Race, Ethnicity and Religion in Conflict Across Asia 2020047516, 2020047517, 9780367617042, 9781003106135

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Race, Ethnicity and Religion in Conflict Across Asia

This book looks at conflict zones in the Asia Pacific with a special focus on secessionist groups/movements in the Indian Northeast, Tibet, Chinese Xinjiang, the Burmese borderlands, Kashmir in South Asia, CHT in Bangladesh, South Thailand, and Aceh in Indonesia. These conflict zones are predominantly ethnic minority provinces, which by and large do not share a sense of oneness with the country that they are currently a part of; most of these insurgencies have had strong linkages with separatist nationalist groups in the region. Methodologically, the author uses extensive fieldwork, interview data, and participant observation from these conflict zones to take a bottom-up approach, giving importance to the voices of ordinary people and/or the residents of these conflict zones whose voices have generally been ignored. Although the book looks at both the historical background and contemporary dimensions of these conflicts, the author focuses on exploring how the role of race, ethnicity and religion in these conflicts can be both direct and indirect. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of conflict and security in contemporary Asia with a background in politics, history, IR, security studies, religion, and sociology. Kunal Mukherjee is a Lecturer in International Relations (Asia Pacific) in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion at Lancaster University, UK. He is the author of Conflict in India and China’s Contested Borderlands (2019).

Religion and International Security Series Editor: Lee Marsden University of East Anglia, UK

In the twenty-first century, religion has become an increasingly important factor in international relations and international security. Religion is seen by policymakers and academics as being a major contributor in conflict and its successful resolution. The role of the Ashgate series in Religion and International Security is to provide such policymakers, practitioners, researchers and students with a first port of call in seeking to find the latest and most comprehensive research on religion and security. The series provides established and emerging authors with an opportunity to publish in a series with a reputation for high quality and cutting-edge research in this field. The series produces analytical and scholarly works from around the world that demonstrate the relevance of religion in security and international relations. The intention is not to be prescriptive or reductionist in restricting the types of books that would be appropriate for the series and as such encourages a variety of theoretical and empirical approaches. International security is broadly defined to incorporate inter and intra-state conflict, human security, terrorism, genocide, religious freedom, human rights, environmental security, the arms trade, securitisation, gender security, peacekeeping, conflict resolution and humanitarian intervention. The distinguishing feature is the religious element in any security or conflict issue. Recent books in the series include: Race, Ethnicity and Religion in Conflict Across Asia Kunal Mukherjee For more information about this series, please visit: https://www.routledge. com/Religion-and-International-Security/book-series/RELSEC

Race, Ethnicity and Religion in Conflict Across Asia

Kunal Mukherjee

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 Kunal Mukherjee The right of Kunal Mukherjee to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Mukherjee, Kunal, author. Title: Race, ethnicity and religion in conflict across Asia/Kunal Mukherjee. Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2021. | Series: Religion and international security | Includes bibliographical   references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020047516 (print) | LCCN 2020047517 (ebook) |   ISBN 9780367617042 (hardback) | ISBN 9781003106135 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Ethnic conflict–Asia. | Insurgency–Asia. |   Asia–History–Autonomy and independence movements. |   Asia–Race relations. | Religious discrimination–Asia. Classification: LCC DS13.M85 2021 (print) | LCC DS13 (ebook) |   DDC 355.02/180890095–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020047516 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020047517 ISBN: 978-0-367-61704-2 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-10613-5 (ebk) Typeset in Times NR MT Pro by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

This book is for my Mum and Dad, Anuradha Mukherjee and Dr Durgadas Mukherjee

Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction

vii

1

1 Insurgency in the Indian Northeast

31

2 Conflict in Tibet

70

3 The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang

102

4 Race relations, ethnic minorities and conflict in contemporary Myanmar

129

5 Insurgency in South and Southeast Asia: Kashmir, The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), South Thailand and Aceh, Indonesia

170

Conclusion and the way forward Index

220 223

Acknowledgements

A large debt of my gratitude is owed to my department, Politics, Philosophy and Religion (PPR) at Lancaster University, UK for supporting my research field trips to Asia. Without funding from Lancaster, this project would not have been possible. I have wonderful colleagues throughout the UK. Special thanks to Dr Sagarika Dutt, Senior Lecturer at Nottingham Trent University, for the discussions that we have had over the years on various aspects of Asian politics and security, particularly on India and China. We have had so many stimulating conversations on the phone and your feedback on my work has always been very helpful. Thanks to Professor Priyamvada Gopal, University of Cambridge, for being a true inspiration to me. Thank you Priya, for being so bold and outspoken. You have so much courage and energy. I really admire you! Thanks also to Dr Richard Johnson, Queen Mary University, London, for the moral support you gave me throughout these very difficult months of the pandemic. I am truly grateful to the Lancaster PPR EDI committee. In this connection, I’d especially like to thank Dr Karolina Follis, Lancaster University, for her excellent leadership with EDI. The EDI process has been very empowering and the conversations that have revolved around race and racism have been especially useful for purposes of this book. I’d like to thank my mum, dad and lovely grandma for all their support. Thank you for having me in India, where I did a lot of the research. Thanks also to Geeta, Arun, Hedi and Bidyut. I am grateful to Geeta for all the lovely meals that she cooked that kept me going when I was in India, and thanks to Arun for driving me through the Sino-Indian borderlands for purposes of data collection. Bidyut and Hedi-You are the best hairdressers in the world! I’d like to thank two of our lovely PhD students here at Lancaster, Jenna Higham and Leoni Connah for their moral support throughout this very difficult pandemic period. Finally, I would like to thank the wonderful Routledge team who have been very supportive and helpful throughout this journey. Thank you for being so encouraging right from the very beginning, and for being so quick

viii  Acknowledgements in responding to my emails/queries. You have been incredibly organised and efficient. I really do appreciate all your efforts in this regard. Parts of this book are revised versions of work I published elsewhere particularly in my earlier book, ‘Conflict in India and China’s Contested Borderlands: A Comparative Study,’ Routledge, 2019. I thank the publishers for their permission to allow me to reuse some of the material here. Special thanks to Professor Lee Marsden, University of East Anglia, Emily Ross and Hannah Rich. All of you have been brilliant! I would also like to take this opportunity to thank all three of the anonymous reviewers who took the time to read the book proposal and provide me with very useful feedback. The feedback provided was excellent and has gone a long way in enriching the book. I am truly grateful to all of you for your support, guidance and encouragement. Thank you so much.

Introduction

Since the ending of the Cold-War, the definition of the word ‘security’ has changed considerably. It means different things to different people. The days of the First World War, Second World War and the Cold War are now long gone and in the post-1990’s phase, we are increasingly having to deal with new challenges, new threats and new enemies. The current situation is fraught with uncertainty as the Covid-19 pandemic rages on. Human security or people’s security, transnational terror networks, failed states and their ripple effects and issues associated with climate change and economic recessions are just a few examples of the new areas of security that have been identified. When it comes to warfare, there is now an understanding that the nature of warfare has also changed considerably, and hence there has been a shift in focus. Since the ending of the Cold-War, analysts have focussed more on intra-state conflicts than conflicts fought between nations. This book primarily looks at troubled hot spots and conflict zones in contemporary Asia with a special focus on secessionist groups/movements. The case studies that this book aims to look at include the Indian Northeast, Chinese Xinjiang, Tibet, Myanmar’s borderlands, South Thailand, Kashmir in South Asia, the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh and Aceh in Indonesia. Most of these conflicts are on-going in one way or another except for the Aceh movement in Indonesia and the CHT in present-day Bangladesh. The first four case studies will be analysed in-depth, and the remaining four case studies will be dealt with collectively in a single chapter. In doing so, the book hopes to give an overview to readers of the most troubled hotspots in the Asia Pacific. All these conflict zones are associated with strong breakaway groups that have been fighting for either political independence or at least more autonomy. These conflict zones are also ethnic minority provinces that feel a disconnect with the country that they are currently a part of. Although the book looks at both historical and contemporary dimensions of these conflicts, it pays special attention to the role of race, religion and ethnicity, particularly where minorities form a cluster. The book tries to show that race, religion and ethnicity have played a key role in creating an identity distinct from the mother country. Structural violence especially racism and poverty are key factors which have caused the conflicts that this book discusses. Many of these

2  Introduction minority borderland provinces are subjected to socio-economic marginalization and human rights violations. Repressive state policies directed at these borderlands where minority groups form a cluster have only exacerbated an already problematic situation and sharpened the sense of ‘otherness.’ A lot of the scholarly literature in IR and Security Studies tends to take a very top-down approach when looking at conflict zones around the world, whether in the Middle East, Latin America, Sub Saharan Africa or the Asia Pacific. In so doing, there is a huge emphasis on the voices of the political elite. This book is new in the sense that it takes a bottom-up approach and gives importance to the voices of ordinary people or the residents of these conflict zones, whose voices have generally been ignored. Extensive research field trips have been taken to some of these conflict zones from 2012 till 2020 and interviews have been carried out over the past few years. Data has also been collected through participant observation. The views put forward by the local people are often at odds with the views put forward by the political elite. Thus, the book takes a grassroots approach by paying special attention to the voices of the people and differs from the earlier literature which tends to be quite top-down. Although the book engages with the wider literature on the topics covered, as part of the bottom-up approach, the book tries very hard to bring to the fore the voices of scholars (mainly historians and political scientists) who are from the region or at least have strong familial connections with these conflict zones/case studies. A good example of this would be the emphasis on Thant Myint-U and his academic work in the chapter on the Burmese borderlands. Other examples would include Tsering Topgyal in the chapter on Tibet and Sanjoy Hazarika in the chapter on the Indian Northeast. This is not in any way to suggest that the wider literature is without merit and some western scholars working in Asia have produced excellent pieces of work. But the incorporation of these scholars would go a long way in giving the reader an insider’s view about the situation. More generally speaking, this is also important because the voices of BAME/Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic scholars and their perspectives are underrepresented in western academic circles. Critical race theory has been used to further the arguments in this book since most of these conflict zones are ethnic minority provinces having problematic relations with the ethnic majority population residing in the country’s heartland. In other words, issues of racism have been at the very heart of the problem. When we look at the role played by race, ethnicity and religion in this book it should be noted that on some occasions the roles played by these will be direct, but on other occasions, the role played by religion, ethnicity and race will be more subtle. The discussions on race, religion and ethnicity are not always direct and straight forward. Whilst some chapters have clear sections on race, religion and ethnic nationalism, in other chapters, the roles played by race, ethnicity and religion is more intertwined with the chapter content and more embedded in the chapter itself. Also, ‘race,’ ‘religion’ and ‘ethnicity’ has not been discussed in any

Introduction 3 particular order. In some chapters ‘race’ will play a significant role and in others ‘religion,’ and hence there is a great deal of variation. The chapters have not been structured the same way. This was not possible because the nature of the conflict differs from region to region. Whilst there may be some similar trends, one also needs to appreciate the complex nature of the conflicts that we are discussing. The book is as much about the conflict as it is about these three factors playing a key role. This book to some extent builds on the earlier book that I also published with Routledge1 and hence there are overlapping areas. But there are also non-overlapping areas and many points of departure: a whole range of new case studies (the Burmese borderlands, the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, South Thailand and the Aceh movement in Indonesia, which were not covered in the earlier book), additional scholarly literature, and additional primary data collected through interviews and participant observation. The conflict zones that this book covers are mainly peripheral parts of India, China, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia and Bangladesh where specific ethnic groups form a racial-religious cluster, and hence a secessionist struggle against the central government of that country that they have been a part of has been possible. For instance, Kashmiri Muslims in Kashmir could carry out a struggle against New Delhi because there are hundreds of thousands of Kashmiri’s living close to one another in Kashmir. Their common ethnicity, race, language and religion bind them together and this gives them a sense of nationhood distinct from the rest of India. They also have similar political aspirations, economic interests and often feel marginalized for the same reason. Kashmiri’s living in the Indian heartland or elsewhere in India proper interspersed by Indian Hindu’s would not be able to carry out a struggle in a similar way against the New Delhi government because they do not form an ethnic cluster in the Indian heartland, the way they do in Kashmir. Similarly, Uyghur Muslims residing in Xinjiang have been able to wage an insurgency or more correctly a secessionist struggle against Beijing because they form an ethnic-racial cluster in China’s far Northwest. In other words, ethnic minority groups living amongst the ethnic majority population in the country’s heartland would not be able to carry out a secessionist struggle against the central government of that country because they do not form a cluster, the way they do in the borderlands. Finally, there is a lot of literature in the public domain, which looks at these conflict zones individually, but what is missing is a collection of chapters in one book that would give readers an overview of the troubled hotspots in the Asia Pacific. This book does just that: provide readers with an overview.

Brief overview of the chapters Apart from the introduction and the conclusion, the book consists of five chapters which deal with the conflicts individually, or collectively. Not all of the case studies will have the same amount or level of detail. Some case

4  Introduction studies have been discussed in-depth, whereas in others, I have provided readers with a quick overview. The purpose of having a range of case studies in chapter five is just to show readers the similarities that exist in ethnic minority borderlands across Asia, and to emphasize on the points made earlier on in the book. The first chapter looks at the insurgency in the remote Indian Northeast. Tucked away in the Eastern sector of the Himalayas, this conflict is almost unknown to a western audience and yet the insurgency has been going on for decades. The Indian Northeast consist of the seven sister states, which include Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya, Mizoram and of course now we have a new addition, which is Sikkim. The region is quite isolated and has harsh geography. It is connected to Indian proper through a small strip of land called the Chicken’s neck or the Siliguri Corridor. Parts of the Indian Northeast are very mountainous or at least hilly and the entire region is very rich in biodiversity. There are multiple layers of conflict in the Indian Northeast. First of all, there is the conflict which exists between the region as a whole and the rest of India or India proper. The second layer of conflict is between different states within the Northeast. The Northeast is extremely culturally diverse and there is a great deal of fragmentation. Although the states, find Indian rule from New Delhi quite oppressive, they are not necessarily united. There are all kinds of racial, linguistic, tribal and ethnic divides and the Northeast is often seen as an ethnic minefield. The region is quite impoverished and by and large Northeastern people feel that New Delhi should be more active in looking into and dealing with Northeastern affairs. There is fierce competition for control over existing resources, which are not only scarce but have often been exploited by New Delhi for the needs of the people living in India proper or in the Indian heartland. The third layer of conflict is between tribal communities and non-tribal communities. The fourth layer of conflict is between different tribal groups. And finally, the fifth layer of conflict is between those who see themselves as insiders or sons of the soil, and those who are perceived as outsiders. Although the conflict is multidimensional, secession and breakaway groups have been at the very heart and core of the conflict. The aim of this chapter is to dissect these different layers of conflict and analyse its multiple aspects. People from the region are often seen as the Indian ‘other.’ When people of Northeastern descent visit Indian proper, especially the big cities like New Delhi, they face racial discrimination. Large parts of the Northeast like Nagaland and Mizoram are Christian and so many are also subjected to religious discrimination. All kinds of violent incidents have taken place since 2014, which is when the BJP came into power. After looking at the historical background of the conflict and recent events, the chapters pay special attention to the role of race, ethnicity and religion in the conflict. Several visits have been taken by the author to the Indian Northeast and primary data has been collected through participant observation and also by interviewing locals. Since students have been active

Introduction 5 in the movement for autonomy and student activism has been at the heart of the conflict on several occasions especially through the role played by the AASU/All Assam Students Union, data has also been collected from students in India of Northeastern descent. The second chapter moves across the international border and looks at the very complex situation in Tibet. Tibet or the Tibetan Autonomous Region, as it is called, is a thorny ethnopolitical issue and has been one of the more troubled hot spots in the Asia Pacific for decades. The problem started with the Chinese invasion of Tibet in the fifties. There are divergent views of history, which has complicated the already strained situation. Whilst the Chinese government based in Beijing believes that Tibet had always been an integral part of China, Tibetans believe that they had always been independent and that they had been under the traditional rule of the Dalai Lama. Tibetans argue that their relationship with Beijing is one of priest and patron. Whilst Beijing may have provided Tibetans with security from external attacks, Tibetans provided Beijing with religious and spiritual guidance. Whilst Beijing sees the Sino-Tibetan relationship as a relation between a superior and a subordinate, Tibetans do not view the relationship in hierarchical terms, and argue that the Sino-Tibetan relation is one of the equals and compares it to the relation that the pope/Vatican has with the rest of the Christian world. Since the Chinese invasion of Tibet in the 1950’s, hundreds of Tibetan monks moved over to India, where they have set up their government in exile. There are numerous Tibetan settlements on the Sino-Indian border, especially in places like Darjeeling and Kalimpong in West Bengal, India and in Sikkim, which the author has visited on several occasions in recent years to collect primary data. Moving away from the voices of the political elite, the author interviewed monks practising Tibetan Buddhism in India, where there is a freer political climate to practise the dharma, unlike the situation in China, which is an atheistic state. The chapter argues that the Tibetan conflict has both an internal side as well as an external side. The internal side deals with Beijing’s repressive policies in Tibet and the external side refers to the role played by neighbouring India and the Tibetan diaspora. After looking at the historical background of the conflict and the contemporary situation, the chapter pays special attention to the role of race, ethnicity and religion, focussing particularly on the role played by the Dalai Lama. The third chapter looks at the situation in Chinese Xinjiang. The situation here is similar to the situation in Tibet. Whilst Tibet has a strong Buddhist presence, Xinjiang is predominantly Islamic. The role of religion is very key in understanding the complex facets of this conflict. Xinjiang or the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region as it is called, geographically is located in China’s far Northwest and has a massive border with the central Asian countries. The dominant ethnic group here are the Uyghur’s who practise Islam and do not share of sense of one-ness with China proper. Uyghur’s feel more of a connection with their ethnic brothers in central

6  Introduction Asia who are geographically closer and also practise Islam. The secessionist movement in Xinjiang is often called the ETIM, or the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. Uyghur’s have been fighting for an independent East Turkestan or Uyghuristan for decades. They see themselves as a distinct nation in their own right, separate from China proper. They argue that they have their own history and cultural traditions which bind their own communities together, all of which is very different from the Chinese mainland. Beijing has responded to the situation by Han migration. The Chinese government has been sending Han people, the dominant ethnic group in China proper to Xinjiang, to settle there and to take up jobs in that province. The state argues that this is being done primarily to raise the material standards of the local people and for purposes of economic growth and development. The local Uyghur people think that this is a deliberate attempt by the state to dilute the Uyghur identity and to undermine the secessionist movement. Whilst the state believes that it has started a process of infrastructure development in Xinjiang, as it has done in other provinces like Tibet, development means different things to different people and local Uyghur’s do not quite see it in the same light as Beijing. Han migration has caused outrage in recent years, adding more fuel to an already blazing fire, thereby exacerbating an already complicated situation. After looking at the historical background of the conflict and the current situation, the chapters pay close attention to the role of race, ethnicity and religion in the Xinjiang conflict. A long detailed interview was also carried out with a man of Uyghur descent to substantiate the key arguments in the chapter. Chapter four looks at the on-going conflict in the Burmese borderlands. Whilst the violence can be sporadic in the three conflicts which have already been discussed, the violence in provinces like the Rakhine state (formerly known as the Arakan) in western Myanmar has been raging for quite some time now. After decades of isolation, Myanmar started to democratise in 2011. Since 1962, the country has been under military rule. The military junta, or the Tatmadaw, ruled through different guises like the BSPP/Burmese Socialist Program Party, the SLORC/State Law and Order Restoration Council and the SPDC/State Peace and Development Council. When the country started to democratise in 2011, there was a huge celebration in the western world. Earlier sanctions were lifted and trade embargoes were rolled back and with Aung San Suu Kyi recently freed from house arrest, Burma or Myanmar appeared to be the new destination for international investment. But the mood turned sour and less optimistic within a few years. What has brought the country under the microscope in recent years is the current humanitarian Rohingya crisis. An Islamist group called the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army had attacked dozens of security posts in the western part of the country and this has been followed by a fierce Burmese army response blown out of proportion. Thousands of men, women and children, nearly all from the Muslim Rohingya minority fled to neighbouring Bangladesh for refuge and protection. Currently, Burma stands accused of both genocide and crimes

Introduction 7 against humanity. Although the Rohingya crisis has put the country on to the centre stage of international affairs in recent years, what has not received a similar coverage is the plight of other ethnic minority groups residing in fear in the other peripheral parts of the country. Most of these other ethnic minority groups like the Kachin, Chin, Karen and Karenni are Christian. The aim of this chapter is to analyse not just the situation in the Rakhine and the Rohingya crisis, but also to bring back the situation of the other minority groups to the fore in order to spread awareness amongst the international academic community. The chapter looks at the historical background in great detail, but also pays close attention to recent events. The chapter argues that problematic race relations in the country should not be seen in isolation but should be viewed as a part of a historical continuum. British colonial policies of Divide and Rule, the obsession that some politicians like U-Nu in the post-independence phase had with Buddhism and wanting to make it the state religion, the xenophobic tendencies of dictators like General Ne-Win have all collectively contributed to the racism and racist tendencies which have taken root in present-day Myanmar. The fifth chapter takes four case studies up for discussion namely Kashmir, the CHT/Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, the insurgency in South Thailand and the Aceh movement in Indonesia. Kashmir in South Asia has been a troubled hot spot for decades. India and Pakistan have been at war on four occasions over Kashmir. Kashmir is important to the two countries for different reasons. Since it is a predominantly Muslim province, and it leans against Pakistan’s national frontier, the political and military elite in Pakistan, which is also a Muslim majority country, have argued time and again that it should be a part of Pakistan and that Pakistan’s national identity as an Islamic nation will not be complete without capturing and incorporating the whole of Kashmir within Pakistan’s national framework. India’s reasons for holding onto Kashmir are primarily strategic. It acts as a buffer zone and protects people in Indian proper from external attacks. Like the violence in the Burmese borderlands, the violence in Kashmir has also recently flared up especially after the BJP government revoked article 370 on fifth August, 2019. Article 370 gave Kashmir special status. By this special status, the Indian government had control over Kashmir in external relations, communications and defence only, but in all other areas, Kashmir was supposed to be free. Whilst New Delhi never really respected the special status, getting rid of it all together last year has sparked outrage both in South Asia and internationally. It has also led to curfew, lockdown and all kinds of atrocities, making the situation worse. The chapter argues that the Kashmir conflict has both an external dimension and an internal dimension. The external dimension relates to the four Indo-Pak wars that were fought in 1947/48, 1965/66, 1971 and 1999. The internal side of the conflict relates to Indian repression in Kashmir. The author has visited Kashmir on a few occasions and has collected data by interviewing the local people. By interviewing local Kashmiri people, the author has tried

8  Introduction to get their version of events, as opposed to getting the version of events put forward by the political elite. The situation in the CHT/Chittagong Hill Tracts has somewhat died down in recent years, but the situation is quite similar to the case studies which have already been discussed. The CHT refers to the extreme Southeastern part of Bangladesh, which has a border with the Indian Northeast and Myanmar. The three main districts of the CHT include Rangamati, Khagrachari and Banderban. This part of Bangladesh like the Indian Northeast is very diverse from a cultural, racial, ethnic, religious and linguistic standpoint. People in the CHT in the past have made it clear that they do not feel a sense of oneness with Bangladesh proper, which is a Muslim majority state. There is a strong presence of Buddhism and Christianity in the CHT, which makes the local people feel even more strongly about their distinct identity. There has been a movement for autonomy led especially by the Chakma ethnic group, who are predominantly Buddhists. The political elite in Bangladesh has responded to the situation by militarization, Islamisation and also by encouraging Bengali people, who are the dominant ethnic group in Bangladesh proper, to settle in the CHT. This is quite similar to the situation in China’s contested borderlands, where Beijing has encouraged the dominant ethnic group in China proper, the Han to settle in places like Xinjiang and Tibet. Whilst all these conflicts are extremely complex, secession is at the very core. Other similar situations can be found in both mainland Southeast Asia and maritime Southeast Asia. The example that we have from mainland Southeast Asia is the case of South Thailand, and the example that we have from maritime Southeast Asia is the Aceh movement from Indonesia. The insurgency in South Thailand is on-going. It has taken place mainly in districts like Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala, which are predominantly Muslim parts of the deep South. Insurgent groups have argued that they have more in common with their ethnic brothers across the international border in Muslim majority Malaysia, than with a Buddhist majority Thailand. This is quite similar to the situation that the Uyghur’s find themselves in when they argue that they have more in common with their central Asian brothers across the international border, than with China proper. Aceh is the extreme western tip of the island of Sumatra in Indonesia, where a conservative form of Islam was practised, quite different from the more syncretic versions practised in Indonesia proper. The central government in Jakarta was viewed as unsympathetic to the needs of the local people in Aceh, which was the main reason why insurgent groups in Aceh wanted to break away in the first place. A military offensive launched by Jakarta and the Asian Tsunami, which took place in 2004, brought the insurgency to an end. Thus, this chapter gives an overview of four conflicts, two on-going, and two of which have now come to a close. The chapter looks at both the historical context of these conflicts and also pays close attention to more recent events. The chapter also pays special attention to the role played by race, ethnicity and religion. This book is both for the specialist as well as for the non-specialist. Anyone who has an

Introduction 9 interest in the major political developments and security concerns of these countries will have an interest in this book. The book is also likely to be of interest to the wider public because of the easy language. There are no complicated terms and the book is very easy to read and is very accessible. No prior knowledge is required to understand the contemporary challenges that some of these countries in Asia face because all the chapters start with the very basics before pitching it up to a high level. Quite a few scholars have dealt with these conflicts individually, but this book deals with a range of conflicts collectively, thereby giving readers an overview of some of the most troubled hot spots in the Asia Pacific. This book is as much about the role of race, ethnicity and religion in these countries as it is about the conflict.

Critical race theory and the ethnic minority experience When asked by fellow academics what got me interested in ethnic minority conflict zones in the Asia Pacific, my answer has been simple and straight forward. My own experience as an ethnic minority citizen in Britain and my own experiences with racism in Britain allowed me to connect, empathise and sympathise with minorities abroad. Whilst living in India, where I was part of the ethnic majority I had no understanding or awareness of what it feels like to be marginalized. In fact in the Indian context, I know what it feels like to be a privileged white man since I come from a so-called uppercaste Hindu, Brahmin background. All societies have their own social stratifications and Britain is no exception. Whilst in countries like India, there has been a centuries-old caste system with Dalits and the so-called lower castes (Shudras) at the bottom of the hierarchy, here in contemporary Britain, people of colour are at the bottom of the pile and are to a large extent treated and viewed unfavourably. My own experience in Britain as a visible minority of South Asian descent and my brush with racism is what motivated me to do this research. It is this experience of mine that got me interested in ethnic minority and majority relations and these conflict zones in the first place. I am not the only one to feel this way. Dr. Anupama Rao also expressed a similar argument when she published her celebrated book, ‘The Caste Question’ in 2009. Although Dr. Rao is from the so-called upper Brahmin caste, it was her own experiences with racial difference and racism in the US, and also exposure to African and American literature that motivated her to write a book that primarily focuses on the experiences of the so-called lower castes in contemporary India.2 Throughout this journey, I have carried out interviews with other academic colleagues and people from minority backgrounds in Britain who have also exchanged their notes and experiences with me. This is why before we move onto the actual case studies, the British context and issues of race require some attention. After all, it was the British context that got me interested in this topic in the first place. There are some very specific reasons that make Britain a racist society and a lot of this has to do with the legacy of the British Empire. We will discuss this in this section.

10  Introduction When we talk about racism in today’s Britain, we no longer refer to physical attacks or verbal abuse and racial slurs being hurled at people of colour. These may happen too but there has been a shift in focus. Racism today is a lot more subtle. Like everything else, racism in today’s day and age has a different form. It is not like it used to be in earlier times. Long gone are the days of open violence associated with the’ KKK in the US. When we use the word ‘racism’ today we are referring primarily to microaggressions, other-ing, unconscious bias especially in jobs, education and employment and the everyday racism that men and women of colour are subjected to. ‘If all racism was easy to spot, grasp and denounce as white extremism is, the task of the anti-racist would be simple. People feel that if a racist attack has not occurred, or the word ‘nigger’ has not been uttered, an action can’t be racist. If a black person hasn’t been spat at in the street, or a suited white extremist politician hasn’t lamented the lack of British jobs for British workers, it’s not racist.’3 Also, it is important to note that there will be a great deal of variation in the experience one has with British racism. Whilst white East Europeans particularly from Poland will also complain of being treated differently, dismissively, disrespectfully, or unfavourably, by and large, they are better received than those who are of South Asian or AfroCaribbean descent.4 South Asian people have been under a lot of pressure especially after incidents like 9/11 and 7/7. We still live in a predominantly Islamophobic society here in Britain. Within the South Asian community, there are numerous linguistic, religious and ethnic divides. From a religious standpoint, one could be Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Buddhist, Jain or Sikh. From the standpoint of ethnicity, one could be Bengali, Pashto, Tamil, Punjabi etc. South Asia is a diverse and culturally heterogeneous region and one could be from India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan or even the Maldives. But for the average white British racist, anyone who is South Asian looking is often seen as being a Muslim from Pakistan and then, of course, there’s the link with terrorism and based on that perception South Asians are treated a certain way. My own experience as a person of South Asian (Indian) descent testifies to this. Sections of the western media has played a big role in exacerbating the situation. In relation to Islamophobia in Britain, Tahir Abbas writes, ‘post-war immigrant groups who were either invited or came searching for improved economic opportunities have found their young growing up in societies that exhibit prejudice, discrimination and racism towards minority Muslim communities.’5 Racism in the UK context should be seen as a spectrum. At one extreme there will be the physical attacks and racial slurs being hurled at people of colour. At the other end, there will be the polite well-mannered white front face of an organisation telling the person of colour why they did not get the job and give him/her some flimsy reason which often does not hold together especially when a white person with exactly similar qualifications and experience was chosen for the same position. It always takes a lot longer for the average black or brown person to get a job in the UK when compared

Introduction 11 with their white counterparts. This is because of unintentional bias. Also, white individuals can easily move up the system and sideways, which people of colour cannot do to that extent. These are the two extreme ends of the spectrum. Then, of course, there will be all the people who come in between these two extremes. Some will tilt towards the more aggressive end but there will be others who will tilt more towards the well-mannered polite end, which is of course very difficult to spot. As a person of colour myself I would rather deal with the open and aggressive variety. That way I know whom to avoid. Not all white acts of rude behaviour will necessarily be racist. It is indeed sometimes difficult to distinguish between general white rude behaviour and an act of racial violence. It could very well be that a white person was having a bad day and lashed out at a person of colour because of the stress and pressure he/she was under. This sort of behaviour can often be perceived as an act of racism by the person of colour, when that was not necessarily the case. Sometimes people of colour can also be wrong in their judgement. Nevertheless, the white person’s rude behaviour will put mental pressure on the person of colour and the latter will often spend the rest of the day wondering whether the white person was having a bad day, or was he/she actually being racist. The problem with racism is that sometimes when people are being racist they are not necessarily aware of it. Such is the nature of unconscious bias and it could be argued that whilst the white person might be having a bad day, he/she took out his/her frustrations on a person of colour rather than on someone who was white. Modern-day racism can be very complex and an area of grey. It is not as black or white as it used to be. Micro-aggressions and acts of othering also accumulate which puts a lot of psychological pressure on the person of colour in the long run. This will go a long way in undermining the person of colour’s mental health and the white person will never know what distress he/she caused unless the person of colour speaks up. It is very important for people of colour to speak out against everyday injustice to prevent these acts of racial violence from happening again in future. But then again, there are also problems speaking out and there is often a heavy price to pay as we saw with what happened to British mixed race Trans model, Munroe Bergdorf. Often when a person of colour raises the issue of racism, instead of looking into the problem, the British establishment will see the person of colour as a trouble-maker. This, however, is beginning to change. The recent BLM protests have put a lot of pressure on the British establishment. It is indeed important to honour one’s own agenda and to speak up if they feel that they are being bullied because of the colour of their skin. Eddo-Lodge writes, ‘the covert nature of structural racism is difficult to hold to account. It slips out of your hands easily, like a water-snake toy. You can’t spot it as easily as a St. George’s flag and a bare belly at an English Defence League march. It’s much more respectable than that.’6 I carried out several interviews with academics of Indian descent across the UK in different universities and most felt that their voices were not heard and that their

12  Introduction promotions were long overdue and that it was always hard to get any kind of recognition for their work, unlike their white counterparts, who seem to climb the ladder quickly.7 Many of us have lost faith in the system and there is a strong sense of disenchantment. Many of us feel that the British system is structurally flawed. Even when some minorities are appointed to senior positions and positions of power, they are often pressurized in putting forward very conservative views on whatever is being discussed. When the British public watch television and see black or brown people like Priti Patel voicing such conservative views, little do they realise that there is pressure from the top. Fingers are often pointed at the individual without looking at the inequalities inherent in the unfair and discriminatory system. Eddo-Lodge discusses, ‘the system’ in chapter two of her bestselling book, ‘Why I am No Longer Talking to White People About Race.’8 In British academia, this experience of feeling marginalized and isolated is not just confined to lecturers and teachers. Students of ethnic minority descent also seem to feel the same way and several reports have been recently published which proves this. In this connection two reports deserve special mention: ‘Built in Barriers: The Role of Race in Shaping BME Student Experiences at Lancaster University’9 and ‘Insider-Outsider Report: The Role of Race in Shaping the Experiences of BAME Students.’10 The very fact that students from former colonies like India and Pakistan have to pay such high tuition fees (almost three times of what British home students have to pay for the same course) is very symbolic of the discriminatory nature of the university sector. This is especially unfair given that some of these universities like Manchester, Liverpool and Leeds came into existence during the peak times of British colonialism in South Asia. In other words, partly one of the reasons why these universities could be built during the 1800’s was because of the wealth that was amassed from the former colonies particularly the Indian subcontinent or ‘the jewel in the crown’, which is now conveniently forgotten. The experience of a lot of international students in Britain also tends to be a very negative story of discrimination and marginalization.11 They do not have access to the support structures that British students have. In a particularly disturbing report, ‘Islam and Muslims on UK University Campuses: Perceptions and Challenges’ published recently by scholars from Lancaster University, SOAS, University of London, Durham University and Coventry University, it was found that anti-Islamic sentiment in universities across the UK was quite pronounced.12 This report was published by a group of both white and minority scholars, which goes to show that not all white people are racist and that anyone can be your ally. Taking a dichotomous ‘Us vs Them’ approach in the struggle for racial equality is not helpful at all and often minority communities themselves can be very fractured. Furthermore, there exists intra-racism within ethnic minority groups. This is very common within certain sections of the South Asian and Afro-Caribbean communities in Britain.13 In the US, a classic example of this would be the brown paper bag test during earlier times, and whether or not you passed the brown paper bag test. If African American people and their skin colour were lighter than

Introduction 13 the colour of the brown paper bag, then they passed the test and were often seen as more beautiful and intelligent and were viewed favourably and given preferential treatment within their own community. Racism like sexism does not happen in a vacuum. Black and brown people internalise Caucasian superiority just as women in some cultures internalise patriarchy. It has often been argued that well-known singer, Beyoncé has been successful partly because of her fairer skin. Although of African American descent, her skin tone is not as dark as some of the other skin tones, particularly the darker shades that exist within the African American community. Critical race theory is a theoretical framework, ordinarily used in the humanities and social sciences that examines and assesses society by paying close attention to both race and power. It is an examination of power relations and prevailing power structures. Socio-political problems like outbreaks of political violence and conflicts, which this book discusses in detail, are often caused by discriminatory social structures, systemic in-built racism in these structures and stereotypical cultural assumptions of minority groups. Just as gender creates a big structural disadvantage for women which men benefit from, whiteness or race likewise does the same thing with race and ethnicity. Where we should expect meritocracy and justice, there is a huge disadvantage built into the British system systemically. If there is a disadvantage on one side, we need to talk about the advantage it creates because disadvantage does not happen in a vacuum. Although critical race theory started in the US in a big way, the scholars and works that I will be referring to in this section are predominantly British writers and scholars of ethnic minority descent who have written extensively and very powerfully about race relations in Britain and the impact of Empire on minority communities today. This excellent list of writers includes Reni Eddo-Lodge, Afua Hirsch, David Olusoga and Professor Priyamvada Gopal from the University of Cambridge. Other works like those of Dr. Shashi Tharoor on Empire will also be consulted to get an insider’s view on Empire. Since my own experience as an ethnic minority citizen has been shaped by the British context, it only makes sense to use works produced by British scholars of ethnic minority descent rather than consulting the works of classical critical race theory specialists. The BLM protests that happened in the summer of 2020 associated with George Floyd’s death has now brought discussions on race and racism to the fore both in the US and in the UK. The crisis associated with Covid-19 in the UK has clearly shown how structural inequalities exist in the NHS/ National Health Service. A large number of people who died as a result of the pandemic were people of ethnic minority descent and a large number of the people who survived and got better were white. This symbolises the inequalities that exist in Britain today, particularly along racial lines and how pain and health issues of people of colour are often not taken seriously. It is also important to note that during a global pandemic or an economic recession whilst everyone is affected, minority groups are always the worst hit. During these times of hardship, they have to deal with the everyday

14  Introduction racism and structural inequalities along with the new challenges associated with the recession or covid-19. Minorities in such a situation often feel doubly oppressed on account of their minority status and also because of new additional pressures whatever that may be. In relation to covid-19, several people of colour told me that the rules associated with face-covering seemed to apply more to them than to white people. On buses, for instance, some white bus drivers did not seem to bother about white passengers not covering their mouth and nose but were particularly harsh on passengers of minority descent.14 This is only one of the many examples of everyday racism that people of colour have to face in contemporary Britain. It feels like as if ethnic minority people are bringing in the disease. One of the reasons why some white British people behave this way towards minorities is because of what they see on television. The British media often talks about how people of colour are more likely to get the disease or are affected by it more than the average white person. This to a large extent is because of structural inequalities in the health services and that the pain of people of colour is not taken seriously. But this critical issue of structural inequality is not always covered in sufficient detail by the British media. Some white British people often behave as if ethnic minorities are to blame for the COVID-19 crisis and this is partly because sections of the British media often gives a distorted or at best an incomplete picture of the story, which fuels racist tendencies in an already deeply racist society. Often a crisis can make the situation worse and people can be racist without even realising it. Given that the current situation with regard to race and ethnicity in Britain is such a sorry state of affairs, it seems that the liberal voices in the establishment are rather weak. It should also be noted that when one talks about racism in the UK, it is often associated with the working class happening somewhere out there. I would like to add on this note that people of colour will experience racism in different ways on a daily basis. Racial violence can be nuanced and very subtle. Also, the working class in Britain is hugely diverse and feel marginalized because of poverty or for not having enough purchasing power. Often the experience of feeling marginalized (for whatever reason, be it because of one’s race, class, gender, sexuality) can bring different groups of marginalized people together cutting across racial lines. In my own experience and also in the experience of some other people of colour whom I interviewed for purposes of this book, a lot of the resistance actually comes from the so-called progressive educated elite.15 Some academics, particularly white cisgender straight male ones, do not want the status quo to be undermined or changed in any way through conversations on diversity. Whilst some may talk about diversity favourably because it is the politically right thing to do, few are really interested in bringing about any meaningful qualitative change. Our corridors of power that are overwhelmingly white are very symbolic of this. The political elite in London engaged in talks of relaxing covid restrictions for five days over the Christmas period, which was not the case for minority festivals such as Diwali and Id. This is very symbolic of the discriminatory society that we live in.

Introduction 15 The protests and marches that took place especially in London and Bristol in the summer of 2020 after George Floyd’s death shows how strongly people of colour in Britain feel about the everyday racism and micro-aggressions that they have to deal with. The everyday racism can happen when one pays a visit to a bank, a post office, a night club, the supermarket etc. People of colour may also have very unpleasant experiences with bus drivers and train conductors, which white people will not experience.16 And then, of course, there are the bigger things like not getting a job despite having similar qualifications and experience that their white counterparts have. Often in Britain when a person wants to talk about racism, some white people get defensive and see the person of colour as the problematic one rather than paying close attention to the discriminatory nature of the system. One thing that is often said is, ‘not everyone is like that.’ Ethnic minorities know that not all white people are racist and there’s no need to give the constant reminder, but when some white people get defensive instead of being sympathetic, they are part of the problem and not the solution. Defensiveness only makes the situation worse. The fact that some ethnic minorities internalise white superiority and take sides with closeted racists instead of expressing solidarity with their ethnic brothers and sisters only complicates the situation further. Currently, the conversation in the UK around race and racism is a very poor quality one. The system does not work in your favour if you are a person of colour. There seems to be one set of laws and rules that apply to white people and another set of laws and rules that apply to black and brown people. Rules are not applied uniformly. There is a big difference between being white British and being British black or British Asian. Justice is not for everyone here in Britain. One’s ethnicity often determines the outcome. The country works as a democracy for the white majority but not really for its ethnic minorities. When some white people get defensive, they tend to think that the black or brown person who is raising the issue of racism hates the country. That is not the case. Criticism does not in any way amount to hatred but that is exactly what a lot of ethnic majority people seem to think. By talking about racism, black or brown individuals want to raise awareness about a serious problem that urgently needs attention and looking into because the current system hurts their life chances. They don’t hate Britain or white British people. But pretending that the problem does not exist when there is a serious issue at hand will only make the situation worse. In this connection, I’d like to add that the British establishment often behaves like the current Hindutva government in New Delhi, India. In India, when intellectuals, writers, scholars and journalists speak out against current ills, they are often labelled as ‘anti-national.’ The criticism often comes from marginalized people. The regime immediately gets defensive and thinks that those who are raising the issue must hate India, failing to realise that constructive criticism, backed with evidence, can only lead to progress. I see no difference between Britain and India in this regard. When some white people have wondered why so many people of colour took to the streets after George Floyd’s death in the middle of a global

16  Introduction pandemic, this did not come to me as a surprise at all. The answer is simple. Racism for people of colour in Britain is a much bigger problem than covid19. It is high time that the British establishment took the concerns and problems of ethnic minorities seriously. There needs to be more representation of minorities at the senior level. Voices of minority groups need to be heard. They need to be offered meaningful platforms to be able to bring about positive change. A simple glance at university staff in the Russell group universities in Britain shows very clearly that British universities do not value diversity. Either there will be the odd one or two minority member of staff, or no minority members of staff at all, or in some exceptional and slightly better situations, there will a handful all clustered at the bottom.17 Also, when a BME staff is hired, it is not so much because he/she was the first choice for the job, but because the white candidate, who is often given first preference, did not take up the offer. When one compares this with the situation in the US, the situation in the US, in my view, is much better. A quick glance at American universities will show that there are people of colour at the top, at the bottom and also in the middle. ‘In 2016, it was revealed by the Higher Education Statistics Agency that almost 70 per cent of the professors teaching in British universities are white men. It’s a dire indication of what universities think intelligence looks like.’18 The lack of minority voices and minority representation is not just confined to British academia but we see it in pretty much all sectors of Britain’s economy and society. Recently, British black supermodel, Naomi Campbell raised the issue with big British fashion houses that they do not hire models of colour, and that diversity is really lacking in the British fashion industry. In Britain, beauty is very often defined in white terms. When one enters a shop, it is easy to see that the covers of fashion magazines are primarily full of white people.19 If there is a person of colour mentioned in the newspaper or in a magazine, it is often a negative news story. Even in the popular British soaps like East-Enders or Coronation Street, which millions of British people watch, the roles given to people of minority descent are often very peripheral or negative.20 Sections of the British media have been notorious in projecting negative images of the East which pander to all kinds of stereotypes. All this collectively has a profound impact on people’s mindsets, and has contributed to racist tendencies and has led to a multicultural paralysis in contemporary Britain. The main difference between the US and the UK in my view is that in the US, acts of racial violence like police shootings and police brutality is a lot more open and explicit and people talk about it. In contrast, in Britain, people by and large refuse to talk about it, get defensive when the topic is raised almost making excuses for racism. Whilst I understand that not everyone is like this, the tendency to get defensive is quite entrenched in Britain.21 The number of negative things happening to people of colour is high and the positives minimal. In a public situation when a white person clearly does something wrong (e.g. swearing) and if there is a black/brown person at the receiving end, other white people in the area do not protest. The white perpetrator gets away with it very

Introduction 17 easily. People often make excuses for racism in England and acts of racism do not get punished at all or are not punished sufficiently. If the situation is reversed and if there is a person of colour doing something wrong and a white person at the receiving end, it almost feels like the whole of Britain comes down on that coloured individual like a ton of bricks.22 Furthermore, sensitive topics like colonialism and slavery are not taught in British schools and universities. When these topics are spoken about in a public lecture or when the British Empire is written about by British historians especially by white wealthy men, the approach is often very simplistic and top-down presenting Britain as the giver and the teacher and everyone else as the receiver and taught, which goes a long way in strengthening racist tendencies in contemporary Britain. In Britain, racism is much more insidious and there is a tendency to sweep things under the rug. The situation needs urgent attention from the government, media and academics. The problem firstly needs to be acknowledged and openly spoken about before the establishment can come up with solutions. Whilst the country has made some progress in the area of gender and sexuality, there has been no real progress when it comes to race and ethnicity. There is a long way to go. The current situation in Britain for people of colour is a very sorry state of affairs. This is very surprising given that it was this country that once controlled and had power over large parts of the globe and was thus exposed to racial diversity. Let us now turn to the British Empire and the legacy that it has had on race relations in contemporary Britain. Inaction by the government to deal with acts of racism, stereotypical images projected by sections of the British media and not teaching the impact of Empire or not taking a critical approach to the study of Empire have all collectively contributed to modern day racism or every day racism in contemporary Britain. Britain and colonialism Before we talk about racism today in Britain, some historical context associated with British colonialism and slavery is required. Let us start with the Empire and then we can get to slavery. Colonisation is a dynamic of oppression, of exploitation, of land grabbing, of creating racial hierarchies and it can be practised across contexts. Whilst being involved in conversations associated with the Empire in Britain, I can clearly see that there is a sharp divide. White middle-class male scholars and writers tend to get defensive and praise the Empire and see it as a benevolent good thing-a force for good in the world. Tharoor writes, ‘for many Britons, imperialism was principally justified as a moral crusade to liberate Indians from ignorance, idolatry and vice.’23 Women scholars and ethnic minority scholars particularly those from the far off former colonies like India tend to be a lot more critical. The differences that exist in interpretations between these two sides are indeed very sharp. White British women have had to fight for their own rights associated with gender and hence tend to be more sympathetic to the cause of racial equality. White middle-class male scholars like Niall Ferguson, Lawrence

18  Introduction James and Charles Allen and others have often written about the British Empire as a force for good or at least defended it. As a part of this approach and trying to defend Empire it is firstly compared with other world empire’s and argued that the British one was less brutal and less evil and secondly, the railways, the English language and introduction of western education in India, democracy and rule of law are often cited as examples of the good deeds that the British left behind in the far-flung former colonies. Many of these white middle-class male scholars have not only written about the British Empire favourably but have also defended it on British television. Let us unpick some of the examples that they have so often used. When we look at the way the railways were built, they were built in a certain strategic way to connect the ports and harbours to the hinterland. In 1854, the first railway line was opened between Bombay and Thane. Calcutta, the former capital of the British Raj, was connected to Raniganj and Madras to Arcot. This was done primarily for the extraction and exploitation of resources. The railways did not connect towns and cities. Neither did they connect pilgrimage centres, where South Asia’s dominant religious communities, the Hindus and Muslims would have loved to have gone to. In other words, the railways were introduced in the subcontinent to suit the needs of the metropolitan power or the mother country, which in this case was imperial Britain. There is no altruism here. The railways were not introduced out of British generosity. It had more to do with theft, plunder and pillage and extraction of resources that would ultimately enrich Britain. They were not built to suit the needs of the local people. They were not introduced for the good of the people but built as arteries for extraction of resources. The reason why the British built the universities in India particularly in what used to be known as Bengal Presidency, Madras Presidency and Bombay Presidency was because they needed a class of men who would be white on the inside although they had a brown exterior and it would be this class who would fill in the more subordinate positions of the East India Company. Thus, there was a very specific reason as to why these universities were built. A good example of this is the former Hindu college that was built in 1817. This later became to be known as Presidency College. Now of course it has gained university status. In the latter half of the 1700’s and the first half of the 1800’s, the Empire was expanding and it was becoming increasingly difficult to uproot young white Englishmen from Britain to govern the subcontinent. Hence a class of men had to be created in India itself who would embrace British values and British rule, and it would be this class who would assist the British in matters of governance and administration. The architectural style of these buildings is very similar to the architectural style of the public buildings that were being built in Britain during that period.24 In cities like Calcutta, now Kolkata, it is very easy to distinguish between the buildings that were built by the British and those that have been built by local architects.25 Good examples of colonial-style buildings in the city of Kolkata and in West Bengal more generally include the General Post Office/GPO, the Kolkata/Calcutta

Introduction 19 High Court building, the Victoria Memorial, Writers building, Presidency University, Scottish Church College, Kolkata/Calcutta Medical College, Serampore College, Kolkata/Calcutta Town Hall and the numerous churches and cathedrals, the St. Paul’s cathedral being one of the better known ones. Calcutta or Kolkata’s New Market has a striking resemblance to the covered markets in places like Leeds, Halifax etc. here in England.26 Once western education had been introduced, a class of Indian men would be created who would be English in their taste, likes, preferences and values. This was actively supported by the East India Company, one of the main pillars of the British Empire, the other pillar being the role played by the Christian missionaries. On that note, Christianity was also introduced in South Asia, so that local Indians would more readily embrace British rule. After the introduction of English education and Christianity, there would be a class of indigenous Indian men who would look after British interests in India and consolidate their power base. Thus, any type of infrastructure development in South Asia should be viewed as a by-product rather than something that imperial Britain did for the good of the local people. In other words, Indian needs were made subservient to the needs of imperial Britain. In the context of western education in India, Professor Bose and Jalal write, ‘The colonial attitude was made explicit by Thomas B. Macaulay, law member in Bentinck’s council, in his famous minute on education in 1835. All learning in Indian languages, according to Macaulay (who did not read or understand any), was useless. The aim of western education was to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons Indian in blood and colour but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect.’27 Finally, no importance or attention was given to primary education because it was not in the interest of imperial Britain to do so. In Britain, some also believe that the Empire helped with the system of justice. Empire was clearly structured along racial lines, where the white British were on top of the hierarchy and had more rights and economic privileges than the local Indians. If anything current research shows that ideas of justice, resistance and opposition and ultimately freedom and democracy in Britain were shaped by the resistance movements in the former colonies.28 Some go to the extent of saying that independence was granted to India and Pakistan in 1947 when really independence was actually fought for. The centrality of black and brown lives in fighting against British rule for their freedom is very important. Sadly, this has been erased from the British public imagination because it is not taught as part of the curriculum. British schoolchildren are not taught about the horrors associated with slavery and colonialism. In fact, they get a very sanitised version of history, which has a direct bearing on race relations today. In the context of racism in the colonial bureaucracy, Professor Bose and Jalal write, ‘Indians within it were discriminated against along racial lines. The upper echelons of the bureaucracy were exclusively British in composition. These

20  Introduction senior British officials were recruited into the Indian civil service through competitive examinations held in London…Indians were needed at the lower levels of the administration, but even here many educated Indians faced racial discrimination. Some of them, notably Surendranath Banerji, turned to the nationalist cause in the wake of their disenchantment with the British colonial service.’29 In relation to justice or more correctly injustice, Tharoor writes, ‘justice in British India, was far from blind: it was highly attentive to the skin colour of the defendant. Crimes committed by whites against Indians attracted minimal punishment; an Englishman who shot dead his Indian servant got six months’ jail time and a modest fine (then about 100 rupees), while an Indian convicted of attempted rape against an Englishwoman was sentenced to twenty years rigorous imprisonment. Only a handful of Englishmen were convicted of murder in India in the first 150 years of British rule.’30 To defend Empire by saying we cannot impose twenty-first century values on the 18th and 19th centuries, which is often the case, is wrong and flawed because when the British were plundering and pillaging India, this was already a post-Enlightenment phase. Some of the worst incidents associated with murder and violence like the Jalianwala Bagh massacre took place in 1919, well after Enlightenment and in a post-humanist period. So even by contemporary standards and values, what the British were doing in India and other parts of the world were ethically wrong. Finally, the story of racial arrogance, racism, the land grabs, dispossession of land, famine caused by repressive British policies, the economic exploitation and extraction of resources and incidents like Jalianwala Bagh, when General Dyer opened fire on women and children in Amritsar in 1919 are not taught as part of the British curriculum. We are given a totally sanitised and whitewashed version of colonial history. Contributions of Indian soldiers who fought on behalf of the Empire so bravely are not recognised. ‘Britain’s involvement in the First World War wasn’t just limited to British citizens. Thanks to its rabid Empire building, people from countries that weren’t European were caught up in the expectation of dying for King and Country….Over a million Indian soldiers or sepoys fought for Britain during the First World War. Britain had promised these soldiers that their country would be free from colonial rule if they did so. Sepoys travelled to Britain in the belief that they would not only be fighting for Britain, but by doing so they would be contributing to their country’s eventual freedom.’31 This was obviously not the case and these promises were eventually broken. Instead of celebrating the contributions of Indian soldiers, we see municipal parks in Britain that are littered with white militaristic men of Empire, who waged war against weaker peoples.32 This whitewashing of history and very simplistic top-down approach is not only at odds with our modern values of cultural diversity and multiculturalism but it is also at odds with intellectual curiosity and academic rigour. But the British establishment readily offers these kinds of men a public platform and their versions of history go a long way in affecting people’s

Introduction 21 mindsets. What is worse is that this simplistic approach, which white wealthy powerful men tend to take entrenches the belief that the British are the givers and teachers and Asian and Africans are the takers and the taught, thereby going a long way in strengthening racist tendencies in contemporary Britain.33 These interpretations go a long way in impacting people’s mindsets, who begin to view themselves as superior and others as inferior. This approach is very entrenched in the public domain and it is not surprising that more than half of the population in Britain see the Empire as a good thing. This is exacerbated by negative media projections of the East, government inaction in dealing with racist incidents and the way Empire is projected in popular culture and films like Victoria and Abdul, Gandhi etc. Because of these projections and the way history is written, white-ness is seen as normal and as good and everything else in negative terms. For instance, in Britain blackness is very often intertwined with criminality.34 It is against whiteness that everything else should be measured and assessed. To be white is to be human; to be white is universal. People who get drawn into these arguments view visible minorities especially of South Asian and Afro-Caribbean descent as inferior and with suspicion. I know this from my own experience of living and working in Britain. Eddo Lodge writes, ‘Neutral is white. The default is white. Because we are born into an already written script that tells us what to expect from strangers due to their skin colour, accents and social status, the whole of humanity is coded as white. Blackness, however, is considered the ‘other’ and therefore to be suspected. Those who are coded as a threat in our collective representation of humanity are not white.’35 In addition to open acts of racial violence, ethnic minorities will find it harder to get jobs and promotions, will get harsher prison sentences and by and large are subjected to socio-economic marginalization. Whilst the corridors of power in Britain tend to be white and male, the bottom of the hierarchy tend to be people of colour especially women of African and Afro-Caribbean descent. It is not hard to see in the early morning when one is on their way to work that most cleaners or at least a large number of cleaners in public buildings tend to be black.36 The racial disparities and inequalities in Britain are huge and as a man of colour, I too have been subjected to racism in all its subtle shades and forms. It is this experience with racism in contemporary Britain that has made me feel strongly about social justice and has also made me passionate about studying and writing about ethnic minorities and their lived experience in other parts of the world. Racism is like a disease and it will not go away on its own. Like all diseases, it needs to be treated and cured. There are various antidotes for racism. One of the ways forward for Britain would be to question orthodox knowledge and decolonise the curriculum by bringing to the fore the voices of both women and BME scholars who tend to take a critical approach to the study of Empire. Generally, the voices of BME scholars are ignored in contemporary Britain and this has been the case for years. One has to seriously ask the question: who is involved in knowledge production? Decolonising the curriculum

22  Introduction is primarily about understanding the myths associated with Empire and then un-doing these myths by bringing to the fore new, fresh and diverse interpretations of history that give a more holistic and balanced picture. This will give the British public access to a new set of narratives which will, in turn, help the public to reframe their understanding of Empire and will also allow them to read existing works by wealthy white male writers in a different light. By having access to a new set of narratives, there is the possibility that people will reconsider how they will relate to people of minority descent in Britain today, and there is also the possibility of positive change. This, of course, will take time and cannot happen overnight. Once the works of ethnic minority scholars and women are more out in the public domain and they are given public platforms, there are chances that this will have a positive knock-on effect on the mindsets of people since women and minorities take a more balanced approach. This will give the public a nuanced understanding of the past and there is every chance of this having a positive impact on Britain’s problematic race relations today. Minorities will be viewed more sympathetically instead of being viewed unfavourably and with suspicion, which is generally the case. In certain British circles, decolonisation is often portrayed as a smooth process of transfer of power when really Indian independence was fought for. It was a long drawn arduous process in which thousands of Indians lost their lives. This centrality of Indians and the role that they played needs to be brought back to the fore in our discussions. Professor Gopal writes, ‘the edifice of colonial rule was subject throughout its duration to implosions and explosions-when confronted with resistance, and these registered in public and political discourse in Britain. If decolonisation was a complex and intermittent process that ebbed and flowed over time, so too was the consolidation and continuance of colonial rule, punctuated as it was by resistance and repression.’37 In Britain, many of us have spoken about trying to decolonise the curriculum. To a large extent, this is about diversity and bringing to the fore the voices of scholars who are not ordinarily heard. The West especially Britain through the colonial project has shaped our ideas, our knowledge, our understanding of knowledge and history for centuries. The colonial project has also shaped our understanding of ourselves and how we relate to one another. The myths associated with Empire are still very entrenched in the UK today that paves the way for racial arrogance and racist tendencies. Ideas travelled not just from Britain to the colonies, but also from the colonies to Britain, but this is generally not acknowledged. Western knowledge produced through the colonial project needs to be subjected to questioning. Decolonising the curriculum is therefore asking for a fundamental shift and rethinking of what knowledge itself is, and who gets to produce it. Britain and slavery Now that we have had some discussion on the Empire and its impact on race relations in Britain today, let us turn to Britain’s involvement in slavery that

Introduction 23 preceded the age of Empire. Like Empire, Britain’s involvement in slavery is also not taught as a part of the British school curriculum. Any difficult side of Britain’s past is conveniently erased and left out. This erasure has paved the way for problematic race relations and contributed to racist tendencies in contemporary Britain. About five hundred years ago, Europeans and Africans met each other on the West coast of Africa, also known as the Gold Coast or the Slave Coast. This encounter gave rise to the slave trade which had huge implications for the world making countries like Britain rich and countries in sub-Saharan Africa poor. Britain’s wealth today has been built on the backs of both slavery and colonialism, which present-day Britain does not wish to talk about. Like colonialism, the slave trade remains a missing chapter in British history, and yet Britain was one of the countries that spearheaded the trade and in the exploitation of human cargo. The slave trade did not happen accidentally. It was a global business created by royal appointment. The Royal African Company saw to the buying and selling of gold, silver and slaves. There were plenty of slave uprisings so slaves should not be seen only as passive victims. This story is not a tale of a dead past but it shapes the way Britons live today and impacts on race relations. British ships carried African slaves and Bristol was a major slave port before Liverpool took over. Slave ships crowded around the river Avon for over a century. But Bristol has turned its back on the trade that enriched it. Until the recent BLM protests not a word of it was spoken about in the city museum or taught at the university. The recent BLM protests and the dismantling of the statue of slave trader, Edward Colston in the city square has, of course, brought this conversation back to the fore. Well-known historian, David Olusoga, writes, ‘in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the Royal African Company traded off the coast of West Africa predominantly in gold, ivory and slaves. The Royal African Company transported more Africans into slavery than any other British company in the whole history of the Atlantic slave trade. Between the 1670’s and the 1730’s around a hundred and fifty thousand men, women and children passed through the company’s coastal fortresses on their way to lives of miserable slavery.’38 Bristol’s ill-gotten wealth is embedded in the transatlantic slave trade when ships carrying British minerals like copper/ brass needed by African chiefs sailed down the West coast of Africa. Once these ships got to Africa, slaves were taken on board and sent to labour in the sugar plantations of the West Indies. From the West Indies, these ships would return to Britain with sugar. This came to be known as the triangular trade and financial risks were minimised. Bristol’s authorities have long resisted the efforts of the black community there who want to push slavery and race relations back onto the agenda. The inauguration of the Pero Jones Bridge, of course, was a success of the black community’s efforts. Pero Jones was a black slave who belonged to the Pinney’s-a Bristol slave-owning family.

24  Introduction Slaves had to labour on the island of Nevis, where they had to clear the island firstly for tobacco and then secondly for sugar. ‘Of course no one migrated from Africa to Nevis; the inhabitants are the descendants of people who were captured forcibly and shipped to the islands during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries…Within fifty years, Britain became the leading slave nation in the world, the foremost supplier of slaves for the rest of Europe, and the financial heart of the triangular slave trade. Of the 12 million slaves abducted from Africa-a conservative estimate-forty per cent were transported on British ships.’39 Down the ages, the African population in this part of the world increased. John Pinney became a key British figure in the slave trade at the initial stages. Demand for Pinney sugar was huge and still growing but for that more slaves were required. The Royal African Company was given exclusive rights over the slave trade. The company’s men would not let anything get in the way of the trade. The Royal African Company knew that slavery was widely practised on the West coast of Africa. In most African countries, the slave trade was an alternative to the prison system. Those who committed a crime could be sold into slavery. One could also be sold into slavery if one was in debt. One could also be tricked into slavery. Slaves were also acquired as captives from Africa’s endless internecine wars. Needless to say, slaves lost their liberty. Slavery has similarities with colonialism. Just as a lot of Indian middlemen helped the British to consolidate their position in South Asia, greed led African kings to sell millions of people across the ocean. Slave traders had started an arms race in Africa. They never gave any African nations enough weapons to challenge European power but the weapons served to keep Africans fighting each other for over a century. When there was peace, there were no captives to be sold and thus the slave trade would decline at that particular time. When there was war, captives would be brought, which meant that the slave trade would be flourishing. In other words, the slave trade depended on the conflicts going on between African nations which were actively encouraged by western powers. Europeans had long been a part of a system for bartering slaves. The first Europeans to arrive on the Slave Coast especially in places like Ghana were the Portuguese. 1471 was the year when the Portuguese first arrived. It was not long after this in 1498 did the well-known Portuguese navigator, Vasco Da Gama land in Calicut on the Western Malabar Coast in India. There was already a brisk slave trade going on between West African nations. For over a hundred years, Portugal remained in Ghana and took part in this coastal trade. Countries like Nigeria, Ghana and Senegal were actively involved. This was the situation before the trans-Atlantic slave trade was introduced. The Royal African Company had no interest in this trade that was confined to the West coast of Africa. They wanted to ship slaves across the Atlantic to the Caribbean. For the Royal African Company, this was just business. The company discovered that African kings were just as greedy as the English kings. Kingdoms rose and fell as a result of the slave trade.

Introduction 25 Selling became an economic necessity. The Europeans generally did not go into the deep interiors of Africa to get hold of slaves. They remained in the castles and forts that were built along the coast. There were African middlemen who sold slaves to the Europeans. These African middlemen had broken English enough for the purposes of trade. Rival European countries built castles along the coast to protect their cargo. Within a century, there would be numerous forts along the Slave Coast. Cape Coast Castle in Ghana deserves a special mention in this connection. All along the coast, new trading settlements were springing up. On every occasion, when the British and other Europeans arrived on the West coast of Africa, they could expect a welcome from the castle and the nearby African settlement’s. Slave markets also came into existence with the passage of time. The main difference between the coastal slave trade of Africa and the trans-Atlantic slave trade was that with the coastal trade slaves were sent to neighbouring countries but with the trans-Atlantic slave trade, slaves were completely cut off from their families and homes and there was a final separation. In other words, these people who were enslaved went away for good and never came back. Profits in Britain were used to kick start the industrial revolution and yet in present-day England, school children are not taught where the money for the industrial revolution came from. The British industrial revolution is taught in isolation totally divorced from the harsh truths and reality associated with slavery and colonialism. A lot of the income generated through the slave trade was used in philanthropic works like the building of schools, churches, public libraries etc. Whilst these slave traders and owners did charity at home, they caused terror abroad. Also, fashionable stately homes in England were built with slave money. Britain celebrates William Wilberforce as someone who abolished slavery without even acknowledging the active and central part it played in it for about four hundred years. The role that black people played in the abolition of slavery like Olaudah Equiano is never spoken about. The average British student will have heard of William Wilberforce but not heard of Olaudah Equiano. ‘Equiano and Ottobah Cugoano, another former slave originally from Ghana, together founded the world’s first pan-African organisation, Sons of Africa, in 1787. Sons of Africa was dedicated to securing an end to the slave trade; but unlike other abolitionists, for these men, it was not a pastime, but a calling inspired by their own survival instincts.’40 Abolition in England is often seen as a white initiative. At least part of the credit must be given to the slaves themselves. Slaves fought for their own emancipation just as Indians fought for their own independence, but this has been erased from British history textbooks. In Britain, we are still in a situation where we have not recognised the centrality of black and brown people to emancipation and the process of decolonisation. The story is often told in a way that gives people like William Wilberforce the full credit for the abolition of slavery. Whilst we don’t need to dismiss his role, his role in abolition should be seen as one of many contributing factors. This kind of narrative that projects

26  Introduction upper-class white men as the ‘good guys’ and black and brown people as inferior and as the ‘bad guys’ needs to change because it perpetuates racism. It is this racism that I have been subjected to on a regular basis in Britain which got me more deeply interested in race relations and ethnic minority conflict zones in Asia. Professor Gopal in her excellent piece of work, Insurgent Empire: AntiColonial Resistance and British Dissent, writes, ‘both abolition and decolonisation-twin outcomes of Britain’s expansionary colonial project over three centuries are all too frequently regarded as deriving chiefly from the campaigning consciences of white British reformers or as the logical outcome of the liberal and liberalizing project that empire ostensibly always was, conquering in order to free.’41 There has been almost a complete erasure of history in Britain and this erasure gives British people a sense of superiority over others: that they achieved their economic growth and success on their own. To talk about the industrial revolution and Britain’s success during the Victorian era without mentioning its links to slavery and colonialism is to give our students only half the truth and to present an incomplete picture that makes Britain look good. There is indeed a much bigger and complicated picture. To talk about some of the so-called ‘great’ British philosophers like John Locke and to celebrate these philosophers and put them on a pedestal, without talking about their links to slavery, amounts to intellectual dishonesty. It does not give the full picture. Whilst some of these so-called ‘great’ British philosophers were advocating rights, and were in favour of all kinds of rights here in Britain, they were not saying the same thing for the people in the colonies. ‘Locke argued that both Native Americans and African ‘negros’ were subhuman. Native Americans had existed in a state of nature, or savagery, he argued, which justified colonisation by the racially and culturally superior English. Yet while these native Americans had at least the potential to be educated, and should not be enslaved, the same was not true of ‘negros,’ who had no such potential and so their enslavement was justified. This was not just harmless philosophical musing. Locke was personally involved in the running of a plantation, and his theories found their way first into the constitution of the Carolinas in the US, which he drafted, and later into court cases that affirmed segregation…. Hume’s writings on the African race were, even in his time, one of the most controversial aspects of enlightenment thought, and became founding texts for the defence of slavery.’42 And yet none of this is taught to British schoolchildren or at the university for that matter. We uncritically praise these ‘philosophers.’ Racism is so engrained within the fabric of British society that it has almost become normalized and no one really questions it. I view this erasure of inconvenient truths in Britain as the Talibanisation of British education. Britain’s economic success is very much embedded in both slavery and colonialism, which should not be ignored. British history is the history to a large extent of colonialism and slavery. There is no such thing as a separate white British history. Because of both slavery and

Introduction 27 colonialism, Britain’s history is already inextricably intertwined with the histories of South Asia, and parts of West Africa and the Caribbean. Afua Hirsch writes, ‘Britain has no white history. British history is the multiracial, interracial story of a nation interdependent on trade, cultural influence and immigration from Africa, India, Central and East Asia and other regions and continents populated by people who are not white, and before that, invasion by successive waves of European tribes most of whom, had the concept of whiteness existed at the time, would not have fitted into it either.’43 Britain does not openly and honestly acknowledge the horrors it created in far off distant lands, possibly because the establishment is fearful of repercussions. There has been a denial and silence in Britain for way too long. The years of conflict and depopulation has left a legacy from which Africa has still not recovered and yet the average British person will not know what role Britain played in bringing about part of Africa’s poverty. The slave trade has left an indelible mark on certain parts of Africa and in a way Africans suffered a holocaust before the Jews did. Africa’s underdevelopment can be traced back to this period of slavery. The slave trade was a commercial enterprise that destroyed Africa’s civilisation and yet there is no real acknowledgement in Britain of its role in causing this destruction. Hirsch writes, ‘these experiences reveal the real power of British imperialism. It was not just controlling vast tracts of land, emptying precious minerals to fuel Britain’s growth, nor even the official subordination of local traditions and governance. It was the mental regime, the intellectual brainwashing, inflicting upon Africans the belief that they were people who had no history, had achieved nothing and contributed nothing to humanity, apart from their capacity to live in mud huts, make simple crafts, grow and extract from the land with ease-for the enrichment of Britain’s coffers-have sex and reproduce. It was the idea that colonised people were no more than children, children that needed the firm hand of a British parent.’44 Britain is a rich country but behind its glamorous exterior, there is a very ugly side to British society. There is a great deal of amnesia in Britain when it comes to its historical past. Britain is currently in a state of denial and needs to wake up and needs to come to terms with its past. British people are very keen to see themselves as liberal and call themselves post-racial. You cannot be post-racial unless you have acknowledged the racialised extent of your reality. It seems that Britain wants to skip and bypass this whole phase of slavery and colonialism and not have to deal with it or do the hard work. White British identities are very fragile so much so that they cannot withstand any kind of robust debate based on facts. You have to do the hard work before you can call yourself post-racial. Once again, I would like to emphasise that the missing chapters of colonialism and slavery in British history textbooks give a lot of British people an air of superiority and makes them believe that Britain achieved its success, both economic success and military success on its own. The contributions

28  Introduction of Indian soldiers during the world wars are not acknowledged. Neither does Britain admit that a lot of its wealth came from slavery. History is written in a way that projects Britain and also white-ness as good, superior and normal and against which everything else should be measured. In other words, the British standard is the gold standard. The British are the givers and the teachers and everyone else need to learn from the British. This top-down and simplistic approach to history has contributed to a racial arrogance and a new kind of racism that I personally am subjected to in Britain on a regular basis. This was not the case when I lived in India. Sadly, some of the trends that we see during colonial times are still present today in contemporary Britain. Slavery is far from over. It has only taken on a new and different form in the 21st century. People of colour will not experience British society the way white people do. The lived experience of people of colour in Britain is very different from the lived experience of white people.45 I am now conscious of my minority status more than ever because I am reminded of it every day in different ways by British people. It is this new consciousness and awareness as a minority citizen that drove me to do research on ethnic minority conflict zones and to try and reach out to ethnic minority communities abroad. My own experience as a minority citizen in Britain to some extent can also be universalised. Whilst there are differences between my life and the ethnic minorities whom I have interviewed for purposes of this book, there are also striking similarities. Often when they would speak, it would remind me of my life back in England. Whilst I am privileged in some ways, there are numerous similarities that exist between my life here in the West and their lives in the Asia Pacific. In other words, the minority experience can be universalized to an extent. Minorities in different parts of the world, whether in the East or in the West are generally viewed unfavourably and have to deal with othering on a regular basis. Just as countries in South Asia like India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have not offered enough protection and security to their minority communities, Britain in many ways is very similar. Whilst we might not have communal riots in Britain, the experience that one has with everyday racism, the absence of minorities in positions of power, the discrimination that a person of colour will face in education and also in employment and the harsher prison sentences speak volumes. So in the end it really was a set of personal journey’s that motivated me to write this book. My interest in ethnic minority borderland conflict zones grew out of my own experience with race and racial difference here in England. Race like caste in India is a form of inherited privilege. It is a system that is based on privilege and it draws on birth. Racism is a practice of de-humanisation by trying to perpetuate this inherited privilege. Finally, the effects of racism are not merely felt by those who suffer its negative consequences but it is also felt by those who cannot embrace human fullness and plenitude. It renders all of us just that much less human. In writing this book, I hope to raise awareness about issues of race and racism both here in Britain and abroad. More

Introduction 29 specifically, in the context of the Asia Pacific, I am trying to be an ally to un-heard voices. If the ethnic majority population both in Britain and in the case studies that this book considers listened to the stories of people who are different to them, then this would go a long way in widening the ethnic majority population’s consciousness. In the end, the aim of this book is to do just that: widen people’s consciousness.

