Radicalization, Terrorism, and Conflict [1 ed.] 9781443850902, 9781443846172

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Radicalization, Terrorism, and Conflict

Radicalization, Terrorism, and Conflict

Edited by

Tali K. Walters, Rachel Monaghan and J. Martín Ramírez

Radicalization, Terrorism, and Conflict Edited by Tali K. Walters, Rachel Monaghan and J. Martín Ramírez This book first published 2013 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2013 by Tali K. Walters, Rachel Monaghan and J. Martín Ramírez and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-4617-1, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-4617-2

To my husband, Peter, for his love and patience. To my boys, Jacques and Julien. To my wife, Tina, for her support.

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements .................................................................................... ix Editors and Contributors.............................................................................. x Introduction ............................................................................................. xiii Part 1: Radicalization Chapter One ................................................................................................. 2 The Leading Causes and Regional Security Implications of the Arab Awakening Saideh Lotfian Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 30 The Politicization of European Converts to Islam Emmanuel Karagiannis Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 47 An ‘Alternative Sense of Reality’? The Case of Anders Breivik and the Threat of Right Wing Terrorism Lyndsey Harris and Rachel Monaghan Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 66 Virtual Terror—From Training Camps to Virtual Sanctuary: The Impact of Islamic Jihad in the Virtual World Vivian Salama Part 2: Terrorism Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 104 Terrorism and Organized Crime in the Spanish Criminal Law: Reasons for Specific Punishment and Punitive Responses Pilar Otero

viii

Contents

Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 130 Conflicting Counter-Terrorisms: The United Kingdom’s Response to Terrorism since 9/11 Jessie Blackbourn Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 162 Counter-Terrorism: The Challenges of Intelligence and Effective Inter-Agency Cooperation in the ‘Game without Frontiers’ Mark Cochrane Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 201 A Decision Support System (DSS) for Intelligence Analysts: A Systems Approach to Understanding, Predicting and Preventing Intelligence Failure Peter Eachus and Ben Short Part 3: Conflict Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 232 The Symbolic Importance of Group Property: Implications for Intergroup Conflict and Terrorism Shannon Callahan and Alison Ledgerwood Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 268 Cyber Terrorism: Fear, Anger and Anxiety as Agents of Change Violet Cheung-Blunden and Bill Blunden Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 291 Cross-Cultural Differences in Navigating Contradiction: Conflict Resolution and Revenge Seeking Dong-Yuan Debbie Wang and F. Dan Richard Contributors ............................................................................................. 311

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

We are extremely grateful to those individuals who took time out of their busy academic and professional schedules to contribute to this book, and for their patience in dealing with our e-mails seeking clarification, exact page numbers and/or higher resolutions of images. This book would not have been possible without you! We would like to express our gratitude and appreciation of those individuals who have supported and continue to support the Society for Terrorism Research by their membership in the organization, their involvement with the Society’s Advisory Board and Governing Board, their attendance at conferences, their contribution of articles for consideration to the Society’s journal Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism & Political Aggression, their membership on the Editorial Board, and their peer reviewing of submissions. Finally, we are also grateful to Carol Koulikourdi at Cambridge Scholars Publishing for seeing merit in our project and for working with us on it. Tali K. Walters, Boston, Massachusetts, USA Rachel Monaghan, Belfast, Northern Ireland J. Martín Ramírez, Madrid, Spain

EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

Editors Tali K. Walters has been a member of the Governing Board of the Society for Terrorism Research since 2006. She has led STR as its president, organized the annual international conferences, served as Associate Editor to the society’s journal Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism & Political Aggression, recruited board members, and led the organization through strategic changes. Dr. Walters is a senior supervising forensic psychologist for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. She served on the faculties of Harvard Medical School and Tufts Medical School. She consults to the Massachusetts Department of Mental Health and to criminal defense and prosecution attorneys in her private forensic mental health consulting practice. Rachel Monaghan is a Senior Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Ulster. Her Ph.D. was from the University of Reading, England and examined the phenomenon of single-issue terrorism. She has been researching political violence in the United Kingdom for nearly twenty years and is the author (with Colin Knox) of Informal Justice in Divided Societies: Northern Ireland and South Africa (Palgrave MacMillan, 2002). She has published a number of articles on single-issue terrorism, animal rights extremism, loyalist violence in Northern Ireland and vigilantism in the International Criminal Justice Review, Space and Polity, Terrorism and Political Violence and the Journal of Conflict Studies. She is an Associate Editor for the journal Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism & Political Aggression and is on the editorial board for Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. J. Martín Ramírez, Professor at Universidad Complutense Madrid, is a leader in the field of aggression research from an interdisciplinary perspective. His main focus is on the biopsychic processes underlying feelings and expressions of aggression. He has studied such feelings in many different species, from birds and rodents to felines and primates. Dr. Ramírez has advanced degrees in Medicine, Neurosurgery, Law, the Humanities, Education, and National Defense. He has served as an

Radicalization, Terrorism, and Conflict

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International Security Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and as a Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institute for War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University. He is on the Editorial Board of several international journals. Dr. Ramírez is the author of more than 400 scientific publications in six languages. Among his multiple international honors, he is a Fellow of the World Academy of Art and Science, and advisor to the Professors World Peace Academy and to the Society for Terrorism Research.

Contributors Jessie Blackbourn

Australian Research Council Laureate Project Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law University of New South Wales Sydney, Australia

Bill Blunden

College of Health and Human Services San Francisco State University San Francisco, California, USA

Shannon Callahan

Department of Psychology University of California, Davis Davis, California, USA

Violet Cheung-Blunden

Department of Psychology University of San Francisco San Francisco, California, USA

Mark Cochrane

Consultant International Affairs Belfast, Northern Ireland

Peter Eachus

School of Social Work, Psychology and Public Health University of Salford Salford, England

Lyndsey Harris

Centre for Applied Criminology Birmingham City University Birmingham, England

xii

Editors and Contributors

Emmanuel Karagiannis

Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies University of Macedonia Thessaloniki, Greece

Alison Ledgerwood

Department of Psychology University of California, Davis Davis, California, USA

Saideh Lotfian

Faculty of Law and Political Science University of Tehran Tehran, Iran

Rachel Monaghan

School of Criminology, Politics and Social Policy University of Ulster Jordanstown, Northern Ireland

Pilar Otero

Vice-Dean of Law Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Madrid, Spain

F. Dan Richard

Department of Psychology University of North Florida Jacksonville, Florida, USA

Vivian Salama

Journalist and Writer New York, USA

Ben Short

School of Social Work, Psychology and Public Health University of Salford Salford, England

Dong-Yuan Debbie Wang

Department of Psychology University of North Florida Jacksonville, Florida, USA

INTRODUCTION

The events of September 11, 2001, with the terrorist attack on New York City, Washington DC, and the hijacking attempt on a fourth aircraft that crashed in a field in Pennsylvania, brought into sharp focus a danger that had heretofore been relegated to the third rung of investigation, law enforcement, and academic research. It wasn't that world leadership was not aware of terrorism as a potential source of risk to their citizenry. Rather, the manifestation of this phenomenon seemed to be rare and circumscribed. When terrorist events occurred, if they received much media attention it was because they had unusual characteristics - a large number of deaths (i.e., the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building) or an uncharacteristic perpetrator (such as Harvard educated Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber). The extremity of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States (USA), followed by equally devastating attacks in Bali, Madrid, and London (among other locations that suffered such attacks), brought into strong relief the importance of developing a clear understanding of this phenomenon. More recent events such as the right wing lone wolf attacks by Anders Breivik in Norway in July 2011, the killing of a prison guard on his way to work by dissident republicans in Northern Ireland in November 2012 and the January 2013 attack on the In Amenas refinery in Algeria orchestrated by Islamist militia leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar emphasize the continued diverse nature of the phenomenon. What we have learned in the past 12 years is that terrorism is a complex subject that requires multiple disciplinary and cultural perspectives to unravel. In 2006, the Society for Terrorism Research (STR) emerged from the recognition of the need for global, interdisciplinary approaches to solving the intensifying risk posed by terrorist actors. This international, nonprofit, nonpartisan, multidisciplinary organization was created to bring together researchers, thought leaders, and practitioners who recognize that, in order to thoroughly understand the concept of terrorism, to lessen its occurrence, and to prevent the devastation that accompanies it, understanding and intervention will occur on the boundaries of disciplines and cultural boarders. STR set out to create opportunities for the connections, collisions, and collaborations between those who are trying to solve the global

xiv

Introduction

problem of terrorism. The collection found in these pages represents one manifestation of those efforts. Radicalization, Terrorism, and Conflict (RTC) reflects the goals that STR set out to achieve. Represented in the pages of this book are research, theory, and analysis from authors from eight countries (Australia, USA, Northern Ireland, England, Greece, Iran, Spain, and China) that represent 10 different disciplines (political science, law, psychology, criminology, international studies, sociology, journalism, geography, engineering, and computer technology) and several different specializations within and across the disciplines (i.e., terrorism/security, aggression, peace, crime and intelligence analysis, and intercultural relations). The title accounts for the process of becoming involved in, the engagement in, and the understanding of the devastating violence that is the result of terrorist action. Because these elements represent an ongoing, evolving process, any effort to capture a static understanding is impossible. The reader of this book will find that events have occurred since the submission of the manuscript’s chapters that make some of the information presented obsolete. That is the nature of this phenomenon.

Overview of the Volume Radicalization, Terrorism, and Conflict (RTC) looks at the process of terrorism on the boundaries between disciplines and national lines, addressing current, rapidly evolving global issues and events. The volume is divided into three main sections that correspond to the key words in the title. Within each of these sections, expert contributors offer discussions on issues or topics related to the section. First, RTC looks at aspects of the process by which individuals choose to become actors in the terrorist theater. Saideh Lotfian provides a broad overview of the economic, social, and political culture of Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, suggesting these elements contributed to the recent outbreak of dissent and violence throughout the MENA. Emmanuel Karagiannis interviewed European converts to Islam as the basis of his qualitative study to develop hypotheses regarding the radicalization of individuals who choose Islam as their religion. Using the case of Anders Breivik who, in 2011, killed 77 adolescents and adults in Norway, Lyndsey Harris and Rachel Monaghan address the role of right wing movements as a source of inspiration and support for individuals who choose terroristic violence to press their political agendas. Vivian Salama provides the reader with a window into the Internet’s role in the

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recruitment and development of terrorist actors and the spread of terroristic activity. In the second section of RTC, authors approach terrorism from the legal side, across international jurisdictions, as well as through critiques of counter-terrorism efforts, with suggestions for moving forward. Pilar Otero explores the complicated issues related to legal definitions and prosecution of terrorism both within Spain and in the European Union. Jessie Blackbourn analyzes the UK’s response to terrorism, assessing the development of related laws. Counter-terrorism efforts must be conducted within the laws of the responding jurisdiction. Mark Cochrane tackles an assessment of those counter-terrorism efforts as they are conducted by the UK and the USA post-9/11. Peter Eachus and Ben Short present a Decision Support System, proposing its use in intelligence analysis. Finally, RTC presents the results of three significant research efforts that move forward our understanding of conflict as it relates to terrorism and the impact of terrorist activity. Shannon Callahan and Alison Ledgerwood present research findings that elucidate the symbolic importance of group property and how it may contribute to the motivations behind conflict and terrorist acts. Violet Cheung-Blunden and Bill Blunden present the results of their research on the psychological impact of fear of cyber-terrorism, offering an analysis of the effectiveness of US alert policy. Debbie Wang and F. Dan Richard look at cross-cultural approaches to managing contradiction related to conflict resolution and revenge seeking. We invite the reader, independent of your discipline or nationality, to join the global effort to find solutions to terrorism. Consider collaborating with a colleague from a different department, or from a university across the world. The Society for Terrorism Research can be a conduit for your efforts to start the process (www.SocietyforTerrorismResearch.org). Consider participation through membership in STR. Tali K. Walters, Boston, Massachusetts, USA Rachel Monaghan, Belfast, Northern Ireland J. Martín Ramírez, Madrid, Spain

PART 1: RADICALIZATION

CHAPTER ONE THE LEADING CAUSES AND REGIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE ARAB AWAKENING SAIDEH LOTFIAN UNIVERSITY OF TEHRAN

Abstract In 2011, the Arab world witnessed unprecedented and dramatic political events. First, the successful revolt of Tunisian citizens culminated in the ousting of Zein al-Abidine Ben Ali's autocratic regime. Similarly, the prodemocracy Egyptians forced Hosni Mubarak to reluctantly end his 30 year-old presidency. Libya’s anti-government forces, with the help of NATO military intervention, ousted Colonel Qaddafi, who had seized power after the 1969 anti-monarchy coup. In Yemen, public dissatisfaction with President Ali Abdullah Saleh led to widespread street demonstrations and external pressures which finally forced him to leave office after 33 years in power. Given the refusal of these leaders and elites to voluntarily hand over power, the Arab masses had no option but to revolt against their dictatorial rulers. Since then, there have been high expectations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) that the democratization of the traditional regimes is an end in sight. Meanwhile, anti-government protests erupted in Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other parts of the oil-rich region. Full scale civil war wages in Syria at the time of this writing. The failure of development policies and the rampant repression exerted by government forces have finally led to social and political rebellion of the citizens who have been excluded from the patronage system of the dominant political groups. In the minds of many people, the Middle Eastern dictators could not have endured for so long without a certain degree of foreign support from the expansionist major powers.

Causes and Regional Security Implications of the Arab Awakening

3

This chapter begins with a brief discussion of how a combination of internal and external factors such as resource curse, tribalism, social inequality, prolonged existence of oppressive hereditary regimes, militarization, corruption, and the great powers’ rivalries leading to support for MENA’s autocratic regimes, have exposed Arab societies to violent conflict and extremism. It concludes that the use of force and military interventions are not adequate policies to address the issue of the region’s new security challenges; and it is advisable and more effective to act before the outbreak of widespread political violence. The revolution in the Arab world continues and the threat of more armed conflict persists, unless priority is given to policies that foster economic growth, equitable distribution of wealth, social justice and guaranteed political reforms. Keywords: Arab world, MENA, awakening, revolution, citizen revolts, uprising, security, autocracy, democracy, political reforms The security environment of the Middle East and North Africa (referred to hereafter as MENA) is changing drastically as a result of the revolutionary wave of protests which led to the removal of four undemocratic leaders (Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, and Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen). The contemporary Arab rulers, whatever their titles (e.g., king, sheik, emir, prince, president, prime minister, general) have been accumulating wealth for themselves and their families by means of plundering, bribery, embezzlement, and other questionable practices at the expense of the welfare of their own people for decades. It should not have come as a surprise that MENA people have poured into the streets to protest against their corrupt elites, demanding their fair share of national income. Popular unrest continues in Arab countries with autocratic governments by the people who are tired of living under their rules. The Qatari and Saudi role with respect to Bahrain, Libya and Syria has been an active one, providing the evidence of the anxiety of MENA conservative monarchies. Saudi Arabia has zealously been helping to suppress revolutionary actions in the Arab world, and has provided economic and military aid to a number of Arab regimes threatened by popular uprising (Kamrava, 2012; Jones, 2011(b); Cafiero, 2012). To a lesser degree, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have assumed a similar role in the region. The rise of world oil prices have provided the oil-rich states with additional revenues to finance overt or covert destabilization efforts in the territories of their regional rivals and enemies. The Saudi and Emirati support for Sheikh Hamad of Bahrain have

4

Chapter One

included the supply of military equipment and military personnel who are fighting in the streets of Manama. The ruling elites are concerned that the anti-government movements and uprising in Tunisia and Egypt, which ended the political life of powerful autocrats, would become examples for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) citizens to follow (Kamrava, 2012). Arab autocracies are determined to suppress the citizen revolts as shown by the regimes’ violent responses to the widespread antigovernment protests in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. The critics of governments are arrested, detained, tried without charge, imprisoned and even tortured and executed to dissuade others from opposing the ruling political elites. With their colossal wealth or the generous foreign aid extended by their equally autocratic regional allies, they have easily acquired the means of social control and violence. They still have enough power and authority to organize pro-government demonstrations and momentarily stabilize their undemocratic political systems (Al-Rasheed, 2011). Until recently, compliance and apparent passivity of Arab people regarding their autocratic rulers was based on one or more of the following assumptions: (a) there is no significant differences between the political leaders; (b) the outcome of the elections are determined before the voting begins; (c) some marginalized groups (e.g., women in Saudi Arabia) do not have the right to participate, and most people have no choice in voting for their preferred candidates from the banned political parties (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt pre-2011 or the reformists in Tunisia); and (d) the despotic political leaders are invulnerable to domestic pressures from below because they are protected by powerful external forces. It was difficult for Arab citizens to ignore the myth of the invincibility of the authoritarian regimes. The citizens of Arab states with a presidential system knew that their electoral systems were associated with high levels of corruption; otherwise it would have been difficult for many contemporary Arab leaders to win the consecutive presidential elections until forcefully removed from office. Broadly speaking, major obstacles to political participation in Arab pseudo-democracies include the lack of perceived differences between the political leaders, lack of political knowledge, and the lack of trust in fairness of elections. The lack of democratic processes of political decision making had intensified the Arab people’s apathy over the years. The Arab citizens of MENA’s eight absolute monarchies have been given little opportunity to enjoy political liberties. Evidently, these citizens, who are not permitted to freely criticize the rulers, do not have the capacity to hold them accountable by voting, civil society activism, or any other means to influence the elite-controlled political institutions. In the next section of this chapter, several important

Causes and Regional Security Implications of the Arab Awakening

5

questions will be answered, including the following: What are the causes of Arab citizen revolts? What is the impact of the rise in income and wealth inequality on authoritarianism? What kind of changes might be expected inside the region as a result of the Arab awakening? What steps should be taken to encourage the democratization trends in the region?

Some Terminological Considerations Before discussing the reasons for the growing unrest in Arab MENA, it is worth saying something about the Arab scholars’ preference for the use of the terms “Arab revolution” or “Arab uprising,” over the most frequently used idea of an “Arab Spring.” As a Lebanese scholar Rami Khouri noted, the use of the Arab Spring term denotes “some subtle Orientalism at work,” by speaking of Arab people as if they “all think and behave the same way.”1 Despite the fact that the revolutionary process is still in progress in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, the people’s 2010-2011 "rebellions" or "uprisings" are called Tunisia’s “Jasmine Revolution” after its national flower, Egypt’s “Nile Revolution,” and the Libyan “Revolution of 2011.” Moreover, it has been asserted that these citizen revolts are “Anger Revolutions” against the political systems of Arab countries (Kazamias, 2011, p. 144). This explains the preference for the use of Arab awakening in the title of this chapter.

Reviewing the Causes of Arab Citizen Revolts First, the reasons for the growing unrest in Arab MENA will be examined. Some researchers have argued that globalization has led to the reawakening of Arab citizens (Tagma, 2011; Posusney, 2003). Other people have focused solely on the domestic economic and social factors, including rising levels of relative inequality within Arab societies, corruption, favoritism, crony capitalism2 and economic mismanagement (Dahl, 2012; Campante & Chor, 2012; Springborg, 2011; Brownlee, 2011; Meguid et. al., 2011). Another group of scholars have focused instead on the political forces within these societies, which have led to the restricted 1

Arab citizens themselves have a preference for the use of the following terms: “Revolution” (or thawra, in Arabic), “uprising” (intifada), “awakening” (sahwa), “renaissance” (nahda), and “citizen revolt” (Khouri, 2011). 2 In this kind of capitalism, economic power is concentrated in a few networks close to the ruler or his family involved in systematic plundering, as in Egypt under Mubarak, and Tunisia under Ben Ali (Droz-Vincent, 2011, p. 10).

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Chapter One

political participation, the restraints on citizen civil liberties, militarization, and in general the absence of a viable civil society (Dupont & Passy, 2012; Dalacoura, 2012; Lutterbeck, 2013; Alimi & Meyer, 2011). The Arab League population in 2011 was about 365 million from 22 different countries, most of them with large urban populations, which make up over 70% of their total population, according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (see Table 1.1) The changes in the urban-rural population ratios, as a result of increased human migration from villages to the largest cities, have created economic and security challenges for Arab governments, which are now more susceptible to destabilizing urban riots. Of about 365 million people living in the 22 Arab League members, 83.43 million (or 23%) of the people of Arab MENA still live under traditional monarchical systems. The remaining 282 million live in countries with a presidential system. Egypt alone makes up almost one-fourth of the population of the Arab world. Four Arab states (Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and Sudan) account for half of the Arab population of the MENA. Whereas the population of the six member states of the GCC is about 44.83 million (or only 12% of Arab MENA population). For security reasons, the GCC governments have been secretive about their small native population, and are believed to overestimate their national population. Qatar’s native population numbers only 200,000 (or 12.5% of the total population of about 1.6 million); and thus the Qataris are a minority in their own country. Similarly, the UAE population is made up of less than 12% citizens and over 88% non-native temporary residents, or guest workers. The foreigners outnumber the Emirati citizens. There are inconsistent statistics on the population of the UAE. According to the World Factbook, the population of the country was estimated at 5,314,317 in July 2012 (“The World Factbook 2011,” 2012). Whereas another official source reported that the population of the small Persian Gulf country was 8.9 million in 2009 (“Background note,” 2011). According to the UAE’s National Bureau of Statistics, the country’s total native population was 947,997, or about 11.4% of its total population of 8.264 million in mid-2010 (“UAE population,” 2012).3

3

There are conflicting statistics for the UAE population because it is a matter of national security to hide the fact that the natives are so few in numbers. Sometimes, the size of its population is lower than the previous years, because of the departure of the expats from the UAE (“UAE population,” 2012).

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Table 1.1: Comparing 2011 Population, GDP per Capita, Human Development Index (HDI), and Gender Inequality Index (GNI) for the 22 Arab League Members Country

Population (in millions)*

Population Rank**

GDP per Capita#

GDP per Capita Rank# #

HDIൔ

HDI Rankൔൔ

GNI±

Algeria Bahrain Comoros Djibouti Egypt

35.98 1.32 0.75 0.90 82.54

3 20 22 21 1

7,421 32,233 1,074 2,106 5,151

10 4 19 18 11

0.698 0.806 0.644

0.412 0.288 0.599

Iraq

32.66

4

3,222

16

0.573

Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Libya Mauritania Morocco

6.33 2.82 4.26 6.42 3.54 32.27

13 18 14 12 16 5

5,082 45,539 11,868 14,985 1,751 4,081

12 3 8 7 19 14

0.698 0.760 0.739 0.760 0.582

Oman Palestinian Territory Qatar Saudi Arabia Somalia Sudan ୛

2.85 4.15

17 15

23,333 2,656

5 17

0.705 -

11 (96) 3 (42) 12 (113) 15 (132) 10 (95) 5 (63) 7 (71) 6 (64) 14 (130) 8 (89) -

1.87 28.08

19 6

82,978 21,321

1 6

0.831 0.770

2 (37) 4 (56)

0.549 0.646

9.56 44.63

10 2

2,007

18

0.408

0.611

Syria

20.76

8

4,295

13

0.632

Tunisia United Arab Emirates Yemen ୛୛

10.59 7.89

9 11

7,512 52,435

9 2

0.698 0.846

17 (169) 13 (119) 9 (94) 1 (30)

24.80

7

2,243

17

0.462

*

Denotes unavailable data. (“Human Development Report,” 2011).

16 (154)

0.579 0.456 0.229 0.440 0.314 0.605 0.510 0.309 -

0.474 0.293 0.234 0.769

8 ୛

**

୛୛

# ##

ൔ

ൔൔ

±

Chapter One This figure includes the population of the South Sudan which gained independence in July 2011. The 2012 World Bank data puts Sudan population at 34.32 millions (World Bank, 2012). The rank order of the 22 members of the Arab League based on their 2011 total population in millions from the most to the least populated states (1 is most and 22 is least populated). The largest percentages of total population living in urban areas are seen in the six southern Persian Gulf Arab monarchies of Kuwait (98.4%), Qatar (95.9%), Bahrain (88.7%), UAE (84.4%), Saudi Arabia (82.3%), and Oman (73.3%). Yemen has one of the lowest percentages of urban population with only 32.4% of the Yemenis residing in cities. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita expressed in purchasing power parity (PPP) and constant 2005 international U.S. dollars (World Bank, 2011). The rank order of the 22 Arab League members based on their 2011 GDP per capita in U.S. dollars from the highest-income to lowest-income states (1 is the highest income state). Human Development Index (HDI) is a useful indicator of the level of national development and well-being of the Arab citizens (“Human Development Report,” 2011). The rank order of the key Arab states based on the latest HDI, followed by their rank among 187 countries in parentheses and in italic (“Human Development Report,” 2011). Gender Inequality Index (GNI) measures inequality between women and men (“Human Development Report,” 2011).

Despite the absence of reliable and unbiased statistics, these population data are significant for at least two reasons: 1) It shows that unlike the rest of Arab MENA, the citizens are a minority or a small majority in most GCC states. Expatriates are not likely to start a revolution, and are more controllable; and 2) Despite an unequal income distribution, the enormous national resources of Qatar, UAE and Kuwait have enabled the rulers to maintain a high standard of living for the large majority of the natives. It is worth noting that even the most affluent Arab regimes have come under increasing pressures to provide opportunities for political participation through free and fair elections, to permit the creation of political parties, and work toward higher degrees of economic and political equality.4

4

Recently, the Emirates Center for Human Rights in London revealed that Sheik Sultan al-Qasimi from Ras al-Khaimah, which is one of the seven emirates making up the UAE, was under detention. He is a member of the ruling family and is the head of an Islamist reformist group, called al-Islah (Reform) which has criticized the ruling regime (Murphy, 2012).

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Similarly, one cannot compare the extent of income inequalities within Arab countries, because there is a dearth of reliable and consistent data. In fact, national statistics have been scare and largely unreliable for many Arab states. Many scholars have mentioned the importance of the availability of consistent time series data for policymaking and policy evaluation, which are accessible in the public domain. For instance, Mackey (1987) writing about Saudi Arabia’s development plans, pointed out that “much of the data on which the Third Plan was built, as with the Second, was conjecture on the part of Westerners trying to plan for the Saudis” (p. 54). In general, economic data are more available than the complex political data on human rights violations, political prisoners, press freedom restrictions, and other instances of disrespect for civil liberties. However, for most Arab states social and economic data are also scarce, particularly measures indicating the extent of poverty, inequality and corruption. As a first step in producing a reliable data source and filling the gaps, the first Human Development Report on the Arab World was released in 2002, and presented data on the status of such development indicators as literacy, life expectancy, and poverty (“Arab Human Development Report 2002,” 2002). The 2011 Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (in constant 2005 purchasing power parity dollars) of Arab states was $8,554, and much lower than the world GNI per capita of $10,082, or the value of $33,352 GNI per capita reported for the very high human development countries (“Human Development Report 2011,” 2011). The number of poor Arab citizens has grown, and the gap between the rich and the poor has continued to widen in most Arab societies. The unemployment and underemployment rates in Arab MENA have been high.5 Many Arab citizens are struggling with low incomes that force them either to live in poverty, or barely above the national and international poverty lines. In 2009, 22% of Egyptians,6 about 35% of Yemenis, over 13% of all Jordanians, 3.8% of Tunisians, 9% of Moroccans, and about 23% of Iraqis lived below their national poverty line. More than 11 million people in Yemen, about 4.5 million people in Egypt, 3.2 million people in 5

Morocco has the highest rate of employed men (47%) and women (65%) in vulnerable jobs, which may not provide safety nets to protect them against economic crisis (World Bank, 2012). 6 A report by the Egyptian Council of Ministries put the number of people living below the national poverty line at 22% in 2010, compared to 17% in 2000. There is also an unequal geographical distribution of the poverty, indicated by the fact that 20% of the poor live in cities, and 80% of them are residing in the rural areas. For a discussion of Egypt’s economic woes, see Meguid, et al. (2011, p. 12).

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Morocco, 1 million people in Syria and many thousands in other Arab societies were in multidimensional poverty.7 Appallingly, 65.6% of people in Somalia and over one-third of the population of Yemen are in severe poverty (“Human Development Report 2011,” 2011). These cross-national data reported for the Arab world reveal the urgency of addressing the problems of inequality and poverty, which have led to social discrimination and political exclusion. The available data show that Arab governments must redistribute more and with no further delays. Arab political elites have largely ignored the impact of economic underdevelopment and political instability; otherwise they would have provided more resources for economic development. Economic growth and prosperity vary considerably across Arab countries, which are at different stages of political development. The rich-poor divide in the Arab world is growing. In 2011, Qatar had a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita equal to $82,978, while the per capital income of Sudan was $2,007 (See Table 1.1). Some MENA states are in possession of considerable resource wealth. Whereas the nature has been cruel to some of the regional states that have to struggle with resource scarcity of even fresh water. The Human Development Index (HDI)8 of Arab states for 2011 was 0.641, which was lower than the world’s HDI of 0.682. The UNDP (2011) reported that between 1980 and 2011, the HDI of Arab countries increased from 0.444 to 0.641, while that of the world changed from 0.558 to 0.682 (See Table 1.1). It is important to note that when the 2011 HDI of Arab states are adjusted to inequality in the three basic dimensions of human development (i.e., education, health, income), the Arab inequality-adjusted HDI declined significantly to 0.472. While it is impossible to measure the precise effects of per capita income, HDI and any other indicator of the quality of standards of living on political unrest, economic explanations of the uprising in the Arab world has sparked a great deal of interest in the academic and political circles. The economic approach ignores the fact 7

Multiple indicators should be used to measure health, education, and other dimensions of poverty, because no income-base indicator can adequately measure the standard of living in any given country. For a discussion of multidimensionality of poverty, see Ravallion (2011) and Ferreira (2011). 8 HDI was developed for the first UNDP Human Development Report in 1990, and is a composite index of human development using indicators of income, knowledge and health. HDI has a minimum value of zero and a maximum value of one. In 2011, Norway with an HDI of 0.943 and Congo with an HDI of 0.286 had the highest and the lowest HDI among 187 countries, respectively (“Human Development Index,” n.d.).

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that there is no clear relationship between economic prosperity and political instability in some societies, suggesting that many other explanatory variables are at play. The ageing leaders at the helm of the authoritarian Arab regimes have been out of touch with the younger generations who are demanding a more equitable socio-economic order. The Arab youth will no longer tolerate a life characterized by relative deprivation, poverty and unemployment. As evidenced by the uprising in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, the political and business elites closely aligned with the unpopular ruling families aggressively resist pro-reform movements. The revolutionary clashes are inevitable in a situation in which the privileged elites are reluctant to accept a meaningful redistribution of national wealth and income, and the underprivileged lower and middle classes are determined to compel the rulers to change. However, Arab revolts could not be explained solely by the failures of the policy elites to fulfill the basic economic needs and expectations of the non-elites. Many protesters are angry at their leaders for their opposition to meaningful political reforms aimed at democratization and the rule of law.

Human Rights Violations in Arab MENA According to Amnesty International’s Annual Report 2011 (n.d.), most MENA governments maintain strict restrictions on freedom of expression. Journalists and human rights activists frequently face criminal charges for criticizing state officials or institutions, including the monarchy. In some cases, freedom of assembly or the formation of political parties are forbidden by law. In many societies, discrimination against women is widespread. Only 26% of women in Arab states participated in the labor force in 2009, compared to 77.1% of men. The female labor force participation rate in these societies was much lower than the world average of 51.5%. The Gender Inequality Index (GNI)9 of Arab countries for 2011 was reportedly 0.563, compared to the 0.224 index calculated for the states with very high human development, and the world average of 0.492 (United Nations Development Program, 2011). The most recent GNI shows that the degree of inequality between men and women ranges from 9

The Gender Inequality Index is a composite measure of inequality between men and women in three dimensions: empowerment, the labor market, and reproductive health. Its lowest score is zero reflecting equality between women and men; and its highest score is one showing maximum gender inequality.

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0.769 in Yemen (highest gender inequality in the Arab League) to 0.229 in Kuwait (lowest gender inequality) (United Nations Development Program, 2011). The unemployment levels among women in most Arab countries today are above the average international levels. Saudi Arabia’s GNI of 0.646 denotes that a larger percentage of women in the conservative Arab kingdom experience discrimination in education, health and the job market. The Basic Law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia discriminates against women, treating them as inferiors who need male guardianship. In fact, “gender inequality is built into Saudi Arabia’s governmental and social structures” (Doumato, 2010, p. 425). Saudi Arabia is the only Arab country which has a driving ban for women, and does not grant them the right to vote. According to the “Women2Drive Campaign,” several Saudi women were arrested for disobeying the official ban on driving (“Saudi woman to face lashings,” 2011; Campaign for Women’s Leadership, n.d.). On the seven-point scale for the civil liberties index calculated by Freedom House, Saudi Arabia scored 7 (7 is the worst case) as reported in the 2012 Freedom in the World report. No improvement to its freedom status of “Not Free” was registered. Moreover, this kingdom of the southern Persian Gulf is one of the least free Arab states, as demonstrated by its political rights score of 7 (out of 7, and the lowest rank).10 Why does the Arab world lag behind when it comes to women’s participation in the labor force and in decision making? A frequently-cited reason is the predominance of Islamic law and practice in Arab societies. Dominant social and legal practices exclude many Arab women from a range of places and practices that most others in the Muslim societies enjoy. A more likely reason is that the patriarchal nature of Arab social systems has matched the rulers’ preferences for the inequitable structure and organization of political and social life. Women continue to be defiantly discriminated against in a full range of areas including freedom of movement, political participation, and access to education and job opportunities. Much of what has been announced in the way of reform to reduce gender inequalities in Arab countries has been inadequate. This policy failure suggests that revolutionary changes in attitudes and policies are necessary. 10

Only five member states of the Arab League (Comoros, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia) are ranked as “partly free”, and the remaining members (Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, UAE, Yemen) are identified as “not free’ societies. No data on political freedom is provided for the Palestinian territory (Freedom House, 2012).

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The Western powers have been accused of ignoring the existence of the highly restrictive laws preventing the average Arab citizens to enjoy even the most basic political rights and freedom, and the blatant discrimination against women and ethnic minorities by their regional allies. A European scholar who examines several initiatives including the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), points out that “while declaring its commitment to promoting human rights and democracy, by its actions the European Union (EU) has favored regimes and practices that ultimately proved intolerable to a broad stratum of Arab society” (Hollis, 2012, p. 81). Jordanian monarchs King Hussein and King Abdullah, and the Egyptian presidents Sadat and Mubarak were showered with the United States foreign aid to assist economic recovery. Yemen’s President Saleh was viewed as a partner in the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Human rights abuses of King Hamad are tolerated because the headquarters of the U.S. Fifth Fleet is located in Bahrain. American human rights advocates have called on the Obama Administration to end the U.S. reliance on the naval base in Bahrain, and “match up American values to interests in the Persian Gulf,” by supporting the people of Bahrain, rather than their autocratic rulers (Jones, 2011(a)). Kenneth Roth of Human Rights Watch mentions five core reasons why Western countries have supported the autocratic monarchs and presidents-for-life in the MENA. These autocrats were viewed as more reliable allies and partners in order to: a) contain political Islam, b) combat the threat of terrorism, c) resolve Arab-Israeli conflict, d) maintain the uninterrupted flow of oil, and e) curtail migration (Roth, 2012, p. 3-6). In Arab autocracies with their elitecentric and externally-dependent political systems, the pressures exerted by foreign powers on their regional patrons and partners through informal and formal channels could be effective democracy promotion instruments.

Corruption in Arab Monarchies and Kleptocracies Some scholars have warned against the negative implications of widespread corruption on economic development. Like many advocates of democratization, the political economists have long recognized that high levels of corruption are associated with increases in income inequality and poverty (Gupta, Davoodi, & Alonso-Terme, 2002, p. 23-45). An outcome of the prolonged existence of the autocratic rulers has been the emergence of government-business corruption networks in which some political elites, in alliance with corrupt business leaders and occasionally even organized crime groups, have been able to accumulate huge amounts of wealth.

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Looking at the Transparency International’s 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, it is revealed that among the 183 countries and territories surveyed, all Arab governments (with the exception of the UAE with a score of 6.8) had a score below 6 on a scale of 1 (highest level of corruption) to 10 (lowest level of corruption) as of November 2011.11 It is no secret that the level of corruption in the MENA is high mostly due to the secrecy of defense contracts, and unchecked budgetary decision-making. The concentration of the bulk of national wealth in the hands of a minority, resource curse, the weakness of legal systems and governance issues are blamed for spreading corruption, including fraudulent kickbacks in public transactions with foreign corporations and business partners. There are no laws to punish corrupt practices by the ruling elites. This was demonstrated by the high-profile case of the Al-Yamamah arms deals involving British Aerospace Company (BAe) and prominent Saudi officials representing the royal family.12 In Saudi Arabia, where stealing and theft are punishable by Islamic laws, it is ironic that political corruption is prevalent among the elites. Looking at the major corruption scandals, it is clear that bribery has been often associated with defense contracts, arm deals and foreign aid. Many Arab government officials do not seem to view bribery as ethically problematic and morally indefensible; consequently Arab citizens have become accustomed to paying bribes for the provision of public services. Three thousand business executives worldwide surveyed for the 2011 Bribe Payers Index (BPI) were asked to evaluate the degree of bribery in companies from 28 of the largest economies in their international business transactions. A country in which its companies never engage in bribery when doing business abroad has a BPI of 10. The minimum score of BPI is 0, and is assigned to the most extreme situation in which all companies from a country always engage in notorious transnational bribery. No country is actually bribe-free. The Netherlands with a score of 8.8 was less likely to engage in bribery, followed by 11 The respondents were asked questions about their views on the level of corruption in public institutions, and on the effectiveness of the government in the fight against corruption (Transparency International, 2011). 12 The BAe has been accused of paying more than £1bn to the Saudi Prince Bandar as secret commissions for the Al Yamamah arms agreement for the purchase of Tornado aircrafts and other military equipment. The secret payments continued “for at least 10 years and beyond 2002, when Britain outlawed corrupt payments to overseas officials.” Prince Bandar, who is now the secretary general of the Saudi National Security Council, was at that time the country’s ambassador to Washington (Leigh & Evans, 2007).

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Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, and Japan. By contrast, Saudi Arabia (with the score of 7.4) and UAE (with the score of 7.3), as the only Arab countries covered in this report, were ranked 22nd and 23rd, respectively. While companies from Indonesia, Mexico, China and Russia are placed at the bottom of the list and perceived as more likely to engage in bribery, the situation is not much better in these two Arab states in which improper payments to government officials are common (Hardoon & Heinrich, 2011). The lavish gifts given to the European royalty are viewed as attempts to influence the foreign policy of major powers toward the unpopular regimes. This is illustrated by the case of broadly publicized Bahraini rulers’ gifts of costly jewelry and silk rugs to the British royal family.13 The opponents of the regime saw these gifts as hush money and a form of bribery to keep the British government silent about the Manama’s brutal treatment of the Bahraini protesters. Similar to most of the other GCC ruling regimes, the al-Khalifa-controlled political system in Bahrain is depicted as the creation of the British imperialists. The disclosure of the official visit of British royals to Manama, in the midst of the violent antigovernment protests, was also viewed as proof of the Bahraini rulers’ subservience to the UK, which together with the US have been benefactors and allies of choice in difficult times for the GCC monarchs. Such practices are largely seen by Arab people as a sign of persistent dependency of their detested ruling elites on their former colonial potentates. There is also an argument that the adverse impact of economic inequality on democracy must be analyzed. One of the scholars to take up this scrutiny is Solt (2011) who finds that “societies with higher levels of economic inequality are concomitantly more hierarchical, making experiences that reinforce vertical notions of authority more common and so authoritarianism more widespread” (p. 2). The concentration of wealth within both rich and poor Arab states is high. Arab super-rich have formed their own self-contained world, apart from the rest of Arab citizenry. Arab billionaires travel in private jets and yachts, have vacation villas in Europe, rub shoulders with the royalty, send their children to the most exclusive European boarding schools and Ivy League colleges, and are above the laws of the land. However, unlike other world rich and famous, the majority of them are connected to Arab ruling regimes. They are habitually self-indulgent and self-interested, and frequently disregard 13 It has been noted in the British press that such gifts are inappropriate (“Countess of Wessex,” 2012).

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boundaries between public and private. Due to the lack of effective governmental checks and balances, and the inadequacy of accountability and transparency mechanisms in the authoritarian Arab societies, public funds are treated as personal assets of the rulers. As of the beginning of 2011, there were an estimated 400,000 people who were classified as high net worth individuals (HNWIs) in the Middle East, while their wealth increased 12.5% to about US$1.7 trillion. The region had 4,000 ultra-HNWIs, which constituted 0.9% of the world’s HNWI population (“World wealth report 2011,” 2011). According to Forbes (Helman, 2011), Saudi King Abdullah with his considerable influence in the international oil markets is the seventh most powerful people in the world. The UAE President Khalifa Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan is listed as number 33 (Ewalt, et. al., 2012, n.p.). In 2011, Sheikh Khalifa controlled the $630-billion of Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, which was viewed as one of the world’s most significant sovereign wealth funds (Zawya, 2011(b)). A large proportion of public funds, which are controlled by the royal family members and other ruling elites, are most likely not subject to public disclosure. As of 2 March 2011, about 75% of more than $240-billion of investments in publicly-listed firms is directly controlled by Arab rulers and their families. The remaining 25% either originate from government institutions (16%), or sovereign wealth funds (9%), which are presumably under the control of the ruling elites (Zawya, 2011(a)). According to a November 1996 U.S. diplomatic cable entitled “Saudi Royal Wealth: Where do they get all that money?” (“WikiLeaks cable,” 2013; Helman, 2011; Lawson, 2011), every Saudi prince and princess receives a colossal monthly allowance, and enjoys a luxury life of unearned income and privileges including huge loans from commercial banks, and frequent cash hand-outs for marriage, new palaces and travel costs under the royal patronage system. At that time, this monthly stipend ranged from $800 for "the lowliest member of the most remote branch of the family" to $270,000 for the senior princes (Robinson, 2011, n.p). The high-profile Saudi prince Alwaleed, with a reported $21.30 billion and the ownership of shares in Apple, Citigroup, and News Corp, ranks number one in the Arabian Business Rich List 2011. Not surprisingly, 60% of the high-net-worth Arabs on the 2011 list were from Saudi Arabia. The other super rich of the Arab world are mostly from Qatar and the UAE (“Rich list 2011,” 2012). There are 1,225 wealthy Saudi residents with $227 billion in assets (Broomhall, 2011), who probably pay no taxes, and are not forced to disclose the sources of their unearned wealth. A prominent critic of the oil-rich Kingdom, Princess Basma, the 115th and the youngest child of the Saudi King Saud who ruled from 1953 to 1964,

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revealed the size of the royal family: “We have 15,000 royals and around 13,000 don't enjoy the wealth of the 2,000. You have 2,000 who are multimillionaires, who have all the power, all the wealth and no-one can even utter a word against it because they are afraid to lose what they have." She voiced her complaint about social injustice: “If you are poor man and you steal, your hand is cut off after three offences. But if you are a rich man, nobody will say anything to you" (Milmo, 2012, n.p.). European royal families are required to reveal financial details about the way they spend their personal fortunes and their annual allowance for public duties. For instance, according to Queen Elizabeth II’s accountant, Sir Alan Reid, “The annual cost per person in the country of funding the head of state amounts to 62 pence” (Bowley, 2007, n.p.). In contrast, there is very little information about the personal wealth of the Arab royal family. It is not possible to estimate the Arab rulers’ assets because of their secret business deals, and their foreign bank accounts. According to Global Financial Integrity (2001, pp. 38-39), the MENA accounted for 18.6% of total illicit outflows14 of US$8.44 trillion during 2000-2009 from the developing world. Indeed, four of the top ten countries with the largest transfers of illicit capital are located in this region, and include Saudi Arabia ($380.04 billion), Kuwait ($270.70 billion), United Arab Emirates ($296.10 billion), and Qatar ($175.32 billion for 2001-2009 as data for 2000 were unavailable). The outflow of unrecorded capital through bribery, kickbacks, theft, and the proceeds of corruption are the dominant channel for the transfer of illicit funds from this strategic region (Global Financial Integrity 2001, p. 9). It is noteworthy that these four southern Persian Gulf states are major exporters of oil and natural gas, and are ruled by absolute monarchies. After the regime change, the new leaders’ investigations have shed light on extreme corruption at the highest level of governments in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. The ousted presidents and their family members and cronies had rarely come under scrutiny for illegal and questionable practices of misuse of public funds. No one can deny that public corruption has been at the cost of socio-economic development, and undermines democracy. The wives and daughters of the more modern Arab leaders are now playing a role in the public life of their countries by participating in ceremonies abroad, visits to the institutions set up to help 14 The report defines illicit financial flows as the cross-border movement of money that is illegally earned, transferred, or utilized. Illicit financial flows generally involve the transfer of money earned through illegal activities such as corruption, transactions involving contraband goods, criminal activities, and efforts to shelter wealth from a country's tax authorities.

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the most disadvantaged groups in the societies, and taking part in cultural activities. Former First Lady of Tunisia, Leila Trabelsi, who fled the country, was accused of stealing one and a half tons of gold bars from the Central Bank of Tunisia (“The Tunisian job,” 2011). Even though this allegation was denied by the bank authorities (“'The Family' Tunisians hate most,” 2011), it acted as additional proof of the scale of corruption among the family and cronies of the president. Millions of dollars held in Swiss bank accounts of Ben Ali and Trabelsi families and their associates were frozen by the order of the Bern government (Bell & Bryan-Low, 2011). The wife of the deposed president of Egypt, Suzanne Mubarak, has been in fear of standing trial on corruption charges. She has been under investigation for money laundering charges and illegal acquisition of wealth. In 2011, she was forced to turn over her villa in Cairo and two bank accounts to Egypt's Illicit Gains Authority (Stanton, 2011). Suzanne Mubarak’s NGO with presumably charitable aims was used to withdraw huge amounts of money without paying taxes, or being accountable to the authorities. These NGOs gave them access to resources independent from those allocated by the government. She was the chair of the Women's International Peace Movement as a non-profit, non-governmental international association established in 2003 in Geneva, and was the only authorized person to withdraw money from its $962 million account. She has been accused of authorizing her deputy to secretly withdraw millions of dollars from the Swiss account and transferred the amount to a Panamanian bank and subsequently to another bank in Cayman Islands (Arabs Today, 2012). The Mubarak family has deposited cash in British and Swiss banks, and owns property in European and American cities estimated to be worth between $40 billion to $70 billion (Kim, 2011). Similar to other MENA corrupt rulers’ families, the bulk of their assets are most likely hidden in secret offshore bank accounts in the Caribbean and other financial safe havens. Arab monarchies and kleptocracies have contingency plans to maintain equally privileged luxurious lifestyles, in case they are forced into exile by their successors. By adopting strict anti-money laundering laws and removing bank secrecy, Western countries are morally obligated to make it difficult for the unscrupulous elites in the MENA to hide their ill-gotten funds and stolen public assets. Resource curse is another factor which might explain political backwardness and corruption in Arab autocracies. In recent years, several empirical studies have shown that oil has an adverse impact on democracy (Ross, 2001; Aslaksen, 2010). As Aslaksen puts it, “Resource wealth,

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especially oil, is a curse for democracy” (Aslaksen, 2010, p. 421). Consideration has been given to the rentier effect of accumulation of oil wealth in the hands of autocratic rulers. With their significant oil revenues, the oil-rich dictators are not dependent on tax systems, and do not feel bound by the rules of accountability and transparency toward their own people (Omgba, 2009, p. 420). In rentier Arab states, the rulers are dependent on oil and natural gas revenues or foreign military and economic aid (Beblawi & Luciani, 1987, p. 51). Consequently, they have been less susceptible to popular pressures from below because they are less dependent on their own people. In the post-1952 political system of Egypt, a small group of influential political elites with military, security and intelligence backgrounds made up the inner circle of the president. There was also a larger coalition of beneficiaries who included peasants and unionized workers under Nasser’s regime (1954-1970), and businessmen under Mubarak (1981–2011) (Adly, 2011, p. 304). The rapid deterioration of real wages, high inflation rates, and the rise of food prices were among the factors which encouraged the public sector workers, the urban poor and the civil servants to participate in anti-government protests during the period of 2004-2011. The decline in rents led to the inability of the Mubarak’s regime to maintain its political power, because the top leaders could no longer allocate patronage rewards among certain segments of the population, recognized as the regime's clients. A key principle of allocation of the economic benefits was the loyalty to the government. In contrast, oil wealth still empowers the Saudi king to fill government positions with the members of the al Saud family, or his loyal supporters of his own choosing, which may or may not be qualified for the job. Oil rents have benefited the political elites in oil-based economies, but now oil revenues no longer provide the rulers with sufficient monetary resources needed to maintain a spoils system, because they are confronted with the demographic challenge of rapid population growth, and the everincreasing youth unemployment rates. For the purpose of limiting institutional and political restraints on their power, the rulers in Arab autocracies give key positions in government to the trusted military and political elites. In most cases, tribal and family connections are the most important criteria for selecting senior government officials. Despite the political nature of the appointment process, many retain their high-ranking jobs for long periods. Sheikh Khalifa, the uncle of Bahrain’s King Hamad has been the prime minister since 1971. The current head of the House of Saud is Abdullah bin Abdul-Aziz who was proclaimed sixth King of Saudi Arabia in August 2005 at the age of 81.

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He is one of the world's oldest ruling monarchs (“Custodian of the two holy mosques,” n.d.). Senior positions within the government belong to the male members of the royal family, who are appointed by the King. The 79-year old Neyef bin Abdul Aziz became the new heir to the throne in October 2011, following the death of Prince Sultan, who had served as the defense minister for five decades. Neyef himself was the interior minister for nearly 36 years. Prince Neyef died in June 2012, and was replaced by the ageing Prince Salman, the Ministry of Defense and the long-time governor of Riyadh in the Saudi gerontocracy. It was not clear whether the King selected them by consulting the Allegiance Council, which he created in 2006 and is composed of his brothers, half-brothers and nephews (Henderson, 2006, 2009). The King appoints the members of the royal lineage to key positions, including governor of the Shi’a-inhabited Eastern Province (Prince Mohamed who has been in this post since 1985, and is accused of corruption), and governor of the remote Tabuk Province (Prince Fahd has been in this job since 1987) (“Saudi King,” 2009). Moreover, the death of a monarch or his removal by his rivals has not led to major change in the direction of the institutionalization of democracy. In some cases, a close family member is given the command of the military forces responsible for protecting the rulers. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad’s younger brother, Maher was appointed the commander of the Republican Guard; in Libya, Khamis Qaddafi, the youngest son of its former dictator, Muammar Qaddafi, was the commander of the best trained force in the Libyan armed forces. One cannot disregard the effects of corruption on the Arab awakening because it provided a rationalization for organizing anti-government protests against the political elites and their business associates most notably in Egypt and Tunisia. The citizen revolts in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen demonstrated that the Arab people blame their leaders, whose entire conduct has been proof of their faulty character, for widespread corruption in the government agencies, and weakness of the rule of law. These leaders felt secure in their power position, and did not implement policies aimed at sustainable economic development for the benefits of the public. They were driven by concerns for their own survival and power. The Arab autocratic regimes have been more prone to corruption, and have not really been influenced by public opinion. Since corruption is viewed as costly for economic development and social justice in the Arab world, it is highly likely that the citizens will rise up against their rulers in the remaining autocracies.

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Democracy Promotion in Arab MENA The recent spread of rebellion and popular uprising across the region has provided clear opportunities for democracy promotion. However, a democratic regime will threaten the interests of economic, political and military elites. The 2010-2011 historic events in the Arab world have shown that most Arab dictators and autocrats are incapable of accurately analyzing national situations shaped by the fearlessness of the people. Muammar Qaddafi15 did not comprehend the reality that Libyans could no longer bear his tyrannical rule. Unlike Ben Ali who escaped to Saudi Arabia when his last bid to quell the uprising had failed, Qaddafi tried to hide in his hometown of Sirte in the hope of being rescued by his loyal followers. He did not step aside like Mubarak, and did not look for a facesaving exit strategy like Saleh. Qaddafi had a fate worse than death, unlike Saddam Hussein of Iraq who was captured in December 2003 by the American forces, tried and executed by hanging three years later. Qaddafi was tortured and humiliated before being killed in the hands of the angry Libyans in October 2011.16 An important question that could be asked is who is to be blamed for inaction on social justice and democratization in many parts of the Arab world. In their own defense, some Arab leaders claim that they have good intentions; but they do not have the capability to improve the life standards of their people. Some of them have cautiously and selectively abided by good governance principles in order to receive multilateral foreign aid from international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, or bilateral aid from the U.S. or other great powers. In 2011, King Mohammed VI of Morocco publicly pledged that his government is committed to political reforms, and appointed the general secretary of a moderate Islamist Party, Abdelilah Benkirane, as the country’s Prime Minister after this party won the largest share of votes in national elections. Arab rulers such as King Abdullah II in Jordan are making statements that intrinsically are designed to calm down the opponents of the regime by making some political reforms but not as fast as the people would have liked. Instead of becoming submissive, the opposition forces are prompted to demand more from the regime. 15

Qaddafi was a ruler of utterly different character, who had a taste for making bizarre political statements, and behaving eccentrically, for example, by taking his Bedouin tent to official visits abroad. 16 Ironically, Qaddafi’s daughter Aisha was on the team of lawyers defending Saddam Hussein at his trial, before the uprising in Libya transformed her family’s life.

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It is more likely that, in the remainder of this decade, the conservative forces in Arab MENA will violently clash with the revolutionary forces; and the fabricated political stability of Arab monarchies will come to an end. Even now, old friendships have been replaced by overt enmity. There is a potential for a shift of power in the region. Democracy promotion and civil society building initiatives are viewed as significant challenges by the ruling regimes. Within Arab societies, the instability problems will become more pronounced, because counter-revolutionary forces will resolutely challenge the transition of power from autocracies to democracies. Human rights activists in Arab MENA will more than ever face harassment by the government forces. One cannot be optimistic that the Arab leaders, who have exposed their resistance to democracy promotion, would yield to the public pressures for political rights. Since they are not likely to accept meaningful democratic reforms which might weaken their hold on to power, and will not voluntarily step down from power, the widespread protests and uprising will be expected in the Arab societies.

Conclusion Arab MENA is a region in need of drastic political reforms; but the policies of the great powers towards Arab states have largely been influenced by national security concerns, and not by the broad criterion of democracy promotion in the region. The continued political authoritarianism, violations of the basic human rights of Arab citizens, economic mismanagement and widespread corruption of Arab rulers should not be tolerated in the name of national security. Since they do not realize that the risks of political destabilization are real, Arab governments have been reluctant to take bold steps towards democratization. Some rulers have only agreed with the minimum reforms viewed as absolutely necessary to placate their opponents. The political elites have been more ambivalent toward long-term democratic political reforms. Incumbent rulers must be forced to address the core economic and political problems facing their nations. The result of inaction will be a vicious circle of violence and armed confrontation between different social and political groups, with drastic repercussions for regional security. So far no credible and full democratic political system has emerged from Arab revolts (Egypt’s revolution is as yet unfinished). There are basically two main schools of thought with respect to the future of the Arab uprising. Some maintain that the next few years are likely to witness a sharp increase in the incidences of political instability in Arab MENA.

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Demands for social justice and political reforms will accelerate in the region, and will bring ever more people into the streets in protest. The second school of thought asserts that with the help of their oil wealth or foreign aid from their allies, the dictators and autocrats in the monarchical systems have a high probability of remaining in power, despite occasional revolts by their disenchanted subjects. It is difficult to foresee the future of the Arab revolutionary processes, in the midst of the conflicting rhetoric and speculation. The pace and the magnitude of changes depend on a multitude of economic and political factors at national and international levels. Only one fact is clear: contrary to the expectations and hopes of the ruling elites, Arab citizenry will no longer be kept subservient. They have reawakened to ensure that their dreams of living in democratic and prosperous societies will come true for the younger generations, without being forced to flee their homelands as refugees, immigrants or asylum-seekers. The masses have become conscious of the undemocratic nature of their political systems, and realized that they are entitled to a better and more dignified life. This is why one should expect to see a sharp increase in the expression of widespread grievances and political unrest in the Arab world.

References Adly, A.I.A. (2011). When cheap is costly: Rent decline, regime survival and state reform in Mubarak's Egypt (1990–2009). Middle Eastern Studies, 47(2), 295-313. Alimi, E.Y. & Meyer, D.S. (2011). Seasons of change: Arab Spring and political opportunities. Swiss Political Science Review, 17(4), 475–479. Al-Rasheed, M. (2011). Sectarianism as counter-revolution: Saudi responses to the Arab Spring. Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism, 11 (3), 513-526. Annual report 2011 (n.d.). Amnesty International. Retrieved from http://www.amnesty.org/en/annual-report/2011/country-data Arab Human Development Report (2002). Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating opportunities for future generations. United Nations Development Program, Regional Bureau for Arab States. Retrieved from http://www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2009e.pdf Arabs Today (2012, January 19). Mubaraks accused of money laundering: Switzerland freezes Suzanne Mubarak's bank account. Retrieved from http://www.arabstoday.net/en/2012011980616/switzerland-freezessuzanne-mubaraks-bank-account.html

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Aslaksen, S. (2010). Oil and democracy: More than a cross-country correlation? Journal of Peace Research, 47(4), 421–431. Background note (2011, December 29). Background note: United Arab Emirate. U.S. State Department. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5444.htm Ball, D. & Bryan-Low, C. (2011, February 23). Banks scrutinize regimes' assets, Wall Street Journal Online. Retrieved from http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052748704071304576160490591620676.html Beblawi, H. & Luciani, G. (Eds.). (1987). The rentier state in the Arab world. London: Croom Helm. As cited in Adly, A.I.A. (2011). When cheap is costly: Rent decline, regime survival and state reform in Mubarak's Egypt (1990–2009). Middle Eastern Studies, 47(2), 295313. Bowley, G. (2007, July 15). Windows opening on the royal family’s wealth. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/business/yourmoney/15windsor.h tml?pagewanted=all Broomhall, E. (2011, December 15). Saudi Arabia takes the top spot in 2011 Rich List. Arabian Business. Retrieved from http://richlist.arabianbusiness.com/culture-society/2011/dec/15/66422 Brownlee, J. (2011). Executive elections in the Arab World: When and how do they matter? Comparative Political Studies, 44(7), 807–828. Cafiero, G. (2012, September 26). Saudi Arabia and Qatar: Dueling monarchies. Foreign Policy in Focus, Retrieved from http://www.fpif.org/articles/saudi_arabia_and_qatar_dueling_ monarchies Campaign for Women's Leadership (n.d.). http://women2drive.com Campante, F.R. & Chor, D. (2012). Why was the Arab World poised for revolution? Schooling, economic opportunities, and the Arab Spring. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26(2), 167-188. Countess of Wessex (2012, January 6). Countess of Wessex criticised for accepting jewels from Bahrain. The Telegraph, Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/theroyalfamily/8999280/ Countess-of-Wessex-criticised-for-accepting-jewels-fromBahrain.html Custodian of the two holy mosques (n.d.). Custodian of the two holy mosques King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. Retrieved from http://www.saudiembassy.or.jp/En/SA/custodian2.htm

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Dahi, O.S. (2012). The political economy of the Egyptian and Arab revolt. IDS Bulletin, 43(1), 47-53. Dalacoura, K. (2012). The 2011 uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political change and geopolitical implications. International Affairs, 88(1), 63-79. Doumato, E.A. (2010). Saudi Arabia. In S. Kelly & J. Breslin, (Eds.), Women’s rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Progress amid resistance. New York, NY: Freedom House; Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Droz-Vincent, P. (2011). Authoritarianism, revolutions, armies and Arab regime transitions. The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, 46(2), 5-21. Dupont, C. & Passy, F. (2012). The Arab Spring or how to explain those revolutionary episodes? Swiss Political Science Review, 17(4), 447451. Ewalt, D. M., Howard, C., & Noer M. (Eds.) (2012, December 5). The World’s most powerful people list. Forbes. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/powerful-people/list 'The Family' Tunisians hate most (2011, January 18). 'The Family' Tunisians hate most. Al Jazeera. Retrieved from http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/20111186719365688.ht ml Ferreira, F.H.G. (2011). Poverty is multidimensional. But what are we going to do about it? Journal of Economic Inequality, 9(3), 493-495. Freedom House (2012). Freedom in the world 2012: the Arab uprisings and their global repercussions. Retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/ default/files/inline_images/Table%20of%20Independent%20Countries %2C%20FIW%202012%20draft.pdf Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. (2002). Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty? Economics of Governance, 3(1), 23-45. Hardoon, D. & Heinrich, F. (2011, October). Bribe payers index report 2011. Transparency International. Retrieved from http://bpi.transparency.org/ Helman, C. (2011, March 1). Report details how Saudi royals cream off oil revenue. Forbes. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2011/03/01/reportdetails-how-saudi-royals-cream-off-oil-revenue

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Henderson, S. (2006, October 25). New Saudi rules on succession: Will they fix the problem? Policy #1156. PolicyWatch. The Washington Institute. Retrieved from http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2526 —. (2009, August). After King Abdullah: Succession in Saudi Arabia. Policy Focus 96. The Washington Institute. Retrieved from http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC04.php?CID=315 Hollis, R. (2012). No friend of democratization: Europe’s role in the genesis of the ‘Arab Spring.’ International Affairs, 88(1), 81–94. Human Development Index (n.d.). Human Development Reports. Retrieved November 7, 2012 from http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi Human Development Report. (2011). Human Development Report 2011, sustainability and equity: A better future for all. United Nations Development Program. Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2011/download Jones, T.C. (2011(a), June 10). Time to disband the Bahrain-based U.S. Fifth Fleet. Atlantic Council. Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/06/time-todisband-the-bahrain-based-us-fifth-fleet/240243/2 —. (2011(b), August 30). Saudi Arabia and the Arab awakening, Saudi in Focus. Retrieved from http://www.saudiinfocus.com/en/forum/showthread.php?p=24420 Kamrava, M. (2012). The Arab Spring and the Saudi-led counterrevolution. Orbis, 56 (1), 96-104. Kar, D. & Freitas, S. (2011, December). Illicit financial flows from developing countries over the decade ending 2009. Global Financial Integrity, a Program of the Center for International Policy. Retrieved from http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/IFFDec201 1/illicit_financial_flows_from_developing_countries_over_the_decade _ending_2009.pdf Kazamias, A. (2011). The ‘Anger Revolutions’ in the Middle East: An answer to decades of failed reform. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 13 (2), 143-156. Khouri, R.G. (2011, August 17). Drop the Orientalist term ‘Arab Spring’. The Daily Star. Retrieved from http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Columnist/ 2011/Aug-17/Dropthe-Orientalist-term-Arab-Spring.ashx Kim, S. (2011, February 2). Egypt's Mubarak likely to retain vast wealth. ABC World News. Retrieved from

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http://abcnews.go.com/Business/egypt-mubarak-family-accumulatedwealth-days-military/story?id=12821073 Lawson, T. (2011, October 9). Saudi Arabia: Leaked cable reveals how royals get rich. Green Left. Retrieved from http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/48999 Leigh, D. & Evans, R. (2007, June 7). BAe accused of secretly paying £1bn to Saudi prince. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/ 2007/jun/07/bae1 Lutterbeck, D. (2013, January). Arab uprisings, armed forces, and civil– military relations. Armed Forces & Society. 39(1), 26-52. Mackey, S. (1987). The Saudis: Inside the desert kingdom. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company. Meguid, N.S.A., Al Banna, S., Korayem, R., & El Din, H.S. (2011). The economic causes of the Egyptian revolution ‘January 25, 2011’. Cairo: The American University in Cairo. Retrieved from http://dar.aucegypt.edu/ handle/10526/2710 Milmo, C. (2012, January 3). The Acton princess calling for reform in Saudi Arabia. The Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/news/the-acton-princesscalling-for-reform-in-saudi-arabia-6284225.html Murphy, B. (2012, April 25). Rulers in UAE emirate hold reformist member. Associated Press. Retrieved from http://news.yahoo.com/rulers-uae-emirate-hold-reformist-member151946204.html Omgba, L.D. (2009). On the duration of political power in Africa: The role of oil rents. Comparative Political Studies, 42(3), 416-436. Posusney, M.P. (2003). Globalization and labor protection in oil-poor Arab countries: Racing to the bottom? Global Social Policy, 3(3), 267– 297. Ravallion, M. (2011, February). On multidimensional indices of poverty, The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5580. Retrieved from http://works.bepress.com/martin_ravallion/25 Rich list 2011 (2012). Rich list 2011: Arab World’s richest men and women. Arabian Business. Retrieved from http://richlist.arabianbusiness.com Robinson, S. (2011, February 28). Special report: U.S. cables detail Saudi royal welfare program. Reuters. Retrieved from http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/28/us-wiki-saudi-moneyidUSTRE71R2SA20110228 Ross, M. (2001). Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics, 53(3), 325361.

