Race and Ethnicity in America 9780520961975

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Race and Ethnicity in America

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Race and Ethnicity in America John Iceland

university of california press

University of California Press, one of the most distinguished university presses in the United States, enriches lives around the world by advancing scholarship in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences. Its activities are supported by the UC Press Foundation and by philanthropic contributions from individuals and institutions. For more information, visit www.ucpress.edu. University of California Press Oakland, California © 2017 by The Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Iceland, John, author. Title: Race and ethnicity in America / John Iceland. Other titles: Sociology in the 21st century (University of California Press); 2. Description: Oakland, California : University of California Press, [2017] | Series: Sociology in the 21st century ; 2 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: lccn 2016041577| isbn 9780520286900 (cloth : alk. paper) | isbn 9780520286924 (pbk. : alk. paper) | isbn 9780520961975 (ebook) Subjects: lcsh: Ethnicity—United States. | Equality—United States. | Minorities—United States—Social conditions. Classification: lcc e184.a1 i124 2017 | ddc 305.800973—dc23 lc record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016041577 Manufactured in the United States of America 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To my family

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Contents

List of Illustrations and Tables

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

1.

Conversations about Race

1

2.

Race and Ethnicity and Causes of Inequality

9

3.

Black-White Inequality

30

4.

Hispanics and Asians

61

5.

American Indians

92

6.

The Multiracial Population

109

7.

International Comparisons and Policy Debates

125

8.

Conclusion: American Color Lines

149

Notes

157

References

169

Index

195

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Illustrations and Tables

figures 1.

Racial and ethnic composition, using mutually exclusive groups

15

2.

Racial and ethnic composition, where people can choose more than one group

16

Percentage of people who have completed high school, by race and ethnicity

34

Percentage of people who have completed college, by race and ethnicity

35

5.

Percentage of blacks and whites in occupations, by gender

36

6.

Poverty rates, by race and ethnicity

37

7.

Racial and ethnic residential segregation

39

8.

Mean isolation, by group

40

9.

Percentage that is poor where whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians live

41

10.

Life expectancy at birth, by race and Hispanic origin

42

11.

Median household income, by race and ethnicity

44

3. 4.

ix

x

illustrations and tables

12.

Median net worth, by race and ethnicity

45

13.

Cumulative risk of imprisonment, by race and ethnicity

54

14.

Percentage of births to unmarried women, by race and Hispanic origin

57

15.

American Indian population in the United States

97

16.

American Indian socioeconomic status compared with other groups

102

17.

Percentage of marriages that are interracial or interethnic

112

18.

Percentage distribution of the two or more races population

117

19.

Socioeconomic status of the multiracial population compared with other groups

122

Percentage of the population that is foreign-born in selected OECD countries

133

20.

tables 1.

Hispanic population by origin

68

2.

Asian population by origin

74

3.

Characteristics of Hispanics by national origin

76

4.

Characteristics of Asians by national origin

79

5.

Characteristics of Hispanics and Asians by nativity

86

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank a number of people who provided critical help for this book, often in the form of insightful reviews of draft chapters: Richard Alba, Jenifer Bratter, Carolyn Liebler, Kris Marsh, and Arthur Sakamoto. I would like to extend a special thanks to Naomi Schneider, executive editor at the University of California Press, who has provided, yet again, invaluable advice, direction, and support for this project. Most of all, I would like to thank my wife, Jean, for her continuous love, support, and insight, and my children, Jakob and Mia. I would like to thank my parents, Harry and Joan, who provide wise counsel on all matters. Finally, I would like to thank all of my other family members, including Charles, Debbie, Matthew, Josh, Matt, John, Edna, and Athena.

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1

Conversations about Race

Discussing racial issues can be difficult. It is often more challenging than talking about many other sociological topics—such as changes in the occupational distribution of American workers or regional migration patterns—because race can be very personal. For many Americans, race is an important part of their identity. It affects how they view themselves, their aspirations, and their communities. This is reflected in, for example, personal ads (“single white female seeks . . . ”) and, institutionally, in the design of the decennial census questionnaire, which asks people about just a few basic characteristics, including age, gender, race, and ethnicity, and where and whom they live with. Also signifying the sensitivity of the topic, racial epithets have become among the most taboo terms to speak in public forums, as their use often results in immediate censure. Race is important today because racial conflict has been an integral part of U.S. history. It was present during colonial times, in the form of the violent seizure of land from American Indians by white settlers and in the forcible importation of slaves from Africa. Waves of immigration from a variety of countries provided fresh opportunities for animosity and conflict, as new immigrants—such as the Irish and Italians—were often viewed with alarm and disdain, and certainly as racially inferior to U.S. 1

2

conversations about race

natives of northern and western European stock. Nevertheless, over time all these groups have made critical contributions to the growth and vitality of the country’s economy and culture. Even periods of apparent tranquility often veil simmering problems and resentments. These often flared in race riots, of which there have been many, including riots by Protestant nativists again Irish Catholic immigrants in New York City, Philadelphia, and Boston in the mid-nineteenth century, riots by whites against blacks in East Saint Louis, Atlanta, and Tulsa in the early twentieth century, riots by blacks across many cities in the Northeast and Midwest during the civil rights era in the 1960s, and, more recently, riots by blacks in Baltimore following the death of Freddie Gray in police custody in 2015. Some might point to the years immediately after the election of Barack Obama in 2008 as a high point in terms of optimism about race relations. Indeed, one poll conducted in 2011 indicated that only 28 percent of the population reported that racism was a “big problem” in society, down from 41 percent in 1995. But a similar poll just a few years later, in 2015, indicated a sharp increase in saying it was a big problem, to 49 percent. African Americans were more likely to say that racism was a big problem in all years, but even among African Americans there was a drop in the percentage saying so between 1995 and 2011 from 68 percent to 50 percent, before a substantial increase to 66 percent in 2015.1 What happened? Did racism get much worse from 2011 to 2015? Is racial inequality worse today than just a few years ago, not to mention more than two decades ago? Rather than signifying a sharp increase in racism in the course of a few years, the change in public opinion in the early 2010s was likely an outgrowth of a series of widely covered incidents that exposed and symbolized simmering and unresolved issues reflecting deep-rooted racial inequality. In a country that was supposed to be on its way to being postracial, they indicated that there was much ground yet to be covered in reaching this goal. Among the incidents between 2011 and 2015 was the shooting death of Trayvon Martin, a seventeen-year old African American, in 2012 by George Zimmerman, and Zimmerman’s subsequent acquittal. Zimmerman had invoked Florida’s “Stand Your Ground” law in his defense (this law authorizes a person to protect and defend his or her own life against threat or perceived threat). Then there were a series of African

conversations about race

3

American fatalities at the hands of the police (often white officers) in 2014 and 2015 that received considerable attention, including Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri; Eric Garner in New York City; Tamir Rice in Cleveland; Freddie Gray in Baltimore; and Walter Scott in North Charleston, South Carolina. Many of the incidents were caught on camera and disseminated through both conventional and social media. These deaths spurred protests in numerous cities against police brutality, the overpolicing of black communities, and the poor treatment of blacks in the criminal justice system. These coalesced into the national Black Lives Matter movement, which protested racism, discrimination, and racial inequality in the United States. Yet the public’s opinion on these issues remains divided. People have strong opinions about race and the source of inequalities, because, as noted earlier, race is personal. Thus, conversations about race can quickly devolve into aggressive or defensive discussions about culpability concerning the current state of affairs. Incidents that make the news are filtered through one’s beliefs, values, and experiences and take on broad symbolic meaning. In some sense, then, it may not altogether matter if a particular incident was sparked by racial animus or not; rather, it often represents a set of broader grievances. For many, the deaths of African Americans at the hands of law enforcement represents the devaluation of black lives, and especially young black men, by the police—and by all Americans. That some of these men were involved in criminal activity before their confrontations with police (for example, Michael Brown stole cigarillos from a liquor store and Eric Garner was selling untaxed cigarettes on the street) symbolize to others black criminality, the disproportionate violence in black communities, and the lack of appreciation of the challenges police officers routinely face in enforcing policies not necessarily of their own making. The comment boards that accompany online news accounts of these incidents exemplify the discordance in conversations about race. For example, comments posted in response to an opinion piece about racism and police brutality by New York Times columnist Charles Blow spoke past one another. Here are but a couple of such comments (and note that these are relatively civil and articulate ones, in contrast to the often nonsensical and hateful ones easily accessed on various online forums and social media):

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conversations about race

Mr. Blow is telling us to please, please think systemically about racial bias and injustice. It is possible to have racism without racists. In both NYCity and Ferguson black and brown men are routinely stopped under the guise of good police practice. The stop and frisk practices in NY were found to be racially biased in the round of protests around racial profiling in the late 1990s, but were continued and defended by multiple NYC administrations. If police are instructed to treat black and brown men as criminals until proven innocent, than [sic] this is what you get.

In contrast, we have another: A movement for social justice organized around the championing of street criminals is doomed. And it should be doomed. Michael Brown was a drugaddled bully who, high on marijuana, committed a robbery, assaulted a store clerk half his size, and shortly thereafter grabbed for a cop’s gun while punching him twice in the face. Eric Garner was only marginally a criminal and one of the things so disturbing about his death is not his race but the pathos of someone dying for committing the most trivial of crimes. But he was also a 400 pound man who suffered from morbid obesity, chronic asthma, and a weak heart and who, consequently, should have known better than to have initiated a physical confrontation with several strong, young cops whose duty was to arrest him (which he did by resisting arrest).2

These conversations about race are typically not that productive, as people are not really listening to one another. Their arguments, more generally speaking, also are often not based on empirical evidence and instead rely on anecdotes. The goal of this book is to address this issue by providing such an empirical overview of patterns and trends in racial and ethnic inequality, as well as their causes and consequences. In doing so, I offer a social scientific basis for much-needed conversations about race. Having this kind of basic information is critical to reduce the extent to which people talk past one another with their own alleged facts accompanying their own opinions. Then people can be honest about their interests and values and recognize that these also play a key role in informing their policy preferences. In short, we need to cut through the clutter of empirical falsehoods to have real substantive discussions about racial inequality in the United States and what to do about it. Moving to the specifics of what this book covers, I begin with a discussion of the meaning of race and ethnicity in the United States. Here I

conversations about race

5

emphasize that people’s views of race have also evolved over time, as some groups that were once outsiders (such as the Irish) eventually became insiders (white ethnics). In other words, race is a social construction, and how groups are defined varies over time and place. This is followed by a discussion of the theoretical approaches commonly used to understand patterns of inequality, including human and social capital theories, perspectives that highlight the role of culture, assimilation theory, and theories that emphasize the role of racism and discrimination. The main empirical chapters in the book review patterns and trends in inequality over the past sixty years for different groups and focus on education, income, poverty, wealth, residential attainment, and health. I offer a thorough discussion of the findings in light of these theoretical debates. For example, do human capital differences explain black-white inequality, or are other factors more important? Are we seeing patterns consistent with assimilation among Hispanics and Asians? The data for these chapters come from various sources, with the most prominent being the Current Population Survey, the decennial census, and the American Community Survey. I often draw on previous studies that used these data and also illustrate the main themes with in-depth stories gathered from ethnographic work and topical news stories. My overarching conclusion is that color lines have generally softened over time, as there has been some narrowing of differences across many indicators for many groups over the past sixty years. The legal edifice supporting racial and ethnic inequality was dismantled during the civil rights era. Public opinion likewise evolved, with many fewer Americans articulating prejudiced beliefs than in the past; tolerance of others is greatest among younger generations too. Consequently, there are many more minorities in positions of power and influence in the United States, and some groups, most notably Asians, have reached socioeconomic parity with whites. Nevertheless, some deep-seated inequalities remain, with blacks, American Indians, and some Hispanics doing less well than others in the United States according to a number of indicators. Despite some progress over many decades, illustrated by the substantial growth of the black middle class, African Americans are still more likely to be poor, unemployed, and incarcerated and suffer from worse health than whites. The legacy of historical inequities and residential segregation plays a role,

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conversations about race

as African American families are more likely to be poor and thus have to contend with overcoming obstacles associated with poverty, such as living in neighborhoods with inferior schools and having fewer resources to invest in the advancement of their children than wealthier families. There is also evidence that contemporary discrimination, while less virulent and obvious than in the past, still hampers African American mobility, be it in the search for employment in the labor market or housing in better neighborhoods. Discriminatory practices by social institutions have played a role in reinforcing racial inequalities, such as in the form of predatory lenders targeting poor and minority home seekers or law enforcement profiling young African American men. Educational attainment among African Americans has increased significantly but still lags behind that of whites and Asians, and this contributes to observed differences in other outcomes. High rates of single parenthood contribute to relatively high black poverty levels and the transmission of disadvantage to children, as does social disorganization in some low-income neighborhoods. Finally, growing income inequality more generally has provided a headwind in efforts to reduce racial and ethnic inequality. So while there has been a continuous growth of African Americans in managerial and professional occupations, for low-income African Americans—and all low-income Americans—there has been very little, if any, increase in their standards of living, especially in recent decades. This growth in relative deprivation has likely also contributed to the widespread political and social disaffection in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. The story for Hispanics and Asians is complicated by the fact that many are immigrants or the children of immigrants, meaning that we have to take into account how the process of adaptation and assimilation (or possible lack thereof ) affects their patterns of socioeconomic achievement and health over time and across generations. On the whole, evidence suggests that Asians, while certainly not immune from hostility from others, are nevertheless faring well in higher education and the economy. This is strongly suggestive of successful incorporation. Hispanics are achieving a measure of upward socioeconomic mobility, though not parity, with whites. Whether this upward mobility among Hispanics eventually translates into equality remains to be seen, and it is likely that darker-skinned

conversations about race

7

Hispanics may face many of the same discriminatory obstacles that blacks do. It is important to note that considering Asians and Hispanics as a whole obscures the diversity of experiences among constituent ethnic groups (e.g., Chinese, Filipinos, Asian Indians, Mexicans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans), so I discuss these within-group differences in the following chapters as well. Research tends to indicate that American Indians on average fare relatively poorly across a number of outcomes, such as educational achievement and income. American Indians have been, and continue to be, marginalized in a number of ways, such as spatially and economically, that contribute to their disadvantaged position. A challenge when examining American Indian outcomes is that, because of the group’s relatively small population, less data are available about them in nationally representative surveys than for most other groups. Moreover, it is difficult to gauge the change in outcomes over time among American Indians because of changing patterns of self-identification among people with some American Indian ancestry. There is considerable interest in the growing multiracial population in the United States. I examine patterns of self-identification among people with mixed-ethnic origins and whether the socioeconomic and health outcomes among multiracial groups resemble one ethnic origin more than the other, or if they fall somewhere in between. Finally, racial and ethnic inequality is not just a U.S. phenomenon; this is a problem confronting ethnically diverse countries around the globe. I compare the United States mainly to multiracial peer countries, such as rich countries that are part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, though I also discuss other countries where racial divisions have long been present, such as in Latin America. I note the similarities in patterns of diversity and inequality shared by many countries, but also the important differences across them rooted in the variation in historical contexts in which racial and ethnic diversity emerged. Policies designed to deal with diversity and inequality likewise vary across countries, and I discuss the different political response to immigration and racial and ethnic inequality, such as affirmative action. A running theme in the book is that how we define racial and ethnic groups, along with changing patterns of identification in the U.S. population, affects our understanding of racial and ethnic inequality. First, these

8

conversations about race

definitions impact the simple counts of different groups. For example, there is a significant difference in the number of American Indians in the United States if we consider those who identify solely as American Indian versus those who identify partly as American Indian and partly as some other group as well. Among all groups, there are also some individuals with an ancestor who would have identified as a member of a particular group, such as Hispanic, but they themselves no longer currently consider themselves as part of that group, perhaps due to intermarriage and an intergenerational drift away from that community over time. Second, these changes in identification can affect the calculation of levels of inequality. For example, people who have a Hispanic grandparent but who don’t themselves identify as Hispanic are on average of higher socioeconomic status than those who do identify as Hispanic. This omission serves to understate the socioeconomic mobility of Hispanics across generations. I discuss the issue of identification and its implications in more detail throughout the book. The next chapter discusses the meaning of race and ethnicity and the main theoretical perspectives used to explain contemporary patterns and trends in racial inequality. The following four chapters then provide an examination of the socioeconomic and related outcomes for blacks and whites, Hispanics and Asians, American Indians, and the multiracial population in turn. Each chapter provides a brief historical overview of the experiences of different groups and includes analyses on the extent to which observed patterns of inequality are consistent with the different theoretical perspectives. I then have a chapter with international comparisons and a discussion of contemporary policy debates. The final chapter of the book includes a brief summary and some concluding thoughts.

2

Race and Ethnicity and Causes of Inequality

It shouldn’t be surprising to hear that people have different views on the causes of racial and ethnic inequality in the United States. A good source of information about these views is the General Social Survey, which, beginning in 1977, asked respondents about their views of four possible causes of white-black socioeconomic inequality in particular: discrimination, less inborn learning ability among blacks, lack of educational opportunity, and insufficient motivation and willpower. The most common response in 2012 was lack of willpower (50 percent), followed by lack of educational opportunity (42 percent), discrimination (35 percent), and, finally, inborn ability (10 percent). Thus, according to the survey, individuals’ behaviors are mainly to blame (i.e., lack of willpower), though respondents still often recognized the multifaceted nature of inequality and the role of structural factors such as educational opportunities and discrimination. The proportion of people attributing racial differences to biology (one in ten) is fairly small, though not wholly insignificant, and has declined since 1977, when over one in four felt it was important.1 Knowing something about people’s beliefs of the root causes of racial inequality is not just academic. These beliefs are tied to people’s view of what should be done about inequality. For example, people who believe 9

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race and ethnicity and causes of inequality

that discrimination is important are more likely to support race-based policies, such as affirmative action, to reduce inequality, while those who believe that individual will is most important are less likely to support such policies.2 Other work also has shown that people’s views about race are strongly associated with their support for welfare programs in particular. For example, researcher Martin Gilens has shown that the desire to cut spending for food stamps is associated with the old stereotype that blacks lack a strong work ethic.3 This chapter explores various theories on the root causes of racial and ethnic inequality in more detail, including human capital and social capital theories; cultural theories that emphasize differences in norms, values, and behaviors across groups; assimilation theory, which is most important for immigrant groups; and theories that emphasize the role of racism and discrimination by both individuals and social institutions. Some of the theories are complementary or have overlapping elements. For example, theories that highlight the importance of culture often acknowledge that racism in broader society has helped shaped cultural responses (such as oppositional behaviors) among individuals. Likewise, differences in human capital can be affected by racism and discrimination that generate unequal educational opportunities across groups. More generally, these theories will help provide a context for understanding the patterns and trends in inequality discussed in subsequent chapters. As we shall see, some theories are better at explaining inequality than others, and the explanatory power of theories varies across the groups being considered. But even before we discuss these theories, it is important to take a step back and explore the meaning of the terms race and ethnicity to come to a better understanding of the groups we are comparing.

w h at i s ra c e an d e t h n i c i t y ? When Tiger Woods burst onto the golfing scene, winning his first major championship, the Masters, at the age of twenty-one in 1997, he not only bested the competition but obliterated it with a record-breaking twelvestroke victory. He generated considerable excitement and interest not only because of his youth and talent but also because he was one of the very few

race and ethnicity and causes of inequality

11

nonwhite players in a very white sport. The final round of the broadcast of that win set a television ratings record for golf; the second highest ratings for the Masters occurred in 2001, when Tiger won the tournament for a second time.4 Because of the ambiguity of his background, different groups sought to claim Tiger as one of their own.5 As writer Ben Arogundade noted, On Wednesday April 23rd, 1997, following his groundbreaking victory in the US Masters, sports celebrity Tiger Woods incurred the wrath of many African American traditionalists when he appeared on The Oprah Winfrey Show. During the broadcast, Winfrey asked the then 21-year-old golfer whether it bothered him to be called “African American.” Woods replied, “It does. . . . I’m just who I am, whoever you see in front of you.” . . . The golfing champion went on to state that as a child he’d invented the term, “Cablinasian” to describe his parents multi-ethnicity and nationality—a mix of half Asian (Chinese and Thai), one-quarter African American, one-eighth Native American and one-eighth Dutch. He’d adopted the term as a way of honouring his mother Kultida (of Thai, Chinese and Dutch ancestry) as well as respecting all aspects of his cultural and racial heritage. Woods disclosure riled many within the African American community because they saw him as the first black winner of the US Masters—a sports star who was one of their own, whose success in breaking down golf ’s racial barriers was a source of racial pride for them. Woods, by declaring himself “unblack,” had stripped all that away.6

The underlying reason why Woods might be identified as black in the first place, given his very mixed heritage, is the traditional “one-drop rule” in the United States. This rule refers to the legal (for a time) designation of people with any black ancestry—that is, a person with even a single drop of black blood—as black. This rule was socially internalized by whites and blacks alike over time. The rule was historically used as a tool of subjugation. If a society was going to keep blacks and whites “separate but equal” as declared by the infamous Jim Crow laws in the segregated South and antimiscegenation laws (which barred interracial marriages) that at one point existed in thirty-eight states across the country, then rules were needed to determine who would fall on each side of the stark line dividing privilege from oppression.7 In the long wake of the civil rights movement, coupled with the tremendous increase in immigration, growing diversity, and rising rates of racial

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intermarriage, the traditional black-white binary no longer seems to make as much sense in the United States today, especially among younger cohorts of Americans. The more varied hues and features that come with diversity have increased the ambiguity of many people’s public (if not private) identity. In addition, those with mixed backgrounds often seek to acknowledge the different sides of their heritage. These pressures contributed to the change in the way the government asked about racial identity in the 2000 decennial census. Beginning in that year, respondents were instructed to choose as many of the races listed as they wished. While only 2.4 percent of respondents chose more than one race then, that number continues to grow (slowly), as 3.0 reported two or more races in 2012.8 These figures, however, don’t include people who might identify as one of the race categories on the census form and Hispanic, since Hispanic origin is considered an ethnicity and not a race, according to these definitions. Does this sound complicated? You wouldn’t be alone in thinking so. The meaning of race and ethnicity has become rather muddled. Thus, I start with some formal definitions. Race has traditionally referred to groups that are biologically distinguishable by physical, mental, and genetic traits.9 Indeed, this notion remains widely held among the public.10 But most social scientists today do not believe that racial differences have a deep biological or genetic origin; rather, most differences (such as skin pigmentation) are superficial and can’t come close to explaining broad social inequalities. Instead, most accept the notion that race is in large part socially constructed. As the historian Matthew Jacobson asks, “Why is it that in the United States a white woman can have black children but a black woman cannot have white children? Doesn’t this bespeak a degree of arbitrariness in this business of affixing racial labels?”11 The social construction of race is also evidenced by the fact that meaningful social distinctions between racial groups vary across time and place. As Jacobson further notes, “The American eye sees a certain person as black for instance, who Haitian or Brazilian eyes might see as white. Similarly, an earlier generation of Americans saw Celtic, Hebrew, AngloSaxon, or Mediterranean physiognomies where today we see only subtly varying shades of a mostly undifferentiated whiteness.”12 As the Irish immigrant population swelled in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, for example, there was a strong, negative reaction among many

race and ethnicity and causes of inequality

13

nativists to the mostly low-skilled Catholic immigrants, and this was often cast in both religious and racial terms. Jacobson continues, “Negative assessments of Irishism or Celtism as a fixed set of inherited traits thus became linked at mid-century to a fixed set of observable physical characteristics, such as skin and hair color, facial type, and physique. The Irishman was ‘low-browed,’ ‘brutish,’ and even ‘simian’ in popular discourse.”13 Likewise, immigrant groups to the United States from southern and eastern Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were initially viewed not only as religiously different but also as distinct races.14 These views on race were legitimized by scientists who developed theories of eugenics and the role of genes in explaining social and economic differences across broad population groups.15 The sociologist Mary Waters writes, “At the peak of immigration from southern and central Europe there was widespread discrimination and hostility against the newcomers by established Americans. Italians, Poles, Greeks, and Jews were called derogatory names, attacked by nativist mobs, and derided in the press. Intermarriage across ethnic and religious lines was very uncommon. . . . The immigrants and their children were residentially segregated, occupationally specialized, and generally poor.”16 Assimilation occurred only gradually through the twentieth century as immigration slowed, the country’s attention turned to two world wars and a depression, and social and economic changes after World War II that facilitated the upward mobility of the descendants of these immigrants.17 While these immigrant groups were considered racially (and sometimes religiously) distinct, that does not mean that all immigrant groups were treated equally—or rather equally poorly—by the native population. Blacks in particular were often regarded with the most hostility and thus were relegated to the bottom of the racial pecking order. In fact, the groups that we consider white ethnics today attained the “privilege of whiteness” (of being part of the mainstream in-group) by, over time, successfully working hard to distinguish themselves from nonwhites and from African Americans in particular.18 For these reasons, social scientists today see race as representing social relations in a particular place and time.19 Racial distinctions are real and meaningful to the extent that people are treated differently and experience different kinds of life experiences and outcomes, as exemplified by the historical record in the United States.

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race and ethnicity and causes of inequality

As to the distinction between race and ethnicity, ethnicity refers to a group of people who are differentiated by culture rather than by perceived physical or genetic differences central to notions of race. Nevertheless, the terms race and ethnicity are often used interchangeably in public conversations today, especially given the growing diversity of the U.S. population, increasing intermarriage, and the changing meaning and importance of group differences. There is also some ambiguity about whether some groups, such as Hispanics or Middle Easterners, are distinct races or ethnicities, and this debate is far from settled.20 Returning once again to the issue of official statistics on race and ethnicity, as noted earlier, the U.S. Census Bureau has collected data on race and ethnicity in a variety of ways over the years, in large part reflecting changing popular notions of social distinctions. It currently collects such information with two questions. The first question asks, “Is [this person] of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin?” There is an option to answer “no” and additional “yes” options for people to indicate if they are Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban, in particular. There is also a write-in option, where respondents can identify other origins. The next question on the form asks, “What is [this person’s] race?” There are answer options for white; black or African American; American Indian or Alaska Native; and a number of options for various Asian groups (such as Chinese, Filipino, and Asian Indian) and native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islander groups. People can also choose “some other race,” as well as two or more races. When releasing data on race and ethnicity, the Census Bureau typically uses five race categories (white, black, American Indian and Alaska Native, Asian, and Native Hawaiian and other Pacific Islander), and one ethnicity (Hispanic origin). A number of respondents are confused by these questions, and wonder why Hispanic origin is asked separately.21 Some advocate using a single combined question that asks more simply about ethnic origins, with the view that “race” has little or no objective basis.22 Given the ambiguity in the use of these concepts, even among social scientists, I often use the terms race and ethnicity together or interchangeably. Figures 1 and 2 provide information on trends in the racial and ethnic composition of the United States from 1970 projected until the year 2050 in two different ways. In figure 1, I use mutually exclusive and exhaustive

15

race and ethnicity and causes of inequality 90

White (not Hispanic)

83

African American (not Hispanic)

80

Hispanic Asian (not Hispanic)

70

American Indian (not Hispanic)

62

Two or more races (not Hispanic)

Percent

60 50

47

40 28

30 20

17

10

13

12

11

8

5

5 1

0

1

0

4

2

1

0 1970

2013

2050

Figure 1. Racial and ethnic composition of the United States, using mutually exclusive groups, 1970–2050. Sources: Data for 1970 from Gibson and Jung 2002; data for 2013 from U.S. Census Bureau 2013a; projections for 2050 from U.S. Census Bureau 2012. Note: Percentages may not sum to one hundred in each year due to rounding.

racial and ethnic group categories, where each person is essentially assigned one and only one category, and all group percentages therefore sum to 100 percent. Figure 1 represents the way racial and ethnic data are most often shown in research publications and even in the newspaper, especially for whites. Here, a person is “white” if they marked white and no other race on the census questionnaire. They also responded that they were not Hispanic. The same applies for other racial groups, as described earlier. A person is considered Hispanic if they answered affirmatively to the Hispanic question, regardless of how they answered the subsequent race question. According to this classification system, non-Hispanic whites were 83 percent of the population in 1970, declining sharply to 62 percent in 2013, and this is projected to fall to 47 percent by the year 2050. (Due to the rounding of decimals, the sum of the percentages in 2013 and 2050 in figure 1 appear to equal 99 and 101, respectively, rather

16

race and ethnicity and causes of inequality

100 90

White

88

African American Hispanic

80

76

76

Asian American Indian

70

Two or more races Percent

60 50 40 28

30 20 10

17

14 17

11

10 6

5 1

0

2

0

3

3

5

0 1970

2013

2050

Figure 2. Racial and ethnic composition of the United States, where people can choose more than one group, 1970–2050. Sources: Data for 1970 from Gibson and Jung 2002; data for 2013 from U.S. Census Bureau 2013a; projections for 2050 from U.S. Census Bureau 2012. Note: Percentages sum to more than one hundred in each year.

than 100.) The proportion of the population that is black is increasing slightly, while the proportion that is Hispanic is rising rapidly, as is the Asian population. The population reporting two or more races is also growing, although it remains fairly small. Figure 2 displays a trend with some similarities but a couple of striking differences. In this figure a person is counted as part of a group if they marked that group in the census form, regardless if they also marked another group as well. Here, a person can fall into more than one category: if they marked white and black, then they show up in both the white and black columns. Thus, the percentages can be interpreted as follows: in 1970, 88 percent of the U.S. population indicated that they were at least part white; this figure fell moderately to 76 percent in 2013, and is projected to stay at about 76 percent through 2050. The small decline in the

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proportion reporting white in this figure, compared to the large decline in figure 1, is explained by the fact that a large proportion of Hispanics also report being white on the census form. Projections also rely on assumption about how people will identify in the future—especially people of mixed origin—and how the Census Bureau collects information on race and ethnicity.23 If the past is any guide, it is probably wrong to assume that there will be no changes in how government surveys collect information on race and ethnicity in the coming decades. Historically, changes occurred with some frequency. The first census in 1790 essentially just collected information on whites and blacks. In the nineteenth century, inspired by the eugenics movement that was popular at the time, there was some experimentation with differentiating among blacks with categories such as “black” and “mulatto” (the latter referring to a black and white mix), and in 1890 even “quadroon” and “octoroon” (categories for one-fourth black and one-eighth black, respectively). The category for American Indian first appeared in the 1860 census, which was also the first year in which there was a category for Chinese. Mexican was an option in 1930, though it disappeared until the Hispanic origin question was introduced in 1970.24 People were first able to choose more than one race beginning in the 2000 census. Even today research continues on whether we should further revise the race and ethnicity question, such as combining them into one that collects information on people’s “origins.”25 It will be interesting to track the ways in which racial and ethnic categories will continue to evolve and change in the coming years, as I believe that such changes are inevitable. For this reason, the projections of the racial and ethnic composition of the United States shown in figures 1 and 2 should be taken with a grain of salt. On the one hand, some analysts make the reasonable argument that figure 2 overestimates the percentage of whites both today and in the future. Many Hispanics report being white only because they are asked to mark a racial category on the census form after answering the Hispanic question, even though they may not feel a strong connection to that group at all and might not be viewed by others as white.26 On the other hand, the figures could overestimate the percentage of the population that will identify as Hispanic in the future. There is

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a significant number of people of mixed Hispanic origins (for example, with some grandparents who are Hispanic and some who are nonHispanic white) who do not identify as Hispanic in surveys and who may not be considered as such by others either.27 As commentator Jamelle Bouie writes, one of the contentious controversies surrounding the shooting of Trayvon Martin, an unarmed black teenager, in Florida in 2012—a case that received international attention— was the identity of George Zimmerman, the person who claimed that he shot Trayvon in self-defense: Yes, Trayvon Martin was black, but is Zimmerman white? For Martin’s sympathizers, the answer was yes. For Zimmerman’s, the answers ranged from “it doesn’t matter” to he “is actually a Hispanic nonracist person who acted in self-defense.” . . . It’s hard to say history is repeating itself—the circumstances of the early 21st century are vastly different from those of the late 19th—but the current period does seem to rhyme with the past. Over the last 50 years of large-scale Latino and Asian immigration, we’ve seen waves of anti-immigrant hysteria (Proposition 187 in California and the minutemen along the Mexican border), attempts to keep high-achieving immigrants and their children out of elite institutions, and intermarriage leading to assimilation—one of the most famous comedians in the world, Louis C. K., is half-Mexican, but to most Americans, he’s just a white guy. Which is to say that, before we begin to say anything about our majority-minority future, we have to consider the ways in which our existing social dynamics and racial boundaries will change in response to the demographic shift. Going forward, will white Hispanics see themselves as part of a different race—lightskinned but distinct from whites—or will they see themselves as another kind of white?28

Finally, people’s own racial and ethnic identities often change over time (and their responses might even vary depending on the place and reason the question is being asked on a given day). How people identify may not be random—it may be correlated with their socioeconomic background.29 For example, people who have both Hispanic and non-Hispanic white ancestors and who no longer identify as Hispanic have, on average, higher levels of education than those who do identify as Hispanic.30 This correlation can serve to bias our understanding of economic inequalities across racial and ethnic groups. This is an issue I return to in the coming chapters on the socioeconomic achievement of different groups.

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th e o r ie s e x pl a i n i n g ra ci a l a n d e t h n i c i n eq ual it i e s In a column critical of black civil rights leaders Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton, Wall Street Journal columnist Jason Riley argues, “What we have left today as civil-rights leaders are second- and third-tier types striving for relevance in an era when the biggest barrier to black progress is no longer white racism but black anti-social behavior and counterproductive attitudes toward work, school, marriage and so forth.”31 In a succinct manner Riley clearly articulates the view that culture matters: black disadvantage can be blamed on harmful attitudes and behaviors among blacks today. In contrast, in an article that makes a case for racial reparations, writer Ta-Nehisi Coates, argues that not only have slavery, Jim Crow laws, and past discriminatory behavior contributed to black economic disadvantage, but so has present-day discrimination, such as in the housing market: In 2010, the Justice Department filed a discrimination suit against Wells Fargo alleging that the bank had shunted blacks into predatory loans [loans with very high interest rates] regardless of their creditworthiness. This was not magic or coincidence or misfortune. It was racism reifying itself. According to The New York Times, affidavits found loan officers referring to their black customers as “mud people” and to their subprime products as “ghetto loans.” “We just went right after them,” Beth Jacobson, a former Wells Fargo loan officer, told The Times. “Wells Fargo mortgage had an emergingmarkets unit that specifically targeted black churches because it figured church leaders had a lot of influence and could convince congregants to take out subprime loans.” In 2011, Bank of America agreed to pay $355 million to settle charges of discrimination against its Countrywide unit. The following year, Wells Fargo settled its discrimination suit for more than $175 million.32

This indicates that discrimination is not dead. But is this an unusual instance? To what extent does discrimination explain overall patterns of inequality today? The root causes of inequality among other groups are also frequently contested. Do low levels of education among Hispanics, for example,

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reflect discrimination, poor quality of schools in Hispanic neighborhoods, or the fact that Hispanic immigrants typically come to the United States with low levels of education, and it takes at least a couple of generations for their progeny to catch up to the American mainstream? Conversely, what explains relatively high levels of education and income among Asian families? Does it again have something to do with the immigration process (Asian immigrants come with relatively high levels of education), with a culture that emphasizes hard work, or something else? In the following section I systematically review different theories typically used to explain patterns of racial and ethnic inequality today. Specifically, I discuss the role of human capital, social capital, culture, assimilation, and racism and discrimination in turn.

