Reason, Religion and Modernity: Gadamer-Habermas Debate 981970703X, 9789819707034

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SpringerBriefs in Philosophy Anil Kumar Vaddiraju

Reason, Religion and Modernity Gadamer-Habermas Debate

SpringerBriefs in Philosophy

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Anil Kumar Vaddiraju

Reason, Religion and Modernity Gadamer-Habermas Debate

Anil Kumar Vaddiraju The Centre for Political Institutions, Governance and Development Institute for Social and Economic Change Bengaluru, Karnataka, India

ISSN 2211-4548 ISSN 2211-4556 (electronic) SpringerBriefs in Philosophy ISBN 978-981-97-0702-7 ISBN 978-981-97-0703-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0703-4 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Paper in this product is recyclable.

Foreword

Though this book by Prof. Anil Kumar Vaddiraju is small, it is profound and thoughtprovoking. The reader will have to go through it slowly with concentration, reflecting over and savouring each sentence, paragraph, chapter and then the book as a whole. The reward will be rich insights and joy of better understanding a troublesome problem affecting our complex world. The focus of the book is on the steady rise of religion and tradition in the world, including in the developing part of it, taking India particularly. India is not taken here as unique, but as a special example. The two words, religion and tradition, are often, though not always, used interchangeably in the book, with the distinction between the two taken as of no pertinent significance. The book is not about the dominance of religion or tradition during the ancient and medieval periods, but about its surprising rise in the post-modern age in spite of all the progress in science and technology and urbanisation, with widespread progress of democracy and liberal ideas. With the Enlightenment Movement in Western Europe during the 17th and 18th Centuries, the emphasis had shifted from religion to reason, which led to modernity. It was a movement which had a wide influence. It did not take place in a vacuum but had been preceded by the Scientific Revolution which emerged after 1500 AD and transformed people’s attitudes to nature. It was the time when modern science was born, leading to the Industrial Revolution during the 18th and 19th Centuries. The Scientific Revolution in turn was preceded by the Protestant Reformation in the 16th Century, which challenged the authority of the Church, and gave the individual much more freedom and scope for the exercise of reason, not only in the secular but also in the religious social spheres. The State also was freed from the clutches of the Church, making the rise of liberalism and secular democracy possible. The French Revolution brought to the fore the principles of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, giving feudalism a mortal blow. Religiosity was replaced by Humanism as the guiding principle of ethics, as a major outcome of the rise of reason. As the author observes, 150 years of religious wars taught the importance of religious tolerance. Creative and progressive forces had thus emerged which changed the globe widely and irreversibly, not only

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in science and technology but also in politics, economy, society and religion. It is against this background that the global recrudescence of religion and tradition has taken place in the post-modern age, which needs to be understood. The present book is a welcome contribution towards this task. Anil Kumar probes into this phenomenon with the help of three perspectives, respectively: Modernisation, Marxism and Hermeneutics (Gadamer-Habermas Debate). It is understandable that the forces of modernisation were expected to push religion from the public to the private sphere and from dominance to marginalisation in politics. But it happened so to a noticeable extent in Western Europe, not in the rest of the world. Why? The author observes significantly: ‘Even Enlightenment did not stand for the abolition of religion; it only stood for the abolition of religious bigotry, superstition and excesses of organised religion’. But what took place was not simply the rise of non-parochial spirituality, but the rise of bigotry and religious nationalism also. Religion was hardly abolished from the public sphere, but got fused with national politics. The partition of India was a result of this phenomenon, and even in the last 76 years after it, India has not been able to come out of its consequences. Several Muslim countries still swear by Sharia and justify excluding women from equal rights. Even some Buddhist-majority countries are not able to give up religious bigotry. Myanmar’s treatment of Rohingya Muslim minority and Sri Lanka’s treatment of Tamil minority go against the religion of love and compassion taught by the Buddha. It seems that modernisation has meant only technological progress for many countries, without the values of religious tolerance and humanism taught by its philosophers. In this restricted sense, stripped of ethics, modernisation has become dangerous. This is so even without considering its terrible impact on the Earth’s environment. Mahatma Gandhi was severely critical of modern technology if it came without compassion and humanism. He made religious tolerance and understanding the motto of his life’s mission. There is thus nothing inevitable or automatic in modernisation as an evolutionary force of development of society, economy, or polity that it will lead to the paradise of liberty, equality and fraternity— which includes religious tolerance too. These goals have to be especially sought after and pursued as a matter of state policy. Anil Kumar points out another dimension of the dark side of modernisation. It was accompanied by imperialist exploitation of developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Andre Gunder Frank called it ‘development of underdevelopment’. Underdevelopment was not simply a case of lagging behind in development, but was an active process of depriving the colonised world of its development potential through exploitation by the industrialised imperial countries. The impact was so bad and widespread that it is a taking a long struggle to come out of it and become free. The resultant poverty led to hopelessness and made people seek the solace of religion as an opium, as observed by Marx. This makes Anil Kumar to take a critical look at the Marxian theory as an approach to understand the rise of religion and religiosity, which takes place even under conditions of economic growth and technological progress. He regards Marx as a

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post-Enlightenment intellectual. Though Marx’s atheism stemmed from the Enlightenment movement, he transcended atheism by arguing that mere rationalism and criticism of religion would not dissolve religion. One has to understand the circumstances or conditions that give rise to religiosity. According to Marx, the superstructure of religion is abolished only by abolishing alienating and exploitative conditions of a capitalist class society which cause poverty and deprivation. He predicted that in a post-revolutionary, casteless, communist society, there will not be any religion since there would be no need for it. However, referring to Kolakowski’s view, Anil Kumar points out that Marxism itself acquired the characteristics of a religion. It was not just an optional religion but a state religion in a communist state, since the communist states banned religion not only in the public but even under the private sphere. They had no confidence that traditional religion would disappear in a classless society by itself. It showed that the followers of Marx themselves were sceptical about Marxist prediction! Anyway when the communist states broke down, the traditional religion revived again! Thus in Anil Kumar’s view, the Marxian theory does not appear to be a great help in understanding the prospects of religion either under capitalism or under socialism. This disappointment with both the modernisation theory and Marxian theory leads Anil Kumar to look at the philosophy of hermeneutics of Gadamer-Habermas debate. Both Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) and Jurgen Habermas (1929–) were leading philosophers of the 20th Century, and the debate between them about tradition including religious tradition is found to be pertinent by Anil Kumar. Hermeneutics may sound a formidable word, but it only means the art and science of interpretation. Originally applied to Biblical and legal texts, the word subsequently came to be used to cover other texts too, and further to all forms of human understanding. Evidently, the word covers interpreting and understanding tradition too. Gadamer emphasised the necessity of tradition and language for human thought and progress. For this progress to take place, openness of dialogue between humans is very much needed. It promotes mutual understanding and contributes to the march of civilization. There is a commonality which all humans share, which is termed as Being by Gadamer. Hermeneutics enriches this Being and makes human existence meaningful. Tradition is a basic condition under which the process of knowledge starts, which provides the interests and questions that incite knowing. According to him, one cannot escape from one’s own tradition. Thus, resurgence of tradition does not surprise Gadamer, because it is a necessary condition of humanity and human progress. But tradition is not necessarily a conservative force; for Gadamer, it is more a provocative force. A revolution is actually a response to tradition. Thus, even if influenced or stimulated by tradition, one does not endorse all traditions. We retain our critical faculty and use it to examine tradition; we do not have to blindly confirm everything in tradition. In the process, old traditions may be drastically modified, or new traditions may emerge. Hermeneutics ensures this. But in Anil Kumar’s interpretation of Gadamer, ‘even a break with tradition cannot be a total one. There is no complete and entirely fresh beginning either in history or for individuals’. The force

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of hermeneutics is utilised more fully, when a dialogue takes place between traditions and cultures. It changes our mental or epistemic horizons and promotes understanding. Gadamer speaks of ‘fusion of horizons’ which promotes further knowledge and human progress. Openness to dialogue reduces the possibility of intercultural conflicts and enriches one’s own culture. To get tied down to a fixed, static horizon or monoculture, means denying differences in horizons and refusing to understand others and promote even one’s own progress. Habermas, on the other hand, feels quite concerned about the resurgence of religion, ‘a fundamentalist radicalisation, and the political instrumentalisation of the potential for violence in many of the world religions’. It appears that he is not worried so much by the resurgence of religion per se, as by the resurgence of inter-religious strife. But there seems to be no attempt to explain it. He raises, however, important questions like how to grapple with traditions, or how to negotiate with them. Anil Kumar observes that such questions become particularly important in complex societies with multiple religions and traditions like India. He mentions that there is a respected tradition of secularism and agnosticism too in India. Lok¯ayata, Buddhism and Jainism come under it. But the latter two are also religions! Habermas finds Gadamer’s emphasis on tradition problematic. He criticised Gadamer for holding tradition as inescapable because it then forecloses the possibility of emancipation from conservatism. He takes Gadamer to task for even speaking of authoritativeness of tradition, as it goes against the role of exercising one’s critical judgement and reason, advocated by Enlightenment. Habermas holds that Enlightenment is still an unfinished project, and the emphasis on reason or rationality is quite pertinent now in the context of resurgence of religion. Later, however, Habermas considers what he calls the ‘post-secular’ condition of humanity in the form of resurgence of religion with sympathetic understanding, if not with approval as such. Anil Kumar quotes him: ‘Even today, religious traditions perform the function of articulating awareness of what is lacking or absent. They keep alive sensitivity to failure and suffering. They rescue from oblivion the dimensions of our social and personal relations in which advances in cultural and social rationalisation have caused utter devastation’. Anil Kumar says that ‘Habermas is the only critical thinker who has shown exceptional openness to understanding and appreciating the importance of religion to human life. … In this mode of thinking, religion is not dismissed tout court. Religion is seen no longer as an ideology or opiate, as in Marx’s terms. It is a meaning-giving font of wisdom; something that complements the loss of meaning in modern life. While it is not a substitute for modernity, it completes modernity with what is lacking in it; not only in private life but also public life and the public sphere’. At the same time, Habermas observes that a liberal democracy neither has nor needs any ‘religious aura’. But it has to grant the right to the freedom of religious practice and be committed to religious tolerance. I think that this standpoint of Habermas brings about a convergence between him and Gadamer. Neither of them rejects religion nor seeks its suppression in either private or public life. As observed above about Gadamer, his emphasis on tradition does not preclude critical reasoning about it, as Habermas charges. Gadamer’s advocacy of dialogue and ‘fusion of civilizations’ is similar to ‘communicative action’

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recommended by Habermas. Communicative actions promote mutual understanding and reduce intercultural conflicts, as with Gadamer’s dialogue. Both stressed the need to sympathetically understand differences in culture and tradition. The point of convergence between the two philosophers is very close to the Gandhian viewpoint also regarding religion. Gandhi did not dismiss religion, but at the same time insisted that it has to pass the test of rationality and compassion for others. Religious tolerance was a motto of his life, and he laid down his life for it. This is particularly important in a country like India with a plurality of religions. Gandhi advocated that the state in India should follow the policy of Sarva dharma sama bh¯ava—equal respect to all religions, rather than Dharma nirapekshat¯a—indifference of the state to all religions, as Anil Kumar points out in the book. He observes that the Indian state has followed Gandhi’s advice and has adopted the former principle. Anil Kumar, however, also observes that Gadamer’s theory has serious limitations when it comes to addressing prejudices that lead to vertical social hierarchies like caste in India and class in general. Dialogues work better in mutual understanding between horizontal groups, but not necessarily between vertical hierarchies. Marx advocated revolutionary class struggles to resolve them, including resort to violence if necessary. M. K. Gandhi, however, advocated a nonviolent approach of Trusteeship on the part of the propertied classes, and state intervention in the form of taxing the rich to help the poor if voluntary Trusteeship does not work satisfactorily enough. But with liberalisation and economic reforms, class-based inequalities are uncontrollably aggravating in most of the countries including India and China. This needs following the principles of a welfare state, under which health care and education up to the 12th Grade are made compulsory, universal and free for all. There is a strong statistical evidence to show a significant positive correlation between the extent of poverty and the proportion of out-of-pocket expenditure on health in the total expenditure on health, both across countries and over time within a country. A serious illness can aggravate poverty, and push down even non-poor households below the poverty line. Epidemics which hit the poor more aggravating poverty significantly, unless tackled resolutely by the state and free medical treatment including hospitalisation is provided. As per WHO statistics, India is among countries with high out-of-pocket expenditure on health. In 2020, it was 51% in India, compared with 35% in China, 28% in South Korea and Russia, 14% in the UK, 13% in Sweden, 12% in Canada, 10% in the USA and only 5% in South Africa. Dialogue is not enough; state intervention to solve inter-class disparities is also quite necessary. The difficult task of ensuring equality of opportunities and a level playing field for all in starting their careers cannot be achieved without state intervention. A democratic state cannot afford to be a handmaid of upper classes, since numbers and voting power are in favour of the lower classes, and they cannot be easily cheated and misled for long, though populist political leaders may try to do so. That is why a genuine democracy is necessary for social justice.

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Caste differences are a more problematic issue. While Marx analysed class differences with great insight, he dismissed caste in India as ‘Class muck’ as pointed out by Anil Kumar. Both Dr. B. R. Ambedkar and M. K. Gandhi, on the other hand, gave a lot of attention to caste discrimination and tried to address the problem. While Gandhi appealed to upper castes to see reason and be more human, Dr. Ambedkar appealed to the oppressed classes to cultivate self-esteem and to educate and organise themselves, and protest against injustice. Thus their missions complemented each other. Dr. Ambedkar was more analytical and pragmatic than Gandhi, though both had the same goal of ending casteism. Dr. Ambedkar pointed out that the chief difference between class and caste was that while the former permitted social or vertical mobility, the latter did not. One can rise above in one’s class but not in caste as it is based on birth which cannot be changed. Thanks, however, to the policy of positive discrimination or reservation policy as is called popular in India, the hierarchical differences are widely breaking down, and millions from the formerly depressed classes have entered into the mainstream (Nadkarni 2020: 10–52). Dr. Ambedkar’s project of ‘annihilation of caste’, is, however, far from over. The role of Hinduism in this task is very much exaggerated. The real reasons for the survival of casteism have to be sought elsewhere. But first, we may look into the alleged role of Hinduism. It is not correct to term Hinduism as Brahmanism or upper caste religion. There is no such religion as Brahmanism. Hinduism is not a creation of Brahmins alone, and non-Brahmins have in fact played a more dominant role in developing it. Vedic and Upanishadic Rishis came from different backgrounds and communities including those at the most humble levels. Valmiki who composed the R¯am¯ayana was not a Brahmin. Vy¯asa, the author of the Mah¯abh¯arata, was of a mixed origin, his mother being a fisherwoman. The greatest of the Sanskrit poets, Kavi K¯alid¯asa, was also not a Brahmin. Reform movements in Hinduism in the form of Bhakti Movements started much earlier than in Christianity. Bhakti Movements denounced caste discrimination, preached equality and advocated Bhakti or Love of God and humanity as the simplest and most effective and direct path to God. Incidentally, it reduced the importance of priests (who were Brahmins) who acted as intermediaries between God and humans. The Bhakti movements started first in Tamil Nadu as early as the 2nd Century CE by Tiruvalluvar. Basavanna, a prominent leader of the Bhakti Movement in Karnataka belonged to the 12th Century BC. The Bhakti Movements during the medieval age all over India were led mainly by non-Brahmins, and their followers came from all communities including the lowest. The Bhakti Movements made Hinduism broad-based as never before. In the modern Renaissance of Hinduism also, non-Brahmins played a leading role. To mention some of them: Swami Vivekananda, Mahatma Gandhi, Shri Aurobindo, Narayana Guru, Satya Sai Baba and Mata Amrit¯anandamayi. The bulk of followers of Hinduism are non-Brahmins. This was so in the past and at present too. Many non-Brahmin communities now have their own Mathas (monasteries) and Swamijis (monks) who head them. Narayana Guru and Mata Amrit¯anandamayi threw open the priesthood

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in Hinduism to non-Brahmins and women too, ending the monopoly of Brahmins and males. The process of sanskritisation, to which Anil Kumar refers, also worked towards bridging the differences between non-Brahmins and Brahmins. Untouchability is not a part of Hinduism as a religion. It can be eradicated without having to eradicate Hinduism. As Dr. Ambedkar himself has pointed out, most of the Vedic period did not have the caste system, which emerged only at the end of it. According to him, untouchability also emerged long after the post-Buddhist period. There was thus a phase in the history of Hinduism when there was neither caste system nor untouchability, and we cannot rule out a similar phase in future. I have presented detailed scriptural evidence elsewhere showing opposition to hierarchical caste system based on birth and to untouchability (Nadkarni 2003; Nadkarni 2013). However, there seems to have taken place a resurgence of casteism in India, with religiosity riding on it in the political sphere. The ritual significance of caste has almost disappeared, but its resurgence is mainly in the political sphere. Since most of the castes especially in Karnataka have their Mathas and religious heads, caste politics is often played out through these religious heads. Political leaders visiting Mathas and seeking blessings of the Matha heads, especially when the elections are close, have become frequent. The nexus between religion and politics is taking place mainly through caste forces. Ironically, it is neither the Dalit castes nor the traditional upper castes, which are prominent in this nexus, but the powerful ‘dominant castes’ as defined by the eminent sociologist M. N. Srinivas, those which dominate in numbers and also in land ownership, thus dominating politics too. Why hasn’t the outdated caste system been wiped out by the forces of modernisation, in spite of all the reformers’ efforts, sanskritisation, urbanisation and industrialisation in India? There are several reasons for this. Firstly, during the British rule, a large number of artisans lost their livelihoods because of the imports of cheap British goods and suffered a serious decline in their social status. Secondly, the caste censuses initiated by the British sharpened the sensitivity to caste differences as never before. Thirdly, Land reforms undertaken after Independence, which should have transferred land to the real tillers of the soil, who were mostly untouchables, benefited mainly the intermediate tenants who belonged to the middle castes including the ‘OBCs’ (the other backward classes). Fourthly, the growth of non-agricultural sectors was not fast enough to absorb excess population in rural areas or agriculture. Fifth, the task of making education up to at least 18 years of age universal, compulsory and free, was not seriously pursued. Last but not least, the reservation policy consolidated caste consciousness and created a stake in being called backward, though the policy was quite necessary to open up blocked opportunities in education and jobs to the oppressed classes. What was missing in the policy was a clause to deny the benefit of reservation to the creamy layer within the oppressed castes, who had already overcome their caste disadvantages because of high success in their careers or business. Such a clause would have diluted caste consciousness and division in society. This is a serious matter because the extent of reservation is up to 50 per cent in most of the states, and almost 75 per cent in Tamil Nadu. There is a clamour by more and more castes for the reservation benefits extended to them, by raising the ceiling above 50 per cent. This would seriously constrain the scope for talents and merit. No other

