Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World [First ed.] 9780521447836

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CAMBRIDGE STUDIES N INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 

QU-:       

Editorial Board T TH (Mana gi ng e ditor)  OOTH

CHTOH O

OT COX

 HTO

 H

 C

 HT

CHTOH H

CH TT

   

International Political conomy O TOO

C  H

Cambridge Studies in International Relations s a o av o Cad vs Pss ad  Bs aoa Suds Assoao (BSA  ss  ud a d a o aa o udadua xooks ad suvs o saasd ooas ad oaoav vous.  a o  ss s o us  s  soas  aoa Suds o uo No Aa ad  s o  od

CAMBRDGE STUDES N NTERNATONAL RELATONS

37

YNIA WEBER Simulating sovereignty

Iereo, he e d ymbolc echge



GARY GERZ Contexts of inteational politics

3

JAMES L RIARDSN Crisis diplomacy

The Gre Power ce he mdeeeh cery 34

BRADLEY S KLEIN Strategic studies and world order

The globl polc of deerrece 33

.V.PAUL Asymmetric conflicts war initiation by weaker powers

3

RISINE SYLVESER Feminist theory and inteational relations in a postmode era

3

PEER.SRAEDER US foreign policy toward Afrca

Icremelm cr d chge 30

GRAAM SPINARDI From Polaris to Trident: The development of US Fleet Ballistic Missile technology

9

DAVID A.WEL Justice and the genesis of war

8

RUSSELL J LENG Interstate crsis behavior, 86980: realism versus reciprocity

7

JN A VASQUEZ The war puzzle

6

SEPEN GILL (ed.) Gramsci, historcal materialism and inteational relations



MIKE BWKER and RBIN BRWN (eds.) From Cold War to collapse: theory and world politics in the 980

4

R B.J WALKER Inside/outside: international relations as political teory

3

EDWARD REISS The Strategic Defense Initiative



KEI KRAUSE Arms and the state pattes of military production and trade

Sere l coe fer de

QUASI-STATES: VGY, L L,  H H WL ROBRT

H

JACKSO

Department of Political cience, Uiversity of ritish Coumbia

.  .  CBRIDGE  

;:

UNIVESI PESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, New York, Melboue, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, So Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo, Mexico City Cambridge University Press he Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York w.cambridge.org

Inrmation on this tie:

w.cambridge.org/978052447836

© Cambridge University Press 990

his publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 990 First paperback edition 993 Reprinted 994, 995, 996 

catalogue recordr this publication is avaibleom the British Library

Library of Conress Catalouin in Publication Data Jackson, Robert H. Quasi-states: sovereign, international relations, and the hird World  Robert H. Jackson p.

cm.  (Cambridge studies in inteational relations: 12)

Includes bibliographical references. ISBN  52353 6 . Sovereignty. 2. Developing countries Foreign relations. 3. International relations. I. T itle. II. Series. JX404.J28 341.26dc20

990 89-77369

CIP

ISBN

978--521-353-6 Hardback

ISBN

978-0-521-44783-6 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibili r the persistence or accuracy of URLs r external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Inrmation regarding prices, travel timetables, and other ctual inrmation given in this work is correct at the time of rst printing but Cambridge University Press does not guarantee the accuracy of such inrmation thereafter.

For Mare

C  

1

Aknowledgemens

Pge x

INTRODUCTON

1 13 13 16 21 26

STATES AND QUAS-STATES

Poou aoa osuoa a Sas ad quassas

g

a so  ad pos so

2

32 32  4 47

A NEW SOVEREGNTY REGME

So saood T od so am A w so am A o aoa amwok

3

5 5 54 55 59 71 74 78

SOVEREGNTY REGMES N HSTORY

So: a o om? T dua asp o  sasssm A aua aw m? T assa pos so m T sad us' o ao T osuo o a so ouo soao o oao?

4

ouoa dooao

82 82 86

Dooao ad dopm

91

NDEPENDENCE BY RGHT

T o aas  Ws

95 98 12

Aad dooao Ppous dooao  aoaa  o vii

CNTENTS

5

S   E R E I G N TY A N D D E  E   P  E N T

The destitute image of the Third World Inteational deveopment assistance Inteationa deveopment law Third Word debt crisis Inteational affirmative action? The dilemma of quasi-states 6

SEREIGN RIGHTS ERSUS HUAN RIGHTS

The uncii image of the Third Word Ciilization and human rights Decoonization, authoritarianism and refugees Sef-determination as sovereign rights The African Charter on Human and Peopes' Rights Inteationa civiity and domestic inciviity 7

Q U A S I  S T A T E S A N D I NT E R N A T I  N A  T H E  R Y

Classica paradigms of inteatonal thought Quasi-states and the theory of survival Quasi-states and the theory of progress Quasistates and inteationa justice CNCUSIN

The future of quasi-states Institutiona fate Noes Index



109 109 112 118 124 131 135 139 139 140 147 151 154 159 164 164 167 173 179 189 189 198 203 219

A CKW D GM

T ss o s ook was  aao  a wok a ma Td Wod sas a o a xpoa d aus ad as o aoa moa ad aoa aw Pm a as o s m ad Aa sas w w o w Ca Ros ad pusd  World Polii 1982 ad  Journal of Modern Afrian Sudie 1986  ow m a osda ­ ua d Jams Maa susd a  soud dop s poop das  a a sud o aoa aos  as oua o  a omms o a poposa o su a ook om wo ads o Camd Us Pss o o wom was Ro Jos w pd o a m k a a a sa ad oom a as sas om pas o aps 2 ad

3  s

dd as paps a  1985 ad 1986 ms o  Bs ­ aoa uds Assoao ad a pusd   Review of ner­ naional Sudie (Oo 1986 ad neaional Oanizaion (Auum

1987  am au o  dos ad aomous ads o  p  mak sos.  aso ws o ak sa ad suds   Dpam o aoa Raos a  Us o K o  aos o a pma da o ap 6 psd  Fua

1988 A d so o ap 7 as dd a  1989 o m o  Ama ad Bs aoa uds Asso aos  Lodo  am au o Ma Doa ad Jak Do  dsussas o   pu sms A ow o  a aum was psd o Jo V's posadua sma o aoa aos a ud Co Oxod  Ap 1989  ak a o oud o  dsusso w oowd   woud spa k o akod  os o Aa Cas Ka Hos ad Aa Jams wo o so o s asd  ow wok ad po omms o a a a   aua  mak sos.  a o ms o am o a os o a o udm w ma T mausp was ompd u 1989 w  d a aak x

A C K N  W E DGEENTS

Walton llam Memoal Fellowshp on sabbatcal eae fom the Un­ est of Btsh Columba. I am most gatefu to the Trustees fo the geneous awad. I woud aso ke to acknowedge the Donne Canadan Foundaton whch poded eseach fundng at an eae stage and Mak Zache, Decto of te UBC nsttute of Inteatona Relatons, who gae ntelectua encouagement at eery stage. Fna sons wee made dung Apl and May 1989 whe  was a Vstng Felow at the Cente of Inteatona Studes, London Scoo of Econ­ omcs and Potca Scence I am gatefu to Mchae Lefe, the Dec­ to, fo s hosptalty dung my stay n London. Stee Smth of the Unesty of East Angla, te managng edto of ts sees, and Mcael Holdsworth of Cambdge Unesty Pess esponded wth good humou and encouagement when on seea occasons the manuscpt faed to are as pomsed. Petua Mue and Nancy Mna contbuted te ceefu expetse n nagatng the manuscpt tough the hghtech wold of com­ putes and lase pntes. My geatest debt s to my wfe Mage and daughte Jenny who oelooked my nattenton to te pactca aspects of ou famy fe, not east the 1988 Canadan ncome tax etuns, we  was peoccuped wth wtng and ewtng successe dafts. I dedcate ths wok to my wfe wth gattude and affecton Vancoue June, 1989

x

I  R  D  C I 

This ook investigates the inteationa noative faewok that uphods soveeign statehood in the Thid Wod.  ca it 'negative soveeignty' and contast it with the ode stuctue of 'positive sove eignty' that eeged in Euope aong with the ode state and was expessed y Weste ipeiais and cooniais The new egie is an expicit epudiation of the od I efe to the soveeign units sup­ poted y this faewok as 'quasistates' to ca attention to the fact that they ack any of the aks and eits of epiica statehood postuated y positive soveeignty I have sought answes to five piay questions: What is the mdu prandi of the negative sove eignty egie? How did it coe into existence histoicay? What ae the consequences of negative soveeignty not ony fo intenationa poitics ut aso fo the doestic conditions of quasistates? What ae the ipications fo intenationa eations theoy? Finay, what ae the pospects fo quasi-states? It ay e hepfu at the outset to caify y appoach. Fist, I a conceed not with a aspects of Thid Wod states o even ost aspects ut ony with one: thei soveeign aspect I eieve, howeve, that negative soveeignty is a cucia and oveooked institution which not ony heps sustain any of these states ut aso ipinges on huan ights and socioeconoic deveopent within the Thid wod states have een studied to date agey in tes of socioogica o poitica econoy appoaches which ephasize unde­ ying cutua o ateia cicustances athe than oveaching oa and ega nos. The oigina iage of 'The Thid Wod' potayed in Pete Wosey's we known ook y that nae was socioogica The asic efeent of the te eve since has een the undedeveoped counties of the nonWesten wod One of these doinant ap­ poaches is odeization theoy: Thid Wod states undestood in tes of tadition' and odeity' and the socioeconoic pocesses such as technoogica innovation, industiaization, uanization ite­ acy education, and so foth  y which counties change fo the 

INTRDCTIN

former condion to the latter. Another prevalent approach i s under­ development theory: Third World states seen as confned to a periph­ eral condition of neocolonial dependency by a Western dominated capitalist world economy which leaves them with very limited freedom to develop on ther own. In inteational relations the latter image, with its emphasis on global class divisions, is sometmes referred to as structuralism' in contrast to the traditional state-centric or pluralist' image of the inteational system2 The structuralist image obviously would be less compelling if there were no underdeveloped states Most of these states are very different sociologically from developed states and partcularly those of the West and seem to require analytical orientations that take account of this Nowhere in these schemes is much attention given to inteational legitimacy and law, however or Marxists this is a second order phenomenon denoted by the term superstructure' while for behav iouralists it is merely formal legality' Structuralists see the primary forces of international relations in terms of underlying material con ditions which transcend international boundaries Behaviouralists usually consider formal rules and institutions of the state as secondary effects of cultural and social norms which are assumed to be funda mental in animating and shaping politcal life. Neither can say whether or not sovereignty is important because it is insignifcant by definition and excluded from analysis by and large. The term Third World may not be entrely apt for dealing with quasistates since it is often used to signi a globe divided vertically in terms of wealth and class rather than horizontally in terms of sovereign populated terrtory It is also valuedloaded and ideological it has usually been a positive term evoking the socioeconomic needs and claims of nonWestern populations but it is becoming a negative term signifying corrupt and abusive elites that rule over them This shift in connotation is a reflection of post-independence authoritarianism in many excolonial states which disappointed orginal expectations of democracy And yet Third World' also usually denotes territorial jurisdictions which were formed under colonial rule and emerged into the light of day by an inteational legal transaction  decolonization  whereby sovereignty was transferred from European states to indigen­ ous governments Today these jurisdictions not only possess equal sovereignty under internatonal law but also laim positive entitle­ ments to exteal aid so that they may eventually become as developed as the states of the First World. We need a mode of analysis that calls our attention to the international normatve and legal order which supports them 2

INTRDUCTIN

Secod ahough sovereig i s esseal a lega codio of saes his is o a egal sud. Howeer I beieve i is ecessar o uie ieraoa aw ad poliics o udersad proper he subec of sovereig saehood The sae afer all is cosiued ad operaes b meas of aw i sigifca par. M emphasis is o he rules of he sovereig regime bu I ake a geeral isiuioa approach Rules icude o ol ieaioal aw proper socaled bu also pri cipes sadards coveios pracices ad he lke. 3 The aalsis of rues is usual associaed wih urisprudece ad his book ca be cosidered a sud i ieraioal urisprudece peraiig o he Third World. However as idicaed i is urisprudece from a poiica sciess raher ha a lawers viewpoi. Lawers as I udersad hem seek kowledge of he rules ha cosiue parcuar legal orders ad heir validi. Academic ieraioal awers  o deer mie he auheici sources ad elemes of ieaioa law  as a glace a a good exbook reveals. 4 The mai poi is o esablish wih as much cerai as possibe wha he law is i paricular do mais i order o give isrucio o he legal sude or praciioer. For example exbooks i public ieraioal law explicae he sad­ ig rules of ieraioa life which are curre a he ime ad make professioa udgemes o heir lega validi as whe Ia Browlie opies ha selfdeermiaio is ow par of he ju cen of he aw of aios5 Poliical scieiss are ieresed i ules o o deermie heir curre legal saus bu o ascerai he exe o which he shape poliical life. Kowedge of ues assiss i explaiig how ad wh poliica acors operae he wa he do. ules of coduc are prescrip ive he are laid dow aced o ivoked appied ad so o. 6 For purposes of his discussio Doroh Emmes geera defiiio of rue ca sufice a direcive ha acs of a cerai kid should or should o be doe o cerai kids of occasio b a perso a cerai kid of perso or aoe . . . To sud huma socie is he o ake accou of coduc which is parl a leas rule direced.7 The subec of his approach is o us regulariies i coduc bu reulate coduc  The ieaioal ssem is a rulebased order a leas i par. Ier aioal socie he commui of saes ad he cosiuio of world poliics are expressios which aemp o capure his ormaive feaure of ieaioal relaios. siuios ad he ules ad oces o which he cosis do o have he oologica saus of aural facs he are made ad maipu­ aed b me. Coveo ad aure are uer differe caegories. 9 The moder sae as Jacob Burckhard oce pu i is a work of ar 0 3

INTRDCTIN

Amost a centuy eaie Edmund Buke wote: Commonweaths ae not physica, but moa essences. They ae aficia combinations and   abitay poductions of the human mind1 Not ony the famiia embodiment of statehood domesticay  constituons, egisatues, couts, eections, paties, bueaucacies, oca govement, and much ese  but aso the expession of soveeignty intenationay  mutua ecognition, dipomacy, inteationa aw, and the ike  ae woks of poitica agents buit up pagmaticaly and passed on histoicay Institutionaists consequenty tend to view the eations of states as a sphee of voition athe than detemination by socia foces o natua aws Inteationa eations is a study of initiatives, communications, esponses, tansactions, exchanges and simia decisions that must nevitaby be not ony instumenta but aso moa because deciding means that it coud have been othewise. Decisionmakes ae theefoe esponsibe fo thei actions. The powe o authoty to make decisions is odinay denied to those who ae not deemed to be capabe of assuming esponsibiity. The wod coud theefoe be othe than it is and ou actions and decisions ae impicated in whateve it happens to be. Thee is no escape fom esponsibiity athough it fas moe heaviy on the shoudes of those with the geatest powe and authoity to shape events among whom statesmen ae usuay in the st ank. My appoach, ike that of Hedey Bu, is accodingy based on human wi and not on stuctuafunctiona anaysis, cass anaysis o any othe methodoogy which discounts choices and thei consequences o sug gests that inteatona eations somehow opeate ove the heads of statesmen. 12 I find it usefu to anayse the states-system by empoying the meta­ pho game which by defnition is a ue-constituted and ue­ govened activity. 13 In a game it is necessay to know at east the basic ues not ony to pay but aso to be a spectato and fgue out what is going on. Othewise confusion esuts  as when Amecans ty to undestand cicket in tems of baseba and Paiament in tems of Congess, o Bitons attempt the evese. This book is about a vesion of the soveeignty game that has been instituted since about

1

pimaiy to incopoate a mutitude of new and often vey weak states into the intenationa community. The ues of this nove game ae significanty diffeent fom those which existed peviousy. And to undestand this game in tems of the od ues can ead to misunde­ standing The expansion of inteationa society thoughout the Thid Wod woud have been impossibe without aso changing the ues of the od soveeignty game which justified oveseas empie and made membeship in the community of states contingent on capabe and to 4

I NTRDUCTI  N

some extent 'civiized government - as defned by the West. I in­ vestigate the rules of this new sovereignty game: what they are, how they originated, how they work, why they exist, what their conse­ quences have been both for international society and for the new states themseves, what they imply conceing inteatona relations theory, and what ther fture might be. My study is simply an attempt, folowing the lead of others, to think the new sovereigny regime through to some concusions14 I ry to make expicit the changing assumptions and beliefs about the right to sovereignty in the Third World and the international reasoning in­ volved in decolonization, selfdeterminaton, human rghts, and de­ veopment In many places this involves reflecting on instiutions, laws, reaties, conferences, decarations, resotions, and so forth which embody this right in international reations. The sudy discloses an image of Third World states as consisting not of sefstanding structures with domestic foundations - ike separate buildings  but of territoria jurisdictions spported from above by internaonal law and material aid - a kind of international safey net. In short, they often appear to be jurdical more than empirica enes hence quasistates. The anaysis also lends support to the institionaist argment that res and laws  incuding internaona law  can have sbstantial independent effects on poitcal life some of which may be contrary to what was orgnaly expected. Instiutiona practices or rles of the game aways involve predilec­ ons which advantage some and disadvantage others There is no such thing as competely impartial rles in favorng certain pays rues tend to invite certain inds of players. It is not only the case that insutions are as good or as bad as those who operate them but also that they tend to encorage certain operators and operaions Insti tutions always invove what E. E Schattschneider refers to as the mobilization of bias 15 If we accept and validate them we also mst accept the biases they contain n the case of the negatie soereignty game this bias, not surprsingly, usually works in favour of sovereigns and against their citizens Perhaps srprisingly it aso sometimes wors in faor of Third World soereigns and against their First and Second World counterparts. Since this book focses on the normatie presppositions nderly­ ing the negative sovereignty game it cold be considered an enqiry into the political theor of inteational relations6 This raises a third point concerning my approach which is one of philosophical idealism as exemplifed particuarly by the wor of  G Collingwood and Michael Oaeshott (The rather different international relaions mean 

 NTR DCTIN

ng of the wod s consdeed beow) Wthout dgessng nto the phosophes pehaps t wl suffice to sa that the emphass accod ngl s on moa and lega deas nvoved n the exstence and eatons of soveegn states. Inteationa equat, selfdetemnation, non dscmnation, anticoonalsm, ntenatonal ad, human ights, among othes ae nstances of deas entanged n the negative sove egnt egme the ae opeative deas, to use A D Lndsas tem, whch ndcate how ntenatonal elations ought to be conducted n the ate tentieth centu7 Insofa as the have been nstitutionazed the ae also facts whch dsclose how those eatons ae conducted The phlosophcal pont of deasm s that deas (o thoughts) and eates (o facts) ae not sepaate categoes but fom a sngle whole1 Thee ma be a phsca ealit but thee s no potica eat ndepen­ dent of human thought and acton Congwood expesses ths n tems of a dstinction between hsto and scence (o natue) the actvt b whch man buids hs own constant changng hstoical wold s a fee activt Thee ae no foces othe than ths actvt whch conto t o modf t o compe t to behave n ths wa o n that, to bud one knd of wod athe than anothe.  He hastens to add that ths does not of couse mean that man s ee to do what he peases fo he s awas constaned b the stuation whch conssts of othe men and thei deas whch ma o ma not be n hamon wth hs own19 In othe wods, complete feedom o complete estrant ae ael f eve encounteed n human conduct. Statesmen ae fee wthn the stuation the nd themseves whch conssts extenal of othe states and ntenall of thei subjects. Ths obvous s a ccumstance of constaned choce, wth the constants vang fom one time o place to the next fom the nea hegemonous poston of the supepowe to the amost confned stuation of the mcostate. Soveegn statehood tself constitutes both constants and oppotuntes. The rundnor of such a poltcal aangement s the basc pohbton aganst foegn nteention whch smul­ taneous mposes a dut of fobeaance and confes a ight of nde­ pendence on al statesmen Snce states ae pofound unequal n powe the ue s obvous a moe constanng fo poweful states and fa moe lbeatng fo weak states It can be and fom tme to time has been voated, of couse, whch s ndcatve of a voltional and not a detemnstic wold. The essentall nomatve chaacte of nonnte­ venton and ndeed al consttutve ues of soveegn statehood s ndcated b a vocabua whch tpcal ncludes such wods as must, should, ought, pemtted, pohbted, enttled, obl gated, and so foth Ths s the pesciptve vocabular of feedom and 6

I NTRDUCTIN

esponsibiity o f which soveeign statehood is a paticuay impotant manifestation Poitica institutions can nevetheess have a ife of thei own seem ingy independent of the human agents who invent o opeate them One can speak inteigiby of constitutiona fate impying that once a cetain aangement of ues is institutionaized cetain cicumstances of choice ae destined to foow Some things ae possibe; othes ae ued out The stuctue of choice may seem inevitabe This most definitey is the case with soveeign statehood which is now so in gained in the pubic ife of humankind and impinted in the minds of peope that it seems ike a natua phenomenon beyond the conto of statesmen o anybody ese When schoochiden ae epeatedy shown a poitica map of the wod which epesents the paticua ocations of named states in diffeent continents and oceans they can easiy end up egading such entities in the same ight as the physica featues such as ives o mountain anges which sometmes deimit thei inteationa boundaies It is nevetheess the case that not ony the map itsef but aso the soveeign uisdictions it epesents ae a totay atificia poitica aangement which coud be ateed o even aboished An histoica atas indicates the actua changes which have taken pace ove the centuies as a esut of was peace teaties, negotiations abitations and othe inteatona eations and if it goes back f enough it eveas a wod which is no onge stuctued in tems of soveeign statehood Fa fom being natua entities, mode soveeign states ae entiey histoica atfacts the odest of which have been in existence in the pesent shape and aignment ony fo the past thee o fou centuies Pio to that time human popuations in Euope whee the mode state was invented and esewhee oganized them seves poiticay aong athe diffeent institutiona ines mosty in 

tems of empie and suzeainty

Ideaism does not mean that the anayst is in any way ideaistic o attempting to ead s vaues into a subect An ideaist in this phio sophica meaning is not the naive opposite of a had headed eaist in the usua inteationa eations ·meaning of the tem Phiosophica ideaism does not pecude eaism in inteationa studies which consists in the idea that powe inteests, pudence, and othe in stumenta consideations shape wod poitics But an intenationa eations eaist who is a phiosophica ideaist is one who eects any noton of states and thei inteactons as ndependent of human wis and desies the inteationa system conceived as a mechanism ike the soa system Things can go wong of couse since human actions and paticuay poitics often have unintended consequences But this

7

INTRDUCTIN

is no h sam as naural laws which opra abov or bnah human consciousnss Hans J Morgnhau s a good xampl of a ralis who concivs of rnaional rlaons in philosophically idalis rms as h insmnal calculaons and miscalculaons of sasmn wha h calls powr polics. 20 h human world is composd significanly of idas and h world of sas is no xcpion  canno maning fully sudy inaional rlaions wihou invsgaing h oprav idals which giv shap o hm whhr innionally or inadvr anly. h ngaiv sovrigny rgim is a basic chang of mind abou how h inrnaional sysm ough o opra and h insi uionalizaion of ha ida. A fourh poin concs h sudy of inaional rlaions spcifi cally. his is no an analysis of h naional inrss or forign policis of nw sas Nor is i an accoun of hir inaional alliancs  wha Robr Morimr aply rms h hird orld coaliion 21 Nihr is i a sudy of hird orld diplomacy alhough h dialogu bwn sas  as Adam ason pus i  dos figur in h nw sovrigny gam insofar as i is an sablishd insiuion of naional sociy Such sudis howvr do no dal gnrally wih h consuion of inaonal sociy or spcically wh sovrigny. Lasly i is no pimarly a wor of inrnaional hisory alhough chaprs and

3  survy h sovrigny rgims of h mod ra and h

mrgnc of ngaiv sovrigny during h pisod of dcolonz aion As indicad his is basically a sudy in inaional poliical hory following h xampl of Marin igh and ohrs who focus in vari ous ways on h soy of sas and conciv of inrnaonal r laions as hrfor involvng no only powr and agncy bu also ruls insiuions norms pracics and h l. I xplor in chapr 7 h prsupposiions of x-colonial sas o s how far hy conform o h prdominan paradigms of inaonal rlaons hoy namly ralism or powr polics and raionalism or inrnaional lgimacy and law Ralism signifis h ida ha sas ar human agncis which inrac no in rspc o inrnaonal law or ohr noms bu solly or a las primarily ou of rgard for hir naonal inrss  rason of sa In classical ralism sas or rahr sasmn ar posulad as insumnal agns wih wills and powrs of hir own and hir rlaons ar undrsood vy considrably if no nirly in rms of powr and h balanc of powr. According o classical raionalism howvr sasmn ar auh oriis who possss noninsrumnal ghs and dus ihr by nau ral law or by inrnaonal cusom and conrac  posiv law  or boh. 8

INTRDCTIN

They create inteational society rather like individuals contract civil society and therefore resemble citizens or any other 'right-andduty bearing unit, as F W. Maitland once put it. 24 They are subjects of inteatonal law. Rationalists generally believe that citizenship in the statessystem is a good thing by and large because it contributes to inteational order and civlization. A rightsbased and lawgoveed system of inteaonal relations is prefrable to one grounded only in national interest and the balance of power because it adds moral and legal restraints to that of prudence. It therefore helps to preserve and protect the populations of states and their civl and sioeconomic goods which are the ultimate values served by inteational society if not the most immediate ones. Although realism and rationalism place thei emphasis on categori­ cally different devices of inteational regulaon they both postulate the state as an inherently liveable and therefore valuable place. A 'realisc raonalist is one who recognizes that such values are the ulmate justification of statehood and must  protected by every means possible including both ams and norms. The postulated inher ent value of statehood has always been challenged by reality, of couse. Polical goods are a standard of appraisal and statesmen have always fallen short of these standards in their actual behaviour. However, the gap between standards and conduct probably has never been any greater than it is today. We live in a world in which the concrete benefits of sovereign statehood for the people involved are highly unequal from one contry or region to the next. Decolonization has added significantly to this ineqality by bringing into existence a large number of sovereign govements which are limited in thei capacity or desie to provide civil and sooeconomic goods for their populations. They are suppoted by inteaonal society like all others, however. The actual outcome in such cases is therefore a reversal of the postulated traditional relaonship noted above whereby inteational relations sees the ultimate purpose of protect g the political goods of sovereign states. This argument is made at some length in the chapters whic follow. This raises a ffth and more difcult point conceg value udge ments. There is no escaping values cause they are embedded in the very fbic of polical life, both domesc and inteaonal. The com munity of states itself embodies certain values which an analysis such as this cannot and should not avoid although it need not subscribe to them and probably should take a sceptical view of them. The cardinal value is of course independence which is the foundation on which the ene scheme rests. Virtually all the principles and practices of a 9

INTRDCTIN

sorign sassysm dri ihr dirly or indirly from his dsidraum Th logi of suh a sysm is h inaional prssion of libralism sorign sas ar h quialn of fr indiiduals On an rogniz his wihou bing a libral howr Insofar as boh h oss and h bnfs of indpndn ar amind my analysis if anyhing migh b onsidrd a riiqu of inaional libralism Howr his is no h hiddn agnda I is simply whr h argumn has ld m Sin indpndn sahood is rald as a md blssing in h following haprs i migh b infrrd ha olonialism or paalism ar h undrlying alu prmiss of h sudy Alhough his is no h as a word of planaon is probably nssary Th argumn is no ha indpndn is bad or ha olonialism is good whih is h rrsal of h usual alu orinaion oday and would mrly b rring o h alu orinaions of ysrday Rahr i is ha indpndn in islf is nihr good nor bad hr ar no agorial goods in inaional rlaions or indd in any ohr sphrs of polial lif hhr a pariular rul or instiuio or prat or poliy is of alu or no always dpnds on irumsans To bli ohrwis is o surrndr o dogma Unforunaly h unrial and widsprad faih n slfdrminaon or qual sorigny oday ofn has his harar Third orld sorignty is a dlia subj o insiga baus i raiss diffiul and indd roubling qusons whih ouh on som of h major aboo subjs of our m inoling ulur pory and ra Th Third orld has rnly mrgd from an ndd prod of s impral dominaion and i may sm unfair or a las prmaur o rais qusions abou h adanags and disadanags of indpndn for h popl inold On suh qusion is whhr all ounrs sand o bnfi mor or lss qually from ind­ pndn and if no whhr ohr insiuions  suh as assoia sahood  would for som b mor bnfiial in hir irumsans? Anohr is how far h suffrings of som iiznris ar h rsposi­ biliy of hir rulrs? A hrd is whhr all sorign gomns ar subj o h sam sandards of huma righs? ha w ha oday and ha had for h pas hr or four dads is h asndany of a dorin ha h urrn arragmn and disribuion of sorign sahood if i is no y good for rybody rywhr will nually pro o b if hos dlopd sas who ar in a posion o mak i possibl a rsponsibly. Th main fous should hrfor b on hir odu hird orld gormns big lss powrful ad pr nd and so ofn finding hmsls in a disadanagd posito 0

 N T R O D  C T O N

vs--vs

developed countries should not be subjected to the same

probing kind of analysis and criicism which academics routnely direct at First or Second World govements. The prohibition usually derives om such doctrnes as cultural relativism socioeconomic determi­ nism, or antiracism However, there is no overruling reason why such issues should not be studied To exempt the conduct of certain govements (or individ uals) from scruny solely on the

a pror

grounds of their different

culture or material conditions or race is to acquiesce in a form of prejudice Such consideraons are important and they may justify or excuse the conduct of cerain governments or other agents And one cannot but agree that greater power always carries with it increased responsbiliies. But recognizing that there may be extenuating circum stances such as poverty which lmit responsibility is entirely different from deciding beforehand that such conditions demand that the sub ject should not be investigated This is to decide on ideological rather than empirical grounds and it amounts to evasion or avoidance of quesons which may be difficult to handle nowadays but are crucially important nevertheless if we wish to understand the nature of the contemporary inteational system In raising this issue explicily my normative focus of conce is the citzenries of many Third World states whose adverse circumstances are well known but often attributed to almost anythin except the actions and omissions of their own govements and the sovereign statessytem which legitimates and supports them Some way of giving these citzenries a voice above and beyond that of their rulers is urgently needed and I hope this monograph can make a small coni bution to that end This is my agenda. This brings me to a final issue which concerns terminology The adjectives 'negative and positive do not signify bad' and good They simply denote rghts of nonintervention (freedom from) and capabilities to act or to deter (freedom to) which are analytical and not evaluative usage consistent with contemporary political theory  To be free from the intervenons of others is not at all the same as being in a posion to deter such interventions or to engage in them. These two types of lberty are categorcally different Not only that: in inter­ naonal relations historically both freedoms tend to be possessed by most states However they have become separated as a result of decolonzation quasi-states possess negative sovereignty by definiton but usually rather limited positive freedom This has created a novel set of inteational relations problems and predicaments as I attempt to indicate in various chapters which follow

11

NTRODCTON

The argment takes the form of connected essays which seek to ncover different facets of the divorce of positive and negative sover eignty in inteational relations Chapters 1 and 2 eplicate the charac ter of qasistates and the

modus oand of the negave

sovereignty

game The two chapters which follow otline the historical back grond of positive and negative sovereignty and the emergence of qasistates as a conseqence of parclar ideas abot selfdetermi nation involved in decolonization Chapters 5 and 6 investigate the conseqences of negative sovereignty for the socioeconomic and civil conditions of certain Third World states Chapter 7 considers the implications of negative sovereignty for the theory of inteaonal relaons The conclsion offers some final thoghts on the ftre of qasistates I hope the argment is written in a style which is sf ficiently plain to enable the reader to agree or disagree or agree in part as the case may  If it provokes controversy I shold consider it a sccess

2

1

S AE S AD Q  A S I - S AE S

O OU

Let us begin with a bref imaginary jouey in our time ma­ chine and interview a man in the street in 19. Suppose he is an Englishman and it is Lower Regent Street, London, in the heart of the Britsh Empire As it happens, he is a career  servant in a senior position at the Colonial Office We introduce ourselves as historians from the late twentieth century and as for an interview Fortunately, he is used to eccentrics and immediately agrees The conversation comes round to the British Empire He enquires how it is doing We say it no longer exsts Obviously taen abac, he ass what happened to it We reply that it was wound down in the fifes and sxties He evidently has some dffculy believing this and ass what became of the numerous colonies in Asia, Africa, and Oceania? We tell him that colonialism came into disrepute durng and after a second world war against Germany and Japan from which the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as rival superpowers Britains colonies and also those of France, Holland, Belgium, Portu­ gal, and all other overseas imperial powers had subsequently become independent states He ass how it was possible to decolonize so soon throughout the world? We reply that it was relatively easy by transferring sovereigny to indigenous politcians He persists in wanting to now how inde­ pendence could be granted to so many different colonial peoples at various stages of development How did they so quicly become conversant with the language, institutions, and techniques of mode selfgovernment? Were they prepared for the transfer of power? Some were, we reply, and some were not t did not mater, however, because they all acquired the right of selfdetermination which is now universally recognized by internatonal law Sovereigny could no longer be withheld on the grounds that indigenous politicians were not yet suficiently experienced in mode statecraft or the colonial 3

STTES ND SSTTES

population w not adquatly ppad and quppd fo ndpn dnt ctnp o, ndd, on any ot tadtonal pcal gound  gt of lfdtnation wa condd aolut and t fo igt of Euopan to ul t wa copltly aan dond  xcpt y t wt Sout Afcan W pont out tat ty ad co a paia tat wt wold opnon totally algnd agant t H cannot lv tat t faflung Bit Ep, contng n t dtt of o foty colon on val contnnt at vaou tag of poltcal and conoc dvlopnt, could av n d antld a apdly and unfoly a w cla H could fo a ovgn Inda  t ad n on t vg of acqung ndpndnc nc t twnt Pap ylon (S Lanka gt  ndpndnt, altoug  tougt t would  vulnal to Indan pal f t w to lo t Bt tat oncvaly o of t Lagu Man dat n t Mddl Eat could  lfgovng, a wa alady t ca wt Iaq. H upctd ty would  jut a untal, owv. And  could  ow conttutionally o advancd cown colon uc a t Gold oat (Gana gt poly  ougt to ffctv lfgovnnt n a owat ot t tan antcpatd  altoug  at doutd t But t ndpndnc of t nuou dpaat Bti dpndnc cattd aco Aa, Afca, and Ocana  tat wa nconcval How w t fodal otacl of poltcal and conoc ack wadn ovco o quckly? W all colon dvlopd to t pont of ng capal of lfgovnnt? W pontd out tat colo n w not ad up fo ndpndnc, at lat not to o coon ntatonal tandad ntad, t lgal qunt tat ty  dvlopd to t pont wa aandond Altoug t pot ndpndnc cod av of cou vad and t av n o akal ucc to, patculaly n Aa, n gnal lvng con dton av n l atfactoy tan wa ognally xpctd at t t of dcolonaton n any fo colon, patculaly to of SuSaaan Afca, lvng condton av gncantly dtoatd nc dcolonaton adt cunt cvl tf, poltcal coupton and conoc anagnt copoundd y vaou xtnal fac to uc a dclnng coodty pc and ing ntt at at vy colony could  gantd ndpndnc at o o l t a t gadl of dotc condton  f tat  wat w a ayng  go agant vytng t olonal Offc lv concn ng t dtinctvn of ndvdual dpndnc and t noou vaaton n dvlopnt twn t t df ajo aupton 4

ROOG

of imperial theor and inteaonal law conceing the necessity of dependency status to ensure good govement in those numerous parts of the world which are not ready for self-government. Why just the other day Margery Perha  'that meddlng Oxford Donna  in one of her ponficating essays in

T Ts called for indirect rule and

the gradual development of local govement as the only reasonable path to progress in Africa Even her well known inteationalism does not extend beyond the League of Naons idea of usteeship which she thnks ought to be the mainspring of British colonial policy . 1 D we really expect him to believe that all this changed? It would be notng less than a revoluon Nevertheless, we insisted it has occurred



The sudden change was possible, we thought because it was essen­ ally normative It was not a case of developng the colonies to the point of satsfing classical posive criteria of sovereign selfgove­ ment Under the strong and increasing pressure of inteational egali tarianism this requirement was abandoned and every colony almost without exception sooner or later was granted independence by the colonial powers They were generally recognized by the inteaonal community and became members of the Unted Natons  the suc­ cessor to the League There were now some 1 members of that body as compared to about  when it was founded in 1945 Most of the increased membership consists of former European colonies There was even a signifcant number of micro-states  mostly small islands, such as Fiji or the Seychelles Even the ny former British riverine territory in West Africa still kown as The Gambia was now indepen dent The Gambia? He evidently has some dificulty imagining such a world What was behind this revolutionary inteational change? This question connues to be debated by histoans There is no definitive answer and we could only offer a few conjectures The war certainly was a major cause parcularly its reducon of the military power of Britain and France But we thought the thesis should not be carried too far. The power of Weste Euroe was still very great Indeed since the war the countries of this region not only formed a major mliry alliance with the United · States against the Soviet Union but also achieved a significant measure of economic community among them­ selves which gave them joint economic weight reater than that o any other world region Three of its members including Britain and France were still among the five leading capitalist powers of the world The new postwar rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Unon which came to  known as the cold war was a significant 5

STTES  N D SSES

bckgrund fcr h ffeced he cpciy f he cni pwers  minin heir empres. The inen enirnmen ws recepie  ncni idegies which were reinfrced by dmesic ide gies prming enfrnchiseen f rci nd ehnic minries in Wese ses. Sef-deerminn perhps he eding ide ined ws instuinized s  primry inein ue in he Chrer f he UN. And i ws in h wrd bdy prcury is Gener As semby h he dcrne ws n ny iced bu s incrpred n rius Decrins nd Resuins which cquired mr nd eg frce The Eurpen cni pwers were unbe  susin widespred beief in he egiimcy f cniism. Rher hn endure perpetu nd grwng inein cticism hey begn  dec nize The mre hey decnized f curse he greer ws he number f new ses which ciferusy ppsed cniism unti

960 ir 980 i ws essentiy

eenuy fr  inens nd purpses i disppered By uy  decnzn ws ineibe By cmpee

Ahugh he cuses f his chnge cntinue  be debed his cnn er he fc h i hs ccurred nd h he wrd dy is mre r ess s we describe i: wihu ny significn frm erses empires We ked bu his rnsfrmin fr  whie. He eenu y red f he jke hweer nd piey brke ff he cnersin wih he excuse h he mus reu  his ffce. Eideny  frmer Gernr f Nigeri  smebdy by he nme f Sir Dnd Cmern  ws giing  briefng h fernn n he cninuing irues f indrec rue s  ehice f piic deepmen in Brish cnies 2  T    A T  O  A   O  S T  T U T  O  A   H A   

The difficuies in his imginry digue derie frm di ergen nd een cnrdicry ides nd expecins cncerning he rens f Brin (nd f Eurpe mre genery)  he nn-Wese prts f he wrd Our cni ffici hs  cnceptin bsed n he inen sysem f his me nd f he previus hf cenury nd mre. The prewr frmewrk f inetin w nd egitimcy drew  shrp distincin beween Eurpens r pepe f Eurpen descen nd nn-Eurpens ny he frmer were unquesinby enied  sereign sehd. The er were ssumed n  be quified  es

prma fac

nd he burden f prf ws n hem  just i in

erms f sndrds defined by Wese ciiztin The pswr frmewrk drws n such distncn nd ssumes he ppsie h  cn pepes re ened  be independen regrdess f heir cuure rce weh gegrphy r ny simir criern Tdy he 6

 NTERNTON C ONSTTTON CHNGE

diffculties o f perception are the reverse: we fnd it hard to imagine a world in which extensive terrtores and populations outside the West are dependencies and subjects of Weste imperial powers. Indeed, it is difficult not only to imagine but also to accept. The difference of nternational outlook between our generation and that of our grand­ parents is fundamental. In the mid-19s vast regions in Asia, Africa, and Oceania were still part of the domestic jursdictons of certain Weste states whch had established formal empes over these areas.3 Consequently, in addition to formally equal relations between sovereign states there were also formally unequal relations between metropoltan powers and ther various colonies, protectorates, and mandated or trust te tores overseas Imperial relatons therefore were exteal but not yet inteational. The Britsh Empire by inteational law was a single state but in politcal and economic fact it was a far flung assotment of colonial dependencies at different stages of development with vayng degrees of local autonomy under a single metropolitan authoty: the Westminster parliament. This arrangement was widely regarded as legitmate and even natural in view of the enormous distances which separated European and nonEuropean peoples  not only geographi­ cal distances but also economic, political, cultural, technological, scien­ c, and even emotonal and psychologcal. In the decades snce 1945 the inteaonal world has been formally levelled into one and only one constitutional category sovereign states. No Weste govement now possesses domestc jurisdicton over extensive populated territores overseas. Virtually every note wothy dependency and most of those which are not even noteworthy have become sovereign states wth membership in the United Nations and the right to engage in inteaonal relations on a basis of equalty with all other states including ther former colonial masters. The con sttuonal levelng that occurred withn Western domestic soceties has also taken place inteatonally and for most of the same reasons which have t do wth the doctrne of equal rghts and equal dignity of all mankind. Alien le is now not only unustfiable but unthinkable  especialy if it involves racial diffeences between rulers and ruled and the ulers are white. Hence he illegitimacy of South Africa. The crucal princple of the contemporay inteational constitution as it apples to formely dependent areas of the world is universal and categorcal selfdetermnaton of the indigenous people. To be a sovereign state today one needs only to have been a formal colony yesterday. All other consideratons are irrelevant. Even the sze of the colony either in population or in territory is not a crteron, as numerous microstates 

STATES A N D Q ASSTATES

indicate. l that i s required i s the evident dese o f the population to be independent. I say 'evident because it  usually attributed to a population rather than expressed by them, as in a referendum The termination of formal inteational hierarchy has not brought an end to inteational differentiation or stracation, however On the contrary, we draw many distincons between independent countries which are reflected by the various adjecves used to describe sovereign states today They are not legal differences, however The globe is usually seen as diided in two fundamentally different ways: first there

 the East-West conflict defined by the nuclear balance of power behind which shelter rival ideologies and ways of life It is at the moment undergoing fundamental reappraisal on both sides owing to political and economc reforms in the Soviet bloc and will become fr less significant if the pares can agree to reduce their arms and increase their reproty in other ways However this division is oly the most recent manifestaon of the balance of power which has always divided powerful states Very possibly some similar divsion will take its place, perhaps based more on economic technological, and scientific rivalry than military Today in addion however there is a NorthSouth gap between states disclosed by profoundly unequal standards of living which cannot be altered undamentally by inteaonal agreements and dip­ lomacy This division is likely to persist indefinitely regadless of inteational desions to the conary because it is rooted in deep seated cultural, material, and even psychological conditons of sover eign states If these domestic conditions are to be changed it will vey likely be only by the efforts of govements supported by citizens and sustaied over long periods New words have been coined to differ enate countries i these terms The excolonies initially became known as the 'new or emergent states of Asia Africa, and Oceana Together with some Latin American countries they now constitute a 'Thid World' of impovershed states in conast to a 'First World of the Weste idustrial democracies. Whereas before the second world war most states were more or less 'developed and the temin ology was not used to differentiate states, the charactezation of contes as 'less developed 'developing' and 'developed is now universal Distincons between more and less 'developed states have been refined and elaborated by a global statistical entepise organed to measure and repot on the comparative performance of counes Inteaonal society has acquired a capaty for data gatheng and nalysis which was almost nonestent before the second world war A 8

 NTRNTI O N   C ONSTTTON C H  NG

case in point i s the World Bank wich pubishes annual

velopment Reports

World

­

that contain aggregate socioeconomic statistics and

analysis on almost all the countries of the world. They are compared in terms of population, GNP per capita, inflation, life expectancy, growth of producon, exteal debt, indusy, agriculture, food, health, nu trition, and various other socioeconomic indicators The result is a rankng of sovereign states according to the followng categores: low­ income, lower middle-income, upper middleincome, highincome oil exporters, industrial market economes, and nonreporting states (some Soviet bloc countries) These reports amount to world league tables which reveal a range of living condiions and capabilities among states that is enormous The reference group n relation to which these categories are defined and al countries evaluated is the 'developed states This suggests songly that the unit of socioeconomic analysis today is the sovereign state and the standard of evaluaton is the comparatively high level of performance achieved by Weste indus trialized counies including Japan Informa disnctions between states are also drawn today in terms of civil conditons There has been in recent decades a remarkable in crease of inteaional awareness, conce and action regarding human rights Since the Universal Declaraton of Human Rights in

19 inteatonal humaniaranism has been promoted by various inteational bodies wih the result that legal insruments and rem edies for protecting human rghts are now available which never existed previously Although they are gravely inadequate in a world of sovereign states, their existence nevertheless reveals explicit standards of domestic state conduct which half a century ago were largely and erroneously taken for granted among Weste states and presumed not yet attainable by most nonWestern peoples n additon, countless inteational humanitaran organizations exist today that never ex­ isted previously, perhaps exemplified best by Amnesty nternaonal Rather ike the World Bank repos but without the same blessing of stesmen and looking at different data of human wellbeing the annual reports of Amnesty Inteaional are a record of the human rights performance of virtuay all of the contemporary states of the world They also disclose a wde divergence in the perfomance of sovereign govements from one exreme where the highest standards of human rghts protection achieved to date are regularly enforced to the opposite pole where they are rounely neglected or volated he unit of analysis is again the sovereign state and the standard of evalu ation is the comparatvely high level of human rights protection ac complished by the Weste democracies Consequently, although 9

STATS A  D Q  A S  - STATS

formal hierarchy beteen states has been abolished informal ranking of a very significant kind has been greatly expanded Without overlooking for a moment significant improvements in the socioeconomic and civil conditions of many nonWeste populaons since decolonization I believe it is plausible to argue that the inter­ naonal change briefly outlined above is primarily juridical Some non-Weste states have developed very substantially and rapidly of course including in particular the Nely Industrializing Countries (NICs) of Asia and the oil producing countries And some atin Ameri can states are becoming economically significant in global terms De­ velopmental breakthroughs are occurring and ill undoubtedly continue to occur The global fulcrum of economic poer has begun to move aay from its historical centres in Weste Europe and North America hich are fang increased competion from these regions The North consequently is no longer an exclusively European or even hite club and in the future it ill undoubtedly become far more multiracial and mulcultural than it is today Our children ill not automacally equate economic technological and scientific advance ith European civilization as our parents did Although it is perhaps less evident civl and political rights are also disceible here they ere not in evidence previously: authoritarianism has been brought to an end on the Mediterranean periphery of Weste Europe and demo ac reforms are being iniated in Easte Europe and the Soviet Union Democracy and human rights have been demanded in China recently and democratic elections ere held in South Korea and Pakis tan Democratic govement has been evident for some time in other Asian countries most notably in India  although political violence has by no means been eliminated Democratization has also made head ay in some Lan American countries even though human rights have been under threat in that region Humanitarian aareness is increas ing around the orld today and similar developments cannot there­ fore be ruled out in other places Yet if the stascs of the World Bank and Amnesty Inteatonal are anything to go by (and they are basically hat e have to go by) a global faultline still runs along approximately the same fronter hich formerly separated sovereign states and colonies The orld is divided beteen a minority of states hose populatons enjoy comparatively high living standards (hich are increasing) and a majority hose inhabitants subsist at far loer levels hich in some cases are little changed om colonial tmes and may even have declined The number of states among the developed and developing minority is expanding but the number of people ithin the underdeveloped majorty here 20

NTERNATONA C O N STTUT O N A  C H A N G E

rthrates are genera far hgher  s aso ncreasng. The gap  s c as we as matera ndeed, authortaran goeents whch threaten or oate human rghts are proa as numerous as underdeeoped countres. In one respect eerthng has changed there are no onger an sgnfcant dependences n the word ut on equa soeregn states In another respect, howeer, there has een far ess change the words popuaton remans dded aong more or ess the same NorthSouth nes as preous. What has asca changed therefore are the nteaona rues of the game conceng the ogaton to e a coon and the rght to e a soeregn state The mora assumptons ehnd these rues hae aso changed n the drecton of nteatona equat and democrac.

STATS A  D QUAS-STATS

The excoona states hae een nteatona enfranchsed and possess the same extea rghts and responstes as a other soeregn states jurdca statehood. At the same tme, howeer, man hae not et een authorzed and empowered domestca and consequent ack the nsttuona features of soeregn states as aso defned  cassca nteatona aw. The dscose mted empca statehood ther popuatons do not enjo man of the adantages tradona assocated wth ndependent statehood. Ther goe ments are often deficent n the potca w, nsttutona authort, and organzed power to protect human rghts or prode sooec­ onomc wefare. The concrete enefts whch hae hstorca jusfied the undenae urdens of soeregn statehood are often mted to far narrow etes and not et extended to the ctzenr at arge whose es ma e scarce mproed  ndependence or een aderse affected  t. These states are prmar jurdca. The are st far from compete, so to speak, and emprca statehood n arge measure s remans to e ut. I therefore refer to them as 'quasstates. Inteatona socet can enfranchse states whch usua requres genera recognon of a goments ndependence. But nter­ natona socet cannot empower states to anthng ke the same extent snce ths for the most part noes ntea reatonshps Stateudng  prmar a domestc process occurrng oer a ong perod of tme that can on e rought aout  the comned ws, efforts, and responstes of goements and popuatons. The communt of states at most can on assst or hnder t. Neertheess, as we w see, one of the definng characterstcs of quasstates s the undertakng of contemporar nternatona socet to promote ther 

STATS A N D ASSTATS

development - or at least to compensate them for their current con­ dion of underdevelopment rather like poor cizens in welfare states. Ths difference tween states and quasistates has been noted by others Colonies were granted 'independence wthout necessarly possessng 'freedom - to borrow a useful dsncton om John Plamenatz  He explains it as follows: The colonies now claiming independence are not societies of the same kind as the thirteen colonies which signed the Declaration of Inde f capacity for freedom is our test, the thirteen pendence in 6 revolted colonies    were fit for selfgovement; or at least not less fit 





than the couny they relled against t is by no means clear that the colonies now clamouring for independence are all fit for selfgove­ ment in the same way

It is clearer today than t was n 19 - when these remarks were published - that numerous emergent states did not, and many stll do not disclose substanal and edible statehood by the emprical cr teria of classcal posive inteatonal law.6 Their lack of freedom has not been a barrer to their independence, however. Quasstates enjoy equal sovereignty, as Hedley Bull and Adam Watson point out, but they lack established institutons capable of consanng and out lasng the indviduals who occupy ther offices 'sll less do they reflect respect for constituons or acceptance of the rule of law 7 hs means that the real nefits of ndependence whch s what freedom amounts to have not yet arrived for most of their cizens Since the concept of 'quasistate s crucial to ths study t s import ant to be as clear as possble about ts meanng to avod msunderstand ing. My argument s not that the emprcal characteristics of quasistates are new On the contrary, some states have always been less substanal and capable than others. Hstory offers many examples of large or strong states and small or weak states and ndeed of ramshackle or derelict states both nsde Europe and outsde ror to German and Italan unficaon in the nneteenth century there was sll a considerable number of what one historan refers to as 'pygmy states n Europe. 8 There were also dlapdated and splnterng empires under selfindulgent dynasties, such as the Habsburgs and Ottomans. And many states outside Europe were easy prey for expanding European mperalsm here s no shortage of examples. he hstory of the mode state s n no small part a hstory of rulrs who are llegmate, govements that are dsorganized or ncompetent, and subects who are indifferent, isolated, alienated, cowed, or n rebellion. Further more, although there s undoubtedly greater substantal nequalty beween soveregn states today than ever before t s not nternatonal 



STTE S   D USISTTES

inequaliy

pr s ha is new.

Inequaliy eween saes is a pesisen

featue of inenaional elaions as Roe Tucke poins ou in an impoan essay on he sujec 9 In he pas howeve small and weak saes had o suvive as es hey could y hei own effos and hose of whaeve allies hey wee ale o enlis in hei suppo Some suvived some succumed Inenaional hisoy is in lage measue he soy of his suggle This is he adiional ealiy of he saes sysem as a powr o alance of powe sysem which coninues o define he dominan heoy of inenaional elaions ealism' Hans J. Mo genhau's heoy of powe poliics' o Main Wigh's deniion of classical inenaional heoy as 'he heoy of suvival' ae well known esponses o his hisoical ealiy 10 Wha has changed is no he empiical condiions of saes u he inenaional ules and insiuions concening hose condiions Bey he feedom o posiive soveeigny of saes expessed y he adiional alance of powe sysem has een inefeed wih and sujeced o new nomaive egulaions weak maginal o insu sanial saes ae now exemped fom he powe cones a leas in pa and eaed as ineaional poecoaes This is cleae in he case of miiay ivaly u new inenaional economic egulaions also diffe eniae etween saes and quasi-saes oday The weakness o ack wadness of counies is no longe a jusificaion fo conques o colonialism No is i a jusicaion fo ineaional suppo of ani govemen eels in deelic Asian o Afican saes  unlike nine eenh-cenuy Euope fo example whee he specacle' of a am shackle' AusoHungaian Empie which denied feedom o is sujec peoples' povided gounds fo foeign inevenion in he eyes of John Sua Mil and ohe lieals Ineaional developmen assisance is usually advocaed someimes coupled wih demands fo human ighs poecion u soveeignty is no inefeed wih o even quesioned Theefoe i is no empiical diffeences and vaiaions among saes ha is novel  alhough hese ae poaly geae oday han eve efoe owing o he gloaliaion of inenaional sociey Rahe i is he way ha inequaliy and undedevelopmen is conceived evalu aed and esponded o y ineaional sociey ha has changed Ramshacke saes oday ae no open inviaions fo unsolicied ex­ enal inevenion They ae no allowed o disappea juidically  even if fo all inens and puposes hey have aleady fallen o een pulled down in fac They canno e depived of soveeignty as a esul of wa conques paiion o colonialism such as fequeny happened in he pas  The juidical ca is now efoe he empiical 

STTES  N D S STTES

horse This is enirely new The resul is a raher differen sovereigny regie wih an insurance policy for arginal saes In shor, quasi­ saes are creaures and heir elies are beneiciaries of noncopeiive inernaional nors I is his which is new and indeed unprecedened in he long hisory of he sovereign saessyse Insead of being a hrea o sovereigny and perhaps even saehood, poliical weakness and econoic underdevelopen are now con­ sidered reasons for eepion fro he ore srenuous classical iner­ naional copeiion beween saes They are also valid grounds for posiive assisance fro inernaional sociey Wha is differen, here fore, is he eisence of an ineaional sociey ha has presided over he birh of nuerous arginal eniies, guaranees heir survival, and seeks a leas o copensae he for underdevelopen if no o develop he ino subsanial independen counries Before he pre­ sen cenury here was no special ineaional regie ha caered for sall or weak saes All sovereign saes oday including soe which are far ore chaoic han he AusroHungarian or Ooan Epires ever were  such as had or Lebanon  enjoy an unqualifed righ o eis and high prospecs for survival despie heir doesic disorganizaion and illegiiacy This caegorical righ derives fro new inernaonal nors such as anicolonialis, ecolonial self deerinaion, and racial sovereigny underwrien by egaliarian and deocraic values which like so uch else have heir origins in Wes­ e social and poliical oveens onsequenly, fr soe saes oday here is an enirely differen consiuional echanis which has largely displaced he iliary or

diploaic securiy arrangeens of he pas Ecolonial selfdeeri naon has led o a new kind of erriorial legiiacy and he freezing of he poliical ap  uch of he Third World The rules of sovereign saehood have changed in he direcion of far greaer ineaional oleraion and accoodaion of arginal governens han has been he case since he eergence of Weserndoinaed universal iner­ naional sociey in he id nineeenh cenury2 Whereas in he pas such eniies were usually doinaed by effecive saes and ofen deoed o an inferior inernaional saus as poliical dependencies and barred fro he club of sovereign saes, oday hey are adied as equal ebers Their adission has brough ino eisence a co­ uniy of saes of unprecedened diversiy of ebership, fro he leading iliary and econoic powers a one eree o a lenghening lis of specks on he ap a he oher, and assored regies of greaer or lesser subsance and credibiliy in beween ever have dispariies beween he ouward fors and he inward subsance of sovereign 4

SES ND S SES

states been any greater than they are tday This has changed the character f the svereignty game fundamentally and irrevcably, as I argue in the next chapter Quasistates and their external supprt structures refect a nvel dctrine f negative svereignty which was fashined expressly fr the independence f the Third Wrld. This regime was instituted beause it was the nly way numerus underdevelped clnies culd rapidly be made independent. If balance f pwer and selfhelp criteria f classical psitive internatinal law had been retained in the determinain f new statehd, fewer cuntries wuld have gained independence and prbably many wuld still be clnies tday. Decl­ nizatin wuld have been pstpned until empirical grunds fr selfgvernment and therefre authentic freedm had been achieved which in many cases wuld have taken a lng time In sme cases it wuld have been delayed ndefinitely Hwever, this prspect was denied nce clnialism became illegitimate in the decade and a half fllwing 945 when the cmmunity f states adpted the principle f selfdeterminatin as an unqualified human right f all clnial peples. It became impssible t insist, as Plamenatz puts it, that sme cuntries ught t be deprived f their independence in rder t be made capable f reem 13 The new dctrine justified the indepen­ dence f every clny which desired it and thereby established a radically different basis f svereign statehd n the exclnial per­ ipheries f the wrld. It was nw pssible t pssess juridical state hd whie as yet disclsing little evidence f empirical statehd. It was als pssible  as it never had been in the past  t make demands n inteatinal sciety fr assistance t becme develped and it was difficult t ignre such demands withut denying the real prblems and dificulties f the new members f an expanded cmmunity f states. Quasistates are therefre disclsed by a new psitive internatinal sciety which fstered the independence f such states and caters fr their survival and develpment If we imagine this superstructure in terms f arrws f assistance and supprt between states r between internatinal rganizans and states, many are pinted twards the Third Wrld and away frm the First Wrld r frm the UN and ther inteatinal agencies invlved in develpment. Materally the arrws represent bilateral and multilateral public aid fws, technical assist­ ance, inteatinal brrwing at cncessinal rates f interest, debt relief, technlgy transfer, fd aid, humanitarian relief, refugee as­ sistance, and much else. In sme imprtant respects these effrts by the sciety f states are attempts t cmpensate fr the differentiating 5

STATS A N D Q  A S I  STATS

 not discriminating effects of inteational economics whose arrows are pointed in the opposite direction towards the developed and de­ veloping capitalist economies  just as domestic welfare states were constructed in part to compensate for the inequality effects of market economies . Normatively the arrows represent emergent standards of international morality and legaliy which underwrite the foregoing ransactions and presuppose nonreciprocity between developed and underdeveloped countries. The latter are presumed not yet able to take equal advantage of traditional economic rules of the statessystem such as free trade or free flowing inteational capital. Some of these new economic principles and practices are summed up in the novel concep tion of 'internaional development law . 14 One can therefore conceive of quasi-states in part as a focus of struggle between traditional forces of competitive inteational economics and new post-colonial inter naional society which is attemptig to shore up marginal states deemed unable to compete successfully. In shor, quasistates are creatures of changes in the rules of membership and modes of operation of international society which were deliberately made to replace the instituons of European over­ seas colonialism The correct level of analysis for understanding these problematical entities consequently is not the state as such but the statessystem and paricularly its new accommodaing norms. Hence the following chapters focus on the ules of the negative sovereignty game rather than the stratagems or tactics of its players However at a more fundamental level quasistates reveal the same egalitarian and democratic values as other twentiethcentuy enfranchisement and liberaion movements conceing disadvantaged class racial and eth nic miorities.