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Roth, K. (2012). Time to abandon the autocrats and embrace rights: The international response to the Arab Spring. World report 2012. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/ files/reports/wr2012.pdf Saudi King solidifies base with extensions (2009, March 7). Wikileaks.org (originally from U.S. Embassy Riyadh). Retrieved from http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09RIYADH393 Saudi woman to face lashings (2011, September 26). Saudi woman to face lashings for defying driving ban. Freedom Alert. Retrieved from http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/saudi-arabia Solt, F. (2011). The social origins of authoritarianism. Political Research Quarterly, 20(10), 1-11. Springborg, R. (2011). The political economy of the Arab Spring. Mediterranean Politics, 16(3), 427-433. Stanton, C. (2011, May 18). Suzanne Mubarak freed after she hands over millions in assets to Egypt. The National. Retrieved from http://www.thenational.ae/news/ world/middle-east/suzanne-mubarakfreed-after-she- hands-over-millions-in-assets-to-egypt Tagma, H.M. (2011). Model, event, context: Globalization, Arab social movements, and the modeling of global order. Globalizations, 8(5), 623-628. The 2011 corruption (2011, December 1). The 2011 corruption perceptions index. Transparency International. Retrieved from http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011 The Tunisian job (2011, January 18). The Tunisian job: How president's wife 'fled with $60m in gold bullion'. Independent. Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/the-tunisian-jobhow-presidents-wife-fled-with-60m-in-gold-bullion -2187035.html UAE population (2012, March 4). UAE population put at 7.2 million. UAE Interact. Retrieved from http://www.uaeinteract.com/docs/UAE_population_put_at_7.2_million /48889.htm WikiLeaks cable: Saudi royal wealth: where do they get all that money? (2013, January 13) The WikiLeaks Discussion Forum. Retrieved from http://www.wikileaks-forum.com/index.php?topic=16898.0 World Bank (2011). World Development Indicators 2011. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org —. (2012, April). Regional highlights. The World development indicators 2012. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/ sites/default/files/wdiregional-highlights2012-web.pdf

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—. (2012, April 19). Sudan. The World development indicators 2012. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/country/sudan The World Factbook 2011 (2012, April 16). The World Factbook 2011: The United Arab Emirates. Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ae.html World wealth report 2011 (2011, June 22). Merrill-Lynch. Retrieved from http://www.capgemini.com/insights-and-resources/bypublication/world-wealth-report-2011 Zawya (2011(a), March 6). Royal investment. Retrieved from Retrieved from http://www.zawya.com/story/ZAWYA20110307052017 —. (2011(b), November 3). Powerful Arabs. Retrieved from http://www.zawya.com/story/ZAWYA20111103043511/Powerful_Ara bs

CHAPTER TWO THE POLITICIZATION OF EUROPEAN CONVERTS TO ISLAM EMMANUEL KARAGIANNIS UNIVERSITY OF MACEDONIA

Abstract Islam has gained thousands of new followers in Europe. Moreover, there is a new class of Islamic activists of convert origin who have been increasingly visible in their efforts to mobilize support for Islamic agendas. It will be argued that the politicization of converts has been the result of widespread Islamophobia. Converts see themselves as the new vanguard of Islam in Europe that dares to confront the unbelievers and spread the word of the Quran. Keywords: Conversion, Islam, Europe, Islamophobia, politicization, activism Despite its largely negative portrayal in the media, Islam is rapidly growing in Europe. Although the exact number of Muslim converts is not known, thousands of native Europeans have converted to Islam. In total, there should be around 200,000-350,000 converts, making up 1.5 to 2.5 percent of the European Union’s Muslim population.1 Most European 1

France has one of the largest Muslim convert communities which is estimated at about 50,000 to 100,000 people out of a population of 3-4 million Muslims (Pew Research Center, 2009). In 2006, there were 850,000 Muslims in the Netherlands, including 12,000 converts (Statistics Netherlands, 2007). In Germany, the community of converts ranges from 12,000 to 100,000 (Kandel, 2004) with the total Muslim population set at around 3 million. In Great Britain, there were about 63,000 native converts out of a population of 1.6 million Muslims in the early

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converts grew up in modern and secular societies so naturally they adjust Islam to fit their own needs. It is hardly a coincidence that many European converts follow Sufi Islam which tends to be inclusive and moderate.2 Yet, there are growing signs of politicization among European converts to Islam. Several prominent Muslim activists in Germany, Italy, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland and even Russia are native Europeans who converted to the Muslim faith. These converts have taken a public stance on many pan-Islamic issues that have agitated Europe’s Muslim communities (e.g. Prophet Muhammad cartoons controversy in Western Europe during 2005 and 2006, Pope Benedict’s controversial comments about Islam during a lecture at the University of Regensburg on September 12, 2006). In fact, a new class of Muslim activists of convert origin has come into being in European countries, a group that is understudied. Over the past four decades, religious conversion has been the subject of significant debate in Western academic world (Lofland & Stark, 1965; Lofland, 1966; Singer, 1980; Rambo, 1993). John Lofland and Rodney Stark defined conversion as a process by which “a person gives up one perspective or ordered view of the world for another” (Lofland & Stark, 1965, p. 862). For the purpose of this analysis, therefore, a convert is one who has changed membership from one religious group to become Muslim. Several researchers have investigated the growing conversion of Europeans to Islam (Poston, 1992; Kose, 1996; Roald, 2004; Van Nieuwkerk, 2006; Zebiri, 2008). Some authors have even focused on those converts who have been involved in jihadi activities (Khosrokhavar, 2002; Roy, 2008; Uhlmann, 2008). It is not easy to conduct research on Europe’s new Muslims because open source information is not always available or reliable. Yet, data gathered from interviews with converts can be a valuable and useful source of information for political trends within the world of converts. 2000’s (Office for National Statistics, 2001). However, their number must have increased because the Muslim population as a whole reached 2.4 million in 2009 (Kerbaj, 2009). Spain has an estimated 800,000 Muslims, roughly 20,000 of whom are converts (Pingree & Abend, 2006). In Belgium there are about 500,000 Muslims of whom approximately 10,000 are converts (Bousetta & Bernes, 2007). In Sweden, the estimated number of converts is 6,000 out of 300,000-350,000 Muslims (McGinty 2006). In neighboring Denmark, there are about 2,800 converts out of 200,000 Muslims (Frøslev, 2010). 2 The word Sufi probably originates from the Arabic word saaf, meaning pure or clean. Sufism is a mystical and spiritual movement within Islam in search of communication with Allah through ascetism.

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Access to them is not easy. Indeed, the establishment of trust is pivotal to obtain interviews. Following the London and Madrid bombings, and the subsequent rise of Islamophobia in European countries, I found that many converts have been increasingly reluctant to share information with researchers. Nevertheless, it was possible to interview 11 converts (eight males and three females) about their life experiences during field trips in Great Britain, Greece, Russia and Netherlands from 2008 to 2011. The interviewees have followed different interpretations of Islam: two are Salafis3, four are adherents of Sufi Islam, and five have identified themselves simply as “Muslims”. Interviews were open-ended and were conducted in English, Greek, or Russian. The names of the interviewees were changed to assure anonymity. Most interviewees were identified on the basis of local knowledge and snowballing in which one respondent suggested other individuals who might be useful to interview. The religious background of the interviewees was Christian, but of different denominations. More specifically, three were Greek Orthodox, two Russian Orthodox, one Roman Catholic, two Anglican, one Episcopalian and two Presbyterian. This research is qualitative due to the small sample size of European converts. It follows that my findings are not necessarily representative of European converts who constitute a diverse group. The chapter will first describe the experience of conversion largely based on the interviewees’ testimonies. It will then focus on prominent Islamic activists of convert origin who have been increasingly visible in their efforts to promote and defend Islamic agendas. Based on the interviews conducted with converts and some activists’ accounts, I will argue that post- September 11, 2001 Islamophobia has contributed to the politicization of European converts. The chapter will finally summarize the main findings.

The Experience of Conversion The history of Islam is a history of conversions. Although Prophet Mohammed’s preaching was not well received by the Meccans, he later won many converts among the inhabitants of Medina and other places in Arabia. After the Prophet’s death, the four righteous caliphs (632-661 A.D) spread Islam to the Mesopotamia and the Levant. Under the dynasties of the Umayyads (661-750 A.D) and the Abbasids (750-1258 3

Salafism is an Islamic movement that calls modern Muslims to revert to authentic Islam of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, the salaf or ‘ancestors’.

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A.D), mass conversions took place in Syria, North Africa, Persia and Central Asia. According to Ira Lapidus, “Conversion by force, while not unknown in Muslim countries was, in fact, rare. Muslim conquerors ordinarily wished to dominate rather than convert, and most conversions to Islam were voluntary” (Lapidus, 2002, p. 198). Although Islam is practiced differently around the world, da’wa (call to Islam) is an important part of a devout Muslim’s life. The believer is commanded by the Quran (16: 125) “to invite (all) to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching.” Indeed, many European converts were first introduced to Islam by Muslim colleagues, neighbors, partners and friends. An increased number of converts also familiarized themselves with Islam by using the Internet. Indeed, there is a large number of websites which are dedicated solely to converting unbelievers (Shavit & Wiesenbach, 2009). These websites present Islam as a universal religion that is open to people of all backgrounds and provide advice to those who want to convert. In the study described in this chapter, interviewees were asked to identify the single most important reason for their conversion. In most cases, it was a traumatic event that took place in their life and made them search for salvation and eventually led to their conversion. For example, a young Dutch man thought that it was the “disappointment from an erotic relationship” that made him question his faith (Mark, 2008); an English woman believed that it was the death of her brother from drug abuse that convinced her to “search for the truth” (Sarah, 2009); an English man mentioned “troubles with the law” (John, 2009); and a Russian man attributed his conversion to “drinking problems and his wife’s extramarital affair” (Vadin, 2011). Some converts also embraced Islam in order to rediscover their lost Muslim roots. For example, a Greek man converted to Islam, although he was raised by his family as a Greek Orthodox, when he discovered that his family was of Albanian Muslim descent (Hairulla, 2010). For some others, conversion happened because of their interaction with Muslims; for example, David embraced Islam while serving with the British army in Malaysia (David, 2010). Some, like the English convert Steven, became curious about Islam after the 9/11 events; in his words, “I wanted to find out whether Islam holds it right to kill civilians but I was eventually attracted to Islam because it is a rational religion” (Steven, 2010). Finally, many Europeans converted to Islam for practical rather than spiritual reasons (e.g. to marry a Muslim). Little is known about the political and social background of European converts since there is no available data. Based on the findings from this study, it appears that converts come from both the lower strata of the

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society and the educated middle class (ten out of eleven interviewees). Most of them converted in their teens or twenties (ten out of eleven interviewees). Some of them had a leftist background (three out of eleven interviewees), but after the fall of the Soviet Union they started questioning the relevance of ideology. In the words of Russian convert Ivan, “communism may have failed but I still believe we need solidarity and unity for mankind and this is what Islam stands for” (Ivan, 2011). In the post Cold War era, Islam has come to be seen as a religion of rebels. Olivier Roy has drawn attention to the phenomenon of “protest conversion” which can be divided into four categories: the politicized rebels who admire the anti-imperialistic rhetoric of radical Islam, the religious nomads who convert to Islam after experimenting with other religions, individuals with criminal record who find refuge in Islam, and members of minority groups (e.g. Blacks, Latinos and people of mixed race) who are attracted to Islam because of its cross-racial appeal (Roy, 2004, p. 317). Conversion to Islam is usually a life changing experience. The new adherents adopt a Muslim name in order to prove their allegiance to their new faith. They are also keen to demonstrate to their friends and relatives their commitment to the Islamic way of life. Therefore, they very often quit habits such as drinking alcohol and change their diet and eating pattern. Conversion to Islam is not always acceptable to parents and other family members. Many converts mentioned a difficult time they had with parents and siblings when they announced to them their decision to embrace Islam. A Greek convert said that “his family treated him as an enemy” (Grigoris, 2009). In particular, female converts have been more visible and thus more vulnerable to criticism and ridicule. As a GreekCanadian female explained, “My parents believed at first that I betrayed my culture” (Maria, 2009). Female converts have faced strong criticism for their decision to wear a hijab (the Islamic headscarf) which, from the Western point of view, has largely symbolized oppression. In the words of a Dutch woman, “People felt sorry for me and almost treated me as a victim. To them, I was a woman who had been coerced by her husband into giving up her rights” (Edith, 2008). Yet, converts often adjust Islam to their needs. For example, a young Dutch convert admitted that he “cannot pray five times per day” but at least he “stopped eating pork” (Mark, 2008).

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Converts as Islamic Activists The term Islamic activism has been used by many scholars, but only a few have attempted to define it. Quintan Wiktorowicz has described Islamic activism as “the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes” (Wiktorowicz, 2004, p. 2). The International Crisis Group equates Islamic activism with “the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws, or policies that are held to be Islamic in character” (International Crisis Group, 2005, p. 1). Moreover, it categorizes Islamic activism into three main groups: political Islamism, missionary Islamic activism, and jihadi activism. In this chapter, I define Islamic activism as any effort to bring together organizations, individuals and/or resources for the purpose of promoting or defending Islam-related issues. In recent years, there has been a growing number of converts who are involved in Islamic activism. They often feel more confident than Muslims of immigrant origin to criticize government policies and defend Islamic agendas. Non-Muslims are usually suspicious of converts, because they “abandoned the religion of their forefathers” (Imam, 2009). The bornMuslims have often mixed feelings towards converts: some are skeptical of them, while others view them as mediators between authorities and the Muslim community because they are part of two worlds (Mark, 2008; Imam, 2009; Maria 2009; Ivan, 2011). Islamist groups in Europe have systematically recruited converts and promoted them to senior positions for several reasons. First, their existence would implicitly demonstrate Islam’s superiority over other religions, principally Christianity. In addition, European converts are “whitening” the Islamist movement and thus making it more acceptable to society and the authorities. In addition, well-educated and high-skilled converts constitute a strategic asset for Islamist groups, because they possess valuable organizational skills. In particular, the London-based Hizb utTahrir (the Islamic Party of Liberation) has recruited a number of converts who tend to be middle-class and highly educated. The former chairman of the United Kingdom Executive Committee, the Canadian Jamal Harwood, is one of them. Al Muhajiroun, an offshoot of Hizb ut-Tahrir in Great Britain that was dissolved in 2004, also recruited converts; for instance, the former spokesman of al Muhajiroun was Simon (or Suleiman) Keeler, a British convert. In addition to those who have joined Islamist groups, there are individual converts who have become involved in activism. Yvonne Ridley, a British journalist who converted to Islam two years after being freed from Taliban captivity in October 2001, is one of the most well-

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known Islamic activists in Europe. In June 2004, Ridley ran as a candidate in European Parliament elections for the Respect coalition party. The party had been established by former Labour MP George Galloway together with the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Revolutionary Communist Party of Britain, and prominent members of the Muslim Association of Britain and the Muslim Council of Britain. The party manifesto condemns “Islamophobia and the demonization of Muslim communities” (Respect, 2010). Ridley herself has turned into a controversial figure, referring to Shamil Basayev as a rebel leader who “led an admirable fight to bring independence to Chechnya” (Ridley, 2006a) and defending Abu Musab alZarqawi for his 2005 Amman bombings in Jordan (Ridley, 2005). In March 2009, Ridley co-founded with Galloway the pro-Hamas charity Viva Palestina. Pierre Vogel (aka Abu Hamza) is another famous Islamic activist. He was born in Germany and converted to Islam at the age of 23 while he was a professional boxer. After studying under a scholarship for two years in Mecca, Vogel returned to Germany and started preaching Salafi Islam (Ehrhardt, 2007). Vogel has used the news media to reach a younger audience of Muslims. In December 2009, the Swiss authorities banned him from attending a demonstration against the minaret ban in Bern. He has claimed that the membership of the ummah (the worldwide Muslim community of believers) takes priority over nationality, which is a view that goes against the principles of modern European political and legal culture (Vogel, 2008). Due to his anti-integration messages, the 34-year old self-appointed imam has been monitored by the German security services that worry about radicalism among the country’s large Muslim community (Brandt & Popp, 2010). Abdul-Jabbar van de Ven is a leading Islamic activist in the Netherlands. He converted from Catholicism to Islam at the age of 14. He studied in Amman and Medina before returning to the Netherlands. He has preached Islam in the Salafi-oriented al-Fourqaan mosque in Eindhoven which has allegedly been linked to jihadi groups. Like Pierre Vogel, Van de Ven has used the Internet to reach out to young Muslims. He has also been known for his controversial statements regarding the assassination of Theo van Gogh (NovaTV, 2004). Indeed, Van de Ven was implicated in the case of Jason Walters, a radical Dutch-American convert, who was a member of the notorious Hofstad group which killed the Dutch artist (Silber, 2012). The Italian convert Hamza Roberto Riccardo represents the older generation of converts. He is one of the founders of the Union of Islamic Communities in Italy and former spokesman of the European Muslim

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Network. Although he has focused on da’wa activities, publishing books about Islam and translating the Quran to Italian, Riccardo has not refrained from controversial statements. During an interview, for example, he confidently predicted that in Italy [Muslims] will one day become the majority: the birth rate among Muslims is 3.8 children per woman [but] the Italian average is 1.2. Just make a turn at the exit of a kindergarten or elementary to realize that our country is becoming multiracial (Melis, no date).

In 2008, Riccardo expressed sympathy for Hamas when he stated that there is a presumption of guilt toward anyone who is critical of Israel. It is a convenient [approach] that on the one hand allows them to criminalize easily Muslims whenever expressing solidarity with the Palestinian brothers, and on the other hand to brand as terrorism every activity of resistance as that of Hamas (Riccardo, 2008).

The German Denis Mamadou Cuspert (aka Abiu Malleq) is a rap singer turned into an Islamic activist. Being a mixed race person (his father was from Ghana and his mother a native German), Cuspert probably felt he did not belong anywhere. He joined youth gangs to revolt against his family. He converted to Islam after meeting Pierre Vogel in 2009. Following his conversion, he started propagating Islamist messages. His songs have praised Osama bin Laden and jihadi warriors (Mekhennet, 2011). Cuspert serves a role model for Muslim teenagers of immigrant origin who struggle to cope with social exclusion and racism. Indeed, Cuspert has been accused of inspiring Arid Uka, a Kosovo Albanian, who killed two American airmen at the Frankfurt airport in March 2011. Although he denied any direct connection with Uka, Cuspert did not hesitate to argue that “the brother hasn’t killed civilians... [Uka] has killed soldiers who had been on their way to kill Muslims” (Mekhennet, 2011). Nicolas Blancho is a Swiss convert who converted at the age of 16. He is the founder of the Islamic Central Council (ICC), a controversial Salafioriented organization which has increasingly taken a confrontational stand in many pan-Islamic issues (e.g., recognition of Palestine as an independent state, Prophet Muhammad cartoons). Blancho provoked a public outcry when he refused to condemn the stoning of the adulterous women in Afghanistan (Wissmann, 2010). According to Markus Seiler, Director of the Swiss Federal Intelligence Service, the ICC has espoused an ideological, not violent, extremism (Rechsteiner, 2010). Yet, it seems that Blancho and the ICC have been monitored by the security services due to their alleged links with al Qaeda terrorists.

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The 27-year old Nora Illi, the director of women’s affairs at the ICC, is probably Switzerland’s most famous niqab-wearer (niqab is a full-face veil). She converted to Islam at the age of 19. Illi has gained the status of a celebrity who is reported on and sought after by the Swiss media. As a teenager, she was involved in demonstrations for Palestine where she met her future husband Qassim Illi, a fellow Swiss convert (Murmann, 2011). Qassim Illi became known for his pro-Hamas statements, endorsing suicide attacks against Israeli citizens (Guenter, 2012). Vadim Sidorov (aka Harun al-Rus) is the chairman of the National Organization of Russian Muslims (Natsional'naya organizatsiya russkikh musul'man - NORM) which was established by ethnic Russian converts in June 2004. The NORM viewed Islam as “a path to the rebirth of the Russian nation” and as “a means to the world-wide liberation of the oppressed” (Goble, 2009). The organization has been eager to promote the creation of a “Russian Islam” which could fill the spiritual vacuum left by the declining influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. Also, Sirodov is member of the Murabitun World Movement which advocates the peaceful restoration of the Caliphate. In December 2011, Sirodov drafted the “Islamic Civic Charter” which calls for the elimination of “lists of prohibited literature and the practice of banning literature” and the replacement of the “current law on political parties to allow such groups to be formed on regional, religious and ethnic grounds” (Zvezda Povolzh'ja, 2012). More importantly, the Islamic Charter demanded “the political resolution of the Caucasus problem (i.e. the Islamic insurgency in Chechnya and Dagestan) by means of broad dialogue with social forces and the participation of authoritative mediators” (Zvezda Povolzh'ja, 2012). Sidorov has apparently joined forces with a new Muslim-dominated movement Intersoyuz (Khamidullina, 2012). All these converts-activists have gained publicity for their inflammatory rhetoric and criticism vis-à-vis Western governments. No matter why they converted to Islam, they now act with defiance and self-assertiveness, sometimes on the borderline of the law. But Islamic activists of convert origin do not constitute a coherent group. They have different political backgrounds and different religious orientations. Ridley, Blancho and Illi are former leftists whereas Vogel and Cuspert have no significant political history. While Vogel, Cuspert, Illi and van de Ven advocate Salafi Islam, Ridley, Sidorov and Riccardo consider themselves “just Muslims”. Yet, all feel part of the ummah. By joining such a transnational entity as the ummah, converts find a larger than life purpose. It is a brotherhood and sisterhood of 1.3 billion people with whom they can identify and improve their self esteem.

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Islamophobia and the Politicization of Converts The September 11 events aggravated the already strained relations between the West and the Islamic world. The fact that the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks were foreigners, who had travelled to the U.S from European cities, brought the Old Continent’s Muslim communities to the spotlight. The homegrown Madrid and London bombings on March 11, 2004 and July 7, 2005, respectively, only confirmed in the eyes of some the untrustworthiness of Europe’s Muslims. It should be noted that European converts were involved in both terrorist attacks; Germaine Maurice Lindsay was one of the London suicide bombers and Luis Jose Galan Gonzales (aka Yusuf Galan) was imprisoned for his role in the Madrid bombings. Negative portrayal of Islam by some politicians and most Western media has stirred up a climate of Islamophobia that has alarmed Muslim communities. The term Islamophobia was defined by the Council of Europe as “the fear of or prejudiced viewpoint towards Islam, Muslims and matters pertaining to them. Whether it takes the shape of daily forms of racism and discrimination or more violent forms, Islamophobia is a violation of human rights and a threat to social cohesion” (Ramberg, 2004, p. 6). A European survey has claimed that “many Muslims have experienced verbal assaults in public transportation means and other public places. Muslim women who wear the headscarf and Muslim men who travel with women dressed this way are particularly frequent targets of offensive comments” (Nyman, 2005, p. 30). Likewise, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia has reported a rapid increase in the number of verbal and violent attacks against Muslims in many European countries (European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, 2006). According to a 2006 survey of Pew Research Center, 51 percent of Germany’s Muslims, 42 percent of Great Britain’s Muslims, 39 percent of France’s Muslims and 31 percent of Spain’s Muslims believe that native Europeans are hostile to Muslims, while 19 percent of German Muslims, 28 percent of British Muslims, 37 percent of French Muslims and 25 percent of Spanish Muslims had a bad personal experience (Pew Research Center, 2006). Islamic activists of convert origin have often attributed their traumatic personal experiences to Islamophobia. Yvonne Ridley proclaimed that “when I converted to Islam and began wearing a headscarf, the repercussions were enormous...I instantly became a second-class citizen. I knew I’d hear from the odd Islamophobe, but I didn’t expect so much open

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hostility from strangers” (Ridley, 2006b). Abdul Jabbar had a similar experience in the Netherlands. The Dutch convert expressed it this way: It is impossible to describe what I’ve experienced in recent years. The atmosphere is totally intolerant. The AIVD (i.e. the Dutch Secret Service) follows me, looks at my email, and listens to my phone...Even worse is what you get in the form of threatening letters and emails and phone calls...And just because I am Muslim...I’m sure that I will eventually leave the Netherlands and go somewhere where I can normally [practice] my faith... more and more Muslims, even Dutch, [leave] because [they] will not be treated as equal (NovaTV, 2004).

Following the Swiss authorities’ decision to refuse him entry to the country, Pierre Vogel argued that “the smear campaign against us is spreading throughout Europe more and more, and that is obvious. I am afraid that, in the future, [Muslims] will be slaughtered. We face a very dark future” (Minuten Online, 2009). Nicolas Blancho has also drawn attention to discrimination against Muslims; he once stated that “Switzerland’s Muslims should enjoy the same respect and the same rights as all other groups” and he raised the case of female Muslim teachers who, “if they wear headscarf, they have almost no chance of finding a job” (Sommer, 2012). During an interview, Nora Illi wondered “what if Islamophobia continues to increase? What if I am threatened with death as in the deportation of the Jews? What should I do if I am deported because of the niqab?” (Murmann, 2011). At first glance, one may be tempted to doubt these accounts. However, most converts interviewed by the author expressed the same concern for the increasing Islamophobia. According to an English female convert, “After the July 2005 London bombings, some of my colleagues stopped talking to me or questioned my patriotism. Suddenly, I felt like an outcast. When the situation became intolerable, I decided to quit my job” (Sarah, 2009). Others mentioned that they have been victims of verbal abuses or ironic comments from neighbors and even relatives. For example, John had a quarrel with his father about the London bombings when the latter called Islam “a religion of murderers” (John, 2009) and Steven’s house “was vandalized with racist graffiti” in East London (Steven, 2010). Russian converts have been particularly vulnerable to anti-Muslim racism and discrimination. Vadim mentioned that he was “threatened to be killed by a neo-Nazi gang” in his neighborhood after the Moscow metro bombings in March 2010 (Vadim, 2011). Ivan was harassed by the police for “looking like a Muslim terrorist” (Ivan, 2011). Apparently, the 9/11 events and the subsequent terrorist attacks on European soil isolated

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further the Muslim communities which have been suffering ever since from a siege mentality. Interestingly, Islamophobia and the growing number of anti-Muslim attacks have also made converts more conscious of the problems facing the global ummah. Most interviewees confirmed that they have been increasingly aware of the “Muslim suffering” in the Middle East and elsewhere, and expressed their concern over the fate of those populations. One convert stated that “what happens in Palestine concerns all Muslims”, a rather popular view among many Muslims (John, 2009). Vadim spoke of anti-Muslim prejudice in Russia and the “ongoing genocide against Chechens” (Vadim, 2011). Interestingly, even Sufi-oriented converts, like David, viewed the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 as “an anti-Islamic crusade” (David, 2010). Yet, only a few of the interviewees expressed radical views; for instance, a Greek male convert argued that “when a Muslim country is invaded then jihad becomes a personal obligation” (Grigoris, 2009). Although it is difficult to prove beyond doubt that the politicization of European converts is a reaction to the prevailing atmosphere of Islamophobia, it is obvious that there is a correlation between them. AntiMuslim sentiments and prejudice have drawn a dividing line between native Europeans and Muslim communities. It is only natural that some converts will take leadership roles because they want to position themselves in their new community. Their angry and aggressive rhetoric possibly indicates a deep sense of insecurity for the future of Muslim life in Europe, but it may also indicate a personal commitment to the well being of fellow Muslims. In this way, they could overcome their double burden of being a visible minority within a visible minority. Indeed, those who have become activists largely perceive themselves as an Islamic vanguard that practices “jihad by tongue” (jihad bil lisan); this form of jihad involves educating non-Muslims about Islam and to strive with one’s tongue to “support good and fight wrong.” In practice, this is done through speeches, debates and other public activities.

Conclusion and Prospects for the Future Despite being negatively presented in the media and elsewhere, Islam has won thousands of new followers in many European countries. Native Europeans are attracted to Islam for a variety of reasons, ranging from personal traumatic experiences to political curiosity and rebellion. No matter why they endorsed Islam, the majority of native European converts

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have been respectful and law-abiding citizens who fully participate in social and economic life. Having said that, the prevailing climate of Islamophobia has led to the politicization of some converts in Europe. Being familiar with the political culture and system of government of their own countries, converts have been turned into activists defending Muslim rights and often propagating Islamist messages. While these politicized converts come from diverse backgrounds, they share a deep sense of personal commitment to the “defense” of Islam from external criticism. In fact, they represent a new group of Islamic activists because they belong both to their native society and to the ummah. They seek to promote a less Arab-looking and more Europeanized Islam that dares to confront its “enemies.” In this way, they can gain more self-confidence and overcome the prejudice of native Europeans and possibly even fellow Muslims who were born into Islam. The activism of European converts to Islam has often been viewed as a security issue. Yet, European governments need Islamic activists to channel rising Muslim discontent over foreign policy decisions into nonviolent actions. Here it is important to notice the difference between activism and radicalization. Being an Islamic activist does not necessarily mean involvement in terrorist activities. Indeed, many jihadi terrorists had no history of activism. Therefore, a harsh security response to Islamic activism may bring about a self-fulfilling prophecy.

References Bousetta, H. & Bernes, L. A. (2007). Muslims in the EU: Belgium. Budapest: Open Society Institute. Brandt, A. & Popp, M. (2010). Will efforts to train homegrown Muslim leaders fail? Der Spiegel, September 16. Retrieved from http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,717512,00.html “David,” Personal communication with an English male convert, London, November 22, 2010. “Edith,” Personal communication with a Dutch female convert, Rotterdam, December 5, 2008. Ehrhardt, C. (2007). Konvertiten: Ich Ben Ein Muslim Jeworden. Frankfurter Allgemeine, September 6. Frøslev, L. (2010). Flere Danskere Konverterer Til Islam. Berlingske Tidende, 21 February. Retrieved from http://www.berlingske.dk/danmark/flere-danskere-konverterer-til-islam Goble, P. (2009). Why are Russians converting to Islam? Retrieved from http://www.iviews.com/articles/Articles.asp?ref=IC0906-3866

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“Grigoris,” Personal communication with a Greek male convert, Athens, July 4, 2009. Guenter, A. (2012). Wie Extrem Sind Schwizer Islamisten? Blick.ch, January 14. Retrieved from http://www.blick.ch/news/schweiz/wieextrem-sind-schweizer-islamisten-id41614.html “Hairulla,” Personal communication with a Greek male convert, Athens, July 6, 2010. Hamza Riccardo: Nelle Moschee si Predica Tutto Fuorche Odio e Violenza. (2008). Retrieved January 21, 2012 from http://www.milanomag.it/index.php?page=news-detail&id-det=222 Imam, Personal communication, London, January 5, 2009. International Crisis Group. (2005). Understanding Islamism. Brussels: ICG. “Ivan,” Personal communication with a Russian male convert, Moscow, August 7, 2011. “John,” Personal communication with an English male convert, London, January 5 2009. Kandel, J. (2004). Organisierter Islam in Deutschland und gesellschaftliche Integration. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved from http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/akademie/online/50372.pdf Kerbaj, R. (2009, January 30). Muslim population rising 10 times faster than rest of society. The TimesOnLine. Retrieved from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article5621482.ece Khamidullina, K. (2012). Musulmane trebuyut peremen. Tatarskaya Gazeta. Retrieved from http://www.tatargazeta.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl e&id=233:2012-01-10-10-37-45&catid=4:2010-11-04-15-2609&Itemid=11 Khosrokhavar, F. (2002). Suicide bombers: Allah’s new martyrs. London: Pluto Press. Kose, A. (1996). Conversion to Islam: A study of native British converts. London: Kegan Paul International. Lapidus, I. (2002). A history of Islamic societies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lofland, J. & Stark, R. (1965). Becoming a world saver: A theory of conversion to a deviant perspective. American Sociological Review, 30, 862-875. Lofland, J. (1966). Doomsday cult: A study of conversion, proselytization and maintenance of faith. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. “Maria,” Personal communication with a Greek-Canadian female convert, Athens, December 12, 2009.

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“Mark,” Personal communication with a Dutch male convert, Amsterdam, December 7, 2008. McCauley, C. & Moskalenko, S. (2009). Measuring political mobilization: The distinction between activism and radicalism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 21, 239-260. McGinty, A.M. (2006). Becoming Muslim: Western women’s conversions to Islam. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Mekhennet, S. (2011). German officials alarmed by ex-rapper’s new message: Jihad. New York Times, August 31. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/01/world/europe/01jihadi.html?_r=1 &pagewanted=all Melis, V. Interview with Hamza Roberto Piccardo, no date. Retrieved from http://www.uniurb.it/giornalismo/lavori/melis/Valentina/intervista2.htm Murmann, K. (2011, June 25). Hinter dem Schleier. Der Sonntag. Retrieved from http://www.sonntagonline.ch/ressort/aktuell/1708/ NovaTV. (2004, November 24). Interview met Abdul-Jabbar in De Gelderlander. Retrieved from http://www.novatv.nl/page/detail/nieuws/7759/Interview+met+AbdulJabbar+in+De+Gelderlander+%2820+november%29 Nyman, A. S. (2005). Intolerance and discrimination against Muslims in the EU: Developments since September 11. Vienna: International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights. Office for National Statistics. (2002). The 2001 census. Retrieved February 2, 2012 from http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/census2001.asp Pew Research Center. (2006). Muslims in Europe: Economic worries top concerns about religious and cultural identity. Available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2006/07/06/muslims-in-europe-economicworries-top-concerns-about-religious-and-cultural-identity/ —. (2009). Mapping the global Muslim population. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center. Pingree, G. & Abend, L. (2006, November 7). In Spain, dismay at Muslim converts holding sway. Christian Science Monitor. Poston, L. (1992). Islamic Da’wah in the West: Muslim missionary activity and the dynamics of conversion of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ramberg, I. (2004). Islamophobia and its consequences on young people. Budapest: Council of Europe. Rambo, R. L. (1993). Understanding religious conversion. New Haven: Yale University Press.

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Rechsteiner, B. (2010, May 15). Wie gefahrlich ist der Islamische Zentralrat?. Aargauer Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.aargauerzeitung.ch/schweiz/wie-gefaehrlich-ist-derislamische-zentralrat-8621169 Respect (2010). Civil liberties. Retrieved from http://www.therespectparty.net/manifesto.php?category=CivilLiberties Ridley, Y. (2006a). The passing of a Chechen, July 10. Retrieved from http://yvonneridley.org/yvonne-ridley/articles/the-passing-of-achechen-4.html —. (2006b, October 22). How I came to love the veil. Retrieved from http://yvonneridley.org/2006/how-i-came-to-love-the-veil —. (2005, November 23). Something rather repugnant. Tajdeed. Retrieved from http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1529185/posts’ Roald, A. S. (2004). New Muslims in the European context: The experience of Scandinavian converts. Boston: Brill. Roy, O. (2004). Globalized Islam: The search for new ummah. New York: Columbia University Press. —. (2008). Al-Qaeda: A true global movement. In R. Coolsaet (Ed.), Jihadi Terrorism and the Radicalization Challenge in Europe (109114). Aldershot: Ashgate. “Sarah,” Personal communication with an English female convert, London, January 9, 2009. Shavit, U. & Wiesenbach, F. (2009). Muslim strategies to convert western Christians. Middle East Quarterly, XVI, 3-14. Silber, M. D. (2012). The Al Qaeda factor: Plots against the west. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Singer, M. (1980). The use of folklore in religious conversion: The classidic case, Review of Religious Research, 22, 170-185. Sommer, A. (2012, February 16). Ich Komme Aus Einem Links-Grunen Elternhaus. Berner Zeitung. Retrieved from http://www.bernerzeitung.ch/schweiz/standard/Ich-komme-aus-einemlinksgruenen-Elternhaus/story/19946069 Statistics Netherlands. (2007). More than 850 thousand Muslims in the Netherland. October 27. Retrieved from http://www.cbs.nl “Steven,” Personal communication with an English male convert, London, November 19, 2010. The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. (2006). Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia. Brussels: EUMC. Twenty Minuten Online. (2009, December 10). Interview mit Pierre Vogel. Retrieved from

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http://www.20min.ch/news/dossier/minarett/story/-Das-wird-einErdbeben-ausloesen--11801151 Uhlmann, M. (2008). European converts to terrorism. Middle East Quarterly, XV, 31-37. “Vadin,” Personal communication with a Russian male convert, Moscow, August 7, 2011. Van Nieuwkerk, K. (2006). Women embracing Islam: Gender and conversion in the west. Austin: University of Texas Press. Vogel, P. (2008). 16,000 Deutsche Konvertieren zum Islam. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ega020cGJMc Wiktorowicz, Q. (2004). Islamic activism: A social movement theory approach. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Wissmann, R. (2010, June 9). Islamic camp on Lake Biel. Der Bund. Retrieved from http://www.derbund.ch/schweiz/standard/IslamischesZeltlager-am-Bielersee/story/23350288/print.html Zebiri, K. (2008). British Muslim converts: Choosing alternative lives. Oxford: Oneworld. Zvezda Povolzh'ja (2012, February 2). Islamskaja grazhdanskaja hartija. Retrieved from http://zvezdapovolzhya.ru/politika/islamskaya-grazh danskaya-hartiya-02-02-2012.html

CHAPTER THREE AN ‘ALTERNATIVE SENSE OF REALITY’? THE CASE OF ANDERS BREIVIK AND THE THREAT OF RIGHT WING TERRORISM LYNDSEY HARRIS BIRMINGHAM CITY UNIVERSITY

AND RACHEL MONAGHAN UNIVERSITY OF ULSTER

Abstract Whilst many types of terrorism and terrorist activity have been subject to academic enquiry, historically the analysis of right wing terrorism has been event driven. For example, the Oklahoma bombing by Timothy McVeigh in 1995 led to a focus on the American militias, survivalists and Christian Identity movements (Crenshaw, 2000). This trend continues in light of the actions of the “lone-wolf” Norwegian terrorist, Anders Breivik. Such analysis of a single event, Crenshaw argues, distracts “researchers from studies that focus on historical developments over time” (p. 411). Thus, an evident gap still remains within the literature on terrorism. This chapter seeks to redress this deficit by offering a discussion and analysis of right wing terrorism. Additionally, it aims to place the actions of Breivik into a wider discussion of the nature of global right wing terrorism, right wing movements and ideologies. In doing so, the authors seek to challenge the populist belief that right wing terrorist actors are more likely to be lone actors or incapable of rational thought. Our discussion starts with an overview of the motivations and tactics used by Breivik, which culminated in the July 22, 2011 Oslo bombing and Utøya Island killings. We will highlight the common assumptions made about right wing terrorism and

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we will then seek to challenge their validity before examining the contemporary threat posed by right wing terrorism. Keywords: Right wing ideology, right wing movements, right wing terrorism, lone wolf, Anders Breivik In 2000 Martha Crenshaw produced a thought provoking proposal that outlined the gaps that continued to exist in the academic enquiry of terrorism and terrorist activity. Crenshaw identified that historically the analysis of right wing terrorism “exemplifies the tendency of terrorism studies to be event driven” (2000, p. 410). Twelve years on, one evident gap remains in the form of a comprehensive discussion and analysis of right wing terrorism. This chapter aims to place the actions of “lone-wolf” Norwegian terrorist, Anders Breivik, into a wider discussion of the nature of global right wing terrorism, right wing movements and ideologies. The authors are seeking to challenge the populist belief that terrorist actors with right wing ideological values are more likely to be lone actors or incapable of rational thought. Our discussion will begin with an overview of motivations and tactics used by Breivik, which culminated in the July 22, 2011 Oslo bombing and Utøya Island killings. In our further discussion of the response to Breivik’s actions we will highlight the common assumptions found within right wing terrorism and we will then seek to challenge these and examine the contemporary threat posed by right wing terrorism.

Definitional Controversies First, it is important to address the terminology used within this chapter. The authors are aware of the definitional controversies that exist within the academic community concerning the terms “terrorism,” “right wing terrorism” and “lone wolf terrorism.” It has long been acknowledged within the literature that there will never be a generally accepted definition of “terrorism” despite there having been a large number of attempts to do so (see Hoffman, 1998; Schmid & Jongman, 1998; Wilkinson, 2011). As the British Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Lord Carlile of Berriew noted in his report on The Definition of Terrorism: “There is no single definition of terrorism that commands full international approval” (2007, p. 47). One of the major reasons for this difficulty is because “terrorism” is a moral problem (Wardlaw, 1990). Any attempt at definition will be predicated on the assumption that some classes of political violence are justifiable whereas others are not. This view is supported by

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Silke (1996, p. 12) who remarks, “Considerable division exists among researchers on the issue of defining terrorism...this [division] has been fuelled by the distinctive question of morality which cloak any consideration of terrorism”. Having said this, it is possible to identify the core characteristics of the phenomenon, by examining the various definitions of terrorism which exist. Schmid and Jongman content analyzed more than a hundred definitions and found that the most frequently cited elements included the use or threat of use of violence, the existence of a political motive, the target selection is symbolic, the goal is to modify behavior, the methods employed may be extreme, the aim is to terrorize, and the act of terrorism is an act of communication (Schmid & Jongman, 1998). Neuman and Smith define terrorism as “the deliberate creation of a sense of fear, usually by the use or threat of use of symbolic acts of physical violence, to influence the political behavior of a given target group” (2005, p. 574). Likewise “lone wolf terrorism” generates considerable debate as many academics and governments define terrorism as a group activity. For example, an early definition of political terrorism by Wilkinson involves “the waging of organized terror either on the part of the state, a movement or faction, or by a small group of individuals” (Wilkinson, 1974, p. 11). Whilst the United States government defines terrorism (Section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the United States Code) as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents” (US Department of State, 2011). In such definitions the actions of a single actor, or “lone wolf” as they are frequently termed, does not equate to terrorism. For the purpose of this chapter, the COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management’s definition of lone wolf terrorism will be used. Such terrorism involves acts undertaken by persons a) who operate individually; b) who do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network; c) who act without the direct influence of a leader or hierarchy; d) whose tactics and methods are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or direction (2007, p. 6). As with the definitions of “terrorism” and “lone wolf terrorism,” the definition of “right wing terrorism” suffers a similar fate in that there is no one agreed upon definition. According to the European Police Office (Europol):

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Chapter Three Traditionally, right-wing terrorist groups seek to change the political, social and economic system in a way that favours authoritarian, antiSemitic and often racist “solutions” to social problems. The ideological roots of European right-wing extremism and terrorism can usually be traced back to Facism and National Socialism (Europol, 2011, p. 29).

Europol’s definition of right wing terrorism focuses upon those actors who have a revolutionary nature and the belief in a need to change the political system. Significantly, a report published by the Transitional Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law Project (TTSRL) (2008) neatly summarises the definitional problems surrounding any discussion of “right wing” terrorism: “In defining right wing terrorism, one immediately notes the combination of an ideology (right wing) with a certain form of expression (terrorism)” (p. 2). Undoubtedly not all people espousing right wing views will engage in terrorism. The term right wing covers a broad range within the ideological political spectrum extending from center right conservatism to far right fascism. When discussing the nature of right wing terrorism we are in fact referring to those actors who would be included in what most commentators identify as the “far right” which, according to Carter (2005), centers upon anti-democratic sentiment including xenophobia and militarism. It is, however, important to note that in recent years Western Europe has witnessed the growth of right wing populism which centers upon anti-elitism, nativism and a rejection of social equality and opposition to social integration. The origins of support for right wing populist ideologies are directly linked to a politics of resentment (Betz, 1994). On a few occasions, an expression of this resentment, which is explored below, has been to engage in the tactic of terrorism. Our survey of the literature on right wing terrorism supports Europol’s 2011 annual Terrorism and Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), which identifies that right wing violence is often labelled as extremism rather than terrorism. This illustrates Eatwell and Goodwin’s (2010) argument that the term extremism is not value neutral. In the context of this discussion, it is useful to consider the definition of extremism provided by the United Kingdom’s Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) (2011): The term only applies to individuals or groups whose activities go outside the normal democratic process and engage in crime and disorder in order to further their campaign. Extremists may operate independently, but will sometimes try to mask their activities by associating closely with legitimate campaigners (n.p.).

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This definition highlights what Eatwell and Goodwin (2010) describe as the two dimensions – “an action-based one and a values-based one” (p. 11) - of extremism. As Michael (2003) explains, “[W]hile it is axiomatic to say that terrorism is usually perpetrated by extremists, the vast majority of extremists are not terrorists” (p. 2). For the purposes of this chapter, when discussing the term right wing we share Michael’s description of the characteristics of right wing groups when he explains that the essence of the far right includes: 1) Particularism: Unlike other political ideologies, the far right tends to take more of a parochial outlook, more concerned with a smaller locus of identify such as the nation, republic, race or ethnic group. It tends not to have ambitions to proselytize the whole world to its belief system; 2) Low regard for democracy; 3) Anti-statism; 4) A conspiracy view of history; and 5) A racial or ethnic component such as racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, or ethnic chauvinism (pp. 5-6). The characteristics identified by Michael illustrate why right wing terrorism has often been linked to the activities of neo-Nazi groups. For example, Searchlight, an international anti-Fascist magazine, investigates many right wing extremist organizations and comments on the nature of the threat posed. Searchlight investigated the emergence, in 2006, of a group called P.O.W.E.R (Patriots of the White European Resistance) in the United Kingdom. Searchlight revealed that the organization claimed to “struggle for the white race” and were strongly racist. In addition, P.O.W.E.R was said to have made available the “Leaderless Resistance” document, “which has been the blueprint for cellular extremist terrorism” (Searchlight, 2010, p. 140). When referring to right wing terrorism we are referring to those actors who adhere to some or all of the characteristics of the far right above and will engage in the use of violence as an expression of “action-based extremism” with the intention of creating fear for political ends. In essence, we are drawing upon Neuman and Smith’s (2005) definition of terrorism, which highlights the application of actual or threatened violence with the aim of creating fear within a target group and obtaining the desired response. This definition of terrorism could be applied to any form of terrorism such as Islamist terrorism, left-wing terrorism or separatist terrorism. What we have highlighted above, is that what differentiates

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right wing terrorism from other forms of terrorism is the values and motivations of the actors involved.

Case Study: Anders Breivik On July 22, 2011 Norway experienced two acts of terrorism perpetrated by a “lone wolf” right wing terrorist, which saw seventy-seven people killed and one hundred and fifty-one injured. At 3:26 pm a car bomb, or vehicle-borne improvised explosive device, exploded outside the government’s headquarters in Oslo killing eight people. The device had been planted by Anders Breivik, who, dressed as a policeman, then drove some twenty-five miles and caught a ferry to Utøya Island where the Norwegian Labour Party’s youth summer camp was being held. It was here that in little more than an hour he shot and killed a further sixty-nine people. Fifty-five of his victims were teenagers. When the police arrived at the scene, Breivik surrendered into their custody and whilst admitting the killings he denied criminal responsibility on the grounds that it “was necessary to wipe out the next generation of Labour party leaders in order to stop the further disintegration of Nordic culture from the mass immigration of Muslims and kick-start a revolution to halt the spread of Islam” (Fekete, 2011, p. 31). Breivik has claimed that his actions were in self-defense on behalf of ethnic Norwegians whose national identity was being deconstructed as a result of immigration and the resulting policy of multiculturalism. Those killed on Utøya Island were thus considered by Breivik to be legitimate targets as they were representatives of a “multiculturalist” regime (Pidd, 2012). Under the alias Andrew Berwick, Breivik revealed his ideology in a 1,500 page manifesto entitled 2083: a European Declaration of Independence, which was e-mailed to fellow counter-jihadists and right wing extremists ninety minutes before the Oslo bombing (Breivik, 2011). His worldview is one influenced by the idea of Eurabia, the colonization of Europe by Islam. As Fallaci, one of the key proponents of this idea explains, Today’s Islamic expansionism…does not need the armies and fleets with which the Ottoman Empire once terrorized Europe. It only needs the immigrants, whom short-sighted politicians and befuddled multiculturalists continue to welcome (Cited in Carr, 2006, p. 11).

Additionally, Breivik believes that cultural Marxism, which he equates to political correctness, is also on the rise. This political correctness and what Carr (2006) terms “excessive liberal tolerance of reactionary

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‘Islamic’ cultural practices” (p. 14) is leading the continent ever closer to cultural extinction. Thus, Breivik saw himself as the commander of the Norwegian resistance movement and part of the Knights Templar, an antiIslamist network established in London in 2002. Following his arrest and throughout the course of his trial, Breivik’s sanity was the focus of much attention. The initial psychiatric evaluation concluded Breivik had suffered from paranoid schizophrenia for years and was “psychotic” at the time of the killings; thus he was criminally insane and could not be held accountable for his actions. Norway’s chief prosecutor, Svein Holden, told the Oslo district court that the psychiatrists’ report concluded that Breivik was someone “who finds himself in his own delusional universe, where all his thought and acts are governed by these delusions” (Coghlan, 2011, n.p.). Given the controversy which resulted following the first report, a second evaluation was undertaken that gave the opinion that Breivik was sane (Paterson, 2012). Under Norwegian law the maximum prison sentence an individual can serve is twenty-one years regardless of the crime committed, although the custody may be prolonged if the individual is considered a danger to society. If the individual is declared insane they can be held indefinitely by the state in a secure psychiatric hospital (Pidd, 2012). On April 16, 2012, Breivik stood trial, charged with terrorism and premeditated murder for the Oslo bombing and the Utøya Island killings. The Prosecution requested that he be committed to psychiatric care whilst his defense team argued that he was sane. On August 24, 2012, Breivik was declared sane, convicted of killing 77 people, and given the maximum prison sentence of twenty-one years. The trial both highlighted general attitudes and interpretations of far right wing motivated violence and the extent of Breivik’s commitment to a far right wing ideology. His far right wing beliefs of anti-statism and racism are illustrated in his response to the verdict in which he stated: My first statement on the 16th April was that I do not recognize this court because you receive your mandate from political parties that support multiculturalism. By discarding my allegations of the principle of necessity and sentencing a representative of the Norwegian resistance movement you have sided with the multicultural majority in parliament and therefore you also expressed support for the multiculturalist ideology. Since I do not recognise this court I cannot legitimize the Oslo district court by accepting this sentence. In my view this sentence and judgement is illegitimate and at the same time I cannot appeal against the judgement because by appealing I would legitimize the court. I would like to end with a statement of regret. I wish to apologize to all militant nationalists in Norway and in Europe for not having executed more traitors (Breivik, 2012).

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Such views were developed over time. For five years (up to 2004) Breivik was a paid member of the right wing populist Progress Party, which has strict views on immigration (Feldman, 2012). He also interacted on the web with other far right supporters by contributing to anti-Muslim websites and blogspots such as Gates of Vienna and Stormfront. In addition, in 2009 he became a member of Nordisk, an internet forum established by neo-Nazis in Sweden, which openly incites violence (Townsend & Traynor, 2011). The internet afforded Breivik a medium through which to share his ideas, but also provided for his online radicalization. Observers note, The fact that Breivik chose the internet to disseminate his ideology is important. His journey to terrorism was forged within a network of blogs where violence is glorified and multiculturalism despised, along with those who embrace it” (Townsend & Traynor, 2011, n.p.).

Right Wing Terrorism Elsewhere Whilst occurrences of right wing terrorism may be rare in comparison to other types of terrorism, they have occurred elsewhere in the world and have been undertaken by both groups and so-called “lone wolves.” The United States (US) has experienced right wing group terrorism throughout the twentieth century. Such terrorism would include the activities of The Order, a group which emerged from the Aryan Nations. The Order was most active in 1983 and 1984 when it undertook armed robberies (which netted the group $4 million), planted bombs and engaged in murder (Levin, 1998; Smith, 1994). Right wing terror groups such as the Black Order and Armed Revolutionary Nucleus were also operating in Italy throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. The groups frequently employed the indiscriminate use of explosive devices in public places such as in piazzas, on trains or at railway stations (Anderson & Sloan, 2002). Of the 419 persons killed as a result of terrorism in Italy between 1969 and 1987, right wing groups were responsible for nearly half of them (Jamieson, 1989). More recently (2011) in Germany information emerged that a neoNazis cell called the Nationalist Socialist Underground (NSU) killed ten people including a policewoman and nine non-German nationals who were either shopkeepers or food vendors between 2000 and 2007. Additionally they were linked to fourteen bank robberies and the planting of two nail bombs over a period of thirteen years (Dowling, 2011; Pidd & Harding, 2011). The cell was only discovered after the suicide of the two main suspects (Uwe Mundlos and Uwe Böhnhardt) following a bank robbery,

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which went wrong. A third suspect, Beate Zschäpe handed herself in to the police and has been charged with founding a terrorist organization and arson (she allegedly set fire to the house she had shared with the main suspects). A fourth individual, Holger G, was also arrested on suspicion of belonging to a terrorist organization. Following the cell’s discovery, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel said We’re seeing something inconceivable…We suspect rightwing extremists are responsible for horrible acts of violence, for rightwing terror. It’s a disgrace and mortifying for Germany and we’ll do everything we can to get to the bottom of this. We owe that to the victims (Dowling, 2011, p. 17).

Right wing “lone wolves” would include David Copeland, who in 1999 planted three separate nail bombs in London. The first of which was left outside a supermarket in Brixton, south London, adjacent to a crowded bus stop on April 17 in an area popular with the black community. The bomb left in a bag packed with nails designed to cause serious injuries and death was unwittingly moved by two passers-by who, on inspecting the contents, suspected it might be a bomb. The device exploded causing injuries to fifty people, many of whom suffered multiple lacerations from flying debris, including nails (R v Copeland, 2011). The second attack using a similar modus operandi occurred a week later (April 24) when a sports bag was left on a pavement in east London in an area popular with the Indian community. Again, a passer-by on spotting the bag carried it to a nearby police station at Brick Lane. On finding the station closed, the man put the bag in the trunk of his car and went to another police station, which was also closed. Whilst in the process of telephoning the emergency services the bomb detonated, injuring thirteen people (Hopkins & Hall, 2000; R v Copeland, 2011). The last and fatal bomb was left in a large sports bag inside the busy Admiral Duncan public house in Old Compton Street in Soho (central London) in the heart of the gay community on April 30. The bag, although noticed by staff and customers, exploded whilst being investigated by the manager. Three people died (including a pregnant woman) as a result of the explosion, four people required amputations due to the injuries they sustained, twenty-six had serious burns, and another fifty-three were wounded (Hopkins & Hall, 2000; R v Copeland, 2011; Ronson, 2011). At his trial, it emerged that Copeland, a former member of both the British National Party (BNP, a right wing party, which campaigns for the voluntary repatriation of immigrants from Britain) and the Nationalist Socialist Movement (the political wing of Combat 18, a neo-Nazi

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organization) was a committed Nazi who had planned the attacks over a three year period (R v Copeland, 2011). The attacks were intended to start a race war with Copeland believing “he was a righteous messenger from God” (Hopkins, 2000, n.p.). Like Breivik, Copeland admitted responsibility for the attacks although he entered a plea of guilty to manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. Whilst it was agreed in court that Copeland was a schizophrenic, the court did not accept that his condition had reduced his culpability and he was sentenced to six life terms with a minimum sentence of thirty years. In a recent appeal (2011) brought by Copeland against a 2007 High Court decision to increase his minimum term to fifty years, the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge ruled, We cannot find that the Appellant’s culpability was in any way reduced by the schizophrenia from which he suffered. He was a highly dangerous man who knew exactly what he intended to do and he carried it through to its horrific conclusions (R v Copeland, 2011, p. 3).

The actions of Breivik, Copeland and the Nationalist Socialist Underground raise questions about many of the basic assumptions that exist within the literature with regards to right wing terrorism and it is these that we now turn.

Common Assumptions about Right Wing Terrorism This section will outline the common assumptions that have been espoused within the literature with regards to right wing terrorism. It will argue that the phenomenon of “lone wolf” right wing terrorist actors masks the complexities of involvement which such individuals have with the wider right wing movements that exist. It will show that portrayal of right wing terror groups and “lone wolf” actors as insane or devoid of rational thought has sought to delegitimize terrorism motivated by right wing ideology, thus diminishing the threat posed by right wing terrorists. Finally, this section will demonstrate that both the existing literature and response by governments has tended to consider right wing terrorism as not constituting a threat to national security at a state level.

“Lone Wolf” Terrorism The phenomenon of “lone wolf” terrorism is not new; indeed in the nineteenth century it was closely associated with anarchists and advocates of “propaganda by deed” (Iviansky, 1977). To this end, “lone wolf”

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anarchists undertook assassinations and attacks targeting institutions and organizations symbolizing bourgeois society (Spaijj, 2010). In the mid- to late twentieth century it has been more readily linked with a number of individuals motivated by a right wing extremist ideology. Such individuals include the already discussed cases of Breivik and Copeland but would also include Joseph Tommasi, co-founder of the Nationalist Socialist Liberation Front in the United States and advocate of “leaderless resistance”. According to Kaplan (1997) leaderless resistance is “a kind of lone wolf operation in which an individual, or a very small, highly cohesive group, engage in acts of anti-state violence independent of any movement, leader, or network of support” (p. 80). Proponents of leaderless resistance believed that such tactics would be more difficult to detect than conventional terrorism. The strategy was further endorsed and popularized by white supremacist Louis Beam in his 1992 essay to counter the infiltration of US militias by law enforcement. He wrote, “No one need issue an order to anyone. Those idealists truly committed to the cause of freedom will act when they feel the time is ripe, or will take their cue from others who proceed them…” (Cited in Kaplan, 1997, p. 88). Whilst lone wolf terrorists are often defined as being terrorists who undertake attacks individually and independently from established terrorist groups or organizations (Goodwin, Ramalingam, & Briggs, 2012; Spaijj, 2010), the reality is they are often linked to the wider right wing family in some way. As discussed above, Anders Breivik had been a member of the right wing populist Progress Party and of the neo-Nazi online forum Nordisk. David Copeland is a former member of the right wing group the British National Party and the neo-Nazi organization Nationalist Socialist Movement. As Kaplan explains in relation to Timothy McVeigh, the perpetrator of the Oklahoma bombing which, prior to 9/11, was considered the most fatal domestic terrorism attack in US history: Estranged from any right wing group, rejected by the militia movement for whom his angry words appeared to be either the ravings of a madman or, more likely, a federal plot…McVeigh was very much a denizen of the cultic milieu of the radical right, giving him access to a vast array of conspiratorial and hate literature (Kaplan, 1997, p. 90).

Thus, the “lone wolves” are or have been members of political parties, they have been members of right wing extremist groups, they have been on the fringes of right wing movements or they identify or sympathize with extreme right wing ideology (e.g. visit websites).

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Portrayal of Right Wing Terrorists as Insane Crenshaw (1981) has noted that “the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality” (p. 390). Yet, despite this observation, right wing terrorists are often portrayed as either irrational or suffering from personality disorders (Hoffman, 1988; Crenshaw, 1986). While research on Italian terrorists revealed “a much higher incidence of borderline or even psychotic personalities and of drug addiction” amongst right wing terrorists as compared to their left wing counterparts (Crenshaw, 1986, p. 386), such conclusions should be treated with care. As Crenshaw notes, there were very few individual case histories available on left wing terrorists. Right wing terrorists are more likely to be examined by psychiatrists given their propensity to employ an insanity defense at trial; these defense efforts have generally been unsuccessful. Ferracuti and Bruno (1981, cited in Crenshaw, 1986) contend that: A general psychiatric explanation of terrorism is impossible. To define all terrorists as mentally ill would be an easy way to solve the problem, simply by invoking evil spirits in order to exclude from normality those from whom we want to be as different as possible (p. 385).

As previously noted, throughout the trial of Anders Breivik his sanity had been continually questioned. Indeed, even his own mother’s testimony to court-appointed psychiatrists suggested that she thought her son was “insane” in the period prior to his attacks. She said he had become obsessed with “spiders and beetles,” with noises he was hearing, and that he had become convinced he was under surveillance (Beaumont, 2012). The psychiatrists responsible for the first report, which concluded that he was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, also suggested that Breivik’s description of the Knights Templar, a secret organization of which he was the Norwegian leader, was a “figment” of his imagination and that alleged exchanges with fellow “knights” may have been the result of hallucinations (Beaumont, 2012). The existence of the Knights Templar has also been questioned by anti-fascism groups; for example, Nick Lowles, the director of Hope Not Hate, does not believe they exist (Lowles, 2012). Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the Copeland case, the Courts do not equate the presence of major mental illness with insanity. Given the complexity of Breivik’s attacks, which were years in the planning, and his subsequent calm manner during his plan’s execution, the opinion that he was insane was not accepted by a second team of psychiatrists; the Court found him to be sane.

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In addition to this portrayal of right wing terrorists as insane, there has also been a tendency within the literature to regard their activities as senseless violence. As Hoffman (1988) notes, such terrorism, has often been characterized as the least discriminating, most senseless type of contemporary political violence. It has earned this reputation mostly as a result of the seemingly mindless “street” violence and unsophisticated attacks that in recent years have increasingly targeted immigrants, refugees, guest workers and other foreigners in many European countries… (p. 164).

The decision by a group or individual to engage in acts of political violence, including those of terrorism, involves a deliberation or calculation of whether the act to be undertaken will result in the desired end - the achievement of their political objective, for example, a change in the behavior of the target population or intended audience. In this respect, acts of right wing terrorism can be considered calculated and as rational as other terrorist campaigns.

Not a Serious Terrorist Threat In terms of the United Kingdom, right wing terrorism has not been considered to pose any significant threat to British national security. Thus, in terms of the British government’s counter-terrorism strategies of 2006 and 2009, right wing terrorism did not feature as a threat requiring attention (Home Office, 2006; Home Office, 2009). The 2011 CONTEST strategy (Home Office, 2011) notes the following with respect to right wing terrorism in comparison to terrorism linked to Al Qaeda; it is “less widespread, systematic or organized,” its members have not “received the same training, guidance or support,” nor have they “aspired or planned to conduct operations” similar to those undertaken by their Al Qaeda associated counterparts (p. 30). More recently and in contrast, the Home Affairs Committee (comprised of Members of Parliament appointed by the House of Commons) warned the government not to neglect the threat posed by right wing terrorism. Their report of 2012 noted that seventeen people associated with extreme right wing groups were currently in jail for terrorism offenses (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2012). Those serving custodial sentences include Ian and Nicky Davison, convicted in May 2010 of preparing a terrorist attack targeting Muslims, Jews and ethnic minorities using the fatal poison ricin. Ian Davison, of the Aryan Strike Force, became the first person convicted of the offense of producing a chemical

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weapon under the Chemical Weapons Act 1996; he received a ten year sentence (Crown Prosecution Services, 2010a; Wainwright, 2010). Another right wing prisoner found guilty of terrorism offenses is Terence Gavan, a member of the BNP who was jailed for eleven years in January 2010 after police found fifty-four improvised explosive devices (IEDs), twelve firearms and one hundred and twenty rounds of homemade or modified ammunition at his home (Crown Prosecution Services, 2010b; Melegrou-Hitchens & Standing, 2010). At the regional level there is also some disagreement as to whether extreme right wing actors or groups pose a “terrorist” threat. In its most recent European Union (EU) terrorist threat assessment, Europol (2012) stated that: The threat of violent right-wing extremism has reached new levels in Europe and should not be underestimated. The threat will most likely come from lone actors but organized underground groups also have the capability and intention to carry out attacks (p. 6).

Despite this acknowledgement, their report notes only one right wing terrorist attack in the European Union (Norway is not part of the EU) in 2011, which occurred in Spain and the arrest of five persons connected with the discovery of the already discussed NSU in Germany. These incidents represent less than 0.5 percent of all terrorist attacks and only one percent of individuals arrested for terrorist-related offenses in the EU. Thus, while cause for concern, right wing terrorism, at least in terms of actual attacks, has not endangered the political, constitutional, economic or social structures of any EU country. On a more global level, in the aftermath of Breivik’s actions and other right wing terror attacks (planned or actual), commentators note that the conflation of Islam with terrorism and an obsession solely with the jihadist threat has meant that liberal democratic societies have not recognized the threat posed by right wing extremists. As Harwood notes this is particularly true of the American media, which possesses a blind spot to terrorist acts and plots not perpetrated by Muslims. Rarely are they described as what they are: rightwing terrorists…When the terrorist looks like you, he gets downgraded to “an extremist”, or to the more vanilla description, “disturbed individual” (Harwood, 2011, n.p).