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country in the world has such a high level of reservation. The ‘dominant castes’ have found sections of them economically and socially backward and want the reservation benefits extended to them also. There is even a call to enable each caste to have a share of economic and political benefits which is equal to their share in total population, requiring a detailed caste census. Since there are many (including some hierarchical) sub-castes within each caste, it would require a census which would count the population in each of the thousands of sub-castes. To make matters even worse, other religions in India, including particularly Islam, Christianity and Sikhism, also have castes within them. Conversion from Hinduism has not helped in erasing the caste status. There is a policy issue of extending reservation to the scheduled castes within them. Since a caste-wise reservation to women (and the third gender too?) would also be required, it would lead to a most complicated reservation scheme. This will keep busy most of the politicians fighting with each other for respective caste rights. What is ignored in this clamour to give primacy to population size of each caste, is that it means acceptance of unashamed majoritarianism in India. The principle may be extended to religious identities also, justifying Hindu majoritarianism in Hindumajority countries, Muslim-majoritarianism in Muslim-majority countries and so on. It can mean second-class citizenship for minorities. A further implication of this principle is that since the growth of population in the northern states of India is much faster than in the southern, it would require an increasing representation in the Parliament to Northern states. The states which followed the national directive for population control, aided by higher per capita income growth, and have been contributing more to GNP of the country and national tax revenues, are precisely the states which will be punished by this principle. The same situation applies to castes as well. Every group will have a stake in increasing their population. It would divert the attention of political leaders from really more important national issues like poverty, hunger, unemployment and economic development. We should not forget that reservation only distributes given opportunities, but it is more important to increase the number and quality of total opportunities available, whether they are for jobs or for education. An excessive obsession with caste-based reservation ignores this significant point. Anil Kumar’s book is not mere philosophy. It has an important implication for concrete policy. He brings it out succinctly thus: ‘Domination of the religious over the secular leads to theocracy, and the domination of one religion over others leads to fascism. … Because neither theocracy nor fascism is welcome choices for multireligious societies, the only way out from the all too frequent religious strife would be either privatisation of religion or domination of the secular over the religious … in the public sphere’. I hope that this central message of the book is accepted by all. I wish the book great success which it really deserves. Bengaluru, India November 2023

M. V. Nadkarni

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References Nadkarni MV (2003) Is caste system intrinsic to Hinduism? Demolishing a myth. Econ Polit Weekly 38(45):4783–4793 Nadkarni MV (2013) Handbook of Hinduism, esp. chap 5. Ane Books, New Delhi, pp 113–148 Nadkarni MV (2020) The broad-basing process in India: an introduction, chap 1; The broad-basing process and Dalits, chap 2. In Nadkarni MV (ed) Socio-economic change and the broad-basing process in India. Routledge, Abingdon, pp 10–52

Preface and Acknowledgements

This book deals with the question of recrudescence and tenacious persistence of traditions and religion in the context of developing country politics. The three theories from the point of which this question is examined include Modernisation theory, Marxian theory and hermeneutics. The attempt is to theoretically engage with the question to the extent possible, given the scope for widely ranging standpoints. In doing so, we limit ourselves to these theories without venturing into debates over modernity and post-modernity, for we believe that much of what is pre-modern is still very present in our midst to talk about post-modernity. That said, we by no means, hold that these are the only lenses through which the question, stated above, should be explored. We are all part of the stream of history. Our finitude means that we live and end here and are limited beings, thus leaving us with a sense of both humility and responsibility. As socio-historical beings, we carry consciousness determined not only by our place in the social structure, but also the stream of history. We carry, whatever our place in such history, a historically influenced consciousness that determines our attitude to society and the need to change it. When we attempt to change the society or history too, we need to remember that we are not the first ones to attempt that. The changes in terms of working people’s history, Dalit history and subaltern history— all presume a historically influenced attitude to the present. In other words, they too form ‘traditions’ of changing the world, though only as parallel traditions. Antitraditional thinking too is part of heritage. In a country like India with nearly 4000 years of history, everything has its roots in some ‘tradition’ or the other. And that is what is ‘effective history’: the history that we are part of and carry along. Whether this history has a ‘Reason’—a dialectical Geist unfolding within it, reason with capital ‘R’, in a teleological manner, is not for me the point of discussion. Thus, throughout this book, we use the word ‘reason’ as opposed to superstition and blind belief, mainly rooted in ignorance, i.e. in the Enlightenment sense of reason as rationality, and not in a Hegelian dialectical sense, as the latter signifies ‘Reason’ as an immanently unfolding philosophic-historical force or process.

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However, whether entirely contingent or entirely teleological, we happen to be children of unfolding history—as products of the past, with an attitude and responsibility towards the societal future. That being the case, this book deals with effective history as it manifests in terms of social and religious traditions and the relentless persistence and recrudescence of the same. These today constitute the most significant bones of contention in politics across the globe, leaving us in an ever-restless condition about their persistence and tenacity. My purpose in this writing is to understand the persistence of these traditions—religious and otherwise—and the endless disturbing conflicts generated by such persistence. Contemporary history gives us no comfort to believe that ‘Reason’ unfolding in the real is rational. The ‘rational’, however, appears far too away as a glimmer. In the Indian context in particular, we are past those days when the nation-builders spoke in terms of promoting scientific temperament and rationality. Now the trend is precisely the reverse, with parliamentary majorities relying more on religious and social traditions than rationality when it comes to social and political matters. Religious communalism in India is a major problem facing the country leading to questions asked in this book and the thinkers invoked. The purpose is not to add to the country of prejudices new prejudices— Gadamer uses the term pre-judgement in the sense of a legal term, pre-understanding reached before the final judgement on an issue or event—on the contrary, to ask why they persist and if they do, how to negotiate with them towards a building a better future. The writing of this book started as a study at the Centre for Political Institutions, Governance and Development, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore, and I thank the following people at the institute who helped me pursue this: Prof. Meenakshi Rajeev, Dr. Sobin George, Prof. M. G. Chandrakant, Prof. S. Madheswaran and Prof. D. Rajasekhar. I am thankful to Prof. Abdul Aziz for reading the initial draft and for encouraging comments. I thank Dr. Sudeep Basu for reading the entire document carefully and providing comments. The academic section of ISEC was enormously helpful during the study. I am immensely grateful to the staff of the V. K. R. V. Rao Library at ISEC and the ISEC librarian Dr. Pradeep Hegde for meeting my innumerable requests for books and articles. I am thankful to B. B. Subhash and Mr. Ittagi for help with editing and fine-tuning the manuscript. I thank the referees of the original report of the study who have provided detailed comments. I thank the esteemed referees of Springer Nature for kindly providing their valuable and detailed comments. I am immensely grateful to Prof. M. V. Nadkarni, Honorary Visiting Professor, ISEC, for providing detailed comments on the previous manuscript and kindly agreeing to write a foreword to the revised one. We make no bones of the fact that this book is a discussion, a review and an exegesis of some ideas regarding the recrudescence of religion and its traditions and do not claim any outstanding originality while contending that the present politico-historical context necessitates undertaking such a task.

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Finally, I should thank Ms. Satvinder Kaur at Springer Nature for providing me an opportunity to publish the book. All the responsibility for the limitations of this book remains with me. Bengaluru, India

Anil Kumar Vaddiraju

Original Works Referred to in This Book

Althusser, L (1969) (Tran. Ben Brewster) For Marx, London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press. Althusser, L and Etienne Balibar (1971) (Tran. Ben Brewster) Reading Capital, London, New Left Books. Althusser, Louis, (2014) On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, London and New York: Verso. Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1975, 1989) Truth and Method, London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic. Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1977, 2008) (Trans. Ed. David E. Linge) Philosophical Hermeneutics, California: University of California Press. Gadamer, Hans Georg (nd.) (Trans. Rod Colman) The Beginning of Philosophy, London: Bloomsbury. Gramsci, Antonio (Ed. Tr. Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith) (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks, New York: International Publishers. Gramsci, Antonio (157, 1978) The Modern Prince and Other Writings, New York: International Publishers. Gramsci, Antonio (Ed. Tra.by Pasquale Verdichchio) (2015) The Southern Question, Bordighera Press. Habermas, Jurgen (1988) On the Logic of the Social Sciences, Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, Jurgen (2013) ‘Reply to My Critics’ in Calhoun, Craig, Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (Eds.) Habermas and Religion, Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, Jurgen (1968) Knowledge and Human Interests, Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, Jurgen (2014) (Ed. Eduardo Mendieta) Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God and Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press. Habermas, Jurgen (1987) ‘The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality’ in Michael T Gibbons (Ed.) Interpreting Politics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, pp. 175–202.

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Original Works Referred to in This Book

Habermas, Jurgen et al (Eds.) (Trans. By Ciaran Cronin) (2010) An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age, Cambridge Polity Press. Habermas, Jurgen (2008) ‘Notes on Post-Secular Society’, New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4. pp. 17–19. Marx, Karl (1906) Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, New York: The Modern Library. Marx, Karl and F. Engels (1957, 1975) On Religion, Moscow: Progress Publishers. Marx, Karl and F. Engels (1976) German Ideology, Moscow: Progress Publishers. Marx, Karl (Tran. by Annette Jolin and Joseph O’ Malley and Intr. by Joseph O‘Malley) (1970). Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. London: Cambridge University Press. Ricouer, Paul (1994) ‘Althusser’s Theory of Ideology’ in Elliott, Gregory (Ed) Althusser: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 44–72. Weber, Max (1930, 1965). The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, London: Unwin University Books.

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Chapter Plan of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 4 6

2 Modernisation, Modernity, Liberalism and Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.1 Criticisms of Modernisation Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3 Marxian Critique of Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Antonio Gramsci . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Louis Althusser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17 22 24 25

4 Early Habermas’s Critique of Gadamer and His Later Approach to Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 5 The Gadamer-Habermas Debate and Its Implication for Religion . . . . 37 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 6 Post-secularism, Liberalism and Their Discontents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 6.1 Post-secular Theory and Pre-secular Societies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Can ‘Fusion of Horizons’ Avert ‘Clash of Civilisations’: Is It Possible? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1.1 Degrees of Secularisation and Variants of Modernity . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49 50 52 55

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About the Author

Anil Kumar Vaddiraju is Professor of Political Science at the Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bengaluru, India. He studied at Jawaharlal Nehru University and the University of Delhi. Political philosophy is one of his abiding academic interests.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Abstract This chapter discusses the main propelling reasons for the book. The chapter argues that the emergence and return of religion as a major phenomenon in our public and private spheres warrants a discussion of the same. The chapter holds that earlier the phenomenon of religion in developing country politics was seen from the points of view of Modernisation and Marxian theories and that both these theories have ended up in blind alleys. The chapter notes that in order to better understand the present upsurge of religion globally and in developing country politics we need to take account of the hermeneutic theory. In addition, the chapter notes that the contribution of Gadamer-Habermas debate in understanding the phenomena of tradition and religion is pivotal. The chapter also refers to the contribution of critical theory towards understanding the superstructural phenomena and contends that even in analysing developing country politics and their ideological formations we need a recourse to critical theory. Besides the above the chapter lays down the chapter plan of the book and navigates the reader towards the rest of the book. Keywords Introduction · Upsurge of religion · Tradition · Politics of developing countries · Modernisation theory · Critical theory · Marxian theory · Hans-George Gadamer · Jurgen Habermas

The purpose of this book is occasioned by a steady rise of religion in the developing world in general and India in particular (Haynes 2005, 2008). The datum brutum of communalism is a sufficient reason to undertake an understanding of such an unpleasant return of religion into our public and private lives. The book tries to understand this phenomenon. While making this attempt, the book refers to three theories that have dealt with religion, both public and private. We refer here to Modernisation theory as an incarnation of liberalism in the context of developing countries and Marxian theory as a critique of both liberalism and Modernisation theory. We look at the hermeneutics and Gadamer-Habermas debate essentially because of the perceived inadequacy of classical liberal and classical Marxian theories to understand the same. While liberal theory and its modernisation incarnation allow room for religion, both private and public, there is a greater degree of ambiguity surrounding the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. K. Vaddiraju, Reason, Religion and Modernity, SpringerBriefs in Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0703-4_1

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liberal concept of religion with respect to what and how much should be private and what and how much should be public religion. Marxian theory, on the other hand, dismisses religion tout court both in its public and private realms. Instead, we in this text, specifically refer to Gadamer-Habermas debate mainly because the debate attempted to come to grips with the question of religious and nonreligious forms of tradition and its initial overcoming of the same by Habermas and later succumbing of Habermas to the same tradition and religion, which he critiqued earlier. And the consideration of liberal theory and its ending up in its modernisation form in the cul de sac of ‘Clash of Civilisations’; along with the cul de sac of Marxian (and Marxist theory, if one likes!), which also ended up in the denunciation or dismissal of religion and all the traditions that go with it, forms an excellent context to discuss the Gadamer-Habermas debate in the context of developing countries. We argue that the central concern of this book is Gadamer-Habermas debate in view of the inadequacy of both liberal and Marxian/ist theories in satisfactorily explaining the persistence of past, religious past, in the form of traditions. In the past, liberal theory and practice had ended up in Nazism in Germany; Marxist theories had ended up in Stalinist totalitarianism and eventual breakup of the USSR in the 1990s. Very clearly, the liberal, by implication modernisation, and Marxian, by implication various Marxist theories, had proven inadequate to explain the phenomenon of persistence and resurgence of religion and religious past in the world in general, and developing countries in particular. As Habermas describes the resurgence: Above all, three overlapping phenomena converge to create the impression of a worldwide “resurgence of religion”: the missionary expansion; a fundamentalist radicalisation; and the political instrumentalisation of the potential for violence innate in many of the world religions. (Habermas 2008: 18)

And, therefore, it is the necessity to revert back to Gadamer-Habermas debate; of course, since we write in the context of India, our chief and ultimate geographical and political referent is India. The book is exegetical in the sense that we discuss modernisation theory and Marxian theory and their basic postulations regarding religion. Then we turn to an exegesis of hermeneutic theory from which standpoint Gadamer elaborates on his idea of tradition. Then, we discuss first, Habermas critique of Gadamer and second, later Habermas countenancing of religion, albeit in its monotheistic form. So, first we begin with Modernisation theory and Marxian theory. The two predominant theories that explain the phenomenon of politics and religion in developing country societies have been Modernisation theory and Marxian theory (Randall 2008: 15–34). While Modernisation theory operates at a sociological plane, Marxism offers a deeper analysis of religion in universalistic terms. However, both theories postulate the imminent disappearance of religion from society over time. While Modernisation theory holds that religion will become less important to social and political life owing to the processes of modernity, Marxism holds that the processes of social change, involving the development of classes, class struggles and eventual transition to socialism through revolution, will lead to the disappearance of religion. While Modernisation theory can be traced to the 1950s, Marxism has an

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older historical tradition of analysing and refusing religion as a permanent feature of societies. Also, while there has been little development in Modernisation theory in this regard, ever since its origins, in understanding the phenomenon of religion, Marxian scholars, particularly those belonging to the Frankfurt School, have grappled with the same not only sociologically, but also philosophically (Wolff 1975). The reason is that while Modernisation theory could not withstand the criticisms it was subjected to from the left and itself became discredited, facing the heat particularly from Dependency theory, Marxism remains a powerful theory in explaining developing country politics. The point, however, is that Marxism too came to face much of discredit owing to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the qualified acceptance of capitalism in China. Particularly, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the subsequent re-emergence of religion in that country has raised many theoretical questions for Marxism. The theoretical questions to Marxism such as that of the resurgence of religion, ethnicity and all particularist identities after the collapse of the USSR have hardly been engaged theoretically within Marxism. The states of the USSR that have broken away from it and its satellite states have in fact moved away from Marxism both as a ruling ideology and a world view. They have come to embrace liberalism and market economies with or without the intervention and influence of the Western powers and their experts. Within Marxism per se, there has been a tremendous reluctance to discuss the questions of religious revival across the world. Among the Western Marxist scholars, Jurgen Habermas is the sole exception to have shown tremendous openness to the questions posed by this phenomenon. It is for this reason that we are concerned with his thought, to some extent, in this book. The second, and more important, point is the re-emergence of religion in political life across the globe, and the reinvention of tradition/s in most countries—leading often to the establishment of right-wing regimes—that have raised serious questions over theories conjecturing the imminent disappearance of religion: such as whether it is more than an ideology or a smokescreen to cover up the existing economic injustices, exploitation and inequalities. Particularly, what should be the role of tradition in a society? How to define a tradition? How to grapple with traditions? Is it possible to do away with them entirely? How to negotiate with traditions, religious and nonreligious? The question becomes even more complex in societies with multiple religions, traditions and multiple sources of traditions. Do Marxism and such theories form traditions in themselves, albeit critical traditions? Both in theory and practice? In this context, this research attempts to look at a theoretical tradition, started as critical theory, and its theorisation of tradition. In attempting to deal with it in the following, we deal with Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jurgen Habermas. In this book, we are using the words ‘tradition’ and ‘religion’ interchangeably. Most traditions in the Indian context happen to be religious traditions. And a plurality and multiplicity of them: Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Jain, Buddhist and Christian to name a few. Among Hindus alone, there are a number of sects and sub-sects. Vaishnavites, Shaivites, Shaktas, Smarthas and Madhvas, to name only a few. Among the Hindu religious-philosophical traditions alone, there are at least three: Monist, dualist and qualified monist (advaita; dvaita; vishistadvaita, respectively) (Hamilton 2001). This is besides the materialist tradition known as the Lokayatas. And then there are secular

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traditions inspired by the Enlightenment thought and the post-Enlightenment thought. Secularism is a very respectable tradition in India. Admittedly, Hans-Georg Gadamer was not a critical theorist. Nor was his theory a theory of religious traditions, though his theorisation has indirect implications for all those that can be called ‘traditions’. He was known for his philosophical/ dialectical hermeneutics, whereas his critic, Jurgen Habermas, clearly belongs to the school of critical theory or what is known as the Frankfurt School. The following is an attempt to understand these theorists’ attempt at defining tradition and grappling with religion; apparently, Modernisation theorists, even when they theorised about the tradition-modernity divide, never invoked Gadamer, or took recourse to philosophical hermeneutics. Both are continents apart, literally and in terms of their origins. Modernisation theory was conceived and propagated in the USA in the 1950s and 1960s, while philosophical hermeneutics and hermeneutics itself developed in the crucible of Continental (Critchley 2001), and particularly, German philosophy (Zimmermann 2015; Bowie 2010). Although we are interested mainly in the latter, we intend to revisit both Modernisation theory, because it addressed itself to tradition in developing countries, defining these countries themselves as ‘traditional’ in the first place, and Marxian theory, which provided a basis for the critique of Modernisation theory, and continues to provide a fecund critique of all theoretical and practical traditions, including its own, as a background. These are considered particularly so, since both theories attempted to explain developing country politics, albeit very differently. Finally, I am not undertaking this exegetical effort because I am unaware of the ‘Eleventh Thesis’ of Marx on Ludwig Feuerbach: ‘All philosophers have hitherto interpreted the world; the point is to change it’. I believe that Marxism in itself is a major tradition of interpreting the world around us—as the multiple and sometimes conflicting, interpretations within Marxism make it abundantly clear—and that every attempt at changing the world needs an interpretation of that world.

