributions to regional order.

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Every great power projects both benign intent and coercive power, and China is no exception. The issue is to what extent China emphasizes one face rather than the other. While China’s two faces pose challenges for China and regional countries, the two faces as a whole reflect relatively rational calculations by China. In foreign policy, deterrence and reassurance may be two sides of the same coin. Beijing’s proactive economic diplomacy may be part of a charm offensive diplomacy; however, economic statecraft has a hidden coercive element. From China’s perspective, deep interdependence could bind its neighbors in a web of incentives that increase their reliance on China. In the China-Philippines standoff over Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal), China took an economically coercive approach by imposing stricter regulations on its import of Philippine bananas.78 The coercive aspect of China’s regional diplomacy can appear threatening but can also help clarify China’s resolve. In some cases, China’s tough image might be good for regional peace and crisis management. As James Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon note, “The key to stable U.S.-Chinese relations over the long term is for each side to be clear about its true redlines. . . . It involves demonstrating both the will and the capability to make good on threats.”79 With the combination of the shifting balance of power and complicated domestic factors, the emergence of an assertive China seems to be inevitable. China’s assertive turn in regional diplomacy is intentional rather than the haphazard result of increasing domestic fragmentation.80 Previously, the prevailing view was that China was prepared to shelve the hotly disputed issues for a later date. Now, China is no longer simply responding but acting on its own initiative. Unlike his predecessor Hu Jintao, who had a highly institutionalized process for making foreign policy, Xi Jinping has strengthened coordination among foreign and security agencies, and he plays a dominant role in the formulation and execution of foreign policy. We are witnessing much more concerted coordination at every level in the Chinese government.81 China’s proactive diplomacy will continue, and China’s low-profile approach to diplomacy will be ending.82 But China’s assertiveness is not always bad for the world; there are different types of assertive behaviors. The world has legitimate reasons to worry about the emergence of China’s offensive assertiveness, but we see little evidence of China taking an offensive assertive approach. Furthermore, while China’s assertiveness is a reality, the most serious challenge for the East Asian region is those nations’ competing versions of nationalism.83 China sends seemingly contradictory signals in regional diplomacy. On the one hand, China wants to reassure its neighbors about its peaceful inten-

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tions so that a rising China will not face a rebalancing coalition of regional countries. On the other hand, China wants to maintain its credibility of coercion and deterrence so that it will not lose bargaining leverage in territorial disputes. China’s intention to be a regional leader generates uncertainty, and some regional powers worry that China might try to reestablish a Sino-­ centric regional hegemony. Under some conditions status signaling can promote international cooperation. If the power gap between the rising power and the leading hegemon is wide, the rising power has no chance to succeed in a challenge to the hegemon’s core interests. If the rising power provides public goods, most members of the region benefit. China’s successful diplomacy after the Asian financial crisis occurred when the above two conditions existed. However, if the power gap between China and the United States narrows in the future,84 it will be more difficult for the two countries to handle the Sino-American status competition in the region and more difficult for China to expand its power and influence without hurting US-China relations.

6

Lying Low or Striving for Achievement Global Financial Crisis and Spin Doctoring in Beijing

And they have been free riders for the last 30 years and it’s worked really well for them. . . . And I’ve joked sometimes, when my inbox starts stacking up. I said can’t we be a little bit more like China? Nobody ever seems to expect them to do anything when this stuff comes up. —Barack Obama, “Exclusive Interview: Obama on the World” China is willing to offer opportunities and room to Mongolia and other neighbors for common development. . . . You can take a ride on our express train or just make a hitchhike, all are welcome. —Xi Jinping, speech at the State Great Hural (Parliament) of Mongolia, 2014

In the twenty-first century, China’s economic status has outgrown the expectations of even its own leaders. In an article published in Foreign Affairs in 2005, Zheng Bijian, a top political advisor to the Chinese leadership, said, “China’s economy is one-seventh the size of the United States’ and one-third the size of Japan’s.”1 Perhaps the Chinese leadership did not expect China’s economy to surpass Japan’s economy five years later or that China would become the largest economy much faster than predicted.2 China’s leaders and bureaucracies are largely ill prepared for the country’s sudden high profile. For instance, as China has increased its international profile, some domestic problems such as environmental issues attract global attention. But many Chinese officials are not prepared to manage those international pressures.3 On the global stage, Chinese leaders often emphasize China’s developing country status. At the UN General Assembly in September 2010, for instance, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao urged the international audience to recognize “the real China,” which is not a superpower but a mere “developing country.”4 Even though President Xi Jinping seems to conduct a more assertive diplomacy on the global stage, he still uses “developing country” to describe China.5 For instance, in his first speech at the UN General Assembly, in 2015,

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Xi said, “China will continue to stand together with other developing countries.”6 China’s foreign policy community hotly debates China’s emerging role on the world stage. Some argue that China should keep its low profile, and others argue that China should take the global financial crisis as a strategic opportunity to expand its power and influence. The global financial crisis caused Beijing to rethink its grand strategy of the late 1990s to 2008 and its emerging role in a new era.7 As its power and capabilities increase, a rising power would naturally expand its influence and increase its status.8 However, the relationship between wealth and status is not necessarily linear. When the United States became a superpower, it had been the largest economy for many decades. Why did the United States not expand its power and influence earlier? One explanation is that the United States did not have enough state capacity to mobilize resources for international expansion.9 In contrast, contemporary China does not lack the state capacities to mobilize financial and economic resources for international projects. While the United States expects a rising China to take a responsible leading role to comanage many global issues,10 China has not demonstrated a strong willingness to transform itself from an underpaying consumer of global public goods to a provider of global public goods. For instance, during the global financial crisis of 2008, the international community expected that China would play a larger role. Chinese leaders backed away from the development of a so-called Group of Two, which was advocated by Zbigniew Brzezinski and would have elevated China to the status of America’s partner on issues such as trade, climate change, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.11 As discussed in Chapter 5, China has often been quite willing to pay the cost for maintaining regional order, and it is debatable whether labeling China as a free rider in international affairs is reasonable. Even in global affairs, Xi Jinping is taking a more assertive approach, and China has been more willing to contribute to global governance. Furthermore, the Chinese foreign policy community is actively debating the trade-off between status and responsibility for China as a rising power. Above all, China signals higher status, as discussed in previous chapters, but also signals lower status. This chapter discusses the mechanisms of why and how a rising power would signal a lower status.12 The first section describes spinning and how it is related to status signaling. The second section considers the reasons for a rising power to signal a lower status. The third section illustrates, through the case of China’s response to the global financial crisis, my argument that status signaling is useful for understanding motivations and

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processes of Chinese foreign policy. The fourth section briefly discusses the extent that Xi Jinping’s assertive diplomacy deviates from the traditional lowprofile approach.

Beijing as Spin Doctor In politics, “spin implies a deliberate attempt to stop short of lying, while still putting the best face on one’s position.”13 If we understand political performance as image projection,14 then signaling status through spinning is one of many possible forms that performance can take. While spin is often discussed in the context of American politics, it could be applied in Chinese politics as well. In modern Chinese history, the Chinese Communist Party has always used spin tactics in its propaganda work. Mao Zedong famously ordered his propaganda officials to reframe the Long March as a victory instead of a frustrated retreat.15 In addition, Chinese officials also have a clear sense of the distinction between domestic propaganda and international propaganda, and they often frame the same event differently. For instance, during Beijing’s campaign to host the 2008 Olympic Games, Beijing’s spin doctors argued that granting Beijing the games would improve China’s human rights situation. That argument was not widely promoted in China.16 To achieve strategic advantages, nation-states and their leaders have incentives to misrepresent their true intentions.17 But deception does not necessarily mean lying. It is useful to differentiate different kinds of image manipulation. “Lying” is “when a person makes a statement that he knows or suspects to be false in the hope that others will think it is true,” and a “lie” is “a positive action designed to deceive the target audience.”18 Concealment involves withholding information that might undermine or weaken one’s position.19 “Spinning” refers to a situation in which a person telling a story emphasizes certain facts and links them in ways that play to his or her advantage while downplaying facts that detract from the story.20 Most literature discusses spinning in a domestic political context. As the historian of American politics David Greenberg points out, “In fact, in the broadest sense of the term, spin has always been a part of politics. Politics involves advancing one’s interests and values in the public sphere, and political leadership means winning and sustaining public support.”21 Spin applies not only to domestic politics but also international politics. For instance, a commentary on a George W. Bush speech was headlined “Bush Spins at the UN.”22 While national leaders can manipulate information in international politics, it is not as easy for them to lie. According to John Mearsheimer, leaders rarely lie to each other at the

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interstate level, more often lying to their domestic audiences.23 Leaders lying to each other at the interstate level is actually quite dangerous and can lead to war, while the costs of lying to the domestic population are usually not as high. Spinning works both ways, signaling either higher or lower status. Emerging economies such as China and India, owing to the unprecedented size of their populations, possess unparalleled flexibility in the type of status they can choose to signal. They have already entered into the club of great powers on the basis of the size of their economies, but they are also ranked near one-hundredth place among all countries in gross domestic product per capita. Contemporary China can be seen as both a powerful rising challenger and a weak developing country, and Chinese officials have much room for spinning when they choose to highlight different aspects of China’s status. Whereas China was primarily struggling for higher status in world affairs in the 1990s,24 China in the twenty-first century sometimes downplays its profile and intentionally emphasizes its weakness. This behavior is more spinning than lying in international politics. Status signaling takes different forms, and states can choose from a range of signaling tactics to communicate and manipulate information to project a desired image. In coercive bargaining, states communicate their intentions through verbal statements, nonmilitary action (such as economic sanctions), and limited use of force. Verbal communication is a crucial tactic in signaling a low status through spinning. As a communicative act, political leaders use spinning to persuade their targeted audiences to accept one particular interpretation of a social reality. Some rationalists assume that all political rhetoric (including spinning) should be regarded as cheap talk, not costly signaling. Some constructivists argue that political rhetoric is not effective in persuasion. I argue, however, that spinning is politically important. If signaling is a communicative action, costly signaling is not a necessary condition for effective communication. Spinning can be a costless signaling, which is a little-studied topic in international politics. If rhetoric is all just cheap talk without political effects, why would leaders bother to repeat their political rhetoric? If describing China as a developing country is simply cheap talk, we still need to know why its leaders use this rhetoric. According to Mearsheimer, “In calling something spin . . . , we’re indicating that we can see through it; paradoxically, spin implies a certain ineffectiveness.”25 But even if spinning does not necessarily send credible signals, it is still important in political life. Spinning as political performance has important implications for domestic and international audiences.26

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There are different types of informative behaviors— deeds are not necessarily more informative than words. As Robert Jervis says, “Although behavior may reveal something important about an actor, often it is not clear exactly what is being revealed, what is intended to be revealed, and what others will think is being revealed.”27 Sometimes words can carry significant evidence of their validity, and some deeds are ambiguous and can be used for deception.28 If talk was all a waste of time, it is hard to explain why politicians who mistrust each other bother to talk to each other at all. The distinction between costly signals and cheap talk is not necessarily absolute, and talk could carry important meaning. “Cheap talk is sometimes defined as behavior that does not cost the actor anything to undertake and sometimes as behavior that can be taken equally well by an actor of any type.”29 Behavior often is highly informative if it is cheap for one actor but not for another. Costly signals come in two types: an action facing significant domestic opposition or threats or promises that will be costly to break.30 Commitment is more easily signaled in deeds than in words because “significant actions usually incur some cost or risk, and carry some evidence of their own credibility.31 As a consequence, Thomas Schelling insists, talk is cheap, and “verbal messages come from different parts of government with different nuances, supplemented by ‘leaks’ from various sources and can be contradicted by later verbal messages.”32 Despite this, Schelling also leaves room for the role of rhetoric. Schelling suggests that “enforceable threats, promises, commitments, and so forth” should be analyzed as moves rather than communication.33 This acknowledges the possibility of discursive practices: if bargaining is about the communication of intentions, the performativity of language should be taken seriously.34

Rising Power Signaling Low Status A rising power might have multiple incentives to signal low status in the international hierarchy. While enhanced status can bring benefits for a rising power, it might also be costly.35 A rising power has three main incentives for signaling a lower status in international hierarchy. One incentive is to create a better international environment for growth through strategies such as reassurance, legitimating, and hedging.36 A rising power has strong reasons to pursue a reassurance strategy because, in the history of great power politics, status competition often leads to international conflict.37 If the hegemon is determined to maintain its primacy, it can view the rise of a competitor as a major threat to its status. Also, because of rising

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powers’ dissatisfaction with the established order, they act assertively to signal their increased strength, which might be viewed as a threat to the hegemon. For example, the United States maintains supremacy by politically, economically, and militarily outdistancing any global challenger and claims that the objective of this primacy is to preserve peace among the great powers.38 Since a rising power is often a real or potential threat to the primacy of the existing hegemon, it becomes a primary target of the hegemon for rebalancing power. Throughout history, established powers have been known to use preventive wars or containment to deal with the challenges of rising powers, thus leading a rising power to mitigate the potential conflict by signaling lower status. In this sense, signaling lower status can be regarded as a case of reassurance. Contemporary China is rising in an American-led unipolar system.39 Unipolarity is the most dangerous structural condition for China’s rise, which partly explains why China has pursued a reassurance strategy since the end of the Cold War.40 At the peak of the global financial crisis in the second year of the Obama administration, a senior foreign policy analyst in Beijing assessed the importance of Beijing’s reassurance toward the United States: “If the United States decides prematurely [by assuming China has bad intentions] that it should confront China, China will suffer. Even if some people think the United States is in a relative decline, we should not ignore the fact that it is still the only superpower in the current international system. The United States has capabilities to punish its rivals.”41 A rising power also signals a low status so that it can avoid taking unwanted responsibilities. A central theme in the classic international relations literature on signaling is the appropriate balance between coercion and reassurance.42 In comparison, status signaling in international politics deals with a different kind of balance—namely, the trade-off between enhanced status and increased responsibilities. In Hedley Bull’s definition, great powers are “powers recognized by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties.”43 Although a rising power might be eager to have more privilege and influence by joining a higher status club, the cost of greater responsibilities might be too high. Furthermore, a rising power is often inward looking, and it is not eager to take on greater responsibility. For example, during its rapid economic rise, Japan chose to “maintain a low posture in international political affairs, to cooperate with other nations rather than take initiatives, to defend its own interests rather than assume responsibility for preserving peace and order around the world.”44 While the rising power may not wish to overthrow the international order (at least not immediately), neither is it always eager to help manage the existing order.

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A rising power signals a low status to consolidate support from its (perceived) peer group. In domestic politics, many politicians, although individually achieving high status, spin their grassroots background. This political spinning is driven by the need to consolidate one’s power base in political mobilization.45 Similarly, an emerging power must have some followers so that its international legitimacy and influence can be consolidated, and leaders who credibly include the interests or ideas of potential followers are more likely to succeed.46 Sharing similar identity builds relationships among countries. To consolidate its relationship with developing countries, China emphasizes its identity as a developing country, and developing countries’ political support has been an important foreign policy asset for the PRC. The rest of the chapter uses China’s responses during the global financial crisis to illustrate the preceding argument and examine why a rising China stresses its identity as a fragile and developing country.

China in the Global Financial Crisis The global financial crisis in 2008 posed both challenges and opportunities for China. In many respects, China seemed to have a “good” crisis.47 The crisis negatively affected the Chinese economy, but Beijing responded with a range of policy measures that helped maintain high rates of growth.48 On November 9, 2008, China announced a fiscal stimulus of RMB 4 trillion ($586 billion), and the Chinese government began to take many measures to counter the socioeconomic effects of the financial crisis.49 As the world searched for solutions, China became a central actor in global economic governance.50 Why and how does a rapidly rising China signal a low status while exhibiting assertive behavior? China’s approach of signaling a lower status is related to the strategic thinking of Deng Xiaoping’s tao guang yang hui (roughly, lowprofile approach).51 Deng took a low-profile approach to global affairs when the West sanctioned China after the Tiananmen Square protests. According to Ma Zhengang, president of the China Institute of International Studies, Deng Xiaoping judged that international conflict could be avoided for a considerable period into the next century and that peaceful development with a low-profile approach should be the long-term strategy rather than expediency.52 Wang Yusheng, a senior policy analyst at the institute commented that China should not seek a leadership role internationally.53 Deng’s strategic thinking about China’s international posture has had a lasting impact on China’s diplomacy. In the decades after the end of the Cold War, China has moved from being a marginalized actor to being an emerging superpower.54

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However, many Chinese elites still think that China should keep a low profile. Chinese political elites such as Tang Jiaxuan, a former foreign minister, and General Xiong Guangkai, a former deputy chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army, support this. Other supporters are prominent intellectuals such as Wang Jisi, the dean of Peking University School of International Studies, and Qin Yaqing, the president of China’s Foreign Affairs University. Signaling a lower status is related to China’s alleviation of fears among other countries about its growing power, not a strategic deception of the international audience, and maintaining a low profile on the global stage is China’s long-term strategy.55 China has repeatedly reassured the established powers and its regional neighbors that its future posture will be peaceful and nonthreatening.56 While the general public might have had high expectations of China’s rising status during the global financial crisis, Chinese leaders had a much soberer view of China’s place on the world stage. Chinese leaders are so eager to reassure the world about China’s nonthreatening intentions that they even changed the slogan of “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) to “peaceful development” (heping fazhan).57 This change furthers the message of reassurance from Chinese leaders about China’s intentions. While the fundamental message of the two slogans is essentially the same, “peaceful rise” has a more competitive tone because “rise” indicates an enhancement of China’s status and implies a decline in other countries’ statuses. In military affairs, Chinese leaders project China’s military development to be many decades behind that of the American military. During his high-profile visit to the United States in 2011, General Chen Bingde, China’s chief of General Staff, said in a speech at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, “The world has no need to worry, let alone fear, China’s growth. China never intends to challenge the United States.”58 Chinese leaders frequently emphasize that China is a beneficiary of the existing international order and therefore will not overthrow it. During President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States in 2011, he addressed the importance of US-China cooperation and the role of the dollar in the world: “The current international currency system is the product of the past. As a major reserve currency, the US dollar is used in a considerable amount of global trade in commodities as well as in most of the investment and financial transactions.”59 In the foreseeable future, China’s renminbi cannot challenge the status of the US dollar, but the renminbi’s role is expected to grow in the future. A rising power not only has strategic reasons to signal a lower status for reassurance; it also has a strong incentive to signal a lower status to avoid

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­ nwanted responsibilities. Chinese political elites argue that since China reu mains a developing country, keeping a low profile in the coming decades will allow China to concentrate on domestic priorities. The Chinese government wants the world to see that China is essentially a poor country with many domestic problems to resolve. A high profile with high expectations is not what Chinese leaders are prepared to handle at this stage of China’s rise. At the UN Climate Conference in Copenhagen in 2009, different understandings of global responsibility clashed. Premier Wen Jiabao’s speech at the summit made China’s position as a developing country clear. Wen brought “common but differentiated responsibilities” on environmental issues to the attention of the forum, claiming that China should be treated as a developing country. Wen said that it is unjustified to ask developing countries “to undertake emission reduction targets beyond their due obligations and capabilities in disregard of historical responsibilities, per capita emissions and different levels of development.”60 Keeping a low profile allows Chinese leaders to focus on domestic priorities. Given the speed and size of its economic miracle, China can be expected to experience growing pains as it transforms from a regional to a global player. Some Chinese officials worry that China is heading to either superpower status or economic and social implosion. China’s potential is enormous, but its domestic challenges are many. For instance, China, demographically, is a rapidly aging society. The biggest question hanging over China, of course, is its political stability. The bottom line is that China is strong abroad but fragile at home.61 Thus, China may be reluctant to take on major international responsibilities with respect to global economic, climate change, and security crises. Instead, it may choose to focus inward, negotiating favorable international deals while shouldering fewer global burdens than other major powers want it to bear. Some Chinese scholars point to China’s domestic challenges as an important part of China’s international responsibilities.62 China’s domestic development is beneficial for the rest of the world because Chinese consumption could boost the growth of the world economy in the long term. Finally, China signals a lower status as a developing country so that it can continue to free ride (or hitch a cheap ride) on the existing international system. In economic affairs, the basic message is that it is too soon to expect China to play a leading global role—the established powers should continue to handle major global responsibilities. Even though China became the world’s second-largest economy in 2010, this does not mean that China’s per capita development level is comparable to the United States and other Western countries. Thus, it is unfair and impractical to expect too much from China.

