Race Against the Court: The Supreme Court and Minorities in Contemporary America 9780814788998

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Race Against the Court

RACE AGAINST THE COURT The Suprem e Court and Minoritie s in Contemporary America

Girardeau A . Spann

NEW YOR K UNIVERSIT Y PRES S

NEW YOR K AN D LONDO N

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS New York and London Copyright © 199 3 by New York University All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Dat a Spann, Girardeau A. Race against the court: Supreme Court and minorities in contemprary America / Girardeau A. Spann. p. cm . Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8147-7963-8 ISB N 0-8147-7993-X pbk . 1. Afro-Americans—Civil rights . 2 . United States. Supreme Court. I . Title. KF4757.565 199 3 342.73'0873-dc20 92-3134 2 [347.302873] CI P New York University Press books are printed on acid-free paper, and their binding materials are chosen for strength and durability. Manufactured i n the United States of America 10

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Contents

Acknowledgments vi

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Introduction i PART ONE : Veile d Majoritarianis m i Th e Traditiona l Mode l o f Judicia l Revie w 9 The Traditiona l Mode l 1 0 Formal Safeguard s 1 4 Operational Safeguard s 1 7 2 Th e Majoritaria n Cour t 1 9 The Socialize d Judiciary 2 0 Inadequacy o f th e Forma l Safeguard s 2 3 Inadequacy o f th e Operationa l Safeguard s 2 3 Infiltratio n o f Principle s 2 7 Incorporation o f Majoritaria n Preference s 2 Incorporation throug h Deferenc e 3 1 4 Selectio n o f Principle s 3 6 Intent v . Effect s 3 7 State Action v . Private Autonom y 4 Discrimination v . Discretio n 5 0 5 Applicatio n o f Principle s 5 Intent 6 0 State Actio n 66 Discrimination 7 0

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VI CONTENT S PART TWO: Perpetuatin g Subordinatio n 6 Th e Politica l Alternativ e 8 5 Pure Politics $6 Minority Influence i n Pluralist Politics 8 9 Minority Frustrations in the Supreme Court 9 4 A Political Mode l of th e Supreme Court 9 9 7 Dependenc y 10 4 Brown an d the Political Mode l 10 The Danger of Dependenc y n o

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8 Centralizatio n 11 9 The Statistical Natur e of Affirmativ e Actio n 12 0 The Centralization of Affirmative Actio n 12 4 The Concrete Dangers of Centralizatio n 13 0 The Subtle Dangers of Centralization 13 6 9 Legitimatio n 15 0 Majoritarian Legitimation 15 1 The Danger of Legitimatio n 15 9 10 Summar y an d Conclusio n 16 Summary of Par t I 16 2 Summary of Par t II 16 5 Conclusion 16 9 Notes 17

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Bibliography 23

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Table o f Lega l Authoritie s 24 Index 25

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Acknowledgments

I would lik e t o than k Anit a Allen , Derric k Bell , Greg g Bloche , Richar d Chused, Richard Delgado, Steven Goldberg, Tom Krattenmaker, Elizabeth Patterson, Gar y Peller , Barr y Pollack , Mit t Regan , Loui s Seidman , an d Mark Tushnet for their help in developing the ideas expressed in this book. In addition, I benefitted fro m th e comments o f faculty , students, and staff members who participated in the workshop series at Columbia Law School and at the University of Michiga n La w School, where I delivered portion s of th e thesi s tha t i s develope d herein . I am extremely grateful t o my editor Niko Pfun d and to the New York University Pres s for thei r hel p and cooperatio n i n the publicatio n o f thi s book. I n addition, th e MICHIGA N LA W REVIEW wa s kin d enoug h t o publish portions o f th e manuscript tha t ultimately evolved int o this boo k in Pure Politics, 8 8 MICH . L . REV . 197 1 (1990) . Suppor t fo r th e boo k was generousl y provide d b y a researc h gran t fro m th e Georgetow n Uni versity La w Center.

VII

Race Against the Court

Introduction

The present Supreme Court has been noticeably unreceptive to legal claims asserted b y racia l minorities . Althoug h i t i s alway s possibl e t o articulat e nonracial motive s fo r th e Court' s civi l right s decisions , th e popula r per ception i s that a politically conservativ e majorit y wishin g t o cu t bac k o n the protectio n o f minorit y interest s a t majorit y expens e no w dominate s the Supreme Court. In reviewing the work of the Court during its infamous 1988-89 term , U.S . LA W WEEK reporte d tha t "[a ] series o f civi l right s decisions b y a conservative majorit y of th e U.S. Supreme Court makin g it easier t o challeng e affirmativ e actio n program s an d mor e difficul t t o es tablish claim s o f employmen t discriminatio n highlighte d th e 1988-8 9 term's labor and employment cases." 1 LAW WEEK went o n to cit e seven decisions hande d dow n tha t Ter m alon e tha t adversel y affecte d minorit y interests.2 Man y o f thos e decisions , a s wel l a s som e o f th e othe r con servative civi l right s decision s issue d b y th e Cour t sinc e 1985 , wer e sub sequently overrule d b y Congress i n the Civi l Right s Act o f 1991. 3 Thes e legislative reversals, however, came only after a bitter political debat e that was characterized most strongly by the racially divisive political oppositio n mounted agains t th e propose d legislatio n b y th e Bus h Administration. 4 Since th e 1988-8 9 Term , Justices Brenna n an d Marshal l hav e resigne d from th e Suprem e Cour t an d hav e bee n replace d b y Justices Soute r an d Thomas, bot h o f who m ar e significantl y mor e conservativ e tha n thei r predecessors i n matter s relatin g t o civi l rights . A s a result , th e commo n perception i s tha t th e ne w Suprem e Cour t wil l b e eve n les s receptiv e t o the claim s o f racia l minoritie s i n th e foreseeabl e future . 1

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One coul d argue , of course , tha t wha t w e ar e witnessing i s the prope r operation o f a complex an d sophisticate d governmenta l process ; that th e Court, consisten t with a refine d understandin g o f it s constitutiona l func tion, i s exhibiting a proper sensitivity t o th e evolvin g conten t o f ou r fun damental social values; that the same social sensitivities that once permitted the Court to condemn segregatio n and permit miscegenation no w compe l the Court to retard the rate at which minorit y gains can be extracted fro m an increasingly disgruntled majority. The problem is that it is not supposed to wor k tha t way. Under th e traditiona l mode l o f judicia l review , th e Cour t i s suppose d to b e abov e th e inevitabl e shift s tha t occu r i n th e prevailin g politica l climate. Exercisin g th e skill s o f reasone d deliberation , withi n th e con straints o f principle d adjudication , th e Suprem e Cour t i s expecte d t o in sulate minority rights from the majoritarian efforts at exploitation to which those right s would otherwis e b e vulnerable . Th e eas y resonanc e o f LA W WEEK's political account o f th e 1988-8 9 Ter m reveals that no one really takes th e countermajoritaria n aspect s o f th e traditiona l mode l ver y seri ously. The Suprem e Cour t ha s neve r bee n abl e t o sustai n significan t in dependence fro m th e demand s o f ordinar y politic s i n th e past , an d i t i s unlikely tha t th e Cour t wil l eve r b e abl e t o do s o i n th e future . Wha t eludes consensus , however , i s a n assessmen t o f jus t ho w fa r th e actua l performance o f the Court diverges from the ideal of the traditional model , and jus t ho w muc h significanc e tha t divergenc e properl y ough t t o com mand. This book postulates that the discrepancy between actual and model Supreme Cour t performanc e i s sufficient t o preclud e th e existenc e o f an y meaningful differenc e betwee n Suprem e Cour t adjudicatio n an d ordinar y politics. There i s a fundamental flaw in any model o f judicia l revie w tha t posits the Cour t a s a chec k o n majoritaria n excesses . Th e viabilit y o f suc h a model depend s upo n a qualitativ e distinctio n betwee n th e wa y i n whic h the Court ascertains the contour s o f minorit y right s and the way in which minority interest s ar e assimilated int o th e political process . However , th e constraints withi n whic h th e Suprem e Cour t i s required t o operat e mak e it vulnerable t o th e same political consideration s tha t govern majoritaria n responses t o minorit y interests . Moreover , th e proces s o f principle d de cisionmaking o n which th e Court relie s to ensur e th e integrit y o f it s constitutional expositio n i s incapable o f preventin g the Court from becomin g a surrogat e fo r majorit y interests . Ultimately , th e societa l pressure s tha t prompt the representative branche s to sacrific e minorit y right s to majorit y interests will prompt the Supreme Court to do so as well. Indeed, far from

INTRODUCTION 3

serving th e countermajoritaria n functio n envisione d b y th e traditiona l model of judicial review, the Supreme Court is better understood as serving the veile d majoritaria n functio n o f promotin g popula r preferences a t th e expense o f minorit y interests . S o viewed , th e gestur e o f judicia l revie w becomes simpl y a less-immediate for m o f majoritarianism . Th e onl y sig nificant differenc e tha t exists between political an d judicial dispositions of minority interests is that judicial majoritarianism functions with undetected effectiveness precisel y becaus e i t transpire s behin d th e vei l o f judicia l re view. A rational minority response to the majoritarianism inherent in Supreme Court adjudication woul d b e t o avoid the Supreme Court and to concen trate o n ordinar y politic s a s th e mean s fo r advancin g minorit y interests . Racial minoritie s hav e now accumulate d sufficien t politica l powe r to participate meaningfull y i n th e politica l process , an d historically , minorit y interests hav e fare d bette r befor e th e representativ e branche s o f govern ment tha n befor e th e Suprem e Court . However , Suprem e Cour t involve ment i n th e proces s o f ordinar y politic s canno t b e avoided . Minoritie s must no t onl y rel y o n th e Cour t t o implemen t minorit y politica l gains , but thos e gain s mus t b e defende d befor e th e Suprem e Cour t whe n the y are mad e th e focu s o f lega l challenges . The inevitabilit y o f Suprem e Cour t revie w i s likely t o hav e a n adverse effect on minority interests because the Supreme Court has been structured to operat e i n a manne r tha t i s inherentl y conservative . Lif e tenur e an d judicial independenc e caus e th e Cour t t o functio n a s a political forc e fo r preservation o f th e statu s quo . However , becaus e racia l minoritie s i n th e United State s ar e disadvantage d b y th e socioeconomi c statu s quo , th e Court's inheren t conservatis m impair s minorit y effort s t o achiev e racia l equality. The Court has manifested it s inherent conservatism i n subtle, yet effective, ways. Brown v. Board of Education,5 th e case most often laude d as the ico n o f judicia l sensitivit y t o minorit y interests , ha s had th e ironi c effect o f lurin g racia l minoritie s int o a dependency relationshi p wit h th e Court tha t ha s impede d minorit y effort s t o acquir e politica l power . I n addition, th e Cour t ha s centralized th e la w o f affirmativ e actio n i n a way that forces minorities to compete for societal resources on a national level, where i t i s difficult fo r the m t o prevai l politically , rathe r tha n o n a loca l level, wher e the y hav e a n opportunit y t o achiev e politica l an d economi c self-determination. Finally , th e rhetori c tha t th e Cour t use s i n writin g it s civil right s decision s legitimate s a serie s o f demeanin g an d counterpro ductive assumption s abou t th e statu s o f racia l minoritie s i n th e Unite d States. Although thi s revisionis t understandin g o f th e Suprem e Cour t ha s

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only limite d instrumenta l valu e i n the face o f th e Suprem e Court's potent political power , it s epistemologica l valu e ma y nevertheles s permi t racia l minorities t o transcen d thei r vulnerability t o Suprem e Cour t protection . Part I of thi s book discusse s the phenomenon o f veiled majoritarianis m and suggest s tha t th e socia l functio n tha t th e Suprem e Cour t ha s bee n structured to serve consigns the Court to the role of perpetually endorsin g majoritarian preferences . Chapte r i discusse s th e traditiona l mode l o f judicial review , and emphasize s th e way s i n which tha t mode l i s dependen t upon th e assumptio n tha t th e Suprem e Cour t ca n resolv e dispute s i n a way tha t i s qualitativel y differen t fro m ho w thos e dispute s woul d b e re solved b y th e politica l branches . Chapte r z discusse s th e subtl e majori tarian natur e o f th e Cour t an d argue s tha t neithe r th e forma l no r th e operational safeguard s on which we customarily rely to insulate the Court from popula r politica l preference s ca n operat e effectively . Chapter 3 demonstrate s tha t o n som e occasion s th e Suprem e Cour t expressly incorporate s majoritaria n preference s int o th e meaning s o f th e legal principle s tha t i t applies , whil e o n othe r occasion s th e Cour t ac quiesces i n majoritaria n preference s throug h deferentia l standard s o f ju dicial review . Chapte r 4 argue s tha t eve n whe n thi s i s no t th e case , ma joritarian preference s wil l ultimatel y dominat e judicia l selectio n o f th e legal principle s tha t ar e deeme d applicabl e t o a particular case . Chapte r 5 argue s tha t onc e a governin g lega l principl e i s selected , majoritaria n preferences wil l als o dominat e th e proces s o f applyin g tha t principle , be cause thos e preference s wil l contro l th e manne r in which th e ambiguitie s inherent i n all lega l principle s ar e resolved . Part I I discusses th e manne r i n whic h th e Suprem e Cour t perpetuate s the subordination o f racia l minorities . Chapter 6 discusses th e inability o f racial minorities to escape the influence of the Supreme Court by retreating to th e spher e o f ordinar y politics , an d i t describe s wh y th e structur e o f the Suprem e Cour t make s i t inherentl y conservative . Chapte r 7 discusse s Brown u Board of Education 6 an d th e manne r i n whic h tha t cas e ha s fostered th e continue d dependenc e o f racia l minoritie s o n th e Suprem e Court. Chapte r 8 discuse s th e la w o f affirmativ e actio n i n orde r t o dem onstrate ho w th e Suprem e Cour t ha s centralize d th e la w i n a wa y tha t stymies minorit y effort s a t politica l an d economi c self-determination . Chapter 9 illustrate s ho w th e Suprem e Cour t ha s utilize d th e proces s o f legitimation t o perpetuat e a perception o f racia l inferiorit y i n th e mind s of th e majorit y an d o f racia l minoritie s themselves . Finally , Chapte r 1 0 concludes tha t th e onl y hop e tha t racia l minoritie s hav e o f escapin g th e protections o f th e Supreme Court i s through th e rout e of epistemologica l maturation.

INTRODUCTION 5

Although th e thesi s o f th e presen t boo k i s that th e Suprem e Cour t func tions t o perpetuat e th e subordinatio n o f racia l minoritie s i n th e Unite d States, th e argumen t tha t I wish t o mak e i s a structural argumen t rathe r than a conspiratorial one . I do no t inten d t o sugges t tha t Supreme Cour t justices commenc e thei r deliberations b y asking themselves ho w the y can best ensur e tha t racia l minoritie s neve r achiev e political , economic , o r social parity with whites in the United States. Although some justices may on som e occasion s b e consciousl y racist , i t i s no t i n thi s sor t o f racis m that th e subordinatin g powe r o f th e Suprem e Cour t resides . Rather , m y argument is that, for structural reasons, the institutional role that the Court is destined t o play within ou r constitutional schem e o f governmen t i s the role o f assurin g th e continue d subordinatio n o f racia l minorit y interests . I believe that this subordinating function i s inevitable; that it will be served irrespective o f th e Court' s compositio n a t an y particula r poin t i n time ; and tha t i t wil l persis t irrespectiv e o f th e consciou s motive s o f th e indi vidual justices. Moreover, my argument does not imply that the Court will always rul e agains t minorit y interests . O n th e contrary , th e mos t potent method o f perpetuatin g minorit y subordinatio n i n th e Unite d State s ha s proven t o b e throug h th e intermitten t issuanc e o f highl y visibl e minorit y victories. I have used th e term s "racia l minority " and "racia l minorit y interests " in an unelaborated manner that might cause some to suspect that I consider all racial minorities to b e fungible, o r that I deem racial minority interest s to be homogeneous and monolithic. This, of course, is not the case. Racial minorities diffe r significantl y fro m on e another , and within particula r minority groups views about wha t bes t serves the interest s of th e group can vary significantly. M y use of thes e terms is not intended to be reductionist, but rathe r aspirational . Fo r me , th e concep t o f rac e i s a promisin g ab straction possessin g a n untapped potentia l t o serv e as an organizing principle in both political and epistemological endeavors . As such, its linguistic imprecision i s simpl y inapposite . State d mor e concretely , m y direc t ex perience with racia l minority status is limited t o m y background as someone wh o i s black . Althoug h man y o f th e illustration s and statistics tha t I use relat e t o blacks , I hav e chose n t o writ e abou t racia l minoritie s i n generic terms, rather than simply to write about blacks . I have done so in order t o highligh t m y normativ e vie w tha t racia l minorit y statu s shoul d supersede particular racial group identifications. The hierarchy of concern s that suc h a vie w engender s wil l foste r th e developmen t o f consensu s within, an d promot e th e formatio n o f coalition s among , racia l minorit y groups.

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Some o f th e comment s tha t I receive d o n draft s o f th e manuscript , from supporter s an d critic s alike , cause d m e t o realiz e ho w difficul t i t i s to presen t a n ide a i n a way tha t wil l permi t i t t o b e evaluate d fre e fro m the contex t ou t o f whic h i t ha s emerged . Thes e comments containe d helpful observation s concerning my case analysis, my use of th e literature, my compliance or noncompliance with certain analytical conventions, and my utilizatio n o f particula r rhetorica l techniques . However , I was some times unable t o promp t muc h reactio n t o th e thesi s itself. I t was as if th e thesis ha d bee n subsume d b y th e attribute s o f presentation . Tha t i s no t what I intend. I have attempted to articulate a vision of th e Supreme Court and it s relationshi p t o racia l minoritie s tha t I find to b e compelling . M y hope is that readers will confront tha t vision and not be distracted by their agreement o r disagreement wit h m y metho d o f presentation . Finally, I recognize that my revisionist conception of the Supreme Court is vigorously a t odds with the traditional countermajoritaria n conception , and tha t i t wil l b e resiste d b y bot h politica l conservative s an d Warre n Court liberal s alike. M y argument i s not that I am right and that they are wrong. Consistent wit h m y postmodern sympathies , I do no t believ e tha t the Supreme Court possesses a true or essential natur e that can make one characterization o f th e Court more correct than another. Rather, I believe that a t th e presen t tim e m y revisionis t conceptio n i s mor e valuable tha n the traditional conception, especially for racial minorities and for members of th e whit e majorit y wh o ar e concerned abou t racia l inequality . Adher ence t o th e traditional , countermajoritaria n mode l o f th e Suprem e Cour t may have been expedient in the era of officiall y mandate d segregation that existed whe n Brown wa s decided . Indeed , adherenc e t o tha t mode l ma y have bee n necessar y fo r th e Unite d State s t o evolv e beyon d it s obsessio n with de jure segregation . Toda y however , whe n th e challeng e fo r racia l minorities i s t o overcom e th e mor e subtl e form s o f discriminatio n tha t actually masquerad e as race neutrality, I believe that adherence to a veiled majoritarian conceptio n o f th e Cour t i s instrumentally mor e realisti c and epistemologically mor e sound .

C H A P T E RI

The Traditiona l Mode l o f Judicial Revie w

Under the traditional mode l o f judicia l review , which i s traceable to John Marshall's semina l decisio n i n Marbury v. Madison, th e functio n o f th e Supreme Cour t i s t o protec t th e right s o f minoritie s wh o ar e unabl e t o protect themselve s effectivel y i n th e pluralis t politica l process . Racia l mi norities hav e typicall y bee n though t t o b e amon g thos e wh o requir e Supreme Cour t protectio n becaus e thei r "discret e an d insular " characte r precludes thei r effectiv e participatio n i n th e politica l process . Althoug h a variety of substantiv e process, and hybri d theories o f judicia l revie w hav e evolved as an elaboration upon the traditional Marbury model , all theories share th e belie f tha t th e Suprem e Cour t possesse s th e capacit y t o ac t i n a manner that is countermajoritarian. That is, the Court is able to perform the functio n assigne d t o i t i n a manne r tha t i s bot h differen t fro m an d better tha n th e manne r i n whic h tha t functio n coul d b e performe d b y a representative branch of government. In order for this countermajoritarian assumption t o hold, the Supreme Court must be free from dominatio n b y the representativ e branches . This freedo m i s secured i n th e Constitutio n through tw o type s o f forma l safeguards , namely , lif e tenur e an d salar y protection, which although eas y t o evade , nevertheless serve the symboli c function o f emphasizin g th e nee d fo r judicia l independenc e fro m major itarian control . I n addition t o th e forma l safeguards , th e proces s o f prin cipled adjudicatio n provide s a n operationa l safeguar d t o ensur e judicia l independence. B y demanding tha t cas e outcome s b e determine d b y legal principles rathe r tha n popula r preferences , th e proces s o f principle d ad judication enable s th e Supreme Cour t t o protect minorit y right s from th e transitory majoritie s tha t woul d abrogat e thos e right s fo r reason s o f po 9

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E TRADITIONA L MODE L O F JUDICIAL REVIE W

litical expediency . I t is apparent tha t th e viability o f th e traditiona l mode l is onl y a s soun d a s th e countermajoritaria n assumptio n upo n whic h i t rests. The Traditional Model The syste m o f governmen t envisione d b y th e framer s wa s designe d t o operate i n a manne r tha t wa s essentiall y political . Influence d b y th e En lightenment, th e framer s o f th e Constitutio n understoo d th e danger s o f self-interest an d faction. In a democracy, individuals and groups motivated by a desir e t o maximiz e thei r ow n welfar e coul d b e expecte d t o for m coalitions whos e aggregat e powe r woul d permi t the m t o abrogat e th e liberty an d propert y interest s o f thos e who , becaus e o f thei r exclusio n from th e coalition , lacke d th e political powe r to protec t themselves . The framers sough t t o protec t thes e politica l minoritie s fro m th e tyrann y o f the majorit y b y establishing a system o f governmen t i n which th e natura l inclination towar d self-intereste d factionalis m coul d b e use d i n a con trolled manne r to chec k itself. 1 The primar y mechanism s o n whic h th e framer s relie d wer e structural . They adopte d a democratic for m o f government , designe d aroun d James Madison's conceptio n o f republicanism , i n which power was broadly dispersed in the hop e of permittin g the formatio n o f onl y transitory, shiftin g majorities. Becaus e today' s majorit y perpetrator s migh t b e tomorrow' s minority victims, the danger of retaliatio n created an incentive for faction s to trea t each other with deference. Accordingly , the Constitution diffuse d power horizontall y withi n th e federa l governmen t throug h th e doctrin e of separate d governmenta l power s an d verticall y betwee n th e stat e an d federal government s throug h th e doctrin e o f federalism . Moreover , th e establishment o f distinc t constituencie s fo r th e Presiden t an d each hous e of th e bicamera l legislature , staggere d term s o f limite d bu t differen t duration fo r eac h o f th e representativ e bodies , an d indirec t electio n o f a President who possessed the power to veto legislative enactments all combined t o minimiz e th e concentratio n o f powe r tha t factionalis m require s in orde r t o flourish. 2 Becaus e th e concurrenc e o f divers e powe r center s was difficul t t o secure , al l governmental actions—includin g tyrannica l ac tions—were les s likely t o ensue . I n addition, the allocatio n o f jurisdictio n over most significant substantiv e matter s to th e states promoted a level o f decentralization that was conducive not only to the emergence of qualifie d governmental leaders , bu t t o optimu m level s o f citize n participatio n an d civic virtu e tha t woul d hel p t o neutraliz e th e threa t o f self-interest. 3

THE TRADITIONA L MODE L O F JUDICIAL REVIE W I

I

It is likely that the framers contemplated judicial review as an additional safeguard agains t th e danger s o f faction . Althoug h ther e i s som e debat e about whether the framers intended t o give the Supreme Court the power to invalidate the acts of coordinate branches, 4 the prevailing contemporary view appear s t o b e tha t th e framer s di d inten d t o gran t th e Cour t th e power to engag e in such judicial review. 5 The framers , however, may well have contemplated a fairly mechanical type of judicial review that entailed very littl e judicia l discretion. 6 Th e flavor of suc h revie w i s capture d b y Justice Roberts ' famous statemen t i n United States u Butler: It is sometimes said that the cour t assume s a power t o overrul e o r control th e action of th e people's representatives. This is a misconception. [When] an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandat e the judicial branc h of th e Government ha s only on e duty,— to lay the article of th e Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the former. 7 Many people question whether such nondiscretionary review is realistically possible.8 Indeed , there i s doubt abou t whethe r Justice Robert s intende d the mechanistic sentiments often attribute d to him. 9 Skepticism about the Supreme Court's ability to engage in such mechanical revie w has led commentators t o undertak e th e herculea n tas k o f developin g theorie s o f ju dicial revie w tha t compor t wit h democrati c principles. 10 Contemporary judicia l revie w no w seem s t o b e firmly established. Bu t in the beginning , th e protections fo r minorit y right s were primarily structural. Moreover , th e manne r i n which thos e protection s wer e t o operat e was expected t o b e political. The strength of thi s proposition i s evidenced by th e fac t tha t th e Constitutio n wa s drafte d an d ratifie d withou t a bil l of right s that could guid e legislativ e deliberation s an d serve as a basis fo r judicial review . Althoug h th e desirabilit y o f a bill o f right s was forcefull y asserted durin g the ratificatio n debates, 11 forcefu l oppositio n wa s also articulated on the grounds that the structural safeguards made a bill of rights not only superfluous but also counterproductive. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 argued : [B]ills of rights[a]re not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers not granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to clai m more than were granted. Fo r why declar e tha t thing s shall no t b e don e whic h ther e i s no power to do ? [I]t is evident tha t i t would furnish , t o me n disposed t o usurp , a plausible pretence for claiming that power. They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the Constitution ought not to be charged with the absurdity of pro-

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viding against the abuse of a n authority which was not given, [and therefore by] clear implication!, a] power to prescribe proper regulations concerning [the area of power exempted by the bill of rights] was intended to be vested in the national government.12 Over time , th e structura l safeguard s bega n t o erode . Ultimately , th e New Dea l desir e fo r economi c recover y prompted th e politica l bodie s t o adopt, an d th e Suprem e Cour t eventuall y t o endorse , th e effectiv e nulli fication o f the framers' primary precautions. The creation of administrative agencies, establishe d wit h th e consciou s goa l o f increasin g governmenta l efficiency, seriousl y diluted separatio n o f powers protections while vestin g the bul k o f governmenta l powe r i n th e executiv e branch . Th e Suprem e Court has permitted administrative agencie s to exercise legislative power 13 and adjudicator y power, 14 i n additio n t o th e executiv e powe r grante d t o the Presiden t unde r the Constitution. I n part to increas e agency efficiency , the Cour t ha s als o uphel d th e constitutionalit y o f independen t agencie s that operat e largel y fre e o f presidentia l control. 15 Moreover , i n matter s affecting foreig n affairs , the powers of th e President and the foreign affair s agencies are essentially plenary.16 In addition, belief in the need for national solutions t o nationa l economi c problem s eliminate d al l meaningfu l sub ject-matter restriction s o n th e scop e o f federa l power . I n upholdin g th e limitations impose d o n private agricultural production b y the Agricultural Adjustment Act—on e o f th e piece s o f Ne w Dea l legislatio n designe d t o ameliorate the economic hardship s of th e depression—the Suprem e Court held, in Wickard u Filburn, that the power to regulate interstate commerce under art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution permitted Congress to regulate the productio n o f a n Ohi o farme r wh o gre w whea t fo r hi s ow n con sumption.17 Prio r t o th e Ne w Deal , suc h privat e productio n wa s viewe d as inherentl y local , whic h th e doctrin e o f federalis m place d beyon d th e reach o f regulatio n b y th e federa l government . Wickard ha s no w com e to stan d fo r th e proposition tha t th e scope o f federa l regulator y powe r is virtually limitless. 18 As th e framers ' structura l safeguard s diminishe d i n importance , th e significance o f Suprem e Cour t protectio n increased . Joh n Marshal l lai d the foundatio n fo r thi s enhance d judicia l rol e i n Marbury v. Madison, where h e characterize d judicia l revie w a s essentia l t o th e protectio n o f individual rights from majoritarian abrogation. 19 John Marshall stated that "[t]he very essenc e o f civi l libert y consist s i n the righ t of ever y individua l to clai m th e protectio n o f th e law s wheneve r h e receive s a n injury " and that "[t]h e provinc e o f th e cour t is , solely , t o decid e o n th e right s o f individuals."20 Although Marshal l state d tha t the protection o f individua l

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rights wa s importan t enoug h t o requir e invalidatio n o f th e act s o f coor dinate branche s tha t abrogate d thos e rights, 21 i n retrospect , Marshall' s actions seem ironically to have been motivated b y political considerations . Rather than being protected, Marbury's rights appear actually to have been sacrificed fo r partisan political gain. By denying Marbury his commission, Marshall wa s able t o diver t attentio n fro m hi s true objective , whic h wa s to establis h a powe r o f judicia l revie w tha t woul d enabl e th e recentl y defeated Federalis t part y t o retai n politica l powe r throug h it s hol d ove r the life-tenure d judiciary. 22 Thi s detail , however , ha s no t deprive d th e decision o f it s symboli c significanc e a s th e harbinge r o f moder n judicia l review. Th e Marbury-bascd mode l o f judicia l revie w ha s bot h endure d and flourished over time, and the Supreme Court has now designated itself the ultimate guarantor of constitutional rights.23 Although racial minorities were almost certainly not among the political minorities whose protectio n the framer s ha d i n mind , enactmen t o f th e Reconstructio n amendment s gave racia l minoritie s specifi c ne w constitutiona l right s that coul d b e ex ercised agains t th e majority . The thirteenth , fourteenth , an d fifteenth amendments t o th e Unite d State s Constitutio n wer e enacte d durin g th e Reconstruction perio d followin g th e Civi l Wa r i n orde r t o giv e certai n rights t o the newly free d forme r slaves and to authorize the enactment o f congressional legislation that might be needed to enforce those rights. The thirteenth amendment, ratified in 1865 , prohibited slavery. The fourteent h amendment, ratifie d i n 1868 , gav e al l persons , includin g forme r blac k slaves, the rights of nationa l an d state citizenship, and guaranteed t o suc h persons du e proces s an d th e equa l protectio n o f th e laws . Th e fifteenth amendment, ratified i n 1870 , gave blacks the right to vote. 24 This, in turn, enhanced the significance o f judicia l review as a means of protecting racial minority interests . A s a result , w e hav e no w com e t o ves t th e Suprem e Court, rathe r tha n th e politica l process , wit h th e primar y responsibilit y for protecting th e interest s o f racia l minoritie s fro m disregar d b y the majoritarian branche s o f government . Under th e Marbury mode l o f judicia l review , th e Suprem e Cour t i s constitutionally obligate d t o nullif y action s o f th e majoritaria n branche s that impermissibl y interfer e wit h rights guarantee d t o minoritie s b y th e Constitution. Thi s judicia l functio n i s capture d mos t crispl y i n th e rep resentation-reinforcement mode l o f judicia l review , whic h ha s bee n de scribed, developed , an d popularize d b y Professo r Ely . Unde r th e repre sentation-reinforcement model , Suprem e Cour t interventio n i n th e political proces s t o invalidat e substantiv e outcome s i s justifie d whe n i t appears tha t th e proces s ha s bee n distorte d b y discountin g th e interest s

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of "discret e an d insular " minoritie s wh o ar e underrepresente d i n tha t process.25 I n orde r t o perfor m thi s function , however , th e Cour t mus t possess th e capacit y t o operat e i n a countermajoritaria n manner . T o th e extent tha t th e Cour t i s subservient t o majoritaria n desires , i t canno t ef fectively protec t minorit y interest s fro m majoritaria n abrogation . Accord ingly, consistent wit h th e traditiona l model , judicia l independenc e i s promoted b y bot h forma l an d operationa l safeguards. 26 Formal Safeguards Formally, th e Court' s insulatio n fro m politica l pressur e i s establishe d through lif e tenur e and salary protection. 27 These safeguard s are designed to facilitat e judicia l independenc e i n two ways . First, they are designed t o prevent dominatio n o f th e judicial proces s b y the representative branche s of government , precisely becaus e th e majoritaria n accountabilit y o f thos e branches migh t promp t the m t o pressur e judge s int o decidin g particula r cases i n way s tha t benefi t th e majorit y a t th e expens e o f a politicall y powerless individua l o r minority group . Although i t is difficult t o imagin e the representative branche s havin g a significant interes t i n the outcome o f most privat e litigation , man y publi c la w case s d o rais e significan t polic y or structura l concern s i n whic h th e representativ e branche s migh t b e interested. Thi s i s especiall y tru e o f thos e case s tha t reac h th e Suprem e Court.28 To the extent that representative branche s do become concerne d about th e outcom e o f particula r cases , lif e tenur e an d salar y protectio n are designe d t o assur e judge s tha t the y wil l no t b e fired or punishe d financially for disregarding the wishes of th e representative branches. 29 Second, the safeguards are designed t o insulate th e judiciary from direct popular pressur e b y freein g judge s fro m th e nee d t o worr y abou t reappointment. N o matte r ho w muc h popula r resistanc e thei r decision s may engender , judge s wil l no t b e subjecte d t o retaliatio n b y th e majori tarian branche s o f government . Lif e tenur e an d salar y protection , there fore, ar e designe d t o protec t judge s fro m bot h direc t an d indirec t form s of majoritaria n control. The life-tenure an d salary-protection concern s are also reflecte d i n th e bil l o f attainde r provisio n o f th e Constitution. 30 Al though th e Suprem e Cour t ha s limite d th e reac h o f th e bil l o f attainde r provision t o pena l enactments , th e functiona l definitio n o f a bil l o f at tainder is simply an enactment tha t benefits th e majority b y allocating th e costs associated wit h that benefit t o identifiabl e individual s or groups who lack th e politica l powe r t o preven t majoritaria n exploitatio n o f thei r interests.31 Accordingly , th e bil l o f attainde r provisio n i s o f obviou s signif -

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icance to minoritie s seeking to protect themselves from the tyranny of th e majority. Althoug h th e bil l o f attainde r prohibition i s addressed t o Con gress, it s bit e depend s upo n it s judicia l enforceability . I n theor y a t least , life tenur e an d salar y protectio n giv e th e Cour t th e countermajoritaria n capacity t o resis t th e popula r pressure s tha t cause d Congres s t o enac t a bill o f attainde r to begi n with . Realistically, i t is unlikely tha t th e forma l safeguard s o f lif e tenur e and salary protectio n i n an d o f themselve s d o muc h t o ensur e judicia l inde pendence. Congres s coul d circumven t thos e safeguard s an d impos e polit ical pressure o n the Cour t i n any number of ways . Congress coul d cance l the Court's term for political reasons , as it did with respect to the Court's June and December Terms in 1802. 32 Congress could also cut the Court's budget, or refuse t o appoint needed additional judge s as it did in the mid1970s, when th e Democrati c Congres s repeatedl y decline d t o creat e ne w federal judgeships until a Democratic Presiden t was elected t o appoint the new judges. 33 T o som e exten t a t least , Congres s coul d als o restric t th e Court's jurisdiction in order to coerce certain outcomes. The Constitutio n authorizes Congress t o regulat e th e appellat e jurisdictio n o f th e Suprem e Court.34 I n the pas t Congres s ha s threatene d politicall y motivate d us e o f this power in a way that may well hav e influenced th e Court's subsequen t constitutional exposition. 35 Congress could even manipulate the Court's personnel in order to affect Supreme Cour t adjudications . The mos t famou s effor t a t personne l ma nipulation involve s Presiden t Frankli n D . Roosevelt' s "court-packing " plan. After the Supreme Court had invalidated several pieces of Ne w Dea l legislation o n constitutiona l grounds , Presiden t Roosevel t propose d leg islation tha t would expan d th e number of justice s on th e Supreme Court . The proposa l calle d fo r on e additiona l justic e t o b e appointed , u p t o a maximum o f fifteen, for eac h justic e ove r th e age of seventy . I n 1937 , at the time that the proposal wa s made, six sitting justices were over the age of seventy . Althoug h th e legislatio n wa s nominall y offere d t o eas e th e caseload o f th e olde r justices , i t i s widel y recognize d t o hav e bee n a politically motivated effor t t o "stack " the Court with justice s that would b e receptive to future New Deal legislation. The court-packing plan generated significant opposition . However , Senate Majority Leade r Joseph Robinso n might hav e bee n abl e t o amas s enoug h politica l suppor t t o secur e enact ment i f h e ha d no t die d o f a hear t attac k shortl y befor e th e propose d legislation wa s voted on. 36 In addition t o th e man y methods tha t Congres s coul d us e t o influenc e Supreme Court adjudications, the Presiden t coul d impos e pressure on th e

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Court by declining to give effect t o its judgments. Thomas Jefferson threat ened not to comply with Supreme Court directives affecting question s that he believed th e Constitution delegate d t o th e President rather than to th e Court.37 President Lincol n also argued that the Dred Scott decisio n o f th e Supreme Court invalidating the Missouri Compromise 38 should b e limited to th e parties befor e th e Court an d shoul d no t b e followed a s a political rule b y th e representativ e branches. 39 I n addition, Presiden t Frankli n D . Roosevelt was prepared to ignore any Supreme Court order that invalidated federal abrogatio n o f "gol d clauses " in federal obligations , thereb y inter fering wit h hi s Ne w Dea l economi c recover y objectives . Althoug h Roo sevelt's actions wer e probably no t know n t o th e Court a t the tim e tha t it upheld th e government' s powe r t o abrogat e gol d clauses , subsequentl y acquired knowledg e o f th e President' s intention s ma y hav e affecte d th e Court's behavio r i n late r cases. 40 The Presiden t coul d als o simpl y threate n t o def y th e Court' s orders . The perceived unwillingness of Presiden t Andrew Jackson to enforce judgments o f th e Suprem e Cour t favorabl e t o th e Cheroke e India n Trib e appears t o hav e affecte d th e manne r i n whic h th e Cour t chos e t o ac t i n at least one case. In 1827 , the Cherokee Tribe declared itself an independent nation wit h complet e sovereignt y ove r it s triba l lands—land s th e Unite d States viewe d a s fallin g withi n th e geographica l boundarie s o f th e Stat e of Georgia . In 1830 , President Jackson responde d t o this declaration, and the political controvers y tha t ensued, by asserting that the Cherokee must leave Georgi a an d mov e wes t i n orde r to avoi d th e forc e o f Georgi a sov ereignty. Toward thi s end, Jackson signe d congressiona l legislatio n settin g aside lan d i n the territor y wes t o f th e Mississipp i Rive r for th e Cheroke e Tribe. As it became evident that the sovereignty dispute betwee n Georgia and the Cherokee Tribe would end up before the United States Supreme Court, Georgia governmenta l official s openl y vowe d t o disregar d an y Suprem e Court judgmen t tha t questione d Stat e authorit y t o exercis e sovereignt y over Cheroke e lands . Moreover , Presiden t Jackso n wa s perceive d t o b e sympathetic to this position. The resolve of th e Georgia officials wa s demonstrated whe n th e Stat e o f Georgi a proceede d t o execut e a n individua l convicted o f murde r o n Cheroke e land s despit e issuanc e b y th e Unite d States Supreme Court of a stay of execution pending Supreme Court review. When the Court was formally petitioned t o restrain enforcement o f Geor gia law over the Cherokee Tribe in Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, 41 the Cour t refuse d t o reac h th e merit s o f th e case . Whil e expressin g sympathy fo r th e pligh t o f th e Cherokee , th e Cour t rule d tha t i t lacke d ju risdiction t o conside r th e case. 42

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Although it is difficult t o view life tenure and salary protection as having much instrumental effec t i n promoting judicia l independence , the y never theless conve y a symbolic message . B y constitutionalizing th e concep t o f judicial independence , life tenur e and salary protection probabl y promot e a conceptio n o f acceptabl e governmenta l conduc t tha t inhibit s th e rep resentative branche s fro m imposin g inordinatel y hig h level s o f politica l pressure o n th e Court . I n addition , th e symboli c valu e o f th e judicia l safeguards ma y well enhanc e th e courag e o f th e Court t o resis t whateve r pressures d o com e t o b e exerte d upo n it .

Operational Safeguards In addition to the symbolic protections of life tenure and salary protection, the operationa l safeguar d o n whic h w e rel y mos t heavil y t o promot e ju dicial independenc e i s th e judicia l traditio n o f principle d adjudication . Because th e representativ e branche s ar e subservien t t o pluralis t politica l preferences, the y canno t b e relie d upo n t o rende r principle d decisions . Although principle may play a significant role in the way that representativebranch decision s ar e made , th e rol e o f principl e i s largely rhetorical . N o one demand s that member s o f th e political branche s genuinely believ e in the principles tha t the y espous e whil e advocatin g thei r favore d positions , and no one suspects that those principles genuinely account for how those positions cam e t o b e adopte d b y th e politician s wh o espous e them . Th e Supreme Court, however, is expected t o make decisions that are genuinely principled. The Court ha s a relative institutional advantag e ove r the representativ e branches wit h respec t t o matter s o f principl e becaus e o f bot h th e con ventions surroundin g judicial decisionmakin g an d th e procedural contex t out o f whic h judicia l decision s emerge . Historically , commo n la w court s were expected to perform their governmental function b y inducing general principles from judicial precedents and then deducing from those principles proper resolutions of the particular cases with which they were confronted. At times , th e proces s wa s though t t o b e a scientifi c on e i n whic h lega l rules possessed transcenden t validit y like the laws of physic s or chemistry. Moreover, a properly functionin g judicia l proces s wa s thought t o posses s unimpeachable reliability , approaching that of th e scientific method. 43 Although curren t claim s fo r th e adjudicator y proces s ar e mor e modest , fidelity to the tenets of principled decisionmaking remains an essential component o f acceptabl e judicia l behavior . Judges are selected i n part on th e basis of their aptitude and temperament fo r "reasoned elaboration," 44 and

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the legitimac y o f judicia l action s i s determine d b y th e adequac y o f th e principled account s tha t judge s offe r fo r thei r adjudications . In addition t o th e traditio n o f principl e i n which th e Cour t i s steeped, adjudication occur s i n a context tha t i s conducive t o principle d decision making. The doctrin e o f star e decisis unde r which th e Court operates 45 is essentially an equality principle that requires like cases to b e treated alike. Consistent wit h thi s doctrine , a judge tempte d t o deviat e fro m th e gov erning principle i n resolvin g a particular cas e would b e forced t o hesitat e before doin g s o fo r fea r tha t a n unprinciple d decisio n toda y migh t bin d the judge to reac h a result tha t he or she would no t desir e in some futur e case. Th e procedura l du e proces s constraint s tha t appl y t o th e judiciar y also promot e principle d decisionmaking . The stringen t "record " requirements tha t th e du e proces s claus e impose s fo r adjudication s focu s th e Court's attentio n o n factor s tha t ar e relevan t t o th e governin g principl e and divert the Court's attention from extraneous political factors that have no prope r bearin g o n th e principle d resolutio n o f a case . I n this regard , due process is the procedural complement to the bill of attainder provision. The du e process claus e provides procedural safeguard s t o individual s and minorities whos e lac k o f politica l powe r make s pluralis t politica l safe guards unavailabl e t o them . Tha t i s wh y hearing s an d on-the-recor d de cisions ar e essentia l i n a n adjudicatory contex t bu t ar e optiona l i n a legislative context. 46 In addition, judges tend to b e lawyers, which gives them more familiarit y wit h an d appreciatio n o f th e proces s o f principle d de cisionmaking tha n a nonlawyer legislato r o r executiv e officia l i s likel y t o possess. Finally , mos t adjudicatio n proceed s a t a leisurel y pac e i n whic h the luxur y o f thoroug h briefin g an d meticulou s contemplatio n i s mor e available tha n i t ofte n i s i n th e legislativ e process. 47 In sum , th e traditiona l mode l o f judicia l revie w accord s th e Cour t a relative institutiona l advantag e ove r th e othe r branche s o f governmen t i n protecting the interests of minoritie s from abrogation by the majority. The formal safeguard s o f lif e tenur e an d salar y protectio n emphasiz e th e im portance o f thi s countermajoritaria n functio n o f th e Court , an d th e op erational safeguar d o f principle d adjudicatio n i s responsible fo r its implementation. Becaus e judicia l decision s emanat e fro m governin g principles , they ca n b e arrived at independent o f majoritaria n preference. Moreover , the doctrin e o f star e decisis, the due process clause , and other contextua l factors hel p ensure that even the inevitable ambiguities embedde d i n governing principles will be resolved in a manner that is free from majoritarian control. Unde r the traditiona l mode l o f judicia l review , it i s this counter majoritarian capacit y o f th e Cour t tha t make s i t a viabl e guardia n o f minority interest s i n ou r pluralist politica l society .

C H A P T E R2

The Majoritaria n Cour t

Despite th e aspiration s o f th e traditiona l model , th e Suprem e Cour t i s ultimately unabl e t o protec t minoritie s fro m th e tyrann y o f th e majority . In fact, the Court is institutionally incapabl e of doin g anything other than reflecting th e ver y majoritaria n preference s tha t th e traditiona l mode l re quires th e Cour t t o resist . Becaus e Suprem e Cour t justice s ar e socialize d by the sam e majorit y tha t determine s thei r fitness for judicia l office , the y will arriv e a t th e benc h alread y inculcate d wit h majoritaria n values . And none o f th e traditiona l safeguard s ca n reliabl y preven t thos e value s fro m controlling judicia l decisions . The forma l safeguard s o f lif e tenur e an d salary protection, which are designed to insulate the judiciary from external political pressures , are no t designe d t o guar d agains t th e majoritarianis m inherent in a judge's own assimilation of dominant social values. Moreover, the operationa l safeguard s surroundin g th e proces s o f principle d adjudi cation ar e not sufficien t t o permi t reliabl e judicia l protectio n o f minorit y interests, because the y cannot constrai n th e exercis e of judicia l discretio n through whic h majoritaria n preference s achiev e thei r expressio n i n th e judicial process . I n man y instances , th e governin g substantiv e principle s of la w incorporate majoritaria n value s in a way that leaves the Court with no choic e bu t t o acquiesc e i n majoritaria n desire s wit h respec t t o th e disposition o f minorit y interests . And even when th e governing principles are subject to judicial implementation, the y cannot perform th e insulating function that the traditional model demands of them because the principles themselves ar e to o imprecis e t o neutraliz e th e effect s o f majoritaria n so cialization. As a result, when th e Court i s called upon to protect minorit y interests, i t i s consigne d t o operat e a s littl e mor e tha n a cover t agen t o f the majority . 19

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The Socialized Judiciary Judges d o no t assum e offic e tabula rasa. Rather , th e judicia l selectio n process ensure s tha t judge s wil l b e chose n fro m th e rank s o f thos e wh o have completed a socialization proces s that all but ensures their sympathy toward majoritaria n values . This socializatio n proces s also make s it likely that judge s wil l hav e internalized man y o f th e belief s an d predisposition s concerning racial minorities that can cause the majority to discount minority interests. Accordingly, on e woul d expec t th e Supreme Court t o reflec t ma joritarian preferences unless the safeguards surrounding judicial review could be show n t o neutraliz e a judge's initia l majoritaria n inclinations . The proces s o f individua l attitud e formatio n is , o f course , a comple x one about whic h littl e can b e said with certainty. I n the absence o f bette r psychological an d sociologica l evidenc e concernin g th e effec t o f sociali zation o n judicia l decisionmaking , however , i t seem s saf e t o mak e on e initial assumption. If all other factors are held constant, judges are as likely as member s o f th e representativ e branche s t o b e majoritarian . I f judge s were simpl y selecte d fro m th e populatio n a t random , thei r personal atti tudes would, by hypothesis, reflect th e attitudes of th e population at large. The percentag e o f judge s favorin g give n position s woul d correspon d t o the percentage o f th e genera l populatio n favorin g thos e positions . More over, wit h respec t t o th e resolutio n o f an y particula r socia l issue , mor e people wil l hol d th e majorit y positio n concernin g prope r dispositio n o f that issu e tha n will hol d an y other position. A s a statistical matter , therefore, a randomly selected judg e is more likel y to espous e th e majoritaria n position concernin g a n issu e tha n an y othe r position . Judicial safeguard s or attitude change s accompanying th e assumptio n o f judicia l offic e migh t prevent a judge's initial majoritarian sympathies from ultimately controlling case outcomes . Bu t al l thing s bein g equal , th e persona l attitude s o f a hypothetical judge appointed through a random selection process are more likely tha n no t t o mirro r the attitude s o f th e majority . Statistically i t i s als o tru e tha t som e randoml y selecte d judge s woul d not shar e th e attitude s an d value s o f th e majority . However , i t i s unclea r how thi s coul d constitut e a n improvemen t o f th e situation . I f judicia l attitudes d o no t reflec t th e value s o f th e majority , the y mus t reflec t th e values of th e individua l judge s who hol d them , or of som e interes t group with whic h thos e judge s identify . Althoug h majoritaria n contro l ove r th e interests o f racia l minoritie s ma y b e undesirable , contro l exercise d b y a particular judge o r interest group i s certainly worse . I t cannot clai m eve n the degree o f legitimac y tha t majoritarian authorizatio n migh t b e though t

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to offer . I f judicia l custod y o f minorit y interest s i s t o b e justified , i t wil l have t o b e throug h feature s o f th e judicia l proces s tha t protec t minorit y interests fro m th e personal attitude s and values of th e judiciary , whateve r their source. Judges, o f course , ar e no t selecte d a t random . However , th e judicia l selection procedure s tha t w e customaril y utiliz e ma y exacerbat e matter s by effectively makin g judges more majoritaria n tha n if the y were selecte d at random. For reasons of checks and balances, federal judges are selected through a process that is intentionally political. They are appointed by the most majoritaria n officia l i n th e government an d confirme d b y th e uppe r house of th e legislatur e after public hearing s in which thei r political pref erences are thoroughly explored. Although judicial temperament and legal competence pla y some rol e i n the appointment an d confirmation process , the acceptabilit y o f a candidate's politica l inclination s i s likely t o b e dispositive a t bot h stages. 1 The political natur e o f ou r judicial selectio n procedure s ha s the effec t of reducin g th e rang e o f attitude s tha t wil l b e reflecte d i n ou r judicia l population. Onl y mainstrea m politica l preference s wil l surviv e th e ap pointment an d confirmatio n process . Proponent s o f periphera l politica l positions suc h a s Marxis m o r anarchis m ar e unlikel y eve r t o becom e judges. Mor e significantly , representative s o f politicall y inactiv e consti tuencies suc h a s alien s o r th e poo r ar e als o effectivel y exclude d fro m consideration. Becaus e racia l minoritie s ar e disproportionatel y likel y t o fall int o thi s latte r categor y o f exclusion , innat e judicia l sensitivit y t o minority view s canno t realisticall y b e expected . I n addition , thes e taci t rules o f exclusio n ar e enforce d wit h adde d vigilanc e whe n appointmen t and confirmatio n t o th e Suprem e Cour t i s involved, makin g the rang e o f views tha t are directl y represente d o n tha t Cour t extremel y narrow . Even minority judges will be firmlymiddle class. Only two black justices have ever served on the Supreme Court—Thurgood Marshall and Clarence Thomas.2 Althoug h bot h ha d background s i n whic h the y experience d invidious acts of racia l discrimination, 3 they had both becom e establishe d government lawyers before bein g appointed to the Court. Justice Marshall had bee n bot h a United State s Cour t o f Appeal s Judge an d th e Solicito r General o f th e Unite d State s befor e bein g appointe d t o th e Suprem e Court,4 and Justice Thoma s ha d been the hea d of th e Equal Employmen t Opportunity Commissio n an d a Unite d State s Cour t o f Appeal s Judg e before hi s appointment t o th e Court. 5 Indeed , Justice Thomas , wh o wa s appointed by conservative Presiden t George Bush, was appointed precisely because o f hi s traditiona l value s an d conservativ e politica l views , whic h placed hi m a t odd s wit h man y blac k leaders. 6

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Although th e view s o f a larg e percentag e o f th e populatio n ma y b e represented o n th e Suprem e Court , thi s percentag e i s stil l likel y t o en compass a narrow segment of the entire political spectrum. Because a large percentage o f th e population hold s politica l belief s tha t fal l withi n a relatively narro w range , i t i s no t surprisin g tha t th e Court' s members , wh o are appointed b y an elected Presiden t and confirmed b y an elected Senate, also hold views that fall within that narrow range. The failure of the Senate to confirm President Reagan's appointment of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court i s an exampl e o f th e proces s successfull y preventin g someon e per ceived t o hol d belief s outsid e o f th e mainstrea m o f America n politica l thought fro m sittin g o n th e Court. 7 Accordingly , rathe r than overcomin g the proble m o f statistica l majoritarianis m tha t woul d characteriz e a ju diciary selecte d fro m th e populatio n a t random , ou r politicall y sensitiv e judicial selectio n proces s aggravate s th e proble m b y contractin g th e siz e of th e majorit y tha t matter s fo r th e purpose s o f judicia l selection . The judges wh o ar e successfully abl e t o surviv e th e judicia l selectio n proces s will not only have been inculcated with majoritarian values, but theirs will be the values of a n elite "majority" that is unlikely t o includ e mos t members o f racia l minorities . Because judge s ar e well socialize d befor e the y assum e office , the y wil l also hav e internalize d th e biase s an d predisposition s tha t enabl e th e ma joritarian branche s t o vie w undervaluatio n o f minorit y interest s a s ac ceptable governmenta l behavior . Th e framer s expecte d tha t th e majorit y would see k t o advance it s ow n interest s at th e expens e o f politicall y less powerful minorities. 8 I t i s tru e tha t i n extrem e cases , thi s tendenc y ma y result from malic e o r xenophobic dislik e o f minorit y groups. In the mor e typical case , however , th e majoritaria n tendenc y t o discoun t minorit y in terests wil l resul t fro m mor e subtl e causes . Wher e racia l minoritie s ar e involved, th e majorit y wil l undervalu e minorit y interest s becaus e o f mis information conveye d throug h cultura l stereotypes , o r becaus e o f a n inability t o appreciat e advers e consequence s upo n interest s wit h whic h th e majority i s culturally unabl e t o empathize , o r throug h mer e inadvertenc e when the majority simply fails to conside r the effect tha t its actions migh t have o n minorit y interests. 9 Professo r Lawrenc e ha s argue d tha t racia l attitudes an d prejudice s ca n operat e i n way s tha t ar e s o subtl e tha t ma joritarian discriminatio n ofte n occur s at an unconscious level . Indee d th e majority culture can transmit prejudices so subtly and effectively tha t even members o f th e racia l minorit y bein g disadvantage d ca n com e t o adop t them.10 Whateve r th e precis e factor s ar e tha t caus e th e majorit y t o un dervalue th e interest s o f minorities , judge s wh o hav e bee n socialize d b y

THE MAJORITARIA N COUR T 2

3

the majorit y cultur e wil l hav e bee n influence d b y them too . Accordingly , judges will com e t o th e task o f protectin g minorit y interest s possessed b y the ver y predisposition s tha t the y ar e asked t o guar d against . Because i t is unrealistic to expec t judge s to have personal attitude s and values tha t ar e significantly differen t fro m th e attitude s an d value s o f th e majority, th e safeguar d o f judicia l revie w canno t b e expecte d t o protec t minority interests from exploitation unless there is something in the judicial process tha t guards against th e influence o f majoritaria n preferences . Th e traditional mode l o f judicia l review assumes that the formal safeguard s o f life tenur e an d salar y protection , a s wel l a s th e operativ e safeguard s at tendant to the process of principled adjudication, can accomplish this task. Contrary t o thi s assumption , however , neithe r se t o f safeguard s i s likel y to b e effective . Inadequacy of

the Formal Safeguards

The formal safeguards of life tenure and salary protection are not adequate to ensur e judicia l protectio n o f minorit y interest s fro m majoritaria n ab rogation. The ability of the formal safeguards to protect the judiciary from political pressures that may be exerted on it by the representative branche s or th e electorat e i s questionable . I t i s also besid e th e point , becaus e th e formal safeguards do not purport to offer any protection from the personal attitudes and values of individua l judges . No t eve n th e symboli c valu e o f the formal safeguard s can have any prophylactic effect against majoritarian inclinations o f whic h th e judge s themselve s ar e not consciousl y aware . As indicate d above , th e forma l safeguard s o f lif e tenur e an d salar y protection do not accord the judiciary meaningful protection from political pressures that may be exerted by the representative branches, because those safeguards ar e easily circumvented. 11 I n theory, life tenur e should provid e more meaningful insulatio n from the majoritarian preferences o f th e electorate becaus e i t precludes th e nee d fo r judge s to see k majorit y approva l of thei r actions. Empirically , however, it appears that whatever insulatio n life tenur e actually provide s i s likely t o b e illusory . Professo r Tushne t ha s noted tha t members of Congres s have effective jo b security tha t rivals the security of life tenure; incumbents are all but assured of reelection. 12 Since World War II, 90 percent o f al l incumben t member s of Congres s runnin g for reelection hav e bee n returne d t o office . Ove r time, margins of victor y have become larger , the number of clos e race s has become fewer, and the number of "safe " districts has increased substantially . B y 1986 , 98. 4 per cent of the incumbents seeking reelection were able to reclaim their seats.13

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Tushnet argue s tha t factor s suc h a s a candidate' s persona l vote r appeal , the availability of staf f suppor t in implementing long term reelection strategies, an d eas e i n attractin g medi a attentio n giv e incumbent s a distinc t electoral advantage. 14 I n addition , th e provisio n o f constituen t services , such as assistance i n dealing with th e regulatory bureaucrac y that governs a constituent' s business , i s wha t generate s vote r loyalty. 15 A candidate' s voting recor d doe s no t appea r t o b e significant . I n fact , onl y 1 0 percen t of th e voter s eve n kno w ho w thei r representative s vot e o n particula r issues.16 A s a result , Tushne t conclude s tha t th e electora l incentiv e fro m which lif e tenur e i s designed t o protect federa l judge s does no t appea r to have enough of an effect o n the formulation o f political positions to make life tenur e a relevan t judicia l safeguard. 17 Moreover , althoug h judge s d o not ru n fo r reelection , the y ma y see k highe r judicia l o r executiv e office , which doe s mak e the m subjec t t o whateve r majoritaria n pressure s th e President and the confirming Senate can bring to bear. 18 In sum, life tenure probably provide s littl e benefi t b y wa y o f insulatio n fro m majoritaria n preferences because , ironically , th e typ e o f majoritaria n politica l pressur e that life tenure is concerned wit h avoiding does little to affect th e conduct of governmen t officials . Ou r representativ e democrac y simpl y doe s no t work a s well a s political theor y woul d predict. 19 Professor Tushnet' s dat a concern s th e Hous e o f Representatives , an d it is possible that different conclusion s might be suggested from analogou s data concernin g th e Senate . Th e Senat e doe s no t appea r t o hav e a s high a percentage o f saf e seat s as the House , no r has the numbe r of saf e seat s in the Senate demonstrated a general increase over time. In House elections from 195 6 t o 1974 , th e proportio n o f incumbent s winnin g a t leas t 6 0 percent of th e major party vote ranged from 58. 5 percen t to 77.8 percent . In th e Senate , fro m 194 6 t o 1974 , th e rang e fluctuated fro m a lo w o f 35.4 percen t t o a high o f 48. 8 percent. 20 Eve n if al l o f Tushnet' s conclu sions prove d t o b e erroneous , however , lif e tenur e woul d nevertheles s remain irrelevan t t o th e proble m pose d b y a judge's persona l attitudes. 21 If lif e tenur e an d salar y protection functione d precisel y a s the framer s intended, the y woul d stil l b e nonresponsiv e t o th e primar y facto r tha t causes th e judiciar y t o reflec t majoritaria n preferences . Judges are majoritarian becaus e thei r personal value s and attitudes are the product o f elit e majoritarian socialization . T o th e exten t tha t lif e tenur e an d salar y pro tection ar e designe d t o immuniz e th e judiciar y fro m politica l pressure s exerted b y th e representativ e branches , those safeguard s ar e simply irrel evant. A judge' s persona l attitude s wil l continu e t o operat e eve n i f th e majoritarian branche s exer t n o influenc e whatsoever . T o th e exten t tha t

THE MAJORITARIA N COUR T 2

5

the safeguard s ar e designe d t o immuniz e judge s fro m th e majoritaria n electorate, the y are invoke d to o lat e t o b e o f muc h assistance . Th e pref erences o f th e majorit y wil l hav e bee n incorporate d int o a judge' s ow n preferences lon g before th e judge is sworn into office. Eve n assuming that life tenur e an d salar y protectio n ar e completel y effectiv e i n neutralizin g judicial apprehension s o f majorit y retaliatio n fo r judicia l behavior , the y offer n o metho d fo r a judge t o gauge the degree t o which hi s or her own attitudes hav e bee n influence d b y majoritaria n values . Ironically , any protections tha t thes e safeguard s ma y offe r ultimatel y serv e onl y t o protec t majoritarian judicial value s from th e minority political pressures to whic h they migh t occasionall y b e exposed . The technica l inadequacie s o f lif e tenur e an d salar y protection woul d be inconsequentia l i f th e primar y valu e o f th e forma l safeguard s wer e symbolic. I f th e forma l safeguard s functione d a s aspirationa l reminder s cautioning judges to guard against the majoritarian inclinations with which they have been inculcate d a s a result of thei r socialization, the safeguard s might meri t appreciation . However , no t eve n suc h symboli c valu e i s re sponsive t o th e primar y caus e o f judicia l majoritarianism . I f Professo r Lawrence is correct tha t much of th e discrimination tha t is inflicted upo n racial minoritie s result s fro m unconsciou s prejudices, 22 th e aspirationa l value of the formal safeguards cannot be more than marginal. It may permit judges t o compensat e fo r thos e incorporate d majoritaria n preferences o f which the y ar e aware , bu t i t canno t inspir e judge s t o neutraliz e thos e preferences tha t operat e beneat h th e leve l o f thei r consciou s perception . Even judicia l effort s t o compensat e fo r know n o r suspecte d prejudice s will b e suspec t becaus e the y wil l b e colore d b y th e sam e majoritaria n values tha t gav e rise to th e nee d fo r compensator y adjustment s t o begi n with.23 For the reasons mentioned, the formal safeguards cannot be relied upon to ensur e tha t judge s wil l operat e fre e o f th e influenc e o f majoritaria n preference whe n the y endeavo r t o protec t minorit y interests . B y default , only th e operativ e safeguard s tha t surroun d th e judicia l proces s o f prin cipled decisionmaking can be counted on to serve the necessary insulating function. I n theory , th e principle d decisionmakin g proces s ca n guar d against judiciall y incorporate d majoritaria n attitude s an d value s becaus e the effectiveness o f it s insulating function doe s not depend upon a judge's conscious awareness of his or her majoritarian predispositions. The process of principle d decisionmaking , however , rest s upo n othe r assumption s about th e constrainin g effec t o f lega l principle s tha t ultimatel y prove dif ficult t o accept .