1.1 Chapter Plan of the Book In the following, Chap. 2 deals with the basic concepts of modernity, liberalism and religion, wherein we argue that the predominant academic form through which liberal politics came to be understood in ex-colonial countries, was through Modernisation theory. Modernisation theory also focuses on a teleological reading of transition from tradition to modernity. The chapter elaborates on these ideas and their criticisms. Marxian thought and those following Marxism have a considerable deal to say about traditions and religions, treating them as ‘ideologies’. Chapter 3 deals with Marx’s concept of ideology, followed by a discussion of ideology in Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser. Within Continental philosophy, Hans-Georg Gadamer made substantial contributions to the ideas of tradition and authority, for a structure of understanding or

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pre-judgements and most importantly, the ontological significance of human understanding and interpretation through his dialogical and philosophical hermeneutics. And Jurgen Habermas provided an equally spirited criticism of the same in his initial writings. Chapter 4 deals with these debates. The chapter also provides the later transformations in the thought of Jurgen Habermas. Chapter 5 dwells on the implications of the above-mentioned Gadamer-Habermas debate for an inter-religious understanding. Here, we contend that what is most important for the purpose of inter-religious dialogue and understanding is the concept of universality of hermeneutics, which regards tradition and authority as inclusive concepts within modernity, through a critical re-examination of the same, thereby establishing the primacy of human, ontological hermeneutic condition as a universal condition that enables dialogue and intercultural and inter-religious understanding. Chapter 6 extends some of these arguments, but critically examines the concept of post-secularity, proposed by Habermas, in the context of developing countries and societies, that are still largely pre-secular, in the European, Enlightenment sense. And it dwells, to some extent, on the debates related to Indian secularism. In this chapter, we argue that the concept of post-secularity has considerable similarities with the concept of right to belief, faith and worship, that is already part of the canon of liberal democratic philosophy. In the conclusion in Chap. 7, while revisiting Marx, we argue that for a critique of ideology to be developed, we need a critique of the present day material conditions. To state otherwise, we argue that religion or ideology, both cannot be critiqued in their own terms. Also the present rise of religion and right-wing ideologies should be examined in the context of emergence of the global neoliberal economies and the kind of conditions they are generating. While we take a long detour to be converging on this well-known argument, we are sure that the reader will find much that is of interest in the above chapters that trace how and under what conditions religion got diluted in the West, what were the initial prognostications made for the developing countries, we provide a complex illumination of both tradition and religion and their recrudescence, through an examination of Modernisation, Marxism and philosophical hermeneutics. While we do not hold out an optimistic promise that tradition or religion will disappear from social and political life, we do not offer an uncritical apology for their persistence either. In the following Chap. 2, we discuss the question of how liberalism, modernity and religion are connected and how when liberal theory is applied to the developing country context, it often takes on Modernisation and Westernisation form and what they mean and how they unfold in the developing country context in general, in India in particular. What is more important to note is that India has continued to remain an exception as a liberal democratic entity even among the developing countries. As such the prognostications of ’50s and ’60s of Modernisation theory are found to be both relevant and often well-contested.

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References Bowie A (2010) German philosophy: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York Critchley S (2001) Continental philosophy: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, New York Habermas J (2008) Notes on post-secular society. N Perspect Q 25(4):17–29 Hamilton S (2001) Indian philosophy. Oxford University Press, Oxford Haynes, J (2005, 2008) Religion. In: Burnell P, Randall V (eds) Politics in the developing world. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, pp 129–147 Randall V (2008) Analytical approaches to the study of politics in the developing world. In: Burnell P, Randall V (eds) Politics in the developing world. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, pp 15–34 Wolff J (1975) Hermeneutics and the critique of ideology. Sociol Rev 23(4):811–828 Zimmermann J (2015) Hermeneutics: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, Clarendon

Chapter 2

Modernisation, Modernity, Liberalism and Religion

Abstract This chapter discusses liberalism, liberal modernity and modernisation theory. The chapter discusses the concepts of secularisation and modernisation. The chapter discusses Weber and his theory of Protestant ethic. The chapter also discusses Weber’s concepts of rationalisation, secularisation and growth of instrumental reason. The chapter discusses the concept of liberal modernity tracing its origins to European Enlightenment. The chapter also discusses the different aspects of Enlightenment such as emphasis on reason, developments and inventions in the natural sciences leading to material betterment of a majority of people and the development of the science of political economy owing to Scottish Enlightenment. The chapter argues that the application of these took the form of modernisation theory in the developing world. Following from that the chapter elaborates modernisation theory and its critics. The chapter elaborates on how modernisation theory hoped for the eventual disappearance of religion from public sphere and how that did not happen. The chapter also refers to some Indian debates on the same. Keywords Liberalism · Modernity · Modernisation theory · Max Weber · Rationalisation · Secuarlisation · Instrumental reason · Protestant ethic · De-magnification · Critique of modernisation theory · Developing countries · India

The concepts of liberalism and modernity are widely used in political and social science. Here we do not venture into defining these words. A concise discussion of modernity, modernism and modernisation has been provided by Calinescu (1993), and the concept of liberalism has been discussed in detail by Gray (1998). These two words (liberalism and modernity) belong as much to the description of economic phenomena as they do to the ‘superstructural’ phenomena—to use a Marxian metaphor. For instance, modernity means the industrialisation process, along with urbanisation process. Historically speaking, modernity means the arrival, on the global stage, of human reason, faith in humanism, and belief in continuous progress. Liberalism, developed conterminously, has many concrete manifestations in the forms of rights that individuals enjoy, including the right to private property.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. K. Vaddiraju, Reason, Religion and Modernity, SpringerBriefs in Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0703-4_2

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The major questions that liberalism addresses are presented by Freeden and Stears (2013) thus: At its best, it [liberalism] has propagated a secular, anthropocentric vision built around some of the most persistent challenges of social and political life: how to balance the uniqueness of individuals with the solidarity of groups, how to encourage optimal choice within a framework of civilized restraint, how to enable the decencies of a fulfilled life alongside an acceptance of productive human rivalry, and how to remain silent where other ideologies may be raucously vocal. (p. 344)

Our attempt in this text is to link the phenomenon of religion to both modernity and liberalism; for the evolution of liberalism and modernity have had significant implications for religion, the latter being chronologically prior to both. While there might be many societies with liberal sensibilities inherent in them, liberalism, as a political doctrine, was first developed in the West. Liberalism is a product of 500 years of evolution of the West through Renaissance, Reformation, the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. The French Revolution enunciated, while abolishing the feudal ancien regime, the liberal principles such as liberty, equality and fraternity. Ever since their enunciation, found reflection in many constitutions of the world over time. The French Revolution, by way of introducing these principles, also laid the foundations of political modernity. Thus, the evolution of liberalism and modernity are coterminous. However, liberal modernity is not about a swansong for religion, although the French Revolution went against the church. Liberalism, which evolved on parallel grounds with the French Revolution, enunciated tolerance in the realm of religion. The 150 years of religious wars in Europe have taught the lesson of the importance of toleration for classical liberalism. Even Enlightenment did not stand for the abolition of religion; it only stood for the abolition of religious bigotry, superstition and the excesses of organised religion. Liberalism thus stood for the right to faith and worship as well as setting the limits to the prevalence of religion in public affairs. It should be made clear that even though the French Revolution envisaged a world without the prevalence of religion, in the end, it looked forward to establishing a ‘civil religion’, as different from Christianity (Doyle 2001). Thus, political modernity and limiting religion to the individual private sphere with mutual religious tolerance as the highest principle, was the greatest achievement of modernity as evolved in the West. Ever since then, there has been no political doctrine in the world which is as much criticised and as much sanctimoniously upheld as liberalism (Mill 1992; Fukuyama 2022; Mukherji 2018). While this liberal modernity evolved first in the Western hemisphere, the application of this liberal modernity came about through the process of Modernisation. Modernisation theory envisaged that liberal political principles, along with mutual religious tolerance, be applied to developing societies. All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned. (Marx and Engels 1952, 1975, p. 46)

The above quotation from Marx refers to the process of Modernisation and development of capitalism. Modernisation theory explains this in a certain way. Modernisation theory is an evolutionary theory. Modernisation theory assumes that societies

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change on an evolutionary scale from traditional to modern societies, and in that Modernisation is also a form of Westernisation. Modernisation is taken as synonymous with Westernisation. The same historical processes of secularisation, rationalisation, societal differentiation and development of capitalist economy that have taken place in the West are assumed to take place in the developing countries as well. The developing countries are called traditional societies. The progress is from tradition to modernity; from religious to secular societies; from backward to advanced; pre-modern to modern; and non-Western types to Western types of societies. In this model, tradition is something which is a backward-looking weltanschauung that renders societies static. It is held that ‘tradition’ is not a monolith. Within the tradition, social anthropologists of India inform us that again, there are ‘high traditions’ and ‘little traditions’ [Redfield as quoted in Madan (2011a, b)]. Both of these are supposedly hierarchically arranged. Again, there are traditions according to caste and sect; also, according to sub-caste and sub-sect. There are Brahminical traditions and traditions of sub-castes within Brahmins. In a hierarchy of caste relations, there are traditions of each caste and sub-caste and then there are subaltern traditions of the most oppressed, the subaltern castes, tribes and Dalits. There are hierarchies among the tribes and subcastes among the Dalits. When we stray into the miasma of Indian socio-cultural and religious traditions, the regress is endless. Religion is part of that tradition whose importance is supposed to be reduced with the process of secularisation. Srinivas (1982a, b, c), for example, provides a very precise definition of secularisation in the following words: The term secularisation implies that what was previously regarded as religious is now ceasing to be such, and it also implies a process of differentiation which results in the various aspects of society, economic, political, legal and moral, becoming increasingly discrete in relation to each other. The distinction between Church and State, and the Indian concept of a secular state, both assume the existence of such differentiation. Another essential element in secularization is rationalism, a “comprehensive expression applied to various theoretical and practical tendencies which aim to interpret universe purely in terms of thought, or which aim to regulate individual and social life in accordance with the principles of reason and to eliminate as far as possible or to relegate to the background everything irrational”. Rationalism involves, among other things, the replacement of traditional beliefs and ideas by modern knowledge. (Srinivas 1982a, b, c: 118–119) (Italics in the original)

This may happen in a variety of ways. The role of religion in the development of modernity, capitalist modernity, is indeed complex. Max Weber, while elaborating on the idea, observed that it was the religious Protestant ethic that helped develop capitalism in Western Europe. Weber’s thesis was that in societies where such ethic does (or did) not obtain, the development of capitalism may not happen. Weber particularly singled out Asian societies for their stasis and the static nature of their religious world views that hindered the development of modern, secular, capitalist values. Protestant ethic involved an emphasis on worldly asceticism in the pursuit of accumulation of capital. According to this ethic, work is seen as a divine calling. Weber, for instance, puts this in these words:

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2 Modernisation, Modernity, Liberalism and Religion The Puritan wanted to work in a calling; we are forced to do so. For when asceticism was carried out of monastic cells into everyday life, and began to dominate everyday morality, it did its part in building the tremendous cosmos of modern economic order. (Weber 1965: 180–181)

And Weber says: One of the fundamental elements of the spirit of modern capitalism, and not only of that but all of modern culture: rational conduct on the basis of calling, was born—that is what this discussion sought to demonstrate—from the spirit of Christian asceticism. (Weber 1965: 180–181)

and Weber explains the phenomenon thus: For the saints, everlasting rest is in the next world; on earth man must, to be certain of his state of grace, “do the works of him who sent him, as long as it is yet day”. Not leisure and enjoyment, but only activity serves to increase the glory of God, according to the definite manifestations of His will. Waste of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of sins. The span of human life is infinitely short and precious to make sure of one’s own election. Loss of time through sociability, idle talk, luxury, even more sleep than is necessary for health, six to at most eight hours, is worthy of absolute moral condemnation. It does not yet hold as with [Benjamin] Franklin, that time is money, but the proposition is true in a spiritual sense. It is infinitely valuable because every hour lost is lost to labour for the glory of God. (Weber 1965: 158–159) …. “Work hard in your calling”. But even the most important thing was that even beyond that labour came to be considered in itself the end of life, ordained by God. St. Paul’s “He who will not work, shall not eat” holds unconditionally for everyone. Unwillingness to work is symptomatic of lack of grace. (Weber 1965: 158–159)

Thus, Weber elaborately explains how the Protestant ethic inspired a work ethic which, in turn, led to the accumulation and development of capitalism in the West. (Marx was to later comment wryly on this: ‘Accumulate! Accumulate! That is the Moses and Jesus for you!’) The process of secularisation and rationalisation took place, following this initial development of capitalism. According to Weber, the initial development of capitalism had its roots in Western Protestant ethic. According to Weber, the concept of secularisation is part of the larger process of rationalisation that occurs with the development of modernity and capitalism. The argument sounds somewhat circular; first capitalism developed in the West because of the Protestant ethic and the entailing religious values. However, the same process of development of modern capitalism leads to increased rationalisation and dilution of religious values. According to Weber, the Protestant ethic is one of the major conditions for the development of capitalism, but not the only one (Weber 1965). Weber, for instance, agrees with Marx that the creation of an absolutely property-less mass of workers too was a necessary feature of early capitalism. The processes of rationalisation and secularisation, development of instrumental reason, which accompany the development of capitalism are larger processes that entail the processes of increased societal differentiation, the growth of industrialisation and urbanisation. Rationalisation and growth of instrumental reason and de-magnification of world views, and the dilution of magical religious world views–based essentially on mythological world views, whose dilution leads to the ‘disenchantment of the world’–are processes that

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take place gradually owing to the development of other historical processes, such as the growth of commerce, industry and urbanisation. According to this view, the rural, agrarian societies are likely to be largely traditional and religious, whereas urban, industrial societies are likely to be less religious and more secular. The process of development of rural, agrarian societies into urban, industrial societies is also, thus, a process of rationalisation and secularisation. Rural, agrarian traditional societies are likely, over time, to develop into urban industrial, modern and secular societies. This evolutionary view of the development of societies lies at the core of Modernisation theory. According to the above view, social institutions such as caste or tribe are destined to wither away or get radically modified or transformed; and the individual and social identities, based on such social institutions are likely to become modern universalist identities, both at the societal and individual levels. Also, ascriptive identities transform into identities defined by individual achievement. This takes place because of the waning away of the world views that rationalise and provide justifications to such world views or Weltanschauungen. This, however, takes place gradually, over a long span of historical time. Singer (1966), summarising a discussion of social anthropologists on the topic particularly with reference to the modernisation of religious beliefs in India, highlighted these following six points (which are worth quoting at length): 1. Continuous exposure to European ideas and criticism from the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries stimulated a number of reform movements within Hinduism, such as Arya Samaj and the Ramakrishna Missions. 2. Partly in reaction to these European influences and partly deriving from indigenous sources, particular individuals and groups increased their conformity to Hindu beliefs and ritual practices, that is “Sanskritized” their style of life. In some cases, this Sanskritization was a prelude to Westernization and Modernization; in others, it followed upon entry into modern occupations and the acquisition of wealth, political power and social status as an effort to close the gap between ritual and social status. 3. European and modern models and influences have not been immediately fused with traditional models. They have rather been incorporated into Indian life and thought in separate spheres—for example office and factory—where they have been permitted to develop as “foreign” innovations. Traditional Hinduism, on the other hand, has been maintained in the sphere of home and social relations. The compartmentalization has minimized direct conflict between tradition and modernity. 4. The conflicts that have emerged from the coexistence of traditional and modern life styles tend to be resolved by abbreviating the time given to ritual observances, by delegating more of the responsibility for ritual observances to those who have the time (for example women and professional priests), and by reinterpreting traditional religious beliefs such as the doctrines of Karma, dharma, moksha and ahimsa to apply to the problems and conditions of modern life. […]

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5. The net result of these processes of reinterpretation, vicarious ritualization, Sanskritization and compartmentalization is not yet a secularization of Hinduism, although the secular ideologies of socialism, communism and rationalism are also found in India. The net result of these processes of interaction and adaptation is more accurately described as an ecumenical sort of Hinduism that is blurring sect and caste lines. 6. While these conditions did not add up to a proof that Hinduism has caused Modernization, they do reveal a capacity of Hinduism to adapt to changing conditions that casts serious doubt on the widespread belief that Hindu beliefs and practices are a major obstacle to Modernization. (Singer 1966: 66–67). What the above paragraphs demonstrate is the approach of Modernisation and the questions it puts forward. Whether, and to what extent, religion is either a causative factor of Modernisation and/or is getting dissolved owing to the Modernisation process; and whether the pre-modern dimensions of social and individual life such as caste, sect, tribe are getting dissolved or strengthened owing to the Modernisation process; or to what extent the pre-modern dimensions of society are supporting the processes of Modernisation. However, wherever the pre-modern aspects of social life may figure on the scale of Modernisation, their final destiny is seen as disappearance owing to the process in the welter of increasing industrialisation, urbanisation, social and economic differentiation and rising standards of living (much as it had happened in the USA and Europe) (Wood 1966). Besides providing the social and economic explanations of modernity, Modernisation theory was a tremendously political theory. It was a political theory with a political intent of fostering liberal democracies in the developing countries on the lines of the Western countries. The major part of Modernisation theory came to be known as ‘political development’ theory, which held that the newly emerging ex-colonial nations were adopting the liberal democratic constitutions and institutions and liberal democratic politics. Modernisation theory held that such a phenomenon was normatively correct. And following this focus, the ‘political development’ theory set about studying the nascent liberal democracies of the developing countries, where they existed. The focus was on liberal constitutionalism, universal franchise, private property, political parties, competitive elections, political participation, political socialisation, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, independent judiciary and an efficient and impartial executive. Development of politics in the developing countries was to take place exactly on the lines of advanced Western liberal democracies. However, the ‘political development’ theory soon came to grief in many African, Latin American and West Asian countries. The liberal democratic political institutions did not take root in these countries nor did they last the test of time. What happened was, even if liberal democratic institutions were initially adopted with great enthusiasm, they could not last for long and came to be replaced by either one-party governments or military coups or one-man dictatorships. Therefore, the adoption of and adaption to the liberal democratic institutions in the developing countries was more a contingent matter than teleological necessity, as was postulated by Modernisation/Political Development theory. The Modernisation theories, in turn, responded

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to these developments by calling this non-survival of liberal democratic regimes in the developing countries as ‘political decay’. India remained, by far, an exceptional country within the cohort of ex-colonial developing countries where liberal democratic political institutions had survived despite some ups and downs. The theorists of such liberal democratic success in India were Rajni Kothari, Myron Weiner, James Manor and a few others. Sociologists such as MN Srinivas and TN Madan had theorised on sociological aspects of Modernisation. These theorists of Modernisation did not dismiss the political phenomenon as an epiphenomenon. Instead, they concentrated exclusively on studying the political and social phenomena. This led to the process of examining how the ‘traditional’ social structures of developing countries such as religion, caste and tribe were adapting to the process of Modernisation as well as political development. Of course, this led to the other extreme of examining the social and political phenomenon in isolation from the economies and political economies of the developing countries in general and India in particular. It would be incorrect to assume that Modernisation theory was a simple unilinear theory. Some theorists of Modernisation process also held that reversals of Modernisation process were possible and not just a smooth transition to Western type of society and democracy, but social unrest and political conflict too were possible owing to the processes of Modernisation (Smelser 1966). MN Srinivas, for example, argued that the Modernisation process would lead to Sanksritisation, i.e. a process of reverse Modernisation wherein the castes situated in the lower rungs of the caste hierarchy imitate Sanskritic culture and the norms of the upper castes. For example, Srinivas notes that when such a phenomenon takes place, the status of women in the upwardly mobile social castes in fact goes down, as they are confined to homes in the process of imitation of the upper castes. This is a clear phenomenon of how Modernisation in the form of Sanksritisation was actually a reversal of the same. Goldstone argues that even many pre-modern revolutions were the responses to the process of rapid Modernisation (Goldstone 2014). However, all said, Modernisation theory, as it was propagated in the 1950s and 1960s, viewed the process of Modernisation as a ‘conceptual cousin’ of economic growth. The economic growth, that was initiated by the ex-colonial countries, was seen as an independent variable, whereas the process of Modernisation, as a dependent variable. Thus, ‘Modernisation’ theory, for all its reasons, too had given primacy to economic growth and development. Here too, though, religion was not seen as an epiphenomenon, it was surely seen as a phenomenon that altered, in a process of fading away, in myriad ways, owing to the rapid progress of economic growth. Thus, in a very interesting, but quite different, Modernisation theory too shared the feature of according primacy to the economic factors.