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A power needs followers to consolidate its legitimacy, normative preferences, and prestige. Thus, a rising power such as China can consolidate its political influence by emphasizing its identity as a developing country. In this sense, signaling lower status is an important solidarity strategy in international politics. South–South unity and cooperation has long constituted a core component of Chinese foreign policy.63 China has always declared that it stands with the developing world. Although the global financial crisis enhanced China’s international status, China still claims membership in the lower-status group—the global South, or the developing world. In social and economic ranking, a developing country has lower status but garners support from many developing countries. This partially explains why China is unwilling to join a higher-status group such as the Group of Seven, which is primarily composed of Western industrialized countries. By holding on to its identity as a developing country, China is trying to strengthen its representation and voice in the global governance structure. China has been asserting its discontent with the current global order and has called for a greater say from developing countries, ultimately leading to parity with the developed world.64 Membership in the Group of Twenty signals China’s status in creating any reformed mechanism of global governance. China welcomes the change in voting rights at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a starting point.65 Signaling a lower status as a developing country could also help China develop its soft power and diplomatic influence in the developing world.66 During the global financial crisis, the Chinese political and intellectual elites become more confident in the Chinese model (or the Beijing Consensus) of political and economic policies. However, there is still no clear definition of the Chinese model, and debates about its precise form continue. The type of soft power campaign China has used has not been very effective in most Western democracies, but it has achieved some relative success in the developing world. For instance, China has increased its impact and soft power in the Latin American region not just because of its expanding economic presence. “China also offered the power of its example as a country that had emerged relatively quickly from internal conflict and widespread poverty to reach middle-income status with gleaming new skyscrapers, gains in science and technology, impressive transportation infrastructure, and relative domestic peace.”67 Signaling a lower status can help China develop new regional institutions and engage other developing countries. Deng Xiaoping famously said China “should never seek a leadership position” (juebu dangtou) within the ­developing

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world.68 This approach is increasingly in conflict with the reality of China’s foreign policy practice: through active participation in South–South cooperation, China enjoys the default status of leader of the developing world, and international expectations that China should play a more active role in the developing world increase. In recent years, China has strengthened its efforts to build multilateral forums and institutions within the developing world.69 In particular, China has played a leadership role in creating new institutions that primarily serve Asian or developing countries such as the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.70

Striving for Achievement: China’s Assertive Diplomacy Many scholars and strategists noticed the assertive turn in Chinese diplomacy with the global financial crisis in 2008. Some argue that Chinese leaders have abandoned the low-profile approach and have taken a new approach of “striving for achievement” (fenfa youwei). It is still unclear whether striving for achievement is more efficient in shaping a favorable environment for China. Nevertheless, most agree that Xi Jinping is asserting a new active role for China on the global stage. In Xi’s worldview, a rising China must now start playing a much bigger role in the world. Will Chinese leaders then abandon their low-profile approach, the tao guang yang hui strategy? Both change and continuity have been occurring in Chinese foreign policy. China’s assertive diplomacy started even before Xi Jinping took his position as China’s top leader. For instance, according to Xinbo Wu, a professor at Fudan University in Shanghai, the global financial crisis provided a great opportunity to expand Chinese influence in international affairs.71 China has taken several steps to increase its power and status. Debates on whether China should further reform its political and economic system continue, but there is no doubt that the China model has gained momentum. “It is a popular notion among Chinese political elites, including some national leaders, that China’s development model provides an alternative to Western democracy and experiences for other developing countries to learn from, while many developing countries that have introduced Western values and political systems are experiencing disorder and chaos.”72 Many in the developing world are looking at the China model as an alternative to the Washington Consensus.73 In 2008, the governor of China’s Central Bank, Zhou Xiaochuan, called for the creation of a new currency to eventually replace the dollar as the world’s reserve currency.74 Zhou proposed expanding the use of the special drawing right and moving from the dollar reserve system to a global reserve

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system.75 Zhou’s proposal signaled Chinese dissatisfaction with the existing international monetary order and was a trial balloon to elicit responses from like-minded emerging powers such as Brazil and Russia. As the world’s second-largest economy and the largest foreign reserve holder, China ascended to center stage in global governance during the global financial crisis. Western media and politicians even wondered if China could save the world economy during the financial crisis. Discussion of a Group of Two reflected recognition of China’s enhanced profile on the world stage. In April 2010, World Bank member countries reached an agreement to shift more power to emerging nations, under which China’s votes increased to 4.42 percent from 2.77 percent, making it the third-largest voting power in the World Bank.76 The International Monetary Fund also raised China’s representation and made it the third-largest quota holder.77 Thus, in terms of international status, the global financial crisis turned China from a peripheral member into a key player. The global financial crisis caused Beijing to think seriously about the internationalization of the renminbi, although many obstacles remain before the renminbi can become a major international reserve currency.78 The dollar’s status will remain uncontested in the near future, but China is gradually enhancing the international status of the renminbi.79 The global financial crisis revealed the volatility of the dollar, and China is taking measures to internationalize the renminbi. Although the renminbi is not yet freely convertible, some of China’s trading partners see the benefits of increasing their holdings of it. China has signed bilateral currency swap agreements with an increasing number of nations, and more countries have made the renminbi a reserve currency. In early 2009, China’s State Council (equivalent to the US cabinet) set the goal for Shanghai to develop into an international financial center by 2020, matching China’s international influence and the renminbi’s international status. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has pursued a more active regional diplomacy. From October 24 to 25, 2013, Beijing held a major conference on China’s regional diplomacy in Asia to lay out long-term goals. According to Xi, China must strive to make its neighbors friendlier in politics and more cooperative in economy and security.80 As discussed in Chapter 5, Xi Jinping’s proactive regional diplomacy is the second wave of a charm offensive. A year after the conference, Xi spoke for the first time of China’s “grand strategy” needing to embrace “a new great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics” (you zhongguo tese de xinxing daguo waijiao), in order to craft a “new type of great power relations” (xinxing daguo guanxi) with the United States.81

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While China still has several incentives to keep a low profile, Xi Jinping has started to modify China’s low-profile approach by pursuing a more proactive diplomacy. Although Xi Jinping’s foreign policy changes have been rapid, keep in mind both the continuity and the change in Chinese foreign policy. As the Chinese scholar Qin Yaqing points out, “A strident turn from one strategy to the other is inadvisable, and indeed continuity through change is a realistic description of China’s present international strategy.”82

Summary The status demands of a rising power have often led to conflicts and instability in the international system. However, rising powers do not necessarily always maximize their power and status. After the global financial crisis in 2008, China was put into the center of global economic governance. While China has taken some opportunities to increase its power and influence, it also signals lower status as a poor developing country. This chapter provides a framework for analyzing China’s status signaling by spinning. Spinning is an important mechanism to signal lower status. Rising powers cannot lie about their ranking and status in international society; however, all governments spin to emphasize some aspects and deemphasize other aspects of their status. China is an optical illusion in the sense that it is both a rising great power and a relatively poor developing country. China has room for maneuvering between both sides of its status in the international hierarchy. A rising China signals a lower status for three reasons: reassurance, shirking, and solidarity. Because rising powers are often viewed as challengers to the existing hegemon, a rising power reassures the established powers by downplaying its power and status. A rising power might also signal a lower status to avoid taking on unwanted international responsibilities. A rising power such as China consolidates its solidarity with developing countries by highlighting its own identity as a developing country. While signaling lower status might serve the foreign policy purposes of China for the time being, such a low-profile approach might also generate an incoherent grand strategy, one incompatible with expectations from international audiences. Chinese elites are starting to rethink China’s status and responsibilities as Chinese leader Xi Jinping pursues a more assertive diplomacy. But China’s diplomatic repositioning is not yet complete.

7

Conclusion

This new era will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind. —Xi Jinping, speech at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 2017

For many years, the United States has urged China to take a responsible stakeholder role in the American-led global order.1 China has largely played a shirking role and focused on domestic growth and development.2 With the US presidential election in 2016, world politics entered an uncertain and turbulent period. In some sense, the United States and China seem to be shifting their roles on the global stage. At the World Economic Forum’s annual meeting in Davos in January 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping, drawing on China’s own experience, actively defended globalization and offered a vision of inclusive, sustainable development.3 Xi also made a major speech at UN Office at Geneva. In that speech, Xi spoke of the vision of building a community of shared future for mankind, and he even talked about humanitarian issues specifically. “In the face of frequent humanitarian crises, we should champion the spirit of humanity, compassion and dedication and give love and hope to the innocent people caught in dire situations.”4 In his inauguration speech, just two days later, US President Donald Trump attacked American global engagement and said, “From this moment on, it’s going to be America First.”5 When have we seen an American president spouting nationalist rhetoric, while a Chinese president speaks about “a community of shared future for mankind”? As America under the Trump presidency threatens to become more inward looking, China has begun a much more active global diplomacy, implementing new international initiatives and hosting many multilateral meetings. Does a more inward-looking America provide

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opportunities for China to play a more prominent role on the global stage? According to the strategic thinker and CNN commentator Fareed Zakaria, the answer is absolutely yes, because “Trump could be the best thing that’s happened to China in a long time.”6 Zakaria’s and others’ interpretations have an implicit assumption: China has both the willingness and capability to replace the United States as global leader in the coming years. Or does it? The answer is not clear for several reasons. As demonstrated throughout this book, China has had an ambivalent and even reluctant attitude toward superpower status and global leadership. Chinese officials have a long tradition of opposing superpower status, for many decades avoiding describing China as a potential superpower. Chinese officials associate superpower status with hegemony, which has a negative connotation in the Chinese context. Although China is increasingly viewed internationally as an emerging superpower that should take a leadership role, within China, elites and the public still emphasize that it is a developing country and should not take a leadership role in global affairs. A final reason is that while China might become a global actor in economic affairs, it does not yet have the comprehensive national power (including geopolitical power, military capabilities, and international legitimacy) to play a more active role in global security and politics.7 Status competition is a major obstacle to peaceful international change. The status demands of rising powers have often generated uncertainty and instability in the history of international politics. This is not surprising, because rising powers have many incentives to disrupt the status quo to expand their power and status. The status struggle of rising powers entails more complications than conventional wisdom assumes. Rising powers do not always maximize their status, and they do not necessarily always rely on war to signal their preferred status in the world. Contemporary China is such a case: it has been sending contradictory status signals to the international community, sometimes acting assertively to signal great power status and other times highlighting its low status as a fragile developing country. China’s policy elites have been heatedly debating China’s status and role in the world, and these debates about China’s repositioning are intense and consequential. While some Chinese strategists regard this repositioning as an important and unique Chinese problem, a newly great power adapting to its new status is not unique to China. This book presents a new theoretically based interpretation of China’s foreign policy transformation. Instead of explaining the familiar story of status conflicts in great power politics, it more closely examines the variations of China’s status signaling. I now summarize my arguments and findings.

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I introduce the concept of status signaling into international relations literature. In particular, this book offers a new type of signaling model that helps explain foreign policy behaviors of rising powers. Previous studies of signaling models in international relations have dealt with signaling processes in contexts similar to the Cuban missile crisis, and rising powers’ attendant resolve, credibility, and benign intention. These signaling models, however, relate to short-term events and do not address the long-term issue of an emerging power’s status and role on the world stage. Status signaling is the mechanism for information transmission to relevant political actors to either change or maintain a certain status belief they hold. Status signaling is not meant to demonstrate coercive capability or benign intention; rather, status signaling demonstrates the preferred ranking a state wants to have in international society. Great powers can signal their preferred status through various mechanisms and strategies. Hegemonic war has been a major mechanism of power transition and international political change,8 but rising powers have multiple mechanisms for signaling their preferred status today. This book examines processes of status signaling: conspicuous consumption, conspicuous giving, and strategic spinning. Conspicuous consumption in international politics is different from consumption at the individual level: it is a complicated political process involving multiple audiences;9 it often has the instrumental purpose of establishing reputation and prestige, which can also lead to status competition among great powers. However, status signaling is not always competitive and can sometimes be compatible with community norms, such as conspicuous giving of public goods to the international community. And status signaling may promote cooperation within a community among nations.10 These status signaling behaviors that promote cooperation are not altruistic, because political actors may receive social rewards and avoid social sanctions.11 In general, the greater a nation’s sense of belonging to a regional community, the more willing it is to demonstrate its preferred status through conspicuous giving to its community. Using strategic spinning, a great power can signal not only a higher status but also a lower status. The primary reasons for signaling a lower status are to reassure the international community that it is not a threat, position itself to shirk responsibilities a higher-status nation would have and demonstrate solidarity with other lower-status nations. The empirical chapters illustrate these three mechanisms of status signaling using several transformative moments in China’s foreign policy. The book identifies patterns in China’s status signaling, arguing that status signaling is a multilevel game in which the state’s leadership pivots between

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several audiences, international and domestic, between not only nation-states but also a state’s leadership and its public. National leaders face competing pressure from domestic and international audiences to project different images. The Chinese debate what China’s status is and the trade-offs between status and other goals. In general, China’s high-status signals are for symbolic purposes as well as domestic mobilization. When targeting the domestic audience, China stresses its rising power status; when targeting an international audience, China sends a reassuring message of its developing country status. When seeking privileges in international institutions, China emphasizes its emerging power status; when shirking responsibilities and seeking solidarity and followers, China emphasizes its developing country status. In many foreign policy issues, it is increasingly difficult for Chinese leadership to reconcile competing expectations from domestic and international audiences. China’s future challenge will be to manage both the international and domestic images projected to multiple audiences in ways that advance its national interests while not engendering dangerous misperceptions and expectations. The pursuit of status is often regarded as an important motive of Chinese ­foreign policy, and most studies investigate how China tries to maximize its pre­ ferred status. Instead of seeing China as solely a status maximizer, this book ex­ plores variations in China’s status signaling behaviors and why and how China sends contradictory status signals. China cannot offer a clear vision for its emerg­ ing roles largely because of the complex process of domestic-international in­ teractions. In this book I challenge the conventional arguments on power transitions. The trade-off between status and responsibilities in power transitions has not been studied in great depth, but this trade-off is a crucial factor in great power emergence and international change. The declining hegemon usually views rising powers as threats to the existing order. Although the major mechanism for dealing with the core issue of international order has been war, status concerns of great powers do not always lead to conflict and war; there are strategies besides war for great powers to signal their preferred status.12 In addition, the nuclear age has made power transition by means of a deliberate hegemonic war unthinkable. By bringing domestic politics into the discussion, the book provides a more nuanced understanding of status concerns in world politics. Most observers assume China has a desperate need for international status; however, my argument starts with the premise that China’s international status is relatively secure and that China’s striving for international status is primarily

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driven by domestic political calculations. China is concerned, for instrumental reasons, that its status is too high at the international level.

Chinese Foreign Policy in the Xi Jinping Era The most consequential Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, Xi Jinping has pursued a much more assertive foreign policy than his two immediate predecessors. China is gradually transforming itself from a regional power into a global player. While Beijing still adheres to its peaceful development strategy, enactment of the strategy is different from past decades. Endorsing the Chinese Dream, President Xi aims to rejuvenate the Chinese nation. Some observers in the West worry about the emergence of an assertive China. At the global level, they are concerned that China wants to replace the United States as the leading power. At the regional level, they worry that China wants to eventually exclude the United States from Asia. Some indicators seem to justify these Western observers’ concerns. Xi’s foreign policy reflects massive changes in China’s place in the international order. The China that Xi Jinping inherited is vastly different from the China of his predecessors. China is the second-largest economy in the world and the world’s largest trading country. China’s diplomatic influence and military capabilities increased dramatically in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In regional maritime disputes, China has strengthened its claims and escalated tensions. In diplomatic practice, Xi Jinping has conducted a much more proactive foreign policy than his predecessors. Xi travels much more frequently and is the most high-profile foreign policy president in the history of the PRC. Instead of simply joining existing international organizations, largely dominated by the West, China has created new international institutions that could potentially rival the Western-dominated World Bank or International Monetary Fund.13 Given Xi Jinping’s assertive diplomacy, some argue that he has abandoned the previous low-profile approach and that Sino-American competition is intensifying. Concern over a new Chinese hegemony might be overblown. While ­China’s potential as challenger is real, we should notice the limitations of Chinese power and the continuity of Chinese foreign policy. While Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream is ambitious, it primarily targets his domestic audience to consolidate the Chinese Communist Party and Xi’s authority. Today’s East Asia has a geopolitical landscape different from the past. The United States has maintained strong military and diplomatic presence in the region since the end of World War II and is not withdrawing from East Asia for the ­foreseeable

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f­uture. China’s rise is real, but China also has important limitations to projecting its power. Geopolitically, China is surrounded by several major powers or strong middle powers. This geopolitical reality makes the return of Chinese hegemony simply impossible. Furthermore, unlike previous rising powers challenging leading states, China’s technological and military capabilities are much lower relative to those of the United States.14 Finally, the ideational and historical foundation of the reemergence of a benign Chinese hegemony is somewhat debatable. It is important to note that the popular Chinese narrative and historical facts do not necessarily align.15 Some Chinese leaders have truly believed the popular rhetoric, and others have cynically made proclamations of it for self-serving purposes. We should not overestimate the influence of a Confucian culture of harmony on strategic decisions of Chinese leaders.16 The narrative of a benign Chinese hegemony might not reflect historical fact. Chinese foreign policy in Xi Jinping’s era also has demonstrated continuity. Note what China is not doing, or at least has not yet done: China is not seeking to overthrow the existing global order, China has not used military force to retake islands occupied by other claimants in the South China Sea, and China does not seek to challenge US global primacy.17 Reassurance continues to be a big part of Chinese foreign policy: China under Xi remains embedded in the major institutions of the international system, China’s official discourses still emphasize China’s identity as a developing country, and Chinese leaders have repeatedly rejected the idea that China will become hegemon. Many Chinese scholars continue to emphasize the wisdom of Deng Xiaoping’s tao guang yang hui strategy. Still, despite China’s reassurance and self-restraint, much uncertainty surrounds China’s future intentions. Despite these limitations and constraints, China could play an international leadership role in at least two respects.18 China could be a coleader on a multilateral platform, and that leadership could be more inclusive and flexible than in the past and include facilitative leadership.19 China could also play a more active leading role in the developing world. As the largest developing country, China’s successful industrialization and economic emergence is an example for many developing countries. While it is debatable whether the China model (versus the Washington Consensus) is applicable outside China, some practical knowledge of China’s modernization could be transferable to other developing countries. China’s soft power campaign has not been very effective in most of the West, but it has achieved some relative success in the developing world. A stronger and more assertive China does pose challenges for the West. Some worry that China’s influence could overshadow that of the United States. However, China’s rise is not a zero-sum game. As President Obama

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said, “I’ve been very explicit in saying that we have more to fear from a weakened, threatened China than a successful, rising China.”20 A peaceful rising China sharing more burdens and responsibilities in maintaining international order could benefit both the United States and China. Meanwhile, China will continue to pose a strategic dilemma for the United States, and US policy makers worry about China’s challenge in Asia.