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Inadequacy of the Operational Safeguards The operativ e safeguar d upo n whic h th e lega l syste m relie s mos t heavil y in orde r t o ensur e judicia l protectio n o f minorit y interest s i s th e proces s of principle d adjudication . Th e procedura l requirement s o f adjudicator y due proces s are thought t o creat e a n environment conduciv e t o th e principled dispositio n o f lega l claims , and th e substantive constraint s o f star e decisis ar e though t t o preven t judge s fro m allowin g persona l prejudice s to contro l thei r decisions . Ther e ar e thre e reason s fo r skepticis m abou t the effectiveness o f principled adjudication i n achieving the desired degree of judicia l insulatio n fro m majoritaria n preferences . First , governing lega l principles often deriv e their meaning through explicit or implicit referenc e to majoritaria n preferences . Second , th e bar e injunctio n t o engag e i n a process o f principle d decisionmakin g doe s no t identif y fo r a judge whic h of th e competin g principle s tha t plausibl y coul d contro l resolutio n o f a legal claim actually should control. Rather , identification o f th e governing principle entail s a n ac t o f judicia l discretio n i n whic h th e personal , sta tistically majoritarian values of th e judge are necessarily implicated. Third, even i f a governing principl e coul d b e selecte d wit h th e requisit e degre e of neutralit y an d disregard fo r majoritaria n preferences , i t is unlikely tha t the principl e woul d b e sufficientl y determinat e t o generat e onl y on e out come. An y principl e broa d enoug h t o secur e genera l acceptanc e a s con trolling i n a controversial cas e woul d b e subjec t t o deconstruction . Tha t is, ambiguities inherent in any formulation o f such a broad principle could be uncovere d tha t woul d permi t th e principl e t o generat e contradictor y results. Again , th e onl y wa y i n whic h a judg e coul d selec t amon g th e potentially availabl e outcomes woul d b e through an act o f discretio n tha t would implicat e th e judge' s own socialize d preferences . Becaus e o f thes e three sources of vulnerability, the process of principled adjudication—eve n if i t occur s i n a contex t i n whic h du e proces s an d star e decisi s hav e en deavored t o exclud e fro m consideratio n al l imprope r majoritaria n influ ences—cannot ensure judicial protection of the interests of racial minorities from majoritaria n abrogation .

C H A P T E R3

Infiltration o f Principle s

Many lega l principle s expressl y incorporat e majoritaria n preference s int o their substantiv e contents . A s a result , suc h principle s canno t b e relie d upon t o insulat e judicial decisionmakin g fro m th e desires of th e majority. On th e contrary , th e principle s themselve s ensur e tha t th e wil l o f th e majority i s what ultimatel y control s an y minorit y claim s tha t are subjec t to thos e principles . Surprisingly , th e Suprem e Cour t ha s expressl y incor porated majoritarian preferences int o constitutional principles , as it did in McCleskey u Kemp, eve n where the effect ha s been to permit the majority to defin e th e conten t o f racia l minorit y rights. More subtly , th e Suprem e Court ofte n incorporate s majoritaria n preference s int o governin g lega l standards indirectly , throug h deferentia l standard s o f judicia l revie w an d through justiciabilit y doctrines . Wheneve r th e scop e o f revie w o r a justiciability doctrine precludes the Court from giving final operative conten t to a governing lega l principle , th e Cour t i s agai n permittin g th e conten t of that principle to be determined by the majoritarian body whose actions are under review. Incorporation of

Majoritarian Preferences

The Supreme Court has often interpreted legal principles to mean whatever the majority says that they mean. This, of course, deprives those principles of an y capacit y t o shiel d judicia l decisionmakin g fro m majorit y domina tion. Instead , th e principle s themselve s guarante e tha t majoritaria n pref erences will ultimately govern the minority claims that are subject to those principles. The cleares t exampl e o f a principle that expressly incorporate s *7

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the will o f th e majorit y i s the principle o f federalism , whic h th e Supreme Court, in Garcia u San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 1 hel d t o contain n o judicially enforceable standards . The Court held that although federalism limitation s are impose d b y th e Constitutio n o n th e scop e o f congressional powe r unde r th e commerc e clause , th e content o f thos e limitations i s to b e determined b y Congress itsel f an d no t b y the courts. 2 The Court' s justificatio n fo r judicia l deferenc e t o th e preference s o f a representative branc h wa s that th e states , who ar e the direc t beneficiarie s of federalism restrictions, are adequately represented in the Senate, thereby precluding th e nee d fo r judicia l enforcemen t o f th e principl e o f federal ism.3 Expresse d differently , state s ar e no t "minorities " whos e interest s require protectio n fro m majoritaria n abrogatio n becaus e state s hav e suf ficient powe r to protect their own interests in the pluralist political process. Taken on its own terms, the Garcia decisio n may well be unobjectionable . However, th e Cour t ha s als o incorporate d majoritaria n desire s int o gov erning lega l principle s wher e th e interest s bein g adversel y affecte d are minority interests . In McCleskey u Kemp, 4 th e Court rejected equal protection and eighth amendment cruel-and-unusual-punishmen t challenge s t o th e impositio n of capita l punishmen t unde r a Georgia statute . The challeng e wa s base d upon statistical evidence, which was undisputed for purposes of the Court's disposition, establishin g tha t defendant s convicte d o f murde r wer e 4. 3 times mor e likel y t o receiv e th e deat h penalty i f thei r victims wer e whit e than if their victims were black—a difference tha t is statistically significant . In addition, blacks convicted o f murde r were overall 1. 1 time s more likely to b e sentence d t o deat h tha n whit e convicts . Accordingly , black s con victed of murderin g white victims were the most likely class of defendant s to receiv e th e deat h penalty . Th e ra w dat a als o showe d that , prio r t o adjustment fo r nonracia l factors , th e deat h penalt y wa s impose d i n 2 2 percent o f th e case s involvin g blac k defendant s an d whit e victims , bu t i t was impose d i n onl y 1 percen t o f th e case s involvin g blac k defendant s and blac k victims. 5 In rejectin g th e eight h amendmen t challenge , Justic e Powell , writin g for a five-justice majority, emphasized tha t a state legislature was required to remai n withi n constitutionall y permissibl e limit s o f proportionalit y i n its impositio n o f th e deat h penalty. 6 A s lon g a s th e legislatur e remaine d within those limits, however, its determination of what acts and aggravating circumstances warranted capital punishment controlled the meaning of the proportionality standar d embodie d i n th e eight h amendment . Thi s i s be cause tha t determinatio n wa s informe d b y th e legislature' s appreciatio n

INFILTRATION O F PRINCIPLE S 2

9

of contemporar y communit y standards . The languag e o f Justice Powell' s opinion i s revealing. I t states: Thus, our constitutional decision s have been informed b y "contemporary values concerning the infliction of a challenged sanction," . .. I n assessing contemporary values, we have eschewed subjective judgment, and instead have sought to ascertain "objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given sanction." . .. First among these indici a are the decisions of stat e legislatures, "because the . . . leg islative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining" contemporary standards....W e also have been guided b y the sentencing decisions of juries , because they are "a significant and reliable objective index of contemporar y values." [Citations omitted]7 In addition, Justice Powell emphasized that in order to withstand eighth amendment scrutiny , impositio n o f th e deat h penalt y i n particula r case s had to resul t fro m th e jury's exercise o f discretio n afte r considerin g all o f the surrounding circumstances , which b y hypothesis mus t include th e defendant's race . The languag e o f th e opinio n i s again revealing . I t states: Thus, it is the jury that is a criminal defendant's fundamental "protectio n of lif e and liberty against race or color prejudice." . .. Specifically , a capital sentencing jury representative of a criminal defendant's community assures a " 'diffused impartiality,' " . .. i n the jury's task of "express[ing] the conscience of the community on th e ultimat e questio n o f lif e o r death. " [Brackets i n original ; citations and footnote omitted]8 The opinion incorporate s majoritaria n preferences int o the meaning of the governing constitutiona l principl e i n two distinc t ways . First, it hold s that within the range of acceptabl e punishments the content o f th e eighth amendment proportionality requirement mirrors what the majoritarian legislature views as appropriate punishment fo r a given criminal act. Second , and mor e striking , th e Cour t hold s tha t th e eight h amendmen t principl e proscribing crue l an d unusua l punishmen t requires th e exercis e o f jur y discretion. Thi s holdin g i s strikin g becaus e th e jur y i s a majoritaria n in stitution. Indeed , i t is precisely becaus e th e jur y is a repository o f major itarian value s tha t th e Cour t elect s t o mak e jur y discretion th e operativ e act i n the state' s impositio n o f capita l punishment . A jur y o f one' s peer s coul d b e viewe d a s a countermajoritaria n insti tution tha t served t o inhibi t government oppression . I n theory, a government intent on advancing the interests of one interest group at the expense of anothe r woul d find it more difficul t t o effectuat e it s exploitative inten t if it had to secure th e cooperation o f a jury composed o f th e defendant' s peers tha n o f a jur y compose d o f member s o f th e government' s ow n

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favored interes t group . Th e Suprem e Cour t nominall y embrace d suc h a conception of the jury in Duncan v. Louisiana. 9 I t seems unlikely, however, that th e Cour t take s thi s countermajoritarian conceptio n o f th e jur y very seriously. I t has decline d t o hol d tha t crimina l defendant s ar e entitle d t o petit jurie s whos e membershi p actuall y include s member s o f thei r ow n race, reasonin g tha t a prohibitio n o n state-sanctione d discriminatio n i n the selectio n o f th e jur y venir e fro m whic h th e peti t jur y i s draw n i s sufficient t o guar d against th e danger s o f governmen t oppression. 10 Conceiving o f th e jur y a s a majoritarian institutio n seem s muc h mor e plausible. As pointed out by Justice Stevens in McCleskey,11 an d elaborated upon b y Professo r Kennedy, 12 i f McCleskey' s allegation s ar e true , th e jury—like th e population a t large—value s th e live s o f black s les s tha n i t values the lives o f whites . I n fact, the jur y undervalues th e live s o f black s to suc h a n exten t tha t i t make s th e deterren t an d retributiv e protection s of th e criminal law four times more available to white citizens than it does to blac k citizens. 13 Such judicial deferenc e t o a majoritarian bod y i n defining the operativ e content o f a constitutiona l safeguar d is , o f course , inconsisten t wit h ju dicial protectio n o f minorit y interest s fro m majorit y control . Bu t unde r the facts o f McCleskey, suc h deferenc e i s affirmatively alarming . The cas e not onl y tolerates , bu t actuall y constitutionalizes, th e leve l o f racia l dis crimination tha t exist s i n th e communit y fro m whic h th e jur y i s drawn . Because o f th e natur e o f McCleskey' s claim—tha t th e Georgi a statut e permitted jurie s t o discriminat e o n th e basi s o f rac e i n th e impositio n o f capital punishment—the Court' s own insistenc e on jury discretion appears to b e a n affirmativ e endorsemen t o f suc h discrimination . McCleskey' s evidence demonstrate s tha t whe n jurie s in Georgia exercis e th e discretio n to impos e capital punishment, i n a statistically significant numbe r of case s they wil l d o s o because o f th e victim' s race . As a result, when th e Cour t insists on giving dispositive discretio n t o thi s institution i n making capital punishment determinations , th e Cour t read s th e Constitutio n t o requir e the level of discriminatory bias that the majoritarian jury reflects. Knowing that jurie s ar e incline d t o discriminat e o n th e basi s o f race , th e Cour t remarkably insists , a s a matte r o f constitutiona l law , tha t thi s discrimi natory inclinatio n b e presen t i n deat h penalt y deliberations . I n thi s way, the Court not only incorporates majoritarian preferences into the meaning of the constitutional standard, but it does so even though those preferences are assumed t o b e discriminatory . In addition to the occasions on which the Court explicitly incorporate s majoritarian preference s int o th e meanin g o f governin g principles , ther e

INFILTRATION O F PRINCIPLE S 3

1

are occasions on which the Court incorporates such preferences implicitly . The primar y wa y that th e Cour t effect s implici t incorporatio n i s through deferential standard s of review . When th e rang e of permissibl e represent ative branch discretion is broad, majoritarian preferences will in most cases control th e dispositio n o f minorit y interest s becaus e th e Cour t wil l no t intervene. Th e operativ e meanin g o f th e governing lega l principle , therefore, i s the meanin g tha t th e representativ e branc h ha s assigned t o it . Incorporation through

Deference

Many minorit y challenge s t o majoritaria n action s ar e frame d a s equa l protection claims . The standar d o f revie w applie d i n typica l equa l pro tection case s i s th e rationa l basi s standard . T o withstan d scrutin y unde r this standar d o f review , a legislative o r executiv e classificatio n nee d onl y bear a rational relationshi p t o a legitimate governmental objective. 14 Th e standard is extremely deferential, and governmental action s almost always survive constitutiona l challeng e whe n thi s standard i s invoked. 15 Whe n a majoritarian enactmen t is invalidate d unde r th e rationa l basi s standard , some othe r facto r i s typicall y th e actua l caus e o f judicia l invalidation. 16 Where suspec t classification s ar e involved , however , th e Court—a t leas t nominally—applies a heightene d standar d o f review , whic h require s th e government t o sho w bot h tha t it s classificatio n i s necessar y t o achiev e a compelling governmenta l objective , an d tha t ther e i s a tigh t fit betwee n that objectiv e an d th e mean s tha t th e governmen t ha s chose n t o pursu e it.17 The tightness o f th e fit is often measure d b y the presence o r absence of les s restrictive alternative mean s of achievin g the desired result. 18 Constitutional challenge s ar e muc h mor e likel y t o b e successfu l i f thi s stric t level o f scrutin y i s applied . Rac e i s considere d t o b e on e o f th e suspec t bases fo r classification , sufficien t t o trigge r heightene d scrutiny , becaus e the relativ e political powerlessnes s o f racia l minorities demand s clos e Supreme Court monitoring of majoritarian classifications that adversely affect racial minorit y interests. 19 In United States u Carotene Products, 20 whic h laid th e groundwor k fo r th e heightene d judicia l scrutin y no w accorde d majoritarian enactment s tha t differentiat e o n th e basi s o f race , Justic e Stone, writin g fo r th e majority , suggeste d tha t th e Cour t shoul d decid e whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. 21

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This suggestio n ha s no w develope d int o a full-fledge d theor y o f consti tutional jurisprudence , known as the representation-reinforcement theory , which ha s bee n popularize d b y Professo r Ely. 22 Despite th e nomina l availabilit y o f stric t scrutin y fo r racia l classifica tions, ther e ar e thre e reason s wh y th e Cour t ma y nevertheles s declin e t o upset majoritaria n disposition s o f minorit y interests . First , the Court ma y simply decline t o appl y heightened scrutin y to a case even when tha t cas e intuitively appears to b e a race case. The Cour t di d this in Washington v. Davis whe n it applied rational basis scrutiny to adjudicate a claim alleging that the qualifying examinatio n use d to selec t Distric t of Columbi a polic e officers wa s raciall y discriminatory. 23 The Cour t hel d tha t becaus e th e allegation o f racia l discriminatio n relate d t o th e discriminator y impac t o f the qualifyin g exa m an d no t t o an y discriminator y inten t o n th e par t o f the officials wh o administered it , the constitutional standar d of strict scrutiny di d no t apply. 24 The distinctio n betwee n discriminator y inten t an d discriminatory effect s i s discussed mor e full y i n Chapte r 4 . Second, the Court may determine that the representative branche s have in fact made the demanding showing that is required under the heightened standard o f review . Suc h determination s ar e no t common , bu t the y do occur. Moreover, they tend to occur in contexts that highlight the ultimate inability o f th e Suprem e Cour t t o protec t minorit y interest s fro m major itarian abrogation . On e o f th e mos t famou s example s o f suc h a deter mination i s the Suprem e Cour t decisio n i n Korematsu v. United States. 25 The cas e aros e ou t o f a military progra m unde r which America n citizen s of Japanes e descen t wer e interne d i n concentratio n camp s afte r th e out break of World War II. It upheld that portion of the program that excluded Japanese-Americans from certain areas along the West Coast of the United States, findingthat the exclusion did not violate the equal protection clause despite th e Court' s concession tha t th e action s o f Congres s and the President i n authorizin g th e internmen t o f a specifie d racia l minorit y wer e subject to strict scrutiny. 26 The decision was a product of wartime hysteria and racia l resentment , an d i t ha s bee n widel y criticized. 27 Nevertheless , the decisio n doe s illustrat e tha t whe n majoritaria n insistenc e o n th e ex ploitation o f minorit y interest s i s most intense , Supreme Court protectio n of racia l minoritie s i s likely t o b e leas t effective . A peacetime exampl e o f a governmental classificatio n tha t ha s effectively survive d stric t scrutin y is provided b y th e Suprem e Court' s now-infamou s decisio n i n Nairn v. Nairn,2* issued on e yea r after Brown u Board of Education 29 wher e th e Supreme Cour t faile d t o invalidat e a Virginia miscegenatio n statut e eve n though th e statute seems to have fallen squarel y within the prohibition o f Brown.30

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3

The third reason that the Court may decline to protect racial minorities from a classification tha t adversely affect s thei r interests i s that th e Cour t may neve r reac h th e merit s o f th e equa l protectio n claim . Justiciabilit y doctrines suc h a s standing, ripeness , mootness, and th e political questio n doctrine ofte n resul t i n taci t affirmanc e o f th e majoritaria n actio n bein g challenged. Fo r example, in Warth u Seldin 31 th e Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of an equal protection challenge to a municipal zonin g ordinance tha t restricte d th e constructio n o f low - an d moderate-incom e housing. Th e blac k plaintiff s claime d tha t th e ordinanc e ha d th e uncon stitutional purpos e and effect o f preventin g black s from livin g in the area. The Cour t hel d tha t th e plaintiff s lacke d standin g becaus e the y faile d t o establish that the housing they desired would be constructed in the absence of th e ordinance. A s a result, the plaintiffs ha d not demonstrate d th e type of redressabl e injur y tha t wa s require d unde r th e la w o f standing. 32 The Court's standing disposition seems to have been result-oriented. The standing issue coul d easil y hav e bee n resolve d th e opposit e way , as it was tw o years late r i n Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 33 wher e the Court granted standing to virtually identical plaintiffs unde r virtually identical facts, and then ruled against the plaintiffs on th e merits . Indeed , som e commentator s hav e argue d tha t th e Cour t will elec t t o rejec t a claim on justiciabilit y grounds rather than deny it on the merit s where th e political cost s t o th e Cour t o f doin g so ar e lower. 34 But eve n assumin g tha t th e decisio n wa s no t result-oriented , i t stil l illus trates a failure o f th e Cour t t o protec t minorit y interests . The en d resul t was tha t th e Cour t agai n ha d factore d majoritaria n preference s int o th e operative equa l protectio n standard . The Cour t effectivel y hel d tha t th e equal protectio n claus e permitte d majoritaria n discriminatio n agains t th e class o f racia l minoritie s wh o woul d no t b e abl e t o establis h standin g t o the Court' s satisfaction . This formulation o f th e Court's holding is a realistic one becaus e there are instances in which the Court has used various combinations of standing, mootness, and ripeness requirements in a way that seems to preclude some challenges fro m eve r bein g cognizabl e o n th e merits . I n a series o f case s alleging a pattern and practice of raciall y discriminatory police harassmen t and prosecutoria l misconduc t i n majo r metropolita n areas , the Cour t repeatedly declined on justiciability grounds to reach the merits of the plaintiffs' claim s fo r injunctiv e relief . Fo r the plaintiff s wh o ha d alread y bee n injured b y th e challenge d misconduct , th e claim s wer e moot . Th e othe r plaintiffs either lacked standing, or the threatened injuries that they alleged were no t ripe. 35 The effec t wa s to mak e th e typ e o f patter n an d practic e

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misconduct abou t whic h th e plaintiff s complaine d effectivel y unreviewa ble—as if th e clai m itsel f amounte d t o a nonjusticiable politica l question , for whic h majoritaria n preference s ar e concede d t o b e dispositive . Th e pattern-and-practice clai m asserte d b y th e plaintiffs , allege d th e typ e o f racially discriminator y conduc t tha t wa s late r documente d i n th e now famous hom e vide o tha t capture d a bruta l instanc e o f polic e brutalit y committed b y several member s o f th e Lo s Angele s Polic e Department. 36 Theoretically, damag e action s b y individual s wh o ha d already bee n injured coul d serv e a s a basis fo r reachin g th e merit s o f th e constitutiona l claims, althoug h a s a practical matter , th e succes s o f suc h action s woul d likely b e frustrate d b y th e doctrine s o f officia l an d sovereig n immunity . Will u Michigan Department of State Police 37 hold s tha t suc h suit s ca n now be maintained onl y against municipalities, 38 with all of the difficultie s that ar e attendan t t o successfu l maintenanc e o f suc h suits , o r agains t a government official seekin g funds from only the official's persona l assets, 39 which ma y well preclude such litigation fro m bein g cost-justified. Regard less of the ultimate viability of damag e actions, however, the decided cases do creat e the impression o f a distinct reluctanc e o n th e part of th e Court to reac h th e merit s o f th e constitutiona l challenges . In Allen v. Wright, 40 the Court hinted at a possible reason for its frequent incorporation o f majoritaria n preference s int o th e meanin g o f constitu tional standard s in racial discriminatio n cases . There, the Cour t hel d tha t the parent s o f blac k schoo l children , wh o ha d filed a nationwid e clas s action suit challenging the IRS practice of allowing private schools to retain their ta x exemption s despit e thei r raciall y discriminator y policies , lacke d standing t o maintai n th e suit . A s i n Warth an d th e polic e brutalit y cases , the Cour t hel d tha t th e variou s injurie s allege d b y the plaintiff s wer e no t sufficiently redressabl e t o provid e a basi s fo r standing , becaus e th e revo cation o f ta x exemption s migh t no t caus e th e discriminator y school s t o change their policies.41 However , in discussing its reluctance to adjudicat e cases involvin g claim s o f broad-base d racia l discrimination , th e Cour t revealed a preferenc e fo r th e resolutio n o f suc h claim s b y th e politica l branches o f government . Justice O'Connor' s majorit y opinio n stated : "When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin the activity of a government agency, even within a unitary court system, his case must contend with 'the well-established rul e that the Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the "dispatch of it s ow n interna l affairs. " ... ' ... " Th e Constitution , after all , assigns t o the Executive Branch, and not to the Judicial Branch, the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. " . .. W e could no t recogniz e respondents ' standing in this case without runnin g afoul o f tha t structural principle.42

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5

Although th e Court's reluctance t o engage in structural social refor m may be understandable , i t doe s disabl e th e Cour t fro m servin g a s an effectiv e buffer betwee n th e majorit y an d the minorit y i n areas where suc h refor m is what i s at stake. One might argue that the problem o f majoritarianis m b y incorporation is not a systemic proble m bu t merel y reflect s remediabl e Suprem e Cour t insensitivity t o th e nee d t o develo p substantiv e lega l doctrine s i n a wa y that does not permit majoritarian desires to control. After all, the doctrines into whic h majoritaria n preference s hav e bee n incorporated , eithe r ex plicitly or incidentally, are not written in stone. The Court is free to modif y those doctrine s s o tha t the y permi t mor e effectiv e judicia l protectio n o f minority interests . Bu t tha t i s precisely wh y th e proble m i s systemic. Th e doctrines ca n b e modified onl y becaus e the y are imprecise and subject t o evolution. Thei r content a t an y particula r poin t i n tim e i s therefor e a function o f Suprem e Cour t discretion , which i n turn i s a function o f th e personal attitudes of th e justices. As a result, the suggestion tha t the problem o f majoritaria n incorporatio n coul d b e overcom e b y havin g the ma jority-socialized justices reformulate the offending principles simply begins a regres s tha t recreate s th e origina l problem . The onl y wa y tha t th e so cialized preference s o f th e justice s coul d b e exclude d fro m th e judicia l decisionmaking proces s woul d b e throug h a more determinat e proces s o f principled adjudication . Greate r doctrina l determinacy , however , appear s to b e hopelessly elusive , bot h becaus e o f difficultie s encountere d i n identifying th e governing principle s and becaus e o f difficultie s encountere d i n ascertaining wha t outcome s th e principle s produce .

C H A P T E R4

Selection o f Principle s

The proces s o f principle d adjudicatio n begin s wit h specificatio n o f th e legal principles that govern proper resolution of a disputed issue. A variety of lega l principles will arguably be relevant, but the Court must someho w decide whic h o f th e candidate s actuall y apply . Selectin g applicabl e prin ciples i s a n ac t o f loosel y constraine d discretio n tha t onc e agai n create s opportunities fo r a judge's persona l attitude s t o ente r int o th e decision making process. Where obviously controlling rules or precedents exist, the problem ma y appea r t o b e insignificant , bu t i n fact , seriou s difficultie s often lur k beneat h th e surfac e o f suc h apparen t certainty . Moreover , i n cases o f first impression , o r case s i n whic h i t i s unclea r whic h line s o f developed preceden t a court shoul d apply , the problem o f identifyin g th e proper legal principle s ca n b e especiall y troublesome . I t is difficult t o se e how suc h a selectio n coul d b e mad e othe r tha n throug h a judge' s sub mission t o hi s o r he r ow n values , whic h i n tur n wil l reflec t majoritaria n preferences.1 The proble m ca n b e illustrate d b y examinin g thre e set s o f lega l prin ciples that are of frequent concern in race discrimination cases. First, intent and effect s principle s hav e traditionall y compete d fo r contro l o f rac e discrimination law . Although th e Cour t purport s t o hav e resolve d th e com petition in a context-dependent manner , it is difficult t o identify an y meaningful constraint s that can be said to hav e insulated the Court's resolutio n from th e danger s o f majoritaria n influence . Th e Cour t seem s simpl y t o have preferred on e principle to th e othe r for unspecifie d reasons . Second, the Court' s treatmen t o f th e stat e actio n principl e indicate s tha t eve n i n areas where superficial analysis might suggest a clear answer to the question 36

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7

of wha t principle should control , deeper analysis can reveal the continue d existence o f a problem. Althoug h th e languag e o f th e fourteent h amend ment explicitl y require s th e presence o f stat e actio n i n orde r t o establis h a legall y cognizabl e ac t o f discrimination , th e Cour t doe s no t alway s ac quiesce i n explicit constitutiona l commands . I t is unclear, therefore, ho w the Cour t decide s t o hono r o r ignor e th e stat e action requiremen t i n th e particular race discrimination case s that i t decides. Third, even a principle as basi c a s the principl e prohibitin g discriminatio n itsel f ma y at time s b e inapplicable to something that at first blush appears to be a discrimination case. The Cour t ha s develope d paralle l line s o f precedent , on e o f whic h condemns discriminatio n an d th e othe r o f whic h favor s majoritaria n dis cretion. Selectio n o f th e prope r lin e o f preceden t turn s o n ho w th e cas e is characterized , bu t i t i s unclea r ho w th e Cour t know s i n a give n cas e which o f th e competin g characterization s i s appropriate . Becaus e lega l principles ar e no t self-actuating , judicia l resolutio n o f th e problem s tha t are entailed i n the identificatio n o f governin g principles raise s th e dange r of majoritaria n dominatio n ove r minorit y interests , thu s furthe r exacer bating doubt s abou t th e countermajoritaria n capacit y o f th e Court . Intent v. Effects In order to advanc e it s antidiscrimination objectives , a legal syste m coul d rationally choos e t o prohibi t action s tha t wer e motivate d b y an intent t o discriminate agains t minorit y interests , o r it could exten d th e prohibitio n to encompass even neutrally motivated action that had a disproportionately adverse effect o n minorit y interest . Strong arguments can be made to support eithe r approach , bu t eac h approac h pose s seriou s problem s a s well . Not surprisingly , the academic literatur e is replete with articles advocating one approac h o r th e other , a s wel l a s article s suggestin g th e desirabilit y of recognizin g additiona l alternatives. 2 The basi c argument i n favor of focusin g o n inten t i s that a prohibition on innocentl y motivated , neutra l action s tha t simpl y happe n t o hav e a racially disparate impact would undul y restrict the ability of governmenta l decisionmakers t o us e precise an d efficien t classification s tha t ar e directl y responsive t o th e merit s o f th e regulator y problem s wit h whic h the y are confronted. I t is sometimes argue d tha t a n inten t tes t i s preferable t o a n effects tes t becaus e th e Constitutio n guarantee s procedural regularit y bu t not particula r outcomes . Tha t argument , however , merel y state s a pref erence fo r inten t ove r effects. I t does no t offe r a justification fo r why th e Constitution shoul d b e viewed as simply a procedural document . I n order

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to justif y suc h a vie w o f th e Constitution , on e woul d hav e t o fal l bac k on th e type s of argument s tha t ar e made below . The majo r drawbac k o f focusing o n inten t i s tha t evidenc e o f intentiona l discriminatio n i s ofte n difficult o r impossibl e t o secure , thereb y permittin g act s o f intentiona l discrimination t o escap e invalidatio n b y masqueradin g a s act s o f neutra l policymaking. Th e basi c argumen t i n favo r o f focusin g o n effect s i s tha t harmful effect s ar e harmfu l regardles s o f th e inten t wit h whic h the y ar e produced. The major drawback o f focusin g o n effect s i s that such a focus would requir e governmental decisionmaker s t o conside r explicitly rac e as a facto r i n formulatin g socia l policy , thereb y contravenin g th e ver y principle o f racia l neutralit y tha t is embodied i n our antidiscrimination laws. 3 In Washington u Davis, 4 th e Suprem e Cour t hel d tha t th e applicabl e principle fo r equa l protectio n claus e purpose s i s the inten t principle . Al though the Constitution affirmatively prohibits governmental actions taken with th e purpos e o f discriminatin g agains t racia l minorities , i t doe s no t prohibit unintentiona l act s of discriminatio n tha t have a racially disparate impact.5 Discussio n o f th e policy reason s fo r th e Court's selection o f th e intent rathe r tha n th e effect s principl e wa s noticeabl y absen t fro m th e decision. Th e Cour t state d onl y tha t a wid e rang e o f action s migh t po tentially b e invalidate d b y a n effect s principle. 6 Th e Cour t als o asserte d that applicatio n o f th e antidiscriminatio n principl e t o effect s rathe r tha n intent wa s a legislativ e rathe r than a judicial function , bu t i t offere d no t even a hint as to why this should b e the case. 7 Presumably, the Court was making a n inchoat e effor t t o reconcil e Washington v. Davis wit h Griggs v. Duke Power* a case that is discussed below . The Court's failure to offe r any policy justification fo r its holding was surprising in light of th e Court's recognition tha t many of it s own prior decisions had suggested that effect s rather than intent should be dispositive.9 In addition, the Court recognized that man y federa l court s o f appeal s ha d hel d tha t disparat e impac t alon e was enoug h t o establis h a n equa l protectio n violation. 10 The Court's lack of policy discussion becomes even more peculiar when one realize s tha t th e Suprem e Cour t itsel f ha d earlie r construe d th e an tidiscrimination provisions of Title VII to prohibit disparate impact as well as intentional discrimination . Titl e VI I of th e 196 4 Civi l Right s Ac t prohibits discrimination i n employment base d upo n race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 11 In Griggs v. Duke Power, 11 the Court expressly rejected the vie w tha t Titl e VI I wa s limite d t o intentiona l discrimination , findin g that the intent of Congress to reach discriminatory effects as well as intent was "plai n fro m th e languag e o f th e statute." 13 Th e Cour t wen t o n t o hold that such an "effects" reading of th e statute was necessary to prevent

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9

facially neutra l practices from prospectively freezin g a status quo that had been create d throug h historica l act s o f discrimination. 14 The question that naturally arises is how the Court knew that the intent principle governed discrimination claims that were asserted under the equal protection clause , while th e effect s principl e governed claim s asserted under Title VII. Although on e migh t initiall y suspect tha t the drafters o f th e two provisions mus t hav e had different intents , there i s absolutely n o evi dence to suppor t suc h a suspicion. The drafters o f th e fourteenth amend ment appea r t o hav e lef t n o evidenc e o f thei r view s concernin g whic h principle should apply to equal protection claims—at least the Washington u Davis Cour t cite d n o suc h evidenc e i n support o f it s "intent" decision. And contrary to th e Court' s assurance in Griggs> is there i s nothing in the language o r legislativ e histor y o f Titl e VI I tha t compel s th e adoptio n o f an "effects " tes t fo r statutor y claim s o f discrimination . The languag e o f Title VI I provides i n pertinent part : Sec 703(a). It shall be an unlawful employmen t practice for an employer— ** * (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual o f employmen t opportunitie s or otherwise adversely affect hi s status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 16 It is difficult t o see how this language favors effects an y more than it favors intent. In fact, use of the phrase "because of" might well evidence congressional contemplatio n o f a n intent test. Although th e statutory languag e is not dispositive , th e Court faile d t o offe r any legislative histor y i n support of its effects construction . Moreover, in arriving at its effects construction , the Supreme Court was required to reverse the district court and the court of appeals , bot h o f who m ha d rea d the statut e t o requir e intent. 17 If th e tw o decision s ar e t o b e reconciled , i t wil l hav e t o b e o n polic y grounds. But the policy advantages and disadvantages associated with each principle see m t o b e equall y present i n bot h cases. 18 There i s no obviou s reason to suppose that the presence or absence or relative weight of thes e policy consideration s shoul d var y with th e constitutiona l o r statutory nature of th e underlyin g cause of action , and th e Court ha s offered n o non obvious reaso n wh y thi s shoul d b e th e case . On e migh t b e tempte d t o argue that Title VH's more expansive effects test could properly be imposed by a politically accountabl e Congress , whereas th e politically unaccount able Suprem e Cour t coul d no t properl y rea d suc h a n expansiv e tes t int o the meanin g o f th e Constitutio n wher e i t woul d b e immunize d fro m

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congressional revision . Thi s argument , however , posit s th e majoritaria n Congress, rather than the countermajoritarian Suprem e Court, as the more effective guardian of minority rights. Moreover, because antidiscrimination remedies can adversely affect th e interests of certain classes of white workers, wh o themselve s migh t no t b e adequatel y represente d i n Congress , countermajoritarian Suprem e Court intervention might be required to prevent Congres s fro m utilizin g a n effect s tes t fo r Titl e VI I purposes . This , of course , i s th e subjec t o f th e contemporar y affirmativ e actio n debate , which i s discussed mor e full y i n Chapter 8 . More recen t Suprem e Cour t decision s hav e mad e matter s eve n mor e confused. Whe n calle d upo n t o decid e whethe r th e inten t o r th e effect s principle governe d challenge s t o subjectiv e employmen t an d promotio n standards allege d t o hav e bee n applie d i n a discriminator y manner , th e Court nominall y adopte d on e standard , bu t appear s effectivel y t o hav e adopted th e other . I n Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 19 th e Cour t held tha t Titl e VI I challenge s t o subjectiv e employmen t standard s ha d t o be adjudicated unde r the Griggs effects test , even though prior subjectivestandard case s ha d bee n resolve d unde r a n inten t test. 20 Th e Cour t rea soned tha t us e o f a n effects tes t was necessary t o prevent employer s fro m evading Griggs. I f subjective-standar d case s wer e t o b e judge d unde r a n intent test , employer s coul d neutraliz e th e Griggs effect s tes t simpl y b y combining thei r objectiv e employmen t standard s wit h a subjectiv e stan dard, such a s a personal interview. 21 Justice O'Connor' s pluralit y opinio n in Watson als o containe d dict a reallocatin g th e burde n o f proo f i n sub jective standar d cases. 22 The Watson dicta was turned into holding the following Term in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. AtonioP Justic e White' s majorit y opinio n i n Wards Cove reaffirme d Watson's us e o f th e effect s tes t i n subjective-standar d cases,24 bu t adde d tha t statistica l disparitie s i n racia l representatio n be tween variou s segment s o f a n employer' s wor k forc e coul d no t alon e establish the plaintiff's prima facie case. 25 The Court then went on to hold that th e plaintif f i n a disparate-impac t subjective-standar d cas e als o ha d the burde n o f provin g tha t particula r employmen t practices , rathe r tha n the aggregate effect o f th e employer's hiring and promotion policies, were the legal cause of the disparate-impact of which the plaintiff complained. 26 Finally, th e Cour t hel d tha t th e plaintif f ha d th e burde n o f provin g tha t the challenge d practice s wer e no t justifie d b y busines s necessity, 27 eve n though busines s necessit y ha d traditionall y bee n treate d a s an affirmativ e defense that employers were required to prove in order to defeat a showing of disparat e impact. 28

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Both Watson and Wards Cove nominall y extend the effects tes t to Title VII subjective-standar d cases . However , th e stringenc y o f th e ne w proo f requirements tha t thos e case s impos e upo n Titl e VI I plaintiff s i s s o hig h that the evidence needed to satisfy thos e standards is likely to be sufficien t to sustai n a n inferenc e o f discriminator y intent . Fo r example , th e fact s giving ris e t o th e disparate-impac t clai m i n Wards Cove, whic h include d segregated housin g an d dinin g facilities , wer e sufficientl y egregiou s tha t the dissenter s foun d the m t o "bea r a n unsettlin g resemblanc e t o aspect s of a plantatio n economy." 29 I f fact s egregiou s enoug h t o warran t thi s characterization ar e no t sufficien t t o satisf y th e Court' s ne w effect s test , it i s difficult t o divin e a meaningful differenc e betwee n thi s ne w tes t an d the traditiona l inten t test . An innocent interpretatio n o f thes e tw o recen t decision s indicate s tha t the inten t an d effect s standard s are quite confused . A less sanguine inter pretation woul d depic t th e decision s a s intentiona l effort s b y th e Cour t to cu t bac k o n th e scop e o f Titl e VI I protections i n orde r to brin g Title VII int o lin e wit h prevailin g politica l opinion . Althoug h thi s i s arguabl y permissible in the statutory context of Title VII, it poses obvious problems for a countermajoritarian mode l o f th e Supreme Court t o th e exten t tha t it suggest s a n inclinatio n o n th e par t o f th e Cour t t o defe r t o politica l opinion i n a constitutiona l context. 30 Fo r present purposes , however , i t does no t matte r whic h interpretatio n i s correct . I t i s sufficien t tha t non e of th e Court' s opinion s adequatel y explai n wh y th e Cour t selecte d th e principle tha t i t selecte d i n eac h o f th e pertinen t contexts . The Cour t could easil y hav e resolve d th e inten t v . effects issu e eithe r way in each o f the case s tha t i t considered . Indeed , th e natur e o f judicia l accountabilit y is such that the Court believe d itsel f fre e t o issue opinions that essentiall y announced rather than explained the results that the Court chose to reach. However, eve n i f th e Cour t ha d trie d t o offe r seriou s policy justification s for it s holdings, th e polic y argument s see m t o hav e roughl y equa l forc e in eac h o f th e context s tha t th e Cour t ha s considered . Again , th e Cour t would easil y hav e bee n abl e t o com e ou t eithe r way . I n man y case s a t least, th e ac t o f identifyin g th e governin g principl e o f la w wil l b e a n ac t of unconstraine d judicia l discretion . An d wher e unconstraine d judicia l discretion i s invoked , th e dange r o f majoritaria n influenc e i s necessaril y present.

State Action u Private Autonomy Arguably, th e dangerou s discretio n tha t exist s whe n th e Cour t i s force d to selec t a principl e unde r first-impression conditions dissipate s a s th e

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constraints governin g principl e selectio n becom e mor e explicit . I f prece dents o r externa l texts , such a s statutes an d constitutional provisions , ex plicitly provide fo r the application o f particula r principles, the amount o f judicial discretion entailed in deciding when to apply those principles might seem to be acceptably low. In actuality, however, vast amounts of discretion are present eve n i n suc h superficiall y clea r cases. There ar e thre e reason s for this . First , th e Cour t ha s reserve d fo r itsel f th e discretio n t o foreg o compliance wit h certai n provision s o f la w despit e thei r textuall y explici t applicability. Second , no t eve n sincer e effort s b y the Cour t t o bin d itsel f under the doctrine of stare decisis can eliminate judicial discretion, because the Court always possesses the power to overrule itself if it wishes to avoid the applicatio n o f a prior principl e i n a subsequen t case . Third , th e ex istence of lega l fictions makes it possible for the Court to feign application of on e principl e whil e i n fac t applyin g another . The Court' s stat e actio n decisions illustrat e al l thre e o f thes e reasons . One might thin k tha t the amount o f Suprem e Court discretion presen t in the selection o f governin g principles woul d b e minimized b y the exist ence o f a n explicitl y applicabl e principl e o f law . Th e problem , however , is that the Court does not always acquiesce i n explicit constitutional com mands. I n fact , ther e ar e man y constitutiona l provision s tha t th e Cour t either blatantly ignores or drastically rewrites. As noted above, 31 since the New Dea l th e Cour t ha s essentiall y ignore d th e safeguard s o f federalis m and separation o f powers , despit e thei r integral importanc e t o th e syste m of governmen t envisione d b y th e framers. 32 Suprem e Cour t attentio n t o other expres s constitutiona l provision s waxe s an d wane s ove r time , a s evidenced b y th e Court' s variabl e enforcemen t o f th e contrac t clause, 33 and th e privilege s an d immunitie s clause. 34 Othe r provisions, suc h a s th e ineligibility and incompatibility clauses, 35 appear never to hav e been taken very seriousl y b y th e Court. 36 An d ther e ar e provision s whos e text s th e Court appear s never to hav e even read , such as the second amendment, 37 the nint h amendment, 38 an d th e elevent h amendment. 39 Althoug h on e could argue that the Court's actions simply indicate that it deems political rather than judicial enforcement o f such provisions to be appropriate, such an accoun t lend s littl e suppor t t o th e argumen t tha t th e Suprem e Cour t can be counted o n to operate as an effective bulwar k against majoritaria n racial insensitivities . The Court' s stat e actio n decision s involvin g th e Reconstructio n civi l rights statute s illustrat e ho w th e Cour t sometime s avoid s explici t consti tutional and statutory requirements in the context of racial discrimination. The Civi l Wa r ended i n 1865. 40 Late r tha t sam e year , Congres s adopte d

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and the states ratified the thirteenth amendment, which abolished slavery.41 Many souther n state s attempte d t o blun t th e impac t o f th e thirteent h amendment b y enacting "Black Codes," which severely restricted the ability of free d slaves to exercise the rights of ordinar y citizenship. As a result, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 § 1 of which gave blacks the sam e righ t a s white s t o mak e contracts , participat e i n judicia l pro ceedings, and own property. However, federalism-based doubts concerning the power of Congres s to enact this legislation under its thirteenth amendment authorit y prompte d Congres s t o adop t th e fourteent h amendment , which wa s ratified i n 1868 . Th e fourteent h amendmen t mad e black s cit izens o f th e Unite d States , and prohibited state s fro m abridgin g th e privileges an d immunitie s o f tha t citizenshi p o r fro m denyin g t o an y perso n due process o r th e equa l protectio n o f th e laws . I n addition, i t explicitl y authorized Congres s t o enforc e th e antidiscriminatio n provision s o f th e amendment through appropriate legislation. 43 Congress then reenacted the 1866 statut e a s par t o f th e Enforcemen t Ac t o f 1870, 44 th e pertinen t provisions o f whic h ar e no w codifie d i n Titl e 4 2 o f th e Unite d State s Code.45 Sectio n 198 1 o f Titl e 4 2 give s black s equa l right s t o mak e con tracts an d participat e i n judicia l proceedings, 46 an d § 198 2 give s black s equal right s to ow n property. 47 A recurring question confrontin g th e Supreme Court ha s been whethe r the antidiscriminatio n provision s o f § § 198 1 an d 198 2 prohibi t act s o f private discriminatio n o r whethe r a stat e actio n requiremen t limit s th e prohibitions o f thos e section s t o act s o f discriminatio n mandate d o r specifically authorize d b y stat e law . The stat e actio n limitatio n i s significan t for tw o reasons . First , a s a practica l matter , adherenc e t o a stat e actio n requirement ha s the effec t o f limitin g the range of discriminator y acts fo r which th e Cour t wil l offe r a remedy , becaus e i t preclude s judicia l inter ference with private acts of discrimination . Second, as a federalism matter , a stat e actio n restrictio n ha s th e effec t o f makin g th e states , rathe r tha n the federa l government , th e primar y guardian s o f individua l civi l rights . In order to establis h stat e authorization, one woul d first have to establis h that stat e la w di d no t itsel f prohibi t an d provid e a remed y fo r th e dep rivation of civil rights being alleged. The exhaustion of state legal remedies necessary t o mak e thi s showing gives th e state s th e initia l opportunit y t o protect the rights in question. One would only impose such a state action/ exhaustion requiremen t i f on e truste d th e states to detec t and correct th e majority o f civi l right s violations. 48 The Reconstructio n statutes , whic h ar e plainl y intende d t o prohibi t racial discrimination, are plainly authorized by the fourteenth amendment ,

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which plainl y impose s a n explici t stat e actio n requiremen t o n th e scop e of thei r coverage. 49 However , a s th e foregoin g chronolog y indicates , th e Reconstruction statute s ma y also hav e bee n authorize d unde r Congress' s thirteenth amendmen t authority . Th e thirteent h amendmen t contain s n o explicit prohibitio n o n racia l discrimination , bu t neithe r doe s i t contai n an explicit state action requirement. By its terms, the thirteenth amendment simply abolishe s slavery , whic h ca n exis t wit h o r withou t stat e authori zation.50 Accordingly, th e issu e o f whethe r th e stat e actio n limitatio n applies t o § § 198 1 an d 198 2 i s amenabl e t o severa l plausibl e resolutions . Ultimately, resolution of this issue turns on distinct assessments of congressional inten t i n enactin g th e Reconstructio n statute s an d i n adopting th e Reconstruction amendments . Becaus e th e sam e Congresse s contempora neously drafted both the statutes and the amendments, however, it is likely that th e relevan t legislativ e intent s coincide . I t migh t b e tha t th e Recon struction statutes do require state action becaus e they are authorized onl y by the fourteent h amendment , whic h b y its terms contain s a state actio n limitation. O r it migh t b e tha t th e stat e actio n limitatio n doe s no t appl y because th e thirteenth amendmen t i s alone sufficien t t o authoriz e th e Reconstruction statutes, and the thirteenth amendment does not require state action. O r it migh t b e tha t stat e actio n i s require d eve n thoug h th e thir teenth amendment authorize s th e statutes , because th e thirteenth amendment itself contain s a tacit state action limitation . Although i t seems clear that the thirteenth amendment's abolition o f involuntar y servitude applies to private as well as state action, it may be that whatever prohibitions that amendment impose s o n th e incidents o f involuntar y servitud e ar e subject to a state action requirement . Or it might b e that bot h th e thirteent h and fourteenth amendments independently authorize the statutes, but the state action requiremen t o f th e fourteent h amendmen t override s th e absenc e of such a requirement in the thirteenth amendment, because the fourteenth amendment i s mor e specificall y addresse d t o th e type s o f discriminatio n barred by the Reconstruction statutes . Accordingly, even though th e fourteenth amendment contains an explicit state action limitation on the scope of congressiona l authorit y t o promulgat e antidiscriminatio n legislation , a discretionary judicia l determinatio n i s nevertheles s require d i n orde r t o ascertain whethe r tha t limitatio n i s ultimatel y operativ e i n § § 198 1 an d 1982 antidiscriminatio n suits . The manne r i n whic h th e Suprem e Cour t ha s exercise d it s discretio n in resolving the state action issues has been inconsistent. Initially, the Court held that the state action limitatio n applie d to what are now § § 1981 an d 1982 claims . I n th e Civil Rights Cases, 51 whic h wer e decide d roughl y

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contemporaneously with the enactment of the Reconstruction statutes and amendments, th e Cour t hel d tha t fourteent h amendmen t authorizatio n for the antidiscriminatio n legislatio n wa s limited b y the stat e actio n principle.52 Th e Cour t als o hel d that , althoug h th e thirteent h amendmen t authorized Congres s t o reac h privat e conduc t i n orde r t o eliminat e th e "badges an d incident s o f slavery, " ordinar y racia l discriminatio n di d no t constitute such a badge or incident tha t could b e regulated in the absence of stat e action. 53 Other contemporaneous Suprem e Cour t interpretation s were i n accord. 54 Contemporary Supreme Court decisions have now abandone d thi s limited interpretation of the Reconstruction statutes . In 1968, the Court held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 55 tha t § 1982 prohibited private discrimination in th e sal e o r renta l o f rea l property , an d tha t s o construe d th e statut e was authorize d b y Congress' s thirteent h amendmen t powe r t o eliminat e the "badge s an d incident s o f slavery " tha t ha d bee n referre d t o i n The Civil Rights Cases. 56 I n 1976 , the Cour t adopted a similar reading of th e § 198 1 prohibitio n o n discriminatio n i n the makin g of contracts . In Runyon v. McCrary, 57 th e Cour t hel d tha t th e prohibition applie d t o privat e refusals to contract o n account o f race , and that so construed §1981 to o was a valid exercis e o f congressiona l powe r unde r the thirteent h amend ment.58 I n 198 9 th e Cour t reconsidere d it s Runyon decision . Th e Cour t first ordere d reargumen t i n Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 59 expressl y requesting th e partie s t o addres s th e issu e o f whethe r Runyon shoul d b e overruled. Afte r reargument , however , th e Cour t reaffirme d th e Runyon holding tha t § 1 9 8 1 applie d t o privat e action , althoug h i t di d adop t a narrow interpretatio n o f th e substantiv e scop e o f § 1981. 60 The difficult y tha t th e Court ha s had in adopting a stable resolutio n o f the state action issue with respect to the scope of §§1981 an d 198 2 attests to the difficulty tha t can be encountered in determining the ultimate impact of eve n explicitly applicable principles of law . Although th e text of a legal provision ma y mak e th e provisio n applicabl e b y it s terms , othe r consid erations suc h a s competin g provision s o f law , contrar y legislativ e intent , or contemporar y politica l exigencie s ma y militat e agains t a litera l inter pretation. Onc e again , th e argument s fo r applyin g o r avoidin g a litera l reading can be so equally balanced that a court's application determinatio n will necessaril y amoun t t o a n ac t o f ver y loosel y constraine d discretion . The contemporaneou s § § 198 1 an d 198 2 case s may have correctly ascertained congressiona l intent . Th e plaintiff s i n Runyon wer e th e parent s o f black childre n wh o ha d bee n exclude d fro m Virgini a private schools an d summer day camps solely because they were black. 61 I t seems unlikely that

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the 186 6 Congres s tha t drafte d §198 1 woul d hav e desire d th e desegre gation o f privat e schools tha t was ultimately require d b y Runyon, a point that Justice Stevens makes in his concurring opinion. 62 However, the contemporary case s ma y have correctl y responde d t o moder n aspect s o f ed ucation an d rac e relation s tha t mak e th e 186 6 legislators ' inten t a s in apposite a s thei r view s abou t airplane s an d cabl e television . I n orde r t o decide whic h o f th e Court' s applicatio n determination s wa s correct , on e would hav e t o do somethin g n o les s discretionar y tha n deriv e a n entir e theory o f statutor y an d constitutiona l interpretation . Like § § 198 1 an d 1982 , mos t federa l civi l right s legislatio n ha s bee n based upo n th e congressiona l authorit y grante d b y th e Reconstructio n amendments. Som e statutes , however , suc h a s th e Civi l Right s Act s o f 1964 63 an d 1968, 64 whic h includ e prohibition s o n variou s type s o f dis crimination in public accommodations, education, employment, and housing, also invoke other powers of Congress, such as the commerce power, 65 and the spending power. 66 I n determining whether those othe r sources o f congressional powe r wer e sufficien t t o preclud e th e stat e actio n require ments o f th e fourteent h amendment , th e Cour t ha d to mak e assessment s similar to those required in connection with §§ 1981 and 1982 . In general, congressional relianc e o n thes e additiona l source s o f constitutiona l au thority hav e bee n uphel d withou t judicia l insistenc e o n stat e action. 67 Because the scope of the commerce power has been extremely broad since the New Deal, 68 it seems that the commerce power will always be available whenever the Court wishes to avoid the fourteenth amendment state action restriction. The stat e actio n decision s als o illustrat e a second proble m entaile d i n any effort t o exclude discretion fro m a court's application determinations . As Runyort an d Patterson reveal , th e Suprem e Cour t i s alway s fre e t o change it s min d an d t o overrul e itsel f i n a subsequent case . Thi s mean s that th e Cour t canno t eve n bin d itsel f unde r the doctrin e o f star e decisi s in a way tha t limit s it s own futur e discretion . B y the Court' s ow n terms , it does not have the unlimited authority to reverse its statutory precedents. Various factors must be considered before the Court can properly overrule itself. These factors , however , ar e quit e nebulou s an d ar e unlikely t o im pose an y significan t constrain t o n th e Court' s discretion . I n Patterson th e Court held that it could properly overrule statutory precedents only: where intervening changes i n governing la w "remove d o r weakened th e conceptual underpinning s fro m prio r decisions " o r rendere d prio r decisions "ir reconcilable wit h competing lega l doctrine s o r policies"; where "inheren t confusion create d by an unworkable decision" or tension with "important

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objectives embodie d i n othe r laws " made th e preceden t " a positive det riment t o coherenc e an d consistenc y i n th e law; " o r wher e a preceden t "becomes outdated[, ] an d afte r bein g ' "tested b y experience , ha s bee n found t o b e inconsisten t wit h th e sens e o f justic e o r with th e socia l wel fare" ' ".69 This is not t o sa y that ther e ar e no constraint s impose d unde r the doctrine of stare decisis. The Court cannot reverse itself too frequentl y or overrule case s that hav e attracted substantia l popula r support withou t risking a loss o f legitimacy . These operativ e constraints , however, are political i n nature . A s such , the y contribut e littl e t o th e Court' s counter majoritarian capabilities . A thir d wa y i n whic h th e Cour t preserve s th e opportunit y t o exercis e discretion in determining whether to apply an explicitly applicable principle of la w i s through th e us e o f lega l fictions. Again, the Court's Civi l Right s Act case s provid e a n illustration . I n addition t o th e provision s o f § 1 o f the 186 6 Civi l Right s Act , whic h prohibite d discriminatio n i n contrac t and rea l propert y transactions, 70 § 2 o f tha t Ac t furthe r prohibite d an y person actin g "unde r colo r of " stat e la w fro m interferin g wit h th e right s guaranteed b y th e statute. 71 Tha t provision , whic h i s no w codifie d a s § 1983 o f Titl e 4 2 o f th e Unite d State s Code, 72 wa s intende d t o preven t state officials fro m usin g their authority t o harass, intimidate o r otherwise discriminate agains t blacks , a s the y ha d shown a propensity t o do unde r the Blac k Codes . I n addition, Congress wishe d t o ensur e tha t th e federa l courts would b e available t o redres s claim s of discriminatio n becaus e th e state court s ha d ofte n bee n unwillin g t o redres s thos e claims. 73 The Cour t ha s construe d th e "unde r color of " languag e i n § 198 3 t o be identical t o th e fourteenth amendmen t stat e action requirement , holding that onl y thos e veste d wit h indici a o f officia l authorit y ar e subject t o the prohibition s o f § 1983. 74 This interpretatio n o f § 1983—a s wel l a s a state actio n interpretatio n of S § 1981 an d 1982—pose s a serious eleventh amendment problem. The eleventh amendmen t bar s the federa l court s fro m entertainin g mos t suit s filed agains t state governments. 75 However , a primary purpose of th e Civil Rights Ac t o f 186 6 wa s to permi t civi l right s claims to b e adjudicate d i n federal court , precisel y becaus e th e souther n stat e court s ha d exhibite d hostility towar d thos e claims . A n elevent h amendmen t ba r to suc h suits , therefore, woul d seriousl y undermin e thi s fundamenta l Reconstructio n objective. O n it s face , th e proble m i s logicall y insoluble . The ver y stat e action tha t i s require d t o establis h a substantiv e § 198 3 caus e o f actio n deprives the federal court s of jurisdictio n unde r the eleventh amendment . Either th e stat e actio n requiremen t applie s o r i t doe s not , bu t i t canno t both appl y an d no t appl y a t th e sam e time .