Human Capital Theory Economists are fond of discussing the role of human capital in affecting people’s economic well-being. Human capital refers to people’s knowledge, skills, personality, and experiences that help them attain good jobs and move ahead in their careers. Most studies of human capital focus on the importance of educational attainment and on-the-job experience in determining one’s earnings and future productivity. Indeed, the evidence is very strong that people who invest in their education can expect higher incomes. The median weekly earnings of people with less than a high school diploma in 2013 was $472, far less than the median weekly earnings of people with a bachelor’s degree ($1,108) and less yet with someone with an advanced professional degree ($1,714).33 Educational attainment can affect earnings in a number of ways. For one, people learn a variety of skills in school, such as analytical thinking, writing acumen, computer programming, accounting, and so on. In addition, a degree provides a credential that acts as a screening device by sending a signal to employers that a person is productive, even in the absence of information about specific skills.34 For example, a degree from Harvard University may signal that a person is smart and capable and thus highly employable. Human capital may affect racial differentials in earnings and wealth if there are significant differences in educational attainment and work expe-

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rience across different groups. While I carefully evaluate this argument by examining patterns and trends in education in detail in the coming chapters, suffice it to say here that there are some basic differences across groups in, for example, attending college. In 2013, 32 percent of people twenty-five years and older had completed four years or more of college in the United States. Among non-Hispanic whites, this figure was a little higher at 35 percent, while the corresponding percentages were 22 percent for blacks and 15 percent for Hispanics. In contrast, 53 percent of Asians had completed four years or more of college.35 Thus, holding other factors equal, we would expect for earnings to be higher among whites, and especially Asians, than blacks and Hispanics. Likewise, there are significant differences in levels of unemployment across groups, and this affects work experience and earnings both in the current period and over one’s lifetime. The average unemployment rate among men sixteen years and older in 2013 was 7.6 percent, with a low of 5.6 percent among Asians, 6.8 percent among whites, 8.8 percent among Hispanics, and a high of 14.2 percent among blacks.36 High black incarceration rates (black men are eight times more likely to be incarcerated than white men) means that a higher proportion of young black men enter the labor force with a criminal record, which further dampens their employability.37 Educational attainment is affected by other factors related to racial inequality. The quality of public schooling in different neighborhoods can affect the probability of one attending college later on. Schools in poor and minority neighborhoods often have inferior resources and fewer enrichment programs than schools in higher-income, mostly white, neighborhoods. High neighborhood poverty rates are strongly correlated with lower student test scores.38 In addition, if people feel that their education won’t pay off because of obstacles in the labor market (including discrimination), they may be less likely to make additional investments in their education. This can in turn further reinforce racial differences in socioeconomic achievement.

Social Capital Theory Sociologists Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant define social capital as “the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or

22

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a group by the virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.”39 In other words, social capital refers to the resources people have due to their social networks. These networks can be used as vehicle for upward mobility. Many people, for example, find a job through word of mouth through friends and neighbors. If one has wealthy, well-connected neighbors, then one might have a leg up on finding a job than an otherwise similarly qualified person (in terms of skills and education) without such connections. Racial differences in socioeconomic achievement, then, might not just reflect differences in human capital, but also differences in social capital. Economist Glenn Loury has argued that African Americans have less access to—or are often excluded from—useful social relationships, leading to lower levels of social capital often crucial to achieving economic success.40 White men are undoubtedly overrepresented in the proverbial “old boys’ network” in many industries, such as finance, which might make it harder for minorities and women to make the connections to get a job, even if there is no intentional racial or gender bias. High levels of black-white residential segregation both reflects and reinforces differences in social networks, and this could further contribute to black-white socioeconomic inequality. A significant proportion of Asians and Hispanics are immigrants or children of immigrants who live in or near ethnic communities. Immigrant and ethnic networks can help group members secure a job. But whether this leads to higher earnings over the long run could depend on the nature and quality of these networks and social contacts. For example, while employers in ethnic enclaves might provide jobs to new immigrants, they might also exploit these newcomers.41 Thus, one’s social networks can at times be harmful rather than helpful.

Cultural Theories Sociologists typically define culture as the beliefs, values, customs, behaviors, and other characteristics that are shared and accepted by a group of people. The connection between culture and racial inequality is hotly debated. Culture has sometimes been used to blame poor people and minorities for their own disadvantage. For example, some people believe that cultural val-

race and ethnicity and causes of inequality

23

ues and lifestyles, such as a weak work ethic, childbearing outside of marriage, criminal behavior, and drug use inhibit upward mobility among some groups.42 Empirically, labor force participation rates are lower, and out-ofwedlock childbearing and crime and victimization are higher among African Americans than others, and these attributes are highly correlated with poverty and disadvantage.43 Asians have the lowest levels of childbearing outside of marriage of any group, including whites.44 Much of the sociological work examining the link between culture, race, and poverty comes from ethnographies that provide detailed portraits of how people live and why they behave the way they do. Elijah Anderson’s Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City, for example, describes how low-income African Americans navigate public spaces in poor neighborhoods and the importance of an individual’s ability to command respect through the use of violence if necessary. Another example is Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas’s book, Promises I Can Keep: Why Poor Women Put Motherhood before Marriage describes how poor women value and aspire to marriage but feel that stable and rewarding marriages are nearly unattainable. Instead, having children provides meaning to their lives, and it is something that they can do on their own.45 The books often provide a structural context that help explain behavior that may seem unproductive and self-defeating to the eye of middle- and upper-class Americans. In the case of Code of the Street, the lack of economic opportunities in the inner city and discrimination against black youth mean that many young men adopt a form of masculinity that emphasizes verbal boasts, sexual prowess, and violence in the quest for pride and respect. In the case of Promises I Can Keep, the declining economic opportunities for less educated men (of all races)—a result of globalization, deindustrialization, and the disappearance of high-paying blue-collar jobs—means that there are fewer “marriageable” men who can help provide a stable basis for partnerships than in the past. This leads to greater rates of single parenthood, which has been linked to numerous negative outcomes, including higher poverty and lower levels of child well-being, as measured by school completion, and other social, cognitive, and behavioral outcomes.46 Culture has also been invoked by some as a possible explanation for relatively high levels of educational attainment among Asian Americans.

24

race and ethnicity and causes of inequality

The thinking here is that Asian Americans highly value education and its potential to foster upward mobility and communicate this to their children, who put more effort into their schoolwork than their white and other non-Asian peers.47 These high levels of education translate into good jobs with high earnings. Asian American families likewise have particularly low levels of single parenthood and high levels of cohesiveness, and this also helps explain relatively low levels of Asian poverty.48 A related concept is cultural capital, which has been defined in a variety of ways, such as possessing the knowledge of high-status culture or, a bit more broadly, as “widely shared, legitimate culture made up of high status cultural signals (attitudes, preferences, behaviors, and goods) used in direct or indirect social exclusion.”49 The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu argues that such capital helps perpetuate economic advantages across generations, as children with cultural capital might be better prepared to master academic material and communicate with teachers and other high-status adults who can potentially help them get ahead in life.50 For example, there are certain expectations on how to act in most kinds of job interviews, such as shaking hands at the outset, providing some eye contact, and generally appearing open and friendly. The extent that white and minority students have different levels of cultural capital, then, could affect their levels of socioeconomic achievement. Finally, while there has been excellent sociological work exploring the role of culture in shaping attitudes and behaviors and outcomes, we know much less about the exact magnitude of its impact on racial inequality. The concept of culture has a multitude of dimensions—it can refer to different kinds of attitudes and behaviors—and even attributing such attitudes and behaviors to culture alone, as opposed to, for example, structural conditions with which they can interact, is challenging and problematic. So the chapters ahead examine the possible role that culture plays in explaining group differences, though quantifying the magnitude of its effect is difficult.

Assimilation Theory Assimilation refers to the reduction of differences between ethnic groups over time. Assimilation has traditionally thought to occur when immi-

race and ethnicity and causes of inequality

25

grant groups adopt mainstream attitudes, culture, and educational and work experiences. Assimilation theorists today emphasize that assimilation need not be a one-way street, where minority members become more like majority group members. Rather, assimilation involves a general convergence of social, economic, and cultural patterns.51 The extent to which assimilation occurs affects racial and ethnic disparities. Richard Alba and Victor Nee, in their discussion of assimilation theory, explain how assimilation is not necessarily a universal outcome for all groups. Moreover, assimilation is a lengthy process that typically spans generations: To the extent that assimilation occurs, it proceeds incrementally as an intergenerational process, stemming both from individuals’ purposive action and from the unintended consequences of their workaday decisions. In the case of immigrants and their descendants who may not intentionally seek to assimilate, the cumulative effect of pragmatic decisions aimed at successful adaptation can give rise to changes in behavior that nevertheless lead to eventual assimilation.52

Descendants of European immigrants of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have largely assimilated into U.S. society. Groups once viewed as outsiders now view themselves, and are viewed by others, as part of the American mainstream. But just because white immigrants of the previous wave of immigration assimilated does not mean that post1965 immigrants will experience the same. Asians, black immigrants, and darker-skinned Hispanics are all “visible minorities,” so they may not be able to blend into what is sometimes referred to as the white mainstream. Immigrants themselves also differ in their characteristics, and this can affect levels of achievement and the pace of assimilation. Asian immigrants, for example, tend to have higher levels of education on average than immigrants from Latin America, and this likely affects other important outcomes, such as their earnings and the quality of neighborhoods in which they live, and subsequently the outcomes of their children. The chapters ahead examine the extent to which assimilation explains current patterns of racial and ethnic inequality. One of the key aspects of the theory is that it is important not just to look at the well-being of

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immigrants themselves but rather how the next generations are faring. Thus, it is important to ask, Are the children of immigrants experiencing upward mobility? Are they less likely to live in ethnic enclaves than their parents? Are they more likely to intermarry with nongroup members? If so, then this is strong evidence that assimilation is occurring.

The Role of Racism and Discrimination Perhaps the most invoked explanation for racial and ethnic inequality in the United States is racism and discrimination. In the context of today’s sensibilities, the country has a very disturbing history of racial violence and oppression, including the annexation of land from American Indians, the institution of slavery and subsequent Jim Crow oppression against blacks, and the internment of more than a hundred thousand Japanese Americans in California and other western states during World War II, to name but a few. The term racism refers to the linking of groups with alleged biological abilities and behaviors to assert the superiority of one racial group over another. Racism has taken on many forms over time and place. As discussed earlier, African Americans were typically thought of as inferior to whites in many respects through much of U.S. history. Jews were considered a degenerate and almost subhuman race in Nazi Germany, which made it easier to justify extinguishing them in Nazi-controlled countries during World War II. Likewise, the genocide of Tutsi by the Hutu majority in Rwanda in the 1990s was grounded in the legacy of Western colonialism, contemporary political conflict, and an inflammatory racist ideology that emphasized distinctions between the two groups.53 Racism goes hand in hand with prejudice, which can be defined as an “attitudinal system of negative beliefs, feelings, and action-orientations regarding a certain group or groups of people.”54 Discrimination goes beyond attitudes and beliefs and into action. It is the differential and unequal treatment of other groups based on some usually observable trait such as race and ethnicity but also gender, sexual orientation, and religion, among other possible characteristics. One can hold many prejudices about the inferiority of other groups but might still refrain from discriminatory behavior. Discrimination itself can represent the actions of indi-

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27

viduals or social institutions, such as in the form of Jim Crow laws that enforced segregation. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, one of the crowning achievements of the civil rights movement, prohibited discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The tools for enforcing the act were initially weak but were strengthened with the passage of additional legislation over time. While these laws have reduced the incidence of racial discrimination, this does not mean that prejudice and discrimination are relics of the past. We hear of plenty of news stories where people feel that they have been mistreated because of their race, and some of these cases end up in the courts, ranging from the settlement in 2013 of a $160 million racial discrimination suit brought against Merrill Lynch by African Americans brokers to the nearly $100 million settlement in 2014 of a lawsuit by 1,500 black and Hispanic applicants against the Fire Department of New York. While overt racism is undoubtedly less common today than in the past, there is considerable debate about the extent to which it impedes the socioeconomic mobility of minority groups today. Some argue that nonracial factors, including those reviewed earlier, drive persisting social inequities. Others counter that whites in the United States often benefit from colorblind privilege. According to this theoretical perspective, we live in a society that celebrates a color-blind ideology: race is skin deep, people of all hues and backgrounds should be treated equally, and racism is an individual problem, in that discrimination is a product of the actions of misguided individuals.55 The problem with color-blind ideology, according to this perspective, is that it masks deep-rooted racial inequalities. Thus, sociologist Charles Gallagher argues that “color blindness maintains white privilege by negating racial inequality. Embracing a post-race, color-blind perspective provides whites with a degree of psychological comfort by allowing them to imagine that being white or black or brown has no bearing on an individual’s or group’s relative place in the socioeconomic hierarchy.”56 Entrenched racial inequality, however, comes in the form of persisting differences in wealth, which can affect whether someone attends college or purchases a house.57 It is also reflected in the differential treatment of blacks by law enforcement and employers.58 This perspective further

28

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argues that whites often don’t recognize these systemic inequalities and thus don’t acknowledge the privileges they enjoy by the virtue of being white and blame the disadvantaged position of many minorities on their own poor choices and wayward values. As Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres argue, one of the negative consequences of this colorblind ideology that it “inhibit[s] racialized minorities from struggling against their marginalized status. . . . It gives those who have enjoyed little power in our society no mechanisms for understanding and challenging the systemic nature of their oppression. . . . The way race has been used both to distribute resources and to camouflage the unfairness in that distribution remains invisible. . . . And the political space, where groups come together to give voice to their collective experience and mobilize to engage in fundamental social change, vanishes.”59 Differing perceptions of systemic inequality drive many race-based controversies today. Was the shooting of Trayvon Martin by George Zimmerman, mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, symptomatic of the stereotypes people have about the criminality of young black men? Similarly, were the 2014 riots in Ferguson, Missouri, after the shooting of an unarmed young black man, Michael Brown, by a white police officer a result of criminal profiling? Or was it an isolated instance of an officer shooting a not-so-innocent man (who had stolen a box of cigarillos from a convenience store earlier in the day) during an unfortunate confrontation? Were supporters of Michael Brown playing the “race card” in a situation that didn’t have much to do about race per se, or was the incident and the subsequent mishandling of the situation (e.g., the body was left in the street for hours and the police provided very little information about the situation even as tensions rose in the following days) and the manhandling of protestors a manifestation of deep institutional racism that African Americans face every day? These are issues to which we return in the following chapters.

con clu si o n Through much of the twentieth century the stark black-white color line, perpetuated and reinforced by white racism, defined the American racial

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landscape. But American society has changed in some important ways over the past few decades. The civil rights movement overturned the legal framework that supported the unequal treatment of blacks, and there has been a gradual change in racist attitudes against minorities. Multiethnic perspectives on racial and ethnic inequality have also risen in prominence in recent years, spurred by growing racial and ethnic diversity. So the question arises, what is the trajectory of the American color line? How are various groups faring, and what explains their advantage or disadvantage? Are we seeing the softening of racial lines altogether? The coming chapters examine empirical patterns and trends in racial and ethnic inequality to shed light on the explanatory power of the theoretical perspectives described in this chapter. If we find, for example, that the relatively low median household income among Hispanic families is mainly a function of the immigration process—whereby new immigrants have low incomes, but by third generation we see growing parity with whites—then this suggests a softening of the color line between Hispanics and others. But if we see persistent Hispanic disadvantage across generations, this speaks to the intransigence of broad social divisions based on race and ethnicity that may not change for the foreseeable future. These are the issues to which we now turn, starting with an examination of black-white inequality.

3

Black-White Inequality

What does it mean to be a minority—an outsider? W. E. B. DuBois, a sociologist writing at the dawn of the twentieth century, wrote about his identity as both an American and a black person in terms of a “double-consciousness”: It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness, an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder. The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self.1

Most of us have been in situations where we feel like an outsider trying to fit in and unsure how others are viewing us. DuBois spoke about how it felt that way nearly all the time, at least in mixed company, in the United States a little over a century ago. Even today there are many stories of “firsts” or near firsts that draw attention to the poor representation of people of some backgrounds in certain areas of American life—Barack Obama elected the first African American president in 2008, Misty Copeland 30

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31

being the first African American principal dancer at the American Ballet Theater in 2015, and so on. In these situations one is often viewed not just as a president or dancer but as a black president or a black dancer, at least initially. White Americans typically do not experience this double consciousness. They are more likely to feel that they are being evaluated on their individual skills and attributes and less likely to feel like that they are being judged on the basis of their skin color or feel the pressure of representing a race. In other words, they feel part of the mainstream, and they are less likely to perceive the importance of race in other people’s lives. This is what some commentators would refer to as “white privilege.” For example, a news story that appeared in the Chronicle of Higher Education about the struggles faced by black men in the administrative ranks of academic institutions reported, “Being part of an underrepresented group can take a psychic toll as one climbs the ranks. Mr. Harper [a black administrator], for instance, knows what it’s like to be the only person of color in a department. ‘There’s something that comes along with that—the stress of having to prove myself and not mess it up for other people who come after me. These things feel really consequential.’ ”2 This double consciousness is situational. When a person is among others not like him or her in some respect, then that person is more likely to feel conscious of his or her difference. This can happen to women in the company of men (women, for example, are underrepresented in many occupations, such as finance and computer programming), to older people among younger people, or to low-income people among richer ones (say, on “elite” university campuses), to name a few examples. Thus, to the extent that race has been an important social construct in social relations—as it has through American history—and African Americans have had to navigate through “mainstream” institutions, then it has played a very important role in their lives. With growing diversity and softening of racial lines in some respects—for example, African Americans are more highly represented in positions of power in many institutions—then this double consciousness might likewise be less important than it used to be. There are likewise some circumstances in which whites might feel quite cognizant of their race. After all, a growing number of metropolitan areas have more nonwhite that white residents. In other instances class may be the critical distinguishing factor rather than race, as power and difference

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are situational. But it is not a stretch to say that African Americans typically grapple with this issue considerably more than whites due to demographic factors, socioeconomic inequalities, and the actual distribution of political and economic power in U.S. society. So just how much black-white inequality is there today? To what extent have things changed? In the rest of this chapter I document patterns and trends in inequality, focusing on education, income, wealth, poverty, residential attainment, and health. I evaluate some of the factors that contribute to racial differences, reflecting on the theories raised in the previous chapter. In doing so, I also discuss the role of incarceration and family structure in shaping patterns of inequality. I conclude with observations about the trajectory of the black-white color line.

tr en d s in b la ck-wh i t e i n e qua li t y The empirical evidence is suggestive of black progress but is nevertheless somewhat mixed depending on the indicator being considered. While blacks clearly fare much better than they did sixty years ago in terms of education, poverty, and health, so have whites. In terms of racial disparities, blacks have narrowed the gap with whites when considering many important indicators, such as education, poverty, residential segregation and residential attainment, and life expectancy, while a couple of gaps have remained more stubborn, including household income and wealth. As will be discussed in more detail shortly, the narrowing of gaps is also often more apparent when looking at the relative likelihood of various outcomes by race, such as the likelihood of whites obtaining a college degree compared to blacks, than absolute gaps in such outcomes, such as the absolute difference in the percentage of whites and blacks obtaining a college degree. In addition, where gaps have narrowed, progress has generally been slow and uneven, leading some commentators to be pessimistic about the extent and pace of change. Some disparities that help explain the differences in socioeconomic achievement, such as the likelihood of incarceration and nonmarital childbearing, are also quite large (even if narrowing). I begin with a discussion of some of the leading indicators of progress, followed by those that have registered little change.

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Evidence of Narrowing Racial Disparities Figures 3 and 4 show trends in educational attainment by race and, in particular, the percentage of people who have completed high school and college. In this chapter I focus mainly on black-white differences, though the educational attainment of Hispanics and Asians are shown as well. First, we see a very substantial increase in educational attainment among all groups. In 1940 just over a quarter of whites finished high school, rising to 93.1 percent in 2014 (when considering non-Hispanic whites). Figure 3 shows the time series for both whites (which goes further back in time) and non-Hispanic whites, though for ease of exposition, I report on non-Hispanic whites, rather than both white groups, when discussing data from recent years. Fewer than one in ten blacks (7.7 percent) completed high school in 1940. By 2014 a vast majority of blacks (85.8 percent) had finished high school. The ratio of the percentage of white to blacks who had completed high school declined from 3.4 in 1940 (that is, whites were 3.4 times more likely to finish high school than blacks in that year) to near parity—1.1—in 2014. Asians are about as likely to have received a high school diploma as whites, while Hispanics have the lowest levels of educational attainment. One caveat is that these findings on the education gap likely slightly overstate the narrowing of the education gap between whites and blacks. Specifically, the Current Population Survey (CPS)—one of the few surveys that provide historical estimates—which is the basis of these figures, does not include people in institutionalized group quarters, such as prisons, and African Americans are overrepresented among the incarcerated population. Estimates that take this into account still find some narrowing of the education gap, but a smaller one than shown in figure 3.3 For example, using American Community Survey (ACS) data, which includes people living in group quarters, the percentage of African Americans who completed high school was 84.4 percent in 2014, which is lower than the 85.8 CPS estimate shown in figure 3. In the ACS the percentage of nonHispanic whites who completed high school was 92.0, down slightly from the 93.1 percent CPS estimate shown.4 The underestimation of the blackwhite gap is larger among subgroups with higher incarceration rates, such as young males, than for the population as a whole.5

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black-white inequality

100 90

84.1

93.1 89.5 88.8 85.8

87.6

80 70

66.5

Percent

60 50 40

Non-Hispanic white Asian White Black Hispanic

36.5

30 26.1 20 10

7.7

14

11

20

08

20

05

20

02

20

99

20

96

19

93

19

90

19

87

19

84

19

81

19

78

19

75

19

72

19

69

19

66

19

62

19

52

19

19

19

40

0

Figure 3. Percentage of people twenty-five years and over who have completed high school, by race and ethnicity, 1940–2014. Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2014b.

The trend in college attainment, shown in figure 4, again shows progress among all groups, but the trend lines for blacks and whites do not converge. Among whites, the percentage completing college rose from 4.9 percent in 1940 to 35.6 percent in 2014. Among blacks the percentage completing college rose from just 1.3 percent in 1940 to 22.2 percent. While the absolute gap in college attainment completion between whites and blacks grew over the period (from 3.6 percentage points in 1940 to 13.4 percentage points in 2014), the ratio of percentage of whites to percentage of blacks completing college declined; in 1940 whites were 3.8 times more likely to complete college than blacks, down to 1.6 times more likely in 2014. Asians are by far the most likely to have a college degree, while Hispanics are the least likely. African American representation in relatively high-status occupations has also increased over time, consistent with both trends in educational attainment and the notion that the black middle class has expanded in recent decades.6 Figure 5 shows the percentage of whites and blacks in managerial, professional, and technical occupations, by gender, over the

black-white inequality

35

60 52.3 50 Asian Non-Hispanic white White Black Hispanic

40 Percent

49.8

35.6 32.3

30 23.8 22.2 20 15.2 10 4.9

52 19 62 19 66 19 69 19 72 19 75 19 78 19 81 19 84 19 87 19 90 19 93 19 96 19 99 20 02 20 05 20 08 20 11 20 14

19

40

0

19

5.5

1.3

Figure 4. Percentage of people twenty-five years and over who have completed college, by race and ethnicity, 1940–2014. Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2014b.

1950 to 2014 period. A few patterns stand out. First, both blacks and whites saw a growing representation in these higher-status jobs, reflecting general educational upgrading of the labor force and increasing productivity and living standards in the United States over time. Second, the proportion of whites employed in these high-status occupations is higher than blacks among both men and women. In 2014, 36 percent of white men were in these managerial or professional occupations, compared with 24 percent of black men. Among women, 43 percent of whites were in these occupations, compared with 35 percent of blacks. But the race gap has narrowed moderately over time (more so in proportional terms than absolute terms). For example, while white men were 4.8 times more likely to be represented in high-status occupations than black men in 1950, by 2014 this was down to 1.5 times more likely—though this still represents a significant difference. The gap narrowed more quickly in the 1950 to 1980 period than afterward. Although not shown in the figure, Asians are the most likely to be in high-status jobs (53 percent and 49 percent of Asian men and women, respectively, in 2014), while Hispanics

36

black-white inequality 50 45 Men, white

43

Men, black

40

Women, white 35

Women, black 33

Percent

30

29 28

25 20 15

24 21 19 18

18 16

7

8

4

5

1950

1960

29 25

24

22

17

17 15

12

10 5

25 23

36 35

12

8

0 1970

1980

1990

2000

2014

Figure 5. Percentage of blacks and whites in managerial, professional, and technical occupations, by gender, 1950–2014. Sources: figures for 1950–2000 from Wright and Rogers 2010, ch. 14; figures for 2014 from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014b. Note: There have been changes in the way occupations have been categorized over time. An effort has been made to harmonize these changes to produce a consistent time series, though exact matches can be challenging.

were the least likely (17 percent and 26 percent of Hispanic men and women, respectively, in 2014).7 Another pattern in the figure is that the occupational upgrading was more prevalent among women than men—both white and black—such that white women surpassed white men in the higher-status occupations in 1990. It should be emphasized, however, that the managerial and professional occupational category used here is quite broad. It encompasses jobs ranging from CEO of large corporations, in which white men are considerably overrepresented, to community health care workers, teachers, and nurses, where women (including minority women) are well represented. The wage gap between the different jobs is also considerable. Overall though, these white-collar jobs tend to have better pay and benefits than other kinds of occupations, such as those in services (e.g., security

37

black-white inequality 60 Black Hispanic Total White Asian Non-Hispanic white

55.1 50

Percent

40

30 26.2 22.4

23.6

20 16.1

18.1

14.8 12.7 12.0 10.1

10 7.5 0 1959

1964

1969

1974

1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

2004

2009

2014

Figure 6. Poverty rates, by race and ethnicity, 1959–2014. Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2015a.

guards, nursing assistants), sales, construction, and production-related occupations (e.g., machine operators). Figure 6 shows trends in poverty by race from 1959 to 2014. Among blacks a staggering 55.1 percent were poor in 1959, compared to 18.1 percent of whites. For both groups, poverty fell significantly during the 1960s and then fluctuated with the business cycle thereafter. Among both groups, for example, poverty increased in the recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s but fell in the subsequent economic recovery period. The increases and declines are sharper among African Americans, including very substantial declines in poverty in the strong economy of the mid- to late 1990s. Blacks, however, were hard hit by the recessions in the first decade of the twenty-first century. By 2014 a substantial gap in poverty remained, with 26.2 percent of blacks living in poverty, compared to 10.1 percent of non-Hispanic whites. The gap (both absolute and the proportional) has narrowed over time, though much of the progress was concentrated in the 1960s and the 1990s. Asians have poverty rates close to that of whites, while Hispanic poverty rates are only moderately below that of African Americans.

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Figures 7 and 8 show trends in racial and ethnic residential segregation among whites and blacks over the 1970 to 2010 period averaged across all metropolitan areas. The first figure uses the dissimilarity index, the most commonly used measure of segregation, which indicates the evenness in the distribution of groups across neighborhoods in a metropolitan area. If the metropolitan area is, for example, 10 percent black, then each neighborhood should be 10 percent black if it were to be said that there was no segregation of blacks in that metropolitan area. The index varies from zero to one hundred, with higher numbers indicating more segregation. Figure 7 indicates that white and black dissimilarity from others not of their own group and from each other declined substantially over the 1970 to 2010 period. Among blacks the drop was from seventy-seven to fiftyfive, and among whites, it was from seventy to forty-one. A common rule of thumb is that dissimilarity scores over sixty are high, those from thirty to sixty are moderate, and those below thirty are low. Thus, black and white segregation fell from very high levels to more moderate ones. In addition, the segregation of blacks from whites in particular, while remaining fairly high in absolute terms, also declined over the period, from seventy-nine to fifty-nine. The segregation of Hispanics and Asians from others was moderate and held fairly steady. Black and white segregation still remains especially high in some midwestern and northeastern metropolitan areas, where racial divisions are deeper and more long-standing than in growing Sun Belt metropolitan areas. For example, black-white dissimilarity scores in Detroit, Milwaukee, New York, and Chicago are extremely high, ranging from seventy-six to eighty, compared to those in Las Vegas; Phoenix; Charleston, South Carolina; and Raleigh, which all range between thirty-six and forty-one.8 Low-income blacks in particular live in very segregated neighborhoods.9 Figure 8 shows trends using the isolation index, which is a measure of exposure (or lack thereof ) to other groups. This index also ranges from zero to one hundred, with one hundred indicating the highest level of isolation and little exposure to other groups. It measures the average percentage of group members in the neighborhood where the typical group member lives. Holding other factors equal, larger ethnic groups will be more isolated than smaller ones simply because there are more co-ethnics

black-white inequality

39

100 90 80

79 77

Dissimilarity index

70

70

Black/White 73 Black/Nonblack 71 59

60

67 65 53

50 48 40 37

47 42

64 61 47 46 43

59 55 43 41

White/Nonwhite Hispanics/Non-Hispanics Asians/Non-Asians

41

30 20 10 0 1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Figure 7. Racial and ethnic residential segregation, 1970–2010 (index of dissimilarity). Sources: Figures for 1980–2010 white/nonwhite, black/nonblack, Hispanic/Non-Hispanic, and Asian/Non-Asian figures from Iceland and Sharp 2013; figures for 1970 from Iceland et al. 2010; black-white figures for 1970–2010 from Logan and Stults 2011. Notes: The segregation calculations are weighted by the size of the group in question (and the black-white index is weighted by the size of the black population) and include only those metropolitan areas with at least one thousand members of the group of interest.

present with whom to share neighborhoods. This helps explain the different story shown in figure 8 compared to that in figure 7, as whites stand out as being considerably more isolated than blacks, even though their dissimilarity was a little lower. The isolation index of seventy-nine for all whites in 2010 indicates that the typical white individual lived in a neighborhood that was 79 percent white. This figure is down from 94 percent in 1970, indicating that whites live in more diverse neighborhoods than they used to, which in turn reflects growing diversity in the nation as a whole.10 Isolation of each group tends to be highest in areas with the high concentrations of the group, such as Altoona, Pennsylvania; and Parkersburg, West Virginia for whites, and Detroit and Memphis for blacks.11 The isolation of Hispanics and Asians has increased gradually as these groups have grown.

40

black-white inequality

100

94

90

Isolation index

87

88

80 70

90

82

85

75 66

60

55 42 32

30

Whites

61

50 40

79

80

38

34

Non-Hispanic whites 51

Blacks

45 34

46 45 35

31 21

20 16

10

19

Hispanics Black-white exposure Asians

20

0 1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Figure 8. Mean isolation, by group, 1970–2010. Source: Number for 1980–2010 from Iceland and Sharp 2013; numbers for 1970 from Iceland et al. 2010. Notes: The reference group is all nongroup members, according to the definition of the group used. Segregation calculations are weighted by the size of the group population of interest and include only those metropolitan areas with at least one thousand members of the group of interest.

Despite some declines in residential segregation, blacks still live in neighborhoods that are considerably more disadvantaged than whites in terms of poverty and school quality.12 For example, as shown in figure 9, in 2010 the percentage of people who were poor in the median neighborhood in which whites lived is 9 percent, well below the median of 19 percent among blacks. Whites and Asians tend to live in neighborhoods with similar levels of poverty, as do Hispanics and blacks. Other research has indicated that black households making $100,000 per year live in communities that have greater levels of disadvantage than low-income white households making less than $30,000 a year—representing a huge disparity. But there has been a narrowing of the poverty rate of the median neighborhoods in which blacks and whites live, consistent with the overall declines in residential segregation. In addition, fewer middle- and upperclass African Americans live in very disadvantaged neighborhood than in the past. For example, while half of black middle- and upper-income families lived in a neighborhood directly adjacent to a severely disadvantaged neighborhood in 1970, by 2005–9 only one in four did.13

41

black-white inequality 30

Median neighborhood poverty rate

1980 22 20

2010 19

18 16

10 7

9

8

9

0 Whites

Blacks

Hispanics

Asians

Figure 9. Percentage of the population that is poor in the median neighborhood where whites, blacks, Hispanics, and Asians live, 1980 and 2010. Source: Firebaugh and Farrell 2016, fig. 3.

Figure 10 shows that the life expectancy among whites was seventynine in 2013, compared to seventy-six years among blacks. The gap in life expectancy (both relative and absolute), however, has narrowed, especially since 1990.14 Health disparities between blacks and whites are evident in other indicators of health, including age-adjusted death rates, cause-specific death rates, disability, and infant mortality, though these gaps have tended to narrow over time as well.15 The higher rates of disease and death among blacks compared to whites reflect the earlier onset of illness, the greater severity of diseases, and lower rates of survival.16 The decline in the mortality gap between whites and blacks since 1990 is due to larger decreases in death rates among the African American population for heart disease, cancer, HIV, unintentional injuries, and conditions affecting newborns.17 Of note, the mortality rate for some groups of non-Hispanic whites has actually increased in recent years, even as that of blacks and Hispanics has continued to decline. In particular, the mortality of white middle-aged Americans increased in the first decade and half of the twenty-first

42

black-white inequality 85 81

82

80

79

79 77 76

Life expectancy in years

75

72

72 70

76

75

74 71 69

69 68

65 64

Hispanic

64

White 60

61 Black

55

50 1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2013

Figure 10. Life expectancy at birth, by race and Hispanic origin, 1950–2013. Source: CDC 2016, table 7.

century, mainly due to increasing death rates from drug and alcohol poisoning, suicide, and chronic liver diseases and cirrhosis. This could reflect the declining fortunes of white Americans with low socioeconomic status (certainly compared with their parents), due to growing income inequality in the United States.18 Likewise, this is consistent with the notion that socioeconomic status is playing an increasing role in shaping the wellbeing of Americans in recent decades rather than race alone. Curiously, figure 10 also shows that the life expectancy of Hispanics is greater than that of whites. This apparent Hispanic health paradox— where Hispanics have long life expectancies despite low average levels of socioeconomic status attainment—is likely related at least in part to the “selectivity” of immigrants. That is, Hispanics who migrate to the United States tend to be more healthy than those who stay behind, and immigrants who leave the United States to return to home often do so when

black-white inequality

43

their health worsens.19 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention does not publish life expectancy figures for Asians, but Asians tend to have lower levels of mortality than other groups, and other research suggests that their life expectancy at birth is longer as well—perhaps as high as eighty-seven years.20

Evidence of No Improvement or an Increase in Racial Disparities Among the measures of socioeconomic status where there has been little change in the black-white gap are median household income and wealth. Figure 11 focuses on household income from 1967 to 2014. Here we see that both whites and blacks experienced increases in median household income over time. The median income among whites increased from $46,181 in 1967 to $60,256 (among non-Hispanic whites) in 2014 (in constant 2014 dollars). Among blacks median income rose from $26,813 in 1967 to $35,398 in 2014. The increases have not been continuous, as both groups experienced stagnant income in the first few years of the twentyfirst century and then a substantial decline during the Great Recession in 2008. Median incomes have only slightly rebounded since. The ratio of white to black median income has not changed: it stood at 1.72 in 1967 and 1.70 (when considering non-Hispanic whites) in 2014. The ratio was at a low point in 2000 (1.54). Asians have the highest median household incomes of all the groups, while the Hispanic median income is moderately above that of blacks. Focusing on median income obscures the distribution of groups’ incomes across the income distribution. While median black family incomes remain low, other research has indicated black households have made more gains than other groups in increasing their share in the top income bracket over the 1971 to 2015 period, indicative of the occupational upgrading described earlier, though African Americans also remain overrepresented in the lowest-income bracket.21 Also, when we examine individual earnings (rather than household income) among workers, there has been modest narrowing of the gap between blacks and whites over the 1970 to 2009 period, though large gaps remain. For example, the median earnings of working black men was 67 percent of the median for white men in 2009, up

44

black-white inequality 90,000 80,000 74,297 70,000

64,267 52,236 46,181

60,256 56,866 53,657

44,284

42,491

2014 dollars

60,000 50,000 40,000 38,866

35,398

Asian Non-Hispanic white White Total Hispanic Black

30,000 26,813 20,000 10,000

19

6 19 7 7 19 0 7 19 3 76 19 7 19 9 8 19 2 8 19 5 8 19 8 91 19 9 19 4 97 20 0 20 0 0 20 3 0 20 6 09 20 12

0

Figure 11. Median household income, by race and ethnicity, 1967–2014 (constant 2014 dollars). Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2015b.

from 61 percent in 1970. The median earnings of black women was 88 percent of the median for white women in 2009, up from 78 percent in 1970.22 On the other hand, researcher Becky Pettit argues that if we were to take into account the earnings of jobless men—including those incarcerated— the wage gap between white and black men has actually increased substantially since the 1980s.23 This suggests that while employed African Americans may be doing better than they used to, for many at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder conditions have worsened. Racial disparities in household wealth are very substantial and also have not narrowed. The black-white wealth gap is considerably larger than the black-white income gap. For example, while the median household income of whites was 1.6 times greater than the median household income of blacks in 2014, the median net worth of white households was 14 times that of blacks in the most recent period (2011), as shown in figure 12. Moreover, while racial wealth inequality declined slightly in the 1980s through the early 1990s, as indicated by the ratio of white wealth to black wealth, since then it has increased. In fact, the relative wealth gap

black-white inequality

45

200,000 180,000 160,000

2011 dollars

140,000 120,000

110,500

100,000 84,726

89,537 89,339

82,386

80,000 74,136

60,000 70,723

68,828

Non-Hispanic white White Asian Total Hispanic Black

40,000 20,000 10,636

7,683 6,314 95 19 98 20 00 20 02 20 04 20 05 20 09 20 10 20 11

93

19

19

88

19

84

19

19

91

7,354

0

Figure 12. Median net worth, by race and ethnicity, 1984–2011 (constant 2011 dollars). Sources: U.S. Census Bureau 1986, 1990, 1994, 1995, 2001, 2013b.

increased during the Great Recession before declining slightly since then. The largest source of wealth in the United States is homeownership, and whites are more likely to own homes (and more expensive homes) than are blacks. The Great Recession saw a drop in wealth among both whites and blacks, but the decline was proportionally larger among blacks because the housing downturn had a relatively large effect on their home equity.24 Blacks have generally been more likely to move out of homeownership into renter status than whites, and this disparity increased for those who purchased their homes in the 1990s or later—consistent with the fact that blacks were more likely to have riskier subprime financing for their mortgages.25 Persistence in differences in income and wealth might also be explained by differences in family structure by race. One-parent families and households with extended family members in residence—both of which are more common in African American households—reduce household income and may make it more difficult to accumulate wealth.26 The median household wealth of Hispanics is only slightly higher than that of blacks, while the wealth of Asians is closer to that of whites.