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2.1 Criticisms of Modernisation Theory Modernisation theory came to be critiqued essentially on political and economic grounds: politically, owing to its origin from the USA during the time of the Cold War; the context, timing and therefore, the intentions of the theory being targeted as counter-revolutionary. The subtitle of the book by Rostow (1991), The Stages of Economic Growth, was ‘A Non-Communist Manifesto’. The theory of Modernisation was even considered as an anti-communist enterprise; an imperialist ploy to counter the Soviet influence on the developing countries. It is well known that the criticism of Modernisation theory essentially came from the Dependency theorists of Latin America. They argued that the Modernisation theory, instead of looking at colonial economic exploitation and imperialist economic exploitation, looked at the third-world countries as ‘traditional societies’ and, therefore, posited a teleology of transition from tradition to modernity. On the other hand, the third-world countries’ backwardness or underdevelopment was the creation of colonial/imperialist exploitation. Thus, what the third-world country history exemplified was not ‘tradition’, but underdevelopment. It was the ‘development of [economic] underdevelopment’ which was to be focused. Modernisation theory, instead, sidestepped from this focus. Thus, to be incorporated into the world economy by creating market economies only perpetuated further the underdevelopment of the third world, and what is more, this perpetuated the dependency of the third world over the first world. Thus, it was not ‘Modernisation’, but ‘dependency’ which is sought to be perpetuated by the Western [imperialist] powers. Modernisation theory came to be critiqued on other accounts as well such as perpetuation of a Eurocentric westernisation of developing countries. Thus, the theory was critiqued as perpetuating dependency, Eurocentric or Western-centric thinking and intellectual, social and political dependency on the West. This entire criticism came prominently from ‘Dependency Theory’ from Latin America by Andre Gunder Frank and his associates. They criticised the framework of tradition and modernity as fallaciously conceptualised. They argued that the Modernisation theory was asking the wrong questions, in the first place, and that this helped perpetuate the dependency of ex-colonial countries on the metropolitan countries—economically, politically and intellectually (Roxborough 1979). The stress of dependency theory, however, was on economic dependency while the critique was essentially economic in essence. The above criticisms of tradition-modernity framework, however, did not generate more substantive discussions of the traditions themselves. Not least the religious traditions or traditions of religiosity. The political and economic critiques mentioned above were largely inspired by Marxism. The task of discussing and elaborating on the questions of tradition and modernity was taken up by some sociologists and political scientists in developing countries, who adhered to the theory and its postulations. They addressed themselves to the substantive questions of traditions and modernity. This particularly happened in India, a country, characterised as it has been by veritable cultures, traditions—religious and otherwise—and overdeveloped

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superstructures and more importantly, where liberal democracy has been a story of relative success, unlike many African and Latin American countries. In India, the theory of Modernisation has had a considerable impact on the theorisation of society and politics. Some sociologists and political scientists (Kothari 1970, 1995, 1972, 2012; Madan 1994, 2011a, b) have taken the theory seriously instead of merely dismissing it as an imperialist theory. Two works that are worth mentioning in the context of Modernisation theory are: Edward Shils’ book-length treatise on the topic ‘Tradition’ (Shils 1981), which deals with traditions in general, and the book by Milton Singer, which specifically focuses on India, ‘When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilization’ (Singer 1972). The latest in the thought of Modernisation theorists is the theory of ‘clash of civilisations’ (Huntington 1996), which explicitly recognises that civilisations other than that of West need not look up to Modernisation and Westernisation, as was postulated in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, the hypotheses forwarded by Huntington are that in the post-Cold War period, there was likely to be more and more identity politics internal to civilisations and cultural clashes between civilisations. The identity and culture became the organising principles of politics across nations of the world (In all, it is a philosophically relativist world.). In this chapter, we essentially focused on liberalism and modernity and their application, in theory, to developing countries in the form of Modernisation theory. We discussed the concepts of secularisation, Modernisation of societies and politics. We also discussed some of the prominent criticisms levelled against Modernisation theory. In Chap. 3, we discuss the Marxian concept of ideology and its relation to his concepts of alienation and class. We also consider the philosophical and sociohistorical contexts of Marx. This is followed by a brief discussion of post-Marxian theorists of ideology, Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser. It is very interesting to examine how the concept of ideology evolved gradually as an all-encompassing concept, thereby losing its critical and emancipatory potential that was to be found in Marx.

References Calinescu M (Winter 1993) Modernity, modernism, modernisation: variations on modern themes. Symploke 1(1):1–20. Accessed from JSTOR Doyle W (2001) The French Revolution: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford Freeden M, Stears M (2013) Liberalism. In: Freeden M, Sargent LT, Stears M (eds) The Oxford handbook of political ideologies. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 329–347 Fukuyama F (2022) Liberalism and its discontents. Profile Books, London Goldstone J (2014) Revolutions. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York Gray J (1998) Liberalism. World View Publishers, New Delhi Huntington SP (1996) The clash of civilizations and the remaking of the world order. Viking Press, New Delhi

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Kothari R (ed) (1970, 1995) Caste in Indian politics. Orient Longman, Hyderabad Kothari R (1972, 2012) (Intro. Prakash Sarangi) Politics in India. Orient BlackSwan, Hyderabad Madan TN (1994) Pathways: approaches to the study of society in India. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York Madan TN (2011a) Sociological traditions: methods and perspectives in the sociology of India. Sage, New Delhi Madan TN (2011b) Indian secularism in a post-secular age. In: Sociological traditions: methods and perspectives in the sociology of India. Sage, New Delhi, pp 3–22 Marx K, Engels F (1952,1975) Manifesto of the communist party. Progress Publishers, Moscow Mill JS (1992) (Ed. J. S. Acton) Utilitarianism, on liberty, considerations on representative government. Everyman’s Library, London and Vermont Mukherji R (2018) Twilight falls on liberalism. Aleph Book Company, New Delhi Rostow WW (1991) The stages of economic growth: a non-communist manifesto. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Roxborough I (1979) Theories of underdevelopment. Macmillan, London Shils E (1981) Tradition. Faber and Faber, London and Boston Singer M (1966) The modernization of religious beliefs. In: Weiner M (ed) Modernization: the dynamics of growth. Basic Books, New York and London, pp 55–67 Singer M (1972) When a great tradition modernizes: an anthropological approach to Indian civilization. Praeger Publishers, London, Washington and New York Smelser NJ (1966) The modernization of social relations. In: Weiner M (ed) Modernization: the dynamics of growth. Basic Books, New York and London, pp 110–121 Srinivas MN (1972, 1982a) Social change in modern India. Orient Longman, Hyderabad Srinivas MN (1972, 1982b) Westernization. In: Social change in modern India. Orient Longman, Hyderabad, pp 46–88 Srinivas MN (1972, 1982c) Secularization. In: Social change in modern India. Orient Longman, Hyderabad, pp 118–146 Weber M (1930,1965) The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Unwin University Books, London Wood RC (1966) The future of modernization. In: Weiner W (ed) Modernization: the dynamics of growth. Basic Books, New York and London, pp 40–52

Chapter 3

Marxian Critique of Religion

Abstract This chapter elaborates on Marxian criticism of religion and traditions. The chapter contends that Marxian theory should be seen as a post-Enlightenment theory. That said the chapter briefly dwells on the origin and nature of the Enlightenment thought and argues that the Enlightenment preceded the development of Marxian views on religion. Therefore, the chapter argues that in order to comprehend Marx’s critique one needs to understand both the historical and philosophical context of Marx. Further, the chapter elaborates on the theory of religion provided Marx, wherein he views religion as a mystifying ideology. The chapter elaborates on the views of later Marxian thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci and his theory of hegemony. The chapter also elaborates the theory of ideology provided by Louis Althusser as an ideological state apparatus. Based on the primary works of and secondary works of these authors this chapter endeavours to elaborate the Marxian critique of religion and religious traditions both as a theory of universal applicability and that can be applied to specific circumstances. The chapter also deals with the limitations of the theory. Keywords Enlightenment · Marxian thought · Marxian critique of religion · Ideology · Hegemony · Ideological state apparatus · Antonio Gramsci · Louis Althusser

Marxism is a post-Enlightenment theory. We hold this point because the principle of hermeneutic circle, when applied to Marx, means that Marx’s texts should be seen not only in their philosophical context, but also in their socio-historical context. In order to understand Marx, it is not sufficient to invoke the textual authority alone. The texts of Marx have to be seen in their socio-historical context. The Enlightenment movement came to its completion as a socio-philosophical movement by 1789, i.e. at the time of the French Revolution, whereas Marx’s text of Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts was written in 1844, though was discovered much later. Indeed, Marx belonged to, and was a successor to, the European Enlightenment legacy and tradition. Not exercising this hermeneutic understanding, particularly in relation to his writings on religion, does violence of abstraction. This violence is of drawing on

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. K. Vaddiraju, Reason, Religion and Modernity, SpringerBriefs in Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0703-4_3

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the ideas of Marx which originated in a certain socio-historical, cultural, context and applying them to other socio-historical cultures, which clearly evolved differently in different socio-historical terms. Therefore, Marx’s texts, particularly the early texts, should be read in their contexts. By the time Marx wrote and Marxian theory developed, the critique of religion as a false set of ideas had already been established in Western European culture. Whenever Marx’s approach to religion is discussed, only the philosophical transcendence by Marx of Feuerbach is usually discussed, leaving out Marx’s socio-historical context. However, this is only partially correct, as understanding Marx requires an understanding of more than his philosophical context (Worsley 2002). Such an understanding of religion as a false set of ideas, was at any rate, already popular among the critics of European society (Hobsbawm 1962, 1975). Certainly among the critics of society of his time and in the emerging socio-political movements, the Enlightenment was an intellectual, philosophical, social and political movement in Europe that began with and was a product of the scientific advancements around 1680 and after great intellectual and social ferment was finally overtaken by the 1789 French Revolution. Enlightenment, which took place in the seventeenth and eigteenth centuries, trenchantly critiqued Christianity as a religion. One may recall that this critique of religion by Enlightenment and its Philosophes took place against the backdrop of the long processes of Reformation and the Protestant critique of Roman Catholic Christianity. Admittedly, Enlightenment did not develop all at once. It evolved historically (Robertson 2015). Etymologically speaking, ‘Protestant’ religion began as a form of protest against corruption in the organised, established church. The philosophes of the French Enlightenment, or lumieres, carried it forward against all religions, with Voltaire being the most well-known philosopher and writer among them; the others being Diderot and D’Alembert and their associates. In political theory, much of the foundations of liberal political thought were laid in this period by a set of political thinkers, particularly those belonging to the social contractarian tradition, with significant contribution to the thought of the period. These included Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and J. J. Rousseau, along with others like David Hume, Montesquieu and Edmund Burke. Enlightenment had its roots in German philosophy too, as Aufklärung, with its most prominent philosopher being Immanuel Kant who envisaged the slogan sapere aude (Dare to know) (And was also known for his work What is Enlightenment?). Enlightenment privileged reason in both public and moral life. It challenged religion and attempted to know its limits. It also challenged superstitions and religious prejudices including the practices of Roman Catholic priests. Two other aspects of the Enlightenment are worth noting here. One, the emphasis on mutual tolerance: particularly religious tolerance as it was very important for maintaining peaceful relations between different religious communities. Second, and most remarkably, commitment to human betterment and universal happiness in this world of here and now (Robertson 2008); thus, Enlightenment not only propagated a critique of religion, superstitions, bigotry and prejudices, but also had a positive agenda of propagating an enduring mutual tolerance between different religious communities and that of improving the everyday living conditions of ordinary people in a broad sense.

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The Scientific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe paved the way for the Enlightenment. The ‘Age of Reason’ had many predecessors in the form of achievements in natural sciences. These achievements had all the potentiality of eradicating superstitions as well as bettering the condition of the larger humanity. The Enlightenment was not just limited to France and Germany. The Scottish Enlightenment and its pioneer Adam Smith led to the birth of political economy which lay the origins of today’s discipline of Economics. The focus of Scottish Enlightenment was on developing a science of political economy that would endeavour to better the living conditions of men and women in this world of here and now (Robertson 2008). The birth of political economy, in turn, proved revolutionary for human history. The birth of political economy was concomitant with the nascent capitalism in Britain; and in the 19th century, when this capitalism reached its inhuman industrial form by way of the Industrial Revolution, led Marx to write a critique of the so-called science of political economy and capitalism. The question of tolerance too was a hard-learned lesson from the preceding European history of religious wars, hatred and strife. Thus, what Enlightenment preached did not happen all at once, nor was it merely a theoretical issue. The lessons learnt from natural sciences, stemming from the progress of discoveries and inventions, and the lessons learnt out of bloody and prolonged religious strife and the terrible human cost that involved, led to the emphasis of Enlightenment on both tolerance and the concern, and the newfound possibility, thanks to the scientific advancement and innovations in various scientific fields, of bettering the material conditions of human lot. We use the word ‘human lot’ because though the Enlightenment as an intellectual, political and social movement happened in Europe, it was universal in its thought and potential applications. And in this, it was heir to the European Reformation. To put it in Robertson’s words: In his essay Was ist Aufklarung? (‘What is Enlightenment?’) (1784), Kant defined Aufklarung as the freedom to make public use of one’s reason with the goal of liberating mankind from its self-imposed immaturity. By ‘reason’. In ‘What is Enlightenment?’ Kant specifically recommended the use of reason in matters of religion, but clearly intended that it be applied to any subject that could be of benefit to mankind. (Robertson 2015: 6–7)

And Robertson clearly says: The Enlightenment […] was a European phenomenon, reaching across the entire continent of Europe, from Britain to Transylvania, and from the Baltic to the Mediterranean. It was also an Enlightenment which extended across the Atlantic Ocean, to the European colonies in North and South America, and from the Atlantic to the Indian and Pacific Oceans, there to encounter the cultures of India and China. (Robertson 2015: 14–15)

It should, therefore, be understood, the fact that Marx’s ideas were, with all their originality, the products of a post-Enlightenment intellectual and socio-political culture. We argue this again because his ideas and critique of religion evolved in the context of European socio-historical and religio-cultural contexts. Despite the fact of an universal critique of religion that Marx offers—religion and religious thought as

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forms of idealist thought, and therefore critique of Hegel, and idealist thought in all their religious and quasi-religious forms (Korcsh 1970, 2012)—this understanding of Marx can avoid much of violence in terms of abstraction that goes on in applying the critiques of Marx. This socio-historical context of Marx was the post-Enlightenment 19th century. The socio-cultural and religious context was that of European JudaeoChristian culture. This helps contextualise Marx’s ideas towards religion. This is certainly a sociological reading of Marx. Rockmore (2002, 2018) presents a philosophical reading of Marx. Marx’s philosophical critique and its context, both are important in our view, both for a better understanding of Marx—if only we consider the early Marx’s statement following Hegel: ‘philosophy is the quintessence of its own time captured in thought’. This practical and hermeneutic problem is due to the fact that Marx saw capitalism as becoming a universal phenomenon and offered a universal critique. This is not to relativise Marx to his time and society. The point is to take from Marx what is of universal significance, i.e. critique of capitalism, and what is of relevance to only his socio-historical context. Marx’s critique of capitalism was universal, as capitalism became a universal phenomenon, however, his critique of religion and socio-historical traditions clearly belonged to his times and sociohistorical background. We should understand that Marx’s atheism stemmed from the Enlightenment movement and, at the same time Marx transcended this atheism by arguing that it was not the atheism that would dissolve religion per se. Marx’s atheism was, therefore, much more than the ‘rationalist’, Enlightenment self-understanding of the same. Marx sees religion as an illusion. As something that holds men back from realising their true human nature. In Marx’s words, Religion is seen as an ‘illusory sun’ around which people move so long as they do not come to know their genuine interests. Religion is the ‘sigh of the oppressed’—of a helpless human. A helplessness against the circumstances over which he/she has no control. And in such circumstances, it also serves the purposes of an assuaging opiate. It restricts people from seeing their true position in the social structure; and their existential purposes in society, as also in their life clearly. Religion prevents people from seeing through their circumstances. To put it in Marx’s words: Religion is the general theory of that world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritualistic point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, its universal source of consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realisation of the human essence because the human essence has no true reality. The struggle against the religion is therefore indirectly a fight against the world of which religion is the spiritual aroma’. (Marx and Engels 1957, 1975, 38–39)