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The Suprem e Cour t resolve d thi s dilemm a b y inventin g th e Ex Parte Young fiction. In Ex Parte Young,76 th e Court held that a suit filed against a state officia l allegin g a fourteenth amendmen t violatio n wa s no t barre d by the elevent h amendment , becaus e i f th e challenge d actio n wa s indee d unconstitutional, i t coul d no t unde r th e supremac y claus e b e validl y au thorized b y stat e law , an d wa s no t therefor e stat e actio n barre d b y th e eleventh amendment. 77 The fiction that ultra vires actions of a state officia l are not actions o f th e state is as strained as it is ingenious. The fiction not only make s i t impossibl e fo r a stat e qu a stat e eve r t o ac t unconstitu tionally—something tha t seem s counterintuitive—bu t i t als o defeat s th e symbolic purpose of the eleventh amendment b y forbidding the state from invoking it s sovereig n immunit y unti l i t ha s first established tha t i t wil l prevail on the merits of th e constitutional challeng e that has been asserted against it. However, the fiction does permit the constitutionality of a state's actions t o b e tested befor e th e elevent h amendmen t ba r can ever be triggered. T o th e exten t tha t th e Reconstructio n statute s an d amendment s evidence a shif t i n th e allocatio n o f responsibilit y fo r th e protectio n o f constitutional right s from the state to the federal courts, this would appear to b e th e desire d result . The Cour t obviousl y ha d broa d discretio n i n decidin g whethe r o r no t to inven t a fiction tha t woul d permi t i t t o circumven t th e explicitl y ap plicable elevent h amendment. That discretion was almost certainly guided by th e Court' s assessmen t o f ho w judicia l powe r wa s to b e properl y distributed i n th e aftermat h o f th e Civi l War . However, tha t judicia l assess ment i n tur n appear s t o hav e reste d upo n majoritaria n enactments—th e Reconstruction statute s and constitutional amendments . It is unlikely that the Court would have thought itself free to initiate such a radical departure from th e then-accepte d tenet s o f federalis m i n th e absenc e o f thos e en actments, o r some othe r evidenc e o f a popular mandat e t o d o so . The Cour t no t onl y possesse d considerabl e discretio n i n decidin g whether to invent the Ex Parte Young fiction, but its subsequent decision s reveal tha t i t possesses considerabl e discretio n i n deciding ho w t o imple ment th e fiction as well. I n order to b e subjec t t o sui t unde r § 1983 , the defendant mus t b e a "person " within th e meanin g o f tha t section. 78 Al though th e fiction was created precisely t o permi t th e constitutionalit y o f state actio n t o b e tested , th e Cour t ha s ironicall y hel d tha t a state i s no t a "person" for § 1983 purposes. 79 The Court reasoned that because it had previously hel d i n Monroe v. Pape*0 that a municipality wa s not a § 198 3 "person," a state coul d no t b e a "person " fo r § 198 3 purpose s either. 81 These holdings , whic h purpor t t o b e base d upo n th e inten t o f Congres s

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in enacting § 198 3,82 are difficult t o square with the Ex Parte Young fiction. Why shoul d th e shif t i n federal-stat e judicia l responsibilit y embodie d i n the inten t o f th e Reconstructio n Congres s b e poten t enoug h t o promp t the Ex Parte Young fiction but insufficient t o create § 1983 "personhood?" The Court then began to reverse itself. In Monell v. New York Department of Social Services,* 3 it reconsidere d th e legislativ e histor y o f § 198 3 an d overruled Monroe u Pape, holding that municipalities were, after all, "persons" within the meaning of § 198 3-84 Although some subsequent Supreme Court case s seemed tacitl y t o assum e tha t after Monell, states to o wer e § 1983 "persons," 85 i n Will u Michigan Department of State Police,* 6 the Court hel d tha t thi s was not th e case. 87 In passing, the final paragraph o f the opinio n note d tha t stat e official s sue d i n their officia l capacitie s wer e not § 198 3 "persons " either, becaus e a state coul d ac t onl y throug h th e actions o f it s officials. 88 Then , apparentl y realizin g tha t thi s holdin g wa s potentially fata l t o th e entir e Ex Parte Young fiction, the Cour t added in a final footnot e tha t it s official-capacit y holdin g di d no t appl y i n case s seeking injunctiv e relief. 89 The § 198 3 la w tha t emerge s fro m thi s collectio n o f case s i s unstabl e and contorted. Wha t th e Court appears to b e grappling fo r is a doctrinal regime unde r which th e constitutionalit y o f stat e actio n ca n b e teste d i n federal cour t withou t puttin g a t ris k th e mone y containe d i n th e stat e treasury.90 The Court's distinction betwee n injunctive and monetary relief may or may not hav e practical significance , bu t it is difficult t o se e ho w i t could hav e theoretica l o r symboli c significanc e wit h respec t t o th e fun damental federalis m issue s tha t underla y th e elevent h amendmen t an d § 1983. Nevertheless , accepting for the sake of argumen t the desirability of this objective, it is worth noting that such a regime could easily have been achieved i n a doctrinall y mor e elegan t manner . Th e Will Cour t coul d simply hav e hel d tha t states , municipalities , an d stat e official s actin g i n their official capacitie s were al l "persons " within th e meanin g o f § 1983 , but tha t th e elevent h amendmen t ultimatel y barre d th e assessmen t o f monetary award s tha t woul d hav e t o b e pai d fro m stat e treasuries. 91 B y preserving hig h level s o f doctrina l complexity , however , th e Cour t ha s wittingly o r unwittingl y advance d anothe r objective . I t ha s preserved th e wrinkles an d crease s i n whic h hig h level s o f doctrina l discretio n ca n b e stored—discretion tha t ca n produc e unconstraine d pattern s o f decision s such as the § 198 3 decision s discusse d above . A s a result, increased doc trinal complexit y ultimatel y increase s th e opportunitie s fo r majoritaria n domination o f th e judicia l process . In deciding whethe r t o appl y an explicitl y applicabl e provisio n o f law , a cour t mus t mak e a variety o f nonobviou s discretionar y determinations .

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It must decide whether the provision i s one that should b e taken seriously, or one that should b e ignored. In addition, it must decide whether its own prior precedents shoul d b e followe d o r overruled. Finally , it mus t decid e whether it s actions shoul d b e fictitiously portrayed o r candidly disclosed . In makin g eac h o f thes e decision s th e Cour t expose s it s deliberation s t o the ris k o f majoritaria n infiltration . An d tha t ris k persist s wit h respec t t o even th e mos t fundamenta l decisio n tha t th e Cour t mus t make—th e de cision abou t ho w th e cas e i s t o b e characterized . Discrimination v.

Discretion

As th e inten t v . effect s an d th e stat e actio n v . privat e conduc t debate s suggest, lega l principle s ten d t o trave l i n competin g pairs . On e wa y t o conceptualize th e manner in which the Court chooses between these competing lega l principle s i s tha t th e Cour t firs t identifie s th e relevan t natur e of th e case befor e it , and then applie s th e principle tha t properly governs cases o f tha t type . Accordingly , i f th e cas e i s a statutor y rathe r tha n a constitutional case, th e Cour t wil l appl y th e effect s tes t rathe r tha n th e intent tes t i n decidin g whethe r th e cas e involve s impermissibl e discrimi nation. Similarly, if the case is an ordinary discriminatio n cas e rather than a "badges of slavery" case, the Court will apply the fourteenth amendmen t state action requirement and decline to remedy purely private misconduct. It would seem , therefore, tha t one coul d predict with confidenc e tha t th e Court would at least believ e itself boun d t o apply antidiscrimination principles to race discrimination cases . However, even that prediction i s problematic. Thi s i s becaus e identificatio n o f a cas e a s a tru e discriminatio n case turn s ou t t o b e less a matter of passiv e recognitio n tha n a matter o f active characterization . A s a result , i n orde r t o determin e whe n t o appl y the antidiscriminatio n principle s tha t gover n discriminatio n cases , th e Court is once again called upon to draw subtle legal distinctions with little nondiscretionary guidance . The lega l principl e tha t prohibit s illegitimat e discriminatio n ha s as it s benign complemen t a competin g principl e tha t favor s desirabl e form s o f differentiation. I n rac e cases , thi s benig n complemen t tend s t o b e artic ulated a s a need fo r discretio n i n the exercis e o f governmenta l functions . Although invidiou s discriminatio n i s sociall y undesirabl e an d legall y in defensible, the presence of humanizing discretion prevents the legal system from becoming artificial, insensitive, and mechanistic. Accordingly, befor e the Cour t ca n properl y appl y antidiscriminatio n principle s t o a case tha t the plaintif f allege s t o involv e racia l discrimination , th e Cour t mus t de -

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termine whether i t is really a discrimination cas e o r whether i t i s actually a case that involves the desirable exercis e of discretion . This is the precise problem with which the McCleskey Cour t was confronted whe n it insisted on th e need fo r jur y discretion, even thoug h i t knew tha t such discretio n was likely to be exercised in a racially discriminatory manner. 92 The Court's jury selectio n decision s furthe r illustrat e th e complication s tha t ca n b e encountered i n judicia l effort s t o arriv e a t th e prope r characterizatio n o f a putative rac e discriminatio n case . The paradig m jur y selectio n cas e i s on e i n whic h a prosecutor inten tionally exercise s peremptor y challenge s t o exclud e black s fro m th e jur y that wil l hea r a case involvin g a black crimina l defendant , believin g tha t a convictio n i s mor e likel y t o b e obtaine d fro m a n all-whit e jur y tha n from a n integrate d o r all-blac k jury . Thu s described , th e cas e certainl y seems amenabl e t o characterizatio n a s a rac e discriminatio n case . Th e prosecutor i s intentionall y accordin g differentia l treatmen t t o potentia l jurors solel y o n th e basi s o f thei r race , i n orde r t o secur e a litigatio n advantage ove r th e defendan t tha t wil l materializ e solel y becaus e o f th e defendant's race . Viewed fro m another perspective, however, the case can easily be characterized as a pure discretion case . The prosecutor is making jury selectio n decision s base d upo n hi s o r he r bes t assessmen t o f wha t combination o f juror s i s mos t likel y t o resul t i n a conviction . Th e fac t that rac e i s merel y incidenta l t o thi s motiv e i s demonstrate d b y th e fac t that racia l consideration s wil l neve r outweig h likelihood-of-convictio n considerations in the prosecutor's deliberations . If tomorrow i t is revealed that black s ar e actually more likel y tha n white s t o convic t blac k defend ants, th e prosecuto r wil l the n see k t o exclud e al l white s fro m a blac k defendant's jury . It is, of course , possible tha t a prosecutor could b e motivated by a species of racial animus that would cause him or her to exclude blacks eve n whe n suc h a n exclusio n woul d decreas e th e likelihoo d o f a conviction, simpl y becaus e th e prosecuto r dislike d black s ver y intensely . That, however , i s no t th e cas e tha t I have i n mind , an d i t doe s no t see m to b e th e paradig m cas e tha t th e Suprem e Cour t ha s considered . A s i s apparent, th e proble m o f prope r characterizatio n ca n b e a difficult one . In theory, difficult characterizatio n problem s can be resolved b y adopting that characterization tha t appears likely to produce the most desirable consequences. However , even such a consequentialist analysi s can b e ambivalent, because consequences themselves are subject to characterization. From th e prosecutor' s perspective , th e justificatio n fo r peremptor y chal lenges is that it permits attorneys to respond to the inarticulable misgivings that the y ma y hav e abou t individua l jurors . Realizin g tha t th e elaborat e

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array of procedura l formalitie s wit h which w e hav e saturated the crimina l justice syste m canno t completel y secur e th e objective s o f fairnes s an d justice tha t w e desire , w e hav e carve d ou t peremptor y challenge s a s th e one are a i n whic h attorney s ca n exercis e unconstraine d compensator y discretion. Moreover, it would be imprudent to disqualify th e prosecutor's discretion solel y becaus e o f it s associatio n wit h race . I n a culture tha t i s as race-consciou s a s ours , th e huma n instinct s tha t ar e indispensabl e t o the effectiv e operatio n o f th e syste m ar e almos t certai n t o b e tinge d b y the facto r o f race . From th e defendant' s perspective , th e consequentialis t analysi s look s quite different . The whol e poin t o f judiciall y scrutinizin g race-sensitiv e classifications is to neutralize race-conscious governmental decisionmakin g of th e precis e typ e i n whic h th e prosecuto r ha s engage d unde r th e fact s of th e paradig m case . B y acquiescin g i n raciall y offensiv e tactic s o f pro secutorial expediency, a court will inevitably end up perpetuating the counterproductive preoccupation wit h rac e on which that expediency i s based. Moreover, ingenious suggestions tha t the prosecutor may technically hav e been discriminatin g o n th e basi s o f som e facto r othe r tha n rac e simpl y camouflage th e fac t tha t a potentia l juror' s rac e wil l always b e th e dis positive facto r guidin g th e prosecutor' s selectio n decisions , n o matte r which correlatio n betwee n rac e an d likelihoo d o f convictio n th e prose cutor ultimately comes to adopt. Judicial acceptance of suc h clever modes of argumentatio n ca n onl y serv e t o increas e th e artificialit y o f th e lega l system an d mak e i t incomprehensibl e t o th e ordinar y citizen s o n who m it depend s fo r it s continue d legitimacy . The latitud e availabl e t o a court attemptin g prope r characterization o f the paradig m cas e i s broad, and th e Supreme Cour t ha s utilized a considerable amoun t o f tha t latitud e i n resolvin g th e tw o incarnation s o f th e paradigm cas e tha t i t has encountered. The first time tha t th e Cour t con sidered the jury selection issu e was in Swain v. Alabama?* Th e defendan t in Swain wa s a black ma n who had been convicted o f rapin g a seventeenyear-old white woman and sentenced to death. 94 Prior to Swain, th e Court had held that the fourteenth amendment prohibited the exclusion of blacks from the jury venire, because such discrimination denied both the excluded jurors an d th e crimina l defendan t th e equa l protectio n o f th e laws. 95 I n Swain the Court went on to hold that although the Constitution prohibited systematic us e o f a prosecutor's peremptor y challenge s t o exclud e black s from th e jurie s o f blac k defendant s ove r th e rang e o f cases , i t di d no t prohibit th e prosecuto r fro m systematicall y excludin g black s fro m a particular jury in a particular case.96 In other words, a case alleging systematic

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exclusion i n multipl e case s wa s a discriminatio n cas e t o whic h th e anti discrimination principles of th e fourteenth amendmen t applied, but a case alleging systematic exclusio n i n that on e cas e alon e wa s a discretion cas e to whic h fourteent h amendmen t antidiscriminatio n principle s di d no t apply. Lest on e thin k tha t i t is I rather than th e Cour t wh o i s taking libertie s with prope r characterization, I should emphasiz e tha t th e Cour t hel d th e prosecutor's conduc t i n a singl e cas e t o b e wholl y beyon d judicia l ex amination precisel y becaus e judicia l scrutin y woul d undermin e th e well established nee d fo r discretion upo n whic h th e long traditio n o f peremp tory challenge s wa s based . The Cour t stated : With these [historical] considerations in mind, we cannot hold that the striking of Negroe s in a particular case is a denial of equa l protection of the laws....T o subject the prosecutor's challenge in any particular case to the demands and traditional standards of the Equal Protection Clause would entail a radical change in the nature and operation of th e challenge... . In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection wit h the institution of jur y trial, we cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his challenges in any given case. The presumption in any particular case mus t be that th e prosecutor i s using the State' s challenges t o obtai n a fair and impartial jury to try the case before the court. The presumption is not overcome and the prosecutor therefore subjecte d to examination b y allegations that in the case at hand all Negroes were removed from the jury or that they were removed because the y wer e Negroes . An y othe r result , w e thin k woul d establis h a rule wholly at odds with the peremptory challenge system as we know it. 97 It i s apparen t tha t th e Cour t wa s no t simpl y applyin g som e fourteent h amendment balancin g test . Rather , i t wa s holdin g tha t becaus e o f th e importance o f discretion , antidiscriminatio n principle s wer e rendere d wholly inapplicable . It is also interestin g t o not e tha t th e Cour t justifie d it s decision no t t o apply th e fourteent h amendmen t b y relyin g o n a lega l fiction—the irrebuttable presumptio n tha t th e prosecuto r properl y exercise d th e State' s peremptory challenge s i n a n effor t t o obtai n a n impartia l jury. 98 Th e Court's reliance o n this fiction in Swain i s particularly fascinating becaus e the fact s o f th e cas e sugges t tha t th e prosecuto r ma y wel l hav e bee n motivated b y a desire to capitaliz e on particular prejudices of whit e jurors precisely becaus e thos e prejudice s migh t no t hav e bee n share d b y blac k jurors. The basi s fo r th e Swain distinctio n betwee n systemati c exclusio n i n multiple case s an d systemati c exclusio n i n a single cas e i s les s tha n self -

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evident. I t may be possible t o justif y a distinction betwee n discriminatio n in th e selectio n o f th e jur y venir e an d discriminatio n i n th e selectio n o f the peti t jury . The exclusio n o f black s fro m th e jur y venir e implie s tha t blacks are not capabl e o f sittin g o n any jury—a n implication tha t i s constitutionally unacceptable—whil e th e exclusio n o f black s fro m particula r juries simply implies that blacks are not capable of being impartial in those particular case s becaus e o f thei r likel y racia l identificatio n wit h th e de fendant—an implicatio n tha t may not b e constitutionally impermissible. " However, assuming that such an argument is susceptible t o a noninvidious interpretation, i t nevertheles s fail s t o explai n wh y on e shoul d distinguis h between th e systemati c exclusio n o f black s fro m on e peti t jur y an d th e systematic exclusio n o f black s fro m man y peti t juries . What is more puzzling for advocates of a countermajoritarian judiciar y is th e fac t tha t th e Swain distinctio n seem s t o b e backwards . Unde r th e Marbury mode l of judicial review, it is the isolated cases of discrimination, rather than the rang e of discriminator y cases , that present th e mos t com pelling nee d fo r judicia l intervention . I n th e rang e o f cases , i t i s a t leas t possible fo r th e clas s o f discriminatio n victim s t o poo l thei r political re sources an d t o pressur e th e prosecuto r int o ceasin g hi s o r he r discrimi natory conduct . Bu t i n th e individua l case , wher e th e singl e victi m i s politically mos t powerless, onl y countermajoritaria n judicia l revie w offer s any hop e o f vindicatin g th e righ t t o b e fre e fro m invidiou s prosecutoria l discrimination. Not e als o tha t th e Court' s action s i n th e jur y selectio n cases see m t o b e inconsisten t wit h it s decisio n i n McCleskey u Kemp, 100 which wa s discusse d i n Chapte r 3 , wher e th e Cour t refuse d t o remed y allegations o f racia l discriminatio n practice d b y peti t jurie s precisel y be cause th e allege d discriminatio n wa s systemi c rathe r than isolated. 101 The Swain Cour t als o hel d that , althoug h th e systemati c exclusio n o f blacks i n multipl e case s woul d amoun t t o a fourteent h amendmen t vio lation, th e defendan t ha d no t establishe d a prima faci e cas e o f suc h dis crimination.102 Thi s holdin g wa s strikin g becaus e th e defendant' s proo f established no t onl y tha t systemati c exclusio n ha d bee n practice d i n hi s own case, but that in the entire history of Talladega County—the Alabama county i n which th e cas e ha d arisen—ther e ha d neve r bee n a black o n a civil o r a crimina l jury. 103 Th e Court , however , viewe d th e existenc e o f other nondiscriminator y explanation s fo r thi s statisti c t o b e s o probabl e that it did not see the need even to require the prosecutor to come forwar d with suc h evidence. 104 Perhaps in response t o th e fragilit y o f it s Swain decision , the Suprem e Court reexamined th e paradigm cas e in Batson v. Kentucky105 and—onc e

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again—overruled itself . Althoug h Justice Powell' s majorit y opinio n state d that it was overruling only the evidentiary portion of Swain, 106 th e opinion actually seems t o hav e a broader reach . Justice Rehnquist' s dissen t assert s that, despite its disclaimer, the majority opinion actually recognizes a substantive righ t o n th e par t o f individua l defendant s t o a jury fro m whic h blacks hav e no t bee n systematicall y excluded , thereb y overrulin g on e o f the fundamental holding s of Swain an d imprudently undermining the utility o f peremptor y challenges. 107 Moreover , Justic e White' s concurrenc e asserts tha t th e decisio n reverse s th e principl e holdin g o f Swain b y au thorizing judicia l scrutin y o f a prosecutor's exercis e o f peremptor y chal lenges.108 I n Batson, therefore , th e Cour t appear s t o hav e hel d tha t in dividual exclusio n case s shoul d b e characterize d a s discriminatio n case s rather than discretio n cases . The problem with the Batson characterizatio n i s that it too seems quite fragile. By suggesting that the paradigm case is a discrimination rather than a discretion case, the Batson Court minimizes the importance of discretio n as a mechanism fo r responding to perceptions and suspicions that are too subtle t o b e articulated. Th e dange r o f suc h minimizatio n ca n b e appreciated by imagining that it is the defendant rathe r than the prosecutor who wishes t o exercis e peremptor y challenge s i n orde r t o exclud e juror s o f a particular race . Althoug h th e Batson majorit y purporte d no t t o addres s this issue, 109 it is necessarily implicate d i n any principled resolutio n o f th e case. Indeed, a perceived inabilit y to distinguish meaningfully betwee n th e racially motivate d exercis e o f peremptor y challenge s b y prosecutor s an d defense counse l cause d Justic e Marshal l t o advocat e th e eliminatio n o f peremptory challenge s entirely. 110 Moreover , imagin e tha t th e defendan t wishes t o exclud e thos e juror s ou t o f fea r tha t the y wil l exercis e racia l prejudice agains t th e defendant . Becaus e a defendan t woul d typicall y b e unable t o disqualif y a juro r fo r caus e solel y o n th e basi s o f heartfel t misgivings about the juror's racial tolerance, we might well wish to elevate discretion ove r discrimination consideration s i n order to permit defensiv e use of peremptor y challenges . Indeed, if we were not willing to do so, the whole poin t o f characterizin g th e paradig m cas e i n Batson a s a discrim ination rathe r tha n a discretio n cas e woul d b e defeated . B y declinin g t o elevate th e defendant' s discretio n need s ove r ou r competin g antidiscri mination objectives , w e woul d b e permitting an increased leve l o f subtl e discrimination t o occur , thereb y directl y thwartin g th e ver y antidiscrimi nation objective s tha t w e wishe d t o advance . If yo u ar e tempte d t o argu e tha t a state actio n requiremen t coul d b e used t o prohibit raciall y motivate d us e o f peremptor y challenge s b y pros-

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ecutors whil e permittin g thei r us e b y defendants , yo u woul d first have t o confront th e difficultie s inheren t i n ascertainin g whethe r th e stat e actio n requirement applied . Thi s difficult y wa s discusse d earlie r i n th e presen t chapter.111 Then , yo u woul d hav e t o confron t th e difficultie s inheren t i n ascertaining whe n stat e actio n i s present. Thos e difficultie s ar e discusse d below i n Chapte r 5. 112 Ultimately , suc h differentia l treatmen t coul d no t be justifie d o n an y principled basis . The Court's most recent forays into the interstices of th e jury selection issue cam e i n 1991 . I n Powers v. Otoo, 113 th e Cour t hel d tha t th e righ t to challeng e th e constitutionalit y o f crimina l jurie s fo r racia l exclusio n also extended to white criminal defendants who wished to complain about the exclusio n o f black s fro m thei r juries . Late r tha t sam e Ter m i n Edmonson u Leesville Concrete Co., 114 th e Court hel d tha t th e Bat sonprohibition on racially motivated use of peremptory challenges by prosecutors in criminal cases also extended to the racially motivated use of peremptor y challenges b y private litigants i n civil litigation . The pervasiveness of stat e involvement i n th e litigatio n proces s wa s viewe d a s sufficient t o rende r a private litigant' s us e o f peremptor y challenge s a delegated exercis e o f th e government's power to empanel a jury, whether the litigation was criminal or civil. 115 Althoug h th e majorit y opinio n di d no t s o hold , th e dissenter s asserted wit h som e plausibilit y tha t th e Edmonson decisio n woul d nec essarily ba r criminal defendant s fro m usin g racially motivated peremptor y challenges because they, like criminal prosecutors and civil litigants, would be stat e actors. 116 Bot h o f thes e decision s see m t o b e permissibl e inter pretations o f th e fourteent h amendment , bu t neithe r seem s t o b e com pelled b y th e fourteent h amendment . On e coul d easil y hav e concluded , for example , tha t o n balanc e th e reduce d dange r of racia l discriminatio n to which white defendants were exposed from the exclusion of black jurors in Powers di d no t warran t interferenc e wit h th e prosecutor' s us e o f per emptory challenges. In addition, one could easily conclude that the dangers of state-sanctione d discriminatio n i n the context o f privat e civil litigation , to which th e government i s not a party, did not warrant interference wit h the us e o f peremptor y challenge s b y private litigant s i n Edmonson. Although Powers an d Edmonson appeare d t o expan d th e protection s of Batson, a third jury selection case that was decided that Term appeared to contrac t thos e protections . I n Hernandez v. New York, 117 th e Cour t indicated tha t relatively weak explanation s b y prosecutors fo r their exclusion of minority jurors would suffice to defeat a charge of racial motivation in th e us e o f peremptor y challenges . I n Hernandez, th e Cour t uphel d a s nondiscriminatory a prosecutor's explanatio n tha t Latin o juror s who ha d

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been excluded throug h the use of peremptor y challenges were permissibly excluded becaus e o f th e prosecutor' s fea r tha t the y woul d rel y o n thei r own understanding s o f Spanis h languag e testimony rathe r than relying on the court' s Englis h languag e translatio n o f tha t testimony. 118 I n addition, the Cour t hel d tha t tria l judge s shoul d b e permitte d t o exercis e consid erable discretio n i n rulin g o n th e adequac y o f a prosecutor's justificatio n for suspec t peremptor y exclusions. 119 It i s difficul t t o imagin e ho w a judge coul d decid e whethe r a jury ex clusion cas e was a discrimination cas e or a discretion cas e without relyin g heavily o n hi s o r her own discretion . No t onl y i s proper characterizatio n less than self-evident , bu t the argument s fo r eac h o f th e competin g char acterizations see m t o b e equall y compelling . Moreover , a s th e strin g o f inconsistent Supreme Court decisions in this area reveal, principled analysis cannot be relied upon to guide the way to proper judicial characterization . When subjecte d t o sufficientl y intens e analysis , th e competin g principle s simply merge . A judge' s view s concernin g prope r characterization, there fore, would seem b y default to be a function o f th e judge's own societall y influenced prioritie s an d values. The proces s o f principle d adjudicatio n o n whic h w e rel y t o insulat e our judge s fro m thei r ow n majoritaria n inclination s begin s wit h identifi cation o f th e governing principle . Thi s first step, however, is so rip e with discretion tha t i t i s difficul t t o imagin e a judg e selectin g a n applicabl e principle o f la w fre e fro m th e influenc e o f majoritaria n preferences . Thi s is true eve n whe n identificatio n o f th e governin g principl e initiall y seem s obvious becaus e o f precedent , textua l specificity , o r fundamenta l appro priateness of one of the alternatives. Accordingly, the process of principled adjudication wil l b e colore d b y majoritarian preference s befor e i t begins. And onc e th e proces s begins , matter s ar e likel y t o ge t eve n worse .

C H A P T E R5

Application o f Principle s

In theory , onc e a governing lega l principl e i s identified , i t eliminate s th e danger of majoritaria n exploitatio n o f minorit y interest s becaus e th e governing principle rather than majoritarian-influenced judicia l discretio n will generate cas e outcomes . A lega l principl e ca n emanat e fro m a constitu tional provision , a statute, a regulation, or from commo n la w precedents. But regardles s o f it s source, proper application o f a principle t o th e fact s of a case, i n accordance wit h th e accepte d tenet s o f logica l analysis , will control th e outcom e o f th e case . Eve n i f th e principl e doe s leav e roo m for the exercise of some discretion, the sphere within which that discretion can properly b e exercise d wil l b e narro w enoug h t o minimiz e th e ris k o f majoritarian domination of the adjudicatory process. Notwithstanding this theoretical construct , however , ther e ar e tw o reason s wh y th e safeguar d of principl e canno t wdMc . First, principles wil l b e acceptable onl y i f the y are so general that the level of judicia l discretion the y demand is also high enough to reintroduce the dangers of majoritarianism . Second, the process by whic h principle d adjudicatio n proceed s make s i t unrealisti c t o expec t even a precis e principl e t o generat e onl y on e resul t t o th e exclusio n o f contradictory results . The nature of pluralist politics requires legal principles to be articulated at a relatively high level of abstractio n i n order to secure general approval. If principles are stated with such precision that they leave little uncertainty concerning the results that they will produce in controversial cases, interest groups who oppos e thos e result s will for m coalitions t o prevent th e principles fro m bein g incorporated int o statutes , regulations o r constitutiona l provisions. I n addition , thos e interes t group s wil l als o us e th e threa t o f 58

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"remedial" legislation t o prevent suc h principles from bein g incorporate d into judge-mad e commo n law . A s a result , th e onl y lega l principle s tha t will typically acquire operative status are principles that interest groups on each sid e o f th e relevan t issue s ca n reasonabl y believ e wil l giv e the m a chance o f winnin g particula r disputes . Arguably , ther e ar e exceptions . I n Roe v. Wade,1 th e Court articulated fairl y specific rule s in order to imple ment a n extremel y nonspecifi c righ t o f constitutiona l privacy . However , the court nevertheles s preserved a fair degree of ambiguit y i n defining th e scope o f th e righ t o n whic h thos e specifi c rule s rested. 2 Moreover , un certainty concernin g periphera l issue s suc h a s abortio n fundin g mad e i t unclear precisely how far the operative right to an abortion would extend. 3 Roe has been subjected t o considerable "majoritarian " political pressure, 4 and although the case itself has not been overruled, its ostensible specificit y does appea r t o hav e been. 5 Similarly , th e highl y specifi c rul e o f la w an nounced i n Miranda v. Arizona6 wa s designed to implement an extremely nonspecific principl e o f voluntariness , and subsequent decision s hav e lef t the actual parameters of the Miranda righ t quite fuzzy.7 In addition, despite its apparen t specificity , Miranda leave s fundamenta l issue s unclear , suc h as which interest s are ultimately advanced and which are frustrated b y the Court's decision. 8 Accordingly , eve n whe n th e Cour t appear s t o adop t specific rules , th e essentia l uncertaint y tha t pluralis t politica l theor y pre dicts wil l b e present i n a governing principl e ca n typicall y b e uncovered . It should b e noted tha t several commentator s hav e distinguished betwee n "principles" or "standards" on the one hand, which operate at a high level of abstractio n an d ten d t o b e phrase d i n term s o f functiona l polic y ob jectives, and "rules " on th e othe r hand , which operat e a t a high leve l o f specificity and are designed to implement the "principles" from which they emanate.9 However , thi s distinctio n i s unimportan t fo r presen t purposes , because I a m prepare d t o argu e tha t eve n highl y specifi c rule s canno t eliminate majoritaria n discretion . If it were politically possible for a precise principle to achieve controlling status, th e principl e woul d stil l deman d recours e t o dangerou s judicia l discretion i n orde r t o effec t it s implementation . Sinc e th e emergenc e o f legal realis m i n the 1920 s an d 1930s , whic h demonstrate d th e futilit y o f relying on linguistic conceptual analysi s to arrive at correct case outcomes, the proces s o f principle d adjudicatio n ha s subsiste d o n functiona l polic y analysis.10 Contemporary lega l analysi s tend s t o conced e th e linguisti c indeterminacy of lega l principles, as well as the profound ambiguity inherent in the quest for legislative intent . I t justifies outcome s b y arguing that one result is preferable t o another because it will advance rather than frustrat e

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the policy objectives on which a legal principle is based. However, reliance on polic y analysi s t o reduc e th e indeterminac y o f eve n seemingl y precis e legal principles ultimately proves to be misplaced. Postmodern legal scholarship ha s demonstrate d th e inevitabl e indeterminac y o f lega l principle s by subjectin g the m t o th e proces s o f deconstruction . A principl e i s de constructed b y undermining its connection t o a particular policy objectiv e and demonstrating that the principle actually advances a conflicting policy. This process is sometimes referred to as the inversion of hierarch y because the outcom e associate d wit h th e polic y objectiv e tha t i s favore d b y th e relevant principle i s severed fro m tha t objective and reattached t o an outcome tha t i s disfavored b y th e principle. 11 The principle' s connectio n t o the conflictin g polic y ca n the n b e reinverted , o r undermine d again , an d the principl e reattache d t o it s origina l polic y objective . Thi s make s i t unclear which policy objectiv e th e principle actually serves. As a result o f this indeterminacy , lega l principle s ca n acquir e operativ e meanin g onl y through recourse to the same type of judicia l discretio n tha t proved to b e always present when the principle was selected. And this once again raises all o f th e majoritaria n danger s that ar e attendant t o th e presence o f suc h discretion. The proble m o f indeterminac y ca n b e illustrate d b y decon structing th e intent , stat e action , an d discriminatio n principle s identifie d in Chapter 4 , demonstratin g tha t eac h i s capable o f generatin g contradic tory outcome s unde r a given se t o f facts . A s a result, th e Suprem e Cour t always has the analytica l optio n o f applyin g a legal principl e i n a manner that wil l generat e an y outcom e tha t th e Cour t desires . Onc e again , th e only wa y i n whic h th e Cour t ca n selec t amon g th e availabl e application s is through recours e t o majoritarian-influence d judicia l discretion . Intent If th e Cour t identifie s th e principl e o f inten t a s controllin g th e discrimi nation issu e i n a particular case , a s i t ha s don e wit h respec t t o rac e discrimination case s tha t alleg e a violation o f th e fourteent h amendment, 12 it mus t nex t appl y tha t principle t o th e fact s o f th e case . Consistent wit h the foregoin g hypothesis, 13 th e term s i n whic h th e principl e i s stated ar e too abstrac t t o generate a result directly . The mer e injunctio n t o appl y a requirement o f intentiona l discriminatio n doe s no t indicat e wh o mus t intend t o discriminat e agains t who m wit h wha t degre e o f consciou s de liberation. Prope r resolutio n o f thes e ambiguitie s require s consideratio n of whic h outcome s wil l bes t serv e th e polic y objective s o f th e inten t principle. Suc h functiona l polic y analysis , however , i s typicall y indeter -

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l

minate because the relationship betwee n principles and the outcomes that they produc e i s fluid. Assume tha t th e legislatur e enact s a statute designe d t o ameliorat e th e problem o f dru g abuse b y authorizing rando m polic e searche s o f privat e residences i n neighborhood s havin g mor e tha n a specifie d incidenc e o f drug-related crime . Assum e furthe r tha t 9 0 percen t o f th e individual s whose home s woul d b e searche d unde r th e progra m ar e black . I f chal lenged o n equa l protectio n grounds , th e Cour t woul d the n hav e t o de termine whethe r enactmen t o f th e dru g searc h statut e di d o r di d no t constitute an act of racia l discrimination withi n th e meaning of th e inten t principle. An y fourt h amendmen t invasio n o f privac y problem s tha t th e legislation migh t pos e ar e irrelevan t fo r presen t purposes . Onl y th e po tential equa l protectio n problem s ar e o f concern . As noted above, 14 th e policy reaso n fo r adopting an inten t principle i s that a prohibitio n o n legislativ e classification s havin g a mer e disparat e impact o n racia l minoritie s woul d undul y interfer e wit h th e legislature' s ability t o tailo r it s remedia l action s narrowl y s o tha t the y wer e precisel y responsive t o th e problem tha t th e legislature was confronting. A n effect s principle might require random searches of the population at large in order to avoid an equal protection violatio n eve n though th e drug problem was highly concentrated in particular neighborhoods. An intent principle, however, would permi t th e legislatur e t o focu s remedia l effort s o n neighbor hoods i n which the y would d o th e most good. Moreover , an effects prin ciple woul d forc e governmenta l decisionmaker s t o engag e i n race conscious rather than race-neutral decisionmaking by forcing them actively to conside r th e racia l impac t o f th e legislativ e strategie s tha t the y wer e considering. An intent principle, however, would permi t th e legislature t o focus solely on th e effectiveness o f a remedy without eve r having to think about race . I t appears , therefore , tha t th e inten t principl e woul d requir e the Cour t t o uphol d th e dru g searc h legislatio n a s lon g a s th e availabl e direct evidence of legislativ e intent indicated that the statute was genuinely enacted fo r th e purpos e o f reducin g th e dru g proble m an d no t fo r th e purpose o f imposin g th e burden s o f dru g enforcemen t o n black s rathe r than whites. 15 However , close r analysi s reveal s tha t th e polic y objective s lying beneat h th e inten t principl e ar e actuall y bette r serve d throug h ap plication o f a n effect s principle . The degre e t o whic h th e objective s o f legislativ e precisio n an d race neutral deliberation s wil l b e advance d i s likely t o b e a direct functio n o f the incentive s impose d upo n th e legislatur e b y th e threa t o f judicia l in validation. Unde r th e equa l protectio n clause , suspec t classification s ar e

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not automaticall y invalidate d bu t rathe r ar e subjecte d t o stric t judicia l scrutiny. Therefore , i f th e legislatur e wa s i n fac t operatin g wit h a hig h degree o f precisio n i n directin g th e dru g searche s t o th e neighborhood s from which drug problems emanate, the statute will be upheld. If, however, there ar e othe r legislativ e classification s tha t woul d generat e a tighte r fit between th e proble m an d th e remedy—perhap s legalizatio n fo r certai n categories o f drug s or mandatory sentencin g fo r certain categories of sell ers—judicial revie w shoul d provid e a n incentiv e fo r th e legislatur e t o us e those mor e precis e classifications . A s lon g a s th e legislatur e i s genuinel y concerned with reducing drug abuse, an intent test provides little incentive for the legislature to use the most precise classification available . An effect s test, however , will ensur e tha t th e legislatur e ha s an incentiv e t o legislat e with th e highes t possibl e precisio n i n disparat e impac t cases , becaus e a n effects tes t wil l trigge r strict scrutin y eve n whe n th e legislativ e purpos e i s pure. Similarly, a n effect s tes t i s mor e likel y tha n a n inten t tes t t o advanc e the objectiv e o f race-neutra l deliberation . Thi s i s tru e bot h becaus e a n intent tes t entail s mor e consideratio n o f rac e tha n i s commonl y though t to b e th e case , and becaus e a n effects tes t entail s less . Contrary t o superficial appearances , an intent test does not relieve the legislature of the need to conside r th e racia l effect s o f propose d legislation , bu t rathe r promotes race-conscious deliberation . A properl y administere d inten t principl e would requir e stric t scrutin y o f al l legislatio n havin g a raciall y disparat e impact because mere legislative toleration o f disparat e impact can amount to a n ac t o f intentiona l discrimination . Eve n unde r a n inten t principle , therefore, a legislature wishin g to ensur e th e validity of it s legislation wil l have t o engag e i n a race-conscious evaluatio n o f effects , jus t a s i t woul d have t o do unde r th e effect s tes t itself . Fo r example , whe n a legislatur e decides to focus drug searches on neighborhoods having a 90 percent black population rather than imposing those searches on the population at large, it i s makin g a n intentiona l decisio n t o impos e upo n black s rathe r tha n whites a high percentage o f th e socia l cost s entaile d i n reducin g th e drug problem. A s a result, a reviewing cour t wil l hav e t o invalidat e tha t legis lation eve n unde r an inten t tes t unles s th e legislatur e make s th e showin g required t o justif y a n ac t o f intentiona l discrimination . Th e legislature , therefore, wil l hav e t o conside r th e racia l impac t o f suc h legislatio n jus t as i t woul d hav e t o do unde r an effect s test. 16 Even if the legislature is initially unaware of the racially disparate impact of it s legislation , th e legislatio n wil l stil l b e subjec t t o invalidatio n unde r an intentional discriminatio n standar d i n a way that preserves the need fo r

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race-conscious legislativ e deliberations . A legislativ e decisio n t o procee d in the absence o f an y given ite m o f informatio n entail s a legislative cost benefit determinatio n t o ris k whateve r adverse consequence s woul d hav e been revealed by such information i n order to save the administrative cost s required to obtain it . In contemporary society , where racia l minorities are disproportionately represente d amon g thos e wh o lac k social , economic , and politica l power , a decisio n t o foreg o th e acquisitio n o f additiona l information canno t b e viewe d a s race-neutral . Becaus e th e advers e con sequences o f proceedin g i n th e fac e o f uncertaint y ar e mor e likel y t o b e borne b y racial minoritie s tha n b y the majority, a legislative actio n havin g a racially disparate impac t ca n b e invali d unde r the intent tes t eve n whe n the legislatur e i s unawar e o f th e disparat e impac t tha t it s legislatio n wil l have. A legislatur e wishin g t o avoi d thi s resul t wil l agai n b e force d t o engage in race-conscious deliberations in order to maximize the likelihood that it s legislatio n wil l b e upheld . Our failure to appreciate the strong correspondence tha t exists between intent an d effect s cause s u s t o understat e th e degre e t o whic h th e inten t principle require s race-consciou s legislativ e deliberations . Tha t sam e fail ure also cause s u s to overstat e th e relativ e amoun t o f race-consciou s de liberation tha t i s necessitated b y the effects principle . As indicated above , a diligent reviewin g cour t wil l dra w inferences concernin g discriminator y intent fro m th e circumstantia l evidenc e o f disparat e impact . However , a reviewing court will also rely upon any direct evidence of legislativ e intent that i s provided b y the statutor y languag e an d legislativ e history . Because a legislatur e i s a multimembe r bod y whos e inten t i s difficul t to ascertain , aberran t evidenc e o f discriminator y inten t ca n pos e seriou s problems. Suppose, for example, that a majority of th e legislature favore d the drug-search legislatio n discusse d abov e fre e o f an y discriminatory animus that would cause a reviewing court to invalidate the legislation under an intentiona l discriminatio n standard . Suppos e further , however , tha t a small bu t voca l grou p o f additiona l legislator s favore d th e legislatio n fo r invidious reasons, and that they disclosed those reasons in floor statements and portions of th e relevant committee reports . Although th e votes of th e invidious discriminator s wer e not neede d t o enac t th e statute, th e statut e nevertheless no w carrie s wit h i t direc t evidenc e o f discriminator y inten t that migh t resul t i n it s invalidation . Under an intent test, the danger of invalidatio n ca n be quite real. Under an effect s test , however , ther e i s no dange r o f invalidatio n a t al l becaus e direct evidenc e o f discriminator y inten t i s simpl y irrelevant . B y focusin g on bot h direc t an d circumstantia l evidenc e o f discriminator y intent , th e

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intent test requires the legislature to thin k about race a lot. Not onl y does it have to be concerned wit h the avoidance o f disparat e impact, but it also has t o avoi d anythin g tha t migh t b e construe d a s direc t evidenc e o f im proper legislativ e motivation . Althoug h th e effect s principl e als o require s race-conscious consideration o f legislativ e effects, it relieves the legislature of th e need to concern itself wit h direct evidence of discriminator y intent . As a result, th e inten t tes t actuall y require s th e legislatur e t o thin k abou t race more tha n the effect s tes t does . Despit e initia l appearances , bot h th e policy favorin g legislativ e precisio n an d th e polic y favorin g race-neutra l legislative deliberatio n ar e bette r serve d b y th e effect s principl e tha n b y the inten t principle . The inten t principl e ha s no w bee n deconstructed . The polic y justifi cations initially thought to be promoted by that principle have been shown to b e fostere d mor e effectivel y b y a principl e tha t focuse s o n disparat e impact. Before becoming too comfortable wit h this inversion of principles and polic y objectives , however , i t i s necessar y t o realiz e tha t th e effect s principle ca n als o b e deconstructed , thereb y permittin g th e relationshi p between eac h principle an d it s associated polic y t o b e inverte d ye t again. Although th e effect s principl e seem s t o enhanc e th e incentiv e fo r leg islatures t o draf t statutor y categorie s wit h precision , i t ignore s th e fac t that judicia l deferenc e i s neede d i n orde r t o secur e optima l legislativ e precision. I f th e Cour t wer e strictl y t o scrutiniz e ever y legislativ e classifi cation having a racially disparate impact, permitting only what it considered to b e th e tightes t fitting classifications t o stand , the Cour t woul d itsel f b e exercising th e policymakin g discretio n tha t th e Constitutio n reserve s t o the legislature. Because courts are institutionally ill-suited to balancing the benefits and burdens of particula r legislative classification s i n order to find out whic h on e i s best , a measur e o f judicia l deferenc e t o legislativ e dis cretion i s necessar y t o preven t judicia l usurpatio n o f legislativ e policy making functions. Indeed , that i s the very reason fo r which court s adhere to particula r standard s o f revie w whe n rulin g upo n th e constitutionalit y of legislativ e enactments . The effect s principl e discount s thi s nee d fo r judicial deferenc e wheneve r a legislativ e classificatio n happen s t o hav e a racially disparat e impact . A s a practical matter , a n effect s tes t applie d a t any give n leve l o f judicia l scrutin y wil l b e mor e intrusiv e tha n a n inten t test applie d a t tha t sam e leve l o f scrutiny , becaus e evidenc e o f disparat e impact will b e more readily available than evidence o f invidiou s intent. As a result, an effects tes t increase s th e ris k o f judicia l usurpatio n ove r what it woul d b e unde r a n inten t test , regardles s o f th e particula r standar d o f review tha t i s employed. The inten t principle , therefore, bette r serves th e

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standard-of-review functio n tha t i s calle d for . B y riskin g th e dange r o f judicial usurpatio n onl y whe n purposefu l discriminatio n ha s bee n estab lished, th e inten t principl e accord s th e legislatur e th e deferenc e neede d for optima l precisio n i n th e formulatio n o f legislativ e categories . Similarly, although th e effect s principl e seem s t o reduc e th e degre e t o which legislator s wil l ultimatel y hav e t o engag e i n race-consciou s delib erations, an y reductio n i s actuall y shortsighted . I f ou r long-ter m polic y objective i s to establis h socia l condition s unde r which rac e neutrality wil l flourish, th e mos t effectiv e mean s o f pursuin g tha t objectiv e i s to engag e in short-ter m race-consciou s deliberation s designe d t o compensat e fo r present societal imperfection s tha t make governmental rac e neutrality no t yet viable . Tha t mean s tha t thoroug h legislativ e consideratio n shoul d b e encouraged wit h respec t t o al l aspect s o f raciall y relevan t classifications . Both the intent and effects associate d with such legislation should b e fully ventilated an d explored. The effect s principl e truncate s such plenary con sideration b y makin g legislativ e consideratio n o f racia l impac t th e onl y thing tha t i s constitutionall y relevant . Th e inten t principle , however , no t only foster s legislativ e consideratio n o f bot h inten t an d effects , bu t suc h contemplation inevitabl y convey s th e importan t insigh t tha t th e tw o ar e inextricably intertwined . The process of deconstruction ca n go on and on indefinitely—or at least until th e analys t reache s th e limit s o f hi s o r he r energ y o r imagination . The reaso n for this is that th e concepts upo n which mos t lega l principle s rest lac k stabl e content . Th e concep t o f inten t ca n mea n purpose , o r i t can mean toleration o f know n effects , o r it can mean knowin g toleratio n of ignorance about likely effects. This lack of stabl e content deprives legal principles o f th e capacit y t o hav e an y dispositiv e meaning . Th e recen t intent v . effect s case s o f th e Suprem e Court , whic h hav e alread y bee n discussed,17 illustrat e ho w th e Cour t ha s capitalize d o n thi s instability . Although th e Court nominally applie d the effects principl e t o thos e cases, the proo f requirement s o n whic h i t insiste d see m actuall y t o implemen t a principle of intent. The court generated this confusion b y silently shifting between nomina l principle s an d thei r evidentiar y attribute s i n th e sam e way that the process of deconstructio n shift s betwee n principle s and thei r policy objectives . The content give n t o a principl e i n an y particula r contex t seem s t o depend heavily upon the purposes and preferences o f the person supplying that content. As a result, the only way that a judge who somehow manage s to identif y a particula r principl e a s controllin g ca n actuall y appl y tha t principle i n a particular cas e i s throug h a n act o f judicia l discretion . An d

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once judicia l discretio n i s give n controllin g importance , th e danger s o f majoritarian influenc e becom e unavoidabl y high . State Action The stat e actio n principl e ca n b e similarl y deconstructed . Onc e a cour t selects th e stat e actio n rathe r tha n th e privat e conduc t principl e a s con trolling in a particular case, it must then decid e how tha t principle applies to th e fact s o f th e case . Again , ambiguitie s ar e present . I t i s no t clea r precisely wh o constitute s th e "state, " and precisely wha t constitute s "ac tion." Accordingly, the court must resolve those ambiguities in the manner that bes t serve s th e objective s o f th e stat e actio n principle . A s wit h th e principle of intent , however, the fit between th e state action principl e and its objectives is loose enoug h t o permit the principle to b e deconstructed. This can b e illustrated b y analyzing another paradigm case whose variant s the Cour t ha s considere d o n multipl e occasions . A whit e selle r agree s t o conve y t o a blac k purchase r a parce l o f rea l property tha t i s subjec t t o a raciall y restrictiv e covenan t prohibitin g sal e of th e property to blacks . The Court i s then called upon t o determine the validity o f th e covenan t i n a suit filed by other whites livin g in the seller' s neighborhood t o enforc e th e racia l restriction . The restrictiv e covenan t has typicall y bee n inserte d int o th e seller' s dee d b y a prior owner o f th e property, o r b y th e rea l estat e develope r o f th e property , wh o ha s a n economic rathe r than a n associational interes t i n maintainin g th e raciall y segregated natur e o f th e development. 18 The Cour t decide s tha t th e stat e action rathe r tha n th e privat e conduc t principl e applie s t o th e cas e and , therefore, mus t determin e whethe r enforcemen t o f th e covenan t woul d constitute stat e actio n i n orde r t o determin e it s validity. The purpos e o f th e stat e actio n requiremen t i s t o isolat e a sphere o f personal autonom y i n whic h privat e partie s ar e abl e t o exercis e thei r associational freedoms. 19 I t is premise d o n th e belie f that , a s distastefu l a s invidious discriminatio n ma y be , unlimite d governmenta l intrusio n int o private affairs ca n be even more undesirable. Whe n state action i s present, a prohibition o n discriminator y conduc t advance s ou r societal interes t i n promoting racia l equalit y withou t underminin g ou r desir e t o protec t au tonomy an d associationa l freedom . Thi s i s becaus e i t i s th e state , rathe r than private parties, that must conform it s conduct t o specifie d norms . In the absence o f stat e action, however , a requirement t o confor m behavio r to government specifie d norm s would interfer e wit h individua l autonom y and associational freedom . Accordingly, the state action principle requires

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government neutrality . Th e stat e mus t mak e it s lega l enforcemen t ma chinery availabl e t o black s and white s o n a n equal basi s so tha t th e stat e itself i s not guilt y o f discrimination , an d i t mus t do s o withou t regar d t o the associational preference s o f privat e parties so that it does not interfer e with thei r personal autonomy . Th e stat e actio n principle , therefore , pro motes individual autonomy and associational freedo m whil e ensuring that the stat e doe s no t selectivel y elevat e th e associationa l preference s o f on e race ove r thos e o f another . The privat e conduc t principle , o n th e othe r hand, woul d undermin e bot h autonom y an d associationa l freedom , an d require th e stat e itsel f t o discriminat e amon g thos e t o who m i t extende d its enforcemen t services . In ligh t o f thes e objectives , th e cour t shoul d determin e tha t th e stat e action requiremen t i s no t satisfie d i n th e paradig m case . Th e restrictiv e covenant wa s place d i n th e whit e seller' s dee d a s th e resul t o f a private contractual agreemen t betwee n th e whit e selle r an d th e previou s owne r of th e property. As long as that agreement wa s knowingly entere d int o as part of a freely bargained-for exchange, judicial invalidation would subvert the autonom y o f th e partie s b y denyin g the m th e abilit y t o protec t thei r associational preferences . Moreover , judicia l invalidatio n woul d under mine th e objectiv e o f governmen t neutrality , becaus e i t woul d resul t i n state enforcement o f th e associational preferences o f the black buye r who wanted to live with the white seller's neighbors, while denying enforcement to th e preference s o f th e whit e neighbor s wh o di d no t wis h t o associat e with the black buyer. The state itself would then be guilty of discriminatory enforcement, i n direc t violatio n o f th e stat e actio n principle . This i s the resul t tha t th e Suprem e Cour t reache d th e first time tha t it considered th e paradig m case . I n it s little-know n Corrigan v. Buckley decision,20 th e Cour t hel d tha t th e absenc e o f stat e actio n wa s s o clea r that th e issu e di d no t eve n rais e a constitutiona l questio n substantia l enough t o trigge r th e Court' s appellat e jurisdiction. 21 Then , i n Shelley u Kraemer,22 th e Supreme Court deconstructed it s own prior decision, holding that th e paradigm cas e did , after all , involv e stat e action. The Shelley Court distinguishe d th e tw o case s b y arguin g tha t Corrigan concerne d only the validity of th e restrictive covenant rather than its enforceability. 23 The distinctio n ma y a t first see m artificial . However , a s th e discussio n below wil l demonstrate , i t is manipulation o f thi s precise distinctio n tha t ultimately permits the state action principle to generate whatever outcome is desired . Althoug h th e restrictiv e covenan t wa s a wholly privat e agree ment tha t di d no t entai l stat e action , judicia l enforcemen t o f tha t agreement would amoun t t o stat e actio n prohibite d b y the fourteent h amend -

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ment. Ultimately , th e presenc e o r absenc e o f stat e intervention , backe d by th e ful l panopl y o f th e government' s coerciv e powers , i s wha t woul d determine whethe r th e willin g buye r an d selle r wer e abl e t o effectuat e their exchange. 24 In functional terms , the Shelley Court can be viewed as having inverted the connection tha t Corrigan ha d initially established between each of th e competing principles and the policy objectives that they served. Protection of individual autonomy and associational preferences was not, as Corrigan had suggested , advance d b y characterizin g th e paradig m cas e a s a stat e action case . I n reality , thi s characterizatio n nullifie d th e autonom y o f a willing buye r an d selle r b y denyin g the m thei r preferenc e fo r voluntar y mutual association . I n s o doing , th e stat e als o abandone d it s rol e a s a neutral arbiter by agreeing to enforce th e real property exchanges of thos e who wis h t o sel l t o white s bu t no t o f thos e wh o wis h t o sel l t o blacks . These ar e the disfavore d polic y consequence s associate d wit h th e privat e conduct principle , no t th e desire d polic y objective s associate d wit h th e state actio n principle . The desire d polic y objective s ar e best advance d b y characterizing th e paradig m cas e a s a state actio n case , s o tha t th e four teenth amendmen t ca n b e invoke d t o preven t th e stat e fro m frustratin g the preferenc e o f th e buye r an d selle r t o associat e wit h eac h other , and from selectivel y enforcin g it s rea l propert y law s i n a wa y tha t denie s in dividuals with certain associational preference s th e ability t o mak e legally enforceable agreements. The Court reaffirmed this deconstructive inversion of policie s an d principle s i n Barrows u Jackson, 2S whe n i t refuse d t o require th e whit e selle r t o pa y damage s fo r breac h o f th e restrictiv e cov enant t o th e seller' s whit e neighbors . The Cour t hel d that , lik e th e eq uitable relie f sough t i n Shelley, a judicial awar d of mone y damage s at law would als o constitut e coerciv e stat e action. 26 After Shelley and Barrows th e la w appear s t o b e tha t restrictiv e cov enants are valid agreements, effective t o the extent that they can command voluntary compliance . However , they are not legall y enforceable, becaus e legal enforcement woul d constitute discriminatory state action. Of course, the stat e action principl e ca n b e further deconstructed i n a way that call s the soundnes s o f eve n thi s formulatio n o f curren t la w int o question . Assume that the white seller refuses to sell to the black buyer , for the express reason tha t th e selle r wishe s voluntaril y t o compl y wit h th e restrictiv e covenant. The black buyer then sues to have the covenant declared invalid. Should th e Cour t declin e t o interven e becaus e th e covenan t i s no w being "enforced" through voluntary private action rather than state action? After all , in this case, unlike Shelley, the Court does not hav e the final say

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as t o whethe r th e dea l wil l g o through ; th e privat e seller' s associationa l preference wil l ultimatel y b e dispositive . Thi s i s th e vie w o f stat e actio n that th e Cour t seem s t o hav e adopte d i n Evans v. Newton. 27 There , th e Court hel d tha t th e Georgi a Suprem e Court' s transfe r o f titl e fro m th e City of Macon , Georgia, to a board of privat e trustees, in order to permit the park to remain racially segregated as required by the terms of th e will that initiall y bequeathe d th e par k t o th e City , constitute d stat e action . Even though the state Court was attempting to remain neutral with respect to private associational preference s b y terminating the City' s involvemen t with the park, the state Court's actions impermissibly facilitated the private testator's discriminator y intent. 28 Or, should th e Cour t choos e t o interven e becaus e judicia l abstentio n would constitut e stat e actio n tha t facilitate d th e privat e selle r i n hi s o r her efforts t o exclude blacks ? After all, in this case as in Shelley, the Court has th e final say a s t o whethe r th e dea l wil l g o through ; effectuatio n o f the private seller's associational preferenc e i s completely dependen t upo n how th e Cour t rule s o n th e stat e actio n issue . Thi s i s th e vie w o f stat e action tha t th e Cour t seem s t o hav e adopted i n Evans u AbneyP There , in a subsequent cas e involving the same Maco n park , the Court hel d that the Georgi a Suprem e Court' s reversio n o f titl e t o th e testator' s estate , in order to permi t th e par k t o remai n raciall y segregate d a s require d b y th e terms o f th e wil l tha t initiall y bequeathe d th e par k t o th e City , di d not constitute stat e action. This time , because th e state cour t was attempting to remai n neutra l wit h respec t t o privat e associational preference s b y applying the Georgia law of cy pres to terminate the City's involvement with the park , th e stat e Court' s action s di d no t impermissibl y facilitat e th e private testator' s discriminator y intent. 30 The proble m i s insoluble . I n a libera l lega l system , th e objectiv e o f protecting a sphere of private autonomy is generally viewed as normatively desirable. Indeed , from a Hobbesian perspective , suc h facilitatio n consti tutes th e onl y justificatio n fo r th e state' s existence. 31 However , judicia l efforts t o advance that objective simpl y generate a paradox. Once a court declines to remed y an act of privat e discrimination, the act can no longe r retain its character as a private act, precisely because the court has chosen to protec t th e discriminator' s privat e autonomy . Becaus e th e cour t i s a state actor , judicia l facilitatio n o f wha t begin s a s a n ac t o f privat e dis crimination transform s th e act int o conduc t tha t constitute s stat e action. As a result , th e stat e actio n principl e require s tha t wheneve r th e privat e character o f a discriminator y ac t compel s a cour t t o refrai n fro m inter vening, th e court' s ow n ac t o f restrain t wil l automaticall y mak e judicia l intervention compulsory .