Implications Beyond China Despite being a single-country study, the book’s theoretical framework is broad, and the research agenda could be extended in several respects. Adding cross-country comparisons in future studies will be fruitful. For instance, countries such as India, Russia, and Brazil are currently engaging in status signaling behaviors. The future transformation of world politics will be not only a redistribution of hard power but also a change in international norms and culture. Emerging powers such as China and India will have a seat at international tables, and they will bring new rules to the game. Existing theories in international politics often address how emerging powers are socialized into the existing international norms and orders.21 The other side of the story—how emerging powers shape existing norms and cultures into something new—has had little attention. As the global distribution of power is shifting, it is increasingly important to examine the political and normative preferences of emerging powers.22 Studying status signaling behaviors of emerging powers will reveal important trends in international political change. Status signaling is different from status seeking, because analysis of status signaling can be applied to the behavior of the existing hegemon, which does not need to seek higher status but can use status signaling to maintain or strengthen its preferred status. Thus, a theory of status signaling may shed light on the behaviors and strategies of the United States. The grand strategic US foreign policy debates concern US power and status in the international system. If the United States anticipates that it cannot maintain its primacy in the long term, it would be wise to think about strategic retrenchment now and make adjustments in its grand strategic commitment.23 The United States will need to consider how it can maintain its image as the leading power in the international system.24 It is crucial that the United States manage its status signals carefully in a period of strategic uncertainty and international change, particularly in its time of financial deficit. Status signaling does not signal a benign intention or credible threat but a preferred ranking in a hierarchical international society. Status signaling thus

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challenges the dichotomy between the symbolic and rational approaches in international politics, and its study could further promote the dialogue between social constructivism and rationalism.25 Status signaling is just one example of many possible types of signaling as a communicative behavior to project an image in social life and international politics. In fact, it would be beneficial to revisit Robert Jervis’s The Logic of Images.26 Signaling literature in international relations has been heavily influenced by economics literature, typically focusing on the rational choice model. Jervis’s Logic of Images, which has sociological and psychological roots, is helpful in expanding the study of signaling to international relations. Building on Jervis’s work, research on status signaling could reconnect signaling literature with sociology and psychology and thus expand the research agenda of signaling in international relations. How states deal with victory or defeat has been studied,27 but how states deal with unsuccessful efforts of status signaling has not been much studied. A systematic examination of failed status signaling in international politics might add insights. While the successful launch of space projects and the development of advanced weapons boosts countries’ prestige and status, how do these governments deal with failures of their status signaling projects? Most likely, the failure of status signals stigmatizes the international image of the relevant nation-states and even generates a sense of national shame and inferiority. How do these stigmatized states manage their image and foreign policy?28 In recent years, some scholars have argued that we should go beyond the Eurocentric approach in international relations theories.29 They argue that the existing theories of international politics, such as balance of power, are largely based on historical and empirical evidence from Western powers in general and European history in particular. Some even argue that the rediscovery of Chinese history in the East Asian order will help create a Chinese school of international relations theory.30 Bringing the history and practice of East Asia into international relations theories is a valuable effort. From a policy perspective, it is crucial to investigate the practices and preferences of rising Asian powers as they play a larger role in global governance.31 Studying East Asian international relations would not only enrich the existing theories of international relations but also contribute to the construction of new theories and extend the validity of many existing international relations theories. In particular, asymmetrical power, hierarchy, and status are all important concepts for understanding the historical patterns of East Asian international relations. Chinese diplomatic history can provide sources and evidence to generate new theories in international relations.

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The uniqueness of Asian regional conditions or the Chinese world order should not be overemphasized.32 That said, ignoring local conditions of the East Asian order is one of two primary errors that plague studies of the rise of China and its international relations. Ignoring local conditions leads to equating a rising China with previous rising powers and thus that China will inevitably have expansionist goals and aggressive motives.33 This realist view of China does not take into consideration nuanced regional conditions. As David Shambaugh writes, “[That] is a classic example of an international relations theorist, who is not well grounded in regional area studies, deductively applying a theory to a situation rather than inductively generating theory from evidence.”34 The second error consists of essentializing Chinese cultural differences and may even take an exceptional view on China’s traditions and behaviors: the peaceful rise of China is inevitable simply because China has a strong strategic culture of peace and harmony.35 Incorporation of local conditions and Chinese cultural tradition in a thoughtful way in ideal-type theoretical models can be promising and useful,36 but a middle-range theory of international relations must also consider the nuanced reality of the East Asian order. Status signaling is a promising research agenda for its potential to reconcile the tension between general theories and regional expertise. The theoretical framework of status signaling developed in this book is generalizable across different cultures and political systems; however, its application requires indepth knowledge that comes with regional expertise.37 My theoretical construction heavily depends on Chinese cases, and a comparison of the similarities and differences between Chinese foreign policy behaviors and those of other countries would be useful. While we should notice the cultural differences, we should also avoid essentializing any cultural differences.38 Otherwise, the alternative to the Eurocentric approach will be a Sino-centric approach. Neither approach to international relations theories is helpful for bridging the gap between the East and the West. Lessons from sociology and anthropology might be useful for international relations scholars. When studying cultures of the world, the sociologist Erving Goffman said, “Underneath their differences in culture, people everywhere are the same. . . . And if a particular person or group or society seems to have a unique character all its own, it is because its standard set of human-nature elements is pitched and combined in a particular way.”39 The challenge for international relations theorizing is to identify the common elements as well as their different combinations across cases, countries, and cultures.

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Notes

chapter 1 Introduction 1.  Keith Bradsher and Coral Davenport, “As U.S. and Europe Pass the Hat at Climate Talks, China Clings to Developing-Nation Status,” New York Times, December 9, 2015, http://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2015/​12/​10/​world/​asia/​as​-us​-and​-europe​-pass​-the​-hat​-at​ -climate​-talks​-china​-clings​-to​-developing​-nation​-status​.html. 2.  Xi Jinping, “President Xi’s Speech to Davos in Full,” World Economic Forum, January 17, 2017, https://​www​.weforum​.org/​agenda/​2017/​01/​full​-text​-of​-xi​-jinping​-keynote​ -at​-the​-world​-economic​-forum/. 3.  Reuters, “Senior Chinese Diplomat: China Will Assume World Leadership If Needed,” Business Insider, January 23, 2017, http://​www​.businessinsider​.com/​r​-diplomat​ -says​-china​-would​-assume​-world​-leadership​-if​-needed​-2017​-1. 4.  Julie Bishop, “Australia-China Foreign and Strategic Dialogue—Joint Press Conference with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi,” February 7, 2017, http://​foreignminister​ .gov​.au/​transcripts/​Pages/​2017/​jb​_tr​_170207​.aspx. 5.  Xi Jinping, “Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” speech delivered at the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, Beijing, May 14, 2017, https://​eng​.yidaiyilu​.gov​.cn/​qwyw/​rdxw/​ 13297​.htm. 6.  Chris Buckley and Keith Bradsher, “Xi Jinping’s Marathon Speech: Five Takeaways,” New York Times, October 18, 2017, https://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2017/​10/​18/​ world/​asia/​china​-xi​-jinping​-party​-congress​.html. 7.  Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” speech delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, October 18, 2017, http://​www​.xinhuanet​.com/​english/​download/​Xi​ _Jinping​%27s​_report​_at​_19th​_CPC​_National​_Congress​.pdf.

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8.  For examinations of China’s status in the world, see Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 9.  Gerald Segal, “Does China Matter?” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 5 (1999): 24. 10.  Franz-Stefan Gady, “US Admiral: ‘China Seeks Hegemony in East Asia,’” The Diplomat, February 25, 2016, http://​thediplomat​.com/​2016/​02/​us​-admiral​-china​-seeks​ -hegemony​-in​-east​-asia. 11.  Liu Mingfu, Zhongguo meng: Hou meiguo shidai de daguo siwei yu zhanlue dingwei [The China dream: Great power thinking and strategic posture in the post-American era] (Beijing: Zhongguo youyi chubangongsi, 2010). 12.  Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New York: Henry Holt, 2015). 13.  Graham Allison, “What Xi Jinping Wants,” The Atlantic, May 31, 2017, https://​ www​.theatlantic​.com/​international/​archive/​2017/​05/​what​-china​-wants/​528561/. 14.  World Bank, “2011 International Comparison Program Summary Results Release Compares the Real Size of World Economies,” April 29, 2014, http://​www​.worldbank​ .org/​en/​news/​press​-release/​2014/​04/​29/​2011​-international​-comparison​-program​-results​ -compare​-real​-size​-world​-economies. China did become the largest economy based on PPP in 2014. See “World GDP (PPP) Ranking,” Statistics Times, April 23, 2015, http://​ statisticstimes​.com/​economy/​world​-gdp​-ranking​-ppp​.php. 15.  “Woguo burenke GDP chaoguo meiguo” [Our country does not recognize GDP larger than US], CEWeekly, May 6, 2014, http://​www​.ceweekly​.cn/​2014/​0506/​82713​ .shtml. 16.  For an analysis of why China does not want to be recognized as the largest economy, see Minxin Pei, “Why China Hates Being No. 1,” Fortune, May 5, 2014, http://​ fortune​.com/​2014/​05/​05/​why​-china​-hates​-being​-no​-1/. 17.  Isaac Stone Fish, “Is China Still a ‘Developing’ Country?” Foreign Policy, September 25, 2014, https://​foreignpolicy​.com/​2014/​09/​25/​is​-china​-still​-a​-developing​-country/. 18.  Quoted in David Shambaugh, China Goes Global (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 307. 19.  Manjari Chatterjee Miller, “India’s Feeble Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 3 (2013): 14 –19. 20.  For a discussion of three possible roles of China in emerging world order, see Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” International Security 36, no. 1 (2011): 41–72. 21.  Thomas L. Friedman, “Obama on the World,” New York Times, August 8, 2014, http://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2014/​08/​09/​opinion/​president​-obama​-thomas​-l​-friedman​-iraq​ -and​-world​-affairs​.html. For a discussion on backlash from Obama’s remarks, see “Obama Labeling China as ‘Free Rider’ in Iraq Issue,” China Daily, September 4, 2014, http://​ www​.chinadaily​.com​.cn/​world/​2014​-09/​04/​content​_18543889​.htm. From a diplomatic perspective, China may not like to be called a free rider. But from an analytical perspective, free riding could describe any great power. See Andrew B. Kennedy, “China and the Free-Rider Problem: Exploring the Case of Energy Security,” Political Science Quarterly 130, no. 1 (2015): 27–50. 22.  Björn Contrad, “China in Copenhagen: Reconciling the ‘Beijing Climate Revolution’ and the ‘Copenhagen Climate Obstinacy,’” China Quarterly 210 (2012): 435 –455.

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23.  G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 1 (2008): 23 –37. 24.  John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (2010): 381–396. 25.  Randall Schweller, “Realism and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict over Scarce Resources,” in Unipolar Politics, ed. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 28 – 68. For more on positional good in a general sense, see Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 27. 26.  For a discussion of China’s assertive diplomacy, see Dingding Chen, Xiaoyu Pu, and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Debating China’s Assertiveness,” International Security 38, no. 3 (2013): 176 –183. For discussions of US rethinking of its China policy, see Harry Harding, “Has US China Policy Failed?” Washington Quarterly 38, no. 3 (2015): 95 –122; Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations,” Foreign Affairs 97, no. 2 (2018): 60 –70; and Aaron L. Friedberg, “Competing with China,” Survival 60, no. 3 (2018): 7– 64. 27.  Deng Xiaoping’s original Chinese does not easily translate into English. But Deng’s main message was that China should maintain a low profile in international affairs. For a detailed analysis of the influence of this idea in China and debates over it, see Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang, “Lying Low No More? China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy,” China: An International Journal 9, no. 2 (2011): 195 –216. All translations are mine. 28.  For the argument that China should change its grand strategy and abandon the low-profile approach, see Yan Xuetong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 2 (2014): 153 –184; and Chen and Wang, “Lying Low No More?” For the argument that China should continue the low-profile approach, see Wang Jisi, “Zhongguo de guoji dingwei yu taoguangyanghui yousuozuowei de zhanlue sixiang” [The international positioning of China and the strategic principle of keeping a low profile while getting something accomplished], International Studies (Guoji Wenti Yanjiu), no. 2 (2011): 4 – 9. The political and ideational obstacles to China playing a larger role include not only Deng Xiaoping’s low-profile principle but also China’s long-term principle of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. To overcome these problems, Chinese scholars tend to use “creative involvement” to describe China’s relatively more active role in some affairs. See Wang Yizhou, Chuangzhao­ xin jieru: Zhongguo waiji xin wuxiang [Creative involvement: A new direction in China’s diplomacy] (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2011). 29.  Wang Yizhou, “Lun Zhongguo waijizhuanxin” [On China’s diplomatic transformation], Xuexi yu tanshuo, no. 5 (2008): 57– 67. Thomas J. Christensen’s book The China Challenge briefly mentions the debates on China’s dingwei without providing detailed analysis. See Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: W. W. Norton, 2015), 3 – 8. For an analysis of Chinese debate over international positioning, see Xiaoyu Pu, “Controversial Identity of a Rising China,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 10, no. 2 (2017): 131–149. 30.  Yan, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement”; Qin Yaqing; “Continuity Through Change: Background Knowledge and China’s International Strategy,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 3 (2014): 285 –314. 31.  Pu, “Controversial Identity of a Rising China,” 131–149.

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32.  Wang, “Zhongguo de guoji dingwei yu taoguangyanghui yousuozuowei de zhanlue sixiang,” 4 –9; Cai Tuo, “Dangdai Zhongguo guoji dingwei de ruogan sikao” [Some reflections on China’s international positioning], Zhongguo shehui kexue [Social sciences in China], no. 5 (2010): 121–136. 33.  William I. Hitchcock, Melvyn P. Leffler, and Jeffrey W. Legro, eds., Shaper Nations: Strategies for a Changing World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016). 34.  Kenneth Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: Public Affairs, 2008). 35.  Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 36.  Very little literature actually catches the complexity in the international relations system. For an effort to deal with the complex great power system, see Bear F. Braumoeller, “Systemic Politics and the Origins of Great Power Conflict,” American Political Science Review 102, no. 1 (2008): 77–93. 37.  Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Randall Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 38.  Aaron Friedberg, The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895 –1905 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988). 39.  For an analysis of under- or overexpansion in the case of US foreign policy, see Peter Trubowitz, Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Prince­ ton University Press, 2011); and Arthur A. Stein, “Domestic Constraints, Extended Deterrence, and the Incoherence of Grand Strategy,” in The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy, ed. Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 96 –123. 40.  In a theoretical essay, two scholars mention that we should pay more attention to the “logic of positionality.” See Janice Bially Mattern and Ayşe Zarakol, “Hierarchies in World Politics,” International Organization 70, no. 3 (2016): 637. 41.  Laurent Muzellec and Mary Lambkin, “Corporate Rebranding and the Implications for Brand Architecture Management: The Case of Guinness (Diageo) Ireland,” Journal of Strategic Marketing 16, no. 4 (2008): 283 –299. 42.  Margaret Scammell, “Political Brands and Consumer Citizens: The Rebranding of Tony Blair,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 611 (2007): 176 – 192; Peter Van Ham, “The Rise of the Brand State: The Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation,” Foreign Affairs 80, no. 5 (2001): 2 – 6. 43.  Ying Fan, “Branding the Nation: Towards a Better Understanding,” Place Branding and Public Diplomacy 6, no. 2 (2010): 97–103; Christopher S. Browning, “Nation Branding, National Self-Esteem, and the Constitution of Subjectivity in Late Modernity,” Foreign Policy Analysis 11, no. 2 (2015): 195 –214; Keith Dinnie, Nation Branding: Concepts, Issues, Practice (New York: Routledge); Jian Wang, “Localizing Public Diplomacy: The Role of Sub-national Actors in Nation Branding,” Place Branding 2, no. 1 (2005): 32 –42. 44.  Alastair Iain Johnston, “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post–Cold War Period,” in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, ed. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 261–318. Yong Deng says China’s struggle for great power status is an “uphill struggle.” See Deng, China’s Struggle for Status, 270.

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45.  For instance, on the basis of social identity theory, any country, but especially great powers, has a natural tendency to project a positive and distinctive image and status on the world stage. See Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy,” International Security 34, no. 4 (2010): 63 –95. 46.  For a comprehensive review of power transition theory, see Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy, “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 6 (1999): 675 –704. For the application of power transition theory in US-China relations, see Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler, “Power Transition and China-US Conflicts,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 1, no. 1 (2006): 35 –55. For a critique of power transition theory, see Steve Chan, China, the US, and the Power-Transition Theory (New York: Routledge, 2008). 47.  Schweller and Pu, “After Unipolarity.” 48.  Denny Roy, “China’s Grand Strategy Is Not Absent, Just Contradictory,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, no. 292 (2014): 1–2. 49.  David Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China,” Washington Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2011): 7–27; Pu, “Controversial Identity of a Rising China.” 50.  Timothy R. Heath, “China’s Endgame: The Path Towards Global Leadership,” Lawfare, January 5, 2018, https://​www​.lawfareblog​.com/​chinas​-endgame​-path​-towards​ -global​-leadership. 51.  Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, “New Foreign Policy Actors in China,” SIPRI Policy Paper no. 26, September 2010, http://​lindajakobson​.com/​wp​-content/​uploads/​ bsk​-pdf​-manager/​5​_JAKOBSON​_KNOX​_SIPRI​_PP26​.PDF. 52.  Pu, “Controversial Identity of a Rising China.” 53.  Thanks go to Ren Xiao for pointing this out. 54.  Cong Mu, “Wen Rules Out ‘G2’ Proposal,” Global Times, May 22, 2009, http://​ www​.globaltimes​.cn/​content/​431991​.shtml. 55.  William C. Wohlforth, “Status Dilemmas and Interstate Conflict,” in Status in World Politics, ed. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 115 –140. 56.  See Johnston, “Realism(s)”; and Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers,” 63 –95. 57.  Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). 58.  Charles Kindleberger, an influential intellectual, argues that the global disasters of “depression, genocide, and world war” in the 1930s were due to the United States replacing Britain as the largest global power but failing to take on Britain’s role in providing global public goods. See Joseph S. Nye, “The Kindleberger Trap,” Project Syndicate, January 9, 2017, https://​www​.project​-syndicate​.org/​commentary/​trump​-china​-kindleberger​ -trap​-by​-joseph​-s​-​-nye​-2017​-01. 59.  Thanks go to Robert Jervis for pointing this out. Signaling is an important phenomenon, but I do not hold that it is everywhere in international politics. 60.  For the original study of signaling and image management in international relations, see Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Prince­ ton University Press 1989). Jervis’s book takes insights from the dramaturgical and impression management framework of social psychology; for more discussion, see Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor Books, 1959). Social psychologists tend to describe these image-building behaviors as “impression management,” while business and public relations scholars tend to use “image management.”

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While taking insights from impression-management literature, I choose in this book to use “image management” for two reasons. First, actors in international politics are often corporate entities, and it is more appropriate to use “image management” to describe the strategic interactions among nation-states. Second, the book focuses on long-term image building of nation-states rather than short-term impression management of individuals. That said, some scholars use the terms interchangeably. 61.  Mark R. Leary and Robin M. Kowalski, “Impression Management: A Literature Review and Two-Component Model,” Psychological Bulletin 107, no. 1 (1990): 34 –47. 62.  Admittedly, some cultures are more status oriented than others. Because Chinese society is strongly influenced by Confucian culture, which is more hierarchical, it is more sensitive to status signals. Thanks go to Greg Moore for reminding me of this. Although focusing on China, the analytical framework of status signaling in this book could be universally applied. 63.  For some examples of status signals in the social sciences, see Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899; repr., New York: Penguin Books, 1967); Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Luuk van Kempen, “Fooling the Eye of the Beholder: Deceptive Status Signaling Among the Poor in Developing Countries,” Journal of International Development 15, no. 2 (2003): 157–169; and Young Jee Han, Joseph C. Nunes, and Xavier Drèze, “Signaling Status with Luxury Goods: The Role of Brand Prominence,” Journal of Marketing 74, no. 4 (2010): 15 –30. 64.  For a classic analysis of conspicuous consumption, see Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class. 65.  Amihai Glazer and Kai A. Konrad, “A Signaling Explanation for Charity,” American Economic Review 86, no. 4 (1996): 1019 –1028. 66.  Dominant states provide public goods that give other states an interest in following their lead. See Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 30. 67.  Deng, China’s Struggle for Status. 68.  For other cases of status signaling, see Wohlforth, “Status Dilemmas”; and Xiaoyu Pu, “Ambivalent Accommodation: Status Signaling of a Rising India and China’s Response,” International Affairs 93, no. 1 (2017): 147–163. 69.  Christensen, The China Challenge. 70.  Callahan, China. 71.  Shogo Suzuki, Civilization and Empire: China and Japan’s Encounter with European International Society (London: Routledge, 2009). 72.  Shogo Suzuki, “Journey to the West: China Debates Its ‘Great Power’ Identity,” Millennium 42, no. 3 (2014): 632 – 650. 73.  Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 74.  James D. Fearon, “Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (1994): 236 –269. 75.  Offensive realism is one of the two versions of structural realism in international relations (the other is defensive realism). According to offensive realism, great powers should maximize power for survival, and they should seek regional hegemony—status as the only great power in the geographical area—and prevent the emergence of another hegemon.