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Finally, in addition to persistent wealth gaps, other research also indicates that blacks continue to experience less intergenerational upward mobility and more intergenerational downward mobility than whites. This suggests that, at current rates of intergenerational mobility, there may be little relative narrowing of the income gap in the near future.27

Causes of Black-White Inequality What factors help explain these disparities? Chapter 2 describes various theories on the root causes of racial and ethnic inequality, including human capital and social capital theories; cultural theories that emphasize differences in norms, values, and behaviors across groups; theories that emphasize the role of racism and discrimination by both individuals and social institutions; and, finally, assimilation theory, which is most applicable to more recent immigrant groups and thus not discussed in this chapter. The most obvious explanation for explaining black-white inequality, especially historically, is racism and discrimination. African Americans first arrived in the United States in large numbers in colonial times via the slave trade and were heavily concentrated in southern states, such as South Carolina and Mississippi, where they often worked on plantations. They had few rights and could be bought and sold at will, meaning that families were frequently broken up at the discretion of their owners. Each state had its slave code that regulated the relationship between the slave and owner. The South Carolina slave code, for example, stated, among many provisions, that no slave should be taught to write and that slaves were forbidden to leave the owner’s property unless accompanied by a white person or by permission. Masters who killed their slaves without justification were subject to a fine, but all types of punishments (including those leading to the death of slaves) for infractions were allowed.28 While slaves won their freedom and the right to vote after the Civil War, the full benefits of citizenship were short-lived. President Ulysses S. Grant had supported Reconstruction policies that had enforced the protection of African American rights. But after he left office in 1877, federal troops were withdrawn from the South, and white democrats there reestablished

black-white inequality

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their political dominance through violence and intimidation. As a result, southern blacks effectively lost the power to vote. The estimated two thousand to three thousand lynchings that occurred in just the last decade and half of the nineteenth century, and the nearly four thousand that occurred overall from 1877 to 1950, terrorized black communities and left African Americans without many fundamental rights.29 During this time blacks in the South often worked as sharecroppers, mainly because they were barred by law or custom from most other full-time jobs outside of the black community. Segregation in all public facilities was legalized through Jim Crow laws, which resulted in inferior services, including education, for the black community.30 For example, Clarendon County, South Carolina, spent just $43 per black child in public schools as late as 1949–50, compared to $149 per white child. Historian James Patterson writes, The schools for whites [in Clarendon County] were generally built of brick or stucco and enjoyed abundant teaching supplies. More than half of those for blacks were ramshackle shanties in which one or two teachers had only the most rudimentary instructional materials. . . . [In one of the school districts] one of the two colored grade schools lacked running water; the other had no electricity. Both white schools had flush toilets, but the three black schools had none—only outhouses. The black schools had no janitorial services—cleanup was a chore for the black teachers and the children.31

During the twentieth century many blacks left harsh conditions in the South to look for opportunity in bustling cities in the North, such as Chicago, Detroit, New York, and Cleveland. Detroit, for example, was the center of the booming auto industry, and manufacturing plants were eager for labor from wherever they could get it, including black migrants from the South and immigrants pouring into U.S. cities from southern and eastern Europe at the beginning of the century. The remarkable flow of international immigrants to the United States became a trickle with the passage of anti-immigrant legislation in 1921 and 1924, making the manufacturing industry even more dependent on internal migrants. This further spurred the Great Migration of blacks to the North, with a lull only in the 1930s during the Great Depression. This migration resulted in a striking regional redistribution of the black population in the United

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States. In 1900 about three-quarters of all African Americans lived in southern rural areas; a century later that figure had declined to about 12 percent. By 1950 more than 2.5 million southern-born African Americans, and more than 4 million by 1980, were living outside the region.32 While economic opportunities were better in the North and the racial climate not as oppressive (northern blacks, for example, could for the most part vote), blacks still faced a wide range of discriminatory barriers in the labor and housing market and were segregated in congested northern ghettos. The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s overturned the legal framework enforcing black oppression. It was propelled mainly by nonviolent protest, civil disobedience, litigation, and lobbying. One of its significant achievements was the 1954 Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, which invalidated the separate-but-equal doctrine underlying the Jim Crow system established by Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896. The plaintiffs in the Brown v. Board case were thirteen Topeka parents, recruited by the leadership of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, on behalf of their twenty children who were enrolled in segregated elementary schools. All the children were forced to attend black schools located farther from their homes than nearby white schools. Once their attempts to enroll their children in their neighborhood (white) schools were rebuffed, the parents filed a class action suit. The Supreme Court heard the Brown case along with four other closely related ones from South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware, and Washington, DC. Patterson writes, Blacks who volunteered as plaintiffs in these suits showed enormous courage, for whites were certain to retaliate. Many plaintiffs (and their kin) were fired from their jobs; others were denied credit by lenders. In Clarendon County, South Carolina, Levi Pearson, a black farmer who dared in 1948 to stand as a plaintiff on behalf of his three school-age children, discovered that he could no longer find a white farmer with a harvester to help him bring in his crops. He watched them rot in the fields. Angry whites later burned down the house and (then) the church of the Reverend Joseph Albert DeLaine, a black minister who led the move for desegregated schools in Clarendon County.33

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In a nine-to-zero decision, the Warren Court ruled that separate educational facilities were inherently unequal. Among other victories was the Montgomery Bus Boycott in 1955–56, which protested racial segregation in the public-transit system in Montgomery, Alabama, that forced blacks to seats in the back of the bus if the front seats were full. The campaign began when Rosa Parks, an African American women active in the movement, refused to give up her seat to a white person. The boycott lasted over a year and finally was a success, and the Supreme Court eventually declared these laws to be unconstitutional. The culmination of the civil rights movement came in the 1960s, when Congress passed several laws, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair Housing Act in 1968, that prohibited racial discrimination in employment practices, public accommodations, and housing market transactions. Legal changes were accompanied by gradual changes in public opinion. The proportion of whites holding blatantly racist attitudes dropped considerably over the decades, according to national surveys. For example, in the 1940s and 1950s, fewer than half of whites surveyed believed that white and black students should attend the same schools or that black and white job applicants should have an equal chance of getting a job. By the 1990s, however, over 90 percent of whites said that they believed that schools and employers should treat whites and blacks equally.34 Views have changed even over the past two to three decades. In 1990, 40 percent of whites supported a homeowner’s right to discriminate on the basis of race. By 2008 this was down to 28 percent. In 1990 nearly two-thirds (65 percent) of whites opposed a marriage of a close relative with an African American; by 2008 only 25 percent felt the same way.35 The legacy of past discrimination has a lingering effect on inequality. Past discrimination made it much harder for blacks to accumulate wealth than whites. As mentioned earlier, for most families, homeownership is the single largest source of wealth. Residential segregation and discrimination in the housing market and financial lending institutions have meant that blacks have not been able to able to accumulate wealth nearly to the extent that whites have. The lack of wealth in turn translates into less intergenerational mobility, as younger cohorts of blacks are less likely

50

black-white inequality

to be able to afford purchasing a house in a better neighborhood with higher-functioning schools or supporting educational investments in their children in other ways (e.g., tutoring lessons and other extracurricular activities).36 Having little wealth also makes all families, including black families, very vulnerable to various kinds of crises, ranging from unforeseen health issues to car problems to fine payments with accruing interest. This in turn leads to more debt and poverty, and fewer opportunities to get ahead.37 Does this mean that black-white inequality today is mainly a function of the lingering effect of past racism and discrimination and not of contemporary discrimination? The short answer is no. On the one hand, studies show that the economic “penalty” of being African American has declined since the 1960s in terms of occupational mobility and wage parity.38 That is, racial differences in economic outcomes are significantly reduced when one accounts for educational achievement and other characteristics.39 On the other hand, the studies discussed earlier indicate that an unexplained difference in the economic outcomes between whites and blacks still remains. It is challenging to measure discrimination directly because it is not always clear when a discriminatory action has occurred, or if general observed differences between whites and blacks are a result of unmeasured differences (e.g., quality of schooling received) or of discrimination itself. There are many instances when people disagree if racism was the root cause of a problem. Did Trayvon Martin’s race play a critical role in his confrontation with George Zimmerman? Likewise, was Michael Brown, who was fatally shot by officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri, targeted because of his race, and did race play a role in the grand jury’s decision not to indict Wilson? Many people suspect that it did, but it can be difficult to definitively prove so in any particular instance. Thus, it is important to move beyond specific situations (and anecdotes more generally) to provide definitive evidence on the effect of racial discrimination. Indeed, more systematic research on racial discrimination indicates that it still occurs in labor and housing markets, in law enforcement, and in other areas of American life. For example, “paired-test studies,” in which minority job applicants were paired with white applicants with similar backgrounds and trained to be as similar as possible in behavior,

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51

have shown that minorities, particularly African Americans and foreignsounding Hispanics, were less likely to receive job interviews and offers, at least in the low-wage labor market. In fact, African American applicants with no criminal record were offered jobs at a rate as low as white applicants who had criminal records.40 Studies have indicated that African Americans are shown fewer apartments to rent and houses for sale than whites, and state legislators were less likely to respond to constituents with black names.41 In the years before the Great Recession, subprime lending disproportionately targeted poor and minority neighborhoods, and as a result African Americans were more likely to suffer a foreclosure after the housing bubble burst in 2006–7.42 Discrimination has been documented in law enforcement and incarceration. While there are considerably higher rates of serious violence and homicide by young black men than other groups, incarceration rates are also affected by racial profiling and surveillance of this population (such as through “stop and frisk” policies) and disparities in pretrial detention, as well as in sentencing, that serve to disadvantage African Americans.43 Many have argued that policies designed to get “tough on crime” that were implemented in the last few decades of the twentieth century, such as mandatory minimum sentences, had a disproportionate effect on African Americans. While these policies were not explicitly targeted toward any one group, some have argued that the “mechanisms of such systematic racial disproportion are more indirect, covert, and implicit than the mechanisms of racial bias evident in the past.”44 One common example is the longer federal prison sentences for dealing crack cocaine than powder cocaine (blacks are relatively more likely to use and deal crack cocaine, while whites are relatively more likely to use and deal powder cocaine). And as described shortly, having a prison record greatly affects one’s future job prospects and the well-being of families.45 In addition, the criminal justice system reduces the political power of African Americans because in many states felons released after serving their prison terms cannot vote. This likely affected the outcomes of a number of U.S. Senate elections and perhaps even one presidential one (Bush versus Gore in 2000).46 The criminal justice system also disproportionately affects poor and minority communities through court-related fines and fees. For example, fines and fees on offenders generate revenue for many local cash-strapped

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black-white inequality

legal systems. If the offenders are too poor to pay them, they may have to pay interest on fines and additional late fees. This can lead to a spiral of accumulating debt.47 In addition, in many jurisdictions civil forfeiture laws allow the police to seize, and then keep or sell, any property they claim was used in a crime, even if the person is never convicted. This further helps to impoverish many already-struggling families of all races. The economist Sendhil Mullainathan, in a review of studies on discrimination, notes that there are a few situations when African Americans may benefit over whites, such as in admissions to elite colleges.48 But, on the whole, African Americans are more often in situations where they experience disadvantages. Mullainathan further notes that such discrimination is not necessarily a sign of widespread conscious prejudice but instead sometimes a function of snap judgments, which “rely on all the associations we have—from fictional television shows to news reports. They use stereotypes, both the accurate and the inaccurate, both those we would want to use and the ones we find repulsive.”49 One study estimates that perhaps one-quarter of the black-white wage gap is due to prejudice, suggesting that racism continues to contribute to African American economic disadvantage.50 In addition to racism and discrimination, human capital differences also contribute to black-white inequality. Human capital is often measured by educational attainment and work experience. As shown earlier, blacks are less likely to have obtained a high school or college degree than whites. But, as also shown, these gaps have narrowed over time. Human capital disparities also arise in the form of the unequal quality of schooling received by blacks and whites. Residential segregation amplifies this problem. Residential segregation affects educational disparities because a significant portion of school funding comes from local taxes. Schools in poor neighborhoods often have inferior resources and fewer enrichment programs. High neighborhood poverty rates are strongly correlated with lower student test scores.51 Declining levels of black-white segregation in recent decades along with rapid black suburbanization have likely reduced modestly the effects of segregation in contributing to racial inequalities over the past couple of decades. But many cities—particularly some in the Northeast and Midwest, such as Chicago, New York, Detroit, Saint Louis, and Milwaukee—still have very high levels of black segregation.52

black-white inequality

53

Moreover, many of these cities with a high concentration of African Americans suffered during deindustrialization—where the share of people employed in manufacturing declined. For example, in the twenty-year period between 1967 and 1987, Philadelphia lost 64 percent of its manufacturing jobs, Chicago lost 60 percent, New York City 58 percent, and Detroit 51 percent. This hurt blacks, and whites, living in those cities and contributed to increasing black concentrated poverty in inner cities.53 Many people with experience in the manufacturing sector could not put their human capital to good use due to the loss of these jobs. Some commentators, such as William Julius Wilson, have argued that race has become less important in determining the labor market success of African Americans and that deindustrialization and class segregation in particular have hampered the economic mobility of less skilled blacks.54 Human capital differentials are also affected by differences in incarceration rates. Going to prison reduces work experience and attachment to the workforce and makes it harder to obtain a job because many employers prefer not to hire people with a prison record. But those with low levels of education and who are not well prepared to enter the labor force are also more likely to end up in jail or prison.55 Nevertheless, in a review of several studies, sociologists Sara Wakefield and Christopher Uggen conclude that incarceration reduces people’s wages somewhere between 10 to 30 percent on average.56 The incarceration rate, after decades of rather moderate fluctuations, began to rise markedly in the early 1970s. Whereas the rate stood at close to 200 people in jails or prisons per 100,000 population in 1970, it rose to about 750 per 100,000 in 2008, before leveling off and dropping slightly in recent years.57 The U.S. incarceration rate is high by historical standards and high relative to those in other countries. For example, the U.S. incarceration rate of 751 per 100,000 in 2006 was about ten times the rate in Norway (66 per 100,000) and Denmark (77), over 7 times the rate in Canada (107), and substantially higher than the rates in other places with high incarcerations rates like Cuba (487) and Russia (611).58 Incarceration rates have risen for both blacks and whites, and blackwhite disparities in imprisonment are considerable. Figure 13 shows the cumulative risk of imprisonment for men aged thirty to thirty-four, by

54

black-white inequality 30 26.8 1945–1949 cohort 1975–1979 cohort

Percent

20

12.2 10.4 10 5.4 2.8 1.4 0 Whites

Blacks

Hispanics

Figure 13. Cumulative risk of imprisonment by age thirty to thirty-four for men born from 1945 to 1949 and 1975 to 1979, by race and ethnicity. Source: Western and Pettit 2010, 11.

race and Hispanic origin, for two cohorts of men—those born in 1945 to 1949 and those born in 1975 to 1979. Among the older cohort, 10.4 percent of black men had experienced prison by age thirty to thirty-four, compared to just 1.4 percent of white men. Among the younger cohort, over a quarter of black men had been in prison by that age, compared to one in twenty white men (and one in eight Hispanic men). The rates for high school dropouts are even more dramatic, as over two-thirds (68 percent) of black men without a high school degree born between 1975 to 1979 experienced some time in prison by the age of thirty to thirty-four (not shown in the figure). The percentage for white school dropouts is also high (28 percent), as for Hispanic dropouts (20 percent), but still considerably lower than the percentage among African Americans.59 This contributes to, and reflects, the challenge that young less educated men face in the labor market, and the black-white disparity in incarceration no doubt contributes to the black-white gap in economic achievement.

black-white inequality

55

I have been discussing human capital as an independent factor explaining black-white disparities. But human capital differentials themselves are affected by racism and discrimination, past and present. Discrimination in the housing market has contributed to racial residential segregation, which in turn affects schooling outcomes. For example, black and white home seekers are often steered to different kinds of neighborhoods (e.g., black home seekers are shown properties in predominately black neighborhoods), and this serves to reinforce residential segregation.60 Incarceration patterns (which contribute to human capital differentials) are likewise affected by discrimination in the law enforcement and penal systems. In a review of the literature on who goes to prison, Wakefield and Uggen conclude that while there is evidence that disadvantaged groups, such as African Americans, are more likely to be involved in criminal activity, imprisonment “is in part socially determined by the differential exposure to police surveillance, increases in the likelihood of charges resulting in convictions, differences in sentencing patterns, and a host of other structural factors.”61 In addition to human capital, social capital also helps explain racial differentials. Because African Americans often live in segregated and disadvantaged communities, they may have fewer economically useful contacts (i.e., social capital) on which to draw to help achieve success than whites. Many people, for example, find a job through word of mouth through friends and neighbors. Those with affluent friends and neighbors typically have access to more and better opportunities.62 The extent to which friendship networks are racially homogenous likewise affects the range of contacts that one could draw on when searching for work. So while it is likely that differences in social capital contribute to black-white differentials, the magnitude of the effect is unknown. Finally, some have attributed black-white inequality to cultural differences. Culture is often a politically loaded term in discussions of racial inequality. As discussed in chapter 2, cultural explanations have been criticized as being used to “blame the victim”—where poor people or minorities are blamed for their poverty because of their misplaced values and lifestyles, such as sexual promiscuity, criminal behavior, or drug use. Sociologists who invoke the importance of culture today typically also

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describe how structural conditions, such as deindustrialization, racial discrimination, and declining opportunities for less educated men, contribute to cultural behavioral responses, such as violence, criminality, and single parenthood.63 Family formation patterns are often thought to be shaped, at least in part, by culture. There is little doubt that differences in family structure today contribute to racial and ethnic socioeconomic differentials. While 36 percent of white births were to unmarried women in 2013, the figure was about double (71 percent) among African Americans (see figure 14).64 Note, however, that differentials by race have narrowed over the years. For example, while the percentage of births to unmarried women among blacks increased slightly by 4 percentage points from 1990 to 2013, among whites this figure increased by 16 percentage points (and from a much smaller base). Asians have the lowest rates of nonmarital childbearing, while the rate for Hispanics is between those of whites and blacks. More generally, differences in nonmarital childbearing contribute to socioeconomic inequalities because single-parent families are considerably more likely to be poor: about four in ten (40 percent) of female-headed families with children were poor in 2013, compared to fewer than one in ten (8 percent) of married-couple families with children.65 Single parents often struggle to earn sufficient income for their family while also providing an attentive, nurturing environment for their children. Single parenthood is thus strongly linked to many negative outcomes among children raised in such households, such as lower educational attainment and social and emotional problems.66 But there is still substantial debate on whether single parenthood produces poverty and inequality, or reflects it. That is, there is disagreement on the causal ordering of these phenomena. On the one hand, some argue that single parenthood has contributed greatly to poverty and inequality in American society, even among whites, where nonmarital childbearing has increased rapidly in recent years.67 Others counter that the decline in job opportunities for low-skilled men—a consequence of deindustrialization, globalization, and declining unionism—is the main driver of declining marriage rates. In addition, the high level of incarceration of young black men also affects marriage rates among African Americans.68 These trends have led to a reduction in the number of “marriageable” men.69

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black-white inequality 80 71

70 67

69

60 56 53

Percent

50 42

40

38

36

37 33

30 28 20

10

41

Black Hispanic All races White Asian

18 11

27

20

17

11 6

0 1970

1980

1990

1999

2013

Figure 14. Percentage of births to unmarried women, by race and Hispanic origin, 1970–2013. Sources: Ventura and Bachrach 2000; Martin et al. 2013.

Women, whose educational attainment and labor force participation has continued to increase, see fewer reasons to get married.70 Research on this issue tends to indicate that both culture and the changing economy have contributed to increases in nonmarital childbearing. A majority of people aspire to having children within a marriage, but it is nevertheless generally socially acceptable to have a child outside of marriage—and more so today than in the past. Nevertheless, the decline in marriage and increase nonmarital childbearing is also rooted in economic changes that have served to decrease the employment and earnings of men with less than a college degree at the same time as those of women have increased. The traditional economic foundations of marriage are weaker today than in the past.71 Other kinds of behaviors reflecting culture can also contribute to racial inequality, such as black youth dropping out of school at higher rates than whites, greater criminal activity, and early or unprotected sexual activity. But, as described earlier, those who study the role of culture in exacerbating black-white inequality for the most part emphasize that such

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behaviors occurs in a structural context that contributes to them, such as a declining economy, mass incarceration, failing schools, and residential inequities that reduce social capital. Thus, if young African Americans (or low-income whites) perceive a lack of opportunity for upward mobility, that may cause them to invest less in activities that might actually facilitate such mobility—education in particular—and engage in other kinds of behaviors that are really not in their long-term self interest or that of their children.72 So where does that leave us—how strong is the association between racial inequality and culture? What percentage of existing inequality can be attributed to cultural differences? The bottom line is that we simply don’t know. We can say that culture plays a role, though probably in concert with structural forces. For those of us who like numbers and the ability to calculate such relationships, this is not a wholly satisfying conclusion. The lack of quantification in this area is a function of the fact that culture is a complex, multidimensional concept and not easy to measure. There has been a resurgence of interest in understanding the role of culture in various social phenomena, and research in this area is likely to provide additional insights in the coming years.

con clu si o n Black-white inequality persists according to many measures of well-being. But in some important respects things have improved. Black-white disparities in education, poverty, residential segregation and residential attainment, and life expectancy have all narrowed over time, especially when considering the relative gaps between the two groups. Some gaps, however, have remained more stubborn, including median household income and wealth. And even where gaps have narrowed, progress has been slow and uneven. Many hoped and expected that the country would make greater progress in reducing black-white inequality by now. In 1903 W. E. B. DuBois predicted that the problem of the twentieth century would be the problem of the color line. Ninety years later historian John Hope Franklin, in a statement lamenting the lack of progress, argued, “The

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59

problem of the twenty-first century will be the problem of the color line. . . . By any standard of measurement or evaluation the problem has not been solved in the twentieth century and thus becomes a part of the legacy and burden of the next century.”73 So while some progress has been made, inequality persists. There are many factors that contribute to black-white inequality, including the legacy of historical discrimination that, for example, has resulted in black families accruing less wealth over time. In addition, studies have shown that present-day discrimination still significantly hampers black mobility. Other factors that remain important are human and social capital differentials, often aided and abetted by residential segregation, and behavioral differences (e.g., differences in rates of single parenthood) shaped in part by culture, though many argue that these behaviors themselves are at least in part responses to unequal structural conditions, such as poor schools, unequal treatment by law enforcement and other social institutions, and the lack of economic opportunities. African American economic mobility has also been hampered by economic changes and growing income inequality in the United States in recent decades. Deindustrialization and globalization have had a greater negative effect on less educated workers of all races, and African Americans have traditionally been overrepresented in low-skilled jobs. Thus, the struggle for equality has occurred during a period of economic change that has not been kind to people at the bottom of the economic ladder, as opposed to the post–World War II period in the 1950s and 1960s, when economic growth was rapid and income inequality was declining. Many researchers have thus emphasized that African Americans’ situation relative to whites has persisted because of multiple causes and cumulative ones as well. The former term refers to the multiple factors that contribute to black-white inequality described earlier. The latter reflects the fact that racial gaps can show up early in childhood and widen through the life course.74 For example, attending a low-quality public school can affect the probability that one attends college, which then affects employment, wages, and the probability that one will engage in illegal activity. Those with a prison record are in turn much less likely to find a good paying job.75

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The importance of multiple and cumulative factors suggests that there is no single easy solution to ending inequality. But it could be useful to address inequalities that occur early in life to reduce their cumulative nature. Reducing educational inequalities, such as those rising from significant disparities in the quality of public education, could help. This would increase opportunities for young men and women in the labor market and thus their future prospects.

4

Hispanics and Asians

All American families, except those who are wholly Native American, have an immigrant story to tell, whether they know it or not. For some, it is a story of allure—ancestors seeking new opportunities in a land full of natural resources and commerce. For others, it is a story of escape, such as fleeing religious or political persecution. For most blacks who came before the Civil War, it is a story of involuntary migration into servitude. Today, fortunately, most immigrants come to seek better opportunities in the United States or to join family members already living here, although a significant number also come as refugees escaping precarious conditions in their home country. Here is just one of these immigrant stories, related by Juan Roca, a young man whose parents immigrated from Mexico: As a teenager, my father left his life of poverty in Mexico for the promise of a new life in the United States in 1959. The hard, physical work of picking crops in the fields of California, Arizona and Texas, earned him less than a dollar a day, once room and board was subtracted. The Braceros program granted him a work visa and when he finished the program, he began his path to citizenship. My father did not complete any formal education past fourth grade. . . . Our upbringing was humble, but my parents provided for all 12 of us children. They taught each and every one of us the importance of 61

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education. Our childhood was filled with the joys of love, laughter and belief in God. . . . I excelled at school. I decided to take a chance and apply for college. I started at the University of Texas at San Antonio in fall 2002 and graduated with a bachelor’s degree in English and a Master’s in public administration. I was the first in my family to get a college degree—I’m the seventh out of 12 children. All of my siblings after me went to college and today we have a public administrator, a teacher and a medical school student in the family. I have given myself to a life of service. I am now responsible for helping many young children reach their potential and live a life our ancestors could only dream of. I am the dream. I am an American. And I am the proud son of an immigrant.1

This is obviously an immigrant success story—a traditional one that embodies, as explicitly described by Mr. Roca, the American Dream. This dream holds that any American, with determination and hard work, can succeed. While it is clear that European immigrants and their children who came in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by and large found success in the United States—they are now fully assimilated into the American mainstream—it is less clear whether immigrants and their children from the latest wave of immigration in the post–World War II period, mainly from Asia and Latin America, are fulfilling these dreams of upward mobility. Whether they are doing so is the focus of this chapter. Pairing Hispanics and Asians here at least in some ways is a study in contrasts. By some measures (such as rates of high school completion), Hispanics are faring quite poorly relative to most other groups, and Asians are faring quite well, as they surpass whites by a comfortable margin. But the Asians and Hispanics share many similarities as well. Both have long histories in the United States, and these histories include bouts with intense racism and discrimination. Patterns of socioeconomic achievement among both groups are also heavily influenced by immigration over the past several decades, since a significant percentage of both groups are composed of either immigrants themselves or children of immigrants. Patterns today are then also influenced by the characteristics of the immigrants, with high levels of socioeconomic achievement among native-born Asians strongly influenced by the relatively high levels of education of Asian immigrants, and the lower levels of socioeconomic achievement

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among native-born Hispanics likewise affected by the low levels of education among Hispanic immigrants. It is also important to recognize the diversity of experiences among these groups. Hispanics and Asians come from many different countries and under different conditions, so there is considerable variation in histories and outcomes within the two. For example, the experiences of the Japanese are quite different from those of the Hmong from southeast Asia, many who came as refugees in the wake of the Vietnam War. Likewise, the experiences of people of Mexican origin are quite different from those of immigrants coming from Cuba. The following sections of this chapter offer brief histories of Hispanics and Asians in the United States and examine patterns of socioeconomic achievement among them. I make broad generalizations about these panethnic groups, while also describing the variation by country of origin where possible (the data for specific ethnic groups are not available for all indicators). I then reflect back on the theories discussed in chapter 2, including human capital and social capital; the role of culture, racism and discrimination; and, finally, assimilation theory in explaining patterns and trends in achievement. My conclusion is that there is considerable evidence that both Asians and Hispanics have experienced upward mobility across generations, indicative of some measure of incorporation in the United States. Asians have achieved parity, or even an advantage, when compared to whites in terms of education, income, and other outcomes. This is true for most Asian groups. Among Hispanics, and particularly Mexicans, there is evidence of educational and income improvements from the first generation to the second, and to some extent beyond, but a gap in achievement between Hispanics and whites persists. Whether this gap will narrow in the future remains to be seen, though there are at least some indications that full incorporation may eventually occur, at least for many Hispanics.

hispanics in the united states: a brief history As the British and other European groups settled on the eastern seaboard of what later became the United States, the Spanish colonized much of

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Central and South America, as well as a significant portion of the Caribbean. There were a few Spanish settlements and missions in Florida, but the Spanish government eventually turned this territory over to the United States through the Adams-Onís Treaty in 1819. Mexico itself gained its independence from Spain after a protracted war from 1810 to 1821, and its population generally consisted of a mix of three groups: a Spanish-origin elite population; mestizos (those of mixed European and Indian ancestry), who were mostly landless but who occupied many middle-tier positions in society (working, for example, as craftsmen, soldiers, laborers, and traders); and, finally, Indians, who remained outside of Spanish-speaking society and who farmed land in a traditional manner.2 The Mexican government had a weak hold on its outlying states to the north in what is now California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The size of the Mexican population in these states was likewise modest but made important contributions to the development of the Southwest, such as through cattle ranching and mining. As U.S. citizens from the East poured into Texas and eventually began to significantly outnumber the Mexican population there, conflict increased, especially as the aggressive newcomers began to assert more control. In 1836 Texas proclaimed its independence from Mexico and beat back a Mexican effort to reclaim the land. Then, at the request of the Texans, the United States annexed this territory in 1845, precipitating the Mexican-American War. After the Mexican army was defeated in 1848, Mexico ceded territory to the United States in what is now California, New Mexico, Nevada, Arizona, Utah, and Colorado as part of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. This treaty also gave U.S. citizenship to the fifty thousand or so Mexicans who remained.3 Aside from frequent back-and-forth movement across border communities, the number of immigrants of Mexico in the United States was modest through much of the rest of the nineteenth century. Immigration increased considerably during the conflict and instability that accompanied the beginning of the Mexican Revolution in 1910. Immigrants from Mexico were also drawn to economic opportunities in railway construction, the expansion of commercial agriculture, and the development of manufacturing in the Southwest and other areas of the United States. Employers were also hungry for cheap labor. Mexican Americans were frequently treated as expendable, second-class citizens, often recruited

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during labor shortages but at other times encouraged to return to Mexico, sometimes by force. For example, during the early years of the Great Depression, from 1929 to 1935, at least 415,000 Mexicans were compelled to leave the United States.4 The next large period of large-scale immigration accompanied World War II, during a period of acute labor shortages in the United States, when many working-age men joined in the armed forces. The Bracero Program was implemented in 1942 to recruit Mexican workers to the agricultural industry, mainly in California, though some immigrants were brought in to work on railroad construction in other states as well. Conditions were generally poor for the workers, but the jobs often paid considerably more than they could earn back at home. The Bracero Program ended in 1964.5 Nevertheless, the number of Mexican immigrants to the United States continued to grow even after that time. In 2013 about 11.6 million Mexican immigrants lived in the United States, compared to 2.2 million in 1980.6 The presence of other Hispanic groups is more recent. Spain ceded Puerto Rico to the United States in 1898 as a result of its defeat in the Spanish-American War. In 1952 it was established as a commonwealth, in which it was a self-governing community voluntarily associated with the United States, with its own governor and legislature. Reflecting its status, Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens at birth (and have been since 1917). Puerto Rico underwent a period of industrialization and development in the post–World War II period. During this period of change and displacement, when, for example, the mechanization of the sugar industry reduced the number of jobs on farms, migration to the U.S. mainland increased rapidly. New York City became the main destination for these migrants; by 1970 New York had a population of 818,000 Puerto Ricans, compared to 463,000 in San Juan, the main municipality in Puerto Rico.7 While Puerto Ricans, compared to other Latino migrants, enjoy the benefit of U.S. citizenship at birth, the population is generally very racially mixed; many have some African ancestry, and darker-skinned Puerto Ricans in particular have encountered significant racial barriers.8 Cubans entered the United States in significant numbers after the Cuban Revolution in 1959. Many of these immigrants were highly educated professionals and business and political leaders who had been supporters of the deposed president and dictator, Fulgencio Batista, or who

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became disillusioned by the increasing repressiveness of the Castro regime as Fidel Castro consolidated political and economic power. By the 1970s the immigrant population from Cuba was becoming economically more diverse—with a substantial number from the working class—and thus more representative of the Cuban population as a whole. Another wave of Cuban immigrants entered in 1980 as part of the Mariel Boatlift, and this group was both racially and socioeconomically very mixed. In that year 803,000 Cubans, or about 8 percent of Cuba’s population, lived in the United States. Cubans overwhelmingly settled in Miami, and many found success as entrepreneurs and small-business owners.9 Immigration from the Dominican Republic to the United States also increased since the 1960s. The country experienced considerable economic growth, but also population growth, urbanization, significant income inequality, and political turmoil—all which contributed to immigration over several decades. Some Dominicans went to Miami and other destinations, but New York was by far the principal destination.10 Since the 1980s there has been a growth in the United States in the number of Latinos from a variety of origins, including El Salvador and Guatemala— two countries that have experienced considerable political instability (sometimes exacerbated by U.S. interference, as in the Dominican Republic as well). These patterns of migration have had a considerable impact on the demographic composition of the U.S. population. In 1970 just 5 percent of the U.S. population was Hispanic. By 2013 this had risen to 17 percent, and population projections suggest that perhaps 28 percent of the population might be Hispanic in 2050, though, as discussed in chapter 2, the actual percentage will depend on how data are collected in the future and changing patterns of self-identification, especially among people of mixedethnic origins.11 Table 1 provides greater detail about the composition of the Hispanic population, according to the 2010 census, and how this changed during the preceding decade. A significant majority of the Hispanic population is of Mexican origin (63.0 percent), with the next largest groups being Puerto Ricans (9.2 percent), Cubans (3.5), Salvadorans (3.3), and Dominicans (2.8). All countries of origin have seen demographic growth from 2000 to 2010, with particularly large increases, in percentage terms, for Uruguayans (from a very small population base),

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Hondurans, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans. Overall, the growth in the Hispanic population from 2000 to 2010 (43.0 percent) far exceeded the growth of the U.S. population as a whole (9.7 percent). While Hispanics are overrepresented in particular regions of the country, with different groups being concentrated in different specific areas due to historical circumstances, the Hispanic population is gradually spreading to new areas across the United States. For example, 11 percent of the Mexican origin population lived in the Los Angeles metropolitan area in 2010, down from 19 percent in 1990. Similarly, while 38 percent of mainland Puerto Ricans lived in the New York City area in 1990, by 2010 this figure was down to 20 percent. Mexicans can now be found in significant numbers in states where they had little historical presence, such as North Carolina and Georgia. A majority of Cubans now live outside of the Miami metropolitan area as well.12 Because of this spread, there are a growing number of communities across the United States with little recent experience with immigration now grappling with population growth and increasing diversity. Immigrants often bring economic vitality but can also strain resources, such as by increasing the need for more schools to meet the needs of immigrant children. Sometimes there is a wariness of the newcomers among the native population, a clash of cultures, or outright hostility. For example, in one study of people’s attitudes toward immigrants in a rural midwestern community that had a growing number of Hispanics working in a local food-processing plant, one respondent reported, “We used to feel like we knew everybody. I mean, you used to walk around town and you could walk down [Main Street], and you knew everybody, you knew all of the faces. And now, you don’t know all the faces and so, I think sometimes you feel a little isolated, or maybe vulnerable, just because you’re not familiar with that person’s background.” Others looked down on the newcomers: “A friend in town had a house for sale for I think over three hundred thousand. And unfortunately next door was a rental property with a, uh, Spanish-Mexican family, and they had about three cars in the yard. . . . It just looks bad. Three, two, cars . . . all covered in junk.”13 Wariness of immigrants is nothing new. Most immigrant groups, ranging from the Irish in the nineteenth century to Italians early in twentieth century, have faced a certain level of animosity, both in the form of

Table 1

Hispanic population by origin, 2000–2010 2000

Total U.S. population Hispanic Not Hispanic Hispanic population Mexican Puerto Rican Cuban Other Hispanic or Latino Dominican Central American (excluding Mexican) Costa Rican Guatemalan Honduran Nicaraguan Panamanian Salvadoran Other Central American

2010

Change, 2000–10

number

percent of total

number

percent of total

number

percent

281,421,906 35,305,818 246,116,088 35,305,818 20,640,711 3,406,178 1,241,685 10,017,244 764,945 1,686,937 68,588 372,487 217,569 177,684 91,723 655,165 103,721

100.0 12.5 87.5 100.0 58.5 9.6 3.5 28.4 2.2 4.8 0.2 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.3 1.9 0.3

308,745,538 50,477,594 258,267,944 50,477,594 31,798,258 4,623,716 1,785,547 12,270,073 1,414,703 3,998,280 126,418 1,044,209 633,401 348,202 165,456 1,648,968 31,626

100.0 16.3 83.7 100.0 63.0 9.2 3.5 24.3 2.8 7.9 0.3 2.1 1.3 0.7 0.3 3.3 0.1

27,323,632 15,171,776 12,151,856 15,171,776 11,157,547 1,217,538 543,862 2,252,829 649,758 2,311,343 57,830 671,722 415,832 170,518 73,733 993,803 -72,095

9.7 43.0 4.9 43.0 54.1 35.7 43.8 22.5 84.9 137.0 84.3 180.3 191.1 96.0 80.4 151.7 -69.5

South American Argentinian Bolivian Chilean Colombian Ecuadorian Paraguayan Peruvian Uruguayan Venezuelan Other South American Spaniard All other Hispanic

1,353,562 100,864 42,068 68,849 470,684 260,559 8,769 233,926 18,804 91,507 57,532 100,135 6,111,665

source: Ennis, Rios-Vargas, and Albert 2011, table 1. note: Percentages might not appear to sum to the total due to rounding.