However, according to Marx, under circumstances of capitalism, religion serving the function of what it does, is also necessary. It forms the inescapable superstructure of class societies in general and capitalism in particular. And, therefore, it is a necessary feature of class societies. Any amount of criticism of religion qua religion cannot abolish it, unless the circumstances that give rise to it are abolished. Thus, in order to critique religion, one should begin with the conditions that lead to it. It is only by abolishing the alienating and exploitative conditions of class society that one can abolish its superstructure of religion. Without abolishing classes and class-divided

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society, there cannot be an abolition of its superstructure (Marx and Engels 1957, 1975; Callinicos 1983). Thus, in a post-revolutionary, classless, communist society, there will not be any religion; nor will there be any need for it. This in a very brief nutshell is Marx’s point of view on religion. Marx’s critique is, of course, directed prima facie against Christianity. And it is also directed against all the other-worldly religions as idealist philosophies. However, it is not all about simple atheism and rationalism. Following Marx’s writings, we can clearly hold that Marxism sees religion as an ideology, though it should be said that the term ideology is broader and more encompassing than religion in the Marxian lexicon (Parekh 1982, 2015). Ideology, according to Marxian theory, is counterposed to science: the science of Marxism. Ideology has a specific role or function to exercise in society. The function is that of obfuscating reality, in presenting reality in a topsy-turvy fashion. Religion according to this theory is only one form of ideology. How dominant is religion as a form of ideology depends on the nature and stage of the development of that society. However, as David Leopold says: Marx does not think individuals are permanently trapped within ideological modes of thinking. Ideology may have an initial hold, but it is not portrayed as impervious to reason and evidence, especially in circumstances in which the objective conditions for social change obtain. In short, these false and misleading ideas can eventually be thrown off. (p. 23)

Thus, it is a radical, post-Enlightenment stance that Marx takes against religion. According to Marx, this is a universal theory because capitalism is universal. Capitalist society that originated in Europe has transformed the rest of the world, including the ‘third world’, in terms of its image. Therefore, the theory that applies to Europe applies to all other societies organised on the lines of capitalist class structures. The Marxian critique of religion is connected to its larger theory of ideology. Ideology is a set of ideas wielded for domination by the ruling class: thus, according to Marx, the ‘ruling ideas’ in any age belong to, and are the ideas of, ‘the ruling class’ of that age. There is a clear connection between the concept of ideology and the concept of class: bourgeois ideology belongs to the ideology propagated by the bourgeois in the era of capitalism; this includes religion, but not religion alone. It is not done conspiratorially, though it might as well be done so. As David Leopold says: Very roughly, Marx’s account of ideology claims that the dominant social ideas in such societies are typically false or misleading in a fashion that redounds to the advantage of the economically dominant class; for example, by variously concealing or misrepresenting or justifying those flaws in the societies which also redound to the advantage of that class. As a result, ideology is one of the non-repressive factors that plays a role in sustaining flawed social arrangements. (p. 22) To give two paradigmatic examples: ideology often portrays institutions, policies, and decisions which are in the interests of the economically dominant class, as being in the interests of the society as a whole (Marx 1986: 303); and ideology often portrays social and political arrangements which are contingent, or historical, or artificial, as being necessary, or universal, or natural. (Marx 2000: 227) (p. 24) More generally, Marx portrays the striving to uncover essences concealed by misleading appearances as characteristic of scientific endeavour. (Marx 1981: 956) (p. 25)

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The important point that we must understand is that this concept is also closely linked to the concept of alienation in Marx. According to Marx, it is not only the working class, which is alienated in a bourgeois society, but also the capitalist class, even though the material conditions of living and existence may be far better for the bourgeois class in a capitalist society. To the extent the bourgeois class shares the alienation with other classes, it too is in the thrall of ideology of the age to which it belongs. Thus, ideology, including religion, is a historical phenomenon. The ideology of an age mystifies conditions as much to the bourgeoisie as to the working class. Religion, for example, is, and can be, common to both the working class and the bourgeoisie. However, the point is that in as much as this set of ideas, or ideology helps perpetuate the conditions of inequality and oppression, it helps the bourgeoisie to perpetuate conditions that are favourable to them. The entire point is that class, and ideology—including religious phenomenon—are connected phenomena. These two evolve historically and perform a function that history assigns to them. The classes thus may be conscious of this or may not be conscious of this. The working class, however, when it understands this phenomenon and realises its historical vocation, starts questioning the phenomenon. Or, ideally speaking, should question the phenomenon. Thus, according to Marx, religion is an ideology. But, ideology is broader than religion. Class societies need a justificatory set of ideas to legitimise their presence in the eyes of the oppressed. Religion serves that function. However, any amount of critique of religion, or for that matter, ideology, qua religion or ideology cannot remove them from reality. They are bound to persist as long as the material conditions that lead to them persist. Two later theorists, who substantively contributed to this tradition of theorisation happen to be the Italian communist thinker Antonio Gramsci and the French Marxist thinker and academic Louis Althusser.

3.1 Antonio Gramsci Gramsci’s concept of ‘hegemony’ in this context assumes significance (Gramsci 1971a, b, c: 206–276). According to Gramsci, when an ideology is given consent to, it becomes hegemony. Hegemony is the acceptance of moral, intellectual and ideational leadership. The ruling class rules not only through physical coercion, but also through hegemony in the realm of ideas, culture, religion and all the aspects of superstructure. The focus shifts, therefore, from the perpetuation of a false set of ideas by rulers to the acceptance of a false set of ideas by the working classes. The question asked is: why do working classes accept, or give consent to, a false set of ideas, if they are false anyway. This happens because of hegemony or moral and intellectual leadership, of the ruling class in the realm of ideas, culture, religion and superstructures in a broad sense. This exercise of hegemony happens in the realm of civil society (Buttigieg 1995) and in the realm of civil institutions, including family. This is where the ‘manufacturing of consent’ for the existing society takes place. Religion is one of the foremost

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among them. The religio-cultural sphere is also the one where hegemony does take place. Religion is not just a belief system; it has a concretised form in the shape of rituals, practices, discriminations, renunciations and refusals. All these form an ideology, a dominant ideology that leads to hegemony and the sustenance of intellectual and moral leadership. These are cultivated, exercised, extended and practised by the ruling classes and are ever-renewed in the pursuit of hegemony. Gramsci’s theory was developed in the context of the failure of revolution in Europe and in the context of the development of Fascism. Gramsci died in Mussolini’s prison. Gramsci’s entire theory is premised on the idea that a violent overthrow of the state is no more possible. And a gradual development of consent of people to revolution is necessary. Also Gramsci in this context makes a distinction between ‘War of Position’ and ‘War of Manoeuvre’ regarding the socialist strategy (Gramsci 1971a, b, c: 229–239). The theory of hegemony or development of socialist hegemony among the masses/people was part of the socialist strategy of ‘War of Position’, wherein the communist party would strive over a long period to develop consent and acceptance among broad masses of people through peaceful means. On the other hand, the strategy of ‘War of Manoeuvre’ meant a frontal violent attack through military means for the overthrow of the state. Gramsci thought that the latter was no longer an option for the communists in Italy in the context of Fascism. And therefore, throughout his writings, Gramsci emphasised his concept of hegemony. Thus, the concept of hegemony is twofold: it explains the stability of a capitalist state and how moral and intellectual leadership is maintained by the ruling classes; it explains how a socialist strategy of counter-hegemony is to be developed. Gramsci also distinguished between hegemony and dominance. According to him, while hegemony is moral, cultural and intellectual, dominance is a more violent form of control and exercise of power. The related concept in Gramsci is that of ‘intellectuals’ and their role. According to Gramsci, they play a crucial role in the exercise of hegemony. That is because he saw the function of hegemony as essentially by means of education and acculturation. Gramsci distinguishes between two types of intellectuals: one, the ‘traditional intellectuals’ and two, ‘organic intellectuals’ (Gramsci 1957: 118–125). Traditional intellectuals are the ones who carry the function of propagating the tradition. The Vedic Brahmins, priests, the Gurus and the Swamis in the Indian context. On the other hand, organic intellectuals are those who emerge from and work with ordinary people and they belong to the communist party. The working class as well as party intellectuals are therefore generally seen as organic intellectuals by Gramsci. The major function of an organic intellectual is the development and elaboration of the world view from the perspective of a particular class. Working class organic intellectuals would develop a world view of the working class, whereas the ruling class organic intellectuals would develop the view of the ruling class. Thus, there is room in interpreting the concept of organic intellectuals. The entire class of intellectuals that consciously work on behalf of the ruling class can be categorised as organic intellectuals of the ruling class developing the world view of the ruling class as opposed to the working class organic intellectuals. What Gramsci emphasised through this is the struggle that goes on in the realm of ideas and hegemonies between classes (Martin 2022).

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3.2 Louis Althusser Louis Althusser was a French structuralist Marxist. According to him, the reality of the capitalist world consists of an economic base, and upon it, politics and ideology are placed structurally and respectively. He argues in terms of ideological superstructures directly in contrast to the science of Marxism. He calls the ideologies of capitalism ‘ideological state apparatuses’. These are different from ‘repressive state apparatuses’ of police and the military. Religion, according to Althusser, is an ideology, that forms part of the ‘ideological state apparatus’ (Althusser 2014: 53–94). Althusser, for example, says thus: What, then, are the Ideological State Apparatuses (ISAs)? The following provisional list will give us a rough idea of them: 1) the Scholastic Apparatus 2) the Familial Apparatus 3) the Religious Apparatus 4) the Political Apparatus 5) the Associative Apparatus 6) the Information and News Apparatus 7) the Publishing and Distribution Apparatus 8) the Cultural Apparatus. This list is provisional because, […]it is not exhaustive […]. (Althusser 2014: 75)

(A detailed critical discussion of Althusser’s idea/s of ideology is provided by Paul Ricouer 1994: 44–72). We leave this at that because we do not think that Althusser’s ideas are a great advancement over those of Marx. Both Gramsci and Althusser continue the Marxist tradition of looking at religion as a false set of ideas. The only difference is that in Gramsci, the notion is far richer and Gramsci argues that though religion is a false set of ideas, people nevertheless give consent to it, thereby continuing the hegemony of the ruling class/es. Althusser’s view of ideology, which he theoretically contrasts to the science of Marxism, is not very different from the orthodox Marxist view of religion. Both theories develop the concept of ideology under the same tradition. There is also a certain Marxian understanding that whenever historical change takes place, superstructures lag behind economic structures. This understanding seems to postulate that the economic basis of society changes first and the ideas and culture of society change only slowly with great laggardness—that the past persists in culture, traditions and ideational superstructures of society, including religious superstructure. This view, however, fails to explain why superstructures have a resurgence even when economic structures are changing fast. Or, they are coming forth only because economic structures are changing too fast. The time lag is difficult to explain and here too a teleology is applied that it is only a matter of time before we look optimistically forward to the disappearance of religion and other superstructures. However, the time seems to be not ripe enough for that to happen. As stated in the beginning, we have used the words ‘religion’ and ‘tradition’ interchangeably in this text. If for Marxism, religion is an obfuscating ideology, so are tradition/s. More so the religious traditions. They are often treated as reactionary ideas and practices that hold back the working classes from their emancipation— those which need to disappear in the process, or, as a result of, revolution. Thus, Marxism does not appear to make a difference between religion as a reactionary ideology and tradition as a set of practices and ideas that follow from the past. Marx,

References

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indeed, says in his remark in the ‘Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte’ that ‘the tradition of all the dead generations looms like a nightmare on the brain of the living’. Thus, tradition is essentially seen as a nightmare from the past and worthy of little attention so far as Marxian theory and practice are concerned. The nightmares are at best to be abolished! It is very interesting to note, in the light of the above discussion of Marxian views on religion, what Kolakowski (1978) noted that in the end, (at least in his view) Marxism itself acquired the characteristics of religion! Or a matter of faith. In this chapter, we discussed the Marxian critique of religion, and by implication religio-cultural tradition, as forms of ideology. We discussed Marx’s original critique of ideology and later critiques under the same theoretical tradition by Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser. We argued that Marx provided a critical and emancipatory view of a world without ideology. However, later, this view came to be much diluted. In the next chapter (i.e. Chap. 4), we deal with early Habermas’s critique of Hans-Georg Gadamer and how the approach of Habermas evolved over time. It is interesting to see that later Habermas advocates a post-secular theory that came close to approving of the right to worship, faith and religion.

References Althusser L (2014) On the reproduction of capitalism: ideology and ideological state apparatuses (into: Bidet J, trans: Goshgarian GM). Verso, London and New York Buttigieg JA (1995) Gramsci on civil society. Boundary 2 22(3):1–32. Accessed from JSTOR, on 14 Feb 2020 Callinicos A (1983) Marxism and philosophy. Clarendon Press, Oxford Gramsci A (1957) The formation of intellectuals. In: The modern prince and other writings. International Publishers, New York, pp 118–125 Gramsci A (1971a) State and civil society. In: Selections from the prison notebooks. International Publishers, New York, pp 206–276 Gramsci A (1971b) Political struggle and military war. In: Selections from the prison notebooks. International Publishers, New York, pp 229–239 Gramsci A (1971c) Selections from the prison notebooks (ed, trans: Hoare Q, Smith GN). International Publishers, New York Hobsbawm E (1962) The age of revolution: 1789–1848. Phoenix Press, London Hobsbawm E (1975) The age of capital: 1848–1875. Phoenix Press, London Kolakowski L (1978) Main currents of Marxism, Vol. III: The breakdown (trans: Falla PS). Oxford University Press, London Korch K (1970, 2012) Marxism and philosophy (trans, intro: Halliday F). Verso, London and New York Martin J (2022) Gramsci: hegemony and revolution. In: Hegemony. Polity Press, Cambridge, pp 13–35 Marx K, Engels F (1957, 1975) On religion. Progress Publishers, Moscow Parekh B (1982, 2015) Marx’s theory of ideology. Routledge, Oxon and New York Ricouer P (1994) Althusser’s theory of ideology. In: Elliott G (ed) Althusser: a critical reader. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 44–72

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Robertson R (2008) The enlightenment: the pursuit of happiness, 1680–1790. The Penguin Books, London Robertson J (2015) The enlightenment: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Rockmore T (2002) Marx after Marxism: the philosophy of Karl Marx. Basil Blackwell, Oxford Rockmore T (2018) Marx’s dream: from capitalism to communism. University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London Worsley P (2002) Marx and Marxism. Routledge, New York and London

Chapter 4

Early Habermas’s Critique of Gadamer and His Later Approach to Religion

Abstract This chapter deals with the theory of tradition by Hans-George Gadamer and the critique of that concept by early Habermas. The chapter deals with the concepts of dialectical hermeneutics developed by Gadamer. The chapter deals with the question of the ontological priority of historical interpretations. The Gadamerian concept of inescapable pre-judgements and the concept of fusion of horizons. The chapter also explains how the concept of fusion of horizons is helpful in intercultural and inter-religious understanding. The chapter argues, following Gadamer that ‘understanding’ is not an empty concept; that understanding is for the sake of mutual agreement over differing cultural and thereby religio-cultural, horizons. The chapter further delineates the later Habermas turnaround on the question of religion and elaboration on the concept of post-secularism. The chapter further argues that the concept of post-secularism developed by Habermas is close to the concept of right to faith and religion in liberal theory. The chapter further contends that the concept of fusion of horizons is helpful in the context of developing countries as well, owing to the fact of the universality of hermeneutic condition. Keywords Dialectical hermeneutics · Tradition · Pre-judgements · Fusion of horizons · Cultural difference · Hans-George Gadamer · Jurgen Habermas · Critique of tradition · Secularism · Post-secularism · Right to faith and religion

Before venturing into the exegesis of Gadamer’s theory, there is a need to answer the question: why hermeneutics? Why Gadamer? Here the philosophy of hermeneutics is considered precisely because of its connection to the philosophy of religion in general and lebens philosophie (philosophy of life) in particular. Hermeneutics may have dealt with many aspects including aesthetics, music and so on; here our concern with hermeneutics is because of its close kinship with lebens philosophie. Our concern with hermeneutics is precisely because of its own concern to make meaning out of human life and existence through its efforts at understanding. Arguably, hermeneutics owes its origins to Christian theology and philology. It is, as we understand it, an offspring of the Reformation. We believe that despite sharing its umbilical cord with Christianity and religion, hermeneutics helps understand many outstanding issues

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. K. Vaddiraju, Reason, Religion and Modernity, SpringerBriefs in Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0703-4_4

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of traditions and religions and the quintessential question of mutual understanding, toleration and dialogue between them. And, therefore, in the following, we consider the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) belonged to the tradition of social theory known as hermeneutics. This is also known as interpretive social theory. Hermeneutic tradition deals with understanding and interpreting of texts (Anderson et al. 1986; Mahajan 1992, 2011; Stevenson 2000; Zimmermann 2015; Palmer 1969). This tradition started with the Protestant Reformation, wherein the interpretation of the Bible, for individuals unto and by themselves, without the authority of church and priests, became a major concern. Thus, the tradition has its roots in the Protestant religious tradition of interpreting the Bible. The major concern here was to correctly interpret the Bible so as not to misunderstand the word of God. However, this process of correct interpretation of the Bible, which was a major theological concern, gradually over historical time became a concern of correctly interpreting, without any misunderstanding of all the texts, including secular texts. Thus, the key word in this social theory is, ‘understanding’. According to the theory, ‘understanding’ is sine qua non of interpretation. A correct understanding of texts leads to correct interpretation of texts. Thus, though hermeneutics began as a process of interpreting theological texts, it has now gradually developed as a method of understanding and interpreting secular texts as well and is widely used to understand any text: juridical documents, utterances, dialogues, historical documents; discourses, etc. What originally began as a method over time, became first, a methodology, and then by Gadamer, an existential and ontological philosophy. The origins of hermeneutics are illustrated in the following paragraph: Originally, Hermeneutics was concerned with the interpretation of texts whose meaning is confused, incomplete, fragmentary or unclear. Although as a philosophy it has broadened its interests, it still retains much of its early philological character. During the 19th century, the discipline of linguistics began to emerge as an independent branch of knowledge separate from philology, literature and the humanities. To begin with, its aims were largely historical, tracing the connections between the Indo-European historical languages, especially Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin among others. This interest was also encouraged by the prominence at the time, especially in Germany, of studies of classical literature and philosophy as well as biblical and Talmudic scholarship. (Anderson et al. 1986: 63)

Gadamer was preceded in this tradition by two important philosophers Dilthey and Heidegger, who theorised hermeneutics. Much of Gadamer’s contribution lies in critiquing these theorists and developing their thought. Through these thinkers the direction shifted more towards two themes: phenomenological emphasis on understanding; and historicality of understanding. The two theorists that developed these themes are Martin Heidegger, following him, Gadamer. Martin Heidegger was a German philosopher known for his phenomenological philosophy and teacher of Gadamer (Inwood 2019). As a teacher, he had a great and lifelong influence on Gadamer. Although Gadamer differed with Heidegger on his politics and differed with Heidegger’s support to Nazism, Heidegger’s philosophy had a profound and formative influence on Gadamer’s hermeneutic philosophy (Di Cesare 2007; Warnke 1987). Gadamer did not support Nazism (Di Cesare 2007).