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Because of th e paradoxical natur e of th e state action conundrum, there can be no hope of principled judicial resolutio n of state action issues. Not even recours e t o th e Court' s fundamenta l countermajoritaria n functio n can assis t th e Cour t i n applyin g th e stat e actio n principle , becaus e th e principle o f countermajoritarianis m ca n b e deconstructe d a s well . Th e Court ca n neve r kno w wit h confidenc e whethe r it s jo b i s to protec t po tential blac k buyer s from majoritaria n whit e seller s who wis h t o discrim inate agains t them , o r to protec t individua l whit e seller s fro m th e major itarian governmen t tha t woul d den y the m thei r unpopula r associationa l preferences.32 Dangerous judicial discretion again appears to hold the only hope o f eve r giving operationa l conten t t o th e stat e actio n principle. 33 Discrimination Like the intent and state action principles, the discrimination principle can also b e deconstructe d b y manipulating it s connection t o particula r policy objectives. A s the followin g discussio n demonstrates , th e concep t o f dis crimination i s inherently ambiguous. Once th e Court decide s to appl y the principle i n a particula r case , i t wil l hav e t o resolv e tha t ambiguit y b y determining whether the policy reason for which the principle was selected would b e advance d o r frustrate d b y a finding of discriminatio n i n tha t case. The polic y objectiv e o f th e discriminatio n principl e i s perhap s th e most fundamenta l i n all o f Anglo-America n jurisprudence . I t stems fro m the a priori belie f that like cases should be treated alike. However, because cases ar e bot h alik e an d differen t i n a vas t numbe r o f ways , som e basi s must b e foun d fo r distinguishin g betwee n th e similaritie s an d difference s that are legally relevant and those that are not. The discrimination principle is designe d t o implemen t thi s distinction . When th e representativ e branche s o f governmen t accor d differentia l treatment t o case s base d upo n legitimat e difference s tha t exis t betwee n those cases , th e representativ e branche s ar e behavin g i n a n appropriat e manner that warrants judicial deference . The discretion principle caution s the Court no t t o interven e i n such case s becaus e th e selection o f relevan t similarities an d difference s ha s properl y bee n mad e b y a politicall y ac countable majoritaria n branc h o f government . I am her e usin g th e dis cretion principle as shorthand fo r th e entire rang e of permissibl e base s of majoritarian differentiation . Whe n a majoritaria n branc h o f governmen t draws legislative or executive classifications based upon permissible factors, it i s usin g it s discretio n i n determinin g tha t thos e factor s ar e importan t enough t o meri t differential treatment . If , however , the governmental dif -

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1

ferentiation i s base d upo n similaritie s o r difference s tha t th e governmen t cannot properl y mak e th e basi s o f disparat e treatment , th e counterma joritarian Cour t i s obligate d t o invalidat e tha t differentiatio n unde r th e discrimination principle . Althoug h a wide variet y o f factor s ma y properly serve t o justif y governmenta l differentiation , fo r purposes o f th e discrim ination principle we refuse to recognize race as such a factor. The Supreme Court establishe d i n Brown v. Board of Education* 4 whe n i t outlawe d the separate-but-equa l doctrin e o f Plessy u Ferguson* 5 tha t racia l dis crimination constitute s inherentl y unequa l treatmen t tha t operate s t o th e disadvantage o f th e minorit y race. 36 The discretio n principle , therefore , encourages differential treatmen t based upon neutral factors becaus e such differentiation promote s politicall y accountabl e policymakin g b y the majoritarian branches of government. The discrimination principle, however, prohibits differentia l treatmen t base d upo n th e immutabl e characteristi c of rac e becaus e i t constitute s a for m o f invidiousnes s tha t w e believ e t o be unfair, inequitable, and immoral, all in contravention o f a fundamenta l tenet o f Anglo-America n jurisprudence . I hav e offere d a formulatio n o f th e discriminatio n principl e tha t i s somewhat stronge r tha n th e principl e actuall y applie d b y th e Suprem e Court. Th e Cour t doe s no t invalidat e al l racia l classifications . Rather , i t deems such classifications t o b e suspect and subjects them to strict judicial scrutiny. As a result, some racia l classification s are , in fact, uphel d b y the Court—specifically, thos e tha t th e majoritaria n branche s ca n establish are narrowly tailore d t o advanc e a compellin g stat e interest. 37 However , th e compelling state-interest formulation of the discrimination principle causes the principl e t o injec t majoritaria n preference s int o it s ow n meaning. 38 These preferences wil l ente r the analysis either through judicial deferenc e to th e representativ e branche s unde r the applicable standar d o f revie w o r through th e Court' s ow n socialize d discretio n i n ascertainin g wha t doe s and doe s no t constitut e a compelling stat e interes t o r a tight-enough fit. The advantag e o f th e stronge r formulatio n tha t I have offere d i s tha t i t does no t openl y cal l fo r th e exercis e o f majoritaria n discretion—althoug h ultimately, recours e t o suc h discretio n wil l stil l b e required . Deconstruction o f th e discriminatio n principl e ca n b e illustrate d b y considering th e fact s o f Lee v. Washington* 9 a brief pe r curiam decisio n of th e Suprem e Cour t tha t ha s com e t o b e know n mor e fo r it s plurality dicta tha n fo r it s holding . There , blac k an d whit e priso n inmate s chal lenged th e constitutionality o f certai n Alabam a statutes , and official prac tices take n i n accordanc e wit h thos e statutes , tha t require d th e racia l segregation o f prisoner s i n stat e an d loca l prisons . The Stat e argue d tha t

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such racia l segregatio n wa s necessary i n order to ensur e prison safety and discipline, and that the Cour t should defe r to th e expert discretion o f th e prison administrator s i n determinin g th e nee d fo r segregation. 40 Never theless, i n a on e paragrap h opinion , th e Suprem e Cour t affirme d th e in validation by a three-judge district court of the Alabama statutes. Although the statute s wer e invalidate d o n equa l protectio n grounds , th e constitu tional permissibilit y o f limited-duratio n segregatio n i n order to dea l wit h emergency situations appears to have been conceded bot h by the Supreme Court an d th e distric t court , albei t i n advisor y dicta. 41 Whe n th e cas e i s cited, it tends t o b e cited fo r the proposition that , in extreme cases , racebased classification s wil l b e tolerate d i n orde r to advanc e sufficientl y im portant state interests. 42 However, it is very difficult t o determine whethe r the Court' s resolutio n o f th e cas e wa s o r was no t correct . Assuming th e trut h o f th e state' s assertio n tha t racia l segregatio n i n Alabama prisons is necessary t o ensur e prisoner safety, the discriminatio n principle nevertheles s require s invalidation o f th e segregatio n statute s be cause the y constitut e impermissibl e race-base d classifications . Sinc e rac e is no t a legitimat e basi s fo r differentia l treatment , stat e statute s tha t ar e expressly draw n i n racia l term s canno t constitut e vali d form s o f govern mental differentiation . Thi s i s th e ver y for m o f majoritaria n illegitimac y that th e discriminatio n principl e require s a countermajoritaria n cour t t o detect and neutralize. Moreover, the judicial deferenc e tha t the discretio n principle typicall y accord s majoritaria n policymakin g determination s i n order t o promot e politica l accountabilit y woul d b e inappropriat e here , where i t i s precisely tha t accountabilit y tha t ha s spawne d th e mandator y segregation statutes. Functional application of the discrimination principle, therefore, require s invalidatio n o f th e Alabam a statutes. 43 The discrimination principle can be deconstructed b y inverting the policies associate d wit h th e competin g principles . Despit e thei r explici t reli ance on racial classifications, the Alabama statutes are actually based upon the legitimat e factor s o f prisone r safet y an d discipline . Tha t groupin g o f prisoners resultin g i n greate r degree s o f prisone r safet y an d disciplin e i s simply preferred to othe r groupings that are likely to result in prison riots. Although th e Stat e relie s upo n a n explici t racia l classificatio n t o advanc e this objective , rac e i s merel y a correlativ e rathe r tha n a n actuatin g basi s for th e differentia l treatment . Invalidatio n o f th e State' s prisone r segre gation statutes, therefore, would actually frustrate rather than advance the goals of th e discrimination principl e b y setting aside a majoritarian polic y determination tha t wa s base d upo n permissibl e safet y factor s rathe r than upon th e impermissibl e facto r o f race . Moreover , upholdin g th e segre -

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3

gation statute s woul d advanc e th e deferenc e t o politicall y accountabl e policymaking that the discretion principle is intended to serve. Accordingly, it is by upholding rather than invalidating the Alabama segregation statute that th e discriminatio n principl e i s properly applied. 44 Or, the discrimination principl e ca n be further deconstructed s o that it once again requires invalidation of th e Alabama statutes. Semantic niceties concerning danger-based differentiation notwithstanding, the operative basis for discrimination in the prison riot situation must realistically be viewed as race. Rac e i s the facto r tha t create d th e dange r of priso n riots , and by hypothesis, racia l separatio n i s th e onl y remed y tha t wil l b e adequat e t o eliminate th e danger . Beginnin g th e analysi s a t th e leve l o f priso n safet y and discipline , whil e ignorin g th e fac t tha t th e problem s o f safet y an d discipline themselves derive from the underlying problem of racial friction, makes th e analysi s unacceptabl y artificial . I t overlook s th e fac t tha t ou r current race-relations problems stem from a history of official majoritaria n discrimination. The discrimination principl e should, therefore, b e applied to invalidate the racial segregation statutes rather than to permit continued deference t o majoritaria n desire s concernin g interracia l association . The reaso n tha t th e discriminatio n principl e ca n b e repeatedl y decon structed i s that ther e i s a fundamental ambiguit y inheren t i n the concep t of discriminatio n tha t i s subjec t t o bot h intentiona l an d inadverten t ex ploitation durin g a particular analysis. The principle assume s that there is an "actual" basis of discrimination in cases involving differential treatment , which ca n b e identifie d an d the n classifie d a s legitimat e o r illegitimate . However, a s th e problem s encountere d i n analyzin g Lee v. Washington suggest, there i s no particular reason t o believ e tha t acts of governmenta l differentiation ar e the result of onl y one caus e or motive. Moreover , even if a single o r primary basi s fo r differentia l treatmen t coul d b e identified , an additiona l proble m woul d remain . I t i s no t clea r ho w a cour t coul d reliably distinguish betwee n legitimat e and illegitimate use s of a particular basis for differentiation . Th e Suprem e Court's school desegregatio n case s reveal th e complexit y o f thi s problem , a s wel l a s th e elusivenes s o f an y principled resolution . The Suprem e Court's decision i n Brown u Board of Education 45 hel d that raciall y segregate d publi c schoo l system s wer e unconstitutional , an d that segregate d "dual " system s ha d t o b e dismantle d an d replace d b y desegregated "unitary " systems. 4* Although Brown wa s decide d i n 1954 , and th e injunctio n t o desegregat e th e publi c school s "wit h al l deliberat e speed" was issued i n 1955, 47 the Suprem e Court di d not becom e activel y involved i n th e implementatio n o f Brown unti l th e mid - or late-1960s. 48

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The majo r doctrinal difficult y i n implementing Brown cam e i n attempting to ascertai n th e differenc e betwee n a dual syste m an d a unitar y one . Be cause th e Brown requirement s appl y onl y t o dua l systems , an d no t t o unitary systems , th e distinctio n betwee n th e tw o i s constitutionall y sig nificant.49 However , on e canno t distinguis h a dual syste m fro m a unitary system simpl y b y lookin g a t it . Th e existenc e o f racia l imbalanc e amon g students or teachers does not alone establis h that a system i s dual. Rathe r the distinctio n betwee n a dua l an d a unitar y syste m depend s upo n th e factors t o whic h tha t racia l imbalanc e i s traceable. Racia l imbalanc e tha t is traceable t o impermissible discriminatio n o n th e part of schoo l official s causes a schoo l syste m t o b e characterize d a s a n unconstitutiona l dua l system. However , racia l imbalanc e tha t i s traceabl e t o th e exercis e o f permissible discretio n b y schoo l official s i n makin g decision s o f educa tional polic y permit s th e syste m t o b e characterize d a s a unitar y syste m despite it s racia l imbalance . Accordingly , th e differenc e betwee n a n un constitutional schoo l syste m an d a constitutiona l syste m turn s o n th e elusive distinctio n betwee n discriminatio n an d discretion . The tes t o n whic h th e Suprem e Cour t ha s settle d fo r determinin g whether a raciall y imbalance d schoo l syste m i s th e produc t o f discrimi nation o r discretio n i s whethe r th e racia l imbalanc e i n th e syste m i s de jure o r de facto i n nature. 50 De jure racia l imbalance , whic h result s fro m an intentiona l polic y o f racia l segregatio n tha t i s expresse d i n stat e law s or intentionall y discriminator y practices , i s deemed t o b e th e produc t o f impermissible discrimination . De facto racia l imbalance, which results primarily fro m segregate d residentia l patterns , i s deeme d t o b e th e produc t of permissibl e discretio n i n th e formulatio n o f schoo l distric t lines , at tendance zones , schoo l busin g programs, and th e like. 51 Accordingly , th e four segregate d schoo l system s tha t wer e hel d t o b e unconstitutiona l i n Brown itsel f wer e dua l system s becaus e the y resulte d fro m officia l an d explicit policie s o f publi c schoo l segregation. 52 However , th e schoo l sys tems i n suburba n Detroit , whic h th e Suprem e Cour t i n Milliken u BradleyS3 permitte d schoo l official s t o exclud e fro m a constitutionall y compelled pla n for th e desegregation o f Detroit' s inner-city schools, were unitary systems because their overwhelmingly white character had resulted from residentia l pattern s rathe r tha n fro m a n officia l polic y o f schoo l segregation.54 When a state or local school syste m admits that it is engaged i n de jure racial discrimination, as the school systems did in Brown,55 i t is a relatively simple matte r t o conclud e tha t th e syste m i s a n unconstitutiona l dua l system. However , whe n a schoo l syste m assert s tha t it s racia l imbalanc e

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5

is merely the de facto resul t of raciall y neutral policies that were designed to advanc e educationa l objective s unrelate d t o racia l segregation , prope r characterization o f th e system as dual or unitary becomes extremely problematic. O n on e level , prope r characterizatio n i s problemati c becaus e i t poses the same insoluble dilemma that is encountered whenever one seeks to apply the intent principle in the context of racially disparate treatment. 56 Just a s th e priso n segregatio n i n Lee u Washington coul d b e viewe d a s the produc t o f eithe r impermissibl e discriminatio n base d upo n rac e o r permissible discretio n base d upo n safety, the racial imbalance o f a school system ca n b e viewe d a s th e produc t o f eithe r impermissibl e de jure discrimination o r permissibl e de facto imbalanc e tha t i s attributable t o th e formulation o f educationa l policy . An additional problem i s encountered, however, eve n whe n th e facto r o f inten t i s hel d constant . Perhaps th e mos t strikin g featur e o f th e schoo l desegregatio n issu e i s the depth o f th e whit e oppositio n tha t i t arouses. 57 Whether on e focuse s on th e nee d t o sen d federa l troop s t o desegregat e th e school s i n Littl e Rock, Arkansas, 58 Governo r Georg e Wallac e blockin g th e schoolhous e doors to prevent the desegregation o f publi c schools in Alabama, 59 or the intense racia l violence tha t accompanied effort s t o desegregate th e schoo l system o f Sout h Boston, 60 i t i s plai n tha t publi c schoo l desegregatio n i s an issu e tha t man y white s regar d wit h vehemen t hostility . Althoug h th e liberal whit e majorit y tha t support s Brown v. Board of Education favor s school desegregatio n i n theory, 61 n o on e seem s t o wan t hi s o r he r ow n children t o atten d a desegregated school . I n the contex t o f "whit e flight" to suburba n an d privat e school s tha t i s designe d t o escap e th e desegre gation o f inner-cit y school systems, 62 it is difficult t o accept th e assurance of schoo l official s tha t factor s suc h a s th e optiona l attendanc e zones , school closings , new school sit e selections, and opposition t o busin g that have had the effect o f increasing rather than decreasing public school racial imbalance i s reall y th e exercis e o f discretio n concernin g matter s o f edu cational polic y tha t hav e nothin g t o do wit h race . Nevertheless , b y de clining t o recogniz e de facto segregatio n a s evidenc e tha t i s sufficien t t o establish th e existenc e o f a dual school system , the Supreme ha s imposed upon itsel f th e burde n o f distinguishin g betwee n permissibl e an d imper missible form s o f racia l imbalance . The Court' s decision s hav e bee n predictably inconsistent , becaus e th e discriminatio n principl e lack s sufficien t content t o contro l them . In 1973 , th e Cour t hel d i n Keyes u School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado,63 tha t th e predominantl y whit e school s surroundin g th e pre dominantly blac k an d Latin o inner-cit y school s i n Denve r wer e dual . A

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year later, in Milliken v. Bradley f* th e Cour t held tha t the predominantl y white school s surroundin g th e predominantl y blac k inner-cit y school s i n Detroit were unitary. More specifically, when the school official s i n Denver continued to honor existing attendance zone lines rather than redraw those lines i n a way tha t woul d permi t desegregatio n o f th e inner-cit y schools , the Cour t hel d tha t thi s decisio n wa s a n impermissibl e ac t o f discrimi nation. The fac t tha t official s ha d engage d i n pas t de jure discriminatio n with respect to some schools was evidence that every school i n the district was tainte d b y de jure discrimination , thu s requirin g a constitutionall y acceptable desegregatio n pla n t o includ e al l o f th e schools. 65 However , when th e schoo l official s i n Detroi t continue d t o hono r existin g schoo l district line s rathe r tha n redra w thos e line s i n a wa y tha t woul d permi t desegregation o f th e inner-cit y schools , th e Suprem e Cour t hel d tha t thi s decision wa s a permissibl e exercis e o f discretion . Althoug h th e official s had engage d i n past de jure discriminatio n wit h respec t t o th e inner-cit y schools, the recor d di d no t revea l an y de jure discrimination wit h respec t to th e surroundin g schools whos e predominantl y whit e characte r was the result o f residentia l patterns. 66 The two cases are indistinguishable. Bot h entail efforts b y white school officials t o preserv e th e de facto racia l imbalanc e tha t resulte d fro m res idential pattern s b y refusin g t o includ e surroundin g whit e school s i n a desegregation plan that was constitutionally required for inner-city schools. Moreover, bot h case s involve d heavil y minority , inner-cit y school s tha t simply could not b e desegregated without the inclusions of white students who live d outsid e o f th e inne r cit y i n th e applicabl e desegregatio n plan . The distinctio n tha t th e Suprem e Cour t offere d betwee n th e tw o case s is untenable. I t hel d tha t th e schoo l distric t line s i n Milliken wer e distin guishable fro m th e attendanc e zon e line s i n Keyes becaus e th e schoo l district line s i n Milliken reflecte d th e nee d fo r loca l contro l ove r th e operation o f school s bu t th e attendanc e zon e line s i n Keyes di d not . Accordingly, the Court rejecte d th e tria l court's conclusion tha t "[s]choo l district line s ar e simpl y matter s o f politica l convenienc e an d ma y not b e used t o den y constitutiona l rights." 67 The distinction , however , i s bot h non responsiv e an d artificial . The distinctio n i s non responsiv e becaus e th e bar e assertion tha t loca l control i s importan t say s nothin g abou t how importan t loca l contro l i s relative t o th e independen t goa l o f attainin g a meaningful leve l o f schoo l desegregation. I f th e objectiv e o f loca l contro l i s no t importan t enoug h to preclud e a n effective remed y fo r th e souther n de jure segregation tha t was foun d t o exis t i n Brown, wh y doe s i t becom e importan t enoug h t o

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7

preclude an effective remed y for the northern de jure segregation tha t was found t o exis t i n Milliken} Indeed , th e whol e poin t o f Brown wa s tha t the nationa l interes t i n schoo l desegregatio n wa s sufficientl y stron g t o override regiona l preference s fo r segregate d schools . The distinctio n i s artificial becaus e ther e i s no necessar y correlatio n betwee n schoo l distric t lines and local control. One can view schools as being controlled b y single unelected principals , b y unelecte d regiona l directors , b y electe d schoo l boards, b y electe d stat e official s wh o enac t educatio n legislation , o r b y elected federal official s wh o make conditional grants of educationa l fund s available t o th e states . Th e poin t alon g thi s continuu m a t whic h contro l changes fro m loca l t o nonloca l i s no t self-evident . Moreover , ther e i s nothing inheren t i n a schoo l district' s siz e o r populatio n tha t make s a school distric t lin e th e natura l lin e o f demarcatio n betwee n loca l an d nonlocal control . I n som e states , schoo l district s ar e smal l enoug h t o include onl y a few school s servin g a small numbe r of students. 68 I n other states, urba n schoo l district s ar e larg e enoug h t o encompas s literall y hundreds o f th e smal l schoo l district s tha t exis t i n mor e rura l jurisdic tions.69 Even i f th e distinctio n betwee n schoo l distric t line s an d attendanc e zone lines were meaningful, it would be easy to deconstruct that distinction so tha t i t produced th e opposit e result s i n Keyes an d Milliken. Assumin g that local control over the formulation and implementation of educationa l policy is important, local contro l i s more closely related to the attendance zone line s tha t th e Cour t disregarde d i n Keyes tha n to th e schoo l distric t lines tha t i t honore d i n Milliken. Becaus e attendanc e zone s ar e b y hy pothesis smalle r tha n schoo l district s withi n a given jurisdiction , respec t for attendanc e zon e line s wil l resul t i n mor e loca l contro l tha n respec t for schoo l distric t lines . The official s wh o se t polic y fo r a n attendanc e zone are more likely to be familiar with the educational policy preference s of th e resident s o f tha t attendanc e zon e tha n schoo l boar d official s wh o live i n distant part s o f a large schoo l district . Moreover , becaus e attend ance-zone policymaker s wil l ten d t o b e unelecte d professiona l educator s rather tha n politicall y vulnerabl e electe d schoo l boar d members , th e at tendance-zone official s wil l b e fre e t o focu s o n th e need s o f thei r ow n attendance zones without engagin g in the process of political compromis e that necessaril y color s th e policie s o f electe d schoo l boar d officials , wh o must balanc e th e divergen t interest s represente d i n thei r large r and less homogeneous schoo l districts . I n addition, the day-to-da y operationa l de cisions that are made by attendance-zone officials , relatin g to matters such as discipline , teachin g methods , an d extra-curricula r activities , ar e mor e

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likely t o b e th e sort s o f decision s fo r whic h loca l contro l i s desirable more likel y tha n district-wid e decision s tha t ca n implicat e matter s o f na tional importance , suc h a s th e natur e an d scop e o f schoo l desegregatio n in the district. Accordingly, if the Supreme Court were genuinely intereste d in fosterin g loca l control , i t woul d hav e mad e mor e sens e fo r th e Cour t to have honored the attendance-zone lines in Keyes, which relate to matters of permissibl e discretio n i n th e formulatio n o f educationa l policy , tha n to honor the school distric t line s in Milliken, whic h relat e to matter s that tend merel y t o camouflag e impermissibl e discrimination . The suggestio n tha t th e distinctio n betwee n impermissibl e discrimi nation and permissible discretio n i s what really accounts for the divergent results in Keyes and Milliken simply lacks plausibility. A much more credible accoun t i s tha t th e Suprem e Court , respondin g t o it s innat e majori tarianism, simply change d it s mind durin g the interva l betwee n Keyes and Milliken abou t th e advisabilit y o f interminglin g whit e suburba n student s and blac k inner-cit y students . Moreover , thi s chang e o f hear t seem s t o have coincided with a decline in popular support for school desegregation . When schoo l desegregatio n wa s a n issu e tha t affecte d onl y souther n schools, souther n regiona l oppositio n t o desegregatio n wa s strong , bu t national suppor t fo r desegregatio n wa s eve n stronger—stron g enoug h t o override souther n opposition . However , a s schoo l desegregatio n move d north i n th e 1970s , nationa l suppor t fo r desegregatio n bega n t o subside , and th e Suprem e Cour t bega n t o invalidat e schoo l desegregatio n plans. 70 In th e 1970s , politica l oppositio n t o desegregatio n bega n t o b e mor e vocal. Presiden t Nixon , wh o ha d bee n electe d i n 196 8 o n a politica l platform tha t included oppositio n t o busing , was reelected i n 1972 . That same year , Congres s als o enacte d th e Educatio n Amendment s o f 1972 , which prohibite d th e appropriatio n o f federa l fund s fo r busin g tha t wa s intended to achieve racial balance. In 1974, Congress amended this statute so tha t i t prohibited federa l court s fro m requirin g th e busin g o f student s beyond th e neares t neighborin g school s i n a n effor t t o remed y de facto segregation. Thi s politica l oppositio n continue d t o gro w durin g th e Re publican administration s o f th e 1970 s an d 1980s , a s Congres s propose d constitutional amendment s t o ba n busing , and a s the Reaga n administra tion ultimatel y pledge d no t t o see k busin g remedie s an d t o constru e nar rowly th e Court' s earlie r desegregatio n precedents. 71 The Suprem e Court' s desegregatio n decision s tracke d thi s increasin g political oppositio n to school desegregation . The early desegregation cases that arose in the south strongl y favored desegregatio n plan s that promised to work . Fo r example, Green v. County School Board 71 invalidate d free -

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9

dom o f choic e plan s becaus e the y wer e empiricall y unlikel y t o resul t i n meaningful level s o f schoo l desegregation . Similarly , Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education 71 authorize d the use of race-based pupil assignment and busing to achieve meaningful levels of desegregation. Keyes suggested tha t th e Cour t woul d continu e t o insis t o n meaningfu l deseg regation even in northern urban school districts. 74 In fact, for twenty years after it s 195 4 decisio n i n Brown, th e Cour t ha d neve r invalidate d a de segregation plan . The first Supreme Cour t decisio n t o d o s o wa s its 197 4 decision i n Milliken, whic h refuse d t o orde r th e inclusio n o f suburba n schools i n a desegregation pla n fo r inner-cit y Detroit. 75 From 197 4 unti l 1979 , th e Court' s respons e t o desegregatio n plan s fluctuated. I n the 197 6 cas e of Hills u GautreauxJ 6 th e Court authorized metropolitan-area remedie s for public housing discrimination even though it had rejected such remedie s for public school desegregatio n i n Milliken, thereby suggestin g tha t the Milliken holdin g would no t b e fata l t o deseg regation efforts. However , in 197 6 th e Court also held in Pasadena Board of Education u Spangler 77 tha t annua l readjustmen t o f attendanc e zone s was no t require d t o ensur e tha t desegregate d school s di d no t rever t t o predominantly minorit y school s a s a result o f populatio n shifts . I n 1977 , the Cour t onc e agai n considere d Milliken u Bradley™ thi s tim e holdin g that remedia l educatio n i n lie u o f th e race-base d pupi l assignmen t au thorized i n Swann coul d b e use d t o remed y pas t de jure segregatio n i n heavily blac k inner-cit y schoo l systems . Also i n 1977 , th e Cour t rejecte d the nee d fo r a system-wid e desegregatio n pla n fo r th e cit y o f Dayton , Ohio, i n Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, onl y t o chang e it s mind two years later in 197 9 whe n i t affirmed a system-wide plan for that same city. 79 In a second 197 9 case , the Court also affirmed a system-wide desegregation pla n fo r th e cit y o f Columbus , Ohio , i n Columbus Board of Education v. Penick.* 0 Since 1979 , th e Supreme Court' s decisions hav e been mor e uniform i n their toleranc e o f majoritaria n effort s t o dilut e th e desegregatio n obliga tions impose d o n publi c schoo l systems—effort s tha t wer e increasingl y shared b y black parent s who ha d become disillusione d wit h the potentia l of desegregatio n t o improv e th e educatio n o f blac k children. 81 I n 198 2 the Court issued two companion decisions that had the effect of permitting school system s t o terminat e thei r effort s t o remed y de facto segregatio n through busing. In Washington u Seattle School District No. i, 82 the Court invalidated a state-wide initiativ e tha t prohibited schoo l district s from or dering busing beyon d th e confines o f a student's neighborhood . I n Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles** the Court upheld

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a simila r initiativ e tha t prohibite d stat e court s fro m orderin g busin g t o eliminate de facto segregation . The Court offered esoteri c justifications fo r its differentia l treatmen t o f th e tw o cases , bu t eve n th e Seattle cas e lef t local schoo l district s fre e t o rejec t busin g remedie s i f the y wished. 84 I n the 198 6 cas e o f Bazemore u Friday™ th e Cour t uphel d a freedom-of choice remed y fo r de jure segregatio n practice d b y 4- H Club s tha t wer e organized throug h th e segregate d Nort h Carolin a publi c schools , eve n though th e pla n wa s seemingl y identica l t o th e freedo m o f choic e plan s that th e Cour t ha d invalidate d eightee n year s earlie r i n Green v. County School Board.* 6 In 1990 , the Court decided Missouri v. Jenkins*7 whic h invalidate d o n federalism ground s a tria l cour t orde r increasin g Kansa s City , Missouri , property taxe s i n orde r t o pa y fo r a sweepin g desegregatio n order . The majority held that, although th e Court did not hav e the power to increase taxes itself , i t di d hav e th e powe r t o orde r loca l governmen t official s t o increase taxe s t o pa y fo r a valid desegregatio n order . The Cour t di d not , however, reac h th e questio n o f whethe r th e distric t court' s orde r wa s a valid order. 88 In the 199 1 cas e of Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools u Dowell,* 9 th e cour t hel d tha t desegregatio n order s were intended to b e temporary in nature and that they could b e dissolved afte r good fait h compliance fo r a reasonable period of tim e that eliminated th e vestiges o f pas t discriminatio n t o th e exten t practicable , despit e th e con tinued existenc e o f avoidabl e one-rac e schools . The Suprem e Cour t ha s also hear d argument i n two desegregatio n case s tha t wil l giv e i t a further opportunity to determine whether previously dual systems become unitary after a perio d o f complianc e wit h a desegregatio n pla n tha t ha s bee n frustrated by resegregation or by school board policies that fail to minimize racial imbalance. 90 Because th e discriminatio n principl e i s imprecise , i t i s abl e t o captur e simultaneously bot h face s o f ou r cultura l ambivalenc e abou t schoo l de segregation in a way that permits the principle to b e deconstructed a t will. This, i n turn , enable s th e Suprem e Cour t t o approv e o r disapprov e de segregation plan s a s i t deem s appropriat e i n it s discretion . Onc e again , because tha t discretio n wil l reflec t majoritaria n preferences , th e discrim ination principl e canno t b e expecte d t o insulat e racia l minoritie s fro m popular politica l pressures . Th e increasingl y unreceptiv e tren d o f th e school desegregatio n cases , whic h correspond s t o a n increasingl y unre ceptive popular response to the prospect of continued efforts at meaningful school desegregation , illustrate s tha t th e Suprem e Cour t i s muc h mor e

APPLICATION O F PRINCIPLE S 8

l

likely t o respon d t o shift s i n majoritaria n attitude s abou t topica l issue s than t o resis t thos e shifts . The difficulties inheren t in properly interpreting the discrimination principle ar e endemic t o al l effort s a t principled interpretation . Becaus e lega l principles ca n b e deconstructed , the y provid e littl e assistanc e t o a Cour t seeking t o limi t th e implicatio n o f it s ow n discretio n i n th e applicatio n of th e principle s o n whic h i t relies . Thi s i s becaus e th e resul t produce d by a legal principl e reflect s littl e mor e tha n th e point a t which th e Cour t chooses to end the analytical process—a process that can in theory continue indefinitely, producing firstone result and then another. Rather than serving a constrainin g function , lega l principle s ironicall y en d u p increasin g th e Court's dependence on majoritarian-influenced discretion , minimizing only the degree t o whic h th e impac t o f suc h majoritaria n influenc e i s likely t o be detected . The phenomeno n o f deconstructio n illustrate s bu t on e o f th e man y difficulties tha t inher e i n th e traditiona l mode l o f judicia l review . Ulti mately, the traditional model cannot work because the countermajoritarian assumptions o n whic h i t i s base d ar e untenable . The traditiona l mode l posits th e existenc e o f a Supreme Cour t tha t i s capable o f protectin g th e interests o f racia l minoritie s b y supersedin g th e majoritaria n preference s that ar e socialize d int o th e justice s wh o si t o n th e Court . However , th e mechanisms relie d upo n t o ensur e thi s countermajoritarian capabilit y are ineffective. Neithe r th e forma l safeguard s o f lif e tenur e an d salar y pro tection no r th e operationa l safeguar d o f principle d adjudicatio n ca n successfully insulat e th e adjudicator y proces s fro m majoritaria n domination . The forma l safeguard s do no t eve n addres s th e proble m o f unconsciou s majoritarianism, which can significantly influence the actions of a socialized judiciary. Althoug h th e operationa l safeguar d o f principle d adjudicatio n nominally is addressed to that problem, it cannot effectivel y guar d against unconscious majoritarianis m becaus e th e adjudicator y proces s i s unabl e to insulat e judicia l decisionmakin g fro m th e vas t amounts o f judicia l dis cretion tha t ar e require d t o mak e th e proces s work . Eve n whe n lega l principles d o no t directl y incorporat e majoritaria n preference s int o thei r meanings, the loosely constrained discretion that is entailed in the selection and applicatio n o f governin g principle s provide s ampl e opportunit y fo r majoritarian concern s t o determin e judicia l outcomes . Ultimately , th e Supreme Court operate s as yet another majoritaria n branc h o f government , whose primary commitment i s to the advancement of majoritaria n desires. For self-interested reasons , the contemporary majority in the United States

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favors the continued subordination o f racia l minorities. However, it is also in the interes t o f th e majorit y t o hav e this subordination accomplishe d i n subtle rathe r tha n conspicuou s ways . Par t I I of thi s boo k describe s ho w the Suprem e Cour t serve s th e majorit y b y perpetuatin g suc h subtl e subordination.

C H A P T E R6

The Politica l Alternativ e

Contemporary minorit y attractio n t o judicia l revie w ha s bee n premise d on th e belie f tha t th e framers ' politica l safeguard s agains t factionalis m could no t adequatel y protec t th e interest s o f racia l minorities who woul d effectively b e under-enfranchise d b y their discret e an d insula r character. 1 Moreover, an y effectivenes s tha t th e structura l safeguard s migh t initiall y have ha d wa s furthe r calle d int o questio n b y th e substantia l dilutio n o f those safeguard s tha t occurre d durin g th e Ne w Deal. 2 However , reex amination o f thes e assumption s i n ligh t o f th e majoritarianis m inheren t in judicia l revie w suggest s tha t whateve r thei r defects , th e politica l safe guards hol d mor e promis e fo r contemporar y racia l minoritie s tha n con tinued relianc e o n judicia l review . Par t I of thi s boo k ha s suggeste d tha t Supreme Court dispositions o f lega l claims will ultimatel y b e governed by the majoritarian-influence d persona l preference s o f th e justice s who con sider thos e claims . Thi s mean s tha t th e judicia l proces s i s ultimatel y a political process—preference s rathe r tha n principle s wil l determin e out comes. Accordingly , th e appropriat e minorit y respons e t o suc h judicia l majoritarianism shoul d b e a political response . In ligh t o f th e failur e o f countermajoritarianism , minoritie s coul d ra tionally choos e t o foreg o relianc e o n judicia l revie w altogethe r an d con centrate their efforts t o advance minority interest s on th e overtly political branches o f government . Th e framer s ha d fait h i n th e abilit y o f pluralis t politics to protect the minority interest s with which the y were concerned . Moreover, th e politica l branche s hav e historicall y don e mor e tha n th e Supreme Court to advance minority interests. In addition, the predominant role of th e Court , consistent wit h it s veiled majoritaria n design , has bee n

85

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to retar d th e rat e a t whic h minorit y claim s o f entitlemen t coul d prevai l at th e expens e o f majorit y interests . A s i s discusse d i n Chapte r 7 below , it turns out tha t even Brown v. Board of Education, 3 th e case most ofte n cited a s establishin g th e viabilit y o f countermajoritaria n review , ca n b e better understood as a product of veiled majoritarianism than as a triumph of th e traditiona l model. Therefore , t o th e exten t tha t i t i s possibl e fo r minorities t o foreg o Suprem e Cour t guardianshi p ove r thei r interest s i n favor o f th e protection s availabl e throug h th e pur e politica l process , th e political optio n ha s considerabl e appeal . However , i t i s no t possibl e t o exclude th e Suprem e Cour t fro m th e politica l process . Moreover , whe n the Cour t doe s intervene , it s interventio n wil l b e inherentl y conservative . Pure Politics In a contest betwee n competin g societa l interest s tha t i s ultimately t o b e judged by political considerations, minorities might well prefer to compete in an arena tha t i s openly political , rathe r tha n on e fro m whic h politica l concerns hav e nominall y bee n excluded . I n a n overtl y politica l process , minority interest s wil l receiv e whateve r degre e o f deferenc e thei r innat e strength ca n command , subjec t onl y t o limitation s i n th e bargainin g an d organizational skill s of minorit y politicians . I n a positive sense , therefore , the over t politica l proces s i s pure. Outcomes ar e determined b y countin g votes, wit h n o nee d t o conside r th e reason s fo r whic h thos e vote s wer e cast. Moreover, the process purports to b e nothing more than what it is— a pluralisti c mechanis m fo r th e generatio n o f bindin g results . Althoug h rhetorical principle s ma y accompany th e solicitatio n o f politica l support , the principle s themselve s ar e inconsequential . N o on e care s muc h abou t their content, an d their meaning i s measured onl y b y the exten t t o whic h their rhetorica l invocatio n prove s t o b e effective . For racia l minorities , th e over t politica l proces s ha s tw o attractions . The first i s tha t i t i s definitionall y immun e fro m distortio n becaus e i t essentially ha s n o rule s tha t ca n b e violated . I n th e film Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, 4 Butc h Cassidy was able t o prevai l i n a knife fight over one of his adversaries by exploiting the absence of formal rules. Butch first suggeste d tha t h e and hi s adversary neede d t o clarif y th e rule s of th e knife fight. A s th e adversary—pu t off-guar d b y Butch' s suggestion—pro tested that there was no such thing as "rules" in a knife fight, Butch kicked the adversar y ver y har d i n a very sensitiv e par t o f hi s anatomy. Wit h thi s one actio n Butc h wa s able bot h t o establis h th e trut h o f th e propositio n

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7

being asserte d b y hi s adversar y an d t o capitaliz e o n tha t propositio n i n order t o wi n th e fight. As a matte r o f lega l positivism , th e pur e politica l proces s i s nothin g more tha n th e proces s o f castin g an d countin g votes . Outcome s canno t be righ t o r wrong , no r ca n the y b e jus t o r unjust . The y ar e simpl y th e outcomes tha t th e proces s produces . Althoug h outcome s ma y b e deter mined b y ho w th e issue s ar e framed , ho w suppor t fo r thos e issue s i s secured, an d eve n b y who i s permitted t o vote , minoritie s shoul d no t b e distracted b y consideration s relatin g t o whethe r th e proces s i s operatin g fairly. The process simply works the way it works. What minorities shoul d focus on is how bes t to maximize their influence i n that process. Minorit y participation i n pluralist politic s can , o f course , tak e th e for m o f voting , running for office, o r making campaign contributions, but it is not limite d to thos e form s o f involvement . Minorit y participatio n ca n als o tak e th e form o f demonstrations , boycotts , and riots. Although suc h activities may be independently illegal , for purposes of positive politics their significanc e is limited t o thei r potential fo r increasin g or decreasing political strength . This i s no t t o sa y tha t ther e ar e n o rule s a t al l governin g th e positiv e political process. There are operative rules that determine which strategies will increas e an d whic h wil l decreas e politica l power . However , th e op erative rule s are not onl y to o comple x an d contingen t t o permi t the m t o be articulate d accurately , bu t ther e i s n o nee d t o articulat e thos e rules , because th e selectiv e responsivenes s o f th e politica l proces s itsel f wil l promote complianc e wit h thos e rule s withou t regar d t o th e accurac y o f their formal expression. The process of positive politics—like a knife fight— cannot be distorted because it has no formal rules . And the operative rules that d o gover n th e proces s ten d t o b e self-enforcing . I n thi s sense , th e pure political proces s i s no t onl y positivist , bu t realis t a s well . There are , o f course , competin g conception s o f th e politica l proces s under which the process is more principled than it is under my conception. Because those conceptions postulate adherence to principle, however, they share th e sam e weaknesse s tha t ar e inheren t i n a principle d mode l o f judicial review . Th e valu e o f politic s a s I have conceptualize d i t her e i s that it escapes the need to depend upon principle for its proper operation. Nevertheless, I do not wish to overstat e th e degree to which pure politics need b e a self-regulating endeavor . Bribery , ballo t bo x stuffing , an d vot e miscounting coul d b e considere d form s o f misconduc t tha t requir e ex ternal regulation—althoug h stron g realis t argument s coul d b e mad e tha t even thes e abuses are subject t o correctio n b y the political proces s itself . Nor d o I wish t o obscur e th e fac t tha t differentia l acces s t o th e politica l

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process ca n drasticall y affec t politica l outcomes . Rather , th e presen t ar gument i s tha t despit e thes e potentia l abuses , th e politica l proces s ma y still be preferable t o policymaking processes involving the Supreme Court. I also realiz e tha t som e advocate s o f politica l pluralis m hol d th e politica l process i n hig h regard , according it s outcome s th e imprimatu r o f demo cratic legitimacy. 5 Th e advantage s o f positiv e politic s o n whic h I am fo cusing, however , d o no t res t upo n normativ e claim s o f externa l validity . The secon d attractio n o f th e over t politica l proces s i s tha t i t permit s minorities to assume ultimate responsibilit y fo r their own interests . There are, o f course , inheren t limit s o n th e politica l strengt h o f an y interes t group. Within those limits, however, positive politics gives minorities themselves contro l ove r th e degre e t o whic h minorit y interest s ar e advanced . It is minorities who determine how important it is for minorities to engage in politica l activity ; i t i s minoritie s wh o determin e ho w muc h politica l activity is appropriate; and it is minorities who decide what minority priorities should b e in selecting among competin g political objectives . Positiv e politics give s minoritie s bot h th e credi t fo r minorit y advance s an d th e blame fo r minorit y failures . B y thu s promotin g minorit y self-determina tion, positiv e politic s elevate s minorit y dignit y an d self-estee m i n a way that i s likel y t o b e o f mor e long-ter m significanc e tha n minorit y succes s in advancing any particular interest . The politic s inheren t i n th e proces s o f judicia l revie w i s o f a differen t order. Wher e th e over t politica l proces s i s transparen t an d unassuming , the Supreme Court political process is opaque and pretentious. The Court requires its political bargainin g to b e conducted i n the vernacular of lega l principle, an d it s referend a t o b e cloake d i n th e mantl e o f reasone d de liberation. Moreover , becaus e judicia l conventio n require s th e justice s t o camouflage th e politica l preference s tha t ultimatel y gover n thei r applications o f principle , politica l negotiatio n wit h th e Cour t i s haphazar d an d imprecise. Judicia l opinion s mus t b e deciphere d fo r th e clue s tha t the y contain regardin g th e concession s fo r whic h a justice wil l commi t hi s o r her vote . An d onc e a commitmen t i s made , member s o f th e Cour t ar e largely imperviou s t o an y leverag e throug h whic h futur e fidelity t o tha t commitment coul d b e enforced. Unlik e th e positive politica l proces s that is effectively immun e fro m distortion , th e Suprem e Cour t proces s i s itself a distortio n tha t render s th e outcome s o f ordinar y politic s uncertain . Moreover, becaus e i t i s th e Cour t rathe r tha n th e pluralis t proces s tha t has the final say over which of the competing political interests will prevail, it is the Court, rather than the affected minority group, that retains ultimate control ove r th e fat e o f th e minorit y group' s interests .

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The positive reasoning that permits one to conceive of the overt political process as immune from the possibility of distortion also makes it possible to characteriz e th e Suprem e Cour t politica l proces s i n suc h terms . How ever, thi s doe s no t undermin e th e reasonablenes s o f a preferenc e tha t minorities migh t hav e fo r a simple proces s tha t doe s no t involv e th e Supreme Cour t ove r a comple x proces s tha t does . I t i s easie r fo r les s ex perienced player s t o maste r th e skill s require d fo r effectiv e participatio n in a simpl e proces s tha n t o acquir e th e skill s demande d o f a comple x process. Moreover , a preferenc e fo r simplicit y i s particularl y sensibl e i f complexities ar e differentiall y beneficia l t o participant s dependin g o n whether they wish to maintain or to change the status quo. There is reason to believ e tha t Suprem e Cour t politica l complexit y create s jus t suc h a differential benefit , working to the disadvantage of minorities who typically wish t o alte r rathe r than preserv e th e socioeconomi c statu s quo . The Suprem e Cour t adjudicator y proces s i s political , bu t it s politica l dimensions ar e comple x an d obscure . Eve n thoug h al l o f th e interes t groups competing fo r Supreme Cour t endorsemen t wil l b e burdene d similarly by the complexities of the Supreme Court process, a rational minority response to those complexities would nevertheless be to prefer the candor and eleganc e o f representativ e politics . Pluralis t politics is , of course , n o panacea. It s historical los s of favo r reflects genuine grounds for concern. 6 Nevertheless, pluralis t negotiatio n offer s mor e t o minoritie s tha n contin ued relianc e o n judicia l review . A s i s discusse d below , politica l theor y suggests that minority interests can successfully influenc e majoritarian politics. Moreover , minorit y interest s hav e historically bee n bette r served b y the representativ e branche s tha n b y the Suprem e Court , notwithstandin g New Dea l evisceratio n o f th e structura l minorit y safeguards . Minority Influence in Pluralist Politics There are at least three reason s for which majoritaria n institution s ca n be expected t o respon d t o minorit y political preferences . First , the logrollin g process through whic h pluralist political theor y predicts tha t majoritaria n public policy will be developed gives minorities a degree of influenc e ove r policy formulatio n tha t is commensurate wit h minorit y political strength . Second, it will often b e in the long term best interest of th e majority itself to protec t minorit y interests . Third , minoritie s ca n negotiat e politica l concessions fro m th e majorit y b y invokin g th e apparen t nee d o f majori tarian institutions t o conceiv e o f themselve s a s capable o f countermajor itarian acts. Although innat e political strengt h impose s a theoretical limi t

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on th e concession s tha t minoritie s ar e ultimately abl e t o secur e fro m th e majority, minorit y politica l skill s ar e likel y t o hav e th e mos t immediat e impact o n th e scop e o f suc h concessions . Pluralist politica l theor y predict s tha t i n a representativ e democracy , majoritarian publi c polic y wil l b e formulate d throug h a proces s o f ne gotiations betwee n interes t groups . Som e theorists , ofte n referre d t o a s civic republica n theorists , view th e negotiatio n proces s a s an opportunit y for collectiv e deliberatio n throug h whic h virtuou s civi c policie s ca n b e developed tha t transcen d th e selfis h desire s o f th e negotiatin g interes t groups.7 Fo r these theorists , the interest s o f racia l minoritie s wil l b e protected b y the prevailing moral theory to which th e deliberants collectivel y adhere.8 Others , ofte n referre d t o a s publi c choic e theorists , vie w th e political proces s a s a n inherentl y self-intereste d on e i n whic h th e mos t powerful specia l interest s will combin e force s t o impos e thei r will o n les s powerful interes t groups , ofte n t o th e detrimen t o f th e overal l publi c welfare.9 Fo r these theorists , the interest s of racia l minoritie s wil l b e protected onl y t o th e exten t tha t racia l minoritie s hav e th e politica l powe r to protect themselves. 10 Even assuming that the less flatteringpublic choice depiction i s correct—tha t publi c polic y result s simpl y fro m a proces s o f logrolling during which interes t groups selfishly pursu e their own interest s by trading votes o n on e issu e fo r suppor t o n anothe r wit h no regar d fo r the overridin g publi c good—contemporar y racia l minoritie s posses s suf ficient political influenc e t o participat e effectivel y i n that process. Indeed , the les s flattering characterization ma y b e th e on e tha t i s preferabl e t o minorities, becaus e i t minimize s th e nee d fo r externa l regulatio n o f th e political process , whic h coul d reintroduc e th e danger s o f veile d majori tarianism. An y theor y whic h require s th e majorit y t o adher e t o a sub stantive mora l theory , o r eve n t o a theory o f elaborat e procedura l regu larity, requires some mechanis m t o enforc e tha t adherence . T o the exten t that th e mechanis m resemble s judicia l review , al l o f th e problem s asso ciated wit h veile d majoritarianis m ar e posed onc e again . One coul d debat e whethe r racia l minoritie s hav e always possessed th e power to protec t thei r own interest s throug h participatio n i n the pluralis t political process . Obviously , th e histor y o f de jure racia l disenfranchise ment i n thi s countr y make s suc h a n argumen t difficul t t o maintain . The argument i s no t a n impossibl e one , however . Sometimes , surrogat e rep resentation ca n compensat e fo r th e lac k o f powe r t o vot e directly . Fo r example, whit e wome n almos t certainl y ha d a highe r standar d o f livin g than blac k me n betwee n enactmen t o f th e thirteent h an d th e nineteent h amendments, even though blac k me n could vot e and white women coul d

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not.11 Moreover , white children presently have a higher standard of livin g than blac k adults , eve n thoug h blac k adult s ca n vot e an d whit e childre n cannot.12 In addition, despite their disenfranchisement, black s and women were someho w abl e t o secur e th e righ t t o vot e throug h operatio n o f th e political process , eve n afte r th e Suprem e Cour t ha d faile d them. 13 Fo r present purposes, however, it is not necessary to determin e whether racial minorities hav e always possessed th e power to protect thei r own interest s through pluralis t politics . Today, i t i s plain tha t minoritie s do possess significan t politica l power . This is demonstrated b y evidence as varied as the success of blac k political candidates among white voter s in recent regiona l elections, 14 the strength of Jesse Jackson's showings in the 1984 and 1988 presidential campaigns, 15 the adoptio n o f minorit y set-asid e program s suc h a s th e on e tha t th e Supreme Court invalidated i n City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 16 an d the notabl e presenc e o f minorit y actor s i n television show s an d commer cials.17 Pluralist political strengt h stems in part from numerical votin g strength as a percentage o f th e tota l electorate . Today , minorit y group s compris e a larg e percentag e o f th e tota l electorate . Black s currentl y compris e ap proximately 1 0 percent o f th e electorate. 18 Latino s compris e anothe r 8. 2 percent, an d th e Latin o populatio n i s growing five time s faste r tha n th e population a t large. 19 B y the middl e o f th e nex t century, whites will con stitute a minority.20 Accordingly, in sheer numerical terms, racial minorities can for m votin g coalitions o f eithe r a temporar y o r a lasting natur e tha t have sufficien t politica l strengt h t o deman d concession s fro m th e major ity.21 Of course, pluralist political power does not result solely from innate voting strength . Minorit y votin g strengt h ca n b e supplemente d b y th e support o f majorit y voter s wh o perceiv e a correspondence betwee n thei r own interest s an d minorit y interest s o n particula r issues , a s wel l a s b y majority voters who ar e simply sympathetic t o minorit y preferences. Suc h majority-minority coalitions wil l no t b e formed i f the discrete and insular nature of a minority group cause s majorit y member s to refus e t o bargai n with tha t group . However , tha t doe s no t see m presentl y t o b e th e case . The availabl e evidenc e indicate s tha t th e majorit y is currentl y bargainin g with racia l minorities . Not onl y doe s th e varie d evidenc e discusse d abov e beli e th e suspicio n that whites will refuse to bargain with racial minorities, but the remarkable popularity enjoyed by the Bill Cosby television show attests to the erosion of feelings of alienation that might preclude such bargaining. The fact that The Cosby Show, whic h weekly—eve n dail y i n som e markets—depicte d

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blacks, whites, and Latinos interacting in a relaxed and uneventful manner , was able to achieve considerable popularity among white viewers suggests the beginning s o f cultura l assimilatio n tha t will increase th e likelihoo d o f future majority-minorit y coalitions . A s th e degre e o f assimilatio n grows , race will ultimately come to lose its status as a characteristic around which interest grou p identitie s wil l b e formed . Th e prospectiv e barrier s t o plu ralist bargainin g ar e likel y t o b e mor e economi c tha n racial—th e Cosby characters ar e firmly upper-middl e class . Althoug h ther e ma y b e man y sound reasons for which one would object to the loss of distinctive cultural identity attendan t t o assimilatio n int o th e dominan t culture , i n term s o f the singl e goa l o f advancin g pluralis t politica l power , assimilatio n seem s likely t o b e beneficial . The welfare o f minorit y interest s is not limite d solel y t o gains that can be attributed to minority political power in the logrolling process. Minority interests can also benefit incidentall y fro m selfish action s that the majority takes in order to advanc e it s own interests . Slavery offers a crass example. Assuming tha t slav e owner s hav e n o concer n fo r th e welfar e o f minorit y human beings , productivity concern s wil l nevertheles s caus e slave owner s to mak e food , clothing , an d shelte r concession s t o thei r minorit y slaves . Although on e coul d argu e tha t thes e productivit y concern s i n fac t giv e slaves th e politica l powe r t o deman d concessions , tha t characterizatio n seems unrealistic . Th e cost t o slave s o f exercisin g whateve r bargainin g leverage the y ma y theoretically b e sai d t o posses s i s simply prohibitive. It is more meaningful to conceive of such concessions as incidents of majority efforts t o advanc e thei r ow n interests , whic h occu r independen t o f th e exercise of minority political power. This suggests that minorities can maximize thei r welfare b y allocating th e political capita l tha t the y do posses s to interest s tha t ar e no t subjec t t o suc h derivativ e advancement . To th e exten t tha t minorit y politician s ar e skillfu l i n framin g th e presentation o f politica l issues , the y ca n defin e issue s relevan t t o minorit y interests in ways that make them appear to b e issues that advance majority preferences. The current abortion controversy may provide a contemporary example. If one assumes that liberal access to abortion services will advance minority interests—somethin g tha t is , of course , open t o debate—i t migh t make sens e fo r minorit y politicians t o allocat e thei r political resource s t o different issues , believin g tha t politicall y powerfu l whit e middle-clas s women wil l ensur e such libera l acces s fo r themselve s an d incidentally fo r minority women . Thi s i s a useful example , becaus e i t als o illustrate s th e potential dange r o f pursuin g suc h a n allocatio n strategy . I t ma y wel l b e that the political preference s o f whit e middle-clas s women will ultimatel y

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prevail o n th e abortio n issue , bu t tha t thei r victor y wil l b e obtaine d b y deflecting anti-abortio n oppositio n awa y from themselve s an d toward minority abortions . Arguably , tha t i s precisel y wha t happene d afte r Roe v. Wade,22 when liberal access to abortion services was available but abortion funding wa s not. 23 Accordingly , althoug h minorit y politica l strengt h ca n be enhance d b y freeridin g o n majorit y preferences , th e strateg y ca n b e a risky one . In additio n t o it s inheren t votin g strength , supplemente d b y partici pation i n voting coalitions , effectiv e minorit y politica l powe r ca n also b e enhanced by playing upon the majority's own need to believe itself capable of countermajoritaria n sensitivities . The countermajoritaria n mode l o f judicial revie w wa s not preordained . Rather , it was a liberal politica l inven tion designe d t o counterac t majoritaria n threat s t o individua l libert y tha t the majorit y itsel f perceive d t o b e quit e real. 24 Paradoxically , continue d faith i n th e viabilit y o f thi s inventio n i s essentia l t o continue d majorit y acquiescence in majoritarian authority. This means that the Supreme Court must exhibi t sufficien t deferenc e t o minorit y interest s durin g th e proces s of judicia l revie w t o reassur e th e majorit y o f th e Court' s countermajori tarian capabilities . I n addition t o th e victorie s tha t minoritie s ar e able t o secure throug h th e over t politica l process , therefore , minoritie s ca n als o win some politica l victorie s befor e th e Supreme Court, which b y hypothesis the y coul d no t wi n throug h th e politica l branches . A s i s discusse d below,25 effectiv e us e o f th e Suprem e Cour t a s a political institutio n ca n be bot h difficul t an d risk y enoug h that , i f give n th e option , minoritie s would choos e simpl y t o avoi d th e Court . T o th e exten t tha t th e optio n of avoidanc e is unavailable, however, skillful us e of th e Court can provide yet another method for increasing the amount of operative political power that minoritie s possess . In theory , th e magnitud e o f minorit y politica l influenc e i s subjec t t o innate limits that correspond to inherent minority political strength. Those limits, however , ar e o f mor e theoretica l tha n practica l interes t becaus e they will never be reached. Variations in operative minority political power are s o likel y t o resul t fro m th e manne r i n whic h minoritie s mak e thei r political judgment s an d exercis e thei r political skill s tha t th e innat e limi tations become relatively insignificant. Questions concerning when to form coalitions, whe n t o freerid e o n majoritaria n preferences , ho w t o fram e political issues , and whe n t o involv e th e Suprem e Cour t ar e s o comple x that ther e wil l alway s b e opportunitie s fo r minoritie s t o increas e thei r political strengt h b y increasin g thei r political skills .