Notes 1. K. Mukherjee, Conflict in India and China’s Contested Borderlands: A Comparative Study, Routledge: London/NY, 2019. 2. A. Rao, The Caste Question: Dalits and the Politics of Modern India, University of California Press: Berkeley, 2009. 3. R. Eddo-Lodge, Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People About Race, Bloomsbury: London, 2017/18, p. 63. 4. Author’s own observation in Britain, 2004–2020. 5. T. Abbas, ‘Introduction: Islamic Political Radicalism in Western Europe’, in T. Abbas edited, Islamic Political Radicalism: A European Perspective, Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 2007, p. 3. 6. R. Eddo-Lodge, Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People About Race, Bloomsbury: London, 2017/18, p. 64. 7. Interviews carried out by the author in Britain, 2015–2020. 8. R. Eddo-Lodge, Chapter 2, ‘The System’ in Why I’M No Longer Talking to White People About Race, Bloomsbury: London, 2017/18, pp. 57–84. 9. A. Ahmed and D. Bharucha, ‘Built in Barriers: The Role of Race in Shaping BME Student Experiences at Lancaster University’, An Independent Research Report Launched by the ‘Why is my Curriculum White?’ Decolonisation Campaign at Lancaster University: UK, July 2020. 10. S. Akel, Insider-Outsider: The Role of Race in Shaping the Experiences of BAME Students, Goldsmiths, University of London: London, October 2019. 11. Interviews carried out by the author with International Students across the UK, 2015–2020. 12. M. Guest, A. Scott-Baumann, S. Cheruvallil-Contractor, S. Naguib, A. Phoenix, Y. Lee and T. Al Baghal, ‘Islam and Muslims on UK University Campuses: Perceptions and Challenges’, SOAS, Lancaster: Coventry and Durham, 2020. 13. Author’s own observation in Britain, 2004–2020. 14. Interviews carried out by the author in August, 2020 with people of colour with a focus on their experiences as minorities in the current Covid crisis in Britain. 15. Interviews carried out by the author with ethnic minority academics in Britain, 2015–2020. 16. Interviews carried out by the author with people of colour in Britain/Author’s own experience and observations in Britain, 2012–2020. 17. Author’s own observation in Britain, 2005–2020. 18. R. Eddo-Lodge, 2017/2018, p. 68. 19. Author’s own observation in Britain, 2012–2020. 20. Author’s own observation in Britain, 2005-2012. 21. Author’s own experience with British people, when trying to talk about race and racism. 22. Author’s observation in Britain, 2004–2020. 23. S. Tharoor, Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India, Hurst, London, p. 96.

30  Introduction 24. Authors visit to Calcutta in 2019, now Kolkata, and former capital of the British Raj. 25. Author’s fieldtrip to Calcutta, now Kolkata, 2019. 26. Author’s own observation of covered markets in Leeds, Halifax, 2020, and the New Market in Kolkata, 2019. 27. S. Bose and A. Jalal, Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy, Oxford University Press: New Delhi/Oxford/NY, 1998/1999, p. 84. 28. P. Gopal, Insurgent Empire: Anti-Colonial Resistance and British Dissent, Verso: London, 2019. 29. Bose and Jalal, 1998/1999, p. 99. 30. S. Tharoor, Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India, Hurst: London, 2016, p. 90. 31. R. Eddo-Lodge, Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People About Race, Bloomsbury: London, 2017/2018, pp. 10–11. 32. Observation by the author in Britain, 2005–2020. 33. Decolonisation Talk by the author, ‘The British Empire and Decolonising the Curriculum’, 1–2pm, Wednesday, 12th February 2020, Lancaster University: Bowland North, Seminar Room, 23. 34. R. Eddo-Lodge, Why I’m No Longer Talking to White People About Race, Bloomsbury: London, 2017/18, p. 36. 35. Eddo-Lodge, 2017/2018, p. 85. 36. Observation by the author, 2005–2020. 37. P. Gopal, Insurgent Empire: Anti-colonial Resistance and British Dissent, Verso: London/NY, 2019, p. 13. 38. D. Olusoga, Black and British: A Forgotten History, Pan Books: London, 2016/17, pp. 22. 39. A. Hirsch, BRIT (ish): On Race, Identity and Belonging, Vintage: London, 2018, p. 54. 40. Hirsch, BRIT (ish), 2018, p. 58. 41. P. Gopal, Insurgent Empire: Anti-Colonial Resistance and British Dissent, Verso: London/NY, 2019, p. 3. 42. A. Hirsch, BRIT (ish): On Race, Identity and Belonging, Vintage: London, 2018, pp. 78–79. 43. A. Hirsch, BRIT (ish): On Race, Identity and Belonging, Vintage: London, 2018, p. 83. 44. Hirsch, 2018, p. 82. 45. Interviews carried out by the author with people of South Asian and AfroCaribbean descent in Britain, 2012–2020.

1

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast

Geographical location The Indian Northeast geographically is located in a remote and very isolated part of South Asia. It is located in the extreme peripheral parts of the subcontinent in the eastern sector of the Himalayas. The Indian Northeast shares international boundaries with China, Myanmar, Bhutan and Bangladesh. It is cut off from the rest of India and is attached to India proper by a small strip of land called the Chicken’s neck or the Siliguri corridor. Through this small strip of land passes ‘a cluster of railways and roads, as well as a pipeline for crude oil.’1 Within India, it shares internal boundaries with the state of West Bengal. The Indian Northeast consists of the seven sister states which are Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram. ‘The Northeast covers a land area of 255,037 square kilometres, accounting for 7.8 per cent of India’s total land space.’2 The new addition is Sikkim and hence the Northeast now has international boundaries with Nepal. Assam is the dominant force within the Northeast.3 Not only does it have a central location and thus share a border with most other Northeastern states, but from an economic standpoint also, Assam is comparatively richer; although by and large the entire region is quite impoverished. Parts of the Northeast are contested. For instance, Arunachal Pradesh is seen as South Tibet by the Chinese. The demarcating line which separates the Indian Northeast from China is called the MacMohan Line. This demarcating line, however, is not always recognised by the Chinese. This part of India is often called the Mongoloid fringe of India because of the historical migrations which have taken place from different parts of the Asia Pacific to the Northeast. ‘Home to more than 220 major tribes and various other sub-tribes, the region has witnessed the mass migration of people from Southeast Asia and East Asia since time immemorial.’4 ‘Migrations of different groups of people over a long period of time have laid the foundation of its uniquely diverse demographic landscape.’5 The entire area is hilly and mountainous and this is the part of Southern Asia where the mighty Himalayan mountain ranges come to an end. The harsh terrain does not support a dense population.6 The entire Northeast is

32  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast very scenic, has a lot of natural beauty and is rich in biodiversity. It has been argued that ‘geography, topography and climate have played an important and significant role in identity formation in the region.’7 The Northeast is essentially landlocked.8 Because the Indian Northeast is sandwiched in between South Asia proper and East Asia proper, the cultural traditions of this part of India tend to be a syncretic fusion of both South Asian and East Asian traditions. When one is in the area, one gets the feeling that he/ she is in East Asia/Southeast Asia as opposed to South Asia because the local people look more Southeast Asian rather than South Asian. The area is culturally very diverse. The cultural heterogeneity has often led to problems in the area. The area is often seen as an ethnic minefield. There are ethnic, racial, religious, tribal and linguistic divides in the Indian Northeast. The Northeast is marked by tremendous racial, linguistic, ethnic and religious diversity. All the major religions i.e. Hinduism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism are found in this part of India. In fact, the Indian Northeast is so diverse that sometimes analysts have actually said it is inaccurate to use the blanket term ‘Northeast’, because it does not respect the diversity which exists within the area. The term ‘Northeast’ which is so widely used in popular parlance has been questioned. There are of course other analysts on the opposite side of the spectrum who believe that there are enough commonalities which exist within the area despite the diversity, so the term ‘Northeast’ can be and should be used. In a lot of ways the Northeast has been imagined in opposition to the Indian mainland or Indian mainstream.9

The role of religion in the Northeast If one travels to the Indian Northeast, one can easily notice the presence of Christianity because of the strong presence of churches and cathedrals in the area. There is religious symbolism associated with Christianity almost everywhere not only in Nagaland, Mizoram and Meghalaya but in places like Assam and Manipur also and adjoining areas like North Bengal. In North Bengal, which has a border with the state of Assam, there is a strong Christian presence especially in Darjeeling, which is a well-known hill station. Darjeeling is very popular with both Indian and international tourists; one can see the third highest mountain peak in the world, mount Kanchenjunga, from here. In addition to churches, there are Christian schools and colleges in Darjeeling and elsewhere in the Indian Northeast.10 St. Pauls Darjeeling for boys and St. Edmunds, also for boys, in Shillong, Meghalaya are very well-known educational institutions in present-day India. Darjeeling had been used by the British colonisers, particularly during the hot Indian summers, as a resort. Calcutta or Kolkata, as it is known today, was the capital of British India and today it is the capital city of the Indian state of West Bengal and is seen as the gateway to the Northeast. Since the British had settled there for centuries, it was not hard for Christian missionaries to carry on with their proselytization

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 33 campaigns in the Northeast due its geographical proximity. ‘Coterminous with British colonization that was in process in the region, American Baptists missionaries contacted and proselytized the Nagas. The missionaries’ involvement included the establishment of churches, schools, mission centres and ‘Christian’ villages for converts. They also introduced reading, writing and Christian rules for new converts and translated the Bibles into native languages.’11 With regard to the origins of Christianity in Nagaland, Bertil Lintner writes, ‘the arrival of Christianity in the Naga hills, then one of the remotest and least accessible corners of the Indian subcontinent, has its roots, unlikely as it may sound, 200 years ago in Salem, Massachusetts … Now, the Christians of Massachusetts decided that with America having been independent for more than thirty years, the time was ripe for the new country to appoint its own missionaries and send them abroad.’12 The first encounter between the missionaries and the Naga people took place in 1839. This happened when an American Baptist missionary, Miles Bronson went to the Namsang Nagas in what is now called Arunachal Pradesh. This mission, however, was not successful. In 1871, an Assamese evangelist called Godhula was sent to the Ao Nagas by EW Clark, who was also an American Baptist missionary in Assam. Clark moved from Sibsagar, Assam and established a mission station among the Ao Nagas at Molung in Nagaland. After that missions were initiated by other Naga tribes. However, the American zeal for proselytization was weakened after India gained independence in 1947. Soon after independence, New Delhi expelled foreigners from Nagaland and restrictions have been imposed by the central government especially for foreigners desiring to enter Nagaland. Even for Indian citizens, special border permits are required before they can visit sensitive border areas. The American Baptist missionaries did not allow Naga converts to participate in tribal cultural practices that were not in keeping with Christianity. This included native songs, festivals, dance and drinks. However, the Naga Hornbill festival which was ordinarily celebrated before Christmas is still celebrated in present-day Nagaland. The missionaries often saw the Naga tribes as barbaric and savage, and often labelled the Nagas as head hunters. Being Christian and white was seen as civilised and cultured. Everything else was measured against Christianity and whiteness. To be white was to be normal and human. The missionaries were seen as the teachers and the givers and all else, especially in Asia, as the receiver and the taught. The civilising mission was thoroughly intertwined with racial arrogance. The missionaries almost took a father figure like role to teach, punish and finally convert their ‘barbaric’ children in Asia. Thong writes, ‘The civilising process cannot take place as long as the colonised subjects remain proud of and attached to their cultural heritage and identity. In order to sever the subjects from their culture and to produce change and conversion, it is necessary to constantly inculcate in the mind of the colonised that their culture is evil, savage, irrational and

34  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast deficient.’13 Finally, the pillars that would support and uphold Naga tradition and culture would fall apart because the people could no longer obtain a sense of value from what they considered their own. The negative images that the missionaries would constantly associate native culture with would finally play a key role in weakening and undermining local Naga values and Naga self-worth. Nagas were often characterised as pagan, heathen, sinful, uncivilised and backward. These negative images ultimately made Nagas lose pride in their local customs and traditions and paved the way for rapid conversion to Christianity in the second half of the twentieth century. When we look at the rapid conversion to Christianity, we also need to understand the socio-political context in which it was happening. The Naga Hills and other parts of the Northeast had experienced over 150 years of British colonisation. But after India gained independence, there was political tension between New Delhi and the Northeastern periphery. Relations between the centre and the periphery remained non-violent until 1955, after which the Indian government began to send its security forces to crush the Naga movement. Also, according to India’s majority religion, Hinduism, tribal people living on the edges of Indic civilisation were often seen as avarna or as outcastes, which had been a leading cause for Naga people to feel marginalised. So, ‘for Nagas, the choice of Christianity was, to a degree, a form of political resistance. Their act of conversion, which was to identify them with their erstwhile Christian western colonizers, was in part an opposition to their immediate non-Christian coloniser, that is, India.’14 This is political emancipation from the mainstream Indian government based in New Delhi, which is often seen as a repressive and exploitative government by many Nagas and north-easterners.

Race and the Northeast Because people of north-eastern descent look different to Indians living in India proper, they have often been subjected to violent acts of racism. Often north-eastern people are mistaken to be Chinese or Southeast Asian. Derogatory words like ‘chinky’ are often hurled at north-eastern people when they visit India proper for holidays, jobs or for purposes of education. The killing of Loitam Richard in 2012 and Nido Tania in 2014 sparked conversations on race and racism at the national level. ‘Most north-easterners have physical features that mark them out from the rest of the Indian ethnic and cultural milieu and subject them to derogatory names such as ‘chinky’, a putatively distinct category to which are ascribed particular attributes.’15 North-eastern people are often cast as being outside the boundaries of the Indian nation because of their membership of a section of the population identified by a racialised physicality. The appearance of a person with so-called chinky features marks them as peripheral and marginal, and external to the social stratifications associated with Hinduism and the Hindu caste system.

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 35 It is worth noting that in recent years, there has been increased contact between India proper and people of north-eastern descent. Between the years 2005 and 2011, there had been a twelve-fold increase in migration out of the Northeast to the big urban centres in India proper. It has been estimated that around half a million people of north-eastern descent live in India proper. All of these migrants in the big Indian cities like New Delhi, Bangalore and Kolkata are very visible and they stick out from the mainstream population. They are visible minorities. They work in retail, hospitality, in the airlines industry and in call centres. Because of the ongoing political violence in different parts of the Northeast and the availability of jobs in India proper particularly after India’s economic rise since market liberalisation since the early 1990s and also the opportunity to pursue higher studies in mainstream Indian universities has encouraged people of north-eastern descent to migrate. The sad thing is that as this migration into India proper has increased in recent years, so have the acts of racial violence. As this migration has taken place, there has been increased contact between Indians living in India proper and those arriving from the Northeast and this has changed the perception that mainstream Indian have of the Northeastern region. Racial tensions reached a peak in 2012, when a twenty-five-year-old student from Manipur, Loitam Richard, was murdered in Bangalore, supposedly one of the more progressive Indian cities by his own housemates when they were having a brawl over the television remote control. This incident sparked a series of protests both in the Northeast as well as in India proper. After the incident, Manipuri scholar, Yengkhom Jilangamba, wrote in the Hindu that every now and again there would be an incident of violence which was clearly racist in nature and there will be protests against it, but it is the everyday subtle shades of racism, micro aggressions and other-ing that bruise and have a detrimental impact on people’s mind and body and it is this that builds up both anger and frustration.16 Needless to say, fighting this everyday racism is exhausting. One thing that complicates things further is when ethnic majority people, whether in Britain, India or China, get defensive when allegations of racism are made. Richard’s killing in the April of 2012 caused so much outrage that the then prime minister, Manmohan Singh, was forced to hold a delegation of north-eastern migrants the next month. ‘Although he condemned the killings, he denied any racial motivation.’17 This did little to ease the tension. There was a lot of tension and anxiety by the middle of 2012, when the fear of attacks on north-eastern migrants in places like Pune and Bangalore led an estimated thirty thousand north-easterners to leave the big cities. Regional governments in the Northeast made provisions for the safe return of their people. There were scenes of overcrowded trains leaving Indian cities and these were shown on national television. With Northeast migrants feeling increasingly insecure and unsafe in India proper, the central government was forced to reassure people of northeastern descent of their safety and in keeping with conventional tactics

36  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast blamed Pakistan for stirring up trouble within the country. Needless to say, this did very little to curtail the fears of the north-eastern migrants. ‘As a consequence, attention to relations between the Northeast and the rest of India gained a new urgency and brought racism into national-level conversations … For many people from the Northeast, racism by Indians not only marks their experiences of Indian cities, but also their experiences of the Indian state back home in the Northeast. Yet, it took the possibility of Northeast migrants abandoning Indian cities, and their vital economic niches, to bring racism into national focus.’18 Whilst some of the more violent cases are reported, there are numerous incidents of everyday racism and harassment that go unreported, one of which I witnessed on a flight from Bagdogra in North Bengal to Kolkata in the August of 2019.19 Before boarding the flight, announcements were made that certain facilities like air coolers would be provided but unfortunately this was not the case once all passengers had boarded the flight. This caused much anger to some but particularly to one Hindi speaking, mainstream Indian male passenger who was travelling with his family. There were a few air hostesses on the flight, one of whom was clearly north-eastern looking. When she was taking the trolley of food and drinks down the aisle, the angry Indian male passenger started shouting at her and said in Hindi that he would not let her pass because the airlines had lied about the air coolers. ‘Nei jaane dega,’ he shouted, which means ‘I won’t let you go.’ The north-eastern air hostess profusely apologised and said that there must have been some confusion whereas the angry passenger insisted that the flight knew about it all along and intentionally misguided the passengers. Despite all the raucous, no one protested or said anything. In fact, they sat in their seats, watching the fun and felt quite entertained. Sadly this is the way it is with visible minorities all over the world including countries like Britain.20 Apart from these very specific incidents of violence, the overall student experience is one of loneliness and marginalisation. When students of north-eastern descent visit places like Kolkata for higher education, their lived experience is one of socio-economic exclusion. In Kolkata, mainstream Bengali students generally do not socially interact with students of north-eastern descent so the latter tend to stick together.21 In 2017, after African students were attacked in Greater Noida, the demand for an anti-racism law grew louder amongst north-eastern people. The Kolkata based newspaper, The Telegraph, reported on the concerns that north-easterners had expressed so powerfully. It was reported, ‘racial attacks like these have become a regular danger not only for African nationals but also for people from our own Northeast, alleged Romen Arambam of Manipur over the phone from Delhi.’22 The victim mentioned that he had been falsely accused of stealing data by the boss of the company that he had joined barely 45 days earlier. He was the only one at the workplace who was of north-eastern descent. He felt that the company wanted to sack him after making false allegations. When he objected, he was beaten. Although

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 37 a case of physical attack had been registered, the police informed him that a racial discrimination charge could not be made and that they could not be of much help since there was no anti-racism law. The victim also mentioned that unless there were anti-racism laws and special security forces to protect visible minorities, violent attacks like these would keep on happening. According to well-known activist, Bina Lakshmi Nepram, denial of racism is racism itself. The demand for an anti-racism law has grown louder since these attacks have taken place. Of all the incidents of reported racism against individuals of north-eastern descent, the worst incident was associated with Nido Taniam. Nido was an eighteen-year-old student from Arunachal Pradesh. Nido walked into a shop in New Delhi, in early 2013, asking for directions to locate a relative’s address. The shopkeeper made fun of his hair, which was streaked blonde. Nido retaliated by breaking a glass counter in the store. The furious shopkeeper and his assistants responded by physically assaulting Nido. Eventually, Nido died of excessive internal bleeding the following day. Nido’s case would have fizzled out but his father was a member of the state’s legislative assembly and also a junior minister in the state government. In other words, Nido’s father had power, position and authority. ‘The shaken family rushed to New Delhi and raised the issue with Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh and Congress President Sonia Gandhi … the anger back home and across the Northeast as well as in New Delhi over the tragedy, channelled through the visual media and mobilized by local leaders of various Northeast associations, had snowballed into an agitation demanding justice for Nido and action against discriminatory treatment … Nido’s family demanded a detailed investigation into the tragedy.’23 However, despite the gloomy picture that has been discussed above, the actual situation is not so black and white and there are shades of grey. The bigger picture is a lot more complex and not all north-eastern students experience brutality and violence in India proper. I carried out an interview with a Tangkhul Naga student who was doing his bachelor’s degree in electronics in India proper on 21 December in 2018 at the Kolkata airport. Both of us were travelling to different parts of the Northeast. The conversation captured elements of religion, racial otherness and the nature of the insurgency in the Northeast. Although he was a Naga, his family was based in Ukhrul, which is in Northern Manipur and has a border with Nagaland. He was on his way back home to celebrate Christmas. He mentioned that Christianity was a very important part of his own identity. Christianity and its arrival helped in the overall development of Nagaland and the Northeast. Christianity was very central not just to his identity but also to Naga culture. It was a well-known missionary by the name of William Pettigrew who was responsible for spreading the word of Christ in the Indian Northeast. He thought highly of the idea of a Greater Nagaland and of all Nagas coming together as a singular political and administrative unit. He mentioned that the insurgency in Manipur was ongoing and that the number of insurgents

38  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast had multiplied over the years. These groups have different demands and aims and want different things but they predominantly want autonomy. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA, which we will discuss later on in this chapter) has not been lifted yet. When he spoke about his own experience in New Delhi, he felt that he was treated well by the ethnic majority. He also mentioned that if north-eastern people spoke Hindi and had some knowledge of India proper and its dominant religion, Hinduism, they were often treated better than those north-eastern students who had no knowledge of Hindi/India and Hinduism. If north-easterners did not speak Hindi, they were often treated ‘differently,’ by which he meant unfavourably. He ended on a positive note by saying that in present-day India there were a lot of people of north-eastern descent who were now residing in the big cities so mainstream Indians had a lot more exposure to north-eastern culture and this familiarity helped relations between India proper and the Northeastern region.24

The historical background When one looks at the situation carefully in the Indian Northeast, one can easily identify multiple layers of conflict. ‘India’s Northeastern frontier is one of South Asia’s hottest trouble spots.’25 The first layer of conflict is between the area as a whole and the rest of India. Relations with the rest of India have been very complicated right from the start. The second layer of conflict is between different states within the Northeast itself. This clearly shows that the area is very fragmented and should not be treated as a homogenous whole. The third layer of conflict exists between different tribal groups. The fourth layer of conflict exists between tribal and non-tribal groups. The final layer of conflict exists between those who see themselves as insiders and those who are perceived as outsiders. To take this slightly further, it should also be noted that within each state there are also multiple layers of conflict. For instance, within Assam itself, there are many layers of conflict which shall be discussed later in this chapter. Haokip writes, ‘by the turn of the 1990s, India’s Northeastern region witnessed a proliferation of ethnic insurgent groups vying for different levels of autonomy, ranging from claims for autonomous district councils to redrawing of state boundaries to create new states.’26 What has complicated the situation further is the involvement of external powers like China, Myanmar and Pakistan in India’s Northeast. The political elite in New Delhi find this highly disturbing. Many of the insurgent groups received their initial training and weapons from China. Insurgencies in India’s Northeast might not have thrived as they do today, had there been no external help. China had supported revolutionary movements across Asia since 1949 in an aggressive and open manner in an attempt to export communist ideology. ‘Thereafter, it provided strong political, economic and logistical support to various revolutionary groups in Northeast

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 39 India, ostensibly motivated by the goal of countering Western imperialism and Soviet revisionism in Asia.’27 Throughout the Cold War phase, both China and Pakistan have tried to destabilise India. After the 1962 war with India, in which India was defeated, relations between the Indians and Chinese have remained problematic. China continues to remain thick with Pakistan and has increasingly got drawn into South Asia by making inroads into Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh and also into mainland Southeast Asia, especially in countries like Myanmar. This has undermined traditional Indian interests in these countries of South and Southeast Asia.28 One reason why this violence can take place is because of the proliferation of small arms. Rajeev Bhattacharya in his essay, ‘Small Arms Proliferation in the North-East: The Chinese Connection’ writes, ‘The illicit proliferation and misuse of small arms are among the most pressing security threats affecting several countries. Thousands of people are killed and/or wounded every year in conflicts fought primarily with these weapons. Proliferation of small arms has gradually increased in the Indian subcontinent fuelled by a host of factors including spread of low intensity conflicts. India’s Northeast is one of the most affected zones since the maximum number of insurgent outfits are found in this region. In addition, a variety of transnational criminal activities have increased in the region which increased the demand for small arms. Such demand for small arms is matched by an equally prompt supply from different sources supported by an intricate web of relations and agreements that cut across regions, communities, and countries. The failure of governments to come together and chalk out coordinated efforts adds to the problem.’29 Although the situation is most certainly very complex, there are two main facets which stand out when we look at the insurgency in the Indian Northeast. At its very core, the insurgency like Kashmir has been associated with strong feelings of separatism. Secessionist movements in the Indian Northeast have been very strong right after India became independent and continue till this very day. The fight has been for more autonomy if not outright independence. Most of these states have fought for political independence from India. The dominant argument is that people in the Northeast do not share an identification or a sense of oneness with mainstream India and relations with India proper have also been very complicated right from the start, so many feel that they are better off being on their own. Since the Northeast is closer to Myanmar than to the Indian core, a lot of the tribal communities straddling the Indo-Burmese border and people living in the Northeast more generally speaking have a sense of oneness with people living next door in contemporary Myanmar. For instance, the Chin people in Myanmar are closely related to the Mizo people of Northeast India.30 So the first facet that can be easily identified in the conflict is strong separatist tendencies and the breakaway groups who have been involved in this process. The second major issue has been over migration into the Northeast. People in the Northeast are very concerned about the waves of migration taking

40  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast place from neighbouring Bangladesh. India shares a massive border with Bangladesh which is a porous border, difficult to manage. The concern from the Northeast is that New Delhi has not done very much to prevent this migration which is in turn increasingly eroding and diluting north-eastern tribal identity. The migration is paving the way for Bengali/Bangladeshi preponderance in the Northeast. Migration is eroding the mongoloid ethos. ‘The region’s history as part of independent India has been dominated by political and social movements against the Indian state and against threats to ethnic identity from migrants and neighbouring countries.’31 New Delhi would need to be more active in Northeastern affairs. Acts of terrorism or political violence in the Northeast have arisen out of extreme feelings of marginalisation and alienation. This marginalisation encompasses both social exclusion as well as economic marginalisation. The levels of violence have differed from place to place and have not been the same everywhere. There has been a great deal of variation in the violence throughout the Northeast. For instance, violence has been very high in the states of Assam, Manipur and Nagaland; Mizoram and Sikkim are relatively peaceful. To deal with the inter-ethnic tension, the Indian government has often carved out states from the dominant state in the Northeast, Assam. In very early times, the Ahoms had migrated from Burma into the Indian Northeast. Some argue that the Ahoms came to the Brahmaputra Valley from the wedge between Southwest China, Southeast Myanmar and Northern Thailand, and left an indelible impress on the countryside with their organising skills, military prowess, the construction of sturdy buildings and roads, and a tough and efficient administration.32 ‘The Ahoms of Burma had ruled Assam for much of the 13th to 18th centuries and also exercised nominal control over the areas to the North of the plains of Assam.’33 Ahom is also pronounced as Asom and hence we have the word, Assam. Throughout the middle ages, the relations between the Ahoms and the Mughal emperors at New Delhi were problematic. They battled with each other for years. With the beginning of the modern era and the rise of British hegemony in the subcontinent the situation began to change. The British colonial administration discovered the Northeast whilst fighting against Burma in the Anglo Burmese Wars. There were three wars which had taken place since Burma had been captured in parts. The wars were fought in 1824/26, 1852 and 1885.34 It was during this time that the Northeast was also discovered since the Northeast has a common border with Burma. The initial impression to the British was not very favourable. But later, with the passage of time, there was the discovery of tea. Tea was to Assam, what rice was to Burma: the British Empire’s cash crop. Robert Bruce, an employee of the East India Company saw tea-growing close to Guwahati, which is the capital of Assam today. By 1835, the Assam Tea Company was established. It wasn’t easy in the beginning because the jungles and forests had to be cleared on the mountains before the tea plantations were set up. Cheap labour was brought from places like Bengal and Bihar and other parts of India proper and labourers were encouraged to work on these

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 41 tea plantations. Other profitable businesses included coal and oil but it was really tea that drove British interests in the Northeast as it proved to be a very lucrative business. Colonial policy workers cared little about Assam’s past and even little about its future especially in terms of preserving its cultural identity and way of life. The colonial administration actively encouraged people from different ethnic and racial backgrounds to move from India proper to Assam to work on these tea plantations. Assam was underpopulated but potentially very profitable. Hence people were forced to move to work in the tea plantations. Huge numbers of people were brought in to work in the 1870s. ‘The British encouraged migrations that changed the face of Assam’s society.’35 This included the Mundas, the Santhals and the Oraons who were living on the edges of Indian society and were brought to work in Assam.36 This is one of the largest organised forced migrations in history. Many of these people had different ethnic, racial and religious identities which were often at odds with one another, and that is when the problem started. They had different senses of nationality, nationhood and belonging, which were often in conflict with one another. In Assam, the politics around demographics remain central even to this day. Assam would soon witness complex and contradictory identities and opinions about ethnic belonging and nationalism amongst an array of people that started to call Assam their home. Nagaland Out of all the states in the Indian Northeast, Nagaland probably feels the most alienated and marginalised. ‘The Naga’s occupy the parallel folds of high mountains on both sides of the Burma-India border between the valley of the Chindwin and the Brahmaputra plains merging with the Kachins in the north and the Chins in the south.’37 The Naga community was never a homogenous one. Some of the major tribes include Mao, Sema, Angami, Ao, Rengma, Thankhul, Maram and Lotha.38 Nagaland was carved out of Assam in the 1960s.39 It has a strong Christian presence like Mizoram. Many people of Naga descent feel more of a sense of oneness and identification with their ethnic brothers across the Indo Burmese border in the Kachin state of northern Myanmar. They argue that they are not Indian by choice but Indian by force.40 The dominant argument from Nagaland is that many have felt a strong disconnect with India proper. Talking about the situation in Nagaland immediately after India’s independence in 1947, Longkumer writes ‘The Naga’s refused to merge with the nascent Indian nation on the grounds that they differed culturally, ethnically, and racially from it, nor did they share any historical memories or general sense of belonging with the Indians.’41 Many Naga people feel that they were forced to join the Indian union by the British but now that the British have left, they should have also gained independence from India. The main issue has revolved around self-determination, sovereignty, political independence and autonomy.

42  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast The conflict in Nagaland is often regarded as one of the oldest conflicts in post-independent India. Dr. Chandrika Singh writes, ‘In North East India the Naga’s were the first to come ahead with the demand of a sovereign Nagaland, and at the denial of such demand by the Government of India, the Naga’s under the leadership of late A.Z. Phizo became rebellious and took arms against the Government of India.’42 One of the main political ideologies of insurgent groups here has been the idea of creating or trying to create a greater Nagaland. Greater Nagaland or Nagalim is a political ideology which believes in bringing people of Naga descent together as one political and administrative unit.43 There are Naga people living not only in Nagaland but also in neighbouring Indian states like Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Manipur and also across the international border in contemporary Myanmar. Many Naga political activists believe that all Naga people should be together although nowadays people are beginning to realise that this may never become a reality. In a recent article published by the Kolkata based The Telegraph, it was reported that the Naga People’s Front which has ruled Nagaland since 2003, endorses the demand for a Greater Nagland or Nagalim.44 When Naga insurgent groups try to enforce this political ideology of Nagalim, they often get into a conflict with neighbouring Manipur and Manipuris. When one travels to Northern Manipur to places like Ukhrul, one gets the feeling that one is in Nagaland rather than being in Manipur. This is because many Naga people have colonised Northern Manipur and have settled there. More specifically, in Ukhrul there is a strong presence of the Tangkhul Nagas.45 Not only have Naga people settled in Manipur, but Naga insurgent groups have also created their own bases in Manipur. For instance, one of the earliest insurgent groups in the Northeast has been the Federal Government of Nagaland which has ‘spread its tentacles to the Naga inhabited hill districts of Manipur by 1956. It established a base in Ukhrul, and operations spilled over into the thickly forested districts of Senapati and Tamenglong. These places also became the site for insurgency operations by the NSCNNational Socialist Council of Nagaland.’46 This has brought them into a conflict with Manipuri people. The Naga’s have laid irredentist claims on Manipur which has paved the way for inter-ethnic tension and tension between states in the Indian Northeast. Immediately after independence in 1947, India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, promised Naga people autonomy but not complete independence. For the political elite in New Delhi, it was important to hold onto Nagaland because it acted as a good buffer zone for India proper against aggressive external attacks especially those coming from China. Before 1947, the Naga’s wanted to be left out of India. India was meant to be a guardian for a period of ten years and after the ten year period, the Naga’s would decide for themselves as to whether or not they wanted to still continue being a part of India or if they wanted to be separate from India. It was hoped by many of the political leaders at New Delhi that they would manage to find a home in India. Gandhi stood for the Naga’s as he did for a lot

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 43 of other minority communities. A series of agreements were signed between Nagaland and the central Indian government. One of the early agreements was the Akbar Hydari agreement which was signed in 1947. Akbar Hydari was the then governor of Assam. According to this arrangement, Naga judicial processes were meant to be based on Naga customary law. Legislation was meant to be on Naga consent and Naga land was meant to be for the Naga community. Tax collection was meant to be done by the Naga National Council (NNC). The NNC had been formed in 1946 by educated Christians who stood for the unity of the Naga community and even circulated their own journal called the Naga nation.47 Forests which had been transferred to Assam were to be recovered. The next agreement came in the year 1960 and this was called the Six Point Agreement. By this agreement, the Naga Hills administration would become the state of Nagaland with a legislative assembly. No act of parliament relating to civil or criminal justice and land ownership would come into effect until the Naga Assembly gave its consent. There would be special grants there for Nagaland. A Naga regiment for the army would also be considered. Neighbouring areas inhabited by Naga people in future would become a part of Nagaland, although there were no promises on this one. In 1975, came the Shillong Accord. Shillong is the capital city of Meghalaya. This arrangement was meant to end the hostilities between Naga insurgent groups and India. Nagas were meant to give up violence and were supposed to embrace the Indian constitution. From the Indian side, security operations were meant to stop, curfew was to be lifted and political prisoners were to be freed. The Shillong Accord did not ultimately go down well with the Naga insurgent groups. ‘A few hardcore militants defected from the NNC under the leadership of Muivah, Isak Chishi Swu and S.S. Khaplang because of ideological differences. They went to China for military training and formed the National Socialist Council of Nagaland in 1980 under the influence of Chinese communism.’48 The National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) has been one of the most prominent insurgent groups. It is this group that has spearheaded the insurgency for decades against India. It is predominantly a Christian/ Marxist force, although this might sound like a contradiction.49 Naga insurgent groups feel passionately about their Christian identity but also believe in socialism. The group has been fighting for Christ and socialism. The NSCN, however, is highly fragmented and not a unified group. This is probably one reason why the secessionist movement in Nagaland has not been successful. There have been ideological and programmatic differences amongst the leaders. Insurgents are usually divided. Generally, they do not get popular support from the people they claim to represent. In some parts, they may enjoy popular support but in most cases, they are viewed unfavourably and are often seen as antisocial elements who are involved in robbery and crime. The Naga Students Federation has been outraged by the constant arrival of ‘outsiders.’ The Unrepresented Nations People’s Organisation (UNPO) has listed Nagaland as a country, occupied by India.

44  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast Poverty, lack of infrastructure, corruption, administrative failure, poor governance have all collectively contributed to the problem and further exacerbated the situation. Whilst there has been a lot of talk about India’s economic rise in recent years in the existing body of scholarly literature, sadly there has not been a trickle-down effect and the people living in the far away Northeastern states have been by and large excluded. In relation to this, David Ludden writes, ‘In India recent growth has favoured states in the south and west, distressing states in the north and north-east.’50 Manipur The situation in neighbouring Manipur is similar to the situation in Nagaland. Manipur is regarded as India’s eastern most state. The Meitei tribe has been the dominant force behind secession. Manipur acceded to India in the year 1947 and the merger took place between the years 1947 and 1949. The new Indian government pressurised the then Maharajah of Manipur to sign a merger agreement and occupied the state in October, 1949.51 As soon as the merger took place, there was a leftist insurgency which challenged the merger. The Meiteis challenged the merger with India. Irabot Singh was also a key figure in challenging the merger. Manipuri secessionists have often asserted their pre-Hindu past and stressed on their cultural differences with India. The conflict here also relates to the unregulated migration from Bangladesh. There is much concern about the illegal status of migrants and there is also a strong sense of disenchantment with the Indian government for not doing much to stop this migration. The border between India and Bangladesh is porous and easy to cross because there is no major natural barrier that exists between the two countries. Manipuri nationalists have a range of grievances. They were not happy about the fact that they did not get special status like Kashmir. It got statehood much later in 1972.52 India gave up the Kubaw valley to Burma in the year 1953. The Manipuri language did not get official status until the year 1992. Manipuri nationalists are also concerned with Naga irredentist claims on Manipur. They had problems buying land in the hills because the Nagas had taken over and occupied the entire area. Hill tribes like the Naga community got reservations in jobs, employment and education under the quota system as a part of India’s policy of positive discrimination and affirmative action. This allowed them to dominate the administration. The Meitei tribes were also annoyed by the fact that they were labelled other backward classes (OBC) by the Indian government. One of the major political forces behind secession was the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) which was founded in the year 1964. Their objective was independence and socialism. In relation to insurgency in Manipur, Haksar writes, ‘Manipur has the largest number of armed insurgent groups among all the states in India. The South Asia Portal on Terrorism has estimated that there are twenty-five in all of which six are proscribed. The earliest armed group was the UNLF

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 45 which was formed in 1964; the latest are the Manipuri Muslim organisations. Broadly, these armed groups represent the four communities: the Meitei’s, the Naga’s, the Kuki-Chin-Mizo (collectively called Zomi), and the Manipuri Muslims. At times these groups have formed alliances such as the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front but they mostly operate in their own sphere of influence …. The Zomi groups demand a Zomi homeland which will require the Churachandpur district of Manipur to be subsumed within Mizoram and then united with the Zomi-inhabited areas in Myanmar. The Manipuri Muslims dream of an Islamic State.’53 In Manipur, there are a couple of very prominent human rights activists who have protested against the violence caused by the Indian Army in Manipur. Whilst these human rights activists are not secessionists, they have openly spoken out against the human rights violations caused by the Indian Army and other paramilitary forces in Manipur. Two very well-known figures are Bina Lakshmi Nepram and Irom Sharmila. Bina Lakshmi Nepram is also a feminist. Irom Sharmila has been on hunger strike and has protested against the draconian AFSPA54 which gives security personnel extraordinary powers to deal with the crises and the emergency situation in India’s so-called disturbed areas. It was recently reported that ‘Sharmila ended her fast against the AFSPA in August, 2016, saying she was convinced that her struggle would not move the governments in Manipur and New Delhi. She said she would fight elections to continue her struggle politically.’55 The AFSPA is most certainly an indelible black mark on India’s democracy. We will discuss this in more detail later on in this chapter. Nepram is the founder of Manipur Women’s Gun Survivors Network and the Control Arms Foundation of India. Nepram deals with women’s issues in conflict zones. Looting and raping of women happen in Manipur on a regular basis by both insurgents and security personnel. The Indian Army has been accused of raping women on several occasions. Because the insurgency has gone on for decades in the Northeast, as a result of the clashes between the Indian state and the insurgents, women have lost their fathers, husbands, brothers and sons. Since so many men have lost their lives, women are now starting to take up the fight against the oppressive Indian state. Nepram believes that only women can bring about effective change and peace. The women’s protest movement is called the Meira Pabi movement. Women respond to conflicts in three different ways: as survivors, protestors and those who are more educated as creators of awareness of the situation regionally, nationally and internationally. Nepram’s group believes in empowering women. First of all women have to survive and then only they can fight back the enemy. Nepram tries to employ women in the handicrafts and weaving industry, and has opened bank accounts for women and also made arrangements for interestfree loans for vulnerable Manipuri women who are often caught up in conflict. The fight to a large extent has been against human rights violations caused by the army which include the illegal imposition of curfew, the desecration of churches, the use of churches as interrogation centres, detention

46  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast for long periods, rape and sexual harassment, threats to shoot, electric shocks, physical torture and looting of homes and granaries. The Indian Army seems to have no real understanding of local customs and practices. In a recent article in the Kolkata based newspaper, The Telegraph, it was reported that the Delhi police’s anti-terror wing had arrested Khoirom Ranjit, thirty-five, alias Poirei Meitei, commander-in-chief of the banned Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP). The KCP is a splinter group from the original Kangleipak Communist Party, formed in 1980, with the objective of restoring Manipur’s freedom. It has been accused of both rampant extortion and killings in Manipur. Ranjit and two of his associates including a woman had been arrested from East Delhi flat in Mayur Vihar. They had been wanted in several terror cases in Manipur. Ranjit, Inugbam Sanatombi Devi, twenty-six, and Pukhrihongbami Bomcha, thirty-six, face charges of ‘murder, shooting, bombing, grenade-throwing, extortion and the intimidation of businessmen and politicians. Police sources said a 9 mm pistol and two hand grenades were found on them.’56 Assam The situation in Assam is very complex. Within Assam itself, there are ethnic, linguistic, religious and racial divides. Prakash Singh writes, ‘the composite state of Assam was a conglomeration of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups.’57 Later on of course separate states were carved out of Assam. There are multiple layers of conflict within Assam itself. The Hindu Assamese have fought against the Hindu Bengalis. The Hindu Assamese have fought against the Bodo tribe who have wanted their separate land called Bodoland. And the Bodo tribes have fought against the non-Bodo tribes. The Indian government has dealt with some of this tension by carving out separate states from Assam. In 1979, the All Assam Students Union (AASU) protested against the presence of Bangladeshis and their voting rights. The central government did not show much interest. The central government has tried to exploit regional resources like Assamese oil which the AASU had successfully stopped. Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, had agreed to deport all the outsiders who had come to Assam post 1971. This had not even taken place and she went ahead with the state elections. This went against the wishes of the students who retaliated and hundreds of Muslims were massacred. The AASU made it clear to the government that it would need to deal with illegal migration. In 1984, when the new government led by Indira Gandhi’s son, Rajiv Gandhi came to power, it turned its attention to the political turmoil and problems of the Northeast. It signed an agreement with the AASU in 1985 and promised that outsiders who had come to Assam after 1971 would be deported. Promises were made to reopen a nationalised paper mill which had been closed down due to the turmoil, and also about setting up new educational institutions and an oil refinery and helping the Assamese with

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 47 basic infrastructure development. Furthermore, cases against those individuals who had agitated against the state would be dropped. But problems continued as the Bodo tribe continued to feel left out and excluded, and it was very difficult to identify outsiders. Sanjib Baruah writes, ‘the term “foreigners” and controversies surrounding it has been a staple of Assamese politics. Assam’s peculiar demographic dynamics explains this protracted controversy.’58 The so-called foreigner issue is still the root cause of turmoil in the state as it threatens Assamese people with political, social and economic exclusion in their own homeland.59 Meanwhile the AASU has announced its decision ‘to constitute a new regional outfit, Asom Sena, to fight for the protection of the rights of indigenous people.’60 Out of all the insurgent groups, the main one that has spearheaded the militancy in Assam against the Indian state is the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). The ULFA was founded in the year 1979 and has been fighting for independence for Assam since 1979.61 While the ULFA wants an independent Assam, separate demands for autonomy have also been voiced by other ethnic subgroups like the Bodos, Karbis, Dimasa, Koch-Rajbanshi, Rabha, Tiwas and Mishings.62 The ULFA stopped the Indian centre from exploiting regional Assamese resources to suit the needs of people living in the Indian heartland. They led a struggle for liberation to free Assam from the colonial Indian regime. They were in favour of an armed struggle and wanted to turn Assam into a socialist state. They took a tough stand against the repression of the Assamese masses and wanted to have more control over Assam’s regional resources like oil, forests and natural gas. The proposition of autonomous councils led to the reduction of some tension. However, anti-migration feelings and acts of terrorism by the ULFA and the Bodo Volunteer Force kept Assam’s fire blazing. The National Democratic Front of Bodoland was founded in 1986 which wanted to secure a sovereign Bodoland. In the 1980s, the ULFA linked up with rebels from Myanmar. The 1000 mile border which India shares with Myanmar is a porous border and for insurgent groups to cross over has never really been a problem. The Kachin Independence Army in Northern Myanmar provided the ULFA insurgents with training and sold weapons to them. The insurgents also had links with groups in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Recently, the Indian Army confirmed in June 2015 that it had conducted a raid inside Myanmar on camps of rebels operating in India’s Northeastern states in response to an incident which happened five days earlier that killed twenty Indian soldiers.63 Frederic Grare argues ‘Insurgent groups on both sides of the border support each other on the basis of their ethnic affinities and a solidarity emanating from the fact that they all combat the state on their respective sides of the border.’64 ULFA insurgents also maintained bases in Bhutan till 2003 when the Royal Bhutanese Army expelled them through ‘Operation Clear Out.’ ULFA militants have also maintained their bases in Bangladesh. Depending on who is in power, anti-India militants are allowed to survive or are done away with. In recent years, there have been two very powerful

48  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast ladies ruling Bangladesh: Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina. Khaleda Zia has proven to be pro Pakistan and thus allows anti-India militants to operate from Bangladeshi soil to carry out attacks against India since India has very problematic relations with Pakistan as discussed in the Kashmir chapter of this book. Sheikh Hasina is pro India since India helped her father, Sheikh Mujibar Rahman and his party, the Awami League to secede from West Pakistan in 1971. Sheikh Hasina, being pro India has not allowed terrorist groups to exist on Bangladeshi soil to carry out attacks against India. She has cracked down on ULFA leaders like Arabinda Rajkhowa and Bodo separatist, Rajan Daimary. Both were sent to jail in Guwahati. Countries like India, Myanmar, Bhutan and Bangladesh have had talks about opening their borders to improve and strengthen their connectivity, but in actual fact, there is already a connectivity that exists: one of the arms trade, criminal activity, drugs, ongoing militancy and violence. Just as a lot of Naga separatists will not speak or avoid speaking Hindi, which is the national language of India, Assamese insurgent groups also believe in using the Assamese language only. In a recent article, ‘Assam Singer Threat Arrest’ published in the Kolkata based The Telegraph, it was reported that a twenty-two-year-old school dropout had been arrested in connection with a Facebook threat to kill Assamese singer Zubeen Garg who had cut short a performance after some of the organisers told him not to sing Hindi numbers. Recently, Zubeen had been in the news since he walked off the stage after organisers of the Noonmati Bihu Sanmilani, the committee that organises Bihu events, asked him not to sing Hindi songs. The singer had been directed by the ULFA (I) (Independent) to sing songs only in Assamese. The singer, however, objected and made it clear that he would not be dictated to. In a Facebook post that went viral on social media, Tultul Baglary had said he would shoot Zubeen with a 9-mm pistol at a Bihu function in Dibrugarh. Police officers further reported that it was clear from his Facebook account that Baglary liked the posts of ULFA(I) and shared its posts.65 Tripura The situation in Tripura is similar to that of Assam and revolves around demographics, the changing ethno-religious composition of the state and migration from Bangladesh. With the continuous flows of migration from Bangladesh, tribal groups have seen their numbers going down in Tripura. For instance, in 1947, tribal people were 51% of the total. In 1981, they were 28% of the total and in the post 2000 phase, their numbers are much lower. The migration from Bangladesh has paved the way for a Bangladeshi preponderance and this has weakened tribal identity which the local people feel very strongly about. Insurgency in Tripura had reached a peak in the 1970s which had been spearheaded by the Tripura Volunteers Force and the All Tripura People’s Liberation Organisation. The main demands were

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 49 that tribal rights would need to be protected; a need to have immigration controls, tribal land would need to be restored to tribal people, assembly seats would have to be reserved for tribal groups but when concessions were made, Bengalis protested. In the 1980s, there had been an agreement between the Tripura National Volunteers Force and India. According to this agreement, the Tripura National Volunteers would stop supporting insurgents, the government would ensure tribal representation, there would be rehabilitation of insurgents and promises were made by the government that it would foster economic growth and help in infrastructure development. There had also been demands for the carving out of a tribal-state out of the existing state of Tripura and that tribal culture and language had to be protected. However, the insurgency continued and new offshoots of the existing insurgent groups also emerged, and the National Liberation Front of Tripura was in favour of secession. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act The AFSPA had been mentioned earlier which applies to the Indian Northeast. This has been a black mark on India’s democracy for a while now, which gives security personnel the right to shoot people based on their suspicion. ‘Instability has brought the Indian military and paramilitary to Manipur in large numbers where they are protected by the AFSPA, which permits any member of the armed forces to fire even to the causing of death upon individuals acting in contravention of any law or order, carrying weapons or assembling in groups of five or more. Suspects can be detained for 24 hours with unlimited extensions and renewals and members of the armed forces are permitted to enter any premises without a warrant.’66 Security personnel have been given extraordinary powers to deal with the emergency situation in India’s disturbed borderlands which have witnessed high degrees of militancy and political violence for decades. ‘India’s national security strategies have long relied on extraordinary laws, particularly in borderland states which have seen ongoing armed conflict over contested borders.’67 In India, most things like education, administration, justice, the legal system and parliamentary democracy are all based on the British model. The British ruled India for over two hundred years and have most certainly left their legacy behind. This act has been derived from the British Armed Forces Special Ordinance of 1942. In the late 1940s of the previous century, the Indian nationalist movement was at its height so in the early 1940s the British colonial administration needed laws in place which would give security personnel powers to crush and suppress the rising tide of Indian nationalism against British colonial rule. The current AFSPA that came into existence in 1958 is actually based on the 1942 colonial act and is an Indianised version of the 1942 act. Formulated in the year 1958, initially the AFSPA was meant to operate for one year. It is not uniformly applied across the Indian Northeast.68 This goes to show that the levels of

50  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast violence differ from place to place in the Northeast. It only applies to areas that have been classified as ‘disturbed’ especially in the borderlands. As of 2008, much of the Indian Northeast has been classified as disturbed. Entire states of Assam, Manipur and Nagaland have been classified as disturbed. Only Mizoram and Sikkim have not been classified as disturbed. The label, ‘disturbed’ is decided by the Ministry of Home Affairs. Labelling an area as disturbed previously had no limit, but since 1997 this has been challenged by the Naga people’s movement for human rights. Now the label must be reviewed periodically in six-month intervals. Yet there is no limit on the number of times this label can be renewed, which means that some places/ areas can be and have been labelled ‘disturbed’ for years. It is not open to judicial review and cannot be contested by state/local governments or by civil society actors and has often paved the way for more violence, brutality and arbitrary killings, torture and human rights abuses. Much of the insurgency in the Indian Northeast is a response to this repressive act. Although militancy has decreased in some parts, in other parts of the Northeast it has increased as a reaction against this act. The act is ineffective and counterproductive and has made matters worse and yet advocates of this act argue that militancy is proof as to why it needs to be enforced even more. India’s high handedness towards the Northeast is not just expressed through acts like the draconian AFSPA, but state repression also spills over into areas like food/cuisine. There are regular conflicts between people of Northeastern descent and mainstream Indians in India proper over the cooking of certain types of Northeastern food. For instance, akhuni or fermented soyabeans is very popular with people from Nagaland and has a distinct pungent aroma and taste. In India proper, akhuni has regularly caused conflict between akhuni consumers and those who find the smell revolting. In 2007, due to increasing akhuni conflict in New Delhi, the Delhi police produced a handbook that warned students and professionals from the Northeast that they should refrain from cooking akhuni and other fermented foods. ‘Such official directives reiterate how the state plays a significant role in legitimising or prohibiting certain foods that particular social groups in India consume, relegating these communities to a remote position in the national social and culinary order.’69

The current situation Having travelled to the Indian Northeast a few times, I managed to get some primary data and first-hand information by carrying out interviews with local people of north-eastern descent. I carried out most of these interviews in January, 2014 and flew to the Northeast from Kolkata airport. In the first instance, most of the interviews were carried out in Imphal, which is the capital city of Manipur. Kolkata is the most important city in Eastern India, the capital during the times of the British raj, currently a bustling metropolis and also the gateway to the Indian Northeast. Kolkata is the nearest

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 51 major city to the Northeast where a lot of north-eastern people come for jobs and education. On my way to Manipur from Kolkata airport, I got the chance to interview a Manipuri man who was a software engineer travelling on the same flight. He mentioned that the situation was not peaceful and that the insurgency was still very much ongoing. The conflict was not just between the insurgent groups and the regional Manipuri government but also between the insurgent groups and the central government of India based in New Delhi. When I asked him whether or not these insurgent groups wanted independence from India, the answer was both a yes and a no. He also said that many of these insurgents were actually involved in various business deals. When I asked him whether or not he felt welcome in India proper, he said that mainstream Indians were not very friendly or welcoming which is why he chose to spend time with people of his own kind, of Manipuri descent. In this context, he also mentioned that the southern city of Bangalore was better than the capital city, New Delhi.70 A second man mentioned that there was racial discrimination everywhere and he felt that he had been treated well in India especially in Bangalore. He said politically the situation in Manipur was not stable because of the presence of terrorists in different parts of Manipur.71 My third interviewee was an autorickshaw driver who said that the problem was still very much ongoing due to the presence of ‘underground’ elements in Manipur.72 My fourth interviewee who was a waiter in a café at a tourist spot called Lokhtak Lake mentioned that the situation was now peaceful and that tourists could roam around freely.73 My hotel manager also mentioned that the situation had improved and that tourists could roam around freely.74 A waiter at my hotel spoke about the AFSPA and that infiltration from neighbouring Myanmar were burning problems. He spoke about Irom Sharmila who had been on hunger strike as a protest against the draconian act. Since fencing the border between India and Myanmar was a major problem, there had been a constant influx of people into India.75 I got the chance to speak to a Naga man who worked for the armed forces in Kashmir. He mentioned that the situation in Nagaland was comparatively peaceful for the past ten to fifteen years because of the ceasefire. The situation in Manipur was much worse. Insurgents in Manipur fought amongst themselves as they were very divided and fragmented and there were different factional groups. The insurgents also fought against the armed forces. In Nagaland, the conflict was mainly between different factional groups. These different factions had different ideologies. Some were fighting for sovereignty, some for more autonomy and some for more privileges within the existing state structure.76 Another hotel waiter in Imphal, Manipur told me that the problem was still very much ongoing. He mentioned that the ‘underground’ elements wanted to be free and were demanding independence. Their argument

52  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast was that Manipur had actually been free before 1947 and originally had not been a part of India. Although he did not agree with this line of argument and said that he felt very Indian himself. He also spoke about how the insurgent groups were collaborating with the Manipuri government and that this was paving the way for much corruption.77 When I asked a security guard why Imphal in Manipur was so heavily militarised, he mentioned that the presence of security personnel were required due to the presence of ‘underground’ elements and the need to control their activities. Hence constant patrolling of streets was required. The violence had gone down in recent years but it was still there. Problems in Manipur had not been fully resolved and there were sporadic outbursts of violence.78 Another security guard at Kangla, Imphal, mentioned that since the ceasefire, things had calmed down and that things were getting better. There were no problems for tourists he said.79 I spent some time speaking to a local technician who gave me a more detailed account of the situation in Manipur. He mentioned that the government of India gave the regional Manipuri government a lot of money for purposes of infrastructure development which the local Manipuri political elite pocketed themselves. The ‘underground’ elements were still there and they made numerous demands on successful professionals like medical practitioners. These ‘underground’ elements wanted successful professionals to support their organisation and their political ideology. If these professionals chose not to support the militant group, then their security could be at risk. Militants could open fire and could even go to the extent of planting bombs in the houses of such professionals. Once one militant group started making demands, others would follow suit. He concluded by saying despite the tension, the situation in Manipur was still okay. The proof for this, in his opinion, was in the rising number of Biharis in Manipur. They would come in large numbers and do whatever they liked. Bihari people would not be given the same freedom in neighbouring Nagaland where permits are required frequently.80 I got the chance to speak to an army captain who had been stationed in Guwahati in Assam. He mentioned that the problem was not just in Manipur but throughout the Northeast. The problem was because of the presence of ‘negative’ elements. The problem was very much ongoing. These ‘negative’ elements were a mixed group. These mixed groups consisted of tribes and different ethnic groups who were all internal to India. Some of these elements wanted independence from India. He admitted that economically the Indian Northeast was impoverished especially when compared with the rest of India. Many of these insurgent groups actually wanted New Delhi to pay serious attention to the Northeast and start infrastructure developmental work in the area. The violence he said broke out in outbursts. Sometimes the situation seemed calm but on other occasions the situation seemed problematic. In other words, one could not really predict anything with regard

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 53 to the political future of the Indian Northeast. The future was still fraught with a great deal of uncertainty. He concluded that the Indian armed forces were stationed in the Northeast to protect the local people from these menacing elements.81 I carried out a second round of interviews, which were much more detailed than the first set of interviews with a few young men of Manipuri descent and their thoughts are expressed in subsequent text. India as a nation is politically unstable. The frequent change of politicians at the centre and alterations at the level of national politics can actually have an adverse impact on regional level politics. The change in high-level politics tends to delay progress at the regional level. Whichever party has taken over at the centre in New Delhi, this has had an impact on regional Manipuri politics. With regard to the insurgency, there is a great deal of controversy. The insurgency started in the first place because India annexed Manipur during the time of Vallabh Bhai Patel and Maharaj Bodha Chandra. Firstly, Manipur had princely status, then it became a union territory and finally, it was given statehood in 1974. The common people of Manipur were not really favoured by the centre because of the ongoing political turmoil and instability and it was in this context that the insurgency came into existence. The common people like the poor farmers and labourers initially supported the insurgent groups because they felt that the insurgents supported the poor people. However, with the passage of time, as Manipur gained in political stability, the insurgent groups did not have much to do or much to fight for. It was at this stage that the insurgents diverted and changed their plans, aims and objectives. Now the insurgent groups started demanding money from individuals and families and often used force to extract wealth. This was not the case to begin with. For instance, they took away vehicles by force. People started to oppose them and the government took positive steps in enforcing the police department of Manipur and the army in the late 1990s till 2001–2002. It was from this time that the insurgents stopped interacting with the people. The insurgents finally moved away from the cities. They started recruiting new members and this gave rise to a new form of insurgency. Due to the mushrooming of new insurgent groups, there was a lot of factional and internal rivalry. Insurgent groups started fighting one another to further their own interests and agenda. The insurgency today is very much alive. The AFSPA has also caused a great deal of instability in the Northeast. There have been regular strikes or ‘bandhs’ in the Northeast protesting against this draconian act. Travelling, especially by land, has become a huge problem in the Northeast because travellers are often stopped by insurgent groups who demand money. Insurgent groups also charge taxes from travellers. Taxes are also charged when goods are being transported. Vehicles are often forcefully stopped and taxes are charged. In this context, it is worth talking about the ‘gundagari’ charge which is taken by north-eastern insurgents for the transportation of goods in the area. Manipur has always experienced transportation problems due

54  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast to the lack of good railways and roads. The two major highways are the Imphal-Silchor highway and the Imphal-Guwahati highway. The safest way to get to Manipur is by flying, and then one can easily avoid the insurgents. Economically, Manipur is struggling and unemployment levels are very high and poverty is very entrenched. The impact and influence of insurgents may have gone down in recent years but some of the clauses associated with the AFSPA also need to be removed. The whole act does not need to be removed as Manipur is a border state and there is constant influx of migrants from both Bangladesh and Myanmar. The increase in population has made competition very fierce. The men associated with the Indian Army are not very educated and take advantage of the AFSPA. For the Indian Army, almost every local is an insurgent or a terrorist. Women have been involved in the insurgency and have been raped on regular occasions by the Indian Army and security personnel. The local people do not see the army as very friendly. The men associated with the Indian Army do not mix with the local people although they say that they are friends of the hill people. There should be more interaction and exchange of ideas between the army and the local people so that the people understand the duties of the army and the army has a better understanding of local culture and the Manipuri way of life. In 2000, in a place called Malom, ten people were killed by the Indian army and they have not been punished or brought to justice. This was when Irom Sharmila went on hunger strike and started to protest since innocent people were being targeted and killed. There was so much outrage after this incident that numerous protests, strikes and bandhs took place after the incident. The chaos and turmoil went on for almost a year. This caused a lot of instability and also had an adverse impact on education and students landed up losing one full academic year. With regard to the role played by neighbouring countries in the insurgency, there are rumours that both China and Myanmar deliver weapons directly to the insurgents to fight against the Indian Army especially in places like Sajik tampak. Local Manipuri people cross the Indo-Burmese border on a daily basis just by paying a sum of money to border security officials.82 My next set of interviews was carried out with two Manipuri men together. This is what they had to say about the situation: politics in Manipur is very strongly linked with corruption. People cannot choose the right leader because of this entrenched corruption. People have no real voters’ rights. In Manipur, voters’ rights are equal to money power. If one has money, then one also has political power. It is difficult to get jobs in Manipur which is why Manipuri people like us have to leave Manipur and come to other Indian states like West Bengal. To be able to work in Manipur, one has to pay a lot of money to the members of legislative assembly. There is still the presence of strong underground terrorist elements in Manipur. Some of these groups want to be a separate country and not a part of India. There are about thirty to forty insurgent groups across the Northeast and in Manipur. In Manipur, the insurgent groups are all mixed up. In this connection, it is worth

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 55 mentioning the Kuki National Front, the Kuki National Organisation and the United Liberation Front. These groups are still very active. The United Liberation Front thinks about winning independence for the motherland. The insurgent groups think that the centre does not look after Manipur very well. The Indian Army and the Assam Rifles have taken advantage of the AFSPA. Raping of women has been a regular occurrence. The situation today is of course better than what it used to be a few years ago. Weapons for the insurgents come through a small market town called Moreh which is on the Indo-Burmese border. Since the insurgency is still ongoing, New Delhi has a duty of looking after Manipur better.83 I was able to gather some more data after a field trip to India in July of 2014. These were my final set of interviews which had a special focus on the voices of students. Students have often played a key role in protest movements in the Northeast, protesting against what they perceived as Indian repression. For instance, we have already spoken about the AASU. Student bodies, particularly the AASU, have played a key role in shaping Assamese nationalism.84 All my interviewees were ethnically of northeastern origin, and from different parts of the Indian Northeast. Many of these north-eastern people come to the Scottish Church College of Kolkata to study, which is where I carried out most of the interviews on this occasion. The college, which comes under the University of Calcutta, is one of the few colleges in India to have a large number of their seats reserved for people of north-eastern origin. Kolkata is a major city in Eastern India, the capital of West Bengal, and is a fast-developing metropolis which is often seen as the gateway to the Indian Northeast. I got the opportunity to carry out these interviews in Kolkata with these people from the Northeast and their thoughts are expressed in below-given text. My first interviewee mentioned that Manipur was very corrupt. There is a great deal of terrorism going on there. He also hinted at the high levels of corruption. He mentioned that even after one clears one’s exams, it is difficult to get jobs and one has to pay government officials to get into the civil service. Nagaland managed to get government funding from the centre, but a large part of these government funds, which were supposed to be used for infrastructure development, went into the pockets of local politicians in the Northeast. He went on to say that Guwahati, which is one of the main cities of Assam, is probably the only city which can be considered as fast developing, unlike the other cities in the region. There are military commanders especially men associated with the Border Security Force and the Central Reserve Police Force, who are constantly patrolling the region. There is a strong presence of the military and paramilitary forces especially in Manipur, and the situation is quite scary at night. If there is a rally or a public protest (against the ongoing injustices and oppression) by the local people, the security forces often fire into the sky to scare the local people or protesters away and to disperse the crowd. For instance, a lot of firing took place in an area called Churachandpur, Manipur. Despite police brutality, this

56  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast interviewee maintained that the presence of security personnel has helped to some extent. The problem in the region is often caused by ‘underground elements’. But after these ‘underground elements’ are caught and once they surrender themselves to the security forces, they are actually given jobs. The Khuga dam area in Manipur is a heavily militarised region and most of the security personnel stationed there are ex-terrorists. The same interviewee also mentioned how marginalised north-eastern people felt when they were in India proper. He mentioned about Nido, the young man from Arunachal Pradesh who was beaten to death in New Delhi in early 2014. After this incident, there were many protests all over India. People of north-eastern origin in places like Safdarjung in New Delhi had been asked to move out. Finally, my interviewee spoke about the racism that they were all subjected to in India proper. He said mainstream Indians often call us ‘Chinki’ which is an offensive term to use—somewhat similar to the word ‘Paki’ in Great Britain, which is often used by racists for people of South Asian descent. He ended on a slightly more positive note, saying that not everybody was racist. The people of Kolkata, he mentioned, were quite friendly.85 My second interviewee mentioned that the economy in Manipur was very poor and that there were constant strikes or ‘bandhs.’86 My third interviewee mentioned that the economic situation in most parts of the Northeast was bad. He spoke about the Mizo National Front, a political party which had tried fighting for independence from India in the 1960s, but the central government had successfully crushed the movement. The plans and aims of the Mizo National Front were not fully known. The Mizo people and the Naga people from Nagaland share the same faith: Christianity. The same interviewee mentioned that the insurgency in the Indian Northeast is still active, although it may not be a big threat. In Nagaland, the NSCN is one of the main insurgent groups. There are also pro-independence groups operating from across the border, from places like China and Myanmar. However, most Naga people, he mentioned want to be a part of India. The same interviewee spoke about racism and how mainstream Indians would make fun of people of north-east origin. However, he also mentioned that the Delhi Police were looking into this. There was a special branch of the Delhi Police that looked after the Northeastern region, so if people had any complaints, they could go to this particular branch of the Delhi Police to get their voices heard. The AFSPA still exists and applies to places like Manipur and Kashmir. The Act is unjust and is similar to the Rowlatt Act during the times of British rule in India. This right gives the army the power to shoot an individual if he is suspected to be a terrorist. Irom Sharmila has protested against this act and has been on hunger strike for a while now, as a part of the protest. In this context of the AFSPA, my interviewee spoke about the Assam Rifles which is a branch of the Indian paramilitary forces that consisted of a mixed group of people from different parts of India. Sometimes, the jawans or military personnel rape women. Moving away from the politics of the

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 57 region, the same interviewee spoke about the other factors like the environmental factors which had complicated the situation further. During the monsoons, for instance, buildings often collapsed and there are frequent landslides. There are also major problems with water and water scarcity. Moving away from the general scene of the Northeast, he chose to speak more specifically about the situation in Manipur. In Manipur, there are different tribes and races, the largest one being the Meitei. Others include the Hmar, Kuki, Thado, the Nagas and so on. Different groups have different motives. They may have the mindset of terrorists or they may not. This has led to much violence in Manipur. The Kukis want another state. They call this state Kukiland, similar to the Telengana region in South India. Thado tribes want more autonomy. The Naga people living in Manipur want to move out of Manipur. Most Naga people live on the borders between Nagaland and Manipur. My interviewee strongly believed that the cause of problems in Manipur was due to the presence of too many different tribes who wanted too many different things, which were often in conflict with each other. There were too many different mindsets. Moving away from the situation in Manipur, my interviewee spoke a bit about neighbouring Mizoram. Mizoram is a peaceful state in contrast to Manipur. The National Democratic Alliance gave a peace bonus to Mizoram during the time of Atal Bihari Vajpayee. There is no army duty in Mizoram. The peace comes from the strong presence of Christianity in Mizoram. Finally, the same man spoke a bit about the situation in Nagaland. The NSCN, he maintained, was a minority and they do not really have a loud voice. Muivah, the leader of Naga nationalism, has tried to free the Naga people from India. Twenty to thirty years from now, the NSCN will disappear. They are already a minority, and very small numbers of Naga people have faith in them and their aims. Muivah does not have many followers, and when he dies, the NSCN movement will fizzle out. He ended by saying that feelings of isolation and alienation are still very high amongst people of the Northeast.87 My fourth interviewee mentioned that there are different ethnic tribes in Manipur. Some are fighting for better lives, and the political equilibrium changes from time to time. Many are demanding a better economic status. Each state within the north-eastern region has a distinct political situation. The political situation differs from place to place within the region. The presence of security forces is very much necessary. When there is turmoil in the region, which the regional government cannot control, help from the central government is required. Even now the situation is problematic in places like Assam and Manipur. Underground elements want better political status. They make their demands to both the regional government as well as to the central government. The rebel groups themselves are also very much divided.88 My fifth interviewee mentioned that the situation in Tripura was unstable. There have been riots in recent times. Levels of corruption are very

58  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast high, and political leaders provide money to villagers so that they can win votes. Political leaders give them money, but the voters or villagers are not sure of what the results will be. Terrorism existed a few years ago, but today the situation seems to be a lot better. There was tension between different ethnic groups. He mentioned that the Chakmas did not get citizenship in Arunachal Pradesh. The thirteenth hearing is going on at the High Court in Guwahati, and the granting of citizenship is expected this year or next year. Chakmas currently have no state, and the Mizos are controlling the Chakmas. There are NGOs working for Chakma rights, but the Chakmas still do not have full rights and are not very educated. The origin of the Chakmas is in Bangladesh and they mainly practise Buddhism. There is some tension between the Mizo people and the Chakmas.89 My sixth interviewee mentioned that insurgent groups like the NSCN are operating and active in two districts of Arunachal Pradesh: Tirap and Changlang. The other districts of Arunachal Pradesh are, however, peaceful. This interviewee mentioned that during his stay in Manipur from 2003 till 2010, he had witnessed militancy in the form of bombing, explosives and grenades. The situation in Manipur was tensed. By comparison, Arunachal Pradesh was peaceful.90 My seventh interviewee interestingly spoke to me about the situation in Meghalaya (which is generally considered to be a peaceful state in the Northeast like Mizoram), but he had a different story to tell. He started by saying that the situation in Meghalaya was politically unstable. The law and order situation is fast deteriorating. He spoke about the rise of insurgency in the Garo Hills of Meghalaya. He mentioned that the centre, New Delhi, was not interested in peace talks but was only interested in taking action against the insurgency. The problem is still very much ongoing. Politicians in the region are corrupt and the insurgents in Meghalaya maintain strong connections with other insurgent groups from other Indian states like the ULFA and the NSCN and also with groups in Bangladesh. The Garo National Liberation Army is currently causing trouble in Meghalaya. Generally one would regard Meghalaya as a peaceful state, but the insurgents cause problems, especially in the more remote areas. Their main aim is to carve out a separate state called Garoland. The three main communities in Meghalaya are the Khasi, the Garo and the Jaintia. There is tension between these communities and many want a separate government. Kidnapping, extortion and killing are regular occurrences. The capital city, Shillong, is comparatively peaceful. Most governments cannot finish the full five-year term and they do not last for very long. Governments in the Northeast tend to break up after 2–2.5 years and corruption is entrenched. When it comes to the general economic situation and infrastructure, Meghalaya is better off than places Nagaland and Manipur. He ended by saying, although there is a strong presence of the police especially the Central Reserve Police Force, one hardly gets to hear of insurgents being arrested.91

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 59 My eighth interviewee was a Naga man who mentioned that the situation in Nagaland is currently peaceful and that although he looked different from mainstream Indians, he still felt a sense of oneness with India.92 My ninth interviewee mentioned that insurgents don’t feel ‘Indian.’ They don’t feel that they are a part of India. They feel that they should have their own government. The insurgency is still active but only in places like the outskirts of Manipur. He mentioned that the ‘underground’ elements hated the Indian military. This is because the underground elements want their own country, but the military was stopping them.93 My tenth interviewee was from Jalpaiguri in North Bengal, which is close to Bodoland in Assam. This interviewee was a Bodo himself. He mentioned that due to the problems in Bodoland in Assam, he and his family were forced to move out of Assam to North Bengal. Bodos have been struggling to get their own land which they call Bodoland, but they have not been very successful. Generally, Muslims and people of other racial/ religious backgrounds tend to feel very marginalised in the villages which tend to have a dominant Bodo presence, and often they leave. My interviewee maintained that although Assam had achieved a certain degree of normalcy, the situation was still quite dangerous. Bodo people feel that they have a distinct culture which needs to be preserved and they want to rule the land themselves. They want to have their own government. Some of the members of the ULFA are Bodos. The situation now of course is a lot better. Currently, the ULFA is silent, but they can be active at any time. The ULFA has been working for Bodoland.94 My eleventh interviewee was also a Bodo man. He was from Alipur Duar in North Bengal, which again is also close to Bodoland in Assam. He mentioned that the main point in the conflict was with Bangladeshi Muslims, particularly over the question of land ownership. Before the arrival of Bangladeshi people, land belonged to the Bodos. Most Bodo people are farmers, so they obviously need the land. But after the arrival of Bangladeshi people into the region, Bangladeshis also want rights over land and this has only added more fuel to the conflict. The problem has not been fully resolved yet. It is a work in progress.95 My twelfth and final interviewee was a young man from Mizoram. He started by saying that except Mizoram, there was insurgency throughout the Northeast and that many of these insurgents actually had influence over the regional governments, especially in Manipur. The border regions of Assam are particularly dangerous, especially villages like Kalain. The border regions of Assam with other neighbouring Northeastern states is a hotbed of insurgency in the sense that people are robbed on a regular basis and vehicles are stopped and searched by the insurgents. On one occasion, whilst my interviewee was travelling in the region by car, the insurgents stopped the car by placing a massive piece of wood on the road to prevent the car from going any further. My interviewee and the other passengers were searched and robbed. My interviewee mentioned if the passengers

60  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast did not give up their valuables, then all sorts of atrocities would begin to take place. He said that although the government of Mizoram was trying to protect people and passengers, they did not have control over the areas which fell out of the Mizo border. The Assamese government did not pay much attention to these issues of security in the borders. This incident happened to my interviewee in the month of December in 2011. Land transport had become a major problem in the Northeast because of the insurgency. With regard to Mizoram in particular, my interviewee spoke about the problems between the Bru refugees from Bangladesh and the local Mizo people. The Bru people occupy parts of Mizoram and have demanded an autonomous region. They have been accepted as citizens of India and also as Mizo. If the Bru people follow the Mizo government and its rules and if they abide by the law, they will then be entitled to certain facilities like rice, safe drinking water etc. Many have accepted these terms and conditions offered by the Mizo government, but some have also refused to accept the offer. Some amongst the Bru people have been known to kidnap Mizo people, keeping them in the forests and demanding money from the Mizo government. This problem has been going on for a while and still has not been fully resolved.96

Ethnic nationalism in the Indian Northeast From the above discussion, it is now quite clear that one of the most obvious features of the conflict in the Indian Northeast is the presence of separatist ethnic nationalism. Apart from the prominent insurgent groups like the ULFA, the UNLF and the NSCN, other groups which have had a strong separatist nationalist agenda include the Dima Halam Daogah (DHD) in Assam.97 Insurgency in the Indian Northeast started primarily with the Naga tribes, whose movement can be traced back to 1918 with the formation of the Naga Club. In the year 1946, the Naga National Council was formed and declared independence in 1947. The movement turned violent in the fifties and is still active under the NSCN and the numerous factional groups associated with it. For sixty-four years, the Naga struggle for sovereignty has been based on the idea of ‘urrauvie’ which means ‘our land belongs to us.’ Over the years, a collective sense of identity has been instilled and the idea of sovereignty based on Naga historical rights and cultural identity has become real. Warring factions created a sovereignty hyperbole, something akin to Kashmir’s azadi where the fight was about ‘all or nothing’ and the cause that justified the violence was sovereignty.98 In Manipur, two very prominent separatist armed groups include the Revolutionary People’s Front and its armed wing, the People’s Liberation Army, not to be confused with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army. Both these groups have been involved in an armed struggle since the 1970s.99 The radical turn in Assamese nationalism can be easily linked with the arrival and huge flows of

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 61 migration from former East Pakistan or present-day Bangladesh. Even after 1947, ‘Assam continued to bear the burden of accommodating people coming from outside. The immediate aftermath of partition witnessed large scale Hindu refugees from East Pakistan entering Assam for shelter.’100 Assamese nationalism or jatiotabad found expression in the Assam Movement (1979–1986) and afterwards found expression through the ULFA.101 As mentioned earlier, Assamese nationalism has also been sharpened by the AASU. ‘Historically, the nationalistic movements have largely been taking place in Assam with the emergence of the educated middle class.’102 There have also been violent protests against the central government when the centre has tried to remove regional resources like crude oil from Assam to Bihar. This was not only seen as exploitative but New Delhi’s attempt to make the needs of Assamese people subservient to the needs and interests of people living in India proper. Recent incidents like the case of Assamese singer, Zubeen Garg, not being allowed to sing songs in Hindi at Bihu cultural festivals shows us that Assamese nationalism can also be seen as or termed as a form of linguistic nationalism as the Assamese language is the main binding force behind the formation of ethnic Assamese identity and solidarity. Patgiri writes, ‘the demand for self-determination for Assam can be seen as a result of the sense of belonging to the distinct Assamese nation, and existence of some threats, real or perceived, to the Assamese nation.’103 Other factors which have contributed to the strengthening of Assamese nationalism include Assam’s geographical isolation from the Indian core, the lack of visibility of Assam in the mainstream Indian media and national discourse, and the huge communication gap which exists between New Delhi and Assam. Factors like geographical insularity, a communication gap between the centre and the Northeast and the absence of the Northeast in the mainstream national discourse also apply to Manipur and Nagaland. In other words, these factors have strengthened Manipuri and Naga nationalisms.