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Heidegger evolves hermeneutics from being an epistemology to ontology. Hermeneutics transforms from being a theory of knowing to a theory of being. This takes place via Heideggerian theory of Dasein or being-in-the-world (Inwood 2019). Hermeneutics, thus, is not just a method, an epistemology, but rather a way of being itself. It is ontological and not just epistemological. Hermeneutics from here on becomes not just a way of knowing but a way of being itself. Heidegger achieves this transformation by applying phenomenology to hermeneutics, and therefore Heidegger’s theory is known as phenomenological hermeneutics. Hermeneutics that began as a theological and philological method of explication, as a method of understanding, becomes thus ontology: a way of being itself; inseparable from the very human existence. And therefore, it is a fundamental way of existence in the world. And thus, is also a universal aspect of human existence. This transformation of hermeneutics from an epistemology to ontology is fundamental in understanding Gadamer’s philosophy. Without the development of phenomenological hermeneutics by Heidegger, much of Gadamer’s theorisation would not have been possible. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is premised on Heideggerian transformation of hermeneutics from an epistemological enterprise to ontological understanding. Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics can be understood in terms of the following essential concepts: historicality of being; temporality of being; prejudgements or pre-judices (Heideggerian the ‘fore-structure of understanding’ or subjective, pre-formed ‘fore-havings’); linguisticality of being; tradition; and fusion of horizons. We consider each of them below. First, according to Gadamer, all understanding of human beings is historical, as they are inevitably situated in history (Gadamer 1975, 1989: 279–387); they receive the social, cultural, political and all other conditions handed down to them. Besides, when they understand these conditions, they bring in their subjectivity. And according to Gadamer, this subjectivity too is historical. That is, there is no ‘objective’ Archimedean point of understanding either texts or given conditions. The understanding subject is herself part of history and carries the historical consciousness. Besides this, being part of history, or historicality, bequeaths the understanding person with certain pre-judgements or pre-understandings or pre-judices that historicality has handed down to them. Again, there is no objective, Archimedean point of understanding either of texts or life. In all, understanding a person thus begins with certain pre-understandings; pre-judgements; presuppositions or what Gadamer calls pre-judices (Gadamer 1975, 1989: 289–318). Therefore, when we approach a cultural object, or social condition, or social circumstance, we are ‘always already’ conditioned. This pre-conditioning of the understanding over time, of the being is called, ‘effective history’ by Gadamer; that is, history is carried by the subject of understanding within herself as part of the stream of historicality. We are all not only part of history; we carry ‘effective history’ (Gadamer 1975, 1989: 350–370). And our interpretations of the world, therefore, are continuous with past interpretations; in that sense, they are continuous interpretations with varying emphasis; this ‘continuity of interpretations’ is what Gadamer calls ‘tradition’; in which every interpreter is herself a part.

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‘Tradition’ in Gadamer’s notion does not imply only rituals or ritual incantations, though it might or might not include them. In Gadamer’s sense, we are all—even resolute rationalists—part of our respective handed down ‘traditions’, which form our horizons of understanding. Or, what is the same, these form the horizons of our inherited worlds. Therefore, even in an attempt to break with them, we are defining ourselves ‘vis-à-vis’ those traditions. In the first place, we come to be, and come to understand the world around us, and the circumstances around us, as ontologically given to us. Nobody begins without a subjectivity of, or understanding of the world, as a tabula rasa. The being is ontologically—‘always already’—carries pre-judgements and pre-given interpretations of the world. Therefore, the being or Dasein is ‘beingin-the-world’. Its ‘thrown-ness’ (Inwood 2019) means that it can choose radically different circumstances, but can choose only from the circumstance that is pre-given or priorly conditioned. (Recall Marx’s sentence: ‘Men make their own history; but do not make it just as they please’.) Finally, the interpreter of the world, texts, circumstances, etc., is herself part of the ‘tradition’ of interpretations and, therefore, carries ‘effective history’. Thus, interpretation is ontological. ‘Understanding’ is not something epistemological, it is a way of knowing, from an objective effort, without a background standpoint; rather, it is mode of being of the Dasein, or ‘being-in-theworld’. And being expresses itself, its mode of being-in-the-world, in language; therefore, there is an inescapable linguisticality of being. According to Gadamer, existence, or being, in order to be understood at all, is only in and through language. Finally, beingin-the-world comes to understand itself only when it encounters the other being, in language; thus, human existence is dialogical or dialectical. To put it differently, we come to understand our traditions, pre-judices and prejudgements, of which we are unconscious, clearly only when we face a cultural social world which is ordered and formed in terms of different traditions, pre-judices and pre-judgements. Then, what takes place is a better understanding of ourselves (we come to ‘realise’ or ‘understand’ that we carry so-and-so pre-judgements), our own traditions and pre-judgements and pre-judices in the light of others’. According to Gadamer, ‘pre-judices’ can be both legitimate pre-judices’ and illegitimate prejudices. For Gadamer, ‘tradition’ is knowledge. In fact, whatever in the tradition that cannot withstand rational knowledge should be thrown out. Therefore, those pre-judices which do not withstand rational argumentation and examination should indeed be discarded. Gadamer’s argument is against the artificial opposition that Enlightenment postulates between ‘reason and tradition’. Gadamer indeed intends to transcend this artificial opposition between reason on the one hand, and tradition on the other. On the question of tradition and authority again, Gadamer is clear that while tradition ipso facto does command some authority, that authority should be examined through reason. And while Enlightenment throws away, or intends to throw away all authority, for Gadamer, not all forms of authority are illegitimate. Thus, tradition is one of the candidates, which claims a place in the list of authorities as handed down reason; that handed down reason is the moral legitimacy of tradition. Any tradition which does not stand up to ratiocination should be discarded. All that Gadamer is postulating is that while tradition can be a source of handed-down reason,

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it need not always be so. It depends on the negotiation that we make with tradition regarding what to preserve and what to discard. Those elements of tradition, such as caste discrimination in India, for example, or racial discrimination in the West for that matter, should be thrown out. On this, Gadamer is in the same league as Bhim Rao Ambedkar. However, Gadamer is not just speaking of one tradition. He is speaking of multiple temporalities and spatial cultures. When we, hailing from one culture with one forestructure of understanding, encounter another culture with another fore-structure of understanding, what takes place is understanding. A fusion. Thus, understanding is always understanding of something. Understanding, according to Gadamer, is reaching an agreement. A mutual process of appreciation of differences. This is what Gadamer calls ‘fusion of horizons’. In describing the above, we have used only a spatial metaphor of other cultures, but it can even be a culture from another time gone by. Thus, what takes place is a meeting of our own ontological horizon with that of the other. This is what Gadamer calls, ‘fusion of horizons’. This can happen across space or time; and across different cultures and between different individuals. What results is a dialogue and a new tradition; or addition to the continuing tradition. Because Dasein is universal, its being-in-the world is universal, Gadamer holds that philosophical hermeneutics too is universal. Universality of hermeneutics means that all human beings, irrespective of their spatial or temporal locations, share these features (Gadamer 1977, 2008: 3–18). Understanding is both ontological and universal. And therefore, a fusion of horizons that we mentioned above is possible. This has two implications: it runs against relativistic understanding of human condition and meanings embedded in human cultures. And second, because hermeneutic condition is universal and ontological, a dialogue between two different cultures, however, different—in as much as they are human—is possible. The dialogical dimension is significant (Gadamer 1975, 1989: 370–387). This can lead to a dialogue with cultures that are different; between cultures that embody different pre-judgements and pre-judices in their cultural traditions. Dialectical hermeneutics, thus, opens up possibilities of a political theory of intercultural dialogue and avoidance of intercultural conflict. Thus, it is the same as intersubjectivity, or dialogue, between two individuals of different cultural traditions attempting to arrive at a mutual understanding. However, Gadamer, following the concept of Dasein and ‘thrown-ness’ of the Dasein, holds the primacy of traditions, constituted by their pre-judices and prejudgments. We can dialogue with other traditions only standing in the tradition from where we come forth. Thus, ‘tradition’ is inescapable. Moreover, being a continuous repository of interpretations constituting ‘effective history’, the tradition in which we stand is also authoritative; the tradition is above and beyond us. We enter it and fade away, but tradition in itself—as a stream of interpretations and effective history— continues. To repeat, in as much as it is so, the tradition retains its authoritativeness over being-in-the-world of individuals. This is not to argue that it is not possible to break with it. But even a break with tradition cannot be a total one. There is no complete and entirely fresh beginning either in history or for individuals.

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Jurgen Habermas, while being influenced by the achievement of Gadamer in the field of philosophical hermeneutics, criticises precisely the concept of ‘tradition’ in Gadamer. In holding tradition to be inescapable, and authoritative, Gadamer is foreclosing the possibilities of emancipation from the domination of tradition and the past interpretations of modes of life, thereby making a case for conservatism (Warnke 1987; Stevenson 2000). The tradition may contain ‘pre-judgements’ and ‘pre-judices’ that may no longer be in need of continuation or may be in need of an active break from them. Gadamer’s insistence of authority of tradition over the present, in that case is not tenable, even if we cannot make a new beginning from a historical tabula rasa. Gadamer’s emphasis on tradition and its authoritativeness goes against the emancipatory interest. Thus, it also goes against the interest of critical reason. Habermas says: Gadamer’s prejudice in favor of the legitimacy of prejudices (or prejudgments) validated by tradition is in conflict with the power of reflection, which proves itself in its ability to reject the claim of traditions.

(Habermas, Jürgen. On the Logic of the Social Sciences, Wiley, Kindle Edition). And Habermas goes on to say: But reflection does not wear itself out on the facticity of traditional norms without leaving a trace. It is condemned to operate after the fact; but, operating in retrospect, it unleashes retroactive power. We are not able to reflect back on internalized norms until we have first learned to follow them blindly through coercion imposed from without. But as reflection recalls that path of authority through which the grammars of language games were learned dogmatically as rules of world view and action, authority can be stripped of that in it that was mere domination and dissolved into the less coercive force of insight and rational decision.

(Habermas, Jürgen. On the Logic of the Social Sciences, Wiley, Kindle Edition). Further, Habermas says: Hermeneutics comes up against the limits of the context of tradition from the inside. Once these limits have been experienced and recognized, it can no longer consider cultural traditions absolute.

(Habermas, Jürgen. On the Logic of the Social Sciences, Wiley, Kindle Edition). Habermas also criticises Gadamer on the grounds that his entire theorisation is highly culturological and culture-oriented. It does not tell us whether cultures are dependent on factors beyond them such as the economic factors which allow cultures, including aesthetic cultures, to develop in particular ways. Habermas also holds in the text that we have quoted from that pre-judices of tradition; however, legitimate or illegitimate can be overcome through both science and reflection and that science itself can dispel many superstitions and irrationalities that come from or handed down by tradition. When even science cannot, we can overcome those most intransigent prejudices through reflection on them. Thus, Habermas at this stage of writing holds that tradition and pre-judgements or pre-judices handed down by the past need not be taken forward in social life-practice; that a break with tradition is possible.

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Habermas, at any rate at this stage of his writing, subscribes to the Enlightenment notion of emancipation and critique of the dominance of ideologies that cannot be justified in terms of Enlightenment concept of reason (Mendelson 1979). Therefore, for Habermas, Gadamer’s concept of ‘tradition’ is open to criticism as an ideology. However, as we see, later Habermas views these questions differently, even while holding that Enlightenment modernity is still an unfinished project. Habermas is today one of the most important thinkers on what he called the post-secular condition of humanity. Three circumstances have forced him to think or rethink the secularisation thesis. These are the questions of religion and democracy in the European Union; the influx of immigrants into the European Union and Germany, who have brought with them diverse religions that are not of European origin, and the attacks of 9/11 on the USA. These have made Habermas consider the question of religion in public sphere seriously. The paragraph provided below makes clear the attitude that Habermas takes towards religion. Even today, religious traditions perform the function of articulating awareness of what is lacking or absent. They keep alive sensitivity to failure and suffering. They rescue from oblivion the dimensions of our social and personal relations in which advances in cultural and social rationalisation have caused utter devastation. Who is to say that they do not contain encoded semantic potentialities that could provide inspiration if only their message were translated into rational discourse and their profane truth contents were set free. (Habermas in Walsh 2012: 43–44)

Habermas, who calls himself ‘religiously unmusical’, has put forward the concept of ‘post-secular’. Habermas is the only critical thinker who has shown exceptional openness to understanding and appreciating the importance of religion to human life. In his later career, Habermas has engaged in debates and discussions with Christian Catholic theologians such as Joseph Ratzinger, who was Pope Benedict XVI. Obviously, Habermas does not reject religion as a mere ideology. For example, consider the below by Habermas: We find in sacred scriptures and religious traditions intuitions about error and redemption, about the salvific exodus from life that is experienced as empty of salvations; these have been elaborated as in a subtle manner over the course of millennia and have been kept alive through a process of interpretation. This is why something can remain alive in the communal life of religious fellowships ... something that has been lost elsewhere and that cannot be restored by professional knowledge of experts alone. (Habermas in Walsh 2012: 46–47)

In this mode of thinking, religion is not dismissed tout court. Religion is seen no longer as an ideology or opiate, as in Marx’s terms. It is a meaning giving font of wisdom; something that complements the loss of meaning in modern life. While it is not a substitute for modernity, it completes modernity with what is lacking in it; not only in private life but also in public life and the public sphere. Habermas calls this ‘post-metaphysical thinking on religion’. According to him, these are ideas ‘that are still in flux’. Habermas clarifies the definition of ‘post-secular’ in the following terms: I use the expression “postsecular” as a sociological description of a shift in consciousness in largely secularized or “unchurched” societies that by now have come to terms with the

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4 Early Habermas’s Critique of Gadamer and His Later Approach to Religion continued existence of religious communities, and with the existence of religious voices both in the national public sphere and on the global political stage. (Habermas 2013)

And, he says: It is precisely the historical simultaneity of the forms of secular thought and of religious consciousness, which have now diverged into polar opposites, that leads me to explore the shared genealogy of post metaphysical thinking and the major world religions. For the selfreferential question about how we as human beings should understand ourselves continues to set philosophy apart from the objectifying sciences. (Habermas 2013)

Habermas’s preoccupation is largely with Christianity and the Western society and its grappling with the emerging world situation and the role of religion in it. Habermas does not engage prominently with Eastern religions. His thought regarding post-secular condition is important to the extent that it addresses the human condition of secular, modern existence and inadequacies that are inherent to it. Much of Habermas’s theory of religion is in the process of development. For example, a weighty volume devoted to the discussion of ‘Habermas and Religion’ (Calhoun et al. 2013) largely deals with Christian religion per se and is largely written by Western authors. The non-Western debates are conspicuous by their absence in the volume. As Habermas says: The controversial term “post-secular society” can only be applied to the affluent societies of Europe or countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, where people’s religious ties have steadily or rather quite dramatically lapsed in the post-World War II period. (Habermas 2008, p. 17)

In these continents, the secularisation process has already taken place. And now Habermas is questioning the secularisation hypothesis. Three circumstances have forced him to think or rethink the secularisation thesis. These are the questions of religion and democracy in the European Union; the influx of immigrants into the European Union and Germany that have brought with them diverse religions that are not of European origin, and the attacks of 9/11 on the USA. These have made Habermas consider the question of religion in public sphere seriously. The paragraph provided below makes clear the concept of post-secularism that Habermas elaborates. The description of modern societies as “post-secular” refers to a change in consciousness that I attribute primarily to three phenomena. First, the broad perception of those global conflicts that are often presented as hinging on religious strife changes public consciousness. The majority of European citizens do not even need the presence of intrusive fundamentalist movements and the fear of terrorism, defined in religious terms, to make them aware of their own relativity within the global horizon. This undermines the secularistic belief in the foreseeable disappearance of religion and robs the secular understanding of the world of any triumphal zest. [...] Second, religion is gaining influence not only worldwide but also within national public spheres. I am thinking here of the fact that churches and religious organizations are increasingly assuming the role of “communities of interpretation” in the public arena of secular societies. They can attain influence on public opinion and will formation by making relevant contributions to key issues, irrespective of whether their arguments are convincing or objectionable. […]

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The third stimulus for a change of consciousness among the population is the immigration of “guest-workers” and refugees, specifically from countries with traditional cultural backgrounds. Since the 16th century, Europe has had to contend with confessional schisms within its own culture and society. In the wake of the present immigration, the more blatant dissonances between different religions link up with the challenge of a pluralism of ways of life typical of immigrant societies. […] (Habermas 2008: 20–21)

In the foregoing, we discussed Hans-Georg Gadamer’s theory of philosophical hermeneutics, along with different concepts within it and the initial critique of Habermas of the same. We also discussed the later transformation of the standpoint of Habermas into a concept of post-secularism. We discussed that the debate had the potentiality of developing an inter-religious or intercultural understanding of the process of alleviating the conflict that emanated all too frequently from such sources. In Chap. 5, we discuss the implications of Gadamer-Habermas debate for religion. The point we would like to stress in the forthcoming chapter is that more than any of the other concepts, the concept of universality of hermeneutic condition and the concept of fusion of horizons and the consequent dialogic notion of human subjectivity and inter-subjectivity are most fruitful in helping us towards developing a theory or theoretical illumination of intercultural and inter-religious dialogue and peaceful resolution of frequent conflicts over differences.