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Minority Frustrations in the Supreme Court The influenc e tha t pluralis t theor y predict s minoritie s wil l hav e i n th e majoritarian politica l proces s ha s bee n born e ou t empirically . Minoritie s have no t onl y secure d significan t concession s fro m th e representativ e branches, bu t th e representativ e branche s hav e typicall y don e more tha n the Suprem e Cour t t o advanc e minorit y interests . I n fact , th e Suprem e Court's civil rights performance ha s historically been so disappointing that it lend s little , i f any , suppor t t o th e traditiona l mode l o f judicia l review . Rather, the Court' s decision s serv e mor e a s a refutation tha n a validation of countermajoritaria n judicia l capacity . The advancement of minorit y interests in the United States has typically been secure d throug h th e politica l process . The mos t obviou s exampl e i s the manumission of blac k slaves. Slavery itself wa s a political creatio n that the majoritaria n framer s chos e t o accor d som e degre e o f constitutiona l protection. The Constitutio n contain s thre e provision s tha t ar e explicitl y addressed t o slavery. 26 Articl e I , sectio n 9 , claus e 1 prohibit s Congres s from terminating the importation of ne w slaves until 1808 , and authorizes the impositio n o f a federal ta x o n importe d slaves. 27 Article I , section 2 , clause 3 apportion s legislativ e representatio n i n th e Hous e o f Represen tatives on th e basi s of stat e population, counting each slave as three-fifth s of a person fo r apportionment purposes. 28 Articl e IV , section 2 , claus e 3 prohibits one stat e fro m accordin g fre e statu s t o a slave who ha s escaped to tha t stat e fro m anothe r state. 29 A t th e tim e tha t th e Constitutio n wa s ratified, slaver y wa s a very contentiou s issu e tha t th e framer s anticipate d would continu e t o b e th e focu s o f futur e politica l attention. 30 Tha t at tention gradually resulted in total emancipation. First, some northern states enacted legislation that abolished slavery within their jurisdictions.31 Then, Congress enacted federal legislation prohibiting slavery in the new territory acquired throug h th e Louisian a Purchase. 32 Next , i n 186 1 afte r th e out break o f th e Civi l War , President Lincol n issue d th e Emancipatio n Proc lamation, which abolished slavery in the southern states. 33 Finally, in 186 5 after th e en d o f th e Civi l War , Congres s adopte d an d th e state s ratifie d the thirteent h amendment , abolishin g slaver y throughou t th e Unite d States.34 Manumission illustrate s tha t eve n th e interest s o f completel y di senfranchised minoritie s wil l b e advance d throug h th e politica l proces s when the y correspon d t o th e perceive d interest s o f th e majority. 35 Manumission als o illustrate s tha t th e political proces s ca n prove t o b e much mor e advantageou s t o racia l minoritie s tha n th e judicia l process . When th e Suprem e Cour t wa s give n th e opportunit y t o limi t slaver y si x

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years befor e th e Emancipatio n Proclamatio n i n th e infamou s Dred Scott case,36 i t decline d t o do so , issuin g a n opinio n s o demeanin g t o black s that i t read s lik e a parod y o f Suprem e Cour t insensitivit y t o minorit y interests. In rejecting th e clai m o f fre e statu s asserted b y a slave who had been take n b y hi s owne r t o a fre e state , the n t o th e Louisian a Territor y where slavery had been prohibited, and then brough t bac k t o th e owner' s original slave state, Chief Justice Taney's opinion made two assertions that are remarkable coming from a purportedly countermajoritarian institution. First, th e opinio n asserte d tha t th e cour t lacke d jurisdictio n ove r th e suit becaus e th e subhuma n characte r o f th e blac k plaintif f deprive d hi m of th e capacit y fo r citizenshi p require d t o invok e th e Court' s diversit y jurisdiction. The opinio n states : The words "people of the United States" and "citizens" are synonymous terms, and mean the same thing....The questio n befor e u s is, whether [blacks are] a portion of thi s people.... W e think they are not and that they are not included, and were not intended t o b e included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore clai m non e of th e right s and privileges which tha t instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they wer e at that tim e considered a s a subordinate and inferio r clas s of beings , who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to thei r authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power and the Government might choose to grant them. ** * It is difficult at this day to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution of th e Unite d State s wa s frame d an d adopted . Bu t th e publi c histor y o f ever y European nation displays it in a manner too plain to be mistaken. They had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogethe r unfi t t o associat e wit h th e whit e race , either i n socia l o r political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. 37 Second, eve n thoug h th e Cour t lacke d jurisdiction , th e opinio n wen t on t o declar e tha t the provision o f th e Missouri Compromis e statut e tha t prohibited slavery in the Louisian a Territory was unconstitutional becaus e it deprived slave owners of a property interest i n their slaves. The opinio n states: [The] right of propert y in a slave is distinctly an d expressly affirmed i n the Constitution. Th e right to traffi c i n it , lik e a n ordinar y articl e o f merchandis e and

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property, was guarantied t o th e citizens o f th e Unite d States , in every State that might desire it, for twenty years. And the Government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time , if the slave escapes from his owner. This is done in plain words—too plain to be misunderstood. And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles property o f tha t kin d t o les s protectio n tha n property o f an y other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.38 The first assertion i s remarkabl e becaus e i t evidence s a n unmistakabl y strong attitudina l predispositio n tha t woul d see m t o b e disqualifyin g fo r an institutio n charge d wit h safeguardin g minorit y interests . Considerin g the range of political position s concernin g slavery that existed at the time, the subhuman position adopted b y the Court seems to have been the most disadvantageous t o blacks . Although Chie f Justice Taney purported t o b e reporting th e view s o f th e framer s rathe r tha n hi s ow n view s concernin g the statu s o f blacks, 39 th e ton e o f Taney' s opinio n belie s an y suggestio n that Taney himself di d not share those views. Although slavery has existed in numerou s societie s an d cultures , th e bran d o f slaver y tha t existe d i n the American south developed to the highest degree a slaveholder ideology under whic h th e hono r o f th e slaveholde r wa s directl y dependen t upo n the degradatio n o f th e slave. 40 The secon d assertio n i s remarkabl e becaus e i t reveal s tha t thi s sub human-property predispositio n o f th e Cour t wa s so stron g that th e Court felt itsel f obligate d t o invalidat e a majoritarian enactmen t limitin g th e spread of slavery . And i t did so after havin g relied upo n th e nee d t o defe r to majoritarian policymakers as a justification fo r its jurisdictional holding . In justifyin g it s conclusio n tha t th e subhuma n characte r o f black s mad e them incapabl e i n th e eye s o f th e framer s o f acquirin g th e citizenshi p necessary t o giv e th e Cour t jurisdiction , th e opinio n states : It is not the province of th e court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of thes e laws. The decision of tha t question belonge d t o the political or law-making power . .. 4 1 It is more than a little ironic that the Court found itself to lack jurisdiction to entertai n suit s filed by those whos e interest s i t was required t o protec t under th e traditiona l model . Although i t i s possible t o argu e tha t Chief Justice Tane y wa s deferrin g to th e majoritaria n framer s rathe r than t o th e majoritaria n Congres s tha t enacted th e Missour i Compromise , argument s of thi s type pose insolubl e analytical difficulties. Wher e the framers did not specifically provide other-

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wise,42 i t i s reasonabl e t o conclud e tha t the y desire d congressiona l pref erences t o govern resolutio n o f futur e issue s tha t woul d aris e concernin g slavery.43 However, the framers may have specifically "provide d otherwise" by includin g i n th e Constitutio n th e protection s fo r privat e propert y o n which Chie f Justic e Tane y relie d t o invalidat e th e Missour i Compromis e prohibition o n slavery. 44 I t is precisely thi s sort o f analytica l difficult y tha t Part I of thi s boo k argue s ca n b e resolve d onl y throug h recours e t o th e personal preference s o f individua l judges . I t is also possible t o argue tha t the Dred Scott Cour t wa s engage d i n a n ac t o f countermajoritarianis m precisely becaus e i t did invalidat e the majoritarian Missour i Compromise , in orde r t o preven t th e majoritaria n abrogatio n o f individua l propert y rights. This argument, however , is suspect becaus e th e Missour i Compro mise appear s t o hav e bee n politicall y dea d a t th e tim e o f it s judicia l in validation, thereb y makin g th e Court' s decisio n mor e majoritaria n tha n countermajoritarian.45 Most o f th e judicial encounter s wit h slavery that occurred prior to th e Civil Wa r resulted i n judicia l invalidatio n o f majoritaria n effort s t o limi t slavery.4* Dred Scott wa s the second Suprem e Court decision t o invalidat e a congressiona l enactmen t o n constitutiona l grounds ; Marbury itsel f wa s the first. Dred Scott, therefore , ca n b e see n a s continuin g th e Suprem e Court tradition established i n Marbury o f sacrificin g th e interests of thos e that th e Cour t i s charge d wit h protectin g i n orde r t o advanc e ulterio r political objectives. 47 The major advances that racial minorities have made since manumissio n have also come fro m the representativ e branches . The fourteent h amend ment overrule d Dred Scott b y granting citizenshi p t o blacks , an d i t provided constitutiona l validatio n fo r th e Reconstructio n civi l right s statute s now codified i n §§ 1981, 1982 , and 198 3 o f Title 4 2 o f th e United States Code.48 After a post-Reconstruction laps e in congressional responsivenes s to minority interests, there was a mid-twentieth century revival of congressional civi l right s activity . The Civi l Right s Act s o f 1957 49 an d i960 5 0 created federa l remedie s fo r votin g discrimination . Th e omnibu s Civi l Rights Ac t o f 196 4 prohibite d variou s type s o f publi c an d privat e dis crimination. Among its most significan t provision s are Title II , which prohibits discriminatio n i n publi c accommodations, 51 Titl e IV , whic h au thorizes th e Attorne y Genera l t o maintai n schoo l desegregatio n suits, 52 Title VI , which prohibit s segregatio n i n schools receivin g federa l funds, 53 and Title VII, which prohibits discrimination in employment.54 The Voting Rights Act s o f 1965, 55 1970, 56 an d 1975 57 substantiall y enhance d th e federal safeguards against voting discrimination containe d i n the 195 7 and

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i960 Act s b y suspendin g literac y test s fo r vote r registratio n an d b y re quiring Attorne y Genera l preclearanc e o f apportionmen t change s tha t might b e use d t o dilut e minorit y votin g strength. 58 The Fai r Housing Ac t of 1968 59 contain s provision s tha t prohibi t discriminatio n i n th e sal e o r rental o f housing , an d i t impose s increase d federa l crimina l sanction s fo r the violatio n o f individua l civi l rights. 60 The Publi c Work s Employmen t Act o f 197 7 containe d minorit y set-asid e provision s requirin g tha t te n percent of th e funds given to state and local governments for construction purposes had to b e used to secure goods o r services supplied by minorityowned enterprises. 61 In addition t o congressiona l enactments , th e executive branc h ha s also made concession s t o minorit y interests . Fo r example , th e Presiden t b y executive order has imposed affirmative actio n obligations on federa l con tractors.62 Moreover , th e schoo l desegregatio n guideline s use d t o imple ment the Title VI fund cut-off provision s under the 196 4 Civi l Right s Act were develope d b y the Departmen t o f Health , Education , and Welfare. 63 In addition, th e Equa l Employmen t Opportunit y Commissio n ha s devel oped guideline s t o implemen t th e Titl e VI I employmen t discriminatio n provisions of the 196 4 Civi l Rights Act, 64 and the Department of Housin g and Urba n Developmen t ha s develope d guideline s t o implemen t th e fai r housing provision s o f th e 196 8 Civi l Right s Act. 65 Obviously , th e repre sentative branche s hav e no t bee n uniforml y o r consistently deferentia l t o minority interests. Rather, they have made concessions to minority interests when the overall political climate has been conducive to such concessions. The Supreme Court has greeted majoritarian efforts to advance minority interests wit h a mixe d response . O n occasio n thos e effort s hav e bee n validated, as when the Court upheld the federal minority set-aside program established b y th e 197 7 Publi c Work s Employmen t Ac t i n Fullilove v. Klutznick.66 Sometime s th e Cour t ha s show n eve n mor e sensitivit y t o minority interest s tha n th e representativ e branc h takin g th e actio n tha t the Court was validating. For example, in holding that the Reconstructio n statutes reache d private as well a s official governmen t conduct , th e Cour t may well hav e gone beyon d th e actua l inten t o f th e Reconstructio n Con gress in its solicitude fo r minorit y interests. 67 On othe r occasions , major itarian efforts t o advance minority interests have met with marked judicial hostility, a s the y di d i n Dred Scott. 68 Fo r example , althoug h th e Cour t upheld th e federa l minorit y set-asid e progra m i n Fullilove, it recentl y in validated a similar municipal program in City of Richmond u /.A. Croson Co.69 An d althoug h i t recentl y reaffirme d th e applicabilit y o f th e Recon struction statute s t o privat e action , i t simultaneousl y redefine d th e sub -

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stantive scop e o f prohibite d discriminatio n i n a way tha t exclude d muc h discrimination tha t did not constitute state action. In Patterson u McLean Credit Union™ th e Cour t hel d tha t althoug h th e 4 2 U.S.C . § 198 1 pro hibition o n discrimination i n the formatio n an d enforcement o f contract s applied t o private acts of discrimination , discriminatory performance o f a contract throug h racia l harassmen t o f a n employe e di d no t com e withi n the scope of the § 1981 prohibition. Discriminatory enforcement occurre d only i f th e stat e mad e enforcemen t remedie s fo r breac h o f contrac t se lectively availabl e o n th e basi s o f race. 71 The ne t effec t o f thi s holdin g was t o reimpos e a state actio n requiremen t i n § 198 1 suit s wit h respec t to discriminatory contrac t performance. Lik e the representative branches , the Supreme Court ha s not bee n unifor m o r consistent i n its deference t o minority interests. Rather, the Court too has made concessions to minority interests whe n th e overal l politica l climat e ha s bee n conduciv e t o suc h concessions. I have argued that a rational minority response to the veiled majoritarian nature o f th e Suprem e Cour t woul d b e t o abando n effort s t o influenc e the Cour t an d t o concentrat e minorit y politica l activitie s o n th e repre sentative branches , becaus e minoritie s ar e mor e likel y t o secur e conces sions fro m a n overtly politica l branc h o f governmen t tha n from a branch whose political dimension s are covert. I have also argued that comparison of th e historica l performance s o f th e representativ e branche s and the Supreme Cour t provide s empirica l suppor t fo r thi s theory , becaus e th e representative branche s hav e done mor e tha n the Cour t t o advanc e minorit y interests. On e migh t objec t t o thi s asserted preferenc e fo r th e represent ative branches b y arguing that i f the actions of eac h branch are ultimately determined b y majoritaria n politica l preferences , i t shoul d no t matte r which branc h minorities choose as the focus o f thei r political efforts . The response t o thi s objectio n i s that , althoug h th e Suprem e Cour t i s a ma joritarian branc h o f government , th e Court respond s t o differen t type s of political preference s tha n th e preference s t o whic h th e representativ e branches respond . A Political Model of the Supreme Court Although representativ e politic s i s mor e promisin g tha n Suprem e Cour t politics fo r minorit y interests , minoritie s do no t hav e th e luxur y o f con centrating thei r effort s exclusivel y o n th e representativ e branches . Whe n minorities secur e politica l concession s fro m th e majoritaria n branches , nonminority interes t groups disadvantaged b y those concession s ca n forc e

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minorities t o defen d thei r politica l victorie s befor e th e Suprem e Court . Many o f th e affirmativ e actio n gain s tha t minoritie s hav e mad e throug h the politica l proces s hav e bee n subjec t t o jus t suc h nonminorit y chal lenges.72 I n addition , minoritie s wil l ofte n b e compelle d t o see k judicia l enforcement o f the political gains that they make before the representative branches. The assistanc e o f th e Cour t wil l b e require d bot h t o resolv e ambiguities i n majoritaria n enactment s an d to promp t complianc e b y recalcitrant nonminorit y interests. 73 Supreme Cour t interventio n i n the po litical proces s affectin g minorit y interest s is , therefore , inevitable . More over, structura l feature s o f th e Suprem e Cour t ensur e tha t whe n thi s inevitable interventio n occur s i t will als o b e politicall y conservative . Part I of thi s boo k suggeste d tha t lif e tenur e and salary protection ar e unable t o provid e an y meaningfu l safeguar d agains t th e influenc e tha t a judge's ow n socialize d majoritaria n preference s wil l hav e o n th e adjudi catory process. 74 That does not mean , however, that life tenure and salary protection are irrelevant to judicial outcomes. They are designed to permit Supreme Cour t justice s t o remai n o n th e benc h fo r extende d period s o f time. The averag e age o f a Supreme Cour t justic e when appointe d durin g this centur y ha s bee n 55 . The averag e lengt h o f a justice' s sta y o n th e Court ha s bee n 1 6 years. 75 Tha t mean s tha t th e contemporar y Suprem e Court ha s bee n staffe d b y justice s wh o serv e fro m age s 5 5 t o 71 . Insti tutionally, a Suprem e Cour t staffe d b y suc h individual s i s likel y t o b e receptive t o tw o type s o f politica l arguments . Professor Tushnet has identified th e first type of argument. 76 The Court will respon d to arguments advancing political preferences tha t are durable rather tha n transitor y i n nature . Th e amoun t o f politica l powe r tha t a pluralist votin g coalitio n possesse s i s a direct functio n o f it s longevity . A coalition tha t ca n secur e majoritaria n suppor t fo r it s position o n a single issue wil l b e abl e t o prevai l upo n tha t issue , bu t i t wil l no t b e abl e t o implement a politica l agend a tha t encompasse s multipl e issue s o r eve n repeated test s o f a single issue . I n orde r t o advanc e a political agenda , a coalition mus t comman d sustaine d politica l support . A coalition tha t can sustain majority support fo r a two-year period can control th e Hous e o f Representatives , al l o f whos e member s ar e electe d every tw o years . Mor e specifically , i n orde r t o contro l th e vot e o f a representative, a coalition mus t hav e the popula r votes neede d t o secur e th e initial electio n o f tha t representativ e and , in addition, mus t fo r tw o year s be able to maintain a credible threat that failure to comply with the wishes of th e coalitio n wil l resul t i n th e failur e o f th e representativ e t o secur e reelection. Suc h a coalition , therefore , wil l b e abl e t o prevai l i n thos e

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contests where the position o f the House of Representative s is dispositive. The position o f th e Hous e alone wil l b e dispositive with respec t to issue s such a s impeachment , whic h th e Constitutio n assign s exclusivel y t o th e House o f Representatives. 77 However, the position o f th e Hous e ca n also be dispositive with respect to issues over which the distribution of politica l power an d th e prevailin g politica l climat e giv e practica l contro l t o th e House. Suc h issue s will aris e frequently whe n th e Hous e i s controlled b y a differen t politica l part y tha n th e part y controllin g th e Senat e an d th e White House . I n suc h circumstance , th e Hous e o f Representative s wil l have a meaningful vet o powe r ove r legislativ e initiatives . A coalition tha t can sustain majorit y support for a period of fou r years is in a much stronger position to advance its political agenda. It can control not only the House of Representatives for two terms, but it can also control the President , wh o i s electe d t o a four-yea r term . I n addition , becaus e one-third o f th e Senat e i s electe d ever y tw o years , a four-yea r coalitio n can als o contro l th e Senate , b y controllin g th e vote s o f two-third s o f it s members. A coalitio n durabl e enoug h t o las t fou r years , therefore , ca n control th e entir e federa l government . Excep t fo r th e judiciary . Becaus e of thei r longer "terms of office " Supreme Court justices can only b e controlled b y political coalitions havin g a political durabilit y tha t i s substantially longer. Professor Tushnet postulates that a coalition mus t comman d majority suppor t fo r approximatel y a decad e befor e i t ca n contro l th e judiciary.78 Tushnet doe s no t offe r a prediction fo r ho w muc h tim e i t would tak e to control th e Supreme Court alone, although the ten-year estimate seems reasonable fo r the Supreme Court as well. As has been noted , the average tenure o f a justic e o n th e Suprem e Cour t ha s historicall y bee n approxi mately sixteen years. 79 If each justic e serves fo r sixteen years , on average, one o f th e nin e justices will leav e the Court ever y 1.7 5 years . This means that it will tak e approximately nin e years for a five-justice majority o f th e Court t o tur n over . Thi s correspond s roughl y t o ho w lon g i t too k th e Reagan-Bush conservative coalition to wrest control of the Supreme Court from the prior liberal coalition tha t supported the decisions of the Warren Court. President Reagan was elected in 1980, and he made his firstSupreme Court appointmen t i n 1981. 80 Presiden t Bus h gaine d contro l o f th e Su preme Court in the period between 199 0 and 199 1 wit h the appointment of Justice s Soute r an d Thomas a s replacement s fo r Justices Brenna n an d Marshall.81 A political coalitio n wit h a nine- o r ten-year duration, therefore, seem s powerfu l enoug h t o gai n contro l ove r th e Suprem e Court — and theoretically , ove r th e entir e federa l government. 82 Thi s mean s that ,

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regardless o f th e particula r politica l preference s tha t individua l justice s may have , th e Suprem e Cour t a s an institutio n wil l b e receptiv e t o lega l arguments advancin g politica l position s tha t hav e th e suppor t o f durabl e rather than transitor y majorities . The ultimat e effec t o f thi s selective sen sitivity is to render the Court a force for preservation of the political status quo. Proponents of political change will be less successful befor e the Court than wil l thei r opponents. 83 The second type of argument to which the Supreme Court will respon d favorably is an argument advancing an issue whose political support, while transitory, i s bot h broad-base d an d intense . Thi s i s due , i n part , t o th e ability tha t proponents o f suc h issue s possess t o rais e a credible threa t o f removal. Because Supreme Court justices have life tenure, political contro l over individua l justice s mus t normall y b e exercise d a t th e selection stage . Under ordinar y circumstances , politicall y motivate d threat s o f retaliator y removal ar e unlikel y t o hav e muc h credibilit y i n ligh t o f th e politica l difficulty o f securin g impeachment . Tushnet' s theor y woul d predic t tha t a politica l coalitio n havin g a four-yea r durabilit y woul d b e require d t o impeach an d convic t a justice . Thi s i s becaus e th e Constitutio n require s controlling influence ove r a simple majority in the House and a two-thirds majority i n the Senat e fo r impeachmen t an d conviction. 84 I n light o f th e reluctance o f interes t group s t o us e impeachmen t fo r ordinar y politica l purposes, suc h a coalitio n woul d normall y b e quit e difficul t t o amass . In a climat e o f intens e politica l fervor , however , th e threa t o f impeachmen t might b e mor e credible . Bot h individual s an d electorate s ar e capabl e o f taking actions i n th e hea t o f th e momen t tha t the y woul d no t tak e afte r calmer reflection.85 Mor e subtly, to the extent that the justices view intense popular resistanc e a s a threa t t o th e perception s o f legitimac y tha t th e Court need s i n orde r t o issu e decision s tha t wil l b e abl e t o clai m th e support o f short-ter m majorit y coalitions , th e justice s wil l b e responsiv e to expression s o f popula r disapprova l intens e enoug h t o jeopardiz e th e Court's continued legitimacy, even if that disapproval is not intense enough to pos e a credible threa t o f impeachment . One might initially suspect that Supreme Court responsiveness to intense bursts of majoritaria n politica l sentimen t woul d mak e th e Cour t populis t rather tha n conservativ e i n it s politica l outlook . I n som e context s tha t might b e true . However , i n the contex t o f judicia l protectio n o f minorit y interests, vulnerability to intense expressions of majoritaria n desires makes the Cour t conservativ e i n th e sens e tha t i t i s unable t o perfor m it s countermajoritarian function. Cases like Korematsu u United States, 96 i n which the Cour t uphel d th e Worl d Wa r I I geographi c exclusio n o f Japanese -

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Americans fro m certai n location s o n th e Wes t Coast, illustrates th e problem o f suc h judicia l submissio n t o a n intens e politica l preference . I t i s difficult t o understan d Korematsu a s anythin g othe r tha n a n instanc e o f judicial deferenc e t o popula r desire s fo r retributio n agains t th e Japanese after the bombin g o f Pear l Harbor . As such, the decision ha s been widely criticized a s th e unfortunat e produc t o f wartim e hysteri a an d racia l re sentment.87 An d a s such , th e decisio n demonstrate s th e dange r inheren t in believin g tha t th e Suprem e Cour t possesse s th e politica l capacit y t o resist majoritaria n effort s t o exploi t racia l minorit y interests . Although th e Suprem e Cour t i s a majoritaria n institution , i t doe s no t merely replicat e th e action s o f th e othe r representativ e branche s o f gov ernment. The manne r i n whic h a representativ e branc h reflect s popula r preferences i s a functio n o f it s politica l sensitivities . The Hous e o f Rep resentatives i s sensitive t o loca l majorities , th e Senat e i s sensitive t o stat e majorities, an d th e Presiden t i s sensitiv e t o th e nationa l majority . The Supreme Cour t ca n bes t b e understoo d a s a representative branc h tha t is politically sensitive to conservative majorities. Because life tenure gives the justices longer terms of office than elected governmental officials, the Court is most responsive to durable political interest groups that are able to exert sustained pressur e fo r th e adoption o f thei r political agendas . This mode l of th e Supreme Court suggests that the Court will la g rather than lead the overtly representativ e branche s i n th e protectio n o f minorit y rights , and history ha s born e thi s predictio n out . I n matter s rangin g fro m th e earl y controversy ove r slaver y t o th e contemporar y debat e abou t affirmativ e action, th e Cour t ha s don e mor e t o imped e th e socia l an d economi c progress o f racia l minoritie s tha n i t ha s t o advanc e minorit y interests . The Suprem e Cour t ha s frequentl y disappointe d racia l minoritie s b y ruling against them in particular cases. However, the Court's most effectiv e contribution t o th e caus e o f conservativ e racia l politic s ha s derived fro m its abilit y t o structur e th e la w i n a way tha t perpetuate s minorit y subor dination. The Court has done this in three ways. First, its decision in Brown v. Board of Education ha s established a dependency relationshi p betwee n racial minorities and the Supreme Court that permits the Court to regulate the socia l an d economi c statu s o f it s minorit y wards . Second , th e Cour t has centralize d th e la w o f rac e relation s i n a manner tha t make s i t mor e difficult fo r racia l minoritie s t o utiliz e thei r loca l politica l powe r t o it s maximum advantage in advancing minority interests. Third, the Court has legitimated a set o f assumption s abou t racia l minoritie s an d minorit y de mands fo r equa l right s tha t virtuall y assure s tha t thos e demand s wil l no t be met. The next three chapters consider each of these three subordinating techniques i n turn.

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Brown u Board of Education 1 i s the cas e typically offere d a s evidence o f the countermajoritaria n capacit y o f th e Suprem e Court . I n th e fac e o f massive popula r resistance , th e Cour t no t onl y desegregate d th e publi c schools, but also invalidated the constitutional standar d adopted by Plessy v. Ferguson 2 tha t tolerate d separate-but-equa l publi c facilities . Sinc e Brown, racia l minorities have concentrated their efforts at achieving equality o n th e Suprem e Court , becaus e th e Cour t ha s appeare d t o b e mor e receptive t o minorit y claim s o f righ t tha n th e representativ e branche s o f government. Despit e th e countermajoritaria n rhetori c tha t ha s bee n cul tivated b y th e Brown decision , th e cas e i s bette r understoo d a s a veile d majoritarian effor t t o perpetuat e minorit y subordination. I n terms of mo tive, Brown di d no t constitut e a heroi c judicia l stanc e agains t a raciall y intolerant majority . Rather , Brown wa s supported b y a majority coalitio n comprised o f liberal s who wer e opposed t o racia l segregation and federa l foreign polic y interest s wh o viewe d segregatio n a s an impedimen t t o th e United State s i n it s competitio n wit h communis m fo r contro l ove r th e third world. Although Brown ma y have generated resistanc e i n the south , the national coalition that favored desegregation of southern schools chose simply t o suppres s tha t loca l resistance . I n term s o f effect , Brown per formed a disservice t o racia l minorities . Brown, o f course , did not deseg regate th e schools ; it ha s bee n almos t fou r decade s sinc e Brown wa s decided an d th e publi c school s ar e experiencin g mor e resegregatio n tha n desegregation. I n addition, by invalidating the separate-but-equal doctrin e of Plessy, Brown ha s deprived racial minorities of their only constitutiona l weapon fo r securin g equal treatmen t i n light o f th e failur e o f integration . 104

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Ironically, th e racial equalit y tha t th e Cour t first championed i n Brown i s the ver y sam e racia l equalit y tha t th e Cour t no w invoke s t o invalidat e affirmative actio n program s tha t minoritie s hav e bee n abl e t o secur e through the political process. The Brown experienc e illustrates the danger of minorit y dependenc e o n th e Suprem e Cour t fo r th e protectio n o f mi nority interests . Suc h dependenc e no t onl y divert s t o th e Cour t minorit y resources tha t migh t bette r b e expende d o n th e political branches , bu t i t places minoritie s i n a positio n tha t arguabl y estop s the m fro m pursuin g race-specific politica l concession s fro m th e majority . Fo r thes e ver y rea sons, however , i t i s i n th e interes t o f th e majorit y t o promot e minorit y dependence o n th e Suprem e Court . Brown and the Political Model The desegregatio n o f souther n school s mandate d b y Brown v. Board of Education* i n 195 4 wa s accompanie d b y predictabl e massiv e resistance . According t o th e traditiona l understanding , th e fac t tha t th e Suprem e Court was willing to disregard such high levels of majoritaria n disapprova l in issuing its school desegregation order reveals that the Court must possess countermajoritarian capabilities . Thi s conclusio n i s further buttresse d b y the post-Brown decision s in which th e Court stuck t o it s convictions an d ordered th e lowe r court s t o fashio n nove l equitabl e remedie s suc h a s busing t o implemen t th e Brown decision , agai n i n th e fac e o f massiv e resistance. Notwithstanding thi s traditional view , Brown i s actually bette r understood a s an illustration o f th e selectiv e politica l responsivenes s o f a veiled majoritaria n Court . The Brown decisio n i s commonly viewe d a s having accomplished tw o things. A s a practica l matter , i t require d th e desegregatio n o f publi c schools. Brown I declare d th e maintenanc e o f separate-but-equa l publi c schools t o b e unconstitutional. 4 Brown II issue d afte r reargumen t ad dressed t o th e issu e o f remedy , ordere d segregate d publi c school s t o b e desegregated "wit h al l deliberat e speed." 5 A s a doctrina l matter , Brown overruled the separate-but-equal principle of Plessy v. Ferguson. 6 Although Plessy upheld the constitutionality o f raciall y separate public facilities, the case did not by its terms require that those facilities be equal. Nevertheless, subsequent case s did require varying degrees of equality , and Plessy i s the case that is typically cited for the separate-but-equal requirement. 7 In overruling Plessy, Brown also established the proposition tha t race-based classifications ar e inherentl y unequa l becaus e the y inevitabl y operat e t o dis advantage th e minorit y race . Brown I hel d tha t "separat e educationa l

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facilities are inherently unequal/' 8 becaus e "[t]o separate [school children ] from other s o f simila r age an d qualification s solel y becaus e o f thei r rac e generates a feeling o f inferiorit y a s t o thei r statu s i n th e communit y tha t may affect thei r heart s and mind s i n a way unlikel y eve r to b e undone." 9 As a result, race-base d classification s coul d b e sustaine d onl y i f the y sat isfied th e mos t exactin g scrutiny. 10 As a n actua l matter , Brown ma y no t hav e realize d thes e accomplish ments a t all . Moreover , t o th e exten t tha t thes e accomplishment s wer e actually secured b y the Brown decision , they appear to have corresponded to th e politica l preference s o f th e durabl e majorit y whos e interest s wer e represented o n th e Brown Suprem e Court . I n addition , th e Court' s ad vancement o f thos e majoritaria n preference s ma y well hav e bee n secure d at th e expens e o f long-ter m minorit y interests , thereb y illustratin g th e difficulties attendan t t o minorit y relianc e o n th e Suprem e Court . The fact that Brown i s perceived to stand for the two propositions with which i t i s associated attest s t o th e rhetorica l succes s o f th e case . Whe n needed, Brown i s now available for citation i n briefs and judicial opinion s to suppor t eithe r th e limite d propositio n tha t th e Constitutio n require s public school s t o b e desegregate d o r th e broade r propositio n tha t race based classification s i n general ar e unconstitutional . A s an actua l matter , Brown o f cours e di d not desegregat e th e schools . A thir d o f th e blac k students attending public school i n the Unite d State s still atten d all-blac k schools, and 63 percen t attend schools tha t are at least half black . Privat e schools, gerrymandere d distric t lines , unequa l funding , whit e flight, residential housin g patterns , an d resegregatio n ar e amon g th e man y factor s that prevente d th e rhetorica l promis e o f Brown fro m eve r becomin g a reality.11 A s an actual matter , Brown di d no t terminat e governmental us e of race-base d classification s either . Althoug h subsequen t case s issue d shortly afte r Brown relie d upo n th e Brown decisio n t o invalidat e racia l segregation i n public facilitie s suc h a s buses , beaches , and golf courses, 12 the Cour t di d no t rel y upo n Brown t o invalidat e al l racia l classifications . Most notably , th e Cour t decline d t o invalidat e miscegenatio n statutes , straining to avoid any application of Brown that would produce this result. After issuin g its 195 4 decisio n i n Brown J, 13 invalidatin g separate-but equal treatment based upon race, the Court nevertheless declined in Nairn v. Nairn14 t o invalidat e a Virginia miscegenatio n statute , holdin g tha t th e constitutional issu e raise d b y th e statut e wa s no t "properl y presented." 15 The Court' s actio n no t onl y ignore d th e holdin g o f Brown bu t i t consti tuted a refusal t o exercis e mandator y appellat e jurisdictio n tha t ha d bee n assigned to the Court by statute. Accordingly, Nairn u Nairn has been the

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target o f considerabl e criticism. 16 The Court' s dismissa l i s understood t o have bee n a concessio n t o perceive d majoritaria n pressur e i n th e post Brown era , whe n i t ha d bee n asserte d tha t schoo l desegregatio n woul d lead t o "mongrelizatio n o f th e race." 17 Th e Virgini a statut e wa s finally invalidated eleve n year s late r i n Loving v. Virginia. 18 A t tha t time , onl y sixteen states had miscegenation laws, as opposed to the time of the Brown decision, whe n mor e tha n hal f th e state s ha d such statutes. 19 Realistically, Brown ha d enormous rhetorica l succes s an d partial prac tical success. This combination of substantial rhetorical success and limited practical succes s appears to hav e bee n precisel y wha t th e Court' s durable majoritarian constituenc y desired . Th e massiv e resistanc e tha t accom panied Brown does not mean that the decision lacked majoritarian support. Indeed, th e resistanc e wa s regiona l rathe r tha n nationa l i n scope . A t th e level o f nationa l politics—th e leve l o f politic s a t whic h Brown wa s de cided—it i s easy to imagin e th e existenc e o f a national coalitio n tha t supported th e Brown decision . Professo r Bel l first hypothesized tha t Brown was decided the way that it was because it marked the point of convergenc e for three national interests. 20 The decisio n advanced th e international ob jectives o f foreig n polic y interes t group s b y reducin g th e embarrassmen t and competitive disadvantag e tha t domestic racis m produced i n our competition wit h communis m fo r influenc e ove r thir d worl d nations . The decision als o advance d th e interest s o f disillusione d post-wa r black s wh o seemed t o b e missin g ou t o n al l o f th e equalit y tha t th e Unite d State s claimed to have been fighting for in World War II. In addition, the decision advanced th e interest s o f white s wh o sa w segregatio n a s a n impedimen t to th e economi c maturatio n an d developmen t o f th e south. 21 Professor Bel l als o suggeste d tha t mora l an d economi c consideration s might hav e playe d a rol e i n th e coalitio n tha t h e wa s postulating. 22 Al though h e di d no t explicitl y clai m tha t th e Supreme Cour t was incapabl e of countermajoritarian acts, Professor Bell did offer the following InterestConvergence Theor y t o accoun t fo r th e Brown decision : The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converge s wit h th e interest s o f whites ; however , th e fourteent h amendment , standing alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy providing effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the superior societal statu s of middle- and upper-class whites.23 This caused Bell to conclude that the remedies for Brown woul d b e coextensive with white support 24—something that is consistent with the present thesis.25

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Professor Dudziak , i n an articl e entitle d Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative?6 furthe r develope d th e ide a tha t Brown wa s a respons e t o national majoritaria n interests , emphasizin g th e particula r interes t sug gested by her arresting title. Professor Dudziak notes that the United States Department o f Justice filed an amicus brie f stressin g the importanc e o f a decision invalidatin g segregatio n becaus e "th e Unite d State s i s tryin g t o prove to the people of th e world, of ever y nationality, race and color, that a free democracy is the most civilized and most secure form of government yet devise d b y man." 27 Just a s the victoriou s norther n coalitio n wa s abl e to impos e civil rights enactments on th e south after the Civil War in order to advance it s own politica l interests , a similar national coalitio n wa s able to impos e Brown o n th e sout h i n orde r to advanc e it s politica l interests . Not onl y doe s th e existenc e o f a national coalitio n provid e a plausible account o f th e Brown decision , bu t th e durabilit y o f tha t coalitio n co incides wit h th e succes s tha t minoritie s hav e ha d unde r Brown an d it s progeny. When the first Brown decisio n was issued, the Court set the case for reargumen t concernin g th e issu e o f remedy. 28 A year later , i n Brown II, th e Cour t rule d tha t althoug h schoo l desegregatio n nee d no t b e im mediate, it ha d to b e accomplished wit h "al l deliberate speed," 29 thereby giving bot h schoo l official s an d th e Cour t itsel f som e latitud e i n imple menting th e decision . Fo r th e nex t fifteen years , mos t o f th e Suprem e Court schoo l desegregatio n decision s issue d subsequen t t o Brown wer e resolved i n a manner that wa s considered favorabl e t o minorit y interests . All of those decisions involved southern school districts. In the early 1970s, when schoo l desegregatio n case s involvin g norther n citie s bega n t o reac h the Court , th e Cour t bega n t o rul e agains t th e minorit y interests. 30 Thi s suggests tha t afte r fifteen years , th e nationa l coalitio n supportin g Brown had broken down, in part because civil rights had ceased to be an important international issue , and in part because northern urban interest groups had withdrawn fro m th e coalitio n afte r the y wer e aske d t o internaliz e cost s of desegregatio n tha t ha d previousl y bee n deflecte d t o th e south . I n a sense, Brown wa s the perfec t veile d majoritaria n decision . I t supplied th e majority wit h rhetorica l benefit s tha t wer e importan t a t the tim e tha t th e decision wa s issue d an d tha t continu e t o b e importan t toda y becaus e o f the manne r i n whic h the y enhanc e th e majority' s self-image . However , practical implementatio n o f th e decisio n continue d onl y a s lon g as , and only t o th e exten t that , Brown itsel f continue d t o comman d durabl e majoritarian support . Brown an d the cases implementing i t can be understood as the product of a majoritaria n coalitio n tha t incidentall y advance d th e immediat e in -

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terests of racia l minorities . I t is unclear, however, whether membership in that coalitio n serve d t o advanc e long-ter m minorit y interests . Professo r Seidman ha s argue d tha t Brown i n fac t advance d whit e majoritaria n in terests at the expense of long-ter m minority interests. By overruling Plessy and declarin g tha t separate-but-equa l treatmen t o f racia l minoritie s vio lated th e Constitution , Brown save d th e majorit y fro m a Pfessy-base d obligation actuall y t o exten d equa l treatmen t t o minorities. 31 Today , as a result o f property-base d ta x structure s an d ta x subsidie s give n t o privat e schools, whit e student s receiv e a significantly large r share o f th e govern mental resource s allocate d t o educatio n tha n minorit y student s receive . The Suprem e Cour t uphel d thi s practic e o f disproportionat e fundin g i n San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.* 2 Ironically , thi s practice may well have been unconstitutional unde r the separate-but-equa l doctrine of Plessy. Brown, however , makes this differential treatmen t constitutionally permissible . A s long a s a school distric t i s not engage d i n de jure segregation an d ha s taken th e requisit e step s t o eliminat e th e effect s of an y pas t de jure segregatio n i n whic h i t ma y hav e bee n engaged , it s constitutional obligatio n ha s bee n satisfied . Becaus e neithe r o f thes e ob ligations entail anything resembling equal treatment, the majority is better off—and racia l minoritie s ar e wors e off—tha n woul d hav e bee n th e cas e under a faithfull y implemente d separate-but-equa l standar d o f constitu tional law. 33 This i s not t o suggest tha t a veiled majoritaria n Cour t coul d not hav e containe d th e damag e t o majoritaria n interest s tha t woul d hav e been don e b y a separate-but-equa l standard , jus t a s th e Suprem e Cour t was abl e t o contai n th e damag e don e b y desegregatio n unde r Brown. However, t o th e exten t tha t Suprem e Cour t toleranc e o f th e differentia l treatment presentl y accorde d minorit y an d nonminorit y childre n i n edu cation would have been more difficult t o justify under a separate-but-equal standard, th e interest s o f racia l minoritie s ma y hav e bee n disadvantage d by Brown. To th e exten t tha t Brown ha s mad e i t constitutionall y difficul t fo r th e government t o rel y upo n race-base d classifications , Brown ha s als o dis advantaged minoritie s b y deprivin g the m o f effectiv e affirmativ e actio n remedies. A s i s discusse d i n Chapte r 8 , race-consciou s remedies , suc h a s minority set-asides , ar e bein g invalidate d b y th e Cour t o n constitutiona l grounds with increasin g frequency , an d the y ar e being invalidated fo r th e stated reason of preventing unfairness to whites.34 The Bush administration has eve n threatene d t o us e Brown a s a sourc e o f lega l authorit y fo r in validating minorit y scholarshi p program s a s a species o f unconstitutiona l affirmative action. 35

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Disillusionment wit h th e result s o f Brown ha s cause d som e minorit y activists to advocate separate minority-controlled schools for minority children.36 Onc e again , however , Brown's invalidatio n o f souther n schoo l segregation could be used to threaten even the legality of minority colleges and universitie s tha t wer e establishe d t o compensat e fo r th e historica l failure o f whit e institution s t o exten d meaningfu l educationa l opportun ities to minorit y students. Such a challenge coul d b e based upon precisely the same legal theor y that the Bush Administration ha s used to attack th e legality o f minorit y scholarships. 37 A s i s discusse d below , i f on e assume s that a strategy of establishin g minority-controlled school s i s in the present best interest s o f racia l minorities , Brown ha s again adversely affecte d mi nority interest s b y makin g tha t strateg y constitutionall y impermissible . I f one assume s furthe r tha t th e majorit y itsel f benefit s fro m th e preclusio n of minority-controlle d minorit y schools , Brown ha s agai n advance d ma joritarian interest s a t minorit y expense . Notably , suc h a benefi t t o th e majority ha s ensue d b y preventin g minorit y childre n fro m escapin g ma joritarian contro l o f th e attitud e an d valu e formatio n proces s t o whic h school childre n are exposed durin g the most impressionable year s of thei r lives.38 I t is during these formativ e year s that minorit y childre n ar e inculcated wit h majoritaria n values—especiall y th e valu e o f minorit y depen dence upo n th e Suprem e Cour t i n lie u o f minorit y self-determination .