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For the classic work on offensive realism, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001). Power transition theory is a theoretical framework that conceptualizes dynamic change of world politics. The theory emphasizes the hierarchy of nations and the cyclical nature of world politics. For the classic work on power transition theory, see A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 1968). Both offensive realism and power transition theory have a pessimistic view on USChina conflict. See Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm”; and Tammen and Kugler, “Power Transition and China-US Conflicts.” 76.  This does not mean China and the United States will not compete at the global level; both nations compete and cooperate on the global stage. As China becomes richer and stronger, though, the competing elements between the two nations might increase. 77.  Johan Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Aggression,” Journal of Peace Research 1, no. 2 (1964): 95 –119; Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); William Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 28 –57. 78.  Joseph Nye, “American and Chinese Power After the Financial Crisis,” Washington Quarterly 33, no. 4 (2010): 143 –153; Xinbo Wu, “Understanding the Geopolitical ­Implications of the Global Financial Crisis,” Washington Quarterly 33, no. 4 (2010): 155 – 163. 79.  For the view that the United States will not accept the emergence of a peer competitor in East Asia, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001), 360 –402. 80.  I note here that rising powers in history were often trying to free ride and avoid paying the costs of system management. The United States in the late nineteenth century was such a rising power. See Zakaria, From Wealth to Power. But rising powers are often challengers to the existing international order, and their shirking receives less notice. For a preliminary analysis of the shirking strategy of a rising power, see Schweller and Pu, “After Unipolarity,” 64 –70. 81.  Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 54 – 67. 82.  Thanks go to Yong Deng for suggesting the term “contested status signaling.” 83.  Jonathan Renshon, “Status Deficits and War,” International Organization 70, no. 3 (2016): 513 –550; Jonathan Renshon, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017); Steve Ward, Status and the Challenge of Rising Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 84.  Thanks go to Alastair Iain Johnston for suggesting the term “status discrepancy reversed.” 85.  Few constructivists pay attention to the instrumental motivations of identity politics in international relations, but as Richard Ned Lebow emphasizes, political leaders sometimes invoke national identifications as rationalizations for policies pursued for other reasons. See Richard Ned Lebow, National Identities and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 1–9. 86.  For an important exception, see Nicholas Sambanis, Stergios Skaperdas, and William C. Wohlforth, “Nation-Building Through War,” American Political Science Review 109, no. 2 (2015): 279 –296. 87.  China is the second-largest economy on the basis of its exchange rate, and it is the largest economy on the basis of its purchasing power parity.

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88.  I thank Avery Goldstein for pointing this out. A systematic study of great power status puts China as a status overachiever in the international system. See Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant, and Ryan G. Baird, “Major Power Status in International Politics,” in Major Powers and the Quest for Status in International Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 1–26. 89.  Rich knowledge of a particular country can be a good source for theory building. See Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980 –2000 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), xxv, 32 –39. 90.  For other cases of status signaling, see Wohlforth, “Status Dilemmas”; and Pu, “Ambivalent Accommodation.” 91.  Deng, China’s Struggle for Status. 92.  Pu, “Ambivalent Accommodation.” 93.  Sean W. Burges, “Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War,” International Relations 22, no. 1 (2008): 65 – 84. 94.  Supported through grants from the Mershon Center of the Ohio State University and Bradley Foundations, I conducted three formal field trips to China in 2010, 2011, and 2013. In addition to these formal field trips, I traveled to China for meeting and research in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. Supported through grants from the International Activities Committee of the University of Nevada, Reno, and the Center for International Relations at Fundação Getulio Vargas, I also traveled to Brazil to conduct research in 2016.

chapter 2  Status Signaling in International Relations 1.  For a comprehensive review of power transition theory, see Jonathan M. DiCicco and Jack S. Levy, “Power Shifts and Problem Shifts: The Evolution of the Power Transition Research Program,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 6 (1999): 675 –704. For a critique of power transition theory, see Steve Chan, China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory (New York: Routledge, 2008). 2.  See, for instance, Richard Ned Lebow, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy,” International Security 34, no. 4 (2011): 63 –95. 3.  Deborah Welch Larson, T. V. Paul, and William C. Wohlforth, “Status and World Order,” in Status in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 7. 4.  Nan Lin, “Social Resources and Social Mobility: A Structural Theory of Status Attainment,” in Social Mobility and Social Structure, ed. Ronald L. Breiger (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 247–271. 5.  Bernardo A. Huberman, Christoph H. Loch, and Ayse ÖncÜler, “Status as a Valued Resource,” Social Psychology Quarterly, no. 1 (2004): 103 –114. 6.  Francis Bloch, Vijayendra Rao, and Sonalde Desai, “Wedding Celebrations as Conspicuous Consumption,” Journal of Human Resources 39, no. 3 (2004): 675 – 695. 7.  Robert H. Frank, Luxury Fever: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of Excess (New York: Free Press, 1999), 139. 8.  For discussions of hierarchy in international relations, see David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 57 – 85; David Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011); Brantly Womack, China and Viet-

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nam: The Politics of Asymmetry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Ian Clark, “How Hierarchical Can International Society Be?” International Relations 23, no. 3 (2009): 464 – 480; Alexander Cooley, Logics of Hierarchy: The Organization of Empires, States, and Military Occupations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Janice Bially Mattern and Ayse Zarakol, “Hierarchies in World Politics,” International Organization 70, no. 3 (2016): 623 – 654; and Ayse Zarakol, Hierarchies in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 9.  Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 10.  Randall Schweller, “Realism and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict over Scarce Resources,” in Unipolar Politics, ed. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 46. 11.  David Lake, “Authority, Status, and the End of the American Century,” in Status in World Politics, ed. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 246 –269. 12.  This does not mean that status has no materialist foundation. People sometimes define social status by economic and materialist basis, but in a broader context, the standards of status largely depend on social norms and cultural context. For an illustration of relational nature of status in international relations, see Marina G. Duque, “Recognizing International Status: A Relational Approach,” International Studies Quarterly, April 5, 2018, https://​doi​.org/​10​.1093/​isq/​sqy001. 13.  Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 31. 14.  Schweller, “Realism and the Present Great Power System,” 43 –47. 15.  Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers.” 16.  Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Lebow, Why Nations Fight. 17.  Jörg Friedrichs, “An Intercultural Theory of International Relations: How SelfWorth Underlies Politics Among Nations,” International Theory, 8 (2016): 63 –96. 18.  For a discussion of status markers and social influence in international relations, see Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980 –2000 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 87. 19.  For a discussion of the aggregation problem in social theories of international relations, see Johnston, Social States, 95 –99. 20.  Wendt Alexander, “The State as Person in International Theory,” Review of International Studies 30, no. 2 (2004): 289 –316. 21.  Both liberal theory and neoclassical realist theory emphasize that domestic preference is important in international politics. See Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics,” International Organization 51, no. 4 (1997): 514 –553; and Randall Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” in Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field, ed. Colin Elman and Miriam Elman (Boston: MIT Press, 2003), 311–347. 22.  For a discussion of dramaturgical framework and impression management from a sociological perspective, see Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor Books, 1959). 23.  Robert Jervis is a pioneer in applying Goffman’s dramaturgical perspective to international relations. See Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). More studies have put Goffman’s perspective into

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international relations in recent years. For instance, see Michael N. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Frank Schimmelfennig, “Goffman Meets IR: Dramaturgical Action in International Community,” International Review of Sociology 12, no. 3 (2002): 417–437; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive Identities, Norms, and Order in International Society,” International Organization 68, no. 1 (2014): 143 –176; and Austin Carson, “Facing Off and Saving Face: Covert Intervention and Escalation Management in the Korean War,” International Organization 70, no. 1 (2016): 103 –131. 24.  Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, 45; Todd H. Hall, “We Will Not Swallow This Bitter Fruit: Theorizing a Diplomacy of Anger,” Security Studies 20, no. 4 (2011): 521–555. 25.  Robert H. Frank, Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), 96 –113; Jonathan Mercer, “Emotional Beliefs,” International Organization 64, no. 1 (2010): 1–31; Hall, “We Will Not Swallow This Bitter Fruit.” 26.  Joel M. Podolny, Status Signals: A Sociological Study of Market Competition (Prince­ ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008). 27.  Anne E. Sartori, Deterrence by Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). 28.  The key is to empirically analyze whether a concern over image drives state ­behavior. 29.  Amotz Zahavi and Avishag Zahavi, The Handicap Principle: A Missing Piece of Darwin’s Puzzle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), viii–viv. For applications of the handicap principle in world politics, see Lin Minwang, Choosing War: A Loss-Aversion Theory of War Decision (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2010), 86 – 87; and Lilach Gilady, “Conspicuous Waste in International Relations” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2006), 59 – 60. 30.  That said, effective signaling is not always costly, and sometimes costless signaling or cheap talk can be effective. See Sartori, Deterrence by Diplomacy; Robert F. Trager “Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 2 (2010): 347–368; Roseanne W. McManus, “Fighting Words: The Effectiveness of Statements of Resolve in International Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 6 (2014): 726 –740; and Todd Hall and Keren Yarhi-Milo, “The Personal Touch: Leaders’ Impressions, Costly Signaling, and Assessments of Sincerity in International Affairs,” International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 3 (2012): 560 –573. 31.  A. Michael Spence, Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974). 32.  Zahavi and Zahavi, The Handicap Principle. 33.  In economics, this is sometimes referred to as the Veblen effect. See Thorstein Veb­ len, The Theory of the Leisure Class (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 34.  Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” International Security 19, no. 3 (1994): 50 –90; Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other,” Security Studies 7, no. 1 (1997): 114 –155. 35.  James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 1 (1997): 68. 36.  Defensive realism is one of the two versions of structural realism in international relations. This theory argues that in an anarchic international system, states seek balance of power for security, not maximization of power for hegemony, and a security dilemma can be mitigated through reassurance and other measures. For the classic works on defensive

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realism, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics; and Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214. 37.  Charles L. Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); Shiping Tang, A Theory of Security Strategy for Our Time: Defensive Realism (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010). 38.  Alexander Thompson, “Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006): 1–34; Alexander Thompson, Channels of Power: The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). 39.  James D. Fearon, “Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (1994): 236 –269; Kenneth Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 40.  Jessica L. Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,” International Organization 62, no. 1 (2008): 35 – 64; Jessica C. Weiss. Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 41.  Political actors often make decisions in a strategic interactive context. This does not mean that political actors (such as nations) always maximize their material interests. See Barry O’Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001). 42.  Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics. 43.  That said, this does not mean that nonsecurity goals are always legitimate. Sometimes states have an inflated view of their status, and their demand for higher status could appear threatening to other countries. 44.  Thanks go to Todd Hall for pointing this out. 45.  Consumption itself does not necessarily signal social status but its conspicuousness. 46.  These categories are, of course, ideal, and the typology of means and purposes of status signaling is more complicated in reality. For a discussion of typology and international relations theory, see Colin Elman, “Explanatory Typologies in Qualitative Studies of International Politics,” International Organization 59, no. 2 (2005): 293 –326. 47.  Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class; Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976); Robert H. Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Frank, Luxury Fever. 48.  Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984). 49.  For applying the economic concept of “conspicuous consumption” or “positional goods” as a motive for obtaining status or prestige in international relations, see Schweller, “Realism and the Present Great Power System,” 28 – 68. My analysis differs from the existing literature in two respects. While some conceptualize conspicuous consumption as wasteful behavior, my study assumes that conspicuous consumption has both instrumental and expressive (symbolic) purposes. I emphasize that conspicuous consumption in international relations is a complicated political process that involves multiple audiences. 50.  Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class. 51.  Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth, 20. 52.  Here it is useful to make a distinction between real social positions and positional goods. Most of the positional goods as defined by Hirsch and Frank would be more

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a­ ppropriately called position-symbolizing material goods, which are defined as material consumption to symbolize people’s preferred status. The positional market of a society is the sum of all social hierarchies within that society. In the positional market, the real positional goods are positions, not position-symbolizing material goods. See Shiping Tang, “The Positional Market and Economic Growth,” Journal of Economic Issues 44, no. 3 (2010): 1–28. 53.  Spence, Market Signaling. Spence’s theory in this classic treatise on information economics is widely applied in international relations literature, most of which focuses on costly signals without developing the related concept of status signal in an international context. 54.  George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, Identity Economics: How Our Identities Shape Our Work, Wages, and Well-Being (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). 55.  Frank, Luxury Fever, 145. 56.  James D. Fearon, “Two States, Two Types, Two Actions,” Security Studies 20, no. 3 (2011): 437. 57.  Noah P. Mark, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and Cecilia L. Ridgeway, “Why Do Nominal Characteristics Acquire Status Value? A Minimal Explanation for Status Construction,” American Journal of Sociology 115, no. 3 (2009): 832 – 862. 58.  Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy: The Psychology of Human Satisfaction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 59.  For a discussion of a signaling explanation for charity, see Amihai Glazer and Kai A. Konrad, “A Signaling Explanation for Charity,” American Economic Review 86, no. 4 (1996): 1019 –1028. 60.  Signaling is not necessarily the only motive for donating to charity. People also give to charity anonymously for moral sentiments rather than self-interested instrumental calculations. For analysis of moral sentiments and human behavior, see Frank, Passions within Reason, 146 –162. 61.  Conspicuous giving overlaps with the notion of public goods provision of a hegemonic power in international relations. The difference is that conspicuous giving is applied not only to hegemonic powers but also to rising powers. Some scholars study specific behaviors of public goods provision, including custodianship and sponsorship. See Simon Reich and Richard Ned Lebow, Good-Bye Hegemony! Power and Influence in the Global System (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 7– 8. 62.  For discussions of counterfeit brands and deception in status signaling, see Luuk Van Kempen, “Fooling the Eye of the Beholder: Deceptive Status Signaling Among the Poor in Developing Countries,” Journal of International Development 15, no. 2 (2003): 157–169; and Young Jee Han, Joseph C. Nunes, and Xavier Drèze, “Signaling Status with Luxury Goods: The Role of Brand Prominence,” Journal of Marketing 74, no. 4 (2010): 15 –30. 63.  Johnston, Social States, 88. 64.  Lebow, Why Nations Fight. 65.  Stephen Peter Rosen, War and Human Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 66.  Philip Smith, “Codes and Conflict: Toward a Theory of War as Ritual,” Theory and Society 20, no. 1 (1991): 103 –138. 67.  For an analysis of why rituals can generate common knowledge in a community, see Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).

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68.  John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 16 –17. 69.  By definition, any leadership must have followers; for a discussion related to international politics, see Stefan A. Schirm, “Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (2009): 197–221. 70.  Frank, Luxury Fever, 140. 71.  Tsuyoshi Shimmura, Shosei Ohashi, and Takashi Yoshimura, “The Highest-Ranking Rooster Has Priority to Announce the Break of Dawn,” Scientific Reports 5 (2015): 116 –183. 72.  Zahavi and Zahavi, The Handicap Principle. 73.  Alexander A. Schuessler, A Logic of Expressive Choice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 74.  Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy. 75.  For an analysis of great power peace, see John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); Shiping Tang, “Social Evolution of International Politics: From Mearsheimer to Jervis,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 1 (2010): 31–55; and Randall L. Schweller, “Rational Theory for a Bygone Era,” Security Studies 20, no. 3 (2011): 460 –468. 76.  Randall Schweller, “Ennui Becomes Us,” National Interest, no. 105 (2010): 27–38. 77.  For the case of China, see Michael Wines and Edward Wong, “China’s Push to Modernize Military Is Bearing Fruit,” New York Times, January 5, 2011, http://​www​ .nytimes​.com/​2011/​01/​06/​world/​asia/​06china​.html; and Michael A. Glosny, Phillip Charles Saunders, and Robert S. Ross, “Debating China’s Naval Nationalism,” International Security 35, no. 2 (2010): 161–175. 78.  Fernando Jaramillo, Hubert Kempf, and Fabien Moizeau, “Conspicuous Consumption, Social Status, and Clubs,” Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, nos. 63 – 64 (2001): 321–344. 79.  Jacques E. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 80.  John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 105 –108. 81.  John H. Fleming, John M. Darley, James L. Hilton, and Brian A. Kojetin, “Multiple Audience Problem: A Strategic Communication Perspective on Social Perception,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58, no. 4 (1990): 593; John H. Fleming and John M. Darley, “Mixed Messages: The Multiple Audience Problem and Strategic Communication,” Social Cognition 9, no. 1 (1991): 25 –46. 82.  Garrett Hardin, quoted in Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 68. 83.  Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–460. 84.  Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 20. 85.  Glaser, Rational Theory of International Politics. 86.  Han, Nunes, and Drèze, “Signaling Status with Luxury Goods.” 87.  Ibid. 88.  Barry Buzan, The United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2004), 66.