The chosen methods used by extremists groups to communicate means that these groups are difficult to monitor (due to new technologies, social media, and cross-European networks). According to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (Goodwin, Ramalingam, & Briggs, 2012, p. 5), right

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wing extremists are engaged in high frequency, lower level acts of violence that impact community safety and intergroup tensions. In addition, Think Progress (2012) recently mapped terrorist incidents that occurred within the United States by perpetrator ideology (anarchist, ecoterrorism, Islamic extremism, and right wing extremism). This mapping exposed the information that the overwhelming majority of incidents were attributed to right wing extremism. They revealed that: Fifty-six percent of domestic terrorist attacks and plots in the U.S. since 1995 have been perpetrated by right-wing extremists, as compared to 30 percent by eco-terrorists and 12 percent by Islamic extremists. Right-wing extremism has been responsible for the greatest number of terrorist incidents in the U.S. in 13 of the 17 years since the Oklahoma City bombing (n.p.).

Conclusion In this chapter the authors have sought, using the Breivik case as an example, to challenge three major assumptions within the literature and populist understanding of right wing terrorist activity. A continuation of engaging with the populist belief that right wing actors are more likely to be a “lone wolf” ignores the impact of how an individual’s belief system is formed. As discussed above, often these “lone wolf” terrorists have been members of political parties or extremist groups prior to committing an act of terror. In essence, they have previously subscribed to “values-based extremism” but not committed to “action-based extremism.” It ignores the political and social environment within which these individuals exist. Furthermore, we have highlighted how simply dismissing an individual as insane because the act is abhorrent or illogical to the majority is misleading. There is a need to engage in academic enquiry that is informed by moral neutrality. As one newspaper commentator effectively summarizes: Breivik's vile philosophy is shared by many. Are they all mad, or do we "sane" people simply deem them so? Without falling for the original-sin view of the world, can't we accept that some people, from choice not psychosis, believe wicked things and perform wicked deeds? Isn't it a feat of circular reasoning to label people mad because they have perpetrated appalling crimes? Doesn't it let us off the hook to label them insane, so we do not need to address their ideology and its breeding ground? (Seager, 2012, n.p.).

This relates to the final point of our chapter: the terminology used to discuss those individuals and groups which engage in terrorist activity is

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important. Even though the vast majority of people will find the use of terrorist activity abhorrent, simply labeling the actor as mad or insane will result in a failure to address the very ideologies or belief systems that are motivating those who commit terrorist activity. Right wing terrorism, similar to all forms of terrorism, remains a serious security threat whether the perpetrator is a group or a “lone wolf.”

References Anderson, S.K., & Sloan, S. (2002). Historical dictionary of terrorism (2nd edition). Lanham, MA: The Scarecrow Press. Association of Chief Police Officers (2011). National Domestic Extremism Unit. Retreieved from: http://www.acpo.police.uk/NationalPolicing/NationalDomesticExtremi smUnit/Default.aspx Beaumont, P. (2012, June 15). Paranoid, delusional and then he killed 77: The psychiatrists report on Anders Breivik. The Guardian, p. 3. Betz, H.G. (1994). Radical right-wing populism. London: Macmillan. Breivik, A. (2011). 2083 – A European Declaration of Independence. Retrieved from www.kevinislaughter.com/.../anders-behring-breivik2083-a-european-declaration-of-independence-manifesto/ —. (2012, July 24). Court Transcript. Retrieved from https://sites.google.com/site/breivikreport/transcripts/anders-breivikcourt-transcript-2012-07-24-live-report Carr, M. (2006). You are now entering Eurabia. Race & Class, 48, 1-22. Carter, E. (2005). The extreme right in Western Europe: Success or failure? Manchester: Manchester University Press. Coghlan, A. (2011, November 29). Norwegian mass killer Anders Breivik declared “insane”. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk COT Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis Management (2007). Lonewolf terrorism. Retrieved from http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/LoneWolf%20Terrorism.pdf Crenshaw, M. (2000). The psychology of terrorism: An agenda for the 21st century. Political Psychology, 21, 405-420. —. (1986). The psychology of political terrorism. In M.G. Hermann (Ed.), Political psychology (pp. 379-413). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. —. (1981). The causes of terrorism. Comparative Politics, 13, 379-399.

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Crown Prosecution Services (2010a, May 14). Far right extremist father and son convicted of terrorism offences (Press release). Retrieved from http://www.cps.gov.uk —. (2010b, January 15). Terence Gavan sentenced for explosives, firearms and terrorism offences (Press release). Retrieved from http://www.cps.gov.uk Dowling, S. (2011, November 15). Suspected founder of neo-Nazi cell held as Merkel pledges inquiry into killings. The Guardian, p. 17. Eatwell, R. & Goodwin, M. (2010). Introduction: The “new” extremism in twenty-first century Britain. In R. Eatwell & M. Goodwin (Eds.), The new extremism in 21st century Britain (pp. 1-20). London: Routledge. Europol (2012). EU terrorism situation and trend report 2012. The Hague: Europol. —. (2011). EU terrorism situation and trend report 2011. The Hague: Europol. Fekete, L. (2011). The Muslim conspiracy theory and the Oslo massacre. Race & Class, 53, 30-47. Feldman, M. (2012, August 27). Viewpoint: Killer Breivik’s links with far right. BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk Goodwin, M., Ramalingam, V., & Briggs, R. (2012). The new radical right: Violent and non-violent movements in Europe (Briefing Paper). London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Harwood, M. (2011, July 26). Norway’s corrective myth to our post 9/11 terror myth. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk Hoffman, B. (1988). Inside terrorism. London: Victor Gollancz. Home Office (2011). CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s strategy for countering terrorism. London: TSO. —. (2009). Pursue prevent protect prepare: The United Kingdom’s strategy for countering international terrorism. London: TSO. —. (2006). Countering international terrorism: The United Kingdom’s strategy. London: TSO. Hopkins, N. (2000, July 1). Bomber gets six life terms. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk Hopkins, N. & Hall, S. (2000, June 30). David Copeland: A quiet introvert obsessed with Hitler and bombs. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (2012). Roots of violent radicalisation (Volume 1) (HC1446). London: TSO. Iviansky, Z. (1977). Individual terror: Concept and typology. Journal of Contemporary History, 12, 43-63.

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Jamieson, A. (1989). The heart attacked: Terrorism and conflict in the Italian state. London: Boyars. Kaplan, J. (1997). Leaderless resistance. Terrorism and Political Violence, 9, 80-95. Levin, B. (1998). The Patriot Movement: Past, present, and future. In H.W. Kushner (Ed.), The future of terrorism: Violence in the new millennium (pp. 97-131). London: Sage. Lord Carlile of Berriew (2007). The definition of terrorism. London: Home Department. Lowles, N. (2012, April 19). Expert view – A life of fantasy. The Guardian, p. 21. Melegrou-Hitchens, A. & Standing, E. (2010). Blood and Honour: Britain’s far right militants. London: Centre for Social Cohesion. Michael, G. (2003). Confronting right wing extremism and terrorism in the USA. London: Routledge. Neuman, P. & Smith, M.L.R. (2005). Strategic terrorism: Its framework and its fallacies. The Journal of Strategic Studies, 28, 4, 571-595. Paterson, T. (2012, April 19). Free me or execute me, demands mass killer. Belfast Telegraph, p. 15. Pidd, H. (2012, April 17). “I acknowledge the acts. But I do not plead guilty” – Breivik defiant as massacre trial opens. The Guardian, pp. 1, 3. Pidd, H. & Harding, L. (2011, November 17). Neo-Nazi terrorist cell had 88 names on hit list. The Guardian, p. 30. R v Copeland, EWCA Crim 1711 (June 28 2011). Ronson, H. (2011, April 30). Remembering the Admiral Duncan bombing. Pink News. Retrieved from http://www.pinknews.co.uk Schmid, A.P. & Jongman, A.J. (1998). Political terrorism. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books. Seagar, S. (2012, August 28). If those who commit atrocious acts are mad, who is bad? The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk Searchlight. (2010). Lone wolves: myth or reality? Ilford: Searchlight. Silke, A. (1996). Terrorism and the blind men’s elephant. Terrorism and Political Violence, 8, 12-28. Smith, B.L. (1994). Terrorism in America. New York: State University of New York Press. Spaaij, R. (2010). The enigma of lone wolf terrorism: An assessment. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 33, 854-870. Think Progress (2012). CHART: 17 Years after Oklahoma City bombing, right-wing extremism is significant domestic terror threat. Retrieved

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from http://thinkprogress.org/security/2012/04/19/467384/chart-rightwing-extremism-terror-threat-oklahoma-city/?mobile=nc Townsend, M. & Traynor, I. (2011, July 30). Norway attacks: How far right views created Anders Behring Breivik. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk Transnational Terrorism, Security & the Rule Law (2008). 20th century right wing groups in Europe: Prone to extremism or terrorism? Retrieved from: http://www.transnationalterrorism.eu/tekst/publications/Rightwing%20 terrorism.pdf US Department of State (2011). Country reports on terrorism 2010. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2010170265.htm Wainwright, M. (2010, May 14). Neo-Nazi Ian Davison jailed for 10 years for making chemical weapon. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk Wardlaw, G. (1990). Political terrorism (2nd edition). New York: Cambridge University Press. Wilkinson, P. (1974). Political terrorism. London: Macmillan. —. (2011). Terrorism versus democracy: The liberal state response (3rd edition). London: Routledge.

CHAPTER FOUR VIRTUAL TERROR—FROM TRAINING CAMPS TO VIRTUAL SANCTUARY: THE IMPACT OF ISLAMIC JIHAD IN THE VIRTUAL WORLD VIVIAN M. SALAMA FREELANCE JOURNALIST

Abstract As the Internet evolves, expands and empowers, so too does the online presence of various extremist organizations wishing to communicate with loyalists, coordinate missions, and most importantly, win the hearts of Internet users around the globe. Just as the world’s failed states have provided a lawless playing field for terrorist organizations for the purposes of hiding and training, the Internet serves as a place where extremists groups can bury themselves in the billions of pages available through the World Wide Web, as they seek to recruit and train followers, and instill them with the ideologies that make them unique – and potentially dangerous. Is the Internet a failed state? This study explores how Islamic extremist organizations like Al-Qaeda have taken advantage of the lax policing of the Internet for the purposes of carrying out missions and recruiting members worldwide. Keywords: Virtual Terror, Terrorism, Al-Qaeda, Jihad, Internet, Failed States, As-Sahaab Al-Qaeda is on twitter. Extremist groups communicate on Facebook and until his death, Yemeni cleric and Al-Qaeda operative Anwar AlAwlaqi Rahimahullah avidly blogged in English. Do you want to learn

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how to participate in Jihad? One website allows you to download an English-language document detailing 39 ways to do so (YouTube, n.d.). From Hezbollah to Al-Qaeda, terrorist groups - specifically, extremist Islamic networks or groups dubbed terrorists by the current United States administration - have commonly embraced the newest forms of communications technology (Nacos, 2007). The Internet is no exception. Web 2.0 is by definition a place where communities of like-minded people come together to contribute and augment content and ethos respectively, thus, creating a cross-national space in which ideas spark reaction and “evolution.” Days before the sixth anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, DC, the world received a chilling message purportedly from Osama bin Laden, the man believed to have masterminded the massacre. With his beard trimmed and dyed black rather than streaked grey, bin Laden provided what he called “a solution” to greedy capitalism and its impact on the world. It was the late Al-Qaeda leader’s first video appearance since Fall 2004 just days before United States President George W. Bush won his second term in office. The video speech, released by Al-Qaeda’s multimedia arm As-Sahaab (Arabic for “the clouds”), served a far greater purpose than simple propaganda. For Al-Qaeda followers around the world, it was a call to arms. After nearly three years of silence, this latest message functioned as a reminder and an assertion of bin Laden’s command of the terrorist network and a symbol of Jihadi movements around the world. Most ironic is that Al-Qaeda almost literally just lifted a finger for its message to be broadcast to the world. As-Sahaab released the video on one or two websites, Internet users circulated it on the web, and the mainstream media publicized it. With the help of a few simple tools and the expansive outreach of globalization, the voice and image of Osama bin Laden were available to anyone with a computer. Social media, or websites that “create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (as videos)” has provided further platforms for extremist groups (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, n.d.). Personal blogs, and websites such as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace and LinkedIn are all regarded as being part of the social media sphere. Focus on social networking websites catapulted last year amid youth-led revolts in the Middle East and North Africa that began with Facebook posts and Twitter feeds. Long before young revolutionaries were plotting their popular uprisings online, extremist groups were using the web to collaborate on everything from ideology to technical know-how. However, the ease and volume at which they now communicate via the World Wide Web has never been more significant (Brachman, 2007).

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Image 4-1. The Link for this graphic is unknown. Shows gunmen in masks and a photo of George W. Bush with a gun pointing at him.

The uses of the Internet by these groups and individuals vary, as do their impact. Numerous scholars, including Gabriel Weimann (2006) and Brigitte Nacos (2006), agree that psychological warfare remains one of the primary strategies driving Islamic extremists on the web. Other strategic goals include propaganda, fundraising, recruitment, coordination of

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activities (Weimann, 2006), and martyr or hero worship (Nacos, 2007). As Jarrett Brachman writes, “Jihadis are empowering one another to be producers, not simply consumers, of this material” (Brachman, 2006). While threats conveyed through these Internet strategies are primarily experienced emotionally (see Cheung-Blunden and Blunden in this volume), evidence of potentially deadly operations has been uncovered by authorities around the world. In Afghanistan, for instance, computers seized from an Al-Qaeda hideout revealed that they were used for accessing maps and developing anti-surveillance techniques (Brachman, 2006). Anders Behring Breivik, accused in the deadly July 2011 attacks on government buildings and a camp in Norway, posted a detailed 1,500 page manifesto and YouTube videos hinting at his anti-multicultural, antiIslamic motives on the Internet. He also posted comments on dozens of websites. None of these were noticed until it was too late (Mackey, 2011). In one incident where law enforcement officials were successful. British police foiled an apparent attack plot on the streets of London in July 2007. Authorities later said they discovered a message on one of the most widely used Jihadist Internet forums written the night before the bomb was discovered and dismantled, which read: "Today I say: Rejoice, by Allah, London shall be bombed” (Trevelyan, 2007, n.p.). What is more disconcerting is that the attempted bombing is believed by authorities to have been coordinated over the Internet from as far away as Australia (Taylor, 2007). The prosecution of 22-year old Younis Tsouli, a British national, is yet another example of an Internet-based terror plot. In 2006, authorities arrested Tsouli for apparently plotting a terrorist attack. Using the cyberego “Irhabi007” (the Arabic word for “terrorist” plus the code name for James Bond), he would surf different chat rooms bragging – in English mostly, but occasionally in broken Arabic - about his hacking abilities (“Cyber operative charged,” 2006). His networking would eventually pay off for him, and he would become the cyber-conduit for Al-Qaeda. Among the files Tsouli distributed were audio and video clips of AlQaeda’s leadership, including the late bin Laden, his successor, Ayman Al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi. Joining jihad is a process, not a single decision (Sageman, 2004). Raphael Perl describes this phenomenon using the metaphor of a factory assembly line. He writes, “The process includes ideological outreach, acquisition of funding and support, recruitment, organization, indoctrination, training, planning, targeting, attack, exploitation of results, financial rewards and other factors which lead to production of terrorist acts” (Perl, 2005, pp. 5-6). A group’s ability to recruit and retain members is essential

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in determining both its survival and its endurance in an ever-changing world. To ensure the success of this endeavor, the durability of the various facets of this assembly line must be maintained. Thus, the Internet, for terrorist groups, becomes a virtual sanctuary for the facilitation of all of these actions and transactions. Why should any willing recruit travel to physical training camps in Afghanistan, Somalia or Yemen when they can interact with the groups through their personal computers? With more than 8 billion web pages as of December 2011, the challenge to secure and monitor the web has become harder than ever leaving ample breathing room for these virtual camps to grow, propagate and flourish (de Kunder, 2011). Noam Chomsky characterizes a failed state as one that demonstrates an “inability or unwillingness to protect their citizens from violence or perhaps even destruction” or one that is “beyond the reach of domestic or international law” (Chomsky, 2006, p. 2). Focusing on the latter definition, the Internet, like many failed states, has become too vast for law enforcement to effectively monitor and suppress the activities of extremist groups. In the borderless cyber-world, issues over who and how to police it, while respecting basic human rights such as free speech present an “extraordinarily difficult strategic challenge that requires a coordinated and focused effort” from the global community (Parks & Schwoch, 2012, p. 36). The study presented in this chapter will explore how the complexity of the expanding Internet, coupled with issues such as privacy clauses and freedom of speech, has complicated efforts to police the web against the spread of activities by Islamic fundamentalist groups that could pose a threat of some kind. Just as web surfers can access information from all over the world simply by logging on to the Internet, Jihadists can now be everywhere without leaving home. As a result, extremist groups are becoming increasingly emboldened knowing that the Internet provides various pockets of unregulated, unmonitored space for them to operate freely. Without international cooperation on this issue, so-called terrorist and extremist groups will continue to take advantage of available technologies and their outreach will pose greater security implications than ever.

Terrorism in the Virtual World The advent of new technologies, advanced means of communication and ever more sophisticated ways of moving money around have already influenced the way terrorists operate and will continue to do so. Terrorist organizers and fundraisers no longer have to be in the same country as

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their target or indeed as each other. Their communications to each other can be encrypted. And there is the potential, if the right targets are hit (such as strategic computer systems running banking or air traffic control operations), to affect thousands or even millions of people. — Jack Straw, United Kingdom Home Secretary (O’Brien, 2004, p. 127)

In his 1970 book Do It, J. Rubin explained “You can’t be a revolutionary without a color TV: it’s as necessary as a gun” (Rubin, 1970, p. 180). Today, the Internet has become an even greater asset in waging a revolution, whether by religious fanatics, ethno-nationalists, millennium terrorists or the solely politically-motivated. In 2011, Tunisian and Egyptian youth used Facebook to organize revolts that would overthrow their respective leaders. In recognizing the potential threat of the Internet to his regime, Egypt’s former President Hosni Mubarak shut down web connections in the country on January 28, 2011 in an effort to stifle protests – but it was too late (Browning & Sherman, 2011). Plans to protest had already been made, and millions of people were alerted in less time than it takes to fly across the United States. For the growing number of groups unified in their justification for employing sacred violence, modern technology can be particularly beneficial. Religion transcends borders far more effectively than politics ever has, so regardless of underlying political motivations, the ideological rhetoric used by extremist religious groups is capable of resonating with people around the world. In this regard, strategy, organization, doctrine and technology attune themselves to the information age (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2003). By shifting information-age ideologies, loyalties may shift from the nation-state to the transnational level of “global civil society” (pp. 6-7). From this, we can derive the concept of a “global Ummah” – the global Muslim community - one in which the Internet has contributed to its growth and vitality. Modern Salafist rhetoric in particular expresses the idea of an Islamic universality superseding all other revelations (Hourani, 1983). Perhaps it is a bit ironic, but not uncommon that groups which seek a return to orthodox, traditional practices and beliefs enlist the most up to date, modern equipment. Dunnigan (2002) explains that while information warfare is nothing new, recent advancements in technology have created a formidable new way of fighting: that is, via “cyberwar.” He distinguishes between the Internet as a medium for “terrorism” – that is, harmful acts committed or threatened against people by groups or persons for political or other ideological goals, Islamic or not – as opposed to motives focused on information and intelligence. Dunnigan makes an association between

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hacking and guerilla warfare. In this chapter, the United States Department of State definition of terrorism will be used. According to this definition, terrorism is “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” It defines "international terrorism" as “terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country” and a "terrorist group" as “any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism” (“Patterns of global terrorism,” n.d.; US State Department, 2010).

High Tech Terror “Terrorism is theater,” wrote Brian Jenkins in 1975. “Terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press” (p. 16). Terrorist groups have always embraced the latest forms of media and so it is not a surprise that they would incorporate the Internet into their general strategy (Nacos, 2006). Public discourse has been a driving force in the survival of Islam since the Prophet Mohammed received his first divine revelation in 612 AD. Arab armies served as carriers of God’s message to Mohammed expanding first eastward from what is today Saudi Arabia, and later, north and westward (Bulliet, 2004). Learned scholars, or ulama, schools of jurisprudence and their supporters often acted autonomously from government rulers since government officials and military officers did not have the credentials to spread the word of God and answer the questions of Muslims in an authoritative manner. These religious authorities were charged with the duty of traveling from place to place, transmitting Islamic oral traditions, or hadith (Eickelman & Anderson, 1999). Religious terrorism, in the traditional sense, has thrived primarily on face-to-face interaction. Sageman writes that when a fanatic is isolated, fanaticism is likely to fade (Sageman, 2004). Older communication technologies such as the telegraph or the printing press did not facilitate a two-way link strong enough to endure the dispersal of group members. Television and radio were not accessible media for communication of terrorist messages except during spectacular attacks such as the Palestinian hijacking of an El Al flight in 1968 or in 1972, when Palestinian militants captured Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics – an event ending in a tragic massacre of the Israeli athletes and deaths of five of the eight captors. The coverage of these events and others like them propelled the terrorists’ causes (in these cases, the plight of the Palestinians) onto the

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international stage, although the messages were filtered through governments and Western media organizations (Hoffman, 2006). Still, some older technologies showed their potential as outreach tools to scattered members of a given movement. In the 1970s, Ayatollah Khomeini, in exile in Iraq, exported sermons on audiocassettes to Iran leading up to the Islamic Revolution. Similarly, footage of the hostile demonstrations by Iranian-Americans and pro-Iranian revolutionaries in Washington against Iran’s last Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi is believed to have been very inspirational for those watching in Iran (Keddie, 2003). Also, the circulation of videocassette recordings was used to communicate the horrors of the wars in Bosnia and Algeria to Muslims across Europe. Videocassettes of glamorized training camps in Afghanistan were carried by travelers from one continent to another in an attempt to reach out to potential recruits (Sageman, 2004). It was not until the 1990s, however, while many of the active Jihadist leaders, including Osama bin Laden, were living in exile, that new technologies began playing a major role in the strategic communications of the various movements. Fax machines were used to release communiqués, often from undisclosed locations. Bin Laden is believed to have purchased a satellite telephone while living in exile in Sudan, and many other individuals and groups began using computers to store information and send emails (Sageman, 2004). However it was the Internet, coupled with inexpensive and easily accessible video production, that had the greatest impact on the spread of global Jihad (Hoffman, 2006). Al-Qaeda in particular has adopted the use of new technology for furthering its strategic aims. In fact, one of Al-Qaeda’s four operational committees prior to the September 11th attacks was charged with media and publicity. The other committees were for fatwa and Islamic study, finance and business, and military operations (Hoffman, 2006).

Tangled Web to Cohesive Organization Margaret Thatcher once referred to the dependence of terrorist groups on the mainstream media as the “oxygen of publicity” (quoted in Apple, 1985). Today, the Internet has provided for these groups portable oxygen tanks, if you will, allowing them to move about shackle-free via a range of self-publicity portals. Al-Qaeda and other like-minded groups have exploited the most sophisticated modes of technology from DVDs to webcams. With the help of the Internet, information specific to the terrorist cause has become accessible to more people than ever before (Nacos, 2006).

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Middle East-based organizations have been regarded as avant-garde in the area of organizational networking given their ability to acquire and utilize the most advanced information technology to advance their offensive operations (Hoffman, 2006). Hezbollah, for example, currently maintains some 20 sites in three languages (English, Arabic and French), each of them with a unique purpose and target audience. While Arab terrorist organizations maintain the highest presence on the web, all major terrorist and insurgent groups have their own websites.

Image 4-2. A poster from Hezbollah's website for Hassan Nasrallah, the group's leader. The caption says “Protect Nasrallah.”

The Internet helps to facilitate easier, inexpensive access for terrorist activities in a number of ways: x It provides the ability to access and disseminate various forms of online propaganda, be it textual messages in chat rooms, list serves or online books; or audio or video recordings which ultimately transcend literacy problems. x The Internet offers would-be terrorists anonymity of communication. x It ensures the fast flow of information.

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x It allows for terrorist networks to avert censorship or government regulations and/or control (Weimann, 2006). x It allows for an expanded target audience for recruiting purposes (Hoffman, 2006). x It provides a forum where like-minded around the world can come together to share and exchange ideas, network and take advantage of referral services to other sites and/or groups. x It enables organizations to easily find and exploit information about their competitors or their enemies (Brachman, 2006). Similar to Anderson’s concept of “imagined communities,” virtual communities offer a forum for the exchange of ideas, in turn fostering a collective sense of identity. A nation, wrote Anderson, “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 1991, p. 6). Fraternity and comradeship are at the heart of a nation’s ability to thrive. In this way, nationalism is an invented concept from which nations come to exist. Religious groups once reigned over this concept of imagined nations since they shared a common language – that is, Chinese, Latin or Arabic – and so were not bound by borders. For instance, because of the Arabic language, the authority of Allah was steadfast, even in Muslim nations where Arabic is not the native language. The Internet has abolished language and literacy barriers with the use of either translation programs or audio/visual media. Regardless of religious educational background, today’s Islamic extremist virtual communities point to the Quran and hadith as the ultimate authority – and they do so in Arabic, English, French and dozens of other languages (Sageman, 2004). This allows for the spread of the message beyond previously solid borders, delineated by language.

Failed State vs. Virtual Sanctuary Takeyh and Gvosdev (2002) list four qualities of failed states that appeal to terrorist organizations. There are four characteristics of both failed states and the Internet that make them similar breeding grounds for terrorist activities: 1) Ability to acquire territory; 2) Weak or nonexistent law enforcement; 3) Easy recruiting; and 4) Outward signs of sovereignty. Foreign Policy Magazine, which publishes an annual online Failed States Index, says the qualities that account for the failure of any state can range from inadequate health care, faulty infrastructure, and famine to ruthless

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dictators, ethnic tension, or political corruption (Foreign Policy, 2012). Many of these qualities ultimately lead to a breakdown in security, and in many cases, the state’s ability to enforce law and order develops significant pockets in which criminal or terrorist activity can flourish. Failed states “provide the opportunity to acquire territory on a scale much larger than a collection of scattered safe houses – enough to accommodate entire training complexes, arms depots, and communications facilities” (Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002, p. 98). It is important to note, however, that failed states traditionally do not produce individuals with extremist agendas, but they often provide sanctuary for recruits hailing from countries with more oppressive regimes (Patrick, 2011). As Stewart writes, weak states also do not have the bureaucratic mechanisms in place to support social programs, which many groups rely on to garner public support. They cannot afford to alleviate poverty levels and they do not have the proper training and available supplies to provide adequate health care. Many groups, particularly those with a history of grassroots work, have used the state’s failures as a way to leverage support from the needy, providing food and basic services to those forgotten by the state. Acquiring virtual “territory,” or in the case of the Internet, websites, enables the greater dispersal of a given terrorist organization. If a website is attacked or shut down, a terrorist organization has alternative websites propagating its information. Thus, it is more likely to thrive if it maintains a greater presence in the virtual world. Al-Qaeda uses the new technologies it has acquired to recover from the lost channels once provided by the old training camps of Afghanistan, for example. The Internet, thus, offers many of the same advantages and utilities of a physical sanctuary. Second, “failed states have weak or nonexistent law-enforcement capabilities, permitting terrorist groups to engage in smuggling and drug trafficking in order to raise funds for operations” (Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002, p. 99). Since the nature of the Internet does not invite the application of conventional jurisdiction over violators, the World Wide Web provides a lawless arena for terrorist groups to operate freely and anonymously, sending information and monetary transactions with reasonable liberty (Hanley, 1998). In the eyes of Jihadist groups (or any other non-Islamic religiously motivated terrorist group such as the Jewish Kach movement (Ranstorp, 2005) or the Christian group The Covenant, the Sword and the Arm of the Lord (Stern, 2000)) acts of violence are executed as a divine duty or a theological imperative (Hoffman, 2006). Therefore, religious terrorist generally view their mission as unconstrained by any law other than the law of God. Crackdowns by the same governing bodies viewed as oppressors of the terrorist groups may only fuel their interest to test

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what legalities do exist (Cronin, 2002-2003). Finally, Takeyh and Gvosdev explain that failed states “retain the outward signs of sovereignty” (p. 100). Interfering in the internal affairs of another state is regulated by the United Nations Charter and any uninvited cross-border action is automatically deemed a threat to the sovereignty of the receiving state. Similarly, protections on free speech and privacy clauses have tied the hands of law enforcement agencies trying to track the movement of radical groups as there are no clear guidelines for online jurisdiction (Gerwehr & Daly, 2005). The third appealing feature for terrorist groups of both failed states and virtual communities is that they “create pools of recruits and supporters for terrorist groups, who can use their resources and organizations to step into the vacuum left by the collapse of official state power and civil society” (Takeyh & Gvosdev, 2002, p. 100). Sageman explains that the Internet appeals to the concept of “disembeddedness,” where individuals come together often as a way to ease loneliness. As a result, they spend more time in their virtual community, fostering a sense of trust amongst group members (Sageman, 2004). The Internet provides a forum for like-minded individuals, otherwise completely disconnected, to congregate in a place where ideas are free-flowing and faces and names are veiled. Similarly, failed states allows for like-minded individuals to gather in a community or sanctuary to operate in an arena where the absence of law and order allow for an exchange of ideas, training and operation planning.

Internet as Jihadi Propaganda Tool That Internet usage by Islamists is growing is obvious. What is also obvious is that they will use it to promote their views, advance their strategies of the “global Islamic movement” and organize their activities, which experience has shown are sometimes inimical to western security, and in a wider sense might also seek to subvert the security of the state (Whine, 1999, p. 131).

Osama bin Laden may be dead, but he is still very much with us. There is no greater reminder of this than the audio message released by Al-Qaeda some two weeks after US special forces killed him in Pakistan in May 2011 (“Osama bin Laden’s Posthumous audio message,” 2011). Bin Laden’s posthumous analysis of the Arab Spring was indication that even in death, he can speak to his followers. They, in turn, can be with him whenever they seek guidance or inspiration, through any number of videos, audio recordings and transcribed lessons available on the web. The use of the Internet by Jihadi groups is far more systematic than

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one might expect. Various groups, including Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq, have launched their own media wings, dedicated to the production and dissemination of all types of propaganda, ranging from simple press releases to online magazines; chat forums, audio and video messages; and websites that supply an array of free computer software for facilitating all virtual activity. In October 2005, Al-Qaeda even used one of its websites to post a “help-wanted” ad for a job as a communications specialist. The job vacancy called for someone with exceptional English and Arabic skills able to collect and disseminate news on Iraq, including audio and video clips (Khaleej Times, 2005). The sophistication of the varying forms of media is increasing at a rate that is leaving authorities stumped for solutions to the spread of this form of propaganda. It is not difficult to access these websites. In fact, often by accessing one, web surfers are easily linked to like-minded sites based out of different countries and written in several different languages. One challenging aspect of following these websites is that they often change addresses either because they are blocked or shut down, or because their hosts are trying to avoid surveillance by law enforcement agencies (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007). Scholarly research on this subject is therefore best when conducted over a period of time due to the hit-or-miss nature of accessibility. Torres, Jordan, and Horsburgh explain that the Internet offers Jihadist groups an advantageous medium “in terms of economic cost, accessibility, diffusion and security” (Torres, Jordan, & Horsburgh, 2006, p. 406). It provides these would-be terrorists with direct access to their constituency without risking media distortion or censorship. Osama bin Laden, in his 2002 message commemorating the one year anniversary of the war in Afghanistan, called out to the media, noting the role they play in helping to reveal to the Ummah, or Islamic community, “the truth” behind the events taking place: The time has come to have the media take its rightful place, to carry out its required role in confronting this aggressive campaign and the open declared Crusader war by all means that can be seen, heard, and read. It is upon the media people, whether writers, journalists, analysts or correspondents, to exercise responsibility in reporting events, and to carry out their required role by showing the Ummah the reality of the events, and to announce the real intentions of the enemy, to reveal his plans and his tricks, and to stand unified in one line regardless of their different attitudes, for the enemy today doesn’t differentiate between one group of people and another, for his aim is to get rid of everyone who’s related to the Arab nation and Islam (bin Laden, 2002, n.p.).

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The nature of this Jihadist propaganda has gone through two main phases. The first, which falls into the time frame between 1994 and September 11th, 2001, was generally characterized by the use of written and audio-visual documents that repeated the demands of the group; cassette tapes and video documentaries were circulated among curious individuals discretely, either glamorizing training camps - showing the abilities and the militant nature of the group; or propagating ideas that were ideological in nature. While Al-Qaeda produced little propaganda during this period, other Jihadist groups, such as the Popular Democratic Liberation Front Party in Turkey (Tsfati & Weimann, 2002), Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Armed Islamic Group, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, Jamaah Islamiya, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group all exhibited some online activity through the second half of the 1990s (Torres, Jordan, & Horsburgh, 2006). This period went greatly overlooked by the mainstream media which often ignored statements and proclamations issued by various radical organizations around the world unless the statement was linked to an event making headlines. Even during the Internet’s earliest phase, there were alarming signs that Jihadist groups were embracing the deadly potential of the Internet. One case involved two lovebirds in Israel who met in an online forum and began corresponding via the Internet. “You don’t know how much I am waiting for Wednesday,” read the chat room conversation between 16-year old Ofir Rahum and his online sweetheart “Sally,” who had introduced herself as a 25-year old Israeli woman of Moroccan descent. “Wednesday,” January 18, 2001 was scheduled to be the pair’s first rendezvous in Jerusalem. “I can’t say goodbye to you – I already miss you,” Ofir wrote during their last correspondence (Nacos, 2007, p. 116). One day later, Ofir’s bullet-ridden body was discovered in the West Bank. The woman, whose real name is Mona Awana, had apparently prearranged a location to take Ofir. Upon their arrival, she fled the car and as many as three Palestinian gunmen then reportedly shot him some 15 times (Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2001). The New York Times called the incident “a chilling tale commingling young love, cyberspace, violence and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (Sontag, 2001, n.p.). The second phase, beginning from the attacks of September 11 onward, is characterized by an explosion of mainstream media coverage of terrorist groups – particularly Al-Qaeda. Any declarations made by the group in the months following the attacks were guaranteed headlines – not just by the mainstream media, but by online publications, cyberforums and gradually, by bloggers. Jihadist groups picked up on this. The messages

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of Osama bin Laden during this period underwent a noticeable change from its original platform of addressing the general public to more deliberate messages calling upon the global Ummah to mobilize against the Muslim worlds near and far enemies.1 Torres, Jordan, and Horsburgh describe it as “Dispersion in the Production of Propaganda and the Primacy of the Internet” (2006, p. 414). During this phase, online propaganda by Jihadist groups was the primary medium for communication, media relations and supporter mobilization. One can also characterize this period by the efforts of various terrorist organizations to organize their media wings for greater, more orderly dissemination of online propaganda. This new wave of propaganda has taken on various forms and continues to grow in sophistication.

Text Propaganda Text remains the preferred medium of communication on the Jihadi websites (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007). Whether to promote ideological discourse, statements, or news relating to the groups’ interests, most organizations dedicate the majority of their web space to the written word. It is the simplest and most economic way for the hosts of these websites to get their messages across. Many of the more established groups like Hezbollah and Hamas are active in their use of statements. The majority of these statements are press releases announcing various “operations” – (i.e., against Coalition Forces in Iraq, against Israeli Defense Forces in Lebanon). The other function of press releases is to address various political issues. The rapidity and efficiency with which many of these websites release these statements is significant. In March 2007, for example, World News Network and Mohajroon2, two Iraq-based Jihadist forums with a special section for insurgent statements, posted a combined 1,000 statements issued by 11 insurgent groups (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007). 1 The “near” enemy, referenced by Al-Qaeda and other Jihadist groups, generally refers to the leaders of Muslim countries viewed by Salafist groups as apostates mainly because of their support and/or alliances with the West. This includes former president of Egypt Hosni Mubarak, King Abdullah Hussein II of Jordan, the Saudi monarchy led by King Khalid, and former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf. The “far” enemy almost always refers to the United States and Western governments aligned with the United States either militarily in Afghanistan and Iraq or via intelligence and security cooperation as part of the global “War on Terrorism.” 2 According to MEMRI, mohajroon.com ceased to operate on April 15, 2007.

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Many groups also produce programmatic and operational text detailing their “creed” or “program” as well as their “mission” (Kimmage & Ridolfo, 2007, p. 8). Hezbollah uses one of its many web pages to inform visitors of the group’s general struggle and the history of the organization. Available in Arabic, English and French, the website offers various links, including “Secretary General” – or statements by Hezbollah’s leader Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah3; the biographies and speeches of various Hezbollah leaders; a “conflict with Israel”4 page with information including “Terrorism” incidents (news reports of Israeli aggression against Arabs); information on the “Shebaa Farms Annexation”5; and a category called “Resistance and Hezbollah” listing many articles by the mainstream media mentioning the group. The website allows visitors to subscribe to its online mailing list for updates on the group’s writing or activities (English.hizbollah.org, n.d.). Also available on the group’s homepage are separate links to reports detailing “hostages,” “martyrs” and “wounded.” The site also has links to audio, video and photo archives, as well as a “search” option. Hezbollah’s Central Press Office provides external links to articles written about the group’s various activities from publications including two articles from Time Magazine and several by the Beirut-based Daily Star Newspaper, (Almashriq, n.d.). Finally, promoted on Hezbollah’s homepage is a special section with text, audio and video material dedicated exclusively to the “July 2006 Aggression,” referring to the clash between Israel and Hezbollah militants (Moqawama, n.d.). A common feature among many of the Jihadi websites is martyr biographies or testimonials. Long before the advent of the Internet, it was common for so-called martyrs of Jihadist operations to leave behind a testimonial of some sort, be it a written letter or video message, in an effort to psychologically rally those left behind to adopt the holy mission. Now, organizations are posting these messages, often in text and video format, as well as photographs and messages praising those who have carried out the mission. So common is the availability of these messages online, in fact, that a video available on YouTube entitled Men of God (Rijaal Allah) shows the outtakes of alleged would-be martyrs who are seen laughing and joking with those filming the videos (Rijaal Allah, n.d.). 3

Hezbollah’s Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah has his own website – available in Arabic, English and French. 4 On Hezbollah’s main website, www.moqawama.org/english, the word “Israel” is always written inside quotation marks. 5 Shebaa Farms is a hotly contested region between Lebanon and another contested zone - the Golan Heights - which has been under Israeli jurisdiction since 1967.

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Chat rooms are another method of communication and information dissemination amongst the Jihadi communities. Jihadi chat forums are not very different from any other special interest forum available on the web. While the general theme of the discussions tends to revolve around Islam, conversation strains range from ideological debates to discussions on politics and society. Jihadi chatrooms serve a number of functions. Frequent users develop a relationship with one another and will often use the various websites for personal communication as well as for information. Since many of the more radical websites and chat forums are password protected, some groups try to bury those passwords in the conversation strains so to avoid detection by authorities (Brachman, 2006). In fact, many of the chat forums even require a login and password in order to participate in the dialogue. Most importantly, these forums facilitate dialogue between like-minded people who otherwise may not have had the opportunity to interact. They share everything from personal experiences to literature and videos. Members even help direct their fellow web surfers to other web forums, particularly since many of the websites are targets of intelligence services. More recently, Jihadist groups have geared their networking efforts to social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter. For example, Voice of Jihad, one of the original extremist websites that frequently changes its web address, used its Twitter feed to inform followers on March 1, 2012 of a new As-Sahaab audio recording by Al-Qaeda leader Ayman AlZawahiri, available on YouTube (Sout Al Jehad, n.d.; Al-Zawahiri, n.d.). Blogging is also becoming increasingly popular among religious leaders with ties to extremist organizations. Perhaps the most significant, however, is the blog of Anwar Al-Awlaki, an American of Yemeni descent who masterminded the attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound airplane in 2009 with explosives hidden in underwear (Hatem & Salama, 2011). Al-Awlaki, who was killed in September 2011 by a US drone attack in Yemen, posted a number of text, audio and video sermons on his blog, always in perfect English, preaching to followers about the many aspects of being a mujahid, or soldier. While his website was blocked by authorities in October 2011, one of his followers salvaged some of the lessons and reposted them on a new page via the popular blogging service Blogspot (Al-Awlaki, n.d.(c)). A number of his video and audio lessons are also posted on YouTube, with messages that include the proper diet for a mujahid (Al-Awlaki, n.d.(a)), or the meaning of Jihad (an audio message recorded over a still photo of a Palestinian boy throwing rocks at an Israeli tank (Al-Awlaki, n.d.(b)).

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Video/Audio Propaganda Al-Qaeda has adopted various forms of contemporary technologies to convey its message – including CD-ROMs, DVDs and professionally produced digital video clips (Hoffman, 2006). This form of technology has been seen as one of the most powerful recruitment tools for Jihadist organizations worldwide. The use of video images transcends language and literacy boundaries, offering a powerful tool for establishing the legitimacy of any given group. In fact, several scholars have cited the Summer 2001 release of a two-hour Al-Qaeda recruitment video, circulated throughout the Middle East, as a presage to the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. The video shows graphic images of Muslims attacking their enemies in Chechnya, Kashmir, Egypt, Israel and Iraq (Hoffman, 2006).

Image 4-3. Al Sahab logo (Medica arm of Al-Queda). (Courtesy As-Sahab Media via http://warintel.blogspot.com/2008_03_02_archive.html)

In September 2007, Al-Qaeda’s media wing, As-Sahaab, released its most sophisticated production of its time. The one-hour 20-minute documentary entitled “The Power of Truth” (Qowat al-Haq) is a detailed testimony of Al-Qaeda’s mission around the world (Al-Sahaab Media Productions, 2007). With Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda’s current leader, appearing frequently as the main authoritative voice, the film features both original and borrowed interviews from numerous Jihadist leaders including Taliban leaders Mansoor Dadullah and Mohammed bin Mirza. It even uses audio recordings from Osama bin Laden laid over a still photograph of the Al-Qaeda leader and a graphic background with the AlQaeda logo. Additionally, borrowed sound bites from several Western scholars and law enforcement authorities are featured throughout the documentary. Among them are journalists Peter Bergen and John Burns, FBI Special Agent Clint van Zandt, and former Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer. The packaging of interviews from Western individuals in this documentary reinforced Al-Qaeda propaganda. Each of the featured

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analysts referenced Al-Qaeda strategy in a way that strategically contributed to the overall message of the documentary. For example, the sound bite from Van Zandt notes, “There is a common philosophy, a common belief system that may bind the various groups of Al-Qaeda together from all over the world. From a law enforcement perspective this is probably the biggest challenge that has been faced in the last 200 years” (Al-Sahaab Media Productions, 2007, n.p.). In fact, Al-Qaeda demonstrated its high-tech abilities long before the release of “The Power of Truth” documentary. Both the execution video of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl and the last will and testament of September 11 hijacker Ahmed Ahmed Ibrahim Al-Haznawi were shot against chroma key blue screens. In the case of the Pearl video, footage rolled in the background showing images of the October 2000 shooting death of Mohammed al-Dura, a young Palestinian boy said to have been killed by Israeli Defense Forces in a gun battle with Palestinian militants (Hoffman, 2006).6 The Pearl video circulated the Internet with such swiftness that the FBI in 2002 ordered certain web providers to ban the distribution of the unedited version (McCullagh, 2002).

Miscellaneous Uses of the Internet Jihadi websites serve various secondary purposes, some of which are slowly gaining popularity among the target audience. Violent video games are commonly accessed on the various websites. In 2003, Hezbollah used one of its websites to promote a game called “Special Force” in which “Islamic Resistance Special Forces” blow up tanks with the Star of David on them (Special Force Game, n.d.). In August 2007, the weblog of MSNBC’s Beirut correspondent Richard Engel reported that the much-anticipated sequel, Special Force 2, had been released by Hezbollah (Engel, 2007). One of the most disconcerting contributions to this rapidly growing arena is the dissemination of mobile videos and photos – a considerably difficult technology for authorities to monitor. Mobile videos are sent from country to country, and many websites are now making video downloads compatible to the MP4 or 3GP mobile phone format (Kohlmann, 2007). A noteworthy feature of these websites is the pages of hacked 6

Israeli Defense Forces continue to deny their role in Al-Dura’s death, saying that he was struck by Palestinian bullets. Al-Dura’s death in his father’s arms as gunmen on both sides exchanged fire became one of the images symbolizing the Palestinian struggle during the Second Intifada.

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programs, ranging from the latest version of Microsoft Office to chat programs, virus protection software and video downloading programs. On the website www.muslm.net, marked by a racing stallion, Al-Qaeda’s logo, visitors can access over one hundred programs for free simply by entering their screen name and password (I am Muslim, 2007). By hacking the programs and providing its members with access, the website administrators are setting a precedent for its members to defy the West using Western technology, without actually having to pay for the programs and financially support Western capitalism (Brachman, October 2007).

Image 4-4. Black horseman carrying the black flag often associated with AlQaeda.

On the English-language website of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a Sunni, panIslamist vanguard, the group makes a unique effort to engage its visitors. For instance, it polls readers on various current events. A poll posted on 4 January 2012, asks “Do you think the Arab Spring is a fake?” to which 49% of the 69 voters said yes, 36% said no, and 15% said unsure (Hizb-utTahrir, n.d.(b)). In January 2008, the question asked, simply: “Who Killed Benazir Bhutto.” As of mid-January, 232 people had responded as follows: [Pervez] Musharaf (36%); America (34%); Al-Qaeda (19 %); Don’t Know (12 %) (Hizb-ut-Tahrir, n.d.(a)). As for a question about whether “the War on Terror [is] a war against Islam,” the overwhelming majority of 265 voters replied yes (81%); 18% said no; 1% answered “don’t know” (Hizb-ut-Tahrir, n.d.(a)). Online libraries are also becoming commonplace on these websites. One of the most comprehensive online repositories for Jihadi literature, in fact, was started by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a prominent Jordanian

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scholar and Jihadist thinker. His website, http://tawhed.ws7 featured a collection of over 3,000 books and articles written by prominent Jihadi authors (Brachman, February 2007). One of the books available on the web, entitled 39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad by Mohammad Bin Ahmad Al-Salem, encourages homegrown militant cells to engage in martyrdom missions.

The Jihadi Media Machine Al-Fajr Information Center serves as a hub and clearinghouse for much of the mainstream Islamic extremist activity on the web. The online distribution network collects statements and audio/video links from various terrorist groups and disseminates it to the numerous websites associated with the movement. Different Jihadi organizations – particularly those with greater resources, such as Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and Hamas’s militant wings, employ their own media centers to help manage their data and communications. Users also often disperse material of one media group onto media outlet other websites, reposting links and other propaganda. Al-Qaeda has several media branches, each in charge of a particular area of communication. As-Sahaab has become the most recognizable Jihadi media outlet in the mainstream Western media, as it is at the forefront of Al-Qaeda’s attempts to reach out to a broader constituency. Employing a number of spokesmen, including California native and Muslim convert Azzam the American (aka Adam Yahiye Gadahn),8 AsSahaab has grown increasingly active in the production and dissemination of audio and video messages. It released at least 100 videos in 2007, including major productions such as the Manhattan Raid (Manhattan Raid Part One, n.d.; Manhattan Raid Part Two, n.d.) parts one and two, the “Power of Truth” documentary (Al-Sahaab Media Productions, 2007), as well as the September 2007 message from Osama bin Laden entitled “The Solution” (The Solution, 2007).9 7 http://tawhed.ws was disabled on North American based IP addresses for several years but is working once again. 8 In late 2006, Gadahn, formerly Adam Pearlman, was added to the FBI’s most wanted list for his involvement with the Al-Qaeda network. Pearlman converted to Islam at age 17, and moved to Afghanistan shortly thereafter. It was at his grandmother’s house that he first accessed a then-primitive version of America Online and began tapping into websites that emphasized radical Islamic propaganda. 9 IntelCenter estimates the release of at least one video every three days in 2007.

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This is double the rate of videos that As-Sahaab released last year when it produced a total of 58 videos; in 2005, its first year of operation, it released only 16 videos in all (Waterman, 2007). Even the Taliban, which once banned news broadcasts and frowned upon any communication with the press, has recently linked itself to Al-Qaeda’s As-Sahaab Media in order

Image 4-5. Poster/Press release issued by Al Sahab when Zawahiri took questions from the media in 2007.

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to help in the dispersal of its propaganda (DuPee, 2007). Similarly, Voice of Jihad (Sawt Al-Jihad), Al-Qaeda’s online magazine, is a sophisticated website with videos of various operations in the Middle East, including the use of roadside bombs against what appear to be US military tanks in Iraq (Sawt Al-Jihad, n.d.). While the Sawt Al-Jihad website has been taken down, it resurrected on other websites as a slogan. A popular Twitter feed under a slightly modified spelling, Souat Al Jehad (Souat Al Jehad, n.p.) emerged in its place. Much of the material on this website is produced by Al-Furqan Foundation Media, which works in partnership with Al-Fajr Center (Brachman, 2007). Both organizations are affiliates with the Islamic State in Iraq and Al Queda supported groups. While groups such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah engage in more sophisticated means of online propaganda, many less mature groups have also tapped into the web as a means for growth and publicity. Army AlIslam, a Gaza-based Salafist Jihadi group with unofficial ties to Al-Qaeda, does not have its own media wing, yet it still manages to publicize its information via an intermediary called the Global Islamic Media Front. Like any business venture, Global Islamic Media Front has its own website, complete with a link to contact its administrators for more information about its services (Global Islamic Media Front, December 2007). This group has a partnership with Al-Fajr. Therefore, when a small group such as Army Al-Islam sends its material to the less prestigious and less connected Global Islamic Media Front, they ultimately receive greater exposure than they would working solo since the same media company that brings you Osama bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri also brings you material from Army Al-Islam. These services are used by a number of Islamic extremist groups, including the Young Mujahideen Movement (Shabaab Al-Mujahideen) in Somalia which releases its propaganda in a local Somali dialect and not in Arabic like most of Al-Fajr’s other affiliates (Kohlmann, 2007). In a way, Al-Fajr serves as the public relations mechanism for the various media wings used by a number of Islamic Jihadist groups. It announces the release of new propaganda by the various networks and takes on the responsibility of disseminating the material to different websites. It also works to clarify what it deems false publicity against any of its “clients.” For example, following the release of Osama bin Laden’s September 2007 message, Al-Fajr released a statement accusing the Arabic satellite network Al-Jazeera of manipulating the intended meaning of the Al-Qaeda leader’s message. In June 2007, Islamic Army in Iraq published a press release informing readers that they launched an English language website. The

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release even referred readers to a “contact us” link for anyone with questions (“Islamic Army in Iraq,” 2007).

Image 4-6. Islamic Army in Iraq — movie poster for their film "Bloody Contracts" -- about military contractors working in Iraq.

Website Access Points It is virtually impossible to determine exactly who is accessing these websites or where they come from. However, by using Alexa.com, an online traffic and user computing software, it is possible to get an idea of the country from which users are accessing these websites. In most cases, Saudi Arabia yielded the highest traffic ranking of any other country – and it was almost always in the top five.10 Muslm.net, one of the more popular discussion pages in which Al-Qaeda and other extremist messages are 10 According to Alexa.com, “the traffic rank is based on three months of aggregated historical traffic data from millions of Alexa Toolbar users and is a combined measure of page views and users (reach). a first step, Alexa computes the reach and number of page views for all sites on the Web on a daily basis. The main Alexa traffic rank is based on the geometric mean of these two quantities averaged over time (so that the rank of a site reflects both the number of users who visit that site as well as the number of pages on the site viewed by those users).”

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often embedded, revealed that 33% of its traffic originates from Saudi Arabia; Libya second, then Jordan, Yemen and Egypt (Alexa.com, n.d.). Similarly, Egypt is perhaps the second most popular source of traffic for many of the Jihadi websites analyzed in this study. The Voice of the Caucasus website, according to Alexa.com, receives 27% of its traffic from Egypt; followed by Saudi Arabia (15%); Algeria (8%); the Palestinian Territories (8%); United Arab Emirates (4%); and the United States (4%). Ansar Center, which has its own Facebook pages and Twitter feeds, generates most of its traffic from Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt (Ansar Center, 2012). One of the more interesting results was yielded by an analysis of AlQaeda affiliated Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) (Global Islamic Media Front, 2007). According to Alexa.com, 9% of the website’s users reside in the United States. Consecutively, other countries with GIMF web surfers include the Czech Republic (6%); Egypt (5%); Brazil (5%) and Serbia and Montenegro (4%). Similar results were revealed for an analysis of Al-Furqan Media Foundation website, Voice of the Jihad (n.d.(a)). Kuwait was home to the highest usership for this website with 56%. Saudi Arabia placed second with 10%. Interestingly, third and fourth highest users of Voice of the Jihad, respectively, were France (8%) and Italy (5%), which tied with the number of users in the Palestinian Territories. While the exactitude of the Alexa computing tool is questionable, it is worth noting that on one of the Arabic-language web forums studied, Khayma.net, nearly every individual who posted a message also listed their country (whether or not it is their country of origin or country of residence is unknown) (Khayma, n.d.). Of the most recent 84 posts analyzed, Egypt topped the list with 17; followed by “Palestine,” at 16; Saudi Arabia (14); Yemen (8); Libya and Jordan with 4 each; Algeria (3). According to an Alexa.com analysis, the majority of the web traffic for Khayma.net comes from Egypt (16.5%), followed by the Palestinian Territories (15%), Saudi Arabia (14.6%), the United Arab Emirates (9.7%) and Algeria (6.8%). These results are an indication that the Alexa search, while not precise, does give a somewhat telling computation of the website user traffic. There is one thing most of the aforementioned countries have in common. With the exception of Yemen, none of the countries yielded by Alexa are failed states. In fact, many, including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt and Libya (prior to the Arab Spring) are home to oppressive regimes that tightly regulate opposition and use heavyhanded and even brutal tactics on groups and individuals deemed terrorists. The Internet provides individuals in these countries with a safe

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house. Websites on the Internet are sanctuaries for their activities to flourish, just as physical training camps function as sanctuaries within failed states, where it is often common to bypass regulation and law enforcement. A study of user traffic for these websites and many more reveals the startling, though unsurprising truth that people in the West are accessing these sites. It is impossible to determine, using unclassified material, whether traffic from the United States has increased over recent years. Further complicating matters is that many of these websites often change domains due to security quandaries. Therefore, it becomes challenging to analyze long-term activity. It is presumptuous to assume that those accessing these websites have malicious intentions. Since the identity of web-users is ultimately anonymous, since it is difficult to authentically identify those using these websites, the results like Alexa and similar traffic-trafficking websites should be deemed scientific, and could indicate access by any range of individuals, from those who accidentally link to the websites, to those who simply browse without intention of participation, to those who visit for the purposes of research or investigation. It is with this last point in mind that authorities find it increasingly difficult to police web activities until the suspected terrorists are caught in action.

Conclusion Over the course of this study, more than a dozen of the websites reviewed and analyzed were shut down or changed domains. Many analysts believe that attempts to counter the terrorist presence on the web are futile as each time a website is blocked, dozens more are bound to spring up in its place. Governments and hackers have tried to block the websites with no persisting success. In fact, one website, www. alfirdaws.org/vbe, shutdown early in this research process, reemerged, shut down, then reemerged again via a different domain. Contrary to what some scholars have suggested, it is becoming increasingly difficult to locate even the most popular Salafist or Jihadi websites via search engines such as Google or Yahoo. A simple query for the word Jihad, for instance, returns millions of hits with definitions, articles, essays and books on the subject and it requires weeding through at least four or five dozen pages for websites with extremist material to begin appearing. Similar results occur when searching words such as Al-Qaeda, mujahideen (strugglers) and irhab (terrorism). Therefore, it is likely that those who enter these Jihadi websites, whether for personal interest or for study, either stumble upon them accidentally, or find them through a

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referral. However, once one accesses any of the Salafi forums available on the Internet, the door easily opens to a web of ideas, camaraderie and opportunity for like-minded individuals. They function as a portal for information, with members posting breaking news bulletins; open dialogue on a range of topics, such as the role of women in the global Jihad; and a virtual purlieu for friendship and consolation - in one case, members comforted each other upon learning that one of their members had been killed in Gaza, and discussions continue about the plight of “brothers and sisters” suffering from violence in Syria. The number of websites functioning as a virtual sanctuary for potentially dangerous Jihadist groups is likely no more than a few dozen. However, with web forums now serving as an open platform to any group looking to recruit like-minded individuals, this number will inevitably grow – forcing authorities to devise new strategies for combating these scattered networks. Individuals looking to lure potential soldiers for the global Jihad bury themselves in chat rooms, web forums, and via encryption tools amid individuals who may very well turn to these websites for nothing more than religious enlightenment. It is purely subjective. Restricting the presence of terrorist groups online is a difficult task in that censorship issues come into play. However, such restrictions are perhaps not as essential as hindering the ability of terrorist organizations to utilize the Internet as a major aspect of their internal communications and logistical operations. This is where the challenge lies, and it is a difficult task. However, blocking websites or countering anti-US messages does little to combat directives and doctrine that are sent from disposable email addresses or are hidden within encrypted images. In a report released in 2010 by Reporters Sans Frontiers entitled “Enemies of the Internet,” Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria and Tunisia ranked amongst the worst offenders of oppressive censorship tactics (“Enemies of the Internet,” 2010). Generally, these governments seek to prohibit websites which exploit sex, politics (that is, politics in opposition to the ruling body) or religion (except those about Islam that are approved by the regime). Judging by the result of this analysis, it would appear these websites circulating extremist and even violent Islamist propaganda are not amongst the websites these governments claim to thwart. It is therefore possible that these websites, which very often sing praises to “Allah” and lace violent propaganda with conservative Salafist ideologies, manage to circumvent censorship under the pretenses of Islamic dialogue. With that in mind, it is too early to determine how regime changes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, and turmoil in Syria, may affect the results of this study.

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The American government has failed thus far to effectively counter the use of the Internet as a communications platform by increasingly distributed terrorist networks. For those monitoring websites in the United States, there is no formula for distinguishing potentially dangerous propaganda spread in the name of Islam from harmless religious rhetoric. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution grants American citizens the right to free speech and the establishment and practice of religion. The Internet is not the sole domain of the United States, and even if it was, cracking down on websites without concrete evidence of wrongdoing would be a huge contradiction of values.11 Further, it can be argued that anything short of an attack does not provide authorities with concrete evidence, thus creating the dilemma that exists today. In several ways, the Internet stands true to many of the democratic principles promoted by the West such as free speech and open discourse. While some may seek to abuse this privilege, it is not realistic, nor will it solve anything to place a cap on online free speech, regardless of the circumstances. In fact, we should consider that these websites, if closely monitored, provide investigators with a unique understanding of the ideological discourse taking place between members of Islamic extremist groups. Islam is the fastest growing religion in the United States and arguably the fastest growing religion in the world (Foreign Policy, 2007). Such a statement is not to suggest that every Muslim is susceptible to heinous acts of violence. However, in the mind of Jihadists, the spread of Islam offers these groups with a sense of hope and optimism that the majority of people may one day share their views. It is important to reiterate that while Islamic extremism has been the focus of this study, radical propaganda on the web is by no means an Islamic phenomenon. Propaganda is a timeless tool used by extremist groups of varying political and ideological orientations, particularly during times of war, for the purposes of reaching out to members or potential members, or for giving the enemy some indication, whether accurate or not, of the group’s activities and abilities. This study has highlighted the various attractive qualities of the Internet for the activities of extremist groups, including massive potential audiences, speedy information exchange, easy access and most important, lack of regulation. Similar to Anderson’s depiction of “imagined communities,” virtual communities are providing Internet users across the 11

This is not to suggest that surveillance and crackdowns do not happen. The controversy surrounding wiretapping, or surveillance by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) of persons within the United States incident to the collection of foreign intelligence, addresses this very issue.

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globe with a medium for fostering camaraderie. In their shared grievances – whether real or imagined – visitors to these websites, chat rooms and online forums create enduring hope in pan-Islamist values. The real question is what are those values? While the reinstatement of the Caliphate and implementation of Shari’a law are among the desired goals of many Islamic extremists in general, these websites, with the exception Hezbollah’s, offer their visitors no tangible objective that might result from a Jihad. A holy war without objectives is one that is likely to evolve with the changing needs of the various terrorist networks. If we look at this study in a broader context, the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi in December 2007 reaffirmed the fears of many that a radical element is thriving in this state where law and order is often at the mercy of extremist groups, particularly along its Western border with Afghanistan.12 As a nuclear-armed country, the idea of a takeover by groups like Al-Qaeda, which is supported by many Pakistanis due to Islamist sympathies and ethnic ties, represents a grave danger (Council on Foreign Relations, 2005). Concerns mounted after the discovery that Osama bin Laden had been hiding in a town 120 miles from Islamabad, the capital, possibly for several years, free from discovery before his death last year. Considering what this study has demonstrated, the Internet adds to such a scenario the element of a borderless portal for communication, transaction of money or supplies, and recruitment. In response, they have learned to adapt to environmental changes, including enhanced counterterrorism policies. This is not to suggest that the Internet renders physical training camps obsolete. However, it is important to question why Jihadists would limit themselves to the camps in Afghanistan or Pakistan when they can recruit from London or Los Angeles? With an online presence, terrorist organizations can simultaneously expand their disciplines via limitless virtual combat classrooms, which convey the Salafist ideology and Jihadist camaraderie and indoctrination. First I will state the obvious: a society that is better informed is one that is more likely to understand and distinguish the threats that exist versus those that are falsified or inflated by governments or the media looking to advance a particular agenda. It is important to bear in mind the presence of honeypot websites set up by intelligence services for the purposes of surveillance. Thus, it is at least worth consideration that the individuals posting messages on the various websites and forums may not 12 According to the Fund for Peace Failed State index, Pakistan ranked No. 12 in 2011 below Yemen, North Korea, Sierra Leone, and Congo.

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be who they claim to be, further complicating research into this trend. It is therefore injudicious to propose a concrete conclusion to this study except to suggest that the greatest impact of this technology, as numerous scholars have accurately assessed, is the psychological camaraderie of these virtual communities. The Internet is, at its core, a distributed electronic medium to communicate messages. Its uniqueness and advantage lies in the speed and the scope of message delivery. It is an imperfect instrument where freedoms are exploited effectively by a number of terrorist groups and aspiring Jihadis today, much as they might be in a failed state, and much to the concern of many governments. What Brachman and several experts have suggested is that government authorities exploit the Internet as a medium for grasping the ideological discourse as it is truly what is at the core of the so-called War on Terrorism. After all, Jihadists do not win the hearts and minds of recruits because of their technological savvy (Brachman, 2006). The Internet broadens their ability to reach out to potential constituents, make transactions and plan attacks, but in the end, it is their ability to promote and expand the ideological legitimacy of global Jihad that poses the greatest threat.

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Johnson, K. (2006, October 12). American indicted on U.S. federal charges of aiding Al-Qaeda. USAToday.com. http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-10-11-manindicted_x.htm Keddie, N.R. (2003). Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press. Kelley, J. (2001, February 2001). Terror groups hide behind Web encryption. USA Today, 1A. Khaleej Times. (2005, October 3). Al Qaeda posts 'help wanted' ad on website: report. http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile=data/middleeas t/2005/October/middleeast_October76.xml§ion=middleeast&col= (Article no longer posted). Khayma (n.d.). Retrieved on January 2, 2008 from http://www.khayma.net/zuwar/jahido.html Kimmage, D & Ridolfo, K. (2007, April). Iraqi insurgent media: The war of images and ideas. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. http://realaudio.rferl.org/online/OLPDFfiles/insurgent.pdf Kohlmann, E. (2007, June 30). Personal Interview. Laqueur, W. (1999). The new terrorism: Fanaticism and the arms of mass destruction. New York: Oxford University Press. Lia, B. (2008). Architect of global Jihad: The life of Al-Qaida strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri. New York: Columbia University Press. Mackey, R. (2011, July 23). Online, clues to a suspected attacker’s motives. http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/scouring-theweb-for-clues-to-a-suspected-attackers-motives/ Mabry, M. (2004, October 31). Breaking to Bush? Newsweek.com. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6367631/site/newsweek/ Manhattan Raid Part One (n.d.). Retrieved on December 10, 2007 from http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=2227985208017300997 Manhattan Raid Part Two (n.d.). Retrieved on December 10, 2007 from http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-1585902606450540249 McCullagh, D. (2002, March 23). FBI seeks Pearl video ban on net. Wired. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (n.d.). Retrieved on November 18, 2007. http://www.merriam-webster.com. Moqawama (n.d.). Retrieved on November 3, 2007 from http://www.moqawama.org/english/ Nacos, B.L. (2006, August 5-8). Terrorism/counterterrorism and media in the age of global communication. United Nations University Global Seminar Second Shimame-Yamaguchi Session.