The Danger of Dependency The nomina l succes s o f Brown i n establishin g th e existenc e o f a coun termajoritarian Suprem e Cour t ha s create d a relationshi p betwee n racia l minorities an d th e Cour t unde r whic h minoritie s hav e com e t o depen d upon the Court rather than upon their own political strength and judgment in order to advanc e minority interests . As was discussed i n Chapter 6, no t only d o racia l minoritie s possess th e political powe r to advance thei r own interests withou t th e interventio n o f th e Suprem e Court, 39 bu t Suprem e Court interventio n i n th e politica l proces s ha s mor e ofte n bee n a source of frustratio n tha n a sourc e o f salvatio n fo r racia l minorit y interests. 40 Nevertheless, minoritie s hav e continue d t o rel y upon th e Suprem e Cour t as i f i t wer e a n all y rathe r tha n a n adversar y i n th e struggl e fo r racia l equality. Thi s i s becaus e racia l minoritie s hav e bee n taugh t th e counter majoritarian lesso n o f Brown s o wel l tha t the y sometime s see m unabl e even t o imagin e thei r ow n politica l self-determination . A mor e realisti c assessment o f th e lesso n t o b e learne d fro m Brown i s tha t measure d majoritarian concession s t o racia l minoritie s ca n indefinitel y kee p racia l

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minority interest s dependen t upo n whit e majorit y control . Throug h thi s single majoritaria n decision , an d th e traditio n o f judicia l revie w tha t i t symbolizes, racia l minoritie s hav e becom e dependen t upo n th e Suprem e Court to control th e manne r in which minority children are educated, the manner i n which minoritie s conceptualiz e th e natur e o f thei r racial diffi culties, and even the strategies that minorities select to advance their racial interests. By no w i t shoul d b e clea r tha t schoo l desegregatio n simpl y ha s no t worked—at least not for racial minorities. As good an idea as desegregation may hav e seeme d a t th e time , i t ha s no t resulte d i n th e equalizatio n o f educational opportunitie s fo r whit e an d minorit y schoo l children . No r has it increased th e qualit y o f educatio n fo r minorit y childre n i n the way that proponent s o f schoo l desegregatio n ha d hope d tha t i t would . Mos t minority school childre n still atten d schools tha t are either completely o r predominantly minorit y schools. 41 Thi s i s due , o f course , t o th e refusa l of th e Suprem e Cour t t o includ e whit e suburba n school s i n th e consti tutionally required desegregation plans that it has approved for the heavily minority school s tha t exis t i n man y o f ou r urba n centers. 42 I n addition , the Court' s approva l o f drasticall y disproportionat e level s o f fundin g fo r suburban an d inner-cit y school s ha s lef t minorit y schoo l childre n wit h many fewer educational resource s tha n their white counterparts. 43 More over, th e educationa l successe s tha t som e all-minorit y school s hav e ha d even in the face of their serious underfunding suggests that there is nothing inherent i n th e concep t o f integrate d educatio n tha t make s i t eithe r a necessary or a sufficient conditio n for quality education.44 Continued commitment t o desegregatio n i s onl y likel y t o mak e matter s worse , a s addi tional whit e flight increase s th e racia l imbalanc e i n th e publi c schools , with a corresponding increase in the educational difficulties associated with racial imbalance. 45 School desegregatio n ha s not onl y prove n t o b e les s beneficia l tha n its proponents ha d originall y hoped , bu t i n many respect s desegregatio n ha s proven t o b e a n affirmativ e burde n o n th e effor t t o provid e qualit y edu cation for minority school children. Not surprisingly, it is minority students who ten d t o bea r the brun t o f th e dislocation s tha t are produced b y th e school desegregatio n effort . Whe n teacher s an d administrator s mus t b e fired as a resul t o f schoo l consolidations , i t tend s t o b e th e minorit y teachers wh o ar e fired. Whe n school s hav e t o b e close d a s a resul t o f redrawn attendanc e zones , i t tend s t o b e th e minorit y school s tha t ar e closed. Whe n student s hav e t o b e buse d awa y fro m thei r ow n neighbor hoods i n orde r t o improv e a school' s racia l balance , i t tend s t o b e th e

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minority student s wh o ar e bused. Eve n when school s ar e formally deseg regated, informa l segregatio n persist s insid e th e schools , wher e minorit y students are disproportionately "segregated " in the slow-track classes , are subjected t o disciplinar y charge s i n disproportionat e numbers , an d mus t endure th e subtl e form s o f day-to-da y racia l discriminatio n tha t ca n b e inflicted b y resentful whit e students, teachers, and administrators.46 Moreover, becaus e minorit y parent s lac k influenc e i n th e whit e communitie s to whic h thei r childre n ar e ofte n bused , minorit y parent s ten d t o b e ex cluded fro m meaningfu l inpu t int o th e educational policymakin g process, from activ e participation i n school activities , and from th e ability to hol d school official s accountabl e fo r th e educatio n o f thei r children. 47 I n sum, desegregation mean s tha t racia l minoritie s mus t ced e contro l ove r thei r schools an d th e educatio n o f thei r childre n t o th e whit e majority. 48 None o f thes e observation s ar e new . I n fact, the y ar e quit e old . The y were th e predicted consequence s o f schoo l desegregatio n tha t were made in th e nineteent h an d earl y twentiet h centurie s b y blac k nationalist s an d others wh o predate d Brown, 49 an d the y wer e th e assesse d consequence s of schoo l desegregatio n tha t wer e mad e b y Blac k Powe r advocate s an d others durin g the 1960 s an d 1970 s after th e decisio n i n Brown ha d bee n rendered.50 As far back as 1790, blacks in Boston began to seek segregated schools as a means of avoidin g the racia l mistreatmen t tha t had driven all but a handful o f blac k schoo l childre n ou t o f th e then-integrate d Bosto n public schools . However , eve n tw o hundre d year s ago , th e now-famou s Boston Schoo l Committe e ha d develope d it s instinc t fo r rejectin g blac k requests fo r qualit y education. Ironically , th e sam e Boston Schoo l Com mittee tha t ha s mor e recentl y becom e know n fo r it s resistanc e t o con temporary schoo l desegregation , the n rejecte d th e blac k community' s request fo r segregated schools , o n th e grounds tha t th e expens e entaile d i n maintaining separate black schools was unwarranted.51 In 1849, after Boston ha d itself chose n t o adop t a policy o f schoo l segregation , black com munity leader Thomas P. Smith unsuccessfully urge d blacks who were then pressing fo r integratio n a s a mean s o f improvin g th e educatio n o f thei r children no t t o abando n thei r blac k school s becaus e integratio n woul d end u p actuall y reducing th e qualit y o f educatio n tha t wa s availabl e fo r black schoo l children. 52 I n the 1930s , whe n th e NAAC P wa s developin g the schoo l desegregatio n strateg y tha t ultimatel y resulte d i n th e issuanc e of Brown, cofounde r W.E.B . D u Boi s unsuccessfull y urge d th e organi zation no t t o commi t itsel f t o a strateg y o f integratio n tha t woul d sub ordinate th e goal o f qualit y education fo r black s t o th e goal o f educatin g blacks i n th e sam e school s a s whites. 53

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In the year s since Brown wa s decided , fear s tha t desegregatio n woul d harm th e qualit y o f educatio n fo r blac k schoo l childre n hav e bee n reit erated i n ligh t o f th e evidenc e tha t ha s becom e availabl e concernin g th e actual effect s o f th e nationa l desegregatio n effort . I n 1963 , Malcol m X vigorously advocate d minorit y contro l o f minorit y schools , explicitl y re jecting th e suggestio n tha t segregatio n woul d lea d t o inferio r educatio n for minorit y children. 54 Leader s o f th e politicall y militan t Blac k Powe r movement tha t bega n i n the mid-1960s hav e not onl y decried th e loss o f minority contro l ove r minority school s tha t ha s resulted fro m forma l de segregation, bu t hav e equate d integratio n wit h whit e supremacy. 55 Blac k Power advocate s Stokel y Carmichae l an d Charle s Hamilto n viewe d inte gration a s the dominatio n o f blac k cultur e b y white cultur e throug h th e indoctrination o f blac k childre n wit h whit e middle-clas s values. 56 Sepa ratist Rober t Brown e sa w integratio n a s a process fo r transformin g blac k people int o white black people. 57 Historian Harold Cruse has emphasized that the assimilation of blac k culture into white culture was accomplished by enticin g th e blac k middl e clas s t o forc e th e blac k workin g clas s t o abandon blac k cultura l distinctiveness , which ha d proven embarrassing t o the middle class blacks who were seeking to perfect their assimilation int o the dominan t whit e culture. 58 Lega l schola r Derric k Bel l ha s stressed th e harmful effect s tha t schoo l desegregatio n ha s ha d o n th e blac k childre n who wer e treate d a s i f the y wer e white , an d o n th e blac k teacher s an d administrators who were firedfor the cause of desegregation. 59 These types of theoretica l arguments have even given rise to aggressive efforts b y some blacks, durin g th e lat e 1960 s an d earl y 1970s , t o seiz e contro l o f loca l school district s an d t o establis h autonomou s Afro-America n Studie s de partments a t majo r colleges an d universities. 60 There i s a lon g an d rich histor y o f minorit y apprehensio n abou t th e supposed benefits of school desegregation. This history, however, has been studiously disregarded by mainstream black political leaders. From Thomas P. Smith t o W.E.B . D u Boi s t o Malcol m X , th e blac k politica l an d intel lectual leader s who hav e favored blac k self-determinatio n hav e been marginalized b y mainstrea m blac k leader s s o a s no t t o interfer e wit h th e promise of black assimilation into white culture. Professor Cruse has stated that "the traditional civi l rights leadership will oppos e any attempt on th e part o f a n alternativ e leadershi p t o organiz e black s int o a n independen t political bloc." 61 Indeed , thi s mainstrea m blac k oppositio n t o assertion s of th e nee d fo r blac k autonom y ha s bee n surprisingl y strong . In Calhoun v. Cook,61 th e Atlanta schoo l desegregatio n case, the loca l NAACP branc h agree d t o a compromis e desegregatio n pla n tha t main -

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tained predominantl y blac k school s bu t increase d bot h th e educationa l quality o f blac k communit y school s an d th e degre e o f blac k contro l tha t would b e exercise d ove r thos e schools . Th e nationa l NAAC P responde d by oustin g th e Presiden t o f th e loca l branc h an d joinin g i n th e litigatio n itself t o oppose th e compromise plan because the plan did not require the maximum degre e o f integratio n tha t was possible i n the schoo l district. 63 The Vic e Chairma n o f th e NAAC P Nationa l Boar d o f Director s stated : Of on e thing we may be sure: the system of racia l caste will neve r be weakened or eradicated by blacks who cooperate with it. Every instance of th e acceptance of segregation, whether voluntary or coerced, forges the chains of inequality more firmly. Segregatio n will not be eradicated by those who abandon integration as a goal, n o matte r wha t tortuou s logi c o r euphemisti c languag e ma y b e use d t o rationalize the expedient compromise. 64 The nationa l NAAC P als o sough t t o interven e i n th e St . Loui s schoo l desegregation litigatio n t o oppos e a similar compromise tha t wa s favore d by loca l blac k parents. 65 When Professo r Bel l publishe d a n articl e i n th e Yale Law Journal ar guing tha t civi l right s lawyer s ha d becom e mor e committe d t o th e goa l of integratio n tha n t o th e educationa l interest s o f minorit y children, 66 NAACP General Counsel Nathaniel R.Jones published vigorous responses in opposition t o Professo r Bell' s thesis. Mr. Jones argued that segregatio n was itsel f th e mos t importan t educationa l har m t o b e remedie d becaus e of it s connection t o institutiona l racism . Then, as if t o prove Bell's point, Jones argued that there was no constitutional righ t to a quality educatio n but onl y t o a n educatio n tha t wa s no t officiall y segregated. 67 A troublesome question is why mainstream racial minorities have chosen so consistentl y t o rejec t the strategies for minority self-determination tha t have bee n espouse d b y progressiv e minorit y leaders . A n equall y trouble some answer is that mainstream racial minorities have permitted the white majority rathe r tha n progressiv e minorit y leader s t o prescrib e minorit y aspirations. I n a sense, thi s i s no t surprising . Becaus e th e whit e majorit y possesses the bulk of the societal resources, the white majority has become the referenc e grou p fo r racia l minoritie s t o emulate . Becaus e th e whit e majority control s th e medi a tha t determin e societa l taste s and ambitions , the white majority has become the group that gives definition to acceptable forms o f socia l life . Becaus e th e whit e majorit y control s th e school s through which societa l value s ar e transmitted, th e white majorit y ha s become th e grou p tha t prescribe s eve n th e normativ e preference s o f racia l minorities. The fac t tha t racia l minoritie s woul d loo k t o th e pervasiv e

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white cultur e fo r aspirationa l guidanc e seem s natural . Wha t i s surprising, however, is the depth of the minority commitment to white cultural norms. It i s a s i f racia l minoritie s too k th e Suprem e Cour t seriousl y i n Brown when the Court promised minoritie s that they could b e equal participants in th e dominan t culture . The danger of minority dependence on the Court's countermajoritaria n promise ca n b e detecte d o n multipl e levels . O n a n immediat e level , thi s dependence ha s permitted th e majorit y to den y educational opportunitie s to minorit y childre n fo r th e nearl y fort y year s since Brown wa s decided . As Professor Seidman has argued, Brown conveniently rescued the majority from the potentially burdensome separate-but-equal requiremen t of Plessy u Ferguson b y replacing that requirement with an integration requiremen t that could b e satisfied withou t reall y integrating the schools. 68 Moreover , contemporary racia l minoritie s stil l see m t o prefer th e demonstrabl y hol low promis e o f schoo l desegregatio n t o th e mor e realisti c potentia l o f minority-controlled minority schools as a strategy for improving the quality of minorit y education . A separate-but-equa l strategy , whic h Crus e refer s to a s "plura l bu t equal " in orde r to emphasiz e th e inescapabl e pluralis m of contemporar y America n culture , no w seem s mor e promisin g tha n a strategy o f integration. 69 Nevertheless , schoo l desegregatio n i s stil l th e cornerstone o f th e NAAC P educationa l policy. 70 Moreover , schoo l de segregation cases are still routinely presented to the Supreme Court despite the hostility of current Court personnel to school desegregation. The Court issued a n expansiv e interpretatio n o f "unitary " school s durin g it s 199 0 Term tha t make s i t easie r fo r schoo l district s t o escap e existin g desegre gation obligations , an d i t hear d argumen t i n tw o additiona l case s durin g its 199 1 Ter m tha t giv e i t th e opportunit y t o dilut e desegregatio n obli gations eve n further. 71 On a deeper level, Brown illustrate s the danger of minority dependence upon the Supreme Court in defining the manner in which minorities think about th e problems o f rac e in contemporary society . A telling exampl e is provided b y th e argument s tha t NAAC P Genera l Counse l Nathanie l R . Jones offere d i n defens e o f th e NAAC P schoo l desegregatio n policy . H e argued tha t th e eliminatio n o f segregatio n wa s mor e importan t tha n th e elimination o f other , more tangibl e educationa l harms , and that the Constitution di d not guarantee th e righ t to a quality education bu t only to an education tha t wa s no t officiall y segregated. 72 Th e assertio n tha t segre gation i s inherentl y harmfu l t o minorit y schoo l childre n come s directl y from th e Suprem e Court' s opinio n i n Brown. 73 Th e assertio n tha t th e Constitution prohibit s racia l segregation bu t does not protect educationa l

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quality i s a direc t restatemen t o f th e Suprem e Court' s interpretatio n o f the Constitutio n i n San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez?* whic h uphel d th e practic e o f disproportionat e fundin g fo r inner city an d suburba n schools. 75 I n offerin g thes e argument s a s a defense o f the NAAC P desegregatio n policy , Mr . Jones ha d simpl y le t th e Suprem e Court defin e th e manner in which he—an d mainstream racia l minorities conceptualize th e school desegregatio n issue . Because th e Supreme Cour t favors integration ove r both loca l contro l an d educational qualit y for majoritarian reasons , racia l minoritie s wh o permi t th e Suprem e Cour t t o dictate th e manne r i n whic h the y thin k abou t racia l problem s ar e likel y to adop t th e sam e conclusion s tha t th e Cour t adopts , despit e th e major itarian cas t o f thos e conclusions . There ar e othe r way s i n whic h th e Cour t ha s bee n abl e t o structur e minority thinking about school desegregation. When Brown overrule d the separate-but-equal doctrin e o f Plessy, 76 i t stigmatize d separate-but-equa l facilities a s morall y illegitimate . Th e faile d desegregatio n effor t ha s no w made the separate-but-equal strateg y see m much mor e appealing to many progressive minority leaders . However, because of th e moral taint that the Supreme Court has placed upo n that strategy, mainstream minoritie s ten d reflexively t o dismis s th e objectiv e o f separate-but-equa l publi c facilitie s as someho w dishonorabl e o r defeatist . Independen t minorit y evaluatio n of separate-but-equa l strategie s woul d revea l th e considerabl e appea l o f those strategie s t o racia l minorities , bu t onc e again , dependenc e o n th e Supreme Court' s mora l leadershi p ha s preclude d mainstrea m minoritie s from undertakin g suc h independen t evaluation . A closel y relate d corollar y i s illustrate d b y mainstrea m minorit y ac quiescence i n th e Suprem e Cour t pronouncemen t tha t racia l segregatio n itself i s per s e demeanin g t o racia l minorities , stigmatizin g the m a s infe rior.77 As Malcol m X ha s pointed out , thi s notio n i s simply silly : I just can't see where if whit e people can go to a white classroom and there are not Negroes present and it doesn't affect the academic diet they're receiving, then I don't see where an all-black classroom can be affected b y the absence of white children . . . . So , what the integrationists, in my opinion, are saying, when they say that whites and blacks must go to schoo l together , is that th e whites are so much superior that just their presence in a black classroom balances it out. I can't go along with that. 78 Unfortunately mainstrea m minoritie s are able to go along with that. They are able to do so because the Supreme Court has told them to, and because they plac e mor e stoc k i n Suprem e Cour t guidanc e tha n the y plac e i n guidance fro m thei r own progressiv e leaders .

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On an even deepe r level , minorit y dependenc e o n th e Suprem e Court , with respec t t o bot h th e contro l o f minorit y school s an d th e manne r i n which minoritie s thin k abou t minorit y schools , generalize s t o th e entir e approach tha t minoritie s hav e take n t o th e advancemen t o f minorit y in terests. Althoug h racia l minoritie s hav e th e potentia l t o exercis e consid erable political powe r to advance their own interests, 79 to date, minorities have bee n conten t t o rel y mos t heavil y o n countermajoritaria n judicia l review t o protec t minorit y interests . Becaus e Brown i s stil l viewe d a s an overwhelming success for the countermajoritaria n mode l o f adjudication , racial minorities seem more concerned with trying to replicate Brown tha n with escapin g th e politica l dependenc y tha t ha s mad e Brown necessary . Contemporary racial minorities have given a low priority to their own selfdetermination. Wit h onl y a few episodi c exceptions , ther e hav e bee n n o race riots ; ther e hav e bee n n o economi c boycotts ; ther e hav e no t eve n been demand s fo r proportiona l legislativ e representation. 80 Moreover , when minorities do engage in political action, it tends to be polite political action tha t i s characterize d mos t strongl y b y minorit y participatio n i n coalitions dominate d b y whit e politica l interes t group s tha t debat e th e proper response to the subtleties of Suprem e Court decisions. 81 The enormous politica l effor t tha t minoritie s chos e t o pu t int o th e relativel y in nocuous propose d Civi l Right s Act s o f 199 0 an d 199 1 i s illustrative. 82 Moreover, althoug h minorit y politician s hav e recentl y begu n t o secur e election a s mayor s o f majo r citie s an d eve n a s th e governo r o f Virginia , they hav e don e s o b y structurin g thei r campaign s t o appea l t o whit e voters.83 They hav e accepted rathe r than challenge d th e structur e o f rac e relations tha t ha s bee n establishe d b y th e Suprem e Court . I n sum , th e Supreme Court has been successful i n convincing minorities to forego th e pursuit o f ra w politica l powe r i n favo r o f continue d dependenc e o n th e reason, order, and stability of supposedly countermajoritarian adjudication. Because countermajoritaria n Suprem e Cour t adjudication i s really major itarianism i n disguise , thi s dependenc e i s intrinsicall y inimica l t o racia l minorities. Brown v. Board of Education wa s no t th e countermajoritaria n gif t t o racial minoritie s tha t i t i s typicall y though t t o be . Rather , Brown wa s a decision tha t was motivated b y majoritarian political preference s an d that was intende d t o benefi t racia l minoritie s onl y incidentally . Despit e thi s intended incidenta l benefit , however , Brown ha s actuall y harme d racia l minorities b y perpetuatin g minorit y dependenc e o n Suprem e Cour t pro tection i n lieu of minorit y self-determination. Becaus e the Supreme Court is a n inherentl y majoritaria n institution , minorit y dependenc e upo n th e

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Supreme Court ultimately benefit s th e white majority b y preserving a legal structure i n which minorit y interest s ca n b e subordinate d t o majorit y in terests wit h minima l minorit y opposition . Th e manne r i n whic h th e Su preme Court has structured the law of affirmative actio n further illustrate s the institutional rol e that the Court has come to play in this subordinating process.

C H A P T E R8

Centralization

The la w of affirmativ e actio n i s the mos t significan t bod y o f la w affectin g contemporary rac e relation s i n th e Unite d States . Th e Suprem e Court , however, ha s develope d th e lega l doctrine s tha t gover n affirmative actio n in a way that adversely affects th e interests of racia l minorities. It has done this b y insinuating itsel f int o th e politica l policymakin g proces s tha t gov erns affirmative action , and b y incorporating centralize d rathe r than loca l standards int o th e regulator y framewor k tha t i t ha s impose d upo n tha t process. I n City of Richmond v. J A. Croson Co., 1 th e Cour t hel d tha t state an d municipa l affirmativ e actio n plan s were subjec t t o stric t judicia l scrutiny unde r the equa l protectio n claus e o f th e Constitution . The practical consequenc e o f thi s holdin g i s t o invalidat e virtuall y al l stat e an d local affirmativ e actio n plans , becaus e i t i s extremel y rar e fo r a n explici t racial classificatio n t o surviv e stric t scrutiny . I n Metro Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 2 however , th e Cour t hel d tha t congressional affirmativ e actio n plans were subject to only an intermediate level o f judicia l scrutin y becaus e o f th e special powers that Congress possesses as the national legislature. The practical consequence of thi s holding is to sustai n mos t federa l affirmativ e actio n plans . Accordingly, the la w o f affirmative actio n i s centralized rathe r than local becaus e onl y th e federa l government possesse s th e practica l powe r t o implemen t a n affirmativ e action program . On a concret e level , thi s structur e place s racia l minoritie s a t a disad vantage because i t increases the amount o f politica l powe r that they must amass i n orde r t o secur e th e adoptio n o f a valid affirmativ e actio n plan . Although racia l minorities will ofte n posses s th e political powe r to secure 119

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enactment o f stat e o r loca l affirmativ e actio n plans , thos e plan s wil l b e invalidated a s unconstitutional . Thi s i s precisel y wha t happene d i n th e Croson case , where minoritie s wer e abl e t o convinc e th e Richmon d Cit y Council t o adop t a n affirmativ e actio n plan , only t o hav e tha t pla n inval idated b y th e Suprem e Court . Althoug h th e Cour t wil l uphol d federa l plans, as it did i n Metro Broadcasting, i t is much harder for minoritie s t o secure the adoption of federal plans because minorities will have to possess enough politica l powe r t o influenc e a national Congress , no t jus t a local city council . Thi s effectivel y denie s loca l pocket s o f minorit y politica l strength the power to advance minority interests in the way that they could under a constitutional rul e tha t incorporate d loca l standards . On a mor e subtl e level , th e argumen t mos t ofte n relie d upo n b y th e Supreme Cour t t o justif y it s invalidatio n o f affirmativ e actio n plan s i s the need to strive for a colorblind society in which resources will be distributed in a race-neutral manne r according to merit, thereby remaining true to the American ideal of treatin g citizens as individuals rather than as mere members o f a racia l group . Grou p identification , however , ca n b e politicall y very potent. Indeed , it i s what ha s permitted th e white majorit y t o amas s a disproportionate shar e o f ou r societal wealth . Just as Americans ca n be convinced t o suppor t a dubiou s foreig n wa r b y th e argumen t tha t thei r support is necessary to preserve "traditional American values" or to protect our "vital nationa l interests, " racial minoritie s hav e the option o f makin g similar "nationalism " appeal s i n orde r t o secur e a n increas e i n minorit y group solidarity . Moreover , thes e appeal s wil l b e particularl y effectiv e i f race is viewed as central rathe r than incidental i n American life. However , by denyin g th e centralit y o f rac e i n America n lif e an d insistin g upo n th e importance of rac e neutrality, the Supreme Court has effectively preclude d minorities fro m respondin g t o appeal s fo r racia l solidarit y tha t coul d fa cilitate minorit y realizatio n o f racia l self-determination . The Statistical Nature

of Affirmative Action

Although law s tha t prohibi t racia l discriminatio n ar e o f obviou s socia l significance, the y hav e les s contemporar y consequenc e tha n th e la w o f affirmative action . I n part, thi s i s becaus e th e desirabilit y o f lega l prohi bitions o n racia l discriminatio n i s now generall y conceded , whil e th e de sirability o f affirmativ e actio n remain s hotl y contested . I n addition, how ever, th e sophisticate d natur e o f moder n discriminatio n mean s tha t th e bare prohibition s o n racia l discriminatio n tha t ar e containe d i n ou r an tidiscrimination law s can have little effect unles s they are accompanied b y

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structural remedie s of th e typ e tha t tend to b e associated wit h affirmativ e action. Stated simply , affirmativ e actio n i s th e us e o f race-consciou s classifi cations fo r th e reallocatio n o f societa l resource s i n a wa y tha t benefit s minorities. I n theory, affirmative actio n an d traditiona l antidiscriminatio n laws ar e analyticall y distinct . Antidiscriminatio n law s promot e rac e neu trality by prohibiting the adverse treatment of individual s o r groups based upon thei r race, while affirmative actio n depart s from th e immediat e goa l of race neutrality in order to channel resources to disadvantaged minorities in a wa y tha t i s designe d t o advanc e th e long-ter m objectiv e o f racia l equality. Despit e thi s theoretica l distinction , however , th e contemporar y relationship tha t exist s betwee n antidiscriminatio n law s an d affirmativ e action ha s becom e s o intimat e tha t i t rarel y make s practica l sens e t o distinguish betwee n th e two . The mos t significan t for m o f racia l discriminatio n tha t exist s i n con temporary America n cultur e i s statistica l discrimination. 3 Althoug h indi vidualized act s of explici t racis m obviously continu e t o occur , the disproportionate allocatio n o f societa l wealt h an d politica l powe r tha t i s presently possessed b y the white majority in the United States has resulted from a pattern o f racia l discriminatio n tha t manifest s itsel f mos t clearl y when one consults the statistical data. Consider, for example, the statistical disparities that exis t betwee n black s and whites. Black s comprise 1 3 percent of th e national population. 4 Nevertheless, in economic terms , whites are considerably better off than blacks. Thirty-one percent of black families live below the federal poverty level while only 1 1 percent of white families live below the poverty level. In addition, 44 percent of blac k childre n live in condition s o f povert y whil e onl y 1 6 percen t o f whit e childre n liv e i n poverty conditions. 5 I n term s o f pe r capit a income , black s ear n onl y 5 7 percent of wha t whites earn, and a black mal e is twice as likely as a white male to b e unemployed. The per capita ne t worth fo r whites i s $32,667 , while th e pe r capit a ne t wort h fo r black s i s onl y $6,837 . Moreover , fo r every $1 o f ne t wealt h possessed b y the media n white family , the media n black famil y possesse s a ne t wealt h o f onl y 9 cents. 6 Healt h an d safet y statistics show equall y dramatic discrepancie s betwee n black s and whites. Homicide i s the leadin g cause o f deat h fo r young blac k males , who con stitute 43 percent of the nation's homicide victims, and young black males are si x time s mor e likel y t o b e victim s o f homicid e tha n whit e male s o f comparable ages. 7 Infan t mortalit y rate s fo r black s ar e twic e a s hig h a s infant mortalit y rate s for whites. 8 Blacks are also twice as likely as whites to be the victims of serious crimes. 9 In terms of political power, all United

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States presidents hav e been white; all bu t two Unite d State s senators have been white ; th e overwhelmin g majorit y o f Unite d State s representative s has bee n white; 10 an d al l bu t tw o Unite d State s Suprem e Cour t justice s have bee n white. 11 I n term s o f it s depth , duration , an d pervasiveness , statistical discriminatio n i n th e Unite d State s ha s bee n s o vas t tha t onl y the systemi c reallocatio n o f resource s offer s an y realisti c hop e o f alterin g the disproportionat e contro l tha t th e whit e majorit y presentl y possesse s over the economic and political resource s of th e society. Because contemporary antidiscriminatio n law s an d contemporar y affirmativ e actio n pro grams bot h see k t o addres s th e proble m o f systemi c discriminatio n tha t occurs o n a statistica l level , th e tw o ca n easil y los e thei r analytica l distinctiveness. The artificialit y o f th e distinctio n betwee n antidiscriminatio n law s and affirmative actio n ca n b e illustrate d b y examinin g Presiden t Bush' s cele brated political oppositio n t o the proposed Civi l Right s Acts of 199 0 and 1991. 12 Thes e legislativ e proposal s woul d hav e reverse d a serie s o f con servative Suprem e Cour t decision s tha t limite d th e scop e o f previousl y enacted congressiona l civi l right s statutes . Althoug h th e legislativ e pro posals were drafted as antidiscrimination amendments intended, inter alia, to modif y th e method s o f statistica l proo f tha t could b e used t o establis h the existence of racia l discrimination, President Bush chose to recast those proposals a s affirmativ e actio n initiative s i n orde r bot h t o fee d an d t o capitalize on the majoritarian resentment to affirmative action that emerged as the United States economy bega n to deteriorat e durin g the Reaga n and Bush administrations. 13 President Bus h was able to do this by arguing that the attention that employers would have to pay under the proposed amendments t o th e statistica l consequence s o f thei r hirin g an d promotio n de terminations would , i n effect , hav e require d employer s t o us e de facto racial quotas in making those determinations. Accordingly, President Bush opposed th e legislativ e proposal s o n th e ground s tha t the y calle d fo r af firmative actio n initiative s tha t wer e unfai r t o whites . Not e tha t thi s argument permit s any antidiscrimination la w tha t addresses th e problem o f statistical discriminatio n t o b e oppose d a s a mere smok e scree n fo r affir mative action. This, in turn, collapses the distinction betwee n race-neutra l antidiscrimination law s an d race-consciou s affirmativ e action. 14 Although affirmativ e actio n i s currentl y controversial , i t i s als o ubiq uitous. Contemporar y America n cultur e utilize s a n arra y o f affirmativ e action programs to redistribut e resources . Typically, these programs occur in educational an d employmen t contexts , although affirmativ e actio n ca n also occu r i n othe r settings , suc h a s th e race-consciou s establishmen t o f

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voting districts for legislative apportionment.15 The most visible affirmativ e action program s ar e thos e tha t endeavo r t o increas e opportunitie s fo r women an d racia l minorities , bot h o f who m hav e traditionall y bee n un derrepresented i n the mos t lucrativ e an d prestigious societa l positions . In addition t o thes e conspicuou s programs , man y educationa l institution s utilize less-apparen t affirmativ e actio n plans , includin g plan s tha t ar e de signed to increase diversity by attracting geographic minorities, to increase prestige an d financial revenues b y attracting athletes, an d t o increas e en dowment b y attracting alumn i son s an d daughters . Indeed , an y selectio n criterion othe r tha n randomnes s necessaril y rest s upo n a preference tha t technically constitutes an affirmative actio n preference. However, the term "affirmative action " has com e t o connot e th e us e o f preference s tha t are unrelated t o merit . Althoug h existin g affirmativ e actio n program s focu s on a number of differen t groups , the affirmative actio n program s tha t are of primar y concer n i n th e presen t contex t ar e thos e tha t concer n racia l minorities. Depending upo n th e particula r justificatio n tha t i s offered fo r a n affir mative actio n program , th e minorit y benefit s tha t ar e advance d b y th e program ca n b e eithe r intentiona l o r incidental . Whe n affirmativ e actio n is use d a s a remed y fo r th e continuin g effect s o f pas t discrimination , it s intended purpos e i s t o provid e a direc t benefi t t o thos e minoritie s wh o are viewe d a s victim s o f tha t pas t discrimination. 16 Lega l scholar s hav e been unabl e t o agre e upo n prope r designation o f thes e victims . O n som e occasions, the victims of pas t discrimination ar e defined t o b e individual s who hav e suffere d identifiabl e injurie s traceabl e t o isolate d act s o f dis criminatory behavior. 17 On othe r occasions, th e victim s are defined t o b e groups tha t hav e historicall y bee n th e object s o f invidiou s societa l dis crimination.18 The presen t Suprem e Cour t tend s t o b e mos t receptiv e t o an individualize d conceptio n o f discriminatio n victims. 19 When affirmativ e actio n i s use d a s a mechanis m fo r providin g pro spective benefit s t o a majoritaria n institutio n i n th e for m o f enhance d diversity, th e direc t beneficiar y i s th e majoritaria n institutio n itself. 20 Fo r example, women and minorities are now routinely admitted to law schools under affirmativ e actio n program s i n recognitio n o f th e pedagogica l in adequacies inheren t i n attempting t o discus s case s lik e Roe v. Wade 21 o r Dred Scott 22 i n a roo m tha t i s populate d exclusivel y b y whit e males . Although minoritie s ma y stan d t o benefi t fro m affirmativ e actio n tha t i s designed t o promot e prospectiv e diversity , thes e minorit y benefit s ar e incidental rathe r than primary. Other justifications fo r affirmative actio n are amenable to varyin g characterizations. For example, role model justification s ca n be viewed as ben-

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efitting either minorities or the white majority.23 When an affirmative action program places minority individuals in positions of high social or economic prestige, other minorities derive aspirational benefit s and enhanced estee m from observing those minorities . For example, men who would no t otherwise conside r career s i n nursing , o r wome n wh o migh t no t otherwis e pursue vocational opportunitie s i n construction work, might choose to do so afte r havin g bee n expose d t o rol e model s i n thos e profession s wit h whom they were able to identify. In addition, countless blacks undoubtedly regard military careers as more viable an d more rewarding simply becaus e they were exposed to General Colin Powell i n the television press briefing s that accompanied th e war against Iraq. 24 However, the larger majoritarian society als o benefit s fro m havin g minoritie s i n hig h prestig e positions , because the presence of minoritie s serving in important social roles negates counterproductive cultura l stereotypes that distort majority perceptions of minority abilities . Fo r example , i t ha s take n actua l confrontatio n wit h minority achievemen t t o negat e th e majorit y vie w tha t minoritie s coul d not becom e successfu l doctors, 25 lawyers, 26 o r eve n basketbal l players. 27 Many white s hav e als o undoubtedl y altere d thei r perception s o f blac k military competenc e a s a resul t o f th e favorabl e publicit y surroundin g General Powell. 28 Although man y justification s hav e bee n offere d fo r affirmativ e action , none ha s achieve d consensu s recognitio n a s th e mos t appropriate . Lega l scholars have been unable to agree upon the proper basis for assessing the legitimacy o f affirmativ e action, 29 an d th e Suprem e Cour t ha s fluctuated between various justifications. 30 Regardles s of wha t justification i s offered , however, affirmativ e actio n seem s destine d t o remai n controversial . The Centralization of

Affirmative Action

One reaso n fo r th e continuin g controvers y tha t surround s affirmativ e ac tion flows fro m it s precariou s lega l status . A s ha s bee n noted , race-con scious affirmativ e actio n i s i n tensio n wit h th e rac e neutralit y objective s of ou r antidiscrimination laws , precisely because affirmative actio n is raceconscious rathe r tha n race-neutral. 31 Thi s make s affirmativ e actio n doc trinally problematic, because the Constitution and an array of federa l stat utes generall y prohibi t race-base d classifications . Althoug h th e Constitu tion that the framers adopted actually protected the race-conscious practice of slavery, 32 adoptio n o f th e Reconstructio n amendment s afte r th e Civi l War modified th e origina l Constitutio n i n way s tha t ar e relevan t t o affir mative action. 33 The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendmen t

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states tha t "[n] o stat e shal l . . . den y t o an y perso n withi n it s jurisdictio n the equal protection o f the laws." 34 Although this constitutional provisio n only applie s t o governmental action , Sectio n 5 of th e fourteent h amend ment authorize s Congres s t o enforc e th e provision s o f th e amendmen t through appropriate legislation. 35 Pursuan t to this authority, Congress has enacted a numbe r o f statute s tha t als o prohibi t racia l discriminatio n i n various nongovernmenta l contexts , includin g discriminatio n i n housing , employment, an d education. 36 Th e ironi c resul t o f thes e constitutiona l and statutory provision s ha s bee n t o cal l int o questio n th e validity o f th e race-based classification s upo n whic h som e publi c an d private affirmativ e action program s rest . The rol e o f statutor y restriction s o n racia l discrim ination i s significant, an d Supreme Court majoritaria n predisposition s ca n affect thes e restriction s b y makin g thei r presenc e fel t durin g th e proces s of statutor y interpretation . However , th e majoritarianis m o f th e Suprem e Court is most influential i n the context of constitutiona l affirmative action , because Suprem e Cour t constitutiona l pronouncement s canno t easil y b e overcome b y racial minoritie s throug h recours e t o th e political process. 37 The nation' s first affirmativ e actio n law s wer e enacte d b y Congres s during th e post-Civi l Wa r Reconstruction period , unde r th e authorit y o f the Reconstructio n amendments. 38 Th e civi l right s legislatio n tha t Con gress adopted durin g that perio d wa s intended t o benefi t th e newl y free d black slaves by guaranteeing them equal rights of citizenship and a measure of protectio n fro m whit e souther n harassment . Althoug h th e provision s of thos e statute s tende d t o b e faciall y neutral , thei r unambiguou s inten t was t o benefi t blacks . The Suprem e Court' s initia l respons e t o th e Re construction amendments and statutes was to enforce them after imposing a narrow construction o n their scope.39 Then, however, the Court actually began t o invalidat e variou s provision s o f th e Reconstructio n legislation , primarily o n federalis m grounds. 40 Thos e narro w construction s an d in validations retained their force until the demise of federalism that occurred during the Ne w Deal , an d th e secon d wav e o f civi l right s legislation tha t was enacted i n th e post-Brown era. 41 In modern times, the Supreme Court authorized the first extensive constitutional us e of affirmative actio n in the context of school desegregation . Brown u Board of Education invalidate d governmental us e of racia l classifications i n holding that de jure school segregatio n was unconstitutional, but th e cas e ironicall y wen t o n t o hol d tha t race-consciou s pupi l assign ment wa s required t o remed y th e constitutiona l violatio n tha t i t ha d just recognized.42 Accordingly , Brown ha s com e t o stan d fo r bot h th e nee d to avoi d th e evi l inheren t i n racia l discriminatio n an d th e nee d t o engag e

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in racia l discriminatio n i n orde r t o counterac t tha t evil . The confusio n that ha s sinc e characterize d th e la w o f affirmativ e actio n simpl y reflect s the affirmativ e actio n dilemm a inheren t i n Brown. 43 The affirmative action dilemma remained dormant as the Supreme Court issued a serie s o f majorit y opinion s throug h th e 1960 s an d earl y 1970 s that authorized th e race-conscious remedie s deemed necessar y to dismantle the previously segregated souther n schoo l systems . As has been noted , however, whe n th e schoo l desegregatio n effor t move d nort h i n th e earl y 1970s, th e national politica l consensu s favorin g schoo l desegregatio n ha d begun t o brea k down , an d th e Cour t bega n t o restric t th e availabilit y o f race-conscious remedies. 44 Moreover , i n context s outsid e th e are a o f school desegregation , a majorit y o f th e Cour t wa s unabl e t o agre e o n a mode o f analysi s fo r affirmativ e action . Thi s resulte d i n a stead y strea m of affirmativ e actio n case s that were resolve d b y plurality rathe r than majority opinions . After usin g th e doctrin e o f mootnes s t o avoi d rulin g o n th e constitu tionality o f affirmativ e actio n i n the 197 4 cas e of DeFunis v. Odegaard 45 the Cour t uphel d th e constitutionalit y o f a race-conscious legislativ e apportionment scheme in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey. 46 However , no majorit y o f th e Cour t was able t o agre e o n a rationale fo r th e Court's outcome. Then in the 197 8 case of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,47 th e Court invalidate d a medical schoo l affirmativ e actio n plan that allocate d 1 6 percen t o f th e seat s i n th e school' s incomin g clas s t o disadvantaged minorit y students. 48 Bu t onc e again , the Cour t wa s unabl e to issu e a majority opinion . Althoug h a five-justice majority vote d t o in validate th e particula r affirmativ e actio n pla n tha t wa s befor e th e Cour t in Bakke, 49 a different five-justice majority state d tha t race-consciou s af firmative actio n woul d b e constitutionall y permissibl e i n appropriat e cir cumstances.50 A majo r sourc e o f contentio n i n Bakke wa s whether affir mative actio n shoul d b e subjec t t o th e stric t judicia l scrutin y tha t i s generally accorde d racia l classification s unde r the equa l protectio n claus e of th e fourteent h amendment, 51 o r whethe r th e benig n natur e o f affir mative actio n mad e a more deferentia l standar d o f relaxe d scrutin y con stitutionally appropriate. 52 In 1980 , th e Cour t uphel d a federa l set-asid e progra m fo r minorit y construction contractor s i n Fullilove v. Klutznick.53 Onc e again, however, the Court was forced to resolve the case through the issuance of a plurality opinion. Althoug h th e justice s wer e stil l unabl e t o agre e o n th e prope r standard o f scrutiny , seve n member s o f th e Cour t di d endors e th e us e o f race-conscious remedie s fo r pas t discrimination, 54 eve n whe n thos e rem -

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edies entailed the use of racia l quotas. 55 Then, in the 198 6 cas e of Wygant u Jackson Board of Education^ 6 th e Cour t issue d anothe r pluralit y de cision, thi s tim e invalidatin g a consen t decre e tha t protecte d lower-sen iority minorit y teacher s fro m layoff s a t th e expens e o f higher-seniorit y white teacher s i n orde r t o maintai n th e percentag e o f minorit y teacher s in the schoo l system. 57 The justice s wh o vote d t o invalidat e th e progra m did so primarily because they found th e program to b e overly burdensom e to white teachers. 58 The justices were still unable to agree on the standard of review. 59 I n the 198 6 cas e o f Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers International Association v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission*® and the 198 7 cas e o f United States v. Paradise, 61 th e Cour t uphel d judiciall y imposed affirmativ e actio n orders , bu t i n bot h case s th e Cour t wa s ye t again force d t o issu e pluralit y opinions . It wa s no t unti l 1989 , afte r Presiden t Reagan' s appointmen t o f con servative Justices O'Connor , Scalia , an d Kenned y t o th e Suprem e Court , that the Court was finallyable to issue a majority opinion in a constitutional affirmative actio n case . I n City of Richmond u J. A. Croson Co.? 1 th e Court invalidated, by a vote of 6-3 , a minority set-aside program that had been adopte d b y th e Cit y Counci l o f Richmond , Virginia . The Cour t invalidated th e Richmon d set-asid e plan , even thoug h i t had been closel y modeled o n th e federa l set-asid e progra m tha t th e Cour t ha d previousl y upheld i n Fullilove. 63 A year later, in 1990 , th e Cour t agai n issue d a majority opinion in an affirmative action case, this time in Metro Broadcasting u Federal Communications Commission. 64 There , th e Cour t upheld , b y a vote o f 5-4 , tw o broadcas t licens e program s tha t ha d bee n adopte d b y the F.C.C . i n orde r t o giv e certai n preference s t o racia l minoritie s i n obtaining radi o and televisio n broadcas t licenses. 65 The curren t la w o f affir mative actio n ha s bee n establishe d b y thes e tw o majorit y opinions . The current law, in essence, upholds the constitutionality o f centralize d affirmative actio n plan s tha t ar e adopte d b y th e federa l government , bu t prohibits decentralize d plan s tha t ar e adopted b y state an d loca l govern ments. It does this by applying a deferential standar d of intermediat e scrutiny t o federa l plans, 66 whil e applyin g a nondeferential standar d o f stric t scrutiny t o loca l plans. 67 This distinctio n effectivel y preclude s th e consti tutionality o f loca l plan s becaus e stric t judicia l scrutin y i s extremely dif ficult to overcome , a s th e outcom e i n Croson illustrates. 68 Unde r stric t scrutiny, a racia l classificatio n ca n b e uphel d onl y i f i t advance s a com pelling governmenta l interes t an d i s narrowl y tailore d t o achievin g tha t interest.69 Intermediate scrutiny, however, is easier to survive, as the Court's decision upholdin g th e F.C.C . racia l preference s i n Metro Broadcasting

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reveals.70 Under intermediate scrutiny, a racial classification wil l b e upheld as lon g a s i t i s substantiall y relate d t o a n importan t governmenta l ob jective.71 When th e Court invalidate d th e minorit y set-asid e program i n Croson, it distinguished the Fullilove set-aside plan, which it had previously upheld. It di d s o b y emphasizin g tha t th e Fullilove plan ha d bee n adopte d b y Congress, wherea s th e Croson pla n ha d bee n adopte d b y th e Richmon d City Council. Justice O'Connor's majorit y opinion reasoned that Congress was entitled to greater judicial deferenc e tha n a local cit y council becaus e of th e special powers that Congress possessed as the national legislature. 72 This distinctio n betwee n federa l an d loca l plan s wa s carrie d forwar d b y Justice Brenna n in his Metro Broadcasting majorit y opinion a s a basis fo r distinguishing Croson. 73 At the time that Croson wa s decided, it appeared that Justice O'Conno r had simply seized upon the distinction between federal and local affirmativ e action program s a s a convenien t metho d fo r avoidin g th e troublesom e Fullilove precedent in the course of invalidatin g the Richmond plan. However, when th e opportunit y t o overrul e Fullilove squarely presente d itsel f the following Ter m in Metro Broadcasting, onl y four justices were willing to abando n th e distinction . Althoug h Justice Brenna n ha d never voted t o invalidate any affirmative action program, whether federal or local in origin, his majorit y opinio n i n Metro Broadcasting nevertheles s endorse d th e Croson distinctio n betwee n federa l an d loca l plans—thi s tim e a s a con venient metho d fo r avoidin g th e troublesom e Croson precedent . Realistically, th e operativ e distinctio n betwee n Croson an d Metro Broadcasting i s tha t Justices Steven s an d Whit e wer e swin g voter s wh o changed thei r positions i n the tw o cases . A four-justice conservativ e cor e consisting o f Chie f Justic e Rehnquis t an d Justices O'Connor , Scalia , and Kennedy ha s vote d consistentl y t o invalidat e th e affirmativ e actio n pro grams tha t th e Cour t ha s resolve d o n constitutiona l grounds . O f thes e justices, onl y then-Justic e Rehnquis t ha s eve r vote d t o uphol d th e con stitutionality o f a n affirmative actio n program , which h e did b y voting t o uphold th e vote r apportionmen t schem e tha t th e Cour t sustaine d i n Carey,74 A three-justice libera l cor e consistin g o f Justices Brennan , Marshall, an d Blackmu n ha s neve r vote d t o invalidat e a n affirmativ e actio n plan tha t ha s bee n presente d t o th e Court . Eac h o f thes e block s vote d predictably i n bot h Croson an d Metro Broadcasting, bu t th e swing vote s determined th e outcom e i n eac h o f thos e cases . In Croson, th e conservativ e bloc k wa s joine d b y Justice s Whit e an d Stevens. Th e reaso n tha t Justice Whit e appear s t o hav e joine d th e con -

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servative block i s that he was convened fro m a proponent to an opponent of affirmativ e actio n a s the overal l politica l climat e i n the natio n becam e more conservative . Justic e Whit e vote d i n favo r o f affirmativ e actio n i n the first four constitutional case s that he considered while on the Supreme Court/ 5 bu t he voted against affirmative actio n i n the next four cases that he considered. 76 Justic e Steven s appear s t o hav e joine d th e conservativ e block i n Croson becaus e h e i s simpl y oppose d t o numerica l set-asides . This vie w i s supported b y th e fac t tha t Justice Steven s ha d also vote d t o invalidate th e federa l set-asid e pla n tha t th e Suprem e Cour t uphel d i n Fullilove, terming the set-aside at issue in that case an inappropriate partisan political effort to give minorities "a piece of the action."77 The four-justic e conservative block , plu s Justice s Whit e an d Stevens , produce d th e 6- 3 decision invalidatin g th e Croson affirmativ e actio n plan . In Metro Broadcasting, Justice s White and Stevens switched their votes and joine d th e libera l affirmativ e actio n block . Justic e Whit e appear s t o have joine d th e libera l bloc k despit e hi s conversio n t o affirmativ e actio n conservatism, becaus e hi s longstanding belie f i n deference t o federa l gov ernmental regulatio n manage d t o overrid e hi s conservatism. 78 Justice Stevens appear s t o hav e joine d th e libera l bloc k despit e hi s anti-affirmativ e action vote s i n cases lik e Croson 79 an d Fullilove? 0 becaus e th e F.C.C . minority preference tha t was involved i n Metro Broadcasting di d not utiliz e numerical set-asides . Rather , it gave minority broadcaster s a preference i n licensing proceedings that might or might not prove to be dispositive when considered in connection with the other factors that go into making broadcast licensin g determinations. 81 The distinctio n betwee n federa l an d loca l program s tha t characterize s the curren t la w o f affirmativ e actio n i s firmly established b y Croson an d Metro Broadcasting. Ironically , however , onl y on e Suprem e Cour t justic e appears actuall y t o believ e i n tha t distinction . Althoug h th e distinctio n accurately accounts for Justice White's recent affirmative actio n votes, the votes o f al l o f th e othe r justice s hav e bee n determine d b y som e othe r factor. Moreover , fo r al l o f th e othe r justice s excep t Justice Stevens , this other factor appears to hav e been simply the justice's general conservativ e or liberal politica l inclination . Becaus e Justice Whit e i s the onl y membe r of th e curren t Cour t wh o accord s genuin e weigh t t o th e distinctio n be tween federa l an d loca l affirmativ e actio n programs , tha t distinctio n ma y prove t o b e a fragile rathe r than a durable one . Justices Brenna n an d Marshall , wh o wer e i n th e libera l cor e o f th e Court when the distinction between federal and local plans was articulated, are n o longe r o n th e Court . Thei r replacements , Justice s Soute r an d

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Thomas, hav e ye t t o vot e o n th e constitutionalit y o f affirmativ e action . However, t o th e exten t tha t general politica l philosoph y wil l continu e t o govern th e developmen t o f Suprem e Cour t affirmativ e actio n doctrine , either o r bot h o f thes e ne w conservativ e justice s coul d easil y upse t th e current law . I t is true that bot h Croson an d Metro Broadcasting ar e very recent decisions , issued after mor e than a decade of experimentatio n wit h plurality opinions . However , eve n th e recen t vintag e o f thes e case s ma y not b e sufficien t t o reduc e th e likelihoo d o f som e imminen t modificatio n in th e la w o f affirmativ e action . The ne w Reagan-Bus h conservativ e ma jority on th e Supreme Court appears willing t o overrul e even recent precedents whe n i t ha s th e vote s t o do so. 82 Nevertheless , th e curren t cen tralized la w o f affirmativ e actio n ma y persist, simpl y becaus e i t serves the conservative majoritaria n interest s tha t ar e s o wel l represente d o n th e Supreme Court . The Concrete Dangers of Centralization The whit e majorit y currentl y control s th e allocatio n o f economi c an d political resources in the United States.83 As a result, economic assumptions about rationa l wealth maximizatio n sugges t that the majority will attemp t to channe l a s many o f thos e resource s a s is practical t o itsel f rathe r than to racia l minorities. 84 I do no t wis h t o sugges t tha t a n economi c mode l provides th e onl y acceptable mode l fo r conceptualizin g affirmativ e actio n issues. However , a n economi c mode l doe s see m particularl y appropriat e in light of the underlying economic nature of the societal resources around which th e affirmativ e actio n debat e ha s centered, an d i n light o f th e pluralist conceptio n o f partisa n politic s tha t thi s boo k ha s advocated . Bot h economics and pluralist politics rest upon the assumption of rational , selfinterested wealth or utility maximization. One could, of course , reject the rational wealth maximization assumption of human motivation, preferring instead t o vie w huma n being s a s possessing th e capacit y fo r benevolenc e and generosity . However , benevolenc e an d generosit y ca n b e assimilate d into th e rationa l wealt h maximizatio n mode l simpl y b y treatin g the m a s factors that even a self-interested majorit y would wish to advance in order to enhanc e th e majority' s sens e o f self-esteem. 85 I n a sense , thi s make s the rationa l wealt h maximizatio n assumptio n tautological , bu t i t als o makes the assumption parsimoniou s enoug h to serve as a useful analytica l construct.86 A rationa l wealt h maximizin g majorit y wil l no t generall y favo r affir mative action , precisel y becaus e affirmativ e actio n allocate s t o racia l mi -

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norities societal resources that would otherwise be enjoyed by the majority. However, the majority i s not fre e t o reserv e all of society' s economic an d political resources for itself, because such short-sighted self-interest woul d ultimately relegat e th e majorit y t o a less than optimal position . There are several reason s for this . As an initial matter , there would b e unacceptabl e collateral consequence s attendan t t o denyin g racia l minoritie s acces s t o all, or even most societal resources . For example, the crime, violence, and disease associate d wit h th e poverty tha t ensued coul d no t successfull y b e confined t o minorit y communitie s alon e withou t considerabl e expendi tures o f majoritaria n resource s i n th e for m o f polic e repression , healt h restrictions, an d th e like . Som e regimes , suc h a s th e antebellu m slaver y regime i n th e Unite d State s an d th e curren t aparthei d regim e i n Sout h Africa, hav e attempte d t o enforc e th e sort s o f law s tha t ar e necessar y t o minimize minorit y acces s t o societa l resources . Suc h regimes , however , eventually collaps e unde r th e pressur e o f thei r ow n repression , jus t a s American slaver y collapse d afte r th e Civi l War , an d jus t a s aparthei d i s presently collapsin g i n South Africa. 87 I n the contemporary Unite d States, which has now evolved beyond its de jure apartheid phase, it would almost certainly b e mor e efficien t fo r a self-interested majorit y t o provid e racia l minorities wit h enoug h resource s t o avoi d a t leas t th e mos t egregiou s externalities associate d wit h th e majoritaria n hoardin g o f al l significan t societal resources . The refusa l t o allocat e an y significan t societa l resource s t o racia l mi norities would also deprive the majority of th e benefits tha t minorities are capable o f providin g t o th e majority . Thes e benefit s ca n b e a s mundan e as manual labor, 88 a s lucrative a s athletic o r entertainment appeal, 89 o r as exceptional a s a lifesavin g scientifi c discovery. 90 However , thos e benefit s will never be available to the majority if minorities are not given the basic resources necessar y t o permi t suc h benefit s t o com e int o existence . I n addition, the majorit y wil l suffe r reduce d self-estee m an d goodwill i f i t is perceived b y itsel f an d b y other s t o b e callou s an d indifferen t t o th e subsistence need s o f othe r huma n beings—eve n minorit y huma n beings . Charity ha s alway s bee n a stron g componen t o f th e America n Judeo Christian ethic . Eve n th e substantia l economi c benefit s o f slaver y wer e eventually abolishe d i n larg e par t becaus e o f majoritaria n perception s o f slavery as immoral an d un-American. 91 Moreover , the majority's desire t o preserve it s ow n self-esteem , a s well a s the goodwil l o f others , i s one o f the factor s tha t account s fo r th e Suprem e Court' s majoritaria n decisio n to allocat e educationa l resource s t o racia l minoritie s i n Brown. 92 A rational wealth-maximizin g majorit y wil l no t attemp t t o allocat e al l significant societa l resource s t o itsel f becaus e th e cost s o f doin g s o ar e

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prohibitive. Rather , th e majorit y wil l striv e fo r th e optima l allocatio n o f resources betwee n itsel f an d racia l minorities . State d differently , th e ma jority wil l no t oppos e al l affirmativ e action . Instead , i t will favo r jus t th e right amount of affirmative action—no t too much, but not too little either. The Suprem e Court' s insinuatio n o f itsel f int o a position o f contro l ove r the affirmativ e actio n policymakin g proces s help s th e majorit y t o achiev e the optima l leve l o f affirmativ e actio n becaus e o f th e Suprem e Court' s inherent conservatism. 93 The way that the Court has chosen t o satisfy thi s optimization obligatio n i s b y centralizin g th e la w o f affirmativ e action . On a superficial level , the control that the Supreme Court exercises over the formulatio n o f majoritaria n affirmativ e actio n polic y seem s nonsens ical. Whatever justificatio n ther e migh t b e fo r Suprem e Cour t impositio n of affirmative action responsibilities on the representative branches of government, it is difficult t o find a justification fo r Supreme Court invalidatio n of affirmativ e actio n programs that the representative branche s voluntarily choose t o adopt . I f th e openl y majoritaria n branche s o f governmen t ar e unconstitutionally discriminatin g agains t racia l minorities , th e Suprem e Court i s arguabl y justifie d i n imposin g affirmativ e actio n obligation s t o remedy tha t discrimination . Th e representation-reinforcemen t theor y o f constitutional law, which contains perhaps the most popular contemporary defense o f judicia l review , provide s fo r suc h judicia l interventio n whe n necessary t o counterac t majoritaria n exploitatio n o f discret e an d insula r minorities wh o ar e underrepresente d i n th e politica l process. 94 However , when a n openl y majoritaria n branc h o f governmen t ha s chose n t o adop t an affirmativ e actio n program , i t appear s t o mak e littl e sens e fo r th e Su preme Cour t t o invalidat e tha t progra m o n constitutiona l grounds . As suming that the plan actually benefits racia l minorities, there is no discrete and insular minority fo r the Court t o protect . Although affirmativ e actio n can adversely affect member s o f th e white majority , the white majorit y is, by definition, adequately represented i n the political process and does not, therefore, requir e Suprem e Cour t interventio n t o protec t it s interests . Nevertheless, th e Suprem e Cour t no w routinel y review s majoritaria n af firmative actio n program s t o asses s thei r constitutionality , an d frequentl y invalidates thos e program s a s i t di d i n Croson. Supreme Court review of majoritaria n affirmative actio n plans does not make sense as a method for protecting racial minority interests, but it does make sens e a s a method fo r protectin g th e majority . Whe n th e majorit y elects to adopt a voluntary affirmative action plan it derives certain benefit s from doin g so . Thos e benefit s tak e th e for m o f enhance d majoritaria n self-esteem, a s wel l a s increase d goodwil l an d toleranc e o n th e par t o f

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racial minoritie s wh o woul d otherwis e resen t th e majority' s dispropor tionate accumulatio n o f societa l resources . The self-estee m benefit s ar e very real, although they are largely intangible. The minority-goodwill ben efits are more concrete, ranging from reduced minority opposition in polite politics to reduced boycotts and riots in less-polite politics. 95 The majority, however, must pay the costs associated with securing those benefits through the increase d minorit y allocation s o f societa l resource s tha t ar e entaile d in th e affirmativ e actio n program s tha t th e majorit y adopts . Judicial revie w o f majoritaria n affirmativ e actio n program s permits th e majority t o deriv e th e benefit s associate d wit h th e voluntar y adoptio n o f affirmative actio n program s at a discounted politica l cost . Meaningfu l ju dicial revie w will necessaril y resul t in the invalidatio n o f som e percentag e of th e affirmativ e actio n program s tha t th e majorit y adopts . I n moder n history, the Supreme Court has invalidated the affirmative actio n programs at issu e i n thre e o f th e eigh t affirmativ e actio n case s tha t th e Cour t ha s resolved on constitutional grounds. 96 This invalidation rate of 37. 5 percent essentially mean s that the majority can purchase the benefits o f affirmativ e action fo r th e pric e o f 62. 5 cent s o n th e dollar—th e invers e o f 37. 5 percent—simply by filteringmajoritarian affirmative action policies through the proces s o f judicia l review . The reaso n tha t Suprem e Cour t invalidatio n doe s no t als o reduc e th e benefits associate d wit h voluntar y affirmativ e actio n i s tha t th e Court , rather tha n th e majority , i s viewe d a s th e entit y responsibl e fo r havin g prevented the majoritaria n affirmativ e actio n programs from taking effect . Because th e majorit y i s no t implicate d i n th e Court' s invalidation , th e majority i s able to retai n the enhanced self-estee m an d minority goodwill that was initially associated with its adoption of th e invalidated affirmativ e action program. As long as the perception persists that the Court operate s in a doctrinally principle d manner , rather than as a disguised majoritaria n institution, judicial review will continue to make the adoption of voluntary affirmative actio n program s a bargai n fo r a rationa l wealth-maximizin g majority. The politica l cost s o f affirmativ e actio n t o th e majorit y ar e furthe r reduced b y th e manne r i n whic h th e Suprem e Cour t ha s structure d th e law o f affirmativ e action . The Cour t no t onl y invalidate s a percentage o f the affirmativ e actio n program s tha t racia l minoritie s ar e successfu l i n convincing the majority to adopt, but the programs that the Court is willing to uphol d ar e th e ver y program s tha t minoritie s wil l typicall y lac k th e political power to get enacted with any degree of frequency. By centralizing the la w o f affirmativ e action , th e Suprem e Cour t ha s effectivel y force d

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racial minorities t o divert their affirmative actio n political effort s fro m th e local leve l t o th e nationa l level . Thi s benefit s th e majorit y a t th e expens e of racia l minoritie s becaus e i t requires minorities to expen d thei r political capital wher e i t wil l pos e th e leas t threa t t o majorit y interests . As the Richmon d set-asid e pla n tha t th e Supreme Cour t invalidate d i n Croson reveals , i n som e localitie s racia l minoritie s wil l posses s sufficien t political powe r t o deman d th e enactmen t o f affirmativ e actio n programs . In Richmond , black s comprise d 5 0 percen t o f th e population , hel d five of nin e cit y counci l seats , and wer e abl e t o secur e th e adoptio n o f a setaside plan tha t reserve d 3 0 percent o f th e publi c fund s expende d o n mu nicipal constructio n contract s fo r minorit y contractors—contractor s wh o had previously been awarded only 0.67 percent of the city's prime contracts in the absence of the set-aside plan.97 On the national level, however, racial minorities will compris e a much smaller percentage o f th e electorate tha n they d o i n man y localities . Fo r example , althoug h black s compris e 5 0 percent o f th e populatio n i n Richmond , the y compris e onl y 1 3 percen t of the population nationally. 98 At the national level, racial minorities simply lack th e abilit y t o compet e a s effectively i n th e pluralis t politica l proces s as the y ca n i n area s havin g a heav y concentratio n o f minorit y voters . Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's decision to apply strict judicial scrutiny to loca l affirmativ e actio n plan s while applyin g relaxe d intermediat e scrutiny to federa l plans , creates compelling incentive s for racial minoritie s t o forego the local political battles that they could win in favor of the national battles tha t the y ar e muc h mor e likel y t o lose . It is true, of course, that racial minorities can sometimes secure political victories a t th e nationa l level . The federa l civi l right s legislatio n tha t wa s enacted b y Congress during the 1960 s and 1970 s illustrates the possibility of minorit y influenc e i n nationa l politics. 99 I n addition , th e existenc e o f federal affirmativ e actio n programs , suc h a s th e minorit y enhancemen t program uphel d i n Metro Broadcasting an d the minorit y set-aside uphel d in Fullilove, indicate tha t racia l minoritie s sometime s posses s th e politica l power to secur e the enactment o f nationa l affirmativ e actio n programs. 100 However, minorities can also fail to secure the enactment of even mundane civil rights legislation at the national leve l because of their lack of politica l power, a s they di d i n thei r initia l effort s t o secur e enactmen t o f th e proposed Civi l Rights Acts of 199 0 an d 1991. 101 Othe r issues, such as public funding fo r abortions , ma y b e susceptibl e t o minorit y victorie s a t th e national level , but they are much more susceptible t o such victories at the local leve l wher e racia l minoritie s posses s greate r political power. 102 Stil l other important legislative reforms are capable of advancing immeasurably

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the interest s o f racia l minorities , bu t the y ar e unlikel y eve r t o b e take n seriously at the national leve l precisely becaus e o f thei r potential t o upse t the existin g allocation o f resource s betwee n white s and minorities. Issue s such a s meaningfu l incom e redistribution 103 an d proportiona l legislativ e representation fall into this category.104 Finally, when minorities are forced to operat e o n th e nationa l politica l level , eve n thei r victorie s can , i n a sense, become losses . This i s because minoritie s operatin g o n th e leve l o f national politics, where they constitute only a small percentage of the total electorate, are forced to join national political coalitions that will invariably be controlled by white interest groups rather than by racial minorities themselves. This need for minorities to join such coalitions simply enables whites to perpetuat e furthe r thei r control ove r th e fate s o f racia l minorities , and frustrates furthe r minorit y effort s t o achiev e politica l self-determination . The Reagan-Bush Supreme Court now appears to have a strong enough conservative majorit y t o invalidat e al l affirmativ e actio n program s i f i t s o desires. Chie f Justic e Rehnquis t an d Justices O'Connor , Scalia , an d Ken nedy consistentl y vot e agains t th e constitutionalit y o f affirmativ e action . In addition, although Justices Soute r and Thomas d o no t ye t hav e voting records o n th e issu e as Supreme Cour t justices , bot h hav e expressed hos tility t o affirmativ e actio n i n othe r contexts . Justice Souter , while servin g as the Attorney Genera l of Ne w Hampshire , referred to affirmative actio n as "affirmativ e discrimination, " an d h e resiste d complianc e wit h Equa l Employment Opportunit y Commissio n requirement s to provide statistica l information t o th e federa l governmen t abou t th e racia l breakdow n o f New Hampshire public officials.105 Justice Thomas has, at times, attributed his academi c an d politica l achievement s t o th e existenc e o f affirmativ e action programs, but his most recen t sentiments, expressed as the head of the Equa l Employmen t Opportunit y Commission , a s a Court o f Appeal s judge, and as a Supreme Court nominee , have all bee n strongly critical o f affirmative action. 106 This appears to give the current Court six solid vote s against affirmativ e action—enoug h t o invalidat e federa l a s wel l a s loca l programs i f th e Cour t shoul d desir e across-the-boar d invalidation . How ever, i f th e Suprem e Cour t wer e t o invalidat e all affirmativ e actio n pro grams, it would ris k losin g it s representation-reinforcemen t reputatio n a s the guardian o f minorit y interests . A Supreme Cour t prohibition o n al l affirmativ e action , just when popular oppositio n t o affirmativ e actio n wa s a t it s pea k i n a deterioratin g economy, migh t promp t racia l minoritie s t o com e t o view th e Cour t as a surreptitiously majoritaria n institution . This , i n turn , coul d caus e minor ities t o ceas e thei r relianc e o n Suprem e Cour t adjudicatio n a s a passiv e

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alternative to more aggressive, extra-legal strategies for the pursuit of racial justice. I f racia l minoritie s wer e thu s provoke d t o abando n thei r depen dence o n Suprem e Cour t protection , th e Cour t woul d n o longe r b e abl e to serve its majoritarian function o f subordinating minorities with rhetoric rather than coercion. The majority would then be forced to resort to more costly an d les s effectiv e mean s o f racia l subordinatio n i n orde r t o retai n their present disproportionate allocatio n o f societa l resources . In order to prolong minorit y acquiescenc e i n continue d Suprem e Cour t protection , therefore, th e Cour t i s likel y t o permi t som e affirmativ e actio n program s to retai n thei r constitutiona l validity . Fo r th e instrumenta l reason s tha t have bee n discussed , th e presen t distinctio n betwee n federa l an d loca l affirmative actio n provide s a convenient , i f no t Machiavellian , mean s o f prolonging minorit y dependenc e o n th e Court . However , th e distinctio n also ha s additional , subtl e feature s tha t increas e it s utilit y t o a veile d majoritarian Court .