3.8 0.3 0.1 0.2 1.3 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3 17.3

2,769,434 224,952 99,210 126,810 908,734 564,631 20,023 531,358 56,884 215,023 21,809 635,253 3,452,403

5.5 0.4 0.2 0.3 1.8 1.1 0.0 1.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 1.3 6.8

1,415,872 124,088 57,142 57,961 438,050 304,072 11,254 297,432 38,080 123,516 -35,723 535,118 -2,659,262

104.6 123.0 135.8 84.2 93.1 116.7 128.3 127.1 202.5 135.0 -62.1 534.4 -43.5

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violence against individuals and widespread discrimination against group members. Over time and across generations this hostility ebbed and group members experienced upward mobility and eventual incorporation. Whether this is also occurring among Hispanics is discussed after a brief review of Asian immigration to the United States.

asians in the united states: a brief history Among Asian groups, the Chinese were the first to immigrate to the United States in significant numbers around the time of the California gold rush in 1848. There was also considerable demand for cheap labor in the developing western part of the country. In the 1860s an estimated twelve thousand to sixteen thousand Chinese laborers were employed to build the western leg of the Central Pacific Railroad. Some Chinese also worked in agriculture, and others were entrepreneurs in San Francisco.14 In China there were also “push” factors that helped spur migration, including economic decline and civil conflict, resulting in part from the Opium War, in the 1840s and 1850s that opened China up to Western imperialism, led by Great Britain.15 The Chinese experienced considerable discrimination and violence in the United States as the community grew—they were viewed as economic competitors who would drive down the wages of native Americans— especially after the completion of the transcontinental railroad project in 1869. Nonwhite immigrants had long been excluded from naturalization, beginning with the Naturalization Act of 1790, which allowed only white immigrants to be eligible for citizenship. The Naturalization Act of 1870 expanded naturalization in the United States to “white persons and persons of African descent,” but other nonwhites remained excluded. Thus, Chinese immigrants were ineligible for citizenship and remained so until 1943 (though the principle of birthright citizenship regardless of race is anchored in the Fourteenth Amendment, passed after the Civil War, and affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1898 ruling, United States v. Wong Kim Ark). The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act went further, barring the immigration of all Chinese laborers. As sociologist C. N. Le notes, “Because they were forbidden from owning land, intermarrying with Whites, own-

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ing homes, working in many occupations, getting an education, and living in certain parts of a city or entire cities, the Chinese were, in effect, forced to retreat into their own isolated communities as a matter of survival. At the least, these first Chinatowns allowed them to make a living among themselves.”16 And because Chinese immigration was so heavily male, the Chinese population in the United States began to gradually decline until about 1920, after which it slowly rebounded due to natural increase.17 The first group of Japanese arrived in California around 1869, but the Japanese-origin population began to increase more markedly in the 1890s, first in Hawaii and then in the U.S. mainland. Most Japanese initially worked in agriculture, filling a strong demand for labor, though many went on to live in larger cities, including San Francisco and Los Angeles, and others became successful farm owners and entrepreneurs. Japanese immigrants, like the Chinese before them, faced many discriminatory laws and prejudices, including restrictions on homeownership and the ability to become citizens.18 White Californian workers and others eventually lobbied for their exclusion, culminating in the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1907. According to this bilateral agreement, the Japanese government agreed—under pressure—to stop issuing passports to Japanese laborers wishing to migrate to the United States. In 1913 and 1920 California enacted “alien land laws” aimed at Japanese American farmers, essentially barring them from purchasing and leasing agricultural land. The Japanese Americans, however, found ways to get around some of these obstacles, and many continued to prosper. Immigration from Japan was later completely halted in 1924.19 After the Japanese navy attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the Japanese-origin population came under intense scrutiny. As Le writes, “Combined with falsified reports of espionage and lobbying by White farmers in California, this racist paranoia culminated in President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066. This effectively revoked the rights of Japanese Americans as U.S. citizens and eventually led to about 120,000 Japanese Americans being rounded up and incarcerated in prison camps in nine states. The lives of Japanese Americans were devastated—not only was their economic well-being destroyed and their emotional security shattered, but there cultural traditions were severely damaged as well” in the communal camp conditions.20 While some noncitizen Germans and

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Italians were interred in the United States during World War II, this did not have the universality and racial character of Japanese American internment. A relatively small number of Koreans, perhaps about seven thousand, immigrated to the United States in the early twentieth century—mainly to Hawaii.21 Of greater demographic consequence, Filipinos began migrating to the United States in larger numbers in the wake of the American annexation of the Philippines in 1898. As residents of a U.S. territory, Filipinos traveled with U.S. passports and could migrate freely to both Hawaii and the U.S. mainland. In the 1920s and 1930 larger numbers came as farmworkers, filling in the kinds of jobs held by the Chinese and Japanese immigrants in previous years.22 Filipinos also faced a significant amount of prejudice and discrimination. For example, rigid antimiscegenation laws in a number of states barred interracial marriages with whites. Whereas immigration policies gradually became more restrictive in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century—such as in the form of the Immigration Act of 1882, which prohibited immigration from China, and the Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924, which greatly limited immigration from outside of northern and western Europe and the Americas— policies after World War II generally became less restrictive. One small step in this direction was the 1952 McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act, which generally retained discriminatory immigration quotas but allowed more exceptions and, importantly, abolished immigration and naturalization statutes that had limited naturalization to white immigrants only. This allowed Asian immigrants to officially receive the right to become naturalized U.S. citizens, though the number of such immigrants allowed to enter the United States remained very small. A more fundamental shift in U.S. immigration policy came in the form of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (also known as the Hart-Celler Act). This act eliminated the discriminatory national quota system that favored northern and western Europeans and instead allowed an annual quota of 20,000 immigrants for any country outside of the Americas, with a total cap of 170,000 annually. While there was a global ceiling of 290,000 immigrants annually, the actual number arriving has always been much greater. People exempt from quotas include spouses, parents, and unmarried minor children of U.S. citizens, as well as refugees and other smaller

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categories of immigrants.23 The most profound effect of the 1965 HartCeller Act was the surge of immigration from Asia that followed. This wave of Asian immigrants came from a variety of countries, including China, Japan, the Philippines, India, Vietnam, and Korea. Table 2 provides an overview of the Asian population by origin in 2000 and 2010. The first set of columns under “Asian alone” indicates that the percentage of U.S. population that identified as Asian but not as any other race group grew from 3.6 percent to 4.8 percent over the decade. Among these Asians, the largest countries of origin are China (24.1 percent of Asians were of Chinese origin in 2010), India (19.9 percent), Philippines (18.1), Vietnam (11.1), Korea (10.0), and Japan (5.7). Thus, unlike Hispanics, where Mexicans are by far the largest group, there is no dominant country-of-origin group among Asians. Most groups experienced considerable increases in population, with the exception of Japanese (and the small number who identified as Okinawans and Iwo Jimans). Among the largest groups mentioned earlier, Asian Indians grew the most rapidly and increased their share among Asians as a whole. The second set of columns shows those who identified as Asian, including those who might have marked another racial group as well (such as white or black). The number of Asians counted in this way is, by definition, as large or larger than the number of single-race Asians in the first set of columns. In 2010, 5.6 of the U.S. population identified as Asian alone or in combination with another group, and the growth of this population was even larger than the growth of the Asian-only population. Using the alone or in combination definition, the Japanese-origin population grew at a moderate clip from 2000 to 2010 (in contrast to the decline in the Japanese-origin population who identified as Japanese alone), indicative of the high rates of intermarriage and mixed-race offspring of such marriages. Otherwise, the patterns of growth across countries of origin do not differ that much across the two sets of numbers.

the well-being of hispanics and asians today Table 3 provides information on the characteristics of Hispanics by national origin. As discussed in chapter 3, Hispanics lag behind the

Table 2

Asian population by origin, 2000–2010 Asian alone

2000

Total U.S. population Asian population Asian Indian Bangladeshi Bhutanese Burmese Cambodian Chinese Filipino Hmong Indonesian Iwo Jiman Japanese Korean Laotian Malaysian Maldivian

Asian alone or in combination with another group

2010

2000

Number

% of total

Number

% of total

% change

281,421,906 10,242,998 1,718,778 46,905 192 14,620 183,769 2,564,190 1,908,125 174,712 44,186 18 852,237 1,099,422 179,103 15,029 29

100.0 3.6 16.8 0.5 0.0 0.1 1.8 25.0 18.6 1.7 0.4 0.0 8.3 10.7 1.7 0.1 0.0

308,745,538 14,674,252 2,918,807 142,080 18,814 95,536 255,497 3,535,382 2,649,973 252,323 70,096 2 841,824 1,463,474 209,646 21,868 102

100.0 4.8 19.9 1.0 0.1 0.7 1.7 24.1 18.1 1.7 0.5 0.0 5.7 10.0 1.4 0.1 0.0

9.7 43.3 69.8 202.9 9,699.0 553.5 39.0 37.9 38.9 44.4 58.6 -88.9 -1.2 33.1 17.1 45.5 251.7

2010

Number

% of total

Number

281,421,906 11,898,828 1,899,599 57,412 212 16,720 206,052 2,865,232 2,364,815 186,310 63,073 78 1,148,932 1,228,427 198,203 18,566 51

100.0 4.2 18.5 0.6 0.0 0.2 2.0 28.0 23.1 1.8 0.6 0.0 11.2 12.0 1.9 0.2 0.0

308,745,538 17,320,856 3,183,063 147,300 19,439 100,200 276,667 4,010,114 3,416,840 260,073 95,270 12 1,304,286 1,706,822 232,130 26,179 127

% of total

% change

100.0 9.7 5.6 45.6 18.4 67.6 0.9 156.6 0.1 9,069.3 0.6 499.3 1.6 34.3 23.2 40.0 19.7 44.5 1.5 39.6 0.6 51.0 0.0 -84.6 7.5 13.5 9.9 38.9 1.3 17.1 0.2 41.0 0.0 149.0

Mongolian Nepalese Okinawan Pakistani Singaporean Sri Lankan Thai Vietnamese Other Asian

3,699 8,209 6,138 164,628 2,017 21,364 120,918 1,169,672 162,913

0.0 0.1 0.1 1.6 0.0 0.2 1.2 11.4 1.6

15,138 57,209 5,681 382,994 4,569 41,456 182,872 1,632,717 238,332

0.1 0.4 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.3 1.2 11.1 1.6

309.2 596.9 -7.4 132.6 126.5 94.0 51.2 39.6 46.3

5,868 9,399 10,599 204,309 2,394 24,587 150,283 1,223,736 376,723

0.1 0.1 0.1 2.0 0.0 0.2 1.5 11.9 3.7

18,344 59,490 11,326 409,163 5,347 45,381 237,583 1,737,433 623,761

0.1 0.3 0.1 2.4 0.0 0.3 1.4 10.0 3.6

212.6 532.9 6.9 100.3 123.4 84.6 58.1 42.0 65.6

source: Hoeffel et al. 2012, table 6. note: The numbers by detailed Asian groups do not add to the total Asian population. This is because the detailed Asian groups are tallies of the number of Asian responses rather than the number of Asian respondents. Respondents reporting several Asian groups are counted several times. For example, a respondent reporting Korean and Filipino would be included in the Korean as well as Filipino numbers.

Table 3

Characteristics of Hispanics by national origin, 2010

U.S. population Hispanics Colombian Cuban Dominican Ecuadorian Guatemalan Honduran Mexican Peruvian Puerto Rican Salvadoran

BA degree (%)1

Median household income

Poor (%)

28 13 32 24 15 18 8 10 9 30 16 7

$49,800 $40,000 $49,500 $40,000 $34,000 $50,000 $39,000 $38,000 $38,700 $48,000 $36,000 $43,000

15 25 13 18 26 18 26 27 27 14 27 20

Foreign-born (%) Citizens (%)

13 37 65 59 57 65 67 67 36 67 1 62

93 74 66 74 70 60 49 47 73 62 99 55

Proficient in English (%)2

91 65 59 58 55 50 41 42 64 59 82 46

Homeowners (%)

Without health insurance (%)

Median age

65 47 49 57 24 39 30 29 50 49 38 42

16 31 28 25 22 36 48 50 34 30 15 41

37 2 34 40 29 31 27 28 25 34 27 29

source: Motel and Patten 2012, figs. 3, 4, 6–12. Their tabulations are from the 2010 American Community Survey summary files. 1 Educational attainment calculated for the population aged twenty-five and over. 2 Refers to those who speak English at home or speak English “very well.”

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general population in terms of educational attainment, median household income, and wealth. This table confirms this but also shows the variability in outcomes across groups. For example, while 28 percent of the U.S. population aged twenty-five and over has a bachelor’s degree, only 13 percent of Hispanics have a bachelor’s degree or more.24 This figure, however, ranges from a low of 7 percent among Salvadorans to 32 percent among Colombians. Notably, then, a larger percentage of Colombians have a college degree than the U.S. average. The figure among Mexicans, at 9 percent, is very low, and this helps explain the low figure for Hispanics as a whole. The rate of college completion for Cubans (24 percent) is below the national average, but only modestly so. The median household income figures and poverty rates are correlated with educational attainment. For example, the median household income among Hispanics as a whole ($40,000) is below the national average ($49,800), with most groups, including Mexicans, having incomes below the national median, but a couple of groups, such as Colombians and Ecuadorians, having median incomes that are almost the same as the national figure. The poverty rate for Colombians (13 percent) is below the national average (15 percent), though some groups, including Mexicans and Puerto Ricans (both at 27 percent) have poverty rates far above the national average. As will be discussed in more detailed, all these statistics might be affected by the fact that 37 percent of Hispanics are foreign-born. This ranges (with one exception), from 36 percent of Mexicans being foreignborn to 67 percent among Guatemalans, Hondurans, and Peruvians. The one exception is Puerto Ricans, who are U.S. citizens at birth, given the status of Puerto Rico as a U.S. territory. Table 3 also shows that a majority of all groups are U.S. citizens, with the exception of Guatemalans (49 percent) and Hondurans (47 percent). A majority of most groups are also proficient in English, though there is variability across groups, which is correlated with the percentage of foreign-born from each group. Homeownership is less common among all Hispanic groups than among the U.S. population as a whole, and this again may be affected by the fact that over a third of Hispanics are immigrants, as well as the low median household incomes of most groups. All groups except Puerto Ricans have lower rates of health insurance coverage than the U.S. population as a

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whole. Finally, all groups except Cubans have a lower median age than the U.S. population as a whole, indicating the young age of many immigrants and the higher levels of fertility among many of the Hispanic groups than among the rest of the U.S. population. Table 4 shows the characteristics of the Asian population for the six largest national origin groups. Here we see that all but one of the six groups have higher levels of education than the U.S. population. Specifically, while 28 percent of the U.S. population aged twenty-five and over has a bachelor’s degree, among Asian groups, this number ranges from 26 percent among Vietnamese to a high of 70 percent among Indians. All Asian groups have higher median household incomes than the U.S. population, ranging from $50,000 among Koreans to $88,000 among Indians. These high median incomes are reflected in low poverty rates as well. The percent of adults who are foreign-born range from a high of 87 percent among Indians to a low of 32 percent among Japanese, reflecting the longer history of the Japanese in the United States as well as the low levels of recent immigration from Japan. The high levels of achievement among Asian groups along with the high proportions born abroad for most of them indicate that Asian immigrants come with higher levels of education than Hispanic immigrants. Table 4 also shows that the variation in nativity across Asian groups is similar to the variation in citizenship and English proficiency. Finally, homeownership is modestly less prevalent among Asian adults than among all U.S. adults, likely reflecting the fact that many are foreign-born (including students and people with H1B visas) and perhaps also due to the fact that many live in high-cost areas. Among a few smaller Asian-origin groups not shown in the table, such as the Hmong and Cambodians, poverty rates are fairly high (about 20 to 28 percent), consistent with their low levels of education. Nevertheless, their median household incomes are close to the U.S. national average. Overall, while most Asian groups are faring well, on average, there is variation across groups.25

ex pl ai n i n g patt er n s of w el l-b ei n g Several factors could contribute to patterns and trends in the socioeconomic achievement of Hispanic and Asian groups in the United States.

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Table 4

Characteristics of Asians by national origin, 2010

U.S. population Asians Chinese Filipino Indian Japanese Korean Vietnamese

BA degree (%)1

Median household income

Poor (%)

28 49 51 47 70 46 53 26

$49,800 $66,000 $65,050 $75,000 $88,000 $65,390 $50,000 $53,400

15 12 14 6 9 8 15 15

ForeignProficient born Citizens in English Homeowners (%) (%) (%) (%)2

13 74 76 69 87 32 79 84

93 70 69 77 56 79 67 80

91 65 52 78 76 82 54 41

65 58 62 62 57 64 48 64

source: Data on Asian groups come from Pew Research Center 2013. Their calculations are based on analyses of 2010 American Community Survey Integrated Public Use Microdata Sample files. Data on the U.S. population come from Motel and Patten 2012. Their tabulations are from the 2010 American Community Survey summary files. 1 Educational attainment calculated for the population aged twenty-five and over. 2 Refers to those who speak English at home or speak English “very well.”

Here I begin with a discussion of racism and discrimination, followed by other explanations, including differences in human capital and social capital, the role of culture, and, finally, assimilation theory. The brief history of Hispanics and Asians in the United States included here describes how racism and discrimination shaped the early experiences of these groups. The Mexican-origin population, for example, were often regarded as second-class citizens in the border states in which they lived. Mexicans in the Southwest were largely segregated and had access mainly to inferior educational facilities. Today, discrimination is less blatant than in the past, but there are ways in which discrimination may occur. As sociologists Edward Telles and Vilma Ortiz argue, “For example, ideas about Mexicans as inferior leads to discrimination in the form of educators deciding to track individuals into less challenging curriculums on the basis of their race and holding Mexican-origin students to lower academic and social standards. Teachers often invest more in non-Hispanic white and Asian students, whom they expect to be more

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successful.” Telles and Ortiz also note that, on average, Mexican Americans have darker skin color than European ethnics (even though there is considerable variation among Mexicans), and there is greater discrimination against darker-skinned people than lighter-skinned ones in education, the labor market, and other social institutions, such as the criminal justice system and the housing market.26 With respect to Asians, contemporary discrimination may come in different forms. For example, a number of universities have been accused of instituting quotas on admissions of Asian students, such that Asians have to score higher than others students to get into elite colleges.27 Researcher Jonathan Zimmerman argues that Asians are the “new Jews on campus,” referencing quotas on the admissions of Jewish applicants in the middle decades of the twentieth century.28 Various Asian groups have faced hostility from the native population in different parts of the country where they have settled, ranging from the Hmong in Minnesota to Koreans in Los Angeles.29 In terms of people reporting having experienced discrimination, a survey from the Pew Center in 2013 indicated that 20 percent of Hispanics said that they had experienced discrimination or had been treated unfairly because of their race or ethnicity in the past twelve months—higher than the 10 percent figure for whites, though lower than the 35 percent figure among African Americans (figures for Asians were not reported in this survey).30 Another survey indicated that about three in five Hispanics believed that “discrimination against Latinos is a major problem in preventing Latinos in general from succeeding in America”; this varied by nativity, with under half of native-born Hispanics reporting this, compared to 70 percent of the foreign-born.31 In a different survey consisting of just Asian respondents, about 20 percent of Asians reported that they had personally experienced discrimination in the past year, ranging from a high of 21 percent among those of Chinese origin to a low of 9 percent among those of Japanese origin. About 13 percent reported that discrimination is a “major problem,” and another 48 percent that it was a “minor problem,” with 35 percent saying it was “not a problem.” Nevertheless, a greater proportion of Asians said that being Asian “helps” when it comes to admission into schools and colleges and finding a job (20 percent and 19 percent, respectively) more than it “hurts” (12 percent to both)—with most (about three in five) saying

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it makes no difference. About an even proportion said being Asian helps (14 percent) rather than hurts (15 percent) when it comes to getting a promotion, with most again believing it doesn’t make a difference.32 One careful study of the earnings of white and Asian men finds that, after taking into account a wide range of factors, including educational attainment, nativity, college major, region of residence, and other factors, nativeborn Asian men have slightly lower earnings than otherwise similar white men, though Asian men born abroad but schooled in the United States did not. It is thus not entirely clear about the extent to which discrimination reduces Asian American earnings, though its effect is likely modest.33 In a study of the second generation of young adults in several immigrant groups in New York City, including Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, West Indians, South Americans, Chinese, and Russian Jews, sociologist Philip Kasinitz and his coauthors find that native-born blacks and West Indians (which includes Haitians, most of whom are dark-skinned) report the most prejudice and discrimination, followed by Hispanic groups, then the Chinese, Russian Jews, and native-born whites. Among the Hispanic groups, the darker-skinned Puerto Ricans and Dominicans experienced more discrimination than lighter-skinned ones. This can occur in school, the workplace, in shopping areas, and encounters with the police. As Kasinitz and his coauthors note, “This expectation of trouble with the police has led some young people to avoid neighborhoods or situations where their race will stand out: r[espondent]: If I go to Bellevue I going to have problems ’cause the cops,

they’re racist up there. They don’t like dark-skinned people. Or Spanish. They don’t like them at all. So you try to keep yourself away from that area. Even now, even now you go up there, like I go up there, they’re gonna ask me “whatchu doin’ over here?” Or “whatchu want? I give you five minutes so you could get out of here. You don’t belong here.” For no reason. I thought it was a free country, you could go anywhere you want as long as you’re not messing with nobody, but they all used to kick us out so we just don’t go over there.34

In short, the evidence suggests that blacks face the most discrimination, followed by Hispanics (especially darker-skinned Hispanics), followed by

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Asians. We will return to this question about the extent to which discrimination may hamper the socioeconomic achievement of Hispanics and Asians after reviewing the evidence on the effects of other factors. The importance of human capital—one’s educational attainment and work experience—in determining other kinds of socioeconomic achievement, such as occupational attainment and income, is straightforward. One would expect that groups with higher average levels of human capital would fare well in terms of household income. Education is important for having access to professional occupations that pay more, on average, than blue-collar professions requiring relatively little education. Indeed, figure 4 from the previous chapter and tables 3 and 4 indicate that Asians have higher levels of educational attainment than Hispanics and whites and, unsurprisingly then, also have a higher median household income. Hispanic and Asian groups of national origins with higher levels of education also tend to have higher median incomes than those with lower levels. Thus, the extent to which human capital differentials across groups will converge in the future will help determine whether group differences in income will persist. As discussed in chapter 2, social capital refers to the resources people have due to their social networks. Immigrants typically rely on social networks and ethnic communities to adapt to their new country. As Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbaut argue, “Ethnic networks provide sources of information about outside employment, sources of jobs inside the community, and sources of credit and support for entrepreneurial ventures. Because isolating themselves from the influence of kin and friends is quite difficult for newcomers in the early stages of adaptation, the characteristics of the ethnic community acquire decisive importance in molding their entry into the labor market and hence their prospects for future occupational mobility.” The implication is that some groups might have stronger, more rewarding social networks than others, and this contributes to their socioeconomic achievement. But some have noted that strong social networks are not always positive—they can sometimes constrain people, impose conformity, and lock them into certain kinds of jobs in ethnic enclaves.35 Networks might not be that useful to low-income people if they connect them only to other people facing the same problems and challenges.

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On the whole, evidence suggests that social capital matters and likely contributes to the success of some groups more so than others. But the extent of the effect is not known or easy to measure. The positive effect of social capital sometimes comes in the form of reducing the vulnerability of members of better-off groups to trouble and downward mobility. For example, in their study of young adult children of immigrants in New York mentioned earlier, Kasinitz and his coauthors find that many of the second generation with strong social ties are less likely to find themselves permanently damaged by adolescent misbehavior than are the Puerto Ricans and native blacks who have fewer economic and family resources and even less societal good will to draw on when they get into trouble.36 Social capital also likely helps some Asian groups succeed in school and hence afterward in the labor market. For example, Chinese immigrants in New York City are socioeconomically diverse, but the group is relatively cohesive, with social networks that cross class lines. Knowledge about how school systems work and how best to navigate them and succeed is spread through the Chinese community, if not through personal social networks, then through Chinese-language newspapers and other ethnic organizations. As Kasinitz and his coauthors argue, “Working class Chinese second generation youth acquire social capital because they are embedded in a social structure—the networks encompassing their immigrant parents—with educational and class diversity. This social capital is not available to Dominican youth, whose parents’ community is homogenously poor, nor to South American youth, whose group exhibits less ethnic solidarity.”37 The emphasis that many Asian groups place on education might reflect, at least to some extent, a cultural attribute that contributes to socioeconomic mobility. In a study attempting to explain Asian Americans’ academic advantage over whites, sociologists Amy Hsin and Yu Xie examine the possible role of sociodemographic characteristics (e.g., family characteristics, such as marital status), cognitive ability, and academic effort. They find that greater academic effort among Asian students is the most important factor explaining the Asian academic advantage and further attribute this it to cultural differences in beliefs regarding the connection between effort and academic achievement, as well as immigrant status.38 The academic orientation is reflected in, and reinforced by, ethnic-specific

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resources such as supplemental schooling, private tutoring, and college preparation, facilitated by the strong social networks described earlier. The kind of knowledge of how to navigate through the system is often termed cultural capital. Thus, social capital and an academic cultural frame both facilitate upward mobility.39 Moreover, the stereotype of Asians as a “model minority”—a minority group with high achievement—may further reinforce educational achievement. Hsin and Xie argue, “These positive stereotypes may help bolster Asian-American achievement just as negative stereotypes have been shown to hinder the achievement of African-American youth. Positive stereotypes help frame Asian-American youths’ understanding of academic success as both attainable and expected of them. These positive stereotypes may also cause teachers to perceive and evaluate Asian-American students in ways that positively enhance their performance.”40 At the same time, Hsin and Xie acknowledge that this emphasis on education does not always make Asian youth happier—they report lower levels of subjective well-being than white youth—because of the pressure they feel to succeed. The strong cultural emphasis on academic success usually instilled in the children of Asian immigrants is likely rooted in the fact that Asian immigrants are a very selective group—they have higher levels of education than both native-born Americans of all other races and Asians in their own countries of origin.41 Asian immigrants are highly selective on skills in part because of the changes to immigration policy in 1965 that provided two important avenues for prospective immigrants to enter the United States: family reunification and occupation skills. Since there were relatively few Asians in the United States at that time, many were admitted on the basis of their skills. In contrast, a higher proportion of Hispanics, and Mexicans in particular, entered because they already had kin living in the United States. Unsurprisingly, immigrants who enter through the occupational-skills provisions have much higher education on average than those who entered on the basis of the family-reunification provisions.42 These high-skilled immigrants believe in the importance of education for achieving upward mobility and instill this in their children. This achievement has become attached to racial and ethnic identity. In some communities Asians are thought to be the smart superachievers, while whites are,

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relatively, slackers.43 In ethnographic work on this issue by Jennifer Lee and Min Zhou, one of their respondents, Debra, a young Chinese woman in Los Angeles who arrived in the United States at a young age, explains, Doing well in school is the Asian thing. You just see a lot more Asians being valedictorians, being top ten, never getting in trouble with the teachers, and entering into the good UC’s and the Ivy League schools. And I even heard jokes from my best friend, this Caucasian girl, she liked hanging around with Asians because she knew that Asians were good students. The ones that I hung around with ended up at Harvard, Stanford, Cal.44

As in work by sociologists Tomás Jiménez and Adam Horowitz, Lee and Zhou find that in Silicon Valley’s high schools, Asians are “cast as high-achieving, hard-working, and successful, while whites are stereotyped as low-achieving, lazy, and all too willing to settle for mediocrity— essentially flipping the traditional US hierarchy between the native-born white host society and the new Asian second-generation population.”45 Like the study by Hsin and Xie, Lee and Zhou find that their respondents internalize a considerable amount of pressure to succeed, have very high aspirations, and are thus sometimes not satisfied with their own achievements, no matter how much education they attain.46 They conclude that culture, but also ethnic resources, in terms of human, social, and cultural capital, helps Asians attain upward mobility in the United States. Assimilation, the last explanation for explaining patterns of group achievement, refers to the decline of distinctions between ethnic groups over time. These distinctions could refer to linguistic ones, such as the English-language proficiency of newcomers; socioeconomic ones (education, income, occupational attainment); residential segregation; culture; and the degree to which friendships and intermarriage occur across groups. The key empirical debate centers on the extent to which the post1965 wave of immigrants and their descendants are becoming incorporated into mainstream U.S. society. Complicating this issue is that a snapshot of a group at any given point in time sometimes can be misleading because it often does not provide a clear picture of trajectories. For example, Hispanics are clearly disadvantaged compared with the non-Hispanic white population when it comes to education, income, wealth, and other metrics. But the Hispanic

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Table 5

hispanics and asians

Characteristics of Hispanics and Asians by nativity, 2013 Hispanic

Share of group population Proficient in English (%)1 Education2 High school completion (%) College completion (%) Median household income Poor (%) Homeowners (%) Segregation from whites (D)3

Asians

nativeborn

foreignborn

nativeborn

foreignborn

65 89

35 70

26 95

74 53

81 18 $45,000 25 48 48

52 11 $38,000 24 43 60

95 49 $67,400 11 57 39

84 49 $65,200 12 58 48

sources: All estimates for Asians except for residential segregation are from Pew Research Center 2013, 10, and reflect 2010 characteristics; all estimates for Hispanics except for residential segregation are from Pew Research Center 2015d, tables 3, 8, 16, 31, 32, 37, and reflect 2013 characteristics. Residential segregation for all groups is from Iceland 2009, app. table B1. 1 Refers to those who speak English at home or speak English “very well.” 2 Educational attainment calculated for the population aged twenty-five and over. 3 Residential segregation is measured with the dissimilarity index. These calculations are based on summary file data from the 2000 census.

population is heterogeneous and includes both foreign-born Hispanics— who come to the United States with very low average levels of education— and native-born Hispanics, who might look very differently. Thus, we must go beyond examining Hispanics as a whole and investigate generational differences. Table 5 sheds light on this issue by showing a few indicators of integration for both Hispanics and Asians. Among both groups, the native-born are advantaged compared to the foreign-born across most indicators, illustrating some measure of integration. For example, native-born Hispanics are more likely to be proficient in English and to have completed high school and college than foreign-born Hispanics. They also have a higher median income, are more likely to be homeowners, and are less residentially segregated from non-Hispanic whites than foreign-born

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Hispanics. Poverty rates are about the same for both groups. The differences between the native- and foreign-born among Asians are smaller, as both groups tend to display high levels of socioeconomic achievement. In fact, while greater English proficiency and less residential segregation across generations is clearly indicative of greater integration among Asians, it is not entirely clear what assimilation should look like when using some of the other indicators. If assimilation refers strictly to a reduction of group differences over time, then greater incomes among nativeborn Asians than foreign-born Asians would actually represent an augmentation of difference with non-Hispanics whites. But if we use the terms integration or incorporation to more loosely refer to socioeconomic achievement that is not altogether impeded by race, ethnicity, or origin, then we can say that some important measure of incorporation has occurred. Many studies using other data and methods have also tended to find important gains in socioeconomic achievement between the first and second generations among both Hispanics and Asians.47 Even so, the findings in table 5 still don’t resolve the broader debate about immigrant incorporation. Among Hispanics in particular, even though there are some improvements in education and income from the first generation to the second, levels of achievement still lag behind those of non-Hispanic whites. Poverty among native-born Hispanics is still fairly high. Hispanics sometimes face substantial hostility in a number of communities, including new destinations that have little recent experience with immigration.48 In addition, some studies cast doubt on whether there is significant additional improvement in the well-being of Hispanics between the second generation and the third and higher ones.49 For example, in their analysis of data collected from respondents in Los Angeles and San Antonio, Telles and Ortiz assert that while cultural, social, and political assimilation occurred slowly and continuously, economic assimilation stalled after the second generation.50 Some studies indicate that the fact that many Latino immigrants—and Mexicans in particular—arrive as undocumented immigrants slows the incorporation process.51 Lacking documentation inhibits access to all kinds of resources that could facilitate upward mobility, such as financial services, legal protections, and good jobs in the formal labor market.

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One challenge in tracking Hispanic socioeconomic achievement among those of the third generation and higher (and this applies to Asians as well), is that intermarriage can cause ethnic attachments to fade across generations. Economists Brian Duncan and Stephen J. Trejo find that among third-generation children with at least one Mexican grandparent, 19 percent no longer identify as Hispanic. These percentages are higher for those with at least one Dominican grandparent (30 percent) or Puerto Rican grandparent (40 percent), and even higher for other groups. These patterns of ethnic “attrition” (no longer identifying with a particular group) are more common among children with mixed parental origins. Moreover, these children of Hispanic origin who no longer identify as Hispanic have parents with higher levels of socioeconomic achievement on average than those children who continue to identify as Hispanic. This indicates that conventional surveys understate the extent to which third generation and higher people of Hispanic origin are achieving upward socioeconomic mobility. In fact, among Asians, the opposite is true—those of some Asian origin who no longer identify as Asian have parents with lower levels of socioeconomic achievement, suggesting that conventional surveys may somewhat overstate the extent of upward mobility among individuals with some Asian origin.52 Overall, while a debate continues among social scientists about the extent of economic incorporation of Hispanics, studies of nationally representative data tend to illustrate slow but steady generational progress.53 But the incorporation process could take longer for Mexicans than for many other immigrant groups because of the low socioeconomic starting point of Mexican immigrants combined with the fact that many are in the United States without valid visas. Thus, Joel Perlmann, in a careful comparison of the Mexican-origin population with Italians and other southern and eastern European groups a century ago, concludes that Mexican socioeconomic mobility is slowly progressing such that it may take them “four or five generations rather than three or four to reach parity with the native-white mainstream.”54 Finally, it is worth considering the possibility that we might see a difference of outcomes among Hispanics based on skin color. Darker-skinned Latinos are more likely to experience discrimination and identify as a “racialized minority”—a group distinct from the American mainstream,

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and certainly from the white mainstream.55 In contrast, lighter-skinned Latinos may be more likely to consider themselves as essentially racially white and ethnically Latino or of a specific country of origin.56 This is more or less what occurred to other white ethnic groups (such as Italians) who initially viewed themselves—and were viewed by others—as distinct outsiders and only after time became part of the mainstream.57 For example, a NBC news story about the diversity of the Latino population highlights the experiences of one woman, Julie M. Rodriguez, which illustrates the complexity of identity among many Latinos: “I am light-skinned, so people often forget that I am Latina. I’ve been around extended family members who made racist comments, not realizing that they were offending me. . . . Then I point out, ‘Hey, you are talking about me right now.’ It gets awkward and everyone apologizes.”58 Yet Rodriguez, who lives in the San Francisco Bay area, said she doesn’t fully connect with other Latinos because she doesn’t speak Spanish. “If I go to a Spanish grocery store, people try to talk to me. I am embarrassed to say that I sometimes feel a need to shut them down pretty quickly, because I don’t speak Spanish beyond a few phrases. I’ve always related to people from mixed backgrounds because we didn’t fit the stereotypes together. . . . It can be just as hard to connect with Latinos as it can be to connect with white Mormons. I am not quite in either space. I feel like I am between both worlds,” said Rodriguez, whose family, including her Mexican grandparents, are Mormon and who was raised in Utah and later Colorado.59

co n clu s i o n Asians and Latinos have a long history in the United States. But because of increases in immigration since the 1960s, a significant percentage of both groups are either foreign-born or of the second generation. Thus, it is imperative to take into account patterns of immigration to assess how well each group is doing over time and across generations. In addition, it is important to be cognizant of the diversity of experiences among Asians and Hispanics, as they hail from many different countries in Asia and Latin America.