The human rights situation India has a rights based constitution, adopted in 1950, that follows the international bill of human rights and recognises these rights at various levels. ‘The value of human rights not only gets reflected in the Preamble of the Constitution but also extensively gets included in chapter III as Fundamental Rights which are basically civil and political in nature and in chapter IV as Directive Principles of State Policy dealing with economic, social and cultural rights which are also recognised as fundamental to the governance of the country.’104 However, the situation has been different when it comes to the Northeast. The Indian state has been, quite frankly speaking, very indifferent and insensitive to the entire Northeast when it comes to human rights issues mainly because the Northeast is a conflict-ridden area. ‘People

62  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast of the Northeast frequently witness gross violations of human rights in the form of violation of the right to life, violation of the right to human dignity and physical security and violation of the right to equal protection of laws and violation of the right to freedom of expression.’105 The situation has been made worse by the imposition of the AFSPA of 1958, National Security Act of 1980, and the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act of 1987. These acts collectively have paved the way for all sorts of human rights abuses to take place. Some of the very basic human rights which are totally ignored in this part of the country include the right to life, the right to live with dignity, the right to equal treatment and not to be discriminated against, the right to freedom from fear and torture and wrongful arrest, the right to a fair trial and right to free speech. The Indian state (through the army and other paramilitary forces) has been involved in acts of violence supposedly to protect India’s territorial integrity. Due to the insurgency and subsequent operations by security forces, women often have to live in constant fear. Violence against women has often been used by the military and security forces to break the morale of the insurgents in the Northeast. Cases of rape and molestation happen on a regular basis. Caught between the state and insurgents, women have lost their children, spouses and other members of the family. Once they lose their husbands, the responsibility of looking after the family and earning money falls upon these women. Such acts of violations and denial of rights often go unreported and unaddressed.106

The Indian Northeast and external connections Insurgent groups in the Northeast took their initial training in guerrilla warfare from the Chinese, received weapons from China and have also maintained bases in both Myanmar and Bangladesh to carry out acts of terrorism to destabilise India. Goswami writes, ‘China’s experience in guerrilla warfare became a great attraction to the North Eastern insurgent groups.’107 Naga rebel groups in the past have often been helped by Kachin rebel groups in contemporary Myanmar. Both these communities share a sense of identification and oneness with each other since they are both predominantly Christian fighting against an oppressive Hindu core in India and a Buddhist core in the case of Myanmar. They also share ethnic commonalities. Both groups also share affinities because they have similar political aspirations and have been involved in acts of secession trying to break away from a Hindu dominated India and a Buddhist dominated Myanmar. ‘Interestingly, the 1961 Kachin insurgency’s sophistication in jungle warfare (largely grown out of their World War II experience) skills spread rapidly.’108 Subsequently, the Kachin Independence Organisation became one of the most ardent trainers of groups like the NSCN and the ULFA. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Bangladesh’s Directorate of Field Intelligence have also supported ULFA’S anti-India activities.

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 63 Insurgency has been possible because of easy access to weapons which tend to be manufactured and come from the Southern Yunnan province in China. In the early years shortly after India’s independence in 1947, nearly a thousand Naga rebels made it through the hills and jungles of Northern Burma to China, where they received military training and were sent back to India, equipped with assault rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers and other modern Chinese weapons. Insurgents on both sides tend to exploit the porous nature of the Indo-Burmese border, ‘which is subject to a 16 km wide Free Movement Regime that allows tribal groups to maintain contact with kin across the border without visas.’109 The situation, however, is very complicated because of Chinese involvement in these insurgencies. Chinese involvement in these insurgencies has evolved with time from actively supporting these insurgent groups to using the insurgencies for intelligence gathering. Reducing Chinese espionage in the Northeast is undoubtedly a requirement for India to crack down on the insurgent groups. It should also be noted that ‘a substantial part of the small arms that feed insurgent movements in India’s Northeast are still said to come from arms manufacturing companies based in the Yunnan province.’110 These small arms are then of course distributed through Myanmar and Bangladesh by Burmese insurgent groups like the Kachin Independence Army, the Karen National Union and the United Wa State Army. Because China seems to be the key to the availability of weapons thereby keeping these insurgencies alive and active, Chinese cooperation would also be required to put these militant movements to an end.

Conclusion In recent years, India has decided not to grant further autonomy to the states in the Northeast. The more autonomy India grants to the Northeastern states, New Delhi looks weaker. There is a fear amongst leaders in New Delhi that if the centre carries on giving more autonomy to the Northeast this will then have a domino effect. Other peripheral states in India might start demanding more autonomy and this could potentially pave the way for the disintegration of the country. New Delhi has made it clear to the Northeast that it should not be making unreasonable demands for autonomy or independence. This is because the Northeast is impoverished as a region within India and hence hugely dependent on India proper for economic support. Will the Northeast really be able to survive on its own without Indian financial support? The answer is a clear no. What one really needs to look at is the quality of independence. If the Northeast did secede from India it would not have access to the sea and would be landlocked. Thus it would not be able to carry out maritime trade which in turn would have an adverse knock-on effect on its economy which is already strained. Furthermore, in a post-secession situation, it would be

64  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast surrounded by hostile powers like China.111 This would place it in a very vulnerable position. There is a fear amongst the ethnic minority groups residing in the Northeast that if they do not take a tough stand against New Delhi then their future will soon pass into the hands of the majority Hindu population in the Indian heartland. ‘It is a sensitive area, struggling at one level with the dominance of central government policy, and the exploitation of a largely outsider entrepreneurial class, and at another level with issues of ethnicity and identity within the region, as tribals seek to get their share of development and resources.’112 Racial discrimination and acts of racism directed against people of north-eastern descent has become a major issue in contemporary India. This happens especially when people of north-eastern descent come to India proper for purposes of employment and education. The Kolkata based newspaper, The Telegraph, recently reported, ‘a college student from Arunachal Pradesh was allegedly assaulted by his landlord in Bangalore and made to lick his shoes for misuse of water from the overhead tank that often ran dry.’113 After recent attacks on African nationals in the greater Noida area, the demand for an anti-racism law has grown much louder and stronger amongst people of north-eastern descent. ‘A special unit Delhi police set up in 2014 to help people from the Northeast has registered more than 500 cases of rape, molestation and harassment by colleagues and landlords, most of which have been attributed to racial discrimination.’114 In the region itself, repression and alienation have fed off each other and state machinery has failed to operate. Rakhee Bhattacharya writes, ‘conflicts and deprivation are inter-connected. Deprivation has many causal links to violence, although these have to be carefully examined. Conversely wars kill people, destroy trust among them, increase poverty and crime and slow down the economy.’115 The place is insecure and travelling by land can often be fraught with peril and uncertainty since insurgent groups roam around freely demanding for money. India has tried winning the hearts and minds of the people by economic packages but sadly these economic packages or the benefits of it have not reached the local people at the grassroots due to high levels of corruption existing amongst local politicians and administrators at the regional level. The AFSPA needs to be removed urgently. As a democracy India has a responsibility of looking after its ethnic minority citizens. Some argue that when compared with neighbouring countries like China, the levels of violence in India’s periphery is much less because being a democracy India is constrained by constitutional liberalism. In other words, the violence in India’s periphery when compared with the Chinese periphery is somewhat calibrated. Whilst the violence may be less when compared with authoritarian China, much more needs to be done in terms of demilitarisation, economic development and political transparency. Finally, voices of the regional/local people need to be incorporated in the decision-making process.

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 65

Notes

1. E.D. Maaker & V. Joshi, ‘Introduction: The Northeast and Beyond: Region and Culture’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 30(3), 2007, p. 381. 2. P. Sonwalkar, ‘Mediating Otherness: India’s English Language Press and the Northeast’, Contemporary South Asia, 13(4), 2004, p. 393. 3. K. Mukherjee, ‘India’s Fractured Northeastern Frontier: An Overview’, Asia Pacific Review, 21(2), 2014, p. 162. 4. N. Goswami, ‘Making Sense of Insurgencies in North-East India: An Overview’, in S. Dutt and A. Bansal, eds, South Asian Security: 21st Century Discourses, Routledge: London/NY, 2012, p. 179. 5. C.K. Sharma, ‘Immigration, Indigeneity, and Identity: The Bangladeshi Immigration Question in Assam’, in D. Gogoi, ed, Unheeded Hinterland: Identity and Sovereignty in Northeast India, Routledge: New Delhi, London, NY, 2016, p. 89. 6. K. Adeney and A. Wyatt, Contemporary India, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke/NY, 2010, p. 40. 7. F. Rajkumar, Rainbow People: Reinventing Northeast India, Manas Publications: New Delhi, 2011, p. 64. 8. T. Myint-U, Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia, Faber and Faber: London, 2011, p. 272. 9. N. Farrelly, ‘AK 47/M16 Rifle-Rs. 15,000 Each: What Price Peace on the Indo-Burmese Frontier’, Contemporary South Asia, 17(3), 2009, p. 284. 10. Participant observation in Darjeeling, north Bengal and the Northeast, India, January, April, August, December, 2019. 11. T. Thong, ‘Thy Kingdom Come: The Impact of Colonization and Proselytization on Religion among the Nagas’ Journal of Asian and African Studies, 45(6), 2010, p. 599. 12. B. Lintner, Great Game East: India, China and the Struggle for Asia’s Most Volatile Frontier, Harper Collins Publishers India, Noida, 2012, pp. 47–48. 13. T. Thong, ‘Thy Kingdom Come: The Impact of Colonization and Proselytization on Religion among the Nagas’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 45(6), December 2010, p. 600. 14. Thong, JAAS, 45(6), December 2010, p. 599. 15. D. McDuie-Ra, ‘Is India Racist?’ Murder, Migration and Mary Kom, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38(2), 2015, p. 307. 16. D. McDuie-Ra, ‘Is India Racist?’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38(2), 2015, pp. 313–314. 17. D. McDuie-Ra, ‘Is India Racist?’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38(2), 2015, p. 314. 18. D. McDuie-Ra, ‘Is India Racist?’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38(2), 2015, p. 315. 19. Participant observation by the author, August, 2019, Flight from Bagdogra Airport to Kolkata. 20. Author’s lived experience in Britain as a visible minority of South Asian descent. 21. Author’s experience of living in Kolkata as a student for five years at the Scottish Church College of Calcutta and Presidency College, now Presidency University, Kolkata, 1998-2003. 22. S. Karmakar, ‘Attacks on Africans spark demand: Northeast Cry for Anti-Racism Law’, The Telegraph, Kolkata, 8th April 2017, p. 8. 23. S. Hazarika, Strangers No More: New Narratives from India’s Northeast, Aleph Book Company: New Delhi, 2018, pp. 266–267. 24. Interview carried out by the author at Kolkata Airport, 21st December 2018.

66  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 25. W. Hussain, ‘Ethno-Nationalism and the Politics of Terror in India’s Northeast’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 30(1), 2007, p. 93. 26. T. Haokip, ‘The Kuki-Naga Conflict in the Light of Recent Publications’, South Asia Research, 33(1), 2013, p. 78. 27. N. Goswami, ‘Making Sense of Insurgencies in North-East India: An Overview’, in S. Dutt and A. Bansal, eds, South Asian Security: 21st Century Discourses, Routledge: London/NY, 2012, p. 188. 28. S. Gupta, The Himalayan Face off: Chinese Assertion and Indian Riposte, Hachette Publishing India: Gurgaon, 2014, p. 17. 29. R. Bhattacharya, ‘Small Arms Proliferation in the North-East: The Chinese Connection’, in K.S. Subramanian, ed, Security, Governance and Democratic Rights, Niyogi Books: New Delhi, 2014, p. 119. 30. B. Rogers, Burma: A Nation at the Crossroads, Rider Books: London, 2012/2015, p. 105. 31. D. McDuie-Ra, ‘Vision 2020 or Re-vision 1958: The Contradictory Politics of Counter-Insurgency in India’s Regional Engagement’, Contemporary South Asia, 17(3), 2009, p. 315. 32. S. Hazarika, Rites of Passage: Border Crossings, Imagined Homelands, India’s East and Bangladesh, Penguin Books: New Delhi, 2000, p. 188. 33. A. Subramaniam, India’s Wars: A Military History, HarperCollins: Noida, India, 2016, p. 207. 34. I. Holliday, Burma Redux: Global Justice and the Quest for Political Reform in Myanmar, Columbia University Press: New York, 2011, p. 26. 35. S. Hazarika, Strangers of the Mist: Tales of War and Peace from India’s Northeast, Penguin: New Delhi, 1994/2011, p. 44. 36. K. Mukherjee, ‘The Conflict in the Indian North-East’, Defence Studies: Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, 14(2), 2014, p. 127. 37. S. Tucker, Burma: The Curse of Independence, Pluto Press: London, 2001, p. 21. 38. P.S. Prasad & P.K. Sinha, Tribal Movements and Politics in India, Anmol Publications: New Delhi, 2012, p. 186. 39. A. Robinson, India: A Short History, Thames and Hudson: London, 2014, p. 200. 40. T. Thong, ‘Thy Kingdom Come: The Impact of Colonization and Proselytization on Religion among the Nagas’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 45(6), 2010, p. 597. 41. L. Longkumer, ‘Conflict, Democratic Rights, and Peace in Nagaland’, in K.S. Subramanian, ed, Security, Governance and Democratic Rights: Essays on the North-East, Niyogi Books: New Delhi, 2014, p. 222. 42. C. Singh, North-East India: Politics and Insurgency, Manas Publications: New Delhi, 2007, p. 222. 43. K. Mukherjee, ‘Insurgency and Peace building in the Northeast Indian State of Manipur’, Democracy and Security, 13(3), 2017, p. 226. 44. K. Thockchom, ‘Blockade on Manipur Mind’, The Telegraph, Kolkata, India, 4th March 2017, p. 9. 45. B.G. Karlsson & D. Kikon, ‘Wayfinding: Indigenous Migrants in the Service Sector of Metropolitan India’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 40(3), 2017, p. 447. 46. D.P. Mehrotra, Burning Bright: Irom Sharmila and the Struggle for Peace in Manipur, Penguin: New Delhi, 2009, p. 56. 47. R. Guha, India after Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy, Macmillan: London, 2007, p. 259. 48. J. Mall, ‘Naga Terrorists in League with Politicians’, in R. Sinha, ed, Secular India: Politics of Minorityism, Vitasta: New Delhi, 2012, p. 112. 49. B. Lintner, Great Game East: India, China and the Struggle for Asia’s Most Volatile Frontier, HarperCollins India: Noida, 2012, p. 42.

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 67 50. D. Ludden, India and South Asia: A Short History, Oneworld: London, 2002, p. 282. 51. J. Parratt and S.A. Parratt, ‘A New Beginning? Manipur State Elections: 2002’, South Asia Research, 23(1), 2003, p. 99. 52. L.L.K. Piang, ‘Overlapping Territorial Claims and Ethnic Conflict in Manipur’, South Asia Research, 35(2), 2015, p. 160. 53. N. Haksar, Across the Chicken’s Neck: Travels in Northeast India, Rainlight Rupa Publications: New Delhi, 2013, pp. 156–157. 54. T. Ngaihte, ‘Armed Forces in India’s Northeast: A Necessity Review’, South Asia Research, 35(3), 2015, p. 369. 55. K. Thockchom, ‘90-Vote Irom Quits Politics’, The Telegraph, Kolkata, India, 12th March 2017, p. 8. 56. Our Special Correspondent, ‘Manipur Rebel Held in Delhi’, The Telegraph, Kolkata, India, 13th January 2017, p. 6. 57. P. Singh, Kohima to Kashmir: On the Terrorist Trail, Rupa Publications: New Delhi, 2001, p. 152. 58. S. Baruah, ‘Separatist Militants and Contentious Politics in Assam, India’, Asian Survey, XLIX(6), November/December 2009, p. 953. 59. R.K. Nanavatty, Internal Armed Conflict in India: Forging a Joint CivilMilitary Approach, Pentagon Press: New Delhi, 2013, p. 44. 60. S. Dutt, India in a Globalised World, Manchester University Press: Manchester/NY, 2006, p. 89. 61. J. Andrews, The World in Conflict: Understanding the World’s Troublespots, The Economist/Profile Books: London, 2015, p. 241. 62. S.G. Sabhlok, ‘Civil Society and Development: Between Peace and Insurgency in the Northeast’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 32(3), December 2009, p. 506. 63. T.C. Schaffer and H.B. Schaffer, India at the Global High Table: The Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy, HarperCollins: Noida, India, 2016, p. 292. 64. G. Grare, India Turns East: International Engagement and US-China Rivalry, Penguin Viking/Random House India: Gurgaon, 2017, p. 94. 65. A. Chakraborty, ‘Assam Singer Threat Arrest’, The Telegraph, Kolkata, India, 23rd April 2017, p. 7. 66. D. McDuie-Ra, ‘Is India Racist? Murder, Migration and Mary Kom’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38(2), 2015, p. 307. 67. M. Encinas, ‘Migrant Rights and Extraordinary Law in India: The Cases of Assam and Jammu and Kashmir’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 40(3), 2017, p. 463. 68. D. McDuie-Ra, ‘Fifty Year Disturbance: The Armed Forces Special Powers Act and Exceptionalism in a South Asian Periphery’, Contemporary South Asia, 17(3), 2009, p. 258. 69. D. Kikon, ‘Fermenting Modernity: Putting Akhuni on the Nation’s Table in India’, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38(2), 2015, pp. 320–335. 70. First interview carried out by author at Kolkata Airport, India, 2nd January 2014. 71. Interview carried out by the author at Kolkata Airport, India, 2nd January 2014. 72. Interview carried out by the author at Imphal, Manipur, India, 2nd January 2014. 73. Interview carried out by author at Moirang, Manipur, India, 2nd January 2014. 74. Interview carried out by author at Imphal, Manipur, India, 2nd January 2014. 75. Interview carried out by the author at Imphal, Manipur, India, 2nd January 2014 76. Interview carried out by the author in Srinagar, Kashmir, India, 21st December 2013. 77. Interview carried out by the author in Imphal, Manipur, India, 3rd January 2014.

68  Insurgency in the Indian Northeast

78. Interview carried out by author in Imphal, Manipur, 3rd January 2014. 79. Interview carried out by the author in Imphal, Manipur, 3rd January 2014. 80. Interview carried out by author, Imphal, Manipur, 4th January 2014. 81. Interview carried out by author, at Imphal Airport, Manipur, India, 4th January 2014 82. Interview carried out by author in Kolkata, West Bengal, India. 83. Interview carried out by author in Kolkata, West Bengal, India. 84. P. Sharma, ‘Identity Consciousness and Students’ Movement: The Role of the AASU’, in D. Gogoi, ed, Unheeded Hinterland: Identity and Sovereignty in Northeast India, Routledge: New Delhi, London, NY, 2016, p. 133. 85. Interview carried out by author in Kolkata, West Bengal, India, 4th July 2014. 86. Interview carried out by author in Kolkata, West Bengal, India, 4th July 2014. 87. Interview carried out by author in Kolkata, West Bengal, India, 4th July 2014. 88. Interview carried out by author in Kolkata, West Bengal, India, 4th July 2014. 89. Interview carried out by author in Kolkata, West Bengal, India, 4th July 2014. 90. Interview carried out by author in Kolkata, West Bengal, India, 4th July 2014. 91. Interview carried out by author in Kolkata, West Bengal, India, 4th July 2014. 92. Interview carried out by author in Kolkata, West Bengal, India, 9th July 2014. 93. Interview carried out by author in Kolkata, West Bengal, India, 16th July 2014. 94. Interview carried out by author in Kolkata, West Bengal, India, 17th July 2014. 95. Interview carried out by author in Kolkata, West Bengal, India, 17th July 2014. 96. Interview carried out by author in Kolkata, West Bengal, India, 22nd July 2014 97. K. Mukherjee, ‘Comparing India’s Disputed Borderlands: Kashmir and the Northeast’, Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, 18(1), 2014, p. 32. 98. Ibid., p. 33. 99. K. Mukherjee, ‘Comparing China and India’s Disputed Borderland Regions: Xinjiang, Tibet, Kashmir and the Indian Northeast’, East Asia: An International Quarterly, 32(2), 2015, p. 185. 100. R. Patgiri, ‘Self-determination, Multi-ethnic state and Quest for Assamese Nationhood’, in D. Gogoi, ed, Unheeded Hinterland: Identity and Sovereignty in Northeast India, Routledge: New Delhi, London, NY, 2016, p. 43. 101. R. Devi, ‘Accommodating Differences: The Indian Democracy and Assamese Nationalism’, in D. Gogoi, ed, Unheeded Hinterland: Identity and Sovereignty in Northeast India, Routledge: New Delhi, London, NY, 2016, p. 209. 102. P. Sharma, ‘Identity Consciousness and Students’ Movement: The Role of the AASU’, in D. Gogoi, ed, Unheeded Hinterland: Identity and Sovereignty in Northeast India, Routledge: New Delhi, London, NY, 2016, p. 133. 103. R. Patgiri, ‘Self-determination, Multi-ethnic state and Quest for Assamese Nationhood’, in D.Gogoi, ed, Unheeded Hinterland: Identity and Sovereignty in Northeast India, Routledge: New Delhi, London, NY, 2016, p. 45. 104. D. Gogoi & U. Dutta, ‘Between States and Insurgents: Violation of Human Rights in Assam’, in D.Gogoi, ed, Unheeded Hinterland: Identity and Sovereignty in Northeast India, Routledge: New Delhi, London, NY, 2016, p. 166. 105. Ibid., p. 167. 106. Ibid., p. 176. 107. N. Goswami, ‘Making Sense of Insurgencies in North-East India: An Overview’, in S. Dutt and A. Bansal, eds, South Asian Security: 21st Century Discourses, Routledge: London/NY, 2012, p. 188. 108. Ibid., p. 188. 109. F. Grare, India Turns East: International Engagement and US-China Rivalry, Penguin Random House India: Gurgaon, 2017, p. 94. 110. Ibid., p. 95. 111. J. Glancey, Nagaland: A Journey to India’s Forgotten Frontier, Faber and Faber: London, 2011, p. 9.

Insurgency in the Indian Northeast 69 112. S. Ghose, ed, Sanjoy’s Assam: Diaries and Writings of Sanjoy Ghose, Penguin Books: New Delhi, 1998, p. 146. 113. K.M. Rakesh, ‘NE Student Assaulted in Bangalore’, The Telegraph, Kolkata, India, 14th March 2017, p. 5. 114. S. Karmakar, ‘Northeast Cry for Anti-Racism Law’, The Telegraph, Kolkata, India, 8th April 2017, p. 8. 115. R. Bhattacharya, North-eastern India and its Neighbours: Negotiating Security and Development, Routledge, South Asia Edition: New Delhi, London, NY, 2015/2019, p. 27.

2

Conflict in Tibet

Introduction ‘Tibet and Xinjiang are today both administered by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and are part of the vast and underdeveloped western region of the country. Both have long-standing and controversial claims to independence also, which are vehemently and consistently disputed by Beijing.’1 The Tibetan conflict is primarily a nationalist secessionist movement, which has been striving for independence and the political separation of Tibet from the Chinese mainland. The main issue here has revolved around sovereignty and self-determination. Ethnic Tibetans see themselves as a distinct nation, a nation in their own right separate from China proper. Beijing, however, sees Tibet as an integral part of China. Shortly after the PRC came into existence in 1949, China invaded Tibet. Since then Tibet has remained under Chinese occupation. In recent years with China’s rise as a superpower and with international support for the Tibetan cause weakening, the demand for complete independence has mellowed down, but there is still a strong desire amongst many ethnic Tibetans to have more autonomy. The conflict is also seen as an ethnic conflict between Tibetans and the Han Chinese people, who form the ethnic majority in China proper. ‘Some 90 per cent of Chinese people belong to the Han ethnic group. They speak Mandarin or some variant of it and live in densely populated coastal or central regions. But the country claims fifty-five other ethnic groups, who live mainly in its vast and inhospitable border regions.’2 The aim of this chapter is to analyse the nature of the Tibetan conflict by firstly looking at its historical background and then at more recent events. The chapter argues that the conflict has both an internal and an external dimension. The internal dimension refers to the repressive policies of the Chinese state, and the impact that these policies have had on Tibet. The external dimension relates to the role played by the Tibetan diaspora, India and the United States in the conflict. Extensive field trips were undertaken between 2015 and 2020 to the Tibetan settlements in India, where interviews with Buddhist monks were carried out. There is an emphasis on the role of race, ethnicity and religion throughout the course of the chapter. Before we

Conflict in Tibet 71 look at the historical background of the conflict, let us first take a look at its geographical location.

Geographical location Tibet or Xizang is China’s second-largest province just after Xinjiang. It is about fifteen times the size of the United Kingdom, and about half the size of the United States. It lies to the South and the West of China proper, sharing a massive border with India. What separates Tibet from India is the mighty Himalayan mountain range. Much of its topography is rough and rugged mountains and because of the high altitude of the Tibetan plateau, it is often referred to as ‘roof of the world.’ The main mountain ranges which surround Tibet include the Himalayas which lie to the South, the Hengduan mountains that lie to the East, and the Kunlun mountains which lie to the North. Some of Asia’s largest rivers like the Brahmaputra, the Mekong, the Indus, the Yangtze and the Yellow river all originate in Tibet. Although very picturesque with breath-taking views of mountains and lakes, Tibet experiences acrimonious winters and is sparsely populated. Within the PRC, it shares boundaries with provinces like Xinjiang in the West and North, Yunnan in the East and Southeast, and Qinghai in the North and Sichuan in the East. Across the international border, it shares boundaries with India, Nepal, Myanmar and Bhutan in the South. The political centre is Lhasa, and Shigatse is the second city. In the existing body of scholarly literature, scholars make a distinction between political Tibet and ethnographic Tibet. Political Tibet refers to the Tibetan Autonomous Region, where most of the protest and resistance movements have taken place against Beijing’s rule. Ethnographic Tibet is much larger. There are ethnic Tibetans not only residing in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, but also in the neighbouring provinces within China namely, Yunnan, Qinghai and Sichuan. There are also ethnic Tibetans residing in neighbouring countries like India, Bhutan and Nepal. In India, there is a strong Tibetan presence in places like Ladakh and Sikkim3. Furthermore, people of Gurkha, Nepalese, Bhutanese and Indian descent along the border with Tibet have been socialised into the practices of Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan way of life. Guo writes, ‘Tibet’s cultural influences have extended to the neighbouring states of Bhutan and Nepal, as well as to the regions of India (such as Sikkim, Ladakh, Lahaul and Spiti), in addition to the Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties that are under the administrations of adjacent Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and Yunnan.’4 Ethno graphic Tibet is also called greater Tibet and the Tibetan Autonomous Region is often called Tibet proper, which came into existence in the year 1965. Tibet is divided into several geographical units. The central part of Tibet is called U. This is where Lhasa, the capital is situated. To the Southwest lies Tsang, where the second city, Shigatse, is located. Collectively the provinces of U and Tsang are called U-Tsang.

72  Conflict in Tibet These provinces together take up much of Southcentral Tibet. Kham and Amdo are both parts of greater Tibet. Kham straddles the Tibet-Sichuan border in the East, and Amdo straddles the Tibet-Qinghai border in the Northeast. To the far West lies the province of Ngari, which has an internal border with Xinjiang and international boundaries with India and Nepal.

The historical background The early years History has played a key role in this conflict. However, there have been divergent versions of history. Not only is the conflict conditioned by historical memories, but both the Tibetan side and the Chinese side have their own interpretations of history, which are often at odds with each other. The Chinese state argues that it has had continuous sovereignty over Tibet since the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368). Beijing also believes that the Tibetan movement for independence is nothing but an imperialist external plot against China. The Tibetan side argues that the relation that Tibet had with both Manchu and Mongol rulers were personal in nature and one that could be best described as priest-patron relations.5 In early times, Tibet was a vassal state in the Mongol empire, but was not really an integral part of China. Tibet was ruled by the Sakya clerics, much as other parts of the Asia Pacific were ruled by indigenous kings. A feature of Mongol and Tibetan relations was that far from being a threat to the dharma, the Mongols not only allowed but encouraged Tibetans to practise their faith: Buddhism. The Mongols allowed Tibetans to govern themselves according to their own cultural traditions and supported the practise of Tibetan Buddhism. The appointment of Tibetans to senior positions of political power and prestige, such as the Imperial Preceptor, raised the status of Tibetan culture and this proved to be advantageous for the propagation of Tibetan Buddhism throughout the Chinese Empire. Because of this positive relationship which the Tibetans had with the Mongols, Tibetans at that time were happy to tolerate Mongol over-lordship. They valued the support that they got from the Mongols. The political flexibility that the Mongols allowed the Tibetans and the support that they gave to Tibetan Buddhism and culture kept the relationship between the two sides alive and healthy. In relation to this flexibility, Timothy May writes, ‘The method of rule was not consistent throughout the empire, but was malleable for each region. With an empire of approximately 36,260,000 square kilometres (fourteen million square miles), an area roughly the size of the African continent, the Mongols had to adjust their governing styles to a vast array of geographical, cultural and linguistic variations.’6 The first half of the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) was also characterised by trust, mutual friendship and respect between the two sides. ‘The Qing did not rule their empire through a single unitary state system…The Qing presented themselves as rulers of

Conflict in Tibet 73 five peoples, whose languages (Chinese, Manchu, Tibetan, Mongolian and Uyghur) were accorded equal status, at least symbolically in the life of the empire. This was an empire that was adept at dealing with different peoples, their customs, beliefs, and languages. It administered each in the way which seemed best or most pragmatic at the time, and given considerations of resource and capability.’7 The monastic communities were showered with respect and protection. When the fifth Dalai Lama visited Beijing in 1652–1653, he was received with great pomp and joy. ‘Qing patronage led to an unprecedented expansion of Tibetan Buddhism beyond Tibet.’8 However, this changed with the passage of time. Qing support for Tibetan Buddhism started to disappear as the dynasty weakened throughout the course of the 19th century. Qing weakness led to a certain degree of insecurity amongst officials, which paved the way for more stringent policies. The later Qing rulers started to follow aggressive integrationist policies with regard to Tibet. These policies of forceful assimilation first had an impact on Eastern Tibet, and then later had an impact on Lhasa controlled Tibet. These late Qing policies were carried out by nationalists such as Zhao Erfeng. China’s state-building policies were shaped to some extent by the adoption of western political ideas, which was accelerated by the rise of the Han Chinese in the Qing officialdom, particularly in the provinces surrounding Tibet. These stringent measures that were introduced replaced the earlier political flexibility that had served relations between Tibet and Beijing well. The earlier support which Tibetans got for their cultural practices from Beijing soon came to an end. Tibet’s autonomy also came to an end. Tibetans valued their autonomy and retaliated and responded to these draconian measures with violence. In Eastern Tibet, especially in places like Kham, people rose up in revolt, particularly in the year 1905. ‘The brutality of the crackdown at the hands of General Ma Weiqi and Zhao Erfeng only provoked a fiercer rebellion towards the end of 1905, which took until the summer of 1906 to suppress. When Zhao was appointed the Lhasa Amban and his brother, Zhao Ershun, the Viceroy of Sichuan in 1908 to bring all of Tibet under direct Chinese rule, the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government in Lhasa countered with what can only be described as Tibetan state-building.’9 By the year 1910, the thirteenth Dalai Lama fled to India when Zhao Erfeng’s soldiers marched into the capital, Lhasa. Whilst he was in India, he wrote to the Qing rulers that he had lost faith in the Chinese state and that the relation that Tibet had with China would never be the same. When the Qing Empire collapsed in 1912, the Dalai Lama organised a secret war department that got rid of the Qing forces in 1912. He returned to the capital, Lhasa, in 1913 and declared Tibet’s independence. After the end of the Qing dynasty, we see the rise of the Republic of China. The transition of the Chinese Empire to a modern nation state has been debated by scholars vociferously in the literature. This transition had serious implications for minority provinces like Tibet. Ho-fung Hung and Huei-ying Kuo

74  Conflict in Tibet argue, ‘While most other multinational world-empires, such as the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian, disintegrated into multiple relatively homogenous nation-states in their transition to modernity, China managed to transform nearly all of its imperial territory into a singular nation-state despite the cultural and ethnic heterogeneity of this geographical space.’10 The president of the new Republic of China, Yuan Shikai, profusely apologized for what had happened in the past and reinstated the Dalai Lama’s position and restored him to his office and titles. The Dalai Lama responded to Yuan Shikai by saying that he traced the source of his authority from the Buddha’s ancient teachings and that he did not require any recognition or titles from Beijing, and that he was going to exercise full authority over Tibet.11 Between the years 1912 and 1950, Tibetan autonomy did not have to face any major challenge since the Chinese had to deal with both external pressures and various internal problems. The Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931 shook Chinese society to its very core and left it devastated. Kerr writes, ‘the Japanese were hated in China. They abducted women for prostitution and men were taken for forced labour projects. Their ruthless policy when faced with resistance (killing all, burning all, looting all) gave the Chinese common cause against their detested enemy. There had been intermittent incidents between the two countries since 1931, the last of which was the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937, a battle between the two sides fought at the Marco Polo Bridge outside the walled town of Wanping, Southwest of Beijing.’12 John Keay writes, ‘As Tokyo’s satellite kingdom of Manchukuo, it provided Japan with the bridgehead and marshalling yard from which to launch its invasion of the rest of China in 1937.’13 The civil war between the nationalists and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) went on for decades which left a damaging impact on the economy. ‘The story of politics in twentieth-century China has usually been told as a narrative of conflict: in particular, the conflict between the Nationalists under Chiang Kaishek and the Communists under Mao Zedong.’14 Because the Chinese state had its preoccupations elsewhere, Tibet remained independent for a while. The Tibetans could have used this period of interlude to strengthen its defences or to strengthen its attempts at trying to win international recognition for Tibet’s independent status, but sadly the Tibetan government was characterized by factionalism, internal rivalry and corruption. Ultimately, they did not use this period constructively to sustain Tibetan independence and paid the price after the communists emerged victorious in 1949. The seventeen point agreement The Chinese state invaded Tibet on the seventh of October, 1950. Due to the lack of international support, Tibetans had no choice but to travel to Beijing for further talks with the central government about the future of Tibet. It was on the 23rd of May, 1951, when the two sides signed the Seventeen Point

Conflict in Tibet 75 Agreement. By this agreement, Tibetans would have to accept Tibet as a part of China and would also have to accept the presence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Chinese state would preserve the authority of the Dalai Lama, and would introduce reforms only in consultation with the Tibetan elites. The terms and conditions of the Seventeen Point Agreement were as follows: • • • • • • • • • • • • •

• •

The Tibetans were expected to drive out aggressive imperialist forces from Tibet. The local people were expected to help the PLA to enter Tibet and play a role collectively with the PLA in strengthening the national defences of Tibet. Under the overarching authority of the Central People’s Government, local Tibetans would be able to exercise regional autonomy. The central authorities would not alter the existing political system in Tibet. Religious freedom was to be protected and the state would not bring about any change in the income of the Buddhist monasteries. Tibetan troops would be reorganised and incorporated within the broader framework of the PLA. Tibetan language would be further developed. Tibetan agriculture and industry would be developed step by step. The local government of Tibet should carry out its own reforms. As long as the nationalists severe their linkages with imperialist groups and as long as they do not undermine the power and authority of the CCP, they can stay in power. The PLA will be fair in all buying and selling. The Central People’s Government will handle the external relations and foreign affairs of Tibet. To enforce the Seventeen Point Agreement, the Central People’s Government will set up an administrative and military committee in Tibet which will have members sent from Beijing, but will also incorporate local Tibetans to take part in their work. Funds required by the above committee and the PLA entering Tibet will be provided by the Central People’s Government. Finally, this agreement will come into force once signatures have been received from the two sides and once seals have been affixed to it.15

The Tibetan government in exile After the Chinese invasion of Tibet in the fifties, or what is also known as the peaceful liberation of Tibet in official Chinese official circles, the Dalai Lama fled to India, where he set up his government in exile in Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh. ‘The Dalai Lama, who has been living in India, at Dharamshala, after fleeing from Tibet since 1959, once called himself to be

76  Conflict in Tibet a son of India.’16 Other religious leaders of Tibetan Buddhism also came to India. When the leading religious figures made their way into India, other Lamas also followed. ‘The Tibetan national struggle has been waged from Dharamsala since then, spearheaded by the Dalai Lama and guided by his spiritual perspective on politics.’17 Tibetans rose up in revolt against the Chinese state in the late fifties. After the Tibetan uprising of 1959, hundreds of monks came to India fleeing the crackdown. Many were captured by the PLA and were put behind bars. There were others who died on the way. Needless to say, crossing the world’s highest mountain range was no easy task. Many of these Tibetan monks set up their settlements in Bhutan, Sikkim and North Bengal in India and in Nepal. They were received very sympathetically by King Mahendra in Nepal.18 India’s first prime minister, Nehru, had been very welcoming to both the Dalai Lama and to all the other Buddhist monks. Huge sums of money were spent on setting up refugee camps and Tibetan settlements and also on medical aid. Thousands of Tibetans were given paid jobs in road building works and construction. Nancy Wilson Ross writes ‘an impressive tribute to the strength of Tibetan Buddhism is the manner in which refugees have managed to keep vitally alive the practise of their religion in new surroundings where grim discomfort and even deprivation are so often their lot.’19 Aid also came from the United States. Despite the scattering of the Khampa rebellion, the United States still continued to provide the rebels with clandestine aid and training, many of whom were now based in a place called Mustang in Nepal. McLeod Ganj, an old British hill station, was where the headquarters of the Dalai Lama had been set up in India. It was called the Central Tibetan Administration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Amongst those who settled there were the council of ministers or the kashag, who had ruled Tibet for centuries. No government in the world gave any real recognition to the Central Tibetan Administration.20 No state, including the Dalai Lama’s host state of India, recognises his government in exile as the legitimate government of Tibet.21 Schaik writes, ‘by the early 1960s, with the Dalai Lama showing no signs of returning to Tibet, it was becoming clear that there were now two Tibetan governments. The Dalai Lama and the remnants of the traditional Tibetan ruling elite were determined, with or without Nehru’s support, to present themselves as Tibet’s government in exile.’22 The land reforms After the Tibetan uprising of 1959, the CCP felt that the policy of trying to work with the Dalai Lama and trying to introduce reforms gradually had failed. Thus, it was decided that Tibet would now come under Beijing’s rule more directly. In the official literature, this was often referred to as Tibet’s warm embrace of the motherland. Zhou Enlai announced that the

Conflict in Tibet 77 Tibetans had not respected the terms and conditions of the Seventeen Point Agreement and hence all traditional Tibetan governmental structures were to be swept away. Tibet was now to be governed by the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region. Because the Dalai Lama had fled to India, the Panchen Lama would lead the committee and Ngapo was raised to the position of vice-chairman. And yet both these individuals had very little power. The real power rested with the PLA’s Military Control Committee that was led by Zhang Guohua, one of the generals who had come to Lhasa at the time of the so-called ‘peaceful liberation’ or invasion, whichever way one looks at it in the early 1950s. For several years, Tibet was run like a police state.23 Monks who had participated in the uprising of 1959 could no longer be trusted and hence were subjected to struggle sessions and were not allowed to gather in monasteries for prayer/worship. Many were sent off to distant labour camps, where they had to engage in hard labour and help in the modernization process. Sections of the monastic community were also subjected to ‘elimination of the rebellion’ campaign. At this point there were many Tibetans working for the CCP who helped the party to identify Tibetans who could not be trusted. Beijing’s repressive policies got worse and the crackdown spread beyond Lhasa. As this happened, thousands of monks fled to neighbouring countries like India. Having failed to win over the Tibetan elite, the CCP turned to the Tibetan masses. Bonded labour and serfdom, which had existed in Tibet for centuries was now done away with. Although Tibetans were now free from their aristocratic lords, they came under the rule of the CCP more directly. Thousands of Chinese and Tibetan communists participated in political rallies and made speeches about the inequalities of traditional Tibetan society and spoke about the benefits of being under the new order. There were clear problems with the old order particularly with regard to the economic inequalities that existed between the serfs/peasants and the wealthy landowners. But the political repression of the new order was not any better. There was a climate of fear and anybody who did not agree with the official policy of Beijing was seen as a sympathiser of the 1959 uprising. Under the new order, Tibetan Buddhism which is so inextricably intertwined with Tibetan society and traditional politics came under attack. Whilst Tibetan peasants were happy to see aristocratic families lose their traditional power, the attack on their faith was very disturbing. During this time we also see the collapse and closure of monasteries. The Buddhist monasteries in Tibet over the centuries had grown very rich and the big ones were the owners of huge plots of land. It was only by taxing the local community that the monasteries could support the monks and nuns. The new land reforms that had been introduced in China shortly after the CCP had come into power, stripped the monastic orders of the means to support themselves. The land reforms are seen as one of the greatest acts of expropriation in contemporary history.

78  Conflict in Tibet In relation to land reforms and referring to the situation at that time more generally, His Holiness, the fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, writes: ‘The summer of 1955 was undoubtedly the best we were to experience during the decade of uneasy coexistence between the Chinese authorities and my own Tibetan administration. But the summer in Tibet is a short season and it was not many weeks before disturbing news began to reach my ears about the activities of the Chinese authorities in Kham and Amdo. Far from leaving the people be, they had begun to press unilaterally with all kinds of ‘reform’. New taxes were imposed on houses, land and cattle, and, to add insult to injury, the contents of monasteries were also assessed for tax. Large estates were confiscated and the land re-distributed by the local Chinese cadres in accordance with their own political ideology. Landowners were publicly arraigned and punished for ‘crimes against the people’; to my horror some were even put to death….Throughout the winter months the situation deteriorated rapidly. As it did so, refugees from Chinese oppression began to arrive in Lhasa, bringing with them horrifying stories of brutality and degradation. The Chinese dealt viciously with Khampa resistance: not only were public beatings and executions carried out, but often these were done by the victim’s own child. Public criticism was also introduced. This is a method especially favoured by Chinese Communists. The ‘offender’ is trussed up with a rope in such a way that the shoulders are dislocated. Then, when the person is utterly helpless and crying out in pain, members of the public, including women and children, are called forward to inflict further injury. Apparently, the Chinese felt that this was all it took to make people change their minds, and that it aided in the process of political re-education.’24 The years of the cultural revolution The Cultural Revolution is a phase of tremendous political turmoil in Chinese history, which lasted from 1966 to 1976. The Cultural Revolution almost brought the entire country on the brink of civil war. One of the reasons why Mao launched the Cultural Revolution is because he had lost a lot of his power and prestige due to the failure of the Great Leap Forward. The Great Leap Forward was meant to be a socio-economic campaign that was supposed to modernize China. During the years of the Great Leap in the late fifties and early sixties, the state tried to develop local industries, and the modern sector at the provincial level. Every province was supposed to have a backbone of basic industries. The ideas and concepts of self-help and rural community development were given importance. Local communities were supposed to take an initiative and actively participate in the industrialisation process. There was also the idea that economic imbalances would lead to further growth. Because women were encouraged to participate in the modernisation process we also see the centralisation of child care during

Conflict in Tibet 79 this period. The commune was responsible for carrying out the Great Leap Forward. Whilst all this looked good on paper, in reality, it was a disaster. The commune was more than an economic enterprise and became an extension of the state and started interfering in the lives of the people. Political life was becoming increasingly oppressive and suffocating. In the end, the Great leap led to famine and scarcity of food. Thousands of people lost their lives as a result of the Great Leap. In fact, it turned out to be such a fiasco that some refer to it as the Great Leap Backward. Mao’s political position had become insecure because of the failures associated with the Great Leap. This insecurity and loss of prestige made him launch the Cultural Revolution as a way to tease out which sections of the population were loyal to him and which sections were not. In this connection, it is worth mentioning that religious groups in an atheistic state were viewed with suspicion. Tibet has a strong presence of Buddhist monks especially came under attack. Westad writes, ‘in minority areas, Mao’s final campaigns were especially disastrous. In Tibet, temples were destroyed along with religious symbols and paintings, while monks and nuns were hauled off to be struggled against by Red Guards flown in from Beijing and Shanghai for the purpose.’25 In relation to the Great Leap, Jonathan Fenby writes, ‘it would cause deaths estimated at up to 46 million from coercion, forced labour and finally, the worst manmade famine ever seen on earth.’26 Because of the failures of the Great Leap, Mao found himself feeling very marginalised and sidelined by economic realists like Deng Xiaoping and Liu Shaoqi and hence decided to get rid of not only them but anyone who got in his way. His strategy to do this was by exploiting the unrest of young students in China’s big urban centres and he urged them to attack their teachers, professors and university administrators. Thousands of students joined the revolutionary movement that came to be known as the Cultural Revolution. They were called the Red Guards, who were absolutely fanatical in their approach and they treated Mao like a prophet, almost like a god-like figure. Millions of copies of Mao’s red book were being published and bought by the so-called Red Guards. Mao’s red book became the new bible. Thousands of people who were seen as recalcitrant and rebellious were subjected to struggle sessions and were beaten by screaming teenagers. Many died and many committed suicide whilst the orgy of violence carried on for a period of ten years. Jeffrey Wasserstrom writes, ‘After the Great Leap disaster, Mao temporarily lost his position as China’s paramount leader….The Cultural Revolution, which remains one of the least fully understood events in modern Chinese history, both within and outside of China, was largely an effort by Mao to reclaim a position of centrality by going around the bureaucracy of the party and leading a mass movement.’27 Amidst all this violence, Mao encouraged students to attack the four olds, which included old thinking, old habits, old customs and old culture. This was the time when Tibet especially came under attack because

80  Conflict in Tibet Tibetan society was viewed as superstitious, backward and feudal, steeped in tradition. By late 1966, cultural vandalism had become the order of the day. Schaik writes, ‘pamphlets appeared demanding the eradication of feudal culture. Religious objects such as books, stupas and prayer flags were to be destroyed. All religious festivals were to be abolished and acts such as reciting mantras, prostrating and circumambulating sacred sites were to be banned. Monasteries were to be converted for general public use while monks and nuns married and engaged in productive labour.’28 People were not allowed to enter temples and religious shrines and photographs of the Dalai Lama and other religious leaders were to be destroyed. The first acts of destruction were carried out by Red Guards from the Lhasa Secondary School. They targeted the Jokhang temple, which was the most prominent symbol of Tibetan culture. They burned Buddhist books and ancient scriptures in the central courtyards of the temples and destroyed religious figures and statues. Large structures were dynamited and smaller ones smashed to pieces. Religious buildings had been put to secular use and were transformed into army barracks, administrative offices, schools, hospitals, granaries etc. Precious metals and stones were taken out of temples and monasteries and shipped to Beijing. It should be noted that it was not only the Chinese Red Guards who took part in this vandalism. Tibetan Red Guards also played a key role in destroying religious figures such as the Tibetan Red Guards from the Tibetan Nationality Institute at Xianyang, who actively participated in destroying the ‘four olds’ as identified by Mao. Anyone who got in the way of the destruction of the four olds was severely punished and subjected to public humiliation. For instance, old lamas were paraded across the town in their traditional attire, along with dunce’s caps with signs around their necks which detailed their crimes. By the end of the Cultural Revolution Tibetan, distinctiveness had virtually been eradicated. In the name of replacing the old feudal culture with socialism, the state had also banned Tibetan songs, dance and drama. Chinese clothing replaced Tibetan clothes and Tibetan houses were painted with red as a symbol of socialism. The Tibetan language was also simplified. In other words, what made Tibet different from the Chinese mainland was totally wiped out. Maoism became the new religion. Going by the events of the Cultural Revolution we can clearly see a discrepancy between what was promised in the Seventeen Point Agreement, and what actually happened in the subsequent years. Professor Jinghan Zeng writes in relation to mass propaganda used by Mao, ‘since the CCP was founded, it has valued the importance of mass propaganda. In the early revolutionary era, mass propaganda was heavily used by the CCP to promote the communist revolution….such propaganda was used to mobilize the entire Chinese society to participate in mass campaigns during Mao Zedong’s rule. At that time, socio-economic affairs were highly politicised, and ordinary people were expected to participate in those campaigns.’29 This, of course, changed a great deal in the reform era under Deng.

Conflict in Tibet 81 The Cultural Revolution came to an end in the year 1976. This is also the year when Mao died. Before his death, President Nixon from the United States visited Beijing and after this visit, we see the normalisation of SinoAmerican relations, which prior to this time had been heavily strained. With the normalisation of Sino-American relations, the CIA stopped supporting the Khampa rebels. The British prime minister at the time, Edward Heath followed Nixon’s example. With time China was growing into a major economic superpower especially under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping and many countries around the world became heavily dependent on China for economic aid. For instance, Nepal grew heavily dependent on China, which is why King Birendra of Nepal was not as sympathetic to the Tibetan cause as was King Mahendra. King Birendra ordered the Khampa rebels to leave Nepal. During this time the Dalai Lama sent the rebels taped messages urging them to leave. The Nepalese Army killed the remaining Khampa rebels in 1974 in Mustang. In a globalised era of interconnectedness and especially with China on the rise, no country seemed keen to take up the Tibetan cause. As the repressive policies of the Chinese government continued, many Tibetans decided to leave the country and start their lives afresh elsewhere. The Tibetan way of life had almost been wiped out in Tibet proper due to the harsh policies of the state during the years of the Cultural Revolution. Whilst Tibetan Buddhism seemed to have been wiped out in Tibet, it started to grow and thrive in other places, particularly in India, where many of these Tibetan refugees had decided to settle. Sino-Indian relations and Tibetan settlements in India Sino-Indian relations have been problematic to a large extent because Nehru, India’s first prime minister gave refuge and shelter to the Dalai Lama. Nehru’s kind gesture to the Tibetan cause did not go down well with Beijing. The Indian government today still remains quite sympathetic to the Tibetan cause and this could partly be because India lost the 1962 war against China and memories of this defeat is still very strong in the minds of the Indian political elite based in New Delhi. ‘In April, 2013, Indian troops sighted an advance patrol of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 19 kilometres deep within Indian territory, a considerable distance from the Line of Actual Control, the de-facto border claim line that was drawn up after the 1962 war between the two countries-a war that still traumatizes the mind of India’s political and military establishment.’30 Whilst the outbreak of a full-fledged war has not taken place between the two countries in recent years, border skirmishes with China are still on-going. The Doklam standoff between the two countries would be a recent example. In relation to Sino-Indian relations Tom Miller writes, ‘the border dispute remains unresolved, a perennial thorn in Sino-Indian relations….This began with the invasion of Tibet in 1950, a traditional buffer zone between China and India, and continues with Beijing’s refusal to support New Delhi in its bid to

82  Conflict in Tibet become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.’31 Another reason why India feels so sympathetically towards the Tibetan cause is probably because of the similarities which exist between Buddhism and India’s majority religion, Hinduism. This will be discussed in a bit more detail later on in this chapter. Grunfeld writes, ‘after 1950 there were so few Tibetans in exile that their presence outside Tibet remained largely unnoticed by the world at large. This situation was to change drastically after the failed uprising in Lhasa in March 1959….When the refugees left Tibet they crossed over mainly into Bhutan and India’s Northeast Frontier Area (now called Arunachal Pradesh). Lesser numbers trekked into Nepal, Sikkim and Ladakh. For the most part, they were welcomed, despite the host countries’ inabilities to meet the needs of such a large influx of destitute people. But one recalls being prevented from crossing the frontier until bribes were paid to the Indian border officials.’32 One of the first figures who decided to offer help and support to the Tibetan Buddhist monks was the King of Sikkim in India and plans were begun to start a new monastery. The royal family here were supporters of the Kagyu school of Tibetan Buddhism and a major centre was established in Rumtek, which is probably the most famous monastery in Sikkim today. Although the original monastery had been in ruin for years, in 1966, Nehru provided with the funding to set it up again. When the Chinese attacked Lhasa, a lot of the treasures from Tsurpu, which is the main centre of the Karmapas in Tibet, were brought into Sikkim. If one visits Sikkim today, one can clearly see how well-entrenched Tibetan Buddhism is. There are numerous Tibetan monasteries and statues of the Buddha and other Buddhist figures all over Sikkim. There are prayer wheels and Buddhist prayer flags almost everywhere. The Buddha Park in Ravongla and the statue of Padmasambhava in a place called Namchi in South Sikkim are particularly impressive.33 A large section of Sikkim’s population is Buddhist. Buddhism is also very well received by the current Modi government. In relation to the Modi government, Arijit Mazumdar writes, ‘Modi has taken a keen interest in promoting India’s rich Buddhist heritage. More than once, he has highlighted the philosophical similarities between Hinduism (India’s largest religion) and Buddhism.’34 Most of the monks from the Gelugpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism set up their monasteries in North Bengal. The three main Gelupa monasteries in Tibet were the Ganden, Sera and the Drepung, which now have their branches in North Bengal particularly in Buxa Duar. It only takes a few hours from Bagdogra airport (which is the main airport in North Bengal, close to Siliguri) to reach places like Mirik, Darjeeling, Lava and Kalimpong, which have some of the major Tibetan settlements in India today.35 If one is seriously interested in Tibetan Buddhism, these places are worth a visit. The Buddhist temple at Shalugara in Siliguri is also very impressive.36 It is in these settlements in India, where the Tibetan refugee monks have kept

Conflict in Tibet 83 their way of life and their culture alive. Most monks came in the sixties and seventies following the repressive policies of the state associated with the Cultural Revolution. ‘As the Dalai Lama struggled to cope with the increasing number of refugee children, lamas were called in to draw up curricula, prepare textbooks and work as teachers. For those tulkus who were still only small children, the Dalai Lama also established a School for Young Lamas.’37 Another example of a well-known Tibetan Buddhist monastery in exile would be the one in Kathmandu, close to the Boudhanath stupa. Some lamas who did not get enough support from India, Nepal or Bhutan decided to start their lives afresh in the West. A good example of this would be Namkhai Norbu who ultimately became a part of western academia. The Deng years Once Deng comes to power in the late seventies, we see a policy of liberalisation and the earlier policies directed at ethnic minorities and religious groups were somewhat relaxed. As a part of this relaxed and liberal approach, Deng decided to revitalise the dialogue with the Dalai Lama, and with the Tibetan community in exile, especially in India. Contact was made with the Dalai Lama’s brother, Gyalo Thondup, who had moved to Hong Kong to work as a businessman after the collapse of the Khampa rebellion. Political prisoners who had taken part in the 1959 uprising were released as a gesture of goodwill and to show the Tibetan community that the Chinese state was willing to show some flexibility, instead of following a hardliner’s approach as Mao had done. The Dalai Lama, however, did not give in immediately to these gestures of goodwill and decided to send a fact-finding mission first from Dharamsala to Tibet, just to test the waters and see what the situation was like. This was agreed by the new Chinese leadership under Deng Xiaoping and preparations started to send the Dalai Lama’s representatives to Tibet. The Dalai Lama initially wanted to keep this as a secret because he felt that if Tibetans got to know about this rapprochement with Beijing, it would most certainly anger sections of the Tibetan population and sections within the monastic community. Schaik writes, ‘The first fact-finding mission was headed by Lobsang Samten, another of the Dalai Lama’s brothers, who was also a tulku…. Entering Amdo, the Tibetan delegation made its first stop at the village of Tashikil, where hundreds of Tibetans quickly surrounded their vehicles….It was becoming clear that the ideological transformation of the Tibetans had failed….Thousands of Tibetans came to greet the visitors, and throughout the visit, the streets of Lhasa were full of people hoping to catch a glimpse of them. During a guided tour of the Norbulingka the crowds, chanting ‘Long live the Dalai Lama,’ overwhelmed the Chinese security officers. Lobsang walked among them for five hours, and one person after another poured out their griefs and sorrows to him. Some tried to tear off strips of his clothing; others pressed gifts upon him, Buddhist paintings and statues

84  Conflict in Tibet that they had kept hidden for years. There were dancing and the sound of long-banned Tibetan traditional songs. There were even shouts of ‘Tibet is independent!’ and ‘Go home, Chinese!’38 It became clear to the Tibetan delegation that behind all the political rhetoric of socialist progress, there was actually economic deprivation and destruction of Tibetan culture. It also became clear to the Chinese state that twenty years of Communist indoctrination had not worked and that people were still very much tied to their religion and culture. The top-down policy of using force and coercion had clearly not worked and the CCP sacked the officials based in Lhasa because it felt that these officials had misguided the CCP about the situation. In 1980, the liberal official, Hu Yaobang (now Party Secretary), started his own fact-finding mission. Hu Yaobang had a lot of sympathy for the situation in Tibet. When he went ahead with his fact-finding mission, he discovered that Tibetan culture had almost been erased and that the standard of living in Tibet was not good and large parts of Tibet were impoverished and lagged behind China proper. He raised the status of Tibetan language and education and encouraged Tibetans to be a part of the government. He also argued that two-thirds of the Tibetan regional government should compose of Tibetans and that the Chinese officials who were part of the regional government should learn Tibetan. Hu Yaobang also stressed the need for genuine autonomy. For a few years, these liberal pro-Tibetan policies were enforced. The liberal atmosphere allowed Tibetan monks who had gone into exile to come back and rebuild their monasteries, gather in prayer halls and chant their prayers. The teaching of Buddhist philosophy was started and monks were allowed to leave the laity and become a part of the clergy again. Visa restrictions were lifted and Tibetans who had been in exile started to visit Tibet again. Figures like Ngapo also came back to the fore. In 1981, he wrote an introduction to a European book on Tibet where he emphasised on Tibet’s distinct identity and that it was very different from the identity of China proper. Although he avoided criticising the CCP directly he did insinuate that the policies that came into effect during the years of the Cultural Revolution between 1966 and 1976 had a very damaging effect on Tibetan life and society. He also went to the extent of teaching the Tibetan language rejecting the simplified version that had been introduced in the 1960s. The Panchen Lama also came forward and spoke about how the Tibetans had suffered under CCP rule and together with Ngapo founded the Tibetan Aid Development Fund, which was supposed to raise the material standards of the Tibetan people. Dillon writes, ‘the death of Mao Zedong in September 1976 led to a period of relative liberalisation throughout the PRC and in the mid-1980s, influenced by CCP secretary-general Hu Yaobang, there had been an increase in the number of Tibetans participating in local government in Tibet; the repression of Tibetan Buddhism was relaxed and the status of the Tibetan language and local culture was also enhanced in government and education.’39

Conflict in Tibet 85 Hu Yaobang also felt that if the Dalai Lama lived in Beijing then it would stop Tibetans from rallying around him. This would in turn weaken the secessionist nationalist movement. Talks started between Beijing and Dharamsala in the early eighties but they did not go very far. The Chinese state was not prepared to give very much. Beijing was only prepared to give a limited form of cultural autonomy. The Tibetans wanted political autonomy for greater Tibet which encompassed not just the Tibetan Autonomous Region but also places like Kham and Amdo. Greater Tibet would also have to become a demilitarised zone and the Chinese would only handle external affairs of Tibet. Many amongst the Tibetan community especially in the diaspora community felt that mere autonomy and not getting full political independence from China proper would be equivalent to surrendering to Beijing. The Tibetan community today is also divided on this particular issue. Some are very much in favour of complete independence and some are in favour of autonomy. Young Tibetans who had been educated in the West and in India started to question the validity and authority of the Tibetan government in exile. They asked the question: How could the Chinese armies enter the Tibetan region in the first place in the early fifties. The disgruntled Khampa rebels also argued that they were the only ones who had put up a fight and tried to defend Tibet when Beijing attacked. Many young Tibetans today have formed the Tibetan Youth Congress. Whilst the Tibetan Youth Congress pays its allegiance to the Dalai Lama, their approach is not necessarily similar to or in keeping with the Dalai Lama’s moderate approach. Whilst the Dalai Lama in recent years has changed his tune and has asked for more autonomy, the Tibetan Youth Congress is in favour of independence. The Dalai Lama’s brother, Thubten Norbu was very clear about the fact that he was in favour of independence. Before Hu Yaobang could implement further policies and take his reforms to the next level, Deng turned against him and Hu was forced to resign as Party Secretary in 1987. From the late eighties onwards, Deng decided to take a more repressive approach. Talks with Beijing had ended in failure by the late eighties. There was no point in pursuing these talks further, which is why at this point the Dalai Lama decided to turn to the West and to the international community more generally for support and guidance. In September of 1987, the Dalai Lama gave a speech at the Congressional Human Rights Caucus in Washington D.C. and argued that Tibet was under illegitimate occupation. He argued that the Chinese had invaded Tibet in the fifties and that prior to that Tibet had always been independent. Beijing’s hold over Tibet was very colonial and the situation in Tibet especially with regard to human rights was compared to the holocaust. He wanted Tibet to be a demilitarised zone or a zone of peace. The Americans were sympathetic to the Tibetan cause and to his speech and this support boosted the morale of the exile community, galvanising some into action. When the news reached Tibet through the Voice of America, there were protests against Beijing’s rule, especially in

86  Conflict in Tibet the Drepung monastery. To many in the CCP, Hu Yaobang’s liberal policies had paved the way for a climate of openness and actually allowed the outbreak of a new set of Tibetan nationalist resistance movements which the state now had to deal with in the late eighties. These protest movements were very much in favour of democracy and human rights. The Chinese state, however, responded with high handedness and in October, 1987, many of these monks who had participated in the protests were beaten, arrested and taken into custody. There were other protestors who demanded that the monks who had been arrested be freed immediately. These protestors gathered around the police station not only making their demands to free the monks, but also set the police station and police vehicles on fire. The police responded by shooting into the protesting crowds and further CCP crackdown followed. Many foreign tourists and journalists witnessed these events at the time. The incident in the late 80s clearly showed the feelings of resentment and antipathy the people had towards the CCP and that the support for the Dalai Lama was still very much there. People were now ready to risk torture and imprisonment for the Tibetan cause. Deng did allow the Dalai Lama to return to his homeland, provided he gave up the idea of Tibetan independence. To this the Dalai Lama responded by giving another international political speech at the European Parliament at Strasbourg. At the European Parliament, the Dalai Lama once again stressed on the earlier points made at Washington: to have a unified and autonomous Tibet and to have a demilitarised zone of peace. Chang writes, ‘In 1988 the Dalai Lama made a visit to the EU Congress and put forward the Strasbourg Proposal, in which the main points read: The whole of Tibet known as Cholka Sum (UTsang, Kham and Amdo) should become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of the people for the common good and the protection of themselves and their environment, in association with the PRC. The government of the PRC could remain responsible for Tibet’s foreign policy….The Strasbourg Proposal continued to propose a self-ruling Tibet and called for an international peace conference to ensure it.’40 Beijing read this as an indirect way of demanding independence or at least as a stepping stone that would next lead to independence. These demands were rejected by Beijing and the situation came to a deadlock. Protest movements continued especially in Lhasa and martial law was declared in the year 1989. Beijing’s international image was especially blackened when the Dalai Lama won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989. The issue over the eleventh Panchen Lama In recent years, one of the big issues that has complicated things further has revolved around the debate over the selection of the eleventh Panchen Lama. ‘The unexpected death of the tenth Panchen Lama in January 1989 and the search for his reincarnation, who would become the eleventh, precipitated another crisis.’41 Since the 18th century, the Chinese authorities