The Subtle Dangers of Centralization One migh t suspec t that , a s ba d a s th e Suprem e Court' s centralizatio n o f affirmative actio n may be, it is still bette r than Supreme Court invalidatio n of al l affirmative actio n programs, including federal a s well a s local plans. At leas t minoritie s ca n no w compet e fo r nationa l affirmativ e actio n pro grams, the enactment of which they will be able to secure on at least some occasions. However, even that suspicion seems dubious after one considers the mor e subtl e consequence s o f th e Court' s centralizatio n o f affirmativ e action. Conceptually , th e mos t significan t differenc e tha t exist s betwee n centralization an d decentralizatio n i s that centralizatio n connote s univer salism, rational objectivity, and race neutrality, while decentralization connotes parochialism , irrationa l subjectivity , an d racia l bias . Capitalizing o n those connotations, the Supreme Court's preference for centralization over decentralization reflect s a n ideology o f colorblin d rac e neutralit y tha t all but guarantee s th e perpetuatio n o f majorit y dominanc e ove r racia l minorities. In contemporary America, centralization i s associated with the positive cultural attribute s o f universalism , rationa l objectivity , an d rac e neutral ity.107 Universalism i s the belie f i n transcendent normativ e truth s that can serve a s guidepost s t o lea d u s fro m th e moras s o f cultura l relativis m t o the hig h groun d o f mora l propriety , thereb y savin g u s fro m th e abys s o f nihilistic despair into which we will fal l i f we rejec t the call of universalis t pursuits. Rationa l objectivit y i s the analytica l proces s throug h whic h uni -

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versalist norms can b e ascertained i n the abstract and implemented o n an operational level , fre e fro m th e distortion s o f irrationa l passion . Rac e neutrality i s the virtue that result s from th e application o f rationa l objec tivity to universalis t norm s i n the contex t o f rac e relations. The fac t tha t centralization i s linke d t o thes e positiv e cultura l attribute s i s illustrate d by th e histor y o f rac e relation s i n th e Unite d States . Afte r th e regiona l South subjecte d racia l minoritie s t o th e bruta l affliction s o f slaver y an d racial segregation , th e centralize d federa l unio n intervene d t o righ t thos e regional wrongs by fighting a Civil War and enacting numerous civil rights laws that guaranteed to all oppressed minorities the right of racial equality. Accordingly, th e centra l government , cognizan t o f th e universalis t imper ative t o hono r th e equalit y o f huma n dignity , behave d i n a rationall y objective manner and supplanted a regional domai n of racia l bigotr y with a nationa l regim e o f rac e neutrality. 108 Decentralization i s associate d wit h th e negativ e cultura l attribute s o f parochialism, irrational subjectivity , and racial bias. 109 Parochialism i s the belief tha t th e particularize d preference s tha t emanat e fro m th e moras s of cultural relativism can be imposed upon others who do not share those preferences, jus t a s i f th e preference s i n fac t reflecte d universalis t mora l canons. Irrationa l subjectivit y i s th e tainte d analytica l proces s throug h which parochia l norm s ar e mistake n fo r universalis t norm s i n orde r t o satisfy th e self-intereste d demand s o f passio n tha t coul d no t b e justifie d through recourse t o rational objectivity . Racia l bia s is the vice that results from th e applicatio n o f irrationa l subjectivit y t o parochia l preference s i n the contex t o f rac e relations . Th e fac t tha t decentralizatio n i s linke d t o these negativ e cultura l attribute s i s also illustrate d b y the histor y o f rac e relations in the United States. The reason that the centralized federal union was required t o wag e a Civil Wa r and to enac t numerou s civil right s laws was becaus e th e regiona l Sout h ha d chose n t o inflic t it s parochia l pref erences fo r slaver y an d segregatio n o n vulnerabl e racia l minoritie s wh o did no t shar e thos e preferences . Accordingly , th e regiona l South , blinde d by th e intensit y o f it s parochia l passions , behave d i n a n irrationall y sub jective manner in instituting it s bigoted regim e of racia l bia s that only the remedy o f centralizatio n coul d cure. 110 The connotation s o f centralizatio n an d decentralizatio n tha t emerg e from thes e contrastin g account s pervad e th e Suprem e Court' s affirmativ e action opinions . The primar y justificatio n tha t th e Cour t ha s offere d fo r its affirmativ e actio n decision s relate s t o th e importanc e o f pursuin g th e cultural goa l o f rac e neutrality . Thi s i s tru e o f bot h th e decision s invali dating and upholdin g affirmativ e actio n programs . When th e Cour t inval -

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idates a n affirmativ e actio n program , i t doe s s o becaus e o f th e nee d t o prohibit race-consciou s remedie s tha t ar e inconsisten t wit h ou r ultimat e cultural goa l o f achievin g a colorblind societ y i n which th e allocatio n o f societal resource s is based upo n merit rather than upon the color of one' s skin.111 Whe n th e Cour t uphold s a n affirmativ e actio n program , i t doe s so onl y becaus e o f th e nee d t o engag e i n temporar y race-consciou s rem edies tha t ar e necessary t o alleviat e th e effect s o f pas t discriminatio n i n a way that will advanc e our ultimate goal o f achievin g that same colorblin d society.112 Accordingly, th e Suprem e Court' s preference fo r a centralized, rather tha n a decentralized , la w o f affirmativ e actio n reflect s thi s deepe r cultural preferenc e fo r th e virtu e o f rac e neutralit y tha t centralizatio n connotes. As noble as this judicial preoccupation with race neutrality may appear on a superficial level , beneath the surface it is profoundly subversive. The problem is that we do not live in a colorblind, race-neutral society . Nor d o we liv e i n a society tha t i s capable o f becomin g colorblin d i n the conceivable future . I n th e Unite d States , rac e i s invariabl y implicate d i n most significan t societa l decisionmaking. 113 Decision s abou t civi l right s and affirmative actio n obviously implicat e th e issue of race , because thos e decisions directl y determin e ho w societa l resource s wil l b e allocate d be tween the white majority and racial minorities. However, societal decisions about matter s tha t d o no t directl y addres s th e issu e o f rac e als o affec t racial interest s i n substantial ways . We canno t adop t a n interna l revenu e cod e withou t determinin g ho w societal wealth will be allocated betwee n middle-class whites and indigent racial minorities. 114 We cannot adopt a federal budget without determinin g how taxpaye r revenue s wil l b e redistribute d betwee n whit e defens e con tractors an d minorit y schoo l children. 115 W e canno t commenc e militar y engagements withou t sentencin g racia l minoritie s t o di e in disproportion ate numbers fo r whatever majoritaria n interes t i s thought t o b e advanced by th e militar y operatio n a t issue. 116 W e canno t institut e capita l punish ment withou t similarl y sentencin g minoritie s t o di e i n disproportionat e numbers i n ou r ga s chamber s an d electri c chairs. 117 W e canno t abolis h capital punishmen t withou t dilutin g whatever deterren t effec t i t may have in th e minorit y communitie s tha t suffe r a disproportionat e shar e o f ou r nation's violen t crime. 118 W e canno t prohibit , permit , o r fun d abortion s without extendin g th e cost s an d benefit s o f thos e decision s i n a manne r that ha s a n integra l impac t o n minorit y famil y structure. 119 W e canno t even determin e whethe r th e first amendmen t protect s "fo r sale " sign s without affectin g th e pattern s o f residentia l segregatio n tha t exis t i n th e United States. 120 I f on e doubt s th e pervasiv e abilit y o f rac e t o influenc e

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the resolutio n o f issue s tha t shoul d properl y hav e nothin g whatsoeve r t o do with race, one need only try to account for why the District of Columbia has been unabl e to escap e it s colonial statu s and achieve voting representation i n Congress . N o plausibl e explanatio n i s possibl e withou t fallin g back o n th e facto r o f rac e t o explai n thi s aberratio n i n democrati c theory.121 It i s difficul t t o contes t th e immanenc e o f rac e i n societa l decision making. A t times , th e rol e o f rac e ha s bee n explicit , a s i n th e era s o f slavery, Jim Crow, and de jure segregation. Mor e recently , the rol e of rac e has bee n implicit , wit h societa l decisionmakin g bein g base d upo n factor s that correlat e wit h rac e rathe r than o n rac e itself. The resul t i s the same, however, regardless of th e route b y which i t is achieved. Racia l minoritie s are systematicall y disadvantage d b y majoritaria n socia l policie s tha t allo cate societa l resource s t o white s rathe r tha n t o racia l minorities . Thi s i s decidedly not rac e neutrality . I t i s racia l discriminatio n pur e an d simple , and it continues t o b e racial discrimination whethe r it takes an explicit o r a subtl e form . One coul d argu e about th e degree t o whic h racia l consideration s con sciously motivate the formulation o f th e social policies that have adversely affected racial minorities, but such arguments are likely to be unproductive. Chapter 4 ha s illustrate d tha t i t i s alway s possibl e t o deconstruc t th e distinction betwee n th e concept s o f inten t an d effec t i n th e contex t o f disparate racial impact. 122 Even tolerance of uncertaint y about the racially correlated consequences of social policies can be reconceptualized to constitute raciall y motivate d societa l decisionmaking. 123 Onl y a cultur e i n which th e issu e o f rac e neve r eve n entere d th e consciou s contemplatio n of socia l policymaker s coul d clai m t o b e capable o f colorblin d rac e neutrality. That is not our culture. In the United States, most societal decision s have a n appreciabl e impac t o n raciall y identifiabl e interests . An d al l o f those decision s ar e race-consciou s decisions . Viewed a s an outgrowt h o f ou r inevitabl y race-consciou s culture , th e Supreme Court' s insistenc e o n rac e neutralit y become s disquietingl y sus picious. I t cease s t o resembl e a n admirabl e socia l panacea , bu t rathe r metastasizes int o a virulen t socia l malignancy . Becaus e unspoke n racia l considerations wil l continu e t o motivat e th e manne r i n whic h majo r societal decisions are made, a judicial prohibition on explicitly race-conscious efforts t o counterac t tha t taci t race-consciousnes s serve s onl y t o protrac t the present allocation of resources—an allocation under which the majority benefits a t th e expens e o f racia l minorit y interests . State d mor e starkly , race i s so intrinsi c i n our societal decisionmakin g tha t th e optio n o f rac e

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neutrality i s simpl y unavailable . Ou r onl y choic e i s betwee n allocatin g a resource t o th e whit e majorit y o r allocating i t t o a racial minority . Whe n a resource i s allocated t o a racial minority , we cal l th e process affirmativ e action. Whe n tha t sam e resourc e i s allocate d t o th e whit e majority , w e call i t colorblin d rac e neutrality . The onl y differenc e betwee n th e two , however, is the recipient o f th e resource . Both are equally race-conscious , but only affirmative action threatens the socio-economic statu s quo. When the Suprem e Cour t opt s fo r rac e neutrality , therefore , i t i s optin g fo r continued racia l discriminatio n i n favo r o f white s an d agains t racia l minorities. The proble m ca n b e illustrate d b y considerin g th e affirmativ e actio n controversy that has arisen concerning the use of racia l preferences as one of th e criteri a tha t ar e customaril y use d i n th e la w schoo l admission s process.124 The controvers y center s aroun d th e clai m mad e b y whit e ap plicants that they are sometimes denied admission in order to allocate seats to minorit y applicant s wh o hav e lowe r grades o r La w Schoo l Admissio n Test (LSAT ) score s tha n th e rejecte d whit e applicants. 125 I n essence , th e argument o f th e disappointe d whit e applicant s i s that the la w schools are using illegitimate , race-consciou s affirmativ e actio n criteri a rathe r tha n race-neutral, merits-base d criteri a i n orde r to mak e admission s decisions . The la w schools typically defen d thei r affirmative actio n programs by emphasizing the need t o compensate racia l minorities for generations o f past discrimination, an d b y highlightin g th e pedagogica l benefit s o f diversit y for whit e an d minorit y student s alike. 126 A s ha s bee n noted , i t would b e pedagogically unsoun d t o attemp t cas e analysis o f a decision abou t abortion o r racia l discriminatio n i n th e presenc e o f whit e male s alone. 127 The proble m wit h thi s challeng e t o affirmativ e actio n an d wit h th e conventional argumen t offere d i n it s defens e i s tha t bot h accep t th e un stated premis e tha t i t i s possible t o mak e race-neutra l la w schoo l admis sions decision s i n ou r contemporar y cultura l climate . Bot h position s as sume that the "merits-based" criteria of grades and standardized test scores reflect somethin g that exists independent o f race . The positions differ only with respec t t o th e legitimac y o f departin g fro m relianc e o n thos e race neutral factors . I n a multiracial admission s context , however , grade s an d test score s ten d t o b e use d a s simply a proxy fo r race . Neithe r measure s anything tha t is indigenous t o successfu l lega l practice, bu t bot h measur e factors tha t correlat e wit h race . Grades are thought t o b e relevant to th e law school admission s process because the y predic t futur e academi c an d professiona l success . However , the reasoning that supports these predictive claims is circular. The evidence

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of succes s o n whic h tha t reasonin g i s base d turn s ou t t o b e directl y de pendent on , rathe r tha n independen t from , th e grade s themselves . Th e suggestion tha t grade s predic t academi c succes s come s clos e t o bein g a truism. Grades do not so much predict as define academic success. Because academic success is itself judged by grades, and the honors that are derived from grades , th e bar e clai m tha t grade s predic t academi c succes s simpl y lacks content . T o b e coherent , th e clai m mus t b e tha t grade s earne d i n college wil l accuratel y predic t grade s earne d la w school . A s an empirica l matter, there i s some correlatio n betwee n colleg e an d la w schoo l grades , but th e correlatio n coefficient s ar e no t hig h enoug h t o generat e muc h excitement.128 Indeed , law school admission s official s appea r to rel y more heavily o n standardize d LSA T scores tha n upo n colleg e grade s a s a predictor o f la w schoo l academi c succes s precisel y becaus e LSA T scores are standardized rathe r than variabl e acros s undergraduat e colleges. 129 I n addition, th e anecdota l evidenc e tha t exist s concernin g colleg e luminarie s who becom e pedestria n la w student s and mediocr e colleg e student s wh o become la w schoo l successe s i s too plentifu l t o giv e th e clai m muc h in tuitive appeal. Moreover , to th e exten t tha t a correlation betwee n colleg e and la w schoo l grade s doe s exist , i t stil l fail s t o establis h tha t grade s are in an y sens e a n independen t measur e o f academi c success . I t simpl y es tablishes the still-circular proposition that students who are good at getting grades in one context tend to be good at getting grades in another context. The numbe r of not-so-brigh t student s who receiv e hig h grades, as well as the numbe r o f obviousl y brigh t student s wh o receiv e undistinguishe d grades, necessarily call s int o questio n th e validit y o f grade s a s a measur e of intellectua l ability . In order to develo p a noncircular justificatio n fo r relyin g more heavil y on college grades than upon other factors in making law school admissions decisions, on e woul d hav e t o establis h tha t grade s wer e goo d predictor s of somethin g othe r tha n futur e grades . One woul d hav e to establis h tha t they correlated wit h an independent measur e o f professiona l succes s tha t existed outside of the grading context. Ironically, however, that is a showing that cannot b e made, precisely becaus e the traditional measure s of profes sional succes s are also heavil y dependent upo n grades. One might initiall y be tempte d t o vie w judicia l clerkships , academi c appointments , o r prestigious law firmaffiliations as independent measures of professional success, but thos e position s ar e overwhelmingl y awarde d o n th e basi s o f grades . As a result, reliance on these positions as measures of professional succes s is as circular as relianc e o n grade s themselves . Moreover , thes e position s are awarded o n th e basi s of la w school grade s rather than colleg e grades,

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thereby furthe r attenuatin g an y connectio n tha t exist s betwee n thi s measure of professiona l succes s an d the grades that actually serv e as the basi s for la w school admission s decisions . On e ca n conclud e fro m thi s analysis that grades have some correlation with other grades and with other factors that ar e themselve s dependen t upo n grades , bu t on e canno t justifiabl y conclude much of anything else. One certainly cannot conclude that grades are a more legitimate law school admissions criterion than diversity-related factors migh t be . The same circularity problem arises in connection with efforts t o justif y the us e o f LSA T scores a s an admissions criterio n tha t shoul d b e favore d over othe r possibl e criteria . However , th e LSA T circularit y reveal s eve n more clearl y ho w purportedl y neutra l selectio n criteri a ca n mas k major itarian racia l preferences . Lik e grades , LSA T score s ar e though t t o b e relevant t o th e la w schoo l admission s proces s becaus e the y to o predic t future academi c an d professiona l success . Althoug h LSA T score s hav e proven to correlate with law school grades better than college grades do,130 reliance on LSAT scores remains vulnerable to the problem that law school grades themselves hav e not bee n shown t o correlate with any independent measure of professional success . If one strains to find a measure of professional succes s tha t i s independent o f LSA T scores, LSAT scores are likely to hav e n o correlation—o r eve n a negative correlation—wit h thos e inde pendent measures . Fo r example, i f on e wer e t o focu s o n incom e earne d as a lawye r a s a n independen t measur e o f professiona l success , i t seem s intuitively unlikel y tha t an y stron g correlatio n betwee n LSA T scores an d income woul d emerge . Man y high-incom e lawyer s deriv e thei r incomes from prestigious law firmsthat have hired them on the basis of thei r LSATcorrelated academi c records . This deprives income o f it s independence a s a measure of professiona l succes s fo r these lawyers . However, if one were to exclud e prestigiou s la w firm income s fro m th e sampl e an d examin e small firmsor sole practitioners, whose incomes are not directly dependent upon thei r academic successes , i t seem s unlikel y tha t an y significan t cor relation betwee n LSA T scores an d incom e wil l b e found . Moreover , a n old adag e declare s tha t th e "A " students will becom e la w professors, th e "B" students will becom e judges , and the "C " students will becom e rich . Assuming tha t LSA T scores correlate wit h grades, this adage suggests that the student s wit h th e highes t LSA T score s wil l accep t th e lower-payin g academic and judicial jobs, while the students with lower LSAT scores will engage i n the mor e lucrativ e lega l practices . If professional succes s i s gauged b y th e independen t measur e o f case s won i n court , i t i s again unlikel y tha t an y significan t correlatio n betwee n

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LSAT scores an d professional succes s wil l b e foun d t o exist . The lawyer s who wi n the mos t case s i n court are likely to b e the lawyer s who posses s the mos t highl y develope d ora l an d dramati c skill s wit h whic h t o char m judges and mesmeriz e juries . These skills , however, are not teste d o n th e LSAT becaus e the y ar e no t relevan t t o th e conceptio n o f lega l practic e that th e LSA T i s intende d t o foster . A s a result , ther e i s n o reaso n t o suspect tha t LSA T scores wil l correlat e wit h thes e skills . If professional succes s i s defined i n terms of th e inclinatio n an d ability to hel p client s who mos t nee d th e assistance o f th e lega l syste m i n order to secure food , shelter, and the other basic necessities o f life , the cultural biases inheren t i n the LSA T will probabl y produc e a negative correlatio n between LSA T scores an d lega l success . The LSA T has a t time s deeme d mathematical aptitud e t o b e relevan t t o hig h qualit y lega l practice , an d the curren t LSA T tests proficienc y i n solving logi c puzzles. 131 However , I have yet t o se e a section o f th e LSA T that i s designed t o tes t fo r fluency in Spanish, familiarity with the technical deficiencies of various drug testing techniques, o r familiarit y wit h ghett o attitude s towar d polic e authority , even thoug h thes e area s o f knowledg e ar e crucia l t o certai n minorit y conceptions o f hig h qualit y lega l practice . Neither LSA T score s no r grade s constitut e independen t measure s o f professional proficiency. They do not correlate with any neutral conception of hig h qualit y lega l practice , bu t rather , they reflec t a majoritaria n pref erence abou t th e shap e tha t lega l practic e shoul d take . Thi s majoritaria n conception of legal practice is far from preordained; it is subjective, highly contingent, an d wholl y normative . I t i s also fa r fro m bein g race-neutral . Although grade s an d LSA T score s do no t correlat e wit h an y non-nor mative, merits-base d conceptio n o f qualit y lega l practice , the y do b y hypothesis correlat e wit h race . Tha t i s wh y th e whit e applicant s wh o ar e disappointed by a law school's affirmative action programs choose to argue that diversit y criteri a shoul d b e subordinate d t o grade s an d LSA T scores in makin g admission s decisions . Bu t all tha t the y ar e reall y sayin g i s tha t admissions standard s shoul d b e use d tha t favo r the whit e majorit y rathe r than racia l minoritie s i n th e allocatio n o f th e dispute d la w schoo l seats . In the final analysis, those seat s will eithe r b e given to whites o r they will be given to racial minorities. Although the opponents of affirmative actio n would hav e u s believ e tha t a n allocatio n t o white s i s a n exercis e o f co lorblind rac e neutrality , ther e i s simply n o wa y t o allocat e thos e societa l resources in a race-neutral manner . Far from being race-neutral, a decision to rely on grades and LSAT scores rather than on affirmative actio n criteria would simpl y b e racia l discriminatio n i n disguise .

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It ha s alway s seeme d curiou s t o m e tha t whit e opponent s o f racia l affirmative actio n hav e bee n uncritica l o f affirmativ e actio n program s that are intende d t o favo r alumn i son s an d daughters , eve n thoug h alumni related affirmative action deprives whites of many more seats in educational institutions tha n racia l affirmativ e actio n does. 132 The absenc e o f whit e opposition t o geographical and athletic affirmative actio n programs is similarly puzzling. Unfortunately, the easiest way to account for this seemingly irrational behavio r is to postulate that whites do not so much resent being deprived o f societa l resource s a s the y resen t bein g deprive d o f societa l resources fo r the benefi t o f racia l minorities . That postulate is , of course , consistent wit h th e presen t thesis : race i s such a potent forc e i n contem porary cultur e tha t i t canno t escap e bein g a substantial facto r i n societa l decisionmaking eve n wit h respec t t o issue s tha t ar e seemingl y unrelate d to race . Colorblind rac e neutralit y ca n no w b e see n simpl y a s cod e fo r whit e supremacy in the allocation of societal resources. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's preference fo r rac e neutralit y ove r rac e consciousnes s i n the for mulation o f race-relate d constitutiona l principle s ca n b e seen a s Supreme Court complicit y i n discriminator y majoritaria n desires . The Suprem e Court ha s justified it s preference fo r rac e neutrality b y invoking the com plex o f connotation s tha t surroun d ou r cultura l preferenc e fo r centrali zation ove r decentralization . Tha t particula r justification , however , ha s additional nonapparen t majoritaria n utilit y becaus e i t deters racial minor ities themselves fro m pursuin g the mos t promisin g strategies o f resistanc e to majoritaria n domination . Althoug h th e positiv e an d negativ e conno tations that contemporary culture has respectively attached to the concepts of centralizatio n an d decentralizatio n serv e t o benefi t th e white majority , racial minoritie s woul d benefi t fro m interchangin g thos e connections . Professor Pelle r ha s argued tha t th e universalism , rationa l objectivity , and race neutrality that I have associated with centralization all contribut e to a n integrationis t conceptio n o f rac e relations , unde r whic h th e whit e majority an d racia l minoritie s coexis t harmoniousl y a s par t o f a singl e community characterize d b y mutua l respec t an d racia l tolerance. 133 The parochialism, irrationa l subjectivity , an d racia l bia s tha t I have associate d with decentralizatio n contribut e t o a separatis t conceptio n o f rac e rela tions, under which the disharmony that characterized the segregated South precludes mutua l respec t an d racia l tolerance. 134 However , jus t a s th e purported majoritaria n preference fo r race neutrality mask s an actual majoritarian desir e fo r th e race-consciou s allocatio n o f societa l resources , the purporte d majoritaria n preferenc e fo r integrationis m mask s an actual

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majoritarian desire for separatism in the exercise of economi c and political power. The most effective wa y for racial minorities to combat the pervasive majoritarian accumulation of societal power is to adopt the same separatist strategy tha t th e majorit y use d t o acquir e tha t power t o begi n with . The separatism that is relevant in the present context does not relate to physical separation. Rather, it relates to the cultura l commitmen t t o independenc e and self-sufficiency tha t th e majority ha s used s o successfully t o resis t th e sharing of societal power with racial minorities. Although such a separatist strategy wa s embodie d i n th e blac k nationalis m an d blac k powe r move ments o f th e lat e 1960 s an d earl y 1970s , th e whit e majorit y wa s suc cessfully abl e t o deflec t thos e effort s a t minorit y self-determinatio n b y relying on th e rhetori c o f integrationis m t o perpetuate majoritaria n dom ination o f racia l minorit y interests. 135 As Peller has demonstrated, the Utopian rhetoric o f integrationis m successfully implicate d racia l minoritie s i n th e perpetuatio n o f thei r ow n subordination. B y accepting th e majoritaria n assertio n tha t blac k nation alism wa s the analytica l equivalen t o f th e whit e separatis m tha t spawne d southern segregation, racial minorities were effectively taugh t to fea r their own self-determination , believin g tha t self-determination woul d bot h en dorse th e sam e separatis t principle s tha t ha d bee n responsibl e fo r pas t minority subordinatio n an d offen d th e integrationis t principle s tha t hel d the only hop e o f achievin g durabl e racia l equality. 136 The Suprem e Court was particularly effective i n disseminating this message to racial minoritie s through th e vehicl e o f Brown v. Board of Education, whic h no t onl y proclaimed th e universalis t benefit s o f integrationis m bu t entice d minor ities int o believin g tha t th e Suprem e Cour t woul d secur e thos e benefit s for them. 137 The majorit y di d no t emphasize , an d racia l minoritie s ap parently did not notice , that the white majorit y ha d retained it s separatist control ove r th e politica l an d economi c powe r tha t i s exercise d i n th e United State s eve n whil e eschewin g th e principl e o f separatism . Accord ingly, racial minorities dutifully resiste d the appeal of nationalis t strategie s for th e advancemen t o f minorit y interests . The majoritaria n underpinning s o f integrationis m hav e no w becom e more visibl e a s th e rationall y self-intereste d majoritaria n preferenc e fo r continued minorit y subordinatio n ha s becom e mor e brazen . Presiden t Bush's successful politica l exploitatio n o f laten t white racia l prejudices in his "Willi e Horton " presidentia l campaign, 138 a s wel l a s th e breadt h o f support fo r hi s politically expedien t oppositio n t o civi l right s refor m leg islation,139 ha s mad e i t apparen t tha t th e nationa l electorat e n o longe r holds warm or cuddly feelings toward its minority competitors for societal

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resources. Moreover , th e Suprem e Court' s doctrinall y suspec t assaul t o n voluntary affirmative actio n ha s exposed th e Court's own view s about th e desirability o f genuin e racia l equality , revealin g th e Cour t t o b e simpl y a surreptitious agent for the advancement o f majoritaria n interests. 140 These majoritarian predisposition s ar e no t new ; the y ar e structura l feature s o f our constitutiona l for m o f government . However , postmoder n analytica l insights hav e mad e thes e structura l feature s newl y apparent , thereb y providing racia l minoritie s wit h a second opportunit y t o asser t contro l ove r their ow n interests . Once freed from universalist claims about the moral desirability of race neutrality and integrationism, racial minorities can unabashedly pursue the race-conscious strateg y o f nationalis m i n a n effor t t o advanc e minorit y interests. The sam e deconstructiv e technique s tha t permi t th e analytica l inversion o f doctrina l hierarchies 141 also permits th e inversio n o f th e majoritarian cultural preference fo r centralization over decentralization. That preference i s based upon the supposed associatio n betwee n centralizatio n and th e universalism , rationa l objectivity , an d rac e neutralit y tha t i t con notes, wit h th e goals o f equalit y an d racia l justice . Decentralization , an d the parochialism , irrationa l subjectivity , an d racia l bia s tha t i t connotes , is supposedl y associate d wit h inequalit y an d racia l prejudice . However , these association s ca n b e easil y interchanged . Once centralizatio n an d it s connotation s ar e recognize d t o constitut e mere camouflag e fo r race-consciou s majoritaria n subordination , i t is centralization tha t take s o n th e disfavore d statu s i n th e hierarch y betwee n centralization an d decentralization . Universalis m become s a mer e facad e for wha t i s actuall y a parochial majoritaria n desir e t o subordinat e racia l minorities; rationa l objectivit y become s a facad e fo r racis t majoritaria n passions tha t merel y parad e a s detached, objectiv e reason ; and rac e neu trality becomes the facade for a doctrinal regim e whose functio n i s simply to perpetuat e racia l prejudic e an d discrimination . Th e centralize d federa l intervention tha t wa s initiall y though t t o protec t racia l minoritie s fro m regional racia l prejudice reemerge s a s an oppressive syste m o f racia l subordination tha t minoritie s lac k th e societa l powe r t o escape . Once decentralization and its connotations are recognized to have been miscast as the villains in our ubiquitous racial conflicts, it is decentralization that actuall y merit s th e privilege d statu s i n th e hierarch y betwee n cen tralized an d decentralize d approache s t o th e proble m o f rac e relations . Parochialism become s th e hones t recognitio n tha t adherenc e t o loca l norms an d value s i s th e bes t tha t on e ca n hop e fo r i n strivin g t o engag e in morally appropriate behavior; irrational subjectivity becomes the honest

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submission t o fel t notion s o f righ t and wrong that are often convenientl y suppressed b y expedien t assertion s o f rationa l objectivity ; and racia l bia s becomes th e hones t appreciatio n o f cultura l difference s tha t mus t b e accommodated rathe r tha n represse d i n orde r t o permi t th e eradicatio n o f racial prejudice and discrimination fro m contemporary culture . The decentralization o f rac e relation s tha t wa s initiall y though t t o subjec t racia l mi norities to regional racial prejudice reemerges as the most promising minority strategy fo r escapin g th e hardship s o f centralize d racia l oppression . Because th e hierarch y betwee n centralizatio n an d decentralizatio n ca n always b e inverted , ther e i s n o analyticall y soun d manne r in which racia l minorities can determine th e strategy that will bes t promote th e objectiv e of racia l justice . Minoritie s wil l hav e t o selec t th e strateg y tha t resonate s best fo r the m i n thos e decisiona l sphere s tha t supersed e th e pre-post modern spher e i n whic h rac e relation s analysi s ha s bee n conducte d t o date. I n those supersedin g spheres , the nationalis t self-determinatio n tha t racial minoritie s hav e yet t o experienc e i n any meaningful wa y is likely t o have considerably mor e appeal tha n the integrationis m tha t has remaine d for s o lon g a hollow an d unfulfille d promise . Nationalism i s a ver y dynami c for m o f grou p identificatio n tha t ca n induce interest s groups to engag e i n seemingly irrationa l behavior . I n geopolitical contexts , nationalis m ha s proven t o b e a uniquely potent sourc e of ideologica l motivation . Th e invocatio n o f nationalis t icons , suc h a s "traditional American values" or our "vital national interests," can be used to mobiliz e suppor t fo r politica l agenda s tha t rang e fro m civi l rights t o foreign militar y intervention . Presiden t Bush' s state d oppositio n t o affir mative actio n ha s been base d upo n it s asserted conflic t wit h th e ideal s of merit and individual achievement—ideal s that , of course , are core aspect s of "traditiona l America n values." 142 Presiden t Bush' s state d reaso n fo r waging war against Iraq—something that seems to defy all efforts at rational justification—was similarl y roote d i n nationalism . Althoug h h e ha s bee n inconsistent abou t th e details , th e Presiden t chos e t o asser t tha t th e wa r was justified b y the need to eliminate the Iraqi threat to our "vital national interests."143 Eve n skeptica l commentator s inten t o n lookin g behin d th e President's rhetori c wer e force d t o fal l bac k o n equall y nationalis t expla nations o f ou r militar y involvement : th e mos t plausibl e accoun t i s tha t the wa r was fough t i n orde r t o reasser t America n militar y superiorit y i n a worl d tha t ha d witnesse d th e declin e o f America n economi c superior ity.144 I n Worl d Wa r II , nationalisti c passion s ra n s o hig h tha t the y no t only caused the United State s to inter n Japanese-American citizens, 145 but they als o cause d th e Unite d State s t o becom e th e onl y natio n o n eart h

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ever to drop an atomic bom b on human beings. Apparently, this was done for no reason other than to celebrate nationalistic arrogance. 146 The recent disintegration o f th e Sovie t empir e an d o f th e Sovie t Unio n itsel f ha s generated nationalisti c conflict s i n easter n Europ e an d i n th e ol d Sovie t republics tha t ar e a s violen t a s the y ar e difficul t t o comprehend. 147 The intractable Arab-Israel i conflic t i n th e Middl e East 148 an d th e equall y in tractable Catholic-Protestan t conflic t i n Norther n Ireland 149 hav e bot h been fuele d b y intensel y nationalisti c feeling s o f grou p identification an d intergroup hostility. In South Africa, the majority blac k natio n is not onl y struggling to wrest economic and political control from the minority white nation, bu t th e blac k triba l nation s ar e eve n fighting among themselve s for futur e contro l o f th e country' s resources. 150 Nationalism i s no t a pretty thing . I t i s an extremel y potent force , an d it is extremely irrational. It is also dependent upon vehement acquiescenc e in the transcendent importance of cultural distinctions that are, at bottom, extremely arbitrary. Nationalism i s the force tha t prompts nations to wage war against each other, that prompts religions to persecute each other, and that prompts race s to discriminat e agains t eac h other , all fo r reason s that stubbornly resis t legitimat e explanation . I n th e contex t o f rac e relations , nationalism i s simply racism . I t is a selfish concer n wit h th e advancemen t of one' s own interests over the interests of another solely because of one' s racial grou p identification . I t i s wha t th e whit e majorit y i n th e Unite d States has been practicing since th e foundin g o f th e nation, and it is what I predic t racia l minoritie s i n th e Unite d State s wil l eventuall y begi n t o practice a s th e strateg y fo r escapin g majoritaria n subordination . Nation alism is not nice, but it is too potent a force for racial minorities to continue to ignore . I n a classi c rac e t o th e bottom , bot h th e whit e majorit y and racial minorities will eventuall y becom e engage d i n the pursuit of societa l goals that are single-mindedly self-concerned . An d this, ironically, will b e the manne r i n whic h contemporar y cultur e i s finally able t o demonstrat e the fac t o f racia l equalit y i n the Unite d States . The Supreme Court's centralization o f th e law of affirmativ e actio n has disadvantaged racial minorities in concrete ways by requiring them to compete for majoritarian concessions in the national political arena where they are rarel y likel y t o prevail , rathe r tha n i n loca l arena s wher e the y woul d often posses s the power to prevail. More subtly, and more surreptitiously , the Suprem e Court' s centralizatio n o f affirmativ e actio n ha s helpe d t o indoctrinate racial minorities into a value system that promotes the illusion of colorblin d rac e neutralit y ove r th e objectiv e o f race-consciou s self determination. The brilliance of this system is not that it benefits the white

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majority b y permittin g i t t o amas s a disproportionat e shar e o f societa l resources. Rather , th e brillianc e o f th e syste m i s tha t i t implicate s racia l minorities i n thei r ow n subordinatio n b y effectivel y precludin g minorit y pursuit of nationalist strategies—the strategies that offer the greatest promise o f promotin g racia l equality . A s racia l minoritie s com e t o recogniz e the ingenious nature of the system that has oppressed them, they will learn to adop t th e nationalis t tactic s o f thei r oppressors. Bu t tha t will, a t best , constitute a bittersweet victory. The Supreme Court's centralization of th e law o f affirmativ e actio n ha s incriminate d th e Cour t i n thi s unfortunat e form o f racia l debasement . Bu t a s invidiou s a s th e Suprem e Court' s in volvement ha s been , i t i s no t a s invidiou s a s th e practic e o f legitimatin g counterproductive racia l stereotypes i n which the Supreme Court has also engaged.

C H A P T E R9

Legitimation

Racial minoritie s i n th e Unite d State s hav e suffere d centurie s o f bruta l inequality wit h remarkabl e quiescence . Slav e rebellion s wer e rare ; rac e riots hav e bee n fe w an d fa r between ; an d concerte d minorit y politica l action has remained largely untried. Even recent minority political victories in majority voting districts have been unsuccessful a t securing true minority participation i n the political process , because the victorious minorit y candidates hav e had to stri p their candidacies o f anythin g othe r tha n dilute d concern fo r racia l issue s i n orde r t o mak e themselve s acceptabl e t o ma jority voters. 1 A s Chapte r 7 ha s explained , minoritie s hav e becom e de pendent upo n th e Suprem e Cour t rathe r tha n upo n themselve s fo r th e education o f minorit y childre n i n particular , an d fo r normativ e an d as pirational guidance in general. As Chapter 8 has explained, minorities have acquiesced i n th e Suprem e Court' s visio n o f colorblin d rac e neutrality , even though tha t vision simpl y mask s a system o f whit e supremac y i n the allocation o f societa l resources . On e migh t wel l wonde r wh y America n racial minoritie s hav e bee n s o submissiv e fo r s o long . The answe r is , i n part at least, because American racial minorities—like th e majority itself — have come t o believ e i n th e inevitabilit y o f th e present lega l system . This belief, however , doe s no t deriv e fro m it s accuracy ; rathe r i t derive s fro m the manne r i n whic h th e fundamenta l assumption s o f th e lega l syste m have bee n legitimated . The proces s o f legitimatio n i s a proces s throug h which a n unstate d assumptio n come s t o b e accepte d withou t scrutin y because ou r analytica l attentio n ha s bee n diverte d fro m th e assumptio n itself t o som e controversy whose existenc e presuppose s the validity of th e assumption. Lik e th e fable d post-hypnoti c suggestion , a legitimate d as sumption derive s it s power fro m ou r inattentio n t o it s operation . 150

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The Suprem e Cour t ha s bee n especiall y accomplishe d a t legitimatin g the assumptions on which the purported race neutrality of our legal system rests. I n particular, th e Cour t ha s legitimate d thre e assumption s tha t ac count fo r th e continue d willingnes s o f th e majorit y t o inflict , an d racia l minorities to tolerate, the inequalities that minorities suffer. First, the Court has legitimated the assumption that there exists a category of fundamenta l minority right s tha t th e majorit y canno t properl y infringe . Second , th e Court has legitimated the assumption that the Supreme Court is the societal institution tha t ha s the final say about th e content o f thos e rights . Third, the Cour t ha s legitimate d th e assumptio n tha t racia l minoritie s canno t properly mak e demand s o n th e majorit y tha t excee d th e scop e o f thos e judicially define d rights. This final assumption carrie s with i t certain con notations about the industrious beneficenc e o f th e majority, as well a s the indolent ingratitud e o f racia l minorities , tha t furthe r reinforc e th e ac ceptability o f th e present distributio n o f societa l powe r and resources . If scrutinized, i t i s likel y tha t thes e legitimate d assumption s woul d becom e unacceptable, an d tha t racia l minoritie s woul d asser t claim s fo r racia l equality wit h unprecedente d vigor . The Suprem e Court , however , i s very good a t it s job , an d th e legitimate d assumption s threate n t o persis t indefinitely. Majoritarian Legitimation One of the most significant majoritaria n function s that the Supreme Court serves is the function of legitimating counterproductive assumptions about the legal system that underlie the traditional mode l o f judicia l review. The process o f legitimatio n i s the proces s b y which a social practic e o r status comes t o b e viewe d a s appropriat e unde r a set o f generall y agreed-upo n governing criteria. 2 Fo r example, whe n a criminal defendan t i s convicted after a fai r trial , th e convictio n i s viewe d a s legitimate , eve n i f th e jur y was unknowingl y mistake n i n it s conclusio n abou t th e defendant' s guilt . Because we realize that ultimate accuracy is elusive, we are forced t o settle for procedural regularity , seasoned wit h good fait h and best efforts, as the basis for judging the appropriateness of a criminal conviction. The criteria governing th e legitimac y o f th e crimina l justic e syste m emanat e fro m a shared mora l theor y whos e tenet s ar e difficul t t o specif y wit h precision . Despite thi s difficult y o f precis e specification , however , w e ten d t o vie w the governin g criteri a a s satisfie d b y th e good-fait h procedura l regularit y on whic h th e crimina l justic e syste m insists . Indeed , i t i s precisel y th e process of legitimatio n tha t permits us to vie w the criminal justice syste m

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as morall y appropriat e eve n thoug h w e canno t articulat e th e governin g criteria, an d eve n thoug h mor e carefu l scrutin y woul d almos t certainl y leave u s skeptical abou t it s legitimacy. 3 The process of legitimation works best when its operation is undetected, because th e result s o f th e proces s ca n the n b e transmitte d withou t eve r being subjecte d t o scrutiny . Conside r th e phenomeno n o f hypnosis . The fabled post-hypnoti c suggestio n derive s it s powe r fro m th e amnesi a tha t the hypnotist induces concerning the hypnotic process. Because the subject of th e hypnosis is unaware of th e process by which hi s or her hypnotically influenced belief s wer e acquired , th e subjec t accept s thos e belief s wit h a degree of unthinkin g conviction tha t would never be possible if the actual origin o f thos e belief s wer e t o becom e known . Similarly , the legitimatio n process owe s it s effectivenes s t o th e surreptitiou s natur e o f it s operation . Although m y psychiatrist friend s insis t tha t th e phenomeno n o f hypnosi s is much mor e comple x tha n th e process I have described, my use of hyp nosis i n th e presen t contex t i s intende d t o b e metaphorica l rathe r tha n technically precise . The manne r b y whic h th e legitimatio n proces s evade s detectio n i s through th e techniqu e o f distraction . Argument s always res t upo n under lying assumptions . Whe n one' s analytica l attentio n i s focuse d o n th e in tricacies o f a n argument, however , th e underlyin g assumption s o n whic h the argument rests may completely escape scrutiny. This is particularly true where the argument concerns a controversial topic . The controversy itsel f serves to increas e the level o f distraction , thereb y also increasing th e likelihood tha t underlyin g assumption s wil l b e overlooked . The legitimatin g effect of rape laws provides a comprehensible example. Professors Dworkin and MacKinnon hav e argued that rap e laws legitimate assumption s abou t women tha t reinforc e thei r status as objects o f mal e sexual exploitation. 4 While vigorous arguments are exchanged concernin g the meaning of con troversial issue s such a s th e natur e an d scop e o f a woman's consent , th e underlying assumption that male-drafted rap e laws can properly determine the circumstances unde r which wome n ca n b e force d t o submi t t o sexua l intercourse a t the behes t o f me n i s simply accepted withou t scrutiny . The distraction legitimate s th e assumptio n b y causin g th e assumptio n t o b e accepted withou t scrutiny . I f th e poin t seem s trivia l o r artificial, conside r that mos t o f u s hav e bee n distracte d fro m th e realizatio n tha t th e lega l system does permi t me n t o engag e i n forcibl e intercours e wit h women . As a de jure matter , forcibl e intercours e i s permitte d b y husbands , wh o in most jurisdictions lack the legal capacity to commit rape. 5 As a de facto matter, forcibl e intercours e i s permitte d b y socia l acquaintances , agains t whom rap e conviction s ar e ver y difficul t t o obtain. 6

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Simplistic version s o f legitimatio n theor y depic t legitimatio n a s a too l of th e elite s i n power to tric k th e masse s int o permitting the m t o remai n in power. Fo r the sam e reason s tha t lega l doctrin e canno t b e counte d o n to generat e onl y on e predictabl e resul t t o th e exclusio n o f contradictor y results,7 legitimation doctrine—assumption s abou t which surreptitious activities wil l produc e whic h societa l outcomes—canno t b e counte d o n t o generate onl y on e predictabl e resul t either . Accordingly , description s o f the legitimation process as conspiratorially instrumental do not have much appeal.8 A more sophisticated version of legitimation theory depicts legitimation as the process by which beneficiarie s o f the present distribution of societa l resources see k t o convinc e thos e wh o d o no t benefi t tha t th e socia l an d legal systems responsible fo r the present distributio n ar e basically fair and should no t b e replaced. Becaus e th e system i s fair rather than capricious , redistribution o f resource s i s possibl e withi n th e syste m a s a rewar d t o those wh o compl y wit h th e system's norms . This theory i s less crass , but it i s still to o conspiratoria l t o hav e ultimat e appeal. 9 A more appealin g depictio n o f legitimatio n i s as an essentiall y passiv e process tha t perpetuate s th e statu s qu o largel y throug h inertia . Althoug h the assumptions underlyin g the curren t system coul d b e easily scrutinize d and the unacceptable assumptions rejected if anyone ever thought to scrutinize an d rejec t them , typicall y n o on e eve r does . Us e o f th e syste m reinforces itsel f becaus e it s underlying assumptions are too commonplac e to b e questioned befor e the y are used, and eac h use further increase s th e strength o f th e assumptions s o that subsequent questionin g become s progressively les s likely . Moreover , thos e wh o posses s societa l powe r ar e a s captive t o th e unquestione d assumption s a s thos e agains t who m societa l power is exercised. Rather than creating an instrumental threat, the process of legitimatio n mor e subtl y threaten s th e appropriatenes s o f th e way s i n which w e conceptualiz e an d perceive. 10 The traditiona l mode l o f judicia l revie w legitimates unhealth y assumptions governin g th e way s i n whic h th e majorit y think s abou t racia l minorities, a s wel l a s th e way s i n whic h racia l minoritie s thin k abou t themselves.11 The process of Suprem e Court adjudication is a heavily publicized distractio n tha t focuse s nationa l attentio n o n th e case s tha t ar e argued befor e th e Cour t eac h Term . Fo r lawyers, attention i s focused o n the comple x an d esoteri c doctrina l issue s t o whic h th e bul k o f th e ad judicatory process is directed. For nonlawyers, attention i s focused o n the controversial socia l issue s tha t wil l b e affecte d b y th e Court' s decisions , as those decision s an d thei r likely impac t ar e popularized i n th e nationa l

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press. Fo r both , analytical attentio n i s successfully deflecte d fro m impor tant assumptions that underlie the concept o f countermajoritaria n judicia l review. The traditional model rests on three assumptions that are necessary to th e coherenc e o f countermajoritaria n review . First , i t assume s th e ex istence o f a category o f individua l o r substantive right s tha t th e majorit y cannot legitimatel y abrogate . Second , i t assume s tha t th e Suprem e Cour t can legitimately resolv e ambiguitie s tha t inher e i n the definition s o f thos e rights. Third, it assumes that minorities cannot legitimately make demands on th e majorit y tha t excee d th e scop e o f thos e rights , becaus e thos e ad ditional demand s woul d interfer e wit h th e right s o f th e majority . Th e traditional mode l legitimate s thes e assumption s b y placing the m beyon d active scrutiny . However , activ e scrutin y coul d wel l caus e thos e assump tions t o b e rejected . Countermajoritarian revie w depend s upo n th e existenc e o f substantiv e rights becaus e withou t suc h rights , judicia l invalidatio n o f majoritaria n enactments woul d b e undemocratic. 12 Fo r ove r a decade , commentator s along the periphery of mainstrea m legal scholarship have in fact attempted to subjec t th e substantiv e right s assumptio n t o close r scrutin y throug h what ha s come t o b e known a s "the critiqu e o f rights. " Stated succinctly , the critiqu e o f right s assert s tha t a concep t o f right s ca n neve r protect a fundamental interes t fro m political abridgement , becaus e the contour s o f the fundamenta l interes t ca n neve r b e articulate d i n a manne r tha t i s sufficiently determinat e t o preven t it s sacrifice fo r reason s o f politica l ex pediency. Just as the doctrinal indeterminacy discussed in Part I undermines the traditiona l mode l o f judicia l review , th e indeterminac y inheren t i n efforts t o defin e fundamenta l right s undermine s th e abilit y o f a politica l system t o respec t thos e right s i n troublesom e cases . Moreover , a rightsbased approac h t o th e protectio n o f fundamenta l interest s i s counterproductive, becaus e i t legitimates th e unstate d assumption s o n whic h particular claims of right necessarily rest, in a way that permits those assumptions to b e use d agains t th e ver y part y assertin g th e clai m o f right . Finally , b y limiting the scop e o f th e discours e use d t o discus s social problems , rights rhetoric inhibit s th e imaginatio n o f ne w way s i n whic h socia l problem s and solution s ca n b e conceptualized. 13 Despite periphera l adherenc e t o th e critiqu e o f rights , i t remain s th e case tha t th e substantiv e right s assumptio n ha s receive d littl e scrutin y b y mainstream lega l scholar s and virtually n o scrutiny b y anyone outsid e th e fields of theoretica l academic s t o whic h right s theor y i s directl y relevant . Although it is possible for a once-unquestioned assumption to be accepted rather tha n rejecte d afte r subsequen t scrutiny , th e substantiv e right s as -

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sumption doe s no t see m t o fit int o thi s category . I suspec t tha t mos t adherents t o substantiv e right s theory coul d neithe r outline th e basi c critique o f right s no r explai n wh y the y ha d chose n t o rejec t th e critique . These are things that one woul d expec t adherents to b e able to do if the y had rejecte d th e critiqu e an d accepte d th e substantiv e right s assumptio n after seriou s scrutiny . Professor Carrington , wh o ha s i n a sens e becom e th e victi m o f frus trations bot h fel t an d generate d b y the critica l lega l studie s movement, 14 is ofte n accuse d o f havin g misunderstoo d th e argument s tha t h e ha s re jected.15 Whether or not thi s is true with respect to Professo r Carrington , the mer e refle x acceptanc e o f a n assumptio n afte r onl y nomina l scrutin y would no t b e sufficien t t o avoi d th e danger s associate d wit h th e proces s of legitimation . I t i s also true , however , tha t som e o f th e commentator s who hav e expresse d skepticis m abou t th e critiqu e o f right s hav e a ver y sophisticated understandin g o f th e critique. 16 Nevertheless , i t seem s tha t the continue d allur e o f substantiv e right s theor y i s attributabl e mor e t o the proces s o f legitimatio n tha n t o it s acceptance afte r scrutiny . If the substantive right s assumption wer e subjected t o seriou s scrutiny, it i s unlikel y tha t i t coul d survive . I t woul d b e rejecte d fo r th e sam e fundamental reaso n tha t Par t I rejected th e possibilit y o f a counterma joritarian judicial capability . I t is not possible t o defin e a substantive righ t in a way that precludes the possibility o f majoritaria n abrogatio n throug h judicial interpretation . A s a result , a substantiv e righ t ca n onl y reflect a judicial decisio n abou t ho w a particula r disput e shoul d properl y b e re solved; it canno t determine tha t decision . It is eas y t o understan d wh y th e majorit y woul d acquiesc e i n th e sub stantive rights assumption without scrutiny. The history of Supreme Court judicial revie w indicate s tha t judicial recognitio n o f substantiv e right s has typically serve d t o advanc e majoritaria n interest s a t th e expens e o f th e minority.17 I t i s mor e difficul t t o understan d wh y minoritie s themselve s have no t bee n mor e receptiv e t o th e invitatio n t o rethin k rights . A fe w minority commentator s no w see m skeptica l o f th e substantiv e right s assumption.18 However , mos t minorit y commentator s sympathiz e wit h th e critique o f right s to som e degree , bu t cautio n agains t wholesal e rejectio n of th e on e concep t tha t the y believ e ha s permitte d minoritie s t o secur e the fe w gain s tha t hav e bee n secure d t o date. 19 Stil l othe r minorit y com mentators strenuously defend the rights-based system, even against the few minority challenge s tha t hav e bee n mad e t o th e substantiv e right s as sumption. The y advocat e refor m bu t no t abandonmen t o f th e presen t system.20 The fac t tha t mos t member s o f racia l minorit y group s embrac e

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the concept of substantive rights, and resist efforts to abandon that concept with varyin g degree s o f vigor , reveal s ho w wel l th e Suprem e Cour t adjudicatory proces s ha s legitimated th e substantiv e right s assumption . The secon d assumptio n tha t th e traditiona l mode l o f judicia l revie w legitimates i s the assumptio n tha t ambiguitie s i n th e natur e an d scop e o f substantive right s ar e t o b e resolve d throug h expositio n b y th e Suprem e Court. Onc e again , critica l scrutin y coul d wel l caus e tha t expositio n as sumption t o b e rejected . I f a concept o f substantiv e right s wer e deeme d to be desirable, political enforcement o f those rights through the structural safeguards establishe d b y th e framer s woul d see m t o b e mor e desirabl e than Suprem e Cour t enforcement. 21 Th e Suprem e Cour t i s mostl y whit e and mostly male , and as an institution i t is mostly nonresponsiv e t o fres h or innovative political thinking. 22 Moreover, it s first two efforts t o protect substantive right s fro m federa l majoritaria n abrogatio n produce d Marbury23 an d Dred Scott. 24 Ther e ma y have bee n a lesson i n that. Part I o f thi s boo k argue s a t lengt h tha t th e inevitabl e politica l biase s an d predispositions o f th e homogeneou s Suprem e Cour t canno t successfull y be prevente d fro m dominatin g th e judicia l decisionmakin g process . A s a result, scrutin y o f th e expositio n assumptio n woul d b e unlikel y t o resul t in continue d acceptanc e o f tha t assumption . Onc e again , i t i s eas y t o understand why the majority, which has typically benefitted fro m Supreme Court contro l ove r rights , woul d fee l n o pressin g nee d t o questio n th e assumed appropriatenes s o f tha t control. Bu t again, even minoritie s ofte n feel compelle d t o defen d th e Cour t agains t charge s o f racia l bia s o r in sensitivity.25 An d again , thi s illustrate s th e powe r o f th e legitimatio n phenomenon. The thir d assumptio n legitimate d b y th e traditiona l mode l i s tha t mi norities ar e not entitle d t o an y mor e tha n wha t th e Suprem e Cour t gives them i n th e proces s o f protectin g thei r substantiv e rights . Becaus e th e discrete an d insula r natur e o f racia l minoritie s render s the m unabl e t o participate effectivel y i n th e politica l process , th e politica l proces s nee d not tak e thei r desire s seriously . Moreover , becaus e th e Suprem e Cour t i s the specialis t whe n i t come s t o determinin g wha t degre e o f majorit y de ference t o minorit y interest s i s appropriate , th e representativ e branche s are under no obligatio n t o mak e mor e concession s t o minoritie s than the Court require s them t o make . As a result, any additional concession s tha t the politica l proces s doe s choos e t o mak e ar e gifts, emanatin g fro m ma joritarian generosity, fo r which minoritie s shoul d b e grateful. However , if the representativ e branche s becom e to o generou s an d mak e concession s that the Court deems inappropriate, the Court itself wil l have to invalidate

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those concessions in order to prevent abrogation of th e rights of member s of th e majority race . Thi s judicia l protectio n o f majorit y right s i s some thing abou t whic h racia l minoritie s canno t complai n becaus e minoritie s themselves hav e forcefull y insiste d o n Suprem e Cour t protectio n o f sub stantive rights . If scrutinized, th e assumptio n tha t Suprem e Cour t concession s shoul d constitute a ceilin g o n th e benefit s t o whic h minoritie s ar e legitimatel y entitled woul d almos t certainl y b e rejected . The fourteent h amendmen t was enacte d i n orde r t o authoriz e legislative—no t judicial—protectio n o f minority rights , thereby makin g i t mor e tha n a little ironi c fo r th e Cour t to invalidate majoritarian enactment s unde r the fourteenth amendmen t in order to protec t majorit y rights. 26 I n addition, fo r al l o f th e reason s tha t the Court proved to b e a dubious expositor of substantiv e rights , it is also a dubiou s arbite r o f dispute s ove r th e prope r allocatio n o f societa l re sources. The allocatio n issu e i s inherentl y political . On e particula r reso lution canno t b e mor e "legitimate " tha n another . Differen t resolution s simply represen t differen t outcome s i n a process o f pluralis t politica l ne gotiations. For the same reason, it makes little sense to view a concessio n secured through the pluralist negotiation process as a gift. The concessio n evidences n o generosity, i t merely reflect s th e poin t alon g a continuum a t which particula r political interest s intersect . The thre e assumption s legitimate d b y the traditiona l mode l o f judicia l review convey an artificial impressio n o f th e legal system . However, thos e assumptions also combine to project an invidious image of racial minorities that i s fa r more troubling . A s envisioned b y th e traditiona l model , racia l minorities ar e no t capabl e o f protectin g thei r ow n interest s throug h th e pluralist political process . Rather, their welfare derive s from th e solicitude of th e Supreme Court, whose dependent s they seem destined to remain. 27 Although no t abl e t o participat e unaide d i n th e politica l process , racia l minorities nevertheless do make occasional attempts to get more than they are legally entitled t o b y appealing t o th e generosity o f th e representativ e branches. However , becaus e th e majorit y i s i n fac t generous , minorit y requests for assistance are often granted. Racial minorities should be grateful fo r the protection tha t they have received fro m th e Court, and for the consideration shown them by the majoritarian branches. Rather than demonstrating thei r gratitude , however , minoritie s ofte n appea r unsatisfied , unappreciative, an d shameles s i n thei r perpetua l abilit y t o as k fo r ye t another majoritaria n concession . That thi s legitimate d visio n constitute s a widel y share d majoritaria n view o f racia l minoritie s i s unfortunate . Tha t i t als o constitute s a widely shared minorit y vie w i s tragic.