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This chapter has shown that most Asian groups have relatively high levels of education and high median household incomes—often higher than non-Hispanic whites—indicative of successful economic incorporation. In contrast, most Hispanic groups have lower levels of education and income than non-Hispanic whites. What explains these differences across groups? I reviewed several factors, including human capital and social capital; the role of culture, racism, and discrimination; and, finally, assimilation theory. All likely play some role in explaining patterns of attainment. Starting with human capital, Asian immigrants arrive, on average, with high levels of education, while Hispanics immigrants come with relatively low levels. This helps explain the relatively high household median income among Asians and the low income among many Hispanic groups. With regard to social capital, Asian immigrant networks also provide critical information about educational opportunities and how to navigate the public school system for less educated immigrant parents. These kinds of networks are less extensive among Hispanic groups. Asian immigrants also place significant emphasis on educational attainment (a cultural attribute) as the vehicle for upward mobility, and this is transmitted to their children. This emphasis on education may reflect the fact that these immigrants have much higher average levels of education than people from their original home country (i.e., they are “positively selected,” as termed in the academic literature), and they instill their value of it in their children. In contrast, some groups of Hispanic immigrants, such as Mexican immigrants, have lower levels of education than people from their country of origin, and this might help explain differences in educational aspirations between Asians and Hispanics. Both Hispanics and Asians have experienced racism and discrimination in the United States, historically and today. The extent to which it affects the social and economic incorporation of these groups is not altogether clear. For Asians, it appears that discrimination is not widespread enough to greatly reduce average levels of socioeconomic achievement, though it could hamper them from attaining top managerial positions (though more research on this issue would be helpful).60 For Latinos, it likely plays a larger role, especially among darker-skinned Latinos. Finally, assimilation also helps explain some of the observed patterns of achievement. Among both Asians and Hispanics, the second generation tends to

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outperform the first one in terms of income and education. This is particularly evident among Hispanics, since immigrant parents tend to have quite low levels of education and income. But despite generational improvement, Hispanic socioeconomic levels among the second and greater generations still lag behind non-Hispanic whites. This in part reflects the low starting point among Hispanic immigrants and is exacerbated by the undocumented status of many immigrants from Mexico and Central America. While debates continue on whether Hispanics will eventually catch up to non-Hispanic whites, there is reason to believe that such progress will continue, albeit slowly. Among Asians, the generational improvement is often small, given that Asian immigrants already have high levels of education and income, though there is some variability by country of origin. Thus, despite challenges and obstacles, Asians have achieved considerable upward mobility and incorporation in the United States, even if such incorporation is as yet incomplete.

5

American Indians

There is a large literature on the history of American Indians in the United States.1 Various works have described the conflicts between encroaching white settlers and various tribes and the appalling treatment of American Indians at the hands of the U.S. government. Other books have provided detailed descriptions of life on Indian reservations and the rich and varied cultures of the Native American population today. Some of these books are historical, others are sociological and ethnographic, and yet others are literary. We thus know much about the American Indian experience from many different perspectives. Writing about American Indians from a demographic perspective, however, is challenging. First, because of the relatively small size of this population (about 1 to 2 percent of the U.S. population), most nationally representative surveys do not collect reliable information about American Indians. The best source of demographic data on this group comes from the decennial census and the American Community Survey. These large surveys collect useful but somewhat limited information about the U.S. population. The second challenge in providing a demographic portrait of American Indians relates to the issue of identity. Who is an American Indian? According to information collected in government household sur92

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veys (such as the census), all individuals who report that they are American Indian in response to the race question are counted as such. But methods for enumerating American Indians and patterns of self-identification among people with some American Indian origin have changed over time, making it difficult to discern trends in the well-being of American Indians. In recent decades more people have reported being American Indian than would be expected, given recorded patterns of fertility and mortality, indicating that it has become more common to assert an American Indian racial identity than in the past. In addition, beginning with the 2000 census, people could report more than one race on the census form, and there are a significant number of individuals who say they are American Indian and another group as well. It thus makes a difference as to which set of individuals one considers when describing the American Indian population. This chapter addresses these data issues when describing the wellbeing of American Indians today. The next section of this chapter provides a brief historical overview of American Indians in the United States, focusing on the population decline, then growth, of this group. This is followed by an examination of patterns of identification among people with American Indian heritage, a description of this group’s socioeconomic profile, and a discussion of the factors that help explain this profile. I also discuss how the socioeconomic status of American Indians varies by whether we consider people who identify as only American Indian or as American Indian along with another race. I also discuss some differences in well-being among those who live on and off Indian reservations. Overall, we see that American Indians continue to experience, on average, low levels of educational attainment and income and high levels of poverty. A legacy of past racism, contemporary discrimination, and continued spatial and economic social isolation especially on and around reservations likely explain the disadvantaged position of many American Indians today.

historical overview American Indians originally migrated to the Americas from Asia across present-day Alaska and Canada perhaps as early as forty thousand years

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ago (though there is controversy about the timing), followed by subsequent waves twelve thousand years and nine thousand to ten thousand years ago.2 Scholars differ on how many American Indians lived in the territory that is now the United States at the time when European explorers first reached the Americas in 1492. Any estimation involves making a number of assumptions, and estimates have ranged from as low as one million to a high of eighteen million. The consensus among scholars today puts the number at between two million to a little over five million.3 The largest American Indian populations in the Americas included the Aztecs in Mexico, the Mayas in Mexico and Central America, and the Incas in the Andean region, though there were also some large civilizations in what is now the United States. These included, for example, the Hopewell people, who flourished from about 300 b.c.e. until 700 c.e. in Illinois, Ohio, eastern Missouri, and the upper Mississippi Valley. Very little is known about why the Hopewell culture declined.4 At the time when European settlers first had contact with Indian tribes in the Southwest (via Mexico) and the East Coast, there were hundreds of robust tribes across the United States. Indigenous peoples’ contact with the European explorers and settlers proved to be devastating, both demographically and otherwise. The American Indians were exposed to new diseases, such as smallpox, measles, the bubonic plague, cholera, and typhoid (among others), to which they had little immunity. For example, not long after contact with the Pilgrims, a series of epidemics obliterated eleven Massachusetts Indian towns along the coast.5 These diseases, along with warfare, displacement, and hardship, decimated the American Indian population over time. There is some debate among scholars about the extent to which epidemics were the principle cause for depopulation. While considerably more American Indians died directly from disease than warfare, the effects of epidemics were exacerbated by social disruption—in the form of population relocation, forced labor, and dietary changes—resulting from conflict with whites.6 The American Indian population also moved westward over time. For example, American Indian tribes in the South and in the Ohio River valley were removed by force beginning in the early nineteenth century. This continued with the Indian Removal Act, signed by President Andrew Jackson

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in 1830, which called for the relocation of tribes living in the eastern United States to lands set aside for them west of the Mississippi River (these lands were often taken away immediately after resettlement).7 Among the most notorious of these forced migrations was the “Trail of Tears,” which moved thousands of members of Cherokee, Muscogee, Seminole, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Nations from their homelands in southeastern United States to areas designated as Indian Territory in present-day Oklahoma. As one contemporary witness of the rounding up of American Indians for the removal reported, Under [Gen. Winfield] Scott’s orders the troops were disposed at various points throughout the Cherokee country, where stockade forts were erected for gathering in and holding the Indians preparatory to removal. From these, squads of troops were sent to search out with rifle and bayonet every small cabin hidden away in the coves or by the sides of mountain streams, to seize and bring in as prisoners all the occupants, however or wherever they might be found. Families at dinner were startled by the sudden gleam of bayonets in the doorway and rose up to be driven with blows and oaths along the weary miles of trail that led to the stockade. Men were seized in their fields or going along the road, women were taken from their wheels and children from their play. In many cases, on turning for one last look as they crossed the ridge, they saw their homes in flames, fired by the lawless rabble that followed on the heels of the soldiers to loot and pillage.8

An estimated four thousand to eight thousand Cherokees died from hunger, disease, mistreatment by soldiers, and exhaustion during this forced migration.9 As one Cherokee woman who made the journey as a child recalled, My father had a wagon pulled by two spans of oxen to haul us in. Eight of my brothers and sisters and two or three widow women and children rode with us. My brother Dick, who was a good deal older than I was, walked along with a long whip which he popped over the back of the oxen and drove them all the way. My father and mother walked all the way also. The people got so tired of eating salt pork on the journey that my father would walk through the woods as we traveled, hunting for turkey and deer which he brought into camp to feed us. Camp was usually made at some place where water was to be had and when we stopped and prepared to cook our food, other emigrants who had been driven from their homes without opportunity to secure cooking utensils came to our camp to use our pots and kettles. There was

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much sickness among the emigrants and a great many little children died of whooping cough.10

Wars between the U.S. government and Indian tribes continued through the middle decades of the nineteenth century. For example, the Dakota War of 1862 (also known as the Sioux Uprising), sparked by continued treaty violations by the U.S. government, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of U.S. soldiers and settlers and ended with the execution of thirty-eight Dakota tribesmen in Mankato, Minnesota.11 A little over a decade later the Great Sioux War of 1876–77 (also known as the Black Hills War) erupted. This conflict was precipitated by a gold rush and influx of miners in the Black Hills, where the Lakota Sioux and Northern Cheyenne tribes lived. The U.S. government protected the settlers and sought to wrest ownership of the land away from the tribes. It was during this war when Lt. Col. George Custer made his infamous “last stand” at the Battle of Little Bighorn, and his cavalry unit was routed and destroyed. Eventually, with their superior resources the U.S. Army overwhelmed and defeated the American Indian tribes, and the war ended with an agreement that ceded the territory to the U.S. government.12 With all the war, disease, and displacement, the American Indian population eventually reached its numerical low point in 1900, when about 237,000 were counted in the census. As the scholar Donald Fixico writes, by the end of the nineteenth century, “disease, poverty, and despair spread throughout Indian reservations which, for many, resembled prisoner of war camps.”13 Since 1900, however, the American Indian population has rebounded (see figure 15), probably in part because of the end of warfare and the reduction in extreme social dislocation that went with armed conflict. Growth initially was slow in the early decades of the twentieth century, which included a small dip in the population between 1910 and 1920 due to a global influenza epidemic in 1918. As population growth resumed thereafter, American Indians also became increasingly urbanized. One factor precipitating this was the participation of many American Indians in the World War II effort, either in the military service or in war-related industries, such as in munitions plants, located in urban areas. In the 1950s the federal government implemented a series of policies, which became known as “Termination and

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Figure 15. American Indian population in the United States, 1890–2010 (in thousands). Sources: Data for 1890–1990 from Campbell and Jung 2005, table A-1; data for 2000 and 2010 from Norris, Vines, and Hoeffel 2012, table 1. Note: Alaska Natives are added to the American Indian category, beginning in 1960.

Relocation,” that aimed to dissolve the reservation system and help American Indians move to selected urban locations and assimilate. Between 1952 and 1972 approximately one hundred thousand American Indians were relocated to cities such as Los Angeles and Chicago. This program was widely attacked by American Indian advocacy groups and was later repudiated and abandoned in the 1970s, as the government moved away from assimilation-focused policies to ones that accepted American Indian sovereignty.14 American Indian population growth was particularly rapid after 1950, surpassing 1.0 million in the 1980 census and reaching 5.2 million in 2010, if one counts all people who reported on the race question on the census form that they were at least part American Indian. The number who reported being American Indian alone (and no other race) was 2.9 million in 2010. What explains the rapid growth of the American Indian population over the past sixty-plus years? Some of the growth was

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a result of natural increase—more births than deaths—stemming from medical advances, public health measures, and greater access to health care that improved the health and life expectancy of American Indians— and all Americans.15 For example, the life expectancy of American Indians rose from just 52.0 years in 1940 to about 71.5 years by the late 1980s (both of these estimates are based on imperfect data), though this still lagged behind that of whites (75.6) at that time.16 The numbers shown in figure 15 are also heavily influenced by how people perceive and measure racial and ethnic identity. Since the 2000 census, data on American Indians were collected with a question asking, “What is this person’s race? Mark one or more boxes.” There was a check box for “American Indian or Alaska Native” and then a line where the respondent is asked to “print name of enrolled or principal tribe.” So today the population count of different racial groups generally is based on selfidentification, and respondents can mark as many races as they wish. But this has not always been the case. In fact, it was not until the 1960 census when people were asked to selfidentify their race on the census form. Before that time, it was census enumerators, who went door-to-door to count the population, who made that determination. Thus, the large increase in the American Indian population from 1950 to 1960 could partially be explained by the fact that census enumerators before 1960 sometimes mistakenly misidentified a number of individuals who considered themselves to be American Indians as nonIndian. For example, American Indians living in places far from reservations were often miscoded. In addition, enumerators were instructed to code a person as American Indian only if they were enrolled in a tribe or recognized as an American Indian in their community.17 The large increase in the number of American Indians continued in the decades after 1960, and some of this has been driven by changing patterns of self identification. With the growth of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, disadvantaged groups more forcefully asserted their rights and expressed pride in their heritage, in the form of the black, Chicano, and American Indian power movements.18 One of the catalysts of the American Indian movement was the occupation of Alcatraz Island in San Francisco Bay in 1969 by a number of activists who sought to dramatize issues related to land and treaty law that had deprived American

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Indians of their homelands. The renewed emphasis on pluralism rather than assimilation also led to a reassertion of Indian identity and to a growing number of people who felt proud to identify as such. As sociologists Carolyn Liebler and Timothy Ortyl state, “Negative stereotypes and cultural repression that previously curbed identification have waned such that lifetime American Indians are [now] more willing to publically embrace this identification.”19 The growing appeal of identifying as American Indian extends to those who have only some American Indian heritage. High rates of American Indian intermarriage with non-Indians over the centuries means that there are millions of people with at least some American Indian heritage.20 Among some of these individuals, their American Indian identity is “symbolic”—analogous to the way that many white Americans identify with their generationally distant European roots (e.g., Italian, German, Greek)—rather than representing a deep connection to American Indian culture or a specific tribal community.21 For example, in one survey of multiracial adults, among those who reported that they were a combination of white and American Indian, just 22 percent said that they had a lot in common with American Indians, while 61 percent said they had a lot in common with whites. Likewise only 19 percent reported that they had a lot of contact with relatives who identified as American Indian.22 A number of African Americans also have some American Indian ancestry. Some of the American Indian tribes in the South, such as the Cherokee, had close relations with African Americans (and some participated in slavery), and this led to intermarriage and the growth of this mixed-race population.23 More generally, the racial identity of many multiracial individuals with some American Indian ancestry is fluid. They may report being American Indian at one particular point but not another, as indicated by surveys that have matched respondents’ reports of their race over time. This occurs more frequently among American Indians than most other racial and ethnic groups.24 Overall, it has been estimated that about 45 percent of the growth in the American Indian population between 1960 and 1990 is attributable to an increase in self-identification rather than natural increase.25 Likewise, in the 2000 census there were 63 percent more American Indians aged ten and over than expected, given the size of the American Indian population

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in 1990 and observed patterns of mortality during the 1990s.26 This again is a huge difference, aided by the fact that people could choose more than one race beginning in 2000 but could not do so before, when they had to choose one, and only one, race response on the census form. Finally, the count of American Indians from household surveys differ from the number enrolled in specific tribes. Tribes enroll members based on membership requirements. Being enrolled in a federally recognized tribe allows an individual to have access to benefits provided by the U.S. government to tribes or provided by the tribes themselves.27 Counts from tribal enrollments tend to be considerably below the counts of American Indians in the census. Most of the information in this chapter comes from the census and American Community Survey, which also provide additional information about characteristics of individuals and their households (such as their education and income). No one source is necessarily better than another—it depends on what population one wishes to consider. While government surveys may include some people in the American Indian category with an uncertain connection to American Indian culture and communities, tribal membership rolls may miss many people who consider themselves to be at least part American Indian.28

american indians today According to the 2010 census, 5.2 million people were American Indian alone or in combination with another race group, representing 1.7 percent of the U.S. population. Of these, 3.4 million reported identifying with one specific tribe. The number who reported being American Indian alone was 2.9 million, or 0.9 percent of the U.S. population.29 Note that both of these counts of the American Indian population from the census are higher than the 2.0 million count of American Indians who are registered as members of federally recognized tribes (or 0.6 percent of the U.S. population).30 Returning to the census data, the most common tribal groups reported in 2010 were Cherokee (819,000), Navajo (332,000), Choctaw (196,000), Chippewa (171,000), Sioux (170,000), Apache (112,000), Blackfeet (105,000), Creek (88,000), and Iroquois (81,000).31 Respondents who listed a tribe on the census form were more likely to report being American

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Indian only (and not in combination with another race group), live on a reservation, and speak an American Indian language, thus suggesting that they had a stronger American Indian identity than those who reported being American Indian and another race.32 About one in three single-race American Indians live on an Indian reservation or an Alaska Native village, indicating that most American Indians live off reservations. An even smaller percentage (22 percent) of those who are American Indian alone or in combination with another group live on an Indian reservation or in an Alaska Native village.33 Not included on the list of the most common tribes, but one that many respondents reported on the census, is “Mexican American Indian.” There is no such tribe. Rather, this likely reflects the substantial number of Mexican Americans, and Hispanics more generally, who identify as being at least part American Indian in the census. Many Latin American countries have significant indigenous populations, and there has also been considerable mixing of people of Spanish and indigenous descent over the centuries. In part because of the rapid growth of the Hispanic population in the United States and also some changes in enumeration rules, the Hispanic share of the American Indian alone population has increased from 8 percent in 1990 to 23 percent in 2010.34 In a story about the growth in the Mexican-American Indian population, the New York Times interviewed a number of participants at Carnaval, a festival in New York City celebrating indigenous culture: When Fernando Meza is asked about his identity, “I tell them that I am Indian,” said Mr. Meza, a parade participant from the Tlaxcala tribe. “They say, ‘But you’re Mexican.’ And I say, ‘But I’m Indian.’ ” Mr. Meza represents one of the changes to emerge from the 2010 census, which showed an explosion in respondents of Hispanic descent who also identified themselves as American Indians. . . . The American Indian totals are still a small fraction of the overall Hispanic population of the United States, which eclipsed 50 million this year. But the blip in the census data represents raised awareness among native Latinos who believe their heritage stretches farther back than the nationalities available on the census form. The trend is not occurring solely among newcomers to the United States. Nancy Perez, who shares her household in Ditmas Park with her sister and parents, held a family meeting to decide how they should identify

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Figure 16. American Indian socioeconomic status compared with other groups, 2013. Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2014a. Notes: Educational attainment is calculated for the population aged twenty-five and over. Estimates for whites, blacks, and Asians are for single-race individuals (regardless of Hispanic origin). Hispanics may be of any race.

themselves in the census. Her parents moved to the United States from Puebla, Mexico, in the 1970s, and although her family was mixed, “if you go back far enough, we are indigenous,” Ms. Perez said. American Indian, they decided, made the most sense.35

Figure 16 provides a 2013 snapshot of the socioeconomic status of American Indians compared with other groups. It includes two definitions of this population: (1) American Indian alone (with no other race) and (2) American Indian alone or in combination with another race. American Indians are, on average, disadvantaged when compared to most other groups, regardless of how the group is defined. The median household incomes for American Indians alone and American Indians alone or in combination with another group were $37,000 and $39,000, respectively. Both of these figures were well below the $56,000 among whites and $72,000 among Asians. The median for American Indians is also

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lower than that of Hispanics too ($42,000), though slightly higher than that of blacks ($35,000).36 The poverty rates among American Indians alone, and alone or in combination with another race group (29 and 26 percent, respectively), are similar to that of African Americans (28 percent) and higher than those of other groups. A low percentage of American Indians have a bachelor’s degree (14 and 18 percent), though their rate of homeownership (54 and 52 percent) is higher than among blacks and Hispanics and almost as high as among Asians (58 percent). Whites have the highest levels of homeownership (69 percent). Other studies also indicate that American Indians are less likely to be employed than whites and are considerably more likely to live in households headed by a single parent with children.37 These inequalities are reflected in various health indicators as well. American Indians have higher preterm birthrates (13.6 percent) than whites (10.8 percent) or Asians (10.7 percent), higher infant mortality rates (8.4 infant deaths per 1,000 live births) than whites (5.5).38 Data on mortality and life expectancy for American Indians, however, are often of uncertain quality due to challenges in accurately identifying this population by funeral directors or attending doctors who assign race at death.39 It is likewise difficult to discern trends in well-being among the American Indian population, largely because of the aforementioned changes in patterns of self-identification. For example, rising educational levels reported in surveys over time could reflect a real upward trend in educational attainment or simply that individuals with relatively higher levels of education are now more likely to report that they are American Indian than in the past. With this important qualification in mind, surveys do indeed show a decline in dropping out of high school among single-race American Indians, from 34 percent in 1990 to 23 percent in 2010. This change is consistent with declines in dropping out of high school among the rest of the population (from 25 percent to 15 percent) over the same period.40 Economic conditions have also changed for many American Indians. Of note, there has also been an expansion and diversification of tribally owned businesses over the 1990s that continued into the twenty-first century—both on and off reservations. These businesses include hotels and resorts, manufacturing, oil extraction, mining, timber, and wild-game hunting, among others. This has increased tribal revenues over time, even

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with the slowing of growth in the aftermath of the deep recession in 2007–9.41 This kind of economic development has likely had a positive effect on the income and health of American Indians.42 American Indians living in tribal areas tend to have lower levels of socioeconomic achievement than those living off reservations. For example, American Indian households living in large tribal areas were twice as likely to live in housing that is overcrowded and twelve times more likely to live in housing that did not have adequate plumbing than the American Indian national average.43 American Indians living on reservations are often isolated from economic opportunities, and the reservations themselves, until relatively recently, had little internal control over the development of their own resources. This has contributed to high poverty levels on reservations.44 One 2015 news story about extreme poverty on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation and efforts by a nonprofit organization (True Sioux Hope Foundation) to alleviate it described the situation as follows: There are no jobs for 90 percent of the population. The average household income is $3,500 a year. About 60 percent of the homes have no water or electricity. An average of 17 people live together under one roof, and babies are dying at a rate higher than anywhere else in the world. You’d expect these alarming statistics to reflect deplorable conditions in a Third World country. But according to TrueSiouxHope.org, this tragic scenario plays out year after year on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota—the second largest Native American reservation in this country (roughly the size of Connecticut), and also the poorest. . . . For now, True Sioux Hope Foundation is focused on answering some immediate needs on the reservation: supporting a workforce training program that teaches the Pine Ridge natives trade skills, such as welding, home construction and farming, that can be used to find jobs and help the reservation become self-sustaining; building an orphanage for children who are in immediate danger; and providing firewood for the elderly, as well as formula for infants.45

ex pl ai n i n g patt er n s of w el l-b ei n g There are a number of explanations as to why American Indians have lower levels of socioeconomic achievement than many other groups.

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While previous chapters evaluated competing explanations based on many quantitative assessments of the data, here I provide a more general—and less rigorous—review for American Indians. The fact is that studies of American Indian socioeconomic status are less common than those for other groups, in large part due to the data-quality issues discussed earlier. There is little doubt that the discrimination and maltreatment of American Indian people and tribes by the white population and the federal government historically played an important role in explaining high levels of poverty among American Indians. American Indians continued to fare poorly even after World War II, when general standards of living of the American population were rising, and there were greater efforts to reduce poverty, such as in the form of Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty, launched in 1964. As researcher C. Matthew Snipp reports, “In the late 1960s, near the peak of the so-called War on Poverty, American Indians were one of the most disadvantaged groups in American society: the poorest, least educated, most unemployed, and unhealthiest. In 1969, one third of all American Indian families had incomes below the official poverty threshold, and this number was higher for reservation families.”46 This legacy of poverty undoubtedly has posed a long-term obstacle, given that individual achievement is affected by the resources of one’s family and community. Discrimination likely continues to hamper American Indian economic mobility. Research using decennial census data indicates that American Indian men earn considerably less than white men, even when taking differences in education and other basic demographic factors (such age and marital status) into account.47 And while there have been some improvements in the socioeconomic status of American Indians over the past couple of decades, some of this can be explained by relatively advantaged individuals—in terms of education and income—who are more likely to report being American Indian than in the past.48 Multiracial American Indians have higher levels of educational attainment and earnings than single-race American Indians, though both of these groups lag behind non-Hispanic whites.49 In addition to discrimination and a legacy of poverty, low levels of educational attainment (human capital) limit the earnings of many American

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Indians. As shown in figure 16, only 14 percent of single-race American Indians aged twenty-five and over have received a bachelor’s degree or more, a figure that is the same as among Hispanics (which includes many foreign-born Hispanics with very low levels of education) and below that of other groups. Given the high returns to college education in our workforce today, this lack of education plays a significant role in explaining low earnings among American Indians.50 In part because of this, American Indians have relatively low employment rates too. For example, just 68 percent of American Indian men between the ages of twenty-five to fiftyfour were employed in 2010, compared with 83 percent of white men. In addition, American Indian households are more likely to have a single parent with children than non–American Indian households, and this likely contributes to the relatively low median family income among American Indians.51 The lack of job opportunities on or near American Indian reservations may help explain some of this disparity between American Indians and whites, as employment rates are lower on reservations than off.52 In the past, Indian reservations typically had been places with high unemployment and few opportunities. After all, a number of American Indian tribes had been repeatedly displaced in the nineteenth century by the U.S. government to lands that were often devoid of natural resources and far from urban centers. Economic development on and around American Indian communities has generally improved over the past couple of decades, as national policy shifted its orientation to allow for greater self-determination and investment by tribes.53 Gaming, for example, has been an important source of revenue and employment growth among some American Indian tribes. But not all tribes use gaming, and not all gaming tribes distribute the profits to their members.54 In addition, these types of economic investments do not always bring long-term economic security. For example, for a number of years the Mashantucket Pequots had a very lucrative gaming facility, Foxwoods Resort Casino, on their reservation in Connecticut. But, as a New York Times article described, its fortunes changed over time: In 1995, casino revenues amounted to close to $750,000 per adult tribe member; at that time there were about 315, according to “Hitting the

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Jackpot” a book by Brett D. Fromson. And for years afterward, adult members, who now number close to 1,000, could expect annual payments reported to be about $100,000, an amount the tribe has not refuted. But those heady days are long gone. The casino, which currently is $1.7 billion in debt, recently missed another payment. The annual payouts to tribal members have ceased, and some, in search of work, have moved. New York and Massachusetts, which supply Foxwoods with a stream of customers, are preparing to open non-Indian casinos in the next few years, increasing competition in the region.55

Overall, while employment differentials still remain between American Indians living on and off reservations (with those living off reservations being more likely to be employed), the difference today is smaller than in the past due to the greater economic activity on reservations—despite some mixed results of such pursuits.56 In short, a combination of factors explain the relatively low average levels of socioeconomic achievement among American Indians, including a legacy of mistreatment and poverty, continued racial discrimination, low levels of human capital, the prevalence of single-parenthood, and economic and spatial isolation.

co n clu s i o n American Indians suffered a centuries-long decline in their population after contact with European settlers due to disease, war, and displacement. The twentieth century, however, saw a rebound in the American Indian population that has lasted through the present. Understanding patterns and trends in American Indian demographic growth and wellbeing is complicated by the relative lack of data from many sources, as well as changing patterns of self-identification among people with some American Indian heritage. In particular, a significant portion of the rapid increase in the American Indian population after 1960 was not a function of natural increase (more births than deaths) but rather more people choosing to report that they were American Indian than in the past. This is due to a variety of factors, including people feeling less stigma and more pride in their American Indian heritage and the blurring of boundaries between racial groups due to considerable intermarriage over time.

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Due in part to brutal treatment at the hands of whites and the federal government and their concentration in isolated reservations, American Indians historically have been disadvantaged in terms of their health and socioeconomic outcomes. There have likely been improvements in the health and well-being of American Indians over time, though changing patterns of identification make this difficult to discern with precision. And even with these improvements, American Indians lag behind others in their levels of education, employment, and income and, along with African Americans, remain one of the most disadvantaged groups in the United States. This speaks to the lack of incorporation of this group in the American “mainstream.” This disadvantage is due to the historical legacy of poverty, continued discrimination, and isolation, which reduces access to good educational and employment opportunities. In response to change in federal policy that allowed greater self-determination, American Indian entrepreneurship has increased in recent decades, and this could potentially lead to better health and well-being in the future.

6

The Multiracial Population

For many young Americans today it is hard to believe that marrying someone of a different race was against the law in many states well into the 1960s. It wasn’t until 1967 that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Loving v. Virginia, struck down antimiscegenation laws that were still in force in sixteen states of the union. The case was brought by Mildred Loving, a black woman with some American Indian ancestry, and Richard Loving, a white man, against the state of Virginia. The Lovings’ ordeal began in 1958. They had been childhood sweethearts, and in that year they traveled to Washington, DC, to get married. Not long after their return to the small town of Central Point, Virginia, the local police, acting on an anonymous tip, raided their home in the middle of the night. Shining a flashlight in their faces as they lay in bed, one of the officers demanded, “Who is this woman you’re sleeping with?” Mrs. Loving answered, “I’m his wife,” and the Lovings pointed to their marriage certificate hanging on the bedroom wall. The police officer responded, “That’s no good here.”1 A grand jury indicted them for violating Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage. Specifically, the state’s Racial Integrity Act of 1924 prohibited marriage between “white” and “colored” people. In January 1959 the Lovings pleaded guilty, and they were sentenced to one year in jail, though 109

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the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period of twenty-five years on the condition that the Lovings leave Virginia and not return during that time. In his opinion he wrote, “Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.” The Lovings left Virginia for Washington, DC (which historically always allowed interracial marriage), but in 1963 filed a motion in a Virginia state court to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence. The case eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, which, by unanimous decision, determined that state laws banning intermarriage were unconstitutional.2 The civil rights movement, transformed attitudes about interracial dating and marriage, the increasing diversity of the American population through immigration, and changing views about racial and ethnic identity have all served to increase the size of the multiracial population in the United States in recent years, though the percentage of Americans who report being multiracial—about 3 percent—is still small. This figure itself raises a few issues that will be discussed in more detail in this chapter. For one, this does not include people who report being Hispanic and a race such as white or black, as there are two separate questions on the census form for race and Hispanic origin (the latter is considered an “ethnicity”). In addition, people who report being multiracial at one given time are more likely to have fluid racial and ethnic identities—they can appear as mixed in one census and not mixed in another.3 This makes it challenging to draw firm conclusions about the size and characteristics of this population. The rest of this chapter begins with a description of trends in intermarriage, as growth of such unions is linked to growth in the multiracial population in the United States. I also discuss how the estimates of the multiracial population are sensitive to how we define and measure this group and how views about racial identity have changed over time. I then provide some measures of well-being (such as education and income) and describe differences among multiracial Americans, such as between people who are black and white and who are Asian and white. This analysis provides a window into the degree to which multiracial populations experience similar advantages or disadvantages of their parents’ racial and eth-

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nic groups. I end by noting that we need to learn much more about the growing multiracial population and the factors that affect their health and well-being.

tr e n d s in i n te r m arr i a g e Interracial and interethnic sexual and marital relationships are nothing new. Throughout U.S. history there has been considerable interethnic blending. While immigrants themselves often married people of the same ethnic origin, their children were less likely to do the same and their grandchildren even less so. As discussed in chapter 2, European groups that people today consider “white” ethnics were once typically considered racially distinct. Nevertheless, they were typically not treated as poorly as other racial groups. For example, none of the new European immigrants from southern and eastern Europe were barred by antimiscegenation laws from marrying native-stock whites, nor were they prohibited from naturalizing, despite restrictions against a number of other racial groups until the 1950s. Thus, the blending of these European immigrant groups and the native population across generations reduced distinctions among them over time.4 Even among blacks and whites, where the color line was unambiguously drawn and interracial marriages were illegal in many states, interracial sexual contact, including the rape of black slaves by white owners, resulted in considerable mixing. As sociologists Joel Perlmann and Mary C. Waters write, “However, notwithstanding the law and the ideology of race, black-white sexual unions occurred in a wide variety of social circumstances, often, of course, involving the sexual exploitation of the enslaved. An extensive mulatto population was documented when the census of 1850 first explored their prevalence nationally.”5 Perlmann and Waters go on to note that despite this extensive mixing, children of these sexual unions were by law and custom treated as black. That is, according to the one-drop rule, people with any black ancestry at all were considered black rather than white. Thus, a large percentage of people considered black today have some white ancestry. Some light-skinned people of mixed heritage sometimes “passed” as white and married other whites, so a nontrivial number of “white” people today also have black

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10

9.5

9 8 6.8

7

Percent

6 5

4.5

4 3.2 3 2 1 0 1980

1990

2000

2010

Figure 17. Percentage of marriages that are interracial/interethnic, 1980–2010. Sources: Data for 1980–2000 from Wang 2012, 5; data for 2010 from Johnson and Kreider 2013, 5. Note: Intermarriages are those between Hispanic and non-Hispanic spouses or between non-Hispanic spouses of different race groups (e.g., white, black, Asian).

ancestry.6 It should be noted that this one-drop rule has been a custom followed in the United States, but not in many other multiracial countries. For example, in both South Africa and Brazil there are officially recognized categories for mixed-race people. Turning to the more recent past, the number of interracial marriages has increased rapidly in the post–civil rights era due to growing social acceptability of such marriages and the growing diversity of the U.S. population. Figure 17 shows the percentage of marriages that are interracial or interethnic from 1980 to 2010. Intermarriages are defined as those between Hispanic and non-Hispanic spouses or between non-Hispanic spouses of different race groups (e.g., white, black, Asian).7 The figure shows that while just over 3 percent of all marriages in 1980 were interracial or interethnic, by 2010 this figure had risen to nearly 10 percent. Moreover, according to data collected in 2008 through 2010, about 15 percent of all new marriages (those occurring in the previous year)

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were between spouses of a different race or ethnicity (as defined earlier). This figure varied across groups, with a low of 9 percent of newlywed whites who married someone of a different race or ethnicity, compared to 17 percent of blacks, 26 percent of Hispanics, and 28 percent of Asians. Nearly half of all U.S-born Asians marry whites. But high rates of intermarriage among Asians may be plateauing.8 The proportion of American Indians who intermarry is high. One study that examines interracial marriages (but not interethnic ones involving Hispanics) finds that 58 percent of newlywed American Indians married someone of a different race. Overall, about seven in ten of interracial or interethnic marriages involve a white spouse, reflecting the fact that whites are the largest racial or ethnic group in the United States.9 Americans have become more accepting of intermarriage over time. In 2011 nearly two-thirds of Americans (63 percent) said they “would be fine” if a family member married someone of a different race. Younger respondents were more accepting of intermarriage than older ones, strongly suggesting generational changes in attitudes toward interracial dating and unions, which has been observed in terms of changing attitudes toward same-sex marriage as well.10 Of course, expressing a positive attitude toward interracial relationships in general does not always mean that one is likely to enter into cohabitation or marriage with someone of a different race.11

g r ow th o f t h e mu lt i ra ci a l p o pu lat i o n One of the consequences of increases in intermarriage is the rapid recent growth of the multiracial population in the United States. We actually know little about the long-term trend in the growth of this population because of limitations in how data on race are collected. Historically, individuals in the United States were enumerated as belonging to one race only, with a few exceptions. In 1850 there was a category for “mulatto”—a mix of black and white—as at the time there were scientific debates about what were considered deeply ingrained differences between blacks and whites (sometimes termed “scientific racism”) and how mixed-race individuals compared to those who were just black.12 In 1890 additional categories were added for Octoroon and Quadroon, signifying that a person

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was one-eighth black or one-fourth black, respectively. As social scientist C. Matthew Snipp has commented on the measurement of race at the time, “One can speculate about the sorts of ‘important scientific results’ that were at stake, but without question, scientific racism, eugenics, and social Darwinism were the prevailing ideas of this time and almost certainly were behind the collection of this information.” Snipp goes on to describe how counterbalancing this quest to differentiate among the black population was the passage of Jim Crow legislation that sought to segregate whites and blacks and the accompanying ideology that anyone with any black ancestry was black—the aforementioned one-drop rule. This could help explain why the 1900 census eliminated the mulatto response option, though the option reappeared for two more censuses (1910 and 1920) before being dropped for good.13 During most of the twentieth century, then, people were enumerated as being of one race only. It was not until the 2000 census that individuals could report more than one race. In the 1990 census, for example, the respondent was instructed by the census form to “Fill ONE circle for the race that the person considers himself/herself to be,” with choices for “White,” “Black or Negro,” and other groups such American Indian and several Asian groups (such as Chinese, Japanese, Filipino). But ten years later, in the 2000 census, the wording of the race question changed so that respondents were asked, “Mark one or more races to indicate what this person considers himself/herself to be.” The option to mark one or more races remains in effect in all census surveys today. So what spurred this change to allow people to choose multiracial identities? At least three factors are involved. First, as noted earlier, the growth in the number of people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds due to immigration and accompanying increases in intermarriage likewise increased the number of people with mixed racial and ethnic backgrounds. Second, in recent decades there has been a shift in the way people perceive race and ethnicity away from simple biological notions based on physical traits (e.g., skin color and hair texture) to more of one based on culture and one’s professed identity. Changing modes of enumeration in the decennial census facilitated this. Before 1960, census enumerators determined an individual’s race based on their physical traits. After 1960, respondents were asked to report their own race as they saw fit.14

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A third factor, which is partly an outgrowth of the first two, is the emergence of a multiracial movement, especially since 1990. One source of support for this movement came from monoracial people who were in interracial families. In the days when respondents could choose only one race category in the census, some parents in these families were unhappy that they could pick only one race for their children, which seemed like a denial of the other half of the child’s heritage. A second source of support for the movement was the multiracial children themselves, who similarly articulated the wish to recognize the totality of their racial and ethnic background. The multiracial movement generally found supporters among both political parties, though it at times clashed with civil rights organizations, which feared that the increase in the multiracial population would decrease the number of people of other specific minority groups and thus their political power. For this reason, the multiracial movement was at times supported by conservative politicians who hoped to undermine the influence of these groups.15 In any case, the change in the census race question in 2000 that allowed people to choose any combination of groups—rather than create a separate “multiracial” response category— was a compromise, as it provided flexibility in allocating people to the counts of different groups for civil rights purposes and still enumerated the number of people who identify with more than one group.16 People who say they are multiracial cite a number of factors that shape their identity. In interviews with multiracial people, anthropologist Eric Bailey asked his informants to describe a multiracial person. One interviewee responded, “I would describe a multiracial person as someone who identifies with more than one race, which means they accept and practice the culture of each racial background. This combination of different races creates a myriad of traits and values.”17 This illustrates the complex way many Americans view race. To many people there is some biological element to it, in the form of one’s physical traits. But culture is also important (this is an element usually thought to be at the core of “ethnicity”), as well as choice—identities can be chosen by accepting and adopting the cultural practices of different groups. Americans today undoubtedly face constraints in the identities that they can choose, but these constraints are less rigid than in the past. For example, one news story on the rapid growth of the multiracial population

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interviewed University of Southern California professor Marcia Alesan Dawkins, whose father was part black and part white: “He has lived his life as an African-American man. He lived through segregation, he lived through civil rights,” Dawkins says. “And though he acknowledges these other aspects of his identity, he sees the world from the perspective of a black man. That’s how he chooses to identify.” But just one generation makes all the difference for Dawkins herself, who claims black, white and Latino heritage. Dawkins and her sister see the world a little differently, she says. “I don’t think it’s better or worse, but I think it’s a credit to the progress in both ways that people can choose to identify just as one, or choose to identify as two or more,” Dawkins says.