Conflict in Tibet 87 cultivated the Panchen Lama’s to counter the position of the Dalai Lama. The CCP had no intention of allowing the Dalai Lama to reassert his authority now in the post-1989 period. The CCP was fully aware that the tenth Dalai Lama had been approved by Beijing and that the Dalai Lama had ratified his position under political pressure. Now, for the selection of the eleventh Panchen Lama, the CCP wanted to keep the Dalai Lama totally out of the process. This did not go down well with the religious figures at the Tashilhunpo monastery, who felt that the Dalai Lama should at least be consulted on the matter. The CCP finally agreed and contact was made with the Dalai Lama through his brother, Gyalo Thondup. The abbots from Tashilhunpo monastery started to carry out their search, keeping the Dalai Lama informed and updated with their progress. But by 1993 there was a breakdown in relations between the CCP and the Dalai Lama. The CCP compared the Tibetan independence movement to a serpent whose head, the Dalai clique, should be cut off. The Party stated that the weak point were the Buddhist monasteries, from where the Dalai clique could infiltrate and spread to other parts of Tibet. So from now on, monasteries would be closely regulated and the number of monks and nuns would be kept to a minimum. The monks and nuns that were allowed to practise the dharma had limited freedom and were often subjected to patriotic educational campaigns. By 1995, the CCP had firmly decided that it was going to select the eleventh Panchen Lama and exclude the Dalai Lama from the process. But when the Dalai Lama chose his own candidate to the astonishment of the CCP, the Dalai Lama’s candidate was taken away to Beijing and no one ever heard of him again. Later, the CCP chose their own candidate and there was a ceremony held at Lhasa. Tibetans were forced by the Party to show support to the Panchen Lama Beijing had selected and their disapproval of the individual chosen by the Dalai Lama. This seriously strained the relations between the people especially the monastic community and the party. Han migration Another point of irritation for the local Tibetan people was the state policy of encouraging Han migration from the Chinese mainland to work and live in Tibet. Whilst the state argues that Han people were being encouraged to settle in Tibet to participate in developmental activities which in the long run would help the local Tibetan people and raise their living standards, the locals think this is a deliberate attempt by the Chinese state to undermine the secessionist nationalist movement and Tibetan identity. With regard to economic growth and development in Tibet under the rule of the PRC, Dreyer writes, ‘after twenty years of central government efforts that include generous state subsidies, the Tibet Autonomous Region remains China’s poorest administrative unit. Growth rates over the past decade have exceeded the national average, while the average Tibetan is

88  Conflict in Tibet better fed and clothed than in the past. However, development has been extensive, resulting from higher subsidies, rather than intensive. Economic rates of return are low and dropping, raising fears that the TAR is becoming more dependent on external aid. There are also questions about the distribution of benefits between both Han versus Tibetans and urban versus rural dwellers; the impact of development projects on the environment; and their deleterious effects on traditional Tibetan culture.’42 Checkpoints from roads entering the Tibetan Autonomous Region were removed and this facilitated the process of Han migration along with the construction of the Tibetan Qinghai railway. Now that the doors to Tibet were officially opened, thousands of Han Chinese came to Lhasa to set up businesses. Some of the key businesses and shops both in Lhasa and elsewhere in Tibet were run by the Chinese and the economic gap between local Tibetans and the Han Chinese grew significantly, adding more fuel to an already blazing fire. In relation to making Tibet more accessible to the Han Chinese, Schaik writes, ‘recognising that Tibet and other areas in western China had been left behind in China’s economic boom, in 1999 the Chinese premier, Jiang Zemin, announced a massive investment of resources called Xibu Da Kaifa, ‘Open up the West.’….The following year, the beginning of the new millennium saw the emergence of Mao’s old dreams: the construction of a highspeed rail link to Lhasa. This incredible feat of engineering, crossing the shifting permafrost of the Changtang plateau, was adopted by the Party as one of its chief priorities. The construction of the railway was rushed forward and completed ahead of schedule in 2006, far more quickly than international observers had thought possible. The railway made access to Tibet, and its natural resources, much easier.’43 The issue of Han migration and sending more Han Chinese people to Tibet has exacerbated the situation. The decision to open Tibet for various business activities run by Han and Hui Chinese people was taken intentionally during the Second Tibet Work Forum in 1984. This decision was taken in spite of the stiff opposition and resistance that came from Tibetan officials. Since the Second Tibet Work Forum of 1984, Beijing has not done anything to restrict or control the flow of Han Chinese people entering the Tibetan Autonomous Region. Because of this large numbers of Han and Hui people, both legal and illegal migrants have not only flooded Tibet but have also acquired a dominant position in the key businesses of the province. The Qinghai-Tibet railway line has only accelerated this process of Han people coming to Tibet and settling in Tibet. This policy of encouraging and urging Han people to enter Tibet and settle there is in keeping with the CCP’s security policies and nation-building rationale of packing in as many ethnic groups as possible, especially the Han Chinese, in Tibet. This would then have the long term effect of creating a formidable proChina constituency in Tibet. This in turn also has the strong possibility of extinguishing the political aspirations of the Tibetan nationalists who

Conflict in Tibet 89 are in favour of having their separate homeland. They would also have the potential of supplementing the coercive role played by the police and other security personnel. The Han Chinese are also often seen as the superior and more civilised ethnic group, who descended from the yellow emperor, Huang Di, and were often seen as more skilled and educated. ‘Some Han Chinese view minority culture as backward, and minority religious education as being of little value.’44 Their presence is likely to have a moderniz­ ing impact on local Tibetans who are often viewed by the political elite as superstitious, backward and unskilled. The state is very much in favour of ethnic Tibetans socially engaging with the Han because it is believed that the so-called modernising effect will push the Tibetans away from feudal practices and religion and allow them ultimately to embrace a modern life. At the same time, Han Chinese migration reduces the ability of ethnic Tibetans to practise regional autonomy in a meaningful way especially when there are better educated and better connected Han Chinese people dominating the key businesses and regional politics.45 Topgyal writes, ‘in Eastern Tibet, immigration of Chinese began in the 18th century when the Qing dynasty annexed these regions. Immigration in the reform era began with an economic rationale, but was aided by infrastructure building, especially in the transportation sector. Tibetan concerns about the railway’s abetting the influx of Chinese into Tibet is illustrative of their sense that Chinese policies contribute indirectly, if not directly, to the problem of Chinese immigration into Tibet. Tibetans consider Chinese immigration as a grave threat to their identity.….In TAR, although the countryside is predominantly Tibetan, as in the neighbouring provinces (over 85 per cent of Tibetans live in rural areas in TAR), Han Chinese now outnumber Tibetans in Lhasa and Shigatse, the two biggest cities in TAR.’46 Thus, Chinese immigration into Tibet has been the result of state policy and the voluntary migration of Han and Hui Chinese who wanted to exploit and take advantage of the economic opportunities in Tibet because of increased state investment and the money that Beijing poured into the TAR. A section of the Chinese population is temporary and seasonal, but Tibetans feel fearful that these numbers will increase in future with the passage of time. There is also the possibility that Beijing could legalise their residency in the TAR whenever the security situation got worse and when it becomes difficult to crush the pro-independence movements. Han Chinese dominance in economics and politics only problematizes the situation further. The demographic imbalance in favour of the Han Chinese people only complicates Tibetan vulnerabilities. Tibetans have often feared that their position will become similar to that of the Manchus, who were once a proud people who had ruled China, but in the present scenario are thoroughly sinicized. Continuous waves of Chinese migration have also changed the physical features of the places where Han people have settled. This reminds Tibetan people of the vulnerability of their own identity. Many traditional parts of Lhasa have been destroyed and contemporary style Chinese houses

90  Conflict in Tibet are increasingly taking over the urban landscape. Street signs and business names are often in bold Chinese characters. All of this collectively has made Tibetans feel even more vulnerable and marginalised in their own land. Wider support for the Tibetan cause The Tibetan cause became even more visible worldwide after celebrities like Richard Gere started to support the Dalai Lama. Awareness about the issue was also spread through Hollywood movies like the 1997 film, Kundun, rock concerts and public endorsement by celebrities. This international support gained in momentum before the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Foreign sympathisers and the Tibetan community in exile used this as an opportunity to express their support for the Dalai Lama’s cause. This, however, did not go down well with Chinese students abroad who felt that the western world should stop interfering in China’s domestic policies and emphasized on the point that Tibet had always been an integral part of China. It became clear that there was a lot of anger amongst Chinese students in the West and that many felt strongly about western criticism of China’s policies in Tibet. These counter-protests by Chinese students in the western world was symbolic of a deeper issue and change in China, which was that nationalism as an ideology was increasingly beginning to replace socialism as an ideology. The CCP now moved away from talking about the people to talking about the nation. Western criticism of China’s policies in Tibet only served to strengthen these nationalist tendencies. People in mainstream Chinese society became very vocal and started talking about China’s links with Tibet and how Tibet had always historically been a part of China. Policies that were previously restricted to the political elite in Beijing were now beginning to get popular support especially from young Chinese people on the mainland. Although the Tibetan issue has now become a lot more visible in international affairs, nothing has really changed in Tibet or in the relations between Beijing and the Tibetan government in exile. With China being on the rise in recent years and with it being a major trading partner, no country has taken the Tibetan cause seriously enough to bring about effective change in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. The self-Immolations as a way of protesting against Beijing’s occupation of Tibet still continue and the CCP show no signs of altering their position in a meaningful way. China’s economic rise and power has made international politicians very wary and now that there is an understanding that the world especially the western world cannot do without China, open support for the Tibetan cause has weakened. Adrien Frossard writes, ‘the GDP of China has been growing at an average of ten per cent for more than fifteen years, and it has acquired huge clout in the international economy. This gives China more leverage than ever to make its voice heard on what it perceives as ‘core issues,’ Tibet being identified as such. It is therefore likely that China will, more than ever, exert pressure on external players to stop helping the exiles.’47

Conflict in Tibet 91

The contemporary situation Recent events Before the Beijing Olympics in the year 2008, there were huge protests that were demanding the release of political prisoners and monks. These began when about five hundred monks from the Drepung monastery demanded the release of their imprisoned colleagues and were also asking the government to lift the restrictions that it had imposed on the people especially with regard to religious practise and festivals. Monks from the Ramoche temple started to march through the streets in Lhasa and when the policemen tried to stop them, local Tibetans started attacking the police. As these attacks increased there was a distinct ethnic aspect to the situation because Tibetans were increasingly attacking not just the police who were there to enforce Beijing’s restrictions, but also the Chinese residents of Lhasa. Chinese shops and businesses were attacked and many Han Chinese people were killed during these attacks. The CCP refused to acknowledge that their repressive policies had anything to do with the violence. As security personnel moved in to gain control over the situation, violence broke out in the other Tibetan parts of the PRC. Protests spread to places like Gansu province and Sichuan province, where countryside Tibetans placed the Tibetan flag on top of government buildings after removing the Chinese flag. There were demands for independence and calls for the return of the Dalai Lama to his homeland. These protests clearly show that Tibetans feel strongly about the fact that their cultural and religious identity has been and is still under threat and the protests is a way of releasing their pent up anger about the situation. During the radical phases of Maoism, the monastic community had fought against the state’s attempt to impose secular education in the monasteries. Now, this secular education is available to most Tibetans. The development of the Tibetan language or indigenous education has not been fully realised. There are very few opportunities to learn Tibetan once a child has finished primary school. Some Tibetan parents have also realised that it is better for their children to be fluent in Mandarin Chinese or Cantonese for purposes of getting a job. This is a bit similar to the situation in neighbouring India, where many Indian parents believe that an English education for their children would help them with employment and is much better than being educated in any of the regional Indian languages like Bengali, Punjabi, Marathi, Assamese etc. Many Tibetan students end up in universities in China proper. Fearing that their children will lose their Tibetan identity, some Tibetan parents have taken the daring step of sending their children to educational institutions in India where there is more political freedom and also where Tibetan children can have the opportunity of being educated amongst the exile community. Yet this policy of repression has not really stopped Tibetans from preserving their identity and learning Tibetan and Buddhist philosophy. Schaik

92  Conflict in Tibet writes, ‘Those who decide to be monks in modern Tibet are not choosing an easy option, as was the case before 1959. Most are committed to study programmes. Buddhist communities have sprung up again outside the monasteries as well. In Kham, where there is a tradition of such things, a sprawling community of dedicated Buddhist practitioners, both monks and laypeople, gathered around a charismatic teacher called Khenpo Jigme Puntsog in the 1990s. The community was focussed on Buddhist teaching and practise, but its size scared the local authorities and, in 2001, after Jigme Puntsog refused to reduce the number of his students, most of the camp was destroyed and the community dispersed.’48 Using force has also not worked on the Chinese mainland including in provinces neighbouring Tibet. I got the opportunity to visit the ancient statue of the Leshan Buddha in Sichuan province in the November of 2016, and I was surprised to see how the site was absolutely heaving with Chinese Buddhist pilgrims.49 Tibetans have also taken advantage of the little bit of freedom that they have. When restrictions are lifted, many come forward and write Tibetan poetry, history and novels depicting Tibetan life but also try hard not to challenge the CCP and Party statements. The challenge is to strike a balance between preserving one’s identity in a predominantly authoritarian state and at the same time not upsetting the party officials. Tibetans have also made use of the internet to express their cultural identities. Those who have access to the internet have used it to communicate with other Tibetans across the globe and despite the state’s attempts at trying to control the internet, forums where Tibetans can have discussions about their identity still have a way of popping up from time to time. In relation to internet activism, Elizabeth Economy writes, ‘internet activism in China exploded during the final years of Hu Jintao’s tenure. The Chinese people logged on to engage in lively political social discourse, to gain access to the world outside China, and to organize themselves to protest against perceived injustices. The Chinese government responded with a stream of technological fixes and political directives to contain what they viewed as the most dangerous behaviour, yet the boundaries of internet life continued to expand.’50 Whilst trying to express their religious and cultural identity there has been a tendency to go back into ancient history and bring out elements of ancient Tibetan culture which make the Tibetan Autonomous Region different from the Chinese mainland. The 2008 uprising In March of 2008, Tibet witnessed one of the biggest uprisings since the 1950s. Whilst the Chinese government claimed that 18 civilians and one policeman died and 382 civilians were injured, the Central Tibetan Administration in India claimed that 220 Tibetans had been killed, 1,294 had been injured, 5,600 arrested, 290 sentenced and over a thousand had disappeared in the crackdown that followed. The crackdown was brutal. It not only widened the gap between the Tibetan Government in Exile or Central Tibetan

Conflict in Tibet 93 Administration and Beijing, but blackened China’s image internationally and strained her external relations with various other countries. In relation to the 2008 uprising, Cao and Xu argue, ‘Chinese nationalists upheld the official claim that the violence was deliberately planned by the mobs and was aimed at attacking Han and Hui civilians. Beijing accused the Dalai Lama and Tibetan secessionists of being responsible for the conspiracy and sabotaging activities. Western observers, however, were inclined to sympathize with the protestors and attributed this incident to the Tibetan’s reaction to their long term political and economic oppression under the CCP’s rule. Supporters of the TGIE regarded this incident as Tibetan’s defiance to the infringement of human rights caused by the detainment of monks.’51 The 2008 uprising was, by and large, a reaction against China’s policies of tightening its grip over Tibet especially through Han migration, which was increasingly undermining Tibetan cultural identity. The uprising can be seen as a set of protests defensive in nature that tried to stop or reverse the waves of Han migration. The Tibetan sense of threats to their identity had been felt as early as 2004, which was the year when the Tibetan communist revolutionary, Phuntsok Wangyal, expressed his fears to then head of the state, Hu Jintao about the continuous waves of Han migration and policies of sinicization with particular emphasis on how the Tibetan language had been replaced by mainstream Chinese. Some of the other state policies which had their role to play in causing the uprising included policies like lack of religious freedom, the eroding impact that Chinese culture was having on Tibetan culture, provocative propaganda and the economic exploitation of Tibet’s regional resources by Beijing. The uprising was a struggle for national survival and the ability of the Tibetans as a nation to survive and develop without losing their special and distinct characteristic features. Chinese policies were increasingly threatening Tibetan identity. What began as an annual observance of the Tibetan uprising day ultimately led to unrest, which spread beyond Lhasa. To quell the unrest, Chinese security personnel intervened more forcefully towards the end. Protests also broke out internationally in India, Nepal and the West supporting the Tibetan cause. In the final analysis, it was the complex mixture of social exclusion, economic polarisation, problematic race relations and social conflict that gave rise to the uprising of 2008. As a part of the crackdown, hundreds of Tibetans were killed, arrested and subjected to all kinds of torture. Tibetans who took part in the political protests were also imprisoned and detained. The re-education program intensified and the monastic community were told to regard the Dalai Lama as a de facto criminal. Self-Immolations One of the ways by which Tibetans have responded to the crackdown and to Beijing’s policy of high handedness in Tibet is through Self-Immolations. Guo writes, ‘Self-Immolation refers to killing oneself as a sacrifice….In most

94  Conflict in Tibet cases, an act of Self-immolation, which is unlike a suicidal attack, is not intended to cause physical harm to anyone else or to inflict material damage. Self-Immolation is tolerated by some elements of Mahayana Buddhism and Hinduism, and it has been practised for many centuries, especially in India, for various reasons, including Sati, political protest, devotion and renouncement.’52 Self-Immolations should also be seen as a form of protest against the policy of cultural genocide in Tibet followed by Beijing. ‘It may well be argued that the Tibetans who have killed themselves in this excruciatingly painful way have been giving up something of value, their lives, for the sake of the greater value, namely the freedom of Tibet from Chinese domination, or at least the freedom of Tibetans to retain their own culture, language and religion without interference although under Chinese political control.’53 The Tibetan plateau did not settle down after the 2008 crackdown. Protests have been going on, although these protests have taken a different form. Self-Immolations, civil disobedience and boycotts would be a few good examples. Lhakar or White Wednesdays is a cultural regeneration movement in which Tibetans very consciously decide to eat Tibetan food, wear Tibetan clothes, speak Tibetan, eat Tibetan food etc, as a way of protesting against Beijing’s rule in Tibet. Monks have also evaded Chinese monastic rules by leaving the monastery. A great deal of protest literature has also now come into existence. Tsering Topgyal writes, ‘since 27th February 2009, 143 Tibetans inside Tibet have self-immolated to protest against Chinese rule over their country.…From the videos and the audios of the self-Immolations and reports from eyewitnesses, we know that the most commonly shouted slogans called for the return of the Dalai Lama, Tibetan unity, Tibetan freedom or independence, leading many analysts to suggest that the Self-Immolators do not have a common agenda.’54 The fact that the Self-Immolations were a response to the Chinese crackdown in 2008 is clear from when they started to take place. A monk by the name of Tapey became the first-ever SelfImmolation protestor inside Tibet on the twenty-seventh of February, 2009, which is almost a year after the 2008 unrest. ‘Holding up a Tibetan flag and a picture of the Dalai Lama, he was then shot by the police whilst on fire.’55 The self-immolators were also responding to the brutal security and surveillance operations, the force often used by the bureaucracy against Tibetans and the content of the Patriotic Education Campaigns. A series of Self-Immolations took place in 2011 and 2012 in the Tibetan Autonomous Region, India and Nepal. ‘Jampa Yeshi ran through the streets of New Delhi, his body aflame….Yeshi sacrificed himself to protest the impending visit of China’s president, Hu Jintao, who was scheduled to speak the next day to the Indian Parliament; in anticipation of President Hu’s appearance, as many as six hundred protestors amassed outside parliament with placards reading, ‘Tibet is not part of China’ and ‘Tibet is burning.’56 In 2012, a few Nobel Prize winners of peace sent a letter to Hu Jintao urging him to free the political prisoners and asked him to stop using

Conflict in Tibet 95 intimidation tactics against protestors. According to this group, the SelfImmolations symbolised the deep frustration that Tibetan people felt with the current situation in Tibet. The letter also asked the government to ease restrictions so that foreign diplomats, international organisations such as NGO’s and journalists could have entry and easy access to Tibet. The state regards suicide as a serious sin and the person who commits this sin will not be able to reincarnate for nine generations. True Buddhists do not kill anybody, including themselves, and neither do they instigate others to kill. The state also argued that in Vajrayana Buddhism, suicide was the most serious sin, almost equivalent to killing the Buddha. Chinese state authorities have also questioned the theological basis of these acts. One of the first ways of dealing with these self-immolators was to label them as outcasts and terrorists. The ethnic Tibetan chairman of the Tibetan Autonomous Region government, Padma Choling, argued that these acts were causing instability and disruption in Tibet and also said that they did not have popular support. When it became clear to the political elite that their official interpretations of Buddhist theology was not going to go far in dealing with the situation, they decided to fall back on their earlier repressive policies. According to the state, the selfImmolators were in fact de facto criminals and terrorists. In 2012, the government issued new extra-legal policies to deal with the Self-Immolations. Again in 2012, the state authorities arrested two Tibetans, Lorang Konchok and his nephew, Lorang Tsering in Sichuan province accusing them of instigating and forcing others to carry out Self-Immolations. SelfImmolators were also being charged with public security offence. The CCP has also militarized the parts of the Tibetan Autonomous Region where these Self-Immolations have taken place. Party operatives have also been stationed there and have been asked to become friendly with the monastic community. Tibetans who would accept Beijing’s gestures of friendship were to be rewarded (with healthcare benefits and television sets) and those who would reject Beijing’s gestures of friendship were to be expelled from their monasteries.

Recent field trip to the Tibetan settlements in India, 2019 In December of 2019, I managed to travel to some of the Tibetan settlements in India. I gathered data by interviewing Buddhist monks in some of the more prominent monasteries in North Bengal and Sikkim. I kept the conversation open-ended and let the monks speak about Tibetan Buddhism, its place in India and their views on Sino-Tibetan relations. On the 19th of December 2019, I interviewed a monk at the Bokar monastery in Mirik in North Bengal. One of the first things that this monk mentioned was that there is more freedom in India to practise one’s own religion. Although the older lamas tend to be from Tibet, many of the current practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism are actually locals from Sikkim,

96  Conflict in Tibet Bhutan, Nepal and Arunachal Pradesh. These days many Tibetan lamas travel to the West. Bokar monastery is a Tibetan Buddhist monastery and the lamas and monks here are reading the scripts in Tibetan. The economy in Tibet has changed but the numbers of lamas have reduced. In terms of India’s relations with China, Dharamsala has relations with China, but at the same time, it doesn’t. The Sino-Indian relationship is complicated as is the Dalai- Lama’s relationship with Beijing. It has become increasingly difficult to define the Sino-Indian relationship. The same monk also mentioned that the Indian economy had been growing. The old monastery had been established between the years 1984 and 1986, but now this building is a library. The new monastery was built in the years 2003–2004. I visited the Bokar monastery during prayer time and one could see that the practices involved many rituals that were similar to Hinduism. There was also an image of the Hindu elephant god, Ganesha, on one of the walls of the monastery. The use of drums, blowing of the conch and other musical instruments used during the prayers reminded me of some of the practices and rituals associated with mainstream Hinduism.57 On the 20th of December, 2019, I got the chance to visit Lingdum monastery, also called the Ranka monastery in Sikkim. I got the chance to have a conversation with a Buddhist monk at this monastery. He mentioned that the mother monastery was actually in Tibet and is about 600 years old. The Ranka monastery in Sikkim was just a branch of the original monastery in Tibet. The original name is Zurmang and is located in Qinghai province in greater Tibet. He also mentioned that Tibetan Buddhism originates from the ancient university town of Nalanda in Bihar, North India. The Chinese have done their best to tighten their grip over Tibet.58 On the 21st of December, 2019, I visited Durpin monastery in Kalimpong, North Bengal. The Durpin monastery is also called the Zang Dok Palri monastery. This monastery is linked with the Nyingmapa sect of Tibetan Buddhism and is dedicated to Lord Padmasambhava or Guru Rinpoche, who is often seen as the second Buddha by followers in Tibetan Buddhism. Most of the monks here are of Nepali descent. Some are also of Bhutanese descent. The monk I interviewed here had something interesting to say. He said that some of the monks do ‘bad things-they want to free Tibet. If you follow the rules of the Chinese government, then the PRC actually allows you to practise the dharma. In India, we follow the rules of the Indian government. It is true that there is more freedom in India. At this monastery, we are mainly students studying Tibetan science, Tibetan mathematics etc. Buddhism is about kindness, compassion and having a pure heart. You can be a monk but do a regular job at the same time. It is us who decide, who gets to be a monk. When Tibetan monks come to India, they come secretly and not with passports or visas.’ It seemed clear after speaking to this monk that local people from Nepal, North Bengal Sikkim and Bhutan were increasingly being drawn into Tibetan Buddhism. This could potentially strain Sino-Indian relations further in future.59

Conflict in Tibet 97 On the 21st of December 2019, I interviewed a senior monk at Kagyu Thekchenling Institute in Lava, North Bengal, India. This monastery is also called Lava monastery. The monk whom I interviewed mentioned that the old monastery was built in 1987 and land was donated by the local community. The founder of Lava monastery was the Third Jamgon Kongtrul Rinpoche who himself was from Rumtek monastery, but his parents were from Tibet. This monastery is linked with the Kagyu sect of Tibetan Buddhism. He mentioned that Tibetan monks in Tibet practised Buddhism but there was more freedom in India. Monks can practise Buddhism in Tibet as long as they do not contradict Party policy. They are free to practise as long as they do not say ‘Free Tibet.’ Many Tibetans want to have one country but two systems like Hong Kong, which is better than being under direct Chinese Communist rule. There are a million Tibetan’s in India who have now taken up Indian citizenship and formed their own government. India of course has more freedom since it has allowed Tibetans to form their own government in exile. He went on to say that Tibetan Buddhism ‘is like water.’ In other words, it is marked by flexibility. If Buddhism is practised in Tibet, it takes a Tibetan character. If it is practised in India, it takes an Indian identity. He ended by saying that there are many Chinese people in China proper who also practise Buddhism although the political elite may be atheistic.60 On the 22nd of December 2019, I visited the famous and very impressive Dali monastery in Darjeeling, North Bengal, India. The lama I spoke to mentioned that he was an Indian citizen. He went onto say that India was independent and a free country and that China was communist so the rules that applied to religious groups practising the dharma in India were bound to be different from the rules in China. Since I spent some time at the Dali monastery, I got the opportunity to observe the religious practices during prayer time. The monks at the monastery were very hospitable and offered guests/visitors like me tea, and pillau rice, which was also offered to the other monks who were praying. The whole prayer service was very ritualistic, with the beating of drums, blowing of the conch and playing of other musical instruments. On the walls of the Dali monastery it said, ‘This is to commemorate the inauguration of Druk Thubten Sangag Choling, by his Holiness The XIV Dalai Lama, Spiritual and Temporal Leader of Tibet, On the 26th of February, 1993.’ The Buddhist art on the walls of the Dali monastery has striking similarities with Brahma from Hinduism. The building itself seemed like a miniature version of the Potala Palace in Lhasa.61 The similarity between Tibetan Buddhism and Hinduism is not surprising given that Tibetan Buddhism originated in ancient India. The fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso and Thubten Chodron have discussed this in great detail in their book, Buddhism: One Teacher, Many Traditions. ‘Tibetan Buddhism is rooted in Indian monastic universities such as Nalanda. Beginning in the early centuries of the Common Era and lasting until the early thirteenth century, Nalanda and other monastic universities

98  Conflict in Tibet consisted of many erudite scholars and practitioners emphasizing different sutras and espousing a variety of Buddhist philosophical tenets. Buddhism first came to Tibet in the seventh century through two wives of the Tibetan monarch Songtsen Gampo (605 or 617–49), one a Nepali princess the other a Chinese princess, who brought Buddhist statues to Tibet. Buddhist texts in Sanskrit and Chinese soon followed. From the late eighth century onward, Tibetans preferred the texts coming directly from India, and these formed the bulk of Buddhist literature translated into Tibetan.’62

Conclusion This chapter has looked at the multiple facets of the complex Tibetan conflict. Whilst the internal side of the conflict relates to Beijing’s repressive policies in the Tibetan Autonomous Region like the struggle sessions and Han migration, the external side of the conflict relates to India’s role and the role played by the Tibetan diaspora. This chapter has also paid close attention to the role played by race, ethnicity and religion. The Tibetan conflict, in the final analysis, is China’s failure in its nation-building project. The way forward as far as the internal side of the conflict is concerned is for the Chinese state to take a more federally minded approach. As history has shown, allowing a certain degree of political autonomy and cultural freedom to the Tibetans is what sustained the relationship between the centre and the periphery during earlier times. Following a coercive policy of might is right is only likely to meet with a backlash and further resistance from below. Some form of decentralisation of power would help in easing the tension. The CCP would need to consider pulling back the military so that people can begin to think in normal, human and political ways. Ethnic minorities like the Tibetans and Uygur Muslims are often subjected to racism, micro-aggressions, overt acts of violence, unintentional bias and othering. This urgently needs looking into. The dominant Han Chinese ethnic majority are often seen as the more civilised, advanced, skilful and superior race, whilst ethnic minorities like Tibetans are viewed in a negative light and seen as uncivilised, backward and linked with primitive customs and practices. In relation to racism in China, Clare Harris, writes, ‘in national museums and theme parks, ‘minorities’ like the Tibetans, Mongolians, and Hui were depicted as specimens of unchanging traditionalism: their ethnicity and culture configured as a raw material that needed to be shaped and moulded for their own benefit by the ‘advanced’ Han….Within this project, Tibetans were trained to look upon their material heritage as the outdated relics of religion and in a secular, communist mode.’63 All kinds of prejudices, biases and discrimination exist against minorities in China. ‘….prejudices and discrimination continue to exist, including the frequently criticised appointment of non-Tibetans as the First Party Secretary of the TAR. The higher the government level, the more likely a

Conflict in Tibet 99 Chinese cadre will be the First Party Secretary, and it is often the Chinese cadre who is doing the real policymaking.’64 For meaningful change and long-lasting peace, the voices of Tibetans need to be heard and taken seriously on key economic, political and social issues. In other words, the Tibetan voice needs to be more at the forefront and ingrained in the decision making process. Another area that would need to change is Beijing’s reliance on hard power65 in restive ethnic minority provinces like Tibet. Currently, Beijing’s counter-insurgency policies are too top-down and rely on force. A policy of might is right can never carry on for too long as history has shown us. This would need to change soon to give local people enough breathing space so that they can begin to think in normal, political and human ways. To deal with the external dimension of the conflict, diplomatic missions and high levels talks between India and China are always a good starting point, but because there is both a knowledge and a trust deficit66 on both sides, understanding each other’s perspective on the Tibetan issue would go a long way in bridge building and bringing about long-lasting peace. ‘Given its territorial size, its larger economy and its greater military resources, it is obvious for Indian decision-makers to remain wary of Chinese intentions.’67 The two countries could also consider third party intervention to resolve the on-going boundary dispute.

Notes

1. M. Dillon, China: A Modern History, I.B. Taurus, London and New York, 2012, p. 370. 2. H. Paulson, Jr, Dealing with China, Headline Publishing Group: London, 2015/2016, p. 117. 3. Participant Observation, Research field trip to Ladakh, 2015, and Sikkim, India, 2019. 4. R. Guo, China’s Regional Development and Tibet, Springer: Singapore, 2016, p. 2. 5. T. Topgyal, China and Tibet: The Perils of Insecurity, Hurst: London, 2016, p. 47. 6. T. May, ‘Central Asia: The Mongols, 1206–1405’, in Jim Masselos’s edited, The Great Empires of Asia, Thames and Hudson: London, 2010/2018, pp. 38–51. 7. R. Bickers, The Scramble for China: Foreign Devils in the Qing Empire, 1832– 1914, Penguin Books: London, 2012, pp. 68–69. 8. Topgyal, p. 48. 9. Topgyal, p. 49. 10. H. Hung and H. Kuo, ‘One Country, Two Systems, and its Antagonists in Tibet and Taiwan’, China Information, 24(3), 2010, pp. 317–318. 11. D.M. Crowe, ‘The Tibetan Question: Tibetan, Chinese and Western Perspectives’, Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity, 41(6), 2013, p. 1104. 12. G. Kerr, A Short History of China: From Ancient Dynasties to Economic Powerhouse, Pocket Essentials, Harpenden: Herts, 2013, p. 131. 13. J. Keay, China: A History, Harper Press: London, 2009, p. 500. 14. R. Mitter, Modern China: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, OUP: Oxford, 2008, p. 40. 15. L.B. Halper and S. Halper, Tibet: An Unfinished Story, Hurst: London, 2014, pp. 252–254.

100  Conflict in Tibet 16. D.N. Panigrahi, The Himalayas and India-China Relations, Routledge, South Asia Edition: London and New York, 2016, p. 68. 17. Z. Ramsay, ‘Religion, Politics and the Meaning of Self-Sacrifice for Tibet’, Contemporary South Asia, 24(1), 2016, p. 76. 18. S.V. Schaik, Tibet: A History, Yale University Press: New Haven/London, 2011, p. 238. 19. N.W. Ross, Buddhism: A Way of Life and Thought, Vintage Books: New York, 1981, p. 104. 20. X. Mingxu, ‘Complete Autonomy: The Best Approach to Peaceful Resolution of the Tibet Problem’, Journal of Contemporary China, 7(18), 1998, p. 370. 21. B. Womack, ‘Resolving Asymmetric Stalemate: the Case of the Tibet Question’, Journal of Contemporary China, 16(52), 2007, p. 444. 22. Schaik, pp. 240–241. 23. Schaik, p. 241. 24. The Dalai Lama of Tibet, Tenzin Gyatso, Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama of Tibet, Abacus: London, 1998, pp. 114–115. 25. O.A. Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750, Vintage Books: London, 2013, p. 359. 26. J. Fenby, The Penguin History of Modern China: The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present, Second Edition, Penguin Books: London, 2009/2013, p. 396. 27. J.N. Wassterstrom, China in the 21st Century: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press: Oxford, NY, 2010/2013, p. 63–64. 28. Schaik, pp. 244–245. 29. J. Zeng, The Chinese Communist Party’s Capacity to Rule: Ideology, Legitimacy, and Party Cohesion, Palgrave MacMillan: Basingstoke, 2016, p. 20. 30. S. Gupta, The Himalayan Face-Off: Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte, Hachette India: Gurgaon, 2014. 31. T. Miller, China’s Asia Dream, Zed Books: London, 2017, pp. 166–167. 32. T. Grunfeld, The Making of Modern Tibet, Revised Edition, Routledge: London and New York, 2015, pp. 190–191. 33. Field trip to Sikkim, India, December 2018 and April and December, 2019. 34. A. Mazumdar, ‘India’s Soft Power Diplomacy Under the Modi Administration: Buddhism, Diaspora and Yoga’, Asian Affairs, 49(3), 2018, p. 471. 35. Field trip to North Bengal, India, 2019. 36. Field trip to North Bengal, India, 2019. 37. Schaik, p. 250. 38. Schaik, p. 257. 39. Dillon, 2012, p. 371. 40. S.T. Chang, ‘A Realist Hypocrisy? Scripting Sovereignty in Sino-Tibetan Relations and the Changing Posture of Britain and the United States’, Asian Ethnicity, 12(3), 2011, p. 328. 41. Dillon, 2012, p. 372. 42. J.T. Dreyer, ‘Economic Development in Tibet under the People’s Republic of China’, Journal of Contemporary China, 12(36), 2003, p. 411. 43. Schaik, p. 264. 44. G. Postiglione, Z. Zhiyong and B. Jiao, ‘From Ethnic Segregation to Impact Integration: State Schooling and Identity Construction for Rural Tibetans’, Asian Ethnicity, 5(2), 2004, p. 199. 45. Topgyal, 2016, pp. 58–59. 46. Topgyal, 2016, pp. 93–94. 47. A. Frossard, ‘Reincarnation Under Stress: The Dalai Lama’s Succession and India-China Relations’, Strategic Analysis, 37(4), 2013, p. 464. 48. Schaik, P267.

Conflict in Tibet 101 49. Participant Observation and field research trip to China, Sichuan Province, November 2016. 50. E.C. Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State, Oxford University Press, OUP: New York, 2018, p. 71. 51. Y. Cao and J. Xu, ‘The Tibetan Problem in the Milieu of a Rising China: Findings from a Survey on Americans’ attitudes toward China’, Journal of Contemporary China, 24(92), 2015, pp. 240–241. 52. Guo, 2016, p. 63. 53. M. Gould, ‘Self-Immolation and Martyrdom in Tibet’, Mortality, 19(2), 2014, p. 176. 54. Topgyal, 2016, pp. 169–170. 55. Z. Ramsay, ‘Religion, Politics and the Meaning of Self-Sacrifice for Tibet’, Contemporary South Asia, 24(1), 2016, p. 80. 56. S.J. Hartnett, ‘Tibet is Burning: Competing Rhetorics of Liberation, Occupation, Resistance and Paralysis on the Roof of the World’, Quarterly Journal of Speech, 99(3), 2013, p. 284. 57. Fieldtrip to Mirik, North Bengal, India, December 2019. 58. Fieldtrip to Ranka Monastery, Sikkim, India, December 2019. 59. Fieldtrip to Kalimpong, North Bengal, India, December 2019. 60. Fieldtrip to Lava, North Bengal, India, December 2019. 61. Fieldtrip to Darjeeling, North Bengal, India, December 2019. 62. The Dalai Lama (Tenzin Gyatso) and Thubten Chodron, Buddhism: One Teacher, Many Traditions, Wisdom Publications: Somerville, MA, USA, 2014, p. 11. 63. C. Harris, ‘The Potala Palace: Remembering to Forget in Contemporary Tibet’, South Asian Studies, 29(1), 2013, p. 66. 64. Z. Hao, ‘Sovereignty, Ethnicity, and Culture: the Tibetan issue in an Institutionalist Perspective’, Journal of Contemporary China, 21(73), 2012, p. 137. 65. L. Odgaard and T.G. Nielsen, ‘China’s Counter-insurgency Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang’, Journal of Contemporary China, 23(87), 2014, p. 535. 66. J. Jacob, ‘For a New Kind of Forward Policy: Tibet and Sino-Indian Relations’, China Report, 47(2), 2011, p. 133. 67. Y. Joshi and A. Mukherjee, ‘From Denial to Punishment: The Security Dilemma and Changes in India’s Military Strategy Towards China’, Asian Security, 15(1), 2019, p. 28.

3

The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang

Geographical location Xinjiang is China’s largest province and is located in the extreme northwestern side of the country. It is also called the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It has an immense territory, of more than 1.6 million square km, 2000 km from East to West and 1600 km from South to North.1 It is a vast area of mountains and deserts and the silk route is said to have connected this part of Asia to the Middle East. Although a part of China and hence immediately a part of East Asia, geographically, Xinjiang is also seen as a part of inner Asia or central Asia. It shares international boundaries with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan in central Asia to the West, and with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India in Southern Asia to the South. China’s disputed territory with India, Aksai Chin is in Xinjiang. It also shares international borders with Russia and Mongolia to the North and East. Its international boundary is about 5600 km. Within China, it shares boundaries with the provinces of Gansu, Qinghai and the Tibetan Autonomous Region or Xizang. It is about three times the size of France and so far away from Beijing that it is effectively two hours behind Beijing.2 Xinjiang is often seen as quite remote and cut off from both the rest of the Chinese mainland as well as from the rest of the Middleeast and Central Asia. This is partly because of the harsh geographical terrain and topography of the province. Some of the world’s highest mountain ranges cut through this province. They include the Karakorum, the Kunlun, the Pamirs, the Altai Mountains and the Tien Shan. The Taklamakan desert is also in Xinjiang. The region is isolated and feelings of aloofness are still very strong. ‘Like most inland provinces in China, Xinjiang’s opening up to the outside world started much later than the coastal regions.’3 Xinjiang is also known to be the home to some very rare animals such as the Bactrian camel. It is one of China’s major fruit-growing provinces and is rich in natural resources. It is China’s natural gas-producing region. The region is known to experience extreme temperatures especially during winters. Xinjiang is often seen as the centre of the world and furthest from the sea, being equidistant to both Europe and Asia. It has a very interior location. This vast

The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang 103 Chinese administrative unit is landlocked. Being close to Central Asia and quite close to the Middleeast, the province is predominantly Muslim and the Uyghur, a Turkic group of people are the dominant ethnic group here. Xinjiang is one of China’s ethnic minority provinces. Although the Uyghur community is the dominant ethnic group here, the entire province is quite multi-ethnic since it shares international borders with other countries and there are constant crossovers of people across the borders. For instance, there are Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kyrgyz people and Uzbeks in Xinjiang who form a part of its ethnic composition. The provincial capital is Urumqi and is often regarded as the city furthest from the seacoast. David Eimer in his ‘The Emperor Far Away: Travels at the Edge of China,’ writes, ‘Many of the minorities are a mystery even to the Chinese. Living thousands of kilometres away from the Han heartlands, they inhabit regions of geographical extremes: the remote deserts of the West and North, tropical jungle in the Southwest and the Siberian-like taiga that still covers the far Northeast of China.’4

The historical background The conflict in Xinjiang is a multifaceted one. Traditionally, as a region, Xinjiang has been contested by the Han Chinese, Central Asians of various ethnicities, and the Russians.5 Despite its multifaceted nature, at its very core, it is primarily a secessionist nationalist movement where the Uyghur community has been fighting for an independent Uyghuristan or East Turkestan or at least for more autonomy. It was once known to the Chinese as the ‘western regions.’6 Xinjiang, which used to be called Sinkiang in earlier times by western travellers, is also called Chinese Turkestan. ‘Encouraged by pan-Turkish ideas and modern forms of Muslim thinking coming in from India and the Middleeast, an increasing number of young Uyghurs and Kazakhs started thinking of themselves as inhabiting a Muslim Turkestan, half of which had been occupied by Russia and the other half held by the Chinese.’7 The separatists argue that they do not feel a sense of oneness and solidarity with mainland China or with the dominant ethnic group in China which is the Han. Uyghur separatists feel a sense of disconnect with China proper and have more of a sense of identification with people living across the international border in parts of Central Asia. It has been argued that ‘the oasis community in the South and the nomadic steppe society in the North of Xinjiang were more similar to the central Asian and Mongolian communities than the communities based on agriculture and commerce in China proper (neidi).’8 Considering the widespread adherence to the Islamic faith amongst the Uyghur people in Xinjiang, the linguistic similarity between the Uyghur people and people from Central Asia, and the considerable overlap in diet, social customs and culture between Xinjiang and Central Asia, one wonders why Xinjiang is a part of China and not a part of any of the central Asian countries.9

104  The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang

The role of religion Religious identity and China Religious identity and ethnic identity in contemporary China especially in the more peripheral parts are often intertwined. When we look at the details of the conflict in Chinese Xinjiang or for that matter even in the other more peripheral parts of China like the Tibetan Autonomous Region, we need to pay careful attention to the interaction that has been going on between religious identity and religious nationalism or revivalism on the one hand and the harshness of Chinese state policies on the other.10 This intersection between religious identity and its expression and China’s state policies deserve special attention whilst looking at conflict zones in China’s distant borderlands. Xinjiang and Tibet deserve special mention in this connection because they are China’s most deeply religious provinces. There is a very strong Islamic presence in Xinjiang just as there is a very strong Buddhist presence in Tibet. Most Uyghur people in Xinjiang feel very strongly about their Islamic identity, which does not go down well with the rest of China which was created in 1949 as an atheistic state. Historically, religious groups in China have been tolerated, but the levels of tolerance have differed from time to time. The Mao years, for instance, which were from 1949 till 1976, were the years when religious groups and ethnic minorities came under tremendous pressure. Mao’s policies towards ethnic minorities and religious groups were stringent and harsh. In this context, it is worth mentioning that Xinjiang has always been viewed unfavourably since it has a strong Islamic presence. To avoid Maoist repression many of these religious groups had gone underground. The Deng years, which were from the late seventies till the early nineties were comparatively a lot more relaxed. During this time state policies directed at religious groups were a lot more liberal in comparison to the earlier Mao phase. During the Deng years, much of the religious groups that had gone underground during the Mao years started to re-emerge. Because of Deng’s liberal approach, new religious movements also started to come into existence e.g. Li Honghzhi’s Falun Gong movement which gained popularity especially in the urban centres amongst professionals. Although levels of tolerance towards religious groups have differed from time to time, by and large, these groups have been viewed negatively. The reason why religious groups have been viewed with suspicion in China is because historically, they have had strong linkages with secret societies that have tried to overthrow the Chinese Empire. These secret societies had their own political agendas which were often at odds with the agenda of the state. Religious groups in China are seen as subversive and as recalcitrant elements and hence very threatening. From time to time throughout history religious groups especially those associated with ethnic minorities have tried to undermine the state’s political authority and

The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang 105 power. Sometimes their political agenda has been in direct conflict with that of the state. Foreign religions like Islam were viewed especially unfavourably because their foreign origins and external connections were seen to be eroding and weakening state definitions of nationalism and patriotism.11 Interestingly, Buddhism is viewed by the state as an indigenous religious tradition although it had its roots in ancient India. The reason why the state views Buddhism as an indigenous tradition and therefore less threatening is because of its long presence in China. Buddhism has existed in China for centuries. The dominant type of political nationalism in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is state-centred as it places the state at the centre of its concerns and projects the state as the embodiment of the nations will.12 All other nationalisms especially any kind of religious nationalism and secessionist nationalist movements associated with ethnic minorities are viewed as threatening. This especially applies to provinces like Xinjiang and Tibet. State policies directed towards ethnic minorities and religious groups have been based on Marxism and therefore atheism. State policies have been by and large based on the model of the former Soviet Union. ‘In authoritarian multi-ethnic countries like the PRC and the former Soviet Union, the Han Chinese and Russians respectively, have been constructed as majority nationalities. In official discourse, these majorities have been represented as culturally advanced and politically awake and as the agents of development and modernisation.’13 Minorities, in contrast, are seen as backward, underdeveloped and powerless. Minzu, which is the Chinese counterpart of the Soviet ‘nationality,’ are now officially recognised population categories. Mukherjee argues that Chinese state policies directed at ethnic minorities and religious groups is more of a ‘sinification of Marxism’ which is a blending of Han nationalism (Han being the dominant ethnic group in contemporary China), Chinese agnosticism and Marxism.14 Over the years, the Chinese state has taken a rather simplistic approach towards religious groups and often see them in binary terms. The state takes a very dichotomous approach when viewing religion in contemporary China. The state has two major categories when it comes to religion. There is the official category which encompasses religious traditions that have political representation and they practice their religion or religious activities in state registered mosques, temples, monasteries or churches. Then there is the unofficial category of religions which is often associated with ethnic minorities residing in the borderlands. The unofficial categories of religions do not have political representation and are not linked with state-controlled mosques, churches, monasteries or any other places of worship. Because the unofficial category of religions is not state registered and because they do not have any form of political representation, their activities cannot be regulated or monitored and the state cannot keep a watchful eye on these groups. Hence these unofficial groups are seen as very threatening and are often

106  The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang subjected to arbitrary and periodic repression. The state feels a sense of unease or insecurity with the unofficial group of religions. The official group of religions are treated better and state policies directed towards the official category are more liberal. The state approach taken towards the official category is gentler and mild. This is because their activities can be regulated and monitored since they have state/political representation. Because the official category has state representation, the state authorities feel that they have a better understanding of what is happening and hence there is a sense of ease. Thus, with regard to the treatment of different religious groups, there is a great deal of variation. Official groups are treated better than the unofficial groups. In this context, mention should be made of the terms, ‘zongjiao’ (which means permitted religion but not encouraged), ‘xiejiao’ (which refers to heresy) and ‘mixin’ (which refers to superstition). Mixin is a broad category referring to shamanism, primitive animism, local cults and religious traditions of ethnic minorities who tend to be more assertive as far as their religious identity is concerned. Post 9/11, the state has often used the ‘mixin’ category to crack down on groups they do not understand and regard as threatening. ‘China is a multinational state whose minority nationalities constitute eight per cent of the population and occupy approximately sixty per cent of the national territory, including its most sensitive border areas.’15 Views towards religious groups and ethnic minorities differ from person to person within the Chinese Communist political party. There are the Han chauvinists who advocate forceful integration of the minority/minzu/nationality provinces like Xinjiang and Tibet within the Chinese mainstream, and then there are the genuine liberals who advocate more autonomy for these provinces. There is no agreement amongst party officials as to what the dominant policy should be with regard to ethnic and religious minorities and overall views are highly fragmented. ‘Regional autonomy is the basic form of government for all areas inhabited by national minorities.’16 The Han nationalists are the more conservative elements in China who have been in favour of total assimilation of ethnic minority provinces into China proper. At the other end of the political spectrum are the liberals who are the more progressive elements in Chinese society who are in favour of genuine autonomy of the ethnic minority provinces like Xinjiang and Tibet. In between these two political extremes are those who tilt more towards the conservative side and those who tilt more towards the more liberal side. One of the main official documents that outline’s the state approach towards religious groups and ethnic minorities in China is a document called Document no. 19. The atheistic side of the document is quite obvious: ….we communists are atheists and must unremittingly propagate atheism, and yet at the same time, we must understand that it will be fruitless and extremely harmful to use simple coercion in dealing with people’s ideological and spiritual questions, and this includes religious

The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang 107 questions…the fact that our party proclaims and implements a policy of religious freedom does not of course mean that the communist party and its members can freely believe in religion…the party member belongs to a Marxist political party, and there can be no doubt at all that she/he must be an atheist and not a theist….17 When one reads the document, one gets the impression that the Communist Party’s propaganda policy in religious matters was to draw the bow without shooting and just to indicate the motion, but it really was finally up to the masses and the peasants to get rid of their temples.18 The document came into existence in the early eighties and is divided into three major sections. The first section looks at the historical side of religions in China. The second section looks at the contemporary situation of religious groups in China and the third and final section of the document looks at the future guidelines and what policies should be taken by future leaders of the Chinese Communist Party when dealing with different religious groups. The document warns future leaders that as China opens up its economy more and more and as China increasingly embraces global market forces, it needs to be careful of the impact that western philosophies and external ideas will have on the thought processes and thinking of indigenous people. For instance, there is a possibility of Islamist groups and Islamist ideas creeping into western China, in the Muslim province of Xinjiang from the neighbouring Muslim majority countries of Southcentral Asia. This is especially important because, since the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, the independent Central Asian republics have witnessed a broad religious resurgence, which was partly a reaction to Islam’s long suppression under Soviet rule.19 If these Islamist ideas successfully creep into the Chinese mainland especially in Xinjiang, the question is: what impact will this have on the Uyghur community in Xinjiang? Will external forces strengthen the separatist groups in Xinjiang? Will the secessionist movement in Xinjiang (often called the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)) get stronger as a result of Islamist ideas creeping into the mainland? This fear still very much exists amongst the political elite in Beijing. When Iran’s President, Mohammed Khatami visited China in the year 2000 and spoke about Tehran wanting to strengthen its relations with Xinjiang, this did not go down well with party officials. ‘By 1990, it was clear that cross border contacts were affecting aspects of Uyghur religion, politics, education, economics and ethnicity as they had for generations before communist China’s attempt to incorporate Xinjiang.’20 It has been argued that Xinjiang’s insurgency is indigenous, yet there is evidence of some external support. It has ‘received external material and ideational support from the global jihadist movement, specifically from al Qaeda and the al Qaeda linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan/IMU.’21 Chinese fear of external forces and the impact that external forces may have on Uyghur people also extends to and applies to Russia. Shichor writes, ‘given the long-standing hostility toward the Chinese, both in history and

108  The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang now, it was easier for Moscow to represent their grievances in its conflict with China…Therefore, they could be easily mobilised for anti-Chinese propaganda, espionage, and even guerrilla raids.’22 Document 19 Document 19 also makes it clear that state officials cannot in any way be a member of a religious group or organisation. Practitioners of black magic and witchcraft are punishable by law. Religious leaders and religion should never regain their feudal power and prestige. Temples and monasteries should not become the new breeding grounds of religious extremism and terrorism. They should not become the focal point of dissent. Religious pretexts should not be used in any way to undermine state power and authority. Immediately after Mao came into power in 1949, China witnessed an aggressive phase of secularisation. Temples, churches, mosques and religious property and land were snatched away from religious groups and forcefully put to secular use. Religious property had been confiscated by the state and transformed into schools, colleges, granaries, army barracks, administrative offices, factories etc. Religion was seen as primitive and feudal and hence backwards which was getting in the way of modernisation and development. Religion was seen as an obstacle that got in the way of China’s developmental path. After Mao’s death, of course, there was a phase of liberalisation and policies towards religious groups were relaxed. There was an attempt made by the state to rebuild temples but the state also made it clear that it has to be very careful and make sure that these new temples do not become the new hotbeds of religious radicalism which will then go on to undermine state power and authority. In other words, new religious buildings which had been constructed from the early 80s onwards should not in any way become the epicentre of resistance against the state. State policies and religious groups Independent religious bodies and their activities had been confined or suppressed all together. Freedom for religious groups has often been very limited and activities have been restricted. Religious activity is only encouraged if it speaks the same language as that of the state. Otherwise, they have been crushed and the more assertive groups have been subjected to all kinds of brutality. The Religious Affairs Bureau came into existence in the year 1954 and this was done to keep a vigilant eye on what was going on especially amongst religious groups in the more peripheral parts of China because it is the periphery that is most deeply religious. The Religious Affairs Bureau was an organ of the State Council, with links with the Chinese Communist Party.23 We also see the rise of religious professionals who performed the same or at least a similar function. They had to keep a watchful eye on

The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang 109 religious activity especially in the countryside since the countryside was seen as the more religious parts of China. The state would have to make sure that this sort of religious activity did not in any way undermine state authority. In other words, party officials basically encouraged ‘patriotic’ religious activity. This form of patriotism was obviously very narrowly defined by the state and defined in state terms only. Religious groups and especially the ethnic minority provinces came under pressure during the radical phases of Maoism which were the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution, which lasted for almost a decade, from 1966 till 1976 was probably the worst time for religious groups and the deeply religious provinces like Xinjiang and Tibet. This was a time when religious temples, monasteries and mosques were destroyed and put to secular use. Students were encouraged to criticise and attack the four olds, which were old thinking, old habits, old culture and old customs and the four olds were seen to be inextricably tied up with religion. Religious leaders, revivalist thinkers and religious philosophers were subjected to harsh treatment and had to attend revolutionary colleges and had to go through a process of thought reform. Many were subjected to communist indoctrination. Often these religious leaders were heavily criticised and subjected to torture and both physical and verbal abuse. They were often sent off to distant far off labour camps and into exile where they had to forcefully participate in harsh laborious activities. Many religious leaders were stripped off their existing titles and forced to participate in the modernisation process. Religious leaders were shown the error of their ways. They were forced to leave their temples and monasteries and mosques and were actively encouraged to participate in both agriculture and industrial activities and were forced by the state to become a part of the laity. Deng of course is responsible for opening up China’s economy and exposing it to international competition. Deng’s phase was of course much more relaxed and thus we see the re-emergence and mushrooming of different religious groups in China from the eighties onwards. ‘In 1978, Deng Xiaoping launched the Reform and Open-up Policy, which created more opportunities for communication between the local people and foreigners.’24 We see the rebuilding and repairing of temples and religious architecture during Deng’s time since much of it had been destroyed or at least damaged during the earlier Mao years, 1949–1976. In general, there was a bit more freedom in the post-80s especially in comparison to the earlier period. ‘One of the major factors that has marked the growth of freedom in post-1978 China is exposure to the outside world.’25 In relation to the relaxation of state policies since the Deng years, Jacoby and Terrone argue ‘With the emergence of a new Chinese middle class, an increased demographic mobility, the gradual relaxation in terms of ideological control of the population, and a growing tourist campaign to promote Tibet as an exotic destination, more and more Han Chinese travel to Tibetan areas and many embrace Tibetan Buddhism as their new religion.’26

110  The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang Islam and China’s extreme Northwest Islam has had a presence in China since the seventh century. ‘Islam made modest inroads into China after the collapse of the Sasanian era, introduced mostly by merchants and former soldiers of the Arab armies.’27 It is most pronounced in China’s extreme Northwest in Xinjiang province, but also in Gansu, Shaanxi and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. There is a presence of Sunni Islam and Sufi orders. Chinese Muslims encompass the Hui Muslims who are more Chinese in their ways and hence less threatening to the state. For instance, ‘The first language of Sino-Muslims who are classified in the PRC as the Hui minority nationality, is Chinese.’28 In contrast, the Uyghur’s of Xinjiang are very assertive in expressing their distinct Islamic cultural identity, and speak a different set of languages. Despite improvements in communications between China proper and Xinjiang, feelings of isolation and aloofness amongst the Uyghur people are still very strong. Uyghur means union but the Uyghur community has never really been unified. As a community, they were highly divided. It was the Chinese who brought them together. Before 1949 which is when the PRC came into existence, there were a series of city-states in Xinjiang. It was only from the 1930s did they start using the word Uyghur. Until the thirties, the native people of Xinjiang identified themselves by their home region. For instance, if someone was from Urumqi, he/she would be called Urumqilik, which means someone from Urumqi. If someone was from Hotan, then he/she would identify himself or herself as Hotanlik. If someone was from Kashgar, he/she would identify himself or herself as Kashgarlik. Twisting history, the Chinese state does its best to insist that the borderlands have always been a part of China and that the Uyghur people have had prosperous lives under Chinese Communist Party rule. The Uyghur community, however, feel otherwise. They feel very differently about this. Until the Qing dynasty, Xinjiang had gone through various names. The Han first referred it to as Xiyu, which means western region. Later it was referred to as Huijiang or Muslim territory. Those who wanted independence referred it to as Uyghuristan or East Turkestan. Turkestan means the land of the Turks and has Middle-eastern origins. West Turkestan refers to the 5 stan’s of Central Asia that were once ruled by Russia. East Turkestan was invaded by the Manchus or the Qing dynasty in the year 1876. The area represents the cradle of Uyghur culture and history. After the 1876 invasion, East Turkestan was renamed Xinjiang or the new dominion. Jonathan Fenby writes, ‘for the Qing, the re-conquest of the west meant the recovery of the fourth pillar of their empire-to go alongside Manchuria, Mongolia and China proper. Xinjiang was not left alone to pursue its traditional ways. In areas where ethnic and religious differences had contributed to the western revolt, campaigns were launched to sinicize the local people…Han Chinese moved in to solidify the imperial presence, taking

The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang 111 official posts, opening Confucian schools, establishing walled garrisons, and putting up Chinese names on the gates of their sections of racially segregated towns.’29 ‘The end of the Qing era ushered in a period of fragmentation in China that resulted in the semi-independence of Xinjiang from the Chinese state from 1911 to 1949.’30 Between 1850 and the 1950s the Uyghur’s have fought against the Chinese state. This was done to gain independence. An independent state was created in 1863, in 1933 and in 1944, but the state of East Turkestan that was created had been quite short-lived. Yaqub Beg had been one of the heroes. Uyghur’s intermarried with Persians and Central Asians. Uyghur nationalism was inspired by Central Asian Muslims. Wealthy merchants travelled from places like Kashgar, which is the spiritual capital of Xinjiang and Turfan to Turkey. New schools were built in the twenties to instil in Uyghur children a sense of Turkic values and ideas. An attempt was made to modernise education. ‘Uyghur ethno-linguistic identity arose as such because consciously nationalistic educational reformers and activists articulated it in this way through the Xinjiang school system of the 1930s and 1940s, which was administered in large part by the Cultural Promotion Societies (CPS), institutions for the management of education, trade and other public services.’31 Similar developments took place in other parts of Central Asia. An example of such a movement is jadidism which refers to an Islamic modernist movement. Rebellions started to break out in the thirties especially by those who had been affected by Uyghur or Turkic enlightenment. This fight has primarily been associated with self-determination. The Chinese state argues that Xinjiang has always been an integral part of China, but the Uyghur people disagree. Uyghur separatists have tried to delegitimise this claim put forward by the PRC. Many Uyghur people believe that their ancestors came from the Tarim Basin. Memories of repression especially during the years of the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1976 are still very strong. Publications which presented the Uyghur community as a distinct nation separate from the Chinese mainland came under attack. Turkic writers are constrained from writing their own history for fear of persecution. Teaching Uyghur history is banned. Under the pretext of ‘eliminating remnants of the past’, many books written by Uyghur writers have been destroyed. Mahmud Qashqari and Yusup Khass Hajj were seen as cultural heroes. Their posters were circulated throughout Xinjiang which strengthened the secessionist ETIM to some extent. These posters connect Xinjiang to a whole new different world. Books written by Turghun Almas in 1991 were attacked by the state as it projected Xinjiang as a distinct nation. The Uyghur community did not simply accept the PRC regime once it had been established in the year 1949. The first major incident of resistance to CCP control over Xinjiang is generally acknowledged to have been the Khotan uprising in the month of December 1954 by a pan-Turkic organisation, known to the Chinese authorities as the Emin group, which had been led by an individual called Abdimit. It declared its intention

112  The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang of establishing an Islamic State. The Emin group also published a document called, ‘Guidelines for an Islamic Republic,’ and issued many posters and pamphlets and even elected a government of which Abdimit was to be the president. On the 31st of December, 1954, Abdimit led more than three hundred supporters from Karakash, Hotan and the Lop areas, all of the followers of one of the Sufi orders collectively known as Ishan in Xinjiang, in an attack against a prison camp in Karakash during which an officer and seven soldiers had been killed.32 Furthermore, disturbances also took place in the Ili region in 1962, which included the May insurrection. There was also the mass exodus of mainly Kazakhs and Uyghur’s westwards from Xinjiang. Objections had been raised due to constant flows of Han migration into Xinjiang. Amongst those who fled to the USSR were senior political and military officials who had been appointed by the CCP, almost all of them Kazakhs and Uyghur’s. Many of them became involved in creating the Turkestan People’s Liberation Committee, which acted as a focus of émigré political activity in different parts of Central Asia, and also became the basis for a number of organisations run by political exiles.33 Of all the dissenting organisations in Xinjiang, the Eastern Turkestan People’s Revolutionary Party is considered by some to have been the single largest resistance organisation in Xinjiang since 1949. It was founded in the early years of the Cultural Revolution, and was a clandestine group. ‘The party had originally been called the Uyghuristan People’s Party but changed its name to echo that of the East Turkestan Republic which had ruled parts of Xinjiang between 1944 and 1949.’34 Since religious groups are seen as a threat in China, in the 50s the China Islamic Association was created to appoint imams in mosques and to keep an eye on what was happening in mosques. All mosques, Islamic seminaries and other Muslim organisations were legally obliged to register with it.35 In other words, the state tried to regulate and monitor religious activities. The state also wanted to keep an eye on who were the individuals who were attending services at these mosques. During the years of the Cultural Revolution, 1966–1976, Muslims were forced to eat pork, which is against traditional Islamic practices. Red flags were placed on top of religious buildings and Mao’s little red book became the new bible. We see gross human rights violations taking place in provinces like Xinjiang which has created outrage amongst the local people. From the 1950s till the post-2000 phase, the state has followed strong assimilationist policies. Anyone under the age of 18 was banned from attending the Mosque and growing beards and wearing skull caps were frowned upon. Uyghur’s working for the government are prohibited from wearing them. Construction of mosques had stopped. Imams had been stripped off their qualifications and were expected to write letters of loyalty to the state. Koranic schools were closed down especially in disturbed areas. Xinjiang is normally divided into three spheres of influence: the South Asian sphere of influence, the central Asian sphere of influence and the Chinese sphere of influence. The bit of Xinjiang which tilts

The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang 113 towards China proper is the Chinese sphere of influence. That part which tilts towards central Asia is seen as the central Asian sphere of influence and that part of Xinjiang which tilts towards South Asia is seen as the South Asian sphere of influence. It is the South Asian and Central Asian spheres of influence which are seen as the most threatening because it is believed that Islamist groups from Southcentral Asia may be infiltrating into Uyghur territory. Elisabeth Van Wie Davis writes, ‘The April 1990 armed uprising in Baren marked the start of an increase in Uyghur Muslim violence in Xinjiang, China. Two justifications-ethnic separatism and religious rhetoric were given…This combination of ethnicity and religion also involves the movement of weapons, people, and religious and political ideologies. Broadly speaking, violent groups in the region desire a separate Uyghur state, called either Uyghuristan or East Turkestan, which would consist of a large part of China…There is no single Uyghur agenda.’36 With the passage of time, China has tried to tighten its grip over Xinjiang and its resources. Document 7 was issued in 1996. Local authorities were expected to take firmer action in Xinjiang. This was done to stop the burgeoning threat of ethnic separatism. Document 7 stated that Uyghur’s were attacking party buildings and government structures and were involved in acts of terrorism and bombing. The three evils that had been identified by the state were separatism, terrorism and religious extremism. It is believed that Beijing has exaggerated the levels of threat and that there has also been inaccurate reporting. Furthermore, Beijing has used the 9/11 rhetoric to crack down further on Xinjiang. The Chinese state has developed antiterror laws based on the western model. The Uyghur diaspora which has a strong presence in North America and Munich in Germany has also been accused of stirring up trouble in Xinjiang. In this context, Rabiya Kadeer deserves special mention who fiercely supports the ETIM from abroad. The people’s militia have been deployed in Xinjiang to arrest insurgents. Sixty years after the PRC was established, Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang is still full of soldiers. The slow-moving convoy of the Wujing which is an offshoot of the PLA is a common sight. The Wujing patrol the streets at all hours. The army, people’s militia and men of the public security bureau and the police have been regularly deployed in Xinjiang. Hundreds have been arbitrarily arrested. Uyghur’s have been accused of splitting the motherland. They have been accused of having links with external hostile forces. During the century of humiliation, western imperial powers all tried having a piece of China. This has often been referred to as ‘cutting of the Chinese melon.’ Mao’s crowning achievement was to bring together the disparate sections of the country and so for any ethnic or religious group to advocate secession is equivalent to heresy as far as the Chinese state is concerned. Since the start of the 20th century, Chinese intellectuals had argued that the lack of a strong nationalist sentiment had allowed western powers to bully China. ‘The current generation of Chinese has indeed been reared on a steady diet of patriotic propaganda that emphasises the humiliations

114  The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang that China suffered at the hands of foreign powers during such events as the Opium War(1839–1842) and the Japanese invasions of the 1930s and 1940s.’37 The lack of a strong sense of Chinese nationalism had allowed western colonial powers to exploit China and its resources in the 19th century for their own imperial needs. By the time Sun Yat Sen became the first president of China in 1912 after the Qing dynasty had been overthrown this argument had been enshrined in the theory of minzuzhuyi or nationalism. Sun saw the Mongols, the Tibetans, the Uyghur’s and other minority races as alien races whereas the Han race had originated from the great Chinese yellow emperor, Huang Di. Huang Di is seen as the father of Chinese civilisation. Only by standing together can the Han maintain their supremacy. It is a doctrine which by claiming that the Han are one big family automatically excludes all other ethnic minority groups from being considered wholly Chinese. ‘The GMD/Guomindang Republican leader Chiang Kai Shek justified sinicization by arguing that all ethnic minorities were merely branches of the Chinese nation and that their variance in culture and language was due to their distance from mainstream Han Chinese civilisation.’38 There were clear elements of racism in the national debate. Violence erupted in the summer of 2009 in a major way. ‘When a crisis occurs, it appears to arise suddenly but usually builds up over time until a threshold is reached….The Xinjiang riot followed this pattern, seeming to have occurred suddenly but actually going through a slow and cumulative process.’39 The 2009 protests were triggered by the murder of two Uyghur men who were workers in a toy factory in Guangdong province close to Hong Kong and had falsely been accused of raping a Han woman. The news of the killings reached Xinjiang very quickly through text messages and caused outrage amongst the people. The internet along with mobile phones and the use of technology more generally speaking has made it harder for the Chinese government to censor unwelcome news. ‘Han workers at the Xuri toy factory justified carrying out an organised attack on Uyghur migrant workers-most of whom were asleep in their assigned dormitory-based on an internet rumour that accused Uyghur men of raping a Han woman. Guangdong authorities identified the man who generated the rumour about rape, charged elevan Han individuals for organising the attack, and detained three Uyghur workers for their supposed involvement.’40 The purpose of the Urumqi protestors gathering and demonstrating on the fifth of July, 2009, was to speak out against the Chinese state authorities with a list of injustices including how the state authorities dealt with the Guangdong violence. ‘As a whole, these protests comply with grievance-based theories of mobilization, which claim that the discrimination inflicted by the majority on national minorities fosters collective grievances, bolsters group identity and propels minorities to mobilize in an attempt to upset the balance of power between the majority group and themselves.’41 After the violence, the government responded in five ways. First of all the security forces clamped down hard and arrested about 1500 Uyghur men in connection with the

The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang 115 riots, and deployed a major police and army presence in Urumqi. Secondly, party officials blamed ‘hostile external forces’ for the events in Urumqi. Thirdly, Beijing emphasised on the point that Xinjiang was an integral part of the Chinese motherland. Beijing sacked the Urumqi CCP secretary, Li Zhi, and Urumqi’s police chief, Liu Yaohua, but not Wang Lequan. Finally, the authorities also paid 200,000 Yuan in compensation to the families of Han victims.42 ‘At the time of the 5 July 2009 riots, the Islamist Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan immediately commented that the incident was a kind of genocide.’43 Since 2009, Rabiya Kadeer has been blamed for disturbances in Xinjiang. Rabiya Kadeer was once a member of the National People’s Congress and the authorities used to uphold her as a role model for the Uyghur community. But with time she soon fell out with the authorities because she started to openly criticise governmental policy in Xinjiang. She had been imprisoned for six years before she went in exile to Washington DC where there is a large expatriate Uyghur community. Since then, Rabiya Kadeer has become the leader and president of the World Uyghur Congress, a Munich based coalition agitating for an independent Uyghur state and trying to create international awareness of Chinese repression and high handedness in Xinjiang. The World Uyghur Congress is the most visible face of opposition and resistance to Chinese rule outside the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Although she has made it clear that she wants to create an independent state for the Uyghur people by non-violent means, the Chinese state has labelled her as both a terrorist and a separatist. Like all other minority communities in China, Uyghur people have been exempted from the one-child policy. This causes huge resentment amongst the Han ethnic majority along with the fact that minorities like the Uyghur’s have to score fewer points on the ‘gaokao,’ which is the national level university entrance exam in China to go into higher/further education. But it is only in the last thirty years that the Han have been restricted to have one child and so they still vastly outnumber the other minorities. The questions in the ‘gaokao’ exam are in Mandarin which most ethnic minorities do not speak, read or write. So this policy of positive discrimination or affirmative action does not really work for the Uyghur people. At most Chinese schools, one only gets to read Chinese history and not local Uyghur history. Uyghur history is not taught in mainstream Chinese schools. If Uyghur children want to hear about their own history, they are very much dependent on their parents and grandparents. Forcefully making Uyghur children attend Han schools is seen by Uyghur parents as an attempt by the state to hanify the Uyghur community and weaken Uyghur identity. Identity and maintaining their distinct identity is very important for many Uyghur people including for Uyghur people who have moved out of their homeland, Xinjiang. Baranovitch argues that even for ‘Uyghur’s who migrated to Beijing have not given up their ethnic identity despite the distance from their homeland and the fact that they have chosen to live in a Han-dominated metropolis,

116  The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang and despite the fact that some of them do business with Han Chinese and rely heavily on their patronization.’44 Xinjiang is rich in natural resources. To tap into these resources and exploit them, the state needs to have political stability in Xinjiang. Political stability is equated with a strong Han presence in the province. The state has actively encouraged Han migration from China proper to Xinjiang. Han people have migrated to Xinjiang supposedly to raise the material standards of the people. Han people see themselves as more skilled and professional. Attractive pay packages are offered to Han people if they move from China proper to Xinjiang. They were expected to develop the national frontier province of Xinjiang as a patriotic duty. Many Uyghur people see this as the state’s deliberate attempt to undermine and dilute Uyghur identity and weaken the forces of secession. ‘After a brief lull in the early 2000s, the events of 2009 marked a significant rise in Uyghur secessionist activities in China.’45 In relation to Chinese strategy in Xinjiang it has been argued, ‘faced with the threat which has been rising since 1980, China’s policies have combined repression with development, renewed assimilation through large-scale migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang, and a vigorous foreign and defence policy to forestall foreign support for this resistance to Beijing.’46 Han migration has led to inter-ethnic conflict. The population profile has changed dramatically. Many Uyghur people see this as an attempt by the state to undermine local Uyghur identity and equate Han migration with culture genocide. The Han is seen as the more advanced nationality and the state believes that the ethnic minorities need the help of the Han to make further advancement. Although the state has pumped in a lot of money into Xinjiang for purposes of infrastructure development and growth, the question needs to be asked: who benefits from this? There has been no real trickle-down effect and the Han still have the upper hand and have an advantageous position in jobs and also when it comes to education and politics. The Uyghur community by and large is educationally very disadvantaged. The Uyghur community are subjected to economic marginalisation in their own homeland where they are losing control over their own resources. What has caused a lot of resentment and outrage amongst the Uyghur people is not just the Han migration, but the policies directed at Xinjiang by the overarching state. ‘Ethnic uprisings in Tibet and Xinjiang highlight that China appears to rely heavily on the use of force to maintain stability and has been successful in improving the procedures for this type of counterinsurgency measures to maintain stability in the short term. However, China seems to be less successful with socio-economic reforms that are meant to ensure the legitimacy of Chinese governance over non-Han populations in Tibet and Xinjiang.’47 There is over Han representation in some of the major regional economic and political organisations in Xinjiang. Senior positions of Uyghur leaders are often undermined or may not be taken seriously by

The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang 117 the Han elite. Although Xinjiang is called the XUAR: Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, there is no real self-rule. There is over-representation of the Han in the regional government. Since Xinjiang is quite multi-ethnic with Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz people, Tajiks living along with the Uyghur’s, a policy of divide and rule has been followed to avoid a united resistance. Policies taken collectively include racial discrimination, economic exploitation of regional resources, ecological destruction, cultural assimilation and political oppression. Professor Jackie Sheehan once compared the situation in Xinjiang to a classic case of colonialism where the needs of the colony have been made subservient to the needs of the mother country. In other words, Xinjiang’s needs and interests have been made subservient to the needs of the people living in China proper or the Chinese heartland. AntiChinese demonstrations have taken place in the80s, 90s and post-2000 phase. The Chinese have claimed that the Uyghur’s are actually training in the AFPAK/Afghanistan-Pakistan region, and have been spotted there and have been accused of having connections with transnational Islamist organisations like Al Qaeda. ‘Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism, along with implicit support from some countries, penetrates into Xinjiang from abroad, which makes Xinjiang affairs more complicated.’48 Using Xinjiang as a nuclear testing ground has paved the way for ecological disaster. ‘Between 1964 and 1996, the Chinese government used to carry out nuclear testing in the Lop Nor area in Eastern Xinjiang. The Christian Science Monitor reported that forty-five official nuclear tests led to radiation poisoning which caused 210,000 estimated deaths.’49 The international media has found it hard to gain access to Xinjiang. Healthcare in the province is quite basic, especially when compared with the rest of the country.50 The seriousness of the health problems in Xinjiang is represented by the recurring outbreaks of Polio, one of the most recent outbreaks have occurred in the summer of 2011.51 There has been further outcry against coercive birth control, China’s sinicization policy in Xinjiang, and growing unemployment amongst the Uyghur people due to the continuous Han migration. Throughout the years, there have also been torture, arbitrary arrests and human rights abuses which all together have added more fuel to an already blazing fire and complicated things further.