A close parallel in time is the civil rights movement in

the United States which has vitually identical moral imperatives and some comparable instiutional features. 15 Quasi-states are therefore part of a more general process of self-determinaon which has affected domestic as well as inteaional politics in the latter half of the twen tieth cenury    A T  V  S O V      T A  D  O S  T  V  SOVT

Embedded i n the foregoing remarks is a concept of negative and positive sovereignty that shapes the analysis in the chapters which follow It is derived from the cognate ideas of negative and positive liberty made famous by Isaiah Berlin. 16 Liberty is possessed by individ­ uals, of course, whereas sovereignty is a property of states In applying Berlins distincion to inteational relations I make no claim that 6



N E G  T  V E S O V E R E G NTY  N D P O S I T IVE SOV EREI GNTY

individuals are stricty analogous to states: the domestic analogy. On the contrary, the analogue is useful in discosing differences as well as resembances between individuas and states that raise special probems for internaona reatons which do not exist in interpersonal reatons. Negative liberty is defined by Berlin as 'the area withn which a man can act unobstructed by others . 17 It affords individuals 'freedom from interference and therefore presupposes individual self-determination. Under conditions of negative freedom one has immuntes from others and is therefore 'at liberty  There is a sphere of action which is one's own Over himsef, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign. Interference with an individuals negatve liberty ordina­ rily is justed  according to J  Mil  only if he harms or threatens to harm another. His own good, either physica or moral, is not a suf­ cient warrant' . 18 This presupposes that individuals are ratona agents and can be hed accountable for their actions  unless there are valid grounds such s insanity which overrde the pncipe  Mil believed in individua sovereignty not ony for its own sake but for the utlitarian contrbution that unfettered individuals could make to the greater good of al Negative sovereignty can also be defned as freedom from outside interference a formallegal condition19 Nonintervention and sover­ eigny in this meaning are basicaly two sides of the same coin This is the central prnciple of the classical law of naions the sphere of exclusive ega urisdiction of states or inteationa ssez fre Nega­ ive sovereignty as regards quasistates prmarly invoves decooniz aion it is the distinctve berty acqued by former coones as a consequence of the international enfranchisement movement men­ oned above It is a formalega entitlement and therefore something which internatona society is capabe of conferring Negaive sover­ eigny is the egal foundaon upon whch a society of independent and formay equa states fundamentaly rests One can therefore think of ndependence and nonintervention as the distincive and reciprocal rghts and dues of an internaiona socia contract beween states When it is hed it is hed absoutey in the sense that it is not dependent on any conditons other than the compact itsef which does not require positve acion but ony observance and forbearance: the basic postu ate of the cassica ibera rule of aw It is the cenral principe of pubic inteaona law and the main focus of inteaonal ursprudence Negave sovereigny dffers from negatve ibery n mportant respects, however It cannot presuppose the same saisfacons or benets as negave berty owng to fundamental differences between 

STTES  N D SSTTES

states and individuals Individuals ae equipped to enoy immunites simply by being o at least by being adult and not physially o mentally disabled he soveeign individual is intinsially and demonstably valuable Populations onsideed as states may o may not be able to deive benets om national autonomy howeve depending on what thei independent govenment is o is not willing o able to do o them Individuals ae sole agents but states ae lage and omplex oganizations onsisting o many agents both ules and uled whih eates poblems o mutual apability and esponsibility Soveeignty only pesupposes govenments whih ae dmd apable and esponsible  Although this has neve been ompletely auate empiially it was a easonable simpliying assumption histoially when intenational soiety onsisted o Westen states that shaed not only a ommon osmopolitan ultue but moe o less the same levels o development whih enabled them to eipoate without undue diiulty It is moe poblematial nowadays in a global inteational soiety beause states ae moe vaied ultually and unequal eonomially tehnologially and militaily than they have eve been Moeove a soveeign govement unlie a ee individual is Janus­ aed: it simultaneously aes both outwad at othe states and inwad at its population he esponsibility o an individual onsists entely in extenally oiented ations: it is owed to othes But the esponsibility o a soveeign govenment is both extenal to othe soveeigns and intenal to its itizens he ham piniple o an individual aoding to Mill onens only the ham that an be done to othe individuals whih would ininge on thei negative libety But the harm piniple o a state onens not only iningements on the soveeignty o othe states but also on the libety o its itizens An independent individual who espets Mills pniple an only hut himsel but an indepen dent govement who is esponsible to othe soveeigns an stll ham his subets eithe delibeately o though negligene o inompetene A soveeign not only an ommit many moe imes and tots than an individual but thee is no highe authoity to arest him bng him to tial and  i guilty  punish him his is why attempts have been made to establis an inteational law o human rights whih would overule soveeign ights in etain iumstanes hee is onsequently a dilemma in negatve soveeignty ooted in the divisibility o states whih does not exist in negave libety owing to the indivisibility o pesons In shot beause thee an be quasi­ states wheeas thee ae no quasipesons negative soveeignty and natonal seldetemnaton ae not ategoial goods lie negative libety and individual seldeteminaton Instead they ae moe am 8

NEGTIVE S OVEEI GNT  N D P O SITIVE SOVEEIG NT

biguous  i s impossibl  o bliv in sovrign sas in h sam unqualiid way ha Mill blivd in sovrign individuals nr naional libralism is mor onradiory and ambivan han dom si libralism and is analysis is onsqunly mor ompliad  Posiiv libry aording o Brlin 'onsiss in bing ons own masr'   is 'frdom o' : bing aiv and slfdiriv; hoosing pursuing and ralizing goals  poins owards h aquisiion and noymn of apaiis and no mrly immuniis; i prsupposs agnis and ondiions whih ar nabling Posiiv frdom implis ha hr ar som individuals and prhaps many who migh b a libry bu who lak h nssiis  duaion raining skills ools mony and so forh  o ak advanag of i This sor of rasoning is pariularly vidn nowadays in affrmaiv aion programms whih sk o nd subsaniv bnfis o popl who ohrwis would no qualify for hm This is jusiid on h grounds ha ngaiv libry anno by islf nabl hm o b hir own masrs owing o disadvanags no of hir own making suh as lass or ra or s Th auhnially auonomous individual is on who has far grar onrol of his dsiny han mr frdom from h inrfrn of ohrs maks possibl  This is h viw of Mar and indd all who fnd ngaiv libry unsaisfaory as a basis for ralizing h good lif Posiiv sovrigny likwis prsupposs apabiliis whih nabl govrnmns o b hir own masrs: i is a subsaniv rahr han a formal ondiion A posiivly sovrign govrnmn is on whih no only njoys righs of noninrvnion and ohr inrnaional immuni is bu also posssss h whrwihal o provid poliial goods for is izns  is also a govmn ha an ollabora wih ohr govrn mns in dfn allians and similar inrnaional arrangmns and riproa in inaional ommr and inan Posiiv sovr igny is h mans whih nabl sas o ak advanag of hir indpndn usually indiad by abl and rsponsibl rulrs and produiv and allgian iizns Posiiv sovrigny as Shwar znbrgr pus i is no a lgal bu a poliial aribu if by 'poliial' is undrsood h soiologal onomi hnologial psyhologial and similar whrwihal o dlar implmn and nfor publi poliy boh domsially and inrnaionally 20  is h disiniv ovrall faur of a dvlopd' sa Consqunly i is a srongr hararisi of som sas han of ohrs Sin sas ar nvr a rs owing o ulural ransformaion sin ifi ad hnologial innovaion and ulimaly h passag of im posii sovrigny is a rlaiv and hanging rahr han an absolu ondiion unlik ngaiv sovrigny 21 Thr an b no ompl 29

S T  T E S   D   S  - S T  T E S

sefmasery eiher for a sae or for a n individua: i is aays a maer of degree. Even a superpoer is imied in ha i can accompish and i is a ise American or Sovie Presiden ho reaizes his Bu he variaion is far greaer oday han fify years ago oing o decooniz­ aion hich has resued in he independence of saes a a eves of deveopmen and underdeveopmen Consequeny ahough sover­ eigns everyhere oday enoy negaive righs of noninervenion ony some possess he hereiha o ake advanage of heir indepen dence And hereas ineaiona society can provide govemens ih negaive sovereigny hrough he ac of genera rcogniion his is no he case ih posiive sovereigny hich depends primariy on he acions and resources of governmens and heir popuaions Variaions in subsance and capabiiies among saes are fr greaer han among individuas and he gap beeen negaive and posiive sovereigny consequeny is much ider han ha beeen negaive and posiive ibery  is no a quesion of size or even poer here have aays been arge and sma poerfu and eak saes. Denmark is a darf compared o Germany and has suffered hisoricay from German invasion and occupaon Bu he Danish govemen can oherise provide for is popuaion as e as any sae and beer han mos. Sovereigny for Danes is a angibe good  is no a quesion of being a darf or a gian among saes Raher i is a quesion of being a sae in organized domesic reaiy and no merey by ineaiona a as indicaed for exampe by per capia iving sandards of he popu aon Denmark or for ha maer ceand or Ne Zeaand or Singa­ pore are subsantia and credibe reaiies hose sma popuaions enoy iving sandards hich are far in excess of hose in mos arger and more popuous saes of he ord . n shor individuas can do more good ad ess harm ih negaive ibery  hich is perhaps hy cassica iberaism gives inied aenion o posiive freedom  han saes ca effec ih negaive sovereigny  hich ikeise is perhaps hy cssica posiive inernaiona a a branch of iberaism con­ fined e possession of sovereigny o deveoped or civiized coun­ tries oday he response is differen underdeveopmen serves as eae grounds for ineaona assisance ncapaciy and in­ euity have been rned ino posiive inernationa righs This gap beeen negaive and posiive sovereignty is universay perceived by ineaiona reaions oday due o ne sandards and expecaions of he sociey of saes concerning he deveopmen of is embers These in tu are inked o he exisence of highy capabe and reaivey civi saes ocaed mainy ahough no onger excusivey in one quaer of he gobe hich highigh he comparaive inade 

N E G    V E S O V E EGNY  N D P O S    V E S O V E  E  GNY

quay of quasistates The ga was not onsidered signifiant in inter­ national relations befoe the develoent of highly organized and oaratively ivil Euroean states in the nineteenth entury. As will be disussed in hater 3, the old renineteenthentury Grotian law of nations ebraed olitial systes with little regard for differenes of ulture or degrees of organization and disorganization It was id nineteenth entury ositive international law refleting the oara­ tive odernization of Euroean states whih first ereived the ga and resonded by denying sovereignty to ost nonWestern olitial systes.  They were redued to Western deendenies of one kind or another. The old olonial regie withheld indeendene fro under­ develoed ountries until they were onsidered 'fit for selfgove ent. The new ostolonial regie etends indeendene as a atter of right in the eetation or at least hoe of subsequently assisting the to develo their aaities of selfgoveent and thereby enable the to deliver ivil and soioeonoi goods to their oulations Inteational aid is justified on the affirative ation grounds that indeendene is neessary but not suffiient to enable eolonial states to beoe their own asters onsequently, the ositive nors and ativities of onteorary international organization an be understood as an attet (to date not very suessful) to oensate for the shortage of ositive sovereignty of quasistates. What is ost signifiant in all of this is not variations in eirial statehood whih have always eisted but hanges of inteational nors and eetations oneing underdeveloent What was one onsidered a prma fac ground for denying ebershi in inter­ national soiety is now regarded as a lai to additional inteational suort and assistane: sovereignty lus The following hater out­ lines the ontrasting modus oprand of these very different sovereignty regies.

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2

A W   RI G R G I M

S O V       STAT HOOD

ovee  eaoa eaos ses osuoa depedee o oe saes   e ods o Aa aes 'a a osuoa depedee eas s a a sae's osuo s o pa o a ae osuoa aaee'  Te God Coas a Bs oo as o sovee eause  as o eal depede o Gea Ba. deed  as osuoa pa o e Bs Epe Gaa e sovee suesso o e God Coas se 1957 s ea depede o o o Ba u o a oe sovee saes ovee aod o Jaes s a ea asoue ad ua odo'  2 Lea  a a sovee sae s o suodae o aoe sovee u s eessa equa o   eaoa a  aou o ouse o eessa  eaoa a Asoue  a sove­ e s ee pese o ase. We a ou s sovee  s depede aeoa: ee s o eedae odo  e­ aoa a su sauses as 'useesp' ad 'assoae saeood' ave ee oeved ad eve eoed Te do o s se­ sovee oeve Te ae dee ea aeoes aoee ' s ae ee a  ppe e o aa ouse o queso o eave sovee' 3 a  a a sovee sae s a supee auo  s jusdo Ts s e ase ee o o a sae as a u o a edea osuo eause  ee ase  s a soe auo  s exea eaos  oe saes Oe­ se  oud e oe a oe sae ea o  oud ave e aue o uaess  As  appes,  edea saes exea aas s e espos o e aoa ovee  oud o e oe­ se ou v au aou e ous o sovee Te Caada edea ovee's seadas u o aas suessu deeao o de e Pove o Quee eve e appeaae o a  o eae  oe aas s usave ovee saeood as pevous daed s o oe o sevea 2

SVEEN SE HD

kds o  teatoal stats whh hae ested hstoally. oday t s tally the oly kd. hs was ot the ase  the eet ast howee. Beoe the adet o qasstates aos othe oms ested whh wee assoated  oe way o aothe wth Eoea oloal­ sm. Most o them old e od wth the elaoate ostttoal amewok o the Btsh Eme whh lded ettes sh as 'olo­ es' (setted oqeed o eded) 'otetoates' (ldg 'oloal otetoates' 'teatoal otetoates' ad 'oteted states') 'madates' o 'tst tetoes' ad 'odoma' . May Btsh deedees wee ostttoal amalgams. he Gold Coast o eamle was a mltle deedey osstg o a settled oloy (Gold Coast Coloy) a oqeed oloy (Ashat) a otetoate (Nothe etoes) ad a tst tetoy (Btsh ogolad). Athogh eah o these statses deed  stttoal shae they all dslosed the ommo odto o legal sodato to a oeg owe hey wee a deal o soeegty  he God Coast was a deedey ot oly y Btsh law t also y teatoal law. he lagage o soeeg statehood s ategoal ad ot o­ tget. hs s osstet wth legal lagage geeally o say that soeegty s a asolte odto o eamle s the same as sayg that maage o ay othe omal elatosh s asolte: oe ethe s o s ot a maed eso a atzed athol a Bahelo o Ats a Uted States tze ad the lke. Legal lagage s deet om soologal lagage  the same way that maage des om seal elatos atsm om smeso a BA om leag o tzesh om esdee he st ategoy  eey ase okes a stats wheeas the atte s meely deste. he same a e sad o soeeg statehood ostttoal deedee des ategoally om hysal seaato ad oloal stats s ot the same as eo­ om deedey Soeeg states ae legally t ot eessay hysaly sla ad today most o them ae eoomally deedet o tedeedet hese ae deget ategoes ad to ose them s to ommt what Glet Rye aoately tems a 'ategoy ms­ take' . 4 he soal see o teatoal elatos has otately eased the osslty o mg the agage o soology (o olt al eoomy) wth that o sdee (o oltal theoy) theey vtg oetal mddle hs s atlaly the ase as egads soeegty sh tems as 'deedee' 'mealsm' ad 'ol­ oalsm' hae ee dsodged om the legal moogs ad ae today thooghy sed wth sooogal ad ee deologa mea gs. he olem o amgty s y o meas eet howee ad s 

 NW S OVRIGNTY RGIM

inherent, for example, i n the issue o f qualifying for sovereignty on empirical grounds. In classical inteational law government effectiveness was a central ground of sovereign statehood Sovereignty was, as James Crawford puts it, 'merely the location of supreme power withn a particular territorial unit, necessarily came from within and did nQt require the recognition of other States or princes'  5 t was simply there Demon­ strated capacity for self-govement created credibility and respect which warranted recognition: sovereigns preceded sovereignty In the now rather dated words of Hans Kelsen 'A national legal order begins to be valid as soon as it has become, on the whole, effcacious, and ceases to be valid as soon as it loses this efficacy'  6 If this were still true today many Third World states probably would not exist The grounds  sovereigns  and the title  sovereignty  are categori cally different, however States historically were empirical realities before they were legal personalies A govement could acquire sovereignty in virtue of being an inescapable reality in the surrounding internaonal landscape which other sovereigns were obliged to recog nize sooner or later: the positive sovereignty of the Soviet Union and China after their communist revolutions which some Weste states regarded as illegitimate and for a time refused to recognize are twentiethcentury examples; the freedom of Holland and Portugal from Spain before the latter recognized them as sovereign are seven teenth-century examples. Today, however, rulers can acquire inde pendence solely n virtue of being successors of colonial govements: the negative sovereignty of many more or less nominal Third World states The states of subSaharan Africa did not as a rule become free of the European empires and later claim independence On the contrary, they were granted independence by those empires regardless of their empirical conditons and they exist today more by their universal rght of idependence than by ther demonstrable reality T H  O  D S O V      T   A  

Since sovereignt is essentally a legal order defned by rules it can very approprately be understood in terms of a game One can intelligibly employ the metaphor only in the analysis of rule-articu lated polical orders: games are activites constituted and regulated by les It is useful to disnguish two logically different but freuently confused kinds of rules: constitutve (civil) and instrumental (organz aonal) 7 Constuve rules defe the game: number of players, size and shape of playng field, me of play, prohibited actions, and so on Instumental rules, on the other hand, are precepts, maxims, strata 

THE O L D SOVEREGNTY GME

gems, and tactcs which ae deived fm expeence and cntibute t winning pay They ae pudentia  pptunistic cnsideatins put int pactice by payes  teams, such as instuctins given by a cach: f example, t keep a staight bat in cicket  t chke up n the bat in baseball Hweve, neithe belng at al t the ule bks cnsti­ tutins) f these games They ae, f example, categicaly diffeent fm the cnstitutive ue f bth games that if afte being hit the ball is caught befe it stikes the gund the batsman  batte is ut The cassical sveeignty game is f cuse cnstituted by vaius laws, pactices, custms, cnventins, and pescptins which p­ mte inteatna civiity and ae genealy acknwedged by sve eign states F example, taditina pubic intenatna law bengs t the cnsttutive pat f the game in that it is signiicantly cncened with mdeatng and civilizing the elatins f independent gven­ ments Diplmacy als bengs insfa as it aims at ecnciling and hamnising divegent natina inteests thugh intenatinal dia lgue On the the hand, feign plicy is amng the maj in­ stuments used by statesmen in paying the sveeignty game that is, pusuing thei inteests Reasn f state  natina inteest theefe is nt pat f the cnsttutn f inteatina sciety Rathe, it is an attbute f states and intega t the instumental pat f the game Diplmacy as bengs t the instumenta pat insfa as it invves machinatins and intigues aimed at futheing natina inteests Histy gves exampes f bth cnsttutinal and Machiavelian dip macy and this ambiguity is egisteed in the cuent semantics f the tem This stdy cncens mainy the cnsttutve ules f the sve eignty game and is inteested in instumenta facets ny insfa as they discse the chaacte, cnditns, cnsequences,  biases f the game The cnsttutve ules f the sveeignty game ae a espnse t the unavidabe and undeniable eaity f a wd f states puality They ae entaed by cnsttutnal independence lega equaity f states, mutua ecgntn, juisdictin, nnnteventin, making and hnuing f teates, diplmacy cnducted in accdance with ac­ cepted pactices, and in the badest sense a famewk f inte­ natna aw incuding the aw f wa which attempts t cnfine even vient cnfict between states wthin a uebunded paying fed that ptects nncmbatants and the spectats n sht, the ules in­ clude evey cnventin and pactce f iteatinal life whch mde ate and indeed civilize the elatins f states a wd theized f the fst tme by Hug Gtus8 And cnsistent with the ules f the cmpettve games thse f sveeignty f the mst pat estct  5

 N  W S VR IN RM

cofie state behaviour  to demarcated jurisdictios  usually by meas of prohibitios, ie. o-itervetio. Ideed, the classical in teratioal game of sovereigty lie the rule of law or costitutional govermet withi states is basically a game of liberty. It is a cetral istitutio of the political world of liberalism. A crucial difference ad major feature of the sovereigty game, however, is the absece of referees with authority to eforce the rules this is left to the players themselves. Coseuetly, the game is more proe to disorder and breadow. Who ca play the game? Oe must be legally entitled: the players, or teams, are sovereig states ad only sovereig states Obviously, there are always may more spectators tha players ad there is cose uently a high value o sovereigty he title player' or team is governed by rules of recogition which acowledge who ca play. he umber of sovereigs has ever bee large. It is a exclusive game. From about the middle of the nieteenth century until the second world war, as already indicated, oly Europeas or their de scedats held the title apart from a few importat ad isolated excep tios. Sice that time the rules of recognitio have been chaged to allow o-European govermets oto the inteational playig field but ot ecessarily into the same league or divisio. Although the rules are still restrictive today ad there are many peoples who desire idependece but are denied, they are far more accommodating than they were fifty or a hudred years ago. his is a basic constitutional change which has created a rather different game as I explain below he classical sovereignty game exists to order the relaons of states, prevet damaging collisios betwee them, and  when they do occur  regulate the conflicts and restore the peace Playing is doing what a sovereig does i relatio to other sovereigs withi the costitutive rules of the game: pursuing foreign policy goals. his is what attracts the spectators  who are scarcely iterested in the rule boo ad only tae a iterest i rule violations by the visitig team  and invites the experts and consultants who purport to master the prudence ad techniue of foreig policy. his is the highstaes part of the game played down through the ceturies by statesme with greater or lesser sill and success. he legitimate foreign policy interest of a state is logically that of advantage ad gai but certaily ot to the point of destroyig the game which is about idepedece ad the political goods derived from it Ultimately the naonal iterest of sovereign states is protection and preservation of their ow way of life. If they elect also to proselytize it must be withi the rules of the game. his would exclude crusades,



jds

state sposored terrorism, the global

T H E  L D S  V E  E  G  T G   E

commis revolio forcily makig he world safe for democracy ad ay oher acios i coemp of sovereigy Wiig ad losig is a more limied cocep ha playig Some forae or iep or weak saes will lose games of corse ad may as a resl e deprived of idepedece Some losers may eve e roke p  he pariio of Polad i 79. Ohers may e redced o proecoraes or coloies ad effecively arred from he game  as happeed o may radiioal Asia ad Africa rlers i heir e coer wih he Wes his is o iimical o he game iself however which cao isre agais losig Fialiy is a oio as illsied o he sovereigy game as i is o mos poliical games which sally are everedig Alhogh here are maor ad mior eams sroger ad weaker players ad oday firs secod ad hird divisios here ca e o pereial or fial wiers ad losers wiho desroyig he game or ig i io somehig else If ha happeed here wold of corse o loger e a sovereig saessysem foded o plraliy Isead here wold e iversal empire or world goverme ased o oe overridig ahoriy is logical ad hisorical opposie he cosiive rles of he sovereigy game as well as some of he isrmeal calclaios  sch as he alace of power  precisely ackowledge ieraioal plraliy ad eis o preve gloal he gemoy Some saes ad heir alliaces have always domiaed large areas of he ield of play  wha Peer alvocoressi erms sper sovereig or serai saes  9  o sigle sae or alliace has ever commaded he eire ield ad seced all oher saes o is ecls ive ahoriy  alhogh over he ceries several have made he aemp Moreover disregardig he rles i a effor o wi amos o desroyig he game y rasformig i io a figh  i ieraioal relaios fighig is a arrower cocep ha oe migh hik War fare for eample is o ighig as log as i coforms o he laws ad pracices of war as geerally acceped amog saes War is par of he game ad hisorically a very impora par ideed ere we ecoer he game a is mos realisic he mai poi of he cosiive rles hisorically is o o preve or o aish warfare which is realisic  o civilie i as mch as possile here is a differece ewee claimig sovereig aoomy ad claimig world domiaio e wee regardig aoher poliical ey as a adversary o e worsed or defeaed ad regardig i as a eemy o e erly vaqished or eve desroyed 0 his remark capres he characer of warfare co dced wihi he rles of he sovereigy game 3

   W S O V R   G  TY R  G  M 

 he claical game which ill ei i he more deeloped par of he world, player a idicaed are logically ad i may cae hiori cally prior o he game. They are ruler of ubaial poliical yem who are edowed wih domeic auhoriy ad power ad are here­ fore credible ieraioally empirical aehood  They are aural rial i irue of heir proimiy ad coflicig iere. er aioal relaio i parly a zero-um game: hi i paricularly eide hiorically i coflic oer erriory.  i alo parly a collaboraie egageme  for eample, amog allie defedig commo iere A idicaed, ae ary coiderably i ize ad power, which ofe oblige ruler of mall ae o ee alliace wih large.  he claical game, howeer, ariaio i capabiliy p capta are far le ad reder mall power aluable allie. Small ae obiouly ca alo be a ciil a large Size aloe cao deermie qualiy amog ae ay more ha amog me a merich Vael obered i hi famou remar ha a dwarf i ill a ma A oereig ae, a oed preiouly, coi radiioally of a bordered erriory occupied by a eled populaio uder effecie ad a lea o ome ee ciil  ha i ciilized  goeme. Succeful ae proide heir populaio wih heler agai eeral ad ieral hrea eablig o oly a orderly ad afe bu alo poe ially a properou ad culiaed way of life o be carried o Soer eig ae are radiioally poulaed, herefore, a iherely aluable ad capable eiie which proide codiio for he good lfe Thi i heir  uificao i claical poliical heory Lie he rule of he road or ay oher law of libery which preuppoe he alue of age, ieaioal rule ei o pree colliio ad herefore iury or damage o poulaed iriically aluable ae The ihere alue of ae i alo dicloed by heir miliary a pec. Amog he defiig properie of ae hiorically are arm hey are orgaized, equipped, ad prepared for war ee if hey oly wh o aoid i Thi ca be a ig ha hey are liable raher ha deolae place. Soereig are i he ae ad pore of gladiaor, Hobbe wroe, o beaue hey are war mogerer bu becaue hey defed he idury, ar, ciece, ad oher good of heir ubec.  1 Wherea mo of he beefi of uropea ae origially were re riced raher arrowly o ruler ad leadig ubec upo whom hey depeded  he dyaic ae  laer i he coure of poliical ad ecoomic deelopme hey were eeded o he ciizery a large  he aioae. Howeer, ee he earlie recogizable oereig were uified by proidig order wihou hem, accordig o Bodi, oe hould hae eiher iercoure, commerce, or alliace  12 

T H E O  D S O V E R E I G N T G A M E

Stats k tuts woud not hav had shs if thy w not ha­ ita If pop had shs thy woud not hav invntd stats. In th cassica thoy of sovign stathood as notd in th in­ toducton th a consqunty two pdominant paadigms a ism and atonaism.  Th fist postuats stats as pow oganiz­ ations with conficting nationa intsts and without th moaiy of individuas rason dtat Rducd to ssntias th stat is a wa machin wh xists to poduc nationa scuity. This is th famiia discous of Machiavi and oth cassica aists. In Micha Oa­ shott s tms it is th stat concivd as an ntps association o unvrstas: an oganization with an oviding nationa intst in scuity and suviva.  Th scond paadigm postuats stats as su­ jcts of intnaona aw sovign govnmnts a intationa ga psons This is th idiom of Gotus Vatt and oth cassica ationaists. It is intatona ations concivd as a socity  soctas  consisting of indpndnt govmnts und common us which appy quay and mpatay to a.  Th stat is a ga pson o ctzn of intatona socty and th us a ntationa aw in th oadst sns th intnationa quivant of th us of th oad Sovignty is th ight to sai th mtaphoica ship of stat on th opn ocans guatd y intnationa aw without ing tod wh to had ut ony how to pocd. This is th tadiona imag of th stat in th od sovignty gam. Th oigna pays w govmnts which had succssfuy asstd sovignty in th past had nv sundd it o suc cumd to anoth stat and consqunty had a stong histoca ght to pay th gam. Whn th Unitd Stats achivd fdom fom th Btsh Empi though its wa of indpndnc o whn Japan avoidd Wstn impaism mpica stathood and th divativ positv tit to sovignty was dmonstatd. Whn hov vi tuay th n Afcan coninnt was patiiond and coonizd y Euopan stats in th at nintnth cntuy this is pcisy what nav us w una to dmonstat. Consqunty Afca cam a fd of pay of Euopan ath than indignous stats and to spak of Euopan Afica as many thn did was ntiy consistnt wth intatona aiy Afican us w ducd y cssion and conqust to dpndncis that w dnid a ights to paticipat in th gam Ony Ethiopia and Liia managd to avoid coonzaton and achiv fing pay status Thy w founns of a nw intatona phnomnon quasistats. In shot intnatona aw hithto acnowdgd two stauss sovign stats and vaious foma dpndncis. Athough th 39

 N E W S O V E E I G N T Y  E G  M E

League o f Nations began to hange the ules of the game, soveeignty and empirial statehood wee still oughly aligned in most ases The seond status was eliminated following the seond wold wa by outlawing olonialism and inventing new ules of soveeign statehood fo exolonies based on a novel dotine of selfdetemination Many olonial entities wee theeby tansfomed legally into states In e­ ality, of ouse, they saely hanged at all Indeed, some egessed by too apidly eplaing uopean offiials with less expeiened in­ digenous pesonnel Inteational soiety now ontained one and only one offical lass whih masked enomous diffeenes and vaiations in the substane and edibility of statehood aound the wold This hange undestandably had an impat on how the soveeignty game is played The analogy with ompetitive spots beomes misleading at this point beause the new thid division states ae not simply less skilled and suessful at playing the same soveeignty game, they ae in fat playing a somewhat diffeent game than fist and seond div­ ision states with novel ules adapted to thei speial iumstanes  The new ules povide them with onstitutional advantages  like handiaps given to poo golfes A   W S O V       T  A M 

Thid Wold soveeigns expet and enjoy the same ights a s all othes They ae jealous about thei independene and onsequently the game fo them is no less a game of libety than it is fo othes Howeve, they gound thei laim to independene in a novel dotine that invokes the right of selfdetemination of teitoies whih pevi ously wee olonial j uisditions They also demand speial onside­ ations and ights defined by thei advese iumstanes whih established states do not laim This eates an unpeedented form of intenational noneipoity as I explain below The new soveeignty game involves basially two normative innovations: selfdetemi­ nation of exolonies, and development entitlements of impoveished ountries These norms einfoe the soveeignty of othewise weak and vulneable hid Wold govements and theefoe amount to a kind of soveeignty plus In addition, howeve, the ontempoay soiety of states has been atiulating a nom of human ights whih limits the autonomy of all soveeigns inluding those in the Thid Wold It is onsequently esisted by many whose domesti ondut is open to question by human rights oganizations The unintended effet of this nom is to diffeentiate between states in tems of humani taianism, with many Thid Wold govenments lassified as inad­ equate otetos of human ights 

 N E W S  V E RE I G N T Y G  M E

Caegorical selfdeerminaion o f former colonies is he fundamenal innovaion which esablished he negaive sovereigny regime i is he moral imperaive in decolonizaion which underwries he indepen dence and erriorial inegriy of mos hird World saes  also serves as a bulwark agains demands for selfdeerminaion by domesic ehnonaional groups. Excolonial selfdeerminaion herefore esab lished no only he caegorical righ o independence of colonial popu laons bu he inviolabiliy of he exising excolonial erriories also.  consecraes he excolonial boundaries and ironically is he riumph of he European definiion of he nonEuropean world  as indiaed by he curren map of Asia Aica and Oceania which is scarcely alered from colonial imes and bears only limied resemblance o he pre exising polical siuaon he sovereigns have changed and he Euro peans have lef bu he erriorial jurisdicions hey creaed are exacly as before in mos cases 'Selfdeerminaion of peoples' is acknowledged by he UN Charer (Aricle 1) and has been reieraed by many subsequen reaies declar aions, and resoluions of he ineaional communiy Who oday is eniled o selfdeeninaion? Who qualify as 'peoples'?  is no longer a posiive righ of tiol selfdeerminaion - very few new saes are 'naions' eiher by long hisory or common ehniy or successful consiuional inegraion nsead i is he negaive righ of exEuro pean colonies - which usually conain differen peoples bu are no peoples hemselves - o consiuional independence under an in­ digenous govemen regardless of condiions or circumsances his new absrac righ is less demanding han he old concree requiremen and ha is of course he poin: o enfranchise colonies and banish colonialism from ineaional relaons  is an anicolonial liberaing principle Numerous peoples which were no colonies could no claim his new righ of selfdeerminaion and have accordingly been barred from enering he inernaional communiy Many which sill aspire o inde pendence are consequenly frusraed by he rules of he new sover eigny game which no only exclude hem bu give no sign of allowing hem o play in he fuure. he accidens of imperial hisory consign hem o he role of unwilling specaors even where hey may acually be in effecive conrol of erriory - as in he case of Erirea Baluchis Biafrans Erireans igreans Ewes Gandans Karens Kachins Kurds Moros ahans Sikhs amils and many oher ehnonaional iies are he abandoned peoples of he conemporary communiy of saes he moral language of he game refers o hem disparagingly as 'separaiss 'secessioniss' or 'irredeniss' which srongly suggess 

 N E W S OVEREIGNTY REGIME

that they are illegitimate and not likely to be admitted to the clubhouse  the foreseeable future. Self-determination has become a conserva­ ve right of quasistates The new statesmen are understandably united and determined to bar ethnonationaiies from the club because if they were admitted it would involve loss of jurisdiction over the territories in question ad remaking of inteational froniers which, in u, would threaten inteational order In such a zerosum game many existing sovereigns would be losers because the territory in dispute is already uder their jurisdiction Palestinians are among the very fe disossessed nationalities that have achieved an anomalous quasisovereigny i the current inteaional regime mainly because the state hich presently controls their homeland is itself of uncertain legiimacy inter­ naonally Israelis of necessity play the old posiive sovereignty game in deiance of the ne rules The polics of the Middle East leave them little choice There is a more fundametal reason hy colonial jurisdicions have been perpetuated ad idigenous ethnoaionalities i the vast ma jority of cases barred from international society If they were admitted, most existng Third World states would crumble into far smaller ar ticularisms These enities might be more coherent domesically than existing quasistates and there probably oud be fewer civil conficts However, they would fragment exising international society into a far greater number of jurisdicons than exist now Instead of fifty states, Africa would cotain more than ten or twenty times as many  deend ing on how 'peoples were defined 16 This would be an umnageable number and would expose the continent to far greater risks of external control than it faces at reset. Selfdetermination consequently has become an internaional categorical imperative which discloses the weakness of the ostcolonial states whose governments claim it and whose territories are defined and preserved by it The major difference betee the new rules and the old, therefore, is that they apply to many political entities which have not met raditional tests of empirical statehood and probably ould not exist as sovereig states otherwise In the late weneth ceury numerous artificial excolonial enies are ostulated, created and rotected by this international orm What started out as a claim of the eople against the state and in the case of colonis as a justificaion for selfgovernment, has ended u as a sovereign right In recent decades the world community has also been instituting unprecedented ositive eilements of sovereign states Today one can speak of a development assistance regime based on a distinction 

A N  W S O V R  G N T  G A M 

between 'developed and underdeveloped states with dramacally unequal capacities and needs. This regime has been targeted primarily and extensively at the Third World since the 19s It is evident in numerous multilateral and bilateral public aid programmes as well as proliferating activities of private inteational aid organizations And it presupposes a new type of sovereign state which is independent in law but insubstantial in reality and materially dependent on other states for its welfare Today underdevelopment is not only a  however, but also the ground for a claim to positive assistance from the inteational community in general and from wealthy states in parcular. These claims are conceived by certain moral theorists as subsistence rights in parallel with traditional security rights of states and equally as signii­ cant7 There is an emerging academic literatre on inteational dis tributive justice which seeks answers to the question, among others, whether affluent states have obligations to share their wealth with poor countries  Even if underdeveloped states cannot yet be said to possess un­ equivocal subsistence rights their socioeconomic demands and expec taons tell us something crucially important not only about the difficult material circumstances and basic socioeconoic needs of their popu­ laons but also about the character and

modus opand

of the new

inteational regie which is tying to shore them up. International development is an extension of self-detemination from the negatve or political to the positive or socioeconomic realm: not only the freedom from noninterention but also the entitlement to material assistance: sovereignty plus In practice this usually translates into inteational fnancial and technical assistance for underdeveloped countries in cluding debt relief and exemptions from the more exacting require ments of fnancial and trading rules in recognition of their special needs and circumstances. The old sovereignty game made no positive socioeconomic pro­ vision for sovereign states which were assumed to be selfreliant, more or less equally developed, and therefore authentically free agents The main point was to avoid discriination either for or against sovereign states which were considered capable of fending for themselves and entled only to benefit from rules which were equal for all Nondis crimination signifed equal trading rights and reciprocity: the socalled level playing feld as established, for instance, by the Most Favoured Nation principle of classical inteational law States possessed sover eignty by their merits or deserts and inteational usce was necess­ arily commutave. Such reestanding and freetrading entities did not require posive discriminaon or sovereignty plus. However, the 

A N E W S O V E R E  G NTY R E G  M E

existence of unerevelope sttes obviously confouns this logic:  plying fiel tht is level for tems of more or less equl tlents n cpcites is not level if they re profounly unequl which is the cse toy in reltions between evelope n unerevelope countries Historiclly this inequlity ws reconcile by coloniztion of the unerevelope In other wors inequlity ws legitimte n legl­ ze Contemporry norms of intetionl emocrcy forbi this n so it is respone to by intetionl efforts to estblish specil positive rules, orgnztions n possibly rights  n interntionl evelop ment regime  for those in nee At the sme me, however, clssicl negtive rights of noninter venton re stll retine by ll sttes, evelope n unerevelope lke. The evelopment clims vnce by mny Thir Worl governments n their voctes o not presuppose ny curtilment of their tritionl security rights The new ethics of interntionl evelopment re obviously ifficult to reconcile with historicl liberties of sovereign sttehoo If evelope sttes hve obligtions to come to the ssistnce of unerevelope sttes  s is often clime  they certinly hve no corresponing rghts to ensure tht their ssistnce is properly n efficiently use by govements of the ltter Develope sttes hve no such rights becuse it woul violte the sovereignty of unerevelope sttes n coul mount to foreign inteention There is  funmentl incomptibility, therefore, between clssicl lberl ruls of reciprocity n commuttve justice n contemporry octrines of nonreciprocity n istributive justice The problem is tht unerevelope sttes clm both security rights n evelop ment rghts n the ntetonl community esres to cknowlege both clms but the clssicl rules of  sovereign sttes-system get in the wy This is n symmetricl reltonship unknown in tritionl intetionl reltions the berers of rghts n the holers of obli­ gtons re ifferentite in  wy tht contricts the historicl reci­ procity n equlity of sttes southe govements hve only rghts n northern only ues The former hve no obligtons to use foreign i properly or proucvely The ltter hve no right to emn it. Some of the problems which rise from this contrictory intetonl morlity re iscusse in chpter 5 The new sovereignty gme is lso complicte by the emergence of  cosmopolitn regime whch seeks to estblsh the legl sttus of humns in intetonl relons ginst tht of the sovereign Levi thn. This norm is not prt of the sovereignty gme but is  rection to it humn rghts re ntene to curb sovereign rghts. One of the most noteworthy innovons in ntetonl lw urng the postwr er



 NEW SVEREIGNT GME

ha been he codfcaon of human rgh n he Unveral Declaraon of Human Rgh and varou oher nernaonal covenan, conven on, and declaraon regardng racal dcrmnaon, relgou n oleraon, orure, and o forh  n addon, here ha been a prolferaon of nernaonal humanaran organzaon,

baed

manly n he e bu operang worldwde, a exemplfed by Am ney nernaonal, he neaonal Commee of he Red Cro, he nernaonal Common of Jur, he Mnory Rgh Group, he neaonal League of Human Rgh, and numerou oher. Th  a gncan developmen whch ell u omehng abou he cvl or raher uncvl conduc of overegn ae and our aude o  oday. Recen nernaonal humanaran law, necearly reflecng he global dvon beween he ndvdual e and collecv Ea, and he developed Norh and underdeveloped Souh, embrace no only cvl and polcal bu alo ocal and economc rgh The e ha horcally placed empha on cvl and polcal lbere whch have her orgn n radonal docrne of naural rgh and naural law ha reach back o European anquy. The Sove Unon and  alle have promoed a conrary docrne of ocoeconomc rgh a a way of aerng he legmacy of her conrang ocal yem and avodng crcm of her dmal record of cvl rgh proecon alhough h  changng n he Gorbachev era and he Sove Unon and ome oher Ea European counre are now explcly recognzng and ncreangly proecng cvl and polcal rgh. Many Thrd orld governmen ao end o aer ocoeconomc rgh a human rgh whch add moral force o her developmen clam and d rac aenon from her queonable conduc a regard cvl and polcal lbere Socoeconomc rgh alo enhance her power whle uch lbere rerc . However,   mleadng o equae he wo caegore and he fac ha curren neaonal law doe equae hem ell u more abou nernaonal polc han abou human rgh. Only cvl and polcal lbere are human rgh properly ocalled and radtonally ac knowledged by neaonal law: ha , unveral moral enlemen  naural rgh  uch a he rgh o lfe, freedom of movemen,

bus cous freedom from orure and o forh Everyone everywhere can ake a lfe or have  aken from hm, conne or be conned, caue or uffer phycal ormen, and generally ake or refran from acon whch nerfere wh oher . Even n he mo underdeveloped coun re anybody who  capable of acon can forbear from hreaenng, confnng, orurng, or abung people n oher way . Human rgh n nernatonal relaon are mmune prmarly agan overegn 5

 N E W S O V E R E I G NTY R E G I M E

govements. Every govement can guarantee such rights at least in pnciple because it requires only responsible and resolute

conduct.

Failure to protect human rights accordingly is misconduct and in­ defensible everywhere. Social and economic rights require something in addiion to human conduct. This is the case with subsistence, employment, education, health care, pensions, and all other claims for material benefits. Stanley Benn suggests that such 'welfare-promoting rights are more aptly termed needs  9 For example, it makes no sense to talk of health care rights in underdeveloped countries which are severely short of doctors, nurses, hospitals, and oter medical resources, technologies, and fcilites . This is not merely owing to underdevelopment, however, because it also makes no sense to talk of such things as rghts in developed countries as is evident in the moral predicament involved in giving access to scarce arficial kidney machines. There is always a limit to material goods even in a rich society whereas there is no limit to human decency in any society. I therefore consider as human rights only those natural rights which are universal and have been traditionally regarded as such. Social and economic claims to development or subsistance if they are rights at al can only be positive rights of sovereign states. As indicated, I classi them as components of the inteational development regime outlined previously. Human ights in current inteational law are subject to the consent of sovereigns, however. The cosmopolitan society of humankind is legally  not to menon politicaly  inferior to the inteational society of sovereign states. Independent govements are free to decide whether or not to be signatories to human rights instruments They may el under a moral obigaton to sign They may come under political pressure to sign. They may believe it is in their interests to sign They are under no lega obligaon to do so, however Although there is a growing moral imperative in inteational society to protect human ghts which derives from the domesc standards and inter naonal influence of Weste democracies, sovereign rights stll have priority over human rights in international law. Since most Third World states are not only underdeveloped but also authoritarian and therefore unconsained domestically, they are inclined to deny human rights. Serious and frequent human rights violatons are not likely to occur in successul demracies in normal circumstances such as mes of peace when governments are subject to popular control. Indeed, other things being equal such states are ikely to be not ony signa­ tories to inteaonal human rghts law but also leading advocates of 

A N  W S O V  R  I G N T G A M 

global humanitarianism. In authoritarian states, however, where con­ stitutional and legal restraints on the exercise of power are far less effective and may even be nonexistent, inteaonal human rights law obviously is more intrusive and has a higher cost in terms of domestic govement freedom of action The probability of subscripon and compliance is accordingly lower In many Third World countries, as Amnesty Inteaonal reports annually indicate, human rghts are routinely violated by govements21 The focus of inteational hu­ manitarian conce on such states reflects their comparative lack of domestic human rights protections But the resistance of their rulers to inteaonal humanitarianism, their assertion of the priority of sover­ eign rghts over human rights, and their affirmation of social and economic rights undoubtedly indicates not only their jealousy regard­ ing sovereignty but their nsecurity and vulnerability also Currently, moreover, there is no effective general right of 'humanirian inter­ venon in inteaonal law to override sovereign rights22 Nor could there be without fatally underming the sovereignty game which must embody the contrary right of noninteenon to exist In principle, as indicated, Third World states are as accountable to human rights norms as any other govements insofar as they consist of adult and sane human beings In pracce, however, many are recently independent by historical standards and have as yet limted experience of self-rule Ther govements regularly fnd themselves in more difficult circumstances than their First World counterparts Their authority may be disregarded, defied, or even unknown in some quarters They are underdeveloped and frequently disjointed which means they cannot always protect human rights even if they desire it They may not be able to control their own agents who might operate with considerable independence as local freelancing despots These characteristcs are suggestive not only of states but also of sociees in which political civility is not yet completely institutionalized Human rights violations would be less surprising in such circumstances Inter­ national humanitarian efforts have not compensated for the civil weak nesses of certain independent countries and they are unlikely to do so in the foreseeable future However, they are an indication of one of the most signiicant dilemmas of the new sovereignty game between sov­ ereign rights and human rights which is discussed in chapter 6

A  O V    TATO  A  FAWOK

The argument spelled out in the remainder o f the book can now be summarized Third World independence has resulted in the 7

 N E W S O V E R E  G N TY R E G  M E

ormation or the first time o two simultaneous games o sovereignty within a universal international society the continuing demanding hardball (or astpitch) game based on positive sovereignty, and a new, soter, third division game derived rom negative sovereignty . The irst and prior game includes not only the amiliar Eastest military contest which is the successor to the traditional balance o power system but also a competition or global leadership in science, technology, and economics. The new game is the NorthSouth dia logue which is the successor o este colonialism It is in many respects a collaborative regime ashioned to replace the imperial orders which governed non-estern areas in the past. Numerous quasi states which might not exist otherwise have ound a protected niche within this sphere. hat is undamentaly changed, thereore, is not the geographical distribution o power in the world. Rather, it is the moral and legal ramewor o the states-system and the way that underdeveloped parts o the world are supported exteally Contem porary internaonal society can be distinguished rom its ancestors by a strong democratic desire to incorporate all ex-colonies as sover eign states regardless o their level or prospects o empirical state hood . Moreover, there are many states today which claim material support rom other states in addition to the usual rights o independence. An attempt is being made or the first tme in mode history to estabish responsibilities or the welare o people which extend beyond national borders and to promote it by cooperation between rich and poor states Even i inteational development support or the latter has been woeully inadequate to the need so ar these claims cannot be ques tioned on moral and increasingly even legal grounds and such states are not expected to end entirely or themselves. Contemporary inter national society is thereore expected to be not only a civil association or all states but in addition a joint enterprise association to assist its poorer members This remarable although as yet ar rom successul enterprise

arguably would

be

unnecessay

i there were

no

quasi-states Finally and in response to the requently adverse civil conditions o many countries around the world the community o states is also attempting to establish international standards_o human rights which sovereign govements are urged to observe. These eorts run up against the strong emphasis on sovereign rights, however, and are oten resisted by nondemocratic governments in the entirely rational belie that they will undermine their power and authorty Seldeter mination has liberated indigenous governments in Third orld states 8

  O V E L  TERTIO FRMEWORK

u as a e same ime sujeced many populaions o unsale and illieal egimes wic ofen use ei soeeign igs o deny o a leas neglec uman igs is ionic oucome was no supposed o appen

9

3

S OVERE I G NTY REGIMES I N H I S T O RY

S    R       : F A  T R   R  

There is an old controversy in inteationa reations as to whether sovereignty is ininsic to states  a fact  or a status acknowl edged by other statesmen. Does the world today consist of about 170 disnct and separate organized political realities called states? Is sovereignty constituted by that reality? Or is the globe a framework of jursdictions defined according to common principles of international law? Is sovereignty a rule or rather a set of rules of an inteational society and therefore extrinsic to states? In short, are sovereign states selfstanding realies and rugged individuaists or are they constitu ents of an inteationa community and responsible citzens or, again, are they somehow both at the same time The polical enties we have come to know as states appeared frst in Weste Europe  The origina foundaons were the regions geo graphical and demographic configuration as popuation isands in an ocean of forest and heath  States were the scaffolding erected on these isands by ambitious rulers facing strenuous inteational compe tition The statessystem is at the root of the European mirace in which that continent and particuarly its northweste extremity his torically outdistanced the rest of the word not ony in science and technoogy but also in political economy and statecraft The states system was an insurance against economic and technological stag naon . . . A large part of the systems dynamic was an arms race   Of course, European states were rarely the efficient machines ruers wanted or the equitable institutions philosophers desired On the contrary, they were frequently ramshacke and arbitrary But they were aso increasingly less disorganized and ilusory than political systems elsewhere The proof was the eventua hegemony of Europe over the rest of the world  Sovereign states first came into view when medieval Christendom fractured under the combined impact of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Anarchy was exploited by the new prince who in the 

SOVE REIGNTY: FACT OR NORM?

words of Mati Wiht suppressed the feudal baros ad halleed the Pope    a arrower ad at the same time a stroer uit of loyalty tha medieval Christedom. 2 New kis ad ew kidoms marhed forward toether, the latter as hadiwork of the former By the seve­ teeth etury whe mode iteatioal law was first theorized by Grotius the emeri territoial state was a reature of persoal rule ad the three hudred-odd idepedet sovereities i Germay aloe were tstimoy to iitial patrimoial oeptio of the state  3  his urivalled study of the Italia Reaissae Burkhardt summed up the politial hae as follows: a ew fat appears i history  the State as the outome of refletio ad alulatio  4 For Burkhardt the ew talia pries were essetially illeitimate but power always seek justifiatio of some kid . The leadi priiple of leitimay i the ew iteatioal order udoubtedly was Rx st mprator n rgno suo the Ki is Emperor withi his ow realm. Uder this laim idepe­ dee

d facto

was ultimately traslated ito a sovereity

d ju r 5

Sovereity is therefore iheret i suessful state-buildi The reality of soverei states was refleted i Europea politial thouht. The writis of Mahiavelli, Bodi, ad Hobbes dislose learly a world of positive sovereity

h Prnc (1513) aptures the

seular, morally ueumbered, ad foreful harater of statesme i its leadi oepts of anmo ambzon apptto nggno prudnza fortuna ad vrt whih Mahiavelli believed were eessary for politi al suess ad survival i a daerous wold. Sx Books of th Common walth (1576) disloses the leadi harateristi of the ew state as a soverei ovemet whih a seure itself aaist exteal eem­ ies or iteal disorders  6

Lvathan (1651)

postulates the otratual

establishmet of suh a overmet as the sole esape from a farful domesti state of ature but also as the eessary oditio of a bellieret iteratioal state of ature: i all times, kis, ad persos of soverei authority, beause of thei idepedey, are i . .  a posture of war 7 For these writers the state is a idepedet .

reality i the world ad for the last two it is the oly foudatio of order ad seurity The starti poit of iteatioal relatios udoubtedly is empirial statehood The earliest moder states suh as Frae ad Elad or rather Frais I ad Hery VIII were palpable polial realities iterally ad i their eihbourhoods. Oe ould try to iore them or preted they did ot exist ut oe ould ot ratioally ad probably would ot prudetly dey their existee The reality osisted i a populated territory uder a ruler who laimed the territory as his realm ad the populatio as his subjets ad was able to efore the laim 5

S O V E R E I G N T Y R E G I M E S I N H I S T O R

He possessed a govement apparatus that could project royal power and prerogative both inteally and externally. However rudimentary that apparatus might be it was sufficiently credible to sustain the ruler both domestically and internatonally and, if it was not, he and also possibly his realm might be replaced by another. Since European states were in close geographical proximity and since the devices and tech­ niques of empirical statehood were means of success and surival they were quickly adopted by rulers throughout Europe. Proximity and power meant there was always a strong ossibility of war: the classical problem of a states-system. Deterrence, alliance, and the balance of power are responses to it. But competion was also a spur to state building and one of the main reasons for the eventual global hegemony of Europe. The starng point of internatonal law is the same the realiy of multiple sovereign powers each possessed of pride and capable of doing or suffering harm. Oassical inteational law is the analogue of common moral and legal rules a soctas or civil sociey. n an empiri­ cal vew morality arises out of the facts of human existence. And the facts are that humans are endowed with brains and limbs, have de­ sires can move about in the pursuit of their desires and in the course of doing so can collide. This human reality lays the groundwork of common morality and law which seeks to reulate the uses of power and to reduce collisions and therefore harm. Classical inteatonal legitmacy and law operate the same way. ne original element was acknowledgement of not only the reality but also the dignity of sover eigns according to Samuel Pufendorf 'just as a king owes his sover eignty and majesy to no one outside his realm so he need not obtain the consent and aproval of other kings or states before he may carry himself like a king and be regarded as such. 8 t is a small step to consider  the legitmate bearer of rghts and dues which belong properly to all who are kings . The balance of power and classical internaonal law evolved in conjuncon. From the seventeenth cen tury to the twentieth statesmen have developed international law, not to prevent ar but to regulate the conduct of states in war and in peace . Inteatonal law resuoses empircl statehood whether it is conceived as natural law or as positve law. The law of nature is the law of things or facts as revealed by mans reason without the assistance of revelation. Pufendorf insists that states, as Hinsley uts it, 'must do as they would be done by: the golden rule of reciprocity. 9 Grotius derves positive internatonal law from the freedom, will, and agency of states­ men. States and only states in vrtue of controlling large populated 52

S O V E RE I G N T Y  F A C T O R N O R M ?

erriories ad beig orgaized realiies i he viciiy of oher saes are i a posiio o paricipae i he makig of ieaioal law by sigig reaies, sedig ad receivig ambassadors, aedig ier­ aioal cofereces ad givig heir cose i various oher cove­ ioal ways. The followig saeme by Georg Schwarzeberger ad E D Brow is ypical of empirical saehood i ieraoal law Before reognsng an entty as an ndependent State the exstng sujets of nteatonal law usually requre a mnmum of three ondtons to  fulflled. he State n quest of reognon must have a stale govement whh does not reognse any outsde superor authorty t must rule supreme wthn a terrtory  wth more or less settled frontrs  and t must exerse ontrol over a ertan numer of people hese features have ome to e taken as the essental hara­ tersts of ndependent States

Ad . L Brierly remarks 'Wheher or o a ew sae has acually begu o exis is a pure quesio of fac Classical ieraioal law is herefore he child ad o he pare of saes The coveioal aswer o he quesios posed a he begiig is ha sovereig saes have a double dual dimesio hey face iwar ad ouward, ad hey have a emprical ad a ormaive aspec Sovereig saes declare ormaive supremacy over all domesic auh oriies ad moral ad legal equaliy o all oher saes uridical sae­ hood. Uder ordiary circumsaces shor of maor warfare hey also disclose he abiliy o eforce boh claims  The defiiive saeme of

drmina no i a habi of obediece o a like superior, receive habiual obediece from he bulk of a give sociey, ha deermiae

posiive sovereigy remais ha of Joh Ausi 'If a huma superior,

superior is sovereig i ha sociey ad he sociey (icludig he superior) is a sociey polical ad idepede.  12 f course here has always bee ad ideed here mus i he aure of poliical higs always  a gap bewee he absolue auhoriy ad he relaive power of saes like all oher huma orgaizaios saes are codiioal o leadership, cooperaio, kowledge, resources, forue, ad much else Absolue power is a impossibiy. I maor ciies of he greaes power o earh oday, icludig he capial, here is  some disrics a igh a sae of aure raher ha a sae. I law saes are oly dmd o be subsaial ad capable This has bee a reasoable workig assumpio hisorically, however 'A idepede poliical commuiy which merely claims a righ o sover eigy (or is udged by ohers o have such a righ), bu cao asser his rgh i pracice, is o a sae properly socaled 3 Uder he forgivig codios of he coemporary collaboraive saessysem, 53

S OVEREGTY R E G  M E S   H STORY

however it is sovereign nevertheless In a leading study of inter national law published in 19 the following statement is made The inteational legal order does not provide foundation for the State; it presupposes the States existence Recognizing the appearance on a teitoy of a political entity showing the characteristics generally at tibuted to the State it merely invests it with personaliy in the law of naons 14 However the inteational legal order centred on the UN is attempting to provide precisely such a foundaon for many Third World states Contemporary international legitimacy and law are not only the parents but also the continuing benefactors of such states If thei existence were a matter exclusively of power or the balance of power rather than bithight many might not have been born TH D U A  AST O F TH STATS - SST

According t o Matin Wight the dual aspect o f the states system was conceived originally  tentatively by Grotius There is an outer circle that embraces all mankind under naural law and an inner circle the corpus Chrsanorum bound by the law of Christ  1  Dualism i different forms has persisted in inteational relations ever since It is a big subect of course and there exists as yet no compre hensive account of which I am aware. 16 However it is possible to review the history of inteational dualism to gain some background perspective on the dualism which exists today and the place of nega ve sovereignty in it Three stages are disceible The frst was an inner circle of positive internaonal law among ChrisanEuropean nations and an outer or universal circle of naural law governing the conduct of mankind Relations between the two spheres (which in pracce were Europe and the rest of the world) were nevertheless pragmatic politically un certain morally and untidy legally They were conducted on a basis of rough equality notwithstanding the historically accelerating inequality of power in favour of Europe and they expressed a fair measure of toleration There was not yet anything resembling a global inter national regime under common rules  Before the nineteenth cenury little emphasis was placed by Europeans on the legal criteria of state hood in their encounter with nonEuropeans The two spheres were simply different and the main problem facing European states was still that of regulating their own relationships NoEuropean ulers were not under challenge and dealt with Europeans the same as other foreigners It was not yet an ordering of global relations in terms of the power and beliefs of Europe The projection of European state power far beyond the confines of



THE DL SPECT

OF

THE STTE SSYSTEM

Europ and vn mor  o h incraingly uccul rriorializaion o ha powr in ohr coninn vnually brough orh uch an ordr in h ninnh cnury. ccupaion had o b uiid o ohr Europan powr and conqunly i invokd inrnaional law and paricularly h rul o t

nullus conqu and cion

A nw orm

o inaional dualim appard which wa conncd wih Euro pan colonial xpanion in Aia and Arica: rough qualiy and di vriy wa rplacd by prci hirarchy and uniormiy in h rlaion bwn Europan and non-Europan counri, wih h ormr in a poiion o uprioriy (Th am dualim xid in orh and Souh Amrica and Ruian Aia, bu i wa inrnal rahr han xrnal colonialim and conqunly wa nvr ubjcd o vnual dcolonizaion.  Th drminaion o ovrigny hroughou h world now dmandd ha crain criria b aid which drivd rom a Wrn and pciically libral concp o a capabl and coni uional a or h ir im h nir glob wa organizd in rm o Europan poiiv inrnaional law hr wa a ingl rgim o world poliic in which colonialim wa an ingral iniuion . Dual im now conid o a uprior innr circl o ovrign a and an inrior our circl o hir dpndnci in Aia Arica and cania. Th innr circl wa compod almo nirly o Europan counri and hir opring in h Amrica  apar rom noworhy xcp­ ion, uch a Turky and apan. By 19 h numbr o ovrign a wa a i low and h xn o hir rriorial conrol wa a i gra, ncloing h nir glob  Th la ag o inrnaional dualim wa ir inimad by Wilonian libralim and pciically h Lagu o aion bli in h viru o mall a and h uridical qualiy o all a   Th Lagu did no abandon mpirical ahood howvr a indicad by h manda ym Tha wa h rul o dcoloniaion ar h cond world war and paricularly 196 which grand mmbrhip in h communiy o a and pciically h U o all dpndnci which dird i rgardl o any ohr conidraion and according o h principl o l-drminaion . Thi inrnaional chang wa nially normaiv and baically naild abolihing inrnaional lgal diabilii prviouly impod on non-Wrn pol A NATURAL LAW REGIME?