Again, there are sometimes constraints and pitfalls, as the story also notes: But taking on such issues doesn’t always go smoothly, as music diva Beyonce discovered in a commercial for L’Oreal. In it, she declared the secret to her skin was a “mosaic of all the faces before it.” The screen flashed the phrases: “African-American. Native American. French.” The backlash was immediate. The singer was criticized for abandoning her black identity. But the multiracial community embraced her.18

Overall, the percentage of Americans who report being multiracial is still small. In the 2010 census just over 9.0 million people, or 2.9 percent of the U.S. population, reported two or more races. This is up from 6.8 million people, or 2.4 percent of the population, identifying as such ten years earlier in 2000.19 Because government surveys collect information on race and ethnicity with two questions—one on Hispanic origin and another on race—these figures include only multiple reports to the race question. The six racial categories in the main census race tabulations are white, black, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, or some other race. Thus, a multiracial person in the census is someone who reported more than one of these, regardless of how they answered the separate question on Hispanic origin. Figure 18 shows the most common race combinations among the multiracial population, which are white and black, white and some other race, white and Asian, and white and American Indian—each composing 16 to

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Black and Asian, 2% White, black, and American Indian, 3% Asian and some other race, 3% Black and American Indian, 3%

All other combinations, 13% White and black, 20%

Black and some other race, 4% White and American Indian, 16%

White and some other race, 19%

White and Asian,18%

Figure 18. Percentage distribution of the two or more races population, 2010. Source: Jones and Bullock 2012, 7.

20 percent of the multiracial population. The fact that whites are one of the groups in each of these combinations is indicative of whites being the largest group in the United States, such that, as described earlier, they are also involved in more than half of intermarriages. Younger Americans are more likely to be multiracial too. For example, 7 percent of those under five years old were multiracial in 2013, compared to just 1 percent of those sixty-five years old and over.20 This pattern is consistent with increasing levels of intermarriage, though it could also reflect changes in patterns of identification across cohorts or age groups. Multiracial identification is also highest in the western region of the country. About 5 percent of the population in the West identifies as multiracial, compared to 2 to 3 percent in the Northeast, Midwest, and South.21 This is likely indicative of the relatively high levels of diversity and intermarriage in the West, along with low levels of racial residential segregation

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in many western metropolitan areas.22 California and Texas are the states with the greatest number of multiracial individuals, reflecting both their size and diversity. Likewise the cities with the highest number of such individuals are New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, Houston, San Diego, and Honolulu, in that order. But the city with the largest percentage of its population reporting two or more races was Honolulu, at 16 percent, followed by Fairfield, California, and Anchorage.23 The percentage of people who identify as multiracial in the census is lower than the total population with some mixed racial and ethnic heritage. As described earlier, a significant percentage of blacks, and even whites, in the United States have an ancestor who was of a different race. One estimate is that perhaps 40 percent of Americans, even if they are not aware of it, have at least some genealogically distant mixture of races.24 One nationally representative sample of adults by the Pew Research Center finds that 6.9 percent of respondents reported that they were of mixed-race heritage going back to their grandparents’ origins. But only 22 percent of these people considered themselves to be multiracial, as most identified with a single group. This varied by origins, where 40 percent of those who reported having white and Asian background declaring that they were multiracial, compared to 12 percent of those who reported having a white and black background.25 Since race is a social construction (see chapter 2), researchers typically consider the multiracial population as consisting of those people who identify as such. Racial identity is more fluid than often recognized, especially among people who at times identify as multiracial, and it is often contextdependent. That is, it can vary across situations, depending on who is asking, in what social situation, and for what purpose. For example, using data from a survey of adolescents, researchers David Harris and Jeremiah Sim find that about 12 percent of youth provided inconsistent responses to nearly identical questions about race when asked at two different times.26 The instability of racial identity does not occur solely among adolescents either. One Census Bureau study that matched respondents in 2000 and 2010 finds that about ten million people (or about 6 percent of the population) reported a different race and/or Hispanic origin in 2010 versus 2000. Changes in identity were most common among American Indians and Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians and other Pacific Islanders,

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multiple-race response groups, and Hispanics when they report a race. Responses were more stable for single-race non-Hispanic whites, blacks, and Asians.27 Identity is also malleable among multiethnic Hispanics. As Richard Alba and his coauthors report in a study of the heterogeneity among the Mexican-origin population, “Importantly, intermarriage has produced a Mexican-origin population that includes a large number of individuals for whom Mexican ancestry is one of many components of a multiethnic ancestral heritage. These individuals show flexibility in constructing their ethnic identity that does not exist for their ‘unmixed’ counterparts.”28 The identity of multiracial people is more dynamic than many singlerace groups because they often straddle these well-established groups. Their physical features may lend some ambiguity, so they may choose to identify in different ways in different situations or at different stages of their life. But it may be easier for individuals of some combinations to express a multiracial identity than others. For example, children of blackwhite interracial couples are more likely to viewed and treated by others as black (and thus may suffer from some measure of discrimination because of it) due to persisting social norms on black identity (i.e., the one-drop rule). These individuals may of course take pride in this identity as well.29 In contrast, multiracial part-Asians appear to more consistently report their mixed heritage, such as both Asian and white. Although it is not entirely clear why they are more likely to have a stable mixed-race identity, it could be that the relatively recent growth of the multiracial Asian population in the United States has occurred during a time when strict rules on racial classification (such as the one-drop rule) have been less normative, and hence there are fewer pressures to identify as one race or the other.30 Americans’ conceptions of race and ethnicity continue to evolve—as exemplified by changes in the way we have collected information on race and ethnicity on the decennial census over time. As noted earlier, the census currently collects such information with two questions, one on Hispanic origin (whether a person is Hispanic or not) and the second on race (white, black, and other groups). Some respondents are confused by these questions and wonder why Hispanic origin is asked separately.31 Some argue that Hispanics have become racialized, such that the distinction between

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racial and ethnic identity is modest at best for Hispanics.32 Thus, some assert that we should simply ask a single question about race that includes Hispanic origin. Others argue that traditional notions of race have little objective basis and that the distinction between race and ethnicity has become increasingly ambiguous. The solution here is also to use a single combined question too, but one that that asks more simply about ethnic origins.33 My own assessment comes closer to this view, as Hispanics are heterogeneous in terms of their origins, physical features usually associated with race in the United States (such as skin color and hair texture), and views about their identity. In either case, the Census Bureau has fielded experimental questionnaires that ask about race and ethnicity in different ways, including with a combined question that allows individuals to choose as many origins as they wish. If implemented, this will likely affect the counts of people of different groups and probably the size of the multiracial and multiethnic population as well. For example, respondents who report being white and Hispanic, or black and Hispanic, can be counted as being multiracial and multiethnic with such a question, whereas currently they are not in official statistics. Indeed, results from the questionnaire experiments confirm that the percentage who will report two or more origins is likely to go up by at least a couple of percentage points if this single-question approach is implemented in government surveys.34 Making long-term predictions about the multiracial population is therefore challenging, as it relies on a series of assumptions. According to Census Bureau population projections, about 4 percent of the U.S. population will choose two or more races by 2050. But this presumes that there won’t be substantial changes in either the way data on race and ethnicity are collected and reported or patterns of ethnic self-identification, especially among mixed-origin individuals. Some commentators have argued, not so much based on demographic population projections but on changing American attitudes toward race and the growth in intermarriage, that the multiracial population will grow very rapidly in the coming decades. One such view holds that “it is not unreasonable to conjecture that not so many decades later—by 2100—multiracials, who are now the smallest minority of the minorities and have just recently come under the government’s statistical radar, will become the majority population in this nation.

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Most people in the country will boast a multiracial, mixed-race heritage. This is indeed our future, not just in the Untied States, but worldwide, with the predominant number of people officially identified as multiracial.”35 I think this outcome is unlikely, as it presumes very significant changes in patterns of self-identification and racial intermarriage. Nevertheless, it will be very interesting to track the growth of this population in the coming years.

s o cio eco n o m i c ch a ra c t e r i st i cs o f t h e m u lti ra c i a l p op ulat i on Given the tentative nature of identity among many multiracial individuals, we still have much to learn about the socioeconomic status of this population. Figure 19 shows a few basic socioeconomic outcomes by race, focusing on comparisons between the multiracial population and other groups. The figure is restricted to non-Hispanic householders aged twenty-five to sixty-four to capture individuals who for the most part have completed their education and self-identify as multiracial (the householder typically fills out the census form—including the race question— for all household members). To aid in making these comparisons, the groups in the figure are sorted in descending order by median household income, which is shown in the first set of columns. As has been shown elsewhere in this book, Asians have the highest median household income ($78,000) among single-race groups, as well as all other multiracial groups in the figure. The groups with the next highest household median incomes are multiracial individuals who are white and Asian, as well as single-race whites ($65,000). The groups with the lowest household median incomes are single-race American Indians and blacks (both at $36,000) and, finally, multiracial individuals who are black and American Indian ($33,000). Generally speaking, multiracial groups have median household incomes that fall somewhere between the incomes of each of the singlerace groups that make up the multiracial group. This “in-between status” has been observed in previous studies as well.36 This is true for multiracial whites and American Indians, blacks and Asians, whites and blacks, and

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90

Asian White and Asian

80 78 70

Percent

60 50 40

White

69

65 65 60

62

59 54

55 50 45 40

43 39 37 27 26 22 25 20 19 14 16 10 10

20 10

55 54

All two or more races

49 48

36 36 33

30

Black and Asian

39

32 27

31

33

33

White and American Indian White and black

23 17

American Indian Black

0 Median household income (thousands)

Percent who are poor

Percent with BA degree

Percent who are homeowners

Black and American Indian

Figure 19. Socioeconomic status of the multiracial population compared with other groups, 2014. Source: Analysis of 2014 American Community Survey data (Ruggles et al. 2015). Notes: Sample includes non-Hispanic householders aged twenty-five to sixty-four. See text for additional information.

whites and Asians (though the income for the last group is only ever-soslightly higher than that of single-race whites). The one exception to the in-between pattern is the median income of multiracial blacks and American Indians, though even in this case the median incomes of all three groups (American Indians, blacks, and multiracial American Indians and blacks) are similar to one another. Unsurprisingly, the poverty statistics tend to follow the same general pattern, with the lowest rates of poverty for Asians, multiracial whites and Asians, and whites and the highest rates of poverty for American Indians, blacks, and multiracial blacks and American Indians. The poverty rate for multiracial blacks and whites is also high. The pattern for educational attainment, with a couple of exceptions, tends to follow the pattern for household income. Differences in homeownership are less straightforward (also shown in chapter 4), as whites have the highest levels of homeownership, followed by Asians.

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It is important to offer an additional word of caution when trying to interpret these differences in socioeconomic status across multiracial groups. As I have emphasized earlier, the racial identity of multiracials is often flexible, dynamic, and situational. Thus, it could be that one’s socioeconomic status and neighborhood circumstances might affect one’s identity as much as one’s identity affects one’s socioeconomic status and neighborhood circumstances. Studies are mixed on this issue, with some analyses indicating that parents with a higher socioeconomic status may be more likely to report their children as multiracial, others indicating the opposite, and yet others finding no relationship.37 Similarly, the school or neighborhood composition might affect identification, but not always in consistent or straightforward ways.38 Nor do we know if the in-between status of many multiracials reflects advantages or disadvantages faced by the individuals themselves, the characteristics of the parents who enter mixed-race unions, or other factors altogether. For example, a study by Richard Alba that examines the median household incomes for mixed-ethnicity, two-parent families with infants finds that the incomes of mixed-race households tended to be closer to those of white households than disadvantaged minority ones, rather than the in-between pattern I reported earlier.39 Is this due to the difference in populations studied, new emerging patterns of socioeconomic achievement among young mixed-race families, or something else? Clearly, more research on the growing multiracial population and the factors that affect identity and socioeconomic status is needed.

co n clu s i o n It has been only since the 1960s when state laws against racial intermarriages were ruled to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Changes in public opinion and the growing diversity of the U.S. population have contributed to increases in interracial marriage over the past several decades. Nevertheless, the number of multiracial individuals remains relatively small, with about 3 percent of people identified as multiracial in the U.S. census. The count of multiracial people depends not only on

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intermarriage but also on how people of mixed-heritage identify. Among some group combinations, such as black-white, individuals are less likely to identify as being multiracial—largely due to the historical one-drop rule and the stark dividing line between whites and black—than other combinations, such as Asian-white. The growth of the multiracial population in the future will depend on the changing racial composition of the population, trends in intermarriage, and people’s attitudes toward race and racial and ethnic identification. The socioeconomic status of multiracial individuals tends to be in between that of the constituent race groups. The median household income of black-white individuals, for example, is between that of singlerace black and white individuals. Given that it has been only since 2000 that many surveys (such as the census) have allowed individuals to report more than one race, we know relatively little about the factors that shape the socioeconomic achievement of mixed-race groups. As the multiracial population continues to grow, there will undoubtedly be growing interest and research on this group in the coming years.

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International Comparisons and Policy Debates

Many countries around the globe are experiencing increases in ethnic diversity. As in the United States, much of this has been sparked by the growth in international migration over the past few decades. In 2013 there were 232 million international migrants globally, up from 154 million in 1990—representing a 50 percent increase. Of these, 59 percent lived in developed countries. The countries with the largest number of international migrants in 2013 were, in order, the United States, Russia, Germany, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, and Spain. Even though the United States tops the list with the most immigrants, a lower percentage of its population is foreignborn than in many other countries with smaller populations. For example, among developed countries that are part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), those with the highest percentage of their population that is foreign-born are Luxembourg (44 percent), followed by Switzerland, New Zealand, and Australia (all 28 percent), compared with 13 percent in the United States.1 International migrants in OECD countries hail from many different global regions. But not all immigrants add a lot of diversity to the destination country. As migration scholars Stephen Castles and Mark Miller 125

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assert, “Some migrants, such as Britons in Australia or Austrians in Germany, are virtually indistinguishable from the receiving population.”2 More often than not, however, these days migration has increased ethnic diversity in receiving countries. There is also considerable debate about how to deal with immigration in many of these countries. For example, there have been a variety of responses to the growth in the number of migrants and refugees in Europe who were leaving troubled countries in the Middle East and South Asia, such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. After a surge of migrants in 2015, one commentator in Iceland urged her government to accept more refugees, saying, “Refugees are human resources, experience and skills. Refugees are our future spouses, best friends, our next soul mate, the drummer in our children’s band, our next colleague, Miss Iceland 2022, the carpenter who finally fixes our bathroom, the chef in the cafeteria, the fireman, the hacker and the television host. People who we’ll never be able to say to: ‘Your life is worth less than mine.’ ”3 Likewise, Pope Francis called for local communities to welcome and assist the newcomers on moral humanitarian grounds: “In front of the tragedy of the tens of thousands of refugees escaping death by war or hunger, on the path towards the hope of life, the Gospel calls us, asks us to be ‘neighbors’ of the smallest and most abandoned. To this end, with the nearing of the Jubilee of Mercy, I address an appeal to the parishes, to the religious communities, to the monasteries and sanctuaries of all Europe to express the concreteness of the Gospel and welcome a family of refugees.”4 In contrast, many are very concerned about the assimilability of migrants and their long-term effects on society. Journalist Christopher Caldwell, for example, has written extensively about increased Muslim immigration to Europe and the challenges this has posed in a number of countries. In one article that focuses on the lack of integration of Muslim immigrants in Sweden, he pessimistically concludes, “Sweden’s biggest immigration problem may be a matter not of crime, unemployment and Islamic radicalism but of something else altogether: that its newcomers understand perfectly well what this system erected in the name of equality is and have decided it doesn’t particularly suit them.”5 Countries likewise have adopted a wide variety of policies toward newcomers more generally. Some favor multiculturalism, which recognizes

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and supports group differences; others press immigrants to assimilate into the native culture; and yet others see the migrants as temporary workers who should return to their country of origin after a specified period. In short, many countries and their people are confronting issues of racial and ethnic diversity, inequality, and incorporation—some with more success than others. The rest of this chapter begins with a discussion of how different countries view race and ethnicity, including different approaches to conceptualizing and measuring racial and ethnic groups. This is followed by an examination of racial and ethnic inequality in various settings—focusing mainly (though not solely) on peer countries of the Unites States in the OECD as well as in Latin America. I end with a discussion of policy responses to racial and ethnic diversity, including debates about multiculturalism versus assimilation and about affirmative action. The goal of this chapter is to broaden our understanding of how different contexts shape patterns of racial and ethnic inequality and thus to provide a global perspective to U.S. conversations about these issues.

g l o b al co n c e pt ua l i zat i o n s of ra c e a n d e t h n i c i t y There is considerable variability in the way countries view and measure racial, ethnic, and national differences between groups. In fact, the way in which the United States collects information on race and ethnicity in its census is unique. But it is not alone in its uniqueness, as a number of countries have their own special approaches. The considerable global variation reflects the fact that the nature of group differences is shaped by historical factors that vary from country to country. Thus, the United Nations, when describing its statistical database on ethnocultural characteristics of countries across the globe, states, “The specific ethnic and/or national groups of the population which are of interest in each country are dependent upon individual national circumstances. . . . Given the nature of this topic, these categories and their definitions will vary widely from country to country; therefore, no internationally accepted criteria are possible.”6 One study of the United Nations’ database by sociologist Ann Morning finds that, among the 141 countries included, nearly two-thirds (63 percent)

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incorporated some form of racial and ethnic enumeration of the population. Among countries that collected such data, there was considerable variation in the types of data. Some countries collected information on “ethnicity,” some on “race,” and others on some aspect of “nationality” or national origins. All these terms capture some aspect of ancestry, even as ethnicity focuses more on cultural practices or beliefs, race on perceived physical traits, and nationality on geographic origin.7 Of the countries that collected some data on race and ethnicity, well over half (56 percent) used “ethnicity” as a primary or secondary term in the question. About 23 percent used “nationality” as one of the terms, and only 15 percent used “race” as one of the terms. No European or Asian country in the study used “race” as one of its terms. The United States stood out in a few important respects: it is one of the relatively few countries that counts people by race; it is nearly unique in treating race and ethnicity as different types of identity (in that the U.S. census has separate questions for race and Hispanic origin); and, finally, the United States was the only country to use ethnicity to single out one specific population (Hispanics).8 One study of how race and ethnicity are defined in United States, Canada, and Australia—three countries that share some similarities in history and demography—finds some similarities in ethnic classification but some important differences as well. In terms of historical similarities, they all had indigenous populations that were overrun by English-speaking settlers, they all have a long history of being immigrant-receiving countries that at times restricted immigration from non-European (especially Asian) nations, and they all are currently becoming ethnically more diverse. Among their similarities in collecting data, they all have grappled with the ambiguity between race and ethnicity and thus with how to word their questions and define the groups to be included in their tabulations. They also have encountered issues surrounding the growth of intermarriage, which has encouraged a shift toward emphasizing the importance of identity (and self-identification) rather than simple biologically based notions of race. Finally, in all three there is an ongoing dialogue between the government institutions that collect data on race and constituent ethnic groups. Nevertheless, they do not ask about race and ethnicity in the same way, with Australia having questions on indigenous status, ancestry, and religion and Canada having questions on ethnic and cultural groups’ ances-

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tral origins, a question that gets at visible minority status, and questions on aboriginal or Indian (“First Nation”) origins. Neither Canada nor Australia ask about race.9 The emphasis on race in the United States is a function of the historical distinction between whites and other groups, rooted in the subordination of blacks through slavery and American Indians through conquest and enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution, for example, specified that for the purposes of representation in Congress, enslaved blacks in a state would be counted as three-fifths of the number of white inhabitants of that state. So having an accurate count of this population was constitutionally mandated. In addition, the black-white color line was maintained with the “one-drop rule,” where people with any black ancestry have traditionally been considered black. The idea behind this was that there was a deep biological division between whites and blacks, and this was the underpinning of a system of white supremacy.10 This division was maintained by drawing a clearly demarcated line between the groups and placing all people with some black ancestry on one side of the line and those with none on the other. But, as discussed in previous chapters, the line was never as clear as it was thought to be, as many people who identify as white actually have some black ancestry (even if they don’t know it), and a number of “black” individuals passed as white over time. This again supports the notion that race is a social construction, and how people decide who is a member of one group or another has some measure of arbitrariness. The contrast between the way Brazil and the United States define racial categories is also illuminating. Brazil and the United States were the two largest slaveholding countries in the Americas. Brazil, like the United States, explicitly asks about race in its census (“Your color or race is:”). Unlike the United States, however, there is a mixed-race category, which also reflects its orientation around skin-color gradations, along with other physical features including hair type, nose shape, and lip shape.11 For example, individuals can report themselves to be black, white, or brown, among other categories. But this does not mean that there is no racial inequality in Brazil, as whites are considerably more advantaged than other groups. Rather, the size of the European colonizing population was considerably smaller in Brazil than in the United States and with relatively few female settlers and families. As a result, there was considerably

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more racial mixing, and white single fathers were more likely to recognize their mixed-race children as their own than if they had been married with a separate family. As a result, there was much less legal discrimination historically in Brazil than in the United States. In addition, as sociologists G. Reginald Daniel and Andrew Michael Lee argue, “European Brazilians were greatly outnumbered by Blacks in Brazil. Consequently, they differentiated multiracials from Blacks and relied on their collaboration in maintaining the racial order.”12 South Africa has a racial system that shares similarities and differences with both the United States and Brazil. Like the United States, it had a history of rigid racial classification and race-based laws enforcing racial apartheid. However, like Brazil, it had a mixed-race category of “coloureds.” In South Africa’s case, this included people with a mix of white, black African, and Asian ancestry. As in Brazil, the European-origin population was relatively small compared to the black population, and “coloureds” (like “browns” in Brazil) held an intermediary social position.13 Many countries in Latin America have vacillated on whether and how to enumerate ethnic groups. They have also varied in the extent to which they sanctioned legal, institutionalized racism. Influenced by international practices and seeking to promote national development, most Latin American countries initially collected information on ethnoracial origins in early national censuses. But many dropped these questions in the middle decades of the twentieth century, as governments instead emphasized the assimilation and homogenization of their national populations. The twenty-first century has seen another reversal, with the reintroduction of questions on ethnoracial origins in a number of countries. This reflects international social movements recognizing and promoting diversity and multiculturalism, as well national political struggles about social inequality and the rights of different groups.14 Despite these generalizations, there is significant variation in how Latin American countries have approached issues of ethnoracial diversity. For example, while most adopted narratives of racial mixture, some like Argentina and Costa Rica did not. While some acknowledge that African ancestry and culture are an important part of the nation’s identity (Brazil), in others, even where a significant portion of the population had some African ancestry, it was ignored or downplayed (Colombia).15

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One study of four Latin American countries (Brazil, Dominican Republic, Colombia, and Panama) by sociologists Edward Telles and Tianna Paschel finds that while skin color was the most important predictor of racial identification in all four, patterns of identification still varied considerably. For example, dark-skinned people were substantially more likely to report being black in Panama than in the Dominican Republic, while Brazil and Colombia were in between. Telles and Paschel conclude that physical characteristics are culturally interpreted—they might signify one racial category in one country but a different category in another— again supporting the notion that race is socially constructed.16 Research also has generally shown that there is a measure of fluidity in racial identification in Latin America due to the considerable racial mixing and blurred racial boundaries. Past research generally indicated that high socioeconomic status had a “whitening” effect on identification. That is, economically successful individuals, even if dark-skinned, would avoid identifying as black. In contrast, recent research has shown a less consistent association between socioeconomic status and the choices people make about their ethnoracial identity, perhaps signifying a growth in racial pride in black ancestry.17 That is not to say that there isn’t ethnoracial inequality in Latin American countries. One study that used the same data as Telles and Paschel but from a larger number of countries finds that whites were advantaged in most countries and indigenous (Indian) people were typically the most disadvantaged. Blacks were often disadvantaged too, though in some countries they had higher mean incomes than other populations. These relationships were observed using self-reports of ethnoracial identity as well as interviewers’ rating of respondents’ skin colors. Thus, social inequality based on ethnoracial origins and skin color is pervasive in much of the Americas, though the exact nature of salient social divisions (e.g., black and white, or indigenous and white, or the interplay between multiple groups) varies across the countries.18 In Brazil the divisions along the black-white continuum remain. As one news story on the changing role of race in Brazil notes, “Many things are changing in this country. Ms. de Araújo left school as a teenager to work as a maid—about the only option open to a woman with skin as dark as hers— but now she has a professional job in health care and a house of her own,

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things she could not have imagined 15 years ago. Still, she says, ‘This is Brazil.’ And there is no point being precious about it. Black is beautiful, but white— white is just easier. Even middle-class life can still be a struggle here.”19

race, e thn i c i ty, a n d so c i oe c on o m i c a c h i e v e m e n t in i mmi gra n t - r ec e i v i n g c o un t r i e s Today most countries with a diverse stream of immigration have experienced the emergence of ethnic communities. The extent to which these groups are incorporated into their host societies is a critical issue. Most of the discussion here focuses on comparisons between the United States and other peer (mainly wealthy) countries of Europe and the OECD, but many countries in a wide variety of regions have very high levels of immigration, ranging from the United Arab Emirates in the Arab peninsula to Singapore in Southeast Asia to Botswana in sub-Saharan Africa.20 But there is a dearth of data on how immigrant and ethnic groups are faring in many countries, making global comparisons across a greater number of countries very challenging. Many European countries that had been senders of migrants (and colonizers) in the nineteenth century became destinations for immigrants in the post–World War II period. Germany, for example, experienced labor shortages in the 1950s as it continued to rebuild and grow after World War II. It first looked to southern Europe, then Turkey, and then North Africa for temporary laborers. Other European countries with guest-worker policies included, among others, Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden. Some countries, particularly Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium, also received immigrants from their former colonies. When a sharp recession hit Europe in the early 1970s, countries with guest-worker programs terminated them. But a significant proportion of supposedly temporary immigrants did not wish to return to their countries of origin and stayed in their adopted countries. Many European countries have struggled with their growing diversity, and public opinion remains divided on appropriate levels of immigration.21 Nevertheless, immigration to Europe continues to grow, buttressed by the influx of refugees from conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere.

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28.228.3 27.6

25 22.6

Percent foreign-born

20.0 20 16.7 16.4 16.1 16.0 15.5 13.413.9 13.1 12.8 12.3 11.511.6 10.1

15

10

8.5 7.1 5.6 4.5

5

3.2 0.8

Sl

ov

ak Me Re xico pu H blic un g C ze F ary ch in Re land pu D bli en c m Es ark to n N Ice ia et la he nd G rl re an at d Br s it G Un e ain ite rma d ny St at e Sp s a N in or w Be ay lg Sw ium e Sl den ov en Ire ia la Au nd s C tria an ad a Is ra A N us el ew tr Z ali Sw eal a itz and er la nd

0

Figure 20. Percentage of the population that is foreign-born in selected OECD countries, 2013. Source: OECD 2015.

Figure 20 shows the percentage of the population that is foreign-born in selected OECD countries. Those countries with the highest percentage of foreign-born residents were Switzerland, New Zealand, and Australia (all at 28 percent), while the lowest were Mexico (1 percent), Slovak Republic (3 percent), and Hungary (5 percent). The United States is somewhere in the middle, with 13 percent of the population foreign-born. Overall, immigration is transforming the character of these countries, as well as playing a significant role in increasing the populations of many countries that would otherwise be facing the prospect of future demographic decline because of low fertility rates. As I have discussed in previous work, the extent to which immigrants are assimilating and otherwise affecting European countries varies, for the countries themselves vary considerably in terms of the timing of immigration, the composition of the immigrants, their policies toward immigrants, and the economic and social conditions at the time of reception.22 In terms of differences in immigration policy, Germany, for example, made it

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difficult for immigrants to become citizens, so many did not bother applying. Until relatively recently, the second generation also inherited their parents’ foreign citizenship. This policy eventually became unsustainable, as many guest workers originally from Turkey and North Africa, and then their children, were clearly making Germany their permanent home. These ethnic groups needed a way to become integrated into German society, or they risked becoming permanently disadvantaged minorities. Thus, laws regarding citizenship were eventually reformed in 1999 to make it easier for immigrants to gain German citizenship, and birthright citizenship was granted provisionally to the second and third generations born as of January 1, 2000, provided that their parents met certain residence conditions. Even so, the bulk of German-born generations descended from Turkish immigrants still lack German citizenship.23 The United Kingdom had a more multicultural approach from the 1970s onward, as it explicitly recognized the rights of different groups. For example, the United Kingdom has supported state-funded schools run by religious organizations. In recent years there has been a backlash against multiculturalism—as many Britons felt that it perpetuated unhealthy divisions between groups. While the United Kingdom has not abandoned multiculturalism, policies have put a greater emphasis on promoting integration and community cohesion.24 France, in contrast, has long had an assimilationist approach to immigration. There is an expectation that immigrants should adopt French customs and culture. For example, this approach informed the passage of a 2010 law that banned the wearing of veils that cover the face in public places. Despite policies strongly promoting assimilation, many immigrants and their children in France from nonEuropean countries report that they are perceived as not being French by others, though they do experience at least some measure of integration over time and across generations.25 Concerns about immigrant integration in many European countries, such as in the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden, frequently focus on Muslim immigrants.26 Some fear Islamic radicalism and whether the values of religious immigrants are compatible with the culture of secular humanism that predominates in many European countries.27 Continued turmoil in the Middle East, the growth of refugee populations, and the growth in Islamic radicalism among some youth have

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heightened concerns among native populations. Muslim immigrants in turn often feel that they are viewed with suspicion and discriminated against by the native-born mainstream.28 They are also alarmed by the growth in anti-immigrant political parties in a number of countries. It is challenging to draw overarching conclusions about the well-being and incorporation of immigrant and ethnic groups in these countries. There is considerable variation by group and country that I cannot cover in depth here. That said, studies that have systematically investigated immigrant incorporation in Europe and other OECD countries for the most part find that, as in the United States, the second generation often does better than the first, though there is significant variation across immigrant groups. For example, one study of education, unemployment, and occupational-attainment outcomes among the second generation in ten countries in Europe (Austria, Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) finds upward mobility among the second generation, but that minorities from nonEuropean countries tend to still experience some disadvantage, such as the second generation of Turkish ancestry in Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands; those of Moroccan or other North African ancestry in Belgium, France, and the Netherlands; people of Caribbean or Pakistani ancestry in Britain; and those of Surinamese ancestry in the Netherlands.29 Another study examining patterns of ethnic intermarriage—which is often thought to be a strong indicator of assimilation and incorporation—in six North American and western European countries finds that while in the United States the main social cleavage is between those of African ancestry and others, in western Europe it is those of Muslim religion who are less likely to enter mixed unions.30 Another cross-national comparison of immigrant integration in the United States, Canada, and Australia finds common patterns of high achievement of the Chinese and South Asian second generation in these countries. In all these countries, Asian immigrants arrive with relatively high levels of education, and this facilitates upward mobility. Children of black immigrants tend to fare less well in all contexts, though the second generation still does better than the first generation. There are some specific differences across the countries in terms of the starting points of the immigrants and the extent of generational change, but similarities on the

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whole seem to outweigh the differences.31 In short, in many different contexts, children from low-status immigrant families lag behind the children from native families, but children of immigrants nevertheless often experience some upward mobility.32 Whether this will result in fuller incorporation or in conflict and division still remains to be seen.

raci al a n d et h n i c i n eq ua li t y a n d p o li c y Government policies can affect patterns of racial and ethnic inequality. Here I highlight two types of policies: (1) immigration policy, which directly affects the formation of ethnic communities and disadvantages that such communities may face; and (2) policies explicitly designed to address existing racial and ethnic inequalities—specifically, affirmative action. At least some overlap exists between the two, in that immigrant integration policies can affect how existing minority groups are treated, while affirmative action likewise can affect immigrant incorporation, as immigrants and their children may be eligible for affirmative action.