State crackdown on Mosques and religious activity There are not many Uyghur individuals in positions of power and authority. The lack of representation of minority groups in positions of power has had a detrimental impact on religion in China in recent years. Whilst policies during the reform era had been relaxed in some parts of the country, this was not so much the case for Xinjiang. Despite restrictions, Muslims across the country responded vigorously to Deng’s liberal policies in the early 80s. Mosques were built throughout the 80s decade. A lot of villages had more resources because of the agricultural reforms of the early Deng period and

118  The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang with their new wealth, many chose to build mosques. A violent uprising took place in 1990 in the Southwestern town of Baren and this took state officials by surprise. What astonished most state officials was the fact that the uprising had popular support and those who were involved in the protest argued that their religion, Islam, would soon take over and that Marxist ideology would soon be buried. After this incident, the CCP reversed its policy of tolerance and religious freedom. It was felt that the liberal atmosphere of the early Reform period had allowed separatist groups to get together and resist the state. Officials now played a key role in preventing the construction of mosques, prosecuting what they considered to be an illegal religious activity, breaking up gatherings of clerics who were viewed with suspicion and also breaking up Islamic seminaries. In 1991, ten per cent of roughly 25,000 clerics who had been examined by state officials were stripped off their positions. ‘The party instituted new regular political examinations for imams, decreeing that only those judged patriotic and politically sound could continue to serve….After a decade of turning a blind eye to mosque building, officials felt that their construction had exceeded acceptable limits.’52 Despite the state’s policy of high handedness, officials in Kashgar, the spiritual capital of Xinjiang, complained of the continuous construction of mosques. There was a fear that these would now become the new breeding grounds for anti-state activity and what Beijing saw as terrorism. By 1995, Kashgar district had approximately 9600 mosques, which was twice the number in 1981 and in the view of party officials there were already enough to satisfy the spiritual needs of the people. Some party officials accused clerics of making unreasonable demands for further mosque construction. ‘Officials then sought to halt as well as to reverse the trend of mosque construction. Between 1995 and 1999, officials in Ili Prefecture demolished seventy mosques or religious sites, and their counterparts in Urumci razed twenty-one sites in 1998 alone. Mosques near schools were especially targeted for destruction, lest they continue to exercise a negative influence on pupils.’53 State officials were also concerned about clerics opening their own private schools, and schools for Koranic training in case they did not get official permission. All private scriptural study was labelled as illegal religious activity and the state cracked down on pupils and teachers alike. Despite the crackdown and state repression, such schools would continue to spring up. The treatment towards Hui Muslims, by comparison, has been somewhat relaxed. To a large extent, this is because the Hui have not challenged secular state authorities the way the Uyghurs have. ‘The Hui religious leader of a Sufi sect in Ningxia was reportedly allowed to establish a virtual religious state with one and a half million followers and a wide network of mosques and religious schools.’54 The party has also taken steps of trying to prohibit anyone under the age of eighteen from entering mosques. Although signs preventing under

The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang 119 eighteen are not visible outside the major city mosques in Urumci, they can be seen elsewhere in the region. The placard that warns party officials not to enter also includes youths under eighteen. By the mid 1990s, students at Xinjiang University were fully aware of the state’s draconian policies. Despite this some continued to pray five times a day and participate secretly in study groups. But the cost of breaking the rules has been high indeed. For instance, in the spring of 1997, six students from Khotan had been expelled and arrested for attending religious study groups and had even received prison sentences. ‘In 2005 Xinjiang University distributed a 142-page student handbook with specific rules against students’ religious observance, although they are somewhat inconsistent. Some articles forbid students to participate in ‘illegal religious activities,’ while others prohibit participation in religious activities of any kind.’55 In recent years, a new set of restrictions have been imposed. In mid-July, 2005, three Uyghurs who were waiting at a bus stop had their bags searched and were detained for being in possession of religious texts deemed ‘unauthorised’ by the state. In August of 2005, police forces barged into the house of a religious teacher without prior warning and had her arrested along with her pupils for studying the Koranic text in private.56 It is clear from the discussion that CCP policies do not move in a straight line and make linear progress. Whilst there had been a relaxation of policies in the early 80s, in recent years state policies appear to be harsher than ever.

The current situation I got the opportunity to carry out a very detailed one hour interview with a Uyghur Muslim man from Kashgar, which is the spiritual capital of Xinjiang. I asked him various questions about his life and personal experience in Xinjiang, Chinese intervention in the province and also asked him questions about his own Uyghur identity. The interview was done on the 24th of July, 2012. Although initially, he had agreed to speak to me, at the time of the actual interview he expressed great nervousness and seemed quite reluctant to speak. The very fact that he was quite nervous and scared to speak about Chinese policy in Xinjiang, that itself told me a bit about the overall political situation in Northwestern China. He started by saying that he had spent most of his life in Kashgar, which is the spiritual capital of Xinjiang. When I asked him about his own views about Chinese state policies in Xinjiang, he instead chose to speak about the ‘Chinese version of events.’ His fear of being found out by party officials hints at the oppressive climate in Xinjiang despite recent democratising tendencies in China. He insisted on giving me the Chinese perspective or the Chinese take on things rather than giving me his own version of events and his own story. For instance, when asked about what he felt about Chinese intervention in Xinjiang, he told me that ‘it was meant to help Xinjiang and the Uyghur community with economic development and that it had nothing to do with

120  The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang making or trying to make Xinjiang a colony.’ In his own life, he had never really experienced any major problems with his Han Chinese colleagues at work. He spoke about how an insider’s perspective would differ from an outsider’s perspective. Then he went on to tell me that he would like to maintain a neutral position on the Xinjiang question, and not go into the details of the province’s colonisation by the Chinese. This was because the whole Xinjiang issue was very sensitive politically. He said that local people did not feel colonised because they could not think that far or were not allowed to think that far due to severe state restrictions. In fact, local people actually felt quite scared to think of Xinjiang as being China’s colony. Only a small number of people who saw themselves as separatists saw Xinjiang as a colony of China. But the numbers of separatist groups are so small that they are almost invisible and very hard to find. People ordinarily do not talk about such matters because they are politically very sensitive. He mentioned that one would only get to hear about separatism only after the official media had reported on riots otherwise one would not get to hear about separatist tendencies. He spoke about Rabiya Kadeer and said that she had become a well-known figure only after the official media had spoken about her. He said that she did not rise to international fame because of her own efforts but because of media reporting. Local people may think of separatism and of a free East Turkestan in their minds and hearts but they do not speak about it openly. The diaspora has been very active in separatist politics. This is because by living in the West, the Uyghur diaspora community has more freedom to express their views on particular issues, unlike the situation in China. At the surface level, the situation in Xinjiang seems calm but party officials are always anxious. The state constantly worries about separatism. They have worried about it so much that they have now almost created a problem when sometimes the problem did not even exist to begin with. Uyghur’s living in Xinjiang could not express their views the way the Uyghur diaspora community could due to lack of freedom in China, but Uyghur’s all over the world are divided on this particular issue: what should be the political status of Xinjiang. Some Uyghur people wanted equal rights, some wanted more autonomy, some want full independence and not full subjugation under China. He said the Chinese had stopped carrying out nuclear tests in Xinjiang since the eighties and nineties. With regard to economic development, he spoke about how people were benefitting from the process of modernisation but how much one actually benefitted differed from person to person and there was a great deal of variation. In other words, some groups benefitted more than others. ‘Some ate the meat of the economic modernisation process, some just drank the soup of the modernisation process and some just had the bones.’ He mentioned that the situation was not always that black or white. It is not the case that only the Han people are rich and that the Uyghur’s are poor. There are also rich Uyghur’s and poor Han people as well.

The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang 121 When asked about religious matters, he said that people were increasingly beginning to practise their religion privately and that people were becoming more and more religious, despite official restrictions. He said that imams had to attend state-run institutes in places like Urumqi for religious training. There were no private madrasas in Xinjiang because it was impossible to run a private Islamic school. If the state found out about privately run religious schools they would be raided which happened both in Korla and Hotan. Privately run schools would be attacked by the state. On the question of separatism, he mentioned that separatist movements in Xinjiang were quite sporadic and that they were not well organised or united and even if there was the odd act of terrorism or political violence it was an isolated incident. He believed that the leaders of the ETIM were based in Pakistan, if there were any leaders at all. It is questionable if the movement exists at all. No one really knows much about the ETIM, who the leaders were/are, where they were/are based/headquartered, and how the movement is funded. Its origins and the whereabouts of its leaders are shrouded in mystery and uncertainty. ‘Underground movements are not allowed to exist in China and so they do not exist.’ The background of the ETIM is shrouded in mystery and darkness. One does not really know. Groups like the ETIM come and go but eventually, they disappear because of state authority and high handedness. Finally, when I asked him about his own personal identity, he mentioned that he felt only Uyghur and that he identified as being only Uyghur and nothing else.57 Colin Mackerras argues since the rioting in the Xinjiang capital, Urumqi in July 2009, there have been continuing disturbances in various parts of the autonomous region.58 ‘Although these are at a considerably lower level than in 2009, they have been quite serious enough to engender worries about ethnic relations, especially between the Uyghur’s and the Han Chinese. In 2013, particularly serious incidents occurred on 24 April in Bachu outside Kashgar, in several separate villages in Lukqun Township near Turpan on 26 June, in Hanerik in Hotan Prefecture two days later and in August in Kargilik in Kashgar Prefecture.’59 Official accounts presented all these incidents as attacks against the police and other state institutions, and as clashes between the rioters and police, with the police being among those suffering casualties. The Chinese legal media in June spoke about criminals who had tried to spread racial and ethnic hatred and terrorism, ‘including audio files that encouraged jihad and extremist religious views through the internet and by mobile telephone.’60 The violence of 2013 was not restricted to the province of Xinjiang. It went further afield. That October a jeep driven by an Uyghur protester crashed through a crowd of pedestrians on the edge of Beijing’s Tiananmen Square and burst into flames killing five people. ‘Then in March, 2014, eight knife wielding Uyghurs rampaged through a packed railway station in Kunming in Southwest China, killing 29 people and wounding more than 140 others-a massacre described by national media as China’s 9/11.’61

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Ethnic nationalism in Xinjiang It has already been mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter that the situation in Xinjiang is essentially a separatist nationalist movement. Whilst the conflict is most certainly multi-dimensional, at its very core it is a movement associated with Uyghur nationalism. The ingredients which bring the Uyghur community together include a common language, a common ethnic and racial identity, a common religion, common culture, and common economic and political aspirations. There is a strong sense of disconnect with China proper because of the racial, ethnic, religious and linguistic divide. What has problematized things further is the sheer distance from Beijing to Xinjiang. The Chinese mainland is far away from Xinjiang. Geographical proximity or closeness helps to bring people together and helps in creating a sense of nationhood and belonging. But as mentioned earlier cities like Beijing in China proper are far away from cities in Xinjiang. Thus communication becomes a problem. It has often been argued that a nation is a nation when it feels as one and what is really important is the psychological element rather than having a common language, ethnicity, religion etc. But in this case, many Uyghurs actually feel oppressed by the Chinese so there is a strong disconnect here as well. The Uyghur people see themselves as a distinct nation separate from the rest of China. Uyghur nationalism is not in keeping with mainstream Chinese or Han nationalism. Uyghur nationalism started with the building of new schools in Xinjiang in the first half of the 1900s. These schools had been started by individuals who had travelled to different parts of the Muslim world and tried to inculcate a sense of Islamic values into Uyghur children. When the rebellions started to break out against the Chinese state in the latter half of the 1900s, many of the participants in these rebellions had been affected by Uyghur/Turkic/Islamic enlightenment which had sharpened Uyghur identity. The ‘us’ versus ‘them’ binary has become pronounced in recent years. What has aggravated the situation further are acts of racism and racial discrimination. Since Uyghurs on many occasions are seen as the Chinese ‘other’ and not treated favourably or with respect, the feeling of disconnect with China proper has only strengthened over the years. Another key factor which has helped in consolidating Uyghur identity and Uyghur nationalism is history writing and the contributions made by Uyghur historians and writers who often project themselves as a distinct nation separate from China proper. Well known scholar on Uyghur affairs, Gardner Bovingdon has written extensively about this in his wellknown book, The Uyghurs: Strangers in their own land published in 2010 by Columbia University Press.62 Although the Chinese Communist Party has been actively involved in a nation-building process themselves, Uyghur political activists have had their own counter-strategies and have attempted to resist this. The Chinese state has done its best to twist history to suit its own needs to be able to strengthen its grip over Xinjiang. But this topdown approach has given rise to nationalist resistance from below. In sharp

The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang 123 contrast to the official accounts, the Uyghur historical accounts emphasise on the point that they had been living in present-day Xinjiang for over six thousand years and that throughout history they had founded many strong independent kingdoms and powerful states there. The accounts put forward by the Uyghur nationalists are just as flawed and bad as the Chinese official accounts. The ‘us-them’ dichotomy has most certainly simplified a very complicated history. Many of these books written by Uyghur nationalists have been banned or destroyed by the Chinese state and these writers have been subjected to severe torture thus paving the way for stronger nationalist tendencies amongst the Uyghur community.

The human rights situation Gross human rights violations have been perpetrated in Xinjiang. The victims have been mostly Uyghurs.63 Anyone in Xinjiang who passes on information to the outside world about human rights violations is at the risk of torture and detention.64 According to Amnesty International, about 100,000 Uyghurs had been arrested in the year 1997 alone throughout the country. In the year 1998 many Uyghurs had been detained on the suspicion of carrying out so-called separatist activities.65 Since 9/11, the number of arrests has increased and Beijing has used the rhetoric associated with the ‘War on Terror’ to crack down further on the Uyghur community in Xinjiang. In 2005 alone, about 18,000 Uyghurs were arrested on charges of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism. Since the 2009 incident, large numbers of Uyghurs have disappeared. Detained Uyghurs have undergone unfair trials. Throughout 2014 and 2015, there have been frequent incidents of violence, discriminatory detentions and unfair searches, especially of both Uyghur students and activists. The detention of Uyghur economics Professor, Ilham Tohti has now become a well-known case. He was the founder of the website, Uyghur Online, which was meant to act as a bridge and as a platform of peace between the Chinese authorities and the Uyghur community. When in detention, Uyghurs have been regularly subjected to torture.66 The Chinese authorities have used all sorts of methods when it comes to torture: electric shocks, the use of whips, hoods/blindfolds, needles and hot oil. Along with these methods, there has also been slept deprivation, water submersion and bodily mutilation of political prisoners.67 The death penalty has been extensively used in Xinjiang and the number of death sentences imposed is significantly higher in Xinjiang when compared with the rest of the country.

External connections It has already been mentioned that the Uyghur diaspora has been very active in separatist politics. Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uyghur Congress68 deserve special mention in this connection. There is a strong presence of the

124  The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang Uyghur diaspora in Munich and North America. According to my interviewee, the diaspora can express their views with regard to Xinjiang freely because they have the freedom to do so unlike Uyghur people residing in Xinjiang. The Uyghur diaspora just outside Xinjiang in Central Asia has been active in separatist politics. The Uyghur diaspora has often been blamed by the Chinese government for stirring up trouble in China. Their speeches and ideas have often galvanised Uyghurs into further action against the Chinese state. When it comes to external influence, the Chinese state not only fears the diaspora community but also Islamist groups from Southcentral Asia. For instance, the possible connection between the Taliban and the separatist movement in Xinjiang has been a concern for the Chinese government and this has been raised within China and abroad, although the connections between the two are still quite vague.69 There has been further speculation of Xinjiang’s connections with Juma Namangani’s IMU/Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Former Chinese President, Jiang Zemin had been especially worried about the Taliban and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan providing Uyghurs with doctrinal and military training and fomenting rebellion in Xinjiang.70 Andrew Small in his recent ‘The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics’ writes, ‘Uyghurs had been involved in the mujahideen’s campaign in Afghanistan in the 1980s but only in small numbers, and not in separate fighting units….It did nonetheless mean that a cadre of Uyghurs were radicalised and integrated into a network of relationships with other militants.’71 These relationships would of course prove to be useful later on for the ETIM.

Conclusion It is obvious from the discussion that the situation in Xinjiang is quite a complicated one. The Uyghur community feel that they are a distinct nation in themselves and do not regard themselves as Chinese. They feel proud of their language and culture and throughout history, they have tried to resist the Chinese occupation of their homeland. Since China’s annexation of Xinjiang, the province has been used as a nuclear testing ground, its regional resources like oil and gas have been exploited for the needs of people living in China proper and the central government has actively encouraged Han Chinese people to migrate to this frontier province supposedly for purposes of economic development. Development is a multifaceted term and the way the Chinese government defines it is not necessarily the way most Uyghur people would define it. Development means different things to different people. The Uyghur community fears that the continuous flows of Han migration and the government’s developmental projects are having an eroding impact on local Uyghur identity. Political oppression, racial discrimination and human rights abuses in Xinjiang have also exacerbated the situation further. It was clear from my interviewee’s response that he was quite scared to speak about the situation in his homeland. Politically, the

The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang 125 climate is very oppressive. So far the Chinese state has followed a policy of coercion in Xinjiang which has further alienated Uyghur people. Hardcore security measures have paved the way for further atrocities and human rights abuses to take place causing more anger, resentment and hatred amongst the Uyghur community. Ultimately for both the Uyghurs and Hans to live in peace, the legitimate complaints of both groups need to be addressed. Political, social and economic realities have led to this conflict which means sound policies in these areas can also provide a solution. Beijing’s developmental projects would need to be more balanced, respecting the cultural traditions of the Uyghur people. There also needs to be a mindset change amongst the Han who view the Uyghur community as inferior. The media can play a very constructive role in bringing about a mindset change by projecting more positive images of Xinjiang or at least more balanced images of Xinjiang, instead of projecting it as a hotbed of terrorism, and religious extremism. Both sides need to understand one another and have to know one another. There is both a trust deficit as well as a knowledge deficit. The Han being the ethnic majority have a responsibility of maintaining good relations with their ethnic minorities and must take proper initiatives and steps to get to know their ethnic minorities better before carrying out policies that concern their homeland. The voices of ethnic minorities need to be taken more seriously and incorporated in the decision-making process both at the central level as well as at the regional level. There needs to be more equitable distribution of the national income and political transparency. The Chinese government will more specifically have to deal with issues like environmental degradation in Xinjiang, human rights issues, health care issues and issues relating to unemployment. Uyghur’s and Hans need to understand each other’s perspective. Finally, there needs to be more trust which can only happen through constructive dialogue.

Notes

1. A. Rahman, Sinicization Beyond the Great Wall: China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Matador: Leicester, 2005. 2. M. Dillon, Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Far Northwest, Routledge: London, 2004, p. 3. 3. M. Li, ‘From Look-West to Act West: Xinjiang’s role in China-Central Asian relations’, Journal of Contemporary China, 25(100), 2016, p. 518. 4. D. Eimer, The Emperor Far Away: Travels at the Edge of China, Bloomsbury: London, 2014, pp. 2–3. 5. C.W. Pannell & P. Schmidt, ‘Structural Change and Regional Disparities in Xinjiang, China’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 47(3), 2006, p. 329. 6. J. Keay, China: A Modern History, Harper Press: London, 2008/2009, p. 12. 7. O.A. Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750, Vintage Books: London, 2012, p. 150. 8. Y. Zhu & D. Blachford, ‘Old Bottle, New Wine? Xinjiang Bingtuan and China’s ethnic frontier governance’, Journal of Contemporary China, 25(97), 2016, p. 27.

126  The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang

9. N. Holdstock, China’s Forgotten People: Xinjiang, Terror and the Chinese State’, I.B. Tauris: London/NY, 2015, p. 12. 10. K. Mukherjee, ‘Comparing China’s Contested Borderland Regions: Xinjiang and Tibet, Millennial Asia: An International’, Journal of Asian Studies, 6(1), 2015, pp. 61–80. 11. M. Dillon, Religious Minorities and China, London: Minorities Rights Group International, 2001, pp. 4–22. 12. Y. Guo, Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: The Search for National Identity under Reform, Routledge: London and New York, 2004, p. 17. 13. A.J. Luthi, ‘Blurring Boundaries and Negotiating Subjectivities-the Uyghurized Han of Southern China’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 39(12), pp. 2187–2188. 14. K. Mukherjee, ‘The Uyghur Question in Contemporary China’, Strategic Analysis, 34(3), 2010, p. 422. 15. U.E. Bulag, ‘Ethnic Resistance with Socialist Characteristics’, in E.J. Perry & M. Selden, eds, Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance, Routledge: London/NY, 2000, p. 180. 16. L. Benson and I. Svanberg, China’s Last Nomads: The History and Culture of China’s Kazakh’s, M.E. Sharpe: London and New York, 1998, p. 93. 17. Document 19, translation from D.E. MacInnis, Religion in China Today: Policy and Practise, International Centre for Law and Religion Studies, Orbis Books, Maryknoll: New York, 2006, pp. 8–26. 18. D.E. MacInnis, Religious Practise in Communist China, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972, p. 9. 19. J.S. Finley, ‘Chinese Oppression in Xinjiang, Middle Eastern Conflicts and Global Islamic Solidarities among the Uyghur’s’, Journal of Contemporary China, 16(53), 2007, p. 631. 20. J. Rudelson, Oasis Identities, Columbia University Press: New York, 1997, p. 45. 21. M.I. Wayne, ‘Inside China’s War on Terrorism’, Journal of Contemporary China, 18(59), 2009, p. 251. 22. Y. Shichor, ‘Pawns in Central Asia’s Playground: Uyghur’s between Moscow and Beijing’, East Asia: An International Quarterly, 32(2), 2015, p. 104. 23. M. Dillon, China: A Modern History, I.B. Tauris: London, 2010/2012, p. 381. 24. Y. Hao & W. Liu, ‘Xinjiang: Increasing Pain in the Heart of the Borderland’, Journal of Contemporary China, 21(74), 2012, p. 207. 25. R. Mitter, Modern China: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008, p. 90. 26. S. Jacoby and A. Terrone, ‘Tibetan and Himalayan Buddhism’, in D.L. MacMahan, ed, Buddhism in the Modern World, Routledge: London/NY, 2012, pp. 89–111. 27. J. Tucker, The Silk Road: China and the Karakoram Highway, I.B. Tauris: London/NY, 2015, p. 61. 28. L. Newby, ‘Writing the Sino-Muslims into a Local History of Xinjiang’, Central Asian Survey, 31(3), 2012, p. 327. 29. J. Fenby, The Penguin History of Modern China: The Fall and Rise of A Great Power, 1850 To The Present, Penguin Books: London, 2008/2009/2013, p. 31. 30. M. Clarke, ‘The Problematic Progress of Integration in the Chinese State’s Approach to Xinjiang, 1759–2005’, Asian Ethnicity, 8(3), 2007, p. 269. 31. E.T. Schluessel, ‘History, Identity, and Mother-Tongue Education in Xinjiang’, Central Asian Survey, 28(4), 2009, p. 384. 32. M. Dillon, China: A Modern History, I.B. Tauris: London/NY, 2010/2012, p. 378. 33. Ibid., p. 379. 34. Ibid., p. 379. 35. Ibid., p. 381.

The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang 127 36. E. Davis, ‘Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in Xinjiang, China’, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 35(1), 2008, pp. 15–16. 37. J.N. Wasserstrom, China in the 21st Century: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press: Oxford/NY, 2010/2013, p. 136. 38. M. Tredaniel & P.K. Lee, ‘Explaining the Chinese framing of the terrorist violence in Xinjiang: Insights from securitization theory’, Nationalities Papers, 46(1), 2018, p. 181. 39. N. Chen, ‘Beijing’s Political Crisis Communication: An Analysis of Chinese Government Communication in the 2009 Xinjiang Riot’, Journal of Contemporary China, 21(75), 2012, p. 462. 40. A. Ryono & M. Galway, ‘Xinjiang under China: reflections on the multiple dimensions of the 2009 Urunqi uprising’, Asian Ethnicity, 16(2), 2015, pp. 235–236. 41. I. Cote, ‘Political Mobilization of a Regional Minority: Han Chinese Settlers in Xinjiang’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34(11), 2011, pp. 1855–1856. 42. M. Clarke, ‘China, Xinjiang and the Internationalisation of the Uyghur Issue’, Global Change, Peace and Security, 22(2), 2010, p. 214. 43. C. Mackerras, ‘Xinjiang in 2013: Problems and Prospects’, Asian Ethnicity, 15(2), 2014, p. 249. 44. N. Baranovitch, ‘From Margin’s to the Centre: The Uyghur Challenge in Beijing’, The China Quarterly, 175, 2003, p. 745. 45. I. Cote, ‘The Enemies Within: Targeting Han Chinese and Hui Minorities in Xinjiang’, Asian Ethnicity, 16(2), 2015, p. 136. 46. S. Blank, ‘Xinjiang and China’s Security’, Global Economic Review, 32(4), 2003, p. 141. 47. L. Odgaard & T.G. Nielsen, ‘China’s Counterinsurgency Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang’, Journal of Contemporary China, 23(87), 2014, p. 537. 48. Y. Hao & W. Liu, ‘Xinjiang: Increasing Pain in the Heart of China’s Borderland’, Journal of Contemporary China, 21(74), 2012, p. 225. 49. A. Cappelletti, ‘Developing the Land and the People: Social Development Issues in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (1999-2009)’, East Asia: An International Quarterly, 32(2), 2015, p. 162. 50. A. Cappelletti, ‘Developing the Land and the People: Social Development Issues in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (1999-2009)’, East Asia: An International Quarterly, 32(2), 2015, p. 157. 51. Ibid, p. 158. 52. G. Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land, Columbia University Press: New York, 2010, p. 66. 53. Ibid., pp. 66–67. 54. Ibid., p. 68. 55. Ibid., p. 71. 56. Ibid., p. 72. 57. Interview carried out by the author on the 24th of July, 2012. Other details of the interview have been withheld on the request of the interviewee. 58. C. Mackerras ‘Xinjiang in 2013: Problems and Prospects’, Asian Ethnicity, 15(2), 2014, p. 247. 59. Ibid. 60. Ibid. 61. T. Miller, China’s Asian Dream, Zed Books: London, 2017, p. 61. 62. G. Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in their own land, Columbia University Press: New York, 2010. 63. People’s Republic of China: Gross Violations of Human Rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, Amnesty International Report, 1999.

128  The conflict in Chinese Xinjiang 64. People’s Republic of China: Uyghurs Feeling Persecution as China Wages its War on Terror, Amnesty International Report, 2004. 65. www.unpo.org/members/7872 (Accessed, 11.05.2018). 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. 68. www.ughurcongress.org (Accessed, 11.05.2018). 69. M. Dillon, Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Far Northwest, Routledge: London/NY, 2004. 70. A. Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Yale University Press: New Haven, 2002. 71. A. Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics, Oxford University Press: Oxford/NY, 2015, pp. 74–75.

4

Race relations, ethnic minorities and conflict in contemporary Myanmar

Introduction For about six decades since independence from Britain in 1948, Myanmar (or what used to be known as Burma) remained isolated and closed to the outside world.1 2011 was the year when the country started to open up and when democratisation started to take place. The recent humanitarian Rohingya crisis in the Western Rakhine state has once again put the country onto the centre stage of world affairs. The central government has come under tremendous international pressure and scrutiny in recent years because of its repressive policies in the Rakhine against the Rohingya people. And yet the Rohingya people are only one of many ethnic groups who have suffered at the hands of the central Burmese government. A lot of the other ethnic minority groups do not get a similar coverage by the international media. The aim of this chapter is to look at the position of ethnic minorities in contemporary Myanmar focussing primarily on the Karen, the Kachin, the Chin and the Ronhigya’s. In doing so, the chapter provides an overview of race relations in contemporary Myanmar. The chapter argues that the current Rohingya crisis or for that matter the on-going problems in Myanmar’s periphery where there is a strong ethnic minority presence should not be viewed in isolation but should be analysed within the framework of a broader historical context. Problematic race relations between the Burman Buddhist majority and the ethnic minorities based in Myanmar’s periphery should be seen as a part of a broader historical continuum. Whilst analysing ethnic and racial tension in the Burmese borderlands a range of factors and multiplicity of events need to be taken into consideration. These factors are both historical and contemporary. ‘Political instability in post-colonial Myanmar has been rooted in ethnic conflicts.’2 Ethnic tension can be traced back to the British colonial policies of divide and conquer when the colonial administration favoured ethnic minorities at the expense of the Burman ethnic majority in government service, military and education. The British also encouraged Indians to migrate to Burma. Indians were often used as cheap labour by the British colonial administration. ‘In Burma the consequences of the demographic change would

130  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar dominate politics for decades, culminating in the Buddhist-Muslim riots of 1938, the flight of ethnic Indians in the 1940s, and the expulsion of people of Indian descent in the 1960s.’3 The colonial mapping exercise also played its part in exacerbating racial divides. Other factors that have contributed to borderland ethnic tension since independence include xenophobic tendencies among military generals like Ne Win and his open dislike for all things foreign. The obsession that some politicians like U-Nu have had with Buddhism and his attempts to establish it as the state religion possibly to unify a fractured country have complicated things further.4 The state has also been involved in forcing people of Indian descent (who were brought in during the colonial years as cheap labour) to leave the country. Most people from South Asia came to cities like Rangoon during the peak years of British colonialism. Church writes, ‘British rule increased the ethnic diversity of Myanmar. The administrative link with India meant that Indians were free to migrate. By 1931, about 7 per cent of the population of Myanmar was Indian, predominantly from Bengal and Madras.’5 Before we take a look at the position of different ethnic groups, let us first take a look at the geographical location, the role of race in Burmese society and pay attention to the historical background which will set the context. It is against this backdrop that we need to study the position of ethnic minority groups in contemporary Myanmar.

Geographical location Thant Myint-U rightly points out that the shape of the country is like a ‘kite.’6 It extends North to South over 1300 miles from high mountains in the North to the hot beaches in the South. The Irrawaddy River flows through the middle of the country, snaking its way through the jungles and scrublands before fanning out into a vast delta and then emptying into the Bay of Bengal. Territorially, Burma is the largest country in mainland Southeast Asia (261,970 square miles) and shares international boundaries with India and Bangladesh in the West, China in the North and Thailand and Laos in the East. It is about the size of Texas and is the fortieth largest country in the world.7 It is about 1275 miles long from North to South. ‘From its eastern extreme on the Mekong River bordering Laos to the Bangladesh border on the West, it is some 582 miles wide. It has a littoral on the Bay of Bengal of 1199 miles. Its highest point is a mountain on the China/Tibetan border (19,295 feet). The border with China alone is 1358 miles, that with Thailand 1314 miles, India 857 miles, Bangladesh 152 miles, and Laos 125 miles.’8 Estimated in 2008, Burma had a population of 53 million. The terms ‘Burman’ and ‘Burmese’ were once used interchangeably. Now of course scholars do make a distinction. Burman refers to the dominant ethnic group residing in the heartland of the country. The term ‘Burmese’ is more political and all-encompassing, which includes not only the ethnic majority but also the various ethnic minority groups like

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 131 the Karen, Karenni, Kachin, Chin, Shan, and Mon. Tucker writes, ‘the heart of the country, where are most of its population, industry and cities, is the hot, flat, fertile, open, tropical valleys of the Chindwin, Irrawaddy and Sittang that fan out at their southern limits and join to form a continuous coastal plain. This is Bama, the land of the Burmans, which was in the colonial era called ‘Burma Proper.’9 Well known author on Burmese affairs, Thant Myint-U writes, ‘the geography of Burma is important in understanding its history, its current ethnic make-up, and its possible futures. Its core, close to half the country in size and more than two-thirds in population, is the long and flat Irrawaddy valley, the home of the majority Burmese Buddhists or ‘Burmans,’ extending a thousand miles from the river’s upper reaches to the delta and the Bay of Bengal. To the West and North are mountain ranges, inhabited by other peoples, like the Naga and the Kachin, mainly Christians, extending up into the Himalayas. And to the East are the Shan Hills, actually a plateau about the size of England, with their own hills and mountains as well as lowerlying valleys. The Shan are the dominant people of the plateau and are also Buddhists. They are the second-largest ethnic group in the country, after the Burmese. But dozens of other peoples also live on the plateau, people like the Wa and the Palaung, who inhabit the higher elevations.’10

The role of race in Burmese history and society About three to four thousand years ago, hunter-gatherer populations gave way to agriculturalists related genetically to the people who inhabited what is today Southwest China. Two thousand years later, fresh migrations started to take place from the North. As it is today, this country had always been a bit of a melting pot of very different cultures and ethnic groups. The earliest farmers are likely to have spoken languages related to Munda, which is now spoken in both Eastern and Central India. The area that is now called the Rakhine in the West historically became a bit of a frontier. Burmese people have traditionally looked up to India for civilizational inspiration. The Burmese would often refer to India as Mizzima-desa or the middle country. Burma’s majority religion, Buddhism was born in ancient India. Just as Sanskrit was the language known by the learned elite in India, Pali was Burma’s prestige language that had roots in ancient India. ‘For ancient Indians, speaking an Indo-Aryan tongue, the lands beyond the Meghna River (now in Bangladesh) were a pandava barjita desh, a place of utter barbarism where no self-respecting Hindu would go…Burmese chronicles relate long-ago encounters in the region between humans and bilus, or ogres.11 The former Arakan or today’s Rakhine is where Burmese and Bengali cultures and political systems have merged. This frontier region also became a civilizational centre in its own right and by the fifteenth century, an impressive kingdom developed at Mrauk-U, which is close to today’s Sittwe, the capital city of the Rakhine state. This kingdom

132  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar dominated the entire coastline and was threatened by the Mughals in the North and by the Burmese in the East. Finally, the Arakan was annexed by the Burmese and became Burma’s Western gate. Before colonial intervention in the 19th century, the people residing in the West were collectively known as Kala. These days, the word, ‘kala’ is used in a racist way referring primarily to the Rohingya people. The word appears in several inscriptions and refers to people who came from the West or overseas, mainly India. The Burmese saw the kala as a race or type of person. Indians, Persians, the Arabs and the Portuguese all came to the country for business and trade and they all appeared similar to the Burmese eyes: bearded men from the West.12 Finally, when the British arrived, they too were seen as kala, but a different kind of kala. The British were seen as the sheep-wearing kala because of their woollen clothes. After the British took over, Europeans, Indians and Chinese were on top of the sociopolitical system and racial hierarchy. A small Burmese elite did come into existence and they imitated the ways of the British. Under colonial rule, Indian labour became a crucial part of the mix. There was always a need for people to do manual jobs and also fill in the subordinate posts of the administrative system. In other words, there was a division of labour along racial and ethnic lines. Although for centuries, India and Indian culture had been viewed favourably, under British colonial rule, they were viewed by the Burmese as exploitative money lenders or as poor labourers working in the big cities like Rangoon. ‘They alone were now called kala, a word that took on increasingly negative connotations. Europeans, on the other hand, were now referred to as bo, which literally means a military officer but became a racial category…Race became the chief cleavage in the new society.’13 After the British militarily occupied the country, Europeans were at the top of the pecking order and held the prestigious government posts and administrative positions. ‘European’ became a separate racial category, which was not to be confused with Indians. The British in Burma referred to themselves as ‘European’, which was a broad category that included people from Britain as well Swedes, the French, Germans and other West Europeans. Much lower in status were the Indians, Chinese and the Burmese. Chinese immigration was primarily from places like Canton and Fujian and did not really compare with the massive Indian population. The leading Chinese merchants connected Rangoon to places like HongKong and Singapore. There were people of Indian, Chinese and Burmese descent who were often schooled in England and were wealthier than their British counterparts. This, however, did not seem to matter in the broad scheme of things especially when it came to racial hierarchy. Indians, Chinese and Burmese, no matter how wealthy or educated were excluded on racial grounds from elite circles. For instance, the Pegu Club in Rangoon was strictly for whites only. Right at the bottom of the racial hierarchy were non-European people who were either immigrant from India or people from other parts of Burma. They were seen as backward and inferior. Burma

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 133 developed its own caste hierarchy and with time these social stratifications became quite entrenched. As we can see from the above discussion, a key part of colonial race thinking was skin colour. In some ways, the British drew on Burmese predecessors when it came to race, but there were differences too. The Burmese royal court classified people or the various types of people they encountered into different groups and categories. The entire population was almost placed in one of the five categories: Myanma, Shan, Mon, Kala and Tayok. The first three groups were seen as Burmese and indigenous, whereas the Kala category referred primarily to the Indians before the arrival of the British, and ‘Tayok’ is likely to have been derived from ‘Turk,’ which by the 1900s referred mainly to the Chinese. The British officials based in the countryside had some understanding that the reality was actually a lot more complicated. Those involved with the census were aware that immigrants in the country often made themselves to be someone other than who they actually were. For instance, the Pariah’s who came from South India were from a low caste and arrived in Rangoon to do low paid jobs and often listed themselves as Christian or belonging to a higher caste. This is still very much the case today with minority groups in India especially Muslims who do not reveal their true identity to avoid discrimination.14 This practise has probably increased especially with the rise of Hindu nationalism in India since 2014 and also with the rise of Buddhist extremism in contemporary Myanmar. Since the Modi government took over in India in 2014, the attacks on Muslim and Christian minority communities have been on the rise. Coming back to the Burmese context, ‘many Indians stopped mentioning their old caste altogether and called themselves Hindustani.’15 Furthermore, interracial marriage and sexual relations between different ethnic group’s complicated things further. Because of this, by the first half of the 1900s a sizable group of people of mixed-race descent, often called, ‘Eurasians’ came into existence. They were often of Burmese and Scottish descent but were labelled as Anglo-Indian, as was the case in neighbouring India. It is worth mentioning in this connection that the term, ‘Scoto-Burman’ was seen as quite complicated by the census officials and ‘Anglo-Indian’ was seen as a much simpler term to use. For a long time, Burma had been a part of British India, which we will take up later for discussion. But gradually, with the passage of time, it became clear that Burma was not India and India was not Burma. The Burmese clearly have a racial and cultural identity that was distinct and separate from that of the Indians. That said, there were people who lived in between India and Burma. These were seen as in between territories. The Indian Northeast which consists of the so-called seven sister states (Meghalaya, Manipur, Mizoram, Assam, Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh and Tripura) would be a good example of a place where people were and still are living in between two worlds: South Asia and mainland Southeast Asia. There came a time in Burma when it was felt that different ethnic and racial groups would need to be categorised as native or not. It was decided that races

134  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar that were associated closely with Burma or the Burmese race even if a large part of the same group lived outside Burma were regarded as indigenous races. For instance, people like the Lisu, who lived mainly in China but at the same time, were also present in Northern Burma, resembled mainstream Burmese people to a large extent and hence were classified as native or indigenous. Tamil people from South India, who were much darker and clearly South Asian looking, were classified as foreign despite the fact that they had been living and working in Burma for centuries. The approach that was taken to categorise racial and ethnic groups was clearly problematic. Because of this binary and dichotomous approach (native and non-native) it became increasingly difficult to categorise Muslims in Burma. There were several and different kinds of Muslim people living in Burma. Thant Myint-U writes, ‘The Muslims who had originated in the Chinese province of Yunnan were of partly Tukic, Persian and Central Asian ancestry; they had fled Manchu repression in the mid-19th century and settled in Mandalay and the towns of the northeast…Added to the mix, by the 1930s, were tens of thousands of children of recent Muslim immigrant fathers and Burmese mothers, sometimes known collectively as Zerbadi.’16 Classifying Muslims of the former Arakan or today’s Rakhine province in Western Myanmar proved to be especially problematic. This is because for centuries there had been constant to-ing and fro-ing across the Bangladesh and Burma border especially across the Naf River. People moved across the border as pirates, soldiers, traders and slaves. Broadly speaking, to the North, most people spoke Bengali or dialects of Bengali and were Muslim and to the South, most people were of Burmese descent, spoke Arakanese and practised Buddhism. In the north, people looked more South Asian and in the south people looked more East Asian or Southeast Asian. In 1871, the Muslim community was roughly a fifth of the population in the former Arakan or today’s Rakhine state. By 1911, they had become more than a third. It was in the North where they remained a majority. That said, the constant movement of people from South Asia and Burma proper across the region paved the way for the intertwining of racial, linguistic and religious identities. Since we are talking about the Rakhine, where the recent Rohingya humanitarian crisis has broken out, it is worth mentioning that the British never used the word Rohingya. The word, ‘Rohingya’ was used by a lot of Muslims residing in the Northern parts of the Arakan and it basically means ‘of Rohang,’ which was their name for the Arakan. The implication of this was that Arakan was their home. In a very similar way, Bengali Muslims residing across the border often called themselves ‘Chatgaya’ that meant of Chittagong. The British often used a different range of terms like ‘Chittagonian’ or ‘Arakan Mohamedan’ to describe and differentiate the Muslims in the area. Some were classified as natives, whereas others were seen as foreign. Culturally, the Arakanese Muslims were similar to the Arakanese Buddhist. This is similar to the situation in neighbouring South Asia with regards to the Bengali

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 135 identity. The Bengali identity is predominantly a dual identity. One can be Bengali Hindu as well as Bengali Muslim and after the British arrived in the subcontinent and after the conversions to Christianity took place, the third category of Bengali Christians also came into existence. Bengali Hindus were generally on the Indian side of the border and Bengali Muslims were on the Bangladeshi side of the border with a sprinkling of minorities on both sides. But, whichever side of the border you were on there were always striking similarities in terms of values, belief systems, customs, cultural practices and ways of life.17 As if things were not complicated enough, the British added to this complication by dividing the natives of Burma into ‘martial races’ and ‘nonmartial races.’ The martial races generally encompassed the ethnic minorities like the Karen and the Kachin, who had converted to Christianity and were by and large loyal to the British. The non-martial races included the Burman ethnic majority living in Burma proper who mainly practised Buddhism. The British also exacerbated the situation by encouraging Indian migration to Burma. Once these Indians arrived they would work as cheap labour involved predominantly in manual and labour type jobs. Different points in time in Burmese history, there have been fears that the Burmese race will be swamped because of the continuous waves of migration from India. These fears also paved the way for race riots to take place in the first half of the twentieth century. Whether or not there was any basis or substance to these fears is a different story and sometimes these fears were more perceived fears rather than being real. Thant Myint-U writes, ‘the actual numbers told a slightly different story, of immigration declining during the early 20th century and Indians barely present in much of the countryside… For many young Burmese, going into the modern world, going to Rangoon, meant venturing from their little upriver towns into an alien universe where the British ruled from their exclusive clubs and Indians dominated the market place.’18 Now that we have taken a look at the role of race in Burmese history, let us turn to the role of religion in Burmese politics.

The role of religion in Burmese history, politics and society Generally, outsiders and people, in general, would associate this country with Buddhism. But this is only partly true. In other words, this is both correct and incorrect. Whilst Buddhism has a strong presence especially in the central areas, there is also a strong presence of Christianity and Islam in the country’s periphery. Pre Buddhist faith in animism and spirit or nat worship also exists. Hence, a more comprehensive and all-encompassing approach would be to look at the different religious traditions collectively, both the religious practises of the ethnic majority as well as the religious traditions of ethnic minorities. In other words, whilst the Buddhist tradition explains much about contemporary Myanmar, there are parts of the country especially the borderlands which are far more complex and Buddhism cannot

136  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar be used in this connection. Burma has been a place in mainland Southeast Asia, where Theravada Buddhism flourished during the monarchical period for centuries. Religion also played a key role in politics during the colonial and post-colonial periods as well. When the country gained independence in 1948, the political leaders at that time and also before 1948 were in a dilemma and were debating between modern and traditional roles of religion in politics and contemporary affairs. There was a clash between the visions of Aung San, who is often seen as the father of contemporary Myanmar, and the traditionalist groups in political circles. Put simply, it was a struggle between the forces of continuity and the forces of change. Whilst Aung San was in favour of a multicultural society and equal opportunities for all, the traditionalists wanted Buddhism to be the state religion. A lot of other post-colonial societies have also had to face and deal with similar challenges immediately after independence. For instance, after Pakistan gained independence in 1947, the political elite were not quite sure whether to develop the country along the lines of the Sharia or whether or not they should take a more secular approach.19 This struggle in Pakistan has continued until recent times. Malik writes, ‘Pakistan was the handiwork of reformers who were themselves products of modernity. These reformist forefathers projected Pakistan, in the 1940s at least, as a cultural utopia where Muslim political and economic interests would be safeguarded…These reformists were enthusiastically challenged by Islamists including Jamiat-i- Ulama-i-Hind, Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam and several other such doctrinal groups.’20 Ironically, in the Pakistani context, both the orthodox elements and the heterodox elements quote Mohammed Ali Jinnah as their hero. The orthodox elements of Pakistani society focus more on his later life when he had become more religious and traditional in his ways and the heterodox elements pay more attention to his youth when he had a more secular approach to life. In the end, Aung San’s view prevailed. The initial constitutions that were drafted emphasized on neutrality in religious affairs and that assistance would be provided to all religious groups. After Aung San had been assassinated, the traditionalists gained the upper hand for a short while. This was a very sensitive issue which came under a lot of pressure throughout the 1950s partly because of the Buddhist Council meetings but mainly because Aung San’s successor and the first prime minister since independence, U Nu, was obsessed with the Buddhist tradition. Rajiv Bhatia writes, ‘at the height of his endeavours in this direction, the minorities did what they could to oppose them, but failed. U Nu’s flawed approach caused considerable damage to nation-building efforts in the crucial first decade.’21 Later on, under the leadership of General Ne Win, the elite faced the challenge to disentangle religion from power politics. There was a belief that religion was not in keeping with building a modern socialist society, which was one reason why government intervention was required in Burmese society from time to time. ‘The Burmese Way to Socialism’ that had been introduced

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 137 by the regime both opposed and compromised with the role of Buddhism in public affairs. At that time it was not possible to keep all sections of the political elite happy and a very uneasy arrangement was in place. The next major political figure was Than Shwe who put his own mark on this very fragile issue. He and his followers had been against socialism and spent much of their time on furthering their own needs and interests. He was a devout Buddhist who understood the appeal of religion to the masses. He worked hard to strike a balance between keeping the Buddhists happy and those who opposed the Buddhist clergy. Despite his efforts, the Saffron uprising took place in 2007. The 2008 constitution recognises the important place that the Buddhist tradition has in the country but it also recognises the importance of other religious traditions that relate to ethnic minorities. Thein Sein is also well known for his Buddhist piety. Opposition leader and democracy activist, Aung San Suu Kyi is often seen as a female Bodhisattva, bodhisattva’s being those who have reached enlightenment or Buddhahood but stay back in the world to help others reach enlightenment.22 Whilst Buddhism does play its part in contemporary Burmese society, it does not explain Burmese society and the country’s beliefs in its entirety. For instance, one cannot ignore the influence of Hinduism. This is not only because of India’s geographical proximity to Myanmar but also because of the arrival of Indians to the country that was encouraged by the British. The arrival of Indian migrants from a Hindu background to places like Rangoon to work as cheap labour for the colonial administration allowed the transportation of Hindu practices and rituals to Burma, which must have paved the way for the rise of syncretic cultural systems after the fusion of Hinduism with local Burmese traditions and Buddhist practices. Both mainland and maritime Southeast Asia in ancient times had been a part of the Greater India and hence India’s civilizational influences can be seen in this region. For instance, in maritime Southeast Asia, especially in parts of Indonesia, one can very easily see how Hindu symbols like the Garuda are used in public life. Garuda is a mythological bird from Hinduism often associated with Lord Vishnu.23 Although Indonesia is a Muslim majority country today, one can easily see Garuda travel agents, Garuda tourism, Garuda flights, Garuda hotels etc. It is also very easy to get beautiful wooden handicrafts of Garuda and other figures from the Hindu pantheon in the shopping malls in Indonesia like the Grand Indonesia shopping mall in Jakarta.24 In relation to this Indian connection, it has been argued that inscriptions were found in several places like Java and Sumatra which linked the Indonesian archipelago to India.25 Rupert Gethin writes, ‘Indian cultural influence began to extend in Southeast Asia from the early centuries of the Christian era, and various forms of Hinduism and traditions of Buddhism had established themselves throughout the region by the end of the first millennium.’26 This is also the case with mainland Southeast Asia-in fact more so, given that the mainland is next door to India, whose majority religion is Hinduism. Bhatia writes, ‘the influence of Hinduism remains visible, not only in the

138  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar temples of Bagan and elsewhere but in many Buddhist rituals as well as in people’s faith in astrology and the power of gems to ward off calamity and bring good fortune….But, perhaps none of these influences is as powerful as the worship of nats i.e. spirits.’27 In relation to India’s influence on the Southeast Asian mainland during the ancient period with special regard to Cambodia, Charles Higham writes, ‘some early interpretations of the state of Angkor stressed the seminal role of India in its formation and nature. Beguiled by the ubiquitous imagery of Shiva and Vishnu, central gods in the Indian pantheon, and the use of Sanskrit, the priestly language of Hinduism, Indianization was put forward as a possible process to explain the origins of Angkor. There is no doubt that the people of Southeast Asia exchanged goods and ideas with India from at least 350 BC.’28 Nat worship in Burma was there before Buddhism took over as the dominant religion and finally, the two coexisted. That said, more traditional Buddhists tried very hard to disentangle Buddhist practices from rituals associated with nat worship. Nat possibly comes from the Sanskrit word natha, which means lord or guardian. Spirits are believed to be of various kinds and take different forms and shapes. It is widely believed that these spirits need to be pleased and kept happy by offering them food, flowers, incense, money etc. lest they got angry and then those who chose to ignore the spirits would have to deal with their wrath. Nats are also seen as guardians of nature who are believed to have authority and full control over certain rivers, mountains, lakes and forests. Some are also associated with Hindu gods like Lord Ganesha, the elephant god strongly associated with good fortune.29 Other spirits are ancestors who were less fortunate and had suffered violent deaths with some of them hovering around certain regions. Indian cultural influences particularly the impact of Hinduism on mainland Southeast Asia has been discussed by many scholars. This applied not just to Southeast Asian countries immediately bordering India like Burma but also to more far off countries like Cambodia in the Indo-Chinese peninsula. By the fifth century kings and chiefs in this part of the world would use Indian suffixes such as ‘varman.’ Scholars have been debating for a while now and it is still not clear as to when this happened, ‘but archaeological evidence suggests the first century CE or earlier.’30 The transmission of Indian culture particularly of Hinduism to these far off lands probably happened through traders and merchants, both ancient Cambodian traders visiting India and Indians visiting ancient Cambodia. There is, of course, no sign of a permanent Indian settlement in the Khmer region. ‘Inscriptions show changes in succession and inheritance patterns, along with a vocabulary of governance, which may indicate that the Khmer were adopting an Indic social structure that better suited the ambitions of rulers with expanding territory.’31 The use of Sanskrit was also introduced in ancient Cambodia as was a male-dominated social hierarchy. Indian art, sculpture and architecture also made its presence felt in ancient Southeast Asia. In architecture, for instance, the Indian sanctuary tower or shikhara

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 139 was adopted and incorporated within ancient Cambodian styles of architecture. There was an impact of both Brahmanism and Buddhism on local culture and religious beliefs. The early inscriptions show us that local deities co-existed with Hindu gods. There is also substantial evidence of ancestor/ spirit worship, which we have already spoken about in the Burmese context. ‘Associated with these spirits are origin myths revealing common elements in indigenous and Indian belief structures, in particular the naga (serpent) as ruler of the water and the underworld, and the mountain as home of the gods, which may explain the easy coexistence of two cultural strands. One legend relates the arrival of an Indian called Kaundinya, inspired by a dream to sail to the Khmer realm. He shoots an arrow into the vessel of its ruling queen, the daughter of the naga king. They marry; her father drinks up the waters of her territory and creates the land of the Kambus, a word for ‘Cambodians’ first cited in a Cham inscription of 817.’32 The myth captures the coming together of Indic land-based culture with the waterbased Khmer, whose myth of origin relates to the emergence of the land from the lake. In large parts of Southeast Asia, we can see that Indic culture was thoroughly absorbed into local and regional traditions. Sanskrit inscriptions, for instance, show high literary and epigraphic standards. The world-famous temples of Borobudur and Prambanan in Indonesia are other examples of how far ancient Indian culture and influences travelled both across the land as well as sea. Thus, we can see from the above discussion that ancient India’s impact on Southeast Asia was profound. With Burma being next door, the impact would have been greater there than on the far off lands in Southeast Asia.

The role of ethnicity in Burmese society, history and politics Myanmar’s racial and cultural diversity is reflected in the multiplicity of its ethnic groups. Ethnic minorities are often represented by different political parties, armed groups and civil society organisations that collectively create an important pillar in the political system. Ethnic groups in this country have had a history of being involved in internecine warfare. Whilst most of these groups have had strained relations with the centre, they are also a fractured community with on-going bitter rivalry amongst themselves. Despite the on-going rivalry, these ethnic groups have survived under the overarching umbrella of the Union of Myanmar. At the initial stages, Aung San played a key role in starting a dialogue with minority groups and was successful to an extent. Had he been alive there would have been a chance of there being better relations in this country between the centre and the periphery. After facing dangers to national unity, U Nu’s leadership was characterised by some decentralisation and federalism. Decentralisation and delegation of power and political authority to separate regional divisions within the country was not something that General Ne Win viewed favourably. Ne Win believed in having a strong centre and

140  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar followed a policy of might is right throughout most of his career. This policy paved the way for numerous civil and internal wars to take place, which went on for decades. Ne Win’s policies especially with regard to ethnic groups in the periphery are reflected in his own character and the kind of person he was. With regard to his character, David Steinberg, writes, ‘He was highly mercurial, and his whims became commands, policy and law. He could not be contradicted. He changed the currency into multiples of nine, his lucky number, which was astrologically assured to enable him to live to be ninety. He changed traffic from the left to the right side of the road (on the advice of an astrologer) to ensure his success.’33 Of course, from time to time ceasefire deals were struck between the centre and ethnic minority armed groups based in the periphery. Under the SLORC/ State Law and Order Restoration Council in the early 1990s, Khin Nyunt negotiated ceasefire agreements that brought fighting between the military generals and ethnic minority armed groups to a halt temporarily. There was an attempt to make the ethnic groups recognise and accept central authority by giving them some form of autonomy within their own regions and home areas. The 2008 Constitution ultimately provided for regional legislatures but bitter relations between the centre and the periphery continued. The centre also tried to incorporate the ethnic armed groups within the umbrella of the central armed forces and this also caused much outcry. Although Than Shwe’s regime insisted on this, these demands were rejected on several occasions by ethnic groups. Many of these ethnic armed groups felt that this was the centre’s attempt to tighten its grip over ethnic armed forces so that it could keep a watchful eye on their activities and control them. This central control was necessary lest the ethnic armed groups at the periphery who were often seen as insurgent or terrorist groups by the generals proved to be too rebellious. Despite on-going tensions between the generals and ethnic minority armed groups, some progress had been made although for a short while. Rajiv Bhatia writes, ‘the agreement with the Karen National Union/ KNU was rightly hailed as a historic landmark because until it was signed in April 2012, this ethnic group had remained engaged in hostilities against the government since independence. The Thein Sein government succeeded in concluding ceasefire agreements with all groups.’34 However, ethnic tensions have continued in recent years. Now that we have discussed the role of race, ethnicity and religion in detail, let us turn to the colonial years and the impact of British colonialism on the country. But before we move on to the next section to talk about the advent of British colonialism in Burmese history, politics and society, it is worth noting that some scholars like David Thang Moe recognise that there are two kinds of colonialism and he makes a distinction between what he calls external colonialism, which relates to British rule, and internal colonialism, which relates to Burmese military rule since 1962.35 Of course, similar arguments can also be applied to neighbouring countries like India in South Asia. India was subjected to British colonialism for over two hundred

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 141 years. India’s nationalist movement against British imperialism and struggle for freedom is one of the best known in world history. However, since British independence in 1947 till the arrival of the BJP/Bharatiya Janata Party in 2014, many in India have felt that they were internally colonised by the Congress party. Many have spoken about winning true freedom from decades of Congress party rule and familial dynastic politics. This happened especially in 2014 when the Modi sarkar/government took over. Now of course many Indians are very disillusioned with the Modi sarkar’s performance or lack of performance, so it would be interesting to hear the argument now. India’s internal colonisation also applies to the way New Delhi has treated the more peripheral parts of the country like Kashmir and the Northeast.

The colonial years Myanmar had been subjected to British colonial rule in the 19th and 20th centuries. The two main pillars of British rule in South Asia and mainland Southeast Asia were the East India Company and Christian missionaries. Whilst the East India Company in its initial years played a crucial role in dealing with political and economic issues and helped with the territorial expansion of the Empire, the Christian missionaries were active with their proselytization campaigns, converting local people to Christianity so that they would more readily embrace British rule. Imperial Britain’s initial contact with Myanmar or what used to be known as Burma was through the East India Company and through the defensive acts and exploratory moves of the British East India Company. Before moving into the Southeast Asian mainland, Britain had already established its political dominance in the Indian subcontinent next door primarily through diplomacy and war. Where diplomacy failed, war had to be waged against indigenous rulers. In the Indian context, the British waged wars against the Marathas, the Mysoreans and the Sikhs for decades. In relation to Anglo- Maratha relations, historian Stewart Gordon writes, ‘The end of the Maratha polity came with a British proclamation in February 1818, which formally removed the Peshwa.36 Within a few months, he surrendered and his army was disbanded. The British began the long process of settling and administering the territories which they had conquered. The remaining Maratha houses received treaties of subordination which turned them into princely states.’37 In relation to the Anglo-Sikh wars, Hew McLeod writes, ‘in 1845–1846 and 1848–1849 two Anglo Sikh wars were fought and the kingdom was finally annexed by the British in 1849.’38 The British took a very similar approach whilst moving into mainland Southeast Asia. Three Anglo Burmese wars had been fought before the British took over. The first one took place between the years 1824 and 1826. The second Anglo Burmese war had been fought in 1852 and the third and final Anglo Burmese war had been fought in 1885, by which time Britain

142  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar had gained full control of what we know as Burma or Myanmar today. This process of taking over Burma was a long-drawn, complicated and arduous process. After the first war, the British had captured the coastal strips, which included the Arakan and the Tenasserim. After the second war, lower Burma, which includes the Irrawaddy delta had been captured. Finally, after the third war, the more interior parts of the country were taken over by the colonial administration. The whole process was gradual but bit by bit imperial Britain tightened its control over Burma. Initially, Burma was governed from the Bengal Presidency or more specifically Calcutta or Kolkata, which used to be the capital of British India.39 Burma very quickly became a part of British India and remained a part of the British Raj till the year 1937. It was after the second and the third Anglo Burmese wars that the British started to introduce administrative reform and development in Burma, some of which paved the way for complications in ethnic minority–majority relations in the post-colonial period. The British began with the pacification campaigns, which were meant to bring in more peace, order, security and stability to Burma.40 Burma was seen as a lawless part of the Empire so it had to be subjected to pacification and the process was completed by 1890. Pacification meant that there would be a permanent stationing of security personnel in the region and that the locals would be subjected to British colonial rule more directly.41 The colonial administration also mapped their new territorial possession. Previously, Burma had not been treated as a single political unit but the colonialists brought it all together. This meant that different ethnic groups were conjoined as a single administrative unit. The British called the central part of Burma, Ministerial Burma, which is where the dominant ethnic group, the Burman majority people live. The peripheral parts of the country is where most of the ethnic minorities resided and these more peripheral parts came to be known as the Frontier Areas or Excluded Areas. The colonial authorities also attempted to rationalise administrative structures by destroying the traditional political structures in central Burma like the aristocracy, the nobility and the monarchy. King Thibaw was expelled by 1885. Needless to say, this paved the way for a great deal of hostility between the new rulers and the Burman majority and caused a great deal of resentment. The traditional political structures in the more peripheral parts of the country, however, remained intact. In fact, the more peripheral parts of the country were ruled indirectly by the British and hence the relations that minority people in the periphery had with the British were less strained. Economic development was introduced and special measures were put in place to accommodate capitalism. The lower Irrawaddy delta region deserves a special mention in this context because it was seen as very fertile and profitable. Measures were taken to develop this part of Burma in particular. Railways were introduced between the years 1870 and 1915. When Burma was formally integrated as a part of British India a single colonial market for goods, services and labour was created. Migration from

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 143 different parts of the Indian subcontinent to the Irrawaddy delta started to take place. For instance, Indians arrived to places like Rangoon and were hired as cheap labour by the colonial administration. Finally, Burma was exposed to the global economy. In the long term, the impact of these colonial policies on Burma was catastrophic. ‘The period of less than sixty years that the British governed all of Burma, coupled with the earlier establishment of British rule in the southern frontier regions of the country, had a profound impact upon the economy and society, and not least on the relationship of the majority peasant population with the state.’42 The pacification campaigns which were meant to introduce order and stability were too top-down and based on coercion. Too much force was used which ultimately strained relations between the colonial administration and the locals. The mapping exercise driven by administrative convenience stirred up racial and ethnic divides. The destruction of traditional political institutions like the monarchy in the centre also strained relations between the ethnic Burman majority and the colonial administration. This was one reason why ethnic minorities like the Karen and the Kachin were favoured by the colonial administration. Ethnic minorities filled in the lower positions of the army and administration. As a result, the Burman majority felt excluded because its participation in governance, administration and the military was limited. This would later have a disastrous effect on ethnic majority-minority relations in the post-colonial period. And ‘even after the rapid expansion of the Burma Army between 1939 and 1941 when it was felt necessary to raise forces following the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe, and in the face of feared Japanese aggression in Asia, only 1,893 of the troops of the regular Burma army were classified as Burmans, in comparison to 2,797 Karens, 852 Kachins, 1,258 Chins, 32 Yunannese, 330 Chinese, 137 others, and 2,578 Indians.43 The Burman majority were also incensed by the fact that many ethnic minority groups like the Karen had actually participated in the pacification campaigns. The economic reforms that the colonial administration introduced ultimately created all kinds of economic disparities and inequalities. Finally, exposing Burma to global market forces and the rest of the world gave rise to a nationalist backlash, the effects of which were felt once the British had left in 1948.

The Panglong agreement, 1947 After the Second World War, the divide between Ministerial Burma or the Burman core and the peripheral Excluded Areas became a critical issue and there were on-going talks on the two Burma principle as the British were in the process of leaving the Southeast Asian mainland. In the beginning, ethnic minority groups were unwilling to join hands with the Burman majority and come together as one nation. The frontier leaders were considering a separate entity for themselves by forming a federation of frontier areas.44

144  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar In 1946, the AFPFL, Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League called for a conference and invited the representatives of all ethnic groups to discuss the possibility of a Union of Burma. Aung San was probably one of the very few Burman’s who was capable of uniting the country’s different ethnic groups. A British official by the name of H.N.C Stevenson was in charge and in support of the ethnic minorities at that time. He actually suggested having a United Frontier Union. This proposal went down well with the ethnic minorities but not with the ethnic majority. It was especially opposed by the AFPFL/ Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League political party. Stevenson wanted to make sure that the rights and interests of minorities were protected. A delegation led by Aung San, Aung San Suu Kyi’s father, to London was sent to try and win the trust of the British government. The British prime minister then was Clement Atlee. The British urged Aung San not to use any kind of force or pressurise the ethnic minorities into joining the union. To this, Aung San responded and said that it was the policies of the British during the colonial years that had led to the current state of affairs in the first place, and that colonial policies had also led to the tension between different ethnic groups. Aung San at the Panglong conference reassured ethnic groups that if people from the ethnic majority received one Kyat, so would minority groups, Kyat being the Burmese currency. This basically meant that if they were to join the union, all people would be treated fairly with justice. This convinced at least some of the ethnic leaders. ‘The primary objective of the agreement was to establish a union government where each ethnic group would enjoy autonomy within its own territory.’45 The conference was not an attempt to abolish traditional self-rule in the frontier areas. By cooperating with the AFPFL leaders, the ethnic leaders thought that this process that had started at Panglong in 1947 would speed up independence from British colonial rule. It actually adopted certain principles for the creation of the Burmese Union. Firstly, a representative of the hill people would be appointed as a counsellor to the governor to deal with issues that affected the frontier/border areas. Secondly, the counsellor would have to be assisted by two deputy counsellors of respective races who would have to attend the governor’s executive council meeting when issues relating to the frontier areas were being discussed. Thirdly, the council would not function in a way that would divorce ethnic groups from power. In other words, ethnic leaders would be granted full autonomy to deal with affairs that relate to internal administration. Fourthly, the frontier areas would enjoy fundamental democratic rights like any other democratic nation. And finally, the executive council along with the counsellor and deputy counsellors of the frontier areas would examine the possibility of adopting financial arrangements for certain ethnic groups similar to those in Burma proper. Popham writes, ‘Aung San, who had fought first the British and then the Japanese to bring independent Burma into being, understood the nature of the problem.’46 The answer was to be found in the idea of ‘unity in diversity.’ The conference was held at Panglong, in the

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 145 Shan state. On the 12th of February 1947, at Panglong, the autonomy of the different ethnic groups in Burma was to be particularly in internal matters in the frontier areas. Aung San made it clear that it would not be feasible to have a unitary state so having a union would be a much better idea with specific provisions that would safeguard the rights and interests of ethnic minority groups. Although the Karen people boycotted the process and others like the Mon were not invited, the Panglong agreement was signed on the 12th of February 1947, by the Shan, Kachin, Chin and Karenni and Aung San who represented the central Burmese government. The Shan and the Karenni who had remained independent during colonial and pre-colonial times would be allowed to secede after a period of ten years if they wanted to. The status of the Karen was to be resolved after independence. The incoming leader, U Nu, promised that ethnic minorities would get a fair deal in the years to come. During this time leaders emphasised the Union of Burma and bringing all ethnic groups together. Nationalism between the years 1945 and 1948 was Burmese rather than Burman. There was an attempt by politicians to bring people from diverse backgrounds together. However, there were also more exclusive dynamics and a tendency for some to look back to a mono-ethnic past instead of looking forward to a multi-ethnic future. We also see the rise of ethnic minority nationalisms coming into existence based on minority identities that would challenge the dominant Burman strand of nationalism after 1948. Although it looked good on paper, the spirit of Panglong, which promised a multi-ethnic federal democracy was strained to breaking point in the years following independence. What complicated matters in the years immediately after independence were the Burmanisation policies associated with the AFPFL. U Nu’s obsession with Buddhism and attempts to create a state religion made him increasingly unpopular amongst ethnic minorities, many of whom were Christian. His attempts to impose national unity through the deployment of Buddhism as a state religion ignored the realities of a society that was fractured along racial, religious and political lines. Besides the Burman, there are seven major ethnic groups: the Karen, the Karenni, the Shan, the Mon, the Kachin, Chin and the Rakhine. In addition to the above, there are numerous sub-groups like the Naga, Pa-O, the Lahu, the Lisu and the Rohingya’s. For much of the period since 1948, many of these ethnic groups have actually been involved in armed struggle with the central government. These groups have led secessionist nationalist movements for decades. They have fought for political independence, autonomy, federal democracy, more representation in political and military circles and basic human rights. ‘Throughout the decades the regime has had to cope not just with several bouts of popular unrest but also with separatist insurgencies by Myanmar’s minorities, notably in the Shan and Kachin states in Myanmar’s Eastern and Northern regions but also in the Rakhine region bordering Bangladesh.’47 Many of these

146  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar groups have also signed ceasefires with the regime although these have often broken down. For instance, the Kachin had seventeen years of ceasefire from 1994, which was broken in the year 2011, when the regime started a brutal offensive against the Kachin people in Northern Burma. ‘These cease-fire groups have widely divergent relations with the central government and different degrees of autonomy or control.’48 In relation to ceasefires, Lee Jones writes, ‘through a series of ceasefire agreements, the SLORC/SPDC gradually pacified the border regions and struck new compromises with local forces based on the pursuit of development and business opportunities.’49

Xenophobic tendencies during years of military rule, 1962–2011 In 1962, New Win launched a coup, which put Burma on to the path of military rule. The Burmese military or Tatmadaw remained in power for decades until 2011 when finally democratisation started to take place. Over the years, the military has gone through different guises. For instance, the regime was officially called the SLORC: State Law and Order Restoration Council from 1988 till 1997 and from 1997 till 2010, it was called the SPDC or the State Peace and Development Council. A hallmark of Ne Win’s rule was a hatred towards foreigners and an antipathy to non-Burman ethnic nationalities although his own racism was inherently contradictory. For instance, although he was openly anti-Chinese, he was himself part Chinese. He would also visit Britain regularly, despite the fact that governance was characterised by xenophobia. Foreign businesspeople, journalists and missionaries were expelled from Burma along with educational organisations such as Ford, Fulbright and Asia Foundations. Mission schools and hospitals were all nationalised and the teaching of English was restricted. In 1964, English medium schools were banned and many elite private schools were taken into public ownership. The Indian population was especially targeted, and their businesses were also taken over by the military. Ne Win established a Revolutionary Council, which nationalised banks, industries and large shops. Between the years 1963 and 1964, 300,000 Indians left following the nationalisation of their trading concerns. After 1964, under the orders of Ne Win, thousands of men, women and children of Indian descent were sent back to India and Pakistan. The Indian government under Nehru’s leadership made arrangements with special planes and ships to bring these people back to India. Many Chinese also left after the race riots, which took place in 1967. ‘Many Indians had left during the Second World War or at independence. In the early years of Ne Win’s rule, 400,000 more were compelled to leave. Those who remained, mainly the very poor, kept their heads down. In 1967, anti-Chinese riots had led to an exodus of ethnic Chinese as well, many to the Bay Area in California.’50 Approximately 2000 civil servants were replaced by soldiers, starting a brain drain, which continued till 2010.