Th hirarchical a-ym bad on Europan hgmony which rachd i znih during h hyday o colonialim in h la ninnh and arly wnih cnuri wa h culminaion o W­ rn commrcial miliary and poliical xpanion o h our cornr o 55

 O  E RE I G N   R E G I  E  I N H I   O R 

the globe ove seveal pevious centuies Dung most o  this peod elations between uopean and nonuopean states wee casual and intemittent and chaacteied b eualit and didence moe than hegemon and aogance Most o the contacts wee made b pvate uopean tades who ma o ma not have been epesentatives o states. Beoe the nineteenth centu the powe advantage was not consistently with the intudes he Ameicas wee a majo eception whee uopeans established thei dominion at an eal stage . he inital division o the hemisphee between Spain and Potugal was based on a iteenthcentu Papal Bull: a emnant o the medieval concept o an impium mundi he Spaniads and the Potuguese at fist and the ench, nglish, and Ameicans late destoyed indigenous civiliatons, which wee weak, and maginalied thei populations, whose numbes wee paticulal small in oth Ameica. he also impoted millions o slaves om Aica to develop plantation agicultue in thei vast new teitoies he Spanish and Potuguese in the new wold might ind it epedient to make ageements with savage tibes, but did not egad them as moal euals with a legitimate ight to teitoy  8 Some natual lawes such as Vitoia deended thei status unde the law o natue Howeve, uopean hegemon was thooughl imposed thoughout the egion in the name o Chistian eligion o commecial civiliation n shot, the Ameicas wee an object o uopean conuest and an etension o uopean soveeignt. hen uopean juisdiction ended in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuies soveeignt did not evet to the native peoples but was inheited by settles o thei descendants. n Asia whee ancient civiliations and signiicant indigenous powes eisted elationships wee ve dieent. Hee the uopean competition om the siteenth to the eighteenth centuies was o oveseas tade and not teitoies. his euied pemission om local ules who contolled the entepts uopean tading companies subjected themselves to these ules to secue access to pied com­ modities. ading contacts settled into pactices which wee useul to both paties. atson sas that in dealing with nonuopean civili ations at this time, uopean tades and epesentatives took account o the paticula stipulations laid down b individual Asian ules as well as uopean ules and pecepts .  hese intenational elation­ ships eventuall etended om esten uope and paticulal Hol­ land and ngland to the geate pat o maitime Asia including the ndian Ocean ittoal Among the Asian states involved at one time o anothe wee the Maatha State the Mogul mpie, the Kingdoms o 56

 NTUL LW EG M E 

Cylon n Burm h Inonn S n Mgcr Pr n Sm lo 'wr lnk wh  numbr of Euron Powr by ry n lomc rlon n h vnnh n ghnh cn­ ur  0 Th Duch conrbu mor o h xnon of nonl ocy hn ny ohr Wrn rng  fr lrgly lcng h Porugu hy wr ly nvolv wh n rulr n mlmn for vrl cnur n crr hr nrnonl ou­ look o  long wh goo for r  If olln rory rv gncnly from ovr r hr lbry w ow no only o h blnc of owr n Euro bu lo o nrnonl lw. I  rh no ccn h h r gr hor of nrnonl ocy w Duch: ugo Grou.  rmry m n

De Jure Belli ac Paci Libri re (62)

w o blh rul of wr n

c h wr mmun o hologcl n olcl conrovry n n only on h fculy of ron  lk mhmc  n coul hrfor cur ccnc from ll mn Nurl lw w h only crn ounon for uch rul:  w h voc of humn ron n woul x vn f Go  no

Deum)2

(eiami aremu

non

ee

Inrnonl lgl hough bulng on Grou ru­

o  Fmly of Non h w no lm o h Euron connn bcu  w b on  humn fculy common o ll mnkn  NonWrn  hrfor o ovrgny  Th nurl lw of non ccorng o Chrl lxnrowc ou l rncl no only of u wr bu lo unvrly noncrm­ non on groun of rlgon cvlon or rc n rohbon of gnoc lv r n rcy  Whhr or no omhng rmblng Grou lw of non w obrv rounly n rlon bwn Euron mrchn n non­ Euron rulr  ll b n hrfor on o uon 3 V gogrhcl n culurl nc log ulmly n h mn of mn r Euro n ohr rgon of h worl  Commrcl rlonh wr conuc lowly n nuouly  vry gr  nc n n g of l Evn o k of  globl conomy n much l  fmly of rng non  uonbl Lnk cro h ocn wr bul u ovr hr cnur    bu o rfr o h nrnonl commrc of h mrcnl g   "wor conomy  o mly  conmorry conc whch    h rlvnc only for our m Throughou h rnurl r conncon bwn conom (vn whn  rmn wk nuou n lbl o nrru­ on  Th convnon of fr g n f omcl uon whch long nc commrc n r  much on nrumnl n ronl conron  on morl unrnng n olcl 57

S O  E RE  G N  R E G   E S  N H  S  O R

agreements. For isoated raders in search of vauabe goods far away from home i was prudent to respect oca customs and curry favour with those in authority. This can be read wihou cynicism as the usua expediency that woud be expected by visitors to paces where fortunes coud be made but ones own state coud no enforce contracts Euro pean powers were not yet abe to dispatch fast gunboats to cow uncooperative oca ruers. The aw of nature may have been practised but whether it was internationa aw is open to reasonabe doubt. The word before the industria age was far more oosey connected than it woud ater be It was aso marked by exreme diversity not ony of societies and cutures  as is sti the case today  but aso of fundamentay different human cosmoogies There was no overarch ing system of rues which coud be even recognized et aone observed by Confucianiss, Buddhiss, Hindus, Mosems, and Chrstans The gobe was home to varous sefcentred and mutua incomprehend ing civiizations which were as yet ony in he most superficia contac: isands in an ocean of nonjurisdiction Grotius' descripton of the sea as so great as not to have any deinite imis and herefore subect to no poitica wi conveys he idea. 25 The seas and aso the enormous Asian and African and masses divided the word into separate orbits: a civiizations-sstem rather than a states-system consistng of great empires or suzerain-state sstems such as the Chinese or the Mogus or the Otomans, sef-isoating feuda sysems such as Japan, scattered trba cutures in sub-Saharan Africa, opica South America norh wesern Norh Amerca and pars of Oceania, European coonists in the Americas, Souh Afrca, and, a the end of the perod, Ausraia, and of course European sovereign staes gradua projectng their power and rivaries at increasing distances from home European or rather Christian ruers never deat with non-Chrisian ruers the way hey dea with each other: as equa members of a singe dipomatic repubic which consisted of independent states resembing each other in their manners, reigion and degree of socia improve ment . 2 There were obvious famiy resembances in reigion, govern ment, phiosophy, science, architecture, iteraure, art, and much ese among European states Burke sti spoke of Europe in the ate eight eenth century as virtuay one great state having the same basis of genera aw, with some diversiy of provincia customs and oca estab ishments and remarked tha no cizen of Europe coud be aogether an exie in any part of i where the traveer 'never fe himsef quie abroad   Lite if an of this commonweath extended beyond Europe except in paces where subsant setemens of Europeans existed, as in the Americas. Even he Turks who were haf-European athough not 58

A NAUAL AW EGIE

Chrsan and for cenures occuped large pars of souhease Europe dsclosed few famly resemblances . n Consannople he European raveller was no longer no abroad. There was sll no coher­ en heory of recognon whch could defne nsders and ousders beyond he obvous recognon ha European saes naurally and cusomarly gave o each oher and laer o he rebellous offsprng n he Amercas  Ther commonwealh could no be dsngushed from her common culure. f here was a famly of naons ha exended beyond Europe  lacked he cusoms and convenons by whch European saes recog­ nzed famly members and  seems scarcely dsngshable from ordnary prudence and common couesy And f such a famly of naons exsed hen  was because Europeans abroad ye had lle choce n he maer. When hey dd acure such a choce n he nneeenh cenury whch derved from unprecedened echnologcal and ndusral developmens n Europe hey dd no subscbe o naural law enes bu nssed on more demandng posve sandards whch hey alone could easly recognze and subscrbe o. And when hs began o happen European radng companes abandoned df dence owards local ulers and saed o ac and look lke saes T H E C L A S S I C A L PO S I T I V E S O V E R E I G N T Y R E G I M E

By he nneeenh cenry he leadng European powers were deeply nvolved n erroal expanson n Asa he ussan land empre exended o he Pacfc cean and he Duch as ndes and Brsh nda were soldly esablshed Amercans and laer Canadans were smlarly nvolved n Norh Ameca   Tradonal polcal sysems could no compee wh nrudng saes whch could now proec her power no evey ocean and connen Those ha sur vved were dffcul o penerae  such as Afghansan and Persa whch became buffer saes beween he ussan and Brsh Empres  or hey were powers n her own rgh lke apan ar less copeve were he lghly organzed prelerae and n any cases sall-scale bal socees of opcal Afca and ceana whch hsocally were proeced fo nuders ore by forbddng geogaphy and clae han by ndgenous power. uropean expanson n Afrca was con­ fned largely o he coasal frnge unl lae n he cenuy nce naural barers could be overcoe by echnology however, erroal aggran­ dzemen becae possble and he enre connen  wh he excep­ on of Ehopa and more euvocally bea  rapdly cae under European colonal ursdcon.  canno go no he numerous and vaed hsocal causes of Euro 59

S V GNTY   G    S  N H SY

pan xpanson whch ar a subct of contnung controvrs What s bond dsput, howvr, s th tmng of xpanson whch concdd wth th dvlopmnt of th tchnologcal and ndustral mans (and th novl das bhnd thm) that nall gav Europan stats a dcsv advantag ovr most nonEuropan socts f arlr ras of Europan xpanson wr basd on th armd salng shp and th dscpln of profssonal soldrs, nntnthcntu mpralsm was owng to stam transport both on watr and on land, rapd frng wapons, hgh xplosvs, and nw mdcal knowldg Modrn tchnolog and ndustr also gav som Europan stats a markd compttv advantag ovr othrs  as ndcatd b th as wth whch th Untd Stats achvd vctor n th SpanshAmrcan war (1898) Morovr, th nw mans of stat powr wr not magcall rstrctd to Wstrn cvlaton Japan dmonstratd ths n th d fat of Russa n 1905 whch conrmd not onl ual mmbrshp n ntrnatonal soct but also mrgnt grat powr status. Th supror powr whch Europan ntruson dmonstratd could not b xrcsd wthout som ustcaton, howvr n a lgall artculatd ntrnatonal soct t s not suffcnt that powr alon occup trrtoral spacs lgtmac s ncssar also Most of th ladng stats of Wstrn Europ had bn justfng poltcal powr for cnturs. Dspotsm was a trm of abus for Montsuu and Burk and somthng hostl to Wstrn Europan cvlaton although far from absnt Consttutonalsm was a crtron b whch  man nntnthcntur Europans judgd govrnmnts both nsd Europ and outsd t was an ntrnatonal as wll as a domstc standard  Prhaps th clarst xprsson of ntrnatonal const tutonalsm was th rcurrnt congrsss and confrncs of powrs hld throughout th nntnth cntur and nto th twntth whch nactd gnral trats on mportant ustons of mutual concrn Th Europan noton of th stat and of ntrnatonal lgtmac currnt throughout most of th cntur thrfor prsupposd not onl capabl but also cvl govrnmnt t was b ths tm no longr mportant whthr a ount was a monarch or a rpublc as long as t was rlab and rsponsbl Capablt was frst n mportanc b caus th balanc of powr dpndd on t Cvlt was not far bhnd, howvr, bcaus ntrnatonal rlatons rurd forbaranc and rcproct n th xrcs of powr. t was takn for grantd that Europan stats and also th Untd Stats dsclosd ths charactr stcs Ths postv sovrgnt outlook was consstnt wth th thor of progrss whch capturd th nntnthcntu Europan mnd t was compatbl wth a moralt of patalsm whch not onl John 60

THE CLASSICAL OSITIVE SOVEREIGNT REGIME

Stuat Mll but any nntntcntuy Euans blv sul gu avanc cvlzatns n t alngs wt backwa s­ cts t tk f gant t cvlzatn f Euan stats  t ffsng n t cntnnts n st stv svgnty ctn xss a sutn f suty bas nt sly n t­ ncnts but als n nstat acvnts f Euans n scnc tcnlgy wafa gvnnt, ltcal cny ac tctu ltatu an t st s sutn was nt yt ­ lx  as t lat wul b  by cntay als f ntnatnal lgtacy s utlk f Euans at t stcal nt f t gatst w an ubs was falz n stv ntnatnal law wc cgnz cal cta f svgn stat a lt t­ ty a stabl ulatn an st tantly a labl gvnnt wt t wll an caacty t cay ut ntnatnal blgatns t was wly blv tat nnstn scts  nt t suc cta  E all an Engls lgal stvst vn cla tat n ntnatnal law cannt b sus t b unst  cgnz by cunts ffntly cvlz  s s t ctn f cnsttutv cgntn wc as Bull cnts s wly vw as avng bn sly an nstunt f Euan nanc   ccng t lx­ anwcz n suc cnsttutv ty f cgntn xst n t stvst wl    guably t  nt xst bcaus t cul nt b nfc By t nntnt cntuy wv Eu a t w an t wll t s ts ntnatnal syst n t st f t wl Evn gly cbl nnstn stats wc w nv clnz suc as Jaan nw a t asst t stat n stvst ts  sult was t fst unvsal ntnatnal scty bas n a slctv bs ncl wc scnat btwn a su­  class f svgn stats an an nf class f vaus n­ ncs lcatn f t ncl sult n t ncatn f s ltcal systs nt t xclusv club f nnnt stats by cnsttutv cgntn an t subnatn f t st wtn a nnt fawk f clnals  ntal xansn f ntnatnal scty byn Eu an t Unt Stats was acv t by culsn  nvtatn  f was vnt n t nfc cutnt f uky Cna an Jaan  wc stcally at accng t t wn uls f suty an nclsu  nt Euan ntnatnal law wc was bas n ccty s stats w fc t b f  latt was vnt n t ncatn f t atn can stats t nnnt stats f t Bts E an t nw stats f Eastn 

SOVRGNTY RG S  N H  STORY

Euope all o f which peviously had been unde the juisdiction of Euopean soveeigns These states meely split off fom Euopean empies and still etained the essential chaacteistics of Euopean states. Recognition of the fome states consequently equied moe explicit standads of empiical statehood than the latte which wee pesumed  ightly o wongly  to be capable and esponsible, wheeas the non-Euopean states had to demonstate it. Some Latin Ameican and East Euopean states might vey well have failed the test had it been applied to them. Thee was if not a double standad at least a divegent one. The legal tools fo binging about the obsevation of Weste noms by non-Euopean states wee capitulation teaties of vaious kinds which Weste powes wee now in a position to enfoce. Inceased movements of Euopeans aound the wold in the nineteenth centuy bought demands fo guaantees of pesonal libety and feedom of commece wheeve they went Euopean govenments wee inclined to povide such guaantees. This led to impositions of extateitoial ity which gave Euopeans exemption fom the juisdiction of non Euopean govenments. Rules in India o in China had taditionally exempted settlements of foeign mechants fom local juisdiction as a matte of coutesy  Nineteenth-centuy positive inteational law tuned this into an unequal teaty' obligation The esot to extatei toiality was now consideed evidence of infeio civilization. The next step, as Alexandowicz puts it, was to ague that non-civilized nations had to be admitted into the amily of Nations by the civilized nations which constituted its supeio inne club. Some wee admitted and some wee not' Tukey was involved in elations with Euope fo centuies but as the leading epesentative of Islamic civilization the Sublime Pote histoically had efused to obsee Euopean inteational law and was suficiently poweful not to be made to do so. Indeed, Euopeans seeking elationships with the Ottoman Empie wee equied to defe to its ules which wee inspied by Islamic tadition Although still a powe to eckon with, by the nineteenth centuy the empie was in decline. Leading Euopean states wee now in a position to enfoce compliance with thei intenational usages by means of capitulations and they had a stong diplomatic and economic inteest to do so. In accepting eluctantly ove the peiod of a centuy such pinciples as equal soveeignty, ecipocity, and feedom of commece and in inally being fomally inducted into Euopean intenational society by teaty in 84 and 856 Tukey epudiated its Islamic taditions in extenal elations and theeby contibuted to the univesalization of the states6

T H E C  A S S  C A  P O S  T  V E S O VE RE  GNT R E G   E

sstem.  n Atcle V o the Teat o Pas (856) the snato states solemnl declae the Sublme Pote admtted to patcpate n the advantaes o the Publc Law and Sstem o Euope' . Chna was the cente o anothe poltcal cosmolo to whch Euo pean 'babaans' and othes pevousl had to kowtow. When Ch nese powe n East Asa was ovetuned  the nneteenth centu b these same babaans the mddle kndom was tsel oced to submt to a ve deent Euopean cosmolo and was aduall ncopo ated nto ntenatonal socet althouh unde tems whch wee coo dnated to a eate extent amon encoachn powes. Westen mpostons amed at secun esdent dplomatc epesentaton at Pekn and openn the vast Chnese maket to exteal commece. The pncpal means aan wee unequal teates' and smla captu latons whch, amon othe thns, enoced the Euopean standad o cvlzaton' o the benet o tades, mssonaes, and othe oen esdents and tavelles n Chna. mpotant pats o Chnese us dcton ell unde Westen decton om the md nneteenth centu: teat pots and patculal the ntenatonal communt at Shanha, extatetoal couts o oen esdents, combned mlta nte venton and ve patols b oen naves, and coodnated dplo matc nteeence n the Chnese mpeal ovenment. Althouh neve omall colonzed b the West, Chna was aduall obled ove an extended peod to abandon ts hstocal selmae as the 'Mddle Kndom' and conom to Westen dplomatc noms. The last captulatons wee not temnated omall untl 94 when Chna's suppot was equed b the alles n the wa aanst Japan. Chna nall emeed as a eat powe n 945 when t acqued pemanent membeshp on the UN Secut Councl. Althouh ntall subected to enoced openn to oen shps and commece b the Unted States, Japan enteed ntenatonal so cet b successull mtatn Westen states n ovenment, law, ndust, technolo and, ndeed, even n at, dess, achtectue, and whateve was consdeed necessa to etan ndependence. Japan was n man was alead on a pa wth Euopean powes n economc development, centalzed selovenment, mlta cedblt, and lteac and was theeoe n a poston to sats Westen standads. She not onl accepted ntenatonal law and dplomac and adopted Westenstle palamenta ovenment but also acheved mlta success n was aanst Chna (8945) and as ndcated, Russa (95) Japan also patcpated n the captulatons mposed on Chna. B the tun o the twenteth centu she had alead emeed as he leadn soveen powe o Asa.  

SOVEREIGNTY REGIMES IN H ISTORY

Solcted ncorporaton nvolved new ursdctons suc as te re publcs of Latn Amerca te gradually emergng Brts domnons anada Australa New Zealand Sout Afrca and more ambgu ously Ireland) and te mostly small states of entral and Eastern Europe e Unted States falls nto te same category altoug t ad been a perperal partcpant n European dplomacy snce te late egteent century and by te end of te nneteent was a reluctant great power Except for te domnons all tese states entered nter natonal socety followng te collapse or defeat of European empres as a result of maor war Vrtually all were eter European states or te offsprng of Europe and enoyed prvleged membersp as a conse quence of ts knsp  some would say racal  prncple. e emergence of te atn Amercan states derved from te be eadng of te Spans and Portuguese empres by Napoleon's armes durng te Pennsular War 8074) ollowng successful rebellons aganst Spans colonal rule  or ndependence under te Portuguese crown n te case of Bral  te frst steps towards ncorporaton nto te states-system were ntated by Amercan and Brts dplomatc recognton n te early decades of te nneteent century e atn Amercan states were plagued by postcolonal wars and began to use European ntrnatonal law to order ter own relatonsps wen stll poltcally solated from te European system ey also became n volved wt te global captalst economy before tey entered overseas nternatonal socety After  870 te regon experenced unpre cedented expanson n ts socoeconomc relatons wt Europe by means of trade foregn nvestment and mmgraton  te latter gong manly to Argentna Bral Uruguay and le Altoug con sdered to possess full nternatonal legal personalty te Latn Amer can states dd not begn to partcpate n te European dplomatc system untl te turn of te twentet century wen tey were nvted to te rst Hague Peace onference n 899 Mexco was te only atn Amercan state n attendance However at te second n 907 all te Sout Amercan countres were represented e Hague conferences are usually consdered to mark te formal extenson of te club of soveregn states beyond Europe and te Unted States Unlke te Spansspeakng republcs of atn Amerca and also of course te Unted States te Brts domnons acqured soveregn stateood n accordance wt evolvng colonal practce ese states possessed domestc self-government for some tme before assertng a rgt to partcpate n nternatonal socety as equal soveregn states wc was not acknowledged by Brtan untl te mperal onference of 9 anada and Australa consdered ter substantal contr

T  E C ASSCA POSTVE SOVEREGNTY REGME

buons o he aed cory n he rs word war as ad grounds or her cams. Canadan goemens poned o he ae o Vmy Rdge and Ausraans o Gapo Souh Arca aso earned mary honour on he baeeds o he rs word war The domnons nernaona credy was reeced y he Treay o Versaes whch hey sgned as Brsh bu aso as ndependen saes becomng members n her own rgh o he eague o Naons. In 196 hey acqured ndependen saus whch was ormay acknowedged n he (Brsh) Saue o Wesmnser (1931) and judcousy  no ndeed brany descrbed n he Baour Repor as 'auonomous Commun­ es whn he Brsh Empre, equa n saus, n no way subordnae one o anoher n any aspec o her domesc or exerna aars, hough uned y a common aegance o he Crown, and reey assocaed as members o he Brsh Comonweah o Naons   These counres were orerunners o  he Brsh pracce o eouon­ ary decoonzaon 39 Ahough mode Greece emerged n 1830 rom he rs major rerea o he Ooman Empre n he Bakan Pennsua, a o he remanng new saes o cenra and easern Europe ganed ndepen dence beween he 1870s and 190. Durng hs perod he Ooman errores n he Bakans began o spner and nay ha empre aong wh he Habsburg, Hohenzoern, and Romano dynases n cenra and easern Europe shaered as a consequence o he rs word war. The poca map o Europe was undamenay redrawn as a resu Romana, Bugara, and Aana emerged beore he war (as dd Serba and Monenegro whch were aer ncorporaed no Yugos aa); Poand reappeared n 1916 The reanng errores were par ceed ou among seen addona saes n he mmedae poswar perod. Some o hese saes had ndependen ancesors and coud perhaps be seen as reerng o soeregny, bu mos coud no. Consequeny hs regon became preemneny one o new saes een  s naona­ es had ancen hsores as oppressed mnores. Hungary had an mmedae preous exsence as he AusroHungaran Empre and earer ndependen exsences Poand was newy resurreced aer hang been drawn, quarered, and ured n he ae egheenh cenury Three saes coud cam enuous knshp wh a soeregn o quassoeregn ancesor Czechosoakas reaon o he Kngdom o Bohema, and Fnand and huanas connecon wh earer Grand Duches o he same names Esona, aa, Yugosaa, Bugara, Romana, and Abana, howeer, were noe ormaons. And ahough a major goa o he Pars Peace Conerence was o creae 5

S O V E R E I G N   R E G I M E S I N H I S  O R

natinstates by lebisites and where neessary the resettlement f ulatins many f these new states still ntained signiiant min rities The mst extreme ase was Yugslavia whih enasulated reently indeendent Serbia 1878) and Mntenegr (1878) as well as several distntve natinalities  Crats Slvenes Albanians Mae dnians  and religins  Orthdx Cathli Mslem Jewish These states nsequently harbur tentially and smetimes atively divisive minrity grus ssessed by strng and frequently intransigent natinalist sentiments The new nsttutinal frame wrks rmted by the League ften uld nt ammdate these divisins. The natinalities wanted t live aart and were nt artu larly devted t mastering the litial arts f living tgether. Later when these states fell int the Sviet rbit mmunist arties nly sueeded in aering ver the natinality rblem  t is n surrise therefre that the term balkanized has beme synnymus with reurrent instability rted in ethniity. Peter Lyn asks: What did being a new state mean in eastern Eure in 1919? and answers Fr the mst art it meant being a benefiiary f the Versailes settle ment Here is a freshadwing f what was later t beme the fast trak t svereign statehd: self-determinatin by right Elements f the sitve svereignty game were nevertheless evi dent in entral and easte Eure. Rights f selfdeterminatin bvi usly did nt revent Sviet imerialist absrtn f Latvia Lithuania and Estnia in 190 ne f the last instanes either inside Eure r utside f ered territral aquisitn by a Eurean wer whih was still erating arding t nineteenthentury nrms. Finland retained its indeendene the hard way by ging t war with the Russians and making Finlandizatn  indeendene as a buffer state  an easier hie fr Msw than military nquest The ther states (exluding Yugslavia) were sufiiently signifiant t be art f the Warsaw Pat and thereby invlved at the entre f the EastWest nflit Sviet imerialism bviusly di nt nede m lete indeendene t its East Eurean vassals but neither did it absrb them nstitutinally nr uld it withut undermining its hesiveness as a wer And in remaining alf Yugslavia did nt evidently lae its indeendene at risk Even if Eastern Eure fr mst f the time sine the send wrld war and befre the Grbahev era f glasnost and prstroka is mst atly neived as a suzerain-state system the fat remains that the nnsuzerain arts f the system figured in the balane f wer between East and West Yet in nsidering membershi by invitatn in the lub f sver eign states ne annt fail t nte anmalies. At the tu f the -



TH C  A S S I C A L POSITI S ORIGNT RGI

twentieth century a few quasistates were in existence which bore virtually no resemblance to the historic states of Weste urope and some were receiving invtations to attend inteatonal conferences Haiti had long existed as an independent although neglected land which nobody evidently desired to recolonize Liberia and thiopia were beginning to appear on the political map of Africa alongside recently established uropean colonies and protectorates Persia and Siam were present at the frst Hague Conference When Liberia ac ceded to the Act of the Brussels Conference (890) and more signii cantly to the Hague Declarations and Convention of 907 additional irregularities were created In short, precedents were being set that were at variance with current rules and practices of positive sover eignty And in the world of law precedent is important In 90 an eminent British legal theorist argued that the architects of international law consisted of all uropean states and their offspring plus Japan The Christian African states of thipia and Liberia were also international legal persons as was the Congo Free State since its sovereign was the King of Belgium A number of states including Turkey, Morocco, Muscat, Siam, Persia, and China were partial but not full members of international society4 As for the rest of the worlds political systems, their status was that of colonial subects of one kind or another The second path in the globalization of positive sovereignty conse quently involved the acquisition of urisdiction and control by certain uropean powers over extensive populated territories in Asia, Africa, and Oceania which owing to their backwardness were considered unqualifed for recognition as sovereign states  The episode was a ind of international enclosure movement. Colonialism resurrected a dynastic practice killed by the rise of nationalism in urope whereby sovereigns acquired and held various noncontingent lands as parts of their states or empires The most obvious new example was the Congo Free State which literally was the personal property of Kng Leopold before its cession to Belgium in 908 4 The clearest and most significant instance of this path was undoubtedly the partition of Africa in the last decades of the nineteenth century And it is this case I examine The political character of Africa at that time gave little indication of either states or a statessystem as deined by the positive sovereignty crteria of the day Africa was a continental archipelago of loosely deined political systems: a world of societies rather than states and far more recognizable to anthropology than to international relations The uropeanstyle territorial state with its legal order, institutionalized government, and defined boundaries was largely unknown ven 6

S O V E  E I G N    E G   E S  N H  S  O 

African states in the looser anthroological deinition exercised un certain control the authority and ower of the central govement faded away more and more the further one went from the centre toward the boundary Thus boundaries between the states were vague, sometimes overlang. Many African societies lacked cen tralized authority structures and consisted essentially of segmentary lineage systems. Some societies were so small as to be coterminous with kinshi relations 45 Government based on written laws and im ersonal administration was virtually unknown throughout most of the continent. Traditional African states had noteworthy features of transitory and ersonal rule. Even the Islamic states which historically aeared and disaeared in the region between the Sahara Desert and the equatorial forests are described as the hastily assembled emires of Muslim adventurers   Personal rule remains a character istic of many African states today which are fixed territorial entities rmarily in their juridical statehood. Inteationa boundaries are defined not by the extent of govement authority and ower  which in some cases still fades as distance from the caital city increases  but externally by the ostcolonial international community Before the advent of colonialism there was no Africa in any inter national sense and of course no olitical ma of the vast continent African geograhy was not known accurately before the second half of the nineteenth century when Weste exlorers inally comleted maing the interior The first continental olitical mas were of colonial Africa . The olitical ma of traditional Africa was also drawn only during the colonial era after comletion of anthroological field work which could not be carried out before that time. It revealed a comlicated lacework of more than a thousand variously defined ol itical societies  some isolated and some interdeendent, some free and others slave, some entangled in imerial relations, others in feudal ties, and so on Traditional Africa was a world of limited olitical scale somewhat reminiscent of the localized feudal societies of Euroe during the Middle Ages. Africa of course lacked entirely the over arching equivalent of socas chrisiana (or of the Chinese Emire in East Asia or the Mogul Emire in South Asia) The olitical tech nologies which historically enabled largescale olitical orders to be built and sustained in Euroe and Asia  organized armies and navies, means of transort, universal religion, literacy, coinage, bureaucracy, extensive division of labour, communications  were absent in most arts of the continent These technologies and the territorial state along with it were introduced only at the end of the nineteenth century by Euroean colonialists. 8

HE  L  S S    L PSVE SVEREGN REGME

Without fixed territorial bases under central govements there could of course not develop the usual marks of statehood which presuppose defined borders domestic jurisdiction civil peace within the jurisdiction enforced by a government with the sole right to exer­ cise force and the administrative ability to mobilize public revenue Traditional frica was marked instead by the ebb and flow of continu­ ous warfare and violent feuding at all levels of society often ritualized and organized in terms of kinship The absence of money in most places obstructed public inance. Territorial states also make possible orderl and lawful international relations between juridically equal mutually recognized and therefore independent governments Old frica more closely resembled a world of suzerain-state systems which operate on the principle of dependency and tribute between unequals. There often were no irm borders at the periphery and tribute could be paid to more than one suzerain at the same time The absence of defined territorial states meant that international relations in te conventional meaning were absent also One cannot speak convincingly of an frican system of states on the analogy of for example the modern European statessystem or the city states­ systems of ancient Mesopotamia and classical Greece    frican states were fluid and  c creations that did not require a fixed human or territorial base 4 lthough various particular customs regulated inter­ course among contiguous political systems there was no internationa society extending over large regions and much less the continent as a whole and consequently no general diplomatic practices or inter national law. Europeans and fricans for centuries engaged in treaty making along the coasts but whether it had the same meaning and signifcance for both parties is open to doubt Europeans signed trea ties with an eye on other Europeans and with the aim of acquiring trading rights or territorial claims which conformed with international law fricans probaby made them to gain commercial and political advantage over local rivals. They could hardly have realized the Euro­ pean international legal implications of what they were doing This in outline was the political character of frica a century ago when Euro pean governments partitioned the continent and incorporated the parts into the international system as their dependencies The partition of frica it should be emphasized was not only a scramble for territories by European powers but was also a joint take over based on an internationa agreement made at the ein onfer­ ence 1885) which established basic ules of partition intended to prevent conflict between these powers nd it succeeded by and large Therefore while the conference itself did not partition frica it did 

S  V E  E  G N TY  E G  M E S  N H  S T  Y

nsttutonalz th pocss n th am of catng a pax Europaa n th contnnt Euopan stats occupd ttos b sgnng blatal tats wth Afcan uls n accodanc wth uls st down b th confnc It should b mphassd that ths uls concnd onl th latons of th Euopan pows inr s and dd not appl to Afcan uls who w not psnt at th Bln Confnc and w xcludd ntl fom ths sovgn gam Th xclusv ol was to sgn a tat If th fusd th could b focd n accodanc wth ntatonal law. In th ccumstancs of powful ntudng mcha nzd stats and wak undvlopd Afcan socts, csson can asl b magnd as th lss of two ls fom th Afcan pont of vw Intnatonal ttl to all but v fw Afcan ttos was tans fd to Euopan stats usuall b csson and occasonall b con qust  although al f at all b th occupaton of trra nullius Although conqust was not common n Afca t was of cous lgt mat n nntnth-cntu ntnatonal law. Cunt lgal analss ss csson as vdnc that Afcan uls w sovgns Hnc, Alxandowcz s dscpton of th colonzng pocss as a comptton fo ttl dds 9 If th Euopan succssos ttl was vald, th fom holds ttl also had to b vald and fo ths h had to b sovgn  Ths ntptaton usuall clams th authot of M F Lndl Howv, h maks th cucal pont that csson dd not mpl qual sovgnt, hnc hs dstncton btwn an advancd sovgn and a natv sovgn Th v noton of backwad tto dnotd an absnc of qual sovgnt  Ths s cucal bcaus t clal sgns a p-xstng dual sstm of supo and nfo stats. Matn Wght has mo accuatl captud th chaact of ths tats n fng n ths cas to potctd stats whch of all dpndncs had th gatst sdual sovgnty t s pobabl that such tats a domstc matts and hav valdt n ntatonal law onl n that th a ntnatonall cognzd as stablshng a dpndnt latonshp btwn th potctd stat and th Btsh Cown whch pcluds oth stats fom ntfng 5 A C McEwn lkws uss th quvocal tm quas-tat n fng to th fomal acquston of tto b Euopans n East Afca.52 Th Bln Confnc sultd n an ntnatonal famwok of lag-scal jusdctons mposd b Euopan pows on Afcans wth onl th most tnuous ndcaton of th consnt Most xpla natons stop at ths pont B th postv ntnatonal law of th da, howv Afcans had no consnt to gv th w not consdd to b capabl of onsntng. Th colons w th st ttoal stats 70

E CASSCA POSVE SOVEREN RE E

wth xed boundare recognzed b nteatonal law that frca poeed Thee were the urdcton from whch frcan member­ hp n nteatonal ocet would eventuall prng The colonalt lkewe were the rt mode tatebulder The expanded enor­ moul the poltcal cale of the contnent b reducng man hundred of tradtonal poltcal tem to ome fift new and uuall arbtrar urdcton whch were panted on the mp n the colour of occup ng Europen tate. In bref, the partton amounted to an nter­ natonal encloure movement n whch the vat connent wa dvded among everal European power and t populaton were ubected to ther urdcton wth lttle f an regard to frcan value or nt­ tuton. The entre epode wa authorzed and guded b nter­ naonal law whch wa tll a European nttuton  T H  ' S A C R  D TRUST OF C  V  L  Z A T  O N

B the tme o f frcan partton  n the late nneteenth centur t wa necear for European govement to utf ther control of foregn populated terrtore condered not fit for elfgovement  doctrne of the acred trut of cvlzaton wa elaborated for th purpoe at a ucceon of nteatonal conference It paralleled dometc guardanhp of aborgnal people n orth merca b contnentalzng ettler tate Truteehp wa a codeword for patealm whch  a moral pracce that are whenever gncant gap n capablt ext be­ tween agent, uch a thoe between parent and chldren, the able and the dabled, rch and poor, and o forth.  ndcad, uch a gap opened between Europe and man part of a, frca and ceana n the nneteenth centur European were now n unchallenged control of mllon of quare mle of terrtor and hundred of mllon of people outde Europe whch the had to utf to themelve f not et to thoe people The were n a poton to extend the bleng and beneft of ther cvlzaton to the ret of the world whch htherto had not been able to eno them Th became ther cvlzng mon or the whte man burden. The frcan, accordng to Sr Frederck later Lord) Lugard, hold the poton of a latebo chld n the faml of naton, and mut a et be chooled n the dcplne of the nurer   The elfdentcaton of European tate a cvlzed parent and of man nonEuropean ocete a backward chldren and the cone quent practce of paternalm acqured moral and legal tandng n nternatonal relaton Wardhp entaled, accordng to Lndle, both the dute whch the advanced people collectvel owe to back 7

SEREIGY R E G I M E S I  H I S RY

ward racs i n gnra and 'h dus which a paricuar Powr ows o backward racs undr is immdia conro   This docrin was a signican chang of inaiona giimacy Prior o h ninnh cnury hr was no such hing as an x pici sandard of civiiaion and no nd for on I was naura for Europans o assum h suprioriy of hir civiiaon bu no is hgmony Ousidrs wr si a hra Th ascndancy of ninnhcnury mchanizd sahood was markd by a shif in inrnaiona giimacy from faring barbarians o paronizing hm naiona rusship aso rfcd prvaiing idoogis of h day And Europ and Amrica wr songy influncd by various posiivisic and vouinary horis of progrss which sough o xpain and jusify h rmarkab ascndancy of Ws civiiaion ovr a ohrs Naura aw was no ongr a aw of oraiy and jusic bu of succss and surviva I accound for h obvious fac ha whis wr far in advanc of ohr racs which was consrud as vdnc of suprioriy Racia paaism was ofn xprssd x piciy as in h 193 commn of an Amrican on h Lagu of Naions mandas sysm Th ngro rac has hihro shown no capaciy for progrssiv dvopmn xcp whn undr h uag of ohr pops Posiiv sovrigny docrn ndd o qua civiiaion wih h abiiy of sas o dfnd hmsvs and o proc civi condiions Civiizaion bcam a sca for dfining h inaiona sanding of counris, incuding hir ga capaciy and righs Th sandard of civiizaion mrgd in rspons o wo probms procng h ivs, ibry, and propry of Europans abroad, and drmining which counris dsrvd rcogniion as sovrign sas As rgards h forr, h sandard dmandd ffcv ga procon of forign naionas by h govrnmn of whavr couny hy appnd o b in Eihr h consiuiv rcogniion of a nonWsrn sa as sovr ign or is rducon o a Europan dpndncy can b undrsood in rms of his rquirmn As rgards h ar, h sandard ad drssd h subsqun probm of dpndncis whos popuaions wr iving in barbarous condions and rquird, among ohr acons of h coonia powr, supprssion of savy and  sav rad (and aso offnsiv cusoms such as poygamy and su), physi ca

procion

of backward pops,

and promoion of ir

improvmn  7 A nw body of inrnaiona aw o advanc h civiiaion of dpn dn pops was nunciad a succssiv inrnaiona confrncs during h hyday of Wsrn cooniaism Th ina Ac of h Con 72

 H E  S A C R E D RS' OF CIVIIZION

gress of Vienna 181) had aready provided for the sppression o f the slave trade which was accomplished on the high seas y the middle of the centry The General Act of the Berlin Conference 188) soght in addition the aolition of slavery which was then widespread in Arica and the Middle East These were restraints laid on colonial sects The signatory powers themselves ndertook an inteational oli gaton to improve the moral and material welleing' of Africans and to protect and favor all religios, scienfic, or charitale insttons which aim at rnging hoe to them the lessngs of vlzaon' (Article 6). The Conference agreed that althogh natve poplatons were nale to defend their own interests they were nevertheless enttled to protecon y inteaonal law which demanded the oser vation of a certain level of condct on the part of the powerfl natons in dealing with defenceless ackward peoples   The efficacy of these reqirements are qestionale, of corse, as disclosed for example y the otrageos ases of plantaon capitalism n King Leopold's Congo The fact that it was a plic scandal in Erope, however, is ndicative of the patealist international morality of the day. In com menting recently on the historical signifcance of the Berlin Confer ence, Lewis Gann concldes tha it helped to set p a new inteational opinion and a new inteaonal standard wherey the colonizers  at least in theory  dged themselves and their compet tors' and it helped to write a new chapter in the history of inteatonal oligations'  59 The sacred tst of cvilization was instittionalzed after the first world war in the Leage of atons' Permanent Mandates Com mssion whch was sperseded aſter the second y the nited aons Inteaonal Trsteeship System. Arcle  of the Covenant declared that for territores inhaited y peoples not yet ale to stand y themselves nder the strenos conditons of the mode world there shold e applied the principle that the well-eing and development of sch peoples form a sacred trst of civlisation' Ttelage' of sch peoples was 'entrsted' to certain advanced nations' and exercised y them as Mandatories on ehalf  the Leage'   Three classes of Mandates were recognzed ased on the stage of development of he poplaons involved 'A' Mandates for peoples of the Middle East who son wold e capale of exercsing sovereign statehood, B Mandates for most peoples of sSaharan Arca who stll reqed an ndefnite period of Eropean ttelage efore ths stage was reached, and fnally C' Mandates for the primitve peoples of Soth West Africa and the Pacfic who very likely wold reman wards of the statessystem for centres,  not forever 73

S O V E R E I G N T Y R E G I M E S I N H I S T O RY

The standard of civiization was still in evidence at the founding of the UN Although 'development was by now displacing the more valueloaded civilization the doctrine of trusteeship was institution alized in the UN Charter. Arcle 73 declared that UN members with foreign territories 'whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of selfgovernment    accept as a sacred trust the obligation to pro mote to the utmost    the wellbeing of the inhabitants of these territories  A Trusteeship Council was established to administer inter naonal dependencies inherited from the defunct League and ad dional territories detached from Japan and Italy by teir defeat in the second world war or voluntariy placed in trusteeship by a colonial power Although the war set in motion changes which evetually contib uted to the ilegitimacy of colonialism in 145 this radically different inteational society was not yet a reality Inteational tusteeship ony became controversial following the war A division opened at the UN between the Trusteeship Council  which was idenfied with colonialism  and e emergent Third World minority in the General Assembly which if decolonization were to continue would eventually be in the majority At the first session in 146 it was evident that some delegaons considered the Declaration Regarding NonSelfGove ing Teritories (Chapter 1 1 of the Charter) as a warrant for the UN to supevise colonialism in general The distinction between ordinary dependencies and trust territories became blurred and paternalism was placed on the defensive In an age of equality it was difficult to jusfy a pracce grounded in hierarchy  even if it was benevolent or the people it affected were as yet not sufficiently equipped or prepared to operate a mode state T H   O  S T T  T  O  O F   G AT    S O   R   G  T Y

About the mid150s a reversal of classical positive sovereignty in iteational relations conceing the dependency system began to occur The change was extremely rapid in historical terms by the early 1s it was virtually complete. And it was general almost the entire colonial and trusteeship system was dismantled It paralleled a dom esc revoluon in the United States in which formal racial discrimi naon was abolished within a tenyear period between the 154 Supreme Cour judgement against school segregation in Brown versus Board of Education and the 164 Civil Rights Act Domestic and inter national antidisimination doctrines were undoubtedly related  Both focused on racial minorities Both involved claims for equality and dignity Both met eventually if not at irst with widespread public 74

T H E C O N S T I T U T I O N O F N E G A T I V E S O V E E I G N T Y

acceptance to the point where nobody but a few diehards were pre­ pared to defend the old regime. Both were instiuted by law Sovereign rghts for colonial peoples in the community of states was the equiv­ alent of civil and political rights or memrs of racal mnorties in Weste democracies  Renunciation o f the standard o f civizaton was - according t o Georg Schwarzenberger - part of the 'secularizaton of nteational law : a shift from law beween 'cvlzed states to law between 'sovereign states  61 Secularization excluded not only Christian defnitions of 'vi­ lzed customs or even liberal values such as consttutional govement and the rule of law but also nationaliy as criteria of membershp in international society Sovereignty was now to be based on a universal doctrine of categorcal selfdetermnation which dd not presuppose underlyng naonhood but only subject colonial status The dtrine stopped at the ndependence of all preexisting colonal entties and did not extend to nationalties or etnic communites whch were not colonial jurisdictons Selfdeterminaton orignaly posulated peoples rather than prnces as the only grounds of inteaonal legitmacy that is,

tol

self­

determination The self was a nation which was assumed to be a substantial entity based on ether poltcal traditon or ethnc ds tnctveness Britain and Swizerland were instances of the former, Germany and Italy of the latter Nneteenthcentury nationalism in Germany and taly nvolved the formation of nationstates by the unfication or absorption of various prncpales or cty states whch shared a common language 'Determinaton presupposed not only the exstence but also the capacity of peoples to establsh ther own constitutonal le and to gove themselves as ndependent states  Ths implied both personal and natonal freedom a s the ulmate grounds of sovereign statehood The spirit of the doctrne s dsclosed by the followng asserton of John Stuart Mill Free nstiutons are next to impossible n a country made up of diferent nationalites Mll was thnkng of the multnational AustroHungaran Empire whch denied not only individual but also natonal lberty to ts subject peoples The principle of natonal selfdetermnaton first receved quas­ official recogntion at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference under the nflu­ ence of Amercan President Woodrow Wlson and to a lesser extent Brsh Prme Mnster Davd Lloyd George lthough t was consdered a polcal rather than a legal prnciple and was not acknowledged by the League Covenant t nevertheless fostered a plebisctarian method of deteg sovereign statehood n Cenal and Easte Europe based 

S O V E R E I G N TY R E G I M E S I N H I S T O RY

on natonaes and the protection o minores It acknowedged the nteatona egtimacy o sma states and reversed the course o nneteenth-centuy natonasm by dvdng rather than unting hs­ torica states It aso combned the prncpe o se-determnation wth treates guaranteeng the rights o ethnc mnorites  Under the eague however natona sedetermination was re­ stcted to Europeans Non-Europeans were subject as noted to the mandates system Mandates and Trust Terrtores were thereore a dena and not a grant o se-determnaton The UN Charter nvokes 'the pncpe o equa rghts and sedetermnaton o peopes' (Artice ) and reterates t n connecton wth 'nteationa economc and soca cooperaton' (Artce 55) However as noted the Charter sti recognzed unequa capactes o derent peopes or segovement and the necessty o trusteeshp Atce 73 acknowedges the ob­ gaon 'to deveop segovement    accordng to the particuar ccumstances o each terrtory and ts peopes and ther vayng stages o advancement' and rtce 76 speaks o 'se-govement or nde­ pendence as may be approprate' Athough trusteeshp s an 'obgaton' under the Charter whereas sedetermnation s ony a 'prncpe' one cannot but agree that t has nevetheess 'ceary proved to be a prncpe o the utmost mportance n nteaona reaons'   For awyers the man ssue s whether sedetermnaon has the orce o aw For poca scentsts the ssue s te ecacy o sedetermnaon n nteatona reaons nd nternaona deveopments snce 950 suggest that t became competey eectve as an ancoona njuncton The prncpe dd not appear uy ormed n the Chater but was brought nto exstence by nteaona potcs oowing the war Thrd Word natonasts used the rhetoc o sedetemnaton to captre the mora hgh gound n nteatona reatons and the oder argument o tstee­ sp proved uttery nadequate to counter t The negatve soveregnty dea o sedetermnaton as a categorica rght o a coona peopes as asseted by a successon o UN Genera Assemby Resoutions hch eventuay shaped nternatona egtmacy on the ssue Among the most sgncant were Resouton 42 (1950) whch caed or a study o te ways and means 'whch woud ensure the right o peopes and naons to sedetermnaton' Resoution 637 (1952) whch decared tat the rght to se-determnaon 's a prereqste to the u enjoy ment o a undamenta human rghts' and Resoution 188 (957) c hed that sedetermnaton was a rght deservng due respect om member states The vctory o categorca se-determnaton was sgnaed y he 76

 H E  O N S      I O N O  N E G A  I  E S O  E R E I G N 

eebrted 1960 Dertio o the Grtig of Idepedee to Co­ oi Cotre d Peope (Reotio 1514 hih proimed tht  peope hve the right to efdetermitio d idey of poiti, eoomi, oi or edtio preprede hod ever erve   pretext for deyig idepedee . It  ped i the Geer Aemby by  vote of 89 to 0, ith 9 btetio. ve the ooi poer ere iig to rejet it The Dertio i o­ idered by Tird Word tte d by my other   eod Chrter of the UN promgted to iberte  remiig depedet peope From thi time empiri ttehood   vid grod for determiig the rght to overeigty i the Third Word et ito eipe. Hvig previoy odemed Portgee ooiim d Soth Afri prtheid  rime git hmity, i 1 970 the Geer Aemby i Reotio 2621 dered The rther otitio of ooiim i  it form d mifettio i  rime hih otitte  viotio of the Chrter of the Uited Ntio, the Dertio o the Grtig of Idepedee to Cooi Cotrie d Peope d the pripe of itertio .  It o dered tht the trgge for efdetermi­ o i ooi territore here it  beig reited, h  Portgee Afr,  egitimte   foreig itervetio to p­ port it, d y ttempt to ppre the trgge  otry to the UN Chrter We o ive i  ord virty devoid of form ooi jriditio d it reittemet eem impoibe. The e dotrie hged the defiitio of both the oetive ef d poiti  determitio . The ef  o oger either hitori or ethi tio bt rtifii exooi jriditio hih ere mtiethi etitie i mot e d iroiy remiiet of the od mtitio empire of rope. The tio  o merey  ho hd bee bjet of  prtir ooi govemet d ere of differet re from their ie rer. digeo eor to thoe rer ere by deito egitimte whether or ot they expreed the popr i Their right  overeig d the hm right of their bjet to ef-determito were oe d the me The ef  ot determied by pebiite d virty o oe w how for mioritie Determitio me do to the evitio of ie ro­ pe rer d the erto of mjority re bed o  ri defi itio of the mjority Sie ooiim  eetiy  viotio of ri overeigty', efdetermitio  deooitio  Sefdetermitio o oger me the me  previoy d mot me the oppoite The e overeig tte re ot y bed o tioitie either ethi or hitori thotio oy rrey oiided ith ooi jriditio d mot ooie ever 

SV IGNTY   G I M  S I N H SY

dvlopd into authntic political nationalitis Th nw doctin x plicitly dnis slfdtmination to thnonationalitis sinc if it w gantd most xisting xcolonial stats would b bokn up just as th AustoHungaian mpi was bokn up by ganting slfdtmi nation to th nationalitis of Cntal Euop  Rsolution

54 dclas

mphatically that any attmpt aimd at th paal o total disupon of th national unity and th titoial intgity of a county is in compatibl with th puposs and pincipls of th Chat of th Unitd Nations  Consquntly thnonational slfdtmination is now illgitimat and th pospcts of indpndnc fo th numous thnonationalits of th Thid Wold a blak And sinc most of th nw stats also do not povid minoity ights and intnal autonomis to compnsat thnonationalitis and indd oftn dlibatly with hold thm thy tnd to povok civil discod along thnic lins as did th old multinational mpis of Euop Matin Wight commntd at th tim of dcolonization with national slfdtmination bing applid in conditions so diffnt fom thos in which it oiginatd that th wod "nation" has lost any distinct maning htognity has tud Th stats psntd at th Unitd Nations a mo vai ous in oigin siz and stuctu than w th stats psntd at th Congss of Wstphalia  OUO, SOAO , O OAO

How can w undstand th chang o f intational lgiti macy and lgality which accompanid th dmis of Wstn ovsas colonialism and th appaan of numous sovign stats in th Thid Wold? How should w chaactiz th contmpoay int national gim and how dos it compa to thos outlind abov which xistd pviously? Th othodox posivist agumnt is that th is of slfdtmination is consistnt with an histoically xpanding intational socity that finally assimilatd all of th wolds political systms to its institutions which hav bn dcontaminatd of Wst  valus and a now authntically scula and univsal n oth wods th club of stats has bn opnd to all gadlss of ligion ac cultu o gogaphy Sinc ovsas colonialism has bn abol ishd no futh admissions a possibl without upstting xisting j uisdictions. Nw stathood thfo spings fom intnational cognition in cluding th fomal tansf of sovignty fom a Euopan pow to an indignous govmnt Nw stats a lgally positd by fomal actions of intnational socity and th will of stats alady stab lishd . 67 This implis that thy flct convntional citia of sov 78

EO LUTIO N , E STOATI O N , O  INNOATION

egn tatehood  Athough thee crtera have evoved over tme  t  poe to ay that the contemporary goa ytem o overegn' tate ha emerged out o an earer Eurocentrc ytem o cvzed and eore that Chrtan' tate There  nttutona contnuty, thereore, etween the od European tate whch ormed the orgna communty o tate n the md eventeenth century and the admon o new tate uch a Inda or Ghana or Fj nto the Unted Naton n the md twenteth The goazaton o the overegn tateytem thereore dcoe an unroken htory Athough t normatve tc ture ha ecome ar more compex than prevouy the ac prncpe o the nternatona ocety have remaned the ame, a have the motve and many o the mode o ehavour o t memertate  Th  ecaue the underyng mperatve o ndependence are  the ame A contrary argument aocated wth natura aw doctrne and the work o Chare Aexandrowcz hod that pot-coona nteatona norm are a return to the practce o a more toerant amy o naton era whch exted pror to the re o Wetern hegemony and hur n nteatona reaton The od natura aw regme wa detroyed n the nneteenth century y European tate who nttuted contrary potvt doctrne to juty ther terrtora expanon overea A key change wa the rejecton o decaratory recognton  whch acknow edged the extence, dgnty, and equaty o non-Wete govern ment  and the adopton o conttutve recognton  whch juted the mpoton o Wetern vaue on non-Wete ocete Tradtona nteatona ocety, whch had een open and emraced Aan a we a European tate who engaged n recproca reaton, hrank nto a Eurocentrc ytem whch mpoed on extraEuropean countre t own dea 69 Thee dea ncuded cpacty or e-de­ ence and the tandard o cvzaton a crtera o conttutve recog­ nton A ew non-Wete tate were recognzed, ut mot were reduced to dependence Independence o Thrd Word tate  thereore a reveron to overegnty' aed o tradtonanatura aw precept By reveron' Aexandrowcz mean that tate are havng retored to them an nde pendence that wa taken away durng the age o European domnaton and  ther natura rght Jut a Poand had t nteatona tatu retored durng the rt word war ater more than a century o depr vaton, o ao have Inda, Burma, Sr anka, Indonea, Maagay, Agera, Morocco, and other tradtona tate had ther overegnty returned They conequenty are not new tate at a ut are a od  not ndeed oder than mot Wete tate And athough Aexan79

 O  E R E   R E    E    H OR

drowcz concedes n he case of Afrca ha mos of the ex-colonal enies are new saes n he presen day meanng of he word' he neverheless argues tha the Afrcan contnen as a whole has revered o soveregny afer an nerlude of proecorae staus under the es of he Berln Conference he man pont of whch always was o resore he connens ndependence.  he resul s a global communy wh more of he characerstcs of he old naural law regme than of he herarchcal posvs srucure of he more recent pas A hrd explanaon spelled out n he followng chapers acceps pars of hese argumens bu also deecs novel posulaes and preceps n he normatve framework of contemporary nernaonal socey as t apples o the excolonal staes It agrees wh the postvss ha he large maory of hrd World saes have been posted' by nter naonal socey and never exsed prevously even n remoely smlar geographcal or consuonal shape  Not only the soveregny but also  mos cases he errtoral ursdcons and bureaucraces of these saes are creaures of colonalsm or ruseeshp kewse the thrd vew subscrbes o he naural law hess hat nondscrmnaon s a reversal of posve soveregny docrne. Bu  canno agree that curren neaonal socey s a resoraton of the old loosely con nece naural law regme he pre-mperal and post-colonal worlds are dfferent n fundamenals. Most fundamental s the contemporary emphass on acvely renforcng he fragle ntegrty of the excolonal sates by nonnervenon and neatonal development assstance hs s a docrne no only of nondscrmnaton but also of posve dscrmnaion neaonal ad, and saebuldng. oday he nernaonal communy does no merely tolerae d versy bu also seeks o supply a safey-ne' for numerous nsub sanal countres whch are unable o provde very much n the way of cvil or socoeconomc goods for ther populatons f the post-960 nernaonal regme were merely a restoraton of tradonal norms of non-dscrmnaon he emphass on hrd World developmen would no be here here would not be ths emphass because  would be assumed ha saes dfferen n form or substance are nevertheess equal n value o her nhabans he old natural law regme was a laissz-fair world. here were no nternatonal standards of emprcal satehood, of developed and underdeveloped countres he new poscolonal regme s an actvtst and constrctvst mode of nter naonal relaons. Negave soveregnty s a twenteth-century nst uton whch was unknown n tradona nternatonal relatons t was unknown because he problem t has been arranged to deal wh  the emergence and developmen of numerous precarous saes  was not 80

E V O L    O N  R  S  O R A   O N  O R  N N O V A  O N 

prcivd prior to th dcoloizo o  th oWstr word i th mid twtith ctury h problm o ittiol dvlopmt ws ot pprt bcus th sttssysm ws ot s dply dividd s it is tody btw dvlopd d udrdvlopd stts I bri w r witssig th mrgc o  commuity o stts with  ormtiv lgl d orgiztiol suprstructur tht is r mor lbort th ythig which istd prviously. his brigs us bc to th ctrovrsy idtiid t th bgiig y hird World stts r scrcly slstdig rlitis but vrthlss r com­ pltly sovrig jurisdictios rcogizd by ittiol lgitimcy d lw Ruggd idividulism i itrtiol rltios hrdly p­ plis to ths titis which or th most prt r crturs o  ovl itrtiol protctioism.

8

4

INDEPENDENCE BY RIGHT

   G   N   W

The hstora hange rom postve t o negatve overegnty s most speay and onretey evdent n European pota ds engagement rom Asa, Ara, and Oeana  As ndated n the ast hapter, the rght to ndependene and the orrespondng duty to deoonze was nstaed as an nteatona ategora mperatve oowng the seond word war and by 19 t was the unhaenged and unhaengeabe dearaton o the Unted Natons There s no better pae to ook or hangng norms and assumptons about sver egn statehood, thereore, than n the sphere o deoonzaton t s one o the momentous nteatona reversas o the twenteth entury whose onsequenes  matera and mora, ntended and unntended  ontnue to reverberate and w or deades to ome We ve n a postoona word whh has undoubted sgnane r nter natona reaons The termnaton o oonasm has neesstated and aed nto exstene ateatve nteatona arrangements and pra es to dea wth the spea rumstanes and probems o post oona states, as we sha see n hapters 5 and 6 Deoonzaton s oten understood as a suessu revt aganst the West and there s evdene to reommend ths postve soveregnty vew The usua mage s o a dene o European prmay by the devastaton and demorazaton o two goba wars and the rse o powers on the perpheres o Europe (Unted States Russa and beyond apan whh utmatey dspaed the Eurpean system  t s ndated by vgorus ant-oonasm durng and wng the seond word war whh made t mpossbe to reestabsh Duth rue n the East ndes and Frenh onasm n ndohna Brtsh deo onzaton n the subonnent n reatn to redbe natonast mve ments, suh as the ong estabshed ndan Congress, s a urther nstane The suessu ant-ona war  beraton aganst the Frenh n Agera s yet another These epsodes are nsstent 82

TH ROLT AGAINST TH WST

wth ptve veegty: ew tatehd  pmaly a et  act I may the pat  the Thd Wld hweve cel ad cedble atcla atalm capabe  hetg veegty  gh cmty wth ptve teatal aw ay dd t de­ vep Th  evdet m th evt clal htgaphy baed  the pt945 mpea achve Accdg t e hta: 'Wete Epe' tat ad capacty elatve t the Uted State wa cleay  the wae  mt  the tweteth cety ad vetly  ate 945 bt whethe that tat ad capacty e  ela t Uppe Vlta  the Gld Cat/Ghaa  vey dbtl  Accdg t athe: 'whateve peaded the th empe 947 t pa t w deme  tpcal Aca t wa t ea  back Aca eedm ghte' Ad  gvemet dc pape  the day 'thee wa lttle ee     ta beg t mpvehed  the tak  ca le   he eteatg  the ace  atalt htty' 7 N wa thee ay cvct that Aca wee w adeately taed ad epped  egvemet The pee  taeg veegty wee t a ceag extet teatal ad pcpled The ptwa ea wteed a at-cla delgy expeed wth gwg cvct by the aay elagg mbe  ewy eached tate wh a Pete Cavce wte at the tme 'ae weak bt t meek' .8 Atca m  etpect k me ad me lke a ea chage  te ata legtmacy Althgh declat  Aa wa pvked by cbe Japaee ccpat  clal tete dg the wa atewad whe Japa wa deeated ad the clal pwe egaed the tate ad capablte they cld t ccely eaet cl­ am  mal ad ega tem The clam  dmetc jdct  the cle ad  the lack  dge capacty  elgve met ell ceagly  dea ea  epecaly at the UN y the late 950 teatal p had ted dametay agat clalm The mage  a mave ad vlet evlt agat the Wet  mt apt a egad the beakp  the Dtch Eat Ide ad Fech Id­ cha The ccel va  thee tete ad the by Japa dg the ecd wd wa ae ambg tace  the decle  Epea pwe  that pat  the wld At the tme hweve t wa a m ceta that calm wl t e eted whe Japa wa deeated I 942 accdg t Ld Haley the Nethe­ lad gvemet ctemplated gatg 'atmy' t the Eat Ide bt wth the amewk  a ctg  wth Hlad 9 

INDEPENDENCE B  RIGHT

Japans occpation prookd Indonsian nationalism, howr, which dring and atr th war was nginrd by Skarno and othr nationalists into a orc to b rckond with Athogh an Indonsian Rpblic was proclaimd in Jakarta (Bataia) in Agst 1945, th Dtch (with initial British assistanc) nrthlss attmptd to rassrt thir colonial rl By 1947 thy had 150,000 troops in th colony Thy did not bcom rconcild to an indpndnt Indonsia ntil 1949 by which tim th UN was alrady a platorm o ocal anti-colonialism and th cost o prsring in thir ntrpris was high   Holland by thn was also inold in th mrging Wstrn allianc against th Soit Union Prssrs rom th Unitd Stats inclding a thrat to sspnd Marshall Aid obligd th Dtch gomnt to ct its losss in th East Indis and concntrat its limitd armd orcs on th dnc o Wstrn Erop Th Frnch wr n mor dtrmind to rstablish colonial rl in Asia atr th dat o Japan. Th war likwis arosd anticolonial nationalism in Japans occpid Indochina An indignos gorn mnt ndr th commnist Vit Minh with cti control or important trritoris in north Vitnam stablishd itsl in 1945 ollowing th Japans withdrawal Ho Chi Minh rad a Dclaration o Indpndnc o th Dmocratic Rpblic o Vitnam which con­ taind Thomas Jrsons immortal words all mn ar cratd al . Th rt o th Frnch to Soth Vitnam in th spring o 1946 consntly st o a bloody anticolonial war in which th Vit Minh orcs wr abl to scr matrial spport rom commnist China atr 1949 In 1954 th Frnch wr orcd to concd indpndnc Althogh a Rpblic o Vitnam brily xistd and lctions wr plannd throghot north and soth Vitnam, thy wr nr hld Instad two indpndnt Vitnams stats mrgd (which latr bcam th scn o anothr war inoling th Unitd Stats) Th ntangld dcolonization o aos and Cambodia occrrd in 1949 and 1953 Althogh Franc nr applid its ll military might and th conict was consd by th iss o commnism and th cold war, th transr o powr in Frnch Indochina is on o th last ambigos instancs o positi sorignty in postwar dcolonization. Had it not bn or this iss th Unitd Stats wold ha bn hard prssd to dny Ho Chi Minhs claim to b on o Jrsons sccssors Unlik th Dtch and th Frnch, th British did not ndaor to prolong thir colonial rl in Soth Asia by orc. Dcolonization was not a nw policy India had bn a candidat or indpndnc as a dominion within th British Commonwalth sinc th lat 1920s. Althogh acclratd by th war, th indpndnc o th sbconti

H O AAS H WS

nent i n 97 completed a constitutional process which had been under­ way for two decades The impact of the war including the fierce campaign of the Indian Army against the Japanese in neighbouring Burma had enormous signficance not only for Indian decolonization but also Burmese These episodes made it impossible to delay the ndependence of ri Lana (Ceylon even though the island colony was not as advanced as India constitutonally, was deeply scarred by an historic division between the majority Buddhist inhalese and the minority Hindu Tamil populations, and had been ruled separately by Britain as part of the dependent empire ri Lana was the first territory under the Colonial Office to gain independence which set an important precedent for other colonies European decoloniation in these parts of Asia signalled the end of empire-as-power' .   In most places after the mid950s the revolt against the West ceased to be a credible rebellion against colonial power and became instead a worldwide moral campaign against the ideology and insttutions of colonialism   The doctrine of negatve sovereignty in postwar decolonizaton is therefore seen most clearly in the international emergence of Blac Africa and Oceania Before this sea change of international legitimacy the complete independence of these areas was rarely contemplated Although there is wide agreement about the signiicance of the episode the underlying causes of decoloniaton continue to be debated and no consensus among scholars has yet emerged What is important from the perspective of this study, however, s not only its signiicance but also its character Independence became an unquali­ ied right of all colonial peoples: self-determination. Colonialism lie­ wise became an absolute wrong an injury to the dignity and autonomy of those peoples and of course a vehicle for their economic exploitation and political oppression This is a noteworthy historcal shift in moral reasoning because European overseas colonialism was originally and for a long time justified on legal positivist and paternalist grounds which postulated the unpreparedness of such peoples for self-govern­ ment and the responsibility of civilized' states to gove them unl they were prepared It is dificult to mae this point today without seeming to be a colonial apologist But the fact is that until the second world war and even for some time afterwards this was the predomi­ nant doctrine of international legitimacy and law. Decolonizaton amounted to nothing less than an international revolution on this question in which traditnal asumpons about the right to sovereign statehood were turned upside down. 