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89.  Michael Mandelbaum, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a CashStrapped Era (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), 8. According to Michael Mandelbaum, the conspicuous consumption era of the United States is ending, and the challenge for the United States is how to become a “frugal superpower” in a new era. 90.  Kempen, “Fooling the Eye of the Beholder”; Han, Nunes, and Drèze, “Signaling Status with Luxury Goods.” 91.  Derek D. Rucker and Adam D. Galinsky, “Conspicuous Consumption Versus Utilitarian Ideals: How Different Levels of Power Shape Consumer Behavior,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 45, no. 3 (2009): 549 –555. 92.  Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 539. 93.  Manjari Chatterjee Miller, Wronged by Empire: Post-imperial Ideology and Foreign Policy in India and China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013). 94.  For one illustration of this logic by an economist, see Frank, Choosing the Right Pond, 125. 95.  Dana P. Eyre and Mark C. Suchman, “Status, Norms, and the Proliferation of Conventional Weapons: An Institutional Theory Approach,” in The Culture of National Security: Institutionalism Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 79 –113. 96.  Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth, 27. 97.  Todd Sandler, Collective Action: Theory and Applications (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992). 98.  Ibid., 63. 99.  For a study of elite club membership in social life, see Lauren Rivera, “Status Distinctions in Interaction: Social Selection and Exclusion at an Elite Nightclub,” Qualitative Sociology 33, no. 3 (2010): 229 –255. 100.  Fei Xiaotong, From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). It is debatable whether Fei’s theory of differential mode of association can be applied only to Chinese society or is a mode of social networking that has wider implications. For some preliminary ideas on applying Fei’s theory in an international relations context, see Yaqing Qin, “International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 2 (2010): 129 –153. 101.  Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie, 16 –17. 102.  Such as the poor peasants who borrow money to hold lavish weddings or consumers who purchase fake luxury goods. Bloch, Rao, and Desai, “Wedding Celebrations as Conspicuous Consumption”; Kempen, “Fooling the Eye of the Beholder.” 103.  Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations; James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379 –414; Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie. 104.  “Lying” occurs “when a person makes a statement that he knows or suspects to be false in the hope that others will think it is true. A lie is a positive action designed to deceive the target audience.” Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie, 16. 105.  H. Markus and P. Nurius, “Possible Selves,” American Psychologist 41, no. 9 (1986): 954. 106.  Jeffrey W. Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Ted Hopf, “Identity Relations and the SinoSoviet Split,” in Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists, ed. Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko

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M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Rose McDermott (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 279 –315. In this book I do not aim to settle the debates among versions of realisms and constructivisms. I simply assume that material capabilities, domestic identity, and international interactions matter in shaping a country’s foreign policy. 107.  Jing Wang, Brand New China: Advertising, Media, and Commercial Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 108.  Johnston, Social States, 76. 109.  Joel Best, Everyone’s a Winner: Life in Our Congratulatory Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 110.  This is related to the social creativity strategy of rising powers; see Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers.”

chapter 3  China on the World Stage 1.  Falk Hartig, “Communicating China to the World: Confucius Institutes and China’s Strategic Narratives,” Politics 35, nos. 3 –4 (2015): 245 –258; Ying Zhou and Sabrina Luk, “Establishing Confucius Institutes: A Tool for Promoting China’s Soft Power?” Journal of Contemporary China 25, no. 100 (2016): 628 – 642; Kejin Zhao, “The Motivation Behind China’s Public Diplomacy,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 8, no. 2 (2015): 167–196. 2.  Yan Xuetong, “How China Can Defeat America,” New York Times, November 20, 2011, http://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2011/​11/​21/​opinion/​how​-china​-can​-defeat​-america​ .html. 3.  Feng Zhang, “The Rise of Chinese Exceptionalism in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 19, no. 2 (2013): 305 –328; Benjamin Ho, “Understanding Chinese Exceptionalism: China’s Rise, Its Goodness, and Greatness,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 39, no. 3 (2014): 164 –176. 4.  Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 1. 5.  David Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push,” Foreign Affairs 94 (2015): 99 –107. 6.  Li Mingjiang, “China Debates Soft Power,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 2 (2008): 287–308; Men Honghua, “Zhongguo ruanshili pinggu baogao” [Evaluating China’s soft power], Guoji guancha [International review] 2 (2007): 15 –26. 7.  Shambaugh, “China’s Soft-Power Push.” 8.  Falk Hartig, “Communicating China to the World; Zhou and Luk, “Establishing Confucius Institutes.” 9.  Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), xiv. 10.  Andrew Chubb, “Propaganda, Not Policy: Explaining the PLA’s ‘Hawkish Faction’ (Part One),” China Brief 13, no. 15 (2013), https://​jamestown​.org/​program/​propaganda​ -not​-policy​-explaining​-the​-plas​-hawkish​-faction​-part​-one. 11.  Ibid.; brackets in original. 12.  Frank Schimmelfennig, “Goffman Meets IR: Dramaturgical Action in International Community,” International Review of Sociology 12, no. 3 (2002): 417–437. 13.  An increasing number of studies put Goffman’s idea into international relations; see Schimmelfennig, “Goffman Meets IR”; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive Identities, Norms, and Order in International Society,” International Organization 68, no. 1 (2014): 143 –176; Austin Carson, “Facing Off and Saving Face: Covert Intervention and Escalation Management in the Korean War,”

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International Organization 70, no. 1 (2016): 103 –131; and Austin Carson and Keren YarhiMilo, “Covert Communication: The Intelligibility and Credibility of Signaling in Secret,” Security Studies 26, no. 1 (2017): 124 –156. 14.  For a couple of exceptions, see Kingsley Edney, “Building National Cohesion and Domestic Legitimacy: A Regime Security Approach to Soft Power in China,” Politics 35, nos. 3 – 4 (2015): 259 –272; and William A. Callahan, “Identity and Security in China: The Negative Soft Power of the China Dream,” Politics 35, nos. 3 –4 (2015): 216 –229. 15.  Zhao, “The Motivation Behind China’s Public Diplomacy,” 167. 16.  For a discussion of multiple identities at the individual level, see H. Markus and P. Nurius, “Possible Selves,” American Psychologist 41, no. 9 (1986): 954 –969. For a discussion of multiple identities and identifications in international relations, see Richard Ned Lebow, National Identities and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). 17.  David Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China,” Washington Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2011): 7–27. Shambaugh’s article covers foreign policy ideas in China, not necessarily China’s competing national identities. 18.  Nina Hachigian and Yuan Peng, “The US-China Expectations Gap: An Exchange,” Survival 52, no. 4 (2010): 73 –74. 19.  Dai Bingguo, “Stick to the Path of Peaceful Development,” China Daily, December 13, 2010, http://​www​.chinadaily​.com​.cn/​cndy/​2010​-12/​13/​content​_11689670​.htm. 20.  Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 68 –79. 21.  Oliver Stuenkel, The BRICS and the Future of Global Order (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015). 22.  For instance, entering “emerging powers” (xinxing da guo) as the key word to search academic articles in the China National Social Sciences Database for the period 1989 – 2001 yields 19 articles, and a search for the period 2002 –2014 results in 612 articles. The database can be accessed at http://​www​.nssd​.org. 23.  For a skeptic’s view of BRICS countries, see Graham Allison, “China Doesn’t Belong in the BRICS,” The Atlantic, March 26, 2013, http://​www​.theatlantic​.com/​china/​ archive/​2013/​03/​china​-doesnt​-belong​-in​-the​-brics/​274363/. 24.  Some Chinese scholars have reservations regarding their potential. See Jian Shixue, “Lun xinxin jingjiti de tiaozhan” [The challenges of the emerging economies], Sichuandaxue xuebao (shehekexueban) [ Journal of Sichuan University (social science edition)] 1 (2014): 101–109. 25.  Senior Brazilian diplomat, discussion with the author, Brasília, Brazil, August 2016. 26.  For instance, see Yan Xuetong, Zhongguo jueqi: Guoji huanjin pingu [The rise of China: An evaluation of international environment] (Tianjin: People’s Publishing House, 1998). 27.  Qi Hao, “China Debates the ‘New Type of Great Power Relations,’” Chinese Journal of International Politics 8, no. 4 (2015): 349 –370. For possible results of a rising power challenging a ruling one, see Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017). 28.  Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, vol. 3 (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1994), 353. 29.  China’s lack of support for the Brazilian bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC poses an important obstacle to further improvement in bilateral relations. Senior Brazilian diplomat, discussion with the author, Brasília, Brazil, August 2016.

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30.  For a discussion of China’s ambivalent attitude toward Brazil’s entry to the UNSC, see Niu Hanbing, “Emerging Global Partnership: Brazil and China,” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 53 (2010): 183 –192. 31.  Yan Xuetong, “The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes,” Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 26 (2001): 33 –39; David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 57– 85. 32.  Aaron L. Friedberg. A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton, 2011). 33.  Foreign policy experts from Peking University, Beijing Foreign Studies University, and China Institute of Modern International Relations, discussion with the author, Beijing, July 2010. For an analysis of bureaucratic politics in China’s foreign policy, see Zhang Qingmin, “Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Foreign Policy-Making,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 9, no. 4 (2016): 435 –458. 34.  William A. Callahan, China: The Pessoptimist Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation (New York: Columbia University Press). 35.  “Xi Jinping Pledges ‘Great Renewal of Chinese Nation,’” Xinhua, November 30, 2012, http://​www​.china​.org​.cn/​china/​2012​-11/​30/​content​_27269821​_3​.htm. 36.  Gordon G. Chang, The Coming Collapse of China (New York: Random House, 2001). 37.  Yuchao Zhu, “‘Performance Legitimacy’ and China’s Political Adaptation Strategy,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 16, no. 2 (2011): 123 –140. 38.  Eric X. Li, “The Life of the Party,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (2013): 34. 39.  Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Office, 2013), 19; Andrew S. Erickson, Abraham M. Denmark, and Gabriel Collins, “Beijing’s ‘Starter Carrier’ and Future Steps: Alternatives and Implications,” Naval War College Review, 65, no. 1 (2012): 14 –54. 40.  “Zhonggongzhongyang, Guowuyuan, Zhongyangjunwei dianhe shoushouhangmu jiaojierulie [Congratulation letter from the Central Committee, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission on the first aircraft carrier],” China News, September 25, 2012, http://​www​.chinanews​.com/​mil/​2012/​09​-25/​4210719​.shtml. 41.  For analysis of the instrumental calculations of China’s soft power projection and public diplomacy, see Falk Hartig, “How China Understands Public Diplomacy,” International Studies Review 18, no. 4 (2016): 655 – 680; Zhao, “The Motivation Behind China’s Public Diplomacy”; and Callahan, “Identity and Security in China.” 42.  Callahan, China. 43.  John Pomfret, “U.S. Takes a Tougher Tone with China,” Washington Post, July 30, 2010, http://​www​.washingtonpost​.com/​wp​-dyn /​content/​article/​2010/​07/​29/​ AR2010072906416​.html. 44.  Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong.” 45.  Aaron L. Friedberg, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics,” National Interest, no. 114 (2011): 18 –27. 46.  Henry A. Kissinger, “The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 2 (2012): 50 –51. 47.  Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 72. 48.  Kissinger, “The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations,” 51.

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49.  Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” March 2012, p. 27, http://​www​.brookings​.edu/​~/​media/​research/​files/​papers/​2012/​3/​30​ -us​-china​-lieberthal/​0330​_china​_lieberthal​.pdf. 50.  Senior scholar at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, discussion with the author, Beijing, July 2010. 51.  This does not mean Xi’s Chinese Dream has no international implications. It provides an ideational foundation for a more active Chinese foreign policy. 52.  Chris Buckley, “China’s Leader Tries to Calm African Fears of His Country’s Economic Power,” New York Times, March 25, 2013, http://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2013/​03/​26/​ world/​asia/​chinese​-leader​-xi​-jinping​-offers​-africa​-assurance​-and​-aid​.html. 53.  Stefan A. Schirm, “Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (2009): 197–221. 54.  George T. Yu, “China’s Africa Policy: South-South Unity and Cooperation,” in China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic, ed. Lowell Dittmer and George T. Yu (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010), 129. 55.  Lowell Dittmer, “China and the Developing World,” in Dittmer and Yu, China, 1–11. 56.  Thomas J. Christensen, Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 24. 57.  Peter Van Ness, “China as a Third World State: Foreign Policy and Official National Identity,” in China’s Quest for National Identity, ed. Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), 194 –214. 58.  Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 59.  Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China.” 60.  Lowell Dittmer, “China’s Rise, Global Identity, and the Developing World,” in Dittmer and Yu, China, 226. 61.  Referring to “developing country” as a lower-status group in international relations does not mean that the status of developing countries is negative in Chinese official discourse. In contrast, in the Chinese revolutionary legacy, the label of developing country is largely positive politically. Just as the working class might be a lower-status group in the rest of the world, it is viewed as a politically positive concept in Chinese official discourse. I offer thanks to Yin Jiwu for reminding me of this. 62.  The Group of Eight became the Group of Seven after Russia‘s exclusion in 2014. 63.  Liu Chang, “Xinhua: Commentary: U.S. Fiscal Failure Warrants a De-Americanized World,” US-China Perception Monitor, October 14, 2013, https://​www​.uscnpm​ .org/​blog/​2013/​10/​14/​xinhua​-commentary​-u​-s​-fiscal​-failure​-warrants​-a​-de​-americanized​ -world. 64.  “China Issues Report on U.S. Human Rights,” Xinhua, April 14, 2016, http://​news​ .xinhuanet​.com/​english/​2016​-04/​14/​c​_135278381​.htm. 65.  Shogo Suzuki, “Journey to the West: China Debates Its ‘Great Power’ Identity,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42, no. 3 (2014): 632 – 650. 66.  Senior Chinese scholar, interview by the author, Tianjin, July 2010. 67.  Lieberthal and Wang, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust.” 68.  Suisheng Zhao, “The China Model: Can It Replace the Western Model of Modernization?” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 419 –436. 69.  Of course, I do not argue that China is unique in having a signaling problem because of multiple audiences. This book merely discusses the Chinese context.

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70.  For an analysis, see Zhang Qingmin, “Zhongguo duiwaiguanli de guoneiguanli he neiwai tongchou” [Domestic administration and intermestic coordination of Chinese foreign relations: Domestic factors and Chinese foreign policy], Shijie jinji yu zengzhi [World economics and politics], no. 8 (2013): 117–138.

chapter 4  Domestic Audience, Nationalism, and Weapons of Mass Consumption 1.  Ronald O’Rourke, “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report RL33153, May 31, 2016, p. 18, https://​news​.usni​.org/​wp​-content/​uploads/​2016/​06/​ RL33153​.pdf; Andrew S. Erickson, Abraham M. Denmark, and Gabriel Collins, “Beijing’s ‘Starter Carrier’ and Future Steps: Alternatives and Implications,” Naval War College Review 65, no. 1 (2012): 15 –54. 2.  Wenfang Tang, Populist Authoritarianism: Chinese Political Culture and Regime Sustainability (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 3.  Zheng Wang, “National Humiliation, History Education, and the Politics of Historical Memory: Patriotic Education Campaign in China,” International Studies Quarterly 52, no. 4 (2008): 783 – 806; Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 4.  Andrew Erickson, “Missile March: China Parade Projects Patriotism at Home, Aims for Awe Abroad,” Wall Street Journal, September 3, 2015, http://​blogs​.wsj​.com/​ chinarealtime/​2015/​09/​03/​missile​-march​-china​-parade​-projects​-patriotism​-at​-home​-aims​ -for​-awe​-abroad/. 5.  “Xi Jinping Pledges ‘Great Renewal of Chinese Nation,’” Xinhua, November 30, 2012, http://​www​.china​.org​.cn/​china/​2012​-11/​30/​content​_27269821​_3​.htm. 6.  Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy,” International Security 34, no. 4 (2010): 63 –95. 7.  This chapter examines signaling of higher status, not lower status. Great powers can signal a lower status through strategic spinning. For more discussion on signaling lower status, see Chapter 6. 8.  Helga Dittmar, The Social Psychology of Material Possessions: To Have Is to Be (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992). 9.  I do not claim that an emphasis on the status motivation is unique to me. Actually, many studies indicate that status has been an important motivation for weapons programs. For instance, see Mark C. Suchman and Dana P. Eyre, “Military Procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation,” Sociological Forum 7 (1992): 137–161; and Fiona Cunningham, “The Stellar Status Symbol: True Motives for China’s Manned Space Program,” China Security 15, no. 3 (2009): 71– 86. 10.  This chapter also is a plausibility probe to determine whether more intensive and laborious testing is warranted. See Alexander George, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 75. 11.  Thanks go to Yong Deng for pointing this out. 12.  Thanks go to Andrew Erickson for pointing this out. 13.  Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-ship Ballistic Missile Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategies (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2013). 14.  The launch was in 2012, but the project started much earlier.

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15.  Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 16.  See, for instance, Suchman and Eyre, “Military Procurement as Rational Myth”; and Cunningham, “The Stellar Status Symbol.” 17.  Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427–460. 18.  This is a modified diversionary-war argument. See Anne-Marie Brady, “The Beijing Olympics as a Campaign of Mass Distraction,” China Quarterly 197 (March 2009): 1–24. 19.  Robert H. Frank, Luxury Fever: Why Money Fails to Satisfy in an Era of Excess (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 140. 20.  Alan Hamlin and Colin Jennings, “Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications,” British Journal of Political Science 41, no. 3 (2011): 645 – 670; Alexander A. Schuessler, A Logic of Expressive Choice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000). 21.  Cunningham, “The Stellar Status Symbol.” 22.  David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29, no. 3 (2004): 64 –99; Xiao Ren, “China as an Institution-Builder: The Case of the AIIB,” Pacific Review 29, no. 3 (2016): 435 –442. 23.  Victor D. Cha, Beyond the Final Score: The Politics of Sport in Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009). 24.  Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214. 25.  Larson and Shevchenko, “Status Seekers.” 26.  Thomas U. Berger, “Norms, Identity, and National Security in Germany and Japan,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 317–356. 27.  Bijian Zheng, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): 18 –24. 28.  Young Jee Han, Joseph C. Nunes, and Xavier Drèze, “Signaling Status with Luxury Goods: The Role of Brand Prominence,” Journal of Marketing 74 ( July 2010): 5 –30. 29.  Michael Mandelbaum, The Frugal Superpower: America’s Global Leadership in a CashStrapped Era (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), 8. 30.  For a discussion of great powers as “parvenu powers,” see Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 539. 31.  “India’s Mega Defense Deals to Reach $100 Billion by Next Decade,” SiliconIndia News, May 13, 2011, https://​www​.siliconindia​.com/​shownews/​Indias​_mega​_defense​ _deals​_to​_reach​_100​_Billion​_by​_next​_decade​-nid​-83485​-cid​-3​.html. 32.  Cunningham, “The Stellar Status Symbol.” 33.  See David M. Lampton, The Three Faces of Chinese Power: Might, Money, and Minds (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008). 34.  M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s Search for Military Power,” Washington Quarterly 31, no. 3 (2008): 125 –141. 35.  “Zhongyang junwei yinfa ‘guanyu shenhua guofang he jundui gaige de yijian’ [Central Military Commission releases the “Guidelines on Deepening Defense and Military Reform”], Xinhua, January 1, 2016, http://​www​.xinhuanet​.com/​mil/​2016​-01/​01/​c​ _128588498​.htm.

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36.  Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” speech delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Beijing, October 18, 2017, http://​www​.xinhuanet​.com/​english/​ download/​Xi​_Jinping​%27s​_report​_at​_19th​_CPC​_National​_Congress​.pdf. 37.  Xiaoyu Pu and Randall Schweller, “Status Signaling, Multiple Audiences, and China’s Blue-Water Naval Ambition,” in Status in World Politics, ed. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 141–162. 38.  Qiang Xin, “Extended Horizon: China’s Blue-Water Navy Ambition and Its Implications,” in The People’s Republic of China Today: Internal and External Challenges, ed. Zhiqun Zhu (Singapore: World Scientific, 2011), 385 –404. 39.  Ronald O’Rourke, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service Office, 2011), 24; Erickson, Denmark, and Collins, “Beijing’s ‘Starter Carrier.’” 40.  Chris Buckley, “China, Sending a Signal, Launches a Home-Built Aircraft Carrier,” New York Times, April 25, 2017, https://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2017/​04/​25/​world/​asia/​ china​-aircraft​-carrier​.html. 41.  Minnie Chan, “China Has Started Building Its Third Aircraft Carrier, Military Sources Say,” South China Morning Post, January 4, 2018, http://​www​.scmp​.com/​news/​ china/​d iplomacy​-defence/​article/​2126883/​china​-has​-started​-building​-its​-third​-aircraft​ -carrier. 42.  Nan Li, “The Evolution of China’s Naval Strategy and Capabilities: From ‘Near Coast’ and ‘Near Seas’ to ‘Far Seas,’” Asian Security 5, no. 2 (2009): 144 –169; Andrew S. Erickson, “Doctrinal Sea Change, Making Real Waves: Examining the Naval Dimension of Strategy,” in China’s Evolving Military Strategy, ed. Joe McReynolds (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2016), 99 –132. 43.  Andrew Scobell, Michael McMahon, and Cortez A. Cooper III, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Program: Drivers, Developments, Implications,” Naval War College Review 68, no. 4 (2015): 64 – 80. 44.  Robert S. Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response,” International Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 46 – 81. 45.  Michael A. Glosny, Phillip C. Saunders, and Robert S. Ross, “Debating China’s Naval Nationalism,” International Security 35, no. 2 (2010): 161–175. 46.  Pu and Schweller, “Status Signaling, Multiple Audiences, and China’s Blue-Water Naval Ambition,” 154. 47.  Charles L. Glaser, “When Are Arms Races Dangerous?” International Security 28, no. 4 (2004): 44 – 84. 48.  Nan Li and Christopher Weuve, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambition: An Update,” Naval War College Review 63, no. 1 (2010): 13 –31. 49.  Liu Huaqing, Liu Huaqing huiyilu [The memoir of Liu Huaqing] (Beijing: PLA Press, 2007), 478. 50.  M. Taylor Fravel, “Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China’s Compromises in Territorial Disputes,” International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 46 – 83. 51.  But, of course, a war with Taiwan is not very likely to happen. China’s purpose is to deter Taiwan’s independence rather than really fighting a war over Taiwan.