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—. (2007). Mass-mediated terrorism: The central role of the media in terrorism and counterterrorism. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Nesser, P. (2006, March 15). Jihad in Europe: Recruitment for terrorist cells in Europe. The Transnational Radical Islamism Project: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI). New Al-Qaeda video: The power of truth (2007, September 20). The Jawa Report. http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/189444.php O’Brien, Kevin A. (2004). Information age terrorism and warfare. In name of editor David Martin Jones. Globalisation and the new terror: The Asia Pacific dimension. 22nd Edition. Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar Publishing. Osama bin Laden's posthumous audio message (2011, May 19). Osama bin Laden's posthumous audio message praises Arab revolutions. The Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/alqaeda/8522750/Osama-bin-Laden-video-Posthumous-audio-messagereleased-by-al-Qaeda.html Parks, L. & Schwoch, J. (2012). Down to earth: Satellite technologies, industries, and cultures. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. Patraeus, D.H. (2007, September 10-11). Report to Congress on the situation in Iraq. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/PetraeusTestimony20070910.pdf Patrick, S. (2011). Weak links: Fragile states, global threats and international security. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Patterns of global terrorism (n.d.). Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. U.S. State Department. Retrieved on April 30, 2001 from http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/index.cfm?docid=2419 Perl, R. (2005, November 23). Combating terrorism: Challenge of measuring effectiveness. CRS Report for Congress, 1-12. Ranstorp, M. (2005). Terrorism in the name of religion. In R. Howard (Ed.) Terrorism and Counterterrorism. New York: McGraw Hill. Rijaal Allah (n.d.). Retrieved on February 29, 2008 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u7-qLglzJE8. Video removed as of 27 February 2012. Rubin, J. (1970). Do it. New York: Simon and Schuster. Sageman, M. (2004). Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania Press. Salama, V. (2007, December 20). Ask a terrorist: A 9/11 mastermind invites journalists for an online chat? Behind Al Qaeda’s latest publicity tactic. Newsweek.com. Sawt Al-Jihad (n.d.). Retrieved on November 17, 2007 from

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http://www.sawtaljihad.org/category/jihad-media/ The Solution (n.d.). Retrieved on December 10, 2007 from http://video.google.co.uk/videoplay?docid=1898712767284671230 Sontag, D. (2001, January 20). Israelis grieve as youth who was lured to his death on the Internet is buried. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/20/world/israelis-grieve-as-youthwho-was-lured-to-his-death-on-the-internet-is-buried.html?src=pm Souat Al Jehad (n.d.). Twitter feed retrieved on March 4, 2012 from https://twitter.com/#!/souataljehad Special Force Game (n.d.). Retrieved on January 10, 2008 from http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x33umn_hezbollah-special-force Stern, J.E. (2000). The covenant, the sword and the arm of the Lord. In J. Tucker (Ed.) Toxic terror. Cambridge: MIT Press. Takeyh, R. & Gvosdev, N. (2002). Do terrorist networks need a home? The Washington Quarterly, 25(3), 97-108. Taylor, R. (2007, July 31). Australia releases new evidence against Indian doc. Reuters. Torres, M.R., Jordan, J., & Horsburgh, N. (2006). Analysis and evolution of the global Jihadist movement propaganda. Terrorism and Political Violence, (18)3, 399-421. Trevelyan, M. (2007. July 5). Britain studies bomb plot for links to al Qaeda. Reuters. http://mobile.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL0536670120070705?s rc=RSS-TOP Tsfati, Y. & Weimann, G. (2002). www.terrorism.com: Terror on the Internet. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 25(5), 317-332. UPI (n.d.). UK bomb warning posted in chat room. Retrieved on July 2, 2007 from http://www.metimes.com/storyview.php?StoryID=20070702-0519257421r Van der Veer, P. & Munshi, A. (2004). Media, war and terrorism: Responses from the Middle East and Asia. New York: Routledge Curzon. Voice of the Jihad (n.d.(a)). Retrieved on January 1, 2008 from http://www.sawtaljihad.org/ [Not available on 4 March 2012]. Voice of Jihad (n.d.(b)). Facebook page retrieved on December 20, 2012 from https://www.facebook.com/Voice.of.Jihad Waterman, S. (2007, September 19). Analysis: Al-Qaeda’s video production unit. UPI. http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2007/09/20/Analysis-AlQaidas-video-production-unit/UPI-10601190302473/

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Weimann, G. (2006). Terror on the Internet: The new arena; The new threat. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Whine, M. (1999). Islamist organizations on the Internet. Terrorism & Political Violence. 11(1), 123-133. YouTube (n.d.). Adam Gadahn: The Jewish American Al Qaeda spokesman arrested in Pakistan. Retrieved from YouTube on April 23, 2010 from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dy7iLgsqY8Y&feature=related [Not available on 21 November 2012]

PART 2: TERRORISM

CHAPTER FIVE TERRORISM AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN THE SPANISH CRIMINAL LAW: REASONS FOR SPECIFIC PUNISHMENT AND PUNITIVE RESPONSES PILAR OTERO UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID, SPAIN

Abstract Among the different manifestations that constitute the concept of organized crime, terrorism arouses special interest because of its intense public repercussions. There are few countries where these crimes take on such relevance as in Spain, not so much for the frequency but rather for the analysis that is made of the criminal justice reaction to them. The regulation of Spanish criminal law is on the borderline of constitutional legitimacy. Incrimination is anticipated to a moment when the protected juridical right is not yet infringed. The wording of some criminal categories (precepts) violates the principle of legality in the sense that the criminal punishment of terrorist offenses has been exacerbated or that the pursued aim is not any more to prevent crimes but exclusively to isolate the criminal. The criminal-legal concept of terrorism is characterized by two main components: a structural or organizational component - the terrorist organization or group - and a teleological component as these organizations or groups shall behave with a clear objective to subvert the constitutional order or seriously alter public peace. This chapter develops these elements of the criminal-legal concept of terrorism through the analysis of the art. 571.3 Spanish Criminal Code after the reform of the organic law 5/2010.

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Key words: Organized crime, criminal organizations, criminal groups, criminal-legal concept of terrorism, penal law for enemies, crime of financing terrorism Terrorism is one manifestation of the concept of organized crime, as laid out in Spanish law. It arouses special interest because of its intense public repercussions. There are few countries where these crimes take on such relevance as in Spain, not so much for the frequency but rather for the analysis made by the criminal justice system in response to them. Criminal law is the framework for the regulation of constitutional matters. Criminal law anticipates barriers to incrimination, defines categories of offenses, determines sentencing guidelines and imposes sentences, and implements preventative measures to incapacitate would-be criminals. In spite of these objectives, an important part of the Spanish citizenry perceives that the criminal justice institutions remain passive in the face of the phenomenon of terrorism (Cancio, 2010, pp. 7-18). This chapter will provide a brief analysis of the Spanish antiterrorist criminal law and its application in case law. Conflicts with governmental policy will be discussed in an attempt to identify a more active criminal justice involvement. Our aim is very complex, due to the role the criminal justice system has played in combating terrorism in Spain.

Criminal-Legal Concept of Terrorism The Spanish Criminal Code does not expressly define terrorism. Terrorism crimes have been assigned to a chapter whose rubric is “crimes against public peace” and, more specifically, terrorist crimes are located in a section called “About Terrorist Crimes.” The corresponding articles regulating this phenomenon do not mention to whom these regulations are specifically addressed, a practice normally required in criminal law under the principle of specificity. In order to create a legal concept of terrorism for the Spanish criminal justice system, the scientific and the jurisprudence communities joined forces to work on interpretations of the law. The resulting definition characterized terrorism as having two main components – structural/ organizational and teleological. The structural, or organizational, component involves articles of the Criminal Code that regulate terrorism. This component requires that the conduct considered to be a terrorist action be performed by individuals belonging to, acting for, or collaborating with criminal organizations or groups. Terrorism, as political violence performed by an organized

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structure, organization, or group, may be seen as an authentic countervailing power against the State. This structural component of belonging to a criminal organization or group is an independent crime from the subsequent realized crimes by the terrorist/criminal organization (Garrocho, 2011, pp. 1537-1548). One of the most important reforms in this matter is the Spanish Organic Law 5/2010. This law specifies and defines the structural component thanks to the explicit classification of the terrorist organizations and groups in the article 571.3 of the Spanish Criminal Code. Through this legal-reform, groups satisfy the requirements established in the articles related to the “criminal organization and group” if their purpose is to subvert the constitutional order or seriously alter public peace by means of the perpetration of any type of crime. Consequently, the Spanish Criminal Code, especially after the reform of the organic law 5/2010, assumes that a “terrorist organization or group” is a criminal organization or group and therefore shares the same characteristics of any other criminal group or organization. Criminal/terrorist organizations are defined as those organizations 1) consisting of more than two people, 2) stable or existing for an indefinite period of time, and 3) sharing in a concerted and coordinated way various tasks and functions with the aim of committing crimes, or carrying out the perpetration of repeated misdemeanors. A criminal/terrorist group is the union of more than two people whose purpose is the concerted perpetration of crimes or repeated misdemeanors. It does not have to fully comply with the characteristics of a criminal organization (i.e., unstable organizations) as defined above. In this sense, the jihadist terrorism would be included within the terrorist groups (but not within the terrorist organizations) since they are formed by unstable groups and they operate with flexible structures through cells, with continuous entry of people having no structured chain of command but with strong loyal ties. There is a second, teleological component that completes the definition of terrorism. The purpose of a terrorist act (homicide, kidnapping, etc.) is the destruction of the constitutional order or to seriously disrupt public peace, i.e., to “subvert the constitutional order or seriously alter public peace”. The political nature of terrorism becomes clear, given that the subversion of the constitutional order deals with clear political objectives. Therefore, terrorist acts are subsumed in the subjective concept of political crimes (those acts whose purpose is to thwart the political order of the State).

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One of the major issues of interpretation of the definition of terrorism lies in the expression “[it] seriously alters public peace” (Cancio, 2011, pp. 1663-1685). This undetermined legal concept expresses more a result than a purpose: the disturbance of the public peace, arousing in the community an alarm. The consequence resulting from action with the political purpose of subverting the constitution justifies the heaviest criminal punishment. The next sections will further develop the structural element of the criminal-legal concept of terrorism (terrorism as organization and group) through the analysis of the concept of criminal organization and group resulting from the wording of the article 571.3 of the Spanish Criminal Code itself.

A Sociological Approach to the Concept of Organized Crime In a similar way as the definition of terrorism is characterized as having two main components – structural/organizational and teleological the definition of organized crime can be looked at from three different perspectives (Flores, 2007, pp. 141-191): organizational/structural, relational (vis a vis clients and socio-political environment), and a for profit business model that involves an underground market. Structurally, the criminal organizations are formed by violence, corruption and obstruction of justice (Herrán, González, & Mendieta, 2007, pp. 21-26). These organizations use violence as a means to establish control over its own members, which guarantees internal discipline. They assert themselves over competitors in the illicit markets that they intend to control, such as drugs, prostitution, people smuggling, arms trafficking, and money laundering. The organized crime groups use corruption, such as bribes, to expand their activities. This corruption has extensively penetrated legitimate criminal justice institutions, especially in police circles, obstructing justice with the subsequent mistrust among citizens as to the legitimacy of the rule of law. In recent years, a new characteristic has emerged - the development of an international nature. The economic, political and technological changes that have occurred since the end of the last century have diffused national borders, causing a change in the modus operandi (MO) of organized crime. This new MO goes beyond the political barriers of each State, leading to pervasive transnational illicit markets. This latter characteristic

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is very conflictive and causes serious tension related to aspirations of sovereignty of the State. Organized crime has tended to become more sophisticated in the globalized business environment. It works within a digital world that makes it much more difficult for law enforcement to intervene. Terrorism, as an expression of organized crime, has also become globalized. Groups like Al-Qaeda have expanded their area of activity to more than half the countries in the world. Al-Qaeda has clearly demonstrated that it has connections with other terrorist organizations, such as Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in the Basque Country, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), and the much smaller Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), as well as the paramilitary Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) in Colombia (Ramírez, 1987; Ramírez, 2011).

Framework for the Legal Definition of Organized Crime in the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) The power of the criminal group is its real capacity to threaten with violence, rather than in its effectiveness at carrying out crimes (Mapelli, 2001, p. 2088). The part of the definition that makes reference to the accumulation of political or economic power is fundamental as it alludes not so much to a reality, such as an especially serious crime committed by its members, but rather to the potential danger that emanates from that accumulation of power, given its capacity to accumulate economic resources (Moore, 1986, pp. 50-54). The EU, through international agreements signed primarily after 1998, established a long list of conditions and requirements necessary for a criminal organization to be classified as an organized crime group with its illegal behavior categorized as organized crime. These conditions and requirements are: 1) the organization exists for a certain time; 2) members show convincing evidence of criminality, and, 3) their objective must be the accumulation of political and/or economic power. Additional criteria were established by the EU: 1) existence of a certain discipline and internal control within the organization, and 2) the use of violence as a means of committing offenses (Fernández Steinko, 2008, p. 23). Specifically, the EU has promulgated the following two instruments: I) The Joint Action: The Joint Action (98/733/JHA), adopted by the Council based on article K.3 of the EU Treaty (21/XII/1998), makes it

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a criminal offense to participate in a criminal organization in the EU Member States. Its Article 1 establishes: With the meaning of this Joint Action, a criminal organization shall mean a structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two persons, acting in concert with a view to committing offenses which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, whether such offenses are an end in themselves or a means of obtaining material benefits and, where appropriate, of improperly influencing the operation of public authorities (n.p.).

Article 2 provides the obligation on the part of the Member States to declare a criminal offense one or both of the following activities: “to participate actively in the criminal activities of the organization or merely to agree that the criminal activity should be pursued.” II) The Council Framework Decision: The Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA revokes the Joint Action regarding the fight against organized crime. Its Article 1 defines “criminal organization” as a structured association, established over a period of time, of more than two persons acting in concert with a view to committing offenses which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years or a more serious penalty, to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit (n.p.).

Article 2 stipulates that each Member State regard as an offense one or both of the following - a) participation in the criminal activities of the organization, including financing or agreeing to pursue the criminal activity without necessarily doing so; and b) taking part in the actual execution of the activity. The first solid example of the United Nations’ involvement in this head-on battle against organized crime is the promulgation of the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNCTOC) (AKA: Palermo Convention), signed in Palermo on November 15, 2000 (General Assembly Resolution A/RES/55/25). The notion of organized crime is specified in its Article 2 as a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offenses established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly, or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit (n.p.).

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The Article 5.1 also establishes that each State Party shall establish as a criminal offense a) the agreement to commit a serious crime, with or without the need for the conspirators to have participated actively in the eventual execution, active participation in the illicit activities of the criminal organization, or active participation in the other activities of the organization, so as to contribute to its criminal aims; and b) the organization, direction, the aiding and abetting of, the facilitation of or counseling the commission of a serious crime involving an organized criminal group. This line of thought was initiated by German criminal jurisprudence that defines organized criminality as the planned perpetration of crimes induced by a desire to obtain profits or power, an aspiration that can come to be very important when two or more participants divide the work during an undetermined period of time: a) using semi-managerial or semi-professional structures, b) employing violence or other intimidating mechanisms, and c) influencing politics, the media, the administration, justice or economy (Kinzig, 2004, p. 57).

In the majority of European legislation, based on the UNCTOC definition of organized crime, acts of terrorism are explicitly excluded from organized crime offenses because these are considered a particular and specific crime (Fernández Steinko, 2008, p. 23). The 2010 Conference of Ministers of Justice of Ibero-American Countries (COMJIB), at its 17th Plenary Session, adopted an intermediate position on the definition of organized criminal behavior when defining illicit associations without regard to the aim of obtaining material benefit: “The structured groups of at least three persons that exist for a permanent or temporary period of time with the aim of committing crimes” (COMJIB, 2010, n.p.). And it adds as well that “only in the case of disregarding irrelevant facts or with little criminal significance is there the possibility of foregoing punishment for associated criminal behavior referring to crimes considered to be minor” (COMJIB, 2010, n.p.). Finally, the last Spanish Criminal Code reform (Ley Orgánica 5/2010, 22nd June) introduced in its art 571 bis for the first time a definition of organized crime, even if it does not include the aim of obtaining material benefit: For the purposes of this Code, a criminal organization is understood to be a stable group formed by more than two persons existing for an indefinite period of time which divides tasks or functions in a coordinated manner with the aim of committing crimes or repeatedly committing minor crimes (n.p.).

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These changes in the definition of organized crime over time demonstrate that the criminal law concept of organized crime has progressively broadened. Both the 1998 Joint Action and the 2008 Council Framework Decision require an organizational structure of at least three persons who conspire to commit offenses that are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years. This is regardless of the objective of the offense in the case of the Joint Action, but highlighting material benefit in the 2008 Council Framework. The Palermo Convention defines organized crime either by conspiring to commit a crime or by active participation – actually committing a serious criminal offense; it does not place a limitation on a particular deprivation of liberty sentence and focuses on obtaining material benefit. The COMJIB definition excludes the concept of minor crimes and defines the criminal organization as being either permanent or temporary. And finally the last reform carried out through the Spanish Criminal Law 5/2010 has extended the definition of organized crime to include conspiring to commit minor crimes. Evidently, the fewer requirements needed to constitute the concept of organized crime, the smoother the road to criminal prosecution since the burden of proof is reduced. However, the unlimited broadening of the concept will generate new problems of legal insecurity and the risk of leaving interpretation in the hands of the judges. Finally, it will be necessary to analyze if the broad scope of the offense classification is coherent and therefore, justifiable regarding the established right that it intends to protect. A priori, the broadening of the concept to include minor crimes, apart from distorting the essence of organized crime, demonstrates an attack on the principle of proportionality. In short, the main differences between the European legal framework (2008 Council Framework Decision), the 2000 UN Convention, and the Spanish definition of the offense can be found in three specific areas. First, the models of criminal organization in the European legal framework and the UN Convention include organized crime induced “by material benefit” (except in the 1998 Joint Action whose article 1 establishes that the offenses can constitute an end in and of themselves or be a means to obtain material benefit and, in this case, improperly influence public authority). This means that a complex structure, such as that of an organized crime or terrorist group, supported by a lucrative aim, must be added to the potential danger of destabilizing the social order and generating loss of confidence in the rule of law (Brandaríz, 2009, p. 745). According to Brandaríz, this greater harm, which goes beyond the infringement of established rights, specifically affects the stability of

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economic and political order. Therefore, a specific punitive policy is justified. However, this lucrative aim has not been targeted in the Spanish legislation. The 4th point of the 2008 Council Framework Decision, derived from Article 2a, establishes the freedom of the Member States to classify as criminal organizations other groups whose aim is not to obtain financial gain or other material benefit, therefore going beyond the obligations. This inclusion of limiting criteria increases the burden of proof and consequently a stumbling block for criminal prosecution (Zúñiga, 2009, p. 280; Brandaríz, 2009, p. 753). In this context, the COMJIB, in its 17th Plenary Session (2010), accepted that the complexity and specialization of criminal organizations makes it inappropriate to include criteria such as that of a lucrative aim because it poses a restriction to the concept of “unlawful assembly”. In this way, whatever may be the aim pursued, forming a group to commit any offense of any type should be considered in and of itself criminal. Second, only serious crimes, that is, those punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum of at least four years, are classified as offenses within the context of the EU. However, in the Palermo Convention, “serious crimes” are alluded to generically without specifying, adding “offenses established in accordance with this Convention.” This means a broadening of the scope of the offense, since the crime, in the last case, does not have a threshold of gravity. The COMJIB only excludes minor crimes from the classification while the new Spanish definition of the offense is extended to include any crime or minor offense: 1. Those who promote, constitute, organize, coordinate or direct a criminal organization will be punished by deprivation of liberty for four to eight years if the organization had as its aim or objective to commit serious crimes, and by deprivation of liberty for three to six years in the rest of the cases; and those who participate actively in the organization, form a part of it or cooperate financially or in any other way with the organization will be punished with imprisonment of two to five years if the aim is to commit a serious crime, and with imprisonment of one to three years in the rest of the cases. For the purposes of this Code, a criminal organization is understood to be a stable group formed by more than two persons existing for an indefinite period of time which divides tasks or functions in a coordinated manner with the aim of committing crimes or repeatedly committing minor crimes” (“Criminal Organizations and Groups” Article 570 bis, Spanish Criminal Code reform (Ley Orgánica 5/2010, 22nd June).

Third, the Spanish reform opts for a much greater penalty than that provided for in the 2008 Council Framework Decision. Whereas in the

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latter one a maximum of five years imprisonment was established (Article 3.1b), the Spanish Criminal Code establishes that in certain circumstances, a maximum of twelve years imprisonment may be imposed (Article 570, bis, 2º last subsection). Another important change in the new Spanish legislation is stated in the preamble to the LO 5/2010. This change is centered on giving a criminal law answer not only to criminal organizations (for example, those involved in drug trafficking) which require proof of a permanent structure, but also to other similar phenomena present in today’s society, such as terrorist groups. Although these groups do not meet the structural requirements of LO 5/2010 for a criminal organization, they can, and do at times, engage in extreme violence. Thus, the legal reform has responded to this reality defining, in parallel with the organizations, the so-called criminal groups, precisely by exclusion, that is to say, as forms of criminal agreement that do not fit into the archetype of the cited organizations, but which do contribute an added criminal danger to the actions of their members (Article 570 ter). Therefore, when LO 5/2010 provides for the EU Member States being free to classify other groups of persons as criminal organizations, it seems to invoke the 4th point of the 2008 Council Framework Decision again, beyond the obligations stated in its Article 2a. The structure of the new offenses corresponds to a similar model in both cases: organizations and groups. Nevertheless, on the one hand, the punishment is stiffer when applied to organizations whose more complex structure corresponds to a deliberate goal of posing a threat to security and legal order. On the other hand, the punishments’ distinct nature demands some differences in the description of actions characteristic of the offense.

Reasons for Specific Punishment of Criminal (or Terrorist) Organizations In order to lay the foundations of a specific punishment it is necessary to start defining the established right protected through the incrimination of the conduct, which form a criminal offense. Some authors (i.e., Moral de la Rosa, 2005, p. 180) put forth that the right to freedom of assembly is being violated by the formation of criminal and terrorist organizations. For others (García-Pablos, 1997, p. 143; Sánchez García de Paz, 2005, p. 122), the protected right should be the public order, or analogous notions such as the State’s protection of its own power, the security of the State, or the very hegemony and power of the State institution against an organization that pursues ends contrary to those

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of the State. If one understands that criminal or terrorist organizations violate rights related to public order, the offenses of unlawful assembly would be considered “delitos de peligro” (crimes of danger) (under Spanish law this type of offense is committed only if there are several offenders acting together and they spread alarm). Finally, a third broad sector of legal writers (for instance, Zúñiga, 2002, p. 66) believes that the mere existence of a stable group organized to commit offenses is punishable. In this way the legislator offers a preventative protection in the form of delitos-barrera (barrier crimes) for those established rights that the members of the criminal group join together to attack. Silva (2008, pp. 5-6) opts to react to criminal and terrorist organizations for preventative reasoning. This preventive theory seems to respond to the potential, indirect danger of those organizations against established rights. Barber (2004, p. 152) found, however, that is an act prior to being raised to the category of delito autónomo (autonomous offense). This appears to be the consideration of the Spanish criminal legislation, when writing “which divides tasks or functions in a coordinated manner with the aim of committing …” (Preamble to LO 5/2010). This model of conspiracy, which is what the Common Law system follows, is one of the alternatives proposed in the previously mentioned European legal framework. In accordance with this conception, the real danger is not what the specific punishment of these criminal and terrorist organizations is attempting to avoid, but rather the potential conspiracy against an established order from outside. Besides the high degree of negative influence that may be generated by their generic references to “peace” or “security”, an unlawful element inherent in the criminal and terrorist organizations is that they assume a monopoly on violence (i.e., only the State is allowed to be violent; if used by others, violence is a criminal offense) that belongs exclusively to the State. In the words of Cancio (2008, pp. 75-81), this is an unwarranted assumption of an organization because the criminal organization assumes the exercise of rights pertaining to State sovereignty. Cancio’s position includes in this debate drug cartels and terrorist organizations. Specifically, the high degree of danger associated with terrorist organizations goes beyond the specific harm of established individual rights. Terrorism also intends to attack the State’s power. The non-terrorist criminal organizations also adopt a position of confrontation against the State, with the intention of controlling the use of violence, and, occasionally, even constructing a parallel State or a State within a State. These apolitical criminal organizations operate using coercive mechanisms within the group and outside the group by committing violent acts

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established as criminal offenses. This is the case in many parts of Latin America, for example in specific areas within Colombian territory (whether because of guerrilla or paramilitary groups) (Ramírez, 2011). The conceptions of Cancio and Silva (2008, pp. 10-11) on the unlawful element of criminal and terrorist organizations are not so far apart. In the case of Cancio, the determination of illegality is based on the negation of the rule of law, whereas in the case of Silva, it is on the increase in the potential degree of danger. The main difference is located in the reaction to this unlawful element. Cancio bases his arguments on the just merit of the penalty, whereas Silva focuses on incapacitation, which, applied to the criminal organization, is illegalization. The organization members are also punished to prevent them from participating in specific crimes. The preamble of the Spanish Criminal Code reform, included in the LO 5/2010, sides with the authors who saw that the configuration of these organizations went far beyond a mere demonstration of abusive, deviant or pathological exercise of the freedom of assembly. Previously in Spain, attempts to stop the vastly complex phenomenon of organized crime employed an almost ridiculous legal category, such as the traditional offense of unlawful assembly originally used to control political dissent, without having adapted it to the current legal and political context. Indeed, the classification of criminal offenses has been subject to certain inertia based on tradition, rather than refocusing regulation towards the scope of effectiveness of real criminal organizations (Brandaríz, 2009, p. 728; Cancio, 2008, pp. 19-20). This legal category, which remains after the recent reform, together with the creation of new legal categories that regulate groups and other criminal organizations, will eventually generate problems of overlapping laws, (whose possible solution has been suggested earlier in this chapter). As stated before, the legislator understood that “criminal organizations and groups in general are not really ‘associations’ that commit crimes, but rather groups with an intrinsic criminal nature, lacking, in many cases, any legal form or appearance or having this appearance for the sole purpose of concealing its activity and seeking impunity” (Preamble of LO 5/2010, n.p.). Precisely because of the controversy that has arisen in relation to the systematic categorization of these criminal offenses, the LO 5/2010 has finally opted for altering the structure of the present Criminal Code as little as possible, situating it within the framework of crimes against public order: These organizations, apart from multiplying exponentially the potential harm of the different criminal behaviors carried out in the group or through the group, are characterized by the aspect of generating complex procedures

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The Criminal Law Response to this Phenomenon: “Penal Law for Enemies” Revisited The criminal law response to this phenomenon (the conception of terrorist as enemies, and not as persons) falls within the so-called Penal Law for Enemies (Jakobs, 2002, p. 734; 2003, p. 22), characterized by the justification of the existence of a criminal law and criminal procedure that restrict individual rights in order to defend society against future aggression, halfway between symbolic criminal law and punitivism (Cancio, 2003, pp. 76-78, 2010, p. 32). Its aim would be the exclusion and incapacitation of that enemy (Silva, 2001, pp. 163-167), which is indicative of a failure of criminal law, giving priority to police control and repression (Fumarulo, 2007, pp. 238-239). According to Cancio (2003, p. 80), this criminal law for enemies functions from a prospective point of view (reference point being a future action) rather than from a retrospective one (focusing on the crime committed), characterized by a broadening of the punitive barrier, exacerbation of the punishment, considerable restriction of the guarantees and procedural rights of the accused as well as limiting prison privileges. Silva (2001, p. 27) argues in this context that penal law for enemies is characterized by the imposition of the most severe deprivation of liberty and coexists along with the relaxation of political-criminal guarantees and of the rules of accusation. A fourth characteristic of Penal Law for Enemies should be added to the above mentioned three: the orientation toward criminal law de author of the regulation (tendency to try and convict people not for what they have done but for who they are), as a consequence of the ostracism of the subjects as enemies. Is this criminal law of exclusion and incapacitation justifiable? Insofar as the crimes that are being fought do not diminish, it would not be legitimate to restrict the guarantees that this exceptional law supposes, and, in my opinion, it would never be to my way of combating merely minor crimes. This option, chosen by the Spanish criminal legislation of 2010, contravenes the principle of proportionality of punishment. That is to say that, beyond questioning whether the new classification of offenses

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confirms conduct near to the category of conspiracy (to commit even less serious or minor crimes) punished as autonomous crimes with quite stiff sentences, this furtherance of the punitive barrier that avoids the infringement of the protected rights threatened by the criminal activity is very difficult to justify as a deterrent to less serious or minor crimes (Brandaríz, 2009, p. 731; Zúñiga, 2002, p. 66). In my opinion, de lege ferenda (what the law should be), some limiting criteria of lucrative aim should be introduced into the punitive equation even though this may imply both increasing the burden of proof and the risk of excluding certain classifications that, while being serious, have other motivations. An intrinsic characteristic of criminal and terrorist organizations that makes infringement of protected rights feasible is their attack on the foundation of democracy, assuming that the violence is directed exclusively to the State. This classification should also be relegated to more serious offenses for reasons of social harm, (in Spanish law, there is no crime without a concrete danger of harming a protected right) and of less intervention. Otherwise, we will fall again into a frustrating interpretative effort, such as the one conducted for years in Spanish legal writing and jurisprudence in which literal interpretations limited the discussion of reasonable limitations to the potential reach of organized crimes. In other words, I argue that no group can be considered to engage in unlawful assembly simply because its aim is to commit offenses. But, in order to challenge the State in its exclusive use of violence, it is necessary first, to have an organization with a solid and powerful structure, and/or a structure developed through the acquisition of valuable resources. Secondly, to be coherent, the catalogue of criminal infractions must be limited, in the sense that only serious offenses really challenge the state monopoly on violence (Cancio, 2008, pp. 68, 82-83; Brandaríz, 2009, p. 734).

Response Based on the Idea that “Crime Does Not Pay” The danger of organized crime is defined starting with its capacity to accumulate profits that can be used to infiltrate the economy. Since the 1980s, the fight against organized crime has been focused, to a great extent, on tracking the associated finances in order to broaden the scale of crime, to include corrupt civil servants, or to assume the monopoly of violence (Fernández Steinko, 2008, pp. 92-96). Therefore, the essential tools in this battle to weaken the economic power of the organized criminal group are confiscation and the fight against money laundering.

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The European provisions of the last twelve years have been directed at two issues related to this discussion: first, insuring the harmonization of national provisions related to confiscation and penal sanctions applicable to money laundering, and second, applying the principle of mutual recognition to the resolutions of preventative embargo of property, of securing evidence between different countries, of confiscation, and the weight of the burden of proof regarding the origin of the property affected.1

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Council Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA harmonizes some of the national provisions regarding confiscation and penalties applicable to money laundering. Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA applies the principle of mutual recognition to the resolutions of freezing of property and securing evidence. Council Framework Decision 2005/212/JHA has as its objective to insure that Member States have effective measures that regulate confiscation of crime-related proceeds, particularly regarding the demonstration of the origin of the property affected. The Framework Decision 2006/783/JHA applies the principle of mutual recognition to the confiscation resolutions. The question of mutual recognition is very pertinent since these procedures are used more and more, especially in countries that apply Common Law and they are becoming very effective instruments when pursuing the products of organized crime’s activities. The Second Protocol of the Agreement regarding protection of the financial interests of the European Communities, provided for measures of confiscation as well as cooperation with the Member States in the fight against fraud and money laundering which included confiscation. The proposal of Framework Decision regarding the European letter of request on obtaining evidence to collect objects, documents and data destined for criminal proceedings, provided for regulations on the follow-up of the resolutions on preventative embargo dictated in accordance with the Council Framework Decision 2003/577/JHA. It also includes certain provisions of the 2001 Protocol of the Agreement regarding legal assistance in criminal matters. Brussels Communication 20-11-2008 (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Proceeds from organized crime: ensuring that “crime does not pay” COM/2008/0766 final). Finally, the provisional report of the European Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council made in Brussels on 23-3-2010, COM (2010) 112 final, on progress in Bulgaria under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, to help with, among other issues, the fight against organized crime, as well as the provisional report of the European Commission to the European Parliament and to the Council made in Brussels on 23-3-2010, COM (2010) 113 final, on progress in Rumania under the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, to help with, among other issues, the fight against organized crime proposes among other questions, to reform the laws dealing with confiscation of proceeds from crime and the fight

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Confiscation. The Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (COM/2008/0766 final) recognizes confiscation, as well as the recovery of proceeds of criminal origin, to constitute a very effective tool to fight organized crime that is essentially motivated by the desire for profit. In effect, confiscation impedes the use of ill-gotten funds for financing other illegal activities, activity that undermines confidence in the financial systems and corrupts legitimate society. A case could be brought before a civil court grounded in the presumption that the property comes from criminal activities. In these cases, the burden of proof is reversed, being incumbent on the accused to prove the legal origin of the property. With the burden of proof lying in the hands of the accused, this remedy would serve as an easier and speedier intervention than would a criminal trial. The creation of an offense of possession of ill-gotten property has been proposed within the European law framework to pursue the proceeds of crime in those cases in which the value is disproportionate to the income reported by the owner. In this case, the proceedings are carried out before a criminal court and the burden of proof is not completely reversed (this classification exists in French criminal law). The UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime of 15/XI/2000 already proposed an equivalent confiscation law (Battista, 2007) that reduces the investigative burden when it is not possible to determine the price or the profit of the crime. This law can use other property that the accused has at his disposal with a similar value to determine the criminally obtained property’s monetary worth. The reform of Spanish criminal legislation (LO 5/2010), through the modification of article 127, complies with the Council Framework Decision 205/212/JHA of February 24, 2005 regarding confiscation of the products, instruments, and proceeds from crime. The preamble to the law highlights that the main objective of organized crime is profit, and consequently, establishing common provisions for monitoring, embargo, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of the crime is the priority for carrying out an effective fight against this criminal activity. As it relates to organized crime, the existing provision on confiscation has been completed by the Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and applies to the fight against terrorism. The provisions enable the judiciary and the courts to come to an agreement as to the effects, property, instruments and profits obtained from criminal activities against money laundering and confiscation of criminals’ property, modifying the notary’s act to prohibit cash payment of real estate transfers.

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committed within a criminal or terrorist organization or group. To facilitate the measure, it is presumed that criminal activity occurred when the value of property proceeds is disproportionate from the legal income of each person convicted of crimes committed within a criminal organization or group. Furthermore, judges and courts are empowered to approve confiscation when it is a negligent offense that carries a prison sentence greater than one year. Money Laundering. The case of money laundering, occurring in both organized criminal and terrorist groups, constitutes a clear example that criminal law functions from a prospective point of view (reference point is a future act) instead of retrospective (focusing on the committed crime). It is a legal instrument that does not judge as much, or only, on what has happened, but rather what could happen in the event that the illicit money were to be used effectively to infiltrate the legal economy and society (Fernández Steinko, 2007, pp. 96-97; Bajo/Bacigalupo, 2009, pp. 11-252). At the same time, money laundering embraces the notion of degree of potential danger posed by organized crime and terrorist groups. Even if there is no evidence that a person has committed a violent crime, s/he is arrested for having attempted to launder money presumably obtained from the non-violent crime and for everything that s/he could do with this money. Therefore, the laundering is separated from the main crime. It is even a different offense if the person is unable to demonstrate the origin of his assets. The person could even be punished more severely than for the potential violent crime which, in my view, violates the principle of proportionality of punishment. At the same time, it also supposes a reversal of the burden of proof violating the principle of presumed innocence, since it is the accused who has to demonstrate the non-illicit origin of his assets under suspicion. Along these lines, the 2010 Spanish criminal legislation, through the modification of articles 301 and 302 of its Criminal Code, broaden the criminal classification of money laundering to include two new features: first, the utilization and the possession of assets known to come from criminal activity, even if the crime was committed by the very subject that possesses the assets; and, second, also punishing the conduct of selflaundering (“autoblanqueo”), outside of the structure of the offenses of money laundering and receiving stolen goods - receiving stolen goods referring to a previous crime committed by another person. This double punishment – punishment for both possessing the stolen goods and laundering them - may violate the principle of double jeopardy (ManjónCabeza, 2010, pp. 344-345). This dual punishment does not seem to be

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permitted by either the criminal legislation or the Supreme Court (2006), where it was maintained that the offense of possessing stolen goods does not exclude the overlap with the offense of having stolen the goods. A report of the General Council of the Spanish Judiciary (Informe CGPJ, 2008, p. 118) suggests that the traditional classifications of money laundering have in common the characteristic that they tend to dissimulate the illegal origin of the assets, giving an appearance of legality to the proceeds or profits of the crime. So, concealment, complicity, transmission and acquisition mean an apparent change of ownership that situate the property within the assets of another person who has not committed the crime, with the purpose of incorporating it into the legal and economic traffic. However, when the 2010 legislation sanctions those who simply possess or utilize property known to be the product of criminal activity (or even through gross negligence), it is not incriminating conduct which actually constitutes money laundering since this conduct does not involve a real or apparent change of ownership. A drawback must be added: merely possessing or using property without having intervened in committing the crime from which it originated can be punished more severely than having committed the very offenses of larceny, fraud, embezzlement, etc. from which the goods proceed. This conclusion (Informe CGPJ, 2008, p. 122) lacks any logical criminal law policy justification and greatly exceeds the constitutional principle of proportionality of punishment. The 2008 report of the Consejo Fiscal (pp. 162-163) (a board that assists the Chief State Prosecutor in his duties) suggested using the term “criminal activity” to describe money laundering, rather than the term “offense.” The Consejo Fiscal reasoned that since a prior conviction on the predicate offense was not necessary, in accordance with the Supreme Court, the guarantees associated with evidence from the investigation were relaxed. The introduction of this nuance is coherent with the terminology used in the new classification of confiscation (a category closely related to the offense of money laundering). Confiscation is characteristically carried out in response to organized crime, where it is not always possible to prove the concrete participation of a particular member in a particular criminal activity (due to the interchangeability of members) although his continuing membership in the organization can be proven, which in and of itself constitutes “criminal activity”. This new category of crime in the fight against money laundering makes it clear that the designation is not so much an instrument to facilitate pursuing the crime; but rather it is primarily useful in dismantling

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the economic structural power in the world derived from organized crime (Fernández Steinko, 2008, p. 116) and terrorist activity. In sum, both measures, confiscation and money laundering, although questionable from the point of view of limiting guarantees, are useful in the fight against organized crime.

Independent International Organizations for Finance Control: Tax Havens and Jurisdictions with Bank Secrecy Confiscation and money laundering as legal instruments are not sufficient to eradicate organized crime and terrorist activity. Additional legal tools are necessary. Some decades ago, the term “Gross Criminal Product” was used to describe to the money moved by drugs, illegal arms sales, coerced prostitution, urban development corruption and trafficking in persons. Contrary to what one might think, this parallel economy based on crime is not fed primarily through blue-collar crime. The primary actors, as well as main beneficiaries, are groups infinitely more powerful than all of the blue-collar criminals put together (Fernández Steinko, 2008, pp. 276-285). Given their organizational and planning capacity, leadership within the organized criminal groups hold some of the great fortunes of the world, run large multinational companies and, more concretely, engage in tax evasion, avoiding democratic control of their activities and operating outside parallel institutional structures of the most influential States in the world. A possible solution to halt associated problems could begin with the creation of independent bodies to study organized crime and terrorist activity that utilizes criminal financing methods. The presence of representatives of workers and of civic society on the boards of directors would make more difficult the accounting manipulation, such as that seen in the ENRON debacle. Thus, the creation of independent international regulatory agencies to monitor international financial activity would assist the fight against these types of parallel financial structures. The flow of criminal money, although important, does not have these last dimensions for the international economy in its whole. Tax evasion generates a higher social, political and economic harm than the flow of criminal money. Aside from the creation of legal instruments to fight money laundering, it should not be forgotten that the structural power derived from organized crime is sustained primarily because of the role played by tax havens, that is to say, the off shore financial centers and jurisdictions with bank

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secrecy. Off shore financial centers are areas in which business can be carried out by non-residents, which permit the legal creation of impenetrable networks of businesses, and which allow financial transactions to be carried out between the businesses and with others in foreign countries without having to notify any authority. Jurisdictions with bank secrecy include Liechtenstein, Panama, and Switzerland. These financial centers and jurisdictions are created, among other things, to ensure their clients’ confidentiality; establish companies, intermediaries or trusts designed to make it impossible to identify the real owners or final beneficiaries of the accounts; and use computing and accounting techniques to make said accounts disappear (Fernández Steinko, 2008, pp. 183-194). Thus, the aforementioned Communication of the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council (Brussels 20-11-2008) recommended to include the provisions of the 2001 Protocol, which established that the authorities of the Member States should facilitate information about the accounts and bank operations of certain identified persons and that the banking secret cannot be cited to avoid cooperating in this context. In addition to the legal tools described above, computing technology applied to combat terroristic crime, together with intelligence services, constitute some of the most important instruments to unravel the complexity posed by the activities of these organizations (Herrán, Santiago, González, & Mendieta, 2007, pp. 67-72). Therefore, workers in the judicial system must be empowered to utilize technology and intelligence in their investigations. In addition, international cooperation must be emphasized, given the transnational character of organized crime and terrorist activity, ridding ourselves of the exclusive sovereignty aspirations of the State. This is stressed by the latest provisions of European regulations discussed earlier in this chapter.

New Spanish Criminal Legislation on the Specific Nature of Terrorism One of the important new features of the previously mentioned Criminal Code Reform LO 5/2010 is the reorganization and broadening of the criminal scope to include terrorist acts i.e., training and integration or participation in terrorist organizations or groups. This change complies with the legislative obligations originating with Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA. The law takes into consideration the intrinsic seriousness of terrorist activity, seen as the greatest threat to the rule of law (Preamble to LO 5/2010). These groups or cells, with recent appearances on the international

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scene, operate with special characteristics. Specifically, their degree of autonomy makes it more difficult to identify and dismantle these terrorist groups. The new legislation opts to equate the punitive policy used with other criminal organizations to that of terrorist groups, maintaining the same penal response that has been given until now by Spanish jurisprudence, unlike the policy adopted for other criminal organizations or groups. In accordance with the guideline set out in the cited Framework Decision, the concept of collaboration with a terrorist organization or group was broadened to include conduct such as recruiting, indoctrinating or training terrorists that, until now, had posed some difficulties and had not fit in legally. Along the same lines as the harmonizing of European regulation, the Framework includes the conduct of public distribution through any means, messages or catchwords that increase the risk of committing a terrorist act, without necessarily constituting provocation, conspiracy or proposition for carrying out a specific criminal action. In this context, it is necessary to take into account that the criminal category of financing terrorism, as happens with the money laundering debate, includes: the negligent conduct of subjects obligated to collaborate with the Administration in the prevention of such financing (González Cussac, 2009, pp. 13-369). This distinct punitive policy given to the rest of criminal organizations, based on punitive aggravation, is a notable advance of the punitive barrier in comparison to the previous legislation, even if it continues to question the limits of the State’s right to sanction. Nevertheless, the emphasis on discovering the threads that lead to financing, more than anti-money laundering measures, could turn out to be useful if we take into account that investigating money laundering does not always produce valuable information with regards to alleged terrorism. The purpose of money laundering is to take profit from illicit activities and invest them in lawful activities. However, the crux of terrorism financing implies a reverse operation, namely the use of small sums that generally come from legitimate sources for illicit ends. These differences have an impact on the mechanisms of detection and investigation (it should not be forgotten that the central element of any organized crime investigation is the ability to interlace data and combine information to acquire evidence). Financing of terrorism has acquired international character leading to consensus for the need to cooperate among countries in its eradication. Nevertheless, access to citizens’ confidential information must have sufficient legal sanctions so as to guarantee the protection of privacy of persons and companies (Fernández

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Steinko, 2008, pp. 170-176) while balancing the needs to stop the funding of terrorist activity.

Conclusions The stiffening of sentences as a response to organized crime, in particular the offenses of terrorism and drug trafficking, is not effective. The rates of these offenses have not decreased. If we do not clearly define the boundaries of the offense, we will be unable to combat it effectively, because the deterrence effect of punishment vanishes when everything is a crime. The punishment no longer completes its preventative function; it tends toward the incapacitation of the criminal. The stiffening of punishment in response to potential crime turns into pure symbolic criminal law; it calms the conscience and social demands but constitutes a clear exercise in hypocrisy because this hardening only affects the lowest layers of the pyramid structure of these organizations. This ineffective consequence seems to have been taken into account by the 2010 Spanish criminal legislation in relation to organized crime. For instance, in the case of intellectual property offenses, it has been established the possibility of extenuating the punishment upon demonstrating a certain breakdown of the necessary proportionality of punishment. This may be the case of small-scale sale of fraudulent copies of works protected by such rights, especially when the authors of this type of conduct are frequently people in poverty who are simply trying to eke out a subsistent living. On the contrary, the pinnacle is orchestrated by people who move huge structured networks to finance terrorism and arms trafficking, and whom it is almost impossible to convict for lack of evidence and for the obstruction of justice that occurs in these high spheres as a consequence of corruption. All of the forms of organized crime have a common end, which is obtaining economic profit and/or political benefit to violate the State’s monopoly on violence, which is where its danger truly lies. The answer has to be unified, based on the idea that crime does not pay. Thus, the fundamental elements to weaken the organization’s economic power are confiscation and prosecution of money laundering. As a complement to them, independent international bodies should be created for regulation of international finance and fighting against underground/illegal finance. Controlling tax evasion by dissolving the structural power of the tax havens and jurisdictions with bank secrecy, and, at the same time, defining the limits of bank secrecy and allowing banks a margin to report crimes, may help in the dismantling of those behind these illegal practices.

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In the specific case of terrorism, the attack on the sources of financing must be emphasized. An investigation into money laundering does not produce valuable information regarding terrorist activities. This is in part because financing terrorism involves a reverse operation to that of money laundering, namely, the use of small sums generally from legitimate sources used for illicit ends. Therefore, strengthening the embargo of accounts and controlling access to them is warranted. Professionalizing and internationalizing investigation is a basic instrument for unraveling the complexity of organized crime through computer technology applied to this area, together with intelligence services. For this reason, workers in the justice system must be capacitated to use them in their investigation, favoring international cooperation and eliminating restraints derived from the sovereignty aspirations of the States.

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Zúñiga L. (2002). Redes internacionales y criminalidad: a propósito del modelo de “participación en organización criminal.” In L. Zúñiga, C. Méndez, & M.R. Diego (Eds.), El Derecho penal ante la globalización. Madrid: Colex. —. (2009). Criminalidad organizada y sistema de derecho penal. Granada: Comares.

CHAPTER SIX CONFLICTING COUNTER-TERRORISMS: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S RESPONSE TO TERRORISM SINCE 9/11 JESSIE BLACKBOURN FACULTY OF LAW, THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES

Abstract The United Kingdom has faced threat from three distinct types of terrorism in the twenty-first century: Northern Irish, international and domestic. Yet the British government has perceived the threat posed by the three types of terrorism differently and has thus responded to them accordingly. Using the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization, this chapter will outline the government’s differing rhetorical and legislative responses to the three types of terrorism. It will categorize the responses and will offer explanations for why the government has taken different measures to combat the different types of terrorism. It will question the legitimacy of countering different types of terrorism with different methods and will draw conclusions as to which approach has offered the greatest success at countering terrorism. Keywords: terrorism, counter-terrorism, international terrorism, Northern Irish terrorism, securitization, desecuritization, delegitimization, criminalization, legal responses to terrorism In the twenty-first century, the United Kingdom (UK) has experienced terrorism perpetrated by organizations connected to al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Britain, as well as by dissident republican terrorist organizations in Northern Ireland. It has also faced the threat of terrorist attacks plotted, though not carried out, by home grown terrorists espousing

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extreme right-wing views. However, terrorism and counter-terrorism have a much longer history in the UK, dating back initially to the aftermath of the partition of Ireland in 1921 and more recently from the start of the Northern Irish Troubles in the late 1960s. At that time republican organizations carried out violence in the hope of reuniting the partitioned six counties of Northern Ireland with the Republic of Ireland, and loyalist organizations perpetrated violence to prevent that from occurring. The UK also experienced other terrorist threats and attacks in the twentieth century, for example from domestic organizations such as Welsh or Scottish nationalists and animal rights activists, and from various international organizations seeking to bring attention to different causes, such as Sikh separatism in India or the Israel-Palestine conflict in the Middle East. These three types of terrorism, defined by the British government in the three categories of Northern Irish, international and domestic (Home Office & Northern Ireland Office, 1998, pp. 5-6), have posed differing threats to the UK over time. The way in which the government has perceived the threat can be evidenced through its rhetorical responses to terrorist attacks and through the types of counter-terrorism policies that have been initiated. This chapter examines how the government has perceived the three terrorist threats: international terrorism, Northern Irish terrorism and domestic terrorism in the form of extreme right-wing terrorism. It will also assess how the government has responded to these threats, legislatively or otherwise, in the ten-year period since the terrorist attacks on the United States of America (USA) on September 11, 2001 (September 11; 9/11). It will present arguments as to why different policies were implemented for the three different types of terrorism and will draw conclusions as to the successes or failures of the various types of counter-terrorism strategy. It will do so through the lens of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory. The methodological framework for the chapter will be set out in the following section. But first a note on the terminology of the three types of terrorism. The UK’s classification of the three terrorist threats is somewhat anachronistic and nebulous. Organizations are categorized not on literal translations of the words “domestic,” “international” and “Northern Irish,” but instead on the UK government’s specific construction of the categories of “domestic,” “international” and “Northern Irish” terrorism. International terrorism is perceived by the British government to be any terrorism that is carried out by international (ie, non-UK based) organizations, or by terrorist organizations in the UK that are influenced

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by an international agenda (Home Office & Northern Ireland Office, 1998). Domestic terrorism is therefore not merely terrorism that occurs inside the UK or by British terrorists. Instead it is considered to be any terrorism in the UK that is motivated by issues pertaining to the domestic policies of the UK government, with one clear exception: organizations that aim to change or uphold the constitutional status of Northern Ireland (Home Office & Northern Ireland Office, 1998). Thus, there is the anomaly that Welsh and Scottish separatist movements are considered domestic terrorism, but Northern Irish separatist organizations are not. This is a direct consequence of the history of terrorism and counter-terrorism in the UK in the twentieth century. The UK government was confronted by a threat from Northern Irish terrorist organizations and introduced laws specifically tailored to combat that threat. These laws applied solely to the type of violence emanating from within the province of Northern Ireland and not to any other form of terrorism (Blackbourn, 2011). The category of Northern Irish terrorism was therefore entrenched within the law long before the concepts of domestic and international terrorism. The term domestic terrorism then serves predominantly as a “catch-all” for any terrorism in the UK that is not perpetrated by Northern Irish terrorists or by terrorists espousing an international agenda. As previously stated, it includes Welsh and Scottish separatist organizations, as well as terrorists who have an agenda relating to environmental or animal rights issues, single issue terrorists such as those with an anti-abortion agenda, and terrorists who hold extreme right- or left-wing views. All these types of terrorism are considered domestic if they occur within the territory of the UK, regardless of the national identity of the terrorist. This chapter will only examine one type of domestic terrorism: extreme right-wing terrorism. There are two key reasons for this choice: firstly, there is no significant threat to the state from Welsh or Scottish nationalists, from animal rights and environmental activists or from leftwing extremism. Extreme right-wing ideology and terrorism, however, has posed a sustained (if low-level) threat over the past decade, both to the UK and more broadly within Europe (Goodwin, Ramalingam & Briggs, 2012; House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 2012). Secondly, the policy of criminalization utilized by the government to counter extreme rightwing terrorism is representative of the government’s entire domestic counter-terrorism policy.

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Methodological Framework In 1998, Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Japp de Wilde published Security: A New Framework for Analysis establishing “a comprehensive new framework for security studies” (1998, p. 1). In it, they set out their theory of “securitization,” which is the process by which certain issues become securitized. They stated that: In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from nonpoliticized (meaning the state does not deal with it and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision) through politicized (meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance) to securitized (meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure) (1998, pp. 23-24).

For Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, known collectively as the “Copenhagen School,” the securitization of an issue works as a process: a securitizing actor (normally a member of the political elite, such as a prime minister or president) uses a particular discourse, referred to as a “speech act,” to represent a particular issue to an audience as an existential threat to the security of a referent object, such as the state or its citizens. The acceptance of this speech act by the audience allows the securitizing actor to break the bounds of normal politics and take exceptional actions to counter the security threat. Desecuritization is the opposite process: an issue is removed from the securitized end of the spectrum and relocated at the non-politicized end. Desecuritization can be considered a passive process, whereby an issue is simply no longer represented as an existential threat and exceptional measures are merely no longer applied. This chapter will, however, consider desecuritization to be an active process, which requires speech acts to be made that represent an issue as no longer an existential threat to security, followed by the intentional removal by repeal of exceptional measures. Whilst there have been many critiques of different aspects of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory (see for example: McDonald, 2008; Booth, 2005; Balzacq, 2005 and Williams, 2003), it is useful here as a tool through which to demonstrate the government’s different perception and treatment of the three types of terrorism analyzed in this case study. Through an analysis of various speech acts and the resultant securitizing and desecuritizing moves, this chapter will argue that the UK government has securitized international terrorism and desecuritized dissident

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republican terrorism in Northern Ireland, whilst extreme right-wing terrorism has, in general, remained at the non-politicized end of the spectrum. It will argue that the effects of these securitizing and desecuritizing moves has not necessarily led to effective counter-terrorism strategies and will conclude that the lack of any attempt to securitize or desecuritize extreme right-wing terrorism has allowed this type of violence to be effectively investigated through ordinary criminal procedures. The chapter’s final conclusion will be to suggest that the process of criminalizing terrorism – that is, dealing with terrorism within the ordinary criminal law – offers the best chance to counter all types of political violence, irrespective of its ideological roots. To assess the various speech acts made by political elites, the chapter draws on publicly available material in the form of prime ministerial statements, parliamentary debates, speeches, newspaper articles and government reports to highlight the rhetorical responses of the British government to the terrorist threat. An examination of the legislation introduced and repealed since September 11, 2001 will demonstrate the government’s attempts to securitize international terrorism, desecuritize dissident republican Northern Irish terrorism and criminalize extreme right-wing terrorism.

Classifying the Terrorist Threat This section will outline how the government has classified the terrorist threat to the UK through its rhetoric and counter-terrorism strategies. It will argue that the government has securitized international terrorism by describing it as an existential threat to the security of the UK and enacting emergency measures as a response. It will show that the UK has sought to delegitimize the terrorism of dissident Irish republican organizations by responding to their terrorism as an ordinary crime, rather than as political violence, thus desecuritizing the threat. Finally, this section will demonstrate that the government has tended to consider extreme right-wing terrorism as a crime to be dealt with within the ordinary criminal law and not as an existential threat that requires exceptional measures. This locates extreme right-wing terrorism at the non-politicized end of the Copenhagen School’s spectrum of issues.

International Terrorism In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the USA, the UK government identified international terrorism as the greatest

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threat to the security of the UK and to the rest of the world. In a statement on the evening of September 11, 2001, Prime Minister Tony Blair stated: This mass terrorism is the new evil in our world. The people who perpetrate it have no regard whatever for the sanctity or value of human life, and we the democracies of the world must come together to defeat it and eradicate it. This is not a battle between the United States of America and terrorism, but between the free and democratic world and terrorism (Blair, 2010, p. 352. See also: United Kingdom Parliament, 2001b; Home Office, 2006).

Following this speech act, the government introduced the AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 to update the UK’s existing antiterror laws. It included measures that were specifically intended to counter the new type of terrorism that was perceived to exist in late 2001. The inclusion of offenses and powers relating to aviation security (UK Parliament, 2001a) can be seen as a direct response to the new use of aircraft as a terrorist weapon on 9/11. Additionally, the creation of new offenses and powers relating to weapons of mass destruction, the security of pathogens and toxins and the security of nuclear industry (UK Parliament, 2001a) can also be seen as a response to the climate of fear that existed in the aftermath of the 9/11 and anthrax attacks. Though the anthrax attacks of late 2001 in the USA were later linked to a US Army microbiologist (Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d.), they did at the time appear to support Blair’s contention, made in Parliament on September 14, 2001, that the limits on the numbers that they [international terrorists] kill and their methods of killing are not governed by any sense of morality. The limits are only practical and technical. We know, that they would, if they could, go further and use chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction (House of Commons, 2001, p. 606).

Blair used this rhetoric of the existential threat posed by international terrorists through their potential use of unconventional weapons and tactics to introduce measures that dealt with the deportation or detention of suspected international terrorists in the UK (UK Parliament, 2001a). This reflected the government’s key concern that those involved in international terrorism in the UK were foreign nationals “suspected of international terrorism or linked with international terrorists” (UK Parliament, 2001c, p. 33). Section 21 of the Act allowed the Home Secretary to certify someone as an “international terrorist” if he or she reasonably believed that person’s presence in the UK was a risk to national security and suspected that the

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person was a terrorist (UK Parliament, 2001a). Once an international terrorist had been certified, the Home Secretary could order their potentially indefinite detention if they could not be deported from the country due to a point of law or a practical consideration, such as on the grounds that they would face torture or inhuman and degrading treatment in the country that they were to be removed to. Section 22(1) of the AntiTerrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 states: “An action of a kind specified in subsection (2) [deportation] may be taken in respect of a suspected international terrorist despite the fact that (whether temporarily or indefinitely) the action cannot result in his removal from the United Kingdom because of – (a) a point of law which wholly or partly relates to an international agreement, or (b) a practical consideration” (UK Parliament, 2001a, p. 11). This section was deemed necessary due to the judgment in the 1996 Case of Chahal v. United Kingdom, which stated that the UK could not deport the applicant to India knowing that he was likely to face treatment that would contravene his Article 3 right to freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment within the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 2010) despite the fact that he was not a citizen of the UK and had illegally entered the country (Council of Europe, 1996). Enacting a measure which allowed for the indefinite detention of nonnational terrorist suspects required the government to derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights on the grounds that it breached a suspected international terrorist’s Article 5 right to liberty and security (Council of Europe, 2010). Article 5(1) of the Convention guarantees that: “Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” (pp. 7-9). One of those cases in which the lawful deprivation of liberty is allowed is subsection (f): “The lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his effecting an unauthorized entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to deportation or extradition” (pp. 7-9). However, the Part 4 detention powers of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 contravened this exception because suspected international terrorists were not being detained in preparation for deportation; they were being detained because deportation was not possible. Thus the government used its Article 15 right to derogate from parts of the Convention “in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation” (pp. 13-14). Citing the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the UK’s derogation from the Convention stated:

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There exists a terrorist threat to the United Kingdom from persons suspected of involvement in international terrorism. In particular, there are foreign nationals present in the United Kingdom who are suspected of being concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism, of being members of organizations or groups which are so concerned or of having links with members of such organisations or groups, and who are a threat to the national security of the United Kingdom (United Kingdom Parliament, 2001d, p. 2).

The government thus considered that international terrorism – specifically foreign international terrorists within the UK – represented a new and existential threat to the security of the state in late 2001 and enacted exceptional measures accordingly, resulting in a successful process of securitization. Despite the derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights, the House of Lords ruled in December 2004 that the Part 4 detention provisions of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 breached the prohibition of discrimination contained within Article 14 of the Convention on the grounds that the measures only applied to nonnational terrorist suspects (House of Lords, 2004). The House of Lords judgment led the government to repeal the Part 4 detention provisions of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. However, the government still represented international terrorism as an existential threat to the UK, though it altered its rhetoric to suggest that the threat from international terrorism now included British citizens as well as foreign nationals (United Kingdom Parliament, 2005b). On 26 January 2005, Home Secretary Charles Clarke explained the altered threat to the UK: The 2001 Act was enacted because there was an unprecedented terrorist threat to the UK, which was assessed to emanate from al-Qaeda and those individuals and groups within the loosely co-ordinated series of overlapping terrorist networks linked to it... It is clear that some British nationals are now playing a more significant role in these threats (United Kingdom Parliament, 2005a, p. 305).

The newly perceived threat of “British” international terrorists led the government to replace Part 4 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 with a new emergency law, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. Reflecting the change in the government’s perception of the terrorist threat, this new law applied both to British and foreign citizens in the UK. The Act instigated a system of control orders. The Secretary of State could place a control order on a person to manage certain behaviors, such as where that person lived or worked, their interactions with other people,

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their use of telephonic and internet communications and their movements both within and outside the UK (United Kingdom Parliament, 2005e). The purpose of the control order regime was to preclude the controlled person from engaging in terrorist related activity and thus to prevent acts of terrorism. There were two types of control orders available for use by the Home Secretary: derogating control orders and non-derogating control orders. Non-derogating control orders restricted the rights and liberties of an individual suspected of involvement in terrorist related activity, and could be placed on an individual regardless of the type of terrorism (Northern Irish, international or domestic) that they were suspected of being involved in. The inclusion of all types of terrorism under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was far broader than the Part 4 detention provisions of the 2001 Act which, in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda, were limited to international terrorism. Derogating control orders deprived controlees of their rights and liberties and so to make a derogating control order the Home Secretary was required to derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights by declaring that the UK was experiencing a public emergency threatening the life of the nation from international terrorism. Both types of control orders exceeded the bounds of normal criminal law by granting power to the executive to place restrictions on persons only suspected of, but not formally arrested for, charged with, or convicted of, terrorism offenses. Normal criminal law processes constitute punishment for acts committed, whereas control orders provided a preemptive measure to prevent acts from being committed. The use of preventive measures is not, however, unique to the anti-terrorism context; the UK has previously enacted other types of civil orders such as AntiSocial Behaviour Orders (ASBO) to manage and control certain behaviors. The difference between the two types of preventive order can however be found in their application of criminal or civil standards; ASBOs required a criminal standard of proof whereas control orders only required a civil standard of proof. This lower standard of proof in the anti-terror context is particularly significant considering that control orders can include restrictions that basically amount to house arrest. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was on the statute books for less than four months when the UK was attacked by four British suicide terrorists on July 7, 2005. The government responded to the attack by claiming that suicide terrorists posed a new and exceptional threat to the UK, particularly in comparison to the threat that the UK had faced in the past from Northern Irish terrorism. UK Home Secretary Charles Clarke said: “Much of our anti-terrorism legislation derives from our experience

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of dealing with 30 years of Irish terrorism, but the fact is that we are dealing with a very different threat now” (UK Parliament, 2005c, p. 341). This point was reiterated by Labour MP (Member of Parliament) and former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Paul Murphy: “The reality is that we live in an extremely different world, so far as terrorism is concerned. My experience, which is limited in these matters to Northern Ireland, tells me that the sort of attacks that we saw in July are unprecedented in our history” (UK Parliament, 2005c, p. 334). And Prime Minister Tony Blair went even further, stating: I don’t think the IRA would ever have set about trying to kill 3,000 people. 3 people is wrong, 1 person is wrong, don’t misunderstand what I am saying, but I think the difference with this terrorism is that the combination of modern technology and the willingness to kill without limit makes this an appreciably different threat, because these people when they killed over 50 people on the London underground and on the bus, they would have preferred 500 to 50, and that is the difference with them... I think it is different in its political demands and most essentially it is different in the way that it operates and in the numbers of people it is prepared to kill (Number 10, 2005, n.p. See also: UK Parliament, 2007).

Following various speech acts articulating the existential threat posed by international terrorists to the UK, the government introduced a new law into parliament. The Terrorism Act 2006 added some new offenses, including encouragement of terrorism, preparation for terrorism and terrorist training (UK Parliament, 2006a) to the UK’s anti-terror regime, but its key contribution to the UK’s anti-terror laws was the extension of the period of pre-charge detention to 28 days. Pre-charge detention is the period of time in which the police can question a suspect after they have been arrested but before they have been charged. The Terrorism Act 2000 granted the police a seven day period of pre-charge detention of an initial 48 hours after which further detention of up to another five days could be granted on application to a judicial authority. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 extended this period to an initial 48 hours plus an additional 12 days following application to a judicial authority. In 2003, the government citied the complexities of international terrorism as the grounds for requiring this change: There has been a marked development in the sophistication of terrorist technology overall since 9/11. Examples of the issues this has highlighted include the fact that multiple arrests are occurring more frequently and when a “cell” is arrested, each member needs to be interviewed and each interview cross-referenced... Some have been released on police bail prior

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The government had argued that the exceptional nature of the new “home-grown” terrorist threat warranted the extension of the period of precharge detention to 90 days in 2006. This proposal was, however, defeated in a vote in the House of Commons (UK Parliament, 2005d) and represents a failed securitizing move by Tony Blair. However the government did succeed in persuading parliament that there was a sufficient threat to the security of the UK that an increase in the period of pre-charge detention to 28 days was necessary. This period of 28 days far exceeded the length of pre-charge detention for those arrested for crimes under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which allowed detention for an initial 24 hours with the addition of a further 12 hours if authorized by a police officer of the rank of superintendent or above (United Kingdom Parliament, 1984). The government had cited the very different nature of international terrorism in comparison to Northern Irish terrorism as the grounds for increasing the period of pre-charge detention. They were supported in their proposals by Andy Hayman, the Metropolitan Police Assistant Commissioner in charge of the AntiTerrorist Branch, who stated that: The threat from international terrorism is so completely different that it has been necessary to adopt new ways of working. Irish terrorists deliberately sought to restrict casualties for political reasons. This is not the case with international terrorists. The advent of terrorist attacks designed to cause mass casualties, with no warning, sometimes involving the use of suicide, and with the threat of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons means that we can no longer wait until the point of attack before intervening. The threat to the public is simply too great to run that risk (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, 2005, p. 54).