Immigration Policy Some immigration policies are better at facilitating integration than others. Four common immigration policies that have been employed by a variety of countries at different times are guest-worker policies, which view migrants as temporary; policies that tend to attract low-wage immigrants, such as those that have provisions for family reunification; policies that seek immigrants selected for high human capital, such as the Canadian point system; and refugee policies that have humanitarian goals. Guest-worker programs welcome immigrants as temporary workers but expect them to leave the country after an appointed amount of time. These programs have rarely worked as intended in advanced democracies. Germany, Austria, and Switzerland, for example, had guest-worker programs in the post–World War II period, but many of the workers and their children found ways to stay. Because this kind of policy fails to eventually provide a route to the full rights and responsibilities of citizenship, it often transforms immigrants and their children into marginalized ethnic com-

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munities.33 Thus, these countries eventually changed course and widened the paths to citizenship for these groups to facilitate incorporation. Even in the United States, which for most of its history has permitted and encouraged immigrants to stay and become citizens, at times adopted guest-worker policies. Perhaps the most prominent of these was the Bracero Program, initiated during a period of labor shortages during World War II and which lasted until 1964. Many of the Mexican immigrants who came as part of this program ended up staying in the United States, and family networks facilitated additional immigration from Mexico in subsequent decades.34 Immigrants admitted on the basis of their skills, versus those who come as low-wage laborers (such as through family-reunification provisions), and refugees often have different integration trajectories. Generally speaking, high-skilled immigrants often fare better than lower-skilled ones. They are more likely to obtain good jobs and higher socioeconomic status that will facilitate mobility for their children. They are also less likely to rely on ethnic networks and more on ties they develop with a particular employer. Meanwhile, low-skilled immigrants who arrive through family channels may be more likely to settle in ethnic enclaves as a result of their kinship ties. While their earnings might be higher than they otherwise would be in their home country, they may lag behind native-born majority group members, and this in turn affects the mobility of their children.35 To the extent that refugees are low-skilled immigrants that settle in ethnic enclaves may slow incorporation, other factors being equal. That said, immigration policy should not necessarily be shaped only on the basis of its effect on short- and medium-term immigrant incorporation. Most countries place great stock on humanitarian and family-reunification admissions as a result of deeply held values, even if some of these immigrants have relatively low levels of education or otherwise need government assistance in the short run.

Assimilationism and Multiculturalism Countries also adopt different approaches to immigrant integration. Among the most prominent are assimilationism and multiculturalism. Assimilationism treats immigrants as prospective citizens and seeks to

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deter the formation of distinct ethnic communities that differ from mainstream culture. The provision of bilingual education for immigrants, for example, typically would not be part of the assimilationist approach. France is a good example of country that encourages assimilation—it offers naturalization and equal social rights to immigrants—and has long tried prevent the rise of ethnic “ghettos.”36 French assimilationism is allied with the idea of Republicanism, which refuses recognition of group differences in the public sphere. Nevertheless, the French ban on face covering in public in 2010, while ostensibly neutral to all religions, was mainly a reaction to burka-style Islamic veils. The Conservative president at the time, Nicolas Sarkozy, said that full veils that hide the face were “not welcome” in France.37 Many other countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom, have at some point adopted the assimilationist approach. The difficulty with this approach is that immigrants and their children often do not wish to fully abandon their ethnic culture or community. The pressure to do so can make newcomers, and then their children, feel unwelcome and excluded, and this in turn may reinforce not only ethnic identity but also disadvantage across generations. In France, for example, hyphenated identities receive no legitimacy, and the second generation, which feels French but also ethnic, confronts serious identity challenges.38 Thus, most countries that have at one time pushed for these policies have either abandoned or softened them to facilitate integration but not press too hard or too quickly.39 Multiculturalism grants all ethnic groups equal rights and access to a country’s resources and accepts some degree of long-term cultural difference between groups. Multicultural policies can come in the form of the adoption of multiculturalism in school curricula that recognizes and supports group differences, the inclusion of ethnic representation in the media, exemptions from dress codes, allowing dual citizenship, the funding of ethnic-group organizations to support cultural activities, the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction, and affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups.40 Many countries, such as Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom, have adopted multiculturalism. The United States has a laissez-faire approach to multiculturalism— ethnic communities and cultural differences are generally accepted, but people do not look to the government to help preserve ethnic cultures. As

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such, it is sometimes characterized as assimilationist, though it is probably best thought of as somewhere between the two.41 Multiculturalism has its critics: some argue that it does not provide the expectations or means to become integrated in local society, and it can also serve to sharpen social divisions. Others counter that it can actually help integration, as the acceptance of other people and their cultures may make them likely to feel a part of their adopted country and, somewhat paradoxically, achieve integration and upward mobility over the long run. Generally speaking, there has been some backlash and retreat from multiculturalism in many European countries since the mid-1990s. Some believe that multiculturalism went “too far” and is threatening the way of life in many countries. Europe has seen the rise of a number of right-wing political movements in a number of otherwise progressive countries that are against further immigration and multiculturalism, such as in Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Germany.42 People who support these parties raise both economic and social concerns against immigration. As one news story from 2016 put it, Opinions of young Europeans appear to be hardening toward immigration. Ask them about their lives and talk quickly turns to the challenge of finding jobs and the threat of Europe being overrun by migrants. In Hungary, Kitti, a 28-year-old sports teacher and mother of an eightyear-old girl, says, “I went to the main railway station in the summer to help migrants.” But since then her heart has hardened. “I think we need to stop them coming, they think differently from us, especially when it comes to women. She cites the notorious drunken gang assaults on women in Germany’s Cologne and Hamburg during the New Year festivities.” . . . Others complained migrants would not be able to integrate because of different traditions.43

So far, many of these countries with Far Right parties have not radically shifted their policies, but rather added policies that foster civic integration. These programs generally try to instill a respect for basic liberaldemocratic values, such as democracy, human rights, gender equality, and basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions. These are not necessarily incompatible with multiculturalism, as countries that have adopted these strategies (such as Germany and Denmark) still accept diversity and the rights of different ethnic groups. There is no

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unambiguous evidence of which policies work best, but many countries have adopted a mix of policies that respect group differences, provide minority groups access to mainstream institutions, allow immigrants to access basic services that can provide a safety net in difficult times, and promote basic civic knowledge and human rights values.44

Affirmative Action Affirmative action policies are intended to improve the employment or educational opportunities of disadvantaged groups, such as minority groups and women. One of the original rationales behind affirmative action in the United States was to help minority groups overcome the lasting effects of historical discrimination. President Lyndon Johnson, for example, voiced his support for affirmative action in 1965 by stating, “You do not take a man, who for years has been hobbled by chains, liberate him, bring him to the starting line of the race, saying ‘you are free to compete with all the others,’ and still justly believe you have been completely fair.”45 In other words, given generations of blocked opportunities, it was not reasonable to think that minority group members could compete on an equal basis with the white majority.46 Others see affirmative action as necessary to combat ongoing discrimination in American institutions, such as the labor market. According to this view, “Unlike anti-discrimination laws, which provide remedies to which workers can appeal after they have suffered discrimination, affirmative action policies aim to keep discrimination from occurring. Affirmative action can prevent discrimination by replacing employment practices that are discriminatory—either by intent or default—with employment practices that safeguard against discrimination.”47 For example, people often hear of job opportunities through their social networks, which are often segregated by race. Affirmative action is intended to help minority group members overcome this structural disadvantage by giving them access to opportunities they previously might not have had. Many countries around the world employ affirmative action programs of one sort or another. In the United Kingdom these policies are called “positive action,” in Canada “employment equity,” in Sri Lanka “standardization,” and in India “positive discrimination.” Other countries that have

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employed group preferences and quotas include Nigeria, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brazil, Australia, Israel, China, Fiji, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union and its successor states, to name a few.48 Countries typically enact these policies as a way of addressing inequalities across different caste or ethnic groups and the discrimination that often reinforced them. In Brazil and South Africa, for example, affirmative action programs are meant to address the historical disadvantage of their black (and mixed) populations. In Malaysia, Malays (and other indigenous people) are disadvantaged vis-à-vis non-Malays (mainly ethnic Chinese and Indians). In Northern Ireland, the Catholic population experienced considerable disadvantage. Nigeria is composed of a large number of different ethnic groups, and patterns of disadvantage vary regionally. All these countries have pursued some form of affirmative action.49 In the United States the term “affirmative action” was first introduced in Executive Order 10925, signed by President John F. Kennedy in 1961, which stated that government contractors should “take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.”50 President Lyndon Johnson issued additional executive orders expanding this effort, as did President Richard Nixon, who in 1970 issued an executive order that required firms with sizable federal contracts and at least fifty employees to have in place written affirmative action plans that had goals and timetables for employing minorities and women. Affirmative action plans have been implemented by a number of organizations for a variety of reasons, such as in government agencies to encourage equal employment opportunity, court-ordered plans for firms found guilty of discrimination, and voluntary affirmative action by many private employers.51 Over time the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that some affirmative action practices were unconstitutional, including racial or gender quotas for college admissions or jobs. In addition, employers generally are not allowed to consider candidates’ race or gender directly, except in rare cases and only as a temporary measure to address severe past job segregation or discrimination.52 Thus, affirmative action practices used by employers today most often consist of outreach campaigns to underrepresented groups, targeted recruitment, and employee support programs.

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In higher education Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) allowed race to play a limited role in the admissions policies of public universities. The case came about when Barbara Grutter, a white woman, filed suit against the University of Michigan Law School, claiming that she was rejected because the Law School used race as a “predominant” factor. The case made its way through lower courts before the Supreme Court finally upheld the university’s admissions policy. The decision essentially specified that race could be taken into account in holistic evaluations of individual student applicants that also took into account other factors (grades, activities, etc.) and accepted the argument that universities could have a compelling interest in promoting diversity. The rationale is that such diversity generates a “critical mass” of minority students to ensure that they do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race.53 Affirmative action policies in other countries vary considerably. Some countries use quotas to ensure that groups are well represented in universities and certain occupations, while others provide more general preferential treatment to minority group members.54 In Brazil, for example, some universities have quotas that guarantee a certain percentage of admission slots to students on the basis of their race or class. A few others have point systems, where candidates are given additional points if they are from a disadvantaged background (race or class).55 Affirmative action is often controversial in these countries. Debates about it revolve around several issues. One of these is fairness. Some feel that affirmative action is necessary to rectify the effects of historical and persistent structural racism and discrimination. Others counter that it is unfair to implement policies that provide an opportunity to an individual of one group and limit opportunities to an individual of another even if neither were necessarily direct perpetrators or victims of discrimination. Along these lines, groups are sometimes lumped together as disadvantaged minorities, even though their experiences with discrimination might differ. For example, Hispanics include both Cubans and Puerto Ricans, though the latter group has by most accounts experienced more discrimination than the former. Moreover, it has been argued that the beneficiaries of affirmative action are often more advantaged minority group members (often those of higher socioeconomic status) rather than the “truly needy.”56 Thus, many believe that decisions about whether an

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individual gets a job or is admitted to a university should be based on individual merit and achievement alone.57 Another critique of affirmative action is that it potentially devalues the accomplishments of minority group members if they are seen as obtaining positions despite inferior qualifications or performance. This stigma may produce negative social and psychological effects on those who benefit from these policies, such as by creating self-doubt about one’s aptitude and ability to fit in (this is often termed “stereotype threat” in the research literature).58 The counterargument is that affirmative action is mainly about facilitating access to opportunities. In the United States many minority group members attend inferior schools, don’t have the resources that could help them do better on qualifying tests, and have less social capital that could effectively link them to opportunities. Moreover, qualifying tests or criteria themselves might be biased (even if not intentionally) in favor of those with a white middle-class background and often don’t adequately measure one’s potential on the job or in the classroom. That is, such tests or criteria often don’t do that well in predicting eventual performance.59 An additional criticism is that affirmative action reinforces ethnic-group divisions by recognizing them and sanctioning differential treatment. One of the arguments used against affirmative action in Brazil, for example, is that it went against the cherished ideal that the country was a racial democracy.60 Perhaps in part due to these affirmative action policies, a larger share of Brazilians report being black in recent censuses than in past, and this likely reflects a new era of racial consciousness.61 In other countries such India, Malaysia, and Nigeria, intergroup conflict and resentment does not appear to have declined after the implementation of affirmative action and instead may have increased.62 Nevertheless, in many of these contexts racial and ethnic divisions are already present, and it is not altogether clear to what extent affirmative action has affected them. In any case, these programs are meant specifically to reduce socioeconomic disparities, which in the long run might result in better intergroup relations. In the United States public support for affirmative action is mixed and often depends on the wording of the survey question. For example, when asked, “Do you generally favor or oppose affirmative action programs for racial minorities?” a majority of Americans (58 percent), including a

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majority of whites (53 percent), support affirmative action.63 But if respondents are asked if college admissions should be based solely on merit or should consider race, a strong majority of U.S. adults (67 percent) believe that admissions should be based on merit, with some expected variation across groups, including 75 percent of whites, 59 percent of Hispanics, and 44 percent of blacks. As polling expert Allison Kopicki has noted, “Using the phrases ‘special preferences’ or ‘preferential treatment’ in a question tends to reduce support for affirmative action. Americans want life to be fair: They generally don’t mind assisting groups that need help, but they don’t like the idea of that help coming at the expense of others.”64 Evaluations of the effectiveness of affirmative action in the United States tend to show that such programs moderately increase the representation of minority groups in universities and employment.65 For example, one study finds that firms holding federal contracts that are mandated to implement affirmative action have a higher share of minorities in highpaying skilled occupations than noncontracting firms that are not mandated to have affirmative action plans.66 Affirmative action has the most significant impact on black and Hispanic admissions to elite universities and graduate programs.67 Immigrants and their children in particular have benefited considerably from affirmative action and are overrepresented among minority group members admitted on the basis of the program.68 Thus, such policies have the effect of furthering the integration of second-generation Americans.69 Replacing race-based affirmative action with other policies to draw underrepresented groups, such as lower income or class rank in high schools, results in a substantially lower representation of minority groups than race-based policies.70 Thus, not unexpectedly, class-based policies are not as effective in drawing underrepresented minorities as those that focus specifically on race. There is some debate about whether affirmative action harms minorities as a result of a possible “mismatch” between their skills and what is expected of them in universities and the labor market. The notion behind this is that less qualified students may fare poorly in places that have high entrance requirements and standards. But evidence of how undergraduate students at elite universities do suggests that affirmative action does

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not hurt minority students—it in fact helps them. A rigorous study by researchers Thomas Espenshade and Alexandria Walton Radford, for example, finds that minority students were generally more likely to graduate when attending elite institutions, mainly because such universities have more resources for students and higher graduation rates overall than other kinds of universities. The tradeoff is that minority students admitted through affirmative action are more likely to graduate lower in their class. They conclude that the benefits of graduating from a more selective college, which often leads to a better job down the road, outweighs the cost of ranking lower in one’s class.71 Overall, while a few studies in a variety of contexts indicate that there might be a mismatch, the weight of the evidence goes against it.72 Research, however, suggests that affirmative action to some extent may stigmatize black and Hispanic students, and this compromises their performance and well-being.73 Mary Fischer and Douglas Massey, for example, report that while minority students who individually benefited from affirmative action earned as high or higher grades and left school at lower rates than others who have the same qualifications, there is a countervailing institutional effect, such that “the greater an institution used affirmative action criteria in admissions, the lower the grades, the greater the odds of school leaving, and the less the satisfaction with college life expressed by individual minority students, holding constant socioeconomic background, academic preparation, and aptitude.”74 They note that the effect is modest. But others have argued, based on the stigmatization argument, that affirmative action makes minority students feel marginalized in universities.75 Affirmative action likely will remain controversial. While it is useful to know its effectiveness in attaining certain goals, values and interests inevitably also play a key role in shaping support for it. As economists Harry Holzer and David Neumark argue, “In the end, whether or in what form affirmative action survives will depend on whether Americans think it is fair to give preference to minorities or women in some contexts, to overcome the barriers they continue to face from current discrimination, past discrimination, and a variety of other causes. Views on fairness are very subjective, and sometimes impervious to empirical evidence.”76

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con clu si o n The growth of international migration has increased ethnic diversity in many countries around the world. While there are a number of countries that have had such diversity for quite some time, there are many others, such as in parts of Europe, where this is relatively new, especially with regard to the presence of ethnic and religious minorities. Countries also recognize and measure racial and ethnic groups in many different ways, which reflects the fact that the nature of group differences is shaped by historical factors that vary from nation to nation. How ethnic groups fare also varies widely, but it is clear that racial and ethnic inequality is a significant global issue. Inequality is often embedded in the immigration process, as immigrants typically arrive with imperfect knowledge about the language and culture of the host country and often low average levels of education and low-status job experience, and it thus takes time for them and their children to adapt and achieve upward mobility over generations. Mobility is also often hampered by discrimination the newcomers face. Countries also vary in their immigration policies that attract immigrants of different skill levels, and these have implications for immigrant incorporation. High-skilled immigrants typically have an easier time adapting in their new countries, though immigration policies often have a humanitarian component that permits other kinds of newcomers, such as refugees and family members of immigrants living abroad. There are two common approaches to immigrant integration: assimilationism, which encourages immigrants to adopt the native language and culture; and multiculturalism, which accepts and supports group differences. Many affluent immigrant-receiving countries today have a mix of assimilationist and multicultural elements, as they often try to facilitate immigrant integration with, for example, civic and native-language classes, while still respecting groups’ differences. These strategies may help prevent group conflict and lasting alienation among minority group members who are visibly different from the native population. Nevertheless, there is still significant variation in the weight different countries place on these elements and how policies are implemented in practice.

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A number of countries have adopted affirmative action policies to reduce systemic racial and ethnic inequalities. These are often contentious, raising debates about social justice and fairness. These policies range from racial and ethnic quotas for particular occupations or in university admissions to active recruitment of minority group members without any such quotas. Affirmative action in the United States has been limited by Supreme Court decisions about the extent to which race can be taken into account by employers and universities. These debates, both legal and in the court of public opinion, will undoubtedly continue.

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Conclusion american color lines

In 1903 the sociologist W. E. B. DuBois declared that the problem of the twentieth century was that of the color line.1 Over a hundred years later it is evident that we have not solved this problem. That is not to say that race relations, racial divisions, or racial inequality have remained unchanged. There have been alternating periods of progress, regression, and stagnation. The United States has been transformed by all sorts of economic and demographic changes that have affected these patterns, not the least being waves of immigration leading to greater racial and ethnic diversity and internal migration that first propelled blacks out of the South to booming cities in the Northeast and Midwest in the twentieth century, before the broad movement of many groups to the Sun Belt by the century’s end. We also witnessed tremendous economic growth and rising living standards over the past one hundred years, but also a substantial increase in income inequality since the 1970s. Also of critical importance has been the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, which destroyed the legal foundations of racial discrimination. The early 2010s saw increasing pessimism about black-white relations. This occurred in the wake of a series of incidents that resulted in the death of a number of African Americans at the hands of law enforcement, 149

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including Tamir Rice, Michael Brown, and Eric Garner. These resulted in protests against what was seen by many as the unfair profiling of African Americans and the devaluation of black lives. These events also generated considerable discussion in conventional and social media and launched the Black Lives Matter movement. Even after the election of our country’s first black president in 2008, these events also pointed to the persistence of racial inequality. Even in light of these events, one of the basic themes of this book is that when measured over a long period, color lines have generally softened, as there has been a narrowing of differences across many indicators for most groups over the past sixty years. People’s beliefs about inherent differences between races have gradually changed, and people generally have become more accepting of others, as exemplified by increasing levels of interracial dating and marriage. There are also many more minorities in positions of political and economic power, and some groups, such as Asians, have reached socioeconomic parity with whites or surpassed them. Nevertheless, there is still a considerable amount of racial and ethnic inequality, especially black-white inequality. The protests described earlier are symptomatic of this, and they remind the rest of America that equality has not yet been achieved. So while blacks have improved their absolute and relative position in many respects, such as in educational achievement, occupational status, residential circumstances, and life expectancy, by other measures, including median household income and wealth, the gap has not narrowed. Thus, progress has been slow and uneven. Many hoped that the country would have made greater progress in reducing black-white inequality by now. Several factors contribute to continued black-white inequality. The legacy of historical inequities plays a role in sustaining these gaps, as African American families are more likely to be poor and thus have to contend with overcoming obstacles associated with poverty, such as living in neighborhoods with inferior schools—exacerbated by high levels of racial residential segregation in many cities—and have fewer resources to invest in the advancement of their children than more wealthy families have. High rates of single parenthood also contribute to poverty and economic instability, as does social disorganization in many low-income communities.

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Discrimination also still significantly impedes African American advancement, such as in the search for employment in the labor market or housing in better neighborhoods. Social institutions have played a role, such as in the form of predatory lenders targeting poor and minority home seekers. Likewise, evidence indicates that law enforcement (police and prosecutors) target young African American men, and the criminal justice system extracts resources from poor and minority communities through court-related fines and fees that can lead to spiraling debt. Finally, growing income inequality more generally reduces opportunities for all low-income Americans, including African Americans. Thus, while more African Americans have been able to achieve a measure of upward mobility than in the past, for many poor Americans, including poor blacks, living standards have not risen, and many are being left further behind because of this rising inequality. Increasing incarceration rates from the 1970s through 2007–8 and negative stereotypes about lowincome blacks in particular means that less-educated blacks are likely as badly off as they were over a generation ago. It is difficult to discern the relative contribution of each particular factor in explaining current levels of black-white inequality. The reality is that there are multiple causes for this gap, and these often interact with one another to produce disadvantages that accumulate over people’s lives. For example, attending a low-quality public school (which is more likely in poor, segregated neighborhoods) affects the likelihood that one attends college, which then affects employment, wages, and family formation patterns. Harmful stereotypes affect how people and institutions treat African Americans and, likewise, how many individuals view their own life chances. Growing income inequality has made mattes worse for all lowincome families seeking to enter the middle class. With regard to patterns of inequality among other groups, inequality between non-Hispanic whites and Hispanics has declined in many respects, but significant gaps between these groups remain. But because a sizable number of Hispanics are foreign-born or children of immigrants, we have to take into account the immigrant adaptation process to assess their well-being and prospects for the future. For example, many Mexican immigrants come with low levels of education, so we would expect that their incomes would be fairly low. In addition, a number are also

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undocumented immigrants, and this further hampers their job prospects in the formal job market and often reduces the opportunities available to their children, especially if they are also undocumented. Nevertheless, we might expect to see intergenerational mobility over time and especially across generations. Overall, a review of the evidence suggests Hispanics are achieving upward mobility, though not yet parity, with whites when we take into account all these factors. There is also considerable variation across groups, with some, like Cubans and South Americans, with outcomes similar to those of non-Hispanic whites, while others, such as Dominicans, who are doing less well. Darker-skinned Hispanics in particular may face many of the same discriminatory obstacles that blacks do, which helps explain some of the variation among Hispanics by national origin and skin color. While debates continue on whether Hispanics will eventually catch up to non-Hispanic whites, there is reason to believe that such progress will continue over generations, especially among non-black Hispanics. On the whole, Asians in the United States have high average levels of educational achievement and income. This suggests that this group is achieving successful incorporation. Asians do relatively well for a few reasons, including the positive selection of Asian immigrants, as many come with high levels of education relative to people in their country of origin and to native-born Americans. As a result, Asian immigrants also put much emphasis on educational attainment as a path to upward mobility and are able to successfully leverage ethnic community resources to achieve this end for their children. It is also important to note the variation in outcomes among Asians. For example, Asian Indians and Filipinos have very high median incomes, while the Vietnamese median household income is close to the national median. Some refugee groups, such as the Hmong, fare less well. Nevertheless, Asians by and large are doing well in terms of socioeconomic outcomes. American Indians continue to fare poorly compared to whites in terms of average levels of educational attainment, income, and other indicators of well-being. Their historical mistreatment by the federal government and white settlers, along with contemporary discrimination in the labor market, contribute to these inequalities. In addition, Native Americans,

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particularly those living on and around Indian reservations, are often spatially and economically isolated. While economic activity has increased in many such places in recent years (such as in the form of gaming), and this has boosted the well-being of many communities, American Indians remain one of the most disadvantaged groups in the United States. The multiracial population in the United States has increased in recent years due to the growth in intermarriage and also to changing patterns of self-identification. After all, it was beginning only in the 2000 census when people could choose to report more than one race in government surveys. Some people with mixed heritage are more likely to report being multiracial than others. For example, individuals who have a black and a white parent are less likely to report being multiracial and more likely to report one race (mainly black) than individuals with an Asian and a white parent. The historical one-drop rule, where people with any black ancestry at all were considered black rather than white, helps explain this pattern of identity. The socioeconomic status of multiracial groups tends to be in between that of the constituent single-race groups, though we know relatively little about the factors that shape the socioeconomic achievement of mixed-race individuals. Future research will undoubtedly shed further light on the well-being of these groups. Finally, the growth in international migration means that many countries are experiencing a growth in racial and ethnic diversity, and they have adopted a variety of approaches to incorporating these new groups. Some implement assimilationist policies that help immigrants adopt native customs and culture, while others favor multicultural ones that respect and support group differences. Most advanced democracies today have a mix of assimilationist and multicultural elements. For example, they may help immigrants assimilate by offering civic classes and nativelanguage instruction, and they may also be multicultural by offering bilingual education to immigrant children and accepting group differences. Such a mix is seen by many as providing the best strategy for successfully incorporating new immigrants and ethnic minorities over the long run. Apart from immigrant incorporation policies, some countries have adopted affirmative action for disadvantaged ethnic groups. The implementation of affirmative action varies, with some countries using numerical

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quotas in university admissions and occupations to more modest measures, like in the United States, that seek to promote the recruitment of underrepresented minorities. In many countries these policies are controversial, as people often differ in what they think is “fair.” In the United States, for example, some argue that employment and university admissions decisions should be based solely on a particular set of criteria (such as test scores) that are meant to measure individual aptitude, while others believe that social justice is better achieved by advancing minority group representation to overcome historical or current discriminatory practices by people and institutions. People’s values and interests inevitably play a key role in shaping their support for it. Finally, a recurrent theme in this book is that race and ethnicity are social constructions, as exemplified by how racial and ethnic group definitions and divisions vary over time and place. For example, someone who is black in the United States might be considered mixed-race or even white in Brazil. The growth of racial and ethnic diversity in the United States, along with changes in public attitudes, have challenged conventional ways of defining and measuring groups at different points in U.S. history. This affects the basic counts of different groups, such as the American Indian and multiracial populations. It also affects our understanding of patterns of socioeconomic inequality. For example, people who have a Hispanic ancestor but who do not identify as Hispanic (perhaps because they are of mixed origins due to intermarriage) have higher average levels of educational attainment than those who do identify as Hispanic. This leads to an underestimation in conventional surveys of the socioeconomic mobility of Hispanics across generations. The United States has become remarkably more racially and ethnically diverse over the past several decades. This is transforming the character of communities across the country, and it will continue to do so for decades to come. The United States has also seen considerable progress in reducing racial and ethnic inequality over the past sixty years, though significant divisions remain. Unfortunately, relatively modest economic growth and increasing income inequality in recent years have provided a stiff headwind in efforts to further reduce racial and ethnic differences. In prosperous times more resources are available to make vital investments in individuals and institutions, such as in community schools or in physi-

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cal and technological infrastructure. Growing income disparities and the decline in middle-class job opportunities makes it more difficult for those at the bottom of the economic ladder, which includes many minority group members, to achieve upward mobility. Thus, as a country we have to come to grips with not only persisting racial and ethnic divisions but also the considerable income inequality that helps sustain them.

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Notes

chapter 1 1. CNN and Kaiser Family Foundation 2015; see also Shoichet 2015. 2. Blow 2014.

chapter 2 1. General Social Survey 2014; see also Bobo et al. 2012. 2. Tuch and Hughes 2011. 3. Gilens 1999, 78. 4. Lisk 2014. 5. See, for example, Younge 2010; and Lim 2009. 6. Arogundade 2014. 7. Roth 2005, 36; Davis 1991. 8. Grieco and Cassidy 2001 (2000 data); U.S. Census Bureau 2013a (2012 data). 9. This discussion appears in Iceland 2014, 140–42. 10. Morning 2011b, 6. 11. Jacobson 1998, 1–2. 12. Jacobson 1998, 10; see also Roth 2012 for differences in views of race in the United States, Puerto Rico, and the Dominican Republic.

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13. Jacobson 1998, 48. 14. Alba 2009. 15. Brodkin 2004, 18–20. 16. Waters 1996, 444–45. 17. Alba 2009, 81–89. 18. Jacobson 1998, 9; see also Ignatiev 1995. 19. Omi and Winant 2015, 4. 20. See Hirschman, Alba, and Farley 2000; Roth 2012; Dowling 2014; and Perez and Hirschman 2009a. 21. U.S. Census Bureau 2016; Compton et al. 2012. 22. Hirschman, Alba, and Farley 2000, 390–91. 23. See also Alba 2016. 24. Pratt, Hixson, and Jones 2014; see also M. Anderson 2002. 25. Compton et al. 2012; Prewitt 2013. 26. Compton et al. 2012; Dowling 2014. 27. Duncan and Trejo 2011. 28. Bouie 2014. 29. Sapperstein and Penner 2012; Liebler et al. 2014; Perez and Hirschman 2009b. 30. Duncan and Trejo 2011; see also Alba and Islam 2009; and Telles and Ortiz 2008, 281. 31. Riley 2014. 32. Coates 2014. 33. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014a. 34. Blau, Ferber, and Winkler 1998. 35. U.S. Census Bureau 2014b. 36. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014c. 37. Western and Wildeman 2009; Wakefield and Uggen 2010. 38. Massey and Denton 1993, 141–42; Duncan and Murnane 2011. 39. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 119. 40. Loury 1977; see also Bourdieu 1986. 41. Xie and Gough 2011; see also Sanders and Nee 1987, 1992. 42. Murray 1984. 43. See Iceland 2013, ch. 5; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2011; and Patterson 2015b, 106. 44. Martin et al. 2013. 45. E. Anderson 1999; Edin and Kefalas 2011. 46. McLanahan 2004; S. L. Brown 2010. 47. Hsin and Xie 2014; see also Zhou and Lee 2014; and Lee and Zhou 2014. 48. Sakamoto, Goyette, and Kim 2009. 49. Lamont and Lareau 1988, 164. 50. Bourdieu 1986; Kalmijn and Kraaykamp 1996.

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51. Alba and Nee 2003, 11. 52. Alba and Nee 2003, 38. 53. Melvern 2004. 54. Parrillo 2012, 80. 55. Guinier and Torres 2009, 109–10. 56. Gallagher 2009a, 100; see also Bonilla-Silva 2014. 57. Guinier and Torres 2009, 110–13. 58. Reiman 2009; Pager 2009. 59. Guinier and Torres 2009, 110.

chapter 3 1. DuBois (1903) 1995, 45. 2. Howard 2014, B8. 3. Pettit 2012, 59–61. The individual-level variables discussed in this chapter, such as education and occupation, are the ones most biased by differential incarceration rates. Some of the measures, such as life expectancy at birth, are not biased at all by incarceration, since they are not based on information from household surveys. The effect of incarceration on other measures, such as household income, wealth, and poverty, is less clear, since these are household-based measures. To the extent that the incarcerated population would reside in existing households (as opposed to living in their own single-person households) means that their absence is taken into account in the reported (low) incomes and wealth of such households. 4. U.S. Census Bureau 2014d. 5. Pettit 2012. 6. Landry and Marsh 2011. 7. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014b. 8. Logan and Stults 2011; Iceland, Sharp, and Timberlake 2013. 9. Iceland and Wilkes 2006. 10. Isolation is a little lower for non-Hispanic whites than whites because of the relative size of the two white groups (holding other factors constant, larger groups tend to be more isolated). 11. Sharp et al. 2010; Marsh et al. 2010. 12. Lareau and Goyette 2014; see also Carter and Welner 2013. 13. Firebaugh and Farrell 2016; Sharkey 2014, 935–38; see also Lacy 2007 for an in-depth discussion of the types of neighborhoods in which the black middle class lives. 14. CDC 2016, table 7. 15. Hoyert 2012, 5; MacDorman, Hoyert, and Mathews 2013; Schoeni, Freedman, and Martin 2009.

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16. Williams et al. 2010. 17. Kochanek, Arias, and Anderson 2015, 4. 18. Case and Deaton 2015. 19. Palloni and Arias 2004; Turra and Elo 2008; Riosmena, Wong, and Palloni 2013. 20. Kaiser Family Foundation 2015; for age-adjusted mortality, see CDC 2016, table 1. 21. Pew Research Center 2015a, 10. 22. Snipp and Cheung 2016, 91. 23. Pettit 2012, 66–67. 24. Kochhar, Fry, and Taylor 2011; McKernan et al. 2014. 25. Sharp and Hall 2014. 26. Keister 2004. 27. Mazumder 2014. 28. Christian and Bennet 1998, 27–28. 29. Gill, Glazer, and Thernstrom 1992, 221; Equal Justice Initiative 2015. 30. See E. Foner 1988. 31. J. Patterson 2001, 25. 32. Tolnay 2003, 210. 33. J. Patterson 2001, xxiv–xxv. 34. Schuman et al. 1997, 104–7. 35. Bobo et al. 2012. 36. Mazumder 2011; Becker and Tomes 1986. 37. Evans 2014; Hacker et al. 2011. 38. Hout 1994; Sakamoto, Wu, and Tzeng 2000; Farkas and Vicknair 1996. 39. Fryer 2011, 856. 40. Pager, Western, and Bonikowski 2009. 41. Turner et al. 2013; Butler and Broockman 2011. 42. Rugh and Massey 2010; Rugh 2015; Gruenstein Bocian, Ernst, and Li 2008. 43. Walker, Spohn, and DeLone 2012; Western 2006. 44. Bobo and Thompson 2006, 447. 45. Wakefield and Uggen 2010; Western 2006; Pager 2009. 46. Uggen and Manza 2002. 47. Evans 2014. 48. Mullainathan 2015; see also Espenshade and Walton Radford 2009. 49. Mullainathan 2015. 50. Charles and Guryan 2008. 51. Massey and Denton 1993, 141–42. 52. Iceland 2009; Iceland, Sharp, and Timberlake 2013. 53. Wilson 1996, 29–30. 54. Wilson 1987.

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55. Pettit and Western 2004; Arum and Beattie 1999; Wakefield and Uggen 2010. 56. Wakefield and Uggen 2010, 395. 57. Kearney et al. 2014, 9. 58. Wakefield and Uggen 2010, 391. 59. Western and Pettit 2010, 11. 60. Turner et al. 2013. 61. Wakefield and Uggen 2010, 392; see also Alexander 2010 for an extended discussion of the mass incarceration of African Americans. 62. Loury 2000, 60. 63. Patterson 2015a; for a discussion of the toll of gun violence in black communities, see Lafraniere, Porat, and Armendariz 2016. 64. Ventura and Bachrach 2000; Martin et al. 2013. 65. U.S. Census Bureau 2014c. 66. McLanahan 2004. 67. Murray 2012. 68. Wakefield and Uggen 2010. 69. Edin 2000. 70. For one example of this argument, see Krugman 2012. 71. Cherlin 2004; Smock and Greenland 2010. 72. Patterson 2015a, 553–55. 73. Franklin 1993, 5. 74. DiPrete and Eirich 2006. 75. Western 2007, 109; see also Wenger 2013.

chapter 4 1. Rocha 2015. 2. Gann and Duignan 1986, 4. 3. Gill, Glazer, and Thernstrom 1992, 349; Gann and Duignan 1986. 4. Gann and Duignan 1986, 52; see also Marger 2011, 293. 5. Daniels 2002, 310–11. 6. Zong and Batalova 2014. 7. Gann and Duignan 1986, 76. 8. Rodriguez 1989. This chapter uses the terms Hispanic and Latino interchangeably, reflecting how data on Hispanic origin are collected by the U.S. Census Bureau (which follows federal guidelines set by the Office of Management and Budget). A 2013 Pew Research Center poll found that about half of their respondents who identified as Hispanic/Latino did not have a preference between the two terms. Among those who did have a preference, “Hispanic” was preferred over “Latino” by two to one (Lopez 2013).