I N D E P E N D E N C E BY R I G H T VO ORY DCOOZO

Britsh cooniaism opratd with th ida o  trustship coo nis wr hd in trust by Grat Britain unti such tim as thy wr ab to gov thmsvs in accordanc with 'mod idas of civi id ru' as ord Haiy onc put it. In British poitica thought this ida was at ast as od as Burk Not vry pop wr y ab to stand aon undr th arduous conditions of th mod word. Nor wr a indignous rurs capab of civi govmnt. Just as it was a driction o duty or a British coonia rur to act unconstitutonay  which was th basis o Burk's argumnt to impach Warrn Hastngs  so aso woud it b a driction o duty i or xamp Northrn Niga wr rstord 'to th uncontrod ru of th mirs or Maay to that o its sutans' .  Indd th poicy of indirct ru or what ord ugard cad 'Th Dua Mandat'  which pursud th goa of trans forming traditiona authorits into mod oca govmnts  was intndd to avoid this.  Th traditona British ida was xprssd in a 938 spch in th Hous o Commons by Macom MacDonad Sc tay o tat or Coonis he great purpose of the Brtsh Empre s the gradua spread of freedom among a Hs Majestys sujets n whatever part of the word they ve. hat spread of freedom s a sow evoutonary proess . . . n some oones . . . the ganng of freedom has aready gone very far n others t s neessary a muh sower proess t may tae generatons or even entures for the peopes n some parts of the Coona empre to aheve sefgovernment i

Morovr it woud b prmatur to assum that vry unit within th Britsh Empir woud vntuay attain compt sovrignty. Many had popuations which wr sti amost ntiry iitrat not ony in th strict inguistic sns but aso  and prhaps mor importanty  in th institutiona sns of having itt or no undrstanding of th workings o a mod stat and th rsponsibiitis of citinship. Many wr pagud by divisions among thir popuation which wr so dpy rootd in rigion anguag or custom that dmocratic s-govrnmnt without an impartia xtrna rfr smd imposs­ ib. Many wr too sma for indpndnc rgardss of thir v of dvopmnt. And urthrmor it coud not b assumd that vry coony woud ncssariy sk sf-govmnt a poicy of catgorica indpndnc or a woud abandon many aginst thir wi Th ony practica and rsponsib cours of action was th continuation of coonia dvopmnt oowing th distinctiv ins of ach particuar coony undr th ovra protction frdom and ustic affordd by th impria systm. 

EOUOA DECOOAO

Te Briti a log oerate wit te aaretly cotraictory cocet of coloial elfgovermet  Sice Lor Duram Reort of 1839 wic lauce reoible govermet i Caaa ecoloi atio meat acievig elfgovermet witi te mire Britai accorig to Jo Stuart ill a alway felt uer a certai egree of obligatio to betow o uc of er outyig oulatio a were of er ow bloo a laguage a o ome wo were ot rereetative ititutio forme i imitatio of er ow . 16 Britai coul ot trafer overeigty to ocotitutioal govermet a remai faitful to er ieology of eveloig te civil a olitical a well a te ocial a ecoomic coitio of coloie Te Briti mire a Commowealt wa liee to a gra olitical roceio woe member were oitioe accorig to teir egree of elfgovermet wit Britai a te ieeet omiio i te vaguar a te leat eveloe Africa a Pacific coloie brigig u te rear. Ti Wiggi metaor of coloial evelomet cotrate arly wit te tatic image of te ol Briti mire i wic eeecie revolve arou te moter coutry i eretuity lie te olar ytem a coul ever evelo to equaliy wit it. Te cotitutioal ae of te ew mire wa cotatly evolvig terefore a te oitio of eac coloial uit wa oly a temorary toig lace alog te roa to evetual elfgovermet For toe may bacwar territorie at te rear of te roceio owever te roa aea wa till log a ifficult Te Briti were oeraig witi a amiiar traiio of cooia eveomet wic a alreay le to omiio tatu for wite coloie a accorig to argery Peram tere wa o reao wy it oul ceae to oerate for brow or blac oe  7 Cotitutioal evelomet wa a far more formiable aigmet i Aia Africa a Oceaia ta it a bee i te omiio owever were it occurre more or le aturally witi reomiat uroea commuitie New Zealaer were a caable of elfgovermet a teir firt coui i te Briti Ile. Te ame coul ot be ai of Nigeria or Fijia wo rag from etirely ifferet toc. A 1937 reort of te Royal Ititute of Iteratioal Affair eclare uequivocally tat ecoloiatio rocee to te goal of ieeece oly i coutrie wic are ecoomically a olitically avace Over te wole of troical Africa a te greater art of te Pacific area ti rerequiite a ot bee attaie a irect avace o Weter emocratic lie i ot feaible   Ti wa o elfeviet tat te autor felt o ee to give ay furter exlaatio. After te 1941 etry o f te Uite State ito te eco worl war 87

 N D E E N D E N C E B RGHT

however, significant new demands were placed o n the colonial powers to make plans for decoloniaton It was now necessar to explain the practices and institutons of colonialism which were no longer self­ justifing as the previousl had been  at least within the Eurocentric international communit The British in particular were faced with justiing their longstanding concepton of evolutionar decolon­ ation to suspicious if not outright anticolonial American allies who were now in the drvers seat The American vew of decoloniaton was almost exactl the opposite idealist and revolutionar US Sec­ retar of State Cordell Hull considered that the Atlantic Charter ap­ plied to all nations and to all peoples and the State Department requested timetables for independence throughout the war This necessitated official British interpretaon which was that the Charter onl concerned previousl sovereign countries overrun b Axs powers The British War Cabinet in September 1941 expressed the vew that it was not concerned with the British Empire or, for that matter, with relations between the United States and the Philippines which were internal matters subject exclusivel to domestic jurs­ diction Prime Minister Winston Churchill, repling to a queson in Parliament, said At the Atlant Meetng we had n mnd prmarly the restoraton of the soveregnty selfgovement and natonal lfe of the States and natons of Europe now under the Naz yoke and the prnples governng any alteratons n the tertoral oundares whh may have to  made. So that s qute a sepaate polem fom the po­ gressve evoluto of self-goveng nsttutons n the regons and peoples whh owe allegane to the Brtsh Crown 

This questioning of the European empires b the superpower at the moment of its ascendanc could not but undermine their international legtimac to some degree. Although the United States enthusiasm for universal decoloniation declined following the advent of the cold war and its new realities and complexities, from this time the practices and institutions of colonialism had to be supported b an ideolog which could communicate to states that were constitutionall unsmpathetic to the enterprise and more likel to construe it as exploitation than benevolence and enlightenment. During the war when Britain was heavil dependent on the United States this required diplomac and careful attention to terminolog, as whn Lord Haile, the foremost colonial theorist of the time, noted to his Britsh colleagues that an attempt to draw a distinction between selfgovernment and indepen dence suggests a refinement which will be viewed with a great deal of suspicion in the USA  Haile was commissioned b the British 88

E  O LUIOAR DECO LOIZAIO

governmen durng he war o repor on prospecs or poca de veopmen n he coones He cauoned agans premaure and  consdered changes In hs condena warme repor Nativ Adminis tration and Political Dvlopmnt in British ropical Aica he sounded a wang agans premaure consuionmongerng   An n ec ures a Prnceon Unversy n ebruary 1943 he noed he quckenng demands or segovernmen bu emphaszed o hs Amercan aud ence ha decoonzaon had o be conssen wh mode deas o cvzaon he demand or "beraon mus    mpy he gran o segovernmen o areas whch are aready ied or , and he acve promoon n ohers o a graded poca educaon whch w enabe hem evenuay o manage her own aars whou exerna conro, bu on erms conssen wh mode deas o cvized rue2 The dicues o expanaon and jusicaon are obvous In deendng he empre agans crcsm, eadng Brsh spokes men e obged o pon ou, repeaedy, ha he condons or granng ndependence were ar rom exsing n many coones whch si requred ueage and woud requre  or some me o come The Brish governmen requeny conroned crca opnon whn par amen particuary rom he Labour Pary e wng Coona Sec reares or UnderSecreares had o deend her poces n paramenary saemens  as n a 1942 speech when Harod Mac man (hen UnderSecreary o Sae or he Coones) camed ha he governng princpe o he Coona Empre was parnershp  An opposon member suggesed he correc erm was subordnaon and asked Is  rea parnershp or jus anoher orm o words o deude peope?24 In 1943 he Coona Secreay decared n he House o Commons ha  s no par o our pocy o coner poica advances whch are unjusiied by crcumsances, or o gran segovernmen o hose who are no ye raned n s use  2 A year aer a Brish memorandum prepared or he Dumbaron aks Conerence ob seved ha he deveopmen o segovernmen whn he Brsh Commonweah mus occur n orms appropriae o he varyng cr cumsances o Coona peopes  2 And n an nuenia 1945 Forign Affairs arice wren or a seec American audence Marjory Perham reveaed no ony he ofica British mnd bu aso uncanny oresgh abou he key consequences o rapd unversa decoonizaon Were hey [he coones] hus cu oose, hey woud probaby be se up as very weak uns under an expermena word organzaion2 Here was he emergen mperia ripose o hose who assumed ha nde pendence was a caegorca good whch requred no urher jus icaion 89

 N D  P  ND  NC 

BY

RGH

The British continued ater the war to regard American atttudes to decolonization as a simplisti ideology which  according to the Britsh Ambassador in Washington  disclosed 'wooly sentimentality towards dependent peoples' and an uninormed belie that colonialism was but a mas on simple 'exploitation'  2 The tas was to counter these atti­ tudes with acts about the reality o the colonial situation which varied greatly rom one place to the next However, the idealist outloo in avour o universal decolonization was also reflected by oicial pro­ nouncements o Soviet bloc countries, many Latin American govern­ ments, and the UN General Assembly  whose anticolonial voice strengthened with the admission o every new ex-colonial member It was also expressed by articulate liberal and let-wing opinion in the imperial countries themselves In 1946 it was evident to Margery erham that the gradual pace o constitutional development in British colonies had to be more rapid than was previously thought desirable or even possible in some cass. However, she elt obliged to identiy 'our chie obstacles to the achievement o early and eective sel-government'  (1 the general populations o many colonies i not most were still 'too unaware' o the operations o mode, large-scale government to be capable o citizen­ ship; () most colonies as yet laced any basis o natonal unity ( a number o colonies were so insubstantial that 'anything mor than a limited internal sel-government' was impossible and lastly (4 the level o economic development was still ar too low to support a modern state2 A 1946 Colonial Ofice memorandum observed that it was 'clearly impossible in the modern world' or smaller colonies 'to reach ull selgovement' and it was 'ludicrous' to imagine Barbados or British Honduras 'standing on their own eet'  In a 1948 mem­ orandum or the Brtish Cabinet the Colonial Oice could oresee independence only or Nigeria, Gold Coast, and a ederation o Malaya with Singapore In 1950 colonial oicials in Southeast Asia oresaw a transition period o twenty-ive years 'beore the peoples o Malaya would be ready or complete sel-govement' According to orter and Stocwell, British colonial policymaers 'were at one in assuming sel-government to be generations distant'  2 Although in public it was becoming impolitic to say so, in private memoranda colonial oicials still spoe o political change in terms o generatons or longer Commentators too it or granted that some dependencies were so ar removed rom the conditions o a modern sovereign state that they would probably have to remain as colonies indeinitely In the speech uoted above, Harold Macmllan ended by observng that colonies 'are poor because they are ust beginning They 

E  O L   I O  AR D E C O L O IAIO

are fur  r ve cenurie behind    hey are a i were in he Middle Age here wa al a mral iue: he cncern ha a premaure ranfer f pwer wuld leave many imple rural fl in he clnie vul nerable  inefficiency expliain and even pprein by indigen u gvernmen affed by inexperienced r inadeuaely educaed r elf-erving elie. Brih cmmenarie n imperal ubjec in he lae 940 herefre reveal a cninuing aumpin ha indigenu peple mu achieve an accepable level f cmpeence and repni biy befre elfgvernmen culd be graned n privae he pin wa made wih greaer candur A 94 cnfidenial Clnial Office memrandum aed ha he andard f African public mraliy i lw  .  if African parcipain in lcal r cenral gvernmen i  be ucceful he Clnial gvemen mu face hi prblem quarely .  he pin wa made wih le rerain in a 947 diary enry f r Philip Michell hen Gvernr f Kenya wh berved ha a ye here wa n rean  uppe ha any African can be cahier f a vilage cuncil fr 3 wee wihu ealing he cah . COLONZTON N VLOPMNT

Evluinim wa refleced in Briih declniain plicy by bh Cnervaive and Labur gvemen alhugh he frmer were mre inclined  believe ha me clnie wuld never achieve independence wherea he laer fel ha i wa a uein ulimaely f clnial develpmen hi idea evenually prevailed ince 929 he Labur Pary had rngly uppred he prgreive plicy refleced in Clnial Develpmen and Welfare Ac which were renewed in 940 and 94 n 944 he Clnial Office aw a dynamic prgramme f clnial develpmen a he m effecive way f addreing criic wh were demanding declniain.  Develpmen wuld laer becme an inernainal dcrine excep ha independence wuld n lnger depend n i and he inernainal cmmuniy  including paricularly he rich cunrie  wuld hen be repnible fr aiing he develpmen f pr cunrie. Befre he grea deprein f he 930 hwever clnie were n uually cnceived in erm f develpmen planning. nead hey were ppruniie fr privae invemen in agriculure r mine r infrarucure and meime fr Eurpean elemen. he earlie rganied exprein f Eurpean clnialim were prfi eeing cmpanie f privae advenurer: he Hudn Bay Duch Ea ndie Ryal Niger and Briih uh Afrca Cmpanie  amng many her Bure characerized he Briih Ea ndia Cmpany a a 9

INDEPENDEN CE BY RIGHT

state disguised a s a merchat' but the reverse coud euay be said o may cooies They were commercia eterprises whose ative i habitats were treated as ecoomic istrumets suppies o cheap abour which coud be expoited to ehace the proitabiity o oreig capita The roe o cooia govermet was imited to that o provid ig aw order ad perhaps educatio  i missioaries were ot avaiabe to take o the atter task This istrumeta ad ihumae orietatio udoubtedy shaped the curret image o cooiaism as the istitutioaiatio o expoitatio or at east capitaist proit seekig However as with ay sigicat istitutio thre were other acets o cooiaism icudig as idicated a trusteeship idea that cooies were to be deveoped at east i part or the beeit o idigeous ihabitats This was the doctrie which prevaied i iteratioa aw It is evidet i Artice 6 o the Geera Act o the Beri Coerece (885) which boud a cooia powers i Arica to watch over the preservatio o the ative tribes ad to care or the improvemet o the coditios o their mora ad materia we-beig'   As oted i chapter 3 the idea was expaded i the League adates ad UN Trusteeship Systems British Cooia Deveopmet ad Weare Acts aso discosed the ideoogy The 1929 Act gave the Treasury ad the Cooia Secretary cocurret authority to aocate uds or agricutura ad idustra deveopmet i the cooies The object as Barbu Nicuescu com mets was ot 'to expoit' the atura resources o the cooies but 'to use the capita ad techoogy o Brtai 'to eabe' their deveop met  Likewise the aim o the 1940 Act  accordig to acom acDoad  was to estabish the duty' o British taxpayers 'to cotrib ute directy ad or its ow sake' to the deveopmet o cooia peopes I repy to a pariametary uestio i the ate 1940s co cerig the beet o cooia expeditures to the British taxpayer Sir Sydey Caie Deputy Uder-Secretary or Cooies remarked 'I thik it was aways uderstood that the expediture o moey uder the Cooia Deveopmet ad Weare Act was ot expected to resut i ay dirct retu or beet to the Uited igdom Govemet It was a deiberate act o assistace to Cooia Govemets' O course this did ot excude the desire that cooies be ecoomicay sesustaiig or that cooia deveopmet cotribute to British power ad prestige  But it did provide expicity or the ecoomic weare o idigeous peopes Oce the prospect o decooiatio bega to appear the British beieved as previousy idicated that substatia cooia ecoomic 92

DECO  O  ZATO A  D DEVE  OPME  T

develme a eeay efe veegy ld e afeed Ul ha me  a a lal ely  me devel me I  he Clal Seeay Olve Lyel med a memadm  he Cae hh aed  a We ae dely ele f he elfae f he Clal ele We have eahed ad e  eah he gel ha hey m e develed  de  mae adeae   he ld eed ad  ae he  adad f lvg hh ae f he m a mealy l  A e f Clal Seeae made mla aeme De velme a evdely he hghe age f lalm I Deeme 8 he lal he ad he a Clal Seeay Ah CeehJe ld he Cmmealh Affa Cm­ mee ha mlee deedee ld e aheved ly f a ey a emally vale ad aale f defedg   ee hh al mled he aaly f elfdefee  He emhaed ha hle he ly f elfgveme a a geeal e lal h daal vly deeded  he mae f eah ly a a gve me e ad Sell ea f h ad f ve lalm hh gh  ve me  Cmmealh  he ee f all eed   mm ed  e evde  Bh y ell  he  alhgh he egalaa La Pay ve ha evey ey a a addae f eveal elfgveme ega y he  eval Olve Lyel Ceave Seeay f Sae f Cle eee  ad   a  emhae he aa ae f Bh lal ly e all am a helg he Clal Tee  aa elfgveme  he Bh Cmmealh T ha ed e ae eeg a adly a le  ld   eah ey he  hh  mae ee B  ae  meal mahe hh  y hem elve They ae hma aageme hh ee ledge ea gd ll ad ave all leadeh   I a f lg dely amed amg lal fal ha ele elf gveme  le heefe eeaed he fma f a dge lg la h a ld lal eda Clal el age a eeay l a level f meee ffe  maage a deede y had ee aheved afeg e h vdg  ld   he d f he La Dey Leade Hee   e le gvg a hld f e a lahey a a a ad a hg  The m eeal eleme a ed a ad ag  eale dge ele  y  ly j  al e admave   he eaae f he 

 N D E P E N D E N C E BY R  G H T

vaus cls. Th lgh  f m qud  sual slf­ gvm hf dpdd  h ca f a cmp ad ddcad dgus l. Ccumsacs w sll a csda as la as 157. A pap ppad f h Bsh Cab cmmdd ha cls shuld  b abadd f hy w  y quppd f slf-gvm  capabl f susag dpd saus wh a asabl sadad f gvm'  47 Ah Cab p  h sam ya k pas  wa ha ay pmau whdawal f auhy by h Ud Kgdm wuld sm bud  add  h aas f sss ad ds c  h wld' .  was w fad, hwv, ha h mgh  lg b suffic m  pv .  h cas f Nga dcla, f xampl, whch sll cfd mus ad pally dsgav pblms f galsm,  was blvd ha h acclad dpdc f h Gld Cas (Ghaa) had cs us sm ff  wy yas . 4 9 Nvhlss, v a hs da  was sll fcally assumd a h hghs lvls f h Bsh gvm ha  vy cly culd alscally xpc  bcm fully slf­ gvg. Csquly, sm mda sauss bw cl­ alsm ad svgy wuld pbably b ccupd dfly. Sa L, f xampl, was ly lkly  achv al slf gvm' . Th Gamba pbably culd  v  asp  dp­ dc'.  Bu hs adal asg was dfily dg ad Ba was abu  mbak  a accla f dcla whch wuld sul  h dpdc f vually vy cly gadlss f s ccumsacs Ud mabls bg shapd casgly by aal plcs h m f vluay dcla was ug u. Th wld was bcmg hal mally ad lgally f   h ways Alhugh smgly asabl ad mpcal, h hy f clal dvlpm pvd  b vy vulabl. Oc  was cfd by paccal quss ad pacula cass  was fud wag  h lack f pcs f s asws. Wha lvl f dvlpm was css­ ay f dpd sahd? Wha ca w apppa  mak such a dma? Ad wh ad wh  h pas was dpdc gad  such a bass? Th aal sysm had v pad  such a dlba way plcs whch s  say dplmacy  wa had always b h fial ab.  was f cus mpssbl  p  ay ucsabl ca f mpcal sahd f dmg dpdc ha wuld sasfy hs f whm clalsm was bcmg ucssay ad llgma. Nh Ld Haly  Magy Pham  ay ls was abl  d  Pl4

D E C O LOZATO A  D DEVELOPET

tcans ecognzed ths eaty In hs now aous 1960 speech n Capetown Btsh Pe Mnste Haod Macan, who once spoe o potca change n tes o centues now decaed caegocay The wnd o change s bowng though ths contnent Whethe we e t o not, ths gowth o natona conscousness s a potca ac. We ust a accept t as a act. Ou natona poces ust tae account o t  I nobody coud say wha aount o type o deeopent was necessay o se-goenen, then deeopent coud not be a jus ficaton o gantng o denyng ndependence. No coud sa o een costates be eused  hat was wha the ndgenous nhab tants desed Independence was a ate o potca choce and not o epca condton New Thd Wod heads o goenent at he 1964_Coonweath Coneence ade what by then was aeady the standad oa aguent the coneence shoud not  dscussng decoonzaton but athe the deeopent o a oe coones and the atea a the Coonweath coud pode The ssue, as the new Pe Mnste o Tndad and Tobago (D Ec Was put t, was no onge ndependence but deeopent needs  Decoonz aton woud contbute to deeopen by gng goenents conto oe the econoes whch coonas dened he Ths was the aguent o the st UN Coneence on Tade and Deeopent (964 Independence was now necessay o deeopent But t was an ndependence wthout pecedent suppoted by noe nte natona oganzatons whch nheed any esponsbtes o co onas but no powes Soe o the deas that esued ae anaysed n the next chapte. ACCRATD DCOONZATON

hen  t ntay becae conceabe that soe Btsh coones woud pobaby oe towads segoeent oe apdy han was peousy thought possbe the htheto unquestoned assupton that the tanse o soeegnty ust be contngent on epca con dtons began to be undened Decoonzaton was doced o the capacty o both se-goenen and potca deeopent n the pans o he Coona Ofice The tadona equeent that ndepen dence oow deeopent stated to eode and the pogesse as supton that t coud pepae the way o deeopent began to pea. A younge geneaton o coona ocas was cong to the oe  en such as S Andew Cohen  who dd no shae Haeys conseats and cae to beee that coona goeens shoud be wong thesees out o busness by tanseng powe to ndgen95

  DPD BY RGH

ous peoples a s apdl a s possble eve a t the s o vtg post depedece pobles. B the late 1950s ths was the ew othodox I ueous Btsh coloes, theeoe, plas wee stepped up to egee the sttutoal aewo o a ode costtutoal deocac, coplete wth legslatve, electoal, ad judcal st tutos whch wee gated to what had bee pal although ot exclusvel a coloal adstatve state. I Btsh costtutoal logc a colo oveseas was the equvalet o a cout  Bta: t was subodate to palaet at Westste. he pcple had to be evesed to acheve esposble selgoveet. Idepedece was a gaded pocess, ad poltcal educato was le a othe oe had to pass though the vaous gades  ode to gaduate he ollowg stages o costtutoal developet wee ecessa o ths to happe: (1 oato o a legslatue  oe was ot alead  exst ece; ( ceato o expaso o a electoate; (3) electoal cotol o the legslatue (4 legslatve cotol o the executve ad (5 depe dece o the Btsh goveet 55 hese stages elected the cost tutoal developet o Bta, whch was a hsto o evolvg depedece o palaet o the cow ad o ceasg depe dece o the House o oos o a electoate evetuall based o uvesal suage. What was dstctvel deocatc about Btsh decoloato was the equeet that all pevous stages be passed beoe the last stage was copleted. Eve colo that acheved depedece poceeded though all these gades, although at the ed o epe ate 1960 the passage was ade wth ceasg ad eve useel haste he Btsh stuc wth the pocess ote  dcult ccustaces whee t was ot at all ceta that eectve legslatve ad electoal sttutos had bee oed ot ol because ths was the tadtoal appoach to decoloato but also to deostate the log stadg cla that the epe exsted ultatel to pepae coloal peoples o costtutoal selgoveet. A act o decoloato whch b passed these stages would be ot ol esposble but a adsso o alue also. he ea o Ghaaa depedece, 1957, s pehaps the date whch as the te fo whch Btsh decoloato acceleated he Btsh abet becae oe dectl volved ad the esos bltes o the oloal Oce wee educed to ogag coeeces o the trase o powe. I 1957 the abou Pat claed that all the salle tetoes had a ght to the costtutoal status o a doo wth the Btsh oowealth But as late as 1959, accodg to 9

 C C RD DCOONON

J  M  ee, the Bitsh onsevtive ooni Secety epotedy con­ tempted segovenment o Tngnyi by 970 nd o Keny by 975 Independence o ech county nd so Ugnd ived in the ey 960s Bitin ws now peped to gnt independence to vey mgin Acn dependencies such s The Gmbi Znib, nd the igh ommission teitoes esotho, Botswn, Swind n 965 the bou ooni Secety, Anthony Geenwood deced ctegoicy tht Bitins min ts ws to iquidte ooniism eithe by gnting independence to  numbe o teitoies o by evoving o the othes oms o govement which secue bsic demo­ ctic ights o the peope but which invove some degee o ssoci­ tion with this county without ny stigm o cooniism 57 he tte tentive  the st whispe o positve soveeignty  poved to be impossibe in  but vey ew cses nd tite to independence ws duy tnseed to vtuy evey emining dependency egdess o its cpciies o cicumstnces Decooniton hd cesed being  substntive entepise imed t sttebuiding nd hd become  om ctivty to tnse negtive soveeignty Few o the oicis in the ooni Oice eg deptment duing the quinquennium o its getest ctivity, 959, epotedy thought the new constiuon mewos woud hve ny sting signiicnce   Apt om Southen hodesi  o the emining Btish coonies in ent nd Southen Aic, whteve thei sub­ stnce, chieved independence by 968 Most o the numeous nd ny Bitish isnd tetoes in the ibben, ciic, nd ndin ocens cquied soveeignty in the te 960s nd 970s Decooni­ ton in its fin stages ws septed not ony om considetions o deveopment nd edeship but om most ny empiic conside­ tons whtsoeve. O the ommonweths 49 membes in 985, 27 hd poputons unde  miion nd 4 occupied nd es o ess thn ,sque omees The hiechic pocession o misceneous Bish dependencies o the pst hd ued into n egitn vngud o uniomy emeging sttes with most evey eminng dependency now in the ont n imptienty demnding equ independence nd eceiving it in y shot ode The extodiny chcte o this histoic chnge is cpued in the ems o one o its cose obseves: t s rna n a pst-na age  whh has n effet rtualy eeated the state nt ng the nly wdely aepted pta stan dard  t reall that great empres n the past the Brtsh nt east regnzed een enuraged pta dersty s that wthn ts apaus and aregated jusdtns were nt nly nes but 97

NDEPEN DENCE BY GT suzerans trutares ondomna protetorates proteted states et Indeed the we ngh unversaty of the am that a erstwhe snge oona admnstratve unts are 'states n posse f not aready n esse and thus endowed wth the potentaty of eomng 'a soveregn state' s one of the most surprsng and rona outomes of ths age of trumphant tendentous antoonasm and of the spawnng of many sma states 

Rpid d geerl deoloitio lo hd to be ommodted by  rehped Commowelth Mot exBritih oloie ltered or b doed their Wetmiter otitutio  rpidly  they quired it My beme preidetil republi i theory but perol dittor hp i prtie If they were to remi member of the Commo welth, politil expediey tpulted tht it reeived ititutiol umptio would hve to be give up  Ited of  oitio of tte hrig ot oly the glih lguge d  ffetio for the royl fmily but lo  iherite of Britih poitil rrgemet d legl prtie, by the mid196 it w  ew orthodoxy to regrd the Commowelth   oveiet d very looe d oti­ tutiolly udemdig oitio  lub of rler who ueeded the Britih The effet w to ehe the libertie of ex-oloil over eig who felt uder o obligtio or preure to odut their gover met i term of otitutiol demory d the rule of lw  hitorilly udertood by older Commowelth member   propheti ey o 'The Coloil Dilemm' publihed i T Lene i 1949 whih w iteded to repod to oloil leder d ew member of the ited Ntio who were demdig or expet ig 'quik reult' from oloil developmet Mrgery Perhm ob erved tht the oloil people let equipped to operte  mode overeig tte were liely to hve the hortet ppretiehip  mode tterft Thi i beue they re rehig it, ot  with the older depedeie beue of itel growth, but mily   reult of exterl ifluee d preure whih elerte the movemet to elf-govermet  Thi w i ft wht hppeed P   C  P  T O U S D  C O  O N Z A T  O N

The poliy o f preprig oloie for elfgovemet  o tht the oloil miio would be vidited w mot lerly evidet i the Britih mpire The other oloil power lked thi trditio d oequety hd diiulty eeig d repodig to itertiol hge whih were begiig to expet deoloitio Fre, i prtiur, hd log operted with the ory ide tht oloilim w preprtio ot for idepedee but for imitio i the 98

PRECPIOUS DECOLON ZA  ON

metropolitan community . The British conception was the key to the fate of te European empires, however If the largest and most signifi­ cant empire was to embark on constitutional decolonization it would establis a precedent wich othr democratic imperial powers could not ignore A small example is the French Trust territory of Togoland wich in

1955 was made into an autonomous republic within the

French Union as te result of Britis decolonization in adjoining Gold Coast 'If little Togoland achieved internal self-government,  as John Hargreaves noted it would be difficult to resist comparable reforms in A  0  F  [Frenc West Afrca ]  61 But French and Belgian decolonizations were more precipitous and were undertaken with minimal conviction tat successor constitutional governments could be established. They also assumed that after independence some form of close association with teir ex-colonies could be maintained which proved to be the case in regards to many former French dependencies Authoritarian Portu­ gal was te only colonial power tat completely ignored international condemnation of colonialism and never became reconciled to decolon­ iation wic only took place after the Caetano regime in Lisbon was overtrown by a militay coup in

1974

The historical policy of France like that of Portugal, was integrative Te Frenc did not officially refer to their empire but instead used the expression

 ranc dour-mr

Until

1956 the French could scarcely

conceive of colonies in the British manner as scools for self-govern­ ment On te contrary, Frenc colonialism involved assimilation rater than autonomy: the development of overseas France as a wole rater tan consttuent units witin it Unifomity and not diversity was te French way Te idea was te education of individ­ uals in te language and culture of rance and te creation of elites consistng of such indivduals wo could seve in te colonial adminis­ taton at the igest level Tey could also become citiens of rance and even members of the French govement  as a few did Frenc policy as is fequently pointed out at least by Anglo-Saxon commen tators refected te Francophone proclivity for universalism: Wen Montesquieu Voltaie Rousseau or Diderot set out to establis te laws wich should gove uman society they believed that tey were discoveng universal laws    wic would apply to all societes  ey did not envisage different laws for Frencmen Germans Sene­ galese or Cinese 2 Altough e could not foresee te policy of assimlaton reacing its logical conclusion by te incorporation of the colonies  te metopole in any

definite

developments

1943 ord Hailey saw no indicatons of toward

selfgovement

in

colonies



Frenc

 N D E PENDENCE B RGH

I n 946, a  a drect ret o f te war rance wa reconttted a  te ort Repbc wc at te ame tme canged t reatonp to te coone Te renc Unon wa formed wc nted metropotan rance and te overea department and terrtore Te dncon between

cons

and

sujs

n overea rance a we a oter ega

dabte of coona bect c a forced abor lndgna) were aboed Eected aembe were ao etabed overea How ever te france wa baed on crtera of cvc competence c a renc terac and terefore topped we ort of one peron one vote Coona cten nevertee dd eect repreentatve not on to ter own terrtora aembe bt ao to te renc Natona Aemb  atog repreentaon wa mted and tere wa obv o no ntention of aowng overea depte to become o nmer­ o a to make rance a coon of er coone   In te Afrcan terrtore of overea rance n

956 te LoCadr

(framework aw) wa nttted wc gncant extended repre entatve government Back Afrcan eader were nvoved n wrng te Lo-Cadr and one peron one vote wa nttted for te frt me Atog te

Lo-Cadr wa a

ng pont wc gave renc over

ea terrtore man power comparabe to toe anted to B coone drng te temna coona peod tere wa  no cear ntenton tat t wod ead nexorab to ndependence n

958 e

ft renc Repbc wa fomed and a n 946, te new conton extended to overea rance Te renc Unon wa repaced b te renc Commnt: a ooer framework wc gave ncreaed aton om to overea terrtore bt not ndependence oregn defence and economc poc wa t controed b ar Te cange tere fore bt pon te LoCadr reform b dferentang beween rance and te renc overea Afrcan tetore wc were reconitted a tate wtn te Commnt T eqvoca arrangement dd not at owever n a referendm on te propoed Commnt ed trogot overea rance te et Acan terrto of Gnea nder te eaderp of te radca Sko Tor voted non and became ndependent amot mmedate n

959 redent Care de Gae

acknowedged te rgt of rancoArcan ate to become overegn and n

960 ever dependenc of rance n bSaaran Arca ac­

qred conttona ndependence tn or ear renc coona poc ad been compete overed n Dakar Senega n

959 at a meeng of te exectve conc of te

renc Commnt redent de Gae acnowedged te ndepen­ dence of Ma formed earer tat ear b te non of Senega and te former renc Sodan and e remarked T tate of Ma w take 

ECOU DECOLOZAO

what i s called the status of independence, and what I prefer to call that of international sovereignty .   Independence is a word signifying an intention, but the world being what it is, so small, so narrow, so intertwined with itself, that real independence, total independence belongs in truth to no one  As if to avoid the stark reality of negative sovereignty signifcant tes providing for military, economic, and cul­ tural cooperation were retained between Paris and every new Franco phone African state - except Guinea. French financial aid in particular was made available and this continuing external dependency was later reinforced by the close association of the FrancoAfrican states and other former French colonies with the European Economic Com munity under the Lom Convention. They also became associated in  Francophoni - a Frenchspeaking parallel to the Commonwealth  which included Canada as a major new soure of foreign aid. Decolonization of the Belgian Congo (Zaire) was compressed into what not only in retrospect but even at the time was an impossibly short period, with the major steps frantically taken between January 1959 and June 1960 'It is hardly surprising that it was fraught with disaster, as one historian put it  The episode was completely unfore seen until almost the last moment not only by Europeans but also by Africans In July 1955 a leading Belgian commentator wrote: The Belgian Congo is the most prosperous and tranquil of colonies, the one whose evolution is the most peaceful and normal This was, according to Jean Stengers, 'the unanimous judgement of that time In 1950 an African intellectual likewise remarked 'We subjects of Belgium know and understand that it will require sixty or one hundred years, or more, before we shall be ready to be left to ourselves.  Eve the man who became the first Prme Minister and martyr of the new African state, Patrice Lumumba, wrote in 1956 that it was too early to say whether the Congo would achieve 'the more advanced degree of civilzation and the required political maturity to enable it to be 'raised to the ranks of selfgoveing peoples .  These evolutionary assump tions were abruptly abandoned in the late 1950s. A progressive coalition govement which came into ofce in Bel gium in 1954 initiated tentative political changes in the Congo. But it was planning, along the lines of Brtish indirect rule, in terms of developing African local government In 1957 the first municipal elec tions were held Late in 1955 a leading Belgian professor of colonial law, A. A J van Bisen, shocked his countrymen by proposing a plan of decolonzaon which anticipated Congolese selfgovernment in thrty years upon successful completion of a 'positive process of cre ating capable and responsible Congolese elites and gradually transfer 0

 N DEPENDENCE B IGH

rng ontrol o f government to them 9 He emphaszed the hanged nternatonal suaton and the movements for ndependene else where n Afra and onluded that Belgum would not be able to gnore them. Hs prognoss was orret but the tmetable proved utterly mstaken In January 1959, only a year and a half before nde pendene a Belgan workng group stll onsdered that deolonz aton would be a longterm proess. Van Blsens thty years ertanly seemed to them a mnmum . 70 As late as Deember 1959, aordng to Crawford Young the Belgans oneved of ndependene as n volvng ontnued Belgan soveregnty n several key poly felds (defene foregn affars urreny and teleommunatons 71 After the Belgans belatedly awakened to the revoluton of nter natonal legtmay whh ondemned olonalsm ategorally they hastly fell n lne wth the Btsh and the Frenh Belgum was a demoray and a staunh member of the NATO allane When t beame lear that the Unted States and some other demorat NATO alles would not support a prolonged perod of gradual deolonzaton and that Belgum would also be ondemned loudly by the UN General Assembly the govement felt t had no aternatve but to deolonze as qukly as possble. Events n Brtsh and Frenh Afra espealy the ndependene of Ghana n 1957 and even more so the abupt deson of Frane to deolonze  n patular the spetale    of General de Gaule prolamng n 1958 at Brazzavle wthn earshot of the Congolese aptal that those who wshed ndependene had only to take t  undoubtedly provoked the Belgans to dramatally alter ourse If Frane was gong to aept nternatonal demands for mmedate deolonzaton how ould Belgum reet them?  TATOAZATO

Followng the seond world war no olonal power ould esape the horus of nteatonal questonng and tsm even f lke Potugal and South Afra t hose not to sten. As noted n the last hapter the UN General Assembly played a entral role n nter natonalzng the sse of deolonzaton and removng t from the sphere of exlusvely domest ursdton of the olonal powers Athough the UN Chater (Atle 73) was rather onsevatve on the ssue of deolonzaton by makng selfgovement subet to rcum stanes and stages of advanement the General Assembly read t dfferently and sought to legslate on olonal questons. A leadng Brazan dplomat and lawyer onsdered that Artles 73 and 74 ds lose the udal phlosophy nherent n the Unted Natons sne they express the deal of unversaty and authoze the organaton 02

I NT E R N A T I O N A  I Z A T I O N

o deal syseacally wh he eress ad aspraos of hudreds of los  oselfgoveg errores I would be a dsoro of ha deal f hey were o be lef uder he exclusve copeece of he eral publc law of he saes holdg ursdco over he   A he rs UN sesso  February 94  becae clear ha ay ocol oal powers wished o exed UN superso o erely over trus errores bu over all coloes Morga speaks of he edecy  ay uares o cotravee he provsos of he Charer o coloal ssues by seekg o expad s auhorty Ially he leadg coloal powers held eaoal eegs aog heselves  he atep o cotrol eaoal polcs o coloal uesos Bu  was o easy for Bra ad Frace  who had a large role  seg up he UN  o gore eaoal opo The deocrac coloal powers were accusoed o coductg her ow govees accordg o aorty rule ad foud  dfcul o repud ae ha deocrac pracce a he UN cocerg coloal ssues Ieaoal pressure o decoloze creased ul by 9 he eerg g AoAsa bloc ad s supporers  Lat Aerca ad elsewhere esured ha acoloal resolutos could o be defeaed  he Geeral Assebly The ovehelg passage of UN Resoluto 54 arked he vcory of a far ore expasve readg of he Charer ad cosued  effec a ajor revso Fro abou hs te argues o delay depedece o grouds of crcusace were cosdered orally feror o uversal clas o selfdeerao Alhough  he pas Bra had publcly voced he eprcal argue ha ay reag errores were lackg  pora reuses of depe de saehood, os UN ebers gored such argues or ds ssed he as selfservg aeps o delay grag depedece whch was a ueuvocal good Laer day Burkes could ake o headway agas he philoophe of coeporary eraoal re latos Ratoals had ruphed over eprcs Thereafer he Brsh pragatcally sough o carry eatoal opo wih us as he Labour Coloal Secreary pu   95 The Coowealh also becae a pora vehcle of er atoal pressure for decolozao By he early 9s Brsh Col oal Secreares were reporg o her decolozatio plas ad polces o he Coowealh Pre Msers Ausrala ad New Zealad, whch adsered UN Trus Terrores  he Souh Pacfc, also egaged  such reporg A he 9 Coowealh Meetg, Pre Mser Nehru of Ida publcly reded hs colleagues ha he 9 UN Declarao was a dcao of he wegh of world opo o he eed o brg coloals o a speedy ed  Three 03

I  D E  E  DE C E BY RGHT

sessions o f the

964 meetng of Commonwealth leaders were devoted

to decoloniation British Prime Minister Sr Alec Douglas-Home, although reminding his colleagues that decoloniation was the const tutional responsiility solely of the British govement, acknowledged that it was also a legitmate conce of the Commonwealth Later that year the new Laour Secretary of State for Colonies said he had een appointed with 'the task of working himself out of a jo as soon as possile   he egalitarian argument that independence should e granted cat­ egoricay even if the territory in queston was extremely marginal ecame morally impregnale According to President Kwame Nkru­ mah of Ghana, it was now the responsiility not only of Britain ut all rich countries to enale his couny and al other poor ex-colonies to develop y providing foreign aid Sovereignty was a right not only to political independence ut also to development assistance afterwards ecause colonialism was not merely political ut also social and econ­ omic Decoloniaton would not e complete untl the inteational economy was reformed to give less developed countres an equal opportunity to ecome developed his ecame hird orld ortho doxy on NorthSouth issues he political difficulty of arguing for the contrary view that a different j uridical status should e held y mar­ ginal states unti they were more developed is indicated y a message sent from Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson to British Prime Minister Harold ilson in

965 Pearson reportedly expressed 'un­

easiness at the unexpectedly rapid growth of the Commonwealth ut realied that to refuse, or suspend such applications would have een 'difficult  He suggested that the Commonwealth might recon­ sider its organiation with a view to memership on a different asis for 'smaller dependent territores   Even this very restrained proposal to consider empirical qualificatons in determinatons of memership could not get anywhere in the face of the postulated international equality of all peoples Pearsons s conces reflected the lingering idea of international trusteeship Smilarly, at the

196 Commonwealth meeting Prime Min­

ister Roert Menies of Ausalia agreed with the sprit of UN Resol­ ution

54 ut waed against interpreting it too literally It would e

an act of irresponsiility if Australia were to grant immediate indepen­ dence to Papua New Guinea whose population 'had reached only the most prmitive stage of civiliation'   And in a 963 UN deate the United States expressed the view that 'classical independence might not e suited to small territores  Periodically there were serious discussions in British oficial circles conceing the desirailty of cre

 N T  R N AT  O N A   Z A T  O N

ating the status of 'associated states of the Comonwealth' which would be inteally self-goveg but not fully independnt st It proved impossibe, however. The Commonwealth felt it had to accom­ modate as a full eber any exBrish Colony which was a UN ember The UN could deny eership to no forer colony which asked for it and acally solicited such requests The positive sover eigny concept of an associate state iplied al inequality which was uterly unacceptale to a word counity that had elevated legal equality to the level of virtually a sacred principle The inteationalizaon of the decolonizaon issue is evident in the ulmately successfl attack on the tradional right of domestic juris diction over colonial territories As noted, the colonial powers legally jused their dependencies y reference to Arcle 2 ( of the UN Charter which prohibits inteention y the UN or any eber state in the doestic jurisdicon of any other meber In the course of the controversy 'domestic jurisdicon' becae a contested concept reflect ing the view taken of the legiacy of colonialis The growg number of ex-colonial embers of the UN and their supporters held that colonial territories separated by expanses of sea water from the metropolitan power were not a legitiate part of its domestic juris dicon The Soviet Union and China needless to say, were also srong advocates of such a view which reoved their suject territories and peoples from ancolonial cricis This concept of doestic juris diction, in contradiction to classical inteaonal law, likewise held that Chapter   of the Charter  Declaraon Regarding NonSelf­ Goveng Territories  provided the legal foundation for the claim that the UN was constituonally authorized to bring aut decoloniz ation The ain legal defences against this clai were the French and Portuguese arguents that colonial territories overseas were integral parts of the etropolitan state, and the Belgian thesis that Chapter 

applied not only to dependent territories overseas but also t o those t home hey failed to ward off the attack on the inteaonal legiacy and legality of such possession Geography was the fatal vulnerability f the first argument Looking at a ap it was difficult to lieve that Angola was an ordinary province of Portugal despite its substantia nuer of Portuguese settlers The sae could even e said of Algeria which, although on a different connent, was in closer proit to France and had a larger setter popuaon In 9 the emergent ancolonial ajority in the UN

secured a General Assembly resoluon stang that Algeria had a right

to self-deterinaon and that the UN had a duty to advance that right Late in the year President de Gaulle conceded the arguent in a 05

INDPNDNC BY RIGHT

speech i n Agers It is vain t o pretend that i t [Ageria] consttutes a province e our Lorraine . . . It is so vain that it is not worth saying because it is not ue It is something ese, it is an Agerian Algeria  In subsequent resoutions, as I indicated in chapter 3, the UN repudiated the ega ground of cooniaism in domestic j urisdiction This was simutaneousy an affirmation of the cuent doctrine that coonia powers have no vaid caim to sovereignty over nonsefgoverning territories beyond ther metropoitan bounds, regardess of whether they ca them coonies or provinces .  India was successfuy abe to use this caim to j usfy its sezure of Portuguese Goa by force in

1961

against Portugas counterca that it was a victm of amed inter venon Ths egitimaon of the internationa use of force for the iberaon of coonized peopes was subsequenty affrmed by a series of UN resoutions conceng Portuguese Africa and Rhodesia The Bean thesis is more teling because it discosed the ambigui­ ties and hypocrsy in the decoonon argument Numerous inde pendent countries contain nonsefgoveng territora groups which may or may not be permitted to participate constitutonay and equay in the poica life of the ruing communy  Domesc ega and administrave arrangements of a pateast knd sometimes exist for deaing with them  such as the speciaized aws, bureaucraces, and poicies by which American, Canadan, and Austraian govements have historicay rued aborgina peopes  In some cases they are vicms of poica or economic oppression by the dominant com­ munity Legimate and ndeed awfu inteationa conce for the wefare of such groups was established under the Covenant of the League of Nations and some inteaona organzaons, including the Inteaona Labour Organizaton (ILO) and the UN Educationa, Scientific and Cutura Organizaon (UNESCO), regard them as within the same category as coonia inhabitants  Canadian aborig ina eaders have from me to me brought their demands for sef­ determnation to the attention of the UN One is songy tempted to concude, therefore, that the Begian thesis in parcuar had to be rejected because it probed the intea cooniaism of too many exist­ ing ndependent countries, deveoped and underdeveoped alke This was of course the appea of the argument from the Beian viewpont but it backfired because the numerous states to which it appied were determined to deny it To have done otherwe woud have opened a Pandoras box Most new excoonia states in parcuar had to reject an argument whch would expose them to demands for sefdeterm­ naon by the usualy numerous ethnonationates they contained Inteaonalization was most dramaticay evident in the decoonz 

I  T E R  A T I O  A  I Z AT I O 

ation o f Portuguese African territories (Angola, Mozambique Guinea-Bissau) and Southe Rhodesia (Rhodesia cum Zimbabwe) . Portugal did not become a U N member until 955 and subsequently argued that Article 3 of the Charter did not apply since as indicated, her African territories were integral provinces of the metropole. After the 9 UN Declaration  which in effect passed censure on Portugal ­ and the successful expropriation of Goa by the Indian amy this argu ment could no longer be sustained. Lisbon's NATO allies deserted her on the issue. During this period Portugal very nearly became another Rhodesia or South Africa in terms of inteational legimacy: an out cast under UN censure. In a series of subsequent resolutions the world body mounted a normative assault on Portuguese colonialism which undoubtedly contributed to its eventual demise Resolution 2 9 condemned Portuguese denial of the political rights of the indigenous population' as a crime against humanity' and appealed to all States to give the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination the moral and material support necessary for the resto raon of their inalienable rghts' . Resolution 33 93 confirmed that colonialism was a crime', that armed struggle for selfdetemination was legitimate and that any attempts to suppress the struggle were conay to the Charter and 'a threat to inteational peace and secur ity'.  Portuguese resistance to decolonzation therefore served as a major opportunity for internaonal society to repudiate colonialism totaly and explicitly. From serving as an agency of civilization less than a centuy before colonialism had become not only morally repug nant but also a cime against humanity. The unversal condemnation of the Ian Smith regime flowed directly and powerfully om this new doctine of inteational legitimacy Rhodesia after its white settlers' Unilateral Declaration of Indepen dence (UDI) from Britain in 965 is therefore a teling instance of th ascendancy of negative sovereignty in decolonization. Since 93 it had been a selfgoveng colony' under the control of European settlers durng which time British authority was minimal. It was nevr part of the dependent empire but was a sot of semidominion nder the Dominions Office The day after UDI, however Britain abandond its earlier argument that intervention was forbidden by Articl  7 of the Charter and called upon the UN to intevene on the grons tat an illegal ovement based on white minoity e was a  f world conce. The Ian Smith regime was universally denied rcog nition  even by South Africa  despite the fact that it satisied citeia of positive sovereignty in the determinaton of statehood for more than ten years. The Rhodesian courts accordingly held that since the Unitd 07

I N DE  E N D E N C E BY RIGHT

ngdom had los s effcacy he regime was he soveregn gove men. Even Brians hgh cour he Judcal Commee of he Prvy Councl ruled ha  was mpossble o predc wh cerany wheher o no Briain would regan s soveregn conrol James Cawford remarked a he ime There can  no doub ha f he radonal ess fo ndependence . . . applied Rhodesa would be an ndepen den sae Despe he fac ha Rhodesa dsclosed adonal chaacerscs of a soveegn sae a leas for mos of s exsence  was univesally dened recognon. Insead he prncple of no nde pendence before majoriy African rle (NIBMAR) prevaled songly suppored by Brian he Commonwealh and he UN. Rhodesa was moally repugnan o he ineaonal communy of he lae wen eh cenury and in he end ha proved decsve n s downfall Crawfd concludes The proposon ha saehood mus always  equaed wih effecveness s no suppored by mode pracce . . . a new le has come no exisence pohbng enes from claming saehood  heir creaon s n volaon of an applcable righ o selfdeerminaion.  Tha rle s negave soverey.



5

S O V E R E I G NTY AND D EVELOPMENT

T H  DSTTT   A G  OF TH T H  R D W O R L D

he way w e hn abou nenaonal elaons oday s srongly nluenced by a pcue o he wold as shaply dvded be ween a ch and echnologcally advanced Noh, and a poo and bacwad Souh he NohSouh cleavage vals and nceasngly supasses he EasWes conlc as a domnan pecepon o he conempoay nenaonal sysem hey ae caegocally deen, howeve he lae could be gealy mgaed by ageemens beween he ned Saes and he Sove non o educe he ams and ncease he dalogue and ne couse Alhough  s no ye a ceany, he end o he EasWes conflc whn he oeseeable uue s enely concevable   happens one saesman, Mhal obachev, can ae a lage shae o he ced No such saemen can be made abou undedevelopmen whch s no a poblem o he same nd   s no a dspue whch can be esolved by dplomacy and nenaonal ageemens nsead,  s lely o pess ndenely snce  s a condon deeply ooed n economc, socal, culual, and even psychologcal acs whch ae exceedngly dcul o ale even wh he geaes good ll  s no a queson o honoung ones commmens Even  m ageemens wee made beween ch and poo saes amed a ameloang unde developmen by nceased anses o nance and echnology, hey pesuppose peomances on he pa o hd Wold govenmens whch could no be guaaneed hey could no because hose goven mens ae hemselves undedeveloped and heeoe pa o he pob lem hee could be no assuance ha he anseed esouces would be pu o use ecenly and popely because  s no ye whn he capacy o such govenmens o do hs he NohSouh cleavage consequenly s lely o be a pedomnan eaue o he nenaonal landscape o decades o even geneaons o come hs global socoeconomc dvson has exsed snce he me Euope 

S O V E RE IG TY A  D D E V E L O P M E  T

egan o oudiance ohe pa o f he wod in am echnoogy cience poiica economy and eaed phee of human endeavou Lae 'he We' wa dened y i upeioity in hee aciviie Duing he coonia ea howeve deveopmen and undedeveop men wa a domeic ahe han an inenaiona iue if i wa an iue a a Decoonizaion heefoe did no ceae he NohSouh gap which ha een in evidence fo evea cenuie nead i inenaionaized i ju a a cenuy ago Wee impeiaim inena ed i Thee epiode ao dicoe he caegoica diffeene noed aove: wheea he gap coud e coonized and decoonized meey y he  and ageemen of ae i canno  eiminaed in hi way ecaue i i no a dipomaic o ega poem a a Eaoae aica documenaion of he NohSouh gap i avai ae oday in epo of vaiou oganizaion ineaiona and naona puic and pivae The Wod Bank aone puihe vaiou udie which decie and inveigae in deai he compaaive ank ing and pefomance of a epoing counie accoding o a wide vaiey of ocioeconomic indicao 1 Thee daa evea a coninuing and in ome cae widening guf etween he induia make econ omie of he Noh and he agicuua o pimay commodiy econ omie (moy) of he Souh n 9 fo exampe he annua GNP pe capia of he wod' iche counie of Wee Euope Noh Ameica and Japan wa appoximaey $3,000 wheea ha of he pooe counie of Afica and Aia wa unde $300 Even he uppe middeincome' economie of Lain Ameica and ome pa of Aia egieed on aveage ony aou onefh of he pe capia income of he ich economie Thee daa ae widey acceped a vaid and ee a he empiica foundaon of he NohSouh pecepion Ahough ome counie and paicuay he ocaed Newy nduiaizing Counie (NC) of Aia have achieved vey impeive ae of de eopmen in he a decade o wo and we houd no ue ou he poiiiy of imia deveopmen eewhee he eadh and deph of he goa ocioeconomic gap emain moe o e a i wa a he ime of decoonizaion and i iey o pei indefiniey Thi fundamena diviion fom he ai of a new undeanding of he wod Since ome countie ae aeady deveoped i i uuay aumed ha a counie a ea in pincipe can eaonay hope o achieve hi goa  i ao commony poied ha he knowedge equied o ing hi aou eihe exi o can e acquied n he pa hiy yea enomou effo and eouce have gone ino he ce aion and appicaion of a new deveopmena aecaf Today hee exi an ineaiona knowedge egime focued on poem of 0

THE D E STITTE I M AGE O F THE THIRD ORD

underdevelopment tat  s emboded n numerous and stll prolferat­ ng tecncal and socoeconomc agences nteatonal and natonal publc and prvate Altoug te results of te global development enterprse n general ave been dsappontng so far tere s no doubt ng tat a sgncant body of knowledge as been brougt nto exst ence very largely n response to te emergence of numerous underdeveloed countres Most studes of development are not merely descrptve accounts of te gap between te rc and te poor or tecncal-economc proposals for reducng t Tey are also prescrptve Not only are under developed states acknowledged to exst but underdevelopment s gen erally regarded as unacceptable and even unconsconable. Moreover underdevelopment s consdered to be a problem not merely of te underdeveloped countres temselves but also at least n part of te nteatonal communty and partcularly ts rcest members. Ts reasonng upsets te tradtonal practce and teory of nternatonal econoc relatons. n te past ndependent states were responsble only for ter own wealt and welfare and nternatonal law merely acknowledged ter freedom to promote t wtout exteal ndrance f course, governments (sometmes) recognzed tat certan nter natonal rules suc as recprocty and nondscrmnaton n matters of trade were generally more favourable to natonal development tan was protectonsm or oter forms of econonc natonalsm Ts as evdent n te General Agreement on Tarffs and Trade (GA) nau­ gurated by nteatonal socety n

1947 wc ams at elmnang

dscrmnaton n nternatonal commerce by reducng tarffs troug recprocal trade agreements. But some soveregn states were not under any oblgaton to actvely and substantally assst oters on a

ecpoc bass

non­

Tday ts s no longer entrely te case. Te evolvng

Law of te GATT now recognzes tat all ts members are not economcally equal and tat among unequal partes te prncple of recprocty does not obtan 2 Te dfferentaton of soveregn states n terms of dvelopment and underdevelopment as consequently ad an mpact on te practce and teory of nternatonal relatons Soveregnty and development ave been dvorced largely as a result of decolonzaton and de­ velopment as become an nteatonal expectaton or goal Trd World states advertse ter overty and demand te nternatonal communty and partcularly ts rc members assst tem to develop ter economes and rase te lvng standards of ter populatons. And te latter respond wt nancal and tecncal ad or debt relef belevng n many cases tat tey are under a moral f not a legal 

S OV E RE GNTY A N D DEVEOPEN

obgation to d o so lthough the resources transferred in this way are sll a tiny fraction of global wealth this is a noteworthy eergent inter­ national nor Sovereignty therefore has a novel character nowadays every sovereign goveent possesses negative rights of noninter vention but soe assert additional positive rights or at least deands of external aterial support This is not only unprecedented in the annals of the statessyste but is also a real dilea in the norative structure of conteporary inteational relations as I indicate below  In su the NorthSouth division is reflected in an eergent regie of internatonal organization aid law and ethics here has been a rearkable expansion of inteational organization to support under­ developed countres  oreover inteational transfers of finances and technology and refor of the rules of the international econoy to aid Third orld states to develop is accepted in principle even if there is as yet liited agreeent in pracce It has been argued that 'the Third orld is the creation of foreign aid without foreign aid there is no Third orld 3 This is a partial although distorted truth for the Third orld would exist without foreign aid but its existence has led to the necessity and orality of foreign aid  There have also been efforts to articulate inteational developent law based on positive rights of states as contrasted to traditional econoic law grounded in reci­ procity and contract The existence of destitute states challenges the classical rule of reciprocity in international econoic affairs precisely because such states cannot reciprocate and are still in a condition of dependency in econoic if no longer in political relations with other states Soe ethic of positive assistance sees necessary These novel postcolonial arrangeents are consequences of the existence of nuerous quasistates  NT   N  T  O N  L D  V  L O M NT  S S  ST  N C 

I n recent decades a n elaborate inteational superstructure has been built to cater for the socioeconoic needs of underdeveloped countries This supportive regime is in spirit with our age of social engineering but it is unprecedented in the history of the odern statessyste which hitherto has been concerned only to respect the freedo of credible sovereigns large or sall It is the unusual if not paradoxical instance to borrow an iage o arxis of an inter national 'superstructure attepting to shore p natonal 'substruc­ tures' on Third orld peripheries of a new egalitarian society of states Having recognized the sovereignty of excolonial peoples the inter­ national counity is now endeavouring to provide the with the furniture and equipent of statehood 2

INTERNATIONAL D E V E L O P  E NT A S SISTANCE

We take this inteationa feature for granted but it was amost unknown before the ast word war. Athough the League of Nations was conceed about the adverse socioeconomic circumstances of mandates most underdeveoped territories were sti under the dom esc jurisdiction of coonia powers ho retained excusive responsi biity for them. The internationa community was not then invoved in their deveopment athough some wanted it to be and British Coonia Deveopmet and Wefare Acts, as indicated were responses to the trusteeship idea that mandates and by impication reguar coonies shoud be provided with socioeconomic assistance for the benefit of their inhabitants Even at the founding of the N itte attention was given to deveopment as an inteationa issue which was indeed amost certainy not at that time foreseen 4 n 945 the probem was to restore the word economy and particuary the European economies which had been devastated by war The Marsha Pan which invoved massive transers of nancia and technica aid from the nited States to Europe had this aim. But this was reconstruction of aready de veoped economies The probem of underdeveopment was then sti argey an imperia responsibiity By 9, however it was beginning to riva war and peace as an inteationa issue ndeed it was seen as a major underying cause of war We have before us now a brand new dipomatic probem of vasty greater dimensions than anything previ ousy incuding the Marsha Pan for European economic recovery5 These are the words of a Word Bank President writing at the moment of change in 9 The probem has preoccupied the community of states ever since Once that community began to admit a arge number of under deveoped members thei predicaments were bound to become inter nationaized As imperia operations were wound down internationa organizations were expanded or buit to take over many of their tasks athough not direct administration of course n some eximpeia states coonia operations were converted into ministries concerned with deveopent probems of former coonies. Today deveopment is a continuous preoccupation of numerous inteationa organizations incuding virtuay a N bodies the MF the Word Bank the EEC the Commonweath  Francophonie, vaous regiona inteationa organizations in Asia Africa and Latin America internationa de veopment agencies of industria countries and countess nongovern ment organizations (NGOs The N system aone consists of sundry speciaized agencies conceed in one way or another with probems of underdeveopment. N bodies which originay had universa aims have tued their attention to underdeveoped countries LO FAO 3