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52.  Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” International Security 25, no. 4 (2001): 5 –40. 53.  Michael C. Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 66. 54.  David Ignatius, “The Future of Warfare,” Washington Post, January 2, 2011, p. A15. 55.  These nine countries are Brazil, France, India, Italy, Russia, Spain, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The United States operates eleven carriers. See Horowitz, The Diffusion of Military Power, 78 – 80. 56.  “Aircraft Carrier Nearly Restored, Report Says,” China.org, January 22, 2011, http://​china​.org​.cn/​wap/​2011​-01/​22/​content​_21797573​.htm. 57.  Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism.” 58.  Paul M. Kennedy, “The Rise and Fall of Navies,” New York Times, April 5, 2007, http://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2007/​04/​05/​opinion/​05iht​-edkennedy​.1​.5158064​.html. For an analysis of the Ming dynasty case from a theoretical perspective, see Paul Musgrave and Daniel H. Nexon, “Defending Hierarchy from the Moon to the Indian Ocean: Symbolic Capital and Political Dominance in Early Modern China and the Cold War,” International Organization, May 10, 2018, https://​www​.cambridge​.org/​core/​journals/​ international​-organization/​article/​defending​-hierarchy​-from​-the​-moon​-to​-the​-indian​ -ocean​-symbolic​-capital​-and​-political​-dominance​-in​-early​-modern​-china​-and​-the​-cold​ -war/​1A48863DA2EE573CA0899DF939CCEE1D/​core​-reader. 59.  “China to ‘Seriously Consider’ Building Aircraft Carrier,” China Daily, December 23, 2008, https://​www​.chinadaily​.com​.cn/​china/​2008​-12/​23/​content​_7332411​.htm. 60.  For instance, Britain’s naval rise and fall was closely bound to its economic growth cycles. See Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Ashfield Press, 1976). 61.  Pu and Schweller, “Status Signaling, Multiple Audiences, and China’s Blue-Water Naval Ambition,” 155 –159. 62.  Michelle Murray, “Identity, Insecurity, and Great Power Politics: The Tragedy of German Naval Ambition Before the First World War,” Security Studies 19, no. 4 (2010): 656 – 688. 63.  Scobell, McMahon, and Cooper, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Program,” 73. 64.  James Mulvenon, “Chairman Hu and the PLA’s ‘New Historic Missions,’” China Leadership Monitor 27 (2009): 5. 65.  Wang Jisi, “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 68 –79. 66.  For more analysis of the strategic values of China’s aircraft carrier project, see Erickson, Denmark, and Collins, “Beijing’s ‘Starter Carrier.’” 67.  Buckley, “China, Sending a Signal.” 68.  Howard W. French. Everything Under the Heavens: How the Past Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power (New York: Knopf, 2017), 7– 8. 69.  Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 5 (1996): 46. 70.  “China Sets Holiday to Mark 70th Anniversary of Japan Defeat,” Bloomberg, May 12, 2015, http://​www​.bloomberg​.com/​news/​articles/​2015​-05​-13/​china​-sets​-sept​-3​ -holiday​-to​-mark​-anniversary​-of​-japan​-s​-defeat. 71.  Zheng Wang, “How Foreign Analysis of China’s Military Parade Missed the Point,” The Diplomat, September 10, 2015, http://​thediplomat​.com/​2015/​09/​how​-foreign​ -analysis​-of​-chinas​-military​-parade​-missed​-the​-point/.

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72.  Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reform in the Age of Xi Jinping: Drivers, Challenges, and Implications (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2017), http://​inss​.ndu​.edu/​Portals/​68/​Documents/​s tratperspective/​china/​ ChinaPerspectives​-10​.pdf. 73.  Cheng Li, Chinese Politics in the Xi Jinping Era: Reassessing Collective Leadership (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2016), 370. 74.  Wang Jian, “Liande shi duilie, zhu de shi junhun” [Practicing parade, enhancing military morale], People’s Daily, August 30, 2015, http://​military​.people​.com​.cn/​n /​2015/​ 0830/​c1011​-27531473​.html. 75.  Wuthnow and Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms. 76.  Yufan Huang, “Cheers and Jeers as Students Watch Victory Day Parade,” New York Times, September 3, 2015, https://​www​.nytimes​.com/​live/​china​-military​-parade/. 77.  Kiki Zhao, “Now Taboo on Taobao: Searching for Peng’s Red Dress,” New York Times, September 3, 2015, https://​www​.nytimes​.com/​live/​china​-military​-parade/. 78.  Xi Jinping, “Address at the Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-fascist War,” China Daily, September 3, 2015, http://​www​.chinadaily​.com​.cn/​ world/​2015victoryanniv/​2015​-09/​03/​content​_21783362​.htm. 79.  “China Moves to Ensure Clean Air for Military Parade,” Xinhua, August 17, 2015, http://​news​.xinhuanet​.com/​english/​2015​-08/​17/​c​_134527293​.htm. 80.  Erickson, “Missile March.” 81.  Ibid. 82.  Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 62 – 67; Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167–214. 83.  The struggle for status is sometimes competitive, however, and attempts to increase status by a rising power may be met by the hegemon in a way that maintains the original hierarchy. This would be costly for both the rising power and the hegemon. 84.  William C. Wohlforth, “Status Dilemmas and Inter-state Conflict,” in Status in World Politics, ed. T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wohlforth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 115 –140. 85.  For instance, China’s assertive regional policy has encountered some backlash from its neighbors. See Philip Bowring, “China’s Troubled Neighbors,” New York Times, June 7, 2011, https://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2011/​06/​08/​opinion/​08iht​-edbowring08​.html. 86.  Asia in 2012, for the first time, spent more on weapons than Europe. See Sam Brothers and Joshua Archer, “How Dependent Are East Asian States on Arms Imports?” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 16, 2013, https://​www​.cogitasia​.com/​ how​-dependent​-are​-east​-asian​-states​-on​-arms​-imports/. 87.  David A. Lake, “Domination, Authority, and the Forms of Chinese Power,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 10, no. 4 (2017): 357 –382. While Lake concludes that status and authority are mutually exclusive, I argue that authority is a special case of status. 88.  Xuetong Yan, “The Instability of China-US Relations,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 3 (2010): 263 –292; John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (2010): 381–396. 89.  Aaron L. Friedberg, “China’s Challenge at Sea,” New York Times, September 5, 2011, p. A19; Aaron L. Friedberg, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics,” National Interest, no. 114 (2011): 18 –27.

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90.  Ross, “China’s Naval Nationalism,” 78 (emphasis in original). 91.  Ibid., 46. 92.  For an earlier theoretically informed debate, see Peter Hays Gries and Thomas J. Christensen, “Power and Resolve in U.S. China Policy,” International Security 26, no. 2 (2001): 155 –165. 93.  “Gates: Chinese Military Expanding, Not Threat to U.S.,” CNN, June 2, 2011, http://​www​.cnn​.com/​2011/​US/​06/​02/​china​.military/​index​.html. 94.  Scobell, McMahon, and Cooper, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Program,” 77. 95.  Erickson, Denmark, and Collins, “Beijing’s ‘Starter Carrier,’” 50. Other naval experts also believe that China’s aircraft carriers could provide opportunities for Sino-American maritime cooperation; see Li and Weuve, “China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions,” 28. 96.  Robert D. Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power (New York: Random House, 2010), 291. 97.  “Xi Jinping: Tuidong quanqiuzhili jizhi gengjia gongzheng gengjia heli” [Xi Jinping: Promoting a more just and more reasonable global governance mechanism], Xinhua, October 13, 2015, http://​news​.xinhuanet​.com/​politics/​2015​-10/​13/​c_​ 1116812159​.htm. 98.  Ibid. 99.  For the case of India and China, see William Antholis, Inside Out India and China: Local Politics Go Global (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013).

chapter 5  Red Mask and White Mask 1.  Xi Jinping, “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation,” speech delivered at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, Shanghai, China, May 21, 2014, http://​www​.fmprc​ .gov​.cn/​mfa​_eng/​zxxx​_662805/​t1159951​.shtml. 2.  For a cautiously optimistic view, see Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York: W. W. Norton, 2015). For a summary of a more pessimistic view, see Harry Harding, “Has U.S. China Policy Failed?” Washington Quarterly 38, no. 3 (2015): 95 –122. 3.  For a strategy that’s more competitive, see Robert D. Black and Ashley J. Tellis, Revising US Grand Strategy Toward China (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015). For a more accommodating strategy, see Charles L. Glaser, “A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice Between Military Competition and Accommodation,” International Security 39, no. 4 (2015): 49 – 90; and Lyle J. Goldstein, Meeting China Halfway (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2015). 4.  Franz-Stefan Gady, “US Admiral: ‘China Seeks Hegemony in East Asia,’” The Diplomat, February 25, 2016, http://​thediplomat​.com/​2016/​02/​us​-admiral​-china​-seeks​ -hegemony​-in​-east​-asia/. 5.  William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 28 –57. 6.  Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy,” International Security 34, no. 4 (2010): 63 –95. 7.  A great power or a hegemonic power might see its policies as being benign, while small powers might see the same policies differently. 8.  For instance, see Barry Buzan, “The Logic and Contradictions of ‘Peaceful Rise/ Development’ as China’s Grand Strategy,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 4

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(2014): 381–420; and Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 44 (2014): 1–43. 9.  Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security 37, no. 4 (2013): 7–48; Dingding Chen, Xiaoyu Pu, and Alastair Iain Johnston, “Debating China’s Assertiveness,” International Security 38, no. 3 (2013 –2014): 176 –183. 10.  Aaron L. Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry,” International Security 18, no. 3 (1993): 5. 11.  Richard K. Betts, “Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States After the Cold War,” International Security 18, no. 3 (1993 –1994): 34 –77. 12.  John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001). 13.  For the distinctions among spontaneous order, imposed order, and negotiated order, see Oran R. Young, “Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 277–297. 14.  David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 57– 85; David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008). 15.  Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong.” For a counterargument, see Amitav Achaya, “Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future?” International Security 28, no. 3 (2003): 149 –164. 16.  Kuik Cheng-Chwee, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China,” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 30, no. 2 (2008): 159 –185. 17.  Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong.” For a comprehensive review of balance of power in East Asian order, see Steve Chan, “An Odd Thing Happened on the Way to Balancing: East Asian States’ Reactions to China’s Rise,” International Studies Review 12, no. 3 (2010): 387–412. Historically, China was a leading power in the East Asian order, but this pattern does not prevent regional actors from competing with or balancing China in the contemporary era. 18.  Kun Choi Jong and Moon Chung-in, “Understanding Northeast Asian Regional Dynamics: Inventory Checking and New Discourses on Power, Interest, and Identity,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 10, no. 2 (2010): 343 –372; T. J. Pempel, “More Pax, Less Americana in Asia,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 10, no. 3 (2010): 465 –490. 19.  Kang, China Rising. 20.  Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 5 –56; Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980 –2000 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007). 21.  Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 22.  G. John Ikenberry, “American Hegemony and East Asian Order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 58, no. 3 (2004): 354. 23.  Victor D. Cha, “Powerplay,” International Security 34, no. 3 (2009): 158 –196. 24.  Henry Kissinger, On China (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 472. 25.  Ibid., 505. 26.  I borrow phrasing from a well-known constructivist idea emphasizing the agency of nation-states in constructing reality in international politics. See Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425.

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27.  Xiao Ren, “China as an Institution-Builder: The Case of the AIIB,” Pacific Review 29, no. 3 (2016): 435 –442. 28.  Ibid. 29.  Xiaoyu Pu, “One Belt, One Road: Visions and Challenges of China’s Geoeconomic Strategy,” Mainland China Studies 59, no. 3 (2016): 111–132. 30.  Cecilia L. Ridgeway, “Status in Groups: The Importance of Motivations,” American Sociological Review 47, no. 1 (1982): 76 – 88; Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Kathy J. Kuipers, Elizabeth Heger Boyle, and Dawn T. Robinson, “How Do Status Beliefs Develop? The Role of Resources and Interactional Experiences,” American Sociological Review 63, no. 3 (1998): 331–350; Noah P. Mark, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and Cecilia L. Ridgeway, “Why Do Nominal Characteristics Acquire Status Value? A Minimal Explanation for Status Construction,” American Journal of Sociology 115, no. 3 (2009): 832 – 862. Signaling is not necessarily the only motive for donating to charity. Some people give anonymously, possibly motivated by moral sentiments rather than self-interested instrumental calculations. For the analysis of moral sentiments and human behaviors, see Robert H. Frank, Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions (New York: W. W. Norton, 1988), 43 –70. 31.  Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 30. 32.  Provision of regional public goods could be a useful approach to understanding the motives and mechanisms of Asian regionalism. See Fan Yongmin, “Cong guojigonggongcanping dao quyugonggongcanping” [From international public goods to regional public goods], Shijie jinji yu zengzhi [World economics and politics], no. 1 (2010): 143 –152. 33.  Robert W. Tucker, The Inequality of Nations (New York: Basic Books, 1977); Michael David Wallace, War and Rank Among Nations (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1973); Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War.” 34.  Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 34. 35.  Stefan A. Schirm, “Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (2010): 197–221. 36.  For an analysis of the guns versus butter trade-off, see Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, 19. 37.  Owen Guo, “Tabloid Editor and Ex-Diplomat Square Off over China’s Foreign Policy,” New York Times, April 8, 2016, http://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2016/​04/​09/​world/​ asia/​china​-global​-times​-editor​-foreign​-policy​.html. 38.  That the foreign policy process is complicated, with multiple factions and voices, is neither new nor unique to China. I merely suggest that conflicting facets of Chinese foreign policy might be useful to Beijing. 39.  Andrew Chubb, “Propaganda, Not Policy: Explaining the PLA’s ‘Hawkish Faction’ (Part One),” China Brief 13, no. 15 (2013), https://​jamestown​.org/​program/​propaganda​ -not​-policy​-explaining​-the​-plas​-hawkish​-faction​-part​-one. 40.  Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor Books, 1959). 41.  Chubb, “Propaganda, Not Policy.” 42.  Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). 43.  Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China’s Soft Power Is Transforming the World (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007). 44.  Bonnie S. Glaser and Deep Pal, “Is China’s Charm Offensive Dead?,” China Brief 14, no. 15 (2014), https://​jamestown​.org/​program/​is​-chinas​-charm​-offensive​-dead/.

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45.  Thomas G. Moore and Dixia Yang, “Empowered and Restrained: Chinese Foreign Policy in the Age of Economic Interdependence,” in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978 –2000, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 203. 46.  Moore and Yang, “Empowered and Restrained,” 209. 47.  Leong H. Liew, “The Role of China’s Bureaucracy in Its No-Devaluation Policy during the Asian Financial Crisis,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 4, no. 1 (2003): 61–76. 48.  According to China’s official account of the Asian financial crisis, China provided Thailand and other Asian countries “with over 4 billion US dollars in aid, within the framework of IMF or through bilateral channels.” See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Pro-active Policies by China in Response to Asian Financial Crisis,” http://​www​.fmprc​.gov​.cn/​mfa​_eng/​ziliao​_665539/​3602​_665543/​3604​_665547/​ t18037​.shtml. Part of China’s aid went through the International Monetary Fund framework. However, former premier Li Peng emphasized that China also provided aid directly to Thailand. See Li Peng, Shichang yu tiaokong: Li Peng jinji riji [Market and intervention: Economic diary of Li Peng] (Beijing: Xinhua Press, 2007), 1386. 49.  For analyses of the Asian Monetary Fund, see Yong Wook Lee, “Japan and the Asian Monetary Fund: An Identity-Intention Approach,” International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 2 (2006): 339 –366; and Phillip Y. Lipscy, “Japan’s Asian Monetary Fund Proposal,” Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 3, no. 1 (2003): 93 –104. 50.  Rosemary Foot, “Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State,” China Journal, no. 45 (2001): 1–19. 51.  David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29, no. 3 (2005): 64 –99. 52.  Michael D. Swaine, “Chinese Views and Commentary on Periphery Diplomacy,” China Leadership Monitor 44, no. 1 (2014): 1–43. 53.  For instance, see Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia,” International Security 32, no. 3 (2007): 113 –157. 54.  Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong.” Of course, given China’s assertive diplomacy, it is unclear if this pattern will continue. 55.  Senior scholar, discussion with the author, Shanghai, December 2011. 56.  Foot, “Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State.” 57.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, Zhongguo waijiao [China’s diplomacy] (Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 1999), 4. 58.  Jiang Zemin, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin (Beijing: People’s Press, 2006), 315, 481. 59.  For a classic study of strategic trade policy, see Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945). 60.  Robert Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 125 –153. 61.  Liew, “The Role of China’s Bureaucracy.” 62.  Yan Xuetong, “The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes,” Journal of Contemporary China 10, no. 26 (2001): 33 –39. 63.  Alastair Iain Johnston, “Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post–Cold War Period,” in Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War, ed. Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 261–318. 64.  Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive.

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65.  Jane Perlez, “In China’s Shadow, U.S. Courts Old Foe Vietnam,” New York Times, August 16, 2014, http://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2014/​08/​17/​world/​asia/​in​-chinas​-shadow​-us​ -courts​-old​-foe​-vietnam​.html. 66.  For more on these practices, see Paul H. B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller, ­China’s Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signaling and Its Implications for a SinoAmerican Military Confrontation (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2013), http://​www​.dtic​.mil/​dtic/​tr/​fulltext/​u2/​a584671​.pdf. 67.  Ibid.; see also Allen S. Whiting, “China’s Use of Force, 1950 –96, and Taiwan,” International Security 26, no. 2 (2001): 103 –131; and Andrew Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 68.  Chen, Pu, and Johnston, “Debating China’s Assertiveness.” 69.  “Xi Jinping: China to Further Friendly Relations with Neighboring Countries,” China Daily, October 26, 2013, http://​www​.chinadaily​.com​.cn/​china/​2013​-10/​26/​ content​_17060884​.htm. 70.  Edward Wong, “China’s Hard Line: ‘No Room for Compromise,’” New York Times, March 8, 2014, http://​www​.nytimes​.com/​2014/​03/​09/​world/​asia/​china​.html. 71.  “Fan Changlong: ‘Dissatisfied’ with Remarks by Chuck Hagel,” CCTV News, April 9, 2014, http://​www​.china​.org​.cn/​video/​2014​-04/​09/​content​_32045455​.htm. 72.  Alexander Vuving, “Did China Blink in the South China Sea?” National Interest, July 27, 2014, http://​nationalinterest​.org/​feature/​did​-china​-blink​-the​-south​-china​-sea​ -10956. 73.  Robert G. Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy Since the Cold War (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 72. 74.  Oriana Skylar Mastro, “Signaling and Military Provocation in Chinese National Security Strategy: A Closer Look at the Impeccable Incident,” Journal of Strategic Studies 34, no. 2 (2011): 219. 75.  Suisheng Zhao calls Chinese nationalism “pragmatic.” Suisheng Zhao, “China’s Pragmatic Nationalism: Is It Manageable?” Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (2005): 131–144. 76.  Suisheng Zhao, “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn,” Journal of Contemporary China 22, no. 82 (2013): 535; see also Robert S. Ross, “Chinese Nationalism and Its Discontents,” National Interest, no. 116 (2011): 45 –51. 77.  For an analysis of the complicated domestic factors in China’s new assertiveness, see Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 54 – 67. 78.  “The China-Philippine Banana War,” Asia Sentinel, June 6, 2012, https://​www​ .asiasentinel​.com/​society/​the​-china​-philippine​-banana​-war/. 79.  James Steinberg and Michael O’Hanlon, “Keep Hope Alive: How to Prevent U.S.Chinese Relations from Blowing Up,” Foreign Affairs 93 (2014): 116. 80.  This does not mean that domestic politics is not shaping China’s foreign policy; it just means that there is rational calculation behind China’s tough image. 81.  Kurt Campbell, “Trouble at Sea Reveals the New Shape of China’s Foreign Policy,” Financial Times, July 22, 2014, https://​www​.cnas​.org/​publications/​commentary/​trouble​-at​ -sea​-reveals​-the​-new​-shape​-of​-chinas​-foreign​-policy. 82.  Xuetong Yan, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 2 (2014): 153 –184.