In the decade since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the government has frequently made speech acts referring to international terrorism as a new and exceptional threat to the UK. It has responded to that terrorism through the enactment of emergency legislation that has incorporated exceptional measures. The government’s rhetorical and legislative response to international terrorism can thus be viewed through the Copenhagen School’s lens of securitization theory.

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Northern Irish Terrorism Whilst the government has tended to securitize international terrorism since the terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001, it has often done so through a direct comparison to the lesser threat posed by Northern Irish terrorism. For example, on September 16, 2010, the Director General of the Security Service, Jonathan Evans, claimed: Despite the demands in Northern Ireland, where we have reinforced our presence in response to the increased violence and work closely with the Police Service of Northern Ireland, the main effort for the Security Service remains international terrorism, particularly from Al Qaida, its affiliates and those inspired by its ideology (Evans, 2010, n.p.).

In a speech to the Munich Security Conference as recently as 5 February 2011, Prime Minister David Cameron continued this trend, stating: The biggest threat that we face comes from terrorist attacks, some of which are, sadly, carried out by our own citizens. It is important to stress that terrorism is not linked exclusively to any one religion or ethnic group. My country, the United Kingdom, still faces threats from dissident republicans in Northern Ireland... Nevertheless, we should acknowledge that this threat comes in Europe overwhelmingly from young men who follow a completely perverse, warped interpretation of Islam, and who are prepared to blow themselves up and kill their fellow citizens (Number 10, 2011, n.p.).

Thus the government recognized that there remained a threat from Northern Irish terrorism, but dismissed it as less important than the threat from international terrorism. This was a theme that existed throughout the decade after the 9/11 attacks, despite the continuing violence in Northern Ireland. The threat from Northern Irish terrorism did not, however, remain static in the ten years after 9/11, but fluctuated according to successes and failures in the continuing peace process. The government’s response to terrorism in Northern Ireland was also not constant in the period, but can be divided into two periods; from September 11, 2001 until the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) announcement ending its armed campaign on July 28, 2005, and from that date forward. The first period constitutes a desecuritizing move within the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization and the second demonstrates the completed process of desecuritization. The government’s response to terrorism in Northern Ireland after 9/11 but prior to the IRA’s announcement ending its armed campaign on July 28, 2005 can be seen as an extension of how it securitized terrorism in

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Northern Ireland throughout the period of the conflict (Fisher, 2011). Violence erupted in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s, amidst the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association’s non-violent campaign for extended rights to the minority Catholic community in Northern Ireland (Prince, 2007). Violence peaked in 1972, the year after the introduction of the policy of internment, an emergency and exceptional measure providing for the indefinite detention of terrorist suspects by the executive (United Kingdom Parliament, 1972). After 1972, lower levels of violence continued in the province and the government responded to it rhetorically as an exceptional threat and legislatively by the introduction of emergency and temporary laws, such as the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974. The use of these emergency and not so temporary laws continued throughout the Troubles and following the peace agreement reached on April 10, 1998. Northern Ireland-specific temporary measures were also incorporated into the Terrorism Act 2000 when it was enacted. Exceptional measures to counter the terrorist threat had become the norm in Northern Ireland, so much so that the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 incorporated a provision requiring the eventual normalization of security practices and politics in Northern Ireland, including the repeal of emergency legislation by the state and the decommissioning of weapons by the various terrorist organizations (Northern Ireland Office, 1998). The Good Friday Agreement failed to bring about the decommissioning of weapons by the paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, and as such the process of legislative normalization was not implemented. Prior to the IRA’s announcement formally ending its armed campaign, terrorism in Northern Ireland was regarded as something of an anachronism. Violence was perceived as the last remnants of the incomplete peace process that still required the exceptional emergency and temporary powers of the Troubles era. This was considered particularly so in comparison to the scale of violence that occurred on September 11, 2001. For example, Jonathan Powell, Blair’s chief of staff considered that 9/11 had rendered the IRA’s “brand of terrorism... obsolete” (Powell, 2008, p. 202). Any small moves towards ending violence were thus treated as major milestones. Despite the Good Friday Agreement, reached in 1998, by September 11, 2001, there had been little progress towards bringing the paramilitary campaigns of violence to a formal end through decommissioning. The IRA was, for the most part, maintaining the ceasefire it had initiated in 1997, though between its ceasefire declaration on July 19, 1997 and the terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001 the organization was responsible for killing 13 persons, predominantly for drug dealing or other

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anti-social behavior (McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney, Thornton, & McVea, 2007). The main loyalist organizations were also, for the most part, maintaining the ceasefires that they announced in 1994, though the various loyalist organizations engaged in intra-communal feuding which resulted in a number of terrorist deaths (Monaghan, 2004). But on October 23, 2001, there was a sudden advancement in the peace process when the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) announced that they had “witnessed an event – which we regard as significant – in which the IRA has put a quantity of arms completely beyond use” (Nieminen, de Chastelaine & Sens, 2001, n.p.). A day later, Blair lauded the progress that was being made in the peace process: For three and a half years, since the 10th of April 1998, we have worked for this moment. This is a move today of fundamental significance to Northern Ireland, for relations between the communities of Northern Ireland, for Britain, and also for the wider world. Whatever the setbacks, whatever the impasses, whatever the strains and stresses of constant negotiation and dialogue and bargaining, this is a peace process, that despite it all is today working (Guardian Online, 2001, n.p.).

Whilst this first act of decommissioning received praise from the British government, it did not satisfy the requirement of being an “act of completion” (Northern Ireland Office, 1998, n.p.) within the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. As such, the normalization sections of the Agreement were not implemented and terrorism continued to be dealt with in Northern Ireland through the use of emergency anti-terrorism measures contained within Part 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Part 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 extended solely to the territory of Northern Ireland, and continued in force the Northern Irish-specific emergency measures contained within the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1998 and the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989. The praising of small moves towards peace as major milestones demonstrates a desecuritizing move on behalf of the British government, though with the failure to implement the process of normalization, the threat was not fully desecuritized. In the aftermath of the July 7, 2005 London bombings, though according to the IRA, not because of it, the leadership of the IRA issued a statement announcing that “all IRA units have been ordered to dump arms. All Volunteers have been instructed to assist the development of purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means” (CAIN, 2005, n.p.). In response to the IRA’s statement, Blair stated: “This may be the day when finally after all the false dawns and dashed hopes

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peace replaced war, politics replaces terror on the island of Ireland” (Number 10, 2005, n.p.). This speech act declaring peace led to the implementation of the program of security normalization set out in the Good Friday Agreement, aimed at removing the British Army from Northern Ireland, demilitarizing the police service and repealing emergency legislation. It also led to the formation of an executive government in Northern Ireland. In the eyes of the British government, peace had been restored to Northern Ireland and the conflict which had started in the late 1960s, had been desecuritized and finally brought to an end. However, terrorism did not end. Various republican organizations that had not participated in the decade-long peace process continued to carry out violence in the name of a united Ireland. The government of the UK and the newly devolved government of Northern Ireland began to respond to these terrorist organizations in a different way to how they had approached terrorism up to mid-2005. The British and Northern Irish governments have used various rhetorical techniques to label these organizations as “dissident.” The term “dissident” refers to organizations which have rejected the peace process and establishment of a powersharing assembly in Northern Ireland. There are currently three main dissident organizations, the Real IRA, the Continuity IRA and Óglaigh na hÉireann (Evans & Tonge, 2012). There have also been groups of dissident republicans unaffiliated to these three main organizations that have been engaged in violent activity in Northern Ireland (Evans & Tonge, 2012; Horgan and Morrison, 2011). Since the final repeal of Northern Ireland-specific emergency counterterrorism legislation on July 31, 2007 (United Kingdom Parliament, 2006b), Northern Ireland has been part of the same anti-terror regime as the rest of the UK. However, dissident republican terrorist activity has not been considered in the same category as violence perpetrated by the organizations that decommissioned as part of the peace process. In fact, the governments of the UK and Northern Ireland have rejected claims made by dissident republican terrorist organizations that they represent a community still intent on the reunification of Ireland through the use of armed struggle (Evans & Tonge, 2012; McDonald, 2010). This delegitimization of dissident republican claims to the legacy of the IRA has coincided with an official acceptance of the Sinn Féin version of the history of armed struggle in Northern Ireland – that armed struggle was a legitimate response to the abuses of the Northern Irish political regime but that the peace process and the Belfast Agreement, negotiated in part by Sinn Féin, brought about a solution to the root causes of armed struggle (Adams, 2007). Thus, armed struggle is no longer considered a legitimate

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method for bringing about the reunification of Ireland. Instead, a constitutional mechanism – a concurrent referendum in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland on the status of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom – now exists to resolve the constitutional question (Northern Ireland Office, 1998). Any continuance of armed struggle is therefore a rejection of the official (Sinn Féin) republican view on the resolution of the root causes of the conflict and is illegitimate. As such, violence perpetrated by dissident Irish republicans is thus considered an ordinary crime and not “political” violence. On March 7, 2009, a dissident republican organization, the Real IRA, killed two British soldiers at an army barracks in Northern Ireland. Prime Minister Gordon Brown stated: “We will do everything in our power to make sure that Northern Ireland is safe and secure and I assure you we will bring these murderers to justice... No murderer will be able to derail a peace process that has the support of the great majority of Northern Ireland” (BBC, 2009, n.p.). Northern Ireland Deputy First Minister Martin McGuinness stated, “I supported the IRA during the conflict, I myself was a member of the IRA but that war is over” (BBC, 2009, n.p.). And Sinn Féin President and then Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) Gerry Adams stated: “Those responsible have no support, no strategy to achieve a United Ireland” (BBC, 2009, n.p.). On April 2, 2011, dissident republicans carried out another fatal attack, this time on a Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) police constable. Prime Minister David Cameron condemned the murder, stating: “Those who carried out this wicked and cowardly crime will never succeed in dragging Northern Ireland back to a dark and bloody past. Their actions are rejected by the overwhelming majority of people right from all parts of the community” (Number 10, 2010, n.p.). These statements reject any claims that the dissident organizations have to links with the IRA of the past and delegitimize their actions by calling them “murder” or “criminal” – far removed from the now accepted “political” violence of the Provisional IRA. This rhetorical delegitimization coincided with a policy of countering terrorism through criminal prosecutions, rather than through exceptional or emergency anti-terrorism measures. This can particularly be evidenced in the case of former IRA member and alleged dissident republican, Colin Duffy, arrested over the murders of the two British soldiers on March 7, 2009. Duffy was held for a period of seven days, and though the police were granted an extension under section 23 of the Terrorism Act 2006, Duffy appealed to the High Court in Belfast which judged that the extension was unlawful and ordered his release (McDonald, 2009). Duffy was subsequently rearrested and later charged with the ordinary crimes of

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murder, attempted murder and possession of a firearm, though he was later acquitted in court (McDonald, 2012). This criminalization of behavior contradicts the government’s response to international terrorism, which was considered an existential threat to the UK, but it does to some extent resemble how the government has dealt with extreme right-wing terrorism in the UK.

Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism The government has not been particularly vocal in its views on extreme right-wing terrorism over the past decade. In general this has been because it did not consider that it posed any significant threat to the UK. For example, extreme right-wing terrorism was omitted from the government’s 2006 and 2009 counter-terrorism strategies (Home Office, 2006; Home Office, 2009) and was mentioned only briefly in the government’s 2011 CONTEST strategy, which stated: In recent years, extreme right-wing terrorism in the UK has been much less widespread, systematic or organised than terrorism associated with Al Qa’ida... People involved in extreme right-wing groups have not received the same training, guidance or support as those who have engaged with Al Qa’ida or Al Qa’ida influenced organisations. Nor have they ever aspired or planned to conduct operations on the scale of those planned by Al Qa’ida (Home Office, 2011a, p. 30).

This muted rhetorical response is also visible in how the government has combated extreme right-wing terrorism. The government has not introduced any laws specifically addressing the threat posed by extreme right-wing terrorism; instead it has relied on police investigations and prosecutions, either for terrorism offenses or for offenses within the ordinary criminal law. This has, to date, been a successful policy; twenty per cent of the UK’s terrorism prisoners are serving sentences for all types of domestic terrorism including extreme right-wing terrorism. In the past ten years the UK has not experienced a single terrorist attack from extreme right-wing organizations. Extreme right-wing terrorism has always been considered criminal violence in the UK. In the twentieth century, terrorism legislation was initially introduced to counter the threat from Northern Irish terrorism (United Kingdom Parliament, 1973; United Kingdom Parliament, 1974). The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974, enacted in the aftermath of the Guildford and Birmingham pub bombings, applied only to terrorism connected to Northern Ireland. Part 1 of the Act allowed

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the Secretary of State to proscribe organizations “concerned in terrorism occurring in the United Kingdom and concerned with Northern Irish affairs, or in promoting or encouraging it” (United Kingdom Parliament, 1974, p. 2). Part 2 of the Act granted the Secretary of State the power to exclude persons from the UK or Great Britain if it “appear[ed] to him expedient to prevent acts of terrorism (whether in Great Britain or elsewhere) designed to influence public opinion or Government policy with respect to affairs in Northern Ireland” (United Kingdom 1974, p. 3). Finally, the arrest and detention powers of Part 3 of the Act applied only to offenses described by Parts 1 and 2 of the Act, thereby limiting them to terrorism connected to the affairs of Northern Ireland (United Kingdom Parliament, 1974). In 1984 the Act was amended to apply the arrest and detention powers to acts of terrorism “connected to the affairs of Northern Ireland; and acts of terrorism of any other description except acts connected solely with the affairs of the United Kingdom other than Northern Ireland” (United Kingdom Parliament, 1984, n.p.). All forms of domestic terrorism, including extreme right-wing terrorism, were explicitly excluded from terrorism legislation in the twentieth century (Blackbourn, 2011). In April 1999, David Copeland, a member of the British National Party (BNP) and a neo-Nazi organization called the National Socialist Movement, detonated three nail bombs in London targeting the Bangladeshi, black and gay communities (Hopkins & Hall, 2000). The bombs killed three persons and injured 139 others (Guardian Online, 2000), yet because the terrorism laws excluded domestic motives for terrorism, Copeland was charged and convicted under the ordinary criminal law offenses of murder and causing an explosion (Guardian Online, 2000). In July 2000, the government enacted new permanent anti-terrorism legislation to repeal the temporary and emergency measures of the past. The Terrorism Act 2000 did not draw distinctions between terrorism carried out for international or Northern Irish affairs and incorporated domestic terrorism into its provisions, though this was for consistency rather than because there was a real threat from domestic terrorism (Home Office, 1998; Lloyd, 1996). The government’s perception of extreme right wing-terrorism can then be seen through an examination of how it has dealt with those arrested for extreme right-wing terrorist offenses. In recent years, extreme right-wing terrorists have been convicted of various terrorist offenses, in particular, possessing material useful for terrorism, explosives and firearms offenses and offenses relating chemical weapons and noxious substances (Lambert & Githens-Mazer, 2011; Searchlight, 2011). In June 2010 Trevor

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Hannington pleaded guilty to possessing a record containing information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism (Crown Prosecution Service, 2010b). He does not appear to have had a specific target for an attack (Hornby, 2010). A month earlier, Nicky Davison was charged and convicted of the same offense (Crown Prosecution Service, 2010a). In December 2008, Nathan Worrell was found guilty of possessing material for terrorist purposes (Press Association, 2008). Though no evidence of any intended terrorist attack was uncovered, the Detective Chief Superintendent of the CounterTerrorism Unit stated: “Worrell's racial intolerance and his hatred for religion are more than obvious. Worrell showed he had the ability and readiness to use threats and intimidation to promote his beliefs and, because of this, his actions became of a terrorist nature” (Daily Mail Reporter, 2008, n.p.). There have also been convictions for explosives and firearms offenses, for example Martyn Gilleard, who pleaded guilty to terrorism offenses in 2008 including possession of weapons and firearms (Lambert, 2011). Though police did not uncover an intended target for attack, the Crown Prosecution Service stated “Martyn Gilleard... was actively planning to commit terrorist acts against people and communities that he hated with a bigot's zeal – black and Asian people, European immigrants, Jews, Muslims and anyone he regarded as a political opponent” (Stokes, 2008, n.p.). Neil Lewington was convicted of possessing explosives in 2009. According to the Crown Prosecution Service (2009), he was on the verge of carrying out a bombing campaign aimed at non-British people. Terence Gavan was reported to have manufactured and accumulated the largest number of explosives in the UK in recent history (Lambert, 2010). Gavan “planned to target an address he had seen on a television programme that he believed was linked to the 7 July bomb attacks in London” (Press Association, 2010, n.p.). In 2008, Jefferson Azevedo was convicted of various terrorism offenses, including carrying out a hoax involving noxious substances under section 114 of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which was enacted following the October 2001 Anthrax attacks in the USA (Daily Mail Reporter, 2008). Azevedo sent letters containing white powder or racist slogans to various organizations and persons, including the Attorney General and then Prime Minister Tony Blair (BBC, 2008). Perhaps the most serious of all extreme right-wing terrorist convictions was that of Ian Davison, who was charged and pleaded guilty to various terrorist offenses, including producing a chemical weapon contrary to section 2(1)(b) of the Chemical Weapons Act 1996 (Crown Prosecution Service, 2010a).

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Davison was the first (and remains the only) person to be convicted of producing the fatal poison Ricin (Crown Prosecution Service, 2010a). These convictions reveal the existence of a genuine threat from extreme right-wing terrorism in the UK. They also demonstrate the police’s success in containing the terrorist threat as no deaths have yet been caused by this type of terrorism. There have, however, been a large number of racial and religious hate crimes, particularly focused on the UK’s Muslim communities (Lambert & Githens-Mazer, 2011). Whilst not included in terrorism statistics, these violent criminal acts by right-wing extremists could be considered terrorist activity under the definition of terrorism in the Terrorism Act 2000. Inclusion of these acts would greatly inflate the sense of threat to the UK from extreme right-wing terrorism, as would the inclusion of potential terrorist cases which have been tried under other legislation. This is best exemplified by the case of Neil MacGregor, who sent an email to Strathclyde police threatening to blow up Glasgow Central Mosque and to behead a Muslim each week until every mosque in Scotland was closed (Howie, 2009). MacGregor was tried not for terrorism charges but for breach of the peace, leading the Scottish Islamic Foundation to question whether double standards might apply to extreme right-wing and international terrorist cases. Despite the very real threat from extreme right-wing terrorism in the UK, this type of terrorism has not been represented as an existential threat to the security of the UK. Whilst convictions have been brought under terrorism laws, including the new offenses of acts preparatory to terrorism, none of the truly exceptional powers, such as extended periods of precharge detention or control orders, have been used to counter extreme right-wing terrorism. Dealing with extreme right-wing terrorism through the ordinary criminal law has, however, led to considerable success at preventing this particular type of violence.

The Different Responses From the above analysis of the government’s rhetorical and legislative responses to international terrorism, Northern Irish terrorism and extreme right-wing terrorism, it can be seen that the UK government has sought to criminalize extreme right-wing terrorist activity, whilst it has securitized international terrorism and delegitimized contemporary dissident republican terrorism in Northern Ireland. This chapter will now offer reasons for why the government has implemented different legislative responses for the three types of terrorism before drawing conclusions about how successful these different counter-terrorism strategies have

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been and what this has to tell us about the successes and failures of counter-terrorism policy in the UK. On a purely domestic level it is difficult at first to see why international terrorism has been securitized whilst dissident republican terrorism in Northern Ireland has been desecuritized. A comparison of terrorist attacks committed by Northern Irish terrorists and international terrorists in the decade since 9/11 reveals little difference in terms of numbers killed, but demonstrates the greater frequency of attacks by terrorists in Northern Ireland than has occurred by international terrorists in the UK. In the period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010 there were 1,902 shooting incidents relating to the security situation in Northern Ireland, there were 999 bombing incidents using 1224 devices and 71 incendiary incidents using 94 incendiary devices (Police Service of Northern Ireland, 2011b). In the same ten-year time period, a total of 5,157 non-fatal casualties were caused as a result of the security situation in Northern Ireland. Paramilitary-style attacks – attacks on civilians by paramilitary organizations as punishment for certain types of anti-social behavior – were responsible for 2,027 of those casualties (Police Service of Northern Ireland, 2011b, n.p.). Furthermore, 1,374 firearms and 980 kilograms of explosives were found (Police Service of Northern Ireland, 2011a, n.p.). In terms of fatalities, 78 persons have died as a result of continuing violence in Northern Ireland since the start of the twenty-first century (Sutton, 2011). Of those 78 deaths, 37 persons were civilians, four of which were specifically targeted in sectarian attacks. In three cases, Protestant civilians were killed by Protestant organizations on the false assumption that they were Catholic. Republicans killed two members of the British Army and two members of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) in this period, as well as one loyalist and two members of rival republican organizations. Loyalist feuding resulted in 21 deaths and a further 13 persons were killed for internal discipline reasons within the various loyalist and republican organizations. Another survey reveals that of those 78 deaths, 63 persons were killed in shooting incidents, four persons were stabbed and six persons were beaten to death. One person died in unknown circumstances (McKittrick, Kelters, Feeney, Thornton, & McVea, 2007). Only four persons were killed by bombings. In two separate bombing incidents, the person setting the bomb was killed by its premature explosion. In a third incident, a civilian construction worker at a Territorial Army base was killed by a booby-trapped bomb. The final bombing death was that of Police Constable Ronan Kerr, who died when a

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bomb planted under his car exploded in April 2011 (Sutton, 2011). In summary, 78 persons were killed in Northern Ireland during this period, 37 were civilians, 37 were terrorists (killed by their own or another terrorist organization) and four were members of the security services. In contrast to the number and frequency of terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland, the number of attacks perpetrated by international terrorists in the UK over the past decade appears considerably smaller. According to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), only four international terrorist attacks occurred in the UK in the first decade of the twenty-first century: the suicide bombings of July 7, 2005 and the attempted bombings two weeks later, the car bombing of Glasgow airport in 2007 and the cargo bomb plot which was discovered at East Midlands airport in October 2010 (GTD, 2011). The Home Office’s CONTEST strategy listed six terrorist attacks and plots (Home Office 2011a). As well as the four incidents recorded by the Global Terrorism Database, the Home Office also included the May 2008 failed suicide bombing of a restaurant in Exeter by Nicky Reilly and the May 2010 attempted murder of an MP. A Chatham House research paper included an additional seven terrorist attacks and plots, though it did not include the cargo bomb plot of December 2010 (Edwards & Gomis, 2011). It added the following attacks: the shoe bomb plot of December 2001, the Wood Green ricin plot of 2003, the 2003 fertilizer bomb plot, the transatlantic airline liquids plot of 2006, the plot to kidnap and behead a British soldier in the UK in 2007, the 2008 attack on the house of a man who owned a publishing company that was about to release a novel about the prophet Mohammed, and the case of a would-be suicide bomber from Bristol (Edwards & Gomis, 2011). In stark numbers, international terrorists have killed 52 civilians and five terrorists in the UK since the start of the twenty-first century, which is less than the 78 persons killed in Northern Ireland. However, if only dissident republican terrorism is taken into account in the post-IRA ceasefire period, that is, from July 28, 2005, only four persons have been killed in Northern Ireland. All four were members of the security services. The threat from international terrorism can therefore be seen to be greater than the threat from dissident Irish republican terrorism, which could explain the government’s differing responses. Furthermore, beyond the domestic level, dissident Irish republican terrorism poses no considerable threat. International terrorism by its very definition is part of a broader global pattern of terrorism and must be viewed in the context of the attacks committed on 9/11 and in the war on terror. It is these links to global terrorists and terrorism, in particular al-Qaeda and its affiliate organizations that renders international terrorism an existential threat to the UK in the

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eyes of the government. As such, its tendency to securitize international terrorism can be explained. The government’s policy of combating extreme right-wing terrorism through the ordinary criminal and terrorist laws can be explained by how it differs from international terrorists and Northern Irish terrorists. International and Northern Irish terrorists are incorporated into distinct organizations (irrespective of the differences in how they are organized, run and controlled), whereas extreme right-wing terrorists tend to be individuals or small groups of individuals. The government cannot respond to them in the same way as to international terrorists because they do not pose an existential threat to the UK – they are not linked to a broader global campaign of terrorism but have local issues. The government also cannot respond to extreme right-wing terrorists in the same way as dissident republican terrorists in Northern Ireland as there is no long history of conflict between the British state and right-wing organizations – there is no way to delegitimize their actions as murder and crime in comparison to past acts of political violence. There is, therefore nothing to be desecuritized. The different motivation, organizational structure, capacity to carry out attacks, types of attacks perpetrated and links to outside organizations of the three types of terrorism in the UK explain why the government has carried out three different strategies to counter their particular type of violence. These different characteristics may also explain the variation in the success rate of the three types of terrorism. For example, it has been argued that religiously motivated terrorists are more violent than terrorists motivated by secular ideologies and that they aim to use more lethal weapons and tactics (such as suicide bombing) that make them more likely to succeed (Gurr & Cole, 2000; Hoffman, 2006; Juergensmeyer, 2003; Sedgewick, 2004). This argument is also sometimes presented in the context of “new” versus “old” terrorism, with new terrorism perceived to be more lethal than old terrorism (Crenshaw, 2000; Rapoport, 2004; Tucker, 2001). There is also research that suggests that terrorist organizations are more successful than terrorist individuals due to either the positive or negative influence of group membership (Crenshaw, 2001). Despite these various alternate possibilities that might influence the success of different terrorist organizations, this chapter will conclude by arguing that the government’s counter-terrorism strategy, not the inherent characteristics of terrorist organizations, plays the most important role in its success at countering terrorism, and that the strategy of criminalization offers the best potential to counter all three types of terrorism in the UK (see: Miller, 2007).

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Conclusion The UK has faced three different types of terrorist threat in the decade since the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA: from international terrorism, Northern Irish terrorism and extreme right-wing terrorism. It has perceived the threats from these three types of terrorism differently and has ranked them accordingly. It has also pursued three different counter-terrorism strategies: it has combated international terrorism by enacting emergency and exceptional measures to deal with what it sees as an existential threat to the security of the UK; it has combated dissident republican terrorism in Northern Ireland by delegitimizing any cause for violence and treating its perpetrators as criminals; and it has used normal criminal procedures of police investigation and prosecution for extreme right-wing terrorism. These different counter-terrorism responses have had differing degrees of success. In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the USA, the UK government enacted emergency legislation which allowed the Secretary of State to indefinitely detain non-national suspected “international terrorists.” The law fell afoul of the UK’s commitments to the European Convention on Human Rights, and the UK repealed the legislation by enacting a new emergency law in March 2005 that dealt with suspected international terrorists (both British and non-British citizens) by placing controls on their behavior. Four months later, British suicide bombers attacked London’s transportation network and the UK government enacted more legislation. However, the fact that the UK was attacked by British suicide bombers after the enactment of a law which aimed to prevent its own citizens from engaging in terrorist behavior brings into question the effectiveness of the anti-terror laws. Many plots have been successfully foiled in the UK; however, for the most part this has been due to effective police investigation, not through the use of emergency and exceptional measures such as extended periods of pre-charge detention or control orders. Dissident republican terrorism in Northern Ireland has continued to grow since the IRA decommissioned its weapons in 2005. The UK and Northern Ireland governments have responded to this terrorism by claiming that it is a rejection of the peace process and criminal, not political behavior. Terrorists have been investigated and prosecuted with offenses included in the terrorism laws, however for the most part the ordinary criminal law has been used to prosecute terrorism in Northern Ireland. There have been many prosecutions under the law for terrorism offenses in the past ten years, however terrorism has continued in Northern

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Ireland. This suggests that the policy of desecuritizing terrorism may not be the most effective counter-terrorism strategy in this context. However, due to the long history of violence in Northern Ireland which was followed by a protracted peace process and a very slow return to security normalization, the use of exceptional measures in a return to securitizing terrorism is unlikely. Furthermore, the case of contemporary international terrorism has shown the policy of securitization to have been less successful than the policy of criminalizing extreme right-wing terrorism. The government has treated extreme right-wing terrorism as a crime and has investigated and prosecuted it as such. Though there have been numerous extreme right-wing terrorist plots, there have been no successful attacks and a significant number of prosecutions and convictions. The three different policies have had different levels of success in the three different contexts. Securitizing international terrorism has had the effect of alienating large sections of the Muslim population (Hickman, Thomas, Nickels & Silvestri, 2012) that the government now believes is at risk of radicalization (Home Office, 2011b), but the police and security services have had some successes at foiling terrorist plots and investigating potential terrorists. Delegitimizing dissident republican terrorism in Northern Ireland has had the effect of bolstering mainstream republicanism within the peace process, but terrorism has continued. The police have had some successes in investigating and prosecuting terrorism as crime in Northern Ireland, but it has been within the strategy of delegitimizing the political and ideological motivations of dissident Irish republicans. It has not been an attempt to introduce a de-politicized policy of criminalization in Northern Ireland. The greatest counter-terrorism policy success appears to be that applied to extreme right-wing terrorism which is treated as a crime by the police in their investigation and prosecution of potential violence. Thus it can be concluded that treating extreme right-wing terrorist action merely as a particularly violent type of ordinary crime has been effective in providing the police the tools to investigate and prosecute terrorism in the manner that it investigates and prosecutes other crimes, and in a manner in which it has significant operational experience. This experience has led to a significant number of successful counter-terrorism policing operations and the prevention of terrorist acts. Delegitimizing terrorism in Northern Ireland has not really helped to bring an end to the violence, though it has helped to secure some convictions. Securitizing international terrorism through the enactment of exceptional anti-terror laws to counter the existential threat to the UK has failed to prevent some

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terrorist atrocities and has led to grievances that have the potential to alienate communities and provoke more violence. In 1981 republican prisoners in Long Kesh Prison engaged in hunger strikes to force the British government to return them to special category status as political prisoners. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher refused to grant their demands stating that “there can be no question of political status for someone who is serving a sentence for crime. Crime is crime is crime. It is not political, it is crime” (BBC, 1998, n.p.). Counter-terrorism policies in the twenty-first century that have carried on this mantra have tended to record greater successes than those that have tried to treat terrorism as exceptional. In order to avoid claims of prejudicial treatment against different types of terrorism, the government should follow a policy that has proven successful, rather than enacting political policies that fail to counter the terrorism they are enacted to prevent.

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McKittrick, D., Kelters, S., Feeney, B., Thornton, C. & McVea, D. (2007). Lost lives: The stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland Troubles. Edinburgh and London: Mainstream Publishing. Miller, G.D. (2007). Confronting terrorisms: Group motivation and successful state policies. Terrorism and Political Violence, 19(3), 331350. Monaghan, R. (2004). “An imperfect peace”: Paramilitary “punishments” in Northern Ireland. Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(3), 439-461. Nieminen, T., de Chastelaine, J. & Sens, D. (2001). Statement by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning. Dublin and Belfast: IICD. Retrieved from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/decommission/iicd231001.htm. Northern Ireland Office. (1998). The Belfast Agreement: An agreement reached at the multi-party talks on Northern Ireland (Cm.3883). Belfast: TSO. —. (2005). Prime Minister’s response to the IRA statement 28 July 2005. Retrieved from http://www.nio.gov.uk/prime_ministers_response_to_the_ira_statemen t_28_july_2005.pdf. Number 10. (2005). PM’s press conference – 26 July 2005. Retrieved from http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20041109040811/number10 .gov.uk/page7999. —. (2010). PM “utterly condemns” Omagh murder. Retrieved from http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pm-statement-on-omagh-murder/. —. (2011). PM’s speech at Munich Security Conference. Retrieved from http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pms-speech-at-munich-securityconference/. Police Service of Northern Ireland. (2011a). Firearms and explosives finds 1969 – 30 September 2011. Retrieved from http://www.psni.police.uk/finds_cy.pdf. —. (2011b). Security situation statistics: calendar year. Retrieved from http://www.psni.police.uk/updates_cy_security_situation_and_public_ order_statistics-2. Powell, J. (2008). Great hatred, little room: Making peace in Northern Ireland. London: The Bodley Head. Press Association. (2008 December 13). Racist who had bomb kit jailed for campaign against couple. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/dec/13/uk-security-nazi-terroristjailed.

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—. (2010, January 15). BNP member given 11 years for making bombs and guns. The Guardian Online. Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jan/15/bnp-member-jailed-gunsbombs. Prince, S. (2007). Northern Ireland’s ’68: Civil rights, global revolt and the origins of the Troubles. Dublin and Portland, OR: Irish Academic Press. Rapoport, D.C. (2004). The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism. In Cronin, A.K. & Ludes, J. (Eds.). Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Searchlight. (2011). Lone wolves: Myth or reality. Ilford: Searchlight. Sedgewick, M. (2004). Al-Qaeda and the nature of religious terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence, 16(4), 795-814. Stokes, P. (2008, June 25). Nazi sympathiser Martyn Gilleard jailed for 16 years. The Telegraph. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2193160/Nazi-sympathiserMartyn-Gilleard-jailed-for-16-years.html. Sutton, M. (2011). An index of deaths from the conflict in Ireland. Retrieved from http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/index.html. Tucker, D. (2000). What is new about the new terrorism and how dangerous is it? Casualties caused as a result of the security situation. Terrorism and Political Violence, 13(3), 1-14. United Kingdom Parliament. (1972). The Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972. London: HMSO. —. (1973). Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973. London: HMSO. —. (1974). Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974. London: HMSO. —. (1984). Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984. London: HMSO. —. (2001a). Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. London: TSO. —. (2001b). House of Commons Hansard (Vol. 372). London: TSO. —. (2001c). House of Commons Hansard (Vol. 375). London: TSO. —. (2001d). The Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 (SI 2001 No. 3644). London: TSO. —. (2005a). House of Commons Hansard (Vol. 430). London: TSO. —. (2005b). House of Commons Hansard (Vol. 431). London: TSO. —. (2005c). House of Commons Hansard (Vol. 438). London: TSO. —. (2005d). House of Commons Hansard (Vol. 439). London: TSO. —. (2005e). Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. London: TSO. —. (2006a). Terrorism Act 2006. London: TSO.

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—. (2006b). Terrorism (Northern Ireland) Act 2006. London: TSO. —. (2007). House of Commons Hansard (Vol. 463). London: TSO. Williams, M.C. (2003). Words, images, enemies: Securitization and international politics. International Studies Quarterly, 47(4), 511-532.

CHAPTER SEVEN COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE CHALLENGES OF INTELLIGENCE AND EFFECTIVE INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION IN THE ‘GAME WITHOUT FRONTIERS’ MARK COCHRANE CONSULTANT INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, BELFAST, NORTHERN IRELAND

Abstract Democratic states face the challenge of seeking to combat terrorism and the threat of terrorism existent within and outside of their borders. If they are to be effective they need to be proactive in their response, and ensure that protective measures are part of a focused strategy supported by adequate legislation in order to assist intelligence agencies and law enforcement to perform their duty. A critical component in the effort to combat terrorism is information sharing, within state agencies and with trusted allies. This chapter examines the challenges facing the United States’ (US) and United Kingdom’s (UK) intelligence agencies, using Pakistan as an example, and deficiencies that prevent effective interagency and international cooperation against a backdrop of ever-changing tactical methodology employed by international terrorist groups in a “game without frontiers” that is increasingly global in nature. Key Words: Counter-terrorism, terrorism, intelligence, inter-agency cooperation, intelligence gathering, intelligence sharing. When considering the issues of national security and counter-terrorism strategy, the stakes are high and there is little room for error. The failings

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of national security responses to the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. signified the nature of the threat posed by the actions of those intent on using violence to achieve their aims. The rules of the game concerning groups engaged in terrorist activity and those responsible for attempting to prevent such attacks seem to have changed resulting in a “game without frontiers.” It is a battle without geographical limits or national boundaries. The terrorist operation on that day crossed the continents and constituted a hybrid domestic and international threat, a factor not lost on the National Commission convened to examine the tragic events of that day: The September 11 attacks fell into the void between the foreign and domestic threats. The foreign intelligence agencies were watching overseas, alert to foreign threats to US interests there. The domestic agencies were waiting for evidence of a domestic threat from sleeper cells within the United States. No one was looking for a foreign threat to domestic targets. The threat was not coming from sleeper cells. It was foreign – but from foreigners who had infiltrated the United States (“The 9/11 Commission Report,” 2004, p. 263).

Regardless of the level of success experienced by intelligence or police agencies engaged in the fight against terrorism, it is unlikely, or more importantly unwise, for them to publicize specific details of, and methodology pertaining to, covert and clandestine operations, as it is likely to educate those they seek to frustrate and bring to justice. It is an undisputable truth that in this “game” one is not judged by the number of successes but by the number of failures. Circumstances favor those intent on carrying out acts of terrorist violence. Terrorist actors determine the time and the place for their actions. The state on the other hand requires pre-emptive intelligence and structures that are professional and constantly vigilant. There is no better illustration of this fact than the words used by the terrorists themselves. The Provisional Irish Republican Army in their claim of responsibility following its attempt to murder British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her government in a bombing at the Grand Hotel, Brighton in 1984 said, “Today we were unlucky, but remember, we only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always” (Quoted in Bishop & Mallie, 1988, p. 426). The law of averages suggests, and reality confirms, that the state will not always be lucky and demonstrates the difficulty faced when attempting to reduce the threat posed by terrorism. Efforts to reduce the threat are

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complicated by the media, particularly twenty-four hour news channels and the Internet, communications networks that have subjected intelligence agencies to an almost continual and unprecedented barrage of exposure and degree of scrutiny oftentimes resulting in a “trial by media.” This exposure and scrutiny is often derogatory and critical in nature (“7/7 inquests,” 2011), whilst affording those engaged in serious acts of criminality what Margaret Thatcher called the “oxygen” of publicity (Thatcher, 1985). This chapter will seek to examine the challenges facing US and UK intelligence agencies and the deficiencies that effect interagency and international cooperation.

A Case of Communication Failures: The Aftermath of 9/11 The events of 9/11 have served as a poignant case study of the stark failures of communication within counter-terrorism structures. The incident boldly illustrates the need for effective intelligence acquisition and the importance of intelligence sharing and inter-agency co-operation. Following the incident it was disclosed that numerous potentially valuable intelligence leads existed in relation to the terrorists and their activities within a number of agencies but were not recognized as such or were not developed or pursued. These intelligence leads included the fact that some of the individuals had been linked to other terrorist suspects; had visa entitlement to enter the United States and did so; and that some of those who were to become attackers were reported to be taking flying lessons. Indeed, one of the most damning criticisms leveled at the American intelligence community by the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Joint Inquiry Report (2002) was as follows: Within the Intelligence Community, agencies did not adequately share relevant counter-terrorism information, prior to September 11. The breakdown in communications was the result of a number of factors, including differences in the agencies’ missions, legal authorities and cultures. Information was not sufficiently shared, not only between different Intelligence Community agencies, but also within individual agencies, and between the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies (p. xvii).

The aftermath of the events of 9/11 saw American President George Bush declare his nation’s intent to wage a “War on Terror.” The comment was not only an unfortunate choice of language, it was as unhelpful as it

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was inaccurate, a point acknowledged by Richardson (2006) who considers the futility of such a statement and comments that such a war can never be won. Cynics view the utility of the phrase to have been as helpful as other social commentary such as “the war on poverty,” “the war on crime,” or the “the war on drugs” (Clutterbuck, 2004). Despite the merit of such criticisms, it is a perspective that does little to accept the reality that governments entrusted with the responsibility to protect its citizens and borders must react immediately to terrorist attacks or incidents. If ever an illustration was needed that one cannot protect the public without access to pre-emptive secret intelligence one would be hard pressed to look beyond 9/11.

“The War on Terror” In response to 9/11, US President George W. Bush launched the “War on Terror.” This “war” was not launched in a vacuum and those environmental factors prevalent at the time largely determined the reaction. It was understandable that the response, which Walt (2001-2002) deemed to be the most rapid and dramatic change in US foreign policy, would attempt to make those considered responsible accountable for their acts. In a wider sense the US experience and awareness of terrorism had largely been limited prior to 9/11 to a small number of events in the country such as the first New York City World Trade Center attack in 1993 and the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building bombing in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma in 1995. Such a perception is arguably misplaced when one considers that more than 2,600 supposed terrorist related incidents are recorded as having occurred in the United States between the period of 1970 and 2008 (LaFree & Bersani, 2012). Following 9/11, coercive diplomacy, such as the use of governmental pressure and threats to withhold financial aid or the introduction of sanctions, was no longer an option regarding the response to al Qaeda; no further efforts would be made in attempting to have the ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan give up Osama bin Laden (Crenshaw, 2011). A decision was made by the Bush administration that their initial response would be of a kinetic nature utilizing conventional military weaponry and tactics. Although successful in the respect that it had the desired effect in dismantling the organization in its previously secure base in that region, the response did not address the ideological force; the response did not acknowledge that it was a situation that could not be resolved through physical force alone (Burke, 2004; Corera, 2009).

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In the days and months immediately following the events in New York and Washington it became evident that America was ill prepared to respond to the threat facing them. The dramatic increase in security measures, including the massive reconfiguration of government resulting in the creation of the Department of Homeland Security with a collective workforce of 230,000, serve as an illustration of this point (“Tenth anniversary report card,” 2011, p. 6). Cronin (2004) described her view of the US nation at that time as being impatient, litigious, intolerant of risk and accustomed to “fixing” problems using superior technologies to defeat enemies and responding with military force – as was to become evident, this was not the solution to the problem facing Western powers. Cogan (2004) suggested that the most fundamental change required in respect to actions by the state post 9/11 was the move from traditionally being “gatherers” of information to that of also acting as information “hunters.” In democratic states, great store is rightly placed on the careful balance of being stuck between affording and upholding the human rights of each citizen and protecting the majority of the populous. Some argue that it is unwise to abandon liberal democratic values in the face of provocation or threat as it can be construed as having conceded to the threat (Richardson, 2006). Changes in legislation to respond to the heightened threat level in order to provide such protection is often intended to be temporary, and for use for a limited period of time. History, however, tells a different story; emergency legislation is rarely temporary in nature, extending for periods much longer than first considered necessary (Donohue, 2001). The unwieldy and wordy United and Strengthening America by Providing the Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act is better known by its acronym, the PATRIOT Act of 2001 (Nacos, 2008). The PATRIOT Act and the Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006 in the United Kingdom sought to provide security and intelligence agencies with the tools they required to thwart and respond to terrorist threats and attacks against US and UK interests. At the same time, they were seized upon by critics who considered the wide-ranging powers to have overridden the balance between security, liberty and human rights (Chang, 2006; Golden, 2006).1 In democracies, the severity of the threat determines the severity of the response (Laqueur, 2009); if that is the case, then arguably the democracies have faced no greater threat than that which now threatens them through potential terrorist action. The new threat faced by Western 1

See Blackbourn, this volume, for further discussion of the UK Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006.

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democracies was unconventional and resulted in unorthodox responses with changes in legislation mirroring this view. The mindset behind the creation of the legislation in the US is best exemplified by then VicePresident Richard Cheney who stated in 2001, We also have to work sort of out of the dark side, if you will…A lot of what needs to be done quietly, without any discussions, using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies if we are going to be successful. That’s the world these folks operate in. And it’s going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal…It is a mean, nasty, dangerous, dirty business out there, and we have to operate in that arena (Cheney, 2001, n.p.).

Wilkinson (2011) contends that in the response to terrorism post 9/11, the US departed from a proud tradition of respect for the law and the constitution. Many claim the infringement of civil liberties has enabled the state to spy on suspected terrorists on US soil without going through mandated processes (Risen & Lichtbau, 2005). Therein lies the problem. Terrorism is said to evoke a wide set of reactions. It challenges the state’s ability to protect the life and property of its citizens. It is argued that prior to the attacks considerable powers were already available to the administration that already impacted on individual rights. The introduction of even more repressive powers risks alienating and marginalizing people further (Donahue, 2002). The use of detention without trial in places such as Guantanamo or Bagram, or in alleged “black site” establishments, put suspects beyond the reach of the US federal justice system (“Bush admits,” 2006). The use of torture and the extraordinary rendition of suspects to other countries caused an outrage to liberals and human rights activists (Danner, 2004; Ignatius, 2005). Can such measures ever be justified? Those persons engaged in terrorism or insurgency pay little heed to human rights, save for their own, and usually after they have been caught plotting, planning, preparing or engaging in acts of terror and violence. Critics argue that we have gone too far in seeking to combat terrorism challenging fundamental freedoms. Ignatieff goes as far as to say that “the human rights era is over” (2002, n.p.) while both Cole (2008) and Holmes (2007) consider the damage to civil liberties and human rights safeguards to be much greater than the harm inflicted by terrorists, real or imagined. This presents the state with a dilemma in seeking to combat the actions of those intent on destroying its very existence. Clumsy responses, racial profiling and images such as those of the human pyramids of detainees in Abu Ghraib prison have done little to support robust measures introduced

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for this purpose (Booth & Dunne, 2012). Difficult operational decisions need to be made with respect to when to make arrests and how far things should be allowed to proceed until sufficient evidence has been acquired to secure a conviction. An additional conundrum for security agencies on a global basis is the difficulty of converting intelligence into evidence. Lessons learned from other theaters or conflicts may or may not be of value due to the evolutionary nature of violent groups who learn from their mistakes and the disclosure of methodology adopted against them. Insurgents or terrorists tend to respond to countermeasures rapidly changing their modus operandi in a manner free from the restrictions that inhibit the apparatus of the state or the military (Kilcullen, 2010). Britain, unlike the US, had a bitter learning experience in dealing with Irish terrorism in terms of intelligence gathering infrastructure, internal security measures and terrorist legislation. The threat both countries now face from international terrorism poses a different problem. Much of the expertise accumulated by the British was gleaned in Northern Ireland where, in addition to an extensive human intelligence network, the development and use of technology to track terrorist suspects came to be used throughout the United Kingdom (Hewitt, 2008). The implementation of any response is difficult due to the nature of a threat that is international in nature, from a variety of group networks and individuals, and intent to cause mass casualties (Mottram, 2007). Responses since 9/11 have forced adversaries of Western nations and their allies to change, and they have proven themselves to be capable and able to do so (Hoffman, 2005). Pillar (2004) contends that no other intelligence topic depends more on foreign liaison than does terrorism. Due to the nature of the threat posed by international terrorism it is inevitable that other governments will be better placed to acquire information of benefit to the West. Some governments are better placed to provide timely and accurate information due to their intimate knowledge of individuals or groups engaged in terrorist activity within their national or territorial boundaries whilst others gain their advantage through less conventional means such as the use of coercion and on occasion the alleged ill-treatment of suspects. The crux of the issue is that their willingness to share this information will depend on a number of factors including their relationship with the West, their own strategic and security interests and on a fundamental level – what is in it for them? In order to acquire intelligence needed to protect the population it is likely that governments must do business with regimes that have dubious human rights records or blood on their hands.

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Know Your Enemy Hoffman asserts that the cardinal rule of warfare is to “know your enemy” (2002a, p. 6). In order to take action against groups that seek to attack society it is necessary to know who they are and the nature of their plans. This is an area in which the West has arguably made the most significant progress since 2001. The collective investment made in meaningful and effective counter-terrorism programs has resulted in a more coordinated approach between agencies. This coordinated approach made it easier to identify and take proactive action against those intent on carrying out attacks. This coordination not only results in educating personnel engaged in work of this nature, but also gives them an understanding of the type of indicators to look for in relation to terrorist activity. But gaining understanding of those who engage in terrorist acts, their aims, objectives and motivation has been a steep learning process for those engaged in the fight against terrorism as intelligence priorities have ebbed and flowed in the last decade from one terrorist group or faction to another. Immediately post 9/11 attention was rightly focused on al Qaeda. Hoffman (2002a, 2012) points out that al Qaeda in many respects appears to operate in the manner of a large corporation with the central command ceding control to franchised operations that share ideological aims and objectives, resulting in leadership figures having to play less of a role. The organization has shown itself to be a nimble, flexible and adaptive entity that has engineered nothing short of a stunning transition from a near bureaucratic entity to something more akin to an ideology. Hoffman (2002a) usefully points out the mix and match approach of four different al Qaeda operational styles. The professional cadre that trained amateurs, walk-ins and like-minded insurgents, guerrillas, and terrorists - each of these groups represents a different threat and challenge to the state. Systematic military bombings of al Qaeda at the outset of the war in Afghanistan and the subsequent use of kill and capture operations throughout the West’s involvement in Afghanistan undoubtedly forced the group to abandon this previously safe haven and led the group to decentralize. In addition, the global crackdown on terrorist finance has made it harder for the group to finance operations across the globe, placing the onus on groups to raise finance for their own activities. It is said that the group has lost roughly 70 percent of its leadership in the intervening period (Dishman, 2012), including its leader Osama bin Laden in May 2011. Some urge caution with this impressive statistic, stating that whilst the organizational setbacks are significant, they must be seen in the

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context of al Qaeda’s ability to foster a global jihadist movement (Braniff & Moghadam, 2012). Threats to national security and Western interests have undoubtedly changed and developed throughout the last decade and is now considered to lie closer to home. Arguably the greatest current terrorism-related menace that the US and European nations face at present is the “insider” or “home grown” threat. A recent RAND paper reported that there were 46 reported cases of radicalization and recruitment to jihadist terrorism in the US, involving 125 persons, between September 11 and the end of 2009 (Jenkins, 2010). These figures, whilst significant, are likely to be only a fraction of the true nature of the threat facing America. Intelligence agencies and academics have been consumed by the analysis of this phenomenon, particularly in the UK and the US (Vidono, 2012). Thankfully, the degree of success achieved in relation to actual attacks successfully mounted by “home grown” threats has not been significant since the July 2005 bombings in London. This has largely been due to the unprofessional and amateur practices of persons engaged in such activity and interdiction by the intelligence agencies at an early juncture, or as critics point out, through the use of “agent provocateurs” that stand accused of thwarting plots that they themselves designed (Lamb, 2012). There is no room for complacency by law enforcement and the intelligence agencies as this threat is most likely to continue to increase further, particularly in light of continued involvement and presence in the conflict in Afghanistan. The “insider threat” is not confined to operations conducted within their country of origin as illustrated by the recent alleged activity of Samantha Lewthwaite, the widow of one of the London July 7 bombers, suspected of supplying money and weapons to an al Qaeda terrorist cell in East Africa (Gardham, Pflanz, Flood, & Ford Rojas, 2012).

Counter-Terrorism Strategy Prior to the events of September 11 and the London bombings of July 2005 counter-terrorism strategies pursued by the United States and the United Kingdom were conducted in secret, far from the gaze of the public accountability and media scrutiny. In the intervening years intelligence became a matter for public consumption and discussion but more importantly increasingly became an issue where public co-operation and involvement was not only invited but was actively sought and pursued. Much of the rationale behind the counter-terrorism strategy’s adopted by the US and the UK take account of the need to address internal and

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external threats posed by terrorist groupings and those individuals sympathetic to their aims and objectives. The US government’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003) articulated a vision of partnership incorporating law enforcement and the intelligence agencies to protect the US and sought to instill public confidence and acquire public support. The policy was based on four pillars: to defeat, deny, diminish and defend America and its allies against terrorist threat. The strategy was implicit in asserting the fact that the enemy is not a person, or a single political regime nor a particular religion. The underpinning rationale behind the strategy was the belief that this effort would be a demanding process with no quick or easy end and that success will only come through sustained, steadfast and systematic application of national power, diplomacy, economic interference, information sharing, financial disruption, law enforcement, intelligence and military action simultaneously across all four fronts. The policy also sought to integrate nations and peoples into mutually beneficial democratic relationships to protect against the forces of disorder and violence. Prioritization of effort focused on immediate threat and US national interests with a recognition of the need to greatly expand linguistic capabilities, coupled with an expansion in recruitment and training within the intelligence community. Internal US counter-terrorism strategy has been largely focused on the creation and development of law enforcement programs to catch and punish would-be terrorists before they strike, with the contention that such interdiction, normally conducted at an early stage will eventually deter future attacks (Banks, de Nevers, & Wallerstein, 2008). Considerable success has been achieved through this approach although many of those caught in the net do not appear to be worthy of the description of experienced or hardened terrorists. That said, one cannot underestimate the serious threat posed by an inexperienced individual or group who possess capability and intent in equal measure. Publication of the United Kingdom’s counter-terrorism strategy, “Contest,” made the general public aware of the government’s intent to reduce the risk from international terrorism. Akin to the US strategy, it was also based on four pillars: prevent, pursue, protect and prepare (“Countering international terrorism,” 2006). The UK’s strategy to date has had an emphasis on preventing radicalization and counterradicalization as this is deemed to be one of the most important areas to address in what one could assume is based on the principle that prevention is better than cure. Burleigh criticized the Prevention section of the strategy as “a feeble replica of the multi-layered and polyvalent strategies

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the US has adopted” and describes a litany of state shortcomings particularly when seeking to combat the radicalization of students in higher education (2008, p. 490-491). In so doing he draws on the disparity between the amount of money the British government has allocated for this purpose when compared to the financial backing of the Saudi Arabian administration in spreading their particular form of Islam. In existence since 2003, the British strategy remained “secret” until 2006. Following the incidents in London on July 7 and July 21, 2005 the document was published in order to provide the public with additional information and reassurance. The European Union’s Counter-Terrorism Action Plan, updated in December 2004, on initial examination looks to be an impressive piece of work on paper. It contains over 150 measures, covering a broad range of counter-terrorism co-operation, from emergency response to curbing terrorist funding. However, the European Union (EU) does not have the powers, such as investigation and prosecution, to tackle terrorism like a national government. The EU can help governments to identify, extradite and prosecute terrorists, but it is only slowly developing its own antiterrorism policies (Keohane, 2005).2 Many criticisms have been made of legislation that is perceived to diminish individual freedoms in the service of counter-terrorism (i.e., through the PATRIOT Act). Critics suggest that a balancing act needs to take place between separate but important issues of freedom and security (Donohue, 2002). This is an important issue, and since the events of 9/11, according to this author, there has been a need and necessity to tilt the fulcrum towards security with a potential loss of freedom. But once, and if, the threat is deemed to have diminished, some view it as likely to return to a more acceptable balance (Golden, 2006).

Counter-terrorism Structures The FBI, was created as an investigative agency within the Department of Justice in 1908 and received its current title, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in 1935. Its mission is to protect and defend the United States against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international agencies and partners. Its mission is further to perform these responsibilities in a manner that is responsive to the needs of the public 2

See Otero, this volume, for further discussion of EU terrorism law.

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and is faithful to the Constitution of the United States (“Frequently asked questions,” 2012). The FBI has personnel located around the globe in US embassies but their primary duties are internal in that they are focused on national security within US national boundaries. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose duties are external in that they are performed around the world outside of US borders, was created in 1947 with the signing of the National Security Act by President Harry S. Truman. The organization is separated into four basic components: the National Clandestine Service, the Directorate of Intelligence, the Directorate of Science & Technology, and the Directorate of Support. The Agency collects, evaluates and disseminates information on political, military, economic, scientific, and other developments abroad, information that is deemed to safeguard US national security. The CIA has no police, subpoena or law enforcement powers or internal security functions (“About CIA,” 2012). Both organizations have important national functions and perform their duties in a challenging and ever-changing environment. This was recognized in the National Commission’s Report that was not devoid of sympathy with those intelligence workers located at the coalface, One can see how hard it is for the intelligence community to assemble enough of the puzzle pieces gathered by different agencies to make some sense of them…Accomplishing all this is especially difficult in a transnational case. We sympathize with the working-level officers, drowning in information and trying to decide what is important (“The 9/11 Commission Report,” 2004, p. 355).

It is evident that the report was critical in respect to collective organizational, rather than individual, failure. Particular mention was made in regard to the weak analytical structures present in both organizations at the time. Both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency were roundly criticized for their inability to analyze and share timely and accurate information with each other in relation to a number of missed intelligence opportunities (Zegart, 2007). As if suffering the ignominy in the National Commission’s Report was not enough, academia later joined the fray. Critics suggested that the Bureau, while superbly qualified to investigate terrorist incidents after the fact, was grossly ill equipped to prevent attacks given its strong law enforcement and prosecutorial culture (Chalk & Rosenau, 2004). Critics of the organizational malaise said to be present within the agency catalogued a litany of errors and missed intelligence opportunities said to contribute to the failings of 9/11, including a failure to place one of the

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bombers, already an al Qaeda suspect, on a State Department watch list denying him entry into the United States and investigation of his reported flying lessons in Arizona (Goodman, 2003; Zegart, 2007). In reaction to the criticism, the FBI made the comprehensive and wideranging internal changes, moving a significant number of personnel from criminal investigations to counter-terrorism duties. In addition, an increase in the number of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) personnel and the creation of Field Intelligence Groups sought to enhance the function of each field office in counter-terrorism work. The concept of JTTF was not new. The first such Task Force was formed in New York in 1980 in an effort to address a significant increase in the number of bank robberies occurring in the city, and saw experienced FBI agents and local law enforcement work together. The success encountered in New York prompted a move towards, and expansion of, this model across the United States (Martin, 1999). JTTFs are now based in 103 cities nationwide, including at least one in each of the FBI’s 56 field offices; a total of 71 of these JTTF’s have been created since September 11 (“Protecting America from attack,” 2012). Task Force Officers are supervised by a Special Agent in Charge (SAC) who is cleared at the Top Secret level to enable them to access FBI databases in addition to those of their host agency. Collaborating with their FBI colleagues on the Task Forces, law enforcement personnel are assigned cases and given file reviews. Law enforcement participation ensures that geographical, sociological and historical knowledge concerning the area of operation is forthcoming and accessible (Cochrane, 2008). Some of the internal FBI problems identified by Blitzer (2003) and Treverton (2003), such as the clear identification of its priorities, the investment in technology and quality training, and the creation of efficient intelligence dissemination processes arguably still exist today. Further changes are required in the cultural mindset of the organization, in order to move it away from a case-driven investigation body, that historically has seen it react to crimes that have already occurred (Zegart, 2007). Changing organizational mindset involves much more than changing organizational structures. Steinburg (2006) suggests that the decision to have the FBI as the principal agency responsible for counter-terrorism and the collection of intelligence in the US, rather than create a new agency to do so, has perpetuated the lack of coordination between foreign and domestic intelligence operations. He further states that the FBI’s incomplete effort to transform itself into an effective counter-terrorism/ intelligence agency makes it difficult for the agency to focus on foreign intelligence when it lacks well-trained agents. He concludes that a separate

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domestic intelligence agency is the best option, and in lieu of such an agency, the FBI needs to strengthen the sense of a separate intelligence mechanism within the Bureau. Similarly, the CIA did not come out of proceedings conducted to examine the failings of September 11 unscathed either. Goodman (2003), a critic of the CIA, deems September 11 to have been one of a long series of CIA blunders consistently followed by an inability of the intelligence committees to conduct oversight. He speculates that the reason for this is the fact that the agency offers a clandestine and relatively inexpensive means to pursue American foreign policy. On October 1st 2002, George Tenet, the then Director of Intelligence and the head of the CIA, sought to explain the CIA’s apparent failure to anticipate the events of September 11 by reminding a congressional committee that the previous decade had seen the CIA budget cut by 18 percent, leading to a 16 percent reduction of employees across the board (Kessler, 2004). Such a representation masked a greater fundamental issue, an issue that was not addressed following the events of September 11 and stretched into post 2003 Iraq. That is, the CIA was not completing its function, as demonstrated by the comments of a former CIA operative, The CIA probably doesn’t have a single truly qualified Arabic-speaking officer of Middle Eastern background who can play a believable Muslim fundamentalist who would volunteer to spend years of his life with shitty food and no women in the mountains of Afghanistan. For Christ’s sake, most case officers live in the suburbs of Virginia. We don’t do that kind of thing (Kessler, 2004, p. 140).

Despite the number of structural changes made to both the FBI and the CIA and the additional powers afforded to them by way of new legislation such as the PATRIOT Act, critics remain unimpressed. They cite that the crux of the intelligence failure responsible for the events of September 11 remain – that is, the traditional agency cultures and the lack of an ability to communicate, particularly with each other, in an effective manner (Martin, 2004). In an effort to address other perceived weaknesses in America’s defenses the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established in December 2002. Its creation was to fulfill three objectives: (1) prevent terrorist attacks in the US; (2) reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and (3) respond to any terrorist attacks and natural disasters that occur (Jones, 2006). Creation of the body resulted in a struggle for power within the FBI and CIA (and other areas of US government, particularly the Defense Intelligence Agency), both of which have increased rather than

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decreased their homeland security functions. In seeking to overcome and plug deficiencies in US national security, some improvements have been made but these improvements have not been considered by all to be the result of creating the new agency. Indeed Jones goes so far as to suggest that developments in intelligence sharing have come mostly in spite of, rather than as a result of, DHS actions. An ongoing issue that has yet to be successfully addressed is the overlapping responsibilities that often occur within the US intelligence structure. Historically the FBI has always had responsibility for internal security threats. The CIA, along with the National Security Agency (NSA), has a similar remit for foreign-based threats, collecting intelligence deemed to affect US national security or its national interests. All three agencies reported to the National Security Council. The clarification of responsibilities is complicated by the various agencies’ overlapping functions within the homeland security apparatus. There is a propensity to collect and analyze each agency’s own intelligence in a stove piped manner. The enactment of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 enabled the creation of this bureaucratic behemoth and transferred 170,000 personnel from all or portions of twenty-two federal agencies to a new government department that has come at a considerable financial cost to the American taxpayer (Banks, de Nevers, & Wallerstein, 2008). Critics suggest that the DHS, created to better coordinate the myriad of agencies responsible for defense, suffers from poor morale and confusion as to its mission (Byman, 2012). The battle for supremacy regarding the counter-terrorism lead has continued within the US, no better exemplified than in New York where an uneasy relationship exists between the FBI and the New York Police Department (NYPD) (Cochrane, 2008). NYPD lost 23 officers responding to the attack on the World Trade Center (“Memorial – 9/11 Tribute,” 2012); the incident was a catalyst for change in the way that the department conducted policing in the city. The fractious relationship between the FBI and NYPD emanates from NYPD’s seeming refusal to accept that the FBI has the national lead responsibility for counter terrorism throughout the United States. The situation in New York possibly best illustrates Oates’ (2001) belief that in many respects Congress indirectly facilitates the emergence and continuance of inter- and intra-agency turf war disputes over the control and use of information. Failure to satisfactorily resolve such organizational differences, professional jealousies and brinkmanship has seen a continuance of turf wars that have historically affected local law enforcement’s ability to ensure public safety.