SOVEREIGNTY A N D D E V E LO P  E N

ECOOC UNEC Addtonal organzatons concerned speccally wth Northoth sses have been ostered under UN auspces Asan Development Bank Arcan Development Bank, UNCTAD, UND UNDO ECAFE, ECA ECA The polces o the MF an the Word Bank have become undamentally nvolved wth the monetary and scal problems o Thrd World contres A responsblty once boe almost entrely by colonal powers at a ar lower level o materal spport s carred out today not only by the nternatonal commnty at large bt also by every developed country ncldng many whch were never mperal powers an bear no hstor cal responsbty or colonalsm. Bateral nteatonal development organzaton has expanded enormously all develope states ncludng every member o the Organzaton or Economc Cooperaton and Development (OECD), some members o the Organzaton o et roleum Exportng Countres (OEC) and the Sovet Bloc an also Chna have establshed nteaonal evelopment agences or pro grammes Althogh the expanson o postve nternatonal organz aton slowed n the 980s t has been aster than the growth o natonal govements whch themselves expanded more rapdly than natonal economes  overegnty has gven Thrd World states global nsttutonal stand ng nence and support Ths was noted by Martn Wght as t was happenng The exstence o the Unted Natons has exaggerate the nteatonal mportance o the have-not powers, enablng them to organze themselves nto a pressure grop wth much greater dplo matc and propagana weght than they would otherwse have ha ' Mohammed Bedjaou pts t as ollows The advantage    o beng a member o an nteatonal organzaton and profitng rom t s gong to prove as mportant as belongng to a trade unon or proessonal organzaton wthn an nustral State.  Bt ths mples an actvst orm o nteatonal organzaton whch s radcally erent rom anythng that has exsted beore Thrd World states have radcalzed nteatonal socety by ntro dcng colectvst deologes and goals that challenge classcal postve soveregnty doctrne partcularly n the area o nteatonal econ omcs The pressre group' whch Wght sceed as t was ormng has become a major coalton o Asan, Arcan atn Amercan, Oceanc and even a ew East European states, such as Yugoslava The first UNCTAD (9) expressed novel global economc emans whch postlated postve enttlements o poor states A new Group o 77 nonndustral countres, whose membershp by 989 ha ncreased to 28, became the collectve expresson o the ndereveloped world n 4

I N T E R N  T I O N  L D E  E L O P M E NT  S S I ST  N C E

intenationa eations Subsequenty a t UNCTAD confeences, at specia sessions of the UN Genea Assemby on NothSouth e ations, and at vaious inteationa gatheings the new doctine was famed and eiteated in a seies of esouons pomoting the ceation of a New Inteationa Economic Ode (NIEO) to povide distibutive jusce fo the Thid Wod The compaative povety of many states and the esutant gap which divides the gobe between undedeveoped and deveoped counties undeines the ugency and egitimacy of inteationa aid which has found expession in the pincipe that the industiaied counties shoud annuay contibute 07 pe cent of GN to the ess deveoped states Athough most deveoped counties have not met this stan dad, few if indeed any ae pepaed to disavow the moa pincipe invoved  Annua oficia deveopment assistance fom OECD coun ties inceased amost sixfod in constant cuency vaue fom a tota of ,480 miion in 1965 to $6,497 miion in 1986. As a pecentage of dono GN this anged fom 0  22 fo the United States  sti the agest dono contibuting $9,95 miion  to a high of 1 4 fo Noway, with Sweden, Denmak and the Netheands a exceeding 1   pe cent GN and Fance coming neaest to it among majo donos (0.82 pe cent) Japan in 1986 was the second agest dono afte the US at $5,761 miion (0  pe cent GN) but as a esut of the inceased stength of the yen and a chaning intenationa poicy by 1989 was emeging as the eading foeign aid benefacto Athough the suppy of intenationa aid disbused is a sma faction of the budgets o ich countes, t nevetheess is a significant tansfe of esouces fo the smaest and pooest economies of Thid Wod peipheies, such as those in pats of South Asia, most of subSahaan Afica and much of Oceania . Moe than haf the membes of the UN eceive socioeconomic aid Vituay a economies cassied by the Wod ank as ow-income and some owe midde income as we (about foty counties in a) ae majo ecipients of pubic and pubicy guaanteed extena capita.  Many of the pooest economies especiay in subSahaan Afca ae unabe to attact substantia pi vate investment whih diminished amost to nothing in the 1980s If inteationa deveopment assistance wee not fothcoming they woud have no extena souces of inance whatsoeve This pospect is moay unacceptabe in todays intedependent wod Aid dependeny is evident in the debt pediament of many hid Wod states Accoding to the Wod ank the extena pubic debt of undedeveoped counties a a pecentage of GN inceased shapy between 1970 and 1986 Some undedeveoped counties have extea 5

SOVEREIGN AND DEVELOPMEN

debts that exceed their GNP During British decoonization it had been assumed or at east hoped that by the time of independence an ex colonial state woud be abe to borow on Western capital marets in London or New Yor However this proved impossible when many colonies became independent before they were financialy viabe  f private foreign investment is ot forthcoming presumaby there are no nvestment opportunities no real economies propery socaed Public inteationa aid both grants and loans becomes necessary if such countries are to enoy any investment at a Here is a nove ind of state whose prospects of deveopment are determined significanty by nteational handouts and bailouts This indicates a party wefare world rather than a purey business world and the necessiy of a new system of inteational fnance resing on assumptions which differ om those of cassica capitaism The reverse of this picture of internaona aid deserves comment or the 1980s there was a net outflow of public and pivate capita from many Third Word states to the industria countries and this i continue in the 1990s uness the rues of inteationa financia obi gation are changed  Payments on loans repariated capita royalties and the ie constitute transfers that can exceed foreign aid disburse ments moving in the opposite direction One can even spea of the decapitaization of countries that are suffering a continuing longtem net loss of capita in these ways This often resuts from the fact that past loans were used for consumption or unproductve investments and now have to be repaid ith no gain in production to nance it Snce such capital movements between states are consistent with the logic of inteationa capitaism this phenomenon woud seem to con tradict any argument about the signifcance of international wefare  What it realy indicates however is the extreme socioeconomic depen dency of some states and usualy the economic ismanagement of ther govements aso The concept of decapitalization is normaive as we as descriptive it is an evauation of nancia relations beween countries of highy unequal capacities and resources which are deemed unfair to the weaer This rests on the assumption that poor stes should not be expected to pay by the same rules as rich states Such reasoing has been discosed in demands for debt reief (as discussed below p 127) This thining sees a a minimum to mae underdeveoped states exceptions to some ues of the iberal economic order and at a maximum to devise new rules and perhaps a new order with their circumstances and predicaments expicity in mind  inancia ansfers beween counies amouning to many biions of doars annualy which cannot be ustied by commercia prospects 6

I  T E R  A T I O  A L D E  E  O P M E  T A S S I ST A  C E

must b e justfied i  some othe way The 969 Repot o f the Com­ missio o Iteatioal Developmet set up by the Wold Bak ad chaied by Leste Peaso saw the desiable elatioship betwee developed ad developig coutes as expessig the ecipocal ights ad obligatios of doos ad ecipiets Doo govemets should be cosulted i mattes of policy ad be assued that thei fuds will be allocated accodig to ecoomc citea I etu, ecipi­ ets should be etitled to a pompt ad steady flow of aid which would suvive chages of govemet shot of extee tyay o fiacial esposibility   Thee is evidece i these emaks of positive sove eigty thikg based o taditioal oms of ecipocity Peaso was a Libeal Pme Miiste ad also a libeal But thee is also a assump­ o of iteatoal obligatio to gve ad etitlemet to eceive aid Fo the Peaso Commissio the justficato of iteatioal develop met assistace was moal as well as ecoomic ad the moality was ew The 980 Repot of the Idepedet Commissio o Iteatoal Developmet Issues ude the chaimaship of Willy Badt  a Social Democatic Chacello ad also pobably a socialist  wet much fathe developed states should ot make the exteal assistace deped o taditioal libeal values of meit o deset The moal issue was lage tha meely the efficiecy ad esposiblity of idi­ vidual southe govemets A efomed if ot a ew iteatioal ecoomic ode was ugetly eeded to accommodate both Noth ad South o a equitable basis The iteatoal debate o develop met at the theshold of the 980s deals ot just with "assistace" ad "aid" but with ew stuctues    Such a pocess of estuctuig ad eewal has to be guided by the pcple of equal ghts ad oppotutes    Behid Badts emaks about stuctues is a as­ sumpto that states ejoy ot oly taditoal ights of soveeigty but i addito socioecoomic etitlemets to a equitable shae of global esouces ad oppotuities The existece of legal equality seems to imply ot oly the desability but also the ight of evetual socoecoomic equality Hee is the implicit if ot ideed explicit image of a emeget wold ecoomy with a sigle ogaato of poduc­ to ad distbuto ot ulke the usual macoecoomic image of a atioal ecoomy i which tasfe paymets fom ch to poo ae

both ecessay ad justifiale This is a omatve shit fom classical libeal ideas of commutative justice based o ecipocity towads dis tibutve justce ecessitated by the goss mateial iequalites of states The taditioal positve soveeigty assumpto that all states ought 7

S OVEREIGNTY A N D D E V E L O  M E NT

to  subject to the same pefomance ctea egadless of develop­ ment o any othe dsablties has become deeply contovesal. he pincple of ecpocty was challenged by the NIEO n the ealy 17s. It s at the cene of debate conceing ntenatonal development law and hd Wold debt. he Chate of Economc Rghts and Dutes of States adopted by the UN eneal Assembly n 174 s an eplct affimation of socal justice n ntenatonal economc elatons affect­ ng the hid Wold In caling fo a educton of global nequalites and claming that t s the esponsblty of the ntenatonal communty to povde the means of hid Wold development the statessystem s beng conceved n a dffeent way that ases many questons about the tadtional ules of nteatonal elations.

NTRNATONA DV OPMNT AW

he bth of one hunded soveegn states has unsettled nte­ national law All s n flu. Even the souces of ntenatonal law ae changng  Recent decades have seen unpecedented legal actvty among developed and undedeveloped states nvolvng numeous Declaaons Fnal Acts Jont Communqus Memoanda of Undestandng

Codes of Conduct

udelnes entlemens

Ageements Aangements (such as IMF Standby Aangements) and much else. Although the stict legalty of these enactments s debated they would not command the effot and attenion they do f they wee nothng but mee scaps of pape whch they ae cetanly not  1 he hd Wold as one Mooccan schola puts t s the beae of a democatng tendency n ntenatonal elatons and wll eecse an inuence on the evoluton of nteatonal law n the dection of a geate equalty of oppotunty and of a bette potecton of undepiv­ leged counies  19 One esult s a fomatve and conovesal nte national law of development . As indcated the law of naions continues to dsclose an ageold peoccupation wth modeating and egulatng the elatons of nde­ pendent states. he polfeaton of new soveegntes has not alteed this ealty hd Wold govements asset the tadtonal lbetes of soveegn states. hey ae vocal and passonate advocates of nonnte­ vention and have no dese to epudate the _classcal law whch up­ holds the soveegn mmunty. Howeve as they see t stct adheence to unvesalty and ecpocy n economc elatons ne­ glects thei specal ovedng poblem of undedevelopment. hey ae n no poston to agan wth deveoped states on a ass of ec­ pocty. (hs s an nveson of the adtonal Euopean clam that 8

 NTERNAT  O N A L D E V E L O P  E NT L A W

nonWs rulrs would no rcroca and sould rfor b subjcd o colonal domnaon  ) Ty bl  s ncssary o sab­ ls nw norms of rfrnal ramn wc comnsa for r dsadanagd oson n  naonal conomy (Ts s an n rson of mralsm and colonalsm ) Ty consqunly mak unrcdnd clams o sococonomc nlmns c noull ra jurdqu qus ngal conomqu ds Eas  Jus as mn­ ors n  Und Sas and or Ws dmocracs a mad us of domsc aw o adanc msls  Trd Word as rsord o naonal law n s ursu of sococonomc dlo­ mn and jusc: nr bfor a so many ras bn adod nr a suc rcs nrnaonal lgal rus bn agrd uon    and nr as naonal law bn mor frquny nokd an  s nowadays  Nw nrnaonal norms of dlomn a bn arcuad wc confound  os sorgny assumons of  as Casscal nrnaonal aw consss n unrsal rus of rcrocy among sorgn sas dmd o b caabl and rsonsbl agn­ cs Ts rus accordng o Gorg Scwarznbrgr nclud rcog­ non consn good fa nrnaonal raby frdom of  sas and slfdfnc   Ts ar good conduc rqurmns wc do no rqur nrnaonal asssanc of any maral knd As nod rously y ar nga bcaus y forbd nrnon and dscrmnaon n raons bwn sorgn sas Ty os sas as abl ns and ar ndffrn o r sococonomc condons Ty do no rfor a o b os and consruc msls nrnaona raons dd no uror o nra byond  sll of domac nrcours no  conomc and socal ascs of  os a da w ac or as uns 3 Ts s  nga logc of nrnaona

liez-ie or ee tde

T caracrsc faur of nrnaonal dlomn aw s  lmaon of rcrocy and xnson of rrna ramn for a slc cagory of undrdlod counrs  oss counrs wc ar no n a oson o rcroca on an qual bass w dlod counrs ndd y rqur naonal rus a njon d­ od sas o asss m maraly Ts s  os logc of i

tde wc

dsnguss bwn  srong and  wak n nr

naona conomc raons and gs rfrna ramn o  ar Accordng o a rcn obsr 'wa srks on as scal    abou  law of dlomn s a  moss on  duybound Sas os obgaons o do cee, and no mry o absan from dong  4 T rason for suc consrucs nrnaona oblgaon s 9

S O V  R I G N T Y A N D D  V   O P M  N T

th mgnc of a nw class of stats whch cannot compt und classca lasszar uls B.VA. Rolng and Wofgang Fdmann w phaps th fst to thoz ths mgnt stuctu of noncpocal ntatona law. Aady n 1 96 Rong dscd a movmnt fom an od nt natonal aw of bty' to a nw 'ntatona law of wlfa'. Th fom s consstnt wth a ba conomc od whch maks po vson fo muual adjustmnts amongst mo o lss uay dvopd stats Th att, howv, by actv ntvnton n ntatona trad and financ and by ntatona conomc dstbuton sks to assst stats to nhanc th wfa of th populatons. Rong con cuds 'Th wold communty s bound to bcom a wfa com munty, just as th natonstat bcam a wlfa stat. '2 Fdmann n 1964 lkws dtctd a shft n ntnatonal lgal noms 'fom an ssntay ngav cod of us of abstnton to postv us of coopaton' whch s an voluton of mmns sgnfcanc fo th pncps and stuctu of ntnatonal law' .26 Intatonal dvop mnt aw daws an pct dsncton bwn ngav and posv sovgny. Accodng to on Thd Wod commntato 'Th pn cpl of sovgnty    n aton to ntatona dvopmnt noms s not uatd wth m potca ndpndnc, but ncopoats substantv conomc sovgnty . . . may th pncp of slf dtmnaton has an conomc contnt. '27 In oth wods, ndpn dnc cannot b complt unt a stats hav acud posv sov gnty and that can ony b mad possbl by fom of ntatonal atons and law aong ths ns. om gal schoas ocat th soucs of ntatona dvopmnt aw n th N Chat, ncudng Atc 1 whch spaks of nt natona coopaon to sov conomc poblms, Atc 55 whch fs to th pomoton of 'hgh standads of vng, ful mploy mnt, and condtons of conomc and socal pogss and dvlop mnt', and Atcl 56 by whch 'al Mmbs pldg thmsvs to tak jont and spaat acton n coopaton wth th Oganzaon' to achv ths standads. Gnal Assmbly Rsoluons such as th obgaon of ch counts to tansf 7 p cnt of th GNP to poo counts n th fom of pubc fnanca ad a addtonal soucs. Th Intaonal Covnant on conomc, ocal and Cuua Rghts, th N caaton on th stabshmnt of a Nw Intaona conomc Od, and th Chat of th conomc Rghts and uts of tats a also dntd as foundatons of ntnatonal dvopmnt aw On ths vw th N systm has a fa wd wokng concpon of nt 20

I NTERNATIONA DEVEOPMENT AW

national peace than all precedng systes snce t  s preoccuped not oly wth preenng war but also wth reong the attributed under lyng sources of nteational conflct such as colonals and underdeelopent.  A different and ore copellng arguent has been adanced by Mohaed Bedjaou a Tunsan legal theorst and eber of the Inteaonal Court of Justce29 Bedjaou rejects the ew that nter national deelopent law s dered prarly fro the UN Charter because international deelopent was stll a nascent dea n 1945 The authentic source s the prncple of selfdeternaton whch he con sders to be the legal foundaton of an entrely new postcolonal inteatonal socety that has resulted fro the antcolonal reoluton of the Thrd World he open ommuny of today whh has replaed the 'losed ommunty of yesterday owes ths dstngushng feature to the selfdeermnaton of peoples    Wthout self-determnaton there s no ontemporary nternatonal ommunty    hus self-determ­ naton elongs to the j ce he rght to development flows from ths rght to selfdetermnaton and s of he me kd or t s pont­ less to aknowledge self-determnaton as an overrdng and preemp­ tory prnple f we do not smultaneously aknowledge a 'rght to development for the people whh has determned ts own future hs rght to development annot  other than an asolute nherent ult-n

rght

nextraly

enshrned

n

the

rght

to

self

determnaton 

In other words the soeregnty of the Thrd World presupposes a new nd of nteatonal county n whch selfdeternaton and deelopent are entaled prary legal nors. A Thrd World state has a rght not only to poltcal but also to econoc soeregnty to be aster n ts own house. Here s the nternatonal eualent of poste lberty. The rght to permanent soeregnty oer natural re sources proclaed repeatedly n UN Declaratons and esolutons s consdered by Bedjaou and any Thrd World legal scholars) to be the paradg enttleent of nternatonal deelopment law lned drectly to the ju cogen of selfdeternaton whereas soe scholars consder t erely to be n ttu ncend) Conseuently nteatonal proclaatons whch embody ths rght such as the UN General As sebly Declaraton on the Establshment of a New Internatonal Econ oc Order are endowed wth specal legtacy and legalty and are therefore authentc manfestatons of nteatonal law. The contro ersy aong lawyers whch ths ew of nternational legalty pro 2

S OERE IGNTY A N D DEELOPMENT

vokes i s not m y conce The ssumption tht Third Wod sttes clim speci rights to deveopment which deive fom sefdetemintion is of cruci interest howeve Pehps the cerest expression of this ssumption is the Chter of the conomic Rights nd Duties of Sttes which denes intention entitements t the cente of the N3 Among its key povisions re the following Artice 10 which observes tht l sttes e 'uidiclly equ nd therefoe possess 'the ight to pticipte fuly nd effec tivey in the intetionl decisionmking pocess in the solution of word economic fnnc nd monety poblems   . nd to she equitby in the beneits esulting theefom Article 14 which c knowledges the duty of 'evey Stte to promote the welfe nd iving stndds of ll peopes nd 'in pticu those of deveoping coun ties; Artice 18 which clls upon 'developed counties to extend n impoved nd enged 'system of genelied nonecipocl nd non discimintoy tiff pefeences to the developing countries nd to 'give serious considetion to the doption of other differentil mesues    to meet .   development needs of the deveoping coun tries; nd finly Aticle 22 which uges ll sttes to pomote 'incesed net flows of el esouces to the developing counties nd to expnd 'the net mont of fnncil fows fom ofcil souces to developing counties nd to impove the tems nd conditons theeof  This ctvist doctine is fundmentlly t odds with the

laieaire postu

tes of clssicl intention lw wyes continue to debte the usticiblty of interntion de veopment w Whethe it is lw o only molity lw in ee o meely

n poe, is ess impotnt howeve thn its signifcnce s  nomtive fetue of intentionl eltions. And the fct is tht development norms commnd widesped egd not only in the Thid Wod but elsewhee. Athough their legl bsis is stl contoversil they cnnot be ignored . ven moe signicnt o the puposes of this study is the dilemm between positive nd negtive soveeignty tht this norm tive fetue hs povoked Wtng t n ely stge Roing nd Fred mnn foesw the new stuctue of positive coopeton gdully displcing the old egime of bstention nd libety nd therefore resulting in  totly chnged intetionl mol nd legl ode. nsted wht ppes to hve hppened is the fomtion of  dual system of intentionl legitimcy nd egity. This is eveled in the

concurrent

pctce of cknowedging the speci clims of mginl

Thid World govenments to pefeentil nd noneciprocl ssistnce while especting thei universl nd recipocl ghts of noninter vention . t is expressed explicitly in Atice 17 of the Chte of the 22

I NTERNATIONA DEEOPMENT AW

Economc Rghts and Dutes o  States whch nokes 'nteatonal cooperaton or deelopment' as 'the shared goal and common duty o a States' but declares n no uncertan terms that eery state should etend 'acte assstance' to deelopng countes 'wth strct respect or the soeregn eualty o States and ree o any condtons dero­ gatng rom the soeregnty'  3 The perpletes whch result are edent n the rules o the GATT snce membershp n that nternatonal tade regme was etended to Thrd World states  Under the GA, as ognally establshed, there are no dstnctons between membe states n tems o ther ablty to recprocate All members ae assumed to possess roughly eual ba ganng postons n nternatonal tade and thereore to benet n smlar proporton rom 'recprocal and mutually adantageous' ta reductons Although sgnficant nternatonal economc neualty o course ested beore the GAT epanded and the Unted States was undoubtedly a major benecay, other natonal economes  large and small  could and dd prot rom the GAT rules o ree trade Howeer, the GATT's orgnal assumptons 'began to be alsed', as Kabr Khan puts t, 'as the membersh epanded to nclude de elopng, the least-deeloped and the landlocked countres' . 33 A GA whch ncludes a large majoty o undedeeloped membes must operate wth derent assumptons  they also ae to benefit om the egme . New ules whch acnowledge ther secal problems are necessary. hrd Wold states hae succeeded n gettng peerental tar aangements bult nto the GA as a matte o ncple  Howee, the GA edently egards these concessons, o eamle the Genealsed Scheme o reeences as meey 'eceptons to ts geneal ules such as the ost aoued aton pncple whch stll am at non-dscmnaton n ntenatonal tade   Kan agues, le Rolng and redmann, that ths emegng anom aly n the GATT ules s mong t ncementally away rom the class cal

Betton

Woods

system

towads

the

ntenatonal

aw

o

Deelopment based on the pncle o nonecprocty3 Ths orecast seems unlely to mateale. But thee s a deepe conlct here be tween assumptons o negate and oste soeegnty  he A would no longe est  t wee tansomed nto an nternatonal deelopment regme based on nonecprocty: ts orgnal

ro re

o gowth n the world economy ounded on ee o at least eer tade would hae been eplaced by that o redstbuton o justce based on a trade as epressed, o eamle, n Atcle

8 o the hater o the

Economc Rghts an Dutes o States whch declaes that 'all States hae the duty . .  to pomote just and eutable tems o tade  ree3

S O V E R E GNY A N D D E V E  O P M E N

m f states t pursue their wn ecnmic avantage within a gen eral framewrk f free tae an scial justice between states base n ules f ecnmic reistibutin are cnflicting if nt cntaicty ieals. The same cnflict is als evient in the Thir Wrl ebt crsis as we shall see in the fllwing sectin T sum up The evelpmental cnce f Thr Wrl states is frequently irecte at classical ules cnceing tae fnance bank ing an ther internatinal ecnmic relatins They see these ules nt as impartial nrms f equal avantage t all but as legal instu ments by which the evelpe states cntinue t explit the uner evelpe after eclnizatin. What the frmer cnsier t be a 'level playing fiel the latter see as steeply incline against them The rules uner attack are thse f the traitnal liberal ecnmic rer which encurage free inteatinal exchange f cmmities an capital in respnse t market prices the cmparative vitality f ecnmies an ultimately the ecnmic cmpetence an respnsibility f svereign gvernments. The ules avcate are thse which regulate wrl cmmity prices interest rates ebt bligatins an s frth in such a way as t remve the current bias in favur f the evelpe ecn mies an rener the playing fiel mre level fr the less evelpe. Althugh Thir Wrl states have nt yet succeee in changng the rules f the glbal ecnmy in the irectn an t the extent they esire their effrts have isclse a cnstitutinal ilemma f inter natinal ecnmic relatins which has n histrcal cunterpart an is a irect cnsequence f the cexistence within the same internatinal sciety f substantial states an quasistates. THRD WORD DBT CRSS

nternatinal respnses t the Thir Wrl ebt crisis are inicative f the ilemma Can all states be hel t the same rules f internatinal fnancial bligatn base n the traitinal banking prin ciple f paying nes ebts n time r must extenuating circumstances be taken int accunt in harship cases? Shul there be easier ules r exemptins fr the weak? n prvking questins such as these the ebt crisi reveals anther facet f inteatinal relatins invlving quasistates. Only a summary analysis is pssible The Thir Wrl ebt league is rganize int ivisins a rst ivisin cnsisting f a few cuntries with heavy exteal ebts which pse a threat t the inteatinal fnancial rer an secn an thir ivisins cmprising many cuntries with far smaller ebts which present n such threat but which suffer greater burens in relatin t natinal wealth. Cmmercial ebt we t Weste banks by a clutch 24

HIRD ORD DEBT CRISIS

of impotat outies iudig Bazi Mexio Agetia Vee zuea doesia ad Poad was of sufiet weight to povoke a goba debt isis i the 80s he most idividuay budesome debt howeve is biatea ad mutiatea pubi oas owed to Weste govemets o the MF ad the Wod Bak by a fa age umbe of pooe outies ofiiay assied as owe o owemidde iome  May hid Wod states have bee uabe to sevie thei extea debt by egua payig iteest A gowig umbe ae uikey eve to epay the piipa ompetey Statiss o the editwothiess of states idiate simia div isios 37  the peiod fom 8 to 84 whe the debt isis aose the edit atig of a deveoped eoomy suh as West Gemay was osistety ove 0 poits out of a maximum 00 as ompaed to udedeveoped Zaie at ude 0 Bazi deied fom 0 to 3 ad Mexio fom 0 to 30 i this peiod  84 the highest atig i Asia was 8 Sigapoe ad the owest  Bagadesh wheeas the oe spodig igues i the Midde East wee  Saudi Aabia ad 4 Lebao i Lati Amea 0 idad ad obago ad  i aagua ad i subSahaa Afia 3 ameoo ad 4 gada  hese figues give a appoximate idiatio of the divisio betwee states ad uasistates i the usetimeta iskasessmet view of iteatioa ivestos t is obvious that ameoo ot to metio gada wi d it diffiut to pay by the same iteatioa fiaia ues as Sigapoe ot to metio West Gemay Some kid of ompesatio woud be eessay to eve the payig ed but it is ot ea what this shoud ivove Weste editos pubi ad pivate aike have tied to efoe aditoa ues by makig thei edig to hid Wod outies oditoa o the MFs good housekeepig sea of appova o ditioaity basiay ivoves meetig pefomae tagets ageed be twee a debto govemet ad MF epesetatives May hid Wod states have adopted MF egotiated eoomi estutuig pogammes desiged to disipie govemets deemed uabe to disipie themseves hese ivove the usua maoeoomi e staits devauatio of atioa ueies whih ae vasty ove vaued ofiay edutio of ifato by shapy sowig the pitig of moey majo uts i govemet spedig ad subsidies fo suh ommodites as food o fue dowsizig of upodutive state o paastata etepses whih do ot ove thei osts ad oseuety ae a dai o the eoomy eimiatio of pie otos patiuay i the agiutua seto whih at as disietives to poduto ad eouage smuggig ad geeay opeig the eoomy to ite 25

S OVEREIGTY A  D D E V E L O P  E T

atioa market forces. These measures am at ecoomc growth by reducg f ot ematg oecoomic cosderatos  atioa ecoomc decsomakg whch ofte resut  the cosumptio of scarce resources by potcay privieged urba etes ad casses Govemets whch fa to ve up to ther debt restructurg agree mets by refusg to take the MF medce ca be decared egbe for ew oas MF restructurg focuses strcty o atioa ecoomc dcators ad gores eteuatg socopotca crcumstaces  such as the sttutoa fragty of the state or the dubous egtmacy of ruers or the cuture of corruptio whch may be the roots of govermet ds cpe ad debtedess  may Thrd Word coutres For eampe the MF has ssted that state eterprses pay ther way Naturay there has bee streuous objecto to ths pocy by ruers who are oy too aware that ther potca base woud be udermed ad possby eve destroyed f govermet orgaatos were scaed dow or cosed ad redudat govermet empoyees dsmssed. The MF repes that t aso s subject to ecoomc dscpes: ts credbty  the teatoa fiaca commuty ad cosequet abty to cotue edg to deveopg coutres w be damaged f t does ot obey them  8 Davd Rockefeer Charma of Chase Mahatta Baks teatoa Advsory Commttee ad represetative of that commuty descrbed the MF as the coveet whppg boy of Thrd Word states ad defeded MF poces for requrg merey what govermets kow they ought to do3 Ths s cassca postve soveregy doctre competet or sef-duget govemets are requred o pa of osg ther credt ratigs to coform to dscpes whch est to uphod tradtoa bakg rues ad utmatey the word captast ecoomy There s tte doubt however that stabty caused by potcay cruca urba popuatos rebeg agast decg wages ad rsg prces has bee a mportat byproduct of MF restrat programmes  Whe uda devaued ts currecy by  per cet ad rased fue ad sugar prces  compace wth a MF agreemet t aroused protests that eft s peope dead ad resuted  the govermet abadog the programme ad cosequety beg decared egbe for ew oas.  8 at-govermet demosatos  Zamba agast the emato of food subsdes voved the death of at east fiftee peope  8 rots  whch some 3 peope were ed broe out  Caracas Veeuea fowg the mposto of a austerty pro gramme suppoted by the MF May other eampes coud be cted Aboshg subsdes o food hams the urba proetarat rasg fue 6

THIRD WORD DEB CRISIS

prices urts te urban bourgeoisie. Eimnating govement patronage oten undercuts te ony basis o egitimacy' tat ests in many Tird Word states  peope riot saky regmes can a Many Tird Word eaders tereore brde at MF discipine wic tey usuay see as intervention. n 8 te President o Zambia accused te MF o backmaiing Arcan states by insisting on com piance wit its poicies in ecange or new oans Botswana's Finance Minister reportedy tod te 8 MF annua meeting tat te inst tution ad pused its conditionaity ar beyond te imit o socia toerance'  President aros Andres Perez o Venezuea paced te bame or te aracas riots on te ineibiity o industra states wic troug te MF orced is government to impose a severe programme o economic austerity wic provoked instabity and vio ence t soud be noted tat te MF does not dictate specic poicies but ony seeks agreement on macroeconomc restraints suc as tose outined above wic are designed to reduce waste and increase productivity However suc restraints oten eave itte room or coice by te governments invoved Moreover tey do not address te probem o depressed commodity prces and ig interest rates wic reduce coice even urter (O course tese are genera market conditons wic a countries are subject to and not merey te ess deveoped Tey a ar more eavy on te atter owever wic again underines te distnction between states and uasistates Does responsibiity ie wit te sovereign government invoved as te MF assumes or does it rest as President Perez caims wit te industra powers wo ave te greatest inuence on MF poicies? s te Venezuean government a ree agent and tereore accountabe or its actons or do te internatona nancia and economic constraints it aces remove tat responsibiity and ocate it esewere  presumaby among te deveoped countres?  a country suc as Venezuea wic enjoyed enormous oi revenues in te 0s is not uy accountabe ow muc ess accountabe are te more numerous and ess ortunate Tird Word states wic do not ave oi weat? Te answer depends on te acts o course But it aso depends on ones teory o sover eignty are sovereign states in suc circumstances responsibe agents or are tey victims o socioeconomic orces beyond teir contro? an a states  obiged to pay by te traditiona nondiscrminatory rues o lisseze or can some egitimatey caim positive discriminaton on grounds o specia crcumstances or needs Arcan governments ave vocierousy opposed conditionaity and caed or reorm o te internationa pubic ending regme Western sympatizers ave carged tat te First Word as betrayed te trust 27

 O V E RE I G N T Y A N D D E V E  O P  E N T

o f poor countries by not substantially increasing concessional aid and otherwise easing their debt obligations by relaxing or abandoning rules which only make sense between developed economies. A special 8 summit of OAU states called for all African external debt to be re­ scheduled over fifty years, without interest, and for sharply increased external financal assistance from developed countries Debt payments should be suspended without penalizing eligbility for new credits in cases where it was impossible to make them without major social sacrifices African govements demand concessionality and non­ reciprocity in financial transfers between wealthy and impoverished states UN bodies such as UNCTAD have argued that exteal debt is a crisis not of some individual states but of inteational society as a whole They emphasize the ytem vulnerabilities of the weaker member states as compared to the stronger Some development econ omists make the same point: 'The poorest people and poorest coun tries are always peculiarly vulnerable to economic shocks not of their own making   . the errors and problems of the past are a joint re sponsibility of African governments and the international com munity  39 This collectivist theory obviously rejects the traditional individualist equation of sovereignty and responsibility and attri­ butes it to the system as a whole Globalist proposals have even come from Weste baners. In 88 James Robinson, Chairman of American Express Company, called for shared sacrifices and rewards by Western banks, the developed coun­ tries and the less-developed countries and proposed an nstitute for nternational Debt and Development the debt crisis is more than a banking problem    t is also a business problem, a geopolitical prob­ lem and a world peace problem  Mr Robinson presumably wanted Western governments and ultimately their taxpayers to pick up his unserviceable Third World loans This is a convergence of ideology one normally would not expect but it reveals the extent to which at least some Western banks are entangled in the financial difficulties of certain Third World states. They want their money back but they know many debtors cannot repay without additional external financial assistance which both the banks and the debtors would like the developed coun tries to provide The MF has been operating with classical liberal doctrine in both economics and international law. f govements wish to borrow they must meet the terms of the lender who himself is subect to similar disciplines which extend up and down the line of credit, all of which is consistent with free market economics and inteational law based on contract. The ultimate aim is to integrate Third World economies into 28

THIRD WORD DEBT CRISIS

the intetionl economy on  bsis o reciprocity rther thn singling them out or specil tretment Conditionlity hs provoked  storm o criticism however owing to its seeming intrusiveness into the sover eignty o debtor sttes which becuse o poor credit rtings usully hve little i ny lterntive to deling with the MF or new lons The MF seeks to improve those rtings through its mcroeconomic dis ciplines But the MF role hs been chrcterzed s tht o 'de fcto receiver to Aricn governments41 nd even s mounting to nothing less thn  recoloniztion o the Third World by 'intetionl bureu crcies   Criticisms such s these ssume tht Third World debtors re in no position to be held ccountble in such wys  The MF evidently considers Third World sovereignty t lest in principle to be the sme s sovereignty everywhere else: nmely to postulte reedom nd responsibility o governments But MF critics ssume positive ree dom to be lcking nd exemptions rom trditionl bnkng rules nd nncil ssistnce on  dierent bsis to be both necessry nd justi ed until such reedom is chieved The severe hrdship o sttes which ptently cnnot meet con dionlity hs cused concern mong Western govements in the soclled Pris Club n 8 the Nordic countries begn to write o their sot lons to the poorest sttes Cnd in tht yer orgve more thn hl  billion dollrs o debt owed by the most destitute members o the Commonwelth nd Frncophonie n 88 Brtin converted over  million dollrs owed by ourteen Aricn countries into grnts Other Western sttes nd the EEC hve tken similr cons The 88 summit meeting in Toronto o the seven leding Weste industrilized countres ccepted the principle tht debt relie must be grnted to the most impoverished Aricn sttes n 8 shortly ter the Crcs riots the new Bush dministrtion in the United Sttes reversed previous Regn dministrtion policy by dvocting debt orgveness on commercil lons to mjor Third World borrowers prticulrly the Ltin Amercn sttes Privte Weste bnks would grnt t lest temporry wivers o the repyment o principl or reduce interest rtes The United Sttes pn nd other mjor OECD countries would underwrite the MF nd the World Bnk in the event tht debtor countries still ltered on the repyment o lons wrtten down by commercil bnks. The Bush proposl did not bndon resucturing however which ws still  key to uture lines o com mercil credit in countries grnted debt orgveness. And there ws no indiction tht Western govements (tht is txpyers) would become involved in nncing Third World debt reducton The debt crisis hs nevertheless brought to light  predicment o 29

SOVEREGNTY A N D D E V E L O P  E NT

nternatona nance n whch the tradona doctrne o repayng oans accordng to one's agreements has been subected to certan quacaton Those parts o the Thrd Word many sub-Saharan Arca whch are east abe to meet ther eterna financa obgatons are consdered to have a egtmate cam to the argest ree rom tradtona nanca requrements  n some cases ought debt cance aton Other parts partcuary atn Amerca wth stronger athough not yet deveoped economes are consdered to have a egtmate cam ony to some debt orgveness In a captast regme at east the major debtors must be hed to some account otherwse the system tse coud be threatened The ormer thereore quay or 'sot oans' admns tered by nteatona pubc endng agences at concessona rates o nterest whereas the atter must be satsfied wth commerca rates athough these may be wrtten down by the prvate banks wth I and Word Bank support underwrtten by the major OED countres The ormer can ony demand ree but the atter can aso threaten deaut Ths s the debt threat presented by major an Amercan borrowers. Debt orgveness or the atter must thereore be handed careuy so as not to erode the rues whch are those o borrowers payng o ther oans n accordance wth agreed rates and terms: the bass o a bankng system There are derent normatve assumptons and expectatons about soveregn statehood dscosed by the debate on Thrd Word debt Shoud a debtor states be hed to the same rues regardess o ther crcumstances? Or shoud easer terms and condtons be avaabe to hardshp cases? There s a dvson o nteatona opnon on ths queston Some are ncned to appy cassca commerca obgatons as wdey as possbe They evdenty beeve that soveregn members o nternatona socety ke aduts n domestc socety are egay ndependent and must be hed accountabe or ther debts Ths s the nternatona moraty o pct unt vnd keep your promses Such a regme cannot operate permanenty on a bass ether o debt or gveness or debt repudaton whch destroy the obgatons between borrower and ender on whch any endurng system o nteatona credt has to be based 43 Debt orgveness such as the Bush admns­ traton recommends s conceved to be ony temporary and thereore not a basc change n the regme But t woud be a precedent. I soe Thrd Word states receve orgveness t shoud not be unexpected that a such states woud cam the same rghts and t woud be easy or them to consder these rghts as somethng ess than temporary Even on a temporary bass such a tered regme o nteatona nanca obgaton coud be read as a retreat rom cassca postve soveregnty 

THIRD WORD DEBT CRISIS

doctrne Of course, t s lso possble to vew t s  new relsm nvolvng prudentl consdertions of nterntonl nncl mngers nd therefore s  deprture from clsscl doctrine only to sve the system n the longer term  n inteonl prllel to Pres­ dent Roosevelts domestic New Del durng the depresson of the 90s hs undoubtedly s the vew of some Western nks nd mor OED sttes ncludng now for the first tme the Unted Sttes Others re nclned to go frther becuse they hve  view of nter­ non oblgton whch s fundmentlly dfferent from the doctrne of ct unt nd Poor sttes n the nterntionl economy, lke poor people n domestc economes, re vulnerble to forces nd events eyond ther control they cnnot control the hgh nterest rtes or low commodty prces n whose ws they re cught hs s the morl logc of the NEO nd ts supporters who reect the princple of strct recprocty n economc reltons nd rgue tht the dverse mteril crcumstnces of most hrd World sttes cll for  fund mentl chnge of nterntonl oblgton wy from free trde nd commuttve ustce towrds economc democrcy nd dstributve ustce But ths s fr too rdcl to be cceptble to those wth prevl ng economc power n ntetonl socety nd prtculrly the Unted Sttes he NEO therefore remns lttle more thn  ppe drem. hs does not men, however, tht  doctrne of postive ssstnce nd dscrmnon hs not found  legtmte plce n nter nonl reltons whch mor economc powers cn ccept  N T  R N A T  O N A  A F F  R  AT  V  A C T  O N ?

ody the dutes of sttesmen evdently re not only to respect the ursdctons of other sttesmen ut in ddition to mterlly ssst underdeveloped countries especlly those n dffcult crcumstnces he deep poverty nd bckwrdness of mny nturlly gves rse to  sense of need  bsc needs  whch n turn re equted wth quli­ ctons for mterl d poor countres feel enttled to receve nd rch countries constrned to provde developmentl ssstnce or debt relief f these nd smlr knds of postve socoeconomc support do not yet reflect  legl oblgton they nevertheless revel  morl inuncton of some kind t s mpossble to deny the mpovershed condtions of mny sttes nd the obvous blty of other sttes to help in llevting them t the very lest provdng d or relef s  decent thng n refusng to do so s worthy of condemnton  R Lucs ponts out tht morl prctce commonly nd qute rghtly dstngushes fr brgns from hrd brgns 'f  tke dvntge of  mns temporry need, he my hve no resonble ltetive 3

S O V E R E I G N Y A N D D E V E  O  M E N 

except to agree to my terms, ut I am expotng hm none the ess e s, n effect, agreeng under duress Athough Lucas s referrng to indivduas and not states, ths coud perhaps e sad of IMF restruc turing agreements Indeed, critics of the doctrine that contracted inter nationa dets shoud e repad n fu requenty resort to the mora anguage of hard arganng in ther condemnations of deveoped countries and Weste anks Inteaona ogaon so conceved oviousy s dfferent from that postuated y cassca postive nter naona aw t s aout what s decent and just n the circumstances and not merey contractua or ega That hard argains do not have the same mora standing as fair argans s easer to recogne, of course,

than respond to wth approprate rues and practices

However, the wiingness of major OECD states to consder det reief for certan countries n the eief that they cannot repay owng to forces and circumstances argey eyond ther contro gives some ntmatons of norms whch depart from cassca era doctrne even f they stop far short of the Charter of the Economc Rghts and Dutes of States Ths seems to e the emergent pracce of states ut how can we characterize t? A domesc anaogy may e suggestve thn some Weste coun tries, as ndcated, exa socoeconomic enttements and assstance are provided to certan peope who quaiy for affrmatve acon pro grammes Ths s a orm of preferentia treatment y the state targeted at ctzens who are memers of parcuar dsadvantaged categores, such as acks or women In Canada t has consttuona standng under the equaty rghts section of the

Chrter o Rights nd Freedoms

whch decares the egaty of any aw, programme or actvity that has as ts oject the ameoration of condtions of    those that are dsad vantaged ecause of race, natona or ethnc origns, coour, reigion, sex, age or menta or physca dsaiity   The cruca dea s that of extendng a speca opportunty or enet to some ndvidua or group who otherwse woud not quafy for t n compensation for dsad vantages attuted to unchosen memershp n such categories Ths s usuay justifed on the grounds of reparng njustice or dsad vantage rought aout y such memershp in the past and in the expectation of therey enang the eneciar to exercse greater sefdetermnaon n the uture frmative action thereore juses prefrenta treatment pocies accordng to ether ackwardooking prncpes or forwardookng prncipes or oth Affmatve acton programmes were nstuted n the United States when t ecame cear that racia ntegration coud not e acheved merey y the repea of segregation aws and the extenson of the 32

INERNAIONAL AIRMAIVE ACION?

ancise and other generally available legal rigts to blacks. Altoug tey were now first class citzens by law tey neverteless remained entangled in adverse economc, social, and cltural circumstances wic severely limited teir freedom of opportunity and over wich tey were considered to exercise little or no control In our termin­ ology, negative rights were not sufficient to overcome the adverse consequences of past discrminaon In addion, it was necessary to discriminate positvely in education or employment or housng to enable certain people to take advantage of their newly won rghts Regional development programmes suc as exist in Canada by wic te Federal Government provides special inancial assistance to poor povices migt be tougt of as affirmatve action for territoral com­ munities 47 Affirmative acton is therefore a kind of citizensip plus: temporary dependency in te form of preferential treatment for the sake of future positve freedom Affrmative action is a practcal polcy in countres lke the Unted States or Canada were tose actually receiving benefits on such grounds are a comparatively small mnory in an oterwise wealthy society Since it presupposes support only untl suc time as the benefciary is able to stand on s own it is not fundamentally in­ consistent wit a liberal political order Perhaps tis is why it as proved acceptable to the majority of Amercans and Canadians and teir political representatves at least to date It is not by any means witout controversy owever Its ethcal base is wdely questioned and its status s by no means secure It is a orm of dscrmination wc in favouring some penalizes tose wo would oterwse qualify for te benefit or opportunity and terefore volates the prnciple of mert or desert Anoter critcism casts doubt on te clam tat it will in due course enable its beneicaries to stand on teir own If it fails to produce the desired results or f it renforces rather tan reduces dependency it could come under crtcsm suffcient to bring about its abandonment. In wch case the tradtional practice of negatve lberty would presumably be reverted to, as some critcs of affrmatve action advocate 49 A cognate idea can be detected in contemporary nternatonal re­ lations Third World states wich ave experienced colonialsm are te internatonal equvalent of racal minorites whose ancestors suffered under slavery or other legal or economc disabilities Both represent vctims o past nsttutonalzed dscrmnaton or dsadvantage and therefore merit specal consderaton and assstance  Although nega­ tive soveregnty was necessary to remove colonialis t s not suf fcient to complete self-determination Tird World states terefore 33

S OVEREIGNY A N D D E V E  O P  E N

have a legitimate claim to international socioeconomic assistance, com­ pensation, and relief not only on the backwardlooking grounds that they suffered from past eploitation by colonial powers and the world capitalist economy but also in the forward-looking epectation that they will thereby develop the capabilities of positive sovereignty The point is not that such eploitation necessarily took place or must be 'proved but only that it serves as moral grounds for present actions and institutions of positive discrimination between otherwise equally sovereign states nternational affirmative action, unlike the NO, is a moral practice that attempts to it into a liberal world order Just as domestic affirma tive action in the United States and Canada goes beyond  although not too far beyond  the franchise and other legal rights available to everyone so also does international affirmative action reach a modest distance beyond negative sovereignty And ust as domestic pro­ grammes of affirmative action anticipate the day when they will be unnecessary, inteational programmes look forward to the time when recipient states can stand by themselves Finally, ust as positive discrimination in favour of disadvantaged minorities is only possible within states because of the eistence of wealthy maorities, corre­ sponding discrimination between states likewise is consistent or at least not inconsistent with the present division of inteational society between an underdeveloped periphery in need and a developed centre with resources to address those needs. nternational affirmative action therefore presupposes that the global economic playing field is not level for all states and to be made level certain rules and actions of positive discmination in favour of the currently disadvantaged is required until such time as they are in a position to play the great game of international economics by the classical rules Something along these lines appears to be happening in international financial and trading relations as my previous remarks indicate Of course, inteational affrmative action is not eplicitly referred to as such  by the actors involved The idea is present, however, even if the term is not Those less developed states which are not yet in a position to take full advantage of the traditional rules can legitimately claim eemption from (some of them or special rules for themselves until such time as they are in that position The various proposals of debt relief for certain Third World states are consistent with the affirmative action notion of temporary eemption from the general rules of international inancial obligation. And modifications to the GA designed for less developed countries and in particular the suspension of reciprocity and the Most Favoured Nation principle and 

NERNAONAL ARMAVE AC O N 

the adopton of nonrecprocy and te Generased Sceme of Preferences are consstent wth te dea of speca rues Both am at makng the payng fied of nternatona economcs f not eve for suc counres at east ess steepy ncned aganst them Furer these speca posive arrangements are consdered to be ony temporary The genera rues of recprocty and nondscrm­ naton are epected to be apped once the dsadvantages are overcome and countre are abe to stand on ther own Ths coud be rater ong n comng owever and n many cases suc spca arrangements coud ast ndefintey f the beneficares are unabe to respond pos­ tvey and the communty of states connues to supprt them Even those whch do respond mgt st be reuctant to gve up ther speca enttements whch they coud very easy come to regard as perma­ nent nternatona rghts In 987 severa countres were consdered too rch for concessonary financa assstance from te nterAmercan Deveopment Bank and other nteatona endng nstutons Some were aso 'graduated from the S preferenta tarff regme wch prevousy gave them prveged access to te Amercan market Graduaon day was a moment not of ceebraon but of btter com­ pant by Sngapore and Barbados who objected openy at enceforh beng requred to compete accordng to the more dscpnng rues of recproty  TH DA OF QAS-STATS

Peraps the treads o f these remarks can b e drawn together Inteatona deveopment doctrne runs up aganst tradtona norma­ ve assumptons underyng economc reaons between soveregn states The reaiy s not that the aw of wefare  nonrecprocy  as repaced the aw of bery  recprocty as Fredmann predcted  Nor s t key Rater t s tat poor states today asse bot negatve and posve norms at one and the same me as ndcated by Arce 7 of the harter of Economc Rghts and Dues of States And contempo­ rary nteaona socety s tryng to operate wt bot But te two norms may not aways be compabe Indeed they may be conradc tory at some ponts and te contradcton may not be capabe of a resouton wtout sacrficng one or te oter We arve at te Nort Sout dlemma because the deprvaton of ndependence for te underdeveoped and the perpeuaon of underdeveopment for te ndependent are both moray objeconabe n te contemporary nter naona communty In pracce of course te demma s resoved n the latter way Ts normatve confct was unknown to cassca nteatona re 35

S O V E RE I  T Y A  D D E V E  O P M E  T

latns which assumed that all svereign states were mre r less capable f benefing frm a liberal inteatinal ecnmic rder based n reciprcity here was nt a significant and acknwledged divisin between sme states which were develped and thers which were underdevelped States required temprary ecnmic assistance frm tme t time, such as I lans t vercme balance f payments difficultes But n states were in mre r less permanent need f psitve assistance r cmpensatin which was nt expected t be reciprcated in kind Plitical independence and sciecnmc well being were all f a piece svereignty was indivisible in this dc­ trine hese psitive svereignty assumptins run int difficulty in an inteatinal sciety cmprising numerus quasistates  F restruc turing is a case in pint it cannt really deal with the fact that mst smaller and weaker debtrs suffer frm far mre than merely tempr­ ary financial r technical difficules  hey cannt respnd t  disciplines in the same way as develped cunies with balance f payments prblems hey have a deeper prblem underdevelp ment Cnditnality is ften thwarted because nt nly ecnmies r setes but als gvernments are underdevelped 'Effrts at stabiliz an and strctural adjustment are rutinely stymied by dmesc ptical frces 1 he ability f hird Wrld regimes t frustrate external cntrl and restrcturing effrts remains ne f the largest lacunae f the grwing literature n inteatinal debt 2 he I cannt infringe upn the svereignty f the brrwer by managing the resucturing itself All it can d is withhld future lans if a gve­ ment fails t perfrm accrding t the terms f its agreement But withhlding cannt reslve the prblem f underdevelpment Simi lar difficultes were encuntered in expecting quasistates t beneit equally frm GA rules r t repay their debts in accrdance with traditinal banking rules hese may be viable nrms fr develped cunies but they are stretched t the pint f breaking when it cmes t underdevelped nes As indicated, sme f the requirements f the inteatinal ecn­ mic game have therefre been changed t accmmdate quasi-states  althugh this is usually cnsidered t be nly temprary One can read internatinal develpment assistance, the GA preferences, debt relief and ther instances f internatinal affirmative actin in this light they amunt t a specialized althugh sll rather minimal regime f psitve and nnreciprcal assistance r cmpensatin which caters fr a new class f svereign states that are underdevelped Insti­ tutinal arrangements such as these d nt and cannt avid the 

HE DIEMM O QSI-SES

normative dlemma outlined above, however I n fact they create it and the consequences which follow from it The dlemma of quasi-states is rooted in the dfference between a state and an individual and therefore discloses one of the limitations of the domestic analogy in inteational relations. Who is ulmately responsible or human welfare: the individual or society? What is just les equal for all or rules that compensate the weak or unortunate? These are questions which divde Weste domestic soeties between Rit and Left and m on conflicting concepons of freedom, re­ sponsiblity, and equalty. A smlar debate divides nteatonal so ciety roughly between North and South. Classical inteational relaons assumes that sovereign governments are generally capable and responsible although they can face brief perods of economic difficulty when they may requre assistance om the inteaonal community or other states. A govement receiving assistance today, however, wll be obliged by the rule of reciproty to extend the same to someone

else

tomorrow

It

therefore

precludes

the

dlemma

However, by assuming that nteatonal socety has the responsiblity of provding assistance to underdeveloped counies untl such time as they can exerse positive sovereignty the docine of intetonal affirmave acon encounters the dlemma and is mpaled on its hos. Provding financial assistance or relief to a sovereign memr of inteational socety is ethcally more ambiguous than proding it to a zen withn domesc society because we cannot be certain that it wll get to those who can best use it or most need it In ng aid to a cizen it is ear who the beneficiary is But n giving assistance to a country (or other collectivity) it is not as ear. Aid ansferred from a rich to a poor country may or may not involve a ansfer of income from a rich to a poor person Cizens of average means in rich state A cannot drectly provde financial aid to persons of far lower average means in poor state B because the ansacton crosses inteaonal boundaries and therefore nvolves sovereign states This can only happen  the sover eign govement of state B authorzes it and is able to enforce its authorizaon A govement may nvest teaonal assistance pro ducvely or redisbute it _n accordance with need but there is no lawful inteaonal way of guaranteeng this once the foreign re sources are on its sol It depends on the ablity and gness of its officials to do so  they are prone to mismanagement corruption or other kinds of ncompetence or indiscipline foreign grants or loans may end up feeding the system of waste and abuse Debt forgiveness can have the same result if past loans were in the hands of such govements This should not be taken to imply that capable and 37

S OV E R E IGNTY A N D DEVEOMENT

respsible gvemet i s a suffiet cdi fr develpmet r scial justice i Third Wrld states. But it prbably is a ecessary cdi I trasactig develpmet assistace r relief acrss iteatial brders the idepedece f recipiets ad the priciple f eci prcity prbably udermies the cfidece f drs. Althugh it wuld be tab fr gvemets f develped cuies t admit it publicly ucertaity  this issue may  e reas why iteaal develpmet assistace is iadequate t the eed I ther wrds, the asymmetrical relatiship r divrce f etlemet ad respsibility which iteraal develpmet etas may limit severely the effec veess ad jusce that such asactis ca achieve Here is perhaps the rt f the dilemma i Third Wrld demads fr bth distribuve ad cmmutave justice develpmet supprt, ad svereig ide pedece reciprty ad reciprcity. I shrt i the real wrld f iteatial relatis e cat have e's cake ad eat it.



6

S OV E RE I G N R I G HT S VE R S U S HUMN R I G HT S

T   U    V     A   F T TD D

n recen decade a earer picre o polical inviliy arond he world ha emerged Repor o ineaional hmaniarian organ izaion annally caalogue arbira deenon beang poliical illing orre eror poliical prioner diappearance regee deah qad deucion o livelihood and vario oher hman igh violaon which ll he page o banal vole1 here wold be more were i no or he ac ha many govemen conceal hem A  96 dy eimaed ha he world reugee poplaon wa in ece o 3 million and ha he nmber o people diplaced wihin hei own conrie i probably even greaer 2 Polical illing eiher by goveen or by agen which hey canno conol have occrred in Gaemala ndoneia Cambodia Uganda Hai Agenina ndia and Libya3 Polical maae wih genocidal endene have been commied in Bndi Rwanda Uganda Cambodia and Bangladeh  Polical abdcon and diappearance carried o eiher by governmen agen or heir opponen in 95 alone ae nown o have occrred in Angola Argenina Bolivia Brazil Cenral Arican Repblic Chile Colmbia Cypr Dominican Repblic El Salvador Ehiopia Gaamala Ginea Hai Hondra ndonieia ran raq Lebanon Mexico Morocco Nepal Nicaraga Paraguay Per Philippine Seychelle Soh Arica Si Lana Syria ogo Uganda Ugay Vienam and  he e o ore a par o ae conolled machinery o ppre dien ha en docmened recenly in ixyi conie wenyhee Aican (inclding Soh Aica) fieen Lain Amecan en Middle Eae en Aian and eigh Eropean6 Spain wa he only Wee demoracy led among he oender he li goe on and he picre change only lighly rom one year o he nex hee occrrence are no happening oide oveeign ae or in war beween hem hey  no infliced on reigner or colonial 39

SOVEEIGN IGHTS VESS HMAN IGHTS

subjects. They are occurring inside independent states. Although ant­ government rebels are also responsible and foreign inteention can be involved, the principal violators are sovereign govements. The vic tims are their own citizens. This 'paradox of the state in which gove ments are a source of threat rather than security is a general phenomenon by no means restricted to the Third World. 7 The political history of Europe can be read without distorton as a long record of political ncivility. Postwar Easte Europe continued the malpractice. Today, however, it is particularly evident outside the West where citizenship often is scarcely more than a nominal status with little or no real purchasing power. This is because the Third World state is usually the possession and instrument of elites who often act as if sovereignty is their licence to exploit people In the past quarter century the image of the Third World accordingly has become one not only of poverty and underdevelopment but also of invility and repression. This regrettable reality is n marked contrast to the tme of ndependence when the Thrd World was 'a vital new force in inteaonal affairs 8 The revolution of the new states was progressive. Decolonizaon was an act of liberation The future was one of promise now that colonial peoples possessed sovereignty and could take their destiny into their own hands But if we are to believe these reports - and the only ones who dispute them are the sovereign goveents involved and the allies  the expansion of the com munity of states brought about by decolonization has not resulted in a corresponding extension of human rights protection as was originally expected when independence was in the offing. Instead, it increased the oppotunity for human rights violations. More than four decades after the Universal Declaraton of Human Rights the violaton of basic standards of human decency is more universal than the protecton. ZATO AD HA HTS

How should we interpret inteational human rghts viol aons? Have humanitarian standards been raised? Or has the in­ cidence of human rights abuses increased? In an imperfect world consisng of men rather than angels, the elevation of human stan dads   other things remain eual, be followed by increased human rights violaons even  behaviour is unhanged. nteational standards of human rights undoubtedly are higher today than at any me in mode story The elaborate framework of humanitarian law is extensive testimony. Perceptions of human rights abuses are also probably more acute than ever - at least in the West. The comparatve vly of Weste states and the corresponding expectaons of their 

VZATON AND HUMAN RGHTS

populaons have unoubtely create heghtene awareness of nhu manty everywhere The percepton of nteatonal human rghts volatons presup poses general stanars an epectatons of humantaran conuct If there were fferent stanars from one place to the net smlartes an fferences woul be all that was notce a worl of cultural relativsm If stanars were low or non-estent such behavour also woul not atract attenton because t woul be a commonplace every where In an uncvl worl noboy but sants woul notce ncvlty Lkewse, f the worl's states were n the habt of protectng the cvl an poltcal lbertes of ther populatons there woul be lttle or no nterest n nteatonal human rghts The sprea of soveregnty aroun the worl an the protecton of human rghts woul be one an the same There woul be no tenson between soveregn rghts an human rghts An there woul be no nternatonal law of human rghts an no nteatonal humantaransm because they woul be unnecessary Toay, however, human rghts volations n most parts of the worl are well ocumente an wiely crtcze by a growng nternatonal humantaran movement Although the term cvlzaton' s conroversal the concept s necessary n nteatonal stues f we are to unerstan ssues n volve n the protecon of human rghts Most nforme people an vrtually all stuents of human relations recognze that the partcular les, nsttutons, practices, an customs of whch soceties consst vary enormously from one tme or place to the net Socal scentsts are professonally nclne to be agnosic about fferent cultures an to suspen any jugements whch mght nvolve ethnocentrsm Ths s particularly the case as regars fferences between Weste an non-Weste cultures The stuent of nteational relatons s confronte wth a specal problem, however Hs subject s a sngle global socey of states to whch all other socetes an cultures are connecte, rectly or n rectly, by means of soveregnty ne cannot conceve of a unversal nteaonal socety otherwse. Moreover, snce states consst of humans one must assume some common humany: perhaps a mn mal content of natural law' whch acknowleges unversal human vulnerablty an respon by a general rule of nonvolence 9 Fnally, t woul be mpossble to operate across cultures wthout not only a share scourse an framework of communcaton  nclung nter naonal law an plomacy  but also common stanars whch make comparative apprasals an equtable treatment possble Not only legal an scentfic language but also moral, poltcal, an economc 

SOEREIN RIHS ERSUS HUMAN RIHS

discourse require terminology which is not merely relatve but also comparative; that is, it involves reference to standards and particularly standards of conduct. The concept of 'civilizaon implied by these remarks was examned at length by the Eglish philosopher R  Collingwood in response to the Nazi atrocties of the second world war.10 According to Colling­ wood, 'civilization prmarily signifies refraning from the arbiary use of force and obeying the rule of law which forbids it. 'Civilizaton is not vilizaon but barbarty unless it nsists that you shall treat every member of your community as civly as possible.  Acting civilly towards someone means respecting his feelings, dignity, and auton omy. The rule of law is a public standard of conduct which precludes arbitrariness and establshes due process based on formal equality. Both 'civility and 'the rule of law presuppose the capacity not only to obey but also to enforce the law. Collingwood points out that the process of civilizaon involves bringing others, including foreigners, into ones community wich is a sphere of human relations goveed by the civilities and the rule of law. The expansion of internatonal society is an nstance of the civilzation process in the broadest sense. Civilizaon also signifies a corresponding process whereby the comforts and enjoyments of human life are enlarged by the applicaon of science and industry to natural resources This is the civilzation associated with technological and economic development. However, there is no cion  in the rational exploitaton of nature human beings are treated as part of the natural world rather than the human world.1 Development without the rule of law is barbarsm. This is the great temptation when extreme inequalites of technology exist be tween societies, as in the historical encounter between the Weste and the non-Western worlds. Technological prowess unfortunately invites a dangerous kind of hubris which is a real threat to civlizaton cause it reinforces the bultin hubris of the state which has troubled many inteaonal theorists and not least Burke: 'I must fairly say, I dread our n power, and our n ambition; I dread our being too much dreaded . 12 Today, owing to continuing scientific and techno logical innovaton, that menace is greater than ever A government which has mastered technology but not the rule of law is the most dangerous of all organizations  as twenethcentury hightech totali tarianism graphically indicates. It is a regrettable fact that diffusion of technology and particularly the means of volence is easier and more rapid than enlargement of political civility. Many of these means and particularly the means of volence have been spread by the expansion of the statessystem The huge inteational arms bazaar feeds the 

C IV I II O N  N D H  M  N RIGHTS

nsatable appetite for such means of many Thrd World govements which could not possess them otherwise. The secondary process of civilzaton consequently is always subject to the first process and particularly the rule of law which forbids the arbitrary use of force. Collingwood is therefore at pains to emphase the most important thing of all about 'civilization, namely that it requires self-discipline.