References Anderson RJ, Hughes JA, Sharrock WW (1986) Philosophy and the human sciences. Croom Helm, London Calhoun C, Mendieta E, VanAntwerpen J (eds) (2013) Habermas and religion. Polity Press, Cambridge Di Cesare D (2007) Gadamer: a philosophical portrait (trans: Keane N). Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis Gadamer H-G (1977, 2008) Philosophical hermeneutics (trans, ed: Linge DE). University of California Press, California Gadamer H-G (1975, 1989) Truth and method. Bloomsbury Academic, London and New York Habermas J (2008) Notes on post-secular society. N Perspect Q 25(4):17–29 Habermas J (2013) Reply to my critics. In: Craig C, Mendieta E, VanAntwerpen J (eds) Habermas and religion. Polity Press, Cambridge Inwood M (2019) Heidegger: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, Clarendon Mahajan, G. (1992, 2011). Hermeneutic understanding. In: Explanation and understanding in the human sciences. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp 50–73 Mendelson J (1979) The Habermas-Gadamer debate. New German Critique 18(Autumn, 1989):44– 73. Accessed from JSTOR, 17 June 2020 Palmer RE (1969) Hermeneutics: interpretation theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer. Northwestern University Press, USA Stevenson N (2000) Questions of hermeneutics: beyond empiricism and post-modernism. In: Burton D (ed) Research training for social scientists: a handbook for postgraduate researchers. Sage, London, pp 21–32 Walsh TG (2012) Religion, peace and the post-secular public sphere. Int J World Peace XXIX(2):35– 61. Accessed from JSTOR, on 15 July 2021 Warnke G (1987) Gadamer: hermeneutics, tradition and reason. Polity Press, Cambridge Zimmermann J (2015) Hermeneutics: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, Clarendon

Chapter 5

The Gadamer-Habermas Debate and Its Implication for Religion

Abstract This chapter attempts to elaborate on the consequences of GadamerHabermas debate on tradition for mutual inter-religious understanding and harmony. The chapter argues that Habermas critique is circumscribed by the binary of Gadamerian tradition and Enlightenment modernity. However, there are many instances when traditions and even religious traditions have supported progressive causes of reform and also revolution. The chapter cites the cases of social reform movements in South India, the Iranian Revolution and the phenomenon of liberation theology in Latin America. Thus, the chapter argues that while the debate was within the framework of the binary of tradition and Enlightenment modernity; first, there are many instances where the binary did not exist. Two, still the debate is very relevant in every contestation between tradition and modernity on one hand and for the mutual understanding between different traditions on the other. Thus while emphasising the significance of the Gadamer-Habermas debate, the chapter points to many instances in India and elsewhere, wherein a middle path was forged between tradition and progressive modernity. Keywords Gadamer · Habermas · Tradition · Social reform · Political revolution · Liberation theology · Iranian Revolution · Religious reform movement in India · Fusion of horizons · Vertical hierarchies · Religion · Caste

To be clear, Gadamer does not dwell on religion; he deals with ‘tradition’ and holds the view that traditions handed down to us have a certain authority; and that we cannot live without or beyond traditions. Gadamer often and perhaps all too correctly invokes the reason of our own finitude for postulation. As finite human beings, we are born into a particular national, social and cultural tradition. That is inescapable. That said, we can discern without much difficulty that countries with thousands of years of past have accumulated, layered traditions. It is possible and in the context of countries such as India, there exist diverse traditions. Diversity is the reality of all dimensions of tradition. One can speak of a linguistic tradition instead of a religious tradition. And the crucial question is, which tradition is that one invoking and according to what expedient principle the invocation is done. And that is not all. Indian traditions

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are extremely hierarchical and given the principle of Karma and one’s ontologically determined Dharma, they are given a veneer of inevitability. That is, with the argument of transmigration and reincarnation of one’s soul, both in Hinduism and in Buddhism, one’s station in life is fixed at birth. The logic of Karma—cause and effect—and the theory of reincarnation justify extraordinary inequalities in all aspects of life. The Indian philosophical traditions, most certainly the dominant ones, run against the principles of the French Revolution—liberty, equality and fraternity. Seen from the point of view of modernity, Hindu, and to some extent even Buddhist principles are sociologically problematic. These principles are now being bitterly contested. It is unreasonable and even absurd to expect Dalits to accept the hierarchy of the caste system. Modern concepts of egalitarianism go against the principles of traditions, however old, and to whichever provenance they belong. The need for consideration and the importance of the Gadamer-Habermas debate philosophically problematises tradition. Similar philosophical attempts should take place—the problematisation of tradition—in contexts such as Indian. What adds to the problem is the opacity of sources of tradition, mainly found in the Sanskrit language. This renders overcoming tradition extremely difficult. Thus, the intra-religious hierarchies are themselves often insurmountable. The message of the Gadamer-Habermas debate is: we should examine our traditions critically instead of accepting their authority uncritically. Likewise, we should examine Enlightenment modernity and not accept the authority of the same uncritically either. The major strength of Gadamer’s focus on tradition, fore-structure of understanding and fusion of horizons lies in contributing towards understanding horizontal cultural differences. And according to Gadamer, understanding is not pointless; it is about understanding something in a process of agreeing with it. Understanding is about reaching an agreement with what is being understood. This aspect has the potentiality of reaching agreements our cultural differences that exist between horizontal social communities. However, Gadamer’s theory of traditions and prejudices is not effective in explaining vertical or hierarchical differences, say that of Indian caste discrimination or for that matter, class discrimination, which Marx so well called ‘class muck’. What Gadamer is forceful in arguing against is the Enlightenment’s ‘prejudice against prejudices’, particularly in the context of European Christianity and religion. Therefore, Gadamer’s theory has both its strengths and limitations. It can be applied to the contexts of religious understanding that can perhaps be reached horizontally, but has serious limitations when it comes to addressing prejudices that lead to vertical social hierarchies. This is with some qualifications. The entire debate between Gadamer and Habermas over tradition, and by implication in contexts such as Indian religion, seems to be embroiled in binaries of tradition versus modernity, belief versus Enlightenment and religion versus reason. The point is that religion has contributed to social reason and social change in innumerable contexts, sometimes even contributing to revolutions (Goldstone 2014). The binary does not hold in such contexts. In the Indian context and in many other such contexts, religion has contributed to social reform movements which, as a result of these movements, have led to remarkable social changes. Likewise, at least in the 20th century, two examples demonstrate

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that religion has stood with the oppressed towards progressive change rather than with forces of oppression. The two examples are the Christian Liberation Theology in Latin America and the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Whatever their subsequent transformations may be, these instances show that religion does not always splay, or play only the role of, keeping the masses blindfolded to oppression. Religion too plays its role in awakening towards realising the forces of oppression. The GadamerHabermas debate misses this point entirely. In all such movements what takes place is a fusion of horizons either between past and present or between two horizontal traditions or a singular tradition’s fusion of horizon changing, followed by an internal critique. As a result, a new hybrid social reality, a fusion of horizons, or new syncretic tradition is created. In Indian history too, many social reform movements took place within the orbit of religion, leading to tremendous social change: The 20th century Bhakti (devotional worship) movement all over India, the Sufi movement in parts of India, and the movement led by Basavanna in Karnataka and finally and most importantly, the influence of religion on the Gandhian movement of Indian freedom struggle. Gandhi operated entirely within the Hindu world view, but still led a largely successful resistance movement against the colonial British (Parekh 1997, 2014). And Gandhi also offered a critique of tradition, particularly vis-à-vis caste, capitalism and modernity; although he did this within the confines of Hindu religion. Gandhi not only championed religion, he also sought to reform the same. What is important to note here is that Gandhi had a deep understanding of other religions of India and the world, which helped him craft a fusion of horizons within himself, his theory towards religion, and religio-political practice. That could perhaps explain how he was both anti-communal and deeply religious at the same time. Thus, the binary that so starkly comes out in the debate between Gadamer championing tradition on the one hand, and Habermas standing for modernist left on the other, does not exhaust all the standpoints across a spectrum of possible transformations between tradition and progressive change towards a better world, modern or whichever name we choose to call it. Of course, one would like to point out that these religious reform movements, or sometimes revolutionary movements, took place largely within particular religions, or sects within them, and rarely between religions. In the above context, therefore, two Gadamerian concepts that are of great importance, more than the concepts of pre-judices, tradition and authority, are the concepts of universality of hermeneutics and the fusion of horizons. These two concepts, along with the dialogic nature of human inter-subjectivity have the potential of leading to a political theory of intercultural or inter-religious dialogue. The first concept, the universality of hermeneutics, essentially assumes that human beings are essentially interpretive beings. As Charles Taylor has put it, ‘man is a self-interpretative animal’. This concept of the essential interpretative nature of subjectivity and intersubjectivity and its universal character, irrespective of to which culture or religion one belongs, means that all cultures and religions interpret not only themselves, but also other cultures and religions for themselves. This assumes essentially a humanist notion of essential interpretive humanity among human beings. And therefore, what

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can potentially emerge from the mutual interpretation is a dialogue between the cultures and religions. That in turn can potentially result in a fusion of horizons depending on the fact that the original interpretations of other cultures and religions are benign. The benignity assumption is crucial to this. In as much as other cultures and religions are interpreted in non-benign terms or hostile terms, the dialogue and inter-subjective fusion of horizons are precluded to that extent. Here comes the role of mystifying ideologies that interpret other cultures and religions as essentially hostile. A fusion of horizons, therefore, is prevented by the distorting ideologies that perpetuate the differences between cultures and religions rather than attempting to arrive at or evolve mutual understanding and fusion of intercultural horizons’ bridges. The point is, that cultures and religions are constantly interpreted and re-interpreted according to the political exigencies and vested political interests. Cultures, religions and their myriad traditions, which are otherwise benign to each other, can also become hostile to each other owing to these intervening interpretations of them. These intervening interpretations are never constant in either cultures or religions. The hostility in one religion or culture can lead to the same response leading to mutual hostility and misunderstanding or non-reaching of an agreement, even to the point of peace between religious and cultural communities breaking down, rendering the fusion of horizons difficult. Since philosophical hermeneutics does not have a theory of state or liberal democratic politics, it is silent on such circumstances where animus between religio-cultural communities is actively promoted and cultivated. Nevertheless, in the absence of such active malcontents that advocate, promote and cultivate inter-religious hostility, the assumption of universality of hermeneutics and fusion of inter-subjective horizons works. This is very much like an ideal situation in which there are no religio-communal political parties, no socio-religious groups, no liberal democratic politics, no populist politics that promote hostility, but only peace-seeking cultural, religious communities populated by peaceful individual with benign intentions towards individuals and communities of other cultures. On the other hand, where hostility is actively promoted, where propaganda machinery actively manufactures discord, hostility between communities, the Gadamerian concepts of universality of hermeneutic understanding, fusion of horizons and the consequent understanding to reach agreement over differences through peaceful dialogues are difficult propositions. The point is ‘reality’ and interpretations of the reality are constantly in flux, creating mutual suspicions, doubts, animosities and breakdowns. Therefore, there is the difficulty in practical circumstances in reaching agreement over mutual differences through peaceful dialogue. The roles of political parties, political groups, quasi-political groups and of the state in dealing with them all matter enormously in such circumstances. Often it is hermeneutics of suspicion and mistrust between communities rather than of trust-enhancing understanding that takes place in circumstances of cultural or religio-political discord. In this chapter, we attempted to elaborate on the implications of the GadamerHabermas debate for religion in general and for inter-religious understanding in particular. We contended that the two most important concepts of Gadamer in such contexts were the universality of hermeneutic condition and the fusion of horizons. We held that these two concepts had a potentiality to develop into a political theory

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of inter-religious and intercultural understanding. However, we also held this was possible only to the extent that there were no intervening ideologies or obfuscatory manipulations that vitiated the mutual understanding between religious and cultural traditions. In Chap. 6, we discuss the concepts of secularism and post-secularism in the context of developing liberal democracies. Here, we argue that the much-anticipated liberal understanding of religion and religio-cultural tolerance often does not prevail and when such phenomenon is not forthcoming, the proponents of harmonious postsecularism and peaceful liberalism face discontents.

References Goldstone J (2014) Revolutions. Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York Parekh B (1997, 2014) Gandhi: a very short introduction. Oxford University Press, Oxford

Chapter 6

Post-secularism, Liberalism and Their Discontents

Abstract This chapter deals with the concepts of secularism and post-secularism as they apply to contexts such as that of India. The chapter argues that the Indian context with all its complexity with all the religious plurality is fecund ground for these debates. In this chapter, we were essentially concerned with pointing out the limits of the concept of post-secularism and how it was not very different from the concept of right to faith, worship and religion. We also discussed how in majoritarian democracies, these liberal concepts all too soon come to disappointment. While agreeing that it is a conceptual progress to speak in terms of post-secular theory, we also mentioned how it was of limited use in societies which had not gone through the transition of secularism and thereby are largely pre-secular. The chapter refers to the Indian context and the many concepts of the secular polity that inform the debates in India. Keywords Secularism · Post-secularism · Liberalism · Public–private distinction · Right to faith and worship · Indian constitution · Sarva Dharma Samabhava or equality of all religions · Dharma Nirapekshata or indifference to religion · The state · Indian politics

In the forgoing, it has been argued that Habermas proposes a concept of postsecularism in the context of a rising religious consciousness and strife in the contemporary world. In the following, we attempt to see in what way the concept of postsecularism is different from the earlier liberal concept of right to religion and faith. While the concept of right to religion and practice of faith under a liberal constitution has been a historically evolved right, the concept of post-secularism evolved out of the failure of secularisation process across the world. Thus, the concept of postsecularism has close affinities with the earlier liberal concept of right to religion and affirms only that right. According to Habermas, one need not subscribe to a radical Enlightenment disavowal of religion altogether, in order to practice progressive politics. However, the discontents with the concept of earlier right to religion and later concept of post-secularism emanates from the fact that the practice of these rights and concepts in the real world is neither simple nor unproblematic. This chapter

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2024 A. K. Vaddiraju, Reason, Religion and Modernity, SpringerBriefs in Philosophy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-97-0703-4_6

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argues that in a world where religious strife is so predominant a reality, what matters are the degrees of secularism enforced by the state in order to manage and alleviate religious/communal/sectarian strife. Thus, along with right to religion, what is required is a detached practice of secularism on the part of the state and privatisation of traditions—religious and otherwise—in a stronger sense of the word. It may be true that meta-theories such as Marxism and Modernisation have prognosticated the disappearance of religion. However, when answering the question as to why this did not or does not happen, we need to consider the fact of the liberal theory and liberal philosophy of granting individual and group rights to practice faith and religion. Polities that are organised in terms of the principles of liberal theory grant this as a matter of principle. Here, the question of rationality or irrationality of faith or religion or tradition is immaterial. In as much as it is granted as a right, citizens have all the freedom to practice (and sometimes propagate) religion, however rational or irrational the practice of such religion is. • Liberal rights and right to religion While discussing the phenomenon of resurgence of religion/tradition in social and political realms, we cannot overlook the liberal philosophy and its concept of right to religion. Liberal constitutions across the world enable right to faith and right to religion. The same is also included in the Indian constitution. This is a historically evolved right. This right evolved particularly after the Nazi denial of right to religion to the Jewish community and the consequent Holocaust. Thus, in societies organised under liberal constitutions, citizens have religious freedom to practice and to propagate any faith that they believe is true. Often, this may result in religious conflicts and, therefore, the role of the state vis-à-vis religion becomes significant in the above-said contexts. • Public and private religion The crucial question concerning religion in liberal societies is whether what is practised is religion in the public or private realm. Communist states do not allow religion even in the private sphere, whereas allowing right to faith and religion, liberal societies permit the practice of religion both in the public and private spheres. To what extent the practice of religion is allowed in the public sphere depends on the lines drawn by the state on the practice of religion and religious traditions. Public/ private dichotomy is central to liberal theory in as much as liberal theory grants citizens the right to privacy and a private sphere to which access is legally denied to the state. The related question is also the concept of secularism adopted by a particular liberal state in question. Some states do not permit the practice of religion at all in the public sphere, defining the public sphere as completely secular or non-religious, whereas, some other states with broader principles of secularism allow the practice of religion both in the public and private spheres.

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• Indian constitution and secularism Though religion has always existed in India, it is through constitutional sanction that religious freedom thrives in India today. Religious freedom is one of the cornerstones of the Indian constitution. However, liberal constitutions such as that of India, for example, have the dual task of maintaining religious liberty and at the same time, liberal, secular principles of religious tolerance. The particular nature of secularism thus becomes very important in this context. Two foundational notions of secularism for the state in India at the time of founding of the post-colonial state were that of ‘equality of all religions before the state’ (sarva dharma sama bhava as Gandhi championed the concept) and ‘indifference of the state towards religion’ (dharma nirapekshata as J. L. Nehru championed the concept). However, what the Indian state adopted was the former principle of secularism of equality of all religions before the state. Thus, the post-colonial Indian state of the Constitution (Mahajan 2008: 297– 310) justified the pre-existing diversity of religions in India. It may be recalled that the post-colonial Indian state was born out of religious strife and the massacres that followed of partition, but that did not prevent the Indian Constitution makers from making the Indian state a liberal one and the Indian secularism a pluri-religious concept. That multiple religious practices exist in India is a testimony to this fact of religious freedom being granted through the Indian constitution. However, the above-mentioned notion of treating all religions equally under the Constitution finds itself with the problem of religious communities themselves being placed unequally in terms of brute numbers and qualitative political importance. Thus, when religious communities are divided on the lines of majority and minority communities, the question of mutual tolerance and, particularly tolerance of minority communities by the majority community becomes extremely significant. Liberal theory—from John Locke onwards—does discuss religious toleration as a major virtue in a democracy. Democracy in principle and in practice means the exercise of majority rule and possession of minority rights. Thus, since majority communities come to power by dint of their demographic predominance, they also carry the burden of maintaining religious tolerance and the rights of religious minorities. All the discontents associated with liberal theory begin when this does not take place. Thus, religious communal politics in India is a red herring to any citizen, who subscribes to liberal political philosophy. The above digression into liberal concept of right to religion is important in the context of the concept of post-secularism proposed by Jurgen Habermas. Our question with regard to the concept of post-secularism is rather simple: In what ways is it different from the earlier liberal concept of religion and right to practice religion of one’s choice under the overall rubric of a liberal state? Once one accepts the liberal right to religion; however, the claim that Habermas makes over methodological atheism falls apart. The liberal right to religion and the concept of religion as an obfuscatory set of ideas do not go together. Because under the liberal concept of a constitutionally guaranteed right to practice and propagate religion, there will not be any further hindrances or limits to religion and religious practice. Or, to state the matter differently, liberalism comes with the espousal of Mill’s ‘Harm Principle’.

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As long as the practice of a religion by person X does not harm person Y and viceversa, both can practice their respective religions with absolute freedom. No metatheoretical justifications or rejections are, therefore, any more relevant. There is a distinct possibility of the concept of post-secularism landing us in such a quagmire. It is apparently a quagmire because witchcraft or any other irrational ritual can be practised on the lines of Bharata Natyam or Kuchipudi dance. All are equally valid traditional and religious practices that can be carried on as long as they do not apparently harm anyone. In other words, irrationalism may be allowed in the name of freedom. That ‘harm principle’ allows can be freedom for the encouragement of absolute irrationalism. Whether the state in that context should take a stance towards encouraging or discouraging such an irrationalism is a question of public ethics and political philosophy (by implication, for state policy). However, in the light of the failure of secularisation of the developing world, and also in the context of the emergence of multiple fundamentalisms in the contemporary world, the Enlightenment project and its concomitant principles of secularism and tolerance still make a great sense. The concept of post-secularism in fact dilutes the reasonableness of the Enlightenment project and to that extent may not really be of help in a world affected by religious or quasi-religious fundamentalism and strife.