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Strozier (2008) is one of a number of academics who regard the New York Counter-Terrorism Bureau model, that sees over one thousand officers perform covert and high visibility duties, as the preferred counterterrorism option. He claims it is better to rely on those who are in the trenches and know their local neighborhoods, the people and the problems. Another supporter of the NYPD model, Henry (2002) whilst advocating the approach, realistically acknowledges that few other American law enforcement agencies could devote resources at the same proportion as NYPD. Nevertheless, she maintains they could emulate the principles involved. Few would argue that further significant change is needed to improve the counter-terrorism effectiveness of law enforcement and intelligence agencies within the US. Regardless of any new counter-terrorism initiative introduced to policing or the intelligence community, a fundamental problem remains. The functional autonomy of the US law enforcement agencies, with over 18,000 separate police forces, operating at a local, state and federal level demonstrates the highly decentralized nature of American policing (also central to the US system of government). In such a populated and decentralized mechanism it is difficult to get each agency or police force to accept that terrorism is a priority particularly when compared to other competing demands on their resources. In the UK immediately after September 11, a Counter-Terrorist Analysis Centre (CTAC) was established; the majority of staff came from the domestic Security Service (MI5). A review of the composition and the agencies represented was still under way when the bombings occurred on the Indonesian island of Bali in October 2002, and resulted in the creation of the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). JTAC was also comprised of staff from MI5, plus personnel from the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) (the agency that works overseas to make Britain safer), the Government’s Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and others as diverse as the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Home Office, police, and Cabinet Office. JTAC sought to overcome historical task force information sharing problems by ensuring that each representative had access to their host agency database in addition to a number of other agencies’ databases within the Analysis Centre (Gill & Pythian, 2006). Other significant changes within the UK intelligence domain included the development of regional MI5 offices; the regionalization of police Special Branches and ports policing; the establishment of a Police International Counter Terror Unit (PICTU) within the Metropolitan Police; and the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) within MI5 (Walker, 2005). Some consider the creation of the Serious and

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Organized Crime Agency (SOCA), established in 2006, to be moving towards a UK equivalent of the Department for Homeland Security. Personnel for SOCA came from Customs, Criminal Intelligence, the National Crime Squad and other agencies, the latter assuming the role of lead national agency. The SOCA seeks to utilize intelligence and investigation with regard to serious crime, particularly that of a transnational nature (Gill, 2006). The advent of SOCA and other “super” agencies of its kind in terms or sheer size and responsibility are cited by critics as further evidence of the move away from traditional locally based and accountable policing methods (Moran & Pythian, 2005). The new UK security structures post 9/11 can hardly be viewed as a success. Casciani (2011) outlines multiple MI5 failings regarding a number of strands of investigation that, with hindsight, failed to identify one of the bombers in London on 7 July 2005 (7/7), Mohammed Siddique Khan, in advance of the attack. The agency was also criticized by the coroner in the inquest examining the events of 7/7. Its failure to identify suspects, and their links to others, its poor assessment practices and the obliteration of surveillance photographs that were said to have been cropped in order to protect the identity of the location where they were taken and the methodology employed to take them, was done to such an extent as to render them to be of little use. As the result of this criticism MI5 gave an undertaking to introduce a number of changes to their procedures and working practices (“7/7 inquests,” 2011). At the time of the 2005 bombings in London MI5 was said to be operating in a time of “increasing threats” and stretched resources. In July of 2004 the agency was involved in over 500 investigations of “primary investigative targets” and rose to approximately 800 by the time of the London bombings a year later. Given the magnitude of investigative work facing MI5, the agency was forced to distinguish between three categories of target: essential, desirable, and other. The existence of these categories failed to identify the significance of two of the 7/7 bombers, Khan and Shazad Tanweer, who appeared on the periphery of other investigations, and were not correctly linked to each other or suspected terrorist activity (Pythian, 2005). .

The Human Touch One of the most successful methods of countering terrorism is through the use of human sources. The use of human sources or informants to covertly gain information is not a new concept and is in fact as old as history itself. Their use is evidenced in the Bible with stories such as that

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of Judas Iscariot who betrayed Jesus to the Romans for thirty pieces of silver. The acquisition of information or intelligence in a secret or covert manner is a primary role for an informant. Information received often indicates future plans and strategic intent by the terrorist and access to such information presents an opportunity to affect the likely outcome. The use of informants, despite representing one of the most intrusive of State security strategies (Lustgarten & Leigh, 1994), was a weapon that the British were very familiar with and a mechanism that presented the security forces in Northern Ireland with an opportunity to disable and diminish the capacity of loyalist and republican groups (Maloney, 2002; Crawford, 2003). Bamford (2005) opines that human agents are widely accepted as providing the best sources of intelligence, a view endorsed by Jeffrey (1987) who asserts, “The most rewarding source of information about insurgents and terrorists is human intelligence from within the target organisation” (p.139). Similarly, Evelegh (1978) is of the view that the only weapon capable of causing the destruction of a subversive organisation is information from within the terrorist ranks. The US intelligence agencies did not have the same depth of experience as their UK counterparts who, despite their past successes, in the light of the 2005 London bombings were reminded of “the need to get into ‘the unknowns’ – to find ways of broadening coverage to pick up currently unknown terrorist activity or plots” (“Report into the London terrorist attacks,” 2006, p. 35-36). Fixing any broken intelligence system is not just about changing the structure of agencies and organizations or the roles and responsibilities of those employed there, it is about changing the mindset and psyche of how the agency does business. The FBI prior to 9/11, and, some critics would even suggest today, is a case and results driven agency (Zegart, 2007). Its vision of success is putting criminals before the courts and taking those guilty of committing crime out of the equation. There is little wrong with that mentality in relation to conventional crime. When dealing with terrorism, though, the emphasis must be on the acquisition of intelligence that may not always constitute evidence that nonetheless can be presented to a court of law In a general sense human intelligence is key because the essence of most terrorist threats is the capacity to conspire, and that in order to intercept and prevent attacks one must penetrate terrorist groups to learn their plans and identify the perpetrators (Betts, 2002). Only a small number of the conspirators will know the intentions of the target group although others may assist in the implementation of the attack (Pillar, 2004). More often than not, the intelligence used to thwart the attack is best obtained through the use of human sources.

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Information required to stop a terrorist attack is likely to come from individuals that would challenge the morality of a civilized society, a point conceded by the former General Counsel to the CIA, Jeffrey Smith, The CIA must be able to recruit individuals with terrible human rights records and with criminal records. There is no way that the CIA can penetrate terrorist groups…without dealing with people who are part of the groups. A judgment is to be made as to whether the value of the intelligence to be acquired outweighs the cost to the United States of dealing with some very bad people (“Spies R us,” 2003, n.p).

In seeking to get people to provide information, the type of individuals with whom state agencies are rubbing shoulders could not be described as “model citizens.” They often have considerable personal baggage, in terms of their criminal activity, that the general public would have difficulty accepting should their relationship with an intelligence or law enforcement agency become known. In order to have the capability to successfully establish rapport with such individuals and have them provide accurate and timely information, the state requires well-trained and highly motivated personnel that are able to speak to a variety of people at an appropriate level. Intelligence agencies in the US and the UK tend to recruit individuals from particular backgrounds and with similar educational qualifications. Historically the FBI has expressed a strong preference for graduates with a background or qualification in law or accountancy due to the strong case-driven culture within the organization. Only in the past twenty years or so does it appear to have opened its doors to a greater extent to former police officers and military personnel. The CIA and both MI5 and MI6 in the British intelligence community have spent a considerable number of years recruiting and training entrants with the “right” background and that had gone to the “right school.” Again, it has been a slower process but the door has gradually opened to encompass a wider and more diverse range of graduates into MI5, less so in respect to MI6. The difficulty regarding the recruitment of personnel from similar backgrounds is that this can perpetuate “group think”,3 and tends to influence how employees view the world and what they hold dear (Zegart, 2007). Furthermore, a more varied mix of race, ethnicity, religion and culture is needed in order to reflect more closely society’s cosmopolitan mix.

3 See Eachus and Short in this volume for further discussion of group think and other cognitive biases encountered in intelligence analysis.

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Counter-Terrorism through Finance Regulation History has demonstrated that terrorists, particularly insurgents, require access to funding and finance to support their activities. Investigations conducted into terrorist attacks demonstrate that it is relatively inexpensive for terrorists to carry out an attack. The 9/11 Commission’s Monograph on Terrorist Financing estimates that the events on September 11 cost al Qaeda somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 of which it is estimated that $300,000 passed through the hijackers’ bank accounts in the US (Roth, Greenberg, & Wille, 2004; Banks, de Nevers, & Wallerstein, 2008). The attacks in Madrid in March 2004 were estimated by the Spanish authorities to have cost in the region of $60,000 (“Congreso de los Diputados,” 2005) and the Home Office inquiry into the events in London and July 2005 put the total cost, including trips overseas, bomb making equipment and other incidentals at around $15,000 (“Report of the official account,” 2006). Following the events of 9/11, much was made of the authorities’ success in finding, freezing and seizing terrorist assets as officials claimed that as much as $147 million worth of assets had been blocked or frozen worldwide (“UN sanctions,” 2005). It is likely that such seizures were merely the tip of the iceberg. The crackdown is unlikely to have seriously affected the war chest held by al Qaeda, who in spite of losing money through seizures, has access to funding through a number of bin Laden’s profitable companies engaged in businesses as diverse as construction, manufacturing, currency trading, import-export, and agriculture (Bergen, 2001). Williams (2007) contends that this strategy of finding, freezing and seizing assets has been given more significance than it deserves, obscuring more than it reveals. Money makes its way to these violent groups in a myriad of ways, such as charity collections, credit card fraud, extortion, donations from wealthy supporters or states, and the use of the Hawala banking system (an alternative remittance scheme operating outside of traditional banking or financial channels). Crime has always been an element of terrorist finance and in the 1980s analysts and policy-makers began to realize the significance of the crimeterror nexus (Giraldo & Trinkunas, 2007), an issue well demonstrated in the fact that the explosives used to carry out the Madrid attack were likely purchased by finance acquired through the sale of hashish (Rotella, 2004). The investigation of terrorist activity in general, and terrorist finance in particular, is time consuming and requires great logistical resources. Despite the difficulty of conducting these investigations, Eckert (2008) agrees that financial information represents some of the best evidence to

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identify, reconstruct, disrupt and dismantle the financing of terrorism. US legislators have agreed as the PATRIOT Act makes substantial provision for the investigation and sharing of financial information. A major element of the investigation of terrorist finance is through the utilization of the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen). Created on order of the US Secretary of Treasury in the early 1990s, it serves as a clearing-house, a focal point, and repository for the government collection of information concerning financial crime. Older legislation, such as the Bank Secrecy Act enacted by Congress in 1970, has been used to place an onus on financial institutions, particularly since 9/11, to report suspicious financial transactions of more than $10,000. Since 1996 FinCen has required banks to file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs), initiatives that post 9/11 were expanded to all of the financial services industry (Eckart, 2008). Existence of such regulatory requirements is not a panacea, as both bank compliance officers and government officials have confirmed what the 9/11 Commission revealed - that the hijackers’ financial activities were not unusual and did not trigger reports by any financial institution (Passas, 2007). Europe has adopted measures of a similar nature to that of the US. The Assets Recovery Agency in the UK and the Irish Criminal Assets Bureau have both experienced considerable success on the island of Ireland in respect to the seizure of Loyalist and Republican terrorist finance (Independent Monitoring Commission, 2004). The need, or some would suggest greed, for money by those engaged in terrorism has led to a growing recognition that the engagement in crime creates a significant vulnerability for terrorist groups as the temptation for corruption and the abandonment of ideological goals can lead to a criminal lifestyle (Dishman, 2001). Activities of this kind present options worthy of exploitation by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. F.L. Jones (2009) believes that the weakest links often include the financiers of terrorism, as they are often the least fanatical and provide the best opportunity to disrupt the operations. This is good news for intelligence agencies, as a preference for personal wealth is easily exploited in return for information and cooperation. The bad news is that “following the money,” like other counter-terrorism intelligence, will provide false leads, false positives, and false alarms (Williams, 2007). Much time and resources will inevitably be wasted in the investigation of “false positives.” The former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld succinctly identified the issues faced by the authorities when he stated, “The cost-

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benefit ratio is against us. Our cost is billions against the terrorists’ costs of millions” (Rumsfeld, 2003).

Counter-terrorism through Technology Arguably the most significant and contentious technological development used in counter-terrorism efforts has been the introduction of surveillance or “kill” operations in a number of theaters, including Afghanistan, the border regions of Pakistan, Ethiopia and Somalia. The majority of such operations have involved the use of unmanned drone crafts that are now commonly used to carry out aerial surveillance and kinetic attacks on terrorist suspects and bases (Whittell, 2011). First used in Bosnia and Kosovo in the late 1990s, the 27-foot-long Predator and the 24-foot-long Gnat, both unmanned reconnaissance aircraft, are armed with Hellfire missiles and satellite-guided bombs. With a range of 1,150 miles, the devices enable the user to build up a comprehensive picture of the terrain without having to risk a significant presence on the ground. The use of this technology has increased significantly during the tenure of the Obama administration. One hundred and seventy one strikes occurred in 2009 and 2010 compared to 43 between 2004 and the end of 2008. They are regarded by the intelligence community as money well spent (Gill & Pythian, 2006). The use of this methodology has not been without incident and critics, including the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalists, the New America Foundation (an independent Washington think tank), and the American Civil Liberties Union. These organizations claim that hundreds of innocent people have died as a result of drone attacks, and are calling on the Obama administration to disclose the exact figures of the number of civilians killed in the secret drone war (Lamb, Woods, & Yusufzai, 2012; “The year of the drone,” 2012). Bergen and Tiedemann (2012) are greatly concerned by the use of drones to thwart terrorist activity. Firstly, they contest that America might be in a weak legal position in that there is a question regarding proportionality and the risk to civilians. Secondly, they deem drone attacks in Pakistan to be not a strategy but a tactic that will have a limited effect on the group as a whole; these attacks have resulted in groups being able to continue their activities despite the loss of key members killed in the attacks. And thirdly, although drone attacks have undoubtedly disrupted militant activity, their unpopularity with the Pakistani public is likely to serve as a useful recruiting tool for al Qaeda and the Taliban.

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The “shoe-bomber” Richard Reid in 2003, the “Airlines” plot in 2006, the Glasgow Airport bombing of 2007, the “underwear bomber” Umer Farouk Abdulmatallab in 2009, and the double agent posing as an underwear bomber out of Yemen in 2012, all demonstrate the continuance of targeting mass transit, particularly air travel, regardless of the initiatives introduced to combat such actions. Levels of airport screening, the increased use of closed circuit television (CCTV) monitoring, and improvements in structural protection and design are representative of physical security measures utilized with increasing regularity in an attempt to not only reduce or minimize the opportunity to create incidents or mount attacks but also to reassure and protect the public and those travelling via air. This is only to be expected, as these measures are both tangible and visible. The provision of these measures demonstrates a growth in the security industry since the events of 9/11. These measures have possibly frustrated attempts by those intent on carrying out terrorist attacks or acts of political violence by altering their plans and therefore saving lives in the process. However, physical protective measures in themselves cannot and will not prevent a would-be attacker with sufficient commitment, intent and capability. Treverton (2003) views the new airport security measures to be in the “pain-for little-gain” category and questions the worth of the $12 billion cost. Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), road tested in the conflict in Northern Ireland, has been incorporated across the UK and is commonly used to monitor and track vehicles (Hennessey, 2007). Facial recognition surveillance is being introduced across airports and sea-ports in an effort to monitor the movements of terrorist and criminal suspects. Target hardening measures, to better protect potential terrorist targets are being “designed and built-in” to structures thought to be at risk and include a diverse range of options such as the erection of bollards to create a greater stand-off distance between vehicular traffic and a suspected target location, or the construction of buildings designed to reduce the impact of any attack (Fussey, 2011). Despite significant moves in the areas surrounding technology as outlined above, British, French and Israeli experts share a degree of skepticism about their utility as a “solution” in counter-terrorism (Lesser, 1999).

International Cooperation: Pakistan International cooperation and the sharing of sensitive intelligence with allied nations are vital in seeking to combat terrorism. A common perception in the West prevails that a number of supposed allies are

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playing both sides in the “war on terrorism” of which the most frequently cited is Pakistan. Pakistan is a central element in the threat currently facing the West in that many members of al Qaeda fled to its border regions following US attacks against the group in Afghanistan. In addition, the country has a strong tradition and history of involvement in Jihadist activity. On one hand, its supporters suggest that Pakistan has not only publicly declared its commitment to tackling the scourge of terrorism but continues to play an active role in assisting the West to negate the actions of terrorist groups that lie within its border areas and beyond its national borders. Nawaz (2011) contends that Pakistan is a prisoner of its geography and history, and cites that its strategic location at the door of Central Asia and China gives it significance on the regional and global scene. History would tend to confirm that view as the area has often been subject to the actions and influence of colonial and western powers. It is this geographical and historical aspect that necessitates the West being so reliant upon Pakistan’s cooperation and assistance, particularly in relation to terrorism. Gunaratna and Iqbal (2011) claim the contemporary Pakistan is fraught with many challenges including that of its territorial integrity, and also suggests that Pakistan has demonstrated a determination beyond its capacity to eradicate the menace of terrorism. In doing so, it has become the primary victim of terrorism rather than the perpetrator. They go on to suggest that Pakistani armed forces and intelligence agencies ought to be commended for restricting the threat of Islamist terrorism. This is a view not widely shared in the West. Crenshaw (2011) posits that Pakistan is a difficult case. Its support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has never been disguised and pressure exerted by the US to exploit this relationship failed to have the Taliban sever its links with Al Qaeda. An indication that this would be Pakistan’s attitude was given in May 2000 when General Pervez Musharraf, the Pakistani leader, stated, “Afghan’s majority ethnic Pashtuns have to be on our side…That is our national interest…The Taliban cannot be alienated by Pakistan. We have a national security interest there” (White, 2008, p. 36). Post 9/11 the US adopted a carrot and stick approach with Pakistan that sought to reward the country for activity aimed against insurgent activity when it conformed with the wishes of the US through the provision of aid, intense political consultation, and military supplies; this policy, however, experienced little tangible sign of success (Schaffer, 2002). The collapse of the Taliban government saw many of those militants, whose activity had previously been confined to Afghanistan, flee to Pakistan (O.B. Jones, 2009). Pakistan and the West enjoy an uneasy alliance that was further

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pressurized by US insistence that Pakistan, due to its geographical location, be at the forefront of the US-led “War on Terror.” Some consider this placement of Pakistan at the frontline of international attention, with the spillover of Afghanistan war refugees into its border areas, as a threat to its own stability, never mind the security implications for the Western world (Lodi, 2011). In addition, Pakistan has not been assisted by an often times confused and flawed US strategy in Afghanistan that arguably has resulted in the spread of radicalization, intensification of violence, and further undermining of an already febrile economy (Lodhi, 2011). Many accusations have been made regarding Pakistan’s support for the Taliban and al Qaeda on a number of levels from training personnel to providing a safe haven within its borders from which insurgents mount attacks (Gunaratna & Iqbal, 2011). If this is the case what is their interest in doing so? Pakistan does not enjoy a good relationship with the government of Afghanistan and fears that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has formed a strong relationship with the Indian government. Some say that it is in Pakistan’s interest to support the Taliban as it is a mechanism for keeping Afghanistan unstable and permits Pakistan to keep her options open should the NATO coalition remove its forces (Bajoria & Kaplan, 2011; Tellis, 2008). A similar case can be made in respect of Pakistan’s support of Kashmiri insurgents who destabilize the border area and offer Pakistan a second line of defense from another “nuclear state,” namely India (Kaplan, 2007). Most of the recent al Qaeda terrorist plots around the world, including that of the London Underground bombings and plots in Denmark and Germany are said to have had a connection to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan’s border regions (Bergen, 2007). As previously mentioned, NATO and the US military have sought to use Pakistan as a base to mount “kill” operations using helicopter gunships and Predator drones with tacit approval from the Pakistani authorities in what has become a so-called “secret war” that has become a focus of militant rage and public protest, which the US has never officially acknowledged nor has Islamabad admitted collaborating (Hussain, 2011). Use of these tactics is not without difficulty as events on November 26, 2011 demonstrate. On that day, 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed and 13 more injured when two Pakistani border outposts were flattened by NATO helicopters in error (“Pakistan and America,” 2011). The US, whilst publicly courting Pakistan as an ally in the war in Afghanistan, has conducted a number of operations within its boundaries without seemingly sharing prior intent with the nation’s authorities. For instance, in May 2011, American Special Forces found and killed Osama

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bin Laden, who was living in a safe house in a military garrison town. The very nature of the operation alluded to the fact that America considered Pakistan to be either incompetent or duplicitous in that it appears to have withheld details of the planned operation from the Pakistani authorities. Such a move is dangerous and further operations of this kind may well result in an irreconcilable breach of trust between the two countries (Friedman, 2011). Many observers lay much of the blame for Pakistan’s fraught relationship with the West firmly at the door of the Inter Services Agency (ISI), the country’s premier intelligence service (Gul, 2010). Billions of dollars siphoned through the ISI used to finance the Mujahideen’s campaign against the Soviet Army (and their ultimate withdrawal) saw the ISI transformed into one of the best financed, self-confident, and most powerful of all Pakistan’s state institutions. In theory the ISI is responsible to the prime minister but the prime minister’s control has always been limited. Senior ranks of the ISI are filled with serving army officers, appointed by, and answerable to the chief of army staff. As a result, they generally feel that their first loyalty is to their military colleagues (O.B. Jones, 2009). Mistrust and suspicion of the ISI by the US intelligence and political administration is possibly best illustrated by thirty-two documents that were created in 1999 by the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). These documents clearly show that the US State Department and the DIA knew of the role of the ISI in sponsoring not only the Taliban but also al Qaeda (“Pakistan: The Taliban’s godfather?,” 2007). Hussain (2011) contends that Pakistan’s major problem in dealing with rising militancy is a lack of a comprehensive and integrated counterterrorism policy implementation. Until this internal issue is resolved it is likely that Pakistan will continue to be accused of trying to play both sides at once. Rashid and Gul (2009; 2010) are of the view that the issue of attempting to play both sides is compounded by the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state. Additionally, it possesses an intelligence service that has sponsored Islamic extremism for almost four decades as part of their foreign policy and the country finds it difficult to give up its selfdestructive and double-dealing policies after 9/11, even under the watchful eye of the CIA (Rashid, 2009). This willingness to play both sides is more understandable when one considers that 90 percent of the $10 billion in aid that Pakistan has received from the US since 9/11 has been spent primarily on military purposes such as strengthening the Pakistani army in its effort to keep up with neighboring India and modernizing the ISI, rather than on internal social development (Rashid, 2009). It would seem that those in

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charge of Pakistan’s general headquarters, whilst keen to seek vast amounts of foreign aid, are reluctant to compromise their own immediate and long term interests for the sake of American and allied interests (Gul, 2010).

So What is the Answer? Counter-terrorism initiatives, which are commonly of a military and security nature, are often considered by detractors to escalate rather than alleviate levels of perceived threat, actual violence, and alienation of the base population. Experience has taught us that military and physical force interventions are largely ineffective, and that is the reason that many post 9/11 initiatives have seen significant progress made towards a “hearts and mind” based approach (Breen Smyth, 2007). Both English (2009) and Kilcullen (2009) suggested frameworks for how efforts to respond to terrorism are best directed. Kilcullen advocates a number of measures including: decide how to allocate resources among military and non-military elements of national power; decide whether our interests are best served by intervention or seeking to contain any spillover of violence or unrest into Western communities; decide how much to spend (in resources and lives), taking into account the likelihood and consequences of future attacks; and prioritize efforts geographically as different choices might produce significantly different regional priorities over time. English’s approach is the more straightforward: learn to live with it; where possible, address underlying root problems and causes; avoid over-militarization of the response; acknowledge that intelligence is the most vital element in successful counter-terrorism; respect orthodox legal frameworks and adhere to the democratically established rule of law; co-ordinate security-related, financial, and technological preventative measures; and maintain strong credibility in the counter terrorist public argument. Many of the points raised by English have been widely accepted and adopted as counter-terrorism strategies across the globe and it is timely to draw reference to a few. The approaches adopted by the US and the UK appear to have followed these guidelines closely. Global Muslim engagement, attempts to counter violent extremism, and adherence to the rule of law are major pillars of the West’s efforts, with the US going one step further through the continued use of kinetic counterterrorism operations (Lynch, 2012). The threat of attack today is more complex and diverse than at any time since 9/11 (Bergen & Hoffman, 2010). There is no single way to address the menace and threat of terrorism within a nation state or across

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the globe. The collective and individual response requires a multi-faceted range of initiatives encompassing political measures, legislative and judicial measures, in addition to security measures (Art & Richardson, 2007). There is certainly merit in having a significant law enforcement presence in any counter-terrorism strategy4; it is how and when they are used that causes a difference of opinion. Many of the findings made by Chalk and Rosenau (2004) demonstrate the merits of having both intelligence agencies and the police jointly conduct work in cases of terrorism with clear demarcation lines delineating specific responsibilities in terms of lead responsibility and investigational matters. However, other academics favor the police having the lead responsibility. The police are the “eyes and ears” of the state, out on the street patrolling their respective areas of responsibility, in an intelligence-led manner, whilst intimately acquainted with the communities they serve, on a 24/7 basis. Hoffman (2002b) suggests that the police are specifically trained to interact with the public and more often have access to good information through access to human intelligence sources. He goes so far as to say that good police work depends on informers, undercover agents, and the apprehension and interrogation of terrorists and suspected terrorists. McCleskey, McCord and Leetz (2007) cite their preference firmly with an emphasis on community policing, almost as a “soft power” option, whereby the public will come to trust the police and through such trust will provide information about suspicious behavior. Chalk and Rosenau (2004) have made the observation that when national security is the primary goal, then counter-terrorism should be confined to an agency that has no functional law enforcement powers of arrest and detention, as is the case in the UK, France, Canada and Australia. In such instances the lead agency is able to devote all of its resources to pre-emptive intelligence gathering in tandem with a close relationship with its policing counterparts. Even then, it is likely that intelligence sharing issues will arise. Pillar (2004), in his analysis of intelligence agencies in the US, discusses the pros and cons of either leaving the responsibility for internal national security issues as it rests at present with the FBI or in the creation of a new agency that would have intelligence acquisition and exploitation as its primary function. He contends that, despite the Bureaus’ protestations that they are now an intelligence agency, intelligence gathering will always be a secondary function to them. Despite the 4

See Jessie Blackbourn’s chapter in this volume for further discussion of law enforcement in counter-terrorism strategies.

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obvious improvements made in the area of information collection and sharing, particularly within the FBI, many obstacles remain to be overcome, not all of which are within the organizations ability to resolve, including limitations placed on them by legislation controlling the manner in which they are expected to perform their duty. Recognition of the importance of intelligence in this struggle, particularly of human sources, must be developed further with efforts made to recruit sources from vulnerable communities likely to host terrorist activity. This must be done as a matter of urgency as there is little point in trying to do this following a terrorist incident. The protean capability of terrorism, that demonstrates a seeming ability to morph and adapt as a living entity in order to pursue its aims, will undoubtedly continue to frustrate attempts to thwart and reduce activity despite state successes and initiatives. The wider and more concerted use of human intelligence has the potential to tip the balance in favor of the state.

Conclusion: Games without Frontiers Tebbit (2007) suggests that the global terrorist threat now facing us is not a passing phase but is here to stay. It is international in nature and, in a sense, facilitated by globalization. It is potentially strategic in effect and simple at one level in its objectives – the overturn of Western influence and values in various parts of the world and their replacement by strict Islamic regimes or fundamental theocracies. Scott and Hughes (2009) view some of the most significant developments in counter-terrorism to have occurred post 9/11 through the development of multilateral and bilateral relationships between intelligence and security agencies. Wilkinson (2011) contends that ideally all countries should fully cooperate to ensure that those responsible for terrorist crime are brought to justice. But is this realistic given the issues of national self-interest and the issues presented in this chapter? Hoffman (2012) shares similar sentiments to the views of Wilkinson and encapsulates them into three main themes. Firstly he considers terrorism and the terrorist threat to be changing, as much due to the success in the efforts to counter it as the terrorists’ own determination, adaptation, adjustment and resiliency. Secondly, the unfolding war on terrorism will bear little resemblance to conventional wars fought thus far; it will last years if not decades, requiring new approaches and perspectives. Thirdly, terrorism itself is becoming a more diffuse and amorphous phenomenon, less centralized with a more opaque command. If these views are correct it places considerable onus on those agencies

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charged with protecting their nation states and populace. Pillar (2012) suggests that foreign co-operation will become more problematic as the terrorist threat moves further away from al Qaeda. Anti-Western and antiAmerican views are likely to affect cooperation and information sharing as the threats turn towards groups that have never inflicted attacks on the West of the kind experienced on 9/11. Many regard intelligence as the “first line of defense” and if it is to be successful it is dependent on a number of factors including improved cooperation across borders (Banks, de Nevers, & Wallerstein, 2008). Sensitive intelligence is of high value and traded on a need-to-know basis; once it is shared, the host agency or country effectively loses control of it. Efforts to protect the West cannot be limited to activity within the West. Much of the planning and training for attacks is conducted in other locations making the need to acquire pre-emptive information and intelligence vital. This is a complex area to successfully administer as the question of national sovereignty is likely to arise in instances where the presence of foreign intelligence agencies or troops are required to locate and root out terrorist facilities. The success of counter-terrorism strategies will depend on effective communication, communication from ground sources to intelligence agencies, across intelligence agencies within a country, as well as communications across nations with similar security goals.

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Kilcullen, D. (2009). The accidental guerilla: Fighting small wars in the midst of a big one. London: Hurst. —. (2010). Counter insurgency. London: Hurst. LaFree, G. & Bersani, B. (2012). Hot spots of terrorism and other crimes in the United States, 1970 to 2008. Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). University of Maryland, College Park. Retrieved from start.umd.edu/start/publications/research_briefs/LaFree _Bersani_HotSpotsOfUSTerrorism.pdf Lamb, C. (2012, February 19). Stings attacked after FBI foils ‘own’ terrorist plot. Sunday Times, p. 32. Lamb, C., Woods, C. & Yusufzai, R. (2012, February 5). Covert CIA drones kill hundreds of civilians. Sunday Times, p. 28. Laqueur, W. (2009). A history of terrorism. Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. Lesser, I.O. (1999). Countering new terrorism: Implications for strategy. In I.O. Lesser, B. Hoffman, J. Arquilla, D. Ronfelt, & M. Zanini (Eds.), Countering the new terrorism (pp. 85-144). Santa Monica, California: RAND. Lodhi, M. (2011). Beyond the crisis state. In M. Lodhi (Ed.), Pakistan – Beyond the crisis state (pp. 45-78). London: Hurst & Company. Lustgarten, L. & Leigh, I. (1994). In from the cold: National security and parliamentary democracy. Oxford: Clarendon. Lynch, M. (2012). Rhetoric and reality – Countering terrorism in the age of Obama. In R.D. Howard & B. Hoffman (Eds.), Terrorism and counterterrorism – Understanding the new security environment – Readings and interpretations (4th ed.) (pp. 674-707). New York: McGraw-Hill. Martin, K. (2004, April 19). Justice Department fails to address 9/11 intelligence failures. Watching Justice. Retrieved from http://www.cnss.org/Watching%20Justice.pdf Martin, R.A. (1999). The Joint Terrorism Task Force: A concept that works. The Law Enforcement Bulletin, p. 2. McCleskey, E., McCord, D., & Leetz, J. (2002). Underlying reasons for success and failure of terrorist attacks: Selected case studies. Final Report. Arlington, VA: Homeland Security Institute. Memorial – 9/11 Tribute. (2012). New York Police Department. Retrieved February 12, 2012 from home2.nyc.gov/html/nypd/html/memorial/memorial_wtc.shtml Moloney, E. (2002). A secret history of the IRA. London; Penguin Books. Moran, J. & Pythian, M. (2005). In the shadow of 9/11. Crime, Law and Social Change, 44, 327-333.

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CHAPTER EIGHT A DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM (DSS) FOR INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING, PREDICTING AND PREVENTING INTELLIGENCE FAILURE PETER EACHUS AND BEN SHORT UNIVERSITY OF SALFORD

Abstract Intelligence analysis is vital for providing decision makers with accurate, timely and appropriate information. However, there are a number of interacting organisational, social and psychological pathologies that impair successful decision making. A multitude of obstacles stand in the way of the analyst, from deception to their own cognitive biases; these issues may be compounded by other factors such as the hierarchy of an organisation. Since intelligence analysts are faced with difficult questions in a complex problem solving environment, it is very difficult to avoid error and the cost of making a mistake can be very high. The Decision Support System (DSS) aims to aid skilled analysts by providing a structured environment for analysis allied with a wiki to encourage collaboration and transparency of process. Keywords: Cognitive bias, Decision Support System (DSS), intelligence analysis, structured decision making.

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Intelligence Failure Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we don’t know. —Donald Rumsfeld (February 2002 Press Briefing)

According to Johnston (2005) “Intelligence is secret state or group activity to understand or influence foreign or domestic entities” (p. 4). Broadly speaking, this activity is comprised of the gathering of information and the interpretation of that information in order to further the goals of an organisation. Intelligence failure is a failure to achieve the goals stated by Johnston and is most visible when in the form of an unpredicted event. Such failure is, in the view of Hedley (2005), inevitable. Intelligence analysis can be viewed as a system that has a number of identifiable interacting components that can predispose this system to dysfunction. Against a background of uncertainty and deception it is inevitable that such a system would, at times, fail its users. This has happened in the past, and will inevitably happen in the future and therefore we must do all we can to reduce the likelihood of this occurance and to mitigate its impact when it happens again. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the Wall Street crash, the Falklands invasion by Argentina, the Yom Kippur war, the 9/11 World Trade Centre attacks, and the recent banking crisis, were all predictable events, but none were predicted. Each is different but all share the same basis in strategic shock: all were rare events that had an unexpected, wide ranging, and devastating impact (through loss of life, and/or major disruption, and/or impact on social, political and economic confidence). Although these events were not caused by intelligence failure, it was intelligence failure that allowed them to happen. Human beings have evolved to make sense of an uncertain world. Uncertainty is uncomfortable and we are motivated to reduce these feelings of discomfort whenever possible. In much of daily life uncertaintly is nothing more than a minor irritation. Will the car start this morning? Will the train be on time? What shall I have for dinner tonight? More often than not these minor irritations are easily removed or resolved. In other areas of life, uncertainty can have much more serious consequences. Is the person approaching the checkpoint a suicide bomber? Does Iraq have weapons of mass destruction? Is Iran trying to build a nuclear weapons capability? Will there be another banking crisis? Is global

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warming going to make large parts of Bangladesh uninhabitable? How can we deal with the unprecedented effects of flooding in the UK? To deal with this level of uncertainty, policy makers have to ask the right questions at the right time and analysts have to provide intelligence that can help support policy makers in reaching the right decision. As we know, to our cost, this doesn’t always happen. The conventional view of the intelligence analysis process proposes a model that is cyclical (Figure 8-1). According to this model the requirement for intelligence is initiated by policy makers who want specific questions answered to aid them in policy formation. For example, “Do the Iranians have the capability to build a nuclear weapon?” The answer to what seems like a simple question will be complex and multifaceted and analysts will look for information from a variety of sources in order to formulate their response to this question. These sources of information may have differing degrees of reliability and veracity. Agents on the ground, called human intelligence sources (HUMINT), may identify deliveries of materials at specific locations that may be indicative of activitiy that could lead to nuclear capability. Imagery intelligence (IMINT) may identify what looks like reactor buildings from photoreconaissance. Signals intelligence (SIGINT) may pick up messages that are compatible with developing nuclear capability. At the same time, the analyst has to be aware that the government or agencies under observation may be involved in active deception. All of these are potential sources of error in the information gathering process and therefore can contribute to intelligence failure. At the second, analytical, phase there are many sources of failure including those due to individuals, group processes, institutional biases and organisational dysfunction. In the classic model shown in Figure 8-1 it is assumed that the intelligence product produced by the analysts will then be disseminated to the people that need it. There are many factors that can interfere with this, some human, some organisational and some political. These are considered in detail later. Policy makers have to make decisions for all sorts of reasons and intelligence is only one of the factors at play. It should be appreciated that the model shown in Figure 8-1 is highly simplified in terms of the processes involved. Later we will consider how intelligence pathologies can impact on this intelligence cycle and thus impair policy decision making.

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Figure 8-1. The Conventional Model of the Intelligence Cycle and Its Potentional for Failure.

Strategic Shock Many intelligence failures will be low level and of minimal strategic interest. If Somali pirates board a US vessel in the Straits of Hormuz and intelligence analysis had failed to predict this, while it may be of major importance to those on board and their families, strategically it is of little significance and probably will not even be recorded as an intelligence failure. However, where the consequences of an intelligence failure are of strategic importance, analysts may refer to this failure as strategic surprise or strategic shock depending on the impact of the event. Strategic shock may be defined in different ways (e.g. Schwartz & Randall 2011, Richards, 2010) but the general consensus appears to be that for an event to qualify as a strategic shock it must be of low probability and have massive, fundamental and widespread impact. As Schwartz and Randall (2011) observe, “Strategic shocks suddenly and irrevocably change the rules of the game, as well as the contours and composition of the playing surface itself” (Schwartz & Randall, 2011, p. 5). Above all else a strategic shock represents a failure of the systems that should have predicted it, in other words, an intelligence failure. To expand

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this idea, Freier (2008) argues that strategic shocks are not so much failures in prediction, but rather they should be conceptualised as failures of the systems used by the strategy and policy communities. Freier also distinguishes between strategic shock and strategic surprise based on its outcome and disruption for the authorities concerned. For example Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait was a strategic surprise, but for the USA, at least, it was not a strategic shock. In the USA there was no need for a fundamental reorientation of defence strategy or priorities as a result. The September 11th attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. (9/11) were both a strategic shock and a strategic surprise as the US Military had to react and mobilise initiatives to fight a war against terrorism and reassure social and economic confidence. More recently, the Icelandic volcano erruption posed a strategic shock to air-travel and the impact of this was a widespread shut down of air travel with little contingency planning. Thousands of people were stranded imposing critical loading on existing infrastructures and resources whilst also compromising the integrity of social and economic activities that they should have contributed to back home. Although strategic shock is often dicussed in terms of military or intelligence failures it has also been used in the context of business activity. Ansoff (1976) draws an interesting distinction when considering how companies should deal with the threat of strategic shock. Taking as an example a fire fighting company, unable to predict or control the outbreak of fires (strategic shock), it prepares for the inevitable by repeated practice and this allows it to respond quickly and effectively to a whole range of different alarms. An alternative approach is to try to deal with the problem before it occurs, like one does with fire prevention - identify fire hazards and install smoke alarms and sprinkler systems. In this way the likelihood of the fire (strategic shock) occuring, and the damage that might be caused, is thereby minimized. Both approaches are useful but anticipatory strategic preparedness might be considered more effective than crisis management; therefore, this is the approach being described here. Consider the analogy of a population faced with a potential attack from a dangerous group. How might they protect themselves from this threat? They could attempt to learn as much as possible about the group that poses a threat - Where do they live? What are their beliefs? What do they want? - and so on. With sufficient knowledge the population under threat might be able to mitigate the dangers and thus ensure their own survival. This strategy is probably quite effective, but it is complex and costly. As

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an alternative they could just erect a barrier, real or virtual, to keep themselves separated from the threat of the dangerous group. Simple, cheap and very effective. The same is true of attacks and threats that lead to strategic shock. We can embark on research to try to understand the nature of unknown threats: How do such threats arise? What are the triggers? How can they be best predicted? While this is the basis of intelligence analysis, the process is complex, costly and very unlikely to be 100% effective. Another solution to this problem, to stretch the analogy further, is to erect a barrier to protect ourselves from the potential threats that we may face. No barrier will be 100% effective and therefore we need to build in alarm systems that will highlight weaknesses and point to vulnerabilities before the possibility of strategic shock becomes real. These alarm systems are the basis of the Decision Support System (DSS). A discussion of Complex and Adaptive Systems will provide a framework for the DSS model.

Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) are systems that have large numbers of components, usually referred to as agents, that interact, adapt, learn and evolve (Holland, 2006). The human brain, an ant colony, an evolving embryo, an ecosystem, an economy and to some extent the intelligence community are all examples of Complex Adaptive Systems (for an overview of different types of CAS, the Complex Adaptive Systems Group has an excellent web site http://www.cas-group.net/). What CAS have in common are properties that allow them to change their stucture and function over time and in response to changes that occur both within, and outside of themselves. A CAS can be represented diagramatically (as in Figure 8-2). In this system the agents are the components that make up the system, e.g. the flora and fauna in an ecosystem or brain cells in the human brain, or even individual companies in an economy. The agents of the CAS shown in Figure 8-2 are connected to and interact with each other in ways that are unplanned and with consequences that are unpredictable. For example in a weather system the agents might be the molecules of water in the atmosphere over New York. These molecules interact with the world’s weather system to produce regularities and patterns that ultimately result, through prevailing winds and precipitation, in a downpour over Manchester in the UK a few days later. This rain, in turn, evaporates back into the atmosphere providing

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atmospheric changes and feedback for the weather system that then adapts further. The complexity of such a system, and the emergent properties that are unpredictable, make such systems extremely difficult to model; hence the unpredictabilty of the weather! Figure 8-2. A Complex Adaptive System (adapted from Fryer, 2011)

Complex adaptive systems all share certain properties which can be summarised thus: x Emergent behaviour: The behaviour that results from the complex non-linear interactions of the agents emerges from this process and is inherently unpredictable. x Adaptive: The feedback structures that are characteristic of CAS gives them the ability to change in ways that promote survival in an ever changing environment (Marten, 2001). x Specialisation: The agents that make up a CAS can have specialised features, for example different neurons in the brain, or different departments in an organisation. Despite this specialisation, in a CAS, these agents work as part of the larger system to maximize function.

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x Dynamic Change: In order to adapt to the constantly changing environment in which they operate, a CAS must be dynamic, responding to feedback within the system and evolving in a way that enhances performance and ensures survival. In some ways the intelligence community in the USA can be likened to a Complex Adaptive System, although not always in a flattering way: “The Intelligence Community is an exemplar, even if not a healthy one, of a truly complex adaptive system” (Cooper, 2005, p. 1). The diverse agencies have a wide range of functions, complicated organisational arrangements and working practices that make understanding it using traditional systems approaches, very problematic. Rather, Cooper (2005) suggests, it is better to conceptualise the system as an ecosphere, with many complex interrelationships between the agents, non-linear dynamic feedback loops and constant adaptations to changes in conditions and pressures. The extent to which the US intelligence community has been unable to adapt to changes following the end of the Cold War is only too apparent by the publically acknowledged intelligence failures. When Complex Adaptive Systems fail, against a background of uncertainty and threat, then an event that could be categorised as strategic shock is a distinct possibility. Fukuyama (2007) argues that it is the elements of the CAS that are likely to fail and therefore increase the likelihood of strategic shock. Specifically, Fukuyama (2007) warns that it is failures in cognitive resources, institutional weaknesses and the dangers resident in shared mental models (groupthink) that all contribute to the tendency to avoid even considering the possibility of strategic shock, with the inevitable consequences.

A Systems Model of Strategic Shock In the model proposed in this chapter (Figure 8-3), we suggest that strategic shock occurs through a combination of organisational, social and psychological pathologies that interact and lead to failure when faced with uncertainty or threat. These pathologies are themselves the result of contributing agents that are represented as the smaller circles; p1 – pN represents the psychopathologies, o1 – oN represents organisational pathologies, and s1– sN represents social pathologies. The straight lines are indicative of a direct impact by these agents on their respective pathology. The curved lines indicate where agents that contribute to a particular pathology may interact, dynamically, with each other, as well as with the agents that contribute to the other pathologies.

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Figure 8-3. A Model of Strategic Shock

The exact nature and number of the agents that contribute to these pathologies, and therefore ultimately strategic shock, is unknown and will differ from one situation to another. Our model starts with the assumption that, unless all potential threats dissappear, given sufficient time, strategic shock is 100% likely to happen. The likelihood of strategic shock can be reduced by identifying the agents and pathologies responsible for the vulnerabilities in the system and then implementing a process designed to mitigate the impact of these pathologies. The second assumption being made is that the different pathologies contribute to the likelihood of strategic shock in different ways but that they can be related probabilistically using Bayesian modelling (e.g. McNaught, et al, 2005). Therefore our model will allow for the eventual Bayesian estimation of the relative contributions of the different agents and pathologies.(i.e. their weightings and the probability of a particular

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agent or pathology contributing to the overall likelihood of strategic shock). It is acknowledged that any organisation, or field of expertise, is likely to be affected in different ways by a variety of factors from both within and without the organisation. For example, individual judgmental biases within and external political events. The success or failure of that organisation will be influenced to different extents by different combinations of agents, and so the model needs to be flexible to the users’ needs.

The Pathologies Organisational pathologies. Organizational pathologies are the characteristics of organisations that make them dysfunctional. At the macro level, organisations can reveal many pathologies that can result in poor performance but of themselves may or may not lead to strategic shock. Examples include failure to innovate, unwillingness to acknowledge the threats posed by competitors, outdated management styles, poor communications, inappropriate organisational structures, poor leadership, lack of strategic alignment, and high levels of stress. Garicano and Posner (2005) have examined, from an organisational perspective, two recent failures of the United State’s intelligence system, the failure to prevent the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the mistaken belief that Saddam Hussein had retained weapons of mass destruction. Many organisations, including those that deal with intelligence, have a hierarchical structure that facilitates the aggregation of information. At the lowest level in the hierarchy, agents (analysts) will have information which they can combine with information from others before passing a summary of that information up the hierarchy. Different levels of expertise within the hierarchy ensures that the information is dealt with at an appropriate level allowing for optimal matching of problems with expertise, what has been called “management by exception” (Garicano, 2000). The process of generating intelligence can be considered a hierarchy with four levels (Figure 8-4) and organisational problems can be found both within and between these four levels.

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Figure 8-4. The Hierarchical Cycle of Intelligence Analysis

At the lowest level in this hierarchy we have the agents that deal with intelligence collection. This might include agents in the field or informers (HUMINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), intelligence derived from measurement and signatures (MASINT), or even open source intelligence (OSINT). Intelligence analysts will have to make a judgment on the veracity of information received from these sources but this is not an organisational issue. What is an organisational issue is the fact that different analysts working in different parts of the organisation may or may not have access to the same sources of information. This will only happen if the organisation is structured to facilitate the sharing of information. One of the main criticisms of the performance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by the 9/11 Commission (2004) was that its organisational structure, centred on local offices, made it unsuitable for domestic intelligence gathering and dissemination. Consider the example of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), one of the main precursors to the invasion of Iraq. If a number of different analysts were using different sources of information that all suggested that Saddam Hussein did have access to WMD, then this would be a good indicator of a threat. But if the apparently “different” sources could in fact

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be traced back to a single source (“Curveball”, an Iraqi defector), then, although the analysts and their superiors may believe they are accessing different intelligence sources, they are not. Therefore, these indicators become much less credible. But how would the analysts know this, unless they had access to shared sources whose veracity could be validated. In their paper, Garicano and Posner (2005) argue that all items of intelligence should be uniquely tagged, thus allowing analysts at different levels in the hierarchy or different positions in the organisation access to the original sources on which reports have been prepared. It would then be possible to determine if a particular report was based on multiple intelligence sources, thus giving it high credibility, or whether it was based on multiple reports from a single source, giving it low credibility. Considering that there may be multiple intelligence organisations involved with a particular problem, these organisational difficulties are compounded. In hierarchical organisations the performance of those lower down the hierarchy is usually evaluated by those in a higher position; this too can create a number of problems, for example downward pressure to conform to the beliefs of those above in the hierachy. One of the most dramatic examples of this problem was the Soviet Union’s failure to anticipate Hitler’s invasion in 1941. There was intelligence suggesting that Hitler was going to invade and Stalin’s subordinates were aware of it but they were too afraid to contradict Stalin who was convinced Hitler would not invade. Hierarchical dominance of this type can be very damaging to the free flow of information through hierarchies. As we will see later, sometimes organisations are structured in this way, in order to enable those at the top to control the movement of information. Another example of this hierarchical problem can be found in the WMD Commission report (WMD Commission, 2005) where it was found that in the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq, a number of lowlevel intelligence officers in the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) did express doubt about the veracity of the information from Curveball. Unfortunately, their superiors disagreed and the view that was eventually presented amounted to a sanitised version of the analysts’ reports that failed to reveal the diversity of opinion at the lower levels. With this type of hierarchical organisation, where incentives, promotions and personal judgments are integral to the structure, then it will always be difficult for an individual lower in the hierarchy to suggest a view that is contrary to those higher in the hierarchy. This type of structure is perhaps not well suited to organisations where the free flow of information is vital for the functioning of that organisation.

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Hierarchical structures are also vulnerable to the politicisation of intelligence estimates with policy makers demanding that the intelligence they receive is congruent or “on message” with their existing policy objectives. Rossmiller (2008) who worked in military intelligence in Baghdad and as a civilian in the Pentagon, cites numerous examples of this problem. In a similar vein Goodman (2008) argues that the politicisation of the intelligence process by CIA director William Casey and his deputy Robert Gates during the 1980s was a major contributor to intelligence failures during this period. During that time, the Reagan administration had a strong policy agenda that saw the Soviet Union as the “evil empire” and they wanted to end detente, arms control and generally create more active anti-Soviet policies in order to deal with the Soviet threat. To facilitate this, there was a systematic slanting of intelligence collection and analysis to serve these policy interests. In reality, the Soviet Union was in disarray, economically, socially and militarily, and close to collapse. Because of the politicisation of intelligence analysis driven by a skewed policy agenda, the final collapse of the Soviet Union was never predicted by the intelligence community in the USA. The extent to which these organisational pathologies can be identified and mitigated by technology remains to be seen. It is interesting to note that both the WMD and the 9/11 Commissions noted that information technology can be utilised to improve intelligence analysis, especially in terms of sharing information. However it was also reported that to gain the greatest benefit from information technology, organisations may need to restructure, to become more decentralised and less hierarchical. Decision making should be delgated to those employees on the frontline because they are the ones with the most immediate access to the information on which decisions are made. Giving these frontline employees information technology that facilitates the sharing of information must be beneficial but it will be pointless if the same organsational structures that have promoted hierarchical disincentives to sharing and turf wars between different segments of the intelligence community are maintained. The Decision Support System discussed later will never be a panacea for the organisational pathologies that can lead to intelligence failure. What the DSS will do however, is alert users to where an organisational issue may be a potential threat. Socio-pathologies. Socio-pathologies are the characteristics of social systems that lead to dysfunction in group performance. A very common example of a social pathology is groupthink that occurs when a group makes faulty decisions because group pressures lead to a deterioration of

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“mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment” (Janis, 1972, p. 9). Groups affected by groupthink ignore alternatives and tend to take irrational actions that dehumanize other groups. A group is especially vulnerable to groupthink when its members are similar in background, when the group is insulated from outside opinions, and when there are no clear rules for decision making. Janis (1982) has argued that a number of failures in US policy (e.g. Pearl Harbour, Bay of Pigs, the escalation of the war in Vietnam and the ill-fated hostage rescue mission in Iran) can be directly attributed to the consequences of groupthink. Other examples of socio-pathologies include deindividuation where membership of a group leads to reduced self awareness which in turn may lead to more impulsive behaviour. Conversely, social inhibition may be seen whereby an individual feels pressured to conform to group norms due to a fear of social disapproval. Pressures to conform to group norms and the desires of those above in the hierarchy may be compounded by groupserving bias (essentially a group form of self-serving bias) where group members will attribute the success of their group to dispositional factors such as good working practices, and group failure to situational factors such as inadequate equipment or failures of an another group. Group members will tend to exhibit the opposite trend when assessing the reasons for success and failure of groups that they are not a member of. In addition, in-group-out-group bias may lead to inaccurate assessment of the performance of groups, inflating assessment of groups which the individual is a member and reducing assessment of groups which the individual is not a member. Other effects of working in groups include social facilitation which predicts that individuals will perform better on simple tasks when part of a group while the audience effect predicts a decrease in performance on more complex tasks in the same situation. Another group effect is socialloafing where individuals in groups may work less hard on the assumption that others in the group will carry their workload. This may be compounded by diffusion of responsibility where group members are less likely to take responsibility on the assumption that others will do so. These socio-pathologies do not operate in isolation and in many instances will occur together. For example groupthink might make risky decisions more likely, but diffusion of responsibility makes this more acceptable. Group-serving bias is also relevant in this type of situation. Looking at groupthink in detail, a number of identifiable charateristics have been associated with the phenomenon. These include an illusion of invulnerability characterised by excessive optimism and extreme risk taking. Collective rationalisation occurs when members of the group

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discount warnings and refuse to reconsider their assumptions. Members of the group will be put under direct pressure by other group members not to express opinions that are contrary to the group’s views, what is sometimes called “going off message”. Self-appointed “mindguards” seek to protect the group and the leadership from information that is problematic or contradictory to the group’s view. When all or some of these characteristics exist in a group which is trying to make an important decision, especially if that group is highly cohesive and under pressure, then this can lead to careless and irrational thinking, a failure to consider all the alternatives and an almost overwhelming need to maintain unanimity. Decisions made under these circumstances have a low probability of achieving successful outcomes. A classic example of this socio-pathology in action is the almost unanimous decsion by the intelligence community that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Garicano and Posner (2005) argue that the accumulated information and conclusions reached by the Bush administration and their intelligence advisors acquired such a strong momentum that it could not be successfully challenged and therefore the invasion of Iraq became inevitable. Although groupthink is a social phenomenon, it can also be a product of organizational dysfunction. Structures with poorly designed systems for communication and information sharing are particularly at risk. Similarly, incentive systems that inhibit the sharing of information with out-groups may also create vulnerabilities. A further complication is that while a particular form of organization may be optimal for one type of function, for example criminal investigation, the same structure may not be optimal for another type of function, for example counter terrorism intelligence analysis. In examining how organisational dysfunction can lead to sociopathologies like groupthink, the FBI is often cited (WMD Commission 2005, 9/11 Commission 2004). Essentially the FBI is characterised by a decentralised organisation in which FBI headquarters delegates the responsibility for initiating and conducting investigations to local field offices. These “offices of origin” will control criminal investigations even where the criminal behaviour might overlap into the jurisdiction of a neighbouring office. As long as the criminal activities under investigation remain localised, as most do, this decentralised structure works well since local offices are best placed to make use of local knowledge in their investigations. Unfortunately, international terrorism is not a local activity and dealing with it effectively requires information sharing across

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geographical and organisational boundaries. The decentralised structure of the FBI is dysfunctional in this respect. Another socio-pathological feature that is social in nature but is derived from a hierarchical structure involves the incentivisation of work. In many orgainsations the use of incentives to improve individual performance is commonplace. If a person is selling cars then it seems quite reasonable that the more cars they sell the greater the reward they will receive. Incentives can also be used appropriately to reward group effort, as well as the effort of individual members of that group. For example in a professional football team, the whole team may receive a bonus if the team wins, but individuals may receive additional bonuses to reward individual contribution, for example in scoring goals. However even in the sporting analogy difficulties are recognised. Individual players may be greedy with the ball preferring to try to score goals themselves when, from a team perspective, sharing the ball may have been better for overall performance. We have a similar problem when intelligence services try to emulate other types of organisations and use incentives to boost performance. Where individual perfromance is rewarded through incentive schemes and where those higher up the hierarchy make judgments on those lower down, the temptation is for individuals to “protect” the intelligence they have, and to limit as far as possible the sharing of this intelligence with others who might benefit at their expense. Taken to its logical conclusion we end up with “turf wars” where different parts of the intelligence communities refuse, or at least severely limit, the extent to which they share information and co-operate with others. This is a good example of how sociopathologies and organisational pathologies interact to lead to dysfunction within the organisation. Psycho-pathologies. Psycho-pathologies are the characteristics of individuals that may lead to dysfunctionality. Psychologists have identified many characteristics that might lead to sub-optimal peformance in many different domains. For example, Eachus (1993) found that investment analysts showed high levels of attributional bias which resulted in them believing they were perfoming better than they actually were. Attributional biases are a set of biases which effect the way that people determine responsibility for events. Actors in events have different information available to them than observers, most obviously their own internal state at the time of events. This is linked to the availability heuristic which is the tendency to judge the probablity of an event on the basis of how easy it is to think of examples of that kind of event. Other examples of psycho-pathologies include: affirmation bias, the tendency to

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say yes rather than no; confirmation bias, seeking information which confirms a hypothesis as opposed to information which disproves it; and hindsight bias, where an outcome is judged to be much more obvious than it actually was once the events have unfolded. A call for an appreciation of the psychological factors which may lead to incorrect analysis within the intelligence community dates back to at least the late 1970’s with Heuer, who strongly advocated a recognition of and reaction to cognitive biases in intelligence analysis (Heuer, 2006). There have been, as a result, some suggestions for best practice for analysis. For example Heuer and Pherson (2011) advocate externalizing internal thought processes so that they may be shared and evaluated. Broadly speaking, the intelligence community has reacted to the presence of psychological biases by seeking methods to reduce or remove them. There has been a good amount of research in the area of cognitive biases and heuristics, notably by Tversky and Kahneman who won a Nobel Prize for their work (see Kahneman, 2003 for a summary). They argue that human reasoning rests upon two separate but interacting systems, System 1 and System 2. The first, System 1, makes quick intuitive decisions while the second, System 2, deals with slower, more rational reasoning and also acts as a moderator for System 1 monitoring the quality of mental operations and their outputs. The exact mechanism by which this happens is not defined in their model. Intuitive reasoning is largely based in System 1 and provides quick answers. This can be highly effective for solving problems of a kind that are frequently encountered. Intuitive reasoning is very useful for everyday reasoning, especially if time is a factor. However human perception and memory are affected by expectation, as can be seen by tricks which may affect these systems. Visual illusion and the possibility of manipulating memory, including the creation of false memories (e.g. Loftus & Pickrell, 1995) are examples. Heavy reliance on heuristics sited in System 1 is problematic. System 2 reasoning, according to Kahneman (2003), is symbol based, rule governed and serial in nature. This makes it slower and much more effortful than System 1 reasoning but means that it is not prone to psychological biases caused by the use of heuristics (as described earlier). The problems inherent in System 1 reasoning are likely to be compounded in intelligence analysis where the analyst may be deliberately deceived and often does not have all the relevant information in their possession (even if it is theoretically available). Confirmation bias is one example of the kind of problem that is created by these predispositions but is by no means the only one. Some of the known biases in reasoning are discussed below. It is important to note here that, since use of System 2 is

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more demanding the higher the cognitive demands placed on an individual the more likely it is that System 2 will fail to regulate System 1 properly, leading to what might be described as a loss of quality control. Consequently the highly demanding activity of intelligence analysis needs support both in and of itself and also in order to try and keep cognitive demand at a level such that System 2 can properly regulate System 1. Intuitive reasoning based in System 1 seems to involve a number of shortcuts or heuristics which are useful in many situations but which can be problematic when dealing with complex analysis. Known cognitive biases that interfere with the effectiveness of System 1 processes include framing effects where presentation of identical probabilities result in different choices, confirmation bias in which people attend more to information which confirms their intuition, and hindsight bias where past events are deemed to be more predictable than they actually were. Judgment heuristics have been demonstrated by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Kahneman (2003). These include representativeness where probability judgments are mediated by resemblance to known examples; availability where estimates of probability are affected by the ease with which instances and associations come to mind, and anchoring where initial values disproportionately affect subsequent estimates. While the intuitive feeling associated with System 1 reasoning is seductive, these effects and biases have been demonstrated with a number of professionals and academics whose training should enable them to make better judgments. While the presence of biases is well established, as Larrick (2004) points out, there is less consensus on the reasons for this, and consequently how we may debias our reasoning. Larrick suggests (following Stanovich 1999) that opinion on debiasing tends to be polarized into Meliorists and Apologists. Meliorists argue that, while everyday reasoning is imperfect, it can be improved by experience and education. On the other hand, Apologists argue that everyday reasoning is, in fact, well adapted to naturalistic judgments and that normative standards are unachievable because of the tasks involved (e.g. Bayesian probability) are too unnatural. Larrick, reasonably enough, argues that these two camps necessarily differ on what should be done about cognitive biases, with the Meliorists seeking to improve cognitive strategies and the Apologists suggesting that decision tasks should be framed in ways which better suit evolutionarily adapted strategies. Whichever viewpoint is correct, there are clearly a set of problems which need to be addressed in intelligence analysis, which is hardly a routine task.

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Therefore it seems sensible to try and offer support in improving the accuracy of intelligence analysis insofar as we can. Larrick (2004) suggests that some facets of System 2 reasoning may be effectively moved into System 1 by training, but even if this is possible the fact of some significant intelligence failures suggests that even highly trained and highly skilled analysts are still prone to errors of reasoning. There are a number of strategies that have been argued to help us reduce innate bias, including simply considering the opposite, which turns out to be a surprisingly effective strategy against a sub-set of biases including the law of large numbers, the sunk cost rule, overconfidence, hindsight bias and anchoring effects. Soll and Klayman (2004) expand this technique by asking participants to consider confidence at two ends of a scale and an estimate of midpoint. They argue that this increases the amount of information considered, thus reducing the natural tendency to consider too narrow a range. Interestingly they also demonstrate that having too narrow an estimate causes more error than too wide an estimate due to the nature of the normal distribution; a natural tendency towards too narrow a range is more problematic than either too wide a range or a random distribution of error direction. Another means of reducing System 1 errors is to frame questions in a format more amenable to normal reasoning. For example Sedlmeier (1999) had some success in teaching participants to reframe probabilistic information into a frequency format, so they reframed a 20% probability as a 1 in 5 chance. This technique yielded an improvement in reasoning using conditional probabilities and Bayes’ rule. Furthermore, participants demonstrated transference of these strategies to novel probability questions. So clearly, how a question is framed can be of considerable importance in properly answering it. Thus, it may be beneficial to encourage analysts to rephrase questions into a format which is more amenable to estimation of frequency. One means supporting intelligence analysts to reduce their error is by technological intervention. Since in-depth reasoning using System 2 is effortful, it perhaps makes sense to support the process as much as possible in order to both relieve cognitive demand and to also facilitate learning strategies which may allow some reasoning patterns to be shifted into System 1. At the worst we are aiding the process and at best aiding it and allowing a shift of some System 2 reasoning into System 1. However checks and balances are likely to be needed as the idea that any single strategy will always be the correct one is fanciful.

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Impact of Groups on Individual Decision Making There are clear advantages of working in a group (increased knowledge multiple perspectives and so on), however group membership leads to the presence of socio-pathologies as mentioned earlier. So how do we maximize the benefits of working in a group? Using averages of individual group member judgments has been shown to be a powerful means of reducing individual error. However this benefit is fragile for two key reasons. First, it is highly dependent on the group consisting of individuals who do not have shared training and experiences. Second, the effects of other factors at both a social and individual level may make individual estimates by members of a given group less independent than one might imagine. This has tended to make co-located group idea generation (i.e., brainstorming) ineffective. Despite its popularity in the fields of intelligence analysis and business organizations, and the notion that ideas are somehow sparked off each other, idea generation in groups is much more effective when the group is nominal (i.e. comprised of people working apart) rather than actual (i.e. the group is in a room together). Mullen, Johnson, and Salas (1991) conducted a meta-analysis of 20 studies and found that “It appears to be particularly difficult to justify brainstorming techniques in terms of any performance outcomes, and the long-lived popularity of brainstorming techniques is unequivocally and substantively misguided” (p. 16). Furthermore they found that the main factors in productivity loss due to brainstorming are social psychological. That is to say, idea generation is more effective as an essentially nonsocial activity. There are a number of social psychological phenomena which may affect group idea generation. For example, social loafing occurs particularly when the individual effort is not monitored. Another well documented effect is that of evaluation apprehension, where some individuals are less likely to contribute ideas in a group setting due to fear of looking foolish. Sadly, simply telling people that no ideas are bad and that “anything goes” does not seem to remove this effect. There are also some factors that, while they aren't purely social in nature, are brought into play by group work. For example, research into creativity by Smith, Ward and Schumacher (1993) showed that giving people examples in idea generation could significantly affect the things that they come up with. Essentially, the presence of exemplars constrains our thinking and therefore reduces creativity. When working in a group, the suggestions of others may act in the same way as exemplars in that study. Therefore, there is an argument that, initially at least, it may be

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preferable to keep analysts apart, essentially adopting the opposite approach to that suggested by advocates of collaborative working. Technology offers an opportunity to facilitate together-yet-apart group work, allowing individuals to formulate hypotheses, judgments, and estimates independently, before entering into collaborative work. A wiki is essentially a website which allows its user to add, modify, or delete its content via a web browser. This format creates a dynamic system in which users are encouraged to engage in an ongoing process of creation and collaboration. Wikis are commonly used by communities, businesses, and academics, generally for the purpose of knowledge management. The most famous example of a wiki is Wikipedia, an online encyclopaedia. Wikis provide a simple, cheap and effective tool for this kind of activity. Also, since they monitor individual contributions, Wikis also provide a means of measuring that contribution.

Reaction to Intelligence Failure When examining analysis, problems, as compared to successes, are more likely to be noticed and dissected following failure. Theories about how things might be improved are bound to follow. In the psychological literature, such speculation about how things might have been done differently is termed counterfactual thinking. Byrne (2002) states that counterfactuals are more likely to be generated following bad outcomes. In addition, they are predominantly upward in direction; they are likely to posit an improved outcome if some factor had been changed. Byrne also argues that events that are within control and a first cause amongst other factors are more likely to be examined as a possible change in counterfactual reasoning. Perhaps this set of cognitive biases leads to a predisposition to believe that, in the context of intelligence analysis, if more information had been gathered things would have turned out better. Hindsight bias (Fischoff & Beyth, 1975) makes us more likely to believe that we could have predicted past events. This, along with the obvious tendency to assume that more must be better, may explain why there are persistent calls for more intelligence, despite a body of evidence which has shown that it was analysis, not information, which was lacking in notable intelligence failures. While it is true that a sufficient quantity and quality of data is necessary for successful analysis, reports examining both the attacks on 9/11 and the 7th of July bombings in London found that information that could have prevented intelligence failure was available prior to both events. One can conclude that availability of information is not the only factor in play here. The issue of signal to noise ratio, the

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visibility of the desired information amongst all available information, is well established in the literature following the attack on Pearl Harbour (Levite, 1987). So gathering more information may be a hindrance to successful analysis in some instances.