'w and order mean strength. Men who respect

the rule of law are by daily exercise building up the strength of their own wils. 13 Civiized men and civized govements aie exercise forbearance. The concept of civilization clearly has extensive applica­ bility in both domestic and inteational politics in spite of the fact that the word is avoided today. A characteristc feature of inteational law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as we saw in chapter  was the 'stan­ dard of civilzaon used in determinatons of membership in the society of states. The standard was established not only to eradicate barbarous practices such as slavery but also to regulate the technologi­ cal power of intruding Weste mechanized states. The standard was embedded in colonialism Today, however, it is of historical iterest only. It has been categorically rejected by the Third Word as a form of Western imperialism: an expression of contempt for their cultures and a pretext for denyig self-government. The expressions 'sacred trust of civilization and 'civilzed state have been erased from current inter national law and the dialogue between states carefully avoids these terms. Even though 'sovereign state has replaced 'civilized state the idea of 'civilzaton has not been and cannot be abandoned Without such a distinction it would be impossible to render certain iteational legal and moral judgements. Immediately following the second world war surviving leaders and high officials of defeated Axis powers were tried for crmes of war and crmes against humanity by the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals and many were convicted The prerogatives of sover eignty were not considered a valid excuse for acts of inhumanity . 14 Legal positvism offers no escape fom civized standards. The old 'standard of civilization still exists, but is expressed differ­ ently today Gerrt Gong suggests that these expressions are, rstly, 'human rights and 'nondiscrimnation, and secondly, 'modeity or 'development  15 This is not only similar but vrtuly identical to Collingwoods twofold concept of 'civilization already discussed. The ideas of a 'standard of civilizaton and a 'standard of human rights share a common preoccupaton with lie liberty, dignity, security, and other fundamental rights which regard human beings as ends rather 43

S  V E R E  G N RGHTS VERSS HMAN RGHTS

than means These are naura rights or human rights propery so caed because to be reaized they ony require forbearance which is within the capacity of everyone; they are negative rather than posiive. The idea of a 'standard of nondiscrimination' aso resembes Coing wood' s concept of civiization as a process of bringing outsiders into one's community Likewise, the idea of civizatio and the idea of deveopment both seek mastery of nature by the appication of science, technoogy, and industry to the materia circumstances of humaniy. Both invoke comparative standards of weath and wefare. n short, athough it is epressed by a different vocabuary 'civiizatio' sti operates as a standard of inteatioa conduct and there reay is no avoiding it if states est for the good of peope and not the reverse. Mode inteationa human rights aw is an important ac knowedgement that sovereign states caot automaticay be co sidered civiized. Otherwise there woud be o need for such aw. Today, for the first time in history, how a sovereign state reats its own citizens is no onger a matter for its own ecusive detemiation, but a matter of leitimate conce for a other states, and for their inhabi tants. 16 This postwar deveopment reiterates a centa argument of the cassica natura awyers which was ost sight of with the advent of positive inteationa aw, namey that human beings are the utimate members of the society of states Some awyers argue that important human rights inunctios, such as the prohibition of geocide, savery and the save tade, now have the character of jus coens: that is, overriding principes which cannot be set aside by the indepedent actions of sovereign states but ony by 'the formatio of a subsequent customary rue of contrary effect'  17 The Kantian image of a cosmopoitan word society consistig of individuas with natura rights immune to poiica itevetion has made considerabe headway in recet decades. A eaborate body of inteationa aw pertaining to huma rights has been deveoped by the  incuding a Universa Decaraio of Huma Rights (98) and a Inteationa Covenant o Civi and Poitica Rights (opened for signatures in 9 and entered into force ten years ater) . There have aso been specia covenios agaist paicuar humaitaria of fences, such as savery, genocide, racia discriinatio, and torture .  addition, regiona human rights insruments have bee estabished i Weste Europe, the Americas, and Afica. The most significat is the European Convenio on Human Rights which provides for a Com mission and a Cout each independent of sigatoy states ad autho rized to receive compaints ad adudicate cases brought not oy by 

CVLZATO AD HUMA RGHTS

saes b individals also. According o Pal Siegha his amons o a sbsanal rerea from he previosly sacred principle of national sovereignty . 18 Alhogh he effectveness of mos ineaional hman righs law is debaable and enforcemen difficl i neverheless provides a moral and legal sifcation for pracical hmaniarian acions aimed a re dcing hman righs violations by sovereign saes. ven if he common law of mankind canno be enforced wiho he cooperaion of he saes involved in hman righs violaons which is obiosly difficl o secre i neverheless constites no merely a moral b a legal sandard for aempting o bring hem o some acconability I herefore has ility When Amnesty Ineational was fonded in

96 here was no single niversal treaty esablishing he righ o fair rials or prohibiting ortre as an infringemen on he righ o life. By

95 more han eighty contries had ratified he Ineational Cov enan on Civil and Politcal Righs and more han forty had signed a UN convenion on ortre which wen ino effec in 97 Nmeros contres o dae have eleced o remain oside hese conventions however A revolion of hman righs is also eviden in he proliferaion of hmaniarian organizaions since he end of he war and particlarly in he pas qarer centry. The hmaniarian movemen in he Wes is of corse far older wih hisorical roos reaching back o he sccessfl campaign of William Wilberforce which secred abolition of he slave trade by he Briish parliamen in 07 Today here are more han a hosand privae hman righs grops in he world mos b by no means all of hem based in Wesern democracies. This is in addition o pblic hmaniarian organizatons wheher naonal regional or ni versal The ineres in ineaional hman righs is also eviden in rapidly expanding and already exensive lieratres on he sbec incding no only aricles and books b also oals and oher periodicals boh poplar and academic. 9 maniarian awareness is propelled by he mass media and especially elevision which enables offences agains basic hman righs commied in one place o be graphicaly known immediely in oher places particlarly he Wes where mos elevision news images are broadcas. Many more people han ever before apprehend Immanal Kan's concep of a pblic law of mankind in which a violaion of righs in one par of the world is fel everywhere' . 20 ndobedly he nvil image of the Third World is a reecion a leas in par of heighened hmaniarian aware ness and legally more explici ineaonal sandards of hman righs. 45

SOVEREIG RIGHTS VERSS HMA RIGHTS

The incidence of human rights violaons has increased in rough proporon to the expansion of inteaonal society. It is not difficult to see why. There are more than three times as many sovereigns today than in  95 Variaon in government condut has also ineased because of decolonization. Before that me most govements of the non-Weste world were under the authority of a few Western cons­ tutional democracies. Independence freed colonies not only from im­ perial direction but also om metropolitan protection under the rule of law Decolonizaon multiplied the number of independent gove ments with responsibility to safeguard civil standards but also with power to violate them. These govements had the sovereign right to abandon the rule of law or do almost anything else in their juris­ dictions Since most came under the control of people who were preoccupied with power and lacked attachment to constitutionalism (and in many cases equated it with colonialism), their decisions were often at odds with civil liberties Inteational humanitarianism is a response to developments such as these But it cannot really make up for shortages of civility or vulnerability of the rule of law in states whic are sovereign Humani tarian organizations point out that human rights problems are fre quently institutional as well as behavioural They can only be addressed by developing a sovereign govements organized ca­ pacity and resolve to protect human rigts This is Collingwood's point about the crucial importance of selfdiscipline and selfrestraint. Ac cording to Anesty Inteational, tis requires 'a comprehensive pro gramme' including independent institutions and procedures for controlling police, military personnel, prison oficials, and oter agents of the state But who is to guard te guards temselves?'21 Wo will institute and defend such procedures? Amnesty replies tat 'citi zens themselves must be made aware of teir rights and know ow to complain when these are infringed  22 But if tey live in authoritarian states standing up for one's rights can be a risky business Amnesty urges tat inteational aid be allocated to promote such programmes But why should such aid be accepted and if accepted be properly used? Quiet and persistent human rights diplomacy and even open condem nation of ross volations is ossible. Under rrent inteational law howver, te efcay of inteational umanitarianism is strictly limited by sovereign rights It is therefore dificult to see ow te vicious circle can be broken if a govement is determined to act in con tempt of civilized standards Yet te action clearly stands condened and

this

norms. 

is

te

cruial

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role

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D E C O  O N IZAION A UHORIARI A N I S M , REUGE E S

DNZN, UHR R   N  S  ,  N D RFUGS

As oted, the key to civiliatio accordig to Colligwood is the rle of law ad the forbearace ad self-discilie it etais  Neither coloialism b y democratic owers or iteatioal trustee shi uder the League ad the UN were fudametally icosistet with the rule· of law For examle, although the Secretary of State for Coloies had o formal cosituoal obligatios to coloial eoles he was resosible to arliamet ad ultimately the Brtish electorate David oldsworthy s study of this toic clearly idicates that members of arliamet eforced this resosibility Their devotio to this duty, as they varously iterreted it, deserves to be remembered with admiratio '23 Various cause grous such as the Fabia Coloial Bu reau also eforced it by voicig cocers o behalf of coloial eoles Ad iteatioal law, accordig to C Wilfred Jeks, lyed for geeratios a sigificat art i the liberaliatio of coloial olicy  24 Britai ad other owers with trust terrtores were also iteratioally resosible to the League Madates Commissio ad later the UN Trusteeshi Coucl J  L Brierly oits out that the madates system was oe of the few oteworthy successes of the League. 2  short, although it was far from erfect ad serious abuses did most certaily occur there evertheless was a istitutioal framework to discourage offeces agaist the huma rghts of coloial subects Coloial govermet by the democratic owers was, of course, ot democratic t was atealistic. There was a double stadard betwee the metroolis ad the various coloies Racial discrimatio was more likely to be codoed either officially or uofficially i the colo ies Force was sactioed ad used beyod the limits which would have bee tolerated i Euroe  Coloial subects were derved of imortat civil liberties. Most coloies of democratic owers everthe less were i their ow terms eaceful, orderly, ad lawful laces by ad large ter-tribal warfare was abolished Slavery was suressed if ot elimiated  The imerial owers created far larger domais tha existed reviously for the growth of uhidered migratio, travel, trade, ad commerce  West Africa coloial admiistratios i varyig degrees established the isitutios of lawful govemet withi which commercial agrculture could floursh 2 The author of these words is ot a diehard coloial aologist but a academic com metator o the olitical ecoomies of cotemorary West Afrca most of which he comared ufavourably with their coloial redecessors Perhas it is true, as Sir W vor Jeigs oce argued, that coloial

7

 O V E R E  G N R  G H   V E R    H  M A N R  GH  

ism and selfgovement were never completely at odds ecause col onial authorities had to take some account of the interests and desires of their sujects 27 Unl the perod following the second world war, however, most colonial peoples were denied the usual rights of demo cac cizenship in all ut a few exceponal cases Decolonizaon therefore necessitated democrac instutionuilding pror to the tansfer of sovereignty  numerous dependencies, as indicated in chapter  steps were taken not only to replace European adminis trave personnel with indigenous offials ut also to eate the ins tuonal famework of a mode constitutional democracy to transform clonial sujects into zens of new stes In Brish tertories sover eignty was only transfrred ſt the constitutional process in each colony had een completed and democrac elections held to deter mine the new indigenous govement Attempts to instute consttutionalism and the rule of law proved unsuccessful more often than not, however After independence, government and opposition could not e constrained y an imperial referee which had departed Constitutions were often replaced y polical frameworks which legalized authotarianism frequently on the model of the one party state Judges and courts in many cases were reduced from independent instituons which enforce the rule of law to instruments of political rule The legal category of politcal crime was enlarged y many postcolonial govements and the numer of people detained for polical offences consequently increased Laws of treason sedion, suversion, and other politcal crimes characteristic of asolutism and rarely resorted to any longer in most Weste demo cracies ae equently relied upon y many Third World governments Parliamentary odies were deprived of authorty and state power was gathered in the hands of narrow oligarchies, usually under the sway of a stong personal rler In many countes electons were manipulated y the party in power, aused y the opposition, avoided or aandoned Not infrequently they were also violent which dis credited them fther Opposion parties were often suppressed in the name of one party states Their leaders faced the choice of joining the ruling monopoly or going underground or into exile Prime minis ters ecame presidents who were kings in all ut name with life tenure either in law or in fact The lives of more than a few proved to e quite short once it ecame clear that the only way to achieve power was to seize it y rce Politics were often reduced to succession suggles 28 In many African and Asian countries, repeating the historcal exper ence of Lan America, the military coup replaced democratc elections as the usual method of changing govements



D  C O  O N  Z A T  O N  A T H O R  TA R  A N  S M  R  F  G   S

The state apparatus o f coercion was usually expanded following independence to deter or deat domestc oppositon. Armed forces often increased many times beyond the small establishments that colonial govements relied on. Zambia' s army became ten times as large as Northern Rhodesia's Nigeria's federal armed orces were built up dramatcally wth exteal mitary aid durng the civi war between 1967 and 1970 but were never substanally reduced afterwards The frepower of most post-independent states is many mes greater than that of their colonal predecessors. These are but a few instances of the praetorianizaton of the Thrd World state which is a general phenom­ enon aimed not at defending countries from exteal attack but at maintaining govements in power. Goveents in multiethnic states were often dominated by particu lar ethnic groups with the equent result of inflaming rather than dampening the built-in conflicts of divided societies . Members of some groups often would not extend toleraton to members of others. Cer tain communities were beyond the pale, so to speak, and in relations with them anything could be tolerated  including not only discrimi naon but also intimidation, violence, and in a few extreme cases massacres. Serious civil discord between govements and their ethnic or regional opponents has consequenty become a marked feature of the postcolonial state. In some cases it involved violence on a large scale: Iraq, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Indonesia, Zaire, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, Sudan, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe  among others.  Coun­ ies such as Chad and Uganda amounted to ltle more than violent arenas where rival ethnc warlords preyed upon innocent bystanders and laid waste to the countryside in a perennial suggle to seize control of a nominal state represented by the capital city. Many ex colonial states therefore have serious diffculty in establishing what Coingwood terms the 'essence' of civilization where men outside one's community come to be considered 'as human ings and there fore as much entitled to civility as  they had been members of the community' . 31 Humanitarian reports in effect have documented the consequences of the failure to institute cstutionalism and the rule of law in many Third World states. The most important point about the weakening or collapse of the rule of law, however, is that it did not undermine or even impinge on the sovereignty of the states involved. Although there were moments of uncertainty at frst  as when coups began to occur in Africa in the early 1960s and the question arose as to whether or not military usurpers shuld be recognized  they were short. 3 The 49

SOVEREIGN RIGHTS VERSS HMAN RIGHTS

new soldier rulers had to b e recognized. Otherwise African inter national society very likely would have been undermined because the dialogue between states would have been interrupted. The alteative possibility that nonrecognition would have prevented the subsequent epidemic of military coups seems far less likely given the weakness of domestic civil and political instutions. Even extreme instances of incivility involving ethnic massacres did not affect the inteational legitimacy of the govements involved. That independence was followed all too often by incivility is in­ dicated by the Third World refugee problem Weste Asia and Sub Saharan Afca had the largest number of political refugees in the 1980s. There were also substantial numbers in Southeast Asia, Central America and Easte Europe People have been prooted and driven into exile in all ages, of course Political refugees are an integral com ponent of the states-system produced by its recurrent militar, re ligious, and ideological conflicts. But whereas the old despotisms of Europe when borders were comparatively open usually fostered refu gees in thousands and occasionally hundreds of thousands, the new authoritarian states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America where borders are far more closed produce them in millions. 4 'What is unique at the present time is the massive scale of such movements  J The per secution of minories by totalitarian governments created unpre cedented flows of refugees following the Russian Revolution in the 1920s, during the era of Nazi Germany in the 1930s, and throughout the second word war. In the past to decades these movements have been imitated and even exceeded by Third World governments which in the mid-1980s denied safe domicile to more than 3 million people This trend is not likely to be reversed very soon because repressive governments or anarchical states, which manufacture refugees in large numbers, give no sign of disappearing. Connections between negative sovereignty and political refugees are not difficult to disce. Colonialism in Africa and elsewhere manu factured numerous economic migrants but comparatively few political refugees Decolonization inceased not only the salience of boundaries as lines of political control ut also their length due to the fct that many previously were merely intra-imperial borders  such as those separat ing the constituent parts of French West Africa which are now eleven

q

sovereign countries Other things remaining e ual the more the globe is crosshatched with independent j urisdictions in which human popu lations are confined the greater the necessity of crossing international borders to secure release from oppression or desttton. ndependent rulers depend on borders more than colonial governors and as a rule 

D E C O L O N ATON A UTHORTAR  A N  S   REUGEES

devoe moe effo and esoues o onollng hem Fuhemoe as aleady noed e-olonal fones deny selfdeemnaon o naonales n many pas of he Thd Wold whee ulual bodes and sae oundaies ae a odds. In many ounes mnoes ae no poeed onsuonally o aommodaed polally. Some naonales ae polally pvleged whle ohes ae ages of ds mnaon noleaon and even epesson whh s pehaps no supsng n ounes whh esemble empes moe han anyhng else Somemes he vmzed ndvdual (o goup) has lle hoe bu o flee and eome a efugee Polal soal and eonom on dions ommon o many Thd Wold ounes enfoe hs sae of affas he naonalzng mpeave of auoa govemens ml arzaon of he sae polal ebellon wdespead ehn o aal pejude and sharp nequales of wealh among ohes  In shor deolonzaon onally was no only a leaon move men bu also an enlosue movemen  onned populaons whn eolonal fones and subjeed hem o ndgenous govemens whh ofen wee no only uned and nepeened bu also unable o unwllng o opeae n aodane wh humaniaan sandads anadan auhoies who deal wh efugees spea of unsafe oun res and legslaon befoe he anadan palamen n 988 onaned a equremen ha unsuessful efugee lamans be eued only o safe hd ounres . The ules of he negave soveegny game uphold safe and unsafe jusdons ale howeve S   F • D  T  R M  N A T  O N AS S O V  R   G N R  G H T S

The pnple o f selfdeemnaion of peoples  s enshned n Ales  and  of he UN hae and eeaed n he 960 Delaa on on he Ganng of Independene o olonal ounes and Peoples and he 966 ovenan on vl and Polial Rghs I s whou doub one of he mos sgnan polal dornes of he eneh enuy As ndaed Ian ownle onsdes  o be pa of he us cogs of he law of naons37 These UN ponounemens ae slen howeve on wha ouns as peoples  The pnple of self deemnaon has also onsequenly poved o be one of he moe ambguous and polal of all he ghs ha have peouped he weneh enuy. Is  a human gh o a soveegn rgh? Aodng o Man Wgh  s a ombnaon of majory ule  whh eludes aal mnoriy govenmens  and eoral vnage  whh pohbs he ule of alens and speally Euopeans o people of Euopean desen n nonWesen neaonal neghouhoodsJ Only ndgenous peoples an gove eolonal saes and hee an 5

SORIN RI HTS RSUS HUAN RIHTS

be n o European immigrant states in Asia and Africa to repeat the experience of the Americas and Australia. The distinctive illegitiacy of Rhodesia and South Africa is disclosed by this logic The prnciple has been aptly named 'racial sovereignty' by Ali Mazrui.39 Self­ determination in the Third World also contains an exogenous eleent, however. The new state is the successor of an identcal pre-exsting European colony and is legtimate by right of succession regardless of the different ethnonatonalities enclosed by it: Thus the prnciple which broke up the Central Empires of Europe in contrary effect outside Europe. The principle

98 is invoked for a

cuju regio eju reigio is

restored in secular form. The elite who hold state power decide the political allegiance of all within their frontiers; the recusant individual may (if he is fortunate) be permtted to eigrate . ' This new doctrne is most clearly evident in subSaharan Afrca. For exaple, all Africans who reside within the excolonial fronters of Kenya are Kenyans. Those who are Somalis by language and religion and by an accident of colonial mapmaking are separated from their brothers in neighbouring Somalia have the choice of emigratng Ironically, therefore it is the colonial state under new indigenous management which is the em­ bodiment of selfdetermination in the Third World The population within its jursdicton is formally the 'people' regardless of substantive differences of tradition, language, religion, or opinon The principle consequently lost important original features and ac quired rather different ones in its migration beyond Europe. It was no longer anything remotely resembling

nion

selfdetermination it

was not the positive right to have a state and government which coincided with historcal or cultural natonality or was subject to popu lar consent  the meaning until this tme It was only the negative right not to be ruled by mebers of a different race. Moreover, self determination is not a continuing process but was dealt to populatons under colonial rule only once at the tme of independence The deck cannot be reshuffled and dealt out again afterwards without the con­ sent of affected sovereign parties which is very unlikely. There are, of course, copeling practical reasons for this change. A weakening of the concept was necessary to incorporate all excolonies in the global counity of states. If the older democratic concept had been retained it would have been more difficult to recognize the sovereignty of numerous excolonies in the Third World And if it were a contnuing possibility rather than a once and for all event it would threaten the geographical integrity of numerous excolonial states. Racial sovereignty and excolonial boundares in any cases have effectvely transformed selfdetermination into a right of sovereigns 52

SELFDEERNON S SOVEREGN RGHS

We see the prma  f sveregn rghts learl n the 96 Charter  f the Organzatn f Afran Unt 4 The re prnples f the OAU em bded n Artle  f the Charter are nerned entrel wth the rghts f member states nludng () eual sveregnt f members () nnnterventn n ther nternal affars and () mutual respet f the sveregnt and terrtral ntegrt f eah member and ts nalen able rght t ndependene Mrever the ffth prnple ndemns wthut reservatn pltal assassnatn and subversn dreted aganst member states The usual targets f pltal assassnatn f urse are rulers These prnples dslse the mutual vulnerablt f Afran states men and ther effrts t redue t b means f nternatnal law up hldng abslute sveregnt wthn nherted elnal frnters n a Reslutn passed b the rst regular OAU meetng n ul 96 thse bundares were delared t be a tangble realt that all members were pledged t respet  Cmments f ndvdual Afran statesmen reterate the same pnt The Presdent f the Malagas Republ bserved that althugh the lnalsts set bundares whh t ften gnred the ndgenus natnaltes t was nether pssble nr desr able t mdf them ndeed shuld we take rae relgn r language as rtera fr settng ur bundares a few States n Afra wuld be bltted ut frm the map  The pnt was made wth greater aura b the Presdent f Mal Afran unt demands    mplete respet fr the lega that we reeved frm the lnal sstem    f we desre that ur natns shuld be ethn enttes speakng the same language and havng the same pshlg then we shall fnd n sngle vertable natn n Afra 43 The elnal state was the nl pratal bass fr sveregnt and f that bass were reeted t wuld result n has Ths has been the prevalng nternatnal reasnng n Afra ever sne  The OAU has been reslved t den selfdetenatn t tradtnal Afran natnaltes  Onl Mr an hstr kngdm and Sma la a nanstate nsstentl epress ntrar vews The resrt t nteatnal law b Afran sveregns t preserve elnal bund ares has been remarkabl suessful Althugh nearl all terrtral ppulatns are deepl dvded alng ethn lnes nt ne state urs dtn has dsntegrated Rebels an gan de facto ntrl f terrtres f urse but ths s nsuffent t apure sveregn The must frst be regnzed but the OAU the UN and the leadng wrld pwers wll nl d ths f the have reeved prr regntn frm the sveregn gvements nvlved Ertrean separatsts have never aheved sveregnt despte havng ntrlled substantal parts f 5

SOVEREGN RGHTS VERSS HMAN RIGHTS

northe Ethopa for more than a quarter century And they  acheve t only when Adds Ababa consents E-colonal boundares reman n effect as nternatonal fronters throughout the hrd World wth very few eceptons Even where de facto borders have effectvely supplanted such boundares, as n Israel, they are stll morally and legally nsecure Inteatonal legtmacy and law s revealed, perhaps surprsngly, as a normatve framework capable of wthstandng the pressures of armed force and ndgenous culture hs s certanly not owng to any shortage of groups that seek to redefine estng terrtoral jursdctons One need menton only the most obvous bos n Ngera, the southern Sudanese, Baganda n Uganda, Skhs n Inda, Berbers n Algera, Baluba n are, amls n Sr Lanka, Karens n Burma, Kurds n urkey, Iran and Iraq, Somals n Kenya, Moslems n Chad, Baluchs n Pakstan, Moslems n the Phlp pnes, and varous ethnonatonal dssdents n Mozambque and Ethopa Selfdetermnaton of e-colonal jursdctons has therefore pro voked serous dscord n many Thrd World states Arnold Wolfers once characterzed the poltcal hstory of Western consttutonal states as that of domestc order and nteatonal volence Cvlty, n the form of consttutonal government, was far more n evdence dom estcally than nternatonally Postve soveregnty was conducve to nteatonal dsorder frequently marked by warfare oday n many parts of the hrd World the opposte s more often the case: statesmen are cvl n ther nternatonal relatons but abusve and coercve n ther domestc conduct whch not nfrequently s provocatve of nteal dsorder and volence he warfare characterstc of negatve sover egnty s nternal and not nteatonal H AFRCAN CHARR ON HUMAN AND POPS

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R   H S

One recent proclamaton of a regonal human rghts regme n the hrd World s the Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples Rghts adopted n 98 by the Assembly of OAU heads of state  However t s actually a thn dsguse for assertng the prorty of soveregn rghts over human rghts n Afrca In the communty of states, as noted, human rghts law properly so-called s an epresson of nteatonal consttutonalsm t mposes an eternal legal restrant on soveregn govements n relaton to the populaton n ther jursdcton If t s effectve t tes the hands of governments whch s undoubtedly why t s ressted Inteatonal consttutonalsm s clearly evdent n the European Conventon for the 

AFRICA CHARTR O HUMA AD POPS RIGHTS

Protecton o  Human Rght and Fundamental Freedom whch  a legally bndng ntrument that provde comprehenve procedural aeguard to protect human right To be ure t alo permt dero­ gaton rom thee procedure n exceptonal crcumtance For example Artcle 15 provde that 'n tme o war or other publc emergency threatenng the l o the naton any Hgh Contractng Party may take meaure derogatng rom t oblgaton Thee meaure mut be conned to thoe trctly neceary to deal wth the cr however Derogaton claue thereore define the prece ground o exceptonal tate authorty when human rght protecton can be upended temporarly or the ake o the greater good o all However they do not alter or even weaken the human rght pro­ von otherwe pecied n the conventon The Arican Charter by contrat  not legally bndng There are not the ame comprehenve procedural retrant on overegn n repect o bac human rght uch a one nd n the European Conventon In the orgnal drat tate parte were under an obl gation to guarantee the right pecied and 'enure repect or them Evdently n order to gan acceptance rom Arcan government both o thee vtal word were elmnated rom the final veron  The unretrainng character o the Arican Charter  trkngly evdent n the abence o derogaton claue and the relance ntead on numer ou clawback claue whch crpple many o the bac human rght enumerated Thee entitle tate to lmt the pecfied rght by ub jectng them to dometc law For example Artcle 9  declare that 'every ndvidual hall have the rght to expre and demiate h opnon wthn the law  Artcle 10 (1) provde every ndvdual wth 'the rght to ree aocaton provded that he abde by the law  Article

11 acknowledge 'the rght to aemble reely ubject to 'neceary retrcton provded or by law n partcular thoe enacted n the nteret o natonal ecurty  Artcle 12 recogze moblty rght wthn countre provded an ndvdual 'abde by the law and the rght to leave and enter a country ubject to pecfied retrcton 'provded or by law Clawback claue apply even to the undamental rght to lberty and ecurty o peron (Artcle 6)  Unle derogaton claue whch do not limt pecfic enumerated rght awback claue make them ubject to the law o the gnatory overegn I thoe law uphold nonconttutonal government whch  uually the cae n Arca the clawback claue nully the humn rght peced Hence they deeat the pont o nteatonal conttutonalm and lberte Arcan gnatore rom the mot m portant retrant peced by the Charter In other word dometc

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SOVEREGN RGHS VERSUS HUN RGHS

law taks pcnc ov t Cat an snc  n Aca omst law usuall s autotaan law ts mans tat t Cat actuall aknowlgs t pot o autotaansm Futmo t Pambl o t Acan Cat maks n to popls' gts' wc soul nssal guaant uman gts' T vocabula an gamma o t tt ncat tat popls' a t populatons o stats (o colons cons as a colltvt wos gts a s b govnmnts Fo ampl Atcl 9 spcs tat all popls' sall njo qual spt an qual gts an tat notng sall just t omnaton o a popl b anot'  Atl 0 pans on ts b statng tat all popls sall av t gt to stnc' an t gt to sltmnaton' an colon o oppss popls to av 't gt to  tmslvs'  Futmo popls av t gt to ntnatonal assstanc b ot stats n t lbaton stuggl aganst ogn omnaton'  Moov Atl  las tat all popls sall l spos o t walt an natual sous'  At ts pont sovgn gts nt plctl sn stats pats    cs t gt to  sposal o t walt an natual sous' an nabl t popls to ull bnt om t avantags v om t natual soucs'  Lkws Atl  acknowlgs tat all popls av t gt to    vlopmnt' an stats    nsu t cs o t gt to  vlopmnt'  It s vnt tat popls' gts' a not onl n ct but also ntnt t gts o sovgn Acan govnmnts Man o t popls' gts' spc a ncal to cntal pn­ cpls o t OAU Cat wc upol t autonom an jus­ cton o Acan sovgns Tat popls' a snonmous wt sovgns' s patulal vnt  Al 3 w clas as popls' gts' t nttlmnts tat sovgns njo un t Cat o t OAU4 Fo nstanc scton () aos popls' t gt to natonal an ntnatonal pa' gov b t UN an t OAU Cats Scton ( povs tat an nvual njong t gt o aslum un Atcl  o t psnt Cat sall not ngag n subvsv actvts aganst s count o ogn'  Scton ( also stpulats tat t ttos sall not b us as bass o subvsv o tost actvts aganst t popl o an ot Stat pat to t psnt Cat'  Ts s vtuall nal to langag n Acl  o t OAU Cat wc s poccup wt upolng t ngatv sovgnt o mmbs It s cla tat t tm popls' s a cowo o sovgns T a o cous no tnonatonal popls no an ot popls w a nclu t tl o b mplcaon  t concpt o 56

ARCAN CHARER O N HUAN AND PEOPLES  RGHS

peopes ghs  n he Bnj Che hs ngge eflecs he e conces of Afcn sesmen whch e he poecon of he js cons no he popons he new soveegny gme of pos coon Afc ke he o soveegny gme of ynsc Eope s  gh of es he hn peopes  An  s geney espece by he commny of ses eess o omesc hmn ghs voons n pocmng peopes ghs he Afcn Che hs cy e ge hmn ghs  Soveegn ghs e so nmbgosy even n he epc es of he nv o he se n he Che Poc obgon emnscen of Hobbes n he ge of bsosm s efney po o cv o poc ghs o empe Ace 7 eces h evey nv sh hve es ows    he Se    n he ne non commny Ace 9 speces he poc es of he nv: o seve hs non commny no o compomse he secy of he Se whose non o esen he s o peseve n senghen he non nepenence n eo negy of hs cony n o conbe o Afcn ny hese es whch so efec bsc OAU es e  owe o soveen govenmens n scose he peoccpon wh secy n ny hs fce of Afcn neon w mos n enfoces omesc ws of eson n seon chcesc of hon eg sysems n hs eg he Afcn Che ffes fnmeny fom he Eo pen n Amecn hmn hs covenns n whch he noon of y' es ecsvey o he Ses obgon o he czen ncng czens of ohe ses who e whn s jscon ny he spemcy of soveegn ghs n he Bnj Che s nce by he sbseven oe gven o he Afcn Commsson esbshe osensby o pomoe hmn ghs poecon n Afc (No povson s me n he Afcn Che fo  hmn hs bn) hee s e esembnce o he Eopen Commsson whch cn no ony nvese hmn hs compns b so nepeneny efe hem o he Eopen Co of Hmn Rghs whch s cpbe of n gns se pes Accong o P Segh mny nvs hve fon eess o compenson fo he evnces n mny of he se pes hve h o chne he non ws o he mnsve pcces n oe o compy wh he [Eopen] Convenon  By cons commncons me o he Afcn Commsson e consee ony f hey e compbe wh he Che of he AU o wh he pesen Che (Ace 56)  Moeove ny ecommenons me by he Commsson ms hve he po ppov of he OAU hes of se befoe hey cn be me 57

SOVEEGN GHS VESUS HUMAN GHS

public Th Commiion i  clrly th rvnt o f th OAU with no uthority of it own Thr i virtully no poibility tht it cn rv  n indpndnt protctor of humn right n hort not only do th Africn Chrtr mcult intrntionl human right but it go on to nhrn  ctgory of 'popl right which r conidrd to b pror to humn rght nd which tnd for nothing othr thn ovrign right ntd of promoting intr­ ntionl contitutionlim by impoing civil rtrint on Africn govrnmnt th Chrtr by mn of clwbc clu nd individ ul dut to th tt librt ovrign from th humn right it numrt. Th Afrcn commiion otnibly t up to polic th rght i in fct th crtur nd rvnt of Africn govrnmnt. n othr word th Africn Chrtr i  rfirmtion of th OAU nd it principl of ngtiv ovrignty. n  rcnt y on th rul of lw in potwr intrntionl rltion tr Clvocori conidr th ccptnc by Europn govrn mnt of dciion by th Europn Court of Humn Right  n hitoriclly igniicnt 'curtilmnt of ovrignty in fvour of th individul  Any rful 'would b cu for cndl not only in th Community t lrg but lo in th country immditly concrnd  49 n n rgumnt rminicnt of Bur h uggt tht thi ccommo­ dtion of intrntionl contitutonlim i md poibl by priting fmily rmblnc mong Wt Europn tt in trm of politcl ida intitutonl tructur hitoricl xprinc urdictonl thori nd lgl ytm duction nd vn lngug. Mot of th tt hv noyd contitutonlim nd th rul of lw without intrruption for  gnrtion nd mny for  cntury or mor   bliv th Europn humn rght chivmnt h bn poibl bcu dmocrcy i now ntrnchd in lmot vry igntory tt f thi i vlid it i  confirmtion of Knt blif dicud in chptr 7 that ntrntonl humnitrinim i poibl only in  lgu of cont tutionl  wht h cll rpublican  tt Unfortuntly inttionl contitutionlim i not urgnt mong uch tt which hv civil nd politcl librt built into thm nd ar tatitically the lt offenive to human right Whr it i urgent a in Africa and om other prt of th Thrd World it i far l lely to b relzd becau dometc conttutonalim i comparatvely wea rvaiv uthortranim  wht Kant cald dpotm nd aw a the nemy of the rule of law  driven by the incurty of ruler obtruct it Fure to ubcrbe to inteatonal human right i no caue for candal in Afrca Even the etablhment of the Afrcan Charter which emaulate them ha provoked no controvery The 158

A  R I C A N C H A RT E R O N H  M A N A N  P E O P L E S  R  G H T S

weakness o f the Acan human rights egime confirms a n inference from Kant's belef namely that inteational humanitaianism is likely to be obstructed by a league of authoritaian ulers who ae peoccu­ pied with their own security. This is the message of an Afican student of human rights: Few of these governments have given prioiy to any national princple other than their own survival A considerable numbe of them have subordinated civil and political ights    Laws have been implemented in a disciminato manner to ewad citizens who suppot the rules and to penalise those who do not '51 NTRNATON A L C    L TY AND DOMSTC NCLT

Perhaps the threads of these remaks can be drawn togethe It is evident that one cannot change significantly the rules of inte­ national society and exand and diversify its membershi without affecting directly or indirectly not only that society but also the people who lve within its member states Decolonization clealy was an extension of self-determination and sovereign rights to numerous governments which reviously had not been independent But it was not always an extension of human rights to the populations under thei j ursdicton Only if those govenments wee prepared to otect the cvil and polical liberties of their subects could it also be the latte Some wee preared but many wee not Sovereignty gave excolonial peoples a legtimate voice in wold affairs and membershp in international oganizations, many designed exressly for undedeveloped countres However it coul not give hm domestic political and civil rghts bcause these are not in the gift of inteatonal society Deang colonial powers could not provide them not because they did not want to o did not try but because they ulmately wee not theirs to give Intenatonal agencies have sub equently been unable to safeguad human rights fo the same eason They cannot arbitrarly intervene to rotect citizens from the gove ments or from any other source of threat orginatng wihin soveeign states Civl lberes can only be derived from effecve state ini tons such as fe and fa elecons a consituonally loyal mlitary nendent cours disclned and uncoule polce an so foh The ffectvene of such instton dends moe than any hn el on he conduct of ovenmnt and ooion and l matly the characer and vrtue of leadn olitcal actos who ae in the st oion to uot o unemine conionalsm and th rl of law Unfnately n umtance of ma ovy ehnic cod an intns olcal tle common to many Th Wold tat 159

SVEEN HTS VESUS HUMN HTS

goenment and opposition feuenty ae moe incined t o pusue powe at a costs than obsee constitutiona ues Authoitaianism is ikey to peai whoee wins And intenationa society wi espect the pincipe of noninteention and suppot the winne whoee that may be n a goba cub of states whose membes ae diided into ui­ dictions of widey aying cutua chaacteistics it is difficut to engage in humanitaian dipomacy een at the best of times he age numbe of goenments inoed in human ights offences of one kind o anothe which in the ate 1980s compised appoximatey twothids of N membes obstucts intenationa action to educe them hy shoud the nited tates inteene in Haiti to peent eectoa io ence when the pobem exists in many othe counties as we? f humanitaian inteention was a poicy whee woud it end in an intenationa society containing many human ights offendes? his was the egettabe but eaistic esponse of a  tate Depatment officia to a membe of ongess who was shocked by the boody suppession of democatic eections in that county in 987 and fet something shoud be done about it Not ony is it moe conenient to opeate with a genea pohibition against inteention but pobaby impossibe to do othewise without pooking seious intenationa contoesy which coud theaten stabiity and adesey affect the foeign poicy inteests of the inteentionists  n such cicumstances it is not difficut to undestand why soeeign ights hae peaied against human ights to date and why thee is itte chance this wi soon change ntenationa society euies and indeed depends on ciiity between a soeeign goenments but this may hae to  puchased at the pice of toeating inciiity between some goen­ ments and thei citiens hid od statesmen ae fastidious in obseing dipomatic codes and geneay conducting thei inteationa eations in accodance with coutesy, dignity, honou and othe noms of ciiity nte­ nationa oganiations pubic and piate constitute a wodwide netwok within which these noms ae the opeatie code of conduct he ast maoity of such goenments ecipocate poiticay and those which cuenty do not ae few  Libya, yia, an, and one o two othes his is supising consideing the taditiona este peudice that nonEuopean ues coud not be tusted to ecipocate and theefoe shoud not uaify fo membeship in the community of states hey hae in fact kept thei pomises as we as anybody Decoonization has expoded this myth egatie soeeignty has undewitten intenationa ciiiation by oingwoods definition of 

I N T E R N A T I O N A  C I V I  I TY A N   O  E S T I C I N C I V I L I T Y

admiing srangers  in his case nonEuropean governmens  ino he communiy of saes All counries are of course obiged o operae wih civiliy inernaionaly and i is aso usuay in heir ineress o do so The same canno be said of her domesic conduc Wha seems noeworhy oday is no merey he arge number of paces where he sae is a hrea o s own people or he fac ha nernaona sociey can do very lile abou i bu he realiy ha cerain receny adoped iernaiona norms acualy conribue o his unforunae sae of aairs The sandard of nondiscriminaion is one such norm Nowadays sovereign righs are reinforced by his sandard which uninenionay acs as a bar o ineaona criicism of cerain abusive governmens  The whie criic of human righs violaions by nonwhie regimes risks being accused of racism  which is abou he mos damning pubic accusaon ha can be suffered in he lae wenieh cenury Wese poliicians dipomas echnica expers academics and ohers in­ volved in ineaiona relaions wih nonWese saes scrupuously avoid making any commens ha migh run he risk of inviing suc a rebuke The resul has unforunaely been a very effecive aboo on such cricism Durng he ermina colonia period as indicaed Euro pean powers wih overseas dependencies were subjeced o srenuous and ariculae condemnaion by whies and nonwhies aike which made i more difficu for hem o negec he cvi and even evenually he poiical iberies of heir coonial subjecs By invoking sefcensor ship however he aboo efecivey prevens condemnaion of pos­ colonia govemens equivaen o wha was direced a heir Euro­ pean predecessors and s is direced a he human righs abuses of Souh Africa The sociey of saes is hereby deprived of an imporan ool which oherwise migh influence some govemens o refrain rom violaing or negecing he human righs of her own people I is surely ironic ha a new sandard of nondiscriminaion inended o repudiae racia prejudice has acuay become a shield for cerain abusive or negligen govemens There is consequeny a curous orm of discriminaion in iner­ naonal reaions oday in which he conduc of sovereign gove­ mens is subjeced o differen sandards deermned by race  Generaly whie govemens are subjeced o higher sandards and expecaions of domesic conduc. This is eviden from he far more srenuous criicism appied o he govemen of Souh Africa as compared say o ha of Sri Lanka despie he fac ha human righs violaions involvig governmen or is agens are probaby no greaer in he former counry and migh be ess The beneficaries of he 161

SOVEREIGN RIGHS VERSUS HUMAN RIGHS

an-racist taboo are not only decent govements but also those which engage in discriminatory, intoerant and even inhumane practces. The osers are citizens of the latter. The doube standard therefore punishes the very people that the inteational  abolition of racia discrimination was intended to benefit. There is little to indicate that this twisted system of inteaional nondiscrimination wil soon end. In a famous essay on non-intervention J S Mll argues that sef­ determination is the right of peope 'to become free by their own efforts and nonintervention is the principle guaranteeing they will not be prevented by foreign powers from attempting it 2 However it is not necessariy the case today that people everywhere are eft to secure freedom on their own and that they have an inteationa right not to be prevented by foreign powers from attemping it They do have such a right under international law which is widey although not uni versay observed today. But prevention by foreign intervention is not usually the probem. Even where noninteention is observed  which is most places  freedom is still very unikely to be realized . This is because internatonal relations have changed very significanty since Mils tme. Because they are aready sovereign the longing for inde pendence cannot serve as an incentive for incumbent rulers to mobiize and organize their popuaons to strive for freedom. On the contray, sovereigny gives incumbent eites a strong incenive to maintain their pivieges by preserving the

status quo

It aso gives rival elites an

incenive to atempt to capture these privileges for themselves. This sets in motion the authoritarian srugge for power which is usualy fata to civi iberties. Furthermore, because most Third Word coun ties are far more ike inteal empires than nationstates they cannot desire and strive for individua and naiona freedom in the same way s e subject naioniies of Cenra Europe which Mil had in mind Tey are lke the empires those naionaies were sriving aginst. The authenic nationaies of the Tird Wod which do possess such onings are effecvey brred om acquiing sttehood by inter nation soey. Tis barier is igher than that which confronted the Balkan peopes in Mill's me because it is based ostensibly on self­ detemnaton rather than imperalism and is therefore uphed by current noms of inteational democracy. To sum up There is evidence of unprecedented civiizaon at the internaonal level today Third World statesmen are honourable members of inteational society who respect inteational law and moraity as well as any others Paradocally, however, inteational cition not only veis significant domesc invility but aaly conbutes to it aleit unintentionally Under cuent noms of the



 N T  R N A T  O N A  C  V    T A N D D O   S T  C  N C  V     

ngativ sovrignty gam th balanc o advantag within stats lis dciddly with sovrign govmnts and against thir citizns Pr haps this has always bn th cas but today it is rinorcd by an laborat intrnational suprstructur built and maintaind vry largly with th prsation o xisting hird World urisdictions in mind h unintndd consqunc all too rquntly is to uphold authoritarian violators o human rights his is a curious rvrsal o civilization in th classical positiv sovrignty rgim



7

Q  A S I - S TATE S AND I N T E RNATINAL T H E  RY

CASSCA

PARAD GS

OF

NTRNATONA

T H O U G HT

A word contanng both tate and quatate  dfferent from one contanng ony tate, or tate and forma dependence, and f our theore are to be reevant they mut be abe to account for the dfference Can our caca theore of nteatona reaton make ene of the practce and nttuton of the negatve overegnty game? Are ther aumpton conceng the nature of tate vad n the cae of quatate? Or are amendment to them and poby even new theore caed for? Before thee queton can be addreed t  neceary to be cea what  meant by nternatona theory  Martn Wght dentfe three caca paradgm whch have exted n dffer ent veron amot a ong a overegn tate 'ream', ratonam, and 'revoutonm  1 At the rk of overmpfcaton, thee term denote the contratng dea of natona efnteret and prudent tate craft (Machavem), nteatona aw and cvty (Groanm), and goba potca communty (Kantanm) They are categorcay dffer ent mode of thought wth the own ogc and dom Caca nternatona theory, accordng to Wght,  preemnenty a theory of urvva Beng overegn tate ext n a condton of anarchy and mut n the at anay depend on themee to urvve Ream conceve of nternatona reaon a haped predomnanty f not excuvey by raison dtat potca rght  the good of the tate and overegnty  the fina word n uch matter Of coure, t may ometme be prudent to conduct foregn pocy accordng to nter natona ethc but they are not to be confued and the atter  merey a dgue Snce tate are at berty but et n coe quarter they cannot avod comng nto contact and are conequenty bound together by fate athough not by ocety Machavem gve no cre dence to the dea of nternaona moraty and aw The nteatona ytem  an arena where tatemen purue ther nteret and perod 

C L A S S I C A L PARA D I G  S O I NTERNATIONAL THOUGHT

cally ge no conflcs whch may hreaen he suvval of some The fundamenal nernaonal relaons problem s herefore prevenng such confcs from geng ou of hand neaonal pracces whch address hs problem nclude prudenal dplomacy, naonal defence, mlary allances, he balance of power, and oher nsumenal measures and calculaons whch dsclose saes as rival power apparauses wh an overrdng neres n suvval The reals mage consequenly s ha of soveregn saes as free, compeve, and some­ imes combave egoss nernaonal ndvdualsm A classcal reals s also one who beleves ha he dea of naonal neres s a xed daum of nernaonal relaons whch s affeced neher by me nor by place Perhaps hs s why Machavell connues o be read oday almos half a mllennum afer he wroe The Prince Ths feaure of reals heory also lends  scenfic saus However,  s no a scenfic heory a all because s objec s no a naurally occurrng phenomenon bu hnkng, wlng and acng human agens who have a hab of repeaing hemselves bu are no slaves o forces beyond her conrol They make msakes They change her mnds They lose her nerve And hey also somemes learn from experence nernaional relaons lke all human reaions are hsorcal and no naural Hans Morgenhau emphaszes hs pon: No formula wll gve he saesman cerany, no calculaon elmnae he rsk, no accumulaion of facs open he fuure    hs acual condon s more akn o he gamblers han o he scenss2 n nernaonal relaons, accordng o classcal realsm, here s no such hng as guaraneed secury fe s conngen Survival s problemacal Saecraf s a world of uncerany like a game of poker excep  s governed by nsumenal ules only Raonalsm, by conras, s a concepion of nernaonal relaons as a socey shaped by a conversaion beween saes and he rule of law The roo of he socey of saes s he socably of man The fac ha nernaonal relaons are anarchcal does no rule ou oblgaions beween saes whch are bound ogeher no only by fae or prov dence bu also by nonnsrumenal rules and pracces such as equal soveregny, muual recognon, and recprocy whch hey obseve by and large  even durng war wch s a rulebased acvy goveed by he laws of war The leadng dea here s consiuonalsm: obsev ng ules whch apply equally o oneself as o ohers Soveregn saes are rghandduybearing uns and no merely nsrumenal agen­ ces, oherregardng nernaonal czens and no ony selfregardng ndvdualss The neaonal sysem s herefore a cvl socey of member saes who have legmae neress whch may confc bu 65

Q U A S   S T A T E S A N D  N T E R N A T I  N A L T H E  R

w are as subject t a cmmn bdy  internatina aw wic seeks t reguate suc cnlicts nternatina tey is sti a tery  surviva but te means  suviva are scia as we as individua Ratinaism is a ntin  states as reey cnsenting aduts w rm internatina sciety by making treaties bseving cmmn custms and usages attending cnerences unding rganizatins and en gaging in ter biatera r mutiatera activities wic aim at mderat ing teir reatins and prviding gds in cmmn ndeed svereign states nt ny cntract internatina sciety but are insepaabe rm it Since suc nging activities cange ver time ratinaism is mre expicity istrica and devepmenta tan reaism Our wn century as witnessed tree rerientatins  internatina sciety: te League  Natins te United Natins and te emergence  te Tird Wrd

A urt is in te ing i Grbacev is successu in reintegating Russia int te cmity  natins Neverteess sme inteatina rues and institutins wic are undamenta t any sciety  sver eign states  suc as nninterventin  cannt be canged witut destrying tat sciety r rater tansrming it int smeting ese Ratinaism cnsequenty is a tery pen t sme institutina rerms but as wedded in te fina anaysis t te practices  cnsti tunay independent states: inteatina anarcy 'Revutinism is te tird paradigm  inteatina tery identi fied by Wigt and reected in te Prtestant Refrmatin te Frenc Revutin te Cmmunist Revutin and by extensin t te pre sent day te samic Revun te Green Revutin and s rt  Revutinists reject te existing svereignty system in te cnvictin tat it is an bstace t te utimate vaues  umankind Fr mma nue Kant svereignty is a barrier in te pat  enigtenment Te predminant revutinist image is tat  a cmmunity  mankind r

unvta

Men aways take precedence ver institutins and cnse

quenty te svereign state must be subject t a iger autrity r

cvta maxma  sme kind 3 A dierent revutinist image assciated wit Marx and wit sme brances  pitica ecnmy tday is tat  a gbe divided int sciecnmic casses wic are mre unda menta tan divisins between states a weaty and industia centre and an impverised and fr te mst part agraian peripery wit igy unequa and indeed imperia reatins existing between te tw 4 Tis mde is revutinary nt ny because svereign states are ess signiicant tan casses and indeed are in certain respects te creatures and instruments  casses but as because te sugt ater uture usuay is a wrd ree  cass divisins and terere free  te capitaist states wic ep t perpetuate tem 

C L A S S I C A L P A R A D I G  S O F I  E R  A  I O  A L  H O U G H 

The emaine o f his chape is evoe o consieing how fa hese classica heoies can euciae he eaions an coniions of uasisaes. If he heoy of an inenaiona sysem conaining only saes o saes an colonies is a heoy of suviva wha is he heoy of a sysem which conains many uasisaes an viuay no coonies? Is i sil a heoy of suviva? Is i a heoy of pogess? O is i somehing else? How o hese noions of inenaional heoy suae wih he negaive soveeigny game? I o no beieve he insiuion of uasisaes efues any of hese heoies I us soe on hei hea howeve. QAS SAS AD H HOR OF SRVVA

I n conceiving o f 'eaism Wigh ha heoiss such a s Machia vei an Hobbes in min so i may be appopiae o begin wih hem Machiaveli is no he bes example of a eais because his hough only peigues he moe heoy of he soveeign sae ha emeges lae in Boin an Hobbes. Thee is no insiuional heoy of he sae in Te Prince bu ony an insumenal heoy of pesonal ule  Even Machiavellis anaysis of he 'consiuiona pincipaliy is wien fom he singula viewpoin of becoming an emaining he ule.  The pincipaliy is inisinguishabe fom he inees of he pince a naowe concepion han cassica eason of sae which allows fo a public inees above an beyon ha of he ue One canno aw such a isincion in Machiavei he enie Machiavellian oolki of insumena wisom is caculae o seve he excusive pupose of he wil o ue. Machiaveis heoy conseueny is moe abou pesonal poiica suvival han suviva of he sae His emphasis on pesonal ue neveheless is a paiculaly useful sang poin fo heoizing uasisaes The omesic poiical life of many such saes is evocaive of Te Prince a pace of insecuiy bu aso oppouniy whee ambiious poiica acos sugge an conspie o cono he govemen an he one wih he sengh of a ion an he wi of a fox usuay pevails in he en Up o a poin uasisaes ae evesions o he eay sixeenh cenuy. Bu only up o a poin howeve an ha poin is he aeweniehcenuy sociey of saes which unewies hei suviva. The Thi Wol pince mus woy abou losing his hea bu he nee no be concee abou osing his pincipaiy Thee is no King of Fance o heaen his soveeigny his sea in he enea Assemby is guaanee. Ahough he mus ofen be a lion an a fox omescaly he has an exena insuance policy which pemis him o  a saesman inenaionaly. Quasisaes heefoe inouce consiuiona assumpions abou inenaional 67

Q  A S   S  A  E S A N D  N  E R N A   O N A L  H E O RY

relaons that are undamentaly at odds ith the Machiaveian a o the ungle Hobbes reaism, unlie Machiavelis, is ounded soidly on a con­ ception o sovereign statehood In chapter  o Liathan Hobbes cals attention to state roniers brstling ith guns and orticatons as evidence not only o an inteational state o nature but aso o sover eign states Sovereigns externaly are in the same condition as men in the state o nature: naturay ree and not merey independent Nationa deence is Leviathan carrying out according to the sovereigns udgement and commands (chapter 8 6) that part o the social con tract hich reates to the extea orld protecting the subect rom oreign threat This is the office o the soverein I he does not perorm and the enemy invades, the covenant is dissolved and domestc civi society reverts to the state o nature hich or Hobbes is the ar o al Sovereignty is consequenty based on the sovereigns perormance o his duty under the covenant positive sovereignty Athough Hobbes is preoccupied ith the problem o securty and survival, he is conceed ith the securty and survival o subects as ell as ruers Hobbes consequently goes ar beyond instrumenta Machiavelian statecrat and conceives o the sovereign state as an organzed protectorate o its subects His politica theory is a constitutional theory o the sovereign state and his inteationa realism is a doctrine o reason o state and not merey o the prince



Quasistates possess arms but they usually point inard at subects rather than outard at oreign poers hich indicates that either no signicant external threat exists or an inteal threat is greater Loo ing outard there can be no baance o poer or international equilib rum based on the credibilty o sovereigns Quasistates by deinition are deicient and deective as apparatuses o poer They are not positivey sovereign or naturally ree

Instead, they are consti­

tutionaly independent hich is a orma and not a substantve con diton  Loong inard, there can hardy be a social contract since the ruer is threatening (at east some o) his subects and evidenty they him This is an instance not o covenants, ithout the sord being but ords7 but o sords ithout a covenant signying nothing but orce and terror The quasistate is an uncivil more than a civil pace it does not yet possess the rule o a based on the social contract The populations o quasistates have not yet instuted a covenant I no covenant exists, there can be neither subect nor sovereign nor commonealth no emprical state But unle Hobbes realist scen ario, the quasistate cannot ocaly colapse into a state o nature because its sovereignty is derved not internaly rom emprical state 16

Q U A S  - S T A T E S A N D T H E T H E O RY O F S U RV  V A 

hood but exteally from the states-system whose members have evidently deided and are resolved that these jurisdiction shall not disappear. The quasi-state is upheld by an exteal covenant among sovereign states. This is not only ironcal but also paradoxical in Hobbes' terms and inconsistent with his realist logic. Quasi-states tu Hobbes inside out: the state of nature is domestic, and civil socety is inteational. I hope it is ear from this brief summary that when it comes to quasistates Machiavell and Hobbes can be misleading But what about classical realism as we understand it today? One might argue that even though quasi-states are organizationally impaed it does not conadict realist assumptions because their estence merely reflects indifference to them on the part of the real states of the world The unconce of the major powers enabled Third World states to become independent and they connue to exist for the same reason despite their disabilities and inirmities. Indifference' belongs to the vocabu­ lay of power and therefore realism. Juridical statehood is only a faade: quasi-states are tolerated by real powers only because nothing vital is at stake. Where something is vital their ostensible indepen­ dence is interfered with: as in Nicaragua, Grenada and Panama by the United States Afghanistan by the Soviet Union Lebanon by Israel and Syria, Angola and Mozambique by South Africa, Camdia by Viet nam. Quasistates therefore exist and survive by virtue of the East West balance of power which has endured throughout the ente period of Thid World decolonization and independence This global contest in which the superpowers are checkmated has created inter­ national space to accommodate a nonaligned Third World of marginal states Only a few strategic ex-colonies mainly in Asian and Middle­ Easte conflict zones have been drawn into alliances with the super powers The rest are bystanders. The SovietAmerican conflict undoubtedly created an inteaonal ccumstance in which it was easier for quasi-states to be bo and to survive. But it does not explain why many ex-colonal states whch ae marginal to power polics are not by any means ignored by the sub­ stanal states of the world including the superpowers The latter can scarcely be interested in thei own security so why do they entertain quasi-statesmen and their views? Perhaps it is because they are no less susceptible to inteational opinon than others: they desie presge and seek the approbation of the statesmen of the world who give and withhold it Power can deter rivals but it cannot procure good will  Although quasistates have nothing substantal to conbute to the developed states, they can and do influence inteaonal opinion 69

Q U A S I  S T A T E S A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A  T H E O RY

Quasi-statesmen have an articulate political voice which is registered in various international forums Voice is signiicant only in a demo­ cratic society where opinion as well as power counts for something which is what inteational society has become since decolonization Third World states consequently receive widespread and unceasing attention today Realism underestimates the political significance of marginal states in international relations It disregards the elaborate democratic ediface of inteational law, organization, and aid fash ioned explicitly for such states The novelty of this situation is empha sized by J. D B Miler: 'The genera atmosphere of the international system is now more favourable to small states, and harsher towards the major powers, than at any time in the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries This may seem a doubtful statement in the era of the superpowers, but the evidence suggests hat it is true8 The contemporary realist might reply that political institutions and activities such as these are merely conveniences for the powerful states or at least are not inconvenient This stems from a view of inteational law as fundamentally instrumental or economical rather than moral or obligatory: it is accepted and acknowledged only because it enables real states to get on with the business of inteaonal relations with greater predictability and confidence and perhaps less cost and effort than would otherwise be possible Law is preferred to force in inter­ naonal relaons because it is more cost effective Consequently, the accommodation of quasi-states by internaonal institutions which are underwritten by real states is consistent with realism and not in conflict with it We come back to the realist point that quasistates exist and are tolerated because they cannot interfere with the interests of real states The inteational instuons which sustain them have utility to all states including the most powerful most of the me In a democratic age nonintervention is less inconvenient than colonialism, giving states a place in the UN is easier than denying it, providing foreign aid costs little in national terms and might promote ones interests with the recipients, writing off the debts of the most impoverished countries is less disruptive than trying to collect them, and generally dealing cour­ teously with marginal states is likely to work better than dictang to them or dismissing them as of no real consequence I believe there is more than a grain of truth in this arument and to this extent reaism provides an apt account of quasi-states However, it aso misconstrues or overlooks some things The key phrase 'in a democrac age is not a statement of power but of le­ macy of rights Presumably in a nondemocratic age imperialism and colonialism were more convenient The fact is that ideas change con