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In thi s regard , perhap s th e mos t seriou s dange r t o racia l minorit y in terests tha t i s pose d b y th e phenomeno n o f legitimatio n i s tha t racia l minorities will adop t th e white majorit y a s their reference grou p an d will advance the interests of th e majority at the expense of thei r own minorit y interests. Thi s dange r i s mor e tha n theoretical . Ther e hav e always , o f course, been racial minority group members who have acquiesced i n white definitions o f appropriat e socia l though t an d behavio r becaus e th e hege monic capabilitie s o f th e whit e majorit y hav e lef t the m wit h littl e alter native. Recently , however , som e racia l minorit y grou p member s hav e elected t o embrac e th e assumption s abou t rac e an d rac e neutralit y tha t have bee n legitimate d b y th e whit e majority . The ne w wav e o f minorit y neoconservative s tha t include s Stephe n Carter,28 Dines h D'Souza, 29 Randal l Kennedy, 30 Gle n Loury, 31 Thoma s Sowell,32 Shelby Steele, 33 and Clarence Thomas 34 potentially harm s racial minority interest s i n a number o f ways . The absenc e o f thes e neoconser vatives fro m th e struggl e t o reac h beyon d th e legitimate d conception s o f merit and race neutrality that have been used so successfully to subordinate racial minorities deprive s that struggle o f th e increase d skill and solidarity that i t woul d deriv e fro m th e presenc e o f thos e talente d individuals . I n addition, minorit y neoconservative s almos t certainl y provid e reassuranc e to th e whit e majorit y b y bluntin g th e forc e o f th e mor e radica l minorit y challenges tha t hav e recentl y bee n brough t t o bea r upo n th e legitimate d concepts o f meri t an d neutrality . Moreover , becaus e th e defectio n o f th e minority neoconservatives has been rewarded by the bestowal of enhance d prestige fro m th e whit e institution s wit h whic h th e neoconservative s ar e associated, the efficacy o f th e existing system o f reward s and punishments has undoubtedl y bee n reinforce d i n a way tha t wil l facilitat e th e majori tarian seductio n o f futur e minorit y talent . However, as Professor Delgad o ha s emphasized , man y o f th e minorit y neoconservatives hav e refuse d t o submi t t o a t leas t som e o f th e assumptions concerning rac e tha t hav e bee n legitimate d b y the white majority. 35 Most notably , thi s refusa l ha s encompasse d seriou s skepticis m abou t th e continued viabilit y o f Warre n Court liberalis m an d traditiona l civi l right s approaches fo r th e resolutio n o f race-relation s problem s confrontin g th e present generatio n o f racia l minorities. 36 I n addition , th e minorit y neo conservatives ma y shar e wit h th e mor e radica l rac e theorist s a belie f i n the desirabilit y o f viewin g pertinen t realitie s a s contingen t socia l con structs, rather than as the more tangible and universal structures suggested by th e whit e majorit y throug h it s essentialis t legitimation. 37 I f ther e i s a deep congruenc e o f concer n an d epistemologica l perspectiv e hidde n be -

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neath th e doctrina l difference s tha t exis t betwee n radica l an d neoconser vative racia l minorit y grou p members , tha t congruenc e ma y wel l b e ac companied by the potential for an alliance so substantial that it will actually advance minority political power and self-determination agains t the wishes of th e white majority . Whether the minority neoconservative s tur n out t o be a n importan t catalys t i n th e ques t fo r minorit y self-determination , o r simply foo t soldier s i n th e wa r o f whit e legitimation , th e legitimatio n phenomenon wil l nevertheless retain one featur e that makes it particularly pernicious. The Danger of Legitimation At th e clos e o f a book o f thi s type, it woul d b e customar y t o emphasiz e that the way to escape the legitimated assumptions of the traditional model, as wel l a s th e unfortunat e visio n o f minoritie s tha t thos e assumption s convey, i s fo r minoritie s t o embrac e a politica l mode l o f th e Suprem e Court. If the Supreme Court adjudicatory process can be viewed as simply one aspec t o f th e large r political process , the assumption s underlyin g th e traditional mode l wil l no longe r b e legitimate d b y minorit y us e o f th e Supreme Cour t t o advanc e minorit y interests . Rather , political us e o f th e Court wil l constitut e a n act o f minorit y self-determination , no t a n act o f continued dependency . Moreover , minoritie s wil l finally have learne d t o place thei r fait h i n th e pluralis t branche s o f governmen t tha t ar e institutionally capabl e o f respectin g thei r interests , rathe r than th e on e branc h whose desig n compel s i t t o retar d recognitio n o f minorit y claim s o f entitlement. The reaso n tha t I am unabl e t o endors e th e traditiona l endin g i s that, in the present context, it is highly problematic. Political use of the Supreme Court will legitimat e th e assumptions underlyin g the traditiona l mode l a s much a s the y ar e legitimate d b y purporte d countermajoritaria n use . I n order t o b e effective , politica l user s o f th e Suprem e Cour t wil l stil l hav e to b e good litigators . The y wil l hav e t o invok e precedent s i n thei r brief s and pay homage to the justices in their oral arguments. Moreover, because the justice s themselve s wil l continu e t o adher e t o th e traditiona l model , minority advocate s wil l als o hav e t o rel y upo n right s rhetori c i n orde r t o formulate winnin g arguments. This means that minority litigator s will no t only have to employ the traditional mechanism s of Supreme Court review, but the y wil l hav e t o feig n allegianc e t o th e traditiona l mode l a s well . From the outside, political an d traditional use s of th e Supreme Court will look precisel y th e same . A s a result , politica l us e o f th e Cour t b y racia l

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minorities wil l d o nothin g t o undermin e th e strengt h o f legitimate d as sumptions i n th e mind s o f th e majority . Rather , i t wil l simpl y constitut e additional us e o f th e Cour t tha t wil l furthe r reinforc e th e legitimate d assumptions. The onl y hop e i s tha t minoritie s themselve s wil l attribut e a differen t significance t o Suprem e Cour t litigation . However , th e traditiona l mode l is deeply ingrained. The strength o f tha t model ca n be experienced simpl y by trying t o pictur e a n acceptabl e socia l orde r that doe s no t incorporat e a functioning concept of rights. Without considerable practice, most members o f a libera l societ y find i t difficul t eve n t o imagine , le t alon e favor , such a socia l order . Moreover , th e strengt h o f th e traditiona l mode l i s ingrained i n minorit y mind s jus t a s i t i s i n th e mind s o f th e majority . I n fact, th e legitimatio n proces s ha s bee n s o successfu l tha t minoritie s ma y find it eve n mor e difficul t tha n th e majorit y t o relinquis h tha t model. I t seems that very few left-oriented political radicals are minority group members. Moreover , th e dissonanc e generate d b y minorit y effort s t o feig n sympathy fo r countermajoritaria n revie w whil e believin g tha t th e proces s is onl y politica l i s likel y t o b e a t leas t substantial , i f no t overwhelming . Accordingly, attempte d politica l us e o f th e Cour t wil l pos e a constan t threat, eve n fo r minorities , o f regressio n t o th e traditiona l model . Rather than offerin g a prescription fo r remedia l action , recognitio n o f the countermajoritaria n fallac y simpl y constitute s a cause for despair . Because Suprem e Cour t revie w canno t successfull y b e avoided , minoritie s have n o alternativ e bu t t o participat e i n a process o f judicia l revie w tha t reinforces th e traditiona l model . An d the y mus t d o s o eve n thoug h th e traditional mode l consign s the m t o a rol e o f continua l Suprem e Cour t dependency. Ironically , i t i s a s i f th e ver y structur e o f America n consti tutional government , dedicatin g a n entir e branc h t o th e protectio n o f minority rights , was designe d i n a way tha t would ensur e ultimat e major itarian control ove r minority interest s and preclude racia l minoritie s fro m ever securing the capacity for self-determination. Th e truly terrifying truth that i s legitimate d b y th e Suprem e Court' s guarante e o f countermajori tarian judicia l revie w i s tha t th e Court' s protectio n o f racia l minorit y in terests appears to b e perpetual. What an ingenious constitutional scheme .

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Summary and Conclusio n

For racia l minorities , judicia l revie w ha s prove n t o b e mor e o f a curs e than a blessing. Rathe r tha n protectin g racia l minorit y interest s fro m th e tyranny of th e majority , the Suprem e Cour t ha s done jus t the opposite . It has protecte d th e majorit y fro m claim s o f equalit y b y racia l minorities . During the early history of the Supreme Court, the Court was fairly explicit in it s sacrific e o f minorit y interest s fo r majoritaria n gain . Whethe r th e Court wa s abandonin g th e Cheroke e Trib e i n th e fac e o f majoritaria n hostility a s i t di d i n Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia? denyin g citi zenship to blacks in gratuitously demeaning terms as it did in Dred Scott? invalidating Reconstructio n civi l right s legislatio n a s i t di d i n The Civil Rights Cases? o r proclaimin g th e virtue s o f de jure segregatio n a s i t di d in Plessy? th e nineteenth-centur y Suprem e Cour t wa s fairl y transparen t in th e implementatio n o f it s missio n t o protec t whit e majorit y interests . In the post-Brown twentiet h century , the Court ha s been mor e opaque in the implementation o f its mission, but the mission has remained the same. Racial minorit y interest s hav e stil l bee n sacrifice d t o majoritaria n desires , but the doctrinal mechanism s o n whic h th e Court ha s relied t o effec t th e sacrifice have been more sophisticated, lurking in the interstices of complex and esoteri c constitutiona l rules . The Cour t ha s eve n mastere d th e ex tremely sophisticate d strateg y o f dressin g minorit y losse s i n th e attir e o f minority gain s whe n i t serve s majoritaria n end s t o gran t suc h apparen t concessions, a s th e Cour t di d i n Brown u Board of Education. 5 Th e structural reason s fo r whic h th e Cour t i s destine d t o serv e majoritaria n rather tha n countermajoritaria n end s hav e bee n discusse d i n Par t I , an d they ar e summarize d below . Th e way s i n whic h th e Court' s veile d ma 161

l6l SUMMAR

Y A N D CONCLUSIO N

joritarianism hav e contribute d t o th e perpetuatio n o f minorit y subordi nation i n contemporar y cultur e hav e bee n discusse d i n Par t II , and the y too ar e summarize d below . Despit e th e sens e o f hopelessnes s tha t con tinued Suprem e Cour t "protection " portends, all o f thi s suggests a rather intriguing conclusio n fo r racia l minoritie s wh o ar e seemingl y trappe d i n the predicamen t o f judicia l review . Th e efficac y o f thi s conclusion , how ever, depends upon a subtle appreciation of the precise locus of the contest that presentl y exist s betwee n th e Suprem e Cour t an d racia l minoritie s i n America. Summary of

Part I

Part I of thi s boo k ha s describe d ho w Suprem e Cour t adjudicatio n fail s to serv e th e countermajoritaria n judicia l functio n tha t i s traditionall y as cribed t o it . Th e framer s initiall y designe d a syste m o f governmen t i n which individua l libert y an d propert y right s wer e t o b e protecte d b y th e political safeguard s o f federalis m an d separatio n o f powers . Durin g th e New Deal , however , thos e safeguard s wer e largel y eviscerated , i n accordance wit h majoritaria n politica l preferences . A s a result, th e tas k o f pro tecting individua l right s has fallen t o th e Supreme Court . Unde r the Marfrwry-based traditiona l model of judicial review, the Court is an appropriate guardian o f individua l right s becaus e i t possesses institutiona l advantage s over th e representativ e branche s tha t promot e sensitivit y t o politicall y impotent interests . Becaus e o f thi s sensitivity , th e Cour t i s able t o hono r rights that an unconstrained politica l branc h of governmen t woul d prefe r to exploi t fo r majoritaria n purposes . The right s o f racia l minorities , lik e the right s o f individuals , ar e subjec t t o simila r majoritaria n exploitatio n because o f th e relativ e politica l powerlessnes s tha t racia l minoritie s hav e historically bee n force d t o endure . Accordingly , th e traditiona l mode l o f judicial revie w require s th e Cour t t o protec t th e interest s o f racia l mi norities fro m majoritaria n abrogation , just as it requires the Court t o protect th e right s o f individuals . Unde r th e traditiona l model , th e abilit y o f the Supreme Court to operate in a countermajoritarian manne r is essential. Although th e Cour t i s commonly perceive d t o b e performin g it s prophylactic function i n an acceptable manner, the Court in fact does not possess the countermajoritaria n capacit y tha t th e traditiona l mode l attribute s t o it. Moreover , th e Cour t no t onl y lack s th e abilit y t o serv e a s a guardian against majority preferences, it actually advances those preferences through its adjudications .

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The Suprem e Cour t a s currentl y conceive d canno t posses s th e coun termajoritarian capacit y require d fo r traditiona l judicia l revie w becaus e the membershi p o f th e Cour t consist s o f socialize d justice s wh o posses s the value s an d predisposition s o f th e sam e elit e politica l majorit y tha t controls th e representativ e branches . A s a statistica l matter , therefore , those majoritarian-influence d jurist s will exercis e judicia l discretion i n the same way that the members of the representative branches exercise political discretion, unless unique feature s o f th e judicial proces s successfully con strain th e exercis e o f judicia l discretion . Althoug h bot h forma l an d op erational safeguard s hav e bee n buil t int o th e judicia l proces s i n orde r t o guarantee it s countermajoritaria n capabilities , thos e safeguard s ar e ineffective. The formal safeguard s o f lif e tenur e and salary protection are designed to protect the judiciary from overt political pressures that might be exerted by the representative branche s in order to affect th e outcome o f particular cases. I t i s unlikel y tha t thes e safeguard s ar e effectiv e i n attainin g thi s limited objective, bu t more important, they are not eve n addressed t o th e majoritarian influence s tha t th e proces s o f socializatio n ha s exerte d ove r judicial attitude s an d values . The operationa l safeguar d o f principle d ad judication, whic h arguabl y is addresse d t o th e proble m o f socialize d ju dicial preferences, canno t ultimatel y serv e the desired insulatin g function , because the legal principles on which the adjudicatory process relies themselves depen d upo n unconstraine d discretionar y inpu t i n orde r t o deriv e their operativ e meanings . Many lega l principle s expressl y incorporat e majoritaria n preference s into thei r meanings , becaus e th e governin g lega l standar d i s define d t o coincide wit h whateve r meaning a majoritarian branc h ha s given it . Mor e subtly, the same result is often accomplishe d through deferential standard s of review , whic h permi t majoritaria n preference s t o gover n th e conten t of a principle becaus e the Court will no t intervene to alter its majoritarian meaning. Althoug h no t al l lega l principle s incorporat e majoritaria n pref erences int o thei r meanings , i t i s th e Suprem e Cour t tha t mus t decid e which principle s do an d whic h d o not . Thi s decisio n require s a n ac t o f judicial discretion , an d i t pose s al l o f th e danger s associate d wit h th e exercise o f suc h discretion . Even whe n a lega l principl e doe s no t itsel f incorporat e majoritaria n preferences int o its meaning, the dangers of majoritarian influence remain , because ther e are two additional aspect s of th e adjudicatory process fro m which judicia l discretio n canno t b e eliminated . Th e Cour t mus t identif y the legal principle that controls resolution o f a particular case, and it must

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apply tha t principl e t o th e fact s o f th e case . Bot h o f thes e activitie s ulti mately res t upo n purel y discretionar y determinations . In order to identify a governing principle of law , the Court must choose between th e competin g principle s tha t ar e potentiall y applicable . The Court's decided cases reveal that identification o f th e governing legal principle i s largel y unconstrained . Th e argument s favorin g choic e o f on e po tential principle are likely to be as strong as the arguments favoring another, thereby giving the Court little guidance in selecting among the competitors. Moreover, provision s o f la w tha t mak e a particula r principl e expressl y applicable are often honored by the Court, but they are also often ignored . Even when th e Court's own precedents requir e application o f a principle, the precedents fai l t o provid e effectiv e constraint , becaus e unde r the doc trine of star e decisis, the Court's own precedents can always be overruled. In addition , th e Cour t ca n rel y upo n lega l fictions t o circumven t a n ex plicitly applicabl e principl e whil e pretendin g tha t th e principl e i s actually being applied . No t eve n th e fundamenta l natur e o f th e cas e a t issu e ca n be relied upon to ensur e that the Court will select the governing principle designed for cases of tha t type, because characterizing the nature of a case is itsel f a highly discretionar y activity . Once a governing principle ha s been selected , application o f tha t principle to the facts of a particular case also requires heavy reliance on judicial discretion. Lega l principles contain inevitabl e ambiguitie s that make them vulnerable t o deconstruction . Tha t is , lega l principle s ca n b e detache d from th e polic y objective s wit h whic h the y ar e initiall y though t t o b e associated and then reattached to conflicting polic y objectives. As a result, a single legal principl e can be shown t o generate contradictory outcomes . This make s i t unclea r whic h applicatio n o f a principl e bes t serve s th e policy function s fo r which the principle was adopted. Again, the only way to choos e betwee n competin g application s i s throug h th e unconstraine d exercise o f judicia l discretion . No t surprisingly , th e rac e case s i n whic h the Supreme Court has applied particular principles of law exhibit a notable lack o f consistenc y whe n examine d fro m a policy perspective . If the present thesi s concernin g th e necessar y correspondenc e betwee n majoritarian an d countermajoritaria n disposition s o f minorit y interest s i s correct, one woul d expec t th e Suprem e Cour t t o preserv e fo r itsel f op portunities t o submi t t o majoritaria n desires . Whether don e intentionall y or unconsciously , th e formulatio n o f doctrina l rule s whos e application s require significant amounts of judicial discretion has ensured the continued presence of enough doctrinal latitude for majoritarian influences to operate effectively withi n the judicial process. Without imputing improper motives

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to the Court, it is sufficient to note that if one were to design a sophisticated judicial syste m tha t woul d optimiz e th e protectio n o f majorit y interest s in the fac e o f minorit y demand s for bette r treatment, i t would loo k ver y much lik e ou r presen t judicia l system . Accordingly , i t i s unrealisti c t o conceive of the Supreme Court as anything other than a veiled majoritarian institution. And because it is a majoritarian institution, one of the primary tasks that ha s tacitly bee n assigne d t o th e Suprem e Court i s to effectuat e the majoritaria n preferenc e fo r th e continue d subordinatio n o f racia l minorities. Summary of Part II Part II of thi s boo k ha s described ho w th e Supreme Court develope d th e legal doctrine s tha t govern rac e relations i n a way that permits th e subtl e perpetuation o f minorit y subordination . Becaus e th e Suprem e Cour t op erates i n a veiled majoritaria n manner , racia l minoritie s coul d rationall y prefer th e over t political proces s t o th e Supreme Cour t adjudicator y process as the mos t promisin g mean s fo r advancin g racia l minorit y interests . The process o f positiv e politic s i s pure i n the sense tha t i t purports t o b e nothing mor e tha n wha t i t is— a proces s fo r generatin g outcome s i n a pluralist politica l environment . Unlik e th e proces s o f Suprem e Cour t ad judication, which purports to have normative content tha t places it above the real m o f mer e cras s political exchange , th e positiv e politica l proces s has n o doctrina l pretension s behin d whic h th e majorit y ca n hid e a s i t extracts resource s fro m racia l minorities . Contemporary racial minorities possess a degree of political power that enables the m t o operat e effectivel y i n th e pluralis t politica l process . B y pooling thei r political resources , individua l minorit y group s ca n increas e their inherent politica l strength . Minoritie s ca n further enhanc e thei r political strengt h b y formin g politica l coalition s wit h sympatheti c majorit y interest group s o n bot h shor t an d lon g ter m bases . The fac t tha t racia l minority interest s hav e historicall y fare d bette r befor e th e representativ e branches of government than before the Supreme Court not only illustrates the viability of suc h a political strategy , but suggests that the simplicity o f the over t politica l proces s i s mor e advantageou s t o minoritie s tha n th e complexities o f Suprem e Cour t politics . Because lif e tenur e gives Supreme Court justice s longer terms of offic e than th e term s hel d b y member s o f th e representativ e branches , th e Supreme Court tends to be an inherently conservative proponent of the status quo, rathe r tha n a proponent o f th e socia l progres s tha t i s require d fo r

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the advancemen t o f racia l minorit y interests . Nevertheless , th e natur e o f the America n lega l syste m i s such tha t minoritie s do no t hav e the optio n of avoidin g th e Suprem e Cour t i n favo r o f ordinar y politics . Minoritie s will hav e to appea r before th e Court i n order to implemen t th e gains that they secure throug h th e over t politica l process , and to defen d thos e gains when they are challenged b y disappointed member s of th e white majority. As a result, racial minorit y interest s canno t escap e th e protective custod y of th e Suprem e Court . The fac t tha t th e Suprem e Cour t wil l inevitabl y b e involve d i n th e formulation o f socia l policie s tha t affec t racia l minorit y interest s mean s that minorit y interest s wil l b e subjec t t o surreptitiou s sacrific e fo r th e benefit o f th e whit e majority . Ther e are three ways in which th e Suprem e Court places minoritie s a t a systemic disadvantag e i n their quest to secur e racial justice . Th e first is b y promotin g continue d belie f i n th e counter majoritarian mode l o f judicia l review , whic h ha s lulle d racia l minoritie s into a dependency relationshi p wit h th e Suprem e Cour t unde r which mi norities hav e com e t o rel y o n judicia l revie w rathe r tha n o n minorit y political strengt h fo r th e protectio n o f minorit y interests . Th e secon d i s by centralizing the law of affirmativ e actio n i n a way that makes it difficul t for minorities to capitalize on the local political power that they do possess. The thir d is by legitimating a set of counterproductiv e assumption s abou t the operatio n o f th e lega l system , and th e wort h o f racia l minorities , that can reduc e th e wil l o f eve n minoritie s themselve s t o achiev e equa l statu s with whites . The firstway in which the Supreme Court has systemically disadvantaged racial minoritie s i s b y successfull y consignin g minoritie s t o th e statu s o f Supreme Court dependents. The Court accomplished this through issuance of its decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Althoug h Brown promised to desegregat e th e schools and to eliminate race-base d governmental clas sifications, i t did neither . Brown merel y replace d de jure segregation wit h de facto segregatio n i n a wa y tha t simpl y prompte d governmenta l poli cymakers t o rel y o n racia l correlate s rathe r tha n rac e itsel f whe n the y wished t o utiliz e a race-base d classification . Brown i s bette r understoo d as a majoritarian decision that inflicted nationa l foreig n policy preference s on the regional south than as a countermajoritarian decisio n that impose d the rul e o f la w o n a massively resistan t majority . Notwithstanding it s tru e majoritaria n nature , Brown ha s com e t o b e viewed a s proof o f th e Suprem e Court' s countermajoritaria n capabilities . Because racial minorities have come to share this view of Brown the y have permitted th e Cour t t o dictat e minority politica l polic y t o them . Racia l

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minorities have disregarded their own progressive political and intellectua l leaders and have manifested thei r dependence upo n the Supreme Court in electing to pursue the elusive goal of integrate d education, rather than the goal o f hig h qualit y educatio n i n minority-controlled schools . Moreover , they continu e t o do s o eve n thoug h thi s strateg y ha s resulte d i n nearl y forty post-Brown year s of inferio r education for minority school children . This submissivenes s o n th e par t o f racia l minoritie s reflect s a deepe r minority dependenc e o n th e Suprem e Cour t a s th e institutio n tha t pre scribes the ways in which minorities conceptualize the problems associated with race . Mos t notably , thi s dependenc e ha s prompted minorit y accept ance o f th e Court' s prescriptio n fo r assimilatio n rathe r tha n self-deter mination a s the aspirational goa l fo r right-thinkin g racia l minorit y group s to pursue. On an even deeper level, it is dependence upo n Supreme Court paternalism tha t ha s le d minoritie s t o esche w aggressive , self-determine d political action i n favor of th e safety inherent in continued minorit y status as wards of th e Suprem e Court . The secon d wa y i n whic h th e Suprem e Cour t ha s systemicall y disad vantaged racia l minoritie s i s b y centralizin g th e la w o f affirmativ e action . With th e demis e o f de jure segregation, th e la w o f affirmativ e actio n ha s become th e mos t significan t are a o f th e la w affectin g racia l minorit y in terests. The statistical natur e of contemporar y racia l discrimination mean s that onl y statistica l allocation s o f societa l resource s offe r an y hop e o f promoting racial equality. However, it is in the interest of member s of th e white majorit y a s rational wealt h maximizer s t o allocate t o themselve s as large a shar e o f societa l resource s a s possibl e withou t eithe r provokin g minorities t o adop t extra-lega l strategie s o f resistanc e o r causin g th e ma jority to vie w itself i n unflatteringly selfis h terms . The Supreme Court has served th e functio n o f advancin g thi s majoritaria n interes t b y upholdin g the constitutionalit y o f onl y thos e affirmativ e actio n program s tha t ar e adopted a t th e nationa l rathe r tha n th e loca l level . By centralizing the la w of affirmativ e actio n t o permit nationa l bu t no t local affirmativ e actio n programs , the Court has permitted th e majority t o retain it s goodwil l an d positiv e self-imag e b y allowin g i t t o adop t some affirmative actio n programs . However , racia l minoritie s posses s mor e po litical powe r a t th e loca l level , wher e ther e ca n b e heav y concentration s of minorit y votin g strength , tha n a t th e nationa l level , wher e minoritie s will compris e onl y a small percentag e o f th e tota l electorate . A s a result, Supreme Cour t validatio n o f onl y centralize d affirmativ e actio n program s turns ou t t o b e a political bargai n fo r th e whit e majority , becaus e i t wil l not resul t i n many affirmativ e actio n program s actuall y takin g effect .

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More subtly, the Supreme Court's centralization of the law of affirmativ e action reflects ou r prevailing cultural preferences fo r universalism, rational objectivity, an d rac e neutrality ove r the parochialism, irrationa l subjectiv ity, and racia l bia s that hav e come t o b e associated wit h decentralization . In a culture tha t i s as inescapably race-consciou s a s contemporary Amer ican culture , allocation s o f societa l resource s ar e significantl y dependen t upon race. It is implausible to suggest that some race-neutral concept such as meri t coul d overrid e th e racia l factor s tha t g o int o makin g resourc e allocation determinations . However , th e Suprem e Court' s centralizatio n of th e la w o f affirmativ e actio n ultimatel y permit s th e whit e majorit y t o view th e race-consciou s allocatio n o f resource s t o racia l minoritie s a s a suspect racial preference while viewing the equally race-conscious allocation of resource s t o itsel f a s the commendabl e exercis e o f rac e neutrality . Thi s not onl y help s th e majorit y t o fee l comfortabl e wit h it s disproportionat e allocation o f societa l resources , bu t i t deter s minoritie s fro m embracin g nationalist strategie s fo r th e advancemen t o f racia l interest s tha t offe r th e greatest hop e fo r promotin g racia l equalit y an d self-determination . The thir d wa y in whic h th e Suprem e Cour t ha s systemicall y disadvan taged racia l minoritie s i s b y legitimatin g a se t o f counterproductiv e as sumptions abou t th e natur e o f th e lega l process , an d ultimatel y abou t racial minorities themselves. The process of legitimatio n operates by causing an unstated assumption to be accepted without scrutiny while analytical attention ha s bee n diverte d t o a mor e salien t consequenc e o f th e legiti mated assumption . Usin g thi s technique , th e Suprem e Cour t ha s legiti mated three unstated assumptions that are relevant to the minority struggle for racial equality. It has legitimated the liberal assumption that there exists a categor y o f fundamenta l right s tha t th e governmen t canno t abridge . It has als o legitimate d th e assumptio n tha t th e Suprem e Cour t i s th e final expositor o f th e conten t o f thos e rights . Finally , i t ha s legitimate d th e assumption tha t minoritie s canno t properl y mak e demand s upo n th e majority tha t excee d th e scop e o f th e fundamenta l right s a s expounde d b y the Court . All o f thes e assumption s serv e th e interest s o f th e whit e majority , bu t they do no t serv e th e interest s o f racia l minorities . The libera l right s assumption i s counterproductiv e becaus e i t tend s t o backfir e o n racia l mi norities. Its most frequent histori c us e has been i n the protection o f whit e property interests. Similarly, its contemporary majoritaria n value lies in its use t o invalidat e affirmativ e actio n program s o n th e ground s tha t the y interfere wit h majoritaria n interests . The assumptio n tha t th e Suprem e Court i s th e final expositor o f th e content o f right s i s counterproductiv e

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because i t authorize s th e mostl y white , mostl y mal e Suprem e Cour t t o referee disputes between the majority and racial minorities over the proper allocation o f resource s i n a wa y tha t i s largel y immun e fro m politica l modification. Historically , thi s ha s bee n a n arbitration syste m tha t favor s the majorit y ove r racial minorities , and ther e i s no reaso n t o believ e tha t this built-i n bia s i s about t o change . The assumptio n tha t minoritie s ar e not entitle d t o anythin g mor e tha n wha t th e Suprem e Cour t grant s the m not onl y solidifies th e dependenc y relationshi p tha t racia l minoritie s hav e with th e Suprem e Court , bu t i t convey s negativ e connotation s abou t th e indolent ingratitud e o f racia l minoritie s tha t perpetuat e perception s o f racial minorities as inferior. To the extent that these perceptions are shared by racial minoritie s themselves , legitimatio n o f thi s assumption frustrate s minority perception s o f self-wort h an d inhibit s th e aggressivenes s wit h which minoritie s wil l pursu e thei r claim s fo r racia l justice .

Conclusion The traditiona l mode l o f judicia l revie w i s hopelessl y disingenuous . No t only i s th e Suprem e Cour t preclude d fro m protectin g minorit y interest s by it s veiled majoritaria n nature , bu t i t seem s tha t th e Court' s tru e insti tutional functio n i s t o perpetuat e th e subordinatio n o f racia l minoritie s for majorit y gain . A s a matte r o f constitutiona l theory , thi s lead s t o a rather paradoxical conclusion . Althoug h contemporar y constitutiona l de bate centers around th e continue d viabilit y o f th e Marbury model , i n the final analysis , it simply does not much matter whether the traditional model of judicia l revie w i s vali d o r not . The Suprem e Cour t ha s cas t fa r to o strong a spel l o f necessit y ove r th e constituent s o f judicia l revie w t o b e thwarted b y mer e insight s int o it s operationa l deficiencies . The lega l ac ademics, operating in the name of constraining scrutiny, have also provided their share of ai d and comfort t o the endeavor. The more transparent th e Court's deficiencies hav e become, the more abundant has become the flow of theor y to obfuscate th e transparency. And racial minorities themselves, wanting desperatel y t o becom e a part o f th e whole , hav e chose n t o roo t for th e succes s o f th e undertaking . The y hav e viewe d th e recurrenc e o f judicial betraya l a s a n unsightl y blemis h upo n a n otherwis e nobl e aspi ration. Like the white majority, racial minorities have resisted the inference that persisten t perfid y reveal s a flaw a t th e inceptio n o f th e enterprise . Everyone seems t o wan t th e system t o work , n o matte r how unworkabl e the syste m seem s t o become .

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In thi s environment , racia l minoritie s arme d wit h insight s abou t th e inescapable majoritarianism o f th e Supreme Court could do no more than treat th e Cour t a s a n antagonisti c politica l institutio n rathe r tha n a s a hospitable benefactor . Bu t to b e effectiv e i n their political treatment , mi norities would stil l hav e to file the same brief s befor e th e Court, offer th e same ora l arguments , an d pronounc e th e word s "You r Honor " wit h th e same degree of deference . N o matte r how enlightene d i t were to become , political us e o f th e Cour t woul d stil l legitimat e th e countermajoritaria n assumptions o n whic h th e traditiona l mode l i s based , thereb y perversel y implicating racia l minoritie s i n th e perpetuatio n o f thei r ow n subordina tion. Sadly , th e assumptio n tha t racia l minoritie s ar e Suprem e Cour t de pendents wh o ar e incapabl e o f politica l self-determinatio n seem s t o b e self-fulfilling. Thi s pose s a n inescapabl e dilemm a fo r minoritie s i n search of racia l justice . Thankfully, th e dilemm a i s onl y syllogistic . I t i s a n artifac t o f th e sam e sorts o f rationa l discours e an d logica l analysi s tha t coul d permi t a social institution a s regressiv e a s th e Suprem e Cour t t o becom e recognize d a s the champion o f oppresse d minorities . Onc e free d fro m th e epistemolog ical constraint s o f syllogisti c analysis , racia l minoritie s coul d als o fre e themselves fro m th e constraint s o f Suprem e Cour t protection . Conside r that the vision o f a n omnipotent Go d exert s enormous influenc e ove r the attitudes an d behavio r o f th e adherent s t o tha t vision . Bu t i t i s o f no consequence whatsoever to those for whom the vision holds no attraction. Similarly, Freud's conception o f unconsciou s determinism is of paramount importance t o thos e wh o hav e chosen t o pursu e psychoanalytic strategie s for self-realization . Bu t i t i s littl e mor e tha n a sourc e o f amusemen t t o those fo r who m hard-edge d conception s o f freewil l offe r a mor e com fortable account of human behavior. Even assuming that an external reality remains constant across epistemological perspectives , it is the perspectives themselves—not th e underlyin g reality—tha t giv e lif e an d meanin g t o ex perience. I t follows tha t the way for racial minoritie s to escap e th e realit y of Suprem e Cour t subordinatio n i s t o thin k abou t tha t realit y differ ently.... Thought abou t differently , i t i s no t a t al l surprisin g tha t a Suprem e Court nominally committe d t o th e protection o f minorit y interest s would resist th e escap e o f racia l minoritie s fro m it s protective custody . Whil e i t is tru e tha t unde r th e Marbury mode l o f judicia l review , minoritie s ar e consigned t o a rol e o f perpetua l Suprem e Cour t dependency , minorit y dependence i s th e lesse r o f th e tw o dependencie s tha t ar e create d b y th e

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traditional model . Unde r the Marbury model , i f ther e wer e n o politicall y impotent minoritie s fo r th e Suprem e Cour t t o protect, ther e coul d b e n o judicial review . And without judicia l review , the Supreme Court would b e deprived o f it s distinctiv e significanc e i n th e America n politica l system . Ironically, i t i s th e Suprem e Cour t tha t i s actuall y dependen t upo n th e continued vulnerabilit y o f minoritie s i n orde r t o sustai n it s ow n consti tutional legitimacy . This , o f course , give s racia l minoritie s a n enormou s source o f powe r ove r th e Court . B y choosin g t o relinquis h thei r vulner ability, racial minoritie s would als o terminate th e traditiona l utilit y o f th e Supreme Court . To date, racial minoritie s hav e charitably serve d a s sacrificial recipient s of Suprem e Cour t larges s i n a way tha t ha s protecte d th e fragil e estee m of thi s governmental institution—a n institutio n whose only real power lies in th e continue d obeisanc e o f it s minorit y charges . Bu t tha t ha s prove n to b e a counterproductive endeavor . The societ y ha s remained unjus t despite it s invocatio n o f judicia l revie w a s th e symbo l fo r it s commitmen t to inchoate equal justice. Racial minorities have demonstrated remarkabl e tolerance wit h th e shortcoming s o f th e Court . The y hav e treate d it s de cisions with the patience and restraint that one would accord the misdeeds of a wayward chil d whos e deficien t parentin g wa s properl y t o blam e fo r the child's poor conduct. Nevertheless, even racial minority tolerance must eventually com e t o a n end . Th e adjudicator y pat h t o racia l justic e ha s proven unworkable , an d i t i s no w tim e fo r minoritie s t o ceas e thei r protection o f th e Supreme Court. It is time to leav e the Court to its fate. The continued self-sacrific e o f minorit y interest s solel y t o shor e u p th e insti tutional importanc e o f th e Supreme Court, and the unworkable approac h to justic e tha t i t represents , woul d serv e n o usefu l purpose . The er a o f the Cour t ha s come , an d i t ha s gone . An d minoritie s mus t no w sho w concern fo r themselve s rathe r tha n continuin g t o protec t thi s obsolet e institution an d th e socia l orde r fo r whic h i t stands. Although minoritie s ma y no t ultimatel y posses s th e powe r t o contro l the manne r i n whic h th e lega l proces s deal s wit h thei r welfare , the y d o possess the power to control thei r conception o f tha t process. Which may be ever y bi t a s good.

Notes

INTRODUCTION i. Review of Supreme Court's Term: Labor and Employment Law, 5 8 L W 3065 (Aug . 8 , 1989) . The 1988-8 9 Ter m has become infamou s becaus e the conservative civi l right s decisions tha t th e Cour t issue d tha t Ter m serve d as the focu s o f highl y publicize d an d raciall y charge d legislativ e proceeding s that ultimatel y le d t o th e congressiona l reversa l o f man y of thos e decisions . See Introduction, not e 4 (discussin g politica l divisivenes s surroundin g legis lative effort s t o enac t propose d Civi l Right s Act s o f 199 0 an d 1991) . 2. Id. Durin g th e 198 8 Term , th e Cour t first invalidated a minorit y set-asid e program for government contractors and imposed a heavy burden of proving past discrimination as a prerequisite to the use of affirmative actio n remedies. See City of Richmon d v . J.A. Croson Co. , 488 U.S . 469 (1989) . The burde n of proof impose d b y the case is so heavy that it was not satisfied b y the wellknown history of racia l discrimination in Richmond, Virginia, see id. at 498 500, o r b y th e fac t tha t i n a cit y whos e populatio n wa s 5 0 percen t black , only .6 7 percen t o f th e city' s constructio n contract s ha d bee n awarde d t o black contractors . See id. a t 484-85 . Second, th e Cour t permitte d a n affirmativ e actio n consen t decre e t o b e collaterally attacke d b y whit e worker s wh o ha d chose n no t t o interven e i n the Title VII action giving rise to the consent decree despite their knowledge that th e Titl e VI I actio n wa s pending . See Martin v . Wilkes, 49 0 U.S . 75 5 (1989)Third, th e Cour t increase d th e burde n o f proo f impose d o n minoritie s who asser t Titl e VI I claim s b y requirin g minorit y employee s bot h t o focu s their challenges o n specifi c rathe r than aggregat e employmen t practice s and to disprove employer assertions of legitimate job relatedness. See Wards Cove Packing Co . v . Atonio, 49 0 U.S . 64 2 (1989) . 173

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Fourth, the Court adopted a narrow interpretatio n o f th e Reconstructio n civil right s statute now codifie d i n 42 U.S.C . § 1981, holding that the statute did not prohibit racial harassment of minorit y employees b y their employers. See Patterson v . McLea n Credi t Union , 49 1 U.S . 16 4 (1989) . Fifth, the Court held that discrimination claims filed against municipalities under 4 2 U.S.C . §198 1 coul d no t b e base d upo n a theor y o f respondea t superior. See Jett v. Dallas Independent School District , 491 U.S . 701 (1989) . Jett wa s a discriminatio n sui t i n whic h a whit e employe e challenge d hi s discharge b y a black employer , id., bu t th e holdin g applie s t o suit s filed by minority plaintiff s a s well . I n a separat e decision , th e Cour t als o hel d tha t 42 U.S.C. § 1983, another Reconstruction civi l right s statute, did not permit race discrimination suits to be maintained against states as employers because states were no t "persons " within th e meanin g of th e § 198 3 prohibitio n o n discrimination occurrin g unde r "color " o f stat e law . See Will v . Michiga n Department o f Stat e Police, 49 1 U.S . 5 8 (1989) . Sixth, the Court held that the statute of limitations for Title VII challenges to discriminatory seniority systems began to run when a seniority system was first adopte d rathe r than when it s discriminatory impac t later materialized in the for m o f subsequen t seniority-base d demotions . See Loranc e v . AT& T Technologies, 49 0 U.S . 90 0 (1989) . Althoug h Lorance involve d a Title VI I claim o f gende r discrimination , it s holding applie s with equa l forc e t o racebased discriminatio n claim s asserted unde r Title VII . Seventh, th e Cour t hel d tha t attorneys ' fees fo r a prevailing plaintiff i n a Title VII case coul d no t b e assessed against a union that intervened i n order to defend the discriminatory practice being challenged. See Independent Federation o f Fligh t Attendant s v . Zipes , 49 1 U.S . 75 4 (1989) . Thi s adversel y affects minorit y interest s b y decreasin g th e source s o f fundin g availabl e t o compensate victoriou s minorit y litigant s fo r thei r attorneys' fees an d b y increasing th e source s o f oppositio n t o minorit y interest s tha t ma y b e repre sented i n particular suits through th e eliminatio n o f a potential cos t o f par ticipation. In addition t o th e seve n decision s cite d b y U.S . LA W WEEK, th e Cour t also hel d i n another cas e tha t discriminator y employmen t decision s di d no t violate Titl e VI I i f th e employe r coul d demonstrat e tha t th e sam e employ ment decisio n woul d hav e bee n mad e i n th e absenc e o f th e impermissibl e discrimination. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S . 228 (1989) . Like Lorance, Price Waterhouse was a gender discrimination case , but its holding too applie s with equa l forc e t o Titl e VI I rac e discriminatio n claims . Congress took step s to overrul e man y o f thes e decision s in the propose d Civil Right s Act s o f 199 0 an d 1991 . See Introduction, not e 4 . 3. See Civil Right s Ac t o f 1991 , Pub . L . 102-166 ; 10 5 Stat . 107 1 (1991 ) (t o be codified) . 4. Afte r th e serie s o f conservativ e civi l right s decisions tha t wer e issue d b y the Supreme Cour t durin g it s 1988-8 9 Term , the propose d Civi l Right s Ac t o f

INTRODUCTION 17

5

1990 wa s introduce d i n th e Senat e to overtur n man y of th e 1988-8 9 Ter m decisions, as well as some of th e other conservative civil rights decisions that the Court had issued since 1985 . See Eskridge, Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game 7 9 CALIF . L. REV. 613, 613-17 (1991) . Presiden t Bus h oppose d enactmen t o f th e propose d legis lation o n th e ground s tha t i t calle d fo r th e utilizatio n o f racia l quota s i n hiring and promotion. Although the proposed Civil Rights Act of 199 0 passed both House s o f Congress , i t was vetoed b y th e Presiden t i n October 1990 . The Senat e faile d b y on e vot e t o overrid e th e President' s veto . In January 199 1 th e propose d Civi l Right s Ac t o f 199 1 wa s introduce d in the Hous e o f Representatives . Tha t bil l passe d th e Hous e i n June 1991 , and afte r a compromise wa s worke d ou t betwee n th e Presiden t an d Senat e Republicans who supported the legislation, the Civil Rights Act of 199 1 was signed into law by President Bush on November 21,1991. The Act overruled most o f th e conservativ e civi l rights decisions tha t ha d bee n issue d b y th e Supreme Cour t durin g the 1988-8 9 Term , as well a s some earlie r and late r conservative civi l rights decisions that had also bee n issued b y the Rehnquis t Court. Th e provision s o f th e Act , a s wel l a s a descriptio n o f th e politica l process leading to its enactment, are described in Alfred and Knowlton, Civil Rights Act Will Encourage Federal Claims: The Civil Rights Act Of 1991, MASSACHUSETTS LAWYER S WEEKLY, Dec. 9 , 1991 , at p . 5 . The President' s action s durin g th e two-yea r politica l struggl e tha t le d t o enactment o f th e statute hav e been criticized b y both civil right s leaders and moderate Republican s a s divisiv e effort s t o exploi t th e issu e o f rac e fo r partisan political gain. See, e.g., Broder, Bush's Favorite Victim, WASH. POST, June 9 , 1991 , a t p . D7 ; Raspberry , Bush, Civil Rights and the Specter of David Duke, WASH . POST , Oct. 30 , 1991 , at p. A23; Schneider, For Danforth & Co., An Uncivil Snub, NATIONA L JOURNAL July 6 , 1991 , at p. 1716. Fo r an argument tha t Presiden t Bus h has , throughout hi s career, sporadically sough t t o exploi t racia l divisivenes s i n his political activities , see T. EDSALL, with M. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AN D TAXE S O N AMERICA N POLITIC S (Ne w York : Norto n 1991); Morley, Bush & the Blacks: An Unknown Story, N.Y . REVIE W OF BOOKS, Jan. 16 , 1991 , at p. 19 . For an argument tha t th e Supreme Court decision s overrule d i n the Civil Rights Ac t o f 199 1 exemplifie d a novel for m o f judicia l activis m practice d by the Rehnquis t Suprem e Court , pursuant t o whic h th e Cour t i s willing t o override the political preferences of both the Congress that enacts a particular piece of legislatio n as well as the preferences of the current Congress in order to advance th e Court's own politica l preferences , se e Eskridge , Reneging on History?. 5. 34 7 U.S . 48 3 (1954) 6. Id.

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Part I CHAPTER I 1. Fo r a general discussio n o f th e historica l an d political contex t ou t o f whic h the Constitutio n emerge d an d th e objective s o f th e framers , se e J . ELY , DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 77 88 (Cambridge : Harvar d Universit y Pres s 1980) ; TH E FEDERALIS T (H . Lodge ed. ) (Ne w York : G.P . Putnam' s Son s 1888) ; G. GUNTHER , CON STITUTIONAL LA W 10-2 1 (Mineola , N.Y. : Foundatio n Press , n t h ed . 1985); G. STONE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN, and M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LA W 1-1 7 (Boston : Little , Brown , 1986) ; L . TRIBE , AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONA L LA W 1-1 7 (Mineola , N.Y. : Foundatio n Press, 2 d ed . 1988) ; Eskridge , Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 7 4 VA . L . REV . 275 , 280-83 ( J 988); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 153 9 (1988); Sunstein , Interest Groups in American Public Law, 3 8 STAN . L . REV. 29 , 31-48(1985) . 2. See generally G . STONE , et ai, CONSTITUTIONA L LA W at 1-18 . 3. See generally id.; Sunstein, Republican Revival; Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition, 9 7 YAL E L.J. 1493-185 1 (1988) . 4. See P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN, and D. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERA L COURT S AND TH E FEDERA L SYSTEM 8-9 n.3 4 (Mineola , N.Y. : Foundatio n Press , 3 d ed . 1988) . 5. See id. a t 8-9 ; A . BICKEL , TH E LEAS T DANGEROU S BRANCH : TH E SUPREME COURT AT THE BA R OF POLITICS 15-1 6 (Ne w Haven : Yale University Pres s 1962) ; G. STONE, et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LA W at 30 . 6. See G. STONE , et ai, CONSTITUTIONA L LA W at 31-33 . 7. Unite d States v. Butler, 29 7 U.S . 1 , 62-63 (1936) , quoted and characterized in G. STON E et ai, CONSTITUTIONA L LA W at 32 . 8. See, e.g., Bennett , Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Self-Restraint, 39 MICH . L . REV . 213 , 22 7 (1940) . 9. See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 19311940, 59 U . CHI . L . REV . 504 , 53 1 (1987) . 10. See G. STONE, et ai, CONSTITUTIONA L LA W at 31-3 8 (presentin g several suc h theories) . 11. See G. GUNTHER , CONSTITUTIONA L LA W at 406 ; L . TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONA L LA W at 4 n. 7 . 12. TH E FEDERALIS T 8 4 (Hamilton) at 537 . See also L . TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 4 n.7 ; G. STONE, et ai, CONSTITUTIONA L LAW at 115-22 . 13. Cf. A.L.A . Schechte r Poultr y Corp . v . Unite d States , 29 5 U.S . 49 5 (1935 ) (last Supreme Court decision to invalidate grant of agenc y power under nondelegation doctrine) .

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7

14. See Commodity Future s Trading Commission v . Schor, 47 8 U.S . 83 3 (1986 ) (upholding powe r o f CFT C t o adjudicat e stat e la w deb t claims) ; Weiner v. United States , 35 7 U.S . 34 9 (1958 ) (upholdin g adjudicator y powe r o f Wa r Claims Commission) . 15. See Morrison v . Olson, 48 7 U.S . 654 (1988 ) (upholdin g constitutionalit y o f statute creatin g independen t counse l t o investigat e hig h leve l executiv e mis conduct fre e of presidential control) ; Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S . 60 2 (1935 ) (upholdin g congressiona l restriction s o n President' s power t o remov e independen t agenc y officials) . 16. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding authority of Presiden t t o impos e fines fo r sellin g arm s t o foreig n government) . See generally Sunstein , Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 10 1 HARV . L . REV. 421 , 430-5 2 (1987) 17. See Wickard v . Filburn , 31 7 U.S . 1 1 (1942) . 18. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism, 10 1 HARV . L . REV . at 430-52 . 19. Marbur y v . Madison , 5 U.S. ( 1 Cranch. ) 13 7 (1803) . 20. Id. a t 163 , 170 . 21. Id. a t 177-78 . 22. See generally G. STONE , et al, CONSTITUTIONA L LA W at 25-31 . 23. Cf. Coope r v. Aaron, 35 8 U.S . 1 , 1 8 (1958) (citing Marbury fo r propositio n that Suprem e Cour t "i s suprem e i n th e expositio n o f th e la w o f th e Con stitution"). B y reserving th e righ t t o hav e th e final say ove r th e meanin g o f the Constitution, th e Suprem e Court ha s also reserve d th e righ t to hav e the final sa y over th e conten t o f constitutiona l rights . 24. See U.S. CONST, amends . XIII , XIV, & XV . 25. See generally J. ELY , DEMOCRACY AN D DISTRUST . 26. Suprem e Cour t invalidatio n o f coordinat e branc h action s ha s bee n empha sized for the sake of simplicity. Much of the Court's work admittedly involves the interpretation o f federa l an d state statute s and common la w rules . Theories o f judicia l revie w tha t ar e relevan t t o Suprem e Cour t constitutiona l adjudication ca n also have an important impact on the Court's statutory and common la w interpretations. For present purposes, however, Supreme Court invalidation o f th e act s o f representativ e branche s serve s a s a n adequat e foundation fo r th e thesi s tha t I wish t o present . Similarly, I d o no t dwel l upo n th e difference s betwee n th e rol e o f th e Supreme Court and the role of the lower federal courts. There are differences, and for many purposes the differences ar e significant. Again , however, I have focused o n th e Suprem e Cour t fo r purpose s o f simplicit y an d becaus e Su preme Cour t adjudicatio n i s sufficient t o illustrat e th e point s tha t I wish t o make. 27. See U.S. CONST, an. Ill , sec . 1 . The framer s rejecte d a proposed constitu tional prohibition o n judicia l salar y increases. See THE FOUNDERS ' CONSTITUTION, VOL . 4 , 133-3 7 (P - Kurlan d an d R . Lerne r eds. ) (Chicago : University o f Chicag o Pres s 1987) .

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28. Whil e i t ma y b e relativel y eas y t o imagin e a situation i n whic h a particular legislator ha s a n interes t i n th e outcom e o f privat e litigation—a s wher e a friend, relative, or major campaign contributor is a party—it is more difficul t to imagin e privat e litigatio n i n whic h th e representativ e branc h a s a whol e would hav e a n interest . Bu t eve n thi s i s no t impossibl e t o imagine . Fo r example, if a member of Congres s sued fo r libel o r slander raises a Speech and Debate Claus e defense , Congres s a s a body , i n additio n t o it s member s a s individuals, will b e intereste d i n th e outcom e o f th e suit . To the extent tha t the representativ e branche s d o hav e a n interes t i n th e outcom e o f privat e litigation, the formal safeguard s are as relevant as they are in public litigation that raise s policy o r structural issues . There are many examples o f Suprem e Court cases raising policy o r structural issues that directly affect th e representative branches. See, e.g., Mistretta v. Unite d States , 48 8 U.S . 361 , 390-9 9 (1989 ) (upholdin g placemen t o f Sentencing Commissio n withi n judicia l branc h afte r separatio n o f power s challenge); Morriso n v . Olson , 48 7 U.S . 654 , 685-9 6 (1988 ) (upholdin g constitutionality o f specia l counse l appointe d unde r Ethic s I n Governmen t Act t o investigat e allege d crime s b y high-leve l executiv e official s afte r sepa ration of power s challenge); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S . 714, 721-34 (1986 ) (invalidating Gramm-Rudman-Holling s Defici t Reductio n Ac t o n separatio n of power s ground s becaus e Ac t veste d executiv e authorit y i n Comptrolle r General wh o wa s subjec t t o congressiona l remova l an d control) ; IN S v . Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,951-59 (1983 ) (invalidating one-House veto provision of Immigratio n An d Nationalit y Ac t o n wha t ar e essentiall y separatio n o f powers ground s fo r authorizin g on e Hous e o f Congres s t o tak e legislativ e actions withou t complyin g wit h an . I , sec. 7 procedure s prescribe d fo r en acting legislation); Powell v. McCormack, 39 5 U.S . 486, 55 0 (1969) (limiting autonomous congressional power to exclude duly elected Members of Hous e of Representative s fo r reason s othe r tha n thos e relatin g t o defect s i n age , citizenship, and residenc e qualification s specifie d i n Constitution); cf. Unite d States v . Nixon , 41 8 U.S . 683 , 70 6 (1973 ) (rejectin g presidentia l clai m o f absolute immunit y fro m judicia l proces s base d upo n separatio n o f power s claim i n whic h Congres s ha d possibl e indirec t interes t relatin g t o potentia l exercise o f congressiona l impeachmen t power) . 29. Impeachmen t i s a n availabl e for m o f retaliatio n b y th e representativ e branches, bu t it s use ma y b e politically to o difficul t t o permi t i t t o serv e as the basi s o f a credible threa t i n typica l cases . See Chapter 6 , not e 85 . 30. See U.S. CONST , art . I , sec. 9 , cl . 3 . 31. Thi s representation-reinforcement , separation-of-power s conceptio n o f th e bill o f attainde r claus e wa s develope d b y Professo r El y a s a la w studen t i n an unattributed la w revie w note . See Note, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of Attainder Clause, 7 2 YAL E LJ- 330 , 343-6 0 (1962 ) (criticizin g inter alia Suprem e Court's limitation o f bill o f attainde r prohibitio n t o pena l legislation) .

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9

32. See G. GUNTHER , CONSTITUTIONA L LA W at 10-11 . 33. See Race Is On for i 5i New judgeships, U.S . NEWS & WORL D REPORT, Oct. 9 , 1978 , a t p. 54 . 34. See U.S. CONST, art . Ill , sec . 2 , cl . 2 . 35. See generally G . STONE ,