Towards a Decision Support System for Intelligence Analysts In an ideal world, organisations would not be dysfunctional, socio- and psycho-pathologies would be eliminated, and intelligence analysis would be “pure” and uncontaminated. Failures of intelligence would still occur but this would not be the result of these pathologies. Rather, they might be due to lack of information, deception, or just poor analysis. Users may not be able to do much about the organisational structure they are working within, but an awareness of the way this structure might impact on their decision making and that of their colleagues could help them make better decisions. Similarly, an awareness of socio- and psycho-pathologies will help mitigate the influence these pathologies may have on the decision making process. A decision support system (DSS) is a tool which is intended to enhance the quality of decisions. According to Keen (1978) the concept of the decision support system can be traced back to the work carried out at the Carnegie Institute of Technology in the late 1950s and early 1960s so the concept is not new. However the development of decision support systems has gained ground as computer power has increased over the past 50 years or so. Data processing by a computer allows analysis and representation which would be very time comsuming to conduct by hand. Since the context of decision making is variable, there is no single best approach to providing support for decisions, but generally some sort of automation of difficult tasks and simplification of complex information would be involved. In the context of the systems approach discussed here, this means that the impact of the pathologies described above needs to be acknowledged and mitigated. These pathologies have very different origins and as such it would be unlikely that a single solution will be available for this mitigation. As we have seen, these pathologies may interact, and there are also elements that operate in isolation. This creates a system of considerable complexity leading to a level of unpredicatbility which makes the development of a DSS that will manage all of these pathologies and their possible interactions unlikely. However, an understanding and awareness of the components of the system should

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enable analysts to considerably improve their ability to account for the pathologies described earlier in this chapter. The DSS is best considered as an interactive workspace where problems and possible solutions can be explored. The current prototype is accessible as a webpage which could be hosted either on the internet or on any intranet to provide stronger access control. The core of the DSS requires next to no training but depending on the components added to form a toolkit, training may be required for their use. The DSS will not provide answers to difficult problems; only analysts can do that. What it can do is provide the challenges and tools that will help analysts work more effectively on these difficult problems – avoiding organizational, socio- and psycho-pathologies - and arrive at solutions that are objective, transparent and relevant. The approach taken in the development of the DSS described here is to provide a system that will aid the user in mitigating against the pathologies discussed. This system is based on a structured approach to intelligence analysis (Clark, 2009; Heuer & Pherson, 2011) with the aim of providing individual analysts with a tool that will enhance their objectivity, encourage clarity and transparency in their thinking, and, as a consequence, increase the rigour of their intelligence products. As well as being aware of the challenges they face, analysts can also be provided with tools that will help them meet these challenges. For example, mindmapping software can help the analyst structure the problem in a way that will facilitate better understanding and creative problem solving by creating a visual outline of information under consideration. Software for the analysis of competing hypotheses is readily available and could also be included in the toolkit. Visualisation is being increasingly used for dealing with large complex datasets, this allows information to be grouped in compact representations, thus reducing search space for the user as well as allowing it to be organized and simplified and via abstractions and aggregation (Dunne, Shneiderman, Gove, Klavans, & Dorr, 2011). An example of visualisation software used in the DSS is Invisique developed at Middlesex University (http://www.invisque.mdx.ac.uk/). Similarly, software for the analyis of social networks can help analysts better understand threats that eminate from groups by identifying relationships beteween individuals and groups which may not be immediately obvious, as well as identifying individuals who mediate contact between several groups. Although the DSS does provide access to this type of tool, it is recognised that individual analysts may have their preferred tools and provision is made for the incorporation of these into the toolkit.

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It has been reported extensively (WMD Commission, 2005; 9/11 Commission 2004 ) that the sharing of information and collaborative working is vital for good intelligence analysis. This DSS recognises this issue and allows users to associate with others to varying degrees, although the wiki allows individuals to work in isolation if required. However, by using wiki technology, problems can be worked on collaboratively with immediate colleagues or even more extensively with other organisations that may or may not be in the host country. In Figure 8-5, a screen shot of the DSS as implemented on a webpage is shown. The drop down menu shown incorporates ideas on redefinition of the issue for analysis suggested by Heuer and Pherson (2011). Towards the left of the screen are a series of drop down menus that present the user with a series of challenges for dealing with a particular intelligence analysis problem. Each of these challenges is provided with a wiki based text box in which the user can post responses to the challenges posed. These posts can be shared or not as the individual analyst desires. As the analyst responds to these challenges, either collaboratively or individually, they will become aware of the pathologies (defined in another drop down menu) that may impact on their decision making, and will be guided into responses that help mitigate the influence of these pathologies. This is the essence of structured intelligence analysis. The first drop down menu presents challenges associated with starting to work on a particular intelligence problem. The user is asked questions like “Why is this intelligence needed?” or “Why is this important?” and “Has this question been answered before?” These and other similar questions are aimed at challenging the basis on which the intelligence analysis is to be carried out. Moving across the menus from left to right, the next menu the user finds is headed pathologies. The purpose of this is to explain what the different types of pathologies are and how they might impact on analysis and decision making. The next menu is a checklist of key questions the user needs to ask before continuing with the analysis itself. These include asking “Who is the intelligence product is for?” “Would graphics help convey the message?” “What is the key intelligence question?” and so on. We would expect experienced analysts to be asking these questions anyway, though not perhaps in this form. It is the use of the checklist that makes the process more objective and transparent.

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Figure 8-5. Screen Shot of the Home Page of the DSS

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Continuing across the screen the next menu deals with redefinition of the problem. The purpose of this section is to ensure that the problem that is to be worked on is actually the problem that needs to be worked on. Redefinition or reframing of the problem can be a powerful tool that can help avoid mission creep whereby the goals of the analysis are extended beyond their original scope and ambition, helping the analyst to focus on the real problem as new hypotheses are formulated. Towards the right side of the screen the drop down menus provide access to a variety of tools for the analysis of the intelligence data. These include tools for Network Analysis, Mapping, Visualisation and Analysis of Matrices. Guidance is also provided on a number of useful analytic techniques such as red team analysis where a group of analysts are tasked with challenging plans and assumptions, scenario generation and force field analysis which seeks to identify the factors acting and against a given analytical outcome. There is also a Workspace where colleagues can work collaboratively on a problem. We believe that by designing the DSS in this way it will be suitable for both experienced and less experienced analysts. We would recommend that intially all analysts should work through the challenges presented in the menus of the DSS, but with increasing experience, users will be able to identify the most relevant challenges to work through for a particular type of problem. Further work will be focussed on case studies that analysts can use to become proficient with DSS. This will help analysts learn how to use the DSS as well as provide real world examples that will enhance the ecological validity of the tool.

References Ansoff, I.H. (1976). Managing surprise and discontinuity – Strategic response to weak signals. Zeitschrift Für Betriebswirtschaft. 28(3), 129-152. Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Mental models and counterfactual thoughts about what might have been. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(10), 426-431. Clark, R.M. (2009). Intelligence analysis: A target centred approach. 3rd Edition. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. Cooper, J.R. (2005). Curing analytic pathologies: Pathways to improved intelligence analysis. Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505. Accessed 9.6.2011 at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-

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publications/books-and-monographs/curing-analytic-pathologiespathways-to-improved-intelligence-analysis-1/title_page.htm Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (2005). Report of Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf Eachus, P. (1993). The irrational behaviour of investment professionals: Masters of the universe or masters of delusion? Paper presented at the annual conference of the British Psychological Society, Easter, Blackpool. Fischhoff, B. & Beyth, R. (1975). I knew it would happen: Remembered probabilities of once-future things. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 13, 1-16. Freier, N. (2008). Known unknowns: Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in defence strategy development. Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Army War College (U.S.). Fryer, P (2011). A brief description of Complex Adaptive Systems and Complexity Theory by Peter Fryer, accessed 9.6.2011 at http://www.trojanmice.com/index.htm Fukuyama, F (2007). The challenges of uncertainty: An introduction. In F. Fukuyama (Ed.), Blindside: How to anticipate forcing events and wild cards in global politics. An American Interests Book, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Garicano, L. (2000). Hierarchies and the organisation of knowledge in production. Journal of Political Economy. 108(5), 874-904. Garicano, L. & Posner, R.A. (2005). Intelligence failures: An organisational economics perspective. Centre for Economic Policy Research. Available online at: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP5186.asp Gove, R., Dunne, C., Shneiderman, B., Klavans, J. & Dorr, B. (2011). Evaluating visual and statistical exploration of scientific literature networks. In IEEE Symposium on Visual Languages and HumanCentric Computing, 217 -224. Hedley, J.H. (2005). Learning from intelligence failures. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 18, 435-450. Heuer, R.J. (2006). Psychology of intelligence analysis. New York: Novinka. Heuer, R.J.Jr. & Pherson R.H. (2011). Structured analytic techniques for intelligence analysis. Washington D.C.: CQ Press.

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Holland, J. H. (2006). Studying complex adaptive systems. Journal of Systems Science and Complexity, 19(1), 1-8. Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink. New York: Houghton Mifflin. —. (1982). Groupthink: Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes (2nd ed.). New York: Houghton Mifflin. Kahneman, D. (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality. American Psychologist, 58(9), 697–720. Keen, P. G. W. (1978). Decision support systems: an organizational perspective. Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. Larrick, R. P. (2004). Debiasing. In D. J. Koehler & N. Harvey (Eds.), Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making. UK: Oxford. Levite, A. (1987). Intelligence and strategic surprise. New York: Columbia University Press. Loftus, E.F., & Pickrell, J.E. (1995). The formation of false memories. Psychiatric Annals, 25, 720-725. Marten, G.G. (2001). Human ecology - Basic concepts for sustainable development. Earthscan Publications, November, 2001. McNaught, K.R., Ng, B., & Sastry, V.V.S.S. (2005). Investigating the use of Bayesian networks to provide decision support to military intelligence analysts. In Y. Merkuryev, R. Zobel and E.J.H. Kerckhoffs (Eds.). Proc. 19th European Conference on Modelling & Simulation, Riga, Latvia. Mullen, B., Johnson, C. & Salas, E. (1991). Productivity loss in brainstorming groups: A meta-analytic integration. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 12(1) 3-23. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004). The 9/11 commission report: Final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attack Upon the United States. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Richards, J (2010). The art and science of intelligence analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rossmiller, A.J. (2008). Still broken: A recruit’s inside account of intelligence failures, from Bagdad to the Pentagon. New York: Ballantine Books. Rumsfeld, D. (2002). Press conference at NATO headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 6 June, 2002. Available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3490 Schwartz, P. & Randall, D. (2011). Ahead of the curve: Anticipating strategic surprise. Accessed June 8, 2011 from http://www.360.monitor.com/downloads/Blindside_Chapter.pdf Sedlmeier, P. (1999). Improving statistical reasoning: Theoretical models

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and practical implications. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Smith, S.M., Ward, T.B. & Schumacher, J.S. (1993). Constraining effects of examples in a creative generation task, Memory & Cognition, 21, 837-845. Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131.

PART 3: CONFLICT

CHAPTER NINE THE SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE OF GROUP PROPERTY: IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND TERRORISM SHANNON P. CALLAHAN AND ALISON LEDGERWOOD UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS

Abstract Symbolic group property such as historic territory and iconic buildings frequently play a role in terrorism and intergroup conflict. Yet what is it that can make people willing to kill or even die for the destruction or preservation of group property? In this chapter, we explore the psychological reasons that drive people to care deeply about property and other symbols of group identity, summarizing relevant research and discussing implications for the study of conflict and terrorism. In Part I, we review a series of experiments suggesting that the mere presence of group symbols such as flags or logos can make a group seem more real and cohesive, a finding that offers insight into why groups both attack and defend symbolic property. In Part II, we describe research identifying key variables that impact the value people place on group property and their willingness to aggressively defend it, as well as strategies for mitigating the perceived importance of group property in order to potentially defuse contentious situations. Keywords: social identity, intergroup relations, conflict, terrorism, symbols, national monuments

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Terrorism, regardless of its ultimate motivation, often focuses on symbolic targets. Al-Qaeda’s 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center provide one vivid illustration. Other examples abound: the 1996 bombing of the Atlanta Olympics by a member of the radical Christian Identity Movement, the 1992 attack on London’s Baltic Exchange by the Provisional Irish Republican Army, and the 2010 attempt to destroy Swiss IBM headquarters by eco-terrorists. State actors, too, have realized the power of such targets: In 2001, for instance, the ruling Taliban destroyed two ancient statues of Buddha and in 2011, the Bahraini government demolished the Pearl Monument after it became a symbol of the Arab Spring uprisings. Even when these actions have no casualties, there can still be something profoundly distressing about the destruction of symbolic buildings or monuments. Yet why is this the case? More broadly, why do people seem to care so much about symbolic group property in the first place? Research across disciplines has established that people frequently use objects to represent aspects of their identity (e.g., Belk, 1988; Dittmar, 1992; Wicklund & Golltwizer, 1981). Importantly, then, an attack on symbolic property is not merely an attack on the property itself—it is also an attack on what that property represents: the abstract values, attributes, goals, and/or history of the group that are captured by the concrete object. However, although the tendency for people to imbue property with symbolic meaning is well-established, less is known about when and why people use property to symbolize group identity in this way. How do symbols change people’s perceptions of a group? And when and why are people particularly motivated to adopt and defend these group symbols? In this chapter, we will describe two ongoing lines of social psychological research that are working to answer these questions. In Part I, we will review a series of experiments examining the effect that the mere presence of identity symbols such as flags and logos can have on people’s perceptions of a group other than their own. In Part II, we will describe findings regarding key variables that impact the value people place on their own group’s symbolic property and their willingness to aggressively defend it. Throughout the chapter, we will discuss the implications of this research for the study of terrorism and conflict, as well as suggesting areas for future research and potential interventions to reduce or prevent aggression over group property.

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Experimental Social Psychology: A Primer The research described in this chapter employs an experimental approach that aims to uncover basic psychological processes using carefully controlled paradigms that permit strong causal inferences—a research method that has both advantages and drawbacks. The advantages stem from the fact that carefully controlled experiments allow researchers to manipulate key psychological variables while holding all else constant. This ultimately allows social psychologists to shed light on basic principles of human behavior and the psychological processes that govern them. The primary goals of such experiments are to create settings where it is possible to draw definitive conclusions about the causal impact of one variable on another (by randomly assigning participants to experimentally manipulated conditions), while simultaneously maximizing psychological realism (the extent to which the experimental setting elicits the same psychological processes that would be evoked in the real world, regardless of whether it actually looks like a setting that one would encounter in the real world). The downside to this approach, however, is that these carefully controlled experiments are often conducted with convenience samples and can employ procedures that—while psychologically engaging—seem quite different from real-world settings. It is therefore useful to consider the extent to which experimental findings will generalize to other populations and contexts. Importantly, considerable research suggests that the basic psychological processes uncovered in experimental research on group identity and intergroup relations over the past several decades often generalize across populations, identities, and cultures (e.g., Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010; Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; see also Anderson, Lindsay, & Bushman, 1999; Mitchell, 2012). For instance, the basic psychological tendency to favor one’s own group over an out-group was first studied in a carefully controlled, psychologically engaging, and yet highly artificial laboratory context: Participants were divided into two groups on the basis of a trivial distinction, and then asked to allocate resources between the two groups (Tajfel, 1970). This research revealed that even trivial group distinctions can lead people to display biases in favor of their own group—a phenomenon that has now been documented and further elaborated across a wide variety of social groups, from artificial groups created in the laboratory to longstanding and meaningful social identities such as Israelis and Palestinians (see Bettencourt, Dorr, Charlton, & Hume, 2001, for a review).

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The research in this chapter draws on this tradition of experimentally manipulating critical variables of interest while controlling other potential sources of variability, using convenience samples of primarily undergraduate students rather than randomly sampling from the population. Given the often close correspondence between social identity processes observed within the laboratory and outside of it, we can be confident that the basic psychological mechanisms and phenomena observed in these experiments are likely to generalize to other people and groups. At the same time, one fruitful and important direction for future research is to test and elaborate the basic processes described here in more highly charged contexts that involve meaningful and entrenched social identities.

Figure 9-1. Sample group identity symbols. From left to right: The national flag for the United States of America, the crescent and star symbol commonly used to represent the Islamic religion, and Gerald Holtom’s 1958 peace sign, a global symbol of anti-war and disarmament movements.

Part I: The Impact of Flags and Logos on Group Perception Group identity symbols, both official and unofficial, are ubiquitous. Our social environment is filled with objects, places, and individuals that people have tacitly or explicitly agreed represent group identity in some way. For example, flags can represent nations, icons might signify religions, and logos can represent social movements, terrorist groups, or corporations. Yet despite their seeming omnipresence, the potential effects that flags and logos have on the way people think about groups is not often considered. Although such symbols surround us, we often all but ignore them. Nevertheless, they may dramatically influence the way we respond to different groups.

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Symbols and the Reality of Groups In our research, we have theorized that one important effect that identity symbols like flags and logos can have is to make groups seem more like valid entities; in other words, symbols can reify groups (Callahan & Ledgerwood, 2012a). Given that group symbols are often highly visible and even tangible, we propose that such symbols can instantiate the abstract concept of group identity and ground it in the real world. That is, having identity symbols can make collectives seem like cohesive groups as opposed to loose assemblies of individuals. This psychological sense that a group is real—a concept called entitativity (from the word “entity”) by social psychologists—can have many important implications for intragroup and intergroup behavior. Known origins of the “groupiness” of groups. Social psychologists have been studying what makes a group seem real and unified for over 60 years (e.g., Campbell, 1958; Hamilton, Sherman, & Rodgers, 2004). From this research, we know that the sense of a group as being a real, cohesive entity can come from several different types of cues (e.g., Hong, Levy, & Chiu, 2001). One category of cues taps into the “essence” of the group: how similar the group members appear to be, whether they seem permanently linked, and whether they seem to share psychological traits. Another category has more to do with the actions of the group: how the group members interact, whether they have shared history, and the extent to which they wish to achieve the same goals. Though these categories of cues are often related, they can also be used independently to infer that a group seems real and unified—for instance, whereas families are seen as highly entitative due to their shared essence, a group of people working on a project together can seem highly entitative due to their shared actions (e.g., Lickel et al., 2000). Consequences of perceived groupiness. This perception that a group is a real, cohesive entity can have important consequences for attitudes and behavior. Perceived groupiness is associated with an increased sense of “potency:” Groups that seem like real entities are perceived as more effective and better able to achieve their desired outcomes (e.g., Crawford & Salaman, 2012). In fact, such groups may actually be more effective: Research suggests that people identify and cooperate more with groups that seem like real entities (e.g., Castano et al., 2002; Gaertner et al., 2006), which could enhance the group’s ability to achieve its goals. If people strongly identify with a group and are more willing to work with fellow group members, it is more likely that the group can achieve its key

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aims. Overall, then, belonging to groups that seem real and unified tends to be particularly rewarding (e.g., Sherman, Hamilton, & Lewis, 1999). However, there is also a dark side to groupiness. As groupiness increases, groups tend to be less tolerant of negative in-group members and are more likely to turn on their own “black sheep” (Lewis & Sherman, 2010). This may be because such groups are seen as having greater collective responsibility, so that group members are held more responsible for each others’ actions (Denson et al., 2006). Thus, members of highly unified groups may be more likely to turn on other members who act against the group’s interests. Importantly, another negative consequence of groupiness is that it can increase perceived threat (Dasgupta, Banaji, & Abelson, 1999). Groups that seem like real entities can also be seen as more menacing. Presumably, this sense of threat is linked to the heightened potency that highly unified groups seem to have. When our own groups are high in groupiness, potency is an asset: it suggests our group will be effective and efficient. However, potency can be more ambiguous when it characterizes a group other than our own: If the group is a rival or a potential rival, increased efficacy and efficiency can also mean increased competition and danger. Symbols and perceptions of threat. Drawing on this latter research, we hypothesized that if symbols help to make a group seem real and unified, they could lead out-groups to seem more potent and threatening. Thus, the mere presence of a symbol could lead people to feel that a group poses a greater threat. Such a finding could have important implications for understanding intergroup behavior: For instance, it would suggest that identity symbols may often become targets of aggression because they seem closely tied to the threat posed by a given group. To test the basic idea that merely having a symbol could make a group seem more threatening, we adapted an experimental paradigm that previous researchers had designed to test how changing specific qualities of a group can influence people’s perceptions and feelings about that group. By creating novel groups to show participants, this paradigm avoids the complex and potentially deeply entrenched sets of pre-existing beliefs that participants would have about real groups. Using novel groups therefore allows researchers to isolate and cleanly manipulate a particular quality of the group (such as the similarity of the group members) while holding all else constant, in order to determine how that variable causally impacts group judgments.

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For example, previous research using novel groups of fictitious alien creatures called “Greebles1” had established that visual similarity among group members can heighten perceived threat: Participants felt that groups of Greebles seemed more threatening when they were all the same color, compared to when they were different colors (Dasgupta et al, 1999). In our experiment, we sought to test whether the mere presence of a symbol would have a similar effect. We showed participants three different kinds of Greeble groups: different-colored Greebles (control condition), samecolored Greebles (high similarity condition) and different-colored Greebles standing next to a Greeble flag (symbol condition). Participants were asked to rate how threatening each group seemed, as well as the extent to which the group seemed united, organized, and interconnected— all hallmarks of groupiness.

Figure 9-2. Sample Greebles in the symbol condition in Callahan & Ledgerwood, 2012a. Although the Greebles shown here are in grayscale, in the experiment the stimuli appeared in color. (Stimulus images courtesy of Michael J. Tarr, Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition and Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, http://www.tarrlab.org/.)

As expected, we replicated the pattern found in previous research: Relative to the differently-colored control Greebles, same-colored Greebles were seen as more threatening and more groupy (e.g., united and 1

Greebles were originally created by Scott Yu at Yale University, and first appeared in Gauthier & Tarr (1997).

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interconnected). More importantly, the mere presence of a symbol had a similar effect: Compared to the control Greebles, the Greebles with a flag were also seen as significantly more threatening and groupy. Thus, even in the absence of shared group characteristics, having a symbol can make a group seem more real, unified, and potentially menacing. A related series of studies extended these results beyond flags to test whether merely reading that a group has a logo might similarly enhance perceptions of groupiness. In particular, we were interested in whether a group that might not otherwise seem real and unified (e.g., a collection of individuals who walk their dogs together or watch sports at the same bar once a week) could be reified by simply having a group logo. Participants in these studies read short descriptions about several different types of groups (such as dog walkers). Importantly, one of the group descriptions mentioned that the group had a logo, whereas the other group descriptions did not. To measure perceived groupiness, we then asked participants to select which group seemed the most cohesive and most real. Our results showed that participants consistently selected the group with the logo as the most real and unified, regardless of whether that group involved walking dogs, watching sports, or some other activity. Thus, simply knowing that a group has a symbol is sufficient to psychologically transform a collection of individuals into a real group. Interestingly, our research indicates that symbols affect many different attributes of groupiness: Merely knowing that a group has a symbol makes group members seem more similar, cohesive, and closely linked, and makes the group itself seem more organized and important to its members. Across our different studies, then, the mere presence of a group symbol appears to have a robust and sweeping effect on group perception. Taken together, these experiments provide key support for our hypothesis that symbols can reify groups. Groups with symbols were seen as more real, cohesive, and threatening than groups without symbols. Given what we already know about the consequences of perceived groupiness for how people feel about and behave toward groups, these findings have potentially important implications for the study of conflict and terrorism, and can suggest fruitful areas of future research and exploration.

Implications for Conflict and Terrorism We turn now to discuss what we see as two of the most important implications of this research for the study of intergroup conflict and terrorism. First, we describe how understanding the impact of symbols on

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group perception can shed light on how people think about different terrorist groups and interpret their actions. Second, we suggest that the link between symbols and perceived threat can help explain why symbolic targets often become focal points for attacks by state and non-state actors. The potential impact of symbols for terrorist movements. Terrorist groups and movements often have some sort of symbol—be it a flag (i.e., al-Qaeda’s black banner), a logo, or even an individual (i.e., Osama bin Laden). Given the research we have described suggesting that symbols can have robust effects on group perception, it seems likely that such symbols tend to make terrorist groups and movements seem more “real,” more efficacious, and more threatening to those outside the group. Moreover, if we extrapolate from what is already known regarding the effects of perceived groupiness on group member behavior, a terrorist group with an identity symbol may not only be perceived as more potent but may actually be better able to achieve its aims, due to heightened identification and collaboration on the part of its members. Because the group may be less tolerant of misbehavior among its members, group members may conform to group pressure and influence more, leading members to copy the beliefs and behaviors of others in their group and be less independent (e.g., Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; Hogg, 1992; Schacter, 1951). In sum, having an identity symbol might make a terrorist group or movement matter more to its members, increase its members’ efficiency at working towards their objectives, and heighten members’ tendency to yield to group pressure, causing them to behave more uniformly. The presence of identity symbols could also play an important role in influencing how governments determine whether actions are conducted by “terrorist organizations” as opposed to being “isolated incidents,” a decision which can have key political and law-enforcement consequences. In the United States, for example, right-wing violence is often framed as “lone wolf” attacks as opposed to being framed as part of a broader movement (e.g. Hewitt, 2003). This “lone wolf” frame may be possible in part because these right-wing movements do not tend to be seen as real or cohesive groups, perhaps due to geographical variability or surface dissimilarities. Highlighting an identity symbol that the perpetrators of such attacks have in common (e.g., a figurehead, a book) could therefore increase the perceived groupiness of these movements and also their perceived threat, which might lead to prosecuting offenders on charges of terrorism and encourage the use of counterterrorism measures to prevent similar attacks in the future. Conversely, governments sometimes wish to categorize certain types of attacks as criminal rather than terrorism, as in

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Northern Ireland (Blackbourn, this volume). In these cases, downplaying group symbols may help lessen the groupiness of such movements and facilitate perceiving such actions as criminal. Future research should explore how the presence versus absence of symbols can affect categorizing incidents as either isolated events or part of a larger movement, for terrorist and non-terrorist movements alike. Perceived groupiness, symbolic property, and intergroup conflict. The tendency for symbols to reify groups could also help account for the key role that symbolic property often plays in intergroup conflicts. Symbols may be seen by both sides as reservoirs of potency that convey a sense of cohesion, unity, and effectiveness. To the in-group, this would be an asset, and symbols would therefore be cherished and defended. To the out-group, however, such potency would be threatening, and attacks on symbolic targets may be attempts to reduce or even eliminate this threat. Thus, attacks on symbolic targets by state and non-state actors may reflect an effort to reduce a rival’s apparent groupiness—and by extension, to weaken the group. For example, by demolishing the Pearl Monument in 2011, the Bahraini government may have wished to make the protesters’ movement seem less real, less legitimate, and ultimately less threatening. As another example, killing Osama bin Laden—the figurehead of alQaeda—could be seen as eliminating a powerful symbol of that group. Regardless of whether these groups were actually weakened by these events, they might still be perceived as less threatening by those outside the group in question. Consistent with this notion, Americans have reported they fear terrorism less since bin Laden’s death (Saad, 2011). As to whether targeting symbols does in fact weaken groups, this is an open question. This strategy of attacking identity symbols might be particularly effective with newly-formed groups whose unity and cohesiveness are not yet well-established, as the loss of a symbol might profoundly impact the beliefs and behaviors of the group’s members. Such a strategy might also be particularly effective with established groups that seem ambiguously cohesive, such as broad political movements or terrorist groups. However, groups that are less ambiguous in their cohesion—such as nations—may be more resilient to such attacks because they often have access to both numerous identity symbols (e.g., flags, anthems, monuments, and leaders) and numerous other qualities that enhance perceived groupiness (e.g., a well-established common history, shared goals, and shared cultural values). For example, following the 9-11 attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon, it is possible that al-Qaeda perceived the United States as less threatening. Yet the United States’ actual behaviors

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—heightened national identification and a militaristic response—suggest the U.S. did not perceive itself as less of a real and cohesive group. Future research on symbolic targets and groupiness should explore this distinction between how group perceptions change from the perspective of the perpetrator and victim in response to the same attack.

Image 9-1. An example of an attack on a group’s identity symbol, the September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. (Image copyright Robert J Fisch and licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0.)

Part I Summary The research reviewed in this section suggests that groups with symbols tend to be seen as more real and unified than groups without symbols. This heightened groupiness can have important implications for how people feel about and judge groups, including how threatening a group seems to be. We have proposed that terrorist groups with symbols might not only be perceived as more menacing, but might even show different intragroup behavior (e.g., heightened efficiency) as the result of

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having a symbol. We have also suggested that the tendency for symbols to enhance perceptions of groupiness and threat may be a contributing factor in the selection of symbolic targets by both state and non-state actors. These hypotheses seem worthy of further research, particularly in field settings that can bridge from the experimental work described here to future recommendations for policy-making and potential interventions. Research should also continue to explore the effects that group identity symbols may have on other aspects of group perception, as well as attitudes and behaviors toward one’s own group and how these effects can impact intergroup and intragroup behavior. Having outlined some of the key consequences of group identity symbols for perception and behavior, we turn next to discuss a second line of research focused on identifying when and why people will value and aggressively defend symbols of group identity. Whereas the research described thus far has focused on flags and logos as examples of group identity symbols, the next section focuses on historic group property as another important type of group symbol.

Part II: Property as a Symbol of Group Identity Symbolism is not restricted to flags and logos: Physical territory and group property can also be symbolic when they are linked to an aspect of group identity such the group’s shared past, the group’s characteristics, or the group’s future plans. For example, the Free Derry Corner in the Bogside section of Derry in Northern Ireland symbolizes important historical events during the Troubles (Jarman, 2005), and the Burj Dubai—designed to be the world’s tallest tower—helps symbolize the modern and prosperous “New Dubai” (Elsheshtawy, 2004). In the previous section, we discussed how symbols such as flags and logos may lead groups to be seen as more real and more threatening. Symbolic property such as buildings, monuments, or land should have similar effects, and we have suggested that this may help explain why groups often target another group’s symbolic property in the context of terrorism and intergroup conflict.

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Image 9-2. An example of symbolic group property, the Free Derry Corner in the Bogside section of Derry. (Image copyright Louise Price and licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0.)

Importantly, considering the symbolic function of group property may have critical implications for understanding conflicts over property. Indeed, people seem to care deeply about property that symbolizes group history and identity: Monuments, land, and other forms of symbolic property are often highly valued and staunchly defended. For example, the Al-Aqsa mosque at the Temple Mount—the third most sacred site in Islam—has been a longtime source of contention between Israelis and Palestinians. The desire to protect this site has led to deadly violence on more than one occasion and even may have partially contributed to the start of the Second Intifada (Inbari, 2009). As another example, in 2010, a subset of Americans who perceived the planned construction of a Muslim community center near Ground Zero as a threat to the area’s symbolic meaning vehemently protested the center’s construction (Mohamed & O’Brien, 2011). Thus, symbolic group property seems to be capable of evoking extreme responses from people in service of its defense.

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Image 9-3. An example of a contested identity symbol, the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. (Image courtesy of John Unrath.)

As these examples illustrate, symbolic group property can oftentimes be an important element in intergroup conflict. However, most extant research on conflict over property has often assumed that conflict arises over scarce resources, which suggests that violence over group property can be prevented or ameliorated by dividing existing resources, or by adding additional resources and “expanding the pie” (Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pruitt, 2001; Sherif & Sherif, 1953). Although understanding property as a resource can certainly shed light on some conflicts, it seems clear that the meaning of land and monuments often goes beyond their instrumental value as a resource. Few would argue, for example, that an arbitrarily chosen stretch of land could ever replace an area such as Jerusalem, Kashmir, or Mecca for the group members who value these regions. Yet surprisingly little research has moved beyond a resource-based perspective on property in conflict settings, even as scholars have noted that resourcebased approaches to conflict resolution often fail, and at times even seem to exacerbate conflict and violence (e.g., Rothman & Olson, 2001).

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Value and Symbolic Property Our research aims to address this gap by focusing on the symbolic meaning of group property, thereby expanding our understanding of conflict over group property beyond what is offered by a simple resourcebased account. We feel this distinction between the utilitarian and symbolic function of property is an important one, as understanding the actual reasons that people value group property is critical to knowing how best to resolve conflict and aggression over property and prevent such conflicts from occurring in the first place. In this section, we will describe research designed to identify key variables that impact the value people place on group property and their willingness to aggressively defend it, and discuss strategies for mitigating the perceived importance of group property in order to potentially defuse contentious situations. By considering the symbolic function of property, we seek to shed new light on each of these issues. In particular, our symbolic perspective on group property suggests that symbols might function as means to a particular end. Specifically, symbols may stand in for actual group characteristics (like status or achievements) as group members strive toward a desired group identity. Building on a wealth of social psychological research on how means are valued during goal pursuit (e.g., Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1981), this means-ends framework suggests two important predictions about when and why group members will value and defend material symbols of group identity. First, symbolic property should be especially valued when people have a strong motivation to achieve a desired group identity, either because they are highly committed to that identity or because they are in a situation that strengthens the motivation to strive toward a desired group identity. Second, group property should be more valued when it provides an effective means by which to pursue the desired identity—that is, when the property is capable of communicating something about group identity to other people. In the remainder of this section, we highlight several studies in a program of research designed to test these key predictions. We first examine the hypothesis that value will depend on (a) personal commitment to a group identity as well as (b) situational factors that influence the motivation to pursue a group identity. Next, we describe research testing the prediction that the value placed on symbolic group property will depend on (a) the extent to which the property is capable of representing group identity and (b) whether other people recognize the symbolic importance of the property. We then turn to examine the implications of

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our perspective for understanding when group members will care more— or less—about who actually owns a material symbol of group identity. To test our predictions, we developed an experimental paradigm that enabled us to present participants with a potentially important group symbol while still affording us a high degree of experimental control over what they knew about the symbol. In order to do this, we created a story about a building that was ostensibly related to the group history of the participants in a given study (e.g., a building in Jerusalem where a key event in Israeli history took place, or a university building in which the university’s founder had once lived). Our initial research with this paradigm showed that participants immediately cared about and valued such a building as a part of their group’s identity and history. By creating this story, then, we were able to very precisely influence participants’ beliefs about a potentially important group symbol; this allowed us to cleanly manipulate variables such as the strength of the identity motive or the effectiveness of the property as an identity symbol, and to examine their causal impact on value.

Variability in Strength of Identity Motive From psychological research on goal pursuit, we know that means to an end are more highly valued when people are strongly motivated to achieve that end (see Ferguson & Bargh, 2004; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Thus, symbolic group property (a means to pursue a desired group identity) should be more highly valued when group identity motives are strong. Moreover, two factors in particular are known to influence the strength of a motive: the extent to which that motive is important to an individual person (their disposition) and whether or not that motive is evoked by a person’s current environment (their situation; see Fishbach, 2008; Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007). We therefore hypothesized that dispositional and situational differences in the strength of an identity motive would affect the degree to which people value symbolic group property. Personal commitment. First, we looked at individual, dispositional differences in how committed people are to their group identities. Different members of a group may be more or less committed to their group identity—for example, students at a university vary in how strongly they identify with the university community as a whole. To test whether personal commitment to a group identity would predict the value people place on a symbol of that group identity, we measured New York

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University (NYU) students’ commitment to their NYU identity, and then presented the students with the story described earlier about a nearby building related to their group’s history. We then asked them to rate how valuable they thought the building was, using a classic economic measure of valuation designed to elicit the true monetary value that people place on an object by presenting them with a series of possible transaction prices (see e.g., Kahneman et al., 1990). As predicted, as commitment to NYU identity increased, so too did the value people placed on the historic building (Ledgerwood, Liviatan, & Carnevale, 2007, Study 1). In other words, people who were more strongly committed to their group identity perceived a symbol of that identity as more valuable. Implications for conflict studies. This research can help us understand when people in actual conflict situations will be more or less likely to value symbolic property, based on their level of commitment to that identity. For example, among the Basque—an ethnic group in Spain and France—many people identify as primarily Basque, whereas others are equally committed to their Spanish or French identities (Martínez-Herrera, 2002). Moreover, not all Basques are nationalists and an even smaller subset are separatists. Therefore, when predicting whether a person will value symbolic group property (in this case, the territory of Basque Country) to such an extent that they want their group to have total autonomy over the property, it may be important to consider their personal commitment to the identity. A strong commitment would presumably lead them to see property symbolic of that identity as highly valuable. Situational factors. In addition to differences between individuals in the typical level of commitment to group identity, there are also certain situations that enhance people’s motivation to strive toward a desired group identity. One such situation is feeling that one’s group has lost or is lacking an important attribute of group identity. To test whether such situations would increase the perceived value of symbolic group property, we randomly assigned NYU students to one of two experimental conditions that differed in their portrayal of NYU. In one condition, participants read an ostensible news article suggesting that NYU’s reputation was falling—a story designed to convey that NYU was missing a key aspect of desired group identity, which should temporarily strengthen NYU students’ objective to strive toward a desired group identity. In the second condition, participants read a news article suggesting that NYU’s reputation was rising, thereby conveying that NYU possessed a key aspect of group identity and temporarily subduing the

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identity motive. Supporting our hypothesis, students who felt their group’s status was falling—and whose identity motives had therefore been situationally heightened—perceived the value of the historic building to be nearly four million dollars higher than those who felt their group’s status was rising (Ledgerwood et al., 2007, Study 3). Thus, a threat to group identity led people to substantially increase the value they placed on symbolic group property. Implications for conflict studies. Our research indicates that threatening group identity—a commonplace occurrence in conflict—can increase the value that people place on symbolic group property. Those who feel like their group has lost or is losing status—a political party that has lost an election, a would-be nation that has lost a war, a religion that is marginalized or losing followers—may be particularly likely to see symbols of their group identity as valuable and important. Importantly, when the value and importance placed on symbolic property increases, people are more likely to want to protect and defend it. A recent study by Jia, Karpen, & Hirt (2011) illustrates the heightened defensiveness that can follow a loss of group status, and how this can affect intergroup relations. To understand why certain Americans were opposed to the so-called “Ground Zero Mosque” (an Islamic community center near the now symbolic site of the former World Trade Center), these researchers adopted the symbolic perspective we have been describing. They hypothesized that threatening group status would affect the degree to which people wanted to protect Ground Zero from “contamination” by an out-group. Their results showed that when people felt that the status of the U.S. was falling, they were more opposed to the construction of the Islamic community center and other projects (such as a French embassy) that could be seen as challenging or diluting the symbolic significance of the site. Interestingly, these effects were only seen among those who felt highly deferential to their country (i.e., people who said they had a particularly high tendency to honor their country, obey their nation’s leaders, and conform to national norms; for more information, see Roccas et al., 2008). Those who were low in deference to their country were less concerned about the Islamic community center, even when the status of the United States was threatened. Overall, this research suggests that threat can lead people who are deferential to a group to strongly defend symbolic group property against actions that could seem to dilute or change the property’s symbolic meaning. Notably, the circumstances that led to the defensiveness observed in this study —threatened group status, high levels of loyalty to one’s in-

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group, and a contested or controversial symbol—are often seen in intergroup conflicts. When people feel that their group identity is vulnerable and care deeply about that identity, they may be more likely to rally around symbols of their identity, because the symbols may help fill in for what is lacking about the identity and help people feel like the desired group identity has been achieved. For example, survivors of the World War I massacres of Ottoman Christians and their descendents by the Young Turks and survivors of subsequent diasporas—Armenian, Assyrian, and Greek—have continually sought official recognition of these genocides and erected monuments to their dead (e.g., Panossian, 2002). Because the Turkish government vehemently rejects the charges of genocide (Hovannisian, 2003), this lack of acknowledgement coupled with strong group identification likely evokes some degree of group threat and leads survivors and their descendants to seek out resolutions and material symbols validating their tragic history. Because such symbols can stand in for actual attributes or characteristics, in the absence of official acknowledgment from Turkey that these events occurred, these symbols will presumably be more highly valued. In addition to explaining when and why symbolic property will be highly valued and defended, our symbolic perspective also makes predictions regarding how to lessen perceived value and defensiveness over group property. For example, in the research described earlier, when NYU participants were reassured that their group had a desired quality (high status), they saw symbolic property as less valuable. Because their group identity was not vulnerable, the objective of a desired group identity was not strong, and so potential means to meet that objective (the historical building) were less highly valued. This suggests that affirming a group’s status or other important aspects of group identity may help to reduce the importance of specific identity symbols. Summary. The research we have described thus far suggests that both personal and situational differences in the strength of an identity motive can affect the perceived value of symbolic group property. These empirical findings are consistent with the notion that as the motivation to attain a desired group identity increases, people increasingly value symbols that can help them achieve that desired goal. Thus, the first key prediction of our means-ends framework was supported: The value placed on property as a means by which to symbolize group identity depends on the strength of the identity motive.

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Quality of the Symbol Our second key prediction was that value placed on property should also depend upon the quality of the symbol, or the extent to which property is capable of symbolizing group identity to others. Importantly, not all group property can effectively symbolize group identity. To be a good identity symbol, property must be (a) related to group identity or history, and (b) capable of communicating or symbolizing that identity or history to other people. Next, we will describe research testing each of these variables in turn. The extent that property represents identity. If the value people place on property depends on its effectiveness as a symbol of group identity, then group property should be valued more highly when it is linked to in-group history and identity, compared to when it is not. To test this idea, we randomly assigned NYU students to one of two experimental conditions that differed in how they described the group-owned building we had used in our earlier studies described above. In the in-group history condition, as in our earlier studies, participants read that one of the founders of NYU had once lived in the building, and that a number of important early meetings had taken place there. In the no history condition, participants only read about the existence of the building, without learning anything about its history. We then measured how valuable participants thought the building was. Supporting our means-ends perspective, students placed greater value on the building when it was related to NYU history and could provide a good symbol of in-group identity, compared to when the building had no symbolic ties (Ledgerwood et al., 2007, Study 4). In another experiment, we asked Israeli participants to rate the value of a building located in West Jerusalem that was either linked to Israeli history (in-group history condition) or Palestinian history (out-group history condition). For instance, in the in-group history condition, participants read that the building was home to the 23rd Zionist congress in 1951. Again, participants valued the building linked to in-group history more highly, presumably because only the building that related to their own group’s past could serve as an effective symbol of their in-group identity (Ledgerwood et al., 2007, Study 2). Thus, the value people place on group property seems to reflect the extent to which it represents or symbolizes something about group identity. Of course, property may be linked to more than just one group’s history, and conflicts often arise over property that is related to the histories of multiple groups. To explore how such dual linkages could

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impact value, we included another condition in the experiment with the Israeli sample described above, in which the building was linked to both Israeli and Palestinian histories. Interestingly, Israeli participants valued the building most highly when it was related to the history of both groups, compared to when it was related to either just Israeli history or just Palestinian history. One reason for this could be that an out-group identity claim on an in-group symbol threatens in-group identity, and, as we saw above, this can lead people to value symbols more highly. Another possibility is that a building linked to both groups’ histories that is now in Israeli-controlled territory may convey information about not just the group’s own history but also the power dynamic or the difference in status between the two groups. Implications for conflict studies. This research suggests that when property is linked to multiple group identities—as is the case with Jerusalem, Kashmir, and Kosovo—it may be especially valued, which could both trigger conflicts and pose a key barrier to successful conflict resolution. It is possible that contested symbols may in fact be more valuable because they are contested, and therefore symbolize not just something about the group’s identity but about the nature of the conflict. Property that is tied to both groups’ histories may also represent the dynamic between the two groups. For the group that this dynamic favors, it could be desirable to represent their victory or power, and property that does so will be especially valued. For the group that this dynamic does not favor, it may be highly desirable to somehow obtain control of the contested symbol, as such an action could stand in for not having equal status and may thereby provide the group with a sense of empowerment. This research also suggests that symbolism may come fairly easily. In our studies, any connection to in-group history—even one that was previously unknown to our participants—was enough to increase the perceived value of the building. In intergroup conflicts, it is the obvious group identity symbols that attract the most attention, such as famous monuments and historic territory. Our findings suggest that less obvious symbols should not be overlooked or underestimated, as people may very quickly come to view property as valuable when a potential connection to in-group identity is learned or highlighted. Social recognition of the symbol. To be an effective symbol, property must not only be related to in-group identity—it must also be capable of communicating something about group identity to other people. In other words, symbols are only effective insofar as they are widely recognized

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and socially shared (Ledgerwood & Liviatan, 2010). We therefore predicted that strong group identity motives would only increase the value placed on historic group property when the property’s link to in-group history was widely recognized. We tested this hypothesis by measuring (or in another study, manipulating) the strength of group identity motives as we did in previous studies described earlier. Next, we once again presented NYU students with information about a building linked to their university’s history, but this time we manipulated social recognition by randomly assigning them to read that the link to NYU history was either widely acknowledged (social recognition condition) or known to very few (lack of social recognition condition). Regardless of whether the motive strength was due to individual or situational differences, stronger group identity motives only increased the perceived value of the building when its link to NYU history was widely acknowledged. When nobody else knew about the symbolic meaning of the building, stronger group identity motives had no impact on perceived value. Importantly, these results suggest that group identity motives will only influence the value placed on property when the property can be used to communicate something about group identity to other people. Implications for conflict studies. This research suggests that historic property is not inevitably seen as highly valuable: In the studies described above, a building related to in-group history was only valued as an effective symbol of group identity when its link to group history was widely shared, and not when this link was unacknowledged by others. When considering what types of group property are likely to be highly valued and contested in a conflict, it is therefore important to consider the extent to which the symbolic importance of the group property is socially recognized by others. Likewise, perceived value may be lower when the symbolic meaning of group property seems unclear, or when there is disagreement about what the property symbolizes. For instance, the Osu Castle in Ghana, which was once the home to colonial rulers but later was the seat of government for independent Ghana, may be perceived as less valuable to Ghanaians because there may be little consensus among group members about what it represents due to its different historical links. Summary. Our prediction that group property will be valued more when it provides an effective means to symbolize group identity was supported: People valued property more when it was linked to their own group’s history and when this link was socially recognized. Thus, symbols that convey something about group identity to others can provide effective

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means for striving toward desired group identities, and are therefore especially valued. Thus far, we have described research suggesting that when an identity motive is strong—either because of a person’s disposition or because of the specific situation—people value and defend group property that conveys something about their group identity to others. In other words, as suggested by our means-ends framework, the degree to which people value symbolic group property depends upon the strength of the motive and the effectiveness of the means. Our symbolic perspective therefore helps to shed new light on the question of when and why people value group property.

Defending Symbolic Property Next, we wanted to broaden the scope of this research to empirically test some of the possible implications of our symbolic perspective for understanding conflict over group property. In the studies described thus far, we have examined how symbolism affected the perceived value of group property. However, as mentioned earlier, symbolic property is not only valued by groups but can also be perceived as something that needs to be defended. Understanding why a group feels they must aggressively defend their ownership of property can be critical for understanding and resolving intergroup conflicts. To explore this issue, we refined our experimental paradigm to measure group members’ desire for their group to aggressively defend its ownership of a building. In these studies, we added information to the story used in our previous research. After informing participants that another party wanted to purchase the building currently owned by the group, we asked them a series of questions that measured the extent to which they wanted their group to aggressively defend its ownership of the building in a negotiation with the other party. We explored two factors that we believed might influence this ownership defensiveness. First, we predicted that ownership of group property would be more strongly defended when certain basic needs were made salient, because we suspected that such needs might be the original psychological source of the group identity motives we have described. Second, we predicted that ownership of group property would be most important—and thus most strongly defended—when ownership was necessary for the property to effectively symbolize group identity.

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Basic needs and symbolic property. Our first prediction was that ownership will be defended more when people are driven to satisfy certain basic human needs. There are several such needs that are thought to be universally held (e.g., Fiske, 2004). One of the reasons that group identity is presumed to be generally important is because it seems to help meet many of these basic needs: For example, it is a source of positive feeling, it can reduce discomforting feelings of uncertainty, it can help manage the existential fear of death, and it can help people feel like they belong (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Hogg, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Insofar as group identity serves these basic human needs, we theorized that just like group threat, these basic needs would lead people to increasingly value and defend symbolic group property. Indeed, previous research suggests that when people are in situations where their mortality is salient and they need to manage the resulting existential crisis, they are more uncomfortable with using group identity symbols in inappropriate or disrespectful ways (e.g., using a flag to sift sand from black dye; Greenberg et al., 1995), and recent research from our own lab suggests that when people are made to feel uncertain, they are more opposed to flag burning. Thus, there is some evidence that certain basic needs may contribute to feeling protective towards symbols. In the research we will describe next, we wanted to particularly focus on the need to affiliate or belong, as it is one of the most basic human needs (e.g., Bakan, 1966; Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and is even thought by some to be ultimate root of social behavior (e.g., Fiske, 2004). We wished to specifically consider how such belonging needs may affect defensiveness over the ownership of group property—an issue with important implications for intergroup conflict. Like other motives, basic needs can vary in strength both from one individual to the next and from one situation to the next. We considered both sources of variation in belonging needs in two experiments (Callahan & Ledgerwood, 2012b). In the first, we measured the baseline strength of each participant’s need to belong as a natural individual difference. In the second, we experimentally manipulated the need through use of a subliminal priming task that temporarily increased the strength of this need outside of participants’ conscious awareness (e.g., Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). In each experiment, University of California, Davis (UC Davis) students were randomly assigned to read about either a group resource (a university-owned building unrelated to the group’s history) or a group symbol (a university-owned building linked to the group’s history as in previous studies). We then asked participants to report how aggressively

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the university should defend its ownership of the building in a negotiation with the City of Davis. As predicted, stronger dispositional or situationally-induced belonging needs led to heightened defensiveness over ownership of the symbol. In contrast, the need to belong had no impact on defensiveness over the resource, highlighting again the importance of distinguishing between the symbolic and instrumental functions of group property. The results of these experiments suggest that variations in basic, fundamental needs can predict who might react more strongly to the prospect of losing ownership of a group identity symbol: People who have a stronger desire to affiliate (either due to their disposition or because of the situation) may actually be more likely to endorse defensive and even aggressive actions toward another party. Implications for conflict studies. This research also suggests that basic needs, which are often not considered when examining the causes of conflict and terrorism, may contribute to the importance that people place on material symbols of group identity. Many things can make belonging needs salient; because it is such a common and important need, it can easily be triggered by the situation. For example, even subtle social rejections can increase people’s need to affiliate with and be accepted by others (e.g., Pickett & Gardner, 2005). Factors such as these could be playing an important but as yet unnoticed role in exacerbating aggression over symbolic group property. Moreover, often in intergroup conflicts, one group’s identity is stigmatized, or devalued. For example, Palestinians may perceive that they are being collectively devalued as a group in the context of their conflict with Israelis. This perception may amount to a societal rejection of their group, which in turn may lead them to seek out and aggressively defend symbols of their identity, such as the Al-Aqsa mosque at the Temple Mount. Understanding how the basic need to belong and feel accepted influences value and defensiveness over symbolic property could potentially offer insight into situations such as these. Furthermore, considering basic motives can also suggest conflict interventions that are not often considered. Because belonging is such a basic need, there are many ways to help satisfy the need to affiliate with others beyond one specific group symbol. Research on goal pursuit suggests that there can be many means to meet the same end and that these means are often interchangeable (see Kruglanski et al., 2002). Thus, if participants in our studies had been reminded of an alternate symbol of their university identity (e.g., a mascot), they might have valued the

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historic building less. Likewise, if a group cannot have a monument to some important moment in their past, symbolic legislation may effectively substitute for it. Moreover, people have many group identities and which identity they use—national, religious, ethnic, regional—might also be substitutable in meeting their basic needs. If a person has a heightened need to belong and a certain identity is made salient by the situation, they will likely “use” that identity and whatever symbols are associated with it to meet that need. In fact, preliminary research from our lab suggests that having an identity symbol for one group makes an identity symbol for another group seem less important: University students who were provided with a symbol of their ethnic identity were later less defensive over a symbol of university identity. That is not to say that certain identities and symbols do not matter more than others. Obviously, certain groups are more central to our identities than others and certain symbols are more cherished than others; these central and cherished means are likely habitually used and more difficult to change. Moreover, certain group identities and symbols could help meet multiple motives, which would make them especially valuable. For example, controlling Kashmir may help satisfy Indians’ need to belong, make them feel more certain about the world, and make them feel like their group has high status. Another identity or symbol would be unlikely to fully substitute for Kashmir in meeting all of these needs. However, it could potentially help fulfill some of them, which could—in combination with other strategies—reduce antagonism and promote conditions conducive to successful conflict resolution. As a potentially important tool for defusing conflicts, this concept of interchangeable identities and symbols should be researched more closely, both in tightly controlled studies like the ones described here as well as in the field to ensure that these effects generalize to real conflict situations. Summary. The research described in this section suggests that ownership of group property is defended more when basic needs such as the need to belong are heightened. We turn next to our second prediction about defensiveness over ownership: namely, that group members will be particularly defensive over group ownership when ownership is necessary to protect a property’s symbolic meaning. Why people care about ownership. Although symbols are often conflated with possessions, people’s identities can be symbolized by material objects that they do not own. For example, although it is privately

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owned, the iconic Chrysler Building has long been a symbol of New York City: When it was first constructed, it represented Art Deco and the Modern Age, and today it represents the city’s illustrious history. As another example, the Mediterranean Sea symbolizes many of the nations it touches, though it is owned by none of them. Therefore, we would argue that a critical advantage that comes from thinking about the symbolic function of property is that it can deemphasize the importance of ownership. That is, a formerly contested symbol may legally belong to one group while still meeting the symbolic function of another group. Ownership may not be necessary for both parties to meet their goals. Moreover, we propose that ownership becomes particularly important to people when it is needed to protect the symbolic meaning of property. Certain symbols do not need to be protected in order to ensure that they can represent group identity because their protection is ensured by the owner: With respect to the earlier example, the Chrysler Building does not need to be owned by the city in order for it to represent an aspect of New York identity and history; the private companies that own it ensure its protection. However, other property must be protected in order to serve as a group symbol: For example, the Prentice Women’s Hospital in Chicago is an iconic Modernist structure that many see as a symbol of the city, yet it faces demolition by its owner in order to allow room for new construction (National Trust for Historic Preservation, 2011). Unless the former hospital is owned by a party that will protect it, its symbolism may be lost forever. Our perspective suggests that ownership will be defended most fiercely when it is needed to protect the symbolism of a monument or site. Consistent with this prediction, research in our lab has shown that students become more defensive over their university’s ownership of a historic building when losing ownership to another party will result the building’s demolition, compared to when the building will continue to exist regardless of who owns it (Callahan and Ledgerwood, 2012c). Moreover, when students learn that a permanent plaque will be posted at the building site communicating its symbolic meaning to the public, it eliminates the defensiveness otherwise evoked by the building’s demolition: Students are less aggressive and more willing to cooperate in negotiations over ownership when the symbolic meaning of the site will be preserved through the plaque, despite the building’s demolition. Thus, people appear to care most—and become most defensive—about group ownership when it is the only way to protect the symbolic meaning of group property. When another strategy for preserving the property’s symbolic meaning is offered, the importance of ownership can be decreased.

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Image 9-4. Examples of city-level group symbols not owned by the city. On the left, the Chrysler Building in New York City, on the right the old Prentice Women’s Hospital in Chicago. The former is a National Historic Landmark and is therefore protected; the latter faces potential demolition. (Bottom image courtesy of Alison Ledgerwood; top image copyright Jim Kuhn and licensed under CC BYSA 3.0.)

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Implications for conflict studies. This research suggests that ownership becomes particularly important to group members when it represents the only way to protect the symbolic meaning of group property. Therefore, though conflicts over symbolic property are often presented as zero-sum conflicts over ownership, it is possible that ownership may not be the crux of disputes. Although ownership may facilitate the use of symbols to represent group identity, it may not always be necessary. One important detail of our results deserves note: The plaque was not a panacea. It only reduced defensiveness when the building would otherwise be demolished. If the building would continue to exist, posting a plaque actually seemed to make participants slightly more defensive. It could be that posting a plaque near an existing building makes the building seem more important. Future research should explore when posting plaques such as these—a not uncommon occurrence when dealing with historic buildings—may do more harm than good. Nonetheless, devising strategies that protect property’s symbolic significance for a group could help ameliorate conflicts by reducing the importance that groups place on owning symbolic property. Group members want to be able to represent important aspects of their group identity and to communicate that identity to others; both of these objectives can potentially be achieved without legal ownership of property itself and in some cases even without the property’s physical existence. Summary. In this section, we identified two variables that contribute to how strongly ownership of symbolic group property is defended: the strength of basic human needs that give rise to group identity motives, and whether ownership is necessary to protect the symbolism of group property. Our research suggests that ownership is seen as important in part because it can help satisfy certain universal drives such as the need to belong, and that ownership may be most strongly defended when it is needed to protect the symbolic meaning of group property. By emphasizing the symbolic function of group property, our theoretical perspective may therefore be helpful in changing the conceptualization of certain conflicts over property from zero-sum disputes over ownership to non-zero sum situations where it is possible to simultaneously meet the needs of opposing parties.

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Part II Summary The research reviewed in the second half of this chapter suggests that group property is perceived as particularly important when identity motives or belonging needs are strong and when the property effectively symbolizes something about group identity to other people. Our research also suggests that the heightened value and defensiveness we observed over symbolic property are not inevitable or chronic: People should see a symbolic building as valuable or fiercely defend it from outside threats only if an identity motive is strong, if the property is an effective symbol of group identity, and if ownership is the only way to protect the property’s symbolism. If these motives are not strong, or if the symbol does not need protection in order to represent group identity, people should be less aggressive and more cooperative about ownership. Therefore, intergroup conflicts over symbolic property are not necessarily inevitable, but may instead result from a particular confluence of circumstances that can potentially be averted or mitigated. This research also suggests potential interventions for intergroup conflicts over symbolic property when they do occur. For example, considering motivational reasons as to why people value and defend group property may suggest alternative ways to meet these needs. If conflict resolution focuses only on the pragmatic uses of group property and fails to factor in the many needs that symbolic property helps meet, the intervention is less likely to be successful. Our perspective may therefore help to shed light on why resource-based interventions often fail, and suggest new ideas for promoting successful conflict resolution. Future research should test and elaborate these ideas outside of the laboratory to refine them in the context of complex and entrenched intergroup conflicts.

Conclusion In this chapter, we summarized two separate yet complimentary lines of research. First, we described how symbols such as flags and logos may reify groups, making them seem more coherent and potentially threatening. We suggested that this sense of “groupiness” and “realness” that symbols impart can help explain people’s perceptions of certain terrorists groups and movements—why some groups are seen as more menacing, and why some groups are seen as “terrorists” while other groups are seen as “criminals.” We also suggested that this reifying effect of symbols may help to explain why symbolic group targets are so often targeted by state and non-state actors: Groups may wish to target what

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they see as one source of threat posed by an out-group and to make their rivals seem less cohesive and menacing. Second, we suggested that people particularly value symbolic group property when they are highly motivated to achieve a desired group identity, and when property conveys something about group identity to others. We proposed that considering how different symbols and different identities may be interchangeable could help temporarily defuse tense situations. We also suggested that understanding the symbolic function of property and how it can be used to meet identity and belonging needs may help transform what are often seen as zero-sum conflicts into conflicts where all parties can obtain their objectives. Returning to the question we posed at the outset of this chapter, this research provides new insight into why people care so much about symbols of group identity. Such symbols can serve a number of important psychological functions. Tangible symbols such as flags and property can make our groups seem real. They help us achieve our desired group identities and satisfy fundamental needs such as belonging. They communicate our group identity and history to others. Yet though the research described here has offered insight regarding why and when groups may attack the symbols of others and fiercely defend their own symbols, it has also suggested that such actions are not inevitable. By understanding the psychological reasons that drive people to care deeply about group symbols, then, we can begin to consider new ways of reducing the conflict and violence that often centers on property and other symbols of group identity.

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CHAPTER TEN CYBER TERRORISM: FEAR, ANGER AND ANXIETY AS AGENTS OF CHANGE VIOLET CHEUNG-BLUNDEN UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO

AND BILL BLUNDEN SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY

Abstract In light of the precedence set by the War on Terror, we argue that cyber terrorism may be the next theater where counterterrorism policies will be utilized. To this end we surveyed a series of recent cyber incidents and found a subset that approximately satisfy the criteria of terrorism defined by Martha Crenshaw. Then we focused on the common psychological effects of terrorism by leveraging two emotion theories. Specifically, we employed the functionalist approach to help explain the power of emotions in swaying the behaviors of a target group. In addition, we used appraisal theory to trace emotions to several cognitive origins. This analysis has both theoretical and practical implications for terrorism in the cyber domain. Although terrorists are supposed to induce fear, cyber terrorists are more likely to create anger and anxiety in a target group. We examine the intrinsic difficulties that prevent cyber terrorists from generating the desired response in the target population. Keywords: Cyber terrorism, cyber policy, fear, anger, anxiety As post-industrial societies become more dependent on technology with regard to commerce, finance, health care, energy, communications

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and national defense, they are also exposed to greater risk. President Obama’s 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review concludes that a growing array of state and non-state actors are targeting U.S. citizens, commerce, critical infrastructure, and government with cyber attacks (White House, 2009). These threats elicited a range of different policy responses, from the appointment of a Cyber Security Czar by the White House to the establishment of CYBERCOM by the Secretary of Defense. One of the most remarkable developments however, is the Pentagon’s assertion in 2010 that computer sabotage emanating from another country can constitute an act of war, and the U.S. would be justified to respond using conventional military force (Gorman & Barnes, 2011). As such, “use of force” can be expected to spread from cyberspace to physical space in the future (Zetter, 2009a). From a bird’s eye view, the information highway has merely provided a new platform for malicious activity. Crime, espionage, terrorism, and war are problems that have traditionally plagued society. Once more, the classification of cyber incidents into distinct categories (cyber-crime, cyber espionage, cyber terrorism, and cyber war) provides heuristics to formulate cyber policy. Openly declaring war against a foreign country has hardly been the standard response for drug cartels or spy rings. Policymakers may come to realize that military intervention is an unusual solution to cyber crime and cyber espionage. Yet, a majority of cyber attacks to date fall squarely into these categories (Blunden & Cheung-Blunden, accepted manuscript). For example, in 2010, the Secret Service investigated cyber crime violations that involved over $500 million in fraud loss (Verizon, 2011). At the same time, it has also been reported that there have been millions of attempts to breach networks operated by the U.S. Department of Defense (Lipinski, 2009). Even though cyber war could be considered a legitimate category, one that warrants military involvement, genuine occurrences of cyber war are conspicuously absent. Based on the definition of war established by Carl von Clausewitz, Thomas Rid (2011) examined the concept of cyber war and concluded that it would be unlikely to occur in the future. The only category in which the Pentagon might legitimize the use of force is in responding to incidents that fall under cyber terrorism. The War on Terror established a precedent with regard to using the military to deal with terror, and some Congressional leaders have been quick to extend the same principle to cyberspace, even when the evidence supporting the efficacy of some of the incidents is sketchy at best. For example, in 2009 an unknown hacker launched a series of denial-of-service attacks against American and South Korean websites, causing disruption at a number of

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institutions (Zetter, 2009a). Though no one claimed responsibility outright, the nature of the sites targeted was enough for some analysts to prematurely conclude that North Koreans were the culprit. Congressman Peter Hoekstra went further and urged President Obama to execute a “show of force” (Zetter, 2009a). Proponents of the retaliatory approach to counterterrorism post 9/11 may claim that its effectiveness outweighs the cost, but the merit of this argument is harder to make in the cyber domain because similar policies are fundamentally flawed from a technical standpoint (Blunden & Cheung-Blunden, accepted manuscript). For example, attribution can be extremely difficult to establish on the Internet. Even with claims of responsibility, corroborating evidence is necessary to assign blame. This, in turn, makes responding problematic. Retaliatory policies cannot be implemented if the target is unknown or uncertain. In the alleged North Korean attack mentioned above, forensic work eventually traced the attack to Florida, and experts still do not know who is responsible for the attacks (Zetter, 2009b). The U.S. policy response to cyber terrorism is in its infancy stage; much of it has been crafted by a select few. There is hope for selfcorrection on behalf of policymakers, but in a democratic system, the public can also influence policies. In one such scenario, the public leverages its cognitive capacities by seeking out facts, deliberating on potential consequences and advocating for a set of solutions. Alternatively, the public may respond viscerally to the threat of an attack and let their emotions dictate the actions that they support. Our earlier studies in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11) highlighted the latter pathway. We found that anger was the linchpin that rallied the public behind the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (Cheung-Blunden & Blunden, 2008a; 2008b). In this chapter, we will first show that incidents of terrorism are few and far apart in cyberspace. Nonetheless, each attack is capable of eliciting emotional reactions from the target group, the public. According to the functionalists, each emotion is supposed to prompt a specific class of actions to solve a particular person-environment predicament (Frijda, 1987; Lazarus, 1999; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1982). We examine what kind of actions a person desires when he/she feels fearful, angry or anxious towards a cyber terrorist attack. Then we use appraisal theory to highlight a common misconception of the word “emotion,” which has the veneer of an automatic response, that emotions are direct results of a specific incident. But if that were the case, the collapsing Twin Towers on the morning of 9/11 should elicit exactly

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the same emotion in everyone. Yet some Americans were overwhelmed by sadness; others were gripped by anger. Some, who support the goals of al Qaeda, were overjoyed. Research on cognitive appraisal shows that emotional reactions pivot on the subjective meaning of an incident. When multiple pieces of information are skewed, the associated reaction can be altered accordingly. Misinformed emotions do not serve a person’s wellbeing and yet are powerful motivators for personal and group actions. We visit some of the appraisals that could sway emotions in different directions in the event of cyber terrorism.