70

Q  A  I -  T A T E  A N D T H E T H E O RY O F   R V I V A 

cein what is not only instumental o possible but also acceptable an ustiable. In nin convenience in these ways of opeatin the poweful states ae acknowlein an obsevin impotant new no mative pecepts in thei conuct. In shot classical ealist theoy oes not altoethe squae with quasistates as inicate fo example by the followin claim of Hans Moenthau 'Face with the necessity to potect the ha coe of the national inteest that is to peseve the ientity of the nation all govenmens houghou hiso have esote to cetain basic policies such as competitive amaments the balance of powe alliances an subvesion intene to make of the abstact concept of the national inteest a viable eality. This is an apt sum may of the taitional soveeinty ame but if it wee univesally tue toay numeous states woul be in ave eopay Yet they ae actually quite secue because they ae not equie to play this ame at all. Thei suvival is uaantee not by thei own effots o those of thei allies but by the new emocac postcolonial inteational so ciety most of which has aisen since Moenthau wote. Quasistates ae evience not of taitional ealism but of a novel kin of inte­ naonal iealism which has flouishe in the last thi of the tweneth centuy. An unlike the utopianism associate with the Leaue of Nations this new iealism is conne only to the mains of inte­ national society whee it can be sustaine without pesenn the same haas as the ealie vesion This bins us to the implications of quasistates fo the ationalist conception of inteational theoy. In conceivin aionalism Main Wiht ha the classical intenational lawyes in min. So pehaps it is appopiate to bein with bief emaks on Gous1 One coul con­ sie Gotius a 'ealist insofa as he beins with the assumpon of a pluality of soveein ovements that ae ee aents Howeve iteaional law is a esponse to the necessity of subjectin soveein powe to some wokable stanas of conuct Gous consequently takes issue with classical ealists that states ae a law unto themselves Machiavelli) an that soveeit  theefe absolute Hobbes) On the conay it is limite by naual law  the ictate of iht eason o moality to which statesmen ae no less boun than othes  an posive inteaonal law  eaes an stoma pactices  to which states consent oveei states ae heee ee to pusue thei naional iteests but the ae sill subject to he iteational le of law hey have no licence to isea he leimate inteests of othe states he ke to Gous is the iea that iteaional elaions consi te a ealm ovee b law an moali a ae not mel a ckpit of vl iteests Even wae is boun b he laws of w o Hobs 

Q  AS ISTATES A N D I NTERNATIONA THEORY

overeignty i  free rom exteal normave regulaon but or Grotiu a or Locke it i held under law like property' . Grotiu exprely denie the Machiavellian doctrne 'that or a king or a tate nothng i unjut which i expedient' . 1 1 Inteational re laon are not goveed by the law o the jungle. Requirement o civility override conideration o expediency  they come into conlict It would thereore be a ditorton to claim that international relaon are determined wholly by elregarding behaviour o overeign government. On the contrary they involve oblgation legal dutie honour repect courtey and other element o cvil conduct The paradigm obligation and indeed the ounation o inteational law i the rule cta sunt sanda Henc the natural order o tate i reci­ procity rather than armed hotility Grotiu thereore acknowledge the reality o tate a ree agencie o power whoe rivalre and conflict could do enormou damage to peron and property either intentionally or inadvertently i they were lave to their own el­ interet and hubri He wa preoccupied with regulating thi mot aweome human power by the only rational mean he could conceive law The undamental predicament o inteational relaton wa not only ubjecting uch power to the rule o law however but ac­ complihing it without the mean o a uperor authority. How doe claical ratonalim quare with quaitate? Quai­ tatemen conduct their inteational relation with a much civility and orbearance a any other they obee norm o inteatonal oety they avoid intervening in the dometic juridicton o other tatemen they do not indulge in warre Indeed they are champion o the law o nation and oten eek an expanion and deepenng o inteaonal obligation. Thi i enrely conitent with Groanim but the act may not be what they eem nteational civility preuppoe the reedom to act otherwie. Quaitate expect and demand orbearance rom other becaue their urvival depend undamentally on nonintervenon However they may not have to bear the burden o reciprocating becaue they are oten in no poition to do anything ele. Their good conduct inter­ naonally may thereore pring more rom neceity than virtue and indicate only the appearance o cvility and not the reality. Further­ more although they repect the right o othe overeign they oten exercie only limited orbearance and civility in ther relaon with domec rival and ubject. Perhap they cannot aord to be cont­ tutionalit dometcally becaue they cannot trut their dometic ri­ val and ubject to reciprocate. They are thereore obliged to be authoritarian. Thi i the revere o their inteaonal urvval which 

Q U A  I -TATE  A N D THE THEORY OF URIAL

dnds no on Machavllan skls bu on h wlngnss of ohrs who could drv hm of hr ndndnc o rfran from dong so by obsrvng h rul of nonnrvnon  In shor Groans maks assumons abou sas as osvly fr y muually oblgad nrnaonal agns whch canno whou dsoron b mad abou quas-sas Raonalss oday ar calld uon o horz a novl naonal socy wh conradcory norms As ndcad n char 2, nr­ naonal law radonally was concvd n rocdural rms as a

oca or cvl assocaon

I was 'advrbal  as Oaksho mgh u

  bcaus  sough only o modfy h slf-chosn acons of sas mn n aroxmaly h sam mannr as h ruls of h road rgu­ la drvrs of moor vhcls (alhough  lackd an ovrarchng offc of rul and aaraus of nforcmn)  2 I dd no drmn h dsnaon or h rou  lgma naonal nrss  bu only h accabl ways of rocdng  whch wr scd n s usags and raccs  Publc nrnaonal law has rand hs rocdural faur n nonnrvnon and ohr ruls of forbaranc Howvr  has also acqurd urosv characrscs of a

unva

or nsrumnal as

socaon whch sks o command and coordna h acons and rsourcs of sas n h on ursu of common goals Raonalsm n h la wnh cnury s hrfor dffrn from wha  was n arlr ms I s no longr only a hory of naonal cons uonalsm h noon of sas as fr agns who ar subc o normav rsrcons and rohbons of varous sors whch rflc h

ngav

characr of classcal nrnaonal law Conmorary

nrnaonal socy n addon gvs xrsson o 'raonalsm n Oakshos

pov

manng sas as collaboraors n a common

ngagmn for xaml o dvlo h Thrd World or rduc n vronmnal olluon or radca dsas or rvn rrorsm or combn n h on ursu of varous ohr subsanv urposs  Q  A S   S T A T  S A N D T H  T H  O R  OF P R O G R  S S

How wll dos rvoluonsm hrfor squar wh h xs­ nc of quassas and h raccs of h ngav sovrgny gam? Consdr Kans classcal vrson whch osulas a com­ muny of manknd ha ranscnds h sassysm and s ror o  4 Th frdom of sovrgn sas rsns a grav roblm bcaus hy ar caabl of causng gra dsrucon and suffrng by hr combav rvalrs Whou a hghr auhory o curb hm ha s mor ffcv han h fbl naonal rul of law horzd by Grous h suffrng wll connu (Kan s of cours rfrrng o cvl 73

Q U A S I - S T AT E S A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A  T H E O RY

and not socioeconomic hardship. ) True freedom for mankind wil be at hand only when the absolute freedom of states - a lawless condition  is ansfomed into eedm under exte ws This can be realed only by states entering a 'great federation' which must be a 'united power which means that states must sacrifice their sovereignty This de­ velopment is the fulfment of the 'enlightenment': the ascendancy of reason over man's 'baser instincts' which for so long has perpetuated the inteational state of nature For Kant the problem of instituting political reason within states is therefore subordinate to that of estab lishing it between states Only a league of constutional states can ensure the civlity of its members and bring ito the light of day the universal community of humankind Although quasistates generaly ar good citizens inteationally many nevertheless operate conary to the rule of law domestically This ght be read as a refutation of Kant's thesis conceing the humanizing effects of inteational constituonalism However, this would equate the UN with Kant's 'great federation' which would be erroneous snce the UN is a creature of the statessystem and no more It nevertheless is tempting to speculate what ight have been if al the victorious great powers in  9 were constitutonal states or if Gorbachev were to en Russian despotism and establish the rule of law in the Soviet Union and the same were to happen n China Would the Secuity Council then perform a Kanan role in which member states are obliged to observe the categorical imperative of political reason and right domestically as well as inteationally under enforcement by the great constitutional powers? But this is speculaton and history has so far taken a different course As indicated in previous chapters the UN accommodated as ul and equal members all newly independent states regardless of thei dom­ estic conduct or chaacteriscs Authoitarian states eventually fomed a majoity of its membership At the General Assembly n New York, Third World statesmen operated constitutionally they were defenders of ee speech and other rights of statesmen But at home many  not indeed most were intolerant of the same rights or thei own ciizens Toay this inconsistency is taken entiely for granted as expected behaviou Thus the spread of inteational democacy has not usually ben accompanied by a coresponding progress within newly enanchised states where in many cases  not most, mens' 'baser insncts' untnately coninue to prevail But Kant's theory cannot b evaluated bcause the practices it presupposes  unlike those of realis and raionalism  have never really been ried The closest to it toay is inteaional human ihts law which althouh suject like all 

Q U A I - TAT A N D TH THORY O F PROGR

ineaiona aw o he eerminaion o f inepenen saes neverhe ess iscoses an image however shaowy of a communy of manki Bu, as noe in chaper 6, inernaiona humaniaanism is mos secure where omesic emocracy is srong, an mos vunerabe where i is no. In ineaiona heory oay unoubey he mos sefconscious exampe of neo-Kanan revouonism is he wor orer perspecve bes exempifie by he hough of Richar Fak who perceives inm aons of an incipien movemen away from he saecenc Wes phaian paraigm which has preominae for he pas hree an a haf cenuries 15 Ahough he new paraigm is no ye evien in prace i is prefigure in ransnaiona probems which are renering anoma ous, obsoee, an even esrucve he esing ivision of he pane Earh ino inepenen an sef-serving errioria ses. Goba probems such as he hrea of nucear esrucion, povery an uner eveopmen, environmena egaaon, he popuaion exposion, an so forh canno be resove by sovereign saes an are inee exacerbae by heir freeom which inicaes ha he saecenic paraim no onger works . Since hese probems are essenay ransnaiona hey can ony be aresse by ineaiona cooperaion. Naiona govemens mus give up some of heir sovereigny o boh higher an ower auhoriies which are beer aape an ocae o ea wih hem. Fak foresees a new wor orer invovng cena guiance an non-errioria acors in which he sas eve of ner naona sociey wi weaken as he goba an e oca eves srenghen: oyaiy an egimacy are shfing away from he sae    owar he cener of he gobe an owar he oca reaies of com muniy an senimen . 1 6 The poica fuure herefore envsage by Fak is a goba unsas ironicay reminscen of he meieva wor Bu snce mankn oay is no a posiive poiica eny n isef he

unsas

moe necessi

aes a wor boy of some kn o give irecon an animaon o he sough afer gob goas of mankin. Ths obviousy wou reque a essening of he inepenence of sovereign saes. On amos any reang of conemporay wor poics i is ifficu o rear his kin of forecas as anyhing bu uopian an naive7 Deveope saes cerainy give e inicaon ha such a prospe is even conceivabe e aone aainabe They wou of couse reconie he oba probems ienfie by Fak an possiby even aee wh hm ha he resouon is hihy esirabe bu hey aso wou amos ceany nsis hey cou ony be aresse wihin he famework of he exsn saessysem an wou probaby arue ha soverei 



Q U A S I  S T A T E S A N D I N T E R N A T I O N A L T H E O RY

internatonal cooeraton are not ncomatble Falk seems to beleve that the constrants of the exstng dvded world wll thwart them and the negatve extealtes wll eventually drve them to collaborate n the world order enterrse he foresees Falk makes a artcular ont of dstngushng the wellbeng of govements from that for eoles or countres The searaton s necessary because a declne of soveregnty need not ental a corre­ sondng loss for eoles who accordng to Falks reaonng would stand a chance of enjoyng the values and goods aleady mentoned, artcularly socal justce and economc develoment, whch the cur­ rent regme denes to many The only concevable losers would be existng soveregns  But quasstate are creatures and ndeed rotec­ torates of the contemorary statessystem and f that system s tran­ scended n the manner rohesed by Falk ther rulng eltes wll suffer a declne n status, rvlege, and wealth Furthermore, f the new world order romotes human rghts and subnatonalsm  as Falk clearly mles  then we can be certan that most Thrd World states­ men wll oose t A shortcomng of the world order ersectve s ts underestmaton of the value of soveregnty to Thrd World govern ments whch s extremely hgh because t s virtually the only source of their status and rvleges They are jealous of ther soveregnty and are the fst to comlan at even the slghtest hnt of foregn nter­ ference They are also the last to authorze nternatonal human rghts covenants whch mght restrct ther ndeendency n short, quas­ statesmen clearly desre develoment but t s doubtful they would embrace the sort of revolutonary change rohesed by Falk What they demand from the nteatonal communty s more contradctoy: both guarantees of ndeendence and rghts to socoeconomc develoment Ths bngs us to the neo-Marxst or structuralst varant of revol­ utionism At rst glance quas-states aear consstent wth many elements of structuralsm: the socoeconomc dvson between the rch catalst countries of the North and the oor roletaran countres of the South; the enetration of quas-states by Multnatonal Coror­ ations (MNCs); the deendency of many Thrd World states on econ­ omc decsons taken beyond ther borders and for the most art wthn major catalst states; the existence wthn quas-states of small rv­ leged eltes and large oressed classes of workers and easants; the fact that the eltes benet from and ndeed owe ther exstence and wellbeng to the states-system and consequently desre to consee t rather than overthrow t; the tendency for the exstng global catalst order and ts state auxliares to be eretuated f undsturbed and the 76

Q U A S I STATES A N D THE THE OY O F POGESS

necessity o f revoltionary action to change it Independence hardly changed the material conditions of the hird World it was a contin­ ation of imperialism and colonialism nder a different name which only revealed greater hypocrisy than efore he term qasistates therefore merely reiterates what is already well known that most hird World states are not yet eneficial to the masses of ordinary people who inhait them and whose living conditions have improved little if at all as a reslt of independence. After decolonization the levers of power and control remained exactly where they were efore: in the hands of the major capitaist powers who were prepared to transfer sovereignty if that was all that was necessary to satisfy hird World elites clamoring for 'independence  his is the familia view of dependency theory  Hence negative sovereignty is only another name for neocolonialism On closer analysis however qasi-states disclose a vision of inter national relations which is very far from viewing independence as little more than a veil on contining dependency o the contrary it con­ siders qasistatesmen to e athentically independent in the classical legal sense of not eing sjects of any higher athority Within their jrisdictions they are at lierty to govern according to their own incli­ nations and decisions. No other athority can overrle them  as was the case nder colonial rle . Hence there is a fndamental difference in presppositions concerning independence: dependency theory sees it as a contination of external complsion y the strctres of international

capitalism

and

the

major

capitalist

powers;

the

theory of negative sovereignty however nderstands it as a condi­ tion of athentic lierty which althogh oviosly restricted y socio­ economic and other circmstances leaves room for responsiility y post-colonial governments Independence is not trivial even if it is not haessed to a capale and efficient state apparats and ltimately a developed economy. con omic nderdevelopment and technological ackwardness do not mean that qasi-statesmen have any less right to make decisions than other statesmen It means that they have far fewer means and re­ sorces with which to implement and enforce their decisions and conseqently mst face harder choices as to what they will concentrate their scarce resorces and energies on If a qasistatesman is wise he will have an accte perception of what is important and what is not a Mchiavellian sense of priorities and the imits of power If gove­ ment capailities and resorces are not to e sqandered decisions mst e more intelligent Scarcity makes it more difficlt to achieve goals. here is less room for error Bt less room is not the same as no 177

Q  A S I-STATES A N D INTERNATIONA THE ORY

oom scrcty  s  reltve concept Furthermore, responsbly n the relm of forbernce such s respectng humn rghts s not ltered becuse of scrcty At the end of the dy ndependence s not freedom; but t s not slvery ether The term neocolonlsm confltes the dstncton beteen the rght to decde (uthorty) nd the cpcty to ct (poer) hch s crucl n the theory of the stte The sgnficnce of ths dstncton cn be lustrted n connecton th reltons beteen MNCs nd negtvely soveregn sttesmen In the usul neoMrxst model the Thrd World sttesmn s the hnd mden of the MNC hch possesses most of the dvntges n the relonshp: t cn threten to locte elseere nd ts thret s cred ble; t hs economc nd technologcl resources hch the county lcks; ts nvestments d enterprse cn consequently crete employ­ ment, tx revenues, nd other benefts of economc groth In short, the qussttesmn s presented th n offer tht s dfficult to refuse Furthermore, f t s ccepted the MNC cn convert hm nto  'compr dor or mddlemn hose role s essentlly tht of mkng the relton shp beteen the MNC nd the Thrd World stte  smooth nd orkble one: the qussttesmn nd hs ssoctes cn be brbed to see the MNC rther thn ther on people Hoever, the reltonshp contns less nequlty thn ths mples The qussttesmn my ndeed nt or even need ht the MNC hs to offer ut he lso possesses somethng hch the MNC must hve n order to operte: ccess to stte jursdctons The postcolonl MNC cononts  globe more crosshtched by ntetonl fronters nd enclosed by locl soveregnty thn s ever the cse durng the colonl er hen huge terrtores under the looser economc control of mpel poers ere stl open Intetonl fronters hve lso been expnded snce decolonzton to gve soveregns jursdcton over offshore terrtores nd resources In shot, more terrtoy hs become more subject to the soveregnty of more sttesmen MNCs must hve ccess to soveregn tertory to operte but they cnnot gn ccess thout  soveregns uthozon They consequently must come to gps th the rely of soveregnty nd mke dels th soveregn goveents n order to uncon Whether there s  del nd ht t mht e depends on th pres Perhps  brgn ll be stuck nd perhps t ll b  very bd one for the counry nvolved It s nverthless stll  del The rulers of qussttes r of course t lbrty to ccept bbes or do the ddng of MNCs ut they re under no oblon to do so They hve he rht to sy no Cs relz ths Th rlonshp s therefore less lke rpe or even seducon nd mor lk lzd prosttuon the prtners my e unequl n mny 8

Q  A S I  S T A T E S A N D T H E T H E O RY O  P R O G R E S S

substantal ways but any busness they ransact must nvolve the consent of both. The point is therefore the followng: the ansnatonal capitalst game cannot overrde the terrtoral sovereignty game without the consent of sovereign governments. Structuralism has grave dfficulty n theorizing quasistates because of blndness to the signiicance of sovereignty and legal instituons generally. It thereby overlooks the reality of independent political choice and consequently some of e most important issues involved i the negatve sovereignty regime. The source of ths blindspot evidetly is its socioeconomc deter­ mnism. QASSAS AND NRNAONA JSC

What therefore are the implications of quasi-states for inter naonal relatons theory? Is it a theory of survval or a theory of progress or something else? Although realists and rationalists usually do not nterrogate the notion of 'survival but merely accept it as selfevdent, it can only mea the log-tem contnuaon of states as sovereign entties in more or less the same geographical location ad shape. What if the independence of some states is guarateed as a matter of right by the community of states? What becomes of the theory of survival if survival is no longer the defning international relatons

problematue

it once was or must be defined in a radically

different way? The theory of survival resuposes freedom but quasi states are not yet ree and erhas many of them never will be free. They enjoy an iternationally guaranteed independece nonetheless which does not requre ositive sovereigty This is the survival of citizens of a inteatonal community The theory aproprate to it is not that of power politcs or of classical inteational law but of inter natonal rights a olitical theoy. Is the iteational theory of quasi-states therefore a theory of ro gress? Yes and No. Yes in that such states demad ad to some extet are accorded interational develoment ettlements and assistace which is not recirocated No i that they do ot exect to surender any of their independence to receive such assistace ad they place a premim value on nointervention. Quasistatesme are jealous of ther sovereign ights and resistant to iternatioal human ghts. They have o desie for a iteatioal revolutio that would crb ther prerogatives of sovereigty. The rogress they seek is a iter­ national chage that ill assist them eventualy to become develoed without any sacrifice of their ideedece. This early is ot revol­ utioism in tian or eve Falkia ters. These changes are not  7

Q  A S   S  A T E S A N D  N  E RN A T  O N A L T H E O R 

cnceved t tanscend the states-system And athgh qas-states men ae ften peny ctca f nteatna captasm they have tte dese t paticpate n ant-captast actvtes beynd seekng nte natna scecnmc faess thgh devepment dpmacy and aw Qas-statesmen d nt dese smethng adcay new They meey want what thes aeady pssess pstve sveegnty Bt they want t by nteatna ght whch s adcay new They cnse qenty have cntadcty expectatins the ght f ndependence (ecpcty) bt as the ght t devepment (necpcty)  In sht, they want t have the sveegnty and eat t. Ths ceates a cnstttna demma f a scety f sveegn states whch ntenatna they shd ty t expan Snce the demma nvves cntay es and ghts the they mst apppiate t t s sme vesn f atnasm. As ndcated, qas-states nvke tw cnay mdes f ntenatna asscatn negative ghts cnsstent

scitas bt as pstve ghts ndcatve f the univrsitas When thests est t sch deas they

with the dea f a cnay dea f a

say see nteatna eatins changng fm the fme aange ment t the atte Ths s the vew f Fedmann 18 Tey Nadn, n the the hand, me accatey sees these tw cnctng mdes f nte natna aw as dscsng the ncheence f the Unted Natns Chate. He as egads the demands f new states f sbstantve ntenatna benefits as ndemnng the pceda  what he tems pactca mde f ntenatina aw wtht vethwng t 19 Hweve, as ndcated n pevis chaptes, qas-states ae nt ny ppnents f cectve entepse t enhance the wefae bt ae at the same tme stanch defendes f nnnteventn. hey theefe pmte these cnflctng nteatina nms whch eay dscse nt ny an ncheence f nteatina aw bt a demma f nte natina stce Tadtina nteatna stce s cmmtave t s pemsed n the ma and ega eqaty f states whateve may  the empica dffeences between them and t cnseqenty fbds the me pwe

 fm dng dwn the ess pwef. States have a ght t exst and can ny stfaby be ntefeed wth  they have pevsy nnged pn the ight f anthe state  vated the ntenatna e f aw n sme eqay ffensve way  Cmmtative stice pesppses the ntnsc wth f a states, age and sma, and theefe ams nteatina bgatins sch as the fwing teitia isdctin sha nt  vated, teaties shd be kept, was shd ny be fght t pnsh aggesss and este the peace, nncent thd paties shd nt  hamed n the cndct f wa, and s fth. 80

Q U A S I  S T A T E S A N D I NT E R N A T I  N A  J U S T I  E

Quasistatesmen d  nt ject t aditinal cmmutative justice On the cntrary they invke equa svereignty, nninterventin,

pacta

sunt sanda and similar cmmutative claims f cassica internatinal lieraism Hwever, they d nt stp at cmmutative justice ut g n t demand disriutive justice as we They eieve that the current distriun f the wrds resurces and pprtunities is prfundly unjust nt ny ecause it registers in miserale standards f iving fr themseves ut mre imprtanty ecause it prmises nly t perpetu ate this srry state f affairs They seek actively t crrect y inter nanal means and endeavurs this prfund scia injustice etween the Nrth and the uth And furthermre they d nt see any cn tradictin etween their claims t cmmutative and distriutive justice There are at least three fundamental prlems with the idea f inteatina disrutive justice in tdays wrd, hwever I can ny summarize them First, there is n ga rganizatin that pr duces gds which culd e distriuted accrding t principles f scial justice The UN prduces few if any such gds  The wrd ecnmy is a huge astractin and very far frm a singe rganizatin f prductin and distriutin There are numerus ecnmies in the wrd including natina, transnatina, and sunana and cunt ess prducers and cnsumers At what evel shuld ne expect dis triutive justice? Distriutive justice within states is ntriusly difficut ut hw much mre difficut is it etween states? And is there any reasn t suppse that justice at ne eve wi e cmpatile with j ustice at anther? There is n cncusive mral reasn why the inter natina evel shud take precedence ver the natina r csmpi tan eves r even e entited t encrach n them f any evel can claim the mra highgrund it surey is the latter which is the asic mraity f Kants cmmunity f mankind Withut an asscian ased n agreed principes and a centra rganizatin it is meaningless t talk f gla distriutive justice Tday distriutive justice cud nly e prvided internay  with very great difficuty and inadequacy  y individua states But distriutins f gds which may e just within states have n necessary cnnectin with inteatina distriutive justice ecnd, unlike cmmutative justice which is univera, there are n agreed principes f internatina distriutin hud it e ased n need, merit, effrt, cntriutin, utility r sme ther principe? n practice, need and t a esser extent utility are usualy singed ut as the apprpriate grunds If merit, effrt r cntriutin were taken int 1

  S   S    E S  N D  N  E  N     N  L  H E   

onsderaton the just dstrbuton mght avour the developed parts o the world  Moreover these onepts are amlar to estern moralt but are the known the world over? hat addtonal prnples exst n other parts o the world whh ought to be taken nto aount?  dstrbutve juste n Lenngrad Lma Lagos or Lahore does not mean the same as n London or Los Angeles what beomes o nter natonal dstrbutve juste? Fnall an sstem o dstrbutve eut between states lmost ertanl would not be just or ndvduals lvng n them owng to the ategoral derenes between states and ndvduals Persons are naural enttes and more or less eual whereas states are artal enttes tha are hghl uneual  vrtuall ever respet exept legal status Dstrbutve eut between states even  t rested on a per apta bass would stll not begn to aheve dstrbutve juste unless a orrespondng sstem o juste operted wthn states as well s between them that ould nsure a just domest dstrbuton o re soures and opportuntes tates are nternall derentated nto rulers and ruled. The ke to juste between states s the wllngness and ablt o soveregn governments to translate nternatonal juste nto domest juste Ths s askng a great del rom even the best governents nortunatel the governments o most states whh would be enttled to nteatonal dstrbutve juste on grounds o need are usuall ver r rom the best Dstrbutve juste between states as seen rom the outsde mght on loser examnaton be prv­ lege or poltal eltes who are srategall posoned o dver ma teral goods to themselves or ther supporters and are all the more lkel to do so  the operate authortaran regmes n poor ountres As J  R Luas puts t juste does not reure that rh natons provde poor natons wth the wherewthal to bu arms or to subsdse natonal arlnes whh onl a small mnor o ther peoples ould ever aord to use'  21 Ths ould onl be a travest o juste There mght even be an nterntonal oblgaton not to provde suh states wth materal goods n the reasonable bele that ther governments would dvert them to sustan ther unjust authortaran rule The ver lted nternatonal redstrbuton we see tod s  be­ leve a releton o suh domest dultes nd unertantes t s a genune nternatonal predament and not merel the absene o _ goodwll or generost or deen or humant or enlghtenment And t s undamentall nsttutonal  we want greater eut n the global dstrbuton o wealth and welre we must aept some lmtaton o state soveregnt as ant and Falk argue e ertanl annot avod lookng nsde o states n the other hand  we aept a world o 82

Q  A SI -STATES A  D ITERATIOA STICE

states we must also accept the possibiies and imitatons of such a world wich are those of sovereignty. Justice between independent states can only be commutave: keeping one's agreements And that is what inteanal justice has been since the beginnings of the states­ system:

cta sunt sanda

The act that most quasi-statesmen cannot

accept this and contnue to seek both forms of justce at the same me does not falsfy the agument although it does underlne the difficulty of ther position. The inteatonal normave dilemma presented by quasistates does not end with distribuve justce, however but extends to com­ mutative justice wich makes the same fundamental assumpon about states that it makes about indivdual humans: their intrinsic value. Both natural rights and civl rghts presuppose what Gregory Vlastos terms indivdual human worth'   Kant expressed the same thought by claiming that humans are ends in themselves' and can therefore never be treated merely as means: the authoritarian temp­ taon. This foundational idea n the theory of rights is carried over into inteaonal theory via the domesc analogy which attributes the moral capabilies of individual persons to sovereign states. The as­ sumption that sovereign states possess intrinsic value is embedded in both realism and rationalsm Defending the naonal interest makes sense only  that interest entails value The state being defended must  assumed to be valuable or worthwhile. There is no point in the hard shell' of the mode territoral state  to use the image of John Herz   there is nothing valuable behind it  This proposion is not affected by the partcula shape of national values but only by the existence of them. Consequently it can embrace the liberalconstuonal and socialistwelfare as well as any other form of state  providing it is of authenc worth to the populatons involved which is the usual justi­ cation of statehood. One can make a similar argument about rational ism Regulang states by inteatonal law to avert or reduce the incidence or extent of damaging collisions between them also makes sense only if those entites are valuable in themselves: collisions would result n harm to persons and property, perhaps bloodshed and de­ stcon on a large scale Internaonal civl sety and its law    therefore exsts prmarly to provde for the autonomy of implicitly valuable states and to ushion ther relations These value assumptions are tued upside down by quasistates whch by definiton are not yet valuable places for thei populatons. Their good lfe is something which must still be built possibly with inteational assistance and support. Wether it is built or not is an emprcal queson that need not conce us. Wat is at issue are the



Q  A S I -STATES A N D INTERNATIONAL THE ORY

normaive assumpions involved. nsofar as quasi-saes claim iner naional assisance on grounds of underdevelopmen hey mus be assumed incapable as ye of providing heir populaions wih he goods associaed wih developed saehood. Oherwise hey could no claim aid on such grounds. ndeed as Mohammed Bedjaoui poins ou consiuional independence can be considered lile more han he beginnings of heir self-deerminaon which can be fulfilled only by heir evenual developmen he realizaion of auhenic iner naional freedom or posiive sovereigny. And his can only be re alized if he rules of ineaional relaions are changed o make i possible. The elaborae ediface of inernaonal developmen which caers for quasisaes is herefore indicave of heir incompleeness and sill limied value o heir populaions. This limiaion is he moral ground of heir claims o social jusice. However he same limiaion undermines in he same proporion heir moral claims o noninervenion and commuaive jusice because here is less public value in such saes. nervenion migh conceivably resul in greaer dividends han noninervenon for he populaion a large. Demands for human righs proecions in such saes cas furher serious doub on heir inrinsic worh n shor he real value of saes varies enormously compared o he inrinsic worh of persons which does no vary a all. Consequenly quasi-saes raise value quesions no only abou disribuive jusice bu also commuaive jusice be­ cause inrinsic worh canno be applied o saes as caegorically as o humans and he easy ransiion from one o he oher via he domesic analogy is problemaical o say he leas. The ineaional heory of J S.  and Michael Walzer on he quesion of noninervenion is useful for analysing his problem as regards quasi-saes. Mill argues ha individuals and saes should no be inerfered wih providing hey respec he righs of ohers and he (exeal) rule of law. Negaive libery and negaive sovereigny should be respeced even if one has good reason o believe ha iner venion would preven self-infliced harm. This rules ou any form of paernalism o promoe he welfare of anoher agen. Alhough Mill jusifes ineaional paealism (see below) he is scepical of he abiliy of civilized saes o besow permnen freedom on any people who are no deermined o possess i even by fighing if necessary he mark of auhenic self-deerminaion. Posiive sovereigny like posi ive libery can only be achieved by oneself. Mil herefore had a very grea relucance o give any laiude o paealism. However children and oher persons who paenly are no ye prepared for libery have o be inerfered wih for heir own 1

Q  A S ISTATES A N D I NTERNATONA STCE

good Likewise although intervention cannot e justified in relations with 'civilized nations it is justied in regard to 'ararous nations since 'it is lkely to e for their enet that they should e conquered and held in sujection y [civilized] foreigners  The question of inter vention n such nations has to e determined according to 'totally different rnciles A 'ararous nation is deined y Mill as an illieral govement which inflicts adversity on its sujects and there fore can not legitimately claim any rights of inteational lierty and recirocity ncluding nonintervention On the contra nations which have no knowledge of lierty can rightfully e made wards of an eisting sovereign 'Desotism is a legitimate mode of goveent in dealing with ararians rovided the end e their imrovement and the means justied y actually effecting that end 26 Colonialism in Mills inteational theory erforms the same role as atealism in his olitical theory: a defensile and indeed resonsile method of dealing with agents deemed not yet t for selfdetermination Nonintervention is not an oligaton therefore when it comes to illieral states and indeed inteational support for such a govement is reugnant to civilized values. 'The only moral laws for the relation etween a civi lized and a ararous govement are the universal rules of morality etween man and man  In other words such a govement has no rights as a sovereign and the inteening state has only to resect the human rights of the local oulation Our negative reaction to this atealistic argument indicates how far nternational moral racce has changed since Mills time Inter naonal atealism has fallen into disreute ecause adults every where today are assumed to e equal olitically and therefore equally entitled to selfgovernment regardless of their actual circumstances or caacities Mills 'soluton is therefore not availale today and most eole roaly elieve this to e a good thng But the rolem of cometence and resonsiility has not disaeared simly y the reformation of inteational legitimacy and the ending of colonialism The inteational community has merely ursued new ways of dealing with it which are comale wth equal sovereignty. Tyical of these are assistance to imrove the socioeconomic conditions of counies and ehortaons that their sovereign govements rotect human rights which the latter are at lierty to accet or not Hence contemo rary ractice has not resolved the rolem Mll is wrestling with It has only reversed n an roncal fashion his oservation conceg human rights today noninteenon rotects constitutional and authoritarian govements alike and human rights violations are no jusfication for interfering with sovereign rights. 85

Q U A S STATS A N D  NTNATONAL THOY

Michael Walzer has adapted Mill's argument to contemporary inter­ natonal society. The patealist downside is abandoned and the lib eral upside that oreign powers cannot orce peoples to be free is elaborated Naions can only become free by their on eorts: self determinaon is the school in hich virtue is learned (or not) and lbery is won (or not)  Independence cannot make people ree but it can give them an opportunity to become free which is its fundamental justification: it can establish an arena within which freedom can be fought for and (somees) on  Nonintervention is the guarantee of this possibility. Therefore, although negative sovereignty cannot pre­ suppose the same as negative liberty - intrinsic worth - it can neverthe­ less posulate the possibiliy o achieving the good life in the future Exceptonal circumstances such as revoluion civil ar massacre enslavement or mass expulsion can perhaps justfy intervention. Or­ dinary oppression clearly cannot however The main thrust of the argument is to rule out intervention in the vast majority of cases This is conventional inteational libertarian doctrne The usual criticism of Walzer' s thesis is that it restrcts unduly the human rights grounds o jusiable oreign intervention and thereore leaves milions at the mercy of govements which usually are not legitmate domestcally and oten are prepared to go to almost any length to remain in power. 21 The problem with such criticism however is its underestimation of the moral standing of states: it does not ace up to the auhentic inteational relaions demma between the legimate rights o states and those of humans It sidesteps the problem by disparaging the moral claims o sovereign states which is somethng Walzer is not prepared to do The theory o quasistates suggests a diferent line o cricis con­ nected with the contemporary communiy of states which is far more elaborate than the relatively simple nineteenthcentury nternational regime Mill had in mind and more signficant than Wazers analysis implies Walzer underestimates he eiht and scope o the rihts and imunities that sovereign states enjoy today which derive rom the constuional fact that internatonal society is now far more democratic and rihtsbased than it has ever been. And he overesmates the possiblities o popular seldetermination aainst oppressive reimes Numerous new states ave een enrancised y the revoluon o decolonzaon  Democrac ranchises once ranted are almost im possible to withdraw or even curtail Inteaonal demracy there­ ore probably is not any more likely to be revoked or even revised than domestic democracy And althouh these franchises are justified as belongin to the populations o new states they are in fact held and 16

Q U  S I  S T  T  S  N D I N T   N  TI O N   J U S T I C 

execised by ues In pactice inteatina demcatizatin has ai dated a genments ithut any egad t thei subjects hich usuay amunts t the underiting  authitaianism ithin states Futheme, intenatina enanchisement undemines i it des nt eiminate atgethe the cmpetitie game hich in the past gae gements an incentie t impe the dmestic cnditins  thei states in de t eicit taxatin, cnsciptin, and the ms  egitimacy and suppt m thei ppuatins The deck  inte natina eatins tday cnsequenty is stacked in au  se eigns and against citizens me than it as in the past In sht Wazes ibetaian sutin expects t much itue m ppuatins h ae up against nt ny the ca despt but as an inteatina sciety hich accds him a me espect and suppt than his histica cuntepat ud hae enjyed We cannt theee aid Mis agument m pateaism quite as easiy as Waze impies Des patenaism hae any pace in intenatina eatins tday? I by patenaism is meant eatins in hich sme states assume a psitie egad  the states and pide them ith assistance then  cuse pateaism is eident in eatins beteen states tday Indeed thee is me  it n than ee bee. Much  the inte natina supestuctue utined in this bk cud be cnsideed an expessin  inma patenaism The eatinship  Fance t the Fenchspeaking states  subSahaan ica has this chaacte: the Pesident  Fance is the athe igue  Fancphne ican heads  states The numeus patncient ties eident beteen deeped and undedeeped cunties is stngy suggestie  the same Hee, i the tem pateaism is t etain its igina meaning  hich is the ma and ega espnsibiity  ne agent  anthe agent n the gunds  the attes inabiity t bea that espnsibiity  then inteatina pateaism is ae tday It has been suppanted by egaitaianism Fance is n nge espnsibe  its me rican cnies Vey e states tda hae espnsibiiy  the states Cniaism nd a the authentic rms  pateaism hae been ued ut  intenatina eatins The ther  pateaism thee e des nt fit the eaity  quasistates any me than the they  eedm The key t quasistates is thei independence and suria egadess  thei cmpaatie ack  pe and agenc  an intenatina system hich as cntains many ea states What st  inte natina eatins cud exist beteen ea states and quasistates hich makes the suria  the atte cnceiabe and justifiabe? The peaent justiicatin curenty is based n the pssibiity that such 7

QAS-STATS AND INTNATONA THO

tate eventually develop into livable counie and independence  the oppotunity r thi to happen Thi obviouly i neither wholly the inteaonal ethic o rationalim nor o revolutionim but omethin ambiuouly in between Sovereinty can no loner potu late the ood lie Intead, t i the bai o a novel claim to overcome the bad lie It i the ethic o prore within the juridical tatu quo an anomalou ort o proreive coneatim Thi i raonalim ed on it head



CONCLSION

H FUUR OF QUASSAS

Wl quassaes connue o be a major feaure of he ner­ naonal landscape n he decades o come as hey have been n he pas hry years? Speculaon abou ha mgh be s a hazardous en­ erprse and ofen avoded by scholars ho perhaps lke myself fnd  hard enough o grasp ha s and ha has been. There neverheless can be value n conemplang he fuure of quassaes f only o dra some conclusons from he foregong analyss Such an exercse mgh even be mely a he sar of he las decade of he eneh cenury hen sgnfican and perhaps momenous changes affecng Eas Wes relaons are underay The prospecs for quassaes hge generally on o hngs: heher hey develop o he pon of no longer dependng on he negave soveregny game and f hey do no heher  ll connue o be possble o play ha game n he fuure The developmen oulok for quassaes s of course exremely dfcul o esablsh ong o he parcular crcumsances of each counry hch vary enormusly. The eneh cenury already has nessed profound nernaonal changes and no leas he ndependence of he Thrd World and so e ough no o rule ou he possbly of furher change  We should expec some Thrd World counres o acheve sgnfcan developmenal breakhroughs as he NICs recenly have. Democra zaon s also a possbly. Hsory s a conngen and no a deer­ mned process of change and he fuure s herefore open and no closed. Hoever f repors of he World Bank are anyhng o go by e should also expec economc povery and echnologcal backardness o characerse a large number of ndependen counres and probably he majory n he foreseeable fuure as n he recen pas. And Am­ nesy Ineaonal gves no ndcaon ha  plans o go ou of bus­ ness because  ancpaes an end o human rghs volaons  Consequenly I shall assume he adverse cvl and socoeconomc condons of many saes are lkely o connue. 89

CONCION

The question I addess theefoe is whethe in the yeas to come the ues of the negative soveeignty egime which quasistates depend upon ae likey to be suppoted by the community of states as they have been since decoonization The fundamenta ule that inaugu ated quasistates is categoica sefdetemination of excolonia tei toies which is now an histoical event The deck of oveseas colonies has been deat, vitualy evey coony of any significance has acquied independence, and no moe cads emain The possibility that the issue of sef-detemination wil be eopened in those excolonies whee it continues to povoke contovesy seems vey slim indeed Apat fom the Paestinians who ae an exceptiona case, no goup which cuenty caims a ght of sef-detmination against an existing ex coonia soveeign has eceived inteationa backing The goven ments which execise juisdicton ove the teitoies in question must ecognize such claims befoe anyone ese wil Thee ae obvious easons why we should not expect this Soveeignty today as in the past is a status which attaches itsef to teitoy Soveeign gove ments ae usualy pepaed to epatiate disaffected o disuptive popuations but not to accept changes that woud incu any loss of teitoy Even mino bounday disputes often pove difficult to e­ sove Futhemoe, if such claims wee alowed in some cases they coud vey easily encouage demands fo the same elsewhee and theefoe theaten the teitoial integity of many othe states with dissident egions Inteationa ode coud be put at isk if this happened Al soveeign govements ealize this and al except the vey few that stand to gain teitoy fom edentism natuay wish to avoid it Consequently, thee is inteationa deteminaton to etain the exisng poitica map and to eject vitualy out of hand any beated demands fo sef-detemination, howeve wothy o just the cause may be The consevatism of inteationa society on this queston is pofound Selfdetemination invoved constitutonal independence of colo nies on a basis of equality with fome colonia mastes and all othe soveeign states: negative soveeignty It is not difficult to see why equal soveeignty was adopted instead of some othe inteational status Who woud accept second o thid-class citzenship? What citeia could be used to detemine it? And who woud make the decision? Lega equaity is the easiest pinciple to accept even by states which ae pofoundly unequal in most othe espects Anything else povokes contovesy and uncetainty Moeove, once ights ae ganted paticualy in an age of democacy they become entenched



HE FUURE OF QUSI SES

and are almost impossible to withdraw This is a stabilizing mechanism of international societ but it entails other consequences as well Equal sovereignt for all states makes it impossible to address the domestic problems of some states b international means without the consent of their governments Alternative arrangements which could suppl greater expertise responsibilit and probit in government decision making are not onl impossible without the permission of te govern ment whose authorit the would undermine but also untinkable because te touch directl on a crucial issue which is ruled out of order b postcolonial international societ the domestic behaviour of independent governments Tis issue cannot be raised international l without inviting accusations of paternalism neocolonialism and even racism and so international societ for the most part remains silent Quasistatesmen have taken the opposite approach The have tied to expand their equal sovereignt into areas from which it has until now been exclded such as international economic bodies like the MF or the World Bank where the financial contributions of states roughl determine their voting rights The chances the will be successful at instituting majorit rule based on one state one vote are slim owing to a similar conservative bias in these positive sovereignt rules and an unwillingness of economic powers to suender an authorit to Tird World govements whom the probabl believe privatel are not sufficientl competent or responsible to be entrusted wit it How long would the capital of an bank last if it were run b borrowers? This continues to be the predominant reasoning of the leading OECD states onsequentl instead of radical changes either in the direction of trusteeship or greater equalit the current stalemate in NorthSouth relations will almost certainl continue Giving aid will probabl still be a badge of good citizenship of developed states and receiving it a moral

 not a legal entitlement of underdeveloped countries  Development assistance will also remain a useful device b which rich states promote their internaonal standing among poor clienteles A few developing countries and perhaps more than a few migt graduate from the nonreciprocial development regime eiter as a result of economic fortune  such as the discover of oil  or their own efforts But most will not Inteational development assistance will also continue to be restricted b the sovereignt of recipients The chance tat the IMF and te World Bank will intrude into domestic jurisdiction beond te current lawful polic of restructuring is unlikel The anticipated inter­ national outcr that it would provoke effectivel prevents it Perhaps 9

CONCLUSON

mre likel is he epansin  f de relief fr he pres cunries  Hwever his wuld i n effec frgive he pas mismanagemen and crrupin f gvernmens and wuld cnsequenl reinfrce raher han undermine heir negaive svereign. Aid ransfers will pr­ al cninue  e  small  imprve he general welfare u large enugh  e f definie ineres and value  ruling elies wh are sraegicall placed  channel hem. This rings us  he pival rule which uphlds quasisaes nn­ inervenin Despie he enrmus inequaliies f pwer eween saes da and he fac ha sme pwers culd if he desired frcil ineene viruall a will in he affairs f her saes i usuall has n happened  In suSaharan Africa fr eample ms signifi­ can inervenins have een invked  he svereign gvemen invlved and n impsed  he inervening pwer r slicied  anigvernmen reels There is evidenl a grea relucance n he par f mar miliar pwers  infringe upn he urisdicin f even he leas susanial svereign sae Nninervenin is he fun­ dain f inernainal scie and here wuld have  e ver cmpel ling reasns f sae  disregard his general prhiiin In recen decades nl inense reginal superpwer rivalr has prvked dica­ rial inervenin in Third Wrld cunries cnsidered  e f signifi­ cance  he EasWes cnes Frcile inervenin in das demcraic ineainal scie is cnsrued as ulling and widel cndemned  Mrever i is far easier and pssil cheaper  rie gvernmens han  cerce hem and such influence als is enirel cnsisen wih ineainal law. This raises he issue f human righs which is f curse cnrar  he negaive svereign game  If ffences agains humani even  he pin f gencide in a few cases have n een suficien usifi­ cain  verride svereign righs unil nw we pral shuld n epec i  e an differen in he fuure. This assumes ha curren inernainal lerain f svereign gvemens which fail  ad­ equael prec human righs will n decrease. Ineainal aware­ ness

rganizain



and acin cnceing human righs have

neverheless een increasing in recen decades and here is n reasn  epec his  sp eiher An fuure success f ineainal hu­ maniarianism hwever will depend in he final analsis n he inclinains and ailiies f independen gvemens  preven human ghs vilains. If inernanal human righs awareness in creases perhaps heir humaniaan inclinains will increase als u unless here is far mre willingness in he fuure  effecivel censure human righs ffenders han here has een up  nw his seems 92

HE UURE O QUASISAES

unlikely to happen A s I indiate below thee is one signifiant possi­ bility of suh a development stemming fom human ights efom in the Soviet Union and Easte Euope whih ould have a demon saton effet elsewhee Howeve even if ineased pessue wee plaed on Thid Wold human ighs offendes it might sill have imited effet owing to domes politial onditions Quasistates as a ule ae plaes whee inivility is by no means onined only to govenments but extends to thei opponents both of whom ae usually pepaed to engage in suh behaviou if it is onsideed politially neessay Unfotunately ini­ vility in suh ounties is usually toleated o at least expeted by many people inside govenment and outside It onsequently is difiult to ual let alone eliminate Even if inteational pessue is exeted against the govenments of suh states and they attempt to espond posively thei ability to do so may be limited by these umstanes This agument should not be aied too fa howeve beause in all soieties ivil nd univil behaviou is at the end of the day a matte of hoe Even n oupt soietes govenments an set standads of pobity and ty to enfoe them The same is tue of human ights Govenment usually is the most impotant ageny that an eate expetaons about soial ondut Seuing a esponsible govenment is pobably the uial step in fosteing not only a less oupt but also a moe humane soiety Unfotunately intenational influene to po mote esponsible govement is stitly limited unde onditions of negative soveeigny Whethe it happens o not depends mainly on those in ontol of govement In summay thee is moe eason to expet the negative soveeignty game to ontinue in its pesent shape than to hange into somethng else Damati new inteaonal iumstanes ould intevene to evise this foeast howeve At the stat of the 0s the most signiiant and indeed fasinating inteaonal development is undoubtedly the Go bahev phenomenon and its unsettling effets on the EastWest status quo We ae witnessing an unpeedented eappaisal and pehaps eadjustment of EastWest elations whih is popelled by equally emakable efom movements in the Soviet Union and othe East Euopean ounties This astonishing development has aleady bought about ageements to edue  not to esolve egional onflits in Weste Asia Southeast Asia and Southe Afia in whih supe­ powes have been involved Signifant balaned edutions in both nulea and onventional weapons between NATO and the Wasaw Pat ae undeway One an only speulate about what might happen to inteational elations if the uent Soviet leadeship emains in 93

CONC USION

oe and ontnues to usue ts delaed oles of ano and What ould be the effet on the negatve soveegnty game of a appohemen beteen the Sovet non and the nted States o a Sovet non hh omled th the st and the lette of the elsnk aods on human ghts Would suh ntenatonal develo ments be moe lkey to nease o deease the oltal sae of quasstates Sne the hd Wold ntally emeged and suvved unde Cold Wa ondtons any hange hh moved EastWest elatons some dstane along the oad fom onflt to ooeaton mght be exeted to edue ts oltal sae aodngly ust as the nonWesten old had less autonomy hen somethng esemblng a Conet of Euoe exsted n the nneteenth entuy o muh movement ould be neessay fo suh an effet s of ouse mossble to say. On the othe hand EastWest dtente ould also onevably nease the ndffe ene of the sueoes to the hd Wold hh ould ehas be left moe to tself than dung the ea of Cold Wa valy. If the Sovet non beame a membe of the ntenatonal eonom establshment t and othe ats of Easten Euoe mght henefoth beome a mao fous of ntenatonal develoment ehas to the detment of the hd Wold . hs s not the knd of ndffeene hh quasstates men ould sh to see. Only athe late ould a efomed Sovet eonomy begn to make a ontbuton to oveseas develoment hs s hghly seulatve of ouse but t s not nonsstent th the log of a onevable eadmsson of ussa to he omty of natons afte many deades as a hostle outsde. On balane quasstatesmen ould obably efe a ontnued dvde beteen East and West hh gves them geate lattude to lay off one sde aganst the othe n a sot of evese ntenatonal veson of meal dvde and onque. What eve the effets mght ove to be hoeve suh momentous hanges ould saely leave quasstates untouhed If desotsm ould finally be bought to an end n ussa afte entues ould t not also beome moe vulneable elsehee he essaton of Sovet human ghts offenes ould obably make t athe ease to tze humantaan abuses by othe states. he agument that human ghts ae meely atalst deology ould etanly be moe dfult to sustan f the olds soalst sueoe ublly avoed the moal and legal valdty. A elmnay state ment to ths effet as made by Pesdent Gobahev n a seeh at the nted Natons n 188 If the Sovet non eenteed the omty of natons not only by onng ulng ntenatonal eonom bodes but also by obsevng human ghts onventons t mght eate an exe

peeoka.

9

HE    RE O Q  ASI-SAES

tation of similar conduct by other states which do not currently respect hman rights Soviet protection of hman rights might encourage greater compliance with international humanitarian standards Demo­ cratic reforms in Hungary, Poland Czechoslovakia and other East European contries could only add to these expectations The United States would no longer perhaps feel obliged to turn a blind eye to humanitarian offences by some of its clients out of concern that other­ wise they might go over to the Soviet side In other words reasons of state might intrde less into humanitarian issues and consequently it would not be as easy to get away with human rights abuses as it has been For the irst time since decolonization there would be a converg­ ing view of acceptable and unacceptable condct concerning hman rights by the world's most prominent and influential states In other words the standard of civilization might again become an acknowl­ edged principle of international relations Wold not Soviet entry into the international establishment there fore be as momentos an international event as 1919 or 1945 or 1960? Possibly yes but probably no For even if the USSR became a civilized' nation by traditional standards it still seems unlikely that this could undermine the basic international conditions which support quasi­ states Negative sovereignty would in all likelihood still be not only a legitimate but also a useful instituton of international society It has successfully filled the juridical void in the non-Western world left by the ending of Western empire No developed government today will pblicly question the wisdom or j ustice of the postcolonial regime whatever their private opinions might be  It is difficult to believe that the imaginary future scenario outlined above could change this. Even if the Soviet Union instituted domestic human rights reforms it would still want to enoy the good opinion of as many states as possible including those of the Third World It would not receive this if it stood in judgement of their domestic conduct Indeed it wold be resented as unwarranted intervention and angrily opposed The same norma­ tive restraint would apply no less to the United States Japan the Weste European states and indeed all states. In summary there are two compelling reasons why the negative sovereignty game will almost certainly continue to be played The first is instrumental. There is in most instittions to which individuals or states become attached a powerful conservatism This is owing in no small part to unreflective habit or lack of imagnaton that things could conceivably be other than they are But it is also because of a conviction that the devil we know as the saying goes is almost always preferable to the devil we do not know. The costs of alternative arrangements 5

COCUSIO

ay turn out  n te end to exceed te benefts e process of cange tself ay prove costly Better to leave well enoug alone Statesen as a rule desre stablty before all else n ter exteal relatons  ey ws to avod unnecessary dfcultes n pursung ter naonal nterests and concerns wt oter states s usually rules out or at least curtals severely any questons about te doestc caracter and conduct of oter statesen wc are alost bound to be dsruptve or at least productve of wll Dploacy s an establsed and success ful nsttuton only because statesen are prepared for te sake of good nternatonal relatons not to look very closely at eac oters doestc affars Agnostcs or lve and let lve s te relgon of nternatonal relatons:

ujus regio, ejus reigio

f doestc consder

atons were taken nto account dploacy tself would probably be te frst casualty e expanson of nteatonal socety across all do estc socetes and cultures akes toleraton and agnostics ore peratve tan ever t also reduces to a nu te nuber of ssues about wc dploats can expect to agree and ncreases to a axu tose about wc tey ust sply agree to dsagree and leave t at tat One can terefore see te negative soveregnty gae as an nstituton wc accoodates te nstruental requreents of dploacy n wat s today a far flung socety of states wt exceedngly dverse caracterstcs n oter words t as utilty bot for exstig states ndvdually and for nternatonal socety at large e second reason s noratve Statesen do not erely confront eac oter fro te narrow perspectve of ter own natonal nterests ey also engage n broader dalogue fro a postion of equa legal status wt ts attaced rgts and dutes No peranent and stable syste of uan relatons ncludng nteational relatons could be based on power and nterest alone t also requires not only law but consderaton respect courtesy onour dgnty decoru and s lar nors wc are usually observed by statesen despte te enor ous nequalties of power and wealt between te nteatonal relatons n ts regard ave te caracter of a club  Mebers are onourable fellows Mebersp as ts prveges Once granted t s rarely wtdrawn or even questioned Provided ebers confor to club rules n ter outward conduct teir prvate lves are teir own ven skeletons n closets are ter own affar provdng tey are not tose of soe oter ebers Statesen wo break club rules usualy cannot be deprved of soveregnty But tey can be cast out of nter national socety condened ostraced solated and n rare cases sanconed  as appened to Sout Aca s action t sould be epasied was for volang a cardnal rule of te negative sover 16

THE FUTURE OF QUAS I STATES

egnty game: selfdetermnatn fr the black majrty n Suth Afrca The whte Suth African gvernment culd nt accept black self determnatn and expect t reman in cntrl f the state s t was recnciled t almst uversal cndemnatin by the nteatinal cm­ munity as the necessary price it had t pay fr pursuing its selfinterest in survval The Suth Afrcan state cntnued t have mre than adequate pwer t survve and it s unlkely that sanctins funda­ mentally altered ths It pssessed pstive sveregnty based n em­ pirical statehd Its islatin was nt a questin f pwer hwever it was a questi f legitimacy Quasistatesmen n black Afrca are supprted by the same prncple f racial svereignty which islated whte Suth Afrca  Whle ths princple cannt make a cntrbutin t ther emprcal statehd t can underwrite their egatve sveregnty by censurng external critcism f their dmestic cnduct whch n sme cases nvlves dscrmnatin aganst ethnc segments f ther wn ppulatns which s nt funda­ mentally dfferent frm that f Suth Afrca Racial sveregnty cnsti­ utes a pwerful tab aganst even the mldest questinng f ther cnduct The tab perates silently as a frm f selfcensrship by vrtually all agents and representatves f states ad nternatnal rganizatins and adds decisive nrmative sactn t the raditinal reluctance f diplmats t engage  publc crtcsm f each ther's dmestc affars The result s a frm f reverse dscrminatn n nternatnal relatins  which the Sviet Unin ther ast urpean states and Suth Africa have deservedly cme i fr strenuus human rights critcism frm the ternatnal cmmunity but numerus equally deservig nnwhite vilatrs usually receive at mst nly a mld rebuke almst always tempered by an understanding f the dffcult circumstances they face This tab seems unlkely t be merely temprary because it s rted n a fundametal hstrcal change f public values (althugh nt necessarly prvate attiudes) cncernng race relatns whch has ccurred in Western cunries and particularly the United States after a lengthy plitcal struggle fr racal equaliy It has been instiutnal ized in public law shapes public plicy and culd hardly nw be reversed urthermre it is reinfrced by the dcrine f culural relavism which has displaced ethncetrism and frbids egative evaluains f analites sieties r cultures dfferent frm es wn rtunately t s tday difcult ad unusual fr defamatry remarks against peple f nurpean descent t be made  public partcularly by state authres Unfruately it is equally difficult because f this t cndemn the dmesc cduct f certain statesmen 7

CONCLSON

 t s wrrnted ut they hppen not to e o Europen rce The culturl remoteness o nonWestern goements reduces further nd proly elmntes ny expectton tht they should osere the sme domestc stndrds Ths nrrowng o morl eluton nd wdenng o tolerton n nterntonl reltons s lso  consequence o the globlzton o nterntonl socety Dplomcy n such  socety could not operte on ny other ss It s thereore one thng to ostrcze the South Aricn goernment It would e something entrely derent to solte eery soeregn goernment tht coud justly e ccused o oences gnst humn rghts Intetionl socety would ecome  clu o outcsts In short there s n ronc nd trgc but proly necessry orm o dscrminton n the nonds­ crmnton prctces o contemporry nterntionl reltions whch protects nonEuropen soeregn goernments rom justifile puc crtcsm nd condemnton It s dcut to see humn rights norms oercoming these rrers  NSTTUTONAL FAT

At the tme o  decolonizton decsons were tken whch nsttuted the negte soeregnty regme s the soe successor to colonlsm Ths ruled out ltete nstitutonl rrngements whch mght he een etter suted to the derent crcumstnces nd needs o prtculr colonl popultons In re, egl unormty trumphed despte the ct tht the emergng word o sttes ws nythng ut unorm nd ws ndeed hghly plurlsc n lmost eery respect Ths nsttutonl outcome desees some concludng comments rom the perspecte o nterntonl jursprudence No dout t ws hoped tht chngng the ntetionl sttus o territores rom dependency to ndependency would proe to e gen­ erlly enecl or peoples who preously hd een dened soer­ egnty Ater  most ndependent countes t the time enjoyed r hgher stndrds o lng thn most colones Why should eeryody not e enttled to the sme opportunty? It ws possle to elee not only tht ndependence nd hgher lng stndrds were postey reted ut een tht the ormer woud produce the lter Incresed prosperty hs indeed resulted n mny ormer coones sometmes exceedng wht would he een expected whether or not decolonz­ on hd occurred But there he lso een mny other excolones n whch ndependence ws olowed y incresed dersy lso eyond wht might othewse he een I nything s cer from the post colonl experence t s tht soeregnty nd deelopment re not necessrly collortors nd cn e ntgonsts 1

NSUON L   E

Both pospty and advsity should hav bn xpctd bcaus in th sovigny gam as in any oth not vybody can play ually ll and som can scacly play at all Ruls of th gam plac a pmium on ctain talnts and soucs hil dvaluing o ignoing oths ams a not dmocatic by dinition if vybody can play ll it is not much of a gam o assum that vy county can tak ual advantag of sovignty is to igno th hug diffncs in talnt skill xpinc disciplin ddication taining ducaion psvanc uipmnt oppotunitis and so foth hich invi tably disciminat btn not only individuals but also national populations Yt this is th assumption (usually unstatd of th nga tiv sovignty gam h fact that xcolonial populations hav bnfitd unually fom ual sovignty and that som hav suf fd und indpndnt govmnts is indicativ of th contay assumption hich is consistnt ith gams in gnal Constitutional choics alays involv oppotunity costs altnativ aangmnts a uld out And fo such choics unlik odinay dcisions th costs a bon fo as long as th institutions a in ffct his institutional maxim is applicabl to Euopan colonial disngag mnt fom Asia Afica and Ocania h adoption of ngativ sov ignty pcludd oth concivabl aangmnts som of hich might hav bn mo appopiat to th cicumstancs Fom a back ad looking Bukan pspctiv fo xampl dcoloniation as an indisciminat abandonmnt of taditional titoial statuss of hich som might hav povd adaptabl to th paticua cicum stancs o nds of xcolonial populations and titois Rsidual sovignty condominia tust titois and vaious oth aang mnts hich limit indpndnc w discadd and a solitay insti tution hich as blind to sociological divsity as adoptd instad Fo thos ho usion th utility of tadition in gnal o th fo going aangmnts in paticula this agumnt will not b psuasiv But vn fom a foad looking Bnthamit pspciv indpn dnc as a blinkd chang hich faild to consid n insti tutional aangmnts fo a adically diffnt postcolonial intational socity hich mbacd all th popls of th old Indpndnc as not th innovativ momnt it might hav bn if novl titoial statuss suitd to th spcial cicumstancs and nds of xcolonial stats and aimd at incasing th pospity of thi populaions had bn fashiond h momnt as lost and th on dimnsional ngaiv sovignty gam as stablishd instad Fom ith pspctiv th dcision as not ational so much as ationalist h pisod is an instanc of ationalism in Michal 1

CONCUSION

Oakeshott' s meaning insofar as it was the shortest possible distance or rather the quickest move from colonialism to noncolonialism: politics as the crow flies . The problem with rationalism as a polical process is its lack of empirical adjustment to the circumstances of particular cases. There is no place . . . for a "best in the circumstances", only a place for the best" . '1 The various circumstances and needs of different colonial populations were ruled out by the universalist ideology of self-determination the rationalists easiy defeated the empiricists The effect of establishing negative sovereignty across the board was to create an artificial institutional levelling of a world which in actual fact was and is anything but level. There are basically two opposing views about how best to accommodate the diversity of the world by institutional means The irst perspective again associated with Burke and later with British imperial constitutionalism but by no means confined ony to colonial arrangements is that societal and cultural differences among nations and peoples are to be expected and should be recognized and reflected in specially adapted rules and instuons . Thus in a post-colonial but highly unequal world such a s ours there ought to be various inteational statuses ranging from outright inde­ pendence to associate statehood to inteational trusteeship which are determined by the circumstances and needs of particular populaons Only one institution or rule for all cases is prima facie not only irrational but also inequitable. The obvious and apparently insurmountable problem with this argument as indicated above is determining the appropriate legal arrangement in the circumstances. Who would merit independence? Who must settle for associate statehood or some other nonindependent stats? Who would make the decision? How should it be made? If it were a referendum who would rame the question? The prevailing and undoubtedly justified belief is that it is impossible although it is fascinating to speculate about what excolonial peoples would dede  given a rel choice in a fair referendum on the question. Having experienced the bitter harvest of independence would some now choose a reduced status  it promised improved living condions through greater inteational involvement and supervision? The second view associated with Michael Wazer and inteaonal liberalism is that sovereign statehood is the best way of guaranteeing the nationa reedom that is necessary to secure and protect the diverse cutures and societies of the world. 2 Sovereign statehood leaves people at liberty to determine their own fate according to their own values and beliefs. Alternative arrangements including international human rights provide an opening for outsiders to interfere and impose their values cultural imperialism. The contemporary world is organized 2