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9. Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Gann and Duignan 1986, 98–104. 10. Gann and Duignan 1986, 114–16; see also Grasmuck and Pessar 1991. 11. Gibson and Jung 2002; U.S. Census Bureau 2012, 2013a; Alba 2016. 12. Logan and Turner 2013, 6–7. 13. Fennelly 2008, 162, 165. 14. Daniels 2002, 239–43; Gill, Glazer, and Thernstrom 1992, 33. 15. Lee 2014, 30–31. 16. Le 2007, 16. 17. Daniels 2002, 245. 18. Le 2007, 17. 19. Daniels 2002, 250–55; Gill, Glazer, and Thernstrom 1992, 333–34. 20. Le 2007, 18. 21. Le 2007, 17. 22. Lee 2014, 52–56. 23. Daniels 2002, 343–44. 24. In this chapter the percentage of Hispanics who have a bachelor’s degree or more for the total population is a little lower than the percentage shown in chapter 3 because of the different year being considered (2014 in chapter 3 versus 2010 here) and different data set (Current Population Survey in chapter 3 versus the American Community Survey here). As described in chapter 3, estimates of educational attainment are slightly lower in the ACS than the CPS, at least in part due to the inclusion of the group quarters population in the ACS. Group quarters includes places such as college dorms, nursing facilities, and correctional facilities, to name a few. 25. Sakamoto and Kim 2013. 26. Telles and Ortiz 2008, 78–79, 131, 233–34; see also Massey 2007, 154. 27. Espenshade and Radford 2009. 28. Zimmerman 2012. 29. Hein 2000, 413; Marger 2011, 270. 30. Caumont 2013. 31. Lopez, Morin, and Taylor 2010, figs. 11–12. 32. Pew Research Center 2013, 110–14. 33. Kim and Sakamoto 2010. 34. Kasinitz et al. 2008, 310–12, 317. 35. Portes and Rumbaut 2006, 95–96. 36. Kasinitz et al. 2008, 350. 37. Kasinitz et al. 2008, 362–63. 38. Hsin and Xie 2014; see also Sakamoto, Kim, and Takei 2012. 39. Lee and Zhou 2014, 39. 40. Hsin and Xie 2014, 8420–21. 41. Sakamoto and Kim 2013. 42. Chiswick 1986; Feliciano 2005.

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43. Jiménez and Horowitz 2013. 44. Lee and Zhou 2014, 45. 45. Jiménez and Horowitz 2013; Lee and Zhou 2014, 45–46. 46. Hsin and Xie 2014; Lee and Zhou 2014, 47–48. 47. White and Glick 2009; Bean and Stevens 2003; Kasinitz et al. 2008; Reitz, Zhang, and Hawkins 2011; Park and Myers 2010. 48. Lippard and Gallagher 2011. 49. Grogger and Trejo 2002. 50. Telles and Ortiz 2008, 16. 51. S. K. Brown 2007; Bean et al. 2014; Rugh 2015; Perlmann 2005. 52. Duncan and Trejo 2011, 2016. 53. Perlmann 2005, 117; S. K. Brown 2007; Bean et al. 2014. 54. Perlmann 2005, 117. 55. Frank, Akresh, and Lu 2010; Golash-Boza and Darity 2008; Itzigsohn, Giorguli, and Vazquez 2005. 56. Frank, Akresh, and Lu 2010. 57. Alba 1985. 58. Reyes 2014. 59. Reyes 2014. 60. See Sakamoto and Kim 2013.

chapter 5 1. There has been considerable debate about whether to use the term American Indian or Native American when discussing the population indigenous to North America. This chapter uses American Indian more frequently because this is the term used by the U.S. Census Bureau to refer to this population, though the chapter uses the terms interchangeably as well. Some of the data presented in this chapter also includes Alaska Natives, who are typically grouped with American Indians in Census Bureau tabulations. 2. Thornton 2002, 71. 3. Snipp 1989, 10; Thornton 2002, 69. 4. Snipp 1989, 17. 5. Snipp 1992, 355. 6. Thornton 2002, 72–73; Snipp 1992, 355. 7. Snipp 1997, 65. 8. Mooney (1900) 1975, 122; repr. in Thornton 1984, 290. 9. Thornton 1984, 298. 10. Neugin 1978; repr. in Thornton 1984, 291. 11. Carley 1961. 12. Greene 1994.

164

notes to pages 96–104

13. Fixico 2002, 384. 14. Snipp 1997, 66. 15. Snipp 1989, 64. 16. Snipp 1997, 63. 17. Liebler and Ortyl 2014; Thornton 1987. 18. Nagel 1996. 19. Liebler and Ortyl 2014, 1105. 20. Thornton, Sandefur, and Snippet 1991. 21. Rindfuss, Sandefur and Cohen 1997; Liebler and Ortyl 2014; Riche 2000, 37; Waters 1990. 22. Cohn 2015. 23. Katz 1986. 24. Liebler et al. 2014; Doyle and Kao 2007; Harris and Sim 2002. 25. Passel 1997, 11. 26. Liebler and Ortyl 2014, 1110. 27. Thornton 1997, 35. 28. Thornton 2002, 76–79. 29. Norris, Vines, and Hoeffel 2012, 3. 30. U.S. Department of the Interior 2014, 10. 31. Norris, Vines, and Hoeffel 2012, 18. 32. Liebler and Zacher 2013, 1928. 33. Norris, Vines, and Hoeffel 2012, 12–18. 34. HUD 2014, ix. 35. Decker 2011. 36. The statistics in figure 16 differ slightly from those elsewhere in the book (e.g., in chapter 4, which focused on Asians and Hispanics) due to the different year considered here, as well as the different survey source. For most groups, the Current Population Survey tends to provide the highest-quality data because of the detailed questions it contains on income and related topics. For data on American Indians, we need to rely on data from the American Community Survey because its large sample allows us to calculate more reliable estimates for relatively small groups, such as American Indians. 37. Austin 2013; HUD 2014, 25. 38. CDC 2015. 39. NCHS 2012, iv. 40. HUD 2014, 27. 41. HUD 2014, 40–42. 42. Wolfe et al. 2012. 43. HUD 2014, 68. 44. Snipp 1992, 366–67. 45. Armitage 2015.

notes to pages 105–117

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46. Snipp 1992, 363. 47. Sakamoto, Wu, and Tzeng 2000; Snipp and Hirschman 2004; Snipp and Cheung 2016. 48. Glick and Han 2015. 49. Huyser, Sakamoto, and Takei 2010. 50. Snipp and Hirschman 2004. 51. Sandefur and Liebler 1997; HUD 2014. 52. Austin 2013. 53. Harvard Project 2008, 111. 54. HUD 2014, 37. 55. Schlossberg 2014, A22. 56. Austin 2013.

chapter 6 1. Martin 2008; Pratt 1997. 2. Martin 2008; Pratt 1997, 238. 3. Liebler et al. 2014. 4. Alba 1985. 5. Perlmann and Waters 2002a, 4. 6. Perlmann and Waters 2002a, 4–5. 7. More specifically, intermarried couples are those between a Hispanic or non-Hispanic person or between non-Hispanic couples who come from the following different racial groups: white, black, Asian, American Indian, mixed race, or some other race. For the 1980 to 2000 figures Asians include both Asians and Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islanders, while in 2010 these are treated as separate groups. 8. Qian and Lichter 2007, 2011. 9. Wang 2015, 2012, 8, 19. 10. Wang 2012, 7; Pew Research Center 2015b. 11. Herman and Campbell 2012. 12. M. Anderson 2002, 279–80; Snipp 2003. 13. Snipp 2003, 567. 14. Snipp 2003, 570. 15. Williams 2008, 5. 16. Yancy and Lewis 2009, 110–14. 17. Bailey 2013, 140. 18. National Public Radio 2013. 19. Jones and Bullock 2012, 4. 20. Wang 2012, 30.

166

notes to pages 117–131

21. Jones and Bullock 2012, 10–12. 22. Iceland 2004; Lee, Iceland, and Sharp 2012; Wang 2012, 2; Iceland, Sharp, and Timberlake 2013. 23. Jones and Bullock 2012, 13–18. 24. Morning 2000. 25. Pew Research Center 2015c, 35. 26. Harris and Sim 2002. 27. Liebler et al. 2014. 28. Alba, Jiménez, and Marrow 2014, 460. 29. Liebler et al. 2014; Harris and Sim 2002; Khanna and Johnson 2010. 30. Morning 2011a. 31. Compton et al. 2012. 32. Hitlin, Brown, and Elder 2007. 33. Hirschman, Alba, and Farley 2000, 390–91. 34. Compton et al. 2012, 42–43. 35. Bailey 2013, 145. 36. Bratter and Damaske 2013. 37. Brunsma 2005; Doyle and Kao 2007; Campbell 2009. 38. Herman 2004. 39. Alba 2016.

chapter 7 1. United Nations 2013, 1, 5; OECD 2015. 2. Castles and Miller 2003, 15. 3. Smith-Spark 2015. 4. Jenkins 2015. 5. Caldwell 2006, E54; for an extended discussion of the challenges of integration in North America and western Europe, see Alba and Foner 2014. 6. United Nations 2014, 41–42. 7. Morning 2008, 242–43. 8. Morning 2008, 260. 9. Stevens, Ishizawa, and Grbic 2015. 10. Roth 2005, 36; Davis 1991. 11. Telles 2004. 12. Daniel and Lee 2014, 93. 13. Telles 2004, 80; Adhikari 2005. 14. Loveman 2014. 15. Telles and Paschel 2014. 16. Telles and Paschel 2014. 17. Telles and Paschel 2014, 866.

notes to pages 131–143

167

18. Bailey, Saperstein, and Penner 2014. 19. Nolen 2015. 20. Central Intelligence Agency 2013. 21. Hansen 2003. 22. See Iceland 2014. 23. Alba and Foner 2014; Hansen 2003. 24. Modood 2003; BBC 2011. 25. Simon 2012, 1. 26. N. Foner 2015. 27. See Caldwell 2006; and Modood 2003. 28. Modood 2003; Simon 2012. 29. Heath, Rothon, and Kilpi 2008, 218. 30. Alba and Foner 2015; N. Foner 2015. 31. Reitz, Zhang, and Hawkins 2011, 1063–64. 32. Alba, Sloan, and Sperling 2011. 33. Castles and Miller 2003, 221–24. 34. Daniels 2002, 310–11. 35. Iceland and Scopilliti 2008; Alba and Nee 2003, 48–49; Portes and Rumbaut 2006, 41; Borjas 1985. 36. Castles and Miller 2003, 212–13, 232–33. 37. Associated Press 2010. 38. Alba and Foner 2015, 201. 39. Castles and Miller 2003, 250–51. 40. Kymlicka 2012. 41. Castles and Miller 2003, 252; Alba and Foner 2014, S269. 42. Kymlicka 2012, 3. 43. Dettmer 2016. 44. Kymlicka 2012, 15–16; Alba 2014; Singer 2007. 45. Johnson 1965, 635. 46. See Marger 2011, 355. 47. Reskin 1998, 5. 48. Sowell 2004, 2. 49. Sowell 2004; Brown, Langer, and Stewart 2012. 50. Executive Order 10925. 51. Reskin 1998, 7–9; for an extended discussion of the origins of affirmative action, see Skrentny 1996. 52. Reskin 1998, 16–17. 53. Supreme Court 2003, 319. 54. See Sowell 2004 and Brown, Langer, and Stewart 2012. 55. Telles and Paixão 2013. 56. Marger 2011, 357. 57. Bradley 2015 has an extended discussion of fairness.

168

notes to pages 143–149

58. Sowell 1990; McWhorter 2000. 59. Crosby 2004, 224; Marger 2011, 357. 60. Telles and Paixão 2013. 61. Telles and Paschel 2014, 866; see also Marteleto 2012. 62. Sowell 2004, 177. 63. Rifkin 2015. 64. Kopicki 2014. 65. Holzer and Neumark 2000, 2006. 66. Kurtulus 2012. 67. Bowen, Bok, and Burkhart 1999; Holzer and Neumark 2006; Hinrichs 2012. 68. Massey et al. 2003, 2007. 69. Kasinitz et al. 2008. 70. Cortes 2010; Reardon et al. 2015; Long and Tienda 2008. 71. Espenshade and Radford 2009; see also Golann et al. 2012; Dale and Krueger 2011; and Massey and Mooney 2007. 72. Among the studies that find evidence of a mismatch are Sander and Taylor 2012; and Arcidiacono et al. 2011, 2012. Among the studies that do not find evidence of a mismatch are Fischer and Massey 2007; Alon and Tienda 2005; Massey and Mooney 2007; Kidder and Lempert 2015; and Bowen, Chingos, and McPherson 2009. 73. Massey and Fischer 2005; Bracha, Cohen, and Conell-Price 2015; Pinel, Warner, and Chua 2005. 74. Fischer and Massey 2007, 544. 75. Haidt and Jussim 2016. 76. Holzer and Neumark 2006, 484.

chapter 8 1. DuBois (1903) 1995, 41.

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Index

The italicized abbreviations “fig.” or “table” following a page number indicates that an illustration or table appears on that page. ACS. See American Community Survey (ACS) affirmative action programs, 7, 10, 147; as controversial, 142–45; international comparisons and, 127, 136, 138, 140–45, 147, 153–54; quotas and, 141, 142, 147, 154 African Americans: American Indian ancestry and, 99, 109–10; culture and, 22–23; educational attainment and, 33–34, 34fig., 46; historical background and, 46–50; household wealth and, 43, 44–46, 45fig.; incarceration rates and, 53–54, 54fig.; job discrimination and, 50–51; life expectancy and, 32, 41–43, 42fig., 58, 150; median household income and, 43–44, 44fig.; multiracial identity and, 117fig., 119, 153; poverty among, 23, 37fig.; residential segregation and, 38–40, 39fig., 49, 52. See also black-white inequality; onedrop rule Alba, Richard, 25, 119, 123 Alcatraz Island occupation, 98–99 American Ballet Theater, 31 American Community Survey (ACS), 5, 33, 92, 164n36 American Indian movement, 98–99

American Indians: assimilation and, 96–97, 108; compared socioeconomic status of, 102–4, 102fig., 108, 152–53; economic mobility and, 105–7; entrepreneurship and, 103–4, 106–7; explanations of wellbeing among, 104–7; historical mistreatment of, 93–100, 152; intermarriage and, 113; multiracial population and, 117fig.; population data on, 17, 92–93, 97–98, 97fig.; reservation system and, 96–97, 98, 100–101, 104, 105, 108, 153; self-identification and, 92–93, 98–101; terminology and, 163n1; tribal groups, in 2010, 100–101 Anderson, Elijah, 23 Arogundade, Ben, 11 Asian Americans: academic orientation of, 83–85; assimilation and, 85, 86–87, 86table, 88, 135, 152; citizenship and, 79table; college completion, 34, 35fig.; comparisons with Hispanics and, 62–63; contemporary well-being measures and, 76table, 78; demographic trends and, 74–75table; discrimination against, 80–82; educational attainment and,

195

196

index

Asian Americans: educational attainment, and (continued) 23–24, 82, 86table, 152; factors affecting well-being among, 78–89; history in U.S., 70–73, 79; human capital and, 82, 90; intermarriage and, 113; multiracial identity and, 117fig., 119; social capital and, 83–84 assimilation: comparisons of, by nativity, 86–88, 86table; concept of, 24–26; European immigrants to U.S. and, 25; intergenerational differences and, 25–26, 85, 87–89, 90–91; international comparisons and, 127, 130, 133–34, 137–38, 139, 146, 153; refugees in Europe and, 126–27; skin color and, 88–89. See also self-identification; under specific ethnic groups attitudes and behaviors. See cultural differences; public attitudes and opinion Australia, 125, 126, 128, 129, 133fig., 135, 138, 141 Bailey, Eric, 115 Batista, Fulgencio, 65–66 Black Hills War (Great Sioux War, 1876–77), 96 Black Lives Matter movement, 3, 150 black-white inequality: causes of, 46–58, 59–60, 150–51; contemporary discrimination and, 50–52; double-consciousness and, 30–32; evidence for decrease in, 33–43; evidence for no improvement in, 43–46; historical patterns and, 46–50; indicators of, 32; international comparisons and, 131–32. See also African Americans; color-blind ideology; skin color Blow, Charles, 3–4 Botswana, 132 Bouie, Jamelle, 18 Bourdieu, Pierre, 21–22, 24 Bracero Program, 61–62, 65, 137 Brazil: policies in, 141, 142, 143; racial categories and, 12, 112, 129–32, 154 Brown, Michael, 3, 28, 150 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 48–49 Caldwell, Christopher, 126 California gold rush, 70, 96 Canada, 53, 128–29, 133fig., 135, 138, 140 Castles, Stephen, 125–26 Castro, Fidel, 66 census data. See U.S. Census Bureau surveys Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 43

Central American immigrants, 68table Cherokees, 95–96, 99, 100. See also American Indians Chicago, Illinois, 38, 47, 52, 53, 97, 118 Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), 70–71 Chinese immigrants, 70–71, 74table. See also Asian Americans Chronicle of Higher Education, 31 citizenship: Asian immigrants and, 79table; Asians and, 70, 71; black-white inequality and, 46–47; Hispanic immigrants and, 76table; international comparisons and, 134, 136–37, 138 civil forfeiture laws, 52 Civil Rights Act (1964), 27, 49 civil rights movement, 11, 27, 29, 98, 110, 149; legal changes and, 48–49 Coates, Ta-Nehisi, 19 Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City (Anderson), 23 college attainment: admissions discrimination and, 52, 80, 142, 144–45, 154; differences across groups and, 21; by race and ethnicity, 34, 35fig. See also educational attainment Colombia: immigrants from, 69table, 76table, 77, 130; racial identification in, 130, 131 color-blind ideology, 27–28 color lines, 5, 32, 58–59, 111, 128–29, 149–55. See also black-white inequality; one-drop rule; skin color Copeland, Misty, 30–31 Costa Rica, 68table, 130 CPS. See Current Population Survey (CPS) criminal justice system, discrimination in, 46, 51–52, 151 Cuban immigrants, 65–66, 67, 76table, 77; demographic change, 2000–2010, 68table cultural capital, 24, 84–85 cultural differences, 22–24; black progress and, 19, 22–23; black-white inequality and, 55–58; family patterns and, 23; racial inequality and, 24. See also discrimination; multiculturalism; racism culture: ethnicity as concept and, 14; multiracial identity and, 115; as term, 22, 55 Current Population Survey (CPS), 5, 33, 164n36 Dakota War (1862), 96 Daniel, G. Reginald, 130

index Dawkins, Marcia Alesan, 116 decennial census data. See U.S. Census Bureau surveys deindustrialization, 53, 59 demographic trends in U.S.: American Indians and, 92–93, 97–101, 97fig.; Asians and, 73, 74–75table; Hispanics and, 66–70, 68–69table Denmark, 53, 133fig., 135, 139 Detroit, Michigan, 38, 39, 47, 52, 53 developed countries. See international comparisons; OECD countries discrimination: affirmative action and, 140; American Indians and, 105, 108; against compared groups, 81–82; concept of, 26–27; as explanation for inequalities, 26–28, 46–52, 151; Hispanics and, 79–80; intergenerational differences and, 81–82; international comparisons and, 130, 140– 42, 145, 146; measurement of, 50. See also public attitudes and opinion dissimilarity index, 38, 39fig. Dominican Republic: immigrants from, 66, 68table; racial identity in, 131 DuBois, W. E. B., 30, 58, 149 Duncan, Brian, 88 Edin, Kathryn, 23 educational attainment: African Americans and, 33–34, 34fig., 46; American Indians and, 102fig., 105–106103; Asian Americans and, 23–24, 82, 86table, 152; earnings and, 20–21, 82; factors in, 19–20; Hispanic Americans and, 18, 19–20, 34, 35table, 54, 76table, 77, 86table, 162n24; incarceration rate and, 53–54; multiracial Americans and, 122, 122fig.; occupational status and, 82; by race and ethnicity, 33–34, 34fig., 35fig.; self-identification and, 18. See also college attainment; school dropout rates El Salvador, 66, 76table, 77 employment opportunity: American Indians and, 105–7; black-white inequality and, 50–51, 59, 151; criminal record and, 21, 44, 59; deindustrialization and, 53, 59; social capital and, 83. See also occupational status; work experience English language proficiency: Asian immigrants and, 79table, 86table; Hispanics and, 76table, 86table English-speaking countries: ethnic classifications in, 128–29

197

Espenshade, Thomas, 145 ethnic diversity, increases in: international comparisons and, 7, 125–26, 127, 146, 153; in U.S., 29, 149, 154 ethnicity, concept of, 14, 127–32 ethnic networks, 82–84. See also social capital ethnic origins, and census information, 119–20 ethnographic research, 23. See also cultural differences eugenics, 13, 17, 114 Europe. See OECD countries; entries for specific countries European immigrants to U.S.: assimilation and, 25; indigenous groups and, 94; interethnic blending and, 111 Executive Order 9066, 71–72 Fair Housing Act (1968), 49 family structure: culture and, 56–57; wealth and, 45. See also nonmarital births; single parenthood Filipinos, 72. See also Asian Americans Fischer, Mary, 145 Fixico, Donald, 96 foreign-born population in compared OECD countries, 125, 133fig. Foxwoods Resort Casino, 106–7 France, 132, 134–35, 138 Francis (pope), 126 Franklin, John Hope, 58–59 Fromson, Brett D., 107 Gallagher, Charles, 27 gaming, 106–7 Garner, Eric, 3, 150 gender gap, 35–37, 36fig. General Social Survey, 9 Gentleman’s Agreement (1907), 71 Germany, 26, 125, 132, 133fig., 134, 135, 136– 37, 139 Gilens, Martin, 10 Grant, Ulysses S. (U.S. president), 46 Gray, Freddie, 2, 3 Great Sioux War (1876–77), 96 Grutter, Barbara, 142 Grutter v. Bollinger (2003) decision, 142 Guatemalan immigrants, 66, 76table guest-worker policies, 131–32, 134–37. See also Bracero Program Guinier, Lani, 28 Harris, David, 118 Hart-Cellar Act (1965), 72–73

198

index

health outcomes: American Indians and, 94, 103, 108; Hispanics and, 76table. See also life expectancy high-school completion, by race and ethnicity, 34fig. Hispanic Americans: assimilation and, 85–89, 86table, 135; citizenship and, 76table; college completion, 34, 35fig.; comparisons with Asians, 62–63; contemporary wellbeing measures and, 73–78, 76table, 151– 52; demographic trends in U.S. and, 66–70, 68–69table; discrimination and, 80–82; educational attainment and, 18, 19–20, 34, 35table, 54, 76table, 77, 86table, 162n24; expulsion of, 64–65; factors affecting well-being among, 78–80, 81–83, 85–89; foreign-born, 76table, 77; health paradox and, 42–43; historical background on, 63–70; household income and, 76table, 77, 86table; human capital and, 82, 90; incarceration rates and, 53–54, 54fig.; intermarriage and, 113, 165n7; life expectancy and, 41–43, 42fig.; poverty rates among, 37fig.; racialization of, 119–20; residential segregation and, 38–40, 39fig.; self-identification and, 17–18, 118, 119; skin color and, 6–7, 25, 65, 80, 81, 152; social capital and, 82; terms for, 161n8. See also Mexican Americans Hmong immigrants, 63, 74table, 78, 79table, 80, 152 Holzer, Harry, 145 homeownership: American Indians and, 102fig., 103; Asian immigrants and, 78, 79table; black-white inequality and, 45, 49; Hispanics and, 76table; multiracial Americans and, 122, 122fig. Horowitz, Adam, 85 household income: American Indians and, 102–3, 102fig., 152; Asians and, 79table, 86table, 152; black-white inequality and, 6, 43–44, 43–46, 44fig., 45fig., 49, 151; Hispanics and, 76table, 77, 86table; human capital theory and, 20–21; multiracial Americans and, 121–22, 122fig., 123; by race and ethnicity, 1967–2014, 44fig. Hsin, Amy, 83–84 human capital, 20–21; Asian and Hispanic differences and, 82, 90; black-white inequality and, 27, 52–55; factors in inequality of, 55 Hungary, 133

Iceland, 126, 133fig. immigrant integration strategies, 87, 146, 153. See also assimilation; multiculturalism immigrant labor: Asians and, 70–71; Hispanic Americans and, 61–62, 64–65. See also guest-worker policies immigrant stories, 61–62 immigration: immigrant groups as distinct races and, 13; increases in international migration and, 125–27; inherent inequality and, 146; right-wing political movements and, 139–40; selectivity effects and, 42–43, 84–85. See also European immigrants to U.S.; international comparisons; national policies; refugees; slavery Immigration and Nationality Act (Hart-Cellar Act, 1965), 72–73 incarceration: African Americans and, 53–54, 54fig., 59, 151; human capital effects and, 53; individual-level variables and, 159n3; job opportunities and, 21, 44, 59; school dropouts and, 53–54; U.S. trends in, 53–54, 54fig. See also criminal justice system, discrimination in income inequality, U.S. growth in, 6, 42, 59, 149, 151, 154, 155. See also employment opportunity; household income; poverty; wealth incorporation, as term, 87. See also assimilation; multiculturalism Indian Removal Act (1830), 94–95 inequality, causes of, 9–29; assimilation theory and, 24–26, 46; black-white disparities and, 46–58; cultural theories and, 22–24, 46, 55–58; discrimination and, 26–28, 46–52; human capital theory and, 19–21, 46, 52–55; racial and ethnic identification and, 10–18; racism and, 26–28, 46–52; social capital theory and, 21–22, 46, 55. See also assimilation; blackwhite inequality; human capital; social capital institutional practices: discrimination in, 19–20, 27, 151; housing market inequities and, 19–20, 50–51, 151 integration, as term, 87. See also assimilation; multiculturalism interethnic blending, 111. See also intermarriage; multiracial identity intergenerational differences: assimilation and, 25–26, 85, 87–89, 90–91; black economic mobility and, 49–50, 135; discrimination and, 81–82; international compari-

index sons and, 135–36, 138; multiracial identification and, 115–16, 117 intermarriage: African Americans and, 109– 10; Asians and, 72; census categories and, 165n7; definition of, 112; international comparisons and, 135; population trends and, 110, 111–13, 112fig., 117, 123, 153. See also multiracial identity internal migration: American Indians and, 96–97; black population and, 47–48, 149 international comparisons: categories for mixed-race people and, 112, 129–32; concepts of race and ethnicity and, 127–32; immigration policy and, 136–37; integration strategies and, 137–40; multiculturalism and, 126–27, 130, 134, 138–40, 153; socioeconomic achievement and, 132–36. See also OECD countries; entries for specific countries international migration, increases in, 125–27 interracial marriage. See intermarriage; multiracial identity isolation index, 38–39, 40fig. Jackson, Andrew (U.S. president), 94–95 Jackson, Jesse, 19 Jacobson, Beth, 19 Jacobson, Matthew, 12–13 Japanese immigrants, 71–72, 74table. See also Asian Americans Jim Crow system, 11, 19, 26–27, 47, 48, 114 Jiménez, Tomás, 85 Johnson, Lyndon (U.S. president), 105, 140, 141 Kasinitz, Philip, 81, 83 Kefalas, Maria, 23 Kennedy, John F. (U.S. president), 141 Kopicki, Allison, 144 Korean immigrants, 72, 74table, 78, 79table, 80. See also Asian Americans labor force participation: criminal record and, 21. See also employment opportunity; work experience Latin American countries: racial identification in, 130–31. See also entries for specific countries Latinos, 161n8. See also Hispanic Americans law enforcement, discrimination in, 51, 151 Le, C. N., 70–71 Lee, Andrew Michael, 130 Lee, Jennifer, 85

199

Liebler, Carolyn, 99 life expectancy: American Indians and, 98, 103; Asians and, 43; black-white inequality and, 32, 41–43, 42fig., 58, 150; Hispanic health paradox and, 42–43; by race and ethnicity, 41–43, 42fig. Louis CK (comedian), 18 Loury, Glenn, 22 Loving v. Virginia, 109–10 Luxembourg, 125 lynchings, 47 mainstream population, integration into. See assimilation; multiculturalism Mariel Boatlift, 66 Martin, Trayvon, 2, 18, 28, 50 Massey, Douglas, 145 McCarran-Walter Immigration and Nationality Act (1952), 72 Merrill Lynch, 27 Mexican Americans: demographic change, 2000–2010, 68table; experiences of, 61–62; expulsion of, 64–65; self-identification and, 101–2, 119 Mexican American War, 64 Mexico: foreign-born population in, 133; immigration from, 63–65. See also Hispanic Americans Miller, Mark, 125–26 mixed-race heritage: international comparisons and, 112, 129–32; U.S. census categories and, 16–18, 16fig., 113–14. See also intermarriage; multiracial identity model minority stereotype, 84 Montgomery Bus Boycott, 49 mulatto, 113, 114 Mullainathan, Sendhil, 52 multiculturalism, 138–40; international comparisons and, 126–27, 130, 134, 138, 139– 40, 153; U.S. approach and, 138–39 multiracial identity: ancestry and, 118; common combinations and, 116–17, 117fig.; intermarriage and, 110, 111–13, 112fig., 123, 153; international comparisons and, 128–32; socioeconomic status and, 121– 23, 122fig., 124; U.S. population trends and, 116–18, 117fig., 120–21, 153. See also intermarriage; one-drop rule multiracial movement, 115 Muslim immigrants, 126, 134–35 NAACP. See National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)

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National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), 48 nationality, and concepts of ethnicity, 127–28 national policies: American Indians and, 94–97, 105; Asian Americans and, 70–73; international comparisons and, 126–27, 132–34, 133–34, 136–37. See also assimilation; multiculturalism; reservation system; U.S. Supreme Court; entries for specific laws Native Americans, as term, 163n1. See also American Indians Naturalization Act (1870), 70 Nee, Victor, 25 networking. See social capital Neumark, David, 145 New York City: American Indians in, 101–2; black-white inequalities in, 3, 53; immigrant groups in, 65, 67, 81, 83 New York City Fire Department, 27 New York Times, 3–4, 101–2, 106–7 New Zealand, 125, 133fig. Nixon, Richard (U.S. president), 141 nonmarital births: black-white inequality and, 32, 56–57, 57fig.; Hispanics and, 56–57, 57fig. See also family structure; single parenthood Obama, Barack, 30 occupational status: black-white inequality and, 50–51; educational attainment and, 82; by race and gender, 34–37, 36fig. Octoroon, 113–14 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) countries, 7, 125, 127, 132, 133fig., 135. See also international comparisons one-drop rule, 11, 111–12, 114, 119, 124, 129, 153 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). See OECD countries Ortiz, Vilma, 79–80, 87 Ortyl, Timothy, 99 paired-test studies, 50–51 Paschel, Tianna, 131 Patterson, James, 47, 48–49 Perlmann, Joel, 88, 111–12 Petit, Becky, 44 Pew Research Center surveys, 79table, 80, 86table, 118, 161n8 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 2, 53

physical features, and racial identity, 12–13, 115, 119, 120, 129, 131. See also color lines; skin color Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, 104 Plessy v. Ferguson, 48 police discrimination. See criminal justice system, discrimination in; law enforcement, discrimination in Portes, Alejandro, 82 poverty: American Indians and, 102fig., 103, 104, 105; among Asian Americans, 78, 79table; among Hispanics, 76table; culture and, 22–23; educational attainment and, 52, 77; multiracial Americans and, 122, 122fig.; by race and ethnicity, 37fig. See also household income; residential segregation prejudice, as term, 26. See also discrimination; public attitudes and opinion; racism Promises I Can Keep: Why Poor Women Put Motherhood before Marriage (Edin and Kefalas), 23 public attitudes and opinion: about race, 115, 119–20; affirmative action and, 143–44; beliefs about discrimination and, 80–81; black-white relations and, 2, 49, 149–50; on causes of inequality, 9–10; changes in, 115, 154; hostility and, 80, 87; immigration and, 132, 139, 147; intermarriage and, 113; social construction of groups and, 154; wariness of immigrants and, 67, 70. See also discrimination; racism Puerto Rican immigrants, 65, 67, 77; demographic change, 2000–2010, 68table “push” factors, 70 Quadroon, 113–14 quotas: affirmative action and, 141, 142, 147, 154; discrimination and, 72, 80, 141–42; international comparisons and, 142 race: ethnicity and, 14, 128; global conceptualizations of, 127–32; mixed-race categories and, 16–18, 16fig., 113–14; physical features and, 12–13, 115, 119, 120, 129, 131; social construction of, 5, 12–13, 31, 118, 129, 154 race riots, 2, 28 racial inequality. See black-white inequality Racial Integrity Act (Virginia, 1924), 109 racism: changes in white attitudes and, 49; definition of, 26; as explanation for inequalities, 26–28, 50. See also discrimination; public attitudes and opinion

index Radford, Alexandria Walton, 145 refugees: in Europe, 126, 132, 134, 136, 137, 146; in the U.S., 61, 63, 72, 152. See also immigration regional differences: forced migrations and, 94–96; Hispanic Americans and, 67; internal migration and, 47–48; multiracial identification and, 117–18, 117fig.; residential segregation and, 38, 39 reservation system, 96–97, 98, 100–101, 104, 105, 108, 153 residential segregation: African Americans and, 38–40, 39fig., 49, 52; American Indians and, 96–97, 98, 100–101, 104, 105, 108, 153; educational disparities and, 52; neighborhood poverty level and, 40, 41fig.; by race and ethnicity, 38–40, 39fig. Rice, Tamir, 3, 150 right-wing political movements, 139–40 Riley, Jason, 19 Roca, Juan, 61–62 Rodriguez, Julie M., 89 Roosevelt, Franklin D. (U.S. president), 71–72 Rumbaut, Ruben, 82 Sarkozy, Nicolas (French president), 138 school dropout rates, 53–54, 57. See also educational attainment school quality: black-white inequality and, 40, 41fig., 47, 48–49, 52; educational attainment and, 21; residential segregation and, 52 scientific racism, 113–14 Scott, Walter, 3 segregation. See Jim Crow system; residential segregation self-identification: American Indians and, 92–93, 98–101, 103, 107; changes in, 18, 93–94, 98, 118–19, 153, 154; double-consciousness and, 30–32; educational attainment and, 18; international comparisons and, 131; in Latin America, 131; multicategory option and, 16fig., 114–15; multiracial identity and, 114–16; mutually exclusive groups and, 14–16, 15fig., 114; skin color and, 88, 131; Tiger Woods and, 10–11 Sharpton, Al, 19 Sim, Jeremiah, 118 Singapore, 132 single parenthood: culture and, 56–57; “marriageable” men and, 23; by race and eth-

201

nicity, 57fig. See also family structure; nonmarital births Sioux, 96, 100, 104. See also American Indians skin color: assimilation and, 88–89; discrimination and, 6–7, 25, 65, 80, 81, 152; other countries and, 131–32; racial identification and, 88, 131 slavery, 19, 26, 99, 129 Slovak Republic, 133 Snipp, C. Matthew, 105, 114 social capital, 21–22, 55; ethnic networks and, 82–84 social construction of race, 5, 12–13, 31, 118, 129, 154 South Africa, racial categories in, 130–31 South American immigrants, 69fig. Spanish immigrants: demographic change, 2000–2010, 69fig. stereotype threat, 143 stereotyping: African Americans and, 10, 28, 52, 151; American Indians and, 99; Asians and, 84–85; Hispanics and, 89 Sweden, 126, 132, 133fig., 134, 135 Switzerland, 125, 132, 133fig., 135, 136 Telles, Edward, 79–80, 87, 131 Torres, Gerald, 28 Trail of Tears, 95–100 Trejo, Stephen J., 88 True Sioux Hope Foundation, 104 Uggen, Christopher, 53, 55 United Arab Emirates, 132 United Kingdom, 125, 134, 138–39, 140. See also English-speaking countries; OECD countries United Nations, 127–28 U.S. Census Bureau surveys: categories used by, 1, 12, 14–18, 113–14; educational attainment data and, 34fig., 35fig.; household income, by race and ethnicity, 44fig.; multicategory option and, 16fig., 114, 115; multiracial identity and, 110, 118–21; mutually exclusive groups and, 14–16, 15fig., 114; net worth, by race and ethnicity, 45fig.; socioeconomic status, by compared groups, 102fig. U.S. Constitution, 129. See also U.S. Supreme Court U.S. Supreme Court: affirmative action and, 141–42, 147; interracial marriage and, 109–10, 123; naturalization and, 70–71; separate-but-equal doctrine and, 48–49

202

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urban areas: black-white inequality and, 38, 52, 53–54; deindustrialization and, 53; internal migration and, 47–48 Wacquant, Loic, 21–22 wage gap: black-white inequality and, 44; occupational status and, 36–37 Wakefield, Sara, 53, 55 Wall Street Journal, 19 War on Poverty, 105 Waters, Mary C., 13, 111–12 wealth: black-white inequality and, 32, 43, 44–45, 45fig., 49, 58–59; color-blind ideology and, 27; discrimination and, 49–50, 59; family structure and, 45; Hispanics and, 77, 85; impact of historic inequities

and, 5–6; by race and ethnicity, 1984– 2011, 45fig.; social networks and, 22. See also homeownership; household income; occupational status; social capital white privilege, 13, 27, 28, 31 Wilson, Darren, 50 Wilson, William Julius, 53 Woods, Tiger, 10–11 work experience, 20–21, 52, 53, 82. See also employment opportunity Xie, Yu, 83–84 Zhou, Min, 85 Zimmerman, George, 2, 18, 28, 50 Zimmerman, Jonathan, 80