Incidents of Cyber Terrorism Several particularly high profile incidents involving infrastructure targets have recently made the headlines. For example, in 2010, the Stuxnet worm made its way into Iran’s nuclear facilities (Symantec, 2011). There were attacks that targeted financial institutions like MasterCard, Visa and PayPal (Barrett, Strasburg, & Bunge, 2011; Business Wire, 2010; Mayo, 2010). There were also incidents of subversion that took place in 2011 and 2012 involving attacks on the news outlets maintained by Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing Ltd. and the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange (Knell, 2012; Thomasson, 2011). Most of these attacks used an offensive technology called distributed denial-of-service (DDoS), which overwhelms targeted servers with a barrage of requests (Menn, 2010). This type of attack is regarded as pedestrian because it usually does not cause permanent damage and, at worst, results in a temporary disruption of service. Data breaches are another common class of attack. For example, the Anonymous hacking collective made off with information on roughly 10,000 credit cards and published them on the Internet. Finally, there are more advanced attacks exemplified by the Stuxnet worm, which produced actual physical damage and reportedly undermined Iran’s uranium enrichment process (O’Murchu, 2011; Symantec, 2011). An infrastructure event, regardless of levels of sophistication, does not automatically qualify as cyber terrorism. Crenshaw (2010) arrived at four criteria after surveying the historical incidents and the well-known definitions of terrorism. We concluded that only two cyber attacks thus far approximately satisfy the criteria of terrorism. Crenshaw’s (2010) first criterion is that terrorism is manifested in acts of social and politically unacceptable violence. A point of contention is whether cyber attacks are indeed violent. There is some merit to the argument that the potential for psychological and physical harm qualify

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cyber attacks as violent. Nevertheless, a dialog is needed to define violence in the age of the Internet. A somewhat relaxed premise is adopted in the present discussion to allow all of the cyber subversion incidents discussed in this chapter to pass the first criterion. In this way, the subversion incidents can be checked against the other criteria of terrorism. The second of Crenshaw’s criteria is that there is a consistent pattern of symbolic or representative selection of victims or targets. Several subversive cyber incidents under consideration meet this criterion, although the qualification for this criterion required some interpretation of isolated cyber attacks within the larger backdrop of traditional conflict to reveal a theme. For example, Stuxnet occurred during a period of heightened rhetoric from Israel and the U.S. about the Iranian nuclear ambition, as well as the assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists. In June of 2012, the New York Times, based on a leak from the White House, reported that the U.S. and Israel were responsible for Stuxnet (Sanger, 2012). The cyber attacks on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange coincided with similar attacks on the websites of Israel’s national airline. The proPalestinian theme was made more obvious by the praise of the hacking activities by Hamas and reportedly, the promise of more attacks by a Saudi, called OxOmar (Knell, 2012). An exception to the rule is a hacking collective known as Anonymous, whose activities do not require much interpretation. Anonymous not only claims responsibility for, but often forewarns, their cyber attacks. Anonymous has thematic targets with a clearly articulated agenda – to bring about freedom of speech, and more recently, parity of income, through subversion. The third of Crenshaw’s criteria is that terrorism is part of a revolutionary strategy – a method used by insurgents to seize political power from an existing government. Under this light, Stuxnet is not a proper terrorist act, because the alleged actors, the U.S. and Israel, were less set out to change the Iranian regime than to sabotage a specific project. The attacks on Israeli targets would only satisfy this criterion when interpreted within the larger backdrop of Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Anonymous is more true-to-type in terms of their revolutionary intentions. They use the cyber attacks to communicate their agenda, determinations, and demands. The fourth of Crenshaw’s criterion has to do with the ways in which terrorist groups try to induce change – a set of actions are used by the movement to create a psychological effect on specific groups in order to change their political behavior and attitudes. As such, only organizations or individuals with an explicit agenda can meet this criterion, which would

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include the pro-Palestinian groups and the Anonymous group. These groups harbor intentional goals, and for these ends they devise tactical means.

Reacting to Cyber Terrorism with Emotions and Action Tendencies Although not all terrorists are rational (Crenshaw, 2010), some might want to strategize about how to elicit emotional reactions in the target group given that psychological effects are the main tools to achieve their goals. The same holds true for the victims of the terrorist attack if they want to guard against emotional outbursts, outbursts that fulfill the aims of the attack. In our view, the emotion-action correspondence is not well understood by terrorists or victims. Sometimes terrorists engage in blind violence that has little chance to deliver desired results; other times victims react in a way that serves the interests of the terrorists. It just so happens that psychologists have made significant headway with regard to their understanding of emotion in the last couple of decades, aided by advances in measurement techniques of the brain and physiology (Norman et al., 2011). Some of the resulting emotion theories may provide the necessary scientific framework to elaborate on the details of the fourth criterion, on exactly how the terrorists’ agents of change, i.e., the emotional outburst, are supposed to work on a democratic population (Groenendyk, 2011). One of the core theories of emotion is the functionalist approach which states that each basic emotion triggers a corresponding set of physiological responses and facial expressions (Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1992; Frijda, 1987; Lazarus, 1999; Roseman, 1991; Scherer, 1982). These physical changes aim to prepare people to produce a class of actions that will address their person-environment challenge. Ekman (1992) for example, examined the facial expressions of emotions in humans and found that some expressions were recognizable across cultures while other expressions were not. He labeled the cross-culturally generalizable emotions “basic emotions.” These emotions are basic in the sense that they are rooted in evolutionarily adapted brain circuitries where each emotion mobilizes a fixed set of facial muscles. Today, our understanding of the functions of basic emotions goes beyond facial expressions and includes physiologies and macro behaviors. In this framework, the expression of fear is characterized by wide eyes, cold sweat, clammy palms and so on (Ekman, 1992; Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, & Wilhelm, 2005). These physiological symptoms prepare the

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recipient to avoid danger, and research has indeed showed that fearful participants tend to hide, freeze in place, or run away (Cheung-Blunden & Blunden, 2008b; Gault & Sabini, 2000; Lazarus, 1999; Roseman, 1991; Roseman et al., 1994; Scherer & Ceschi, 1997). In fact, the facial expression associated with fear is contagious enough to make naive bystanders vicariously feel the same physiological response and show the same avoidance behavior, without being aware of the true nature of the situation. It is not a coincidence that the word terror is derived from the Latin word meant to describe physical trembling and an emotional state of fear (terrere = “to frighten, terrify”). Fear might very well be the most effective emotion for terrorists to elicit considering its associated action tendency. The National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria used bombs and grenades to instill fear (Crenshaw, 2010). The end result was that shops closed, people cowered in their homes and a large number of local officials resigned. The FLN, according to historical record, was said to have achieved an effect of mass panic, insecurity, disarray, disorientation and fear. The 9/11 events also elicited fear, and the success of the operation from the terrorists’ perspective can be seen in the damage to the economy when Americans avoided shopping malls, pulled back in their stock portfolios and refused to travel on airplanes (Cheung-Blunden & Blunden, 2008b). One characteristic of fear tactics is that while they may bring about compliance, they do not necessarily yield broad based support. This is perhaps why some terrorist groups chose to induce fear in a narrow segment of politically relevant groups. Mao Tse-tung for example, placed his sight on popular support when engaged in gruerrilla warfare “We should strike only when positively certain that the enemy's situation, the terrain and popular support are all in our favor and not in his” (Chapter V, Section 5). He advocated precise tactics: “Injuring all of a man's ten fingers is not as effective as chopping off one, and routing ten enemy divisions is not as effective as annihilating one of them” (Mao, 1936. Chapter V, Section 9). The Red Army of China strategically targeted townships, Guomindang officials, and the elites. They tried to avoid harming the peasantry and the poor while engaging them with the communist ideology of equality. The Red Army’s success in fighting the Japanese occupation during World War II won approval from an even wider base which included patriots from all classes and origins. A variation in targeting is exemplified by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), who would incur infrastructure damage while keeping civilian casualties to a minimum. This allowed the IRA to seek support through an agenda

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that possessed mass appeal in conjunction with effective propaganda (Sarma, 2011). If fear is the “correct” emotion to be elicited through terrorist attacks, then anger would be the “wrong” emotion. Anger is perhaps what classic terrorism literature labels as psychological backfiring because the emotion typically prompts antagonistic actions (Darwin, 1872). Prototypical expressions of anger include teeth bearing, fist clenching and feet stomping, all of which prepares the person for a fight (Cheung-Blunden & Blunden, 2008b; Ekman, 1992; Gault & Sabini, 2000; Lazarus, 1999; Roseman, 1991; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994; Scherer & Ceschi, 1997). Research on basic emotions supports the idea that anger is fairly unique at driving aggressive behavior (Frijda, 1987; Ramirez et al., 2001; 2002; Roseman et al., 1994). If a target group is mobilized by anger, it will likely support a more repressive counterinsurgent policy that incurs damage to the terrorist movement. Of course, this does not mean that an angry response will always work for the target group. Policies founded on rage can come with blind spots in terms of the costs and other long-term ramifications. Another emotion that the public often experiences as a result of terrorism is anxiety (Crenshaw, 2010), which entails symptoms such as constant worrying, rumination, dwelling on worst case scenarios, and loss of sleep (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990; Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, Franken, & Maver, 2005; van Rijsoort, Emmelkamp, & Vervaeke, 1999). Although the functionalists have not articulated the specific behavioral ramifications of anxiety because anxiety is not a basic emotion, clinicians seemed to have honed in on the link between anxiety and precautionary behavior. For example, patients with post traumatic stress disorder or obsessive compulsive disorder (or other disorders with underlying trait anxiety) tend to experience state anxiety (Sylyers, Lilienfeld, & LaPrairie, 2010). Their primary behaviors revolve around precautionary measures that eliminate perceived threats (Helbig-Lang & Petermann, 2010). If terrorists elicit this emotion in the masses, there would most likely be broader support for policies like The Patriot Act as people begin to favor security over liberty. While this policy outcome can be costly to society due to the expenses associated with pervasive measures, it is also costly to terrorists as new tactics must be devised to avoid detection and overcome obstacles placed to prevent terrorist attacks. The result can be an arms race fueled by spending and inventiveness as each side responds to the other’s technological and security innovations.

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Our studies of 9/11 supported the basic tenets of the functionalists. In the aftermath of 9/11, we linked fear to avoidant behaviors and anger to antagonistic intentions (Cheung-Blunden & Blunden, 2008b). Specifically, fearful participants were preoccupied with avoiding crowded places and angry participants rallied behind the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our findings shed light on the political analysis of post 9/11 policies where the functions of emotions were not clearly distinguished (e.g. Moore, 2004). At the time, U.S. President George W. Bush had been accused of relying on fear tactics to gain the public’s support for his military campaign in the Middle East. Our studies showed that fear is not necessarily the political linchpin that it may seem. Rather, anger was the more salient factor with regard to garnering consent for military action. Our data on cyber terrorism also supported the functionalist notion by mapping fear to immobilization and anger to antagonism. A cyber attack launched by the Anonymous group in the fall of 2010 is an instructive example. After WikiLeaks released State Department cables, the U.S. government reacted by pressuring financial institutions to hobble Wikileaks’ ability to raise funds. Some financial institutions complied, including MasterCard who closed the WikiLeaks’ account. The hacking collective known as Anonymous retaliated against the company by launching a DDoS attack and posting some 10,000 credit card numbers online. We asked participants to watch a news report of the cyber attack by Anonymous. Participants responded to questionnaires pertaining to fearful, angry, and anxious emotions (Forgays, Forgays, & Spielberger, 1997; Kvaal, Laake, & Engedal, 2001; Spielberger, 1983) as well as avoidant, antagonistic and hypervigilant behavioral intentions (Cheung-Blunden & Blunden, 2008a; 2008b; Dekay et al., 2009). Significant demographics and emotions were entered into three separate multiple regression equations for avoidant, antagonistic and hypervigilant behavioral intentions. Results showed that fear but not anger predicted avoidance. Anger but not fear predicted antagonism. While the effects of fear and anger were specific in our studies of cyber terrorism, the effect of anxiety was more widespread in the regression analyses – anxiety was able to predict avoidance, antagonism, as well as hypervigilance. Further studies are needed to clarify the function(s) of anxiety. It is a distinct possibility that since anxiety is not a basic emotion, its functional implications may be non-specific. A more likely possibility though, is that anxious participants desire safety specifically, but a range of responses can be construed as security measures. For example, patients with anxiety disorders have shown avoidant behavior when they believe that avoiding certain places can prevent them from getting sick; they have

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also shown a proclivity to attack the source of danger if they believe that the threat can be eliminated (Helbig-Lang & Petermann, 2010; Sylvers et al., 2011). On the surface, anxiety has been linked to a variety of behavioral tendencies; on a deeper level though, all of the behavioral tendencies may share one meaning to the anxious person – security measure.

A Look behind Emotions After discussing the impact of emotion on the terrorists’ target group, our focus can shift to the process of eliciting specific emotions. In this regard, appraisal theory provides useful tools, as it traces the origins of emotion to specific pieces of information (Roseman, Antoniou, & Jose, 1996; Scherer & Ceschi, 1997; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Smith & Lazarus, 1993; Sylvers et al., 2011). We will focus on a few pivotal bits of information about cyber attacks that are not easily obtained by investigators (like attribution), but are nonetheless key ingredients for fear, anger or anxiety. But before we delve into the specifics, we will visit the basics of appraisal theory. Our hope is to examine the implications of appraisal theory from the perspectives of both sides of a terrorist attack, i.e. terrorists, general public and policymakers. The central tenet of appraisal theory is that the quality and quantity of emotions are determined by the conscious evaluation of a situation, i.e. cognitive appraisals. The claim that emotions have cognitive roots met with resistance at first, as it was considered contradictory to the primitive nature of emotion (Izard, 1994). However, the premise gained wider support from neuroscience and animal research as the limbic system was shown to not operate in isolation but take inputs from other parts of the brain (Norman et al., 2011). One of the implications of this central tenet is that information influences emotional reaction and is, in turn, the key to the public sentiment after an attack. It is often the case that a majority of the general public does not directly witness a terrorist attack but instead experiences it through media reports. As such, terrorists are often dependent upon the mainstream media in the target group to induce psychological reactions, and there is a lot of room for unintended consequences such as igniting anger rather than eliciting fear (Somerville & Purcell, 2011). An insight that government officials could glean from appraisal theory is that an informed public is an asset to the decision-making process (Surowiecki, 2004). Misinformation engineers emotions that produce unfit solutions to the person-environment challenge. For example, if a child is taught to be careless around strangers or a homeowner made indifferent to

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the possibility of fire, they will abide by behavior that may not serve their interests (such as get into the stranger’s car, or leave candles burning unattended). In the same way, government propaganda can highjack the emotion process and generate hysteria that leads to inappropriate actions. On the other hand, sure footed emotions can be valuable as they signal hazards in the environment. The general public can also take away a message from all this. Just because the root of emotions is cognitive does not mean cognitive raw materials and the emotional outcomes have the same texture. To process cognitive material, most people are willing to discuss and revise their opinions. But emotions, perhaps because they are seated in the prehistoric parts of the brain, seem beyond reproach. By learning to scrutinize the influence of emotionally potent cues, the general public can safeguard against rash policy moves in response to terrorism in a democratic system.

Culpability as an Emotionally Potent Cue Many kinds of information were proposed by appraisal theory as raw materials for emotion. One causal factor is culpability, which is sometimes referred to as accountability, or other-blame. When there is an opportunity to blame someone else for a negative event, anger is likely to arise (Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits & De Boeck, 2003; Smith & Lazarus, 1993; Roseman et al., 1996; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Conversely, natural disasters and accidents lack the blame factor, and thus leave victims feeling sad and distressed but not necessarily angry. The role culpability plays in anger, has been studied with various research designs. When participants were randomly assigned to answer questionnaires containing scenarios that systematically varied along several appraisal dimensions, the appraisal that involved holding someone else responsible seemed to be a feature of anger (Kuppens et al, 2003). Van Zomeren and Lodewijkx (2005) asked participants to read a news article which had an additional piece appended to the ending in order to manipulate who was accountable. The group of participants who were able to blame an actor felt angrier. Similar results were derived by Roseman (1991), Smith and Lazarus (1993) and Neumann (2000), who found that other-person agency in vignettes led to perceived reactions of anger and unfriendliness. Culpability is an important factor to discuss in the context of cyber terrorism because the origin of a cyber attack is often impossible to establish from a technical standpoint (Blunden & Cheung-Blunden, accepted manuscript). Insomuch as electronic trails are prized forensic

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artifacts, they are not as definitive as a layman would assume. Many techniques can be used to produce enough confusion to render the trails useless. As a result, the clearest way to ascertain culpability is for a reliable actor to publicly claim the responsibility. But not all terrorist groups can afford the weight of culpability and flirt with the wrath of anger. Not claiming responsibility also has its downsides. First, other groups might take the credit and advance their causes. Second, the control of this information is given to the establishment, who is capable of inventing convenient fabrications. A common practice of mainstream news is to identify attacker with qualifiers (e.g. suspected or alleged) and the default culprits have been Chinese and North Koreans (China Security Review Commission, 2002; Vijayan, 2010; Zetter, 2009a). The problem with this sort of speculative reporting is that information on culpability has a tendency to turn emotional. Once public outrage is piqued, emotions are often given the free reign in civic participation as they tend to be construed as patriotism (as opposed to the negative connotation given to emotions in interpersonal interactions). Therefore, the public and lawmakers must be careful of information that assigns culpability.

Efficacy as an Emotionally Potent Cue High self-efficacy has been well-documented as a factor in aggressive behavior. Specifically, greater confidence in the ability to execute an aggressive act plays a role in the decision to launch an attack in human adults (Crick & Ladd, 1990; Feldman & Dodge, 1987; Johnson, 2004; Perry, Perry, & Rasmussen, 1986; Slaby & Guerra, 1988; Waas, 1988). Archer and Benson (2008) reported that teenage men in their study were less likely to escalate a dispute to physical aggression when the opposing agent was judged to be a better fighter. Archer (1988) extended earlier observations of animals (Parker, 1974) that several animal species also assess the size, weapons, and allies of their opponents before engaging in a fight. The appraisal theory together with the functionalist approach would indicate a two-segment pathway between efficacy and aggression: first from high efficacy to anger, and then from anger to hostile behavior (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Roseman et al., 1996; Van Zomeren & Lodewijkx, 2005). Hence, a sense of self-confidence tends to fuels angry feelings. Not only is efficacy an appraisal antecedent for anger; Lazarus (1999) suggests that it is also an antecedent for fear. For example, a situation might be similarly confrontational, but a (self-perceived) weak

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person tends to respond with fear and run away; a (self-perceived) strong person tends to become angry and counterattack. In essence, efficacy can be seen as a switch between fearful and angry responses to terror. To instill fear in the target population, terrorists must seem capable. This is not always easy to achieve considering that terrorism is usually an instrument of the weak. If terrorists appear incapable, they tend to generate angry rather than fearful responses from the target group. To change public perception, terrorists have to demonstrate a consistent gain of strength, for example by bolstering their ranks or by an expanding territory. Sometimes a strong image is achieved early in the movement with a “spectacular” attack. The challenge posed by an initial success like this is that momentum has to be maintained with escalating attacks. Stagnation or a decline in “success” will give the opposition the necessary breathing room to restore a sense of group capability (“The U.S. will accomplish the mission in a matter of months”). From the perspective of the target group, the inherent differential in efficacy predisposes the target group to respond to terrorist attacks with anger. If this relative advantage is indeed genuine, then the target group can utilize its vast resources (e.g. law enforcement and international cooperation) to strategically deal with the threat. However, a cautionary lesson from military responses to 9/11 is that the discrepancy in efficacy may not be as large as it appears. The determining factor of the military campaigns may not be sheer military superiority, but rather difficult terrain and rampant political corruption. Therefore, the victims must not react with anger too quickly without a thorough capability analysis. A correct assessment of relative capability is an even harder task in the constantly changing world of technology. The hackers and security professionals of the Internet are perennially engaged in an arms race that focuses on the development and detection of malware. The state of play is not always accurately reported by the press, setting a worrisome precondition for misguided public reaction. Many official statements have been made of malware becoming the weapons of terrorists, but little detail was offered about the capability of each terrorist group to launch assaults.

Comprehension as an Emotionally Potent Cue Fear and anxiety are similar emotions that can be hard to differentiate at times (Lerner, Gonzales, Small, & Fischhoff, 2003; Smith, Haynes, Lazarus, & Pope, 1993). Nevertheless, there are distinct characteristics that separate the two. The discrete view of emotions purports a formal theory that emotions are differentiable on all levels, from function and

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phenomenology to genesis (Roseman, 2001). Thus, there is the potential that researchers may identify unique causes for anxiety that do not play into fear. Given that such a candidate for a unique cause for anxiety is absent in the current version of appraisal theory, we relied on previous clinical research and developed some understanding of the cognitive features of anxiety. We also present initial findings to show that the cognitive process of comprehension could be a relatively unique antecedent of anxiety. Two hallmark symptoms of anxiety are a fixation on the threat causing the fretfulness and a preoccupation with corresponding safety behaviors. Researchers induced these symptoms and found a (paradoxical) degradation in their ability to recall details from memory For example, one research was conducted by van den Hout, Engelhard, de Boer, du Bois, and Dek (2008) who instructed healthy volunteers to stare at a gas stove. These participants subsequently reported dissociative symptoms that they felt uncertainty about their perception. Similarly, Radomsky, Gilchrist, and Dussault (2006) asked students to double check a gas stove. This group of participants reported less confidence and fewer details in memory than the control group who did not double check. These studies revealed a possible link between poor memory and anxiety. A similar link between a poor grasp of the detail and anxiety also emerged in our studies of public reaction to cyber terrorism. We asked participants to view a multimedia clip of a news report on a cyber attack by Anonymous. Their understanding of the information in the news clip was assessed through several multiple choice questions. Our findings showed that participants who gave more incorrect answers also reported higher levels of anxiety. The level of comprehension seemed to only relate to anxiety; but not to fear or any other emotions that we have measured. Hence, the inability to comprehend details seems to be a signature of the anxiety. Of course an important question is the direction of causality – whether participants who experienced anxiety were unable to digest the news clip or whether poor understanding of the news clip bred anxiety. In this regard, we measured trait anxiety in the pretest before the presentation of the news clip and confirmed that poor comprehension was not a function of pretest anxiety. It is foreseeable that understanding is one of the unique causes of anxiety that will help to distinguish it from fear. This hypothesis on comprehension as an antecedent for anxiety is consistent with some of the conclusions in a recent review paper by Helbig-Lang and Petermann (2010). Although anxious patients grapple with a vast number of behavioral responses, they are generally ineffective in alleviating their anxieties (with the exception of using distraction as a

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measure). A possible explanation for this is that anxious patients cast a vast net to address a threat because they do not necessarily understand the nature of the threat. Comprehension may not simply be an antecedent of anxiety but the key antecedent that lies at the core of anxiety. If the hypothesis on comprehension holds up in future research, it has unique implications for cyber terrorism. Since much of the technical minutiae is beyond the grasp of the general public (including bureaucrats), the comprehension of cyber threats is expected to be limited. As a result, the public might indiscriminately embrace policy responses that appear to reduce cyber threat while shouldering the associated costs. To curb this trend, public education can be used to reduce anxiety. For example, DDoS attacks, which are often mischaracterized, should be explained using everyday language so that people are less inclined to overreact.

Conclusion A couple of emotion theories are particularly useful with regard to clarifying exactly how the psychological effects in the fourth criterion of terrorism are supposed to induce change in the target population. Specifically, we used the functionalist approach to project the policy implications of emotions; and the appraisal theory to trace emotions to information. Perhaps because terrorism is the weapon of the weak or sometimes a refuge of last resort, many terrorists’ acts are irrational. However, any rational terrorist would be well advised to fathom the nuances of their main tool – the ability to induce explicit psychological effects in the target population. In this chapter, we focused on three emotions as agents of change and it became apparent that it is not at all easy for a resource-strapped group to elicit fear while avoiding anger and anxiety. Besides specific strategic disadvantages along the lines of culpability, efficacy and comprehension, a general disadvantage, that prevents the terrorists from utilizing emotions effectively, is that their own news outlets are often out-shined by the mainstream media of the target group. Information control is crucial in terms of guiding the public’s appraisal of a terrorist attack. The information campaign will have to continue well beyond the immediate aftermath of a terrorist attack as emotions are fluid and the target group can always reappraise based on new information. Incidentally, the process of constant re-appraisal is sometimes misconstrued as one emotion transforming into another. There are mechanisms through which emotions are connected. For example, fear, anger and many other emotions are negatively valenced; one negative emotion is said to be able

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to activate another negative emotion. But the more convincing explanation for the transformation of emotions is a change in perception. The Anonymous hacking collective is a case in point as it is the only group that has thus far almost exclusively utilized the cyber channel. This group has a notable advantage according the appraisal theory – they are well versed in the Internet to use it as a propaganda tool to manage the public’s perception of their attacks. However, a detailed look into the specific appraisal antecedents suggests that their strategies flirt with anger, as exemplified by indiscriminant targets, consistently assuming responsibility, and the use of relatively basic cyber weapons. As such, the “preferred” psychological reaction, fear, remains out of their reach. Our analysis also showed that Anonymous might easily elicit anxiety due to the inherent nature of cyber threats (low levels of comprehension of technical details). Anger and anxiety would rally the public behind aggressive cyber policies, like those espoused by the Pentagon in the summer of 2010. The U.S. government, however, in a notably measured response to Anonymous, has so far relied on law enforcement and international cooperation to capture hackers and has left judgment to the courts. We hope that this even-tempered approach will prevail in the future with respect to cyber terror as strategies based on massive retaliation are flawed in the cyber domain. We also hope that continued research on the public’s response to cyber terrorism will shed light on the origins of anger and anxiety, in addition to underscoring the dire consequences that arise when these emotions dominate public discourse.

Acknowledgement We wish to thank Rosario Neyra and Taryn Larribas for their contributions to the empirical studies of cyberterrorism.

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—. (2001). A model of appraisal in the emotion system: Integrating theory, research, and applications. In Scherer KR, Schorr A. Johnstone T. (eds). Appraisal Processes in Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Roseman, I. J., Antoniou, A., & Jose, P. E. (1996). Appraisal determinants of emotions: Constructing a more accurate and comprehensive theory. Cognition and Emotion, 10(3), 241-277. Doi:10.1080/026999396380240 Sanger, D. (2012, June, 1). Obama order sped up wave of cyberattacks against Iran. New York Times. Retrived from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/01/world/middleeast/obamaordered-wave-of-cyberattacks-against-iran.html?pagewanted=all Sarma, K. (2007). Defensive propaganda and IRA political control in Republican Communities. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30(12), 1073-1094. Doi:10.1080/10576100701670888 Scherer, K. R. (1982). Emotion as process: Function, origin and regulation. Social Science Information, 21, 555-570. Scherer, K. R., & Ceschi, G. (1997). Lost luggage: A field study of emotion—antecedent appraisal. Motivation and Emotion, 21(3), 211235. Doi:10.1023/A:1024498629430 Slaby, R. G., & Guerra, N. G. (1988). Cognitive mediators of aggression in adolescent offenders: I. Assessment. Developmental Psychology, 24(4), 580-588. Doi:10.1037/0012-1649.24.4.580 Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of cognitive appraisal in emotion. Journal Of Personality and Social Psychology, 48(4), 813838. Doi:10.1037/0022-3514.48.4.813 Smith, C. A., Haynes, K. N., Lazarus, R. S., & Pope, L. K. (1993). In search of the ‘hot’ cognitions: Attributions, appraisals, and their relation to emotion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(5), 916-929. Doi:10.1037/0022-3514.65.5.916 Smith, C. A., & Lazarus, R. S. (1993). Appraisal components, core relational themes, and the emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 7(3-4), 233-269. Doi:10.1080/02699939308409189 Somerville, I., & Purcell, A. (2011). A history of Republican public relations in Northern Ireland from ‘Bloody Sunday’ to the ‘Good Friday agreement’. Journal of Communication Management, 15(3), 192-209. Doi:10.1108/13632541111150970 Spielberger, C.D. (1983). Manual for the state-trait anxiety inventory (STAI). Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. Surowiecki, J. (2004). The wisdom of crowds. New York, NY: Doubleday

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Sylvers, P., Lilienfeld, S. O., & LaPrairie, J. L. (2010). Differences between trait fear and trait anxiety: Implications for psychopathology. Clinical Psychology Review, doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2010.08.004 Symantec (2011). Symantec security response: W 32. Stuxnet dossier. Accessed from http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_res ponse/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf Thomasson, L. (2011, August). Hacker attack on Hong Kong Exchange website triggers halt in HSBC trading. Bloomberg. Retrieved from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-10/hong-kong-exchangehalts-some-trading-after-website-glitch-1-.html van den Hout, M. A., Engelhard, I. M., de Boer, C., du Bois, A., & Dek, E. (2008). Perseverative and compulsive-like staring causes uncertainty about perception. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46(12), 13001304. Doi:10.1016/j.brat.2008.09.002 van Rijsoort, S., Emmelkamp, P., & Vervaeke, G. (1999). The Penn State Worry Questionnaire and the Worry Domains Questionnaire: Structure, reliability and validity. Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy, 6(4), 297-307.Doi:10.1002/(SICI)1099-0879(199910) 6:43. 0. CO;2-E van Zomeren, M., & Lodewijkx, H. M. (2005). Motivated responses to ‘senseless’ violence: Explaining emotional and behavioural responses through person and position identification. European Journal of Social Psychology, 35(6), 755-766. Doi:10.1002/ejsp.274 Verizon (2011). 2011 data breach investigations report: A study conducted by the Verizon RISK Team with cooperation from the U.S. Secret Service and the Dutch High tech Crime Unit. Retrieved from http://www.verizonbusiness.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breachinvestigations-report-2011_en_xg.pdf Vijayan, J. (2010, January). Alleged China attacks could test U.S. cybersecurity policy. PCWorld. Retrieved from http://www.pcworld.com/article/186901/alleged_china_attacks_could_ test_us_cybersecurity_policy.html Waas, G. A. (1988). Social attributional biases of peer-rejected and aggressive children. Child Development, 59(4), 969-975. doi:10.2307/ 1130263 White House (2009). Cyberspace policy review. Retrieved from http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Rev iew_final.pdf Zetter, K. (2009a). Lawmaker wants “Show of force” against North Korea for website attacks. Wired Magazine. Retrieved from

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http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/07/show-of-force —. (2009b). Cyber attacks traced to the U.S., Britain. Wired Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/07/brits-attackus/

CHAPTER ELEVEN CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN NAVIGATING CONTRADICTION: CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND REVENGE SEEKING DONG-YUAN DEBBIE WANG AND F. DAN RICHARD UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA

Abstract Decision making and conflict resolution styles vary across cultures. This variation may exacerbate existing conflicts if the approach used to solve conflicts does not match cultural norms. Understanding of this variation will be important in successfully solving international and crosscultural conflicts. Accumulated evidence demonstrates that Easterners and Westerners differ in many ways, especially in perception and reasoning. Easterners tend to prefer dialectical or holistic thinking, being able to suspend judgment, consider multiple perspectives, and find a middle-way to solve a conflict. Westerners, alternatively, prefer non-dialectical or analytical thinking, preferring to come to judgments quickly, focusing on perspectives they perceive as more valuable, and selecting a polarized solution they perceive is right. When faced with uncertainty, individuals may choose to suspend judgment and seek additional information or quickly pick any available solution. Variations across cultures in the avoidance of uncertainty may be associated with differences in conflict resolution strategies, the tendency to choose extreme solutions to conflicts, and the tendency to switch from revenge to forgiveness. In this chapter, we will explore the practical implications of varying reasoning styles across cultures on intercultural conflicts and conflict resolution.

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Keywords: Dialectical thinking, culture, conflict resolution, revenge, forgiveness In August 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, unlike his predecessor, failed to make an annual appearance to the Yasukuni Shrine, a memorial shrine containing the remains of over two million Japanese war dead, including the remains of 14 Class A war criminals. In protest, a 54-year-old member of a right-wing political group in the Okayama Prefecture sent the Prime Minister his severed finger with a letter and DVD, complaining that the Prime Minister had dishonored war heroes who died in service of Japan (“Man nabbed”, 2007). The man was arrested for threatening the Prime Minister. On the 22nd of July, 2011, Anders Behring Breivik posted on Facebook his manifesto, a 1500 page document outlining issues facing Europe, primarily the influence of Islamic and Marxist ideologies on the European political system (Boston, 2011). In the document, he calls for an expulsion of all Muslims from Europe. After posting the manifesto, he used a car bomb to attack government buildings in Oslo, Norway, killing eight people, then proceeded to attack a Norwegian Labour Party youth camp on Utoya island, killing 69, many of them teenagers. These two incidents highlight the importance of how individuals frame, understand, and respond to conflict. The above incidents share common elements. Both incidents involved individual actors engaged in violent acts and threats to affect political systems. Both incidents included individuals who were involved in extremist groups1. In this chapter, however, we would like to highlight one important common feature within these incidents, one that tends to be overlooked – the way in which these individuals think about conflict. In this chapter, we will focus on how individuals respond to opposing views, how these responses might be influenced by deep cultural differences in cognitive frameworks, and how addressing these opposing views might lead to divergent conflict resolution strategies.

Activation of Cognitive Frameworks in Conflict Situations Bonta (1996) provides a relatively comprehensive definition of conflict as “the incompatible needs, differing demands, contradictory wishes, opposing beliefs, or diverging interests which produce interpersonal 1

See Harris and Monaghan, this volume, for analysis of right wing extremism and the Breivik incident.

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antagonism and, at times, hostile encounters” (p. 405). An important component of this definition is the recognition (either explicitly or implicitly) that needs are incompatible, that wishes are contradictory, and that beliefs are opposing. Using a Gestalt perspective, Heider (1944) highlighted the central value that contradictory ideas (unbalanced systems) and the resolution of cognitive “tension” has in evaluating and responding to perceived social events. Festinger (1962) explains that the “existence of non-fitting relations among cognitions” (p. 3) produces psychological discomfort and that individuals seek to reduce this discomfort. Therefore, conflict arises when individuals recognize opposing views or incompatible motives and then seek to achieve a more acceptable state of affairs (Abelson, 1959). Consistent with these early theorists in the field of perception and social cognition, information received regarding a conflict situation begins in the human experience as neither positive nor negative. After an individual receives information about a conflict situation, two cognitive activation processes are engaged that provide a context and valence to the information. The first process is the recognition of contradiction and the associated experience of cognitive “tension” (Festinger, 1962). The second process includes the automatic, spontaneous activation of associated beliefs and ideas that relate closely to the immediate situation and context (Collins & Loftus, 1975). These two activation processes are essential to conflict resolution within the individual context, in that they represent the starting conditions around which the remainder of the conflict resolution process develops. Loza (2007) describes the influence of cognitive inconsistency and cognitive dissonance in the thinking of terrorist actors. Loza explains that many terrorists are influenced by the difference between Western liberalism and ultra-traditional and idealistic Islamic society. Ibrahim (1980), in his description of Egyptian Islamic groups, notes that for many Islamic militants, there is an obvious contrast between the idealistic “righteous vision for a healthy society” supported by their religion and the society and practices characteristic of those in opposition to the “new social order” (pp. 429-430). Therefore, researchers and theorists have explained that cognitive dissonance and cognitive inconsistency contribute to religious extremism as well as terrorist actions. Druckman and Broome (1991) addressed the issue of cognitive consistency and conflict resolution empirically. Using role-playing in a conflict scenario, Druckman and Broome manipulated the scenario in some conditions to highlight the cultural and value differences between the groups and in other conditions to minimize these differences. Participants

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who received the scenarios highlighting inconsistency in culture and values, more than those who received consistent information, were less likely to show a willingness to compromise and had more negative expectations about the ultimate outcomes of the negotiations. Contradictions and apparent difference, when emphasized, leads to the activation of cognitive tension and a competitive conflict environment. Another important cognitive component of conflict situations is the spontaneous activation of prior experiences and beliefs associated with the conflict scenario. Associations between perceptions, events, and behaviors become strengthened over time through experience (Fiske, Kitayama, Marcus, & Nisbett, 1998; Higgs, 1996). Because the human mind operates on spreading activation of associated beliefs (Collins & Loftus, 1975), when a person enters a conflict scenario, associated thoughts, ideas, patterns, and expectations are activated at the same time. Fisher (2001) identifies activated misconceptions about an outgroup as one of the most influential factors in predicting the outcomes of intergroup conflict situations. The activation of previously learned expectations, biases, and attitudes about the conflict situation or about an outgroup can lead to further conflict. Deutsch (1994) explains how initial steps toward competition in a conflict situation can build an expectation of and orientation toward competition. These automatically activated expectations of conflict can lead to a conflict ethos (Bar-Tal, 2000), such that the experience of previously learned elements of a conflict can automatically activate other associated elements. Automatically activated beliefs are culturally defined and can even lead to less conflict. Gilovich (1981), for example, found that when participants were presented with scenarios that resembled the Vietnam conflict (a largely unpopular war), participants from the United States were less supportive of aggressive action to resolve the conflict as compared to those participants who received scenarios resembling World War II or a neutral scenario. Therefore, the content of activated beliefs and the historical context within which these beliefs are activated influence the preferred resolution of the conflict.

Activation of Dialectical or Analytical Thinking Different individuals perceive opposing views in different ways, and in turn, individuals approach the conflict in different ways. These various approaches may be conceptualized as either leading toward polarization or toward integration. The tendency to polarize (i.e., select the best perspective) versus integrating (finding a combined solution to opposing views that

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represents both sides) depends on one’s cognitive developmental stage and cultural background. Riegel (1973), using a developmental psychology perspective, described dialectical thinking and operation as the last stage of cognitive development. This stage was considered as a necessary synthesis toward the maturity of adults’ thinking. Riegel characterized dialectical thinking as when an adult “comprehends itself, the world, and each concrete object in its multitude of contradictory relations” (p. 6). Later, other empirical studies showed evidence that people were more likely to accept contradiction in reality and synthesize contradiction in their thinking as they aged (Chandler & Boutiler, 1992; Grossmann et al. 2010; Kramer & Woodruff, 1986). Peng and Ames (2001) defined dialectical thinking as “the mental processes of compromising or synthesizing facts, views, and goals of opposing perspectives” (p. 3634). Several researchers have associated dialectical thinking with Eastern culture and have compared this approach to analytical thinking in Western culture. Nisbett, Peng, Choi, and Norenzayan (2001) pointed out that these differing approaches to dealing with contradiction (i.e., dialectical and analytical) determined or at least influenced approaches to mathematical, medical, and philosophical questions in Eastern and Western cultures. Easterners are more likely to engage in dialectical and holistic thought which involves an orientation to the context, field, or relationships and a reasoning process based on such relationships. Easterners recognize contradiction as an essential part of the world, take multiple perspectives, and apply experience-based knowledge to find a “middle way” between opposing views. Westerners are more likely to take an analytical approach which emphasizes the detachment or isolation of objects from their context, assigns objects to categories, and applies formal logic to find a solution to contradiction. Peng and Nisbett (1999) showed differences between Chinese and Americans on several measurements focused on dialectical reasoning, acceptance of contradiction, and conflict resolution. First, they found that Chinese participants, more so than American participants, preferred dialectical (in which there are two oppositions co-existing in a proverb, e.g., Silence is also speech) over non-dialectical (e.g., Golden key can open any lock) proverbs. Second, Chinese participants were more likely to select a moderate solution for social conflicts relative to American participants. Peng and Nisbett (1999) concluded that Chinese participants showed more dialectical thinking (i.e., a willingness to accept contradiction and to compromise in solving a conflict) than American participants.

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When conflicts occur, Chinese people likely activate a cognitive framework based on Confucius ideology, valuing harmony, endurance, and the doctrine of the mean (avoiding extremes). This framework leads people to control their emotions and refrain from pursuing individual desires in order to maintain a harmonious environment. However, for Westerners, the same conflict likely activates a different cognitive framework, one having its origin in ancient Greece, valuing individual freedom, law, justice, and debate (Nisbett, et al., 2001). These ideologies are reflected in behavior, influencing which procedure individuals select to solve a conflict. Leung (1987) found that Chinese participants were more likely to select an indirect, non-confrontational method, such as mediation and bargaining, whereas Americans were more likely to apply a direct and confrontational procedure, such as debate and court proceedings, to solve the conflict. If dialectical thinking is a cognitive process, it could transcend the categories of Eastern and Western. From a historical perspective, both Easterners and Westerners are capable of dialectical thinking, but the type of dialectic thinking may vary. Different types of dialectical thinking likely developed in almost all cultures (e.g., Greek Dialectic, Heglian dialectic, Adorno’s Negative Dialectic, Chinese Dialectic, and Indian Negative Dialectic; see Wong, 2006 for details). Thus, to categorize Chinese as dialectical and holistic and Westerners as linear and analytical could be problematic. Cultural differences in reasoning and conflict resolution lie more “on which structures are highly accessible than in which structures are cognitively available” (Morris & Fu, 2001, p. 332). In other words, both dialectical thinking and analytical thinking may be present in both cultures, but when trying to solve a conflict, people in some cultures may retrieve from memory a dialectical solution first more than would people in other cultures.

Implications of Dialectical Thinking on Conflict Resolution With increasing interaction on the global stage through business, political activities, and social issues, humans in contemporary society are going to experience many differences in values and beliefs. These differences in values and beliefs can be perceived as a major source of conflict. For example, in 2007, a British teacher in the Sudan found herself in difficult circumstances because of a violation of cultural expectations. The teacher allowed the children in her classroom to name a teddy bear after a revered prophet (CNN, 2007). Many Sudanese citizens, primarily

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those who subscribe to the Muslim religion, considered naming a teddy bear the same name as the most revered prophet, Mohammed, as reprehensible. The notion was inconsistent with their beliefs about how the prophet should be honored. To the teacher, there was no apparent contradiction. Although, the teacher indicated that she meant no disrespect, some citizens called for the teacher’s death. As interaction across cultures and the potential for cross-cultural conflict increases, so does the need to deal with contradiction from multiple perspectives. People can be exposed to and possess many ways of dealing with conflict, but the specific conflict resolution strategy selected depends on which strategy is routinely activated and routinely practiced within a given culture and in turn becomes most accessible in memory. Hong et al. (2000) explains that “most important implicit theories about the social world are possessed by people everywhere; the variance across cultural groups probably lies in the relative accessibility of particular implicit theories, not in whether the theories are possessed” (p. 716). Hong et al. (2000) also demonstrated that bicultural Hong Kong Chinese could be primed by American or Chinese cultural icons to adopt different cultural frames in reasoning. When individuals deal with a conflict, they employ either a cooperative or competitive process determined by the accessibility of the process most consistent with the cultural mode. Activating dialectical reasoning might reduce conflict. Zhang et al. (2011) demonstrated that there was an inverse association between the activation of dialectical thinking and aggression. In their study, aggressive tendencies decreased when participants received a prime emphasizing dialectical thinking. It is possible that attending to the conflict situation and using dialectical primes could decrease tensions and promote cooperative motives. In a large-scale review of the intergroup contact literature, Pettigrew and Tropp (2008) identified empathy and perspective taking as important components in reducing intergroup prejudice and intergroup anxiety (see also Pettigrew, 1998). Activating dialectical reasoning might facilitate the development of perspective taking across groups with a history of conflict. Being exposed to other groups, learning differences among groups, and engaging in intergroup contact would help to form a dialectical reasoning view, which has been shown to reduce prejudice and promote diversity (Nagda, Kim, & Truelove, 2004). Dialectical thinking might be encouraged not only through activation within the immediate conflict situation but also through mental practice. Koo and Choi (2005) suggested that we can be trained to think in a particular cultural mode of reasoning. They found that as medical students received more training in oriental medicine (a dialectical and holistic

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approach), they were more likely than students not receiving the training to adopt a holistic perspective and predict greater changes over time within a seemingly predictable pattern. Koo and Choi suggest that training in holistic medicine changes the cognitive response and the approach to problem solving. These studies hold promise in connecting specific training and education with an increase in dialectical reasoning. Advanced education and training in dialectical reasoning might be used to make dialectical cognitive frameworks generally accessible in conflict situations. Other studies on race issues showed that exposure to multi-cultural education environments improve race relations and decrease levels of conflict (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008; Zirkel & Cartor, 2004). Thus a multicultural educational environment may serve as an important counterpart to promote dialectical thinking and support perspective taking. Orfield (2001) suggested many benefits of a multi-cultural mode of public education. He indicated that multi-cultural modes of education allow students to engage in perspective-taking where students “learned a lot about the other group’s background and feel confident about the ability to discuss even controversial racial issues across racial lines” (pp. 8-9). Thus, to enhance inter-group understanding, education institutions could create multi-cultural environments and curriculum for students to practice perspective-taking as well as to integrate diverse views across cultures. It would seem that promoting student/scholar exchange programs would improve communication and understanding, and in turn, enhance intergroup relationships and reduce levels of conflict. Richard and Wang (2012) also found that education influences dialectical perspectives in conflict resolution. In their study, Chinese participants who had taken college courses were more likely than participants without college experience to select a moderate (dialectical) solution to a social conflict (a disagreement between a mother and daughter). The effect of education did not hold for Japanese and American participants. Japanese and American participants preferred dialectical resolutions to the social conflict regardless of college experience. The impact of educational experiences on dialectical thinking, therefore, may depend on differences across cultures. Just as intergroup contact, perspective taking, and dialectical approaches enhance intergroup cooperation and moderate approaches to conflict resolution, isolation, fundamentalism, and single-solution approaches produce tension and hostility. Terrorist groups function well through isolation from normal social environments (Post, 2005). From a cognitive perspective, isolation from diverse social influences not only restricts access to alternative points of view but primes one cognitive framework or

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worldview in solving a conflict (Silberman, Higgins, & Dweck, 2005). This isolation not only leads to attitude polarization (Tesser & Conlee, 1975) but to a simplified, fundamentalist approach to solving problems (Loza, 1999). Following this selective exposure, terrorists develop cognitive frameworks from a single ideological perspective while limiting their exposure to dissenting views. Radicalization, fundamentalism, attitude polarization, and isolation limit perspective taking and dialectical reasoning and lead to extreme rather than moderate resolutions to conflict.

Activated Associations of Revenge and Forgiveness Conflict situations produce many associated thoughts and emotions. As conflict situations develop, members involved in the conflict can experience individual harm as well as ideological harm based on group membership (Deutsch, 1994). When people feel wronged by others, thoughts of revenge can emerge. Revenge is defined as “the attempt, at some cost or risk to oneself, to impose suffering upon those who have made one suffer” (Elster, 1990, p. 862). When someone has received harm from others, negative emotions result, and angry memories can begin to dominate their thoughts (Berkowitz, 1993). Rumination (i.e., persistent and recurring angry memories) about past hurts can activate associated thoughts and emotions (Bower, 1981). Angry rumination (Sukhodolsky, Golub, & Cromwell, 2001) also can lead to thoughts of revenge (Barber, Maltby, & Macaskill, 2008) and acts of aggression (Collins & Bell, 1997). Bushman (2002), for example, found that when participants were allowed to think about how others had mistreated them, they were more willing to deliver aversive noise to others. Using a longitudinal design, McCullough, Bono, & Root (2007) found that lingering angry thoughts about a transgressor lead to revenge motives and a reduced orientation toward forgiveness. Thoughts of revenge can become strong motivating factors for wouldbe terrorists. Silke (2008) highlighted the importance of activating events and perceived injustice in generating recruits for jihadi terrorist organizations. In their discussion of risk of group radicalization leading to terrorism, Post, Ruby, and Shaw (2002) note that the progression toward terrorist activity often involves group members who are “subjected to psychological and physical attacks that result in feelings of humiliation and need for revenge” (p. 94). Similarly, in a description of the motivations of Hamas suicide bombers, Moghadam (2003) includes humiliation, the need to restore honor, and feelings of revenge for previous attacks as personal motives for moving toward a path of suicide terrorism.

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Cultural Differences in Revenge and Forgiveness When someone inflicts harm on someone else, revenge does not follow in most situations. The pursuit of revenge over forgiveness involves the interpretation of activated beliefs associated with the offense and the assessment of whether these events indicate intentional and unjust acts (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wottman, 1990). For example, Bradfield and Aquino (1999) found that people who were more likely to assign blame to a co-worker who committed a past offence were more likely to contemplate revenge over forgiveness. Therefore, the activated thoughts and beliefs associated with an injurious act are filtered through a set of expectations and a contextual framework that applies meaning to the offender’s actions. These expectations are influenced by one’s culture. Although people in all cultures likely experience tendencies toward revenge (McCullough, 2008), people from different cultures experience and express revenge in different ways (Fujihara, Kohyama, Andreu, & Ramírez, 1999; Ohbuchi, et al., 2004; Otterbein & Otterbein, 1965). Individuals from different cultures form different patterns of expecting, knowing, and responding based on their specific ecological challenges (Oishi & Graham, 2010), unique experiences, and shared cultural practices (Fiske, Kitayama, Marcus, & Nisbett, 1998). When one experiences physical or psychological pain from others, automatically activated thoughts consistent with one’s past experience and elements related to one’s culture become accessible (Berkowitz, 1993). The person must then use this information to decide how to respond to this offence. Associated beliefs and interpretations of those beliefs are represented as expectations and norms within a culture (see Lehman, Chiu, & Schaller, 2004, for a review). These beliefs, expectations, and norms vary by culture; therefore, the conditions under which one chooses vengeance over forgiveness vary by culture. Hofstede (2001) provided five dimensions upon which cultures typically vary: Individualism, Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity, Power Distance, and Long-Term Orientation. The most studied of these five dimensions of culture in psychology is Individualism (see Fiske et al., 1998; Triandis, 1988), which represents the “degree to which individuals are integrated into groups” (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004; p. 63). In a cross-cultural comparison, Kadima Kadiangandu, Gauché, Vinsonneau, and Mullet (2007) found that Congolese participants were more likely than French participants to endorse views that forgiveness involves the broader community, more than involving just the offended and offender. Kadima Kadiangandu et al. explained that because

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Congolese participants come from a collectivistic culture where selfidentity is tied to important groups, they see forgiveness as an expectation within their close groups. Similarly, Ohbuchi et al. (2004) found that Japanese and Korean participants, also coming from collectivistic cultures, were consistent across contexts in that they rated interpersonal offenses as more severe than societal offenses. Ohduchi et al. explained that people from collectivistic cultures place a higher premium on interpersonal offenses because they share closer ties with members of their ingroups. The pattern of offense ratings were inconsistent across contexts for American and German participants (those from individualistic cultures) in that the ratings varied based on the closeness of the relationship. Similarly, culturally-consistent expectations affect the tendency to forgive. In a large-scale meta-analysis (reviewing data from over 26,000 participants), Fehr, Gelfand, and Nag (2010) identified offender intent and offender apology as two major cognitive correlates of forgiveness. Those who have been offended are more likely to forgive if they interpret the actions of the offender as unintentional and if the offender engages in some form of apology. Fehr et al. also identified empathic concern (associated with perspective taking) as a major emotional correlate of forgiveness. Takaku, Weiner, and Ohbuchi (2001) studied the role of cognitive dissonance in the desire to seek forgiveness in United States and Japanese samples. They found that although cognitive dissonance created as a result of a perspective taking exercise was correlated with forgiveness in Japan and the United States, the correlation was stronger for participants from the United States. The researchers suggested that these differences were a result of the role of the independent self-view which is more dominant in Western cultures. Despite the focus by researchers on individualistic versus collectivistic orientations on cross-cultural differences in conceptions of revenge and forgiveness, other cultural dimensions likely influence the tendency to seek revenge. The dimension of Uncertainty Avoidance involves the extent to which individuals within a culture are comfortable with novel, surprising, or unstructured situations (Hofstede & McCrae, 2004). People may feel uncomfortable with situations that violate the norm of reciprocity (Eisenberger, Lynch, Aselage & Rohdieck, 2004; Gouldner, 1960), when good deeds fail to be rewarded or when harm is not followed by punishment (uncertainty in social response). When a person is unjustly treated, that person may feel the need to retaliate in order to restore a sense of fairness and predictability about the world. Kaiser, Vick, and Major (2004), for example, found that participants with the strongest beliefs in a just world (those who believe that good people will predictably be

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rewarded and bad people will be punished; see Rubin & Peplau, 1973) were the most likely to show an increase in their anger and support for revenge following the September 11th attacks on the New York City World Trade Center in 2001 (9/11). Similarly, van den Bos (2001) found that participants were especially likely to experience negative emotions and feelings of anger as a result of unjust treatment when participants were prompted to focus on their uncertainty. The need to avoid uncertainty and pursue culturally activated notions of fairness, therefore, likely influences the desire to seek revenge. Richard, Lennon, and Wang (2011) investigated the relationship between cultural differences in uncertainty avoidance and tendency to seek revenge over forgiveness. In a review of 15 cross-cultural comparisons of revenge and forgiveness, representing data from over 9000 participants and across 15 countries, Richard et al. found that countries with higher levels of uncertainty avoidance also showed a greater tendency toward seeking revenge over forgiveness.

Implications of Revenge for Conflict Resolution Cultural influences on the activation of thoughts associated with revenge have major implications for conflict, aggression, and suicide terrorism. Feelings of revenge of Hutu rebels toward a ruling Tutsi minority contributed significantly to the Rwandan genocide, resulting in over 800,000 deaths (Smeulers & Hoex, 2010). Speckhard and Ahkmedova (2006) found that feelings of obligation toward revenge in radicalized Chechen rebels was a major contributing factor in predicting support for suicide terrorism. In 2008, a religious extremist used a suicide attack (a car bomb specifically) on the Danish Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan, killing five people and wounding many others, as retaliation for the publication of cartoons by a Danish newspaper found insulting to the prophet Mohammed (Masood & O’Neil, 2006). There are three steps in addressing automatically activated, culturally-consistent notions of revenge: 1) identify cultural difference in the conceptions of revenge and forgiveness; 2) construct resolution environments associated with one’s culture; and 3) dealing with uncertainty and the perception of difference in conflict situations. The first step in addressing automatically activated, culturallyconsistent notions of revenge would be to identify cultural differences in the conceptions of revenge and forgiveness. Mullet and colleagues (Mullet, Girard, & Bakshi, 2004; Neto, Pinto, & Mullet, 2007; Paz, Neto, & Mullet, 2007) have taken steps to identify cross-cultural differences in

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conceptions of revenge and forgiveness. For example, Neto, Pinto, and Millet (2007) found that East Timorese participants were more likely to endorse that forgiveness could be granted without the offender asking for forgiveness and that Angolans were more likely to endorse that the forgiveness process should be made public. Ting-Toomey (1998) highlights the importance of “face,” protecting one’s favorable self-worth in the eyes of others, in intercultural conflict negotiations. Recognizing differences in the conceptions of revenge and forgiveness will allow both researchers and practitioners to understand and predict the culturallyspecific thoughts and emotions that are likely to be activated within a conflict situation. The second step in addressing automatically activated notions of revenge would be to construct resolution environments that are supportive of the specific concepts related to conflict resolution and de-escalation associated within one’s culture. Ho and Fung (2011) suggest that dialectical approaches to conflict resolution, with a focus on change over time, re-conceptualization of problems, and perspective-taking, could lead to increased forgiveness. Emphasizing the changing nature of conflict situations, providing opportunities for re-conceptualization, and helping parties recognize the perspective of others in conflict situations likely will provide opportunities for successful resolutions. Perspective-taking has been used for many years in truth and reconciliation hearings. Hewstone et al. (2008), for example, noted the importance of perspective-taking in reducing tensions in Northern Ireland. Third, research on cultural influences on revenge and forgiveness highlight the importance of dealing with uncertainty and the perception of difference in conflict situations. Hartzel and Hoddie (2003) note that power-sharing after a civil war will lead to a reduction of conflict when this power sharing increases security and reduces uncertainty among the citizens. Pursuit of certainty in uncertain conflict situations might lead to other maladaptive solutions. Van den Bos, van Ameijde, and van Gorp (2006) addressed the role of uncertainty in fueling religious fundamentalism. The pursuit of certainty in these situations likely leads to additional conflict because they reduce flexible thinking and perspective-taking. If individuals become members of radical groups, their isolation from different ideas may lead to a reduced awareness of other perspectives and polarization of views (Silke, 2008). Reducing feelings of revenge in conflict-ridden societies involves identifying similarities across competing groups, increasing empathy, reducing activated thoughts of revenge, and finding a balance between opposing perspectives in offering compromise solutions to the conflict.

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Conclusion Various aspects of culture affect our mind and behavior, and in return our mind and behavior partly shape our social habits (Nisbett et al. 2001; Oishi & Graham, 2010, for a review). These habits of mind can significantly impact the way we solve conflicts. Conflict resolution requires different skills to be successful. In order to successfully solve conflicts, first one needs to perceive the opposition and identify contrasts as well as contradictions. Then, one must be creative in finding a way out of the conflict. Dialectical thinking emphasizes the cognitive process of perceiving and synthesizing opposing aspects. Individuals can learn dialectical thinking in a multi-cultural environment. Multi-cultural environments can facilitate the acquisition of dialectical reasoning frameworks. Research supports the idea that intense conflicts based on feelings of social distance and revenge have the potential to be ameliorated through intergroup dialogue. One important function of this dialogue is to promote deep active thinking, taking different perspectives, and challenging misconceptions. Dialectically, differences (cross culturally or otherwise; Deutsch, 1994) are not only the source of conflict, but also the driving force behind personal growth and social change.

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CONTRIBUTORS

Jessie Blackbourn is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow on the Australian Research Council Laureate Fellowship: ‘Anti-Terror Laws and the Democratic Challenge’ in the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law at the University of New South Wales. Her current research focuses on the postenactment review of anti-terrorism laws in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. Her past research has examined the UK’s anti-terrorism laws in twentieth century Northern Ireland in comparison to those enacted post-9/11. She has published widely in the field of counter-terrorism, including in major international journals such as Statute Law Review, Parliamentary Affairs, Journal of Commonwealth Criminal Law, Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression and Terrorism and Political Violence. Dr. Blackbourn has also edited a special issue of Critical Studies on Terrorism. Bill Blunden has a Masters degree in Operations Research from Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland. He has written six books covering a broad range of topics, from off-shore outsourcing to institutional dynamics. He is an information technology consultant at San Francisco State University. Shannon Callahan is a doctoral student of social psychology at the University of California, Davis. She completed her bachelor's degree in peace and conflict studies and psychology at Juniata College, and obtained a Master’s of Science in experimental psychology from Seton Hall University. Her research focuses on how the identities, beliefs, and motivations of groups contribute to intergroup and intragroup relations. She has received funding from the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. Violet Cheung-Blunden completed a Ph.D. in psychology from the University of California at Berkeley and is currently an assistant professor in the department of psychology at the University of San Francisco. She is currently involved in basic research on emotions and self-regulation. She has leveraged this research to explain public sentiment towards the threat of terror.

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Mark Cochrane is a former Police Officer in the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the Royal Ulster Constabulary George Cross (RUC GC). For over 20 years he was employed in national security intelligence work in Northern Ireland. He is currently a self-employed consultant engaged in work with a number of agencies and is a part-time teacher at the University of Ulster in addition to lecturing at U.S. lawenforcement and academic institutions. Peter Eachus is Director of Psychology and Public Health at the University of Salford in the UK. As well as his interests in the psychological aspects of terrorism, he also has research interests in robotics and the psychology of Internet use. He has published extensively and has presented papers at conferences in North America, Colombia, Spain, Italy, Belgium, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Lyndsey Harris is a Senior lecturer in Criminology and Security Studies at Birmingham City University. She is Vice President in charge of conferences of the Society for Terrorism Research (STR). Her research interests include extremism in the UK: The English Defense League; terrorism and political violence; strategic theory and Northern Irish Politics. Before joining Birmingham City University, Dr. Harris, taught Politics at the University of Ulster and Criminology at the University of Chester. Dr. Harris’ doctoral thesis, ‘A Strategic Analysis of Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland’, included over 50 interviews with Loyalist paramilitary members and ex-members of The Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). She has published in the British Journal of Political and International Relations and The Howard Journal of Criminal Justice and is the author of a number of book chapters. Emmanuel Karagiannis is Assistant Professor at the University of Macedonia’s Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies in Thessaloniki, Greece. In addition, he is a Research Associate of Bryn Mawr College's Solomon Asch Center for the Study of Ethno-political Conflict. From 2005 to 2011, he was an Investigator at the University of Maryland's National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. He obtained a Ph.D. in Politics from the University of Hull in Great Britain in 2000. He received his B.A in European Community Studies from London South Bank University and an M.A in International Security Studies from the University of Reading. He was a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania in 2005 and a

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Visiting Scholar at Yale’s University Macmillan Center for International and Area Studies in 2008. During 2010, he spent his sabbatical at Princeton University as a Stanley J. Seeger Visiting Research Fellow. Alison Ledgerwood is an assistant professor of psychology at the University of California, Davis. She received her Ph.D. in social psychology from New York University in 2003. Her research interests include social influence, political attitudes, and the role of symbols in shaping group identity and conflict. Saideh Lotfian is Professor of Political Science at the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the University of Tehran. She is the Chair of the International Pugwash Council for the 2007-2012 Quinquennium. She received her Ph.D. from Michigan State University in political science, and was assistant professor of political science at the University of Iowa, Texas Christian University, and Boston University from 1985 to 1991. She was a visiting researcher at Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in Sweden in 1995, and the Visiting Iranian Fellow at the Middle East Centre, St Antony's College, the University of Oxford in 2003. She has written on non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament in the Middle East, security of the Persian Gulf and Central Asia, as well as foreign and defense policies of Iran. Pilar Otero studied Law at the Universidad Complutense de Madrid and got her Ph.D. at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, where she is currently Vice-Dean at the School of Law and Full Professor of Criminal Law. She has worked on criminal protection of different types of secrets and professional confidentiality, as well as on the system of mitigating circumstances in Spanish criminal law, and more specifically on the nature and efficacy of analogous mitigation. She has also tackled subjects of corruption. Another of her fields of research is gender criminal law, studying sexual harassment and domestic violence. Dr. Otero is currently working on different types of sentences in the field of prison law, such as home confinement or electronic methods of control and their efficacy regarding control of aggression and of social rehabilitation of the offender. Additionally, she has been named Expert Technical Consultant in Criminal Law by the European Union, supporting legal modernization in Paraguay and the Dominican Republic.

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Contributors

F. Dan Richard is an Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of North Florida in Jacksonville, Florida, where currently he serves as the Director of Faculty Enhancement. He earned his degree in Experimental Social Psychology at Texas Christian University in Fort Worth, Texas. His research focuses on lay epistemology, the study of how people gain knowledge and how they use their beliefs to make decisions about their social world, and meta-analysis, a quantitative procedure for combining evidence from a variety of previous studies on the same topic. He is most noted for conducting a quantitative retrospective of the field of social psychology. Most recently, he has studied how culture and experience shape how people resolve contradiction and manage conflict. Vivian Salama is an award-winning journalist with almost a decade of experience in the Middle East. Her byline has appeared in publications including Newsweek Magazine, TIME, Bloomberg News, Business Week, The Washington Post, and USA Today, as well as a number of academic publications. She holds a Masters Degree in Islamic Politics from Columbia University and has previously worked as a lecturer of Global Media trends at Rutgers University. Ben Short is a lecturer in Psychology at the University Salford. He completed (with distinction) an MRes in the Design and Evaluation of Advanced Interactive Systems and has a Ph.D. in Psychology. He has worked as a lecturer and as a researcher on government funded projects related to terrorism and examining decision making in complex environments. Dongyuan Debbie Wang is an Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology, University of North Florida. Dr. Wang was born in China and came to US for her Ph.D. She graduated from Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana, and joined UNF in 2004.