  S T  T U T  O   L   T

exclusiely on the second basis and there is little doubt that negatie soereignty accommodates cultural diersity internationally Within many quasistates howeer plurality often is not encouraged or een tolerated minority cultures and populations not to mention political oppositions are under some measure of threat from soereign goe ments Domestic plurality may therefore be sacrificed for the sake of inteational plurality by the existing framework of uniersal soer eign statehood Crrent international practice operates with the aim of recognizing and accommodating diersity

within

this framework Hence states

which are underdeeloped are reconciled by new institutions and practices of inteational deelopment Problems of inciility are ad dressed by international human rights. Preious chapters hae out lined how these institutional arrangements hae fared to date and it is not necessary to repeat what has already been written In general they hae run up against the immoable object of contemporary inter national society equal soereign statehood These arrangements are only effectie if soereign goernments are willing and able to make them effectie They cannot oerrule soereignty and consequently cannot compensate for alteatie institutions which were ruled out of consideration at the time of decolonization The possibility of going further within the existing soereignty framework as adocated by proponents of a New International Economic Order is definitely limited Once institutional arrangements become set they are difficult to change one is saddled with them for better or worse This is desirable

 on balance they contribute to the wellbeing of those subject to them For populations of countries whose goernments regularly protect ciil rights and proide socioeconomic welfare it is a blessing that the institutions of soereignty are difficult to alter Outsiders cannot inter fere and perhaps threaten their good life But for populations whose goements do not proide such goods the instutional fate of soer eignty is less knd Quasistates are now a settled feature of the inter national landscape Third World rulers enjoy the full complement of soereign rghts including the most important one noninterention Their inteational liberty and formal equality with other statesmen is underwritten by the community of states  But many Third World populations find themseles confined within jurisdictions of question able alue and limited promise under goernments which frequently are incompetent and corrupt and sometimes abusie also This is their institutional fae And Michael Walzer is rght; it is up to them to change it But tis is difficult because soereign statehood works in 20

CONCLUSION

faour of goernments soereign rights continue to preail oer human rights in inteational relations This institutional predicament of many Third World populations is reinforced by some of the most powerful taboos of our time which make it a moral offence to ealuate negatiely the domestic conduct of nonwhite goernments or criticize the international institutions which support them Once taboos inade issues such as these the room for subsequent rational discussion is strictly limited t is perhaps appropriate to end on the ironic note that has sounded throughout this book the same institution which proided inter­ national recognition, dignity, and independence to all colonized popu lations could be exploited to deny domestic ciility liberty, and welfar to some And the exploitation this time was by their own goernments. nternational liberation could therefore be followed by domestic subugation. Alteae institutions which proided for in­ ternational reiew or superision might hae preented such adersi ties or at least reduced them Of course they would hae fostered unintended consequences of their own not all of which would hae proed desirable Howeer a greater ariety of international statuses including more intrusie forms of international trusteeship might hae rendered the postcolonial situation less unsatisfactory than it proed time and again to be under the onedimensional negatie soereignty regime

202

N OTE S

Introduction 1 Peter Worsley, The Third World (London, 1) 2 See especally Ralph Pettman, State and lass (London, 17) and Robert W. Cox, 'Socal forces, states and world orders, Millennium vol. 10 (11), pp 12 3 Some ega schoars aso take a broader view G. Schwarzenberger and E. D Brown conceve of nternatonal law as consstng of not only 'rules, such as exclusve domestc jursdcton, but also prncples, whch are abstrac­ tons and 'rovde the common denomnator for a number of related rules . See A Manual of International w, 6th edn (London, 176), pp 36  Smlar dstnctons are drawn n jursprudence See, for example, R M Dworkn, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambrdge, Mass., 17), chs. 2 and 3 4 See, for example, an Brownle, Principles of Public International w 3rd edn (Oxford, 17)  Ibid. p 1 6 I cannot consder the jursprudental problem of establshng the character of rules  human relatons, but see the famous analyss by H L A Hart, Analytcal jursprudence n md-twenteth century, University of Penn­

sylvana w Riew vol 10 (17), pp 7 Also see G Marshall, 'The role of rules, n D Mller and L Sedentop (eds), The Nature of Political Theo (Oxford, 13), pp 17 7 Dorothy Emmet, Rules Roles and Relations (Boston, 166),  12 Emmet s a phlosopher but her definton s vrtually dentcal wth a recent one by two lawyers: ' "Rule s    a general norm gudng conduct or acton n a ven type of stuaton  W Twnng and D Mers, How To Do Things with Rules 2nd edn (London, 1), pp 1267  Emmet, Rules Roles and Relations p 1 1 (orgnal emphass).  K R Poper, The Open Society and Its Enemies vol 1 Plato th edn (London, 166), ch  10 Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaisnce in Italy vol. 1, The State as a Work of Art (New York, 1)  1 1 Edmund Bure, 'Frst letter on a Regcde peace, n F W Rafferty (ed.), The Works of Edmund Burke VI (Oxford, 12) 12 See Hedley Bull, 'The theory of nteatonal poltcs 1116, n Bran Porter (ed), Te Aberystwyth Papes (London, 172), p 32 13 See chapter 3 203

NOTES TO PAGES

522

 4  am nsprd by Hdly Bulls rmark: My book [s]    a n attmpt to dal wth a larg and omplx subt smply by thnkng t through  Hdly Bull Th Anarchil ocity (ondon 977) p x    E  E  hattshndr T miorign Popl (Nw York 960) p  7     h vw o f ntrnatonal rlatons thory s attrbutd to Martn Wght  Hdly Bull Martn Wght and th thory of ntrnatonal rlaons Britih Journa o Intrnational tudi, vol  (97) p  7 A D ndsay Th Modn Dmratic tat (ondon 943) pp 37  Oakshott has xprssd ths pont as follows  "Exprn" stands for th onrt whol whh analyss dvds nto "xprnng" and "what s xprnd  Exprnng and what s xprnd ar takn sparatly mannglss abstratons; thy annot b sparatd Prvng for xampl nvolvs a somthng prvd wllng a somthng wld    Ths two abstratons stand to on anothr n th most omplt ntr dpndn thy ompos a sngl whol Expinc and It Mod (Cam brdg 933) p 9 Also s R G Colngwood An Autoiogaphy (ondon 970) h  9 R G Collngwood Th Ida o itoy (ondon 96) pp 3 36 0  n partular Hans J Morgnthau cintific Man Vru Pow Politic (Chago 9)  R A Motmr Th Thid Wold oalition in nttional Politi nd dn (ondon 94)

 Adam Watson Diplomacy (ondon 9) On dplomay as a haratst of ntrnatonal soty s Martn Wght ytm o tat (str 977) pp 4

 h dstntons btwn ralsm and ratonalsm ar dsussd n Hdly Bull Marn Wght and th thory of ntatonal rlaons

Bitih Jounal o Inttional tudi vol  (976) pp  4  W Matland Moral prsonalty and lgal prsonaty rpntd n Davd Nhols Th Plualit tat (ondon 97) p 9  saah Brn Fou Eay on Lirty (Oxford 969) h 3  haptr    States and quasi-states

 Margry Prham Our task n Aa  Tim (0     buary 9) rprntd n Margry Prham olonl qunc (ondon 967) pp 44  r Donald Camron was Govor of Nga btwn 930 and 93 Ths s dsussd n Margry Prham Nati Adminitation in Nigia (ondon 937) hs 0 and  3 Oan hraftr rfrs to smal sland usdtons n not ony th Pa but also th ndan and Carbban Oans 4 John Plamnat On Aln Rul and lGonmnt (ondon 9) pp 3  Iid. p  6  J Crawford Th ta r stthoo n ntaonal law Bitih Yarok o Inttional w 1971977 (Oxord 97) pp   67 7 Th trm quasstat s usd by H Bu and A Watson  Expanion o Inttional ity (Oxford 9) p  4 Also s Rort H  Jakson Quasstats dual rgms and nlassal thory Intrnational Organiz

 O   S O P A G  S

22-3

ation vo. 41 (Autumn 1987), pp. 51949. The rather dfferent legal concept

8 9 10

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

of quassoveregnty ('quasnternationa aw, quaspersona jusdc tion, and quasterrtoral ursdton) s dsussed n Schwarzenberger and Brown, A Manual o Intenational w Sr Lews Namer, Vanished Supemaies (New York, 1963), p. 33 R W Tucker, he Ineuality o Nations (New York, 1977)   Morgenthau, Sienti Man Vesus owe olitis (Chago, 1946) and M. Wght, Why s there no nternatona theory n Sr . Buttered and M. Wght (ed), Diplomati inestigations (London, 1966), pp. 1734. Also see chapter 7. See A. Ryan, J S Mill (London, 1974), p 214. See chapter 3 Plamenatz, On Alien Rule and Seloenment pp 22-3 See Francs Snyder and Peter Slnn (ed.), Intenational w o Deelopment (Abngdon, 1987) See chapter 5. Berln Fou Essays on ibety h 3 Ibid p 122. he only purpose for whch power an be rghtfuy exercsed over any member of a cvsed communty, aganst hs w, s to prevent harm to others . . S. Mll, On ibety reprnted n H B Aton (ed.), J S Mill:

Utilitaianism On ibety and Consideations on Repesentative ovenment 19

20 21



(London, 1972), p. 73. Ths s the usual lega concept. See Schwarzenberger and Brown, A Manual o Intenational w pp 5. Schwarzenbergers concepton of negatve and postive soveregnty overaps wth my own at severa ponts but s not dentcal to t. Ibid pp 52, 564. By pota soveregnty Schwarzenberger means 'nde­ pendene n fat, not merey n aw  Ibid p 53f. Shwarzenberger onsders postve soveregnty to be an absolute rather than a relative condton, and negatve soveregnty the reverse But ths s logaly nonsstent f postive soveregnty s a sub­ stantive condton and negatve soveregnty a formallegal one, as he aso seems to suggest See Ian Brownle, The Expanson of nteationa socety: the onse quences for the law of natons, n Bul and Watson, he Epansion o Intenational Soiety ch 24

  new sovereign regime

1 Aan James, Soveeign Statehood (London, 986), p 25 2 Ibid p 39 The analyss n ths paragaph s based on chapter 3 of ames book 3 bid p 48. 4 Gbert Ryle, he Conept o Mind (armondsworth, 1968), h. 2 5 Crawfod, 'The teia for statehood n nteationa law, p. 96 Also see Wght, Systems o States p 27 6  Kesen, eneral Teo  w and State (Cambdge, 1945), p 29. 205

NOTES TO PGES

3-53

7 S Mcha Oakhott Th u of aw On itor and Oter a (Oxfod 8) pp 58 8 Hugo Gotu De Jure Bei A Pai Liri tan F Ky (Oxfod 5)  P Cavoco 'Th faty of ntnatonam Internationa Reation vo 8 (86) 0 S Hnz Lubaz (d.) e Deveopment of te Modern State (London ) p.   Hobb Liatan Mcha Oakhott (d) (Oxfod 6) ch   Bodn Six Book of te Commonweat M   Tooy (d  ) (Oxfod nd) book    Ao  chapt 7  M. Oakhott On uman Condut (Oxfod 75) Pat  5 T Nadn w Morait and te Reation of State (Pncton 8)  6 S G Mudock Afria It Peope and te Cutura ito (London 5) 7 H. Shu Bai Rigt (Pncton  80) ch   8 S among oth C  Btz M  Cohn T Scanon and   Smmon d nternationa ti (Pncton 85) Pat 5 C  Btz Poitia To and Internationa Reation (Pncton 7) pat  and  and Shu Bai Rigt pat  and   S S. I. Bnn 'Human ghtfo whom and fo what?' n  Kamnka and A  Tay (d) uman Rigt (London 78) p  Ao  D M  Tubk 'Human ght aw and human nd pogam' n T Mon (d) uman Rigt in Internationa w (Oxfod 85) ch 6 0 Th uopan Convnton on Human ght mak povon fo d­ ogaton n xcptona ccumtanc uch a dung natona mgn­ c. S oayn Hggn 'Th uopan Convnton on Human ght' n Mon uman Rigt ch   S fo xamp Amnet Internationa Report 1 986 (London 86)  S th baancd dcuon n ack Donny 'Humantaan ntvnton' Journa of Internationa Affair vo 7 (Wnt 8) pp 8 3 Svereignty regimes in histry

  L on e uropean Mirae (Cambdg 8) pp 06  .  M Wght Power Poiti nd dn (London 86) p 5  H Lautpacht 'Th Gotan tadton n ntnatona aw' e Briti Year Book of Internationa w 1 946 (Oxfod  7) pp    Buckhadt e Civiization of te Renaiane in Ita vo  (Nw Yok 58) p  5 C H Mcwan e owt of Poitia ougt in te Wet (Nw Yok 8) p 68 6 odn S Book of te Commonweat boo  ch  p 0 7 Hobb eviatan p.  8 S Pufndof De Jure Naturae et entium Liri Oto (67) C H and W A Odfath tan (Oxfod ) book 7 ch  paa 60  F H ny Sovereignt nd dn (Cambdg 86) p 85 0 Schwaznbg and Bown A Manua of Intetiona w p     L y e w of Nation nd dn (London 6) pp 0 06

NES  P  G E S 5 364

1 John Austn, The Poe o Juspudee Deemed . L A. rt (d . ) (London, 1954)  194 (orgn mhss) 1 Bu, The Ahl Soey  89. 14 C d Vsschr, Theo d Rely  Publ eol  P E. Corbtt, trns. (Prncton, 1968),  1 745. 15 Wght, Sysems o Ses . 18 16 Th cosst to t s Bu nd Wtson, The pso o eol Soey 17 Afrd Cobbn, The No Se d Nol SelDeemo (Nw York 1969), ch. 4. 18 Adm Wtson, Euron ntrnton soct nd ts xnson, n Bu nd Wtson, The pso o eol Soey  18 19 bd   . 6.  Chrs . Axndrowc, Nw nd orgn stts, eol Affs vo. 45 (Ju 1969), . 471  Aso s hs oduo o he Hso o he  o Nos  he s des (London 1967). 1 S th dscusson n A. P. dEntrvs, Nul w nd dn (London, 197),  556  Axndrowc, Nw nd orgn stts,  469, 479  S, for xm, Mrtn Wghts crtcsm of Axndrowcs thss n Sysems o Ses . 1 1 78 4 Ptrck OBrn, Euro n th word conom, n Bu nd Wtson, The pso o eol Soey  6. 5 Grotus, The  o W d Pee . 199 1 .  6 A. . L rn quotd b  Wtson, Euron ntrnton soct nd ts xnson, . 5 7 ees o he Regde Pee rrntd n F W. Rfft (d.), The Woks o he Rgh Hoouble dmud Buke vo. 6 (Oxford, 198),  1567. 8 Mch owrd Th mtr fctor n Euron xnson, n Bu nd Wtson, The pso o eol Soey . 8. 9 J. S M, A fw words on nonntnton, rrntd n G mmfrb (d.), ssys o Pols d ulue by Joh Su Mll (Nw York, 196), .   Quotd b Wght Sysems o Ses . 115

1 d Bu, Th mrgnc of  unvrs ntrnton soct n Bu nd Wtson, The pso o eol Soey . 11.  Axndrowc, Nw nd orgn stts . 467.  C.   Axndrowc The uopeA ooo (Ldn 197)  15  S T Nff, h Ottomn Emr nd th Euron sttssstm n Bu nd Wtson, The pso o eol Soey  1569. 5 S Grt W Gong, Chns ntr nto ntton soct n Bu nd Wtson, The pso o eol Soey  171-8  Se dm Sugnm, Jns ntr nto ntton soct, n Bu nd Wtson, The pso o eol Socey  1899 7 Chrs C. Grffn, Th stts of Ltn Amrc n F  ns (d), The N mbdge Mode Hso vo 1 1 (Cmbdg, 1976),  516 7

NOES O PGES

53

38 Quoted by J  C Beaglehoe he Btih Commonweath o f Naton n Davd homon (ed)  N amd Mod sto, vo 1 (Cam bdge 1960) p 540 39 See Chapte 4 40 Pete Lyon New tate and ntenatonal ode n A Jame (ed)  Bass o tatoa Od (London 1973) p 45 41 J Wetlake tatoa w, pat 1 (London 1904) pp 41  4 he defntve lega tudy of the poce efe to thee tetoe a back wad  See M  F Lndey  cqusto ad Govmt o Bacad  to  tatoa w (London 196) 43 Weten powe bought and old tetoe a late a the peent centuy Fo example Denmak od the Danh Wet Inda Iland to the Unted State n 1916 fo $5  See Lndley  cqusto ad Govmt o Backad to p 167  J Vanna Kdoms o t Savaa (Madon 1966) pp 15 Alo ee Lucy Ma ca Kdoms (Oxfod 1967) ch 1  45 M Fote and E E  EvanPtchad (ed ) ca otca Sstms (Oxfod 1940) pp 7  Jacque RchadMolad a quoted by A B Bozeman oct  ca (Pnceton 1976) pp 1313 47 Bozeman oct  ca p 143  Lndley Backad to  tatoa w pp 44 49 Aexandowcz  uopa-ca ootato ch 7  Lndey Bacad to  tatoa w ch  1  51 M  Wght Bts ooa osttutos 1947 (Oxfod 195) p 10 5 A C  McEwen tatoa Boudas o ast ca (Oxfod 1971) p 14 53 In 1831 ChefJutce Mahal deveng udgement n a cae entted he Cheokee Naton veu the State of Geoga" defned the poton of the Fedea Govement a one of tutee fo the land held by Indan It  cetany the fact that n 1837 a commttee of the Bth oue of Common apponted to conde the teatment of abognal tbe n Bth te toe" expctly adopted th fomua Lod aley  utu o ooa ops (London 1943) p 15  Quoted by  A  C Can ud to mpasm (London 1965) p 95 55 Lndley Backad to  tatoa w pp 3930 56 G L Bee ca Qustos at t as ac oc (New Yok 193) p 1 1 7 57 See C W Jenk  ommo w o Makd (London 1958) pp 4 and G W Gong  Stadad o vato  tatoa Soct (Oxfod 1984) pp 1415 58 Lndey Backad to  tatoa w p 37 59 L  Gann he Beln Confeence and the humantaan concence n S Fote W J Mommen and R Robnon (ed ) Bsmack uop ad ca  B oc 1884188 ad t Ost o atto (Oxfod 1988) pp 33 1   Accodng to Bey Atce  wa one o f the uccefu function o f the League of Nation See J  L Bely he League of Naton n homon 08

N O T E S TO P A G E S

6 62 6 

65 

67 

69

70 71



The N abridge Mdern iry, ol 12 p  498. I  s somemes forgoe ha he prcple of useeshp was aso eshed  Arcle 2 of he Coea uder whch sgaores acceped he duy of securg 'us reame of he ae haas of [exsg] erroes uder her coro' dey argues ha ruseeshp herefore apped bh o madaes ad o ordary cooes ad proecoraes. See dley Bakward Terriry in Inernainal w, p 6 Schwarzeerger A Manual  Inernainal w pp 45 Ml Uiliariani p. 36 . M N Shaw Tile  Teriry in Aia Oxford 986 p 59 he maory opo of ega commeaors s ha Arcles 1 (2) ad 55 do o creae a dg lega ogao For a reew of hs coroersy see Shaw Tile  Terriry in Aia, ch  A Mazru Tward a Pa Aiana odo 167) p  Wgh Sye  Sae, p.  1  d  p  8 Aa ames 'he emergg goa socey' Third Wrld Aair, ol 7 986 p 67 Aexadrowcz The EurpeanAian nnain, p 6 Also see y he same auhor 'he ew saes ad eaoa law' Millenniu, ol  7) pp 22 Alexadrowcz The EurpeanAian nnain, p 25 Id  pp 5 1 2 Also see Alexadrowcz 'New ad oga saes' pp  ad N  WaaceBruce 'Afca ad eraoal aw: he emer­ gece o saehood The Jurnal Mdern Aian Sudie, ol 2 Decemer 985 pp. 572

 Independene by   he Mddle Eas ad Noh Arca are excuded fom hs aalyss.  See Hedley Bull 'he reo agas he wes'  Bull ad Waso The Exnin  nainal Siey, oe 45 ch 4  Geofey Baaclough An rdui  epa i Haods woh 167) p 06 4 See D  Morga uidae Tward Selverne in Briih lnie,  The fil i  lnl Delpen, o 5 odo 980; A N Porer ad A  Sockwel Briih prl Pli ad Delnizain  ol.  amdge 987 oh Gallagher The Delie Revival and Fall  he Biih Epie amdge 982 R F Holad Eupean Deln­ izain  odo 985; ad P Gfford ad W . R ous eds The Traer  Pw in Ai odo 82 5 Holad Eup Delizain  p  6 Roald Roso 'Adrew Cohe ad he asfer of power  ropcal Afca'  W H osoes ed Delnizai andAſter (, 1 80) p 52 7 Poer ad Sockwel Briih rl Pli, p 69 8 Peer alooress Wrld Orde ad N Sae odo 162) p  9 Haley The Fuure  lnl Peple, pp 4  1 0 he Neherlads admsered Wes New Guea ul 62 

NOTES TO PAGES

3

  Holland uopean Decoloniaton p  73 2 The major eceptions were Algeria and to a far lesser etent GineaBissa Angola Mozambiqe and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 3 Hailey e Futue o olonial eoples p 24. 4 Lord F D gard e Dual Mandate in Bitis opical ica (Edinbrgh 922) pp 95 03 5 Qoted by Kenneth Robinson e Dilemmas o usteesip (London 95) p 9 As indicated the Colonial Empire did not inclde British ndia or Brma .  Qoted by . M Ward olonial SelGovenment 1 9186 (Oford 97) p.  Those who were not refers to FrenchCanadians 7 Perham olonial Sequence p.255. 8 e olonial olem  Repot  a Stud Goup o Memes o te Roal nstitute o Intenational ffais (Oford 937) p 255 9 Qoted by Porter and Stockwell Bitis mpel olic p 29 20 Reprinted iid. pp 05 2 He went on to say that a declaration by s mst lead off with those resonding statements of principle on which America insists - or to Americans a declaration of this natre is rather of the natre of an ad vertisement of the character of the party making it than a garantee of performance  Qoted iid. p 55 2 Qoted iid p 35 23 Hailey e Futue o olonial eoples p 24 24 Qoted by Porter & Stockwell Bitis mpel oli pp 2  Qoted iid. p 5 2 Qoted by Morgan Guidance owads SelGovenment p    27 Perham olonial Sequence p  27 28 Qoted by Porter and Stockwell Bitis mpeial olicy pp 330 29 Perham olonial Sequence pp 295 337  Qoted by Porter and Stockwell Bitis Impel oli p 233 3 Qoted iid.  p 338 32 Iid p 3 33 Qoted iid p 24  Qoted iid p 255  Qoted iid p 277  See iid. p 202 37 First Letter on a Regicide Peace in Rafferty e Wo o dmund Buke vol  38 Reprinted in Brce Fetter (ed) olonial Rule in i (London 979) p . 39 Barb iclesc olonl lanning  ompaative Stud (London 958) p   Qoted by iclesc iid. p  4 D  Morgan (ed)  Reassessment o Bitis d olic 1 91196 e fical isto o olonl Delopment vol 3 (London 980) p 339  Qoted by Morgan Guidance owads SelGovement p 32 43 Qoted iid. p 2   Porter and Stockwell Bitis mpel olic p 28 20

NO  S TO AGS

933

5 Quoted by Mogan Guidance wards SelGovernment p 21   Quoted by Coln Coss The Fall of the British Empire 1 18-168 (ondon 1968) p 262 7 Mogan Guidance Towards Self-Goernment p 102.  Quoted by Mogan ibid .  p 32 9 Ibid   p 97  Ibid  , p 98 51 Quoted by Mogan ibid   p 1 1 7 52 Ibid   pp. 213-1 53 ccodng to Geneal ncple XIV of te fst NCD complete decol onaton .  . s a necessay condton fo economc development and te execse of soveegn gts ove natual esouces e ole of te confe ence n pomotng Not-Sout poltcs s dscussed by Robet  Mo tme The Third World Coalition in International Politics, 2nd edn (ondon 198) p 16  S ndew Coen British Policy in Changing Africa (Evanston Ill 1959) 55 See te analyss n Wgt Bh Colonal Conttution c 2  J  M . ee Colonial Deelopment and Good Goernment (Ox 1967) pp 2 215 57 Mogan Guidance Towards Self-Goernment p 218 58 ee Colonial Deelopment, p 281  59 ete yon (ed ) The Round Table: Special Edition on Small States and the Commonwealth (ondon 1985) p 3  eam Colonial Sequence p. 338 (empass added) 61 Jon D ageaves West Africa The Former French States (Englewood Clffs 1967) p 155. 62 M . E. Cambelan Decolonization: The Fall of the European Empires (Oxfod 1985) pp. 5 omas odkgn wtes of Fenc Catesansm  National­ ism in Colonl Africa (ondon 1956) pp 330  aley The Future of Colonial Peoples p 5  Rut Scacte Mogentau Political Parties in French-Speaking West Aica (Oxfod 19) p. 56.  Quoted ibid p. 7.  Cambelan Decolonization p. 68 67 J Stenges e Congo Fee State and te Belgum Congo befoe 191 n . . Gann and ete Dugnan (ed ) Colonialism in Africa 1870160 vol 1 (Cambdge 1981) p 305.  Quoted by Stenges e Congo Fee State p. 31. 69 Roge nstey Belgan ule n te Congo and te aspatons of te olu class n Gann and Dugnan Colonialism in Aica vol 2 p 218 70 Stenges e Congo Fee State p. 329. 71 Cawfod Young Politics in the Congo (nceton 1965) p.   Stenges e Congo Fee State p 325. 73 Quoted by Wlfed Benson e nteatonal macney fo colonal lbe aton n tu CeecJones (ed.) New Fabian Colonial Essays (ondon 1959) p. 227 7 Mogan Guidance Twards Self-Goernment p. 18 21 1

NOTES TO PGES 10315

Ibid, p  2 Ibid, p   Quoted Ibid , p 2 7 Quoted Ibid, p 2  Ibid , p   Ibid, p 20  Ibid, p 0 7 Quoted

7 Quoted

2 See I Caude 'Domestc jusdcton and coonasm'   Kson (ed) N Sae in he Mdern Wrld (London 97) pp 23

 Quoted by Caude ibid, p   Ibid, p 32  awcett ctes the oowng exampes sevea Latn Amecan countes Inda Buma Afghanstan the Phppnes Iaq Sya Saud Aaba Lbea and the Sovet Unon See James awcett w and Pwer in Iner nainal Relain (London 92) One coud undoubtedy cte many othes  Caude 'Domestc jusdcton and coonasm' pp 2 7 Quoted by Leo Goss 'The ght of sefdetemnaton n nteaona aw'  Kson N Sae in he Mde Wrld, pp   awcett w and Pwer, pp 20 9 Cawfod 'The ctea fo statehood' p 2

 Ibd, pp  

 Soverety and development

 See Wod Ban Wrld Delpen Rer  988 (New Yo 9) Tabe  : Basc Indcatos pp 2223 2 abuRahman an 'Inteatona aw of deveopment and the aw of the GA' n  Snyde and P Snn Ininal w  Dvelpn (Abngdon 97) p 9 3 P T Baue Equali, he

ird Wrld and Eni Deluin

(Cambdge

ass  9) p 7  Evan Luad Ininal Agenie (London 977) p 22  Eugene R Bac  Dipla  Eni Develpn and

Ohr Paper

(New Yo 93) p 23  Intenatona Labou Oganaton ood and Agcutue Oganaton  Economc and Soca Counc UN Educatona Scentfic and Cutua Oganaton 7 UN Confence on Tade And Deveopment  Deveopment Po gamme UN Industa Deveopment Oganaton  Economc Com

msson f Asa and the a East  Economc Commsson fo Afca UN Economc Commsson fo Latn Ameca  Luad Innal Agenie, pp 32  9 atn Wght Pwer Plii, 2nd edn (amondswoth 98) p 23 Aso  S D Kasne Sruural Cn The ird Wrld Again ll ir ali (Beeey 9) 0  Bedjaou 'A Thd Wod vew of nteatona oganaons' n Geoges AbSaab (ed) The Cnep  Ininal Organiain (Pas 9) p 29 

Wrld Dvelpn Rr  988 (New Yo 22

9) Tabe 2

NOES O PGE S

  5- 2 5

1 2 World Development Report  988 Table 17. 13 Prtners n Development Report of the Commsson on Interntonl Development New York, 16), pp 1278 14 North-South A Progrm for Survvl ambridge, ass, 181), p 10 15 Ibd pp 1 718 16 ee the documents pubished in Phiippe Brailard and ohammadRea Djaii eds), The Thrd World nd Interntonl Reltons London, 184), part 3. 17 Wang Tieya The Third Word and inteationa aw, quoted by Alain Pelet, A new internationa egal order, in nyder and inn, Interntonl w of Development, p 1 1. 18 Pelet, A new internationa ega order, p. 126. 1 ohammed Bennouna quoted by aurice Fory, A Northouth lega diaogue, in nyder and inn, Interntonl w of Development, p 12. 20 aurice Flory, Drot Interntonl du Developpement Paris 177), p 16 21 Pelet, A new international ega order, p 1 1.  chwarenberger and Brown, A Mnul of Interntonl w p. .  W. Friedmann, The Chngng Struture of Interntonl w New York, 164), · 5 24 Antony Alott, The aw of deveopment and the deveopment of aw, in nyder and linn, Interntonl w of Development p. 82. 25 B V. A. Roling, Interntonl w n n pnded World Amsterdam, 160) p. 83 26 Friedmann, The Chngng Struture of Interntonl w p 62 Aso see . uganami, nternational aw, in . ayal ed), The Communty of Sttes London, 182), pp 678. 27 KabirurRahman Kan, Internationa aw of development and the aw of the A, in nyder and inn Interntonl w of Development p. 176 28 Ibd, pp 1 76 2 ohammed Bedjaoui, ome unorthodo reflections on the "right to de veopment" , in nyder and linn, Interntonl w of Development, p 4  Bedjaoui, ome unorthodo reections on the "right to deveopment" , p 4 origina emphasis)  31 Reprinted in Brailard and Djaii, The Thrd World nd Inttonl Reltons, pp 2236 32 Reprinted bd, p 232. 33 Khan nteationa aw of deveopment and the law of the GA, p 182  The atter gives to a contacting party automaticaly any rights in the same field aready granted, or to be granted at a future date, to any third tate Thus, mostfavourednation treatment    creates equality with thid par ties The former  does not aim at equality  .  but at discrimination in favour of those enttled to invoke it chwarenberger and Brown, A Mnul of Interntonl w pp. 878 35 Khan, Inteatonal law of deveopment and the aw of the GA, p 17  ee World Development Report  988 tabes 171 37 ee Peter Koer, Gegro aass, T iebod and R Tetaff, The IMF nd the Debt Crss London, 187), pp 2 213

NOTS TO PAS

 2   3

8  Gob nd M [Toronto Rport o n usnss (  October 1987) 9 G. K. Helleiner Economic cisis in subhrn Aric Interntonl our­ n vol. 41 no 4 (Autum 1986) p. 75966 40 Rport on usnss (16 une 1988). 41 Trevor Pritt nd tephen Riley The intetionl politics o Aicn debt Potl Studs (1987) 5 p 5 4  V Gruhn The recoloniztion o Aric A Tody vol , no 4 (198) pp 7 48 4 Tim Congdon T Dbt Trt (Oord 1988) p 156.  . R Lucs On ust (Ord 1980) pp 1 11 45 ection 15 ()  ee A  H Goldmn Airmtive ction Posopy nd Publ Affrs vol 5 (1976) pp 1 795 47 This point ws suggested by Aln Cis.  Airmtive ction progrmmes bsed on gender discimntion - ginst women  or this reson my not prove to be s workble 49 ee N Glzer Affirmtv Dsrmnton (New York 1975)  Rport on usnss (19 December 1987). 51 tephen Hggrd The politics o djustment lessons rom the MFs Etended Fund Fcility Intrnton Orgnzton vol 9 no  (ummer 1985) pp  5 T M Cllghy Aics debt crisis ournl of Intrntonl Affrs, vol 8 no 1 (ummer 1984) pp 70  Sovereign rights versus human rights

1 ee Amnsty Inttonl Rports (published in London nnully)  Rgs A Rport for t Indpendnt Commsson on Intrntonl Humn trn Issus (London 1986) p 9  Potl Klngs  ovmnts An Amnsty Intrntonl Rport (London 198) 4 L Kuper no Its Pot Us n t Twentt Cntury (Hrmonds­ worth 1981). 5 Dspprd A Report for t Indpendnt Commsson on Inttonl Humn trn Issus (London 1986) p 9 6 ortur n t gts: An Amnesty Intton Rport (London 19). 7 ee Brry Buzn Popl Stts nd Fr (Bighton 198) ch 1 . 8 Worsley  rd World 9 ee H L A. Ht  Conpt of w (Oord 1961) pp 1895 10 ee R G Collngwood  N vtn (New York 1971) prt  1 1 Ibd. pp 91-9 1 Rmrks on t Po of t Als, uoted by Mtin Wight 'Weste vlues in intetionl reltons in H Butterield nd M . Wight (eds) Dpomt Invstgtons (London 1 966) p 14 (oiginl emphsis) 1 Collingwood  N vtn p  (oiginl emphsis) 14 ee the nlysis in Michel Wlzer Just nd Unust Wrs (New York 1977) pp 8996 15 G W Gong  Stndrd of Cvlzton n Intton Soty (Oord 1984) pp. 9 14

N O  E S  O P A G E S  4 4

16 P. Sieghart The l Rghs of Mnknd (London 1986) p vii (orgnal emphasis) 17 See Brownlie Prnples of Publ neonl w p 513 and R B. Lillich Civil ghts in Meron Humn Rghs n Inernonl w pp 1 1 7-18. 18 Siehart e wl Rghs of Mnknd p 68 19 The literature is too vast to cite For a useful source of pertinent aricles consult the Humn Rghs Qurerly 20 Immanuel Kant 'Perpetual peace: a philosophical sketch in Hans Reiss (ed) n's Poll Wrngs (Cambidge 1977) pp 1078 21 Sed quis custodiet ipsos Custodes? Juvenal as quoted by The Oxford Don of Quoons (2nd edn) (Oxford 1955) p 283  Amnesy Inernonl Repor 1 986, pp. 7 23 David Goldswothy Colonl Issues n rsh Pols 1 941961 (Oxford 1971) p 385 24 C. Wilfred Jenks e Common w of Mnknd (London 1958) p. 4 25 J L Bierly he League of Nations in David Thomson (ed) The  Cmbrdge Mode Hso vol 1 2 (Cambridge 1960) p 498 26 Keith Hart The Poll onomy of Wes An Agrulure (Cambidge 1982) p 104 2 Sir . vor Jennings The Approh o elfovernmen (Cambridge 1956) p 162 28 See the special issue devoted to this topic by Thrd World urerly vol 10 (1988) 29 See S. P. Huntngton Poll Order n Chngng oees (Yale 1968)  See the comprehensive survey by D L. Horowitz hn roups n Confl (Berkeley 1985)  31 Collinwood The  Levhn p. 299 32 Zdenek Ceveka  Unnshed Ques for Uny (New York 19) p.   For a study of such episodes see Kuper enode  Alan Dowty Closed orders (London 1987) p. 142 35 Rgees p 9.  Bill C89 as reported n e lobe nd Ml (4 June 198) 37 Brownlie Prnples of Publ Inernonl Lw p 515  Wight ysems of es ch. 6. he notion of territorial vicnae is fro Edund Burke First letter on a regicide peace in Rafferty The Works of dmund urke vol 6 p 159 note 3 39 Mazrui Towrds  Px An ch. 2  Wiht ysems of es note 5 pp 172 41 See Ian Brownlie (ed) s Doumens on An Affrs (Oxford 1971) p 3 42 See the analysis in A C McEwen Ineonl oundres of s A (Oxford 1971) p. 22.  Qd id p   Aold Wolfers Dsord nd Collboron (London 1962) pp 2390 45 Reprinted in Claude E. Welch Jr and Ronald I Melzer (ed) Humn Rghs nd Developmen n A (Albany 19) pp 31729  See Rchard Gittleman he Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 215

N O T E S T O P A G E S   6

47



4



5

5

·

a legal aalysis i elch ad Meltze uman Righs and Delopmen in  p 5 he eamble eaffims the Afica states adheece to the piciples of huma ad peoples ights    adopted by the Ogazatio of Afca Uity the Movemet of NoAliged outies ad the Uited Natios  Sieghat  l Righs of Mankind, p   alvoessi he failty o f iteatoalism nional Relaions, p 588 Kat epetual peace pp 0 G  Kayeihamba Huma ights ad developmet with special efe­ ece to Afica i Syde ad Sl ninal w of Developmen, p 5. Mill A few wods o oitevetio i Himmelfab Essays on Poliics and Culure  John Suar Mill, ch 0

 Quas-states and nteanal the

 M ight A aatomy of iteatoal thought Review of neonal Sudies, vol 3 (87 pp 7 Also see Bull Mati ight ad the theoy of iteaoal elatios pp 06.  Mogethau Scienic Man Versus Power Poliics, p  3 See A Liklate Me ad cizes i teaoal elatos Revi of nional Sudies, vol 7 (8 pp 37 4 See R ettma ompetig aadigms i iteatioal politics Review of nernaional Sudies, vol 7 (8 pp 39 5 N Machavell The Prince, Geoge Bull tas (Hamodswoth  ch . 6 Machiaveli e Prince, ch 8 7 Hobbes vhan, ch 7. 8 J. D B Mille he soveeig state ad its futue nional oul, vol. 3 ( p .  Has J Mogethau as quoted by  Gelma Has J Mogethau ad the legacy of poltcal ealsm Review of neional Sudies, vol 4 ( p 54 (emphasis added) 0 his bief aalysis is deived maily fom H Lautepacht he Gotia ado i iteaoal law The riish Year ook of nional w, vol 3 (946 pp 53  Lautepacht he Gota taditio i iteatioal law p 3.  M Oakeshott he ule of law  iso and Oher Esys (Oxfod 83 p  Also see chapte  3 M Oakeshott Raionalism in Poliics and Oher Essays (Lodo 6 pp 36. 4 his summay aalysis is based o Kats essays Idea o a uivesal hstoy  a cosmopolita pupose O the commo sayig "this may  tue  theoy but it dos ot apply  pactice  ad epeual peace a philosophical sketch i Reiss n's Poliil Wriings, pp 453 6 ad 930. 5 Richad Fak A ew paadigm fo iteatioal legal studies i R Falk F Katochwil ad S H Medloitz (eds ) neional w: A Conempo ra Pespeve (Lodo 985 pp 65793 6 Ib. p 6. 6

 O T  S T O  A G  S 1 75 - 2 0 0 1 7 See the discussion in Bull,  Anchil

Siey

p 25

18 See Friedmann, T hnging Sucue of niol 19 For a criticism of the  in these terms see Nardin, Relion of Se p 1 10.

20 For an analysis along these lines see Lucas, 21

bd

w w Moliy nd he

On ue ch

15

p 256

 G Vlastos, 'Justice and equality', in J Waldron (ed), eoie of Righ (Oxford, 19), p 55.

 J H Herz, 'Rise and demise of the territoal state, Wold Poliic vol 9 (1957), pp 4793 4 djaoui, 'Some unorthodox reflections on the "right to development" , pp 87116  Unless otherwise indicated the following analysis and quotations are from

 A few words on non-inteenon', pp  and Walzer, u nd ,

6

Unju W ch 6.  Uilinim ,

p 73.

27 See D uban, 'The romance of the nationstate, in itz, Ehic p 243. Concluson 1 Oakeshott,

Rionlim in Poliic nd Ohe Ey

nionl

p 5

2 M Walzer, 'The moral standing of states, in Beitz, Cohen, Scanlon and Simmons,

nionl Ehic

pp 

217

INDEX

Afghanistan, 59 Aica, 14, 59,  71,  115, 125, 127, 139, 1, 187, 197 rin Confence (1) and, 670, 72 'Euroan Aca, 39 European paon, 671 Euroan usteeship des,  Organizaon of African Unity (OAU), 128, 15, 1 paron of, 67-71 rsonal le in,  'standard of on and, 723 adiona poica systems, 679 Aexandrowicz, Charles, 57, 61, 62, 70,  Algeria, 82, 1 Amnesty Inteaona, 19, 20,  47, 14, 189;  al human ghts Asia, 7, 59, 71, 115, 1, 139 assiate stateh, 32, 1, 117, 2 Atanc Charter,  Ausn, John, 53 Ausaia, 5, 103, 1 AusHungaan Empire,  ,    al Habsbu empire Baur Rert,  b'I  Barbados, 135 baba, 4, 35 djaoui, Mohammed, 114, 121, 1 haviouraists, 2 lan Congo  67, 1012 Benn, Sney,  rlin Conference (15), 69-70, ;  al Afca, human ghts Genera Act of, 73 rin, Iiah, 27, 29 Bodin, ean, 51, 167 Brandt, Wiy, 117 Bery, J . L., , 147 Btain, 16, 1, 129, 147 Brish Empi, 13, 14, 17, 323, 39,  61, 

constuona framework of,  doonizaon of,   and prsion ima of, 87 uscaon of,  parehip ido,  in,  on,  Winston Brownlie, Ian, 3, 151 Bull, Hedey, 4, , 61 Burckhardt, Jacob, 3, 51 Burke, Edmund, 4, ,   91, 142, 158 Caine, Sir Sydney,  Cavossi, Peter, 37, 1 Cameron, Sir Donald, 16 Canada, 5, 87, 129, 1323 Chad, 24, 149 Charter of the Economic Rights and Dues of States, 1223, 132, 135 China, 20, , 61, 62,  105, 174 Churchil, Winston,  vil rights movement, 26 on;   human ghts R G Coingwd on, 1423, 149, 11 concept of, 142 deveopment and, 143 domesc invility, 161 Gert Gong on, 143 human gh and, 1 inteaona vility, 1 Nuremrg and Tokyo Tbunals, 143 e of aw and, 1423 d ust of,  technoogy and, 1423 onssystem,  Cohen, Sir Andrew, 95 cod war, 15; al EstWest conflict, Gorbachev Colingw, R G, 5, 6, 1423, 1, 1, 149, 11 Coonia Office, 114 coom as a me, 

2

NDEX colonalsm (cont.) human ghts of, 147 inteaonalzaon of, 102 Commonwealth, 89, 97, 129; el Brsh Empre Brish Commonwealth, 65 as club of rulers that succeeded Brsh, 98 reshad by Bsh decolonzaton, 98 self-detenaton and, 15 vehicle of decolonzaton, 103, 1 constuonal indendence, 32, 35  lso sove statehd Crawford, James, , 108, 1423 CrhJones, Arthur, 93 crcket, 4, 35 ultural relavsm, 1 1 deoloon, 821 Atlanc Charter and,  Balfour Report, 65 lan Congo (re), , 1012 lan thess, 105, 1 Bsh constuonal enneng, 7 Brsh Empre,  7 Colonal velopment and Welfare Acts, 912 colonal tutelag, 93 decline of Euroan pmacy, 82 Lord Durham's Rert (1839), 87 tch East Indes, 82 as enclosur movement, 151 French empre, 82, 1, 10 G denden,  Inda,  teaonal lemay of,   Harold  on, 1, 95 Marg Perham on,  Poug A, 107 (Southe) Rhesa, 1 Sr  (Ceylon),  me g out, 9 Untd States demands fr, 9  Gaulle, Charles, 11, 102, 1 nmark,  velopng counes rd Wod, Northuth gap development; eteaonal development, nteonal development assstan, tonal development law, negave soverety, outh gap dplomacy aossm of, 196 constonal, 8, 35 Machavellian, 8, 35, 165 Sr Alec, 1 East Indes, 

0

dynasc state,  EastWest conflct, 18, 1925  lso orbachev Emmet, Dorothy, 3 empirical statehd, 21, 2, ,   42,  513, 55, 62,  94, 168;  lso jurdcal statehd J  Brerly on, 53 G. Schwarzenrger on, 53 Ertrea, 41 Ethopa, 39, 59, 67 Europe, 59, 1, 62, 65, , 71,  110, 1390, 162 elso Africa Euroan expanson, 5971, 912 the European miracle,  Falk,  17 Famly of aons, 57, 59, 62; el natural law, inteatonal law Charles Alexandrowcz on,  Brtsh Domnons n, 5 Chna ,  Comty of aons, 1, 194 Easte Europe in,  rotus, Hugo, on 57 Hague Peace Conferences 18, 17),  Japan ,   Amecan states in,  Pas Peace Conference,  Turkey in, 623 Unted States n,   Findlandon,  France, 1, 129, 187 F 129, 187 Frnch Empre, 1 assmlaon l,  Frenh Indhna, 82 Fedmann, Wolfgang, 120, 1, 1 Gamba, e, 15, 94,  metaphor of, 4 Lws, 73 General on Taffs and Trade 123 Generald heme of Prens n, 123 nteaonal ve acon and, 1 Most Favourd Naon prnple n, 123 reprty de of, 1 1 1 Gany,    1  Ghana (Gold Cst), 14, 323,    ,  102, 1 Goldsworthy, Davd, 147 Gong, Get, 1 Gorbachev,  , 1, 1, 174, 193;   Sovet Unon gsnost, , 194

INDEX human rights and 45 945 restri  1 Greece  Grous, Hugo  52  57  72 Group of   4 Habsburg Empre 22 24 e als AustoHungarian Empire Hague Peace Conferences  Hailey Lord   9   Hait 67  Hall W. E .  6 Hareaves John  Hasngs Warren  Hinsley F. H   52 Hobs homas  5 69 7 Holland 57  Hull Cordel  human rights  393; see als cition; inteational law negave sovereignty; Amnesty Inteaonal African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 9 as naural rghts 45 authoritaian govements and 7 55 Bern Conference on 73 Peter Calvacoressi citon' and 46 Congress of Vienna on 723 cultural relativism and 4 decolonzaon and 49 59 European Convention 5 555 M. Gorbachev and 45 95 instuonalized demraes and  inteaonal codificaon 445 as inteaonal constutionalism 55 Inteaonal Covenant on Civil and Polical Rights 445 inteaonal law and 45 inteationa relations and 42 as jus gens,  League Mandates Commission and 47 mass media and 45 as natural rights 45 postwar revoluon of 446 refugees and 50 Paul Sieghat on 5 standards and expectations of 4 Universal Declaraon of Human Rights 9 45 40 44 humanitarian awareness 20 47 Kant on 45 59 humanitain organitions 45 idealsm

in inteaonal relations 7 7 in phiosophy 57 India 20 62 Indonesia  insutional te 7 9202 instittionaists 5 inteational affiave action 29 3 35 e als negave sovereignty game affimave action in Canada 323 affirmave action in the United States 323 GA les and 34 loc of 3 Third World states and 3 inteational demcracy 7 inteaion development assistance  28 see al NohSouth gap assymetical relaons in 38 OECD counties and  5 Third World and 6 inteational development law 26 24 see als inteaional law naural law faly of nations B. V.A Ruling on 20 22 Mohammed djaouion 2 Chater of the Economic Rights and Duties of States and 223 demratic tendency of  8 fair trade and 9 ee tade and 9 Wolfgang Friedmann on 20 2 GA and 23 Kabir Khn on 23 nonreciprocity and 3 posive libety and 2 selfdetemination and 2 UN Charter and 22 validity of  inteational justice; e als NothSouth diemma commutative justice 44 7  distibutive jusce 43 7 82 fai bargains versus hard bargains' 32 J. R Lucas on 82 J. S.  on 85 noatve diemma in 83 patealism and 87 theories of 7988 Michael Walzer on 86 inteational laissez faie 27 inteaonal law see als fmily of naons inteational development law natral law inteational leitimacy inteational sciety as a sieas 52 73 83 as a univesias 73 capitulation teaties 62

221

IDEX inteaona law (cont. cession 55 conquest 55 'constuve recognion doctine 61 cuju rego u relgo 152 1% W E Hall on 61 Most Favoured Naon prinple 43 Ter Nardn on 1 ct unt  1, 11 13 reciproty 11 G hwarzenrger on 119 culaizaon of inteaonal law' 75 standard of tion 71, 143 terr nullu 55, 7 'unequal eaty obligations 62 inteonal legimacy; ee lo inteaonal law inteaonal soety Europeans and 16 Non-Europeans and 16 postwar 117 prewar 16 Rex t mrtor n regno uo 51 sea change in 3  inteona liberaism 6 1,   'jurdical equality of al states 55 virtue of small states  Michael Wazer on 22 Wilsonian  Inteaonal Monetary Fund ) agent of recolonization 129 classical liral de of 129 sctural adjusent policy of 129, 136 hird World debt 129 hird World leaders 127 intetiona organizaon 1115 Bedjaoui M on 114 Third World and 1114 nteaonal relations theory classical raonaism 9 39 1, 171-2 classical realism 7, 39, 51, 15, 167-9 classcal revolutionism 9 39 1 contemporary ratonalism 173 contemporary realism 16971 Grotius 1712 Hobs 19, 171 Kant 1 175, 12 Machavelli 15 167 neo-Maxist sucturalsm 179 Marn Wight on 1, 167, 171 world order perspecve 175 inteonal society 9; elo inteaonal lema inteaonal law conseasm of 1 constuonal levelling of 17



diplomac agnoscsm and 196 dualism of 5455 empowerment and 21 enfanchisment n 21, 17 191 new positive 226, 31 as  39, 173, 1, 13 hid World Radicalization of 114 1 as un 39 1, 173, 175, 1 nteaonal tusteeshp 15 32 71 Brish poical thought and  Colonial Development and Welfare Acts 923 General Act of rln Conference 92 League Covenant on 73 League Permanent Mandates Comission  Lord Lugard on 71 UN Charter on 74, 76 UN Inteaonal steeship System 73 Iran (Persia 59 Israel 169 James Alan 32 Japan 39 55, 59  61  3 129, 195 Jefferson homas  Jenks C Wilfred 147 Jennings Si W Ivor 147 juridical statehood 21, 234  53, ; ee lo empirical steho jurisprudence 3 Kahn Kabir 123 Kant Immanuel 145 159 1 175, 12 Kelsen Hans  tin America 61  1 1293 139 Law of Nations ee nteaonal law natural law family of natons League of Naons 15, , 55  Mandates 73 76 92 147 League of Naons Covenant 73, 75, 1 Lebanon 24 Lee J  M  Liria 39, 59 67 Lndey M F 7 71 Lindsay A D 6 Lloyd George David 75 Locke John 172 Lucas J R. 1312, 12 Lugad S Fedeck Later Lord) 71 and 'he Dual Mandate  Lumumba Paice 11 Lyon Peter  Lyttelton Olver 93 MacDonald Malcolm  92 McEwen A C 7 Machiavell Nccolo 51, 1-5, 167

INDX Macmillan Harold 9 1 95 Maitland F W .  9 Mali 11 153 Marshal Plan 113  Karl 29 1 Masts 2 17 Mazi  152 Menies Rort 1 mio-states 15 17 95 Middle East 125 169 Mill John Stuat  27  1 75 7 162 15 Miller J D B. 17 Minh Ho Chi  modetion theory 1 Morgenthau Hans J     165 171 Morrison Herrt 93 Mortmer Rort  Mulnaonal Corporaons (MNCs) and negave sovereity 1769 Nardin Terry  natural law; e  nteaonal law fmily of naons Charles Aexandrowicz on 57 7 Groan law of naons 31 Grous on 57 old natural law reme  negave lirty; ee  posive lirty I  Berlin on 27 definion of 11 27 J. S. Mill on 27 negave and posive sovereignty gap tween 31 negative sovereignty 1 e decolonizon human rights negave lty noninteenon sef-determnation absolute conditon of 29 assumpons n hrd World debt relief 1 classical inteatonal theo and 1 decolonization and 25  97 17- definion of 27 de of 25 nteatonal society and  mulnaonal corporaons and 1769 necessity of  11 negave sovereignty game 26 9  1; e so negave sovereignty posive sovereignty game rules conseave bias of 191 196 development entlements and  future of 1 orbachev revoluon nd 15 human rights and , 157 192 as nteaonal safety net  as nteaonal ratonalism 2 lack of nstutional alteaves to 19 2

noninteenon and 192 seldeteminaon and  Nehru Jawaharlal 13 New uinea 1 New Inteaonal Economc Order (NIEO) 115 11 1212 131 1 21 Charter of the Economic Rights and ues of States and 122- disibuve jusce and 131 Third World debt and 131  Generl Asmbly clraon on 121 New Zeand 13 Newly Indusg Counies (NICs)  11 19 Nigera  149 Nkrumah Kwame 1 noninteenon e  negave sovereity negave veity game classica rights of  foundaon of inteonal sety 192 inteaonal  6 J S. Mil on  15 nomave vbulary of 7 pivotl rule upholding quasistes 192 Michael Wlzer on 17 Nordic countries 129 NorthSouth dilemma 1 13; e so inteaonal jusce conflicng concepons of 137 GA and 136  and 136 nteaonal development assistance and 137- inteaonal jusce and 18 hird World debt and 121 NorthSouth gap 119 21 112 176 ee  Thrd World Brandt Report on 117 decolonion and 1 1111 moral unacceptability of 1 1 1 negave sovereignty and 1 1 7 Pearson Report on 1 1 7 World Bank ndicators of 1 1  Oakeshott Michael 5  39 173 2 Oceana 61 71  97 115 Orgnization for Economic Cooperaon and Development (OECD) 1232 191 Ottoman Empre 22 24 62 65 e urkey Paris Peace Conference ( 1919) 75 Patesm e nteaonal jusce nteaona trusteeship North­ South dilemma



NDEX Peason Leste 1 117 Peez Calos Anes 127 Peham age 15 7   4  Plenatz ohn   Polan 37  polical gs  Pougal  102 Potuguese Afica 107 posive lity 121 e al negative lty I  lin on 2 an classical alism  efinion of 11 2 asm on 2 posive soveeignty 1   107 117 lW1 126 1 eal negative soveeignty ohn Ausn efinon of 53 . Cawfo on  efintion of 2  obs on  1 inteaonal eteat fom 1  Kelsenon  elave concept of 2 G Schwazenge on 2 E Vattel on  posive soveeiy game   171 e al negave soveeity game posive soveeignty ules consttuve les of 35 an League of Naons  playes  Pufenof Samuel 52 pygmy sates  Quec Povnce of 32 Repot of the Commssion on Inteaonal veopment (Peason Ret) 117 eal Nouh gap Repot of the Inepenent Commission on Inteaonal Development Issues ant Repo) 117 e al Noth­ uth gap Repubic of Vieam  Robnson ames 12 Refele Davi 126 Roling  V A. 120 123 ules  al negative soveeity game posive soveeignty game constutive 5 instmental  lawyes on 3 poiical sciensts on 3 Russian Empie 5  Ryle Gil 33 hatthneie E. E   5



Schwazenge Geog 2 53 75 11 selfeteminaon 16 77 e al negave soveeignty Chales Aleanowicz on  ohamme jaoui on 121 14 Ian ownlie on 151 categocal impeave  75 76 1 1 classic concept of 77 conseative ight  ames Cawfo on 10 Chales e Gaulle on 10 ethnonatonaies an 412 7 154 1 genea pess of 26 iniviual 2 as jus cos 3 151 League Covenant on  7  azi on 152  S ill on 75 162 naona 28 natual law an 7 posiive law an 7 as aal soveeigny 1523 Rhoesian Unilateal Declaaon f Inepenence an 107 as soveeign ight  151 Thi Wol concepon of 1512 UN Chate on 41 77 151 UN Resolutions on 7 an Wight on 7 1512 selfgoveent 114 e al ecolonzaon selfeteminaton ish constuonal loc of  . S ill on 7 agey Peham on  Senegal 1 Siegha Paul 145 Sea Leone  Singapoe 135 Smith Ian 107 South Afica 17 102 152 161 16 17 1 Southe Rhesia oesia) 7 1 152 soveeign stateh  al constuional inepenence ohn Ausn on 53 afactual chaacte of 7 efinion of 32 empical gouns of  Chales e aulle on 11 6 of  legal oe of  soveeignty plus 31  viet Union 15 20  45 105 16 174 15 e al Gobachev Spain 

NDEX Si  (Ceylon), 14, sucturalism, 2, 1 Sudan, 126 Sukao, Achmed, 

,

161

tao subjects in Third World studies, 10 1 161 191, 197 202

Third World 1 2; e al North-South gap challenge to posive sovereignty de, 114 creditwothiness, 125 debt csis, 1231 'decapion of, 116 definion of 2 1 development conces of, 124 oreign ad concepon of, 112 frozen polical map of, 24 image of, 2 14 inteaonal affiave acon, 131-5 Toure, kou, 1 Treaty of Pas (156) and Turkey, 62 Tucker, Roert  Turkey, 55 61 62-3 see al Ottoman Empire Uganda, 149 underdeveloped countes;  Thd World, NorthSouth gap United Naons claraon Regarding Nonf­ Goveing Tertoies, 74 Declaraon on ranng of Independence,  General Assembly, 74, 102 174 Inteaonal Tsteeshp System,  memrship, 15 Secuty Council,  174 Third Word stes and, 144 174 Tusteeship, 74 92 United Naons Charter, 16 41, 74 76

United States, 15 39   7  129-31 1323 135 1, 169, 1945 197

Brown versus rd of Educaon (19) 74

Civ Rights Act (19), 74 on decolonization,  Universal Declaraon of Human Rights, 19,  140 144 value udgements, 910 values egalitarian and demrac, 26 inteaonal, 910 van Bilsen, A. A. J .  1012 Vatte, Emmech, 3 Venezuela, 127 Vietnam,  169 Walzer, Michael on intetional lraism, 2 202 on noninteention, 1 17 warfare, assical, 37 Watson, Adam,   Wight,    51, , 70 114 151, 1, 167 171

Wilrforce, William, 145 Wiliams,  Eic, 95 Wilson, Harold, 1 Wlson, Wrow, 75 Wolfers, Aold, 1 Wod Bank, 20 19 economic classificaon of countries, 115

President of (19) 113  t Rt 19 world league tables, 19 Wosley, Peter, 1 Young, Crawford, 102 Yugoslavia, 

105, 121 151

on decolonzaon, 1023, 105, 107

Zambia, 127 149



AMBRDGE DE N NERNANAL RELAN 21

ROGER BUCKLEY

UJn ince diomc 19451990 20

19

nd E R N ST-OTTO C Z E M P I E L eds Goence ithout oement order nd chne in ord oitics

JAMES N . ROSENAU

M I C H A E L N I C H O LS O N

Rtionit nd the nsis o intetion conflict 18

nd SUSAN Ri sttes ri firms J O H N STOPFORD

STRA N G E

Compeiion for world marke shares 17

16

T E R R Y N A R D I N nd DAVID R M A P E L eds. rditions o intetion ethics CHARLES  DORAN

stems in crisis

New imperaies of hih poliics a cenurys end 15

DEON G ELDENHUYS

Isoted sttes  comrtie nsis 14

KALEVI J  H O LST!

Pece nd r ed conflicts nd intetion order 16481989 13

SAKI DOCKRILL

Britins oic or West Gen rement 1951955 12

R O B E RT H  J A C K S O N

usisttes soereint intetion retions nd the hird Word 11

nd J O H N BARRATT outh Arics orein oic JAMES BARBER

e search for saus and securiy 1941988 10

JAMES MAYALL

Ntionism nd intetion societ 9

WILLIAM BLOOM

Person identit, ntion identit nd intetion retions 8

Z E E V MAOZ

Ntion choices nd intetion rocesses 7

IAN CLARK

he hierrch o sttes

efo and resisance in he ineaiona orer 6

HIDEMI SUGANAMI

e domestic no nd ord order rooss

AMBRDE DIE IN INERNAINAL RELAIN 5

STE P H E N G I L L

ericn heeony n he rierl Coission 4

M  C H A E L C P U G H

he NZUS crisis nucer visiin n eerrence 3

M  C H A E L N I C H O LS O N

For heories in ineion reions 2

F R  E D R  C H  KRAT O C H W  L

ules, nos, n ecisions

On h ondons o praa and a rasonn n naona raons and doms aars 1

M  L E S L. C R O B E R T S O N

Sovie policy owrs pn

n anayss o rnds n h 170s and 1 80s