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83.  David M. Lampton, “PacNet #63 — The US and China: Sliding from Engagement to Coercive Diplomacy,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 4, 2014, http://​csis​.org/​publication/​pacnet​-63​-us​-and​-china​-sliding​-engagement​-coercive​ -diplomacy. 84.  For the argument that status ambiguity will lead to conflict, see Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”; and Roger V. Gould, Collision of Wills: How Ambiguity About Social Rank Breeds Conflict (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

chapter 6  Lying Low or Striving for Achievement 1.  Zheng Bijian, “China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great-Power Status,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (2005): 19. 2.  Arvind Subramanian, “The Inevitable Superpower,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 5 (2011): 66 – 78; Arvind Subramanian, Eclipse: Living in the Shadow of China’s Economic Dominance (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2011). 3.  Former Chinese diplomat, interview by the author, Shanghai, August 2010. 4.  Wu Jiao and Zhang Yuwei, “China Will Focus on Peaceful Development: Wen,” China Daily, September 24, 2010, http://​www​.chinadaily​.com​.cn/​china/​2010WenUN/​ 2010​-09/​24/​content​_11340567​.htm. 5.  Isaac Stone Fish, “Is China Still a ‘Developing’ Country?” Foreign Policy, September 25, 2014, http://​foreignpolicy​.com/​2014/​09/​25/​is​-china​-still​-a​-developing​-country/. 6.  Xi Jinping, “Working Together to Forge a New Partnership of Win-Win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for Mankind,” speech delivered at the General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly, New York, ­September 28, 2015, http://​gadebate​.un​.org/​sites/​default/​files/​gastatements/​70/​70​_ZH​ _en​.pdf. 7.  Feng Zhang, “Rethinking China’s Grand Strategy: Beijing’s Evolving National Interests and Strategic Ideas in the Reform Era,” International Politics 49, no. 3 (2012): 318 –345. 8.  For a discussion of the incentives and reasons for expansion, see Randall Schweller, “Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory,” in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert Ross (New York: Routledge, 1999), 2 –7. 9.  Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999). 10.  Thomas J. Christensen, “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 90, no. 2 (2011): 54 – 67. 11.  Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Group of Two That Could Change the World,” Financial Times, January 13, 2009, https://​www​.ft​.com/​content/​d99369b8​-e178​-11dd​-afa0​ -0000779fd2ac. 12.  Some might argue that the motives for China to signal lower status are obvious. But even if we know that China’s rational motive is to shirk costs, it is still pertinent to investigate the specific mechanisms behind China’s signaling behaviors. Others might argue that if the bargaining is ultimately related to a cost-benefit analysis to gain privileges and to shirk costs, is that bargaining over international status? I argue that international status is an intervening variable and thus that status signaling could be complementary to some

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conventional bargaining model. Even if the ultimate purpose is for material interests, status signaling might still be a useful framework for understanding motivations and processes of Chinese foreign policy. 13.  David Greenberg, Republic of Spin: An Inside History of the American Presidency (New York: W. W. Norton, 2015), 7. 14.  Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (New York: Anchor Books, 1959). For a recent performativity turn in international relations theories, see Erik Ringmar, “Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order,” International Organization 66, no. 1 (2012): 1–25. 15.  Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 1. 16.  Ibid., 170. 17.  Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 379 –414; John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 18.  Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie, 16. 19.  Ibid., 17. 20.  Ibid. 21.  Greenberg, Republic of Spin, 4. 22.  “Bush Spins at the UN,” The Nation, September 23, 2004, https://​www​.thenation​ .com/​article/​bush​-spins​-un/. 23.  Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie. 24.  Yong Deng, China’s Struggle for Status: The Realignment of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 25.  Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie, 8. 26.  Ringmar, “Performing International Systems.” 27.  Robert Jervis, “Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images,” in Political Psychology, ed. Kristen Renwick Monroe (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2002), 298. 28.  Ibid., 300. 29.  Ibid., 301. 30.  Ibid. 31.  Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), 150. 32.  Ibid. 33.  Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 117. 34.  Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, “International Practices,” International Theory 3, no. 1 (2011): 1–36. 35.  Analyses of the costs of great power status are rare, and these studies are not systematically integrated into the study of great power behaviors. For an analysis of great power responsibilities, see Inis L. Claude, “The Common Defense and Great-Power Responsibilities,” Political Science Quarterly 101, no. 5 (1986): 719 –732; and Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 194 –222.

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36.  Stacie E. Goddard, “When Right Makes Might,” International Security 33, no. 3 (2008): 110 –142; Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” International Organization 54, no. 2 (2000): 325 –357; Rosemary Foot, “Chinese Strategies in a USHegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging,” International Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006): 77–94. 37.  William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 28 –57. 38.  For summaries of such a hegemonic strategy, see Christopher Layne, The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); and Barry R. Posen, and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy,” International Security 21, no. 3 (1996): 5 –53. 39.  William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security 24, no. 1 (1999): 5 –41. 40.  Jia Qingguo, “Peaceful Development: China’s Policy of Reassurance,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 4 (2005): 493 –507. 41.  Senior foreign policy analyst, discussion with the author, Beijing, August 2010. 42.  Andrew Kydd, “Trust, Reassurance, and Cooperation,” International Organization 54, no. 2 (2000): 325 –357. For application in a temporary case, see Thomas J. Christensen, “The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict,” Washington Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2002): 7–21. 43.  Bull, The Anarchical Society, 196. 44.  Ezra Vogel, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979). 45.  For analyses of solidarity in social and political contexts, see M. J. Hawkins, “Continuity and Change in Durkheim’s Theory of Social Solidarity,” Sociological Quarterly 20, no. 1 (1979): 155 –164; Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); and Kelly Rae Kraemer, “Solidarity in Action: Exploring the Work of Allies in Social Movements,” Peace and Change 32, no. 1 (2007): 20 –38. For the application of solidarity in international relations, see Martin Weber, “The Concept of Solidarity in the Study of World Politics: Towards a Critical Theoretic Understanding,” Review of International Studies 33, no. 4 (2007): 693 –713; and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of UN Reform,” American Journal of International Law 99, no. 3 (2005): 619 – 631. 46.  Stefan A. Schirm, “Leaders in Need of Followers: Emerging Powers in Global Governance,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 2 (2010): 197–221. 47.  Shaun Breslin, “China and the Crisis: Global Power, Domestic Caution and Local Initiative,” Contemporary Politics 17, no. 2 (2011): 185 –200. 48.  Nicholas R. Lardy, Sustaining China’s Economic Growth After the Global Financial Crisis (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2012). 49.  Pieter Bottelier, “China and the International Financial Crisis,” in Strategic Asia, 2009 –10: Economic Meltdown and Geopolitical Stability, ed. Ashley J. Tellis, Andrew Marble, and Travis Tanner (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009), 71–102. 50.  Breslin, “China and the Crisis.” 51.  Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang, “Lying Low No More? China’s New Thinking on the Tao Guang Yang Hui Strategy,” China: An International Journal 9, no. 2 (2011): 195 –216.

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52.  Roger Irvine, “Primacy and Responsibility: China’s Perception of Its International Future,” China Security 6, no. 3 (2010): 27. 53.  Ibid., 32. 54.  Deng, China’s Struggle for Status. 55.  Senior scholar and university leader, discussion with the author, Tianjin, July 2010. 56.  For a systematic study of China’s reassurance strategy, see Avery Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power’s Emerging Choice,” China Quarterly, no. 168 (2001): 835 – 864. 57.  Bonnie S. Glaser and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of Peaceful Rise?” China Quarterly, no. 190 (2007): 291–310. 58.  Robert Burns, “Chinese General: We’re No Match for U.S.,” Associated Press, May 18, 2011. 59.  “Q&A with Hu Jintao,” Wall Street Journal, January 18, 2011, http://​online​.wsj​ .com/​article/​SB10001424052748703551604576085514147521334​.html. 60.  “Premier Expresses China’s Sincerity at UN Climate Conference,” Xinhua, December 18, 2009, http://​www​.china​.org​.cn/​environment/​Copenhagen/​2009​-12/​18/​ content​_19094086​_4​.htm. 61.  Susan Shirk, China: A Fragile Superpower (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 62.  Hu Jian, Juese zheren chenzhaolujin: Zhongguo zai 21 shiji de jichuxin zhanluewenti [Role, responsibility and the path of growth: The fundamental strategic question of China in the twenty-first century] (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 2010), 144 –145. 63.  George T. Yu, “China’s Africa Policy: South-South Unity and Cooperation,” in China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic, ed. Lowell Dittmer and George T. Yu (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2010), 129. 64.  Gregory Chin and Ramesh Thakur, “Will China Change the Rules of Global Order?” Washington Quarterly 33, no. 4 (2010): 119 –138. 65.  China and other emerging economies had complained that their voting rights in the IMF were not compatible with their rising economic capabilities. In 2010, the IMF approved a reform package that would give emerging economies more voting rights. The Obama administration supported the reform package, but Republicans in Congress blocked it. In 2015, Congress finally approved this reform. As a result, China’s voting rights increased from 3.8 percent to 6 percent. See “IMF Reforms Clear Last Hurdle with US Adoption,” BBC News, December 19, 2015, https://​www​.bbc​.com/​news/​business​ -35141683. 66.  Li Mingjiang, “China Debates Soft Power,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 2 (2008): 287 –308; Sheng Ding, “To Build a ‘Harmonious World’: China’s Soft Power Wielding in the Global South,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 13, no. 2 (2008): 193 –213. 67.  Ted Piccone, “The Geopolitics of China’s Rise in Latin America,” Brookings Institution, November 2016, https://​www​.brookings​.edu/​research/​the​-geopolitics​-of​-chinas​ -rise​-in​-latin​-america/. 68.  Deng Xiaoping, “Shanyu liyongshiji jiejiefazhanwenti” [Seek opportunity to solve the problem of development], in Deng Xiaoping wenxuan [Selected works of Deng Xiao­ ping], 3rd ed. (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1993), 363.

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69.  Injoo Sohn, “After Renaissance: China’s Multilateral Offensive in the Developing World,” European Journal of International Relations 18, no. 1 (2012): 77–101. 70.  Oliver Stuenkel, Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2016). 71.  Xinbo Wu, “Understanding the Geopolitical Implications of the Global Financial Crisis,” Washington Quarterly 33, no. 4 (2010): 155 –163. 72.  Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” March 2012, p. 10, http://​www​.brookings​.edu/​~/​media/​research/​files/​papers/​2012/​3/​30​ -us​-china​-lieberthal/​0330​_china​_lieberthal​.pdf. 73.  Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century (New York: Basic Books, 2010). For some qualifications of the Beijing Consensus, see Scott Kennedy, “The Myth of the Beijing Consensus,” Journal of Contemporary China 19, no. 65 (2010): 461–477. 74.  Jamil Anderlini, “China Calls for New Reserve Currency,” Financial Times, March 23, 2009, https://​www​.ft​.com/​content/​7851925a​-17a2​-11de​-8c9d​-0000779fd2ac. 75.  The special drawing right (SDR) is an international reserve asset created by the IMF to supplement official reserves of member countries. The value of the SDR is based on a basket of several currencies. During the review concluded in November 2015, the IMF board decided that the Chinese renminbi met the criteria for inclusion in the SDR basket. Following this decision, the renminbi joined the US dollar, euro, Japanese yen, and British pound sterling in the SDR basket. See International Monetary Fund, “Special Drawing Right (SDR),” April 19, 2018, https://​www​.imf​.org/​en/​About/​Factsheets/​Sheets/​2016/​ 08/​01/​14/​51/​Special​-Drawing​-Right​-SDR. 76.  “China’s Influence Grows at World Bank,” China Daily, April 26, 2010, http://​ www​.chinadaily​.com​.cn/​china/​2010​-04/​26/​content​_9772218​.htm. 77.  International Monetary Fund, “IMF Quotas,” October 13, 2017, http://​www​.imf​ .org/​external/​np/​exr/​facts/​quotas​.htm. 78.  For the renminbi’s limitation, see Sebastian Mallaby and Olin Wethington, “The Future of the Yuan,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 1 (2012): 135 –146. For analysis of the strategic implications of China’s monetary reserve, see Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, “China’s Grand Strategy and Money Muscle: The Potentialities and Pratfalls of China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund and Renminbi Policies,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 4, no. 1 (2011): 31–53. 79.  See Paul Krugman, “China’s Dollar Trap,” New York Times, April 2, 2009, http://​ www​.nytimes​.com/​2009/​04/​03/​opinion/​03krugman​.html; and Yu Yongding, “Zhongguo shenxian meiyuan xianjing” [China is deeply trapped by US dollars], Di Yi Caijin Ribao, May 31, 2010, https://​finance​.qq​.com/​a /​20100531/​000939​.htm. Whether China will succeed in challenging the dominant status of the US dollar is debatable. For a systematic examination of the dollar’s status, see Eric Helleiner and Jonathan Kirshner, eds., The Future of the Dollar (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009). 80.  “Xi Jinping: China to Further Friendly Relations with Neighboring Countries,” China Daily, October 26, 2013, http://​www​.chinadaily​.com​.cn/​china/​2013​-10/​26/​ content​_17060884​.htm. 81.  For a summary in English of the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference of the Chinese Communist Party held in Beijing on November 29, 2014, see “China Eyes More Enabling Intl Environment for Peaceful Development,” China Daily, November 30, 2014, http://​www​.chinadaily​.com​.cn/​china/​2014​-11/​30/​content​_18998580​.htm. See also Christopher K. Johnson, “Xi Jinping Unveils His Foreign Policy Vision: Peace Through

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Strength,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2014, http://​csis​.org/​ files/​publication/​141208​_ThoughtsfromtheChairmanDEC2014​.pdf. 82.  Qin Yaqing, “Continuity Through Change: Background Knowledge and China’s International Strategy,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 3 (2014): 285.

chapter 7 Conclusion 1.  Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” speech delivered to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York, September 21, 2005, https://​2001​-2009​.state​.gov/​s /​d /​former/​zoellick/​rem/​53682​.htm. 2.  Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of US Decline,” International Security 36, no. 1 (2011): 41–72. 3.  Xi Jinping, “Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promote Global Growth,” speech delivered at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, Davos, Switzerland, January 17, 2017, https://​america​.cgtn​.com/​2017/​01/​17/​full​-text​-of​-xi​-jinping​ -keynote​-at​-the​-world​-economic​-forum. 4.  Xi Jinping, “Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind,” speech delivered at the UN Office at Geneva, January 18, 2017, http://​www​.xinhuanet​ .com/​english/​2017​-01/​19/​c​_135994707​.htm. 5.  Donald J. Trump, “The Inaugural Address,” January 20, 2017, https://​www​ .whitehouse​.gov/​inaugural​-address. 6.  Fareed Zakaria, “Trump Could Be the Best Thing That’s Happened to China in a Long Time,” Washington Post, January 12, 2017, https://​www​.washingtonpost​.com/​ opinions/​trump​-could​-be​-the​-best​-thing​-thats​-happened​-to​-china​-in​-a​-long​-time/​2017/​ 01/​12/​f4d71a3a​-d913​-11e6​-9a36​-1d296534b31e​_story​.html. 7.  Xiaoyu Pu, “China’s International Leadership: Regional Activism vs. Global Reluctance,” Chinese Political Science Review 3, no. 1 (2018): 48 – 61. 8.  Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 9.  For a take on conspicuous projects in international relations as being wasteful, see Lilach Gilady, “Conspicuous Waste in International Relations” (PhD diss., Yale University, 2006); and Lilach Gilady, The Price of Prestige: Conspicuous Consumption in International Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2018). 10.  My argument is similar to Alastair Iain Johnston’s “social influence” proposition; see Alastair Iain Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980 –2000 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 88. 11.  Ibid. 12.  Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to US Primacy,” International Security 34, no. 4 (2010): 63 –95. 13.  Oliver Stuenkel, Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2016), 120 –153. 14.  Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-First Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position,” International Security 40, no. 3 (2015 –2016): 7–53. 15.  Ja Ian Chong, “Popular Narratives Versus Chinese History: Implications for Understanding an Emergent China,” European Journal of International Relations 20, no. 4 (2014): 939 –964.

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16.  Yuan-Kang Wang, Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 17.  For an analysis of what China is not doing in the Xi Jinping era, see Jeffrey A. Bader, “A Framework for U.S. Policy Toward China,” Brookings Institution, March 2016, pp. 1–2, http://​www​.brookings​.edu/​~/​media/​research /​files/​papers/​2016/​03/​us​ -policy​-toward​-china​-framework​-bader/​us​-china​-policy​-framework​-bader​.pdf. 18.  Pu, “China’s International Leadership,” 60. 19.  Zhimin Chen, Guorong Zhou, and Shichen Wang, “Facilitative Leadership and China’s New Role in the World,” Chinese Political Science Review 3, no. 1 (2018): 10 –27. 20.  Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016, http://​www​ .theatlantic​.com/​magazine/​archive/​2016/​04/​the​-obama​-doctrine/​471525/. 21.  See, for example, Johnston, Social States. 22.  Xiaoyu Pu, “Socialisation as a Two-Way Process: Emerging Powers and the Diffusion of International Norms,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 5, no. 4 (2012): 341– 367. 23.  Paul K. MacDonald and Joseph M. Parent, “Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment,” International Security 35, no. 4 (2011): 7–44. 24.  William C. Wohlforth, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics 61, no. 1 (2009): 28 –57. 25.  James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, “Rationalism vs. Constructivism? A Skeptical View,” in Handbook of International Relations, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons (London: Sage, 2002), 52 –72. On the efforts to provide a rational explanation of cultural and symbolic phenomena, see Barry O’Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001); and Michael Suk-Young Chwe, Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). 26.  Robert Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). 27.  G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Constraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); Ayse Zarakol, After Defeat: How the East Learned to Live with the West (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 28.  Erving Goffman identified patterns of personal stigma, and his insights can be intuitively applied in international relations. See Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster/ Touchstone Books, 1986); and Lauren Rivera, “Managing ‘Spoiled’ National Identity: War, Tourism, and Memory in Croatia,” American Sociological Review 73 (2008): 613 – 634. 29.  Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, “Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics: Insights from Comparing Ancient China and Early Modern Europe,” International Organization 58, no. 1 (2004): 175 –205; David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 57– 85; Feng Zhang, Chinese Hegemony: Grand Strategy and International Institutions in East Asian History (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015). 30.  For instance, see Qin Yaqing, “International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 2 (2010): 129 –153; and Qin Yaqing, “Development of International Relations Theory in China: Progress Through Debates,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 11, no. 2 (2011): 231–

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257. For a skeptical view, see Chen Ching-Chang, “The Absence of Non-Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 11, no. 1 (2011): 1–23. 31.  Ann Florini, “Rising Asian Powers and Changing Global Governance,” International Studies Review 13, no. 1 (2011): 24 –33. 32.  For the traditional Sinologist approach on this issue, see John King Fairbank, The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). For a skeptical view, see Zhang Feng, “Rethinking the ‘Tribute System’: Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 4 (2009): 545 –574. 33.  John J. Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 4 (2010): 381–396. 34.  David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order,” International Security 29, no. 3 (2004): 94. In addition, for a critique of bold prediction in international relations, see Richard K. Herrmann and Jong Kun Choi, “From Prediction to Learning,” International Security 31, no. 4 (2007): 132 –161. 35.  Some scholars emphasize the peaceful nature of Chinese culture in international relations. See Huiyun Feng, Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership, and War (New York: Routledge, 2007); Huiyun Feng, “Is China a Revisionist Power?” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2, no. 3 (2009): 313 –334; and Yaqing Qin, “International Society as a Process: Institutions, Identities, and China’s Peaceful Rise,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 3, no. 2 (2010): 129 –153. Not all these scholars are necessarily advocating Chinese exceptionalism. For instance, while Qin emphasizes the positive implications of Chinese culture for international relations theorizing, he also acknowledges that we should be cautious of cultural parochialism and exceptionalism. See Yaqing Qin, A Relational Theory of World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 64. For the view that China’s peaceful culture is historically inaccurate, see Victoria Tin-bor Hui, “How China Was Ruled,” American Interest 4, no. 3 (2008): 53 – 65. For a more systematic critique on the myth of Chinese peaceful exceptionalism, see Yuan-kang Wang, Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 36.  Some scholars bring the Chinese cultural concept of guanxi, or relationality, into international relations theorizing in an interesting and meaningful way. See, for instance, Qin, A Relational Theory of World Politics; Emilian Kavalski, The Guanxi of Relational International Theory (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2018); Chih-yu Shih and Chiung-chiu Huang, “China’s Quest for Grand Strategy: Power, National Interest, or Relational Security?” Chinese Journal of International Politics 8, no. 1 (2014): 1–26. 37.  For a discussion of the relationship between regional expertise and international relations theorizing, see Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 247–248; Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), xi–xii; and Alastair Iain Johnston, “What (If Anything) Does East Asia Tell Us About International Relations Theory?” Annual Review of Political Science 15 (2012): 53 –78. 38.  For instance, Alastair Iain Johnston makes an important clarification about his first book, Cultural Realism: “Contrary to many readings of the book, it did not make an essentializing argument about a Chinese strategic culture across time. It was emphatically

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not an argument about an inherent collective personality of the Chinese people. Rather, it made an argument about the socialization of Chinese decision makers in particular periods of time into a hard realpolitik strategic culture.” Johnston, Social States, xviii. 39.  Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (New York: Pantheon Books, 1967), 44 –45.