6.1 Post-secular Theory and Pre-secular Societies In as much as the Enlightenment project of reason, tolerance and human betterment is incomplete in most of the non-European developing countries, they remain as presecular societies. The pre-secular loyalties and identities of religion, caste, tribe and race continue to remain quite prominent in the context of developing countries. In fact, these identities and loyalties often hinder the progress of reason, tolerance and human betterment in developing countries. In as much as this is the case, the project of Enlightenment still remains a much-needed aspiration for these societies. Not only that, many developing country societies remain pre-secular, given the liberal constitutional sanction to religion and acceptance of right to religion, faith and worship in these societies; secularism remains a highly contested domain. It is definitely true that given the close adherence of the faithful to their religions and traditions, the Enlightenment project is not something that can be enforced by the state. Sometimes, as is the case with India, the state itself is entangled with religion in its ambiguous and ambivalent relationship in terms of a highly flexible secularism. Bhargava (2013) calls this ambiguous and ambivalent relationship of the state to religion in India the maintaining of ‘principled distance’ and ‘contextual secularism’. However, since enforcement or imposition (these words may sound strong) of political secularism by the state is not an option available to these societies, nor is a strict separation of state and religion an available option, what is possible is only a dialogue between diverse traditions/faiths and religions in the public sphere outside the state to mitigate the religious strife. If mutual understanding on matters concerning civil peace is reached then fusion of horizons on points of understanding is

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possible. Herein is the significance of dialectical hermeneutics or a dialogue between different traditions/faiths/religions. However, for dialogue to take place on an equal level, with no one dictating the terms of the dialogue, there should be neither inter-religious domination nor intrareligious domination. Dialogic practice cannot be fulfilled in circumstances where one religion dominates over others. That will only lead to the political domination of one religion over others. The second problem is the domination of the secular by the religious. These latter two seem to be the dominating feature of liberal democracy in India today. Domination of the religious over the secular leads to theocracy. Domination of one religion over other leads to fascism. In as much as history is replete with examples of these, lessons of Holocaust and Auschwitz need to be heeded. Post-secularism, as a concept forwarded by Habermas, can be helpful only if it does not lead to the above-mentioned circumstances. Because neither theocracy nor fascism are welcome choices to multi-religious societies, the only way out from the all too frequent religious strife would be either privatisation of religion or domination of the secular over the religious. Since the liberal constitutional state does provide right to religion, and since there are always threats of theocracy or/and fascism present in uneven multi-religious societies, what appears to be the only solution is the combination of privatisation of religion and the domination of the secular over the religious in the public sphere. In this chapter, we were essentially concerned with pointing out the limits of the concept of post-secularism and how it was not very different from the concept of right to faith, worship and religion. We also discussed how in majoritarian democracies, these liberal concepts all too soon come to disappointment. While agreeing that conceptual progress to speak in terms of post-secular theory, we also mentioned how it was of limited use in societies which had not gone through the transition of secularism and thereby are largely pre-secular. In the concluding Chap. 7, we argue that if a Marxian concept and discussion of religion is to be forwarded, it requires some form of a concept of determination. That is, religion, culture or religio-cultures cannot be explained in their own terms. Marx famously termed these as superstructures, and if at all to forward a Marxian argument, it should be an explanation of these in terms of an economic basis that has a determining effect on them, at least in the last instance!

References Bhargava R (2013) Reimagining secularism: respect, domination and principled distance. Econ Polit Weekly XLVIII(50):79–92 Mahajan G (2008) Religion and the Indian constitution: questions of separation and equality. In: Bhargava R (ed) Politics and ethics of the Indian constitution. Oxford University Press, New Delhi, pp 297–310

Chapter 7

Conclusion

In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven … (Marx and Engels 1976, p. 14)

Abstract This chapter summarises the book and argues that we have considered three theories: Modernisation, Marxian theory and Hermeneutics in understanding and explaining the phenomenon of the religious upsurge in global politics as well as developing country politics. We have argued that the orthodox modernisation theory and Marxian theory have ended up in blind alleys from which it is difficult to go forward in comprehending and coming to terms with the contemporary phenomenon. However, the chapter argues that dialectical hermeneutics can show a glimmer of hope towards reaching mutual agreement over matters of cultural or religio-cultural difference. And that hermeneutics does not make many large claims about political reality. Whereas Marxian theory does. In order to understand the religious reality in terms of Marxian theory one needs to relate the religious upsurge to the political economy of the times. However, Habermas limits his discourse to viewing religion as unconnected to the political economy matters; while Habermas’s attempt to translate the sacred intuitions and truths of religion into secular enlightenment values and universalist egalitarian values of secular enlightenment into religion is quite relevant today, this may be inadequate from the point of view of ‘methodological atheism’ that Habermas claims to espouse. Keywords Universality of hermeneutic condition · Gadamer · Habermas · Marxian method · Political economy of capitalism · Secularism and post-secularism · German philosophy · Marxian theory · Fusion of horizons · Enlightenment · Mutual understanding and recognition

In the foregoing discussion, we have considered three theories that have attempted to explain the phenomenon of tradition and religion. We have used the words ‘tradition’ and ‘religion’ interchangeably. The theories we have considered are Modernisation, Marxism and Hermeneutics. We have considered Habermas’s account of religion in

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the light of these theories. We have argued that Modernisation theory and Marxism postulate an imminent disappearance of religion and religious traditions with the progress of history. However, one of these theories, Modernisation, now predicts a resurgence of cultural and identity politics and a resultant ‘Clash of Civilisations’. Modernisation is not seen as an inevitable process. Hermeneutic theory, on the other hand, holds a promise that an intercultural dialogue is possible and can be a way out of the impasse of the post-modern relativism of the Modernisation theory. Habermas’s theorisation holds much promise in explaining religion and religious traditions. However, the crucial point is that Habermas still attempts to explain religion qua religion. The major difference between classical Marxian theory and Habermas is that Marx’s theory of religion is connected to Marx’s theory of capitalism; or class societies in general. Marx denounces the approach of explaining superstructures in general and religion in particular in their own terms. Following this, if Habermas were to develop a theory on the lines of Marxian theory, he has to connect the condition of post-secularity to the condition of 21st-Century capitalism. We have seen that according to Marx, there is no abolition of religion without the abolition of the material conditions that lead to it. This is as true of the 21st Century as of Marx’s 19th Century. This is the essential point that we would like to stress. Since Habermas is still developing his theory of the contemporary religious phenomenon, and since he calls himself the ‘last Marxist’, it would be reasonable to expect from him an explanation of the 21st-Century religious upsurge in terms of the Century’s material conditions. As long as he follows a Marxian approach, he cannot explain the religious phenomenon in its own terms, however edifying he may find the religious phenomenon is. A connected point is also that we cannot explain the contemporary upsurge of the religious phenomenon in terms of the failure of secularisation thesis alone. The roots of the emergence of the phenomenon lie in the political economy of the times. This is the problem with Modernisation theory, which ends up in a cul de sac of ‘Clash of Civilisations’. Insights from hermeneutic theory can be developed, in as much as it holds the thesis of ‘universality of hermeneutic condition’ as a dialectical way out through intercultural, inter-religious, inter-traditional dialogue. This approach will have to go beyond both the post-modern blind alleys, such as that where Modernisation theory ends up and that of positivist Marxian theory. The latter appears to be still in the denial mode of the phenomenon.

7.1 Can ‘Fusion of Horizons’ Avert ‘Clash of Civilisations’: Is It Possible? ‘Understanding’ is understanding something. It is about reaching mutual agreement. In the above, we discussed the point of ‘fusion of horizons’ held by the hermeneutic theory followed by its concept of universality of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics holds

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the interpretative condition of human beings as an existential condition. Following its concept of fusion of horizons, can a fusion of cultural horizons, therefore, be helpful in averting the violent ‘clash of civilisations’ that we are witnessing today? The point is that while hermeneutic theory and philosophical hermeneutics are helpful in forwarding our understanding of each other, it lacks a theory of power. It is too soft a theory The world is not only constituted of horizontally situated cultural communities it is also constituted vertically and hierarchically structured; the world is also saturated with relations of power between unequal social constituents. Inter-religious domination is a huge hurdle for inter-religious dialogue to happen in the first place. In addition, the differences in understanding stem from the reluctance to understand by the dominant communities—and sometimes by the dominated communities as well. Consider for example the Hindu majoritarianism in India. Or for that matter, the still dominant West’s cultural attitude towards the rest of the world. Therefore, the concept of fusion of horizons has limitations. Perhaps, the fusion of horizons, particularly cultural horizons is possible at an individual level. Perhaps one can even argue that the fusion of horizons is possible between the erstwhile colonisers and the colonised. However, to expect fusion of horizons to avert clash of civilizations or civilizational conflicts is a doubtful proposition; and also, linguisticality alone does not exhaust our shared world. We cannot reduce Being to its linguisticality. There is also the point of ‘facticity’ or materiality of the world that leads to all the differences between cultural communities, which make mutual understanding difficult. Unless these questions of unequal distribution of power and facticity of human existential differences are resolved, the theory of hermeneutic understanding, even if it is universal, cannot go far. The point is that philosophical hermeneutics, as forwarded by Hans-Georg Gadamer, does not make such tall claims of resolving intercultural or interreligious/tradition conflict. Gadamer’s theory is modest in its contentions. Dialectical hermeneutics does not resolve the dialectic of conflict altogether. Dialectical hermeneutics can help understand each other in order to reach an agreement. It is modest in its claims; hence, we cannot find fault with it. On the other hand, Habermas claims to have a more ambitious project of developing a theory of explaining post-secularity. And therefore, is the question of expecting a more meaningful Marxian explanation of the contemporary phenomenon of the upsurge of religious/identity and cultural politics. However, in the previous chapter, we attempted to hold the point of view that the concept of post-secularism that Habermas proposes is not very distant from the concept of right to religion, faith and worship, as is postulated, for example, in the Indian constitution. This is a right bestowed by liberal philosophy to humanity. Marxist philosophy and Marxian regimes across the world do not recognise the right to religion, faith and worship even in the private sphere, leave alone in the public sphere. In contrast to that, liberal constitutional regimes, such as that of India, do recognise not only the right to religion in the private sphere but also allow for the right to practice and propagate religion in the public sphere. However, as argued in the previous chapter that the liberal concept of right to religion and the concept of

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post-secularism run into trouble in societies, which are not only diverse and multireligious, but also where inter and intra-religious domination is a prominent factor. Inter-religious domination has a tendency of degenerating into fascism, and religious domination over the secular has a tendency of leading to theocracy. Both of which erode the liberal political constitutional culture, which allows for the right to practice religion in the first place. Thus, the concept of post-secularism has considerable hurdles to face in socio-religious conditions and political circumstances such as that of India. If anything, this only makes us refocus on the Enlightenment project and secularism, especially as a public project—unlike Nandy (1992, 1997, 1998), who tends to argue against the Enlightenment Project—rather than focusing on postsecularism and giving up on the Enlightenment project. Enlightenment modernity, even if distant now, is a dream worthy of cultivating in circumstances such as that of India.

7.1.1 Degrees of Secularisation and Variants of Modernity We have argued in this book that the rise of religion is a global phenomenon. And while Habermas addresses the question of what and how this phenomenon is taking place, he does not sufficiently address the question of why this phenomenon is taking place. It is our proposition that the global rise of religion in politics is connected to the global hegemony of neoliberalism in the economies of the world. Neoliberal capitalism and the global rise of religion and religiosity are taking place simultaneously. There is sufficient ‘circumstantial evidence’ to believe that both are related to each other. Globally, neoliberalism introduced into economic policies by the developed countries in the late seventies and early eighties has led to vast inequalities in inter- and intra-societies of the world (Harvey 2005; Stegar and Roy 2010). This has rendered the lives of the working classes of the world, as well as the middle classes, vulnerable and economically precarious. The growing inequalities, precarity, unemployment, uncertainty, austerity, and casualisation and informalisation of the economies have led to increased reliance of individual and social groups on religious appeal. For a large number of people in the developing world, the neoliberal reality is what Althusser calls a ‘crushing reality’ (Althusser 1969). Religion thus becomes a ‘soul of the soulless world’. The states in question face a legitimation crisis. In such contexts, the only way to govern people is to invoke the ideology of religion. Religion thus becomes what all the names that Marx gives to it. Bennett (2006: 2011–224) has argued that modernity is critiqued in social and political theory from four standpoints: one, that of rationalisation as argued by Max Weber; two, that of commodity fetishism as argued by Marx; third, critique as articulated by critical theory; and critique from the standpoint of nature, as argued by post-modernists (In the world of this philosopher Jane Bennett, Gandhian critique of modernity does not exist!). Bennett for instance defines modernity thus:

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What does the condition of modernity consist? First, in a distinctive constellation of intellectual tendencies, including the propensity to subject established norms and practices to critical reflection, to seek physical causes for disease, to believe both in universal human rights and in cultural specificity, and to affirm oneself as an individual even while lamenting the lack of community. The condition of modernity refers, second, to a set of institutional structures associated with such a temper, including popular elections, rule by law, a secular democracy, an independent judiciary and free press, public education, capitalism, and monogamous marriage. (pp. 211–212)

Having thus defined the phenomenon of modernity, Bennett discusses how rationalisation, secularisation and disenchantment were discussed and critiqued by Weber, how Marx critiqued commodity fetishism in Vol-I of Capital (Marx 1906; Althusser and Balibar 1971) and how Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno discussed and critiqued culture industry, the latter being an offshoot of modernity. In the previous chapters, we considered Weber, Marx, and critical theory; we have not addressed the post-modernists. Liberal theory from French Revolution onwards focused on liberty, equality and fraternity. Liberalism also promises freedom for individuals to self-realise and prods as well as expects them to practice self-determination in all aspects of life. However, more often than not, liberal philosophical principles are violated by liberal economics. More so by the neoliberal economics. In that specific sense, liberalism, in its neoliberal incarnation, has both triumphed and failed at the same time. The problem with the theorists we have considered in the foregoing chapters is that they address reality from different philosophical perspectives. They do not consider neoliberal economics. In that way, they add strength to the comment on Western Marxism made by Anderson (1976) that while Marx in his intellectual life moved from philosophy to political economy, the entire Western Marxism moved away from political economy to philosophy. What is, therefore, warranted is the inclusion of neoliberal economics as the significant factor in giving rise to religion in global politics. If the neoliberal economic policies did not directly cause the rise of religion in the national and international context, they have certainly provided the context for the same. Thus, in order to critique the current rise of religious consciousness across the world, the blame should be squarely laid on neoliberal economics and the policies inspired by it. In the end, what we have, owing to the resurgence of religion in the public sphere and politics of developing countries in general and India in particular, is an outcome of degrees of secularisation and different variants of modernity (Kaviraj 2011a, b). This does not—and should not—force us to normatively privilege tradition/s and different variants of modernity that emerge as a result of a combination of globalisation, emergence of fundamentalism and neoliberalism. The developing countries and India among them are constituted by degrees of secularity and secularisation resulting in different variants of modernity. Some of these might be quite awkward forms of modernity; some others might be closer to the Western forms of the secularisation process. It is largely a matter of degree and some qualitative difference. However, as long as capital carries on its onward march of global accumulation, secularisation too will spread in corresponding degrees.

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This brings us to some methodological issues in interpreting tradition and religion and modernity in society. In this regard, the Indian writings of Kaviraj (2000, 2011a, b) and Nandy (1992, 1997, 1998) too, to a large extent, see the above phenomena as not connected to any phenomena outside them. To put this differently, the interpretation and explanations provided by Kaviraj and Nandy do not connect their interpretations of either traditions or religions, either subsidence or resurgence to any form of economic phenomena. The interpretations and explanations provided by them assume a large amount of autonomy to politics. Therefore, the heart of the question here—particularly vis-à-vis the writings of Kaviraj on religion and politics and modernity in India, is the extent of autonomy of the political. As we have seen, Habermas too gives unlimited autonomy to the spheres of religion and political and attempts to explain the same independently in connection to anything outside them. Kaviraj too, with all his insightful writing on religion and modernity in the context of India, does not attempt to consider the phenomena with respect to the economic realm or sphere. This attempt of explaining Indian modernity in terms of political economic categories and not just social-cultural coordinates is what is missing. In what ways does the new political economy ushered in since, for example, the liberalisation of Indian economy coincides with the beginnings and upsurge of religious identity politics in India? We started this book with the contention that there was a resurgence of religion and religious traditions in the world, including the developing world, and that there was a need to understand this recrudescence. We have chosen three theories to look at this phenomenon—the Modernisation theory, Marxian theory and hermeneutics. We held that this was clearly an exegetical work. We argued that in explaining the phenomenon of religious and even fundamentalist resurgence and that of the accompanying traditions, both Modernisation theory and Marxian theory had proved unsatisfactory. On the other hand, we pinned our hopes on the German debate between Gadamer and Habermas regarding tradition. We provided an account of Gadamer’s pre-judgements and tradition as well as early Habermas critique of the same. However, we observed that later Habermas had changed his standpoint to such an extent that it could hardly be consistent with radical Enlightenment standpoint. Now Habermas held the view that there should be a debate between secularists and custodians of faith and that the translation of the truths of religion into secular Enlightenment language and secular universalist, egalitarian, Enlightenment values into religious idiom is the need of the hour. This, besides, raised other questions such as whether pre-judgments, pre-judices and the traditions, were themselves not ideological in the Marxian sense; that whether they mystified power relations and oppression of various kinds or not—however ontologically inescapable—by the standards of modernity, the concepts of Gadamer appeared problematic. If they were inescapable, it even more stressed the need to overcome them. Our hope in revisiting the debate was that we would find in the debate a glimmer of hope that enabled us to combine what was best in the past traditions with that of the best values of modernity. Habermas too perhaps hoped for the same when he mentioned mutual translation of truths between the religious and the secular.

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However, all said, in social and sociological terms, pre-judices and traditions can be and often are serious ideological impediments to realising individual freedom and life opportunities themselves. Pre-judies in terms of gender, caste, race and tribe in the developing and developed world seriously constrict human flourishing. Liberalism recognises this, but only makes pragmatic concessions for religion to flourish—there are as many stances on religious freedom/limitations as there are liberal states. In order for the best possible worlds of tradition and modernity, in the end, one needs to be as critical of pre-judices and pre-judgments and traditions as of modernity. For developing world, where traditions mean exercise of ascriptive authority, domination and severe constraints on human freedom and flourishing, in all religions, the ideal of modernity still offers a glimmer of hope.

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