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 147 This was partly because the military regime did not trust the English speaking professional class. Libraries run by Britain, America, India and Russia were closed down by 1965. After the military took over it was increasingly becoming hard to obtain visas to travel to Burma. Visas for western tourists were especially restricted. Political dialogue with ethnic nationalities also came to a grinding halt during the years of military rule. Events from the past have also impacted on the present. ‘The 1930s notion of Muslim men as threats to Buddhist women and a Buddhist conception of the nation resurged with inter-religious riots in Northern Rakhine state in 2012.…In total, the 2012 violence left around 200 people dead and another 140,000 displaced-predominantly people who identified as Rohingya Muslims.’51

Ethnic majority–minority relations Ethnic minority and majority relations in Myanmar have never been smooth, particularly between 1946 till 1974. Even today the situation is very uncertain and fluid. Much of the political leadership is drawn from the Bamar ethnic majority. More representation of ethnic minorities at the senior political level would be a good idea for the country to move forward. Incorporating diverse voices at the senior political level would go a long way in easing the tension, which exists in the Burmese borderlands. The views put forward by the state are often at odds with the views put forward by the ethnic minority groups. Firstly, as far as the official narrative is concerned, the lack of national unity is a legacy of the British colonial policy of divide and rule. In other words, the racial complications of the country that we see today can be traced back to the colonial years. Secondly, the civilian government in the early post-independence years problematized the situation because they neglected the interests of minority groups which led to an insurgency that has lasted for 45 years. Thirdly, the CIA in support of the KMT or the Chinese nationalist party actively encouraged the production of opium to fund its anti-communist activities thus sowing the seeds of the drug production problem in Myanmar. Fourthly, the Armed Forces of Myanmar has had to fight the insurgents in order to preserve the territorial integrity of the country. Fifthly and finally, the change of the country’s name from ‘Burma’ that was given by the British back to its original name ‘Myanmar’ in 1989 was an attempt to sever all connections with the colonial past. The ethnic minority version of events is clearly at odds with the official narrative. Firstly, the 1947 Union constitution had been hastily passed without reflecting the spirit of the Panglong agreement. It was Aung San’s leadership that had achieved the historic Panglong agreement, which paved the way for the independence of Burma. Secondly, since the death of Aung San, ethnic identities and equality which had been recognised at Panglong were now increasingly being weakened. Thirdly, the efforts to amend the 1947 constitution to properly reflect the Panglong agreement had failed.

148  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar Fourthly, after General Ne Win launched a coup in 1962 (supposedly to save the nation from disintegration and further fragmentation), minorities have been denied their rights that had been guaranteed in the 1947 constitution. Fifthly, the increasing repression finally peaked in the massacre of unarmed civilians in 1988. And ‘as for the change of name from ‘Burma’ to ‘Myanmar’ in 1989, the military junta, which is seen as illegitimate, did not have the authority to change the name without consultation. Others were of the view that it is ‘Burmanization’ by another name.’52 Now that we have taken a look at some historical background, let us discuss the position of some specific ethnic groups in a bit more detail.

The Karen The Karen people in the Southeast close to the border with Thailand call their land, ‘Kawthoolei’. The Karen are internally displaced people whose original villages had been overrun by the military and on some occasions burned down. Their ancestral home is on the banks of the Moei river very close to Thailand where Karen people try to celebrate their culture. Since the year 1949, the Karens have been fighting an armed struggle for basic human rights, a degree of autonomy and more recently a battle for existence. The Karen National Union is the major resistance organisation, which has been fighting on behalf of the Karen people. ‘The Karen National Union/KNU, formed in 1947, began its armed movement against the Burmese government in 1949 and engaged in armed conflicts until it signed a ceasefire with the Myanmar government on 12th January, 2012.’53 One of its vice president’s, David Thackerbaw is of the view that the Karen community will eventually be wiped out. The Karen community is fragmented when it comes to their political aspirations. Some seek political independence, while others favour a degree of autonomy within the Union of Burma. This is similar to secessionist movements elsewhere in the Asia Pacific like in the Indian Northeast. Before we deal with more contemporary affairs and events, let us quickly take a look at ethnic majority-Burman and Karen relations just before independence. Before modern Burma’s founding father, Aung San had switched sides and joined hands with the British, he had tried to win the friendship and support of the Japanese. Whilst Japan initially helped the Burmese to free themselves from British colonial rule, their own rule especially under the Greater East Asia Co Prosperity Sphere, which had the aim of keeping Asia only for Asians by freeing Asia of western foreign powers,54 was becoming increasingly oppressive. That said, in the beginning, Japan did provide Aung San with support. ‘For Colonel Keiji Suzuki, the Japanese Lawrence of Arabia, Aung San’s arrival in Tokyo was just what he was hoping for.…Suzuki’s heart lay increasingly in Burma and he encouraged the young men under him to themselves lead the fight for Burmese independence…within months their numbers had soared, as they were joined by their old fellow nationalists and other excited youngsters across the country.’55

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 149 These Karen soldiers were Christian soldiers who had been a part of the colonial forces and they had decided not to trek to neighbouring India but to go back home and protect their families. The BIA was indeed an ethnic nationalist Burmese force and the Karens were fearful of the future especially with colonialism coming to an end. A Karen elder, Sir San C. Po had been working hard at that time to ease ethnic tensions and his efforts had proven to be successful especially in the port town of Bassein. But a group of Karens soon hatched a plot of attacking the town of Myaungmya, driving out the Burmese soldiers and rescuing the Karens in the process who were believed to have been in danger. ‘But the plot was discovered by the Burmese, who immediately shot the local Karen leader, Saw Pe Tha, together with his Scottish wife and their children. Sir San C. Po managed to prevent an even greater tragedy by then persuading the Karens not to go ahead with their attack. But the genie had been let out of the bottle.’56 The BIA started regular executions of ethnic Karen people who were viewed unfavourably and suspected of being disloyal to the new order and forces of change. Dozens were brutally killed. The Catholic Mission headquarters as well as an orphanage was burned and razed to the ground. Many Karens retaliated and fought back and race riots and communal violence spread all across the delta region. ‘What began in those days would soon lead to a war that has yet to end.’57 Brenner writes, ‘The KNU is Myanmar’s oldest ethnic insurgency movement, which posed a viable threat to the country’s rulers with more than 10,000 well-trained rebel soldiers for many decades since Myanmar’s independence. During its heyday, the movement ruled over parts of Eastern Myanmar, spanning from Shan state in the North all the way to the Tenasserim Region in the South, which is administered as a quasi-state, known as Kawthoolei. While the KNU still operates across the whole of Karen State with approximately 5,000 soldiers today, the power relations between Myanmar’s insurgent borderlands and the state have shifted in favour of the latter since the Cold War due to changing geopolitics and counter-insurgency strategies.’58 The Karen struggle has been primarily with the regime although the roots of this conflict actually go much deeper. Historically, the Karen people had faced centuries of oppression and persecution at the hands of Burmese kings. This is why, when the British colonised Burma, they were welcomed by the Karen people. The Karen people saw the British as liberators. The British in turn favoured the Karen. The Karen were favoured by the British over the Burman majority and received privileged access to service in the military, government service and administration. They were also given opportunities in education by the British. By 1939, Karen troops outnumbered Burmans in the British Burma Army by a ratio three to one. Wade writes, ‘Partly in response to the campaigns of agitation led by predominantly Bamar figures, the British had drafted soldiers from the Kayin (Karen), the Kachin and other smaller ethnicities into their army, as well as Muslims, and awarded them positions above that of Bamar.’59

150  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar Karen allegiance to the British colonial administration further strained relations between themselves and the Burman ethnic majority. During the Second World War, whilst the Burmans fought alongside the Japanese, the Karen people were allied with the British. The British had promised Karen independence after the war but this was not to be the case. Despite the lack of support, the Karen people decided to soldier on their own without British support in the post-independence phase. In 1946, a Karen Goodwill Mission led by Sydney Loo Nee, Saw Than Din and Saw Ba U Gyi went to London, but the mission was unsuccessful and they returned to Burma without achieving their goals. There are Karen people still alive today who have not forgotten the promises that were made and subsequently broken by the British. One of the KNU’s chairman, Saw Tamlabaw, fought with the British in Force 136. His daughter, Zipporah Sein was elected the KNU’s first women Secretary-General in 2008. She has been the KNU’s vice president and has played a very central role in ceasefire talks. In August 1950, the Karen movement lost momentum when their leader, Saw Ba U Gyi, who was basically the Karen equivalent of Aung San in terms of political leadership and inspiration, was killed by the Burmese military along with his chief lieutenant, Saw Sankey. Like a lot of the Indian politicians who went to England for their higher studies, Saw Ba U Gyi also attended Cambridge University. Saw Ba U Gyi had been born in 1905 in Pathein. He qualified as a barrister before returning to Burma to work as a civil servant. He offered strong charismatic leadership to the Karen movement and emphasised four major points, which came to be known as the ‘Four Principles.’ According to the ‘Four Principles,’ surrendering was out of the question, the Karen people will retain their arms, the recognition of the Karen state must be complete and that the Karen people will decide their own political destiny. The Karen struggle has continued since the 1950s. In common with other secessionist nationalist movements in both Southeast Asia and neighbouring South Asia, the Karen movement has also been characterised by fragmentation. Although the movement was marked by internal divisions it regained momentum in the 1960s under the leadership of General Bo Mya, who maintained a position of pre-eminence and dominance in the movement for about four decades. Born in the Papun hills in 1926, he was a Second World War veteran and fought with Force 136. He became a Christian under the influence of his wife. He was supported by Thailand until the 1990s and along with others like Tamla Baw, he rebuilt the Karen National Union leading effective armed resistance to the Burmese Army. In the early 1990s, the KNU headquarters at Manerplaw became the alternative power base to Rangoon. He welcomed students who had taken part in the pro-democracy protest movements in 1988 and also NLD/National League for Democracy members and an alliance with different ethnic groups and the Burman dominated democracy movement began to develop. But by the mid-90s, however, Manerplaw came under threat and the military regime in Rangoon

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 151 started to follow a policy of divide and rule. Divide and rule according to Zoya Phan, daughter of the assassinated KNU General Secretary Padoh Mahn Sha La Phan, has been one of the regime’s most effective tactics over the years. Manerplaw fell in 1995 and since then the Karen National Union has lost ground and retains barely a foothold in its old territory. Many Karen have suffered from the brutality of the military, have been displaced from their homes and live under desperate conditions. For instance, rape is widespread and not just limited to women. The military campaign against the Karen people was especially brutal between 2006 and 2010. ‘In the worst offensive for a decade, within a space of just a few weeks in 2006, over 15,000 civilians were displaced, and at least twenty-seven Burma Army battalions were poised to destroy hundreds of villages in Papun district.’60 The Karen Human Rights Group has described these as attacks against undefended villages with the objective of flushing out villagers from the hills to bring them under direct military control and provide the Burma Army with food and labour. Women and children have also been attacked by the military, highlighting the fact that this is not just a counter-insurgency campaign. Women and children do not count as insurgents and raping and shooting them whilst they are fleeing are not even legitimate tools of counter-insurgency. Humanitarian aid groups like the Free Burma Rangers argue that these attacks reflect the ongoing effort of the Tatmadaw to break the morale of the people and to intimidate them and subject them to greater control. ‘The murder of porters and the laying of landmines to terrorise and block food to a civilian population are two of the tactics used in the strategy of the Burma Army to dominate, assimilate and exploit the ethnic people of Burma…What is clear is that the Burma Army is slowly attempting to expand its control, that people are under great danger and there is already a shortage of food.’61 The attacks continued from 2006 until at least 2012, when a ceasefire was agreed. Two years later, more than 30,000 Karens were displaced in the North of the state alone. It is widely believed that the military is seeking out villages and pockets of internally displaced people and destroying homes, food and property. The Burma Campaign UK website reads, ‘Burma’s ethnic minorities have been struggling for ethnic and political rights for decades as successive dictators in Burma have pursued a policy of Burmanisation, which ranges from repressing the teaching of ethnic history, language and culture to military attacks against civilians.’62 The same website discusses the plight of minorities in the country in quite a bit of detail.

The Kachin The Kachin people live in the Kachin state in Northern Myanmar, which has a border with the Indian Northeast and China. Annexed by the British in 1885, the Kachin hills were self-governing until the 1930s. The Kachin

152  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar are primarily Christian and converted at the turn of the 20th century by American Baptist missionaries. The population is approximately one million and can be categorised into six sub-groups: Jingpo, Lisu, Maru, Lashi, Atsi and Rawang. One of the first missionaries was Dr Ola Hanson, who transcribed the dominant language, Jingpo into written form. ‘According to a UN Development Programme report in 2005, Kachin State has a population of 1.3 million, approximately 2.5 per cent of Burma’s population, but only 500,000 are Kachins (the remaining population may be Burmans, Shans and other ethnic peoples). A further 175,000 Kachins live in Northern Shan State and 32,000 in Mandalay Division, while 120,000 Kachins inhabit a semi-autonomous zone across the border in China. Several thousand are in India and some have fled as refugees to Europe and the United States.’63 Like the Karen and other Christian ethnic groups such as the Chins, the Kachin also supported the Allies during the years of the Second World War against the Japanese. ‘During the colonial era, the British heavily recruited Kachin soldiers for the colonial army. After Myanmar gained its independence in 1948, the Kachin faced reprisal for their role during the colonial period, while at the same time coming under repression by the government, under the control of the majority Bamar ethnic group.’64 Just before independence in 1948 and although they had signed the Panglong agreement, some started demanding more autonomy later on. When there were talks going on in central Burma under U-Nu’s leadership that Buddhism would become the state religion, many Kachin people rebelled to protect their religious freedom. It was on the fifth of February, 1961, that Zaw Seng founded the Kachin Independence Organisation/KIO, and since then the Kachin have been engaged in armed struggle against the government. During the decades of conflict with the Burmese military, the Kachin people had been subjected to the regime’s ‘Four Cuts’ policy, which tried to end access to food, funding, recruits and intelligence for the KIO, and its armed wing, the KIA/Kachin Independence Army. On several occasions in the 1970s, and between 1980 and 1981, the Kachin Independence Organisation, has unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a peace settlement with the regime but this did not work. However, in 1989, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, who was head of the regime’s military intelligence, started a process of piecemeal ceasefires with different ethnic groups. The military has consistently followed a policy of divide and rule and in keeping with this policy, the regime refused to sign a nationwide ceasefire but instead entered into individual-specific agreements with different ethnic groups. By 1995, ceasefire deals had been struck with twenty-five different armed groups. These border worlds are often very complex regions with all kinds of racial, linguistic and religious divides. The Kachin people are spread across the Burmese and Indian Northeastern border but are known by different names on either side of the border. On the Indian side, the term that is often used is ‘Singpho’ but in Burma, the word, ‘Kachin’ is widely used. One

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 153 could argue that the Singpho are an ethnic group spread over Northern Myanmar, India’s Arunachal Pradesh and Assam and China’s Yunnan province and they form the largest subset of the Kachin people. Haksar writes, ‘the Kachins are spread over the Yunnan province of China where they are known as the Jingpo; over Myanmar where they are called Kachins; in India they are known as the Singpho.’65 The Kachin people mainly practise Christianity and are often seen as potential suppressors of Theravada Buddhism practised in Burma proper. The Kachin region is often viewed unfavourably by the Burmese political elite and is seen as a backwater where ethnic conflict is rife, whose people are not yet ready for politics. The Kachin state is also rich in natural resources that China needs and in recent years, especially during the period of the ceasefire, 1994–2011, we have seen the large scale passage of lorries transporting resources like timber along the roads going up to Yunnan province in Southwestern China. These illegal movements often rely heavily on both state and non-state actors. Trips to China from the Kachin state capital, Myitkyina can be quick. The remote town of Laiza also plays a part in this. Laiza is a town where we have not seen open conflict with the Burmese military in recent years. The KIA/Kachin Independence Army is said to have its headquarters in Laiza. Some actually see Laiza as the main capital which has played a central role in the production of ethno nationalist Kachin ideology. Recently, both the KIA/Kachin Independence Army and its civil wing, KIO/Kachin Independence Organisation have been able to carve out areas of self-governance around this Northern town and the signage’s in Laiza often proclaim that this is Kachin land as opposed to being a part of Myanmar. There are also schools, businesses and military training camps in the local language. That said, the fragile autonomy of these border worlds are often turned upside down and are very easily destabilised. This happened when the Burmese military launched its offensive again the Kachin in 2011 and also by the Chinese extraction of resources. Sadan writes, ‘Kachin nationalist elites have to manage their activities in and around the borderline and beyond in ways that are cognisant of the wider Chinese state-defined objectives for Minority Nationalities in Yunnan, avoiding unnecessary problems with local representatives of Chinese state authority where possible.’66 The Kachin people had signed a ceasefire with the regime in 1994, which brought an end to armed conflict, mass displacement and destruction of villages. The KIO were the only ceasefire group to have a written agreement. This was a very fragile peace though. Most other groups only had an understanding of the regime. The Kachin Independence Organisation’s agreement, which was not made public, was meant to include the following points: a nationwide ceasefire, a general amnesty, a tripartite dialogue, development activities in the Kachin State and that the Kachin Independence Organisation would maintain its arms until its demands were reflected in a new constitution. The first three points were not enacted by the regime.

154  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar The new constitution that was introduced fell short of the KIO’s demands. Initiatives were undertaken but these have had an adverse impact on the environment. Under the terms of the ceasefire, the KIO was given control over a 15,000 square mile territory and a population of 300,000. The territory is mostly in rural areas and they are not connected to each other. Most of the urban areas in the Kachin State remained under military control. Despite the ceasefire, the atmosphere in the Kachin state has been tensed and the future is still fraught with fear, peril and uncertainty. Human rights abuses like rape, religious discrimination and persecution, land confiscation and forced labour happened regularly even during times of ‘peace.’ In February of 2007, four Kachin girls were gang-raped by the military in Putao township. Wherever there is a strong presence of the military, rape is a common occurrence, and over the years the Tatmadaw’s presence in the Kachin State has increased. The Kachin people have always felt fearful and did not internationalise their cause thinking international attention would further draw the ire of the Burmese military. But the Burmese military launched an offensive against the Kachin people in 2011. About sixty thousand Kachin civilians were displaced from their villages and fled to temporary camps close to the Chinese border. In relation to the Kachin ceasefire, Sadan writes, ‘in June 2011, the ceasefire between the Kachin Independence Organisation/KIO and the Myanmar Army or Tatmadaw collapsed. Signed in 1994, it had lasted for seventeen years, making it one of the longest ceasefires with a major ethnic armed organisation that the Tatmadaw had concluded in recent decades.’67 The Kachin people are predominantly Christian and have more in common with Naga Christians in the Indian Northeast than with a Buddhist majority Burma proper. This is also the same with Naga Christians in Nagaland in Northeast India who feel a disconnect with a Hindu majority India and share strong ties with their ethnic brothers across the international border. ‘The territorial claims of the Nagas, Mizos, and other ethnic groups in India’s Northeast extend across the Myanmar border. Insurgent groups on both sides of the border support each other on the basis of their ethnic affinities and a solidarity emanating from the fact that they all combat the state on their respective sides of the border.’68 Their Christian identity is something that the Kachin people take very seriously, but several churches have been attacked, priests have been beaten, and in extreme situations, the military has fired on worshippers. Wherever there is a strong military presence, there is also forced labour and forced labour is often demanded on Sundays, intentionally, because Kachins are mainly Christian and their Christian faith is very central to their identity and struggle. Villagers are often required to dig bunkers, build fences and barracks particularly around army camps, clean towns, cleans villages and entire army camps. Failure to cooperate has resulted in heavy fines. Religious discrimination against Christians is commonplace and reflects the regime’s determination to assert the dominance of Buddhism in all spheres

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 155 of life. Christians are sometimes forced to accept Buddhist traditions and also forced to recite Buddhist scriptures. Some Kachin people see this as a cunning way to convert Kachin people to Buddhism in a more subtle and indirect way. During the ceasefire period, the local authorities would regularly hold staff meetings for those working for the government knowing that Kachin Christians observe Sundays as a day of rest and worship. Christians in government service including school teachers and doctors are forced to make a choice: either to attend these meetings and miss their church services or refuse to attend the government meeting but risk losing their job. What is more, those who do lose their jobs are ordinarily replaced with Buddhists. Getting permission to build new churches or extend existing churches can be very difficult. In 2003, the Kachin Baptist Convention asked the SPDC for permission to hold its convention, which ordinarily takes place every three years. Permission was delayed, leaving many Kachin to conclude that this was a deliberate attempt to interfere with church activities. In 2006, a church in Bhamo received a message from the local authorities ordering them to stop the construction of new church buildings. New orders had been issued by the Ministry of Religious Affairs prohibiting the construction of churches and mosques. In contrast, there are no restrictions on the construction of Buddhist pagodas and monasteries. Kachin people are often forced to contribute labour or construction materials in the making of these pagodas and monasteries. Land confiscation also has impacted on religious freedom. In 2002, a prayer mountain belonging to the church at Daw Hpum Yang, very close to the KIO headquarters in Laiza on the Myitkyina-Bhamo road was seized by the military and also occupied. Prayer rooms and crosses on mountain tops have been destroyed. Religious discrimination, land confiscation and environmental degradation, trafficking of women are some of the key challenges that the Kachin people have had to deal with in recent years. The military and its businesses and Chinese owned businesses have all played a central role in plundering the Kachin state for teak and other natural resources. Deforestation has been taking place on a wide scale and dam construction has also been a concern because it leads to displacement of villages. In effect, these, too, are forms of land confiscation and Kachin displacement. One of the starkest examples of this would be the Hukong Valley especially the Yuzana Company, a corporation which has strong links with senior General Than Shwe. The company has been engaged in rubber, teak, tapioca and sugar cane plantations and has confiscated large areas of land in the Hukong valley without providing any compensation to the local people. As a result of the drug trade, trafficking of women and prostitution, HIV/ AIDS has spread rapidly throughout the Kachin state. In 2008, one of the biggest hospitals in the KIO controlled town of Laiza ‘reported over 1000 HIV/AIDS patients, most of them intravenous drug users. In Mai Ja Yang, the second major KIO controlled town, eight out of ten intravenous drug users are HIV positive, according to Health Unlimited.’69

156  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar The Kachin Independence Organisation’s vice chief of staff, General Gun Maw compared the current situation to a foreign occupation. The province is like a conflict zone filled with camps that are now home to thousands of displaced people. These camps are often overcrowded located in old warehouses or old factories. Aid from the international community has been limited. Kachin activists have set up their own organisation called RANIR, Relief Action Network for Internally Displaced People and Refugees. In some instances, this is the only source of humanitarian relief available. A very small number of journalists and academics have visited the Kachin state, which is why some Kachin people feel that the international community remains largely unaware of their critical situation.

The Chin The Chin people reside in the western part of the country in the Chin state, which has a border with the Indian states of Mizoram and Manipur, and Bangladesh. Predominantly Christian, the Chin people have more in common culturally with the Mizo people of Northeastern India than with a Buddhist majority Myanmar. The Chin consists of different subgroups, clans and tribes. They originate in the Tibeto-Burman group and are believed to have come from Western China and Eastern Tibet. There are numerous subgroups within the Chin community. In this context, the Asho, Cho, Khuami, Laimi, Mizo or Lushai, Zomi, Kuki and Mara deserve special mention. The Chin land straddles the borders between three countries: Myanmar, India and Bangladesh. Before the British invaded the Chin Hills in the late 19th century, the Chin had been self-governing. They never converted to any of the dominant religions that surround them: Hinduism, Buddhism or Islam. Instead for centuries they followed their own tribal beliefs, customs, rituals and practices. They followed their traditional beliefs, known as phunglam or ‘ways of life.’ This was a monotheistic tradition based on the belief in a Supreme Being but of course, after the arrival of Christian missionaries to mainland Southeast Asia, they converted to Christianity. The first recorded encounter between the Chin and the British happened in 1824, when Chin villagers killed a few British traders who had come to their land to collect bamboo and timber but refused to pay taxes to the local people. In the next few years, the Chins made a series of raids on British territory, which culminated into the Great Kuki Invasion of 1860. A series of battles followed and although the Chin proved to be skilful fighters, the British had occupied the Chin lands by the late 1800s. After further pacification campaigns, the Chin Hills Regulation was promulgated establishing a basic colonial administration for the whole of Chin territory. It should be noted though that the Chin had not been defeated by the military might of the British but rather by famine. Famine and burning of villages and destruction of rice barns became regular features of Chin life under the Burmese military.

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 157 Christian missionaries first arrived in Myanmar in the 16th century, when Jesuits accompanied the Portuguese traveller Philip de Brito y Nicote. The first Europeans to arrive in neighbouring India before the British were also the Portuguese and the landing of Vasco da Gama in Calicut in 1498 on the Malabar coast is well known to students of history. Italian priests came to Burma in 1720 and in 1783, Father Sangermano arrived and published one of the earliest histories of Burma. In 1807, the first group of protestant missionaries arrived, who were sent by the London Missionary Society, but it was Adoniram Judson and his wife, Ann, the first American Baptists who made a lasting impact. They arrived in 1813 and translated the Bible and played a crucial role in compiling the Burmese-English dictionary, which is still used today. It was mainly Judson’s successors who ventured into the Chin Hills, led at the early stages by Reverend Arthur Carson and his wife Laura in 1899. The Christian missionaries were also invited by the British into the Chin Hills primarily for purposes of pacification and many in colonial circles believed that the missionaries would be able to help in this regard. However, the Chins did not embrace Christianity straight away. In neighbouring South Asia, those who embraced Christianity or Islam for that matter tended to be people who were at the bottom of the Hindu caste system. In the Burmese context, the Chins initially resisted. The collective impact of the on-going war with the British, famine and disease paved the way for a breakdown in traditional structures and Christianity filled in the vacuum that was created. Early Chin converts to Christianity faced persecution from within their own community because conversion was viewed as a betrayal of traditional values and way of life. Gradually many Chins did embrace Christianity, due to similarities in religious beliefs and values. The Chin also embraced Christianity because the missionaries played a central role in developing Chin society through educational activities. The missionaries and their emphasis on education (which was also the case in neighbouring South Asia), the development of a written language, medical provision and the attempt to bring different sections of Chin society together as one administrative unit drew Chins increasingly to Christianity. Now, of course, the Chin identity is inextricably intertwined with Christianity. Because the Chins take their Christian identity so seriously, this is often viewed as a threat by the Burmese state. Throughout the decades since 1962, the Chin have been subjected to religious persecution and discrimination. A common practise of the Chin people has been to construct crosses on hilltops, which the military have torn down. In place of these crosses, Buddhist pagodas have been built using Chin labour. Chins have also often been forced to contribute money and construction materials for these projects. In 1994, a local Roman Catholic Church in Tonzang Township in the Northern Chin state built a cross and the local authorities ordered its destruction. The church refused and on 16th May the township authorities and local police burned the cross.

158  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar ‘In 1998, several churches were destroyed on SPDC orders, and in 2000, Captain Khin Maung Myint ordered the destruction of a church in Min Tha village, Tamlu Township, in Magwe Division, next to Chin State.’70 Printing the Bible in the Chin state is forbidden so copies of the Bible are often smuggled in from neighbouring India, where there is more freedom. ‘In 2000, it was reported that 16,000 Bibles were seized by the Burma Army and burned.’71 The regime has often forced Chin Christians to convert to Buddhism. They are often offered rice and educational opportunities if they become Buddhists. Many children from Chin Christian families have been sent to Buddhist monasteries for schooling but have been forced to participate in Buddhist prayer and acts of worship. The same practise also occurs in other predominantly Christian parts of Myanmar like the Northern Kachin state. Church workers, priests and pastors often are subjected to torture. In the Chin State, the Burmese military has stated very clearly that their three major concerns are ABC-AIDS, Hepatitis B and Christianity. As in the rest of Myanmar, forced labour is widespread but like the Kachin State, forced labour is linked with religious discrimination. For instance, the Burmese military often orders villagers to work for the government on Sundays, which is meant to be a day of rest and worship. Villagers are also ordered to work during Christian festivals. Many Chin people believe that this is done intentionally to disrupt church-related activities. For instance, in Sabungte, villagers were ordered to porter for the military from the 20th of December 2003, until 19th January, 2004, which meant that they had to miss both Christmas and New Year’s celebrations. Also, in June of 2003, soldiers entered into a church in Hmun Halh during a Sunday service and ordered the leaders of the service to accompany them to work as porters. Traditionally, the Chin people do not allow alcohol in their community but the military has been involved in bringing large quantities of liquor called the ‘OB,’ which it sells in the streets particularly on Sundays. It is highly addictive and has contributed to the social and familial breakdown in Chin society, crime and also death in some instances. Toxic liver failures, jaundice and brain damage are some of the physical effects. Like in some of the other ethnic minority provinces, rape is also a common occurrence in the Chin State. The Women’s League of Chinland have documented this in a report called, ‘Unsafe State’. All of this has happened as a result of the direct militarisation of the Chin state. The army’s presence in the Chin state has grown rapidly over the years. ‘In 2007, for example, there were an estimated thirty-three Tatmadaw camps, whereas now there are at least fifty five.’72 The Chin are, to a degree, facing cultural genocide since Burma Army troops are encouraged to marry local Chin women and are rewarded if they do so. This is also the case in some other neighbouring countries like Bangladesh and China. The Bangladeshi government has encouraged Muslim men to marry young minority women from the Chittagong Hill

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 159 Tracts, where a secessionist movement had been active for decades. The Bangladeshi government uses this as a tactic to control separatist elements in peripheral ethnic minority provinces. Similarly, the Chinese government has encouraged ethnic majority Han people to marry Tibetans. Countries like China and Bangladesh have used inter-ethnic marriage and militarisation as a means to counter political insurgencies in peripheral regions. In relation to Bangladesh, Bhumitra Chakma writes, ‘as part of the counterinsurgency strategy, the Army pursued forced and induced Islamisation in the CHT. The Army deliberately encouraged young Muslim women to marry local youths after converting to Islam and in a similar fashion, the Bengali youths and military personnel were encouraged to marry hill women.’73 Rogers writes, ‘in Matupi, the local commander, Colonel San Aung, has apparently offered 100,000 kyats and a pig to soldiers who succeed in marrying a local Chin woman. In Kalaymyo a special army battalion was reportedly established with the specific purpose of incentivising soldiers to marry Chin women, particularly the daughters of Chin pastors.’74 The main aim of the Burmese military is quite clear: to weaken the Chin identity and to make Chin state more like Burma proper. This is not surprising considering that other regimes from neighbouring countries have also followed a similar practice. The Chin language and its use has been forbidden in schools. The number of Burmese teachers in Chin state has increased significantly in recent years. The state has often tampered with history textbooks and the histories of ethnic minority people are not ordinarily taught. Other challenges include high levels of poverty in the Chin state, which is regarded as one of the most impoverished parts of contemporary Myanmar. The lack of healthcare facilities is particularly critical through the province. The Chin Human Rights Organisation believes that there are only eight permanent clinics in the entire state to serve a population of 500,000. There is also a shortage of doctors and medicine. Thus, the Chin rely on their own resources which include clinics set up along the India-Burma border to provide help to those who can reach them. Educational opportunities are equally bleak. High school education is only available until the age offifteen, and there are no universities in the Chin state. Chin state also lacks natural resources. ‘In addition to the general poverty, approximately every fifty years Chin State is hit by a natural phenomenon which the Chin call the ‘Mautam,’ literally ‘dying bamboo.’ The flowering of bamboo attracts rats, who multiply in scenes reminiscent of an Old Testament plague, and devour every food source in sight-the bamboo itself initially, then turning their attention to the paddy fields and rice barns. The result: a chronic food shortage.’75 The Mautam hit in 2007 and over a 100,000 people were affected in about 200 villages. The crisis spread across seven townships in Chin state and part of Sagaing Division, and upto 82 per cent of the farmland in the affected areas was ruined. As a result, more than four thousand people fled to neighbouring countries like India and Thailand. When this happened the tatmadaw

160  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar did not do much to help. The Indian government was very active on its side of the border but the Burmese military did not prepare the Chin people for the anticipated famine or respond to their needs. The Chin themselves created a Chin Famine Emergency Relief Committee and helped the most affected areas, targeting over seventy villages. The overall picture of Chin state has been and remains grim. The Chin people have had to deal with political repression, religious discrimination, famine and food shortage, lack of health care facilities, and the lack of educational opportunities. Many have had no choice but to leave the Chin state. Many have fled to neighbouring countries like India, Thailand and Malaysia. Others have fled to the west.

The Rohingyas The Rohingyas are a predominantly Muslim group living in the Western province of Arakan, now called the Rakhine state. In recent years, state-sponsored violence against the Rohingya community has brought international attention to their plight. ‘The government of Myanmar has confiscated their lands, leading more Rohingya to become internally displaced persons.’76 Alam writes, ‘Some Rohingya claim that they are an ethnically distinct group, descendants of the first Muslims who occupied Northern Arakan in the ninth century. Some also add that they are a mix of Bengalis, Persians, Moghuls, Turks and Pathans.’77 Racially and ethnically the Rohingya people are of South Asian descent and are closely linked to the Chittagonian Bengalis in Bangladesh in terms of religious practices and language. They practise Sunni Islam. This ethnic differentiation has been very central to the current crisis.78 Recent events brought the Rohingya people onto the centre stage of world affairs. The Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army launched coordinated attacks on thirty police posts and also an army base in the Western Rakhine state at the end of August 2017. They did this by using man-made bombs and small weapons that resulted in the deaths of soldiers and policemen. The same group had carried out similar attacks the previous year in October 2016. Myanmar’s military launched clearance operations in retaliation and this resulted in about 87,000 Rohingya’s fleeing to neighbouring Bangladesh, where they ‘joined many others who had fled in the past several decades.’79 The leader of the group, Ata Ullah, said the group was defending the Rohingya people against the state army, which he accused of committing human rights violations. Hundreds of young Rohingya’s had joined hands with the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army to defend their own people from the atrocities committed by Burmese security personnel. ‘The Myanmar government refuses to grant citizenship to Rohingya because it is not among the officially recognised 135 ‘national races’ of the country. The government’s position is that the Rohingya are interlopers, implying that they are Bengalis who illegally immigrated from neighbouring Bangladesh.

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 161 But the problem is that Bangladesh does not recognise them as their own citizens, which automatically makes them stateless.’80 Buddhist extremists in Myanmar see them as a Bengali Muslim people who have no place in Myanmar and should be sent back to Bangladesh. Buddhist extremist groups also see the Rohingyas as a threat to Buddhist culture. Some analysts like Azeem Ibrahim believe that they are currently in a very precarious position and threatened by genocide. Out of all the ethnic groups in contemporary Myanmar, the Rohingyas have received the most attention by the international media due to the on-going humanitarian crisis. The human rights violations and atrocities committed by the state have brought the regime under tremendous international pressure and scrutiny. Ibrahim writes, ‘Ever since Burma became independent in 1948 they have been targeted whenever ambitious or desperate politicians need to deflect attention from other matters. Both government officials and party leaders have called for their expulsion from their homeland, and the main opposition ignores their plight.’81 British imperial rule ended in Myanmar in 1948 and this brought a new set of problems for the Rohingya people. The Rohingya’s like many of the Christian ethnic groups had remained loyal to the British and even after independence they did not engage in an armed struggle the way many of the other ethnic minority groups did against the central regime. Loyalty to the British when the Japanese invaded in 1942 also provoked intercommunal strife. Some Rohingya politicians petitioned for the Northern parts of the Arakan to be included in what was then East Pakistan. The Rohingyas are ethnically different to most other groups and they are also the largest Muslim community. In the early years after 1948, Prime Minister, U Nu indicated that the Rohingyas would have equal status to that of the other ethnic groups like the Kachin, Karen, Mon and Shan. This relative tolerance started to change mainly after the military gained power in 1962. The 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma was a crucial step because it removed the status that the Rohingyas had been granted at the time of independence. There was now an insistence that they had to accept identity cards, which defined the Rohingya people as foreigners. This led to a period of violence and since then there have been huge outflows of Rohingya refugee people to neighbouring Bangladesh. The 1982 Burmese Citizenship Law further complicated matters and worsened the status of the Rohingya. It started the modern-day obsession with who had lived in Burma in 1824 and emphasised that Rohingyas were foreigners since they ‘were deemed not to have lived in Arakan before 1823.’82 Since then there has been ‘a sustained campaign of propaganda and lies aimed at the Rohingyas to convince the rest of the population that this Muslim minority group, who spoke a language very different to Burmese, had no place in the country.’83 Prejudice against the Rohingyas is entrenched because they are Muslim and from a distinctly different ethnic background. Walton writes ‘much of the injustice associated with racial discrimination and racism comes from

162  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar the fact that a group of people is judged based on ascriptive characteristics, that is, physical characteristics over which they have no control and cannot change.’84 What adds to the prejudice also is that the Arakan is one of the most impoverished parts of the country. Although democratic tendencies have emerged in the years since 2000, the discriminatory ethnicity laws based on the 1974 Constitution have remained. Recent events clearly show that the Rohingya’s have no place in the country’s democratic future. The run-up to the 2015 elections completed the relentless destruction of the fundamental rights of the Rohingyas. ‘The 2014 census forced them to choose between being described as ‘Bengali’ or not being able to register to vote. The first option carried the threat of deportation, the second of being forced into one of the refugee camps that had sprung up after the 2012–2013 violence in Rakhine.’85 ‘The Myanmar government is disinclined to amend the citizenship law and to recognise the Rohingya as citizens.’86 Mukherjee argues that it is the convergence of the activities and ideologies of certain political actors, which explains the escalation of violence in recent years.87 These actors include the military, the National League for Democracy, regional political parties like the Arakan League for Democracy, and extremist organisations like the MaBaTha.88 Despite recent democratic changes, real power still rests with the military-an institution with a long history of anti-Rohingya extremism. Because the military has been in power for decades its presence is pervasive in all areas of civil society, including the corporate sector, the state bureaucracy, and communications. Ex-army officers have often been appointed to civilian posts. ‘Politically, the generals maintained the veneer of a civilian government.’89 After 1974, the military-ruled under the guise of the BSPP/ Burmese Socialist Programme Party. The military’s new political vehicle has been the USDP/Union Solidarity and Development Party. There is also growing evidence that the military has allowed extremist groups like the MaBaTha to exist as an alternative power base to foster civil unrest. ‘In turn, the existence of inter-communal violence keeps open the possibility of a return to military rule-in order, of course, to save the nation from violence.90 In Myanmar, extremist Buddhist organisations have increasingly come to the political forefront. Both the USDP and the NLD have been extremely dependent on their electoral support, which in turn gives these groups some power and influence over the electoral process. Whilst the NLD tries to take a multicultural approach, its electoral base still remains the Burman ethnic community and this makes it very dependent on the Buddhist monks as influencers among the Burman electorate. In the years shortly after its founding, the NLD did not really appeal to the Burmese population, but this role was subsequently assumed by Buddhist monks. Sadly, there have been elements within the monastic community that have become very anti-Islamic and they demand that the NLD support their stance. If the NLD does not, then there is a possibility that

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 163 sections within the monastic community will withdraw their support. Regional parties including the ALD/Arakan League for Democracy have also adopted a clear anti-Muslim/anti-Rohingya stance and in some contexts have allied themselves with Buddhist extremist groups like the 969 Movement and the MaBaTha. Ibrahim writes, ‘The USDP struggles to appeal to many Burmese apart from those directly employed by the state. In the same way that the 969 Movement allowed the NLD to broaden its electoral appeal, in 2015 the MaBaTha campaigned for the USDP. In effect, the military is directly backing two different groups in contemporary Myanmar. It has, in the USDP, a notionally non-sectarian political organisation with a guaranteed block of parliamentary seats. And it now has its own organisation of Buddhist extremists who both offer the means to channel electoral support to the USDP and to create violence that can later be used to justify a military intervention.’91 It is the convergence of these political actors which have made matters worse for the Rohingyas in recent years.92 Despite the gloomy picture presented above, what gives us hope are the efforts of civil society networks like the Pan Zagar. Although the Pan Zagar is not as politically organised as the other actors mentioned above, it has challenged the extremist groups and has provided protection to Muslims when they have been attacked by religious extremist groups like the MaBaTha. Due to the on-going brutality and atrocities committed by the Burmese military, thousands of Rohingya people have fled to neighbouring countries like India and Bangladesh. Others have also gone as far as Malaysia and the Middle East. ‘Bangladesh shares 168 km of border with Myanmar.’93 Basu Ray and Samaddar wites, ‘The Rohingya are now the world’s most persecuted minority without citizenship. Currently, around 32,000 Rohingya are registered with the UNHCR/United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Bangladesh, living in two camps in Kutupalong, and Nayapara near Teknaf.’94 The Rohingya problem is not that recent although many might see the humanitarian crisis as a very recent one. The refugee problem has been a serious concern for the Bangladeshi government since the late 70s of the previous century. ‘In 1978, the military rulers of Myanmar launched an anti-Rohingya military campaign declaring them as illegal immigrants in their country. In March and April of the same year, when a mass exodus took place from the Arakan region into Bangladesh, the problem caused strong tension in the political relations between Bangladesh and Myanmar.’95 In recent years, of course, we have seen that this strained relation between the two countries because of this on-going crisis continues. At this stage, Bangladesh has to take a very specific position on the burning Rohingya problem. It needs to be strategic and strike a balance between maintaining good relations with Myanmar but also making sure that it does not put too much pressure on its own economy. Bangladesh itself is a poor country struggling to survive with many below the poverty line so there is only so much that it can do in terms of accommodating Rohingya

164  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar refugees and offering them a home. Because of its geographical location, it has also been subjected to all kinds of natural calamities. Rahman writes, ‘Bangladesh’s foreign policy objectives require that it continues friendly relations with Myanmar. A comprehensive solution of the Rohingya problem can be found by adopting a well thought out long term strategy to make the Rohingya community workable by uplifting them educationally, socioeconomically, and politically.’96

Concluding remarks and the way forward From the discussion above it is clear that xenophobic tendencies and problematic race relations between ethnic minority and ethnic majority groups in contemporary Myanmar should not be viewed in isolation but should rather be analysed within a broader historical framework and regarded as part of a historical continuum. British colonial policies of divide and rule, the mapping exercise done by the British, the obsession of politicians to make Buddhism the state religion after 1948, coupled with the policies taken by General Ne Win to expel Indians from Myanmar are integral parts of this historical continuum. Countries in both South and Southeast Asia have had to face similar challenges particularly with regard to centre-periphery relations. This is partly because of British colonialism and its impact and partly because of the policies taken by politicians or dictators after colonialism ended. Ethnic conflicts in many developing societies result from authoritarian nation-building policies of the state. To stop these ethnic tensions from happening, it is important for these post-colonial states to follow policies of accommodation and inclusiveness. In multi-ethnic societies like Myanmar, the centre would need to take a more federally minded approach and incorporate the voices of minority people in the decision-making process. In relation to centre-periphery relations, Macdonald writes, a ‘critical relationship will be between the central government and the inclusion of ethnic parties (some affiliated with armed groups) in the political system.…The political system will have to be flexible enough to allow ethnic representation, including elements promoting not only greater regional autonomy, but perhaps independence in a manner which does not threaten current ceasefires and political stability…Defining citizenship, in particular, is a major issue confronting all political participants…Moves towards a federal structure, furthermore, is an issue that any future government, military or civilian, will have to face and could become the next major political reform.’97 The key demands that have been put forward by different ethnic groups include genuine political autonomy for the areas where they live and to have a say in crucial affairs that affect the country as a whole. Since the coup that took place in 1988, the SLORC/State Law and Order Restoration Council, which was renamed SPDC/State Peace and Development Council in 1997, has negotiated ceasefires with some armed ethnic groups but war has been waged against others. Religious repression has also been a central feature

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 165 of military rule. Burma is a Buddhist majority country and generals have demanded that the Buddhist monastic community support its rule. From the discussion above, it is clear that that the country has a sizeable Muslim and Christian presence. Minority religious groups have been subjected to all kinds of atrocities and human rights violations. Apart from the humanitarian Rohingya crisis, mosques have been ransacked. Churches have also been desecrated and destroyed. Church-related activities are often closely monitored. Church-related activities are also restricted. Religious differences have often been exploited by the generals to suit their own agenda and to keep ethnic minority groups apart lest they come together to resist the regime. The junta has also exploited ethnic divides to strengthen its rule. The constitution has not only guaranteed continuous years of dictatorship and military rule, but has also denied ethnic groups their basic fundamental rights. Constitutions have not granted ethnic people any real autonomy or protected or promoted their culture. Thousands of Karen people have fled to Thailand just as the Rohingyas on the other side of the country have fled to neighbouring Bangladesh. In several areas, there are also large numbers of internally displaced people. Many of these people are ethnic minorities or villagers who have fled their home areas to avoid conscription or other abuses. There can be no democracy, security, and long-lasting effective peace if the establishment continues to ignore the rights and voices of ethnic minorities. Democracy is not just about elections but is also very much about the protection of the rights of minority citizens. The issue of national reconciliation in contemporary Myanmar is both a sensitive and a fragile one. Political opposition groups like the NLD/National League for Democracy have been marginalized and ethnic groups only patchily represented. There has been no real political solution to the low-grade civil war that continues in the country’s periphery. In a multi-religious and multi-ethnic state, a legislature can play a crucial role in reducing and resolving ethnic conflicts. The constitution outlines the formation and the responsibilities of the legislatures at the central level, as well as the fourteen sub-national level legislatures, seven of which are in ethnic minority areas. Although the regional legislatures have some power, in reality, they are much weaker than the central legislature. Ethnic minority lawmakers have tended to be more active than their ethnic majority Bamar counterparts. This is partly because the system favours ethnic majority groups but does not work in favour of the minorities. Many ethnic minority lawmakers have tried to make use of the system and work with it to try and bring about meaningful and positive change that would go in their favour. Following questions and motions from ethnic minority lawmakers, the government has reduced tension to some extent. ‘Overall, however, the legislature’s achievements on ethnic issues were marginal when compared with actions and interventions by the executive branch.’98 Furthermore, due to the nature of the country’s constitution and electoral laws, not all ethnic minority groups can expect to get equal representation based on their

166  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar population size. The rules favour ethnic groups that are officially recognised. But there are groups like the Rohingyas who are surviving stateless. Also, religious groups are not guaranteed representation. Rajiv Bhatia writes, ‘history shows that ceasefire agreements by themselves are not adequate to establish and preserve peace. For sustaining it, a lasting political settlement is essential.’99 The regime urgently needs to eliminate laws that are discriminatory in nature. With regard to Myanmar, regional organisations like ASEAN can also play a part in putting more pressure on the regime to relax its policies in peripheral areas where there is a strong ethnic minority presence. Regional organisations like the ASEAN would need to move away from its traditional approach of non-interference and look at Myanmar’s domestic situation more carefully since it has ramifications for neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia. Countries in South Asia that share a common border with Myanmar like India and Bangladesh would also need to do much more since they are the countries that have had to bear the brunt of the recent Rohingya refugee crisis. Finally, civil society networks like the Pan Zagar movement desperately need increased support from the international community.

Notes

1. H. Kawanami, Renunciation and Empowerment of Buddhist Nuns in Myanmar-Burma: Building a Community of Female Faithful, Brill: Leiden, Boston, 2013, p. 234. 2. R. Egreteau, ‘Assessing Recent Ethnic Peace Talks in Myanmar’, Asian Ethnicity, 2012, 13(3), p. 311. 3. T. Myint-U, Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia, Faber and Faber: London, 2011, p. 286. 4. A. Cotterell, A History of South East Asia, Marshall Cavendish Editions: Singapore, 2014/15, p. 302. 5. P. Church, A Short History of South East Asia, Wiley: Singapore, 2016, p. 123. 6. T. Myint-U, The Hidden History of Burma: Race, Capitalism, and the Crisis of Democracy in the 21st Century, Juggernaut Books: New Delhi, 2019, p. 7. 7. D. Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know, Second Edition, Oxford University Press: Oxford/NY, 2010/13. 8. Steinberg, 2010/13. 9. S. Tucker, Burma: The Curse of Independence, Pluto Press: London, 2001, p. 12. 10. T. Myint-U, Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia, Faber and Faber: London, 2011, p. 77. 11. T. Myint-U, 2019, p. 9. 12. T. Myint-U, 2019, p. 11. 13. T. Myint-U, 2019, pp. 19–20. 14. Field research carried out by the author on minorities in Bengal, India, 2012–2019. 15. T. Myint-U, 2019, p. 23. 16. T. Myint-U, 2019, pp. 25–26. 17. Field research carried out by the author on minorities in South Asia and trips to the Indo-Bangladesh border especially Taki, 2012–2019. 18. T. Myint-U, 2019, p. 28.

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 167 19. K. Mukherjee, ‘Islamic Revivalism and Politics in Contemporary Pakistan’, Journal of Developing Societies, 26(3), 2010, pp. 330–331. 20. I. Malik, Pakistan: Democracy, Terror and the Building of a Nation, New Holland Publishers: London, 2010, p. 91. 21. R. Bhatia, India-Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours, Routledge, South Asia Edition: New Delhi, London and New York, 2016/19, p. 18. 22. N.W. Ross, Buddhism: A Way of Life and Thought, Vintage Books, A Division of Random House: New York, 1980, p. 20. 23. G. Flood, An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996, p. 115. 24. Participant Observation in Jakarta, Indonesia, November, 2016. 25. T. Hellwig and E. Tagliacozzo, eds, The Indonesian Reader: History, Culture, Politics, Duke University Press: Durham and London, 2009, p. 13. 26. R. Gethin, The Foundations of Buddhism, Opus, Oxford University Press: Oxford, NY, 1998, p. 256. 27. R. Bhatia, India-Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours, Routledge, South Asia Edition: New Delhi, London and New York, 2016/19, p. 19. 28. C. Higham, The Civilization of Angkor, Phoenix: London, 2001/2003, p. 9. 29. K. Knott, Hinduism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2016, p. 48. 30. H.I. Jessup, ‘South East Asia: The Khmer’, in J. Masselos’ edited, The Great Empires of Asia, Thames and Hudson: London, 2010/2018, p. 84. 31. H.I. Jessup, ‘South East Asia: The Khmer’, in J. Masselos’ edited, The Great Empires of Asia, Thames and Hudson: London, 2010/2018, pp. 84–85. 32. Jessup, 2010/2018, pp. 85–86. 33. D.I. Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press: Oxford/NY, 2010/2013, pp. 75–76. 34. R. Bhatia, India-Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours, Routledge, South Asia Edition: New Delhi, London and New York, 2016/2019, p. 31. 35. D.T. Moe, ‘Burman Nationalism and Ethnic Identity: Toward an Ethnic Postcolonial Theology of Resistance and Reconciliation in Myanmar’, Black Theology, 2019, 17(1), pp. 69–88. 36. Peshwa is the name given to the prime minister of the Maratha kingdom in South Asia. 37. S. Gordon, The New Cambridge History of India: The Marathas: 1600–1818, Cambridge University Press, Foundation Books: New Delhi, 1998/2000, p. 177. 38. H. McLeod, Sikhism, Penguin Books: London, 1997, p. 70. 39. R. Cockett, Blood, Dreams and Gold: The Changing Face of Burma, Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 2015, pp. 9–10. 40. K. Mukherjee, ‘The Ethnic Minority Question and Rohingya Crisis in Contemporary Myanmar’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 39(1), 2019, p. 28. 41. I. Holliday, Burma Redux: Global Justice and the Quest for Political Reform in Myanmar, Columbia University Press, New York, 2011, p. 28. 42. D.J. Steinberg, In Search of South East Asia: A Modern History, University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, 1985/87, p. 282. 43. R. Taylor, The State in Myanmar, Hurst: London, 2009, p. 101. 44. N. Kipgen, N., Democratization of Myanmar, Routledge, South Asia Edition: New Delhi, London and New York, 2016, p. 27. 45. Kipgen, 2016, p. 28. 46. P. Popham, The Lady and the Generals: Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma’s Struggle for Freedom, Rider Books: London, 2016, pp. 45–46. 47. J. Andrews, The World in Conflict: Understanding the World’s Trouble Spots, The Economist Books: London, 2015, p. 252.

168  Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 48. D. Steinberg, Burma: Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press: Oxford, NY, 2010/13, p. 112. 49. L. Jones, ‘The Political Economy of Myanmar’s Transition’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 44(1), 2014, p. 151. 50. T. Myint-U, The Hidden History of Burma: Race, Capitalism, and the Crisis of Democracy in the 21st Century, Juggernaut: New Delhi, 2019, p. 35. 51. G. McCarthy and J. Menager, ‘Gendered Rumours and the Muslim Scapegoat in Myanmar’s Transition’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 47(3), 2017, p. 401. 52. A.C. Guan, ‘Political Legitimacy in Myanmar: The Ethnic Minority Dimension’, Asian Security, 3(2), 2007, pp. 124–125. 53. N. Kipgen, ‘Ethnicity in Myanmar and its importance to the Success of Democracy’, Ethnopolitics, 14(1), 2015, p. 21. 54. B.L. Walker, A Concise History of Japan, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2015/16, p. 201. 55. T. Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: A Personal History of Burma, Faber and Faber: London, 2007, pp. 229–230. 56. T. Myint-U, 2007, p. 231. 57. T. Myint-U, 2007, p. 231. 58. D. Brenner, ‘Inside the Karen Insurgency: Explaining Conflict and Conciliation in Myanmar’s Changing Borderlands’, Asian Security, 14(2), 2018, p. 85. 59. F. Wade, Myanmar’s Enemy Within: Buddhist Violence and the Making of a Muslim Other, Zed: London, 2017 p. 30. 60. B. Rogers, Burma: A Nation at the Crossroads, Rider Books: London, 2012, p. 56. 61. Rogers, 2012, p. 57. 62. www.burmacampaign.org.uk/about-burma/ethnic-groups (Accessed, 21.05. 2020). 63. Rogers, 2012, p. 86. 64. E. Han, ‘Geopolitics, Ethnic Conflicts along the Border, and Chinese Foreign Policy Changes Toward Myanmar’, Asian Security, 13(1), 2017, p. 65. 65. N. Haksar, Across the Chicken Neck: Travels in Northeast India, Rainlight/ Rupa Publications: New Delhi, 2013, p. 88. 66. M. Sadan, Being and Becoming Kachin: Histories Beyond the State in the Border-worlds of Burma, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 9–10. 67. M. Sadan, War and Peace in the Borderlands of Myanmar: The Kachin Ceasefire, 1994–2011, Nias Press: Copenhagen, 2016, p. 1. 68. F. Grare, India Turns East: International Engagement and US-China Rivalry, Penguin-Viking: Gurgaon, India, 2017, p. 94. 69. Rogers, 2012, p. 100. 70. Rogers, 2012, p. 109. 71. Rogers, 2012, p. 109. 72. Rogers, 2012, p. 113. 73. B. Chakma, ‘The Post-Colonial State and Minorities: Ethnocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 48(3), 2010, pp. 294. 74. Rogers, 2012, p. 114. 75. Rogers, 2012, p. 115. 76. J. Alam, ‘The Rohingya Minority of Myanmar: Surveying their Status and Protection in International Law’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 25(2), 2018, p. 163. 77. J. Alam, ‘The Current Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar in Historical Perspective’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 39(1), 2019, p. 12.

Conflict in contemporary Myanmar 169 78. M. Sahana, S. Jahangir and M.D. Anisujjaman, ‘Forced Migration and the Expatriation of the Rohingya: A Demographic Assessment of their Historical Exclusions and Statelessness’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 39(1), 2019, p. 45. 79. N. Kipgen, ‘The Rohingya Crisis: The Centrality of Identity and Citizenship’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 39(1), 2019, p. 62. 80. Kipgen, 2019, p. 63. 81. A. Ibrahim, The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar’s Hidden Genocide, Hurst: London, 2016, p. 1. 82. Ibrahim, 2016, p. 8. 83. Ibrahim, 2016, p. 8. 84. M. Walton, ‘The Wages of Burman-ness: Ethnicity and Burman Privilege in Contemporary Myanmar’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 43(1), 2013, p. 4. 85. Ibrahim, 2016, p. 10. 86. E. Jung, ‘Islam and Politics in Contemporary South East Asia’, in A.D. Ba and M. Beeson, eds, Contemporary South East Asia, 3rd edition, Palgrave: London, 2018, p. 141. 87. K. Mukherjee, ‘Race Relations, Nationalism and the Humanitarian Rohingya Crisis in Contemporary Myanmar’, Asian Journal of Political Science, 27(2), 2019, p. 236. 88. Mukherjee, 2019, p. 236. 89. Ibrahim, 2016, p. 11. 90. Ibrahim, 2016, p. 3. 91. Ibrahim, 2016, pp. 14–15. 92. Mukherjee, 2019, p. 236. 93. S.N. Parnini, ‘The Crisis of the Rohingya as a Muslim Minority in Myanmar and Bilateral Relations with Bangladesh’, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 2013, 33(2), p. 287. 94. S. Basu Ray, & R. Samaddar, R.,The Rohingya in South Asia: People without a State, Routledge: London/NY, 2018, p. 4. 95. A.A. Ullah, ‘Rohingya Refugees to Bangladesh: Historical Exclusions and Contemporary Marginalization’, Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 2011, 9(2), p. 151. 96. U. Rahman, ‘The Rohingya Refugee: A Security Dilemma for Bangladesh’, Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 2010, 8(2), p. 238. 97. A.P. Macdonald, ‘From Military Rule to Electoral Authoritarianism: The Reconfiguration of Power in Myanmar and its Future’, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 40(1), 2013, pp. 30–31. 98. C. Win and T. Kean, ‘Communal Conflict in Myanmar: The Legislature’s Response, 2012–2015’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 47(3), 2017, p. 420. 99. R. Bhatia, India-Myanmar Relations: Changing Contours, Routledge-South Asia Edition: New Delhi, London and New York, 2016/19, p. 31.

5

Insurgency in South and Southeast Asia: Kashmir, The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), South Thailand and Aceh, Indonesia

Kashmir Geographical location Geographically, Kashmir is located at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia and China. It is located in the Himalayas and is often seen as the starting point of the mighty Himalayan mountain range which stretches from Kashmir and runs throughout Northern India, Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet and finally ends in the Indian Northeast and Northern Myanmar. Kashmir is located in the Western sector of the Himalayas and has boundaries with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan and China. It is a contested area which is divided into three spheres of influence controlled predominantly by India and Pakistan. The Indian sphere of influence or Indian administered Kashmir is the Southern bit which is also called Jammu and Kashmir. That part of Kashmir which tilts towards Pakistan in the West is the Pakistani sphere of influence administered by Pakistan and is also called Azad Kashmir. And finally, the eastern bit that tilts towards Tibet in China is the Chinese sphere of influence, also called Aksai Chin. Kashmir is essentially a Muslim majority province1 with a sprinkling of Hindus in the Indian sphere of influence and a strong Buddhist presence in the East. The demarcating line which separates Indian administered Kashmir from PoK or Pakistan administered Kashmir is called the Loc or Line of Control.2 The demarcating line which separates Indian administered territories from Chinese administered territories is called the LAC/Line of Actual Control. In a broad sense, the Line of Actual Control extends from Kashmir in the West to the disputed areas which India has with China in the Eastern sector of the Himalayas. The Line of Actual Control is basically the boundary between India and the PRC/People’s Republic of China although it may be perceived differently by both Indian and Chinese armies.3 The historical background The situation in Kashmir has indeed been a very complex one and the problem is still very much on-going. This is a disputed territory mainly between India and Pakistan. Whilst India declares Kashmir to be an integral part

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 171 of India and accuses Pakistan of interfering in India’s domestic affairs, the Pakistani side view it somewhat differently and argue that it is an unresolved international dispute which should be resolved by plebiscite as envisaged by the UN Security Council decades ago.4 The two countries have been to war on four occasions over Kashmir.5 Wars were fought in 1947, shortly after the two countries gained independence from British colonial rule, in 1965, in 1971 and finally in 1999. Well known expert on South Asian affairs, Ahmed Rashid writes, ‘Periodic Wars and breakdowns in diplomatic relations between the two countries, unwarranted expenditure on their armies, and a nuclear arms race, despite poverty and underdevelopment, have fuelled new generations of Indians and Pakistani’s growing up in the midst of mutual hate and a widening divide.’6 Both countries have been involved in low-intensity conflict along the LoC for decades.7 Although the conflict here is most certainly a multidimensional one, at its very core, the problem in Kashmir is essentially a secessionist nationalist movement with strong separatist tendencies. However, the public opinion in Kashmir is highly fragmented. There are groups in Kashmir who want to break away from a Hindu dominated India which is often perceived as oppressive. Some groups, of course, are also pro India because they see a brighter economic future with India. There are other groups in Kashmir who are pro Pakistan and have more of a sense of oneness with Pakistan because of religious and cultural commonalities they share with Pakistan, Islam being the dominant common factor. And finally, there are some groups who want Azadi, which is basically independence from both India and Pakistan. Professor Harsh Pant writes, ‘Pakistan has long backed separatists in Jammu and Kashmir in the name of self-determination, and India has over the years been a victim of the radicalisation of Islamist forces in Kashmir, which have been successful in expanding their network across India’.8 Scholars often trace back the origins of the Kashmir conflict to the times of British colonial rule focussing primarily on colonial policies such as divide and rule. Whilst the Kashmir conflict is multidimensional in nature, a lot of it is about Hindu Muslim tension. For centuries, Hindus and Muslims have lived together peacefully in the subcontinent. The Hindu Muslim story is one of both peaceful coexistence and conflict. It is a story of collaboration and friendship as well as discord and animosity. The British colonial administration feared that if the two religious communities joined hands and came together then there was a possibility of them overthrowing British rule. There was a fear from the side of the colonial authorities that if the two communities came together then their rule might be subverted and that they would lose all their privileges which they enjoyed in colonial South Asia. Therefore, the British found it necessary to keep the two dominant religious communities apart and started exaggerating the differences that existed between them and focussed more on the story of discord than on the commonalities. The British forged hostile identities. Colonial constructions of religious identity led to conflict. For instance, the caste system and the

172  Insurgency in South and South East Asia social stratifications associated with Hinduism were often contrasted with the more egalitarian nature of Islam especially the concept of the ummah which basically means world-wide Muslim community or world-wide Muslim family. It was feared that if the British focussed on the story of friendship and the common areas between Hindus and Muslims then this would ultimately have an eroding impact on British rule and ultimately pave the way for the collapse of the British Empire in India. Thus, to maintain the status quo, it was important to keep the two communities divided and separate. This theory that it was the colonial policy of divide and rule that led to Hindu Muslim tension which is what the Kashmir issue is partly about has been criticised since Hindu Muslim tension existed before the arrival of the British in South Asia. Later on, however, in more recent times, politicians such as Mohammed Ali Jinnah, who is seen as the founding father of present-day Pakistan, built his own arguments (what famously or infamously came to be known as the two-nation theory) on this colonial policy of divide and rule. It was argued that Hindus and Muslims did not get along with each other because of their cultural differences and hence a separate homeland for Muslims was necessary and Kashmir was meant to be a part of that separate homeland. In other words, the argument was that the Hindu way of life was and is fundamentally incompatible with the Islamic way of doing things. This paved the way for the creation of Pakistan, which means the pure land and the country was created as a separate homeland for South Asian Muslims who feared discrimination in jobs, politics and administration in a Hindu dominated India post 1947, after the British had vacated. The two religious views supposedly informed respective state-building and set the two countries on a collision course over Kashmir. The two-nation theory of course has been criticised. Many scholars point out that Indian nationalism has always been associated with civic and liberal nationalism and is not based on one particular religion, race, ethnicity, caste or creed. In other words, there is a place for minorities within India’s broader democratic framework. India’s politicians after independence in 1947 had a very secular approach towards politics, many of whom were educated in England and were not particularly concerned about a Hindu identity. The first group of leaders in India immediately after independence were well socialised in the ideals of western democracy having been educated in England. So India’s so-called Hindu features could not have really clashed with Pakistan’s Islamic nature because at its core, ideologically, India was a founded in 1947 as a secular democracy, and not as a Hindu state. Also, millions of Muslims chose to stay back in a Hindu dominated India after the so-called pure land, Pakistan, was created. Furthermore, within Pakistan, even today we see Muslims fighting against other Muslims. Since 1947, Islamabad has had to deal with strong centrifugal forces and separatist movements in places like Sindh, Baluchistan and North Western Frontier Provinces (NWFP, today called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). This is because Muslims living in the

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 173 more peripheral parts of the country find the centre’s rule oppressive. The most glaring example of the Muslim community fighting one another and not being able to get on with one another is the secession of former East Pakistan from West Pakistan and the creation of the independent country of Bangladesh in 1971. Finally, both South Asian Islam and Hinduism are inherently pluralistic and accommodate one another which they have done for centuries and hence we see the rise of cultural syncretism and hybridity in South Asia. These criticisms have most certainly undermined the twonation theory. It has also been argued that the Kashmir conflict was started by the Pakistani military. Whilst the more democratic leaders in Pakistan favour good relations with India, the Pakistani military, the ISI or the InterServices Intelligence and various Islamist groups view India with considerable suspicion especially when it comes to the Kashmir issue.9 ‘Members of Pakistan’s intelligence agencies have repeatedly been accused by the West of retaining links with former Kashmiri militants.’10 Pakistan has supported separatist groups in Kashmir and eventually used Islamist groups such as the Lashkar e Toiba, Jaish e Mohammed and Harkat ul Jihadi Islami to destabilise India.11 Since the Pakistani military has consistently received backing from Washington, the United States has also been blamed for the on-going Kashmir problem. Without American assistance, the Pakistani military could not have had the strength to wage wars against India over Kashmir. But this theory has also been criticised because the first Indo Pak war over Kashmir started in 1947 before the military even came into existence in Pakistan. The first prominent military general in Pakistan was Ayub Khan who rose to power a good ten years later in 1958. So the Pakistani military cannot be fully blamed for this conflict although it has played a key role. The United States also should not be fully blamed because a proper analysis shows that it has actually been quite impartial in its dealings with India and Pakistan. For instance, had the United States been exclusively pro Pakistan then they would not have supported India against China in the 1962 war against Pakistan’s wishes. China has traditionally been an ally of Pakistan. Furthermore, in the second Indo Pak war over Kashmir between India and Pakistan which took place in 1965, the United States reduced aid to both countries. Had the United States been only pro Pakistan and wanted to hurt India, then the US would have made India the target of an arms embargo, but this did not happen. Scholars like Sumit Ganguly12 argue that the four Indo Pak wars which took place over Kashmir between India and Pakistan happened because there were windows of opportunity or what were perceived as windows of opportunity at certain critical junctures in history. For instance, Pakistan attacked India in 1947 because India was perceived as weak since it was struggling with a rebellion in Poonch in Kashmir. The Pakistani leaders at the time thought that this would be a good time to wrest Kashmir from India because India was struggling to put down a rebellion. Pakistan again

174  Insurgency in South and South East Asia attacked India in 1965 thinking India was weak because India had just been defeated by the Chinese in the 1962 war so it was assumed by the Pakistani military that from a military standpoint India must be exhausted. India sees a window of opportunity in 1971 when the two halves of Pakistan i.e. West Pakistan and former East Pakistan or today’s Bangladesh were at war with each other. The Kashmir issue has been important to both India and Pakistan but for different reasons. Pakistan’s claim on Kashmir is irredentist.13 Traditionally, the Pakistani leadership has argued that Pakistan’s national identity would not be complete unless it captures the whole of Kashmir since Kashmir was a Muslim majority province leaning against Pakistan’s frontier. The leadership in Pakistan probably would not have bothered so much about Kashmir had it been a predominantly Hindu or Buddhist province. India argues that it is a secular democracy and as a democracy, it has a responsibility of looking after its minority citizens. If Kashmir which is a Muslim and hence minority part of a predominantly Hindu India secedes, then this clearly shows that India has failed to look into the interests of a minority community. This in turn undermines India’s democratic credentials. India then loses its face to the international community. Any chance of Pakistan’s success of capturing the whole of Kashmir undermines India’s ideological basis as a democracy and any chance of India’s success of capturing the whole of Kashmir undermines Pakistan’s ideological basis as a purely Muslim state. ‘A secular and peaceful India accommodating its religious minorities (relatively) harmoniously and consisting of a Muslim population larger than the entire population of Pakistan threatens the very ideological foundations of the land of the pure created as the national homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent.’14 The accession of Kashmir to Pakistan would have confirmed for Pakistan that it truly was the pure land for Muslims and that India was in fact not so much a democracy with a place for religious minorities but Hindustan or land for the Hindus.15 Kashmir has also been important to India for other reasons. India fears if Kashmir secedes then this will have a domino effect and sets a precedent for other disgruntled groups in other Indian borderlands who will also want to secede. It should also be noted that when the wars took place since 1947, there was entrenched chauvinistic nationalism on the Pakistani side. With Pakistan being a predominantly authoritarian state, the military generals and the ISI denigrated India, exaggerated the righteousness of the national cause and spoke highly of their own bravery. Being a military state, Pakistan relied only on a few military generals to make an assessment of India’s military capabilities and got it wrong on multiple occasions. This then paved the way for Pakistan’s failure in the wars they fought with India. Whilst chauvinistic nationalism existed on the Indian side too with the presence of Hindutva groups, India comparatively was in a better situation being democratic. Being a democracy, there were multiple voices in India’s democratic framework. So when India made an assessment of Pakistan’s military strength,

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 175 whilst some assessments and reports may have been inaccurate, others were accurate and hence India had a better understanding of when to attack Pakistan. This finally paved the way for Indian success against Pakistan. When we look at the situation in Kashmir more closely we see that the conflict especially in the Indian sphere of influence has both an external dimension as well as internal dimension.16 The external dimension relates to the four Indo Pak wars which have been fought over Kashmir since 1947 till 1999. The internal dimension relates to India’s repressive and undemocratic policies in Kashmir. India and Pakistan have been war on four occasions: 1947/48, 1965/66, 1971 and 1999. Pakistan is said to have initiated the war on three occasions in 1947, 1965 and in 1999. India initiated the war on the third occasion in 1971. Because of these wars and because of the prolonged nature of the conflict, the situation in Kashmir is often compared with the Arab Israeli conflict in the Middle East. It has often been described as the most dangerous place on earth.17 The Kashmir conflict ‘now remains one of the longest-running disputes in the world.’18 This dispute has gone on for so long partly because of the communication gap which exists between the central government and the people of Kashmir and also because the people have lost faith in the central government’s ability and willingness to solve the problem.19 It is also worth noting that the Kashmir issue is now no longer confined just to North Indian politics but has become a pan Indian issue, and the role played by the electronic mass media, especially satellite and cable television in this process of transformation has been central.20 The first war During the time of independence (1947) and shortly afterwards, it was a Hindu ruler by the name of Maharaja Hari Singh who ruled over Muslim majority Kashmir.21 During that time when the British were leaving the subcontinent or about to leave, the independent princely states, of which Kashmir was one, had the choice of joining hands either with India or with Pakistan22 based on geographical proximity and demographics. Independence was not an option because this would then lead to the fragmentation and disintegration of the subcontinent. Kashmir was in a peculiar position because it shared a common border with both India and Pakistan so its ruler ‘could thus appropriately join either.’23 Hari Singh in the late 40s of the previous century initially could not make up his mind24 whether to join hands with a Hindu dominated India or with a Muslim dominated Pakistan. Whilst he was a Hindu himself and his own personal allegiance may have been towards India, his subjects were Muslim who shared more affinities with Pakistan. At the same time, Jinnah campaigned in Kashmir so that Kashmiri’s would accede to Pakistan but support for Jinnah was hardly uniform.25 The Buddhists in Ladakh and Hindus in Jammu protested. There were also many Muslims who saw a brighter economic future

176  Insurgency in South and South East Asia with India. Hari Singh vacillated on the question of accession for a while. It was during this time that a rebellion broke out in the Poonch area of Southwestern Kashmir, which had to be urgently dealt with. During this time, a panic-stricken Hari Singh asked for help from the Indian government at New Delhi. The then leader, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, also India’s first prime minister made it clear to the Maharaja that India would provide the Maharaja with military assistance to crush the rebellion provided the Maharaja joined hands with India. Because India was seen to be grappling with the rebellion, the Pakistani side saw this as a window of opportunity to attack India and capture Kashmir whilst India was dealing with the rebels. ‘On 22 October 1947, an estimated 4000–5000 tribesmen, half of the tribal territory, mainly Mohmands, Mahsuds, and Wazirs, and about the same number from Hazara, crossed the Jhelum river in order to wage a holy war against the Kashmir government.’26 The Pakistani side also provided the rebels with a lot of assistance27 with the hope that they would be able to free Kashmir from Indian rule. Hari Singh, in the end, agreed to Nehru’s proposal and a document called the Instrument of Accession was signed and India finally sent its troops to secure the capital city of Srinagar.28 Because of the crisis situation at that time, the local people could not be consulted on political matters and a referendum was simply not possible. The matter was at one stage referred to the United Nations29 and there were talks of having a plebiscite at some point in the near future, which ultimately did not happen. India labelled Pakistan as an aggressor and Pakistan accused India of following a genocidal policy against Kashmiri Muslims. The Pakistani side was keen to have a plebiscite, but the Indian side believed that during the time of the rebellion, many Pakistani’s had settled in the area so the Indian elite urged the Pakistani’s to first leave and vacate the land, and then India would go ahead with the plebiscite. ‘Hindu Jammuites also feared that should the people’s plebiscite be held, Muslim voters, who were in the majority, might deliver Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan, a distasteful prospect for Jammuites, especially after their Hindu ruler had clearly acceded to non-Muslim majority India.30 India was also reluctant to go ahead with the plebiscite under the then UN regulations because it was of the view that the United States and its western allies who supported the idea of the plebiscite were biased in favour of Pakistan.31 Thus the situation reached a deadlock and India gradually lost faith in multilateral diplomacy. Pakistan ultimately got frustrated with India’s refusal to abide by the UN Security Council resolutions pertaining to Kashmir in the 1940s/50s and this pushed to take a more militaristic approach.32 So this is what was happening in Kashmir in the years immediately after 1947 especially when we look at the external side of the conflict. Internally, a lot was also going on especially in the Indian sphere of influence. India promised Kashmir special status. According to Article 370 of the Indian constitution, Kashmir was to have special status and would not resemble the other British Indian states. Kashmir was to fly its own flag.