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Index

Aircraft carrier projects, 42, 51, 53, 54, 57– 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69 Allison, Graham, 8 ASEAN+1, 78 ASEAN+3, 78 Asian financial crisis, China’s response to, 77–79 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 54, 74 –75, 96 Asian Monetary Fund, 77, 135n49 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 43, 78 Assertive diplomacy, 71, 86, 88, 96 –98, 103, 111n26 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 43, 74, 80 Audience: in global South, 45 –47; in the West, 47–49 Beijing Olympic Games (2008), 2, 34, 52, 54 –55, 88 Belt Road Initiative, 1–2 Benign leadership, 71, 77 Betts, Richard, 71 Bourdieu, Pierre, 23 Brazil, status signaling of, 13 BRICS countries, 38, 39, 124n23 Britain, assessing relative power position of, 5 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 87 Budangtou (avoid taking a leadership role), 47 Bull, Hedley, 91

Bush, George W., 88 Buzan, Barry, 28 Cai Tuo, 5 Callahan, William A., 9 –10, 43 CCP (Chinese Communist Party). See Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Century of humiliation, 41, 42, 49, 51, 52, 68 Charity: motives for donating to, 120n60, 134n30; signaling explanation for, 120n59 Charm offensive diplomacy, 14, 77, 78, 84, 97 Chaxugeju (differential mode of association), 31 Cheap talk, 20, 89, 90, 118n30 Chen Bingde, 93 Cheng Li, 61 Chen Jining, 63 Chiang Kai-shek, 41 China: advanced weapons systems of, 55 –56; as ambivalent about superpower status, 100; audience of, in global South, 45 –47; audience of, in the West, 47–49; as deeply conflicted, 6; as developed country, 6, 11; as developing country, 3, 4, 6, 11, 38, 46, 86, 89, 94, 95, 102, 126n61; development goal for, 6; domestic audience of (see domestic audience); and East Asian order, 71–74; as emerging superpower/rising power, 3, 4, 38, 39, 89, 92, 95, 100, 102; as free rider, 3, 86, 87, 110n21; international

148

Index

China (continued ) audiences of, 56; international leadership role of, 104; international status of, as relatively secure, 102; as largest foreign reserve holder, 97; mixed signals of, 7; motives of, to signal lower status, 137– 138n12; multiple identities of, 37–40; as obsessed with image building, 34; as pursuing more active global diplomacy, 99; regional audience of, 43 –45; response of, in global financial crisis (2008), 92 –96; and rivalry with United States, 70; as sending contradictory status signals, 100; as spin doctor, 88 –90; as striving for achievement, 97–98; as strong abroad but fragile at home, 94; studies of image building by, 35 –37; and Taiwan, 129n51; as world’s second-largest economy, 94, 97; on world stage, 34 –50 The China Challenge (Christensen), 9 China National Social Sciences Database, 38 China-Vietnam war (1979), 81 Chinese Communist Party (CCP), 35, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42 –43, 48, 51, 52, 56, 59, 60, 61 Chinese Dream, 41, 45, 52, 103 Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, military parade in commemoration of, 51–52 Christensen, Thomas J., 9, 60 – 61 Club goods, 26, 30 Coercive diplomacy, 20, 40, 80 – 83 Cold War, 28, 46, 55, 65 Competition as strategy for enhancing international status, 52 Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (2014), 70 Confucius Institutes, 35 Conspicuous consumption: applying economic concept of, 119n49; Beijing Olympics and fashionable skyscrapers as evidence of, 52, 54; as causal driver in military affairs, 53; individuals defining themselves through, 52; as political game in international politics, 53 –54; purposes of, 54; role of, in status signaling, 29 –30; Shanghai Expo as evidence of, 54; as status signaling, 55 –56, 101; as strategy for demonstrating status on world stage, 27, 28 Conspicuous giving: compared to public goods provision, 120n61; as status signaling, 27, 30 –31, 74 –75, 101

Conspicuous projects, 42, 51, 52, 61, 67 Counterfeit brands, 24, 28, 29, 120n62 Cui Tiankai, 3 Cultural Revolution, 42 Defensive assertiveness, 81 Defensive realism, 22, 55, 58, 118 –119n36 Deng, Yong, 9, 13 Deng Xiaoping, 1, 4, 39, 41, 47, 48, 61, 92, 95, 103, 104 Destined for War (Allison), 8 DF-21D weapon, 63 Dingwei (positioning), 5 Diplomatic art of theater, 2, 3 Dittmer, Lowell, 47 Dollar (US), status/role of, 1, 93, 96, 97, 141n79 Domestic audience, 11, 14, 21, 27, 28, 33, 37, 40 –43, 45, 49 –50, 51– 67, 75, 82, 89, 102, 103 Domestic insecurity, role of in status signal­ ing, 29 Domestic politics as factor in status signaling, 27, 28 Dramaturgical framework/perspective, 19, 36, 117–118n23, 117n22 Duiwai xuanchuan (foreign propaganda), 35 East Asia: China’s goal in, 71; order in, 71– 74; United States’ goal in, 71 East Asia Summit, 43 Economic interest, 46 Elite club membership, 122n99 Emulation as strategy for enhancing interna­ tional status, 52 Equal sovereignty, principle of, 17 Experience China (video), 47 Fan Changlong, 81– 82 Fearon, James, 20, 24 Fei Xiaotong, 30 –31, 122n100 Fenfa youwei (striving for achievement), 96 Financial crisis: Asian, 77–79; global (see Global financial crisis (2008)) Foreign Affairs, 86 Foreign policy: complexity of process of, 6; as debating trade-off between status and responsibility, 87; in Xi Jinping era, 1–2, 4, 103 –105 Frank, Robert, 23, 119 –120n52 Free rider, China as, 3, 86, 87, 110n21

Index Friedberg, Aaron, 71 Fuqiang (wealth and power), 41 Fuzerendaguo (responsible power), 78 Gates, Robert, 66 Germany, 55 Gilpin, Robert, 18, 75 Global financial crisis (2008), 7, 11, 13, 14, 48, 82, 87, 91, 92 –96, 97, 135n48 Global South, audience in, 45 –47 Global Times, 76 Goffman, Erving, 36 –37, 76, 117–118n23, 123 –124n13, 143n28 Goldman Sachs, 38 Great Leap Forward, 42 Great power peace, 26, 121n75 Great power responsibilities, 138n35 Great powers, defined, 91 Greenberg, David, 88 Group of Eight, 7, 126n62 Group of Seven, 30, 47, 95, 126n62 Group of Twenty, 95 Group of Two, 7, 39, 87, 97 Guangxi (relationality), 144n36 Guo Boxiong, 62 Hagel, Charles, 81 Hardin, Garrett, 27 Harris, Harry, 2, 70 Heping fazhan (peaceful development), 93 Heping jueqi (peaceful rise), 93 Hierarchy in international relations, 116 – 117n8 Hirsch, Fred, 23, 119 –120n52 Hu Jintao, 47, 60, 61, 93 Human rights practices, 48, 88 Hu Xijin, 76 Identity politics, instrumental motivations of, 115n85 Ikenberry, John, 72 –73 Image building, 34 –37, 113 –114n60 Image management, 8, 113 –114n60 Impeccable (ship), 82 Impression management, 8, 113 –114n60, 117n22 India: advanced weapons systems of, 55; status signaling of, 13 Informative behaviors, types of, 90 International Comparison Program (World Bank), 3

149

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1, 74, 77, 95, 97, 103, 140n65, 141n75 International relations: hierarchy in, 116 – 117n8; peaceful nature of Chinese culture in, 144n35; and regional expertise, 144n37; status in, 16 –19, 117n12; status markers and social influence in, 117n18; status signaling in, 16 –32 Japan: deemphasizing of military instruments by, 55; relationship of China with, 79; as rising power, 91; status struggle of, 5 Jervis, Robert, 16, 36, 90, 106, 117–118n23 Jiang Zemin, 61, 78 –79 Jichu (the foundation), 45 Johnston, Alastair Iain, 80 The Joyless Economy (Scitovsky), 26 Juebu dangtou (should never seek a leadership position), 95 Jueqi guo (rising power), 38 Junshi zhanlue fangzhen (military strategic guidelines), 60 Kaplan, Robert, 67 Kindleberger, Charles, 113n58 Kindleberger trap, 8 Korean War (1950), 81 Lake, David, 18 Lebow, Richard Ned, 29, 115n85 Lee Kuan Yew, 2 –3 Liangge daju (two major games), 50 Liang Guanglie, 59 Liaoning, 42, 51 Lin Zexu, 41 Liu Huaqing, 58 Liu Mingfu, 2 The Logic of Images in International Relations ( Jervis), 16, 106 logic of positionality, 5, 112n40 Low-profile approach to foreign policy, 1, 4, 47, 84, 87, 92, 93, 94, 96, 98, 103, 104 Luo Yuan, 36 Lying, 31, 88, 89, 122n104 Mao Zedong, 35, 41, 46, 48, 61, 88 Maritime claims, 2, 14, 82 Maritime disputes, 82, 103 Material resources: propensity to seek status as correlated with, 55; role of, in status signaling, 29

150

Index

Ma Zhengang, 92 Mearsheimer, John, 71, 88 – 89 Military affairs, conspicuous consumption as causal driver in, 53 Military modernization of China, 42, 51, 56, 57, 58, 59, 64, 66 – 67 Military parades, 13, 14, 51, 53, 61– 64, 66, 68 Miller, Manjari Chatterjee, 3 Mixed signals, China as sending, 7 Monument to the People’s Heroes, 41, 42 Mo Yan, 51 Multiple audiences in status signaling, 28 Multiple identities of China, 6, 14, 35, 37–40, 124n16 National Bureau of Statistics, 3 Nationalism, 10, 27, 40, 41, 42, 49, 53, 60, 82 – 83, 84. See also Naval nationalism Natural resources, 46 Naval modernization in China, 56 – 61 Naval nationalism, 58, 65 New Development Bank, 96 Nye, Joseph, 8, 35 Obama, Barack, 3, 86, 105 Offensive assertiveness, 81, 84 Offensive realism, 11, 22, 55, 71, 114 –115n75 Peng Liyuan, 62 People’s Daily, 61 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 61, 62, 63 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), 57 Pillsbury, Michael, 2 Positional goods, 4, 23, 30, 64, 111n25, 119n49, 119 –120n52 Possible selves thesis, 32 Power transition theory, 6, 7, 11, 16, 17, 22, 33, 49, 101, 102, 113n46, 114 –115n75, 116n1 Preferred status, 2, 3, 9, 14, 23, 30, 33, 64, 74 –75, 100, 101, 102, 105, 119 –120n52 Provision of regional public goods, 134n32 Purchasing power parity (PPP), 3, 115n87 Qin Yaqing, 93, 98 Rebranding, use of term, 6 Red mask, 76 – 80 Regional audience, 13, 43 –45, 50, 56, 65, 68, 76 Regional diplomacy, two faces of, 71–72, 75 –76

Renminbi: China’s decision not to devalue, 77, 83; internationalization of, 1, 97, 141n75; limitation of, 141n78; role of, 93 Repositioning as rebranding strategy, 5, 6 Rising power: China as, 3, 4, 38, 39, 89, 91, 100, 102; as having multiple mechanisms for signaling preferred status, 101; incen­ tives of, to signal low status, 90 –92; as not always maximizing status, 100; shirking strategy of, 115n80 Ross, Robert, 57, 65 Russia, perceptions of honor of, 5 Schelling, Thomas, 90 Scitovsky, Tibor, 26 SDR (special drawing right), 96, 141n75 Segal, Gerald, 2 Shambaugh, David, 37 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 54 Shanghai Expo, 2, 34, 54 Shaper nations, national strategy of, 5 Shinzo Abe, 63 Signaling: as communicative action, 89; distinction between costly signals and cheap talk, 90; as explanation for charity, 120n59; importance of, in strategic interactions, 20; models of, 19 –20, 101; rationalist signaling models, 22. See also Status signaling Sino-Indian border dispute (1961–1962), 81 Sino-Japanese War, military parades commemorating, 61– 63 Sino-Soviet border dispute (1968 –1969), 81 Skyscrapers as evidence of conspicuous consumption, 52 Snyder, Jack, 27 Social creativity as strategy for enhancing international status, 52, 55, 123n110 Soft power, 6, 34, 35, 37, 42, 95, 104, 125n41 Solidarity in social and political contexts, 139n45 Soviet Union, status games of, 55 Special drawing right (SDR), 96, 141n75 Spin doctor, Beijing as, 88 –90 Spinning, 88; use of, 101 State Council Information Office, 35 Status: as compared to power, capability, and authority, 17–18; as fundamentally social and relational, 18; as important motivation for weapons programs, 127n9; in international relations, 16 –19, 117n12;

Index rising power signaling low status, 90 –92, 93 –94, 95; strategies for demonstrating of on world stage, 26 –27; as valued differently in different cultures, 18 –19 Status acquisition, 22 Status anxiety, 6, 18 Status discrepancy reversed, 12 Status insecurity, 6 Status over-recognition, 3, 6, 12 Status politics, 6, 7, 11, 12, 15, 52, 53, 74 Status seeking, 9, 12, 13, 105 Status signaling: China’s contested, 7–12; and China’s naval modernization, 56 – 61; conspicuous consumption as causal driver in, 55 –56; conspicuous giving as, 74 –75; as dealing with trade-off between enhanced status and increased responsibilities, 91; deception in, 120n62; different forms of, 89; as distinct from status acquisition, 22; domestic politics as factor in, 27, 28; in international relations, 16 –32; as multilevel game, 101–102; multiple audiences in, 28; as one model of signaling, 21–22; research on, 106, 107; role of, 4; role of conspicuous consumption in, 29 –30; role of conspicuous giving in, 31; role of domestic insecurity in, 29; role of material resources in, 29; typology and implications of, 23 –26, 119n46; and weapons of mass consumption, 53 –55 Status spinning, 32 Status struggle, 2, 9, 11, 12, 13, 100, 131n83 Strategic deception, 31, 93 Strategic spinning, 11, 13, 14, 25, 27, 31, 101 Sun Yat-sen, 41 Suzuki, Shogo, 10 Tang Jiaxuan, 93 Tao guang yang hui (low-profile approach), 1, 4, 47, 84, 87, 92, 93, 94, 96, 98, 103, 104 Territorial disputes, 44, 45, 60, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85 Thompson, Alexander, 21 Thucydides’s trap, 8, 39 Tiananmen Square protests, 36, 46, 60, 92 Trump, Donald, 99, 100 UN Climate Conference (2009), 94 Unipolarity, 91 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 30, 39, 75

151

United States: versus China as number-one power, 2 –3, 4; as leading power in AsiaPacific region since World War II, 44; as maintaining delicate balance of deterrence and reassurance in Asia, 73; as more inward looking, 99; as prioritizing military power, 55; rivalry of, with China, 70; and status games with Soviet Union during Cold War, 55 Veblen, Thorstein, 23 Verbal communication, 89 Victory Day military parade, 61– 64 Waijiaozhuanxing (diplomatic transformation), 4 Waltz, Kenneth, 17 Wang, Zheng, 10 Wang Jian, 61– 62 Wang Jisi, 5, 38, 60, 93 Wang Yi, 1, 81 Wang Yusheng, 92 Washington Consensus, 96, 104 Wealth and status, 87 Weapons of mass consumption, 52, 53 –55, 64 – 67 Wen Jiabao, 42, 51, 86, 94 West, audience in, 47–49 White mask, 76, 80 – 83 Wohlforth, William C., 7– 8 World Bank, 3, 74, 97, 103 World Economic Forum, 99 Wu Jianmin, 75 –76 Xi Jinping: as asserting new active role for China on global stage, 96; charm offensive of, 78; foreign policy of, 103 –105; on China as developing country, 67, 86 – 87; on Chinese Dream, 41, 45, 50; modifica­ tion of low-profile approach by, 98; on need for China to safeguard “national sov­ ereignty, security, and development inter­ ests,” 81; and “new type of great power relationship” (xinxing daguo guanxi), 39, 73; proactive regional diplomacy of, 77, 97; speech at Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs by (2014), 34; speech at historical museum of Chinese revolution by, 52; speech at military parade by (2015), 61– 63; speech at 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China by (2017), 6, 57, 99; speech at State

152

Index

Xi Jinping (continued ) Great Hural by (2014), 86; speech at Sum­ mit Meeting for Belt Road Initiative by (2017), 1–2; speech at UN Office by, 99; speech to Tanzanian politicians by (2013), 45; unveiling of new Asian security concept by, 70; visit to Central Asia by (2013), 43 Xinbo Wu, 96 Xinhua News Agency, 47–48 Xinxing daguo (emerging great power), 38 Xinxing daguo guanxi (new type of great power relations), 73, 97 Xiong Guangkai, 93 Xu Caihous, 62 Yang Jiechi, 43 –44 Yan Xuetong, 34, 79 You zhongguo tese de xinxing daguo waijiao (new great power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics), 97 Yuan Peng, 37–38

Yu guoji diwei xiangchen (commensurate with its international status), 57 Yu guoji jie gui (linking up with the international track), 48 Zaidingwei (repositioning), 4, 5 Zakaria, Fareed, 100 Zhang Jun, 1 Zheng Bijian, 86 Zhenfen minzu jingshen (stimulate national spirit), 42 Zheng He, 59 Zhong he guoli (comprehensive national power), 42, 51 Zhonghua mingzhu weida fuxin (rejuvenation of the Chinese nation), 41 Zhoubian waijiao (peripheral diplomacy), 43 Zhou Xiaochuan, 96 –97 Zou chuqu (go out), 35 Zuidade fazhanzhong guojia (the largest developing country), 38

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