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 177 It was meant to have some autonomy and India was to have authority and power over Kashmir in three areas and three areas alone which included defence, communications and external relations.33 In all other matters, Kashmir was meant to be independent. Despite its initial promises, India did not keep its promise and we see how Kashmir with time gets forcefully integrated into mainstream India and the symbols of Kashmiri’s special status ultimately get abolished. For instance, Kashmir had the sadr-i-riyasat and the prime minister. All the other Indian states had the governor and the chief minister. With time, India abolishes the position of the sadr-i-riyasat and changes it into the position of the governor and Kashmir’s prime minister becomes the chief minister. Thus Kashmir started to resemble the other Indian states. To the people of Kashmir, India was clearly eroding its special status and not sticking to its earlier promises. In other words, India was not respecting Kashmir’s autonomy. One key figure in Kashmiri politics has been Sheikh Abdullah who was associated with the National Conference Party. Sheikh Abdullah was proving to be difficult and in the end, when India realised that it could not crush or control Abdullah, New Delhi decided to collaborate with Abdullah, which then paved the way for the rise of the Congress-Conference alliance. The Congress Conference alliance finally won the elections in the 80s but there were huge protests after this victory because it was believed by many that elections had been rigged, voters had been intimidated and harassed and electoral fraud had taken place. The political elite in New Delhi responded to these protest movements with repression, coercion and high handedness.34 Brutality from the Indian side took the form of police shootings, firings, detentions, and arrests. This has only strengthened a deep sense of alienation from the Indian Union amongst the people living in the Kashmir valley. Due to the rise in militancy in Kashmir from the late 80s, hundreds of Kashmiri Pundits who were from a Hindu background but living as a religious minority in the Kashmir valley left for Jammu or India.35 India ultimately labelled Kashmir as a disturbed area and subjected it to the draconian AFSPA which gives security personnel extraordinary powers to deal with the emergency situation. Since security personnel have extraordinary powers to deal with the militancy in Kashmir, this has paved the way for all sorts of human rights violations to take place36 with the Indian Army and paramilitary forces like the BSF, Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) and the Rashtriya Rifles often misusing and abusing the law. Kashmir has now become one of the most militarised parts of the world. ‘As of 2001, as many as 117 army battalions were deployed in counter-insurgency duties in J&K alone.’37 Although security personnel are meant to protect the people, they often take the law into their own hands. Currently, the Rashtriya Rifles have the primary responsibility for counter-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir.38 ‘This military intervention has resulted in serious human rights violations, further aggravating the distrust between Islamabad and New Delhi.’39 This situation has often been described as the paradox of Indian democracy where India offers

178  Insurgency in South and South East Asia to hold elections in Kashmir on the one hand but gets involved in electoral fraud on the other and in the process snatches away people’s fundamental rights by following a policy of repression and high handedness when they protest. This also sadly happens to be the case today. The second war Going back to Indo Pak relations over Kashmir, the second war took place in the year 1965. It was called operation Gibraltar with comparisons drawn between Pakistan trying to recover Kashmir from India and the Islamic Arab invasion of Spain and Gibraltar in the early middle ages. The military general in power at this time in Pakistan was General Ayub Khan. In 1962 India had been badly defeated by the Chinese in the Sino-Indian War40 and it was thought by Pakistani military generals that India was exhausted from a military standpoint and hence quite weak. The political elite in Pakistan saw this as an opportunity to attack India. Furthermore, Pakistan could see how India was undermining Kashmir’s special status and gradually integrating Kashmir within the Indian framework. This was quite disturbing as far as the military generals in Pakistan were concerned since India was stripping Pakistan of its irredentist claims on Kashmir. A now or never mentality gripped the generals. First of all, General Ayub Khan tried testing the waters by sending in troops to Western India to Gujarat in the Rann of Kachch area.41 When India did not respond to Ayub Khan’s limited probe since that part of India was not viewed by the Indian political elite as valuable as Kashmir, the Pakistani generals read this as a sign of weakness and hence a window of opportunity to attack India. In the war that followed, Pakistan was badly defeated. By the agreement of Tashkent supervised by the former Soviet Union,42 the second war came to an end and there was a ceasefire. The situation in Kashmir remained dormant for a while. The third war The third war that took place between India and Pakistan was in 1971. This had less to do with the actual Kashmir province and more to do with the rise of Bengali nationalism in former East Pakistan. From 1947 till 1971, Pakistan consisted of two parts: West Pakistan and former East Pakistan or today’s Bangladesh. During this period when India and Pakistan went to war over Kashmir, India had to allocate troops on two fronts. During the third war in 1971, India saw an opportunity to attack Pakistan because the two halves of Pakistan were involved in an internal dispute. India started this war. The roots of this war were actually very complex and relates to the failure of the federative arrangement within Pakistan’s domestic politics. The origins of the war are rooted in the exigencies of Pakistan’s domestic politics. There was long-standing demand for regional

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 179 autonomy by the Bengali’s in former East Pakistan. Negotiations over power-sharing had reached a deadlock and West Pakistan had done little to pacify the Bengali’s despite constant demands for autonomy. Nationalist leaders from former East Pakistan like Sheikh Mujibar Rahman and his Awami League Party argued that Bengali Muslims were being discriminated against and that they were not being fairly represented in political and military circles. ‘The emergence of Sheikh Mujibar Rahman in the aftermath of the 1965 war led to the rallying of all East Pakistanis behind one powerful political entity, the Awami League.’43 They also faced economic discrimination especially when it came to jobs and employment. Furthermore, West Pakistan even tried to impose Urdu as the national language on a predominantly Bengali speaking people. The language riots had taken place as early as 1952. Pakistan’s policies of political, economic and cultural repression against the Bengali’s in former East Pakistan strengthened the rising ride of Bengali nationalism. ‘Slowly but surely, a distinct national identity was evolving among the Bengali Muslims based on their own language and their feeling of being discriminated against by West Pakistan.’44 The military general in power in Pakistan at that time was General Yahya Khan who responded to the nationalist movement with repression and high handedness. ‘It was a punitive operation to eliminate Bengali nationalism and reassert West Pakistan’s dominance over East Pakistan.’45 Repressive policies forced many Bengali’s to leave former East Pakistan and to enter neighbouring India. The Indian political elite thought it would be cheaper to go to war than to accommodate so many Bengali’s from former East Pakistan. Also, strategic thinkers in New Delhi felt that if it could liberate former East Pakistan from West Pakistan, then in future Kashmir wars, India could focus and allocate its troops only on the Western front and this would make the task of dealing with Pakistan over Kashmir a lot easier. In 1971, with Indian assistance, former East Pakistan successfully seceded from West Pakistan and became the independent country of Bangladesh. ‘The breaking away of East Pakistan to become Bangladesh was the most traumatic event in Pakistan’s short life as an independent nation.’46 It was on the 16th of December, 1971 that Pakistan’s military commander in former East Pakistan surrendered to the Indian authorities which led to a crisis of legitimacy and forced the military to at least temporarily withdraw from politics.47 Although India likes to see its own intervention in the Bangladesh liberation war of 1971 as humanitarian intervention, some analysts argue that this was done so that in future Kashmir wars with Pakistan India could devote all its energies, money and troops to one side of the border and hence the real reasons were actually more strategic than humanitarian. The fourth war which India and Pakistan fought over Kashmir was in the year 1999. Since most of it was fought in Kargil, it is also called the Kargil War. Tensions had already been in the air because of the nuclear tests that had been carried out by both countries in 1998 and this has ‘added a new

180  Insurgency in South and South East Asia edge to their adversarial relationship.’48 ‘In the past India has sought to increase its room to manoeuvre against Pakistan through diversification in arms procurement and a programme of indigenisation.’49 ‘Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine has been based on the fairly clear and straightforward goal of forging a credible deterrent to counter the perceived threat from India, defined in terms of Kashmir and the integration of the Pakistani state.’50 ‘Kargil was the first conflict to occur after India and Pakistan overtly demonstrated their nuclear status’.51 The Kargil War is seen as a consequence of the non-resolution of the Kashmir conflict. Essentially, this was launched by Pakistan to get a more advantageous position vis a vis India along the Loc/Line of Control. It was also an attempt by Pakistan to infiltrate its troops into Indian territory across the Line of Control. Pakistan managed to infiltrate 1000 troops across the LoC.52 Most of these troops belonged to Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry and the infiltration had been quite large and well organised.53 Infiltration and external involvement from Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan into Indian Kashmir has always been a problem. This has been a problem for New Delhi right from the times of the first Kashmir war. Kashmir had been a part of Abdali’s Afghan kingdom and Pushtun’s felt a special affinity with it. When many of these tribal groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan heard of the atrocities committed by the Indian government against Kashmiri’s, many travelled hundreds of miles with their own weapons to prevent the massacre.54 Most of the Kargil war was fought along the Line of Control with Dras, Kargil and Batalik being the main centres of war. The 1999 war ‘prompted the United States to exert diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to back down, as the danger of a nuclear war between the two neighbours appeared to be a distinct rather than a remote possibility’.55 In the words of former Pakistani President, Pervez Musharraf, ‘As a backup to understanding the Kargil conflict it needs to be stressed that Kargil was not a one-off operation, but the latest in a series of moves and countermoves at a tactical level by India and Pakistan along the Line of Control in the inaccessible, snowbound Northern Areas.’56 It is worth mentioning that in recent years the political elite in New Delhi have broken off talks with Islamabad over the Kashmir issue especially after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks57 for which Pakistan is often blamed. The current situation I got the opportunity to travel to Kashmir over the past few years from 2012 till 2015 and did some interviews with local Kashmiri people. As mentioned earlier in the introduction of this book, my approach is more bottom-up rather than top-down. My research focuses on the voices of ordinary people who reside in these conflict zones. I am especially interested in hearing what they have to say about the conflict and the current situation. Their voices are often excluded and not heard and never taken into consideration

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 181 in the decision making process. Their version of events is often at odds with the arguments put forward by the political elite. The political elite especially from New Delhi will always have their own agendas and it is hard to see their version of events being neutral and impartial. The arguments put forward by the political elite are inextricably tied up with their own political agenda and propaganda. Most of my interviewees were local Kashmiri men. Here is some of the interview material that I gathered from my travels and field research. First of all, it should be mentioned at the very outset that it is really difficult to make an assessment of the strength of the separatist groups in Kashmir and to what extent they constitute a real threat to Indian security and Indian territorial integrity. There seems to be a mixture of views with regard to the question as to whether or not Kashmiri’s want to be a part of India proper. The first person I spoke to was a man by the name of Abdul, who was the owner of a shop that sold beautiful Kashmiri wooden handicrafts. He said very openly that he wanted azadi which is the South Asian word for independence. He said that he did not want to be a part of India or for that matter a part of any other country. Although he said he wanted independence, in the course of the interview he sounded anti-India and pro-Pakistan. He also spoke about how the Indian police force and security personnel saw local Kashmiri’s not as Indian citizens but as militants involved in acts of terrorism. Although he wanted his own country people from other countries would always be welcome to visit.58 My second interviewee was with a man by the name of Nazir, who was the owner of a houseboat. Houseboats are very popular with tourists. Most of them are found on the Dal Lake which is in the centre of Srinagar, the capital city of Indian Kashmir. Nazir spoke about how the CRPF were always suspicious of local Kashmiri’s. Even if local men wanted to urinate on the roadside, the security personnel would hold a gun to their head. He did acknowledge though that the situation had got better especially when compared with earlier times. He spoke about how the Dal Lake in earlier times had been heavily militarised but now the number of troops had been reduced and this reduction in security personnel had helped with tourism.59 The third interview was with a hotel manager who mentioned that the situation in Kashmir had not only improved but also western advisory committees had taken Kashmir off their list of conflict zones and thus travellers had nothing to worry about if they wanted to visit Kashmir. According to the hotel manager, this symbolised that things were getting better.60 The fourth person I spoke to was a man by the name of Naz who was not happy with the current state of affairs. He was in favour of azadi and wanted Kashmir to be left alone. He specifically mentioned that Srinagar had an international airport and that flights from outside India should come directly to Srinagar and not via New Delhi. He was of the view that

182  Insurgency in South and South East Asia by landing in New Delhi, tourists would spend money in New Delhi when the same amount of money could easily have been spent in Srinagar in Kashmir. This would in turn help the Kashmiri economy. He spoke about the Indian government and how it did nothing to strengthen the infrastructure of Kashmir and how Kashmiri’s were being forced to set up businesses outside the state, elsewhere in India. He saw the central administration as exploitative and only interested in extracting resources from Kashmir to suit the needs of people living in India proper.61 He also mentioned that the Indian security personnel would not let local Kashmiri people speak to the media/press. He finally ended on a more positive note saying that the current state of affairs is likely to change because of the efforts of young people and because of their use of the internet. A lot of young people were increasingly using Facebook as an outlet to reveal the true story about the current situation in Kashmir. My fifth interviewee was a student who was very keen to tell me about the injustices caused by the Indian administration and the repressive measures that had been meted out by the Indian armed forces. He went into detail about how the Indian military gang-raped local Kashmiri women and how they beat up local Kashmiri men and children. Some people were even killed. He spoke about the Public Safety Act. If this act got associated with a Kashmiri individual, then he/she was not only put behind bars but on release, he/she would find it hard to get employed. This label could have a very damaging impact on one’s career and future. He also told me that for his own B. Tech studies he had left his homeland for Punjab because if he had carried on staying in Kashmir he might have gotten into trouble with security forces and his future would have been doomed. Most young Kashmiri men are viewed unfavourably and with suspicion by the Indian armed forces. People in Kashmir could not freely text one another and often the police got brutal if the local people protested against the on-going injustices.62 The sixth person I managed to speak to was a man by the name of Rafi, who was the owner of a handicrafts shop. He spoke about how he had lost his sister in the year 2006 in a police firing. He spoke about the trouble and turmoil he had witnessed in Kashmir since 1989 and mentioned that many young men had lost their lives over the years. He also mentioned that not only did young Kashmiri men lose their lives but men from the Indian armed forces had also lost their lives. People in Kashmir wanted azadi or freedom. There was an on-going conflict between the Indian Army and militants and often the militants would use young men and boys to further their own interests. The media had made matters much worse. On a more positive note, he mentioned that the situation had gotten better since 2010 and that Kashmir was still better off being a part of India than being a part of Pakistan. He also spoke about the porous nature of the border. People often crossed the border. Border officials are often very corrupt and they allow some people to cross and prevent others from crossing. One

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 183 would ordinarily have to pay the border police to cross over to the other side. He mentioned that corruption was entrenched in Kashmir and often both militants and the Indian armed forces tried to make money from the on-going violence.63 Rafi also mentioned that he had to close his shop on several occasions fearing that something dreadful would happen. He mentioned that the situation was still quite unpredictable and that the future was still fraught with peril and a great deal of uncertainty. He mentioned that although the central Indian administration in New Delhi was pumping money into Kashmir for infrastructure development the money was getting into wrong hands. And finally, although he had lost his sister in the act of police firing, by and large, he sounded very sympathetic towards India. The next person I got the chance to speak with was a man who was a local shopkeeper by the name of Syed. Syed mentioned that local people in Kashmir were quite irritated by the fact that there were so many security forces stationed in Kashmir particularly the BSF. Although the current situation had reached a certain degree of normalcy, people could still not move around freely because of the heavy military presence in Kashmir. Women, in particular, could not move around freely especially from 1989 till the year 2000, and this problem still persists especially in the borderlands. The Indian government had given the BSF power to arrest people on suspicion without warrant. For a long time, especially in the extreme interiors of Kashmir people could not leave their homes after dark because of the constant harassment by the BSF. However, the current situation has improved and reached a certain degree of normalcy and because of this tourism had done well in the year, 2012.64 After the first set of interviews that were carried out in December 2012, I visited Kashmir again in December 2013 and was pleased to see a certain degree of normalcy65. The situation in 2013 seemed better than what I had seen in December of 2012 but political developments in South Asia do not necessarily move in a straight line. We cannot expect linear progress in Kashmir where things are so uncertain. When one arrives in Kashmir, what is easily noticeable is the heavy presence of the Indian armed forces. Kashmir is one of the most militarised parts of the world. This can often be quite disturbing for visitors coming from outside. Like the first set of interviews, the second round of interviews was carried out with local residents who were mostly male and of Kashmiri descent. The first person I spoke to in December of 2013 was a local taxi driver who mentioned that the situation was normal and that there was no real tension. When I asked him about the heavy presence of the security personnel he said that the security forces were just there and that one should not jump to any quick conclusions about the intensity of the conflict based on the heavy presence of the Indian Army and different sections of the paramilitary. According to him the heavy presence of the military was not necessarily an indicator of how tensed the situation actually was.66

184  Insurgency in South and South East Asia The owner of a stationery shop told me that as a tourist it would be fine for me to move around freely and that I would not have any trouble. With regard to the presence of security forces in Kashmir, he said that when one travels from India proper to Jammu one would not get to see the armed forces. It was only from Jammu onwards travelling North to the Kashmir valley did people get to see a heavy military presence. Like my earlier interviewee, this person also mentioned that the heavy presence of security forces did not necessarily symbolise any kind of danger. He mentioned that the main responsibility was with the regional state government, the central government and the media. If the government wants the situation in Kashmir to be fine it will be fine and things can even get better.67 The owner of a Kashmiri shawl shop mentioned that there was nothing to worry about. Another shawl owner by the name of Amin, who was quite old, also said the same thing that there was no tension in Kashmir but if there was any tension it was caused by men associated with the Border Security Force (BSF).68 A shopkeeper by the name of Sohail mentioned that the actual tension took place in the extreme remote border areas where Pakistani militants tried to cross over. When asked about the heavy presence of security forces in the heart of Srinagar he said that this was for the protection of high profile people associated with the government and also for the protection of official administrative buildings. He said that security personnel were not managing a problem because there was no problem to manage. The media only exaggerated the problem and blew things out of proportion. If visitors did not see local people leaving their homes after dark this had nothing to do with an on-going conflict or security forces harassing them but more to do with the bitter cold winters.69 Another person I spoke to mentioned that since 2000 the tension and political problems had stopped and even if there was some tension this did not affect tourists from visiting Kashmir.70 A boatman spoke about how the tension existed from the 1990s onwards but from the year 2000 the situation had calmed down. Even if there was any tension it was not in places like Srinagar but in the extreme borderland parts of Kashmir which has common borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan and China. The security personnel were present to protect both the people and the government. However, his tone changed as he carried on with the interview. He spoke about how the regional Kashmir government was under constant pressure from the central Indian government, which was very corrupt. Furthermore, the Indian government uses force to extract taxes from Kashmiri’s without giving anything in return. He spoke about the discrimination his son had faced when his son went to Bangalore in South India looking for employment. His son faced discrimination despite the fact that he had all the necessary educational qualifications. Local Kashmiri’s were heavily taxed to feed and maintain the security personnel. The Indian government would need to find these

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 185 military men alternative forms of employment and free Kashmir from their military might.71 The owner of a handicrafts shop told me that it made him quite angry when he saw people from India proper viewing Kashmir as a disturbed area. He specifically told me that there was no rape or robbery in Kashmir unlike India proper. He mentioned that the media often exaggerated the conflict and were bribed by hotel managers and tourist agencies from other hill stations in India. The media was told to project negative images of Kashmir so that hotel managers in other Indian hill stations could get more tourists and make more money. He mentioned that if Kashmir’s image was projected as a positive one by the Indian media, then most tourists from India proper would visit Kashmir and none of the other hill stations. This was because of Kashmir’s stunning views of the Himalayas. He also mentioned that the BSF men were getting double pay packages and other incentives to work in disturbed areas like Kashmir.72 A boatman by the name of Ibrahim maintained that he wanted independence from both India and Pakistan. He mentioned that the heavy military presence was not only bad for the tourism industry and hence the local economy, but it was also having a detrimental impact on the psychology of local Kashmiri children. He mentioned that the Lonely Planet tourist guide previously had a detailed section on Kashmir which would encourage tourists to visit Kashmir, but now it had only two pages due to the on-going political turmoil. When young Kashmiri men protested against the heavy military presence, the Indian military opened fire at them. When protestors throw stones at the military and protest holding placards saying, ‘Indian Army-Go Back,’ the soldiers fired bullets at them. Although these incidents had clearly upset him, he acknowledged that the current situation was better than earlier times and he was hoping that it would get better in the years to come.73 A young driver mentioned that whilst he had no anger towards India proper, he was hurt and very disappointed when a movie by the name of ‘I am’ projected Kashmir in an unfavourable light.74 Another driver mentioned that the area was so heavily militarised because of the recent shootings that had taken place due to the infiltration of Pakistani militants into Indian Kashmir. Militants from Pakistan do not take the usual routes to come to Indian Kashmir. They often come through the villages and are disguised. This was the reason why the highway or the main road close to the villages were heavily militarised. He also mentioned that these militants from Pakistan did not have identity cards which local Kashmiri people had.75 An owner of an art emporium mentioned that he and his people wanted independence from both India and Pakistan. Indians only killed Kashmiri’s. The Indian government is not listening. When Kashmiri’s throw stones at the Indian Army, they fire bullets back in retaliation. The central government has encouraged Hindus to leave Kashmir because if they carried on

186  Insurgency in South and South East Asia living in Kashmir they would be supposedly killed by Muslims but everyone can see that Hindu temples like the well-known Shankaracharya temple is still here but many mosques have been demolished. Kashmiri leaders encourage shopkeepers, traders and owners of small businesses to go on strike for independence, but the central government is too strong and is not listening. Earlier generations could not do anything but there is hope that the next generation will succeed in winning independence. Actual shootings and killings tend to happen more in the remote extreme border areas and not so much in mainstream cities like Srinagar. There are no businesses in Kashmir which is why Kashmiri’s have had to set up their outlets elsewhere in India. With regard to the levels of violence, he mentioned that there were high levels of violence between 1995 and 2000, but now the situation had calmed down considerably.76 A boatman mentioned that rice, chal, pulses, and da’al all come from India. What can Pakistan seriously give to the people of Kashmir? ‘Pakistan hamlog ko kya dega?’ He said that he had been a boatman all his life and so was his own father and grandfather. Being a boatman on the Dal Lake in Srinagar which is very popular with tourists, he said that his family has had to live on tourism money all their lives and most tourists tend to come from India proper. Without the money coming from tourism his family would not have survived. He pointed out that Kashmir had no major industries or factories so the main income for most people was through tourism.77 ‘It is tourism that keeps us alive and our tourists come from India proper/Hindustan.’ Whilst all the above interviews had been carried out with men of Kashmiri descent, my final interview was carried out with a man of Naga descent at the Srinagar airport. At the time he was working for the Indian armed forces and was posted in Srinagar. He mentioned that borderland insurgencies in India are still very much on-going. This included Kashmir and India’s border in the extreme Northeast. He said that the main difference between the two borders is the role played by external elements especially Pakistan on the Kashmir side and the absence of external forces in the Eastern sector of the Himalayas. He believed that Pakistani militants were constantly infiltrating and crossing into India and this was possible because the border was porous. Although parts of the border are heavily guarded, there are other parts of the border which are difficult to patrol and manage. It is the responsibility of the Indian armed forces to protect these borders and to prevent further infiltration from happening.78 After the second set of interviews, I was able to carry out one more very detailed interview in the month of April 2014. When I asked this man from Kashmir about the situation in Kashmir and how it had changed over time, this is what he had to say: The Indian security forces or the jawans as they are popularly called are basically frustrated individuals. They basically have nothing to do and so to keep themselves entertained, they pick on local Kashmiri people. These jawans are not exactly senior officers so they lack education and are not very intelligent. They often intimidate local Kashmiri

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 187 people and subject them to all kinds of abuses, both physical and verbal. This has often led to very violent clashes between the Indian security forces and the people. Kashmiri’s do not exactly feel Indian or have a sense of identification with mainstream Indians/India. If Kashmiri’s say that they are Indian, then this is primarily for economic reasons because from an economic standpoint, Kashmir is very dependent on India. One cannot force Indian-ness on the Kashmiri people. A sense of loyalty to a country has to grow naturally from the bottom-up. The Indian government should not expect Kashmiri’s to be loyal to India especially if it treats Kashmiri people so badly. A sense of loyalty towards New Delhi cannot be forced from the top down. Kashmiri’s do not get to hear the Indian national anthem (janagana-mana) very much and flag hoisting happens only in official buildings that deal with administration in Srinagar. He went on to talk about racial discrimination which Kashmiri’s are subjected to when they visit India proper for purposes of education and employment. Kashmiri pundits who are from a Hindu background and are supposed to be educated are actually quite corrupt. Because of this corruption which exists amongst the Hindu pundit community, some Kashmiri’s have felt the need to carry out attacks against them. The pundits then went on to the Indian armed forces and complained and labelled the attackers as militants. This obviously had adverse repercussions and later the Indian security forces would come and harass the so-called militants. Because of the strained relations between Indian security forces and the locals, some local Kashmiri’s would cross the border and go to Pakistan for training to fight back against the oppressive Indian security forces. Many of these Kashmiri men were brainwashed and this only added to the problem. After the training had finished, many would come back from Pakistan to India with guns. These men with guns or those who had access to guns would, later on, harass local people and make money or try to make money from the on-going violence. Many would start demanding money from local people. Often local people would feel scared seeing that these men had weapons and would surrender what they had. This was the time in contemporary South Asian history when the Kashmir cause lost popular support. Men with guns would often grab fruits and vegetables from local fruit sellers. The same men would also visit homes and go from door to door with receipt books demanding money from the local people. This started to happen from the late 80s and early 90s onwards. External infiltration would happen from the AFPAK/Afghanistan-Pakistan area and these external militants would attack the Indian army and paramilitary forces stationed in Kashmir. This made local Kashmiri people feel that Pakistan was actually in favour of them and was seriously interested in freeing them from Indian oppression. However, when local Kashmiri’s started attacking one another, this was when Pakistan realised that the situation had gotten out of control and decided to directly intervene. Its intervention took the shape of attacks on the Indian Army. Pakistan has always wanted to meddle in Indian affairs and even went to the extent of

188  Insurgency in South and South East Asia offering Kashmiri families money and proper salaries if they would carry out the plans directed by the Pakistani military. This was mainly to attack the Indian Army. The whole Kashmir issue has now become politicised. If the Indian National Congress party gave up Kashmir then the opposition party would probably spend the next decade hurling accusations at the Congress party for breaking up the country. Most Kashmiri people are so poor that they cannot leave Kashmir so the impression which they have of India is the impression that they get from the security forces stationed in Kashmir who tend to come from India proper. And this image which the security forces give to the people is a dark and gloomy one. Security forces are known to be hostile and cruel to the people. To most people in Kashmir, the Indian Army and other paramilitary forces are basically representatives of the Indian state and are seen as an extension of the Indian state. People tend to generalise and when they see the Indian forces behaving in this hostile way, many Kashmiri’s conclude that all Indians must be like this. Despite the political turmoil that has existed in Kashmir in previous years, the situation now is much calmer and the people have almost given up the fight against India.79 The recent violence in Kashmir has been regularly reported by the Indian press. Some of the Indian security forces have killed innocent people whilst trying to target militants. In relation to this, Chief Minister, Mehbooba Mufti has asked Indian security personnel to differentiate between actual militants and their families and made the point that everyone cannot be painted with the same brush.80 A 15-year-old student by the name of Aamir Nazir Wani died after being hit by a bullet as security forces battled militants in early 2017 in a South Kashmir village. Whilst police forces say it was a stray bullet that killed him, villagers from the area have said that he was fired upon by the forces.81 Three young lives have been lost after protesters ‘sought to disrupt an operation against a holed-up militant, prompting security forces to open fire as the army chief had warned earlier.’82 The security forces fired bullets and pellets at a mob near the encounter site in central Kashmir which took place in early 2017. The practice of pro azadi protesters marching towards encounter sites between the security forces and militants has now become quite common and this is being done to offer the besieged militants an opportunity to escape. It has also been reported that security forces were using Israeli built drones in anti-insurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir. The unmanned aerial vehicles are expected to help the security forces to hunt down militants and separatists.83 This situation has been further problematized by Islamist groups who have vowed to target the families of security forces if the relatives of militants are harassed.84 Militant raids have also taken place on the homes of senior army officers in South Kashmir and this has given rise to fears that separatists were planning an eye for an eye retaliation. Armed men stormed the house of a senior officer in Shopian one Saturday, ransacked it and threatened the family but did not actually harm them.85 ‘Slain Hizbul Mujahideen commander

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 189 Burhan Wani’s successor Zakir Musa has espoused a pan-Islamic agenda, asking Kashmiri youths to fight with guns and stones for the supremacy of Islam and not for Kashmiri nationalism.’86 Mehbooba’s government in early 2017 mentioned that Rs 5 lakh would be offered to the family of each of the dead and free education and jobs for those blinded mostly in one eye by gun fired pellets.87 In the April of 2017, Kashmir witnessed its most turbulent election with violence leaving eight young men dead and dozens injured across Srinagar parliamentary constituency.88 The deaths have been caused by the bullets of security personnel during clashes. During the clashes there have been stone-throwing, petrol bomb attacks and fire was set on polling booths. Much of the violence in April, 2017 took place in Budgam district which by Kashmir standards has little history of clashes between security forces and protesters, suggesting that such fights are now becoming a valley-wide trend. People have lost their lives not only because of the bullets fired by security personnel. A bus driver by the name of Ali Mohammed Dagga died in April 2017, after being hit by stones by pro azadi protesters near Hyderpora in Srinagar.89 In response to the constant stone-throwing by protesters during the election time in April 2017, the Indian security forces made use of a ‘human shield’ to protect army jeeps. A 26-year-old man, and embroidery artist by profession by the name of Farooq Ahmed Dar was used as a human shield by the army against stone missiles. After assaulting him the army ‘tied him up, strapped him to the front of the jeep between the headlights and he was driven through a dozen villages, warning residents against stone-throwing.’90 Immediately after this outrageous incident, no official from the police, civil administration or the army had approached Dar to record a statement and fearing more trouble his family was reluctant to lodge a complaint against the army.91 A video relating to this had also surfaced on social networking sites. All this violence has had an adverse impact on education and schools. Officials in April 2017 ordered the closure of universities, colleges and schools and suspended mobile and internet services across Kashmir. Students also joined the protesters. ‘Hundreds of students, many of them in their school uniforms and ties, clashed with security forces in the latest challenge for the embattled Mehbooba Mufti government.’92 Ethnic nationalism in the Kashmir conflict When we look at the role played by nationalist forces in the Kashmir conflict, three types of nationalisms stand out and can be easily identified. The first and most obvious strand or category of nationalism that can be identified here is the secessionist nationalism associated with separatist groups like the Hurriyat, which is an alliance of different political and religious organisations founded in the year 1993 to raise the cause of Kashmiri separatism. These are clear elements within Kashmiri society who want to break away from mainstream India. They feel that they are a distinct

190  Insurgency in South and South East Asia nation in themselves and have nothing in common with a Hindu majority India. This form of nationalism often overlaps with Islamist tendencies or Islamist nationalism since a lot of Islamist ideologues advocate an independent Kashmir free from India. Figures like Syed Ali Geelani would fall into the first category, which is a combination of political separatism and Islamism. The second category of nationalism that is having an impact on Kashmir is Pakistani irredentism. Irredentism is advocating the annexation of a neighbouring state/territory based on the belief that the neighbouring state in question at one point of time in history belonged to the country which is carrying out the annexation or the annexation is being carried out because of strong cultural commonalities which exist between the two countries. Here the common factor between Kashmir and Pakistan is clearly Islam. Irredentism is strongly associated with pan nationalist movements and identity politics. As mentioned earlier, Kashmir is important to Pakistan because the latter believes that the Pakistani national identity will not be complete unless it captures the whole of Kashmir since Kashmir is a Muslim majority province leaning against Pakistan’s frontier. The third category of nationalism associated with the Kashmir conflict is the rise of Hindu nationalism. Hindutva groups often feel very strongly about the Kashmir issue and link it with Indian patriotism. The conflict in Kashmir is often seen as a response to or reaction against the rise of an aggressive Hindu nationalism in contemporary India.93 Mutahir Ahmed writes, ‘fundamentalists have isolated the moderate, nationalist element of Kashmir and indirectly strengthened extreme Muslim and Hindu fundamentalist forces in Pakistan and India respectively.’94 So when we look at the role of nationalism in the Kashmir context it is very important to pay careful attention to the intersection of these three nationalisms. The human rights situation in Kashmir When faced with armed separatism, Indian authorities have resorted to an excessive and unproductive use of force that has paved the way for further violence by secessionist groups and Islamists, thereby increasing the prospect of Indian disintegration. In particular, the use of the paramilitary who are expected to assist the Indian Army in counter-insurgency operations has paved the way for further violence to take place. The increasing use of force and high handedness by the Indian state has eroded India’s democratic credentials in Kashmir. As violence escalated from the 80s, the constitution was amended and special legislation had to be introduced which gave the central government more power to use force whilst dealing with acts of terrorism, religious extremism and separatism. The frequent use of the military and paramilitary forces to crush secessionists tends to politicise those forces and thereby increases the chance of a military takeover.95 On the 8th of September, 1993, the USA expressed concern over the human rights situation in Kashmir and catalogued the excesses committed by the security

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 191 forces against the civilians.96 The European parliament also expressed much concern over the issue and had its delegation denied entry into Kashmir. Basic human rights and civil liberties had been grossly violated by security personnel. Many human rights teams and independent groups visited Kashmir since April 1990, thus breaking the conspiracy of silence on the issue of human rights violations. The Asia watch/human rights watch group reported in 2010.97 The Armed Forces Special Powers Act or AFSPA grants the military wide powers to arrest without warrant, shoot to kill, and destroy property in so called, ‘ disturbed areas’. It also protects military personnel responsible for serious crimes from prosecution; creating a pervasive culture of impunity. State authorities have often abused the AFSPA. They have used it to place several places in the valley under restrictions to prevent demonstrations and further protests. Those involved in the protests have often retaliated by throwing stones at security personnel. Many have also destroyed public property. To suppress the protests, security forces have often used excessive force to disperse the crowds. This has led to hundreds of deaths and many being injured. Each death has led to further protests. This has in turn led to further state repression thereby increasing the levels of violence. Transnational connections and the Kashmir conflict Rostum K Nanavatty writes ‘External involvement in internal armed conflict is not a new phenomenon. Domestic violence creates conditions that encourage intervention. A hostile power can either support or sponsor internal armed conflict. It may choose to intervene either covertly or clandestinely. This constitutes covert war.’98 It has already been mentioned that the Kashmir conflict has a strong external dimension to it and that Pakistan is most certainly one of the key external actors in Indian administered Kashmir. Indian security analyst Kanti Bajpai argues that the Pakistan Army and the ISI/Inter-Services Intelligence have provided militant groups with space, arms and training.99 Pakistan has provided support to insurgent groups in Jammu and Kashmir all under the ‘fig leaf of political, diplomatic and moral support to freedom fighters in a freedom struggle.’100 In Jammu and Kashmir, after the Kargil War of 1999, the state has witnessed a sharp increase in Pakistan assisted infiltration of trained Islamists from across the Line of Control. Anti-India terrorist groups and their front organisations have flourished in Pakistan with their infrastructure intact and infiltration continues albeit on a reduced scale. Furthermore, there is also uninterrupted flow of instructions from controllers in Pakistan to their foot soldiers in Kashmir.101 The loss of the United States of America as an ally since the end of the Cold War has prompted Pakistan to step up its efforts in promoting Islamic unity in other parts of the Muslim world especially in

192  Insurgency in South and South East Asia Central Asia and the Middle East. In the year, 1991, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had called for the creation of a Common Islamic Market. All these efforts by Pakistan carried the dual purpose of not only promoting Islamic solidarity but also confronting a much larger Hindu dominated India. In the context of transnational connections, it is also worth noting that the Kashmiri diaspora has also been active. The Kashmiri diaspora community in Britain for instance actively participates in the separatist politics associated with Kashmir. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front was founded in Birmingham in 1977 with Amanullah Khan as its chairperson. It has been one of the most important manifestations of diasporic mobilisation around the situation in Kashmir. Current research shows that the British Kashmiri identity is inextricably linked with Kashmiri territory and this link is likely to remain strong so long Kashmir remains disputed.102 The members of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front organise events amongst the diaspora community and develop strategy in the West. We also see the lobbying of national and international politicians and organisation of sympathetic influential groupings in mainstream political arenas, meetings being arranged at all levels from local to international and close liaison with the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front in Southern Asia. There have also been strong linkages with Afghanistan. Mutahir Ahmed writes, ‘It has been estimated that approximately 1200 foreigners, of whom nearly half belong to Afghanistan, have infiltrated into the valley from Azad Kashmir.’103 This has most certainly complicated things further. Conclusion This chapter has discussed the situation in Kashmir in great detail firstly by looking at the historical context and then by focussing on the current situation. The chapter has also dealt with issues like ethnic nationalism, human rights violations in Kashmir and the involvement of external forces in the dispute. Kashmir has been the on-going point of international tension between India and Pakistan in South Asia for decades. Whilst the Indian side argues that it is an integral part of India, the Pakistani side argues that it is important for Pakistan to capture Kashmir because it is a Muslim majority province leaning against Pakistan’s frontier and without capturing it, Pakistan’s national identity will not be complete. Whilst India has consistently accused Islamabad of meddling in India’s domestic affairs, Pakistan sees the situation as an unresolved international dispute. Currently, the dispute is threefold. Firstly, there is a deep sense of alienation from the Indian union amongst the people living in the Indian sphere of influence in the Kashmir valley. Secondly, since the late 80s, Pakistan has mounted a covert military operation to exploit this alienation, instigating and encouraging acts of terrorism. And finally, Indian security personnel have systematically perpetrated violations of human rights in the valley.104 Whilst Indian efforts to maintain the status quo have met with some success, Pakistan’s efforts

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 193 to push forward their side of the argument have by and large failed. The inability of both India and Pakistan to resolve the dispute has allowed local Kashmiri people to be subjected to all kinds of hardships and sufferings since 1947.105 Considering the complex nature of the situation in Kashmir, there are no easy or quick answers to the problem. The way forward especially for the Indian government would be to start with demilitarisation. Kashmir as mentioned earlier is one of the most militarised parts of the world. ‘Kashmir’s population of less than 5 million in small agricultural communities resides in the most militarized region in the world today, with nearly 700,000 Indian military and paramilitary troops located in the part controlled by India and 300,000 Pakistani troops across the border in the part controlled by Pakistan.’106 Security forces patrolling the streets with guns 24/7 not only create an atmosphere of fear but it also infringes upon the basic human rights of the people. The political atmosphere needs to be more relaxed and people should be allowed to talk more freely with the press. Whilst it is acceptable to have a military presence in the extreme borders to prevent infiltration from Pakistan and Afghanistan, heavy presence of the Indian armed forces in places like Srinagar or other mainstream Kashmiri cities for that matter is counterproductive. The heavy presence of the Indian military and paramilitary forces have paved the way for all sorts of human rights violations to take place which has caused more turmoil and instability in Kashmir rather than furthering the cause of peace, security and stability. The human rights situation in Kashmir requires urgent attention. This Armed Forces Special Powers Act gives extraordinary powers to security personnel who often misuse and abuse the law or take the law into their own hands. Furthermore, there is no accountability. The Indian government would need to provide these young jawans with alternative forms of employment. The current situation is not serving India well. Whilst some military presence is required, such a heavy presence is counterproductive and unnecessary. The heavy presence of the military has also had a detrimental impact on Kashmir’s economy especially the tourism industry. Kashmir is a major hill station and tourist destination in South Asia and makes a lot of money through tourism. Considering the current state of the local economy is a sorry state of affairs, this to some extent can be improved by reviving tourism and one way to go about doing that would be to reduce the presence of the military in Kashmir. The sight of such a heavy military presence in places like Srinagar can be very off-putting for some tourists. If the Indian government insists on maintaining such a heavy military presence then at least there needs to be more accountability and jawans should not be allowed to get away with human rights violations. The immediate impression one gets when one visits Srinagar is one of extreme poverty and power cuts are very common.107 The Indian government would therefore need to pay more attention to issues like growth and infrastructure development in Kashmir. Instead of spending so much money on defence, India

194  Insurgency in South and South East Asia would need to pump more money into developmental projects in Kashmir. Better infrastructure would also help the tourism industry. The local people would need to be incorporated in the decision-making process and not treated like the Indian other. If the Indian state makes a genuine effort to help the people, automatically a sense of oneness with India would start to grow amongst the people and the intensity of secessionist movements would be reduced. The grievances of the people need looking into. As a democracy, India has a responsibility of looking after its minority citizens. One of the hallmarks of a democracy is to secure and protect the rights of its minority citizens. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and the repressive way the Indian state has dealt with issues in Kashmir is a black mark on India’s democracy which needs to be corrected urgently. Kashmiri’s should not be treated like a subject population living under colonial rule. Their voices should be heard and taken more seriously. Political transparency, free and fair elections, good governance, infrastructure development is most certainly the way forward. Other issues which need urgent attention are corruption, poverty, unemployment and administrative failure. Hopefully, these things taken collectively will bring about long-lasting and effective peace for the people of Kashmir. Political, social and economic realities have led to this conflict, so sound policies in these areas will also be able to provide a solution.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh The CHT, which had been a hotbed of insurgency for over two decades especially in the 70s and80s, is located in the extreme Southeastern corner of Bangladesh. It is located at the confluence of two regions: South Asia and Southeast Asia. It has international borders with the Indian Northeast and Myanmar. Shahabuddin writes, ‘The CHT, located in Southeastern Bangladesh and comprising the Rangamati, Bandarban and Khagrachari Hill Districts, occupy an area of 5,093 square miles (a tenth of the total land area of Bangladesh) with a population of 1,598,000 (out of a total population of 150.6 million in the country).’108 Once again, this is an ethnic minority area that has felt a disconnect with a Muslim majority Bangladesh. A lot of scholars have argued that ethnocide in post-colonial societies like Bangladesh can be located at the interplay of three processes: nation-building and development visions of the dominant state, which are often at odds with the way minorities define development, the struggle for autonomy by these minority groups and finally the tendency of the dominant state to view the situation in security terms and pursue a militaristic approach to deal with it. Countries in South Asia like India and Pakistan gained their independence in the late 1940s. Bangladesh used to be East Pakistan and hence a part of Pakistan. It was after the 1971 liberation war that former East Pakistan seceded and became Bangladesh. In those days between 1947 and

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 195 1971, West Pakistan or Islamabad was seen as the centre and former East Pakistan as the periphery. The main reason for the secession was because they felt oppressed by Pakistan or West Pakistan. However, since 1971, we see a similar pattern happening within Bangladesh’s internal boundaries where minority communities residing in the south-eastern periphery wanting to secede for the very same reason. Since the 50s some of these countries in South Asia have colonised themselves. Whilst they had gained freedom from imperial Britain and from a white ruling elite class, this was only replaced by a brown ruling elite. This has happened across the global south especially in Asia and in Africa. Minority groups in the borderlands have always been viewed as the ‘other’ who did not quite fit in with the mainstream. When the dominant state pursued a so-called development agenda, it was development defined by the elite coming from the ethnic majority. This was often in conflict with the interests of ethnic minorities residing in the borderlands. We must remember that development means different things to different people. The elite from the heartlands of these post-colonial societies have often tried to exploit regional and peripheral resources to suit the needs of the people residing in the heartland as opposed to catering to the needs of people living in the borderlands. Not only have borderlands been exploited economically, but from a strategic standpoint, these borderlands are also often seen as buffer zones that would play a key role in protecting the heartland from external attacks. The colonial approach taken by the elite based in the centre is then resisted by the local people in the periphery. This resistance causes concern amongst the elite based in the centre, after which they tend to securitise the situation and begin to follow a policy of repression and high handedness. The elite often use security personnel to crush the resistance, which only exacerbates the situation further. Ethnocide is a word similar to genocide. The word ‘genocide’ comes from the Greek words, ‘genos,’ which means race or tribe and the Latin word ‘cide, which’ refers to killing. Similarly, the word ‘ethnocide’ has been derived from the words ‘ethnos’ referring to nation, and ‘cide’ which again means killing. The economic, political and bureaucratic penetration of the dominant state in minority peripheral lands causes great concern amongst the people. Many feel that their indigenous culture will be eroded as a result of the dominant state penetrating their lands. This in turn leads to stronger demands and calls for autonomy and in extreme cases independence. The state responds to this situation by pursuing a militaristic agenda. The problem in the CHT was primarily about ethnic majority–minority relations and like a lot of the other case studies in this book the insurgency was linked to separatist groups. The CHT has been crucial for Bangladeshi interests. It is rich in natural and mineral resources like oil, copper, coal and gas. Also, it protects the mainland from external attacks. This is very important, given that there are on-going insurgencies in the Indian Northeast and contemporary Myanmar, which share borders with the CHT. The last thing

196  Insurgency in South and South East Asia the central government based in Dhaka want is foreign insurgencies having spillover effects into its own territory. Despite being a part of Bangladesh, the CHT has always had a distinct cultural identity-an identity of its own. Racially, linguistically and ethnically, the CHT is very different from Bangladesh proper. Geographically, the CHT is also very different from the mainland. The CHT is very hilly, whereas Bangladesh proper is predominantly a plain land, although some of the Northern areas like Sylhet are also quite hilly. The CHT also differs from Bangladesh proper from a religious standpoint. The CHT has a strong Buddhist presence whereas Bangladesh proper is predominantly Islamic. Ethnically, the people in the CHT resemble people from the Indian Northeast, Thailand and Myanmar. Roughly, there are thirteen native groups in the CHT who are by and large of Sino-Tibetan descent. The CHT consists of the three hill tracts: Rangamati, Bandarban and Khagrachari. Each indigenous tribe speak their own language. They have their own customs, traditional practices, values and way of life. They have a rich cultural heritage which differs from the heritage of Bengalis living in Bangladesh proper. The Chakmas, Marmas, Chaks and Khayangs are Buddhists, the Lushais and Pankhus are Christians, and the Riangs and Tripuras are Hindus. The rest are animists. These indigenous groups have their own social norms, dietary habits, methods of agriculture, and rituals associated with marriage, birth and death. The historical background The British East India Company acquired the CHT in 1760. During Mughal rule, the CHT had been autonomous. During the days of the East India Company, the CHT remained autonomous and it did not create any administrative structures there. The East India Company delimited its boundaries in 1860. In 1881, the government of Bengal divided the CHT into three circles: Chakma, Bohmang and Mong. Each of these was placed under the guidance of a superintendent. The British colonial administration took steps to limit the interference of the civil administration in local affairs. For instance, no interference in local customs, rituals and social norms was permitted. The conventional wisdom is that the British colonial administration allowed self-rule as much as possible and protected the indigenous people, although in recent years this has been contested.109 In 1900, the British introduced the Hill Tracts Manual or the CHT regulation. This manual detailed the rules of administration for the CHT. The administration was placed under a deputy commissioner who presided over civil, criminal and jurisdictional matters. The circle chiefs retained powers over customary matters but were formed into an advisory council that was meant to assist the deputy commissioner. If anyone had intentions of settlement in the CHT, permission from the deputy commissioner was required, who in turn had to seek advice from the circle chiefs or village headman. In other words, there

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 197 were all kinds of restrictions. This was done to protect the local people and their culture from massive inflows of Bengali people into the CHT. There was an economic logic behind this. The CHT had very limited forest land that could be used for agricultural cultivation. If there was a massive influx of Bengalis coming into the area, there would clearly be a lot of pressure on existing and limited resources. In the Government of India Act of 1935, the CHT was declared a totally excluded area. Pakistan viewed the separatist tendencies in the CHT as a communist uprising and the elite in Dhaka viewed it as an autonomy movement. Pakistan and the CHT Pakistan as we all know was carved out in 1947 as a separate homeland for South Asian Muslims. The CHT remained immune from the anti-colonial movement. Unable to identify with the Muslim League that was founded in 1906 and played its part in the Pakistan movement, the CHT sought help from the Congress party that was more secular in its approach. The three-circle chiefs demanded that the British, the Muslim League and the Congress party recognise their region as native states. They then went on to demand for a confederacy with the Indian states of Tripura, Cooch Bihar and Khasia. The Marma chief suggested a union with neighbouring Myanmar. The situation in the CHT is quite similar to the situation in Ladakh just before 1947, when the Buddhists of Ladakh did not want to be a part of Jinnah’s Pakistan. Despite being a predominantly nonMuslim area with over ninety per cent of indigenous people, the Bengal British Boundary Commission led by Cyril Radcliffe handed the CHT to Pakistan. Chakma leaders were clamouring for a merger with India. This is possibly because Buddhism, which is what the Chakmas practise, is an offshoot of Hinduism and because Buddhism as a religion is very well received in India. In short, most of the hill communities resented their inclusion in Pakistan. Pakistan’s nation-building strategy produced sharp reaction from different ethnic minorities. For instance, when Urdu was declared the national language, the Bengalis of former East Pakistan resisted but as a group ethnics in the CHT were too small to mount a resistance movement although their language rights had been infringed upon as well. Pakistan’s language policy started a process of language destruction in the CHT. This process was accelerated by Bangladesh in the seventies and eighties, which we shall discuss later in this section. Pakistan’s economic vision also had a detrimental impact on the CHT. In this connection, the building of the Kaptai dam between 1957 and 1962 deserves special mention, which inundated an area of four hundred square miles. A lot of this land was fertile and suited for agriculture. The building of the Kaptai dam uprooted and displaced thousands of native people especially Chakmas. Over fifty per cent of the Chakma population were uprooted because of the creation of the Kaptai dam. The central government

198  Insurgency in South and South East Asia did not do anything meaningful or take any measures that would rehabilitate the victims who had been affected so badly. Neither was any compensation given so that the affected people could rebuild and restart their lives. As a result, many of these people crossed over into India in the 1960s. Many of them have been languishing in the Indian Northeast especially in Arunachal Pradesh. They have been surviving state-less, waiting to be granted Indian citizenship. Their stateless situation can be compared with the current Rohingyas although the situation of the Rohingyas is much more critical. In response to this, the native students of the CHT formed the Hill Students Society or the Pahari Chatra Samity in the 1960s in an attempt to voice their concerns. Bangladesh and the CHT Bangladesh’s first Prime Minister, Mujibar Rahman, declared that the newly liberated country would be a mono national and mono-cultural state and emphasized on Bengali nationalism. Although he and his party had fought hard against the West Pakistani establishment, post-liberation, he was not sympathetic to minorities who were fighting for the same thing that he had once fought for against Islamabad. Bengali nationalism was to be the main pillar of the state. Bangla became the state language. Hill communities were denied the right to be educated in their own languages. This was a policy of forceful integration and of trying to forcefully incorporate indigenous communities within the framework of the Bengali nation. This homogenising approach to nation-building gave rise to an autonomy movement in the CHT. Identity construction in the hills emerged in the form of resistance to Bangladesh proper and its hegemonic approach to nation-building. The hill people made several demands to Rahman. These included preserving the autonomy of the CHT, restricting the inflow of Bengali people into the CHT, continuation of the positions of the circle chiefs, bringing back the Hill Tracts Manual of 1900 into the political forefront and restricting its amendment. Rahman rejected all these demands and asked the hill people to merge with Bengali nationalism. In response to this rejection, the hill people formed a political party of their own: United People’s Organisation of the CHT or the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS). It was this party that would lead the autonomy movement in the next few years. India gave its full support to this party and allowed the party to operate from the Indian Northeastern state of Tripura. Initially, in the first half of the 1970s, this demand for autonomy was pursued through constitutional means but after 1975, the situation changed and got violent. After Rahman’s assassination, a guerrilla force called the Shanti Bahini or peace force spearheaded the autonomy movement in the years to come. The Shanti Bahini was founded by Manabendra Narayan Larma. The Shanti Bahini was dominated by the Chakmas. Ethnocide in the CHT took place within this context of

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 199 continuous fighting between the armed forces of the Shanti Bahini and the security personnel from Bangladesh proper. Amena Mohsin writes, ‘The PCJSS demanded that the constitution of Bangladesh give recognition to the Hill people as a nation distinct from the Bengalis. To attain this goal, it formed the identity of Jumma to denote the Hill people’s distinctiveness from the Bengalis on the one hand, and to unite the different communities of the CHT on the other….Consequently, the PCJSS adopted the nomenclature of Jumma nationalism to unify the Hill people under one banner and counter the hegemony of the majority.’110 An autonomous regional council would need to be created. This council would have to look into all kinds of administrative affairs that included general administration and law and order, local government institutions, youth development and sports, forestry, water resources, fisheries, tourism, agriculture, markets, cultural affairs, country liquor, religious institutions, graveyard and cremation grounds, power supply, finance, social welfare etc. The demand for autonomy was viewed as a key security concern by the ruling political elite in Dhaka. The hill people were viewed unfavourably and seen as a threat to national security. This threat perception was exaggerated during the years of military rule in Bangladesh. In this connection, the Ershad regime and the Zia regime deserve special mention. The Zia regime lasted from 1975 till 1981/82 and the Ershad regime lasted from 1982 till 1990. Both dictators used the CHT issue for their own purposes and to gain domestic political legitimacy. India got involved and helped the separatist forces in the backdrop of deteriorating bilateral relations with Bangladesh. The policies taken by Dhaka at that time were ethnic cleansing, eviction, physical annihilation and persecution. Dhaka made it clear that it wanted the CHT land and not the people. Sadly, this approach led to massive militarization of the CHT that ultimately paved the way for human rights violations. Dhaka’s main aim was to defeat the Shanti Bahini militarily and to gain as much control over the CHT so that Dhaka could follow and carry out other counter-insurgency policies like Islamisation and Bengali settlement in the CHT. This is where the role of religion, race and ethnicity come into play. The policy of Bengali settlement and encouraging Bengali’s to settle in the CHT was a deliberate attempt to undermine local culture and was very similar to the practices and approach taken by Beijing (Beijing’s policy of Han migration) in relation to Xinjiang and Tibet discussed earlier. Rahman had established three full-fledged army garrisons in the CHT but militarization expanded especially during the Zia and Ershad years and the CHT practically became a military garrison. The civil and development sectors of the administration were also militarized and came under the control of the armed forces. The military was superimposed practically on all sectors of the economy, polity and society. In 1975, the Zia regime started the CHT Development Board whose main objective was to initiate and boost socio-economic growth and development in the region. However, minority groups feel that its true objective was to fund and assist the counterinsurgency forces in the CHT. Military campaigns were initiated in the CHT to

200  Insurgency in South and South East Asia totally wipe out the resistance. Torture, attacks on the hill people, detention and disappearances became regular occurrences in the CHT in the years to come. Professor Willem Van Schendel writes, ‘Demands for regional autonomy within Bangladesh surfaced soon after the state had come into existence. They fell on deaf ears… National debates first ignored the rights of the country’s many indigenous communities and then actively sought to silence them.’111 The role of religion, race and ethnicity The role played by race, ethnicity and religion is absolutely key in understanding the conflict in the CHT. As a part of the counter-insurgency measures, Dhaka encouraged ethnic majority Bengali people to settle in the CHT. This, of course, could only be achieved after Dhaka had considerable control over the region and flushed out military resistance from the CHT. The policy is somewhat similar to Beijing’s policy of Han migration in Xinjiang and Tibet. There were two main objectives associated with this policy. Dhaka wanted there to be popular support for the armed forces to weaken the insurgency and this could be achieved if there were more Bengali people from the plains residing in the CHT since they were viewed as proDhaka. The policy was also strongly tied with the slow eventual extermination of indigenous people through demographic change. This policy of encouraging Bengali’s to settle in the CHT started soon after independence. Independence in the Bangladeshi case, of course, is firstly independence from the British, and then secondly from West Pakistan. After Mujibar Rahman’s death, the military dictators encouraged Bengali settlement in the CHT. With the passage of time, the Bengali presence increased in the CHT from nine per cent in 1951 to fifty per cent in 1991. The arrival of more and more Bengali settlers led to the dispossession of land and the hill people were now being deprived of their homes and land. Dhaka could not always provide the new Bengali arrivals with fertile agricultural land because of the scarcity of land in the CHT. Hence once the Bengali settlers arrived, they started to grab the lands of the native people and this led to further conflict and eviction of native people. Bengali’s being the stronger group out of the two because of their ready access to resources only weakened the autonomy movement in the CHT. In the process, the settlers got active support and assistance from state agencies. The process led to massive displacement and many of the natives fled the country and crossed over into India where they started to lead lives as refugees. Systematic massacres started to take place in the CHT in the late 1970s. Mass rape was carried out to terrorize the hill people so that they would stop supporting the Shanti Bahini. This was clearly a process of ethnic cleansing. As a part of the counter-insurgency strategy, Dhaka also followed a policy of Islamisation in the CHT so that this would have an eroding impact on the Buddhist/Hindu and Christian practices in the region. In other words,

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 201 Dhaka was trying to make the CHT more and more like Bangladesh proper. Difference especially cultural differences were viewed as a threat. Cultural similarities were viewed favourably by the ruling elite. The army encouraged young Muslim women to marry local youths from the CHT after converting these youths to Islam. Muslim Bengali male settlers were also encouraged to marry hill women. Islamic NGO’s like Al Rabita also played their part in this process of Islamisation of the CHT. Al Rabita offered food, shelter, jobs and money to the poor hill people. This was done to win their hearts and minds and so that they would readily convert to Islam. Islamic institutions have grown rapidly over the years in the CHT and the Jamat I Islami, a prominent political party, has joined hands with some of these Islamic NGO’s that are already actively involved in the CHT. The peace process The insurgency in the CHT is generally seen as a conflict that is now over. However, some analysts may not accept this view. The peace process in the late 1990s has been generally seen as quite an effective one. It has been hailed as a success by some. It was seen as a process that brought stability to the war-torn province. The peace process took place in 1997 and there was no third party involvement. There was no international involvement or involvement by civil society. It was a process that directly involved the government of Bangladesh and the main political group associated with the CHT insurgents/autonomy movement. However, as with a lot of these things, the peace process did not fully stop the process of ethnocide. Some believe that the accord was structurally flawed. For instance, it failed to address the issue of Bengali settlement and there has been a lack of sincerity on the part of the central government to implement the accord. Some of the more powerful mainstream political parties like the BNP/Bangladesh National Party and Islamist organisations and parties like the Jamat I Islami have shown resistance and opposed the accord. Some of the provisions were not implemented with sincerity. One major issue that seemed unresolved was settlement of land and the on-going disputes over land. People who had been displaced and dispossessed were not properly rehabilitated. The hill people often felt that the army camps had not been withdrawn fully from the CHT. The presence of the army camps in the CHT after the peace process for years was viewed unfavourably by the hill people. In other words, proper demilitarisation had not taken place. The hill people always wanted to have a strong indigenous police force and expected the centre to assist them with the formation of a strong native police force. Some are of the view that the expectations of the accord have not been fully met and that the future is still fraught with uncertainty but only time will tell. Bhumitra Chakma writes, ‘ethnic conflicts in many developing countries result from the nation-building policies and assimilationist strategies of the state. To prevent the rise of such conflicts or to resolve such conflicts

202  Insurgency in South and South East Asia which have appeared, it is important to pursue policies of accommodation and inclusiveness, instead of assimilation.’112

The case of South Thailand Let us now turn to the situation in South Thailand. Geographically, South Thailand is very close to the Malay world. This part of Thailand is predominantly Muslim. It is a Muslim part of a predominantly Buddhist country, so once again we have a minority region. ‘With the exception of the three southernmost provinces, Thailand’s population of 68 million is relatively homogeneous.’113 Due to the on-going separatist violence, it has been argued that over three thousand people have lost their lives since 2004. Some analysts believe that the situation in South Thailand is both the country’s as well as the entire region’s most threatening security concern. ‘A low-level insurgency started in Southern Thailand in 2004, and has continued since then. Militant Malay Muslims have been fighting for an independent state.’114 One of the reasons why this conflict started in the first place was because of the Thai state’s annexation of the Pattani Kingdom in 1902. Since then, there have been multiple attempts by the central government in Bangkok to force the periphery into accepting a mainstream Thai identity and in trying to make Malay Muslims into Thai Muslims. Of course, this is not the only reason as to why the insurgency came into existence. These are all very complex situations and multiple factors have led to the crisis. The situation, however, is very similar to the previous case studies that have already been discussed. Maladministration, poor governance, racism, economic deprivation and poverty, drug abuse, ethno-religious nationalism, corruption, and political repression are some of the key factors that have caused this difficult situation. ‘While media accounts typically characterised the conflict in terms of a struggle between ‘Islamic separatists’ and the forces of the Thai state, the real causes of the violence were complex and often opaque. Alternative explanations include questions of identity, historical injustice, economic inequality and discrimination, unequal power relations, and networks of criminality involving local politicians and members of the security forces.’115 The situation got complicated after 9/11 with Prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra’s flawed policies. Post-2006 a policy of appeasement was followed. The historical background The three districts of South Thailand consist of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. Then of course there is Songkhla. All four provinces are located in the Deep South. Except Pattani, they all share borders with Northern Malaysia, particularly with Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and Perak.116 According to the 2000 census, seventy to eighty per cent of the people residing here are Malay Muslims and native Yawi speakers. The remaining people are either Thai

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 203 Buddhists or Sino-Thais. The roots of the violence can be found in the region’s history. Yala, Narathiwat and Pattani were all a part of the kingdom of Pattani, which was founded in the mid-fourteenth century. It converted to Islam about a hundred years later. The sultanate became a very famous centre of Islamic learning. However, during the eighteenth century, Pattani was forced into a tributary relationship with the more powerful Northern kingdom of Ayutthaya ‘By the end of the fourteenth century, Ayutthaya had established itself as one of the strongest states in mainland Southeast Asia.’117 Ayutthaya is the forerunner of the modern Thai state. After the Chakri dynasty was founded in the late 1700s, tighter control was exercised by Thailand over the southern provinces. ‘The residents of Pattani objected, not least because of the subsequent Thai policy of requiring Pattani residents to speak Thai, as well as ascribing Buddhism as the state religion.’118 Thailand’s name before 1939 was Siam. Some of the administrative reforms included tightening control over the southern borders to prevent any kind of penetration by imperial Britain and France. Pattani over the years increasingly came under Bangkok’s direct and more stringent rule and this was formalised in 1909 by the Anglo-Siamese treaty. The situation is somewhat similar to Tibet in the sense that there are different interpretations of these historical events depending on which side you belong to. Thai Buddhists view the treaty of 1909 favourably and see it as an event that should have happened much earlier and that the South should have recognised Bangkok’s rule a long time ago. In other words, this recognition was long overdue. Pattani nationalists, however, view both the treaty of 1909 and the administrative reforms of 1902 unfavourably and see it as the Siamese kingdom following a policy of territorial aggrandisement and naked imperialism that eventually led to the collapse of the Pattani sultanate. Till about 1945, residents in Pattani were being subjected to Bangkok’s policies of forceful integration and the centre was trying to force Malay Muslims into accepting a Thai identity. The situation was especially volatile under the ultra-nationalist Field Marshall, Phibun Songkhram between the years 1938 and 1944. ‘Phibun and his followers were much attracted to other countries which had a militarized tradition of nationalism, most notably Japan and Germany.’119 Under his rule, religious holidays were abolished. Also, Malay Muslims were prevented from wearing their traditional dress, teaching their traditional language Yawi and from practising Sharia law. Malay Muslims were also encouraged to take up Thai sounding names which clearly show that cultural difference was seen as a threat by the state. The people in the South saw these steps as the state’s attempts to weaken and undermine local religious and ethnic identity. Tensions reached a peak especially in 1948 with Phibun’s return to power. The separatists were led by an Islamic scholar, Haji Sulong, who presented to the central government a list of demands. This situation is similar to the CHT when the PCJSS sent in their demands to Dhaka. The list of demands included political autonomy for the South, the right to practise and implement Sharia law and the

204  Insurgency in South and South East Asia protection of their language and traditional culture. Like Dhaka and a lot of the case studies discussed earlier, the centre rejected these demands. Haji Sulong was arrested and this not only sparked riots in 1948 but it also strengthened separatist tendencies. In this connection, the Dusan Nyor rebellion deserves special mention. Hundreds of people in the South lost their lives. Further demands were made for the South to be incorporated into British Malaya. Bangkok also introduced an emergency rule in the South. Separatist tendencies strengthened under Phibun’s successors as the centre’s assimilationist policies increased under the slogan of one nation, religion and king referring to Thailand, Buddhism, and King Bhumibol Adulyadej. The Islamic system of learning and schooling known as the Pondok/Ponoh system which had been viewed by the Thai state as a hotbed of separatism and Islamism was now brought under stricter state control. The Thai government has also encouraged Thai Buddhists from the Northeast of the country to migrate to the South. Sporadic riots led to armed insurrection led by groups like Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional, and the Pattani United Liberation Organisation. These groups were highly fragmented. For instance, some were more religious than others but they all favoured complete separation from the Thai state, which they perceived as oppressive.120 From the fifties onwards, we also see the rise of numerous splinter groups which carry out a low-intensity insurgency in the South against the Thai authorities. ‘At the heart of the Southern violence lie contrasting views of identity and citizenship.’121 Thai Buddhists were targeted, as were Thai police, security personnel and civil servants. Thai schools also came under pressure and were attacked because they were often perceived by separatist groups as state-led that were playing a crucial role in brainwashing children from the South. Insurgencies often require political solutions as opposed to military ones. In the eighties, the Thai state switched from high handedness to a more political approach. This approach temporarily defeated the insurgency. The mastermind behind this strategy was Prem Tinsulanonda. He himself was a southerner from Songkhla and had served as prime minister between 1980 till 1988. His policies looked into improving the economy of the South, placating local grievances and improving coordination. He gave a lot of importance to administrative issues and in 1981, the Southern Border Provinces Administrative/Administration Centre (SBPAC) came into existence. The SBPAC was meant to govern the South directly and help with socio-economic development. The SBPAC was also meant to act as an intermediary between the Thai authorities and the disgruntled elements in the South. It was to act as a dispute resolution mechanism that also had the power to get rid of corrupt and weak officials. To improve intelligence gathering, it was given a joint security arm: Civilian Military Police Unit 43. Prem’s policies collectively played a key role in placating the insurgents in the South. These policies included socio-economic development projects in the South, financing the construction and upkeep of mosques, the establishment of

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 205 the summer residence at Narathiwat and introduction of democracy in the South that allowed Malay Muslims to become a part of the political mainstream. However, within a few years, the fires of the conflict were reignited once again. The contemporary situation Despite the advent of democracy southerners still felt deep resentment and hostility towards the Thai authorities. This continued throughout the 1990s. Between 2000 and 2003, there were violent attacks against symbols of Thai authority. Attacks on the police, security personnel and Thai schools still continued. Southerners continued to feel that their religious identity was being eroded intentionally by the insensitive Thai state. Many Southern Muslims felt that their traditional identity was also being threatened by the twin forces of modernity and globalisation. They also felt politically marginalized and that they were being denied access to jobs and education. Local governance in the South had also become dysfunctional and the South has often been used as a dumping ground for incompetent officials. Southern Malay Muslims were feeling alienated and complained that they were being treated like second class citizens. The Thai police in the Southern provinces are especially corrupt. The SBPAC gradually became weak, was under-financed and staffed by weak personnel. As a result of this local governance suffered greatly. Malay Muslims in the Southern provinces were poorly represented. Some of these people did not have the relevant educational qualifications and felt challenged because they did not have the required Thai language skills to even pass the civil service exams. A lot of the senior Southern positions were filled in by non-southerners who were insensitive to the local culture and this only exacerbated the situation further. The poor economic conditions fuelled a sense of discrimination. The economy of the South is primarily dependent on agriculture and fishing. Both sectors had been hit hard by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. It is hard to find jobs in sectors other than these two, and unemployment rates amongst young Malay Muslims are especially high. Although initially neutral after the twin tower attacks in the US, under US pressure Thailand also started to participate in the War on Terror. Thai support for the War on Terror was generally low key. But later Bangkok stepped up counter-terrorism measures and cooperation with the US. ‘Thailand joined the War on Terror in stages, attempting to balance relations with the world’s only superpower with qualitative gains for Thailand.’122 There have been numerous explanations put forward as to why Thailand’s support for the US War on Terror was low key and why Bangkok’s support was so limited. There’s a possibility that Thailand did not want to gravitate towards the US too much in case this angered Beijing. There is a possibility that Thailand was trying to protect its country from an Islamist attack, given that much of the Islamist attacks have been a response to western foreign

206  Insurgency in South and South East Asia policy spearheaded by the US in the Muslim world. Needless to say, this would have a destructive impact on Thailand’s flourishing tourism industry. One other reason as to why Thailand’s participation in the US War on Terror was low key is because it did not want to anger separatist groups in the South any further. Whatever support Thaksin gave to the US War on Terror was very unpopular with both Thai and Malay Muslims, who all saw the War on Terror as a war on Islam. The post 9/11 context may very well have reinforced the belief amongst Southern Muslims that Bangkok was inherently anti-Muslim. One of the reasons why the insurgency flared up again in the post-2000 period is because of Thaksin’s radical reorganisation of the security apparatus and the administrative machinery. Thaksin abolished the SBPAC and CPM-43 in 2002. Thaksin’s party, Thai Rak Thai had performed badly in the 2001 elections in the South and Thaksin felt that this was because of the SBPAC, which he saw as aligned to his opposition. By abolishing these institutions, he could weaken his opponents influence in the South and then fill the vacuum in with loyalists. After abolishing the SBPAC, provincial governors elected by Thaksin (who were also answerable to Thaksin) took over the Southern provinces. By getting rid of the SBPAC, he got rid of a dispute resolution mechanism and this added to the sense of injustice amongst Southern Malay Muslims. Bangkok believed that a lot of the security concerns in the South were associated with criminal gangs and that the police were best placed to deal with these. This made Thaksin transfer power from the hands of the army to the police who had already developed a bad reputation amongst the locals, especially for corruption. Another likely cause of renewed violence in the Deep South was Thaksin’s War on Drugs in 2003. The campaign against the illegal use of drugs ultimately led to numerous deaths. Trafficking illegal narcotics had become a serious problem in the South and the police had been given extraordinary powers to deal with the situation. The police is already known for corruption often abused and misused their powers to settle old scores. The lack of accountability and the heavy-handed tactics of the police created a sense of alienation amongst the southerners and this only added fuel to the fire of separatism. South Thailand’s militant groups Throughout history, we have seen that insurgent groups have had a range of and different ambitions, visions aims and objectives. Some seek to establish an independent state by totally breaking away from the mother country or the country that they are currently a part of and feel oppressed by. Some want to establish a communist utopia. Some want to break away and seek a merger with a neighbouring country. Since 1945, practically all insurgent groups waging war in different parts of the world have been identified and they have had a clear set of demands. South Thailand is quite unique in

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 207 the sense that the identity of certain groups remains anonymous and this anonymity has served these groups well by creating an atmosphere of fear. It is unclear if these insurgent groups and their demands are linked to local grievances or whether they are a part of an international network like Al Qaeda. What these groups ultimately want is also very unclear. Analysts feel that they want to create an independent Islamic state. Others feel they want a union with Malaysia. Still, others feel that the insurgents want to see the restoration of the Pattani Kingdom. The Thai military intelligence associates the on-going violence to four groups: separatists, religious leaders, criminal gangs and political groups. There, of course, may be links and strong connections between them but this is also unclear. Despite the lack of clarity on this subject, there is a widespread belief that an umbrella organisation by the name of Barisan Revolusi Nasional Koordinasi is spearheading the movement. It is also referred to as the BRNC, which is believed to have broken away from the BRN in the 1980s and then went underground in the 1990s because the movement lost momentum. The leaders associated with the BRN-C are said to have infiltrated the Islamic schooling system and are teaching young students a mixture of Pattani nationalism and radical interpretations of Islam. Thus a new generation of separatists have now come into existence and have resumed the campaign of separatist violence. In 2007, Human Rights Watch carried out a series of interviews with individuals who claimed to be members of the BRN-C. It is believed that they have created a network of autonomous cells both in South Thailand but also in Northern Malaysia. The BRN-C has a youth wing called Permuda. The youth wing has been involved in death threats, and carrying out arson attacks. The military wing of the BRN-C is the Runda Kumpulan Kecil who have been involved in bombings and assassinations.123 Their aim has been to create an Islamic republic joining Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat. Other groups associated with violence include the Gerakan Mujahideen Islamic Pattani. There still exists a lack of clarity especially when it comes to the aims, structural organisation and leadership of these groups. Whilst the groups themselves remain unclear, there is a lot of clarity on their strategy. Their strategy has been threefold. Firstly, the insurgents tend to attack symbols of Thai authority. Secondly, they try to polarise Malay Muslims and Thai Buddhists and finally they have tried to gain the popular support of the civilian population. The insurgents have also tried tapping into and exploiting the sense of injustice and alienation that southerners feel and have also attacked shops, banks, telecommunication networks, hotel, restaurants and railways. Schools have especially been attacked and teachers have been murdered. This is because insurgents believe that Thai teachers in the South are brainwashing children and trying to make young children accept a more Thai identity. Muslims who have joined hands with Thai authorities have also been attacked. Whilst there has been some speculation about their connections with transnational Islamist groups like Al Qaeda and Jemmah Islamiyah, there is a general agreement that the insurgents are

208  Insurgency in South and South East Asia strongly linked with ethno nationalism and local groups. This is because there have been no calls for a global jihad and there’s also an absence of attacks on western targets and an absence of suicide bombings, which is what the global Islamist groups tend to do. There are elements of religion and ethnicity intertwined with the conflict. There is a sense of Malay vs Thai and Islam vs Buddhist intertwined with the different strands of the conflict. Jerryson writes, ‘as Buddhist spaces and monks become associated with the Thai military, they increase the religious divide between Buddhists and Muslims.’124 Thai authorities, of course, have from time to time mentioned that the Southern insurgents received their training in countries like Indonesia and tried making it clear that there actually were external connections with the insurgent groups in South Thailand. Evidence to support this has been very difficult to come by. However, one thing that can be said for certain is that if the insurgency continues for much longer, there are chances of external forces getting involved. Like all other insurgencies discussed in this book, the insurgency in South Thailand has also evolved and changed its nature. The nature of the insurgency has changed a lot and the way it exists today is very different from the way it used to operate in the fifties. For instance, previously the insurgents sought refuge in jungles and mountains but now the attacks are a lot more urban and open. Previously, the religious side of things was not very pronounced but now they are and Buddhists are increasingly being attacked. The insurgency is likely to be influenced by global trends and other Islamist movements. The scale of attacks has increased and the brutality has also intensified over the years. ‘A key feature of the current insurgency is its secrecy. This applies at all levels, from the anonymity of top leaders, through to military planners at regional and district levels, and to members of village-based networks.’125 State responses The state’s approach in dealing with the insurgency has varied. When dealing with an insurgency there are three things that the government should keep in mind. Firstly, whilst military action needs to be taken, the military approach should be kept to a minimum and should not take over. Local grievances are often rooted in political and poor socio-economic conditions. So, political transparency, introduction of democracy and pursuing growth and development should be considered as a long term plan. Secondly, it is important to note that insurgents will always be a minority. The state should therefore try to win the hearts and minds of the local people so that popular local support for the insurgents is cut off. Thirdly, it takes a while for the insurgency to be wiped out so state authorities would need to think long term as opposed to short term solutions. Thaksin Shinawatra’s approach between 2004 and 2006 was predominantly militaristic and this alienated the insurgents and the local population further. ‘Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 209 adopted a hard-line response, including use of martial law. The police, in particular, appeared to be complicit in the unexplained disappearances of numerous Malay Muslim suspects.’126 This approach is very unhelpful and increases the chances of the insurgency flourishing and gaining in recruits. The local population will also become more sympathetic to the cause of the insurgency if the centre follows a policy of repression. Thaksin blamed criminals for the on-going violence. There was a lack of understanding of the complexity of the situation. ‘Multiple forms of resistance to the Thai central government developed in the Southern border provinces, beyond armed opposition and bandit groups…Thai governance of the South exacerbated the unrest.’127 The measures taken were too top-down. He dispatched more troops to the South and declared martial law. The responsibility shifted from the police to the army. He put a lot of pressure on military personnel. The military and police were rotated frequently within very short periods of time especially when there was a failure. The heavy presence of security forces in the South paved the way for all kinds of human rights violations. This included abductions, torture, arbitrary arrests and unexplained disappearance of Malay Muslims. A lot of the atrocities took place between April and October of 2004. On the 28th of April, a hundred young males attacked police and army checkpoints. The security forces responded by going on a killing spree. The second serious incident happened on the 25th of October in Tak Bai, Narathiwat. There had been a demonstration outside the local police station and security forces not only killed six of the protestors, but the army detained hundreds and stacked them horizontally into trucks for transportation to Pattani. Many died and suffocated on the way. Needless to say, the above two incidents of 2004 caused outrage. Excessive force had been used by the authorities and no prosecutions had taken place. Thaksin refused to publicly apologize which made the already strained situation worse. Thaksin argued that the deaths that had taken place were due to weakness caused by continuous religious fasting. These incidents were often invoked in militant propaganda and it became all the more clear to the South that the Thai state was anti-Muslim and was doing its best to eradicate the Southern identity. These two incidents also went a long way in increasing the pool of recruits for the cause of the insurgency. After these two horrific incidents, the scale of assassinations, bombings and arson attacks increased. Thaksin now responded with an emergency decree in 2005. Through the decree, the responsibility of dealing with the situation shifted from the security forces to the prime minister’s office and this gave him unprecedented powers. Through the decree, the powers of the security forces expanded, which included detention without charge for thirty days, the ability to conduct searches, the ability to make arrests without warrants, and also provided government officials working in the South with immunity from prosecution. The decree was perceived by many as a license to kill. One of Malaysia’s prominent leader’s Mahathir Mohamed suggested autonomy as a solution and way forward, which was rejected.

210  Insurgency in South and South East Asia Although several talks took place in the aftermath of these two incidents, nothing positive came out of the talks and they were also divorced from the reality of the conflict. One of the very significant political initiatives during Thaksin’s period was the creation of the National Reconciliation Commission. The NRC composed of religious figures, academic scholars, political figures and retired army generals, thereby representing a wide cross-section of society. When the NRC issued its report in 2006, there was a lot of criticism directed at Thaksin’s administration. Past injustices needed to be looked into and corrected. To achieve national reconciliation it was suggested to introduce democracy and bring the southern population into the political mainstream, to start a dialogue with insurgents, to initiate educational programs in the South and also to introduce land reforms. The recommendations stopped short of political autonomy. Thaksin chose to ignore the suggestions that had been made by the NRC. Thaksin’s approach to the South fuelled the insurgency and his approach also had a damaging impact on Thailand’s relations with Malaysia. Although Malaysia, in the first half of 2004, had agreed to facilitate cross border economic relations between South Thailand and Northern Malaysia, bilateral relations between the two countries deteriorated because of the escalation of violence in the South. Thaksin prioritised on security and his militaristic approach instead of politics and economics which proved to be counterproductive. In 2006, the army led a bloodless coup and Thaksin finally lost his position. Whilst this was a setback for democracy in Thailand, there were expectations and hopes that the new regime would take a softer approach towards the South and this new approach would be effective in bringing about peace and security. The coup leader and chairman for the Council of National Security was General Sonthi Boonyaratglin who supported the NRC’s recommendations. He opposed the blacklisting of the insurgents and believed in entering a dialogue with them. Surayud became the interim prime minister and was very critical of the Thaksin administration. Both Sonthi and Surayud had extensive counter-insurgency experience which they could bring to the table of discussions. Surayud’s approach showed maturity and better understanding of the very complex situation in the South. His approach had multiple facets. First of all, he tried to look into the past injustices and deal with them. He tried to improve governance and re-establish the SBPAC. He tried to foster a conversation between Thai Buddhists and Malay Muslims. Surayud was also in favour of developing educational institutions in the South and played a key role in promoting economic growth and development. He also believed in enhancing intelligence gathering so that the effectiveness of military operations against insurgents could be improved. He also played a key role in fixing relations with neighbouring Malaysia. Despite Surayud’s good intentions, the South remained volatile and a hotbed of insurgency. There was a failure to bring about a political solution

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 211 to the conflict. In other words, there was still a tendency to rely on security forces to deal with the situation. The Surayud administration ruled out the possibility of autonomy or devolution for the South. They also rejected the idea of giving special administrative status to the South like the Hong Kong and Macao models. It was strongly believed by the political elite that all parts of the country were to be governed in the same way. The elite viewed autonomy as a stepping stone for secession and there was a fear in Bangkok that once they started making concessions, there would be further demands made by the South in future. The topic of sovereignty in Thailand is a very fragile and sensitive one given that it was only in the 19th century that Siam had to give up territory to imperial Britain and France. Surayud also became preoccupied with national-level politics like reforming the police services and reframing the constitution and this took him and his attention away from the South. Although Surayud did apologize for the atrocities committed during the Thaksin administration and although he was open to the idea of partial implementation of Sharia law, correcting past injustices between 2006 and 2007 and trust-building was minimal. Military generals were not charged with human rights abuses. No one got prosecuted. His regular renewal of the emergency decree complicated the situation further. Although Surayud had emphasized on reconciliation and re-established the SBPAC in 2006, its performance was sad. There have been staffing issues, finance issues, and Thai officials generally do not want to work in a war-torn zone. It was also very difficult for the SBPAC to regain the support and trust of the people given that the agency has always had strong links to security forces that are generally viewed with suspicion by people of the South for their past actions. Again although Surayud promised economic growth and development in the South, it was very hard to attract external investors. Because of the on-going violence not many wanted to invest in a war-torn region. Many Thai Buddhists also left the South to escape the violence. ‘Some Buddhists have quit the area (estimates range between 35,000 and 100,000), while others with nowhere to go-especially the more impoverished rural dwellersare feeling increasingly encircled. In certain areas, Southern Buddhists are arming and training themselves in preparation for what they fear might become a real battle for future survival.’128 Whilst the administration has tried to raise the educational standards of the South, these attempts have also been met with limited success. Numerous university scholarships have been provided by the centre to Malay Muslim students but there are persistent problems with both primary and secondary education and also issues with language instruction. The government fears the Islamic centres of learning as a hotbed of terrorism and therefore has spent much time on trying to reform the Islamic school system. The centre believes that these schools primarily focus on Pattani nationalism and radical interpretations of Islam. The centre’s efforts to bring the Islamic schools under closer supervision has angered separatist groups and fuelled

212  Insurgency in South and South East Asia separatist sentiment. Governments have also failed to provide schools with enough security. Schools have been burned down and teachers have been executed at the peak times of violence. The violence in the South has led to periodic school closures thereby causing great disruptions in a child’s education. The on-going violence has also forced teachers to apply for transfers to teach in other parts of Thailand. In contrast to the earlier Thaksin administration, Surayud’s administration at least tried to hold talks with separatist groups and insurgents. However, these efforts have failed in trying to get a dialogue going between the different sides involved in the conflict. Insurgents feel fearful of being identified by the state. Once identified, they could then be killed by state authorities. There has been an upsurge in violence post-2006. This could be linked with the legacy of the Thaksin era. Insurgents are probably trying to intimidate the majority population into not cooperating with the Thai authorities. The upsurge in violence after 2006 could also be seen as a rejection of Surayud’s offer of reconciliation. It maybe that they are also trying to provoke the security forces to crack down on them, so that they can then use the Thai state’s anti-Muslim stance as a part of their propaganda. Conclusion Political violence in South Thailand is rooted in the annexation of the Pattani Kingdom by Siam a century earlier. The modern Thai state’s attempts in trying to convert Malay Muslims into Thai Muslims over the years has proven to be hugely problematic. This conflict like the other case studies discussed earlier is primarily about nation-building and a total failure in the nation-building process. Issues of race and identity especially religious identity are very much at the centre of the problem. Acts of insensitivity and racism by Bangkok are worsened by poor governance and administrative failure. Poverty and corruption are other burning issues. Thaksin’s administration gave extraordinary powers to security forces which paved the way for all kinds of human rights abuses and deaths to take place. Whilst Surayud took a more mature approach to the situation in the South, he too failed in bringing about long-lasting peace, stability and security. The need of the hour is constructive dialogue. ‘Notions of autonomy for the region have long been considered off the table, since the Thai constitution specifies that the country is an indivisible unitary state.’129 Decentralization and offering political autonomy would go a long way in easing at least some of the tensions in the Deep South. Local sensitivities of the South need to be factored in whilst Bangkok makes decisions. There also needs to be more representation of minorities in senior positions so that they can bring about long-lasting change. They should be able to express themselves freely and openly, and not feel fearful of repercussions and consequences. State policies would need to be more inclusive. Unless this happens, the violence is likely to continue.

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 213

Aceh, Indonesia The Free Aceh movement or Gerakan Aceh Merdaka was a separatist group which tried to gain political independence for the Aceh region in Sumatra, Indonesia, in maritime Southeast Asia. The insurgency went on from the mid-seventies till 2005. There were several reasons that led to the outbreak of this conflict. The factors include historical mistreatment of the region by the centre, disagreements over Islamic law, discontent over the distribution of natural resources and the influx of Javanese people into Aceh. The country has always been dominated by Java and there has been resistance to this from the more peripheral parts of the country. Woodward writes ‘Indonesian politics has always been dominated by Javanese. Of the country’s six presidents five have been Javanese, as is the leadership of the (formerly) politically dominant armed forces.’130 During the period of foreign rule and Dutch colonisation in the 1800s, Aceh had been a centre of resistance against the Netherlands. They were one of the last groups in Indonesia to give in to the invasion. The Aceh War went on for three decades against the Netherlands from the late 1800s till the beginnings of the 1900s. ‘In 1903, Dutch colonial armies finally vanquished the sultanate of Aceh in Sumatra, ending a thirty year-long struggle, and proceeded to coerce hundreds of small kingdoms of the archipelago definitively into subject status.’131 Finally when the Dutch authorities left Indonesia, the responsibilities associated with administration and governance of Aceh was left to Jakarta, without proper consultation with the people of Aceh. Daud Bereueh started a rebellion that finally got Aceh special status by Indonesia’s founding father, Sukarno. This special status was quite similar to the special status offered to Kashmir in India shortly after India gained its independence in 1947. The special status gave Aceh control on religious affairs, customs and education. Encouraged by the discovery of large gas reserves, a former minister by the name of Hasan Tiro, started the insurgency in 1976. The central authorities, however, responded with repression when counter insurgency troops were sent to Aceh. Many of the leaders associated with the Free Aceh movement were either killed or forced to leave the country. ‘From January 1950, the Republic of Indonesia occupied the space of the Dutch colonial state, excepting its West New Guinea territory….Looking out from Jakarta, Sumatra had natural resources, militias that had operated independently of any coordinating authority, recognizing no superior power, and the history of killing as the means to eliminate designated classes. Aceh showed no signs of wanting to accept equal status with other regions under Jakarta’s rule.’132 Kingsbury writes, ‘Indonesia was initially constructed, in 1949, as a federal republic, potentially allowing considerable scope for self-determination on the part of constituent states. However, when Indonesia was unilaterally reconstituted as a unitary state in 1950, Aceh’s qusi-autonomous status was lost and in the following year, Aceh was subsumed into North Sumatra. Failing

214  Insurgency in South and South East Asia to resolve this loss of autonomy, in 1953, Aceh’s governor Teungku Daud Beureueh, declared Aceh’s independence from Indonesia, initially joining with the Darul Islam Indonesia rebellion, declaring the independence of the Federated State of Aceh, later joining with the Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia-Perjuangan Semesta rebellion as a means of securing this claim.’133 The Free Aceh Movement and the insurgency associated with it went through different phases. The first phase was in the seventies. The second phase was in the late eighties till the early nineties. The third phase carried on till 2005. During the first phase, the centralist policies associated with the Suharto regime along with a range of other grievances led Hasan de Tiro to lead the Free Aceh Movement and declare independence for Aceh. The main threats to Aceh included the stringent policies associated with the neo-colonial government and the increase in the number of Javanese migrants to Aceh which undermined local culture and identity. This is similar to a lot of the other case studies that we have already discussed. The unfair distribution of income from Aceh’s natural resources was another point of controversy. In the mid-eighties, de Tiro secured Libyan support for the movement taking advantage of Gaddafi’s policy of supporting nationalist rebellions against imperialism and fascism. The Suharto regime fell in 1998 and there was a power vacuum. Chaos in central Indonesia and the weak government gave the insurgency in distant Aceh an advantage. The situation worsened and under the leadership of Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001–2004) additional troops were sent to Aceh to crush the movement. 1999 was also the year that started the dialogue between the Indonesian government and the separatists. The process was started by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, a private diplomacy organisation that facilitated peace talks, between the two sides until 2003. During this phase we also see a temporary cessation of hostilities. In this connection, the COHA/ Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, 2002, deserves special mention. This, however, was short-lived. The COHA ended in 2003, when the Indonesian central government declared a military emergency in Aceh and decided that it wanted to eradicate separatist elements once and for all. This led to thousands of deaths after the government launched an offensive. The catastrophic impact of the 2004 Tsunami on Indonesia and on Aceh, in particular, brought international attention to the conflict. Although earlier peace talks had failed, an agreement under the leadership of President Sushilo Bambang Yudhoyono was signed in 2005 after almost thirty years of war. Suharto had ruled the country with an iron hand. ‘Suharto’s regime was military in nature, authoritarian and repressive.’134 However, post-Suharto Indonesia witnesses a liberal democratic reform period as well as changes in the Indonesian military, all of which helped in the creation of an environment conducive for peace talks.

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 215

Notes

1. W. Habibullah, My Kashmir: The Dying of the Light, Penguin Books: Gurgaon, 2014, p. 7. 2. A. Siddique, The Pashtuns: The Unresolved Key to the Future of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Random House India: Gurgaon, 2014, p. 37. 3. S. Gupta, The Himalayan Face-Off: Chinese Assertion and the Indian Riposte, Hachette India: Gurgaon, 2014, p. 1. 4. M. Ahmed, ‘Confidence building measures between Pakistan and India: an argument for change’, Contemporary South Asia, 7(2), 1998, p. 140. 5. S. Tharoor, Pax Indica: India and the World of the 21st Century, Penguin Books: Gurgaon, 2012, p. 31. 6. A. Rashid, Descent into Chaos: Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Threat to Global Security, Penguin Books: London, 2008, p. 109. 7. F.H. Khan, ‘Nuclear Command and Control in South Asia during peace, crisis and war’, Contemporary South Asia, 14(2), 2005, pp. 165–166. 8. H.V. Pant, India’s Afghan Muddle: A Lost Opportunity, HarperCollins Publishers India: Noida, 2014, p. 37. 9. C. Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience, Random House India: Guragon, 2015, p. 507. 10. S. Beg, ‘Pakistan’s Tribal Areas: A Battle for Jihad’, in R. Durward and L. Marsden, eds, Religion, Conflict and Military Intervemtion, Ashgate: Surrey, 2009, p. 150. 11. D. Byman, Al. Qaeda, The Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement: What Everyone Needs to Know, Oxford University Press: Oxford/NY, 2015, p. 125. 12. S. Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India Pakistan Tensions since 1947, Washington D.C: Columbia University Press: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001, p. 1–15. 13. A. Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country, Penguin Books: London, 2012, p. 186. 14. F. Grare, ‘India and Pakistan: Improbable War, Impossible Peace’, in C. Jaffrelot, ed, Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures, Random House India: Gurgaon, 2016, p. 336. 15. K. Adeney and A. Wyatt, Contemporary India, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke/NY, 2010, p. 31. 16. K. Mukherjee, ‘The Kashmir Conflict in South Asia: Voices from Srinagar’, Defence and Security Analysis, 30(1), pp. 44–54, 2014. 17. P. Singh, Kohima to Kashmir: On the Terrorist Trail, Rupa & Co: New Delhi, 2001, p. 174. 18. Y. Khan, The Great Partition: The Making of India and Pakistan, Penguin Books: New Delhi, 2007, p. 98. 19. S. Dutt, India in a Globalised World, Manchester University Press: Manchester, 2006, p. 94. 20. V. Sahni, ‘The Protean Polis and Strategic Surprises: Do changes within India affect South Asian strategic stability?’ Contemporary South Asia, 14(2), 2005, p. 221. 21. D.S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad, Cambridge University Press: New Delhi, 2013, p. 42. 22. C. Snedden, Kashmir: The Unwritten History, HarperCollins Publishers India: Noida, 2013, p. 8. 23. B. Metcalf and T. Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India,Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2012, p. 224. 24. V. Schofield, ‘Kashmir and its Regional Context, Self-Determination and Prospects for Peace’, in S. Gregory ed, Democratic Transition and Security in Pakistan, Routledge: London/NY, 2016, p. 140.

216  Insurgency in South and South East Asia 25. K. Mukherjee, ‘Indo Pak Relations and the Kashmir Problem: From 1947 to the Present Day’, Journal of Borderlands Studies, 31(4), 2016, p. 500. 26. V. Schofield, Afghan Frontier: At the Crossroads of Conflict, Tauris Parke Paperbacks: London, 2010, p. 246. 27. J. Singh, India at Risk: Mistakes, Misconceptions and Misadventures of Security Policy, Rainlight Rupa: New Delhi, 2013, p. 21. 28. R. Guha, Makers of Modern Asia, Cambridge, Belknap Press: Massachusetts, 2014, p. 129. 29. D. Hiro, Jihad on Two Fronts: South Asia’s Unfolding Drama, HarperCollins Publishers India: New Delhi, 2011, pp. 100–101. 30. C. Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, Hurst and Company: London, 2015, p. 196. 31. T.C. Schaffer and H.B. Schaffer, India at the Global High Table: The Quest for Regional Primacy and Strategic Autonomy, HarperCollins Publishers India: Noida, 2016, p. 22. 32. H. Abbas, The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the PakistanAfghanistan Frontier, Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 2014/15, p. 39. 33. R. Guha, India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy, Macmillan: London, 2007, p. 240. 34. I. Talbot, Pakistan: A New History, Husrt and Company: London, 2012, pp. 58–59. 35. A. Evans, ‘A departure from history: Kashmiri Pundits, 1990-2001’, Contemporary South Asia, 11(1), 2002, pp. 19–37. 36. M. Ahmed, ‘Confidence building measures between Pakistan and India: an argument for change’, Contemporary South Asia, 7(2), 1998, p. 140. 37. R. Rajagopalan, ‘Innovations in Counter Insurgency: the Indian Army’s Rashtriya Rifles’, Contemporary South Asia, 13(1), 2004, p. 26. 38. R.K. Nanavatty, Internal Armed Conflict in India: Forging a Joint Civil Military Approach, Pentagon Press: New Delhi, 2013, p. 97. 39. I. Malik, Pakistan: Democracy, Terror and the Building of a Nation, New Holland Publishers: London, 2010, p. 78. 40. J. Andrews, The World in Conflict: Understanding the World’s Trouble Spots, Profile Books Ltd: London, 2015, p. 238. 41. T.V. Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World, Random House India: Gurgaon, 2014, p. 48. 42. A. Behuria, ‘India Pakistan Relations and the Kashmir Issue, 1947-2009’, in S. Dutt and A. Bansal, eds, South Asian Security: 21st Century Discourses, Routledge: London/NY, 2012, p. 67. 43. A. Subramaniam, India’s Wars: A Military History, 1947–1971, HarperCollins Publishers India: Noida, 2016, p. 338. 44. N. Sengupta, Land of Two Rivers: A History of Bengal From the Mahabharata to Mujib, Penguin Books: New Delhi, 2011, p. 503. 45. W.V. Schendel, A History of Bangladesh, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2009, p. 161. 46. H. Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Penguin Viking: Guragon, India, 2016, p. 97. 47. A. Siddiqa, Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, Penguin Books India: Gurgaon, 2017, p. 91. 48. P.R. Chari, ‘Strategic Stability in South Asia: the role of confidence building and threat reduction measures’, Contemporary South Asia, 14(2), 2005, 211. 49. S.K. Mitra, ‘The reluctant hegemon: India’s self-perception and the South Asian strategic environment’, Contemporary South Asia, 12(3), 2003, pp. 402–403. 50. A.Z. Hilali, ‘The Costs and Benefits of the Afghan War for Pakistan’, Contemporary South Asia, 11(3), 2002, pp. 292–293.

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 217 51. G. Perokovich and T. Dalton, Not War, Not Peace? Motivating Pakistan to Prevent Cross-Border Terrorism, Oxford University Press: New Delhi, 2016, p. 16. 52. A. Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics, Oxford University Press: Oxford, NY, 2015, p. 57. 53. P. Lavoy, Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2009, p. 1. 54. A. Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam, HarperCollins Publishers: Noida, India, 2013, p. 63. 55. H.G. Kiessling, Faith, Unity and Discipline: The ISI of Pakistan, HarperCollins Publishers India, Noida, 2016, p. 2. 56. P. Musharraf, In the Line of Fire: A Memoir, Pocket Books: London, 2008, p. 87. 57. K. Bajpai, India in the World: Trials of the Republic, Times Group Books: New Delhi, 2017, p. 91. 58. Interview carried out by the author, 19th December 2012. 59. Interview carried out by the author, 19th December 2012. 60. Interview carried out by author, 19th December 2012. 61. Interview carried out by author, 20th December 2012. 62. Interview carried out by author, December 2012. 63. Interview carried out by author, December 2012. 64. Interview carried out by author, December 2012. 65. Participant Observation, December 2013. 66. Interview carried out by the author in Srinagar, Kashmir, India on the 18th December 2013. 67. Interview carried out by the author in Srinagar, Kashmir, India on the 18th December 2013. 68. Interviews carried out by the author in Srinagar, Kashmir, India on the 18th December 2013. 69. Interview carried out by the author, 18th December 2013. 70. Interview carried out by the author, 18th December 2013. 71. Interview carried out by the author, 18th December 2013. 72. Interview carried out by author, 18th December 2013. 73. Interview carried out by the author, 18th December 2013. 74. Interview carried out by author, Sonmarg, Indian Kashmir, 19th December 2013. 75. Interview carried out by author, Pehelgam, Indian Kashmir, 20th December 2013. 76. Interview carried out by author, Srinagar, Indian Kashmir, 20th December 2013. 77. Interview carried out by the author, Srinagar, Indian Kasmir, 20th December 2013. 78. Interview carried out by author, Srinagar, Indian Kashmir, 21st December 2013. 79. Interview carried out by the author in April 2014. 80. Our Special Correspondent, ‘Don’t Treat kin as Militants: CM’, The Telegraph: Kolkata, 15th December 2016, p. 5. 81. M. Raina, ‘Valley bullet kills student’, The Telegraph: Kolkata, 10th March 2017, p. 7. 82. M. Raina, ‘Encounter Protesters shot dead in Valley’, The Telegraph: Kolkata, 29th March 2017, p. 4. 83. I.A. Siddiqui, ‘Israeli Drones in Valley’, The Telegraph: Kolkata, 31st March 2017, p. 6. 84. Our Special Correspondent, ‘Provocation price: Omar’, The Telegraph: Kolkata, 2nd December 2016, p. 8. 85. Our Special Correspondent, ‘Raid on Officer home worries Valley police’, The Telegraph: Kolkata, 8th March 2017, p. 5. 86. M. Raina, ‘Burham successor for Islam supremacy’, The Telegraph: Kolkata, 17th March 2017, p. 6. 87. Our Special Correspondent, ‘Mehbooba offers a healing touch’, The Telegraph: Kolkata, 10th January 2017, p. 6.

218  Insurgency in South and South East Asia 88. M. Raina, ‘Blood and Stone Rip Veneer’, The Telegraph: Kolkata, 10th April. 2017, p. 1. 89. Our Special Correspondent, ‘Few Tears for father of 3 killed by Stones’, The Telegraph: Kolkata, 12th April 2017, p. 4. 90. M. Raina, ‘Vile tactic in Valley backfires’, The Telegraph: Kolkata, 15th April 2017, p. 1. 91. M. Raina, ‘Wait for Kashmir Jeep Torment Probe’, The Telegraph: Kolkata, 16th April 2017, p. 4. 92. M. Raina, ‘J&K Campus Chain Reaction’, The Telegraph: Kolkata, 18th April 2017, p. 1. 93. K. Mukherjee, ‘Comparing India’s Disputed Borderlands: Kashmir and the Northeast’, Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, 18(1), 2014, pp. 31–62. 94. M. Ahmed, ‘Confidence Building Measures between Pakistan and India: an argument for change’, Contemporary South Asia, 7(2), 1998, p. 141. 95. R.J.C. Thomas, Democracy, Security and Development in India, St. Martin’s Press: New York, 1996. 96. B. Puri, Kashmir: towards Insurgency, Orient Longman: New Delhi, 1993. 97. www.hrw.org/news/2010/09/17 (Accessed, 18.08.2012). 98. R.K. Nanavatty, Internal Armed Conflict in India: Forging a Joint CivilMilitary Approach, Pentagon Press: New Delhi, 2013, p. 12. 99. K. Bajpai, Roots of Terrorism, Penguin Books: New Delhi, 2002. 100. R.K. Nanavatty, Internal Armed Conflict in India, Pentagon Press: New Delhi, 2013, p. 38. 101. Ibid, pp. 46–47. 102. I. Talbot and G. Singh, eds, Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Subcontinent, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1999. 103. M. Ahmed, ‘Confidence Building Measures between Pakistan and India: an argument for change’, Contemporary South Asia, 7(2), 1998, p. 141. 104. M. Ahmed, ‘Confidence Building Measures between Pakistan and India: an argument for change’, Contemporary South Asia, 7(2), 1998, p. 140. 105. C. Snedden, Kashmir: The Unwritten History, HarperCollins: New Delhi, 2012, p. 222. 106. A. Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam, HarperCollins India: Noida, 2013, p. 295. 107. Participant Observation, Field trip to Kashmir, 2012 and 2013. 108. M. Shahabuddin, ‘The Myth of Colonial Protection of Indigenous People: The Case of Chittagong Hill Tracts under British Rule’, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 25(2), 2018, p. 211. 109. Ibid., pp. 210–235. 110. A. Mohsin, The Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh: On the Difficult Road to Peace, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder-Colorado/London, 2003, pp. 42–43. 111. W.V. Schendel, A History of Bangladesh, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2009, p. 211. 112. B. Chakma, ‘The Post-Colonial State and Minorities: Ethnocide in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh’, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 48(3), July, 2010, pp. 296–297. 113. P. Church, A Short History of South East Asia, Wiley: Singapore, 2017, p. 178. 114. E. Jung, ‘Islam and Politics in Contemporary South East Asia’, in A.D. Ba and M. Beeson, eds, Contemporary South East Asia, 3rd edition, Palgrave: London, 2018, p. 139. 115. D. McCargo, ‘Thailand’s National Reconciliation Commission: a Flawed Response to the Southern Conflict’, Global Change, Peace and Security, 22(1), 2010, p. 75.

Insurgency in South and South East Asia 219 116. I. Storey, Southern Discomfort: Separatist Conflict in the Kingdom of Thailand, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 35(1), 2008, p. 32. 117. A. M. Marshall, A Kingdom in Crisis: Thailand’s Struggle for Democracy in the Twenty First Century, Zed Books: London, 2014/2015, p. 50. 118. D. Kingsbury, ‘Post-colonial states, Ethnic minorities and Separatist Conflicts: Case Studies from Southeast and South Asia’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34(5), 2011, p. 770. 119. A. Cotterell, A History of South East Asia, Marshall Cavendish Editions: Singapore, 2014/15, p. 305. 120. I. Storey, ‘Southern Discomfort: Separatist Conflict in the Kingdom of Thailand’, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 35(1), 2008, p. 34. 121. D. McCargo, ‘Informal Citizens: Graduated Citizenship in Southern Thailand’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34(5), 2011, p. 835. 122. B. Zawacki, Thailand: Shifting Ground between the US and a Rising China, Zed Books: London, 2017, p. 134. 123. I. Storey, ‘Southern Discomfort: Separatist Conflict in the Kingdom of Thailand’, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 35(1), 2008, p. 38. 124. M. Jerryson, ‘Appropriating a Space for Violence: State Buddhism in Southern Thailand’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 40(1), 2009, p. 57. 125. M. Askew and S. Helbardt, ‘Becoming Pattani Warriors: Individuals and the Insurgent Collective in Southern Thailand’, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 35(11), 2012, p. 785. 126. D. McCargo, ‘Thaksin and the Resurgence of Violence in the Thai South: Network Monarchy Strikes back?’ Critical Asian Studies, 38(1), 2006, p. 40. 127. L.E. Cline, ‘Thailand and the Insurgency in the South’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, 18(2), 2007, p. 276. 128. D. McCargo, ‘The Politics of Buddhist Identity in Thailand’s Deep South: The Demise of Civil Religion?’ Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 40(1), 2009, p. 14. 129. D. McCargo, ‘Mapping National Identities’, RUSI Journal, 154(3), 2009, p. 59. 130. M. Woodward, ‘Indonesia’s Religious Political Parties: Democratic Consolidation and Security in Post-New Order Indonesia’, Asian Security, 4(1), 2008, p. 45. 131. J.R. Rush, ‘Sukarno: Anticipating and Asian Century’, in R. Guha ed, Makers of Modern Asia, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts/London, 2014, p. 173. 132. J.G. Taylor, Indonesia: Peoples and Histories, Yale University Press: New Haven/London, 2003, p. 340. 133. D. Kingsbury, ‘The Free Aceh Movement: Islam and Democratization’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 37(2), 2007, p. 170. 134. T. Hellwig and E. Tagliacozzo, edited, The Indonesian Reader: History, Culture Politics, Duke University Press: Durham and London, 2009, p. 366.

Conclusion and the way forward

The aim of this book was to give readers an overview of conflict zones in different parts of the Asia Pacific. The term ‘Asia Pacific’ has been defined differently by different scholars. It is a much-contested term and it means different things to different people. Some scholars use it exclusively for the Southeast Asian region and take quite a narrow approach, whereas other scholars take a broader approach. Those who take a broad approach consider Southeast Asia plus much of the Asiatic mainland as part of the Asia Pacific. In this book, I have taken the broad approach and we have focussed on secessionist movements in both South Asia and in East Asia. The conflict zones that we have looked at are mainly minority provinces in the peripheral parts of the country. For instance, Indian Kashmir is a predominantly Muslim province in a Hindu dominated India. Nagaland is a predominantly Christian part of a Hindu dominated India. Whilst these conflicts have been characterised by poverty, corruption, administrative failure, human rights abuses and external intervention, this book has paid close attention to the role played by race, religion and ethnicity. A common religion, race, culture has often brought these people together. Common political aspirations and economic grievances have also strengthened a sense of solidarity. These factors have not only brought these people together but have also created a different sense of nationhood and nationality that is distinct from the mother country. Many of these conflict zones are geographically located in the borderlands where minority groups form a cluster. This is one of the reasons why a separatist insurgency against the central government has been possible. I have argued in this book that it was my own experience in Britain as a visible minority and my own experience with racism in Britain that motivated me to do this research. Hence there is a detailed discussion on racism in Britain at the very early stages of this book. It was my own journey in Britain as an ethnic minority that allowed me to connect, empathize and sympathise with minority communities abroad. Throughout the book, we have tried analysing the different facets of the conflict. It is important to have a good understanding of the multiple facets of the conflict before one can come up with solutions. One of the reasons why these conflicts started in the first place and why most of them have been on-going in one way or another is because of the power differential between the centre and

Conclusion and the way forward 221 the periphery. Often we find the centre trying to exploit regional peripheral resources for the needs of the people living in the heartland. Borderland people in Asia are also often treated as the ‘other’ and are subjected to acts of racism by ethnic majority people when they visit the mainland. Minorities will face discrimination in both education and employment. Then of course there are the physical attacks and racial slurs. These acts of racial violence create a distance between them and the mother country, thereby strengthening an identity that is different from that of the mainstream. Minority groups may also face religious discrimination. Political high handedness and lack of transparency have also gone a long way in fuelling the conflict. There are no straight forward answers to these on-going problems. Depending on the nature of the conflict, there are different pathways to peace, security and stability. Internal conflicts can often be very difficult to manage and the whole peacebuilding process can be a long drawn arduous protracted one. It is also important to note that most of these conflicts have been going on for decades and their character has changed with the passage of time. We need to keep this in mind whilst formulating policies. Whilst there may be no easy answers to these very complex situations, a good starting point would be demilitarisation. The presence of excessive security personnel in some of these provinces has paved the way for all kinds of human rights violations. Security personnel are known to take the law into their own hands and civil rights violations have now become almost an everyday occurrence in places like Indian Kashmir, the Indian Northeast, Chinese Xinjiang, Tibet, the Burmese borderlands and South Thailand. Demilitarization will help to reduce the tension to some extent giving the local people some breathing space and allowing them the opportunity to think in normal, political and human ways. There needs to be more accountability. Whilst stationing the army in the borderlands is essential in case of an external attack there needs to be more checks and balances on the military. Often security personnel come from the mainland and are not familiar with local cultural practices. They should be educated about local customs and practices before being stationed in the borderlands. One challenging task would be to identify all the parties involved in the conflict. These conflicts have been going on for years and new splinter groups may have come into existence thereby complicating the situation further. Bringing all the disputants to the table for talks can indeed be a difficult task. We understand that not all disputants can be brought to the negotiating table but at least if we can bring the most identified groups that would be a good start. An external figure who does not belong to any of the parties involved could act as a mediator. Once this has been done, we can then go to the next stage and hear the different perspectives of the different sides and necessary steps can be taken to deal with the grievances. Harsh economic, political and social realities led to the conflict so sound policies formulated accordingly can also bring about long-lasting peace and stability. Acts of racism, once identified, should be punished so that it does not happen again. It is generally a lack of awareness and ignorance that causes acts of racism. Racial violence can be nuanced and often ranges from

222  Conclusion and the way forward microaggression and acts of other-ing to physical attacks and verbal abuse. The national media needs to stop pandering to people’s prejudices and needs to start projecting more balanced images of these conflict zones. The image that most ethnic majority people have of minorities is overwhelmingly negative and this to a large extent (both in the West and in the East) is because of the media. Negative stories and images sell newspapers and thus news agencies have a profit motive. The media can play a constructive role in bringing about peace just by giving a more balanced image of these war-torn regions. Issues of poverty, corruption, poor governance and administrative failure need to be looked into carefully. There needs to be political transparency and democratic reform. Another area that needs looking into is unemployment and infrastructure development after consulting the local people. Development means different things to different people so this would need to be factored in. The way the centre defines development may not be in keeping with the way the periphery defines it. Since it is their land, local people should be incorporated into the decision-making process. Their views and interests need to be given priority. Governments should realise that repressive policies against minorities are futile and threatened identities do not disappear-they only get stronger and hence state policies would need to be more inclusive. Hopefully, after all these factors have been taken into consideration something positive will begin to emerge. Finally, there needs to be more representation of minorities at the senior level in politics and administration. Minorities want to feel that they belong to the national narrative. They want to be seen and want their voices to be heard. When governments in Asia fail to be inclusive and represent minorities, sections within minority groups tend to switch off and turn to alternative ideologies and separatist tendencies. Minorities will retreat to other fringe narratives because they feel excluded by the mainstream. They need to be represented in films and popular culture. Depictions of minorities in the media need to change. The old order in Asia has been in flames for a while now and a new and more inclusive national narrative needs to be created. The old order stopped making sense and does not factor in the complex realities that minorities have to deal with. Centrifugal forces are tearing these countries apart so governments would need to step up their game. Governments would need to train against unconscious bias and need to start tying public money for proper representation targets. The question is: as these countries move forward, will they take everyone on board or will they leave minorities behind? If they leave minorities behind, there is every chance of losing some to extremism. The new national story needs to empower as many people as possible factoring in minority interests, rather than excluding and alienating people who are different. Countries in Asia will need to have a more expansive idea of who they are as a nation. Minorities want to feel valued, be a part of the national narrative and want to know that they matter. The national imagination of all these Asiatic governments would need to stretch and be elastic and include people residing in the distant peripheries.

Index

AASU see All Assam Students Union (AASU) Abbas, Tahir 10 Abdimit 111–112 Abdullah, Sheikh 177 Aceh, Indonesia 213–214 AFPFL see Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) AFSPA see Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) Ahmed, A.: ‘Built in Barriers: The Role of Race in Shaping BME Student Experiences at Lancaster University’ 12 Ahmed, Mutahir 192 Ahom 40 Al Baghal, T.: ‘Islam and Muslims on UK University Campuses: Perceptions and Challenges’ 12 ALD see Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) All Assam Students Union (AASU) 46, 47, 55, 61 Allen, Charles 17 All Tripura People’s Liberation Organisation 48 Al Qaeda 107, 117, 207 Al Rabita 201 Amban, Lhasa 73 American Baptist missionaries 33 Anglo Burmese Wars 40, 141–142 Anglo-Maratha relations 141 Anglo-Sikh wars 141 Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) 144, 145 Arakanese identity 134 Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) 162, 163

Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army 160 Arambam, Romen 36 Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) 38, 45, 49–50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 62, 64, 177, 191, 194 ASEAN 166 Asia Foundation 146 Asian Tsunami 8 Assam 4, 153; Assam Movement (1979–1986) 61; current situation of 52–53; ethnic nationalism in 60–61; historical background of 46–48 Ata Ullah 160 Aung San 136, 144, 145, 148 Aung San Suu Kyi 137 Baglary, Tultul 48 Bajpai, Kanti 191 Banderban 8 Banerji, Surendranath 20 Bangalore 35 Bangladesh: Chittagong Hill Tracts see Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT); Islamisation in 8; militarization in 8; slavery in 28 Bangladesh National Party (BNP) 201 Baranovitch, N. 115–116 Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani 204 Barisan Revolusi Nasional 204 Barisan Revolusi Nasional Koordinasi (BRN-C) 207 Baruah, Sanjib 47 Beg, Yaqub 111 Beijing 77, 85, 91, 93, 94, 99 Bengal British Boundary Commission 197 Bengali identity 135 Bengal Presidency 18

224  Index Bereueh, Daud 213 Bergdorf, Munroe 11 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 4, 141 Bharucha, D.: ‘Built in Barriers: The Role of Race in Shaping BME Student Experiences at Lancaster University’ 12 Bhatia, R. 139, 140, 166 Bhattacharya, Rajeev: ‘Small Arms Proliferation in the North-East: The Chinese Connection’ 39 BJP see Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) blackness 21 BLM protests 13 BNP see Bangladesh National Party (BNP) Bodo tribes 46, 47 Bokar monastery 95, 96 Bombay Presidency 18 Bomcha, Pukhrihongbami 46 Border Security Force 55 Border Security Force (BSF) 177, 183, 184 Bose, S. 19–20 Bovingdon, Gardner 122 Bristol 23 Britain see UK British Armed Forces Special Ordinance of 1942 49 British East India Company 18, 19, 40, 141, 196 British media 14, 16, 17, 21 Brito y Nicote, Philip de 157 BRN-C see Barisan Revolusi Nasional Koordinasi (BRN-C) Bronson, Miles 33 brown paper bag test 12–13 Bruce, Robert 40 BSF see Border Security Force (BSF) BSPP see Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) Buddha Park, Ravongla 82 Buddhism 8, 58; Mahayana 94; Theravada 136, 153; Tibetan 5, 71–73, 76, 77, 81, 82, 84, 95–97, 109 Burma Campaign UK 151 Burmese borderlands 6–7 Burmese Citizenship Law of 1982 161 Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) 6, 162 Burmese Union/Union of Burma 144, 145 Campbell, Naomi 16 Cao, Y. 93 Cape Coast Castle, Ghana 25

Carson, Arthur 157 Carson, Laura 157 CCP see Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Asia 27 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) 55, 177, 181 Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 214 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement 2002 (COHA) 214 Chakma, Bhumitra 159, 201 Chakma ethnic group 8 Chakmas 58 Chandra, Maharaj Bodha 53 Chiang Kai Shek/Chiang Kaishek 74, 114 Chin 156–160 China: Reform and Open-up Policy 109; Religious Affairs Bureau 108; State Council 108 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 74, 77, 80, 84, 85, 90, 93, 95, 99, 106–107, 112, 118, 119, 122 Chin Famine Emergency Relief Committee 160 Chin Hills Regulation 156 Chin Human Rights Organisation 159 Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) 194–202; Bangladesh and 198–200; ethnicity in 200–201; historical background of 196–197; Pakistan and 197–198; peace process in 201–202; race in 200–201; religion in 200–201 Chodron, Thubten: Buddhism: One Teacher, Many Traditions 97 Choling, Padma 95 Christianity 19, 32, 33, 34, 135, 141; Chin 157, 158; Kachin 153–155; Mizoram 56, 57; Nagaland 37 Christian Science Monitor 117 CHT see Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Civilian Military Police Unit 43 (CPM-43) 204, 206 Clark, E.W. 33 COHA see Cessation of Hostilities Agreement 2002 (COHA) colonialism 12, 17–27, 117, 130, 140, 149, 164; and slavery, similarities between 24 Colston, Edward 23 Columbia University Press 122 Common Islamic Market 192 Control Arms Foundation of India 45 Coronation Street 16

Index 225 COVID-19 crisis 13–14 CPS see Cultural Promotion Societies (CPS) critical race theory 2, 9–17 CRPF see Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) Cultural Promotion Societies (CPS) 111 Daimary, Rajan 48 Dalai Lama 5, 73–76, 80, 81, 86, 90, 91, 93; and School for Young Lamas 83 Dali monastery 97 Darjeeling 5, 32 Darul Islam Indonesia rebellion 214 Davis, Elisabeth Van Wie 113 decolonisation: curriculum 21–22 Deng Xiaoping 79–81, 83–86, 104; liberal policies 117; and Reform and Open-up Policy 109 Devi, Inugbam Sanatombi 46 Dharamsala 96 Directive Principles of State Policy 61 Document 7, 113 Document 19, 106–107, 108 Drepung monastery 86, 91 Durpin monastery 96 Dyer, Genera 20 East Asia 27 East-Enders 16 Eastern Turkestan People’s Revolutionary Party 112 East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) 6, 107, 121, 124 economic oppression 93 Eddo-Lodge, R. 11–13, 21; ‘Why I am No Longer Talking to White People About Race’ 12 Emin group 111–112 Erdogan, Recep Tayyip 115 Erfeng, Zhao 73 Ershun, Zhao 73 ethnicity 2, 10; in Chittagong Hill Tracts 200–201; in Myanmar 139–141 ethnic majority–minority relations, in Myanmar 147–148 ethnic minority experience 9–17 ethnic nationalism: in Kashmor conflict 189–190; in Xinjiang 122–123 ethnic nationalism, in Indian Northeast 60–61 ethnocide 195, 198–199 ETIM see East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

exploitation 4, 17, 18, 34, 46, 47, 61, 63, 64, 79, 89, 93, 114, 116, 124, 132, 151, 165, 182, 192; economic 18; of human cargo 23; of regional peripheral resources 117, 195, 221 Facebook 48, 182 Falun Gong movement 104 Fenby, Jonathan 79 Ferguson, Niall 17 First World War 20 Floyd, George 13, 15–16 Ford Foundation 146 ‘Four Cuts’ policy 152 ‘Four Principles’ 150 Free Aceh Movement 213, 214 Free Burma Rangers 151 Fulbright Foundation 146 Gampo, Songtsen 98 Gandhi, Indira 46 Gandhi, Rajiv 46 Gandhi, Sonia 37 Ganguly, Sumit 173 Garg, Zubeen 48, 61 Garuda 137 Geelani, Syed Ali 190 General Post Office (GPO) 18 genocide 195 Gerakan Mujahideen Islamic Pattani 207 Gere, Richard 90 Gethin, Rupert 137 Gopal, Priyamvada 13, 22, 26; Insurgent Empire: Anti-Colonial Resistance and British Dissent 26 Gordon, Stewart 141 Goswami, N. 63 GPO see General Post Office (GPO) Grare, Frederic 47 Greater East Asia Co Prosperity Sphere 148 Great Kuki Invasion of 1860 156 Great Leap Backward 79 Great Leap Forward 78, 79, 109 Grunfeld, T. 82 Guohua, Zhang 77 Gyatso, Tenzin 78; Buddhism: One Teacher, Many Traditions 97 Hajj, Yusup Khass 111 Haksar, N. 44 Han migration 6, 87–90, 93, 116–117, 124, 200

226  Index Haokip, T. 38 Hari Singh, Maharaja 175, 176 Harkat ul Jihadi Islami 173 Harris, Clare 98 Hasan Tiro 213 Hasina, Sheikh 48 Heath, Edward 81 Higham, Charles 138 Higher Education Statistics Agency 16 Hill Tracts Manual 196 Hirsch, Afua 13, 27 Honghzhi, Li 104 Huang Di 89, 114 Hu Jintao 94 human rights situation: in Indian Northeast 61–62; in Kashmir 190–191; in Xinjiang 123 Human Rights Watch 207 humiliation 113–114 Hung, Ho-fung 73–74 Hydari, Akbar 43 Ibrahim, Azeem 161 IMU see Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) India: Article 370 of the Constitution 176–177; British colonialism 18–22; Public Safety Act 182; railways 18; slavery in 27; Tibetan settlements in 81–83; tuition fees in 12; universities in 18 Indian media 61, 175, 182, 184, 185 Indian National Congress 188 Indian Northeast: current situation of 50–60; ethnic nationalism in 60–61; external connections of 62–63; geographical location of 31–32; historical background of 38–50; Armed Forces Special Powers Act 49–50; Assam 46–48; Manipur 44–46; Nagaland 41–44; Tripura 48–49; human rights situation in 61–62; insurgency in 4–5, 31–64; race and 34–38; religion, role of 32–34 Indonesia: Aceh movement in 7, 8; insurgency in 8 industrial revolution 25, 26 ‘Insider-Outsider Report: The Role of Race in Shaping the Experiences of BAME Students’ (Akel) 12 Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) 191 intra-racism 12 ISI see Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

Islam, and China’s extreme Northwest 110–117 Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) 107, 124 Jacoby, S. 109 Jaish e Mohammed 173 Jakarta 8 Jalal, A. 19–20 Jalianwala Bagh massacre (1919) 20 James, Lawrence 17 Jamiat-i- Ulama-i-Hind 136 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 192 Jemmah Islamiyah 207 Jerryson, M. 208 Jigme Puntsog, Khenpo 92 Jilangamba, Yengkhom 35 Jinnah, Mohammed Ali 172, 175 Kachin 41, 62, 131, 135, 143, 145, 146, 149, 151–156, 158 Kachin Baptist Convention 155 Kachin Independence Army (KIA) 47, 63, 152, 153 Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) 62, 152–153, 155, 156 Kadeer, Rabiya 115, 123 kala 132, 133 Kalimpong 5 Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) 46 Karen Human Rights Group 151 Karen National Union (KNU) 63, 140, 148–151 Karens 129, 135, 143, 145, 148–152, 165 Kashmir 7–8, 170–194, 220; conflict: ethnic nationalism in 189–190; transnational connections and 191–192; current situation in 180–189; first war 175–178; geographical location of 170; historical background of 170–175; human rights situation in 190–191; Kargil War 179–180; second war 178; third war 178–180 KCP see Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) Kerr, G. 74 Khagrachari 8 Khan, Ayub 178 Khan, Yahya 179 Khaplang, S.S. 43 Khatami, Mohammed 107 Khin Maung Myint 158

Index 227 Khin Nyunt 140, 152 KIA see Kachin Independence Army (KIA) KIO see Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) KKK 10 KNU see Karen National Union (KNU) Kolkata/Calcutta/West Bengal 35; current situation of 50–51; High Court 18; Medical College 19; New Market 19; racism 36; religion 32–33; Town Hall 19 Konchok, Lorang 95 Kuki National Front 55 Kuki National Organisation 55 Kundun (film) 90 Kuo, Huei-ying 73–74 land grabbing 17, 20 Larma, Manabendra Narayan 198 Lashkar e Toiba 173 Lava monastery 97 Leeds University 12 Lee, Y.: ‘Islam and Muslims on UK University Campuses: Perceptions and Challenges’ 12 Lequan, Wang 115 Lhasa Secondary School 80 Lintner, Bertil 33 Liverpool University 12 Locke, John 26 London Missionary Society 157 Longkumer, L. 41 MaBaTha 162, 163 Macaulay, Thomas B. 19 Macdonald, A.P. 164 Mackerras, Colin 121 Madras Presidency 18 Mahathir Mohamed 209 Mahayana Buddhism 94 Mahendra, King 76 Majlis-i-Ahrar-i-Islam 136 Malik, I. 136 Manchester University 12 Manipur 4; current situation of 51–57; ethnic nationalsim in 60; historical background of 44–46 Manipur Women’s Gun Survivors Network 45 Maoism 91, 109 Mao Zedong 74, 78–81, 84, 104, 108, 112 Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 1937 74

marginalization 9, 12 Marxism 105 May, Timothy 72 Mazumdar, Arijit 82 McLeod, Hew 141 media 125, 222; British 14, 16, 17, 21; Chinese 120, 121; Indian 61, 175, 182, 184, 185; international 117, 129, 161; national 222; social 48 Megawati Sukarnoputri 214 Meghalaya 4, 32, 53, 58 Mehbooba Mufti 188, 189 Meira Pabi movement 45 Meitei, Poirei 46 micro-aggressions 10, 11, 15, 98, 222 Miller, Tom 81 Ministry of Home Affairs 50 mixed race Trans model 11 Mizo National Front 56 Mizoram 4; current situation in 59–60 Modi, Narendra 141 Moe, David Thang 140 Mohsin, Amena 199 Mundas 41 Musa, Zakir 189 Musharraf, Pervez 180 Myanmar 129–166; Chin 156–160; colonial years 141–143; ethnicity in 139–141; ethnic majority–minority relations in 147–148; geographical location of 130–131; Kachin 151–156; Karens 148–151; Ministry of Religious Affairs 155; National League for Democracy 162; Panglong agreement (1947) 143–147; race in Burmese history and society, role of 131–135; religion in 135–139; Rohingyas 160–164; xenophobic tendencies during years of military rule 1962–2011 146–147 Naga Club 60 Nagaland 4, 220; current situation of 51, 59; historical background of 41–44; religion 33–34 Naga National Council (NNC) 43, 60 Naga People’s Front 42 Naga Students Federation 43 Nanavatty, Rostum K. 191 Narathiwat 8 National Conference Party 177 National Democratic Alliance 57 National Democratic Front of Bodoland 47

228  Index National League for Democracy (NLD) 150, 162, 163, 165 National Liberation Front of Tripura 49 National People’s Congress 115 National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) 210 National Security Act of 1980 62 National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) 42, 43, 56–58, 60 Native Americans 26 nat worship 138 Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal 42, 76, 82, 176 Nepram, Bina Lakshmi 37, 45 Nevis island 24 New Delhi 4, 15, 33, 35, 63, 64, 81, 141, 177, 179, 181–183 Ne Win 130, 136, 139–140, 146, 148, 164 Ngapo 77, 84 969 Movement 163 Nixon, Richard 81 NLD see National League for Democracy (NLD) NNC see Naga National Council (NNC) Norbu, Namkhai 83 North Western Frontier Provinces (NWFP, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) 172 NRC see National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) NSCN see National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) NWFP see North Western Frontier Provinces (NWFP, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) OBC see other backward classes (OBC) Olaudah Equiano 25 Olusoga, David 13, 23 Operation Clear Out 47 Opium War (1839–1842) 114 oppression 4, 17, 45, 55, 62, 78, 79, 119, 125, 148, 149, 171, 173, 187, 204; economic 93; political 93, 117, 124 Oraons 41 other backward classes (OBC) 44 otherness/other-ing 2, 10, 35, 98, 222 Padoh Mahn Sha La Phan 151 Pakistan 19, 36; and Chittagong Hill Tracts 197–198; Pakistan Army 191; slavery in 28; tuotion fees in 12 Panchen Lama 77, 84, 86–87

Panglong agreement (1947) 143–146 Pant, Harsh 171 Pan Zagar 163, 166 Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) 198, 199, 203 Patel, Vallabh Bhai 53 Patgiri, R. 61 Pattani United Liberation Organisation 204 PCJSS see Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) Pegu Club 132 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 60, 75, 76, 81; Military Control Committee 77 Pero Jones Bridge 23 Phizo, A.Z. 42 Pinney, John 24 PLA see People’s Liberation Army (PLA) political oppression 93, 117, 124 Popham, P. 144 Po, Sir San C. 149 Prem Tinsulanonda 204 Presidency College 18 Presidency University 19 Qashqari, Mahmud 111 Qing dynasty (1644–1911) 72–73, 110, 111 race/racism 2; in Burmese history and society, role of 131–135; in Chittagong Hill Tracts 200–201; in Indian Northeast 34–38; intra-racism 12; structural 11–12; systemic in-built 13; in UK 10–11, 15–29; in US 13, 15–16 racial arrogance 20, 22, 28, 33 racial discrimination 4, 20, 37, 51, 64, 117, 122, 124, 161, 187 Radcliffe, Cyril 197 Rahman, Sheikh Mujibar 179, 198, 200 Rahman, U. 164 railways: India 18; Myanmar 142; Tibet 88 Rajkhowa, Arabinda 48 Rangamati 8 RANIR see Relief Action Network for Internally Displaced People and Refugees (RANIR) Ranjit, Khoirom 46 Ranka monastery 96 Rao, Anupama: ‘Caste Question, The’ 9

Index 229 Rashid, Ahmed 171 Rashtriya Rifles 177 Relief Action Network for Internally Displaced People and Refugees (RANIR) 156 religion 2; in Chittagong Hill Tracts 200–201; in Indian Northeast 32–34; in Myanmar 135–139; in Xinjiang 104–117 representation of minorities 16, 105–106, 116–117, 147, 165–166, 179, 212, 222 Revolutionary Council 146 Revolutionary People’s Front 60 Richard, Loitam 34, 35 Rogers, B. 159 Rohingyas 6, 7, 129, 132, 134, 145, 147, 160–166, 198 Ross, Nancy Wilson 76 Rowlatt Act 56 Royal African Company 23, 24 Royal Bhutanese Army 47 rude behavior versus racial violence 11 Samte, Lobsang 84 San Aung 159 Sangermano 157 Santhals 41 Saw Ba U Gyi 150 Saw Sankey 150 Saw Than Din 150 SBPAC see Southern Border Provinces Administrative/Administration Centre (SBPAC) Schaik, S.V. 76, 80, 83, 88, 91–92 Schendel, Willem Van 200 School for Young Lamas 83 Scottish Church College of Kolkata 19, 55 Second World War 143, 146, 150 Self-Immolations 93–95 Serampore College 19 Seventeen Point Agreement 74–75 Shanti Bahini 198–199 Sharif, Nawaz 192 Sharmila, Irom 45, 56 Sheehan, Jackie 117 Shichor, Y. 107–108 Shikai, Yuan 74 Shillong Accord 43 Singh, Chandrika 42 Singh, Irabot 44 Singh, Manmohan 35, 37 Singh, Prakash 46

Sino-Indian relations 81–83 Six Point Agreement 43 slave markets 25 slavery 17, 19, 22–29; and colonialism, similarities between 24 slave trade 23–25 SLORC see State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) Small, Andrew: ‘China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics, The’ 124 social media 48; see also Facebook; media Sonthi Boonyaratglin 210 Southeast Asia: mainland 8; maritime 8 Southern Border Provinces Administrative/Administration Centre (SBPAC) 204–206, 210, 211 South Thailand: contemporary situation in 205–206; historical background of 202–205; militant groups 206–208; state responses to 208–212 SPDC see State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) 6, 140, 141, 164 State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) 6, 146, 155, 158, 164 Steinberg, David 140 Stevenson, H.N.C. 144 St. Paul’s cathedral 19 structural racism 11–12 sub-Saharan Africa: slavery trade 23 Suharto regime 214 Sun Yat Sen 114 Surayud 210–212 Sushilo Bambang Yudhoyono 214 Suzuki, Keiji 148 Swu, Isak Chishi 43 Sydney Loo Nee 150 systemic in-built racism 13 Taliban-isation of a British education 26 Taniam, Nido 34, 37 Tapey 94 TAR see Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) Tashilhunpo monastery 87 Telegraph, The 36, 42, 46, 64 Terrone, A. 109 Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act of 1987 62 TGIE see Tibetan Government in Exile (TGIE)

230  Index Thaksin Shinawatra 208–210, 212 Than Shwe 137, 155 Thant Myint-U 2, 130, 131, 134, 135 Tharoor, Shashi 13, 17, 20 Thein Sein 137, 140 Theravada Buddhism 136, 153 Thondup, Gyalo 84 Tibet 8; Chinese invasion of 5; conflict in 70–99; contemporary situation: recent events 91–92; recent field trip to Tibetan settlements in India (2019) 95–98; Self-Immolations 93–95; 2008 uprising 92–93; geographical location of 71–72; historical background of: Cultural Revolution 78–81, 109; Deng years 83–86; early years 72–74; government in exile 75–76; Han migration 87–90; issue over the eleventh Panchen Lama 86–87; settlements in India 81–83; Seventeen Point Agreement 74–75; Sino-Indian relations 81–83; wider support for Tibetan cause 90; Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region 77; uprising of 1959 76 Tibetan Aid Development Fund 84 Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) 8, 71, 77, 85, 87–90, 92, 94, 95, 98, 102, 104 Tibetan Buddhism 5, 71–73, 76, 77, 81, 82, 84, 95–97, 109 Tibetan Government in Exile (TGIE) 92, 93 Tibetan Nationality Institute 80 Tibetan Red Guards 80 Tibetan Youth Congress 85 Tohti, Ilham 123 Topgyal, Tsering 94 Tripura 4; historical background of 48–49; Tripura National Volunteers Force 49; Tripura Volunteers Force 48 Tsering, Lorang 95 UK: colonialism 12, 17–27, 117, 130, 140, 149, 164; COVID-19 crisis 13–14; ethnic minority in 9; industrial revolution 25; intra-racism in 12; mixed race Trans model 11; pacification campaigns 142; racial violence in 16; racism in 10–11, 15–29; slavery 17, 19, 22–29; structural racism in 11–12 ULFA see United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)

unconscious bias 10, 11, 222 UNHCR see United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) unintentional bias 11, 98 Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) 162, 163 United Liberation Front 55 United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) 47, 48, 59–61 United National Liberation Front (UNLF) 44, 60 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 163 United People’s Organisation of the CHT 198 United States (US): brown paper bag test 12–13; racial violence in 16; racism in 13, 15–16; slavery in 26 United Wa State Army 63 University of Calcutta 55 UNLF see United National Liberation Front (UNLF) UNPO see Unrepresented Nations People’s Organisation (UNPO) Unrepresented Nations People’s Organisation (UNPO) 43 UN Security Council 82, 171, 176 U-Nu 7, 130, 136, 139, 145, 152, 161 US see United States (US) USDP see Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) ‘Us vs Them’ approach 12, 123 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari 57 Vasco da Gama 157 Victoria Memorial 19 violence: inter-communal 162; overt acts of 98; racial versus rude behavior 11 Wangyal, Phuntsok 93 Wani, Burhan 189 War on Drugs 206 War on Terror 123, 205 Weiqi, Ma 73 West Bengal 5 West coast of Africa/Gold Coast/Slave Coast: slavery trade 23–25 Wilberforce, William 25 Women’s League of Chinland 158 World Uyghur Congress 115, 123 Writers building 19

Index 231 Xibu Da Kaifa 88 Xinjiang 5–6, 8, 102–125; current situation in 119–121; ethnic nationalism in 122–123; external connections of 123–124; geographical location of 102–103; historical background of 103; human rights situation in 123; religion, role of: Document 19, 106–107, 108; Islam and China’s extreme Northwest 110–117; religious identity and China 104–108; state policies and religious groups 108–109; state crackdown on Mosques and religious activity 117–119 Xinjiang University 119 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 115 Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) 117

Xu, J. 93 XUAR see Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) Yala 8 Yaobang, Hu 84–86 Yaohua, Liu 115 Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) 72 Yunnan province 153 Yuzana Company 155 Zaw Seng 152 Zeng, Jinghan 80 Zhi, Li 115 Zhou Enlai 76–77 Zia, Khaleda 48 Zipporah Sein 150 Zoya Phan 151